State Terrorism and Neoliberalism

The North in the South

Ruth Blakeley

State Terrorism and Neoliberalism

This book explores the complicity of democratic states from the Global North in state terrorism in the Global South. It evaluates the relationship between the use of state terrorism by Northern liberal democracies and efforts by those states to further incorporate the South into the global political economy and to entrench neoliberalism.

Most scholarship on terrorism tends to ignore state terrorism by Northern democracies, focusing instead on terrorist threats to Northern interests from illiberal actors. The book accounts for the absence of Northern state terrorism from terrorism studies, and provides a detailed conceptualisation of state terrorism in relation to other forms of state violence. The book explores state terrorism as used by European and early American imperialists to secure territory, to coerce slave and forced wage labour, and to defeat national liberation movements during the process of decolonisation. It examines the use of state terrorism by the US throughout the Cold War to defeat political movements that would threaten US elite interests. Finally, it assesses the practices of Northern liberal democratic states in the 'War on Terror' and shows that many Northern liberal democracies have been active in state terrorism, including through extraordinary rendition.

This book will be of much interest to students of critical terrorism studies, security studies, South American politics, US foreign policy and IR in general.

Ruth Blakeley is a lecturer in International Relations at the University of Kent. She holds a PhD in International Relations from the University of Bristol.

Critical terrorism studies

Series Editors: Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth and Jeroen Gunning
University of Wales, Aberystwyth, UK

This book series will publish rigorous and innovative studies on all aspects of terrorism, counter-terrorism and state terror. It seeks to advance a new generation of thinking on traditional subjects, investigate topics frequently overlooked in orthodox accounts of terrorism. Books in this series will typically adopt approaches informed by critical-normative theory, post-positivist methodologies and non-Western perspectives, as well as rigorous and reflective orthodox terrorism studies.

Terrorism and the Politics of Response
Edited by Angharad Closs Stephens and Nick Vaughan-Williams

Critical Terrorism Studies
Framing a new research agenda
Edited by Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth and Jeroen Gunning

The De-Radicalization of Jihadists
Transforming armed Islamist movements
Omar Ashour

State Terrorism and Neoliberalism
The North in the South
Ruth Blakeley

State Terrorism and Neoliberalism

The North in the South

Ruth Blakeley

For Stephen, my inspiration

Contents

Acknowledgements

Abbreviations

AI	Amnesty International
ARENA	Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (Nationalist Republican Alliance – political party, El Salvador)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIP	Centre for International Policy
CoE	Council of Europe
DNII	Dirección Nacional de Información e Inteligencia (Paraguayan Intelligence Agency)
DoD	US Department of Defence
DoS	US Department of State
DSCA	US Defence Security Cooperation Agency
EU	European Union
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)
FBI	US Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCO	UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FMF	US Foreign Military Financing
FMLN	Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional (Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation – political party, El Salvador)
FMS	US Foreign Military Sales
FOIA	US Freedom of Information Act
FRAPH	Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti
FTAA	Free Trade Agreement for the Americas
GAO	US Government Accountability Office (formerly Government Accounting Office)
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IHRL	International Human Rights Law
IMET	International Military Education and Training
IMF	International Monetary Fund

IPU	Inter-Parliamentary Union
IR	International Relations
MNF-I	Multi-National Force (Iraq)
MoD	UK Ministry of Defence
MTTs	Mobile Training Teams
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSA	National Security Archive
NSS	US National Security Strategy
ONUSAL	UN Observer Mission to El Salvador
PIC	Province Interrogation Centre (Vietnam)
PIL	Public Interest Lawyers
PKI	Indonesian Communist Party
SISMI	Security Intelligence Services (Italy)
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USAID	US Agency for International Development
VCI	Vietcong Infrastructure
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organisation

1   Introduction

State terrorism is one of a number of coercive tools that have regularly featured in the foreign policy practices of liberal democratic states from the North. State terrorism should be understood as a threat or act of violence by agents of the state that is intended to induce extreme fear in a target audience, so that they are forced to consider changing their behaviour in some way. Many examples of state terrorism are explored in this study. One such example is the disappearance of civilians at the hands of the state. Disappearances are a key tool of state terrorism, and were used widely by numerous Latin American states during the Cold War; they are designed to terrorise a target group through the kidnap of an individual. Relatives are rarely notified of the whereabouts of the victim, resulting in extreme anxiety about their fate. A wider audience is also targeted through these acts, since colleagues and other acquaintances of the victim are both anxious about the victim's whereabouts, and fearful that they may be the next victim. Yet in mainstream policy, media and academic circles, terrorism tends to be understood as the targeting of the members or interests of liberal democratic states largely located in the North by fanatical groups which are supplied and controlled by 'rogue' states or elements, usually located in the South. This is only partially accurate. It is the case that non-state groups have carried out attacks against the people and property of Northern liberal democracies, and the attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon on 11 September 2001 by Al-Qaida were the most devastating against Northern targets by such a group. Non-state terrorist organisations have also enjoyed varying levels of backing from some governments. The condemnation of such attacks and of state support for them is appropriate and necessary. But far less attention is given to the terror perpetrated by states, particularly liberal democratic ones. State violence results in far more deaths than non-state terrorism does. An estimated 170–200 million civilian deaths were caused by state-instigated mass murder, forcible starvations and genocide in the twentieth century alone (Rumell 1994). Many forms of state violence, including mass murder and genocide, involve terrorising large sectors of the population. While deaths by terrorist groups account for, on average, a few hundred per year, in the last two decades, 300,000 people have been 'disappeared' by state agents worldwide (Sluka 2000a). Despite this, much public debate on terrorism tends to ignore state terrorism, especially state terrorism by

Northern liberal democratic states, with most politicians, journalists and acade-
mics only showing an interest in state terrorism by 'rogue states' or non-demo-
cratic authoritarian regimes. Even scholarship on state violence by repressive
regimes tends not to define such violence as state terrorism, as I will show. Con-
ventional assumptions about who the main perpetrators of such violence are fail
to tell the full story about who is culpable, meaning many acts of terror occur
with impunity.

The reality is that for centuries Northern states have condoned and used terror-
ism, along with other forms of repression, against tens of thousands of citizens in
the South. For an act to constitute state terrorism, as I discuss in more detail in
Chapter 2, the following elements must be present: a deliberate act of violence
against individuals that the state has a duty to protect, or a threat of such an act if a
climate of fear has already been established through preceding acts of state viol-
ence; the act is perpetrated by actors on behalf of or in conjunction with the state,
including paramilitaries and private security agents; the act or threat of violence is
intended to induce extreme fear in some target observers who identify with the
victim; and the target audience is forced to consider changing their behaviour in
some way. These elements are drawn from the core characteristics that are
common to numerous definitions of terrorism, developed over the years by terror-
ism scholars. As I will show in Chapter 2, existing definitions of terrorism do not
in any way preclude states as perpetrators of terrorism. It is the selective applica-
tion of those definitions that has led to state terrorism by liberal democratic states
being greatly ignored. There are a number of difficulties associated with identify-
ing state terrorism, and these relate primarily to questions of agency and motive. I
explore these challenges in more detail in Chapter 2. Despite these challenges it is
nevertheless the case that acts by states can and do fit the definition of terrorism.

The purpose of this study is to explore the use of state terrorism by liberal
democratic states from the North in the South. The states to which I am referring
are states that tend to identify themselves with each other based on similar political
systems, in which it is claimed that the rights of the individual are upheld within a
democratic system, and where economics are based on free market principles.
These states tend to be relatively well off and are largely situated in the Northern
hemisphere, with the exception of Australia and New Zealand. Recently within IR,
the term 'North' has been used to describe this grouping of states. The terms
'North' and 'South' were first adopted by the Brandt Commission to move away
from notions of East and West which became redundant with the end of the Cold
War. As the Commission argued, 'in general terms, and although neither is a
uniform or permanent grouping, "North" and "South" are broadly synonymous
with "rich" and "poor", "developed" and "developing"' (Brandt Commission
1990: 31). The terms 'Global North' and 'Global South' have been deployed to go
beyond a simple geographical dichotomy between the generally rich Northern
hemisphere and the generally poor Southern hemisphere, and beyond a state-
centric approach that excludes class differences from our conceptions of the varia-
tions within and between states, regions and hemispheres (Sklair 2002).
Appreciating the importance of the terms 'Global North' and 'Global South' as a

means of denoting those variations that transcend state boundaries, this study is nevertheless concerned with state terrorism by Northern states in Southern states. It is not looking at state terrorism by Northern liberal democratic states against the populations of the suburbs of Paris, or British inner-cities, for example. There are, as I will show, cases in which state terrorism has been used by elites in Southern states against sectors of the population, as was the case in the Latin American dictatorships during the Cold War, and in many of those cases, Latin American elites enjoyed the support of their liberal democratic allies in the North, most notably, the US. In such instances, we might refer to state terrorism by the Global North in the South, since Northern and Southern elites shared common objectives and collaborated in specific activities to achieve those objectives. Primarily, however, this work explores the role played by Northern states in using and sponsoring state terrorism in the South, so the study adopts the terms 'North' and 'South' rather than 'Global North' and 'Global South' throughout. I will nevertheless show where Northern liberal democratic states were collaborating with or sponsoring elites in the South in the use of state terrorism.

Not all liberal democratic states have used and sponsored state terrorism. As Peter Lawler has argued, certain middle-power liberal democracies such as New Zealand, Sweden, Canada, Norway and Finland, among others, have never officially sanctioned repression overseas. Their foreign policies have tended to reflect a commitment to a humane internationalism which differs markedly from 'the muscular militarism' most recently exercised in the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq (Lawler 2005: 428–36). This is not to say that these states do not benefit from the repressive practices of the great powers. Their incorporation into the global political economy means that their capitalist elites have access to the resources and markets of the South – access which has often been secured through the repression meted out by other powerful Northern states. Furthermore, the widespread involvement of many European states in the policy of extraordinary rendition in the 'War on Terror', as discussed in Chapter 6, is indicative of the fact that even middle-income countries not renowned for using or sponsoring state terrorism may nevertheless be complicit. Among the Northern liberal democracies, the historical record shows that it is the great powers with colonial legacies, for example Britain and France, and more recently the US, that have been directly responsible for the regular use of state terrorism. Moreover, in some senses the US, as the sole remaining superpower, is a unique type of actor that differs not just from small and middle-power liberal democracies but also from the other powerful liberal democratic states. Its military reach is unmatched, as is its power within the global capitalist system, and, as this study will show, so is its use of state terrorism in the South, although this is frequently with the support and involvement of other liberal democratic states.

This study's rationale lies in the observation that works on terrorism have proliferated since 9/11, but that the use of state terrorism by liberal democratic states in the North continues to be largely absent from IR, particularly the sub-field of terrorism studies, as well as from other disciplines in the social sciences including sociology, criminology and anthropology (Blakeley 2008: 151–65). There is

some debate about whether we can speak of a field of terrorism studies, with scholars such as John Horgan doubting its existence as a discrete field, and others, including Richard Jackson and Sam Raphael, arguing that a core of art-icles, books and authors can be said to constitute an emerging terrorism studies field (Jackson 2009, forthcoming; Raphael 2009, forthcoming). This argument is strengthened by a review of the growing number of undergraduate and postgradu-ate courses and modules on terrorism within British IR academia (Gunning 2007; Jackson 2007). Edward Herman (1985), Michael Stohl and George Lopez (1986) and Alexander George (1991) sought to address the absence of state terrorism from debate years ago through their exploration of the use of state terrorism by Western powers during the Cold War. But few IR scholars have taken up the challenge since then, and there has been no update of Herman and George's work in light of shifts in international relations since the end of the Cold War, or the US-led 'War on Terror'. Instead works that view terrorism as a kind of asymmet-ric warfare waged against liberal democratic states have proliferated. Terrorism, as this work will show, is also a weapon of the strong. Studies have focused on Al-Qaida and Islamic terrorism, US and UK counter-terror efforts, suicide bomb-ings, the risks of terrorist groups acquiring weapons of mass destruction, cyber-terrorism and the financing of terrorism (Bascio 2007; Cordesman 2002; Davis 2002; Ehrenfeld 2003; Gunaratna 2002; Jenkins 2002; Lewis 2004; Reuter 2004; Verton 2003). The assumption is that terrorism poses a serious threat to liberal democratic states and, therefore, comprehensive counter-terrorism efforts by the state are necessary and legitimate. As I will show in subsequent chapters, such responses to supposed terrorist threats have a number of important precedents in history, most notably the actions of the French against the Algerians in the 1950s and 1960s, and of the US in its counterinsurgency activities in Indochina and Latin America during the Cold War.

The main argument of the book is that Northern liberal democratic states have frequently used state terrorism, along with other forms of repression, in pursuit of their foreign policy objectives, despite their frequent claims to the contrary and their public support for war against 'terrorism'. The book provides a detailed history of Northern state terrorism, within the context of the foreign policy objectives of those states and the strategies they use to achieve them, dating back to the European colonial era, through to the practices of the US and its allies in the 'War on Terror'. It demonstrates a continuity in the foreign pol-icies of formerly colonial powers, now Northern liberal democratic states, which is to ensure access to and dominance of resources and markets in the South. I show that these objectives have been pursued through two main strategies. The first is the use of coercion, understood as the use of force to compel people to act in a particular way, through threats, intimidation or violence. State terrorism is a form of coercion which, as I will show in Chapter 2, involves the use of violence against an individual or group to alter the behaviour of a wider target audience than the direct victim. The second strategy is legitimation, which involves secur-ing popular endorsement for the political and economic systems which Northern liberal democracies seek to impose in the states in which they intervene. Legiti-

mation involves establishing democracy and seeking to secure popular endorsement for neoliberalism, although passive acquiescence will suffice, in order to ensure access to resources and markets in the South, primarily for elites (Herring and Rangwala 2006).

Neoliberalism involves dismantling the apparatus of mercantilist protection operated at state level, the opening up of previously closed economies to the forces of economic competition, macroeconomic discipline, globalised rather than national economics, and foreign direct investment. At the heart of neoliberalism as an abstract principle is the notion that markets should solve all economic problems but, in practice, this has not meant dispensing with the state. Indeed, neoliberalism requires the state. The main policies that together constituted the neoliberal economic model championed by policymakers for the development of the Latin American economies from the 1950s onwards were identified by John Williamson, who coined the phrase the Washington Consensus in 1989 to describe them. The policies that Williamson identified were: cutting budget deficits; cutting subsidies but spending on education, health and infrastructure; limiting the amount of tax paid as income increases, but taxing many activities; ensuring interest rates are determined by markets and are slightly higher than inflation, to discourage capitalist flight; ensuring competitive exchange rates to help exports; encouraging trade liberalisation through more open markets and reduced subsidies; foreign direct investment liberalisation (ensuring more access for foreign investment in economic activity other than markets); privatisation, which involves selling state-owned assets and services; deregulation, meaning reducing controls on business activity; and securing property rights (Williamson 2004a). I am in no way suggesting that Williamson intended state terrorism to be used as a means of enforcing these policies, but, as this study will show, state terrorism has proved functional for many of them, and has been used widely to this end.

Neoliberalism is not simply an ideology, but also a strategy for ensuring the globalisation of the political economy along specific lines. It has therefore evolved into a number of historically distinctive forms in which greater and lesser emphasis has been placed on each of the policies identified by Williamson. Adam Tickell and Jamie Peck identify three phases of neoliberalism, which they refer to as proto-neoliberalism, roll-back neoliberalism and roll-out neoliberalism. Proto-neoliberalism constitutes the incipient phase up until the late 1970s, during which key figures such as Milton Friedman were first critiquing Keynesian orthodoxy, and initial attempts were made to begin implementing neoliberal policies in Chile, in cooperation with Augusto Pinochet, by the Chicago Boys – students at the Chicago Business School under Friedman, many of them members of Chile's elite. Roll-back neoliberalism involved the dismantling of Keynesian welfare institutions in the 1980s under the governments of President Reagan in the US and Prime Minister Thatcher in the UK. Considerable efforts were made to destroy Keynesian practices, through extensive deregulation and privatisation. During this period, Structural Adjustment Policies were implemented by states in the South as required by the IFIs, and any aid was conditional on their implementation. They involved the granting of loans with certain conditionalities relating to the adoption of free

market principles. This laid the ground for roll-out neoliberalism from the late 1980s, where efforts were made to implement these policies more widely through the building of institutions to ensure the neoliberalisation of economies. Such efforts were championed in particular by President Clinton, Prime Minister Blair and Chancellor Schroeder. It was during this phase that neoliberalism was met with anti-globalisation protests which, among other things, were critical of the effects of neoliberalism on populations in the South (Tickell and Peck 2003: 168–9).

Joseph Stiglitz, former chief economist at the World Bank, led the way in critiquing the Washington Consensus particularly in relation to the latter two phases of neoliberalism, because of what he referred to as the massive inequalities between the North and South. His critique was the foundation for what became known as the post-Washington Consensus. Stiglitz advocated increased financial regulation by the state, competition policy, investments in human capital and policies to facilitate the transfer of technology (Stiglitz 1998). He thus promoted policies that would increase the capacity of poorer states to compete. As I show in Chapter 3, he was particularly critical of trade agreements that disproportionately favoured the interests of rich states over those of the poor. In response, Williamson argued that there are three understandings of the Washington Consensus: his own as set out in the ten policies he identified; the package of measures that were actually taken by what he refers to as 'official Washington', meaning the IFIs and US state; and the version that critics have presented, namely, that the Washington Consensus was to be imposed. Williamson argues he neither advocated 'official Washington's' measures, nor advocated that the Washington Consensus be simply imposed. He also argued that insufficient measures had been taken to improve income distribution in areas such as health and education and that, if used properly, states could reform taxation systems to improve this in future (Williamson 2004b). There has been some reform of the practices of the IFIs in light of these critiques, explored by Narcis Serra and Joseph Stiglitz (2008), among others, but it is not yet clear what impact this is having on the massive disparities in wealth between rich and poor states.

It is also too soon to say what the full impact of the 2008 global economic crisis will have on neoliberalism and, in turn, how this will affect the policies of the IFIs in the economic reform of poorer states. We witnessed in the latter half of 2008 the massive injection of capital by numerous states to prop up failing banks and other financial institutions, practices that are far removed from the minimal state principle at the heart of neoliberalism. This does not, however, necessarily signal an outright rejection of neoliberalism. Indeed, its defendants are still championing many of the policies identified by Williamson. It may simply be that neoliberalism is entering a new phase. Time will tell whether and how this will affect efforts by the rich North to fashion economies in the South.

This study is intended to explore the relationship between state terrorism and neoliberalism. Specifically, it will examine the extent to which state terrorism has been used as a tool of foreign policy to open up the South for exploitation by Northern elites. This includes examining the use of state terrorism by early European and American imperialists, by European colonial powers as they attempted

to defeat national liberation movements, by the US during the Cold War to defeat political movements that threatened elite interests, and by the US and its liberal democratic allies in the post-Cold War period and in the 'War on Terror'. It will pay close attention to the use of state terrorism alongside efforts to entrench neoliberalism in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. In the book's conclusion, I will return to the question of the evolution of neoliberalism and will attempt to evaluate what the relationship has been between the use of state terrorism by liberal democratic states from the North and the development of neoliberalism. In other words, I will address the question of whether the manner in which state terrorism has been used by these states has altered during each of the phases of neoliberalism identified by Tickell and Peck.

Coercion dominated the colonial practices of the European powers, both during the process of colonisation and as part of efforts to maintain control over conquered territories, as well as early American imperialism. There is a large body of literature which explores the nature of colonialism. This literature, as well as the post-colonial literature, contains accounts of the use of terror by colonial powers and their representatives. Notable works are those by Hannah Arendt (1966) and Franz Fanon ([1961] 1967). More recent texts that provide an informative overview include work by Ian Beckett (2001), Caroline Elkins (2005) and Jonathan Barker (2003). Coercion was also the dominant means by which the US established control in the South during the Cold War, often with the support of allies from the North as well as local elites in the South. This involved extensive campaigns of state terrorism by the US and its allies. By contrast, since the end of the Cold War, legitimation efforts have been the preferred means through which to secure access to and control of resources and markets in the South. Coercion, including state terrorism, is resorted to by Northern liberal democratic states, particularly where processes of legitimation are deemed unlikely to prove successful in achieving their goals. This has been the case in tacit support by the US of coups d'état in Haiti since the end of the Cold War, and the US-led invasions of Afghanistan following 9/11 and Iraq in 2003, as I show in Chapters 5 and 6.

These two strategies – coercion and legitimation – are drawn from Gramscian conceptions of state power. For Gramsci, two major superstructural levels exist within the state, referred to as civil society, which constitutes the collection of 'organisms commonly called "private"', such as political parties, trade unions, political groups, social groups and the media, and political society, that which constitutes the state apparatus, referred to conventionally as 'the state' (Gramsci 1971 [1929–35]: 12). In order for a class to dominate the state, it must have control over both levels. This is achieved, according to Gramsci, when ' "spontaneous" consent [is] given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group' (Gramsci 1971 [1929–35]: 12). This is the result of the prestige which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function within capitalist production. Control over the state apparatus is also needed because it is this 'which "legally" enforces discipline on those groups who do not "consent"', through coercion

(Gramsci 1971 [1929–35]: 12). Consensual domination does not mean the absence of coercion, because dominance, or hegemony, in Gramsci's words, is consensus protected by the armour of coercion. Even in liberal democratic societies therefore, political systems will always combine coercive and consensual elements (Robinson 1996: 22).

This concept can also be applied to international relations, particularly relations between the North and South. The dominant class and the state apparatuses they manage have tried to maintain control over populations in the South through coercion, such as colonial control, or more commonly in the case of US elites, through invasions, coups and support for authoritarian regimes (Robinson 1996: 24). But they have also attempted to maintain control through foreign policy initiatives intended to bring about spontaneous consent through the political and ideological incorporation of subordinate groups (legitimation), particularly since the end of the Cold War (Robinson 1996: 24). Indeed, as Robert Cox argued in the 1980s, the US was hegemonic throughout the Cold War, since:

> It commanded a wide measure of consent among states outside the Soviet sphere and was able to provide sufficient benefits to the associated and subordinate elements in order to maintain their acquiescence. Of course, consent wore thin as one approached the periphery where the element of force was always apparent, and it was in the periphery that the challenge to the imperial system first became manifest.
>
> (Cox 1986: 229–30)

These strategies of consent and coercion are not mutually exclusive, therefore, but intertwined, just as they are within the state. As I will show in subsequent chapters, the foreign policy of powerful liberal democratic states from the North, and the US in particular, has been dominated by one or other of these strategies at different times, but this is not to say that they operate independently. Indeed, whereas US strategy in Western Europe since the end of the Second World War has tended to be characterised by legitimation, US policy in the South has been dominated by coercive strategies. Nevertheless, even where coercive strategies have dominated, they are accompanied by legitimation efforts, particularly securing consensus among local populations for US activities. This study will help develop a more comprehensive understanding of how state terrorism, as one of a number of coercive tools, has been used by liberal democratic states, alongside consensual strategies.

In this introductory chapter I explore the reasons why state terrorism by liberal democracies from the North is marginalised within IR scholarship, as well as within other social sciences disciplines, and within most public debate. Leonard Weinberg and William Lee Eubank have correctly noted that work on repression, ethnic cleansing, genocide and authoritarianism in Stalin's Russia, Mao's China, Pol Pot's Cambodia and in Communist regimes in Eastern Europe is extensive (2008: 191). Yet within the discourses of research on 'terrorism', and within the terrorism studies field, such repression tends not to be studied as 'state terrorism',

as Richard Jackson shows (Jackson 2009, forthcoming). Furthermore, the sponsorship of terrorism by liberal democratic states from the North in the South is rarely studied, even though such states have used and sponsored state terrorism widely. This is a considerable gap in the discipline, particularly as state terrorism is far more destructive of human life than non-state terrorism. There are multiple and complex reasons why scholars across the social sciences have instead chosen to explore terrorism committed by non-state actors or so-called 'rogue states'. The term 'rogue states' has been used as a tool of propaganda by leaders of liberal democratic states to refer to states it considers to be hostile. However, as has been argued by scholars including Noam Chomsky (2004) and Eric Herring (2000), and as I will show, the term could also be used to describe the US, because of its widespread sponsorship of state terrorism.

The reasons why scholars tend to focus on terrorism by non-state actors or specific 'rogue states' can be divided into two categories: methodological and motivational. The combination of these reasons has been a powerful force in shaping the parameters of debate, resulting in state terrorism by liberal democratic states being almost completely absent from scholarship within the social sciences. I show that even those works which have sought to incorporate Northern state terrorism into debate in some respects fall short, since they fail to offer a detailed account of the historical use and sponsorship of terrorism by Northern states in relation to their foreign policy objectives, and also fail to establish a sophisticated theoretical basis for their arguments. As a consequence, the dominant discourse on terrorism, by ignoring state terrorism, frequently serves to legitimate the foreign policy practices of Northern liberal democracies. This analysis lays the ground for the subsequent chapters, which conceptualise state terrorism in terms of the forms it takes and the functions it serves, and contextualise state terrorism by the Northern powers in relation to their foreign policy objectives and strategies, before providing a detailed account of Northern state terrorism since European colonialism.

Accounting for the absence of state terrorism

Methodology

There are certain peculiarities within each of the social science disciplines that have contributed to the marginalisation of state terrorism. These relate to whether and how attempts are made to define terrorism and state terrorism, and how those definitions are then applied, if at all. Very few sociologists have studied state terrorism, primarily because there has been little work within sociology on terrorism more broadly (Gibbs 1989; Turk 2004). Because labelling acts as terrorism promotes condemnation of the actors involved, definitions of terrorism, Jack Gibbs (1989: 329–30) argues, may reflect political or ideological bias. Conceptualising terrorism therefore requires an assessment of competing definitions in relation to specific problems associated with terrorism, including whether the state can be a perpetrator of terrorism. Yet there has been a general

indifference on the part of most sociologists to conceptualising terrorism. This, according to Gibbs, results from an insistence within sociology that a distinction should be maintained between substantive theory and conceptual analysis. This has caused many sociologists to privilege theory over the resolution of conceptual problems. Gibbs argues that, instead, these should go hand-in-hand, because detailed conceptualisations would enable the development of a definition of terrorism that was empirically applicable, and this in turn could result in the development of a sophisticated theory of terrorism. Over 15 years after Gibbs set out his agenda for further research on terrorism within sociology, Austin Turk (2004) echoed this call. An article exploring the concept of terrorism, and its use and misuse as a term in the 'War on Terror', was published in 2004 by sociologist Charles Tilly in *Sociological Theory*. He made a strong case for ensuring that terrorism by states is not ignored (Tilly 2004). This may encourage further consideration in the discipline of the concept of terrorism, since it challenges approaches in policy and academic circles that reduce it only to non-state terrorism.

There has also been a lack of engagement with the question of state terrorism by liberal democratic states within criminology, a discipline born out of sociology. While this may in part be due to the lack of will to conceptualise terrorism, as in sociology, it also has to do with the purpose of the discipline itself, which is to study crime. It is the state itself that defines what is criminal, so the parameters of study for the discipline are therefore set by the state – criminologists study what the state has determined is criminal (Green and Ward 2004: 1; 2005: 432). Indeed, as international law scholarship shows us, states themselves have been very reluctant to have state terrorism defined as a separate category. As Tal Becker indicates, during the Cold War most Western states rejected the notion that government violence could be classified as state terrorism and argued that the recourse to violence by the military forces of a state was adequately regulated under international law (Becker 2006: 91). More recent efforts to incorporate state terrorism into the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, thereby giving it international recognition, were thwarted by the UN Secretary General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in 2004, which argued that it had not found the claims for the codification of state terrorism within the Convention 'to be compelling'. It therefore recommended that, based on the language of UN Security Council Resolution 1566, the definition of terrorism adopted should provide the following description of terrorism:

> any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004) that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature and context, is to intimidate a population or compels a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.
>
> (UN 2004)

As Becker concludes, this means that 'terrorism is to be generally understood as an act perpetrated by a non-State actor that is designed to intimidate a population or to achieve a political objective through the intentional infliction of harm' (Becker 2006: 88). Since the state, or in this case states, have determined that state terrorism should not exist as a legal category, it is not surprising that scholars concerned with crime tend not to study state terrorism as such. There are some notable exceptions, including Penny Green and Tony Ward (2004, 2005), Ronald Kramer and Raymond Michalowski (2005), Jude McCulloch and Sharon Pickering (2005), Ruth Jamieson and Kieran McEvoy (2005), William Chambliss (1989) and Eugene McLaughlin and John Muncie (2001).

Interestingly, Green and Ward, leading criminologists who have sought to promote the study of state crime, including state terrorism by liberal democratic states, within the discipline, have concluded that key inputs to the study of state crime have been made not by criminologists but by political scientists, IR scholars and anthropologists (Green and Ward 2005: 431). Certainly anthropologist Jeff Sluka (2000b) has made an important contribution with regard to state terrorism, but he too has lamented the lack of engagement within the discipline of anthropology, citing a fellow anthropologist, Linda Green, in the preface to his own work, who argued:

> Overwhelming empirical evidence demonstrates that state violence has been standard operating procedure in numerous societies where anthropologists have conducted fieldwork over the past three decades. Despite an alarming rise in the most blatant forms of transgression, repression and state terrorism, the topic has not captured the anthropological imagination.
>
> (Green in Sluka 2000b)

Fears among anthropologists of the consequences of research in this area may be a factor in the lack of anthropological studies on state terrorism, discussed in more detail below.

A minority of politics and international relations scholars have similarly expressed concern about the absence of state terrorism, particularly by liberal democratic states from the North, from their own discipline (Blakeley 2007a; Jackson 2009, forthcoming). There is, for example, very little scholarly literature published in the key journals that discusses the use of state terrorism by liberal democratic states. Andrew Silke's review of 490 articles in the core terrorism studies journals from 1990 to 1999 shows that only 12 of them, fewer than 2 per cent, examined state terrorism at all (Silke 2004a: 206). Of these an even smaller subset will have addressed state terrorism by liberal democracies. This is also reflected in the programme for the 2008 International Studies Association Annual Convention. From the programme I identified 173 papers on 'terrorism' or the 'War on Terror', of which just six were on state terrorism. Of these six, four were concerned with state terrorism by liberal democracies, and all four were on a panel which I convened on the subject of state terrorism. Of the remaining two, one was entitled 'Why a state can't be a terrorist', and it

is not clear whether the other was concerned with state terrorism by liberal democracies.

As I have argued elsewhere, state terrorism by liberal democratic states therefore continues to be an elephant in the room, even though there are numerous cases of such states using and sponsoring state terrorism, along with other forms of repression (Blakeley 2008). In other words, there are significant gaps in the literature on the use and sponsorship of state terrorism by liberal democratic states, and in a number of areas research is needed. Here I point to a number of those gaps which demand new research, although this is by no means an exhaustive list. Questions remain about the support by the US for Colombia's armed forces, which are known to have used state terrorism widely. Indeed, as Doug Stokes (2005a) has argued, US support for state terrorism in Colombia constitutes a 'war of terror'. The US also continues to provide extensive training to military forces all over the world, the nature of which is not fully known since much of it is classified. The past record of the US in this regard does not paint a promising picture, since its counterinsurgency training for its own and overseas forces during the Cold War contributed to widespread state terrorism in Indochina and Latin America (Blakeley 2006b, 2007b; McClintock 1992, 2001). Further work needs to be done to explore whether current training is in any way linked to state terrorism. There is scope therefore for establishing a counter-terrorism database, which records incidents in which counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency activities have resulted in violations of human rights among civilians (Kurtulus 2007). The full extent of US abuses of human rights in the 'War on Terror' invite further work, including assessing the policy of extraordinary rendition, in which other liberal democratic states, especially in Europe, are complicit (Grey 2006). This may well fit the definition of state terrorism, but as yet, there has been no detailed work to explore it within a taxonomy of forms of political violence. With US and British forces involved in counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, and NATO forces involved in the same in Afghanistan, and given what we already know about the repressive nature of US counterinsurgency strategies during the Cold War, there is a need for work to determine whether current operations also involve acts of state terrorism and pose the same threats to human rights. This book will begin to address these questions.

Despite the significant absences in IR scholarship, outlined above, a review of the work carried out on state terrorism by a minority of scholars from anthropology, criminology and sociology indicates that they draw extensively on the small body of work that has emerged which assesses state terrorism by liberal democratic states, some of which has been undertaken by IR scholars, including Alexander George (1991). This may be because of the focus of much IR scholarship on the activities of states, even if the majority of that work where terrorism is concerned focuses on threats to the state. By contrast, other disciplines within the social sciences tend to focus on actors other than states or specific institutions within the state. The fact that scholars from other disciplines have found work from IR so useful where state terrorism is concerned is testament to the achievements of a small number of IR scholars who have developed a robust research

agenda that has gained respect. There is nevertheless much work to be done to update the work that was begun in the late 1970s and 1980s by scholars from various disciplinary backgrounds including Edward Herman (1985), Noam Chomsky and Herman (1979b, 1979a), Alexander George (1991) and Stohl and Lopez (1984), and certainly the ways in which definitions of terrorism are applied within IR, as discussed above, continue to hamper progress in this area.

In addition to definitional and conceptualisation issues, the availability of data on terrorism further contributes to a lack of debate on state terrorism by Northern liberal democracies within the social sciences. The main sources of data on incidents of terrorism are government or government-sponsored academic institutions and think tanks (Herman and O'Sullivan 1989: 69). Therefore, while liberal democratic states are willing to invest heavily to produce data on terrorist incidents and threats against their own interests, discussed in more detail below, obtaining data on acts of terrorism committed by those states is extremely difficult, since only very infrequently do they advertise their terrorist activities or intent (Chambliss 1989: 203–4; Gibbs 1989: 330; Mitchell *et al.* 1986: 2; Nicholson 1986: 31). In most cases governments seek to conceal the extent to which they use terrorism. Despite this secrecy, such acts are nevertheless still terrorism, since, as I show in Chapter 2, even where states try to conceal their use of state terrorism at the international or even national level, they still use it as a means of terrorising an audience directly connected to the victim. When such activities are exposed, they tend to be justified as 'necessary measures' or more benignly as 'police action' (Mitchell *et al.* 1986: 2–3; Nicholson 1986: 31). When they are exposed, and presented as something other than state terrorism, considerable analytical effort is required to determine whether such an act does constitute state terrorism, since they are unlikely to be included in the major data sets of terrorist incidents.

The roles, motives and interests of academics

The problems relating to methodology may be further exacerbated by the motives of academics themselves, although it is very difficult to know what an individual's motives are, or how they might be weighed against other factors. What follows are some reflections on factors that might cause scholars to avoid research on state terrorism by liberal democratic states. In a minority of cases, research into state terrorism can be physically dangerous, particularly when it involves fieldwork in areas where state terrorism has occurred, as anthropologist Jeff Sluka notes in the preface to his edited volume, which brings together work by a panel of international anthropologists who have all undertaken research in areas 'marked by extreme forms of state repression and terror', and who may suffer or have already suffered recriminations as a result (Sluka 2000b: ix–x). Myrna Mack, a renowned anthropologist who spent years investigating the destruction of rural communities in Guatemala under the successive US-backed military regimes from 1954 until the early 1990s, was herself stalked for two weeks by a military death squad before her assassination on 11 September 1990 (HRF 2003). In most cases, scholars do not have to contend with such threats to

their personal safety, but this does not make their fears of such threats any less real. There may also be other reasons for their silence on the subject.

It could be that scholars are travelling the road most travelled. Since non-state terrorism is perceived in policy and academic circles to be an issue of considerable concern, they may simply be responding to the perceived need for research in this area. It could also be that scholars are simply oblivious to state terrorism by liberal democratic states as a research area for the same reason that many scholars explore non-state terrorism – this concern dominates the discipline, whereas there is little work available on state terrorism by liberal democracies so it does not occur to academics to pursue it. Or it could be that scholars consider this to be work that is already being carried out, particularly if they are aware of the few titles that have emerged in recent years on state terrorism in Latin America during the Cold War (Gareau 2004; Huggins *et al.* 2002; Molloy 2001), or on US conduct in the 'War on Terror', with specific reference to torture at Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo Bay (Greenberg and Dratel 2005; Hersh 2004; Rose 2004).

On the other hand, it could be that scholars are deterred from undertaking work that assesses state terrorism by liberal democratic governments, because individual academics deem the associated costs to themselves to be too high. Sometimes their job (on which their livelihood depends) exists to undertake work aimed at helping protect the state by assessing threats against liberal democratic states. This does not mean to say that they are actively deterred from undertaking work on state terrorism. Indeed, it is not difficult to get panels and papers on the subject accepted for inclusion in the programmes of leading academic conferences. A further reason for the relative silence on state terrorism by scholars in liberal democracies may be that even though individuals recognise that states are complicit in terrorism, they find this uncomfortable, and would prefer not to have to confront the awkward conclusions that research on state terrorism by liberal democratic states might lead to.

Frequently, individual academics are employed by governments, directly through think tanks and government institutions, and indirectly through government funding councils, to undertake research into terrorist threats against the state, or to advise governments on how to counter such threats, as in the case of the RAND Corporation and the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at the University of St Andrews. RAND was established by the US Air Force in the late 1940s, and is now an independent policy think tank. Considerable government funding has been made available for such research in the years since 9/11 in the US and the UK, and is therefore guided by government agendas and policy concerns (Silke 2004b: 58). The US and UK governments have a captive audience among IR academics faced with increasing pressures to secure external funding for research, in light of which they can and will meet government demands for data and analysis of groups considered to be a threat to national security. This does not preclude those academics from being critical of unpopular foreign policy choices that they argue have helped generate terrorism, as John Horgan and Michael Boyle (2008: 5) point out. Indeed Frank Gregory

and Paul Wilkinson, in their assessment of Britain's performance in the 'War on Terror', funded by the ESRC and published by Chatham House, are critical of the junior rather than partnership role that Britain has taken in the 'War on Terror', pointing out that 'Riding pillion with a powerful ally has proved costly in terms of British and US military lives, Iraqi lives, military expenditure, and the damage caused to the counter-terrorism campaign' (Gregory and Wilkinson 2005: 2–4). Such critique stems from the fact that many IR academics are motivated by a wish to contribute to security and peace, and in the course of their research on terrorism, they are willing to speak out if they consider government policy to undermine the prospects for peace and security.

The close links between liberal democratic governments and academics undertaking such research has nevertheless impacted on the field of terrorism studies, in that it further privileges work on threats by non-state actors against liberal democratic states and their interests, and marginalises work that examines the use and sponsorship of state terrorism by those states. This can be illustrated with reference to the RAND Corporation. In addition to Wilkinson, various academic experts on terrorism have close links to RAND, which in turn had significant affiliations with members of the US administration under George W. Bush, including Donald Rumsfeld (Flynn 2005a) and Condoleezza Rice (NSC 2004), both former RAND board members. Other leading academics associated with both RAND and the CSTPV are Bruce Hoffman, who temporarily left the RAND Corporation in 1993 to found the CSTPV at St Andrew's, and who remains an honorary senior researcher of the CSTPV, and Brian Jenkins, a senior analyst with RAND, who is also a member of the CSTPV's advisory council (Burnett and Whyte 2005: 8). These connections have a significant effect upon terrorism studies. As Jonny Burnett and David Whyte point out, individuals associated with the CSTPV and RAND retain key editorial positions in the two most prominent English-language journals in the field of terrorism and political violence: Wilkinson as co-editor of *Terrorism and Political Violence*; Hoffman and Jenkins as members of its editorial board; and Hoffman as editor-in-chief of *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, a journal originally founded and editorially managed by RAND (Burnett and Whyte 2005: 9). The dominance of research on non-state terrorism is in large part a product of the agenda-setting by policymakers where their own role in terrorism is ignored and threats to the states that they represent are prioritised.

Even those scholars not affiliated with such institutions and government bodies may shy away from studying state terrorism by liberal democratic states because it is uncomfortable and even dangerous. For some, the question they may ask in relation to terrorism is how they can protect themselves. If they start to look at state terrorism by liberal democratic states, however, they may be forced to admit that, as Michael Nicholson argues, their own government, which ideologically they support, is involved in atrocities (Nicholson 1986: 35). It may, therefore, be psychologically more comfortable not to get involved in this kind of research, and instead to engage in research that helps to overcome problems faced by the state. This is the conclusion reached by Neil Smith in a review

of a collection of Noam Chomsky's essays, where he argues that opinion on Chomsky's work is polarised precisely because of this discomfort:

> Reading that your revered leaders are ruthless hypocrites is painful and calls for action. Any such action would involve sacrificing both leisure and certain aspects of privilege and power. It's easier to deny the claims, accept the power structure and assume that we are uniquely right with a divine mission in the world.
>
> (Smith 2008)

Various scholars acknowledge state terrorism, even if they choose not to study it, as I show in Chapter 2, but for some, it is possible that they would prefer not to face these facts.

Within Critical Terrorism Studies, scholars, myself included, have explained the predominance within terrorism studies of work which focuses on terrorism as a threat to liberal democratic states that needs to be dealt with, with reference to Robert Cox's 1981 article, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders' (Blakeley 2007a, 2008; Gunning 2007). Specifically, reference is made to Cox's description of problem-solving theory as theory that 'takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action' (Cox 1981: 128). Reference is also made to Cox's argument that the aim of such theory is, therefore, 'to make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble' (Cox 1981: 128–9). Paul Cammack has argued that the distinction Cox makes between problem-solving and critical theory is flawed, since 'what is presented as a contrast between two approaches to theory turns out to be a contrast between two political orientations – support for and opposition to the status quo respectively' (Cammack 2007: 5). It also, mistakenly, assumes that states themselves are in the business of upholding the status quo. As this study will show, at various points, specific administrations of states from the North have gone to great lengths to reorder the politics and economics of their own as well as other states, often through coercion. Indeed the will to reorder the politics and economies of other states was central to the agendas of neoconservatives during the Bush administration. We cannot therefore assume that states, or scholars engaged in policy-relevant research, are necessarily in the business of always maintaining the status quo. As I will show, Cox's article offers much more for the study of state terrorism than reference to his claims about the dichotomy between problem solving and critical theory would imply. Specifically, he sets out a framework for understanding the development of the global political economy in relation to class, the state and world order. As I will show, this provides a framework for understanding the use of state terrorism by liberal democratic states from the North in the South.

It is the case that, for many terrorism scholars, the aim of work is to consider the problem of terrorism within the context of existing institutions and power dynamics. It is also the case that realist and liberal approaches within IR scholarship have

carried significant weight, and have in turn dictated the parameters of analysis for most terrorism studies scholars. The same is true of the field of Security Studies, as Richard Wyn Jones has argued, and the problems he highlights are applicable to terrorism studies. The state is the only significant actor for these approaches, and its security is paramount (Jones 1999: 94–102). This results in a fetishisation of the state (Jones 1999: 96) whereby the security of individuals is 'subsumed under the ambit of the state', and is frequently 'sacrificed to the demands of realpolitik' (Stamnes and Jones 2000). This emphasis on state security, when coupled with the close ties between academic experts and the state at the height of the Cold War, meant that 'Security Studies, implicitly or explicitly, generated information and analysis for states, and specifically for the ruling elites within them' (Stamnes and Jones 2000). Not surprisingly, these dominant approaches tend to assume the benign character of the foreign policies of Northern liberal democratic states. At worst, when such states use force, it is assumed that this is in response to credible threats, or as a means of protecting other, weaker states or groups. Indeed in the wake of 9/11, scholars, especially in the US, may have felt it was their duty to apply their research skills to the subject of terrorism, which may help explain the considerable growth in titles on the subject in recent years, discussed above. While this is an understandable reaction, it has skewed the direction of research on terrorism towards non-state rather than state terrorism, which is responsible for far more human loss. This is beginning to change, since a number of scholars associated with realism, for example Stephen Walt (2005), and liberalism, for example John Ikenberry (2006), have published works that critique US practices in the 'War on Terror', but there is still much to be done. Even though individual scholars do not necessarily set out to marginalise the study of state terrorism by their governments, the consequence of their decisions, which in turn are often the result of the agenda setting of policymakers, is precisely that. This inadvertently furthers the interests of elite power, because it puts the state beyond reproach.

A historical materialist approach can overcome this gap in the literature, providing both an analytical framework for and an explanation of the use of state terrorism by the North in the South. At the heart of historical materialist analysis is the relationship between the state, capitalism and world order. Cox's article, reprinted with a postscript in 1986, in *Neorealism and its Critics*, edited by Robert Keohane (1986), sketched out a historical materialist approach to international relations, which, as Cammack argues, is

> an excellent starting point for an holistic understanding of the global political economy, which was capable of linking class, state and world order, and at the same time able to place specific processes of institutional change in that broader context.
>
> (Cammack 2007: 9)

This study adopts a particular historical materialist approach, drawing on Cox, but also more recent scholarship, including that of Mark Rupert, which is not simply an economistic reductionist Marxism, but an approach which contends

that 'states and systems of interstate power relations are embedded in and (to a significant degree) produced through systems of relations which encompass (among other things) the social organization of production' (Rupert 2008). Central to this approach is the notion that the social organisation of production is itself structured according to relations of class (Rupert 2008). As Rupert argues:

> politics and political struggle are essential aspects of the process by which all social structures are (re)produced, and hence that the analytical separation of political from economic life (as well as domestic and international aspects of these) may represent a false dichotomy. ... Thus politics is not confined to the formally public sphere of the state, but permeates the economic sphere as well: just as the state and interstate politics can profoundly shape economic and social life, so the politics of the economy can have enormous – if not conventionally recognized – implications for the historical form taken by the state and world orders constructed among states.
>
> (Rupert 2008)

Class is understood in relation to the ownership or control of the physical and financial assets necessary for capitalist production. In this sense, we can distinguish between two classes, first, those individuals who own or control the means of production, and second, the employees of those who own or control the means of production – the workers. As Mark Rupert and Hazel Smith argue, 'class struggle is an imperative defining the way human beings relate to each other within systems of capitalist social relations – it is not optional and neither is it a condition of existence from which any individual can escape' (Rupert and Smith 2002: 2). Individuals within capitalist social relations must earn a wage or salary, since their existence depends on it. They are involved in an ongoing negotiation with their employer. If they are the owners of capital, they must seek to maximise their returns from the labour they employ, to win out in the competition with other owners of capital, otherwise their own survival is under threat (Rupert and Smith 2002: 2). That competition between the owners of capital has been central to capital expansion and to the globalisation of the political economy. Rupert and others have stressed that the struggles engendered by capitalist relations do not all take class forms, so the historical materialist approach they adopt is flexible enough to explore exploitative gender and race relations in addition to class relations (Laffey and Dean 2002: 93; Rupert 2008). Race relations, as well as those of class, have been a concern of post-colonial scholars (Arendt 1966; Fanon [1961] 1967).

This study situates the use of state terrorism within the context of the objectives that have historically driven the foreign policies of powerful hegemonic states in the North over the last 200 years. Those objectives have been to secure access to, and control over, resources and markets in the South in the interests of elites, driven by the pursuit of profit. Elites are understood to be individuals that have concentrations of power of any kind. The work uses imperialism as the context within which those states have pursued these objectives. Imperialism,

for historical materialism, as Cox argues 'adds a vertical dimension of power to the horizontal dimension of rivalry among the most powerful states', a dimension which, he adds 'is the dominance and subordination of metropole over hinterland, center over periphery, in a world political economy' (Cox 1986: 215–16). This is particularly important for historical materialists, since economic development is understood as the motor of history. Explorations of imperialism enable scholars to theorise IR not simply in terms of competition between states, but also in terms of the relations between core and periphery and between elites and the subordinate class across state boundaries.

My aim is to demonstrate the role that state terrorism has played in efforts to secure access to and control of resources, including labour, and markets in the South, in the interests of elites. In this regard historical materialism provides an explanation for the use of state terrorism. As discussed above, where consent among the subordinate class is not achieved, elites resort to coercion. In the chapters that follow I demonstrate that the use of state terrorism by Northern states has almost always been motivated by an underlying material aim, whereby elites haves used terrorism in an attempt to ensure a plentiful supply of slave or forced labour, or to defeat political movements that might threaten elite interests. Situating the use of state terrorism within the context of class struggle and of the history of imperialism, I am able to trace the use of both coercive and legitimation strategies in the practices of Northern states in the South. I demonstrate that coercion, including state terrorism, dominated the practices of early European imperialists, as well as early American imperialism, and was also a defining feature of US efforts to secure access to and control of resources and markets in the South throughout the Cold War period. Legitimation has, at times, led to a reduction in the recourse to state terrorism by powerful states from the North, since acquiescence is achieved among the subordinate class through specific institutions, without the need for coercion, including state terrorism. Coercion and state terrorism have nevertheless continued to underpin the foreign policies of liberal democratic states from the North where legitimation fails to achieve the intended outcomes for elites, or is deemed unlikely to do so. Situating this work within a historical materialist framework therefore enables the identification of important historical continuities, both in the objectives of the elites of Northern states, and in the use of state terrorism to achieve their ends.

Finally, as already indicated, the work is motivated by a normative aim to help overcome the use of state terrorism. Historical materialist approaches are aimed not just at providing a theoretical framework and explanation for specific phenomena, but are also aimed at social transformation. As Rupert and Smith argue, progressive social change, 'comes about through the self-organization of those social classes marginalized by capitalist social relations and those individuals and groups who are allied with them' (Rupert and Smith 2002: 2). The work is informed by a normative commitment to help end the use of terror by any actor, including Northern liberal democracies. Since such states have been responsible for or complicit in terrorist acts that have led to the deaths of and human rights abuses against hundreds of thousands of civilians, especially in the

South, there is a need for a re-orientation of terrorism scholarship to ensure that state violence by Northern liberal democracies, and not just by 'rogue states' or non-democratic regimes, is included and challenged.

Work on state terrorism

While a small number of scholars have undertaken work to examine state terrorism by Northern liberal democracies, the emphasis has tended to be on US or Western state-sponsored terrorism in the latter half of the twentieth century. Important works include those by Alexander George (1991), Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman (1979a, 1979b), Edward Herman (1985) and, more recently, Frederick Gareau (2004). George, Chomsky and Herman in particular have played an important role in bringing the question of US-sponsored state terrorism during the Cold War to the fore. In *Western State Terrorism*, George also highlighted British complicity in relation to Northern Ireland and British and American support for repression in Indonesia.

The main gap in the literature on state terrorism is that there has been no work to explore the functions that state terrorism currently serves within the wider foreign policy context, in relation to the foreign policy priorities of Northern liberal democracies and to developments in the international system. Chomsky and Herman did draw conclusions on this during the Cold War, arguing that the use of terror by the US was intended to protect the interests of capitalist elites. In *The Washington Connection*, they stated that the US succeeded in organising under its sponsorship 'a neo-colonial system of client states ruled mainly by terror and serving the interests of a small local and foreign business and military elite' (Chomsky and Herman 1979a: ix). But there has been no research to update this assessment of the functions served by the use of terror in US foreign policy, particularly in light of significant changes in the international political economy since the end of the Cold War. Since the closing years of the Cold War, states in the South have been further incorporated into the global capitalist system, through rigorous and relentless efforts by the IFIs, led by the US. While this has been well documented and debated (Barkawi and Laffey 2002; Burbach and Tarbell 2004; Colas and Saull 2006; Gill 2003; Gowan 1999; Hardt and Negri 2000; Jessop 2003; Robinson 1996, 2005; Rupert and Smith 2002; Stokes 2005b; Watkins 2004), the role that state terrorism has played in these processes has not been considered in any great detail, with the exception of Doug Stokes' work on US relations with Colombia (Stokes 2005b). This study seeks to overcome this gap in the literature and involves, as Eric Herring (2008: 197–211) has noted, bringing class analysis, as well as the state, back into terrorism studies. In so doing it provides, 'a way of describing, explaining and challenging Northern state terrorism because it would frame it in terms of the extent to which it is functional for shoring up exploitative relations which favour capital over labour' (Herring 2008: 200). It is also important because while Northern powers have been some of the greatest perpetrators of state terrorism in the South, they do not act alone. As discussed above, they frequently collaborate with authoritarian regimes in the

states in which they intervene. The agency of actors in others states should not, therefore, be ignored. We can better understand state terrorism when we examine the collaborations that are established between elites across state boundaries, in order to achieve specific shared objectives.

Such work also needs to situate the use of state terrorism in the current climate within a much longer history of its use by Northern states prior to the twentieth century. Imperial powers, now liberal democratic states in the North, used terrorism extensively, both in their invasions and occupations of their colonies, and in efforts to maintain power over their colonial subjects. While there is an extensive body of literature from various disciplines on the use of terror by the colonial powers (Arendt 1966; Beckett 2001; Elkins 2005; Fanon [1961] 1967; Sartre [1964] 2001), scholars within terrorism studies, including those that analyse state terrorism, tend not to incorporate this into their work. This is a significant omission, and will be considered here. Since this work analyses the foreign policy priorities of Northern liberal democracies, which should really be understood within their historical context, it also makes sense to consider the foreign policy practices of those states during the formative years when those foreign policy priorities were first fashioned.

Overview of the chapters

In Chapter 2 I provide a conceptualisation of state terrorism in relation to other forms of repression that Northern states have used in the service of their foreign policy objectives. While some scholars have argued that political violence by states should not be classified as state terrorism, I show that existing definitions of terrorism do not in any way preclude the state as a perpetrator of terrorism. I explore the core characteristics common to existing definitions of terrorism and, based on these, outline the key elements that must be present for an act to constitute state terrorism. I show that a defining feature of state terrorism, and that which distinguishes it from other forms of state repression, is its instrumentality, in that it involves the illegal targeting of individuals that the state has a duty to protect in order to instil fear in a target audience beyond the direct victim. I then outline the main difficulties associated with identifying state terrorism, which relate primarily to questions of agency and motive. I explore the measures that scholars can take to overcome these difficulties, before examining the different forms that state terrorism can take. It can involve numerous forms of violence that vary in scale and intensity. They can be divided into two broad categories, although there is some overlap between them. The first of these involves small-scale operations aimed at more specific targets, or what I refer to as limited state terrorism. The second is state terrorism that is intended to instil fear among large sections of the population, or what might be referred to as generalised, governance or wholesale state terrorism. This refers to its widespread use as a means of subduing populations and deterring political opposition, or its use against civilians in war. Both forms of state terrorism can be used domestically against perceived enemies, or externally as a tool of foreign policy against adversaries.

Finally I discuss the incidents of state terrorism that are assessed in subsequent chapters and show why they are defined as such.

Chapter 3 provides the historical context for the subsequent analysis of state terrorism as a tool in the service of the foreign policies of great powers from the North. To understand state terrorism as a tool of foreign policy, we must first establish the objectives that such tools are intended to serve, and the strategies used to achieve those objectives. I therefore outline the continuities at the heart of the foreign policy objectives of the great Northern powers, dating back to colonial times. In the colonial period, the European powers were driven by the aim of acquiring territory in order to increase their global presence and dominance and to secure access to resources in the interests of economic elites, and used coercion widely, including terrorism, to achieve this. Those practices were also emulated in early American imperialism. While contemporary Northern powers do not seek to expand their territory, they still seek to maintain their power economically, politically, militarily and ideologically. One way in which to do this is to increase and sustain their access to and control of resources and markets in the South, a process that is led by the US. The chapter demonstrates that efforts to neoliberalise the South are intended to ensure that states in the South are opened up so that multinational corporations, largely headquartered in the North, can increase their market share, and thereby the wealth of Northern elites.

Chapter 4 explores the ways in which liberal democratic states from the North used and sponsored state terrorism in the South in the twentieth century, up until the end of the Cold War. In the cases of the former European colonial powers, this was often part of the process of attempting to thwart decolonisation. I show that the strategic aerial bombardment of German cities by allied forces during the Second World War also constituted state terrorism. Throughout the Cold War the US sponsored and deployed state terrorism on an enormous scale. This was justified as a means of containing communism. It was, primarily, however, a means of ensuring that the interests of US elites were protected and promoted. Northern powers used both generalised, governance and wholesale state terrorism and limited state terrorism to achieve their objectives up until the end of the Cold War. British forces and British-sponsored state agents in Kenya detained hundreds of thousands of people during their counterinsurgency campaign against the Mau Mau. This resulted in terrorising many Kenyan civilians. Similarly the French detained, interrogated and tortured thousands of Algerians during the French–Algerian war in which the Algerians struggled for independence, both in Algeria and France. The US deployed similar tactics throughout the Cold War. Use of generalised state terrorism by the US included the strategic aerial bombardment of Korea during the 1960s, explicitly intended to terrorise; the use of massive detention, interrogation and torture of the Vietnamese by US intelligence services and the South Vietnamese army during the Vietnam war; US counterinsurgency training of Latin American military forces which advocated the widespread use of interrogation and torture of those suspected of associating with insurgents; and US support for death squads in Latin America throughout the Cold War. The US also used limited forms of state terrorism. These included:

covert CIA operations intended to assassinate Fidel Castro; covert support for the Contras by the US in Nicaragua; the sponsorship of terrorist groups such as the Mujahedin in Afghanistan; specific intelligence-gathering operations aimed at singling out individuals for assassination such as Operation Condor; and detention and repression of specific individuals and groups in an attempt to disable opposition movements.

Chapter 5 examines the shift in the foreign policy strategies of the US and its allies following the Cold War. As outlined above, legitimation rather than coercion was deemed the most effective means to achieve the foreign policy objectives of liberal democratic states from the North in the South. Through the IFIs, and in the case of the US, through specific organs established and funded by the US state, a concerted effort was made by liberal democratic states from the North throughout the 1990s to promote neoliberalism. There were nevertheless numerous cases in which Northern liberal democracies used and sponsored state terrorism in the 1990s, a number of which I briefly outline. The main focus of the chapter is the efforts by the US to spread neoliberalism, since it has been by far the most significant player in seeking to achieve these goals. I briefly outline the organs that the US uses to promote democracy and neoliberalism in the South. I show that the case of El Salvador is typical of US democracy promotion efforts since the Cold War. El Salvador is held up by the US state as a success story in its post-Cold War foreign policy strategy, although the benefits for many Salvadorans are limited, as I will illustrate. The contrasting case of Haiti, in which the US reverted to coercion when legitimation failed, which in turn resulted in state terrorism, will then be assessed. State terrorism remained a tool of US foreign policy, albeit on a smaller scale than during the Cold War, and indeed operated in conjunction with legitimation strategies.

In Chapter 6 I demonstrate that legitimation has continued to be the preferred option of liberal democratic states from the North in the pursuit of their objectives in the South, and neoliberalisation efforts have indeed intensified since 9/11. Although of course if states do not embrace neoliberalism, but are pro-US, this is favoured over an anti-US neoliberal state. I show that there has nevertheless been a resurgence in the use of state terrorism by the US and numerous other liberal democratic states from the North. In Latin America, while the US has favoured legitimation strategies to achieve its objectives, it has also turned a blind eye to anti-democratic actions including a coup d'état in Haiti. This led to state terrorism by the self-appointed government which officials in the Bush administration foresaw but did little to stop, not least because the overthrown government had been enacting policies inimical to US interests. The US also continued to provide extensive military aid to the Colombian state, despite knowing of the widespread acts of terror committed by members of the Colombian armed forces against political opponents. Furthermore, the US attempted to increase its military presence in the region. I then show that state terrorism has been used widely by the US and its liberal democratic allies from the North in the 'War on Terror'. The US and UK have lent considerable support, including high levels of military provision, to numerous states renowned for their appalling human rights records, since these

states were considered key partners in the 'War on Terror'. Elements of the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq constituted state terrorism, including the excessive use of force, illegal detentions and supporting the regime in Iraq despite its use of death squads. The treatment of detainees by British and American forces involved considerable levels of state terrorism. Senior officials in the Bush administration attempted to re-define torture, and US state representatives used torture, which is euphemistically referred to as 'enhanced interrogation techniques'. Detainees in facilities such as Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo Bay were terrorised by representatives of the US state. Terror suspects were held in secret prisons where they were tortured. The US and various allies, including other liberal democratic states from the North, have been involved in the extraordinary rendition of suspects to third party countries where torture of detainees is commonplace. In exploring these strategies, I show that many of them directly descend from the state terrorism deployed by the US and its allies against opponents during the Cold War, and can be traced back to the practices of the earlier colonial powers.

In the concluding chapter I attempt to demonstrate that there are important continuities, dating back to early European imperialism, in the foreign policy objectives of liberal democratic states from the North, which are driven by elite interests, in the assumed functionality of state terrorism, and in the forms that state terrorism takes. I then outline the contribution of this study and explore its implications, with specific reference to the emerging field of Critical Terrorism Studies, and the recent call to 'bring the state back into terrorism studies'. I attempt to demonstrate the significance of historical materialism for enhancing our understanding of the use of state terrorism by liberal democratic states from the North, showing that such an approach goes some considerable way in overcoming the dearth of research on state terrorism by liberal democratic states from the North in the South. I then evaluate the limitations of the research, outlining what a future research agenda might focus on. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications of the research for policymakers, academics and activist scholars.

2 Conceptualising state terrorism

Introduction

Liberal democratic states from the North have used and sponsored various forms of repression in pursuit of elite interests in the South. This has included terrorism. Yet, as discussed in Chapter 1, there has been relatively little research on state terrorism by states from the North within the discipline of International Relations. Some scholars even argue that political violence by states should not be classified as terrorism. I begin by exploring the core characteristics common to existing definitions of terrorism. I show that states should not be precluded as potential perpetrators of terrorism, since those core characteristics are concerned with the actions involved in terrorism, rather than the nature of the actors themselves. I then set out the key elements that must be present for an act to constitute state terrorism. I show that a defining feature of state terrorism, and that which distinguishes it from other forms of state repression, is its instrumentality, since it involves the illegal targeting of persons that the state has a duty to protect, in order to instil fear in a target audience beyond the direct victim(s). In exploring state terrorism in relation to other forms of repression, I show that state terrorism always violates international law because of the methods used to instil terror.

I then outline the main challenges involved in identifying state terrorism. These relate primarily to questions of agency and motive. Measures that can be taken to overcome these challenges are then proposed. This includes a discussion of how we might determine whether specific acts were part of a wider institutionalised policy of state terrorism. I then discuss the different forms that state terrorism can take. State terrorism can be both internally directed against perceived enemies within the state and externally directed against foreign individuals or groups perceived to be adversaries. There are varying degrees to which a state may be involved in terrorism overseas. They may use it directly, via their own security services, they may cooperate with the agents of other states in its use, or they may sponsor it, and, as I will show, levels of sponsorship can also vary. State terrorism can involve numerous forms of violence that vary in scale and intensity. They can be divided into two broad categories, although there is some overlap between them. The first of these involves small-scale operations aimed at more specific targets, or what I refer to as limited state terrorism. This includes

one-off events, small-scale terror directed at one group or sector or a series of small operations. The second is state terrorism that is intended to instil fear among large sections of the population, or what might be referred to as generalised, governance or wholesale state terrorism. This refers to its widespread use as a means of subduing populations and deterring political opposition, or its use against civilians in war. Both forms of state terrorism can be used domestically against perceived enemies, or externally as a tool of foreign policy against adversaries. As Gus Martin notes, terrorism by the state is potentially the most far-reaching because of the extensive resources the state has at its disposal, which far exceed those of non-state actors engaged in terrorism (Martin 2003: 81). As I will show, the use of generalised or governance state terrorism is much more likely in situations where there is an institutionalised policy to terrorise. I will then briefly discuss the incidents of state terrorism explored in subsequent chapters, explaining why they are defined as such.

Defining state terrorism

For an act to be labelled 'state terrorism', its constitutive elements must be consistent with those of non-state terrorism. This is not to say that there is a consensus on how terrorism should be defined. Indeed, as Andrew Silke notes, most works on terrorism begin with a discussion of the various associated definitional problems of the term (Silke 2004a: 2), and the failure of scholars to reach agreement (see, for example: Badey 1998: 90–107; Barker 2003: 23; Cooper 2001: 881–93; Duggard 1974: 67–81; Jenkins 1980; Weinberg *et al.* 2004: 777–94). There are nevertheless a group of core characteristics that are common to competing definitions. Those core characteristics relate to the act of terrorism, rather than to the nature of the perpetrator. As explored in the first chapter, one of the main reasons state terrorism receives so little attention is because many scholars focus on terrorism by non-state rather than state actors. Some do not even accept that terrorism by states should be equated with terrorism by non-state actors. Walter Laqueur, for example, argues:

> According to one school of thought, 'state terrorism' is the all-important issue. It is true that the number of victims and the amount of suffering caused by oppressive, tyrannical governments has been infinitely greater than that caused by small groups of rebels.
>
> (Laqueur 1986: 89)

But he adds, 'There are basic differences in motives, function and effect between oppression by the state (or society or religion) and political terrorism. To equate them, to obliterate them is to spread confusion' (Laqueur 1986: 89). He has also argued that including state terror in the study of terrorism 'would have made the study of terrorism impossible, for it would have included not only US foreign policy, but also Hitler and Stalin' (Laqueur 2003: 140). Laqueur's position shows that his analysis of terrorism is actor based, rather than action based. Even if the

motives, functions and effects of terrorism by states and non-state actors are different, the act of terrorism itself is not, since the core characteristics of terrorism are the same whether the perpetrator is a state or a non-state actor.

A helpful starting point in identifying the core characteristics of terrorism is the definition offered by Eugene Victor Walter, who argued that terrorism involves three key features: first, threatened or perpetrated violence directed at some victim; second, the violent actor intends that violence to induce terror in some witness who is generally distinct from the victim, in other words the victim is instrumental; and third, the violent actor intends or expects that the terrorised witness to the violence will alter their behaviour (Walter 1969). Subsequent scholars have incorporated and adapted these features of terrorism in their own definitions. Jonathan Barker asserts that terrorism has three key elements: 'violence threatened or employed; against civilian targets; for political objectives' (Barker 2003: 23). In Boaz Ganor's words, 'terrorism is the intentional use of, or threat to use violence against civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain political aims' (Ganor 1998). There are two problems with these latter definitions. The first is that they limit the definition to those acts where civilians alone are the targets. This is problematic since, as Robert Goodin has argued in detail, considerable analytical difficulties ensue when terrorism is defined in relation to the Just War tradition's opposition to 'violence against innocent civilians' (Goodin 2006: 6), a definition that is enshrined in the US Code and the UN's International Convention for the Suppression and Financing of Terrorism. The US Code defines terrorism as 'premeditated politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatants, targeted by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience' (US Congress 2007b). The UN's International Convention for the Suppression and Financing of Terrorism regards terrorism as:

> Any act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.
>
> (UN 1999)

The difficulties identified by Goodin when terrorism is defined in this way are, first, it is not clear how terrorism is different from murder, since, 'If the wrongness of terrorism is exhausted by the wrongness of "killing those who are innocent", then terrorists have done nothing morally worse than ordinary murder' (Goodin 2006: 10). This is why the definition offered in the US Code falls short. Although the US and UN emphasise that the problem with terrorism is not simply the targeting of supposedly protected individuals, but the intention to terrorise a target audience beyond the direct victim, they assume that individuals are simply 'innocent' or 'guilty'. In reality, there are gradations of complicity when we consider the involvement of citizens in the politics of their state with which the terrorists take issue (Goodin 2006: 6–14). More seriously, they also

imply that while individuals targeted by terrorists are innocent, there are others who would be legitimate targets of other attacks:

> The standard application of just-war theory is to military campaigns of course. There, complaints about 'killing innocent civilians' make sense, precisely because there are indeed combatants who ought to have been targeted instead. But except where terrorism is being conducted as part of a literal war ... there are no combatants who ought to have been targeted instead.
>
> (Goodin 2006: 14)

There are always 'non-civilians' or 'armed people in uniform' in any community, be they members of the armed forces or police, who, 'depending on the particulars of the terrorists' complaint' might be 'wholly innocent of what the terrorists are complaining about and wholly powerless to do anything about it' (Goodin 2006: 15).

A further related problem with defining terrorism in relation only to 'innocent civilians', and of concern to this work, is that it entrenches the supposed moral legitimacy of state violence. This is the effect of arguments made by Laqueur. He claims that those who argue state terrorism should be included in studies of terrorism ignore the fact that,

> the very existence of a state is based on its monopoly of power. If it were different, states would not have the right, nor be in a position, to maintain that minimum of order on which all civilised life rests.
>
> (Laqueur 2003: 237)

Bruce Hoffman has made similar claims. He argues that failing to differentiate between state and non-state violence, and equating the innocents killed by states and non-state actors would 'ignore the fact that, even while national armed forces have been responsible for far more death and destruction than terrorists might ever aspire to bring about, there nonetheless is a fundamental qualitative difference between the two types of violence'. He argues that this difference is based upon the historical emergence of 'rules and accepted norms of behaviour that prohibit the use of certain types of weapons' and 'proscribe various tactics and outlaw attacks on specific categories of targets'. He adds that 'terrorists' have by contrast 'violated all these rules' (Hoffman 1998: 34).[1] This argument would only stand up to scrutiny if it could be shown that states do not violate these rules, as set out in the Geneva Conventions. The reality is that they do. Any monopoly of violence that the state has is neither a justification for excluding state terrorism from studies of terrorism nor, more importantly, for affording states the right to use violence in any way they choose. As Michael Stohl argues, even if the argument is made that the state does have the monopoly on legitimate violence, 'it may still use that violence (and its threat) in ways as unacceptable as terrorism, mass killings and other forms of repression and human rights violations' (Stohl 2006: 4–5). Indeed, even in situations where, according to international law and

norms, states have the legitimate right to use violence (*jus ad bellum*), it is not always the case that their conduct (*jus in bello*) is itself legitimate. States, including liberal democratic ones, have shown themselves more than capable of perpetrating illegitimate acts in war against civilians. Such acts are entirely consistent with the definition of terrorism set out by Walter, discussed above, as I later show with reference to strategic aerial bombardment. They also extend to the treatment of enemy forces. Although the norms and rules governing the conduct of war permit, and indeed favour, the targeting of enemy combatants over civilians, there are also many cases in which states, including liberal democratic ones, have been complicit in perpetrating acts against enemy forces that are prohibited under international law and which, as I will show, constitute state terrorism.

The second problem with Barker's and Ganor's definitions is that they fail to state explicitly the importance of the target audience and the instrumentality of the direct victim. Paul Wilkinson's widely quoted definition is much closer to Walter's, since he is explicit about the importance of the target audience and does not limit the definition to acts against civilians or civilian targets. He argues that terrorism has five main characteristics:

> It is premeditated and aims to create a climate of extreme fear or terror; it is directed at a wider audience or target than the immediate victims of the violence; it inherently involves attacks on random and symbolic targets, including civilians; the acts of violence committed are seen by the society in which they occur as extra-normal, in the literal sense that they breach the social norms, thus causing a sense of outrage; and terrorism is used to try to influence political behaviour in some way.
>
> (Wilkinson 1992: 228–9)

The emphasis here on the random nature of the terrorist attack may give rise to the assumption that states do not commit terrorism, and instead can only commit acts of repression. Such arguments posit that states often try to suppress their opponents, so if individuals oppose the government and are victims of state repression as a result, they are not really random targets. People know what they need to do to avoid state violence and need not, therefore, be terrorised if they are compliant. This argument is easily dismissed, because it implies that states could and would repress every single one of their opponents, precluding the possibility that their attacks would be random. The reality, as will be clear in subsequent chapters, is that even targets of state terrorism are selected fairly randomly from among all opponents, with the purpose of making an example of them to others. And when states do target opponents, the intention is not simply to terrify other opponents, but to ensure that compliant citizens remain compliant. This highlights the importance of the distinction between state terrorism and repression. In one regard, we might ask why distinguish between them at all, since both involve the illegitimate targeting of persons that the state has a duty to protect and are both, therefore, widely considered to be immoral. The difference lies in the instrumentality of state terrorism. There is a specific logic of not only harming

the direct victim, but exploiting the opportunity afforded by the harm to terrorise others. In other words, it involves not one, but two intended evils. That this instrumentality is captured by Wilkinson means his definition contains all the core characteristics outlined by Walter. Equally important, in line with Walter, terrorism is defined according to the actions carried out, rather than who the actors are, meaning that the state is not precluded as a potential perpetrator of terrorism.

In an attempt to establish an agenda for research on state terrorism in the 1980s, Christopher Mitchell *et al.* incorporated Walter's core characteristics into their definition of state terrorism. They argued:

> Terrorism by the state (or non-state actors) involves deliberate coercion and violence (or the threat thereof) directed at some victim, with the intention of inducing extreme fear in some target observers who identify with that victim in such a way that they perceive themselves as potential future victims. In this way they are forced to consider altering their behaviour in some manner desired by the actor.
>
> (Mitchell *et al.* 1986: 5)

While this is not far removed from Wilkinson's definition of terrorism, it retains one of the elements established by Walter that have been missing from sub-sequent definitions, namely, that the threat of violence is sufficient for a state to be perpetrating terror. I would add the caveat that a threat would only be suffi-cient in a pre-existing climate of fear induced by prior acts of state terrorism. I am inclined to agree with Ted Robert Gurr that to invoke a sufficient reaction for a target audience to consider altering their behaviour, a threat to some other victim would not be adequate unless it was part of a pattern of activity 'in which instrumental violence occurs often enough that threats of similar violence, made then or later, have their intended effects' (Gurr 1986: 46).

Drawing on existing definitions of terrorism then, and specifically the core characteristics set out by Walter, I propose that state terrorism involves the following four key elements:

1　there must be a deliberate act of violence against individuals that the state has a duty to protect, or a threat of such an act if a climate of fear has already been established through preceding acts of state violence;
2　the act must be perpetrated by actors on behalf of or in conjunction with the state, including paramilitaries and private security agents;
3　the act or threat of violence is intended to induce extreme fear in some target observers who identify with that victim; and
4　the target audience is forced to consider changing their behaviour in some way.

With the exception of Walter's definition, all of the definitions discussed argue that the nature of the change in behaviour in the target audience has to be political. In line with Walter, I do not make the same claim, since states have frequently

used violence against individuals and groups to terrorise a wider audience so that they subordinate themselves to the wishes of the state. Those wishes may of course include lending political support to the state, and this has certainly been the case in the latter half of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, but those wishes may also involve citizens labouring in the interests of elites. As I show in Chapter 3, this was frequently the case in colonial states, where imperialists used terror to coerce citizens into working, often as slaves, to extract resources. The strength of Walter's criteria, therefore, is that state terror where the objective is to coerce behaviour other than political behaviour is not precluded. As already implied, the key ingredient that distinguishes state terrorism from other forms of state repression is the intent of the actor to create extreme fear among an audience beyond the direct victim of the violence, in short, its instrumentality.

International law and state terrorism

Before discussing the importance of the target audience in more detail, a few words on state terrorism in relation to international law are warranted. As discussed above, state terrorism has not been codified in international law as an illegal act. As I will show, state terrorism nevertheless involves acts which are themselves violations of international law, with the aim of terrorising others through those illegal acts. A case of state terrorism as such has never been put to the legal test, although acts that violated international law and were intended to terrorise have been tried as war crimes. In this regard, state terrorism can be defined with reference to the illegality of the acts it involves, even though we cannot argue that state terrorism itself is illegal. Attempting to define state terrorism in relation to domestic law is, however, counterproductive, as Mitchell *et al.* point out, since agents of the state, and even the highest echelons of the state apparatus, violate their own laws, or introduce 'temporary' measures, usually justified in light of some perceived or implied 'emergency' that enable them to suspend their laws (Mitchell *et al.* 1986: 13). For the purposes of identifying and analysing state terrorism, and even calling governments to account for their actions, therefore, it is worth examining acts of state terrorism in relation to international norms and laws, specifically those concerned with human rights. Of course the perpetrating state may ignore international norms and laws, just as they ignore or circumvent their own laws. But they are at least being held to account according to obligations and standards that exist independently of that state, and in the cases of the countries under consideration here at least, they profess to respect and uphold those standards.

State terrorism involves the deliberate targeting of individuals that the state has a duty to protect, in order to invoke terror in a wider audience. The deliberate targeting of civilians, either in armed conflict or in peacetime, violates principles enshrined in the two bodies of international law that deal with the protection of human rights: International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL). Human rights are those rights which all citizens share under international law, both in peacetime and during armed conflict. The

most fundamental of these are the right to life, the prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the prohibition of slavery and servitude and the prohibition of retroactive criminal laws (ICRC 2003). They are to be guaranteed by armed actors under IHL, and by the state and armed actors under IHRL. Military forces are required to uphold both IHL and IHRL. There are key differences between the circumstances in which IHL and IHRL apply. According to the ICRC, rules of IHL apply primarily to issues that are 'outside the purview of IHRL, such as the conduct of hostilities, combatant and prisoner of war status and the protection of the red cross and red crescent emblems' (ICRC 2003). The main treaty sources for IHL are the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, and the Additional Protocols I and II of 1977.

Targeting armed enemy combatants is legitimate in warfare but, even then, certain acts are prohibited, as set out in the Geneva Conventions. These include killing prisoners of war, or subjecting them to torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (ICRC 1949). Where the laws prohibiting such acts are violated, states may also be guilty of state terrorism, as I will later show with reference to the abuse of detainees in the 'War on Terror'. IHL also deals with the thorny question of what acts are permissible in warfare where civilian casualties are likely to ensue. The targeting of civilians is prohibited, both by IHL and IHRL, in times of war and peace. It is acknowledged in IHL, however, that civilian casualties are likely to be a secondary effect of certain actions deemed to be legitimate in armed conflict. There is considerable support for these principles, as a recent consultation by the ICRC to assess global attitudes to the targeting of non-combatants found (ICRC 1999). For the great majority of respondents in the countries surveyed, the principle of not attacking civilians is absolute. They found that 64 per cent of those surveyed say that combatants, when attacking to weaken the enemy, must attack only combatants and leave civilians alone. Furthermore, two-thirds of respondents rejected the practice of combatants putting pressure on the enemy by denying populations food, water and medicine, as well as attacking populated areas where civilians would die. Three-quarters were also opposed to attacks on civilians that provided material support to combatants (ICRC 1999: x–xi). In other words, the respondents also reject acts tantamount to state terrorism. IHL is therefore concerned with ensuring that maximum effort is made to protect civilians when such operations take place, and with ensuring that any risks taken with civilian life are proportional to the acts being carried out. As I will discuss below, with reference to strategic aerial bombardment, this is far from straightforward, but where states violate certain key principles, they may be guilty of state terrorism.

Some IHRL treaties permit governments to derogate from certain rights in situations of public emergency threatening the life of the nation, but there are some rights that are never to be violated:

> Derogations must, however, be proportional to the crisis at hand, must not be introduced on a discriminatory basis and must not contravene other rules of international law – including rules of IHL. Certain human rights are

never derogable. Among them are the right to life, freedom from torture, or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, prohibition of slavery and servitude and prohibition of retroactive criminal laws.

<div align="right">(ICRC 2003)</div>

State terrorism involves the derogation from one or more of these against an individual or group, in order to invoke fear in a wider audience. The illegally targeted individual may be a civilian or an enemy combatant who has been disarmed and is being detained. The law is clear that there should be no derogations at all from the provisions of IHL that uphold the right to life and the right to freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.[2] In other words, states have a duty at all times to protect the lives of their citizens and protect them from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. States, as discussed above, also have a duty to protect enemy combatants they detain from the same. State terrorism, then, only exists through the illegal targeting of individuals that states have a duty to protect. In this regard, as with other forms of state repression, a key ingredient of state terrorism is that it involves acts that are illegal under international law. It is deemed illegal and inhuman when non-state actors commit those acts, and it is no more humane if the perpetrator is a state.

The importance of the target audience

What differentiates state terrorism from other forms of repression is the intent of the actor to create extreme fear among an audience beyond the direct victim of the violence. That audience may be a domestic audience, and it may be a limited one, consisting of only the immediate acquaintances of the actual victim. Indeed states may go to great lengths to maintain secrecy, certainly at the international level. Brigitte Nacos has argued that a central element of terrorism is the publicity the terrorists seek, specifically through the media (Nacos 2007: 17–19). On this logic, violence by states against targets to instil fear in a wider audience which slips under the radar of the news media, would fail to constitute terrorism. The target audience referred to by numerous scholars in their definitions of terrorism should not, therefore, be seen as synonymous with that of the news media. Even when the terrorism is carried out in relative secret, and states do all they can to avoid their actions being exposed, they are nevertheless seeking publicity among a particular, albeit small, audience. For an act of state violence to constitute terrorism, the intention to terrorise must be present, even if the target audience is only a small, internal one. This is significant because it helps us to make an important distinction between isolated incidents of what we might determine to be repression or criminal activity, on the one hand, and state terrorism, on the other. The case of torture is helpful for exploring the significance of the target audience.

Many victims of state repression are subjected to torture. The most comprehensive account of torture to date has recently been published by Darius Rejali, and explores the many methods of torture that have been used over centuries,

how they have evolved, the functions torture serves and the legitimacy of the arguments justifying its use. Rejali also demonstrates the use of torture by liberal democratic states (Rejali 2007). In some cases torture is carried out covertly, and is aimed primarily at tormenting the victim. It of course violates international law. Torture is outlawed by Protocol II, Part II, Article IV of the Geneva Conventions (ICRC 1977), the United Nations Convention Against Torture (UN 1985), as well as by article three of the Council of Europe's Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (CoE 1998). For torture to constitute state terrorism it must be aimed at, or have the effect of, terrorising an audience beyond the direct victim. Torture was used in history, very publically, as a form of punishment, but also as a means of deterring criminal behaviour (Beccaria [1764] 1995; Foucault 1977; Peters 1985; Vidal-Naquet 1963). Torture continues to be used as a means of terrorising other incarcerated detainees in order to compel certain behaviour, by ensuring that they hear the torture occurring, or see the physical harm inflicted on their fellow captives. Torture is often intended to alter behaviour among a much wider audience well beyond the prison walls. It was used in this way by the Guatemalan state during the counterinsurgency war of the 1970s and 1980s, during which, as Amnesty International reported, newspapers were permitted to publish photographs of dead torture victims:

> Guatemalan counterinsurgency operations in the early 1980s ... included the terrorisation of targeted rural populations in an effort to ensure that they did not provide support for guerrillas. Tortured, dying villagers were displayed to relatives and neighbours who were prevented from helping them. Newspapers in urban areas during this period were allowed to publish photographs of mutilated bodies, ostensibly as an aid to families seeking their missing relatives, but also as a warning to all citizens not to oppose the government.
>
> (AI 1976)

The publication of the photographs in the Guatemalan case clearly indicates that the target of the terrorism was a very general audience. Indeed the intention was to terrorise the populations of entire cities. In some cases a much more specific organisation or set of individuals will be the intended audience. Had the victims in the Guatemalan case been members of a specific political group that the government opposed, and had the victims' bodies been returned to the group's headquarters, the target of the terrorism would have been that political group, although others in the community may also have been terrorised if they came to know of the torture and murder of those individuals.

If torture occurs in complete secret, and there is no audience to witness it, it is difficult to argue that this constitutes state terrorism. For example, if an isolated individual or group of prison guards or members of the armed forces secretly used torture, and went to great lengths to ensure that no one else knew of it, and there was no evidence that higher authorities had sanctioned the torture, we

might conclude that this was the criminal act of an individual or group, rather than an act of state terrorism. In practice, most torture committed by state agents, as I will show, is part of a wider pattern of state repression and, in many cases, state terrorism. Nevertheless, it is important to make this distinction between criminal activities by individuals on the one hand, and state terrorism on the other, thereby reserving the label of state terrorism for those acts which are condoned at some level by the state. I will discuss in more detail below how we might determine when individual acts are part of a wider policy of state terrorism, and when they are simply isolated illegitimate incidents.

Forms of state terrorism

Terrorism is used by states internally and across state boundaries against their own populations, as a means of maintaining order and quelling political opposition. This involves a range of activities, including disappearances, illegal detention, torture and assassinations. Terrorism was used in this way by, among others, the Latin American national security states during the Cold War. They targeted civilians at home to instil fear among a much wider population, and they targeted their own citizens living abroad, in collaboration with other states, through programmes such as Operation Condor. This entailed intelligence gathering and sharing and the kidnap, interrogation, torture and assassinations of nationals of one Condor state by its own agents or agents of other Condor states, discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. States also use terrorism externally in pursuit of specific foreign policy objectives, either by undertaking limited campaigns of terror against specific individuals or groups, often officials of that state, using acts such as assassinations and bombing campaigns, or by engaging in much more generalised campaigns of terror which are intended to destabilise whole societies. More generalised state terrorism involves the following: acts of war that violate the Geneva Conventions, including the torture and killing of enemy combatants that have been disarmed and the illegal targeting of civilians; hijackings; kidnap; illegal detentions; torture and other humiliating and degrading treatment. In both cases, there are varying degrees to which states are involved in the terrorism. At times they are the main perpetrators, deploying their own agents, such as armed forces or secret services, to engage in acts of terrorism (Stohl 2006: 7). States may also be sponsors of terrorism by other entities. Domestically, sponsorship tends to involve covert support for paramilitary or vigilante groups, or pro-government extremists involved in acts of terrorism against the citizens of the state. Externally, this involves any or all of the following: lending ideological support to, providing financial or military support to, or collaborating and cooperating with, an external terrorist organisation or state involved in terrorism against individuals or groups within its own or another population (Martin 2003: 81–111; Stohl 2006: 7). Such terrorism may include acts of war that violate the Geneva Conventions, including the torture and killing of enemy combatants who have been disarmed and the illegal targeting of civilians, disappearances, assassinations, hijackings, kidnap, illegal detentions,

torture and other humiliating and degrading treatment, and terrorist attacks such as bombing of civilian targets.

The difficulties of identifying state terrorism

I have shown that central to determining whether a specific act constitutes state terrorism depends on establishing that the intimidation of a target audience beyond the direct victim was the intention of the state agents involved. As I discuss below, where this was not the primary intention, but a welcome secondary effect of some other malign act, this still constitutes state terrorism. Determining the intentions of state actors is not easy. Often their purposes will, at best, be ambiguous. This is largely because in most cases governments seek to conceal the extent to which they use terrorism, and when such activities are exposed, they tend to be justified as 'necessary measures' or more benignly as 'police action' (Mitchell *et al.* 1986: 2–3; Nicholson 1986: 31). Indeed, while liberal democratic states are willing to invest heavily to produce data on terrorist incidents and threats against their own interests, usually through academic institutions and government-sponsored think tanks (Burnett and Whyte 2005; Herman and O'Sullivan 1989: 69; Silke 2004a), obtaining data on acts of terrorism committed by those states is extremely difficult, since they tend not to advertise their terrorist activities or intent (Chambliss 1989: 203–4; Gibbs 1989: 330; Mitchell *et al.* 1986: 2; Nicholson 1986: 31). When such activities are exposed, considerable analytical effort is required to determine whether such an act does constitute state terrorism, since they are unlikely to be included in the major data sets of terrorist incidents. This also means that drawing concrete conclusions about whether certain acts constitute state terrorism may not always be possible, and instead we might need to make inferences from other, context-specific evidence. I will explore some of the difficulties involved in identifying state terrorism. They relate primarily to problems of agency and motive. I will then discuss how the various acts of repression that I explore in subsequent chapters can be classified as state terrorism, as distinct from other forms of state violence.

The problem of agency: when are state representatives acting on behalf of the state?

As discussed above, before concluding that an act of violence by a representative of the state was an act of state terrorism, we are confronted with a number of challenges relating to agency and motive.[3] We must first rule out the possibility that the act was simply an isolated, criminal act by an individual with no sanction from the state. Even then, however, the state still holds a degree of responsibility for the actions of its representatives. Whether we conclude that a state sanctioned the act, and therefore was complicit in state terrorism through its agents, depends very much on how the state responds afterwards. If the state fails to prosecute the individual to the full extent of the law and fails to compensate the victims, and if the state attempts to excuse the actions in some way, the

state is, to some extent condoning the actions of that individual. We can argue therefore that the state was complicit.

No state or government can be seen as a single decision-maker, or as a homogenous group. Rather it is a complex web of connections between numerous entities that have varying degrees of autonomy (Nicholson 1986: 29). While those different components are operating to achieve a range of objectives, some of which conflict and some of which converge, there may nevertheless be a shared set of overall objectives, or what is often termed 'the national interest'. There may also be a shared set of strategies used by various organs of the state to achieve those objectives. As I show in Chapter 3, the interests of states and of capital are central to this work. I am concerned with whether the acts of violence committed by the agents of liberal democratic states from the North contribute to the pursuit of the 'national interest', understood to mean the aim of maintaining their positions of power in terms of their military, political, economic and ideological strength, and to secure access to and control of resources and markets in the South. However, determining how specific acts, in this case of state terrorism, contribute to the achievement of those interests, is far from straightforward. Sometimes decision-makers may act for bureaucratic, party or organisational reasons that have little to do with the pursuit of what is perceived to be the national interest, and the objectives of these groups may not always be congruent with what is broadly perceived to be the national interest (Brodie 1973: 343). As already discussed, some acts of violence by state agents may simply constitute criminal acts, and not acts of state terrorism. In other cases, acts of violence by agents of the state may indeed be acts of state terrorism, since they are aimed at instilling fear in a target audience beyond the victim, even if that target audience is a limited, internal one. In cases where we find no evidence that the terrorism was explicitly sanctioned by the upper echelons of the state, we may still conclude that the state was complicit, particularly if it does not take appropriate punitive measures against those responsible. While the state is a disparate network of entities with conflicting and competing objectives as well as methods, the highest levels of the state are nevertheless accountable for the actions of its agents.

Acts of state terrorism may occur because a specific organ of the state determines that this is the most efficient way of achieving the perceived national interest, even though other organs of the state, and in some cases the highest levels of the state, may not approve such actions. In such cases, those acts of violence still constitute state terrorism, but it would be hard to make the case that they were part of an institutionalised policy of terrorism. This would only be the case if the upper echelons of the state explicitly approve the use of terrorism by one or more organs of the state, as a means of achieving the wider objectives of the state. With reference to the use of torture at Abu Ghraib, I will demonstrate the importance of context-specific evidence in determining, first, whether acts of violence by state agents were acts of state terrorism and, second, whether those acts were part of an institutionalised policy of state terrorism.

To differentiate between the odd isolated criminal act of a prison officer or member of the armed forces, and an act of state terrorism, it is important to

examine the reaction of the relevant officials and the state. If measures are taken, swiftly, to try and punish the perpetrator(s) through proper legal and disciplinary channels, and if there is no evidence of a broader pattern of such incidents, nor of the state sanctioning such activities, we might conclude that this was a criminal act by an individual or group, and not an act deliberately enacted by the state to terrorise. This was indeed what the Pentagon and Bush administration claimed once the photographs emerged in 2004 revealing that detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq had been tortured by US personnel. Nevertheless, as I discuss in more detail below, this claim cannot be sustained, since there have been very few prosecutions, sentences have been light and punitive measures have been limited to lower ranking soldiers, rather than the senior officers involved, or indeed the officials in the Bush administration who fought to ensure that methods tantamount to torture be permitted against terror suspects. In a speech on Iraq on 24 May 2004, shortly after the public had learned of the torture, President Bush declared: 'Under the dictator [Saddam Hussein], prisons like Abu Ghraib were symbols of death and torture. That same prison became a symbol of disgraceful conduct by a few American troops who dishonored our country and disregarded our values' (Bush, cited in Milbank 2004). This condemnation was intended for external audiences, since Bush and other senior figures in the administration were embroiled in efforts to permit the use of torture against detainees. Bush did not refer to the acts committed by US troops at Abu Ghraib as torture, labelling them instead 'disgraceful conduct' by troops who, he argued, acted in ways contrary to US values. The same conclusions were drawn by Major General Antonio Tabuga in his initial inquiry. He concluded that the torture was the work of a few bad apples in need of improved training (Taguba 2004: 37). Yet the record of events uncovered through various leaked documents shows that despite the public statement condemning torture, the administration had been behind numerous attempts to allow torture of detainees in the 'War on Terror'. The links between the torture at Abu Ghraib and the leaked documents was traced by investigative journalist Seymour Hersh (Hersh 2004), and the documents in question have now been compiled by Karen Greenberg and Joshua Dratel (Greenberg and Dratel 2005). Policies outlined in the various memos, which included not affording protection under the Geneva Conventions to detainees, and allowing torture, were enacted.

Senior officials in the Bush administration made various efforts to justify the use of torture in the 'War on Terror', as well as to redefine torture so that only the most extreme forms of physical pain were defined as such (Bybee 2002: 172–214). Precisely what the approved torture methods would involve is indicated in a memo from Major General Dunlavey, dated 11 October 2002, requesting permission from General James T. Hill for approval of techniques which were drawn from US survival techniques training given to American forces during the Cold War to resist the worst of communist Gulag treatment, known as Survival Evasion Resistance Escape, or SERE. The techniques recommended for use against detainees in the 'War on Terror' included:

The use of stress positions such as the proposed standing for four hours, the use of isolation for up to thirty days, and interrogating the detainee in an environment other than the standard interrogation booth ... the deprivation of light and sensory stimuli, the placement of a hood over the detainees head during transportation and questioning, and the use of 20 hour interrogations ... forced grooming and the removal of clothing ... the use of scenarios designed to convince the detainee that death or severely painful consequences are imminent ... exposure to cold weather or water ... the use of a wet towel to induce the misperception of suffocation.

(Dunlavey 2002)

These techniques were subsequently sanctioned by Donald Rumsfeld who, on 2 December 2002, signed off on the request made to him by William J. Haynes, General Counsel, on behalf of Southern Command on 27 November 2002 to approve these techniques (Haynes 2002). The CIA also admitted to using water boarding, a variation on the use of the wet towel to induce feelings of suffocation against a handful of suspects in the 'War on Terror' (BBC 2008).

The official basis for the approval of torture has been that it may yield intelligence. No explicit statement has come to light to indicate that it was intended to terrorise a wider audience. This does not mean that if carried out, the torture advocated by the administration would not have had a terrorising effect. It simply means that this was not the stated intention of those seeking to justify the torture. Donald Rumsfeld headed a working group that recommended torture be used in US detention facilities such as Guantánamo Bay against suspects in the 'War on Terror'. The argument was made that valuable intelligence could be gained through 'enhanced interrogation techniques' (Rumsfeld 2003: 341–4). Further evidence that the administration was directly involved in seeking to justify the use of torture is provided in a memo from Jay Bybee of the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel to Alberto Gonzales, counsel to the president, in 2002, advising that torture may be justified to prevent terrorist attacks:

In the current circumstances, however, an enemy combatant in detention does not himself present a threat of harm.... Nonetheless, leading scholarly commentators believe that interrogation of such individuals using methods that might violate Section 2340A [of title 18 of the US Code, which implements the UN's Convention Against Torture] would be justified under the doctrine of self-defence, because the combatant by aiding and promoting the terrorist plot 'has culpably caused the situation where someone might get hurt. If hurting him is the only means to prevent the death or injury of others put at risk by his actions, such torture should be permissible, and on the same basis that self-defence is permissible.'

(Bybee 2002: 211)

There is no discussion in the memo of the utility of torture, despite the fact that there is a wealth of evidence that shows that torture is rarely effective in securing

credible intelligence, although it can be effective in securing false confessions and in intimidating others (Rejali 2007: 446–79). Neither is there any comment on the possibility that those against whom the torture is intended to be used are simply suspects, not proven to be terrorists or even to possess the intelligence that it is assumed the torture would yield. Indeed, most torture has very little to do with securing intelligence, and is instead used to deter potential and actual opposition to a regime (Blakeley 2007b).

Importantly, the Bybee memo also fails to refer to the terrorising effects of torture. While there is no explicit evidence that those involved in these discussions intended that these tactics would be used to terrorise an audience beyond the direct victims of the torture, if victims of torture are not subsequently killed, they become a living testament to their families and contacts around them of the practices used against them. Those contacts in turn fear the same treatment. In other words, fear is perpetuated, and the torture itself has successfully transmitted a message to a whole network of people of the types of things that might befall them if they step out of line. So even if there is no explicit statement of torture's terrorising effect, those seeking to defend its use will have known its likely consequences. Furthermore, in the case of Abu Ghraib, the photographs themselves can be used as a means of intimidating both those photographed, by threatening to expose them, bringing shame on the individual and their family, and can also be used to intimidate others. As I will show in Chapter 6, photographs of torture victims were shown to a number of victims of extraordinary rendition, as a means of terrorising them before they themselves were subjected to torture. As is clear from the earlier discussion of torture in prisons, torture has often been used against incarcerated individuals, not only to illicit a specific response from the victim, but also to coerce others around them to respond. Thus by sanctioning these techniques, the administration may well have intended them as a means not only of gaining intelligence from the direct victims of the torture, however flawed this assumption was, but from other prisoners who witnessed the torture or its effects.

The response of the administration to the abuses at Abu Ghraib involved proceedings in military courts against nine reservists involved in the abuses, three of whom were convicted; the other six made plea deals (Gutierrez 2005). None of the senior officers implicated were brought to trial, and there was no attempt to hold to account those in the Bush administration who had themselves been involved in efforts to legitimise torture. Following criticism of the Bybee memo, the Department of Justice issued a new memo in December 2004, stating that it 'supersedes the August 2002 memo in its entirety' and that, 'torture is abhorrent both to American law and values and to international norms' (Levin 2004). While the new memo did not directly address the earlier conclusions that torture might be justified on self-defence grounds, this declaration is clear that the US state officially prohibits torture. Yet the documents outlined show that abuses of the kind enacted at Abu Ghraib had been sanctioned at the highest levels. Although the administration condemned the torture at Abu Ghraib, it cannot deny responsibility for the attitudes that developed as a consequence of its own efforts to legitimise torture in the 'War on Terror'. Following the revelations of

the abuses at Abu Ghraib, I interviewed several Pentagon officials. A number of them indicated that that there was confusion among US military and intelligence personnel about what was permitted and what was not, following the issue of the various memos by the President, the Department of Justice and the Department of Defence itself.[4] Without examining the wider context of the Abu Ghraib case, it would be possible to conclude that this was an isolated incident committed by a small number of miscreants, and this was certainly the message that the administration attempted to portray. The reality, however, as I will show in more detail in Chapter 6, is that there have been many cases of abuse in the 'War on Terror' at numerous camps in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as at Guantánamo Bay, at the hands of US and allied forces. Furthermore, as I will show in Chapter 6, the policy of extraordinary rendition has resulted in torture and abuse, sanctioned by the US and various liberal democratic allies, and carried out by security agents from many countries with appalling human rights records. Abu Ghraib, therefore, was not an isolated incident, but part of a much bigger pattern of terrorism sanctioned by the US state.

The case of Abu Ghraib underlines the importance of the wider context when considering whether acts of violence by state agents constitute state terrorism. As Mitchell *et al.* note, 'it is frequently impossible to tell what intentions underlie an observable act from the mere observation of the act itself' (Mitchell *et al.* 1986: 7). In many of the cases of state terrorism explored in the chapters that follow, such information confirming that the state intended to terrorise a wider group beyond the actual victims of certain acts of violence has emerged and, often, this was explicitly stated as policy at the highest levels of government, as I will show with reference to now declassified documents. But where no such evidence emerges, we have to look to the broader context. In the case of disappearances, it would be helpful to determine whether there were disappearances of other individuals critical of the state during the same period. Certainly in the Latin American states during the Cold War, as I will show, initially a small number of people assumed to be a threat to the regime disappeared, but these occurred in sufficient numbers to imply a pattern. In many cases there was nothing terribly secretive about the means by which individuals were taken. In Argentina and Chile, for example, it was not uncommon for individuals to be taken by government agents in broad daylight. This would imply that the disappearances were as much a part of an attempt by the governments to intimidate their associates as an effort to remove political opponents. Examining the context of specific acts, therefore, can also help indicate whether there was an intention on the part of the state to terrorise.

A further indicator of intention concerns the reasonably anticipated likely consequence of an act. If, for example, a state chooses to bomb civilian areas of a city, knowing that this is almost certainly going to result in civilian casualties, it cannot claim that no harm was meant to civilians. Similarly, if state agents are in the business of kidnapping political activists, the state cannot claim that it did not intend to terrorise other political activists. If such acts are carried out repeatedly, despite the state having already seen that civilians are killed and terrorised by the bombing, and that political activists are fearful, we can conclude that this

was the intended outcome of those acts and that the state, therefore, is committing acts of terrorism against civilians.

Mixed motives

Linked to the problem of determining whether state agents are acting on behalf of the state to instil terror, is the problem of identifying whether a broad set of actions, some legitimate, some less so, which resulted in the terrorising of a particular sector of the population, can be said to constitute state terrorism. In such circumstances the terror may ensue from the acts of one specific arm of government, and may not be the intended outcome of the upper echelons of the state. As discussed above, this still constitutes state terrorism, but may not be indicative of an institutionalised policy of state terrorism. Mitchell *et al.* illustrate the difficulties of such a case with reference to the activities of the Kenyan government in 1966–7, which saw the massive and violent relocation of the population in the north-eastern region of the country in order to undertake search and destroy operations on the cleared areas to root out the Mau Mau insurgents. Mitchell *et al.* argue that the government might have had a variety of objectives, such as easing the task of the security forces, simplifying the administration of the local population, land reform and resettlement. They state, 'Only incidentally might such a policy be regarded as a way of cowing and instilling fear in the dissident population, and the realisation that this has, indeed, been the effect arises only at a subsequent stage of the operation' (Mitchell *et al.* 1986: 7). They go on to propose that this may not constitute state terrorism until the later stages of the operation, at the point when either the anti-insurgent objectives have been achieved or when they have been judged to be a failure, and yet the security forces persist with their repressive operations (Mitchell *et al.* 1986: 7). However, if these effects could be reasonably foreseen, and the policy was still enacted, then the argument can be made that there was a degree of intention. There are clearly ambiguities here, since elements of the operation were neither intended to nor in fact resulted in terror. Other elements did result in terror, but it is not clear that this was part of an institutionalised policy of terrorism. Where it is unclear if the upper echelons of a state sanctioned repression we can examine its response to the repression. The following questions should be asked, in the absence of any evidence that the repression was state policy. First, at what point did the state acknowledge that it knew of the repression? At this point, did the state seek to halt the repression? If not, how long was it before the state took any action to rein in its representatives and limit the use of violence? As Mitchell *et al.* argue, making an absolute determination in such cases is very difficult, but the longer the abuses go on, the more confident we can be that the violence should be attributed to the upper echelons of the state (Mitchell *et al.* 1986: 8).

Unintended consequence as state terrorism

In some cases, groups within a society may be terrorised as a consequence of other repressive acts or policies. In other words, states may have multiple objectives or

intentions when they carry out one act. This raises the question of whether we can argue that state terrorism has occurred if it is not the primary or only outcome of an action. According to Mitchell *et al.*, if the terror was unintentional, we could not argue that this was 'true' terrorism. But this assumes that we can determine that the terror was not intentional, rather than one of a number of intentions of the act. If we apply this condition, an act of repression cannot be defined as state terrorism if it is primarily aimed at harming the victim, a secondary effect of which is to terrorise other groups within a population. Mitchell *et al.* illustrate their argument with the example of the policies of the Khmer Rouge that were aimed at the destruction of a particular sector of society, and which therefore constituted genocide. While this will have instilled terror throughout society, this was not the primary intention. By contrast, they argue, policies such as US Operation Phoenix in South Vietnam, which involved terrorising people associated with members of the National Liberation Front by publically rounding them up, torturing and assassinating them, do constitute state terrorism, because terrorising the target audience was the primary objective (Mitchell *et al.* 1986: 6).

Such a sharp distinction should not be made between terror as a secondary effect and terror as the primary objective of an act, particularly in cases where the act itself is illegitimate. Even where terror is not the primary intention, but a secondary effect of some other act, it still constitutes state terrorism. A parallel can be drawn with Michael Walzer's work on the legitimacy of acts in war which are likely to have evil consequences. He argues that, in line with the *jus in bello* principles, an act that is likely to have evil consequences is only permissible providing four conditions hold:

> that the act is good in itself or at least indifferent, which means ... that it is a legitimate act of war; that the direct effect is morally acceptable ... that the intention of the actor is good, that is, he aims only at the acceptable effect; the evil effect is not one of his ends, nor is it a means to an ends; that the good effect is sufficiently good to compensate for allowing the evil effect; it must be justifiable under the proportionality rule.
>
> (Walzer 2000: 153)

And with regard to intentions, Walzer restates the third condition as follows:

> The intention of the actor is good, that is, he aims narrowly at the acceptable effect; the evil effect is not one of his ends, nor is it a means to his ends, and, aware of the evil involved, he seeks to minimise it, accepting costs to himself.
>
> (Walzer 2000: 155)

These conditions can be usefully applied to state terrorism, where it appears to be a secondary effect of some other act. State terrorism in such cases is not the unintended secondary effect of some good or indifferent act. It is a consequence of a policy which itself is illegitimate, repressive and, on Walzer's terms, evil. Furthermore, if the state seeks to commit genocide, for example, against a specific

group, are they not assisted because others outside of that group are sufficiently fearful of the consequences for themselves if they were to intervene in an attempt to prevent the genocide? And could the terror that arises among other groups not be an intended effect, whether primary or secondary? In the case of the genocide by Nazi Germany against Jews, gypsies and homosexuals, individuals outside of those groups may not have intervened because they had been sufficiently terrorised by the increasing intensity of efforts by the Nazis to single these groups out, round them up and transport them to unknown places, and subsequently by the rumours they had heard of concentration camps, and of others outside those groups, who had attempted to protect the vulnerable, themselves disappearing. Indeed, as Gurr notes, Adolf Hitler, while in power, was explicit about the fact that his genocidal policies also served as a tool of terror to deter opposition:

> I shall spread terror through the surprising application of all means. The sudden shock of a terrible fear of death is what matters. Why should I deal otherwise with all my political opponents? These so-called atrocities save me hundreds of thousands of individual actions against the protestors and discontents. Each one of them will think twice to oppose me when he learns what is [awaiting] him in the [concentration] camp.
>
> (Adolf Hitler, cited in Gurr 1986: 46–7)

Even where the terror is not a secondary objective, it might prove expedient to the state, and should be labelled state terrorism. Walzer argues that to conclude that a secondary effect was unintentional there would have to be evidence that the actors involved sought to minimise the secondary effect. It is difficult to envisage that a state involved in a genocidal policy would be too concerned about minimising the ensuing terror among others outside of the targeted group, particularly where the terror may be instrumental to its overall objectives.

As with various phenomena in the social sciences, identifying state terrorism and determining whether it was used instrumentally in pursuit of a state's objectives requires that we make judgments concerning the agency and motives behind specific acts. To legitimately label incidents of violence by representatives of the state as state terrorism, those incidents should not be analysed in isolation, but with reference to the wider context. This helps overcome some of the ambiguities we face when seeking to determine the degree of sanction from the state for those acts of violence, and the purpose that they were intended to serve. In some cases it simply may not be possible to make a decisive judgement, and it may only be through the passage of time that sufficient evidence comes to light to confirm that an act of state terrorism was committed, and to confirm that it was part of a wider institutionalised policy of terrorism.

Acts of state terrorism

In the subsequent chapters I examine various cases in which state terrorism was used by liberal democratic states from the North to achieve its foreign policy

objectives in the South. Some of those cases, as I will show, were part of a broader policy of state terrorism that involved various organs of the state, and were sanctioned at the highest levels. Here I will briefly outline the different acts of state violence that are included in the subsequent chapters. State terrorism can take on two forms, as previously mentioned. The first involves small-scale operations aimed at more specific targets, or what I refer to as limited state terrorism. This includes one-off events, small-scale terror directed at one group or sector or a series of small operations. The second is state terrorism that is intended to instil fear among large sections of the population, or what might be referred to as generalised, governance or wholesale state terrorism. This refers to its widespread use as a means of governance or during war. Use of state terrorism in this way is much more likely in situations where the state has institutionalised a policy of terrorism, in which case we are likely to see both focused and generalised state terrorism enacted by numerous state agents, possibly from various organs of the state. In cases where the state has not instituted state policies of terrorism, we are more likely to see focused acts of state terrorism, committed by a small number of state agents representing perhaps just one organ of the state.

Limited state terrorism

Limited state terrorism involves the use of violence by the state in order to instil fear in a specific target audience, rather than among a more general population. Sometimes such acts of state terrorism are enacted against the highest levels of government. Assassination attempts may be made by the state on senior political figures, just as non-state terrorists might target senior politicians. In these cases, the wider audience are the allies of those politicians, and the assassination is usually a warning intended to alter the political behaviour of their allies. This could be the work of the state against political opponents within that state, or of an outside state seeking to alter politics within a foreign sovereign state. Infamous examples include the many failed assassination attempts by the CIA against Fidel Castro of Cuba, discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. Where the specific target audience of assassination attempts is political opponents directly involved in government, they are likely, and may indeed be intended, to terrorise a much wider audience, and are often accompanied by other acts of state terrorism.

As discussed, the state may use torture among detainees in a prison to elicit specific responses from other prisoners, such as confessions or compliance. Similarly, evidence that specific individuals have been tortured might be circulated among a particular political organisation, such as a trade union or political party, as a means of deterring political activity by these groups. Disappearances and assassinations may be used in the same way. Individuals from political groups may be disappeared or assassinated as a warning to other members of that particular group. I have already discussed the measures we can take to distinguish between acts that are simply criminal acts by individuals and acts of state terrorism, and have also commented on how we might determine whether disappearances are intended to instil fear among a specific group or a much wider

audience. The same principles apply to assassinations. We must assess individual acts in relation to the wider context. Similarly, to conclude that such acts are part of a wider institutionalised policy of terrorism, we will need to consider whether the state is using these tactics in conjunction with others. The presence of death squads which stalk their targets quite openly before carrying out assassinations, for example, would be evidence of the intent to terrorise a wider audience. It would also indicate a strategy aimed at terrorising a wider community than just the political associates of that individual. Similarly, support by the state for terrorist groups or paramilitary organisations that carry out acts of violence and terrorise civilians would be further evidence of an institutionalised policy.

Depending on the extent of their use, the degree to which they are publicised, and the range of the backgrounds of their victims, methods such as torture, disappearances and assassinations might be deemed acts of generalised or wholesale rather than limited state terrorism, particularly when used in conjunction with each other. This was true in many of the national security states in Latin America during the Cold War, as I show in Chapter 4. One of the reasons why there is some overlap between limited and more generalised or wholesale state terrorism is the former tends to lead to the latter. Again the case of torture illustrates this point well. In the 'War on Terror', various arguments were made, most notably by the lawyer, Alan Dershowitz, that torture may be a regrettable but necessary tool in the fight against non-state terrorism, and therefore its use should be regulated and carefully controlled by the state so that it is only used in very specific circumstances (Dershowitz 2001: 19). Amnesty International note, however, that in all the years that they have researched torture, it always expands from a few isolated cases to being widespread and fairly indiscriminate:

> We have not found a single state which tortures 'only once', or only in a few extreme cases. Whenever and wherever torture and cruelty are accepted as legitimate tools of government 'in extreme circumstances' they become widespread – the means used become increasingly extreme and the circumstances in which they are used increasingly less so. Moreover, those states which use torture and ill-treatment against political opponents do not stop at these acts, but resort also to other violent and repressive measures, such as 'disappearances' and extrajudicial executions, not only against detainees, but also against a wider population associated with the 'enemy'.
>
> (AI 2006b)

Rarely does torture remain a tool to be used against specific individuals and opposition groups, therefore. It quickly tends to become more widespread and indiscriminate (Rejali 2007: 478). This is because while torture may initially be intended for use against overt political opponents, those in control of torture regimes tend to be poor at finding such opponents, and at distinguishing between those and others that pose little or no threat. One tactic deployed is to detain and torture the associates of known opponents, initially close friends and family, but before long large networks of people that have had only fleeting contact with sus-

pected opponents. Simultaneously, notions of what constitute 'political opponents' are widely interpreted so that, eventually, all kinds of people may be considered a threat. For example, teachers who may not be at all involved in political processes are considered a threat because they are classified as individuals who may be interested in politics and may at some point engage with opposition groups, and because they may yield influence over others. Similarly, students may be considered a threat because they spend time debating with others and are in a good position to organise. They too may therefore face threat of torture, as I will show in Chapter 4 with reference to the National Security States in Latin America. The same effects are likely when a state begins using assassinations and disappearances as a means of deterring political opposition.

Generalised or wholesale state terrorism

In addition to using methods such as torture, disappearances and assassinations as a means of terrorising a wider audience, states sometimes carry out acts of violence that target great numbers of people at one time and, in the process, terrorise many more. Examples include aerial bombardment, mass detention and interrogation. Specific programmes have been implemented for these purposes by states in the past. Military planners will argue that the aim of aerial bombardment is to attack strategically significant targets. This can, but does not always, include the targeting of a civilian population with the intention of terrorising to provoke a political response. In 1942, Directive 22, issued to the British Bomber Command, called for the deliberate targeting of residential neighbourhoods, as Beau Grosscup shows. The designated targets were 'the morale of the enemy civilian population, in particular industrial workers' and the points to be aimed at were 'built-up areas, not for instance, the dockyards or aircraft factories' (Grosscup 2006: 64). As Grosscup demonstrates, 'Bomber' Harris ordered the bombing of residential areas in Germany, and his memoirs indicate his conviction that 'air power alone could win the war if the RAF were allowed to bomb the working class into open revolt against the Nazis' (Grosscup 2006: 65). Grosscup argues that from then on the British bombing of Germany 'was purposely indiscriminate with the intent of terrorizing the civilian Huns into political revolt or flight' (Grosscup 2006: 65).

Terrorising the civilian population is not necessarily always the primary objective of an air campaign, but it can be a welcome secondary effect. For example, in Operation Desert Storm, the US-led campaign against Iraq in 1990–1, civilians were never intended as direct targets. According to the Gulf War Air Power Surveys (an analysis carried out by the US Air Force following the Gulf War), 'there was widespread agreement from the outset of the planning process that directly attacking the people of Iraq or their food supply was neither compatible with US objectives nor morally acceptable to the American people' (Keaney and Cohen 1993: 3, Chapter 6). The target categories drawn up by the planners also indicate that civilians were not intended as direct targets. Iraq's national power structure was divided among five broad core categories: Leadership, Key

Production, Infrastructure, Population and Fielded Forces. Within these core categories, there were a number of 'strategic' targets. The Survey states that 'the Iraqi population was not made a direct target of bombing' (Keaney and Cohen 1993: 1–3, Chapter 6). The authors of the Gulf War Air Power Surveys claim that the air campaign had not only been 'precise, efficient and legal, but had resulted in very few civilian casualties' (Keaney and Cohen 1993: 27, Chapter 6). A Greenpeace International study estimated that between 5,000 and 15,000 civilians were killed as a direct result of sorties flown against strategic targets in the war (Arkin *et al.* 1991: 46–7). The Greenpeace report does indeed note that efforts were made by the allied forces to keep civilian casualties to an absolute minimum (Arkin *et al.* 1991: 7–8). It nevertheless highlights the catastrophic human impact of the air campaign, caused by the devastation of the Iraqi infrastructure and the intense environmental degradation caused by the bombing (Arkin *et al.* 1991: 5). This was a result of the intensity of the air campaign. On average 2,500 combat sorties were flown daily. These included more than 1,000 bombing missions where almost 6,000 bombs and over 2,000 tonnes of munitions were dropped. As Greenpeace report, 'In one day of the Gulf War, there were as many combat missions flown against Iraq as Saddam Hussein experienced in the entire Iran–Iraq war' (Arkin *et al.* 1991: 6).[5]

There was, however, no indication in the Gulf War Air Power Surveys that measures were taken to minimise the secondary effect of terrorising the population, which would undoubtedly ensue from aerial bombardment of targets deemed to be legitimate, especially given the extensive nature of the bombing campaign. The opposite was true. There was a view among a number of those involved in the planning of the air campaign that harming the morale of the civilian population would be a welcome secondary effect of the targeting of Iraq's electricity generating capacity:

> As for civilian morale, some of the air planners, including General Glosson, felt that 'putting the lights out on Baghdad' would have psychological effects on the average Iraqi.... By demonstrating that Saddam Hussein could not even keep the electricity flowing in Baghdad, it was hoped the Ba'th Party's grip on the Iraqi population could be loosened, thereby helping to bring about a change in the regime.
> (Keaney and Cohen 1993: vol. II, part II, ch. 6, p. 19)

Aerial bombardment that killed between 5,000 and 15,000 civilians, and that was sufficient to cripple the entire electricity generation capacity of modern cities such as Baghdad and Basra, is likely to have resulted in considerable levels of fear among the civilian population. This was not seen by the planners as an illegitimate secondary effect, but instead as a welcome means by which to undermine the regime. Indeed it was hoped that the population would be sufficiently 'psychologically affected', a euphemism for 'terrorised', that opposition to the regime would increase. Rather than try and prevent the terrorising of the population, those involved in planning the air campaign actively encouraged it.

A further policy that can constitute state terrorism is the detention and interrogation on a large scale of members of the population and, as I will show in Chapter 4, this practice was used by the French in Algeria and used and condoned by the US in various states during the Cold War in Indochina and Latin America. To determine that such a policy constituted state terrorism, we would need to show that there were no legitimate grounds in law for the detention of so many people, that no legal process had been followed to determine that those involved should be detained, and that this was not part of some other legitimate process. The case of Kenya, discussed above, shows that an argument could be made to the effect that such a policy was not primarily intended as a means of terrorising the population, although this could be a secondary effect. Our challenge is to determine whether this was a deliberate secondary effect, and whether it could therefore be deemed an act of state terrorism. As with other forms of state violence, we may be able to draw conclusions based on the wider context. Were the conditions attending the detentions particularly violent? Was the manner of rounding up and detaining people likely to instil fear in other members of the community? Were individuals released having evidently been subjected to violence, as a means of intimidating others? These are some of the questions we must ask to determine whether cases of mass detention and interrogation can be defined as state terrorism.

Finally, counterinsurgency campaigns, while ostensibly aimed at winning hearts and minds, have, in practice, frequently resulted in generalised state terrorism. Many of the cases of state terrorism discussed in subsequent chapters emanated from counterinsurgency campaigns. These involved gathering intelligence on large numbers of people, often through violent means; mass killings as a means of coercing others into surrendering information, or themselves to the armed forces; and, in the case of the US, the provision of military support and training to foreign forces engaged in counterinsurgency campaigns in countries where the US sought to protect its material interests. Often that training encouraged the use of state terrorism, as I will show. Counterinsurgency doctrine emphasises overcoming insurgencies, not simply through military means, but also through political, economic, psychological and civic actions. A central element of counterinsurgency is to secure support from the public for the counterinsurgency campaign, and to deter them from lending support to or joining the insurgency. Tactics include spreading anti-insurgent propaganda and gathering intelligence about the insurgents in order to pre-empt and thwart their activities, but also putting in place infrastructure development (DoD 2004). It is therefore not intrinsically or necessarily repressive. Indeed US doctrine recognises that coercive counterinsurgency will ultimately fail, and that it is, at best, a holding measure until stability takes root. In the 'War on Terror' US doctrine emphasised that preferred counterinsurgency methods were not coercive, but involved 'assistance and development programs', and leaders were encouraged to 'consider the roles of military, intelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement, information, finance, and economic elements in counterinsurgency' (DoD 2004). Yet counterinsurgency as practised and advocated by the US during the Cold War encouraged repression,

some of which constituted state terrorism. Examples include Operation Phoenix, a CIA counterinsurgency programme established in Vietnam to improve intelligence and wipe out what was assumed by the CIA to be the Vietcong infrastructure (VCI). It involved the widespread use of torture and killings intended to instil fear in citizens suspected of supporting the insurgency. Under Phoenix, according to Douglas Valentine, 'Vietnamese citizens were rounded up and jailed, often in tiger cages, tortured, and killed, either in the process of being arrested or subsequently' (Valentine 2000: 131). Phoenix thereby had the effect not simply of destroying the VCI, but also of instilling terror among Vietnamese civilians, and killing thousands. Civilians, often not even members of the VCI, simply family members or neighbours of suspected members, were frequently killed in their sleep by US and South Vietnamese military personnel:

> Phoenix was, among other things, an instrument of counter-terror – the psychological warfare tactic in which VCI members were brutally murdered along with their families or neighbours as a means of terrorising the neighbouring population into a state of submission. Such horrendous acts were, for propaganda purposes, often made to look as if they had been committed by the enemy.
>
> (Valentine 2000: 13)

As well as murder, torture was widespread under Phoenix, often at Province Interrogation Centres (PICs), in which atrocities occurred including:

> Rape, gang rape, rape using eels, snakes, or hard objects, and rape followed by murder; electrical shock ('the Bell Telephone Hour') rendered by attaching wires to the genitals or other sensitive parts of the body, like the tongue; the 'water treatment'; the 'airplane,' in which a prisoner's arms were tied behind the back and the rope looped over a hook on the ceiling, suspending the prisoner in midair, after which he or she was beaten; beatings with rubber hoses and whips; the use of police dogs to maul prisoners.
>
> (Valentine 2000: 85)

All this occurred at the PICs, through which the CIA claimed it learned the identity and structure of the VCI in each province (Valentine 2000: 80). John Patrick Mouldon was the first director of the PIC programme in Vietnam and he maintained that, 'You can't have an American there all the time watching these things', and blamed the torture on inexperienced advisors, as well as on the practice of the advisors handing responsibility for the PICs onto hired assistants who were 'former cops or Green Berets – paid by the CIA but worked for themselves, doing a dirty job in exchange for a line on the inside track to the black market' (Valentine 2000: 85). According to CIA officer William Colby, who directed Phoenix between 1968 and May 1971, 20,587 alleged Vietcong cadres died as a result of Phoenix. The South Vietnam government places the number at 40,994. The true number will never be known, neither will the number of those killed

under the programme's forerunners, operational from 1965 (Blum 2003: 131; Chomsky and Herman 1979a: 324).

Valentine's work on the Phoenix programme, which involved painstaking gathering of evidence, not just concerning specific acts of violence, but also the wider context, helpfully illustrates the work involved in identifying state terrorism, and determining whether it was part of an institutionalised policy to terrorise. In most cases, we are unlikely to have access to evidence demonstrative of an explicit intention on the part of a state to terrorise. Where such evidence does emerge, it is usually only a long time after the event. The wider context is therefore crucial in our analysis of state violence, where no such evidence emerges, if we are to justifiably label that violence state terrorism.

Conclusion

Existing definitions of terrorism adequately encompass acts by state agents. I have shown that state terrorism involves a deliberate threat or act of violence against a victim by representatives of the state, or a threat of such when a climate of fear already exists through prior acts of state terrorism, which is intended to induce fear in some target observers who identify with the victim, so that the target audience is forced to consider changing their behaviour in some way. This can be, but is not limited to, their political behaviour. The key ingredients identified are entirely consistent with existing definitions of terrorism. It is the intent of the actor to create extreme fear among a target audience that differentiates state terrorism from other forms of state repression, as well as from criminal acts on the part of agents of the state which are not part of a broader strategy of state terrorism. The audience can be a very specific audience, such as a particular political organisation, and where state terrorism is used in this manner, I have referred to it as limited state terrorism. Where the audience is a much broader one, such as an entire community or even a whole population, I have referred to this as generalised state terrorism. There is significant overlap between limited and generalised state terrorism, not least because where state terrorism is used initially in a limited way, it tends to become more widespread, particularly in cases where the purposes of the terrorism are to thwart any challenge to the state's authority and control. Where generalised state terrorism takes place, it may emerge from the use of other forms of repression, where the main objective was not to terrorise, but where this was a secondary, and often welcome, consequence. With reference to the Just War tradition, I have argued that where state terrorism appears to be a secondary motive (albeit an instrumental one) rather than the primary motive of some other act of repression, it still constitutes state terrorism. While state terrorism has not itself been deemed illegal in international law, the acts it involves are, since they involve the illegal targeting of individuals that the state has a duty to protect.

Neither definitions of terrorism nor international law pertaining to human rights present significant obstacles to scholars of state terrorism. On the contrary, they provide helpful criteria by which to identify and oppose state terrorism. The

challenge for scholars, however, is determining whether acts of violence by state representatives can be labelled state terrorism, and when acts of state terrorism are part of a wider, institutionalised policy. As with other atrocities, there is a scarcity of evidence that explicitly shows such acts to have been sanctioned by the state. We are therefore faced with considerable challenges in identifying agency and intent when atrocities are committed. We can overcome some of these challenges by situating specific acts of state violence within a much broader context. This involves analysing the circumstances surrounding the events in question, both at the local level and in relation to other events and broader policies and strategies. In the chapters that follow, in the absence of evidence that specific actions were part of a deliberate policy of state terrorism, judgments are made that specific acts constitute state terrorism because the broader context would indicate that this was so.

3   Contextualising state terrorism

The North and its foreign policy objectives in the South

Introduction

This chapter provides the historical context for the subsequent analysis of state terrorism as a tool in the service of the elite interests of liberal democracies from the North. To make sense of state terrorism as used or sponsored by those states, we must first understand their foreign policy objectives, and identify the tools used to achieve those objectives. From the European colonial period onwards, the foreign policy objectives of powerful, and now liberal democratic, states from the North have been shaped by continuities. The European colonial powers were driven by the aim of acquiring territory in order to increase their global presence and dominance and to secure access to resources in the interests of the economic elite. Their efforts to seize territory and assets were accompanied by considerable violence, and the terrorising of indigenous populations, often to induce slave labour. While contemporary Northern liberal democracies do not seek to expand their territory, they still wish to maintain their positions of relative strength in political, economic, military and ideological terms. The primary way of achieving this is to increase and sustain their access to resources and markets in the South, which is achieved through the spread of global capitalism. This is a process that is led by the US, through various mechanisms, especially the international financial institutions (IFIs).

Coercion, understood as the use of force to compel people to act in a particular way, through threats, intimidation or violence, has always served an important instrumental function in the achievement of the foreign policy objectives of states from the North. As discussed in Chapter 2, state terrorism is a specific form of coercion that involves violence against individuals or groups to instil terror in a wider audience than the direct victim, to bring about changes in the behaviour of that audience. Even though such states now espouse liberal democracy, coercion has not lost its place among the foreign policy tools of these states. Coercion, including state terrorism, as discussed in Chapter 2, can be used as a means of inducing slave or forced wage labour, which was often the case under European imperialism, or as a means of curtailing political opposition, which was one of the main functions of state terror during the Cold War, as I show in Chapter 4. But whether state terror is used to induce a plentiful supply of forced labour, or to

thwart political opposition, the underlying motive is the same. In both cases, state terror is a means by which to control populations. Even when states pursue their objectives through processes of legitimation, which have of late been deemed the most effective means by which to secure access to and control of resources and markets in the South, as discussed in Chapter 1, such efforts are still underpinned by the threat of coercion, including state terrorism, particularly where it is felt that opposition to certain policies cannot be overcome through legitimation. Similarly, in the 'War on Terror' numerous states from the North have been complicit in coercion, including state terrorism, on the assumption that this will help achieve their objectives of protecting their interests from supposed terrorist threats. In this regard, therefore, there are significant continuities in the strategies used by modern liberal democratic states and the strategies of their colonial ancestors in pursuit of their foreign policy objectives. I illustrate the assumed instrumentality of coercion for liberal democratic states from the North in detail in Chapters 4 to 6.

I begin this chapter by outlining the objectives of the North in the South, examining first the aims of the European powers during their colonial eras, and the use of coercion, including state terrorism, to achieve these objectives. The cases of colonial state terror that I present are by no means an exhaustive list, but give some indication of the widespread use of terror. I show that the coercive practices deployed by the European colonisers were repeated by American imperialists, with reference to the American–Philippine war in the early 1900s. As will become clear in the subsequent chapters, forms of state terrorism as used by the colonial powers live on in the foreign policy arsenals of now liberal democratic states from the North. Similarly, there are continuities in the purposes that state terrorism is intended to serve, namely, controlling populations, either to induce specific behaviour in relation to capitalist production, or to deter political opposition, which may also be linked to production.

I then discuss the processes of European decolonisation, which coincided with the emergence of the US during the Cold War as the dominant actor in the spread of global capitalism, and a world hegemon in terms of its military reach and political influence. I develop a framework which accounts for the relationships between US foreign policy and the various agents and beneficiaries of the spread of capitalism, specifically other liberal democratic states and capitalists. The chapter demonstrates that efforts to neoliberalise the South are intended to ensure that states in the South are opened up so that multinational corporations, largely headquartered in the North, can increase their market share, and thereby the wealth of Northern elites. This lays the ground for the analysis in the subsequent chapters that explores how state terrorism has been deployed to these ends.

European colonialism

Empire as practiced by the European post-feudal states was aimed either at dominating trade, or at extracting resources, usually through exploitation of indigenous

labour, or in some cases, notably the Portuguese colonisation of the territory that is now Brazil, through shipping slave labour to the conquered territory from other regions of the empire, especially Africa. Whether aimed at dominating trade or resource extraction, the construction of empire involved considerable levels of coercion, by military conquest and direct political rule, or formal empire. This involved territorial control, military forces on the ground, direct control of sovereignty and of the state apparatus, and the use of the empire's military and police forces to control the new territory (Gallagher and Robinson 1953). Both Spain in Latin America, and Belgium under King Leopold II in Congo exercised formal empire. The Spanish were explicit about their imperial quest, which was to secure land and, crucially, the resources, particularly gold and silver, it yielded. Indeed, Ellen Meiksins Wood notes that even though Christianity played an important role in justifying the empire, the Spanish were much more 'unambiguously explicit' that religion was being used to justify conquest than any of the European empires that followed, all of which cloaked their aims in the rhetoric of civilising missions (Wood 2003: 40).

The European colonial powers have a long record of coercion among local populations both in their acquisition of territory and its policing, which has included the use of terrorism, as I will show. The actions of the colonisers of these countries were frequently sanctioned by the state. Violence against the indigenous populations, particularly by the Spanish and Portuguese, involved the initial terrorising of the indigenous populations into supplying conquerors with food supplies, threatening them with death if they did not acquiesce, and the wiping out of whole tribes that were deemed of no use to the economic projects of the European settlers. Those that did survive were terrorised into forced labour, often as slaves, as part of the imperial efforts of the Spanish and Portuguese crowns. Similar methods were used by other European imperial powers, which frequently terrorised populations into providing slave labour or forced wage labour.

For a long time the massive decline in the native population of Latin America following the arrival of Columbus and the conquistadors was believed to be the result of the violence inflicted by the Spanish and Portuguese settlers (Bethell 1984: 8). There has been relatively little scholarship that examines the use of coercion by the Spanish and Portuguese colonisers, but the authoritative and multi-volume study on Latin American history by Leslie Bethell provides important insights (Bethell 1984). There is considerable debate about the size of the native population of Latin America on the eve of European colonisation, largely as a result of insufficient and inadequate data.[1] Nevertheless, the decline following the arrival of the colonisers was dramatic. For example, of the estimated 25 million indigenous people in what is now central Mexico in 1519, only 17 million survived the first four years following the arrival of the conquistadors. By 1548 only six million survived, and by 1580 only two million. By 1630, it is estimated that around 750,000 survived, or three per cent of the population prior to the conquest (Bethell 1984: 4). The Dominican friar, Bartolomé de las Casas, one of the earliest commentators of the period, certainly attributed the decline of

the indigenous to the warlike interventions of the invaders which involved the confiscation of food, plunder, rape, public and private exaction of tribute, enslavement and the cruel treatment of those forced into labour to extract resources for the Spanish and Portuguese crowns (Bethell 1984: 8). Bethell shows that the decline in population could not simply be attributed to violence by the colonisers, although this was extremely brutal, and was in large part a consequence of the Old World diseases such as measles and smallpox transported to the continent by the settlers (Bethell 1984: 9–13). This position is now widely accepted among Latin American historians (Crosby 1973: 169–78), but the brutality of the colonisers must nevertheless be acknowledged.

An initial wave of violence was meted out by the colonisers against indigenous groups that refused to hand over foodstuffs. This had a terrorising effect, and was intended to do so. Surrounding populations would witness the violence and would then be sufficiently terrorised into providing the resources demanded by the colonisers, or face the same violent outcomes. This was less devastating however, as Bethell notes, than the harm caused by the confiscation of food reserves which led to hunger and starvation. Before long natives were taken as slaves by the colonisers, and this was followed by extensive programmes of forced labour, which further exacerbated the population decline as the indigenous people were literally worked to death (Bethell 1984: 8–10). The Spanish settlers threatened them with violence if they refused to provide food supplies, thereby terrorising them into working in their mining and agricultural projects. It was assumed that the labour force was inexhaustible, as Bethell notes, so there was little concern about the long-term consequences of the deaths caused by Spanish violence against them. They were simply assumed to be replaceable (Bethell 1984: 10).

As in Spanish-controlled Latin America, the Portuguese colonisation of Brazil resulted in massive population decline. Data on the numbers of native Brazilians is even more confused than that on indigenous populations elsewhere in the continent. Contemporary calculations, however, suggest that there were 2.5 million indigenous people in Brazil in 1500 (Bethell 1984: 39). The decimation of the population, while exacerbated by disease in Brazil, was primarily the result of Portuguese violence. Within the first four years alone, it is estimated that two million indigenous people had been killed (Bethell 1984: 43). In campaigns that would now be referred to as genocide, whole tribes were wiped out, and those that were not were taken as slaves (Bethell 1984: 39–40). Aided by intelligence supplied by Jesuit priests, Portuguese colonisers waged a war in coastal areas around Rio de Janeiro and Bahia against the Tupinambá which wiped out all but 3,000 of them, who were then subjected to a process of deculturisation by the Jesuit priests. Most survivors of the Portuguese campaigns were then enslaved (Bethell 1984: 40–3). Central to the practices of the Iberian colonisers was the use of fear to ensure the compliance of the local populations. The Catholic Church, as is clear from its efforts to deculturalise indigenous peoples, and its complicity in locating populations for elimination or enslavement, played a key role in this process. It was therefore not simply the colonisers with their military backgrounds that were sponsored by the state to terrorise the population, but also

representatives of the church that collaborated closely with the crowns of Spain and Portugal.

The British, Belgians, Germans and French were also involved in similar practices in their colonies. In the Congo, for example, following King Leopold of Belgium's colonisation, a programme for the forced gathering of wild rubber from the plantations was instigated. Terror was used as the main method to ensure the compliance of the indigenous population (Barker 2003: 63). A British consular agent in 1899 described seeing soldiers in the Congo taking women as hostages until the men of a community delivered sufficient quantities of rubber (Killingray 1973: 90). Terror (at what might happen to the women) was clearly being used as a tool to force the men to work. A *New York Times* report, on 24 November 1909, demonstrated the extent of the terror. Returning missionaries from the Congo had witnessed the cutting off of one or both hands of indigenous members of the Congolese population. One such returning missionary reported to the *New York Times* that 'the tortures suffered' were 'practiced in order to impress upon the blacks the necessity of their bringing to market the rubber wanted by their persecutors, and the dire results that would follow their failure to do so' (*New York Times* 1909). Very visible violence of this kind was clearly intended as a means of ensuring that workers surrounding the direct victims were terrified into working for the colonisers. Resistance was discouraged, and the Crown would enjoy the spoils of its colonial enterprise.

Mistreatment occurred under British colonial expansion and rule as well. In the American frontier wars, not only did diseases new to the continent wipe out many indigenous people, but British settlers were implicated in efforts to deliberately spread smallpox among native American populations, as part of a process of total war against them, as Elizabeth Fenn (2000) has shown. This constitutes genocide. British treatment of Aborigines in Australia and New Zealand included the hunting of them for sport by the settlers (Barker 2003: 62). As in the Spanish colonies, many British Chartered Companies, including in South Africa, also imposed systems of forced labour in British colonies, again through terror, as Bernard Porter shows (Porter 1968: 65). This was the basis for much of the protest among British liberals against the slave trade in particular, and British colonial practices more generally. Indeed, critics of the 1899–1902 Boer War argued that despite being portrayed in government circles as a war to liberate the natives of Southern Africa, it was a war to reintroduce slavery, albeit under an exploitative capitalist wage–labour system. Many critics argued that the indigenous people would be no better off than under the Boers, including Lloyd George, who proclaimed, 'that is what our brave troops are shedding their blood for; they are dying to restore slavery under the British flag' (cited in Porter 1968: 67).

Works on British colonialism in Kenya describe the use of forced labour to secure resources for the empire and, as in the colonies of other European states, indigenous people were terrorised into working for the colonial regime. M.P.K. Sorensen notes that in 1907, A.C. Hollis, the newly appointed Secretary for Native Affairs conducted an inquiry into the recruitment and treatment of labourers. He discovered 'a deplorable state of affairs', finding that 'at first mild

pressure only was used, then goats were confiscated and later armed force had to be employed' (cited in Sorenson 1968: 150–1). Robert Tignor provides further insight into Hollis' findings, reporting that beatings were used regularly to coerce labour, as was seizure of possessions and imprisonment (Tignor 1976: 104). Hollis also reported to the native labour commission of 1912–13 that 'in 1907 African workers were not only recruited by force but were also kept at work by being ringed by askaris [locally recruited soldiers] to keep them from deserting' (Tignor 1976: 104–5). A catalogue of complaints compiled by Kikuyu chiefs after the First World War included the following charge:

> A common procedure to obtain labour was for a government officer to send an order to a chief to furnish so many girls for a neighbouring European plantation where coffee had to be picked. If the chief refused, he was placed under restraint at the government station. The girls were rounded up by tribal retainers and taken under guard to their work destination. The petition added that many girls were seduced and bore illegitimate children.
>
> (Tignor 1976: 105)

The French too used similar methods in their colonies, described in considerable detail by Jean Suret-Canale (Suret-Canale 1971 [1964]). In the Congo, for example, the French responded to rebellions by burning down whole villages (Suret-Canale 1971 [1964]: 26–7). Throughout the French empire, forced labour was used widely (Suret-Canale 1971 [1964]: 244–55). In Senegal indigenous people were terrorised to induce taxes and labour as late as the 1930s. The *A Dahomey* newspaper reported in 1935 that:

> Everyday men and women, even those who owe nothing to the fiscal authorities, are arrested, lashed together, and beaten under the pretext of refusal to pay taxes.... Many of them, to comply with the payment of their taxes, pawn their own children.
>
> (cited in Suret-Canale 1971 [1964]: 346)

The article went on to describe specific individual cases of terror and violence deployed against local people to coerce payment.

European empires from the 1800s differed from early Spanish and Portuguese colonialism, in that they constructed commercial empires built on trade rather than simply expropriation of territory, settlement or resource extraction. The Dutch empire, for example, perfected the commercial empire, according to Wood, as indicated by a number of factors, not least that it was a world leader in the slave trade, but less dominant in direct exploitation of slave plantations. Nevertheless, coercive power was its 'basic operating principle' and military power its 'bottom line', with the Dutch engaging in the massacre of rival merchants in order to dominate trade routes (Wood 2003: 45, 61–7).

While both these forms of empire (extractive and commercial), relied heavily on settlement by colonialists, it was early English imperialism that relied most

heavily on settler colonies. This eventually became an end in itself of British colonialism. This helps explain why at its height the British empire covered a quarter of the earth's land mass and comprised approximately 500 million subjects by 1921. This is further explained by the fact that the British Empire was built on the logic of capitalism. The objective was not simply to expropriate unoccupied land, or to take land because it was not being cultivated, but to add value, because it was deemed at the time not to be profitable by the standard of English agriculture, as a letter from Sir John Davies, lawyer and statesman and architect of English imperialism in Ireland, to the Earl of Sainsbury in 1610, shows:

> His majesty may take this course in conscience because it tendeth to the good of the inhabitants many ways; for half their land doth now lie waste, by reason whereof that which is habited is not improved to half the value; but when the undertakers [the settlers] are planted among them ... and that land shall be fully stocked and manured, 500 acres will be of better value than 5000 are now.
>
> (quoted in Wood 2003: 82)

As Wood notes, this conceptual move is of great significance: empire was no longer 'simply a means of subjecting populations for the purposes of tax and tribute or the extraction of precious resources' nor was it 'simply a means of ensuring commercial supremacy by controlling the networks of trade'. Instead a transition occurred from commercial conceptions of profit – the profits of unequal exchange – to capitalist profit, whereby profit is derived from competitive production, 'from the increased productivity enabled by "improvement"'. Land, and colonised territory, was therefore a 'profit-making investment' (Wood 2003: 82–3). It was not until the latter half of the nineteenth century that economic competition would prove a strong enough alternative to direct colonial rule.

This is not to say that coercion disappeared, indeed it was still vital, and Britain depended heavily on its massive Navy and the use of military violence to establish colonial settlements and to dominate international networks of trade. Britain also used coercion, including state terrorism, internally in an attempt to maintain order and facilitate the extraction of resources. In numerous African colonies, for example, houses and even villages would be razed to the ground if labour and taxes were insufficiently forthcoming, or if indigenous populations attempted to resist taxation (Bush and Maltby 2004). Thus the British also used terror to induce productive labour and extraction, and to overcome challenges to its power in its colonies, especially in the later stages of British imperialism. The British instigated aerial bombing campaigns in response to a rebellion against British occupation in Iraq in 1920, which involved the dropping of 97 tonnes of bombs and a total of 4,008 flying missions. This included the use of night 'terror' raids. As Jonathan Glancey reported in his comparison of these attacks and the 2003 aerial bombardment of Iraq by the US and British air forces, in 1920 terror raids were deemed extremely effective by strategic planners (Glancey 2003). As he reports, Wing Commander J.A. Chamier wrote in 1921 that the best way to

demoralise local people was by concentrating bombing on the 'most inaccessible village of the most prominent tribe which it is desired to punish'. Furthermore, 'bombs and machine guns must be relentless and unremitting and carried on continuously by day and night, on houses inhabitants, crops and cattle' (Glancey 2003). There was clearly, therefore, a deliberate intent to terrorise the local population in order to diminish support for the rebels. As Glancey reports, Winston Churchill had at the time also expressed his keenness for the use of chemical weapons, which he described as 'lively terror', although they were not actually deployed, since conventional aerial bombardment succeeded in crushing the rebellion (Glancey 2003).

Much of Britain's imperial expansion during the nineteenth century was characterised by informal empire, meaning the establishment of quasi-sovereign states in conquered territories, the use of local elites aligned to the Empire to administer colonised territory, the insistence on a system of free-trade rather than protectionist policies – since this would ensure that profits accrued to the economically most powerful, in this case Britain – and the use of external force only as a last resort. This operated alongside more formal forms of empire. Indeed, parts of the British Empire were not governed by the logic of capitalism or informal imperial structures, but by more traditional forms of imperial rule. In India, for instance, British imperialism was more akin to its non-capitalist predecessors than England's early colonisation of Ireland, since it began as a commercial empire dominated by monopolist trade, through the East India Company, but was eventually dominated by the imperial state, with profits generated not primarily through capitalism, but through extraction of finance in the form of taxation, and through control by military despotism (Wood 2003: 110–11). Capitalist empire, as Wood notes, can only fully take hold 'when economic imperatives become strong enough on their own to extend beyond the reach of any conceivable extra-economic power and to impose themselves without day-to-day administration and coercion by an imperial state' (Wood 2003: 116–17). This would not fully occur until after the Second World War, during the era of the globalisation of capital, under the leadership of the US. I refer to this form of empire as neo-imperialism, rather than informal empire, since it has not involved the establishment of quasi-sovereign states in conquered territories, and does not require the establishment of administrations by the imperial state. Those territories can be self-governing. Even under US capitalist imperialism, however, coercion, including state terrorism, still underpinned the neo-imperial project, explored below.

Early American state terrorism

Repressive practices were also deployed by the US in its imperial expansion in the late 1800s and into the early twentieth century. In the Philippines, for example, state terrorism was used widely in the 1901–2 war to bring the Philippines under US control, and involved the use of torture, rape, shootings, hangings and the systematic burning of homes and villages, all aimed at quelling support for the insurgency (Welch 1974). Richard Welch shows that despite

early intentions to win the war through the winning of hearts and minds, terrorism by US forces became more widespread as the war progressed (Welch 1974: 236) These incidents were exposed when a Republican Senator, George Frisbie Hoare, presented them to the US Senate on 22 May 1902. In his speech, he held the imperialists of Washington responsible for these acts, arguing:

> You have devastated provinces. You have slain uncounted thousands of peoples you desire to benefit. You have established reconcentration camps.... You make the American flag in the eyes of a numerous people the emblem of sacrilege in Christian churches, and of the burning of human dwellings, and of the horror of the water torture.
>
> (quoted in Welch 1974: 233)

A description of the water torture was provided by Lieutenant Grover Flint to the Senate hearing:

> A man is thrown down on his back and three or four men sit or stand on his arms and legs and hold him down ... a carbine barrel or a stick as big as a belaying pin ... is simply thrust into his jaws and his jaws are thrust back, and, if possible, a wooden log or stone is put under his head or neck, so he can be held more firmly. In the case of very old men I have seen their teeth fall out,-and I mean when it was done a little roughly. He is simply held down and then water is poured onto his face down his throat and nose from a jar; and that is kept up until the man gives some sign or becomes unconscious. And then ... he is simply ... rolled aside rudely, so that water is expelled. A man suffers tremendously, there is no doubt about it.
>
> (quoted in Welch 1974: 235)

This is particularly instructive, since the use of water torture, now referred to as water boarding, has featured in the US 'War on Terror', and attempts were made to justify it, along with other forms of torture, by senior officials in the Bush administration and the CIA, as discussed in Chapter 2. This highlights the continuities in the coercive practices of contemporary powerful states from the North and their colonial ancestors.

Decolonisation, the US and global capitalism

As well as playing a leading role in the globalisation of capital during the twentieth century, the US had also participated in the old imperial system, pursuing the same objectives and replicating the practices of the European empires in the service of those objectives during the nineteenth century. This included expanding its own territory through the conquest of the American frontier, the invasion and annexation of Texas and California, the purchase of Alaska and the acquisition of Puerto Rico and Hawaii. The US was also involved in imperial wars in the Philippines, and against Spain for control of territory in Central

America, notably Cuba. US national security, US primacy and the protection and promotion of US capital have been central to US foreign policy ever since President James Monroe delivered a speech to Congress, on 2 December 1823, which became known as the Monroe Doctrine. The principle at the heart of the Monroe Doctrine was the protection of the Western hemisphere from colonisation by the European powers. Monroe declared:

> We owe it, therefore, to candour, and to the amicable relations existing between the US and those powers [the European powers], to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.
>
> (Monroe Doctrine, quoted in Perkins 1927)

The US thus declared itself the protector of the independent nations of the Americas, with the role of protecting the Western hemisphere from European states, seen as potential sources of threat which might undermine that position of the US in the hemisphere (Richardson 1907). Latin American states were identified as existing to serve the US and, therefore, an extension of US territory, in that any efforts by European states to invade them would be seen as an attack on the peace and safety of the US itself. This was the logic for US expansion southwards and the annexation of half of Mexico during the 1845 war, the invasion of Cuba by US forces in 1898 to liberate Cuba from Spanish rule, and the subsequent acquisition of Cuba and Puerto Rico as US protectorates.

The resolve to ensure US primacy has shaped US foreign policy ever since, not only in the Western hemisphere, but globally. US foreign policy is therefore characterised by this continuity. Yet realist and liberal scholars of IR tend to understand US foreign policy within the context of a historical account of the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, which assumes that there was no real continuation of Cold War policies in the post-Cold War period. They have argued that the end of the Cold War was a watershed in US foreign policy, with new threats to face and new policies needed to tackle them (Huntington 1997). They see US Cold War foreign policy in the South to have been benign and pro-democratic, and dominated by containing Soviet expansion. By contrast, and in agreement with other historical materialist scholars including Gabriel Kolko, Noam Chomsky and Doug Stokes, I argue that US foreign policy in the South was, and continues to be, shaped primarily by continuities. US foreign policy has been driven by the defence of US primacy and capital since the early 1800s, and the Cold War was as much a war for dominance of the South by the North, and particularly the US, as between East and West (Chomsky 1992: 1–28; Kolko 1988: ix–xiii; Stokes 2003: 530–85; 2005a: 18–38).

Evidence of these continuities dating back to the Monroe Doctrine is found in the planning of the US Council on Foreign Relations, a non-partisan foreign policy membership organisation, in its Second World War War and Peace Studies Project, for a Grand Area in which the US could ensure its economic supremacy. The Council worked closely with the US government to establish a world order

which would serve the US (Shoup and Minter 1977: 117–77). In 1940 the Council began to assess the degree to which the Western hemisphere was self-sufficient, and whether it required trade with other areas to maintain its prosperity, whether it was as self-contained as Europe, and how much of the world's resources the US would require to maintain power and prosperity (Shoup and Minter 1977: 125).

The Council on Foreign Relation's findings were presented to President Roosevelt in 1940, recommending that, because Britain was engaged with protecting the world from German penetration, the entire world outside of Continental Europe was open to the US, or as the Council advised the President, there was 'a great residual area potentially available to us and upon the basis of which US foreign policy may be framed' (quoted in Shoup and Minter 1977: 129). The Council pointed out that preservation of this kind would require 'increased military expenditures and other risks' (quoted in Shoup and Minter 1977: 129). The first step would be the integration of the Western hemisphere with the Pacific region into a trading bloc, of which the US would be the greatest beneficiary through its exports of manufactured and agricultural goods and the import of numerous raw materials and foodstuffs (Shoup and Minter 1977: 127). The Council concluded that a major component of this expansion of US access to global capital was:

> [the] coordination and cooperation of the US with other countries to secure the limitation of any exercise of sovereignty by foreign nations that constitutes a threat to the minimum world area essential for the security and economic prosperity of the US and the Western Hemisphere.
>
> (Shoup and Minter 1977: 130)

This was to ensure the maintenance of US supremacy without requiring any internal changes to the US fiscal system, with the Grand Area becoming known among the planners as 'elbow room' (Shoup and Minter 1977: 129). Economic means were to play a key role in integrating the Grand Area, with the Council proposing the IMF and the World Bank as the international institutions that would create one world economy, which would be dominated by the US (Shoup and Minter 1977: 166–9). The loss by the former European imperial powers of their remaining colonies following the Second World War would further enable the US to penetrate the Grand Area to ensure its dominance of the international capitalist system. This was to shape US foreign policy throughout the Cold War, although much of the official rhetoric emphasised containing communism, rather than the expansion of US capital. A great deal of US military might was deployed to assist US capital expansion and to bring the South under the yoke of the US in economic terms, including by force. Impressive levels of military assistance were offered by the US to other states to this end as well. The Grand Area strategy clearly invokes the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, and indeed extends them far beyond the Western hemisphere. But a shift had occurred in US thinking whereby the objectives of US foreign policy were not to secure territory, as had

been the case in the old imperialism of the nineteenth century, but to ensure access for the US to global resources and markets. As Wood notes:

> There is an analogous difference between non-capitalist and capitalist imperi-alisms. Old colonial empires dominated territory and subject peoples by means of 'extra-economic' coercion, by military conquest and often direct political rule. Capitalist imperialism can exercise its rule by economic means, by manipulating the forces of the market, including the weapon of trade.
>
> (Wood 2003: 12)

US foreign policy continues to be shaped by the drive to ensure US primacy and expand US capital. This contrasts with realist and liberal approaches to US foreign policy, which assume the US to be driven purely by what is referred to as national security, or by a commitment to spreading democracy and liberal values. The US has found that extending and intensifying the capitalist system in the South, while conducive to the material interests of other states and their capitalist elites, has been an effective way of achieving its own goals. But these other states and capitalist elites are also agents of the spread and intensification of capitalism.[2]

While decolonisation assisted the US in its emergence as a dominant eco-nomic force in the latter half of the twentieth century, the European powers, particularly Britain and France, went to great lengths to maintain their own influence in regions they had previously dominated, and particularly to ensure ongoing access to valuable resources and markets in those regions. As Mark Curtis shows, in 1950 the Foreign Office cautioned against Britain losing its influence as processes of decolonisation took place. It argued:

> If the United Kingdom were voluntarily to abandon her position or political influence in selected areas, she would probably find herself not only without economic access to those areas but unable, through loss of prestige, to prevent a further involuntary decline in her influence elsewhere and con-sequently a general decline in the strength of the Western powers.
>
> (quoted in Curtis 2004: 126)

Thus the UK tied its own prosperity to that of other Western powers, which became a strategy for British conduct throughout the twentieth and into the twenty-first century. A subsequent cabinet office briefing, dated 14 April 1958, noted that one of Britain's main aims should be 'to maintain political conditions favourable to our trading requirements throughout the world, and especially in the Middle East', and in 1968, a Foreign Office report stated that Britain should 'bend our energies to help produce a world economic climate in which our external trade, our income from indivisibles and our balance of payments can prosper', and that the key to this involved 'increasing our efforts to open up new markets in Europe, Latin America and the Far East' (Curtis 2004: 123). Such efforts would often be in cooperation with the US. One such example is the British support lent to the regime which overthrew the republican regime of

Brigadier Abdul Karim Qasim in Iraq, in a CIA-backed coup on 8 February 1963. Qasim had led a nationalist revolution in 1958 which overthrew the monarchical regime of King Faisal and Prime Minister Nuri El Said. As Curtis shows with reference to declassified British government documents, the Qasim revolution 'removed a pro-British regime and a key pillar of British imperial policy in the Middle East' and posed a significant threat to British material interests in the region (Curtis 2004: 80–2). This threat was described, as Curtis notes, by a British member of the Iraq Petroleum Company, in a memo to the Foreign Office, dated 25 November 1962, who stated that Qasim:

> wished to give Iraq what he considered political independence, dignity and unity, in brotherly cooperation with other Arabs and in neutrality between the world power blocs; he wished to increase and distribute the national wealth, partly on the grounds of nationalist and socialist principle, partly out of simply sympathy for the poor; on the basis of economic prosperity and justice he wished to found a new society and a new democracy; and he wished to use this strong, democratic, Arabist Iraq as an instrument to free and elevate other Arabs and Afro-Asians and to assist the destruction of 'imperialism', by which he largely meant British influence in the underdeveloped countries.
>
> (quoted in Curtis 2004: 82)

The new government under General Abdul Arif and Prime Minister General Abdul al-Bakr of the Baath party unleashed a campaign of massacres against suspected communists, in part a consequence of the CIA's insistence that the new regime remove the supposed threat of the communist party as a significant force in Iraqi politics (Curtis 2004: 83). British officials in Baghdad and London knew of these massacres and approved of the new regime carrying them out, seeing this as an opportunity for Qasim's oil policies, which threatened British interests, to be reversed, even though it was recognised within the Foreign Office that 'there is no indication of a Communist threat or of any effective opposition to the new government' (Curtis 2004: 86). British complicity in the brutality carried out by the regime, and attempts to cover up its involvement, are explored in more detail in Chapter 4. As Curtis points out, an internal Foreign Office brief commented that the new government 'have shown courage and steadfastness in hatching and executing their plot' and that they should be 'somewhat friendlier to the West' (quoted in Curtis 2004: 87). Cooperation of this kind between the US and Britain, in regions where the UK had previously dominated, would characterise numerous interventions in the South during the twentieth century and, as I will show, frequently involved the use and sponsorship of state terrorism. Such cooperation is also a feature of globalisation in the latter half of the twentieth century.

Globalisation, understood as processes of interconnection and mutual constitution on a worldwide scale (Barkawi 2006), has transformed the relations between states and capitalist elites, so that states and those elites are intertwined through a variety of relationships across state boundaries. Some of those relationships are

cooperative and some competitive.[3] As I will show in subsequent chapters, in the case of Britain, those relations have frequently been cooperative, with the UK playing a significant role in supporting the US in numerous military operations in the South throughout the twentieth century. Since states and capitalist elites are interconnected in these ways, and have become increasingly internationalised, it logically follows that the actions of one of those states, or elites, may impact upon not just that state and its elite, but also on other states and their elites. Former European imperial states continue to play an important role in the spread and intensification of capitalism, but it is the US that has emerged as the leading actor in these processes.

Implicit in an analysis of the ascendancy of the US is the degree to which the US is able to exercise power and influence. The concept of power is contested in IR, but is generally understood as the ability to ensure a particular outcome, so for actor A to ensure that actor B carries out a specific act. Influence tends to be understood as being less directive, constituting the ability to make broad categories of outcomes more likely. Bertrand Russell defines power as 'the production of intended effects' (Russell 1938: 35). While US foreign policy will primarily be aimed at promoting the interests of the US state, its actions may also have positive outcomes for other agents within the global system. At times it may also have negative impacts for other agents. Any assessment of US foreign policy must, therefore, take into account the outcomes, whether intended or consequential, of foreign policy for the following agents: the US state; US capital; other states; and international capital, by which I mean non-US capitalists, either working alone, or collectively, for example through the EU, sometimes in conjunction with US capital, to achieve their own or collective interests.[4] I distinguish between the US and other states because the US is the primary driver of the spread of capitalism, often acting unilaterally and using coercion to achieve this end. Whereas other states, specifically the core capitalist states, also seek to spread capitalism, they do not, individually, currently challenge US dominance of the international system, so they can only balance US dominance, as I will show, through collaborative action. I develop a framework below which accounts for the interconnections between these agents and potential beneficiaries in the process of spreading and intensifying capitalism in the South, and will show that the distinction between these agents will not always be a sharp one. This framework provides a comprehensive account of the relationships between US foreign policy and the various agents and beneficiaries of capitalism.

The role that US foreign policy plays in the spread and intensification of capitalism in the South has been the subject of intense debate in recent years among a small number of IR scholars. Many of them accept the continuity thesis that US foreign policy is driven by the aim of securing and promoting the interests of the US state, and to protect and promote US capital. It is the degree to which US foreign policy has also benefited international capital and other states, and specifically other core capitalist states, on which they differ. Contributors to this debate tend to focus on whether the US state, through its foreign policy, is the primary agent of global capital, with only minimal consideration given to the

role of other agents and potential beneficiaries within this process, and the inter-relations between those various agents. The approach I propose corrects this, by offering a framework which sees various agents as potential drivers and benefi-ciaries of the policies that are aimed at expanding capitalism, while recognising that the US state is the most influential of those agents. The approach enables primacy in terms of both agency and outcome to be attributed differently in dif-ferent circumstances, but also allows for the identification of broad trends. I will first outline the three main approaches to the relationship between US foreign policy and the spread and intensification of capitalism, referred to as the capital-ism as imperialist approach, the US as agent of capital approach, and the dual logics approach. I will then put forward the approach that I propose, the multiple agents approach, which allows for a more flexible account of the interrelations between the various agents.

Approaches to US global power projection

The capitalism as imperialist approach argues that capital itself is the driving force and instigator of the contemporary world order. This approach, developed by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, sees the capitalist project as bringing together economic and political power to realise a 'properly capitalist order', or Empire. Empire, they argue, is a concept that is characterised by a lack of boundaries. Its rule, they say, has no limits because it is a regime that rules over the entire world. Rather than being a historical regime, it is an order that effect-ively suspends history and fixes the existing state of affairs for eternity (Hardt and Negri 2000: 9). Thus it is capital that is seen as the primary agent of the expansion of global capitalism, as opposed to the US state, through its foreign policies. While my own approach allows for the agency of capital itself in the process of spreading capitalism, underplaying the US as a key agent of global capitalism is mistaken, as I will show.

The US as agent of capitalism approach, advanced by Peter Gowan, argues that the US state is the driving force for the spread of capitalism, in that the US has not simply been pursuing its own interests at the expense of its rivals, but has been 'securing the general conditions for the expansion of capital as a system, in which they have an interest too' (Gowan 2002). Gowan argues that the inter-national monetary regime, which he terms the Dollar–Wall Street Regime, has acted as a potential instrument of economic statecraft and power politics for the US (Gowan 1999: 4). The Dollar–Wall Street Regime is the new international monetary system, created in the 1970s, following the cutting of the link between the dollar and gold in 1972, which shifted the world economy onto a 'pure dollar standard', and which turned people towards Wall Street for finance (Gowan 1999: 19–25). This led to the strengthening of Wall Street in the international financial market, which in turn reinforced the dominance of the dollar (Gowan 1999: 24). Gowan argues that this new monetary and financial regime was the 'deeply political result of political choices made by successive governments of one state: the US' (Gowan 1999: 4). This new system, Gowan argues, is an

immensely potent political instrument, and privileges the US within the system because the US Federal Reserve can largely dictate the levels of international interest rates through moving US domestic interest rates, thereby determining the costs of credit internationally; Washington can influence the levels of regulation and supervision of bank lending; the US can combine unregulated international banking and financial markets with minimal risk of the US banking and financial systems suffering a resulting collapse; and finally, through this system, state barriers can be broken down to further the interests of US capital. This occurs through redesigning the financial systems of target states, particularly in the South, to fit with the business strategies of Wall Street operators and their US clients, such as transnational corporations (Gowan 1999: 26–30). Gowan's account is important, because it helps to explain the reasons for US primacy within the international economic system. There is little discussion of the agency of other states and of international capital in Gowan's account, but the approach I propose addresses this.

Building on Gowan's approach, the dual logics approach developed by Stokes focuses not simply upon the US state as an agent of capitalism, but also on the way in which US efforts to expand capitalism will primarily benefit US capital, because of the structural power of the US economy within the world capitalist system (Stokes 2005a: 217–36). For Stokes, the US 'as the core hegemonic capitalist state' has played a dual role in the spread of capitalism (Stokes 2005a: 230). On the one hand, it has been subject to a national logic which seeks to maximise US national interests, including those of the state and of US capital, and on the other, to a transnational logic, which has caused the US to play 'a coordinating role that has sought to reproduce a global political economy conducive to other core capitalist states' (Stokes 2005a: 230). Stokes shows that the US seeks to secure conditions that will lend themselves to the material interests of other capitalist states and international capital because such conditions will benefit, primarily, US capital. He states:

> Instead of arguing that the US state now acts to secure a transnational outcome for transnational capital, I would argue that when the US state acts it is because of the structural power of the US economy within world capitalism, with transnational outcomes primarily benefiting US capital through the USA's preponderance of global market power.
>
> (Stokes 2005a: 228)

Stokes illustrates his argument with the case of the neoliberalisation of Latin America, largely driven by multilateral agreements between the US and Latin American states. He argues that the US has dominated the international institutions that are implementing neoliberal reforms in Latin America, and that agreements such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which link Latin American states into a single trade bloc, while opening the region up to global capital, will simultaneously strengthen the power of US capital, thanks to the preponderance of US market power (Stokes 2005a: 228–9). Thus the US state is

the primary agent, and the US state and capital are the primary beneficiaries in the system. Stokes acknowledges international capital as a potential, although lesser beneficiary of US policy, but the purpose of his dual logics approach is to consider the role of the US state in the spread of capitalism, and not to assess US capital, international capital or other states as agents in this process.

The multiple agents approach

I propose an approach that can be referred to as the multiple agents approach, which sees the US state, acting via its foreign policy according to its economic and political aims, and according to the national and transnational logics referred to by Stokes, as just one of various agents and potential beneficiaries of the spread of capitalism. And taking Cox's cue, I am referring here not to the whole US government, but to 'those executive bodies within the "government" which are charged with promoting and protecting the expansion of capital across state boundaries' (Cox 1986: 228). As Gowan and Stokes argue, in recent times, the most effective way in which to achieve this objective has been through the pursuit of conditions that lend themselves to the material interests of other capitalist states and international capital. I agree with Stokes that, currently, the primary beneficiaries of the system are the US state and US capital because of the position of primacy that they occupy within it. This is evident in the repatriation of capital into the US financial system, referred to by Gowan with specific reference to the re-investment of petro-dollars into the US economy, and the ongoing use of the dollar as the favoured currency within international oil markets (Gowan 1999: 21–2, 35–6). In 2000 Saddam Hussein opted to convert all of Iraq's US dollars in its UN Oil for Food account to euros, meaning that any trade in Iraqi oil would be in euros (Islam 2003). When Iraqi oil exports resumed following the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, it was announced that oil would be paid for in dollars only. At the same time the billions of euros in the Iraqi Oil for Food account, under UN Resolution 1483, were transferred to the Development Fund for Iraq, a US-run dollar account (UNSC 2003). One outcome of the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq, therefore, is the re-establishment of the dollar as the currency for Iraqi trade in oil. It is not yet clear what the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis will have on the role of the US in the global political economy. Already, as discussed in Chapter 1, powerful Northern liberal democratic states have intervened to prop up their ailing banks and financial institutions, practices that are at odds with the principles of neoliberalism. Whether this crisis will bring about change in the imbalance between rich and poor states remains to be seen.

The conditions that have been established which lead to this disproportionate privileging of the US state and US capital have been established not just by the US, but also by other agents. Those other agents, as outlined above, are US capital, other states, or at least those parts of the state charged with promoting the expansion of capital beyond state boundaries, and international capital. Even though I distinguish between the state and capital as agents of the spread and intensification of capitalism in the South, this is not to say that I see the state as

being devoid of an economic function. Rather, the capitalist state has economic and political functions, and the foreign policy of the state, usually articulated in terms of the national interest, responds variously to political and material issues. The state does not, therefore, always act in the immediate interests of capital. Indeed it may at times act in ways which are contrary to the material interests of capital, at least in the short-term. This is because, as Poulantzas argues, the capitalist state does not directly represent the dominant class' economic interests but their political interests (Poulantzas [1968] 1987: 130–91). A key function of the capitalist state is to ensure that the subordinate class is politically disorganised so that it is unable to overcome its economic isolation and is therefore unable to threaten the interests of the dominant class. This is achieved through the state appearing as a political unity of a society of divergent economic interests, which are articulated not as class interests but as the interests of private individuals. The state therefore appears to be neutral, an appearance which is in part ensured by the state sometimes acting in the economic interests of the dominated class, in the short-term, at the expense of capital, while always guaranteeing the long-term political interests of the economic elite.

Just as the US state is acting according to a national and a transnational logic, US capital is also acting according to two logics, in that it seeks to maximise its own interests in the form of profits, comparable to the national interest at state level, but it also seeks to reproduce the global political economy to further its own capacity to increase profits. This also happens to be conducive to the interests of other national capitals. For instance, the US-based oil company Exxon will try and maximise its own profits but will also push for transnational structures that will further this aim, such as conducive trade regulations, improved infrastructure and trading rights. Other states, and particularly other core capitalist states, are also agents of global capital and either work independently, as the US state does, through their own foreign policies to protect and promote their national interests, or corporately to secure their collective interests, for instance through the EU. International capital, meaning non-US capital, working alone or collectively, is also an agent of global capital. International capital is driven by the same two logics as US capital, maximizing its own profits and reproducing the global political economy to further its collective capacity to increase profits for itself and, thereby, other national capitals. Each of these agents, then, can also be potential beneficiaries and losers from the actions of the others, so when the US state acts, the others might also gain or might lose out, to varying degrees at different times.

To some extent, the approach I propose echoes the work of William Robinson, who argues that we are witnessing the emergence of a transnational capitalist class (Robinson 2004b).[5] Central to Robinson's thesis is the idea that 'under globalisation a new class fractionation, or axis, is occurring between national and transnational fractions or classes' (Robinson 2004b: 37). It comprises the owners of transnational capital, i.e. the group that owns the leading worldwide means of production as embodied in the transnational corporations and private financial institutions (Robinson 2004b: 47). The transnational

capitalist class 'works through identifiable institutions and is fairly coherent as a collective actor' (Robinson 2004b: 86). For Robinson, the emerging transnational institutions, established by the transnational capitalist class, constitute an incipient transnational state apparatus (Robinson 2004b: 87–8). This apparatus is defined as an emerging network that is made up of transformed and externally integrated nation-states, together with the supranational economic and political forums such as the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO, the OECD and EU, among others, but, as Robinson argues, it has not yet acquired any centralised institutional form. It is therefore an emergent state (Robinson 2004b: 88).

While there are increasing processes of transnationalisation at play, this is not an emergent transnational state for two main reasons. First, while we have witnessed the transfer of some decision-making powers upwards to supranational bodies, such as the EU, this has been accompanied, as Jessop argues, by attempts on the part of states to reclaim power by 'managing the relationship among different scales of political and economic organisation' (Jessop 2003: 14). This, he argues, has included governments becoming more involved in coordinating the self-organisation of partnerships, networks and governance regimes. In addition, states are also seeking to shape the development of international policy regimes in ways which will benefit their respective national elites (Jessop 2003: 14). Second, the US continues to be a dominant force within the process of the transnationalisation of capitalism. The US, as Stokes shows, continues to headquarter the majority of the world's transnational corporations. Of the world's richest members of the capitalist elite, the majority are US citizens, with eight out of the top ten holding US citizenship (Stokes 2005a: 228). Politically, too, the US is the dominant power within the system. For example, in terms of trade law, the US frequently uses section 201 of its 1974 Trade Act which authorises the US president 'to take action when a particular product is being imported into the country in such large quantities as to cause injury or threaten serious injury to a domestic industry' (ITDS 2004). It was over the US' use of section 201 that the EU appealed to the WTO about high US tariffs on EU steel imports into the US. The WTO ruled against the US, arguing that US actions violated WTO rules. British Trade Minister, Mike O'Brien, announced that if the US did not lift the tariffs the EU would impose retaliatory measures, including sanctions against US imports worth $2.2 billion per year (BBC 2003). Despite this, Ian Rodgers, director of UK Steel, warned:

> The US Department of Commerce is contemplating technical changes in the way that anti-dumping duties are calculated that would mean that even if the section 201 tariffs were withdrawn today they would continue to bite on many steel products for another two to three years, and if the section 201 tariffs are not withdrawn would double their real effect. It looks to us like the USA is preparing to cheat on its obligations. We are urging the Commission and the British government that if this proposal is enacted, then the EU must still proceed with its retaliation even if the section 201 tariffs are withdrawn.
> (quoted in UK Steel 2003)

Thus, even in cases in which judgments are made that conflict with the interests of the US, for instance through the UN or the WTO, the US has the power to exempt itself from such judgments, and uses its power to pursue its own interests regardless of international pressure. Furthermore, these institutions function to reproduce the conditions necessary to ensure ongoing hegemony for the US in the long term, even when small decisions go against US capitalists at particular moments.

In this sense it is difficult to make a strong case for referring to the apparatuses at the disposal of international capital as an emergent transnational state. We should also note that it is US-led. We thereby avoid merging the various agents I refer to, with their competing and cooperative relationships that each affect the other, into a single actor. Indeed Cox's argument, made in the 1980s, regarding whether contemporary US imperialism could be understood in terms of a form of state are still pertinent:

> The [American] imperial system is at once more than and less than the state. It is more than the state in that it is a transnational structure with a dominant core and dependent periphery. This part of the US government is at the system's core, together with interstate institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank symbiotically related to expansive capital, and with collaborator governments (or at any rate parts of them linked to the system) in the system's periphery. It is less than the state in the sense that nonimperial, even anti-imperial, forces may be present in other parts of both core and periphery states ... the struggle for and against the imperial system may go on within the state structures at both core and periphery as well as among social forces ranged in support and opposition to the system. The state is thus an insufficient category to account for the imperial system.
>
> (Cox 1986: 228–9)

By rejecting the notion of a transnational state, therefore, we also avoid underplaying the dominant position that the US continues to occupy, while at the same time accepting that the international system as it is currently configured does allow for agency by other social forces, including fractions of the state and of capital, albeit with lesser influence than those segments of the US state involved in the spread of global capitalism. This is not simply because of the power of the US to act outside of the rulings of international organisations, but also because there is no level playing field within the international institutions themselves. Even within those international institutions that Robinson refers to, core capitalist states, and their respective capitalist classes, and the US in particular, are still the ones that are able to wield the most power and influence. Even the notion of a transnational capitalist class is not entirely accurate, given that the international owners of capital tend to be based in the core capitalist states, and the institutions of the emergent transnational state continue to be geared to respond to the interests of the capitalist classes of the most powerful states. There are, therefore, what might be referred to as class divisions even within the so-called transnational capitalist class.

For instance, within the International Monetary Fund (IMF) the core capitalist states, by virtue of the fact that they are obliged to contribute the greatest financial resources to the IMF, because of their economic position compared to other members, are granted a greater share in IMF votes, with the US having 17.1 per cent of the total vote; Japan, 6.13 per cent; Germany, 5.99 per cent; the UK and France, 4.95 per cent each; and China, 2.94 per cent (IMF 2006). In addition, in order to change the constitution of the IMF, and the World Bank, 85 per cent of the vote is required. Given that the US holds 17.1 per cent of the vote, it can, in effect, veto any such effort (Monbiot 2002). And while at the WTO each member state has one vote, because of the resources that the core capitalist states have access to, they are in a much stronger position to ensure that negotiations go their way (Jawara and Kwa 2004: 1–25). This is exacerbated by the fact that certain agreements that have been reached favour the producers that are predominantly headquartered in core capitalist states. For example, one of the key issues that the WTO deals with is intellectual property rights. These were strengthened under the Uruguay Round of Trade talks which took place between 1986 and 1993, and which brought the World Trade Organisation into being.

In a few instances periphery states have successfully challenged intellectual property rights. For example, Western pharmaceutical companies, under the agreements on intellectual property rights, could stop pharmaceutical companies from Brazil and India 'stealing' their intellectual property, which they argued they had done in developing generic drugs for the treatment of HIV and AIDS that were much cheaper than those produced by the Northern companies. Because of the outcry over this, the Northern companies were forced to back down. Yet the trade agreements, as Joseph Stiglitz, former chief economist at the World Bank, argues, still 'overwhelmingly reflected the interests and perspectives of the producers, as opposed to the users, whether in developed or developing countries' (Stiglitz 2002: 7–8). The foundations of the trade agreements therefore contribute to the unequal relationship between core and periphery states and capital. Furthermore, with a complete lack of transparency in the negotiations that lead to agreements, all of which take place behind closed doors, it is not possible to see the degree to which corporate and other special interests affect the outcomes of those negotiations. Given the number of agreements that favour transnational corporations headquartered in the core capitalist states over the interests of the poor in the Global South, however, it is not difficult to see the leverage that such corporate groups have (Stiglitz 2002: 227).

This approach allows for a more nuanced conception of the relationship between the US state and the spread and intensification of capitalism that does not preclude other potential agents. It allows us to analyse the relationships between the US state, acting as a result of a variety of economic and political aims, US capital, other states and international capital, casting each of these as agents and beneficiaries in different measure in different circumstances. The multiple agents approach provides a theoretical framework for exploring the role of the US state which does not preclude the other actors as agents in the process of reproducing the global capitalist system. The other states and international

capital may not have been as successful as the US state in securing the privileged position that the US state and US capital have in the system, but this does not mean that the other states, as agents of global capital, should be absent from our analysis. Similarly, the primacy of the US state and US capital as beneficiaries of this process should not lead us to the conclusion that they are the only beneficiaries. Primacy is not synonymous with exclusion. Even though international capital and the other states may benefit less from US power projection, and indeed from their own efforts at power projection, both as individual states and national capitals, and as states and national capitals collaborating through organisations such as the EU, they should not be absent from the analysis. Indeed, this approach is consistent with the argument of Daniel Nexon and Thomas Wright that approaches which conceptualise the international system 'as involving various configurations of structural logics', offer the most accurate account of imperialism, which they argue is characterised by a network-structure of distinctive contractual relations between core and periphery states (Nexon and Wright 2007). For this study, this approach provides scope for considering the ways in which other agents emulate or differ from the US in terms of their foreign policy practices, particularly in relation to the use of state terrorism. Indeed the subsequent chapters will examine state terrorism as used and sponsored by various Northern liberal democracies in the South, with specific reference to the collaborations between these states and their elite allies in the South. Particular attention will be paid to the US as the greatest sponsor among the Northern liberal democracies of state terrorism in the South, but also to the partnerships between the US and other Northern liberal democracies in the use and sponsorship of state terrorism.

Distinguishing between the agents of capital

US foreign policy, then, will at the least be aimed at serving the interests of the US state and possibly US capital, but may also have the effect of serving other states and international capital. It is also possible, although less likely, that it may be subordinated to the other states, particularly other core capitalist states, and international capital. It is important to note that the distinction between these various agents will not always be a sharp one, particularly at the level of the state and national capital. A key question is the degree to which it is possible to separate out these agents, as this has important implications for any discussion of the interests pursued and served by them. The nation-state and national capital are likely to be the least distinguishable. This is because, at a structural level, liberal democracy as is practiced in the North is inextricably linked to the capitalist system. The success of the state itself is understood in terms of ensuring an increase in returns for national capital which helps to strengthen the national economy. Thus one driver of the political system within Northern liberal democratic states will be to work in tandem with capital. In this structural sense, therefore, state policy will be tied closely to ensuring the spread and maintenance of the capitalist system to ensure that this type of progress continues.

States and capital are deeply intertwined. The overlap between them is likely to be greatest between the US state and US capital. This is because key figures within the state apparatus may simultaneously represent capital by having a financial interest in private companies, or by occupying executive roles, such as directors or board members, within them. There are, in fact, extremely close ties between members of the US state apparatus and US capital. Various members of the Bush administration, for instance, were owners and directors of capital, and were closely associated with various private corporations. Both Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, for example, had previously served as Secretary of Defence, Cheney under the administration of Bush Senior, and Rumsfeld under President Ford, and both were CEOs, directors and board members of major US corporations. Rumsfeld was chairman of the Gilead Pharmaceuticals Company until 2001, chairman and CEO of the General Instrument Corporation between 1990 and 1993, CEO, chairman and president of the pharmaceutical company G.D. Searle between 1977 and 1985, was involved in negotiations with Bechtel and Iraq during the 1980s for a pipeline project, and is a former director of Gulfstream Aerospace, Tribune Company, Metricom Incorporated, Sears Roebuck and Company and Asea Brown Boveri (Flynn 2005a). Dick Cheney was president and CEO of Halliburton between 1995 and 2000 (Flynn 2005b). They both later took up office in the administration of George W. Bush, as did Condoleezza Rice, who had served as a board member of Chevron, Hewlett Packard and Charles Schwab, and as a board member and member of the International Advisory Board of JP Morgan (Barry and Flynn 2005). Thus while there is an imperative within the Northern liberal democratic political system itself to further capital, there are also obvious ties between individuals within the political system, responsible for making policy, who are themselves closely linked with capital. Given these linkages between the US state and US capital, it is likely that their interests will often be coterminous, and the distinction between these two agents will not always be clear. Indeed, this can be empirically tested in specific cases by assessing whether a particular foreign policy decision was taken in the interests simply of the US state or of US capital as well, by looking at the role of specific individuals that may be involved in a particular foreign policy action and their ties to capital that may also benefit. By looking at a range of such cases, we can then draw conclusions about the degree to which the US state and US capital can be distinguished in foreign policy decisions.

The distinction between the other states and the US state is likely to be sharper because, while the US state is one of the core capitalist states, through its position as a leading member of various transnational institutions it might make decisions that are shared by other states, particularly core capitalist states, but it also enjoys autonomous decision-making powers, as do each of the other states. It therefore may well act in its own interests which may conflict with those of other states. In specific cases, it might be that the decision of the US is completely in line with other states, so we would say that there was significant overlap between them. In others, it might be that the US state acts outside the wishes of the others, in which case there is a much more obvious distinction between them. The degree to

which the US state and the other states overlap in general terms can be deduced by looking at cases in which decisions by the US state and other states are complementary, and at cases in which they are at odds with each other, and assessing how often their decisions complement and conflict with each other. This is particularly important when we look at the use of state terrorism in the subsequent chapters.

The distinction between US capital, meaning corporations headquartered in the US and owned primarily by US nationals, and international capital, meaning corporations owned primarily by non-US nationals and headquartered in states other than the US, is also sharper than that between the US state and US capital. This is because, while these two groups share a number of objectives, such as opening up markets across the globe and ensuring that trade practices serve their interests, they also act in competition with each other. The degree to which these two groups can be distinguished from each other can be deduced by looking at cases in which they cooperate and in which they compete with each other, and assessing how often their actions serve the interests of each other, and how often they conflict with each other.

Finally, the other states and international capital are also likely to overlap less than the US state and US capital do, although there are significant linkages between them, as Stiglitz points out. At the IMF, he notes, it is the finance ministers and the central bank governors that represent each of the states, and at the WTO it is the trade ministers:

> Each of these ministers is closely aligned with particular constituencies within their countries. The trade ministers reflect the concerns of the business community – both exporters who want to see new markets opened up for their products and producers of goods which compete with new imports.... The finance ministers and central bank governors are typically closely tied to the financial community; they come from financial firms, and after their period of government service, that is where they return.
>
> (Stiglitz 2002: 19)

Thus states will, to some extent, be acting on behalf of their own, and potentially other national, capitals if they are collaborating, as the EU states did in the dispute over US steel tariffs, when they enter into negotiations at the international level. While the core capitalist states will often govern the conditions under which international capital operates, through institutions such as the WTO and the IMF, the ties between other states and international capital are not necessarily as tight as those between the US state and US capital. It could be that just as members of the US state apparatus have stakes in US capital, members of other states also have stakes in their national capitals, but also in foreign capitals. They might act at the transnational level in the interests of their national capital and of international capital. This can be measured by analysing cases in which states act on behalf of international capital as a whole and on behalf of specific national capitals against others.

The case of the protection of oil pipelines in Colombia is instructive here, in that the foreign policy decision taken by the US state in this case does not simply serve the interests of the US state, but also, to varying degrees, those of US capital, other states, particularly Colombia, and international capital. The US General Accountability Office (GAO) reported in 2005 that since 2002 the US had provided $99 million in equipment and training to the Colombian army to minimise attacks along the first 110 miles of the Caño Limón-Coveñas oil pipeline, which was operated by US-based petroleum company, Occidental and Colombian Ecopetrol. This included training by US Special Forces for 1,600 Colombian military personnel (GAO 2005). The US state is the agent of capital in this sense, and the outcome of its actions benefit both the US state, and US capital and international capital. It benefits the US state because of the strategic benefits that this brings, which include influence over the Colombian military and potential for arms transactions and ongoing provision of parts and of training as a result of the relationships established through the training. It also benefits US capital, specifically the Occidental company, and international capital, specifically the Colombian Ecopetrol company.

Fractions of international capital, particularly British capital, have also been agents, as well as beneficiaries, in the reproduction of the global capitalist system in Colombia. British Petroleum, and Canadian companies Transcanada and IPL Enterprises and the French oil company Total are all shareholders in the Ocensa Consortium which runs Colombia's largest pipeline. They all benefit from the actions of BP, which employed an Anglo-American security company, Defence Systems Limited (DSL), to protect the Ocensa pipeline in the late 1990s. London-based DSL sends former SAS forces to undertake these security operations. In addition BP had a secret agreement with the Colombian government to provide protection by counter-guerrilla brigades based near the pipeline (Gillard *et al.* 1998). In this case, British capital, as opposed to the British state, has operated to further the interests of British and transnational capital. The primary beneficiaries of this are British capital, specifically BP and DSL, but also international capital, specifically Transcanada, IPL Enterprises and Total, and also, to some extent, US capital, through the sale of equipment to the Colombian military brigades, including 60 pairs of restricted night-vision goggles to the 14th Brigade for its operations at the pipeline, following the grant of a US export licence in 1997 (Gillard *et al.* 1998). It is also possible that the US state may have been an agent in this process if training it had given to Colombian military forces in any way impacted upon the activities of the brigades employed by the Colombian state on behalf of BP. Finally, this whole process benefits other states because it strengthens the ties that bind them through their multilateral engagements and involvements in supranational organisations, such as the WTO, IMF and the OECD. In these cases, then, we can ascertain the degree to which the different groups benefit from the US decision to offer training to protect pipelines in Colombia. What is more ambiguous in these cases is whether the US state was intentionally acting on behalf of any of the other agents or whether the benefits were consequential because of the overlap in the interests of each of these groups. What this case

shows is that there are cross-cutting connections between each of the groups within the global capitalist system. Each of them have the capacity to be agents of global capital, and they are all potential beneficiaries of the actions of any of the others. The multiple agents approach allows for different assignments of primacy to the different groups in different contexts.

This multiple agents approach therefore allows us to make general observations about the relationship between US global power projection and the global capitalist project, with specific reference to the likely agents and beneficiaries, and the hierarchy of those agents and beneficiaries. It also allows us to develop more nuanced accounts of how those agents/beneficiaries benefit in relation to each other in specific circumstances. In other words, this lends itself to empirical application, at both general and specific levels of analysis, from which we can then draw more informed conclusions about the broader trends, than the other approaches permit.

Conclusion

There are important continuities in the objectives of liberal democratic states from the North and their colonial forebears, as well as in the strategies used to achieve those objectives. As I have shown, the nature of imperialism has evolved, in the sense that contemporary efforts to secure dominance over resources and markets in the South are attempted through consensual mechanisms at least as much as coercive ones. Furthermore, contemporary liberal democratic states no longer seek to colonise territory, although they are keen to monopolise access to resources and markets. Their underlying motives are little changed, however, since they are driven by a logic of maximising opportunities for economic expansion and increased political influence. Similarly, whereas recent and contemporary efforts to globalise capital have emphasised processes of legitimation, coercion has continued to serve an important instrumental function in the foreign policies of these states throughout the twentieth and into the twenty-first centuries, both in attempts to thwart independence movements by former colonial powers, and to thwart political movements that challenge the agendas of powerful Northern liberal democratic states. There are even continuities in the forms that coercion takes. As I will show in the chapters that follow, the use of terror has persisted throughout the twentieth and into the early twenty-first century as a means of controlling populations, and particularly as a method of deterring political opposition, which has in turn served an important function in securing specific material interests. Various tools of terror that were deployed by the European colonial powers and early American imperialists have lived on in the foreign policies of now liberal democratic states from the North, including aerial bombardment intended to terrorise populations in which rebellious groups are active and torture as a means of intimidating other opponents.

The objectives of the now liberal democratic states of the North remain unchanged. Just as the European colonial powers were committed to expanding their influence and their access to resources and markets, the US, building on its

own imperial legacy has, since the end of the Second World War, been driven by the logic of ensuring US national security, US primacy and the protection and promotion of US capital. It has been assisted by cooperative allies. These allies include other liberal democratic states from the North, keen to ensure access to their share of the world's resources, markets and power, and the political and economic elites of states in the South, driven by similar motives. While realist and liberal scholars have argued that the end of the Cold War marked a break in US foreign policy, critical scholars have shown that these objectives have consistently shaped US foreign policy, and continue to do so. Ensuring that these goals are met has involved securing large parts of the South for the expansion of US capital, including through the exploitation of resources in the South, often through the use of armed coercion. As the subsequent chapters show, this has frequently been at great cost to human rights.

In recent times the US has found that an effective way of ensuring US primacy and the promotion of US capital has been through expanding and intensifying capitalism in the South. In this chapter I have developed a framework for understanding the complex relationships and interconnections between various agents and potential beneficiaries of the spread of capitalism. These are the US state, US capital, other states, and particularly other core capitalist states, and international capital. I have shown that while the US state and US capital have benefited the most from the spread of capitalism in the South, the agency of these other actors should not be underplayed as, alone and collectively, their actions can have both positive and negative effects for the US state and US capital, just as the actions of the US state and US capital affect the other agents positively and negatively. This approach enables us to account for the complex relationships between these agents, and allows us to make general observations about the hierarchy of these agents, but also allows us to assign primacy to the different agents in different sets of circumstances. This is significant for the chapters that follow, because state terrorism has frequently been used by Northern liberal democratic states in collaboration with other agents. Furthermore, this framework provides us with the broader context of the foreign policy objectives of Northern liberal democratic states in relation to elite interests, which helps us better understand their use and sponsorship of state terrorism in the South.

4   Decolonisation, the Cold War and
state terrorism

Introduction

This chapter examines the use of state terrorism by liberal democratic states in the
South following the Second World War, and up until the end of the Cold War.
Two significant processes involved the widespread use of state terrorism in the
South by powerful states from the North, and their allies. The first of these was
decolonisation. In an effort to suppress nationalist movements in their struggle for
independence, the European colonial powers resorted to various repressive meas-
ures in their colonies, including state terrorism. The final struggles for independ-
ence from the European powers coincided with the ascendancy of the US as the
most powerful Northern state. As discussed in Chapter 3, the rise to prominence of
the US was, in part, a consequence of the devastating impact of the Second World
War on the economies of the European powers. It was also a direct result of the
will on the part of US foreign policy planners to ensure that the US extended its
global reach and influence and to ensure access to and control of resources and
markets deemed essential if the US was to maintain a dominant position on the
world stage. Throughout the Cold War the US sponsored and deployed state ter-
rorism on an enormous scale. This was justified as a means of containing
communism. It was, primarily, however, a means of ensuring that the interests of
US elites were protected and promoted.

I begin by briefly outlining the use of generalised state terrorism by the French
and the British, and their deputies, in their colonies, as nationalist movements
struggled for independence. British forces and British-sponsored state agents in
Kenya detained hundreds of thousands of people during their counterinsurgency
campaign against the Mau Mau. The accompanying treatment of those suspected
of supporting the insurgency had a terrorising effect on civilians. Similarly the
French detained, interrogated and tortured thousands of Algerians during the
French–Algerian war, both in Algeria and France. I show that Britain also sup-
ported state terrorism in a number of its former colonies, where it deemed this
necessary to protect its economic interests. I then explore the use of state terror-
ism, both generalised and limited, by the US and its allies in the South, focusing
primarily on Indochina and Latin America. As I will show, use of generalised state
terrorism by the US in Indochina included the strategic aerial bombardment of

Korea during the 1960s, explicitly intended to terrorise, and the use of massive detention, interrogation and torture of the Vietnamese by US intelligence services and the South Vietnamese army during the Vietnam war. The US used generalised and limited forms of state terrorism in Latin America, which included covert CIA operations intended to assassinate Fidel Castro; covert support for the Contras by the US in Nicaragua; support for governments in various states in Latin America that had seized power through illegitimate means and were involved in the widespread use of state terrorism during the Cold War; intelligence-gathering operations aimed at singling out individuals for assassination such as Operation Condor; and detention and repression of specific individuals and groups in an attempt to disable opposition groups. I show that the counterinsurgency methods developed by the US in Indochina, many of which constituted state terrorism, were emulated in Latin America, and indeed found their way into US training of Latin American military forces during the Cold War. The training is significant, not only because thousands of Latin American military forces received the training, but because it shows that the use of state terrorism was deeply embedded in US military policy. As I will show in Chapters 5 and 6, it continues to shape thinking and practice among US military and intelligence personnel, and helps explain the acts of state terrorism committed by the US and its allies in the 'War on Terror'.

Decolonisation

In its struggle to halt the decolonisation of their few remaining colonies following the Second World War, the British government was complicit in repression, including state terrorism, against its colonial subjects.[1] In 1952 the British declared a state of emergency in Kenya, and sent its military forces to crush the rebellion mounted by the Mau Mau movement, which was primarily made up of members of the Kikuyu people group, the poorest and most exploited group under British rule (Curtis 2003: 317). As was the case across the British empire, there were massive inequalities of wealth between the white settlers and Africans in Kenya, with white settlers, despite comprising only 0.7 per cent of the population, owning 20 per cent of Kenya's most fertile land (Curtis 2003: 319). British-sponsored government forces, particularly the police, were responsible for the majority of the human rights abuses committed during the emergency. Independence was not secured until 1963. For almost ten years, therefore, Kenyans were subjected to violence, including mass detention and torture. Police, Home Guard and military personnel used torture against suspected insurgents, justified as a means of securing intelligence to defeat the insurgency. Some of the worst cases involved slicing off of ears, boring holes in eardrums, flogging to death, setting suspects alight, castration, cutting off tips of fingers, whipping the soles of the feet, tying up with leather thongs and dragging victims around the floor, and rape. On top of this, defendants were rarely given the chance to prepare a defence case, mass trials took place and those found guilty were sent to the gallows. A total of 1,015 people were hanged between 1952 and 1956 (Curtis 2003: 324–5). In 1954, a parliamentary delegation reported back from a visit to Kenya that 'brutality and malpractices by

the police have occurred on a scale which constitutes a threat to public confidence in the forces of law and order', and Labour MP Barbara Castle described Kenya as a 'police state where the rule of law has broken down, where murder and torture of Africans go unpunished and where the authorities pledged to enforce justice regularly connive at its violation' (quoted in Curtis 2003: 326). As discussed in Chapter 2, where the acts of state agents have the effect of terrorising sectors of the population, even if there is no evidence to show that the upper echelons of the state sanctioned this, we can still conclude that state terrorism occurred. Furthermore, as I will show, the British government knew of the extent of the violence, but did little to prevent it. This further supports the argument that the British government was complicit in state terrorism in Kenya. The effects of the methods used by agents of the state in Kenya were to terrorise the Kikuyu, rendering the country a 'police state' and, as is clear, members of parliament were well aware of this and reported back to government that this was the case.

Many Kikuyu, officially around 78,000, were detained in camps during the emergency (Beckett 2001: 125), although Mark Curtis puts the figure at 90,000, and Caroline Elkins, based on her reading of the declassified documents, claims the figure to be at least two, and more likely four times higher than the official figure (Beckett 2001: 125; Elkins 2005: xi). The purpose of such measures, as Iain Beckett argues, was 'to deny guerrillas in the field ready access to food or other material support from civilians' (Beckett 2001: 36). Detainees had their livestock seized and were subjected to forced labour (Curtis 2003: 326; Elkins 2005). As Elkins notes, this was in violation of international labour laws, which prohibit the forced labour of those in detention who have not been tried (Elkins 2005: 129). She shows that plans had been in place well before the operation to establish work camps to house the Mau Mau suspects. There were two types of camp, the first, located in Kikuyu districts and intended for homeless repatriated families considered to be soft sympathisers of the Mau Mau, and the second, located outside of Kikuyu districts for those considered harder line, which were to be punitive. While mass detention does not necessarily, in and of itself, constitute state terrorism, some of the methods used against those detained in Kenya do. Detainees were regularly subjected to torture, including simulated drowning, food and water deprivation, and beatings, to compel compliance with the regime (Curtis 2003; Elkins 2005: 327–8). Those who managed to smuggle letters out of the camps reporting the abuses were subjected to further threats and violence (Elkins 2005: 214). The British claimed not to have detained more than a few thousand women as part of this process, yet Elkins found that women and children, while not detained in the official camps, were held under siege in their villages which were enclosed with razor wire fences and watch towers, and policed by Home Guards. It was the Home Guards that forcibly removed the women and children from their homes, burnt their houses and transported them to these incarcerating villages. They were forced to work and were regularly subjected to violence, including rape, by the Home Guards (Elkins 2005: 233–74). In the case of one of the Home Guards leaders in Gatun'ang'a village, if a woman refused his advances, he would rape her with a beer bottle, forcing it up to her stomach, after which many of the

women died (Elkins 2005: 245). It was not until 1959 that Britain ordered an inquiry into the conditions at the camps (Beckett 2001: 128), even though it had known in 1954 of the extent of the repression, thanks to the report by MP Barbara Castle. Thus, for years, Britain permitted a widespread campaign of state terrorism by its colonial agents against the Kikuyu people, in order to try and avoid losing its valuable asset in the region, and was therefore complicit in the terrorism. Furthermore, following independence, as Curtis argues, Britain went to great lengths to secure a settlement which would ensure the protection of British commercial interests, but this also perpetuated the disparities between rich and poor that had their origins in British colonial rule (Curtis 2003: 330–3).

Similar methods of internment were used by the British in their efforts to defeat a Chinese insurgency in Malaya, a valuable source of minerals including coal, bauxite, tungsten, gold, iron ore, manganese, rubber and tin, to which Britain was seeking to ensure access for British business. As well as a resettlement and internment programme similar to that established in Kenya, the counterinsurgency war fought by the British between 1948 and 1960 also involved widespread aerial bombardment, and the use of a forerunner to the cluster bomb (Curtis 2003: 334–45). Targeting during the air campaign was fairly inaccurate, resulting in many civilian casualties (Curtis 2003: 338–9). There were also cases in which British forces were involved in beatings of Chinese squatters who did not inform on 'insurgents', and cases of dead guerrillas being exhibited in public. In one case, 24 Chinese villagers were slaughtered before the village was razed (Curtis 2003: 339). As discussed in Chapter 2, public displays of dead victims of state violence are deliberately intended to instil fear in surrounding populations, and constitute state terrorism.

Britain also tacitly supported repression in a number of its former colonies, particularly where elite interests were threatened (Curtis 2003, 2004). I will refer briefly to three cases by way of example. Britain supplied weapons to the Nigerian state, thereby assisting Nigeria in its repression of the Biafra independence movement during the civil war of the late 1960s (Curtis 2004: 161–83). The Foreign Office, on the eve of war, noted, 'Our direct interests are trade and investment, including an important stake by Shell/BP in the eastern Region' (quoted in Curtis 2004: 169). Britain also backed Idi Amin in his campaign of terror in the 1970s in Uganda, through provision of weapons and military training, and by turning a blind eye to the repression (Curtis 2004: 161–83 and 245–61). Britain knew of the disappearances and deaths enacted by the regime, as one Foreign Office official made clear when he wrote:

> Amin 'may have to resort to more unpleasant manifestations of his power in order to retain authority, i.e. more disappearances and deaths.... We are close to Amin and some of the odium may well rub off on us. If there are any more reports and if we get a spate of awkward questions, particularly if they refer to the help we are giving Amin, we may find it necessary to ask the High Commissioner to seek from Amin some explanation'.
>
> (quoted in Curtis 2004: 257)

The documents examined by Curtis show that the UK government did nothing to stop Amin's campaign of state terrorism. Similarly in Iraq, as discussed in Chapter 2, Britain was well aware of state terrorism under General Abdul Arif and Prime Minister General Abdul al-Bakr which resulted in the assassination of suspected communists and the imprisonment of 14,000 political prisoners in 1963 (Curtis 2004: 83–8).

The UK government went on to back Iraq in its suppression of the Kurds in their struggle for autonomy. Not only was this intended to terrorise the Kurds, it was also intended to annihilate them. As Curtis notes, British officials were aware of the 'Iraqi intention to carry out terror campaign' and reported that 'the army are now apparently engaged in the clearing out and destruction of Kurdish villages in the Kirkuk neighbourhood', and that 'ruthless tactics' including air strikes were used (Curtis 2004: 89). Despite this, the British had previously approved major arms exports, including Saracen armoured personnel carriers, Hunter fighter aircraft, artillery ammunition and rockets that the Foreign Office knew 'were possibly for use if needed against the Kurds' (Curtis 2004: 90). As the assaults on the Kurds persisted, Britain continued to arm Iraq even though officials acknowledged that 'Iraq's methods have been brutal and might sustain a charge of attempting to destroy or reduce Kurds as a racial minority', in other words, genocide. This was therefore a continuation of earlier policies in the region, discussed in Chapter 3, where the British sanctioned strategic aerial bombardment in the 1920s against rebellious Iraqi villages which were deliberately intended to terrorise the population and undermine support for the insurgency. Arms for the campaign were approved after the above memo was issued (Curtis 2004: 92–3). As the campaign proceeded, napalm was used against the Kurds, and villages were razed to the ground (Curtis 2004: 94). The complicity of the British in Iraqi state terrorism is clear. As I will show, the British also lent support to the US for its counterinsurgency campaigns during the Cold War, which involved the extensive use of state terrorism, including similar methods to those used by Iraq against the Kurds. Such practices were also used in the 'War on Terror' with the US and its Northern allies arming warlords regularly involved in state terrorism, as I show in Chapter 6.

The French were equally brutal in their response to the liberation movement in Algeria in the 1950s and early 1960s. Resettlement was used by the French in Algeria in the war between 1954 and 1962, but on a much larger scale than in Kenya, with as many as three million people being moved to 1,840 *auto-défense* (self-defence) villages by 1960 (Beckett 2001: 164). This was accompanied by a systematic campaign of state terrorism by the French, intended to deter support for the liberation movement, and involving the widespread use of disappearances and torture. Of 24,000 Algerians arrested in the Battle of Algiers, 3,000 disappeared in detention (Beckett 2001: 165). Many were tortured, both in Algeria, at the hands of military and police personnel, and in France, where Algerians fell victim to the French police (Vidal-Naquet 1963: 40–4). The torture used in Algeria included electric shocks, crushing of limbs and organs in vices, and pumping the body with air or liquid (Beckett 2001: 165). Various people, particularly General Jacques

Massu, Commander of the Tenth Parachute Division, which was responsible for police powers in Algiers from 1957, justified the use of torture on the grounds that the circumstances demanded its use and military necessity dictated it (Massu, cited in Peters 1985: 177). This was in the context of a counterinsurgency war which saw French troops interning thousands of Algerians and extreme police control of the population through intelligence-gathering on all Algerians (Vidal-Naquet 1963: 40–4). Torture was used not simply with the intention of securing intelligence about imminent threats to French forces, although this was the justification used by General Massu and his associates, but in the main to attempt to identify the leaders of the Algerian independence movement. Massu admitted years later that the torture had served no useful or necessary intelligence purpose in overcoming terrorism, but had turned most of the Algerian population against the French (MacMaster 2004: 167–8). This demonstrates that the assumed instrumentality of torture was flawed.

The record of the European colonial powers is a violent one. Many of the strategies that they used both to acquire territory and to exploit its resources involved using state terrorism on a massive scale against their colonial subjects, discussed in Chapter 3. In the early stages this was justified as part of the civilising mission of those powers. Later on, the purpose was to halt the decolonisation of territory seized by the colonial powers, although attempts were made by the British and the French to cover up the use of state terrorism, or to justify it as a necessary means in the fight against dangerous insurgents. This was to set a precedent for acts of state terrorism throughout the twentieth and into the twenty-first century.

Communism, capitalism and US state terrorism

As discussed in Chapter 3, US foreign policy priorities following the Second World War were to maintain US global supremacy without having to make changes to the internal fiscal system of the US. This would involve increased deployment of military force to limit activities by foreign countries that would threaten the minimum area of the world to which access was necessary, if the US was to maintain its security and economic prosperity. During the Cold War, US foreign policy strategy in the South involved the extensive use and sponsorship of state terrorism to this end. I show that the US collaborated with elites in the South in order to suppress political movements that might threaten US elite interests and challenge US global dominance. The US was able to achieve its objectives, either through direct US military action or, more often, through the actions of its Southern allies. I chart the use and sponsorship of state terrorism by the US in the South, and show that much US activity during the Cold War was focused on the South, despite the notion of the Cold War as an East–West conflict. The rhetoric surrounding US interventions in the South was dominated by claims that communism was a real and present danger and must be contained. As I will show, with reference to many declassified documents, US activity was as much to do with protecting US elite interests and, in many cases, the US enjoyed the support of the British for its activities in the South.

In Indochina millions were victims of human rights violations at the hands of the US and its clients during the Cold War, as a result of state terrorism by the US. This was exacerbated by the US advocating state terrorism, including torture, through the training its military and intelligence personnel gave to its allies in that region. The US was also involved in state terrorism in almost every Latin American state throughout the Cold War, either directly or through its allies. As I will show, many of the strategies used by the US were borrowed from the practices of US military and intelligence services in Indochina, and were even written into US military training for Latin American armed forces. While a causal link between such training and the practices of Latin American armed forces and intelligence agents cannot be proven, it is clear that the US encouraged the use of state terrorism by its allies in the region.

Generalised state terrorism in Indochina

The Grand Area Planning strategy, discussed in Chapter 3, involved securing access to the Pacific region, as well as the Western hemisphere and the former European colonies, to maintain US dominance of the global system. The Cold War period saw the US engage in extensive wars and counterinsurgency campaigns in Indochina to this end. State terrorism was a key ingredient of US strategy, and was used widely by the US and its allies. The US implemented a policy of state terrorism in Vietnam through Operation Phoenix, which involved the widespread use of torture and killing of civilians believed to have links to the insurgency, with the aim of limiting support for the insurgents.[2] These tactics were deployed elsewhere in the region, including through the inappropriately named Public Safety Programmes established by the CIA in countries throughout the Third World, including Korea, Cambodia, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Iran, Turkey, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama and Uruguay (McClintock 1992). These programmes provided training for military, paramilitary and police forces, and were frequently involved in activities that threatened rather than promoted public safety, since, as Michael McClintock shows, they encouraged the use of similar methods to those deployed through Operation Phoenix, discussed in Chapter 2, resulting in many human rights abuses (McClintock 1992). I will briefly outline the use of state terrorism by the US in its operations in Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan and Indonesia, demonstrating that in these states the US was complicit in generalised state terrorism against civilian populations, either directly or through support of repressive regimes which were themselves terrorising their own populations.

Korea

Aerial bombardment, as a means of instilling fear in the civilian population, was deemed illegitimate following the Second World War. Leading international lawyers including Geoffrey Robertson, QC, consider the practice of terrorising the civilian population through carpet bombing areas of high population density to be a war crime (Robertson 1999: 185). Carpet bombing had indeed been prohibited

under the Hague's Draft Rules of Aerial Warfare as early as 1923 (ICRC 1923). These rules were never adopted under the Geneva Conventions in 1949, however, as Robertson notes, partly because of the RAF's use of aerial bombardment against Dresden in the Second World War, which killed over 135,000 citizens, and continues to be one of the most ethically problematic air raids of the Second World War (Robertson 1999: 185). Despite the illegitimacy of aerial bombardment as a means of terrorising civilians, the US used it in South Korea after the Second World War. The war which took place between North Korea, backed by the communist People's Republic of China, and South Korea, backed by UN forces primarily from the US, from 1950, involved atrocities on all sides. Bruce Cumings argues that while the war officially ended in 1953, it continued well beyond then as a protracted civil conflict (Cumings 2004: 40). The US killed thousands of South Korean civilians as part of its efforts to wipe out supposed insurgents, which it did through indiscriminate aerial bombardment, as Cumings shows: 'From early November 1950 onward, MacArthur ordered that a wasteland be created between the fighting front and the Chinese border, destroying from the air every "installation, factory, city and village over thousands of square miles of North Korean territory"' (Cumings 2004: 19). The strategy was expanded over the next two years, and was deliberately intended, as Beau Grosscup notes, to 'have a deleterious effect upon the morale of the civilian population actively engaged in the logistical support of enemy forces' (Grosscup 2006: 79). Cumings has compiled important evidence consisting of eye witness testimony, US Military Advisory Group files and news reports on US atrocities against the population in areas of the South (Cumings 1990: 701). Charles Grutzner, from the *New York Times*, stated that early on in the war, 'fear of infiltrators led to the slaughter of hundreds of South Korean civilians, women as well as men, by some US troops and police of the Republic'. Grutzner went on to quote a high-ranking US officer who stated that, out of panic in July 1950, an American regiment shot 'many civilians' (Grutzner, quoted in Cumings 1990: 705). US military documents show that the US carried out indiscriminate aerial bombardments in South Korea against suspected insurgents, using napalm. On 6 August, for example, a request was made by the Air Force to have the towns of Chimbo, Kusu-dong and Chongsong 'obliterated'. Within five days, five groups of B-29s 'hit a rectangular area near the front, full of towns and villages, creating an ocean of fire with hundreds of tonnes of napalm'. Twenty days later a further request was made, and 11 villages were fired in the same way (Cumings 1990: 706). A total of 866,914 gallons of napalm were dropped between June and late October alone (Cumings 1990: 707).

The Philippines

Concern on the part of the US over the Huk resistance in the Philippines in the 1950s led to a US presidential order to rapidly expand and reorganise Philippine combat forces, which was funded by the diversion of $9.3 million from other Cold War military aid allocations. Much of this aid was used to equip and train 16 Battalion Combat Teams in counterinsurgency techniques. The army and

navy increased significantly in size thanks to further provision from the US (McClintock 1992: Chapter 4). From late 1951 the US supplied the Philippines with napalm which was used both for crop destruction and antipersonnel purposes. The US also helped develop a record system for Philippine military intelligence, which traced all known supporters of the wartime Huk resistance movement, and was used in screening operations that resulted in some 15,000 arrests in the first six months of 1951 (McClintock 1992). Over the course of the next ten years the US continued to assist the Philippine armed forces, largely under the direction of Colonel Ed Lansdale.

Taiwan

Following the Second World War, successive US administrations also backed the repressive, dictatorial regimes of Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo in Taiwan, up until the 1980s when the Carter administration broke off relations (Johnson 2000: 26). Taiwan was expelled from the UN in 1971, following two decades of repression which, according to Peter Huang, President of Taiwan's Association for Human Rights, included 'Operation Cleaning the Countryside', peaking in 1955, and intended to rid Taiwan of supposed communist insurgents. This resulted in the deaths of several thousand and the detention and terrorising of hundreds of thousands more (Huang 2000). US backing for the regime included arms sales and a commitment to back Taiwan should war break out with the mainland (Johnson 2000: 59 and 138–9).

Indonesia

The case of Indonesia reveals the extent to which the US state prioritised its elite interests over the human rights of hundreds of thousands of Indonesians, by supporting the military regime in an extensive campaign of state terrorism. It also demonstrates the complicity of the British in Indonesian state terrorism. In October 1965, a small group of left-wing army officers assassinated six Indonesian generals. This provided the Indonesian military with a reason to set out to destroy its rival – the Indonesia Communist Party (PKI) (Chomsky and Herman 1979a: 206). The PKI was opposed to corruption within the Indonesian military-dominated bureaucratic system and its close ties to the US through US provision of military hardware and training. The army was quick to establish itself in power following this attempted coup and there followed a four-month period of violence. Estimates of those killed range from 500,000 to one million, and many cases of torture and rape, including of girls under the age of 13, were reported to Amnesty International (AI 1977: 13 and 73–7). At the time, the US and British were well aware of the campaign of state terror being waged by the Indonesian generals. From late 1951 the US supplied Indonesia with napalm which was used both for crop destruction and antipersonnel purposes. The US Consulate in Medan reported to the State Department that: 'Something like a reign of terror against PKI is taking place. This terror is not discriminating very carefully

between PKI leaders and ordinary PKI members with no ideological bond to the party' (quoted in Curtis 2003: 391). The British Consul in Medan described the generals as follows: 'Posing as saviours of the nation from a communist terror, [the army] unleashed a ruthless terror of their own, the scars of which will take many years to heal' (quoted in Curtis 2003: 392). Yet neither in the US nor the British files, now declassified, is any concern expressed about the extent of the terror being committed by the generals. Indeed, both the US and UK actively encouraged coercion. The British deployed tens of thousands of troops to Borneo by 1965 to defend its former colony from Indonesian efforts to expand its territory, yet, as Curtis notes:

> British planners secretly noted that they did not want to distract the Indonesian army by getting them engaged in fighting in Borneo, and so discourage them from the attempts which they now seem to be making to deal with the PKI.
>
> (Curtis 2003: 392)

Meanwhile, US educational foundations had been working to establish ties with Indonesian social scientists that themselves had connections with the Indonesian army. As research by Inderjeet Parmar shows, the Ford Foundation expended significant resources in establishing a modernising elite in Indonesia during the 1950s and 1960s, or, in the words of the Ford Foundation's John Howard, the Foundation was 'training the guys who would lead the country when Sukarno got out' (Parmar 2002: 18). After receiving training at Berkeley, various Indonesian scholars returned home and began liaising with the army, 'becoming drawn in to the military's machinations against the nationalist government', which as Parmar shows, involved economic development plans in line with IMF and World Bank strategies (Parmar 2002: 19).

In the period that followed the coup that removed Sukarno, as ties between the US state and the Indonesian government strengthened, major tax incentives were implemented for foreign, mostly US-based, investors who, by 1973, controlled 59 per cent of the capital invested in forestry, 96 per cent in mining, 35 per cent in industry, 47 per cent in hotels and tourism, and 33 per cent in agriculture (Robison 1978). Meanwhile, after failing to criticise the slaughter of 1965, the US continued to provide military support, including training of Indonesian military forces, despite Indonesia's repression of its own population and the East Timorese. Successive Australian governments also supported the Indonesian government, provided ongoing military support to the regime (Kiernan 2002: 167). From 1975 onwards, the Suharto regime, which feared that East Timor would secure international support in its bid for independence, through the efforts of the populist FREITLIN party, invaded the country and subjected the population to extensive repression, including state terrorism. As Curtis notes:

> The population was for years subjected to aerial bombing, campaigns of deliberate starvation and the wholesale destruction of villages. By 1985, up

to half a million people had been killed or displaced. Disappearances or deaths in custody, the killing of prisoners who surrendered after being promised amnesty, the torture and imprisonment of people suspected of being disloyal to the Suharto regime were all common.

(Curtis 2003: 403)

Declassified documents show that President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger gave the green light to Suharto for the invasion. In a meeting between Suharto and Ford on 6 December 1975, Suharto made it known that he was planning the invasion. Ford made it very clear that they would not oppose the invasion, stating 'We will understand and will not press you on the issue. We understand the problem and the intentions you have' (US Embassy 1975). Kissinger raised concerns about the use of US weapons, stating, 'the use of US-made arms could create problems', but added, 'it depends on how we construe it; whether it is in self defense or is a foreign operation' (US Embassy 1975). Similarly, the Australian government backed the Indonesian government, with Richard Woolcott, Australian ambassador to Jakarta, encouraging the Australian government to back Kissinger's policy. The Australian government then went to great lengths to cover up the extent of the repression by Indonesia against the East Timorese (Kiernan 2002: 171–5). The US and Britain continued to supply arms to Indonesia despite the ongoing repression. In the case of Britain, the Callaghan government permitted the export of eight Hawk aircraft, Rolls Royce engines, spares and training of pilots and engineers to Indonesia in 1978 (Curtis 2003: 405). The Indonesian military commander of Aceh province was quoted in 1990, stating: 'I have told the community, if you find a terrorist, kill him. There's no need to investigate him … if they don't do as you order them, shoot them on the spot, or butcher them' (cited in Curtis 2003: 407). Even President Carter, who claimed to be pursuing a foreign policy in which human rights mattered, provided military training and weapons to the Indonesian government, as the now declassified summary of a meeting between Carter's vice-president, Walter Mondale, and President Suharto shows. In this meeting Mondale discussed with Suharto the US administration's desire for expanded arms sales to Jakarta, including the sale of the F-5 jet, and a co-production plant to produce the M-16, and also indicated that the Carter administration 'does not question the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia', but noted that 'there are problems on how to deal with our mutual concerns regarding East Timor and how to handle public relations aspects of this problem' (DoS 1978). Carter thus supported Indonesia despite the fact that the UN and, later, the European Community, did not recognise Indonesia's claim to East Timor. The East Timor Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) found that US 'political and military support were fundamental to the Indonesian invasion and occupation', and that:

This was so not only because weapons and equipment purchased from the United States played a significant role in Indonesian military operations

in Timor, but also because it never used its unique position of power and influence to counsel its Indonesian ally against embarking on an illegal course of action.

(CAVR 2006)

The same can be said of Britain. Both the US and Britain were complicit in an ongoing campaign of state terrorism by Indonesia which cost hundreds of thousands of lives. Furthermore, their economies benefited from the sale of arms which were used against East Timorese civilians.

The methods used by the US to defeat its opponents in Indochina involved the widespread use of state terrorism. The US was directly responsible for state terrorism in some cases, as in the aerial bombardment of the civilian population in Korea and the establishment of counterinsurgency programmes such as the Phoenix Programme in Vietnam, which involved torture and assassination of civilians suspected of supporting the opposition, and was intended to deter public support for the enemy. The US was complicit in state terrorism through its support for repressive regimes, either by giving the green light to acts of state terrorism or providing military hardware to regimes engaged in campaigns of state terrorism, as was the case in Taiwan and Indonesia. The US also collaborated with those regimes through the sharing of military doctrine which advocated state terrorism, as the case of the Philippines shows. As I will demonstrate, the US advocated such practices widely through its military training of Latin American armed forces throughout the Cold War, and particularly from the 1960s onwards.

State terrorism in Latin America

As discussed in Chapter 2, ever since President Monroe announced his Doctrine in 1823, Latin America has been designated a key sphere of US influence by successive administrations, essential for strategic, political, military and material purposes. Indeed, when interviewed, even José Alvarez, the former commandant of the School of the Americas,[3] conceded, 'US policy towards Latin America has been one of benign neglect at best in terms of politics. Historically it has been a corporate land-grab, a fiefdom of US corporations'.[4] This sums up US approaches to Latin America throughout the Cold War. As implied in the advice given by the Council on Foreign Relations to President Roosevelt, discussed in Chapter 2, all efforts would be taken to prevent political movements that posed a threat to US interests from gaining ground in Latin America. As I will show, they were frequently met with US state terrorism, either carried out directly by US military and intelligence agents or, more frequently, by US-sponsored allies, often collaborating in regional networks headed by the US. The sponsorship of such allies took on various forms, and included limited state terrorism, such as the assassination attempts against political leaders, most notably Fidel Castro of Cuba, and the use of death squads to target specific opponents of the regime. The US also used and supported generalised state terrorism, including the widespread use of disappearances, detentions, torture and murder. Such tactics were further encouraged

through US training of military, intelligence and police forces in the region. The rationale underpinning each of these strategies is that the knowledge of violence against opponents will secure acquiescence among the rest of the population and help thwart the insurgency. The use of torture and of death squads is publicised, and military training in such techniques encourages the targeting of large groups within society in a fairly public way. Without the publicity, such techniques would have little value, as discussed in Chapter 2.

Sponsorship of state terrorism

In Guatemala, the US was complicit in a coup to overthrow the democratically elected leader, Jacobo Arbenz, in 1954, and then lent support to successive regimes that used state terrorism extensively in the ensuing 40 years of conflict. The interests of the US state and US capital were under threat, following the ousting of the Guatemalan military government in 1944. Juan José Arévalo was elected President, and a decade of reform began. Guatemala's first labour unions were established, and a Labour Code was introduced. In 1953, the new, democratically elected president, Jacobo Arbenz, continued with these reforms, and as part of a policy of redistributing land to the Guatemalan peasantry, expropriated 40 per cent of the land owned by US-based United Fruit Company. This amounted to 234,000 acres (Cullather 1994). Both John Foster Dulles, then American Secretary of State and his brother, Allen, then CIA director, owned stock in the company (Schoultz 1998: 338). John Foster Dulles was also closely connected to United Fruit's management as the executive partner of the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, which was employed by United Fruit. His brother was also a Sullivan and Cromwell attorney (Schoultz 1998: 338). The US administration began to plot Arbenz's overthrow, ostensibly because of communist tendencies, following a meeting between the US ambassador and Arbenz. The CIA was then assigned the task of organising, arming and training the Arbenz government's military opposition in Honduras, with a view to overthrowing the government (Schoultz 1998: 452).

The CIA-backed coup in 1954 followed CIA training of 37 Guatemalan sabotage trainees, 30 leadership trainees, and communications trainees (Cullather 1994; Schoultz 1998: Chapter 5). Documents obtained by the National Security Archive indicate that the CIA had also been involved in planning the assassination of enemies of the new regime, should the coup be a success (CIA 1954). Decades of violence ensued, led by the Guatemalan state and right-wing paramilitary groups that claimed the lives of thousands, many during the US-sponsored counterinsurgency campaign in the mid-1960s. The Commission for Historical Clarification, established in 1994 through the Oslo Accords, estimated that over 200,000 people in Guatemala were killed or disappeared between the 1950s and 1994 (Tomuschat *et al.* 1999: Chapter 7). The report states:

> A high proportion of the human rights violations known to the CEH [Commission for Historical Clarification] and committed by the Army or security

forces were perpetrated publicly and with extreme brutality, especially in the Mayan communities of the country's interior.

(Tomuschat *et al.* 1999)

Despite extensive repression, particularly against the Mayan communities, US support for counterinsurgency campaigns persisted throughout the 1960s, a key element of which was the ongoing military training of Guatemala's military, para-military and police forces. Key roles were played by the Inter-American Police Academy in the Panama Canal Zone, the Department of Defense's Special Forces for paramilitary training, and joint Department of Defense and CIA programmes, which included the Public Safety Programme. This was engaged in activities that were completely contrary to ensuring public safety, including the use of torture by US and overseas personnel (McClintock 1992). These programmes provided train-ing for military, paramilitary and police forces, not just from Guatemala, but across the South, including Korea, Cambodia, the Philippines, Thailand, Indone-sia, Iran, Turkey, Colombia, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Panama and El Salvador (McClintock 1992).[5] Between 1950 and 1975, 3,030 Guatemalan soldiers of the 5,000-strong Guatemalan army received US training (NACLA 1972). Amnesty estimated that between 1966 and 1976, the number of victims of secretly sanc-tioned murders and disappearances in Guatemala numbered over 20,000 (AI 1976: Chapter 7). The Commission for Historical Clarification attributed 93 per cent of these to the Guatemalan state, predominantly the army (Tomuschat *et al.* 1999, see 'Conclusions').

Declassified documents illustrate that the US military was complicit in these human rights abuses through its ongoing support of the Guatemalan state, and continued counterinsurgency training. One of the documents sent by Viron Vacky, US Deputy Chief of the Guatemalan Mission, to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Affairs, Covey Oliver, at the Department of State's Policy Planning Council, argued:

> The Guatemalan government's use of counter-terror is indiscriminate and brutal, and has impeded modernisation and institution building within the country.... This is not only because we have concluded that we cannot do anything about it, for we have never really tried. Rather we suspect that maybe it is a good tactic, and that as long as communists are being killed it is alright. Murder, torture and mutilation are alright if our side is doing it and the victims are communists.... Counter-terror is, in short, very wrong morally, ethically, politically from the point of view of Guatemala's own interest and practically from our own foreign policy point of view.

(Vaky 1968)

Yet support for such operations continued, and a further declassified document, sent by the US embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State's Fascell Sub-Committee Hearings on the Guatemala Public Safety Programme reads:

1) The U.S. government is aware of the tactics being used by the government of Guatemala (GOG) to combat urban and rural terrorism. The GOG for the most part uses orthodox police methods to rid Guatemala of the communist-inspired terrorism, but on occasion has engaged in illegal detention and elimination of individuals. President Arana is troubled by these operations. 2) The advent of a communist government considerably more repressive than the present one would have a serious and adverse effect on U.S. security. 3) The U.S. Public Safety Program is not involved in assistance to or cooperation with terrorist operations of any kind. 4) Contrary to the misleading information put forth by members of the U.S. and international press the Public Safety Program is not associated by Guatemalans with terrorist tactics.

(DoS 1971a)

The US continued to lend support to the Guatemalan government, and to insist that US training programmes were in no way involved in repression. Yet the Commission for Historical Clarification concluded that US military assistance had a 'significant bearing on human rights violations during the armed confrontation' (Tomuschat *et al.* 1999). The Public Safety Programme was investigated in the 1970s because of allegations that its Latin American programmes had encouraged torture, and because of the role that it played in establishing the Phoenix Programme in Vietnam which, as discussed in Chapter 2, involved the widespread use of torture.

Declassified documents show that the US was also implicated in the coup in Brazil in 1964 which overthrew President Goulart and led to the establishment of a military regime. Goulart had been involved in land reform programmes, and lent his support to dissenters in the Army. An audiotape of a conversation between President Johnson and his Undersecretary of State, George Ball, and Assistant Secretary for Latin America, Thomas Mann, on 31 March 1963, shows that Johnson gave the green light for active US support of the coup. Ball had informed the President that Goulart was a leftist, closely associated with the Brazilian communist party, and feared that Brazil 'would be another China'. Johnson responded, 'I think we ought to take every step that we can, be prepared to do everything that we need to do' (Johnson 1964). Subsequent exchanges between the CIA, the State Department and the White House reveal that the US lent military support to the coup.

Ambassador Lincoln Gordon sent a secret memorandum to the White House on 27 March 1964, urging the US to make a 'clandestine delivery of arms' to the leaders of the coup, as well as a shipment of gas and oil to help the coup forces succeed. He also suggested such support be supplemented by CIA covert operations (Gordon 1964). On 31 March, Gordon was sent a cable by Secretary of State Dean Rusk confirming that the plans were in place to support the coup. It states that decisions had been taken by the White House 'in order [to] be in a position to render assistance at appropriate time to anti-Goulart forces if it is decided this should be done', including sending US naval tankers loaded with petrol, oil and

lubricants, assembling 110 tonnes of ammunition and other equipment for pro-coup forces, and the dispatch of a naval brigade including an aircraft carrier, several destroyers and escorts to be positioned off the coast of Brazil (Rusk 1964). Following the coup, the military government launched a 'cleanup' operation which, over the coming ten years, as documented by Martha Huggins, would see thousands of Brazilian citizens involved in a whole range of political parties, inter-est groups, labour unions, religious groups, student organisations and activist organisations disappeared and tortured at the hands of a brutal police force (Huggins 1998: 119–60; Huggins *et al.* 2002: 77–9 and 236–40). The US con-tinued to provide training for military and police personnel (Huggins 1998: 136).

As in Guatemala and Brazil, the US also lent tacit support to the coup, led by Augusto Pinochet, which overthrew Salvador Allende in Chile and, again, sup-ported Pincohet's repressive regime. Despite the campaign of state terrorism unleashed by Pinochet, the US continued to support the government, supplying arms and training to its military forces. The election of Allende's reformist social democratic government in Chile in the 1970s concerned the US govern-ment. A declassified memorandum obtained by the National Security Archive showed that Henry Kissinger urged President Nixon to take action to undermine Allende's government, just two days after he was inaugurated. This was to include covert support for military action against Allende:

> The election of Allende as president of Chile poses for us one of the most serious challenges ever faced in this hemisphere.... The consolidation of Allende in power in Chile, therefore, would pose some very serious threats to our interests and position in the hemisphere, and would affect developments and our relations to them elsewhere in the world: US investments (totalling some one billion dollars) may be lost ... Chile would probably become a leader of the opposition to us in the inter-American system, a source of dis-ruption in the hemisphere and a focal point of support for subversion in the rest of Latin America.
>
> (Kissinger 1970)

As with Guatemala, fears for US state interests and for the future of US capitalist investments dictated policy. The memo goes on to outline the difficulties involved, emphasising particularly the fact that Allende was democratically elected and therefore has 'legitimacy in the eyes of the Chileans' (Kissinger 1970). An audio tape of a telephone conversation between Nixon and Ron Zeigler, the White House Press Secretary, on 23 March 1972 shows that the White House had instructed US Ambassador Edward Korry 'to do everything short of a Dominican Republic-type action' to stop Allende (Nixon and Zeigler 1972). Behind the scenes the CIA had been plotting the coup which was to overthrow Allende since 1970. This included deploying a team of covert operatives working individually within Chile to under-take propaganda operations that were intended to push the then Chilean president, Eduardo Frei, to support a military coup which would prevent Allende from taking office (CIA 1970). There are no documents available that determine the degree to

which the US was implicated in the coup on 11 September 1973 which overthrew Allende, although one document indicates that the US Naval attaché, Patrick Ryan, was extremely pleased with the success of Pinochet's coup, which, he stated, 'was close to perfect' (Ryan 1973). The years that followed would see Chile's population suffer greatly at the hands of Pinochet's military government, throughout which the US was involved in providing Chile with military assistance and covert support for clandestine intelligence and counterinsurgency activity. The Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (CNCTR) found that during and in the years following the coup, 2,279 people were killed. Of those, 815 were victims of execution and death by torture, 957 disappeared following arrest, and the remainder were killed either as a result of war tribunals, during political protests, alleged escape attempts or gun battles (CNCTR 1991). The coup also ushered in a period of intense economic restructuring with the privatisation of previously expropriated assets, and the implementation of structural adjustment under the Chicago Boys – 150 Chilean technocrats who were sent to study under Milton Friedman at the Chicago Business School. This was accompanied by significant US finance in the form of aid and investment (Robinson 1996: 165–6).

Death squads and disappearances

US state terrorism in the South during the Cold War involved directly supporting or turning a blind eye to the use of death squads, comprised of military and intelligence agency personnel, to round up and kill individuals considered to pose a threat to elite interests in allied states, regularly torturing them first. Often US support involved establishing networks for intelligence gathering on suspects. At other times it was simply the case that the US administration was prepared to look the other way, since elimination of political opposition was conducive to US interests.

Ongoing human rights abuses by the government in Argentina did not deter the US from providing military assistance, indeed, as I will show, Kissinger explicitly expressed his support for the repression of political opponents. US forces were themselves implicated in abuses. The coup in Argentina which saw Isabel Peron imprisoned by the military, and the establishment of a military dictatorship from 1976 to 1982, unleashed widespread, largely indiscriminate repression, particularly among the middle and lower classes, in what became known as the 'Guerra Sucia' or Dirty War. Just two days after the coup, then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had expressed his approval of the economic benefits that could ensue for the US, in a meeting with his staff members. In that meeting William Rogers informed Kissinger that 'we're going to look for a considerable effort to involve the US – particularly in the financial field' and Kissinger replied, 'Yes, but that's in our interest' (Kissinger 1976). Estimates of the numbers of people that were killed or disappeared under the military dictatorship range from 9,000 to 30,000, many of whom were also tortured in Argentina's secret detention centres (AI 2003a). The US Embassy in Argentina had itself compiled documentation of nearly 10,000 human rights violations,

most of them disappearances by 1979, which it sent to the State Department 'for the Department's permanent records and use' (Embassy 1979). Kissinger, rather than condemn these abuses, urged the junta to at least be quick about it, when he spoke with the Argentine Foreign Minister, and in a meeting on 7 October 1976, promised US support:

> Look, our basic attitude is that we would like you to succeed. I have an old-fashioned view that friends ought to be supported.... The quicker you succeed the better. The human rights problem is a growing one.... If you can finish before Congress gets back, the better. Whatever freedoms you could restore would help.
>
> (DoS 1976)

Meanwhile, the military dictatorship was also enjoying ongoing assistance from the US. Viron Vaky, then Assistant Secretary for Interamerican Affairs, in a memorandum to the State Department argued:

> The Argentines remain dubious about the sincerity of US human rights demarches. Many in the government may have believed that US protests were largely perfunctory, a temporary outburst of moral fervour reflecting pressure from a few misguided human rights zealots in the Congress and non-governmental organisations and Argentina would be protected for the duration or its 'dirty war' by friends in the US executive and Congress and/or the Pentagon.
>
> (Vaky 1978)

Given ongoing encouragement of counterinsurgency doctrine provided by the US to the Argentine military, it is hardly surprising that the Argentine top brass considered the US to be giving a green light to their actions. During the 1980s, some of the Argentine army intelligence officers who had played a role in human rights violations during the Dirty War, went on to assist the US in its counterinsurgency operations in Central America. Argentine officers oversaw a training programme for the Honduran Army and the Nicaraguan Contras. They trained 3–16 Battalion, a Honduran death squad responsible for numerous disappearances, and former members of the Somoza National Guard, in their new role as Contra leaders. The CIA had helped the Honduran armed forces establish Battalion 3–16, which was behind the murders of at least 184 people, most of whom were disappeared, as the CIA's Inspector General's Secret Report into the Battalion, dated 27 August 1977, shows (CIA 1977).

El Salvador's repressive military government also enjoyed extensive US military assistance. Following a coup in 1979, an alliance was formed between the opposition group, the Democratic Revolutionary Front, and the guerrilla organisation, the FMLN. With the election of Ronald Reagan, the FMLN expected massive security assistance from the US for the Salvadoran military government, so it launched a final offensive against the government. It failed, but was

met with widespread repression from the government, with the Catholic archdio-
cese of San Salvador documenting 2,644 murders of civilian non-combatants by
the armed forces and paramilitary groups associated with them (Brown 1985:
115–18). The aid from the Reagan administration did indeed arrive. It rose from
$5.9 million dollars in 1980 to $35.5 million in 1981, and to $82 million in 1982
(DoS 1980–2). The support included the provision of military training for large
sections of the Salvadoran armed forces, including counterinsurgency training
(Leuer 2000: 17). The Truth Commission for El Salvador concluded that
'counter-insurgency military operations affected the non-combatant civilian
population, causing a high death toll and the emergence of a new phenomenon –
displaced persons' (UNSC 1993). During the conflict around 75,000 people
were killed, and many were tortured (Buergenthal 1994: 502).

The situation in 1980s Peru was similar to that of El Salvador. In its efforts to
overcome the terrorist activity of Sendero Luminoso, the Peruvian government
deployed its own terror tactics through a far-reaching counterinsurgency cam-
paign. Ayacucho, and a number of other provinces where Sendero Luminoso
were active, were militarised, and civilian functions were placed under the
authority of political military commanders (Brown 1985: 216). One of Ayacu-
cho's counterinsurgency experts told Marlise Simons of the *New York Times*
that the security forces purposely left bodies on public display, because 'this
raises doubt about who did it and dissuades people. The idea is to reduce the ter-
rorists to their hard core by using greater terror' (quoted in Simons 1984: 216).
Americas Watch, now Human Rights Watch, reported that this campaign
included disappearances:

> In scenes reminiscent of Argentina's mothers of the desaparecidos [disap-
> peared], every day there are long lines of women, in this case Quechua
> Indian women, outside the offices of the police and the public prosecutor's
> office in Ayacucho seeking news of relatives who have not been heard from
> since they were arrested. Along the roads outside Ayacucho, rotting bodies
> can be found as well as mass graves.
>
> (Brown 1985: 216–17)

The US, rather than condemn the government for these actions, continued to
lend military support to Peru, increasing its military aid to $10.7 million in 1984,
from $4.6 million the year before (Brown 1985: 219). In a testimony to US
Embassy staff in Lima, a former Peruvian military officer provided details of
extensive human rights abuses committed by the Peruvian military, as the
Embassy reported to the Secretary of State in a secret cable on 30 June 1994:

> A former army officer provided a detailed account of what he claims was
> his direct involvement as a member of army commando and intelligence
> units that engaged in systematic and officially-sanctioned assassination and
> torture of suspected terrorists and opponents. These included the 1984
> killing of a mayor; five letter bombs in 1991 that killed two persons and

maimed two, and many other murders, rapes and torture of suspects during assignments outside of Lima.

(Embassy 1994)

This cable shows that the US political elite were acutely aware of the human rights abuses occurring in Latin America.

Throughout the last 50 years Colombia has been an ongoing recipient of high levels of US military assistance, officially for combating terrorist activities of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and fighting the 'war on drugs'. Doug Stokes shows that ongoing military assistance to successive Colombian governments, all of which have been involved in human rights violations against thousands of civilians, has been for the purposes of protecting the interests of the US state and US capital (Stokes 2005c). Between 1958 and 1974, the two major political parties in Colombia alternated control of the Presidency. This arrangement was known as the National Front. Colombia received a total of $1.4 billion in military aid during the National Front period (Brown 1985: 223). This was intended to assist the Colombian government's counterinsurgency campaign against the terrorist activities of the FARC, and was implemented through Plan Lazo in 1962, designed to destroy the armed groups in Colombia's rural areas. Stokes shows, however, that it was 'principally targeted at the peasant agriculturalists found in Colombia's south' (Stokes 2005: 72). Even when the peace process between the guerrilla movements and the government began in 1982, the US continued to back the Colombian military and paramilitary groups which increased their counterinsurgency offensives against the guerrilla groups and Colombian civilians throughout the 1980s (Stokes 2005: 75). Disappearances and torture were ongoing, as were murders. A number of new paramilitary groups, involved with drug cartels, were also formed during this period, and were responsible for kidnappings, murders and mass killings, all with the assistance of the Colombian military, which provided intelligence on the identities and locations of some of the targets (Stokes 2005: 75–6). Yet the US did not condemn the activities of the Colombian military and, in 1984, sent $50 million of arms to Colombia's military and police forces (Stokes 2005: 77). Such aid would continue and, by the end of the Cold War, would be granted in the name of counter-drug as well as counterinsurgency operations.

Assassination attempts

Frequent reference was made throughout the Cold War by US officials to the case of Cuba, and the risk that other states in the region would fall to communism. The case of US sponsorship of the failed invasion of Cuba's Bay of Pigs in 1961 demonstrates the ends to which the US went to overthrow a regime that was at odds with its designs on the region, in the hope that this would also prevent the spread of communism in Latin America. CIA and US Special Forces covertly trained members of the 1,400 strong taskforce of Cuban nationals who had been selected for the job. The planned invasion also involved the provision of 17 B-26

bombers, a fleet of naval vessels and five M14 tanks (McClintock 1992: Chapter 5). This was one of the earliest engagements in which the US would train or offer assistance to allied armies to carry out its objectives in the region. While this failed, subsequent arrangements between the US and elites in the South were much more successful for the US, but resulted in extensive abuses of human rights in the region. And despite the failure, the CIA was not deterred from attempting to rid the world of Castro. A member of Cuba's Secret Service, Fabian Escalante, who for a time was charged with protecting Castro, claims in a documentary film made for Channel 4, and an accompanying book, that the US, particularly the CIA, was persistent in its efforts to assassinate Castro (Campbell 2006: 14). Assassination attempts included the infamous exploding cigar. Even more peculiar plans involved the investment by the CIA in a large number of Caribbean molluscs. As Duncan Campbell reported in the *Guardian*, 'the idea was to find a shell big enough to contain a lethal quantity of explosives, which would then be painted in colours lurid and bright enough to attract Castro's attention when he was underwater' (Campbell 2006: 14). This, along with a plan to prepare a diving suit for Castro that would be infected with a fungus that would cause a debilitating skin disease, were revealed when documents were released under the Clinton administration. Plots that were carried out, but failed, included the dispatch of an agent armed with a pen-syringe, the same day that JFK was assassinated. The CIA also deployed an ex-lover of Castro, armed with poison pills, but she hid them in her cold cream jar and they melted. She alleges that Castro already knew what she was up to, and offered her his pistol to kill him, but she claims she could not do it. The CIA also developed various poisons to be secreted in a handkerchief or his tea or coffee, but all to no avail. More conventional attempts by the CIA included recruiting members of the mafia to assassinate him (Campbell 2006: 14). Campbell notes that 'all these plots inevitably changed the way Castro lived his life'. Castro used to walk the streets alone when first in office, but that had to change, and so he used doubles, and moved around between 20 different addresses to try to avoid would-be assassination attempts (Campbell 2006: 14). Castro was, thus, never far from the threat of focused acts of state terror by US agents, and while they failed both to kill him and to alter his politics, they nevertheless intended to.

Covert counterinsurgency operations

The US also actively encouraged and led the elite forces and military personnel of numerous Latin American states in specific collaborative operations, resulting in widespread state terrorism. In July 1979 the Sandinista Front of National Liberation (FSLN) were finally able to establish a government in Nicaragua following years of struggle against military governments originally established by General Somoza, when he seized power in 1936. Although elections had operated throughout that period, they had been routinely manipulated by the Somoza regime (Smith 1993: 131–2). The aim of the FSLN was to build a socialist society in Nicaragua, but from day one the US was intent on delegit-

imising the FSLN. Initially the US accused the FSLN of supplying Salvadoran guerrillas with arms. When this could not be proven, the US labelled Nicaragua a threat to its neighbours, to the US and to democracy, referring to it as a totalitarian regime. This was despite reports from groups including Americas Watch which upheld Nicaragua as a democratic state, and condemned the Reagan administration for distorting the situation as a means to justify military intervention. Americas Watch stated in 1985 that, 'Such misuse of human rights to justify military interference is in US-Latin American relations an unprecedented debasement of the human rights cause', and, 'Of particular concern is the Administration's constant – and inaccurate – use of the term "totalitarian" to characterise Nicaragua' (Americas Watch, cited in Smith 1993: 131–2). When Reagan came to office, he almost immediately sanctioned a covert CIA paramilitary war in Nicaragua against the Sandinistas, as a declassified document, signed by the President on 1 December 1981, shows:

> I hereby find that the following activities are important to the national security of the United States, and direct the Director of Central Intelligence, or his designee, to report this finding to the Intelligence Committees of the Congress ... Nicaragua: in cooperation with other governments, provide support, equipment and training assistance to Nicaraguan paramilitary resistance groups as a means to induce the Sandinistas and Cubans and their allies to cease their support for insurgencies in the region; to hamper Cuban/Nicaraguan arms trafficking; to divert Nicaragua's resources and energies from support to Central American guerrilla movements; and to bring the Sandinistas into meaningful negotiations and constructive, verifiable agreement with their neighbours on peace in the region.
>
> (Reagan 1983)

Further declassified documents show that senior US officials drew up plans to secure funds from other states to sustain the campaign, should Congress refuse to provide further funding. This included deals with Saudi Arabia, Honduras and Panama, negotiated by Oliver North, a member of the National Security Council (North 1985). It also included using funds raised through arms sales to Iran to fund the Contras in Nicaragua, which Reagan finally confessed had taken place at a press briefing on 25 November 1986.

In 1986, the International Court of Justice found the US guilty on 15 counts of violations of international law for acts of aggression in Nicaragua, which were part of the administration's policy of supporting the Contras. The Court judged:

> The United States of America, by training, arming, equipping and supplying the contra forces or otherwise encouraging, supporting and aiding military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua, has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to intervene in the affairs of another state.
>
> (ICJ 1986: 136–40)

The Court also found the US guilty of disseminating a counterinsurgency manual, compiled in 1983, entitled 'Operaciones sicológicas en guerra de guerrillas' (DoD 1962), among Contra forces, stating that this had encouraged actions by the contras which were 'contrary to the principles of humanitarian law' (ICJ 1986: 136–40).

US arrangements with military and intelligence forces in Latin American states were not simply bilateral. Operation Condor was operative by 1975 and built on pre-existing arrangements for sharing intelligence and close cooperation between the US and Latin American allies, all of which were already embroiled in campaigns of state terrorism (McClintock 2001: 9). Through Operation Condor, the US sanctioned the assassination of political opponents abroad, to accompany the ongoing human rights abuses that the Latin American governments in question were committing at home. Operation Condor and the involvement of Argentine intelligence officers in the training of forces also connected to the CIA in Honduras and Nicaragua, discussed above, show that the US-led counterinsurgency operations were part of a system of hemispheric cooperation which would connect military and intelligence forces from numerous states in pursuit of US interests in the region.

Uruguay was party to Operation Condor, and was linked not just to the US, but to the Argentine and Brazilian security forces. The US was also involved in transforming the police intelligence component of Uruguay's security forces into a national security agency, the Dirección Nacional de Información e Inteligencia (DNII) (DoS 1971b). Declassified documents show that, in 1971, the US, Argentina, Brazil and the US all shared concerns that a shift to the left was imminent in Uruguay in the upcoming elections of November 1971, where it was feared that the left-leaning Frente Amplio would take office, and that military personnel from all three states were collaborating closely on how to handle the situation (Osorio 2002). The Embassy in Montevideo, on 25 August, recommended in a report to the US Department of State that the US 'collaborate overtly and covertly with those media elements which compete with those of the Frente', and that where training of Uruguayans was taking place as part of US military assistance and the DNII programme, 'special emphasis should be made to keep such training at a maximum level' (DoS 1971b). The Embassy stated, 'It is especially desirable that such neighbouring countries as Argentina and Brazil collaborate effectively with the Uruguayan security forces and where possible we should encourage such participation', and that, 'To improve the capability of services to successfully detain, interrogate and imprison suspected terrorists, we should consider advisability of providing expert advice ... on effective detention procedures' (DoS 1971b). It also indicated that a Public Safety Programme had been implemented (DoS 1971b). The Uruguayan generals had wiped out, as Americas Watch reported, the Tumpamaros, the largest terrorist group affiliated to Frente Amplio, by early 1973, either by killing or imprisoning their leaders, which had led to the organisation being dismantled (Brown 1985: 74).

This was not, however, considered adequate. In 1973 the generals forced the government to suspend constitutional rights. Amnesty estimated that between

1973 and 1979, one in every five Uruguayans was imprisoned for political reasons and one in 50 was detained for interrogation, including torture (Brown 1985: 76). The Carter administration ordered that no new military assistance be given to Uruguay, as information about human rights abuses dripped out, but existing assistance arrangements remained in place (Brown 1985: 86–7). This was part of Carter's agenda to push human rights as part of US foreign policy. In his first year in office he gave a speech in which he outlined his vision for foreign policy in which he criticised past actions:

> For too many years, we've been willing to adopt the flawed and erroneous principles and tactics of our adversaries, sometimes abandoning our own values for theirs ... we have reaffirmed America's commitment to human rights as a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy.
>
> (Carter 1977)

But Carter's allusions to human rights were largely rhetorical, since he also engaged in strategies that were broadly repressive, as discussed above in relation to Indonesia and East Timor. Indeed, the existing arrangements for military assistance to Uruguay remained in place, so Uruguay continued to receive assistance that had already been contracted, it simply did not receive any additional support (Brown 1985: 86–7). By 1981, Reagan had resumed military sales, and by 1983 the Reagan administration had also restored military training for Uruguayans (Brown 1985: 88).

The details of Paraguay's involvement in Operation Condor were uncovered in 1992 when an archive of documents detailing the kidnapping and torture of hundreds of Latin Americans by security personnel was discovered. One of these documents, for example, consists of a letter from Paraguayan Police Director, Alberto Cantero, to Pastor Coronel, Paraguay's Chief of Police and chief torturer under the government of Alfredo Stroessner, detailing the transfer of five detainees from the Paraguayan police to José Montenegro and Juan Manuel Berret of Argentina's Secretariat of State Intelligence (SIDE). None of the five were ever heard from again, and are presumed to have been killed by Argentine security forces. The letter became the basis for legal proceedings by families of two of the victims against the police and intelligence services in Paraguay in 1993 (Slack 1996). In terms of US involvement, the documents indicated that the source of much of the intelligence gathered by the Paraguayan intelligence personnel, which was then used to detain victims, was the CIA (Slack 1996: 498).

Counterinsurgency training

The impact of US support for state terrorism in Latin America during the Cold War was exacerbated by its training of Latin American military forces, which encouraged the use of state terrorism. As I have discussed elsewhere, it is not possible to prove a causal link between the training and specific human rights abuses. Nevertheless, declassified documents show that the US encouraged state

terrorism through its training, and that training was consistent with many of the methods deployed by Latin American military and intelligence forces during the Cold War in their counterinsurgency campaigns (Blakeley 2006a: 1439–61). Particularly significant were the training materials used by the US in its training of Latin American military forces, which condoned and advocated repression, including torture. These were distributed among students at the US Army School of Americas and US Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) for use among Latin American soldiers, and were consistent with materials used by US military and intelligence services during the Cold War. The manuals, as I have shown elsewhere, encourage the use of torture, assassination, blackmail, beatings and intimidation, and were entirely consistent with Cold War CIA manuals which encouraged state terrorism, including torture (Blakeley 2006b, 2006a). Their content was entirely consistent with US foreign policy during the Cold War, which was characterised by support for and use of state terrorism.

Conclusion

State terrorism has featured in the foreign policies of powerful states from the North since the European colonial era. It was used widely to seize and maintain territory by the European imperial powers and then, as their empires began to crumble, colonial powers and their agents terrorised civilian populations in a last ditch attempt to hold onto power and prevent decolonisation. The British government was complicit in state terrorism in Kenya, as well as in other colonies and former colonies, including Malaya, Nigeria, Uganda and Iraq. There is ample evidence to show in the Kenya cases that the British government knew its local agents were terrorising the local population, and it acted very late, after years of atrocities, to halt the abuses. In this regard it was complicit in the practices that caused one British MP to label Kenya a police state. French state terrorism in the war with Algeria, which included mass internment and torture, was deliberately aimed at terrorising the population and thereby deterring support for the independence movement. Despite their efforts, both Britain and France lost their remaining colonies, leaving the way open for the US to extend its global influence.

The US wasted no time in occupying the role of neo-imperial power as the European empires were finally laid to rest. While the US had no interest in seizing territory, it used considerable military might in pursuit of its objectives. Those objectives, drawn up towards the end of the Second World War, were to secure access to and dominance of resources and markets deemed necessary to ensure US global supremacy. Administration after administration was willing to use and sponsor state terrorism across the South to this end, and enjoyed the support of numerous allies from the North and South. The US used generalised state terrorism in various wars in Indochina, notably Korea and Vietnam, where its actions resulted in human rights abuses against hundreds of thousands of people, and where the deaths of civilians ran into the millions. The counterinsurgency campaigns fought in Indochina resulted in US military and intelligence doctrine that encouraged the widespread use of interrogation, torture and assassination, all

intended to terrorise civilians who might be at risk of embracing the opposition. These strategies became standard operating practice for the US in its counterinsurgency wars in Latin America, and were advocated through the extensive military training provided by the US for Latin American military and police forces. Even where the US was not directly responsible for disappearances, torture and assassinations, it lent considerable support to the regimes that were. These counterinsurgency efforts were accompanied by limited forms of state terrorism on the part of the US, including assassination attempts against political leaders, and intelligence operations aimed at identifying and killing individuals believed to be the leaders of left-wing political movements. While the rhetoric surrounding US conduct during the Cold War emphasised the threat of communism, declassified documents show that in most cases what was at stake was US elite interests, which the widespread use and sponsorship of state terrorism by the US in the region was aimed at protecting.

5   The post-Cold War world, neoliberalism and state terrorism

Introduction

This chapter examines the shifts in US foreign policy strategy following the Cold War and up until the events of 9/11, and the impact that this had on the use and sponsorship of state terrorism by liberal democratic states from the North, particularly the US, in the South. Following the Cold War, led by the US, those states, through the international financial institutions (IFIs), have heavily promoted neoliberal economics in the South. I demonstrate that the US in particular has invested heavily in the neoliberalisation of the South. I show that US state and capital interests have remained central to US foreign policy, but that following the Cold War, legitimation, rather than support for repression, was for the most part deemed by US policymakers to be the most effective strategy for achieving US objectives. As shown in Chapter 3, the promotion of neoliberalism has benefited other Northern liberal democratic states and international capital, as well as the US state and US capital. This shift in US foreign policy strategy resulted in a reduction in the sponsorship of state terrorism by the US following the Cold War, although it did not disappear completely from the arsenal of foreign policy tools at the disposal of US governments in the 1990s. As I will show, the US continued to back regimes known for their use of terrorism against their own populations, it continued to use aerial bombardment as a means of terrorising local populations in the hope of turning populations against regimes unfavourable to the US, as in Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War, and the programme of extraordinary rendition was devised. In this chapter I comment briefly on the ongoing use and support for state terrorism by the US and its allies in the 1990s.

The main focus of the chapter is then to outline the organs that the US has used to promote neoliberalism in the South. The case of El Salvador, typical of US neoliberalisation efforts since the Cold War, is then analysed. El Salvador is held up by the US state as a success story in its post-Cold War foreign policy strategy, although the benefits for many Salvadorans are limited, as I will show. The contrasting case of Haiti is then assessed. In this case, the US continued in its efforts to neoliberalise Haiti, but this has been detrimental to the poor. The US also tacitly supported a coup against the democratically elected government which was not fully on board with the neoliberalising agenda, and then continued

to insist on impunity for those responsible, despite the use of terrorism by the new regime against those suspected of supporting the ousted regime. Support for and use of state terrorism evidently remained a tool of US foreign policy in the 1990s, albeit in fewer cases than during the Cold War, and indeed operated in conjunction with legitimation strategies. Legitimation would remain central to US foreign policy following 9/11, but as I will show in Chapter 6, this was accompanied by a resurgence in support for state terrorism and other forms of repression by the US as well as numerous other liberal democratic states from the North who have been active in state terrorism in the 'War on Terror'.

State terrorism in the 1990s

As discussed in Chapter 3, there was a shift in the foreign policies of liberal democratic states from the North following the end of the Cold War, with increased emphasis on legitimation as a means of achieving foreign policy objectives in the South. There was, nevertheless, ongoing use and support for state terrorism in the South during the 1990s, albeit less extensive than during the Cold War. For example, as discussed in Chapter 2, the devastating air campaign of the 1991 Gulf War, led by the US, was, at least by some of the planners of the campaign, intended to terrorise the Iraqi population, in the hope of turning the population against Saddam Hussein's regime. Throughout the 1990s, the US and UK continued to provide military support for the Colombian government, despite its ongoing complicity in state terrorism. Support for the Colombian government continued after 9/11, as did state terrorism in that country, as I show in more detail in Chapter 6. During the 1990s the US and many of its liberal democratic allies also continued to back states that consistently used terrorism against their own populations in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The US State Department Report on Human Rights in Saudi Arabia in 1999 reported that 'the government commits and tolerates serious human rights abuses' (DoS 2000a). Human rights violations that the report refers to include abuse of detainees and prisoners, arbitrary arrest and detention, and torture (DoS 2000a). Egypt came in for similar criticism from the US State Department: 'The Government continued to commit numerous serious human rights abuses' which included the mistreatment and torture of prisoners, and arbitrary arrests and detentions (DoS 2000b). Despite this, the Egyptian government received over US$15 million in foreign military financing from the US in 2000 (DoD 2001). The programme of extraordinary rendition, used widely in the 'War on Terror' was also devised during the 1990s, as I show in Chapter 6. Coercive strategies were therefore still present in the period immediately following the end of the Cold War, even though the emphasis was now on processes of legitimation.

Democracy

At the end of the Cold War, legitimation was emphasised in order to secure popular endorsement for neoliberalism, often by promoting democracy, to ensure

access to and control over resources and markets in the South. Democracy as promoted by the US is variously referred to by its critics as 'liberal democracy', including the neoliberal form which comprises the minimal tax state with minimal social welfare; 'market democracy' (Chomsky 1997); 'low-intensity democracy' (Gills *et al.* 1993: 3–34); and 'polyarchy' (Robinson 1996: Chapter 1). Each of these terms refer to one aspect of the form of democracy that exists in states such as the US and UK. 'Market democracy', for instance, evokes the notion that the democratic systems in the North are tied closely to neoliberal economics. 'Low-intensity democracy' problematises the degree to which contemporary democratic systems in the North offer significant levels of participation and breadth of choice in the practice of democracy. The term 'polyarchy' implies that even though the population participates in the democratic process, choice is limited to a small set of options that will all result in outcomes that are tied closely to the enhancement of the interests of elites, particularly, in Robinson's analysis, the capital-owning elite. These terms are problematic in that they only capture one aspect of contemporary democratic systems in the North. Equally, they are all in some way pejorative towards the democratic systems in the North. I prefer, therefore, to refer simply to democracy promotion, but with the caveat that the form of democracy being promoted offers only limited choices, and that significant efforts are made to ensure that elite interests are protected, just as democratic systems in the North offer only limited choices and are geared towards protecting elites. For all these flaws, Northern liberal democracy is still rooted, to a degree, in the liberal principles of democratic participation and freedom of choice. Such principles are not met for all citizens in the states of the North, and policies enacted by elites sometimes curtail the liberties that citizens of democratic states are supposed to enjoy. Yet what is on offer in democratic states in the North is still preferable to authoritarian, anti-democratic regimes in other states because legal systems and democratic institutions are in place and offer a level of protection from state repression.

US neoconservatives, who have been present in US politics since the 1960s, many of whom were advisors and members of previous Republican governments, went on to hold office in or acted as advisors to the administration of George W. Bush. Neoconservatives were entirely committed to the US using unilateral force, where efforts to promote neoliberalism through legitimation fail. This was evident in the proclamations of numerous contributors to the Project for the New American Century (PNAC). Garry Schmitt and Tom Donnelly, for instance, issued a statement on the PNAC website praising George Bush in 2002 for his commitment to 'active American global leadership', 'regime change' and 'promoting liberal democratic principles' (Schmitt and Donnelly 2002). They argued that Bush had correctly embraced the notion that 'peace and security is to be won and preserved by asserting both US military strength and American political principles', by which they mean the democratic principles of 'liberty, law and justice' (Schmitt and Donnelly 2002). They saw no contradiction in using regime change policies, including armed coercion, to attempt to establish liberal democracy in order to achieve their ultimate end of

entrenching neoliberalism in the South. This view dominated US foreign policy strategy under the Bush administration.

Promoting democracy and neoliberalism through legitimation: 1991–2001

Just as securing foreign resources and markets to sustain US capital dominated US foreign policy from the early 1800s and up until the end of the Cold War, this continued to be a principle aim under President George H.W. Bush, as articulated in the 1991 National Security Strategy:

> National security and economic strength are indivisible. We seek to promote a strong, prosperous and competitive US economy; ensure access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the oceans and space; promote an open and expanding international economic system, based on market principles, with minimal distortions to trade and investment, stable currencies, and broadly respected rules for managing and resolving economic disputes.
>
> (NSC 1991)

Thus, any effort to promote democracy by the US was to work in tandem with these aims. It is clear from the National Security Strategy that democratisation and neoliberalisation are intended to assist the US in its goals:

> America will continue to support an international economic system as open and inclusive as possible, as the best way to strengthen global economic development, political stability and the growth of free societies.... Our interests are best served in a world in which democracy and its ideals are widespread and secure.
>
> (NSC 1991)

Thus there was a clear shift in US foreign policy strategy following the Cold War with an emphasis on legitimation, by promoting democracy and securing popular endorsement for neoliberalism. This contrasted with the widespread use of repression, including state terrorism, during the Cold War in order to achieve US foreign policy objectives. This is not to say that all states in the South have been the target of US democratisation and neoliberalisation efforts. The US has continued to support states that are undemocratic and known abusers of human rights since the Cold War. For instance, despite refusing to implement democratic reform, and having consistently poor human rights records, as indicated in the State Department's annual human rights reports, Saudi Arabia continues to enjoy extensive US military aid and sales (DoS 2005b).[1] Nevertheless, securing acquiescence with neoliberalism, often through establishing democracy, has been the dominant US foreign policy strategy since the end of the Cold War.

The organs of neoliberalisation

The US has established a number of organs that are intended to assist elites in the South that share a commitment to neoliberalisation. Their remit is to build up institutions of political and civil society in countries in the South, with the aim of developing structures which, as Robinson argues, were 'capable of absorbing tensions, maintaining social control, and steering societies in directions responsive to US and transnational interests' (Robinson 1996: 83). This is a different view from that of liberals such as Thomas Carothers, a key figure in US democracy promotion through his role as International Research Fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations, who argues that programmes to support democracy by such organs were primarily 'related to the heightened anticommunism of Ronald Reagan's foreign policy' rather than specifically to promoting democracy (Carothers 1999: 29). He argues that this eventually led to a shift away from support for authoritarian regimes that were friendly to the US and resulted in democracy assistance programmes (Carothers 1999: 29). He makes no connection to the function that such programmes serve within the framework of promoting US and global elite interests.

Organisations with this agenda include the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and the US Department of State. An indicator of the shift to a strategy of legitimation in US foreign policy is the increase in programmes run by these organisations since the Cold War. For instance, in 1990 the US, via the NED, was funding just 21 democracy promotion projects in Africa, and 94 by 1995. In Asia, 27 projects were funded in 1990, and 75 by 1995. In Latin America and the Caribbean, 71 projects were funded in 1990, and 87 by 1995, and in the Middle East, there was just one project in 1990, but 40 by 1995 (NED 2005b). This upward trend has continued, with NED projects worldwide increasing from 223 in 1990, to 418 in 2003 (NED 2005b). These, as I will show, are part of a process of ensuring the protection and promotion of elite interests, without resorting to repression.

The NED was established in 1983 by the US government as a private, non-profit organisation. Its stated aim is to 'strengthen democratic institutions around the world through nongovernmental efforts' (NED 2005c). While it is supposedly non-partisan, its donors include the Department of State and USAID, and organisations closely linked to specific political parties, including the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, which receive funding from the State Department (NED 2005b, 2005c).

USAID similarly focuses on the promotion of democracy, emphasising that this will ultimately serve US foreign policy objectives:

> The strategic long-term domestic and foreign policy objectives of the United States are best served by enlarging the community of democratic nations worldwide. Establishing democratic institutions, free and open markets ... all of these contribute to the goal of establishing sustainable democracies.
>
> (USAID 2005b)

The State Department website gives some indication of the type of development it has in mind for the South: 'We will support programs that encourage broad-based participation and civil society development as the foundation for demo-cracy and good governance, economic growth and free enterprise, sound environmental stewardship, and quality education and healthcare' (DoS 2004). I will show, with reference to the case of El Salvador, that this kind of support is closely tied to neoliberalisation, and is a key component of US efforts to repro-duce the global political economy in the South.

El Salvador

El Salvador's transition to democracy is typical of US legitimation strategies in the South since the Cold War. It is seen among liberals as a model of US demo-cracy promotion. For example Carothers argues that the emphasis in US assis-tance on elections and the administration of justice were major components in US democracy promotion, and had their beginnings in El Salvador (Carothers 1999: 35). I agree that it has become the model for US democracy promotion efforts, not simply because of its emphasis on support for elections, but also because of the emphasis on ensuring that elites who share US commitments to neoliberalisation dominate political and civil society, and that they successfully co-opt the subordinate class in order to secure popular endorsement for the reproduction of the global political economy in the South.

Elections were held in El Salvador in March 1994, following the civil war which ended in 1994, during which the US had condoned repression through its ongoing support of the military government (HRW 1991: 1–27). The right-wing ARENA party gained 69 per cent of the vote and the left-wing FMLN, 31 per cent (OAS 1999). These results were upheld by the UN Observer Mission to El Salvador (ONUSAL), despite significant irregularities in the elections (UN 1995a). For example, the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) found that there were approximately 750,000 people of voting age who were not on the electoral register (IPU 1994). This is not surprising given that the country had been in the grips of violent conflict for more than a decade, during which many thousands of people were displaced. Of the Salvadoran population eligible to vote, approxi-mately 15 per cent were unable to because of weaknesses in the system. With just 50 per cent of registered voters going to the polls, the vote for ARENA amounted to support from 34.5 per cent of the eligible voting population (OAS 2001). The outcome may have been different had all those who had registered actually been permitted to vote. The ARENA party have remained in power since those first elections in 1994, with observers concluding that progress is being made in the electoral system, despite some ongoing irregularities and low turnout.[2]

ARENA's success in maintaining power and successfully instigating neolib-eralism can be attributed at least in part to US support. This began with the US ignoring the role of members of the post-1994 government in human rights violations during the war. Research by the Centre for International Policy (CIP

2005), an independent research group in Washington, DC, analysed thousands of previously classified documents, including cables and reports from the US embassy, and found that high ranking members of the armed forces and of ARENA, many of whom continued to hold office following the 1994 elections, were involved in the planning of death squad activities throughout the 1980s and early 1990s (Gilbert 1994).[3] Yet the US raised no objection to individuals implicated in human rights violations from holding office in the new government. In 1991 Americas Watch reported that: 'Officials of the Bush administration failed to acknowledge any army violations of the rules of war during the FMLN urban offensive, instead shifting the blame for any harm to civilians solely to the rebels' (HRW 1991). The UN Truth Commission found that the majority of human rights violations were committed by the armed forces and paramilitary groups allied to them (UNSC 1993). It reports that of the 22,000 complaints of serious acts of violence between January 1980 and July 1991, 85 per cent were complaints against agents of the state, with just 5 per cent of the complaints attributed to members of the FMLN. Over 60 per cent of all complaints concerned extra-judicial killings, over 25 per cent enforced disappearances, and over 20 per cent torture (UNSC 1993). These figures do not cover every act of violence. They are just a sample of cases which the Commission was able to collate in the three months in which it gathered testimony. After the elections El Salvador was governed by people who had previously been responsible for extensive human rights abuses. The Salvadoran public, especially those who had supported the opposition, are likely, therefore, to have feared those in office because of their past involvement in human rights violations. This may have contributed to the neutralisation of opposition following the war.

Neoliberalisation favours the elites

The US also contributed to the weakening of opposition groups by ensuring that subordinate groups within El Salvador were integrated into the neoliberal agenda. I will show that support through USAID and the NED has favoured organisations sympathetic to neoliberalism, while marginalising and neutralising opposition from groups affiliated with the FMLN, whose policies emphasise alternatives to neoliberal economics, in particular, equitable land distribution (FMLN 2005; Horazuk 1995). In negotiations between ARENA, the FMLN and representatives of the US government, at a meeting of the World Bank Consultative Group in 1992, $800 million was secured for El Salvador's National Reconstruction Plan (Stahler-Sholk 1994). This involved Structural Adjustment Policies through the IMF and World Bank which encouraged private sector development, and the privatisation of public services (WB 2003a). Between 1994 and 1999, ARENA privatised formerly state-owned sugar mills, telephone services and electricity distribution companies (WB 2002).

This emphasis on privatisation was reflected in the way funds for reconstruction were distributed. US support for civic and political groups was channelled towards groups aligned with ARENA which served to marginalise the FMLN.

For instance, rather than creating an independent agency to oversee post-war reconstruction, a government agency, the Secretaría de Reconstrucción Nacional (SRN), was established to administer the reconstruction (Stahler-Sholk 1994). The SRN, in turn, channelled the majority of the funding, which came from USAID, through the Municipales en Acción programme, which had been established under the Comisión Nacional para la Restauración de Areas Afectadas, the agency in charge of the civilian components of the counterinsurgency efforts during the war (Sollis 1993). Thus, institutions that had previously been involved in counterinsurgency operations against the left were now responsible for overseeing reconstruction among the very communities they had previously suppressed. Less than 1 per cent of the SRN funds were channelled through opposition NGOs, even though they had proven experience in local development projects in the former conflict zones (Murray *et al.* 1994). One of the outcomes of this, according to an ONUSAL official, was that although the SRN designated 106 municipalities in the former battle zones as eligible for funds, it tended to concentrate resources in the 28 municipalities whose pro-ARENA mayors had returned, having been driven out by the FMLN during the war, after the peace accords were signed (Stahler-Sholk 1994). This was part of a process of marginalising the FMLN (Horazuk 1995), and was a consequence of the way in which reconstruction efforts were established under the control of ARENA, instead of an independent agency, a decision that went unchallenged by USAID.

There were instances in which the NED was more directly involved in channelling funds to groups that were aligned with ARENA. A review of NED initiatives in El Salvador indicates that a large proportion of NED funds donated to El Salvadoran civic groups between 1990 and 1995 were given to a group with close ties to ARENA. This was the Asociación Nacional de Empresa Privada (ANEP) or National Association of Private Enterprise. According to the ANEP website, this organisation is intended to 'contribute to the economic, cultural and social development of El Salvador, promoting the strengthening of the business sector and the right-wing democratic state' (ANEP 2005). ANEP's members include CEOs of the major companies active in El Salvador, and the directors of numerous commercial groups representing the different financial and industrial sectors of the country (ANEP 2005). ANEP was one of the primary beneficiaries of NED support in the early 1990s; 26 per cent of NED funds for El Salvador were invested in ANEP projects (NED 2005d). The rest were invested in election observing, women's groups, independent media, moderate human rights groups, labour legislation and mediation, and university projects. No FMLN-associated NGOs received any donations.

Efforts to promote neoliberalism in El Salvador, then, have been spearheaded by USAID, and the NED. This is beneficial for US capital and, to some extent, to global capital, although the US state and the IFIs are keen to stress the benefits for the Salvadoran economy. The State Department noted in 2005 that El Salvador 'is pursuing an aggressive strategy to increase exports, especially manufactured and non-traditional products, and to attract foreign investment' (DoS 2005). It now argues that:

The Salvadoran economy continues to benefit from a commitment to free markets and careful fiscal management.... Much of the improvement in El Salvador's economy is a result of the privatization of the banking system, telecommunications, public pensions, electrical distribution and some electrical generation; reduction of import duties; elimination of price controls; and improved enforcement of intellectual property rights. The U.S.–Central America–Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), implemented between El Salvador and the United States on March 1, 2006, provides El Salvador preferential access to U.S. markets. Textiles and apparel, shoes, and processed foods are among the sectors that benefit. In addition to trade benefits, CAFTA-DR also provides trade capacity building, particularly in the environment and labor areas, and a framework for additional reforms on issues such as intellectual property rights, dispute resolution, and customs that will improve El Salvador's investment climate. For sensitive sectors such as agriculture, the agreement includes generous phase-in periods to allow Salvadoran producers an opportunity to become more competitive.

(DoS 2008)

The World Bank argues that trade liberalisation, financial sector and pension reform, the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, and the transition from a primarily domestic-oriented agricultural economy to an export-based diversified and deregulated economy have all contributed to El Salvador's growth (WB 2003a). Neoliberalism in El Salvador had significant benefits for US capital as the State Department indicates:

U.S. support for privatization of the electrical and telecommunications markets markedly expanded opportunities for U.S. investment in the country. More than 300 U.S. companies have established either a permanent commercial presence in El Salvador or work through representative offices in the country. The U.S. Department of Commerce maintains a Country Commercial Guide for U.S. businesses seeking detailed information on business opportunities in El Salvador.

(DoS 2008)

This outcome is indicative of the ways in which the reproduction of the global economy in the South reaps benefits for US capital.

Neoliberalisation and El Salvador's poor

The impacts of neoliberalisation on El Salvador's poor have actually been rather mixed. Growth has occurred since the end of the 1980s, and a number of social indicators have improved. Between 1989 and 2000, per capita GDP grew at 2.7 per cent per year and average inflation fell from 20 per cent in 1989 to around 2 per cent in 2000. Households in poverty fell from 60 per cent of the total in 1991 to about 41 per cent in 1999. Life expectancy at birth increased

from 64 years in 1987 to about 70 years in 1998, infant mortality declined from 46 per 1,000 births in 1990 to 31 per 1,000 in 1998. School enrolment increased from 81 per cent in 1990 to 97 per cent in 1997 (WB 2002).

Poverty in the 1990s was still extremely high compared to other Latin American states. In 1991, the extreme poverty rate was 33 per cent (Silverio-Marques 2004). While this fell during the 1990s, the United Nations Development Programme reported that on the international extreme poverty line, whereas the incidence of extreme poverty for Argentina and Uruguay was just 0.2 per cent, El Salvador was at the top end of the scale with an extreme poverty rate of 18 per cent in 2002 (UNDP 2002). Some of the growth in GDP is the result of extraordinary levels of remittances from Salvadoran workers living overseas, which account for more than 10 per cent of annual GDP, according to the World Bank (WB 2002). Many Salvadoran children grow up with little contact with their fathers, because they can eke out a better salary by working overseas, usually in the US, than they can in El Salvador. Poverty and inequality are still high and there are large health and education gaps, and limited infrastructure in the poorest areas, which tend to be rural. According to the US Department of State, the poverty rate by 2006 was 30.7 per cent (DoS 2008). Ray Kiely has argued that the basis for the World Bank's optimistic position on poverty reduction globally, is unfounded (Kiely 2007: 415–34). Kiely shows that the measures the World Bank uses are based on methodologies that are biased towards presenting an optimistic assessment of the extent of poverty reduction (Kiely 2007: 416). He demonstrates that if India and China are excluded from the various analyses, there has in fact been an upward trend in levels of poverty, not a downward one. He shows that where there are small improvements in poverty reduction, as is the case in El Salvador, from 33 per cent in 1991 to 30.7 per cent in 2006, these tend to be small and associated with high levels of labour flexibility, long work hours and poor world conditions (Kiely 2007: 423). In the case of El Salvador, they may be linked to the high and increasing levels of remittances. He also points out that since 1960, Latin America's total share of world trade has fallen from 7.5 per cent to 5.4 per cent in 2002 (Kiely 2007: 427). Kiely concludes that rather than sufficiently integrating the South into the global economy, neoliberalism has reinforced their marginalised positions since it renders them incapable of developing dynamic comparative advantages (Kiely 2007: 432–4). This marginalisation is even more marked in Haiti, as I will show.

ARENA has been a willing partner in streamlining itself with neoliberalism as pushed by the US. Traditionally ARENA has been made up of El Salvador's elites, so it has not been contrary to the interests of the ruling party to follow the neoliberal model. Given the success of ARENA in securing the vote in every election since the end of the conflict, not least because of the assistance that civil society groups allied with ARENA have received from US government departments such as USAID, there has been no recourse by the US to coercive means to ensure that El Salvador keeps in step with neoliberalisation. El Salvador has come to represent the model of legitimation strategies that the US favours for the South, with similar liberalisation initiatives pursued by US government agencies

in countries across the South, particularly in Central and Latin America, former Yugoslavia, and the former Soviet states of Eastern Europe.[4]

State terrorism: 1991–2001

Between 1991 and 2001, US foreign policy strategy in the South was dominated by legitimation efforts, as in El Salvador. Where legitimation efforts were deemed inadequate for achieving US objectives, the US was prepared to resort to coercion, including supporting state terrorism. This involved covert use of repression that typified US activities across the South during the Cold War, and included the tacit support by the US for the coup d'état in Haiti in 1991.

Haiti

When elections deemed to be free and fair by the UN were held in December 1990 (UN 1995b), the outcome was unsuitable both to Haitian and US elites. As a consequence, the US was complicit in state terrorism in the country. Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a Catholic priest and proponent of liberation theology, who campaigned on a radical agenda of social and economic reform, won with 67.5 per cent in elections which were deemed by the UN Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti to be 'highly successful' (UN 1995b). Aristide took up office in February 1991, but was overthrown in a coup in September that year led by Lieutenant-General Raoul Cédras, and supported by disaffected members of the army and the country's economic elite (DoS 2005a). It is unclear whether the US was directly involved in the coup. Emmanuel Constant, former leader of the FRAPH (Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti), an organisation that had been formed from right-wing political and paramilitary organisations by Constant in 1986, appeared on the *60 Minutes* programme on 3 December 1995 and claimed that he and others involved in the coup had been employed by the CIA shortly afterwards and that he had received $700 per month in cash from the CIA station chief in Port-au-Prince. He had been kept on the payroll until just before the US invasion in October 1994. This was confirmed by the CIA (Nairn 1994: 458–61; 1996: 11–15; *New York Times* 1995). It later transpired that the FRAPH had been formed at the suggestion of the CIA and Defence Intelligence Agency, to 'balance the Aristide movement' and gather intelligence against it (Nairn 1994: 458–61).

It is not clear whether there was any direct encouragement or support from the CIA or any other US government organ for the coup. Haitian army documents on the subject remain in the possession of the US government, after they were seized when US troops entered Haiti in 1994. HRW stated:

> Washington has said that it will only return the materials once US citizens names have been deleted.... The US government has maintained that US citizens' names and identifying information must be deleted from the materials before they are returned to Haitian custody.
>
> (HRW 1999)

This does raise suspicion that the US government was attempting to cover up US complicity in the coup, as well as in human rights abuses linked to the FRAPH (HRW 1999). Regardless of US involvement, the position adopted by the US following the coup constituted support for state terrorism in Haiti.

Both the Bush and Clinton administrations publicly condemned the coup, and liberal scholars such as John Ballard insist that the OAS and US were 'drawn to Aristide's defence because of their support for democratically elected leaders, regardless of their political records' (Ballard 1998: 50). He asserts that the US immediately pledged to return Aristide from exile (Ballard 1998: 50). Aristide was returned to office in 1994, after authorisation was secured on 31 July 1994, under UN Security Council Resolution 940, for a US-led multinational force to invade Haiti and reinstate Aristide (UNSC 1994). As the 20,000-strong force began deploying in the months that followed, former US President Jimmy Carter led negotiations with the military leaders in Haiti, which resulted in the resignation of General Cédras and Aristide's return to office on 15 October (UN 1995b). The delay between the coup and Aristide's reinstatement provided the US with the opportunity to attempt to refashion Aristide according to its neoliberal agenda. Aristide's policies were out of step with the free market model that the US intended for Haiti because he resisted privatisation of public services; called for reform of the agricultural sector with an emphasis on production for the domestic market rather than for export; advocated increased wages and production, rather than the low-wage strategy of USAID; and called for regional and South–South economic and political relations as an alternative way to increase Haiti's autonomy and counteract US dominance (Dupuy 1997: 102–3). At the same time, as the refugee crisis worsened and the plight of Haitians under the military government was publicised, a legitimation strategy was gaining greater currency for the realisation of US interests.

From 1991 to 1994 the Bush and Clinton administrations sought to persuade Aristide to accept various conditions that would water down his radical agenda in return for his reinstatement. This included granting a general amnesty for the coup leaders (Dupuy 1997: 138). It also involved forming a broad-based government that included representatives from the elite that opposed Aristide and supported the coup against him; accepting the neoliberal agenda developed by USAID and the IFIs; and agreeing to hold new presidential elections in 1995 without insisting on reclaiming the years lost from his five-year term following the coup (Dupuy 1997: 138). The US also imposed an embargo while calling for a return to democracy, although US corporations were exempt from this until the last few months before the 1994 invasion by US troops (Dupuy 1997: 138; James 1997).

HRW and the Haitian Coalition for Refugees were highly critical of US policy, because human rights violations were ignored and those behind the repression would enjoy immunity under the US demand for amnesty for those involved in the coup:

> The Clinton administration deliberately ignored the issue of human rights.... As could be predicted, the amnesty proved to be a serious point of

contention between Aristide and the de facto leaders. But instead of siding with Aristide in a public unequivocal way, the Administration consistently refused to state publicly its position on which crimes should be included in the amnesty.

(HRW 1994)

So while the US was busy in its efforts to mould Aristide into its neoliberal image, human rights violations escalated, with little deterrent for the perpetrators, given the impunity that it seemed likely they would enjoy. Amnesty stated that the days following the coup were marked by repression, particularly in poor communities where support for Aristide had been strongest:

Soldiers deliberately and indiscriminately opened fire into crowds, killing hundreds of people, including children. In one neighbourhood soldiers reportedly raided private homes and shot more than 30 unarmed people dead, then forced relatives and other local people to bury the bodies. Other human rights violations were widely reported, including torture and short-term arbitrary arrests without warrant, usually accompanied by several beatings.

(AI 1992)

The self-appointed government was, therefore, responsible for instigating terrorism by deploying military forces to target civilians that were suspected of having supported Aristide. The tactic of forcing relatives and other members of the public to bury the bodies was a means by which the armed forces were terrorising local communities into submission. Such acts were a clear warning that anyone suspected of continuing to support Aristide would meet the same violent end. Amnesty estimate that over 1,500 civilians were killed immediately following the coup, and that the number of arrests reported to Amnesty exceeds 300. Amnesty added that following the coup, an estimated 200,000 people were forced into hiding, several thousand left and more than 10,000 attempted to flee to the US. Amnesty stated, 'But these figures could substantially underestimate the extent of the human rights crisis', due to 'problems in communications and the climate of fear and repression' (AI 1992). Indeed, by the time Aristide was reinstated in 1994, an estimated 4,000 people were killed, and 300,000 were internal refugees (Dupuy 1997: 139). The US had not only turned a blind eye to state terrorism that ensued from the illegal coup, but was complicit because it gave a green light to the perpetrators by granting them immunity, in order that it could capitalise on the opportunities afforded by the coup to ensure Aristide's acquiescence with its agenda.

    US government agencies were heavily engaged in efforts to neutralise opposition to neoliberalism among the Haitian population through non-coercive means too. Aristide's return was to be accompanied by heavy involvement of USAID, the IMF and World Bank, with Aristide forced to accept significant reductions in state involvement in the economy, and the privatisation of public services, although, as I will show, this did not actually improve growth in Haiti,

nor the lives of the majority of Haitians (Blum 2003; James 1997: 382). Involvement of these institutions dated back to the 1980s, when the IMF and US state worked together to neoliberalise Haitian finance. This included the establishment of a development bank and a mortgage bank to provide loans to encourage private industrial and housing projects, and the cutting of tariffs so that Haiti could become a market for US agricultural surpluses (Prince 1985: 52–6). Throughout the 1970s there was a massive influx of transnational corporations into Haiti, with around 240 mainly US-based corporations (specialising mainly in textiles, electronics, toys and sports goods), setting up in Port-au-Prince to take advantage of the plentiful supply of labour, as well as the minimum wage of US$3 per day and little trade union activity (Prince 1985: 47–8). The simultaneous growth of agro-industries forced peasant farmers into the cities and provided a pool of cheap manual labour for textile and electronics companies (James 1997). By 1984 this meant that Haiti had become dependent on the US for 65 per cent of its imports, and US companies dominated the Haitian export market, with the US taking the majority of Haitian goods (Prince 1985: 51).

This growth in trade has not been matched by improvements in the lives of the majority of Haitians, even if US corporate elites have fared rather well. The World Bank reported in 2003 that 65 per cent of the population lived under the poverty line; life expectancy remained low at 53 years; half the population did not have access to clean drinking water and only 28 per cent had access to decent sanitation; nearly half the population was illiterate; Haiti had the highest incidence of HIV/AIDS outside of sub-Saharan Africa, at 5 per cent of the population; and 97 per cent deforestation had occurred. As with El Salvador, Haiti relied on remittances from Haitians living overseas which made up 19 per cent of GDP (WB 2003b). The World Bank reports that after growing at an average annual rate of 2.3 per cent in real terms in the 1970s, real per capita GDP fell an average of 2.4 per cent per year in the 1980s and continued to decline in the 1990s at an average annual rate of 2.6 per cent (WB 2003b). Thus, the situation in Haiti was bleaker than in El Salvador. Indeed recent reports underline the desperate situation faced by many Haitians, since many of them were having to resort to eating mud cakes because of soaring food prices (Carroll 2008: 17).

While growth has been falling in Haiti, US agencies such as NED and USAID, as well as international organisations, have continued to work among groups within Haiti to ensure that civil society is aligned with the neoliberal agenda, even though this is not actually showing any sign of benefiting the lives of the majority of Haitians.[5] Democracy promotion programmes under USAID and the NED focused on more conservative groups within civil society in order to marginalise and impede those who supported the radical policies of Aristide. USAID support pre-dated the coup, and emphasised development and humanitarian programmes (Sims 2004). Such support was accompanied by efforts to marginalise left-wing groups. The CIA were giving funding to the American Institute for Free Labour Development (AIFLD) to weaken the influence of the more radical union Centrale Autonomne des Travailleurs Haïtiens (CATH) which was pressing for wage increases from those US-owned companies which

were still operating in Haiti (Ferguson 1987: 137). In 1990 there was a marked increase in USAID funding for Haiti, when $13 million was poured in, through three programmes in 1990 and again in 1991: the Development of Democracy Project; the Elections Management and Assistance Project; and the Development of Civil Society Project. This was followed in 1991 by the four-year Democracy Enhancement Project, overseen by America's Development Foundation (Sims 2004). It tended to invest in groups that the NED had already been working with prior to the coup (ADF 2005; USAID 2005a).

NED funding favoured three conservative groups up until 1990. These were the International Institute for Research and Development (IHRED) which had been founded in 1986 with NED assistance; and the two conservative unions, FOS and the General Organisation of Haitian Workers (OGITH) (Sims 2004). The IHRED helped form a loose association of anti-communist political leaders known as the Group of Ten, who headed a collection of political parties, none of which could claim much popular support, but which the NED and IHRED promoted as representative of the democratic movement in Haiti. They included Marc Bazin, a former World Bank official favoured by Washington (Sims 2004). According to Jean Geneus, Haiti's consul general, the aid given to FOS and OGITH was intended to break CATH, the more radical trade union, a policy which he argued was successful, because in early 1990, a conservative wing was able to take over the leadership of CATH, with the backing of Bazin (Sims 2004).

Between 1990 and 2004 the NED website indicates that $2,681,700 had been invested in Haitian projects. The vast majority of this, 91 per cent, came through organisations with an overtly neoliberal agenda, with the remaining 9 per cent channelled through a range of NGOs, many of which were based in Quebec (NED 2005a). Of the total, 25 per cent ($667,404) was given to the Free Trade Union Institute, now the American Centre for International Labour Solidarity (NED 2005a).[6] The FTUI was no supporter of Aristide, and in its 1990–1991 report to the NED it stated: 'Aristide prepared to usher in his new order, a rhetorically extreme programme that seemed to be deliberately framed to strain relationships with many of Haiti's democratic friends' (Sims 2004). The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs received 24 per cent ($636,060), of the total, during the Clinton administration only; the Centre for International Private Enterprise received 18 per cent ($473,067); the International Republican Institute received 16 per cent ($430,531); and the America's Development Foundation received 9 per cent ($239,000) (NED 2005a). This breakdown serves to demonstrate that in Haiti, as in El Salvador, democracy building initiatives favoured institutions with a strong neoliberal commitment, with few left-wing organisations receiving NED support. As I will show in Chapter 6, efforts to further entrench neoliberalism in Haiti have continued into the early twenty-first century. There has also been a further coup against Aristide, and evidence suggests that the US knew of the likely coup, as well as the violence and repression that would ensue, but again did little to prevent it.

The neoliberalisation of Haiti, following the ousting of the Duvalier dynasty, did not go to plan for the US and its elite allies. This resulted in the coup against

Aristide and repression of his supporters, with tacit support from the US. Whether or not the US was directly implicated in the coup, its delaying of the reinstatement of Aristide in order to persuade him to comply with their neoliberal agenda for Haiti exacerbated the use of repression by the self-appointed government which overthrew Aristide. This tacit support for state terrorism was accompanied by non-violent means of ensuring that Haiti would comply with neoliberalisation on Aristide's reinstatement. The case of Haiti was the exception rather than the norm in the decade following the Cold War in Latin America, with El Salvador setting the precedent for democratisation and neoliberalisation through legitimation across the South. However, Haiti shows that repressive means, including tacit support for coups, which frequently results in the use of terrorism against those suspected of supporting the ousted regime, would remain a tool in US foreign policy strategy in the South where legitimation efforts fail to fulfil US objectives.

Conclusion

Whereas during the Cold War US foreign policy strategy was broadly characterised by support for and use of repression, including state terrorism, following the end of the Cold War there was a shift in US foreign policy strategy, with a much greater emphasis on legitimation in order to establish neoliberalism in the South. The IFIs played a key role in the development of neoliberal economics in the South. In this regard, the promotion of neoliberal institutions has been supported by the elites of other liberal democratic states from the North, that are key players in the IFIs. The purposes of US foreign policy, however, remain unchanged. US foreign policy continues to be geared towards maintaining dominance in the international system, and to ensuring that the South is opened up for US expansion of capital. In the post-Cold War world the most efficient way for the US to achieve these goals was through the reproduction of the global capitalist system in the South, which was intended to open it up to US capital, and thereby international capital, and to ensure that states in the South operate in partnership with, rather than in opposition to, US elite interests. In order to achieve this the US has established a complex global network of programmes and institutions which are intended to assist states in the South in their trade liberalisation through legitimation.

The cases of El Salvador and Haiti show that despite the benefits to US and international capital from the neoliberalisation of the economies of Southern states, the majority of people in those states have not benefited, with many still suffering from extremely poor living conditions; in Haiti these have worsened. Neoliberalism has not helped Haiti's poor. Rather Haiti has been marginalised further through an inability to secure comparative advantage. David Harvey has argued that capitalism has internalised a predatory nature, crucial to its neoliberal form. The process that ensues, which he terms 'accumulation by dispossession', a variation of the Marxian term 'primitive accumulation', involves privatisation, deindustrialisation, the erosion of pension and welfare rights orchestrated through

credit systems and the use of state powers to enforce these processes (Harvey 2006: xvi–xvii) – all these processes have been forced through in El Salvador and Haiti. Indeed, for Harvey, the forcing open of markets in the South through the institutional mechanisms and pressures of the IMF and WTO, backed by the US, and to a lesser extent Europe, is the primary vehicle for accumulation by dispossession, making military interventions the 'tip of the imperialist iceberg' in this process (Harvey 2005b: 181). I have shown that where efforts to entrench neoliberalism confront resistance, for example through efforts by elected leaders to undertake reforms that might benefit the poor, but which are inimical to the principles of neoliberalism, and thereby to US elite interests, the US has been willing to revert to coercion, including using state terrorism, to ensure that such states fall into line. Interventions of this kind in Haiti are reminiscent of the repressive means that characterised US foreign policy strategy throughout the Cold War. As I will show in Chapter 6, there was an increase in the use of coercion by the US following 9/11 in the 'War on Terror', and this accompanied ongoing attempts to continue securing access and control of markets in the South. Increasingly these efforts were conducted through the US Department of Defence, rather than through civilian functions of the US government.

6   State terrorism after 9/11

Introduction

This chapter explores the use and sponsorship of state terrorism by liberal democratic states from the North following the events of 9/11. While efforts to entrench neoliberalism through the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and various state aid initiatives increased after 9/11, there was also a resurgence in the use and sponsorship of state terrorism by the US and other liberal democratic states from the North, ostensibly to combat international terrorism. I begin by examining developments in Latin America since 9/11. While the US favoured legitimation strategies to achieve its objectives, it also turned a blind eye to anti-democratic actions including a further coup d'état in Haiti. While coups do not in and of themselves necessarily constitute state terrorism, the violence and intimidation that often ensues at the hands of military forces against supporters of the overthrown government should be understood as state terrorism. As I will show, the US knew of the likely coup and potential for human rights violations, and did little to stop it, particularly because the overthrown government had been acting in ways inimical to US elite interests. The US has also continued to provide extensive military aid to the Colombian state, despite knowing of the widespread acts of terror committed by members of the Colombian armed forces against civilians with no links to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), including extrajudicial killings and various forms of intimidation. Furthermore, the US attempted to increase its military presence in Latin America. While this is not itself a form of state terrorism, it is indicative of a foreign policy which prioritises military solutions to perceived problems over other strategies, as I will show.

   I then provide a brief overview of the support that liberal democratic states from the North, and in particular the US and UK, lent to states known to use terror among their own and external populations, as part of the 'War on Terror'. In the remainder of the chapter I explore various elements of the invasions and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq that constituted state terrorism, including the excessive use of force, detentions without charge or trial, support for groups known to use terror, and a failure to condemn and prevent state terrorism, including the use of death squads by the Iraqi state. Treatment of detainees by American forces also constituted state terrorism. British forces used torture methods

outlawed in Britain in the 1970s, and allegations have been made that British forces were responsible for serious violations of human rights against detainees in the Basra area. Senior officials in the Bush administration attempted to re-define torture, and US state representatives used torture, which was euphemistically referred to as 'enhanced interrogation techniques'. Detainees in facilities such as Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo Bay were terrorised by representatives of the US state. Terror suspects were held in secret prisons where they were tortured. The US and various allies, including other liberal democratic states from the North, were involved in the extraordinary rendition of suspects to third-party countries where torture of detainees is commonplace. Many of the acts of state terrorism explored in this chapter can be traced back to the Cold War, and even as far back as the practices used by the early European and American imperialists, described in Chapters 4 and 5.

Legitimation since 9/11

In the years following 9/11, liberal democratic states from the North continued to promote neoliberalisation in the South. The British UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office emphasised the British government's position that the globalisation of capital will improve welfare, in its 2007–8 report:

> As trade, capital, people, information and culture become more globally mobile, this opens up significant markets for British goods and services. It also speeds up technological progress and creates commercial opportunities in developing countries, which will lift millions of people out of absolute poverty.
>
> (FCO 2008)

Similarly, the EU continued to champion free trade as a means of bringing developing countries out of poverty:

> Increased trade is likely to boost world growth to everybody's advantage. It brings consumers a wider range of products to choose from. Competition between imports and local products lowers prices and raises quality. The EU believes that globalisation can bring economic benefits to all, including the developing countries, provided appropriate rules are adopted at the multilateral level and efforts are made to integrate developing countries in world trade.
>
> (EU 2007a)

The US increased its investment in programmes through USAID and the NED after 9/11. Indeed US foreign policy rhetoric continued to emphasise the promotion of democracy as a key tool in its 'War on Terror'. As discussed in Chapter 5, US neoconservatives were determined to spread neoliberalism, and while they favoured legitimation strategies in the South, they were entirely committed to

using armed coercion and regime change strategies, unilaterally if necessary, in order to bring about conditions in which neoliberalism would flourish.

I will briefly outline the legitimation strategies in US foreign policy following 9/11. With reference to Latin America I will show that even though there was a preference for legitimation, the US continued to tacitly approve of anti-democratic measures in situations where these would further US elite interests and which have, in some cases, resulted in state terrorism. The US also continued providing substantial military support to governments in the region to deal with problems such as narcotics production and trafficking and supposed terror threats, despite knowing that the armed forces of those states regularly used terrorism against civilians with no link at all to terrorist groups, as I will show with reference to Colombia. Similar support was also given to the Philippines, the Middle East and North Africa, discussed below. This was a symptom of the neoconservative commitment to the military sphere being prioritised over social and economic issues, and the increased use of the Pentagon since 2001 to take on political roles previously performed by the Department of State and USAID (Priest 2004a).

Neoliberalisation and democracy promotion

Following 9/11, the Bush administration continued to stress the need to promote democracy and neoliberalism in the South, and consistently linked this objective to its fight against international terrorism, as illustrated in the National Security Strategy of 2002:

> We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world. The United States will stand beside any nation determined to build a better future by seeking the rewards of liberty for its people. Free trade and free markets have proven their ability to lift whole societies out of poverty – so the United States will work with individual nations, entire regions, and the entire global trading community to build a world that trades in freedom and therefore grows in prosperity.
>
> (Bush 2002: iv–vi)

Organisations such as the NED continued to play an important role in this process, and significantly increased their involvement after 2001.[1] The NED 2002 Strategy Report stated that its core budget was 'supplemented by special funds for a number of regions or countries to which Congress or the Administration attaches particular importance' (NED 2002). The priority of the NED was the Islamic world, which helps to account for the increase in projects in the Middle East. The Strategy Report stated:

> Promoting democratic institutions and values in the Muslim world is thus one of the most urgent challenges now facing the NED.... The fact that NED

already has a track record in the Middle East and a network of grantees and contacts upon which to build an expanded program there and in other Muslim regions is due entirely to its global approach, which assumes that no region where democrats are asking for help should be disregarded, no matter how difficult the challenges there might be. Moreover, as September 11 made clear, any seam of dysfunction in the international system, however marginal to the main centres of political and economic interest, can become a source of exposure and threat.

(NED 2002)

The same priorities continued to shape NED's funding, as the 2007 Strategy Report indicates:

The Endowment will continue to make the promotion of democracy in the Muslim world a top priority in its global grants program, supporting efforts by indigenous democrats to influence public policy, monitor government agencies, combat corruption, support the rule of law, and strengthen independent media. In the Middle East and North Africa, NED and its core institutes should continue to support the emerging civil society leaders and groups that have acted as catalysts for reform and have formed the base of popular movements for change. The work of civic groups in the region can complement the training and development of political activists and potential leaders of the liberal democratic political parties of the future, and their sup-porters and members could provide the base of support and membership for such parties. The Endowment should also engage with and support, where possible, serious reformers within the ruling parties as well as moderate Islamists who are advocates of democratic reform. The Islamists should be encouraged to develop a code of conduct for political participation that goes beyond a readiness to participate in elections and to respect their results and includes such principles as the renunciation of violence, acceptance of women's and minority rights, support for internal party democracy, and acceptance of pluralism not just in politics but also in interpreting Islamic law. NED's core institutes can help reformers build platforms that move them away from polarizing Islamist and nationalist ideologies toward a dis-course and practice that emphasize a new social agenda that addresses the basic needs of citizens.

(NED 2007)

US foreign policy rhetoric after 9/11 continued to emphasise the promotion of democracy and neoliberalisation, deemed essential for defeating terrorism. This continued to be the case in Latin America, although there were incidents following 9/11 where the US administration knew of anti-democratic activities in the region, and did little to help halt them, or the ensuing repression.

After 9/11 a further attempted coup d'état occurred in Haiti. There is insufficient evidence to determine whether the US was directly involved. What is clear,

however, is that the US lent tacit approval to those responsible for the coup. In so doing, it carried some responsibility for the violence by the self-appointed government that the US backed. In Haiti, President Aristide's Lavalas party won the parliamentary and local elections with 15 of the 19 contested seats in the Senate, in May 2000, although the results were challenged by election observers from the OAS, concerned about irregularities in the polling and calculations when counting the votes (HRW 2000a; OAS 2000). Aid donors threatened to continue withholding $500 million in aid if the government failed to reach an agreement with the opposition (AP 2000). Following this, political groups opposed to Aristide's party formed a coalition with support from USAID's 'Democracy Enhancement' programme, the purpose of which was to 'fund those sectors of the Haitian political spectrum where opposition to the Aristide government could be encouraged' (Mitchell 2005). In November 2000 further presidential elections were held, with Aristide, the only candidate, winning 91.5 per cent of the vote, and with an estimated turnout of 61 per cent (Mitchell 2005).

Louis-Jodel Chamblain and Guy Philippe, both known abusers of human rights that had been involved in the 1991 coup, were behind the second coup to overthrow Aristide in 2004 (AI 2004a). They began by taking cities in the north and were advancing on Port-au-Prince by 4 February (Dodds 2004). Within days, US Representative Barbara Lee wrote to Secretary of State Colin Powell:

> I must say, Mr. Secretary, that our failure to support the democratic process and help restore order looks like a covert effort to overthrow a government. There is a violent coup d'état in the making, and it appears that the United States is aiding and abetting the attempt to violently topple the Aristide Government. With all due respect, this looks like 'regime change'.
>
> (Lee 2004)

It is clear, therefore, that politicians in the US had knowledge of these anti-democratic acts in Haiti. There are conflicting accounts of what followed. Aristide, who had been cooperating with Cuba and Venezuela in trade agreements (Mitchell 2005), maintains that he was taken at gunpoint along with his wife and brother-in-law to a US commercial jet and flown, without knowledge of his destination, into exile in the Central African Republic. He states that he was warned by US diplomat Luis Moreno that if he did not leave, thousands of Haitians were likely to die and Philippe would attack the presidential palace and kill him. Aristide maintains that this was a US-supported coup d'état. The US government insisted that Aristide voluntarily went into exile, following advice from US ambassador Foley that the Bush administration could ensure his safe departure if he chose to resign, and that this was what the administration thought he should do. Moreno maintains that Aristide also handed over a letter of resignation and that Aristide left willingly. Aristide's concierge disputes the US's account, however, and states that US soldiers took Aristide at gunpoint and that he did not want to leave. Pro-Aristide Haitians, following the coup, were victims of violence and murder at the hands of those responsible for the coup and the

armed gangs associated with them. Amnesty reported that the Catholic Church's Justice and Peace Commission documented some 300 cases of killings in Port-au-Prince alone (AI 2004b). The truth of the Bush administration's role in Aristide's overthrow and exile in 2004 may not be known for some time. However, the US was slow to act to prevent those rebels from launching their coup, which culminated in Aristide's exit from office, and repression of his supporters. At the very least the US turned a blind eye to the actions of those rebels and, at worst, was directly involved.

Militarisation of Latin America

The US continued to sponsor state terrorism in Latin America through its ongoing military support for the Colombian government. US military spending in Latin America following the Cold War prioritised the 'War on Drugs'. This intensified considerably following 9/11, with US officials increasingly linking the drug trade to terrorism. The 'War on Drugs' involved crop eradication programmes as well as the provision of military hardware and counter-narcotics training for the Colombian armed forces (Brophy and Zirnite 1997) from the end of the Cold War. The 1991 National Security Strategy underlined the centrality of counter-drug operations:

> The scourge of illegal drugs saps our vitality as a free people, diverts our energies from more positive pursuits and threatens friendly democratic governments now plagued by drug traffickers.... The United States seeks to ... reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States by encouraging reduction in foreign production, combating international traffickers and reducing demand at home.
>
> (NSC 1991)

There followed significant investment in a war on drugs to be waged both within the US and in Latin America in the early 1990s. $47 million of Foreign Military Financing was designated for Colombia in 1992, and $58 million was requested for 1993, as well as $2.5 million in International Military Education and Training (IMET) provision each year (HRW 1992). This intensified with the initiation of 'Plan Colombia' in July 2000, with a $1.3 billion package of what was claimed to be emergency anti-drug aid to Colombia and its neighbours (CIP 2002). Since 1996, the International Narcotics Programme covered most of the training, rather than the IMET programme. Funding increased for the International Narcotics Programme in Colombia, from $16 million in 1996 to $439 million in 2003, of which $284.2 million was for police and military programmes (CIP 2002). HRW reports that the UK also provided ongoing military assistance to Colombia, although the full amount or nature of that assistance is not publically known (HRW 2007a).

The US government claimed that Plan Colombia was intended to assist in the war against Colombia's 'narco-guerrillas' as 90 per cent of all cocaine entering

the US originated in Colombia (Stokes 2001: 59). In reality the priority of the US was to target the terrorist group the FARC, which, it argued, was behind the majority of drug trafficking to the US, even though, as Adam Isacson has shown, right-wing paramilitaries were far more involved in human rights abuses than the FARC, through their vigilante efforts to protect large, drug-producing landowners in the north of the country:

> The drug lord-landowners, along with remaining farmers and ranchers, adopted a new approach to the guerrillas' intimidation tactics, setting up well-paid vigilante 'self-defense groups.' With military-style weapons and uniforms, these groups were created with heavy input from Colombia's armed forces. Though the paramilitaries attacked civilian populations far more frequently than guerrillas, the Colombian Army trained, equipped, and operated alongside them until 1989, when they were declared illegal. Little or no effort was ever made to enforce this ban, however, and the groups' relationship with the armed forces, though pushed underground, remains strong.
>
> (Isacson 2000)

Declassified documents show that the Colombian armed forces had little interest in halting the activities of the paramilitary groups. During a visit to Norte de Santander in 1999, following a series of approximately 15 massacres in the area that had left 145 dead, Colonel Victor Hugo Matamoros, a local army commander, told US Embassy officials that the armed forces of Colombia were not pursuing paramilitary groups:

> Look, I have 100 kilometers of oil pipeline to protect, as well as several bridges and the National Police. ... Plus, there are guerrillas to fight.... If you have so many tasks to do with so few resources, and you're faced with two illegal armed groups, one of which (guerrillas) is shooting at you and the other (paramilitaries) is shooting at them, you obviously fight the guerrillas first, then worry about the paramilitaries.
>
> (quoted in DoS 1999)

The US administration knew, therefore, of the role of right-wing paramilitaries in human rights violations, and of the inaction by the armed forces. Yet the subsequent Plan Colombia package went ahead, emphasising the targeting of the FARC, and providing millions of dollars of support to the country's armed forces despite their complicity. Stokes attributes this to the US agenda of eliminating movements that threaten US interests in the region (Stokes 2001: 60). He shows that the US actually 'strengthened the largest players in Colombia's drug equation primarily because the right-wing death squads form an integral part of the US's overall strategy of counter-insurgent warfare' (Stokes 2001: 75). Stokes concludes that the suppression of the FARC via Plan Colombia reflected the US commitment to containing the perceived challenge posed by the FARC's

alternative socio-economic model to US oil and investment interests (Stokes 2001: 75–8). In the Colombian peace process of 1984, the FARC was interested in promoting a number of socio-economic reforms that would benefit Colombia's poor. These included political reforms to end the Conservative and Liberal domination of Colombian politics; popular elections of local mayors; rural land reforms; and the nationalisation of foreign businesses, Colombian banks and transportation (Stokes 2005b: 75). While we might condemn the violent means that they use to try and implement these socio-economic reforms in Colombia, we should treat human rights violations by the military and paramilitary forces allied to the Colombian state with the same levels of condemnation. States that support the Colombian government should also be held to account.

HRW reports that in 2006, 72 trade unionists were killed in Colombia at the hands of military and paramilitary forces. It notes that the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has reported that extrajudicial killings of civilians by the country's armed forces have increased substantially in recent years, yet those responsible enjoy impunity. As Mario Novelli has shown, even teachers have frequently been targets, with 808 educators assassinated between 1991 and 2006, 21 were tortured, 59 were disappeared and 1,008 were forced to leave their homes and jobs for fear of violence (Novelli 2008: 22–39). Many of the teachers were targeted because they resisted efforts by guerrilla and paramilitary groups to recruit their students (Novelli 2008: 22), or because they challenged educational reforms and restructuring, particularly measures relating to privatisation and fiscal austerity, and then were considered subversives, resulting in attacks against them by state and paramilitary forces (Novelli 2008: 22). In addition, HRW reports that 'Human rights monitors, journalists, politicians, and victims of paramilitary groups continue to be the subjects of frequent threats, harassment, and attacks for their legitimate work' (HRW 2007a). Of the military aid which the US government has given to Colombia, approximately US$800 million in 2007, only one-quarter of it was subject to human rights conditions. As a result, in April 2007 the US Congress did freeze US$55 million in US military assistance because of concerns over increases in extrajudicial killings by the military, and a lack of progress in prosecuting those responsible (HRW 2007a). Tying human rights requirements to a fraction of US military aid does little to ameliorate the serious human rights situation in Colombia. Indeed by continuing to fund and arm the Colombian state, without attaching human rights conditions to much of that assistance, the US is complicit in terrorism at the hands of the Colombian armed forces against civilians engaged in legitimate democratic processes.

After 9/11 the US sought to further its military presence in Latin America by establishing military bases, and by attempting in 2004 to have all Latin American military activities coordinated through US Southern Command, ostensibly to curb the activities of narco-terrorists and criminal gangs which Pentagon officials claimed were linking up with Al-Qaida operatives in what is known as the tri-border region of Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina (Grandin 2006). Southern Command chief Bantz Craddock nevertheless admitted that the Pentagon had 'not detected Islamic terrorist cells anywhere in Latin America' (Craddock 2005: 4).

Southern Command now has a staff of 1,400 and a budget of $800 million, which is more that the combined budgets of the State Department, the Treasury, Commerce and Agriculture for the region (Grandin 2006). Some clue as to the purpose of these efforts to increase the US military presence in the region was given in the Pentagon's reference to establish 'dominion' over 'ungoverned spaces', including boundary areas such as the tri-border region, but also poor city areas where gangs operate, rural areas where civil institutions are weak and waterways and coastlines where illegal trafficking takes place (Grandin 2006). While some Latin American leaders resisted this, Paraguay proved a willing partner, inviting the Pentagon to undertake bilateral military exercises on Paraguayan soil, and engaging with the US on plans to expand the US-built Mariscal Estigarribia air base in northern Paraguay (Eimer 2005; Grandin 2006). The region's military leaders rejected both US practices and the pretext, with some of them, including Brazil's José Alencar and Chile's defence minister, refusing to accept that terrorism, or even narco-terrorism, are the number one problems of the region. Alencar argued that poverty and failed neoliberalisation are what have caused instability in Latin America. Even though Craddock acknowledged that 'free market reform and privatisation of the 1990s have not delivered on the promise of prosperity' (Craddock 2005: 8), the US response was, as Greg Grandin argues, to position the Department of Defense as 'globalisation's Praetorian Guard, making the opening up of markets across Latin America a central objective of its mission' (Grandin 2006). As a consequence, whereas the Pentagon had a relatively small presence in Latin America during the Cold War, usually operating through its allies, as shown in Chapter 4, increasingly the Pentagon and not the State Department have set policy and undertaken diplomacy in Latin America, a strategy explored in detail by Dana Priest (2004a). This did not send appropriate signals to Latin American states about the role that armed forces should play in dealing with the complex social, political and economic challenges that the region faces.

State terrorism in the 'War on Terror'

While support for and use of state terrorism was not such a prominent tool of the foreign policies of powerful liberal democratic states from the North in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries as it was during the Cold War, there was a resurgence of its use as part of the 'War on Terror'. The methods deployed by the US and a number of its liberal democratic allies were entirely consistent with the state terrorism used during the Cold War, especially by the US. I briefly outline a number of cases in which liberal democratic states from the North lent support to states known to use terror. I then explore the use of state terrorism by Northern states in the 'War on Terror', beginning with Afghanistan, and then moving onto Iraq. Details of human rights abuses by US intelligence and military personnel at the Abu Ghraib prison and at Guantánamo Bay have been well documented (AI 2006a; Danner 2004; Hersh 2004; MacMaster 2004; Rose 2004; Roth 2008; Valentine 2004). The involvement of the Bush administration in sanctioning

these practices has come to light through the acquisition of numerous formerly classified documents, either because they have been leaked or because they have been obtained under the US Freedom of Information Act. Many of them have been compiled in the important volume edited by Karen Greenberg and Joshua Dratel (2005). As discussed in Chapter 3, these documents show that torture was approved for use in the 'War on Terror' at the highest levels of the Bush adminis-tration and the US Department of Defense. My purpose in this chapter is to demonstrate that numerous violations of human rights in the 'War on Terror', including abuses that have received less public and media attention than Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo Bay, constituted state terrorism. A number of liberal democratic states from the North sanctioned and were, in some cases, party to it.

Support for states known to use terrorism

While not an exhaustive list, I provide here brief details of a number of the cases in which liberal democratic states from the North, particularly the US and UK, lent support to states known for using terror against their own and external pop-ulations. Such support was justified as part of the fight against terrorism, but in fact constitutes the sponsorship of state terrorism. Northern liberal democracies backed Russia in its campaign against Chechnya, despite use of terrorism by Russian forces, which has, according to Human Rights Watch (HRW), involved the systematic burning of houses, beatings, rape, torture and murder of unarmed civilians. Often this was accompanied by the pillage of people's homes, and even involved the forcible removal of gold dental fillings (HRW 2000b). Tony Blair visited President Putin in March 2000, and stated that he understood Russia's position in Chechnya, with a British spokesman later commenting that Russia was facing a 'terrorist insurrection' (quoted in Cockburn 2000). Other states involved in terrorism against their own populations also enjoyed ongoing support from Northern democracies, including military support. Saudi Arabia, for example, despite its persistent abuse of human rights, well documented by the US Department of State in its Country Human Rights reports (DoS 2005b), enjoyed considerable backing from both the US and UK governments after 9/11, with the US naming Saudi Arabia, along with other states with appalling human rights records, such as Pakistan, Egypt and Uzbekistan, as key players in global counter-terrorism efforts (DoS 2002–7).

Pakistan's military forces received US$5.56 billion in Coalition Support Funds from the US after 2001, according to the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) for its efforts to combat terrorism along the border with Afghanistan, although the GAO raised serious concerns about the accounting processes, expressing doubt about how those funds had actually been used (GAO 2008). Beyond suspect accounting and suggestions of corruption, however, Pakistan's record of using terrorism and repression is a serious cause for concern. In 2007 the US Department of State's report on human rights in Pakistan found that the human rights situation in the country was worsening, particularly during the State of Emergency declared by President Musharraf which lasted 42 days.

Over 6,000 lawyers, judges, political party workers/leaders and civil society activists were arrested and detained during the emergency. It also found that extrajudicial killings, torture and disappearances were commonplace at the hands of police and military forces (DoS 2007). In Uzbekistan, opponents of the regime have even been boiled in oil (Murray 2006). Israel continued to enjoy considerable support from the UK and US, despite its ongoing repression of Palestinians. Israel is consistently the highest recipient of US military assistance in the world, with US provision of hardware and training through the Foreign Military Financing Budget totalling US$2.9 million in 2004 (DoD 2001–5, 2005, Part IV). Yet abuses by Israeli forces are well-documented, and include the widespread use of torture by the Israeli intelligence services, which has the effect of instilling fear among many Palestinians that they too may be arrested and tortured; targeted killings of civilians, particularly through the bombing of civilian areas, which the Israeli government argues will limit the capabilities of armed Palestinian groups to launch attacks, even though the victims are usually not involved with such groups; and the collective punishments aimed at the entire Palestinian population, such as interrupting the water supply or enclosing the population behind walls (Jackson 2008).

The US also expanded its 'War on Terror' to the Horn of Africa. This involved significant levels of training of African military forces from Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti in counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency methods (Feickert 2005: 7). Critics of the policy, as Andrew Feickert notes, have suggested that US operations in the region were as much to do with 'a need to protect Africa's rapidly expanding oil industry' as with counter-terrorism (Feickert 2005: 9). As part of an annual £4 million training package from the British Ministry of Defence, Kenyan Para forces received training in regional stability and border security but, in 2008, evidence obtained by HRW showed that forces in receipt of the training had allegedly been involved in the torture and killing of dozens of men and boys in the Mount Elgon area early in 2008. As a result, the Ministry of Defence stated, 'Were the allegations proved to be true, the UK could not resume training until we were satisfied that those allegations had been properly addressed by the Kenyan authorities' (Rice 2008). It has not been possible to ascertain whether the training actually ceased. The 'War on Terror' was also extended to the Philippines, where the US was involved in supporting counterinsurgency training to combat Islamic insurgent groups, as well as one supposed Marxist group (Feickert 2005: 9–10). The Philippines, as HRW report, has a poor human rights record, with regular extrajudicial killings and disappearances, often at the hands of the country's military forces (HRW 2007b). These examples indicate that military training was provided under the umbrella of the 'War on Terror' by liberal democratic states from the North to countries whose military forces regularly use terrorism against the population.

These cases show that despite having a poor human rights record, and a history of using terrorism against their own populations, numerous countries enjoyed diplomatic, economic and military support in the name of the 'War on Terror'. This sent the signal to the governments of those regimes that their use of

terrorism and repression would not be challenged, providing they continued to cooperate with their Northern allies in the 'War on Terror'. By lending support to these regimes, the governments of the US and UK were complicit in state terrorism in those countries, since they legitimised rather than challenged the actions of those states.

Afghanistan

The war on Afghanistan in response to 9/11 was to prove devastating for the Afghan people, not simply because of the deaths and suffering caused, but because of the inability of the US to stabilise society and establish credible democratic institutions (Burbach and Tarbell 2004: 203). A key element of the war was the use of anti-Taliban forces, and particularly former Mujahidin Northern Alliance groups, to work on the ground to wipe out Taliban militia. This meant that the US, as Paul Rogers argues, 'took sides in a long-running civil war, supporting a range of groups that themselves had an appalling human rights record before the Taliban had progressively taken power' (Rogers 2002: 143). Civilian casualties in the initial three months may have exceeded 3,000. Cluster bombs were used widely, killing and injuring many local people as a result of accidental detonation of unexploded cluster bombs (Rogers 2002: 144). A significant consequence of this strategy was the withdrawal and going into hiding of many Taliban troops, and the flooding of the country with arms from Russia as the Northern Alliance advanced (Rogers 2002: 144).

This had significant consequences for Afghanistan's future stability. Afghanistan was already fragile following decades of war. By the end of 2003, the economy was in ruins and the main source of income was the heroin trade. Mujahidin warlords controlled the state and reconstruction was limited because of corruption, despite the US pouring in millions of dollars (Burbach and Tarbell 2004: 203–6). HRW states that many Afghans lived in fear of violence by US-sponsored warlords, and that women had particularly suffered, since they have not been able to obtain work, healthcare and education, because of the instability brought about by the war (HRW 2006). The outcome for the US in terms of its foreign policy objectives was much more favourable than the outcome for the Afghan population. As Rogers notes, the US, as a result of the war, was able to extend its military presence significantly into Central Asia, with bases not just in Afghanistan, but also in Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Rogers 2002: 145). These countries are all known to use state terrorism against their own populations, and enjoyed US military and political support. This served neoconservative aims to ensure military reach and pre-eminence well.

Iraq

The US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003 was a facet of neoconservative designs on the Middle East region, where it was intended that the US would rid Iraq of Saddam Hussein's regime, considered, as Eric Herring and Glen

Rangwala note, 'a long-term threat to both US dominance in the Gulf area and to Israel, prized as the model democracy in an undemocratic region' (Herring and Rangwala 2006). This goal was most explicitly articulated in a strategy document produced by the neoconservative think tank, the Project for the New American Century in 2000:

> The United States has for decades sought to play a more permanent role in Gulf regional security. While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein.
>
> (PNAC, September 2000)

That permanent role included securing the region for the spread of neoliberalism. A number of scholars including William Robinson (2004a: 441–7), David Harvey (2005a: 1–25 and 87–182), and Roger Burbach and Jim Tarbell (2004: 149–71), have demonstrated that the invasion and occupation was also intended to further the interests of US-supported elites. They show the invasion of Iraq to have been for the purposes of establishing a neoliberal democratic state in the Middle East that would lend itself to the expansion of US-supported capital in the region, would secure US access to and control of oil, and would help to transform much of the Middle East along the same lines. The invasion and occupation of Iraq is an example of the push among the neoconservatives to use regime change in their strategies to entrench neoliberalism and maintain US primacy. This, as Herring and Rangwala argue, has not succeeded and has resulted in the fragmentation rather than the stabilisation of the Iraqi state (Herring and Rangwala 2006). Furthermore, it has involved significant levels of state terrorism. I explore the case of Iraq in some detail to show that the combination of coalition abuses, mass detention without charge or trial by the coalition, and incidents of excessive use of force by the coalition, when coupled with widespread torture and abuse by elements of the Iraqi state, the sponsorship of death squads by the Iraqi state, as well as widespread sectarian violence, have contributed to and exacerbated a climate of extreme fear in Iraq. Furthermore, coalition conduct has undermined the ability of the coalition to challenge Iraqi state terrorism.

The costs to the people of Iraq of the invasion and occupation were catastrophic. Coalition forces chose not to keep records of the number of Iraqi deaths during or following the invasion. As Herring and Rangwala show, using a method of extrapolating from a sample of households, the medical journal the *Lancet* estimated that 98,000 more Iraqis died violently and non-violently than would normally be expected between the start of the invasion and September 2004. The study did not distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. The Iraqi Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation, working with the UN Development Programme, sampled a much larger number of households, and concluded that 24,000 Iraqis, both combatant and non-combatant, had died as a result of combat up until May 2004. The NGO Iraq Body Count uses a very different method which involves surveying media reports and eyewitness accounts

and focuses on confirmed civilian deaths. This does result in underreporting, as IBC acknowledge, since many deaths are reported unreliably or are not reported at all. It found that the numbers of violent civilian deaths up until March 2005 was 25,000, with coalition forces responsible for 37 per cent. Of those, anti-coalition forces were responsible for 9 per cent, criminals were responsible for 36 per cent and 18 per cent were the result of actions by unknown agents (Herring and Rangwala 2006: 183–4). Results of an updated version of the *Lancet* study were released in 2006, and found that as many as 654,965 more deaths than would have been expected in pre-war conditions had occurred since March 2003 (Public Health News Centre 2006). Despite the difficulties associated with counting the number of deaths, and contention over the best methodologies, the findings of all the studies show that the effects of the war have been severe.

The extensive damage to the infrastructure, which was already in a poor state following the 1991 Gulf War and subsequent decade of economic sanctions, also exacerbated the suffering of Iraqi civilians. There has been a catalogue of abuses against Iraqi civilians by US-led Multinational Forces (MNF-I), which, when taken together, are indicative of a pattern of state terrorism. These have included the abuse and torture of prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison, outlined in Chapter 3; abuse and torture in other MNF-I detention facilities, notably by some American forces and British forces; indefinite detention without charge or trial of thousands of detainees, not granted the right to challenge their detention; relative inaction by, or an inability on the part of, coalition governments to halt abuses by Iraqi military and police forces; and the disproportionate use of force, particularly during the assault against Falluja where civilians remained alongside the suspected insurgents that were said to be the target of the attack, with hundreds of civilians killed, many of whom were women and children (FCO 2006; GPF 2007). Amnesty International has also reported that US forces were involved in house demolitions in Iraq in November 2003, which it argues are a form of collective punishment, and were carried out in one case in response to an attack on a US convoy several days earlier (AI 2003b). As is well documented by Amnesty, house demolition has been a practice that the Israelis have used persistently against Palestinians (AI 2004c), and Amnesty notes that the UN Committee Against Torture considers that house demolition amounts, in some instances, to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (AI 2003b). Further research is needed to investigate the extent of this policy in Iraq, to determine whether the US enacted this policy extensively, either as punishment or to terrorise.

Abuse and torture of prisoners

As discussed in Chapter 3, the torture of prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison was not an isolated case of misconduct by a few 'bad apples', but rather was a consequence of the view at the highest levels of the US administration that torture should be permitted against terror suspects to prevent further terrorist attacks. This view flies in the face of substantial evidence that torture rarely secures credible intelligence. Furthermore, if the abuses at Abu Ghraib were simply the

acts of a few isolated individuals, one would not expect to see torture being used by other American or indeed coalition forces against detainees. The reality is that the US used torture and other forms of humiliating and degrading treatment widely among Iraqi detainees. British forces have also used torture methods outlawed in Britain in the 1970s, and there were allegations of serious violations of human rights by British forces around Basra. These practices are consistent with US conduct during the Cold War in its counterinsurgency operations across the South, as discussed in previous chapters. The effect of this has been to further terrorise a population already living in fear of attacks from multiple armed groups involved in ongoing sectarian violence. In this regard the US and UK have exacerbated state terrorism in Iraq.

Despite claims by the US administration that measures were introduced to try and prevent the use of torture in the wake of Abu Ghraib, torture and other forms of abuse by members of the MNF-I persisted. A small number of cases resulted in prosecution and court-martials against those involved, although none of these were carried out independently. In September 2005, members of the US National Guard's Infantry Regiment were sentenced to prison terms in connection with the torture and abuse of Iraqis detained in March 2005, after an attack on a power plant in Baghdad. The abuse allegedly involved electric shock guns, including shocks to one man's testicles. An investigation was carried out when a fellow soldier found evidence of the abuse on a laptop. The sentences included 5–12 months imprisonment of three sergeants and sentences of hard labour for four soldiers (AI 2006a: 29). In a further case, five soldiers from the 75th Ranger Regiment were charged before a court martial following an incident in which soldiers were allegedly punching and kicking detainees repeatedly. All were sentenced (AI 2006a: 29). Despite action in these cases, abuses by US forces continued. Amnesty reported that even in cases where charges were brought, they were often dropped or reduced, and in some cases attempts were made to cover up the abuses (AI 2008: 14). Amnesty note that former detainees held in Camp Bucca have said they were tortured and abused by US guards, who used stun guns and subjected them to extremes of heat and cold (AI 2008: 14). Given this, Amnesty expressed concern that insufficient safeguards were put in place to protect detainees (AI 2006a: 29). As I show below, not only were the safeguards inadequate, but the US and its allies were also involved in further activities that violated human rights and, given the context, also constituted state terrorism. These included the detention without charge or trial of thousands of Iraqis, as well as people from numerous other states, and the policy of extraordinary rendition.

Allegations have also been made that British forces tortured and abused detainees, despite persistent attempts by British military officials to distance the British from the Americans in terms of their conduct in military operations. For example, in 2004 one senior British Commanding Officer made the following arguments to the *Daily Telegraph* on condition of anonymity:

> My view and the view of the British chain of command is that the Americans' use of violence is not proportionate and is over-responsive to

the threat they are facing. They don't see the Iraqi people the way we see them. They view them as untermenschen. They are not concerned about the Iraqi loss of life in the way the British are. Their attitude towards the Iraqis is tragic, it's awful. The US troops view things in very simplistic terms. It seems hard for them to reconcile subtleties between who supports what and who doesn't in Iraq. It's easier for their soldiers to group all Iraqis as the bad guys. As far as they are concerned Iraq is bandit country and everybody is out to kill them. ... The British response in Iraq has been much softer. During and after the war the British set about trying to win the confidence of the local population. There have been problems, it hasn't been easy but on the whole it was succeeding.

(quoted in Rayment 2004)

The alleged conduct of British forces in a small number of cases is difficult to distinguish from that of US forces. Nevertheless, the Aitken Report (Aitken 2008), undertaken at the request of former Chief of Defence Staff Sir Michael Jackson to investigate abuses of human rights by British forces, and published in 2008, concluded that very few British soldiers were implicated in human rights abuses. Those cases are nevertheless serious, and evidence that emerged through their investigation demonstrated that torture techniques that the UK had banned in the 1970s were being used in Iraq. The cases in question concern allegations of torture and abuse by British forces, and are being pursued in British courts by Public Interest Lawyers (PIL). They include the case of Jabbir Kammash, Ammar Kammash and Ramzi Hassan. In April 2007 all three were subjected to interrogation techniques that included hooding, stress positions, sleep, food and water deprivation and extreme noise (Shiner 2008b). These were banned under British law in 1972, after an Amnesty International investigation into the use of torture and abuse by British troops in Northern Ireland against suspected para-militaries. For a long period, official British policy was to intern, without charge or trial, the suspected members of paramilitary groups. The British army also used torture as part of its interrogation of some suspected Republican terrorists, as documented by Amnesty (AI 1972), which concluded that the British govern-ment had violated national and international law in relation to its treatment of 14 Northern Irish men in 1972. These men were subjected to beatings with batons and kicking, often until they passed out; hooding; stripping; sensory assault, including being subjected for a whole week to constant noise at various levels of intensity; food, water and sleep deprivation; and prolonged stress positions (Conroy 2001: 5–11). The British government claims that its policy is to retain this ban and, following the death of a detainee, Baha Mousa, in September 2003, the Ministry of Defence claimed to have taken steps to ensure that these tech-niques were not used.

The court martial which dealt with the Mousa case resulted in the acquittal of seven members of the British armed forces, with just one corporal admitting inhuman treatment, despite the fact that Mousa and others with him had been subjected to hooding, stress positions and sleep deprivation. No officers were

prosecuted in this case. Amnesty concluded that the investigation carried out into the death of Baha Mousa by the UK's Royal Military Police was flawed (AI 2007). Evidence obtained by PIL includes 46 photographs showing the 93 different injuries suffered by Mousa. Another 102 photographs show the severe injuries suffered by another five men, and other injuries suffered by a further four. Following a High Court Ruling in October 2007, this evidence was disclosed and a full and public enquiry into the case – *R* (Al Skeini and others) v. *Secretary of State for Defence* – is ongoing (Shiner 2008a). A BBC *Panorama* investigation into abuses by British forces first broadcast in January 2008, found that according to court testimony in relation to the Mousa case, hooding and stressing had been approved at the Brigade level 'to prolong the shock of capture for up to six hours' (*Panorama* 2008). *Panorama* interviewed former Attorney General Lord Ashcroft, who maintained that he and his office had in no way legitimised the use of these outlawed techniques:

> There is no question of anyone in my office, let alone me, advising that it was legitimate to interrogate whilst hooding or using sleep deprivation or any of those techniques. Full stop. ... It appears that there was confusion about what the rules in relation to interrogation were ... I think the Ministry of Defence are probably the responsible department to understand with the army what took place, to learn the lessons from it to make sure it never happens again.
>
> (Lord Ashcroft, interviewed by *Panorama* 2008)

A further case being pursued by PIL is the Khuder Al-Sweady and Hussain Fadhil Abbas case, and concerns events at the Danny Boy checkpoint and Camp Abu Naji. It is far from clear whether this case constitutes state terrorism, but if efforts by PIL to get the bodies of victims exhumed are successful, the details of the case will be much clearer. The incidents in question followed a gun battle near the Danny Boy checkpoint between British and enemy forces, following which British forces were issued with the extraordinary order to collect the bodies of dead Iraqis. This case was investigated by the *Panorama* programme, aired in January 2008 (*Panorama* 2008). The logic behind the order was to check the bodies against a list of suspects in the previous killings of six British military police personnel. The British maintain that 20 bodies were logged and photographed and returned the following day. The allegation being brought by PIL is that British forces were involved in the death in detention of 21 Iraqis on 14 May 2004, and involved in the torture of many of these, as well as the torture of nine others. The British maintain that only nine Iraqis were captured alive, and of these, seven were sentenced and two were acquitted, and that there was no unlawful treatment and no case of murder (*Panorama* 2008). In a commentary piece for the *Guardian* on 19 October 2007, Phil Shiner stated that the evidence obtained by PIL indicates that soldiers had earlier executed Iraqis in front of a number of witnesses. Some were executed by shooting at close range, others were strangled. Many of the bodies that were returned, they allege, showed signs of torture.

Bodies had been mutilated, with eyes gouged out, multiple stab wounds and body parts severed, including a penis. If accurate, these allegations would be suggestive of state terrorism, since they include shooting dead in front of others, torture and the return of the bodies, a known method of terrorising others. Iraqi medical staff concluded that the victims had been tortured and killed by British forces. They attested that many of the wounds were fresh and that the deaths had occurred just before the bodies were returned. As the *Panorama* investigation found, one of the medical experts was the uncle of one of the victims (*Panorama* 2008). *Panorama* asked a pathologist to look at the photographic evidence of the bodies. They were advised that without proper post-mortems, it was impossible to tell how and when the victims had died (*Panorama* 2008). The Ministry of Defence claims to have interviewed 200 witnesses regarding the case, and as a result, deny the allegations. They insist that the injuries are consistent with battlefield injuries and that the claims of deaths at the camp may have arisen from the unusual decision to remove the bodies from the battlefield (*Panorama* 2008). The MoD issued a statement in response to the *Panorama* programme:

> There is currently no evidence to support claims of alleged mutilation of bodies at or near VCP Danny Boy, or of torture or execution at Camp Abu Naji. ... The RMP [Royal Military Police] is currently looking into new evidence and hopes to interview those who have made the allegations as soon as possible. Once the interviews are complete, the RMP will be in a position to decide whether to reopen their investigation.
>
> (MoD 2008)

Phil Shiner, on the other hand, insists that 'British soldiers may well have been responsible for the executions of up to 20 Iraqi civilians, the torture of many of these 20 before death and the torture of nine other survivors, and horrific bodily mutilations prior to executions' (*Panorama* 2008). *Panorama* concluded that there was insufficient proof that prisoners had died at the hands of their captors and that the case being brought by PIL represents 'the most extreme interpretation of a troubling but confusing incident' (*Panorama* 2008). The case will be heard in early 2009. With regard to the above case, without exhuming the bodies and carrying out full post-mortems it is not possible to conclude that the allegations are true.

We can conclude that interrogation techniques amounting to torture that were banned by the British government in 1972, and which the government maintains are still prohibited, have continued to be used by British forces. Former Chief of Defence Staff Sir Michael Jackson told *Panorama* that, as the investigation into abuses of human rights by British forces that he had commissioned by Brigadier Robert Aitken had found, 'there was no evidence whatsoever of any endemic behaviour of that nature'. If the cases being brought by PIL come to fruition, perhaps we will start to have answers to three important unanswered questions: how have these practices continued; how widespread are they; and have they led to even more extreme forms of torture? This will help determine whether the

British government can be deemed to have sanctioned state terrorism through the treatment of Iraqi detainees.

Detention

As well as allegations of humiliating and degrading treatment and torture, thousands of Iraqis, as well as some foreign nationals, are being detained in MNF-I facilities in Iraq. Charges are not being brought against them, they are not being tried, and in many cases they are not even informed of the reasons for their detention. They are being held indefinitely with little or no access to legal representatives or to families. This adds to the climate of fear and terror among Iraqis, in a context where individuals disappear all the time at the hands of various militia groups.

In a press conference given on 13 November 2007, Karl Matti of the ICRC stated that as of November 2007, 60,000 people were being held at MNF-I or Iraqi detention facilities (AI 2008: 12). Of these, the US military stated that it was holding 23,900, of which 3,500 were in Camp Cropper near Baghdad airport, and 20,400 in Camp Bucca near Basra. This figure includes 620 foreign nationals, mostly from other Arab countries, and 620 children. The oldest was 80 years of age, and the youngest, ten years old (AI 2008: 12). An amnesty law was passed by the Iraqi Council of representatives on 13 February 2008, which would release all political detainees. This will come into effect only when the Presidential Council ratifies it. It does not, however, extend to those held by the MNF-I (AI 2008: 5). The MNF-I claim that UN Security Council Resolution 1546 allows them to detain people in Iraq 'where this is necessary for imperative reasons of security' (AI 2008: 12). Furthermore, under Memorandum Number Three of the Coalition Provisional Authority, 'anyone who is interned for more than 72 hours is entitled to have the decision to intern reviewed within seven days, and thereafter at intervals of not more than six months' (AI 2008: 12). As Amnesty note, 'These procedures deprive detainees of human rights guaranteed in international human rights norms. There is no time limit for the detention of security detainees, who also have no right to challenge the lawfulness of their detention before a court' (AI 2008: 12). Amnesty refer to the case of Mu'tassim al-Ani, head of the pharmaceutical department at one of Baghdad's hospitals. Arrested on 20 May 2007, following a raid on his house, he was taken to Camp Cropper, having been told by a US soldier that he would be back soon. His wife went to Camp Cropper the following day to ask for him, but was told she was not allowed to see him, and was given an appointment to return in August 2007. On returning she was told he had been transferred to Camp Bucca, but on going there she was told she could not see him and that she must return in December. On seeing him he told her he had no idea why he was being held and had not had access to a lawyer. Four letters sent to him by his wife, via the ICRC, had not been delivered. She has also not been told anything about the terms of his detention (AI 2008: 12–13). Amnesty have condemned the 'arbitrary' nature of the MNF-I system of internment, arguing that it is in violation of fundamental human rights. It adds,

All detainees, including security internees, are protected by Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), ratified by both Iraq and the USA, which provides that no one should be arbitrarily detained and that deprivation of liberty must be based on grounds and procedures established by law.

It also insists that all detainees must have access to a court (AI 2008: 13). The prolonged detention of so many individuals, without charge or trial, including children and the elderly has further exacerbated the climate of fear within Iraq.

Iraqi state terrorism

Treatment of detainees in detention facilities run by the Iraqi state is also brutal. Amnesty reported that up to 35,000 detainees were held in prisons under Iraqi control in 2008 and, while under Iraqi law, detainees must be brought before an investigating judge within 24 hours of arrest, many were held for months before this occurred (AI 2008: 12). According to Amnesty, torture and other ill treatment, including of children, was widespread in these facilities, with those suspected of involvement in the insurgency being subjected to regular torture by Iraqi security forces, especially the special forces of the Interior Ministry (AI 2008: 14). In May 2006, for example, a joint team of Iraqi–MNF-I investigators inspected Site Four detention centre in Baghdad, where 1,421 detainees were held. They found that 'detainees had been systematically abused, in some cases amounting to torture' (AI 2008: 14). Despite 57 arrest warrants being issued for those responsible, by the end of March 2007 only one individual was in custody (AI 2008: 14). In 2007 British troops and Iraqi special forces stormed the headquarters of an Iraqi government intelligence agency and found 30 prisoners that were showing signs of having been tortured. In a further case, former prisoners held in pre-trial detention facilities run by the Interior Ministry in 2007 reported to UN staff that they had been subjected to torture, including routine beatings with hosepipes, cables and other implements, prolonged suspension from limbs in contorted and painful positions for extended periods, electric shocks to sensitive parts of the body, the breaking of limbs and the forcing of detainees to sit on sharp objects resulting in serious injuries (AI 2008: 14). Amnesty lists numerous other cases of detainee abuse at the hands of Iraqi security forces. These abuses constitute state terrorism. They are widespread and widely acknowledged and witnessed. This has the effect of instilling terror in Iraqi society. Coalition forces and governments condemn such treatment of Iraqis, yet their own practices of detaining thousands of individuals without granting them basic human rights as guaranteed by treaties that they have signed, have undermined their own credibility in challenging such practices.

Sectarian killings

Much of the violence in Iraq, as Amnesty reports, is the consequence of sectarian violence:

Sunni Muslims living in predominantly Shi'a districts and Shi'a Muslims living in predominantly Sunni neighbourhoods in Baghdad and other towns and cities have been forced by armed groups to leave their homes in a process akin to 'ethnic cleansing'. Some of the armed groups, in particular al-Qa'ida, have also carried out numerous attacks, such as bombings and suicide attacks, in heavily crowded areas, including markets, checkpoints or in places where people queue to buy food or petrol. The intention has been to kill as many civilians as possible. In recent months, al-Qa'ida has reportedly recruited women as volunteer suicide bombers and is said to be recruiting children and training them in secret camps in Iraq. Many of those killed were abducted from their homes or in the streets by the armed groups. Days later their bodies were found in a street or had been taken to morgues by the police. The bodies invariably bore marks of torture, including the use of electric shocks and drills. Some Iraqi newspapers carry daily reports of the discovery of unidentified bodies, most mutilated, and daily incidents of killings by armed groups. Some people perceived to be wealthy, including children, have been kidnapped by armed gangs for ransom. Once ransoms have been paid, those held have generally been released. Other civilians targeted have included members of religious and ethnic minorities, such as Yezidis, Christians, Mandaean-Sabeans and Palestinians; members of professional associations, such as medical doctors and judges; and human rights defenders, including journalists and lawyers.

(AI 2008: 5–6)

This constitutes clear evidence of death squad activity in the region. Death squads are known to have been employed by the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, as the outgoing UN human rights chief, John Pace, explained to the *Independent* in 2006. Pace described the Ministry as 'acting as a rogue element within the government' which is controlled by members of the Shia party (Buncombe and Cockburn 2006). Its minister, Bayan Jabr, and many of its employees, including policemen, are allegedly former members of the Badr Brigade of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, which is the main group responsible for sectarian killings, according to Pace. Pace also described the nature of the killings of thousands of people at the hands of these militias, with many of the killings involving torture. The nature of these killings shows that they are intended to terrorise wider communities, especially non-Shias (Buncombe and Cockburn 2006). The coalition is aware of state terrorism emanating from the Ministry of the Interior, but has failed to either fully investigate or bring an end to these practices.

Excessive use of force

Excessive use of force by the MNF-I has further contributed to the climate of terror in Iraq. Colin Kahl (2007) maintains that the US succeeded in exercising considerable restraint, resulting in far fewer civilian casualties in the invasion and

occupation than would otherwise be expected. Yet Kahl shows that a key strategy of US military operations in the invasion and occupation has been the overwhelming use of force against the enemy. Much of the conflict unfolded in highly populated areas, so deploying the overwhelming use of force against the enemy inevitably resulted in excessive civilian casualties, precisely because of the context. One such example is the assault on Falluja in 2004 which killed hundreds of civilians, many of them women and children. As Herring and Rangwala note the story of events differs between US forces and Iraqis. For American forces, the assault was sparked when four US citizens were killed and dismembered, which was televised on 31 March 2004. For Iraqis, events began unfolding much earlier than this, when anti-US demonstrators were shot by US forces on 28 April 2003. Seventeen people were killed, and at least 70 injured (Herring and Rangwala 2006: 30). A HRW investigation found no conclusive evidence that Iraqis had first fired on US forces, as had been claimed. Furthermore, HRW state that there was 'extensive evidence of multi-caliber bullet impacts that were wider and more sustained than would have been caused by the "precision fire" with which the soldiers maintain they responded', and that 'Witness testimony and ballistics evidence suggest that U.S. troops responded with excessive force to a perceived threat' (HRW 2003). In the US assault on Falluja that followed, the US military killed at least 600 Iraqis. While the marines themselves and the Coalition Provisinal Authority had urged a measured response, Donald Rumsfeld and George Bush were among those who demanded the immediate taking of the city through a 'precise' and 'overwhelming action' to 'pacify' Falluja (Herring and Rangwala 2006: 29). A secular member of the Iraq Inspectors General Council, Adnan Pachachi, described this attack as 'collective punishment' of Falluja (Herring and Rangwala 2006: 30). As Herring and Rangwala report, US Lt Col Brennan Byrne stated that 95 per cent of those killed were military age males and claimed, therefore, that the Marines were precise (Herring and Rangwala 2006: 180). Yet as Herring and Rangwala show, the NGO Iraq Body Count found that 800 people were killed, of whom 572 were civilians, 308 of them women and children (Herring and Rangwala 2006: 180). A brief truce following these incidents did not last and, in November 2004, the US attacked Falluja to capture it by force. The US claimed to have killed 1,200 insurgents, but hundreds of civilians were also killed, and most others, over 200,000, were forced to flee (Herring and Rangwala 2006: 35).

The MNF-I continue to use disproportionate force in response to perceived threats. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, the excessive use of force in counterterrorism can itself be a form of state terrorism. US forces have in recent months fired at unarmed civilians that they argue have come too close to US convoys or have approached patrols too quickly. Amnesty states that it raised such cases with US authorities in 2003, but to date there has been no change in the rules of engagement for US forces. US forces tend to blame Iraqi militias, who they accuse of deliberately attacking Iraqi and MNF-I in inhabited areas so that civilians are likely to be injured or killed when the MNF-I return fire (AI 2008: 7). Examples cited by Amnesty include the case of an air strike on a building near Lake

Tharthar, 120km north-west of Baghdad, in which nine children and six women were killed. Amnesty reports that a US military official expressed his regret, adding that, 'We do not target civilians ... but when our forces are fired upon, as they routinely are, then they have no option but to return fire' (AI 2008: 7). The Amnesty 2008 report *Carnage and Despair: Iraq Five Years On* lists numerous other cases in which MNF-I have used force excessively (AI 2008).

The conduct of coalition forces in the invasions and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq was detrimental to human rights. In Afghanistan the US-led coalition lent its support to former Mujahidin Northern Alliance groups, allied with the new government established in Afghanistan, in its attempts to defeat the Taliban. This amounted to the US lending military backing to groups with appalling human rights records. It has also used munitions, including cluster bombs, which have had devastating consequences for the civilian population, and have intensified fear among the local population. In Iraq, the abuse and torture of detainees, often in front of other Iraqis which intimidates and terrorises them, is entirely consistent with the practices of the US in its Cold War counterinsurgency operations across the South, particularly Operation Phoenix in Vietnam and US complicity in state terrorism by the Latin American national security states, including through Operation Condor. Such abuse, along with the arbitrary arrest and detention without charge or legal representation of thousands of people, often for months or years on end, the disproportionate use of force by the MNF-I, and the failure to adequately challenge the practices of the Iraqi state, has contributed to state terrorism on a considerable scale.

Extraordinary rendition

The use of state terrorism by the US in the 'War on Terror' is not limited to their actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The policy of extraordinary rendition involved the seizure of suspects from one sovereign territory by agents of the CIA, and their transfer to another sovereign territory. This policy was first devised during the 1990s, but was greatly expanded after the commencement of the 'War on Terror', as is clear from evidence given by Michael Scheuer, former chief of the Bin Laden Unit of the CIA, and self-confessed author of the CIA's Rendition Program, to Congress in 2007 (US Congress 2007a). Furthermore, as I will show, numerous European liberal democratic states were party to extraordinary rendition. In the 'War on Terror', victims of extraordinary rendition were transferred to prisons in states known to routinely use torture, including states that the US and other liberal democratic states from the North condemn both as state sponsors of terrorism and as persistent abusers of human rights, including Syria. Extraordinary rendition is, in essence, kidnap. And it closely resembles the disappearances carried out by the security forces of the Latin American national security states during the Cold War, especially as part of Operation Condor. Through painstaking work and the assistance of various sources, including the victims of extraordinary rendition, other journalists, human rights activists, plane-spotters, CIA pilots and CIA operations officers, investigative journalist Stephen Grey has

compiled a comprehensive account of extraordinary rendition in the 'War on Terror' (Grey 2006). Rather than simply repeat his findings here, my purpose is to demonstrate that extraordinary rendition constitutes state terrorism, in which numerous liberal democratic states from the North are involved.

Rendition as state terrorism

There are a number of grounds on which we can deem rendition to be a form of state terrorism. These relate to the manner of the torment of the victims themselves as well as to the wider community surrounding the victim. As Grey argues, rendition became a system of outsourcing torture (Grey 2006: 21). The US and its allies gave the green light to other states actively involved in state terrorism. In those states, the torture of the victims was carried out in prisons where numerous other victims of rendition had also been taken, and was frequently witnessed by those victims. Victims also witnessed the torture of other inmates in those prisons. As discussed in Chapter 3, witnessing torture in this way is deliberately intended to intimidate and terrorise other detainees. This was certainly the case for a number of victims of rendition who found themselves in Syria's Palestinian Branch, which is, according to Grey, Syria's most feared interrogation centre. One victim, Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen, was subjected to physical and psychological torture, which included hearing the screams of other prisoners around him throughout the night and day (Grey 2006: 2–3). Another prisoner, Omar, said that before he was transferred from Pakistan to Syria, he was shown the photograph of Abu Zubaydah, who had been badly beaten, and was told 'If you don't talk, this is what will happen to you' (Grey 2006: 4). Another Canadian, Abdullah Almalki, recalled Abdel Halim, a student arrested in Pakistan, returning from an interrogation session: 'He was treated really bad. He was brought down from the interrogation room wrapped in a blanket. He was brutally beaten and couldn't walk' (Grey 2006: 4).

A number of victims have spoken as much of the psychological torment of rendition as the physical torture they suffered. Maher, for example, in an interview with Grey, said that the psychological torment was worse than the physical abuse:

> I got into a very, very desperate situation, where I wanted to be out of that place at any cost, and that's when I realized, to be in that place, the psychological torture in that place is even worse than the beating, the torture. I was ready to accept anything. I was ready to accept a ten-, twenty-year sentence, and say anything, just to get to another place.
>
> (Grey 2006: 6)

As Grey argues:

> Dragged for months or even years from prison to prison, from country to country, with *no hope of release, no hope of appearing in court*, or *no hope*

of facing concrete charges, rendition for many became a tunnel with no light at the end. ... The system itself was the torture.

(Grey 2006: 21–2)

Evidence gathered by legal representatives that have finally had access to victims of rendition indicates that they have said anything to try to stop the torture and escape detention. The problem with this, as Grey points out, is that it makes determining what the truth is impossible (Grey 2006: 61). The case of Binyam Mohamed is instructive here. Mohamed, an Ethiopian-born man who had spent his teenage years growing up in Washington, DC, and had then moved to the UK, was arrested at Karachi airport in southern Pakistan following a trip to Afghanistan. There began his passage through various secret prisons in numerous states, where he was subjected to frequent torture and interrogation, based on accusations that he was involved in an Al-Qaida dirty bomb plot, as chief accomplice to José Padilla, a US citizen who ultimately did not face any charges over the bomb plot, and was instead tried in a civilian court on much lesser charges. As Grey notes, Mohamed, as a foreigner, was due to face charges in a military trial at Guantánamo (Grey 2006: 46). Mohamed was arrested at Karachi airport on 10 April 2002, and was held in various local prisons until 19 July, when he was transported to Islamabad. He has admitted to his lawyer to briefly attending a training camp in Afghanistan and to attempting to leave Pakistan on a false passport because he had lost his own, but not to the many charges that he confessed to when he was subjected to ongoing torture over a three-year period. Before being transferred to Morocco on 21 July by the CIA, he was interrogated by Pakistani intelligence, British intelligence and the FBI, but at that point all he had confessed to was his name. He was transported to Islamabad on an ordinary domestic Pakistan International Airlines flight. Two days later he was seized by American soldiers who, as he later told his lawyer, Clive Stafford Smith, 'stripped me naked, took photos, put fingers up my anus, and dressed me in a tracksuit. I was then shackled, with earphones, and blindfolded' (Grey 2006: 47). He was then bundled into a plane, now assumed to be the CIA's Gulf Stream Jet used for the rendition of numerous prisoners (Mayer 2005; Priest 2004b). When Clive Stafford Smith finally had access to Mohamed in Guantánamo Bay in May 2005, it took Mohamed three days to recount the last three years, during which he was moved from prison to prison and subjected frequently to torture and interrogation. After Stafford Smith's notes were declassified, he wrote them up and they were a key source for Grey's work. The torture began from the very start, in Karachi. When questioned by the FBI he was told, 'If you don't talk to me, you're going to Jordan. We can't do what we want here; the Pakistanis can't do exactly what we want them to. The Arabs will deal with you'. He was then threatened with the British SAS: 'The SAS know how to deal with people like you.' Pakistani interrogators held a loaded revolver to his chest, and he was also told by British interrogators that he was going to be tortured by Arabs (Grey 2006: 53–4). In Morocco Mohamed was incarcerated in a small prison made up of a cluster of houses outside Rabat. Mohamed said that the worst of the torture

occurred in this prison in Morocco. Mohamed described being tortured by a team of eight people, men and women, both Moroccan and foreign, who spoke English and classical Arabic, as spoken in the Gulf, rather than the Moroccan dialect (Grey 2006: 56). Shortly after arriving he asked one of the guards what type of torture took place there. He replied, 'They'll come in wearing masks and beat you up. They'll beat you with sticks. They'll rape you first, then they'll take a glass bottle, they break the top off, and make you sit on it' (Grey 2006: 56). To be told this is itself psychological torture. Mohamed recalls that the torture began on 6 August and consisted of severe beatings that went on for what Mohamed thinks may have been hours (Grey 2006: 57). After that night he was denied food and the use of the bathroom. He told his lawyer:

> A circle of torture began. ... They'd ask me a question. I'd say one thing. They'd say it was a lie. I'd say another. They'd say it was a lie. I could not work out what they wanted to hear. They'd say there's this guy who says you're the big man in Al Qaida. I'd say it's a lie. They'd torture me. I'd say, okay it's true. They'd say okay, tell us more. I'd say, I don't know more. Then they'd torture me again.
>
> (Grey 2006: 58)

Despite confessing under torture, often because he was told he must plead guilty by his torturers, Mohamed maintains that he could never have had conversations with the high profile Al-Qaida members he was accused of working with, because when he was in Afghanistan and Pakistan his Arabic was so poor that this would have been impossible (Grey 2006: 58). The worst of the torture came on an occasion when Mohamed insulted one of his torturers, Marwan:

> 'Strip him,' shouted Marwan. They cut off my clothes with some kind of doctor's scalpel. I was naked. I tried to put on a brave face. But maybe I was going to be raped. Maybe they'd electrocute me, maybe castrate me. They took the scalpel to my right chest. It was only a small cut, maybe an inch. At first I just screamed ... I was just shocked, I wasn't expecting. ... Then they cut my left chest. This time I didn't want to scream because I knew it was coming. Marwan got agitated at this. 'Just go ahead with the plan,' he said. One of them took my penis in his hand and began to make cuts. He did it once, and they stood still for maybe a minute, watching my reaction. I was in agony, crying, trying desperately to suppress myself, but I was screaming. I remember him seeming to smoke half a cigarette, throw it down, and start another. They must have done this 20 to 30 times, in maybe two hours. There was blood all over. They cut all over my private parts. One of them said it would be better just to cut it off, as I would only breed terrorists. I asked for a doctor. 'The doctor's off,' I was told. But in the end there would be two doctors who did see me and I did get treated.
>
> (Grey 2006: 59)

Mohamed was subjected to this monthly, it was carefully controlled so it would not leave permanent marks. As he told his lawyer, Mohamed eventually said to his captors, 'I will sign anything; confess to anything' (Grey 2006: 59). He was subjected to other forms of torture as well, including extremely loud music which he found excruciating, experimentation with drugs in his food and the administering of a drug through an intravenous drip, and attempts to tempt him with pornography and with half-naked girls that were brought to his cell (Grey 2006: 59). As with numerous other victims of rendition, Mohamed maintains that the mental torture was worse than the physical. 'I think I came to several emotional breakdowns in this time, but who was there to turn to … I never saw the sun, not even once. I never saw any human being except the guards and my tormentors' (Grey 2006: 59).

This ongoing torment of not knowing the outcome, not knowing if there is any end, not having any access to legal representatives, or people beyond one's captors, not only affects the victims themselves. The family and friends of the victim also suffer the agony of not knowing where their loved ones are, or what their fate is. For Binyam Mohamed's family in Washington, DC, his disappearance was traumatic. They had last heard from him in the spring of 2001. In the month of his arrest they were visited by FBI agents who said that he was in custody in Pakistan, after which the FBI refused to give any more information of his whereabouts for the next four years (Grey 2006: 46–9). Disappearances of any kind have the effect of instilling fear in and tormenting the family, friends and other contacts of the victims. As knowledge of the policy of rendition has trickled out, it has a further terrorising effect among vulnerable communities. On release, or on the rare occasions that detainees are allowed visitors, an even wider community bears witness to the torture, further intensifying a sense of fear among those known to the victim, or others who may have had contact, however fleeting, with organisations considered a threat in the 'War on Terror'

EU states and rendition

Fourteen EU states have been involved in US rendition programmes, at least by knowing what was going on, and, in the case of the UK, by handing over information about its residents and former residents that has allegedly led to renditions and torture; in the cases of the UK, Ireland, Portugal and Greece, by providing stopovers for CIA aeroplanes; in the cases of Spain, Turkey, Germany and Cyprus, by providing staging posts for rendition operations; in the cases of Italy, Sweden, Bosnia and Macedonia, by allowing the rendition of their citizens; and in the cases of Poland and Romania, by allegedly allowing the US to run secret prisons on their territory (Grey and Cobain 2006). Thus elites in numerous EU states, the US, and states in the South to which terror suspects are rendered, are tied together by a common cause which transcends state boundaries.

In response to pressure from investigators in various European countries, once knowledge of the rendition programme had trickled out, implicating the security services of various European states, the European Parliament established a

Temporary Committee on 18 January 2006 to investigate 'the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners' (EU 2007b: 3). The findings of the report produced by the Committee, which pays tribute to the efforts of journalists and NGOs who have worked to bring the details of the rendition programme to light, indicate how embroiled numerous European states have been in the rendition of 'many people' (EU 2007b: 33). The report stresses that member states 'cannot circumvent the requirements imposed on them by European Community and international law by allowing other countries' intelligence services, which are subject to less stringent legal provisions, to work on their territory' (EU 2007b: 4). It also reminds them of the principle of the inviolability of human dignity enshrined in international human rights law, and in particular the right to life, the right to freedom from torture and inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, the right to liberty and security, the right to protection in the event of removal, expulsion or extradition and the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial. It states:

> extraordinary rendition and secret detention involve multiple violations of human rights, in particular violations of the right to liberty and security, the freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, the right to an effective remedy, and, in extreme cases, the right to life ... in some cases, where rendition leads to secret detention, it constitutes enforced disappearance.
>
> (EU 2007b: 4)

It also reminds member states that there is no derogation from the law which prohibits the use of torture (EU 2007b: 4).

The report states that it has obtained evidence of an informal meeting that took place on 7 December 2005 between EU and NATO foreign ministers, including Condoleezza Rice, and which confirms that member states had knowledge of the policy of rendition (EU 2007b: 5). It expresses its 'outrage' that on 3 May 2006 a further meeting was held between the European Council's Working Party on Public International Law, the Transatlantic Relations Working Party, and senior representatives of the US Department of State, with the aim of setting up 'a joint "framework" with the US on standards for the rendition of terrorism suspects' (EU 2007b: 8). The full documentation pertaining to these meetings has not been released to Parliament by the Council and its Presidency, and the report calls for the immediate release of the relevant documentation (EU 2007b: 5–8). It condemns governments of EU states for not asking the US administration for clarifications regarding the existence of secret prisons outside US territory, and urges them not to take any action against officers that have disclosed details of their involvement in rendition to the Committee (EU 2007b: 6). The report notes that various senior officials have refused to appear before the Committee, including Director of the European Police Office, Max-Peter Ratzel, and former and current Secretaries General of NATO Lord Robertson and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. Others have given inadequate and incomplete answers to its questions, including EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Gijs de Vries (EU 2007b: 8–9).

The report provides valuable insight into the scale of the rendition programme, although it notes that not all of the flights were necessarily used for rendition:

> At least 1,245 flights operated by the CIA flew into European airspace or stopped over at European airports between the end of 2001 and the end of 2005, to which should be added an unspecified number of military flights for the same purpose.
>
> (EU 2007b: 11)

The report condemns member states for 'relinquishing their control over their airspace and airports and turning a blind eye or admitting flights operated by the CIA which, on some occasions, were being used for extraordinary rendition' (EU 2007b: 11). It also condemns the participation of European agents in the interrogation of victims of rendition 'because it represents a deplorable legitimisation of that type of illegal procedure, even where those participating in the interrogation do not bear direct responsibility for the kidnapping, detention, torture, ill-treatment of the victims' (EU 2007b: 11). In other words, the Committee considers such knowledge and involvement as complicity – complicity in a policy which I have shown to be a form of state terrorism. It also notes that the fact that the families of victims are kept in complete ignorance of the fate of their relatives is deplorable (EU 2007b: 11).

Outlined in the report are details of the involvement of specific EU member states. In relation to Italy, it shows that a carabinieri marshal and various officials from the Italian military, security and intelligence services (SISMI) were involved in the extraordinary rendition of Abu Omar – an Egyptian who had been granted asylum in Italy – on 17 February 2003, and flown to Egypt where he has been held incommunicado and tortured ever since. It concludes that the SISMI had lied before the Committee when stating that no Italian agents had been involved, and found it unlikely that the Italian government was unaware of Omar's fate. It also notes that Italian journalists investigating the case were illegally pursued, had telephone calls tapped and computers confiscated. Another Italian citizen, Abou Elkassim Britel, was rendered from Pakistan, and the report finds that the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs was in 'constant cooperation' with foreign secret services concerning his case. It also found that 46 stopovers were made by CIA-operated aircraft at Italian airports. Some of the aircraft in question are known to have been involved in the rendition of Bisher Al-Raw, Jamil El-Banna, Abou Elkassim Britel, Khaled El-Masri, Binyam Mohammed, Abu Omar and Maher Arar (EU 2007b: 12–13).

With reference to the UK, the Committee indicates that evidence it obtained shows MI5 to have supplied erroneous information to an unspecified government which contributed to the abduction of Bisher Al-Rawi and Jamil El-Banna, residents of the UK who were seized by Gambian authorities in November 2005 and turned over to US agents, who flew them to Afghanistan and then on to Guantánamo. It also condemns the UK for its role in the 'multiple extraordinary

rendition' of Binyan Mohammed and expresses its deep concern at his lawyer's account 'of the most horrific torture endured'. Given that UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw conceded in December 2005 that UK intelligence officials met Mohammed when he was detained in Pakistan, it concludes that the questions put to him by Moroccan officials were likely to have been inspired by information provided by British intelligence. It also expressed its 'outrage' at the legal opinion of Michael Wood, former legal advisor to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, that 'receiving or possessing information extracted under torture, in so far as there is no direct participation in the torture, is not per se prohibited by the UN Convention Against Torture' (EU 2007b: 15). The report states that 170 stopovers were made by CIA-operated aircraft in the UK, 'which on many occasions came from or were bound for countries linked with extraordinary rendition circuits and the transfer of detainees'. Some of the aircraft in question are known to have been involved in the rendition of Bisher Al-Rawi, Jamil El-Banna, Abou Elkassim Britel, Khaled El-Masri, Binyam Mohammed, Abu Omar and Maher Arar (EU 2007b: 14–15).

In the case of Germany, the report shows that German authorities had knowledge of the illegal abduction of a German citizen, Khaled El-Masri. A Turkish citizen and resident of Germany, Murat Kurnaz, arrested in Pakistan, was taken to two US units in Afghanistan and Pakistan and then flown on to Guantánamo, having been tortured in all locations. He was eventually released without charge in 2006. The Committee received evidence that the US made an offer in 2002 to release him but the German government declined, despite German officials interviewing him twice at Guantánamo. Evidence also implies he was under surveillance by German intelligence, and that information was passed to his captors. The German Federal Criminal Police Office passed information to the FBI which facilitated the detention of Mohammed Zammar, rendered from Casablanca airport in Morocco. The Committee also has evidence that the rendition of six Algerians was planned at the US European Command military base near Stuttgart. CIA-operated aircraft made 336 stopovers in Germany. The aircraft in question are known to have been involved in the rendition of Bisher Al-Rawi, Jamil El-Banna, Abou Elkassim Britel, Khaled El-Masri, Binyam Mohammed, Abu Omar and Maher Arar (EU 2007b: 15–17).

The European Parliament's Commission also criticised the Swedish government for allowing the return of two Egyptian nationals, Ahmed Agiza and Mohammed El-Zari, seeking asylum in Sweden, to Cairo, with nothing more than diplomatic assurances that they would not be subjected to torture or other inhuman treatment. Swedish authorities allowed the US to provide an aircraft for their transfer and, as Grey notes, they were accompanied on the return flight by a Swedish security official and an interpreter. In Egypt they were handed over to Egyptian security services and subjected to torture, including electric shock (Grey 2006: 30–1). The European Parliament's Committee upheld the finding by the UN Human Rights Commission that Sweden had breached the absolute ban on torture, and it concluded that the decision for the expulsion of the two men was taken at the highest executive level, with no grounds for appeal (EU 2007b: 17–18).

While there is no evidence to suggest that Austria was directly implicated in rendition, some doubt remains over whether Austrian authorities cooperated in the rendition of Masaad Omer Behari. The Committee condemns the Austrian government for failing to see through a judicial procedure against him in 2002, which was subsequently closed. The report indicates that this might have prevented his rendition in 2003. It also condemns the government for failing to appear before the Committee (EU 2007b: 18–19).

The Committee found that the EU Police Mission was incorporated into the Ministry of the Interior of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and was involved in the work of the Macedonian Security and Counter-Espionage Service at the time when Khaled El-Masri, a German citizen, was abducted at the border-crossing of Tabanovce in 2003, illegally held in Skopje and then transported to Afghanistan where he was held until 2004 and subjected to degrading and inhuman treatment. The Committee expresses regret that Macedonian authorities have failed to fully investigate (EU 2007b: 22–3). Bosnia and Herzegovina is, as the Committee point out, the only country not to deny its involvement in rendition. Four Algerian citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and two residents were abducted in Sarajevo in 2002, handed over to US soldiers and flown to Guantánamo, where they remain without trial or legal guarantees (EU 2007b: 23).

The report condemns the following countries for allowing stopovers of CIA-operated aircraft in their territory – aircraft which are known to have been used in the rendition of numerous individuals: Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Cyprus, Belgium and Turkey. It also condemns Belgium and Turkey for their lack of cooperation with the Committee (EU 2007b: 19–22). Finally, the report condemns those countries that have allowed the existence of secret detention facilities on their soil, specifically Poland, Romania and Kosovo, all of which have failed to fully cooperate with the investigation (EU 2007b: 24–8).

In its conclusions, the Committee 'notes the reports by reputable media operators that extraordinary rendition, illegal detention, and systematic torture involving many people is continuing', and adds that 'considering the declaration by the current US government that the use of extraordinary rendition and secret places of detention will be continued', the Committee calls for 'an EU–US counter-terrorism summit to seek an end to such inhumane and illegal practices' (EU 2007b: 33). A Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight and the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the US House of Representatives on 17 April 2007 (US Congress 2007a), provided insight into the divide among US officials from different sectors of the US administration on the findings of the EU investigation. Congressional Representative, Bill Delahunt, for example, condemned extraordinary rendition at the hearing, stating that it was 'utterly inconsistent with our broader foreign policy goals of promoting democracy and the rule of law', that renditions 'appear to violate our obligations under the UN Convention Against Torture', and that 'they have undermined our very commitment to fundamental American values' (US Congress 2007a: 2).

Others did not share Delahunt's view, including Michael Scheuer, former chief of the Bin Laden Unit of the CIA, and self-confessed author of the CIA's Rendition Program (US Congress 2007a: 12). He stated that it was established in 1995 and was intended to 'take men off the street who were planning or had been involved in attacks of the United States or its allies'. He claims that interrogation was never the intended goal of rendition under the Clinton administration, and that this only changed under the Bush administration, when the national security team 'wanted to use US officers to interrogate captured Al Qaida fighters'. He maintained that it has and continues to be aimed at senior members of Al-Qaida, and not rank-and-file members, and that for every individual that became a target, a written brief explaining the intelligence had to be prepared by him and his successors. He argues that the policy 'has been the single most effective counterterrorism operation ever conducted by the United States government', and that 'Americans are safer today because of the program'. On the use of torture he stated:

> I would not, however, be surprised if their treatment was not up to US standards. This is a matter of no concern as the Rendition Program's goal was to protect Americans, and the rendered fighters delivered to Middle Eastern governments are now either dead or in places from which they cannot harm America.
>
> (US Congress 2007a: 12–14)

As has been noted previously, there are numerous problems with these arguments. First, they fail to respond to the obligations of the US under its own, and international, law. Second, it is simply assumed that those captured are guilty of involvement in terrorism, based on intelligence which may or may not be reliable, and little attempt is made to actually try the individuals in question to determine their guilt. Even if attempts are made to try them, any evidence presented is both inadmissible and unreliable because it is likely to have been obtained through torture. It is therefore impossible to prove their involvement in activities that would 'harm the US or its allies'.

Numerous liberal democratic states from the North were involved in state terrorism through their tacit or overt support for the policy of extraordinary rendition pursued by the US as part of the 'War on Terror'. This practice was little different from Operation Condor, enacted by various Latin American national security states with US cooperation during the Cold War. If there is any difference, it is in the sheer size and scope of the rendition programme, which involved the collaboration with the US of various EU states and numerous Middle Eastern allies, all with appalling human rights records.

Conclusion

The use and sponsorship of terrorism by the US and many of its liberal democratic allies increased following 9/11. This resulted primarily from the neoconservative

policies of the Bush administration of establishing neoliberalism in the South by whatever means, including armed coercion in the form of regime change. Indeed the invasions and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, and especially Iraq, were enacted with elite interests very much in mind. Similarly, the Bush administration was willing to use any means, no matter how repressive, to counter perceived terrorist threats. Even where there was no evidence of any link to terrorism, the US in particular articulated threats to its elite interests, and crucially to the interests of global capitalism, in relation to terrorism and extremism. In the case of Haiti the US lent tacit approval to those involved in an illegal coup, by doing nothing to stop it, despite knowing of the planning of it and of the likely violence that would ensue. US priorities have been to buttress neoliberalism, no matter how anti-democratic the actions that would help secure this outcome. The erroneous argument that Al-Qaida was active in the tri-border region of Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina was also made to justify increased military activity by the US in Latin America, even though various political figures from the region argued that this is the least likely means by which serious economic, social and political ills will be overcome. The threat of terrorism was also invoked to justify ongoing military aid from the US to Colombia, despite ample evidence that the military forces of Colombia are embroiled in state terrorism against citizens involved in legitimate, democratic activities. The British, too, continued to supply military assistance to Colombia despite the widespread use of terrorism by Colombian forces and their paramilitary associates. Support was also given by the US and UK to numerous states known to use terror and human rights abuses widely among their own and other populations, in the name of the 'War on Terror', including Russia, numerous African and Middle Eastern states, and the Philippines.

State terrorism has been used widely by the US and its allies as part of the 'War on Terror', within and beyond Afghanistan and Iraq. The evidence of the use and sponsorship of terrorism by the US, UK and other liberal democratic allies in this chapter demonstrates continuity in the covert practices deployed by defence and intelligence agencies of these countries in the South. Practices used by British forces against suspected Irish Republican Army members in the 1970s were used by British forces in Basra, despite having been outlawed. Torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment was not only used by US intelligence agents and members of the armed forces, again intended to terrorise a wider audience, but there was also considerable effort expended by numerous senior officials in the Bush administration and US Department of Defense to both legitimise and promote practices against suspects for whom no credible evidence of wrongdoing has been made available. The powerful testimony of some of the 'War on Terror's' victims adds further weight to the argument that torture and other forms of inhumane and degrading treatment rarely secure credible intelligence, and prejudice any chance of ever discovering the truth of the supposed illicit activities of those subjected to these methods. Many of those methods are drawn directly from US practices in Vietnam and from US training of its own and Latin American armed forces in the Cold War. The US orchestrated and participated in covert networks comprised of the intelligence and military establishments of various states,

with the explicit aim of terrorising, torturing and murdering opponents in the Cold War. The US repeated these practices in the 'War on Terror' and succeeded in drawing together numerous states, including Middle Eastern ones renowned for their poor human rights records, and liberal democratic ones from the North who tend to claim the moral high ground in relation to human rights, to collaborate in extraordinary rendition. Meanwhile, the dominant foreign policy discourses of those liberal democratic states continued to emphasise democracy promotion, freedom, liberty and respect for human rights. Remarkably, even state terrorism, including torture and extraordinary rendition, was presented as being a necessary part of the efforts of these states to fight terrorism, and to uphold and promote liberal democracy.

7 Conclusion

This study has attempted to show how widely state terrorism has been used and sponsored in the South by liberal democratic states from the North in the service of elite interests. State terrorism has been deployed on the assumption that it would help secure access to, and dominance of, resources and markets in the South and, in the latter half of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, to entrench neoliberalism. Yet its use by Northern democracies has tended to be absent from most terrorism scholarship within IR, as well as in various other social science disciplines. This has very little to do with how state terrorism is defined since, as I have demonstrated, many of the existing definitions of terrorism do not preclude the state as a potential perpetrator of terrorism. Rather, the absence of state terrorism from much debate relates to the motivations of scholars, and the methodological problems associated with analysing state terrorism. The combination of these reasons has been a powerful force in shaping the parameters of debate, resulting in state terrorism by liberal democracies being excluded. Dominant discourses on terrorism have frequently had the effect of legitimising the foreign policy practices of liberal democratic states from the North, despite their complicity in state terrorism. My goal in this chapter is to show that there are important continuities, dating back to early European imperialism, in the foreign policy objectives of those states, which are driven by elite interests; in the assumed functionality of state terrorism; and in the forms that state terrorism takes. In so doing I will address the question of the relationship between state terrorism and the various phases of neoliberalism, discussed in Chapter 1. I then outline the contribution of this study and explore its implications, with specific reference to the emerging field of Critical Terrorism Studies, and the recent call to 'bring the state back into terrorism studies'. I attempt to demonstrate the significance of historical materialism for enhancing our understanding of the use of state terrorism by liberal democratic states from the North, showing that such an approach goes some considerable way in overcoming the dearth of research on state terrorism by liberal democratic states from the North in the South. I then evaluate the limitations of the research, outlining what a future research agenda might focus on. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications of the research for policymakers, academics and activist scholars. For policymakers this includes a reflection on the normative implications of the study, particularly in relation to state

terrorism, as well as on the prospects for the ending of state terrorism. The normative implications are also relevant to academics, specifically in terms of the marginalisation of normative approaches from IR. As I will argue, such approaches are both pertinent and necessary. For activist scholars, suggestions are made in relation to how scholarship might challenge state terrorism by liberal democratic states from the North.

The North and state terrorism in the South

While there have been significant power shifts in international relations over the last four centuries, there are two threads that run continuously through this period. The first of these is the foreign policy aims of states from the North, which have been driven by elite interests. As I have shown, early European imperial powers were driven by the aim of acquiring territory to increase their global presence and dominance, and to secure access to resources in the interests of the economic elite. This same goal drove early American imperialism. While contemporary liberal democratic states from the North are not interested in acquiring territory, they are still motivated by a wish to ensure access to and dominance of resources and markets in the South for the benefit of elites. This in turn is intended to maintain their positions of power in terms of their political, economic, military and ideological strength. I have traced this continuity through European colonialism, British imperialism, early American imperialism and US hegemony in the latter half of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. I have shown that from the end of the Second World War, as the remaining European colonial powers finally rescinded the last of their colonies, the US led its allies from the North in efforts to increase and sustain access to resources and markets in the South, which was achieved through the spread of global capitalism and efforts to entrench neoliberalism. I have attempted to develop a framework for explaining the configuration of actors in this process, and have shown that the US state and US capital benefited most from this process, but that other states and other national fractions of capital, particularly those from the North, also exercised agency and reaped considerable benefits for their elites.

The second thread running through the last four centuries is the persistent use of coercion, including state terrorism, by states from the North in the South, in pursuit of their elite interests. Despite assumptions emanating from the liberal democratic peace thesis that increasing democratisation should result in a reduction in the use of violence, this study has shown that state terrorism has continued to be an important foreign policy tool for liberal democratic states from the North. I have tried to show that there has consistently been a material aim underlying the use of state terrorism by Northern states in the South. For the most part, state terrorism by early European imperialists was used to ensure a ready supply of slave labour or forced wage labour, guaranteeing the ongoing extraction of resources for the imperial elites. As the European and early American imperialists faced opposition to imperial rule in their colonies, terror was intended as a means by which to curtail opposition. Indirectly it was therefore meant to ensure

continued access to and extraction of resources for the empire. Much state terrorism by liberal democratic states from the North in the South during the twentieth century occurred in an attempt to defeat movements that posed a challenge to the interests of Northern elites. In the case of the French and British in their former colonies, notably Algeria and Kenya respectively, state terrorism was used in an attempt to defeat independence movements that would finally end French and British dominance over the resources and markets of those states. US use and sponsorship of state terrorism throughout the Cold War was similarly aimed at defeating political movements that would threaten dominant access by US economic elites to resources and markets in the South.

There was an important shift in the strategies used by liberal democratic states from the North, led by the US, at the end of the Cold War. From then on, the US favoured legitimation strategies. This involved securing popular endorsement for neoliberalism in the South, in collaboration with other liberal democratic states from the North, and with considerable input from the IFIs. Neoliberalism was championed as a means by which to bring people out of poverty. As I have shown, it is far from proven that neoliberalism has this effect and, in the case of Haiti, the reverse is true. Neoliberalism has been detrimental to Haiti's majority poor population. Scholars such as David Harvey (2005b, 2006) have gone much further than this study has in exploring the pernicious effects of neoliberalism, arguing that its impact is devastating for the poor and marginalised. I have shown that coercion, including state terrorism, by no means disappeared from the foreign policy arsenals of liberal democratic states from the North, particularly the US, after the Cold War, and continued to be used where legitimation was deemed unlikely to secure the outcomes required. After 9/11 there was a resurgence in the use of coercion, and an increase in the use of state terrorism by the US and its allies. The use of coercion, particularly in the case of the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq, was intended to establish a neoliberal democratic state in the Middle East that would lend itself to the expansion of US-supported capital in the region, would secure US access to oil, and would help to transform much of the Middle East along the same lines.

As discussed in Chapter 1, neoliberalism has evolved through various phases, referred to by Adam Tickell and Jamie Peck as proto-neoliberalism up until the end of the 1970s, roll-back neoliberalism during the 1980s, and roll-out neoliberalism from the later 1980s onwards (Tickell and Peck 2003: 165–6). This study indicates that there has been some limited relationship between the use of state terrorism in the South, particularly by the US, and these various neoliberal phases. During neoliberalism's incipient phase, the US was involved in the widespread use of state terrorism, primarily to defeat movements considered a threat to US elite interests, rather than to entrench neoliberalism. In Indochina, US coercion and state terrorism was aimed at defeating supposed communist movements. In Latin America, the US backed various military coups in the 1950s and 1960s in cases where US elite interests were threatened by proposed reforms aimed at wealth redistribution, as in Guatemala. It was during the roll-back phase that the relationship between the use of state terrorism and neoliberalism was the

strongest. The coup which overthrew Allende in Chile in 1973, and the pursuant support of Pinochet's regime by the US, was the first indication of an explicit link between the use and support of state terrorism and efforts to entrench neoliberalism. From the late 1970s and into the 1980s, this relationship continued, and US backing of repressive regimes against democratic movements was accompanied by significant investment by various organs of the US state in neoliberalisation processes in the region. In other words, roll-back was achieved, in part, through the literal destruction of political movements, as well as potential political opponents, which would stand in the way of neoliberalism. In this regard, the use of state terrorism has been a significant tool in what Harvey refers to as accumulation by dispossession, since it has been used extensively to exploit the productive capacity of land and resources including by terrorising local populations into giving up land, and to securing the property rights of elites, frequently with impunity. During this phase the US, particularly under the Reagan administration, provided considerable levels of financial and military support for regimes engaged in efforts to wipe out actual and potential opposition. This was particularly the case in Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua, and was also manifest in ongoing backing for Pinochet and for the Argentine military junta. But military investment was matched by financial investment, and the use of the IFIs to implement structural adjustment policies in the region, as the cases of El Salvador and Haiti indicate. As shown in Chapter 5, there was a massive influx of transnational corporations throughout the 1970s, the IFIs had been involved in efforts to neoliberalise Haitian finance throughout the late 1970s and 1980s and, by 1984, Haiti had become dependent on the US for 65 per cent of its imports. Towards the late 1980s, US support for state terrorism in the region waned, not least because of the worldwide condemnation of US backing of repressive regimes. This can also be explained, at least in part, by the fact that the roll-out phase was underway. The destruction of Keynesian institutions had been largely successful, and the US and its liberal democratic allies were embarking on the establishment of institutions to ensure the entrenchment of neoliberalism, as the case of El Salvador shows. The bedding down of neoliberalism in the 1990s can explain why there was less recourse to state terrorism during this period. As this work has shown, state terrorism was not entirely absent during the roll-out period. The US still lent tacit support to the coups in Haiti which would result in outcomes more favourable to neoliberalism. Because of the functionality of state terrorism as a tool for accumulation by dispossession, even where there is a generalised trend in which legitimation efforts dominate processes of entrenching neoliberalism, it will still be used in specific circumstances if this is deemed the most efficient way of securing access to and dominance of resources and markets.

The use of state terrorism is contingent on many factors, so even when there is evidence of specific trends, states will sometimes engage in state terrorism to serve specific objectives in certain contexts, and these will not necessarily be linked to the material interests of elites. This is illustrated well by the use of state terrorism under the Bush administration. The invasion and occupation of Iraq was intended to establish a neoliberal state in the region. Yet many of the

incidents of state terrorism, particularly extraordinary rendition, were not directly linked to efforts to entrench neoliberalism. The evidence presented here would indicate that they resulted from long histories of military and intelligence forces using such practices in the face of certain perceived threats and obstacles, and the subsequent institutionalisation of those practices within the context of the 'War on Terror', aided and abetted by attitudes within the administration that those repressive practices were necessary to defeat the terrorist threat. We should guard against assuming, therefore, that the use of state terrorism by liberal democratic states from the North is always a tool for the neoliberalisation of the political economy. While there have been phases during which state terrorism was largely used to this end, particularly during the roll-back phase, its use can also stem from, and be intended to serve, other purposes. This includes securing the state from perceived external threats, as was the case in the 'War on Terror', where it was aimed at acquiring intelligence in relation to terrorist threats, and preventing terrorism through the detention, interrogation, torture and rendition of terror suspects.

Not only has the use of state terrorism by Northern liberal democratic states been continuous, but I have also attempted to show that there are significant continuities in the forms that state terrorism takes. Examples include, but are not limited to, the use of waterboarding, strategic aerial bombardment, torture programmes and disappearances. US agents used waterboarding against opponents in the Philippines in the early 1900s. In the 'War on Terror' a century later CIA agents used it against terror suspects, and attempted to legitimise it. Strategic aerial bombardment was used by the British against Iraqi villages as a means of terrorising the local population and undermining support for the insurgency in 1920, it was used to terrorise the German population in the hope of undermining support for Hitler during the Second World War, it was used extensively by the US in Korea in the 1950s, again to terrorise the population, and it was also hoped by some of the planners during the Gulf War that the bombing campaign by the US and its allies would terrorise the population sufficiently to effect regime change. Operation Phoenix, devised by the US in Vietnam, spawned numerous comparable programmes in Latin America during the Cold War, backed by the US, including Operation Condor. The policy of extraordinary rendition, established by the US and supported by numerous liberal democratic allies from the North, many of which have been directly involved, echoes the widespread use of disappearances by numerous Latin American states, with US backing, during the Cold War. Torture has been an ongoing method of state terrorism practised widely by the agents of liberal democratic states from the North, and we witnessed growing support for its use among senior US officials in the name of the 'War on Terror'.

The objectives underlying the foreign policies of now liberal democratic states from the North have changed little since those states first embarked upon their imperial adventures. Elites continue to be driven by the goal of securing access to and maintaining control over resources and markets in the South. And while there has been a greater emphasis on achieving those objectives in recent

years through legitimation rather than coercion, use of state terrorism continues to feature as a means by which elite interests are served, particularly where legitimation is deemed unlikely to succeed. There has similarly been little change in the forms that state terrorism takes, with liberal democratic states from the North continuing to use and refine methods that have been around for centuries. If there is any significant change, it is in the levels of collaboration between these states in the deployment of state terrorism. Whereas previously they have tended to act in isolation, or in collaboration with just one or two allies, extraordinary rendition as practised in the 'War on Terror' brought together dozens of states, many of them liberal democratic states from the North, in the use of methods that violate international law and result in considerable costs to human rights.

Research contribution

This study has sought to make a number of significant contributions to scholarship. These include: the conceptualisation of state terrorism developed in Chapter 2, where state terrorism is explored in relation to existing understandings of state terrorism, and in relation to other forms of state repression; the situating of state terrorism within a much longer history than has previously been attempted by scholars concerned with state terrorism by liberal democratic states from the North, focusing on its role in the globalisation of the political economy in the service of elite interests; the exploration of practices witnessed in the 'War on Terror' to determine whether they constitute state terrorism; and finally the detailed empirical analysis in defence of the argument.

The conceptualisation of state terrorism that this study offers is intended to make a contribution to scholarship, since it explores state terrorism with reference to existing definitions of terrorism and shows that existing definitions are more than adequate to encompass acts of terrorism perpetrated by state agents. I have shown that it is the instrumentality of state terrorism that distinguishes it from other forms of state repression. I have examined state terrorism in relation to international law, and shown that it arises through acts that violate international law, specifically the deliberate targeting of individuals that the state has a duty to protect. Neither definitions of terrorism nor international law pertaining to human rights present significant obstacles for scholars of state terrorism. Rather the challenge is determining whether acts perpetrated by state agents can be labelled state terrorism, and whether they are part of a wider institutionalised policy. I have attempted to demonstrate how we can overcome some of the challenges associated with identifying state terrorism by situating specific acts of state violence within a much broader context. This involves analysing the circumstances surrounding the events in question, both at the local level, and in relation to other events and broader policies and strategies. Finally, I have demonstrated why the numerous acts of state terrorism explored in this study are defined as such, with reference to the preceding conceptualisation of state terrorism.

This study has attempted to make a significant and original contribution to debate precisely because it has situated the use of state terrorism by liberal

democratic states from the North within a much longer history and context. Initial contributions from scholars associating with the emerging field of Critical Terrorism Studies called for a greater focus on state terrorism, particularly as used and sponsored by liberal democratic states from the North. Eric Herring argued that class, as well as the state, should be brought back into terrorism studies (Herring 2008). This study has attempted to answer both of those calls. It has been informed by historical materialist approaches to IR, which I have argued provide both a useful analytical framework and an explanation for the use of state terrorism. In this regard it has not just attempted to bring the state back into terrorism studies, by putting state terrorism squarely on the agenda, but has also attempted to analyse state terrorism as a tool in the service of dominant class interests, and specifically as a means by which to globalise the political economy. This study therefore updates the work of Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman (1979a), to assess the involvement of liberal democratic states from the North in state terrorism in the South, taking into account the end of the Cold War and the impact of 9/11. Furthermore, whereas much of the work carried out on Western or Northern state terrorism to date has tended to focus on the Cold War period, this study has situated state terrorism by liberal democratic states from the North within a much longer historical context, tracing the development of its use as an instrument in the neoliberalisation of the global political economy, from early European colonialism up until the 'War on Terror'.

Finally, the work has tried to make a substantial empirical contribution. With reference to many declassified documents, the study has provided a comprehensive account of the widespread use of state terrorism by liberal democratic states from the North, particularly those with colonial legacies. It has also explored recent cases of violence in which state agents have been involved to determine whether those acts constitute state terrorism. It has found that numerous practices in the 'War on Terror' were consistent with definitions of state terrorism, and should be designated as such, particularly cases of torture and abuse of detainees in the 'War on Terror' by US, British and other allied forces, and, most especially, the policy of extraordinary rendition. The research has also demonstrated that, despite assumptions to the contrary, many liberal democratic states from the North that claim to uphold human rights have been complicit in rendition, and are therefore guilty of state terrorism.

The limitations of the research and future research agendas

While I have attempted to show the extent of state terrorism as used and sponsored by Northern states over several centuries, and have offered many empirical examples to support the argument, this study is by no means exhaustive. There is scope for a much more comprehensive study of colonial state terrorism by numerous European powers, including the UK and, building on work by Mark Curtis, France, Germany, Belgium, Portugal and Spain. This work has examined the use of state terrorism alongside efforts to entrench neoliberalism in the latter half of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. In this chapter I have

reflected on the relationship between state terrorism and the different phases of neoliberalism. This could be extended, and future research might explore state terrorism in relation to the latest phase of neoliberalism following the 2008 global economic crisis. This study has begun to explore state terrorism in the 'War on Terror', with specific reference to the invasion and occupation of Iraq and extraordinary rendition. But there are many examples of violence by agents of liberal democratic states from the North that have not been analysed. Further work is needed to determine whether such acts constitute state terrorism. This will depend largely on access to data regarding these cases. Work by human rights organisations, human rights lawyers and investigative journalists has been crucial for the analysis in this study, and future work will depend largely on collaboration with such activists, certainly until the time that official documents are declassified. Scholars are faced with considerable challenges in accessing data on human rights violations in the 'War on Terror', but this should not deter further work.

This study has shown that international organisations including the ICRC and UN, as well as leading human rights NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have played an important role in monitoring, exposing and challenging state terrorism by liberal democratic states from the North. Building on the findings of this study, further work could explore the efforts of such institutions, often in collaboration with fractions of the states that have been complicit in state terrorism, to uphold international law and prevent human rights violations by military forces and their associates. Such work could assess the efficacy of measures in place to prevent human rights violations, including state terrorism. The extent to which state terrorism could be prevented using existing international legal mechanisms and structures could also be explored. Work to theorise the relations between different factions within states in relation to state terrorism and its prevention is also called for.

Implications for policymakers, academics and activist scholars

This research has important implications for policymakers, academics and activist scholars. In policy terms coercion is usually justified as a means of increasing security against specific threats. Similarly, when use and support for state terrorism are admitted by state officials, it too is couched in terms of overcoming perceived threats to the national interest. Yet this study has shown that much state terrorism by liberal democratic states from the North has little to do with security and is, instead, primarily, and illegitimately, a means of protecting the interests of elites. Many of the cases explored here show that state terrorism was used either to bring about slave or forced wage labour, particularly in colonial times, or to defeat political, democratic movements that pose a threat to the interests of elites, as in the cases of efforts to prevent decolonisation and efforts to suppress democratic movements during the Cold War. State terrorism in both cases is intended to help establish the stable conditions required by elites to ensure control of resources and

markets. This stability, however, is illegitimate, because it is founded on state terrorism, which involves the targeting of individuals that the state has a duty to protect. Even in cases where state terrorism, particularly torture, has been used in the name of security, rather than for any obvious material gain, this research has shown that the intelligence that it is assumed can be secured is unlikely to be of any value. Indeed, in the 'War on Terror', the use of torture has done little more than undermine the legitimacy of those states complicit in its use. In security terms, as discussed in the study, it has also contributed to increasing resentment and instability for Northern democracies. Many policymakers would accept this proposition if presented with the evidence, so it is important that academic work engages policymakers on these issues.

At the time of writing, Barack Obama had recently won the 2008 US Presidential elections. Many were hopeful that his election would bring about significant changes in US foreign policy, including bringing to a halt the systematic erosion of human rights by the Bush administration. It is too soon to say what impact Obama will have in this regard, and this may depend, to some degree, on wider structural factors, in particular the future of American power in world politics. As this study has shown, and as Dana Priest has discussed, under the Bush administration much US foreign policy activity previously exercised through civil functions of government was transferred to the Pentagon, including counter-drug operations and counter-terrorism, among others. This coincided with significant increases in defence spending (Priest 2004a). It is not yet clear whether this will continue under the new administration, or whether we will see some functions of US foreign policy handed back to civilian institutions. Fareed Zakaria has recently argued for a much more conciliatory foreign policy on the part of the US. This is necessary, he argues, because we are already entering a 'post-American world' in which there is a much broader diffusion of power across the world, and we will eventually see unipolar order replaced by a multipolar one, with China and India the rising powers (Zakaria 2008: 43). This, he claims, is not simply because of US overextension culminating in the Iraq war of 2003, but rather because of the most intense economic competition the US has ever faced (Zakaria 2008: 42). This may be accelerated by the 2008 economic crisis. Zakaria appeals for a far greater emphasis on legitimacy in US foreign policy, through consultation, cooperation and compromise, with respect for and involvement in multilateral institutions and international treaties (Zakaria 2008: 222–33). If the new administration heeds this advice, it will necessarily lead to the exercise of foreign policy not through the Pentagon, but through civilian arms of US government.

With reference to the prospects for bringing to an end the use and sponsorship of state terrorism by the US and its allies, I will make two observations. The first concerns the findings of this study, and the second, the challenges Obama faces. State terrorism, as I have shown, was not invented by the Bush administration. Despite the excesses of the Bush administration, the use and sponsorship of state terrorism has been around for a very long time, and numerous liberal democratic states from the North have long histories of using and sponsoring it in pursuit of

elite interests in the South. Furthermore, agents of the state that enact state terror-
ism are embedded in institutions with long histories and ingrained practices that
will not be excised simply through the election of a new US president, however
committed he may be to upholding international human rights law, and to righting
some of the wrongs of the Bush administration. The recurrence of practices that
amount to acts of state terrorism by British forces in Iraq following the invasion in
2003, despite the outlawing of them in the 1970s, and the reappearance in the
'War on Terror' of abuses as practised by US forces in the Cold War, are com-
pelling evidence of the degree to which they have been institutionalised. Those
practices also go back much further, as the exploration of European colonialism
and early American imperialism shows. Even if Obama takes seriously his pro-
claimed commitment to upholding human rights, he faces significant challenges.
There will be no immediate withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and Iraq, and
decisions taken to intern so many Iraqis without charge or trial cannot be reversed
overnight. Given the evidence of the institutionalisation of abusive practices, even
if considerable efforts are taken to prevent them, they are unlikely to disappear
completely, particularly in contexts where many US and UK troops are on long
and repeat tours of duty, and where abuses have in the past been witnessed, prac-
tised and even legitimised. Guantánamo Bay cannot close overnight. A number of
the countries of origin of the detainees have refused to allow their citizens to
return home, and other states will not take them. Fair trials are impossible, because
of the possibility that any evidence secured against detainees has been done so
through torture. State terrorism has been deployed for centuries in pursuit of elite
interests, and it would be naive to assume its use and sponsorship by liberal demo-
cratic states from the North will end with the ousting of the Bush administration.
Scholars and activists still have a role to play in challenging state terrorism.

This research also has important implications for IR academics. First, the way
in which definitions of terrorism are applied has led to the near absence from
academic debate of the issue of state terrorism by liberal democratic states from
the North. Terrorism is usually assumed to constitute activities by non-state
actors, often located in the South, against Northern democracies and their inter-
ests, and state terrorism is assumed to constitute support for terrorists by 'rogue'
states. This research shows that numerous Northern democracies, especially
those with a colonial legacy, have been responsible for widespread terrorism
against populations in the South in the service of elite interests. This exclusion
of state terrorism from current usage of the term 'terrorism' means that acade-
mics are playing into certain political agendas. This was certainly the case in the
'War on Terror'. They are reinforcing certain political assumptions about what
constitutes terrorism, which in turn reinforces the false notion of Northern
democracies as simply upholding liberal values and protecting Northern popula-
tions from threats. The term 'terrorism' should be reclaimed as an analytical
tool, rather than a political tool in the service of elite power.

The second implication for academics relates closely to the first. Generally
speaking, explicitly normative approaches to foreign policy have been margin-
alised within IR scholarship. This research has carefully critiqued the dominant

interpretation of the foreign policies of liberal democratic states from the North – that they are benign in character – and has analysed the practices of foreign policy and its outcomes within the broader context of the global capitalist system, of which the US was the greatest champion in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The work was undertaken with the specific, normative aim of offering suggestions for the emancipation of people in the South from the oppressive practices of elites from the North. The research does not simply accept the system as a given, but has critiqued its foundations, as well as the repressive strategies that are instituted in order to maintain and entrench that system. Normative approaches of this kind are necessary for the development of IR scholarship for two reasons. First, they enable us to overcome certain biases in the field, including the selective application of terms such as 'terrorism' which serve to fortify rather than confront illiberal practices. Second, they help to diversify and broaden debate beyond the narrow parameters set by the dominant, realist and liberal approaches. This will help us to generate knowledge which can challenge not only repressive practices, but the systems which generate them and which they are intended to reinforce.

Research of this kind on state terrorism has an emancipatory goal. The goal is to contribute to ending state terrorism by exposing it. The case of the Chilean Diaspora is instructive. Pinochet's regime was gradually undermined in part as a result of efforts by political exiles from Chile, including academics, to raise global awareness of the atrocities committed by the regime, resulting in its condemnation by other states (Ropp and Sikkink 1999). This helped bring an end to the regime and to years of repression, in which the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (CNCTR) found that during and in the years following the coup, 2,279 people were killed. Of those, 815 were victims of execution and death by torture, 957 disappeared following arrest, and the remainder were killed either as a result of war tribunals, during political protests, alleged escape attempts, or gun battles (CNCTR 1991). Identifying state terrorism and raising awareness about it is one way that activist scholars can assist those struggling against oppression. They cannot do this in isolation, but instead need to depend on and cooperate with various networks of concerned individuals, including investigative journalists, NGOs, political activists and even members of the state apparatus or international organisations that share these concerns. As the examination of extraordinary rendition in this study has shown, academics have only been able to explore this phenomenon because of the input they have received from investigative journalists, human rights organisations, international human rights lawyers and even from the Council of Europe's investigation.

Emancipation also implies challenging the perceptions of elites that consider specific groups of people to constitute security threats. This may help prevent violations of human rights, as well as the undermining of states proclaiming to be liberal democratic. The starting point is to explore the consequences of state terrorism, not only for victims, but for perpetrating states. A leading figure in France's counterinsurgency campaign in Algeria in the 1950s and 1960s, Jean-Jacques Massu, years later admitted that the widespread use of torture, often a tool of state

terrorism, served no useful or necessary intelligence purpose in overcoming terror-ism, but had turned most of the Algerian population against the French, pushing them into the arms of the Front de Libération National (MacMaster 2004: 9). One priority for Critical Terrorism Studies and activist scholars working on state terror-ism must be to critically examine state responses to perceived threats that involve the use or sponsorship of state terrorism, evaluate its strategic usefulness as well as its impacts on human rights, and then to challenge elites that deploy such prac-tices, precisely because the assumed functionality of state terrorism in such cir-cumstances is misplaced.

Finally, this study has shown that there is a clear link between the use of state terrorism by liberal democratic states from the North and efforts to neoliberalise the global political economy. State terrorism has underpinned many efforts to entrench neoliberalism, but even where neoliberalisation has occurred without the use of coercion, it too has eroded the rights of many citizens in the South, by subordinating their interests to those of the dominant class. Emancipatory schol-arship involves not only analysing and challenging state terrorism, but also assessing the impacts of political and economic policies and strategies on popula-tions at risk of exploitation, which includes, in Harvey's words, accumulation by dispossession.

Appendix

Interviews

Interview 1:
Ken LaPlante (HQDA DCS G-3)
Thursday 3 June 2004. The Pentagon
Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) liaison to the Army, 2004, and WHINSEC Board of Visitors
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, International Affairs

Interview 2:
Lt Col Linda L. Gould (HQDA, G3)
Thursday 3 June 2004. The Pentagon
Chief of the Latin America Branch
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, International Affairs

Interview 3:
Jacqueline Baker
Monday 7 June 2004. School of Americas Watch (SOAW) Office, Washington, DC
Legislative Coordinator, SOAW

Interview 4:
Jose Alvarez
Tuesday 8 June 2004. The Pentagon
Former School of Americas (SOA) Commandant (February 1993 – March 1995)
Currently: Defence Contractor for DoD

Interview 5:
John Speedy III (HQDA, G3, DAMO-SSZ)
Tuesday 8 June 2004. The Pentagon
Deputy Director for International Affairs. Strategy, Plans and Policy Directorate

Interview 6:
Eric Maltzer (HQDA, Army G-35-R)
Tuesday 8 June 2004. The Pentagon
Country Desk Officer, Southern Cone, Latin America Branch

Interview 7:
Ambassador George Bruno (Retired)
Thursday 10 June 2004. Interview conducted by telephone
General Counsel and Managing Director, USA GROUP INTERNATIONAL

Interview 8:
Mr Steven Schneebaum
Monday 14 June 2004, Patton Boggs LLP, Washington, DC Office
Partner: Patten Boggs LLP, Human Rights Litigator
Chairman of WHINSEC's Board of Visitors, 2004 (formerly on SOA Board of Visitors)

Interview 9:
Mr Eric LeCompte
Wednesday 16 June 2004, SOA Watch Office, Washington, DC
SOA Watch

Interview 10:
David Mazzera
Friday 18 June 2004, Foggy Bottom Metro Station
SOA Watch

Interview 11:
Jose Sorzano
Monday 21 June 2004, Jose Sorzano's Office, Arlington
US Ambassador to the UN (retired); Director for Latin America Peace Corp;
Chairman: Austin Group
Current member of WHINSEC Board of Visitors
Professor: Georgetown University (18 years)

Interview 12:
Eric Olson
Monday 21 June 2004, Amnesty International USA Office
Amnesty International USA, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, SE, Washington, DC 20003

Interview 13:
Rachel Stohl
Tuesday 22 June 2004, Centre for Defence Information Office, Washington, DC
Senior Analyst, Centre for Defence Information

Interview 14:
David Mazzera
Wednesday 23 June 2004, Foggy Bottom Metro Station
SOA Watch

Interview 15:
Ken LaPlante (HQDA DCS G-3)
Thursday 24 June 2004. The Pentagon
WHINSEC liaison with the Army, 2004, and WHINSEC Board of Visitors
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, International Affairs

Interview 16:
Dr Deborah Avant
Monday 28 June 2004
Associate Professor, Political Science and International Affairs
George Washington University
Member of WHINSEC Board of Visitors, 2004

Interview 17:
Adam Isacson
Tuesday 29 June 2004
Director of Programmes, Centre for International Policy

Interview 18:
Lee Rials
Tuesday 6 July 2004
WHINSEC Public Affairs Officer
WHINSEC

Interview 19:
Commandant Gilberto Pérez
Wednesday 7 July 2004
WHINSEC Commandant
WHINSEC

Interview 20:
Mr Yamil Collazo
Thursday 8 July 2004
WHINSEC Information Specialist
WHINSEC

Interview 21:
Lee Rials
Thursday 8 July 2004
WHINSEC Public Affairs Officer
WHINSEC

Interview 22:
Dr Russell Ramsey
Monday 12 July 2004
WHINSEC Visiting Professor, Norwich University
CMS3 Course: Resource Management
WHINSEC

Interview 23:
Major Irma Baquedano (Honduras)
Tuesday 13 July 2004
Student: CMS3 Resource Management (7 June–16 July 2004).
WHINSEC

Interview 24:
Antonio Raimondo
Wednesday 14 July 2004
Judge Advocate, Chief of Human Rights Training, Instructor
WHINSEC

Interview 25:
Father Roy Bourgeois
Tuesday 20 July 2004
Roy Bourgeois' office, Columbus, Georgia
Founder, SOA Watch

Interview 26:
Dr Donald Harrington
Monday 26 July 2004
Academic Dean of the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation
WHINSEC

Interview 27:
Chaplain Luis Scott
Monday 2 August 2004
Command Chaplain
WHINSEC

Interview 28:
Elisabeth Andrews
Wednesday 4 August 2004
Spanish Instructor
WHINSEC

Interview 29:
Colonel Walter Pjetraj

Thursday 4 August 2004
Chief of Department of Professional Military Studies
WHINSEC

Interview 30:
Major Antonio Raimondo
Monday 9 August 2004
Judge Advocate, Chief of Human Rights Training, Instructor
WHINSEC

Interview 31:
WHINSEC Instructor (interviewee wishes to remain anonymous)
Monday 9 August 2004
WHINSEC

Interview 32:
Colonel Cardenas (Colombia)
Wednesday 11 August 2004
CMS2 Democratic Sustainment Course
WHINSEC

Interview 33:
Lt Colonel Martinez (Guatemala).
Wednesday 11 August 2004
CMS2 Democratic Sustainment Course
WHINSEC

Interview 34:
Police Officer (Colombia)
Counternarcotics (interviewee wishes to remain anonymous)
Wednesday 11 August 2004
CMS2 Democratic Sustainment Course
WHINSEC

Interview 35:
Jorge Santiso (Guatemala)
Analyst, Department of Defence
Wednesday 11 August 2004
CMS2 Democratic Sustainment Course
WHINSEC

Interview 36:
Dr Jorge Figueron Salguero (Guatemala)
Wednesday 11 August 2004

Ministry of Foreign Relations: Sub-director of North American Division
(US, Canada, Mexico)
CMS2 Democratic Sustainment Course
WHINSEC

Interview 37
Captain Edwin Urbano (Colombia)
Wednesday 11 August 2004
Colombian Police Force, Counternarcotics
CMS2 Democratic Sustainment Course
WHINSEC

Interview 38:
Major Paradas (Honduras)
Thursday 12 August 2004
Logistics
WHINSEC Guest Instructor
WHINSEC

Interview 39:
Lt Col Luis Garcia (Peru)
Thursday 12 August 2004
Professional Military Studies Division
WHINSEC Guest Instructor
WHINSEC

Interview 40:
Mr Joseph Leuer
Monday 16 August 2004
Assistant Dean of Academics
WHINSEC

Interview 41:
Mr Walter Santamaria
Wednesday 18 August 2004
Chief, Translation Division
WHINSEC

Interview 42:
Mr Pedro Valle
Monday 23 August 2004
Chief, Training and Education Development Division
WHINSEC

Interview 43:
Mr Pedro Valle (Chief, Training and Education Development Division)

Captain Chris Murray (Instructor TAC6 – Counterdrug Operations Course)
Captain Cosme (Instructor TAC6 – Counterdrug Operations Course)
Monday 23 August 2004
WHINSEC

Interview 44:
Commandant Gilberto Pérez
Wednesday 7 July 2004
WHINSEC Commandant
WHINSEC

Notes

2 Conceptualising state terrorism

1 A more detailed critique of the work of these scholars can be found in Sam Raphael (2007).
2 In terms of who is bound under these two bodies of law, IHRL binds governments in their relationships with individuals, and there is a growing body of opinion which argues that non-state actors ought also to be bound by IHRL. IHL, in contrast, imposes obligations on individuals and provides that individuals may be held criminally responsible for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I, and for other war crimes. While individuals do not have specific duties under IHRL, it does provide for individual criminal responsibility for violations that may constitute international crimes, such as genocide, torture and crimes against humanity. IHRL applies at all times, and military forces are bound by this, except during armed conflict, when they are bound by IHL. This has important implications for the activities of military forces at all times.
3 The term 'representative' is used to denote both state employees, such as members of the armed forces, police force or intelligence agencies, and non-state actors contracted by the state, however informally, to carry out certain duties on behalf of the state. This would include paramilitaries or private security contractors involved in collaborative operations with direct employees of the state.
4 Interviews undertaken by the author between June and September 2004, at the Pentagon and the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, Fort Benning, Georgia, USA.
5 The Greenpeace report stressed that even though civilians were not included among the targets for the air campaign, the bombardment itself was so intense, that civilians were extensively harmed through the devastation of the infrastructure, and the massive environmental impacts of the campaign. See William Arkin *et al.* (1991). This was further exacerbated by the imposition of a repressive regime of economic sanctions by the UN throughout the 1990s, which further crippled the Iraqi infrastructure and resulted in massive loss of civilian life. This led, as the World Health Organisation reported, to a six-fold increase in the mortality rate of children under five years of age between 1990 and 1994, resulting from diseases such as typhoid and cholera, diseases not even seen in Iraq prior to the 1991 Gulf War. See WHO (1996).

3 Contextualising state terrorism: the North and its foreign policy objectives in the South

1 For an account of the problems associated with establishing the population size, see Denevan (1976).
2 Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman refer to such elites as proxies of the US, see Chomsky and Herman (1979a). I prefer not to use this term as it implies a lack of

agency on the part of those agents, and instead refer to them as allies of the US. This is because, as this analysis will show, those allies demonstrate significant independent action and sometimes act at odds with the US, so are not simply US proxies.

3 For a convincing account of these relations within the context of globalisation, see Chapter 1 of Barkawi (2006). Barkawi argues that globalisation is not the new phenomenon that it has often been assumed to be, but is a process that has been underway since the late nineteenth century. Theorists who have explored the impact that these processes have had on the form and functions of the nation state include Nicos Poulantzas (1977) and, more recently, in light of debates on US imperialism, Bob Jessop (2003).

4 These distinctions between the state and capital as agents are drawn from the Marxist conceptualisation of the state developed by Nicos Poulantzas ([1968] 1987).

5 I am grateful to Eric Herring for suggesting the taxonomy which resulted in the framework developed here.

4 Decolonisation, the Cold War and state terrorism

1 Challenges to British colonialism emerged during its colonial period, and well before British struggles to retain its last remaining colonies in the twentieth century, as the historian Bernard Porter has discussed in considerable detail. The arguments of the critics were made on humanitarian grounds against the brutality of British imperial forces in their policing of colonised populations. See Porter (1968). Similarly, critiques of French colonialism abound, see Fanon ([1961] 1967) and Sartre ([1964] 2001).

2 As Curtis shows, the US enjoyed unwavering support from the UK throughout its war in Vietnam, despite its extensive use of repression, including state terrorism. See Curtis (2004: 198–242).

3 The School of Americas was a US training facility for Latin American military and police forces, made infamous when training manuals emerged that advocated repression, including torture. It was closed in 2000, and reopened as the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) in 2001. See Blakeley (2006).

4 Interview with José Alvarez, Former Commandant of US Army School of the Americas (February 1993 – March 1995), The Pentagon, Washington, DC, 8 June 2004.

5 The formal brief of the Public Safety Programme provided for grants of security equipment, training overseas and in the US, and for stationing Public Safety advisors overseas to organise training programmes and provide advice and technical assistance to foreign counterparts. Its emphasis was on counterinsurgency doctrine, and as a consequence, it became known, according to McClintock, as a conduit for CIA training, assistance and operational advice to foreign political police, 'and for linking the US to the jailers, torturers, and murderers of the most repressive of "free world" regimes'.

5 The post-Cold War world, neoliberalism and state terrorism

1 US Foreign Military Sales to Saudi Arabia in 2003 totalled $692.65 million, second only to Egypt in the Near East and South Asian region. US Foreign Military Sales to Egypt in the same year totalled $930.64 million. See DSCA (2003).

2 I was part of a UN-supported NGO observer team during the 2003 elections, and while on the whole the elections were fair and followed appropriate procedures, some people have still not received polling cards, despite applying in good time; polling registers continue to be out of date, with the names of deceased persons continuing to appear while more recent additions have not been updated; the system is still open to manipulation because of these flaws.

3 By independent I mean organisations and institutions that are in no way funded by the government. Numerous 'independent' non-governmental organisations receive government funding for some or all of their work. The Centre for International Policy's budget

however is free from government and political party funding; its work is funded entirely by individual donors and private foundations. See CIP (2005).

4 For a detailed account of liberal democracy promotion efforts by the US, considered by liberals to be successes as a result of USAID, State Department and NED efforts, see Diamond (1995). For specific country accounts, on Serbia see USIP (2001). On Guatemala, Bosnia-Herzegovina and South Africa see IIDEA (1998). See also the websites of the US Department of State, www.state.gov/; USAID, www.usaid.gov/; and NED, www.ned.org/ for details of democracy promotion initiatives in these regions.

5 For a helpful analysis of the role of the OAS in democracy promotion in Haiti see Shamsie (2004).

6 The percentages presented are based on my own calculations using the information provided in the database.

6 State terrorism after 9/11

1 The NED funded just 29 projects in Africa in 2001, but was funding 112 by 2003. It funded 56 projects in Asia in 2001, and 50 in 2003. Sixty-eight were funded in Central and Eastern Europe in 2001, and 70 were funded in 2003. In Latin America, 49 projects were funded in 2001, and 61 in 2003, and in the Middle East, 60 projects were funded in 2001, as compared with 105 in 2003. See NED (2005b).

Bibliography

ADF (2005), America's Development Foundation Website. Online, available at: www.adfusa.org/home.htm (accessed 24 October 2005).

AI (1972), *Report of an Inquiry into Allegations of Ill-Treatment in Northern Ireland*, London: Amnesty International.

—— (1976), *Guatemala*, London: Amnesty International Briefing Papers, No. 8.

—— (1977), *Indonesia: An Amnesty International Report*, London: Amnesty International.

—— (1992), 'Haiti – The Human Rights Tragedy: Human Rights Violations Since the Coup', Amnesty International. Online, available at: www.amnestyusa.org/countries/haiti/document.do?id=CF1E58816376C148802... (accessed 24 August 2005).

—— (2003a), 'Argentina Feature: Cleaning Up the Dirty War', Amnesty International. Online, available at: http://news.amnesty.org/index/ENGAMR1312122003 (accessed 8 February 2006).

—— (2003b), 'Iraq: US House Demolitions Could be Illegal', Amnesty International, 21 November. Online, available at: www.amnesty.org.uk/news_details.asp?NewsID=15017 (accessed 28 October 2008).

—— (2004a), 'AI Press Release. Haiti: Convicted Human Rights Violators Must Not be Allowed to Take Power', Amnesty International. Online, available at: http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR360142004?open&of=ENG-HTI (accessed 5 January 2006).

—— (2004b), 'Haiti: Breaking the Cycle of Violence: A Last Chance for Haiti', Amnesty International, 21 June. Online, available at: http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR360382004 (accessed 5 January 2006).

—— (2004c), 'Israel and the Occupied Territories: Under the Rubble: House Demolition and the Destruction of Land and Property', Amnesty International, 18 May. Online, available at: www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE15/033/2004 (accessed 28 October 2008).

—— (2006a), 'Beyond Abu Ghraib: Detention and Torture in Iraq', Amnesty International. Online, available at: www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/001/2006/en/dom-MDE140012006en.pdf (accessed 17 September 2008).

—— (2006b), 'Torture and Ill-Treatment: The Arguments', Amnesty International. Online, available at: http://web.amnesty.org/pages/stoptorture-arguments-eng (accessed 21 June 2006).

—— (2007), 'Public Statement: United Kingdom Court Martial Acquittals', Amnesty International, 15 March. Online, available at: www.serve.com/pfc/misc/basraai.html (accessed 18 September 2008).

—— (2008), 'Carnage and Despair: Iraq Five Years On', Amnesty International. Online, available at: www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/001/2008/en/3f78611b-f1e9–11dc-adcd-cdafd0ab0dfe/mde140012008eng.pdf (accessed 17 September 2008).

Aitken, R. (2008), 'The Aitken Report: An Investigation into Cases of Deliberate Abuse and Unlawful Killing in Iraq in 2003 and 2004', 25 January. Online, available at: www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/7AC894D3–1430–4AD1–911F-8210C3342CC5/0/aitken_rep.pdf (accessed 10 November 2008).

ANEP (2005), Asociación Nacional de Empresa Privada Website. Online, available at: www.anep.org.sv/actaconstitucion.htm (accessed 14 August 2005).

AP (2000), 'Clinton Urges Aristide to Resolve Haiti's Electoral Impasse', Associated Press, 7 December. Online, available at: http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/americas/12/07/haiti.clinton.ap/ (accessed 7 December 2005).

Arendt, H. (1966), *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World.

Arkin, W., Durrant, D. and Cherni, M. (1991), 'On Impact: Modern Warfare and the Environment – A Case Study of the Gulf War'. Online, available at: www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/international/press/reports/on-impact-modern-warfare-and.pdf (accessed 6 October 2008).

Badey, T. (1998), 'Defining International Terrorism: A Pragmatic Approach', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 10 (1): 90–107.

Ballard, J. (1998), *Upholding Democracy. The United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994–1997*, Westport: Praeger.

Barkawi, T. (2006), *Globalization and War*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Barkawi, T. and Laffey, M. (2002), 'Retrieving the Imperial: Empire and International Relations', *Millennium*, 31 (1): 109–27.

Barker, J. (2003), *The No-Nonsense Guide to Terrorism*, London: Verso.

Barry, T. and Flynn, M. (2005), 'Profile: Condoleezza Rice'. Online, available at: http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/1325 (accessed 7 March 2006).

Bascio, P. (2007), *Defeating Islamic Terrorism: The Wahhabi Factor*, Boston: Branden Books.

BBC (2003), 'EU Scores Steel Victory Over US', BBC, 10 November. Online, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3256197.stm (accessed 10 February 2006).

—— (2008), 'CIA Admits Waterboarding Inmates', BBC, 5 February. Online, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7229169.stm (accessed 28 October 2008).

Beccaria, C. ([1764] 1995), *On Crimes and Punishments and Other Writings*, ed. Richard Bellamy, trans. Richard Davies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Becker, T. (2006), *Terrorism and the State: Rethinking the Rules of State Responsibility*, Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing.

Beckett, I. (2001), *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and their Opponents Since 1750*, London: Routledge.

Bethell, L. (1984), *The Cambridge History of Latin America* Vol. II, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Blakeley, R. (2006a), 'Still Training to Torture? US Training of Military Forces from Latin America', *Third World Quarterly*, 27 (8): 1439–61.

—— (2006b), *Repression, Human Rights and US Training of Military Forces from the South*, PhD Thesis, University of Bristol.

—— (2007a), 'Bringing the State Back into Terrorism Studies', *European Political Science*, 6 (3): 228–35.

—— (2007b), 'Why Torture?', *Review of International Studies*, 33 (3): 373–94.

—— (2008), 'The Elephant in the Room: A Response to John Horgan and Michael Boyle', *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 1 (2): 151–65.

Blum, W. (2003), *Killing Hope. US Military and CIA interventions since World War II*, London: Zed Books.

Brandt Commission (1990), *The Challenge to the South. The Report of the South Commission*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brodie, B. (1973), *War and Politics*, New York: Macmillan.

Brophy, R. and Zimite, P. (1997), 'US Military Training for Latin America', *Foreign Policy in Focus*, 2 (48), October.

Brown, C. (1985), *With Friends Like These: The Americas Watch Report on Human Rights and US Policy in Latin America*, New York: Pantheon Books.

Buergenthal, T. (1994), 'The United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador', *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law*, 27 (3): 497–544.

Buncombe, A. and Cockburn, P. (2006), 'Iraq's Death Squads: On the Brink of Civil War', *Independent*, 26 February. Online, available at: www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iraqs-death-squads-on-the-brink-of-civil-war-467784.html (accessed 29 October 2008).

Burbach, R. and Tarbell, J. (2004), *Imperial Overstretch. George W Bush and the Hubris of Empire*, London: Zed Books.

Burnett, J. and Whyte, D. (2005), 'Embedded Expertise and the New Terrorism', *Journal for Crime Conflict and the Media*, 1 (4): 1–18.

Bush, B. and Maltby, J. (2004), 'Taxation in West Africa: Transforming the Colonial Subject into the "Governable Person"', *Critical Perspectives on Accounting*, 15: 5–34.

Bush, G.W. (2002), 'The National Security Strategy of the United States of America', Washington, DC: The White House.

Bybee, J. (2002), 'Memorandum for Alberto R Gonzales, Counsel to the President. 1 August. Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 USC 2340–2340A (US Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel)', in Karen Greenberg and Joshua Dratel (eds), *The Torture Papers. The Road to Abu Ghraib*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 172–214.

Cammack, P. (2007), 'RIP IPE', *Papers in the Politics of Global Competitiveness*, 7. Online, available at: www.e-space.mmu.ac.uk/e-space/bitstream/2173/12264/1/ipe.pdf (accessed 26 October 2008).

Campbell, D. (2006), '638 Ways to Kill Castro', *Guardian*, 3 August, p. 14. Online, available at: www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/aug/03/cuba.duncancampbell2 (accessed 16 November 2008).

Carothers, T. (1999), *Aiding Democracy Abroad. The Learning Curve*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Carroll, R. (2008), 'Haiti: Mud Cakes Become Staple Diet as Cost of Food Soars Beyond Family's Reach', *Guardian*, 29 July, p. 17. Online, available at: www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/29/food.internationalaidanddevelopment (accessed 16 November 2008).

Carter, J. (1977), 'Human Rights and Foreign Policy'. Speech given at Notre Dame University, June 1977, Washington, DC: US National Archives, Public Papers of the Presidents of the US, Jimmy Carter, vol. I.

CAVR (2006), 'Chapter 8: Responsibility and Accountability', Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor. Online, available at: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB176/CAVR_responsibility.pdf (accessed 27 January 2006).

Chambliss, W. (1989), 'State-Organized Crime – The American Society of Criminology, 1988 Presidential Address', *Criminology*, 27 (2): 183–208.

Chomsky, N. (1992), *Deterring Democracy*, 2nd edn, London: Vintage Books, Verso.
—— (1997), 'Market Democracy in a Neoliberal Order: Doctrines and Reality', *Davie Lecture*. Online, available at: www.bigeye.com/chomsky.htm (accessed 16 October 2005).
—— (2004), 'Rogue States', *Z Magazine*. Online, available at: www.zmag.org/chomsky/articles/z9804-rogue.html (accessed 16 March 2008).
Chomsky, N. and Herman, E. (1979a), *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism: The Political Economy of Human Rights, vol I*, Boston: South End Press.
—— (1979b), *After the Cataclysm. Postwar Indochina and the Reconstruction of Imperial Ideology. The Political Economy of Human Rights, vol II*, Nottingham: Spokesman.
CIA (1954), 'Memorandum to all Staff Officers. Subject: Selection of Individuals for Disposal by Junta Group (Memorandum obtained by National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, DC, and is document 3 of 5 compiled for the Guatemala Documentation Project, NSA Electronic Briefing Book no. 4)', 31 March. Online, available at: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB4/cia-guatemala3_1.html (accessed 24 January 2006).
—— (1970), 'Report on CIA and Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 September to 3 November 1970 (Declassified document, obtained by the National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, DC, NSA Electronic Briefing Book 8)', 18 November. Online, available at: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/nsaebb8.htm (accessed 30 January 2006).
—— (1977), 'Report of Investigation: Selected Issues Relating to CIA Activities in Honduras in the 1980s, and Related Documents (Declassified document, obtained by the National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, DC, Document 4 of NSA Electronic Briefing Book 27)', 27 August. Online, available at: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB27/index.html (accessed 8 February 2006).
CIP (2002), 'Just the Facts: A Civilian's Guide to US Defence and Security Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean', Center for International Policy. Online, available at: www.ciponline.org/facts (accessed 12 August 2005).
—— (2005), 'Funding Sources', Center for International Policy. Online, available at: http://ciponline.org/aboutus.htm (accessed 24 October 2005).
CNCTR (1991), 'Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation'. Online, available at: www.usip.org/library/tc/doc/reports/chile/chile_1993_toc.html (accessed 30 January 2006).
Cockburn, P. (2000), 'Blair Understands Putin over Chechen "Terrorism"', *Independent*, 12 March. Online, available at: www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/blair-understands-putin-over-chechen-terrorism-722263.html (accessed 28 October 2008).
CoE (1998), 'Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as amended by Protocol No. 11', Brussels: Council of Europe.
Colas, A. and Saull, R. (eds) (2006), *The War on Terrorism and American 'Empire' After the Cold War*, London: Routledge.
Conroy, J. (2001), *Unspeakable Acts, Ordinary People. The Dynamics of Torture*, London: Vision Paperbacks.
Cooper, H. (2001), 'Terrorism: The Problem of Definition Revisited', *American Behavioral Scientist*, 44: 881–93.
Cordesman, A. (2002), *Terrorism, Asymmetric Warfare, and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Defending the US Homeland*, London: Praeger-Greenwood.
Cox, R. (1981), 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 10 (2): 126–55.

—— (1986), 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', in Robert Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics*, New York: Colombia University Press, 204–49.

Craddock, B. (2005), 'Posture Statement of General Bantz J. Craddock, United States Army Commander, United States Southern Command Before the 109th Cngress House Armed Services Committee', 9 March. Online, available at: www.ciponline.org/colombia/050309crad.pdf (accessed 21 October 2008).

Crosby, A. (1973), 'Why the Indian Population Declined', in Lewis Hanke (ed.), *History of Latin American Civilisation: Sources and Interpretations, Volume I, The Colonial Experience*, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 169–78.

Cullather, N. (2006), 'Operation PBSUCCESS. The United States and Guatemala, 1953–1954 (Declassified document obtained by the National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, DC, document 5 of 5 documents compiled for the Guatemala Documentation Project, NSA Electronic Briefing Book no. 4)'. Online, available at: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB4/cia-guatemala5_a.html (accessed 24 January 2006).

Cumings, B. (1990), *The Origins of the Korean War, Volume I: The Roaring Cataract, 1947–1950*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

—— (2004), *North Korea*, New York: The New Press.

Curtis, M. (2003), *Web of Deceit: Britain's Real Role in the World*, London: Vintage.

—— (2004), *Unpeople. Britain's Secret Human Rights Abuses*, London: Vintage.

Danner, M. (2004), 'Abu Ghraib: The Hidden Story', *New York Review*, 7 October. Online, available at: www.markdanner.com/nyreview/100704_abu.htm (accessed 21 June 2006).

Davis, P. (2002), *Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on Al Qaeda*, Washington, DC: RAND Corporation.

Denevan, W. (ed.) (1976), *The Native Population of the Americas in 1492*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Dershowitz, A. (2001), 'Is There a Torturous Road to Justice?', *Los Angeles Times*, 8 November, Part 2, p. 19.

Diamond, L. (1995), 'Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives'. Online, available at: http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/mb.htm (accessed 5 July 2005).

DoD (1962), *Field Manual 33–5: Psychological Operations*, Washington, DC: US Department of Defense: Army.

—— (2001–5), 'Foreign Military Assistance 1990–2003', US Department of Defense. Online, available at: www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/aid/aidindex.htm (accessed 13 July 2005).

—— (2004), 'Counterinsurgency Operations (Field Manual-Interim FMI 3–07.22)', US Department of Defense. Online, available at: www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3–07–22/index.html (accessed 25 August 2006).

—— (2005), 'Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest: Joint Report to Congress', US Department of Defense. Online, available at: www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/ (accessed 5 August 2005).

Dodds, P. (2004), 'Convicted Assasin Gets Role in Haiti', *Independent*, 3 March. Online, available at: www.independent-media.tv/item.cfm?fmedia_id=6014&fcategory_desc=Haiti (accessed 16 January 2006).

DoS (1971a), 'Secret Cable. Subject: Fascell Sub-Committee Hearings on Guatemala Public Safety Programme, from the US Embassy in Guatemala to the US Department of State (Cable obtained by National Security Archive, George Washington University,

Washington, DC, and document 7 of 32 compiled for the Guatemala Documentation Project, in NSA Electronic Briefing Book no. 11)', US Department of State, 2 September. Online, available at: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB11/docs/07–01.htm (accessed 24 January 2006).

—— (1971b), 'Transmission of a Preliminary Analysis and Strategy Paper – Uruguay, from the US Embassy in Montevideo to the US Department of State (Declassified document, obtained by the National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, DC, Document 2 of NSA Electronic Briefing Book 71)', US Department of State, 25 August. Online, available at: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB71/doc2.pdf (accessed 8 February 2006).

—— (1976), 'Memorandum of Conversation: Secretary's Meeting with Argentine Foreign Minister Guzzetti (Declassified document, obtained by the National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, DC, Document 6 of NSA Electronic Briefing Book 104)', US Department of State, 7 October. Online, available at: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB104/Doc6%20761007.pdf (accessed 8 February 2006).

—— (1978), 'Telegram 6076 from US Embassy in Jakarta to US Secretary of State, "Summary of Vice President's Meeting with Suharto", US Department of State, 10 May 1978'. Online, available at: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB174/10may1978%20suharto%20mtg%20summary.pdf (accessed 24 January 2006).

—— (1980–1982), 'Country Reports on Human Rights', Washington, DC: US Department of State.

—— (1999), 'Visit to Cucuta, on Colombian–Venezuelan Border (US Embassy, Bogota, Confidential Cable)', US Department of State. Online, available at: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB166/19991115.pdf (accessed 17 October 2008).

—— (2000a), '1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Saudi Arabia', US Department of State, 23 February. Online, available at: www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/426.htm (accessed 28 October 2008).

—— (2000b), '1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Egypt', US Department of State, 23 February. Online, available at: www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/408.htm (accessed 28 October 2008).

—— (2002–7), 'Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Military Assistance)', US Department of State. Online, available at: www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/cbj (accessed 10 March 2007).

—— (2004), 'US Department of State Mission Statement', US Department of State. Online, available at: www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/23503.htm (accessed 24 October 2005).

—— (2005), 'El Salvador Profile', US Department of State. Online, available at: www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2033.htm (accessed 20 June).

—— (2005a), 'Haiti: Background Profile', US Department of State. Online, available at: www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1982.htm (accessed 23 August 2005).

—— (2005b), 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2004: Saudi Arabia', US Department of State, 28 February. Online, available at: www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41731.htm (accessed 24 October 2005).

—— (2006), 'Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Military Assistance)', US Department of State. Online, available at: www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/cbj/ (accessed 10 March 2007).

—— (2007), 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Pakistan', US Department of State. Online, available at: www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100619.htm (accessed 29 October 2008).

—— (2008), 'El Salvador Profile', US Department of State. Online, available at: www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2033.htm (accessed 30 July 2008).

DSCA (2003), 'Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts. As of September 30, 2003', Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Online, available at: www.dsca.osd.mil/programs/biz-ops/2003_facts/ Facts_Book_2003_Oct04_FINAL.pdf (accessed 8 June 2005).

Duggard, J. (1974), 'International Terrorism: Problems of Definition', *International Affairs*, 50 (1): 67–81.

Dunlavey, M. (2002), 'Counter-Resistance Strategies (Memorandum for Commander, US Southern Command)', 11 October. Online, available at: www.torturingdemocracy.org/ documents/20021011.pdf (accessed 18 Octoner 2008).

Dupuy, A. (1997), *Haiti in the New World Order*, Boulder: Westview Press.

Ehrenfeld, R. (2003), *Funding Evil: How Terrorism is Financed and How to Stop It*, Los Angeles: Bonus Books.

Eimer, C. (2005), 'Spotlight on US Troops in Paraguay', BBC, 28 September. Online, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4289224.stm (accessed 29 September 2005).

Elkins, C. (2005), *Britain's Gulag: The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya*, London: Jonathan Cape.

Embassy (Argentina) (1979), 'Airgram from US Embassy in Argentina to the US Department of State: Human Rights Case Reports (Declassified document, obtained by the National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, DC, Document 8 of NSA Electronic Briefing Book 73, Part One)', 19 June. Online, available at: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB73/790619dos1.pdf (accessed 8 February 2006).

Embassy (Lima) (1994), 'Cable from US Embassy in Lima to the Secretary of State: Systematic Human Rights Violations Under Fujimori (Declassified document, obtained by the National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, DC, Document 27 of NSA Electronic Briefing Book 96)'. Online, available at: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/ NSAEBB/NSAEBB96/940630.pdf (accessed 9 February 2006).

EU (2007a), 'European Union in the World: Trade Policy', European Union, 18 March. Online, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/what/trade_policy/index_en.htm (accessed 18 October 2008).

—— (2007b), 'Report on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the Transportation and Illegal Detention of Prisoners (2006/2200(INI)) [A-0020/2007]', European Union, 30 January. Online, available at: www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/ getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A6–2007–0020+0+DOC+PDF+V0// EN (accessed 19 September 2008).

Fanon, F. ([1961] 1967), *The Wretched of the Earth*, London: Penguin.

FCO (2006), 'FCO Overview of Human Rights in Iraq', *Human Rights Annual Report*, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Online, available at: www.fco.gov.uk/Files/ kfile/02%20OVERVIEW.5.pdf (accessed 10 November 2008).

—— (2008), 'Departmental Report 2007–2008', UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Online, available at: https://fco-stage.fco.gov.uk/en/departmental-report/introduction/ work-in-context/ (accessed 18 October 2008).

Feickert, A. (2005), 'US Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism: Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia (CSR Report for Congress)'. Online, available at: www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32758.pdf (accessed 28 October 2008).

Fenn, E. (2000), 'Biological Warfare in Eighteenth Century North America – Beyond Jeffrey Amherst', *The Journal of American History*, 86 (4): 1552–80.

Ferguson, J. (1987), *Papa Doc, Baby Doc. Haiti and the Duvaliers*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Flynn, M. (2005a), 'Profile: Donald Rumsfeld'. Online, available at: http://rightweb. irc-online.org/profile/1346 (accessed 7 March 2006).

—— (2005b), 'Profile: Richard "Dick" Bruce Cheney'. Online, available at: http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/1072 (accessed 7 March 2006).

FMLN (2005), 'FMLN Website'. Online, available at: http://fmln.org.sv/portal/index.php (accessed 21 June 2005).

Foucault, M. (1977), *Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan, London: Penguin.

Gallagher, J. and Robinson, R. (1953), 'The Imperialism of Free Trade', *The Economic History Review*, VI (1): 1–15.

Ganor, B. (1998), 'Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter?'. Online, available at: www.ict.org.il/ (accessed 17 July 2008).

GAO (2005), 'Security Assistance: Efforts to Secure Colombia's Caño Limón–Coveñas Oil Pipeline Have Reduced Attacks, but Challenges Remain', US Government Accountability Office. Online, available at: www.gao.gov/new.items/d05971.pdf (accessed 10 February 2006).

—— (2008), 'Combating Terrorism: Increased Oversight and Accountability Needed Over Pakistan Reimbursement Claims for Coalition Support Funds', US Government Accountability Office. Online, available at: www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08–806 (accessed 29 October 2008).

Gareau, F. (2004), *State Terrorism and the United States. From Counterinsurgency to the War on Terrorism*, London: Zed Books.

George, A. (1991), *Western State Terrorism*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Gibbs, J. (1989), 'Conceptualization of Terrorism', *American Sociological Review*, 54 (3): 329–40.

Gilbert, L. (1994), 'El Salvador's Death Squads: New Evidence from US Documents'. Online, available at: http://ciponline.org/dethsqud.htm (accessed 20 June 2005).

Gill, S. (2003), *Power and Resistance in the New World Order*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gillard, M., Gomez, I. and Jones, M. (1998), 'BP Hands "Tarred in Pipeline Dirty War"', *Guardian*, 17 October. Online, available at: www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/ 0,3504,740184,00.html (accessed 19 October 2008).

Gills, B., Rocamora, J. and Wilson, R. (eds) (1993), *Low Intensity Democracy: Political Power in the New World Order*, London: Pluto.

Glancey, J. (2003), 'Our Last Occupation: Gas, Chemicals, Bombs: Britain has used them all before in Iraq', *Guardian*, 19 April. Online, available at: www.guardian.co.uk/world/ 2003/apr/19/iraq.arts (accessed 27 October 2008).

Goodin, R. (2006), *What's Wrong with Terrorism?* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Gordon, L. (1964), 'Secret Cable from Ambassador Gordon to the State Department (Declassified document, obtained by the National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, DC, Document 2 of NSA Electronic Briefing Book 118)', 27 March. Online, available at: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB118/bz03.pdf (accessed 8 February 2006).

Gowan, P. (1999), *The Global Gamble. Washington's Faustian Bid for World Dominance*, London: Verso.

—— (2002), 'A Calculus of Power', *New Left Review*, 16, July/August. Online, available at: www.newleftreview.org/?view=2399 (accessed 18 November 2008).

GPF (2007), 'War and Occupation in Iraq', Global Policy Forum, June. Online, available at: www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/occupation/report/full.pdf (accessed 10 November 2008).

Gramsci, A. (1971 [1929–35]), *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, eds Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, London: Lawrence and Wishart.

Grandin, G. (2006), 'The Wide War – How Donald Rumsfeld Discovered the Wild West in Latin America', 7 May. Online, available at: www.truthout.org/docs_2006/printer_050806L.shtml (accessed 9 May 2006).

Green, P. and Ward, T. (2004), *State Crime: Governments, Violence and Corruption*, London: Pluto Press.

—— (2005), 'Introduction to Special Issue on State Crime', *British Journal of Criminology*, 45: 431–3.

Greenberg, K. and Dratel, J. (eds) (2005), *The Torture Papers. The Road to Abu Ghraib*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gregory, F. and Wilkinson, P. (2005), 'Riding Pillion for Tackling Terrorism is a High-Risk Policy', London: Chatham House.

Grey, S. (2006), *Ghost Plane: The True Story of the CIA Torture Program*, New York: St Martin's Press.

Grey, S. and Cobain, I. (2006), 'From Logistics to Turning a Blind Eye: Europe's Role in Terror Abductions', *Guardian*, 7 June. Online, available at: www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0,,1791991,00.html (accessed 15 June 2006).

Grosscup, B. (2006), *Strategic Terror: The Politics and Ethics of Aerial Bombardment*, London: Zed Books.

Gunaratna, R. (2002), *Al Qaeda: A Global Network of Terror*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Gunning, J. (2007), 'A Case for Critical Terrorism Studies?', *Government and Opposition*, 42 (3): 363–93.

Gurr, T.R. (1986), 'The Political Origins of State Violence and Terror: A Theoretical Analysis', in Michael Stohl and George Lopez (eds), *Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research*, New York: Greenwood Press, 45–71.

Gutierrez, T. (2005), 'Lynndie England Convicted in Abu Ghraib Trial', *USA Today*, 26 September 2005.

Hardt, M. and Negri, A. (2000), *Empire*, New York: Harvard University Press.

Harvey, D. (2005a), *The New Imperialism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

—— (2005b), *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

—— (2006), *The Limits to Capital*, 2nd edn, London: Verso.

Haynes, W.J. (2002), 'Counter-Resistance Techniques (Action Memo from William J. Haynes, General Counsel, to Secretary of State for Defense Donald Rumsfeld)', 27 November. Online, available at: www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents/20021127–1.pdf (accessed 18 October 2008).

Herman, E. (1985), *The Real Terror Network*, 2nd edn, Montreal: Black Rose Books.

Herman, E. and O'Sullivan, G. (1989), *The 'Terrorism' Industry: The Experts and Institutions that Shape Our View of Terror*, New York: Pantheon.

Herring, E. (2000), 'Rogue Rage: Can we Prevent Mass Destruction', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 23 (1): 188–212.

—— (2008), 'Critical Terrorism Studies: An Activist Scholar Perspective', *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 1 (2): 197–211.

Herring, E. and Rangwala, G. (2006), *Iraq in Fragments: The Occupation and its Legacy*, London: C. Hurst and Co.

Hersh, S. (2004), *Chain of Command. The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib*, London: Penguin Books.

Hoffman, B. (1998), *Inside Terrorism*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Horazuk, C. (1995), 'Turning Point for the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador'. Online, available at: www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/47/067.html (accessed 20 June 2005).

Horgan, J. and Boyle, M. (2008), 'A Case against "Critical Terrorism Studies"', *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 1 (1): 51–64.

HRF (2003), 'Human Rights Defenders in Guatemala: The Case of Myrna Mack Chang', Human Rights First. Online, available at: www.humanrightsfirst.org/defenders/hrd_guatemala/hrd_mack/hrd_mack.htm (accessed 6 November 2007).

HRW (1991), 'El Salvador's Decade of Terror', New York: Human Rights Watch/Americas.

—— (1992), 'Colombia Human Rights Developments', Human Rights Watch. Online, available at: www.hrw.org/reports/1993/WR93/Amw-02.htm (accessed 2 August 2003).

—— (1994), 'Terror Prevails in Haiti: Human Rights Violations and Failed Diplomacy', Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch/Americas and the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees.

—— (1999), 'US Government Must Return Seized Haitian Documents. Deportation of Haitian Death Squad Leader Urged'. Online, available at: www.hrw.org/english/docs/1999/09/16/haiti1641_txt.htm (accessed 23 August 2005).

—— (2000a), 'Haiti's Tarnished Election Results', Human Rights Watch. Online, available at: www.haiti-info.com/article.php3?id_article=54 (accessed 5 January 2006).

—— (2000b), 'Russian Atrocities in Chechnya Detailed', Human Rights Watch, 1 June. Online, available at: http://hrw.org/english/docs/2000/06/02/russia611.htm (accessed 28 October 2008).

—— (2003), 'Violent Response: The US Army in Falluja', Human Rights Watch. Online, available at: www.hrw.org/reports/2003/iraqfalluja/ (accessed 18 September 2008).

—— (2006), 'Afghanistan: Civilian Life Must be Donor Priority', Human Rights Watch, 30 January. Online, available at: http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/01/30/afghan12554.htm (accessed 11 May 2006).

—— (2007a), 'Colombia: Events of 2007', Human Rights Watch. Online, available at: http://hrw.org/englishwr2k8/docs/2008/01/31/colomb17754.htm (accessed 14 October 2008).

—— (2007b), 'World Report. The Philippines: Events of 2006', Human Rights Watch. Online, available at: http://hrw.org/englishwr2k7/docs/2007/01/11/philip14840.htm (accessed 28 October 2008).

Huang, P. (2000), 'The Paradox of Taiwan's Human Rights Conditions'. Online, available at: www.tahr.org.tw/site/committee/2001.01Commissions/peter.htm (accessed January 2008).

Huggins, M. (1998), *Political Policing. The United States and Latin America*, Durham: Duke University Press.

Huggins, M., Haritos-Fatouros, M. and Zimbardo, P. (2002), *Violence Workers. Police Torturers and Murderers Reconstruct Brazilian Atrocities*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Huntington, S. (1997), *The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order*, London: Simon and Schuster.

ICJ (1986), 'Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (*Nicaragua* v. *United States of America*)', The Hague: International Court of Justice.

ICRC (1923), 'Draft Rules of Aerial Warfare'. Online, available at: www.dannen.com/decision/int-law.html (accessed 12 December 2008).

—— (1949), 'Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War'. Online, available at: www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/6fef854a3517b75ac125641e004a9e68 (accessed 2 May 2005).

—— (1977), 'Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II)'. Online, available at: www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/52d68d14de6160e0c12563da005fdb1b/d67c3971bcff1c10c125641e0052b545?OpenDocument (accessed 2 May 2005).

—— (1999), 'The *People on War* Report: ICRC Worldwide Consultation on the Rules of War'. Online, available at: www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/p0758/$File/ICRC_002_0758.PDF!Open (accessed 11 November 2008).

—— (2003), 'International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law: Similarities and Differences'. Online, available at: www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/57JR8L/$FILE/IHL_and_IHRL.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 6 June 2005).

IIDEA (1998), 'Democracy and Deep Rooted Conflict', International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Online, available at: www.idea.int/publications/democracy_and_deep_rooted_conflict/ (accessed 31 August 2005).

Ikenberry, J. (2006), *Liberal Order and Imperial Ambition: Essays on American Power and World Politics*, London: Polity Press.

IMF (2006), 'IMF Members' Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors'. International Monetary Fund, 31 March. Online, available at: www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.htm (accessed 6 April 2006).

IPU (1994), 'Report of the Inter-Parliamentary Delegation to Observe the Electoral Process in El Salvador'. Online, available at: www.ipu.org/elcn-e/rptslvdr.htm (accessed 19 August 2005).

Isacson, A. (2000), 'The Colombian Dilemma: After Half a Century of Fighting, can a Fragile Peace Process Succeed?' Online, available at: www.ciponline.org/coipr/coipr001.htm (accessed 17 October 2008).

Islam, F. (2003), 'Iraq Nets Handsome Profit by Dumping Dollar for Euro', *Observer*, 16 February 2003. Online, available at: http://observer.guardian.co.uk/iraq/story/0,12239,896344,00.html (accessed 24 August 2006).

ITDS (2004), 'Sections 201–204 of the Trade Act of 1974', International Trade Data System, 23 April. Online, available at: www.itds.treas.gov/sec201.htm (accessed 6 April 2006).

Jackson, R. (2007), 'The Case for Critical Terrorism Studies', *European Political Science*, 6 (3): 225–7.

—— (2008), 'Israeli State Terrorism', Personal Correspondence, 5 March 2008.

—— (2009), 'The Ghosts of State Terror: Knowledge, Politics and Terrorism Studies', *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 1 (3).

—— (2009, forthcoming), 'Knowledge, Power and Politics in the Study of Political Terrorism', in Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth and Jeroen Gunning (eds), *Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda*, Routledge Critical Terrorism Studies, London: Routledge.

James, C. (1997), 'Haiti: The Roof is Leaking'. Online, available at: www.zmag.org/ZMag/articles/june97james.htm (accessed 21 June 2005).

Jamieson, R. and McEvoy, K. (2005), 'State Crime by Proxy and Juridical Othering', *British Journal of Criminology*, 45: 504–27.

Jawara, F. and Kwa, A. (2004), *Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of International Trade*, London: Zed.

Jenkins, B. (1980), 'The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems', *The RAND Paper series*, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.

—— (2002), *Countering Al Qaeda*, Washington, DC: RAND Corporation.

Jessop, B. (2003), 'Globalisation and the National State'. Online, available at: www.lancs.ac.uk/fass/sociology/papers/jessop-globalization-and-the-national-state.pdf (accessed 25 April 2006).

Johnson, C. (2000), *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire*, London: Little, Brown and Company.

Johnson, L. (1964), 'White House Audio Tape: President Lyndon Johnson discussing the impending coup in Brazil with Undersecretary of State George Ball (Declassified audiotape, obtained by the National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, DC, NSA Electronic Briefing Book 118)', 31 March. Online, available at: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB118/index.htm#2 (accessed 8 February 2006).

Jones, R.W. (1999), *Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Kahl, C. (2007), 'In the Crossfire or the Crosshairs? Norms, Civilian Casualties, and US Conduct in Iraq', *International Security*, 32 (1): 7–46.

Keaney, T. and Cohen, E. (1993), 'Gulf War Air Power Surveys (Volume II, Part II, Chapters 6 and 7)', Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University Press and the US Air Force.

Keohane, R. (ed.) (1986), *Neorealism and its Critics*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Kiely, R. (2007), 'Poverty Reduction Through Liberalisation? Neoliberalism and the Myth of Global Convergence', *Review of International Studies*, 33 (3): 415–34.

Kiernan, B. (2002), 'Cover Up and Denial of Genocide: Australia, the USA, East Timor, and the Aborigines', *Critical Asian Studies*, 34 (2): 163–92.

Killingray, D. (1973), *A Plague of Europeans: Westerners in Africa Since the Fifteenth Century*, London: Penguin.

Kissinger, H. (1970), 'Memorandum for the President, from National Security Council Meeting, 6 November, Chile (Declassified document, obtained by the National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, DC, Document 2 of NSA Electronic Briefing Book 110)', 6 November. Online, available at: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB110/chile02.pdf (accessed 30 January 2006).

—— (1976), 'Staff Meeting Transcripts of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (Declassified document, obtained by the National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, DC, Document, NSA Electronic Briefing Book 185)', 26 March. Online, available at: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB185/index.htm (accessed 4 April 2006).

Kolko, G. (1988), *Confronting the Third World. United States Foreign Policy 1945–1980*, New York: Pantheon Books.

Kramer, R. and Michalowski, R. (2005), 'War, Aggression and State Crime', *British Journal of Criminology*, 45: 446–69.

Kurtulus, E. (2007), 'The New Counterterrorism', *Work in Progress Seminar, Dept of Politics and IR*, Canterbury: University of Kent.

Laffey, M. and Dean, K. (2002), 'A Flexible Marxism for Flexible Times', in Mark Rupert and Hazel Smith (eds), *Historical Materialism and Globalisation*, London: Routledge, 90–109.

Laqueur, W. (1986), 'Reflections on Terrorism', *Foreign Affairs*, 65: 86–100.

—— (2003), *No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*, New York: Continuum.

Lawler, P. (2005), 'The Good State: In Praise of "Classical" Internationalism', *Review of International Studies*, 31: 427–49.

Lee, B. (2004), 'Letter to Secretary of State Colin Powell', 11 February. Online, available at: www.haitiaction.net/News/bl2_24_4.html (accessed 5 January 2006).

Leuer, J. (2000), 'A Half Century of Professionalism: The US Army School of the Americas', *Adelante, Historical Edition*: 6–35.

Levin, D. (2004), 'Memorandum for James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General, from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Re: Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 USC, 2340–2340A', 30 December. Online, available at: www.usdoj.gov/olc/dagmemo.pdf (accessed 3 July 2006).

Lewis, B. (2004), *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*, London: Phoenix.

McClintock, M. (1992), *Instruments of Statecraft*, New York: Pantheon Books. Online, available at: www.statecraft.org/index.html.

—— (2001), 'The United States and Operation Condor: Military Doctrine in an Unconventional War', Latin American Studies Association Conference, Washington, DC.

McCulloch, J. and Pickering, S. (2005), 'Suppressing the Financing of Terrorism', *British Journal of Criminology*, 45: 470–86.

McLaughlin, E. and Muncie, J. (2001), *The Problem of Crime*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

MacMaster, N. (2004), 'Torture: From Algiers to Abu Ghraib', *Race and Class*, 46 (2): 1–21.

Martin, G. (2003), *Understanding Terrorism. Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues*, London: Sage.

Mayer, J. (2005), 'Outsourcing Torture. The Secret History of America's "Extraordinary Rendition" Programme', *The New Yorker*, 7 February. Online, available at: www.newyorker.com/printables/fact/050214fa_fact6 (accessed 1 September 2005).

Milbank, D. (2004), 'Bush Seeks to Reassure Nation on Iraq', *Washington Post*, 25 May 2004.

Mitchell, C., Stohl, M., Carleton, D. and Lopez, G. (1986), 'State Terrorism: Issues of Concept and Measurement', in Michael Stohl and George Lopez (eds), *Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research*, New York: Greenwood Press, 1–26.

Mitchell, D. (2005), 'The 2004 Removal of Jean-Bertrand Aristide'. Online, available at: www.cooperativeresearch.org/timeline.jsp?timeline=the_2004_removal_of_jean-bertrand_aristide&startpos=100 (accessed 5 January 2006).

MoD (2008), 'MoD Response to Second Panorama Letter', UK Ministry of Defence, 20 February. Online, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/25_02_08_mod.pdf (accessed 10 November 2008).

Molloy, I. (2001), *Rolling Back Revolution*, London: Pluto Press.

Monbiot, G. (2002), 'The Rich World's Veto', *Guardian*, 15 October. Online, available at: www.monbiot.com/dsp_article.cfm?article_id=538 (accessed 21 October 2004).

Murray, C. (2006), 'The Banality of Evil', 15 June. Online, available at: www.craigmurray.org.uk/archives/2006/06/the_banality_of.html (accessed 27 October 2008).

Murray, K., Coletti, E., Spence, J., Curtis, C., Cheff, G., Ramos, R., Chacón, J. and Thompson, M. (eds) (1994), *Rescuing Reconstruction: The Debate on Post-War Economic Recovery in El Salvador*, Cambridge: Hemisphere Initiatives.

NACLA (1972), 'The US Military Apparatus: Defence Department Organisation; the Intelligence Establishment; US Bases and Forces Abroad; Military Police Aid; Arms Sales', Berkeley, California: North American Congress for Latin America.

Nacos, B. (2007), *Mass-Mediated Terrorism*, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

Nairn, A. (1994), 'Our Man in FRAPH: Behind Haiti's Paramilitaries', *The Nation*, pp. 458–61.

—— (1996), 'Haiti Under the Gun: How US Intelligence Has Been Exercising Crowd Control', *The Nation*, 8 January, pp. 11–15.

NED (2002), 'Strategy Document', National Endowment for Democracy. Online, available at: www.ned.org/publications/documents/strategy2002.html (accessed 19 October 2008).

—— (2005a), 'Democracy Projects Database: Haiti', National Endowment for Democracy. Online, available at: www.ned.org/dbtw-wpd/exec/dbtwpub.dll (accessed 26 August 2005).

—— (2005b), 'Democracy Projects Database', National Endowment for Democracy. Online, available at: www.ned.org/dbtw-wpd/textbase/projects-search.htm (accessed 24 October 2005).

—— (2005c), 'National Endowment for Democracy Website', National Endowment for Democracy. Online, available at: www.ned.org/ (accessed 3 August 2005).

—— (2005d), 'Democracy Projects Database: El Salvador', National Endowment for Democracy. Online, available at: www.ned.org/dbtw-wpd/exec/dbtwpub.dll (accessed 22 August 2005).

—— (2007), 'Strategy Document', National Endowment for Democracy. Online, available at: www.ned.org/publications/documents/strategy2007.pdf (accessed 20 July 2008).

New York Times (1909), 'Tells of Attrocities in Belgium's Congo', *New York Times*, 24 November. Online, available at: http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?_r=1&res=9E06E5D91630E733A25757C2A9679D946897D6CF&oref=slogin (accessed 27 October 2008).

—— (1995), 'Haitian Ex-Paramilitary Leader Confirms CIA Relationship', *New York Times*, 3 December, pp. 8–9.

Nexon, D. and Wright, T. (2007), 'What's at Stake in the American Empire Debate', *American Political Science Review*, 101 (2): 253–71.

Nicholson, M. (1986), 'Conceptual Problems of Studying State Terrorism', in Michael Stohl and George Lopez (eds), *Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research*, New York: Greenwood Press, 27–44.

Nixon, R. and Zeigler, R. (1972), 'White House Audio Tape, President Richard Nixon and White House Press Secretary Ron Zeigler (Declassified audio tape, obtained by the National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, DC, NSA Electronic Briefing Book 110)', 23 March. Online, available at: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB110/index.htm (accessed 30 January 2006).

North, O. (1985), 'National Security Memorandum from Oliver North to Robert McFarlane: Fallback Plan for the Nicaraguan Resistance (Declassified document, obtained by the National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, DC, Document 1 of NSA Electronic Briefing Book 210)', 16 March. Online, available at: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB210/4-North%20Fallback%20memo%203-16-85%20(1C%2000952).pdf (accessed 22 July 2008).

Novelli, M. (2008), 'Colombia's Classroom Wars: Political Violence Against Education Sector Trade Unions in Colombia (Draft Report Prepared for Education International, Brussels)', Amsterdam: IS Academe: Education and Development, AMIDST, University of Amsterdam.

NSC (1991), 'National Security Strategy of the United States', National Security Council. Online, available at: www.fas.org/man/docs/918015-nss.htm (accessed 8 July 2005).

—— (2004), 'Biography of Dr Condoleezza Rice', National Security Council. Online, available at: www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/ricebio.html (accessed 22 January 2008).

OAS (1999), 'Political Database of the Americas: El Salvador Presidential Election Results 1994', Organisation of American States. Online, available at: www.georgetown.edu/ pdba/Elecdata/ElSal/pres94.html (accessed 19 August 2005).

—— (2000), 'The OAS Electoral Observation Mission in Haiti: Cheif of Mission Report to the OAS Permanent Council', Organisation of American States. Online, available at: www.upd.oas.org/EOM/Haiti/haitichief%20of%20mission%20report.htm (accessed 5 January 2006).

—— (2001), 'Political Database of the Americas: El Salvador 1982–1994 Voter Turnout', Organisation of American States. Online, available at: www.georgetown.edu/pdba/Elecdata/ElSal/82–94tout.html (accessed 19 August 2005).

Osorio, C. (2002), 'Nixon: "Brazil Helped Rig the Uruguayan Elections," 1971', 20 June. Online, available at: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB71/ (accessed 8 February 2006).

Panorama (2008), 'On Whose Orders?' *Panorama*, BBC. Broadcast 25 February 2008. Online, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/7235426.stm.

Parmar, I. (2002), 'American Foundations and the Development of International Knowledge Networks', *Global Networks*, 2 (1): 13–30.

Perkins, D. (1927), *The Monroe Doctrine 1823–1826*, 3 vols, 1, Gloucester, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Peters, E. (1985), *Torture*, New York: Basil Blackwell.

PNAC (2000), 'Rebuilding America's Defences: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century'. Online, available at: www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf (accessed 11 May 2006).

Porter, B. (1968), *Critics of Empire: British Radical Attitudes to Colonialism in Africa, 1895–1914*, London: Macmillan.

Poulantzas, N. (1975), *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, London: New Left Books.

—— (1977), *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, London: New Left Books.

—— ([1968] 1987), *Political Power and Social Classes*, trans. Timothy O'Hagan, London: Verso.

Priest, D. (2004a), *The Mission. Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military*, New York: W.W. Norton and Company.

—— (2004b), 'Jet is an Open Secret in Terror War', *Washington Post*, 27 December. Online, available at: www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A27826–2004Dec26.html (accessed 1 September 2005).

Prince, R. (1985), *Haiti Family Business*, London: Latin American Bureau.

Public Health News Centre (2006), 'Updated Iraq Survey Affirms Earlier Mortality Estimates', Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health: Public Health News Centre, 11 October. Online, available at: www.jhsph.edu/publichealthnews/press_releases/ 2006/burnham_iraq_2006.html (accessed 28 October 2008).

Raphael, S. (2007), 'Putting the State Back In: The Orthodox Definition of Terrorism and the Critical Need to Address State Terrorism', paper presented at British International Studies Association Annual Conference, Cambridge, 17–19 December.

—— (2009, forthcoming), 'In the Service of Power: Terrorism Studies and US Intervention in the Global South', in Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth and Jeroen Gunning (eds), *Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda*, Routledge Critical Terrorism Studies, London: Routledge.

Rayment, S. (2004), 'US Tactics Condemned by British Officers', *Daily Telegraph*, 10 April. Online, available at: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/1459048/US-tactics-condemned-by-British-officers.html?mobile=true (accessed 18 September 2008).

Reagan, R. (1983), 'Presidential Finding on Covert Operations in Nicaragua, (with attached scope note) (Declassified document, obtained by the National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, DC, Document 1 of NSA Electronic Briefing Book 210)', 19 September. Online, available at: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/ NSAEBB/NSAEBB210/1-Reagan%20Finding%209–19–83%20(IC%2000203).pdf (accessed 22 July 2008).

Rejali, D. (2007), *Torture and Democracy*, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Reuter, C. (2004), *My Life is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Rice, X. (2008), 'MoD Threatens to Halt Training of Kenyan Military Over Claims of Rights Abuses', *Guardian*, 29 July. Online, available at: www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/29/kenya.military (accessed 29 July 2008).

Richardson, J. (1907), 'Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents (vol II): The Monroe Doctrine'. Online, available at: http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/50.htm (accessed 26 August 2003).

Robertson, G. (1999), *Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice*, London: Penguin.

Robinson, W. (1996), *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalisation, US Intervention, and Hegemony*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

—— (2004a), 'What to Expect from US "Democracy Promotion" in Iraq', *New Political Science*, 26 (3): 441–7.

—— (2004b), *A Theory of Global Capitalism. Production, Class, and State in a Transnational World*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

—— (2005), 'Global Capitalism: The New Transnationalism and the Folly of Conventional Thinking', *Science and Society*, 69 (3): 316–28.

Robison, R. (1978), 'Toward a Class Analysis of the Indonesian Military Bureaucratic State', *Indonesia*, 25: 17–40.

Rogers, P. (2002), *Losing Control. Global Security in the 21st Century*, 2nd edn, London: Pluto Press.

Ropp, S. and Sikkink, K. (1999), 'International Norms and Domestic Politics in Chile and Guatemala', in Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 172–204.

Rose, D. (2004), *Guantanamo: America's War on Human Rights*, London: Faber and Faber.

Roth, K. (2008), 'After Guantanamo', *Foreign Affairs*, 87 (3).

Rumell, R. (1994), *Death by Government*, Somerset, New Jersey: Transaction Books.

Rumsfeld, D. (2003), 'Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy and Operational Considerations', Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defence, 4 April.

Rupert, M. (2008), 'A Retrospective View of the Development of my Research Program'. Online, available at: http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/merupert/research%20Summary.htm (accessed 13 November 2008).

Rupert, M. and Smith, H. (eds) (2002), *Historical Materialism and Globalisation*, London: Routledge.

Rusk, D. (1964), 'Outgoing Telegram from the Department of State to Ambassador Gordon (Declassified document, obtained by the National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, DC, Document 5 of NSA Electronic Briefing Book 118)', 31 March. Online, available at: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB118/ bz05.pdf (accessed 8 February 2006).

Russell, B. (1938), *Power: A New Social Analysis*, London: George Allen and Unwin.

Ryan, P. (1973), 'Navy Section, United States Military Group, Chile, Situation Report Number 2 (Declassified document, obtained by the National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, DC, NSA Electronic Briefing Book 8)', 1 October. Online, available at: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/nsaebb8.htm (accessed 30 January 2006).

Sartre, J.-P. ([1964] 2001), *Colonialism and Neocolonialism*, London: Penguin.

Schmitt, G. and Donnelly, T. (2002), 'The Bush Doctrine', Project for the New American Century, 30 January. Online, available at: www.newamericancentury.org/ defense-20020130.htm (accessed 8 May 2006).

Schoultz, L. (1998), *Beneath the United States*, London and Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Serra, N. and Stiglitz, J. (eds) (2008), *The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global Governance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Serra, N., Spiegel, S. and Stiglitz, J. (2008), 'Introduction: From the Washington Consensus Towards a New Global Governance', in N. Serra and J. Stiglitz (eds), *The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global Governance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3–13.

Shamsie, Y. (2004), 'Building "Low-Intensity" Democracy in Haiti: The OAS Contribution', *Third World Quarterly*, 25 (2), 1097–115.

Shiner, P. (2008a), '*R* (Al Skeini and others) v. *Secretary of State for Defence*', Public Interest Lawyers. Online, available at: www.publicinterestlawyers.co.uk/cases/cases.php?id=34 (accessed 20 September 2008).

—— (2008b), '*R* (Kammash and others) v. *Secretary of State for Defence and the MOD*', Public Interest Lawyers. Online, available at: www.publicinterestlawyers.co.uk/cases/ cases.php?id=85 (accessed 17 September 2008).

Shoup, L. and Minter, W. (1977), *Imperial Brain Trust: The Council on Foreign Relations and United States Foreign Policy*, New York: Monthly Review Press.

Silke, A. (2004a), *Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures*, London: Frank Cass.

—— (2004b), 'The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism', in Andrew Silke (ed.), *Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures*, London: Frank Cass, 57–71.

Silverio-Marques, J. (2004), 'Operationalising Pro-Poor Growth. A Country Case Study on El Salvador', Department for International Development. Online, available at: www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/oppgelsalvador.pdf (accessed 24 October 2005).

Simons, M. (1984), 'Peru Adopts Severe Tactics to Combat Guerrillas', *The New York Times*, 18 August, p. 1.

Sims, B. (2004), 'Populism, Conservatism, and Civil Society in Haiti'. Online, available at: http://rightweb.irc-online.org/analysis/2004/0403ned-haiti.php (accessed 24 August 2005).

Sklair, L. (2002), *Globalisation, Capitalism and its Alternatives*, 3rd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Slack, K. (1996), 'Operation Condor and Human Rights: A Report from Paraguay's Archive of Terror', *Human Rights Quarterly*, 18 (2): 492–506.

Sluka, J. (2000a), 'Introduction: State Terror and Anthropology', in Jeffrey Sluka (ed.), *Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1–45.

—— (ed.) (2000b), *Death Squad: An Anthropology of State Terror*, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Smith, H. (1993), *Nicaragua: Self-Determination and Survival*, London: Pluto Press.

Smith, N. (2008), 'Where Power Lies with Impunity', *Times Higher Education*, 13 March, p. 46.

Sollis, P. (1993), 'Reluctant Reforms: The Christiani Government and the International Community in the Process of Salvadoran Postwar Reconstruction', Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America.

Sorenson, M. (1968), *Origins of European Settlement in Kenya*, Nairobi and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stahler-Sholk, R. (1994), 'El Salvador's Negotiated Transition: From Low-Intensity Conflict to Low Intensity-Democracy', *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, 36 (4): 1–59.

Stamnes, E. and Jones, R.W. (2000), 'Burundi: A Critical Security Studies Perspective', *Peace and Conflict Studies*, 7 (2): 37–56.

Stiglitz, J. (1998), 'More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving Towards the Post-Washington Consensus', *The 1998 WIDER Annual Lecture*, 7 January. Online, available at: www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/bwi-wto/stig.htm (accessed 10 November 2008).

—— (2002), *Globalisation and its Discontents*, London: Penguin Books.

Stohl, M. (2006), 'The State as Terrorist: Insights and Implications', *Democracy and Security*, 2: 1–25.

Stohl, M. and Lopez, G. (eds) (1984), *The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Governmental Violence and Repression*, Westport: Greenwood Press.

—— (eds) (1986), *Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research*, ed. Bernard Johnpoll, Contributions in Political Science, New York: Greenwood.

Stokes, D. (2001), 'Better Lead than Bread? A Critical Analysis of the US' Plan Colombia', *Civil Wars*, 4 (2): 59–78.

—— (2003), 'Why the End of the Cold War Doesn't Matter: the US War of Terror in Colombia', *Review of International Studies*, 29 (4): 560–85.

—— (2005a), 'The Heart of Empire? Theorising US Empire In An Era Of Transnational Globalisation', *Third World Quarterly*, 26 (2): 217–36.

—— (2005b), *America's Other War*, London: Zed Books.

—— (2005c), 'Gluing the Hats on: Power, Agency and Reagan's Office of Public Diplomacy'. Online, available at: www.naspir.org/members/doug/doug_stokes.htm (accessed 14 November 2005).

Stubbs, R. and Underhill, G. (2000), *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order*, 2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Suret-Canale, J. (1971 [1964]), *French Colonialism in Tropical Africa 1900–1945*, trans. Till Gottheiner, London: C Hurst and Company.

Taguba, M.G.A. (2004), 'Article 15–6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade', Washington, DC: US Department of Defence.

Tickell, A. and Peck, J. (2003), 'Making Global Rules: Globalization or Neoliberalism?' in J. Peck and H. Wai-Chung Yeung (eds), *Remaking the Global Economy*, London: Sage, 163–181.

Tignor, R. (1976), *The Colonial Transformation of Kenya*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Tilly, C. (2004), 'Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists', *Sociological Theory*, 22 (1): 5–13.

Tomuschat, C., Lux-de-Cotí, O. and Balsells-Tojo, A. (1999), 'Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification', 26 February. Online, available at: http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/ (accessed 12 July 2005).

Turk, A. (2004), 'Sociology of Terrorism', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 30: 271–86.

UK Steel (2003), 'UK Steel Welcomes WTO Ruling on Illegal Tariffs but Warns of New US Threat to Trade', UK Steel, 10 November. Online, available at: www.uksteel.org.uk/nw108.htm (accessed 6 April 2006).

UN (1985), 'Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment', United Nations. Online, available at: www.hrweb.org/legal/cat.html (accessed 4 May 2005).

—— (1995a), 'United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador, Background', United Nations. Online, available at: www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/onusalbackgr2.html (accessed 19 August 2005).

—— (1995b), 'Haiti: Background Summary', United Nations. Online, available at: www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unmihbackgr1.html (accessed 23 August 2005).

—— (1999), 'International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism', United Nations. Online, available at: http://untreaty.un.org/english/Terrorism/Conv12.pdf (accessed 30 September 2008).

—— (2004), *Secretary General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility* (UN Document A/59/565), United Nations. Online, available at: www.un.org/secureworld/ (accessed 19 October 2008).

UNDP (2002), 'Meeting the Millennium Poverty Reduction Targets in Latin America and the Caribbean', United Nations Development Programme. Online, available at: www.undp.org/rblac/documents/poverty/mdg/MDGs-libro70.pdf (accessed 23 August 2005).

UNSC (1993), 'From Madness to Hope: the 12-year War in El Salvador: Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador', United Nations Security Council. Online, available at: www.usip.org/library/tc/doc/reports/el_salvador/tc_es_03151993_V.html (accessed 12 July 2005).

—— (1994), 'Resolution 940', United Nations Security Council, 31 July. Online, available at: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/312/22/PDF/N9431222.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 19 October 2008).

—— (2003), 'Resolution 1483', United Nations Security Council, 22 May. Online, available at: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/368/53/PDF/N0336853.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 24 August 2006).

US Congress (2007a), 'Extraordinary Rendition in US Counterterrorism Policy: The Impact on Transatlantic Relations (Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight and the Subcommittee on Europe of the

Committee on Foreign Affairs of the US House of Representatives)', 17 April. Online, available at: www.fas.org/irp/congress/2007_hr/rendition.pdf (accessed 19 September 2008).

—— (2007b), 'US Code, Title 22, Section 2656f (d)'. Online, available at: http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode22/usc_sec_22_00002656—f000-.html (accessed 30 September 2008).

US Embassy (Jakarta) (1975), 'Embassy Jakarta Telegram 1579 to Secretary State, 6 December 1975 [Text of Ford-Kissinger-Suharto Discussion] (Declassified document, obtained by the National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, DC)', 6 December. Online, available at: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/doc4.pdf (accessed 23 July 2008).

USAID (2005a), 'Development Experience Clearing House: Haiti, Recent Reports on Democracy and Governance', US Agency for International Development. Online, available at: www.dec.org/country/more_display.cfm?country=Haiti&category=dg (accessed 24 October 2005).

—— (2005b), 'Promoting Democracy and Good Governance', US Agency for International Development. Online, available at: www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/ (accessed 24 October 2005).

USIP (2001), 'Whither the Bulldozer? Nonviolent Revolution and the Transition to Democracy in Serbia', United States Institute of Peace. Online, available at: www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr72.html (accessed 31 August 2005).

Vaky, V. (1968), 'Memorandum. Subject: Guatemala and Counter-Terror, Sent to Covey Oliver, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Memorandum obtained by National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, DC, and document 5 of 32 compiled for the Guatemala Documentation Project, in NSA Electronic Briefing Book no. 11)', 29 March. Online, available at: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB11/docs/05–01.htm (accessed 24 January 2006).

—— (1978), 'Memorandum to State Department: Evolution of US Human Rights Policy in Argentina (Declassified document, obtained by the National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, DC, Document 13 of NSA Electronic Briefing Book 73, Part Two)', 11 September. Online, available at: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB73/780911.pdf (accessed 8 February 2006).

Valentine, D. (2000), *The Phoenix Program*, 2nd edn, Lincoln: Authors Guild BackinPrint.Com.

—— (2004), 'The Prison at Guantánamo. What the World Should Know'. Online, available at: www.counterpunch.org/valentine09042004.html (accessed 12 December 2004).

Verton, D. (2003), *Black Ice: The Invisible Threat of Cyber-Terrorism*, London: McGraw Hill Professional.

Vidal-Naquet, P. (1963), *Torture: Cancer of Democracy*, Middlesex: Penguin.

Walt, S. (2005), 'Taming American Power', *Foreign Affairs*, 85 (5): 105–20.

Walter, E.V. (1969), *Terror and Resistance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Walzer, M. (2000), *Just and Unjust Wars*, 3rd edn, New York: Basic Books.

Watkins, S. (2004), 'A Weightless Hegemony', *New Left Review*, 25: 5–33.

WB (2002), 'El Salvador Country Assistance Evaluation'. Washington, DC: World Bank. Online, available at: http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewForJavaSearch/B27BD8596FD1289C85256B810052C1EC/$file/el_salvador.pdf (accessed 22 August 2005).

—— (2003a), 'El Salvador Country Brief'. Washington, DC: World Bank. Online, available at: http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/LAC/LACInfoClient.nsf/

5996dfbf9847f67d85256736005dc67c/79051920dc2134e985256c08006f0cb2/$FIL
E/El%20Salvador%20Brief.pdf (accessed 23 August 2005).

—— (2003b), 'Haiti Country Overview'. Washington, DC: World Bank. Online, available at: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/
HAITIEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20226261~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~the-
SitePK:338165,00.html (accessed 26 August 2005).

Weinberg, L. and Eubank, W.L. (2008), 'Problems with the Critical Studies Approach to Terrorism', *Critical Terrorism Studies*, 1 (2): 185–95.

Weinberg, L., Pedahzur, A. and Hirsch-Hoefler, S. (2004), 'The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 16 (4): 777–94.

Welch, R. (1974), 'American Atrocities in the Philippines: The Indictment and the Response', *The Pacific Historical Review*, 43 (2): 233–53.

WHO (1996), 'The Health Conditions of the Population in Iraq since the Gulf Crisis'. World Health Organisation. Online, available at: www.who.int/disasters/repo/5249.html (accessed 6 October 2008).

Wilkinson, P. (1992), 'International Terrorism: New Risks to World Order', in John Baylis and Nick Rengger (eds), *Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World*, London: Clarendon Press, 228–57.

Williamson, J. (2002), 'Did the Washington Consensus Fail?' Speech given at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 6 November. Online, Available at: www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=488.

Williamson, J. (2004a), 'A Short History of the Washington Consensus', 5 October. Online, available at: http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/ipd/pub/williamson.pdf (accessed 10 November 2008).

Williamson, J. (2004b), 'The Washington Consensus as Policy Prescription for Development', B-Span, 13 January. Online, available at: http://info.worldbank.org/etools/bspan/
PresentationView.asp?PID=1003&EID=328 (accessed 18 November 2008).

Wood, E.M. (2003), *Empire of Capital*, London: Verso.

Zakaria, F. (2008), *The Post-American World*, London: Allen Lane.

Index

The use of terror by states has been an enduring feature of violence, yet largely ignored in terrorism studies. Even more limited has been the analysis of the role of northern liberal democracies. Blakeley's book is a major addition and powerful rejoinder to this failing.

Professor Paul Rogers, Department of Peace Studies,
University of Bradford

Blakeley admirably brings the state back into terrorism studies by confronting both Northern terrorism in the Global South and the theoretical shortcomings of much contemporary scholarship which have precluded such examination. A significant and thoughtful contribution to our understanding of both states and terrorism.

Professor Michael Stohl, University of California, Santa Barbara

In this trenchant and sobering book, Blakeley throws light on the shadowy connections between the neoliberal search for profit and the use of massive violence and terror by Northern states.

Doctor Laleh Khalili, School of Oriental and African Studies, London