SOCIAL ISSUES AND INTERVENTIONS

Explaining the Breakdown of Ethnic Relations

Why Neighbors Kill

Edited by
Victoria M. Esses
and Richard A. Vernon

Blackwell Publishing

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This book is dedicated to Marcelle and Israel Esses, and to the victims of ethnic cleansing and genocide throughout the world

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Notes on Contributors

Howard Adelman, currently Research Professor at the Key Centre for Ethics, Law, Justice and Governance at Griffith University in Brisbane, Australia, and previously, a Visiting Professor at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, was a Professor of Philosophy at York University in Toronto from 1966 to 2003 where he founded and was the first Director of the Centre for Refugee Studies and Editor of *Refuge* until the end of 1993. He has written well over 100 academic articles and chapters in books, as well as authored or coedited 21 books, and recently served as an Associate Editor of the Macmillan 3-volume *Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity*.

Daniel Bar-Tal is Professor of Social Psychology at the School of Education, Tel Aviv University. His research interest is in political and social psychology, studying sociopsychological foundations of intractable conflicts and peace making. He has published more than 15 books and over 150 articles and chapters in major social and political psychological journals and books. He has served as President of the International Society of Political Psychology and received various awards for his work.

Ed Cairns is Professor of Psychology in the School of Psychology at the University of Ulster in Northern Ireland. He has spent the past 35 years studying the psychological aspects of political violence in relation to the conflict in Northern Ireland. During this time he has been a visiting scholar at the Universities of Florida, Cape Town, and Melbourne. He is a Fellow of the British Psychological Society and of the American Psychological Association, and Past President of the Division of Peace Psychology of the American Psychological Association. His most recent publication was *The Role of Memory in Ethnic Conflict* (with Michael Roe, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

John F. Dovidio (MA, PhD in Social Psychology from the University of Delaware) is currently Professor of Psychology at Yale University. Dr Dovidio is Editor of the *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology – Interpersonal Relations and Group Processes*, and he was previously Editor of *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*. He is coediting the annual series *Social Issues and Policy Review*, with Victoria M. Esses. His research interests are in stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination; social power and nonverbal communication; and altruism and helping. Together with Samuel L. Gaertner, he has shared the Kurt Lewin Memorial Award and the Gordon Allport Intergroup Relations Prize awarded by the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues.

Victoria M. Esses is Professor of Psychology and Director of the Collaborative Graduate Program in Migration and Ethnic Relations at the University of Western Ontario, Canada. Her research examines prejudice, discrimination, and intergroup relations. Dr Esses is co-editor of *Social Issues and Policy Review* with John F. Dovidio. She is also on the editorial boards of *Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race, Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* and *Social and Personality Psychology Compass.* She is a Fellow of the American Psychological Association, the Association for Psychological Science, the Canadian Psychological Association, and the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues.

Samuel L. Gaertner is Professor of Psychology at the University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware. He earned his BA (1964) from Brooklyn College and his PhD (1970) from the City University of New York: Graduate Center. He has served on the editorial boards of the *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, and *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations.* Together with John F. Dovidio, he has shared the Kurt Lewin Memorial Award and the Gordon Allport Intergroup Relations Prize awarded by the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues.

Peter Glick (Oberlin College AB, 1979; University of Minnesota PhD, 1984) conducts research on the social psychology of prejudice. Glick is a Fellow of the American Psychological Association and the Association for Psychological Science. With coauthor Susan T. Fiske, he won the 1995 Gordon W. Allport Prize for research on ambivalent sexism. Forthcoming books include a coedited *Handbook of Prejudice* (Sage) and a coauthored book on the *Social Psychology of Gender* (Guilford).

Carolyn L. Hafer (PhD in Psychology, 1993, from the University of Western Ontario, Canada) is now a Professor in the Department of Psychology at Brock University in St. Catharines, Canada, where she has been a faculty member since 1991. Her research focuses on the social psychology of justice, especially the topics of belief in a just world, and scope of justice.

Miles Hewstone is Professor of Social Psychology and Fellow of New College, Oxford University. He has published widely on the topics of attribution theory, social cognition, stereotyping, and intergroup relations. His current research focuses on the reduction of intergroup conflict. He is cofounding Editor of the *European Review of Social Psychology*, and a former Editor of the *British Journal of Social Psychology*. He is a Fellow of the British Academy and an Honorary Fellow of the British Psychological Society. He was the recipient of the British Psychological Society Presidents' Award for Distinguished Contributions to Psychological Knowledge in 2001, and the Kurt Lewin Award, for Distinguished Research Achievement, from the European Association for Experimental Social Psychology in 2005.

Gordon Hodson is an Associate Professor at Brock University, Canada. He is currently a Consulting Editor at the *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. His research interests include prejudice and discrimination, individual differences, perceptions of intergroup threat, intergroup emotions, and group contact.

Joanne Hughes is Professor of Education in the School of Education, Queen's University: Belfast. Her main research interest is in intergroup relations, and current research projects include analyses of social identity and direct and indirect cross-community contact and tolerance in mixed and segregated areas of Northern Ireland, and a comparative analysis of integrated/mixed religion schools in divided societies.

Lynne M. Jackson is an Associate Professor in the Department of Psychology at King's University College at the University of Western Ontario, Canada. Her research deals with prejudice and discrimination, with particular emphasis on religious intergroup attitudes and relations.

Jared Kenworthy received his PhD from the University of Southern California in 2002. He then worked with Miles Hewstone as a Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Oxford between 2002 and 2005. He is currently an Assistant Professor of Psychology at the

University of Texas at Arlington. His research interests are intergroup contact and conflict, social categorization, social identity, and group dynamics.

Colin Wayne Leach (BA, MA Boston University; PhD University of Michigan) has been on the faculty of Swarthmore College and the University of California-Santa Cruz as well as a visiting scholar in Germany, the Netherlands, and Australia. Currently, Dr Leach is Reader/Associate Professor at the University of Sussex, England. His research examines people's emotional experience of the social comparisons behind status distinctions.

Patricia Marchak is Professor of Sociology and Dean Emerita of Arts at UBC. She is the author of a dozen books on topics including political economy, ideology, forestry and fisheries, state crimes and human rights. Her current research on societies that have experienced crimes against humanity is reported in several articles and three books: *God's Assassins. State Terrorism in Argentina in the 1970s* (1999); *Reigns of Terror* (2003); and *No Easy Fix: Global Responses to Internal Wars and Crimes Against Humanity* (forthcoming).

James M. Olson is a Full Professor in the Psychology Department at the University of Western Ontario. He has conducted research on many topics, including the social psychology of justice, attitudes, and social cognition. He has published more than 100 articles and chapters and is a co-organizer of the Ontario Symposium on Personality and Social Psychology. He has served as Associate Editor of three scientific journals and is a Fellow of the Canadian Psychological Association, the American Psychological Association, the Association for Psychological Science, and the Society for Personality and Social Psychology.

Adam R. Pearson is a doctoral student in the Department of Psychology at Yale University. He received his BS in Biology from Cornell University and MA in Psychology from the University of Connecticut. His work centers around issues of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination, exploring the nature of more subtle forms of bias and their manifestations in everyday social interactions.

Alexandra A. Peterson received her BA (Hons) from McGill University in Psychology and her MA in Psychology from the University of Western Ontario (UWO). Her research at UWO focused on cognitive dissonance, attitude change, and perceptions of justice and fairness. She is currently completing her final year of her Juris Doctor

(JD) at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law, and plans to practice law in Toronto as a civil litigator.

Keren Sharvit has recently submitted her PhD dissertation to the Department of Psychology at Tel Aviv University. She is currently a Postdoctoral Fellow at the School of Political Science at the University of Haifa, and will soon begin a fellowship at the Swiss Center for Conflict Research, Management and Resolution at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Her research addresses the psychological dynamics of intractable intergroup conflicts, with emphases on the role of societal beliefs and ideologies in such conflicts and their relationship to stress and emotions.

Russell Spears is Professor of Social Psychology at Cardiff University and the University of Amsterdam. His research interests are in social identity and intergroup relations, including work on group-based emotions. He has published numerous papers and coauthored/coedited *The Social Psychology of Stereotyping and Group Life* (Blackwell, 1997), *Social Identity: Context, Commitment, Content (*Blackwell, 1999), and *Stereotypes as Explanations* (CUP, 2002).

Ervin Staub is Professor and Founding Director of the PhD program in the Psychology of Peace and the Prevention of Violence, Emeritus, at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. His has studied altruism and the origins and prevention of genocide and mass killing. His books include *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence* (1989); and *The Psychology of Good and Evil: Why Children, Adults and Groups Help and Harm Others?* (2003). He is past President of the Society for the Study of Peace, Conflict and Violence and of the International Society for Political Psychology. He has worked in many applied settings, including Rwanda and other parts of the Great Lakes Region of East Africa to promote psychological recovery and reconciliation. He is the recipient of various awards.

Nicole Tausch obtained her DPhil at the University of Oxford in 2006. She is currently a British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow at Cardiff University where she is working on a project examining predictors of support for terrorism. Her research interests lie broadly in the areas of social identity, intergroup relations, prejudice, and attribution. She has published work on intergroup contact, group-based threat, and trait attribution in journals such as *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *British Journal of Social Psychology*, and *Political Psychology*.

Richard A. Vernon is Professor of Political Science, and Co-Director of the Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict Research Group, at the University of Western Ontario. His primary area of interest is political philosophy. His most recent books are *The Career of Toleration* (1997, winner of the C. B. Macpherson Prize in political theory), *Political Morality* (2001) and *Friends, Citizens, Strangers* (2006). His current research is in the field of global ethics.

Alberto Voci is Associate Professor of Social Psychology at the University of Padova, Italy. He completed his PhD at the same institution. His research concerns the field of prejudice reduction, in particular intergroup contact and empathy, the perceptions of group variability and, more broadly, the relation between motivational and cognitive processes in the dynamic between personal and social identity. He is member of the editorial board of the *European Review of Social Psychology*.

Series Preface

The series of volumes on Social Issues and Interventions launched in 2006 represents a joint effort of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI) and Wiley-Blackwell. Consistent with SPSSI's dual mission of encouraging systematic research on current social issues and bringing the findings of social psychological research to bear on public policy, the goal of the series is to help fill the gap between basic research on social issues and translation into social policy and program interventions.

As the inaugural volume in the series, *Explaining the Breakdown of Ethnic Relations: Why Neighbors Kill* fulfills the purposes envisioned for this venture and provides a model for bringing together multiple perspectives to focus on a compelling and critically important social issue. Horrific examples of intergroup violence within divided societies have been prominent in media coverage from all parts of the world. Dramatic events lead us to search for dramatic causes, but as much of the content of this volume makes clear, subtle psychological biases and social psychological processes can have massive emergent consequences. The chapters in this volume approach the problem from distinct vantage points, each of which provides unique insights on the nature of violent conflict. As the authors acknowledge, this volume does not address the best of human nature. It is a strength of the book that the editors and chapter authors address this head-on and, when appropriate, do consider when intervention and social change may be possible. There are powerful messages here that should be of interest and relevance to social scientists and policy-makers alike.

Marilynn B. Brewer
Series Editor

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Victoria M. Esses
Richard A. Vernon

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Why Neighbors Kill

An Overview

Richard A. Vernon and Victoria M. Esses

In *Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century*, the moral philosopher Jonathan Glover asks what it is that makes acts of great inhumanity possible (Glover, 2001). Glover is (mercifully) sparing in his use of examples, given the huge array of examples that the twentieth century provides; but even his exemplary list evokes a horrified demand for explanation. What makes people commit such cruelties to one another? In two ways, his book also gives some ground for optimism. First, it shows convincingly that the way to cruelty has to be prepared before it opens. Soldiers have to be systematically desensitized before they can kill; victims have to be dehumanized before they can be killed (or else killed from so great a distance that their humanity need not be confronted); great cruelties have to be approached, step by step, by a series of smaller ones, as though a natural resistance has to be overcome. Second, Glover's book demonstrates the "moral resources" that stand in the way of acting cruelly: memorably, it records the story of the Afrikaner policeman who found that he could not beat a demonstrator to whom he had just acted politely (he had returned her lost shoe to her), and George Orwell's famous anecdote, from the Spanish Civil War, about his inability to shoot a half-dressed Fascist soldier who was in the human predicament of holding up his beltless trousers (pp. 37–38, 53).

Among the "moral resources" that should stand in the way of brutality, it is natural to think, neighborliness should rank highly. It is a sad but fairly unsurprising fact that, given the right conditions, humans are capable of discounting the suffering of strangers. It is both a sad *and* a surprising fact that humans are capable of discounting the

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suffering of those whom they know well *and* of directly inflicting the cruellest forms of suffering upon them. But the evidence for it is clear. In their work on rescuers, both Monroe (1996) and Geras (1995) have shown that neighborly ties have only rarely motivated people to risk their lives to save victims of genocide: For the most part, rescuers gave as their reason a primitive sense of shared humanity, not any special connection arising from local or neighborly ties. On the other hand, "an inestimably large number of people . . . did not help friends, neighbours and other acquaintances" (Geras, 1995, p. 35). When we turn from rescue and abandonment to actual perpetration, the evidence also tells against neighborliness. In both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s, to mention but the two best-known cases, victims were killed – brutally – by people on first-name terms with them: who had broken bread with them, had chatted at the bus stop with them, had babysat their children, had married into their families, and for whom they had performed acts of personal kindness. "Doctors [in Rwanda] killed their patients, and schoolteachers killed their pupils" (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 115).

Of course, we need to know what *kind* of "neighborhood" preceded the killing, as chapter 4 in this volume, by Hewstone et al., importantly reminds us. It may not have been a very neighborly neighborhood, perhaps. If, as a Bosnian Croat reported, "we lived in peace and harmony . . . because every hundred metres we had a policeman to make sure we loved one another" (p. 72), then we would hardly expect neighborhood (in the sense of mere locality) to provide a moral resource. In a case of that kind, neighborliness would be a fiction that papered over deep preexisting hostilities, without which there would have been no need of "love police." Moreover, in the Holocaust rescue cases and in the Rwandan case, we know that neighborliness was undercut by a particularly virulent ideology that was transmitted by all the resources of state power and reinforced by social pressure, or indeed by direct coercion. Thus, it is not implausible to suppose that neighborliness *is*, as intuition suggests, a "moral resource" that inhibits brutality, though we need to think about when it does and when it does not.

The chapters in this volume repeatedly point, as Glover's book does, to the events and processes that can eat away at inhibitions and make the apparently unthinkable happen. None of them attribute magical potency to neighborhood, but they do assume "why neighbors kill" to be a more pressing question than "why *don't* neighbors kill?", a question that would be premised on very deep misanthropy indeed. The chapters reflect several different disciplinary perspectives; they work

at different levels of generality; and they concern different real-world cases. As a result, it is not surprising that their findings differ, though their differences are generally of a complementary rather a contradictory kind. As with other studies of intergroup conflict, this volume will offer the conclusion that "no single factor or set of factors can explain everything" (Brown, 1997, p. 24), and that understanding will be based on a sense of the way in which different kinds and levels of explanations interact with one another.

The chapters in Part I of this work direct our attention to the importance of factors at the level of the individual agent. In chapter 2, Hafer, Olson, and Peterson open the discussion with an account of the social psychology of justice, a field that enquires into "the conditions under which justice is seen as an important consideration in one's interactions with others; how people judge what is fair and unfair (or just and unjust); and how people respond to injustice once it is perceived" (p. 18). Focusing upon individual-level variables, the authors distinguish between three scenarios. In the first, which very clearly addresses the theme of "devaluation" that frequently recurs in these chapters, certain groups are simply excluded from what the agent takes to be the scope of justice; these groups simply do not count, and so the field is left open to the operation of other motives, such as self-interest. Groups may be excluded because they are perceived as different, distant, perhaps not "human," because they pose a threat; or because they are useless to the agent. In the second scenario, justice is operative, but weak, and what it calls for is outweighed by competing considerations, directly self-interested or otherwise. In the third scenario, justice applies, and with full force, but what it calls for is the infliction of harm. In this context, it becomes particularly important to examine what factors influence determinations of a group's deservingness of punishment or reprisal. Those determinations may arise from actions taken or believed to have been taken, from the perceived character of the group's members, or simply from whether members of the group are *liked*. Even when there are more-or-less agreed background principles of fairness or justice, then, many subjective elements will enter into decisions about whether and how they apply: "What may be especially difficult as an outsider is to entertain the notion that some atrocities might not be seen as unfair, and may even be seen as absolutely necessary for justice to prevail" (p. 32). When the latter applies, of course, we confront a much more overt phenomenon than the more furtive or unconscious operations of schadenfreude or prejudice discussed in later chapters, although some of the same variables (devaluation, difference, distance) may be involved.

In chapter 3, Dovidio, Pearson, Gaertner, and Hodson discuss mild racial bias or what they term "everyday" prejudice. Within the past half-century outright racial bigotry has declined in western societies; however, Dovidio et al. demonstrate that extreme and overt prejudice of that kind is not necessary to produce support for harmful or even fatal damage to other racial groups. Many people who forthrightly condemn bigotry nevertheless have negative feelings towards racial minorities, feelings that may be given no expression in normal contexts of behavior, and that may be unperceived even by the agents themselves. Certain circumstances, however, make them consequential. For example, when negative judgments about a member of a racial minority can be justified by other criteria, aversion comes to the fore. Aversion may be "disinhibited" by perceived provocations, by anonymity, by peer pressure or the contagious effects of collective action. The effects are also evident, the authors show, in the interpretation of evidence and in sentencing decisions in the legal process. Employing an explanatory model of hatred that comprises three variables – denial of intimacy, passion (anger and/or fear), and devaluation of the other – the authors show that even low levels of negative disposition may cross the line into aggression. Levels of negativity that are quite consistent with normal neighborliness, then, are also consistent, given the right disinhibiting conditions, with support for destructive actions. As a result, legislation that delegitimizes and punishes outright bigotry will not reach some important causes of racial hostility and violence.

Most of the chapters in this volume refer in part to the question of what can restrain mass violence, if only by implication. However, the chapter by Hewstone at al. places the question of restraint at the forefront, asking what it is that neutralizes expected restraints or renders them inoperative. Its focus is on the well-known "contact hypothesis" (Allport, 1954), which concerns the restraining effects of previous contact between a group of potential perpetrators and a group of potential victims. When certain conditions have been met, it is hypothesized, prior contact among members of groups will inhibit subsequent violence between them. At least on the face of the matter, the stunning twentieth-century examples of neighborly murder in Poland, Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and elsewhere would seem to put paid fatally to that hypothesis. Hewstone et al. suggest a much more nuanced conclusion. For one thing, as already noted briefly above, we need to know much more about the kind and extent of intergroup contact. Mere proximity may mean nothing at all (and may even have negative effects when "the other" is nearby in worrying numbers). Coexistence, even over a long period, may be a poor predictor of future peace if

it accompanies a "psychological wall" of buried, unavowed distrust. Intermarriage may mean little if rates are low (and if intermarriage fails to win full social acceptance). Gross statistics may conceal crucial differences of very local kinds, which would need to be correlated precisely with rates of participation in or resistance to genocidal action. For another thing, even if prior intergroup contact (of any kind) has positive effects, it is entirely unreasonable to expect these to survive countervailing influences, ingroup pressure, massive propaganda, and threats to punish nonparticipation in mass violence. "Placed in some of the situations that perpetrators found themselves in, we doubt whether any of us could have resisted such extreme pressure" (p. 74). There are, then, many unknowns. But Hewstone et al. conclude their chapter by suggesting that "actual, face-to-face" contact among members of potentially hostile groups is at least a necessary condition for potential hostility to be prevented from becoming actual.

In the final chapter in this section, Spears and Leach address a psychological trope known as schadenfreude, a German word pressed into service because English lacks a convenient term for taking pleasure in the misfortune of others. The chapter concerns schadenfreude in its group-based rather than its individual form. Spears and Leach are modest in their claims about its significance. Schadenfreude does not, they claim, directly propel people to mass violence; it is a passive and opportunistic reaction rather than an action-guiding motive, as Nietzsche classically pointed out. However, it may nevertheless enter into the explanation of mass violence in several important ways. It may help to explain the inaction of bystanders, in whom the alternative reaction of sympathy may be blocked by taking pleasure in the suffering of certain groups, groups that may well include neighbors, whose proximity facilitates comparison and thus amplifies the likelihood of resentment. Spears and Leach helpfully point out that it is implausible to take bystanders' inaction as a sort of default position, in need of no explanation: It requires explaining just as the perpetrators' actions do, and schadenfreude is one of the mechanisms that make it more intelligible. Schadenfreude may be part of a context of socially sustained beliefs that foster intergroup conflicts, especially, perhaps, if its widespread acceptance tends to neutralize norms that generally forbid the expression of malice. Its presence may signal to perpetrators that their actions will likely be overlooked or furtively approved. Finally, because the pleasure of schadenfreude is apparently enhanced when one also benefits from the target group's misfortune, the emotion may easily ally itself with the motive of material interest, when, for example, the target group stands to lose land or property or other

transferable assets. This chapter, like that of Dovidio et al., is particularly useful in showing how familiar and unsurprising emotions, accepted in the context of ordinary life, may nevertheless be steps toward gross violence. Schadenfreude, Spears and Leach show, is more or less rife in sporting contexts. One might add that some theorists, notably Hobbes (1968), propose that it is the basis of all humor. Banal though it is, then, it may nevertheless be "a brick in the bridge," as the authors put it.

The chapters in Part II of this book move the focus to societal factors. In chapter 6, Glick takes up the scapegoating phenomenon that is near-universal in explanations of group-based violence; he rejects the view from Freudian psychology that scapegoating is a projective device in which agents with weak personalities displace upon others the features that they reject in themselves (an explanation adopted in Adelman's chapter below). Instead, Glick argues, we should adopt a cognitive view of the phenomenon: It is a kind of derailing of normal processes of attribution through which agents try to make sense of the world. Blame, after all, is *for* something, and so the starting point is an attempt to assign responsibility for some negative event. Here Glick refers to Staub's category (see chapter 11) of changes in "life conditions," such as economic depression or social dislocation. Assigning responsibility for such things is often inherently difficult, for causation is complex; as a result, it is often preformed by conveniently preexisting stereotypes and it is skewed by the fact that some explanations are more flattering to the interpreter than others. That said, Glick suggests that scapegoating is an attempt to *explain* otherwise puzzling events in the world. The scapegoat role tends to fall to groups that fit the explanatory attempt because they are perceived to have the capacity to bring about the negative events, and are open to suspicion because they are perceived as cold or distant. Chua's recently popular book, *World on Fire* (2003), provides rich anecdotal confirmation of Glick's hypothesis. Merchant niche groups (as they may be termed) – South Asian, Jewish, Armenian, and Chinese minorities that retain their distinct identity – tend to be blamed for the dislocations resulting from structural adjustment policies induced by the International Monetary Fund. Drawing first upon the phenomenon of witchcraft persecutions in early modern Europe, Glick goes on to detail the ways in which Jews, Armenians, and Tutsi fitted the profile that attracts scapegoating, and thus enabled German, Turkish, and Hutu persecutors to see themselves as victims of the powerful groups that they themselves persecuted. That *we*, the perpetrators, are the real victims is of course a belief that confers a license for virtually unlimited abuse. Glick goes on to argue that his proposed model,

unlike the personality-based model, can explain why breakdowns can be sudden, why long periods of coexistence may break down, why old and apparently archaic enmities can rekindle, and why neighbors (as opposed to distant enemies) are often convenient vehicles for blame.

Chapters 7 and 8 also move emphatically, though in different ways, away from the individual context to political ones. Bar-Tal and Sharvit draw our attention to the role of a political dynamic that they term "the transitional context." To a degree, this notion echoes the importance, alluded to in other chapters, of situational factors and processes that can lead to interethnic conflict, though the depiction of variables here is on a larger scale. A transitional context, according to the authors, "consists of the physical, social, political, economic, military, and psychological conditions, temporary in their nature, that make up the environment in which individuals and collectives function" (p. 148). Within this context, they distinguish between "major societal events" and "major societal information," the former being events that resonate with meaning and dominate the public agenda, the latter being "information supplied by an epistemic authority" that "affects the psychological conditions of the society by influencing society members' thoughts and feelings about their reality" (p. 149). Drawing upon the reactions of Israeli Jews in the years after 2000, Bar-Tal and Sharvit examine three elements: the intensity of the transitional context (the strength of its impact on thoughts and feelings), its negativity (because the negativity of events is correlated with strength of response), and the effect of commonly held shared narratives on people's responses. The events following the Al Aqsa Intifada, the chapter shows, evoked a "repertoire" of psychological responses – fear, delegitimization, a sense of victimhood, and a conviction that differences were irreconcilable – that led to widespread support for a violent response, for a forceful leader, and for a policy of physical separation of the Israeli and Palestinian populations. Because many of the same psychological processes were mirrored in the Palestinians' experience, each group was led to behave in ways that reinforced the repertoire of expectations of the other, in a vicious informational cycle. Of particular importance, in relation to other chapters in this book, are the saliency of threats as motivators and the role of culturally enshrined narratives in delegitimizing the viewpoints of others and validating the justice of one's own cause.

Marchak's chapter is a forthright corrective to any notion that explanations of genocide or crime against humanity can proceed on a psychological or cultural level without reference to structural factors of a political kind. As its title indicates, the chapter challenges

the premise of this book. Most victims of mass crime are killed not by neighbors but by states: Where neighbors do kill, as in Rwanda, or in Holocaust-related incidents mentioned in other chapters, they do so under the heavy influence of state-directed violence, sometimes, in fact, under direct state coercion. Thus, Marchak suggests that we should look to states' circumstances in order to determine causation. Reviewing nine cases from the Armenian genocide to Rwanda, Marchak establishes the importance of five preconditions: social change that is undermining the position of dominant groups, strong military (professional or militia) forces, weak civil society, substantial inequality (between ethnically defined groups or otherwise), and the existence of a material interest in eliminating or expelling potential victim groups. With the partial exception of Cambodia, where no material interest (as distinct from ideology) drove the leadership, all these preconditions can be identified in the cases that are analyzed, leading to Marchak's conclusion that the principal cause of mass violence is the state's role in maintaining dominant groups under conditions of threat and instability. Marchak is particularly concerned to induce skepticism about causal theories that emphasize ethnicity, for other kinds of group divisions may be equally or more important, Cambodia, of course, being the classic modern example. (In order to bring the case under the rubric of "genocide," the stretched term "autogenocide" is sometimes employed – rather like counting suicides in the murder rate on the grounds that they are "automurders"?) Moreover, the chapter suggests that where ethnicity, race, or religion do figure, they may be no more than rationalizations for power- or greed-based motives, which depressingly recur, to varying degrees, in the cases studied.

In Part III of this collection, Adelman, Esses and Jackson, and Staub offer some integrating perspectives. Adelman's chapter takes the explanatory level to a remarkable depth. We must, he says, take seriously the notion of *evil*. Dissenting from social science that tells us that there are only evil acts, not evil people, Adelman believes that we need to seek the origins of evil at the basic level of personality (or character) construction. He also suggests that acts of great cruelty arise from a progressive series of five stages in "altering the identity of the other": We move from defining a group as other, through defining it as less valuable than our own group, defining it as less than human, blaming it, and finally to "defining the other as a threat . . . *independent of* [*its*] *intent*" (p. 199) and thus as something that must be dealt with through elimination rather than attempts to change it. This "moral disengagement" from the human reality of the other is aided by social and institutional conditions (such as an authoritarian climate)

that undermine the sense of individual responsibility and merge the agent with the group. Vital though these stages and conditions are to an explanation, they depend on something more profound, which Adelman describes eloquently and at length. Drawing on Hegel's idea of a (masculine) desire to become god-like, and thus to separate one's self from one's flesh, Adelman explores the model of a divided person who seeks to rid himself of irrational parts that he regrets by projecting them upon others. "Reason blames the flesh. The fundamental root of xenophobia is a phobia directed at one's own body and its appetites" (p. 204). On this basis, Adelman rejects the view that genocide results from a quest for wealth or power. Unlike such materialistic models, the proposed model explains why genocide is accompanied by the humiliation of the victims as well as their destruction – they are being ritually expunged – and why genocidal murder is so often accompanied by sexual violence: It springs from hatred of the body. After critically reviewing several alternative explanations of the Rwanda genocide, Adelman returns to his general model as an explanation of both the perpetrators' actions and the bystanders' inaction. "In all cases," he writes, "each agent and agency was permeated with what was perceived to be a profound and higher vision of the entity that did not include a responsibility towards the Other as a prime consideration" (p. 215). To overcome this alienating preoccupation with the integrity of our own mental constructs, we need to resurrect a concern with building characters that do not (abstractly) repel and expunge, but (concretely) care.

The chapter by Esses and Jackson, which follows, analyzes ethnic conflict and violence through their Unified Instrumental Model of Group Conflict (Esses, Jackson, Dovidio, & Hodson, 2005). Integrating work by a number of psychologists in the area, this model considers the joint role of socially prevalent ideologies and situational characteristics in eliciting ethnic antagonism. Esses and Jackson suggest that dominant ideologies, such as belief systems that promote group dominance and cultural worldviews that prescribe appropriate modes of thinking and behaving, and situational factors, such as instability and challenges to the status quo, may be mutually reinforcing and operate in concert to create and exacerbate perceptions of intergroup competition and tension. This competition, they suggest, may be real or only perceived, and may be over more tangible resources such as jobs and material possessions, or over more symbolic factors including religious and cultural dominance. Irrespective, according to the model, competition elicits a drive to remove the source of competition, so that interethnic violence may be seen as a manifestation of attempts

to reduce competition by discrediting or obliterating the competitor outgroup. Using the example of the ongoing conflict between Arabs and Africans in Sudan, they provide compelling evidence for each of the stages of their model. At the same time, application of the model allows insight into heinous acts that might otherwise be considered "inexplicable." Although they paint a grim picture of the human condition and the drive for power and dominance, their model also provides some potential for intervention or even prevention.

Staub's chapter, which draws upon his extensive work on the origins and prevention of genocide, serves to bring together many of the general themes that recur in explaining neighborly violence. In Staub's account, explanatory factors fall under two general headings: difficult social conditions, and culture. The sets of factors interpenetrate, however, for features of culture influence how groups respond to difficult social conditions, in constructive or destructive ways. "Difficult social conditions" include, but are not exhausted by, material deprivation. It is not – Staub's and other contributors' examples suggest – absolute deprivation, but a deterioration in conditions that is especially problematic. Under such conditions, direct material self-interest will come into play, but no less important are reactions stemming from insecurity, insecurity that may arise not only from material threats but also from political upheavals and dislocations resulting from wars. Destructive reactions to insecurity of all kinds may include scapegoating (a phenomenon examined in chapter 6) and devaluing of the other (a phenomenon examined in one form or another in most of the other chapters). The devaluing of some other group, its representation as something less than human, makes it all too easy for it to figure as an obstacle to the achievement of positive social visions, so that its elimination is called for as a matter of justice or general well-being or historical necessity. The progress from devaluing and blaming to destroying is of course aided when, as was the case in Rwanda and in Yugoslavia, the lines of group division are associated with past wounds, wounds that are not only unhealed but also, in some cases, actually treasured as tokens of group identity. The progress to genocide is also aided by a culture of authoritarianism, either in the society at large or in a powerful subgroup seeking dominance. Finally, the process, once under way, feeds itself (a confirmation of Glover's central view). A further coarsening of standards takes place, the persecutors are themselves damaged by their own cruelty, and the reactions of the other may confirm the devaluation imposed upon them.

While the authors in this collection may wish in some cases to start the causal story at different points, they need not disagree about

a list of elements of which most will likely find a place in a full explanatory picture. Somewhere in the causal environment we need to find a place for both chronic and short-term situational factors. Chronic factors may include an authoritarian political culture that dulls critical capacity and diminishes the sense of responsibility; the scarcity of some valued good; background memories of rivalry; and the resources to mobilize populations. Short-term situational factors include, notably, the fairly rapid emergence of threats to basic (economic and physical) security. Second, we need to find a place for the modalities described in detailed and various ways in this book. We may call them psychological modalities when they are apparently culturally invariant complexes of attitude, such as the scapegoating and schadenfreude phenomena, or the family of mental operations associated with various stages of devaluing the other. We may call them cultural modalities when they are sets of attitudes connected with specific group identity and memory, such as the sense of victimhood that Bar-Tal and Sharvit trace in the Israeli example, but which is also a notable feature of the Serbian and Afrikaner cases. Third, we need to enquire into why what would otherwise restrain perpetrators does not. The absence of internal restraint – of the connectedness to others that Adelman and others stress – will be explained by some combination of the two elements above. *Social* constraints include an independent civil society, mentioned in both Staub and Marchak's accounts, that denies perpetrators a monopoly of informational influence by making present a variety of sources of news and points of view. *External* constraints include, very importantly, the state: Whether we consult classical social contract theory or Weberian political sociology, it is the state that bears the role of suppressing violence among its citizens, and if neighbors kill neighbors that must mean at the very least that the state has failed, if not that it has become complicit in or the direct sponsor of violence. Why this is so, given that the security-promoting role of the state is so well understood and universally acknowledged in principle, must always be an indispensable question, though answers will necessarily differ from case to case. Bridging the divide between external and internal constraints is the question of the role of bystanders: From the standpoint of the perpetrators, they are external agents, while if we consider their own motivation, they may be subject to the same internal failings as the perpetrators themselves, that is, they may devalue or dehumanize the victims, exclude them from the scope of justice, suspect them of somehow deserving their fate, secretly applaud it, stand to profit from their loss, or for one reason or another wash their hands of personal responsibility.

A list, of course, is not an explanatory model, and in fact this list is consistent with several different, and rival, explanatory models. If the drive to destroy is a universal (male) character flaw then other factors will figure essentially as releasers or excuses rather than having independent causal force. If mass destruction is state-driven, then the psychological and cultural factors will be no more than links in a manipulated series. If material greed is a primary motive, the apparatus of scapegoating and conspiracy theories will amount only to rationalization. There is no reason to suppose that consensus can be reached in contested social-scientific questions such as this. Nor is there any reason to suppose that the most plausible model in any given case will apply across the board. Also, there is nothing wrong with multicausal models, if that is what the evidence calls for. But at the very least, a list can help to modify or qualify or test the adequacy of selected variables, by pressing the claims of alternative or prior or jointly necessary conditions, or by revealing the presence of overdetermination.

A list can also help with the question of remedies, for the place to begin remedying conflict is not necessarily the place where the causal chain begins. There may be nothing we can do about root causes, if there are root causes. Or even if we can do something about them, the subsequent process will have left its mark on both victims and perpetrators, and so we need to understand the intervening elements and phases too: Remedies may be path-dependent. Although the question of remedy is not a central focus of this collection, most of the chapters contribute to it valuably. Staub comments on the extensive remedial processes currently under way in Rwanda, stressing the need for mutual comprehension (even when there is no mutual agreement in narratives), and for concrete activities undertaken by the parties in common. Adelman stresses the need for moral thinking to return to issues of character of the kind discussed in "virtue ethics." Glick draws attention to the potential of latent stereotypes to activate when disaster calls for the assignment of blame, and hence to the importance of not ignoring them even when they are latent. Hafer et al. point to the importantly different remedies called for by exclusion from the scope of justice, on the one hand, and the (mistaken) belief in just punishment on the other. Hewstone et al. advocate the importance of a strong civil society (and are implicitly supported in this by Marchak). Dovidio et al. and Esses and Jackson point to the important role of identity, and specifically the possibility of an inclusive identity, as potentially reducing intergroup competition and conflict. In their different ways, these proposals all aim at the building or rebuilding

of what Glover terms the "moral resources" that can draw agents back even when pressures for mass violence mount.

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Part I

Individual Factors

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2

Extreme Harmdoing

A View from the Social Psychology of Justice

Carolyn L. Hafer, James M. Olson, and Alexandra A. Peterson

For the past 20 years, we have been interested in the social psychology of justice. Our goal in the current chapter is to examine what this literature says about cases where an individual or group of people inflicts extreme harm on other humans. We hope this exercise will shed some light on the more general question of why neighbors sometimes kill neighbors, as well as the approaches that could be taken to reduce the probability of such tragedies.

First, we briefly outline the general perspective of social psychological research on justice. By "justice," we are not referring to the formal legal system; rather, consistent with a social psychological viewpoint (see the next section), we mean people's beliefs about the fairness of a particular situation. For the purposes of this chapter, then, "justice" is defined as the extent to which people perceive or believe a given situation to be fair or unfair. We will discuss three different roles that justice (i.e., perceived fairness/unfairness) could potentially play in extreme harmdoing. We then attempt to integrate these ideas to address why people might inflict severe harm on others and how extreme harmdoing might be avoided.

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The Social Psychology of Justice

Justice can be studied from many perspectives; we want to contrast two of these alternatives. One perspective is to take justice as an objective truth and to argue what is just or fair in an objective sense on the basis of either philosophical argument (e.g., Aristotle, ca. 335–323/1962; Nozick, 1974; Rawls, 1971) or existing sources such as religious doctrine or formal legal code. A second perspective regards justice as a subjective concept that influences human emotion, beliefs, and behavior. From this perspective, justice is a socially constructed idea and can serve as an important motive in social behavior (e.g., Lerner, Miller, & Holmes, 1976; Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997). Social psychologists study justice from this latter, subjective viewpoint. Given the assumption that the concept of justice is socially constructed and that the subjective sense of justice versus injustice can be a powerful influence in human affairs, central issues in the social psychology of justice include: the conditions under which justice is seen as an important consideration in one's interactions with others; how people judge what is fair and unfair (or just and unjust); and how people respond to injustice once it is perceived.

A final comment on the general perspective taken in this chapter is warranted. There are two distinct branches of social psychology – and, correspondingly, the social psychology of justice – the psychological branch and the sociological branch (see Stephan & Stephan, 1990). We focus on the former. A major difference between these perspectives is the type of variable that is investigated to understand social phenomena, such as extreme harmdoing. The psychological social psychology perspective focuses on individual-level variables: individuals' thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, and how these constructs are influenced by the immediate social environment, including the individual's subjective perceptions of the social environment (Allport, 1985). Thus, variables that describe the broader social structure – such as social class – are not typically within the realm of this perspective. Instead, these variables are more characteristic of a sociological viewpoint. Those interested in a more sociological approach to social justice should see Hegtvedt and Markovsky (1995).

In the remainder of this chapter, we look specifically at how the social psychological approach might help us to understand the role of justice in cases of extreme harmdoing. In the next three sections, we discuss contrasting possibilities for the relation between justice and

extreme harmdoing, as suggested by the social psychological literature: (1) Justice is sometimes perceived as irrelevant to behavior, (2) individuals' motives to follow justice principles are sometimes weaker than other motives influencing behavior, and (3) extreme harmdoing is sometimes seen as just and deserved. In a final section, we integrate these alternatives within a more general discussion of the factors involved in situations where people inflict severe harm on others.

Justice is Perceived as Irrelevant

What is the role of justice in extreme harmdoing? One suggestion from the social psychological literature is that, although justice is frequently an important concept in people's interactions with others, perpetrators of extreme harmdoing may sometimes perceive justice to be irrelevant – that is, they do not even consider justice issues in their behavior toward victims. Thus, the role of justice in some cases of extreme harmdoing may be minimal.

One task of social psychologists who study justice has been to delineate the characteristics of situations and individuals that influence when justice is deemed an important consideration. Most notable among such efforts is research on the *scope of justice*, or the boundary within which justice is considered to be applicable (e.g., Deutsch, 1985; Opotow, 1990, 2001). If an actor believes that justice is not a relevant consideration in dealing with a particular target (a person or group of people), then that target is said to have been "excluded" from the actor's scope of justice; whereas if an actor believes that justice *is* a relevant consideration in his or her dealings with another, then the target has been "included" in the actor's scope of justice (e.g., Opotow, 1990). The concepts of scope of justice, inclusion, and exclusion are potentially important in understanding extreme harmdoing because some scope of justice researchers claim that people who are excluded from one's scope of justice are particularly vulnerable to extreme harmdoing, including acts of genocide, mass internment, and so forth (e.g., Deutsch, 2000; DeWind, 1990; Nagata, 1990, 1993; Opotow, 1990; Staub, 1990).

The implicit reasoning in much of the work on the scope of justice is that, if people are not motivated to treat others on the basis of justice or fairness, then other motives will guide behavior. These alternative motives, such as self-interest, are more likely to lead people to harm others, compared to a motivation to behave fairly, at least under certain conditions (see Hafer & Olson, 2003). For example, if

an individual is primarily concerned with amassing as many resources as possible, with little consideration for who is legitimately entitled to a particular share of resources (see Wenzel, 2001; 2002), he or she may end up harming others, given other conditions such as a culture of violence or little fear of reprisal (Deutsch, 2000; Staub, 1989, 2003a, 2003b; see also chapter 11, this volume).

If exclusion from justice concerns is related to extreme harmdoing, then it is important for researchers interested in explaining such acts to investigate the predictors of exclusion. Researchers have proposed several types of variables that promote excluding targets from an actor's scope of justice. One category of variables consists of negative forms of "identification." Identification includes such characteristics as the perceived similarity between an actor's and the target's attitudes or interests, the degree to which an actor shares the same social group as the target, and the closeness of the relationship between the actor and the target (e.g., Boeckmann & Tyler, 1997; Brockner, 1990; Foster & Rusbult, 1999, Study 2; Opotow, 1993, 1995; Singer, 1998, 1999; Wenzel, 2001, 2002). In general, negative identification (e.g., perceived dissimilarity, a distant or hostile relationship) makes it more likely that the target will be excluded from the actor's scope of justice, which means that motives that might ultimately lead to harm will be engaged. For example, Nagata (1990, 1993) has argued that the internment of, and other harmful acts toward, Japanese Americans during World War II were exacerbated by perceptions that these targets were not "human." Instead, they were often seen as "*subhuman*, untrustworthy, and inferior to Caucasian Americans" (italics added; Nagata, 1990, p. 134). Her interviews with second and third generation Japanese Americans revealed these individuals' recognition of this perceived nonhumanness, as well as their feelings of exclusion from justice considerations. Presumably, the perceived dissimilarity of Japanese Americans not only led to their exclusion from other Americans' scopes of justice, but also increased the likelihood that self-interest motives would ultimately guide Americans' behavior toward them. Coupled with circumstances such as having strong leaders who sanctioned the use of violence against certain groups (Staub, 1999), these self-interest motives led to harmdoing.

A second type of variable that has been hypothesized to predict exclusion from the scope of justice can be referred to as threat/conflict. This category includes the extent to which the goals or needs of the actor's group are incompatible with those of the target and the degree to which the actor feels threatened by the target (e.g., Beaton & Tougas, 2001; Nagata, 1990, 1993; Opotow, 1993, 1994, 1995;

see also chapters 7 and 10, this volume). Greater conflict and perceived threat are thought to predict a greater likelihood of exclusion from the scope of justice. Deutsch (2000), for example, argued that the genocides in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, among other such atrocities, had roots in difficult social conditions that caused people to feel that their economic and personal safety were threatened (see Staub, 1989, see also chapter 11). Perceived threat, combined with other negative social conditions (e.g., poverty), may promote exclusion and therefore harmdoing by focusing energies on gathering basic resources for survival and shifting attention away from "higher order" considerations of morality and fairness (for a review of research related to scarcity of resources and justice concerns, see Tyler et al., 1997).

A third and final class of variables postulated to predict exclusion can be called utility or the extent to which the target is seen as beneficial versus harmful/worthless (e.g., Opotow, 1993, 1994). For example, Leets (2001) studied Romanians' reactions to orphans. She assessed the perceived utility of orphaned children in Romania by asking respondents to rate the children's usefulness/uselessness, value/worthlessness, benefit/harmfulness, and helpfulness/nuisance. An indicator of exclusion from the scope of justice was also obtained, which included the extent to which respondents were willing to extend resources to the children and support child protection policies. Analyses showed that low perceived utility was associated with higher scores on the indicator of exclusion. Thus, these data are consistent with the notion that low perceived utility can be related to harmdoing or, at least, to passive acceptance of harm (see Opotow, 2001). Presumably, exclusion from justice concerns in this Romanian case meant that other motives guided behavior, which, given the societal conditions of the time (e.g., economic hardship, a philosophy of human worth based on one's economic productivity: see Leets, 2001), manifested themselves in lower endorsement of protection for orphaned children.

In summary, research on the concept of scope of justice suggests that justice may sometimes play very little part in cases of extreme harmdoing in the sense that the perpetrators do not see justice as a relevant consideration in their treatment of the victims. Variables such as negative or low identification, threat or conflict, and perceived harmfulness or worthlessness of the victims may be precursors to exclusion from justice concerns. When justice is seen as irrelevant, motives other than justice and fairness, such as survival, may dominate human concerns; under certain conditions (e.g., a culture of violence), these alternative motives may open the door to harmdoing.

The Justice Motive is Relatively Weak in Comparison to Other Motives

The literature on the scope of justice suggests that extreme harmdoing may result when people do not see justice as a relevant consideration in their interactions with specific others and when the conditions are such that alternative motives are manifested in harmful behavior. An implication of this reasoning is that, if justice *is* perceived to be relevant, this motive to be fair will guide behavior – and the person will be less likely to inflict extreme harmdoing on the target.

Even if individuals believe that justice is relevant to a particular interaction, however, their behavior may not ultimately be guided by justice concerns (Hafer & Olson, 2003). In many situations, more than one motive or goal can be relevant (Atkinson, 1957; Brewer, 1993; see also Tetlock, 1984, 1986). For example, in a situation where the relevant justice norm is equity (e.g., each person in a work relationship is expected to receive resources in proportion to his or her contribution to a common project; Deutsch, 1975), individuals may be motivated simultaneously by self-interest and by fairness. Specifically, individuals may want to gain more resources for themselves regardless of their contribution, but they may simultaneously want the resources that people receive to be equitable and fair (Lansberg, 1984; Messick & Sentis, 1983). Although multiple motives exist in many situations, individuals' behavior may often reflect primarily one of the relevant motives (e.g., Batson, Klein, Highberger, & Shaw, 1995). Thus, with respect to extreme harmdoing, people may engage in such acts when the justice motive is relatively weak in its influence (though *not* perceived as irrelevant) compared to other motives (Staub, 1989, 1990). It is important to distinguish between (1) situations in which justice is perceived as irrelevant and (2) situations in which justice is seen as one applicable concept but the individual's behavior is guided by another, competing motive, because different strategies for preventing extreme harmdoing are likely to be most effective in the two situations (we elaborate on this issue in the final section of the chapter).

A relatively weak justice motive may result in harmdoing in the same way as excluding others from one's scope of justice. If justice concerns are not sufficiently strong to compete with other motives, then those other motives (e.g., self-interest) guide behavior, which, under certain conditions, may be manifested in harmdoing.

If the relative strength of the justice motive can influence extreme harmdoing, then we need to understand the factors that determine

the justice motive's strength vis-à-vis coexisting motives. There is little direct work on this notion of multiple, competing motives in the social psychological literature on justice – thus, our discussion must be somewhat speculative. We draw on psychological research on motivation and goals to propose some ideas about when the justice motive may have relatively little influence on behavior in contrast to coexisting motives.

First, some of the situational factors mentioned earlier that are thought to predict exclusion from the scope of justice may also predict the relative strength of a justice motive versus competing motives. We have previously suggested (Hafer & Olson, 2003) that, whereas extreme forms of negative identification, threat/conflict, and perceived worthlessness might indeed lead to exclusion from justice considerations, less extreme forms of these variables might influence the relative strength of the justice motive rather than its existence in the first place. For example, given that a person accepts another as human, that person may necessarily believe that the target should be treated fairly (Lerner, 1981); however, perceived attitudinal dissimilarity (which can be considered a milder form of negative identification) might mean that a coexisting motive of self-interest wins out and, under specific conditions, results in harmdoing.

Other situational variables not mentioned in the previous section of this chapter might also affect the relative strength of a justice motive. First, if people believe that their attempts to bring about justice are likely to be frustrated, they may invest their emotional and material resources in some other goal. For example, if people cannot help or compensate a victim of injustice, they may instead invest resources in improving their own mood (e.g., Haynes & Olson, 2006). If the desire for mood enhancement becomes stronger than the desire for justice, the actor may ignore harm done to the victim – a form of passive harmdoing (see Opotow, 2001). Social psychological research on "priming" suggests a second set of situational variables that might influence the relative strength of a justice motive. Priming refers to events or procedures that increase the ease with which a particular concept is brought to mind (Olson, Breckler, & Wiggins, 2008). For example, if one reads a newspaper story on the gay community, the concept of "homosexuality" will be primed (i.e., will be particularly salient, or at the forefront of one's memory). A primed concept can influence, among other things, the interpretation of events and behavior toward others (e.g., Herr, 1986). To continue our example, if after reading the gay community article, an individual encountered two women holding hands, he or she would be more likely to assume they were lesbian

and, thus, treat them differently than if the concept of homosexuality had not been primed. Our example is of a situational variable (media exposure to a particular topic) priming a human trait – homosexuality. Social psychological research has also shown that a specific motive or goal can be primed by situational cues, even outside of people's conscious awareness, such that the primed construct then exerts more influence on behavior in a particular interaction (see Bargh & Barndollar, 1996). With respect to harmdoing, we can hypothesize that when justice as well as other motives are relevant in a situation, certain elements in the setting might focus people's attention away from justice concerns, thus allowing an alternative motive to guide behavior, which might lead to harmdoing. For example, if situational cues prime self-interest (e.g., Chong, Citrin, & Couley, 2001; Young, Thomsen, Borgida, Sullivan, & Aldrich, 1991), this motive may ultimately win out over a competing motive for justice and, given the right conditions, lead to harmdoing. For examples of attempts to use situational cues to prime concerns with justice, though not within the context of coexisting motives, see Correia and Vala (2003, Study 2), Hafer (2002, Study 6; 2000, Study 1), and Maxwell, Nye, and Maxwell (1999).

Individual difference variables might also influence the relative strength of a justice motive in comparison to other drives. In psychology, individual difference variables are characteristics of people or groups that distinguish them from one another, such as personality traits, beliefs, attitudes, and demographic characteristics (e.g., gender, age, ethnicity). Many psychological researchers have discussed differences between people in the relative strength or accessibility of basic needs, goals, motives, and values (e.g., McClelland, 1985; Murray, 1938; Rokeach, 1973, 1979; Schwartz, 1992). Differences in the relative strengths of various motives and values are associated with a variety of individual difference variables, such as personality traits (e.g., Bilsky & Schwartz, 1994; Sorrentino & Roney, 2000), political ideology (e.g., Tetlock, 1984, 1986), and demographic variables (e.g., Kasser, Koestner, & Lekes, 2002; Sikula & Costa, 1994).

Similar kinds of variables might predict the relative importance of justice versus other concerns in motivating people's behavior toward others. For example, those with a strong need to believe in a just world (Hafer & Bègue, 2005; Lerner, 1980) might be more emotionally invested in seeing that situations are just than are individuals with a weaker need to believe in a just world (for reviews of the individual difference literature on belief in a just world, see Furnham, 2003; Furnham & Procter, 1989). Schmitt's (e.g., Schmitt, Gollwitzer,

Maes, & Arbach, 2005) concept of individual differences in justice sensitivity may similarly predict the relative strength of justice versus other motives. Whatever the precursors, a person with a chronically weak concern with justice may often act on competing motives that, under particular circumstances, result in harming others.

Extreme Harmdoing in the Name of Justice

In the previous two sections, we discussed situations in which extreme harmdoing can occur because the perpetrator's behavior is not guided by justice; justice concerns might be seen as irrelevant when interacting with the target or, though justice is one relevant concern, stronger motives might end up "carrying the day." In this third section, we discuss harmdoing that can occur as a direct reflection of a desire for justice. From a social psychological perspective, justice can be construed in many different ways (e.g., Deutsch, 1985; Lerner et al., 1976) and the motive for justice can manifest itself in a myriad of behaviors, including acts that appear to some to be the antipathy of justice (see Bobocel, Son Hing, Davey, Stanley, & Zanna, 1998; Lerner & Simmons, 1966). Extreme harmdoing can sometimes be seen by the harmdoer as the just and fair way to treat another person (Martin, Scully, & Levitt, 1990).

Many social psychologists interested in justice have focused on delineating people's subjective definitions of what is just and how these principles are reflected in human behavior. This area of the justice literature is important in our discussion of harmdoing because, at least under certain circumstances, people may believe it is perfectly fair to inflict severe harm on others.

The research on people's subjective conceptions of justice that is most applicable to harmdoing is probably work on the principle of deservingness. Many justice theorists have afforded an important role to perceived deservingness in people's conceptions of what is fair (e.g., Adams, 1965; Crosby, 1982; Lerner, 1981; Wenzel, 2000, 2002). With respect to harmdoing, the principle of deservingness is implicated when people believe that specific others deserve to be hurt. To the extent that people believe that victims are getting what they deserve, the treatment, even if negative, is deemed fair (see Feather, 1999; Freudenthaler & Mikula, 1998; Heuer, Blumenthal, Douglas, & Weinblatt, 1999; Major, 1994; Olson, Roese, Meen, & Robertson, 1995; Sunshine & Heuer, 2002). By definition, fair treatment is compatible with a justice motive.

If perceived deservingness can be related to inflicting extreme harm on others, then we must try to understand the precursors to perceptions of deservingness, especially predictors of the belief that a target deserves harmful treatment. One of the conditions for perceived deservingness that has been investigated in the social justice literature is the match between the valence of an individual's outcome or treatment and his or her behavior (e.g., Feather, 1992; Heuer et al., 1999). A negative outcome or negative treatment is seen as deserved if the target person's behavior was also negative, and a positive outcome or treatment is seen as deserved if the target person's behavior was also positive. Behavior that is seen as extremely negative may be seen as deserving particularly severe punishment or negative treatment – the harm extended toward people performing such acts can be seen as merely reflecting their "just desserts" (e.g., Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002). For example, Darley, Carlsmith, and Robinson (2000) had participants in their research read about crimes that varied in their severity (from petty theft to murder and assassination). Participants were asked for their opinions on the punishment that should be given (from no punishment to a death sentence). Participants endorsed more severe punishment the worse the crime, both spontaneously and when they were specifically asked to assign the punishment that best reflected just desserts. These findings accord with the notion that particularly bad behavior is viewed as deserving more severe negative outcomes and that people are quite willing to assign very negative outcomes from this perspective (see also Carlsmith et al., 2002). In summary, perpetrators of harm may believe that they are treating their victims as they deserve; thus, from the perpetrator's perspective, the harm is fair. Historical cases of genocide have often involved allegations of negative, dangerous, or immoral behavior by the target group. In Germany in the late 1930s, Nazi propagandists spread rumors of treacherous and selfish behavior by Jews, which they claimed had slowed Germany's recovery from the worldwide depression. Himmler, for example, in a speech delivered in October of 1943, justified "the extermination of the Jewish people" by referring to the supposedly harmful effect of Jews on society: "We know how difficult we would have made it for ourselves if, on top of the bombing raids, the burdens and deprivations of war, we still had Jews today in every town as secret saboteurs, agitators, and troublemakers" (quoted in Noakes & Pridham, 1988, p. 1199).

A second possible condition for perceived deservingness is the match between the valence of a person's outcome or treatment and his or her *character* rather than his or her behavior (e.g., Feather &

Atchison, 1998; Heuer et al., 1999; Lupfer & Gingrich, 1999; Pepitone & L'Armand, 1996). In other words, bad *people* are seen as deserving bad outcomes: This match is seen as fair. For example, Feather and Atchison (1998) found that the perceived moral character of a perpetrator of a crime predicted how deserving the perpetrator was of punishment: the less moral the character, the more deserving participants thought he or she was of punishment. In violent intergroup conflicts, aggressive acts are often discussed in relation to the immoral or unworthy character of the victims of harm. For example, a U.S. military officer fighting in Iraq in 2003 said of the Muslim insurgents, "They stand, they fight, sometimes they run when we engage them. But often they run into our machine guns and we shoot them down like the morons they are" (quoted in Murdoch, 2003). In summary, it seems that negative treatment of another can be seen as deserved and, presumably, fair, when either the person's behavior or character is also seen in a negative light.

Responsibility for a behavior has also been shown to influence perceived deservingness (e.g., Feather, 1992; Heuer et al., 1999, Studies 1 & 2), the notion being that a person who is responsible for (i.e., has control over) a particular negative behavior is seen as more deserving of negative outcomes than a person who is not responsible for (i.e., has little control over) the behavior; the same reasoning applies to positive behavior and outcomes. Thus, the tendency to see negative outcomes following negative behavior as deserved, and therefore fair, can be qualified by perceived responsibility (see also Lupfer & Gingrich, 1999, for the role of responsibility when the target's character, rather than behavior, is evaluated). With respect to harmdoing, harm might be seen as especially deserved and, therefore, fair when the victim is seen as not only doing something bad, but also doing so deliberately (for discussions comparing such concepts as responsibility, control, blame, culpability, etc., see Alicke, 2000; Mantler, Schellenberg, & Page, 2003; Shaver & Drown, 1986). For example, Himmler's statements quoted earlier imply that Jews were deliberative in what he claimed was their corruptive influence. Hitler (1943), in *Mein Kampf*, discussed his beliefs about how the Jews planned the dilution of the Aryan race. He stated that:

> With satanic joy on his face, the black-haired Jewish youth lurks in wait for the unsuspecting girl whom he defiles with his blood, thus stealing her from her people. . . . It was and it is Jews who bring the Negroes into the Rhineland, always with the same secret thought and clear aim of ruining the hated white race by the necessarily resulting bastardization,

> throwing it down from its cultural and political height, and himself rising to be its master. (Hitler, 1943, p. 325)

Again, a target who is seen as having control over or being responsible for an outcome on which the actor places extremely negative value (e.g., corruption of society) may be seen to deserve harm.

Finally, Feather (1999) has suggested a link between the extent to which a person is liked or disliked and his or her perceived deservingness. There is indirect support in the social psychological literature that people who are disliked are seen as more deserving of negative outcomes than those who are liked. For example, jury research shows that unattractive defendants (who are presumably less likeable) are often seen to deserve more severe punishment than are attractive defendants (for a review, see Dane & Wrightsman, 1982). Along the same lines, Feather (see Feather, 1999) has hypothesized and found support for the notion that targets who are dissimilar from an individual are seen as more deserving of negative treatment than are targets who are similar (see also Olson & Ross, 1984).

These relations between dislike/dissimilarity and deserving negative outcomes return us to an issue raised in the previous section. That is, variables that are thought to predict exclusion from the scope of justice might instead, at least in relatively mild forms, influence perceived deservingness of negative outcomes or treatment – and, therefore, the extent to which harm is seen as fair rather than the extent to which fairness is applicable (Hafer & Olson, 2003). We suggested earlier that so long as a victim is seen as human, justice may be one consideration in his or her treatment, and that variations in milder forms of negative identification might predict the relative strength of a justice motive. We propose here that milder forms of negative identification might alternatively influence the degree to which negative (or positive) treatment and outcomes are seen as deserved and fair. In other words, certain forms of perceived dissimilarity and dislike may predict whether negative treatment or harm is seen as deserved, rather than the inapplicability of justice considerations.

There are many possible reasons for dislike/dissimilarity to influence perceived deservingness. For example, dislike of or feeling dissimilar to another individual who reaps a negative outcome may represent a "balanced" situation (Heider, 1958). Social psychologists define a balanced situation as one that seems psychologically consistent; thus, for example, we would be more comfortable with a disliked other reaping a negative outcome because the negative outcome seems psychologically consistent with our negative attitude toward the individual.

Feather (1999) suggests that such balance might lead to a belief that the disliked other actually deserved the negative outcome. Alternatively, a relation between dislike/dissimilarity and deservingness may result from people's tendency to believe that they (and their group) are good people who generally engage in positively valued behaviors (see Brown, 1998; Sherman, Chassin, Presson, & Agostinelli, 1984) and, therefore, deserve positive outcomes and do not deserve negative outcomes. By contrast, targets who are dissimilar to oneself (or one's group) or targets who are disliked may be perceived as less deserving of positive circumstances and more deserving of negative circumstances.

Perceived utility is another variable from the scope of justice literature that might be relevant to perceived deservingness. The perceived utility of another person or group of people is influenced by the value attached to (a) the target's behavior and (b) the target's character. Thus, consistent with the literature on precursors to perceived deservingness, perceived utility might influence the extent to which another individual (or group) is thought to deserve positive or negative treatment, including harm, rather than exclusion from justice concerns altogether (Hafer & Olson, 2003). Target groups that are seen as worthless or detrimental may be judged deserving of negative treatment.

To sum up this third section of our chapter, extreme harmdoing can occur even when justice is both relevant and a major influence on behavior. We have argued that this is most likely to happen when harm is seen as deserved, either because of the perceived negativity of the victim's behavior, the victim's perceived bad character, perceptions that the victim can be held directly responsible for a bad outcome, or dislike of or perceived dissimilarity to the victim. We also suggested that the literature on deservingness might account for some of the links drawn in the scope of justice literature between identification and harmdoing and between utility and harmdoing.

Summary and Implications

How would theories and research in the social justice literature shed light on extreme harmdoing? Figure 2.1 integrates the points we have made so far about the potential role of justice in harmdoing. By discussing each step in this figure, we will summarize our major points. We will then outline some of the broader implications of our analysis for understanding and dealing with cases in which people engage in extreme acts of harm against others.



Figure 2.1 The possible roles of justice in extreme harmdoing

The first level of Figure 2.1 asks if the perpetrators of harm believe that the concept of justice should be considered in how the victim is treated. In the language of social justice research, is the target of harm included in or excluded from the perpetrator's scope of justice? We discussed earlier in this chapter three sets of conditions that the scope of justice literature suggests lead to exclusion from justice considerations: weak or negative identification with the victim, strong feelings of threat or perceptions of conflict, and low perceived utility of the victim. *Extreme* levels of these variables, such as perceived nonhumanness or life-and-death conflict, may be particularly predictive of exclusion from justice concerns.

Also in the first box in Figure 2.1, we suggest that whether or not justice is seen as relevant to the target of harm may depend, in part,

on characteristics of the actor (what we referred to earlier as "individual differences"). To our knowledge, there has been no research directly on this issue in the scope of justice literature, but we mention a few possibilities here. For example, there may be individuals who have not adopted justice as an important motivating force in their lives, such as very young children (see Lerner, 1977) or, among adults, psychopaths or other delinquent groups (see Hafer, 2000; Hafer, Bègue, Choma, & Dempsey, 2005). If justice is not a relevant concern for these individuals, they are more likely to ignore justice considerations when interacting with others.

Referring back to Figure 2.1, if the victim of harmdoing has been excluded from the scope of justice, then any harmdoing is guided by other motivations, such as self-interest (Wenzel, 2001, 2002; Tyler et al., 1997). Note that these alternative motives do not *necessarily* lead to harm. For example, people's self-interest might best be served by *positive* treatment of some targets, in which case exclusion from the scope of justice might nevertheless be associated with favorable treatment. The nonjustice motives must be combined with other conditions in order for harmdoing to occur (see Staub, 1989, 1990, 1999, 2003b; see also chapter 11, this volume), some of which we have already noted in this chapter.

If the victim of harm is included in the perpetrator's scope of justice, then another justice-related question is whether the justice motive is sufficiently strong, compared to other competing motives, to guide behavior (see the second level of Figure 2.1). We proposed earlier that mild forms of negative identification (e.g., perceived attitude dissimilarity, as opposed to nonhumanness), the extent to which a justice goal is blocked, priming of justice versus other concerns, and individual differences might determine the strength of the justice motive – and, therefore, whether it guides the actor's behavior. If the justice motive is relatively weak, then harmdoing can result from other motives that, because key conditions are present, induce negative treatment of the target.

As noted in the third step of Figure 2.1, however, if the justice motive is relatively strong, then it is likely the primary influence on an actor's behavior. Thus, harmdoing that occurs will be based on the perpetrator's need for justice. For example, a number of justice principles can lead to harmful treatment when certain features are present. Most notably, perpetrators of harm may believe that their victims deserve to be harmed because they did something reprehensible or they are bad or worthless individuals. If harm is seen as deserved, it is probably also seen as just.

What are the implications of our social psychological analysis of the role of justice in extreme harmdoing? First, extreme harmdoing can occur under a wide variety of circumstances and can be driven by different, sometimes seemingly opposite, motives (e.g., justice versus self-interest). To fully understand any particular act of harm, we must know what motives were present in the harmdoer, the relative strength of these motives, and the conditions that aligned the primary motive with harmdoing.

Second, acts of extreme harmdoing may be seen as just by the perpetrators, even if the victims and third-party observers do not believe the act is fair. Perhaps the biggest lesson of a social psychological perspective on justice is that we should not ignore the motivational impact of people's subjective sense of justice and injustice (see Dalbert, 2001; Ross & Miller, 2002). Even if there are generally agreed upon and relatively objective justice principles, such as people should get what they deserve (Lerner et al., 1976), subjective perceptions of the situation may differ between individuals, so the actual implementation of a particular principle may be a source of conflict. For example, Rev. Jerry Falwell, an evangelical Christian minister, was in the news for comments he made on his television show a few days after the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in the U.S. His famous words were: "What we saw on Tuesday, as terrible as it is, could be minuscule if, in fact, God continues to lift the curtain and allow the enemies of America to give us probably what we deserve" (Goodstein, 2001, p. 15).

It is likely that, although there is general agreement among Americans that people should get what they deserve, many did not agree with Falwell's particular assessment of their own entitlement. Thus, a complete understanding of incidences of extreme harmdoing, aside from an analysis of less psychological factors mentioned in some other chapters of this book (see Part II), depends on how well we can understand the perceptions and motivations of the perpetrators (see White, 1991, 1998). What may be especially difficult as an outsider is to entertain the notion that some atrocities might not be seen as unfair, and may even be seen as absolutely necessary for justice to prevail.

Third, the literature on the social psychology of justice has implications for attempts to deal with current cases of extreme harmdoing or to avoid such events in the future. For example, if an act of harm results when the perpetrators exclude the victims from justice concerns, and the primary precursor to exclusion is extreme perceptions of dissimilarity, then one approach to change would be to promote

psychological "recategorization" of the victims, such as promoting the vision of a superordinate group that includes both the perpetrators and the victims as members (see Gaertner, Dovidio, Nier, Ward, & Banker, 1999; Mikula & Wenzel, 2000; Wenzel, 2000). Once in the same category, justice should presumably be relevant. If inclusive thinking is encouraged in children, of course, whole societies may be able to avoid neighbors killing neighbors (Staub, 2003a, 2003b).

A recategorization approach may not be effective, however, in some cases of extreme harmdoing where justice is seen as relevant but the motive for fairness is very weak relative to other concerns. If the perpetrators have only a weak motive to behave justly, then encouraging the perpetrators to think of their victims as belonging to the same group as themselves will not help. Under such circumstances, techniques that increase the strength of the justice motive, like removing psychological and material barriers to reaching justice goals (e.g., Crosby, 1976; Foster & Matheson, 1995), might be more effective.

Finally, if the perpetrator of harm believes that his or her victims deserve such treatment, so the treatment is deemed fair, then attempts to highlight unrecognized contributions of the target will be more effective than recategorization approaches. It may also be the case that a failure to recognize that perpetrators are motivated by a concern with justice could preclude the use of potentially effective procedures such as integrative negotiation (in which solutions that meet all parties' underlying interests are sought; Fisher & Ury, 1981; Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994) or interactive problem solving (in which opposing parties work to develop a deeper understanding of each other's motivations, needs, etc.; Cross & Rosenthal, 1999; Kelman, 1972).

We started this chapter with the goal of exploring insights that the social psychology of justice can offer about people inflicting extreme harm on others. We believe that concepts from this literature – the scope of justice, the justice motive, and deservingness, to name a few – can be extremely useful in helping us to understand genocide, torture, and other acts of great harm, and perhaps even play a role in reducing the likelihood of such tragedies in the future.

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3

On the Nature of Contemporary Prejudice

From Subtle Bias to Severe Consequences

John F. Dovidio, Adam R. Pearson, Samuel L. Gaertner, and Gordon Hodson

Other chapters in this volume describe the fragile nature of intergroup relations and illustrate vividly, with examples from Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and from the Holocaust during World War II, how neighbors who had been living in apparent harmony can suddenly become violent enemies. These chapters describe conditions such as political instability that arouse strong passions, elicit hatred, and produce violence in its most extreme form: genocide. Whereas the other chapters focus on the political, social, structural, and intergroup factors that address the central issue of this volume, why neighbors kill, in this chapter we examine the psychological processes that provide the foundation for transforming basically normal and well-intentioned people into agents of violence under these societal-level conditions.

We use as a case study the attitudes of Whites toward Blacks in the United States. We focus on this topic because of the historical and contemporary importance of race in the United States; racial issues have defined politically, legally, and socially the nature of majority–minority relations throughout the nation's history. It is a history involving absolute oppression and violence associated with the inhumanity of slavery in the past and manifested most overtly in hate crimes, criminal acts motivated in whole or in part by prejudice toward another group (Boeckmann & Turpin-Petrosino, 2002), in the present.

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Because the standards for reporting hate crimes have varied, it is difficult to determine whether incidences of hate crimes have changed systematically over time. Nevertheless, the number of *reported* hate crimes against Blacks has increased from 1,689 (36% of all reported hate crimes) in 1991 to 3,573 (39% of reported hate crimes) in 1998 (Perry, 2002). In 2006, there were 3,136 anti-Black hate crime offenses (35% of all hate crime offenses; U.S. Department of Justice, 2007). Perhaps because of its social importance, racial prejudice has been the primary focus of empirical research on the psychology of prejudice. As experimental social psychologists, this is the approach we adopt in this chapter. Specifically, we draw on psychological theory and research to explore the nature of Whites' contemporary racial attitudes and show how subtle prejudice can represent a catalyst for producing direct, and potentially extreme, harmful actions.

In this chapter, we propose that extreme prejudice is not necessary to produce support for actions that will harm, and ultimately kill, members of other groups. Instead, "everyday" prejudice, bias within the latitude of normal expression, provides a foundation that, under appropriate conditions, can be manifested in actions of physical harm to members of other groups. We first describe the nature of contemporary prejudice of Whites toward Blacks in the United States and illustrate how it differs from the traditional, overt form. We then apply Sternberg's (2003) model of intergroup hate to understand potential processes that transform subtle bias to direct harm. We conclude by discussing the practical and theoretical implications of this perspective.

The Nature of Contemporary Racism

Overt expressions of prejudice of Whites toward Blacks in the United States have declined significantly over the past several decades (Bobo, 2001). These declines have been attributed, at least in part, to the landmark civil rights legislation of the 1960s, which made racial discrimination illegal and helped to facilitate more egalitarian norms and standards in personal behavior. Only a small minority of Whites still express blatantly prejudiced attitudes. For example, less than 10% of White respondents report on national surveys that, because of race, they would not vote for a well-qualified Black presidential candidate (see Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998). Although we recognize that blatant forms of racism still exist and are frequently the basis of violence of Whites against Blacks, in this chapter we focus on racism among the well intentioned.

We propose that contemporary prejudice in the United States operates largely unconsciously and produces discrimination in ways that occur unintentionally and are often difficult to recognize. Although this contemporary form of racism most typically produces more mild or subtle forms of discrimination, it can elicit more direct and aggressive reactions under conditions of competition and threat. We explore when and how this subtle bias can contribute to direct and significant harm – to understanding why neighbors kill – at least when it occurs within socially condoned circumstances.

Aversive racism

According to the aversive racism perspective, many people who consciously, explicitly, and sincerely support egalitarian principles and believe themselves to be nonprejudiced also harbor negative feelings about Blacks and other historically disadvantaged groups. A critical aspect of the aversive racism framework (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986) is the development of underlying unconscious negative feelings by Whites toward Blacks as a consequence of normal, almost unavoidable and frequently functional, cognitive, motivational, and social-cultural processes. In terms of cognitive processes, people normally categorize others into groups, typically in terms that delineate one's own group from other groups. This mere classification of people into ingroups and outgroups is sufficient to initiate bias (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). In the United States, Whites automatically categorize people on the basis of race, and this categorization spontaneously elicits evaluative racial biases and stereotypes (Blair, 2001). With respect to motivational processes, people have basic needs of power, status, and control not only for themselves but also for their group, which exacerbates bias and often produces intergroup conflict (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; see also chapter 10, this volume). With regard to sociocultural influences, people often adopt, without question, cultural stereotypes and justifying ideologies for group inequalities that reinforce group hierarchy (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

Cultural values may also be partly responsible for perpetuating the strong convictions concerning fairness, justice, and racial equality held by most White Americans. The existence of both the conscious endorsement of egalitarian values and unconscious negative feelings toward Blacks makes aversive racists' attitudes complex and produces a distinct pattern of discriminatory behavior. In the next section, we

examine the implications of the aversive racism framework and illustrate how bias expressed in subtle ways can have profound consequences.

Expressions of Subtle Bias

The aversive racism framework helps to identify when discrimination against Blacks and other minority groups will or will not occur. Whereas old-fashioned racists exhibit a direct and overt pattern of discrimination, aversive racists' actions may appear more variable and inconsistent. At times they discriminate (manifesting their negative feelings), and at other times they do not (reflecting their egalitarian beliefs). Our research has provided a framework for understanding this complex pattern of discrimination.

We have found consistent support across a broad range of situations for the basic proposition that contemporary biases tend to be expressed in subtle rather than blatant ways (see Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998, 2004; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Because aversive racists consciously recognize and endorse egalitarian values, and because they truly aspire to be nonprejudiced, they will *not* discriminate in situations with strong social norms when discrimination would be obvious to others and to themselves. Specifically, we propose that when people are presented with a situation in which the normatively appropriate response is clear (when right and wrong are clearly defined), aversive racists will not discriminate against Blacks. In these circumstances, aversive racists will be especially motivated to avoid feelings, beliefs, and behaviors that could be associated with racist intent. Wrongdoing, which could directly threaten their nonprejudiced self-image, would be too costly.

However, because aversive racists also possess, often unconsciously, negative feelings toward Blacks, these feelings will eventually be expressed, but in subtle, indirect, and rationalizable ways. Discrimination will tend to occur in situations in which normative structure is weak, when the guidelines for appropriate behavior are vague, or when the basis for social judgment is ambiguous. In addition, discrimination will occur when an aversive racist can justify or rationalize a negative response on the basis of some factor other than race. Under these circumstances, aversive racists may engage in behaviors that ultimately harm Blacks, but in ways that allow them to maintain their self-image as nonprejudiced.

In our initial studies on this topic, which usually involved situations in which Blacks were not personally responsible for their predicament (e.g., being the victim of an emergency; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1977), self-reported racial attitudes were generally unrelated to manifestations

in aversive racism. That is, both relatively high and low prejudice-scoring Whites generally did not discriminate against Blacks when appropriate behavior was clear. In addition, low prejudiced Whites discriminated against Blacks as much as high prejudiced Whites when they could justify their behavior on the basis of some factor other than race. Even high prejudice-scoring college students, however, are relatively low in prejudice compared to the general population. Also, they may not perceive their responses to prejudice inventories as reflective of prejudicial feelings but rather as an objective assessment of reality. Thus, both high and low prejudice-scoring students could maintain the belief that they are not prejudiced.

However, subsequent research has suggested that when a Black person's actions are clearly responsible for their situation *and* a negative response can be justified on the basis of a factor other than race (e.g., with convincing evidence that the person committed a serious crime), relatively high and low prejudice-scoring White college students often show divergent responses. In particular, relatively high prejudice-scoring Whites, who are less able or less motivated to suppress their bias on prejudice questions, tend to show more direct behavioral evidence of bias, which resembles blatant bias but is revealed only under these justifiable circumstances. Low prejudice-scoring White students also show bias in these situations, but it is typically manifested in an even more indirect way (e.g., in terms of amplified ingroup favoritism). Thus, there may be systematic shades of subtlety in the subtle bias associated with aversive racism.

In the next section, we illustrate how contemporary bias may inhibit Whites' helping of Blacks and, under some circumstances, facilitate the harming of Blacks.

Bystander intervention

One of our earliest experiments (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1977) demonstrates how aversive racism can operate in dramatic and consequential ways. The study built upon the work of Darley and Latané (1968), who demonstrated how the presence of other witnesses in an emergency can reduce the likelihood that any given person will intervene. In particular, if a person witnesses an emergency knowing that he or she is the only bystander, that person bears all of the responsibility for helping. Consequently, the likelihood of helping is high. In contrast, if a person witnesses an emergency but believes that there are several other witnesses who might help, then the responsibility for helping is shared. Moreover, if the person believes that someone else will help or has already helped, the likelihood that the bystander will take

action is reduced. We extended these ideas to study subtle racial bias. Specifically, in addition to leading White participants to believe that they were the only witness to an emergency or that there was another witness who could help, we varied the race of the victim (Black or White). We predicted that discrimination against Blacks would occur only when Whites could rationalize not helping, when there was another witness who presumably could help, not when they were the only bystander.

The results supported these predictions. When White participants believed that they were the only witness, they helped both White and Black victims very frequently (over 85% of the time) and equivalently. There was no evidence of blatant racism. In contrast, when they thought others had witnessed the emergency and could therefore rationalize a decision not to help on the basis of a factor other than race, they helped Black victims only half as often as White victims (37.5% vs. 75%). High and low prejudice-scoring participants showed a very similar pattern of response in this study.

These results illustrate the operation of subtle biases in relatively dramatic, spontaneous, and life-threatening circumstances involving a failure to help, rather than an action intentionally aimed at doing harm. Nevertheless, when the situation permits discrimination while allowing a White person to avoid an attribution of bigotry, aversive racism can have consequences as profound as racism motivated by overt hatred.

In a society in which norms against discrimination and physical harm are strong, the most common expressions of aversive racism may involve "biases of omission," such as failing to offer as much assistance to an outgroup member as to an ingroup member. Nevertheless, we further propose that when the norms change, when social inhibitions are relieved and harm can be socially rationalized or justified, the effects of aversive racism will be manifested in more directly harmful ways. We consider this implication in the current section in terms of experiments on interracial aggression and juridic decisions involving guilt or innocence, recommended length of sentencing, and support for the death penalty.

Interracial aggression

The aversive racism perspective suggests that because aggression and intergroup violence are usually normatively sanctioned, aversive racists would be particularly inhibited in engaging in interracial aggression in most contexts. Nevertheless, given their underlying negative feelings and beliefs, aversive racists, compared to truly nonprejudiced people, may also be particularly susceptible to disinhibiting influences,

such as provocation that justifies retaliation or immediate norms or social forces (e.g., behavioral contagion) that promote aggression. Mullen (1986), for instance, found that interracial violence by Whites against Blacks often occurs within a social context that permits or encourages aggression. His analysis of newspaper reports of Blacks being lynched by White mobs revealed that violence against Blacks was more likely when Whites were part of a larger group and experienced greater anonymity and deindividuation. Recent research on hate crimes similarly reveals that the perceived attitudes of others in the situation, even more than an assailant's own attitudes, influences violent action (Franklin, 2000), and a substantial portion of hate crimes involve reactions to perceived threat or provocation (McDevitt, Levin, & Bennett, 2002). Thus, factors that normally disinhibit aggressive behavior, such as provocation, deindividuation, peer pressure, and anonymity, may be particularly potent for promoting interracial aggression among Whites who normally appear nonprejudiced but who harbor unconscious negative feelings about Blacks.

Research by Rogers and Prentice-Dunn (1981) illustrates how subtle prejudice, which may not be manifested under most normal circumstances, can be a critical factor in interracial aggression and hostility under certain conditions. Under the guise of a study in behavior modification, White male college students were told that they should administer shocks to another person, actually a Black or White confederate, when a signal indicated that the person's heart rate fell below a predetermined level. In one condition designed to provoke anger, the participant overheard the confederate say to the experimenter (before the task was performed) that the participant looked too "dumb" and "stupid" to operate the apparatus. In a control condition, the confederate simply stated that he was ready to proceed with the experiment and had no objections about participating.

Consistent with the aversive racism perspective, in the control condition, when they were not provoked by the insults and interracial aggression could not be justified by a nonracial factor, White participants administered somewhat lower intensity shocks to Black than to White confederates. However, after being angered by the socially inappropriate remarks, White participants in the insult condition administered substantially higher levels of shock to Black than to White confederates. That is, when they were provoked by the confederate, which aroused anger and provided a nonracial explanation for retaliation, Whites were particularly aggressive to Blacks.

Other research using similar interracial aggression paradigms has also produced results consistent with the operation of aversive racism.

Supportive of the aversive racism framework, Whites' willingness to shock Blacks more than Whites is moderated by situational factors relating the salience of compliance to nonprejudiced norms. Whites' biased aggression is inhibited when Whites anticipate censure from others; it is facilitated when Whites feel freed from prevailing norms through conditions that make them feel anonymous and deindividuated, or when their actions are perceived to be justified (Donnerstein & Donnerstein, 1973; Donnerstein, Donnerstein, Simon, & Ditrichs, 1972; Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1981).

The legal context provides another frame under which aversive racism can operate subtly but have profound influence. Racial biases can influence how evidence is perceived and weighed, affecting assessments of guilt, and once a defendant is judged guilty, can effect the severity of recommended punishment in the context of formal structures and social norms that support punishment.

Bias in legal decisions

Traditionally, Blacks and Whites have not been treated equally under the law (see Sidanius, Levin, & Pratto, 1998). Across time and locations in the United States, Blacks have been more likely to be convicted of crimes and, if convicted, sentenced to longer terms for similar crimes, particularly if the victim is White. In addition, Blacks are more likely to receive the death penalty (Government Accounting Office, 1990). Baldus, Woodworth, and Pulaski (1990) examined over 2,000 murder cases in Georgia and found that a death sentence was returned in 22% of the cases in which Black defendants were convicted of killing a White victim, but in only 8% of the cases in which the defendant and the victim were White. Paralleling the trends in overt expressions of bias, although differences in judicial outcomes have tended to persist, racial disparities in sentencing are declining over time. We propose that the aversive racism is particularly pertinent in the legal context because the body of evidence may offer nonracial justifications for actions and punishment that is formally endorsed and supported under these conditions. We illustrate these effects first in terms of how evidence is weighed in judgments of guilt and then with respect to factors involved in supporting a death sentence.

Inadmissible evidence and judgments of guilt. Even though the influence of old-fashioned racism in juridic judgments may be waning, aversive racism appears to have a continuing, subtle influence. One way it can operate is by influencing how evidence is weighed in decisions.

For example, in a laboratory simulation study, Johnson, Whitestone, Jackson and Gatto (1995) examined the effect of the introduction of inadmissible evidence, which was damaging to a defendant's case, on Whites' judgments of a Black or White defendant's guilt. No differences in judgments of guilt occurred as a function of defendant race when all the evidence presented was admissible. However, consistent with the aversive racism framework, the presentation of inadmissible evidence increased judgment of guilt when the defendant was Black but not when the defendant was White. We have recently found similar results involving inadmissible DNA evidence and judgments of guilt and severity of sentencing among participants in the United Kingdom (Hodson, Hooper, Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2005).

Another study of simulated juridic decisions involving the impact of inadmissible evidence by Faranda and Gaertner (1979; see also Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986) demonstrated how individual differences in a prejudice-related personality variable, authoritarianism, can shape perceptions of a defendant's guilt. Authoritarianism is a personality variable involving a constellation of factors, such as rigidity of beliefs and strong perceptions of ingroup–outgroup distinctions (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), associated with negative attitudes toward a number of groups, including Whites' prejudice toward Blacks (Altemeyer, 1996).

In Faranda and Gaertner's (1979) study, both high and low authoritarian participants displayed racial biases in their reactions to inadmissible evidence, but they did so in different ways. In their ratings of certainty of guilt, high authoritarians did not ignore the inadmissible testimony when the victim was Black; they were more certain of the Black defendant's guilt when they were exposed to the inadmissible evidence than when they were not presented with this testimony. For the White defendant, however, high authoritarians followed the judge's instructions appropriately; the inadmissible evidence had no impact on their judgments. Low authoritarian participants, in contrast, followed the judge's instructions about ignoring the inadmissible testimony when the defendant was Black. However, they were biased in favor of the White defendant when the inadmissible evidence was presented. That is, low authoritarians were less certain of the White defendant's guilt when the inadmissible evidence was presented than when it was omitted. Thus, low authoritarian participants demonstrated a pro-ingroup bias. It is important to note that the anti-outgroup bias of high authoritarians and the pro-ingroup bias of low authoritarians both disadvantage Blacks relative to Whites – but in different ways.

As we noted earlier, within the United States the legal system allows for capital sentencing, the death penalty, in a number of states. As we propose in this chapter, the dynamics of aversive racism can lead to actions of direct physical harm when the normative context supports it, as with a government sanctioned death penalty. We explore why neighbors kill in the context of the legal system in the United States in the next section.

Capital sentencing. Using the aversive racism framework, we have investigated evidence of direct and indirect patterns of racial discrimination among Whites scoring high and low in self-reported prejudice in recommending the death penalty for Black and White defendants (Dovidio, Smith, Donnella, & Gaertner, 1997). High and low prejudice-scoring White college students read a summary of facts associated with a case in which the offender was found guilty of murdering a White police officer following a robbery. The race of the defendant, Black or White, was systematically varied. After reading the case and before making a decision, participants viewed five other jurors on videotape individually presenting their decisions to vote for the death penalty in the case. In half of the conditions, all of these jurors were White; in the other half of the conditions, the second juror presenting a decision was a Black male student. The main measure of interest was how strongly the participant subsequently recommended the death penalty.

It was hypothesized on the basis of the archival research on racial disparities in death sentencing and on social psychological research on racial biases that, given the established guilt of the defendant and the legal support for applying the death penalty, Black defendants would be discriminated against relative to White defendants. However, the aversive racism framework further suggests that this discrimination would be displayed most broadly when one of the jurors recommending the death penalty was Black, which would allow White participants to avoid attributions of racial bias when recommending the death penalty for a Black offender.

High prejudice-scoring Whites showed a straightforward pattern of bias against the guilty Black defendants: Regardless of the other jurors, they gave generally stronger recommendations for the death penalty for Black defendants than for White defendants. Low prejudice-scoring white participants, in contrast, demonstrated a more complicated pattern of responses. Their strongest recommendations for the death penalty occurred when the defendant was Black and a Black juror advocated the death penalty. Under these conditions in which their response could not necessarily be interpreted as racial

bias, lower prejudice-scoring Whites were as discriminating as higher prejudice-scoring Whites. However, when all of the jurors were White and they opposed the death penalty, low prejudice-scoring Whites were sensitive to this immediate norm and exhibited the strongest recommendations *against* the death penalty when the defendant was Black. Again, higher and lower prejudice Whites showed different patterns of discrimination, but when there was sufficient rationale both showed discrimination against Blacks – discrimination that had lethal consequences for Black defendants.

Subtle bias: A summary

Taken together, the work we have described thus far in the present chapter reveals that contemporary racial bias is a pervasive influence in U.S. society, influencing the perceptions and actions of Whites who, in an absolute sense, do not see themselves as racially biased. The vast majority of the participants in our samples, 90%, report that they are not racially prejudiced, and when their responses are compared to national representative samples, they appear to be nonprejudiced. At a conscious and overt level, they *are* well intentioned. Nevertheless, they express racial bias in subtle but systematic ways.

Moreover, although we have found aversive racism to be a pervasive form of bias among people who report that they are not prejudiced in an absolute sense, as we have illustrated in our research there is some evidence that Whites who score relatively higher in traditional prejudice (but are still relatively nonprejudiced by national standards) may embrace nonracial justifications more readily and therefore show patterns of discrimination more strongly and overtly. These seeds of racism may be a critical factor that can facilitate the transformation of subtle bias into overtly harmful action. We examine more directly the mechanisms involved in the next section of the chapter.

From Discomfort to Hate

Whereas the first part of this chapter was devoted to describing the nature of contemporary racism and identifying when and how this prejudice is manifested in discrimination, this part of the chapter explores the processes that may produce these effects. We pursue the question of why neighbors kill by considering the function of prejudice and the ways in which it shapes Whites' affective and cognitive reactions toward Blacks in the United States.

Functions of prejudice

Racial biases are a fundamental form of social control that support the economic, political, and personal goals of the majority group (Liska, 1997). Because of their functionality, racial biases are deeply embedded in cultural values, such as in widely accepted ideologies that justify inequality and exploitation, as well as institutional policies and practices (Jones, 1997). They are not typically expressed in terms of extreme negative emotions or overt negative behaviors, rather, more ostensibly positive forms of behavior, such as paternalism (Jackman, 1994), often operate instead to promote disparities and inequities.

Like its traditional form, however, contemporary prejudice lays a foundation for more overt forms of discrimination, often involving direct harm. The transformation of prejudice – which represents a readiness for antisocial action – to negative behavior can be triggered by perceptions of material threat (threat to one's resources) or symbolic threat (threat to cherished values; see chapter 10, this volume). Such threats provide justification for the expression of prejudice in the form of discriminatory actions. Under threat, latent bias can become active bias.

Although the effect of economic threat has traditionally received the primary empirical attention as a cause of hate and violence against Blacks (Hovland & Sears, 1940), other forms of threat, such as symbolic threats to a group's sense of identity or to a group's cultural values and ideals (Stephan & Stephan, 2000), can arouse intense affective reactions and facilitate open discrimination. Glaser, Dixit, and Green (2002) theorize that "hate crimes against African Americans typically result not so much from economic concerns or frustrations, or competition for material resources, but more often from the perceived threat to the integrity, separateness, and hegemony of the ingroup" (p. 180). They found that White racists were more threatened by, and advocated violence more strongly in response to, interracial marriage and Blacks moving into the neighborhood than job competition. Thus, the roots of the many violent actions against Blacks may reside in collective identity and the forces of ingroup favoritism – the fundamental elements of aversive racism (Gaertner et al., 1997).

Prejudice and emotion

One mechanism that is critical to this transformation from latent prejudice to bias is the nature of the emotions that people experience in

the situation. The experience and intensity of the negative affect related to intergroup relations can vary as a function of the specific group and moderating situational conditions. Intergroup emotional reactions typically range from mild discomfort, disgust, and fear, to anger, and, at the extreme, open hatred, with the specific emotions involved corresponding to different patterns of behavioral responses to the other group (Devos, Silver, Mackie, & Smith, 2002).

Within the United States, anxiety is the emotion that typically characterizes interracial interaction. Besides the anxiety aroused within Whites when interacting with a person from a group with which they may have had limited contact (Stephan & Stephan, 1985), fears of acting in a way that reveals one's racial biases can heighten the anxiety and discomfort that aversive racists experience in interracial interaction.

Whites' interracial anxiety can be an element of intergroup relations that, under certain conditions, can contribute to more violent reactions to members of other groups. As Stephan and Stephan (1985) propose, because arousal created by one source (e.g., interracial anxiety) can be transferred and attributed to another source (e.g., perceived threat), interracial anxiety can amplify Whites' affective reactions and consequently produce more extreme behavioral responses to Blacks than to Whites. Thus, the more diffuse emotions of interracial anxiety and discomfort that are experienced by aversive racists, and typically lead to avoidance, can represent seeds for hate: They can readily be transformed into more intense negative emotions that motivate violent and aggressive actions toward Blacks.

Although intergroup anxiety may represent one important element of contemporary prejudice contributing to intergroup harm, Sternberg (2003) identifies other elements that can contribute to extreme intergroup reactions. In particular, he extends conceptions of hate in a way that applies to both individuals and groups. Sternberg writes, "Typically, hate is thought of as a single emotion. But there is reason to believe that it has multiple components that can manifest themselves in different ways on different occasions" (p. 306). One of these components is the "negation of intimacy," which involves aversive reactions to members of others or other groups (e.g., anxiety, disgust). This component is closely related to the anxiety and avoidant reactions that have been considered within the aversive racism framework.

Sternberg's (2003) second element that is pivotal in producing extreme negative reactions is "passion." This component also relates to the conditions that have been identified to facilitate the expression of racial discrimination. Sternberg defines passion as intense anger or

fear during periods of threat. The third element in Sternberg's model involves devaluation of the other person or group. To the extent that racism, both traditional and contemporary, involves Whites' more favorable valuation of their own group relative to Blacks, Sternberg's model further links aversive racism to the potential for the elicitation of direct harmful acts. In the next section, guided by Sternberg's model, we examine more directly the processes that underlie these biases.

From bias to hate

In this section, we briefly describe the results of recent studies in which we examined the contribution of each of the three elements that Sternberg (2003) identified in his model of hate: (a) negation, (b) passion, and (c) devaluation. Following from our work on aversive racism, two of these studies involve a legal context in which White participants were asked to recommend sentencing for a defendant who was found guilty of a violent crime. In both of these studies, we investigated the role of the three components of Sternberg's model to harsher treatment of Black defendants. A third study explored participants' endorsement of armed intervention to combat terrorism against the United States.

In an initial study applying Sternberg's model to expressions of racial bias, Dovidio (2004) examined the extent to which people would support the death penalty for a Black defendant who had shot and killed a White police officer attempting to apprehend him for a robbery. The central question examined in this study concerned how each of the components of hate identified by Sternberg relates to the strength of Whites' recommendations for the death penalty. Devaluation involved perceptions of how inherently immoral and bad the defendant was; negation of intimacy was assessed by how much anxiety and discomfort was experienced when thinking about the defendant; and passion was measured by feelings of fear and anger evoked by the defendant.

Supportive of Sternberg's model, all three components individually and collectively predicted support for the death penalty for the Black defendant. Stronger recommendations for a death sentence for the Black defendant were associated with reactions reflecting greater negation (i.e., stronger feelings of anxiety and discomfort; $r = .27$), greater passion (i.e., feelings of anger and outrage; $r = .36$), and greater devaluation (i.e., attributions that the defendant was immoral and evil; $r = .32$). When considered simultaneously, the overall combination significantly predicted support for the death penalty (multiple $r = .44$),

and this effect was essentially additive, with each contributing some, but not a significant amount, of unique variance. That is, as proposed by Sternberg, the combination of these three factors was a better predictor of responses than when the unique contribution of each was considered separately.

In another study investigating support for military intervention against another nation to combat terrorism, similar results were obtained (Dovidio, 2004). Participants read a newspaper article about the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, and their reactions were assessed. In this different context, negation of intimacy ($r = .25$), passion ($r = .35$), and devaluation ($r = .43$) individually and in combination predicted support for massive military intervention by U.S. armed forces.

We have proposed in this chapter that prejudice provides the foundation for destructive actions to emerge. That is, Whites generally experience anxiety and discomfort (feelings of negation) with Blacks and tend to value Blacks less than Whites (devaluation; Gaertner et al., 1997). When the actions of a Black person are perceived to justify it, they will respond more negatively toward Blacks, often with amplified negative emotions (Katz, Wackenhut, & Hass, 1986), reflecting more intense passion. Thus, drawing on Sternberg's (2003) model, we hypothesized that even within a generally non-overtly-prejudiced population of White college students, those higher in prejudice would tend to sentence a Black defendant who committed a violent crime against a White person more harshly than a White defendant who committed the same crime, and that this effect would occur, in large part, through the elements of intergroup hate identified by Sternberg.

In a study testing these predictions (Pearson, Dovidio, & Smith-McLallen, 2005), White college students were asked to read a newspaper article in which a White or Black assailant was described as having brutally attacked a White man with seemingly little provocation. Participants were asked to provide their reactions to the incident, which included feelings toward the assailant related to negation of intimacy (e.g., anxiety, discomfort), passion (e.g., anger, fear), and responses related to devaluation (e.g., attributions of evil and inhumanity). In this study, self-reported expression of hate was also measured. Finally, outcome measures related to recommendations of severity of punishment – length of recommended sentencing and support for the death penalty, had the victim died – were also examined.

The pattern of results was generally supportive of the predictions. First, higher prejudice-scoring White participants recommended

harsher punishment for Black than for White assailants. Second, higher prejudice-scoring White participants showed greater levels of dehumanization and passion in response to the Black assailant's crime than to the White assailant's crime. Both high and low prejudice-scoring participants showed comparably higher levels of negation with the Black than with the White assailant. Third, consistent with Sternberg's (2003) model, greater expression of hate was predicted by greater dehumanization ($r = .49$), negation of intimacy ($r = .49$), and passion ($r = .39$). The multiple correlation, .60, was substantially higher than the unique contribution of any single component (betas = .12 to .33). Finally, hate significantly predicted harsher sentences ($r = .32$) and mediated, at least in part, the effect of prejudice on sentencing. When the level of hate was statistically controlled, the effect of prejudice on racial discrimination in sentencing was substantially reduced and no longer significant.

Although the expression of bias is generally subtle, these studies reveal how contemporary forms of bias, which generally involve feelings of discomfort rather than antipathy (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), can be transformed by specific incidents and normative conditions into actions designed to cause harm. Fueled by feelings of passion and supported by devaluation of members of the group, latent prejudice becomes active discrimination. While contemporary bias in many situations involves more favorable treatment of Whites than Blacks, with provocation and justification it can also lead to greater harm.

Implications and Conclusion

In this chapter, we have used racial prejudice of Whites against Blacks in the United States as a case study illustrating how psychological processes critically contribute to and shape the dynamics of intergroup relations. We have explored the nature of contemporary racism in the United States and its implications for a range of race-related responses. We have argued that although blatant bigotry motivated by racial hatred is now relatively rare, contemporary forms of racism, such as aversive racism, still have a significant negative impact on Blacks.

Although the expression of bias from aversive racism is typically subtle, its effects can be as pernicious as the impact of traditional, overt racism. Moreover, aversive racism contains the seeds of more blatant racism, rooted in the three main components of Sternberg's (2003) duplex model of hate: the negation of intimacy, intense anger or fear during periods of threat, and devaluation of the other group

through contempt. In particular, aversive racism represents latent racism that can be transformed into open hatred, discrimination, and violence by threat, provocation, negative stereotypes, cultural ideologies that justify disadvantage, or local norms supporting discrimination that supersede normally prevailing norms against bias and violence. Thus, the capacity for racial hatred and aggression resides "just below the surface" among well-intentioned and well-educated White Americans.

We have proposed a variety of techniques for limiting the effects of aversive racism and combating aversive racism at its roots (see Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Because aversive racists' conscious beliefs are already genuinely nonprejudiced, these strategies have focused on increasing people's sensitivity to their emotional experiences with Blacks (Esses & Dovidio, 2000) and making them aware of their generally unconscious feelings and beliefs (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2000). Changing how Whites think about Blacks by emphasizing common group memberships (e.g., institutional or national identity) can also effectively combat contemporary bias at the individual level (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), and can be supported by appropriately structured intergroup contact (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).

At the societal level, the adverse impact of aversive racism on Blacks may be limited and controlled by policies and laws. Current laws in the United States, however, are not designed to address subtle forms of discrimination. As Krieger (1995, 1998) has observed, for successful prosecution, current antidiscrimination laws require that racial bias be identified as *the* cause for disparate treatment, that intention to discriminate be demonstrated, and that the action directly harmed the complainant. Research on aversive racism has shown that disparate treatment is most likely to occur in combination with other factors that provide nonracial rationales for negative treatment, that racial bias is typically unconscious and often unintentional, and that disparate treatment, because of ingroup biases, often represents ingroup favoritism (pro-White responses) rather than outright rejection of outgroup members (anti-Black responses).

In conclusion, we contend that a better understanding of the psychology of racial prejudice can help illuminate why neighbors kill, and how macro-level social and political events relate to micro-level processes. A comprehensive understanding of both societal-level and psychological factors can also guide interventions that effectively address the potential for hate, hostility, and group-based violence at the foundations of prejudice, which often lies just below the surface.

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4

Why Neighbors Kill

Prior Intergroup Contact and Killing of Ethnic Outgroup Neighbors

Miles Hewstone, Nicole Tausch, Alberto Voci, Jared Kenworthy, Joanne Hughes, and Ed Cairns

> . . . scenes from hell, written on the darkest pages of human history.
>
> *(From a report to the General Assembly of the United Nations in November, 1999, by its Director General, Kofi Annan, quoting from the indictment of the former Bosnian Serb President, Radovan Karadzic, and his army chief, Ratko Mladic; cited by Gourevitch, 2003)*

> Do not seek revenge or bear a grudge against one of your people, but love your neighbour as yourself.
>
> *(Leviticus, Chapter 19, Verse 18)*

Whether in Srebrenica or Kigali or any number of other conflict zones, the appalling scenes witnessed in ethnic massacres might lead us to conclude that members of different ethnic groups sometimes cannot live together and coexist in peace. Yet the success of multiculturalism in other countries (Canada, for example) shows that they *can*. Mazower's (2005) portrait of Salonica from 1430 to 1950 reveals, in one city, both the lighter and darker sides of history. Under the relatively tolerant regime of Ottoman Islam, Christians, Muslims, and Jews largely coexisted peacefully, and both tolerated and learned

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from each other. But the three different faiths and races never fused into a true entity; the cultures coexisted, rather than mixed, spoke their respective languages, followed their own customs and lived apart in different districts of the city, each policed by their own community (Fearon & Laitin, 1996). Later, nationalism opportunistically seized on the differences and, in turn, the Greeks expelled the Muslims, and the Nazis virtually exterminated the Jews. Must we conclude that an empire is required to force ethnic groups to cohabit peacefully?

In the early 1990s the central European state of Yugoslavia was catapulted into civil war and "ethnic cleansing." It became clear from harrowing journalistic accounts that neighborly relations, even close friendships, with members of different ethnic groups cannot deliver complete immunity against barbaric acts. This chapter tries to identify some of the key factors in why ethnic integration breaks down in such cases, but also highlights cases where close ethnic ties did result in saving individuals from massacre. These two sides of the coin are well represented by two true stories:

> Dusko Tadic was a member of the Serb minority in the Bosnian town of Kozarac; his best friend was a Muslim policeman, Emir Karabasic. Tadic was later accused on 34 counts at the international war crimes tribunal at The Hague, one of which was beating to death four of his former neighbours, *including* Emir, in the Omarska detention camp.[1] (Vulliamy, 2004)

> Ahmed, a Bosnian, related how his life was saved when Serbian forces intercepted a group of Muslims trying to escape from Srebrenica to the haven of Tuzla: "My father was just ahead of me. In front of the tank, he turned to the left with the other men. Without thinking, I continued walking straight ahead with the women and children. After a few yards a hand reached out and grabbed my right shoulder. It was a Serb soldier, a neighbour of mine from Srebrenica. He shoved a blanket in my arms and motioned for me to put it on my head. He literally saved my life." (reported in Stover & Peress, 1998)

It is obviously asking an enormous amount of any kind of contact that it should "inoculate" the recipient against the host of forces urging it in the direction of ethnic conflict (e.g., group pressures such as conformity, calls to national identity, and threats to one's family). There is plentiful evidence (e.g., from Rwanda; Prunier, 1995) that contact does not *prevent* people massacring former neighbors. It is important, then, to acknowledge that contact cannot offer complete "immunity,"

and we should not have unrealistic expectations of what it can achieve. That does not mean, however, that it is ineffective, nor that it is not worth attempting.

We begin this chapter with a brief look at ethnic massacres from a social psychological perspective, and we are careful to note the limitations of this level of analysis. We then summarize the "contact hypothesis" and consider the plausibility of the idea that cross-ethnic neighborhood contacts might help to reduce the likelihood of massacres, or lead to cross-ethnic altruism in such cases. Next, we provide a summary of a range of instances of intergroup violence against "neighbors," drawing on four case studies: lynching in the American Deep South; a massacre of Jews by Poles in World War II; genocide in Rwanda; and ethnic cleansing in former Yugoslavia. We then supplement these more historical analyses with some of our own social psychological data from two less extreme conflicts, in Northern Ireland and India, which identify the types of contact that may work effectively to prevent conflict. Finally, we pose some questions for the future and ask how we can promote conditions in which cross-ethnic neighbors cooperate rather than kill each other.

Killing Neighbors versus Killing Members of Neighboring Groups

The impetus to write this chapter comes, in part, from the fact that none of us finds it surprising that members of one group kill members of neighboring groups. But we find killing neighbors utterly surprising, because the term *neighbors* seems to imply positive interpersonal relations that we associate with trust, cooperation, intimacy, and mutual helping. How can this come about?

Groups in proximity are often groups in conflict (for East African evidence, see Brewer, 1968; Brewer & Campbell, 1976; Levine & Campbell, 1972). There is even infrahuman evidence of a community of chimpanzees on the shores of Lake Tanganyika raiding valuable territory of a neighboring community, eventually killing all six males (see Dunbar, 2004). Neighboring groups often pose potential threats, to social identity, to numerical superiority, to locally held power, even to the existence of one's own group (see Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). Even in conflicts that appear on the face of it to be "straightforward" ethnic clashes (such as Hutu–Tutsi conflict in Rwanda or Burundi), competition for power and resources may be as important as ethnic differences.

Diamond (2005) notes that mass killing occurred even in an area of Rwanda where there lived only a single Tutsi. That individual was killed, but the Hutu also killed 5% of the other Hutu in a wider area of 2,000 inhabitants. Diamond's thesis is that part of the explanation must lie in Rwanda's overpopulation and scarcity of natural resources. This created tensions, and conflicts between neighbors were common. Under the cloak of the genocide in 1994, many scores were settled, landless killed landowners and seized their profitable land and cattle. Des Forges (1999) had earlier reported that many Hutu fought among themselves over land, cattle, or crops. Sherif (e.g., Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961) provided the most enduring social psychological account of conflict in terms of scarce resources, arguing that negatively interdependent goals (competition instead of co-operation) *caused* conflict. As subsequent social identity analyses made clear (see Tajfel & Turner, 1979), this was an overstatement, because goals were a sufficient, rather than a necessary, condition for conflict. However, as *The Economist* put it, in reviewing Diamond's (2005) book, notwithstanding the culpability of machete-importing Tutsi politicians, "when people are starving because they do not have enough land, it is surely easier to persuade them to kill their neighbours" ("Of porpoises and plantations", 2005). Consistent with this thesis, Biro et al. (2004) argued that the worsened economic situation by the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s contributed greatly to the sparking of ethnic conflict in former Yugoslavia, and was exploited by extremist politicians.

The Social Psychology of Massacres

Faced with "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia or genocide in Rwanda, what can social psychology contribute? Most theory and research on intergroup bias has studied the fairly mild tendency to favor one's ingroup (see Hewstone et al., 2002, for a review), rather than more extreme forms of outgroup derogation (see Mummendey & Otten, 2001). It would be a mistake on three counts to consider ethnic and religious mass murder as a simple extension of intergroup bias. First, the motives of those implicated in ethnic violence may be more complex than simple hatred for an outgroup (see Fearon & Laitin, 2000; Green & Seher, 2003) and some perpetrators participate only under duress, and in fear of their own lives. Second, the paradigmatic instances of ethnic and nationalist violence are large-scale events, extended in space and time; hence they differ from the phenomena that social psychologists normally study, although not necessarily those they

(should) seek to explain (see Brubaker & Laitin 1998). Third, social conflict is more complex than intergroup bias, and cannot be equated with the outcome of just one psychological process, nor should it be analyzed from just one disciplinary perspective. Real-world intergroup relations owe at least as much of their character to history, economics, politics, and ideology as they do to social psychological variables such as self-esteem, ingroup identification, group size, and group threat (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Notwithstanding these caveats, social psychology can contribute to our understanding of massacres in several ways, as outlined by Zajonc (2000), by its analysis of several social psychological processes closely linked to intergroup bias and conflict. These include "delegitimizing" victims (assigning them to an extreme social category, which enjoys no protection; Bar-Tal, 1990), "infrahumanizing" them (treating them as *less than* human and more bestial; Leyens et al., 2000), and morally excluding them (placing them outside the ingroup boundary of justice, fairness, and morality; Opotow, 1995). One particularly important process seems to be *deindividuation* which can, in fact, take two forms. "Subject-focused" deindividuation provides *perpetrators* with anonymity, which facilitates acts of atrocity (Staub & Rosenthal, 1994), diffuses responsibility, and mutually reinforces group members in their view that they are all behaving appropriately (see Postmes & Spears, 1998). "Object-focused" deindividuation deprives the *victims* of their individuality and encourages uniformity of treatment of all outgroup members. However, as Zajonc (2000) points out, in the most shocking massacres – where perpetrators betrayed or killed their friends (as in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda; see below for examples) – neither form of deindividuation could have occurred.

A complete answer to the question "why do neighbors kill?" would have to go well beyond these processes and include the issues outlined by Turner and Reynolds (2001) in their set of requirements of a general social psychological theory of intergroup conflict: an analysis of the psychological group; an understanding of the processes that come into play in intergroup relations; a theory of social influence; and an analysis of the content of group beliefs relevant to intergroup relations and wider society. We do not have space to explore all of these processes, but we will analyze the role of intergroup contact.

The "Contact Hypothesis"

In its simplest form, the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954; Hewstone & Brown, 1986; Pettigrew, 1986) proposes that bringing together

individuals from opposing groups "under optimal conditions" (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000) can reduce prejudice and improve intergroup relations. Allport (1954) suggested that these positive effects were most likely if four conditions were met: (a) equal status, (b) common goals, (c) institutional support, and (d) a perception of similarity between the two groups (see Kenworthy, Turner, Hewstone, & Voci, 2005).

There is extensive narrative (Pettigrew, 1998) and meta-analytic (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000, 2006) support for the hypothesis. More recently, attention has turned to understanding both *mediational* (*how* does contact work?) and *moderational* (*when* does contact work?) questions regarding intergroup contact (see Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Kenworthy et al., 2005). In particular, Pettigrew (1998) has highlighted the importance of affective processes (such as reduced intergroup anxiety) in explaining what makes contact effective, and Brown and Hewstone (2005) have accumulated evidence that the salience of group boundaries should be maintained during contact, to promote generalization across members of the target outgroup.

Allport (1954) summarized his contact hypothesis in an often-quoted phrase: "It has sometimes been held that merely by assembling people without regard for race, color, religion, or national origin, we can thereby destroy stereotypes and develop friendly attitudes. The case is not so simple" (Allport, 1954, p. 261). However, he also formulated a second hypothesis, rarely quoted: "[There are several conditions] required to remove the normal brakes that exist between verbal aggression and overt violence. These are likely to be fulfilled in regions where the two opposing groups are *thrown into close contact* . . . At such meeting points the precipitating incident is most likely to occur" (p. 58, italics added). We will argue that where conflict has erupted, prior contact has rarely been characterized by the *facilitating* conditions (Pettigrew, 1998) such as equal status and cooperation, and has more often reflected superficial levels of contact, with groups coexisting, but not enjoying meaningful contact across ethnic lines.

Even in the absence of overt group conflict, an interesting study of *neighborhood* contact reveals very low levels of cross-group interaction. Hamilton and Bishop (1976) studied what happened when the first Black family moved into a previously all-White neighborhood in the United States. They measured change in symbolic racist attitudes over one month, three months, and one year. After one month, 11% knew the last names of Black neighbors; 60% knew last names of White neighbors. Knowledge of White and Black neighbors' names was equal,

however, after three months, and one year. Yet a sizeable number of White respondents did not interact with new neighbors (White or Black). Hamilton and Bishop concluded that frequency of interaction was so low that it could not be proposed an important mediating variable. This cautionary study should remind us that coexisting, sharing the same street or neighborhood, is not the same as enjoying the benefits of extended, cross-group *contact*. It is important to bear this in mind in evaluating the available evidence on "neighborhood contacts" in the remainder of this chapter.

Case Studies in Neighbor-on-Neighbor Violence

Hellhounds in the Deep South

It is instructive to begin our consideration of ethnic violence with an example from the United States, because the way we try to explain such events should bear some resemblance to the way we try to explain the more recent massacres and genocides in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.

Litwack (1998) reported that between 1890 and 1917, on average at least 2–3 Blacks were hanged, burned at the stake, or murdered *every week*. Victims were often chosen for their failure to show deference and submission to Whites. While some might try to cling on to the idea that this violence was, in some way, "different" from that later seen in former Yugoslavia or Rwanda, this is difficult to sustain on closer analysis. Litwack wrote that, "Hate and fear transformed ordinary men and women into mindless murderers and sadistic torturers" (p. 284). Execution of Black victims was no longer enough; White violence was also characterized by sadism and exhibitionism. Lynching became "a public ritual, a collective experience, and the victim needed to be subjected to extraordinary torture and mutilation . . . [a] voyeuristic spectacle prolonged as long as possible (once for seven hours) for the benefit of the crowd . . ." (p. 285). Barely credible from today's perspective, the outrages were reported and photographed in papers; families posed with tethered victims, postcards were made and sent, even body parts were dispatched to friends to bear witness to one's presence and participation. In a fascinating archival analysis of lynchings, Mullen (1986) found evidence to support his thesis that being in a crowd lowers self-awareness. In 60 lynchings between 1900 and 1946, he found that larger mobs perpetrated more vicious and brutal murders, regardless of the victim's alleged crime.

A World War II massacre with a difference

The Nazi holocaust is, of course, the most prominent, well-recorded and deeply analyzed massacre of the Second World War. A much less well-known case, and one that involves killing neighbors, is more pertinent to the present chapter.

In one day, in July 1941, half of the Polish inhabitants of Jedwabne murdered the other half. Sixteen hundred men, women and children, all but seven of the town's Jews, were massacred. An estimated 92 perpetrators, roughly 50% of the adult Polish men of Jedwabne, carried out this massacre: "What the Jews saw, to their horror and, I dare say, incomprehension, were familiar faces. Not anonymous men in uniform, cogs in a war machine, agents carrying out orders, but their own neighbors" (Gross, 2003, p. 121).

Just like the case of the Deep South, then, this example exposes the limitations of any explanation in terms of "uncivilized savages," because those who propose this account would not normally think of either White Americans in the late nineteenth/early twentieth century or Poles in 1941 as "savages." This is an important step before considering our next case, Rwanda, where exactly such explanations were often lazily adopted.

Rwanda (1994)

Rwanda's genocide appears to be a prototypical case of neighbor-on-neighbor killing. It has been described as an "intimate genocide" in which "Neighbors hacked neighbors to death in their homes . . ." (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 115). Most estimates now agree that around 800,000 people were massacred in the 13 weeks after April 6, 1994. The vast majority of the victims were Tutsi, hacked to death with machetes by Hutu, a process facilitated by the existence of identity cards showing everyone's ethnic category. Rwanda dispelled many myths about genocide. It also taught us about the power of propaganda and the apparent weakness of existing social ties to resist pressures to kill.

The major myth dispelled is that genocide springs spontaneously from primeval ethnic antagonism; the so-called "primordialist" view asserts that ethnic boundaries are strong, enduring, and pervasive aspects of "human nature" and that ethnic violence results from antipathies and antagonisms that are enduring properties of ethnic groups (for a critical account of this view, see Fearon & Laitin, 1996). In fact, this genocide was assiduously planned over many months; militias

were organized, millions of machetes purchased from China and distributed, and Hutu peasants were subjected to unrelenting propaganda. Since the genocide there has been much discussion of the need for "early warnings," but part of the tragedy of Rwanda is that, with hindsight at least, there were ample warnings, but outsiders did not respond to them. These came in the form of political speeches, editorials, earlier massacres (from 1990 to 1994), confidential letters, and coded telegrams (see Des Forges, 1999, pp. 141–179; Human Rights Watch, 1994).

Rwanda's genocide illustrated the power of propaganda through the hate-filled campaign broadcast by the radio station *Radio Télévision Libre des Milles Collines* (RTLM), described by the respected Human Rights Watch organization as "the voice of genocide." Human Rights Watch (1994) reported that towards the end of 1993, "the broadcasts became more virulent, urging Hutu listeners to stamp out Tutsi 'cockroaches' (*Inyenzi*) and began targeting individuals who were named as 'enemies' or 'traitors' who 'deserved to die' " (p. 2). Throughout the weeks of the genocide, RTLM encouraged the killers with slogans such as "fill the half-empty graves" (p. 2) and reminded them that even unborn Tutsi children posed a threat and should be ripped from their mothers' wombs. Hundreds of thousands chose to become perpetrators in the genocide, but some participated only under duress, in fear of their own or their loved ones' lives (Des Forges, 1999). Prunier (1995) reported that 10,000–30,000 Hutu were killed by other Hutu during the genocide.

The case of Rwanda is particularly disturbing, because it should have benefited from a number of factors that one might have expected would "protect" against genocide (Gourevitch, 1998; Keane, 1995; Prunier, 1995). These included a common tongue, *Kinyarwanda*, a common cultural heritage, relatively frequent intermarriage (Vanderwerff, 1996, p. 16, refers to the term "Hutsi," used to describe the progeny of Hutu and Tutsi parents), movement from one category to the other, and extensive prior intergroup contact. In some cases that contact was evidently very intimate. Apollon Kabahizi is a worker with the Aegis Trust in Rwanda, a charity that helped to fund the building of a memorial center in Kigali. His Tutsi family was murdered. He recorded the following conversation:

> "One day I said to my best friend, who was a Hutu, 'Do you think you can pick up a machete and cut me with it, just because I'm a Tutsi. Is that something you can do?' 'Of course not,' he said. 'Are you sick

> or something?' But this same guy, my friend – well, I discovered later that he had killed my mother. My mother fed him; she brought school books for him because his own mother had died. He was my best friend. That's what genocide does." (Cowley, 2005)

Against the background of stories such as this, Rwanda could be taken as an example of the apparent weakness of existing cross-group social ties to resist pressures to kill. But it would be premature to draw this conclusion, because we know little about the exact nature of "contact with neighbors"; there is no reliable evidence as yet.

However, as in the case of former Yugoslavia, there undoubtedly were also acts of extraordinary bravery and defiance by individual Hutu. Canadian General Roméo Dallaire, United Nations commander in Rwanda at the time of the genocide, recorded some of these cases in his book (Dallaire, 2004). Human Rights Watch (1994) wrote that it would not publish the names of "these courageous defenders of human rights for fear of putting them in danger but will acknowledge them for their bravery and decency at a future date" (p. 6). The particular case of hotel manager Paul Rusesabagina was reported by Gourevitch (1998) and in the film *Hotel Rwanda*.

The Balkan tragedy

> Throughout the [Dayton] negotiations, I often thought of the refugees I had visited in 1992; how they knew many of the men who had killed and raped their families; how some of the killers had been their co-workers for twenty years . . . (Holbrooke, 1998, p. 370)

Even though it happened at the heart of Europe, not in deepest Africa, and in the twentieth century, not the dark ages, the conflict in former Yugoslavia and its associated massacres were, to many journalists, politicians, and diplomats, best explained in terms of "ancient ethnic hatreds" (for a critical analysis, see Gallagher, 2003; Naimark, 2001). Yet what seemed most puzzling was how appalling acts of barbarity could have occurred in what seemed like a multiethnic polity.

We shall analyze this case of neighbor-on-neighbor violence in two steps: (1) We ask, how ethnically integrated *was* this part of the Balkans, in fact?; (2) We consider the evidence of both antisocial and prosocial behavior on the part of neighbors from different ethnic groups. In the following section, we consider Rwanda and the Balkans together to ask why prior cross-group contact could not offer complete immunity against the "virus" of ethnic hatred.

Ethnic integration in the Balkans. There undoubtedly was ethnic integration in former Yugoslavia and ethnic cleansing occurred in many places where the population was "profoundly integrated" (Carmichael, 2002, p. 77), but the overall evidence is rather mixed, and sometimes ambivalent. Carmichael reports that before 1990 in the Croatian town of Karlovac, "many people . . . did not even know whether their neighbours were precisely Serbs or Croats and religion only ever became an issue if marriage was the outcome of a relationship" (p. 77). Yet in Bosnia alone ethnic cleansing resulted in around 200,000 deaths (50% Muslim, 30–35% Serb, 15–20% Croat; Carmichael, 2002; Weitz, 2003).

In prewar Bosnia, individuals from different ethnic groups socialized together, but Simic (2000, p. 115) referred to an "invisible psychological wall" between neighbors. He argued that "superficial cordiality, more often than not masked a deep sense of alienation, suspicion, and fear" (p. 115). Carmichael noted the history of interethnic conflict and that "individuals do not forget what happens during war and crisis and will bury hostilities until such time as it is possible to take revenge" (Carmichael, 2002, p. 78). Finally, interethnic conflict in the Balkans faced the same problem as intergroup contact anywhere (see Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Hewstone & Brown, 1986), namely that of generalizing from specific instances of cross-group contact to generalized views of the outgroup as a whole. For example, Mertus (1999, cited in Carmichael, 2002, p. 78) cited the example of a Serb woman, living in one of only two Serbian households in a settlement with 14 ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. She praised her Albanian neighbor's generosity, but continued to "cast the most vile slurs" against ethnic Albanians in general.

The proportion of mixed marriages constitutes, at first sight at least, the most compelling evidence for ethnic integration. Botev and Wagner (1993) reported that 12% of all marriages in Yugoslavia from 1962 to 1982 were mixed (Agger, 1996, estimates that 2 million people lived in households headed by mixed marriages). The figure was as high as 30% in Bosnia (according to a census from the 1980s, cited by Weine, 1999), and 36% in Bosnia and Herzegovina (according to 1991 census data cited by Biro et al., 2004). These rates are far higher than, for example, for Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland (between 4 and 10%; see Hewstone et al., 2005), or for Blacks and Whites in the United States (between 3 and 10%; see US census, 1990; Waters, 2000). But the great majority of mixed marriages were between Serbs and Croats; over 90% of Muslim marriages were endogamous. Moreover, people in mixed marriages came

under "immense pressure" (Weitz, 2003, p. 204) and spousal violence intensified as men blamed their wives of a different ethnicity for destroying their future prospects.

An interim summary of interethnic contact among neighbors in the Balkans suggests that much of it was superficial versus intimate, and particularized versus generalized. This is some way from what Allport (1954) considered to be optimal contact and it is not surprising that it provided no real bulwark against the ghosts of the past, the clamor of extremist politicians, and tendencies to seek retribution and revenge. Even what is sometimes viewed as the golden era of interethnic integration, the Tito period, appears not to have been that at all. A Bosnian Croat (speaking to an anthropologist) admitted, "Yes, we lived in peace and harmony . . . because every hundred metres we had a policeman to make sure we loved one another."[2] Communities existed side-by-side, but with varying levels of tension, and contact was insufficient to overcome the fact that ethnic outgroup neighbors are also obvious "targets of opportunity" in times of conflict.

One other distinction appears fundamental: urban versus rural. Within major cities, especially Sarajevo, there had been a long-term culture of tolerance and diversity with extensive mixing in Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Mostar. In the 1981 census, 20–25% of the population of Bosnia's five largest cities identified themselves as "Yugoslav" (a superordinate or "common ingroup" identity; see Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), rather than providing an ethnic or national identity. But this identity was chosen by many fewer respondents within the overall population (7.9% in 1981; 5.5% in 1991; Carmichael, 2002). In some communities (Tuzla, Vares, Bihac region, Fojnica) local residents of different communities continued to work together and tried to resist violence. In the countryside, however, villages tended to be predominantly Serb or Muslim or Croat, even if few villages were populated exclusively by one ethnic group. Presumably in the cities it was easier to escape pressures to attack or denounce ethnic outgroup neighbors, and their greater density of population provided greater anonymity. But in the villages, risks were greater owing to identifiability and tight social networks.

Antisocial and prosocial behavior on the part of neighbors from different ethnic groups. There is, tragically, plentiful evidence relating to neighbors as perpetrators in the Balkans. Carmichael (2002, p. 79) writes that, "Victimization of neighbours is a constant element in ethnic cleansing" and that "spite, greed, lust and sadism" were shown by people the victims knew "all too well." The Human Rights Watch (2001) report

on War Crimes in Kosovo reports that in the Pec area, unlike in other parts of Kosovo, "local Albanians had regular contact on a variety of levels with many ethnic Serbs who lived in the area" (pp. 322–323). Identifying a picture of a suspected Serb perpetrator (Zvonimir [Zvonko] Cvetovic) from the massacre in Cuska, an Albanian eyewitness said: "Of course I know Zvonko. We lived on the same street" (p. 326).

Among many other incidents recorded, a Muslim woman from Bosnia reported being raped by her teenage neighbor, who "so often . . . had sat at our place, drank coffee with us" (Naimark, 2001, p. 169). Bosnians were killed by their neighbors in Omarska, and at Trnopolje. The disused iron ore mine at Omarska became a concentration camp in 1992, described in one newspaper as "the location of an orgy of killing, mutilation, beating and rape . . . The victims were Bosnian Muslims and some Croats; the perpetrators their Serbian neighbours." (Vulliamy, 2004). Maass (1996) recorded the slaughter of 35 Muslim men in a Bosnian village, "killed by Serbs who had been their friends, people who had helped harvest their fields the previous autumn, people with whom they had shared adolescent adventures and secrets, skinny-dipping in the Brina river on hot summer says . . . All of a sudden, seemingly without reason, they had turned into killers" (p. 7).

Yet, in spite of everything, some neighborhood contacts did prevail, although these cases seem to have received far less attention in the mass media. Neighbors were sometimes saviours in the Balkans, at great personal risk to themselves and their families. Many Bosnian Muslim refugees in London reported escaping because they had used identity papers of Serb neighbors (Human Rights Watch, 2001) and among the prisoners at Omarska were two Serb women arrested for speaking out against the behavior of Serb soldiers and reservists towards their neighbors (Hukanovic, 1998). In Bijeljina, a number of local Serbs tried to halt the massacre of Muslims; they were themselves killed by Arkan's Tigers.

Commonalities from Rwanda and the Balkans

Having considered Rwanda and the Balkans separately, we now consider them together to make two fundamental points about neighborhood contacts and conflict. The first is that prior cross-group contact cannot, and should not be expected to, provide perfect protection. The second is that neighbor-on-neighbor atrocities have special consequences both for victims (or their families) and perpetrators.

Why contact cannot inoculate against hatred

There are multiple reasons why prior cross-group contact alone could not be expected to prevent massacres or genocide. It is evident from the foregoing that even outgroup friendships paled in the face of immense ingroup pressure, propaganda, and threats to one's own family. Reluctant perpetrators were often placed in impossible moral dilemmas and made unwilling accomplices to genocide. For example, General Mladic commandeered buses in Srebrenica (scene of the worst Bosnian atrocities) to deport women and children. Serbian bus drivers were ordered to kill at least one Muslim, so they would not testify against soldiers. Killings were made into a "communal event" (a chilling parallel with lynchings in the Deep South) that bound all Serbs together (Weitz, 2003). Placed in some of the situations that perpetrators found themselves in, we doubt whether any of us could have resisted such extreme pressure.

Consider the following statistics. In a postwar survey of 2,291 beneficiaries of psychosocial projects in Bosnia and Croatia (Agger & Mimica, 1996) many reported feeling betrayed by neighbors and acquaintances of the dominant or majority group (48%); and that their family members had been betrayed by neighbors and acquaintances of the dominant or majority group (50%). In the Tuzla region, the figure was 70% for both categories. Eighteen per cent reported feeling betrayed by *friends* and *family* of the dominant or majority group. Given the sometimes unimaginable pressures on individuals in war zones to participate in outgroup killing, perhaps we should be impressed by the fact that *anyone* with outgroup neighbors, friends, or relatives resisted these pressures, and see this as evidence *for* the effectiveness of prior contact, not against it.

Dealing with the aftermath of neighbor-on-neighbor killing

Rwanda and former Yugoslavia find themselves in very different situations today, with regard to trying to rebuild and come to terms with the massacres in each country. They each face different challenges, and have responded in different ways (see, e.g., chapters by Corkalo et al., 2004, and Warshauer Freedman et al., 2004).

In Rwanda, where many more people were killed, Hutu and Tutsi continue to cohabit. President Paul Kagame has decided that, in a country where almost everyone has close relatives or friends who were either killers or killed, the only way to live together is to repress the past, face the future, and emphasize national over ethnic unity.

Kagame's party, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), includes both Hutu and Tutsi, has abolished identity cards, and forbids the breakdown of official statistics by group. "There are no Hutus or Tutsis any more, only Rwandans," said a peasant ("The road out of hell," 2004). This, at least, is the rhetoric, and the new government's aim; it now tries to prevent use of the terms Hutu and Tutsi in public discourse. This message is inculcated by former rebels who are put through reeducation camps and by all young Rwandans who are obliged to attend "solidarity camps." Justice is pursued through 10,000 village courts called *gacaca*, where 280,000 lay judges hear testimony from villagers who witnessed the genocide. This traditional system, focused on confession and apology, is aimed not only at uncovering the truth, but also at promoting reconciliation. Gerald Gahima, the government's chief prosecutor, explained this justice strategy by acknowledging that the enormity of the event precluded some alternative solutions: "Of course, we cannot kill all those who deserve to die, it would not stabilise our society" (Brittain, 2001). In the prisons, thousands of *génocidaires* were offered release if they confessed their guilt and asked for forgiveness.[3]

Former Yugoslavia is different, because it is just that: *former*. The confederation held together by Tito has collapsed and the architects of "ethnic cleansing" have won, in part at least, their argument that ethnic homogeneity is a prerequisite for political stability. Attention is focused on the long, drawn-out trial of Slobodan Milosovic in The Hague and the failure to find other prominent perpetrators, such as Mladic. But because the original state has split, there seems less emphasis on justice, reconciliation, and forgiveness. However, Biro et al. (2004) emphasize the great importance for reconciliation of the acceptance of, and apology for, war crimes committed by one's own ethnic group. Thus the public apologies offered by President Marovic of Serbia and Montenegro and President Mesic of Croatia represent an important step forward for the reconciliation in the disintegrated Yugoslavia.

The poignant case histories from Rwanda and former Yugoslavia highlight special features of the consequences of neighbor-on-neighbor killings. First, there is the sense of betrayal; second, there is the challenge of forgiveness.

"Grannie 'Nana' Batusha," an inhabitant of the Kosovan village of Little Krushe, related how the Serbs who came to remove menfolk from the village, among them her husband and sons, included a Serbian neighbor, Dimitri Nicolic. Grannie Batusha even recalled being told, "No harm will come to you. After all, we've grown up together. After

all, we're neighbours." Qamil Shehu survived the massacre in which 117 out of 140 adult and teenage males were killed. He had worked for 38 of his 48 years at the village distillery alongside Nicolic. It is hard to overstate the sense of betrayal that emerges when neighbor kills neighbor (see Weine, 1999). As Quamil Shehu put it, "I couldn't live with the Serbs anymore. We lived alongside them and they did this to us." (Sweeney, 1999). Perhaps the most central aspect of this betrayal is an irreparable violation of trust for those victims who survived, or relatives of the deceased. Trust in any relationship is hard to gain and easy to lose (Rothbart & Park, 1986). Across ethnic lines this may be even more so.

Second, victims, or relatives of the deceased, sometimes still have to endure contact with the perpetrators. Sabaduhin Garibovic runs the Concentration Camp Survivors' Association in Kozarac; his father survived Omarska, his brother did not. "Almost every day I see the people who did this to me" (Vulliamy, 2004). While forgiveness is surely desirable in the long term for intergroup conflicts (see Hewstone, Cairns, Voci, Hamberger, & Niens, 2006), it poses enormous challenges following massacres, and none more so than following "intimate genocides." One of Rwanda's many widows expressed the view, "Where I live there is no love between Hutus and Tutsis. Many Hutus still hate the Tutsis. There is no remorse, no pity, no asking for forgiveness" (Carlin, 2001). From former Yugoslavia, Sabaduhin Garibovic stated, "We cannot forgive or forget what happened, and they either deny it happened or say they had to do it – they were obeying orders" (Vulliamy, 2004). But at the same time he acknowledged that, "Any future together is conditional upon them admitting what they did, and apologizing for it." In Rwanda, at least, interventions to promote forgiveness are underway and are currently being evaluated (Staub, 2000, 2005; Staub, Pearlman, & Miller, 2005).

While taking the perspective of the perpetrators may seem morally repugnant, it is a necessary feature of intergroup forgiveness (Hewstone et al., 2005). French journalist Jean Hatzfeld (2000, 2005) has written two books on Rwanda's genocide, a first from the standpoint of the victims, a second from that of the perpetrators. Having betrayed trust, violated close relations, and killed intimates it is likely that perpetrators will be left with irredeemable guilt. A BBC documentary on Rwanda (*The Killers)*, for example, included an interview with a Hutu *génocidaire* who talked quite calmly about his killing, and explained it in terms of being caught up in wild hysteria, not knowing or feeling responsible for what he was doing. Thus he seemed to

have acted with subject-focused deindividuation (Staub & Rosenthal, 1994). But the interview changed dramatically when he spoke of killing those he knew, including former neighbors. In fact, he broke down in tears, and said he could never forgive himself for that. Apparently, he could not sustain the object-focused deindividuation which had, at the time, deprived his victims of their individuality.

Social Psychological Evidence concerning Prior Contact and Intergroup Conflict

Thus far we have had to rely mainly on historical and journalistic sources to evaluate neighbor-on-neighbor contact in both Rwanda and Yugoslavia. We turn now to two case studies of less extreme conflict (Northern Ireland and India), in both of which we collected our own data, including measures of neighborhood contact. We should be cautious of claims that intergroup contact can reduce conflict (Tausch, Kenworthy, & Hewstone, 2006), rather than merely prejudice, especially where prejudice may not be a prime cause of conflict (Green & Seher, 2003). Although the term intergroup conflict subsumes a vast array of (often highly interrelated) phenomena ranging from subtle biases at one extreme to violence and genocide at the other, psychological research has mainly focused on the milder forms of conflict and bias, such as prejudice (attitudes toward outgroups; see Hewstone & Cairns, 2001; Hewstone et al., 2002). The decisive goal of conflict resolution is to promote changes at the level of *societies.* However, studies on the effectiveness of contact in improving intergroup relations typically focus on individual cognitions and feelings as dependent variables (McCauley, 2002). Notwithstanding this debate, these data sets do allow us to provide more scientific answers to questions about the relationship between outgroup neighbors and milder aspects of intergroup conflict, namely outgroup attitudes.

Sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland

This small country has a history of intergroup conflict lasting over 300 years, between the Protestant community, with a majority wishing for the province to remain part of the United Kingdom, and the Catholic community, of which the majority wish to see the unification of the island of Ireland (Cairns & Darby, 1998). Although the conflict cannot be considered religious in the sense of a doctrinal dispute, ethnoreligious polarization is so strong that almost every aspect

of life (e.g., streets, schools, shops, sports clubs) can be identified as either Catholic or Protestant (Trew, 1986). Unlike other well-known intergroup conflicts, the conflict in Northern Ireland takes place between two relatively equal-sized groups (it is estimated that 44% of the Northern Irish population is Roman Catholic and 53% is Protestant, with those not wishing to state a denomination comprising the rest of the population; see Northern Ireland Census, December, 2002). Both communities are capable of maintaining their own political, social, cultural, and educational infrastructure.

The modern form of the conflict, known colloquially as "The Troubles," dates from 1969 until 1994. The Troubles have led to over 3,600 deaths and many thousands of appalling injuries (see Fay, Morrissey, & Smyth, 1999; McKittrick, Kelters, Feeney, & Thornton, 1999). Many citizens, who suffered directly or only indirectly because of The Troubles, report psychological maladjustment (Hayes & Campbell, 2000; Muldoon & Trew, 2000). For others, experience of violence has fuelled support for paramilitary organizations and further prolonged and exacerbated the conflict (Hayes & McAllister, 2002). Despite the recent ceasefires, Northern Ireland still has not achieved "normal" political and social stability. It remains a deeply segregated society, especially in terms of education, residential location, and cross-community marriages (see Hewstone et al., 2005), and reconciliation lies a long way off (Hewstone et al., in press).

In considering the results of our survey work (for more detailed treatment, see Hewstone et al., 2005) we focus here specifically on the distinction between the mere *number* of outgroup neighbors (what we call a measure of "opportunity for contact"; Wagner, Hewstone & Machleit, 1989) and actual, self-reported *contact* with outgroup neighbors and friends (the latter of which is deemed to be the most effective form of cross-group contact by Pettigrew, 1998). While the contact hypothesis explicitly requires *face-to-face* contact under cooperative conditions to reduce prejudice, the mere presence of outgroup members in larger numbers is sometimes used as a measure of threat and correlates positively with prejudice (e.g., Taylor, 1998).

Using data from a representative sample of the population of Northern Ireland (collected in 1999), we tested a model with four predictors, one mediator (i.e., the hypothesized underlying process), and one outcome. The four predictors included one measure of opportunity for contact (number of outgroup neighbors) and three measures of actual contact (contact at work, with neighbors and number of outgroup friends). The mediator, a multi-item measure of intergroup anxiety, refers to the anxiety felt at the prospect of experiencing

contact with the outgroup, compared with the ingroup, and is one of the most effective mediators of contact on outgroup attitudes (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Stephan and Stephan (1985) proposed that intergroup anxiety stems mainly from the anticipation of negative consequences for oneself during contact. Some of the major antecedents of intergroup anxiety may be minimal previous contact with the outgroup, the existence of large status differentials, and a high ratio of outgroup to ingroup members. The outcome measure was outgroup evaluation; this was an index of how positively respondents evaluate the outgroup, and we emphasize that it is not a measure of conflict per se. This was a five-item scale including a variety of measures (e.g., "How would you feel about having a member of the outgroup as your boss?"; "Do you think the outgroup get jobs that ingroup members should have?"; see Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). All measures met or exceeded conventional levels of reliability.

The pattern of relationships between the variables was equivalent for the two religious groups, so we tested a model based on all respondents. Figure 4.1 shows the results of a sophisticated analysis of the associations between the variables (using structural equation model with latent variables; LISREL 8.3: Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1999). As the figure shows, the three measures of contact were all positively related to outgroup evaluation. Contact at work and, especially, outgroup friends had direct, positive effects on outgroup evaluation, and both contact with neighbors and number of friends had indirect effects via reduced intergroup anxiety. But the mere *number* of outgroup neighbors was negatively associated with outgroup evaluation; *more* outgroup neighbors were associated with *lower* outgroup evaluations. This is consistent with earlier analyses, suggesting that outgroup proportions can constitute a threat (Taylor, 1998).

Hindu–Muslim communalism in India

The conflict between Hindus and Muslims in India has long historical roots (Judd, 1997; Keay, 2000). At present, the Muslim community constitutes the country's largest religious minority of about 12.1% of the total population (82% of which is Hindu; Census of India, 1991). Muslims have suffered from economic and social disadvantage, and violence between Hindu and Muslim communities has plagued India with regularity since partition in 1947 and cost more than 8,000 lives. Communal riots occur mainly in urban areas with a Muslim population of 20–40% and many scholars agree that the conflict is basically over clashing economic interests (Singh, 1988). Periodically, anti-Muslim



Figure 4.1 Estimated model of the mediating role of anxiety in the relation between opportunity for contact, contact, and outgroup evaluations in Northern Ireland (Catholic and Protestants respondents).
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05
Numbers are standardized parameters. Chi-square (16) = 29.43, p = .021; RMSEA = .040; SRMR = .018; CFI = .99; *n* = 521

violence is incited by populist politicians from extremist parties (such as *Shiv Sena*). One of the worst Hindu–Muslim riots occurred in Gujarat in 2002, leaving 1,100 Muslims dead and up to 600 missing. One man who lost his brother, Muslim Idris Yusuf Ghodawala, was reported as being able to name four members of the mob that killed his brother, "two of whom he had played cricket with as a child" (Waldman, 2004).

Social psychological research has looked at strength of religious identity and perceptions of relative deprivation as predictors of prejudice (see Ghosh & Kumar, 2001, for a review), but very little research has investigated how relations between Hindus and Muslims could be improved or which factors can account for more positive, less conflictual relations between the two communities. Varshney (2002), a political scientist, pointed out that Hindu–Muslim violence in India is highly locally concentrated and that cities and even districts within cities vary greatly in terms of their "riot proneness." He proposed

that intercommunal networks of civic life such as business associations, professional organisations and clubs, as well as everyday interactions, promote peace between the communities that can withstand attempts of political parties to polarize the ethnic communities. He provided some evidence for this hypothesis from a number of comparisons between peaceful and riot-prone cities.

We conducted a survey of Hindu and Muslim students at the University of Allahabad (for more detailed treatment, see Tausch, Hewstone, Singh, Ghosh, Voci, & Biswas, 2005). As in our survey work in Northern Ireland, we focus here on the effects of number of outgroup neighbors versus actual contact with outgroup neighbors and friends. We tested a model with four predictors, three mediators and one outcome. The four predictors included one measure of opportunity for contact (number of outgroup neighbors) and three measures of actual contact (contact with neighbors, number of outgroup friends, and contact with those friends). The mediators were multi-item measures of intergroup anxiety and threat. Stephan and colleagues have emphasized the importance of perceived threats to the ingroup as predictors of prejudice (Stephan et al., 2002; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). They distinguish *realistic threats* (e.g., threats to the ingroup's political and economic power) from *symbolic threats* (e.g., threats to the ingroup's value system, belief system, or worldview) as proximal predictors of prejudice. Available studies underline the potential role of contact in ameliorating perceived threats and their mediating role in the relationship between contact and attitudes (see Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Tausch, Hewstone, Kenworthy, Cairns, & Christ, 2007). The outcome measure was social distance (e.g., willingness to accept outgroup members at varying levels of closeness, such as visitor to your home, or spouse). We used a similar analysis to that used for the Northern Ireland data; however, in this case, because of the nature of some of the measures (e.g., factor loadings of individual items), we tested a model with observed, rather than latent, variables.

The pattern of relationships between the variables was rather different for the two religious groups, so we present and discuss them separately for Hindus and Muslims. Figure 4.2 shows the results of a structural equation model for the majority Hindu respondents. As the figure shows, only the two measures of contact relating to outgroup friends had significant negative effects on social distance. Number of outgroup friends had a direct effect, whereas contact with friends had an indirect effect via reduced symbolic threat and intergroup anxiety. There was no effect of contact with neighbors, or of the number of outgroup neighbors.



Figure 4.2 Estimated model of the mediating roles of anxiety, realistic threat and symbolic threat in the relation between opportunity for contact, contact, and social distance in India (Allahabad: Hindus, n = 235).
***p < .001;**p < .01; *p < .05

Figure 4.3 shows the results of a structural equation model for the minority Muslim respondents. Two of the measures of contact had significant effects on social distance. Contact with outgroup friends had a direct negative effect, and an indirect effect via reduced realistic threat. Number of outgroup friends had an indirect effect via reduced intergroup anxiety. There was again no effect of contact with neighbors, but the mere number of outgroup neighbors had a direct *positive* effect on social distance, and also an indirect effect via *increased* realistic threat. Thus, for the minority group, the more outgroup neighbors, the greater the perception of realistic threat.

To summarize findings across our surveys in two countries, they point to a clear difference between the mere number of outgroup neighbors and actual contact with those neighbors. As expected, forms of friendship contact are the most potent predictors, and they have their effects via mediators such as reduced anxiety and threat. However, contact with outgroup neighbors can contribute to improved intergroup relations (the exception being the Hindu majority in India), but the number of outgroup neighbors tends to be associated with lower intergroup evaluations (in Northern Ireland) or greater realistic threat and more social distance (for the Muslim minority in India). Of course we should be careful in generalizing from the student samples in India to the population as a whole, but overall these data



Figure 4.3 Estimated model of the mediating roles of anxiety, realistic threat and symbolic threat in the relation between opportunity for contact, contact, and social distance in India (Allahabad: Muslims, $n = 203$). ***p < .001;**p < .01; *p < .05

suggest that the presence of outgroup members in a neighborhood can have contradictory effects. If outgroup members are present in relatively large numbers, but without this opportunity for contact being taken up, then this variable is likely to function as a proxy for threat (see Wagner, Christ, Pettigrew, Stellmacher, & Wolf, 2006). Where, however, the presence of outgroup members leads to more actual intergroup contact, and that contact is positive (e.g., cross-group friendships), then its effects will be positive, promoting more positive outgroup attitudes.

Summary and Conclusions

We began this chapter by looking cautiously at massacres from a social psychological account, and considering whether cross-ethnic neighborhood contacts might help to reduce their likelihood. We then reviewed case studies of neighbor-on-neighbor violence, focusing on genocide in Rwanda and ethnic massacres in former Yugoslavia. Results of our own surveys in Northern Ireland and India served to identify which types of contact do, and do not, help to ensure that conflict does not prevail. Finally, we pose some questions for the future

and ask how societies can be structured so as to promote cooperation and tolerance between cross-ethnic neighbors.

One of the interesting questions to pursue is why relatively "strong" forms of contact (cross-ethnic friendships) sometimes apparently failed, while relatively "weak" forms of contact (cross-ethnic neighbors) sometimes did not. This should go hand-in-hand with an attempt to answer the question of how and why certain microregions largely avoided problems of violence, while others suffered immensely. For example, in former Yugoslavia, fieldwork in Herzegovina emphasized variation even at the parish or village level (Bax, 2000), while in Rwanda there were isolated cases of refusal to join in the carnage.

The challenge for the future is to build multiethnic states and neighborhoods with "social capital" (Putnam, 2000): connections among individuals, social networks, norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness. However, social capital has not only positive manifestations (e.g., mutual support, cooperation, and trust), but also negative ones (sectarianism, ethnocentrism, and corruption). The challenge is to maximize the former (but between, rather than within, communities) and minimize the latter. Thus Putnam refers to "bridging" and "bonding" forms of social capital, respectively. Bridging social capital is inclusive, and can generate broader identities and reciprocity; the "weak ties" that link *between* networks (Granovetter, 1973) are, in fact, extraordinarily strong and important. Bonding social capital is exclusive, inward-looking and tends to reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups. By creating strong ingroup loyalty, it may also create outgroup antagonism. Hence the challenge is to build bridging social capital in ethnically heterogeneous neighborhoods, and our work suggests that face-to-face contact is required for this, not mere coexistence. That this can be achieved is suggested by Varshney's (2002) work in India:

> . . . Hindus and Muslims can form associations, lead integrated civic lives, and get along quite well in Calicut. That they can do so suggests how important inter-communal engagement is. People begin to live with differences, pursue their interests in institutionalised arenas of politics, maintain everyday warmth, and agree on the futility of violence as a way to deal with differences . . . Deep civic engagement dulls the painful edges of historical memories. (p. 131)

This must be the vision of "neighborhood" that guides rebuilding after ethnic conflict, whether in Rwanda, or Bosnia, or anywhere scarred by a history of intergroup violence.

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Notes

1. Kozarac was the site of a particularly savage attack on May 24, 1992, in which it was emptied of all 25,000 Muslims, or Bosniaks (the secular term by which they are properly known).
2. This was told to the anthropologist Tone Bringa and quoted in Bell (1996, p. 123).
3. *The Guardian*, February 18, 2004. This is an interesting parallel with Northern Ireland's Belfast ("Good Friday") Agreement, which required survivors and their families to accept the early release of paramilitary prisoners as a price to pay for paramilitary peace. But in this case prisoners who had committed heinous crimes were released early without any necessary expression of remorse.

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5

Why Neighbors Don't Stop the Killing

The Role of Group-Based Schadenfreude

Russell Spears and Colin Wayne Leach

Just before I presented some of the work described below at the conference of this volume, a fellow social psychologist, acknowledging the gravity of the theme, noted that presenting laboratory experiments to address such serious issues would seem trite (Hewstone, this volume). The point was well taken but left me, as next speaker, feeling rather vulnerable given that this is precisely what I was planning to do. It is probably true that social psychologists do not always get out of the laboratory as much as they should, and the nature of the issues addressed here suggest that they probably should look at major world events more than they sometimes do. What, then, can studies in the laboratory tell us about why neighbors kill each other? Of course, it is impossible for both ethical and practical reasons to recreate the conditions for such nefarious practices in the laboratory, although the research we present here does use real-life groups brought into the laboratory, so to speak. We argue that examining these groups in the laboratory may help us to get to the heart of some of the psychological processes involved, albeit thankfully in diluted form. Specifically, our goal is to show how the intergroup form of the emotion *schadenfreude* may contribute to the context of killing addressed in this volume. Schadenfreude is the malicious pleasure that can be experienced at the misfortune of another. Although schadenfreude is a passive emotion associated with the uninvolved bystander, under

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conditions of mass intergroup hostility and genocide, even passive responses can be very consequential, and make the difference between saving and losing lives. As we hope to make clearer below, although passive in one sense, group-based schadenfreude may be directed at neighbors, and actively contribute to the conditions in which the killing of neighbors is sanctioned and even encouraged.

Although we are social psychologists, and provide a social psychological analysis, it is important to provide some caveats and quickly say that a social psychological analysis can provide but one piece in the puzzle of why ordinary people come to commit such extraordinary acts. As Tajfel (1978a) once noted, social psychology is no substitute for analyses drawing on history, economics, sociology, political science, and so on. However, social psychologists do have something important to add: they have a piece of the puzzle in the giant jigsaw, part of an interdisciplinary approach to the big picture, so to speak. Social scientists are not always good neighbors themselves in this respect, but the fact that genocide and atrocity still occur is one reason to seek at least dialogue and understanding, if not active collaboration, across these disciplinary boundaries.

As a useful example, the link between history and psychology is too often neglected, perhaps because of different methods, and standards of proof. This is more than a shame. Too often, great historical analysis is weakened by an absence of adequate psychology or by the presence of "pop" psychology or speculative psychoanalysis. Similarly psychologists all too rarely take into account the historical context of what they are studying, and how this may impact on psychology (Gergen, 1973). Part of our project, then, is to provide a clearer social psychological grounding for the context of atrocious acts that can be deployed by historians, political scientists, and the like. We aim to provide greater empirical and theoretical foundations for the psychological and psychoanalytic explanations that populate historical and political analyses of these events (see also chapter 6, this volume).

Although intergroup schadenfreude might not explain why neighbors kill, it may help us to understand why such activity might be tolerated or even encouraged. In particular we argue that emotions such as group-based schadenfreude may contribute to social norms that devalue the lives of others, and may be bound up with material interests that see people profit from the defeat of a rival group, particularly one as proximal as their neighbors. Too often the "social context" of behavior remains untheorized background, and yet it is social context that is asked to explain, and sometimes excuse, why ordinary people become involved in acts of atrocity (Milgram, 1974). We

believe that emotions such as intergroup schadenfreude help to give more foreground attention to a context in which such acts become possible and even normative. In developing social identity theory Tajfel (1978b) took important steps in helping us to understand how the interpersonal relations between neighbors could quite literally be transformed into the intergroup conflicts of enemies, and to explain the atrocities that become possible in this context.

Social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978b; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) was developed as an alternative to individualistic theoretical approaches in social psychology, precisely in an effort to understand how people could sometimes act as members of a group, and treat others exclusively in terms of their group memberships and not as individuals. Tajfel, who as a Jewish prisoner of war during World War II had survived by hiding his own group identity, was only too well aware that people could be treated exclusively in terms of their group identity, and that in certain historical conditions this could be a matter of life or death. Social identity theory conceptualizes social contexts and social behavior as reflecting an interpersonal–intergroup continuum: in certain contexts we see others and ourselves as individuals, but in more group-based contexts we tend to see others and also ourselves in terms of group memberships or "social identities" corresponding to these group memberships. The social context defines the situation as more interpersonal or more group based, and intergroup conflict, or, in the extreme, wars, are prime examples of intergroup contexts. Social identity theory proposes that as well as categorizing ourselves and others in social terms, we make evaluative social comparisons with other social groups, and try to positively differentiate ourselves from these groups, providing a valued source of group distinctiveness for our social identities.

Some social identity theorists have argued that this drive for positive differentiation can itself help to explain examples of intergroup discrimination and conflict. Others, however, have argued that social identity theory is better placed to understand ingroup enhancement than outgroup derogation (Brewer, 1999). Ironically then, there is a sense in which the theoretical framework Tajfel developed failed – in his lifetime at least – to capture fully the pernicious nature of the processes underlying the extreme intergroup conflicts that he personally experienced. Whether true or not, it is evident that work on intergroup emotions has enriched the social identity tradition, and added further theoretical color to the varieties and extent of prejudice and discrimination directed at outgroups.

Schadenfreude, when expressed at the intergroup level, is one emotion that helps to explain the malicious and pernicious form that

prejudice can take, although as Nietzsche (1887/1967) noted long ago, schadenfreude is not a direct and active form of prejudice like other types of derogation. However, the inactivity associated with schadenfreude has a paradoxical power, especially in the historical contexts where this can mean the difference between life and death. As Edmund Burke once famously remarked, "All it takes for evil to prosper is for good men (sic) to do nothing." This quote might have been invented for the intergroup form of schadenfreude. Whether schadenfreude can be associated with "good people" is a question we leave to the moral philosophers, but as our experiments will show, rather as Milgram (1974) showed in relation to obedience to authority, group-based schadenfreude is something to which most people succumb to some degree when the circumstances dictate (although whether they admit to this is another matter).

Milgram related his research to the "banality of evil" evoked by Hannah Arendt (1994) in describing the desk-Nazis such as Adolf Eichmann who claimed to be "just following orders." Clearly Eichmann's role went well beyond the passivity of schadenfreude but Milgram's research program does illustrate the power of the social context to extract pernicious behavior from ordinary people. In his classic studies, participants were introduced to someone they thought was a fellow participant by the experimenter but who was in fact a "confederate" or colleague of the experimenter. The participant was then assigned the role of teacher, and the confederate the role of learner, who was then led away to another room that had audio contact with the participant. The experiment used a bogus setup such that the participant was required to administer electric shocks of increasing magnitude to the confederate. The "learner" then subsequently answered questions incorrectly, and despite audible distress at the shocks, followed ultimately by silence, the participant was told by the experimenter to continue. The "shocking" finding was that a considerable proportion of participants did proceed with the experiment even to the point at which they thought the confederate had collapsed.

Such experiments might strike us as unethical today and would not be allowed by most ethics and internal review boards. However, the information gleaned from such experiments is arguably very important in two respects. It shows us just how powerful contextual constraints on behaviors can be, and that ordinary people can feel pressure to undertake acts harmful to others. Second, despite the apology given at the start of this chapter, such demonstrations show that experiments do not have to be trite sources of evidence regarding momentous or extreme social acts, but can in themselves be

powerful paradigms of power and authority that demonstrate the power of situational pressures (Spears & Smith, 2001).

Once again, in relation to the current context it may be possible to question the context of experimental paradigms that demonstrate active, albeit highly situationally constrained, behaviors with the passive nature of schadenfreude. However, it should be recalled that although not active, schadenfreude is the willed delight in the misfortune of another, and so in this sense could be seen as being even more pernicious than the forms of active obedience extracted by Milgram, which were often accompanied by clear distress in many cases. The point here is that if the motivational seeds for group-based schadenfreude are planted, and the societal constraints on this antisocial response are removed, then even a passive experience may contribute to a climate in which more active pernicious behavior is tolerated.

By examining a specific emotion underlying passivity we hope to give a more "motivated" dimension to the banality of such evil. The key point here is that group-based schadenfreude is motivated inaction that provides psychological succor (or "imaginary revenge" in Nietzsche's terms) at the defeat of a rival. This inaction becomes particularly consequential when the misdeeds being observed are deadly and socially acceptable under "normal" conditions. Inaction can then be just as consequential as action, especially when alternative emotions (sympathy, empathy) might save lives. Who is to say that the motivated inaction that could otherwise prevent a single atrocity is any less consequential than a motivated act of atrocity itself? Because greater attention and potency is accorded to action rather than inaction, commission rather than omission, it may seem easier to hide from moral responsibility in confronting inaction (Zeelenberg, van der Pligt, & Manstead, 1998). This asymmetry between action and inaction is deeply ingrained in matters of law and accountability so that to hold people to book for doing nothing is by no means straightforward. These considerations make intergroup schadenfreude particularly opportunistic, "efficient," and also dangerous. We therefore aim to provide an analysis in which the bystanders can be judged alongside "perpetrators" and brought to account in psychological if not legal terms.[1]

The basic outlines of our social psychological model can now be summarized as follows. Group-based schadenfreude can be defined as the malicious pleasure that accompanies the downfall, defeat, or demise of a rival group. It is a group-level emotion associated with a social identity (E. R. Smith, 1993). Following Nietzsche, a key function of this emotion is that it can serve as a kind of symbolic revenge against a rival group and thereby "deaden the pain" of one's own inferiority

(Nietzsche, 1887/1967, p. 127). However, we believe it may also serve more material and instrumental functions, relating to the gains that the bystander group stands to make in times of conflict and upheaval at the expense of the rival group (for a discussion of symbolic and instrumental functions of discrimination in relation to social identity see Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2006; see also Esses, Jackson, Dovidio, & Hodson, 2005).

We are not claiming that schadenfreude is a natural response to the fall of another group – this would be to naturalize and essentialize group relations that are dynamic and contingent, and to treat all group members as equivalent. However, we believe this reaction is more likely in the case of rival outgroups, especially among some group members (we discuss some individual difference moderators below). Rival outgroups are groups that are likely to be similar and proximal to the ingroup, evoking the frequent and familiar social comparisons that can later feed intergroup schadenfreude. Neighbors from a different group are obvious candidates for such social comparison, and provide the material resources from which the ingroup might directly benefit from their dislocation or demise.

Although some theorists have argued that the envy or resentment are necessary precursors to schadenfreude, to the extent that these emotions often involve upward social comparisons (of which more below), we argue that these take the target of group-based schadenfreude out of the realm of relevance. Such groups are less likely to be our rivals and neighbors. Upward comparisons also introduce the possibility of legitimacy constraints: It may be more difficult to experience schadenfreude towards outgroups seen to be deserving of their success, or having a legitimately higher status. Once again we will argue that it is groups like our own, our *neighbors* in status as well as locality, who are more likely to be the targets of group-based schadenfreude.

Intergroup schadenfreude may be particularly relevant in escalating intergroup conflicts. We believe that the presence of schadenfreude, and especially awareness of its presence, provides a powerful context in which the more active agents of atrocity can operate unhindered. It provides licence to the "spoilers" (chapter 9, this volume), signalling that their murderous acts may go unpunished, indicating that they have a supportive audience, and helping also to suppress other agents who might otherwise be motivated to contest exploitation and killing. Social action is a product of opinion and action support as well as group-based emotions (van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004), and the perceived emotional reactions of others feeds

into these appraisals of collective support. The passive acceptance of group violence in group schadenfreude provides a legitimizing context that arguably facilitates the step from passive acceptance to active participation and gloating.

Of course, there may be many steps in getting from a context where schadenfreude is likely to where active gloating is possible, and here we turn to historians, sociologists, and political scientists (inter alia) to take up the lead. However, social psychologists can still help to explain the motives and phenomenology of people caught up in these events. The neighbors who betrayed Jews to the Nazis in the occupied countries may have participated more actively than the passive emotion of schadenfreude suggests, but they did so in the knowledge of a supportive gentile constituency that passively approved their actions. Such furtive and opportunistic behavior is another brick in the bridge from the passive to the active and open forms of discrimination that promote the march of the larger forces of history.

In short, we think that intergroup schadenfreude forms one part of a social psychological dimension to the context of killing. In the following sections we elaborate the theoretical underpinnings of our approach to intergroup schadenfreude, illustrate its historical relevance, and then present some empirical evidence for it from laboratory and field experiments.

Theoretical Background: Intergroup Schadenfreude

There has been very little previous work on intergroup schadenfreude (but see Ben-Ze'ev, 2000), and, to our knowledge, no empirical work from a social psychological perspective. However, there is research investigating schadenfreude in interpersonal contexts. Research by Richard Smith (e.g., R. H. Smith et al., 1996) and Norman Feather (e.g., Feather, 1994; Feather & Sherman, 2002) form the most significant programs of work in this area and it is useful to review this briefly to set the theoretical scene for our own research and to highlight the ways in which our approach differs from theirs, partly as a result of our intergroup focus.

R. H. Smith and his associates have argued that schadenfreude is closely related to the emotion of envy, and tends to be associated with an upward social comparison towards the rival, with the person coveting their position or status in some way (R. H. Smith, 2000). For example, in their classic study R. H. Smith et al. (1996) showed

schadenfreude to occur towards a successful high-achiever at university who subsequently failed. Specifying some psychological precondition (in this case envy) would seem to be important because the obvious human, if alas not default, response to another's misfortune is to experience sympathy – to feel the victim's pain rather than derive pleasure. According to this account envy helps to explain how the pain associated with envy can be alleviated by the discordant pleasure of schadenfreude (cf. Heider, 1958).

The other main approach to interpersonal schadenfreude has been pioneered by Norman Feather and coworkers. Feather relates schadenfreude to the perceived deservingness of the victim for their lot, grounded in resentment (being "knocked down a peg or two," getting their "comeuppance"). Feather has distinguished his explanation from the approach of Smith and colleagues and claims that resentment rather than envy is a crucial trigger or prerequisite emotion underlying schadenfreude, although in practice we think it is difficult to distinguish envy and resentment. In both cases schadenfreude can be seen as righting some kind of psychological injustice captured in envy (coveting the success or status of the other).

An envy-based conceptualization of schadenfreude also has close links with the envious prejudice outlined by Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, and their associates (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; see also Glick, this volume), a form of prejudice directed at outgroups characterized by high status. In their stereotype content model they characterize groups and group perceptions along two key dimensions of competence and warmth and argue that envy-based prejudice may be directed at groups that are high in competence but low in warmth. For example, Jews, who figure in some of our key historical examples of victims of intergroup schadenfreude, have been placed in this quadrant according to this research.

Following from the work of R. H. Smith and Feather, groups that are envied might appear to be prime targets for intergroup schadenfreude. Although we do not rule this possibility out in principle, in our research we have emphasized the importance of rivalry and comparative relevance in evoking intergroup schadenfreude. Groups that are seen as legitimately higher in status (e.g., high in competence) as well as evoking envy may also produce social reality constraints and legitimacy concerns that can limit schadenfreude. It is also worth remembering that our focus on neighbors means that we are keen to explain malicious prejudice toward others who are in many respects just like us, and not those distant or different, be this superior or indeed inferior, in terms of status-related attributes.

As well as considering this contemporary research, we have also drawn theoretical inspiration from the writing of the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (*On the Genealogy of Morals*, 1887/1967), who anticipated the intergroup dimension to schadenfreude. Although he refers extensively to resentment ("ressentiment") his usage is arguably more psychologically tied to the pain of the subject, than the deservingness of the target as implied in Feather's approach.

In line with Nietzsche we see schadenfreude as a highly opportunistic form of "imaginary revenge," directed toward a rival, that functions to "deaden the pain" of negative affect (p. 127). Although this pain can derive from a sense of illegitimate inferiority (Leach & Spears, 2005), this can take many different forms depending on circumstance and social comparison, and can be more chronic or acute (Leach, Spears, Branscombe, & Doosje, 2003), depending on the specific comparative context. Nietzsche also argued that this pleasure was more likely and possible where there was strong interest in the domain of the misfortune of the other and this has also been a recurring theme in our own work.

Like Nietzsche, we conceptualize schadenfreude as highly opportunistic and contingent (Leach et al., 2003; Spears & Leach, 2004). One important condition neglected in other approaches is the idea that this malicious pleasure is subject to "social reality constraints" or legitimacy concerns (Leach et al., 2003; Spears & Leach, 2004). This is not the same as the concern of whether expressing the emotion is socially desirable. We argue that recognizing the (valid) superiority of a rival group can actually make it more difficult to experience the symbolic revenge that is schadenfreude, to the extent that this feels illegitimate, as doing an injustice to the rival's true worth or status. For this reason, we argue that rivalry between groups of similar status provide the conditions most likely to facilitate intergroup schadenfreude.

This is where our work most clearly diverges from that of other schadenfreude scholars such as R. H. Smith and Feather. We are not suggesting that their approach to schadenfreude is flawed, but rather that different principles and parameters may be more relevant in the intergroup domain. It is possible to argue that social reality constraints and legitimacy concerns are likely to be stronger at the group level (where group images are established in group stereotypes, based on large samples, or on a shared social reality). Similarity fosters social comparison (Festinger, 1954) and this also applies at the intergroup level (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). As a result, similarity is also likely to stimulate rivalry between groups. This

idea is consistent with social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978b, 1982), which predicts most rivalry and competition between groups of similar status.

From this perspective it is perhaps clear why we do not view envy, in the conventional sense of this emotion, as involving an upward, coveting comparison, as a general precondition for schadenfreude. Moreover, conceptualizing schadenfreude in terms of the more objectivist notion of deservingness, although this may predict schadenfreude in some circumstances, for us lacks the element of negative affect (pain of illegitimate inferiority or dejection), which provide schadenfreude with it psychological raison d'être. The idea that schadenfreude provides some symbolic compensation for a source of pain (and indeed the prospect of material compensation for material deficits) suggest that schadenfreude is a more general and a more psychologically driven phenomenon than approaches suggesting that it is grounded in deservingness alone (and one that is potentially more pernicious).

To summarize, we have argued that the intergroup schadenfreude will be directed at a rival outgroup, especially where the groups are well matched; they will become more likely where there has been pain or a sense of inferiority associated with some kind of intergroup comparison, and where there is some interest in the domain of comparison. When the rival is clearly superior to the ingroup, although envy and resentment may well occur, we argue that to the extent that this superiority is experienced as valid or legitimate, it will be more difficult for the ingroup to experience pleasure at the rival's downfall.

Because previous research on schadenfreude has taken place almost exclusively in the interpersonal domain it is possible that the intergroup context of our own focus may be particularly sensitive to the legitimacy constraints. Intergroup contexts refer after all to large samples of people (groups and social categories) where there is often considerable consensual evidence (stereotypes, norms, social knowledge), which can serve to constrain social reality (Spears, Jetten, & Doosje, 2001). Such socially validated expectations might not always be present in interpersonal comparison, perhaps providing more scope for the opportunism of envy-based schadenfreude. If true, this may provide a reassuring limit to the likelihood of intergroup compared to interpersonal schadenfreude. However, once again history points us to the cases where status gaps between groups may close (or indeed are moved), bringing rival groups into range of this malicious emotion. We now consider these ideas in historical context.

Creating the Context of Killing: Historical Insights and Examples

Before we present some experimental evidence for these contentions, it is important to relate these theoretical ideas to the central theme of this volume, and (in line with our interdisciplinary goodwill) to set this analysis in some kind of some historical context. First of all, connecting to the central theme of this volume, we want to argue that our particular approach to understanding group-based schadenfreude is especially relevant to understanding why people do not intervene to stop the killing of close neighbors, and might even be tempted into the fray themselves as the intergroup conflict escalates. Neighbors are, after all, people we are often familiar with, people we are likely to see as similar to ourselves in terms of status and (quite literally) of similar background. They are people with whom we are likely to compare ourselves (Festinger, 1954; Gartrell, 2002). They are often likely to be our friends. However, in times of flux and social instability, they are also likely to become our rivals – more so than people from other areas, other social classes, groups, or backgrounds, and especially when intergroup boundaries intervene.

"Keeping up with the Joneses" is a phrase that captures the petty rivalries between neighbors that living cheek by jowl can sometimes produce. Although this might suggest an element of envy based on an upward comparison, neighbors, almost by definition, are likely to be well within the range of rivalry ("who do they think they are") rather than being put on a pedestal. The Nietzschian notion that schadenfreude relies on there being some "interest" in the domain of comparison now starts to take a very sinister form, if neighbors start to think that they might stand to benefit materially from the persecution of a rival group in terms of property or possessions. Of course, self-interest and group-interest would move the issue from a matter of merely symbolic revenge. But then again, one could plausibly argue that to benefit from one's neighbor's misfortune in such an extreme way would surely not be possible *without* first the malice of schadenfreude to sanction it. There is plenty of evidence of the property of murdered or dispossessed groups being seized by neighbors from victorious groups even by those who might not have been directly involved in persecution. This happened to the Jews in Germany but was a recurring feature of more recent "ethnic cleansing" in the Balkans. The signature inaction of schadenfreude does not prevent profiting from the spoils of war, and clearly material group-interest could form

an element in an even more potent and deadly combination when underwritten by this malicious emotion.

Consideration of such possibilities also shows in starkest form the limitations of "contact," at least conceptualized as a generic panacea for prejudice reduction (see chapter 4, this volume, for a discussion of this literature). We do not doubt that friendly contact between neighbors may well be an important route for prejudice reduction. However, within the present framework, and within an intergroup context, contact also provides us with the direct instantiations of rivalry, allowing the proximity for social comparison, and possibility of chronic coveting that make the rivalries real and lived, rather than mere abstractions. In short, within our scheme, neighbors are in many respects the "natural" targets of group-based schadenfreude and the psychological and material benefit it can bring to those on the ascendant side of the intergroup divide.

Based on our theoretical analysis, schadenfreude should be most likely when a rival group similar in status to the ingroup is singled out for persecution. This emotion may become particularly dangerous when power shifts and this group starts to lose its previous protection. This will likely be exacerbated by political instability, in which initial acts of persecution by a vanguard or spoilers are protected directly by the ascendant power, or indirectly by the failure to enforce the rule of law. The key point here is that schadenfreude will function to prevent the intervention of bystanders who might otherwise protest at the persecution of the victim group. Those in the vanguard of active persecution might then take lack of intervention as tacit consent for their activities and if schadenfreude becomes openly expressed this may even turn to active encouragement. As the persecution becomes more explicit, the bystanders may then become polarized in their reactions, with some joining in the active persecution as passive schadenfreude turns to active gloating.

Those genuinely revolted by the turn of events may try to intervene, especially if they feel moral outrage and injustice at the treatment of neighbors (Montada & Schneider, 1989; see Leach, Snider & Iyer, 2002). Other plausible penitent emotional reactions may be less helpful to those in the eye of the storm. Collective guilt by association with the actions of their group (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998) suggests a reparatory action tendency, but even here it can be argued that the main focus is inward, dependent on accepting responsibility and addressed to alleviating the pangs of one's own conscience, rather than preventing the suffering of the victims (Iyer, Leach & Crosby, 2003). Atrocities that go well beyond a few

reprehensible acts are perhaps more likely to evoke shame at the very nature of the group to which one belongs. However, the classic action tendency of shame is avoidance and withdrawal (Frijda, 1986) and this reaction is likely to be of even less use to the persecuted group.

As intergroup conflict escalates, there may be a stage at which, in a self-interested sense, withdrawal and inaction may also be the most rational survival strategy, even for members of the dominant group opposed to the persecution. In situations where factions are openly killing the persecuted group, to sympathize with the victims or to help them may risk being categorized as on "their" side, endangering them to the same fate. In Nazi Germany it is well known that people who openly helped the Jews were seen as collaborators, and perished themselves in the concentration camps. A more recent example is the case of moderate Hutu who were hounded and killed themselves by Hutu militias along with the Tutsi in Rwanda.

The shifting status of the persecuted group is likely to be accompanied by an ideological assault (propaganda, stereotypes, rumor, and myth), used to reinforce and justify the swift course of persecution (Tajfel, 1981). The dehumanization of the outgroup through racism and stereotyping is one classic way to eliminate legitimacy constraints based on the fellow humanity of the "other," and then to justify repression, atrocity, and even genocide (chapter 11, this volume). We believe that the role of schadenfreude in preventing intervention, and indeed furthering encouragement of persecution, is a key factor in why neighbors do not stop the killing, and indeed a necessary stage in the process by which they are turned into actual killers.

There is plenty of historical evidence that captures this grisly scenario. History abounds with groups that have been persecuted leading to genocide, many of them analyzed in this volume. The persecution of Jews during the rise of National Socialism in Weimar Germany, resulting in the Holocaust, is perhaps the best documented example of this, although pogroms have been a recurring fate of Jews since biblical times. Tragically, the struggle to prosper despite anti-Semitism, turning to money-lending when other forms of trade were prevented by law, may ironically have reinforced the distinction with gentiles in the capitalist era and fed anti-Semitic rivalries. Once again this has been fertile territory for the ideological myths and conspiracy theories of the Jewish control of both capitalism and communism (a central theme in *Mein Kampf*), that have helped to paint this group as a threat (Billig, 1989; see also chapter 6, this volume). Although some sections of the Jewish community may have prospered (evoking envy), ordinary Germans were just as likely to have Jewish neighbors

living close by, no more prosperous than themselves, and this was equally true of Poland and the Slavic countries.

The deprivation and depression in Weimar Germany, and the instability caused by the onset of war, made for a particularly volatile mix of the conditions in which the malicious feelings associated with schadenfreude could also be acted out in extreme form. It is well known that ordinary German soldiers were part of this persecution (Browning, 1993; Goldhagen, 1996). However, perhaps the most graphic and chilling example of (gentile) neighbors killing (Jewish) neighbors is provided by the account of what happened in the Polish village of Jedwabne, documented by Jan Gross (2003). During the war the gentiles of this village systematically exterminated the Jewish population of the village, without the direct intervention or encouragement of German forces. From this account it was clear that this was not an isolated incident; similar pogroms occurred in surrounding towns and villages and civilian participation was widespread. For this kind of atrocity to happen, and on such a widespread scale, is almost inconceivable without there being a strong group dimension, and indeed group coordination. It seems equally inconceivable that intense group-based emotions, such as hatred and schadenfreude, played no role. Although some figures from this account were clearly more active than others, such mass murder would not have been possible unless this was tolerated and sanctioned on a wide scale. It would also not have been possible, we argue, if sympathy had outweighed at the very least indifference, and most probably group-based schadenfreude. In addition, the murderers, but also the passive bystanders, stood much to gain from this persecution, with land, property, and businesses their booty.

This is one graphic example but history is replete with other cases of groups who became victims of such neighbor-on-neighbor violence. The cases of the Muslims in Bosnia and the Tutsi in Rwanda offer more contemporary examples, with the Sudan being only the most recent. Some subsections of these groups may even have been sufficiently successful to evoke envy, but many more had sufficient social standing to evoke rivalry. The prevalence and economic mix of these target groups meant that they were sufficiently dispersed, both geographically and within the social hierarchy, to become potential rivals of the ascendant group, in terms of their visible access to available resources. Even if sections of these targeted groups had enjoyed a degree of social status and power at earlier junctures in history, the point is that the shift in power had removed these protections and left them vulnerable to genocidal onslaughts, be these based on ideological quests for power, or a more material push for territory and resources, bound

up with conflicts of identity or culture. While social identity theory and realistic conflict theory between them capture some important features of such extreme intergroup conflicts, neither is perhaps fully equipped to explain the intensity and specificity of such behavior. Malicious emotions such as schadenfreude go some way to helping us understand how such behavior can be tolerated if not perpetrated.

Despite the reality of attacks on these various groups and communities, it is nevertheless difficult to say with certainty that emotions such as schadenfreude and gloating definitely played a role, plausible though this may seem. However powerful the appeal of transcendental arguments of what *must* have been the case, the psychologist in us poses the question of how we can know for sure that such emotions played a role? Social psychologists are fond of saying that such historical evidence remains "anecdotal." This may sound patronizing to historians and other social scientists, and indeed lay-people (a million die – that is an anecdote; an experiment with 40 people in the lab – that's science!) We are not doubting the historical evidence of these events but the value that a social psychologist can bring to understanding some of the social psychological processes involved comes from testing and validating these processes in laboratory and field. Once again this is not to substitute for other forms of analysis, but might help to complement and inform these historical and political analyses. With these limitations and caveats in mind we now proceed to establish evidence for intergroup schadenfreude and the processes proposed to underlie it.

Group-Based Schadenfreude: Experimental Evidence

The main objective of our experimental studies on intergroup schadenfreude has been to establish evidence for a group-based form of this emotion, and to examine the conditions underlying its emergence. Clearly, we are not able to address the extreme circumstances studied in the previous section and engaging this book. However, it should be possible to generalize from some of the processes examined in the laboratory to these more extreme conditions. With the ethical and practical issues in mind we have developed a number of paradigms for examining schadenfreude. One immediate problem, already alluded to, is that there may be legitimacy constraints on the experience of schadenfreude. Specifically, where the outgroup is clearly superior this may make it more difficult to legitimately feel this malicious pleasure. More generally, there might also be good reason

to suppress expression of schadenfreude because of knowledge that this is malicious and therefore socially undesirable. There is a close parallel here with aversive racism (see Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004).

We have used various methods to try to tackle these issues. First we have sought to select social contexts where the expression of schadenfreude might be more socially acceptable. Our main strategy here has been to use the sporting domain where it is relatively legitimate to cheer at the loss of a rival in a sporting fixture, if only because it is "only a game." We have also developed paradigms using nonsporting contexts. In these cases, to counter social desirability and legitimacy concerns we have adapted techniques designed to delve beyond the dissimulation and denial of schadenfreude, and the emotional reactions that facilitate it. These involve various forms of honesty manipulation, such as the making salient an "honesty norm," or using the "bogus pipeline" technique (Jones & Sigall, 1971). We describe these techniques, along with the studies, in more detail below.

Intergroup schadenfreude and sporting rivalries in international contexts

In our first studies designed to assess evidence for intergroup schadenfreude and factors that govern it (Leach et al., 2003) we drew on the longstanding antagonism between our Dutch participants and their German rivals in the domain of international soccer. The more general historical background to this rivalry goes back to the occupation of World War II, but this soccer rivalry also has its very own specific character, with the Germans forming the nemesis of the Dutch team in many key encounters in recent decades. A loss by the German national team in key international tournaments therefore forms an obvious schadenfreude opportunity for the Dutch. In keeping with the definition of schadenfreude it is important to note that this defeat is inflicted by a third party and not the ingroup, providing our analogy to the passive bystanders watching the suffering of their neighbors.

In our first attempt to research this we used the German loss to Croatia in the 1998 World Cup tournament as the schadenfreude opportunity. In line with the ideas discussed earlier, we measured interest in the domain of soccer and also induced threats to the ingroup's status (or "inferiority" threats) in this key domain, predicting that both these conditions would stimulate intergroup schadenfreude. We manipulated the threat of inferiority in two ways, in *chronic* and *acute* terms: (1) We reminded participants of the Netherlands' relatively poor performance in previous World Cups compared to others (Brazil

and England, both of whom have previously won this tournament; the Dutch had not) – a chronic inferiority manipulation; 2) we asked participants about their loss to Brazil in that World Cup tournament immediately prior to the schadenfreude opportunity regarding Germany's loss – an acute inferiority manipulation. As in all our studies, we also controlled for dispositional schadenfreude (in order to ensure that the emotion was not interpersonal or due to individual differences) and for (dis)like of the German rival to ensure that it related to the "downfall" event and not to general prejudice. We measured schadenfreude to the German loss on a series of emotion scales tapping satisfaction at the outcome (including the Dutch word for schadenfreude).

In line with predictions we found effects of both inferiority threat manipulations, with intergroup schadenfreude reliably higher after being exposed to these threats compared to the respective control conditions. Schadenfreude also increased as a function of interest in soccer. However, when interest was low the effect of chronic threat was greater: Those with high soccer interest did not need to be reminded of the lack of Dutch tournament success in order to get their group-based schadenfreude flowing.

These results provided promising first evidence for intergroup schadenfreude and factors that facilitate it, supporting our approach. Following Nietzsche, we have also proposed that schadenfreude is an opportunistic emotion that is likely to be constrained by legitimacy concerns. In order to investigate this aspect of intergroup schadenfreude, as well as replicate our basic finding, we conducted a second study. For this we drew on the European soccer championship of 2000, in which the top European nations participated, including Germany, the Netherlands, and another soccer rival of the Dutch, Italy. In this study we compared Dutch reactions to these two rivals being knocked out of the tournament.

The crucial twist here was that Italy was also the team that had knocked the Netherlands themselves out of the tournament at an earlier stage and we suspected that this might constrain schadenfreude towards this rival, especially for participants reminded of this rival's valid superiority. To test this idea we used a manipulation similar to the "acute" inferiority threat of the previous study: We reminded participants of their own loss to Italy prior to the schadenfreude opportunity, which in one condition was the loss of Germany, and in another condition was the loss of Italy itself. In the case of the German rival, being reminded of their own loss to Italy was not expected to affect the status of Germany as an equal rival for the Dutch, and should

therefore function as an acute inferiority threat as in our previous study. However, being reminded of their own loss to Italy for the Dutch should constrain the experience of schadenfreude when responding to the loss of the Italian rival. The Italians had after all defeated the Dutch participants' own team (a legitimacy constraint).[2]

In line with the earlier soccer study we expect that those low in soccer interest would be particularly sensitive to this threat/constraint manipulation. To increase the chances of detecting this difference we also introduced an "honesty norm" manipulation in which we made salient the Dutch norm of directness and honesty (part of the Dutch national stereotype) prior to these responses. Results confirmed that whereas the reminder of the loss to Italy exacerbated schadenfreude toward the German rival, the very same reminder reduced schadenfreude towards the Italian rival, at least for those low in soccer interest and for whom the honesty norm was made salient (i.e., the moderating factors predicted to sensitize participants to the legitimacy constraint). This second study thus provided further support for intergroup schadenfreude and the threat of inferiority that can foster it, but also for the legitimacy concerns that can constrain schadenfreude.

Another study in the sporting domain allowed us to examine the possibility that schadenfreude might reflect not only some interest in the domain of the rival's misfortune, but can also be exacerbated by having a material (group) interest in this misfortune. In other words, is there evidence that when the ingroup actually profits from the rival's demise, rather than evoking sympathy this actually exacerbates schadenfreude? Recall our argument that self- and group-interest and schadenfreude could form particularly potent allies? In this study we wanted to assess whether profiting from the rival's loss may perversely exacerbate the pleasure of schadenfreude.

This study (Leach, Spears, & Mitchell, 2004) used the context of the German loss in the Olympic hockey tournament of 2000, and capitalized on the fact that the Dutch progression to the final knock-out phase of the tournament was only made possible by the fact that Great Britain defeated Germany in the group phase (the schadenfreude opportunity). Would reminding participants of this cruel twist of fate for Germany actually make the schadenfreude taste even sweeter for the Dutch?

As well as manipulating the salience of this interdependence we manipulated a further facilitating condition, namely whether schadenfreude was expressed to an ingroup audience (a Dutch researcher) or to an outgroup audience (a British researcher), expecting this furtive

pleasure to be admitted more freely to an ingroup audience. Finally we manipulated the key constraining condition, "valid outgroup superiority," by telling participants that the Germans were seen by experts as strong contenders for the gold medal position or omitting this information. We also measured the crucial variable of interest in the domain of soccer shown in our previous work to moderate the experience of schadenfreude.

Results provided support for the prediction that being made aware that one's own team benefited from the outgroup loss would actually enhance the pleasure at their loss. In the ingroup audience condition (but not outgroup audience condition) domain interest generally predicted schadenfreude, except in the case where the Dutch benefiting from the German loss was *not* salient, and the key constraint (valid German superiority) was salient. As well as pointing once again to the importance of legitimacy constraints, this finding suggests a perversely "poetic" pleasure in gaining from the outgroup's disadvantage as a factor in facilitating schadenfreude, in conjunction with more general interest in the domain. This finding supports our suspicion that schadenfreude may be a grubby sibling to self-interest. In case there should be any doubt, this further underlines the malicious nature of schadenfreude: More pain for the rival can mean more gain for the group that benefits.

Once again, however, this malicious pleasure is not blanket in nature. The importance of expressing schadenfreude to an ingroup audience, with this pleasure also constrained by the valid superiority of the rival, reinforces the opportunistic and furtive nature of schadenfreude and suggests why we might not always easily detect it. Although the opportunistic nature of schadenfreude means that it may often be tempered when conditions dictate, paradoxically it may acquire an extra sense of urgency and viciousness when conditions allow.

Evidence from other intergroup contexts

Although the sporting studies provide evidence of intergroup schadenfreude, for the reasons discussed earlier we were keen to establish evidence of this emotion in other contexts and also with other group identities. However, when we move into domains where schadenfreude may be less legitimate this poses the question of whether we will be able to measure this emotion as directly or as easily as we have done in the sporting domain.

As we have already seen, manipulations designed to reinforce the truthfulness of responding (the honesty norm) under certain conditions

either reinforce or attenuate schadenfreude, depending on the critical conditions operating in the specific social context (namely whether defeat by Italy was seen as a threat or a legitimacy constraint). One distinct possibility when we move into the realm of nonsporting groups is that in less "playful" contexts there may also be a strong social desirability norm against expressing such malicious pleasures as schadenfreude, and this is another reason to employ measures designed to encourage honest responding.

However, there is an even more basic reason to suppose that more serious and involving intergroup contexts may also exert more fundamental emotional constraints on the very experience of an emotion such as schadenfreude. If we are right in our analysis that schadenfreude is closely related not only to interest in the domain of the loss but also to a sense of (status) inferiority caused by painful defeats or unfavorable social comparisons, then the very experience of schadenfreude is likely to be closely bound to the pain or dejection associated with inferiority (especially if this inferiority is seen as somehow undeserved or illegitimate, and thus not subject to legitimacy constraints). One classic coping strategy to deal with such pain is denial (Lazarus, 1991). However, if schadenfreude is seen as a palliative to this pain (the imaginary revenge, so to speak), then coping strategies designed to deny pain in the first place may also undermine the raison d'etre for schadenfreude. Put another way, any factors that force one to confront the pain of failure or defeat may be particularly fertile ground for experiencing subsequent schadenfreude at the rival's loss. Techniques designed to force a focus on one's true emotions may therefore help us to enhance both the dejection at defeat, and the pleasure of schadenfreude that this may foster.

In sum, there are at least two possible reasons to introduce techniques to enhance truthful responding: either because the expression of schadenfreude is strategically suppressed (for reasons of social desirability, for example) or because the very experience of schadenfreude is preempted by coping with the pain of implied inferiority. We therefore employed the bogus pipeline technique, which operates rather like the honesty norm manipulation to encourage truthful responding. The bogus pipeline is a device involving an electrode, rather like a polygraph, which participants are led to believe gives the researcher direct access to their feelings (although in fact it measures nothing, hence "bogus"). The intended effect is that participants become more sincere about their feelings. However, as well as subverting dissimulation, this technique should also force people to "listen" more closely to their emotional reactions, so to speak, and to report

them. If schadenfreude is mediated by the pain of inferiority, the pipeline should serve to "release" this affect and set the process of symbolic revenge in motion.

In this study (Spears & Leach, 2005, Study 2) we assessed evidence of this process by stimulating pain at a specific form of status inferiority, namely dejection at a recent loss to a rival. Note that this potentially creates a legitimacy constraint: The rival having won a recent duel could be seen as legitimately better than one's own group, and thus undeserving of schadenfreude. This constraint was not present in our previous studies in which an acute sense of status inferiority was inflicted by defeat at the hands of a *third* party unrelated to the rival target of schadenfreude. However, in the present study we deliberately built this feature into our design to manipulate legitimacy constraints and test our hypotheses that schadenfreude (and indeed the rivalry and dejection caused by defeat) would be most intense among equal rivals. Once again this was the basis for our contention that neighbors are the "ideal" targets for schadenfreude.

In this study, students at the University of Amsterdam learned that their university team had lost to their cross-town rival, the Free University, in the most recent match of an interuniversity quiz competition. Providing feedback about the history of this competition allowed us to set this most recent loss against a context where the rival group had previously won all six duels (outgroup superior condition), where the rival had only won the most recent of the six duals (ingroup superior condition), or where honors had been evenly shared (three wins and three losses each, including the most recent loss by the ingroup team). We expected greatest schadenfreude when the history of competitions reflected equality. In line with our argument that a recent defeat by one's rival may lead to dejection (Higgins, 1987) and attempts to cope with this through distancing and denial, we expected this effect to be strongest when the bogus pipeline was operating. When the outgroup is superior there should be a legitimacy constraint on schadenfreude (and translating dejection into schadenfreude). When the rival is actually inferior, then the rivalry should be more muted and schadenfreude reduced (it is arguable whether schadenfreude applies to a lower status or less successful group).

Our prediction that the dejection at this most recent loss would be translated into the pleasure of schadenfreude in the bogus pipeline condition, but only so in the equal status condition, received support. Status and bogus pipeline factors interacted such that the dejection and schadenfreude only differed as a function of the bogus pipeline

manipulation in the equal status condition, and dejection and schadenfreude were both highest when the pipeline was on in this condition. Moreover, the effect of the pipeline manipulation on schadenfreude was reliably mediated by the dejection at the loss to the rival in the equal status condition only.

Schadenfreude was generally low when the ingroup had a superior history, consistent with the relative absence of rivalry. Interestingly, in this ingroup superiority condition participants reported a high level of dejection when the pipeline was off, but this dropped to a low level when the pipeline was on. This suggests that participants in the superior condition were facing up to the public embarrassment of losing to an inferior team, but the bogus pipeline suggests that this did not represent a real threat to ingroup status.

This study gives further support for our process model of schadenfreude, providing a response to the pain of acute status inferiority (in this case, dejection at the most recent loss). However, this result again reveals the bounded nature of this effect and the constraint on actually experiencing the emotion when the outgroup is legitimately superior. This account supports our conceptualization of schadenfreude being most likely under conditions of competition between those closest to each other on the social scale, indeed conceptual neighbors, rather than a product of envy or resentment deriving from upward social comparison.

Concluding Remarks

We have presented some empirical evidence that we hope will convince social psychologists at least, that intergroup schadenfreude occurs and is distinct from interpersonal forms of this emotion. This evidence supports our contention that schadenfreude could have played a role in many of the examples of atrocity, "ethnic cleansing," and genocide addressed by this volume. Of course, we are not claiming that the playing fields of international soccer equate or translate in any direct way to the killing fields of Cambodia (for example). While we do not want to trivialize the context in which neighbors kill, nor should we underestimate the passion with which people embrace sporting identities and their rivalries, just as any other kind. Bill Shankly, the late manager of Liverpool Football Club, once famously remarked: "Some people say that football is a matter of life and death. I disagree. It's much more important than that." The power of "interest" should therefore not be underestimated. The idea that football fan-ship tells

us little about the prejudices underlying historical events as extreme as the Holocaust, is also quickly dispelled when considering the chants directed at Ajax, the Amsterdam team with a strong Jewish history, by fans from its rival club, Feyenoord. "Hamas, Hamas, put the Jews to the gas" is one such chant in which the malicious historical and contemporary references are all too clear (Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2003).

To try to convince sceptics, we have shown evidence of intergroup schadenfreude in other intergroup contexts too. This research, as well as showing the constraints on schadenfreude, and showing it to be particularly likely among close rivals matched in status, shows both the limits and possible extent of this emotion. If the envy associated with upward social comparison can constrain intergroup schadenfreude, this offers little solace to the many rival groups of comparable status who can easily become the targets of schadenfreude. These rivals are likely to be ordinary people, just like us; our neighbors in fact.

We have only scratched the surface of the research that social psychologists can offer to this topic. Many questions remain unanswered and there is much yet to do. Although we have made a start to distinguish interpersonal and intergroup forms of schadenfreude, the question occurs of whether the intergroup variant can be more extreme or intense than its interpersonal equivalent, as the historical examples considered here might imply (Schopler & Insko, 1992). Ongoing research on this topic suggests that it can be (Ouwerkerk, Van Dijk, Pennekamp, & Spears, n.d.). Another important question is how the social sharing of schadenfreude, a typically furtive and private emotion, might validate, intensify, and propagate the emotion within the ingroup, creating a climate of persecution. We have already described how schadenfreude is strengthened when reported to an ingroup audience (Leach et al., 2004). Although there is much work attesting to the prosocial benefits of social sharing of emotion for the individual or group (e.g., Finkenauer & Rimé, 1998; Parkinson, Fischer, & Manstead, 2005; Van Zomeren et al., 2004), social sharing for malicious emotions such as schadenfreude and gloating has yet to be fully explored. Finally, the distinction between schadenfreude and gloating (Leach & Spears, 2004), and the process by which one can be transformed into the other, is also a critical issue. Here the help of historians and other social scientists is necessary to provide a full account of how such group emotions both reflect and motivate social change.

In this chapter we hope to have explained why intergroup schadenfreude is so important to understanding why people do not stop the

killing of neighbors, and may indeed encourage complicity as passive goading begets active gloating. In this respect we hope also to have provided a moral perspective on the by-now infamous claim that some perpetrators of violence, and perhaps more plausibly some who did not oppose it, "were just following orders." Arendt's (1994) famous analysis of the banality of evil speaks to some of the greatest crimes of inhumanity in modern times. Her analysis has also reverberated back into our discipline to inspire some of the most classic studies in the history of social psychology. Milgram's (1974) studies of the obedience to authority were designed to capture the power of the situation, and passivity in the face of power. Equally classic research on bystander apathy was also a response to heinous crimes where neighbors failed to stop killing (Latané & Darley, 1970). What is perhaps missing from these classic studies, and also Arendt's analysis, is an appreciation of the "interests" of the bystander, in terms of emotion, and group allegiance (Levine, Cassidy, Brazier, & Reicher, 2002). By providing an analysis of a malicious intergroup emotion we hope to have shown that doing nothing often entails doing something in psychological terms, in serving an interest whether symbolic or more material. Rather than seeing this inactivity as the default position of bureaucrats and bystanders, we claim there is often an emotional, and thus a motivated, basis to simply looking on in the face of such events. Neighbors, far from being safe from these malicious passions, may often be its most obvious targets.

Author Note

Russell Spears and Colin Leach contributed equally to this research. We thank the editors for their insightful comments on an earlier version of this chapter.

Notes

1. Of course we are not suggesting that all inaction is motivated by schadenfreude. For example, other factors, many of them without a clear social psychological dimension, can help to explain why failures to intervene may fail to prevent atrocity (the UN in Rwanda described elsewhere in this volume is one such example).
2. It could also be argued that the Dutch look better if Italy wins the tournament, producing greater sympathy for the Italian loss (we thank the editors for pointing out this possibility). However, the fact that schadenfreude to the Italian loss was quite high when not reminded of the Dutch loss to Italy suggests there was no general sympathy toward Italy for this reason.

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Part II

Societal Factors

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6

When Neighbors Blame Neighbors

Scapegoating and the Breakdown of Ethnic Relations

Peter Glick

The precipitous breakdown of relationships among neighboring groups into conflict and mass murder has been a disturbingly frequent occurrence in the contemporary world. What are the social psychological sources of such violence? Psychologists (e.g., Berkowitz, 1989) have contrasted "instrumental" violence, in which aggression is primarily a means to other ends (e.g., the expropriation of others' resources) with "hostile" or "emotional" aggression, in which violence stems from feelings of hatred (and its primary goal is to inflict harm on another, even at some cost to oneself). In other words, theorists have suggested that violent motives are either cold, rational, and economically based, or hot, irrational, and emotional.

From an instrumental point of view, violence against neighbors is predictable in many circumstances. Neighboring groups are likely to be competitors for scarce resources, such as land, or may be victimized because they possess wealth that can conveniently be confiscated. That violence against neighbors often occurs for instrumental reasons is not particularly controversial or surprising; human history is one of conquest, displacement, and enslavement as groups have sought more territory, greater resources, cheap labor, and power. The greater puzzle is violent outbursts against neighbors in the apparent absence of instrumental motives. Such violence not only seems irrational but is often ultimately self-destructive for the perpetrators. Why, for example, did early

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modern Europeans accuse neighbors of witchcraft, leading to the torture and execution of tens of thousands? In the last century, why did so many Germans turn against Jewish citizens in their own nation (as well as the rest of Europe)? More recently, why did the Hutu of Rwanda murder almost 1 million of their Tutsi neighbors (and fellow Hutu seen as sympathetic to the Tutsi) in an outburst of genocidal violence that, while it lasted, exceeded the rate of killing in the Holocaust?

Instrumental motives, though not entirely absent, seem insufficient to explain some of the most severe eruptions of intergroup violence. It is true, for example, that the Nazis sought to extract all value from the Jews before murdering them (by seizing Jewish property, processing the bodies of death camp victims to extract everything of material worth, and using Jews as slave laborers). Yet this profiteering clearly took a back seat to the goal of extermination: the Nazis preferred to expel or murder Jews whose talents could have significantly aided their war effort (e.g., physicists and engineers), had no plans for a permanent class of Jewish slave laborers (labor was merely a way to extract value while working the Jews to death), and spared no expense to make Europe *Judenrein* (devoting considerable manpower and resources to the death camps, even as it became clear that Germany was losing the war).

To the degree that aggressive acts appear (at least to outsiders) to be noninstrumental, they seem to call for explanations rooted in irrationality – extreme emotions and disordered thought processes. For instance, Aronson (1987) argues that the Holocaust is a case of "social madness" in which perpetrators experienced a "rupture with reality" (p. 137). The most prominent explanation for such apparently irrational explosions of violence has been *scapegoating*, which can be defined as "an extreme form of prejudice in which an out-group is unfairly blamed for having intentionally caused an in-group's misfortune" (Glick, 2005, p. 244).

In this chapter, I argue that the classic view of scapegoating, which characterizes such aggression as an irrational venting of frustrations, is insufficient and offer an alternative view, the *ideological model of scapegoating* (Glick, 2002, 2005), that better explains the scapegoating of neighbors. This alternative model suggests that scapegoating can be the unfortunate outcome of the (normally adaptive) cognitive and motivational processes by which people try to explain and to solve shared misfortunes. Although not inherently irrational, these processes can result in socially shared explanations for negative events – such as blaming an innocent group – that are wholly misguided.

The ideological model suggests that in the minds of perpetrators, violence is necessary and justified by an internally consistent set of beliefs

(based on assumptions that they believe to be true). This is not to deny an emotional component to such aggression or that many perpetrators of intergroup violence descend into sadism, taking pleasure in their victims' pain. Nevertheless, I argue that the emotions and violence that accompany scapegoating do not represent a primitive "venting" of frustration, but rather are the outcome of (often sophisticated) shared ideologies in which violence is seen as a necessary part of the solution to a group's misfortunes. That is, perpetrators typically view their aggression, even if preemptive, as necessary. But unlike instrumental aggression motivated primarily by greed (e.g., the expropriation of resources), scapegoating ideologies typically justify aggression as a matter of self-defense against a powerful enemy that cannot be defeated unless it is utterly destroyed – it is this conviction that generates the intense emotions of hatred toward the targeted group.

The ideological model of scapegoating can help to explain some of the most puzzling aspects of apparently noninstrumental violence against neighbors: (a) why the breakdown of ethnic relations can be precipitous, (b) why periods of relative tolerance may not protect groups from being scapegoated, (c) why old (even ancient) enmities can suddenly reemerge in contemporary conflicts, and (d) why neighbors (groups within the society as opposed to external enemies) are often singled out for blame.

"Classic" Scapegoating Theory

Classic scapegoating theory has its origins in Freudian psychology (see Allport, 1954). This version of the theory assumes that an irrational displacement of aggression onto weak, vulnerable, and innocent victims stems from perpetrators' internal personality conflicts. Psychoanalytic theory assumes that people are born with drives, primarily for sex and aggression, that society (with parents as its primary agents) attempts to control. Thus, some degree of inner conflict is all but assured as people are forced to repress or rechannel their "instincts" in acceptable ways. The primary project of psychological maturation is to express one's primitive drives in a healthy and socially acceptable manner; but many individuals are assumed to have difficulty balancing the demands of their drives (the *id*), reality (represented psychologically by the *ego*), and their internalized moral principles (the *superego*).

People who are unable to deal with inner conflict adaptively (i.e., those with weak, infantile personalities), according to the

psychoanalytic approach, are likely to project their psychologically unacceptable impulses (e.g., desire to aggress) onto others, who serve as projective screens. Thus, the individual's own moral shortcomings are transformed into the perceived flaws of others, who become targets of what would otherwise be self-directed aggression. A further assumption is that devalued minority groups make a convenient projective screen because they are not in a position to fight back and it is socially acceptable to view and treat them in a hostile manner.

The mechanisms proposed by the psychoanalytic approach to scapegoating are complex and notoriously difficult to test. As a result, there have been few empirical attempts to demonstrate projection of the sort that might account for scapegoating. When it has been tested, the theory has not received empirical support (see Gollwitzer, 2004; though see Newman & Caldwell, 2005, for a review of evidence in favor of a cognitively based theory of projection).

Subsequent theorists suggested, in contrast to the psychoanalytic approach, that external frustrations (e.g., economic downturns or rapid social change) precipitate scapegoating. This view is based on the frustration-aggression hypothesis (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939), which states that when circumstances thwart their goals, people experience an instigation to aggress. As with the earlier Freudian approach, these theorists also believed that frustration-induced aggression can be irrationally displaced onto innocent bystanders who are chosen primarily for their vulnerability. Berkowitz (1989) proposed a reformulation of frustration-aggression theory aimed at shoring up shortcomings revealed by a half-century of research, especially the claim that frustration inevitably produces an instigation to aggress. He argued that frustrations "produce an instigation to aggression only to the degree that they generate negative affect" (Berkowitz, 1989, p. 60).

Early work by Hovland and Sears (1940) appeared to show that economic downturns in the Southern United States (from 1882 to 1930) were related to increased numbers of lynchings of African Americans. This archival study long served as the most convincing evidence for a link between social frustrations and ethnic violence. However, subsequent consideration of these data using more sophisticated statistical techniques, better indices of economic conditions, and encompassing the years of the Great Depression, cast doubt upon these findings (see Green, Glaser, & Rich, 1998). Further, Green et al.'s (1998) attempt to determine whether contemporary hate crimes (in New York City from 1987 to 1995) are related to economic conditions also failed to support a link. These authors concluded that

the relationship of economic conditions and violence may depend "on the way in which political leaders and organizations frame and mobilize . . . grievances" (p. 89). In short, scapegoating may be a collective act motivated and organized by a shared ideology.

Whether one accepts the original formulation of the theory or Berkowitz's reformulation, the frustration-aggression approach shares two fundamental assumptions with prior psychoanalytic scapegoating theory: (a) that individual frustrations, whether due to internal (psychoanalytic) or external (frustrating circumstances) causes, generate hostile emotions that (b) may be displaced upon innocent targets simply because these targets cannot retaliate. In other words, both the psychoanalytic and frustration-aggression approaches to scapegoating are grounded in an individualistic psychology in which the social context (e.g., a history of conflict between neighboring groups) is, at best, in the background while immediate emotional reactions are assumed to provoke an irrational, hostile aggression.

Ideological Model of Scapegoating

Any scapegoating theory is fundamentally about blame; therefore, all such theories presume that scapegoating follows real or imagined negative events. The ideological model of scapegoating (Glick, 2002, 2005) builds upon Staub's (1989, this volume) theory of the roots of genocides and mass murders, which assumes that collective (not just individual) frustration is a necessary (though not sufficient) precondition for genocidal violence. Staub notes that genocides and mass murders are invariably preceded by widely shared difficult life conditions (e.g., economic depression and rapid social change) that frustrate people's basic needs. Such negative events demand explanation because they threaten people's wellbeing, motivating them both to diagnose the causes of the events and, guided by their perceptions of causality, to seek solutions. Staub's approach builds upon frustration-aggression theory, but places frustration within a social context.

The contribution of the ideological model of scapegoating is to develop in more detail the manner in which collective frustrations translate into intergroup blame. This model posits that a normally adaptive and rational process of causal attribution can yield misguided perceptions about the causes of shared negative events, resulting in scapegoating. There are three main reasons why intergroup attributions, without being the result of fundamentally irrational processes, can go horribly awry. First, the causality of large-scale events is typically

so complex and information about the causes so limited that people are ill equipped to explain them (e.g., even experts with the benefit of hindsight are unlikely to agree on the causes of the Great Depression). Second, people's explanations for events are guided by established cultural ideologies, fostering shared social realities that can entrench false beliefs, such as stereotypes that increase the likelihood of blaming a specific group for having caused widespread misfortunes. Third, some kinds of explanations for shared misfortunes are more psychologically attractive than others. For example, explanations that blame another group for poor outcomes are more attractive than blaming one's own group, which would threaten collective self-esteem. This third reason suggests a motivated form of cognition that might be considered "irrational," but is grounded in well-accepted human motivations. For example, the desire to maintain collective self-esteem is a mundane and normal motive, as compared to the blind fury prior scapegoat theories posit.

In contrast to earlier views of scapegoating, the ideological model concentrates on *collective* processes – shared misfortunes and shared ideologies or worldviews. Following Tajfel (1981) and Billig (1976), the ideological model assumes that when misfortunes are widely shared, people seek a social consensus about the causes of these problems and an organized solution to them. Genocides, for instance, are not spontaneous outbursts by a mob of frustrated individuals, but are highly organized among a group of people sharing a common set of beliefs. Any model that focuses solely on individual processes cannot explain such events (e.g., see Billig, 1976).

The ideological model presumes that cultural worldviews shape and pave the way for social consensus about the causes of shared negative events. People in any society look to others to understand how to view the world; social consensus has been shown to be a powerful determinant of what people perceive to be true (Cialdini, 2000; Kelman, 1958). Thus, in a culture that believes in supernatural agency, people may be prepared to interpret symptoms of a new disease as a plague from a displeased god or the Devil, whereas people in a secular, industrialized society will be prepared to attribute causality to a toxin, bacterium, or virus. While the people in the latter society might deride those in the former as irrational, people in both societies rely on social consensus and authority figures to define correct belief. If the premises of the first society are provisionally accepted, their allocation of blame and proposed solutions may follow an internally consistent logic. In other words, the ideological model proposes that shared false beliefs that result in the scapegoating of an innocent group do not

necessarily reflect some sort of mass psychosis or disordered thinking. Rather, normal processes of attribution, shaped and guided by shared cultural beliefs, can result in scapegoating. In some cases, of course, the causal analysis may have merit or be based on a kernel of truth, and the line between realistic group conflict and unfair scapegoating may be difficult to draw.

Why are shared negative events frequently blamed on a group rather than, for example, impersonal or natural forces? Certainly large-scale negative events can be (and are sometimes) blamed on something other than human agency (e.g., a poor crop yield attributed to naturally occurring drought conditions). Such attributions, however, may reinforce a perceived lack of control over negative events and therefore be unattractive (Taylor & Brown, 1988), whereas attribution toward human agencies may suggest that there are actions that could remedy the problem. Furthermore, prior conflict between groups may pave the way for blaming current problems (fairly or not) on an historical enemy.

If scapegoating is the outcome of attributional processes, however, attributions to human agency must be *psychologically* plausible. Heider's (1958) analysis of causal inference specifies that blame is most likely to be allocated to a person or group that is viewed as having the *intention* and *ability* to bring about the events in question. Further, if attributions are to become socially shared, then they also have to be *culturally* plausible. Thus, scapegoating is likely when well-established cultural beliefs lend plausibility to the notion that a specific group had the ability and intent to cause widespread harmful events.

Stereotypes of various groups within a society are a regular feature of shared cultural beliefs and ideologies (Cuddy et al., in press). The ideological model of scapegoating suggests that it is the specific content of these well-established stereotypes that determines which groups are at risk of being scapegoated when shared misfortunes strike. This approach incorporates the stereotype content model (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002), which proposes that there are two underlying dimensions to group stereotypes – perceived *warmth* and *competence*. These two dimensions are relevant, respectively, to perceptions of groups' intentions and abilities. Warmth is inferred based on whether a group is generally perceived as competing or cooperating with mainstream society, whereas competence is inferred from the group's relative success or failure in the society (i.e., socioeconomic standing). This results in a four-fold classification scheme: (a) successful, mainstream groups viewed as warm and competent (e.g., the cultural ingroup); (b) unsuccessful, cooperative groups viewed as warm but

incompetent (e.g., mentally handicapped); (c) unsuccessful competitor groups that are viewed as a drain on societal resources and perceived as both cold and incompetent (e.g., the indigent poor); and (d) successful, competitive groups viewed as competent but cold (e.g., economically successful minorities).

It is the last group – successful minorities – that, according to the ideological model, is at the most risk of being scapegoated. Such groups occupy a precarious position in many societies; although successful, they are viewed with suspicion because they are assumed to be motivated to profit themselves at the expense of others. Their success can create feelings of envy and resentment (see Chua, 2003; Smith, 1991) and increase the risk that they will be viewed as being capable of causing societal misfortunes. For instance, it has been noted that "middleman" minorities, who achieve success as merchants and bankers, are often targets for violence (Chua, 2003; Zenner, 1987). Such groups may be viewed as being positioned to manipulate a society's economy (e.g., as part of a secretive conspiracy) and as intentionally having done so to increase their own profits (e.g., by price-gouging on scarce goods).

Whereas prior theories of scapegoating viewed the victims as blank screens onto which perpetrators' repressed desires or frustrations are projected or displaced, the ideological model proposes that a group's prior position within the society (and consequent stereotypes about them) determines their likely vulnerability to being scapegoated when shared misfortunes strike. This hypothesis stands in sharp contrast to the notion of classic scapegoating theories that aggression is displaced onto weak and vulnerable targets. Instead, the ideological model proposes quite the reverse, that groups are scapegoated *because they have long been viewed as being powerful and ill intentioned*.

In sum, the ideological model suggests that shared misfortunes motivate people collectively to search for explanations and, in turn, solutions to these negative events. The explanations that people hit upon are shaped and guided by shared cultural assumptions that include stereotypes of groups within the society. Groups that are stereotyped as being *ill intentioned*, but also as *capable* of causing widespread harm (typically successful minority groups), are likely to be blamed. In cases of ongoing conflict or exploitation, such blame may be realistic (e.g., a colonized group's resentment of the colonizers' expropriation of resources) or a kernel of truth may be exaggerated; in other cases, cultural stereotypes and the position of the targeted group within a society may combine to create completely false beliefs that nevertheless gain social credibility. It is not a big step from allocating blame

to a group to seeing the expulsion or elimination of that group as being the solution to current and future problems, which is justified in the eyes of the perpetrators as a form of self-defense. Further, once a group is believed to be the intentional cause of severe, shared problems, feelings of betrayal and anger feed into the motivation to take action against the scapegoated group (see Glick, 2002, 2005, for more detail on how scapegoating transforms into sustained, organized actions against the victimized group).

Historical Examples

Upon closer examination, historical examples of scapegoating – each of which may appear at first glance to be the product of irrationality – provide support for the ideological model of scapegoating. I begin with the execution of witches in early modern Europe and then examine the most prominent ethnic genocide attempts of the twentieth century. Although the European witch hunts do not represent ethnic scapegoating (since accused witches were typically of the same ethnicity as their accusers), they are worth examining because such accusations have been viewed as a prototypical case of irrational scapegoating, in which even the misfortunes ("possession" and "bewitchment") are more imagined than real.

European witchcraft accusations

From 1450 to 1750 approximately 40,000 Europeans were killed as witches. From a contemporary perspective, there can hardly be a more open-and-shut case of irrational behavior. Psychoanalytic interpretations presume that the projection of repressed aggressive and sexual desires led to witchcraft accusations. For example, based on the transcript of a 1669 German trial, Roper (1994) contended that a mother projected her unconscious desire to rid herself of her demanding newborn onto the nursemaid, whom she accused of bewitching the baby. This follows the classic Freudian sequence of repression (of unacceptable aggressive thoughts) to projection ("It's the nursemaid who wants to harm my baby") to displacement ("She's a witch!") In this view, common symptoms of "witchcraft," such as pain, nausea, panic, and burning sensations, are psychosomatic symptoms of guilt, whereas feelings of being "pinched" or "nipped" reflect repressed feelings of sexual desire.

Witchcraft accusations appear perfectly to fit the psychoanalytic view of scapegoating since the alleged crimes seem wholly the stuff of

fantasy. But Caporeal (1976) and Matossian (1989) have compiled careful evidence that the symptoms reported by victims of "witchcraft" may have resulted from eating rye infected with ergot, a vasoconstrictive and hallucinogenic fungus that can cause severe spasms; sensations of burning, pinching, pressing, and suffocating; and a variety of hallucinations. Outbreaks of ergot poisoning (which could have occurred frequently in rye-eating regions) would have set up shared horrific events that cried out for explanation – creating the sort of circumstance that the ideological model suggests as a precondition for scapegoating.

The ideological model proposes that people's explanations of events are shaped by shared cultural beliefs. In medieval and early modern Europe, belief in the Devil and his disciples (witches and sorcerers) was common and legitimized by religious and governmental authorities (Briggs, 1996; Levack, 1995). Even so, Briggs (1996) notes that only strange and unnatural symptoms, rather than those that matched a known disease, were likely to be attributed to witchcraft. It is hardly surprising that, within the cultural context, people would interpret the vivid hallucinations and spasms of ergot poisoning as the result of a witch's curse. Such inferences, though wrong, were not necessarily irrational. In any age, people rely on social consensus and authorities to determine correct beliefs. For example, for most people, the contemporary assumption that sickness is caused by germs, viruses, and bacteria is likely to rest on received wisdom rather than a scientific understanding of these concepts (and from this standpoint is no more "rational" than any other cultural belief).

Although it is easy to parody past ages, as Briggs puts it "early modern European villages were not populated by a race of half-wits who attributed any and every misfortune to witchcraft" (1996, p. 68). In a culture where most people (including the elite) believed in supernatural forces, the tendency to attribute unusual events to supernatural causes does not require elaborate psychoanalytic explanations, but can be accounted for by well-established principles of causal attribution.

Furthermore, witchcraft accusations did not generally lead to unruly mobs, but were handled through the legal system (Levack, 1995). Although torture was used to elicit confessions, Briggs (1996) points out that the legal theory behind torture was rational (even if inhumane): to elicit details about the "crime" that only the criminal could know. Caporael (1976) notes that the Salem witch trials proceeded only after a dog that was fed a "witchcake" (a piece of bread soaked in the bewitched victim's urine) exhibited spasms and other unusual behavior (ergot poisoning can in fact be transmitted in this manner). This empirical test, however misguided the assumptions behind it might

be, reflected a systematic attempt to rule out alternative explanations. Briggs (1996) concludes that "there was nothing automatic about the diagnosis of witchcraft; it needed to be supported by chains of reasoning and evidence that may have been defective, but were certainly not absurd" (p. 408).

In sum, witchcraft accusations happened after unusual events that seemed to defy naturalistic causal explanations. The scapegoating of witches seems consistent with a central contention of the ideological model – that scapegoating results when accepted ideologies shape an imperfect, but not wholly irrational, process of causal attribution of blame. Unlike ethnic scapegoating, however, witchcraft accusations were more individualized (rather than group based); they occurred in the context of small village life that did not have the ethnic diversity that might have led to group-based blame (with the exception of Jews, who were often scapegoated).

In contrast, ethnic scapegoating targets a collectivity, rather than specific individuals within it. Although the influence of cultural context on the process of allocating blame may generalize across individualized and collective scapegoating, the ideological model's predictions about how targets are chosen apply specifically to the scapegoating of groups. Thus, the remaining historical examples reviewed here address the issue of central concern in this volume: violence between neighboring ethnic groups.

The Holocaust

Scholarly and theological debate about whether the Holocaust is a unique event in human history centers around the perceived irrationality of the Nazis' aim, to eliminate an entire ethnic group from the face of the earth (Bauer, 1980). Those who argue the uniqueness of the Holocaust assert that it cannot be understood along a continuum of other atrocities in which ethnic groups were decimated in an aggressor's quest for territory and resources (i.e., for instrumental reasons). According to Rubenstein (1966), the Nazis, though desirous of these things, saw the elimination of the Jews an end in itself, not just a means to other ends, to the degree that they "often seemed far more intent upon achieving irrational victories over defenseless Jews and Gypsies than a real victory over their military opponents" (p. 2).

The apparently noninstrumental character of their genocidal aggression and the outrageous stereotypes (e.g., of an "international Jewish conspiracy") that the Nazis used to justify their actions seem strongly suggestive of irrational defense mechanisms, such as projection.

Rubenstein (1966) provides an interpretation that combines elements of both the psychoanalytic and frustration-aggression approaches to scapegoating. He argues that the Nazis exhibited an "infantile regression" and "mass psychosis" in reaction to both a repressive society and frustrating life conditions. What the Nazis desired, according to Rubenstein, was a world in which they could freely act on repressed aggressive impulses. Scapegoating the Jews, onto whom repressed desires were projected, provided the rationale that allowed the Nazis to unleash their own desires, which were acted out through aggression against the Jews. (Rubenstein's view is considerably more complex in its details and includes a sophisticated social and historical analysis of the Holocaust, but space considerations do not permit a full summary.)

The ideological model offers an alternative explanation as to why the Jews in particular were so strongly scapegoated by the Nazis: A prior history of German anti-Semitism that cast the Jews as both powerful and ill intentioned, combined with the overall success of Jews in German society, made it culturally plausible to blame them for Germany's misfortunes (see Glick, 2002). Germany, like the rest of Europe, had a long history of Christian anti-Semitism which stereotyped the Jews in the same manner as witches, as devious and manipulative allies of the Devil, who conspired secretly to harm Christians (Goldhagen, 1997; Rubenstein, 1966; Staub, 1989). Jewish success in such areas as banking and the media fed into a secular equivalent of this stereotype: that the Jews had profound powers to influence Germany's economy and culture, and that an international conspiracy of Jews regularly exercised this power (S. Friedländer, 1997). Biological "theories" of race, commonly accepted by European and American scientists before World War II, allowed the Nazis to essentialize their stereotype of Jewish traits as inherent in "Jewish blood" (H. Friedlander, 1995).

Despite how well German Jews had been assimilated into German society, stereotypes of the Jews had been long established and were still widely shared (Goldhagen, 1997). Given the content of these stereotypes, for many Germans it was culturally plausible to believe that the Jews were both able and motivated to cause the kinds of problems Germany suffered in the 1920s and early 1930s. The Nazis provided and popularized the causal explanation of how Jewish industrialists had "stabbed Germany in the back" to profit off their loss of World War I (a loss that otherwise seemed inexplicable to many Germans, who had received falsely optimistic news during the late stages of the war; Fritszche, 1999). In *Mein Kampf*, Hitler characterized the Jews as dominating the press, international finance, and university positions; as being

cunning, unscrupulous demagogues and exploiters out to destroy and dupe Germans (Volpato and Capozza, 1998). Other victims of the Nazis, such as the Gypsies, were also targeted for elimination, but not with the same degree of obsessive zeal, for it was only the Jews who were conceived as being "a superhuman force driving the peoples of the world to perdition" (S. Friedländer, 1997, p. 100).

That Jews were citizens of Germany only increased the Nazis' view of them as a threat. The Nazis saw the Jews as weakening Germany from within. It was precisely because of the prominence of Jews in German society (despite their small numbers) that they were perceived as having been able to stab Germany in the back. The overall success of the Jewish minority in Germany worked to their disadvantage by lending plausibility (in the minds of many Aryan Germans) to Nazi conspiracy theories of Jewish influence.

The history of the Nazis' first foray into mass killing provides an instructive contrast for considering the role of blame in sustaining popular support for genocide. The Nazis began to develop their mass murder techniques (the use of gas chambers disguised as showers) in their euthanasia program, begun in 1939. This extremely secretive program of "mercy killings" of people who were physically or mentally ill or handicapped was so unpopular when word leaked out that the Nazis soon discontinued it (H. Friedlander, 1995). Germans were generally unwilling to accept the necessity of killing people who were perceived to be innocent of any intentional wrongdoing.

In contrast, no such widespread protests greeted the destruction of the Jews, presumably because many Germans believed that the Jews were not innocent, but, as the Nazis alleged, had caused Germany's misfortunes. Well-established stereotypes of Jews as both powerful and ill intentioned, combined with the success of Jews in German society, made them especially vulnerable to Nazi claims that a Jewish conspiracy was responsible for Germany's woes. Once the Nazis had defined the Jews as the continuing source of Germany's difficulties, the belief that eliminating the Jews (whether through expulsion or, later, extermination) would solve these problems and usher in an Aryan utopia was a logical consequence of their ideological assumptions.

The Armenian genocide

The mass murder of approximately 1 million Armenians in Turkey (primarily in 1915 to 1916) has strong similarities to the scapegoating of Jews in the Holocaust. Like the Jews in Germany, many Armenians were merchants and bankers or occupied prominent professional

roles, such as doctors and lawyers (Adanir, 2001). Thus, consistent with the ideological model, the Armenians were a successful minority group. More specifically, Zenner (1987) suggests that the middleman role was an important commonality in determining the choice of scapegoats in the Armenian genocide and the Holocaust. This role, as merchants and bankers, is a precarious one when difficult conditions occur, since such minorities can be easily perceived as having too much influence over a nation's economy. Furthermore, the middleman position promotes precisely the kinds of stereotypes (that the group is manipulative, ill intentioned, and powerful) and emotions (hostility, resentment, envy) that can result in blame for large-scale negative events and the aggression that follows such blame.

Adanir (2001) notes that in Istanbul, before the massacres, Armenians controlled a significant percentage of trade, business, and transportation, and that more publishing houses were owned by Armenians than by Muslims. This prominent position in society made the Armenians (like the Jews, whom the Nazis viewed as controlling much of German industry and culture) vulnerable to charges of manipulating the economy and negatively influencing the nation's culture.

As in Germany, genocide in Turkey occurred in the context of a precipitous decline in the status of the nation as a whole; in this case, the final collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I. This collapse was the end of a steep decline, with the Turks already having lost about one-third of their empire between 1908 and 1911, before they allied themselves with the losing side in World War I (Melson, 1987). The Armenians were subjected to the same accusation that was later levied at the Jews in Germany, treachery that explained the nation's military defeat – the same "stab in the back" theory (Hovannisian, 1987).

The Turkish regime viewed the Armenians not only as a cause of their problems, but as a continuing threat. Melson (1987) notes that the Armenians became the last of the Christian minorities within the remains of the Ottoman Empire, after it had lost so much territory and so many resources to western, Christian nations. This made the Armenians suspected of being loyal to the regime's enemies and a potential help to Russia at a time of war. The Armenians had also begun vocally to renew a sense of Armenian identity, which unfortunately served to increase their salience as a target.

In sum, the scapegoating of Armenians in Turkey has strong parallels to the later scapegoating of Jews in Germany. In both cases, the victimized groups were (to some degree) "middleman" minorities, suspected of divided loyalties (the Armenians to Russia and the Jews

to an "international Jewish conspiracy"), and portrayed as the enemy within who had stabbed the nation in the back, causing a military defeat. Consistent with the ideological model, minorities who were perceived to be powerful (not weak) and to be competitors to the majority were, in each case, scapegoated as the cause of severe societal misfortunes.

The Rwandan genocide

In the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the deaths of almost 1 million Tutsi (and Hutu seen as sympathetic to them) resulted from mass killings that pitted neighbor against neighbor. Whether this can be classified as "ethnic" conflict is unclear because the exact basis of the distinction between the Tutsi and Hutu is a matter of debate. Many scholars do not consider the Tutsi and Hutu to be ethnic groups, though Hutu extremists have portrayed the groups as constituting separate "races" (Mamdani, 2001). Prunier (2001) notes that it is not accurate to refer to the Tutsi and Hutu as castes because they intermarry. Mamdani (2001) suggests that the distinction between the groups is primarily political, although "Tutsi . . . *may* have existed as an ethnic identity before the establishment of the state of Rwanda," while "the Hutu were simply those from different ethnicities who were subjugated to the power of the state of Rwanda" (p. 74).

Regardless of whether the Tutsi distinction is ethnic or political, the dynamics of the relationships between the groups prior to the genocide attempt seem to fit the preconditions for scapegoating specified by the ideological model, with the Tutsi being a powerful minority. In precolonial times, the Tutsi raised cattle and the Hutu were peasants, with the Tutsi "on top of a very complex system of patron–client relationships" (Prunier, 2001, p. 109). Belgian colonizers subsequently "proclaimed the Tutsi to be racially superior to the Hutu" (Prunier, 2001, p. 110), exacerbating this already hierarchical system, but later attempted to stave off Rwandan independence by switching their allegiance to a Hutu regime in the 1950s.

It is not surprising that the Hutu, who had been told that they were racially inferior to the Tutsi and systematically discriminated against, had built up a great amount of resentment. Therefore, when members of the Hutu majority (which constituted 85% of the population) gained control, they marginalized the Tutsi, keeping them out of the army and government. Prunier (2001) notes, however, that because the Tutsi were better educated (a result of the Belgian colonizers having allowed education only for the Tutsi), the Tutsi retained a great deal of economic power and maintained a strong advantage in the

private sector (e.g., holding most of the prestigious jobs). Thus, despite being shut out of political power, the Tutsi (like the Jews and Armenians) were a highly successful minority.

Stereotypical characterizations of the Tutsi, as evident in propaganda published in the anti-Tutsi newspaper *Kangura*, were extremely similar to Nazi characterizations of the Jews. In particular, the "Tutsi Ten Commandments" mirrors the "Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion," characterizing the Tutsi as "thirsty for blood and power, seeking to impose their hegemony over Rwanda," as "dishonest in business," and seeking "only the supremacy of their ethnic group" (as quoted by Schabas, 2000, p. 145). These are the kinds of stereotypes (of an ill-intentioned, dominating group) that, according to the ideological model, make groups vulnerable to being scapegoated.

The Rwandan genocide was precipitated by a combination of severe economic difficulties (due to falling coffee and tin prices, destroying income from Rwanda's only exports), attacks by Tutsi exiles from Uganda, and international pressure on the Hutu government to share power with the Tutsi (Prunier, 2001). The Tutsi were not only blamed for Rwanda's problems, but were also characterized as threatening to restore their past dominance over the Hutu. For instance, in another eerie parallel to the "stab in the back" accusations against the Jews in Germany and Armenians in Turkey, a propaganda cartoon depicted a Tutsi literally shooting arrows into the backs of defenseless Hutu (*Echo des Milles Collines*, 1991). Once again, as suggested by the ideological model, scapegoating was directed against a minority perceived to be powerful and influential.

Implications and Speculations

Why the breakdown in ethnic relationships can be precipitous

Ethnic "cleansing" and other forms of attack do not emerge spontaneously. As Staub's (1989, this volume) extensive social psychological analysis of actual cases of mass murders and genocides shows, widely shared "difficult life conditions" form what may be a necessary prelude to attacks on ethnic minorities or neighbors. Staub notes that the frustration of basic human needs (e.g., for security, hope, esteem) under difficult life conditions can motivate attraction to ethnocentric ideologies that derogate neighboring ethnic groups. Thus, one answer to the question of why ethnic breakdown can occur relatively

quickly is that social conditions can undergo rapid change (e.g., the relatively sudden onset of an economic depression or collapse of a government).

The ideological model of scapegoating expands on Staub's analysis, suggesting more specifically why the breakdown of ethnic relations can occur so swiftly. Severe, shared misfortunes urgently demand explanations and solutions. Unfortunately, it is often difficult to fathom the (typically complex) causes of large-scale social events. Furthermore, people may be prone to blaming human agents, rather than impersonal abstract forces, in order to maintain a sense of control over their environment. Once a group is blamed as the intentional cause of the society's problems, their elimination may therefore be seen as the solution to those problems. Aggression against the scapegoated group can be propelled not only by a utopian vision of a better future, but intense feelings of having been betrayed by the scapegoated group.

Ironically, the perpetrators of genocide typically feel that they have been the "victims" of the scapegoated group. They therefore construe their aggression as a matter of self-defense. This is a theme that runs through all of the attempted genocides described above. The Nazi and the Turkish regimes believed that the Jews and Armenians (respectively) had stabbed them in the back and the Hutu invoked a history of prior domination by the Tutsi. Similarly, the "Myth of Kosovo" fanned the flames of aggression in Bosnia by portraying the history of the Bosnian Serbs as one of Muslim domination (Ali, 1993; Bieber, 2001). Such narratives of betrayal, if generally accepted by many people in a society, can quickly provoke action against a scapegoated group.

Why periods of relative tolerance may not protect groups from being scapegoated

One of the most disheartening as well as puzzling aspects of genocidal scapegoating is how periods of relative calm between neighboring ethnic groups do not seem to offer protection for minority groups once a society experiences difficult life conditions. It is well documented that intergroup contact can lessen prejudice and improve intergroup relations (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2005), especially when it promotes friendships that cross group lines. One would hope that such positive affective bonds developed during times of relative calm and prosperity would inhibit the subsequent scapegoating of minority groups.

Unfortunately, whatever protective effect a period of quiescent relationships between groups provides may not quell the underlying, well-entrenched suspicions that are held toward minority groups that have

long been stereotyped as untrustworthy. In fact, the ideological model implies that if a period of better relations allows the minority group to flourish, becoming more salient and prominent within the society, this may only *increase* their vulnerability to accusations of having caused later societal calamities. For example, Germany was arguably one of the more hospitable European nations toward Jews before the Nazi regime took control, but the prominence of the Jews within Germany (despite their relatively small numbers) may have made the Nazis' charges of Jewish manipulation all the more plausible to many Germans.

Why old enmities reemerge

It is striking how contemporary ethnic conflict builds upon past, even ancient, enmities, with perpetrators often explicitly referring to this past history to justify their actions. Social psychologists tend to focus on contemporaneous events (or proximal causes) as the most important determinants of behavior. This perspective has a difficult time explaining the intensity with which old conflicts can reemerge. The ideological model, however, suggests that embedded cultural narratives or *social representations* (see Moscovici, 1984), especially those that are central to group or national identity, may act as culturally available explanations for current misfortunes, feeding into and accelerating the breakdown of ethnic relations. A past enemy is likely to be seen as a plausible culprit for current problems, especially when cultural stereotypes are continually renewed by social traditions (e.g., the Serbs' annual commemorations of the Battle of Kosovo).

Thus, for example, the history of both Christian and secular anti-Semitism provided a narrative that made it plausible to many Germans that the Jews had the motivation and ability to cause Germany harm. Various relevant cultural narratives were strongly embedded in German (and more widely, European) culture. Christianity cast Jews as in league with the Devil, and images of Jews as killers of Christ were acted out yearly in Passion plays, reinforcing the image of Jews as betrayers who would have no compunction about stabbing Germany in the back. The medieval role of Jews as money-lenders was another cultural narrative that fitted with the notion that Jews profit when others suffer (since money-lenders fare best when demand for credit is high). The Nazi characterization of Jews as parasites who sucked Germany's economy dry to enrich themselves matched this established narrative.

Similarly, Bieber (2001) argues that mythology of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo, despite having occurred 600 years previously, formed a

significant part of Serbian nationalism in the 1980s and 1990s. It is significant that what the Serbian nationalists mythologized and commemorated on a yearly basis was a Serbian loss to a Muslim army. This sense of having been the historical victims of Muslim aggression was part of the justification for contemporary Serbian aggression in Bosnia.

Historical narratives are a part of shared cultural beliefs that serve as an interpretive framework through which current events are explained. They can also be viewed as a form of priming, making specific stereotypes and attributions readily available. Because such narratives are widely shared throughout a culture, they gain a sense of veracity and can foster a consensus about interpretations of current events, such as attributions of blame toward scapegoated groups.

Why are neighbors blamed?

The ideological model does not specifically suggest that neighbors (or groups within a society) are more likely to be blamed for problems, as opposed to external enemies. It does suggest, however, that past conflicts (e.g., between Hutu and Tutsi) or a history of distrust toward a minority group (e.g., the history of anti-Semitism in Germany) make it likely that an internal group will be suspected of causing harm. Also, groups within a society may be viewed, from an attributional standpoint, as having the opportunity to cause harm (e.g., if they are believed to have control over a large sector of the economy, they might be blamed for economic problems).

Additionally, consistent with Staub (1989), the ideological model proposes that people are drawn to explanations for misfortunes that are not only culturally plausible, but also psychologically attractive. Unfortunately, attributions of blame against neighbors (especially minority groups within the society) may serve a variety of psychological needs that attributions toward external enemies do not. Staub (1989) outlines a number of relevant needs that are heightened during difficult life conditions – for belonging, control, group-esteem, and hope for the future – that may be better served by scapegoating internal groups, rather than external groups, as the "enemy."

Consider the common theme of "betrayal" and being "stabbed in the back" that emerges in the historical examples of attempted genocide reviewed here. Such an explanation preserves group esteem in the face of a military defeat because it suggests that the dominant group within the society did not lose in a fair fight. In *Mein Kampf*, Hitler faulted the Germans only for having been too trusting and benevolent, admirable Aryan qualities that were allegedly exploited by the

Jews, who could not directly defeat Germany, but relied instead on secret conspiracies (Volpato & Capozza, 1998). This type of explanation not only preserves collective esteem for the majority group, but also provides hope for a solution to their problems: By exposing the traitors and destroying them, the problems will be fixed. Finally, scapegoating an internal group can serve heightened needs for belonging and social identity. Scapegoat ideologies reassert group boundaries and enhance the sense of belonging to a homogenous collective through exclusion of the "other."

The persistence of ethnic violence in the face of globalization

The analysis of scapegoating offered here dovetails well with Chua's (2003) contention that globalization – increasing economic trade and interdependence between countries – can inflame ethnic violence. Her argument relies on similar social psychological dynamics: envy (on the part of national majority groups) of ethnic minorities who dominate markets (e.g., ethnic Chinese in Indonesia). Owing to historical factors such as prior colonization (e.g., Whites in Zimbabwe), free market capitalism often disproportionately benefits what Chua calls "market-dominant minorities" (2003, p. 7). This, in turn, creates envious resentment of those minorities and, according to the ideological model, precisely the kind of situation that is ripe for scapegoating when economic or social conditions become unstable. The spread of democracy, Chua points out, may simply serve to give the majority group the political position to retaliate against economically powerful minorities (e.g., as the Hutu did toward the Tutsi), creating the potential for severe ethnic violence. Chua's sobering analysis suggests that the current policies of economically dominant nations (e.g., the United States) to open markets and spread democracy may unintentionally make future genocidal scapegoating more, not less, likely, unless ethnically-based disparities in the benefits of such changes are carefully addressed.

Conclusion

The ideological model suggests that scapegoating is not an inherently irrational process or a sign of collective "madness," but rather the outcome of normally adaptive cognitive and motivational processes that, nevertheless, can yield false beliefs. Shared misfortunes initiate a chain

of processes that put specific types of groups within a society at risk of being blamed as having intentionally and maliciously brought about widespread suffering. These groups are not merely blank screens onto which the perpetrators' repressed desires and fears are projected; rather *well-established prior cultural beliefs* (and, in some cases, realistic social conflict) result in some groups being seen as suspect. Specifically, minorities whose position within the society suggest that they have a great deal of influence over large-scale events (e.g., middleman minorities, economically successful, or culturally influential groups) are at particular risk of scapegoating, especially if there is a cultural narrative or history of past conflict that reinforces suspicions about the group's motives. Unfortunately, even when the recent history of ethnic relations within a society has been relatively calm, troubled times can reactivate old suspicions, leading neighbors to turn against neighbors.

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7

The Influence of the Threatening Transitional Context on Israeli Jews' Reactions to Al Aqsa Intifada

Daniel Bar-Tal and Keren Sharvit

Analysis of the relations between Israeli Jews and Palestinians in the context of the Al Aqsa Intifada highlights a sad paradox. Even at the climax of the present violent confrontations, in 2002, the majority of people in both societies were ready for far-reaching compromises to peacefully resolve their conflict. A national survey in November 2002 indicated that about 70% of both Palestinians and Israelis were ready to undertake a settlement involving the establishment of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders, if the violence would cease (Kull, Ramsay, Warf, & Wolford, 2002). At the same time, however, a majority on both sides carried extremely negative stereotypes of the rival and revealed fear and a deep mistrust, all of which prevented any possible negotiation and resolution. In addition, the majority in both societies supported violent acts against the rival, which only deepen mutual delegitimization and mistrust (Kull et al., 2002). These paradoxical views continue to be dominant in later years, until 2007.

This chapter is an attempt to explain this sad paradox from the point of view of only one society, namely, Israeli Jewish society. The first part of the paradox, Israeli Jews' readiness to make substantial compromises, was well analyzed and explained in Oren's (2005) wide-scope study. She describes the changes that Israeli Jewish society went through after 1967 in terms of ethos of conflict, including the readiness to withdraw from the territories occupied in the 1967 war and to approve of the establishment of a Palestinian state as part of

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a two-state solution. Her analysis of change was based on the effects of major events such as the 1973 Yom Kippur war, the historical visit of Egypt's President Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem in 1977, the 1979 peace treaty with Egypt, the Lebanon war of 1982, etc. All these events greatly moved Israeli public opinion toward compromising attitudes.[1] To illuminate the second part of the paradox, we will try to explain the described negative reactions of Israeli Jewish society toward the Palestinians that have intensified dramatically since fall 2000 and serve as major obstacles to peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The explanation will be based on the conception of transitional context that will be described first (see details of the theory in Bar-Tal & Sharvit, 2007).

The Conception of Transitional Context

Concepts

Transitional context consists of the physical, social, political, economic, military, and psychological conditions, temporary in their nature, that make up the environment in which individuals and collectives function. These conditions may be either manmade (e.g., conflicts, revolution, or, indeed, peace) or natural phenomena (e.g., storms, earthquakes); they may also develop as a result of a combination of both types of factors (e.g., recession, famine). Our conceptualization of transitional context emphasizes the fact that social contexts are dynamic and constantly changing, even when the broad structural characteristics of a society and its environment remain relatively stable over long periods of time, altering slowly at an almost unnoticeable pace. A transitional context consists of observable and well-defined societal conditions that emerge as a result of major events and major information that influence the behavior and functioning of the individuals and collectives who perceive and cognize them.

A *major societal event* is defined as an event of great importance occurring in a society; such an event is experienced either directly (through participation) or indirectly (through watching, hearing, or reading about it) by society members, has wide resonance, has relevance to the well-being of society members and of society as a whole, involves society members, occupies a central position in public discourse and the public agenda, and implies information that forces society members to reconsider, and often change, their held psychological repertoire (Oren, 2005). Instances of major events are

wars, revolutions, stock market crashes, earthquakes, famines, or peace agreements. Major events create new conditions that require psychological adaptation, cognitive reframing, attitudinal-emotional change, and behavioral adjustments, and as such they often have a profound effect on the thinking, feeling, and behaving of society members and on the functioning of the society as a whole (see also Birkland, 1997; Deutsch & Merritt, 1965; Sears, 2002, for other approaches to major events).

Another important factor that may create a transitional context and then have consequences for societal functioning is *major societal information*. This term refers to information supplied by an epistemic authority (i.e., a source that exerts determinative influence on the formation of an individual's knowledge; see Kruglanski et al., 2005) about a matter of great relevance and great importance to society members and society as a whole. It, too, resonates widely, involves society members, occupies a central position in public discourse and the public agenda, and forces society members to reconsider and change their psychological repertoire. Major information does not create observable changes in environmental conditions and therefore does not provide experiential participation, but affects the psychological conditions of the society by influencing society members' thoughts and feelings about their reality, which may eventually lead to changes in their behavioral intentions and courses of actions. For example, information supplied by American society's epistemic authorities – the president, government officials, and intelligence agencies – to the effect that Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction in violation of UN resolutions and supports the terrorist activities of organizations such as Al-Qaeda, would be considered major information. This information was brought to the U.S. public shortly after the events of September 11, 2001, and served to mobilize American society toward a military attack on Iraq. It did not change the physical conditions in which most Americans live, but it has altered psychological conditions by evoking feelings of threat, fear, and anger. It is clear that subsequently many Americans began to support a war against Iraq – something they might not have done were it not for the major information they had received.

It should be noted that a transitional context can be formed either merely on the basis of major information, or only in response to a major event, or as a combined effect of major events and major information occurring simultaneously or following each other. For example, a leader, after first providing major information, may then initiate a major event. President Bush provided major information about

weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and then initiated war against this state. In addition, major events, especially those that are manmade or initiated (e.g., the bombing of Cambodia in 1970 or Al Qaeda's terror attack on the US on September 11, 2001), may be accompanied by major information, provided to shed light on the events. Given the nature of these two defining components, transitional context is temporary in comparison to other types of more stable contexts.

Thus, our approach sees leaders, together with groups and societies, as active agents in shaping and altering the conditions in which they function, and not just as passive "recipients" who react to given environmental and/or psychological conditions. Leaders, with the support of society members, are the ones who most often decide to go to war, change a government by revolution, implement radical economical plans, sign peace treaties, or provide significant information about threats and the like. Such actions may lead to the formation of a transitional context, which may significantly affect the behavior of individual society members and the functioning of a society as a whole.

The present conception considers *psychological conditions* as part of the context. They emerge together with other conditions (physical, political, etc.) as a result of major events and information and become inseparable from the features of the environment. Specifically, major events and major information provide immediate signals and cues, and when these are perceived and cognized by individuals and collectives, they create the psychological conditions that affect society members. Examples of the psychological conditions that may be formed as a function of transitional context are threat, danger, stress, uncertainty, alienation, hardship, tranquility, harmony, etc. These psychological conditions in turn trigger perceptions, thoughts, ideas, and emotions, which lead to various lines of behaviors.

Propositions

We would now like to suggest three propositions regarding the effects of transitional context on collective behavior. First, transitional contexts vary in their intensity; this intensity is determined by the extent to which the major events and/or information touch and involve the society members. An intense context greatly concerns and involves almost all society members. Intense transitional contexts lead to extreme reactions, on the part of both individuals and collectives and on the cognitive, affective, emotional, and behavioral levels. They lead to change of thoughts, strong affect and emotions, and instigate courses

of action. We suggest that the more intensive the transitional context, the more extensive and unidirectional its influence on individual and societal behavior is likely to be (see, e.g., Hobfoll & deVries, 1995; Shalev, Yehuda, & McFarlane, 2000).

Second, transitional contexts may have either a negative or positive meaning for society members and we suggest that transitional contexts that include negative psychological conditions are more intense than transitional contexts that include positive psychological conditions. This assumption is based on considerable evidence in psychology to the effect that negative events and information tend to be more closely attended and better remembered, and that they strongly impact evaluation, judgment, and action tendencies (see reviews by Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Kanouse & Hanson, 1971; Lau, 1982; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; and studies by Ito, Larsen, Smith, & Cacioppo, 1998; Wagenaar & Groeneweg, 1990). This negativity bias is an inherent characteristic of the negative motivational system, which operates automatically at the evaluative-categorization stage. It is also structured to respond more intensely than the positive motivational system to comparable levels of motivational activation. This tendency reflects adaptive behavior since negative information, especially related to threats, may require immediate adaptive reactions to the new situation.

Finally, we suggest that the influence of the transitional context also depends on the commonly held shared narratives of society members regarding their past and present, mainly shared societal beliefs of collective memories and ethos (Bar-Tal & Salomon, 2006; Connerton, 1989; Irwin-Zarecka, 1994). This shared knowledge provides the basis for the perception and interpretation of the experiences and information coming from the major events and information. Thus, for example, memories of collective traumas greatly influence the understanding of present threatening events (Bar-Tal, 2007a; Staub & Bar-Tal, 2003; Volkan, 1997).

The above implies that the more intensive and negative the conditions, the more extensive, profound, and unidirectional their influence will tend to be on people. This indicates that a transitional context that involves extremely negative conditions may well powerfully affect the psychological repertoire of both individuals and collectives and lead to predictable behaviors. Negative psychological conditions often come about as a result of direct danger to the lives of society members, threats to the fulfillment of their basic needs, or to society's very existence, its functioning, or its wellbeing and prosperity. In turn, they manifest themselves in negative experiences such as insecurity, fear, anger, or frustration. There is evidence

suggesting that a transitional context that is governed by negative psychological conditions, such as threat and danger, will result in reactions that are characterized by relatively little variation, because human beings are adaptively programmed to act in quite a specific way in such situations (see, e.g., Doty, Peterson, & Winter, 1991; Gordon & Arian, 2001; Hobfoll, 1998; Sales, 1973). Moreover, we suggest that this tendency will be strengthened, if a society carries central collective memories associated with trauma and threat.

Using the above analysis, we will now try to explain the views, feelings, and behaviors of the majority of the Israeli Jews since summer 2000 and during the Al Aqsa Intifada. We propose that a powerful transitional context for Israeli society unfolded in this period of time. We believe that observation and analysis of Israeli society's behavior during this episode provides a useful illustration of how transitional context affects the behavior of collectives.

Israeli Jewish Society in a Transitional Context

Background

The transitional context of Israeli Jewish society after fall 2000 consisted of major events and major information, together with the psychological conditions they created. This context involved a great deal of violence, which was perceived as highly threatening to the lives of Israeli citizens and to society as a whole.

In order to analyze this specific transitional context and its effects, we relied on data collected in several studies of Israeli society conducted in the relevant period of time, data from public opinion surveys published in the media, books analyzing this period, and media reports and commentaries.

The intractable Israeli-Palestinian conflict has a history spanning about 100 years (Bar-Tal, 1998). It developed over the territory that two national movements claimed as their homeland: Palestinian nationalism and Zionism clashed recurrently over the right of self-determination, statehood, and justice (see Gerner, 1991; Morris, 2001; Tessler, 1994, for details). Only in 1993 came the historic breakthrough**,** when Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) signed an agreement in which the PLO recognized the right of Israel to exist in peace and security and Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people in peace negotiations (Hirschfeld, 2000).

Seven years later, in summer 2000, the two parties eventually convened to try to complete the final agreement and resolve all the outstanding issues peacefully. Many of the events and processes that occurred during the 7-year period did not facilitate the evolvement of a peaceful climate of mutual trust, but it is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyze the nature of these developments.

We begin our analysis by describing the major events and information of summer and fall 2000 to show how their combination created a powerful transitional context. The period of time to be analyzed was marked by two major events in Israeli society: the Camp David conference with its unsuccessful ending, and the outbreak of violence in September 2000 (see Bar-Siman-Tov, 2007). Furthermore, during this time Israeli citizens were repeatedly provided with major information regarding these major events, by Prime Minister Ehud Barak, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, their associates, and the army commanders, who were acting as societal epistemic authorities in this context. This information served as a frame for Israeli citizens' interpretation of the events.

Major events and major sets of information

The first major event took place between July 11 and 24, 2000, when top-level delegations of Israelis and Palestinians met in Camp David, USA, with the participation of a U.S. team led by President Bill Clinton, to try to reach a final agreement ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, the two sides did not succeed in reaching an agreement and the peace summit failed.

The first major information about this event was provided by Prime Minister Barak prior to the conference, when he built an expectation that with the July 2000 Camp David conference the time had come for crucial decisions in the negotiation process with the Palestinians (Drucker, 2002; Pressman, 2003; Sher, 2001; Swisher, 2004; Wolfsfeld, 2004). This implied that Israelis were ready for historical compromises and that this was the moment that would reveal whether the Palestinians were ready too, and really wanted to settle the conflict peacefully. Second, when these negotiations failed, Barak provided another major information by saying that he had done all he could, turning every stone in search for peace and making a very generous and far-reaching offer at Camp David; he further alerted that Arafat had refused to accept this offer and did not make any counter proposals. This left responsibility for the failure solidly on the side of the Palestinians (Drucker, 2002; Enderlin, 2003; Pressman, 2003;

Swisher, 2004; Wolfsfeld, 2004). This information was supported by statements from U.S. President Bill Clinton and from all Israeli participants at the Camp David conference. Subsequently, almost all the country's political, social, and religious leaders, along with the mass media, intensely circulated this information (Swisher, 2004; Wolfsfeld, 2004). This had a major effect on the views of the Israeli people (Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2007). It implied that although Israel had made its ultimate compromise and "given everything," Palestinians refused to accept this offer. Hence, Arafat, and the Palestinian leadership, were not interested in resolving the conflict through compromises and in a peaceful way, but were still striving to annihilate Israel, especially by insisting on the right of the return to the state of Israel of millions of Palestinian refugees.

The second major event began on September 28, 2000, when violent conflict erupted. In response to the controversial visit of Israel's then opposition leader, Ariel Sharon (who later became Israel's prime minister), to Jerusalem's Temple Mount – where Muslim holy mosques are located – Palestinians began disturbances accompanied by stone throwing, demonstrations, and shootings. These were met with violent responses by Israeli security forces. In the first four days of the uprising, or Intifada, 39 Palestinians and 5 Israelis were killed; within a month the death toll rose to over 130 Palestinians and 11 Israelis. From the beginning of the Intifada until April 1, 2001, 409 Palestinians were killed and about 1,740 were injured, and at the same time 70 Israelis were killed and 183 were injured.[2]

As the violence began, major information coming from the Israeli government claimed that the outbreak of the Al Aqsa Intifada had been well prepared by Arafat and the Palestinian Authority (Dor, 2004; Wolfsfeld, 2004). This explanation was circulated even though at the beginning of the violence most of the security sources had a different interpretation of the events, suggesting that the Intifada had erupted from below, as an expression of deep dissatisfaction of the masses with the situation (Bar-Siman-Tov et al., 2007; Dor, 2001). But very soon, all security and government sources rallied behind this powerfully disseminated major information. As the violence continued, both government and military sources and much of the media kept providing information to the effect that the Palestinians aimed to destroy Israel, so that Israel was engaged in a war for its survival (Bar-Siman-Tov et al., 2007; Dor, 2004; Feldman, 2002). Other information provided by governmental and military sources continuously repeated that Arafat was personally responsible for every terror attack

and that the Palestinian leadership (especially Arafat and leaders associated with him) were no partners for negotiation because of their involvement in terror and their refusal to prevent terrorism.[3]

In the months that followed, Palestinians launched terror activities and engaged in violence, mostly in the occupied territories, and the Israeli army continued military attacks to contain the uprising and prevent terror. During the fall of 2000 and early 2001 continuous attempts at negotiation to end the violence and complete the agreement were still being made. The climax of these efforts took place in Taba, where the Israeli and Palestinian delegations made a sincere effort to negotiate the framework for a final settlement of the conflict (Matz, 2003; Pressman, 2003). But these attempts ended on February 6, 2001, with the election of Ariel Sharon as the prime minister of Israel by an overwhelming majority of Jewish voters.

After the election of Ariel Sharon, the level of violence on both sides increased and relations between Israelis and Palestinians deteriorated. The Palestinians increased their terror attacks, mostly through suicide bombings in public places all over the country. At the same time Israeli security forces, in an attempt to contain the violence and especially the terror, engaged in violent acts against the Palestinian Authority, assassinated Palestinians suspected of terrorist activity, imposed severe restrictions on the Palestinian population (severely affecting their daily lives), and made frequent incursions into the Palestinian territories. A climax of these activities was operation "Defensive Shield" carried out by the Israeli army in April and May 2002, which culminated in Israeli reoccupation of almost the entire West Bank (Reporters without borders, 2003).

Up until 2007, the violence claimed over 4,200 lives and 30,000 injured on the Palestinian side, many of them civilians, and 1,115 lives and over 6,000 injured on the Israeli side. Various attempts by external mediators, especially from the US and Europe, failed to stop the violence.

Having thus described the major events and major information, we will now show evidence that the information provided by epistemic sources was accepted as truthful by the majority of Israeli Jews. Thus, data from a survey carried out at the end of July 2000 showed that 67% of Israeli Jews believed the Palestinian side to be entirely, or in the main part, responsible for the failure of the Camp David summit. Only 13% thought that Israelis were either solely or largely responsible, and 12% thought that both sides were equally responsible for the failure (Peace Index, July 2000). With regard to the major

information about the outbreak of the Intifada, the polls showed that in November 2000, about 80% of Israeli Jews blamed the Palestinians for the eruption of the violence (Peace Index, November 2000), and in 2002, 84% of Israeli Jewish respondents thought that the Palestinians were solely or mostly responsible for the deterioration in the relations between themselves and the Israelis, while only 5% thought that Israel was solely responsible (Arian, 2002). Finally, with regard to major information about Palestinian intentions, 53% of Israeli Jews believed that the Intifada was aimed at harming and fighting Israel as such, and not in order to improve the terms of the agreement (Peace Index, March 2001).

The major events of the Camp David summit and of the eruption and continuation of violence, together with the major information about the causes of the failure at Camp David and about the reasons for the eruption of violence and its continuation, created powerful psychological conditions of threat that dramatically affected Israeli Jewish society.

Psychological conditions of threat

Violent acts carried out by Palestinians, and especially indiscriminate terror attacks against the civilian population all over Israel, together with major information claiming that the Palestinians strive to destroy the Jewish state and that the Palestinian leadership is involved in terror, created psychological conditions of threat among Israeli Jews. Already at the beginning of the violence, in a poll conducted in November 2000, 59% of Israeli Jews reported feeling personally threatened and 62% felt that Israel's national security was under threat (Peace Index, November 2000). Also, while in 1999 less than 50% of the Israeli Jews thought that Arabs aspired to conquer the State of Israel, in 2002 68% thought so and in 2004 74% thought so. As the terror attacks intensified in 2002, 80% of Israeli Jews perceived the continued Intifada as a threat (Arian, 2002).

The above described transitional context with its psychological condition of threat was followed by changes in the psychological repertoire of the majority of Israeli Jews that included fear, delegitimization of the Palestinians, self-perception of victimhood, and sense of irreconcilability, together with support for certain modes of action, such as violent ways of coping with the Palestinians, support for forceful leadership, and unilateral steps to separate from the Palestinians. Each of these elements will now be described in detail.

Changes in Israeli Jews' Psychological Repertoire in Response to the Powerful Transitional Context

Fear

Perception of threat evokes the emotion of fear (Gray, 1989; Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal, 2006; Rachman, 1978), and this was evident in the reactions of Israeli Jews to the described context of threat. In June 2001, 67% of Israeli Jews reported that they were "anxious about the future of Israel," and 63% reported higher anxiety than in the past regarding their personal security and that of their family (*Maariv*, June 8, 2001). With the increase of violence, Israelis' fear increased and influenced all aspects of life, in particular their behavior in public places and their use of public transportation (Klar, Zakay, & Sharvit, 2002; Lori, 2002). In the spring of 2002 almost all Israeli Jews (92%) reported fear that they or a member of their family might fall victim to a terrorist attack (in February 2004 the percentage decreased to 77%, while in 1999 this percentage was only 58% (Arian, 2002).

Delegitimization of the Palestinians and their leaders

Violence and threat perceptions arouse a need for explanation, to justify one's own acts and differentiate between one's own group and the rival. Delegitimization fulfils these functions (Bar-Tal, 1989; Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005). Indeed during the Al Aqsa Intifada systematic and institutionalized mutual delegitimization of Palestinians and Israeli Jews has been occurring (see Oren & Bar-Tal, 2007; Wolfsfeld & Dajani, 2003).

The delegitimization of the Palestinians began with their leader. Within a very short time after the eruption of violence, Yasser Arafat was presented by Israeli leadership and Israeli media as not being a partner for peace (Wolfsfeld, 2004). Later, Arafat was presented as a terrorist and he was blamed personally for every terror attack carried out by any Palestinian group. This line of delegitimization intensified after September 11, 2001, when the USA and other western states declared a "world war against terrorism." In this context Arafat was equated with Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein. The Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, said: "it is necessary to delegitimize Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Authority. It is necessary to make the connection between Arafat and terror, and destroy his image as a peace maker" (Ben, 2001, p. 3a). Finally, Arafat was presented as "irrelevant," and contact between him and the Israeli authorities ceased. The Israeli public concurred

with this presentation. As the polls showed, already in October 2000, 71% of Israeli Jews thought that Arafat behaved like a terrorist, in comparison to 2 years earlier when only 41% had thought so (Peace Index, October 2000). Similarly, the Palestinian Authority was presented by the Israeli government as a "terrorist entity," which initiates and supports terror attacks (*Herald Tribune*, 2001), and 67% of the Israeli Jews supported this view (*Maariv*, December 7, 2001).

As for negative stereotyping of the Palestinians, while only 39% of Israeli Jewish respondents in 1997 described the Palestinians as violent and 42% portrayed them as dishonest, by the end of 2000 68% of Israeli Jewish respondents perceived the Palestinians as violent and 51% as dishonest. Also, in November 2000 78% of the Jewish public agreed with the statement that Palestinians have little regard for human life and therefore persist in using violence despite the high number of their own casualties (Peace Index, November 2000).

Finally, lack of trust, which goes with delegitimization, is clearly reflected in the following beliefs: 70% of the Israeli Jewish public estimated that Arafat personally lacked the desire, or the ability, to sign an agreement to end the conflict with Israel, even if Israel were to agree to all his demands – and that he would make additional demands aimed at foiling the agreement; and 80% believed that Palestinians would not honor an agreement (Peace Index, May 2001). Moreover, the great majority of Israeli Jews started to believe that the Palestinians were striving to destroy Israel and therefore peace with them could not be achieved (Arian, 2002).

Self-perception of victimhood

One clear effect on group life in the context of violence, perceived threat, and fear is the emergence of a sense of victimhood (Mack, 1990). This feeling greatly intensified in Israeli society during the period of time described, with the perception that the Palestinians instigated the violence in spite of the fact that, in the view of most Israeli Jews, Ehud Barak had made the most generous possible proposals to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As already indicated, the majority of Israeli Jews blamed the Palestinians for the eruption of the violence and thought that the Palestinians were solely or mostly responsible for the deterioration in the relations between them and the Israelis. It is not only the attribution of responsibility for the eruption of violence that set the scene for Israelis' deep sense of victimhood. It was also powerfully underlined by the continuous terror attacks that claimed many Jewish lives, most of them civilian. The sense of victimhood came to

dominate Israeli Jews, as every attack on Israeli Jews was viewed as terror and received immense exposure as such in the media. The Israeli media not only provided detailed accounts of terror attacks, the subsequent rescue actions, reports from hospitals and funerals; it also personalized the victims by describing their lives and publishing descriptions by those who knew them (Dor, 2004; Wolfsfeld & Dajani, 2003).

Irreconcilability

In addition, the above described context led to a sense of irreconcilability, which implied that the conflict would continue to be violent and could not be resolved peacefully. Public opinion surveys, taken before and during the relevant period, reveal a dramatic change in the percentage of Israeli Jews who thought that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could come to an end through a peace agreement: In 1999 the evaluations about a peace agreement were optimistic as 69% of Israeli Jews preferred peace talks over strengthening the country's military capacity, 68% believed that peace between Israel and the Palestinians would be achieved in the next 3 years, 59% thought that terror attacks would be curtailed only through negotiations and a majority was ready to negotiate with the Palestinians on various core issues related to the conflict (Arian, 1999). But in 2002 this mood changed: 58% of Israeli Jews preferred increased military power over peace talks, 77% believed that war would erupt in the next 3 years and 68% thought that it was impossible to reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians (Arian, 2002).

The above described psychological repertoire of fear, delegitimization of the Palestinians, self-view of victimhood, and sense of irreconcilability led further to a repertoire of behavioral intentions supporting harmful action against Palestinians, forceful leadership, and separation from the Palestinian people.

Support of violent means to cope with the Palestinians

When group members believe that the other group initiated violent confrontations, perceive threat, experience fear, and delegitimize the rival, then they tend to support aggressive ways to cope with this state of affairs, especially when they believe that they have the ability to withstand the enemy (Brubaker & Laitin, 1998; Lake & Rothchild, 1998). In this line Israel's Jewish population began to support violent acts taken by its government against the Palestinians after the eruption of the Intifada in the fall of 2000 (the support was consistently

about 70%). In March 2001, 72% of Israeli Jews thought that more military force should be used against the Palestinians (Peace Index, March 2001). A survey poll of February 2002 revealed that 75% of Israeli Jews thought that the Intifada could be controlled by military action; and 57% thought that the measures employed to put down the Intifada were too lenient, and 34% thought that they were appropriate, while only 9% thought that they were too harsh (Arian, 2002).

With regard to specific actions, in April 2002 about 90% of Israeli Jews supported operation Defensive Shield in which the Israeli army reconquered the West Bank cities that had been under the control of the Palestinian Authority (Peace Index, April 2002); in 2002 90% supported so-called "targeted assassinations" of Palestinians suspected of terrorist activity (Arian, 2002), and in July 2002 62% of Israeli Jews supported such assassinations even if this would cause Palestinian civilian losses (Peace Index, July 2002); 80% supported the use of tanks and fighter planes against the Palestinians, 73% supported use of so-called "closures" and economic sanctions, and 72% supported military invasion of the cities under the control of the Palestinian Authority (Arian, 2002). Still in February 2004, 44% of the Israeli Jews thought that governmental policy to ensure quiet in the territories was too soft and that there was a need for harsher methods: 45% thought that current policy was appropriate and only 11% thought that it was too harsh.

Support of a leader who projects forcefulness

Situations of violent intergroup conflict cause people to look for a leader who projects determination to cope forcefully with the rival and can assure security. Israelis went to the polls on February 6, 2001, and elected Ariel Sharon (with a 60% majority), the Likud party candidate, over Ehud Barak, of the Labor party (Dowty, 2002). This outcome was not surprising in view of the fact that the majority of Israeli Jewish voters believed that Barak had not only made the Palestinians an overly generous offer (44% thought so already in July 2000, Peace Index, July 2000, and 70.4% thought so by January 2001, Peace Index, January 2001), but also had been too lenient in handling the crisis that had led to the increased Palestinian violence (70% of Israeli Jews thought so, and even 51% of Barak's own supporters accepted this view, Peace Index, January 2001). The newly elected prime minister, an ex-general, had been involved in all of Israel's major wars, was behind the building of many of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and took an extreme hawkish position, vehemently opposing the

Oslo agreement. In Israel and outside it, Sharon had come to stand for forceful activities and a powerful determination to curtail the Arabs, and especially the Palestinians. In his campaign he promised peace and security, and on taking office he stopped negotiations with the Palestinians and insisted on cessation of Palestinian violence as a precondition to any political negotiation. At the same time he outlined the contours of an eventual conflict resolution proposal, which promised Palestinians very minimal political gains (see the interview with Sharon in *Maariv*, April 13, 2001). During his first 3 years of incumbency the terror and violence increased and Israel stuck to a policy of forceful and violent "containment" of Palestinian violence. In his own constituency, Sharon gained great approval (about 60–70%) and consistent support for his security position, policy, and action (Barzilay & Levy-Barzilay, 2002).

Support of unilateral steps for separation from Palestinians

One result of violence, threat perception, fear, delegitimization, self-perception as a victim, and sense of irreconcilability is the tendency to draw clear distinctions between one's own group and the rival (Kelman, 1973; Staub 1989). Thus, the Israeli public first of all differentiated psychologically between themselves and Palestinians by perceiving the latter negatively as rejectionists, as having ill intentions, as perpetrators of violence, and as having generally negative characteristics, as described above. In contrast, Jews were perceived as victims, with predominantly positive characteristics.

Moreover, the violence led many Israeli Jews to support physical separation between Jews and Palestinians. The notion that "we are here and they should be there" was propagated by politicians from the entire political spectrum, who suggested at least nine different plans for unilateral separation in the relevant period (Galili, 2002). This reflected not only a desire for self-defense but also a wish for psychological differentiation from the Palestinians (Baskin, 2002; Nadler, 2002). Among the Israeli public, at least 60% supported separation from the Palestinians by physical means (Peace Index, May 2001), and 56% preferred it over an agreement with the Palestinians (*Maariv*, May 10, 2002). The direct reflection of this desire was the construction of a fence intended to separate Israelis from Palestinians and at the same time prevent terror attacks (Rabinowitz, 2002). The government eventually yielded to public demand and in the summer of 2002 decided formally to create physical separation between Palestinians and Israelis, which included building the fence and other

physical means of separation. A survey poll in February 2004 showed that 84% of Israeli Jews supported the separation fence. About 66% believed that the fence should be built to meet Israeli security considerations and 64% believed that the suffering of the Palestinian people should be a secondary or negligible consideration in this matter.

In sum, we have shown that the powerful transitional context of the Al Aqsa Intifada had significant effects on Jewish Israelis' psychological repertoire, as well as their willingness to support certain courses of action. At this point, it is important to note that the above described specific repertoire of Israeli relations with Palestinians, which was assessed during the Al Aqsa Intifada, did not just appear out of nowhere. It is based on the ethos of conflict, collective memory, and collective emotional orientation of fear, which have dominated Israeli Jewish society throughout decades of intractable conflict with the Arabs, and with the Palestinians in particular (Bar-Tal, 1998, 2000, 2007b). Israeli society's ethos and collective memory are dominated by societal beliefs about the justness of the Israeli cause, by delegitimization of Arabs and particularly Palestinians, a positive self-collective view and a self-perception of victimhood. *Societal beliefs about the justness of one's own cause* deal with the reasons, explanations, and rationales of the goals that are at stake in the conflict and, foremost, justify their crucial importance; *societal beliefs that delegitimize* Arabs deny the adversary's humanity; *societal beliefs supporting positive self-collective image* concern the ethnocentric tendency to attribute positive traits, values, and behavior to one's own society; and *societal beliefs about one's own victimization* concern self-presentation as a victim (Bar-Tal & Salomon, 2006). These societal beliefs are shared by society members, circulate in public discourse, including the mass media, are expressed in cultural products, and feature in school textbooks. Their presence became somewhat abated during the peace process in the 1990s, but they resurged with the latest cycle of violent conflict that started in the fall of 2000 (Sharvit & Bar-Tal, 2007). Recent laboratory studies with Israeli Jews have demonstrated unequivocally that a threatening context causes activation of this repertoire (Sharvit, 2007).

Furthermore, anyone who tries to understand the psychological repertoire of the Israeli Jews in times of threat has to consider the focus of the held Jewish collective memory about their persecutions in the Diaspora and especially their climax in the form of the Holocaust during World War II. The Holocaust, in which 6 millions Jews perished just because of their Jewishness, became the master symbol of the Jewish identity and the major lesson for the Jewish

people. Every situation of perceived collective threat is automatically associated with these collective memories, which arouse feelings of fear and a strong motivation to overcome the threatening rival. Specifically, it leads to suspicion, sensitivity, group mobilization, hostility, and defensive courses of action that may even disregard international behavioral codes (Bar-Tal, 2007b; Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992; Elon, 1971; Kelman, 2007; Liebman, 1978; Segev, 1991; Stein, 1978; Zafran & Bar-Tal, 2003)

Thus, transitional context, powerful as it may be, does not operate in a vacuum. Its effects are dependent upon and moderated by the existing characteristics of society, and the existing psychological repertoire of its members.

Conclusions

The psychological repertoire that emerges in times of conflict serves the continuation of the conflict and in fact it operates as part of the vicious cycle that characterizes the intractable conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007a). Considering that this process is mirrored by the two parties in the conflict (Israeli Jews and Palestinians), it is obvious how the vicious cycles of violence operate. As the conflict evolves and intensifies, each of the opponents develops a negative psychological repertoire, which fulfills important roles on both the individual and collective levels. With time, however, this repertoire comes to be one of the factors determining the course of policy and action taken by each side in the conflict by serving as the major motivating, justifying, and rationalizing factor. The negative actions taken then serve as validating information to the existing negative psychological repertoire and in turn magnify the motivation and readiness to engage in conflict. The behaviors of each side confirm the held negative psychological repertoire and justify harming the rival – and so the cycles continue.

These vicious cycles of intractable conflict between Israelis and Palestinians are detrimental to the wellbeing of both the individuals and societies involved, as well as posing a danger to the world. The negative psychological repertoire plays an important role in these cycles. It is, therefore, vital to change this repertoire, in order to change the nature of relations between the rival groups (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004). Changing the psychological repertoire of societies involved in intractable conflict is a necessary condition for advancing a peace process and stopping the violence.

The present conception clearly suggests that the psychological repertoire can change with the evolvement of new transitional context. The transitional context is responsible for and maintains the negative psychological repertoire that feeds continuation of the violent conflict. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to change this psychological repertoire without changing the context. Thus the major challenge is to change the transitional context of violent conflict. In order to accomplish this change, it is necessary first of all to cease the violence, since it constitutes the fundamental part of the context, as its major event. We realize that cessation of violence must take place together with another major event–namely, the beginning of negotiations.

The primary condition for progress toward peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is negotiations between the rivals, which will allow development of a mutually acceptable agreement. Without negotiation it is impossible to make any progress toward conflict resolution, and thus to reduce the violence significantly. But it is obvious that even when such negotiations begin, it will be necessary to take concrete conciliatory steps. The steps consist of such actions as improving life conditions, performing acts that imply good will, and meetings between representatives of the two groups, including leaders. These steps contribute further to the establishment of a new transitional context that is conducive to the peace process.

Of special importance for creating a new transitional context are new sets of major information. First of all, Israeli Jews and Palestinians have to generate well-formulated major information about peace. This should include a presentation of peace as a supreme value and goal, the formulation of beliefs that provide a clear and strong rationale for this goal, the outlining of realistic ways and means to achieve it, and of the required compromises (which meet the minimal requirements of the rival). The information should be specific and concrete, also stipulating the costs and sacrifices for achieving peace and not only the expected rewards and gains.

In order to reinforce this information, personalizing and legitimizing the enemy is also required. These new beliefs present the former enemy as a human being with whom it is possible to make peace. Through personalization, Israeli Jews and Palestinians can begin to see each other, after years of denial, as human beings, who have personal lives and who can be trusted. Legitimization allows viewing each other as belonging to the category of acceptable groups with whom peaceful relations are desirable and who have legitimate needs and goals.

We realize that the creation of a new transitional context is a very difficult undertaking, because it is impossible simply to stop violent expressions such as terror attacks on civilians, military encounters, aggressive rhetoric, or agitation. There are powerful groups among the Israeli Jews and Palestinians who object to a peace process and use all possible means to obstruct such development. Hostile and aggressive acts cannot stop at once, but usually continue for years, with a downward slope. In such a situation the reaction of leaders and the media to the threatening cues is crucial. When they frame the violent events in support of the fear orientation and the general delegitimization of the rival, then a peaceful transitional context has a very low chance of evolving. But when, in contrast, the leaders and media on both sides explicitly condemn both the violent acts and their perpetrators and repeat their commitment to peace goals, then the chance is high that a peaceful transitional context will continue to evolve and even gain momentum.

We thus conclude this chapter by affirming that both a transitional context of violent conflict and transitional context of peace process are manmade and therefore their creation depends on the will of the leaders and peoples. It is they who decide whether the context supports suffering, violence, human loss, threats, fear, and hate, on one hand, or peace, security, prosperity, cooperation, and hope, on the other. We hope that Israeli Jews and Palestinians will choose the latter way.

Notes

1. Major events are not the only factors that influenced the views of Jewish Israeli society. Obviously additional factors such as democratization and globalization are also responsible for these changes (Oren & Bar-Tal, 2006).
2. The numbers of the Palestinian casualties were taken from the Palestine Red Crescent Society (www.palestinrecs.org), and of the Israelis, from the Israeli Foreign Ministry (www.mfa.gov.il).
3. It should be noted that all the described sets of major information provided to the Israeli public should be viewed at best as presenting a particular one-sided perspective. Over time, numerous publications have appeared that questioned and refuted the validity of these sets of information (see, e.g., Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2007; Bar-Siman-Tov, Lavie, Michael, & Bar-Tal, 2007; Dor, 2004; "Lessons of Arab-Israeli negotiating," 2005; Pressman, 2003; Shamir & Maddy-Weitzman, 2005; Swisher, 2004).

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8

Why Do States Kill Citizens? Or, Why Racism is an Insufficient Explanation

Patricia Marchak

The prototype of all genocides and other massive crimes against humanity is the Holocaust. The assault on Jews by the Nazi regime has long been understood as an event caused by racism and more specifically by anti-Semitism. Following the war, the United Nations adopted the term "genocide" as proposed by a Polish Jew who survived, Rafael Lemkin, in the 1951 UN *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*. Much of the original definition was scraped away in the debates of the time, where many nations feared too sweeping a convention were it to denounce mass murders for any reasons other than race. Thus the definition adopted in the *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court* (Article 6, as of July 12, 1999), consistent with the *Convention*, is "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such." Much outstanding scholarship since that time has concentrated on racism, stereotyping, demeaning, and dehumanizing "the other" as causes of episodes of state crimes against citizens, and it is these that I refer to in short form as racism. (e.g., Adelman & Suhrke, 1999; Fein, 1990, 1992; Kuper, 1981; Staub, 1989; Van den Berghe, 1990).

However, in the past century many mass murders committed by states have had no obvious relation to nationality, ethnicity, race, or religion. Moreover, even where ethnic labels are used by way of rationalizing murders, the actual differences between perpetrators and victims have been minimal and some were invented by state propagandists shortly before the onset of the crimes. Taking these

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circumstances into account, the *Rome Statute* includes a separate definition of "crimes against humanity" that is considerably wider in scope, referring to "a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack" (Article 7). Another form of mass crime is "war crimes," defined as "grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949" (Article 8). My inquiry is concerned with why those in control of states (whether conventional or revolutionary at the time of the event) order mass crimes against their own citizens – torture, rape, abduction, arbitrary incarceration, the taking of hostages, forced marches, starvation, and outright murder – where the intended victims are selected because they are members of a group. The group may be identified by the perpetrators as a racial, national, ethnic, or religious group, or as political dissidents and revolutionaries, or as enemies of the people, but their identification is not necessarily an accurate statement of group characteristics or the reason for the intended action. Some of these events have been defined as genocide by scholars; that is, they have identified the victims in terms of race, nationality, ethnicity, or religion.

As I inquired into these events I began to suspect that explanations for them that focus on race or ethnicity may be misleading. I do not mean that they are wrong, as much as insufficient. Insulting ethnic labels may be in use for centuries without being accompanied by state-sponsored violence. The question I pose is why state-sponsored violence occurs when and where it does, and pointing to a constant, such as racism, will not answer that. For this reason I would argue, for one example, that Goldhagen (1996) may have demonstrated the ubiquity of anti-Semitism in Europe prior to the Holocaust but did not thereby provide an explanation for why the Holocaust occurred in Germany under Naziism rather than at any earlier time or elsewhere; indeed, elsewhere in Europe Jews were a higher proportion of the population and less well integrated into non-Jewish society than in Germany prior to the onset of the campaign against them. In addition, not all state-sponsored violence in Nazi Germany or other locations involves identifiable races or other conditions in the *Genocide Convention*, so the second question is, are those that do involve such conditions similar in societal structure at the time to events that involve none of those conditions? Further, many of the events understood as ethnic conflict have a clear material interest for the perpetrators or their supporters (see, e.g., Aly, 1999, regarding the Nazi population policy). Is this inconsequential? I suggest not: To use rationales pointing to race or religion while engaging in theft is not a new trick. To sum up the puzzles underlying my research: What common

societal conditions precede state-sponsored crimes against citizens, whether or not the citizens are identified as ethnic groups?

Methodology

I decided to search the literature on societies prior to and at the time of the commission of these crimes during the twentieth century, with the objective of determining whether there were any common conditions prior to the crimes that would enable us to understand what happened and perhaps come closer to predicting eruptions in future. I selected nine cases for intensive examination. The selection was not random but depended on there being a body of scholarly, journalistic, witness, diplomatic, or other documentary evidence regarding the case, preferably where there were some differences in opinion and assignment of blame. I tried to include a range of instances from diverse cultures and geographical locations, and where the nature of the events differed (as between civil war, apparent genocide, revolution, or any combination of these). Eventually I included these cases: Armenia, 1915–1916 (by Ottoman Turks); the Eastern Ukraine, 1932–1933 (by Stalinist Russia); the Nazi Holocaust, 1930s to early 1940s; Cambodia, 1975–1979; Chile, 1973–1988; Argentina, 1976–1983; Burundi, 1972 and later dates; Rwanda, 1994; and the former Yugoslavia, with emphasis on Bosnia, 1992–1995. In each case I examined the documentary evidence and published materials, and for several contemporary instances I had some familiarity with the country. Also, in the two Latin American cases I had earlier conducted field research.

The number of deaths is not the criterion here. In the Armenian case, estimates run between 800,000 and 1.5 million; in the Ukraine, anywhere from 5 to 8 million were starved to death in an 18-month period; in Nazi Germany, up to 6 million; in Chile, we are talking about "only" some 3,000, and in Argentina, an estimated 30,000; in Rwanda, nearly 1 million out of 6–7 million; in Cambodia, the highest proportion of a population: between 1.7 and 2 million out of a population of 7 million. In Bosnia, including in the battles of Sarajevo, Srebrenica, and Mostar, the Demographic Unit of the ICTY numbers the deaths at 102,622. Another 1.8 million are displaced. The point is, the numbers do not provide an explanation for what happened. They matter for other reasons, but we are seeking explanations.

Historical explanations are available for all events, including these. Indeed, in many accounts the particular history of the country is the main component of subsequent explanations. But there are

commonalities between historical instances that allow us to seek more general explanations and to create conventions and international law. The search for commonalities does not rest on a denial of historical particularities; it seeks only to find in the particularities common themes or social structures that might enable more understanding of the general case. The argument, for example, that genocide arises because people stereotype others or demean and dehumanize them involves a generalization about several historically unique circumstances combined with assumptions about human psychology.

In what follows I will first list and discuss the common preconditions or characteristics that emerged from this study, provide definitions, and then state an argument based on the list of preconditions. Then I will briefly describe several societies included in the study, indicating for each one the preconditions that led me to that list. I will conclude with a short discussion of the argument.

Preconditions to Crimes Against Humanity

After examining the nine cases for which I had information I concluded that these preconditions were present in all of them:

- substantial social change that threatened to destroy or was already destroying the existing hierarchy of social and economic positions of citizens. Such events as these might constitute substantial change: war imposed on or initiated by a society or revolutionary forces with some momentum inside societal borders; environmental change or exhaustion of resources on which the economy has depended in the past; sudden and economically drastic changes in market demand for major exports; demographic or cultural changes that fundamentally alter population dynamics; implosion of empire containing smaller states.
- strong military and /or trained militia in place (or even stronger revolutionary opposition forces).
- weak independent institutional structure as when institutions are absent or incapacitated. Institutions include political parties, universities, unions, mass media, and voluntary associations that are capable of voicing opposition and of sharing the risk of social change, and that include diverse demographic components of the population.
- substantial gulf between powerful/powerless, rich/poor populations or inequalities otherwise defined. This might include inequalities between defined ethnic or religious groups but is not restricted

to those. Differences between rural and urban populations, or by occupation and education are significant in several cases.
- The powerful have material interests in most cases vis-à-vis potential victims such as territory and property.

There is not a neat division between preconditions and process. But for some theoretical purposes it is useful to consider the two separately. The processes, given the preconditions in place, are these:

- a political crisis, a paralysis of governance, or a breakdown of the state.
- development of exclusionist ideology/ideologies – the victims are defined in terms of inequality and blame (they "do not deserve" to live; they are "not really human," etc.).
- articulated intention to exterminate proposed victims.
- open conflict.

Further Definitions and Discussion

The state

Since all the crimes I investigated were committed by agents of the state (or by a revolutionary state following a civil war), and by armies under orders from governments, or armies that took over government for this period, I needed a definition of the state. I used the classical definition by Max Weber (as translated by Gerth & Mills, 1958, and Parsons, 1966) with some modifications along the lines formulated by contemporary social scientists (especially O'Donnell 1973, 1988): *organizations with a monopoly of legitimate force in a defined territory and with political power over an identified population, whose function is to sustain and reproduce, though with adaptations to change where possible, the existing system in place at their inception; in particular, the hierarchy of status, power, and wealth (i.e., its system of domination and subordination)*.

Most states, historically, were formed through war and represent the limits of the armed capacities of the most powerful families to control territory. Other states were formed under imperial conditions, their boundaries determined by the capacities of armies under the aegis of imperial powers (Tilly, 1975). Given such a provenance, it is not surprising that war, both external and internal, is a powerful force influencing or even determining the nature of any society and of its state institutions.

Substantial social change

Societies are variously organized agglomerations of individuals whose ancestry is not necessarily similar. They live together under political leaders who may be warlords or democratically elected governments, or anything in-between. When societies are faced with substantial change, their internal organization is threatened. Those at the top may fear their demise or at least their loss of status and wealth; those at the bottom may see opportunities for upward mobility not previously possible; even those in the middle may interpret processes of change as either threats or opportunities. In all cases, change poses dilemmas. The state itself, as a political entity, is also threatened because its very existence depends on its capacity to protect its territorial boundaries and sustain a status quo whereby those in power retain power, those without means stay at the base of the organization.

Armed force

Of utmost importance in any state is the power of armed forces. In theories of ethnic-based conflict, the roles of both the state in the form of governments, or government agencies, and the military forces are often ignored. It is as if they were mere backdrops to "ordinary" folks whose murderous instincts toward one another were the fundamental cause of events. In fact, in most cases it is not "neighbors" who kill, but where it is, as in Rwanda, the neighbors have been first subjected to massive doses of propaganda about the likelihood of their own deprivation and death should the "others" be allowed to live, and then, in the moment of mass hysteria, are backed by army and militia forces who oblige them to kill.

Armed forces are taught to kill, and their members are also trained to obey orders. These are reasons why they may be involved in the crimes. But there is a more important reason: They, and generally only they, are capable of physically controlling a whole society while the killing takes place. In many of the identified cases of genocide or crimes against humanity, the "legitimate" government has been displaced by military dictators or juntas. Sometimes the original government is still, ostensibly, in place but the real rulers are military forces. Argentina is a case in point: The junta staged a formal coup in March 1976 at which time it implemented the full process of kidnapping, torturing, and killing those it deemed to be subversives. But in fact, the military had already been behind the "legitimate" governments of Juan

Perón and, after his death, Isabel Perón, during what is now referred to as "the dirty war," from 1974 to 1976 (Marchak, 1999).

In some cases (Cambodia and Rwanda, for outstanding examples) the state army is less competent than a revolutionary or invading army. If the opposition army is capable of defeating the state army and simultaneously controlling the country, the revolutionary elite or invaders become the government and the army then becomes the new state army.

Inequality

Inequality of wealth, status, and power is characteristic of large-scale societies everywhere, but there are differences in the degree and social consequences of inequality. Some states – Norway is the outstanding example – have relatively small differences in income between those at the top and those at the bottom; other states – such as contemporary Serbia, Central American countries, and the United States – have a much less egalitarian distribution of income and (more generally) of wealth and power. The arrangement of unequal citizens and residents is maintained by states via governments and bureaucratic organization of state activities. The economic system depends on unequal residents for its operations. The population contributes investment funds, entrepreneurial talent, bureaucratic and service work, or physical labor in varying degree depending on the nature of the system.

A government may espouse an egalitarian ideology, but it will not last long if it fails to sustain the dominant group in its population. It can modify some conditions, toss to the courts the occasional miscreant from the dominant class, or gradually introduce social change that is not perceived as threatening at least in its initial stages, but there are always limits, whether in authoritarian or democratic contexts. The precise area of the limitations differs from one society to another because other conditions – such as the strength of the military forces and their sources of recruitment, or the presence of strong independent associations and institutions, or particular histories – would affect the limitations experienced by any government. Governments are not the whole of the state; they are the political group in charge of the state at a given time. They might determine a course of action but be unable to carry it through because the civil service is unwilling to implement it; or might attempt to stop a course of action but be frustrated by imbedded bureaucrats whose adherence to the dominant class is unaltered.

Ideology

Ideology involves values, beliefs, and assumptions about the public world that act as ancestral memories or "rules of thumb" under peaceful conditions, but can be invoked as rationales for action under conflict conditions, and usually involve some notion of identity for affected groups. As background beliefs, an ideology might be sustained from one generation to the next without incurring conflict behaviors. Factual evidence and logical truth are not criteria for ideological commitments.

Brief Statement of Argument

Political paralysis brought on by confrontation with fundamental social change that results in erosion of the state's ability to sustain the status quo with its hierarchy of power and wealth is a primary condition of state-sponsored crimes. But this situation also requires that the state has control of armed force that is capable of enacting crimes against humanity. In these situations there tends to be a paucity of vital institutions independent of the state. The reasons may be expressed in many ideological frameworks that act as the bridge between motivation and action. The ultimate objectives are often instrumental and material. Autocratic forms of governance, an authoritarian culture, or cultures that have not hitherto included protection of civil rights may add to the probability of the commission of state crimes, but are not the essential causes. Where revolutionary forces or external armies defeat state armies under these circumstances they may take over government and will demonstrate the same responses to instability as the previous incumbents (this argument is stated at length in Marchak, 2003).

Selected Case Studies Briefly Described

Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915–1916

The crime. Over the final decades of the nineteenth century and early years of the twentieth century, young male Armenians were incarcerated or killed in the Ottoman Empire when they were suspected of either fueling or joining revolutionary movements. In 1915–1916, the Armenian Christian component of regional populations where

Armenians were either the majority or the largest minority were evicted and forced to walk long distances, many of them being massacred on the way, and many more dying from thirst, hunger, and exhaustion. Turks were in control of state institutions and army at the time (Dadrian 1995, 1999; Hovannisian, 1986, 1998; Kirakossian, 1992; United States, 1994, 1995. See also Oke, 1988, for a contrary version in support of the Turkish position).

Substantial social change and the state. The state in this case was a rapidly disintegrating Ottoman Empire. Its demise was eagerly watched by leaders of European nations who anticipated territorial gains. Their greed was thwarted prior to the 1914–1918 war by a group known in the West as the "young Turks," who led the dominant, though not the majority, ethnic group in the empire and who gradually took over much of the empire between 1900 and the 1920s.

Military forces. The Turks controlled most of the Ottoman army by 1915, and commanded a paramilitary force of militias from diverse Muslim groups and released prisoners encouraged to oust Armenians with a promise that they would gain Armenians' property.

Institutional structure. Although each state within the Ottoman Empire had its own culture and cultural institutions, the center of the Ottoman state was disintegrating. In the two regions where Armenians had a majority in the nineteenth century, they had businesses, schools, churches, and community organizations, but over the previous decades non-Turkish Muslim groups were encouraged to settle and to thus reduce Armenian claims to a separate state.

Inequalities. There were inequalities between ethnic groups (e.g., Turks and Armenians but also many other groups in this empire) and between religious groups (Muslims and Christians). Armenian and Greek Christians were discriminated against during the century prior to the killing and forced dispersal of the Armenians. There were, as well, inequalities between Muslim groups, with Turks at the top. These ethnic and religious inequalities tended to overlap, though not precisely, with status and wealth. Some writers have suggested that Armenians' status as a low-ranked minority was incongruent with the relative wealth of their business leaders, an argument also invoked with respect to Jews in Europe (Dadrian, 1999; Kuper, 1981; Melson, 1992). However, this explanation does not extend to other cases or to those for which there is sufficient information to test it.

Material interests. Territorial interests were paramount for both European powers seeking gains from the implosion of empire, and non-Turkish Muslims recruited to disperse Armenians.

Ideology. Turks claimed that Armenians were conspiring with Europeans to dismember the Ottoman Empire. Turks say they acted in defense of the nation as they construed it. Contemporary forms of this argument include rebuttals of Atom Egoyen's film, *Ararat*. Gündüz Aktan in the *Turkish Daily News* in 2002 argued that because the action was taken for political purposes it was not genocide (quoted and discussed by Marchak, 2003, p. 96).

Conclusion of episode. The attack did not end in 1916; it carried on in intermittent episodes well into the 1920s. By the end of the war, however, other countries were less interested in prosecuting the perpetrators. Some territorial realignment occurred, and Europe established political relations with the new Turkish government. By 1918 Kemal Atatürk succeeded in unifying the country, but he insisted that it must be secular.

Analysis. Christian Armenians fit the definition of victims under the *Genocide Convention*. However, there were political and economic motives involved in this case, and these dilute the argument that the event was motivated entirely by ethnicity and religion. Armenian Christians were disliked (and had been for generations), but it took the impending disintegration of the Ottoman Empire to provide a rationale for claiming Armenian territory, ridding their state of opposition, and removing possible European allies from the new state. Nationalism rather than religion was promoted by the "young Turks" as a means of unifying the population around Turkish power bases. (This argument continues today vis-à-vis the Kurd population and its demand for autonomy.)

Cambodia

The crime. After a 5-year war (1970–1975) between the state army and a revolutionary force known as the Khmer Rouge (KR), the KR won, took over the country, and proceeded to kill army officers, Buddhist monks, urban professionals, and bureaucrats, and then forced the remaining urban population to march, some being obliged to work on rural farms, others obliged to keep marching until they dropped from thirst, hunger, or exhaustion.

Substantial social change, state breakdown. In 1970, Prince (Prince is correct at this date) Sihanouk was deposed by Lon Nol, an army officer backed by the United States. The prince was popular with the peasantry even if problematic for the United States. Simultaneously, under orders from Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon, the U.S. armed forces intensified bombing and destroying villages, rice paddies, and a large part of Cambodian territory, on the rationale that Viet Cong insurgents were using Cambodian territory as bases for their war in neighboring Vietnam. The bombing deeply affected the countryside, killing many peasants, disrupting family and community life, and destroying crops (Owen & Kiernan. 2006; Chandler, 1993; Shawcross, 1984; Hersh, 1983).

Military forces. Lon Nol's army was poorly trained and unable to repel the revolutionary army which had grown because of easy recruitment of displaced peasants during the bombing and because King Sihanouk threw his support to the rebels.

Infrastructure. Cambodia was a poor country, largely rural, with little in rural regions beyond the monarchy, the army, and the Buddhist monasteries as institutional organs.

Inequalities. Cambodia prior to the growth of the KR included extreme inequalities (Chandler, 1993; Deac, 1997; Jackson, 1989; Kiljunen, 1984; Vickery, 1984; Kiernan & Boua, 1982). The majority rural population was engaged in subsistence agriculture or in the farming of rice to be exported to the cities and external markets with poor returns for the farmers. Urban populations – bureaucrats, politicians, army officers, teachers, and other professionals, many educated abroad – were relatively prosperous. There was little industry in Phnom Penh; the wealth depended on the appropriation and export of rice grown by the peasants.

Material interests. This is the atypical case where the leaders indicated no interest in material gains. The peasant army, however, undoubtedly hoped for alleviation of hunger and poverty.

Ideology. The ideology of the KR was anticapitalist, antibourgeois, and antiurban. A half-dozen ideological leaders, educated superficially in Paris, had a scattering of Marxist theory, but they adopted Maoism and remained close to China throughout their tenure as government. Since the peasant army had no urban skills and their ideology pulled them in another direction, they did not attempt to reorganize the cities.

End of the KR regime. The KR regime lasted only 44 months. It ended when a Vietnamese army invaded Cambodia, defeated the KR, and took over the government. This Vietnamese puppet government incorporated many former KR leaders during the following decade, and these individuals remain powerful within the postoccupation state, renowned for its corruption. The peasant population is still hungry, and unemployment in cities is high.

Analysis. The advent of the KR was preceded by substantial and shocking social change, failure of government, paucity of institutional infrastructure, and massive inequalities. Although the state had a monopoly of legitimate use of force, the more powerful revolutionary peasant army won the civil war waged against urban bureaucrats, professionals, and army officers. As the government of the state, it then killed all those it regarded as enemies of the peasants. Foreigners were obliged to leave Cambodia, and many resident Vietnamese and Thais were killed, but they were not the primary or major victims of the KR; other Khmer were the chief victims. In short, this was not a genocide as defined in the *Convention*. It was a crime against humanity.

Yugoslavia

Background information and the crime. The original migrants to the region that became Yugoslavia were all South Slavs, there were no genuine "racial" distinctions (Cohen, 1993; Cushman & Mestrovic, 1996; Denitch, 1994; Meier, 1999: Pavkovic, 1997). There were religious differences incurred during their respective exposure to and inclusion in diverse empires between the twelfth and the twentieth centuries: the Byzantine Empire that gave Orthodox Christianity to Serbs; the Ottoman Empire that gave Islam to Bosnians; and the Austro-Hungarian Empire that gave Roman Catholicism to Croatians and Slovenes. During World War II, the Croatian "Ustashe," allied with Nazi forces, incarcerated, tortured, and killed Serbs, Jews, Roma, and others. These crimes were known and retained in the collective memory of Serbs. Some Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina were allied with the Croatians but some others were also incarcerated. Marshall Tito's "Partisans" took control of the country in the late stages of the war and created the second Yugoslavia in 1948, lasting until a decade after Tito's death in 1980.

Between 1991 and 1995, the former Yugoslavian army (JNA), now under Serb control, fought against Slovenes who had declared their independence; then the Serbian minority in Croatia, backed by JNA

soldiers, fought against Croatians, over their status and properties; finally a portion of the Serbian minority in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnia or BiH) backed by Serb paramilitaries and the JNA fought against the multicultural population of Bosnia. Moreover, in the town of Mostar the Croatian minority, probably supported by troops from the Republic of Croatia, fought against Bosnian Muslims (now known as Bosniaks). In the course of this war there were several war crimes referred to as genocide in journalistic reports. In particular, the city of Sarajevo was under siege for many months in 1992 and intermittently until 1995 by Serb forces, with numerous civilian deaths caused by snipers and bombers; the town of Srebrenica in 1995, even though designated by the United Nations as a safe area, was near the site of a massacre by Bosnian Serb paramilitaries, gangs, and Serbian armed personnel (whether under direct orders from superiors is not yet determined) of an estimated 7,500–8,000 Muslim men and boys. Canadian General Lewis MacKenzie, 2005, argued that the actual count would not exceed 2,000, and that the massacre was preceded by numerous guerrilla attacks by Bosniaks. However, the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) have both accepted the much higher numbers. The ICTY has elicited testimony during trials that clearly implicate Serb army personnel and the Serb government under Slobodan Milosevic in the planning of the Srebrenica massacre. The ICJ argued that the Serb government knew of the plans and failed to stop the genocide (the ICTY website provides details of all cases; reference for ICJ is 2007 (February 26), "Judgment," available at ICJ website). There were other atrocities as well over the period 1990–1995. Rape of Muslim women and girls was frequent, and has been declared an act of war.

Substantial social change and disintegration of the state. By the 1970s, the economy of Yugoslavia was beginning to fall apart because its markets in the USSR were dwindling, its comanagement system was not able to produce competitive products for western markets, its external debt was increasing, and *gastarbeiter* jobs in Germany were no longer as plentiful as they had been in the 1950s and 1960s. Unemployment rates increased while growth rates declined throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In addition, the regional elites were in disarray and fighting among themselves even before Tito's death. With the demise of the USSR, the privileged situation of Yugoslavia between the West and communist states disappeared, causing numerous dislocations in the status system within the state and between republics. Finally in 1991 Slovenia declared independence. Then

Croatia and, finally, Bosnia-Herzegovina, led by their respective elites, sought independence. Serbia, and Serbian minorities in Croatia and Bosnia, fought against the independence movements. Bosnia was occupied by a polyglot population, with the highest proportion of mixed marriages and their progeny. Its declaration of independence destroyed what remained of Yugoslavia. Serbia, previously the dominant national republic, and Serbs as important minorities throughout Croatia and Bosnia, fought to prevent the breakdown of what they perceived as "Greater Serbia" (see Johnstone, 2002 for a defense of Serbia in this war). Both Croatia and Serbia have long maintained their interest in the territories inhabited by "their" ethnic group.

Military forces. Yugoslav military forces were dominated by Serbs, despite strenuous attempts by Tito to create a more heterogeneous force with a more diverse officer corps. As the breakdown developed, Serbs began to ostracize members of other republics, and they, in turn, chose to withdraw and to create their own militias. Serbs also raided equipment storage containers that had been placed in each republic for its own defense in the event of battles with external countries (Divjak, 2001, 2004). As hostilities intensified, the minority Serbs in both Croatia and Bosnia developed paramilitary forces, and Croatians in Bosnia did likewise. Many of the battles were fought by these paramilitary forces and gangs with support, but not necessarily central command, from the JNA army and the Serb government.

Independent institutional sectors. By the time the war appeared to be unavoidable, all institutional sectors throughout Croatia and Bosnia were affected by the conflict. Religious differences were weakening the unified school system and other civic sectors. The Serbs of the Krajina region in Croatia (close to Bosnia) and of the northern and eastern border regions of Bosnia (next to Serbia) were engaged in pre-war attempts to prevent those republics from declaring independence. Migrants from Croatia were moving into both Serbia and Bosnia, while migrants from Bosnia were moving to Croatia and Serbia. Serbia had been endowed with substantial institutional infrastructure in Belgrade as the capital of Yugoslavia, but otherwise half the population of Serbia lived in rural regions. Its new migrants were not easily accommodated.

Inequality. Slovenia and Croatia, richer than other republics and closer to European markets, were unwilling to continue providing aid to lesser southern regions such as Montenegro. Serbians had been the politically and militarily powerful components of the federation

before the separation of Slovenia and Croatia. Bosnia, landlocked, had been enabled to survive by federal initiatives including numerous military production plants, and tourist facilities during the 1984 Olympics. Otherwise it had marginal independent capacities.

Material interests. Serbians and Croatians both had persistent material interests in territory in the Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina.

Ideology. The ideologies of war in this event were carried on in ethnic, religious, and nationalist terms.

Conclusion of war. The U.S.-negotiated Dayton Accords of 1995 stopped the physical hostilities, following intense NATO bombing. Bosnia was divided, with 49% designated as Republika Srypska (predominantly Serbian) and 51% given to an uneasy federation of Bosniaks and Croats. Croatia has indicated its preference to take over the territories known as Herzegovina, including the city of Mostar, and claims that it should have as much territory as the Serbian minority (though Croats were always a much smaller population). In short, this war is not really over, though physical hostilities have stopped for the time being.

Analysis. The war was initiated by the Serb-dominated army during a period of substantial social change in a country with many regional disparities. The prior hierarchy was threatened and losing ground as others fought for power. Serbia lost supremacy and Belgrade lost its status as the capital of Yugoslavia. War crimes were committed by all participants, but minority Serbs in both Croatia and Bosnia, and Serbs from Serbia committed a larger proportion of them if only because Serbs were engaged in three battles (Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia; Kosovo did not occur until 1999), while Croatians were involved in two battles and Bosniaks only one, though with two enemies. The breakup of Yugoslavia was probably unavoidable, given the economic and social changes that had occurred following the fall of communism and the USSR.

Rwanda

Background information and the crimes. Belgium had been given Rwanda as a protectorate in 1916 by the League of Nations. For most of this colonial period Belgians ruled through the minority Tutsi, effectively subordinating the majority Hutu. Leading anthropological

accounts (e.g., African Rights, 1994; Lemarchand, 1997: Prunier, 1995) of the peoples of the Great Lakes region of Africa contend that the Tutsi and Hutu (and under other nomenclature, the same groups in the Congo region) are either not racially divided or may have had divergent origins in a remote past. They share the same culture, clans, customs, religions, and language. The Tutsi, however, have traditionally been herders. Newbury (1988) says that in the Kinyarwandi language, "tutsi" means herder. The Hutu and less wealthy Tutsi were subsistence agriculturalists. The turning of these class divisions into ethnic groups was in large part due to Belgian colonial power. This is consistent with another version, that the Tutsi herders, whose wealth was represented in cattle, had always been the dominant group, and that under the Belgian occupiers they had become bullies against the poorer Hutu. When democracy was declared in 1959 the 85% of the population who were Hutu were eager to rid themselves of their despised upper class. The Tutsi monarchy was toppled. Up to 700,000 Tutsi went into exile between 1961 and 1963 (Prunier, 1995). However, the Hutu were not a united population, and regional elites from north and south were competitors for government positions. Even within the presidential family, the divisions persisted, and extremists attempted to gain political power. In 1990, a well-trained Tutsi army (the RPF) began an invasion in the north from Uganda. The president, having signed an agreement with the Tutsi leaders of this invasion, was then assassinated. Immediately following the assassination, the killing of Hutu moderates and resident Tutsi began, and within a 4-month period approximately 800,000 were murdered.

Substantial social change and state breakdown. Rwanda's population was greater than the land-carrying capacity before the return of Tutsi. The only export products – tea and coffee – were facing low market prices. An ineffective government without popular support was facing an invading army.

Military forces. The Rwandan army was not capable of stopping the advance of the RPF. Instead, extremists in the Rwandan army trained a paramilitary force known as the Interahamwe, consisting largely of young Hutu males who were taught how to kill with machetes and other unsophisticated instruments and told that their victims were to be Tutsi and moderate Hutu who opposed violence. The army and the Interahamwe carried out the massacre.

Infrastructure. This was a predominantly rural farming population. Its institutional structure consisted of local markets, the Roman Catholic

Church, and a (distant) government in Kigali. There was a university at Butare, but the majority of the population was illiterate.

Inequalities. The two groups experienced inequalities before, during, and after the colonial period, but not all Tutsi were equally dominant and many were subsistence farmers who did not go into exile.

Material interests. The dominant interest for both groups was the ownership of property. In a situation where the land was already overpopulated, the Hutu wanted to retain what they had taken over from exiting Tutsi, and Tutsi wanted to regain their lost lands.

Ideology. The ideology on the Hutu side, justifying the attack on Tutsi, was ethnic based. Tutsi were relentlessly called "cockroaches" by radio personalities on state stations.

End of crimes. The RPF conquered the Hutu army and took over government, effectively ending the mass murders. (However, crimes committed by Tutsi soldiers during the war and in its aftermath have yet to be judged by a war crimes trial initiated by the Tutsi-dominated government). There are 120,000 Hutu in Rwanda's national jails awaiting trial (often without knowing the charges), and another 80 or so have been indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha, Tanzania.

Analysis. This was a case of a government that never gained popular support and legitimacy faced by a threat beyond its capacities or the capacities of its state army to repel. Contested ownership of territory and political power were the primary causes of the war, potential ecological disaster from use beyond land-carrying capacity was underneath that cause, and for some areas, declining market demand for export products was ancillary. The crimes were committed in a futile attempt to stop the invaders from continuing, or to stop potential allies (moderate Hutu as well as Tutsi), from helping the invading army. The ideology enshrined the notion that these two opponents were ethnic groups.

Conclusion and Remaining Issues

These cases, excepting Cambodia, involve claims of racism, and have been called genocide by journalists, international administrators, and some scholars. My argument is that material and status differences

between ethnic groups constitute one, but only one, form of inequality and that the differences in themselves do not provide an explanation for genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. Class, rural–urban differences, or differences between regional populations as a consequence of either natural-resources endowment or access to markets are at least as salient. Occupational and educational differences are bases for other hierarchies within any urbanized state. These inequalities may give rise to revolutionary groups, or even the threat of revolutionary groups, and a reaction by existing elites in control of the state, as in the Ottoman Empire and Cambodia. Fear of being deposed or loss of material advantages and privileges may fuel a reaction, as in Rwanda and Serbia. I am arguing that these events can be best explained in terms of a theory of the state and its relationship to the dominant class or other groups. The state has a monopoly on legitimate use of force and a mandate to sustain the status quo including, specifically, its hierarchy of dominant and subordinate groups. Revolutionary groups that have force (illegitimate by definition) may attempt to replace the existing hierarchy, and if they do so, they, in turn, become the agents of the state. States that cannot sustain the system by which governments came to power turn on less powerful groups, by way of renewing their hold on power. Turks in the dying Ottoman Empire provide the classic case of an elite trying to maintain its supremacy by turning on an unpopular minority, accusing it of political crimes as a rationale for trying to eradicate it. Cambodia is an example of a revolutionary elite that killed its former enemies in order to establish its dominance in a new state. Yugoslavia is an example of a failed state where elites competed for control of territory and power. Rwanda is an example of a state that failed to establish its legitimacy, where the controlling groups attempted to eradicate a minority under conditions of war. None of these situations is really about ethnicity, though ethnic claims are made in the Yugoslavian case in order to justify nationalistic claims, and in Rwanda and the Ottoman Empire to justify killing claimants to scarce land resources under conditions of war. In the Armenian case, the perpetrators of a crime against humanity continue to excuse themselves on the grounds that their ancestors' behavior does not fit the definition of genocide.

This interpretation of events leaves us with several interesting questions. One of these is: are there states that have all of the preconditions in place, yet manage to pull back from the brink? There surely are: I do not pose my theory as deterministic, so much as probabilistic. Given the preconditions, the state (through its governments and bureaucracies) is likely to move in this direction. Possibly

we could consider Eastern European and other component regions after the fall of the USSR. The central state, through its governments and bureaucracies, was incapable of sustaining its own organization. Yet the elites in the former regimes did not, for the most part, launch massive killing sprees against dissidents. I suggest that this was because they could not count on state armies to do the work. The same elites had committed mass murders in the past, and their armies had obeyed their orders, so apparently this is a matter of relative strengths in a protracted battle. The governments in decline had lost the support of their people, their armies, and their neighbors.

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Part III

Synthesis

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9

Theories of Genocide

The Case of Rwanda

Howard Adelman

Rwanda in 1994 was the scene of genocide against Tutsi and moderate Hutu. At least 800,000 people were killed despite the presence of UN peacekeepers believed by the victims to have been mandated to protect them (African Rights, 1994a, 1994b, 1995; des Forges, 1999; Destexhe, 1994, 1995; de Waal & Omaar, 1995). Many political leaders and most media outlets originally incorrectly depicted the genocide as tribal warfare stemming from ancient, unchangeable hatreds. If an event is a result of a continuing, long-term, chronic problem seemingly immune to correction, then contemplating intervention to change the situation seems futile (Adelman, 2002; Feil, 1996) Further, in this inaccurate depiction, both groups are presumed to be equally culpable; therefore, neutrality seems advisable. Finally, there is no reason to look for a small cabal plotting and planning mass murder. Advancing an accurate and correct explanation for genocide is a critical ingredient in facilitating its prevention or mitigation.

If one fully understands why perpetrators commit such acts, once they have the power[1] who and what will stop them? The understanding must be complemented by devising preventive tools, creating the means to limit, and hopefully prevent, the devastating effects of genocide by developing mechanisms to make societies resistant to its possibility. Knowing why perpetrators commit genocide is insufficient. We must also know why others who have the mandate and/or the power to prevent or mitigate the genocide – both states and international agencies – abet the genocide, subvert attempts to intervene, or idly stand by. This suggests that we have stepped into the realm of responsibility as well as the sphere of necessary and sufficient causes,

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when we consider acts of negligence and omission as well as acts of commission.

In considering the interveners as well as the perpetrators, the choice of the Rwandan genocide as a case study is particularly apt. When one examines genocides that seemed to characterize the twentieth century, the Rwandan genocide stands out as by far the easiest to stop. There was sufficient early warning information (Adelman, 1999b; 1996; Adelman & Suhrke, 1996; Guilmette, 1995; Gurr & Harff, 1994). The mandate of the UN initially proposed by the Rwandan parties to the Arusha peace agreement (Adelman & Suhrke, 2004) was sufficiently robust to have enabled the peacekeepers to have been effective in prevention. Canadian and Ghanaian troops held the Kigali airport throughout the genocide, enabling ready access for an intervening force. The number of interveners needed to stop or mitigate the genocide was relatively small, especially given the low-tech capabilities of the genocidal killers. The moral issue was clear. It is difficult to imagine an easier case both to justify and mount an intervention.[2] Why then was virtually nothing done?

Hopefully, a theory of genocide will assist in answering this question. This chapter begins with a critical consideration of one potentially comprehensive theory of the causes of genocide. This critical examination provides a framework in the next section, Ontology and Human Dispositions, to examine specific explanatory theories of the Rwandan genocide, differentiating primarily between rational universal theories and cultural theories, and between those that focus on perpetrators and others that focus on bystanders (Hilberg, 1992).[3] The third section, Explaining the Rwandan Genocide, then tries to reconcile the general theory with various specific explanations for the Rwandan genocide.

Waller's Thesis on the Causes and Conditions Fostering Genocide

Among the many general theories of genocide, James Waller's (2002) offers two advantages. He views genocide as an extreme in a continuum of mass slaughter and an even larger spectrum of types of mistreatment of other humans. Second, in addition to viewing genocide simply as an extreme of ordinary bad behavior, Waller's social psychological analysis focuses on "how" rather than "why"; the explanation is focused on mechanisms without any apparent confusion between reasons and causes that often plague "why" explanations in

identifying the broad spectrum of conditions conducive to humans becoming instruments of mass murder. This is very different than a focus on just the motivations and/or reasons driving those who initiate and plan a genocide, or those that focus on necessary and sufficient preconditions (see Gurr & Harff, 1994, 1996; Harff, 1994).

Waller's thesis not only offers a very comprehensive causal account, it also serves as a foil for my own position. Waller's thesis postulates that an "evil person is just as much an artificial construct as a person who is purely good," and that "Perpetrators of extraordinary evil are extraordinary by what they have done, not by who they are" (Waller, p.18). Waller thus dichotomizes behavior and character. In contrast, at the end of this chapter I will suggest that looking at behavior of evil people to discern character may be the best early indicator of genocide; looking at behavior of good people to discern character may be the best way to identify potential interveners. Character and behavior are not disjuncts; they are complementary.

Second, I will challenge Waller's thesis that those who are extraordinarily evil and who initiate and organize genocide cannot be distinguished from the rest of us except by their actions. Instead, I will argue that the characterization of evil is a crucial ingredient in understanding genocide. In the plethora of conditions that foster genocide – though, as the reader will see, identifying certain conditions are crucial – we can best take action to prevent and mitigate genocide when we can identify the people who have a propensity to evil and prevent them from taking power. Identifying the character of initiators and organizers of genocide (I will identify this later as virtue ethics) is more important than identifying the conditions under which ordinary people participate in genocide. However, the crucial factor will not be a "unified theory of perpetrator behavior" or even a theory of genocidal *leader* behavior, or even of genocidal leader *character*, but a political theory of the role of abettors, subverters, and passive bystanders (Adelman, 2003, 2004a; Kroslak, 2003; Power, 2001, 2002; Wheeler, 2002).

I agree, however, with three of the four dimensions that Waller uses to characterize genocide, even though I sometimes characterize those three dimensions a bit differently. In Waller's four-dimensional model explaining genocide, the first dimension concentrates on human predispositions,[4] the second on cultural forces, the third on institutional cultural reenforcers that submerge an individual perpetrator within the group, and the fourth on institutions that alter the perceived identity of the other. I differ with Waller in a fundamental way only with respect to the first dimension dealing with predispositions.

Waller identifies three predispositions: *ethnocentrism*, the tendency to focus on one's own group as the "right" one; *xenophobia*, the tendency to fear outsiders or strangers; and, third, the *desire for social dominance* often leading to aggression and violence (2002, pp. 19–20). For Waller, these traits are universal and present in everyone from infancy. The second dimension concentrates on the cultural forces that help mold these predispositions in a particular direction. Waller names three *cultural belief systems*: *authority orientation*, *moral disengagement* (fostered by ideology and propaganda), and a cultural system that fosters *rational self-interest*, both professional and personal. In addition to universal predispositions and cultural reenforcers, the social context provides the third dimension, the existence of specific institutions in a society that foster a culture of cruelty. With respect to perpetrators, Waller names three: *professional socialization*, *group conformity*, and the *merger of role and person*. The fourth dimension refers to institutions that alter the perceived identity of the victim to identify them as *other*, to *dehumanize* them as other, and to *blame them*.

Summary of the four dimensions explaining the behavior of perpetrators

A. Predispositions:	1. Ethnocentrism; 2. Xenophobia; 3. Desire for dominance
B. Cultural forces:	1. Authority system; 2. Moral disengagement; 3. Rational self-interest
C. Cultural reenforcers:	1. Professional socialization; 2. Group conformity; 3. Merger of person and role
D. Identity alterations:	1. Othering; 2. Dehumanizing 3. Blaming the other

Since I have no fundamental quarrel with the final three dimensions, let me comment upon them in reverse order. With respect to the fourth dimension, institutions alter the perceived identity of the victim, identify them as *other*, *dehumanize* them, and *blame them*, make them deserving of their treatment. As Waller puts it, we "rearrange our perceptions of people and events so that it seems everyone is getting what they deserve. Victims must be suffering because they have done 'something,' because they somehow are inferior or dangerous or evil, or because a higher cause is being served. The belief that the world is a just place leads us to accept the suffering of others more easily, even of people we ourselves have harmed" (2002, p. 254).

Instead of these three being elements of the fourth dimension, I identify them as *stages* in altering the identity of the other or in othering the other. Further, I identify five stages instead of three characteristics of Waller's fourth dimension. His initial characteristic of defining a group as other is the first stage. I then introduce a second stage that he does not mention, defining the other as of lesser value than one's own group. Characterizing a group as other is not the same as evaluating the group as having a comparatively lesser value. My third stage is the same as his second type of institutional role that defines the other as having a value that is less than human. For it is one thing to define the other group as having a lesser value than one's own group; it is another to characterize the other group as having a value that makes them unworthy to be considered human. My fourth stage is similar to Waller's third characteristic in altering the perceived identity of the other. However, in characterizing it as blaming the other, I am more specific since the fourth stage defines the other as threatening and having an intent to destroy one's own group. Finally, I disaggregate a trait Waller included in blaming the other and add a fifth stage, defining the other as a threat working insidiously like a disease *independent of intent* to one's own group, and thus an other that must be dealt with through elimination of the threat rather than through education.

These five stages are similar to the pantheon Waller sets forth with respect to treatment of the identity of the intended victim. The first two are simply aspects of what Waller calls "Us–Them Thinking." The first stage is the process of social categorization that distinguishes ingroups from outgroups. Then comes the evaluation that favors the in- versus the outgroup, as members of each group tend to perceive other members of the ingroup as possessing one identity differentiated from that of the identity of the Other, often exaggerating those differences. There tends to be attachment and allegiance even when the basis of differentiation of the two groups is relatively trivial; and arbitrary as indicated in the famous Tajfel experiments in social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Such a distinction easily deteriorates into seeing the other, not only as other, and not only as inferior, but as *inherently* inferior, thereby reifying competition, antagonism, and then complete distrust. When it reaches the latter position, there is a very fine line before the third characteristic is manifest that corresponds to Waller's thesis about dehumanization, where the other is categorized as subhuman (the Tutsi were characterized as *inyenzi* or cockroaches) or unhuman (monsters and demons): The Tutsi were linguistically and physically assaulted.

The fourth and fifth stages constitute what Waller refers to as "Blaming the Victims," so that victims are regarded as getting what they deserve, thereby reducing any sense of responsibility in the minds of the perpetrator (Staub, 1989, p. 17). This is facilitated by the well-known philosophical error of engaging in a category mistake by attributing "blame" simply where there might be some arbitrary "cause" – young women cannot be blamed for a greater frequency of being rape victims simply because they are young. Together, these characteristics make up what Helen Fein (1993, pp. 55–56)[5] called relegating an intended victim to a realm "outside the universe of moral obligation" and what Orlando Patterson (1982) termed condemning others to "social death."

I have set these characteristics up as a sliding scale of greater and greater alienation from any responsibility towards the other so that the presence of the first seemingly innocent and universally pervasive factors serve as part of a warning system about the initial stages in a trend toward extraordinary evil. The utility of the different specific categories or the creation of a scale can be debated, but some sense of a process of delegitimization of the other is present in all explanations of the mechanisms for genocide. Whether these are best explained in terms of self-protection mechanisms, concern with self-protection, self-esteem, or provoked by frustration (Waller, 2002, p. 255) I will leave to our discussion of the underlying ontological universal human predispositions set forth in Waller's first dimension explaining genocide.

Similarly, there are various categories to characterize those specific cultural factors that reduce an individual sense of responsibility and promote conformity to group norms so that, in the extreme, there is no difference between the individual and the individual's role in the group. Once again, I see the three that Waller has articulated as well founded in the social science literature; they are simply measures of increasing the degree of loss of individual identity, first through reinforcing group conformity, then using peer pressure and other reenforcers to bind the individual to the group to reduce the sense of individual responsibility further, until the very extreme is achieved when the sense of individual responsibility is destroyed altogether and the individual becomes simply his or her role through a social psychological process of compliance, identification, and internalization.

This is accomplished based on escalating commitments – seemingly small innocuous incremental steps constituting ritual "theatrical" conduct – through persistent indulgence in excessive, noninstrumental, and unproductive behavior and repression of conscience that

progressively desensitizes perpetrators through a process that begins with the control of information and makes those who have any information complicit in the cruel deeds. This desensitization then proceeds through other socialization steps: banishing criticism, creating a conspiracy of silence, and developing a language of euphemisms to refer to the actions that, in the end, extinguishes any inhibitions toward inflicting pain and suffering on the victims. The second is *group conformity* which includes activities that diffuse individual responsibility and reduces any identification with the consequences through the numbers involved and segmentation and fragmentation of the task of killing that deindividualizes, enforces conformity, and establishes an atmosphere of anonymity through peer pressure to bind individuals to follow group norms, accept authority, and set aside any capacity for crucial self-reflection. The third factor is something that goes even further to reduce individual identity towards zero through the *merger of role and person*.

If the third dimension focuses on these three specific institutions that submerge an individual perpetrator within the group, the second dimension focuses on more basic traditional *cultural belief systems*. If the history of Rwanda was characterized by a distinction between Tutsi and Hutu, between the self and other both from the Tutsi and the Hutu perspectives, if that history is then given a new twist in the Hamitic hypothesis[6] that *defined* the two groups as *primarily* other, as products of historical forces of migration from two radically different natural sources that lay in a long-forgotten past beyond one's control,[7] that is, that the two groups originate from two different racial stocks, then the tradition is suddenly provided with roots in natural law. The above conditions are reinforced when the Rwandan political system itself is oriented very powerfully towards *obedience to authority*, particularly when the authority resides in the state, and an ideology and corresponding propaganda, such as that propagated over the air waves of *Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines*, reinforces an *individual detachment*, particularly for those with a high *social dominance orientation* (SDO)[8] and high acceptance of group-based hierarchies. Such individuals have a low level of any sense of responsibility for the other. When this propensity is fostered by economic and political conditions that reinforce a propensity of everyone to look after themselves, both professionally and personally, as happened after the crash in coffee prices in the late eighties in Rwanda and an *economic struggle for survival* that ensued, then the specific economic, social, and political situation of the society reinforces the specific cultural institutional factors reinforcing individual irresponsibility,

moral disengagement accompanied, at the same time, by moral justification and the identification of the other as unworthy.[9]

Ontology and Human Dispositions

Underlying the cultural forces and reenforcers, underlying the way one misidentifies the Other, Waller (2002) locates what he believes to be a set of universal human dispositions – our appetites of desire, fear, and hope. In doing so, Waller equates *expressions* of a fundamental character with the fundamental traits themselves. I take a Hegelian tack. The predispositions underlying ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and desire to have power over others resides in our *desire* to aspire to be gods and the need for survival (what Hegel in the *Phenomenology* calls "life" in contrast to one expression of life, the fear of death at the hands of others; Hegel, 1807/1977). The latter results from the interaction of an instinct for survival and a desire to be immortal and immaterial, what Hegel dubbed "desire-in-life," in contrast with hope (Adelman, 1996, 1997a). Instead of a basic *desire for social dominance*, or a propensity to seek power over others as foundational, I take from Hegel a depiction of the masculine in humanity that is driven by an innate propensity to aspire to be god – characterized as a love for oneself as purely mental and disembodied *without* any appetites. Desire is not equated with appetite. Quite the opposite! The strongest desire manifested in the male imagination and thought is the desire to be unboundaried, to reject the limits of the flesh, to be immaterial and see oneself as divine. Thus, Adam (in *Genesis*, chapters 1–3) is all of *man*kind. His basic propensity is to see himself akin to God in making things simply by using the language of *logos* and bringing things into being by naming them. He does not have to work. He says and there is. Just by thinking and uttering something, a world comes into being.

This is the very source of the imaginative arts. But it has a very negative side. In the Garden of Eden, Adam does not take responsibility for his own body. He does not recognize he even has appetites or that he has feelings – such as feeling lonely and needing another. In other words, detachment and irresponsibility are not products of social conditioning; they are the "original sin." Certain forms of social conditioning can reinforce these propensities. Alternatively, civilized society develops by creating institutions and cultural practices to counteract this propensity while, at the same time, allowing this source of creativity an outlet for benign expression.

Just as Adam others his own flesh and feelings, Adam projects fleshly existence, the appetites of the flesh, and human feeling, onto the Other. The Other is viewed initially as the female Other. Eve is a projection of Adam's own embodiment. Thus, Adam begins by being alienated from his own flesh and seeing Eve as the embodiment of that flesh and having no center of initiative in herself. But if Adam is primarily desire – not as appetite, but its opposite, the will to be God – Eve is primarily life that cuts through any fear of consequences to follow the dictum to propagate and multiply. She gives into the temptations of Adam's penis – which in the Adam and Eve story is depicted as an erect, wholly independent Other, an erect phallus (a snake) for which Adam does not take responsibility. In spite of warnings that such a path will lead to the knowledge of good and evil with recognition of one's physical mortality, Eve consciously surrenders to the appetite that will result in procreation, while Adam insists that the action was not his responsibility, but that of his penis seen as Other. Adam was in denial that he was being driven by the appetites of the flesh. The objectified flesh (Eve) through Adam's reflection became Life and an object of immediate desire without cognitive endorsement (Hegel, 1807/1977, para. 168).

Adam and Eve surrender to the life instinct and become "one flesh." They have sex. This destroys Adam's delusion that he is a *pure* immortal self-consciousness. At the same time, Life, instead of being a passive material existence for the use of the Mind, becomes Life as a living thing, a life force, an origin of action. Life becomes a process in which unity is forthcoming only out of the clash with its opposite, the desire to be divine and immaterial. On the one side, there is the life force, the passion that seeks unity with the Other. On the other side, there is the *divine* thought that sees itself as *objective*, as being in the business of objectifying the Other, including objectifying its own fleshly existence. Detachment is a fundamental ontological disposition. By definition, the source of the problem that results in genocide is not in the appetites and Life, but in Desire, the aspiration of mind to be free of its fleshly embodiment. That is why it is so willing not only to destroy but to mutilate and humiliate the flesh. That is why genocide is always so self-destructive.

With the discovery of its impossibility and the surrender to the life instinct, comes embarrassment. Adam and Eve engage in a cover-up and fail to take responsibility for what they did. The companion of the propensity to both detachment from one's feelings for the Other and from one's own fleshly existence is repression, secrecy, shame, and the evasion of responsibility.

Instead of Waller's (2002) *desire for social dominance*, there is a more basic desire to dominate over the Other viewed as one's *own* flesh. The root of the problem is not in the appetites, but in Thought, in a Mind that views itself as *pure* (that is, uncontaminated by embodied existence), a pure self-consciousness and an agent that acts through that self-consciousness. Instead of the very specific form that Life can take at one stage in the form of *ethnocentrism*, there is the more general propensity of the masculine side of the self to pursue only its own definition of the self and ignore any feeling or attachment to the Other. Instead of *xenophobia*, the interaction of Desire and Life leads to a dialectic clash of opposites in which the Other becomes the Object to be feared, as the source of all one's problems, as the root of Evil. The root of Evil is, however, the projection of the alleged root of evil onto the Other. This projection begins with the projection of the source of Evil onto one's own appetites. So the clash between Desire and Life is characterized as rooted in the appetites. Reason blames the flesh. The fundamental root of xenophobia is a phobia directed at one's own body and its appetites.

Modernity begins with the rejection of the aspiration of the self and the characterization of the divine other as pure disembodied self-consciousness. Consciousness and self-consciousness are rooted in the flesh. Reason functions as an instrument of the passions, whether it be a passion for power over nature and pursuing material acquisitiveness, as in John Locke's *Second Treatise*, or a passion for power over other humans as in Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan*. What the early modernists did not recognize, and Waller (2002) fails to recognize as well, is that reason is not just an instrument of passion. This characterization of the relationship of passion and reason is itself a product, a construct of reason. In contrast, in the Hegelian modernist version, power is manifested in the pursuit of divine omniscience, of comprehensive knowledge by the imprint of *logos* on nature. Power over the other is a by-product of the dualism created by dichotomizing Mind and Matter.

When I assert I am Mind, *Cogito Ergo Sum*, Matter is projected as Other without any Mind, as that which must be conquered and mastered. The presumption of a desire for social dominance or a propensity to seek power over others is common to many enlightenment theorists who idealize individual political human autonomy, an individual that defines its own ends and denies the natural propensity to be with the Other and to empathize with the Other. Freedom is best achieved by the pursuit of human happiness without a *telos*, a final cause, without the quest to be with and share the feelings of another. In other words, although modernity begins with the acceptance that

the demands of the flesh are real and basic and cannot be rejected, it still mischaracterizes the flesh by projecting onto it characteristics of thought and, at the same time, identifying virtue with autonomous rights of a self-defining and self-legislating autonomous self. The idealization of individual human rights as the counter to possessive individualism and the desire for power over the other is not the antidote, but the complement rooted in the same propensity for dichotomization and othering of material existence of the mind.[10] It is no wonder then that the construction of a human rights regime based on the idealization of the autonomous individual will never work as a protection against genocide.

John Locke regarded the quest for the extension of the material self through acquiring possessions as basic, a desire to extend the material self in space and time that became realizable with the invention of money. More basic, however, was not the quest for wealth for its own sake, but the quest for the wealthy to be able to sacrifice that wealth – in fact, the material wealth most highly valued – in order to gain recognition. We seek to become wealthy so we can engage in philanthropy. Why? Because we want the recognition that, for us who are divine, money is not everything. Instead, in the end it is nothing; it is irrelevant in comparison to our quest for recognition as agents of the divine.

Cain and Abel (in *Genesis*, chapter 4) willingly seek to bind themselves to an Other seen as divine and immaterial by sacrificing the best products of their very different ways of economic life, the herdsman his fattest sheep and the farmer the best of his grain. In true ritual fashion, they both engage in "theatrical" conduct that demonstrates their indifference to the destruction of the best of that for which they labored in what is clearly excessive, noninstrumental, and unproductive behavior. When Abel is recognized and, hence, favored by God, Cain is crushed. In frustration and total loss of self-esteem, he lashes out and kills his proximate other, his own brother and rival. He does not do so because he wants power over the other or even because he seeks power over the other because he fears that the other wants power over him, as in Hobbes. He does so because he wants to be identified as divine. When he is only perceived as human-all-too-human, he does not enslave the other but kills him. Bondage to the Lord is not then a product of coercion but of an inherent desire to obey and be identified with a higher authority.

Genocide is not a by-product of the quest for wealth or the quest for power. It is instead a manifestation of the same, more basic ontological root that gives rise to the quest for wealth and the quest for

power, the quest to be recognized by a divine pure self-consciousness as also being a divine pure self-consciousness. Genocide is a religious act of sacrificing the other and a willingness to sacrifice the self in the quest for purity. This is viewed as a divine quest.

Further, such a basic account of human nature is much more consistent with the understanding of the other three dimensions that characterize the propensity to commit genocide and the most basic desire to escape and evade responsibility and project blame onto the body of an Other. That is why the death of the Other is insufficient. That is why the other is humiliated as an embodied Other, why assaults against the sexuality of the Other are particularly prevalent, and why rape and genocide are so intrinsically intertwined. That is why the mistreatment of the corpse of the other and denial of a civilized burial goes so closely hand-in-hand with extraordinary evil (Adelman, 1997b; Neier, 1998). That is why there is a fundamental contrast between the moral edict to assume responsibility for oneself as an embodied self, and the evil propensity to slide into irresponsibility for one's own actions.

In genocide, the social expresses this fundamental ontology. Specific cultural traits reinforce this propensity to avoid individual responsibility by reinforcing group conformity reinforced by mechanisms, such as peer pressure to bind the individual to the group to reduce the sense of individual responsibility until, in the extreme, the sense of individual responsibility is destroyed altogether and the individual becomes simply his or her role. When a political system in such a culture acts to reinforce authority with a propaganda ideological campaign that reinforces individual detachment from taking responsibility for the other reinforced by a political economy that fosters self-seeking, that political system fosters genocide when the Other is painted, as depicted above, as Other, as wholly Other, as a lesser Other, as a dangerous Other capable of destroying the *body* politic, and as an Other that must be eliminated because the other is a "natural threat" independent of intent. Then we have a comprehensive set of categories for understanding when and the conditions under which the extreme degree of irresponsibility is manifested in genocide. But it is precisely in conditions that foster extreme irresponsibility that the responsibility of others is most needed. That is why, if genocide is to be mitigated and even prevented (Adelman, 1999a; Adelman & Suhrke, 1996), focusing only on the conditions that foster genocide is insufficient. One needs to understand the conditions that will foster responsibility and intervention by others (Adelman, 1997a, 1998, 2000, 2002; Adelman & Suhrke, 1996; Feil, 1996; Guilmette, 1995).

Explaining the Rwandan Genocide

Universal versus cultural explanatory theories of the Rwandan genocide

Here I examine two basic approaches. One set of theories locates the explanation in universal factors. The problem then is to develop systems of cultural conditioning that can counteract these universal failings. The other set of theories locates the explanation for genocide in the development of a set of specific traits in a culture, but, other than advocating the alteration of the predominance of those cultural traits, the theory offers no mechanism by which that can be accomplished.

Universal theoretical explanations of the Rwandan genocide generally presume that the irresponsibility of both perpetrators and bystanders is fostered by the pursuit of self-interest. The way of ensuring that these self-serving projects do not become violent entails putting in place *institutional mechanisms* for allowing our constructed intellectual versions of the world and quest for personal power and wealth to be challenged by a reality and/or morality independent of those constructions. But no program, let alone any foundation, in human nature is put forth to demonstrate how such "moral sensitivity" can be cultivated.

At another pole are cultural theorists who presume that there will always be cultural clashes. Cultural theorists tend to be antiutopian, both with respect to any ideal of a perfect detached rational calculation or with respect to any political or economic system that can overcome and prevent violence. The best we can do is to manage and mitigate conflict to prevent and limit violence as much as possible. If universal theories have implicit in them an objective idealism, a utopian vision of what constitutes an ideal rational order, implicit in cultural theorists one finds a subjective idealism, a presumption that within the varied cultures can be found norms which allow those cultures to transcend their own limitations. Humans can pursue a wholeness that is part of their culture from the start.

In this part of the paper, I will not explore the vast majority of accounts of the Rwandan genocide, but instead will concentrate on a select few of those that are both better known and that have a strong element of theory in the construction of the thesis. In contrast to the wide variety of specific cultural explanations for genocide, I can identify only three different sets of motives and explanations offered

for the genocide among the universal rationalists. Mamdani (2001) offers a *diachronic political explanation* for the growth and development of racism and genocide that culminated in the genocide. In Mamdani's account, clashes of power arise out of a particular set of historical circumstances that replay the search for identity and recognition (Waller's third and fourth dimensions, 2002), though the replay does not imitate the original process of colonial enslavement. Bruce Jones (1999a; 1999b; 2001) offers a *synchronic political analysis* of the weakness of the strategic decisions and actions taken to foster peace that allowed the extremist spoilers an opportunity to muster their strength, depose Habiyarimana, resume the civil war, and begin the systematic slaughter of Tutsi (see also Suhrke & Jones, 2000). In Jones' account, the failure is located in a series of interventions from outside that initially appear to be adequate each time but prove, in the end, to be inadequately thought out. The emphasis is on the interveners rather than on the perpetrators.

Peter Uvin (1998) offers an *economic structural analysis* of the impact of foreign aid in exacerbating the crisis in Rwanda by creating a ruling class totally dependent on this aid for their status and power, without any alternative option to preserve the prestige and income when they lose power. When the commodity price of coffee, the main export crop, crashed in the mid-1980s, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) insisted on restructuring in 1989, thereby weakening the state apparatus, creating a motive for corruption, and throwing Rwanda into a crisis that encouraged the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invasion. Uvin critiques the role of the World Bank, the IMF, and the development agencies of various Western countries for their role first in developing an economic system in which the leaders became dependent for their wealth and status on the inflow of external aid. In the case of Rwanda, this reinforced the political and cultural propensities already present in Rwandan society. The way of ensuring that such situations do not become violent entails putting in place improved and more rational institutional mechanisms for allowing our constructed intellectual versions of the world to be challenged by a reality and/or a morality independent of those constructions, that is, a conceptual and moral framework that can abstract itself from historical conditions and circumstances. However, no philosophical foundation is provided to facilitate this happening.

All three explanations presume a universal dichotomy of rational and nonrational and an idealization of rationality. That which fails to meet the ideal standards of rationality is nonrational. For Mamdani (2001), it is rational to develop political states in which membership norms

are based on residence in the territory of that state and not on ethnicity and, more specifically, not on race (see also Chirot & McCauley, 2006). Such a membership system prevents the dichotomization of self and other in Waller's third and fourth dimensions, at least domestically. In Mamdani's envisioned solution, we do need a system of states that guarantee *everyone* protection so that no individual lacks a political home that guarantees him/her protection. The primary solution depends upon solving the problem internally by insisting that anyone resident within the territory of a state should have citizenship. Mamdani never considers the possibility that, as an unintended consequence, this may merely provide an incentive for irregular migrants to seek residency in the most prosperous states. Further, Mamdani overlooks the fact that ethnic identification within a state need not be a source of interethnic conflict, but can be a source of interethnic recognition and respect. Finally, in the utopian vision of a system of states on which every state identifies its members only by the fact that they are resident in that state, the demand for a melting pot, a harmonization of identity, both ignores the roots of states in an historically based nationality or even in a constructed nationality that, once constructed, limits access to new members by that very construction, and, on the other hand, is intolerant of minorities preserving their identities and uniqueness.

For Jones (2001), rational decisions of leaders outside the fray must be both coherent and comprehensive in taking into consideration all the factors that might threaten the peace, and creating all the necessary and sufficient conditions to foster that peace. The explanation for the failure to act was not one of norms at all. It was a failure in strategic thinking, in ensuring the proper fit between intended outcomes and the means put in place to achieve those ends – taking into consideration both opportunities and obstacles to that implementation. This happened either because of a series of cascading misperceptions resulting in poorly coordinated and contradictory policies that undermined the peace effort, or "ill conceived and counterproductive" (Jones, 2001, p. 95) ones in the first place that led to an understandable failure given the strategic priorities of the powers, the speed of the genocide, the misleading media coverage, and the size, strength, and speed of military intervention required to make a significant impact (Kuperman, 2000a, 2000b, 2001; Straus, 2006). Like Jones, Kuperman views the problem strategically. The problem was not the lack of action but the wrong actions taken. The problem was not moral or cultural, but a rational failure rooted in ill-conceived actions in the political solution developed and in the military peacekeeping plan designed to implement it.

For example, though Mamdani (2001, p. 211) suggests that a government containing the Committee for the Defense of the Republic (CDR) was a possible alternative outcome of the talks, to Jones that outcome appears certain: "the final result proved to be a recipe for disaster because it pushed well beyond what was acceptable in key sectors in Kigali on distribution of command posts and the distribution of seats in the BBTG (the Broad-Based Transitional Government)" (2001, p. 95), and thereby violated key tenets of conflict resolution that insist that one party *not* be given a significantly disproportionate role in government, and that the various groups be represented in the army, particularly in command posts, roughly in proportion to their percentage of the population. Different scholars offer alternative answers to the questions whether the RPF made a mistake in excluding the CDR from military and political power, and whether the mistake lay in relying on the international community to neutralize the spoilers. However, allowing committed racists and spoilers to join the government would not have neutralized but empowered them. Jones (p. 82) implies that either possibility would have been preferable, but, in the absence of anyone able and willing to neutralize the spoilers, Jones argues that inclusion would have been the better option, even if inclusion enhances their opportunities. Jones regrets that France did not back the government against the RPF more effectively (p. 78), but concedes that, as the CDR's supporters were spoilers determined to violate the peace agreement, containment was an alternative strategy not adopted.

In their rational choice models, Jones (2001) and Kuperman (2001) both presume that the problem can be resolved by finding and constituting a group that is wise and all-knowing, that can devise strategies for preventing and mitigating violence. However, perceptual and analytic capacities are insufficient. Tough choices have to be made based on limited knowledge and an inability to forecast changing geo-political circumstances. Do you put in sufficient force to neutralize the spoilers? Or do you try to co-opt the spoilers through inclusion, risking giving them more power and leverage? Or do you try to muddle through, exclude the spoilers, and hope that the political solution will be in place in time to offset the need for a military solution? And when circumstances tend to dictate one choice rather than the other and that choice proves to be calamitous, then hindsight will fault the "rational" decision-maker for miscalculation.

In a third type of rational universal model (Uvin, 1998), it is irrational to impose cookie-cut economic solutions and conditionality for aid after first making the status and security of the leadership

class dependent on that aid, and then failing to take into account the historical circumstances of the state in question at that time. This, and all these rational approaches, deliberately eschew taking into consideration the customs and norms of the local community in question. Mamdani (2001) focuses on maintaining rationality within the state where genocide has a possibility of breaking out. In contrast, Jones (2001), Kuperman (2001), and Uvin focus on maintaining rationality through the rational behavior of outsiders, Uvin focusing on rational behavior that will not exacerbate internal propensities, and Jones and Kuperman on rational behavior that will counteract such propensities once they break into open violence.

Cultural explanations, in contrast, do not presume a universal dichotomy of rational and irrational. Violent conflict is primarily a product of *cultural* conflict and not of a quest for power in this world, conflict which only ends with the supercession of both cultures in a new way of life. Construction of the objectified world is a result of tradition shaping our norms, beliefs, and even character, norms that lead either to clashes with others who construct the objectified world differently, or to passivity in the face of such clashes. It is clear that in two types of rational accounts – Uvin (1998) and Jones (2001)/ Kuperman (2001) – and in the cultural accounts, only the superior culture and rationality of outsiders can prevent disaster. It is to the role of bystanders (passive and active), active subverters, or abettors that I now turn.

Abettors, subverters, and bystanders

If rational models of explanations *dominate* the explanations for the genocide itself – though the Uvin (1998), Jones (2001) and Kuperman (2001) accounts are clearly exceptions in dealing with a rational failure with respect to outsiders – cultural models tend to dominate in explaining the role of bystanders.

Samantha Power (2002) and Michael Barnett (2002, 2003) offer two other types of cultural explanation that focus on the role of interveners, in this case explaining why potential interveners failed to intervene and stop the genocide, where culture once again represents a set of norms and habits,[11] mental and behavioral, characteristic of an institution, each institution reflecting its uniqueness and difference from other cultures in the particular set of norms that characterize it and the historical explanation for their predominance. In Barnett, culture stresses social and cognitive processing more than institutional patterning. Barnett's empathetic account of decision-making within

the context of UN norms does not prevent him from unabashedly condemning the United States and Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Barnett finds UN bureaucratic procedures blameworthy and "simply unconscionable" (2002, p. 20). For Barnett, UN indifference was rooted in a principled concern for the survival of the United Nations, the principle of neutrality, an accumulation of personal and institutional strategic and expedient steps, failures in communication between the Secretariat and the Security Council, and the silence of Boutros Boutros-Ghali on the genocide until after the withdrawal of the bulk of UNAMIR troops.

If Barnett (2002, 2003) focused on an international agency, Power (2002) stressed the role of the state, in her case, the most powerful state, the USA. For Power, expanding on the initial lead of Holly Burkhalter (1994a, 1994b), the policy of nonintervention in the face of genocide was part of a consistent American cultural pattern that can only be counteracted by developing enhanced moral sensitivities. This historical propensity was reinforced by familiar expectations of large-scale ethnic violence in the region that contributed to American inaction and irresponsibility. Power notes Clinton's failure to consult Joyce Leader, the U.S. political officer in Rwanda, after her return in April 1994, and his failure to assemble his senior political advisers to consider diplomatic intervention. Power documents the belated and ineffective efforts to send reinforcements to Dallaire of Senator Paul Simon (D-Illinois), the chairman of the foreign relations committee on Africa, and Senator James (Jim) Jeffords (R-Vermont), the ranking Republican on the committee, who retrospectively blamed the lack of public support.

However, this account seems inconsistent with Jones' (2001) portrait of the United States' role at the Arusha talks characterized as governed simply by a desire to end a conflict in which it had no strategic or economic interest. As a result, the US was trusted both by the RPF and the government of Rwanda delegations. The US served as a source of creative ideas, friendly persuasion, and leverage (p. 75). The other side of the story is that when the crunch came, as Barnett (2002), Melvern (2000), Power (2001), and Ronayne (2001) all show, the United States insisted on a weak peacekeeping mandate which undermined the Arusha Accords from the start by limiting any independent arms enforcement actions; gave weak support to a UN peacekeeping force limited in size owing to the hostility of Congress; supported phased deployment only after no other state supported its proposal of a tiny force of 500 peacekeepers; blocked the supply of armored personnel carriers and helicopters promised; advocated complete withdrawal

once the genocide began, on the grounds that intervention in an active civil war was deadly; feared redeployment once genocide was undeniable, fearing the slippery slope of involvement (Power, 2002, p. 170); and contended that the other signatories were not committed to abiding by the Arusha Accords. Ronayne (2001, pp. 166–167) stressed the constraints of the PDD-25 mind-set, seen (as Power, 2001, pp. 381–382, documents) in the support in July/August 1994 for safe zones on the border that Dallaire called a mission "to put on a show at no risk," and which undermined his efforts to make UNAMIR II effective. In essence, Power and Melvin stress what the United States knew and could have known but did not act upon that knowledge.

In fact, the United States showed the greatest lack of commitment; obfuscated the identities of the parties to the agreement by collapsing the extremist spoilers into their enemies, the moderate Hutu, whom the extremists regarded as traitors and eliminated first; confused the civil war with the war against the civilian population (Adelman, 1998); and, when finally deciding in May 1994 to support UNAMIR II, after the genocide was well under way, tangled the provision of the authorized armored personnel carriers in a bureaucratic web of debates about capital, transportation, and insurance cost recovery.

Other scholars focus on the irresponsibility of other states. Reyntjens (1994) contributed an excellent study of the genocide itself, paying particular attention to the role of Belgium and the way it projected its own cultural divisions and nineteenth-century racist ideology on Rwanda. With respect to the French role, following Prunier (1995, 1999), there is general agreement on the self-serving role that France played (see also Callamard, 1999; Kroslak, 2003; Verschave, 1994), determined by its cultural concerns with its own honor and the maintaining of francophonie in Africa. Thus, Power restates the conventional view that France was "the least appropriate country to intervene because of its warm relationship with the genocidal Hutu regime" (2002, p. 380). Further, most scholars adhere to Prunier's explanation that, in June 1994**,** France launched the militarily substantial Operation Turquoise extremely quickly, if very late, but only for domestic public relations reasons and to protect its own political interests (Barnett, 2002, p. 147). Although the operation saved lives, it did not interfere with the hate radio broadcasts or try to stop the genocide and the escape of those responsible for it.

However, Mamdani (2001) and Melvern (2000) went even further than Prunier (1995) and followed President Kagame in claiming that France's provision of training and arms for the Habyarimana regime prolonged the conflict and allowed the extremists to consolidate their

hold on power, and, further, created the protected corridors by which those politically responsible for the genocide escaped to Zaire (Mamdami, pp. 254–255). Melvern (p. 214), like Prunier, attributes France's support for the Habyarimana regime to a small powerful group in the Elysée Palace surrounding the president, François Mitterand, and his son Jean-Christophe who enjoyed close personal ties with the Habyarimana clique. Barnett (2002, p. 171) charges France with protecting and continuing to supply arms to the genocidaires after the genocide had begun. Mamdani (p. 254) and Melvern (p. 183) go further and insist that France continued to supply the defeated Rwandan government in the refugee camps at Goma and, according to Mamdani, conspired with Sese Seko (Joseph-Désiré) Mobutu, to ensure that the extremists who controlled the camps were not disarmed. Jones (2001, pp. 76–77), while supporting the harsh criticism of France, argues that French diplomats also played a constructive role during the Arusha talks and at the UN.

If the universalist solutions are too grand, the cultural solutions are too limited, and both are self-contradictory. Humanitarian sensibilities are both unreliable and historically inadequate. Institutional systems for reality checks for our constructions of reality are necessary and helpful, and may lead to different decisions in certain circumstances, but in themselves are unlikely to do so. Strengthening the identification of crimes such as genocide and the enforcement mechanisms offers a worthy long-term goal, but the question remains of how to understand genocide *before* it becomes manifest in collective institutions. When it becomes collectively apparent, we are usually too late. In any case, any of these solutions by themselves are unlikely to work and will generally require the others as well.

General theory and specific explanations of the Rwandan genocide

How does the general theory of explanation of genocide reconcile with the specific explanations of the Rwandan genocide offered by different scholars (Adelman, 2004b)? The first and most outstanding difference is that most of the scholars explain the genocide by the inability of outsiders to be effective interveners; they do not focus, as does Straus (2006), on the causes and conditions that reinforced the activities of the general perpetrators. Even scholars like Ronayne (2001), who offer a cultural explanation of the genocide, focus on the powerlessness of nondominant cultural norms to offset the propensities in the culture to foster genocide.

What are those propensities? They are a truncated version of the second dimension in Waller's (2002) analysis, that is, the *cultural belief systems*, *authority orientation*, *moral disengagement* (fostered by ideology and propaganda), and a cultural system that fosters *rational self-interest*, both professional and personal. Further, virtually all authors in the *depiction* of the Rwandan genocide capture many if not most of the specific categories within the fourth dimensions in the Waller framework dealing with the process of dehumanization and blame of the Other (the Tutsi) and, to a lesser degree, depict the third dimension and the specific institutions that brainwashed a significant minority of the population to participate in genocide wherein individual identities were submerged within a framework of group-think.

Most analysts, however, focused on the failures of the bystanders. Uvin's (1998) economic model concentrated on the role of international agencies in fostering the fourth in the list of cultural norms (within the second dimension) that reinforce genocide. Mamdami (2001) concentrated on the state as an institution that had a reified belief system that made the divisions between Hutu and Tutsi superordinate to citizenship without any significant external challenges. Power focused on the economic and power interests of the USA that contributed to that country's indifference. Barnett (2002) pointed to the "instinct" for institutional self-preservation that made the UN behave so indifferently. Prunier (1995) and others pointed to the cultural flaws and inherent character of the French and their state's preoccupation with honor and the promotion of the French language. But why were all these states and the major international agency so afflicted with mindblindness with very different manifestations in each party?

What is most telling is that at the root of the failure in responsibility in all cases – recalling that most cases deal with the failure in responsibility of the bystanders – was not a desire for power over others, or an ethnocentrism or xenophobia, but, in fact, a concern with the identity of the self, whether as individuals or as collectivities. In all cases, each agent and agency was permeated with what was perceived to be a profound and higher vision of the entity that did not include a responsibility towards the Other as a prime consideration. Driven by this vision – whether it was the preservation of the United Nations, the extension of the power and interests of America, the honor of France or the glory of French, these self-images were critical in allowing an evasion of responsibility (Erskine, 2004).

In sum, I want to put forth the thesis that a comprehensive theory explaining genocide has to include an explanation of the effective inaction of the bystanders as well as the action of the perpetrators.

That requires a common ontological theory of human nature that, I argue, will not be found in any desire for power over others, ethnocentrism, or xenophobia which are all derivative. The basic ontology reveals itself as a *masculine* propensity in human nature to escape from responsibility though a devotion to mental constructions that cut us off from feeling both who we are as well as a concern for others. Civilization is the process of fostering sensitivity to such feelings, and creating institutions that enhance individual responsibility and do not foster creating intellectually constructed escapes. It is necessary to document the *character* of the organizers of genocide, and not just the culture that promotes irresponsibility both in perpetrators and interveners, and to document the character of those who resist and try to counteract genocide.

There is a need to resurrect a concern with virtue ethics, the version of ethics (as elaborated by Plato and Aristotle) that stresses those personal traits that make an individual moral, as opposed to abstract general principles from which our duties can be deduced (see Hursthouse, 1999, p. 36). That is not to say, however, that virtue ethics should be resurrected in their original form. Aristotle in his *Nicomachean Ethics* (Aristotle, ca. 335–323 BC/1941, I, 7–8) listed as individual virtues honor, reason, and the pursuit of self-satisfaction, virtues that are identified herein with promoting indifference and irresponsibility in dealing with victims of genocide. Aristotle defined the self-sufficient as that which is chosen for its own sake rather than for what it contributes to something else, that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing. Such a definition of virtue, I have implied, is but an expression of reason's narcissism, whereby the life of the rational contemplative mind, thought's focus on itself, is viewed as the highest virtue. It is perhaps unsurprising that this intellectual narcissism should be esteemed above all else by a philosopher who sees rational contemplation as the highest virtue and desires to place philosophical self-centeredness at the pinnacle of value. I have suggested that such a naturalistic masculine identification of virtue is itself the original sin in that it raises a natural propensity of most men to the highest rank of virtue when it is a trait and a disposition that leads to a theory of the state rooted in the self-centered thrust for power and promotion of self-interest, or in the highest esteem placed on the cultural characteristics of one's own group, and that must be counteracted by institutional and cultural mechanisms that make men care for the Other. However, the fuller development of this version of virtue ethics must await another time and place.

Notes

1. As many have documented (e.g., Horowitz, 1997), the instruments of state power are critical to committing genocide. (See also chapter 8, this volume.)
2. For a detailed analysis of the realistic possibility of an effective military intervention with a relatively small armed force, see Feil (1996). For a critique of this view, cf. Kuperman (2001). For support of Kuperman's thesis that the intervention had to occur quickly or else it would be ineffective see Straus (2006). For an ethical evaluation, see Wheeler (2002).
3. I have concentrated on theories that explain the event in terms of human agents. There are explanations that focus on issues such as the environment, demographic density, and competition for scarce resources. For a materialistic ecological explanation and formula for prevention that eschews a focus on human agents as fundamental, see Dobkowski and Wallimann (1998).
4. I have used Waller because he has a theory of disposition, one with which I disagree, but at least he has one. Many theorists of genocide do not. They concentrate on some or most of the categories concerned with socialization; see, for example, Alvarez (2001), Sykes and Matza (1957).
5. The phrase was originally introduced in Helen Fein, 1979, *Accounting for Genocide*, New York: Basic Books, and has been very widely adopted.
6. In the Hamitic theory, the germ of which can be found in the speculations of an English explorer of the Great Lakes district, John Hanning Speke, and which was developed by the White Fathers, a Catholic missionary group led by Bishop Leon Classe, Bantu-type Africans (Hutu) from the south were perceived to be descendants of Ham, who was the cursed son of Noah; successive generations inherit that curse which determines that they will always be inferior. Tutsi, by contrast, were perceived to be descendents of the White race who spoke a different language and belonged to a different culture that included the Egyptian, Berber, Cushitic, and Chadic languages – the Hamitic culture. The Hutu Bantus were descendents of Ham. The Tutsi were superior Hamites, Caucasians with lighter skin who civilized the Bantus. With colonization, in the late nineteenth century, colonial authorities – first the Germans and then the Belgians following WW I – viewed the Tutsi as martial pastoralists who had conquered the Bantu Hutu. Since there were clear differences in the appearance of the Tutsi royal family and the majority of the rest of the population, the colonizers projected these differences of physiognomy onto all Tutsi as racial differences. These distinctions were used to justify differential treatment in the allocation of political positions, and economic, but particularly educational, opportunities (Twagilimana, 2003).

7. Such forces need not simply be ones relegated to "superstition" – chance, luck, fate, or divine intervention – but may be perceived to reside in nature and/or history, even if the source of that belief may be rooted more in myth than actual history.
8. Social Dominance Theory (SDO) tries to account for social factors that are hierarchy enhancing (as expressed in racist, sexist, class, and ethnic domination) with a preference for group-based inequality, that is, the degree to which a person desires to establish and maintain the superiority of his or her own group over another group – what is called social dominance orientation. SDO argues that a hierarchy orientation can be reliably measured and, to the degree a society is hegemonic, can be correlated with socially reinforced habits of hegemony (SDO), or socially reinforced habits that negatively stereotype oppressed groups. (See Sidanius & Pratto, 2003. For earlier articulations, see Sidanius, 1993, and Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994. See also Jost & Thompson, 2000. For a critique of SDO, cf. Ray, 1990.)
9. For an account of a process to unwind such cultural reinforcement, see Smith (1998).
10. This position is clearly opposite to that of Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch (re the latter, see Human Rights Watch, 1993a, and 1993b; see also Jonassohn, 1998). Since human rights concerns direct one to take responsibility for the Other, it does not seem self-evident that a focus on human rights as the antidote to genocide is misplaced. The problem is not the emphasis on human rights, but on connecting the abuse of individuals with abstract, universal norms and standards when the issue is a particular community taking responsibility for protecting the Other.
11. The term "norms" is used in this chapter to stand for conceptualized collective internalized values that shape positive and negative attitudes; they are expressed in rational language as regulative rules directed at making decisions and determining actions following from such decisions and the regulative norms. Norms need not be explicitly consensual and may only be derived by abstracting from actual behavior. Norms may be constituted as a system of values based on a limited number of guiding principles and may be used to determine modes and conditions that govern separate decisions, as in the interpretations of the rules of engagement sent to General Dallaire by the Secretariat in New York that commanded Dallaire not to take a proactive role in uncovering hidden arms in Kigali that the rules of engagement he had produced would have allowed.

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10

Applying the Unified Instrumental Model of Group Conflict to Understanding Ethnic Conflict and Violence

The Case of Sudan

Victoria M. Esses and Lynne M. Jackson

Contrary to the idealistic hopes expressed at the end of the last century, the twenty-first century has not seen a reduction in ethnic conflict and violence globally. Instead, it seems that the developments of recent years have, if anything, served to exacerbate competition and strife among ethnic groups. Whether it is conflict between Indonesians and ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, between Russians and Chechnyans in Chechnya, between Arabs and Jews in the Middle East, between Arabs and Africans in Sudan, and closer to home, conflict between European Americans and Native peoples in North America, the intensity of ethnic conflict worldwide begs explanation. Certainly a number of psychological perspectives have been proposed to explain these conflicts. What has been lacking until recently, however, is a unified model that attempts to integrate both individual and societal factors, and consider how they may operate in concert to initiate and maintain ethnic strife.

In this context, the current chapter provides an overview of the Unified Instrumental Model of Group Conflict proposed by Esses, Jackson, Dovidio, and Hodson (2005), which builds on work by a number of psychologists in the area. The chapter then describes how this model may be used to explain major ethnic conflicts worldwide.

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In order to demonstrate the utility and contemporary relevance of this model, we link it to Chua's (2003) discussion of the negative consequences of globalization, and specifically apply the model to explaining one of the most devastating conflicts in recent years – the ongoing conflict between Arabs and Africans in Sudan. Conflict between Arabs and Africans in Sudan has persisted for over 50 years, with only a few years of intermittent peace. It has claimed over 2 million lives in the past 20 years alone, and has led to the displacement of over 5 million individuals (BBC News, 2006; infoplease, 2006; International Crisis Group, 2002; US Department of State, 2006). Most recently, although a ceasefire was struck between Sudan's Arab government in the north and several rebel African groups in the south, conflict between government troops and Africans in the Darfur region of Sudan has flared, with devastating consequences (BBC News, 2005; infoplease, 2006; Nolen, 2005; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2007). The recent violence and forced displacement of people in Darfur have been described as "the world's greatest humanitarian crisis" (Nolen, 2005; Rice & Smith, 2004), and it calls for understanding and response. This conflict also provides a prime example of how ethnic strife may arise and maintain itself over time, and thus can provide insight into other conflicts worldwide. Following our analysis of this conflict, we describe how understanding the roots of ethnic conflict may aid in developing effective strategies for intervention.

The Unified Instrumental Model of Group Conflict

Theories dealing with the origins and functions of intergroup conflict tend to place particular emphasis on the role of either socially prevalent ideologies (e.g., Bobo, 1999; Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997; Pratto, 1999; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, Burgess, & Mosso, 2001; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) or situational characteristics (e.g., Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong, 1998; Sherif, 1966; Stephan & Stephan, 2000) in eliciting ethnic antagonism. In our Unified Instrumental Model of Group Conflict, we discuss ways in which these ideologies and situational factors work together to create and exacerbate perceptions of intergroup competition and tension (see Figure 10.1).

In general, we suggest that ideologies and situational factors may be mutually reinforcing in initiating the process of perceiving group competition and conflict. In order for perceptions of group competition to arise, however, a relevant outgroup must be present, and perceived



Figure 10.1 The unified instrumental model of group conflict (from Esses, Jackson, Dovidio, & Hodson, 2005)

competition with that group will then be experienced. As a result of perceptions of competition and its concomitant affective, cognitive, and motivational components, attempts will be made to reduce this competition, including attitudes and behaviors developed to directly decrease the competitiveness of the outgroup, to increase the competitiveness of the ingroup, and to avoid contact between the groups. These attitudes and behaviors may then feed back on the ideologies and situational factors, reducing or exacerbating the belief structures and situational factors that initiated the process. In what follows, we discuss each of these steps in more detail.

Ideologies

Belief systems that promote group dominance and cultural worldviews may both lead to chronic perceptions of group competition, though the resources seen to be primarily at stake may differ (see also Duckitt, 2006). Belief systems that promote group dominance may primarily lead to perceived competition over relatively tangible resources, such as wealth and power. In order for some groups in society to dominate others, they must have disproportionate access to valued resources. It is not sufficient for them to have a great deal in an absolute sense; they must have more than others in a relative sense. As a result, in societies in which group dominance is evident, there is likely to be a perception that there are not enough valued resources to go around (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). This will lead to the belief

that groups are chronically competing for valued and scarce resources. Dominant group members are especially likely to hold a belief in zero-sum competition between groups because it is in their interests to maintain the hierarchy and to feel entitled to their position in the hierarchy (Bobo, 1999; Sidanius, Levin, & Pratto, 1996; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Indeed, research has demonstrated that members of dominant or majority groups in society are especially likely to be high in the individual difference known as social dominance orientation, and that social dominance orientation is highly correlated with a belief in zero-sum competition among groups (e.g., Esses et al., 1998; Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001; Esses, Hodson, & Dovidio, 2003; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1994). In turn, these zero-sum beliefs mediate the relation between social dominance orientation and negative attitudes toward other groups, particularly groups seen to be succeeding in society (Esses et al., 1998; Esses et al., 2001; Esses et al., 2003). Although belief systems that promote group dominance often lead to perceived competition over tangible resources such as jobs and power, previous research has demonstrated that high social dominance oriented individuals also perceive zero-sum competition for cultural and value dominance (Esses et al., 2003). This is likely because group dominance can be reinforced and justified with moral hegemony.

More general cultural worldviews may be the primary source of perceived competition over symbolic factors such as values. Worldviews, such as the belief that there is only one true religion (e.g., religious fundamentalism, Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992) or the view that one's cultural traditions are better than all others (characteristic of high right-wing authoritarians, Altemeyer, 1996), often have an absolute nature so that they not only prescribe appropriate modes of thinking and behaving, but proscribe others (Batson & Burris, 1994; Brewer, 1999; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Rosenblatt, 1990; Greenberg et al., 1997). As a result, groups may be seen as competing for demonstrating "truth." The correctness of a cultural worldview may be promoted, then, by proving the incorrectness of alternative views. Indeed, it has been demonstrated that individuals who are high in right-wing authoritarianism and religious fundamentalism not only strongly endorse particular values, but perceive other groups as a threat to their values (e.g., Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993; Jackson & Esses, 1997). As a result, they are likely to express negative attitudes and behaviors toward these groups (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Esses et al., 1993; Jackson & Esses, 1997, Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999).

Just as beliefs in group dominance lead primarily to perceived competition over material resources, but also secondarily to competition for moral hegemony to support power, cultural worldviews may lead mainly to competition over symbolic resources; but such competition for value hegemony may also involve more concrete factors, such as political representation.

Situational factors

Ideologies related to group dominance and cultural worldviews may lead to a relatively chronic belief in group competition. However, situational factors also have an important role to play in terms of making salient and heightening perceived competition among groups (LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961). We propose that instability and perceived challenges to the status quo are likely to have such effects. For example, major events such as economic upheaval and uncertainty or threat of war may lead to increased protection of tangible resources held by one's group, as well as protection of more symbolic factors such as values and positive group distinctiveness (Rothgerber, 1997; Worchel, & Coutant, 1997). More specific situational factors, such as high unemployment rates or attempts by some groups to impose their religious beliefs on others, may have similar effects (e.g., Esses et al., 1998). Challenges to the status quo such as collective action by underrepresented or disadvantaged groups may also lead to increased protection of both resources and values. In both cases, the increased motivation to protect group interests is likely to increase perceived competition with other groups. In addition, ideologies and situational factors that promote perceived group competition may be mutually reinforcing, so that the ideologies may heighten sensitivity to situational factors and the situational factors may reinforce and strengthen the ideologies. For example, high right-wing authoritarians are particularly sensitive to perceived threats to their values (Esses et al., 1993) and conversely, national threat and uncertainty have been shown to lead to increased expressions of authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1988; Doty, Peterson, & Winter, 1991; Sales, 1973).

Relevant outgroup

Although ideologies and situational factors may promote the likelihood of perceiving zero-sum competition among groups, some groups are

more likely to be perceived as competitors than are others. Groups that are salient and distinct from the ingroup are especially likely to stand out as potential competitors. For example, groups that are separated culturally, linguistically, economically, politically, or based on appearance are especially likely to be identified as potential competitors, as are groups that are large or are increasing in size (e.g., Brewer, 1979; Masgoret, Esses, & Ward, 2004). In addition, however, groups are most likely to be identified as potential competitors to the extent that they are seen as likely to be successful in enacting changes in the status quo (see also Allport, 1954; Bobo, 1999). Thus, groups that are seen as actively seeking social change and are likely to be successful in taking resources or challenging values are most likely to be seen as competitors. For example, as Blacks have made gains in the United States, they have been more likely to be seen as a competitive threat to Whites (e.g., Bobo, 1988; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996). Similarly, as same-sex couples have gained rights in a number of countries, criticism of gay rights, such as the legalization of same-sex marriage, is often expressed in zero-sum terms such that benefits for same-sex couples are described as a loss for everyone else. For example, an article posted on the website of Concerned Women for America explicitly states that "Homosexual marriage will devalue your marriage," and, in this context, argues that, "Any time a lesser thing is made equal to a greater, the greater is devalued" (LaRue, 2003).

Perceived competition with outgroups

The propensity to perceive group competition in response to ideological and situational factors, and the presence of a relevant outgroup together lead to perceived competition with that group. This perceived competition may have cognitive, affective, and motivational components. The cognitive component may involve not only beliefs about the nature of the competition with this group (e.g., zero-sum beliefs relevant to the nature of the resources seen to be at stake; Esses et al., 2003) but, as suggested by Fiske and her colleagues (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002), stereotypes specifically associated with perceived competition, including perceived lack of warmth of the group. The affective component may involve anxiety and fear (Fiske & Ruscher, 1993; Stephan & Stephan, 2000), as well as more specific emotions directed toward the group, such as envy or contempt (Fiske et al., 2002). Finally, the perceived competition is likely to elicit a motivation to reduce the sense of group competition and the negative emotions that may accompany it.

Attempts to reduce competition

Attempts to reduce group competition may take a variety of forms, reflecting various manifestations of prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory behavior toward outgroups. We discuss three general strategies here, though others may certainly exist. The first two strategies correspond to the distinction between outgroup derogation and discrimination versus ingroup enhancement and preferential treatment (Brewer, 1999, 2001). A group may attempt to reduce the outgroup's perceived competitiveness by expressing negative attitudes and attributions about members of the other group in an attempt to convince one's own group and other groups of the competitor's lack of worth. This may include heightened endorsement of stereotypes about the outgroup, used to justify the system as it currently exists and establish the lack of worth of the outgroup (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 2001). Attempts to reduce the outgroup's competitiveness may also entail overt discrimination and violence used to weaken and eliminate the group (e.g., Bobo, 1999; Jackson & Esses, 2000; Pratto & Lemieux, 2001). Alternatively, a group may attempt to increase the ingroup's competitiveness through the expression of ingroup-enhancing attitudes aimed at convincing one's own group and other groups of the ingroup's entitlement to the resources at stake, be they tangible resources or more symbolic moral certainty and social value (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 2001). Attempts to increase the ingroup's competitiveness may also entail preferential treatment in the allocation of positive outcomes (Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). The third strategy that may be used to reduce group competition is avoidance. The competitor outgroup may be denied access to the ingroup's territory or kept at a distance (e.g., Esses et al., 1998, Bobo, 1988). In addition, the outgroup may be denied voice so that its challenges to the status quo are silenced (McFarland & Warren, 1992). As a result, the competition, or the salience of the competition, may be reduced.

Feedback loops

The cycle does not end here, however. Behaviors designed to reduce group competition may feed back to the ideologies and situational factors that elicited the competition. For example, outgroup derogation, ingroup enhancement, and avoidance may reinforce the ideologies of group dominance and strengthen the perceived "correctness" of one's worldview, increasing the likelihood of further perceptions of competition. In terms of situational factors, however,

if successful, the attempts to reduce competition may increase the stability of the system and reduce challenges to the status quo, so that situational factors promoting group competition are no longer operating. As a result of mutual effects of group ideologies and situational factors, further group competition may or may not be perpetuated.

Negative Consequences of Globalization

Aspects of the international context, such as trends toward globalization, may set the stage for the generation of group competition and conflict within a nation. Indeed, Chua (2003) has argued persuasively that globalization and the American-led spread of free markets and democracy worldwide have had devastating consequences in terms of promoting group hatred and ethnic conflict. She suggests that free markets and democracy often benefit different ethnic groups within a country so that conditions become highly unstable and what she has described as "combustible." In particular, Chua argues that free markets benefit mainly "market-dominant minorities" – ethnic minorities who already hold a disproportionate share of economic power and wealth within a country – so that they become even more wealthy and may come to control symbols of the nation, such as diamonds in South Africa or oil in Russia. In terms of our model, this type of dynamic would reinforce the material and ideological dominance of those in power. At the same time, Chua points out, the promotion of democracy increases the often subordinate majority groups' political power and voice, which in our terms increases their salience as competitors. The resentment and hatred directed toward the dominant ethnic minorities by the majority groups may result in fear and anxiety about challenges to the status quo (perceptions of competition) on the part of the ethnic minorities. Chua argues that a backlash is likely to result. Consistent with our model, Chua shows that this can take a variety of forms, including ethnonationalist movements led by political demagogues that attempt to reclaim the country's wealth and symbols for the majority group, attempts by the dominant minority to suppress the power and voice of the majority group, and outright violence between the groups.

Chua's explanation of the negative consequences of globalization complements the Unified Instrumental Model of Group Conflict by showing how international contexts influence perceptions of, and relations between, groups within a nation. This link between the international

and national context is evident in the ongoing conflict between Arabs and Africans in Sudan, the context to which we now turn.

Application to the Ongoing Conflict in Sudan

Background

Sudan is a large country in Northern Africa with an estimated population of 40 million and two distinct major cultural groups – Muslim Arabs and non-Arab Black Africans who are predominantly Christian or Animist. Muslim Arabs mainly live in the north of the country in which most of the major urban centers are situated, whereas non-Arab Black Africans generally live in the south, which is more rural (BBC News, 2006; infoplease, 2006; US Department of State, 2006). Major conflicts between the northern Arabs and southern Africans in Sudan have repeatedly occurred, with only a few years of intermittent peace, since Sudan obtained independence from Great Britain in 1956. These conflicts have claimed over 2 million lives in the past 20 years alone, and have led to the displacement of over 5 million individuals (BBC News, 2006; infoplease, 2006; International Crisis Group, 2002; US Department of State, 2006). Most recently, although a ceasefire was struck between Sudan's Arab government in the north and several rebel African groups in the south in 2005, conflict between Arab government troops and Africans in the Darfur region of Sudan has flared, with devastating consequences (BBC News, 2005; infoplease, 2006; Nolen, 2005; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2007).

The Unified Instrumental Model of Group Conflict may be used to shed light on factors that have instigated and maintained these repeated and seemingly unsolvable conflicts. Therefore, we describe next how various aspects of the historical and current context in Sudan fit into each of the cells of the model presented in Figure 10.1 and described above.

Ideologies

To begin, the ideologies held by Arab Muslims in Sudan set the stage for ethnic conflict. For centuries, the northern Arabs in Sudan have held a disproportionate share of the resources and political power within the country (International Crisis Group, 2002; US Department of State, 2006). Correspondingly, they have historically seen the Black Africans

as inferior to themselves and have taken southern Africans as slaves (American Anti-Slavery Group, 2005). Indeed, the word used by the Arabs to refer to Africans is "abid," which means slave (Knickmeyer, 2004). Thus, it is clear that the Muslim Arabs in Sudan hold beliefs about their dominance and entitlement to resources in Sudan.

At the same time, the northern Arabs have also attempted to spread their religious beliefs and make Sudan an Islamic state. The government has been described as authoritarian, with all political power in the hands of the president (International Crisis Group, 2002; Reuters AlertNet, 2005). In 1983 the Muslim president, Jaafar Nimeiri, implemented Sharia Law in Sudan, and the ruling party has attempted to impose it throughout the country up until the most recent Accord of 2005 (Ockenden International, 2006; US Department of State, 2006). As a result, Islamic Law was made the basis of the national legal system and was imposed on non-Muslims and secular Muslims. This religious domination has been resisted by non-Muslims and by secular Muslims, leading to increased suppression of alternative religions (US Department of State, 2006). Overall, then, it seems that northern Arabs in Sudan not only wish to dominate economically and politically, but in terms of cultural and value dominance.

Situational factors

Many of the situational factors described in the Unified Model as promoting group competition and strife are evident in Sudan. First, the country has undergone decades of instability, beginning when the northern Arabs and southern Blacks were forced together into one nation by British colonists (Salopek, 2003). Drought and overgrazing of arable land has led to major food shortages and famine (Anderson, 2004; Salopek, 2003; Suliman, 2004). This has led to competition between African farmers and nomadic Arab groups for remaining arable land (Anderson, 2004; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2007; Suliman, 2004). A government plan to divert water from the Sudd swamp in the south to grow cash crops in the north has been described as contributing to the tension and the civil war (Salopek, 2003). The ongoing civil war has led to instability throughout the country and to the mass migration of millions of people. The reduction in international trade because of the civil war has promoted further economic instability. Indeed, Sudan has been described as "buffeted by civil war, chronic political instability, adverse weather, high inflation, a drop in remittances from abroad, and counterproductive economic policies" (Sudan.net, 2005).

At the same time, rebel groups such as the Sudan People's Liberation Army have made demands for change to address long-standing grievances (BBC News, 2005; US Department of State, 2004). These groups have made a number of successful raids on government sites. These challenges to the status quo have served to exacerbate the situation and enhance the attempts by the Arab northerners to impose their dominance. Although southern groups have signed a peace accord with the government, challenges have now been launched by Muslim Africans in the Darfur region, who claim to have been neglected by the government (Anderson, 2004; BBC News, 2005; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2007; US Department of State, 2004). Thus, repeated challenges to the status quo are evident.

Relevant outgroup

Groups are likely to be seen as a competitive threat when they are salient and distinctive and when there is a perceived high likelihood that they will succeed in enacting change. In Sudan, Arabs and Africans are very distinctive, differing in ethnicity, physical appearance, language, affluence, means of livelihood, culture, and often religion (International Crisis Group, 2002). In terms of the likelihood of enacting change, as mentioned above, rebel groups have been quite successful in their raids on government sites; this has led to increased attempts at suppression. For example, renewed government support of militia killings came shortly after the Sudanese Liberation Army staged a successful attack on the al-Fasher airport in 2003, demonstrating its ability to create problems for the government (Anderson, 2004; BBC News, 2005).

Perceived competition with outgroup

The ideologies held by Muslim Arabs in Sudan, and the country-wide instability and challenges to the status quo by Black Africans has led to perceived competition between the groups. The conflict has been described as based on competition over ethnic and religious identity, and the south's resources, including water, agricultural land, and oil (International Crisis Group, 2002; Salopek, 2003). The beliefs that are a component of this perceived competition are zero-sum in nature, such as the belief that in order to get ahead, Arab Muslims must take land and resources from Africans, and the belief that Islamic Law should apply to all of Sudan and not only to Muslims (Anderson, 2004).

Competition over whether Sudan is Arabic or African is also evident. For example, the Janjawiid – government-supported Arab militia – claim that the government has told them "Sudan is a country for Arabs" (Amnesty International, 2004). The affective component of the competition has been described as including contempt, anxiety, and fear (Anderson, 2004). Finally, the perceived competition clearly has a motivational component involving the goal of reducing the sense of competition and the negative emotions that accompany it. Thus, for example, Arab fighters talk about their desire to "wipe out" the African ethnic groups.

Attempts to reduce competition

All three classes of strategies for reducing competition have been attempted by the Arabs in Sudan. First, most recently in Darfur, there have been concerted efforts to wipe out Africans so that they are no longer a competitive threat to the Arab elite. The government has not only helped organize and supported the Janjawiid, through the provision of weapons and through a failure to intervene in their attacks on civilians, but has actively assisted them through bombing of villages (Human Rights Watch, 2004). In turn, the Janjawiid have implemented a coordinated effort to burn villages, destroy food stocks and water resources, steal livestock, and rape and kill African civilians (Amnesty International, 2004; BBC News, 2005; Human Rights Watch, 2004; Nolen, 2005; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2007). The frequent rape of women and girls, often in public, has been described as an attempt to humiliate African women and also their families and communities (Amnesty International, 2004). Racial slurs are also used by the Janjawiid as they attack villages (Frist, 2004). In addition, international relief assistance has been purposely hindered so that the dire conditions in remaining villages and in refugee camps are not alleviated (Human Rights Watch, 2004; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2007; Reuters AlertNet, 2005; US Department of State, 2004).

These acts have been described by the Arabs as an attempt to prevent civilians from providing support, food, and shelter to rebel troops, but are also clearly aimed at attempting to eliminate the African groups as competitors (Human Rights Watch, 2004; Reuters AlertNet, 2005). For example, a female refugee who was captured and raped by Arab militia members stated that they claimed, "You, the black women, we will exterminate you, you have no god" (Amnesty International, 2004). Similarly, the Arab militias are at

times accompanied by Arab women singers known as Hakama who sing their praise and encourage the attackers (Amnesty International, 2004). One reported song included the following: "The blood of the Blacks runs like water, we take their goods and we chase them from our area and our cattle will be in their land. The power of al-Bashir belongs to the Arabs and we will kill you until the end, you Blacks, we have killed your God" (Amnesty International, 2004). The perception of zero-sum competition and the intermingling of competition for resources and value dominance are clearly evident in this song, as is the aim to wipe out the Africans.

Second, the northern Arabs have worked to increase the competitiveness, or perceived competitiveness, of their own group. At a behavioral level, the Arab-controlled government has worked hard to develop and bolster its financial security while excluding Africans. For example, up until very recently, the oil resources in the south benefitted only the Arabs, while excluding African southerners. Indeed, some aid agencies claim that the attacks on civilians were driven by the Sudanese government's desire to clear people from the land in order to begin drilling oil fields (Reuters AlertNet, 2005). Finally, rape itself may be described as an attempt to increase the competitiveness of the Arab minority. In support of this, Arab militias are reported as saying, "We want to make a light baby. You get out of this area and leave the child when it's made" (Wax, 2004). Similarly, an international aid worker is quoted as saying, "The pattern is so clear because they are doing it in such a massive way and always saying the same thing . . . It's systematic. Everyone knows how the father carries the lineage in the culture. They want more Arab babies to take the land. The scary thing is that I don't think we realize the extent of how widespread this is yet" (Wax, 2004).

Finally, the strategy of avoidance has been implemented. Perhaps most evident is the fact that millions of Black Africans have been driven from their villages, and have sought refuge in neighboring countries. In addition, African groups have been denied a voice so that their challenges to the status quo are silenced. Examples of this include heavy restrictions placed on the media and the attempt to silence victims of the conflict. In terms of the media, Sudan has one of the most restrictive media environments on the African continent. Radio and television broadcasts are state owned and under direct government control, and are required to reflect government policy. There are military censors who ensure that the news reflects the government's views (BBC News, 2006). The privately owned press has a greater degree of freedom, but the government also has considerable influence over

what is published (BBC News, 2006). In terms of attempts to silence the victims of the conflict, government workers have been sent to villages to threaten people to stop talking about the widespread rapes or face beatings and death (Wax, 2004). In addition, journalists and media representatives have been threatened, detained, and even killed for publishing stories without official permission (King, 2006; Reporters Without Borders, 2006).

Feedback loops

It is certainly the case that the attempts to reduce group competition described above have served to exacerbate the very factors that led to this competition in the first place. As mentioned above, the civil war has markedly increased instability within the country, providing additional threats to the dominant Muslim Arab group economically, politically, and culturally. In particular, the civil war has severely damaged Sudan's economy, restricted domestic and foreign investment, and required government investment in the conflict of approximately 20–40% of its annual budget (Oxford Analytica Brief, 2002). Politically, the government has lost much of its international support; for example, the United States has threatened sanctions against specific individuals in the Sudanese government, including travel bans and freezing of assets (Energy Information Administration, 2004). In terms of cultural threat, it is believed that a UN peacekeeping force is not being allowed into Darfur because of a fear that it would be hostile to the continued cultural dominance of the Islamic minority in the country (Doyle, 2006).

The civil war has also likely reinforced the ideology held by the Arab minority within the country. The vehement nature of the conflict and the slaughter of thousands of civilians have surely served to reinforce the Arab perception of superiority and dominance, as suggested by the Janjawiid's continued use of the term slave to refer to African women and their use of the term "Fursan," meaning knight, to refer to themselves (Amnesty International, 2004). As a result of all of these factors, the conflict seems unlikely to abate without external intervention.

Strategies for change

It is perhaps naïve and idealistic to imagine that we can contribute to successful interventions in conflicts such as that in which Sudan is embroiled. The long-standing and complex array of factors contributing to this conflict suggests that any single intervention is unlikely to

be effective. Nonetheless, by analyzing these factors within the framework of the Unified Instrumental Model of Group Conflict, we can gain an understanding of, and perhaps contribute to, solutions that target the underlying foundations of this conflict. As described above, an integral element of the conflict in Sudan is competition, including competition over both symbolic resources, such as political power, identity, and religion, and competition over resources, such as land, water, and oil. Returning to our roots as social psychologists, perhaps cooperative interdependence strategies for reducing group competition first proposed by Sherif (1966), and the more recent Common Ingroup Identity Model developed by Gaertner & Dovidio (2000), can be mobilized in this regard.

Sherif (1966, p. 153) stated: "If hostile attitude and deed are the outcome of groups confronting one another with incompatible and mutually exclusive claims, conversely, the reduction of hostility must depend on intergroup action to achieve goals that are desired by all parties and that require their cooperation." Surely this is the case in Sudan. The biggest potential asset currently available in Sudan is the presence of oil fields, with a claim that Sudan oil reserves may be as much as 400 billion barrels, almost double that of Saudi Arabia (International Crisis Group, 2002). However, until the civil war is ended, none of the ethnic groups in Sudan will be able to fully benefit from this resource, owing to embargos, nervousness on the part of some foreign investors, disruption of oil lines and roads by rebel forces, and general economic instability (International Crisis Group, 2002). Thus, the goal of profiting from this resource requires cooperation among the Arab and African groups. It is encouraging to note that recent peace deals include a sharing of oil revenues between the south and north so that both Arabs and Africans benefit, though a number of regions of the country are still excluded from this sharing of wealth (BBC News, 2006).

Peace initiatives in Sudan must focus on reducing competition at both a symbolic and material level. Thus, the most recent accord between the ruling party and rebel groups in the south, which includes establishing a coalition government between the ruling National Congress party and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, the decentralization of power, sharing of oil revenues, and integrating the military (Ockenden International, 2006), seems like a step in the right direction. Unfortunately, however, not all ethnic groups in Sudan were included in this accord, resulting in the current conflict in Darfur. Thus, if peace is to be established, cooperative interdependence among all regions of the country must be promoted. Suggestions provided by

the International Crisis Group (2002) that are very appropriate in this regard include establishing a federal constitution not based on religion but also not labeled as secular, establishing a coalition government with representation by all major ethnic groups within the nation, and developing an internationally monitored mechanism for wealth sharing.

Not only are these proposals for cooperative interdependence likely to reduce conflict between Arab and African groups in Sudan through reduction in competition among the groups, but cooperative goals are likely to influence perceptions of group representations so that the various ethnic groups in Sudan may in time come to see themselves as part of one superordinate group – the Sudanese. As such, this common ingroup identity may promote further cooperation and more favorable attitudes and behavior toward previously perceived enemies (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). The cycle of conflict and civil war may then be broken.

Conclusions

The Unified Instrumental Model of Group Conflict was developed in order to integrate and promote an understanding of the factors that underlie conflict and competition among groups in society. By applying it to large-scale ethnic conflicts such as that in Sudan, we hope to have demonstrated the utility of psychological perspectives for addressing global social issues. Psychologists should not shy away from the big issues that confront us today. Rather, our work complements that of other disciplines, such as sociology, political science, and economics, in attempting to promote a brighter future for all people.

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11

The Origins of Genocide and Mass Killing, Prevention, Reconciliation, and their Application to Rwanda

Ervin Staub

In this chapter I will review a conception I have developed of the origins of genocide and mass killing, and its implications for how such violence between groups might be prevented. I will also discuss avenues to reconciliation in the aftermath of violence between groups (see Staub, 2006). I will exemplify the conception, which I have developed in the course of examining a number of different instances of genocide and mass killings – the genocide against the Jews, the genocide of the Armenians, the "autogenocide" in Cambodia, the disappearances in Argentina, and the mass killing in Bosnia (Staub, 1989, 1996, 2003) – by focusing on the Rwandan genocide (Staub, 1999). I will also briefly discuss how, after extreme violence between groups, new violence might be prevented and peaceful relations promoted by healing the psychological wounds created by the past and by advancing reconciliation. I will discuss these issues as well in the context of the Rwandan genocide. My associate Laurie Pearlman and I have been conducting varied projects in Rwanda since 1998 to promote healing and reconciliation (Staub, 2000; Staub, Pearlman, & Miller, 2003; Staub, Pearlman, Gubin, & Hagengimana, 2005; Staub, Pearlman, Weiss, & van Hoek, 2007; Staub & Pearlman, 2001, 2006). A primary aim of these projects has been to prevent renewed violence.

Genocide and mass killing have similar roots. When the influences leading to mass violence are present, and as violence evolves, it is impossible to predict whether it will become a mass killing or a genocide.

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Mass killings have often been way stations to genocide, the latter happening sometimes decades after the former, as in the case of the Armenian genocide and Rwanda. Both understanding the roots and prevention must therefore focus on intense violence between groups – usually between subgroups of society when we consider mass killing or genocide – not specifically on genocide.

In the genocide in Rwanda truly neighbors were killing neighbors. The perpetrators included part of the military, militias composed of young men – the Interahamwe – as well as neighbors, and even relatives in mixed Tutsi Hutu families. In the course of about 100 days, from April through June 1994 at least 700,000 Tutsis were killed, with also about 50,000 Hutus who were considered politically unreliable, or political opponents, or as violence evolved were killed for personal reasons (des Forges, 1999). One of our Tutsi research assistants experienced her neighbors coming into her home and killing her father and brothers. Then other neighbors came who wanted to kill the women, but the neighbors who had killed the men stopped them (Staub & Pearlman, 2001).

Before I continue, I want to address a concern, which I had even when I wrote my book *The roots of evil: The origins of genocide and other group violence*, published in 1989, which presents in detail my analysis of the influences leading to genocide (although I will also discuss here later additions to the conception, particularly the importance of victimization and psychological wounds in creating violence: see Staub, 1998, 2003). This concern was that survivors of genocide might interpret the effort to understand the roots of genocide as excusing perpetrators. While understanding the influences that have led to people's actions does tend to create empathy with them, it does not excuse them. This is evident to scholars who engage in genocide studies, but not necessarily to people outside this circle, and perhaps not to survivors or perpetrators of, and passive bystanders to, genocide and mass killing.

The influences that move a group, whether an ethnic group, an ideological movement, or some other group to genocide can be very powerful, but they do not eliminate choice. Even though these influences affect all members of a society, only some plan a genocide or participate in it. Furthermore, some members of the group that perpetrates genocide – some Germans and other Europeans during the Holocaust, Turks at the time of the genocide of the Armenians, and Hutus in Rwanda – endanger their own lives to rescue people, to save lives.

Moreover, many of the influences leading to genocide are created by the group itself that becomes the perpetrator: by devaluing the members of the other group, by scapegoating them – blaming them when society faces difficulties of life – and by creating ideologies in which this other becomes an enemy. As a specific example of a perpetrator group creating such influences, in Rwanda the Hutus were severely repressed and exploited before 1959. The Tutsis were already dominant before colonial rule, but the Belgians elevated them and had them rule in their behalf. The Hutus were repressed, the conditions of their life difficult. In 1959 there was a Hutu uprising, with about 50,000 Tutsis killed. After that, the Hutus remained in power, first under Belgian colonial rule, and then when the country gained independence in 1962.

The Hutus intensely devalued, discriminated, and engaged in violence against Tutsis, including repeated mass killings. But perpetrating such violence increased the woundedness they had suffered from their treatment before 1959 (see below) and contributed to the evolution of violence, influences that make genocide more likely. Humanizing Tutsis and creating a just, equal relationship with them would have promoted reconciliation and peace.

Perpetrators are responsible for the choices they make, which in turn exert an influence on them. While understanding does not excuse perpetrators, it tells us what to do to prevent violence. However, it also enlightens us to an important truth: If we want to avoid violence between groups, it is essential to prevent and/or change the *conditions in a society and the nature of the culture* that move groups toward violence. As we shall see, understanding is itself an avenue to psychological healing, which makes new violence less likely (Staub, 2006).

Starting Points: Difficult Life Conditions and Destructive (versus Constructive) Reactions to Them

Genocide is the outcome of the joining of varied influences. To understand genocide, one must consider the psychology of individuals and groups, the culture of a society, its institutions, political system and political processes, and current social conditions (Staub, 1989, 2003).

One group of influences I consider to be starting points. I call them difficult life conditions. They include severe economic problems, political disorganization and upheaval, or very great social/cultural changes. Sometimes political upheavals involve the creation of new

regimes. Another starting point is persistent conflict between groups in a society. Often difficult life conditions and group conflict are both present as starting points. War between nations sometimes contributes (Fein, 1993; Melson, 2003), but the hostility that creates genocide is not usually the outcome of the war. In a number of genocides, for example in Germany and Turkey, the war was not between the groups that became the perpetrators and victims in the genocide. War makes violence more acceptable – contributes to the evolution of violence – and may also be a cover under which genocide can be more easily perpetrated.

Some of these life conditions create material deprivation for people. But beyond that, both difficult life conditions and persistent conflict frustrate universal psychological needs in whole groups of people. These include the needs for feeling secure; for feeling effective and able to influence important events in one's life; for a positive identity; for positive connections to other people; for a comprehension of reality and of one's own place in the world (Kelman, 1990; Staub, 1989, 2003). All these needs are frustrated by the disorganization, confusion, chaos, and threat represented by difficult life conditions. Intense, persistent conflict creates insecurity, often threatens identity and affects people's comprehension of reality.

As I will describe below, such difficult life conditions give rise to psychological processes in individuals and whole groups of people, and social processes in groups, that are destructive. They lead groups to turn against each other. To reduce the likelihood of mass killing or genocide, we must learn to deal with such difficult life conditions constructively. Societies do not know how to avoid these, and when they arise the challenge is to avoid responding to them in destructive ways.

At times the starting point for group violence is self-interest. This has most often been the case when indigenous groups are the victims (Hitchcock & Twedt, 1997). Wanting their land can lead to direct or indirect (depriving them of food or other necessities) violence against them. But many of the other influences I describe below are still usually present.

In Rwanda, many of the elements of difficult life conditions were present before the genocide. There were economic problems, due especially to the great decline in the price of coffee and tin in the international markets, the main exports of Rwanda. There was intense conflict between Hutus and Tutsis that led, starting in 1990, to a civil war (des Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2001; Staub, 1999). There was political conflict and disorganization, with political parties allowed to operate for the first time, in the context of the civil war.

Devaluing versus Humanizing the Other

One frequent, destructive response to difficult life conditions is *scapegoating*, blaming some group for the life problems, or conflict, or past violence, even if the violence has been mutual. Another frequent response is increased *devaluation* of another group. In many societies some group, usually a minority group, has been devalued in the course of history. This devaluation becomes part of the culture. There are many forms of devaluation, such as seeing members of another group as less intelligent and lazy, or as exploitative of one's own group, untrustworthy and immoral. I also consider it a devaluation when one group sees another as dangerous, as a threat, when this is not the case, or when a group greatly exaggerates the threat another represents. When intense devaluation is directed at a group that in spite of being devalued does well economically, or socially in that its members have relatively good positions in society because of special skills or talents, this puts them into an especially vulnerable position (Staub, 1989).

It is normally a devalued group that becomes the scapegoat for life problems. When conflict and mutual antagonism, hostility and violence are present, regardless of the role of the groups in it, each group tends to blame the other, seeing its own cause as just, and the harmful actions of one's own group as a necessary, defensive response (Staub & Bar-Tal, 2003).

Devaluation of the other group is a core, crucial element in violence, especially in genocide. Historical devaluation intensifies under difficult social conditions. Devaluation is in people's hearts and minds. But devaluation is solidified, strengthened, and maintained by discrimination against the devalued group. To properly understand the roots of extreme group violence, we must consider not only the psychology of individuals and whole groups, but also culture and structures. Discrimination is a matter of how institutions operate. Laws often institutionalize discrimination. Discriminatory laws and institutions are, in turn, justified by increased devaluation. While devaluation between groups in a society can be mutual, it is the more powerful group that can institutionalize devaluation through discriminatory laws and practices, practices that progressively enhance devaluation.

The scenario presented here, devaluation combined with discrimination, was very much present in Rwanda prior to the genocide. Intensely derogatory terms were applied to Tutsis. For many years they were discriminated against and the target of violence, and in the years just before the genocide, concentrated propaganda intensified

the devaluation. All this was crucial in leading to the genocide (des Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2001).

To prevent violence by groups, it is essential to humanize other groups and their members. Leaders expressing respect and describing the other group in positive ways can do this. Writers and journalists can do it, as they write about the other in ways that show their humanity. It can be done by any person who talks about positive experiences with, and views of, members of the other group. Eliminating discrimination and creating just structures and institutions greatly contribute to overcoming devaluation (Staub, 2006).

In Rwanda, the genocide was stopped by a Tutsi-led army, which defeated the government army. The new Tutsi-dominated government has created equal access to schools and other institutions, based on merit. This should have a humanizing effect. The societal recognition of the heroic actions of some Hutus, who endangered their own lives to save the lives of Tutsis during the genocide (Africa Rights, 2002), can also help humanize Hutus, in the eyes of Tutsis as well as in their own eyes. It is a positive sign that a decade after the genocide this has begun to happen in Rwanda (Staub & Pearlman, 2006).

Destructive Ideology versus Constructive Social Vision

Another frequent response to difficult life conditions is a destructive ideology. I define ideology as a vision of social arrangements, of how society should be organized. Ideologies often specify relationships between groups, the role of an ethnic group, nation, or political/ideological group in society or the world, and may also specify relationships among individual members of groups.

A positive vision is very important for people in difficult times. The ideologies that emerge in response to life problems often have two elements. They have a positive component that can give people hope, although at times this component, like nationalism and dominance over others, is only positive for members of the group that holds the ideology. But the ideologies that arise in response to life problems also tend to identify some group as standing in the way of the ideology's fulfillment. The identified enemy must be dealt with, so that the positive vision can be fulfilled. Often the destruction of this enemy is advocated, if not at first, then as violence evolves.

For example, in Cambodia the Khmer Rouge advocated the creation of total social equality. But they identified many groups – the former ruling class, intellectuals, and others – as incapable either of contributing

to the creation of, or even of accepting and living in, such a society. These groups were to be destroyed, or at the very least subjugated in cruel ways (Staub, 1989). In Rwanda, the genocide was powerfully moved forwards by an ideology of "Hutu power" (des Forges, 1999). This is an unusual case of the fusion of the two elements, the "positive vision" and the identification of an enemy, so that the two became one. The better world to be created was a world without Tutsis. The "positive element," a better world (for Hutus) fused with and became one with the negative element, identifying the Tutsis as enemies and their destruction.

It is important to create constructive social visions, especially in difficult times, that include all members of society. Such visions allow all members of society to work together for a better future. In Rwanda, since the genocide the government has propagated an ideology of unity, of one people, everybody a Rwandan, strongly discouraging people identifying themselves as Tutsi and Hutu and discussing differences between them based on such identification. This is a seemingly positive ideology. It is inclusive. It is a positive ideal. However, as a reality, it probably has to evolve progressively.

There is no firm knowledge in this domain, with only limited historical examples. But my analyses of group conflict, violence (Staub, 1989), and reconciliation (Staub, 2006) suggest to me that before Rwandans can experience themselves as one people, they have to deal with the intense devaluation and hostility toward each other that has become part of the culture, and has been intensified by persecution and mutual violence. This evolution or progression toward reconciliation needs to include healing from past wounds or psychological recovery. It can include groups and their members overcoming hostility by humanizing each other, not only in words, but through significant engagement by group members working together for shared goals (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). The exploration and detailed understanding of the roots of violence can also help (Staub, 2006 – see below). All this can promote reconciliation: two parties coming to accept each other.

In the former Yugoslavia, Tito did not allow an exploration of the Croat violence against Serbs during World War II. The lack of attention to the wounds and the enduring hostilities the past must have created was one likely source of the violence during the 1990s (Staub, 1996). In Rwanda, there is attention to the genocide, and more than one justice process in progress. There is awareness of the need to heal, and, among people we have worked with, even an awareness that all parties – survivors, returnees, perpetrators, passive members of the perpetrator group (and probably even rescuers) – need to heal.

But it is important to pay attention to the still almost certainly existing negative attitudes and fear of many Hutus and Tutsis toward each other, and to develop ways to humanize each other. This seems more difficult to do if in public discourse there can be no reference to the other, if everyone is simply Rwandese. These negative attitudes may be intensified by the Gacaca, a justice process that requires all members of the community to participate – whether giving testimony or being present as witnesses/observers (Honeyman et al., 2004; Staub, 2004). Survivors and other Tutsis hear again and again about the terrible violence against them, and Hutus who have not been perpetrators themselves feel again and again implicated as members of the group that engaged in such extreme violence.

Part of humanizing the other is to be aware of and acknowledge the other's needs. These are not only material needs, but also psychological. One of the latter is a need for a positive identity. Consider the experience of the Tutsis. Many of them returned to Rwanda after the genocidal government was defeated. Before that, they were refugees in other countries. These countries did not allow them to become citizens. The government of Rwanda did not allow them to return. They were not allowed to share an identity with people where they lived, and neither was their identity as Tutsi respected (Mamdani, 2001). Affirming a group's identity is a way of humanizing and showing respect for the group. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) – the group that came into the country in 1990 and started the civil war, and that stopped the genocide by defeating the government military – was created in part in response to this isolation, separation, and exclusion. Now all Rwandese are welcome in Rwanda, and the country is led by a predominantly Tutsi leadership. If many Hutus still consider themselves Hutu, which is likely, it seems of great importance to acknowledge that identity.

The importance of identity is shown in ethnopolitical conflicts in our contemporary age. Many of them have been referred to as "identity conflicts," the root of the conflict being the denial of the identity of a group (Chirot & Seligman, 2001). While the goal of overcoming past divisions and creating a country in which everyone considers himself or herself a Rwandan seems highly positive, as long as groups consider themselves separate, not acknowledging their identity is likely to create hostility. Groups should not be allowed to express their identity through hate speech and the advocacy of violence: That should be unacceptable everywhere, but especially in a country with the tragic recent history of Rwanda. But it seems important to give groups and their members a voice. The possibility to express and affirm identity

by a group that considers itself to have a separate identity may be essential for future peace. From that starting point, healing and reconciliation should facilitate an evolution toward an inclusive identity as Rwandans.

Unhealed Wounds versus Healing from Past Wounds

Individuals or groups that experience violence against them or other forms of intense victimization are deeply affected, in many ways. All their basic psychological needs are frustrated. In addition to potentially developing symptoms of trauma, members of a victimized group will feel diminished, vulnerable, and see the world and other groups as dangerous. New threats, such as conflict with another group, will be experienced more intensely. It becomes more likely that the group, feeling intensely threatened, will strike out to defend itself, even when forceful self-defense is not necessary. As a result, the victim group can become a perpetrator (Staub, 1998).

To avoid this, healing from the trauma of past victimization is essential. Healing requires mourning. Mourning requires remembering. While some people may need distance, initially, from the horrible events they have experienced, over time it is important that they engage with what has happened to them. Healing is facilitated by others' acknowledgment of the group's suffering, as well as by finding hope for a better future. The healing by Armenians has been very adversely affected by the denial by Turkey that a genocide was perpetrated against them, and by the joining of many countries in this denial (Hovannisian, 2003).

Since a mass killing or genocide is a societal event, and since many people are involved, healing will best happen in community. Part of our work in Rwanda has been to facilitate healing from the aftermath of genocide. Our focus has been person-to-person healing, people in the community helping each other, rather than trauma counseling, both because of the lack of available resources for trauma counseling, and as importantly, because community healing can be a powerful antidote to community trauma. People can help each other heal by becoming witness to each other's experiences, especially their painful experiences during the genocide, with empathy and caring. In small groups, people can hear and support each other (Staub & Pearlman, 2006). We have worked with facilitators who work with small groups in the community (Staub et al., 2005), with community leaders, journalists, and national leaders (Staub & Pearlman, 2006), and developed radio programs (Staub & Pearlman, 2006; Staub et al., 2007)

to promote understanding the roots of genocide, of avenues to prevention and reconciliation, of the psychological woundedness created by traumatic events, and of avenues to healing (with a focus on person-to-person and community approaches).

On the group level, healing may be advanced by commemoration and memorialization. It seems important that commemoration focus not only on woundedness, but also offer hope. But there is certainly a time course, in that early on survivors may need to focus on their woundedness. Over time, as healing has begun, it is important to shift to remembering and commemoration that also point to a hopeful future and the way members of the society can contribute to it.

How does all this apply to Rwanda? Hutus in Rwanda had been wounded by their diminished status and rights before 1959, as the Belgians elevated the Tutsis and had them rule in their behalf (des Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2001), a fairly common colonialist strategy. An uprising and violence by Hutus followed in 1959, a reaction to suppression and diminished status and rights. However, as Hutus gained power, their woundedness led to discrimination and violence against Tutsis, over many years, with both mass killings and more limited sporadic killings. As I have noted already, this was not inevitable – the government and the people could have chosen a constructive path leading to reconciliation. Their actions, instead of healing from the past, while greatly harming Tutsis, almost certainly increased the psychological woundedness of Hutus.

The violence was justified by devaluation and by the danger that Tutsis were perceived to represent. However, it must also have increased the feeling of threat, by creating fear of retaliation. The need to retain power intensified, because power might provide relative safety. Over time, the experience of Hutus before 1959 seemingly became what one specialist in ethnopolitical warfare, Volkan (1997, 1998), has called a "chosen trauma." Chosen traumas are important collective memories that become a lens through which a society or a group within a society sees the world and which guides its response to the world.

Healing may enable people who have suffered to feel empathy for others, and to act to prevent others' suffering. Healing can also help the Tutsis avoid the genocide becoming a chosen trauma. It can help avoid unnecessary violence by them, which is especially challenging when there is still a real threat, with past perpetrators still around. Other than those in prison, or recently released, the perpetrators are presumably mainly outside Rwanda; but their existence, and not knowing how the Hutu population in Rwanda feels at this time about Tutsis, represent a threat.

Healing by perpetrators

More and more research in the past decade indicates that people who inflict violence on others are traumatized by their actions and the consequences of those actions. This is especially the case when people engage in atrocities, in cruel and violent actions against innocent people (McNair, 2002; Staub & Pearlman, 2006). This is exactly the type of violence in which perpetrators of genocide or mass killing engage. In addition to being psychologically wounded by their actions, when the group process that leads to violence is stopped, the world's reactions bring perpetrators face to face with their transgression of both moral values and their own humanity.

Nonetheless, perpetrators tend to resist accepting that their actions were immoral and inhumane. They tend to continue to justify their actions by devaluing their victims, claiming that their behavior was a response to the other's actions, and by using their ideology to justify their actions. Pearlman and I (Staub & Pearlman, 2006) have come to believe that underlying this is unacknowledged guilt and shame. Healing may enable perpetrators to acknowledge their actions, to assume responsibility for them, and to begin to feel regret, sorrow, and empathy for their victims. Healing by perpetrators may require that others show empathy for them, a difficult task. To come to feel regret and sorrow for their actions may require them to be exposed to the suffering their group has caused, while receiving support as this happens.

The preceding discussion suggests the great importance of healing of the people of Rwanda from the trauma and psychological woundedness that has resulted from both the genocide and the history preceding it. Members of a group that perpetrated violence who were bystanders also need to heal from the psychological effects of their group's actions on them. Rwandans are very aware of the need to heal and are engaged in many efforts to promote healing. However, they may primarily be aware of the need to heal in order to enable people who have suffered so much to lead better lives. This, of course, is of profound importance. But I am suggesting that healing is also of great importance to make it less likely that survivors feel they must use violence to protect themselves at times when this is not necessary; and to make it less likely that perpetrators, and members of the perpetrator group who were passive bystanders, continue to hold the beliefs that led their group to genocidal actions.

It is the survivors who have a moral claim to receiving everyone's support and help in healing. It even seems paradoxical that creating a better future requires that survivors care about the healing both of

perpetrators and passive bystanders. But this is essential in order to enable perpetrators and passive bystanders to acknowledge responsibility for the harm they or their group have caused, to apologize, and to participate in constructive actions in building peaceful relations.

Excessive versus Moderate Respect for Authority; Monolithic versus Pluralistic Society

Excessive respect for authority, with a predominant tendency to obey authority, is another important cultural characteristic that tends to contribute to genocide. It leads people to turn to authorities, old or new, for guidance in difficult times. It leads them to accept the authorities' definition of reality and their views of problems and solutions. It stops them from resisting authorities that lead them to harm others. It makes obedience to people in authority more likely (Staub, 1989).

Strong respect for authority characterized many societies that engaged in genocide or mass killing, such as Germany, Turkey, Cambodia, and Rwanda. In some cases it was especially strong in the subgroup of the society that became the perpetrator, as in Argentina, where the military was both the architect and executor of the disappearances. As with devaluation, in addition to psychological/cultural elements, the tendency to obey authority can also be built into the way institutions operate, and be maintained by a political system that is authoritarian. In Rwanda the culture and institutions – such as hierarchical arrangements in leadership, starting with heads of small units within villages up to the national government – as well as the political system all promoted strong respect for authority.

A monolithic in contrast to pluralistic character of society, with a small range of predominant values and/or limitations on the free flow of ideas, as well as limitation of the access of some groups to the public domain, adds to the predisposition for group violence. The negative view of a victim group and the definition of reality by authorities that justifies or even necessitates the victims' mistreatment will be resisted less and accepted more broadly.

The cultural/societal conditions I have described and their psychological impact can give rise to bad leadership, leaders scapegoating some group, offering destructive ideologies, and promoting violence. It is even more important that the same conditions tend to give rise to bad followership. Without the effects on them of the combination of culture and social conditions that I described, people are much less

likely to follow destructive leaders. Changes in the culture, such as moderating respect for authority, promoting pluralism – the expression of varied views – as well as overcoming devaluation, are essential to enable societies to respond in constructive ways to life problems.

Difficult life conditions intensify, and may even create, the tendency to blindly follow leaders. In difficult times, people tend to turn to authorities for protection and support. This seems to have been the case in the US after the 9/11/2001 terrorist attacks. Neither the people, the media, nor leaders of the opposition party questioned the policies and practices of the government. In societies where there are already existing strong tendencies to follow and obey authorities, these tendencies are likely to intensify in difficult times.

Unjust Societal Arrangements

A significant source of group violence is significant differences in power, opportunity, and wealth between subgroups in society (Fein, 1993). Frequently, the division between us and them and devaluation of the other is between superordinate and subordinate groups in a society. When the latter begin to demand more rights and opportunities, the former often resist. As conflict intensifies, violence begins and grows. When the other influences I have described are also present, the violence can evolve into a genocide. More often, it is the more powerful group that perpetrates genocide, as in Turkey against the Armenians. At times, it is the originally less powerful group, as in Cambodia (Staub, 1999). Promoting justice is important to prevent the potential for mass violence. Fair societal procedures and processes, or procedural justice, seem especially important to people (Tyler & Smith, 1998).

In Rwanda, there had been unjust social arrangements for a long time. There was strong Tutsi dominance in wealth and power, especially under Belgian rule, followed by strong Hutu dominance. Currently, the government provides equal opportunity in access to education. In *principle*, there is no discrimination in employment or in other realms. However, Harff's (2003) research suggests that a minority ruling a country is one of a number of conditions that makes mass violence more likely. Minority rule tends to be repressive. It is a question of whether it can be not repressive. At any rate, open discussion of issues, including group identities and what they mean at this time, seems important as part of the "experience" of justice.

The Evolution of Violence

Central to genocide is the evolution of increasingly harmful and violent actions. Individuals and groups change as a result of their own actions. When some group is harmed, when individuals are harmed because they are members of a group, the perpetrators justify their actions by what they think and say about the actions or character of those they have harmed. Victims are increasingly dehumanized, and over time are excluded from the moral realm not only by perpetrators, but also by passive bystanders, who need to justify their passivity. The norms and standards of behavior change to allow harmful, violent actions. Policies and institutions change, allowing increasing violence. In a monolithic society with excessive respect for authority, it is less likely that people will be positive bystanders who speak out and inhibit this evolution (see Staub, 1989, for a detailed discussion of such evolution, and Staub, 2006, for the changes in perpetrators, bystanders, as well as victims in the course of it). It is important for leaders to promote pluralism, so that people learn to use both their own judgment and their voice, and respond as active bystanders, when this is necessary to oppose and inhibit the evolution of destructiveness.

As part of the evolution, harmful actions and violence toward a victim group intensify. An aspect of the evolution is the spread of violence. Other groups can also become targets. This has happened in many instances. In Cambodia, for example, in addition to the ideological enemies originally identified, various minority groups became targets of genocidal violence.

Passive versus Active Bystanders

Bystanders are witnesses. Internal bystanders, members of a group that begins to harm another, usually remain passive in the face of harmful words and action. This is partly because they are also affected by life problems and, as members of their culture/society, have learned to devalue the other group. They lack sufficient motivation to oppose their group in behalf of this devalued other, especially as their group moves to increasing hostility and violence, and they have reason to fear social exclusion and eventually physical harm for opposing it. With very rare exceptions, external bystanders, outside

groups and nations, also remain passive. Too often they are complicit, in that they continue with business as usual with perpetrators, or in various ways support a perpetrating government or group (see Staub, 1989, 1999, 2000, 2003).

Perpetrators see passivity as acceptance or even approval of their actions. One example of this is the reaction of Goebbels, the Nazi propaganda minister. When representatives from many nations at a meeting at Evian, Switzerland, in 1938 were unwilling to accept persecuted Jews who were trying to leave Germany, he wrote in his diary: "They all want to do to the Jews what we are doing, but don't have the courage to do it" (Taylor, 1983).

The nearly incredible passivity by the UN and the nations of the world in the face of the impending and then ongoing genocide in Rwanda is a tragic and well-known story by now (Power, 2002). It was more than passivity. In the case of some nations, it was active resistance, trying to stop the UN from taking action. In the case of some, it was complicity. The French continued to support the Rwandan government during the 1990s, after the civil war had begun, in the midst of a crescendo of propaganda against Tutsis and calls for violence against them, with periodic killings of Tutsis even before the genocide (des Forges, 1999).

An international system needs to be created that is able not only to warn, but also to initiate, action. The principle agreed upon by the UN in 2006 of the "responsibility to protect" will not lead to protective actions, just as the genocide convention has not led to the prevention of genocide, without a system capable of initiating and executing prevention. One element in such a system should be offices established in every government around the world, led by high-level officials in foreign ministries (Staub, 1999), with the mandate and responsibility to act jointly with the UN and other nations to prevent mass violence in situations when a fair probability of such violence can be identified. These preventive efforts should address the roots of violence that have been described here. They should include support by the international community for countries that are undergoing great economic or political difficulties and turmoil. They should include engagement with leaders, who may be part of a group that has suffered great violence and who may therefore feel highly vulnerable, to constructively address threat or life problems. While prevention should start early, so that no force is needed, the international community should initiate intervention as soon as significant violence begins.

The Role of Leaders

Leaders tend to propagate scapegoating and destructive ideologies, organize perpetrators, and in these and other ways lead the group toward violence. However, in the presence of instigating conditions and cultural characteristics that promote violence, groups tend to *turn* to leaders who offer at least psychologically satisfying "solutions" to the difficulties and problems the group faces. Thus, the role of leaders must always be considered in relation to the psychological situation and needs of followers and their readiness to follow destructive leaders (Staub, 1999, 2003). Moreover, it is often assumed, even by important psychologists (Allport, 1954), that leaders focus on outside threat and move the group to scapegoat some group in order to gain followers or strengthen their hold on followers. However, leaders are themselves affected by the past history (e.g., victimization) and culture of the group, and by current social conditions. In working with leaders to prevent genocide, it is important to consider these influences on them.

In our work in Rwanda with national leaders, one focus has been on helping them to understand the psychological impact of past events on them, and ways to address these (Staub & Pearlman, 2006).

Reconciliation: The Importance of Truth, Justice and a Shared History

It has become evident to many observers that once violence subsides, even if it is through a peace treaty between groups, it often resumes (De la Rey, 2001; de Silva & Samarasinghe, 1993). In postconflict societies, where there has been either one-sided or mutual violence, a process of reconciliation that leads to increasing mutual acceptance is essential. Truth and justice have been identified as important elements of reconciliation. So is healing by all parties. In relation to Rwanda, there are a number of justice processes in progress: in the International Court in Rwanda, the Rwandese courts, and the Gacaca, the nationwide community-based justice system.

Truth is of great importance for healing and reconciliation. Establishing what has been done to them seems an essential need of victims/survivors. It is a form of acknowledgment of their suffering that helps with healing. Truth that is empathic with the victims and indicates that the perpetrators' actions are unacceptable also reaffirms

the moral order. Expressing the community's refusal to accept such actions can enhance a feeling of safety. The establishment of the truth is also important in making it difficult for the perpetrators to deny their actions or their responsibility for the harm they caused, and to claim that they themselves were the victims (Staub, 2006).

Truth makes justice possible. Survivors have a profound need for justice. This can vary in form from punishment, to restorative justice (i.e., compensatory actions by perpetrators), to procedural justice (in which a system is established that makes it certain that the impunity that usually characterizes the evolution toward genocide will not recur). The experience of justice is healing. It affirms survivors, tells the world about their suffering, reestablishes their dignity, and to some extent balances their relationship to perpetrators (Staub, 2006).

While truth is essential, it is usually complex. In some cases, such as the genocide against the Jews, violence was completely one-sided. Even in such cases, usually the different sides have different stories, create different histories. In many instances of mass killing, however, there is some harm done by both sides, if not at the time of the mass killing or genocide, then over a longer historical period. It is crucial for reconciliation that the harm suffered by each be acknowledged, even if there is great difference in its magnitude. Without acknowledgment of harm done to them, a perpetrator group continues to focus on its suffering, rather than on the suffering it has created (Staub, 2006; Staub & Pearlman, 2006).

In Rwanda, the genocide itself was completely one-sided, and was preceded by discrimination and a great deal of violence against Tutsis, starting in 1959 (des Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2001). However, as I have noted, before 1959, especially in the colonial era under Belgian rule, Hutus had diminished rights and opportunities and this period seems to have become a "chosen trauma" for Hutus, who refer to it as a period of servitude. In addition, after the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) entered Rwanda in 1990, in the ensuing civil war some Hutu civilians were killed. While, after the genocide was stopped, the government was successful in inhibiting revenge killings, in the course of the fighting to defeat the government and end the genocide there were revenge killings. When, after the RPA victory, infiltrators from the Congo continued to kill Tutsis, more civilians were killed in the course of fighting them. A large number of Hutu refugees into Zaire were also killed in the course of the advance of Kabila's army against Mobutu that was helped along by the Rwandan army.

Given their very great pain, loss, and grief, survivors of genocide understandably focus on the horrendous violence against them.

However, reconciliation between the groups requires consideration of a complex truth, of injuries to both sides, within some reasonable historical time span, even if these injuries were far from equal, as in the case of Rwanda. This is essential for the development of a shared history, of shared collective memories, and a peaceful future (Cairns & Roe, 2002; Staub, 2006).

Collective memories, which may take the form of a chosen trauma, significantly shape group perceptions, beliefs, and actions. Important historical events and the way they are remembered shape and, in part, define group identity. When two antagonistic groups have conflicting memories about important events that have caused suffering for one, the other, or both, their antagonism is likely to continue.

Resolving differing views of a violent history is hard. However, Rwanda is a rare instance of a society engaged in intentional processes that aim to promote reconciliation. These include seminars, national conferences that are broadcast on television and on the radio, the Gacaca proceedings, the release of large numbers of prisoners in 2003, and the promotion of reconciliation by national leaders. The ministry of education in Rwanda has made the introduction of peace education and reconciliation a top priority for schools. The ministry is also engaged in developing a shared history, which hopefully will be inclusive enough for all Rwandese to recognize themselves in it.

Understanding the roots of violence, with all the influences leading to violence that I have described, may help each party to accept the other more, in spite of its past actions. It may also help them to do what is also extremely difficult: acknowledge their own harmful actions. But the creation of a shared history is also likely to require dialogue and coming to agreement. History is not simply a matter of "objective" facts, but also a way of understanding events. It is not only a matter of what, but also of why, things happened. Moreover, it may require that, when disagreements are not resolved, different and conflicting views of history are both included in the description and teaching of history. All this may make the creation of a shared history possible. However, openness to a shared history also requires that Hutus and Tutsis feel that the past has been addressed in a just manner, and that political developments are on a path to creating just relations between groups. To rework the past, people must have confidence in a shared future.

A potentially significant problem in Rwanda is that the Tutsi-dominated government, partly in the name of creating unity, but probably also owing to fear and the desire to maintain power, does not allow diverse views to be expressed. Opposition to government

views tends to be labeled as "divisionism," and at times may be designated as genocidal ideology. The Tutsis have long been a minority of about 14% of the population. After the genocide, Tutsis, who at times of earlier mass killings had left Rwanda and were refugees in neighboring countries, returned, and Tutsis are again about 14% of the population. Such a small minority, surrounded by a majority whose members perpetrated genocide against them, must feel tremendously vulnerable. This makes their policies understandable. However, the limitations on free expression and pluralism make it difficult to create a shared history; they drive Hutu voices underground, and instead of resolving hostility may create new antagonism.

Understanding, Prevention, and Reconciliation

Establishing a shared collective memory may be greatly facilitated by understanding how both one's own group and the other group's harmful actions came about. We found in working in Rwanda with many and varied groups that such understanding brings many benefits. Survivors feel humanized as they understand the influences that have led to the perpetrators' actions. Through such understanding, both survivors and bystanding members of the perpetrator group seem to become more open to reconciliation (Staub et al., 2005). Leaders can consider and evaluate policies and practices they develop from the standpoint of understanding both societal-level influences that lead to mass violence, as well as influences on the behavior of individual perpetrators. Understanding the influences that led the young men who were members of the Interahamwe to become killers can help people as they listen to testimony in front of the Gacaca. It can mitigate retraumatization as well as lessen anger and renewed hostility (Staub, 2006; Staub & Pearlman, 2006).

Contact between Groups as an Avenue to Reconciliation

Contact has been found to be important in overcoming prejudice and hostility (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). But superficial contact does not help and can even increase problems. Deep contact, deep engagement by members of groups, helps to diminish devaluation (Staub, 1989; Varshney, 2002). Cooperative learning in schools that creates deep engagement between students (Aronson, Stephan, Sikes, Blaney, & Snapp, 1978),

or people building houses together (Wessells & Monteiro, 2001), and other significant joint projects that serve shared goals, are among the types of contact that are likely to bring significant benefit. Friendships created along the way can spread (Pettigrew, 1997). Significant contact may help people come to know and trust each other enough that in case of new differences or conflict they do not demonize and fear the other to the extent that they engage in great violence to "protect" themselves.

Often there is ongoing contact between groups that live next to each other, have social relationships, trade, and intermarry, such as Jews and Christians in Germany, or people in Rwanda. Increasingly, however, research shows that under conditions of threat, people will shift from individual identity to group identification (see Hewstone et al., 2004). Their collective identity makes it easier for them to turn against former associates belonging to another group. In addition, past violence between groups creates a rift, like a fault line in the earth, that can be reopened. This rift must be attended to, carefully tended, the chasm filled. It is like what happens after a suicide in a family: Once the possibility enters people's awareness, suicide, which may have been inconceivable before, is now conceivable, and is more likely to happen again in that family. Understanding the influences leading to mass violence, combined with significant contact, may provide inoculation against the tendency to shift to group identification and respond to others as group members, and as a people driven by historical injuries.

Raising Inclusively Caring Children with Appropriate (Moderate) Respect for Authority

To prevent mass violence it is essential that children be raised so that they become inclusively caring people. This means caring not only about the welfare of people in their group, but also those outside the group, including former antagonists. For this to happen, children require positive guidance, adults humanizing people outside the group, and positive contact with people outside the social (and psychological) group (Oliner & Oliner, 1988). It is also important that children develop respect for authorities that is rooted not simply in the position of those in authority, but in their conduct. Children must also learn to use their voice and develop the capacity and willingness to be active bystanders, to become morally courageous persons who will speak out against immoral, uncaring, harmful practices. For this to happen, children require opportunities to participate in decision-making about the life of the family at home, and the life of the classroom in

their schools (Staub, 2005). It requires that they be encouraged to express what they think and feel. Guiding children this way requires training and ultimately transformation by adults.

The prevention of violence, reconciliation, and peace building have many elements and are long-term processes. Especially in societies with a history of violence, they require persistent engagement in these processes. But old enmities can be overcome; peaceful relations between groups can be created. After repeated, intense violence between them, the European countries, including Germany and France, are now at peace. Jews and Christians in most countries live peacefully together. This chapter aims to identify some of the processes that can create such a future in places of current or recent violence, such as Rwanda, Israel/Palestine, and others.

Author Note

This chapter is a greatly revised and extended version of the opening talk at the International Conference on the Origins and Prevention of Genocide that was part of the 10-year commemoration of the Rwandan genocide, in Kigali, April 4, 2004. Part of the purpose of the talk was to suggest processes required in Rwanda to prevent future mass violence.

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