Intra-Party Politics and Coalition Governments

Edited by
Daniela Giannetti and
Kenneth Benoit

Routledge/ECPR Studies in European Political Science

Intra-party Politics and Coalition Governments

This book explores how intra-party politics affects government formation and termination in parliamentary systems, where the norm is the formation of coalition governments.

The authors look beyond party cohesion and discipline in parliamentary democracies to take a broader view, assuming a diversity of preferences among party members and then exploring the incentives that give rise to coordinated party behaviour at the electoral, legislative and executive levels. The chapters in this book share a common analytical framework, confronting theoretical models of government formation with empirical data, some drawn from cross-national analyses and others from theoretically structured case studies. A distinctive feature of the book is that it explores the impact of intra-party politics at different levels of government: national, local and EU. This offers the opportunity to investigate existing theories of coalition formation in new political settings. Finally, the book offers a range of innovative methods for investigating intra-party politics which, for example, creates a need to estimate the policy positions of individual politicians inside political parties.

This book will be of interest to political scientists, especially scholars involved in research on political parties, parliamentary systems, coalition formation and legislative behaviour, multilevel governance, European and EU politics.

Daniela Giannetti is Professor of Political Science at the University of Bologna, Italy. Previously she has been Research Associate in the Department of Political Science, Trinity College, Dublin. Her research interests and publications focus on rational choice theory of political behaviour and institutions.

Kenneth Benoit is Professor of Quantitative Social Sciences in the Political Science Department at Trinity College, Dublin. His research focuses on party politics and applications of statistical methodology to political problems.

Routledge/ECPR Studies in European Political Science

Edited by Thomas Poguntke, *Ruhr University Bochum, Germany on behalf of the European Consortium for Political Research*

The Routledge/ECPR Studies in European Political Science series is published in association with the European Consortium for Political Research - the leading organisation concerned with the growth and development of political science in Europe. The series presents high-quality edited volumes on topics at the leading edge of current interest in political science and related fields, with contributions from European scholars and others who have presented work at ECPR workshops or research groups.

1 **Regionalist Parties in Western Europe**
Edited by Lieven de Winter and Huri Türsan

2 **Comparing Party System Change**
Edited by Jan-Erik Lane & Paul Pennings

3 **Political Theory and European Union**
Edited by Albert Weale and Michael Nentwich

4 **Politics of Sexuality**
Edited by Terrell Carver and Véronique Mottier

5 **Autonomous Policy Making by International Organizations**
Edited by Bob Reinalda and Bertjan Verbeek

6 **Social Capital and European Democracy**
Edited by Jan van Deth, Marco Maraffi, Ken Newton and Paul Whiteley

7 **Party Elites in Divided Societies**
Edited by Kurt Richard Luther and Kris Deschouwer

8 **Citizenship and Welfare State Reform in Europe**
Edited by Jet Bussemaker

9 **Democratic Governance and New Technology**
Technologically mediated innovations in political practice in Western Europe
Edited by Ivan Horrocks, Jens Hoff and Pieter Tops

10 **Democracy without Borders**
Transnationalisation and Conditionality in New Democracies
Edited by Jean Grugel

11 **Cultural Theory as Political Science**
Edited by Michael Thompson, Gunnar Grendstad and Per Selle

12 **The Transformation of Governance in the European Union**
Edited by Beate Kohler-Koch and Rainer Eising

13 **Parliamentary Party Groups in European Democracies**
Political Parties Behind Closed Doors
Edited by Knut Heidar and Ruud Koole

14 **Survival of the European Welfare State**
Edited by Stein Kuhnle

15 **Private Organisations in Global Politics**
Edited by Karsten Ronit and Volker Schneider

16 **Federalism and Political Performance**
Edited by Ute Wachendorfer-Schmidt

17 **Democratic Innovation**
Deliberation, Representation and Association
Edited by Michael Saward

18 **Public Opinion and the International Use of Force**
Edited by Philip Everts and Pierangelo Isernia

19 **Religion and Mass Electoral Behaviour in Europe**
Edited by David Broughton and Hans-Martien ten Napel

20 **Estimating the Policy Position of Political Actors**
Edited by Michael Laver

21 **Democracy and Political Change in the 'Third World'**
Edited by Jeff Haynes

22 **Politicians, Bureaucrats and Administrative Reform**
Edited by B Guy Peters and Jon Pierre

23 **Social Capital and Participation in Everyday Life**
Edited by Paul Dekker and Eric M Uslaner

24 **Development and Democracy**
What do we know and how?
Edited by Ole Elgström and Goran Hyden

25 **Do Political Campaigns Matter?**
Campaign Effects in Elections and Referendums
Edited by David M. Farrell and Rüdiger Schmitt-Beck

26 **Political Journalism**
New Challenges, New Practices
Edited by Raymond Kuhn and Erik Neveu

27 **Economic Voting**
Edited by Han Dorussen and Michaell Taylor

28 **Organized Crime and the Challenge to Democracy**
Edited by Felia Allum and Renate Siebert

29 **Understanding the European Union's External Relations**
Edited by Michèle Knodt and Sebastiaan Princen

30 **Social Democratic Party Policies in Contemporary Europe**
Edited by Giuliano Bonoli and Martin Powell

31 **Decision Making Within International Organisations**
Edited by Bob Reinalda and Bertjan Verbeek

32 **Comparative Biomedical Policy**
Governing Assisted Reproductive Technologies
Edited by Ivar Bleiklie, Malcolm L. Goggin and Christine Rothmayr

33 **Electronic Democracy**
Mobilisation, Organisation and Participation via new ICTs
Edited by Rachel K. Gibson, Andrea Römmele and Stephen J. Ward

34 **Liberal Democracy and Environmentalism**
The End of Environmentalism?
Edited by Marcel Wissenburg and Yoram Levy

35 **Political Theory and the European Constitution**
Edited by Lynn Dobson and Andreas Follesdal

36 **Politics and the European Commission**
Actors, Interdependence, Legitimacy
Edited by Andy Smith

37 **Metropolitan Governance**
Capacity, Democracy and the Dynamics of Place
Edited by Hubert Heinelt and Daniel Kübler

38 **Democracy and the Role of Associations**
Political, Organizational and Social Contexts
Edited by Sigrid Roflteutscher

39 **The Territorial Politics of Welfare**
Edited by Nicola McEwen and Luis Moreno

40 **Health Governance in Europe**
Issues, challenges and theories
Edited by Monika Steffen

41 **Republicanism in Theory and Practice**
Edited by Iseult Honohan and Jeremy Jennings

42 Mass Media and Political Communication in New Democracies
Edited by Katrin Voltmer

43 Delegation in Contemporary Democracies
Edited by Dietmar Braun and Fabrizio Gilardi

44 Governance and Democracy
Comparing national, European and international experiences
Edited by Yannis Papadopoulos and Arthur Benz

45 The European Union's Roles in International Politics
Concepts and analysis
Edited by Ole Elgström and Michael Smith

46 Policy-making Processes and the European Constitution
A comparative study of member states and accession countries
Edited by Thomas König and Simon Hug

47 Democratic Politics and Party Competition
Edited by Judith Bara and Albert Weale

48 Participatory Democracy and Political Participation
Can participatory engineering bring citizens back in?
Edited by Thomas Zittel and Dieter Fuchs

49 Civil Societies and Social Movements
Potentials and problems
Edited by Derrick Purdue

50 Resources, Governance and Civil Conflict
Edited by Magnus Öberg and Kaare Strøm

51 Transnational Private Governance and its Limits
Edited by Jean-Christophe Graz and Andreas Nölke

52 International Organizations and Implementation
Enforcers, Managers, Authorities?
Edited by Jutta Joachim, Bob Reinalda and Bertjan Verbeek

53 New Parties in Government
Edited by Kris Deschouwer

54 In Pursuit of Sustainable Development
New Governance Practices at the Sub-National Level in Europe
Edited by Susan Baker and Katarina Eckerberg

55 Governments, NGOs and Anti-Corruption
The New Integrity Warriors
Edited by Luís de Sousa, Barry Hindess and Peter Larmour

56 Intra-Party Politics and Coalition Governments
Edited by Daniela Giannetti and Kenneth Benoit

Also available from Routledge in association with the ECPR:

Sex Equality Policy in Western Europe, *Edited by Frances Gardiner;* **Democracy and Green Poltical Thought**, *Edited by Brian Doherty & Marius de Geus;* **The New Politics of Unemployment**, *Edited by Hugh Compston;* **Citizenship, Democracy and Justice in the New Europe** *Edited by Percy B. Lehning & Albert Weale;* **Private Groups and Public Life**, *Edited by Jan W van Deth,* **The Political Context of Collective Action**, *Edited by Ricca Edmondson;* **Theories of Secession**, *Edited by Percy Lehning;* **Regionalism Across the North/South Divide**, *Edited by Jean Grugel & Wil Hout*

Intra-party Politics and Coalition Governments

Edited by Daniela Giannetti
and Kenneth Benoit

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2009 by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2008.

"To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge's collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk."

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Intra-party politics and coalition governments / edited by Daniela Giannetti and Kenneth Benoit.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Political parties--European Union countries. 2. Coalition governments--European Union countries. 3. European Parliament. 4. European Union countries—Politics and government. I. Giannetti, Daniela. II. Benoit, Kenneth.
JN94.A979156 2008
324.2094--dc22

2008016969

ISBN 0-203-88922-3 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN10: 0-415-46225-8 (hbk)
ISBN10: 0-203-88922-3 (ebk)

ISBN13: 978-0-415-46225-9 (hbk)
ISBN13: 978-0-203-88922-0 (ebk)

Contents

Acknowledgements

This book originates from a series of papers presented at an ECPR Joint Session Workshop on 'Intra-party politics and its effects on government formation and duration in parliamentary systems' held at the University of Granada, Spain, in April 2005. We would like to thank all the participants who attended this workshop for their valuable contributions. Moreover, we also wish to thank the editors of *Party Politics*, David M. Farrell, Paul Webb and Kenneth Janda, for granting us permission to reprint an article entitled 'Intra-party politics and coalition formation: evidence from Swedish local government' by Hanna Bäck (2008) 14: 71–89. This contribution is reproduced with minor changes as Chapter 3 of this book. We are very grateful to Thomas Poguntke, editor of the ECPR series, for his support and encouragement. Finally, a special word of thanks is due to Michael Laver for his long-term collaboration and friendship.

Figures

Tables

Contributors

Hanna Bäck is Junior Professor at the Mannheimer Zentrum Für Europäische SozialForschung (MZES), University of Mannheim. Her recent work and publications focus on coalition formation, portfolio allocation and cabinet reshuffles at the national level in Western Europe, political participation, party identification and the combination of large-*n* and small-*n* methods. She is currently leading a project with the title 'The Presidentialisation of Parliamentary Democracies'.

Stefanie Bailer works as Lecturer and Researcher at the Institute for Political Science at the University of Zurich. Her main research interests are decision-making processes in the European Union, legislative behaviour and comparative politics. Among her publications is the monograph *Nationale Interessen in der Europäischen Union* (2006, Campus Verlag) and articles published in the *Journal of Legislative Studies*, *European Union Politics* and *Comparative European Politics*.

Kenneth Benoit is Professor of Quantitative Social Sciences at Trinity College, University of Dublin, in the Department of Political Science. His substantive research interests include comparative electoral systems, Eastern European politics, political party systems and transitions to democracy. His methodological interests include statistical applications, quantitative content analysis and computer simulations. He has published extensively in leading scholarly journals and written (with Michael Laver) *Party Policy in Modern Democracies* (London: Routledge, 2006).

Thomas Bräuninger is Research Fellow at the University of Konstanz. He is currently working on institutional and partisan determinants of the agenda-setting power of governments in parliamentary democracies. Recent work has been published in scholarly journals such as *Public Choice, Journal of Theoretical Politics* and *Party Politics*.

Pedro J. Camões is Assistant Professor of Public Administration and Public Policy at the University of Minho in Braga, Portugal. His research interests include fiscal decentralization, policy analysis and local government. He is the author of several articles published in the *Journal of Public Administration and Theory, Local Government Studies* and the *Policy Studies Journal*.

Marc Debus is a Research Fellow at Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES). His recent publications include *Pre-Electoral Alliances, Coalition Rejections,* and *Multiparty Governments* (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2007).

Sam Depauw is a Post-doctoral Researcher at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel. He co-authored *Rebellen in het Parlement* (Universitaire Pers Leuven) and *Een halve eeuw partijbureau in België* (Acco Leuven), as well as a number of book chapters and journal articles. His current research is on political representation in a multi-level environment.

Daniela Giannetti is Professor of Political Science at the University of Bologna, Italy. Her research interests include coalition theory and, more generally, rational choice theory of political behaviour and institutions. She is the author of a book about the rational choice approach to politics (in Italian) and the co-author of a number of book chapters and articles published in the *European Journal of Political Research, Electoral Studies* and the *Journal of Theoretical Politics*.

Michael Laver is Professor of Politics at the New York University. His research interests include analytical, computational and empirical accounts of political competition and decision-making. He is the co-author (with K. A. Shepsle) of *Making and Breaking Governments* (1996); (with M. Gallagher and P. Mair) *Representative Governments in Modern Europe* (2001) and (with K. Benoit) *Party Policy in Modern Democracies* (2006). Laver has published numerous articles in such scholarly journals as the *American Political Science Review*, the *American Journal of Political Science* and the *European Journal of Political Research*. He is currently working on agent-based spatial models of party competition.

Shane Martin is a Lecturer in Comparative Government at the School of Law and Government, Dublin City University.

Silvia M. Mendes is currently Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Minho in Braga, Portugal. Her research focuses on political behaviour, policy analysis and local government. She has contributed to several edited books and published articles in the *British Journal of Political Science* and *Electoral Studies*.

Gail McElroy is currently Lecturer in Political Science at Trinity College, University of Dublin. Her research interests include legislative organisation and behaviour, party organisation and European Union politics. She is the author of 'Legislative Politics' in K. E. Jorgensen, M. Pollack, B. J. Rosamond (eds) *Handbook of European Union Politics* (London: SAGE, 2007) and of several articles on European Union politics.

Wolfgang C. Müller is Professor of Political Science at the University of Mannheim and previously taught at the University of Vienna. He is senior author of *Die österreichischen Abgeordneten, Individuelle Präferenzen und politsches Verhalten* (2001) and co-editor of *Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political Parties*

in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions (1999), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe* (2000) (both with K. Strøm) and *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies* (2003) (with K. Strøm and T. Bergman).

Thomas Saalfeld is Professor in Political Science at the University of Kent, in the Department of Politics and International Relations. His research interests include German political parties and party system, coalition politics in Western Europe, German and comparative legislative studies, ethnicity and political representation in liberal democracies. He is the author of *Parteien und Wahlen* (Baden Baden: Nomos 2007) and of several articles published in the *European Journal of Political Research, German Politics* and the *Journal of Legislative Studies*.

Irina Ştefuriuc is a Researcher at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels. Her current research focuses on coalition governments in multi-level settings (Spain and Germany). Her recent publications include 'The coalition strategies of state-wide parties in multi-level settings', in K. Deschouwer and M.T. Jans (eds) *Politics Beyond the State. Actors and Policies in Complex Institutional Settings* (Brussels: Brussels University Press, 2007) and 'Government formation in multi-level settings: Spanish regional coalitions and the quest for vertical congruence', *Party Politics* (forthcoming).

Kaare Strøm is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego. His research interests include political parties, coalition theory, European politics and the institutions of parliamentary democracy. He is the author of *Minority Government and Majority Rule*; co-editor of *Political Parties, Policy, Office or Votes?*, *Coalition Governments in Western Europe* (both with W.C. Muller), *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies* (with W. C. Muller and T. Bergman) and the textbook *Comparative Politics Today: A World View* (with G. A. Almond, R. J. Dalton, B. J. Powell Jr.). Strom has published numerous articles in such scholarly journals as the *American Political Science Review*, the *American Journal of Political Science* and the *European Journal of Political Research*.

Series editor's preface

The study of political parties has always taken a strong interest in how parties function internally. Going back to Robert Michels' famous analysis of the German Social Democratic Party in the early 20th century, a focal point has been the quality of intra-party democracy and the alleged inherent limitations to rank-and-file participation. Party factionalism has been another important theme in party research for many years and the difficult path of many new parties towards their first participation in government has often been accompanied by factional strife.

Much of this has been largely disregarded by coalition theory that has preferred to treat parties as unitary actors for the sake of parsimonious modelling. Given that parliamentary systems depend on party discipline to keep a government in office, it is, of course, also a fairly plausible assumption in the context of formal models of coalition formation.

On the other hand, it has been shown that despite continuous refinement of such formal models they have not fared exceedingly well in predicting coalition formation and portfolio allocation. Furthermore, as the editors write in their introduction, "many coalition phenomena were hard to explain without relaxing the assumption that parties are unitary actors". Clearly, Italian coalition politics is not really a convincing case for assuming that parties are unitary actors, and there are many examples of parties ridden by endemic factionalism that equally call the usefulness of this assumption into question. However, intraparty politics covers far more than organized factions. Political parties are complex organizations which assemble very different actors including party employees, parliamentary candidates, officials and members of legislatures and, of course, ordinary rank-and-file activists. They are subject to different incentives and may follow quite diverse motivations – think of Panebianco's distinction between 'believers' and careerists'. Also, institutions matter and even though the preferences of core actors may be quite divers systemic requirements may still induce cohesive behaviour. Clearly this list is far from complete but it indicates that there many aspects of intraparty politics that are likely to have an effect on coalition governance. Particularly approaches that focus on policy as a crucial goal of political parties are prone to relax the unitary actor assumption and include intra-party politics into models of coalition formation and coalition behaviour and government termination.

Following a theoretical chapter by Strøm and Müller which lays the theoretical foundation for the subsequent analyses, the current volume assembles studies on the interrelation of intraparty politics and coalition governance on local, sub-national, national and supra-national levels. Coalition politics in local government is a particularly interesting phenomenon in that there is often less party politics at the local level because pragmatism, politicians' personalities and their appeal may weight heavier that party political considerations. Several chapters focus on regional politics including the intricate relationship between regional and national coalition formulae which add further complexity to coalition politics.

Factionalism and coalition politics is another fruitful perspective that is explored in this volume. Unsurprisingly, one of the case studies focuses on Italy but the example of the relatively united German parties demonstrates that intraparty factions are relevant factors in coalition governance also in countries where factionalism is not endemic, because factions influence policy, portfolio allocation and government duration. Clearly, the European Parliament is a special case in that there is no EU government that would be accountable to the legislature. Yet, EP legislation often requires legislative coalitions and this raises the question of voting coherence of EP party groups.

Two perspectives stand out in the contributions to this volume: The effect of intra-party politics on policy-making and the actual life of coalition governments. The latter is particularly relevant because it draws our attention to the fact that coalitions are the product of continuous negotiations and decisions that party elites can only make within the parameters set by the internal politics of their parties. A crucial aspect of it are the preferences and it is fitting that the editors conclude this important contribution to the field with a discussion of existing methods and new avenues to measuring the preferences of those who determine intraparty politics.

Thomas Poguntke, Series Editor
Bochum, May 2008

PART I

Overview

1 Intra-party politics and coalition governments in parliamentary democracies

Daniela Giannetti and Kenneth Benoit

Introduction

As Schattschneider (1942) pointed out more than half a century ago, political parties are the key institutions of representative democracy. It is not surprising that a long tradition of scholarship in political science focuses on parties, as reflected in the enormous literature dealing with party emergence, party organization and party change in electoral democracies. The 'internal life' of political parties, to quote the title of an essay by Katz (2002), has thus been the subject of extensive debate. Classic works by Ostrogorski and Michels highlighted the inner complexities of a party as a modern organization. And from Duverger (1951) to Katz and Mair (1994), the internal organizational structure of political parties has been the basis for distinguishing different types of parties, as well as conceptualizing their role and evolution in modern democracies. Finally, a tradition of empirical research on party cohesion and unity in different political systems, driven by a concern for the functioning of the basic democratic mechanisms of representation and accountability, dates back to early studies by Rose (1964) and Sartori (1976).

Within the rational choice approach to analysing political competition, the focus has been mainly on how parties relate to voters. In the classic Downsian approach to party competition, parties are defined as unified 'teams' seeking to control the governing apparatus by winning elections. To win elections, parties take those policy positions they think will gain them the most votes. Parties, however, do not aspire to serve voters, but to enjoy the benefits of office and to control government decisions. These Downsian assumptions have provided the basis for the development and testing of a generalized approach to the study of party competition, known as the spatial approach to voting. This approach has been extended from the experience of two-party systems to the study of party competition in multiparty democracies, in which parties almost never govern alone – meaning that electoral competition and coalition formation are inextricably linked. The spatial approach, based on party policy positions, has provided a coherent framework to analyse coalition formation replacing early 'policy-blind' models (Laver and Schofield 1998).

Most coalition theories operate under the simplifying assumption that parties can be treated as unitary actors. Justifications for this assumption typically invoke both substantive plausibility and analytical tractability. Only recently have scholars started to relax the assumption of parties as unitary actors, paying systematic attention in formal models of political competition to intra-party politics. This has led them to analyse not only the impact of intra-party politics on bargaining over government formation, but other important political phenomena such as party switching, splits and fusions. This represents a tendency to 'endogenize' parties themselves, rather than treating parties as exogenous 'given' facts of political life.

Despite significant advances, intra-party politics remains a significantly under-researched area. This book sets out to put together some pieces of this puzzle by focusing on the specific setting of multiparty parliamentary democracies and by investigating the impact of intra-party politics at different levels of government. In addition to politics at the national level, the study of local government coalitions at the sub-national level allows us to evaluate old theories using new data – and more particularly offers a significant methodological bonus by allowing us to investigate a range of different political settings, while holding constant a number of key institutional and cultural variables. Moving to the supra-national level, the European Parliament offers an attractive research site for the study of party cohesion and party discipline. While there are several studies on party unity in the European Parliament (Hix 2002; Kreppel 2002; Carrubba *et al*. 2004), there are both methodological and theoretical reasons to pay further attention to the difficult task of relating party cohesion and discipline to theoretically driven models of individual legislators' voting calculus in the multilevel EU setting.

In this chapter, we set the intellectual scene by outlining some of the key questions that have arisen in the analysis of intra-party politics within the rational choice approach. We first offer a brief overview of common themes within the study of intra-party politics more generally, including the nature of party unity and cohesion, as well as of explanations for why parties differ, both within and between national contexts. We then conduct a brief review of rational choice scholarship on intra-party politics which has to a very large degree been focused on the US context. We then expand this discussion to include analyses of intra-party politics in the multiparty parliamentary government systems that predominate in Europe. The penultimate section of this chapter discusses how relaxing the assumption that parties operate as unitary actors underlines the need to adopt a dynamic model of party competition and coalition formation. The final section provides a road map for the rest of the book.

Comparative research on intra-party politics

An important focus of comparative research on internal party behaviour in contemporary democracies has been the cohesiveness of political parties, both at the legislative party level and at the level of party organization. The literature abounds with different definitions of party cohesion, coherence and party discipline. Thus Ozbudun (1970) differentiated between 'cohesion' (voting together

for whatever reason) and 'discipline' (voting together due to a party leaders' influence). More recently, Kitschelt and Smith (2002: 129) define a party's 'programmatic cohesion' as the 'general agreement within a party organization on specific issue positions'. In contrast, 'party discipline as measured by the uniformity of legislative roll-call voting conduct among representatives of the same party … may be a matter of organizational coercion more than of programmatic cohesion' (Kitschelt 2000: 859). Party cohesion or unity has also been used to refer to both homogeneity of policy *preferences* among party members, and to the *behavioural* phenomenon of voting as a bloc in parliament. In a similar vein, party discipline has been used to refer to both uniformity in legislative voting behaviour and to the combination of carrots and sticks administered by party leaders. Despite this significant degree of conceptual overlap and confusion, however, there is some agreement that party 'cohesion' arises when similar preferences are held by different party members, while party 'unity' refers to coordinated party behaviour by legislators. Such coordinated party behaviour may be driven by rewards and punishments imposed by party leaders, or by those who control the legislative agenda (Bowler *et al*. 1999; Cox 2000).

Traditional comparative politics scholarship has offered a number of taxonomies and typologies of parties, based on their degree of internal cohesion. The focus has been mainly on the static properties or '(dys)functions' of factions, defined as party subgroups having similar preferences on relevant policy issues (Rose 1964; Sartori 1976; Beller and Belloni 1978; Hine 1982; and, more recently, Bettcher 2005). In the past, some political scientists tended to regard party factionalism as pathological (Sartori 1976) while others pointed out that factionalism may play a positive role in providing a way for parties to manage internal dissent (Leonardi and Wertmann 1989). These scholars have for the most part treated party cohesion and unity as dependent variables, attempting to explain variations in party behaviour across different political systems, in terms of three main sets of explanatory variables: constitutional or institutional factors, party system features and internal structures within political parties.

Institutional perspective

Several authors have focused on the impact on intra-party politics of *institutional factors* such as federalism (Mainwaring 1999; Desposato 2004; Carey 2007), legislative-executive relations (Cox 1987; Huber 1996a, 1996b) and different electoral rules (Carey and Shugart 1995; Bowler *et al*. 1999). Thus, on one hand, federalism is argued to weaken legislative party unity at the national level by encouraging the organization of parties at the regional or local level (Mainwaring 1999). On the other hand, studies of Latin American legislatures show that federalism has little effect on party unity when various procedural devices provide party leaders the capacity of centralizing control over the legislative agenda (Figuereido and Limongi 2000; Desposato 2004).

Perhaps the most common recently deployed institutional explanation of party unity has to do with the different executive – legislative relations that characterize

presidential and parliamentary systems (Owens 2003). The logic of parliamentary systems requires cohesive parties to build and sustain the government. In separation of power systems that accord substantial legislative powers to presidents, legislators have fewer incentives to support the executive because voting against the president and/or losing a particular vote in the legislature does not necessarily weaken the party or the individual legislator's chances of nomination or re-election.

Electoral rules also figure prominently in accounts of intra-party politics. Carey and Shugart (1995), for example, argue that where the electoral system fosters a large 'personal vote', parties should be less cohesive. Other scholars have analysed in detail how electoral systems such as the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) in Japan engendered systematic intra-party competition inside the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), within which longstanding factions supported candidates for office. Differences in electoral incentives have been shown to generate different patterns of factionalization in the Japanese Upper and Lower Houses (Cox *et al*. 2000). However, empirical evidence for a larger cross-section of countries is still lacking, which has led Shugart (2005) to start collecting comparative data about the intra-party dimension of electoral systems. This promises the discipline a major advance in the availability of basic data on which to build theoretical and empirical accounts of the behaviour of legislators under different electoral rules.

Much of the current literature on the role of institutional factors in intra-party politics does not capture significant differences between parties operating within the same institutional structure. Thus, all parties within a given country operate under the same electoral rules, but different parties nonetheless operate in different ways (Morgenstern 2004). Alternatively, under different electoral rules operating in different contexts within the same country, as in Brazil, levels of party unity do not show significant differences (Desposato 2006a).

To sum up, the comparative politics literature highlights the role of institutional factors in generating different incentives for legislative party unity. However, empirical research indicates that most hypotheses proposed relating institutional factors to party unity need to be qualified. If party unity depends on the extent to which 'legislators are subject to pressure from other principals whose demands may conflict with those of party leaders' (Carey 2007), different combinations of institutional factors may account for different levels of party unity.

Party system perspective

A second strand of research on party cohesiveness focuses on the *characteristics of the party system* itself including, for example, the presence of a dominant party such as the now defunct Italian Christian Democrats or the Japanese LDP. Long ago, Golembiewski (1958) noted that 'party cohesion is a direct function of the degree of competition between political parties'. In a similar vein, Sartori (1976: 86) argued that 'when a party finds for itself an electorally safe situation, party unity tends to give way to sub-party disunity' (Sartori 1976: 86). This line of argument has been recently reformulated by Boucek (2005). The causal mechanism linking

factionalism and dominant parties concerns intra-party competition for distributive goods such as the perquisites of office. Assumptions about the individual motivations of self-interested politicians are at the centre of an argument according to which party elites seek to maximize their individual policy influence and office rewards, whereas party leaders seek to maximize unity. Asymmetries in the supply and demand of distributive goods create an obvious potential for intra-party conflict, a potential that tends to grow the longer a party is in office, as expectations increase but the capacity of party leaders to meet these expectations decreases. A key factor in the capacity of disappointed intra-party elites to have their grievances redressed relates to electoral conditions. Competitive electoral conditions increase the bargaining power of dissidents, but party unity is enhanced because the cost of dissent is higher. If party unity breaks down, government survival may be seriously endangered and political parties may be voted out of office. Non-competitive conditions decrease the cost of dissent and create incentives for party dissidents to 'free ride' on the efforts of co-partisans. Under this situation party leaders may tolerate intra-party dissidents and contain factionalism.

Party organization perspective

There is a considerable literature on how parties are organized in which intra-party political competition has been a central, even when not an explicit, theme (Katz and Mair 1994; Narud *et al*. 2002; Katz and Crotty 2006). With the growing democratization of party organizations, stemming from a wish to halt long-term declines in party membership and partisanship, there has been a considerable expansion in scholarly knowledge of internal party rules and their effects (Scarrow 2000). The consequences of democratization have most often been explored in the context of the debate on the emergence of something that has become known as a 'cartel party' (Katz and Mair 1994).

When focusing on the relationship between the organizational features of political parties and party cohesion and unity, scholars have highlighted the role of candidate and party leader selection procedures (Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Pennings and Hazan 2001; Le Duc 2001). The most important source of variation in candidate selection procedures is their degree of inclusiveness, ranging from the less inclusive (elite agreements) to the most inclusive (primaries open to voters). Party cohesion and unity are expected to be higher when party leaders strictly control candidate selection. In contrast, when candidate selection is beyond the control of the national party leadership, as when there are open primaries, the door opens for local activists to select MPs who do not share the leadership's policy preferences, thereby loosening party control over the behaviour of the party's representatives and affecting its legislative voting patterns (Pennings and Hazan 2001). Evidence from countries such as Israel shows that introducing more inclusive methods of candidate selection may dramatically weaken legislative party unity, causing 'the breakdown of disciplined and institutionalized parties' (Rahat and Hazan 2001).

More generally, empirical studies show that 'the types of consequences produced by democratizing candidate selection are not unequivocal, because there are different degrees of democratization. The empirical evidence shows … that moderate forms of democratization can have beneficial effects on political parties … but their effect is far from certain. Radical forms, on the other hand, are more likely to distort party cohesiveness' (Pennings and Hazan 2001: 273).

Rational choice approach to intra-party politics

Following Downs' seminal contribution, the rational choice approach focused predominantly on competition between political parties, treating these parties as unified teams seeking to control the government. The main prediction of the Downsian model was the convergence of parties, in a two-party system, toward the median voter's ideal policy position. Since this is far from being what is typically observed in the real world, many subsequent scholars have occupied themselves with the problem of why rational parties might *not* converge on the median voter. Thus Aldrich (1983), for example, added assumptions about the role of policy activists within the party who pressure party leaders to take ideologically extreme positions. Indeed a general trend within this type of approach has been to look inside political parties for explanations of their *non-convergence* on the ideological centre ground.

A more recent focus on intra-party politics has arisen from theoretical attempts to explain the origins of political parties. The central question addressed by such theories concerns the incentives for ambitious politicians to create or join parties. As Aldrich (1995: 29) notes, 'Shared preferences are important bases of political parties. Parties-in-government are also institutions with rules and procedures for selecting leaders, providing them with power and resources, and structuring Congress and government more generally.'

One strand of research in this tradition focuses on *electoral payoffs* to party members. Politicians who seek re-election can benefit from the party 'brand', which conveys a great deal of information to voters at little cost. Thus party affiliation, providing reputational cues, mitigates the collective action problem for voters who might otherwise have little incentive to become sufficiently informed to cast a vote. This theory of party formation has been best articulated by Snyder and Ting (2002).[1]

A second strand of research focuses on the *legislative payoffs* to forming a party. Schwartz (1989) shows that, given the cyclicity of majority rule, potential gains from legislative trade cannot be accrued. Incentives exist for individual legislators to form 'long' or durable coalitions in order to deal with the unpredictability – and unprofitability – of the unorganized legislature. Aldrich (1995) develops this perspective to explain the birth of Federalist and Jeffersonian Republican parties. More recently, Cox and McCubbins (2005) developed a theory of party affiliation that stressed the benefits to party members arising from legislative agenda control.

These electoral and legislative incentives for politicians to form political parties arise under both parliamentary government systems and the US separation-of-powers regime. They are important because they make it clear that parties are not monolithic

entities, but are more appropriately seen as durable 'endogenous' coalitions,[2] created by ambitious politicians who aim not to create parties *per se*, but to be re-elected to control legislative decisions.

The most commonly studied *behavioural* manifestation of intra-party politics analysed within the rational choice tradition has been roll-call voting in the US Congress and, to a very much more limited extent, in parliamentary systems such as Britain and France. Analyses of the cohesion of party roll calls have tended either to be preference-driven or institutional models of legislative behaviour. Preference-driven models, such as those generated by Krehbiel (1993) for the US Congress, see parliamentary party unity merely as a function of the distribution of politicians' policy preferences – since legislators who want the same things can be expected to vote in the same way. Consequently, preference driven models do not make any distinction between party cohesion and party discipline – what looks like discipline is seen simply as a result of the common interest of legislators.

Most theoretical accounts of intra-party politics, however, assume the actions of politicians to stem from both preferences themselves and from the institutional structures within which competition between politicians with different preferences takes place. Thus models of the institutional structuring of legislative behaviour stress the importance of formal and informal rules and procedures, which are seen to structure decision-making by politicians. Arguing in this vein, Cox (1987) showed that changes in Britain's electoral laws in the nineteenth century provided incentives for MPs to shift from being primarily servants of their constituents to being members of cohesive legislative parties that competed with one another in offering voters alternative policy platforms. Later work by Huber (1996b) on politics in the French Fifth Republic examined how specific legislative rules such as the vote of confidence procedure and time allocation provisions bolstered party cohesion.

Another important stream of work within the rational choice approach has centred on agenda setting. Agenda-setting models provide an account of how, if some political actors control both what the legislature discusses and the order of such discussions, they can influence the particular decisions the entire chamber eventually makes (Romer and Rosenthal 1978; Cox 2000; Tsebelis 2001). Models that stress the role of legislative agenda setting in intra-party politics typically cast leaders as agents of party members (Rohde 1991; Cox and McCubbins 1993), with huge incentives to manipulate the legislative agenda for internal party reasons. For example, party leaders may set the legislative agenda so as to minimize the salience of disunity within their own party on a specific issue. In this respect, leaders may prefer to find an accomodation with other party leaders; they may agree to non-partisan votes on especially divisive issues; or they may plump for cross-party consensus and hence avoid divisive legislative votes altogether. These are just some of the agenda-setting strategies open to party leaders in their efforts to manage intra-party conflicts.

The theoretical accounts of intra-party politics discussed above are not necessarily exportable to the constitutional setting of parliamentary governments, in which the executive is responsible to the legislature and party unity is crucial

if party leaders are to ensure government survival. In parliamentary government systems, defined as those in which the executive derives from, and is constitutionally responsible to, the legislature, the fate of governments depends fundamentally on coherent party behaviour in parliament. Party leaders cannot credibly commit themselves to the making of governments, for example, or to maintaining control of the government once in office, if they are not able to rely on the loyalty of their party members. Coordination at the legislative level is of vital importance for government survival. This constitutional situation is fundamentally different from the one which characterizes separation-of-powers systems such as that in the US, where individual legislators are much freer to form different legislative coalitions, depending on the political issues before them.

Within the set of parliamentary government systems, it is common to make a distinction between 'Westminster-style' versus 'consensus' democracies (Lijphart 1999). Westminster-style systems are characterized by a double monopoly of power. First, the cabinet has a near monopoly of executive and legislative power and second, a single party has monopoly of the cabinet itself (Palmer 1995; 168–70). This system is seen to be a product of a majoritarian electoral system that ensures one party will dominate in parliament, and of party rules that minimize the likelihood of MPs operating as free agents on the legislative stage. The UK, 'supposedly *the* example of a cohesive parliamentary system', shows a crucial strategic problem of how to maintain party unity (Bowler *et al*. 1999). In this case, the importance of institutional arrangements and constitutional norms such as legislative 'whipping', collective cabinet responsibility and secret budget preparations are clearly central pillars underpinning party unity. Kam's (2006: 27) model of intra-party politics highlights the logic of party unity in Westminister systems. He states:

> An MP who wishes to exercise policy influence or enjoy the perks of higher office must attain a cabinet post; party leaders control advancement to the cabinet (or, in opposition, to the shadow cabinet); the MP's advancement depends, therefore, on maintaining good relations with party leaders. Inevitably, this involves supporting the party leadership. Indeed, should the MP secure a position in the ministry, the relationship is expressed formally in a constitutional convention of collective responsibility. Thus as an MP gains access to the perks of office and policy influence, she loses the ability to distance herself from party policy.

In short, party leaders use the fact that most MPs are ambitious to bolster party unity. Only MPs who are loyal are promoted to prestigious front bench positions. However, when the effectiveness of selective promotion incentives lose their effectiveness, party leaders can resort to punitive measures such as social pressure or sanctions to elicit compliance from an errant MP. Kam's main finding, based on a variety of empirical evidence from the UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, is that the institutional feature that has the greatest impact on

party unity is the leadership's monopoly on the career advancement pathways that lead to the cabinet or shadow cabinet.[3]

Single-party majority governments are an exception in parliamentary systems, where most governments are multiparty coalition governments or minority governments. Almost without exception, models of coalition formation have treated parties as unitary actors. First, such an assumption was considered a useful, albeit simplistic, analytical tool. Second, the assumption did not appear to be in too stark a contrast with the empirical evidence about parliamentary systems, where parties tend to enter and leave governments as unified blocs and parliamentary party members overwhelmingly vote with, not against, their parties (Laver and Schofield 1998; Powell 2000). At the same time, many coalition phenomena were hard to explain without relaxing the assumption of parties as unitary actors, for example, the instability of Italian cabinets (Mershon 2001), the oversized unstable German cabinets of the 1950s (Saalfeld 1995) or the persistence of minority governments in Norway (Strøm 1994).

Over two decades ago, Luebbert (1986) proposed an often quoted intra-party approach to coalition formation premised on the assumption that party leaders are motivated above all 'by the desire to remain party leaders'. From Luebbert's perspective, inter-party negotiations over government formation are mainly shaped by party leaders' concerns about maintaining intra-party consent. Strøm (1990) developed propositions concerning parties' internal organization in an account of the mix of strategies pursued by competitive political parties. But it is only in the past decade that theorists of government formation have made very explicit attempts to address the problem that 'parties are clearly not unitary actors and function as unitary actors only to the extent that their leaders are able to maintain disciplined behaviour between rank and file' (Laver 1999: 28). In the next section we will briefly examine how theories of coalition government formation and duration have thus far dealt with intra-party politics.

Intra-party politics and coalition government formation

Theoretical accounts of government formation can be categorized into those that stress office and those that stress policy motivations among politicians (Laver and Schofield 1998). The former includes the earliest models of government formation theories, for which the sole motivation for political actors was to win a place in office. Consequently, members of a coalition were predicted to form only minimal winning coalitions, within which their individual benefits are larger (Riker 1962). In contrast, policy-oriented theories focused on the positions of parties as the exogenous primitives in their accounts of government formation (De Swaan 1976; Axelrod 1970). Within policy-oriented theories, there is an important distinction between unidimensional models, which analyse competition between politicians whose ideal policy positions can be represented adequately using a unidimensional policy scale, and multidimensional models, which assume that the ideal policy positions of key politicians can only be adequately represented using a policy space with at least two orthogonal dimensions.

Multidimensional policy-driven theories that deploy an 'institution-free' cooperative game-theoretical approach to modelling government coalition formation have provided predictions about which political parties will be *core* parties, or key players, in the coalition formation process (Schofield and Sened 2006).

Supplementing 'institution-free models' that consider only parties' weights and policy positions, another line of scholarship stresses the role of institutional regularities in the process of government formation. Strøm (1985, 1990) and Laver and Schofield (1998) informally discussed several rules that can influence coalition government formation. These include electoral thresholds; investiture rules; recognition rules which give special bargaining power to the head of the state or the status quo government; cabinet and legislative rules and party internal rules. More recently, models grounded in non-cooperative game theory have become the standard way of modelling bargaining over government formation, starting from the seminal work by Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) and Baron (1991, 1993). Each of these models is driven by some specific institutional assumption about the 'bargaining protocol' that structures the government formation process. Thus Austen-Smith and Banks presented a unidimensional model of a parliamentary system with a proportional representation electoral system and an assumed deterministic bargaining protocol under which parties were selected to be government *formateur* in strict size order. Baron developed a sequential model of government formation with an assumed bargaining protocol based on an exogenous probabilistic random recognition rule, with parties' probabilities of being recognized as *formateur* conditioned by their size. These models all conclude that the *formateur* party, however recognized, should have a prominent role in the process of government formation.

A different approach to modelling the institutional structure of the government formation process was proposed by Austen-Smith and Banks (1990) and by Laver and Shepsle (1990, 1996), who developed a spatial model of ministerial delegation, according to which government policies are determined by delegated policy choices of ministers and thus by the allocation of cabinet portfolios between potential ministers with differing policy preferences. This approach is based on two key institutional assumptions. The first concerns the distinction between executive and legislative coalitions, with the executive in effect setting public policy and the legislature sustaining the executive in office. The second concerns the role of the status quo government which is the reversion point in any bargaining over government formation.

The most distinctive assumption of the model is that ministers' agenda powers over their own policy jurisdictions allow them to pull government outputs toward their ideal policy positions. Assuming differing policy preferences between different 'ministrable' politicians within the same party, the model is also distinctive among the existing approaches in suggesting ways in which intra-party politics might affect government formation. Different ministerial nominations to a given policy portfolio generate different forecasts of government policy outputs. Consequently, party leaders can exploit differences in policy positions of potential ministers within their own party, while bargaining over portfolio allocation, in an attempt to improve their prospects in government formation. Since executive and legislative elements of the

same party may face quite different incentives and payoffs, the capacity of party leaders to honour coalition agreements relies crucially on the disciplined behaviour of their party. Consequently, 'whether or not a leader delivers a unified party to honour a particular coalition commitment is an intensely strategic matter rather than something that can be taken as given' (Laver 1999: 22).

Another line of research focuses on ways in which intra-party decision-making procedures affect bargaining over government formation. Internal decision-making procedures can vary between parties, allowing for different levels of 'intra-party democracy' or centralization of decision-making authority (Strøm 1990; Laver and Shepsle 1990). It has been argued that more 'democratic' parties can incur efficiency losses while bargaining over government formation (Warwick 1996; Müller and Strøm 2000).[4] Strøm (2003) proposes a 'delegation model' of coalition bargaining, arguing that party leaders can be thought of as agents of their parliamentary, or extra-parliamentary party. If leaders act as agents of their parties, however, then there are the information asymmetries and potential shirking problems that arise in any principal–agent relationship. In addition, considering negotiations between party leaders, each may know the others' personal preferences and yet be less than fully informed about the discretion they enjoy vis-à-vis their respective parties.

Intra-party politics and government termination

Recent authors have taken three basic approaches to the study of government termination in parliamentary government systems. The first approach focuses on *attributes* of the political system that seem likely to affect government stability. Attributes considered include: features of the party system such as fragmentation and polarization; constitutional rules such as formal investiture procedures (Taylor and Herman 1971; Dodd 1976; Strøm 1985); and features of the cabinet itself, such as majority status and ideological compactedness (Laver 1974; Warwick 1979). A second approach focuses on critical events, such as economic and political shocks that can lead to government termination, and involves estimation of the 'hazard rate' of particular types of government (Browne *et al*. 1984, 1986). These two streams were combined in an event history model by King *et al*. (1990), according to which the hazard rate of government dissolution is a function of a range of independent variables – most of these being attributes of particular governments that had been investigated by previous scholars. Warwick (1994) subsequently built on this approach by examining a larger number of cases with additional explanatory variables.

A third approach focuses on strategic responses by governments and opposition parties to critical events. According to this perspective, government replacements and voluntary dissolutions represent government terminations that arise from the strategic decisions of key actors (regardless of the timing of scheduled elections). Lupia and Strøm (1995), Baron (1998) and Diermeier and Stevenson (1999) have presented theories of government termination based on this approach. In particular, Lupia and Strøm have challenged the conventional wisdom that government parties will always force new elections when they expect

to gain votes (Grofman and van Roozendaal 1994) showing that government coalition parties that are going to increase their legislative weight if an election were to be held immediately may either force an early election, renegotiate the existing coalition agreement or continue to accept the status quo, depending on the potential opportunity and transaction costs associated with these decisions.

A different way of modelling government termination was proposed by Laver and Shepsle (1998) who built on their earlier model of government formation and extended the Lupia and Strøm approach. Laver and Shepsle extended the range and type of shocks that might potentially affect the electoral expectations of key actors. These shocks, such as unanticipated events that force parties to take policy positions on matters they had not considered before (i.e., 'policy shocks'), or unanticipated events that push some issue on which parties already have stated positions significantly up or down the policy agenda (or 'agenda shocks') are seen to have the power to destroy government equilibria.

In general, the strategic approach highlights the importance of legislative activity as a key factor influencing government termination. The Laver and Shepsle model stresses the roles of policy shifts in party ideal positions which may well be the result of intra-party politics. For this reason, such an approach has the potential to be a fruitful line of future research on intra-party sources of cabinet instability. There is, however, a relative disjunction between theoretical and empirical work in this area. In part this situation stems from limitations in the models themselves (e.g., the Lupia and Strøm model is limited to a three-party legislature). In part it arises from serious difficulties in obtaining data that would allow rigorous testing of the theories outlined across a larger number of national settings; this involves measuring the policy preferences of a range of important intra-party actors, which is not an easy task. Nonetheless there has been some progress on these issues. For example, data about intra-party conflict as a key determinant of government termination in 13 European democracies has been published in Müller and Strøm (2000). Moreover, Druckman (1996) has performed a large comparative study and found that increasing levels of party factionalism tends to reduce the life expectancy of a cabinet. As Saalfeld (this volume) notes, further comparative studies will be needed to complement case studies if more cumulative knowledge has to be produced in this important area.

Thus far, our focus has been on the impact of intra-party politics on the birth and death of governments. Quite obviously, internal party dynamics also play an important role during inter-election periods. However, until recently relatively little theoretical work was undertaken on what we might think of as the 'life and times' of coalition cabinets (as opposed to their birth and death) because of the inherent difficulties of formulating the necessary dynamic models of party competition and legislative behaviour.

Intra-party politics during inter-electoral periods

Formal coalition theories have focused mainly on government formation and government termination, as we have seen for the most part treating parties as

unitary actors. Relaxing the assumption that parties are unitary actors directs our attention to legislators' behaviour *between* elections. As Laver and Benoit (2003: 215) point out, 'There is a great deal of politics between elections. In particular, legislators may defect from one party and join another, parties may split and fuse, and the party system may thereby evolve into one quite different from that produced by election results.'

Recent research on switching by legislators has challenged the conventional view of party switching as a pathological phenomenon or an exceptional occurrence. Patterns of legislative party switching have been observed in many countries, including Brazil, Italy, Japan, Poland and Russia (Benoit and Hayden 2004; Reed and Scheiner 2003; Heller and Mershon 2005; Desposato 2006b, Mershon and Shvetsova 2007). The reshaping of parliamentary groups can have a dramatic impact on the making and breaking of governments, as happened in Italy during the period 1996–1998 (Giannetti and Laver 2001).

Office-based accounts of inter-electoral legislative behaviour have pointed to incentives for both fusions and defections (Kato and Laver 2001). Game-theoretic models of party switching have been proposed by Aldrich and Bianco (1992) and Mershon and Heller (2004). Desposato (2006b) builds on those contributions modelling legislators' decisions to switch or stay put in a simple game with two parties and two legislators. Legislators are assumed to maximize their expected utility, a function of the resources they will receive in their party of choice, less any transaction costs. Parties weigh the added (electoral) benefit of an additional member versus the cost of increased ideological dispersion when deciding to accept defectors. Implications of the model are that legislators with more partisan voters will be less likely to switch party; legislators will be more likely to switch parties as resource differentials increase; legislators stay in, or switch into, parties with low electoral thresholds; legislators stay in, or switch into, ideologically compatible parties; switchers will be welcomed when their value added is positive (e.g., when they bring votes) but excluded when their value added is negative (e.g., when they are ideologically too inconsistent with a party). Desposato (2006b) applied this model to the case of Brazilian parties, suggesting that extending it to other cases would require analysts 'to carefully identify the benefits of party membership that could affect legislators' career utility, taking into account each system's institutions, norms and transaction costs'.

The foregoing theoretical literature represents an important step forward in modelling party behaviour between elections, generating testable empirical implications. As with most formal theories of coalition formation, it uses an essentially static approach. Party cohesion, however, is best understood as the output of a complex dynamic process. Relaxing the assumption of parties as unitary actors underlines the need for a dynamic approach to modelling party competition and coalition formation, a daunting task given the analytical intractability of any dynamic model, and one that has led to an interest in computational approaches, such as agent-based modelling (e.g., Kollman *et al*. 1992).

Laver and Benoit (2003) depart from classical game-theoretical accounts to model the evolutionary dynamics of legislative party switching between elections.

Party affiliation of legislators is treated as a continuous choice that depends on expected payoffs from switching. The model explores the relationship between party size and attractiveness within a party system, showing that a dominant largest party is more likely than others to attract (and accept) defectors. Laver and Benoit's 'baseline' model is built on purely office-seeking assumptions and relies on an iterated adaptive decision-theoretic framework. Another application of this perspective extends a dynamic approach to party competition, examining how different types of internal party decision rule affect parties' competitive behaviour (Laver 2005). In this model voters switch parties on the basis of policy preferences, and parties continuously re-adapt their policy positions on the basis of the shifting affiliations of voters. Different adaptive rules are explored, including a rule reflecting a party in which the leader's freedom to set policy is constrained by the policy preferences of current party supporters ('Aggregator'), a rule reflecting an 'unconstrained' party leader who constantly modifies party policy in the search for more supporters ('Hunter'), an alternative rule reflecting an 'unconstrained' party leader who moves party policy to the position of the largest party in the search for more supporters ('Predator') and a rule modelling an ideological party leader concerned exclusively with maintaining a particular policy position and not at all with increasing party support ('Sticker'). Trends in the behaviour of parties using different methods of adaptation are explored. The analysis is a first step toward 'endogenizing' key features of party competition, including the birth and death of parties (Laver and Schilperoord 2007) and internal party decision rules (Fowler and Laver 2006).

Road map for the book

As we have shown during the course of the preceding pages, the systematic and rigorous analysis of intra-party politics, and in particular the interaction between intra-party politics and the self-evidently crucial process of making and breaking governments, present both huge opportunities and huge intellectual challenges. The rest of this book presents a sequence of chapters, each devoted in some way to the investigation of these opportunities and challenges.

In Chapter 2 of this volume, Strøm and Müller discuss the functions that parties fulfil in parliamentary systems and the foundations upon which party government builds. They explore the different forces of party cohesion in Westminster and various types of coalitional systems. This chapter lays the foundation for many of the theoretical and empirical chapters that follow, organized in terms of a simple 'hierarchy of governance' approach to focus, in turn, on sub-national, national and supra-national levels of government.

Thus the chapters in Part II extend the analysis of intra-party politics and coalition behaviour to the sub-national level of government. In Chapter 3, Hanna Bäck evaluates hypotheses about intra-party politics and coalition formation drawn from existing coalition theories that have been concerned hitherto with government at the national level. First, she evaluates the hypothesis that factionalized, or non-cohesive parties, are less likely to get into government. Second, she evaluates

the hypothesis that internally democratic parties are less likely to be in government. Crucially, however, she evaluates hypotheses using a new dataset from Swedish local governments. Not only does this bring a much needed new dataset to bear upon an important problem but, from a research design perspective, it generates a significant number of cases within a single national setting, within which many important institutional and cultural variables can be held constant.

In Chapter 4, Pedro Camões and Silvia Mendes investigate coalition behaviour in Portuguese local government, in a setting where electoral rules exclude formal post-electoral coalition formation. However, there is coalition-like bargaining in the form of delegation, the allocation of policy portfolios to some but not all members of the councils. This makes the Portuguese local government an attractive setting in which to test hypotheses about post-electoral coalition bargaining that are derived from existing models of portfolio allocation.

Finally, in relation to local government, Irina Ştefuriuc in Chapter 5 analyses party behaviour in 'two-tiered systems', in which parties often participate in government at the state level while being in opposition at the regional level, or vice versa. Minimal winning coalitions, minority governments and informal or ad hoc legislative coalitions occur frequently in such settings. Under these conditions, government formation and survival require strong parliamentary discipline. Maintaining policy coherence and keeping their various parliamentary groups in line may thus become a primary task for party leaders operating at both levels. The chapter explores the potentially disruptive consequences for party unity arising from governmental and parliamentary decentralization examining two cases: the Spanish Social-Democratic Party (PSOE) and the British Labour Party (BLP).

The essays in Part III investigate intra-party politics and coalition behaviour at the national level. Chapter 6 by Depauw and Martin analyses the factors explaining cross-party and cross-national variation in the observed levels of party cohesion and unity in parliamentary democracies. They argue that political institutions systematically affect levels of party cohesion. Specifically, electoral systems and candidate selection procedures create different incentives for individual legislators to be responsive to the party leadership. Using a cross-national dataset, this chapter shows how electoral and candidate selection institutions increase party unity in the legislature.

In Chapter 7, Debus and Bräuninger move from relaxing the assumption of parties as unitary actors to explore the conditions under which – with respect to the traditional structure of specific party organizations – key intra-party factions play a role in coalition bargaining processes. They develop a simple model to show when and how the outcomes of coalition formation processes reflect the policy positions and intra-party strength of party factions, as opposed to the positions of parties if viewed as unitary actors. Their argument is evaluated in a case study of coalition formation in Germany in 1990 and 2002.

Chapter 8 by Giannetti and Laver first reviews some of the theoretical issues arising from treating political parties as endogenous coalitions of politicians, exploring the incentive structure of legislators at the level of electoral, legislative and executive politics. The authors then elaborate these issues at an empirical

level by mapping the internal factional structure of the main Italian left-wing party (*Democratici di Sinistra*), then using this to explain why different deputies of that party voted in different ways on the same key foreign policy roll calls.

In Chapter 9, Thomas Saalfeld focuses on the role of intra-party conflict as a source of cabinet durability, developing a cross-national empirical analysis of the impact of intra-party conflict on government duration. It uses a 'unified model' of cabinet termination which focuses on a number of institutional variables – such as the electoral system and the prime minister's dissolution powers – and the presence or absence of certain conflict management mechanisms.

Part IV explores intra-party politics at the EU level. In Chapter 10, Stephanie Bailer examines party cohesion and the control mechanisms used by party groups in the European Parliament (EP). To date most analyses of cohesion in the EP use roll-call data. Such analyses are limited because roll calls in the EP are used only 30 per cent of the time; furthermore, the fact that roll-call votes are often used strategically compounds the problem that roll-call votes are not representative of all voting. Starting from a discussion about the influence of multiple principals and institutions on Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), the chapter uses survey data to show that an increase of the size of party groups after EU enlargement led to more internal pressure within European party groups. However, looking at roll-call vote data shows that the European party groups behave as homogeneously following enlargement as before. The rest of the paper discusses this puzzle suggesting future avenues of research, in particular whether the smooth integration behaviour of the new MEPs or increased coordination efforts of party group leaders could explain this discrepancy. Chapter 11 by Gail McElroy contributes to the emerging literature on party switching by analysing patterns of party switching in the EP. The EP is a particularly interesting arena in which to study the phenomenon of party switching, as the electoral incentives to defect are not obvious and theories of switching suggesting that members defect to increase their access to pork have limited application. This chapter tests the hypothesis that factors internal to the parliament are key in accounting for switches. Using an original dataset of party switchers and party, parliamentary and committee posts (covering the period 1989–1994), the author uses a discrete choice model to test the hypothesis that MEPs switch political groups to advance their political careers within the parliament itself.

As will be seen from the chapters that follow, intra-party politics occurs in a wide range of contexts. In this book we concentrate on two key dimensions. The first dimension relates to the 'level of governance', where we will see that analysing the dynamics of internal party politics advances our current understanding of local, national and supra-national public policy-making. Although there is a considerable literature on multilevel governance (MLG), this book presents one of the first explorations of MLG from the point of view of (internal) party actors. The second dimension examined in this volume is 'timing', the location of intra-party politics within the electoral cycle, so that specific chapters look at the birth, death and daily life of parliamentary governments.

Consideration of intra-party politics from the perspective of both level of governance and timing has the merit of highlighting important directions for future research. This is most especially the case in the area of theory, with a focus on intra-party politics highlighting the need for more dynamic models. It is also very clearly the case in the realm of empirical measurement, with a focus on intra-party politics highlighting the need for data sources and statistical techniques suitable for measuring the policy positions of factions and politicians within given political parties. A central insight of this book is that future progress is most likely to stem from studying intra-party politics across all of its domains, and in a manner that reflects the inherent dynamism of life within parties. It is hoped that the substantive topics and theoretical and methodological issues addressed in this book will contribute to the growth of this important subfield within political science.

Notes

1 See also Cox and McCubbins (1993).
2 Aldrich also stresses the important point that a party is more than just a group of people; it also entails a set of regular rules, norms and procedures for selecting leaders. A party is, in this view, an institutionalized coalition.
3 A second empirical finding is the relation between electoral dealignment and party dissent; as party identification in the electorate declines, the unity of parliamentary parties is slowly eroded. This relationship comes about because dissent, like constituency service, is principally an electoral strategy intended to win the MP a personal vote, a fact that is reflected in the close connection between the MP's electoral security, constituency service efforts and propensity to dissent in Parliament (Kam 2006).
4 Mahor (1998) advanced the opposite argument according to which decentralized parties as opposed to centralized parties do better in managing intra-party conflict and in so doing can sustain their bargaining power over 'decisive preferences' in the process of coalition government formation. Mahor's evidence, however, is limited to four case studies.

References

Aldrich, J. H. (1983) 'A Downsian spatial model with party activists', *American Political Science Review* 77(4): 974–90

Aldrich, J. H. (1995) *Why Parties?* Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Aldrich, J. H. and Bianco, W. T. (1992) 'A game-theoretic model of party affiliation of candidates and office holders', *Mathematical and Computer Modeling* 16(8–9): 103–16

Austen-Smith, D. and Banks, J. (1988) 'Elections, coalitions and legislative outcomes', *American Political Science Review* 82(2): 405–22

Austen-Smith, D. and Banks, J. (1990) 'Stable governments and the allocation of policy portfolios', *American Political Science Review* 84(3): 891–906

Axelrod, R. (1970) *Conflict of Interest*. Chicago: Markham

Baron, D. (1991) 'A spatial bargaining theory of government formation in a parliamentary system', *American Political Science Review* 85(2): 137–64

Baron, D. (1993) 'Government formation and endogenous parties', *American Political Science Review* 87(1): 34–47

Baron, D. (1998) 'Comparative dynamics of parliamentary governments' *American Political Science Review* 92(3): 593–609

Beller, D. C. and Belloni, F. P. (1978) 'The study of factions', in F. P. Belloni and D. C. Beller (eds) *Faction Politics: Political Parties and Factionalism in Comparative Perspective*. Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, pp. 417–50

Benoit, K. and Hayden, J. (2004) 'Institutional change and persistence: The evolution of Poland's electoral system, 1989–2001' *Journal of Politics* 66(2): 396–427

Bettcher, K. E. (2005) 'Factions of interest in Japan and Italy. The organizational and motivational dimensions of factionalism', *Party Politics* 11(3): 339–58

Boucek, F. (2005) 'Why does party dominance end in factionalism and what are the implications for democracy?' paper presented at the Third ECPR Conference, Budapest, 8–10 September 2005

Bowler, S., Farrell, D. M. and Katz, R. S. (eds) (1999) *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press

Browne, E. C., Frendreis, J. P. and Gleiber, D. (1984) 'An "events" approach to the problem of cabinet stability', *Comparative Political Studies* 17(July): 167–97

Browne, E. C., Frendreis, J. P. and Gleiber, D. (1986) 'The process of cabinet dissolution: An exponential model of duration and stability in western democracies' *American Journal of Political Science* 30(3): 628–50

Carey, J. (2007) 'Competing principals, political institutions, and party unity in legislative voting', *American Journal of Political Science* 51(1): 92–107

Carey, J. M. and Shugart, M. S. (1995) 'Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral formulas', *Electoral Studies* 14(4): 417–39

Cox, G. W. (1987) *The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Parties in Victorian England.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Cox, G. W. (2000) 'On the effects of legislative rules', *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 25(2): 169–92

Cox, G. W. and McCubbins, M. D. (1993) *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*. Berkeley: University of California Press

Cox, G. W. and McCubbins, M. D. (2005) *Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Cox, G. W., Thies, M. F. and Rosenbluth, F. M. (2000) 'Electoral rules, career ambitions and party structure: Comparing factions in Japan Upper and Lower House', *American Journal of Political Science* 44 (1):115–22

De Swaan, A. (1976) *Coalition Theories and Government Formation*. Amsterdam: Elsevier

Desposato, S. W. (2004) 'The impact of Federalism on National Party Cohesion in Brazil', *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 24(2): 259–85

Desposato, S. W. (2006a) 'The impact of electoral rules on legislative parties: Lessons from the Brazilian Senate and Chamber of Deputies' *Journal of Politics* 68(4): 1018–30

Desposato, S. W. (2006b) 'Parties for rent? Ambition, ideology, and party switching in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies', *American Journal of Political Science* 50(1): 62–80

Diermeier, D. and Stevenson, R. T. (1999) 'Government survival and competing risks', *American Journal of Political Science* 43(4):1051–68

Dodd, L. C. (1976) *Coalitions in Parliamentary Governments*. Princeton: Princeton University Press

Druckman, J. (1996) 'Party factionalism and cabinet durability', *Party Politics* 3(2): 397–407

Duverger, M. (1951) *Les Parties Politiques*. Paris: Armand Colin, 1976

Figuereido, A. C. and Limongi, F. (2000) 'Presidential power, legislative organization and party behaviour in Brazil', *Comparative Politics* 32(1): 151–70

Fowler, J. H. and Laver, M. (2006) 'A tournament of party decision rules', *Journal of Management Reviews* 8(2): 91–112

Gallagher, M. and Marsh, M. (eds) (1988) *Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics*. London: Sage

Giannetti, D. and Laver, M. (2001) 'Party system dynamics and the making and breaking of Italian governments', *Electoral Studies* 20(4): 529–53

Golembiewski, R. T. (1958) 'A taxonomic approach to state political party strength', *Western Political Quarterly* 11(3): 494–513

Grofman, B. and van Roozendaal, P. (1994) 'Toward a theoretical explanations of premature cabinet termination with applications to premature government termination in the Netherlands', *European Journal of Political Research* 26(2): 155–70

Heller, W. B. and Mershon, C. T. (2005) 'Party switching in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1996–2001', *Journal of Politics* 67(2): 536–59

Hine, D. (1982) 'Factionalism in West European parties: A framework for analysis', *West European Politics* 5(1): 36–53

Hix, S. (2002) 'Parliamentary behavior with two principals: Legislator preferences, parties and voting in the European Parliament', *American Journal of Political Science* 46(4): 688–98

Huber, J. (1996a) 'The vote of confidence in parliamentary democracies', *American Political Science Review* 90(2): 269–82

Huber, J. (1996b) *Rationalizing Parliament: Legislative Institutions and Party Politics in France*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Kam, C. (2006) 'On Division! Cohesion, Discipline, and Intra-Party Politics', unpublished manuscript

Kato, J. and Laver, M. (2001) 'Dynamic approaches to government formation and the generic instability of decisive structures in Japan', *Electoral Studies* 20(4): 509–27

Katz, R. (2002) 'The internal life of parties', in K.R. Luther and F. Müller-Rommel (eds) *Political Parties in the New Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 87–118

Katz, R. S. and Crotty, W. J. (eds) (2006) *Handbook of Party Politics*. London: Sage

Katz, R. S. and Mair, P. (eds) (1994) *How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies*. London: Sage

King, G., Alt, J., Burns, N. and Laver, M. (1990) 'A unified model of cabinet dissolution in parliamentary democracies', *American Journal of Political Science* 34(3): 56–71

Kitschelt, H. (2000) 'Linkages between citizens and politicians in democratic polities' *Comparative Political Studies* 33(6–7): 845–79

Kitschelt, H. and Smith, R. (2002) 'Programmatic party cohesion in emerging post-communist democracies. Russia in comparative context', *Comparative Political Studies* 35(10): 1228–56

Kollman, K., Miller, J. and Page, S. (1992) 'Adaptive parties in spatial elections', *American Political Science Review* 86(4): 929–37

Krehbiel, K. (1993) 'Where's the party?', *British Journal of Political Science* 23(2): 235–66

Kreppel, A. (2002) *The European Parliament and Supranational Party System*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Laver, M. (1974) 'Dynamic factors in government coalition formation', *European Journal of Political Research* 2(September): 259–70

Laver, M. (1999) 'Divided parties, divided government', *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 24(1): 5–30

Laver, M. (2005) 'Policy and the dynamics of political competition', *American Political Science Review* 99(2): 263–81

Laver, M. and Schilperoord, M. (2007) 'Spatial models of political competition with endogenous political parties', *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B* 362: 1–11

Laver, M. and Schofield, N. (1998) *Multiparty Government 2nd ed*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press

Laver, M. and Shepsle, K. A. (1990) 'Government coalitions and intra-party politics', *British Journal of Political Science* 20(4): 489–507

Laver, M. and Shepsle, K. A. (1996) *Making and Breaking Governments*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Laver M., Benoit, K. and Garry, J. (2003) 'Extracting policy positions from political texts using words as data', *American Political Science Review* 97: 311–31

Le Duc, L. (2001) 'Democratizing party leadership selection,' *Party Politics* 7(3): 323–41

Leonardi, R. and Wertman, D. A. (1989) *Italian Christian Democracy: The Politics of Dominance*. Basingstoke and London: Macmillan

Lijphart, A. (1999) *Patterns of Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press

Luebbert, G. (1986) *Comparative Democracy*. New York: Columbia University Press

Lupia, A. and Strøm, K. (1995) 'Coalition termination and the strategic timing of parliamentary elections', *American Political Science Review* 89(3): 648–65

Mahor, M. (1998) *Parties, Conflicts and Coalitions in Western Europe: Organizational Determinants of Coalition Bargaining*. London and New York: LSE Publishers

Mainwaring, S. P. (1999) *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil*. Stanford: Stanford University Press

Mershon, C. (2001) 'Party factions and coalition government: Portfolio allocation in Italian Christian democracy', *Electoral Studies* 20(4): 509–27

Mershon, C. and Heller, W. B. (2004) 'Theoretical and empirical models of party switching' paper presented at the Dublin Workshop of the Party Switching Research Group, Dublin, Summer 2004

Mershon, C. and Shvetsova, O. (2007) 'Parliamentary cycles and party switching in legislatures', *Comparative Political Studies* 41(1): 99–127

Morgenstern, S. (2004) *Patterns of Legislative Politics: Roll Call Voting in Latin America and the United States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Müller, W. C. and Strøm K. (eds.) (2000) *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Narud, H. M., Pedersen, M. N. and Valen, H. (eds) (2002) *Party Sovereignty and Citizen Control: Selecting Candidates for Parliamentary Elections in Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway*. Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark

Owens, J. E. (2003) 'Explaining party cohesion and discipline in democratic legislatures', *Journal of Legislative Studies* 9: 12–40

Ozbudun, E. (1970) 'Party cohesion in Western democracies', *Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics* 1: 303–88

Palmer, M. S. R. (1995) 'Toward an economics of comparative political organization: Examining ministerial responsibility' *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization* 11(1): 164–88

Pennings, P. and Hazan, R. N. (2001) 'Democratizing candidate selection. Causes and consequences', *Party Politics* 7(3): 267–75

Powell, B. G. (2000) *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions.* New Haven: Yale University Press

Rahat, G. and Hazan, R. Y. (2001) 'Candidate selection methods. An analytical framework', *Party Politics* 7(3): 297–322

Reed, S. D. and Scheiner, E. (2003) 'Electoral incentives and policy preferences. Mixed motives behind party defections in Japan', *British Journal of Political Science* 33(3): 469–90

Riker, W. H. (1962) *The Theory of Political Coalitions*. New Haven: Yale University Press

Rohde, D. W. (1991) *Parties and Leaders in the Post Reform House*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Romer, T. and Rosenthal, H. (1978) 'Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo' *Public Choice* 33(4): 27–44

Rose, R. (1964) 'Parties, factions and tendencies in Britain, *Political Studies* 12(1): 33–46

Saalfeld, T. (1995) *Parteisoldaten und Rebellen: Eine Untersuchung zur Geschlossenheitder Fraktionen im Deutschen Bundestag (1949–1990).* Opladen: Leske und Budrich

Sartori, G. (1976) *Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Scarrow, S. (2000) 'Parties without members?', in R. Dalton, J. Russell, P. Martin and M. Wattenberg (eds) *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 79–102

Schattschneider, E. E. (1942) *Party Government*. Westport: Greenwood Press

Schofield, N. and Sened, I. (2006) *Multiparty Democracy: Parties, Elections and Legislative Politics in Multiparty Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Schwartz, T. (1989) 'Why parties?' Department of Political Science, University of California at Los Angeles, Research memorandum: 1–17

Shugart, M. (2005) 'Comparative electoral systems research: The maturation of a field and new challenges ahead', in M. Gallagher and P. Mitchell (eds) *The Politics of Electoral Systems*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 25–55

Snyder, J. M. Jr. and Ting, M. M. (2002) 'An informational rationale for political parties', *American Journal of Political Science* 46(1): 90–110.

Strøm, K. (1985) 'Party goals and government performance in parliamentary democracies', *American Political Science Review* 79(3): 738–54

Strøm, K. (1990) *Minority Government and Majority Rule*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Strøm, K. (1994) 'The Presthus debacle: Intra-party politics and bargaining failure in Norway', *American Political Science Review* 88(1): 112–27

Strøm, K. (2003) 'Parliamentary democracy and delegation' in K. Strøm, T. Bergman and W. C. Müller (eds) *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Taylor, M. and Herman, V. M. (1971) 'Party systems and government stability', *American Political Science Review* 65(1): 28–37

Tsebelis, G. (2001) *Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work*. Princeton: Princeton University Press

Warwick, P. V. (1979) 'The durability of coalition governments in parliamentary democracies', *Comparative Political Studies* 11(4): 465–98

Warwick, P. V. (1994) *Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Warwick, P. V. (1996) 'Coalition Government Membership in West European Parliamentary Democracies,' *British Journal of Political Science* 26: 471–99

2 Parliamentary democracy, agency problems and party politics

Kaare Strøm and Wolfgang C. Müller

Introduction

Until the last quarter of the twentieth century, any serious student of democracy would have had to be sceptical about its prospects worldwide. Throughout human history up to that period, democracy had been rare and fragile, if at all conceivable. But, beginning in the 1970s and accelerating later, the 'third wave' of democratization has greatly extended the geographical domain of this form of governance and fostered a renewed optimism about its prospects.

Democracy means that citizens are sovereigns. Yet in large-scale contemporary societies, citizens may be formal and perhaps remote principals rather than active governors. This is because modern democracies are primarily representative ones, in which citizens delegate to a more or less professional class of politicians. Democracy may require good citizens as well as good politicians, but neither of these conditions, separately or jointly, can guarantee that democracy will actually work. This is because rather than resting on the qualities of voters and/or politicians in isolation, the prospects for democracy hinge on the relationship between the two, the linkage between citizens and politicians. This relationship defines the democratic accountability of politicians to ordinary citizens. Competitive political parties are without doubt the most important organizations on which this democratic accountability rests.

Political scientists have in recent decades made several important attempts to explain the functions of political parties within such a framework of democratic representation and competition (Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Schlesinger 1991), yet these accounts have in large part presumed the institutional context of presidential government (specifically the US case) and two-party politics. In this chapter, we shall take a closer look at the roles that political parties play in European parliamentary democracies, and at the reasons why voters as well as politicians rely on them. For reasons that we shall discuss below, parties are particularly critical to democratic accountability in parliamentary regimes. At the same time, these systems are different from the ones on which most of our theoretical accounts are based in two respects: they are parliamentary and they are in most cases multiparty systems. We shall therefore discuss to what extent the functions of political parties differ between parliamentary and presidential democracies, or between majoritarian and various types of proportional systems.

Finally, we shall consider whether multiparty coalitions in proportional parliamentary systems can serve the same purposes as mechanisms of democratic delegation that single-party governments do in majoritarian systems.

Parliamentary democracy and the chain of delegation

Parliamentary government (or simply, parliamentarism) is a system of government in which the prime minister and his or her cabinet are accountable to any majority of the members of parliament and can be voted out of office by the latter, through an ordinary or constructive vote of no confidence (Strøm *et al*. 2003).[1] Parliamentary government is the most common way to organize delegation and accountability in contemporary democracies. Of the 36 stable democratic states covered by Lijphart (1999), today only 5 – the US, Switzerland, Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela – are by our standards not parliamentary.[2] In fact, about a third of the world's population live under this regime form a larger proportion than for any other system of government. The states that feature parliamentary constitutions span all continents and include some of the largest countries in the world (India), as well as some of the most economically advanced (Japan), and some of those commonly considered to have the highest qualities of life (Canada, New Zealand). Yet Europe remains the heartland of parliamentarism. In Western Europe (leaving aside such micro-states as the Vatican), only Switzerland is not parliamentary. And by and large, the great majority of European citizens accept their parliamentary constitutions as legitimate vehicles for popular representation.

The chain of delegation

Our minimal definition of parliamentary government does not tell us much about the ways in which such democracies actually work. One key to the operation of modern representative democracies is delegation. Though democracy occasionally means that citizens make critical political decisions directly, it much more often means that they delegate such authority to a large and differentiated class of politicians, who then act in their name and place. There are many ways in which the citizens can delegate to politicians, and many ways in which politicians can delegate among each other. Democratic delegation from voters to those who govern is not a simple, one-shot process, but rather a chain of relationships, from voters to the ultimate policy makers, in which at each stage, a *principal* (in whom authority is originally vested) delegates to an *agent* (who has been conditionally authorized to act in the principal's name and place). In parliamentary systems, this chain of delegation has at least four discrete steps:

1 from voters to their elected representatives (the legislators)
2 from legislators to the head of the executive branch (the prime minister)
3 from the prime minister to the heads of different executive departments
4 from the heads of different executive departments to their respective civil servants.

Ideal-typically, the parliamentary chain of delegation and accountability is indirect, in that voters (the ultimate principal) directly elect only their parliamentary representatives; and simple, since at each stage of the parliamentary chain of delegation, a single principal delegates to a single agent (such as a member of parliament) or to a set of non-competitive ones. Presidential systems, in contrast, typically feature delegation relationships in which voters have multiple directly elected agents, and in which agents (such as administrative agencies) have multiple principals (e.g., a president and members of two separate legislative chambers).

Agency problems and accountability

Delegation does not always work. Principals (in our case, citizens) may be poorly served by their agents (politicians) either because these agents have preferences that differ from those of their principals, or because the principals do not know enough about their potential agents to get the best possible deal from them. The latter, informational, challenge may in turn come in the guise of two critical *agency problems*. First, principals may not be able to choose the right agents in the first place (*adverse selection*). Second, principals may not be able to keep their agents honest and diligent after they have been designated (*moral hazard*).

In response to such political agency problems, democratic societies have developed various accountability mechanisms that directly or indirectly permit citizens to control their representatives. A reverse chain of accountability thus mirrors the chain of delegation that we have discussed above. And there are effectively two accountability mechanisms by which democratic societies can contain agency problems: *political parties* and *external constraints*.

Parties are political organizations that align the preferences of the occupants of the most important political offices (parliament, the cabinet and the heads of the different executive agencies) and subordinate them to centralized control. Party leaders present to the democratic principals (the voters) a package of candidate agents whose policy preferences are fairly well understood, and whose behaviour will be strictly policed by this semi-public organization. Modern parliamentary systems rely on cohesive and centralized political parties to induce policy agreement along their long and indirect chain of delegation.

External constraints are checks on the agent that are beyond the control of his principal, such as courts, referendums, presidents with veto powers, social partners, and international agreements (see Epstein and O'Halloran 1999). Constraint may also come in the design of delegation relationships in which the agent accounts to multiple principals. External constraints check politicians once they have been placed in office and do not necessarily derive their authority directly from representatives of the people. The virtue of external constraints as a mechanism of accountability is precisely that preferences do *not* get aligned, so that the overseers retain some distance from the office-holders and some motivation to scrutinize their behaviour.

As controls, political parties and external constraints can complement one another. Some accountability mechanisms operate prior to the time of delegation

(*ex ante*), whereas others operate once a delegation relationship has been established (*ex post*). Generally, *ex ante* controls are most effective against adverse selection, whereas *ex post* solutions are more likely to effectively contain moral hazard (see Lupia 2003). Cohesive parties serve especially as a screening device, by which politicians with appropriate beliefs, values and skills can be selected for public service. Parties are therefore well suited to combating *adverse selection*. Constraints, on the other hand, typically operate after the fact of delegation (*ex post*). External constraints are therefore the weapon of choice against *moral hazard* among politicians and civil servants.

Varieties of parliamentary democracy

Although Westminster parliamentarism is important and illustrative, it is not representative of contemporary European democracies. Real-world parliamentary systems have been drifting away from the simplicities of the Westminster model, and most specifically toward less inclusive parties, for about a hundred years. This drift has been caused by a number of institutional reforms, but most notably the introduction of proportional representation (PR) and the consequent fragmentation of parliamentary party systems (Boix 1999; Rokkan 1970: 148–168). Since World War I, most parliamentary systems, and particularly those in continental Europe, have not been two-party systems. And multiparty government has in many countries become the norm (see Strøm *et al*. 2008).

Proportional representation has affected the relationship between voters and parliamentarians less than the relationship between parliament and the cabinet. List PR systems do nothing to weaken the internal cohesion of political parties. On the other hand, they may well jeopardize the cabinet cohesion that is traditionally found in the Westminster system. Thus, it is in the critical confidence relationship between parliament and the cabinet that multiparty systems most diverge from the cohesive, two-party model.

However, the world of multiparty parliamentarism is sufficiently diverse that it is important to recognize cross-national differences in coalitional cohesion. In some parliamentary systems, parties have found ways to make credible and durable commitments to competing coalitions. These alliances may be reinforced by electoral systems that reward pre-electoral agreements, as in Germany, France, Ireland, and Italy after 1992. Or they may be supported by a pattern of particularly simple and durable political cleavages, such as the one between socialists and non-socialists in the Scandinavian countries. We can refer to such systems as *alternational*, as their dynamics often come close to those of Westminster parliamentarism. In other systems, coalition bargaining is more short term and typically takes place *after*, rather than before, elections. For this reason, coalitional status is often not transparent to the voters, who are unable to cast their votes for a coalition rather than for a party. Examples of this type of parliamentarism can be found in Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland, or Italy before 1992. Because coalitional bargaining in such systems often revolves around a centrally located party or bloc of parties, we call these systems *pivotal.*

Parliamentary democracies, especially in their archetypical Westminster form, are partial to political parties as a control mechanism. The secret of Westminster parliamentarism is *centralized, cohesive, policy-oriented political parties*. Party and parliamentary government evolved symbiotically into the 'efficient secret' of British government (Bagehot 1865; Cox 1987). Even though in a parliamentary democracy the voter directly elects only the parliamentarians, the 'downstream' consequences are straightforward and predictable. As Palmer (1995: 168) puts it:

> The Westminster model of government similarly involves the holding of a competition (an election) between competing organizations (parties) for the virtually unconstrained right to exercise a monopoly power (by government, over legitimate coercion). The electorate seeks competing bids from parties in terms of promises to govern according to particular policy preferences and leadership characteristics. By appointing one disciplined party as its agent, the electorate accepts, by majority vote, what it judges to be the best bid.

Although the significance of political parties is particularly great in pure Westminster systems, they are of central importance in all parliamentary democracies. Parties influence all stages of the chain of delegation. In particular, they generally control delegation from voters to representatives, as well as from representatives to the chief executive (Müller 2000). Party control means extensive screening of prospective parliamentarians as well as potential cabinet members. Before candidates gain access to higher office, they must acquire the proper party credentials and prove themselves in lesser offices. But the effects of party attenuate as we move 'downstream' the policy chain. Their reach into administrative agencies is either tenuous or controversial, since partisanship in the civil service often conflicts with cherished values such as competence, neutrality or simply 'clean government' (Müller 2000).

Why accept party authority?

Political parties are voluntary and collaborative devices for mutual gain, formed because candidates for public office and voters find them useful for their respective purposes. Party organizations cannot prosper unless large numbers of citizens are willing to rely on them and credible politicians are willing to run under their labels. Hence, to understand political parties we must capture their purposes for voters as well as for party candidates and officials.

Political parties thus have to satisfy two incentive conditions. First, they have to provide sufficient inducements for political office-holders to submit to the cohesion (discipline) that they impose. If politicians refuse to submit to their discipline, party labels can be of no use to the voters. Second, the policy cohesion that parties induce among office-holders must be sufficient that voters find the party label informative and useful. In addition, it is helpful (though not strictly necessary) for parties to attract activists who can help them in the recruitment,

training and selection of potential candidates for office, as well as provide inexpensive campaign labour. Moreover, parties have to serve these functions at a cost that is attactive to both politicians and voters. Let us then consider the rationale for political parties in the process of popular representation, beginning with the motivations of politicians.

Parties must appeal to a significant number of competitive candidates for political office. And party discipline means that politicians occasionally have to commit themselves to policy positions that neither they nor their constituents may favour. Why, then, do politicians in parliamentary democracies so readily submit to such authority? The answer, we believe, lies in the success with which political parties can channel the goals and ambitions of potential office-holders, at the same time that these parties enable their candidates to contain decision and transaction costs.

Ambition

The first function of political parties is thus to allow politicians to satisfy their political goals. For party government to be efficient, parties must be the preferred way in which legislators can realize their main political goals, their political ambitions and their policy objectives (see Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Schlesinger 1966, 1991). Aldrich (1995: 28) argues that parties allow politicians 'to win more of what they seek to win, more often, and over a longer period'.[3] For parties to function in this way, their leaders must control the government policy-making process as well as recruitment (election and appointment) of government personnel. Political parties make this possible by establishing an institutional arrangement – party organization – that allows leaders to monitor other party members in order to ensure that they indeed contribute to the collective goal. And inside the legislative and executive arenas, there are decision rules that allow party leaders to set the political agenda and control the decision-making process. Party leaders also control the means to the personal ambitions of their elected representatives. As Schlesinger (1966, 1991) has noted, most politicians tend to have static (to be re-elected) or progressive (to win higher office) ambitions. Party leaders control, at least to a significant extent, their access to the ballot and campaign funds, and thus have a substantial impact on the re-election prospects of their co-partisans. To the extent that upward mobility is channelled through the political parties, their leaders can also maintain tight control over the realization of their representatives' progressive ambitions.

Decision and transaction costs

The second reason that politicians find parties attractive is that they help reduce decision and transaction costs in politics, specifically in the pursuit of votes. In the absence of political parties, these goals may be stifled by problems politicians experience in collective decision-making. One such problem has to do with their ability to form consistent collective preferences in large decision-making bodies.

The problem, by now well known at least to academic economists and political scientists, is that a stable group preference cannot always be inferred from the preferences of its individual members (Arrow 1951). The larger the group, and the more numerous the policy alternatives it faces, the greater the risk of such problems. In the absence of any procedural restrictions, members of any large legislature could easily find themselves trapped in endless voting cycles.

Even if politicians can avoid, or find ways to solve, their preference aggregation problems, their members may still encounter serious *collective action* or *coordination* problems. Collective action problems exist when individual members of a group have incentives to behave in ways that lead to collectively inefficient outcomes (Olson 1965). For example, each legislator might have incentives to take up scarce floor time attending to his or her local constituency interests, to the extent that important collective decisions would never be made. This is how Cox (1987) describes the operations of the British House of Commons before the advent of modern, centralized parties. Alternatively, legislators would not have the time or leadership necessary to coordinate on any one of a series of possible decisions that would benefit them and their constituents.

Finally, politicians face transaction costs, meaning any costs that collective decision-making bodies confront in reaching, implementing and enforcing policy decisions. These are 'search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, policing and enforcement costs' (Dahlman 1979: 148). These costs may be considerable in legislative politics, particularly when it is difficult to anticipate all the contingencies that might arise (Epstein and O'Halloran 1999). Transaction costs can often be lessened through organizations, such as political parties, that impose some form of hierarchy. This allows their leader to 'invoke fiat to resolve differences'. Moreover it allows 'easier and more complete access to the relevant information when dispute settling is needed' (Williamson 1981: 559). Hierarchy is not always superior to 'spot market solutions', in our case, *ad hoc* alliances between politicians.[4] Internal production involves a loss of flexibility, and internal coordination has its costs. Yet, the larger and the more complex the political institutions, the greater the attractions of formal hierarchical organization.

To understand the role political parties play in reducing political transaction costs, consider the classical (pre-party) alternative: a political assembly in which all decisions are made through *ad hoc* alliances of individual politicians. In the parliamentary and executive arenas, *ad hoc* alliances would mean constant vote trading. One of the problems with this strategy is obviously the large cost involved in reaching decisions, particularly as the political assemblies and legislative agendas get large. A less obvious but no less serious problem lies in enforcement, specifically in the fact that in legislative politics there is no underlying medium of exchange (such as money is in business), and since vote-trading is often non-simultaneous and promises of future considerations cannot generally be legally enforced. As a consequence 'trading votes requires future reliance and hence the opportunities for reneging' (Weingast and Marshall 1988: 158).

As game theory has proven, repeat play alone is often insufficient to maintain such deals. Hence, ways must be found to complement reputation building,

trigger strategies and 'prevent the breakdown of cooperation at precisely the circumstances under which these other strategies fail' (Weingast and Marshall 1988: 142). In their analysis of the US Congress, Weingast and Marshall (1988) identify the committee system as the primary institutional device to protect legislative bargains against opportunistic defection. Congressional rules give committees agenda power: a monopoly right to bring new legislation to the floor. Control over this 'property right' enables committee chairs to facilitate mutually advantageous agreements among legislators.

Weingast and Marshall (1988: 158–9) also identify a potential alternative institutional vehicle for credible legislative exchange: strong political parties that control entry into the competition for seats and yield considerable influence over legislative power and benefits. Parties also help reduce transaction costs. According to Aldrich, 'It is likely that transaction costs for parties are far less (…) than those for forming new majorities for each piece of legislation' (1995: 36). In the European context, no one would seriously question the pre-eminence of political parties as mechanisms for political coordination and transaction cost containment. Since World War I or even earlier, European parties have dominated the electoral, parliamentary and governmental arenas. Indeed, the initial establishment as well as the current form of these arenas owe a great deal to party activities and designs. 'Internally created' political parties first emerged to reduce the transaction costs of forming winning legislative alliances. Later, the challenge of 'externally created' political parties, which emerged as vehicles for social classes previously excluded by restrictive electoral law, caused even the older elite parties to become more cohesive and also to organize outside parliament (Duverger 1954).

Parties and entrepreneurship

Political parties do not emerge out of thin air – they typically hinge on the efforts of political entrepreneurs who assume the costs of organizing the party. These political entrepreneurs constitute the 'critical mass' (Marwell and Oliver 1993) necessary to get parties started. Political parties need leaders who are willing to (1) internalize the collective interest of the party and (2) monitor their fellow partisans. Party leaders control selective incentives, which they use to reward cooperative party members, while they punish those who 'defect' (Cox and McCubbins 1993: 91).

Political entrepreneurs thus monitor other party members to ensure that they indeed contribute to the collective goal. They are compensated by a claim on some of the expected payoffs from collective action, in particular, attractive leadership positions in public institutions (e.g., government office).[5] Indeed, party histories as a rule identify party founders (i.e., political entrepreneurs), and show that they have almost always ended up in the most attractive public positions their respective parties were able to fill. Contemporary political entrepreneurs enter a stage that is already set by entrenched political parties, and, as Aldrich (1995: 24–5) remarks, 'their existence creates incentives for their use'. Although occasionally

political entrepreneurs try to establish new political parties, the usual pattern is to join an existing one. Since forming new winning alliances is costly, existing ones are likely to be favoured (Cox and McCubbins 1994: 227).

Typically, party leadership positions are both attractive and elective. This means that there is internal competition for these positions and that incumbents can be held accountable if they fail to act in the collective interest. Yet many parties feature organizational rules that stack the deck in favour of incumbent leaders and limit intra-party competition for leadership posts. This may be particularly true for parties that owe much of their success to entrepreneurial leaders (such as the Norwegian Progress Party).

Why do voters delegate to parties?

In order thus to function as mechanisms of democratic accountability, parties need first and foremost to gain adherents among elected politicians and candidates for office. If they are unable to induce any coherence or discipline among these politicians, parties can hardly serve any larger purpose. But effective parties also need to induce citizens to trust them, to the extent that in their voting decisions they will be guided by the party labels that political candidates adopt. Unless most voters attach some positive value to at least some of these labels, parties cannot be effective mechanisms of democratic accountability. What, then, might motivate voters to place such trust in political parties?

Capacity and competence

One powerful reason why citizens delegate many (or most) political decisions to political parties lies in a variety of resource constraints, one of which is simply time: 'The amount of time devoted to making decisions is limited both by the unwillingness of the people involved to spend an inordinate amount of time on decisions and by deadlines set by events that will not wait. Because time has value, scheduled meetings often have a more or less fixed amount of time within which to do their business; the cost of not completing the agenda during that meeting is another meeting or not getting it done at all' (Dahl 1970: 44–45). Parties help citizens by reducing the amount of time they need to devote to political matters.

A second motivation for delegation involves competence, or rather the principal's lack of such. This is the classic motivation for delegation between private citizens and professionals such as physicians and lawyers. Competence motivates political delegation as well. Most ordinary citizens, for example, recognize that they do not have the requisite insight to determine production and safety standards for the energy industry or to select the optimal interest rate for government lending. They may trust the representatives of political parties to have more expertise than themselves in such areas. Yet competence is by itself probably a fragile motivation for delegation to political parties, since contemporary citizens tend to be much less deferential to parties than to professionals such as physicians.

Informational Economies

But the more critical reasons voters tend to rely on parties and their labels have to do with their informational functions. Parties help citizens economize on information costs by aggregating or 'packaging' demands and presenting them with simplified menus of policy choices. To dominate the electoral arena and keep out independents and 'favourite sons', parties must be sufficiently effective 'information economizing devices' that voters and activists will sustain them. For this to be the case, the candidates' party labels must allow voters to make informed judgements about how they will behave once elected (Jones and Hudson 1998: 184; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991: 39; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Wittman 1995: 10, 21). Yet voters can only rely on party labels to the extent that party leaders are capable of enforcing policy agreement in government. If legislative politics is anarchic, then party labels can be of no informational value to the voters.

Finally, for voters to attach themselves to political parties, there must also be electoral institutions that translate popular votes into partisan representation in a reasonably meaningful and transparent way. In the classic two-party model, this is indeed the case. Under a competitive two-party system and plurality single-member districts, the electoral menu is simple and the process transparent. Moreover, the process is non-perverse in that voters can never hurt themselves (would never experience rational *ex post* regret) if they vote for their most-preferred party.

What determines party cohesion?

For parties to play an important role as mechanisms of political accountability, they must be cohesive. Party cohesion is the degree to which the public office-holders of any one party act mutually consistently. In operational terms a lack of cohesion can be seen from MPs abstaining from parliamentary voting, failing to support the party in other aspects of their legislative behaviour or – more manifestly – voting against the party line. According to Krehbiel (1993), a party is 'strong' when it can cause its members to follow the party line even if this conflicts with their preferences. Given the negative electoral effects of a lack of cohesion, parties have a collective interest in being strong. Politicians and activists are keenly aware that any party's lack of cohesion will generally be interpreted as weakness, and they do not lightheartedly engage in behaviour that demonstrates such fragility. Therefore, any demonstrable lack of cohesion in the actions of public office-holders typically indicates significant intra-party conflict.

But what, then, determines party cohesion, and under what conditions is it likely to be high in parliamentary systems? As Figure 2.1 indicates, party cohesion results from the interaction of individual cost–benefit calculations of the various intra-party actors with party and government rules, and with the features of the party system (Müller 2000). Party cohesion, then, is a function of preferences as well as institutions. Let us begin by exploring the former.



Figure 2.1 Determinants of party cohesion

Preferences

In an unconstrained world the behaviour of politicians is guided by their preferences only. If many of them find it beneficial to go against the party line, cohesion will be low. And if individual preferences within the party by and large do not conflict, party cohesion will be high even if no discipline is imposed. Yet, often intra-party preferences are not so well aligned. Under such conditions, parties must be 'strong' in order to be cohesive.

Typically, politicians care about their careers (office) as well as about policy (Laver 1997). Maintaining party loyalty is important for achieving both office and policy goals. Policy-seeking politicians similarly recognize that without party most of them would have virtually no political influence. This is most obvious for backbench MPs (unless their vote is pivotal for reasons that may be beyond their control) (Cox and McCubbins 1994; Wittman 1995: 21). Maintaining party discipline allows them to win 'more often' (Aldrich 1995: 28). This is because co-partisan MPs will follow the party line and help them win on issues in which the party's policy is (almost) identical to their own preferences.

The observed levels of party cohesion are generally very high across European parliamentary systems, certainly higher than in the US Congress or most other presidential legislatures. But since we do not directly observe the preferences of politicians, it is difficult to know whether this high level of cohesion is due to more homogeneous preferences or 'stronger' parties. The most obvious factor that could plausibly be responsible for such variation would be the number of parties. It seems reasonable to expect that, all else being equal, the homogeneity of preferences within each party would be positively correlated with the number of parties. The greater the number of parties, the smaller the range of preferences within each party. Thus, we would expect that regardless of regime type, proportional systems would tend to generate more cohesive parties than countries with majoritarian electoral systems. Or, to put it more precisely, party cohesion should depend more critically on institutional constraints in systems with majoritarian electoral systems.

The impact of party organization

Party organization is one type of institutional constraint that can affect cohesion. Some of these features flow from the fact that parliamentary systems rely heavily on the *ex ante* control of political agents, and that political parties play the major role in *screening* such candidates. Potential parliamentary candidates often have to go through long apprenticeships before they can win their party's nomination (in SMD systems) or move up to 'eligible' slots on the party list (under closed-list PR). Typically, they serve in party and sub-national public offices before they are nominated as parliamentary candidates. During this process parties check their personal qualifications and make sure that they acquire a certain political professionalism, such as the ability to deliver a speech, argue in public forums, and understand their institutional environment. Parties typically also allow candidates to specialize, as both voters and parties are better off to the extent that MPs represent a broad spectrum of expertise.

The control of parliamentary nominations is often vigorously contested. In most parties the vast majority of candidates are nominated locally by the constituency party organizations (Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Hazan 2002; Katz and Mair 1992; Narud *et al*. 2002). This is important because MPs may be cross-pressured between local and national party interests. They may choose to support local demands if otherwise their renomination would be jeopardized. If renomination seems safe, however, ambitious MPs are likely to toe the national party line in order to enhance their career prospects in and beyond parliament. Members who defy their party leaders are always at risk. In contrast to renomination, which appears on the agenda only infrequently, party and legislative offices can in most parliamentary countries be withdrawn at any time (Damgaard 1995).

Consider also the extra-parliamentary party organization (Müller 2000). While members of parliament are constitutionally unbound (and hence trustees of their voters), they typically have close links to their respective party organizations. Indeed, party activists often tend to consider MPs as party delegates. Party activists, in turn, tend to be ideologically motivated and often favour more radical policy positions than the party voters (often combined with a strong sense of the moral superiority of these positions) (May 1973). While parties differ with regard to the centralization of candidate nomination, party activists tend to play a key role. Consequently, MPs who care about renomination have strong incentives to remain in tune with them. Another reason why the opinion of the party activists matters is that they provide labour and funds that are often critical for maintaining the party organization and mounting credible campaigns. To be sure, public party finance can compensate for membership dues and much labour can be replaced by capital input (by drawing on hired professionals rather than activist amateurs). Yet, even in the most centralized party and in the system with the most generous public funding, activists maintain some residual influence over party decision-making.

Parties employ mechanisms of ongoing oversight of their representatives. Once their agents have assumed public office, parties typically require these representatives to *report* relevant information as well as actions that they have taken.

Hence MPs regularly report to their constituency organization, and cabinet members to the cabinet or, in coalition governments, to the party team in government. They also report to the parliamentary party and, less frequently, to the party executive committee and the party congress. Some of these audiences (e.g., committee members, parliamentary spokespersons) are well positioned to challenge their agents on the basis of their own monitoring.

Yet for party leaders to impose reporting routines is no free lunch, since it deflects time and attention away from other tasks. It may also be ineffective since 'the agent has incentives to shade things, to make reports that reflect favourably upon himself, or to reveal information in some other strategic manner' (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991: 32). Therefore principals typically also *monitor* their agents ('police patrol' oversight) and/or seek information from affected third parties ('fire alarm' oversight) (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). The party organization 'on the ground' often functions as such a 'fire alarm'. These alarms are relatively reliable, since 'people with similar interests have little incentive to mislead each other' (Lupia and McCubbins 1994: 108). Parties with strong parliamentary representation are well positioned to monitor their representatives. Much of these members' electoral and parliamentary behaviour takes place before large audiences. It is easy for party leaders to check whether MPs observe party discipline in the plenary meeting, as well as in committees (Damgaard 1995), and thus to police moral hazard. While probably more critical, the problem of hidden information can also be contained. In large parties the informational advantage of individual MPs over other party officials (other MPs, cabinet members, etc.) tends to be small, though in smaller parties it can be considerable. Empirical studies show that sanctions are imposed only rarely (Saalfeld 1995: 286–308) and not mechanically (Piper 1991). Yet the very existence of these sanctions and the members' knowledge that they are imposed at least occasionally help to contain agency loss.

European political parties are the gate-keepers to the desired offices in the national and European parliaments, the political executive and various politically appointed bodies. Their near-total control over avenues for progressive ambition places parliamentary parties in a much more favourable position to impose discipline compared to parties in presidential systems. The screening of cabinet ministers is a long-term process. Service in the parliamentary party and/or lower offices provides the selectors with ample cues about potential ministers. Even political 'outsiders' recruited to cabinet office often have a record as party experts and advisors. In classical Westminster systems such as the UK and Ireland, party screening is institutionalized through the rule that a seat in parliament is a (virtual) precondition for appointment to the cabinet. In many proportional parliamentary systems, however, cabinet members may be recruited from outside of parliament, and the parties' screening function may therefore be weaker.

Parties in parliamentary systems are often organized in a way that divides authority, for instance, in a triangular way between the parliamentary party, the party team in government and the party executive committee. Although the party's cabinet members may dominate, the parliamentary and the extra-parliamentary party leadership may enjoy veto powers, at least in the sense that

no action is taken against their will until an attempt has been made to hammer out a compromise. Overall, the available information suggests that parliamentary parties, although they may fall short of textbook party government, exercise a considerable amount of control over their cabinet members (Blondel and Cotta 1996; De Winter 1993; Laver and Shepsle 1994).

The institutional foundations of party government

The institutional rules of parliamentary democracy tend to reinforce party cohesion, and in fact they have in many cases been designed with this specific purpose in mind. Yet it is important to remember that institutions can also provide the 'wrong' kinds of incentives for political parties. One example is the secret vote that existed in the Italian Parliament until 1988. By making it possible for MPs to vote against their party without any risk of detection, this voting procedure clearly served to weaken party cohesion and to promote the factionalization of Italian parties.

Nonetheless, party cohesion in parliamentary systems is reinforced through a series of institutional features. One important set of such institutions is the electoral system and specifically the rules for ballot access. Party cohesion can more easily be sustained if these rules systematically favour party leaders over individual candidates and party members. The most powerful such rules are typically found in PR electoral systems, especially closed-list ones. One such example is where the electoral laws contain a nationwide threshold, thus *de facto* ruling out individual candidates. Likewise, closed-list PR systems prevent candidates that are not favoured by their respective parties from getting elected.

Electoral rules also tend to reinforce party cohesion by fostering 'asset specificity': they tie politicians to one specific party. Once they have joined, politicians are 'locked into' transactions with their particular party (Williamson 1981: 555). In order to maintain credibility they can represent only that party, save under extraordinary circumstances (Jones and Hudson 1998: 184). 'Turncoats' and 'renegades' face dim prospects in any parliamentary system, with the possible exception of those in which the electoral system weakens centralized party control and, of course, transition periods (see Zielinski *et al*. 2006). One interesting example here is the effect of the single transferable vote (STV) in Ireland, which has since World War II experienced a higher number of independents parliamentarians than any other OECD country (Strøm 2000). Many of these independents were originally elected on the slate of one of the major established parties. Yet the consolidation of the party system clearly also matters greatly to the incidence of party-switching, as attested to by the case of Italy in the 1990s, when the party system was in flux and party-switching in parliament was rampant.

Political finance rules similarly tend to stack the deck in favour of permanent parties and to concentrate resources in the hands of party leaders. Campaign rules, the rules of media access and public funding also have clear incumbency effects. Likewise, parliamentary resources (finance and personnel) can be channelled to the parliamentary parties rather than to individual MPs, and the

parliamentary rules of procedure can systematically favour parliamentary parties over individual MPs.

Two features of the relationship between cabinet and parliament also reinforce centralized party authority: the confidence vote and the dissolution power. These institutional constraints are found in particularly stark form in the Westminster model, but are essential features of most parliamentary systems. It is indeed the parliamentary majority's dismissal power, through a vote of no confidence, that defines parliamentary government. But paradoxically, the flip side of this procedure allows the cabinet and the party leadership to dominate the legislative branch. The *confidence vote* enables the prime minister to attach the cabinet's fate to some bill before parliament. This is indeed a 'doomsday device' (Lupia and Strøm 1995), by which the entire cabinet can be removed in one fell swoop. Yet, this ability to raise the stakes and redefine the parliamentary agenda often enables prime ministers to quell policy dissent within their respective parties or coalitions. It also allows them to manipulate the legislative policy process (Huber 1996).

The *dissolution power* is another doomsday device that allows the prime minister or cabinet to threaten the parliament with an immediate electoral verdict. In the Westminster model, within the limits of the maximum constitutional term, the election date is fully controlled by the prime minister and his party. Consequently, this dissolution power can be, and is, used strategically for partisan purposes (Strøm and Swindle 2002). Like the confidence vote, it gives the incumbent parties' leaders a weapon with which to control their backbenchers. Unlike the confidence vote,[6] however, the dissolution power is not a ubiquitous feature of all parliamentary systems. Norway has no such provision for early elections, and in several other parliamentary systems (e.g., Sweden and Germany[7]) early parliamentary dissolution is sufficiently constitutionally constrained that it rarely or never happens. Therefore, though the dissolution power reinforces party cohesion, it is a stronger force in Westminster systems than elsewhere.

The impact of the party system

Finally, the cost–benefit calculations of intra-party actors are affected by party system conditions. Maintaining cohesion is relatively easy for parties in single-party majority cabinets facing strong competition and most difficult for parties in coalition governments characterized by great preference diversity. Single-party cabinets are most likely to feature preference identity within the cabinet (and between the cabinet and the relevant parliamentary party), particularly in majority situations. In contrast, parties in coalition governments are forced to make concessions to the other government parties, as do weak minority governments that have to accommodate other parties in parliament. The greater the concessions, the more strain on party cohesion.

In sum, parliamentary systems feature a series of institutional and organizational features that are even more conducive to party cohesion than those found in the US presidential system, the backdrop against which many of the textbook accounts of party politics have been written. Many of these features are common

to all or most parliamentary systems. Yet there are significant differences across parliamentary systems, such that the forces of party cohesion seem to have particular force in the Westminster democracies. It is in systems built on the British model that the parties have the most complete control over access to high political office, and the same polities also feature the most unconstrained dismissal and dissolution powers. On the other hand, the rules of ballot access may be more conducive to party cohesion in systems with closed-list PR, such as Norway, Portugal, Spain and (for most of the post-war period) Sweden. The net effect of each of these institutional features may be difficult to estimate, but it seems likely that the various favorable conditions of the Westminster world provides an especially privileged environment for party unity.

Can coalitions of parties perform as if they were parties?

As we have argued, political parties are especially critical to the operation of parliamentary systems, and the forces that promote party cohesion may be particularly strong in Westminster systems. But perhaps multiparty parliamentary democracies can compensate for their somewhat weaker parties through the promotion of inter-party coalitions that function much like individual parties do in a two-party world? Under what conditions then (if at all), can a coalition of parties serve the same purposes as a single, cohesive party in the Westminster tradition?

Note first that the value of parties is determined not by their official status, but by their ability to condition the behaviour of voters and their agents. The fact that for a long time, Christian Democrats in Italy were organized as a single party (the DC), whereas in Germany there were two such parties (the CDU and the CSU), does not mean that the former served as a more effective vehicle of agency control than the latter. The contrary is clearly closer to the truth.

The key here is that the strength (ability to foster cohesion) of parties, or coalitions of parties, is determined by their value to politicians as mechanisms of bonding, and to voters as informational economizing devices. Compared to individual parties, coalition governments seem weak in both respects. Indeed, they have been judged inefficient and unstable in much of the classic scholarship in political science, from A. Lawrence Lowell (1896) through Maurice Duverger (1954) (for a review, see Dodd 1976: 6–10). Proportional electoral systems have been condemned for shifting the power to decide who governs the country from the voters to politicians acting in ‘smoke-filled rooms’ where political deals can make winners out of electoral losers. The trouble with coalitions allegedly does not end here, as multiparty government blurs executive responsibility. Hence, the capacity of coalitions to bond politicians is low, and they also fail to help voters economize on information.

Such critical accounts of coalition governments have been challenged since the 1960s by authors such as Hans Daalder (1971) and Arend Lijphart (1969) and, of course, by the very success of some coalitional systems in economic performance and political stability. Indeed, the world of multiparty parliamentarism is sufficiently

diverse that it is important to recognize cross-national differences in coalitional cohesion and transparency. In what follows we therefore discuss how two-party (Westminister), alternational and pivotal systems distinguish themselves with regard to the bonding of politicians and as informational devices for voters.

Bonding politicians

The bond of co-partisanship, as we have seen, hinges on the incentives party leaders can offer parliamentarians that are willing to submit to its discipline. In Westminster systems, most of these levers are squarely in the hands of party leaders. Parties have amassed a range of devices by which they induce cohesion by controlling access to goods that politicians desire, such as ballot access, coveted committee assignments, perquisites, campaign funds and the like. To foster coalitional cohesion of similar magnitude, inter-party coalitions must strive hard to generate and control the requisite inducements.

One shortcoming of coalition governance is that typically the fusion between the leadership of the participating parties and the government remains more incomplete than in the Westminster model (Andeweg 2000; Blondel and Cotta 1996). In some coalitional systems (e.g., Italy or Belgium), even the most important leaders of some cabinet parties have often stayed out of the cabinet. Even when this is not the case, the sheer number of parties that must be accommodated in the cabinet can leave a substantial number of party heavyweights without government office. As a result, the party leaders in government normally are not in command of all important mechanisms of control within their respective parties. Moreover, to the extent that to their co-partisans, these party leaders come to represent the interests of the coalition at large, the dynamics of coalition governance may undermine their influence.

Party leaders need to maintain the support of those who, by the power of their public offices, can remove the government, namely the parliamentarians. Coalition government means inter-party bargaining for the purpose of agreeing on those policies that fall under the cabinet's collective responsibility. Such bargaining typically begins at the coalition formation stage and continues throughout the coalition's life cycle. The party representatives in these negotiations have the twin tasks of building inter-party agreement and maintaining intra-party consensus. Agreement with other parties is likely to require policy concessions (deviations from the party's ideal policy positions) (see Crombez 1996; Sened 1995, 1996). Coalition government typically also means that some parties – those with more bargaining power – will do better (bear lesser policy costs) than others. This, in turn, may create tensions with those parties bearing a disproportional share of the costs. The perks of office designed to compensate for these costs go to party leaders (almost) exclusively and thus cannot accommodate party activists. And MPs, who are expected to enact the deals struck among the coalition leaders, may find themselves sandwiched between the perk-consuming party leaders and frustrated party activists. Such situations create ample potential for intra-party conflict.

In such settings, coalitions are prone to bargaining failure. When party representatives in the cabinet know that their MPs and activists are sceptical toward the results of coalition bargaining, they will bargain hard for the best possible result, which in turn increases the potential for negotiation breakdown, since negotiators are often unaware of the 'policy horizons' – the point until which a party will make concessions (Warwick 2000, 2006) – of other parties. The result may be policy immobilism or cabinet termination. If, on the other hand, the negotiators are not aware of the 'policy horizons' of their own party, they may face intra-party conflict. Such intra-party conflict often slows down or prevents inter-party agreement and may lead to the replacement of cabinet members or even the termination of the cabinet.

Coalition negotiators can try to anticipate such dynamics and take their precautions. For that purpose coalition parties often sign extensive agreements and set up institutional arrangements, such as coalition committees, inner cabinets or party summits, to enforce them (Müller and Strøm 2000, 2008; Strøm and Müller 1999). In such agreements, individual coalition parties on the one hand try to lock in their negotiated gains in terms of policy concessions and office rewards, and on the other hand to bar their partners from particularly inconvenient courses of action. The empirical record suggests that such coalition governance institutions generally have a positive effect on coalition effectiveness and stability, but that they still frequently fail to cement inter-party coalitions (Saalfeld 2008; Timmermans 2003). One problem is that coalition agreements are essentially private and unenforceable (Müller and Strøm 2008). Whereas in many countries, the mechanisms of party control have been around long enough to take on constitutional status, this is rarely the case with coalition agreements, and individual parties can therefore reinterpret these agreements, or renege on them, with less severe repercussions.

The final and most serious weakness of coalitional governance lies in the electoral connection. Whereas the cohesion of co-partisan legislators is brought about in large part by the expectation of a common electoral fate, this tie is much less likely to bind in multiparty coalitions. Although the electoral fortunes of coalition parties are more likely than not to be positively correlated, many parties benefit at the expense of their coalition partners (Narud and Valen 2008; Rose and Mackie 1983). Politicians can try to make coalitions more 'party-like' by signing committal pre-electoral agreements that allow voters to treat the coalition as if it were a party (Golder 2006). However, in most cases, voters retain the right to reward one coalition party at the expense of another, and this possibility induces electoral competition within the coalition. For these reasons, as Palmer (1995) notes, inter-party coalitions are unlikely to align incentives as effectively as a single political party. Therefore, *ex ante* partisan control is also less likely to be effective in multiparty parliamentary democracies than in the Westminster model.

Note, however, that this electoral connection, even though attenuated, is much more likely to be obtained in alternational than in pivotal systems. This is because electoral coordination is so much more common in alternational systems than in pivotal ones. It is true that even in alternational systems, electoral coordination within the competing blocs of parties need not be explicit or heartfelt, yet the

mechanisms of electoral competition in such systems generally reward politicians for signalling their coalition intentions in good faith. In pivotal systems, on the other hand, pre-electoral coordination is much rarer, except in a defensive mode when incumbent coalitions try to get returned to power. The general incentive for pivotal parties is to eschew formal coalitional commitments simply because these parties are indeed pivotal. Thus, coalition government includes a dynamic that undermines the bonding of politicians – particularly in pivotal systems.

Providing informational devices for voters

Westminster, alternational and pivotal systems also differentiate themselves with regard to the voters' ability to identify their menu of potential governments and policy packages. In other words, the *ex ante identifiability* (Strøm 1990: 72) of the government options varies substantially and systematically. And the less the voters know how their votes will influence government formation – in other words, the less the voters know whom they are voting into office – the less likely it is that the informational conditions for successful delegation can be met. Powell (2000: 71–72) finds that the identifiability of future governments is best met in majoritarian systems. Systems with explicit pre-electoral coalitions can provide a functional equivalence. Systems where policy proximity, past record and non-commital statements by politicians create strong expectations about post-electoral governments provide 'a much less certain, but still important, degree of identifiability' (Powell 2000: 72). When all these conditions are absent and voters are left with the promise that the parties will simply do their best to honour their campaign promises in post-electoral bargaining, pre-electoral commitments simply cannot function as an effective informational device.

Similar effects are obtained for the 'clarity of responsibility' (Powell 2000), which is the *ex post* side of government accountability. Again, Powell (2000) ranks different government formats. Single-party majority government provides the greatest clarity of responsibility. Next comes multiparty majority government based on pre-electoral agreeements. Majority coalition government negotiated after the elections is third. According to Powell (2000: 52–53), responsibility is even less clear under minority governments with permanent outside support and most blurred under minority governments lacking such permanent support and hence governing on the basis of issue-specific parliamentary voting alliances.

A second concern is the predictability of government policy. In Westminister systems, the electoral manifesto of the victorious party will outline government policy. In pivotal systems, on the other hand, government policy is hammered out in post-electoral bargaining. The more diverse the party preferences and the more equal their bargaining power, the less we can expect that under such circumstances *ex ante* signalling devices can resolve potential delegation problems.

Two-party systems induced by the electoral system (rather than by genuine voter preferences) exercise a moderating effect on the parties (Downs 1957), resulting from the fact that the median voter is pivotal.[8] The constraining effect on candidates and potential entrants has long-term consequences, identified

by Duverger (1954) as the 'psychological effect' of the electoral system and generalized to the $M+1$ rule by Cox (1997: 99). Under an electoral system that provides M seats, no more than $M+1$ parties will contest the elections. In a system with single-member districts $M=1$ and hence the party system will have a two-party format. And these two parties will try to appeal to the median voter and hence adopt centrist positions.[9] In contrast, proportional electoral systems allow for multiparty systems and provide space for *niche* parties. Even politicians with rather extreme policy preferences can find enough voters to sustain parliamentary representation. In any case, such systems create more relevant parties (Sartori 1976), and while some of these parties can gain from moderation, the very rationale of others is to take distinctive policy positions.

Consider the bargaining power of parties with extreme preferences under various multiparty systems. Bargaining power derives from centrality and patience. Centrality obviously does not work to the general advantage of extremist parties, though it may occasionally favour *niche* parties that have a limited issue agenda and can therefore compromise broadly outside this domain. But what about patience? As evidenced by some revolutionary left parties that despise their social democratic brethren for opting for immediate improvements for the working class rather than waiting for the conditions that will permit a revolution, extremist parties can indeed be very patient. Consequently, it may be difficult for voters to predict the consequences of their electoral choices.

In those alternational systems where the competing blocs are based mainly on preference proximity, individual parties can by standing apart considerably damage the electoral chances of the bloc to which they would otherwise belong. In contrast, in those alternational systems reinforced by strong institutional mechanisms (e.g., France, Italy after 1992), small parties may depend on being a member of a bloc for their survival in parliament. This subtype of alternational systems in many respects is similar to those two-party systems that have emerged in response to strong incentives from the electoral system.

In pivotal systems, governments form around the pivotal party, which is typically centrally positioned. In a one-dimensional policy space, the median party enjoys a great bargaining advantage. If only policy mattered and all politics were one-dimensional, such parties could form viable minority cabinets (Laver and Schofield 1990: 111), and coalition politics might be rather predictable. When multiple policy dimensions are relevant, however, there are often several viable coalitions, and bargaining power tends to be more equally shared. The formation of unconventional coalitions, such as the Irish Fianna Fáil–Labour coalition (1992–94), the Finnish 'rainbow coalition' or the 'purple' coalitions of liberal and leftist parties in Belgium and the Netherlands over the past 15 years, indicate what Deschouwer (2002) calls 'the end of predictable politics'.

Conclusion

Democracy is a difficult business, since it implies delegation of authority from voters to all sorts of politicians. Delegation is in turn beset with potential agency

problems, such as adverse selection and moral hazard. In response to these challenges, democracies have witnessed the emergence of two dominant mechanisms of political accountability: external constraints and political parties. These are devices that can help ensure that democratic politicians meet certain minimum standards of competence, diligence and representativeness.

Different democratic regimes rely on different combinations of accountability mechanisms. Parliamentary democracy, at least in its Westminster variety, rests heavily on political parties for this purpose. In multiparty parliamentary systems, the forces of party cohesion are generally weaker than in Westminster systems, but in some multiparty contexts, inter-party coalitions can plausibly perform some of the functions associated with individual parties in the Westminster world. The conditions for bonding politicians and functioning as informational devices are better served in alternational party systems than in pivotal party systems. Coalitions in alternational systems develop stronger bonds between politicians, particularly if the electoral system punishes parties standing alone. Yet even here the bonding effect typically falls short of the one found in two-party systems. With regard to the informational needs of voters, the difference between pivotal and alternational systems seems much more accentuated. Here, coalition government under alternational systems comes much closer to a full functional equivalent of the more parsimonious two-party system. Yet in both respects the Westminster system outperforms both types of coalitional systems.

Our account has stressed the functional role of political parties in representative, and specifically parliamentary, democracies. But even though viable political parties may be a necessary condition for effective parliamentary democracy, they are by no means sufficient, as critics of modern democracies have pointed out. Far too easily, we are told, the democratic purpose of political parties may be subverted, as they degenerate into career vehicles for self-interested politicians. Robert Michels was famously aware of the need to delegate to political parties as well as highly critical of its effects: 'Democracy is inconceivable without organization' (1949: 21), he wrote, yet organization 'gives birth to the domination of the elected over the electors, of the mandataries over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization says oligarchy' (Michels 1949: 401). Contemporary surveys across the world show that political parties rank among the least trusted political institutions and that they are particularly tainted with perceptions of corruption.

Thus, the tension between representation and domination is still alive in contemporary political parties, but it is not very evident in our theories of political parties. Just as in economic theories of the state (see Hardin 1997), rational choice accounts of political parties have tended to focus on their *capacity*. Political parties have a capacity to function as mechanisms of bonding and information shortcuts, but it is by no means certain that they will always do so, or that this will be their most important political effect. Just as economic theories of the state need to encompass an understanding of government failure, so our theories of political parties need to explore the conditions under which they may undermine, rather than sustain, the process of democratic delegation. That is the next great challenge to our understanding of these critical organizations.

Notes

1 For bicameral systems, it suffices for the prime minister and cabinet to be accountable to the majority in one chamber, typically the lower one. Constitutions under which the prime minister and cabinet are accountable to both chambers, such as in Italy, are the exception.
2 Lijphart (1999) classifies Israel as non-parliamentary after the introduction of a directly elected prime minister in 1996. A subsequent institutional reform has, however, returned Israel to the set of parliamentary systems.
3 Laver (1997: 87) is more specific. According to his theoretical account, political entrepreneurs have at least three motivations to form parties: (1) to control sufficient skills and resources to submit realistic tenders for political service contracts in the modern state, (2) to restrict competition and (3) to gain strategic bargaining advantages that stem from combining into larger groups.
4 In business 'the costs of organizing certain transactions within the firm may be greater than the costs of carrying out the exchange transactions in the open market' (Coase [1937] 1988: 45; Williamson 1975: 117–31; 1981: 556–62). Thus, Charles Perrow (1986: 24–31) claims that markets are generally superior to hierarchy, because even within firms opportunism exists and contracts (between employers and employees) need to be written.
5 See Laver (1997) for a good general account of political entrepreneurs.
6 Not all parliamentary systems feature a formally regulated confidence vote, yet parliamentary governments can tie their fate to specific parliamentary votes even without such a formal mechanism.
7 In the German case, Chancellor Schröder's 2005 manoeuvre, in which he engineered a failed confidence vote that was accepted by the German President, may de facto have removed this constitutional constraint.
8 This clearly is a simplification. The division of the country into separate electoral districts makes the identification of the median voter a non-trivial task, and majoritarian electoral systems only guarantee a single winner in each district, but do not rule out a hung parliament. Single-party majorities thus also require the nationalization of elections (Caramani 2004; Cox 1987).
9 Yet intra-party politics may constrain such centrist adaptation or delay it for years, as witnessed by the British case since the 1970s (see Saalfeld 2003).

References

Aldrich, J. H. (1995) *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Andeweg, R. B. (2000) 'Political Recruitment and Party Government', in J. Blondel and M. Cotta (eds) *The Nature of Party Government*, London: Palgrave, pp. 119–36

Arrow, K. J. (1951) *Social Choice and Individual Values*. New York: Wiley

Bagehot, W. (1963) [1865] *The English Constitution*. London: Fontana/Collins

Blondel, J. and Cotta, M. (eds) (1996) *Party and Government*. Houndmills: Macmillan

Boix, C. (1999) 'Setting the rules of the game: The choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies'. *American Political Science Review*, 93: 609–24

Caramani, D. (2004) *The Nationalization of Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Coase, R. H. (1988) *The Firm, the Market, and the Law*. Chicago University of Chicago Press

Cox, G. W. (1987) *The Efficient Secret*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Cox, G. W. (1997) *Making Votes Count*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Cox, G. W. and McCubbins, M. D. (1993) *Legislative Leviathan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Cox, G. W. and McCubbins, M. D. (1994) 'Bonding, structure, and the stability of political parties: party government in the house', *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 19(2): 215–31

Crombez, C. (1996) 'Minority governments, minimal winning coalitions and surplus majorities in parliamentary systems', *European Journal of Political Research* 29(1): 1–29

Daalder, H. (1971) 'Cabinets and party systems in ten smaller european democracies', *Acta Politica* 6: 282–303

Dahl, R. A. (1970) *After the Revolution?* New Haven Yale University Press

Dahlman, C. J. (1979) 'The problem of externality', *Journal of Law and Economics* 22(1): 141–62

Damgaard, E. (1995) 'How parties control committee members', in H. Düring (ed.) *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*. Frankfurt am Main: Campus and New York: St Martin's Press, pp. 309–25

Deschouwer, K. (2002) 'The colour purple. The end of predictable politics in the low countries', in P. Webb, D. Farrell and I. Holliday (eds) *Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 151–81

De Winter, L. (1993) 'The links between cabinet and parties and cabinet decision-making,' in J. Blondel and F. Müller-Rommel (eds) *Governing Together*. London: Macmillan, pp. 153–76

Dodd, L. C. (1976) *Coalitions in Parliamentary Government*. Princeton: Princeton University Press

Downs, A. (1957) *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper & Sons

Duverger, M. (1954) *Political Parties*. London: Methuen

Epstein, D. and O'Halloran, S. (1999) *Delegating Powers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Epstein, L. D. (1967) *Political Parties in Western Democracies*. New York: Praeger

Gallagher, M. and Marsh, M. (eds) (1988) *Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective*. London: Sage

Golder, S. N. (2006) *The Logic of Pre-electoral Coalition Formation*. Columbus OH: Ohio State University Press

Hardin, G. (1968) 'The tragedy of the commons', *Science* 162: 1243–8

Hardin, R. (1997) 'Economic theories of the state,' in D. C. Mueller (ed) *Perspectives on Public Choice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 21–34

Hazan, R. Y. (2002) 'Candidate Selection', in L. LeDuc, R. G. Niemi, and P. Norris (eds) *Comparing Democracies 2*. London: Sage, pp. 108–27

Huber, J. (1996) *Rationalizing Parliament*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Jones, P. and Hudson, J. (1998) 'The role of political parties: an analysis based on transaction costs', *Public Choice* 94(1–2): 175–89

Katz, R. S. and Mair, P. (eds) (1992) *Party Organizations*. London: Sage

Kiewiet, D. R. and McCubbins, M. D. (1991) *The Logic of Delegation*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Krehbiel, K. (1993) 'Where's the party?', *British Journal of Political Science* 23(2): 235–66

Laver, M. (1997) *Private Desires, Political Action*. London: Sage

Laver, M. and Schofield, N. (1990) *Multiparty Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Laver, M. J. and Shepsle, K. A. (eds) (1994) *Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Laver, M. and Shepsle, K. A. (1998) 'Events, equilibria, and government survival', *American Journal of Political Science* 42(1): 28–54

Lijphart, A. (1968) 'Typologies of democratic systems', *Comparative Political Studies* 1(1): 3–44

Lijphart, A. (1999) *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press

Lowell, A. L. (1896) *Governments and Parties in Continental Europe*. London: Longmans, Green, and Co.

Lupia, A. (2003) 'The perils of delegation', in K. Strøm, W. C. Müller, and T. Bergman (eds) *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 33–54

Lupia, A. and McCubbins, M. D. (1994) 'Learning from oversight: fire alarms and police patrols reconstructed', *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 10(1): 96–125

Lupia, A. and McCubbins, M. D. (1998) *The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Lupia, A. and Strøm, K. (1995) 'Coalition termination and the strategic timing of parliamentary elections', *American Political Science Review* 89(3): 648–65

McCubbins, M. D. and Schwartz, T. (1984) 'Congressional oversight overlooked: police patrols versus fire alarms', *American Journal of Political Science* 28(1): 165–79

McKelvey, R. D. (1976) 'Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control', *Journal of Economic Theory* 12(June): 472–82

Marwell, G. and Oliver, P. (1993) *The Critical Mass in Collective Action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

May, J. D. (1973) 'Opinion structure of political parties: the special law of curvilinear disparity', *Political Studies* 21(2): 135–51

Michels, R. (1949) [1915] *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*. New York: Free Press

Müller, W. C. (2000) 'Political parties in parliamentary democracies: making delegation and accountability work', *European Journal of Political Research* 37(3): 309–33

Müller, W. C. and Strøm, K. (eds) (2000) *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Müller, W. C. and Strøm, K. (2008) 'Coalition agreements and cabinet governance', in K. Strøm, W. C. Müller, and T. Bergman (eds) *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle In Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Narud, H. M. and Valen, H. (2008) 'Coalition membership and electoral performance', in K. Strøm, W. C. Müller, and T. Bergman (eds) *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle In Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Narud, H. M., Pedersen, M. N. and Valen, H. (eds) (2002) *Party Sovereignty and Citizen Control. Selecting Candidates for Parliamentary Elections in Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway*. Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark

Olson, M. Jr (1965) *The Logic of Collective Action*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press

Palmer, M. S. R. (1995) 'Toward an economics of comparative political organization: examining ministerial responsibility', *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization* 11(1): 164–88

Perrow, C. (1986) 'Economic theories of organization', *Theory and Society* 15(1–2): 11–45

Piper, J. R. (1991) 'British backbench rebellion and government appointments, 1945–87', *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 16(2): 219–38

Powell, G. B. Jr. (2000) *Elections as Instruments of Democracy. Majoritarian and Proportional Visions*. New Haven: Yale University Press

Rokkan, S. (1970) Citizens, Elections, Parties. New York: David McKay

Rose, R. and Mackie, T. T. (1983) 'Incumbency in government: asset or liability?', in H. Daalder and P. Mair (eds) *Western European Party Systems*. London: Sage, pp. 115–37

Saalfeld, T. (1995) *Parteisoldaten und Rebellen*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich

Saalfeld, T. (2008) 'Institutions, chance and choices: the dynamics of cabinet survival in the parliamentary democracies of Western Europe (1945–1999)', in K. Strøm, W. C. Müller, and T. Bergman (eds) *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Saalfeld, T. (2003) 'The United Kingdom: still a single "chain of command"? The hollowing out of the "Westminister model"', in K. Strøm, W.C. Müller, and T. Bergman (eds) *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 620–51

Sartori, G. (1976) *Parties and Party Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Schlesinger, J. A. (1966) *Ambition and Politics*. Chicago: Rand McNally

Schlesinger, J. A. (1991) *Political Parties and the Winning of Office*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press

Sened, I. (1995) 'Equilibria in weighted voting games with sidepayments', *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 7(3): 283–300

Sened, I. (1996) 'A model of coalition formation: theory and evidence', *Journal of Politics* 58(2): 350–572

Strøm, K. (1990) *Minority Government and Majority Rule*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Strøm, K. (2000) 'Parties at the core of government', in R. J. Dalton and M. P. Wattenberg (eds) *Parties without Partisans*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 180–207

Strøm, K. (2003) 'Parliamentary democracy and delegation', in K. Strøm, W. C. Müller, and T. Bergman (eds) *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 55–109

Strøm, K. and Müller, W. C. (1999) 'The keys to togetherness: coalition agreements in parliamentary democracies', *Journal of Legislative Studies* 5(3 and 4): 255–82

Strøm, K. and Swindle, S. M. (2002) 'Strategic parliamentary dissolution', *American Political Science Review* 96(3): 575–91

Strøm, K., Müller, W. C. and Bergman, T. (eds) (2003) *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Strøm, K., Müller, W. C. and Bergman, T. (eds) (2008) *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Timmermans, A. (2003) *High Politics in the Low Countries: An Empirical Study of Coalition Agreements in Belgium and the Netherlands*. Aldershot: Ashgate

Tsebelis, G. (2002) *Veto Players: How Institutions Work*. Princeton: Princeton University Press and the Russell Sage Foundation

Warwick, P. V. (2000) 'Policy horizons in west european parliamentary systems', *European Journal of Political Research* 38(1): 37–61

Warwick, P. V. (2006) *Policy Horizons and Parliamentary Government*. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan

Weingast, B. R. and Marshall, W. J. (1988) 'The industrial organization of congress; or, why legislatures, like firms, are not organized as markets', *Journal of Political Economy* 96(1): 132–63

Williamson, O. E. (1975) *Markets and Hierarchies*. New York: Free Press

Williamson, O. E. (1981) 'The economics of organization: the transaction cost approach', *American Journal of Sociology* 87(3): 548–77

Wittman, D. A. (1995) *The Myth of Democratic Failure*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Zielinski, J., Slomczynski, K. M. and Shabad, G. (2005) 'Electoral control in new democracies', *World Politics*, 57(3): 365–95

PART II

Intra-party politics and coalition behaviour at the sub-national level

3 Intra-party politics and local coalition formation

Hanna Bäck

Introduction

The fact that in most parliamentary democracies, no party typically gains a majority of the seats in the legislature implying that no one party can take control of government without cooperating with some other parties. This implies that 'coalitions become a necessity' (Müller and Strøm 2000:1), and it is thus no surprise that a number of theories about coalition formation have been presented. Early coalition theories assume that parties only seek the power and prestige that comes with government posts and predict that minimal winning coalitions will form (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953). Soon after these theories were given their first empirical evaluation, attempts were made to introduce policy-seeking motivations for parties, and the prediction was that parties should coalesce with ideologically proximate parties (see e.g., Axelrod 1970).

Rather than settling the question, these early theories only paved the way for extensive rejoinders. More recent developments in coalition theory have been based on the rationale that some of the basic assumptions of coalition theory are too simplistic. One assumption that most coalition theories operate under is that parties can be treated as unitary actors. If we relax this assumption and treat party factions, or even individual legislators, as actors, the coalition game of course becomes more complex, since the number of actors then increases substantially. Even though there are good reasons to keep this assumption when formally modeling bargaining, many authors have argued that we should be careful that we might miss some factors that significantly influence government formation if we do not consider the role of intra-party politics (see e.g., Laver and Schofield 1998). In this chapter I evaluate the idea that intra-party politics influences coalition formation, by testing two hypotheses that say that internally democratic parties and factionalized parties are less likely to get into government.

Contrary to most existing coalition studies, I study coalition formation at the *local* level instead of the *national* level. A reason for this is that there is a need to evaluate coalition theories on new data, and the local scene offers a vast number of coalitions which have never been studied before. In this study I use data from Swedish local government. By doing so, I not only get access to new data, but it also enables me to study a number of coalition formation opportunities within one country and at a single point in time. This creates a sort of quasi-experimental

situation that allows me to control for a number of key factors without including such factors as variables (see Bäck 2003; Laver 1989).

Theories about coalition formation

Coalition theories based on the unitary actor assumption

Most early coalition theories are policy-blind, assuming that parties are motivated exclusively by the aim to attain the payoffs associated with being in office. Among the first to model coalition formation were von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953), who argue that we should expect that only minimal winning coalitions will form. Such coalitions are characterized by the feature that if any member (party) leaves the government, the coalition loses its winning status in the sense that it ceases to control a majority of the seats in the legislature. Many researchers have argued that a party's size should affect its likelihood of getting into government (see e.g., Laver and Shepsle 1996). Focusing on formateur selection, Warwick (1996: 474) states several reasons why large parties are likely to be advantaged for formateur status. For example, the closer a party is to majority status, the less need it has for partners. The argument is that forming coalitions is difficult, and 'these difficulties may be lessened to the extent that a government can be created either with few partners or with small partners'.

Referring only to the size of the parties, these theories do not account for parties' policy positions. Axelrod (1970) made one of the first attempts to include policy goals in a theory about coalition formation and his minimal connected winning theory says that coalitions will form that are ideologically 'connected' along a policy dimension, which means that the parties in the coalition must be placed adjacent to each other on a dimension. A coalition also has to be minimal winning in the sense that if it loses one of its members it no longer controls a majority of the seats in the parliament, or it is no longer connected. Another policy theory is based on the logic of the median voter theorem (Black 1958). This theorem, as applied to coalition bargaining, suggests that the party controlling the median legislator will have increased bargaining power, since there is no policy position that can be implemented that is preferred by a majority of legislators to the ideal position of the median legislator (assuming uni-dimensionality).

A more recent important account about coalition formation is the notion that incumbent administrations are favored in bargaining, since they represent 'the reversion point in the event the other parties fail to agree on an alternative' (Strøm *et al*. 1994: 311). Other arguments for why we should expect incumbent governments to be advantaged have also been presented. For instance, parties who have cooperated before in government are likely to be informed about each other's preferences and should have established routines for cooperating. Transaction costs are thus likely to increase when parties change coalition partners, which implies that parties that have governed together will prefer to continue this cooperation rather than creating a new cabinet. This means that it is likely that incumbent cabinets will form again (see Bäck 2003; Bäck and Dumont 2007; Warwick 1996).

Even in the limited review, it is apparent that a wide variety of explanations for coalition formation have been suggested. Early coalition theorists focused mainly on answering the question: What type of governments will form? (e.g., minimal winning governments). Other coalition theories have focused on the question: What type of parties will get into government? (e.g., median parties). What all of the coalition theories presented so far have in common is that they are based on similar assumptions, and most importantly, they all assume that parties can be treated as unitary actors.

Questioning the unitary actor assumption

The rationale for relying on the unitary actor assumption when studying coalition formation is that bargaining takes place between parties by party representatives, not individual legislators, and furthermore, game-theoretical modeling becomes less tractable as the number of actors increase. The most radical alternative would be to treat individual legislators as actors, which would imply a game between hundreds of actors in most parliaments (Laver and Schofield 1998).[1] Even though there are good reasons to keep the unitary actor assumption when formally modeling bargaining, we should be wary that we might miss some factors that explain why some parties are in government if we do not consider how intra-party politics affects bargaining.

According to Laver and Schofield (1998), coalition theorists have, with the exception of Luebbert, not had much to say on what happens in bargaining if parties are not unitary actors. Luebbert (1986) argues that party leaders are motivated above all by the desire to remain leaders, while party activists are assumed to be concerned intrinsically with policy. According to Luebbert, party leaders strive to minimize party disunity because their leadership positions are at stake. Laver and Schofield (1998: 16) draw from this idea and argue that intra-party tensions can have systematic effects on bargaining (see also Mitchell 1999); more specifically, tensions should negatively affect parties' ability to enter government. The idea is that some parties can be seen as 'coalitions of distinct factions', and 'such parties will have ambiguous policy positions and internally conflicting sets of preference orderings over different potential coalitions'.

Thus, if we relax the unitary actor assumption, we can consider that members of a party do not always share the same policy views. Hence, parties may be more or less cohesive, or differently put, they may be more or less factionalized. A party where members have diverging policy views and that consists of distinct factions will most likely have difficulties in reaching agreements with other parties. This implies that *a factionalized party is less likely to get into government*. One possible mechanism that could explain an effect of factionalization is that parties that are not united on policy issues may also disagree on who they should govern with. This implies that factionalized parties will have difficulties in making bargaining decisions. Policy disagreements within a party will probably also make other parties less likely to trust that the factionalized party will honor bargaining agreements, since differences in policy views might later manifest

itself as a low level of party discipline. Other parties may also perceive factionalized parties' policy positions with less certainty if they are characterized by open internal dissension, and uncertainty may lead to the exclusion of these parties from bargaining if actors are risk-averse (see Bäck and Vernby 2003).

Relaxing the unitary actor assumption also means that we can consider the fact that decision-making procedures take different forms in different parties. Even though early party researchers, like Michels (1962) and Duverger (1954), claimed that all organizations are oligarchies, later research has shown that decision-making procedures in parties may be more or less democratic; that is, the level of democracy varies between parties (see Harmel and Janda 1982). According to Teorell (1998), oligarchy and democracy within parties should be seen as the endpoints on a theoretical continuum. This implies that in some parties, leaders always have to seek the members' support, while leaders in other parties operate more freely. In some parties, the members have ample opportunities to influence the leaders' decisions, while other parties' members have no such opportunities once power has been delegated.

Strøm (1994) argues that variations in delegation regimes may constrain party leaders in different ways in coalition negotiations. Following the same logic, Müller and Strøm (1999) claim that party members and party activists may constrain the party leadership to follow a distinct policy course or to rule out certain strategies. Warwick (1996: 475) suggests that greater leadership control over coalitional decisions should enhance a party's likelihood of participating in a government coalition. He argues that since 'leaders have more to gain than followers from cabinet membership', a high degree of leadership control could increase a party's likelihood of being in government.

Thus, one of the main ideas that can be drawn from this literature is that highly democratic decision-making procedures are likely to constrain party leaders in bargaining, which will render parties that are characterized by such regimes less likely to be in government. As already indicated, there are several mechanisms that could explain a negative effect of intra-party democracy on a party's likelihood of being in government. For example, if we expect party members to be more policy-oriented than their leaders, then leaders of parties where members can influence decisions will be less prone to policy concessions in inter-party bargaining. Leaders of parties that use highly democratic decision-making procedures are probably also not able to make bargaining decisions without informing and seeking the support of the members, which may make them less efficient, and hence less successful in bargaining. Or as Teorell (1999: 375) puts it, 'If relieved of the constant worry about what their members might say, party officials might be able to speak more candidly and change their positions more easily when trying to achieve compromise with political opponents.'

To sum up, I argue that there are two main hypotheses that can be drawn from a discussion about the effect of intra-party politics, namely that *parties are less likely to be in government the more factionalized they are, and the higher their level of intra-party democracy*. These hypotheses will be tested in the following analyses.[2]

Methods and data

Two methods for evaluating coalition theories

A number of different methodological approaches have been used in previous coalition research. For example, some researchers have chosen to model countries or systems (at a point in time) as units of analysis, whereas more recent studies have modeled government formation as a choice between potential governments (see e.g., Bäck 2003; Bäck and Dumont 2007; Martin and Stevenson 2001).

When we aim to test predictions about what type of parties are more likely to be in government, the most straightforward approach is to make parties the unit of analysis. Warwick (1996) uses this methodological approach when trying to answer the questions of whether a party gets to play the formateur role, and whether a party participates in government as the formateur's coalition partner. This approach will be used here.[3] The dependent variable used in one of the following analyses describes if a party was in government. Thus, the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable, and it is therefore appropriate to use a logit or probit model to analyze this particular discrete choice problem.[4] Here, a binary logit model is used.

A problem with using this methodological approach is that it does not allow us to evaluate traditional coalition theories, which focus on predicting what type of governments will form. Even though the primary aim of this analysis is to evaluate the hypotheses that say that some party features should affect its likelihood of being in government, it may be important to also account for traditional coalition variables when evaluating these hypotheses. I therefore also perform an analysis using an approach which allows me to include variables drawn from different types of theories; that is, that predict which parties will be in government *and* that predict which cabinets will form.

Martin and Stevenson (2001: 38) model government formation as 'an unordered discrete choice problem where each formation opportunity … represents one case and where the set of discrete alternatives is the set of all potential combinations of parties that might form a government'. When using this approach, we assume that the actors in a political system choose one of the often very large number of potential governments that may form. The number of potential governments in a system is equal to $2^n - 1$, where n is the number of parties; for example, in a six-party system 63 governments may form. Thus, government formation is here modeled as a discrete choice problem. To evaluate this discrete choice, Martin and Stevenson (2001) apply a conditional logit model.[5]

A problem with using Martin and Stevenson's approach is that it is not completely straightforward to evaluate theories that say that some party features affect a party's likelihood of being in government. I am here interested in evaluating hypotheses that say that a higher level of factionalization and a higher level of intra-party democracy will lessen a party's likelihood of getting into government. From these ideas, we can infer that potential governments including parties with a high level of factionalization or a high level of intra-party democracy should be less likely to form. Since these party features are continuous and

the hypotheses probabilistic, we cannot simply state that a potential government including a specific type of party is less likely to form. I therefore state my hypotheses as such: potential governments are less likely to form the higher the *average* level of factionalization in a potential government, and the higher the *average* level of intra-party democracy in a potential government. In Table 3.1, I present the hypotheses to be evaluated using the two different methodological approaches.

Data from Swedish local government

As mentioned above, there are several advantages to studying local data. First, we access a large number of cases of government formation that have never been used as data in coalition studies. This solves one of the problems that coalition research faces. The problem is that coalition researchers have relied heavily on national-level data from parliamentary democracies in post-war Western Europe, even though some coalition theories have been formulated as a result from observation of these same data.[6] The use of local data also gives us greater opportunities to test coalition theories, since we can study a number of cases within one country and at a single moment in time. Thus, we control for several key factors without including them as variables in the model. One of these key factors is

Table 3.1 Two methodological approaches and hypotheses evaluated

		Hypotheses evaluated		
		Factionalization	*Intra-party democracy*	*Control features*
Methodological approach	Parties as units – *binary logit*	Parties are less likely to be in government the higher their factionalization	Parties are less likely to be in government the higher their intra-party democracy	Parties are more likely to be in government: • the larger they are • if they are median parties
	Potential governments as choice alternatives – *conditional logit*	Potential governments are less likely to form the higher their average factionaliztion	Potential governments are less likely to form the higher their average intra-party democracy	Potential governments are more likely to form if they: • include the median party • are minimal winning • are minimal connected winning • are incumbent cabinets

of course time, but we can also study cases within one political system, suggesting that some institutional, cultural and party system characteristics are held constant.[7] This enables us to more adequately isolate the effects of our variables, and decrease the risk of omitted variable bias (see e.g., Bäck 2003; Laver 1989).[8]

Due to these advantages, I have chosen to study coalitions in Swedish local government. Before performing analyses on these local data, we should however consider that there typically exist a number of important distinctions between local government and national government. Laver *et al*. (1987: 501–2) argue that the most important difference between national and local government that we should consider is that there is not always a direct equivalent to the national-level cabinet at the local level. This creates a problem of 'finding the government in local government'.

The question is whether there is something that resembles a national-level cabinet in Swedish local government. In Swedish municipalities, all parties are represented in the formal executive (*Kommunstyrelsen*), which implies that no coalitions form when this committee is appointed. Previous research, however, suggests that we can find something that approximates the national-level government coalition if we consider the informal institutional structure. Henry Bäck and Folke Johansson (2000) argue that Swedish municipalities can be characterized as 'quasi-parliamentary', since a majority party or coalition typically appoint committee leaders and full-time posts. A similar system is used in other Nordic countries. Previous research suggests that the full-time politicians and the committee chairs form a kind of executive, and the coalitions that form when these posts are elected can thus be considered as government coalitions. These posts are the spoils that the parties try to capture in the local legislative game.

Information on a wide array of factors needs to be collected in order to evaluate the hypotheses presented above. It is for example necessary to gather information on the distribution of seats in the council and the parties' ideal policy positions along some key dimension. Some of these measures can be found in official government archives, such as the distribution of seats in the councils. But many others are less straightforward to obtain. For example, obtaining information on party policy positions in the local systems can be a significant hurdle. I have solved this problem by performing a survey investigation among politicians in 49 of the 289 Swedish municipalities. The survey questionnaire was distributed among all members of the local council in each of these municipalities. In this questionnaire, each politician was asked, for example, to place the parties in their council along some key policy dimensions, and about the nature of the decision-making and level of factionalization in the politicians' own parties.[9]

Measuring intra-party democracy and other party features

In this section of the chapter I describe the operationalization of the variables included in the following analyses. All explanatory variables have been rescaled to vary between zero and one. The dependent variable used in the binary logit analysis describes whether the party is included in government or not after the 1998

election, and in the conditional logit analysis, it describes if a potential government is the government that formed in 1998. Due to the quasi-parliamentary nature of the Swedish local government system, it is more difficult to determine which parties govern than at the national level. To obtain information about government membership, I distributed a questionnaire to representatives in all Swedish municipalities in 1999, in which I asked, 'Which party or parties formed government after the 1998 election?'

One of the independent variables that I include in the analysis is the parties' level of factionalization. To measure the level of factionalization in the parties in local government, I use a question included in the questionnaire sent to the council members. I asked the members to mark to what extent they agreed with this statement: 'There are various groups in my party that have vastly different opinions on important issues.' The average party response is used to measure the party's level of factionalization, and the more members that agree, the more factionalized a party is.[10]

Teorell (1998) measures the level of intra-party democracy in two Swedish parties by intensively studying the party organization's exercised influence, its opportunity to influence and its possibility to hold the decision-makers accountable during two decision-making processes. In the survey referred to above, I asked the members to mark to what extent they agreed with five statements about their party:

1 'The local party organization has a significant capacity to influence the decisions that are made in the party's parliamentary group.'
2 'The leadership of the party group always informs and seeks the support of the party group when important decisions are made.'
3 'A very small group in the party negotiate when we are to enter a coalition.'
4 'Decisions about cooperating with other parties in a coalition always have to be supported by the party group.'
5 'It is very easy for the local party organization to dismiss a group leader if it so wishes.'

These five items have been summed to an additive index.[11] The average value on this index in a party measures the party's level of intra-party democracy.

The evaluation of size-oriented coalition theories only requires information on the seat distribution in the parliaments at hand. Using information on the distribution of seats in the local councils (from *Statistics Sweden*), I create a continuous variable that describes the parties' size, measured as their proportion of seats, and a variable that describes if a government is minimal winning. To gain leverage on the median legislator theory, and the minimal connected winning theory, we also need information on the parties' positions along a key policy dimension. Information on party positions is obtained in the elite survey referred to above, where the council members were asked to locate the parties along a left-right dimension. Lastly, I include a dummy that describes if a potential government was the incumbent administration. Such administrations are identified by using information gathered in a survey performed in 1995 (by the tabloid *Kommunaktuellt*).

Before turning to the evaluation of the main hypotheses, it may be useful to look at some descriptive statistics. In Table 3.2, I present information on the level of factionalization and intra-party democracy in the parties. In this table, we can see that the average value of factionalization is quite low (0.37 on a 0–1 scale), which implies that few party members characterize their party as consisting of groups with vastly different policy views. There is, however, some variation in this measure. For example, the factionalization seems to be higher in the social democratic parties than in most other parties. The intra-party democracy index has a rather high average of 0.66, which suggests that most party members view their party as internally democratic. There is some variation in this measure too, with the Left party and the Greens showing especially high levels of intra-party democracy, whereas the level of democracy is lower in the Social Democrats, the Liberals and the Conservatives.

The effect of intra-party politics

I will here present two types of statistical analyses aimed at gauging the importance of intra-party politics in coalition formation. The first analysis presented here is a binary logit analysis applied to data on the 354 parties in the 49 municipalities in the sample. In Table 3.3, I present unstandardized logit coefficients and their standard errors. Since the unstandardized logit coefficients do not represent changes in the probability of an event, I calculate first differences and confidence intervals indicating the uncertainty around these measures using *Clarify*, a statistical simulation program provided by King *et al.* (2000). The first differences here describe the change in probabilities that occurs when an independent variable changes from its observed minimum to its observed maximum, when all other independent variables are held at their means.

By studying the results presented in Table 3.3, we can see that most of the hypotheses about the features that affect a party's likelihood of being in government are supported. The unstandardized coefficients are all in the expected direction;

Table 3.2 Factionalization and intra-party democracy across parties

	Factionalization		*Intra-party democracy*	
	Mean	*Std deviation*	*Mean*	*Std deviation*
All parties	0.37	0.19	0.66	0.12
Left party	0.31	0.19	0.73	0.13
Social Democratic party	0.44	0.11	0.63	0.06
Green party	0.38	0.20	0.70	0.15
Centre party	0.39	0.20	0.66	0.10
Christian Democratic party	0.29	0.17	0.67	0.11
Liberal party	0.40	0.23	0.63	0.11
Conservative party	0.35	0.14	0.64	0.11
Local parties	0.42	0.24	0.72	0.14

Table 3.3 Logit analysis of a party's likelihood of being in government

	Parameter estimate	*First difference*	*95% confidence interval*
Constant	2.25**	—	—
	(0.89)		
Factionalization	–2.34***	–0.51	–0.72 to –0.25
	(0.75)	[–0.51]	[–0.72 to –0.21]
Intra-party democracy	–2.47**	–0.42	–0.68 to –0.09
	(1.04)	[–0.45]	[–0.74 to 0.01]
Size of party	1.31	0.15	–0.14 to 0.38
	(1.32)	[0.24]	[–0.28 to 0.55]
Median party	2.19***	0.40	0.27 to 0.50
	(0.51)	[0.40]	[0.27 to 0.50]
Log likelihood	–202.11		
Pseudo-R^2	0.10		
N	326		

Note: Significant at ** the 0.05 level, *** the 0.01 level. Parameter estimates are unstandardized logit coefficients. Entries in parentheses are standard errors obtained using STATA's *robust cluster* command. First differences and confidence intervals are obtained using *Clarify*. First differences indicate the probability change when an independent variable changes from its empirical minimum to its maximum (factionalization: 0–1, intra-party democracy: 0.23–1, size: 0.02–0.51, median: 0–1), and all other variables are held at their means. Entries in brackets are 0 to 1 changes.

that is, parties are more likely to be in government the more seats they control and if they are median parties, whereas parties are less likely to be in government the more factionalized they are and the more democratic they are. All variables, except the variable measuring party size, also exert significant effects.

To get a feel for the magnitude of the effects of these independent variables, we can study the first differences presented in Table 3.3. For example, with all other variables held constant at their means, the probability that a party will be in government increases by about 40 percent if it is a median party, which indicates that this party feature is an important determinant of what parties will be in government. Both factionalization and intra-party democracy also have substantial effects on a party's likelihood of being in government. With other variables held constant at their means, a party is about 50 percent more likely to be in government if it has a low level of factionalization (0) than if it has a high level of factionalization (1), and a party with a low level of intra-party democracy (0.23) is about 40 percent more likely to be in government than a party with high level of intra-party democracy (1). Thus, the hypotheses that emphasize that the level of factionalization and the level of intra-party democracy should affect a party's chances of getting into government are strongly supported by these results.

In the logit analysis, I was able to control for two more general coalition variables, describing a party's size and whether the party was the median party or not.

In a conditional logit analysis, we can include additional coalition variables in the analysis. In Table 3.4, I present the results from three conditional logit models applied to data on about 8,000 potential governments. The first model includes the three party variables that displayed significant effects in the logit analysis, measuring the average level of factionalization and intra-party democracy in a government, and whether the median party is included. The second model includes the variables drawn from theories that predict that a specific type of cabinet will form. In the third model, all variables are included. In Table 3.4, I present the unstandardized conditional logit coefficients, which tell us if a variable increases or decreases the likelihood that a government will form.[12]

In Table 3.4, we can see that all party hypotheses are given support, since the effects of the factionalization, intra-party democracy and median party variables are all statistically significant (in both model 1 and 3). Thus, even when I control for several important coalition variables, the hypotheses about the effects of intra-party politics are supported. A potential government is more likely to form if the average level of factionalization and intra-party democracy among the parties is low. In Table 3.4, we also see that some of the effects of the more general coalition variables are significant. The effect of the minimal connected winning and

Table 3.4 Conditional logit analysis including important controls

	Model 1 *Party features*	*Model 2* *Government features*	*Model 3* *All features*
Average factionalization	–5.55***		–4.96**
	(2.06)	—	(2.30)
Average intra-party democracy	–7.17**		–7.68**
	(3.35)	—	(3.83)
Median party in government	2.01***		1.09**
	(0.45)	—	(0.49)
Minimal winning government	—	0.39	0.53
		(0.44)	(0.43)
Minimal connected winning government	—	3.76***	3.31***
		(0.40)	(0.42)
Incumbent administration	—	3.38***	3.21***
		(0.49)	(0.50)
Log likelihood	–218.95	–149.56	–140.39
Pseudo-R^2	0.08	0.39	0.41
N	7654	8399	7654

Note: Significant at ** the 0.05 level, *** the 0.01 level. Parameter estimates are unstandardized conditional logit coefficients. Entries in parentheses are standard errors. A drawback to using the conditional logit model is that the model imposes the property of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). I here follow Martin and Stevenson (2001), who evaluate if the IIA assumption is problematic by dropping a random set of alternatives from each formation opportunity and applying a Hausman test. In neither of the models tested here is the average *p*-value obtained over 50 replications (where a random 10 per cent of the choices is dropped) lower than 0.05, suggesting that the IIA assumption is not problematic.

incumbent administration variables are both significant, whereas the effect of the minimal winning variable is not. Thus, potential governments are more likely to form if they consist of parties that are placed close to each other and if they consist of parties that have previously governed together.

Conclusion

Traditional theories about government formation are based on the assumption that parties can be characterized as unitary actors. Many authors have questioned the soundness of this assumption. The problem is that we may miss some factors that affect coalition formation if we do not consider that intra-party politics matter. In this chapter, I have evaluated two hypotheses that can be drawn from this type of discussion, that say that parties are less likely to be in government, the higher their level of factionalization and the higher their level of intra-party democracy.

Here, I use data from Swedish local government to evaluate coalition hypotheses. To evaluate the hypotheses presented, I perform two types of analyses. Regardless of how I model government formation, I find support for the hypotheses drawn from a discussion about intra-party politics. Parties are less likely to be in government if they consist of distinct factions and if they use democratic decision-making procedures.

This suggests that intra-party politics is important to consider if we want to fully understand coalition formation. Thus, further efforts should be made to theorize about and empirically investigate how factors concerned with the internal workings of parties affect coalition bargaining. The first step in such a research effort is to evaluate the hypotheses presented here on, for example, intra-party democracy, on national-level data. This may of course require a large-scale data collection effort, which gathers new data on the internal workings of parties in European countries.

I have here suggested several mechanisms that could explain why factionalization and intra-party democracy have negative effects on a party's chances of getting into government. For example, factionalization could affect the efficiency with which parties bargain. Parties that are highly factionalized may, for example, have problems acting as unitary actors and in reaching decisions about which partners the party should choose, since the members have highly divergent policy views. Other parties may also view a factionalized party as being a less attractive coalition partner since it may be less likely to 'deliver the goods' in terms of getting all its members to vote a specific way.

A high level of intra-party democracy could also affect a party's bargaining efficiency, since leaders in highly democratic parties may have to spend a significant amount of time and effort during bargaining seeking their members' approval before making important bargaining deals. Intra-party democracy could also adversely affect the way in which a party is perceived. For example, an internally democratic party may allow more open internal dissension, which could render it difficult for other parties to place this party ideologically. This could make risk-averse actors shy away from cooperating with such a party. Since it is

not clear which causal mechanisms are at work, further efforts should be made to investigate the mechanisms underlying effects of variables focusing on the role of intra-party politics in coalition formation.

Notes

1 As mentioned in the first chapter of this book, there have been attempts to relax the unitary actor assumption in studies of legislative behavior by focusing on party factions as actors. See for example, Laver and Shepsle (1990, 1999); Mershon (1999, 2001); and Giannetti and Laver (2004).

2 Maor (1995: 66) argues that 'when intra-party conflicts occur, organizational decentralization allows the party to handle intra-elite and elite-follower conflicts in a variety of manageable ways', making decentralized parties better able at handling conflicts and entering coalition negotiations. This argument is the opposite of the one made by Groennings (1970), who claims that when internal disputes occur, the more centralized the party, the easier it is for the party to remain in the coalition. The hypotheses presented by these authors suggest that we should interact the level of conflict within a party with its level of centralization, since they expect the effect of intra-party conflict to vary across different party organizations. Following Maor, we would argue that a party which is plagued by conflict and that is internally centralized should be least likely to be in government, whereas Groennings would argue that the conflict-ridden and decentralized party should be least successful. If we assume that factionalization can be seen as an equivalent of intra-party conflict and intra-party democracy as an equivalent of decentralization, this suggests that I should interact these two features in my analyses. If the interaction term is negative, Groennings' hypothesis is supported (factionalized parties are less likely to be in government the higher the level of intra-party democracy). When I include such an interaction term in my analysis of which parties are more likely to be in government (see Table 3.3), this variable exerts a negative, but non-significant effect.

3 A problem with this approach is that the units are not independent since groups of observations are parties in the same party system. According to Laver and Shepsle (1996: 178), this should not influence the estimates of the coefficients, but should 'exaggerate the *t*-statistics used to evaluate their significance'. To correct the standard errors for this type of spatial autocorrelation, STATA's *robust cluster* command is used.

4 See, for exmple, Long (1997).

5 In conditional logit, the probability that individual *i* chooses alternative *j* is:

$$\Pr(Y_i = j) = \frac{e^{\beta \mathbf{z}_{ij}}}{\sum_{j=1}^{J} e^{\beta \mathbf{z}_{ij}}}$$

where $j = 1, 2, \ldots, J$ for a total of J alternatives (Greene 2000: 862). In this specific application *i* equals the system and *j* equals the potential government, or the choice.

6 Laver (1989: 16–17) describes the problem as an 'incestuous relationship' between theory and data.

7 Local government systems in Sweden are, as in many other countries, organized in upper-tier counties and local-level municipalities. At the end of the twentieth century, Sweden consisted of 289 municipalities. The size of Swedish municipalities ranges between fewer than 3,000 inhabitants and to more than 700,000 inhabitants in the city of Stockholm. The average sized municipality has about 30,000 inhabitants.

The Swedish Local Government Act requires that all municipalities have a council *(Fullmäktige)*, which is elected using a proportional representation rule. The council is the institutional equivalent of a national-level parliament. The number of council members varies between 31 and 101 representatives. Just as other proportional representation systems, the Swedish municipalities are multiparty systems. During the 1998–2002 term of office, between five and ten parties were represented in each local council. Most of these parties have national party organizations and are represented in the *Riksdag*, but some parties are represented only in one or a few municipalities. Thus, the municipalities vary in a number of features, such as their size and the number of parties represented, and we cannot say that these features are held constant. However, all municipalities are proportional-representation multiparty systems and we can expect that these party systems are similar in many respects since they are all situated within the same national system.

8 Some authors have recognized these advantages and have tried to evaluate coalition theories using local-level data (See e.g., Denters 1985 (Belgium); Laver *et al*. 1998 (Great Britain); Steunenberg 1992 (the Netherlands); Temple 1995 (Great Britain). In *Coalition Government, Subnational Style*, Downs (1998) performs one of the most comprehensive studies of subnational coalition formation. In this study, the author focuses on *regions* or *provinces* in Belgium, Germany and France instead of *municipalities*, which are studied here.

9 For information on the survey, see Bäck (2003).

10 Another possible way to measure factionalization is to measure the policy cohesion in the party by studying the spread, for example the standard deviation, in the party members' self-placements along a left–right policy scale. A problem, and the reason why I have not used this type of measure in the following analyses, is that in some cases I only have one or two responses from a party, which automatically gives this party a low standard deviation.

11 A principal component analysis including these items suggests that there is only one underlying dimension in the responses to these survey questions (only one factor has an eigenvalue over one). All of the variables have factor loadings over |0.3|. One of the variables has a negative loading on this dimension (3) that a very small group negotiates. This makes perfect sense, since a low value on this variable would indicate a high level of intra-party democracy. This item has been recoded before it was included in the additive index.

12 Martin and Stevenson (2001: 41). As the conditional logit model is nonlinear, the unstandardized conditional logit coefficients cannot be directly interpreted as what happens with the probability that a potential coalition is chosen when we alter a choice-specific variable. There is no straightforward way to convert the coefficients into probabilities in this particular application (see Bäck 2003).

References

Axelrod, R. (1970) *Conflict of Interest*. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company

Bäck, H. (2003) *Explaining Coalitions. Evidence and Lessons From Studying Coalition Formation in Swedish Local Government*. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis

Bäck, H. and Dumont, P. (2007) 'Combining large-n and small-n strategies: the way forward in coalition research', *West European Politics* 30(3): 467–501

Bäck, H. and Johansson, F. (2000) 'Reinventing the wheel: institutional reforms in the city of Stockholm', paper presented at the European Urban Research Association, Dublin, 13–15 April 2000

Bäck, H. and Vernby, K. (2003) 'In the eye of the beholder: sources of uncertainty in MPs' placements of other parties', paper presented at the MPSA Conference, Chicago, 3–6 April, 2003

Black, D. (1958) *The Theory of Committees and Elections*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Denters, B. (1985) 'Towards a conditional model of coalitional behaviour', *European Journal of Political Research* 13(3): 295–309

Downs, W. (1998) *Coalition Government Subnational Style – Multiparty Politics in European Regional Parliaments*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press

Duverger, M. (1954) *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*. London: Methuen

Giannetti, D. and Laver, M. (2004) 'Party factions and split roll call voting in the Italian DS', paper presented at the APSA Annual Meeting, Chicago, 2–5 September 2004

Greene, W. H. (2000) *Econometric Analysis* (*4th edition*). Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall

Groennings, S. O. (1970) 'Notes toward theories of coalition behavior in multiparty systems: formation and maintenance', in S. Groennings, E. Kelley and M. Leiserson (eds) *The Study of Coalition Behavior: Theoretical Perspectives and Cases from Four Continents*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, pp. 445–65

Harmel, R. and Janda, K. (1982) *Parties and Their Environments: Limits to Reform?* New York and London: Longman

King, G., Tomz, M. and Wittenberg, J. (2000) 'Making the most of statistical analyses: improving interpretation and presentation', *American Journal of Political Science* 44(2): 341–55

Laver, M. (1989) 'Theories of coalition formation and local government', in C. Mellors and B. Pijnenburg (eds) *Political Parties and Coalitions in European Local Government*. London: Routledge, pp. 15–33

Laver, M. and Schofield, N. (1998) *Multiparty Government. The Politics of Coalition in Europe*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press

Laver, M. and Shepsle, K. A. (1990) 'Government coalitions and intra-party politics', *British Journal of Political Science* 20(4): 489–507

Laver, M. and Shepsle, K. A. (1996) *Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies*. New York: Cambridge University Press

Laver, M. and Shepsle, K. A. (1999) 'How political parties emerged from the primeval slime: party cohesion, party discipline, and the formation of governments', in S. Bowler, D. M. Farrell and R. Katz (eds) *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, pp. 23–48

Laver, M., Rallings, C. and Thrasher, M. (1987) 'Coalition theory and local government: coalition payoffs in Britain', *British Journal of Political Science* 17(4): 501–09

Laver, M., Rallings, C. and Thrasher, M. (1998) 'Policy payoffs in local government', *British Journal of Political Science* 28(2): 333–53

Long, J. S. (1997) *Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables*. Thousand Oaks: Sage

Luebbert, G. M. (1986) *Comparative Democracy. Policymaking and Governing Coalitions in Europe and Israel*. New York: Columbia University Press

Maor, M. (1995) 'Intra-party determinants of coalition bargaining', *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 7(1): 65–91

Martin, L. W. and Stevenson, R. T. (2001) 'Government formation in parliamentary democracies' *American Journal of Political Science* 45(1): 33–50

Mershon, C. (1999) 'The costs of coalition: a five-nation comparison', in S. Bowler, D. M. Farrell and R. Katz (eds) *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, pp. 227–68

Mershon, C. (2001) 'Party factions and coalition government: portfolio allocation in Italian Christian democracy', *Electoral Studies* 20(4): 555–80

Michels, R. (1962) [1915] *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*. New York: The Free Press

Mitchell, P. (1999) 'Coalition discipline, enforcement mechanisms, and intra-party politics' in S. Bowler, D. M. Farrell and R. Katz (eds) *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, pp. 269–87

Müller, W. C. and Strøm, K. (eds) (1999) *Policy, Office or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Müller, W. C. and Strøm, K. (2000) 'Coalition governance in Western Europe. An introduction', in W. C. Müller and K. Strøm (eds) *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–31

Steunenberg, B. (1992) 'Coalition theories: empirical evidence for Dutch municipalities', *European Journal of Political Research* 22(3): 245–78

Strøm, K. (1994) 'The Presthus debacle: intra-party politics and bargaining failure in Norway', *American Political Science Review* 88(1): 112–27

Strøm, K., Budge, I. and Laver, M. (1994) 'Constraints on cabinet formation in parliamentary democracies', *American Journal of Political Science* 38(2): 303–35

Temple, M. (1995) 'The relevance of ideological position and policy closeness to English local coalition pay-offs', *Local Government Studies* 21(1): 65–81

Teorell, J. (1998) *Demokrati eller fåtalsvälde? Om beslutsfattande i partiorganisationer*. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis

Teorell, J. (1999) 'A deliberative defence of intra-party democracy', *Party Politics* 5(3): 363–82

von Neumann, J. and Morgenstern, O. (1953) *Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour*. Princeton: Princeton University Press

Warwick, P. V. (1996) 'Coalition government membership in West European parliamentary democracies', *British Journal of Political Science* 26(4): 471–99

4 Party politics and local government coalition formation in Portugal

Pedro J. Camões and
Silvia M. Mendes

Coalition government formation in parliamentary democracies is the topic of a well-established body of literature which dates back to seminal studies from the early 1960s. For some time theorists of coalition formation assumed that the driving motivation of political actors was to get into office. Subsequently the policy positions of political parties became an important element in theories of coalition bargaining. Most theories of coalition formation tend to focus on government formation at the national level. Only recently studies of coalition government formation at the local level have begun to appear in the literature. However, such studies mainly focus on cases where electoral institutions and coalition government formation at the local level are similar to those of the central government.

In this chapter, we explore local government formation in Portugal, where electoral rules at the local level do not allow formal post-electoral coalitions to form, and where local government formation is different from that found at the national level. In the Portuguese case, local government portfolios are equivalent to national ministries; as we shall see, they are not functional equivalents of office. Electoral winning parties or pre-electoral coalitions may govern on their own, regardless of whether or not there is a majority. *A priori* there is no theoretical reason to expect bargaining behaviour in these cases. In spite of this, some form of coalition building occurs and there are governments that voluntarily share governing power.

In the winter of 2001, Portugal experienced one of the most contested races for local government in the country's short history as a democratic nation. The vast majority of socialist executive councils were thrown out of government to make way for their social democratic challengers. Results were such that the central government fell afterward, following the resignation of the prime minister at the time, António Guterres, on the very night of the election outcome. In subsequent weeks, a caretaker government was placed in charge of the country until a date could be set for new national legislative elections.

Two interesting cases to point out are the Lisbon and Porto contests of 2001. In both cases, incumbent Socialist Party (PS) presidents, João Soares in Lisbon and Nuno Cardoso in Porto, lost to their respective Social Democratic (PSD) challengers, Pedro Santana Lopes and Rui Rio. In both cases, the winning parties

missed majority status by a very small margin, more specifically by one seat. Despite the fact that the winning party could form a 'cabinet' without the risk of losing office, in both councils portfolios were distributed to one council member of the party having won precisely one seat.

In the municipal elections that followed in December 2005, the PSD was able to win a second term in both municipalities. In the case of the Porto executive council, the PSD was able to secure a majority of seats and reinstate incumbent president Rui Rio. This time around, there was no need for coalition bargaining over portfolio allocation because the PSD claimed them all. In Lisbon, Carmona Rodrigues (replacing Santana Lopes) did not head a majority council; in fact, the PSD needed one more seat to ensure a smoother term in office, so portfolios were delegated to the only Popular Party (PP) council member, Maria Nogueira Pinto. Due to ensuing conflicts between Carmona Rodrigues and Nogueira Pinto, she later rejected the post. This ended up making quite a difference in Carmona's management of the municipality, so much that Carmona's council was thrown into disarray and fell some time later.

What explains the difference in the winning party decisions from one election race to the next? More generally, what explains the willingness of some winning parties in executive councils to allocate portfolios to other parties when they can govern on their own, or in other words, to engage in power sharing with outside party council members when the electoral rules protect councils, even minority councils, from losing office? The bargaining dynamics apparently can have potentially critical effects on the functioning and maintenance of the political institutions of local government. Despite the absence of formal coalition formation following electoral contests, there is nonetheless evidence of a bargaining process. We argue that there is a coalition-like type of bargaining by both majority and minority winning parties. This bargaining results in the distribution of portfolios to some non-governing parties. Simply put, our argument is that delegation turns out to be an informal form of coalition building.

We begin with a brief review of the literature on coalition formation and its application to the local government level. We then turn our attention to the description of the institutional setting of Portuguese local government. Finally, using descriptive evidence on local election data, as well as survey data on local portfolio allocation, we explore how parties behave in the post-electoral period and analyse their behaviour in light of the literature on coalition formation.

Coalition building and portfolio allocation

Ultimately, democratic theory is about understanding the workings of government. The literature on coalition formation is at the heart of democratic theory since it is all about understanding the formation and duration of governments, most especially those that are not a direct reflection of election results. The existence of minority governments and power sharing in most parliamentary democracies make coalition theories especially relevant. These theories make up a dynamic and mature body of literature that has evolved along two inter-related lines

of inquiry. The first concerns which parties get to share executive power, while the second concerns how spoils are distributed to these governing parties.

Regarding the first question, early explanations of coalition formation and composition were based on a game-theoretic view of parties as rational actors pursuing the goal of office. Office-seeking or 'size principle' explanations are based on the idea that the best possible solution for parties competing for the spoils of government is to share as little power as possible. This results in coalitions that are only as large as they need to be to secure their winning status and maximize cabinet durability, with partners as small as possible to minimize sharing spoils – 'minimum winning coalitions' (MWC) (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953; Gamson 1961; Riker 1962). Offices, irrespective of substance, would be distributed proportionately according to the share of legislative seats each party contributes to the coalition.

Empirical evidence, however, reveals that the pure office-seeking model of coalition formation does not adhere well to reality (Browne and Franklin 1973; Budge and Keman 1990; Martin and Stevenson 2001; Bäck and Dumont 2004). Scholars argue in favour of policy preferences as being the most important determinant of coalescence. Empirical studies have shown that policy-based coalition theories are, in fact, more applicable (De Swaan 1973). These studies led to the relaxation of the pure office-seeking model through the incorporation of policy-driven explanations, where MWC would more likely form if they were ideologically compatible; that is, if they formed a 'minimal connected winning coalition' (Axelrod 1970). These studies also led to the notion of compactness, where MWC would more likely form in the face of a minimal ideological range (Leiserson 1966; De Swaan 1973).

More recently, institutional constraints have been incorporated in theories of coalition formation or 'coalition avoidance', as Strøm and Leipart (1993: 870) put it. Early coalition theories, both office- and policy-seeking, were free of institutional considerations such as cabinet formation rules, electoral rules, pre-electoral agreements, parliamentary rules, institutional veto players, and so on. However, as the literature on new institutionalism of the 1980s points out, institutions are relevant constraints that shape the negotiation process and can lead to the failure of coalescence (Strøm and Leipart 1993; Strøm *et al*. 1994; Lupia and Strøm 2008). Parties operate in specific institutional settings that reduce coalition options. These constraints are, therefore, as important as seats and policy positions in explaining and predicting coalition formation.

Most studies in the coalition formation literature deal with the composition and duration of equilibrium cabinets (Austen-Smith and Banks 1990; Budge and Keman 1998; Laver and Schofield 1990; Laver and Shepsle 1996). Fewer studies have focused on the second question, associated with 'how well rewarded each member-party [can] expect to be in terms of ministerial portfolios' (Warwick and Druckman 2001: 627). Scholars also argue that not all offices have the same bargaining value, so that it matters how the cake is cut. Understanding how the 'bargaining chips' are awarded is key to understanding the answer to the 'Who gets in?' question (DeWinter and Dumont 2006: 181). Although the literature on

portfolio allocation bargaining has burgeoned in very recent years, it dates back further than does the coalition membership literature, more specifically to Gamson's law of pure proportionality between party seat shares and portfolio payoffs and to its empirical tests in the 1970s (Gamson 1961; Browne and Franklin 1973; Browne and Feste 1975). Exceptions to this relationship, such as disproportionally larger returns for larger parties or an overcompensation bias in favour of small parties, inspired scholars to further explore the bargaining process behind portfolio allocation looking at the distinguished position of the *formateur* (Baron and Ferejohn 1989; Morelli 1999) or at the spatial location of small parties (Laver and Schofield 1998).

Recent studies on portfolio allocation have focused on the qualitative aspect of the allocation process, that is, on the nature of the incentive behind distribution. Not all portfolios are valued in the same way, in the sense that whoever has control over key posts in government has a better chance of leaving distinguishing marks on policy-making. Therefore, parties oftentimes are interested in gaining control over a specific portfolio or subset of portfolios. So it may be that the salience, and not necessarily the number of portfolios is what really matters. Understanding how parties evaluate portfolios (Warwick and Druckman 2001, 2006; Fréchette *et al*. 2003, 2005; Ansolabehere *et al*. 2005; Druckman and Warwick 2005) is key to understanding the criteria behind portfolio allocation and, ultimately, the dynamics of coalition formation.

In the second half of the 1980s, coalition research was taken to another level. Mellors recognized sub-national governments as 'a new arena for the study of coalitions' (Mellors 1989; Mellors and Pinjemberg 1989; Laver and Schofield 1998). Despite this, the number of studies on subnational governments remains scarce when compared to the body of literature on national governments. Since studies at the local level are just now starting to make a mark on the literature (Denters 1985; Steunenberg 1992; Laver *et al*. 1998; Back 2003; Skjæveland *et al*. 2004), most parliamentary local government systems are open fields for research on coalition formation and portfolio allocation.

One of the greatest strengths of local government studies is that it avoids a key weakness of the coalition theory at the national level – the circularity problem in which the same data are used to develop and test theories (Skjæveland *et al*. 2004). In other words, theory is usually no more than data description. In this sense, local governments are seen as an obvious solution to this problem because they provide both a larger and a more varying data set. Not only do they provide for a greater number of cases, but also the cases are themselves substantively different. In addition, local government studies hold the institutional setting constant and control for its effect, whereas in coalition studies at the national level, institutional settings necessarily differ from case to case.

Studies on coalition formation at the local level are not without their limitations. On the restrictive side, one of the main limitations of these studies is that coalition theories are, in fact, formulated to address the specificities of national government in parliamentary democracies. This means that coalition theories may not hold at the local level. They have to be adapted to reflect the nature of

local coalitions. For example, while the concept of coalition is clearly defined at national level, it is not without its problems at the local level. 'There are local functional equivalents to national government, but they depend on the specific local government system under study' (Skjæveland *et al*. 2004: 9). Also with respect to theoretical premises, both the Denters (1985) and Steunenberg (1992) studies on the Netherlands are based on the assumption that policy positions of local parties match those at the national level – a rather 'heroic' assumption (Skjæveland *et al*. 2004). More recent studies have improved on this problem by obtaining data on local party policy positions. Bäck (Chapter 3) focuses on Swedish surveys sent to local councillors. Also, Skjæveland *et al*. (2004) have measured policy positions in Denmark through an expert survey sent to local councillors. Although one may object on the grounds that this raises comparability problems, this procedure is a clear improvement to equating local and national policy positions.

Finally, another difficulty emerges with the characterization of either office-seeking or policy-seeking political actors or parties at the local level. Laver *et al*. (1998) state that 'there is no compelling reason why policy-seeking models of government formation … should not be applied at the local level' (1998: 335), but when is it the case that local parties seek 'to maximize their rewards from executive office' or that local 'party leaders pursue policy objectives at least in part because of voter demands' (Strøm and Leipart 1993: 870–2)? For example, according to the standard view at the national level of government, the formation of an oversized or surplus majority coalition is interpreted as a rejection of the office-seeking model of coalition formation based on the 'minimum winning' concept. This may not be the case at local level; more information is needed to understand the underlying driving motivations of political actors.

Coalition-like bargaining in Portuguese local governments

Not much is said in the literature on coalition formation in the Portuguese parliamentary democracy (for an exception see Magone 2000). This is perhaps because there have been very few coalitions in central government, and most of these occurred in the early years following the restitution of the democratic regime. At the local level, there are virtually no studies on coalition formation. In this case, however, the reason is different – political coalitions cannot form in the post-electoral period. Despite this obvious limitation, upon closer examination, there is evidence of bargaining activity in the executive council that makes Portuguese local governments potentially attractive for empirical study.

Institutional framework

The most important form of local government in Portugal is the municipality.[1] Its institutional setting can be briefly described as follows. All municipalities are limited to the same institutional rules of political formation and policy-making that are approved by the national government. These include general guidelines

concerning municipal activities, election form, the local financing system, and so on. There are two main bodies, an executive body and a legislative body, elected separately through a system of proportional representation of closed lists and the d'Hondt method. Political parties, pre-electoral coalitions of parties, and independent lists of organized ordinary citizens are free to compete for these offices, but no post-electoral coalitions are permitted to form.

The legislative body (*assembleia municipal*) meets about three or four times a year and approves the budget, housing plans, loans, and other large projects. The executive council (*câmara municipal*) is the governing body that manages the municipality on a day-to-day basis. It is composed of five, seven, nine, or eleven members[2] (besides the president of the council), depending on the population size of the municipality. Given that the council is elected through the d'Hondt method, it is a multiparty body that, in practice, can be equated to a small parliament that meets weekly to vote on the most important issues. A single party may or may not have a majority in the executive body. When a party gains a majority of seats, it may proceed on its own to implement its preferred policies.

With regard to local party politics, there are some important issues to note. First, the main parties that compete in the local elections are the same that are represented in the national parliament. While made up of different types of actors, these parties can be characterized by a high level of party discipline and centralization. Following the left–right ideological spectrum, from left to right, they are the following: BE (Radical Leftists),[3] PCP-CDU (Portuguese Communist Party), Centre Left–PS (Socialist Party), Centre Right–PSD (Social Democratic Party), and Extreme Right–PP (Democratic Social Center). The two centrist parties are the largest, usually capturing about 80–85% of the votes and accounting for at least two-thirds of municipal presidents. Typically, though, two or three parties are represented in the executive body, meaning that party competition at the local level can vary greatly.[4]

The president of the council is not only the first name on the winning list; the presidency is also in itself a local government institution. The president can be seen roughly as a 'strong mayor' given the legal powers of the office (Pereira 1991).[5] The president, among other things, has the power to manage, coordinate, and control the decisions of the executive municipal body. However, because the president is a member of the winning party, we may assume for simplicity that his or her decisions reflect the winning party positions, despite the fact that some intra-party disagreements may occur. In addition to the specific powers of the office of presidency, the executive council can delegate many of its competencies to the president; in fact, this is the most frequent case (Pereira 1991). The president can also delegate functions to other council members, whether they belong to the president's party or not.

Delegation and portfolio allocation

Delegation to council members assumes a special meaning in the Portuguese case because holding a local government portfolio is not the equivalent of holding

office in central government. The functional areas, not offices, are similar to policy portfolios. The spoils of office reside in this delegation of portfolios. Therefore, parties comprising the executive council *per se* have decision power only with respect to issues that concern the council during the regular meetings, and of these, only with regard to those issues that are not delegated to the president. These executive council parties do not run the municipality on a daily basis. This means one cannot speak of office-seeking behaviour in Portuguese local government in the traditional sense because offices are determined solely by election results. There is no negotiation of offices. The winning party cannot bargain away seats to another party.

Upon delegation, council members become responsible for one or more functional areas of administration. If the executive council can be compared to a small parliament, the president and his 'chosen few' operate as a council within a council or a cabinet of some sort.

The mainstream principal-agent (PA) model tells us that delegation may be very useful in many circumstances as a form of commitment among partners (Melumad and Mookherjee 1989; Andeweg 2000; Strøm 2000; see also Miller 2005 for a review of PA models in political science). In addition, if the incentive scheme is correctly designed, the commitment may turn out to be credible and, therefore, stable. The delegation of policy portfolios to other party members of the executive councils corresponds then to an informal coalition. In fact, delegation and political coalitions are not wholly distinct (Lupia and Strøm 2008), since both are instances of joint action and both occur in an electoral setting. This coalition-like bargaining is based on an implicit trade between the president (the principal) and a specific council member (the agent), where the good is the approval vote on matters brought before the council and the *payoff* is the portfolio.

The council member receiving a portfolio ensures an effective, though partial, control of government on a daily basis, deciding over resources, allowing for the possibility of pleasing his electorate, and so on. This control is very effective mainly due to the well-known issues of information asymmetry. Division of labour (portfolios) allows for specialization that guarantees an informational advantage (Shepsle and Bonchek 1997). This informational advantage, as the literature predicts, is sure to be exploited. The only cost in accepting a portfolio is the commitment to approve the matters of the president's agenda.

On the presidential side, there are obvious advantages in delegating. First, in securing a stable majority of approval votes, the president and the winning party guarantee policy continuity. The alternative of relying on free-floating majorities is not appealing because it implies negotiating the approval of every decision anew. Therefore, delegation to another party member minimizes negotiation costs and maximizes stability. This stability represents credibility that is very useful in gaining voter support. Another advantage for the president is the possibility of shifting responsibilities on controversial policies to other parties (Epstein and O'Halloran 1999; Melumad and Mookherjee 1989). This also helps in cultivating electoral support. The only cost is a coordination problem due to the loss of

control over the controversial policies because it is harder to coordinate policies with council members of more than one party. This loss of control can have possibly negative electoral consequences.

If no party has a majority, the president faces a choice. One is the decision not to delegate, proceeding with a greater probability of lengthy discussions to gain support from minority parties on a case-by-case basis. Alternatively, the president may opt for delegation, which means the formation of what in practice functions as a stable informal coalition. As in any other decision problem, the choice depends on the evaluation of the benefits and costs of each alternative. Let us see what happens in Portuguese local councils regarding this choice. Two issues are relevant to provide some clues: the frequency of delegation and the policy salience of the portfolios distributed.

Evidence on delegation and portfolio salience

The choice to allocate portfolios can be studied from both an office- and a policy-seeking perspective. Depending on which parties are chosen, we may be able to infer something about whether parties exhibit office- or policy-seeking concerns in local government. The choice to govern alone says something about the extent to which they value the spoils of office. Figure 4.1 is a 2×2 table that refers to four hypothetical behavioural situations for majority and minority councils in Portuguese local government. Majority councils that opt to distribute portfolios may be seen as oversized policy-seeking majorities. Majority councils that do not delegate portfolios exhibit neither office- nor policy-seeking behaviour because it is impossible to ascertain the underlying motivation. In the case of minority councils, the choice to delegate may reveal either office- or policy-seeking behaviour, depending on the size of the receiving party. Minority governments

	Distribution of portfolios	**No distribution of portfolios**
Majority	Policy-seeking	Not applicable
Non-majority	Office-seeking (MWC)[a] Policy-seeking (oversized coalition)[b]	Office-seeking

a If there is delegation to just enough councilmen to form a minimum winning 'coalition'

b If there is delegation to more than enough councilmen to guarantee a minimum winning 'coalition'

Figure 4.1 Portfolio distribution and bargaining behaviour in majority status executive councils.

that distribute portfolios can be 'minimum winning' office-seekers if they choose to delegate to just enough councilmen to secure an informal working arrangement or 'coalition'. On the flip side, they may be likened to policy-seekers, if they opt to distribute portfolios to more than enough councilmen, arriving at what may be likened to an oversized 'coalition'. When minority councils do not distribute portfolios at all, we can argue that they exhibit some form of office-seeking behaviour because of the particular institutional definition of portfolio. They know that they do not stand to lose office; they simply do not want to share governing power. Of course, this contradicts the standard office-seeking model where minority governments would not be expected to be office-seekers so as not to jeopardize the duration of the cabinet. This is not the case here, however, where minority councils are not at risk of breaking up when they do not distribute portfolios.

In the remainder of this chapter, we seek to assess what kind of bargaining, if any, may have occurred among local government party players. In order to do this, we examine the descriptive evidence on local governments following the election results of December 2001. These election data refer to the 278 continental municipalities.[6] Data on seats are available online;[7] data on portfolio allocation are generally not available on the Internet, so they were gathered through a survey we conducted among municipalities.

Tables 4.1 through 4.3 present data on post-electoral arrangements agreed upon by the council parties. Table 4.1 lists the winning parties in municipalities and data on portfolio delegation. The first and foremost thing to notice is the fact that most of the Portuguese local executive councils that formed are majority councils. There were only 35 minority councils out of 278 municipal executive councils listed in the table. In these municipalities, the winning party had to share seats with one or two other parties. In 14 cases there was no portfolio distribution. In these cases, the winning party, given the option to distribute portfolios, chose not to do so; rather it preferred to govern alone and face the opposition in the council. This behaviour, as we argued above, could be interpreted as office-seeking.

Table 4.2 provides more detailed information on the portfolios that were distributed and the parties receiving them. The table shows the subset of 20 municipalities with minority councils that decided to delegate portfolios. What can we say about bargaining here? These councils could be considered office-seekers if they strategically delegate to form informal 'minimal winning' arrangements or as policy-seekers if they form 'informal oversized' majorities, as discussed above in reference to Figure 4.1. Which parties received portfolios? By examining the receiving end of the delegation, we may be able to say something more specific about the winning minority parties' behaviour. Did these minority councils allocate portfolios to large parties or the smaller parties or independents? Did they delegate to ideologically similar parties; that is, do they share policy preferences? In 12 of the 20 cases, we can see that the winning party distributed portfolios to the smallest party in council, resulting in arrangements that were 'minimal winning'. In the remaining eight municipalities, policy-seeking 'oversized majorities' formed, with four councils distributing portfolios to all council parties and the other four distributing portfolios only to the second larger party.

Table 4.1 Non-majority winning parties and portfolio allocation

Municipality	*Winning party*	*Total seats*	*Winning party seats*	*Portfolio allocation*
Alvito	PS	5	2	No
Barreiro	PS	9	4	Yes
Beja	CDU	7	3	No
Bombarral	PSD	7	3	No
Celorico da Beira	MPT	5	2	No
Chamusca	CDU	5	2	Yes
Coruche	PS	7	3	Yes
Crato	PS	5	2	No
Entroncamento	PSD	7	3	Yes
Estremoz	CDU	7	3	Yes
Lamego	PS	7	3	No
Lisboa	PSD-PPM	17	8	Yes
Loures	PS	11	5	No
Marinha Grande	PS	7	3	Yes
Mirandela	PSD	7	3	Yes
Monforte	CDU	5	2	Yes
Moura	CDU	7	3	Yes
Nisa	CDU	5	2	Yes
Odivelas	PS	11	5	Yes
Peniche	PS	7	3	No
Portalegre	PSD	7	3	Yes
Porto	PSD-PP	13	6	Yes
Salvaterra Magos	PS	7	4	No
Santarém	PS	9	4	No
Santiago do Cacém	CDU	7	3	Yes
Satão	PSD	7	3	Yes
Sertã	PS	7	3	No
Sesimbra	PS	7	3	Yes
Sintra	PSD-PP	11	5	Yes
Terras de Bouro	PSD	5	2	No
Torres Vedras	PS	9	4	No
Vale de Cambra	PSD	7	3	No
Vila do Bispo	PSD	5	2	No
Vila Real S. António	PS	7	3	No
Vila Viçosa	CDU	5	2	Yes

Examining the substance of the allocated portfolios provides us with a better understanding of the bargaining process. When taking into consideration portfolio salience, it is interesting to note that of all portfolios allocated, most of them fall into three broad categories: (1) social housing and sanitation works, (2) safety and environment, and (3) recreational activities. Portfolios generally considered key posts in local government, such as finance, urban planning, and public construction works, were generally never distributed. Table 4.2 shows only five exceptions; that is, five cases where the portfolio of urban planning was bargained away: Bombarral, Chamusca, Coruche, Santiago do Cacém, and Sesimbra.

Table 4.2 Portfolio allocation to outside parties

Municipality	*Total seats*	*Winning party (seats)*	*Other council parties (seats)*	*Council party getting portfolios*	*Portfolios*
Barreiro	9	PS (4)	CDU (4) & PSD (1)	PSD	Sanitation Urban Planning, Agriculture, Commerce, Education, and Professional Improvement
Bombarral	7	PSD (3)	Ind. (2), PS (1) & PP(1)	PS	
Chamusca	5	CDU (2)	PS (2) & PSD-PP (1)	PS(2) & PSD-PP(1)	Regulation, Traffic, Economic Activities, Markets and Fairs, Urban Planning, Social Housing, Health, Tourism, Supervising Commission for Public Works and Service Acquisition
Coruche	7	PS (3)	CDU (3) & PSD (1)	PSD	Urban Affairs, Water and Sanitation, Environment, Parks
Entroncamento	7	PSD (3)	PS (2), BE (1) & CDU (1)	PS (2) & BE (1)	Commerce and Industry, Markets and Fairs, Cultural Activities
Estremoz	7	CDU (3)	PS (2) & PSD (2)	PS	Sports, Markets and Fairs, Cemeteries, Maintenance
Lisboa	17	PSD-PPM (8)	PS-CDU (8) & PP (1)	PP	Urban Affairs, Solid Waste, Traffic, Mechanical Maintenance
Marinha Grande	7	PS (3)	CDU (3) & PSD (1)	PSD	Social Affairs, Social Housing, Elderly Health Care
Mirandela	7	PSD (3)	PP (3) & PS (1)	PS	Sports, Tourism, Cultural Activities
Monforte	5	CDU (2)	PS (2) & PSD-PP (1)	PSD-PP	Sports, Recreational Activities
Moura	7	CDU (3)	PS (3) & PSD (1)	PSD	Industry, Commerce, Agriculture, Consumer Information
Nisa	5	CDU (2)	PSD (2) & PS (1)	PSD (2) & PS (1)	Sanitation, Urban Maintenance, Parks, Rural Development, Riverfront Affairs, Sports, Markets and Fairs, Traffic, Health, Juvenile Affairs
Odivelas	11	PS (5)	PSD (4) & CDU (2)	PSD (3) & CDU (2)	Health, Social Housing, Tourism, Veterinary Services, Environment, Economic Activities, Transportation and Garages, General Administration and Judicial Council

Continued

Table 4.2 Portfolio allocation to outside parties—cont'd

Municipality	*Total seats*	*Winning party (seats)*	*Other council parties (seats)*	*Council party getting portfolio*	*Portfolios*
Portalegre	7	PSD (3)	PS (3) & CDU (1)	PS (1) & CDU (1)	Sports and Recreational Activities, Social Works, Social Housing, Markets and Fairs, Education, Science and Cultural Activities, Health, Consumer Information
Porto	13	PSD-PP (6)	PS (6) & CDU (1)	CDU	Environment, Administrative Reform
Sant. do Cacém	7	CDU (3)	PS (3) & PSD (1)	PSD	Health, Water and Sanitation, Environment, Urban Affairs, Municipal Infrastructures, Markets and Fairs, Traffic, Cemeteries
Satão	7	PSD (3)	MPT (2) & PS (2)	MPT	Education and Cultural Activities, Arts and Crafts, School Transportation, School Transportation, Cafeteria & Dormitory Management, Cultural Affairs, Pre-School and Day Care, Schools, Tourism, Social Works
Sesimbra	7	PS (3)	CDU (2) & PSD-PP (2)	CDU	Social Works, Health, Education, Social Housing, Urban Planning
Sintra	11	PSD-PP (5)	PS (4) & CDU (2)	CDU	Environment, Local Intervention
Vila Viçosa	5	CDU (2)	PS (2) & PSD (1)	PS	Sports, Markets and Fairs, Traffic, Cemeteries

Table 4.3 Majority winning parties with portfolio allocation

Municipality	*Total seats*	*Electoral winning party (seats)*	*Non-electoral winning parties (seats)*	*Non-electoral parties with portfolios*	*Portfolio distribution to outside party*
Alter do Chão	5	PSD (3)	PS (2)	PS	Sports and Cultural Activities
Alvaiázere	5	PSD (4)	PS (1)	PS	Health
Amadora	11	PS (6)	PSD-PP (3) & CDU (2)	CDU	Economic Activities, Sanitation, Markets and Fairs, Job Placement, Tourism, Minor Protection
Aveiro	9	PS (5)	PSD (3) & PP (1)	PSD	Civil Protection, Consumer Council, Markets and Fairs, Municipal Police, Health
Braga	11	PS (6)	PSD-PP-PPM (4) & CDU (1)	CDU	Social Works, Social Housing, Tourism
Coimbra	11	PSD-PP-PPM (6)	PS (4) & CDU (1)	CDU	Social Housing
Lousã	7	PS (6)	PSD (1)	PSD	Traffic and Health
Maia	9	PSD-PP (6)	PS (3)	PS	Sanitation, Sanitation and Safety Inspection, Art Academy Management, Cultural Activities, Tourist Establishment Inspection, Food and Beverage Establishment Inspection, Gaming Establishment Inspection, Commerce, Markets and Fairs, Marketing
Mora	5	CDU (3)	PS (1) & PSD (1)	PSD	Markets & Fairs
Mourão	5	PS (4)	PSD (1)	PSD	Health
Oeiras	11	PSD (7)	PS (3) & CDU (1)	PS & CDU	Municipal Enterprises, Property Management, Job Placement and Profissional Improvement, Sports
Oleiros	5	PSD (4)	PS (1)	PS	Environment, Traffic
Seia	7	PS (4)	PSD (2) & Ind. (1)	Ind.	Economic Development, European Funds
Seixal	11	CDU (6)	PS (3) & PSD (2)	PS & PSD	Health, Drug Abuse Prevention, Civil Protection, Consumer Protection
Setúbal	9	CDU (6)	PS (2) & PSD-PP (1)	PS & PSD-PP	Consumer Protection, Cemeteries, Health
Tomar	7	PSD (5)	PS (2)	PS	Sanitation, Civil Protection, Fire Prevention

Most majority councils do not allocate portfolios. In Table 4.3, we see that only 16 majority councils in continental Portugal formed oversized policy-seeking councils by sharing portfolios with other council members. The winning party in each case could have chosen to keep all portfolios, but instead chose to bargain with other council parties. What is also interesting about these councils is that if we examine the portfolios distributed and the parties rewarded, as we did in the previous table, we also see that no key portfolios were allocated.

Conclusion

The objective of this chapter was to explore local government coalition behaviour in a setting where no formal coalitions form following the election results, and therefore no bargaining behaviour to expected on the part of the winning party or pre-electoral coalition. We examined the institutional specificities and constraints of the Portuguese case. In Portugal, local government bodies are elected through proportional representation. Executive councils are majoritarian, in the sense that only the party or pre-electoral coalition winning most of the seats within the council is responsible for all portfolios. Here, portfolios are equivalent to the ministries at the central government level. However, they are not functional equivalents of office, and therefore interpreting them according to the traditional literature on coalition behaviour is not straightforward. Since the president may delegate portfolios to other councilmen representing different parties, this creates an opportunity for strategic bargaining.

In a nutshell, our exploratory look at coalition-like bargaining in Portuguese local government points to three conclusions. First, we find that most executive councils are majority councils with winning parties that do not allocate portfolios. Second, in spite of this, we find that there are enough councils, both majority and minority, that warrant evidence of some form of strategic bargaining through the presidential delegation of portfolios. There are a few cases of policy-seeking majority councils that delegated portfolios when they had no obligation to do so. Most minority councils appear to be office-seekers for one of two possible reasons. Some of these minority councils distributed portfolios to secure an informal 'minimal winning' agreement that we may compare to a coalition. Some minority councils also exhibit office-seeking behaviour by not delegating; that is, by choosing not to share power. There are also minority councils that appear to be policy-seekers. Although fewer in number compared to minority office-seeking councils, these are councils where the winning party distributed portfolios to council members with more than enough seats to ensure alliance, thus displaying an interest in the pursuit of more consensual policy goals. Finally, we find that portfolio salience is an important issue in Portuguese local government, given that the vast majority of portfolios allocated are not politically relevant. The portfolios widely believed by Portuguese experts to be the most valuable to parties are not subject to bargaining.

All in all, the chapter reveals that both the delegation of portfolios and their salience are highly significant in explaining Portuguese local party politics. In the cases where bargaining does occur, there appears to be a greater tendency

toward office-seeking behaviour. This is mostly the case of minority councils, despite the fact that the institutional rules protect these councils from having to worry about cabinet duration. They negotiate arrangements or informal coalitions simply to minimize transaction costs involved in the business of government.

Notes

1 There are 278 municipalities in the mainland, 19 in Azores and 11 in the Madeira Islands. Parishes constitute a lower level of government; there are about 4,000 of these. Since 1976, the Portuguese constitution also refers to a regional level of government; that is, the administrative region, but this level has yet to actually exist.
2 Because they are much larger municipalities, Lisbon and Porto have 17 and 15 members, respectively.
3 Only recently have Radical Leftists won representation at the national and local levels. But, contrary to what happens with the other four parties, none of the 308 municipal governments are headed by this party.
4 At the local level, we can only speculate that parties are distributed along a left-right dimension in the same way as parties at the national level.
5 Law no. 169/99 on the Attributions, Competencies, and the Functioning of Local Government Bodies.
6 The municipalities of the Autonomous Regions, the Azores, and the Madeira Islands were excluded due to too few survey responses.
7 Available online at http://www.stape.pt

References

Andeweg, R. B. (2000) 'Ministers as double agents? The delegation process between cabinet and ministers', *European Journal of Political Research* 37(3): 377–95

Ansolabehere, S., Snyder, J., Strauss, A. and Ting, M. (2005) 'Voting weights and formateur advantages in the formation of coalition governments', *American Journal of Political Science* 49(3): 550–63

Austen-Smith, D. and Banks, J. S. (1990) 'Stable governments and the allocation of portfolios', *American Political Science Review* 84(3): 891–906

Axelrod, R. (1970) *Conflict of Interest*, Chicago: Markham

Back, H. (2003) 'Explaining and predicting coalition outcomes from studying data on local elections', *European Journal for Political Research* 42(4): 441–72

Bäck, H. and Dumont, P. (2004) 'A combination of methods: the way forward in coalition research', paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, 2–5 September 2004

Baron, D. P. and Ferejohn, J. (1989) 'Bargaining in legislatures', *American Political Science Review* 83: 1181–206

Browne, E. C. and Feste, K. (1975) 'Qualitative dimensions of coalition payoffs', *American Behavioral Scientist* 18(4): 530–56

Browne, E. C. and Franklin, M. (1973) 'Aspects of coalition payoffs in European parliamentary democracies', *American Political Science Review* 67(2): 453–69

Budge, I. and Keman, H. (1990) Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Denters, B. (1985) 'Towards a conditional model of coalition behaviour', *European Journal of Political Research* 13(3): 295–309

De Swaan, A. (1973) *Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations: A Study of Formal Theories of Coalition Formation Applied to Nine European Parliaments After 1918*. Amsterdam: Elsevier

De Winter, L. and Dumont, P. (2006) 'Parties into Government: Still Many puzzles, in R. S. Katz and W. Crotty (eds) Handbook of political parties, London: Sage

Druckman, J. N. and Warwick, P. V. (2005) 'The missing piece: measuring portfolio salience in Western European parliamentary democracies', *European Journal of Political Research* 44(1): 17–42

Epstein, D. and O'Halloran, S. (1999) *Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy-Making under Separate Powers*. New York: Cambridge University Press

Fréchette, G., Kagel, J. H. and Lehrer, S. F. (2003) 'Bargaining in legislatures: an experimental investigation of open versus closed amendment rules', *American Political Science Review* 97(2): 221–32

Fréchette, G., Kagel, J. H. and Morelli, M. (2005) 'Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol and discounting in legislative bargaining', *Journal of Public Economics* 89(8): 1497–517

Gamson, W. (1961) 'A theory of coalition formation', *American Sociological Review* 26(3): 373–82

Laver, M. and Schofield, N. (1998) *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press

Laver, M. and Shepsle, K. A. (1996) *Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies*. New York: Cambridge University Press

Laver, M., Rallings, C. and Thrasher, M. (1998) 'Policy payoffs in local government', *British Journal of Political Science* 28: 333–53

Leiserson, M. A. (1966) *Coalitions in Politics: A Theoretical and Empirical Study*. New Haven: Yale University Press

Lupia, A. and Strøm, K. (2008) 'Bargaining, transaction costs, and coalition governance', in K. Strøm, W C. Muller, and T. Bergman (eds) *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Magone, J. M. (2000) 'Portugal: the rationale of democratic regime building', in W. C. Mueller and K. Strøm (eds) *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Martin, L. and Stevenson, R. (2001) 'Government formation in parliamentary democracies', *American Journal of Political* Science 45(1): 33–50

Mellors, C. (1989) 'Sub-national government: a new arena for the study of coalitions', in C. Mellors and B. Pinjenburg (eds) *Political Parties and Coalitions in European Local Government*. London: Routledge

Mellors, C. and Pinjenburg, B. (eds) (1989) *Political Parties and Coalitions in European Local Government*. London: Routledge

Melumad, N. and Mookherjee, D. (1989) 'Delegating as commitment: the case of income tax audits', *RAND Journal of Economics* 20(2): 139–63

Miller, G. (2005) 'The political evolution of principal-agent models', *Annual Review of Political Science* 8: 203–25

Morelli, M. (1999) 'Demand competition and policy compromise in legislative bargaining', *American Political Science Review* 93(4): 809–20

Pereira, A. (1991) 'The system of local government in Portugal', in R. Batley and G. Stoker (eds) *Local Government in Europe: Trends and Developments*. London: Macmillan, pp. 134–145

Riker, W. H. (1962) *The Theory of Political Coalitions*. New Haven: Yale University Press

Shepsle, K. A. and Bonchek, M. (1997) *Analysing Politics: Rationality, Behavior and Institutions*. New York: W.W. Norton

Skjæveland, A., Serritzlew, S. and Blom-Hansen, J. (2004) 'Theories of coalition formation: an empirical test using municipal data from Denmark', Nordic Local Government Researchers, Oslo, 26–28 November 2004

Steunenberg, B. (1992) 'Coalitional theories: empirical evidence for Dutch municipalities,' *European Journal of Political Research* 22(3): 245–78

Strøm, K. (2000) 'Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies', *European Journal of Political Research* 37(3): 262–89

Strøm, K. and Leipart, J. Y. (1993) 'Policy, institutions, and coalition avoidance: Norwegian governments, 1945–1990', *American Journal of Political Science* 87(4): 870–87

Strøm, K., Budge, I. and Laver, M. (1994) 'Constraints on cabinet formation in parliamentary democracies', *American Journal of Political Science* 38(2): 303–35

von Neumann, J. and Morgenstern, O. (1953) *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*. Princeton: Princeton University Press

Warwick, P. V. and Druckman, J. N. (2001) 'Portfolio salience and the proportionality of payoffs in coalition governments', *British Journal of Political Science* 31(4): 627–49

Warwick, P. V. and Druckman, J. N. (2006) 'The portfolio allocation paradox: An investigation into the nature of a very strong but puzzling relationship', *European Journal of Political Research* 45(4): 635–65

5 Party unity in multi-level settings

Irina Ştefuriuc

Introduction

One of the long-standing debates in the literature on party unity is that federal and politically decentralized systems are expected to erode levels of party cohesion (Owens 2003; Ozbudun 1970). In such settings, the territorial aspect of party organization is not a purely administrative device for running day-to-day party business, but has important power-related implications, with regional branches holding significant levels of decision-making autonomy. These regional branches often operate as relatively autonomous organizations within the national party organization. Regional party leaders are thus agents with double loyalties, acting simultaneously as representatives of territorial-based interests and as representatives of the general interest of their national party. In national parliaments, when these interests clash, MPs might well coalesce around their territorial commitments rather than obey the party line (Ozbudun 1970: 355), with important consequences for the national government's policy-making ability and, ultimately, its survival in office.

In decentralized political systems, maintaining party cohesion and discipline is part of a wider coordination effort that parties participating at multiple levels of government engage in. This effort also includes developing and maintaining a coherent policy line across levels and finding a way to achieve organizational integration of central and territorial party divisions (Deschouwer 2006; Swenden and Maddens forthcoming). It is targeted at counteracting the disruptive effects that political decentralization is expected to have on party organizations.

There are two sets of factors which have the potential to affect party unity in multi-level systems. The first one is rooted in the territorialization of party competition. This process leads almost inevitably to differentiated campaigns across levels (Jeffery and Hough 2003). For state-wide parties, different territorial campaigning together with asymmetrical government participation are likely to lead over time to substantial departures of regional party divisions from the general policy orientation of the central party (Debus 2006; Maddens *et al*. 2007). One can expect that these effects are magnified if the same party participates in government in different coalition formulae across levels, and or if it simultaneously governs at one level and is in opposition at the second one.

Additionally, while in unitary systems most policy positions can by approximated on the left–right axis, political competition in decentralized states often acquires a second, equally relevant, dimension which is defined by the opposition between regional autonomy and state centralization (Heller 2002). This is especially likely to be the case with countries with a relatively novel experience in decentralization and those whose 'federalization' process is still in the making. In such systems, cohesion and discipline might well take different values on these two axes. Parties which are highly cohesive on the left–right dimension might find themselves strongly divided by the territorial question. Vice versa, regionalist or minority nationalist parties are usually very cohesive in their territorial positions, but display a much more heterogeneous outlook on the classical left–right dimension (de Winter 1998). And yet, at best we have only mixed empirical evidence that party unity is undermined in federal and other multi-level settings. Indeed, certain federal settings, such as the US, Argentina or Nigeria come with much lower levels of party cohesion, but others such as Germany, Canada or Australia have highly disciplined parties (Owens 2003: 26). Even where levels of ideological cohesion are lower, parties can make use of a host of institutional and organizational incentives to discipline their MPs.

This chapter explores how the effects of federalism/state decentralization interplay with those of other institutions and how party organizational rules and practices can be used to prevent a disruptive impact of the institutional setting on party unity. It does so by examining two cases: the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) and the British Labour Party (BLP). Our aim is to provide a systematic comparative analysis of the relative importance of systemic, institutional and party organizational determinants of party unity.

Case selection and method

As a consequence of its majoritarian electoral system, the UK government is always formed by a single party. Spain has so far never experienced formal coalitions at the national level but periods of minority status in which the national government depended on forging legislative coalitions with other parliamentary parties have been rather frequent. Furthermore, parties in both countries frequently enter coalition governments at the sub-national level. This experience, along with other factors (see below), is expected to require additional disciplinary efforts on behalf of the party in national government. Although single-party governments are generally perceived to be more stable and enduring than coalition governments, neither is spared the disruptive effects of intra-party politics. As the introduction to this volume indicates, maintaining legislative cohesion and preventing MPs from defecting are major concerns of parties in government during inter-electoral periods and government survival largely depends on how successful these efforts to maintain party unity are.

Both Spain and the UK have relatively recent multi-level institutions. After the demise of the Francoist regime, Spain was constitutionally provided with a decentralized political structure that mainly responded to the demands of its Basque and Catalan minority nations. The first complete cycle of the decentralization

process in Spain ran from the establishment of the new democratic constitution in 1978 until the year 2001, when the last competencies in a long series were devolved from the centre to the regional governments. More recently, decentralization appears to be going through a new deepening process by a series of reforms of regional autonomy statutes that started in 2006. In the UK, although the issue of devolution was on the table since the 1970s, it was only in 1997 that the process was finally started, creating regional legislatures and governments for Scotland and Wales that have been functioning since 1999.

It is generally expected in the literature that these decentralization processes will gradually lead to the territorialization of party appeals (Hough and Jeffery 2006; Jeffery and Hough 2003) and thus to a differentiation in the policy profile of different territorial groups within the same political party (Maddens *et al*. 2007). This chapter argues that should this differentiation really occur, in the cases of Spain and the UK, it would be best observable in those regions which enjoy substantial levels of decision-making autonomy, whose party systems are substantially different from the respective national party systems and, ultimately, where the regional sectors of the national party embark on different governing formulae than those existing at the national level. These three factors – regional governing autonomy, regional party system asymmetry and different incumbency formulae across levels – are expected to increase the autonomy of the regional party branches and contribute to its increasingly specific policy profile within the national party organization. When cross-pressured by the national party interest and the territorial-based interest of their constituency, these policy differences might turn problematic for party discipline at the national level (Swenden and Maddens forthcoming) and thus endanger a government's capacity to pass legislation and, ultimately, survive in office.

The cases analysed here were selected in light of these theoretical considerations. The Scottish Labour Party (SLP) is an important and sizeable sector within the BLP. Many of the BLP top leaders, including notable prime ministers such as Gordon Brown most recently, came from the SLP. Due to the extent of devolution, to the strength of the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) and to the SLP's experience in two coalition governments with the Liberal Democrats in Scotland between 1999 and 2007, the SLP is the Labour party sector that is most likely to develop a differentiated profile which would possibly affect policy making at Westminster. Additionally, the SLP openly opposed the party shift to New Labour under Tony Blair and is generally regarded as being more to the left than the BLP overall (Hassan 2004).

Likewise, the Catalan Socialist Party (PSC) constitutes an important section of the Spanish Socialist Party. Catalonia has always been a stronghold of Spanish social democracy in national elections. The Catalan and the Spanish party systems are largely asymmetrical, due to the electoral weight of Catalan nationalist parties in regional elections. Since 2003, the PSC has participated in a coalition government at the regional level with a radical left-wing Catalan nationalist party and with a small regional counterpart of the Spanish United Left Party. Unlike all other regional branches of the PSOE, the Catalan Socialists have never

been formally subordinated to the national Socialist leadership, the party statute providing for a separate organization associated to the PSOE federation. All these features, in addition to a traditionally anti-centralist orientation (Colomé 1991), indicate that if problems should occur with party discipline at the national level based on territorial intra-party divisions, they should be most visible within the Catalan ranks.

The most straightforward measure of party discipline is parliamentary voting behaviour, using roll-call voting records to indicate levels of internal dissent. The problem with legislative behaviour data is that it is not easily comparable across countries (Owens 2003). Roll-call voting is only one type of voting procedure among many. Secret and anonymous voting is also often used in various legislatures, as are collective rather than individual voting records. The former provide no indication of party discipline levels and the latter allow little room for manifesting dissent on the parliamentary floor. If votes are cast by a delegate of the party group rather than by individual MPs, no dissent will be visible on the floor. It is obvious that any influence individual MPs might have on the final outcome is exercised at a pre-voting stage, and possibly in the extra-parliamentary organization. In this case, the analysis of parliamentary voting says nothing about party unity. It is only roll-call voting with its public character that enables party leaders to monitor their MPs and enforce sanctions on defectors: 'Recorded votes tend to enhance party unity and, as a consequence, reduce decision-making costs in parliamentary systems of government' (Saalfeld 1995: 530).

In both Spain and the UK, legislative voting is public, thus allowing for a transparent scrutiny of party discipline by party whips. Problems of comparability arise only for those matters decided by weighted voting in Spain, when there is only one vote per party group cast by the parliamentary party group representative (the *portavoz*) on matters decided in the Board of Speakers (*Junta de Portavoces*) and by one party representative on matters decided in parliamentary committees and sub-committees. This is an important aspect, as over time there was a substantial increase in ordinary law bills delegated to be decided in committees (reaching up to 52% in the 1986–1989 legislature) (Field 2005: 1086). The weight of these votes in the final result is proportional to the numerical weight of the group in the configuration of the chamber (Sánchez de Dios 1999). Obviously, this is an extremely sharp corrector of internal party dissent. The Spanish parliament is thus functioning as a 'group of groups', rendering MP independent voting behaviour 'quasi-inexistent' (Fernández Riveira 2003: 276). In plenary votes, however, which includes voting on the non-delegated ordinary law bills and on all the organic laws, the MPs vote individually.

A second obstacle to analysing voting patterns comparatively is posed by the available timeline. At the time of writing this chapter, the UK is just half-way through the second post-devolution legislature, which is not sufficient to observe any generalizable trends in the legislative behaviour of Scottish Labour MPs. That is why the scope of this chapter is limited to examining the institutional constraints to party discipline and the organizational strategies the two parties are using to prevent the centrifugal forces induced by political decentralization.

The remainder of this chapter will embark on an analysis of how the two political parties use a variety of party rules and parliamentary regulations in order to counteract the possible negative effects of decentralization on party discipline. I show that despite the expectation that decentralization exerts centrifugal tensions on party unity, territorially based dissent is not likely to emerge as a significant problem for national governments' policy-making capacity or survival as long as these governments enjoy parliamentary majorities. This is because parties set in place complex coordination mechanisms to either compensate the weak institutional incentives to party discipline, as in the UK, or to reinforce the latter, as is the case in Spain.

Institutional constraints on party discipline

Whether the political system is parliamentary or presidential has generally been found to affect levels of party unity. Presidential systems have a negative impact on party unity, as they come with a clear separation between parliaments and the executive which allows the former to behave more independently. On the contrary, voting against government bills is often linked to motions of confidence in parliamentary systems and, depending on the size of the majority parties' control in parliament, voting rebellions can have fatal consequences for government survival (Owens 2003; Ozbudun 1970). These effects are not necessarily mechanical: as governments know they are the target of dissent, a whole array of whipping and sanctions are put in place to keep MPs in line.

Furthermore, parties competing in systems characterized by closed-list proportional representation and high district magnitudes are likely to be more united than those operating in plurality electoral systems (Carey and Shugart 1995). Plurality elections, single-member districts or preferential voting foster intra-party competition and personalized elections, together with a weak sense of loyalty towards the party and a low degree of party unity (Carey and Shugart 1995; Katz 1980; Laver 1999).

Both Spain and the UK are parliamentary democracies in which government survival depends on maintaining a parliamentary majority – and thus on party discipline. Confidence votes are tools that can be used to pass divisive pieces of legislation. However, in the UK, the 1977 defeat on a guillotine motion on devolution is a notable example of miscalculating the disciplinary power of this parliamentary tool (Norton 1980). Just as notable however are the successes of a series of confidence motions introduced by John Major in the 1990s, which managed to bring dissenters back in line (Boucek 2003). There is no example of a government falling on a confidence vote in Spain, but this is largely due to the fact that the other disciplinary devices that are in place make the use of this ultimate tool unnecessary.

As regards their electoral systems the two countries are placed at opposite poles. The British MPs are elected in single-member districts using a first-past-the-post formula. The Spanish system is based on proportional representation and closed party lists. Generally, observed MP behaviour in the two countries confirms the theoretical expectations about electoral system effects, with substantially more

dissent expressed on the parliamentary floor at Westminster and very little (if any) in Madrid.

One must note, however, that these systemic differences cannot be responsible for variations in levels of dissent across territorially based sub-groups of MPs, but exert a uniform effect on aggregate levels of party unity. Moreover, their effects do not however always occur mechanically and the power of agency should not be underestimated. Incentives pertaining to the level of party organization are often used to enhance discipline where structural characteristics work against party unity.

Designing party organizational rules to counteract centrifugal tendencies

Turning now to the power of party organization, a high degree of organizational and power centralization within parties normally fosters party unity. However, in multi-level settings, the 'denationalization' of politics and the creation of autonomous sub-national parliaments almost automatically require at least some degree of 'territorialization', if not outright decentralization or federalization of the state-wide parties' organizations (Deschouwer 2003, 2006; Van Biezen and Hopkin 2006; Thorlakson 2001). Furthermore, with the increase in autonomy of the sub-national level, the costs of additional necessary efforts of coordination and discipline and mounting tensions between the central party and regional leadership groups might be corrosive for the party organization.

So what instruments can the central leadership use to keep these centrifugal forces under control? One method is to put in place tight coordination mechanisms at the level of the parliamentary groups and party organization. Another method is to maintain control over the drafting of electoral manifestos, ensuring that there are no fundamental differences between what the party stands for in regional elections and what it stands for in national elections. Finally, the central leadership can stay involved in the candidate selection process. Central control over party nominations is likely to act as a strong constraint on parliamentary behaviour, resulting in a tighter party discipline, 'as disloyalty will mean deselection' (Gallagher 1998: 15). On the contrary, constituency-based nominations are likely to shape a stronger loyalty towards the constituency rather than the party label, encouraging MPs to stand occasionally against the party line (Gallagher 1990). Thus, the less dependent the MP on the central party organization for reselection, the more independent and locally oriented we can expect them to behave. The more the MP 'owes' their re-election to the centre, the more we can expect them to be loyal to the central party leadership. In what follows we will describe the organizational incentives that the Labour Party in Britain and the Socialist Party in Spain set up to enhance cohesion and discipline.

The Spanish and the Catalan Social Democrats: two organizations, one single voice

The PSOE has a federal structure, in which the Catalan Socialists retain a special position. While other federal organizations of the PSOE are technically territorial

branches of the party, ever since its formation in 1979 by the merger of three Catalan socialist groups – one of which was precisely the regional branch of the PSOE – the PSC has enjoyed formal sovereignty in all Catalan matters (Colomé 1991). The PSC and PSOE are thus associated but separate party organizations. In Catalonia, the two parties run in general elections together under the PSC–PSOE label, but regional elections are fought by the PSC alone. The PSC has the formal autonomy to decide on all regional level matters, but the association agreement between the two parties (the so-called Unity Protocol/*Protocol d'unitat*) stipulates that they commit to coordinate in state-wide matters (Fabre 2007).

Despite a formal federal structure, the PSOE has long been characterized by rather strong centralism. The process of party federalization was itself a response to state decentralization, but it was exclusively directed from the party centre. One of the primary goals of the central party leadership was to maintain party unity intact (Colomé 1991; Maravall 1991; Méndez Lago 2000; van Biezen 2003). On the background of organizational territorialization, the PSOE has remained highly centralized: the Federal Executive Committee enjoys a large variety of powers over the federate organizations (Maravall 1991), organized factionalism is officially prohibited (Colomé 1991) and there is one committee at the federal level in charge of party discipline as such (Méndez Lago 2000). On the other hand, regional organizations have been systematically empowered by government participation at the regional level (Keating and Pallarés 2003: 243; Hopkin 2003: 232). As the regional barons started to voice disagreements with the central party line, the national party leadership's strategy was to co-opt them to high party positions in the federal leadership structures of the party (Méndez Lago 2000: 141; Gillespie 1992).

The PSC has managed to maintain a privileged position in the party federation since 1979, despite the fact that it only gained governmental representation at the autonomous level in 2003. Undoubtedly, this can largely be attributed to the fact that Catalonia remained an important electoral stronghold for the Socialists in national elections even when the PSOE was losing in the rest of Spain (Baras and Matas Dalmases 1998) and to the maintenance of the special status within the Socialist federation sanctioned by an official association agreement (*Protocol d'unitat*).

There are some differences in the policy orientation of the two partners, especially in what concerns the territorial issue. Until Rodríguez Zapatero took hold of the PSOE leadership in 2000, the PSOE used to be a state-oriented and rather centralist party. Recent developments pushed the party into a more pluralist direction, but differences still persist between the two agendas, with a PSC that has always been seen to pursue decentralist, pro-autonomist and even federalist goals. A recent illustration of these policy differences is provided by the heated debate that accompanied the revision of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, that placed the PSC at odds with other important sectors of the Socialist federation and ultimately with the national leadership as well. Along with its nationalist and Catalanist governing partners at the regional level and with the largest opposition party in Catalonia, the PSC pushed for a substantial extension of competencies for the regional government that included asymmetrical fiscal

arrangements for Catalonia. These demands were watered down in the final version of the statute that needed the approval of the Spanish parliament due to fierce opposition within the Socialists ranks. Several regional leaders of PSOE accused the PSC and its Catalan coalition partners of wishing to break inter-territorial solidarity and of violating the Spanish constitution. In the final vote on the new statute bill, however, the PSC voted along with the rest of the PSOE, despite the fact that it was thus voting for a modification of its own original proposal. This is a very good illustration of the extent to which the national leadership is able to contain policy divergence and ensure party discipline even on highly controversial matters.[1]

In addition to policy divergence, the PSC has never formally renounced the goal of forming its own group in the Spanish parliament, separate from that of the PSOE. In the recent legislature after the 2000 elections the governing coalition in Catalonia that includes the PSC has been sharing a separate party group from PSOE, the so-called *Entesa*, in the Spanish senate. A replication in the lower chamber is still not officially on the agenda, but it is not completely unforeseeable in the future.

The first two democratic legislatures after 1979 saw the formation of separate Socialist party groups. The first legislature counted two Socialist groups, that of the PSOE and that of the PSC. A third one was added in the following legislature, that of the Basque Socialists. However, the year before the second legislature was dissolved new parliamentary party group rules were passed. Regulations of party group composition became extremely restrictive in the Spanish parliament, stating that for the formation of a group at least 15 MPs must sign up.[2] To prevent the possibility that strong branches could still form their own group, an additional stipulation prevents parties which are not formally separate organizations and parties not competing against each other in elections from forming separate parliamentary groups. The former restriction targeted the Basque Socialists, which were officially the territorial branch of PSOE in the Basque Country, while the latter was a clear reference to Catalonia. In Catalonia, as it is the party federation PSC–PSOE that runs in Spanish elections, the PSC fields candidates on its own only in regional elections. Thus, the PSC is denied the right to form a separate group from the PSOE, as the two are not competitors in national elections.

Interestingly, these restrictions followed an internal crisis in the Socialist federation. The government proposal of a law whose purpose was to harmonize the decentralization process across the Spanish regions (and thus scrap asymmetrical benefits for Catalonia) fuelled divisions in the Socialist camp, with a faction of the PSC openly opposing the bill. The Catalan group speaker publicly expressed his discontent by refusing altogether to present the Catalan amendments to the bill. Already ridden by internal division following the poor electoral performance in the 1980 regional elections, the parliamentary PSC passed to a stage of outright crisis. This incident created a clear incentive to find a preventive solution to territorial indiscipline and, on the background of a weak and divided PSC, the new standing orders of the parliament were easily passed. Since the third Spanish legislature, all Socialist parties have formed a single parliamentary group. Furthermore, due to the extremely restrictive regulations regarding parliamentary

voting presented above, they have also had a single parliamentary voice on all matters decided by weighted voting.

Additionally, the PSOE also set in place complex coordination mechanisms in order to fight the centrifugal tendencies activated by the statutory autonomy of the federate PSC. A trans-organizational parliamentary coordination secretariat formed by the parliamentary leader of the PSOE-PSC group in the lower house, one senator, one member of the European Parliament and the leader of the PSC party group in the Catalan parliament meet regularly. The specific task of this coordination secretariat is to ensure the coherence of parliamentary positions at all the levels at which the Socialists have parliamentary representation. Beyond parliamentary roles and in addition to the coordination secretariat, weekly meetings are held between the coordinator of the PSC MPs in Madrid, the party secretary, the vice-first secretary and a deputy of the above mentioned secretariat's coordinator. The role of these additional meetings is to coordinate general party activity across levels and decide on common tasks.

In contrast with these clear efforts to maintain convergence, the processes of manifesto drafting and candidate selection are careful to respect the formal autonomy the PSC holds within the PSOE federation. The Catalan party can draft its manifestos autonomously from the PSOE with the latter having no official role in the process. There is little documented evidence of intervention from the centre in this process other than the necessary degree of coordination that follows from running a joint campaign (Fabre 2007). For national elections, the candidates running in Catalan constituencies are formally selected by the PSC district organizations. The lists are afterwards approved by the Catalan party executive and they are further communicated to the PSOE executive. In practice, however, the candidate selection process is done in a much more top-down approach, the lists being largely under the control of the Catalan party executive. As a consequence, the individual MPs' careers are highly dependent on the regional party leadership.

Nevertheless, as long as the Catalan MPs will still be automatically part of the PSOE parliamentary group, these two aspects of regional autonomy can have no significant effects on party unity. All in all we can see that, under a formally decentralized statute characterized by non-hierarchical linkages between the PSOE and the PSC, the national leadership maintains a strong grip on party activity via a series of coordination mechanisms.

British Labour and its Scottish organization: tight control in a loose institutional context

As regards regional autonomy, the case of Scottish Labour Party is rather different than that of the Catalan Socialist Party. Although the party had been created as early as 1888 as a separate entity, in 1909 it was incorporated in the British Labour and it functioned as a regional council of the British Labour for the most part of the twentieth century (Hassan 2002; Bennie *et al*. 1997). Organizational and policy autonomy of the Scottish party amounted to very little, although the votes won in Scottish constituencies were crucial for nearly all

post-war Labour victories. The Scottish party had a small administrative staff, its campaigning was funded by the London Labour headquarters and there were no members of the Scottish regional unit as such (Lynch and Birell 2004).

The devolution plans and the 1997 general elections coincided with Labour's organizational and policy renewal: under the leadership of Tony Blair, the party shifted rightwards and policy making became more centralized (Shaw 2002). At the same time, preparing for devolution required some degree of functional decentralization of the British Labour Party. The Scottish Council of the British Labour Party assumed a new identity at the 1994 Congress, changing names to become the Scottish Labour Party. Prior to that, the Scottish Labour Action (SLA), an organized pressure group within the party, putting forward demands for Scottish self-determination, was already vocal in requesting more autonomy for the Scottish organization (McLean 2004: 46). However, there was no abrupt change in the autonomy status of the SLP following devolution. This is best illustrated by the fact that party finance and membership, as well as party rules and party discipline are still centrally controlled from London (Lynch and Birrell 2004: 187) and that the National Executive Committee of the British party is involved in the policy making and the candidate selection process of the SLP (Bradbury *et al*. 2001).

Internal divergences in the Labour party are to be found mostly in the policy orientations of the Scottish and the British organizations. Significant segments of the Scottish leadership openly opposed the rightwards shift of Labour in Britain. The Scottish electorate shows much less support for New Labour policies than is the case elsewhere in Britain and the Scottish party remains divided over the virtues of adopting the policy shift (Hassan 2002; Bradbury *et al*. 2001).

Devolution itself constituted another source of division in the Scottish Labour. The Labour devolution plans of the 1970s were not wholeheartedly embraced by Scottish Labour MPs, whose commitment to a welfare state with national institutions and solidarity plans opposed them to decentralization (McEwen 2004: 162). Support for home rule among the Scottish Labour in the 1970s would probably not have been achieved had it not been for the electoral threat of a rising Scottish National Party (SNP) and the prospects of a prosperous, self-reliant Scotland that emerged after the discovery of oil (Hassan 2002: 35).

In the 1990s, the devolution campaign platform inside Scottish Labour was the SLA. The SLA campaigned for self-determination, for Labour participation in the Constitutional Convention which was to define the new constitutional structure of the British state and for more autonomy for the Labour's Scottish organization (McLean 2004: 46). Thatcher's large-scale denationalization of industry and the experiment with the poll tax in Scotland were coupled with an increasing belief that the Conservative governments had no legitimacy to govern Scotland. Scotland had never been a Conservative stronghold, but during the five consecutive British Conservative governments after 1979, the Tory electoral situation in Scotland deteriorated substantially. For Scottish Labour, devolution became more and more 'a means of resisting Thatcherism' and 'of preserving the institutions, social services and jobs the social democratic state had created' (McEwen 2004: 164).

Thus, by the early 1990s, agreement over the devolution idea had been reached inside the party, but the way devolution was to be carried out became a source of dispute. Blair's decision to hold a popular referendum regarding the establishment and the tax-raising powers of the Scottish parliament proved particularly divisive. The fervent supporters of devolution in the Scottish party opposed the idea of a referendum on the basis of the disastrous precedent of the 1979 referendum, which put an end to devolution prospects and marked the beginning of the Conservative era in British and Scottish politics (Brown *et al*. 1999). At the same time, devolution supporters were also associated with the more left-leaning, 'Old Labour' wing of the SLP, whereas the 'New Labour' wing was less supportive of devolution and leaning more towards unionism (Bradbury *et al*. 2001).

The referendum was finally held and the Scottish Parliament was subsequently established. Nevertheless, the decentralization of British politics did not result in the decentralization of the Labour Party organization. On the contrary, party leadership sought to tighten its control over party decisions. Labour's old conference system of policy drafting was dismissed as ineffective and resulting in poor policy, as well magnifying and institutionalizing 'disagreement between the parliamentary leadership and the wider party' (Shaw 2002: 148). It was replaced by the National Policy Forum and the Joint Policy Committee as decision-making and coordinating bodies. Membership participation in these new policy-making bodies is numerically reduced and the party's National Executive Committee (NEC) is effectively controlling the agenda of these two new bodies (Shaw 2002).

The role of Scottish Labour needs to be understood on the background of these centripetal developments inside the British Labour Party. Obviously, after the creation of the Scottish parliament and the 1999 elections which brought Labour to power in Scotland, the autonomy of the Scottish party naturally increased. The electoral manifestos of the SLP were subsequently drafted in the Scottish Policy Forum,[3] and some first signs of apparent policy detachment from London did not fail to occur. Bennie and Clark (2002: 7) point to the non-inclusion of the pledge for private involvement in the provision of public services in the Scottish manifesto as an indicator of the 'Old Labour' orientation of the Scottish party.

Regarding candidate selection methods, the introduction of the one-member-one-vote (OMOV) system in the British party was largely interpreted as a measure meant to circumvent mid-level elites and increase the power of the central party leadership, while empowering the grassroots and thus formally democratizing the party organization (Hopkin 2001). In the new selection system, the constituency parties still retain control over nominations, but the proposed candidates need to be drawn from a panel of names that have been previously approved by the NEC. The NEC also reserves power to veto candidates even after they have been selected by OMOV. The reselection of incumbent MPs is guaranteed provided that they are backed up by their constituency organizations. In any case, the NEC also receives a report on the parliamentary record of the aspirant for re-election from the chief whip and can subsequently decide to interview the MPs and, eventually, take the liberty not to approve their reselection (Thomson 1999: 12). This drastically reduces the role that

the Scottish executive plays in candidate selection, which works against MPs developing loyalty ties other than to their constituency and the national party executive.

To summarize, the autonomy of the Scottish Labour Party is restricted in the British organization. The centrifugal elements introduced by devolution and the negative incentives offered by the electoral system are counterbalanced by a set of organizational rules designed to enhance parliamentary discipline and loyalty to the national leadership.

Conclusion

The literature argues that federalism weakens party discipline by creating territorial divisions within political parties and shifting the locus of power from the federal to the sub-federal level. This chapter started from the observation that parties operating in two-tiered systems face an important coordination dilemma (Hopkin 2003). The tasks of governing at different levels and in different coalition formulae, of managing multiple parliamentary groups and of maintaining at the same time a coherent policy line across levels might very well cause organizational strain. Furthermore, if the systemic and parliamentary attributes vary across levels, the complexity of these tasks and the structural obstacles in achieving them are likely to increase.

Following an analysis of two parties performing in such decentralized systems, two opposing models emerge. On the one hand, the decentralized, federal model of the PSC–PSOE occurs in the context of strong parliamentary discipline which is already fostered by restrictive systemic and parliamentary rules. The Catalan party enjoys substantial autonomy in the Spanish Socialist Party federation, but the risk of discipline deviations is minimized by complex coordination mechanisms exercised by both horizontal linkages at the level of state and autonomous party elites and by the strategic integration of Catalan Socialist politicians in the leadership structure at the federal level.

On the other hand, the Labour Party in Britain has responded to devolution by granting only very limited autonomy to the SLP. The British electoral and parliamentary systems present few powerful constraints on party unity, and thus all efforts to maintain discipline are concentrated at the party level. The risks for policy divergence and lack of discipline appear to have been anticipated by the British Labour leadership, which tightened its control over party policy and the screening of party candidates for parliamentary seats. Vertical rather than horizontal integration of the SLP in the British Labour Party is currently the Labour Party response to the challenges of devolution.

However, in both the Catalan and the Scottish case, participation in regional governments can be expected to contribute to increasing autonomy over time. Moreover, the coalition experience at the regional level can be expected to further shift the policy positions of regional parties away from those retained at the centre, where both the PSOE and the British Labour Party govern alone. So far, the model of co-opting regional elites into the federal leadership structures while at the same time retaining a unitary structure in the Spanish parliament appears

to have delivered good results for the PSOE leadership. But this situation might change, as the PSC has never renounced the ambition of forming a separate parliamentary group in the national parliament. While the tradition of strong party discipline is unlikely to change in Spain, parliamentary fragmentation induced by territorial disputes will have a direct impact on the formation and maintenance of national governments and their policy-making capacity in Spain. As for the SLP, an increased functional autonomy inside the British Labour Party might eventually lead to the corrosion of intra-party rules that keep it formally subordinated to the centre.

Notes

1 Van Houten (forthcoming) argues that Catalan MPs' motivation to vote with the party leadership on the final bill was motivated by two factors: on the one hand, the rational expectation of Catalan MPs that a watered down reform was still better than no reform at all; and on the other hand, the national PSOE leadership strategically turned to the main Catalan opposition partner, the moderate nationalist Convergence and Union, to ensure sufficient parliamentary support should the three parties forming the Catalan government, who were the initiators of the bill, decide to vote against it.
2 Alternatively, the threshold is lowered to five MPs, if their party or electoral party block has obtained at least 5% of the national vote or 15% of the total votes cast in the districts in which the party fielded candidates.
3 The 1999 manifesto is an exception, having been drafted exclusively by the Scottish leadership and voted by delegates at the party conference (Lynch and Birrell 2004).

References

Baras, M. and Matas Dalmases, J. (1998) 'Els partits polítics i el sistema de partits', in M. Caminal Badia and J. Matas Dalmases (eds) *El Sistema Polític de Catalunya*. Barcelona: Publicacions de la Universitat de Barcelona, pp. 160–90

Bennie, L. and Clark, A. (2002) 'Scotland's post-devolution party system', paper presented at the EPOP Annual Conference, University of Salford 13–15 September

Bennie, L., Brand, J. and Mitchell, J. (1997) *How Scotland Votes. Scottish Parties and Elections*. Manchester: Manchester University Press

Boucek, F. (2003) 'Managing factional conflict under severe constraints: John Major and British Conservatives 1992–1997', paper presented at the Political Studies Association Annual Conference, Leicester 15–17 April

Bradbury, J., Mitchell, J., Bennie, L. and Denver, D. (2001) 'Candidate selection, devolution and modernization: The selection for Labour party candidates for the 1999 Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly elections', *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties,* 10: 151–72

Brown, A., McCrone, D., Paterson, L. and Surridge, P. (1999) *The Scottish Electorate. The 1997 General Election and Beyond*. London: Macmillan

Carey, J. M. and Shugart, M. S. (1995) 'Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral formulas', *Electoral Studies* 14(4): 417–39

Colomé, G. (1991) 'The Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya', in G. Colomé (ed.) *Socialist Parties in Europe*. Barcelona: Institut de Ciencies Politiques i Socials, pp. 35–62

de Winter, L. (1998) 'Conclusion: A comparative analysis of the electoral, office and policy success of ethnoregionalist parties', in L. de Winter and H. Tursan (eds)

Regionalist Parties in Western Europe. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 204–47

Debus, M. (2006) 'Party competition and coalition formation in the German federal states: Different party strategies, but similar coalition game outcomes?', paper presented at the 1st ECPR Graduate Conference, 7–9 September, University of Essex

Deschouwer, K. (2003) 'Political parties in multi-layered systems', *European Urban and Regional Studies* 10 (3): 213–26

Deschouwer, K. (2006) 'Political parties as multi-level organizations', in R. S. Katz and W. Crotty W (eds) *Handbook of Party Politics*. London: Sage, pp. 291–300

Fabre, E. (2007) 'Party organisation in a multi-level setting: Spain and the United Kingdom', unpublished thesis, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

Fernández Riveira, R. M. (2003) *El Voto Parlamentario*. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales

Field, B. (2005) 'De-thawing democracy: The decline of political party collaboration in Spain (1977 to 2004)', *Comparative Political Studies* 38(9): 1079–103

Gallagher, M. (1988) 'Introduction', in M. Gallagher and M. Marsh (eds) *Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics*. London: Sage Publications, pp. 1–9

Gillespie, R. (1992) 'Factionalism in the Spanish Socialist Party', working paper #59, Institut de Ciencies Politiques i Socials. Barcelona

Hassan, G. (2002) 'The paradoxes of Scottish Labour: Devolution, change and conservatism', in G. Hassan and C. Warhurst (eds) *Tomorrow's Scotland*. London: Lawrence and Wishart, pp. 26–49

Hassan, G. (2004) 'The people's party, still? The sociology of Scotland's leading party', in G. Hassan (ed.) *The Scottish Labour Party. History, Institutions and Ideas*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 1–9

Heller, W. B. (2002) 'Regional parties and national politics in Europe: Spain's *estado de las autonomías*, 1993 to 2000', *Comparative Political Studies* 35(6): 657–85

Hopkin, J. (2001) 'Bringing the members back in? Democratizing candidate selection in Britain and Spain', *Party Politics* 7(3): 343–61

Hopkin, J. (2003) 'Political decentralization, electoral change and party organizational adaptation', *European Urban and Regional Studies* 10(3): 227–37

Hough, D. and Jeffery, C. (2006) 'An introduction to multi-level electoral competition', in D. Hough and C. Jeffery (eds) *Devolution and Electoral Politics*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 2–13

Jeffery, C. and Hough, D. (2003) 'Regional elections in multi-level systems', *European Urban and Regional Studies* 10(3): 199–212

Katz, R. D. (1980) *A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems*. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press

Keating, M. and Pallarés, F. (2003) 'Multi-level electoral competition: Regional elections and party systems in Spain', *European Urban and Regional Studies* 10: 239–55

Laver, M. (1999) 'Divided parties, divided government', *Legislative Studies Quarterly* XXIV(1): 5–29

Lynch, P. and Birrell, S. (2004) 'The autonomy and organization of Scottish Labour', in G. Hassan (ed.) *The Scottish Labour Party: History, Institutions and Ideas*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 176–93

McEwen, N. (2004) 'Pragmatic nationalists? The Scottish Labour Party and nationalism', in G. Hassan (ed.) *The Scottish Labour Party: History, Insitutions and Ideas*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 160–75

McLean, B. (2004) 'Labour in Scotland since 1945: Myth and Reality' in G. Hassan (ed.) The Scottish Labour Party: History, Institutions and Ideas. Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, pp. 34–50

Maddens, B., Libbrecht, L. and Fabre, E. (2007) 'How state-wide parties cope with the regionalist issue, the case of Spain: A directional approach', paper presented at the Workshop on Territorial Politics, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 9–10 February, 2007

Maravall, J. M. (1991) 'From opposition to government: The politics and policies of the PSOE', in G. Colomé (ed.) *Socialist Parties in Europe*. Barcelona: Institut de Ciencies Politiques i Socials, pp. 5–34

Méndez Lago, M. (2000) *La Estrategia Organizativa del Partido Socialista Obrero Español, (1975–1996)*. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas

Norton, P. (1980) 'The changing face of the British House of Commons in the 1970s', *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 5(3): 333–57

Owens, J. E. (2003) 'Explaining party cohesion and discipline in democratic legislatures: Purposiveness and contexts', paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia 31 August–1 September

Ozbudun, E. (1970) *Party Cohesion in Western Democracies: A Causal Aanalysis*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications

Saalfeld, T. (1995) 'On dogs and whips: Recorded votes', in H. Döring (ed.) *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*. Frankfurt and New York: Campus Verlag/St Martin's Press, pp. 528–65

Sánchez de Dios, M. (1988) 'Parliamentary party discipline in Spain', in S. Bowler, D. M. Farrell and R. D. Katz (eds) *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, pp. 141–66

Shaw, E. (2002) 'New Labour in Britain: New democratic centralism?', *West European Politics* 25(3): 147–70

Swenden, W. and Maddens, B. (forthcoming 2008) 'Territorial party politics in Western Europe', in W. Swenden and B. Maddens (eds), *Territorial Party Politics in Western Europe*. Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan

Thomson, S. (1999) 'The changing structure of the Labour party: A leader-centered party?', paper presented at the Political Studies Association Conference

Thorlakson, L. (2001) 'Federalism and party organizational adaptation: A cross-national comparison', paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Grenoble, 6–11 April 2001

van Biezen, I. (2003) *Political Parties in New Democracies: Party Organization in Southern and East-Central Europe*. London: Palgrave Macmillan

van Biezen, I. and Hopkin, J. (2006) 'Party organization in multi-level contexts', in D. Hough and C. Jeffery (eds) *Devolution and Electoral Politics*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 14–36

Van Houten, P. (forthcoming) 'Authority in multi-level parties: A principal-agent framework and cases from Germany and Spain', in W. Swenden and B. Maddens (eds) *Territorial Party Politics in Western Europe*. Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan

PART III

Intra-party politics and coalition behaviour at the national level

6 Legislative party discipline and cohesion in comparative perspective

Sam Depauw and Shane Martin

Introduction

It is hard to envisage representative government, save in terms of unified political parties. Legislative voting unity is a precondition for responsible party government. Existing scholarship has focused extensively on explaining patterns of unified party voting within legislatures by references to presidential versus parliamentary forms of government (see, e.g., Bowler *et al*. 1999; Carey 2007; Tsebelis 2002). Institutions associated with parliamentary systems, such as the vote of confidence mechanism, are said to enhance party voting unity (Huber 1996). Explanations of variation in party voting unity across parliamentary regimes have been limited.

Our aim, beyond a mere description of the behaviour of legislators in casting floor votes, is to build on the scarce exceptions that attempt to link party unity in the legislature and the varying degree to which electoral and other institutions shape the behaviour of legislators (Carey 2007; Depauw 2003; Hix 2004; Hix *et al*. 2005; Sieberer 2006), and progress towards a general comparative framework that allows us to explain variation in the level of party voting not just between different political systems but also between parties operating in the same political system. The institutions that we focus on are the electoral system, the candidate selection system and the opportunities that party leaders have to promote legislators to higher political office.[1]

Notwithstanding recent attempts to introduce a comparative approach to understanding party unity the problems with this existing body of knowledge are manifold. Most analysis has tended to employ only system (country) level variables. While the unit of analysis should typically be at the level of the individual legislative party the institutional explanations posited are at a different, higher level. For one thing, this eliminates the possibility of explaining differing levels of voting unity among political parties in the same legislature.

Perhaps even more damaging has been the lack of cross-national data on legislator voting behaviour. Even the Döring project that did so much to uncover and report data on so many aspects of legislative politics in Europe was nevertheless unable to systematically collect data on voting unity (Saalfeld 1995a: 557). Even for those legislatures where votes are commonly recorded, the records are not made easily available (Carey 2007).

Another possible explanation for the dearth of cross-national research on the topic is the controversies surrounding the most commonly used indicator of party unity, Rice's index of cohesion. The index of cohesion is computed as the absolute difference between the proportion of party members voting in favour and the proportion of party members voting in opposition, multiplied by 100 to obtain a number ranging from 0 to 100.

It is worth repeating and attempting to deal with some of the controversies before beginning our analysis. First, recorded votes are not a *random selection* of votes (Carrubba *et al*. 2006; Hug 2005; Saalfeld 1995a). Recorded votes are typically called for by party leaderships for reasons of disciplining or signalling: to allow their party's legislators to be monitored or to denounce important differences of opinion in the other parties. Both reasons, however, can be expected to have opposite effects on party voting unity scores. On a related issue, as recorded votes increase in number, they tend to include more minor matters (e.g., resolutions, amendments) and therefore to exhibit more unity: on those minor matters only those legislators most interested in leadership positions will attend and they are more likely to toe the party line (Carrubba *et al*. 2006). Indeed, Hug (2005) notes that party unity scores are higher for those votes in the Swiss parliament that are automatically recorded; for example final votes or votes on urgency measures.

Second, the index of cohesion tends to overestimate unity in *smaller parties*. A majority of members voting 'the wrong way' (i.e., against the party line) pushes cohesion upward and this is more likely to happen in small parties. Yet the bias appears to decrease as parliamentary party group size exceeds a minimal number of members and groups are more cohesive – both of which apply to our sample of parties (Desposato 2005). Third, interpreting *non-votes* and *abstentions* is by no means straightforward – the option of abstention is not recorded in all legislators for instance. Excluding both non-votes and abstentions is the more conservative option when attempting to measure voting unity (Cowley and Norton 1999), and this is the approach we employ here. Finally, Krehbiel points out that the Rice index cannot discriminate between situations of perfect and no party discipline at all. That is, the index does not take into account *legislators' preferences*. Under conditions of perfect discipline, legislators vote together *even when* their preferences diverge, while under conditions of no discipline legislators may still vote together but *only* when their preferences converge (Krehbiel 1993, 2000).

In what follows we explain how variation in key political institutions which shape the behaviour of legislators will likely have an impact on the level of observed party voting unity. Using a mix of party-level and system-level data, we then empirically test the arguments that the design of political institutions affects party voting unity. We compile or bring together data on the voting behaviour of legislators in over 90 parties in 16 legislatures.[2] As we can see from Table 6.1, party voting unity tends to be lowest in Finland and highest in Ireland and Denmark. Combining our voting unity data with system and party-level data permits a theoretical and empirical analysis of the variation in legislative voting unity between parties that has not been possible to date. We conclude the chapter with a review of our findings and suggestions for future research in the area.

Table 6.1 Party unity in 16 European democracies

Country	*Period covered*	*No. of parties*	*Mean*	*St. dev.*
Australia	1996–98	3	99.07	0.15
Austria	1995–97	5	98.68	1.45
Belgium	1991–95	9	99.06	0.75
Canada	1994–95	4	97.60	2.24
Denmark	1994–95	7	99.93	0.11
Finland	1995–96	7	88.63	2.59
France	1993–97	4	99.33	0.63
Germany	1987–90	3	96.33	1.79
Iceland	1995–96	6	96.93	2.84
Ireland	1992–96	3	100.0	0.00
Israel	1999–00	10	96.88	1.15
Italy (1st Republic)	1987–92	9	97.52	1.60
Italy (2nd Republic)	1996–01	11	96.46	1.44
New Zealand	1993–94	2	93.17	0.65
Norway	1992–93	6	95.90	0.52
Sweden	1994–95	7	96.57	1.51
United Kingdom	1992–97	2	99.25	0.49

Determinants of party voting unity

The electoral system, personal vote and party voting unity

While the shape, origin and consequences of different electoral rules are generally well documented, their impact on legislative behaviour, most notably on party unity in legislative votes, is not always well understood. For example, German legislators elected via single member districts choose different legislative committee assignments than legislators elected under the party list (Stratmann and Baur 2002). Cox and McCubbins (2007) argue that the ties that bind candidates' electoral fates together are responsible for party unity. These ties reflect the *party reputation* based on the state of the economy, major pieces of legislation and in their argument the reputation of the president. Legislators are ready to comply with party unity when an unfavourable party reputation might seriously damage their own electoral prospects. Such an unfavourable party reputation might result from overspending, as legislators chase pork-barrel benefits for their constituencies, or even from open in-fighting in the legislature. But when candidates cannot hope to benefit from spill-over votes from co-partisans, they will focus on cultivating a personal vote. In those circumstances, they are more inclined to point out differences with their party than legislators whose electoral incentives are more aligned with their party.

Depending on the ballot structure, legislators have varying incentives to appeal to voters over party leaders. In more candidate-centred electoral environments, incumbent politicians will actively respond to and build personal relations with individual constituents in their district. In more party-centred electoral systems,

incumbents focused on re-elections have greater incentives to cultivate favour with their party leadership in the hopes of securing a prominent position on the party list. Carey and Shugart (1995) offer such a method to rank-order electoral systems according to the value of a personal vote on the basis of the interaction between ballot control, vote pooling and type of votes on the one hand, and district magnitude on the other. Where *intra-party competition* is present, greater district magnitude increases the need for a personal vote as the number of co-partisans on the list increases. Yet when intra-party competition for votes is absent, the possibility of a personal vote decreases as district magnitude grows.

The presence of such intra-party competition is defined by ballot control, vote pooling, and type of votes. *Ballot control* refers to the degree of control district-level party leaders have over access to the party label and voters' ability to upset their proposed list. The *pooling of votes* indicates whether votes for one candidate also contribute to the number of seats won by other candidates of the same party. The *type of votes* is determined by the form of the ballot paper that voters are presented with – voters may vote for a party, for multiple candidates or for a single candidate. As voters may only vote for a single candidate (vote), those votes are not pooled (pool), and those votes do 'upset' the party list (ballot), the intra-party competition increases and candidates search for a personal vote – if needs be by voting against the party line (Carey and Shugart 1995).

With *district magnitude*, the intra-party competition increases and candidates are forced to seek out a personal vote – that is, when the ballot structure allows for such competition. On the other hand, with district magnitude, the information demands on voters, too, increase rapidly. Voters can hardly keep up with voting records of multiple incumbents. District magnitude, thus, might have a different impact depending on the type of vote. In closed-list systems, district magnitude increases party unity. In open-list systems, party unity decreases with district magnitude. But in those circumstances, an independent voting record may not be the only, or even the most effective, means to court a personal vote. Shugart *et al*. (2005) argue that district magnitude increases the number of candidates who have local roots or have served in local elected positions within the district in 'pure' open-list systems: social characteristics become more important as candidates hope to attract personal support.

Despite the seminal character of Carey and Shugart's contribution, research on the relationship between ballot structure and voting unity has yielded only mixed empirical success. Focusing on the European Parliament, Hix (2004) finds a relationship between voting unity within the party group and the electoral system by which the MEP was elected (see also Hix *et al*. 2005). Sieberer (2006) argues that incentives to cultivate personal votes should be associated with lower unity in the parliamentary party group. Differentiating between three categories of electoral systems, Sieberer (2006) finds that voting unity is marginally stronger in candidate-centred than party-centred electoral environments. However, an intermediate electoral environment creating mixed incentives for personal vote and party vote cultivation is most strongly associated with higher voting unity, questioning the validity of the argument that voting unity is a function of electoral rules and in

particular the need to cultivate personal votes. More recently, Carey (2007) reaches a different conclusion, finding evidence that the level of intra-party electoral competition, considered a defining feature of personal-vote electoral systems, helps explain variation in voting unity. Given the theoretical interest in the effect of electoral rules on party unity and the only mixed evidence that such relationships withstand empirical scrutiny, we attempt to measure more accurately the effect of ballot structures on party voting unity.

One reason for these mixed results may be that the interaction effect at the heart of Carey and Shugart's thinking renders operationalisation more difficult. A second reason regards the uncertainty surrounding single-member district (SMD) plurality systems. Carey and Shugart code SMDs among the systems least encouraging the development of intra-party competition and therefore a personal vote, while Wallack *et al*. (2003) maintain that there is room for a personal vote in those circumstances and code SMDs accordingly. Both appear to be right: the search for a personal vote in SMDs is not inspired by intra-party competition (at least not in any single election), but by the necessity to court the *median voter* in the district. As long as the opinions of the local median voter sufficiently differ from the national median voter, there might be a reason for MPs to dissent. Finally, the ballot indicator combines a characteristic of the electoral system with one of the party selection process. On the electoral system level, ballot indicates whether votes for candidates can actually 'upset' the party list. On the party level, ballot captures whether party leaders can present lists at all. The latter aspect might in fact be better captured by the candidate selection process.

In sum, we suggest that political parties which operate in electoral systems that provide less incentive to cultivate a personal vote will be more likely to have higher levels of unified legislative voting than political parties operating under electoral rules where electors choose between individual candidates rather than political parties. Where a difference exists between the preference of constituents (the median constituent or an electorally significant sub-constituency) and the party leadership we would expect the electoral system to shape the voting decision of the legislator to vote with or against the party.

Candidate selection and party voting unity

The process by which candidates for legislative office are selected and or reselected remains one of the most overlooked aspects of politics (Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Rahat and Hazan 2001). While, as we discussed above, attention has focused on the nature and impact of electoral systems, much less is known about how candidate reselection procedures impact the behaviour of individual legislators. Yet, if re-election is the goal of incumbent legislators then the proximate aim is to get reselected as a candidate – in effect to secure access to the ballot, or as high as possible a position under list electoral systems. We should note that the critical issue here relates not just to ballot access but the ability to be associated with the party label. An incumbent may easily access a ballot by paying a registration fee and or collecting signatures; we are primarily interested in how much

the party leadership controls access to the party label for prospective candidates. In a general sense, as Strøm (1997) was one of the first to note, what an incumbent must do to be reselected is likely to influence their legislative strategies and role orientation.

Of course, processes of candidate selection are complex undertakings, involving many dimensions and even more actors. Rahat and Hazan (2001) have argued that at least the dimensions of inclusiveness and centralisation should be separated. Inclusiveness of the process refers to the number of actors that are part of the selectorate. Centralisation, on the other hand – and this is the key concern here – regards the degree of control the central party leadership has over the (re)selection processes vis-à-vis other actors in the process, most commonly local party executives.

Indeed, much of the impact of the 'party-centredness' of electoral rules may be logically attributed to candidate selection procedures and in particular the risk of being deselected by the national party leadership. Carey (2007), for instance, found party unity to be lower in both presidential and parliamentary systems where legislative candidates compete against co-partisans for personal votes. But he effectively contrasted parties where candidates compete against co-partisans for personal votes with parties where nominations are controlled by party leaders. In fact, Poiré (2002: 21) reported that electoral rules failed to predict party unity in over 60 political parties in the 1950s and 1960s, when candidate selection procedures were included. Hix (2004: 20), on the other hand, concluded that the defection rate of MEPs from their national parties is more affected by candidate-centred rules than decentralised selection procedures. The latter effect is in the predicted direction, but not statistically significant. Sieberer (2006) found that party voting unity is slightly higher in parties where the leadership has some formal control over candidate selection, and that candidate selection is a better predictor of party voting unity than electoral rules.

Building on this body of research and unclear empirical results, we predict a direct causal link between the degree of control party leaders exert over the candidate reselection process and the level of unified party voting. Lundell (2004) developed a five-point ordinal scale to measure this degree of centralisation. Essentially it is a reduced version of Janda's nine-point scale, collapsed over the inclusiveness dimension (Janda 1980).[3] In our empirical analysis, Lundell's data on candidate selection rules is supplemented with information from Gallagher and Marsh (1988), Gallagher *et al*. (2005) and Narud *et al*. (2002) – in particular on countries that have legally regulated candidate selection procedures: Finland, Germany and Norway.

Detailed information on the inclusiveness of selectorates is generally lacking. Yet something of its impact can be found in the impact of the membership organisation. Ozbudun (1970) distinguished two strands of the argument. The first emphasises that party unity is greater in mass membership parties than in parties where the membership organisation is not the dominant decision-making centre. The second maintains that a mass membership is sufficient – dominant or not in the party. On the other hand, as the proportion of the party electorate that

is also a member of the party increases, party unity is expected to decrease: mass membership is not only a unifying force, it is also likely to be more diverse and thus provide dissenting members cover. Members at the party's more extremist wings often claim to be loyal to the party's orthodoxies when they dissent.

Opportunities for promotion and party voting unity

The motivation of legislators may very well extend beyond the desire to get reselected or re-elected (Strøm 1997). For example, legislators may feel secure in the knowledge that they will be reselected or re-elected. More probably, it could be argued that once elected, legislators in parliamentary systems are strongly motivated by the desire to gain leadership positions within the party, which they hope would ultimately lead to a ministerial seat (Huber and Shipan 2002: 197). In parliamentary systems the executive, by which we mean prime minister, cabinet and junior ministers, typically emerges from and is populated by members of the legislature (Gallagher *et al*. 2005). This is at odds with presidential government, where separation of powers requires that the head of executive be directly elected and the executive cabinet be composed of non-legislators. The difference in approach to staffing the cabinet in parliamentary and presidential systems probably explains why most theories of legislative behaviour, rooted as they are in congressional politics, start and end in assuming that legislators are motivated by re-election (the classic example being Mayhew 1974).

To re-emphasise our point, in parliamentary systems legislators care greatly about reselection and re-election but they are also motivated by the desire to gain even higher political office, similar to what Carroll *et al*. (2006) describe as *mega-seats*. Such political office is typically at the discretion of the party leader. In effect, the party leadership can use the potential for promotion to the ranks of government as a form of control over individual legislators.[4] The tight grip typically held over the legislative agenda by the cabinet under parliamentarism makes individual cabinet ministers the prime initiators of policies – almost to the exclusion of all other legislators (Laver and Shepsle 1996). The autonomy that cabinet ministers are awarded differs remarkably between countries and so may the desirability of the position. Hallerberg (2004: 16) distinguishes between systems of delegation (where the prime minister gives ministers detailed instructions), commitment (where detailed policy agreements restrict ministers' discretion) and fiefdom (where ministers have relative autonomy over decisions in their jurisdiction).

While the practice of including only serving legislators in the cabinet may differ from country to country, promotion is mostly in the hands of the party leadership. And that provides a powerful incentive for motivated politicians not to dissent from the party leadership in legislative votes. The more opportunities that exist for promotion, the more legislators will be inclined to yield to the party leadership. We argue, therefore, that where legislators stand a stronger chance of being promoted to the ranks of government party voting will be more unified. Where the prospects for leadership are more limited, individual legislators

are more likely to rebel against the party leadership, resulting in lower levels of unified party voting.

It is worth noting that this argument is not restricted to governing parties, assuming that no one political party continually monopolises executive seats. In most circumstances, legislators from non-governing parties will be acutely aware that their party may be in government at some point in the future and if or when that time arrives the party leadership may look to them. Hence, we expect to see government and non-government legislators responding to the varying prospects for higher political office. Nevertheless, the promise of promotion may play out differently in governing and non-governing parties as that promise is more uncertain as it lies further in the future.

To quantify the opportunities for ministerial promotion we collected data on the number of government posts filled by legislators in each country included in this study.[5] Logically, a legislator with 99 colleagues is, *ceteris paribus*, more likely to have realistic ambitions of obtaining promotion than a legislator operating in a parliament of 200 members. Consequently our measure of ministerial opportunity controls for the size of the legislature and the member's party. We present two measures of opportunity for ministerial promotion: the variable *Cabinet* measures the number of available senior ministerial positions per legislator. The broader *Government* measures the number of cabinet and sub-cabinet ministerial posts available per legislator.

Having identified how the design of institutions shapes the actions and behaviour of legislators, we proceed in the next section to test empirically the claims that electoral systems, candidate selection rules and promotional prospects impact the level of party voting unity under parliamentarism. First, we will look at bivariate regressions because a small sample size limits the degrees of freedom. Second, the effects of electoral systems, candidate-selection rules and promotional prospects will be combined in multivariate regressions.

Empirical analysis

Centralisation of the candidate selection procedures has a strong impact on party unity in our selection, when using Lundell's five-point scale. With every additional point on the scale towards national party control over nomination, party unity increases – that is, when the first and second point on the scale are combined. As the national leadership enters the selection process, a party's unity scores increase almost three points on the Rice index. As the national leadership further strengthens its control over the process, beyond merely ratifying local decisions, unity scores further increase. The difference between the first and second point on Lundell's scale is related to the inclusiveness of the party selectorate rather than to centralisation. While the composition of party selectorates is not an unimportant concern in intra-party politics, its impact on cohesion is sketchy at best and cohesion itself is only imperfectly related to discipline, which is in fact what we observe.

Candidate selection procedures affect party unity irrespective of a party's position in or out of office, the majority's margin or the size of parliamentary

parties – although the effect of the strongest centralisation category is not significant. Because of space limitations, however, only the bivariate regressions are listed in Table 6.2. Parties of all sizes have long solved the issue by developing formal means of discipline. In fact, party unity is strongest in the larger parties. Larger parties are slightly more likely to have developed centralised nomination processes, for one. As a result, the effect of party size disappears after controlling for candidate selection, whereas the effect of the nomination process remains unaffected.

Contrary to what is often expected, being part of the government reduces rather than reinforces party unity, even if the impact of office is not significant. That expectation has largely been fuelled by the debate on the impact of presidential and parliamentary institutions – the vote of confidence in particular – on party unity. Jackson (1968), however, pointed out that opposition parties may remain absent when they face considerable dissent with little harm to the party reputation. The government side has no such option. While from a longitudinal perspective, it is plausible, for instance, that political parties develop centralised nomination processes in response to the shock of losing office, cross-sectionally candidate selection processes and being in or out of office are largely unrelated.

The impact of centralisation is reinforced by the party membership organisation. As the proportion of party voters that are also party members increases, party unity suffers. This, in turn, may be an indication of the impact of inclusiveness and diversity of the party membership. Parties with a mass membership are more likely to have developed centralised nomination processes. After controlling for the effect of a large membership organisation, however, party unity continues to increase as nomination processes are more centralised. In particular, the effect of the most centralised condition is strengthened. Thus, the proportion of party members to the party electorate reflects the inclusiveness of the nomination process, which is not captured by the centralisation of the nomination processes. Especially in Finnish parties, a large membership compared to the party electorate plays a crucial role in selecting the parties' candidates. The members use the cover that this provides vis-à-vis the party leadership to dissent more often.

In addition to candidate selection procedures, electoral rules that provide incentives to cultivate a personal vote reduce party unity. As Hallerberg and Marier's (2004) index of personal vote increases, party unity decreases.[6] To be fair, the impact is not strong and largely depends on the precise coding rules for various electoral rules. Single-member district systems, for instance, have been considered both among the most candidate-centred (Wallack *et al*. 2003) and the most party-centred electoral rules (Carey and Shugart 1995). In fact, Carey and Shugart's original rank order appears more consistent with the practice of party unity than Wallack's coding. But even the Carey/Shugart rank order overestimates the incentives that ordered-list proportional systems provide to cultivate a personal vote. In that respect, the Hallerberg coding appears more correct – acknowledging that parties often have established other means to restrict the impact of these personal votes. For one, party votes might be redistributed in the order of the list, thus adding another obstacle for candidates ranked lower.

Table 6.2 Bivariate analyses

	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*	*Model 7*	*Model 8*	*Model 9*	*Model 10*	*Model 11*	*Model 12*
Candidate selection												
3	2.862 (0.754)***											
4	2.157 (0.776)***											
5	1.264 (0.804)											
Personal vote												
Carey/Shugart		–0.349 (0.236)										
Wallack *et al.*			–0.146 (0.148)									
Hallerberg				–0.502 (0.189)***								
Promotion												
Cabinet					2.483 (2.894)							
Cabinet *Autonomy *Office						2.861 (1.267)**						
Government							–0.900 (2.226)					

Government *Autonomy *Office								0.436 (0.815)				
Membership									–0.073 (0.034)**			
Office										–0.195 (0.658)		
Majority margin											0.007 (0.005)	
PPG size												0.007 (0.003)**
Constant	95.499 (0.655)***	98.144 (0.646)***	97.598 (0.530)***	98.013 (0.308)***	96.577 (0.672)***	96.308 (0.495)***	97.257 (0.880)***	96.804 (0.557)***	97.732 (0.382)***	97.081 (0.323)***	96.855 (0.312)***	96.653 (0.382)***
Adj. R^2	0.137	0.029	–0.004	0.145	–0.005	0.137	–0.009	–0.009	0.189	–0.009	–0.004	0.113
F	5.74*** (3.94)	2.190 (1.96)	0.960 (1.96)	7.06*** (1.96)	0.740 (1.96)	5.090** (1.96)	0.160 (1.96)	0.290 (1.96)	4.59** (1.96)	0.090 (1.96)	1.970 (1.96)	6.31** (1.96)
N	97	97	97	97	97	97	97	97	97	97	97	97

Notes: * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%

In addition, party leaders ranked at the top of the list often get more than their proportional share of these personal votes, thus further reducing their impact.

As mentioned, the electoral rules that provide incentives to cultivate a personal vote include the ballot structure, the pooling of votes, the number of votes, and district magnitude (Carey and Shugart 1995). None of these rules, however, is able to consistently explain party unity on its own. Nevertheless, as the selection of cases does not include cases where the party leadership does not control access to the ballot, party unity increases as voters cannot 'disturb' the list. In addition, party unity decreases as voters cast a single vote below the party level and those votes are pooled across the list. In particular, the latter runs counter to the expected effect of intra-party competition. The effect of vote pooling, however, differs remarkably from one coding rule to the next: to be more precise, from one rule of coding SMDs to the next. The counterintuitive result appears to be largely driven then by unity in the Finnish parties. With district magnitude, party unity decreases – indicating that growing intra-party competition may in fact outweigh the effect that increasing voters' information demands may have on the propensity to defect from the party line. The difficulties that voters face to keep track of the voting records of tens of incumbents do not seem to mean that a strategic dissenting vote will pass unnoticed. In fact, it is something of a surprise that personal vote has an impact at all. After all, a personal vote can be based on a number of activities and characteristics; for example, local office, pork-barrel benefits, celebrity status, which may or may not have an impact on a legislator's voting record.

Finally, the level of observed party unity in parliamentary systems is related to opportunities for ministerial promotion when combined with ministerial autonomy. The prospect of promotion effectively silences dissent only when the position actually promises an impact on policy. For this purpose, the number of cabinet positions compared to the parliamentary party group size is too crude a measure. The number of either cabinet or junior minister positions in itself does not affect party unity significantly. Only in combination with government type and government status does the prospect of promotion loom sufficiently large in the minds of members. Party unity increases as the number of cabinet positions available rises *and* ministerial autonomy is strengthened from a situation where it is severely curtailed by the prime minister or a detailed policy agreement to a situation of ministerial fiefdom. Furthermore, only a more immediate prospect of promotion has that effect: in opposition parties, future promotion doesn't cast its shadow forward that much. To capture this, the number of cabinet positions is weighted by 0.5 in opposition parties. Note, however, that party unity is unrelated to government type in itself and that unity is actually stronger in parties currently out of office. Yet combined with the number of cabinet positions, government type and government status are positively and significantly related to party unity – even if the impact is not substantively large. An increase by 10 per cent, for instance, in the proportion of cabinet positions is expected to raise party unity by 0.15 in opposition. The increase is expected to rise further to 0.86 if the party was in office *and* ministerial autonomy was at its strongest. In fact, the impact of

Table 6.3 Party unity and electoral rules

	Model 1			*Model 2*			*Model 3*			*Model 4*
	Carey/Shugart			*Wallack et al.*			*Hallerberg*			
Ballot	−1.623			−2.571			−2.824			
	(0.726)**			(0.945)***			(0.656)***			
Pool		2.707			0.541			2.707		
		(0.377)***			(0.391)			(0.377)***		
Vote			−0.868			−0.928			−2.449	
			(0.598)			(0.552)*			(0.691)***	
District magnitude										−0.715
										(0.366)*
Constant	98.039	96.830	97.832	99.331	96.753	98.047	97.831	96.830	97.820	97.659
	(0.401)***	(0.322)***	(0.477)***	(0.815)***	(0.402)***	(0.501)***	(0.236)***	(0.322)***	(0.248)***	(0.413)***
Adj. R^2	0.097	0.036	0.027	0.153	0.005	0.0312	0.296	0.036	0.230	0.008
F	5.00**	51.68***	2.08	74.000***	1.910	2.830*	18.5***	51.68***	12.55***	3.82*
	(1.96)	(1.96)	(1.96)	(1.96)	(1.96)	(1.96)	(1.96)	(1.96)	(1.96)	(1.96)
N	97	97	97	97	97	97	97	97	97	97

Notes: * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%

promotion further increases if the weight of the opposition parties is lowered from 0.5.

The difference between cabinet and junior government positions tells much the same story. In itself, the relationship with party unity is even in the wrong direction: unity decreases as the number of junior minister positions available increases. Yet combined with government type and government status the relationship is in the right direction – though not significant. Legislators, therefore, appear more motivated by the prospects of attaining a seat at the cabinet level than by the opportunity to serve as a junior minister – despite the fact that holding a junior ministerial post may be a stepping stone to securing a full cabinet seat.

The impact of candidate selection, personal vote, promotion and membership on party unity is hardly affected, when their effects are combined in multivariate analysis (Table 6.4). Voting unity is strongest in parties where candidate selection processes are centralised, in parties where the chances of promotion to an autonomous cabinet position are the greatest, in parties where the party electorate does not extend far beyond the party membership and in parties operating under electoral rules that do not encourage the cultivation of a personal vote.

Table 6.4 Multivariate analyses

	Robust model		*Fixed effect models*			
	β	*SE*	β	*SE*	β	*SE*
Candidate selection						
3	2.832	.644***	0.319	0.542	0.022	0.547
4	2.463	.683***	0.412	0.525	0.062	0.532
5	1.367	0.703*	0.764	0.725	0.334	0.764
Personal vote	–0.522	0.143***	–1.062	0.148***	0.171	0.137
Cabinet *Autonomy *Office	3.816	1.164***	2.526	1.289*	2.280	1.121*
Membership	–0.090	0.037**	–0.068	0.041	–0.017	0.041
Australia			5.486	.667***	1.831	0.460***
Austria			2.727	1.086**	2.481	1.099***
Belgium			1.823	0.468***	2.023	0.501***
Denmark			4.973	0.541***	2.468	0.425***
Finland					–9.056	1.386***
France			2.931	0.629***	2.878	0.614***
Ireland			7.792	0.862***	2.319	0.576***
Italy (1987)			6.537	0.102***		
New Zealand			–3.747	0.560***	–3.720	0.564***
Norway					–0.917	0.405***
United Kingdom			2.854	0.661***	2.786	0.653***
Constant	96.492	5.882***	97.198	0.539***	96.206	0.523***
Adj. R^2	0.354		0.756		0.759	
	$F(6,91)$	5.76***	$F(15,82)$	60.13***	$F(16,81)$	67.58***
N	97		97		97	

Notes: * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%

To be fair, these effects are vulnerable to the selection of cases – as is not uncommon in small-*n* studies. It appears that, in particular, party unity is relatively low in Finland and New Zealand. Low party unity in Finland can be traced back to candidate selection rules and the electoral system. Finnish political parties' primary selection rules are required by law (Sundberg 1997: 97–117). In New Zealand, low unity is consistent with neither candidate selection nor the personal vote. This not easily explained – it could be of interest that the parliament studied is in fact the last under the first-past-the-post rules, before the introduction of mixed-member proportional representation. However, the electoral reform does not appear to have affected party unity in the following parliament (Barker and McLeay 2000: 139). On the other hand, party unity scores are relatively high in Denmark and Ireland – especially in light of the open candidate selection rules in the former and Single Transferable Vote electoral rules in the latter.

It is surprising that the inclusion of country dummies reduces the impact of the centralisation of candidate selection processes most – a variable that has performed most consistently so far. Yet incentives to seek out a personal vote continue to encourage MPs to defect from the party line, even if that personal vote is most vulnerable to the selection of cases. More importantly, opportunities to be promoted to a cabinet position that promises a tangible impact on policy consistently serve to hold members together. As a result, promotion opportunities are as crucial in understanding cross-national differences in party unity as they are in understanding rebels and loyalists in the British Parliament.

Conclusion

Strong parties whose members vote collectively within the legislature have long been understood as a necessary element of parliamentary government. Previous attempts to account for variation in legislative party unity have focused on presidential versus parliamentary forms of government as being the main explanation for cross-national variation.

Our aim in this chapter has been to point to the fact that within parliamentary systems parties display variation in the level of legislative voting unity – something which cannot be accounted for by relying on the classification of presidential versus parliamentary systems. Beyond a mere acknowledgment of this fact, our aim has been to explain this variation in party unity within otherwise similar political systems.

Incentives to cultivate a personal vote encourage MPs to defect from the party line. Centralised selection rules, where the party leadership has greater control over the future of incumbents, appear to result in higher party voting unity – although this may be influenced by the particular selection of countries. The opportunity for promotion to government, and in particular, the opportunity to enter cabinet is a tempting offer to maintain unity. The evidence suggests that legislators in parliamentary systems are motivated by the desire to be promoted. This result might point to a significant difference between legislators in presidential systems and legislators in parliamentary systems of government and one that needs to be explored further at the theoretical and empirical level.

Notes

1 As we are dealing exclusively with parliamentary regimes, we exclude from consideration the vote of confidence mechanism as an institutional explanation of party voting unity. We do agree that in comparing presidential and parliamentary regimes the vote of confidence is likely an important factor in explaining between-system variation in voting unity.
2 We ourselves collected data for Belgium, France and Ireland. Scores for United Kingdom were computed on the basis of data made available by Philip Norton (University of Hull). Data for Italy were made available by William Heller (Binghamton University). Data for Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Israel were gathered from Carey (2005). Data for Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden were taken from Jensen (2000), for Switzerland from Lanfranchi and Lüthi (1999), for Germany from Saalfeld (1995b) and for Austria from Müller *et al*. (2001).
3 In this respect it is odd, however, that what distinguishes Lundell's first category from the second is only the inclusiveness of the selectorate: the local party members rather than a restricted selection committee.
4 As Benedetto and Hix (2007) note, rebels are the rejected, the ejected and the dejected, a phrase evoking British Prime Minister Major's quip about the dispossessed and the never possessed.
5 In all cases this information was available on the website of national governments. This data was collected in January 2005 and is available from the authors on request. In calculating the number of ministerial offices we included only positions filled by members of the legislature.
6 To create this index, ballot, pool and votes are added together plus one. If the electoral system has a closed list and is not plurality, this number is divided by the natural log of the district magnitude. In all other cases, the log of district magnitude is added to the sum (Hallerberg and Marier 2004: 576–77).

References

Barker, F. and McLeay, E. (2000) 'How much change? An analysis of the initial impact of proportional representation on the New Zealand parliamentary party system', *Party Politics* 6(2): 131–54

Benedetto, G. and Hix, S. (2007) 'The rejected, the ejected, and the dejected: explaining government rebels in the 2001–2005 British House of Commons', *Comparative Political Studies* 40(7): 755–81

Bowler, S., Farrell, D. and Katz, R. (eds) (1999) *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press

Carey, J. M. (2007) 'Competing principals, political institutions, and party unity in legislative voting', *American Journal of Political Science* 51(1): 92–107

Carey, J. and Shugart, M. (1995) 'Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: a rank ordering of electoral formulas', *Electoral Studies* 14(4): 417–39

Carroll, R., Cox, G. W. and Pachón, M. (2006) 'How parties create electoral democracy, Chapter 2', *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 31(2): 153–74

Carrubba, C. J., Gabel, M., Murrah, L., Clough, R., Montgomery, E. and Schambach, R. (2006) 'Off the record: unrecorded legislative votes, selection bias, and roll-call vote analysis', *British Journal of Political Science* 36(4): 691–704

Cowley, P. and Norton, P. (1999) 'Rebels and rebellions: conservative MPs in the 1992 Parliament', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 1(1): 84–105

Cox, G. W. and McCubbins, M. D. (2007) *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House* (2nd edn). New York: Cambridge University Press

Depauw, S. (2003) 'Government party discipline in parliamentary democracies: the cases of Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom in the 1990s', *Journal of Legislative Studies* 9(4): 130–46

Desposato, S. W. (2005) 'Correcting for small group inflation of roll-call cohesion scores', *British Journal of Political Science* 35(4): 731–44

Gallagher, M. and Marsh, M. (eds) (1998) *Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics*. London: Sage

Gallagher, M., Laver, M. and Mair, P. (2005) *Representative Government in Modern Europe* (4th edn). New York: McGraw Hill

Hallerberg, M. (2004) 'Electoral laws, government, and parliament', in H. Döring and M. Hallerberg (eds) *Patterns of Parliamentary Behaviour: Passage of Legislation Across Western Europe*. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 11–33

Hallerberg, M. and Marier, P. (2004) 'Executive authority, the personal vote, and budget discipline in Latin American and Caribbean Countries', *American Journal of Political Science* 48(3): 571–87

Heitshusen, V., Young, G. and Wood, D. M. (2005) 'Electoral context and MP constituency focus in Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom', *American Journal of Political Science* 49(1): 32–45

Hix, S. (2004) 'Electoral institutions and legislative behavior: explaining voting-defection in the European Parliament', *World Politics* 56(4): 194–223

Hix, S., Noury, A. and Roland, G. (2005) 'Power to the parties: cohesion and competition in the European Parliament, 1971–2001', *British Journal of Political Science* 35(2): 209–34

Huber, J. D. (1996) 'The vote of confidence in parliamentary democracies', *American Political Science Review* 90(2): 269–82

Huber, J. D. and Shipan, C. R. (2002) *Deliberate Discretion? The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Hug, S. (2005) 'Selection effects in roll call votes', paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshop, Granada, 14–19 April 2005

Jackson, R. (1968) *Rebels and Whips. An Analysis of Dissension, Discipline and Cohesion in British Political Parties*. London: Macmillan

Janda, K. (1980) *Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey*. New York: Free Press

Jensen, T. (2000) 'Party cohesion', in P. Esaiasson and K. Heidar (eds) *Beyond Westminster and Congress: The Nordic Experience*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, pp. 210–236

Krehbiel, K. (1993) 'Where's the party?', *British Journal of Political Science* 23: 235–66

Krehbiel, K. (2000) 'Party discipline and measures of partisanship', *American Journal of Political Science* 44: 212–27

Lanfranchi, P. and Lüthi, R. (1999) 'Cohesion of party groups and interparty conflict in the Swiss Parliament: roll call voting in the National Council', in S. Bowler, D. Farrell and. R. Katz (eds) *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, pp. 99–120

Laver, M. and Shepsle, K. A. (1996) *Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies*. New York: Cambridge University Press

Lundell, K. (2004) 'Determinants of candidate selection', *Party Politics* 10(1): 25–47

Mayhew, D. R. (1974) *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. New Haven: Yale University Press

Müller, W. C., Philipp, W. and Jenny, M. (2001) 'Die Rolle der parlamentarischen Fraktionen', in W. C. Müller, M. Jenny, B. Steininger, M. Dolezal, W. Philipp, and

S. Preisl-Westphal (eds) *Die österreichischen Abgeordneten. Individuelle Präferenzen und politisches Verhalten*. Wien: WUV, pp. 183–260

Narud, H. M., Pedersen, M. N. and Valen, H. (eds) (2002) *Party Sovereignty and Citizen Control: Selecting Candidates for Parliamentary Elections in Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway*. Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark

Ozbudun, E. (1970) *Party Cohesion in Western Democracies: A Causal Analysis*. Beverly Hills: Sage.

Poiré, A. (2002) 'Do electoral institutions affect party discipline, or do nomination rule?: comparative evidence on the impact of nomination procedures on party discipline', ITAM (Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico, Mexico City, Working Papers on Political Science.

Rahat, G. and Hazan, R. Y. (2001) 'Candidate selection methods: an analytic framework', *Party Politics* 7(3): 297–322

Saalfeld, T. (1995a) 'On dogs and whips: recorded votes', in H. Döring (ed.) *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, pp. 528–65

Saalfeld, T. (1995b) '*Parteisoldaten und Rebellen. Fraktionen im Deutschen Bundestag 1949–1990*.' Opladen: Leske und Budrich.

Shugart, M., Ellis, M. and Souminen, K. (2005) 'Looking for locals: voter information demands and personal vote-earning attributes of legislators under proportional representation', *American Journal of Political Science* 49(2): 437–49

Sieberer, U. (2006) 'Party unity in parliamentary democracies: a comparative analysis', *Journal of Legislative Studies* 12(2): 150–78

Stratmann, T. and Baur, M. (2002) 'Plurality rule, proportional representation, and the German Bundestag: how incentives to pork-barrel differ across electoral systems', *American Journal of Political Science* 46(3): 506–14

Strøm, K. (1997) 'Rules, reasons, and routines: legislative roles in parliamentary democracies', *Journal of Legislative Studies* 3(1): 155–74

Sundberg, J. (1997) 'Compulsory party democracy. Finland as a deviant case in Scandinavia', *Party Politics* 3(1): 97–117

Tsebelis, G. (2002) *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*. Princeton: Princeton University Press

Wallack, J., Gaviria, A., Panizzi, U. and Stein, E. (2003) 'Political particularism around the world', *World Bank Economic Review* 17(1): 133–43

7 Intra-party factions and coalition bargaining in Germany

Marc Debus and Thomas Bräuninger

Introduction

In most parliamentary democracies, single parties rarely obtain a majority of seats in parliamentary elections so that attaining the control of the executive branch necessitates the formation – mostly explicit – of a coalition of parties possessing a majority of seats in the legislature. The study of the formation and termination of such coalitions is a major field of interest in comparative politics. Almost all of these theories start with the assumption of parties as unitary actors seeking office (Riker 1962; Peleg 1981) or policy gains (De Swaan 1973; Laver and Shepsle 1990a) or a mixture of the two (Austen-Smith and Banks 1988; Sened 1995, 1996). Yet inquiries into coalition politics began with a focus on the 'partisan composition' of coalition governments, whether as the *explanandum* (formation) or *explanans* (termination), and have somehow marginalized other questions such as what these collective actors intend to do, what they expect to do, what they actually do and how these government policies come about (Strøm and Müller 1999). More recent studies have begun to examine these issues in more detail (Austin-Smith and Banks 1990; Laver and Shepsle 1996; Mitchell 1996; Timmermans 1998, 2006; Müller and Strøm 2000).

A major issue in these studies is the question of stability. In a wide range of settings, majority rule does not produce stable outcomes (Arrow 1964; McKelvey 1986). Likewise, government coalitions are susceptible to re-negotiation, their policy agreements are not self-enforcing *per se* and 'transferable utility' goods like office spoils provide room for making and breaking governments. Given this, a number of stability-inducing mechanisms have been identified, most notably, ministerial discretion (Austin-Smith and Banks 1990; Laver and Shepsle 1996) last offer authorities (Heller 2001), appointment of junior ministers (Thies 2001) or parliamentary scrutiny (Martin and Vanberg 2004). In this chapter, we seek to provide an insight to the following conditions: supposing that two parties have agreed on both the formation of a coalition and the allocation of portfolios to the two parties, what then are the strategic options of party leaders when putting individual party members in charge of a ministry? More specifically, we relax the unitary actor assumption and theorize about the conditions under which members of intra-party factions holding different preferences from the core party

are delegated to ministerial power given that ministerial discretion is present, but constrained by parliamentary scrutiny or hostile junior ministers.

We develop a simple spatial model to argue that members of party factions may be used to establish a counterbalance against the policy views of the coalition partner. The argument is evaluated in a case study of six coalition government formations in Germany from 1987 to 2005. To map possible intra-party heterogeneity in terms of policy views, we look at party manifestos and the platforms of key party working groups and consider their contents as positional statements of the party core and party factions, respectively. Using the 'Wordscores' technique (Laver *et al*. 2003), we estimate the positions of these intra-party groups with respect to the two policy dimensions that are most salient in German party competition, the economic and the social policy domains.

In what follows, we first present our argument on how intra-party politics might help us to explain the allocation of portfolios to individual ministers in coalition governments. The third section introduces our case study of portfolio allocation in Germany in the time period from 1987 to 2005. Section four evaluates the argument on the impact of intra-party politics on portfolio allocation in light of this data. In the final section, we draw conclusions from our analysis and discuss possible avenues for future research that result from the findings of this study.

Delegating power to factions: portfolio allocation within intra-party groups

In this section we develop our argument on how to explain the allocation of portfolios to members of intra-party factions, and on how intra-party politics can help to explain the allocation of portfolios in coalition governments more generally. In a nutshell, our argument is that the allocation of ministers and junior ministers from intra-party groups may be used to increase the policy distance between the ministerial agenda setter and the coalition partner and hence the bargaining leverage of the party.

To begin with, we note that coalition bargaining or government formation proceeds in several steps and involves a number of decisions on the side of the actors involved. One is the problem of whom to ask to join a coalition, or vice versa, whether or not to join once asked for. A second problem is how the conflict of interest concerning future governmental policies is resolved within the coalition. Obviously, the two questions are inter-related. Laver and Shepsle's (1990a, 1996) model of portfolio allocation is one of the theoretically more sophisticated examples of recent research that addresses the two questions in one set-up.[1] They presume that coalition cabinets are usually based on ministerial discretion. Cabinet ministers have 'considerable influence' over governmental decision-making in their area of jurisdiction: 'Health policy is heavily conditioned by the partisan political agenda of the minister of health, defence policy by the political views of the political party of the minister of defense and so on' (Laver and Shepsle 1998: 34). In short, the party that holds a portfolio sets its policy

(Laver and Shepsle 1996: 91). As a result, parties agree over portfolio allocations to parties rather than policies. Coalition programs may exist, but they do not reflect a compromise that is negotiated by all coalition partners and covers all relevant policy areas and portfolios.

Ministerial discretion is apparently a key feature and critical assumption of the model. A number of studies have challenged the assumption on both theoretical and empirical grounds. One rather obvious argument is that it seems unlikely that coalition partners are willing to accept Pareto-inefficient outcomes, and the existence of formal coalition policy programmes suggests that Pareto improvements are indeed feasible (Dunleavy and Bastow 2001). A second, related argument refers to the allotment of junior ministerial positions to keep tabs on other parties' ministers and thereby implement policy packages that are Pareto superior to those implied in ministerial government (Thies 2001: 581). Third, parties may make use of parliamentary scrutiny of proposals from coalition partners' ministers at the committee stage, which should render the enforcement of coalition policy agreements possible (Martin and Vanberg 2004). As another example, Bräuninger and Hallerberg (2005: 27) argue that countries employ different cabinet decision-making rules, whereby ministerial discretion is but one of the three types of rules considered in their analysis (see also Andeweg 1993; Laver and Shepsle 1994; Warwick 1999). A further possibility – which to our best knowledge has yet to be investigated in detail – is the delegation of ministerial policy-making powers to members of party factions having different interests but no bargaining power (see, however, Giannetti and Laver 2005). In any case, the key problem is how to put into effect a bargaining outcome when there is no third party equipped to monitor or enforce the agreement.

In this chapter, we join this line of research by addressing the question of which individual senior politician is allocated a government job. More particularly, we seek to discover whether the allocation of senior and junior minister jobs to politicians attached to different intra-party groups is by pure chance or follows a systematic pattern, and is due to strategic considerations of government parties. In doing so, we set out to expand the analysis of coalition formation and portfolio allocation between government parties to the allocation of government jobs to individual politicians attached to particular intra-party groups. In virtually all parliamentary democracies with multi-party governments, the coalition parties have high discretion in nominating and getting senior politicians into office once the allocation of portfolios between government parties is set in the initial coalition bargaining. It is this second stage of government formation where each coalition party can use their allocated cabinet posts to reward loyal senior party politicians (e.g., Gamson 1961).

While this is plausible, strategic party officials may also think of using their discretion in nominating ministers to make the most of the coalition in terms of substantial policies. If the policy output of a specific government department depends on the policy preferences of the minister in charge but certain institutional devices also constrain ministerial discretion, party officials have incentives to install ministers whose policy reputation enhances the bargaining position

of the party as a whole. In particular, we would expect that more often than not, ministers from extreme intra-party groups come into office, increasing the bargaining leverage of the party.

Admittedly, we do not know exactly what the balance is between the two mechanisms, ministerial discretion and counterbalancing constraints such as junior ministers, coalition contracts and parliamentary scrutiny. Yet, when neither is perfect or absent, the government policy in a jurisdiction can be understood as the outcome of bargaining between the minister of the respective department and the coalition partner. It is under these assumptions that even core party members have incentives to appoint fellow members that are attached to intra-party groups that have different policy preferences.

More formally, we start with three assumptions regarding the stages of coalition formation, the nature of intra-party groups and the making of government policies. First, we conceive coalition politics as involving three stages: (1) the initial coalition bargaining over party composition, portfolio allocation and the policy programme of the coalition government: (2) the largely autonomous appointment of senior politicians to ministerial jobs by their party leaders and (3) day-to-day policy-making. In this chapter, we are concerned with the second stage. We assume that parties consist of a party core and, possibly, several party factions (see Luebbert 1986; Laver and Shepsle 1990b; Maor 1995, 1997; Bäck this volume). Party leaders are members of, or at least responsible to, the party core which includes the median party member. Party factions have no bargaining power in the process of coalition formation. Third, in day-to-day policy-making ministers have considerable discretion over their portfolio once they are in office. Ministers set the agenda, but coalition partners have means to monitor and influence ministerial policy-making.

What are the implications of these assumptions? Agenda-setting power with partial control implies that the party holding the department should select a politician as minister whose policy views are even more distant from the coalition partner than those of the party core. A larger distance should not only secure a high profile against the coalition partner in the electoral competition, but also when allocating a 'radical' minister to a department, the party should be able to achieve a policy outcome closer to their ideal point than with a minister from the party core, or even with a minister affiliated to a moderate party faction. As an example, consider the situation in Figure 7.1 where two parties A and B form a centre-right coalition government whereby, as an outcome of the coalition negotiations, party B wins control over the ministry of economic affairs. Party B has two intra-party factions. B_1 favours free market policies even more than the party core B_0 does, while B_2 is less inclined to liberal economic policies. Now consider a situation where both parties agree on the inefficiency of the status quo but disagree on its replacement. The minister of economic affairs may set the agenda, but if ministerial discretion is imperfect, party core B_0 is doing better when having a member of extreme faction B_1 rather than a member of B_2 appointed for minister. In Figure 7.1, the preferred-to-set of a B_2 minister even extends to the position of party A putting the minister in a bad bargaining position. More generally, wherever



Figure 7.1 Intra-party portfolio allocation and bargaining leverage.

the status quo is located, having an extreme minister B_1 is better than having a moderate minister B_2. Our hypothesis therefore is that party leaders strategically select members of such extreme intra-party factions.

Hypothesis 1*: Let parties* A *and* B *form a two-party coalition, with party* B *holding the ministry with jurisdiction* X *and assume that for the party cores* A_0 *and* B_0, $x_{A0} < x_{B0}$ *holds. Then party B appoints an individual of a faction* B_1 *if there exists such a faction* B_1 *of* B *with* $x_{B_1} < x_{B_0}$, *and of the party core* B_0, *otherwise.*

Now we add a twist to the argument. We know that most coalition governments are based on coalition contracts that lay out the main features of the policy programme of the future government. The coalition contract may then serve as a reversion point that party A can insist on when a minister from party B sets the agenda. In this case, however, there is no need for party B to appoint extreme ministers if the coalition contract is close to party B, or even more restrictive, if the coalition contract is more extreme than the party core.

Hypothesis 2*: Let parties* A *and* B *form a two-party coalition, with party* B *holding the ministry with jurisdiction* X, *and assume that for the party cores* A_0 *and* B_0, $x_{A0} < x_{B0}$ *holds, and the position of the coalition agreement of* A *and* B *is* c. *Then party B appoints an individual of a faction* B_1 *if there exists such a faction* B_1 of B *with* $x_{B1} < x_{B0}$, *and* $x_{B0} < c$, *and of the party core* B_0, *otherwise.*

Intra-party groups and portfolio allocation in Germany since 1987

To test the above hypotheses, we analysed the programmatic positions of all political parties represented in the German *Bundestag*, their most important intra-party factions and the coalition government's policy agreement. We restrict the analysis

to the time period beginning with the federal election of January 1987 for three reasons. First of all, there is considerable variance in the composition of governments. After the elections held in 1987, 1990 and 1994, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), their Bavarian counterpart Christian Social Union (CSU) and the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) formed a coalition government under Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU). The outcome of the coalition formation process after the federal elections in 1998 and 2002 was a coalition between the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Green Party (Bündnis90/Grüne) under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (SPD). As a result of the federal election in autumn 2005, a coalition between the two large parties CDU/CSU and SPD under the leadership of Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) formed (Saalfeld 2000: 41; Pappi and Shikano 2005).

Second, and in keeping with the unitary actor assumption for a moment, the coalition between the Christian Democrats and Liberals may be located at a moderate right-wing position on the general left–right ideological dimension. Taking into account at least two of the key conflict dimensions, however, reveals a huge gap in social policy between the progressive Free Democrats on the one hand and the clearly conservative CDU/CSU on the other (Laver and Hunt 1992: 56, 197f; Benoit and Laver 2006: 261). The same is true in the case of the 2005 grand coalition. Whereas the SPD adopts a moderate left-wing position in economic policy and a progressive position on social issues, the Christian Democrats are conservative in social issues and more liberal-orientated in the economic conflict dimension. A 'red–green' coalition does not have such ideological differences on the most important policy dimensions, according to recent expert surveys (see Benoit and Laver 2006: 261; Warwick 2006: 205).

Third, the party system changed over this time period. The German unification in 1990 had major implications for each party and the party system as a whole. East Germany developed a fundamentally different party system with three major parties – CDU; SPD and the left-socialist, former communist PDS – and very small parties as well, notably Liberals and Greens (Niedermayer 2001). The mere existence of a left-socialist party reduced the chances for attaining a red–green majority at the federal level. As a result, the block thinking in coalition building vanished. Another implication of the demise of communism was the sharply decreasing significance of neo-Marxist theory inside the SPD and particularly the Greens. The left-fundamentalist wing of the Green party dropped away in 1991 (Poguntke and Schmitt-Beck 1994), and the Social Democrats copied the 'Third Way' of Tony Blair's 'New Labour Party' for their 1998 electoral campaign (Gallagher *et al*. 2001: 182).

Intra-party groups of German parties

When one considers the two major German parties,[2] the most important groups are the lobbies of employees in the CDU/CSU and in the SPD, respectively. In the case of the Christian Democrats, the 'Christlich-Demokratische Arbeitnehmerschaft' (CDA, or in the case of CSU, CSA) is the connection between CDU/CSU and

labour groups. Ideologically, the CDA draws heavily on the so-called 'katholische Soziallehre' ('catholic social doctrine', see Pappi 1984: 13), and puts emphasis on welfare state issues and traditional values such as the social function of the family. The organized social democratic counterpart is the 'Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Arbeitnehmerfragen' (AfA), which has strong ties to the German labour unions. The intra-party opponent of the AfA is the group of self-employed inside the SPD ('Arbeitsgemeinschaft Selbstständige in der SPD', AGS). Since the roots of social democratic parties are in the trade union movement, the influence of organized labour is much larger, however. The opposite is true in the case of the CDU/CSU. Here the 'Mittelstandsvereinigung' (representation of small and middle-sized companies, MIT) is considered to be more influential than the CDA (Ismayr 2000: 108; Poguntke 1994: 200; Dümig *et al*. 2006).

One specific feature of German politics in the 1970s needs to be mentioned here. At that time, policy-making was characterized by fierce ideological conflicts. The intra-party interest aggregation of the Social Democrats was especially aggravated by the antagonism between more left-wing orientated, mostly younger politicians and moderate, mostly senior party activists. The supporters of both camps congregated in more informal circles. These unofficially organized intra-party groups still exist today, and they have a strong influence on the political direction of the party (Ismayr 2000: 110f). The rightist group is called the 'Seeheimer Kreis' ('Seeheim Circle', SK). The leftist group of the party formed under the name 'Frankfurter Kreis' ('Frankfurt Circle', FK; since 2000: 'Democratic Left 21'). The more conservative Seeheimer Kreis attained key influence during the late 1970s, and was the strongest intra-party supporter of the economic reforms of the red–green government. The Frankfurter Kreis was very influential during the long period of opposition from 1982 to 1998. We therefore consider these groups as two important intra-party factions of the SPD, and include them in our analysis.

Looking at the smaller German parties during in the time period in question, only the PDS has a well-structured party organization with formal intra-party groups (Poguntke 2001: 259). Given that the Left-Socialists were not involved in any coalition building process at the national level, we will not analyse the programmatic positions of their intra-party factions. More important for our analysis are intra-party factions of the Liberals and Green Party. Both parties have a more informal organizational structure. The organization of the FDP in particular looks like one of a 'party of notables' or an 'Elite party' (Poguntke 1994: 201f.; Mair 1997: 97f., 110). German Liberals are traditionally separated into a libertarian and a national wing, with the latter focusing more on economic issues (Kirchner and Broughton 1988: 63f). The informal conglomeration of the first-mentioned group is called the 'Freiburg Circle' (FR). The economic liberals convene in the working group 'Bundesverband Liberaler Mittelstand' ('Liberal Business Owners', BLM). As regards the Green Party, a well-structured and detailed party organization comparable to those of other German parties does not exist due to the 'grassroots democracy' approach of the German Greens (Poguntke 2001: 259). Therefore, we do not take the Greens and their intra-party wings into consideration here.

Key policy dimensions and government ministries

According to cleavage theory of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), the German party system is structured around two key conflicts. The first and most important one is a result of industrialization in the late nineteenth century, and is about how much influence the government should have on economic issues. This socio-economic conflict is the basis for party competition in Germany with the Social Democrats and Liberals being at the opposite ends of the economic policy dimension, where the CDU/CSU is the median player. But how could SPD and FDP build and maintain the long-lasting coalition from 1969 to 1982 given their wide ideological differences? The simple answer to this question is that on the second key policy dimension, which reflects the conflict between progressive and conservative perspectives on social order in German society, Social Democrats and Liberals have a similar progressive position, whereas the more clerical CDU/CSU is at the other end of that policy dimension (Pappi 1984: 12f). Following this argument, German parties should try to capture those government ministries where central questions of these conflicts were decided.

In a second step, we seek to find pairs of dimensions and portfolios. The identification of portfolios related to the social policy dimension is unproblematic. We refer to the Ministry of Justice as the portfolio in which issues like abortion, euthanasia or same-sex marriage are discussed and decided. More problematic is the allocation of one portfolio to the economic dimension. The German cabinet structure allows three possibilities: first, the finance portfolio as used by Laver and Shepsle (1996); second, the economic portfolio and third, the Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs (hereafter Ministry of Labour). Despite the fact that the Minister of Finance possesses veto power in the budget negotiations (Saalfeld 2000: 66), we refer to the Ministry for Labour as the key economic portfolio as it is here where the conflict between the different points of view regarding welfare state expansion and market regulation clash.

We next have a look at the partisan composition of the portfolios under investigation. Considering the research on the 'monitoring' function of junior ministers in coalition governments (Thies 2001), we also look at the distribution and intra-party group membership of these so-called 'Parlamentarische Staatsekretäre'. Following the monitoring hypothesis and Thies' (2001: 592) findings on the importance of intra-party factions during single-party governments in Japan, a similar conclusion may be reached in the case of Germany. If a ministry is completely controlled by one party and the office-holder is a member, for example of a left-wing intra-party group, then some right-wing factions in the same party could try to balance policy in this area by having one of their members nominated as a junior minister. Table 7.1 shows the distribution of senior and junior ministers in the four key departments for the six government coalitions considered.

Table 7.1 reveals that for most departments and governments, senior and junior ministers are from one and only one coalition party. There are just three exceptions to this pattern, suggesting that there is no real evidence for Thies' (2001) monitoring hypothesis as a general rule for German coalition governments. One exception

Table 7.1 Party and party faction affiliation of senior and junior ministers

Term government coalition	*Department*	*Minister*	*Junior minister*
1987–1990 (CDU/CSU, FDP)	Labour	Blüm, CDU-CDA	Vogt, CDU-CDA Höpfinger, CSU-CSA
	Justice	Engelhard, FDP-core	Jahn, CDU-MIT
1990–1994 (CDU/CSU, FDP)	Labour	Blüm, CDU-CDA	Günther, CDU-core Seehofer, CSU-core
	Justice	Kinkel, FDP-core	Göhner, CDU-core Funke, FDP-core
1994–1998 (CDU/CSU, FDP)	Labour	Blüm, CDU-CDA	Günther, CDU-CDA Kraus, CSU-core
	Justice	Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, FDP-FK	Funke, FDP
1998–2002 (SPD, Greens)	Labour	Riester, SPD-AfA	Andres, SPD-SK Mascher, SPD-core
	Justice	Däubler-Gmelin, SPD-core	Pick, SPD-core
2002–2005 (SPD, Greens)	Labour/ Economy	Clement, SPD-core	Andres, SPD-SK Schlauch, Greens-core Staffelt, SPD-SK
	Justice	Zypries, SPD-core	Hartenbach, SPD-SK
2005– (CDU/CSU, SPD)	Labour	Müntefering, SPD-core	Andres, SPD-SK Franz Thönnes, SPD-core
	Justice	Zypries, SPD-core	Hartenbach, SPD-SK

Source: Bundestag Handbook (Kürschners Volkshandbuch 1987/1991/1999/2003/2006), official websites of intra-party groups (http://www.parlamentarische-linke.de/, http://www.seeheimer-kreis.de/organisation/leitungskreis, http://www.kas.de/archiv/acdp/ 832_webseite.html, accessed 16 July 2007).

Notes: A minister is coded as a party faction member if she explicitly mentions her faction membership in the short biography of the official *Bundestag Handbook* or is mentioned as a member by the intra-party group.

is the Ministry of Justice in the governments of Chancellor Helmut Kohl formed in 1987 and 1990. In these cases, the smaller coalition party, the Liberals, held the position of the senior minister, while at least one junior minister post was given to a Christian Democrat. A further exception is the portfolio allocation after the 2002 government formation process. Here, the Greens were able to obtain the post of a junior minister in the economics and labour ministry that was led by a minister from the Social Democrats. Keeping in mind what the general programmatic direction of each coalition party is, Thies' (2001) argument once in a while might make some sense. In the 1987 and 1990 government formations, the Liberals received the Ministry of Justice. Social policy, however, is the area where Liberals and Christian Democrats constantly hold opposing positions. Thus, possibly because of the quite progressive attitudes of Liberals on social issues, at least one junior minister was a member of the Christian Democrats, who traditionally have more conservative positions on social issues. Still, whatever the reason in these cases was, the overall pattern suggests that rather the reverse of the monitoring hypothesis is true: coalition parties agree not to have senior ministers being

controlled by hostile junior ministers. If this is the case, there is an even larger necessity to have senior ministers controlled by cabinet or parliamentary institutions. The question then is how this affects a party's strategy for appointing both senior and junior ministers.

In the next sections, we apply a new method for estimating the policy positions of party cores, party fractions and government coalitions (Laver *et al*. 2003). Equipped with this new information, we first explore whether the results of a computerized analysis of political texts corresponds with what is reported by qualitative analyses of the programmatic behaviour of German intra-party factions. In a second step, we use this data to evaluate our hypotheses on the strategic allocation of portfolios to members of intra-party groups.

Estimating the policy positions of German parties, intra-party groups and coalition agreements

Although there exists a number of studies employing different methodologies for the measurement of party positions, most of these do not provide information as to what the specific policy-area positions of political parties are. Notable exceptions is recent expert surveys (Laver and Hunt 1992; Benoit and Laver 2006; Warwick 2006) and the data provided by the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) that is based on a manual content analysis of election manifestos (e.g., Budge *et al*. 2001; Klingemann *et al*. 2006). The problem with the first is that expert surveys are usually conducted sporadically; data therefore refers to specific points in time and it is seldom possible to track potential changes in the policy positions of political parties between successive elections. The CMP data takes possible changes in policy priorities of political parties into account. However, being based on salience theory (Robertson 1976; Budge 2001: 82), the whole approach has come under some criticisms (Laver 2001: 70f).

Even more importantly, to our knowledge, there is no data-set that would provide us with information on the positions of both party cores and their (key) intra-party factions. We therefore use the language blind and non-manual Wordscores method to analyse political texts authored by these actors (Laver *et al*. 2003). The basic idea of Wordscores is to compare the frequency distribution of words (or phrases) in a text, the programmatic position of which is known, to the word distribution of a text of the same character whose position is unknown.[3] Laver *et al*. (2003: 314f) refer to these two sorts of documents as 'reference texts' and 'virgin texts', respectively. In a nutshell, the position of a virgin text changes if the frequency of some 'signal' words goes up or down. Laver *et al*. (2003: 326f) as well as Giannetti and Laver (2005) use the Wordscores technique not only to estimate the position of political parties, but also the positions of Irish MPs and cabinet members in Italy. In these studies, 'virgin texts' are the speeches of the respective politician, while 'reference texts' are election manifestos calibrated with expert survey data. In this chapter, we use programmatic documents of each intra-party group as virgin texts and compare them to election manifestos of parties (the positions of which we 'know' from expert surveys).[4]

The main reason for selecting intra-party documents stems from the fact that the character and language used in such documents are more similar to each other than the text evident in political speeches and election manifestos. Finally, we will also estimate the position of German coalition agreements, again using election manifestos as 'reference texts'. A conventional way to think about the (policy-area specific) 'position of a coalition' of actors is to use the arithmetic mean of the position of each participant, sometimes weighted by their share of seats in the parliament (e.g., Cusack 2001). We consider here the formal coalition agreement as a more reliable and independent source of information. Ultimately, the estimated policy position of the coalition government should facilitate an analysis of the influence of party factions on policy outcomes. Table 7.2 gives an overview of the programmatic documents used in the analysis.

Analysis: intra-party groups and portfolio allocation

Descriptive results

Before moving on to evaluate the hypotheses on the allocation of portfolios to intra-party factions, we will have a brief look at the descriptive results. Where are German political parties, their intra-party factions and the coalition governments located on key policy dimensions? Table 7.3 shows the estimates of the positions on the economic and social policy dimension since 1987. Roughly speaking, the position of the five parties on these policy dimensions are as expected and match with the results from qualitative analyses of the German party system and the party positions extracted from the CMP data-set (see e.g., Lehmbruch 2000; Volkens 2004; Pappi and Shikano 2004). On the social policy dimension, the Christian Democrats adopt conservative stances on issues like abortion or gay marriage. In the 1990 election, the Bavarian CSU drafted a separate manifesto in addition to the joint one with the CDU. As Table 7.3 illustrates, the CSU and CDU/CSU have almost the same programmatic position on both policy dimensions. This lends some support to our assumption that the two parties can be regarded as a single actor.

The Free Democrats have more progressive points of view on social policy issues, but they are the party with the most right-wing position on the economic policy dimension. We also note that the positions of the Christian and Free Democrats remained relatively stable over time. Social Democrats, by contrast, changed their programmatic positions remarkably over the same time period. The SPD moved from a clearly left-wing position on economic issues to a more moderate position since the mid-1990s. On social issues, the SPD adopted a progressive policy position excepting the federal elections in 1994 and 1998. While the Green Party and the socialist PDS are the most progressive parties on social issues, in terms of economic policy area, the Greens are more moderate than the PDS. This was particularly evident in the 2002 election campaign, when the Greens together with the SPD formed the federal government and were seen as the coalition party that was most in favour of welfare state reform and retrenchment (see Harlen 2002; Padgett 2003).

Table 7.2 Programmatic documents covered in the analysis

Party/ Intra-party group	*Title of document (year of publication)*	*Total words*	*Share of scored words (%)*
Federal election 1987			
SPD	Zukunft für alle - arbeiten für soziale Gerechtigkeit und Frieden (1986)	15,325	—*
AfA	Leitlinien sozialdemokratischer Wirtschaftspolitik (1986)	3,657	92.2
AGS	Wirtschaftspolitischer Leitantrag des AGS-Bundesvorstands (1986)	2,043	93.2
SK	Ein Seeheimer Beitrag zur Sozialdemokratischen Programmdiskussion (1987)	4,525	90.6
FK	Thesen der sozialdemokratischen Linken (1986)	8,991	87.4
CDU/CSU	Weiter so, Deutschland - für eine gute Zukunft Das Wahlprogramm von CDU und CSU für die Bundestagswahl 1987 (1986)	18,994	—*
CDA	Arbeit für Alle: Hamburger Erklärung der CDA. (1987)	4,961	90.1
MIT	Strategiepapier zur Veränderung der Arbeitslosigkeit und Einschränkung der Schwarzarbeit (1985)	2,193	85.3
FDP	Zukunft und Leistung. Die Wahlplattform der F.D.P. zur Bundestagswahl 1987 (1986)	7,870	—*
FR	Was will die F.D.P.-Linke? (1983)	646	85.9
Greens	Farbe bekennen. Bundestagswahlprogramm 1987 (1986).	29,356	—*
Coalition government	Koalitionsvereinbarungen für die 11. Legislaturperiode des Deutschen Bundestages zwischen CDU, CSU und F.D.P. (1987)	7,395	85.5
Federal election 1990			
SPD	Regierungsprogramm 1990-1994. Der neue Weg. Ökologisch, sozial, wirtschaftlich stark (1990)	9,007	82.5
AfA	10-Punkte-Programm Arbeit und Umwelt in Europa (1989)	4,222	90.1
AGS	Auf die kleinen und mittleren Betriebe kommt es an (1988) Ja zu Deutschland – ja zur Zukunft	5,430	90.0
CDU/CSU	Wahlprogramm der Christlich Demokratischen Union Deutschlands zur gesamtdeutschen Bundestagswahl am 2. Dezember 1990 (1990).	20,536	86.0
CSU	Heimat Bayern. Zukunft Deutschland. Mit uns. CSU. (1990)	11,897	92.0
CDA	Zukunft der Arbeit - Zukunft des Sozialstaates (1989)	10,764	89.4
MIT	Beratung und finanzielle Hilfen für den Mittelstand (1989)	719	88.6
FDP	Das liberale Deutschland: Programm der F.D.P. zu den Bundestagswahlen am 2. Dezember 1990 (1990)	37,399	80.6
Greens	Bundestagswahl 1990: Das Programm (1990)	5,794	81.8
PDS	Wahlprogramm der Linken Liste/PDS zur Bundestagswahl 1990 (1990)	13,830	80.1
Coalition government	Koalitionsvereinbarung für die 12. Legislaturperiode des Deutschen Bundestages zwischen CDU, F.D.P. CSU und (1991)	14,623	87.9

Table 7.2 Programmatic documents covered in the analysis—cont'd

Party/ Intra-party group	*Title of document (year of publication)*	*Total words*	*Share of scored words (%)*
Federal election 1994			
SPD	Das Regierungsprogramm der SPD: Reformen für Deutschland (1994)	14,705	82.8
AfA	Konstituierende Sitzung von Bundesvorstand und Bundesausschufl der Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Arbeitnehmerfragen (1994)	973	86.5
CDU/CSU	Wir sichern Deutschlands Zukunft: Regierungsprogramm von CDU und CSU (1994)	13,156	82.7
CDA	Einheit durch Gerechtigkeit: Die politische Union Europas sozial und solidarisch gestalten (1993)	4,286	90.1
MIT	Mittelstand: Offensive 2000. Mehr Markt – weniger Staat (1993)	11,299	85.2
FDP	Liberal denken - Leistung wählen: das Programm der F.D.P. zur Bundestagswahl 1994 (1993).	45,245	80.2
FR	Zu den Aufgaben des Liberalismus im zusammenwach-senden Deutschland 16 Thesen (1992)	2,232	89.7
Greens	Programm zur Bundestagswahl 94 (1994)	32,954	81.5
PDS	Opposition gegen Sozialabbau und Rechtsruck - Wahlprogramm der PDS 1994 (1994)	9,256	83.1
Coalition government	Koalitionsvereinbarung für die 13. Legislaturperiode des Deutsches Bundestages zwischen CDU, CSU und F.D.P. (1994)	10,429	91.9
Federal election 1998			
SPD	Arbeit, Innovation und Gerechtigkeit. SPD-Programm für die Bundestagswahl 1998 (1998)	15,003	94.8
CDU/CSU	Wahlplattform von CDU und CSU (1998)	8,696	93.5
CDA	Sozial ist, was Beschäftigung schafft: Neuer Aufbruch für die soziale Marktwirtschaft (1997)	3,957	90.6
MIT	Reformen braucht das Land (1997)	5,027	91.7
FDP	Es ist Ihre Wahl: das Wahlprogramm der F.D.P. zur Bundestagswahl 1998 (1998)	23,971	91.2
FR	Anstöfle zur Erneuerung (1994)	720	87.6
Greens	Programm zur Bundestagswahl 98. Grün ist der Wechsel (1998)	35,126	89.7
PDS	Programm der PDS zur Bundestagswahl 1998 (1998)	26,261	91.7
Coalition government	Aufbruch und Erneuerung - Deutschlands Weg ins 21. Jahrhundert. Koalitionsvereinbarung zwischen der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands und Bündnis90/Die Grünen (1998)	16,606	91.0
Federal election 2002			
SPD	Erneuerung und Zusammenhalt. Regierungsprogramm 2002 – 2006 (2002)	21,273	—*

Continued

Table 7.2 Programmatic documents covered in the analysis—cont'd

Party/ Intra-party group	*Title of document (year of publication)*	*Total words*	*Share of scored words (%)*
AfA	Den Sozialstaat erhalten und fortentwickeln Tarifautonomie schützen (2001)	3,777	91.4
AGS	Mittelstand im Mittelpunkt (2002)	27,653	85.6
SK	Erklärung des Seeheimer Kreises: Reformtempo beschleunigen ohne Tabus! (2003)	6,397	90.0
DL21	Selbstverständnis Forum Demokratische Linke 21 (2001)	4,952	88.0
CDU/CSU	Leistung und Sicherheit. Regierungsprogramm 2002-2006 (2002)	20,536	—*
CDA	Erst der Mensch, dann der Markt (2002)	13,226	79.0
MIT	Zukunft für Deutschland. Freiheit und Verantwortung. Kölner Leitsätze (2003)	12,834	86.4
FDP	Bürgerprogramm 2002 (2002)	32,607	—*
FR	Nürnberger Erklärung (2000)	2,626	85.9
Greens	Grün wirkt! Unser Wahlprogramm 2002-2006 (2002)	24,829	—*
PDS	Es geht auch anders: Nur Gerechtigkeit sichert Zukunft! Programm der PDS zur Bundestagswahl 2002 (2002)	14,031	—*
Coalition government	Koalitionsvertrag 2002-2006: Erneuerung – Gerechtigkeit – Nachhaltigkeit. Für ein wirtschaftlich starkes, soziales und ökologisches Deutschland. Für eine lebendige Demokratie (2002)	27,221	90.7
Federal election 2005			
SPD	Vertrauen in Deutschland. Das Wahlmanifest der SPD (2005)	12,447	93.9
AfA	Solidarisch und gerecht! Den Wandel sozial gestalten (2004)	10,694	89.8
SK	Seeheim Strategieklausur 2005 (2005)	3,780	91.3
DL21	Gerechtigkeit, Innovation und Leistungsfähigkeit in der Steuerpolitik - 10 Merkpunkte der Parlamentarischen Linken (2006)	2,784	87.3
CDU/CSU	Deutschlands Chancen nutzen. Wachstum. Arbeit. Sicherheit. Regierungsprogramm 2005-2009 (2005)	11,324	92.2
CDA	Für einen neuen Gesellschaftsvertrag: menschlich, solidarisch, zukunftsfähig (2003)	4,616	90.4
MIT	Resolution des MIT-Bundesvorstands (2005)	2,569	89.1
FDP	Arbeit hat Vorfahrt: Deutschlandprogramm 2005. FDP Die Liberalen (2005)	21,418	91.6
BLM	Ein Programm für den Mittelstand (2003)	3,273	88.8
Greens	Eines für Alle: Das grüne Wahlprogramm 2005 (2005)	28,855	91.8
Linke.PDS	Wahlprogramm zu den Bundestagswahlen 2005 (2005)	7,545	91.6
Coalition government	Gemeinsam für Deutschland – mit Mut und Menschlichkeit. Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD (2005)	53,288	88.9

* Document used as Wordscores reference text.

Table 7.3 Policy positions of German parties and intra-party factions, 1987–2005

	Party scores (standard errors) with LBG transformation[1]					
Economic policy	*1987*	*1990*	*1994*	*1998*	*2002*	*2005*
SPD	6.5*	6.3 (.53)	8.7 (.40)	9.0 (.37)	9.3**	9.2 (.40)
AfA	5.0 (.84)	9.1 (.83)	10.5 (1.7)	10.5 (1.7)$^{+}$	10.7 (.89)	10.7 (.89)$^{+}$
AGS	10.8 (1.1)	11.5 (.66)	11.5 (.66)$^{+}$	11.5 (.66)$^{+}$	12.3 (.33)	12.3 (.33)$^{+}$
SK	4.2 (.77)	4.2 (.77)$^{+}$	4.2 (.77)$^{+}$	4.2 (.77)$^{+}$	11.0 (.66)	9.9 (.81)
FK	0.8 (.61)	0.8 (.61)$^{+}$	0.8 (.61)$^{+}$	0.8 (.61)$^{+}$	5.5 (.75)	12.5 (1.05)
CDU/CSU	13.5*	12.5 (.54)	15.3 (.42)	15.0 (.50)	14.4**	13.8 (.45)
CSU		11.7 (.43)				
CDA	10.1 (.73)	10.1 (.48)	10.0 (.78)	12.7 (.81)	11.7 (.44)	11.4 (.75)
MIT	14.9 (1.3)	15.8 (1.9)	17.2 (.56)	17.5 (.73)	17.3 (.53)	18.6 (1.2)
FDP	15.7*	16.0 (.28)	17.3 (.27)	18.7 (.35)	18.7**	17.3 (.37)
FR	10.1 (2.5)	10.1 (2.5)$^{+}$	12.8 (1.1)	13.9 (2.0)	8.9 (1.1)	8.9 (1.1)$^{+}$
BLM	20.4 (.99)	20.4 (.99)$^{+}$	20.4 (.99)$^{+}$	20.4 (.99)$^{+}$	20.4 (.99)$^{+}$	20.4 (.99)$^{+}$
Greens	5.2*	1.4 (.72)	5.0 (.30)	5.4 (.28)	11.0**	7.3 (.29)
PDS		2.0 (.53)	–2.2 (.63)	–2.6 (.36)	3.0**	3.0 (.65)
Coalition government	14.5 (.64)	16.9 (.44)	17.4 (.50)	9.9 (.38)	11.0 (.28)	15.5 (.22)

Continued

Table 7.3 Policy positions of German parties and intra-party factions, 1987–2005—cont'd

	Party scores (standard errors) with LBG transformation[1]					
Social policy	*1987*	*1990*	*1994*	*1998*	*2002*	*2005*
SPD	6.7*	8.8 (.55)	10.2 (.40)	13.3 (.38)	7.3**	8.1 (.45)
AfA	6.1 (.78)	6.6 (.80)	3.7 (1.7)	3.7 (1.7)$^{+}$	7.5 (.75)	7.5 (.75)$^{+}$
AGS	9.4 (.97)	9.8 (.63)	9.8 (.63)$^{+}$	9.8 (.63)$^{+}$	5.0 (.32)	5.0 (.32)$^{+}$
SK	8.7 (.75)	8.7 (.75)$^{+}$	8.7 (.75)$^{+}$	8.7 (.75)$^{+}$	5.6 (.63)	8.1 (.76)
FK	2.0 (.56)	2.0 (.56)$^{+}$	2.0 (.56)$^{+}$	2.0 (.56)$^{+}$	4.6 (.71)	7.7 (1.1)
CDU/CSU	14.4*	17.9 (.63)	19.3 (.51)	20.6 (.60)	15.9**	14.3 (.52)
CSU		17.4 (.49)				
CDA	6.6 (.73)	7.3 (.47)	10.4 (.75)	8.9 (.78)	6.9 (.46)	8.8 (.76)
MIT	4.9 (1.3)	11.3 (2.0)	4.1 (.50)	9.8 (.69)	5.5 (.52)	10.0 (1.1)
FDP	6.8*	7.6 (.25)	7.8 (.24)	9.2 (.31)	5.3**	8.6 (.33)
FR	−3.7 (2.3)	−3.7 (2.3)$^{+}$	6.6 (.98)	5.6 (1.6)	4.5 (1.0)	4.5 (1.0)$^{+}$
BLM	10.2 (.92)	10.2 (.92)$^{+}$	10.2 (.92)$^{+}$	10.2 (.92)$^{+}$	10.2 (.92)$^{+}$	10.2(.92)$^{+}$
Greens	2.9*	2.3 (.71)	0.5 (.29)	−1.0 (.30)	2.4**	4.1 (.30)
PDS		0.6 (.44)	0.1 (.52)	0.7 (.31)	4.9**	1.2 (.57)
Coalition government	5.0 (.64)	7.3 (.44)	13.4 (.49)	9.1 (.39)	7.7 (.29)	8.5 (.22)

[1] Transformation of Wordscores raw scores according to Laver, *et al*. (2003). Low values imply a leftist or progressive policy position, while high values imply a rightist or conservative position. Positions of government parties (party fractions) are shaded gray.

* Expert assigned reference score (Laver/Hunt 1992 expert survey); ** Expert assigned reference score (Benoit/Laver 2006 expert survey); $^{+}$ Position estimate based on political text from former period.

Overall, the results reveal that the arrangement of German political parties on the selected policy dimensions is – with few, but significant exceptions – stable over time. Is this also the case for their intra-party factions? Considering intra-party groups, the range of positions occupied on each dimension widens (which is hardly surprising). The evidence presented in Table 7.3 shows that there are remarkable differences between the various factions in each party. These factions do however tend to locate themselves consistently on either the left or the right of the policy space across time. Moreover, the party factions examined tend to be more strongly oriented on the economic rather than the social policy dimension. In general, the policy positions of parties shown in Table 7.3 exhibit the patterns expected, with the striking exception of two factions from the SPD.The AfA, which was expected to be to the left of the party core, is actually located to the right of the SPD's election manifesto in five of six cases. Also, the position of the Seeheim Circle (SK), which can be considered as a rather right-wing intra-party group of the Social Democratic, is to the left of the party core from 1987 to 1998.[5] The remaining SPD intra-party groups, the AGS and the Frankfurt Circle, are located to the right and the left of the party core, respectively, which is in accordance with our expectations derived from the qualitative analysis of these intra-party groups.

There are no surprises when turning to the economic policy position of CDU/CSU intra-party groups. While the position of the CDA is very moderate and since 1994 close to the SPD's position on this policy area, the Christian Democratic organization of the self-employed (MIT) is economically very liberal-orientated and holds similar policy positions as the Liberal party does. The two intra-party groups of the Liberals are also located there where one would expect them to be: the libertarian Freiburg Circle is clearly more moderate than the FDP party core in its election manifestos, whereas the right-wing of the party (BLM) is explicitly liberal on economic issues.

What are the policy positions of the German coalition governments? Table 7.3 suggests that in most cases, though not always, the policy goals of the government are located in between the positions of the coalition parties. In addition, the government's position is often close to that of the smaller coalition party. In 1987 and 1990, for instance, the social policy position of the Christian Liberal government was progressive, thus resembling the position of the FDP, the smaller coalition party. In 2002, the economic policy position of the second red–green coalition government was located at exactly the same position as the Green party. Yet, it seems that if the partisan composition of the government changes, the policy goals of the government also change. While the economic policy position of the CDU/CSU-FDP government formed in 1994 was clearly in line with free-market principles, the social democratic-led government of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (SPD) adopted a much more moderate economic policy than the former government of Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU). After the former held 2005 federal elections, however, the grand coalition between Christian and Social Democrats led by Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) shifted its economic policy position to the right despite the presence of the economically moderate SPD in the government. Turning now to social policy, we observe that the CDU/CSU-SPD government

did not make a similar shift to the right like in the economic policy area. Instead, the social policy position of the Merkel cabinet was very similar to the one of the former red–green coalition government.

One element useful in understanding these patterns might be the presence and importance of intra-party groups. Consider, for instance the pattern presented in Figure 7.2, which represented the ideological constellation of German government parties, associated intra-party groups relevant to the coalition agreement in 1990. A coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP formed. One would expect that the policy compromise between both parties would be located somewhere on the Pareto line between both parties. Surprisingly, the content of the coalition agreement between both parties came close to that of the FDP election manifesto. It seems the Liberals were able to use their intra-party factions – that is, the free market supporters (BLM) and libertarians (FR) – in the negotiation rounds so that the outcome came close to the FDP's election manifesto. In the next section, we evaluate our two hypotheses in light of the data presented so far, and ask whether ministers and junior ministers are selected in a way to form a counter-balance against a coalition partner.

Evaluation of the hypotheses

Our main concern in this chapter is the role of party factions in the allocation of portfolios. We assume that individual senior politicians belonging to party factions



Figure 7.2 Ideological constellation of coalition parties and their intra-party groups after the election of 1990.

have preferences that deviate from that of the party core. Then, if ministers *do* have considerable discretion once they are in office – that is to say, they are not perfectly controllable by the parliamentary coalition or cabinet members of the coalition partner – the appointment of party faction members could be used as a counterbalance to the specific policy-area position of the respective coalition partner. Table 7.4 shows the results for both ministries under consideration in the time period between 1987 and 2005. In our first hypothesis, we argued that parties strategically allocate politicians to ministries so that the policy distance from the coalition partner increases.

This is the case in five of six cases (83.3 per cent) in the labour ministry. Except for the 2002 government formation process, Christian or Social Democrats selected politicians that belong to such party factions that have an opposite policy position than the coalition partner and are more 'radical' in that policy area than the party core. The Christian Democrats, for instance, nominated Norbert Blüm, an exponent of the parties' left-wing intra-party faction CDA, as the Minister for Labour between 1987 and 1994. In 2005, all intra-party groups of the SPD were more free market orientated than the party core. The optimal strategy for the Social Democrats was therefore to nominate a member of their party core – Franz Müntefering – as the Minister for Labour. In the case of the Ministry of Justice, it turns out that in only two of the six cases (33 per cent), the respective party – the FDP in 1994 and the SPD in 1998 – selected ministers that

Table 7.4 Ordering of positions of coalition parties, ministers and coalition agreements

			Senior ministers		*Junior ministers*	
	Year	*Ordering*	*H1*	*H2*	*H1*	*H2*
Economic policy (Ministry of labour)	1987	$\underline{b} < b < B_0 < c < b < A_0$	1	1	1,1	1,1
	1990	$b < b < \underline{B}_0 < b < A_0 < c$	1	1	0,1	0,1
	1994	$\underline{b} < b < \underline{B}_0 < b < A_0 < c$	1	1	1,1	1,1
	1998	$b < \underline{b} < A_0 < \underline{B}_0 < c < b < b$	1	0	0,0	0,1
	2002	$b < \underline{B}_0 < b < A_0 = c < \underline{b} < b$	0	0	0,0*	0,0*
	2005	$\underline{B}_0 < b < b < b < b < A_0 < c$	1	1	0,1	0,1
Social policy (Ministry of justice)	1987	$b < c < \underline{B}_0 < b < A_0$	0	1	—*	—*
	1990	$b < c < \underline{B}_0 < b < A_0$	0	1	0*	1*
	1994	$b < \underline{B}_0 < b < c < A_0$	1	1	0	0
	1998	$A_0 < b < b < b < c < b < \underline{B}_0$	1	1	1	1
	2002	$A_0 < b < b < \underline{b} < B_0 < b < c$	0	1	0	0
	2005	$b < b < b < \underline{b} = B_0 < c < A_0$	0	0	0	0

* Junior ministers from the 'hostile' coalition party are not under consideration.

Notes: In column 3, only intra-party groups of the party that controls the ministry are listed (marked with 'b'). The party or party faction to whom the senior minister belongs to is in italics. The party or party faction(s) to whom the junior minister belongs to is underlined. In columns 4–7, portfolio allocations that are in accordance with our two hypotheses are marked with '1' and '0' otherwise.

had clearly opposite policy views than the respective coalition partner. In 1994, the FDP selected a member of their libertarian Freiburg circle, Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, as the justice minister. She stood in clear opposition to the conservative social policy positions of the Christian Democrats. In the first red–green cabinet installed in 1998, the Minister of Justice, Herta Däubler-Gmelin, belonged to the social democratic party core, which was the 'group' of the SPD that differed most from the Greens with respect to social issues. When including information on the junior ministers inside both portfolios, there is also no evidence that these offices could be used to win bargaining leverage. Seven of the seventeen (42 per cent) junior ministers belonged to that party group that had the largest policy distance towards the respective coalition partner.

While there is partial confirmation for the first hypothesis, there is more evidence for our second argument that considers the coalition agreement to be the reversion point. If the policy-area specific position of the agreement between two parties A and B is located in between the position of the coalition parties or contains more 'radical' policy views than the one of party A, then there is an incentive for party B to allocate the ministry to its most left-wing intra-party faction. If, by contrast, the position of the coalition agreement is already located at B (or to its left), then the minister should come from the party core. When including the policy-area specific position of the coalition agreement, 10 of 12 cases (83 per cent) concur with our second hypothesis. In 1998, the Social Democrats selected a member of a party faction, Union-affiliated and AfA member Walter Riester, as Minister for Labour which, according to Hypothesis 2, was 'unnecessary' as the coalition agreement was at the position of the SPD party core. However, as we noted above, we might also doubt whether the estimated position of AfA is reliable. A second deviant case occurred in 2002, when the SPD chose a member of the party core to serve as Minister for Labour, although the position of the coalition program was close to the Green Party. As regards the allocation of junior ministers, there is again no evidence that these posts are allocated in a policy-strategic way. The partisan affiliation of the junior ministers reflects the expectations of the second hypothesis in just 9 out of 17 cases (53 per cent).

Conclusion

The aim of this study was to identify intra-party groups in Germany's major parties, to estimate their policy positions and to analyse their role in portfolio allocation. In accordance with the literature on party politics in Germany, the identified intra-party groups are in most cases located where one would expect them to be: leftist groups are to the left of the party core, whereas right-wing groups are to the right of the party's larger programmatic position. Second, we find no evidence that junior ministers are placed to one side of senior ministers in order to serve as departmental watchdogs (Thies 2001). By contrast, most junior ministers are members of the same party – or even party faction – as the senior minister. Third, we find that consideration of intra-party politics in the study of portfolio allocation and coalition bargaining is worthwhile. The empirical

results suggest that the appointment of individual ministers who belong to party factions is used to increase bargaining leverage inside the coalition government. We considered two scenarios or alternative styles of coalition bargaining. In the first scenario, the senior minister uses his discretion to put forward his own policy agenda but the legislative party of the coalition partner counters the ministerial agenda and insists on its own policy position. Bargaining outcomes should then be located somewhere between these two options. In the second scenario, senior ministers set the agenda but the coalition partner insists on the commitments made in the coalition agreement. In this case, we would expect bargaining outcomes to be located between the positions of the senior minister and the coalition agreement. In both scenarios there are incentives for each party to strategically allocate portfolios to members of their intra-party factions. The study of German coalition formation from 1987 to 2005 suggests that there is some evidence for this argument.

These findings on intra-party politics and its impact on cabinet decision-making in Germany certainly call for the application of a similar research design to other countries with different party systems and different patterns of coalition politics. One could, for instance, measure the programmatic heterogeneity of parties in the UK by applying a content analysis of speeches of MPs or publications drafted by intra-party factions such as parliamentary clubs (Brand 1989; Maor 1997; Norton 2000). As surveys of candidates to the House of Commons have shown, there is indeed variance in the ideological and policy positions of members of British parliamentary parties (see Norris and Lovenduvsky 1995; Kam 2001, 2007). Future research might explore how ideological heterogeneity impacts on office allocation in single party governments.

Notes

1 For a similar work, see Austen-Smith and Banks (1990).
2 We here consider CDU and CSU as one party and hence as one unitary actor at the federal level. Despite the fact that the two are formally independent parties, they have formed a joint parliamentary group in the Bundestag since 1949. Furthermore, in the empirical part of this chapter we show that they have nearly the same programmatic position in all relevant German policy dimensions.
3 For the pros and cons of Wordscores, see Budge and Pennings (2007a, 2007b), Benoit and Laver (2007) and Martin and Vanberg (forthcoming 2008).
4 More specifically, we use a total of nine election manifestos as reference texts: the manifestos of the four parties elected to the 1987 Bundestag and the manifestos of the five parties elected to the 2002 Bundestag. We assign the expert survey results from Benoit and Laver (2006) to 2002 manifestos and results of the Laver and Hunt (1992) study to 1987 manifestos. Using two sets of documents – one at the beginning and one at the end of the observation period – will provide us with more reliable estimates, we believe, as we allow Wordscores to pick up possible changes in the 'meaning' or usage of words. We note that using estimated scores (for virgin texts) and assigned references scores (for reference texts) at the same time is problematic since the two have a different metric (Martin and Vanberg 2008). We refrain, however, from using the Martin/Vanberg transformation, as their approach works with two reference texts only, and is thus highly sensitive to the texts selected.

5 One must note, however, that the position of the Seeheim Circle in the whole time period is estimated on the basis of a single programmatic document from 1987. This holds for other intra-party factions as well (see note under Table 7.3). These estimates (whether in favour of expectation or not) therefore do not provide independent bits of information.

References

Andeweg, R. B. (1993) 'A model of the cabinet system: the dimensions of cabinet decision-making processes', in J. Blondel and F. Müller-Rommel (eds) *Governing Together: The Extent and Limits of Joint Decision-Making in Western European Cabinets*. New York: St Martin's Press, pp. 23–42

Arrow, K. A. (1964) *Social Choice and Individual Values*. New York: Wiley

Austen-Smith, D. and Banks, J. (1990a) 'Elections, coalitions, and legislative outcomes', *American Political Science Review* 82(2): 405–22

Austen-Smith, D. and Banks, J. (1990b) 'Stable governments and the allocation of policy portfolios', *American Political Science Review* 84(3): 891–906

Benoit, K. and Laver, M. (2006) *Party Policy in Modern Democracies*. London, New York: Routledge

Benoit, K. and Laver, M. (2007) 'Benchmarks for text analysis: a response to Budge and Pennings', *Electoral Studies* 26(1): 130–35

Brand, J. (1989) 'Faction as its own reward: groups in the British parliament 1945 to 1986', *Parliamentary Affairs* 42(2): 148–64

Bräuninger, T. and Hallerberg, M. (2005) *Cabinet Decision-Making and Policy Outcomes in Parliamentary Democracies*. Atlanta: Emory University

Budge, I. (2001) 'Theory and measurement of party policy positions' in I. Budge, H. D. Klingemann, A. Volkens, J. Bara and E. Tanenbaum (eds) *Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors and Governments 1945–1998*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 75–90

Budge, I. and Pennings, P. (2007a) 'Do they work? Validating computerised word frequency estimates against policy series', *Electoral Studies* 26(1): 121–9

Budge, I. and Pennings, P. (2007b) 'Missing the message and shooting the messenger: Benoit and Laver's 'response', *Electoral Studies* 26(1): 136–41

Budge, I., Klingemann, H. D., Volkens, A., Bara, J. and Tanenbaum, E. (eds) (2001) *Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors and Governments 1945–1998*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

De Swaan, A. (1973) *Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formation*. Amsterdam, New York, San Francisco: Elsevier

Dümig, K., Trefs, M. and Zohlnhöfer, R. (2006) 'Die Faktionen der CDU: Bändigung durch institutionelle Einbindung?' in P. Köllner, M. Basedau and G. Erdmann (eds) *Innerparteiliche Machtgruppen: Faktionalismus im internationalen Vergleich*. Frankfurt, New York: Campus

Dunleavy, P. and Bastow, S. (2001) 'Modelling coalitions that cannot coalesce: a critique of the Laver-Shepsle approach', *West European Politics* 24(1): 1–26

Gallagher, M., Laver, M. and Mair, P. (2001) *Representative Government in Modern Europe*. London: McGraw-Hill

Gamson, W. (1961) 'A theory of coalition formation', *American Sociological Review* 26(3): 373–82

Giannetti, D. and Laver, M. (2005) 'Policy positions and jobs in the government', *European Journal of Political Research* 44(1): 91–120

Harlen, C. M. (2002) 'Schröder's economic reforms: the end of Reformstau?', *German Politics* 11(1): 61–80

Heller, W. B. (2001) 'Making policy stick: why the government gets what it wants in multi-party parliaments', *American Journal of Political Science* 45(4): 780–98

Ismayr, W. (2000) *Der deutsche Bundestag.* Opladen: Leske und Budrich

Kam, C. (2001) 'Do ideological preferences explain parliamentary behaviour? Evidence from Great Britain and Canada', *Journal of Legislative Studies* 7(4): 89–126

Kam, C. (2007) 'On division: cohesion, discipline, and intra-party politics'. Available at: http://www.politics.ubc.ca/index.php?id=9410 (accessed 13 November 2007)

Kirchner, E. J. and Broughton, D. (1988) 'The FDP in the Federal Republic of Germany: the requirements of survival and success' in E. J. Kirchner (ed.) *Liberal Parties in Western Europe*. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp 62–92

Klingemann, H. D., Volkens, A., Bara, J., Budge, I. and McDonald, M. D. (2006) Mapping Policy Preferences II: Parties, Governments & Electors in the OECD, EU and Central and Eastern Europe 1990–2003. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Kürschners Volkshandbuch (1987–2006) *Deutscher Bundestag: 11./12./14./15./16. Wahlperiode*. Darmstadt: Neue Darmstädter Verlagsanstalt

Laver, M. (2001) 'Position and salience in the policies of political actors' in M. Laver (ed.) *Estimating the Policy Positions of Political Actors*. London, New York: Routledge, pp 66–75

Laver, M. and Hunt, W. B. (1992) *Policy and Party Competition*. New York, London: Routledge

Laver, M. and Shepsle, K. A. (1990a) 'Coalitions and cabinet government', *American Political Science Review* 84(3): 873–90

Laver, M. and Shepsle, K. A. (1990b) 'Government coalitions and intraparty politics', *British Journal of Political Science* 20(4): 489–507

Laver, M. and Shepsle, K. A. (1994) 'Cabinet ministers and government formation in parliamentary democracies' in M. Laver and K. A. Shepsle (eds) *Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Laver, M. and Shepsle, K. A. (1996) *Making and Breaking Governments*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Laver, M. and Shepsle, K. A. (1998) 'Events, equilibria, and government survival', *American Journal of Political Science* 42(1): 28–54

Laver, M., Benoit, K. and Garry, J. (2003) 'Extracting policy positions from political texts using words as data', *American Political Science Review* 97(2): 311–31

Lehmbruch, G. (2000) *Parteienwettbewerb im Bundesstaat. Regelsysteme und Spannungslagen im Institutionengefüge der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag

Lipset, S. M. and Rokkan, S. (1967) 'Cleavage structures, party systems and voter alignments: an introduction' in S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan (eds) *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-national Perspectives*. New York, London: Collier-Macmillan

Luebbert, G. M. (1986) *Comparative Democracy: Policymaking and Governing Coalitions in Europe and Israel*. New York: Columbia University Press

McKelvey, R. D. (1986) 'Covering, dominance, and institution-free properties of social choice', *American Political Science Review* 30(2): 283–314

Mair, P. (1997) *Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations*. Oxford: Clarendon Press

Maor, M. (1995) 'Intra-party determinants of coalition bargaining', *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 7(1): 65–91

Maor, M. (1997) *Political Parties and Party Systems. Comparative Approaches and the British Experience*. London, New York: Routledge

Martin, L. W. and Vanberg, G. (2004) 'Policing the bargain: coalition government and parliamentary scrutiny', *American Journal of Political Science* 48(1): 13–27

Martin, L. W. and Vanberg, G. (2008) 'A robust transformation procedure for interpreting political text', *Political Analysis* 16(1): 93–100

Mitchell, P. (1996) 'The life and times of coalition governments. Coalition maintenance by event management', unpublished doctoral dissertation, European University Institute

Müller, W. C. and Strøm, K. (2000) *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Niedermayer, O. (2001) 'Nach der Vereinigung: der Trend zum fluiden Fünfparteiensystem' in O.W. Gabriel, O. Niedermayer and R. Stöss (eds) *Parteiendemokratie in Deutschland*. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung

Norris, P. and Lovenduvsky, J. (1995) *Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Norton, P. (2000) 'The United Kingdom: exerting influence from within' in K. Heidar and R. Koole (eds) *Parliamentary Party Groups in European Democracies. Political Parties Behind Closed Doors*. London, New York: Routledge

Padgett, S. (2003) 'Germany: modernising the left by stealth', *Parliamentary Affairs* 56(1): 38–57

Pappi, F. U. (1984) 'The West German party system' in S. Bartolini and P. Mair (eds) *Party Politics in Contemporary Western Europe*. London: Cass

Pappi, F. U. and Shikano, S. (2004) *Ideologische Signale in den Wahlprogrammen der deutschen Bundestagsparteien 1980 bis 2002*. *MZES Working Papers Nr. 76*. Mannheim: Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung

Pappi, F. U. and Shikano, S. (2005) 'Regierungsabwahl ohne Regierungsneuwahl?', *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 46(4): 513–26

Peleg, B. (1981) 'Coalition formation in simple games with dominant players', *International Journal of Game Theory* 10(1): 11–33

Poguntke, T. (1994) 'Parties in a legalistic culture: the case of Germany' in R. S. Katz and P. Mair (eds) *How Parties Organize. Change and Adaption in Party Organizations in Western Democracies*. London: Sage, pp. 185–215

Poguntke, T. (2001) 'Parteiorganisationen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Einheit in der Vielfalt?' in O.W. Gabriel, O. Niedermayer and R. Stöss (eds) *Parteiendemokratie in Deutschland*. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung

Poguntke, T. and Schmitt-Beck, R. (1994) 'Still the same with a new name? Bündnis90/Die Grünen after the fusion', *German Politics* 3(1): 91–113

Riker, W. (1962) *The Theory of Political Coalitions*. New Haven: Yale University Press

Robertson, D. (1976) *A Theory of Party Competition*. London: Wiley & Sons

Rüdig, W. (2002) 'Germany', in F. Müller-Rommel and T. Poguntke (eds) *Green Parties in National Governments*. London, Portland: Cass, pp. 78–111

Saalfeld, T. (2000) 'Germany: stable parties, chancellor democracy, and the art of informal settlement' in W.C. Müller and K. Strøm (eds) *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Sened, I. (1995) 'Equilibria in weighted voting games with sidepayments in two dimensional spaces', *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 7(3): 283–300

Sened, I. (1996) 'A model of coalition formation: theory and evidence', *Journal of Politics* 58(2): 350–72

Strøm, K. and Müller, W. C. (1999) 'Political parties and hard choices' in K. Strøm and W. C. Müller (eds) *Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–35

Thies, M. F. (2001) 'Keeping tabs on partners: the logic of delegation in coalition governments', *American Journal of Political Science* 45(3): 580–98

Timmermans, A. (1998) 'Conflicts, agreements, and coalition governance', *Acta Politica* 33(4): 409–32

Timmermans, A. (2006) 'Standing apart and sitting together: enforcing coalition agreements in multiparty systems', *European Journal of Political Research* 45(2): 263–83

Volkens, A. (2004) 'Policy positions of European social democrats, 1945–1998' in M. Powell and G. Bonoli (eds) *Social Democratic Party Policies in Contemporary Europe*. London: Routledge, pp. 21–42

Warwick, P. V. (1999) 'Ministerial autonomy or ministerial accommodation? Contested bases of government survival in parliamentary democracies', *British Journal of Political Science* 29(2): 369–94

Warwick, P. (2006) *Policy Horizons and Parliamentary Government*. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

8 Party cohesion, party discipline, and party factions in Italy

Daniela Giannetti and Michael Laver

Introduction

Theoretical models of party competition often treat political parties as 'unitary' actors. Real political parties are collectivities – coalitions of political agents who have something in common, at the very least a party label. In this important sense, political parties are endogenous outputs of political competition as much as inputs to it. This means we must explain why, in practice, members of a political party often behave in a cohesive and/or disciplined way so that, to an outside observer, the party behaves 'as if' it is a unitary actor.

Seeking an answer to this question here, we explore the cohesion and discipline of political parties in parliamentary democracies with multi-dimensional, multi-party competition (MDMPC). We do this by adapting and extending arguments developed for the more tractable setting of two-party competition in a one-dimensional policy space under a separation-of-powers regime (which we can think of, substantively, as like the US Congress). Systematic consideration of party cohesion and discipline forces us to be precise about our unit of analysis. In general theoretical terms, the basic unit of analysis is an autonomous decision-making agent – an individual politician or citizen. In the real political world, however, it is often difficult to discuss the making and breaking of parties without referring to intra-party 'factions' or groupings of some shape or form. Accounts of intra-party politics are often, in practice, accounts of inter-factional politics.

Building on this observed empirical regularity, we describe the intra-party politics that drives the making and breaking of parties in terms of inter-factional competition. We then illustrate this account using an example from Italy, where a pervasive empirical pattern of legislators switching party affiliations highlights the endogeneity of political parties. We focus on the important Italian left-wing party *Sinistra Democratica* (Democratic Left) (DS), which has a well-documented factional structure. We characterize this factional structure in a number of different ways, including: observed patterns of support for motions at party congresses; policy positions estimated from political speeches, and roll-call voting behavior on key foreign policy issues.

Cohesion and or discipline?

Party *cohesion* is best thought of as an emergent 'bottom-up' phenomenon – reflecting congruent behavior patterns that arise in some way from interactions between individual politicians. Party *discipline*, in contrast, is a 'top-down' phenomenon – the outcome of a strategic game played within the party in which rank-and-file members respond to rewards and punishments created by some internal party decision-making regime.[1]

The vast bulk of scholarly debate on party cohesion and discipline deals with roll-call voting behavior of members of the US Congress (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Krehbiel 1993; Aldrich 1995; Krehbiel 1998; Nokken 2000; Snyder and Groseclose 2000; McCarty *et al*. 2001; Snyder and Ting 2002; Cox and McCubbins 2005). Explanations of this typically concern *electoral* incentives deriving from the information value of the party label or *legislative* incentives deriving from the enhanced expectations of diverse legislative payoffs arising from coordinated behavior.

The electoral value of a party label to candidates

The electoral value to candidates of being associated with a party label derives from an assumed or observed situation in which electors factor candidates' policy positions into their voting decisions, but are imperfectly informed about these positions. Electors are further assumed to be more inclined to update on the basis of what candidates actually do (joining a political party with a well-known policy position), rather than what they say they will do (issuing a statement making some policy promises). Building on analyses of party-free electoral competition between 'citizen-candidates' (Osborne and Slivinski 1996; Besley and Coate 1997), Snyder and Ting develop an argument, extended by Levy, whereby electors treat candidates' party affiliations as costly signals about their policy positions, ignoring as cheap talk anything a candidate might actually say (Snyder and Ting 2002; Levy 2004). If parties' policy positions are influenced in some way by the policy preferences of all party members, then candidates, whose fates are inextricably bound up with the policy position of their party, prefer to join parties comprising colleagues with similar preferences. This in turn implies that electors can draw useful inferences about candidates' policy preferences by observing which parties they join. Despite occasional casual references to 'party discipline', this account involves no explicit model of intra-party politics and therefore of party discipline in the strict sense. It is also assumed that politicians can both join and stay in any party they choose. The only 'filter' on party entry arises from party policy itself which, combined with obvious deadweight costs of party membership, discourages candidates with very divergent policy positions from joining the same party (Snyder and Ting 2002: 95).

While the substantive setting of discussions electoral incentives for party cohesion is typically the US Congress, there is no obvious reason why such incentives

should differ in the more general context of MDMPC. If it is plausible to assume electors are under-informed about candidates' policy positions in the simple setting of two-party, one-dimensional competition, this seems no less, and arguably more plausible when several different dimensions of policy are important and several different parties contest the election. Once we establish that party labels are valuable electoral assets, we can explain party cohesion in MDMPC along lines discussed by Snyder and Ting (2002). What is important, as we shall see, is that this explanation comes from outside the legislative game. If we add the empirically realistic assumption that politicians can be exiled from political parties and thereby alienated from the benefits of membership, then we can also build an account of electoral incentives for top-down party discipline, enforced by threats by party leaders to withdraw the party label from undisciplined party members.

Benefits to legislators of coordinated behavior

A second set of incentives for legislators to affiliate to political parties characterizes parties as cartels of legislators, or voting blocs, and concerns payoffs arising within the legislature that accrue to legislators who belong to larger rather than smaller cartels. A large part of the relevant literature has been concerned with (relatively undisciplined) parties in the US Congress; Cox and McCubbins (2005) provide a comprehensive overview of this. At a mundane but nonetheless important level, the legislature is where legislators go to work, valuing legislative 'perquisites' that can include matters such as office space, as well as administrative, research, and PR resources. Moving on to 'official' politics, legislators also value paid positions as committee chairs, scarce speaking time in debates, and so on. Invariably, perks are first allocated between legislative parties, before being allocated within parties. As a rule, therefore, belonging to some legislative party makes life a lot more rewarding for most legislators, while being exiled to the extra-party wilderness is severe punishment indeed – a conclusion that holds as much for European-style parliamentary democracies with MDMPC as for US-style separation of powers regimes.

Moving beyond 'mere' perquisites, Cox and McCubbins (2005) base much of their argument on legislative agenda control. This is an important resource that can be captured by a majority coalition of legislators and affects both the content of public policy and the contents of the pork barrel. Within the US Congress, control over the legislative agenda is achieved via agenda-setting positions such as committee chairs (Shepsle and Weingast 1987). Authority to fill these positions is monopolized by party leaders who, according to this argument, fill positions in a way that enhances realization of the party policy position – which in turn feeds back to enhance the electoral value of the party label. On this argument, each party is a putative majority coalition, a premise more compelling for two-party than for multi-party legislatures. In parliamentary systems such as Britain, where there is typically a single-party majority government, the argument that parties *per se* deliver legislative benefits arising from agenda control generalizes

in a straightforward way, substituting cabinet portfolios for committee chairs. In multi-party systems where coalition cabinets are the norm, however, the argument that parties enhance agenda control needs to be augmented with evidence and or assumptions about ways in which, during bargaining over government formation, agenda-control resources such as cabinet portfolios are first allocated between leaders of government parties and then allocated by leaders within their own parties. This seems a perfectly reasonable assumption, suggesting that we can extend the agenda-control rationale for party discipline to a setting with MDMPC.

The Cox–McCubbins argument that US party leaders impose top-down discipline by manipulating scarce agenda-control resources has been contested by Keith Krehbiel (1993, 1998), who argues that what looks superficially like discipline is essentially emergent bottom-up party cohesion. For Krehbiel, such 'party-esque' behavior arises because legislators choose a party to affiliate to on the basis of their intrinsic policy preferences. A party is seen as little more than a collection of like-minded legislators who voluntarily behave in the same way, with no need for an externally imposed 'party effect'. The question that remains to be answered in this event, of course, is why any legislator would choose to join any party or, minimally, to accept some party label.

One answer to this question may be found in a characterization of parties as endogenously emerging legislative voting blocs. Jackson and Moselle (2002: 70) model a political party as 'a binding agreement among its members to act as one player in the legislative game. That is, they can commit each to follow the same single action when recognized, and to approve each other's proposals.' To see a party as an exogenously enforced binding agreement between legislators is of course to see a party as 'an organization that is external to the [legislative] game and through rewards and punishments can enforce behavior that would otherwise not be observed in the game' (Jackson and Moselle 2002: 69). Given an external rationale for political parties that offer members valuable benefits (perhaps the electoral benefits discussed above), agreements between party legislators can then be made and enforced, including agreements to vote in ways that systematically enhance their expectations. The assumed exogenous top-down enforcement of agreements between party members makes this a model of party discipline as opposed to bottom-up party cohesion.

While Jackson and Moselle deal with a simple one-dimensional, two-party, three-legislator case, the argument is taken a step further by Eguia (2007), who models a one-dimensional setting with an arbitrary number of legislators and potential parties, and is interested in explaining the emergence of political parties as endogenous voting blocs. These voting blocs are legislative coalitions that use some internal decision rule (such a simple- or super-majority voting) to determine how all bloc members will vote. Members who join the bloc, by implication constituting a political party or faction, can in certain situations increase their expectations if they commit to voting according to bloc decisions and do not renege on this commitment.[2] Key intuitions from this work are that submission to disciplined enforceable coordination can increase expectations of legislators

and the precise internal decision rule used a voting bloc/party to determine the coordinated behavior affects its coherence, stability, and/or discipline.

Making and breaking governments

All arguments thus far assume the main job of legislators is legislating. In a parliamentary democracy, however, the main job for legislators is not legislating, but making and breaking governments. This derives from the binding constitutional requirement that the executive gains and retains office as long as it maintains the confidence of the legislature, institutionally realized in the parliamentary vote of confidence/no confidence in the government (Huber 1996; Lijphart 1992, 1999). The stability and effectiveness of governments depend on whether the leaders of government parties can maintain disciplined behavior by legislators. While the vote of no confidence is the constitutional underpinning of parliamentary government, the behavioral underpinning is party discipline. This generates big incentives for senior party politicians, often members of the government themselves, to maintain firm control over party members.

Given this overwhelming incentive to maintain firm party discipline in parliamentary democracies, party leaders derive the ability to achieve this from many sticks and carrots at their disposal. These include some we have already discussed: control over valuable party labels and control over sought-after perks in the legislature. But the incentive structure has an important new dimension under parliamentary government, arising from the fact that the legislature typically functions as a recruitment pool for the executive, while the career ambition of many legislators in such systems is to hold high government office. (This and other aspects of the agency relationship between members of parliament and government ministers in parliamentary democracies are discussed by Saalfeld 2000.) All of this means that maintaining tight party discipline is highly incentive-compatible for party leaders under parliamentary democracy. They must maintain party discipline if they want to keep hold of their positions in the government – or if they want to challenge successfully for these positions from the opposition benches. At the same time, control of the government gives access to very valuable resources: senior government jobs that can be allocated to reward disciplined party members. Indeed party leaders have huge incentives to perpetuate this incentive structure by confining jobs in the government to legislators, whose disciplined behavior is so vital, rather than distributing these jobs more promiscuously.

Factions and intra-party politics

We noted in the introduction that it is hard to give an empirically realistic account of party cohesion and discipline without talking about intra-party factions. Rather little has been written about party factions in general, although considerable attention has been paid to the impact of factional politics in particular parties – especially the Christian Democrats (DC) in Italy (Mershon 2001a, 2001b) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan (Leiserson 1968; Cox and Rosenbluth

1993; Cox *et al*. 1999, 2000; Bouissou 2001) In these two cases in particular, the factional structure of the party is both very explicit for all to see and clearly central to intra-party politics. In what follows, therefore, we distil some features of these discussions of Italy and, in particular, Japan into a more general characterization of the role of factions in intra-party politics.

A faction is not simply a group of agents within some organization who are similar in some important respect (as are women, for example, or young people). The existence of a faction implies coordinated behavior by faction members, whether actual or putative. Perhaps the most obvious example of this arises inside government parties, where factions structure intra-party distribution of the payoffs of office – in particular cabinet portfolios and junior ministries. The empirical patterns here are very striking, both in the case of the DC (Mershon 2001) and the LDP (Leiserson 1968; Cox *et al*. 1999; Bouissou 2001). Indeed faction membership in the LDP appears to be a pre-requisite for receiving any serious office payoff (Cox *et al*. 1999: 35). Inter-factional payoff allocations, furthermore, typically conform to a 'Gamsonian' proportionality rule (Gamson 1961), as opposed to some alternative measure of bargaining leverage. Intra-faction allocation of scarce resources, certainly in Japan, seems to be by a seniority rule (Bouissou 2001), very important since '[a] seniority system for post allocation, which became an integral part of the factional system in the Lower House, gave back benchers enough security to stay in a single faction over the length of their careers' (Cox *et al*. 2000: 117).

A second striking pattern that emerges in the cases of the DC and LDP is that the *quid pro quo* for the top-down flow of scarce resources is bottom-up support of faction leaders by rank-and-file members, particularly in struggles for the most senior party positions, including the prime ministership.

> In return for help with money, endorsements and posts, factional bosses received their followers' support in the contest for the LDP presidency (which, given the party's perennial majority status, automatically conferred the premiership of Japan)… No LDP president, hence no LDP prime minister of Japan, was without factional affiliation when he took office. … Sometimes, support was sufficiently taken-for-granted that no actual election was held; the factional chieftains simply bargained among themselves, in the light of their known bloc of votes. At other times factional support was expressed in terms of voting as the factional boss dictated – either in a presidential election or in other skirmishes with prime ministerial implications.
>
> Cox *et al*. 1999: 36

In this context, note that factions are almost always defined and named in terms of their leaders. This leads us to a characterization of a faction as the set of followers of an actual or potential party leader. There may be other types of group within a political party, but we feel it is useful to reserve the notion of a legislative faction for a group of legislators who are supporters of some actual or putative party leader.

This in turn suggests a third conclusion about the systematic basis of faction membership. If we assume that the policy preferences of a party leader make a difference to the party policy position, then policy preferences will tend to structure faction membership. In the knowledge that a significant obligation of faction membership is to support the faction leader in contests for party leadership positions, a freshman legislator deciding which faction to join should, other things equal, prefer a faction leader with compatible policy preferences. If, in addition, the legislator expects the faction to function as a legislative voting bloc motivated to increase the probability of realizing desired outcomes, then this enhances incentives to join a faction whose leader has similar policy preferences.

The bottom line in all of this is that if we want to move beyond the unitary actor assumption and incorporate an account of intra-party politics into our models of party competition, then we will almost certainly find it helpful to begin by modeling intra-party politics in terms of inter-factional competition, where factions are seen as support coalitions for actual or putative party leaders. In order to put some substantive flesh on this preliminary characterization of the role of party factions in intra-party politics, we now apply the ideas we have been discussing above to an analysis of intra-factional politics within the Italian DS, a party for which, as we noted above, intra-factional politics is both well-documented and clearly very important.

Factional structure of the Italian DS

While left-wing parties are often considered more cohesive than others, the recent history of the major Italian left-wing party (the former PCI, then PDS, now DS) involves a series of splits and fusions, both deriving from and resulting in very explicit factional politics within the party. The starting point for analyzing this history is 1991, when the PCI (*Partito Comunista* (Communist Party)) held its twentieth congress. In response to an initiative launched by the party leader, Occhetto, to dissociate the Italian left from the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the PCI changed its name to PDS (*Partito Democratico della Sinistra* (Democratic Party of the Left)). A group of dissenters split to form an extreme left party, the PRC (*Partito della Rifondazione Comunista* (Communist Refoundation Party)). The PDS held two party congresses, the first in 1995 and the second in 1997. While the first congress was mostly devoted to discussing practical party strategies for the coming 1996 national election, debates during the 1997 congress clearly showed the emergence of minority factions inside the party. While only one policy document was debated and only one official candidate ran for party leadership, several amendments to this were presented by both left- and right-wing minority group leaders.

In February 1998, the PDS held a national party convention ('*Stati Generali della Sinistra*'). Several outside groups entered the party, including: *Laburisti* (a splinter of the former PSI, born in 1994), *Cristiano Sociali* (a splinter of the former DC, born in 1993), *Comunisti Unitari* (a splinter of PRC, born in 1995), and *Sinistra Repubblicana* (a splinter of former PRI). As a result, the party changed its name to *Democratici di Sinistra* (DS).

The factional structure of the DS can most easily be observed during party congresses, during which debate is organized around comprehensive omnibus motions that are in effect policy documents mapping out the overall ideological orientation of the party. In the four party congresses held by the DS party from 2001 to 2007, there was always a major motion proposed by the official party leadership, as well as one or more rival motions proposed by party factions opposing the leadership. Huge numbers of party delegates signed one or other of these congress motions, thereby publicly declaring their alignment within the party to the faction proposing the motion they signed. These party factions, however, are not static. DS party congresses show evidence of a continuous regrouping of party members and increasingly open contests for party leadership positions, eventually leading to a fundamental party split in 2007.

The first congress of the DS was held in Torino, 13–15 January 2000. Two alternative motions were debated. The first motion was proposed by the party leader, Veltroni, and was titled '*Una grande sinistra, un grande Ulivo, per un'Italia di tutti*'. The second motion was proposed by the internal leftist component (*Sinistra DS*) and was titled '*Per un partito di sinistra, per una coalizione riformatrice, per rinnovare i valori del socialismo europeo*'. The only official candidate for the party leadership, Veltroni, was elected as party leader with 80 per cent of delegates' votes. New party rules were also approved at this congress, allowing the formation of 'political clubs' and thereby officially recognizing the existence of different factions inside the party.

National elections were held in Italy on 13 May 2001, in which the centre-left coalition was defeated and the DS gained 16.6 per cent of the popular vote. Later in the same year (16–18 November 2001), a second DS party congress was held in Pesaro. Delegates discussed three motions: (i) '*La sinistra cambia per governare il futuro. Con l'Italia. Nell'Ulivo*', (ii) '*Per tornare a vincere*', and (iii) '*Per salvare i DS, consolidare l'Ulivo e costruire un nuovo unitario partito del riformismo socialista*'. The first two were proposed, respectively, by the leadership and the internal left faction, the third was proposed by a new liberal faction that had recently emerged, located to the right of the party leadership. For the first time, there were three candidates for the position of party leader: Piero Fassino, representing the 'leadership' faction; Giovanni Berlinguer, endorsed by the 'internal left' faction led by Fabio Mussi; and Enrico Morando, representing the liberal faction. Fassino was elected leader with 62 per cent of the vote, ahead of Berlinguer with 34 per cent and Morando with 4 per cent.

The summer of 2003 saw the beginning of an internal debate about the foundation of a new party, the *Partito Democratico* (Democratic Party) – a fusion between the DS and the centre party DL (*La Margherita-Democrazia è Libertà* (Democracy is Freedom – Daisy). On November 26, Senator Cesare Salvi founded a new DS faction, *Sinistra DS per il Socialismo* (DS Left for Socialism), opposing the creation of the new party.

The third DS congress, held in Rome on 3–5 February 2005, was a major step in defining the party leader's strategy to merge the DS into a new party. Four motions were debated. The first, *Per vincere, L'Italia che unisce* was proposed by

the leadership faction and endorsed by the liberal faction. The other three were proposed by different party leaders belonging to the internal left: *Una sinistra forte, una grande alleanza democratica* proposed by Fabio Mussi; *A sinistra per il socialismo*, proposed by Cesare Salvi; *L'ecologia fa bene all'Italia e alla sinistra* proposed by Fulvia Bandoli, leader of the association Ecological Left. The four motions obtained, respectively, 79 per cent, 15 per cent, 4 per cent, and 2 per cent of delegates' votes.

The congress held in Florence in 2007 (19–21 April) was actually the last held by the DS. The current secretary Fassino ratified the move towards the foundation of the Democratic Party. The official birth of the new party was scheduled 14 October, 2007. Three motions were debated: the first, *Per il Partito Democratico*, proposed by the party leader, strongly advocated the foundation of the new center party. The second, *A Sinistra. Per il socialismo europeo,* was proposed by Fabio Mussi, leader of the internal left faction and a government minister, who also ran as a candidate challenging for party leadership. Mussi and his followers opposed the creation of the DP in any shape or form. The third motion, *Per un partito nuovo, democratico e socialista*, proposed by senator Gavino Angius, was favorable to the creation of the DP only in the event that the new party joins the European PSE. Delegates' support for the three motions was 76 per cent for the Fassino motion, 15 per cent for the Mussi motion, and 9 per cent for the Angius motion.

Mussi left the DS following the party congress. On 5 May 2007, he founded a new party called *Sinistra Democratica* (*Democratic Left*). On 16 May 2007, Mussi and his followers formed new parliamentary groups: the group in the chamber comprised 22 MPs; the group in the senate comprised 12 senators.

Mapping DS faction membership

Our first task is to estimate the location of individual DS members *vis-à-vis* the two main internal party factions, the 'leadership' faction and the 'internal left' faction. We use two different empirical measures to map the factional structure of the DS. The first derives from the explicit way in which members identify with party factions by signing faction-sponsored motions at party congresses. The second is a more nuanced measure of policy positions, deriving from content analyzes of delegates' speeches on these same congress motions.

Signing congress motions

As we have seen, the first two party congresses involved extensive debate on significant motions. In each congress, one motion was proposed by each main faction, setting out opposing views on the ideological direction of the party. Large numbers of congress delegates signed these competing motions and we can use the motion a delegate signed as a clear public signal of factional affiliation. We thus collected data on delegate signatures and used these to identify each signatory with the faction proposing the motion signed.

Wordscoring congress speeches

As we have just seen, DS party congresses at Torino and Pesaro debated 'rival' motions about the ideological orientation of the party, each motion proposed by one of the party factions and summarizing its overall position. Large numbers of delegates spoke in congress debates on these motions. We collected these speeches and analyzed their content, using the 'wordscoring' technique for computational text analysis devised by Laver *et al*. (2003), to estimate the closeness of each speaker to the faction positions set out in the motions.[3] Essentially this technique estimates for one or more policy dimensions the (unknown) positions of a set of 'virgin' texts under investigation, stating these positions in relation to the (known or assumed) positions of a particular set of 'reference' texts. We treated congress speeches of individual delegates as virgin texts, measuring positions of each speaker relative to congress motions proposed by each faction, which we treated as reference texts. Since the ideal is to have reference texts with as many words as possible and since the two party congresses took place within 22 months of each other, we generated reference texts for each faction by concatenating texts of their motions at the Torino and Pesaro congresses. The resulting reference text for the leadership faction had 27,934 words and was given an assumed reference score of 0; the reference text for the internal left faction had 15,932 words and was given an assumed policy score of −1.[4] The two reference texts thus generate a latent policy dimension with the leadership faction located at the origin and the internal left at an arbitrary position of −1. Wordscores were generated for this *a priori* dimension using the Laver *et al*. (2003) technique.

Results of wordscoring speeches by DS faction members at both the Torino and Pesaro congresses are summarized in Figure 8.1. The top panel is a box plot summarizing the scores of those speakers, broken down by factional affiliation, who also attached signatures to congress motions. Computerized wordscoring clearly distinguishes between members of the three party factions. The lower panel shows mean text scores for speeches made by members of the two main factions. Recalling that the reference score for leadership motions was 0 and for internal left motions was −1, the mean score was −0.24 for members of the leadership faction, and −1.07 for members of the internal left, a difference of means significant statistically at better than the 0.001 level.

Legislative party discipline in the DS

Substantive bases of intra-DS policy disagreement

The most important policy divisions within the DS were a product of internal differences over foreign policy. 'Much more than by matters of economic policy, the traditional identity of the Italian communism was shaped by matters of foreign policy, the alignment of Italy in the international system and its affiliation to military alliances, [such as NATO]' (Bellucci *et al*. 2000: 154). After the fall of the Soviet Union, the official position of the PDS/DS increasingly moved towards an explicit adoption of the security policy of Europe and NATO.



Faction	*N*	*Mean*	*Std. deviation*	*Std. error*
Leader	59	–0.238	0.722	0.094
Left	24	–1.070	0.514	0.105

Note that difference of means significant at better than 0.001 level.

Figure 8.1 Policy scores of speeches at DS Torino and Pesaro congresses, by faction.

However, the internal left faction within the party was always closer to the much more explicitly pro-peace and anti-NATO policy positions of Communist Refoundation (PRC). Such internal dissent on foreign policy issues was clearly visible in 1999, when the center-left *Ulivo* coalition government – of which DS was a member – sent Italian troops to support NATO military intervention in Kosovo. There was a major split in the party's legislative voting on the Kosovo crisis.[5] This split was controversial and significant for Italian politics as a whole because, for the first time in Italian history, the prime minister was actually the leader of the DS.

Dissent within the DS was also manifested when the Italian government, led by the center-right *Polo* coalition with DS in opposition (2001–2005), declared its support for the military operation, Enduring Freedom, by sending Italian troops

to Afghanistan on 7 November 2001, and confirmed this support on 3 October 2002. Divisions within the party were again clear during political debates in Italy over the Iraq war, the third international crisis during the period under consideration. Iraq was potentially less divisive for the DS because the leadership of the party was united with the internal left in opposition to any military intervention in Iraq. However, this foreign policy issue became crucial, both inside the DS and for the party's external critics. Despite its generally hostile approach to the Iraq war, any particular DS policy response to Italy's practical role in the international situation, given Prime Minister Berlusconi's support for the military intervention, generated divisions between DS factions. These divisions undermined the ability of the party to present itself in the wider political system as a credible and united party of government.[6]

In 2006, following electoral reform that explicitly rewarded the formation of pre-electoral coalitions, a center-left electoral coalition of many parties named *The Union* and led by Romano Prodi, won the general elections. The government that formed after the election could rely on a safe majority in the lower chamber but only on a very narrow majority in the senate (including life-tenured senators). The coalition was enlarged to cover a wider range of left-wing parties or confederations of parties, making difficult to maintain a unique agreed policy position in key areas such as economic and foreign policy. In February 2007, the Prodi government faced its first serious crisis after losing, by a two-vote margin, a vote in the senate on a non-binding resolution on government foreign policy and Italian military presence in Afghanistan. As a consequence, Prodi submitted his resignation as prime minister. After formal political consultations, the president of the republic asked Prodi to request a new investiture vote for his government in both chambers. On 28 February, the government passed a confidence vote in the senate.

Legislative behavior of DS faction members

Our next task is to characterize the legislative voting behavior of individual DS deputies on crucial foreign policy motions relating to the internally divisive policy issues discussed above. We constructed a dataset that includes the 38 roll-call votes on these issues taken between October 2001 and June 2003; these are listed in Table 8.1. Two of these roll calls concern final votes on the passing of a law: the vote of 4 June 2002 converted into law a government decree concerning the continuation of Italian support for international military operations; the vote of 3 June 2003 was on a bill related to the agreement on a common European defense policy. The other roll calls concern different motions or resolutions proposed by either government or opposition parties on the political response of Italy to some important aspect of the international situation. Thus:[7]

- The session of 9 October 2001 included six votes, on two separate motions proposed by government and opposition, concerning the application of Article 5 of the NATO treaty.

Table 8.1 Roll-call votes on key foreign policy issues in Italy, 2001–2003

Date and official number of roll-call votes	*Issue*	*Final vote, motions, or resolutions*	*Government party sponsor*	*Opposition party sponsor*
Oct 09 01 v128	Application of article 5 of the NATO Treaty	Res. Vito n.6-00004 part I	FI	
Oct 09 01 v129		Res. Vito n.6-00004 part II	FI	
Oct 09 01 v130		Res. n.6-00006 (motivation)		Margherita
Oct 09 01 v131		Res. Rutelli *et al.* n. 6-00006		Margherita
Oct 09 01 v132		Res. Rutelli *et al.* n. 6-00006 p.9		Margherita
Oct 09 01 v133		Res. N. 6-00007		Margherita
Nov 07 01 v1	Italian military involvement in Afghanistan (Enduring Freedom operation)	Res. N.6-9 Vito cap. I, II, III, V, VI	FI	
Nov 07 01 v2		Res. N.6-9 Vito cap. IV	FI	
Nov 07 01 v3		Res. N.6-10 Rutelli (motivation)		
Nov 07 01 v4		Res. N.6-10 Rutelli cap. I, II, III		
Nov 07 01 v5		Res. N.6-10 Rutelli cap. IV		
Nov 07 01 v6		Res. N.6-9 Vito disp and Res. Rutelli u2c	Gov. and opposition combined	
Nov 07 01 v7		Doc. LVII n.1-bis Res. 6-11		
Jun 04 02 v17	Continuation of Italian involvement in international military operations	Conversion into law of decree n.64/ 2002 (AC 2666) (final vote)		
Oct 03 02 v4	Continuation of Italian military involvement in Afghanistan (Enduring Freedom operation)	Res. Bertinotti *et al.* n.6-32 part I		PRC
Oct 03 02 v5		Res. Bertinotti *et al.* n.6-32 part II		PRC
Oct 03 02 v6		Res. Ramponi *et al.* n 6-33	AN	
Oct 03 02 v7		Res. Rizzo *et al.* N.6-34 p. I		PDC
Oct 03 02 v8		Res. Pisicchio *et al*. n.6-35 p.I		Misto (Other)
Oct 03 02 v9		Res. Pisicchio *et al.* n.6-35 p.II		Misto (Other)

Table 8.1 Roll-call votes on key foreign policy issues in Italy, 2001–2003—cont'd

Date and official number of roll-call votes	*Issue*	*Final vote, motions, or resolutions*	*Government party sponsor*	*Opposition party sponsor*
Oct 03 02 v10		Res. Fassino *et al.* n. 6-36		DS
Oct 03 02 v11		Res. Castagnetti n.6-37 p. I		Margherita
Oct 03 02 v12		Res. Castagnetti n.6-37 p. II		Margherita
Oct 03 02 v13		Res. Castagnetti n.6-37 p.III		Margherita
Apr 03 03 v11		Motion M.Cossutta *et al.* 1-00175		PDC
Apr 03 03 v11		Motion Violante *et al.* 1-00177		DS
Apr 03 03 v12	Italian military involvement in Iraq	Motion Burani Procaccini *et al.* 1-00182	FI	
Apr 03 03 v13		Motion Intini *et al.* N. 1-00186		Misto (Other)
Apr 03 03 v14		Res. Craxi 6-58	Misto (Other)	
Apr 03 03 v15		Res. Vito 6-59	FI	
Apr 15 03 v1		Res. 6-60 Arrighi *et al.*	AN	
Apr 15 03 v2		Res. 6-61 Grignaffini *et al.*		DS
Apr 15 03 v3		Res. 6-62 Belillo *et al.*		PRC
Apr 15 03 v4	Italian military involvement in Iraq	Res. 6-63 Violante *et al.* Part I		DS
Apr 15 03 v5		Res. 6-63 Violante *et al.* Part I		DS
Apr 15 03 v6		Res. 6-64 Colasio *et al.*		Margherita
Apr 15 03 v7		Res. 6-65 Vito *et al.*	FI	
Jun 03 03 v77	Agreement on a common European defense policy	DDL 1927 B Agreement on European Dfefense (final vote)		

- The session of 7 November 2001 included seven votes, on two separate motions proposed by government and opposition, concerning sending Italian troops to Afghanistan (the Enduring Freedom operation).
- The session of 3 October 2002 included ten votes, on six separate resolutions proposed by the government and different opposition parties, concerning the continuation of military operations in Afghanistan.
- The session of 3 April 2003 included six votes, on six separate resolutions proposed by the government and different opposition parties, concerning Italian involvement in military operations in Iraq.
- The session of 15 April 2003 included seven votes, on six separate resolutions, concerning Italian involvement in military operations in Iraq.

For each motion, the DS leadership faction articulated an 'official' party position; we can compare individual legislators' roll-call votes with this. More generally, we can identify the position of the majority of each DS faction on each motion. On some occasions the positions of all three factions are the same; on other occasions these positions differ. For each roll call, we can observe for each legislator whether s/he voted in accordance with a particular faction position. An aggregate estimate of the 'roll-call loyalty' of each legislator to the official DS party position can be derived by averaging the number of times, in split roll calls, the legislator voted in the same way as the leadership faction, as a proportion of all possible opportunities to do this.

We first investigate the extent to which faction membership, measured by signatures attached to party congress motions, predicts individual legislator behavior on key foreign policy roll calls. Table 8.2 gives examples of key roll calls on which DS legislators did, and did not, split their votes.[8] Panel *a* of Table 8.2 cross-tabulates the factional affiliation of DS legislators against their roll-call votes on a motion on Italian military involvement in the US-led Enduring Freedom operation in Afghanistan. This motion was proposed by a deputy from the PRC, as we have seen a splinter of the former Communist Party with a policy position close to that of the left faction of the DS. It is clear that DS deputies were split on this motion, with members of the majority and liberal factions voting 'no' and the bulk of the internal left faction voting 'yes'. We use the chi-square statistic for this faction/voting table to measure the depth of this split. When all party factions vote in an identical manner, there will be a very low and insignificant chi-square; when factional affiliation systematically predicts voting behavior, there will be a much higher and statistically significant chi-square. For the roll call reported in panel *a* of Table 8.2 there is, as expected, a high chi-square and statistically significant relationship between faction membership and roll-call voting.

Compare the pattern in panel *a* with that in panel *b* of Table 8.2, which shows a unified response by DS legislators to a motion relating to NATO proposed by a member of the *Margherita* – a parliamentary grouping to the right of the DS. All DS factions voted in the same way, with just the odd exception. The faction/voting table has a much lower, and insignificant, chi-square statistic; roll-call voting behavior cannot be predicted from faction membership.

Table 8.2 Analysis of roll calls for DS on Afghanistan and NATO issues

8.2a

Issue	*Afghanistan (deep split within DS)**				
Vote/Faction	*Liberal component*	*Internal left*	*Party leader loyal*	*Other*	*Total*
Yes		21		1	22
No	11	6	65	7	89
Abstain		6	2		8
Present, but did not vote		4	6		10
Total	11	37	73	8	129
Chi-square tests	Value	df	Sig.		
Pearson chi-square	80.30	9	<0.001		
Likelihood ratio	88.80	9	<0.001		

8.2b

Issue	*NATO (unity within DS)***				
Vote/Faction	*Liberal component*	*Internal left*	*Party leader loyal*	*Other*	*Total*
Yes	11	33	69	8	121
Abstain		1			1
Present, but did not vote		4	4	2	10
Total	11	38	73	10	132
Chi-square tests	Value	df	Sig.		
Pearson chi-square	6.60	6	0.360		
Likelihood ratio	6.81	6	0.339		

8.2c

Issue	*NATO (moderate split within DS)****				
Vote/Faction	*Liberal component*	*Internal left*	*Party leader loyal*	*Other*	*Total*
No		15			15
Abstain	11	20	67	9	107
Present, but did not vote		3	4	3	10
Total	11	38	71	12	132
chi-square tests	Value	df	Sig.		
Pearson chi-square	48.99	6	<0.001		
Likelihood ratio	48.71	6	<0.001		

* Roll call of October 3 2002: Italian military involvement in Afghanistan (continuation of Enduring Freedom). Res. Bertinotti (PRC) *et al*. n 6-32 part II (vote n. 5).
** Roll call of October 9 2001: Application of Article n. 5 of the NATO Treaty. Res. Rutelli *et al*. (Margherita) n 6-00006 p.9 (vote n. 132).
*** Roll call of October 9 2001. Application of Art. 5 of the NATO Treaty. Res.Vito (Forza Italia) n 6-00004 part II (vote n. 129).

Table 8.3 summarizes the level of faction-based party splitting in each of the set of foreign policy roll calls analyzed. The first column identifies the roll call; all votes on the same day were taken in the course of a debate on the same issue. The remaining two columns show the extent to which the DS vote was split, summarized by a chi-squared statistic for the faction-voting tables analogous to those shown in Table 8.2. Table 8.3 shows a significant number of foreign policy roll calls in which the split in the DS vote was statistically significant – in which faction membership predicts roll-call voting behavior.

Table 8.3 Summary of factional impact on DS split roll calls

Roll call	*Chi-square*	*Sig.*
Oct 09 01 v128	1.8	0.621
Oct 09 01 v129	***49.0***	***<0.001***
Oct 09 01 v130	5.4	0.500
Oct 09 01 v131	6.5	0.367
Oct 09 01 v132	6.6	0.360
Oct 09 01 v133	24.2	0.019
Nov 07 01 v1	***52.0***	***<0.001***
Nov 07 01 v2	5.8	0.444
Nov 07 01 v3	***23.1***	***<0.001***
Nov 07 01 v4	8.3	0.041
Nov 07 01 v5	***29.7***	***<0.001***
Nov 07 01 v6	***48.2***	***<0.001***
Nov 07 01 v7	10.6	0.101
Jun 03 02 v17	***72.7***	***<0.001***
Oct 03 02 v4	***33.8***	***<0.001***
Oct 03 02 v5	***80.3***	***<0.001***
Oct 03 02 v6	14.5	0.024
Oct 03 02 v7	18.1	0.033
Oct 03 02 v8	***42.8***	***<0.001***
Oct 03 02 v9	11.7	0.069
Oct 03 02 v10	8.0	0.233
Oct 03 02 v11	***50.6***	***<0.001***
Oct 03 02 v12	***33.9***	***<0.001***
Oct 03 02 v13	26.7	0.002
Apr 03 03 v10	2.5	0.481
Apr 03 03 v11	5.4	0.145
Apr 03 03 v12	22.4	0.008
Apr 03 03 v13	5.0	0.174
Apr 03 03 v14	4.7	0.580
Apr 03 03 v15	15.1	0.020
Apr 15 03 v1	2.2	0.530
Apr 15 03 v2	2.2	0.530
Apr 15 03 v3	3.4	0.762
Apr 15 03 v4	1.3	0.734
Apr 15 03 v5	2.0	0.572
Apr 15 03 v6	3.1	0.386
Apr 15 03 v7	***87.2***	***<0.001***
Jun 03 03 v77	8.0	0.237

There can be high levels of faction-structured vote splitting in DS roll calls, even when the majority of deputies from each faction voted in the same way. Panel *c* of Table 8.2 illustrates this with a DS roll call for another motion on NATO, proposed (this time by a member of *Forza Italia*) during the same debate as the motion reported in panel *b*. The majority of deputies in each DS faction voted in the same way, abstaining. However a significant minority of deputies from the internal left voted 'no', while no member of the leadership or liberal factions did this. This is the second roll call listed in Table 8.3; this faction/voting relationship has a highly significant chi-square statistic.

Overall Table 8.3 shows us that, for each foreign policy debate, except the June 2003 debate on European defense policy, there was at least one legislative roll call that significantly split the DS on factional lines. Factional affiliation, measured by signatures attached to motions at party congresses, is clearly structuring legislative voting by DS deputies.

Faction membership and the aggregate foreign policy voting profile of DS deputies

We now move from the behavior of DS legislators on individual roll calls to their aggregate voting behavior across the set of foreign policy debates investigated. An index of roll-call loyalty was calculated for each deputy. This aggregates his or her behavior across all of the 'deeply divided' roll calls reported in Table 8.3. A deeply divided roll call was taken as one with a very highly significant (<0.001) chi-square statistic for the relevant faction-voting table – these roll calls can thus be identified from Table 8.3. The 'roll-call loyalty' score for a given deputy is the number of times s/he voted in the same way as the majority of leadership faction in such roll calls, as a proportion of all opportunities to do so. Thus a deputy who always voted with the leadership faction would score 1, while a deputy who never did would score 0.

The top panel of Figure 8.2 shows the distribution of DS deputies' roll-call loyalty scores broken down by factional affiliation. This sums up in a very graphic way the deep divisions between DS factions over foreign policy; the internal left shows very much lower levels of roll-call loyalty on foreign policy motions than members of the leadership or liberal factions. The lower panel of Figure 8.2 shows that the loyalty scores of internal left members were on average half of those of members of the leadership factions. The average member of the internal left faction voted the party line in only 43 per cent of these divisive foreign policy roll calls, compared to an 89 per cent score for the average member of the leadership faction, a difference of means that is highly significant statistically.

Congress speech content and the legislative voting behavior of DS deputies

Although the roll-call information we have relates to all 135 DS deputies, only a small proportion of these deputies made speeches at the party congresses. Thus only 21 DS deputies made speeches at the Torino congress, 19 at the Pesaro



Faction	*N*	*Mean*	*Std. deviation*	*Std. error*
Leader	75	0.886	0.138	0.016
Left	38	0.430	0.292	0.047

Note that difference of means significant at better than 0.001 level.

Figure 8.2 DS deputies' roll-call voting loyalty, by faction.

congress, and only 12 deputies made speeches at both. For this small subset of 28 DS deputies, however, we can investigate the extent to which their legislative voting behavior on divisive foreign policy issues is explained by their policy position within the party, estimated by scoring their congress speeches. The top panel of Figure 8.3 shows a scatterplot with the policy scores of congress speeches by DS deputies on the horizontal axis and their roll-call loyalty scores on the vertical axis, with deputies categorized by party faction.[9] Once more, patterns are quite striking. DS deputies associated with the internal left faction have both highly negative policy scores for their congress speeches and low roll-call loyalty scores.

Roll-call voting would be a more reliable way to identify faction members than congress speeches, however, because it turns out that those congress speakers from the leadership faction who were also deputies tended to make more left-wing



Mean congress speech scores of DS deputies

Faction	*N*	*Mean*	*Std. deviation*	*Std. error*
Leader	14	–0.499	0.985	0.263
Left	9	–1.420	0.430	0.144

Note that difference of means significant at better than 0.001 level.

Figure 8.3 Policy scores of speeches at DS congresses, by roll-call voting loyalty on foreign policy, by faction.

congress speeches than non-deputy members of the same faction. This can be seen by comparing the mean speech scores, by faction, in the lower panel of Figure 8.3 with the equivalent panels of Figure 8.2. Thus, while congress speeches by internal left deputies are distinctively left-wing, and are associated with distinctively low levels of roll-call voting loyalty, congress speeches by deputies from the leadership faction tend to range much more widely from right to left.[10] In other words, deputies in the leadership faction may sign motions associated with the leadership faction and vote loyally on foreign policy, but may give relatively left-wing congress speeches. In contrast, deputies from internal left are easy to identify, giving left-wing congress speeches and often not voting the party line on key foreign policy roll calls.

Conclusion

This chapter has set out to advance our understanding of the role of factions in intra-party politics. Reviewing existing theoretical work on party cohesion and

discipline, and defining a faction as a collection of members supporting some putative party leader, we identified intra-party factions as sources of structure in intra-party politics. We used an empirical account of inter-factional politics within the Italian DS to give substance to some developing theoretical ideas. We showed that the DS factions can be mapped by analyzing endorsements of, and the content of speeches on, conference motions debated in DS party congresses. We then showed a clear relationship between the factional structure we mapped in these ways and indicators of party cohesion and or discipline we derived from the behavior of DS deputies in individual roll calls on divisive legislative motions on foreign policy.

In many ways, of course, the DS is a very 'easy' case if we want to understand intra-party inter-factional politics. Not only are the DS factions defined with blinding clarity, with faction members clearly identifiable, but legislator behavior on key role call votes is clearly structured on factional lines. The characterization of a faction as a set of supporters of a putative leader, furthermore, is illustrated in the starkest possible terms by the breakaway of the Mussi faction to form a new party, *Sinistra Democratica,* in May 2007. We do not claim, therefore, that our analysis of this case in any sense 'tests' some theoretical account of intra-party politics. Rather, we see our account of factional politics within the Italian DS as a theoretically informed 'model generator', to be added to existing theoretically-informed accounts of factional politics within the Italian DC and the Japanese LDP. Our hope is that these cases will inform a new model of party politics that abandons the unitary actor assumption and sees the decision-making 'engine' of political parties as being driven by intra-party inter-factional competition.

Notes

1 And, potentially, a 'meta-regime' under which the party's decision-making regime is selected.
2 This lack of reneging is left unexplained by Eguia but, as with the argument by Jackson and Moselle, we can think of the enforcement of intra-party deals in terms of the manipulation of exclusive party resources, such as the electoral party brand, derived from outside the legislative game.
3 The wordscoring software for conducting this analysis, which integrates as a set of subroutines into *Stata 8*, can be downloaded from http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/kbenoit/wordscores
4 The liberal faction also proposed a motion at Pesaro, but we did not use this since only four members of this faction spoke at the Pesaro congress. These speeches were scored, as were all others, on the internal party policy dimension generated by the internal left and leadership faction reference texts.
5 We excluded this from our analysis because the first two congresses of the DS for which we have data were held afterwards.
6 On this point Sartori (2004) argued that 'The DS is now a unitary party only in terms of electoral statistics … one third of the DS … is not reformist but extremist... if approximately the 7% of the DS (which means a third of the total party vote) is added to the 12–13% of the radical left, the situation is that Bertinotti [leader of the PRC] controls 20% of the left leaving to poor Fassino only 13%'.

7 Some motions (or resolutions) may involve a vote on separate parts of the same motion.
8 We excluded from this table and all subsequent analysis the roll-call classification 'away on official business'. This applies to only a very few deputies in any single roll call and has no strategic significance, unlike the distinct classifications 'abstain' and 'present but did not vote'. There were 135 DS deputies during this period, and the number 'away on official business' is thus 135 minus the valid *N* for any given voting table.
9 When a deputy spoke at both congresses, the score for his/her Pesaro speech was used since the Pesaro congress more immediately preceded the roll calls under analysis. When a deputy spoke at only one congress, the score of this speech was used.
10 The cluster of four 'left-wing' leadership faction deputies in the top left of the scatterplot comprises Bersani, De Luca, Filippeschi, and Lucá.

References

Aldrich, J. H. (1995) *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Bellucci, P., Maraffi, M. and Segatti, P. (2000) *PCI, PDS, DS. La trasformazione dell'identità politica della sinistra di governo*. Roma: Donzelli

Besley, T. J. and Coate, S. (1997) 'An economic model of representative democracy', *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112(1): 85–114

Bouissou, J. (2001) 'Party factions and the politics of coalition: Japanese politics under the "system of 1955"', *Electoral Studies* 20(4): 581–602

Cox, G. W. and McCubbins, M. (1993) *Legislative Leviathan*. Berkeley: University of California Press

Cox, G. W. and McCubbins, M. (2005) *Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the US House of Representatives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Cox, G. W. and Rosenbluth, F. (1993) 'The electoral fortunes of legislative factions in Japan', *American Political Science Review* 87(3): 577–89

Cox, G. W., Rosenbluth, F. M. and Thies, M. F. (1999) 'Electoral reform and the fate of factions: The case of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party', *British Journal of Political Science* 29(1): 33–56

Cox, G. W., Rosenbluth, F. M. and Thies, M. F. (2000) 'Electoral rules, career ambitions, and party structure: Comparing factions in Japan's upper and lower houses', *American Journal of Political Science* 44(1): 115–22

Eguia, J. X. (2007) 'Voting blocs, coalitions and parties', working paper, Department of Politics, New York University

Gamson, W. A. (1961) 'A theory of coalition formation', *American Sociological Review* 26(3): 373–82

Huber, J. (1996) *Rationalizing Parliament: Legislative Institutions and Party Politics in France*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Jackson, M. O. and Moselle, B. (2002) 'Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game' *Journal of Economic Theory* 103(1): 49–87

Krehbiel, K. (1993) 'Where's the party?' *British Journal of Political Science* 23(1): 235–66

Krehbiel, K. (1998) *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Laver, M., Benoit, K. and Garry, J. (2003) 'Estimating the policy positions of political actors using words as data', *American Political Science Review* 97(2): 311–31

Leiserson, M. (1968) 'Factions and coalitions in one-party Japan: An interpretation based on the theory of games', *American Political Science Review* 62(3): 770–87

Levy, G. (2004) 'A model of political parties', *Journal of Economic Theory* 115(2): 250–77

Lijphart, A. (1992) *Presidential versus Parliamentary Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Lijphart, A. (1999) *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press

McCarty, N., Poole, K. T. and Rosenthal, H. (2001) 'The hunt for party discipline in congress', *American Political Science Review* 95(3): 673–87

Mershon, C. (2001a) 'Contending models of portfolio allocation and office payoffs to party factions: Italy, 1963–79' *American Journal of Political Science* 45(2): 277–93

Mershon, C. (2001b) 'Party factions and coalition government: Portfolio allocation in Italian Christian Democracy', *Electoral Studies* 20(4): 555–80

Nokken, T. P. (2000) 'Dynamics of congressional loyalty: Party defection and roll call behavior, 1947–1997', *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 25(3): 417–44

Osborne, M. J. and Slivinski, A. (1996) 'A model of political competition with citizen-candidates', *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 111(1): 65–96

Saalfeld, T. (2000) 'Members of parliament and governments in Western Europe: Agency relations and problems of oversight', *European Journal of Political Research* 37(3): 353–76

Sartori, G. (2004) 'La sinistra frammentata', *Corriere della Sera* 23 June

Shepsle, K. A. and Weingast, B. (1987) 'The institutional foundations of committee power', *American Political Science Review* 81: 85–104

Snyder, J. M. and Groseclose, T. (2000) 'Estimating party influence in congressional roll call voting', *American Journal of Political Science* 44(1): 193–211

Snyder, J. M. and Groseclose, T. (2000) 'Estimating party influence on roll call voting: Regression coefficients versus classification success', *American Political Science Review* 95(3): 689–98

Snyder, J. M. and Ting, M. (2002) 'An informational rationale for political parties', *American Journal of Political Science* 46(1): 90–110

9 Intra-party conflict and cabinet survival in 17 West European democracies, 1945–1999

Thomas Saalfeld[1]

Introduction

Governments need the confidence of a parliamentary majority to survive in office in Europe's parliamentary systems of government. They also need a legislative majority to ensure the passage of their legislative proposals. In a few European democracies such as Greece or the United Kingdom, government formation has usually been the result of the voters' verdict at general elections: A single party usually conquered a majority of the seats in the lower house of parliament and – as long as it could muster sufficient party discipline – used its majority to control the parliamentary agenda and legislative process. However, a study of government formation in 17 parliamentary democracies between 1945 and 1999 showed that only 13 per cent of all cabinets were based on such an overall parliamentary majority of a single party. Approximately 63 per cent consisted of multi-party coalitions, a further 23 per cent were (single or multi-party) minority cabinets tolerated by a sufficient number of MPs on the opposition benches (Saalfeld 2007: 180; for similar, more recent data, see Gallagher *et al*. 2006: 401). Thus, to understand policy-making in Europe's parliamentary systems, 'one must understand above all else the formation and dissolution of coalition governments' (Martin and Vanberg 2005: 93).

The dynamics of coalition politics can be understood as those of a mixed-motive game: If no single party controls an overall majority of the seats in parliament, several parties may join forces to control the legislative agenda, capture offices and realise policy goals. Despite the coalition agreements such parties often produce before they form a coalition, the coalition partners tend to remain competitors for office, votes and policies throughout the lifetime of a parliament. After their formation, coalitions therefore vary in their ability to manage this constant tension between simultaneous cooperative and competitive strategies, which may lead to a termination of the coalition when the costs of coalition outweigh its benefits for at least one of the parties concerned (see, e.g., Lupia and Strøm 1995; Mershon 2002). Even where a single party controls an overall majority of seats in parliament, such parties are best thought of as coalitions of individuals and factions competing not only against members of other parties but also among each other for votes in intra-party elections, government office and

policies. Under some electoral systems, members of the same party may even have to compete for votes against each other at general elections (e.g., in electoral systems based on open lists or the single transferable vote). The present chapter makes an empirical contribution to an emerging body of scholarship modelling coalition politics not as a 'game' between 'unitary actors', but as a system of at least two interlocking political games between political parties:

> At one level, party leaders do interact with each other, as modelled by classical coalition theorists. At another level, each decision a party leader makes has to be carried through within the party's internal political system – and of course party leaders will anticipate the need to do this when making commitments to other party leaders.
>
> (Laver 1999: 11)

While authors such as Druckman (1996), Laver (1999), Strøm (2001) or Tsebelis (1992, 2002) have made progress in developing theoretical models for the analysis of such complex two-level processes, rigorous quantitative tests of hypotheses derived from their models are rare. To my knowledge, Druckman's (1996) study of the influence of party factionalism on cabinet durability is the only published comparative, quantitative analysis of the intra-party sources of coalition durability in the English language. Druckman demonstrates that increasing levels of party factionalism reduce the life expectancy of cabinets significantly, even if other institutional variables are held constant.

The present chapter seeks to model the dynamics of those cabinet terminations that are the result of intra-party conflict during the lifetime of a parliament. Like a number of other recent contributions, it shifts the traditional focus of coalition theory from the conditions of cabinet formation and termination to the process of coalition governance between these two defining events in the life of a coalition (see also Heller 2001; Kim and Loewenberg 2005; Martin and Vanberg 2004, 2005; Strøm and Müller 1999a; Thies 2001). Employing a Cox proportional hazards model in a competing-risks design (see, e.g., Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; Diermeier and Stevenson 1999, 2000), it utilises data on cabinet formation and termination in 17 European democracies (1945–1999) to compare the estimated survivor and hazard functions of cabinets terminated due to intra-party conflict with those terminated for other reasons. Following the 'unified' approach first proposed by King *et al*. (1990), which has become the standard in the extant literature, the chapter will then examine the extent to which these estimated hazard functions are influenced by key institutional variables discussed in the theoretical literature, operationalising Laver's (1999) 'whipping model' and the 'delegation model' used by Druckman (1996) and Strøm (2001).

Coercion or delegation?

All major game theoretic accounts of the complex interaction between inter-party and intra-party negotiations in coalition politics are influenced by the idea of party

politics as a 'nested game' with variable payoffs where political parties pursue competitive and cooperative strategies in several different but nonetheless connected arenas. The parties' payoffs in the 'main arena' (inter-party bargaining) vary according to the outcome of further games in other, connected arenas of intra-party bargaining. As a result, seemingly 'irrational' strategies in one arena may be perfectly rational responses to a situation where payoffs are influenced by strategies and payoffs in other arenas (Tsebelis 1992: 188).

Coercion

Laver's (1999) intra-party 'whipping game' (Figure 9.1) is an example of such a model. It is nested within a larger inter-party coalition game. The game models



Key:
p = payoff to Leader P from reneging on deal with Leader Q
q = cost to Leader Q of Leader P reneging
p′ = defection payoff to pivotal Legislator P
s = sanction applied by Leader P to pivotal Legislator P if latter defects
c_1 = cost to Leader P of applying sanction to pivotal Legislator P
k_1 = credibility hit to Leader Q from leaving cabinet even after Leader P applies whip
c_2 = credibility hit to Leader P from refusing to sanction those who defy whip
k_2 = credibility hit to Leader Q from accepting Leader P's refusal to sanction those who defy whip
c_3 = credibility hit to Leader P from refusing to apply whip at all
k_3 = credibility hit to Leader Q from accepting Leader P's refusal to apply whip

Source: Laver (1999: 16)

Figure 9.1 Laver's (1999) 'whipping game'.

inter-party negotiations between a party leader P and his or her opposite number in another party, party leader Q. Assuming that both party leaders agree on a particular policy and that the convention of collective cabinet responsibility is an important norm, both party leaders now have an obligation to persuade their own parties (here only symbolised by pivotal legislator P′) to support their policy in a parliamentary vote. Hence, the inter-party game is followed by an intra-party 'whipping game', in which party leader P can (a) apply party discipline ('whip') or (b) allow independent decision-making by members of his or her own parliamentary party. The willingness and or ability of party leader P to carry his party – even if he has to impose a whip and to sanction dissenters within his own party – then feeds back into the inter-party coalition game as party leader Q will have to decide how to respond to the decisions taken in the other party. The game cannot be developed fully here (see Laver 1999: 12–23), but the possible moves and payoffs for party leader P, pivotal legislator P′ and party leader Q are summarised in the game tree and explained below the diagram.

The crucial variables in Laver's 'whipping game' are the payoffs and costs associated with the various moves: costs and payoffs of reneging on the agreement between party leaders P and Q, costs of applying sanctions to their own party members and credibility hits for reneging and or inability or unwillingness to carry the own party. This has a number of important strategic consequences:

> A party leader's failure to deliver on commitments may be seen either as a straightforward reneging on the part of the leader, or as a political failure by the leader to carry the commitment within party. This failure … may … have been anticipated quite accurately by a party leader who cynically made a commitment to others in the clear expectation that this could not be carried within his or her own party. This raises … the clear possibility of shirking by party leaders, who may not put in the effort needed to ensure fulfilment of commitments that have become inconvenient. These different potential reasons why a party leader might fail to honour commitments may well have a bearing upon how other political actors react to such failure. We quickly find ourselves in muddy strategic waters.
>
> (Laver 1999: 11–12)

Laver's model is based on the party leaders' ability and willingness to 'whip' and punish dissenters, if necessary. It is not difficult to identify *institutional* arrangements that are likely to increase the cost of reneging and or failure to carry one's own party. If party leader Q is simultaneously the head of government and if this affords him with the right to table a confidence motion or dissolve parliament before the end of the CIEP (Constitutional inter-election period), he or she can reduce party leader P's payoff for reneging and pivotal legislator P's defection payoff, depending on the timing of the inter-party and or intra-party conflict within the parliamentary term (Diermeier and Feddersen 1998; Huber 1996). In addition, far-reaching dissolution powers may add credibility and severity to party leader P′s ability to sanction pivotal legislator P′, if he chooses to defect.

Therefore we would expect the head of government's power to dissolve parliament to reduce the risk of a cabinet termination due to intra-party as well as inter-party conflict *(Hypothesis 1)*.

A second institutional device that potentially increases a credibility hit to party leader P, if s/he reneges on an agreed policy or fails to carry his or her party is a clearly understood norm of coalition discipline in legislation. In other words, the existence of an established norm that coalition parties do not vote opportunistically against each other in the legislative process would increase the political cost of defection. This norm reinforces the principle of collective responsibility and affects the credibility of party leaders and their perceived ability to commit to an agreement in the long run. Again, the existence of such a norm increases the political cost of reneging and should decrease the risk of a cabinet termination due to intra-party and inter-party conflicts *(Hypothesis 2)*.

Research on government agenda-setting powers has enhanced our understanding of legislative politics and the determinants of government policy-making in recent years. Heller (2001), for example, emphasises the importance of the government's authority to propose amendments late in the legislative process, when no one else can. He found that such a 'last-offer authority' in legislative amendments 'allows the Minister to avoid being rolled by an alliance of Partner and Opposition. She can do this because she can threaten to use the last offer to punish the partner for colluding with the Opposition' (Heller 2001: 787). If a government minister has such agenda powers, the risk of coalition failure due to intra-party conflict should be reduced *(Hypothesis 3)* as they help relevant government ministers to discipline their own parties and allow them credibly to commit to agreements with coalition partners.

One of the most direct institutional operationalisations of leadership powers in Laver's 'whipping game' is the power of the party whips. Döring (1995) employs a principal component analysis of a number of government agenda-setting powers in the plenary and committees of 17 European parliaments to identify three dimensions of governmental agenda control: priority for government business, the extent to which committees enjoy independent drafting authority in the legislative process and, crucially for our purposes, the whips' powers to discipline backbenchers. This factor loads highly on the whips' powers to recall and replace recalcitrant committee members of their party with more loyal party delegates and the government whips' powers to manipulate the voting order in the plenary (Döring 1995: 664–665). The more extensive the party whips' powers (as measured by Döring's factor scores for the countries in our sample), the better the chances of party leaders P and Q to ensure intra-party ratification of inter-party agreements and the lower the risk of cabinet termination due to intra-party and inter-party conflicts *(Hypothesis 4)*.

Delegation

In Strøm's (2001) model of coalition bargaining in the context of the 'Presthus debacle' in Norway (1987), payoffs are influenced by the actors' preferences (office, votes, policies), institutional constraints, stage of the electoral cycle and,

crucially for the present study, intra-party constraints imposed on party leaders. Strøm's starting point is that coalition bargaining may fail if a high level of uncertainty about intra-party ratification reduces the negotiators' ability to commit themselves to a particular bargaining outcome at the leadership level. Strøm (2001: 16) argues that

> Information asymmetry in coalition bargaining may in large part be a function of intra-party politics. Party leaders may know each other's personal preferences and yet be less than fully informed about the discretion each enjoys *vis-à-vis* his respective party. This goes at the heart of the assumption that parties bargain as unitary actors … It is often more fruitful to think of party leaders as agents of their respective parliamentary or extraparliamentary parties (their principals) in coalition bargaining. Because of variation in delegation regimes, party leaders may be constrained in different ways in these negotiations. Such constraints may strongly affect outcomes, and when bargaining fails, it may be because of how the hands of the agents are tied.

Whereas Laver's 'whipping game' is based on a hierarchical perspective, delegation models theorise how parliamentary institutions and intra-party delegation regimes affect the chief negotiators' ability to commit to an agreement in inter-party negotiations. Government backbenchers are likely to be more willing to ratify a coalition agreement, if they have *ex-post* devices at their disposal to monitor the other coalition party's (or parties') adherence to a deal. And explicit ratification of a coalition agreement through the vote of a party conference or the government parliamentary parties is a public commitment on behalf of the party at large.

Before delegation to ministers takes place, principals (such as government backbenchers) may seek to protect themselves by constraining agents through the use of contracts. Formal contracts may include coalition agreements committing the government and government parties to a particular set of policies. Such a contract could be sealed by an explicit ratification through party bodies or a parliamentary investiture vote. The existence of an explicit, mutually agreed coalition agreement provides a degree of *ex-ante* commitment and is expected to reduce the risk of a cabinet termination not only due to inter-party but also to intra-party conflict (*Hypothesis 5*). The investiture vote is often the formal parliamentary ratification of such an agreement. It gives parliamentary principals (i.e., the members of parliamentary parties) one last *ex-ante* chance to refuse delegation, if the coalition agreement is not satisfactory. Thus the existence of an investiture vote should initially increase the probability of a cabinet termination due to insufficient support within and between coalition parties. However, after this initial phase, the probability of a cabinet termination due to intra-party and inter-party conflict should decrease (*Hypothesis 6*).

A number of authors have highlighted the importance of institutions as *ex-post* mechanisms helping to reduce risks arising from delegation. This includes coalition committees and similar conflict-management devices set up by the government

parties (Strøm and Müller 1999a), the use of junior (non-cabinet) ministers shadowing ministers belonging to other parties (Thies 2001), the allocation of committee chairs to a coalition party other than the party to which the relevant minister belongs (allowing party experts of coalition parties to monitor other parties' cabinet ministers) (Kim and Loewenberg 2005), and the scrutiny powers of parliaments in the legislative process (Martin and Vanberg 2004, 2005). Some of these devices such as coalition committees are highly endogenous institutions: they tend to be set up or called upon, if and when coalitions already face serious inter-party and or intra-party disagreements. Their effect is therefore hard to test in causally oriented models. The use of junior ministers and legislative committee chairs as 'watchdogs' monitoring a coalition partner's ministers mainly capture inter-party delegation problems. Martin and Vanberg (2005: 97) investigate the importance of legislative committees in this context as they may provide members with opportunities 'to acquire the policy expertise necessary to revise complex legislation' as well as 'a tool that parties in a governing coalition can employ to manage the risks posed by ministerial discretion'. While Martin and Vanberg largely maintain the 'unitary-actor assumption' and apply their model to inter-party conflict, there is no reason why their reasoning should not be extended to delegation problems between government ministers and backbenchers of the same party, capturing the problem of intra-party disagreement and potential agency loss in coalition politics. The more extensive the independent drafting powers of legislative committees in a parliament, the better the chances for government backbenchers to keep tabs on 'their own' as well as the coalition partner's ministers, the lower the risk of a coalition termination resulting from both intra-party and inter-party conflicts *(Hypothesis 7)*.

Variable definitions, data and research design

The data used to test these hypotheses were mainly extracted from the Comparative Parliamentary Democracy Archive (available at http://www.pol.umu.se/ccpd). Some additional institutional data were taken from other published sources (Döring 1995; Heller 2001; Mattson and Strøm 1995) (see Table 9.1). For the purposes of this study, cabinet duration is defined as the period between a prime minister's appointment by the head of state (start) and one of the following terminal events: (a) any change in the set of parties holding cabinet membership, (b) any change in the identity of the head of government and (c) any general election, whether mandated by the end of the constitutional inter-election period (CIEP) or precipitated by a premature dissolution of parliament (Müller and Strøm 2000: 12).[2] The data set also provides information on the reasons for each termination (e.g., through early elections, the replacement of a cabinet without elections, intra-party conflict or inter-party conflict), which allows us to estimate the survival functions of cabinets that were terminated as a result of intra-party conflicts and compare them to analogous functions of other types of terminations (competing risks).

Table 9.1 Variable definitions

Variable	*Predicted operationalisation hazard ratio*	
Dependent variable	Hazard rate of cabinet termination (a) all cabinets (technical terminations censored) (b) cabinets terminated due to intra-party conflict (c) cabinets terminated due to inter-party conflict	
General attributes		
Cabinet majority status	<1	Dummy variable (1 if the cabinet controls 50%+1 seats)
Number of cabinet parties	>1	Number of parties represented in cabinet
Post-election status	<1	Dummy variable (1 if cabinet was formed Immediately after an election)
Ideological range in the cabinet	>1	Based on data extracted from the Comparative Manifesto Project
Whipping model		
Prime minister's dissolution power	<1	Dummy variable (1 if head of government can propose or decide to dissolve parliament)
Coalition discipline in legislation	<1	Dummy variable (1 if such a norm exists)
Government has last-amendment authority	<1	Dummy variable (1 if such a norm exists); source: Heller (2001: 783)
Whips' powers	<1	Factor scores from –1.26 (minimum) to 1.50 (maximum); source: Döring (1995: 684)
Delegation model		
Coalition agreement exists	<1	Dummy variable (1 if the answer is yes)
Investiture vote	>1	Dummy variable (1 if such a constitutional norm exists)
Drafting powers of parliamentary committees	<1	Factor scores from –1.71 (minimum) to 1.21 (maximum); source: Mattson and Strøm (1995: 299)
Interaction effect investiture vote x Time	<1	Calculated from the variable investiture vote and time of cabinet formation

Sources: Comparative Parliamentary Democracy Archive, if no references are given. Further variables taken from Döring (1995), Heller (2001) and Mattson and Strøm (1995).

The main dependent variable is the hazard rate of those cabinet terminations that are the result of intra-party conflict. The covariates used to test the seven institutional hypotheses formulated above are briefly summarised in Table 9.1, which also contains some basic information about data sources and about the theoretically expected causal direction of the covariates' effects. One difficulty with the data from the Comparative Parliamentary Democracy Archive is that our data *do not* provide any information on the number and nature of intra-party (and inter-party) conflicts that *did not* lead to cabinet terminations. Yet from an institutionalist

perspective the numerical ratio of those intra-party conflicts that led to cabinet dissolutions and those that did not is not the most interesting issue. The crucial questions for the purposes of this chapter are: Are there institutional mechanisms that systematically increase or reduce the risk of cabinet terminations due to intra-party conflict? To what extent does this risk exhibit specific distributional properties that distinguish it from other dissolutions (especially inter-party conflict)? This question can be addressed through a research strategy of studying *outcomes* rather than by tracing processes: 'Influence' as Martin (2000: 9) points out in a slightly different context, 'is best measured by looking at patterns of outcomes, asking whether they covary with characteristics of the legislative environment. Studies of activity alone are insufficient for testing claims about influence; patterns of outcomes will be more revealing.'

Hazard-rate models such as the Cox proportional hazards model employed here allow us to pursue such an outcome-based research strategy: They can be specified as 'competing risks models', if an event may occur for different reasons. In the context of our study, cabinets may fail due to (a) intra-party conflicts, (b) inter-party conflicts, or (c) a combination of both. Here, the technique of censoring is particularly useful. Technically, the competing-risks design can be operationalised through the right censoring of the appropriate records (see King *et al*. 1990). In all models estimated for this chapter, I censored the records of cabinets terminated for purely technical reasons (including regular scheduled elections), cabinets that ended within 10 per cent of the CIEP and those that were still in existence on 31 December 1999 (the endpoint of or 'window of observation'). This censoring regime was used to estimate the pooled hazards in models 3a and 3b (described later). For the estimation of intra-party conflict hazards, I additionally censored the records for cabinets exclusively terminated by inter-party conflict. For the estimation of the hazard rates for inter-party conflict, I censored technical terminations and cabinets terminated due to intra-party conflicts.

Intra-party conflict and cabinet termination: descriptive evidence

To what extent are intra-party conflicts a significant source of cabinet instability in consolidated European democracies? Our general definition of events terminating a cabinet includes purely 'technical' terminations that are not of central importance to this study, including *regular* elections at the end of the CIEP or the death of the head of government.[3] The focus of Table 9.1 and all other analyses in this chapter is on *discretionary terminations*. These include phenomena such as the voluntary enlargement of coalitions, parliamentary defeats at the hands of the opposition, conflicts between coalition parties over policy or personal matters, and conflict within any coalition party. Calculations based on the Comparative Parliamentary Democracy Archive show that approximately six out of ten cabinet terminations in European parliaments between 1945 and 1999 were discretionary; that is, they resulted from strategic choices made by relevant parties or their leaders. Despite minor differences, this is true for both coalition and single-party cabinets.

Of all those *coalition* cabinets terminated as a result of choices made by at least one of the actors, more than 60 per cent were destroyed by *inter-party* conflicts. Only one in seven of all discretionary terminations were triggered by conflicts *within* one or more of the parties represented in the relevant cabinet. In other words, most cabinets that were terminated as the result of actor choices ended because the parties disagreed with each other. However, the number of cabinets terminated due to disagreement *within* parties is not insignificant, especially if we consider the highly developed capacity of most parties in parliamentary systems of government to manage internal conflict and impose a high degree of discipline.

Table 9.2 provides a breakdown of intra-party conflicts that led to the termination of European cabinets between 1945 and 1999 by country and type of internal disagreement. The table distinguishes between different types of terminal intra-party conflicts, including conflicts (a) within the national party leadership, (b) between a united national party leadership and 'non-leaders' (e.g., parliamentary backbenchers or lower-ranking party members outside the parliament) and (c) within the national party leadership, but involving 'non-leaders' as well. Table 9.2 also demonstrates that nearly eight out of ten intra-party conflicts that led to cabinet terminations occurred within the national party leadership, with Italy, Germany, France and Ireland accounting for the vast majority of cases. In other words, within their own parties the most dangerous threats to incumbent cabinet ministers did not stem from government backbenchers or regional party leaders, but from their fellow party leaders in the national leadership (e.g., factional leaders).

These classifications offer some insights about the frequency of conflicts within government parties triggering discretionary terminations. The statistical method of event-history analysis allows estimations of the risk of a termination across the (potential) life course of a (coalition) cabinet. Figure 9.2 plots the estimated risk of a cabinet being terminated because of disagreements between two or more cabinet parties. The risk was pinpointed by censoring both technical terminations and terminations not due to inter-party disagreement. The graph demonstrates a sharp rise in the risk within approximately the first year of a coalition cabinet's 'life'. This high level of 'infant mortality' suggests that the parties discover the real cost of governing with one another early on. Those coalitions that do survive this initial 'shock' apparently begin to manage inter-party conflicts increasingly effectively, and the hazard rate gradually decreases as the coalition 'ages'. Towards the end of the CIEP – and with regular elections on the horizon – the competitive incentives begin to outweigh the perceived costs of breaking the government, and the hazard rate rises. The drop in the hazard rate shortly before day 1,500 suggests that technical terminations (due to scheduled elections) dominate the dynamics of cabinet dissolutions immediately before general elections.

The dynamics of cabinet survival are strikingly different for those coalition cabinets that are terminated as a result of conflict within at least one of the parties in government (see Figure 9.3). Although there is no strict linear pattern, the hazard rates for coalition terminations due to intra-party conflicts rise more

Table 9.2 Type of intra-party conflict leading to discretionary cabinet termination in Western Europe (1945–1999, by country)

Country	*No intra-party conflict*	*Intra-party conflict*			*Total*
		Within in national party leadership	*Between united national party leadership and non-leaders*	*In national party leadership involving non-leaders*	
Austria	19	2	1	0	22
Belgium	30	1	1	0	32
Denmark	30	0	0	1	31
Finland	43	1	0	0	44
France	17	5	0	1	23
Germany	18	6	2	0	26
Greece	10	1	0	0	11
Iceland	25	0	0	0	25
Ireland	15	5	0	2	22
Italy	32	19	0	0	51
Luxembourg	15	0	1	0	16
Netherlands	21	2	0	0	23
Norway	24	2	0	0	26
Portugal	14	0	0	0	14
Spain	5	0	1	2	8
Sweden	26	0	0	0	26
United Kingdom	19	1	0	0	20
Total *N*	363	45	6	6	420
Total per cent	86.43	10.71	1.43	1.43	
Per cent of intra-party conflicts		78.95	10.53	10.53	

Source: Comparative Parliamentary Democracy Archive (www.pol.umu.se/ccpd)

Please note: categories are not mutually exclusive

gradually and continuously throughout the lifetime of a cabinet. The hazard rates remain clearly below those for terminations due to inter-party disagreement (see Figure 9.2). Again, the risk of a discretionary cabinet termination accelerates in the year before scheduled elections, albeit not as strongly as in the case of terminations due to inter-party conflict.

A comparison of the two hazard functions confirms that the risks of discretionary coalition terminations due to both inter-party and intra-party conflict reach their peak in the year before scheduled elections. This is in line with Warwick's (1994) well-established and replicated empirical observations and Lupia and Strøm's (1995) game-theoretic model of cabinet termination. However, the dynamics before

Figure 9.2 Smoothed hazard rate of coalition cabinet failure resulting from inter-party conflict in 17 European democracies, 1945–1999. Calculated from data in the Comparative Parliamentary Democracy Archive.



Figure 9.3 Smoothed hazard rate of coalition cabinet failure resulting from intra-party conflict in 17 European democracies, 1945–1999. Calculated from data in the Comparative Parliamentary Democracy Archive.

scheduled elections differ. Inter-party disagreements have the potential to trigger the failure of a coalition from its very inception. In fact, the risk of an early failure is very high in such cases. The danger of intra-party disagreement to cabinet survival rises gradually over time. Backbenchers and rival party elites seem to grant party leaderships in government a certain 'honeymoon period', but if there is internal dissatisfaction the risk of coalition failure increases almost steadily.

Multivariate analysis

A Cox proportional hazards model was used to test the seven institutional hypotheses formulated in the second section. Five models are reported in Table 9.3. Models 1a and 1b estimate the risk of cabinet failure due to intra-party conflict. Specifications 1a and 1b reflect separate estimates for coalition cabinets (1a) and single-party cabinets (1b) as a number of covariates (the number of parties in the cabinet, the existence of a norm of coalition discipline in legislation and the existence of a public coalition agreement) capture information that is particular to coalitions, but irrelevant for single-party cabinets. Model 2, estimating the impact of the same covariates on the hazard of discretionary cabinet terminations resulting from inter-party conflict, can obviously only report for coalition cabinets. Models 3a and 3b again report the estimates for the pooled hazards separately for coalition and single-party cabinets.

The estimated coefficients in Table 9.3 are expressed as hazard ratios. Ratios equal to one indicate that as a covariate's value changes by one unit, the marginal change in the hazard is zero. Ratios greater than one imply that the hazard is increasing as the value of the covariate increases. In contrast, ratios less than one imply the hazard is decreasing as the value of the covariate increases. The three control variables exhibit the expected causal direction, although the estimated coefficients are not always statistically significant even at the 10 per cent level. This is largely due to the small number of cabinets failing due to the specific risk, especially with regard to cabinets terminated due to intra-party conflict. Cabinets enjoying a parliamentary majority are less likely to be terminated (and tend to be terminated later) than those that do not have a majority. Post-election status reduces and delays the risk of discretionary terminations across all models and is statistically significant at least at the 10 per cent level in four out of five models. The number of parties in the cabinet has the expected effect of increasing and accelerating the risk of discretionary terminations resulting from inter-party conflict. The insignificant coefficient for this variable for the risk of terminations resulting from intra-party conflict (model 1a) is not surprising.

Of the variables listed under the heading Coercion, only two have the expected effect across all five models: prime ministerial dissolution powers and the existence of a norm of coalition discipline in legislation. Again the estimated coefficients are not always statistically significant, especially in models with a small number of cases failing due to a particular risk. Nevertheless, the estimates for the covariate capturing prime ministerial dissolution powers demonstrates once again how powerful this instrument is and confirms earlier research by Huber (1996)

Table 9.3 Competing risks of discretionary cabinet terminations in European democracies, 1945–1999: Terminations due to intra-party conflict, inter-party conflict and pooled risks by cabinet type

	Terminations due to …				
	intra-party conflict		*inter-party conflict*	*All discretionary terminations*	
Covariates	*Coalition cabinets (1a)*	*Single-party cabinets (1b)*	*Coalition cabinets (2)*	*Coalition cabinets (3a)*	*Single-party cabinets (3b)*
General attributes	*Hazard ratios (standard errors in brackets)*				
Majority cabinet	0.48	0.55	0.48*	0.34***	0.32***
	(0.26)	(0.35)	(0.19)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Post-election status	0.72	0.34*	0.63*	0.48***	0.37***
	(0.36)	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Number of cabinet parties	0.78	—	1.47***	1.35***	—
	(0.19)		(0.18)	(0.14)	
Coercion					
Prime minister has dissolution power	0.37	0.89	0.42**	0.61*	0.94
	(0.23)	(0.47)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.26)
Coalition discipline in legislation	0.46	—	0.47*	0.52*	—
	(0.55)		(0.21)	(0.19)	
Government has right of last amendment	1.11	3.75**	0.61	0.76	1.44
	(0.75)	(2.49)	(0.28)	(0.25)	(0.42)
Whips' powers	1.92*	1.26	0.85	0.95	0.92
	(0.70)	(0.34)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.11)
Delegation					
Public coalition agreement exists	0.72	—	0.97	1.22	—
	(0.52)		(0.34)	(0.37)	
Investiture vote exists	2.92	6.04	4.65***	2.49**	2.45**
	(3.10)	(6.86)	(2.42)	(1.02)	(0.97)
Drafting powers of parliamentary committees	0.93	0.53**	0.84	0.81	0.57***
	(0.31)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.12)	(0.08)
Interaction effect investiture vote x time	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Log likelihood	–104	–68	–376	–529	–320
Chi^2	33.71***	22.95***	47.68***	64.53***	58.72***
N (number of cases failing due to risk)	193 (27)	143 (19)	193 (87)	193 (123)	143 (83)

Sources: See Table 9.1; ***: $p<0.01$; **: $p<0.05$; *: $p<0.10$

and Diermeier and Feddersen (1998). If the government has last amendment authority and the government party whips have extensive powers, the risk of a termination due to inter-party conflict is generally reduced (again, most coefficients are not statistically significant). This suggests that – as Laver (1999) suggests – intra-party whipping may increase the ability of a party leadership to commit to a coalition deal. However, the estimated coefficients for both of these covariates *increase and accelerate* the risk of coalition cabinet terminations due to intra-party conflict sharply and (in two cases) significantly in models 1a and 1b. In other words, party managers seem to face a trade-off between inter-party and intra-party conflict management.

Most of the covariates capturing institutional and intra-party delegation mechanisms also have the expected causal direction. The existence of a public coalition agreement tends to reduce and delay the risk of a discretionary cabinet termination for coalitions for both specifications, intra-party and inter-party conflict. This confirms, at least in principle, Strøm and Müller's (1999a) arguments about the effect of norms of coalition governance. If committees have independent drafting authority in the legislative process, the risk of discretionary cabinet terminations is reduced and delayed in all five models, although the effect is statistically significant in only two cases (models 1b and 3b). Generally, these findings provide some confirmation of the arguments presented by Martin and Vanberg (2004, 2005) and are generally in line with the logic of the arguments in Kim and Loewenberg's (2005) work. In most studies of cabinet survival the existence of an investiture vote is generally controlled for as an important control variable. For the purposes of this chapter the investiture vote was interpreted as a powerful institutional device allowing parties to commit to the support of a cabinet – or to remove it at an early stage. Indeed, an investiture vote increases and accelerates the risk of cabinet terminations sharply and significantly (at least in models 2, 3a and 3b). However, a test of the Schoenfeld residuals for the model overall and the individual covariates demonstrates that this covariate violates the proportional-hazard assumption underlying the Cox model used for our estimations. Following a strategy proposed by Box-Steffensmeier *et al*. (2003), the effect of non-proportionality was controlled for through an interaction effect with time. The estimated coefficients for this interaction variable are close to 1.0 (0.999). In other words, the investiture vote is an early test for a government. Those cabinets that survive this test are no longer affected by this institution at a later stage of their life courses.

In sum, the multivariate analyses carried out in this section offer some support for the seven institutional hypotheses derived from Laver's (1999) whipping and Strøm's (2001) delegation model; although the small number of relevant events and the high standard errors associated with some of the estimated coefficients frequently render the results statistically insignificant. One of the most interesting and unexpected findings is that extensive powers of the whips to discipline backbenchers in coalition games and single-party governments often increases and accelerates the risk of a termination due to intra-party dissent.

Conclusion

Using data from 17 European parliamentary democracies (1945–1999), the present chapter sought to shed light on one of the most intractable phenomena in the comparative (empirical) study of coalition politics: the impact of intra-party conflict on discretionary cabinet terminations – and the extent to which such risks can be reduced through political institutions. Although *inter-party* conflicts remain the most frequent cause of discretionary cabinet terminations (i.e., terminations based on the decisions of actors to end a cabinet before its 'natural death' at the end of a CIEP), intra-party conflicts contribute to decisions about terminations in a significant number of cases. Beyond these empirical observations, Laver's (1999) and Strøm's (2001) models lead us to expect significant interaction effects between inter-party bargaining and intra-party ratification not dissimilar to the logic of two-level games in the analysis of international negotiations (Putnam 1988).

Event-history analysis permits the analysis of 'competing risks' of discretionary cabinet terminations. This technique goes some way in mitigating the most serious methodological problem involved in the study of intra-party disagreement: comparative students of coalition politics do not usually have accurate information on the entire 'universe' of intra-party conflicts across a large number of cases, especially on those intra-party conflicts that did not lead to cabinet terminations. In this chapter an alternative approach was employed: using data on the 'lives' of cabinets in European democracies, I estimated the dynamics of cabinet survival across the relevant parliaments' CIEPs, comparing the hazard functions of cabinets that were terminated as a result of intra-party conflicts with the hazard functions of all those cabinets that failed prematurely due to inter-party disagreement. The results of this longitudinal approach to the study of cabinet survival reveal significant differences in the distribution of terminal events between these two types of cabinet termination. The most striking finding is that the highest risk of failure resulting from disagreement *between* coalition parties can be observed in the first few months after cabinet formation, followed by a strong drop in failure probabilities, which rise again as the next scheduled election approaches. In comparison, the risk of failure due to intra-party conflicts starts from a low level and increases almost steadily over time, peaking just before the next regular elections (Figures 9.2 and 9.3).

These dynamics influence the baseline hazards used to estimate the impact of institutional variables on the risk of cabinet terminations due to intra-party conflict. Predictions about the nature and likely influence of such institutional variables were derived from two game-theoretic models of coalition governance: Laver's (1999) 'whipping game' and a 'delegation model' of the type proposed by Druckman (1996) and Strøm (2001). A Cox proportional hazard model and a competing risks design were used to test seven hypotheses derived from these models. The main results are that effective mechanisms of intra-party delegation and accountability generally tend to reduce and delay the risk of discretionary cabinet terminations. These findings are in line with a number of institutional hypotheses proposed to explain variations in coalition governance (e.g., Kim and

Loewenberg 2005; Martin and Vanberg 2004, 2005; Strøm and Müller 1999a). Institutional mechanisms based on coercion, by contrast, had a more ambivalent impact. Whereas my estimates for the effects of prime ministerial dissolution powers confirm the findings of Diermeier and Feddersen (1998) and Huber (1996) that such powers reduce the risk of cabinet failure, the power of party whips and the authority of last amendment tend – unexpectedly – to increase and accelerate the risk of cabinet failure due to intra-party conflict.

Notes

1 The data on which this paper draws were collected by a multi-national team of researchers for a number of publications: Müller and Strøm (2000), and Strøm *et al*. (2003, 2008). The data are largely accessible through the Comparative Parliamentary Democracy Archive (http://www.pol.umu.se/ccpd). This project was supported in part by a grant to Torbjörn Bergman from the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation through the project on 'Constitutional Change and Parliamentary Democracy' (Project No. 1996-0801). I owe thanks to Magnus Blomgren, Elisabeth Gerber, Scott Kastner and Ben Nyblade for their invaluable assistance in preparing the data set and to Wolfgang C. Müller, Kaare Strøm and Paul Warwick for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this contribution. Needless to say that any remaining errors or opacities are my responsibility alone.

2 Resignations that were subsequently withdrawn or refused have been discounted. For a more detailed discussion see Warwick (1994: 27–30) and Laver (2003: 25–27).

3 Of course, the decision to continue a cabinet up to its maximum duration is a choice made by the actors, which is of interest.

References

Box-Steffensmeier, J. M. and Jones, B. S. (2004) *Event History Modeling: A Guide for Social Scientists*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Box-Steffensmeier, J. M., Reiter, D. and Zorn, C. (2003) 'Nonproportional hazards and event history analysis in international relations', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47(1): 33–53

Diermeier, D. and Feddersen, T. J. (1998) 'Cohesion in legislatures and the vote of confidence procedure', *American Political Science Review* 92(3): 611–21

Diermeier, D. and Stevenson, R. T. (1999) 'Cabinet survival and competing risks', *American Journal of Political Science* 43(5): 1051–68

Diermeier, D. and Stevenson, R. T. (2000) 'Cabinet terminations and critical events', *American Political Science Review* 94(3): 627–40

Döring, H. (1995) 'Is government control of the agenda likely to keep "Legislative Inflation" at Bay?', in H. Döring (ed.) *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*. New York: St Martin's Press, pp. 654–87

Druckman, J. N. (1996) 'Party factionalism and cabinet durability', *Party Politics* 2(3): 397–407

Gallagher, M., Laver, M. and Mair, P. (2006) *Representative Government in Modern Europe* (4th ed.). Boston: McGraw-Hill

Heller, W. B. (2001) 'Making policy stick: why the government gets what it wants in multiparty parliaments', *American Journal of Political Science* 45(4): 780–98

Huber, J. D. (1996) 'The vote of confidence procedure in parliamentary democracies', *American Political Science Review* 90(2): 269–82

Kim, D. and Loewenberg, G. (2005) 'The role of parliamentary committees in coalition governments: keeping tabs on coalition partners in the German Bundestag', *Comparative Political Studies* 38(9): 1104–29

King, G., Alt, J. E., Burns, N. E. and Laver, M. (1990) 'A unified model of cabinet dissolution in parliamentary democracies', *American Journal of Political Science* 34(3): 846–71

Laver, M. (1999) 'Divided parties, divided government,' *Legislative Studies Quartely* 24: 5–29

Laver, M. (2003) 'Government termination', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 6: 23–40

Lupia, A. F. and Strøm, K. (1995) 'Coalition termination and the strategic timing of parliamentary elections', *American Political Science Review* 89: 648–65

Martin, L. L. (2000) *Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press

Martin, L. W. and Vanberg, G. (2004) 'Policing the bargain: coalition government and parliamentary scrutiny', *American Journal of Political Science* 48(1): 13–27

Martin, L. W. and Vanberg, G. (2005) 'Coalition policymaking and legislative review', *American Political Science Review* 99(1): 93–106

Mattson, I. and Strøm, K. (1995) 'Parliamentary committees', in H. Döring (ed.) *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*. New York: St Martin's Press, pp. 249–306

Mershon, C. (2002) *The Costs of Coalition*. Stanford: Stanford University Press

Müller, W. C. and Strøm, K. (2000) 'Coalition governance in Western Europe: an introduction', in W. C. Müller and K. Strøm (eds) *Coalition Government in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Putnam, R. (1988) 'Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games', *International Organization* 42(3): 427–60

Saalfeld, T. (2007) 'Koalitionsstabilität in 15 europäischen Demokratien von 1945 bis 1999: Transaktionskosten und Koalitionsmanagement', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 38: 180–206

Strøm, K. (2001) 'Why did the Norwegian Conservative Party shoot itself in the foot?', in B. Grofman (ed.) *Political Science as Puzzle Solving*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 13–42

Strøm, K. and Müller, W. C. (1999a) 'The keys to togetherness: coalition agreements in parliamentary democracies', *Journal of Legislative Studies* 5(3–4): 255–82

Strøm, K. and Müller, W. C. (1999b) 'Political parties and hard choices', in W. C. Müller and K.Strøm (eds) *Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–35

Strøm, K. and Swindle, S. (2002) 'Strategic parliamentary dissolution', *American Political Science Review* 96(3): 575–91

Thies, M. F. (2001) 'Keeping tabs on partners: the logic of delegation in coalition governments', *American Journal of Political Science* 45(3): 580–98

Tsebelis, G. (1992) *Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics*. Berkeley: University of California Press

Tsebelis, G. (2002) *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation/Princeton: Princeton University Press

Warwick, P. V. (1994) *Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

PART IV

Intra-party politics at the EU level

10 The puzzle of continuing party group cohesion in the European Parliament after Eastern enlargement

Stefanie Bailer

Introduction

Loud internal clashes in the Conservative Party Group of the European Parliament – the European People's Party/European Democracy (EPP-ED) – about whether the German Elmar Brok or the Pole Jacek Saryusz-Wolski would chair the Foreign Affairs Committee[1] or the recent change to the statute of the European People's Party in the European Parliament officially allowing the British Tories to have a differing view on the European Constitution, demonstrated that even the largest party groups may suffer from ideological disunity.[2] Their desire to become the largest party group in the European Parliament by including quite diverse parties from all EU countries probably came at the price of increasing ideological heterogeneity.[3] Critical voices such as the one from the French MEP Jean-Jacques Bourlanges about the increasing lack of cohesion within party groups in the European Parliament as well as controversial issues such as the federalist structures in the (former) EU 'Constitution' make one realise that party cohesion varies. These quoted episodes and comments stand in contrast with the very cohesive voting behaviour of the party groups in the European Parliament – a puzzle for which I suggest two possible explanations in this chapter.

Recent studies of the transnational party groups in the European Parliament have found that these groups show an astonishingly high degree of cohesion, considering that they comprise a large number of different parties and nations of the EU (Hix 2002b; Hix *et al*. 2003, 2007; Kreppel 2002).[4] The high cohesion of European party groups is surprising, considering that the ideological positions of parties within them differ considerably. An analysis of party manifestos by Pennings (2002) demonstrated that the national parties united in the Socialist group of the European Parliament as well as the group of Green parties are ideologically closer than the Conservative group of the European People's Party. McElroy and Benoit (2007: 832) found a similar result using expert estimates on party positions. However, all groups show a similar level of cohesion when it comes to voting behaviour, as measured using roll-call vote data (Hix *et al*. 2007). Theoretically, one would not expect such a high level of coherent voting behaviour from MEPs because – compared with national legislators from federative states – they are faced with the problem of representing apart from their ideology numerous principals such as their national party, their constituency and their transnational

party group (Bailey and Brady 1998; Epstein and O'Halloran 1999; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). This phenomenon is enhanced by the fact that national parties still control access to the seats in the European Parliament, but that MEPs have to work within transnational groups as soon as they become members. Furthermore, we would have expected that party group cohesion decreases with an influx of MEPs from the new EU member states; however, as Hix *et al*. (2006) show, cohesion does not significantly decrease. Thus, we do not yet know whether the stated level of cohesion might be due to effective party discipline mechanisms by the party leaders or due to the adaptation behaviour of new party members.

This chapter approaches such a question as an empirical puzzle and suggests a way to find a solution (Grofman 2001). In the first part, I present a theoretical overview of the factors influencing cohesion in party groups. In the second part, using survey data from the European Parliament Research Group, I show that the cohesion of the party groups is challenged by even more tension after Eastern enlargement, a fact that analysis based only on roll-call vote data would not indicate. Finally I consider these findings as a background for a research agenda on party group discipline in order to explain the persistence of party group cohesion in the European Parliament even following enlargement.

State of research

Political parties are the product of an efficient representation mechanism between voters and their deputies and are regarded as a legitimate means to participate in democratic forms of government (Müller 2000). Voters delegate the task of making decisions to their representatives. Political parties solve the problem of collective choice, to find a common decision and are an institutional solution to control party members in order to deliver public goods. Thus parties are a mechanism to keep parliamentarians accountable to the voters (Cox and McCubbins 1994; Müller 2000) and function as constraints of parliamentary decision behaviour (Damgaard 1995: 308). They ensure their credibility if they fulfil the promises which they have given in election campaigns (Bowler *et al*. 1998). In order to fulfil the mission of the voters, parties behave coherently and thus increase their chances of winning in parliamentary voting situations (Cox and McCubbins 1994). Cohesive parties thus allow the principal voter to control its agent, the deputy and to reduce its subjective risk (Müller 2000). The mechanism functions well because party candidates profit from parties by using the party label for information saving purposes (Downs 1957). The party label facilitates voters' judgements as to how candidates are going to behave when they are elected. As a result, parties reduce transaction costs such as the costs of information, negotiation, decision and implementation.

A reason for parties to defect from the orders of the principal might be the representation of interests other than the one from the party (Müller 2000: 321). The cohesion of a group is thus reliant on the concrete mechanisms available to provide positive and negative incentives for maintaining cohesion among

its members: the resources the group can offer to the member, as well as the costs the group may impose on members deciding to defect or leave the group. Moreover, the party group control mechanisms influence cohesion. According to Hechter (1983), this influence consists of the sanction and monitoring capacity of the group. Cox and McCubbins (1994) develop the argument that party leaders internalise the collective interest of the party and therefore monitor, reward cooperating and punish non-cooperating party group members. The following factors are known to influence the voting cohesion of parliamenty party groups.

Ideology

A crucial variable influencing party group voting cohesion is the ideological unity of a party group. The closer the ideological preference of parliamentary party group members, the easier it is to maintain voting cohesion among the group. Constitutionally, most MPs are only obliged to follow their conscience (Heidar and Koole 2000b: 255). In reality however, they have to ask themselves whether it might not be more rational to follow the party line. When the preferences of delegates are distributed on a political dimension, the votes that are undecided between the status quo and a newly suggested policy are especially susceptible to influence by party leaders. In particular, in a two-party system such as the US Congress, the question becomes relevant which party leader can reaffirm a majority for his own position by exercising pressure on his party members or by gaining votes from the opposing party group who might be closer to his opinion than members of his own party group. In the context of the US Congress, Krehbiel (1993) refers to this question as the 'Party or Preference' debate: If personal preference and the opinion of the party are in conflict, Krehbiel claims that the influence of the party distinctly decreases, although other scholars argue instead that the influence of parties did not decrease in the twentieth century in the US Congress (Binder *et al*. 1999; Cox and McCubbins 1991).

It is not completely clear whether the ideological proximity of party groups differs according to the various partisan ideologies. Damgaard (1995) puts forward the view that ex-Communist parties, for instance, are more disciplined than Liberal or Conservative groups. This result is confirmed by Pennings (2002) who finds that the Socialist grouping in the EP forms an ideologically closer group than the Conservatives – a result echoed elsewhere (Heidar and Koole 2000a: 18). However, the empirical evidence of this claim remains tentative.

Voters

Parliamentarians are expected to represent the interests of their voters (Peltzman 1985) in order to get re-elected (Mayhew 1974). If deputies consider it more beneficial to follow their voters' views than their party's when these opinions diverge, they tend to side with voters rather than party (Piketty 2000). Furthermore, the influence of the voters is stronger the more directly they can influence the re-election of a candidate (Bowler and Farrell 1993). If they are elected in a majority system,

MPs are more responsive to voters' interests than MPs voted on national or regional party lists (Rasch 1999). Thus, election systems in which it is possible to indicate a personal preference for a candidate are expected to lead to more heterogeneity in party groups than election systems where the candidates are voted on closed party lists as in the Netherlands (Hix 2003).

National parties

In the case of the European Parliament, national parties act as additional principals since they control the recruitment of party candidates. This is especially likely in federal systems such as Switzerland or the European Union. In these cases the party whip or the head of the party group at the supranational level has no control over candidacies in particular constituencies, since candidate selection is carried out on the national or subnational level. The more decentralised the candidate recruitment, the smaller the influence of the party group (Bowler *et al*. 1999; Carey 2007; Whiteley and Seyd 1999). In the European Parliament the national election of the MEPs explains why the preferences of the MEPs do not 'shift to the European level' (Wessels 1999) as some neo-functionalists believed would happen (Haas 1958) and why sometimes national delegations are motivated to defect from the party group opinion (Raunio 1999). A recent example of an efficient control system to monitor the behaviour of Labour MEPs in the European Parliament was recently introduced by Blair (Messmer 2003). Within this system the prime minister asked certain MEPs to report regularly to the British government so that he would be constantly informed about the developments within the European Socialist groups and the behaviour of the Labour MEPs.

Committees

Committees within parliaments also exercise influence on parliamentarians. Committees are specialised working *fora* in which deputies collect expertise and information concerning a policy and offer this service to the legislature. Often parliamentarians work in those committees in which they have the most intense interest (Weingast and Marshall 1988). The concentrated work on certain issues may also mean that deputies develop opinions apart from their party mainstream and turn into 'preference outliers' who have to be 're-integrated' into the party group (Londregan and Snyder 1994; Müller 2000: 316). In the US Congress both types of committees can be found: committees with outsider opinions and committees which are representative of the opinions in the parties (Londregan and Snyder 1994: 262). In order to guarantee party cohesion, party groups attempt to ensure that committees allow specialised opinions only to the extent that they can still be integrated in the party group (Shepsle and Weingast 1994:163). In this sense, committees may serve as information experts who offer their expertise to the party but do not necessarily represent outsider opinions (Krehbiel 1991). Such experts often act as 'voting signals' by indicating openly

to their party group how to vote in the plenary. The party group leader will always try to ensure that the party group members provide expertise but that they only develop into preference outliers who can be integrated into the party group (Shepsle and Weingast 1994: 163). Mostly, the party group can exert control by regulating which MP is serving in which committee (Damgaard 1992; Mattson and Strøm 1995).

Party group coordination

While the topic of party cohesion has already attracted much scrutiny, less attention has been paid to party group control mechanisms. Comparative studies on party control are currently limited to a handful of studies of Western European parliaments (Damgaard 1992), about the United Kingdom and Germany (Lee and Shaw 1979) and Northern European parliaments (Arter 1984; Damgaard 1992). Some studies investigate how party group coordinators deal with party group members deflecting in certain countries (Norton 1975; Saalfeld 1995). Carey (2007) analyses the extent to which institutional factors such as federalism or presidential systems affect party cohesion, but focuses mostly on South American and East European countries and does not mention party group coordination mechanisms. Other projects investigate to what extent ideological distance between government members and institutional veto players influence speed and success of legislation (Saalfeld and Becker 2000) but do not explicitly talk about the influence of party group coordination. Analyses about Western European legislatures find relatively coherent voting behaviour and trace this back to effective party disciplinary mechanisms, but they demonstrate the actual mechanism only in individual cases (Damgaard 1992: 317; Messmer 2003).

The party group leadership has various means to motivate its deputies to behave according to the party line. Party control can be exercised by applying internal party mechanisms or using the parliamentary delegation chain (Müller 2000: 319). Party leaders control not only the nomination of deputies to certain committees in many parliaments, but also the legislative agenda, office space, staff resources and so on (Carey 2007). The party grants access to offices and services whereas the party member offers behaviour conforming to the party line. Therefore, the power of the party depends on the extent to which it controls the candidates' access to their electoral seats as well as the parliamentary position. The more dependent a party member is on receiving a candidacy or keeping his/her parliamentary seat on a party list, the higher will be the influence of the party. The influence of a party decreases when a deputy is not interested in its position anymore, the so-called 'last-period problem' (Zupan 1990). The younger a representative, the more we can expect a voting behaviour according to the party line because the group will exercise a dominant influence on his career for quite a while. In some instances, an effective sanction mechanism is the withdrawal of deputies from their preferred committees (Damgaard 1992: 318–319). Other forms of punishment apart from blocking a re-election or a participation in a preferred committee are warnings or isolation within the party as well as expulsion

from the party group (Damgaard 1992: 320). The German party group leader of EPP-ED, Hans-Gert Pöttering, used this extreme measure against Roger Helmer in 2005 when the Briton had voted in favour of a motion of censure against Commission President Barroso against the decision of the party group.

Apart from these negative sanctions, positive sanctions such as attractive parliamentary positions or better office allocation or attractive travels allow rewarding behaviour according to party line.

Certain reporting mechanisms are also methods with which parties can enforce party discipline. Accordingly cabinet ministers often report to their respective parties about proceedings within the government. The party principals monitor their agents directly with 'police patrol oversight' or ask third persons for reporting the behaviour according to 'fire alarm oversight' (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). This form of control is assumed by the 'whips' in the British or the European parliaments. These whips closely monitor members' voting behaviour as well as their attendance in parliament for important votes, and initiate more or less drastic measures in response to dissenting voting behaviour. For instance, the party whip of the European People's Party informed all members of the party group when some parliamentarians did not stick to the party line or were not present during a crucial vote on the European monetary union in May 1998.

Empirical evidence

In this section, I present evidence for my argument that additional variables have to be taken into account when considering party group cohesion. As empirical corroboration, I compare the European Parliament before and after Eastern enlargement in 2004, given the expectation that this huge influx of MEPs from new Central and Eastern Europe would pose an enormous challenge for party group cohesion. A substantial number of parliamentarians from new member countries not only meant a possible learning period in which the newcomers had to learn the rules of the house, but also meant a likely increase in the heterogeneity of preferences. Within the European integration literature, there have been some attempts in predicting future conflicts after Eastern enlargement; for example, Zimmer *et al*. (2005) as well as König and Bräuninger (2000) predicted for the Council of Ministers a stronger heterogeneity of preferences. While there have been no studies on future conflicts in the European Parliament to my knowledge, it seems fair to assume that the differences between old and new member states concerning history, democratic experience and economic structure might lead to more divergences in the European party groups.

More insight into the pressures and voting behaviour of MEPs can be gained by looking at survey data from the European Parliament Research Group (EPRG) survey.[5] Simon Hix and his colleagues David Farrell, Roger Scully and Mark Johnson asked the members of the European Parliament in 2000 and 2006 about several aspects of their decision-making and relationships to various principals next to information on their attitudes to representation, general policies and specific EU policies. The first EPRG survey in 2000 was completed by 195 of 626 members

(31% response rate) and represented a good sample of the total population of the European Parliament (Hix 2002: 280). The second EPRG survey in 2006 had a response rate of 37.2% (Farrell 2006: 746). A tentative evaluation of the differences between MEPs is possible by comparing their different attitudes towards representation. Table 10.1 lists the answers of the MEPs to the question of how important it is to represent the national voters in 2000 and 2006.

In nearly all of the five big party groups we see an increase in the desire to represent the national party voters which might lead to more conflict in the European party groups, which try to unite the differing party groups in a unified voice in the voting process. The *t*-test of difference of means between the two surveys for the variable 'Importance of representing the national party voter' was significant at 1% for the two big party groups – the EPP and the Social Democrats – whereas it was not statistically significant for the three smaller party groups. However, this increase is only to some extent due to MEPs from the new member states. Their answers do not differ very much from the replies of their party group colleagues in 2006, and in some groups such as the Social Democrats the mean is even lower. For this variable, the *t*-test of difference of means was significant at 1% between party groups and between the old and new member states only for the Social Democrats. The wish for a stronger consideration of the national party voters is also shared by their colleagues from the old EU member states. One explanation for this more nationally oriented representation behaviour of the MEPs in some cases may stem form the election systems through which they were elected into office. Of the ten new member states, seven use a voting system which is either open or ordered, allowing a preferential vote for a candidate (Farrell and Scully 2005). Only three countries (Hungary, Poland and Estonia) apply a closed voting system in which the candidates are determined by the national party and where voters have no choice between different candidates; the share of countries with a closed voting system thus dropped from 40 to 34% in the enlarged European Parliament.

Another variable illustrating the conflict between the national party principal and the transnational European party group principal is the response to the following question: 'In many cases people have different views concerning matters before the European Parliament. On which of the following would you be most inclined to base your decision in such cases?' MEPs could indicate a first, second or third choice. I have only looked at those persons who put the European party group before the national party preference and compare the share of the MEPs in the former and the current European Parliament in columns 4–6 of Table 10.1. Again, in all party groups but the EUL/NGL the share of MEPs who would rather follow their European party group principal than their national voters has significantly dropped. The *t*-test of means for the variable 'Percentage of MEPs who prefer to follow the views of their European Party Group instead of their national party' between the 2000 and 2006 survey was significant at 1% for the Christian Democrats, the Social Democrats and the Greens, whereas it was not for the Liberals and the EUL/NGL. The largest drop in party group orientation is experienced by the group of Socialists and the Greens who therefore seem to be challenged with more nationally oriented party group members in the new

Table 10.1 Attitudes of MEPs towards national party voters and the European party groups

	*Mean importance of representing the national party voter in the European Parliament**			*Percentage of MEPs who prefer to follow the views of their European party group instead of their national party***		
	2000	*2006*	*2006*	*2000*	*2006*	*2006*
Party Groups	*All*	*All*	*New*	*All*	*All*	*New*
European People's Party/European Democracy (EPP-ED)	3.7 (1.8, 69)	4.4 (0.83, 67)	4.6 (0.69, 19)	39.19 (74)	22.11 (95)	25 (24)
Party of European Socialist (PES)	3.4 (1.2, 60)	4.1 (1.1, 57)	3.42 (1.21, 12)	70.31 (64)	39.73 (73)	35 (17)
Alliance for Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)	4.1 (1.01, 19)	3.8 (1.24, 12)	3.78 (1.48, 9)	55 (20)	36.36 (44)	60 (10)
Greens and Allies (G/EFA)	4.08 (1.3, 14)	4.1 (1.24, 10)	5 (0,1)	61.54 (13)	16.67 (18)	10 (1)
European United Left/ Nordic Green Left (EUL/NGL)	3.71 (1.3, 14)	4 (0.94, 10)	4 (0,2)	35.71 (14)	40 (15)	40 (5)
Average	3.72 (1.21, 189)	4.16 (1, 206)	4.11 (0.99, 53)	50	29.04	33.82

* 1 = of little importance, 5 = of great importance, standard deviation and number of cases in brackets
** number of cases in brackets

legislature from 2004 to 2009. This survey result is not in line with previous findings that compared the ideological cohesion of party groups and found a high level for the Social Democrats. Once more, the drop is not only due to more nationally oriented MEPs from Eastern Europe. Further analyses of the data show that the MEPs from the new member states are not more nationally oriented on this question than their colleagues. In the EPP-ED and the ALDE party groups, the Eastern European parliamentarians are even more oriented towards the party groups than the average of their group in 2006. Between the old and new member states and between party groups the *t*-test of means was significant at 1% only for the Liberal party group.

In the following section, I look at the efforts of the party group leadership to unite the party groups. For this purpose I compare the answers of the MEPs on questions concerning voting recommendation and contacts with the national and European party leadership. The results in Table 10.2 show that the national parties slightly increased the frequency with which they issue voting recommendations to their national MEPs. By contrast, the voting recommendations by the European party groups roughly stayed the same. The European party group leaders and their whips issue voting instructions to their members, via voting lists, on nearly all votes. National parties, however, counsel their representatives in the European

Table 10.2 Voting instructions from national and European party leaders

	*Voting instructions from the national party**			*Voting instructions from the European party group leader**		
Party group	*2000 All*	*2006 All*	*2006 New*	*2000 All*	*2006 All*	*2006 New*
European People's Party/European Democracy (EPP-ED)	2.20 (1.19,67)	2.25 (0.95, 60)	2.31 (1.01, 16)	4.47 (1.02, 71)	4.16 (1.13, 62)	4.18 (0.95,17)
Party of European Socialist (PES)	2.08 (0.97,61)	2.29 (1.07, 56)	2 (0.91,13)	4.46 (1.06, 63)	4.39 (1.06, 56)	4.62 (0.65, 13)
Alliance for Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)	1.75 (0.97,20)	2.06 (1.22, 36)	2.12 (0.99,8)	3.9 (1.12, 20)	4.13 (1.16, 37)	4.25 (1.16, 8)
Greens and Allies (G/EFA)	1.92 (0.76, 13)	1.81 (0.98, 11)	4 (0,1)	4.61 (1.12, 13)	4.33 (1.37, 12)	5 (0,1)
European United Left/ Nordic Green Left (EUL/NGL)	2.69 (1.44, 13)	2.91 (1.30,11)	3 (1.73,3)	4 (1.41, 13)	3.63 (1.21,11)	5 (0,3)
Average	2.19 (1.15)	2.25 (1.09)	2.31 (1.09)	4.29 (1.16)	4.05 (1.24)	4.09 (1.11)

* (1 = never, 5 = on almost every vote), standard error and number of cases in parentheses

Parliament far less frequently. In some instances, spectacular failures of EU laws such as the Takeover Directive in 2001, which was vetoed in the European Parliament due to the German government pressure on the German MEPs, illustrate the potential of national party instructions to cause conflict with the interests of European Parliament groupings. However, Hix *et al*. (2003) found that members in the European Parliament who are from parties in government have a positive influence on party cohesion. It seems that governments exert pressure on parliamentarians from their party to ensure the final adoption of laws in the European Parliament, which they have already agreed on in the Council of Ministers.

The impression of the somewhat increased level of voting recommendation from the side of national parties and the similar level of the European party groups is confirmed by the results for the frequency of contacts with the national party leaders in contrast with the contacts with the European party group leaders (results not listed here). In all of the five major party groups in the European Parliament, the contacts with the national party leadership intensified after 2004 whereas the frequency of contacts with the European party group leadership stayed the same after enlargement. Moreover, the MEPs from the 2004 accession member states are confronted with more frequent contacts to their national party leadership than their party group colleagues from the old member states. The reason for this might be that party leaders from Eastern Europe might consider the European Parliament as a possible arena for national influence.

When we compare the ideologies of MEPs in the new and old European Parliament from the MEP survey, we find that the party groups did not become ideologically more heterogeneous after enlargement. Table 10.3 displays the ranking of the MEPs on the left–right spectrum ranging from 1 (left) to 10 (right).

Table 10.3 Left–right placements of MEPS before and after enlargement

	Left–right placement		
Party group	*Mean, 2000 All*	*Mean, 2006 All*	*Mean, 2006 New*
European People's Party/European Democracy (EPP-ED)	6.24 (1.39,72)	6.8 (1.19, 65)	7.58 (0.84, 19)
Party of European Socialist (PES)	3.24 (1.07,62)	3.18 (0.96,55)	3.39 (0.77, 13)
Alliance for Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)	5.56 (1.29, 18)	5.43 (1.48,37)	6 (1.07, 8)
Greens and Allies (G/EFA)	3 (1.21,12)	3.09 (1.04,11)	4 (0,1)
European United Left/ Nordic Green Left (EUL/NGL)	1.92 (1.07,14)	1.91 (0.83,11)	2.33 (1.15, 3)

Whereas the Conservatives shifted a bit more to the political right, the other party groups remained pretty much at the same ideological positions. The standard deviations indicating the ideological spread of the various party groups also show that the groups have not necessarily become more diverse in their opinions considering the relatively rough measure of left–right self-placement. However, in all party groups the deputies from the ten new member states deviate somehow from the overall political position of the party group. This is especially evident in the case of the Conservatives and the Green party groups, which both had to face the challenge of integrating these new MEPs smoothly in order to retain their level of cohesion.

The amazing fact, however, is the result by Hix and Noury (2006), who found that actual voting cohesion did not decrease in the sixth European Parliament (2004–2009). Table 10.4 reproduces the results by Hix and Noury (2006) who measured the cohesion of party groups before and after Eastern enlargement using a cohesion index where a value of one means total cohesion of a group when everyone is voting the same way. The table shows that there seems to have been very little change in the cohesion of the groups. In four of the five biggest party groups, we find a very small drop in cohesion which is, however, not

Table 10.4 Absolute cohesion of European party groups

Party Group	*EP5 (1999–2004)*	*EP6 (2004–05)*	*Change*	*No of nations represented in EP5**	*No of nations represented in EP6*	*Share of newcomers from the new member states in EP6*
European People's Party/European Democracy (EPP-ED)	0.866	0.858	–0.008	15	27	42%
Party of European Socialist (PES)	0.901	0.900	–0.001	15	27	20%
Alliance for Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)	0.882	0.870	–0.012	10	22	12%
Greens and Allies (G/EFA)	0.923	0.910	–0.13	11	13	1%
European United Left/Nordic Green Left (EUL/NGL)	0.798	0.861	+0.063	10	14	5%
Average	0.802	0.814	+0.012			

Source: Hix and Noury (2006: 27).
* The data in the last three columns are derived from Bale and Taggart (2006)

proportional to the intake of MEPs from new member states or the share of newcomers in the party groups. Whereas the EPP-ED party group had to deal with 42% of the newcomers from Central and Eastern Europe as well as Cyprus and Malta, other party groups had far less change. Yet very small changes in cohesion are similar across all parties.

Discussion and further research

One explanation for the above findings could be that the roll-call votes in the European Parliament do not illustrate the whole decision-making process within the party groups. Most of the analyses of party group cohesion in the European Parliament are based on roll-call votes and thus suffer from two drawbacks: roll-call votes are not representative for the overall number of votes because they are only used in 30% of all votes (Hix 2001) and they tend to be used more frequently in matters of lesser importance rather than on crucial legislative decisions (Carrubba *et al*. 2006). Furthermore, roll-call votes are frequently requested in order to control group members (Carrubba *et al*. 2006) or to signal a certain stance towards other groups, the national electorate or other EU institutions (Kreppel 2002).

Another interpretation of these overall findings is that MEPs from the new member states have impressively adapted to the parliamentary decision-making in the party groups. It is conceivable that these deputies consciously choose a certain behavioural strategy in order to adapt well to the new environment (Bailer *et al*. 2007). These MEPs might choose to first adapt to the European party groups in order to learn the rules and act according to a 'logic of appropriateness' (March and Olsen 1989). This would be the exact opposite of the 'loud and proud' behaviour (Szczepanik 2006) sometimes observed by a few of the Polish MEPs. Such an 'adaptive' behaviour of the governments of the new EU member states is also found in analyses of the Council voting decision after 2004 where no deviating behaviour of new member states' governments could be found so far (Hagemann forthcoming; Mattila 2006, 2007). Some early interview evidence from my ongoing research confirms this, because the interviewed civil servants from the party groups, journalists and politicians thus far underline the impression that the integration of their colleagues from new accession states has so far worked smoothly.

However, the descriptive data show that also the MEPs from the old member states think more nationally and contribute more to intra-party tensions. In spite of a smooth integration of the new members into the party groups, the party groups are still faced with an overall distinctly less European and more nationally oriented approach to representation. The puzzle between intra-party tensions and a high level of party voting cohesion should serve to focus attention on the neglected role of party group coordination (Thomassen *et al*. 2004). Thus, the descriptive data results pave the way for further research investigating party control mechanisms. The disciplinary mechanisms can first be distinguished in institutional possibilities for influence such as the possibility to regulate the composition of committees (Sieberer 2006), government position, party and party group positions.

Second, the less formal, non-institutionalised possibilities for influence such as intensified communication with the party and party group leader, control of the access to the media, rewards such as travel and better office allocation (Carey 2007) or better information access (Heidar and Koole 2000b) have to be taken into account. Further research should concentrate on a more fine-tuned measurement of the various disciplinary mechanisms of party group leaders in order to be able to account for their influence.[6]

In the theoretical part of this chapter I have argued that party control mechanisms are a necessary, if insufficiently explored, variable in order to explain why party groups agree in voting, despite ideological differences among members, possibly leading to fierce discussions before the adoption of a law. Based on empirical evidence I have shown that there is an explanatory gap between the tensions of MEPs and their final cohesive voting behaviour in the European Parliament. In this way, I adhere to a 'puzzle-solving approach' (Grofman 2001) in order to find an explanation why increasing tension and pressures within party groups do not lead to a decrease in voting cohesion.

Notes

1 *European Voice* 13(4), 1 February 2007, 'Committee chairs finally saddle up'.
2 Available online at http//www.euractiv.com, accessed 13 February 2004.
3 Information provided by interview partners in the European Parliament who were questioned about party group discipline for the research project 'Party Group Discipline and its Influencing Factors', see note 5.
4 Following Hazan (2003: 679) and others I distinguish party cohesion from party discipline. While the former is simply a behavioral observation that members of a particular party tend to vote together, the latter implies that party unity is obtained not because of similar preferences of the MPs, but by disciplining mechanisms of the political parties.
5 Available online at http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/EPRG/.
6 The author of this chapter is currently in the process of conducting qualitative structured interviews in four national assemblies and the European Parliament to gather this information in order to compile a comparative measure of party group disciplinary mechanisms across nations and countries for the research project 'Party Group Discipline and its Influencing Factors', a project funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation, under the guidance of Stefanie Bailer, University of Zurich and Simon Hug, University of Geneva.

References

Arter, D. (1984) *The Nordic Parliaments: A Comparative Analysis*. London: C. Hurst.

Bailey, M. and Brady, D. W. (1998) 'Heterogeneity and representation: the Senate and free trade', *American Journal of Political Science* 42(2): 524–44

Bailer, S., Hertz, R. and Leuffen, D. (forthcoming 2008) 'Oligarchization, Formalization, Adaptation? Linking Sociological Theory and EU Enlargement Research', *Journal of European Public Policy*

Bale, T. and Taggart, P. (2006) 'First timers yes, virgins no: the roles and backgrounds of new members of the European Parliament', *Sussex European Institute Working Paper* 89

Binder, S. A., Lawrence, E. D. and Maltzman, F. (1999) 'Uncovering the hidden effect of party', *Journal of Politics* 61(3): 815–31

Bowler, S. and Farrell, D. M. (1993) 'Legislator shirking and voter monitoring: impacts of European Parliament electoral systems upon legislator–voter relationships', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31(1): 45–69

Bowler, S., Farrell, D. M. and Katz, R. S. (1998) *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press

Bowler, S., Farrell, D. M. and Katz, R. S. (1999) 'Party cohesion, party discipline, and parliaments' in S. Bowler, D. M. Farrell and R. S. Katz (eds) *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, pp. 3–22

Carey, J. M. (2007) 'Political institutions, competing principals, and party unity in legislative voting', *American Journal of Political Science* 51(1): 92–107

Carrubba, C. J., Gabel, M., Murrah, L., Clough, R., Montgomery, E. and Schambach, R. (2006) 'Off the record: unrecorded legislative votes, selection bias and roll call vote analysis', *British Journal of Political Science* 36(4): 691–704

Cox, G. W. and McCubbins, M. (1991) 'On the decline of party voting in congress', *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 16(4): 547–70

Cox, G. W. and McCubbins, M. D. (1994) *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*. Berkeley: University of California Press

Damgaard, E. (ed) (1992) *Parliamentary Change in the Nordic Countries*. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press

Damgaard, E. (1995) 'How parties control committee members' in H. Döring (ed.) *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*. St Martin's: Campus Damgaard 1995: 309–25

Downs, A. (1957) *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper and Row

Epstein, D. and O'Halloran, S. (1999) *Delegating Powers. A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Farrell, D. M. and Scully, R. (2005) 'Electing the European Parliament: how uniform are "uniform" electoral systems', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 43(5): 969–84

Farrell, D. M., Hix, S., Johnson, M. and Scully, R. (2006). 'A survey of MEPs in the 2004-2009 European Parliament', paper presented at the Annual Conference of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, 31 August–3 September 2006

Grofman, B. (2001) 'Introduction: the joy of puzzle solving' in B. Grofman (ed.) *Political Science as Puzzle Solving*. Michigan: University of Michigan Press, pp. 1–77

Haas, E. B. (1958) *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950–57*. Stanford: Stanford University Press

Hagemann, S. and Declerck-Sachsse, J. (2007) 'Old Rules, New Game. Decision-Making in the Council of Ministers after the 2004 Enlargement', Centre for Economic Policy Studies. Special Report. March 2007

Hazan, R. Y. (2003) 'Does Cohesion Equal Discipline? Towards a Conceptual Delineation'. *Journal of Legislative Studies* 9(4): 1–11

Hechter, M. (1983) 'A theory of group solidarity' in M. Hechter (ed.) *Microfoundations of Macrosociology*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp. 16–57

Heidar, K. and Koole, R. (2000a) 'Approaches to the study of parliamentary party groups', in K. Heidar and R. Koole (eds) *Parliamentary Party Groups in European Democracies. Political Parties Behind Closed Doors*. London, New York: Routledge, pp. 4–22

Heidar, K. and Koole, R. (2000b) 'Parliamentary party groups compared', in K. Heidar and R. Koole (eds) *Parliamentary Party Groups in European Democracies. Political Parties Behind Closed Doors*. London, New York: Routledge, pp. 248–70

Hix, S. (2001) 'Legislative behaviour and party competition in the European Parliament: an application of nominate to the EU', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 39(4): 663–88

Hix, S. (2002a) 'Parliamentary behavior with two principals: preferences, parties, and voting in the European Parliament', *American Journal of Political Science* 46(3): 688–98

Hix, S. (2002b) 'A supranational party system and the legitimacy of the European Union', *The International Spectator* 4: 49–59

Hix, S. (2003) 'Electoral institutions and legislative behavior: explaining voting-defection in the European Parliament', *World Politics* 55(1): 194–223

Hix, S. and Noury, A. (2006) 'After enlargement: voting patterns in the Sixth European Parliament', paper presented at the European Parliament and the European Political Space Conference, London, 30 March

Hix, S., Noury, A. and Roland, G. (2005) 'Power to the parties: competition and cohesion in the European Parliament', *British Journal of Political Science* 34(4): 209–34

Hix, S., Noury, A. and Roland, G. (2007) *Democratic Politics in the European Parliament*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

König, T. and Bräuninger, T. (2000) 'Governing the enlarged European Union. Accession scenarios and institutional reform' *Central European Political Science Review* 1(1): 42–62

Krehbiel, K. (1991) *Information and Legislative Organization*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press

Krehbiel, K. (1993) 'Where's the party?', *British Journal of Political Science* 23(2): 235–66

Kreppel, A. (2002) *The European Parliament and Supranational Party System. A Study in Institutional Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Lees, J. D. and Shaw, M. (eds) (1979) *Committees in Legislatures: A Comparative Analysis*. Durham: Duke University Press

Londregan, J. and Snyder, J. M. J. (1994) 'Comparing committee and floor preferences' *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 19(2): 233–66

McCubbins, M. D. and Schwartz, T. (1984) 'Congressional oversight overlooked: police patrol versus fire alarms', *American Journal of Political Science* 28(1): 165–79

McElroy, G. and Benoit, K. (2007) 'Party Groups and Policy Positions in the European Parliament'. *Party Politics* 13(1): 5–28

March, J. G. and Olsen, D. M. (1989) *Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis of Politics*. New York: The Free Press

Mattila, M. (2006) 'Voting and coalitions in the council. Two years after enlargement', paper presented at the workshop 'Who Governs in the Council of Ministers?' European University Institute, 19–20 May

Mattila, M. (2007) 'The effects of enlargement on council voting and coalitions', paper presented at the 4th ECPR General Conference, Pisa, 6–8 September

Mattson, I. and Strøm, K. (1995) 'Parliamentary committees' in H. Döring (ed.) *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*. Frankfurt, New York: Campus Verlag

Mayhew, D. R. (1974) *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. New Haven: Yale University Press

Messmer, W. B. (2003), 'Taming labour MEPs', *Party Politics* 9(2): 201–18

Müller, W. C. (2000) 'Political parties in parliamentary democracies: Making delegation and accountability work', *European Journal of Political Research* 37: 309–33

Norton, P. (1975) *Dissension in the House of Commons 1945–74*. London: Macmillan

Peltzman, S. (1985) 'An economic interpretation of the history of Congressional voting in the twentieth century', *American Economic Review* 75(4): 656–75

Pennings, P. (2002) 'The dimensionality of the EU policy space', *European Union Politics* 3(1): 59–80

Piketty, T. (2000) 'Voting as communicating', *Review of Economic Studies* 67: 169–91

Rasch, B. E. (1999) 'Electoral systems, parliamentary committees, and party discipline: The Norwegian Storting in a comparative perspective' in S. Bowler, D. M. Farrell and R. S. Katz (eds) *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, pp. 121–40

Raunio, T. (1999) 'The challenge of diversity: party cohesion in the European Parliament' in S. Bowler, D. M. Farrell and R. S. Katz (eds), *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government*, Columbus: Ohio State University Press, pp. 189–207

Saalfeld, T. (1995) *Parteisoldaten und Rebellen: Eine Untersuchung zur Geschlossenheit der Fraktionen im Deutschen Bundestag (1949–1990)*. Opladen: Leske Budrich Publishers

Saalfeld, T. and Becker, R. (2000) 'Cohesion, veto players and agenda control: explaining the dynamics of the legislative process in 17 West European Parliaments', paper presented at the Annual Conference of the UK Political Studies Association, London, 10–13 April

Shepsle, K. A. and Weingast, B. R. (1994) 'Positive theories of congressional institutions' *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 19(2): 149–79

Sieberer, U. (2006) 'Party unity in parliamentary democracies: a comparative analysis', *Journal of Legislative Studies* 12(2): 150–78

Szczepanik, M. (2006) 'The European Parliament after enlargement: any different?', paper presented at the European Parliament and the European Political Space conference, London, 30 March

Thomassen, J., Noury, A. and Voeten, E. (2004) 'Political competition in the European Parliament: evidence from roll call and survey analyses', in G. Marks and M. Steenbergen (eds) *European Integration and Political Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 141–64

Weingast, B. R. and Marshall, W. J. (1988) 'The industrial organization of congress, or: why legislatures, like firms, are not organized as markets', *Journal of Political Economy* 96(11): 132–63

Wessels, B. (1999) 'Whom to represent? Role orientations of legislators in Europe', in H. Schmitt and J. Thomassen (eds) *Political Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 209–34

Whiteley, P. F. and Seyd, P. (1999) 'Discipline in the British Conservative Party: the attitudes of party activists toward the role of their members of parliament' in S. Bowler, D. M. Farrell and R. S. Katz (eds) *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, pp. 53–71

Zimmer, C., Schneider, G. and Dobbins, M. (2005) 'The contested council: conflict dimensions of intergovernmental institution', *Political Studies* 53(2): 403–22

Zupan, M. A. (1990) 'The last period problem in politics: do congressional representatives not subject to a reelection constraint alter their voting behavior?', *Public Choice* 65(2): 167–80

11 Intra-party politics at the trans-national level

Party switching in the European Parliament

Gail McElroy

Introduction

This chapter examines party switching in the European Parliament as an interesting manifestation of intra-party competition. As a general phenomenon, party switching has received relatively little attention in the canon of political parties. Switching by legislators is generally viewed as an aberration, an indicator of a weak, ill-formed party system; a pathology associated with newly emerging or unstable democracies. Recent research, however, has challenged the conventional wisdom that switching is an exceptional occurrence. These studies have demonstrated that party switching is a relatively common experience in many democracies, including Italy (Heller and Mershon 2005), Japan (Reed and Scheiner 2003), Ecuador (Meija-Acosta 1999), Poland (Benoit and Hayden 2004) and Brazil (Desposato 2006).

Previous studies of party switching have focused primarily on the electoral incentives for party members to switch (Aldrich and Bianco 1992; Desposato 2006; Heller and Mershon 2005). In the European Parliament, by contrast, the electoral incentives to switch parties are not obvious. The European electorate's knowledge of MEPs' behaviour is negligible and European party labels have little if any meaning for voters. Most members who switch affiliation from one political group to another, furthermore, do not switch their party allegiance at the national level. In the absence of an electoral advantage, why do members of the European Parliament who switch political groups bother? Few, if any, of the previous studies have given much consideration or weight to incentives internal to the legislature itself. As most switches occur during the legislative session, it seems odd to ignore the possibility that potential incentives for switching exist internally to parliaments themselves. Switching need not necessarily be the product of electoral incentives alone.

This chapter has four key objectives. First, the chapter aims to highlight the need to consider legislative payoffs from switching, by examining the occurrence of party switching in the absence of electoral payoffs. Second, the chapter illustrates that political groups in the European Parliament, frequently dismissed as an irrelevancy, are actually important. Third, it is hoped to shed some light on the evolution of the party system in the European Parliament. In the political parties literature there is far too little attention paid 'to the evolution of party

systems between elections' (Laver and Benoit 2003). Finally, the chapter aims to contribute to the party literature more generally by underscoring the argument that party affiliation is not a one-off decision, but something that is an ongoing process, even in party systems with low levels of switching (Aldrich and Bianco 1992).

First, I begin with a brief introduction to the political groups and the history of party switching in the European Parliament. Second, I set up the theory of why members should switch. Third, I present the statistical model and justify this methodological approach to switching. Fourth, I present the independent variables and data. Fifth, I present and interpret the results. Sixth, I briefly present an alternative approach to the question of who switches and finally I end with a brief discussion of the results and future avenues for research.

Political groups in the European Parliament

The number of political groups within the European Parliament has grown steadily over the course of its history from an initial three parties to its current seven (see Figure 11.1). This rise in numbers partially reflects an increase in the number of member states from the original 6 nations to the current 27, and a ten-fold increase in parliamentary size from 78 members to 785. Yet the evolution of the party system is not simply a story of a linear increase in numbers; two parties in particular have come to dominate over the course of the 30-year history



Figure 11.1 Party growth in European Parliament 1957–2008/Increase in share of seats of EPP and PES since 1979.

of the elected parliament. The bold line in Figure 11.1 shows the combined increase in share of parliamentary seats of the Party of European Socialists (PES) and the European People's Party (EPP). A clear upward trend is discernible. An interesting feature of the popularity of these two large parties is that they now have representatives of national parties within their folds that would not traditionally be associated as ideological allies, leading to considerable heterogeneity of preferences within the political groups. For instance, the Italian delegation within the European People's Party, a political group ostensibly in the Christian Democratic tradition, had representatives from eight separate political parties in the Fifth Parliament (1999–2004). There were parties from the centre-right Casa delle Libertà coalition (e.g., Forza Italia) and parties from the centre-left Olive Tree coalition (such as Partito Popolare Italiano).[1] Furthermore, there were three different French parties in the EPP, including a classic liberal party, Démocratie Libérale (DL), which started its career as a member of the Liberal Democratic and Reformist group (LDR) within the parliament.[2]

Switching between political groups is a relatively frequent occurrence in the European Parliament; in the Third Parliament, for instance, 71 members chose to move to an alternative party from the one in which they commenced the legislative session.[3] This figure represents almost 15 per cent of parliamentarians. In the Fifth Parliament the Group of the European United Left (GUE/NGL) increased its size by 44 per cent, through switches alone from 34 members as of the June 1999 elections to a membership of 49 by late 2003. This very movement suggests that these parties are not irrelevant, an accusation regularly levelled at the political groups within the European Parliament, especially in its early years. If parties did not matter, deputies would not switch. It is the contention of this chapter that this movement of members is not random. Members defect if their expected payoff in terms of office and ideology increase; they choose the parties that maximise their utility.

Intra-party politics and party group switching in the EP

What types of payoff may induce a member to join a party (and switch between parties)? Office-seeking models (Downs 1957) assume that the objective of legislators is to get into office and that policy if at all important has a purely instrumental function. Policy-seeking models in contrast suggest that it is policy that is the objective payoff that members seek (McKelvey and Schofield 1987). Most scholars now accept that there is some mix of these motivations in the political calculus of most actors, though there is no consensus on the precise nature of the trade off (Strøm 1990). Whatever the motivational mix, it is assumed here that in choosing among political groups a member will weigh the benefits – patronage, electoral, ideological - against the costs – loss of seniority, credibility and electoral liability.

Previous accounts of party choice or the 'calculus of candidacy' suggest that the electoral connection is paramount (King and Benjamin 1986; Castle and Fett 2000). Aldrich (1995: 52–57) and Aldrich and Bianco (1992) offer a formal model

of the calculus of candidacy. To summarise their model, members choose the party that maximises their prospects of re-election.[4] But in the European Parliament these electoral incentives appear to be extremely weak or even non-existent.

First, it is well documented that elections to the European Parliament are not run on the basis of European issues but are best interpreted as classic 'second order elections' (Hix 2005; Reif 1997; Reif and Schmitt 1980). In the European Election Survey (EES) of 1994, for instance, a mere 13 per cent of Greek respondents answered that their opinion on European issues was more important than their opinion on national matters for their vote choice. The elections are essentially informal referendums on national government performance; the competition takes place between national political parties rather than the political groups of the European Parliament.[5]

Second, knowledge of the activity of the European Parliament and its political groups is negligible among the citizenry of Europe. Once more looking at the 1994 EES, we find that 83 per cent of the Danish and 94 per cent of the Dutch respondents could not correctly identify the date of the election.[6] An astonishing 42 per cent of Italians claim to have never even heard of the European Parliament, let alone have any knowledge of its internal workings (EES 1994). The value of the political group label in the context of European elections is clearly minimal. The political groups do not campaign in the member states. Political groups in the European Parliament clearly do not convey a great deal of information cheaply; they do not cue an established reputation (see Downs 1957).

Third, the political groups in the European Parliament have no control over the nomination process in each member state. National political parties in each of the 15 member states control access to the ballot. Thus, switching political party in the European Parliament cannot result in improvements in, for instance, list ranking, a key reason provided by Desposato (2006) for Brazilian switching.

Fourth, the supply of political goods, to which the political groups have access, is highly constrained. The political groups do not have funds at their disposal to finance members' election campaigns. The need to distribute goods is a prime motivation for switching in Brazil (Ames 2001) but the European Parliament does not have vast resources at its disposal. The budget of the European Union as a whole corresponds to a mere 1.2 per cent of the total Community GDP, almost half of which is spent on the Common Agricultural Policy, a policy area in which the European Parliament has (traditionally) no legislative powers.

Finally, the fact that most party switchers within the European Parliament do not actually change their national party affiliation suggests that the electoral incentives are not a pressing motivation for defection. Switchers generally run for the same national parties in the elections subsequent to their defection within the parliament. In the data from 1989 to 1994, a mere 10 per cent of switches actually involved a switch at the national level also.[7] There are essentially two choices involved in the 'calculus of candidacy' of the European Parliament, the choice to affiliate with a particular national party and subsequently the choice to affiliate with a particular political group once in the parliament. The traditional electoral motivations may prevail in the first choice but do not apply appear to apply at the second level.

But if the electoral motivations for defection are not obvious in the context of the European Parliament, parties do offer a whole range of office benefits. These legislative payoffs are absent from the current literature on party switching (Laver and Benoit 2003). These include positions internal to the political groups, such as membership of the party bureau, in addition to positions that are controlled by the parties such as committee assignments and committee chairmanships. It is argued here that these post-electoral career advancements are critical in explaining the patterns of switching in the European Parliament. In keeping with ambition theory (Schlesinger 1966), it is assumed here that all politicians prefer holding a higher office to a lower one and prefer a lower office to no office at all. In practice, a deputy will strictly prefer to be a party leader to being a backbencher and he will also favour serving on a high prestige committee over membership of a non-exclusive one. In addition it is assumed that members preferences are such that all parties have a positive probability of selection for each MEP.

Are members indifferent to policy considerations? I do not assume that policy is irrelevant in a MEP's choice of party. Of course the question of how much power the European Parliament has to influence policy is much debated (Hix 2005). The parliament does not have the right of legislative initiative nor does it have veto power in several key policy areas. Nevertheless, under the terms of the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) the European Parliament was given *co-decision* powers in a number of areas and these have been further expanded under the treaties of Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon. The co-decision procedure effectively makes the parliament an equal partner with the European Council in the legislative process in the areas under which it applies. So I do not assume that MEPs are necessarily policy indifferent and thus their choice of party may very well be constrained by ideology.

Hypotheses

If MEPs value office, those with a senior leadership position within their party should be much less likely to switch than those who are sitting on the backbenches. The benefits of such positions are well documented and do not require recapitulation here. Party leadership provides prestige, power to influence policy and key control over the distribution of offices. This consideration leads to the first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1*: All else equal, a party leader should be much less likely to defect than a non-ranking member of his party.*

Cox and McCubbins (1993) have indicated that the payoff from being a member of a winning coalition (or majority party) is higher than that accruing to a minority party (1993: 125). Previous research has indicated that switchers do indeed prefer large to small parties (Heller and Mershon 2005; Desposato 2006).[8]

While there is no incumbent government in the European Parliament, the two largest parties do appear to be advantaged in some respects. Most parliamentary offices are handed out proportionately, but the system used favours the PES and EPP. Florus Wisenbeek (Dutch member for the LDR), in a debate on the distribution of vice-presidencies, captured this large party advantage nicely when he complained

> "Mr. President the smaller groups in this House have serious objections to the d'Hondt system … this system operates quite extraordinarily badly as the numbers get smaller. This means, Mr. President that the election of the twelve vice-presidents of this Parliament is itself, for example, badly afflicted by this weakness … One could say that the desire of the larger groups to impose their will on the smaller groups at every turn is on its own reason enough for objecting to this system.
>
> (Debates of the European Parliament,10 September 1991)

There are certain positions within the European Parliament that, in spite of the proportionality norm, are never available to small parties, such as key committee chairmanships and vice-presidencies.[9] It is thus hypothesised that party switching is from the small to the large parties on the whole.

Hypothesis 2*: All things being equal, a member will prefer to be affiliated with a large party rather than a small party.*

As already stated, there is no government in the European Parliament, no majority resting on a vote of confidence. Nonetheless, there is the Bureau, a regulatory body responsible for parliament's budget and for administrative and organisational matters. Not all parties are represented in the Bureau, the president and fourteen vice-presidents are elected at the beginning of each legislative session. On average about half the political groups in the parliament are represented in the Bureau at any given time. It is hypothesised that a party represented by a member in the Bureau should be more attractive to an MEP than a party not represented in the Bureau.

Hypothesis 3*: A party which is represented in the Parliamentary Bureau should be more attractive to an MEP than a party without representation in the Bureau.*

Obviously a member's choice of party depends not just on current prospects but also on future prospects of office. It is not clear if there is a seniority norm in the European Parliament. Bowler and Farrell (1995: 240) argue that seniority is irrelevant. However, their analysis does not take account of the very particular assignment rules in the European Parliament. Seniority certainly does not operate to the extent it does in the US Congress. There is such a high turnover amongst MEPs that a seniority system in the traditional sense runs aground pretty quickly.

Freshmen MEPs do end up on high prestige committees and have even been known to get chairmanships. Nonetheless, elite interview evidence suggests that seniority may play some role in the committee assignment process. Previous research (McElroy 2003) suggests that high profile committees such as Environment and Industry have a much higher number of non-freshmen MEPs than low prestige committees such as Culture or Regional Policy. Switching party will not be costless if there is some seniority norm in operation within the European Parliament. Switching parties may result in the loss of this seniority and a place at the back of the queue for high prestige committees.[10] Assuming a seniority norm, I expect that long serving members of a party are more likely to remain with their party than newer members.

Hypothesis 4*: All else being equal, a seniority norm will result in long serving party members being more reluctant to defect than freshman MEPs.*

Finally, it is argued that ideological compatibility with a party is an important consideration in the calculus of affiliation. All else being equal, members will prefer a party that is closer to their ideal point.

Hypothesis 5*: All else being equal, the closer a party's median point is to a member's ideal point the more likely he is to align himself with it.*

Statistical model

Ideally a statistical model approximates the underlying theoretical causal process. Concern for model choice has been highlighted by Whitten and Palmer (1996). They suggest that moving from a simple model specification to a more complicated model is particularly appropriate in multiparty systems. Statistical techniques for the analysis of discrete choices are being used with increasing regularity in political science. The best known are the much used (and abused perhaps) binomial logit and probit, used when the dependent variables are dichotomous in nature. For questions involving choice among three or more categories, the multinomial logit technique is most often employed and is usually preferable to a simple dichotomous logit. However, until recently, less frequent use was made of the related technique, conditional logit, developed by McFadden (1973) in the context of transport economics. Conditional logit is, in many situations in the social sciences, a preferable technique to multinomial logit. In particular, the conditional choice model is preferable when a choice among alternatives involves functions of the alternatives rather than characteristics of the individual making the choice. It is worth noting that the nomenclature of such discrete choice models is very confused. The terms 'multinomial logit' (MNL) and 'conditional logit' (CL) are often used interchangeably, although two distinct modelling techniques. The conditional logit model can be altered to include characteristics of the individual (essentially adding a multinomial component). Such a model

allows testing simultaneously not only for the choice-specific characteristics but also chooser-specific characteristics. Here, I apply such a mixed model that incorporates both characteristics of the parties and characteristics of the switchers themselves.

Unordered choice models, such as the CL, can be motivated by a random utility model (Green 2003: 719). The corresponding utility function associated with the *j*th choice in this mixed model is given by

$$U_{ij} = z'_{ij}\alpha + x'_i\beta_j + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

where z_{ij} refers to the choice varying covariates and x_i refers to individual varying covariates

If the deputy makes choice j in particular, then we assume that U_{ij} is the maximum among J utilities. The statistical model is driven by the probability that choice j is made which is Prob ($U_{ij} > U_{ik}$) for all other $k \neq j$.

A mixed version of the CL model is essentially a combination of a standard CL model consisting of choice-specific covariates that vary across (in this case) parties and an MNL part consisting of $J-1$ dummies as choice specific constants together with their multiplicative terms based on all individual level covariates (Powers and Xie 2000). It is worth emphasising the importance of including interaction terms between *all* individual level covariates and the specific dummies, since failure to include all of these interaction terms results in model mispecification.

For modelling the probability that ($y = j$) where j = 1,2,…….J, we have the equation

$$\text{Prob}\,(y = j) = \frac{e^{\sum_{k_1=1}^{K_1}\beta_{jk_1}x_{k_1} + \sum_{k_2=1}^{K_2}\alpha_{k_2}z_{jk_2}}}{\sum_{j=1}^{J} e^{\sum_{k_1=1}^{K_1}\beta_{jk_1}x_{k_1} + \sum_{k_2=1}^{K_2}\alpha_{k_2}z_{jk_2}}}$$

where the k_1 and k_2 subscripts distinguish between the two types of explanatory variables (z and x). To identify the model we normalise on any one of the alternatives and set the β coefficient for that alternative to zero (in this instance I set the β coefficient on the largest party (PES) at zero).

The major advantage of this mixed model of party choice is that it allows us to isolate the impact of individual characteristics net of characteristics of the alternatives themselves. In a pure conditional logit model, we assume that individual choices among alternatives are a function of the characteristics of the alternatives, rather the characteristics of the individual themselves (Hoffman and Duncan 1988: 425). In a pure MNL model we assume the latter. A mixed model allows for the possibility of both types of causation.

A final note on the statistical model: the most serious limitation with the conditional logit model is the assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternative (IIA). Essentially the probability odds ratio for the *j*th and the *k*th choices should

be the same irrespective of the total number (m) of choices. Or in this case the odds that a particular party is chosen over another is independent of the presence of other potential parties. This is so, because

$$\frac{\text{Prob}\,(I_j = 1|\{1,2.\ldots m\})}{\text{Prob}\,(I_k = 1|\{1,2.\ldots m\})} = \frac{\text{Prob}\,(I_j = 1|\{j,k\})}{\text{Prob}\,(I_k = 1|\{j,k\})}$$

This property states that the ratio between the probabilities of choosing alternative k and alternative j cannot depend on the attributes of any other alternative in the choice set. This is a rather stringent assumption and its violation needs to be considered. MEPs should not view any two political groups as equivalent in the European Parliament. McFadden (1973) suggests that so long as the outcome categories 'can be assumed to be distinct cases and weighted independently in the eyes of each decision maker' IIA is not violated. Further, Ameniya (1991) suggests that MLM works well when the alternatives are dissimilar. It does not seem unreasonable to assume that political parties and the political groups with in the EP are 'distinct cases' and not substitutes for one another, as (as explained next) their mean ideological positions are quite distinct.

Data and independent variables

I begin the discussion of the empirical results with an explanation of the data and the variables. The dependent variable is party membership for member i at time t. Data on this variable was collected from the party listings in the *Medlemsfortegnelse* (List of Members) published (at irregular intervals) each year. The current analysis is restricted to the third European Parliament (1989–1994). Two time points were chosen, membership immediately after the 1989 European Parliament elections and membership in June 1993. The latter was chosen as it represents the year in which the co-decision procedure came into effect, a water shed moment in the history of the European Parliament. There were ten parties for each member to choose from in 1989 and eight in 1993 (see Table 11.1 for full list and abbreviations).

Party-specific variables:

DISTANCE

To capture ideological distance from the party under consideration, some measure of an MEP's preference is required. True preferences are unobservable and unfortunately, unlike the case of the US Congress, there are no independent interest group ratings for individual members of the European Parliament. One must therefore use data on MEP behaviour to infer policy preferences. One such means of locating member preferences is to use their voting record in plenary.

Table 11.1 List of party names and labels

Political group name	*Abbreviation*
Socialist Group/Party of European Socialists	PES
Group of the European People's Party	EPP
Liberal Democratic and Reformist Group	LDR
European Democratic Group	ED
The Green Group in the European Parliament	V
Group for the European Unitarian Left	GUE
Group of the European Democratic Alliance	RDE
Technical Group of the European Right	DR
Left Unity	CG
Rainbow Group in the European Parliament	ARC

In this chapter I use the NOMINATE procedure to locate members of the European Parliament in multidimensional Euclidean space. My estimation includes a random sample of 500 roll call votes for the parliamentary period 1989–1994. The data was collected from the *Official Journal of the European Communities, Series C*. Following Poole and Rosenthal (1991) for each of these legislative periods I include every legislator who cast at least 25 votes. In addition, votes where less than 3 per cent of those voting voted against the majority are excluded. Figure 11.2 illustrates the distribution of NOMINATE scores by party for the third parliament (1989–1994) along the first two dimensions.

The political groups are clearly quite distinct from each other, even at this early stage in the development of the institution. The parties form clusters on both dimensions. The first dimension very closely approximates the left–right dimension of national politics, stretching from the Greens on the far left to the conservative Technical Group of the Right (DR) on the far right. All the parties in the interval are in correct alignment with classic left-right expectations. The second dimension is a little more problematic. One might expect it to represent a European integration dimension (pro-federalism versus pro-intergovernmentalism) but the placement of the European Democratic Group (ED) to the right of the EPP and LDR suggests that this is not an accurate interpretation. The ED was very much in favour of an intergovernmental Europe whereas the EPP and LDR were and remain two of the strongest advocates of further integration.

Admittedly, this type of ideal point is a quite primitive measure of member preferences and not without serious problems. The accusation that roll call votes only reveal information about how a member voted is not without justification. It should also be noted that not all votes in the European Parliament are subject to roll calls. In the current legislature such votes represent approximately one-third of votes (Hix *et al*. 2007: 114). Roll call votes by no means provide a complete picture of MEP voting behaviour. The decision to call a roll call vote is itself undoubtedly a strategic action. There is some suggestion that roll call votes may be biased towards the groups that call them and are disproportionately called on



Figure 11.2 1989–1994 ideological scores (NOMINATE) by political group.

certain issues and under certain procedures (Carubba *et al*. 2006). But in the absence of a better proxy for members' preferences, I will assume that they are a reasonable approximation of members' preferences.

I estimate the distance variable as the absolute difference between the member's ideal point (on the first dimension NOMINATE scores) and the median ideal point of the party choice under consideration. The variable, thus, takes on different values dependent on the response category for each individual.

$$\text{DISTANCE}_{ij} = |\text{Medianpoint}_j - \text{ideal}_i|$$

Hypothesis 5 leads me to expect this score to be negatively correlated with a member's probability of choosing a party. The greater the distance between an MEP and a party, the less likely he is to choose it.

PARLIAMENTARY BUREAU

Hypothesis 3 suggests that a deputy is more likely to choose a party with membership of the Parliamentary Bureau. To test this hypothesis, I create a dummy variable coded 1 if a party is represented in the Bureau and 0 otherwise.

MAJOR PARTY

To measure whether party size has any impact on switching, I create a dummy variable that identifies the two largest parties. Coded 1 for the PES and the EPP and 0 otherwise. Hypothesis 2 leads us to expect a positive relationship between party size and party choice.

SESSION

This is included as a time-specific variable to control for the effects of the Maastricht Treaty and any stabilisation of the party system over the third parliament. It is coded 0 for 1989 observations and 1 for 1993 observations.

Member-specific variables

PARTY LEADERSHIP

Data on party leadership was compiled from the *Medlemsfortegnelse*. Leadership is here defined as presidency or a vice-chairmanship of the party. The number of such positions varies quite substantially by political group. The variable is coded 1 if the member was a party leader at time *t*, 0 otherwise. Hypothesis 1 leads me to expect members with leadership positions to be less likely to switch parties.

SENIORITY

Data on a member's tenure in his party was garnered from a variety of sources, including *The Times Guide to the European Parliament, the Manual of the European People's Party* (1989, 1993), *Dod's Companion Guide to the European Parliament* (1992) and the *Directory of European Institutions* (1991). As turnover was exceptionally high in the European Parliament in the period 1989–1994, seniority kicks in quite quickly. To measure seniority, I have calculated a score for each member as his length of tenure in the party (in years) minus the median length of tenure in his party. Thus a high score (positive value) indicates that the member has seniority while a low score (negative sign) indicates junior status. Hypothesis 4 leads me to expect that a high SENIORITY score will make a member less inclined to switch.

Analysis and results

The results of the mixed conditional logit model are presented in Table 11.2. The co-efficients on the conditional logit part of the model indicate the overall effect of party-specific characteristics. All of these variables are in the expected direction and significant. Conditional logits differ from standard categorical data analyses in that the data is stratified and some caution must be exercised in interpreting the probabilities. Likelihoods are computed relative to each stratum. The coefficients on the CL model indicate the overall impact of the party-specific characteristics on the likelihood of choosing a party. First consider the

Table 11.2 A conditional logit model of party choice

Variable	*Coefficients*
Distance	–15.15***
Major Party	0.81***
Parliamentary Bureau	1.47***
Session	0.20
Party Leader*EPP	0.51*
Seniority*EPP	0.1
Party Leader*ELDR	2.30***
Seniority*ELDR	–0.34
Party Leader*Greens	3.62**
Seniority*Greens	–1.00***
Party Leader*ED	0.38
Seniority*ED	0.19***
Party Leader*ARC	1.25*
Seniority*ARC	0.20
Party Leader*DR	0.66
Seniority*DR	–0.3
Party Leader*RDE	2.33***
Seniority*RDE	0.21
Party Leader*CG	1.47*
Seniority*CG	0.18*
Party Leader*GUE	0.99
Seniority*GUE	–0.37**
EPP	–0.48
ELDR	–0.75***
Greens	–2.11***
ED	0.63
ARC	–0.06
DR	1.30
RDE	–0.05
CG	–0.56
GUE	–1.30*
Number of cases	8,591
LL	–652.14
Psuedo R^2	0.73

Note: *significant at the $p<0.05$ level, **significant at the $p<0.01$ level, ***significant at the $p<0.001$ level

DISTANCE coefficient, we see that it is strongly significant and in the expected direction. As the distance between an MEP and a party increases, the less likely he is to choose it (negative sign on the DISTANCE variable). The nearer a party choice is to the individual member the more likely he is to choose it. For example, an increase in distance of 0.05 would decrease the probability of choosing an alternative party by a factor of exp $(-15.15 \times 0.05) = 0.46$. Second, if we hold all other variables constant, we see that the odds of choosing a party that is in the Bureau is exp (1.47) = 4.3 times that of choosing a party not represented in the Bureau.

Third, the odds of choosing one of the big two parties are exp (0.81) = 2.2 times those of choosing a small party. It is worth reiterating that these effects are dependent only on the party-specific traits. Regardless, of the individual characteristics of an MEP, he will prefer a large party to a small party, a party in the Bureau to one outside of the Bureau and a party that is ideologically consistent with his preferences.

Looking next at the MNL section of the model we find that PARTYLEADER is significant for a majority of the parties under consideration and is in the expected direction for all parties. Interpreting these estimates indicate that, for instance, the odds of a party leader in the European People's Party choosing the EPP (versus PES) are exp (0.51) = 1.66 those of a non-leader in the same party. These odds increase to exp (1.47) = 4.3 when we consider the Left Unity Party (CG). SENIORITY is only significant for four of the parties and works in both directions. Senior members of CG and ED are less likely to defect to PES than members with no seniority in these parties. However, when we consider GUE and the Green party the coefficients indicate that the relationship is in the opposite direction. Senior members of these parties are more likely to defect than low ranking members. For instance, these estimates indicate that odds of choosing ED versus PES is exp $(0.19 \times 5) = 2.5$ for a senior ranking member of the party. However, for the GUE group a member with similar seniority rank would be $1/\exp(-0.37 \times 5) = 6.3$ times more likely to choose PES. These mixed results may reflect the fact that there is actually no seniority norm operating in some parties in the European Parliament, but more research is clearly needed in this area.

The party-specific constants indicate the impact of unobserved factors that are not accounted for in the model (member or party specific). Three of these coefficients are statistically significant (though six are not) indicating that the model is missing party-specific or member-specific variables that account for party choice in particular cases. This is not surprising given the parsimonious nature of the model and suggests the need for further theoretical consideration and empirical exploration in this field. Overall, these results are encouraging nonetheless. Ideological distance from parties is an important factor in accounting for party choice, as is the holding of the office of party leader. Large parties, holding all other variables constant, are also favoured in the calculus of affiliation in the European Parliament.

Logistic model of defection

As stated earlier, the conditional logit model can only capture the effects of positions that are allocated to parties on a proportional basis, such as prestigious committee assignments, indirectly though the SENIORITY variable. These positions are allocated to parties only after party membership is defined. Where committee slots are assigned perfectly proportionately, the odds of obtaining such a seat are equal across parties. If a member joins a large party with more committee assignments to divvy up, there are also more party members competing for these slots. The mixed CL specification of party choice can thus not capture the

effect of these variables directly on the likelihood of switching. But it remains an important question to consider in the context of the European Parliament, which has a very developed and powerful committee system. Are members on key committees less likely to defect from their parties than those on neutral or consultative committees? Interviews with MEPs have indicated that prestigious committee assignments are highly valued and used as a form of patronage by party leaders to reward loyalty (McElroy 2003). This question needs to be approached from a different angle. In an attempt to see if these factors matter, I use a logistic model to analyse the characteristics of those who defect. The dependent variable in this model is dichotomous. It simply measures whether or not a member switched political group in the European Parliament in the period 1989–1994, coded 1 if a member switches and 0 otherwise.

The independent variables in this model are as follows:

DISTANCE

This variable measures the distance of the member from the median position in *his* party. Note that this variable is quite different from the one used in the previous model. It cannot capture the proximity or location of alternatives party relative to the member's distance from his own party. It is quite possible that a member may be quite far from his party median but it may nonetheless still be the nearest party median to his own ideal point. It is hypothesised that the further a member is from his party ideal point the more likely he is to defect.

PARTY LEADER

It is hypothesised that party leaders will be less likely to defect than rank-and-file party members. This variable captures whether or not the member holds a leadership position in his party.

COMMITTEE LEADER

This variable captures whether or not the member holds a committee leadership position, here defined as a chairmanship or first vice-chairmanship. It is expected that a committee leader will be less likely to defect.

MAJOR PARTY

As in the previous model, this variable measures whether or not the member is affiliated to the PES or EPP, 1 if yes, 0 otherwise.

KEY COMMITTEE

There is a strict hierarchy of committees in the European Parliament. Committees whose policy jurisdictions correspond to those areas that fall under the co-decision procedure are more highly valued than those with mere consultation powers

(McElroy 2003). It is hypothesised that members on key committees are less likely to defect than members on low ranking or neutral committees. In particular this variable takes account of whether or not the individual is a member of the Environment Committee, the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee or the Industrial and Research Committee. Coded 1 if yes, 0 otherwise.

SENIORITY

As in the previous model, this variable measures the length of time an MEP has served in his party relative to the median MEP tenure in the party.

ED

This is a control variable to capture the fusion of the European Democratic Group with the EPP in 1992.

KEYCOMM*COMMLEAD

I include this interaction term to capture the possibility that leadership positions on key committees rank more highly than chairmanships on non-prestigious, non-legislative committees.

The model estimated has the following form:

$$\ln \frac{\Pr(switch = 1)}{1 - \Pr(switch = 1)} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Dist} + \beta_2 \text{Seniority} + \beta_3 \text{PartyLeader} + \beta_4 \text{Commlead} + \beta_5 \text{Commlead*KeyComm} + \beta_6 \text{MajorParty} + \beta_7 ED + \beta_8 \text{KeyComm}$$

Expectations

A negative coefficient for an independent variable implies that changing the value of the independent variable from 0 to 1 decreases the probability of switching (and obviously the reverse for positive coefficients). For example, a negative coefficient on PARTY LEADER would mean that, holding all other values at their mean, members of the leadership bureaus of political groups are less likely to switch party than non-members. I expect the coefficient on SENIORITY, PARTY LEADER, KEYCOMM, MAJOR PARTY and KEYCOMM*COMMLEAD to be negative, and on DISTANCE to be positive.

Results

The results are presented in Table 11.3 and are largely consistent with expectations. We see that all the signs are in the expected direction and that the coefficients on KEYCOMM, SENIORITY, PARTY LEADER MAJOR PARTY and

Table 11.3 Results of logistic regression of switching

Variable	*PES* *Model 1*
Seniority	–.548**
	(0.136)
Distance	0.712
	(1.987)
Key Committee	–1.174*
	(0.630)
Major party	–3.641**
	(0.908)
Committee leader	–0.026
	(0.908)
Committee leader × Key committee	–1.523
	(2.41)
Party leader	–1.667**
	(0.838)
ED	2.08**
	(0.64)
Constant	–0.575*
	(0.3)
Number of cases	474
Percent correct	90
–2LL	167.81

Note: *significant at the $p < 0.05$ level, **significant at the $p < 0.01$ level
Standard errors in parentheses

ED are significant. Being a member of a major party is in particular a key determinant of the likelihood of a member switching. DISTANCE is in the expected direction but it is not significant nor is its substantive impact large. This is in contrast to the role ideology played in the CL model and underscores the usefulness of conditional logit models. The success of the model is encouraging when one considers that very few individual characteristics of MEPs and their preferences are contained within the model.

In order to facilitate interpretation of the coefficients, Table 11.4 presents the predicted probability of switching under several different scenarios. As COMMLEAD, COMMLEAD*KEYCOMM and DISTANCE are insignificant, they were set at their modal or mean values (as appropriate) for each of these scenarios. The probability reported in the table is the probability that an MEP will switch. Scenario A presents a baseline case, in which an MEP holds no office within his (minor) party, has low seniority and is a member of a low prestige committee. As the table reveals, in this case, the member's predicted probability of switching is 0.63. Compare this with scenario F, where a member holds a senior position within his party, serves on a high ranking committee and is a long serving member, the predicted probability of switching in this instance is a very low (0.01). SENIORITY is a highly significant variable in substantive terms in this

Table 11.4 Predicted probabilities of switching

Scenario	*Party leader*	*Key committee*	*Seniority*	*Major party*	*Probability of switching*
A	No	No	Low	No	0.63
B	No	No	High	No	0.16
C	No	Yes	Low	No	0.35
D	No	Yes	High	No	0.06
F	Yes	No	High	No	0.04
H	Yes	Yes	High	No	0.01

Note: Distance set at mean values and committee leader at modal value

model, in contrast to the results from the previous model. Clearly, this relationship needs to be considered in some more detail.

Conclusion

The recent surge of interest in party switching as a phenomenon is a welcome development. It provides an unexploited opportunity to understand the bigger question of 'why parties?' In this chapter, I have drawn attention to the incentives of legislators to switch parties between elections, perhaps the ultimate manifestation of intra-party politics. The trans-national case of the European Parliament has provided a unique insight into this process for several reasons. First, while the electoral connection usually figures prominently in accounts of party switching, in the European Parliament this motivation has been shown to be weak or non-existent. Second, because the European Parliament does not elect an executive, as in pure parliamentary systems, intra-party politics is not constrained by the threat of a no-confidence motion bringing down the government. In the global examination of intra-party politics and coalition politics, therefore, the European Parliament presents an almost unique case of intra-party competition in parliamentary style-government without the straitjacket of party discipline required by most parliamentary governments to maintain governing coalitions. In the absence of this stricture, the analysis here has demonstrated that payoffs internal to legislatures can be strong motivating forces for encouraging intra-party unity. Political actors invariably prefer high office to low office after all and there is a range of such positions available within parliaments. The results here demonstrate that, in the context of the European Parliament, members choose parties on the basis of both office and ideological payoffs. Finally, the fact that the European Parliament authority is trans-national yet its MEPs are elected at the national level adds interesting new dimensions to intra-party politics. Since differences among national parties have a very real potential for causing MEP preferences to be heterogeneous within their party groupings.

The analysis presented here remains preliminary and points to several obvious avenues for future analysis. First, it is imperative that the number of observations is

increased. It would be possible to (within one parliament) have a least one observation per MEP per year. Second, given the very dynamic history of the European Parliament it is clearly necessary to apply the model to alternative legislative sessions, preferably all six. Third, it would be fruitful to distinguish between those switchers who change national party affiliation and those who switch political group but maintain their national party identity. Electoral considerations are probably of some importance in the former category. Fourth, it would also be productive to distinguish between fusions and individual defections, it may be the case with fusions that there are some electoral costs for not defecting with the whole national delegation or political group. Finally, it is worth pointing out in conclusion that I have modelled the phenomenon of switching as a question of choice on the part of the MEP. I have not looked at the possibility that not all members are attractive to parties, or the possibility that some parties are more willing to accept switchers than others. I assumed that a member defects if it increases his payoff but equally it should be the case that a party will only accept a switcher if it increases the payoff of the party (or more strictly the payoff of the legislators already in the party).

Notes

1 The other Italian political parties in the EPP were as follows: Centro Cristiano Democratico, Südtiroler Volkspartei, Cristiani Democratici Uniti, Partito Pensionati, Unione Democratici per l'Europa, Rinnovamento italiano - Dini.
2 Another interesting feature of party affiliation in the European Parliament is that not all members of national delegations necessarily affiliate with the same political groups. For instance, in 1989, the seven members of the French Centre Party chose three different political group affiliations once in Parliament. Similarly, the 25 members elected on the UDF/RPR list chose variously to affiliate with the European Liberal Democrats (LDR), the European People's Party and the European Democratic Alliance (RDE). One member of the Catalan party joined the European People's Party while the other joined the LDR.
3 This figure does not include an additional ten members who switched their allegiance immediately after their re-election in the June 1989 elections.
4 Note that work by Grose and Yoshinaka (2003) tests the electoral impact of switching in Congress and finds that – despite the conventional wisdom – switchers incur an electoral cost rather than benefit from defection.
5 In addition, turnout is frequently very low. In the 1999 European elections turnout in the United Kingdom was an abysmal 24 per cent, compared with 71 per cent in the national election of 1997.
6 Not surprisingly the highest recognition for the date was in Luxembourg, Greece and Italy, three countries with compulsory voting. One in two Luxembourgers could correctly identify the date of the upcoming election.
7 And the majority of these (90 per cent) involved Italian deputies whose national party system was undergoing serious changes in the wake of the corruption scandals of the early 1990s.
8 However, it should be noted that Laver and Benoit (2003) suggest that the relationship is far more complex than big party versus small party. They argue, 'it can be very unrewarding to be the second largest party'.
9 For instance, in the 1989 Parliament, the seven most prestigious committee chairs were held by the PES and EPP.
10 This assertion rests on the assumption that switchers do not bargain for a similar level of seniority in the accepter party.

References

Aldrich, J. H. (1995) *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press

Aldrich, J. H. and Bianco, W. T. (1992) 'A game theoretic model of party affiliation of candidates and office holders', *Mathematical and Computer Modeling* 16(8–9): 103–15

Ameniya, T. (1991) 'Qualitative response models: a survey', *Journal of Economic Literature* 19(4): 483–536

Ames, B. (2001) *The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press

Benoit, K. and Hayden, J. (2004) 'Institutional change and persistence: the origins and evolution of Poland's electoral system, 1989–2001', *Journal of Politics* 66(2): 396–427

Bowler, S. and Farrell, D. (1995) 'The organizing of the European Parliament: committees, specialization and co-ordination', *British Journal of Political Science* 25(2): 219–43

Carrubba, C., Gabel, M., Murrah, L., Clough, R., Montgomery, E. and Schambach, R. (2006) 'Off the record: unrecorded legislative votes selection bias and roll-call vote analysis', *British Journal of Political Science* 36 (4): 691–704

Castle, D. and Fett, P. J. (2000) 'Member goals and party switching in the U.S. Congress', in W. T. Bianco (ed.) *Congress on Display, Congress at Work*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 231–42

Cox, G. and McCubbins, M. (1993) *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House* Berkeley: University of California Press

Desposato, S. (2006) 'Parties for rent? Ambition, ideology and party switching in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies', *American Journal of Political Science* 50(1): 62–80

Dod's European Companion (1990) London: Dod's Publishing and Research Limited

Downs, A. (1957) *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper and Row

European Election Study (1994) at http://europeanelectionstudies.net (Accessed 25.7.2008)

Green, W. T. (2003) *Econometric Analysis*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall

Grose, C. and Yoshinaka, A. (2003) 'The electoral consequences of party switching by incumbent members of Congress, 1947–2000', *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 28(1): 55–75

Heller, W. and Mershon, C. T. (2005) 'Party switching in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1996–2001', *Journal of Politics* 67(2): 536–59

Hitzler, Gerhard (1991) *Directory of European Institutions*. Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag

Hix, S. (2005) *The Political System of the European Union*. London: MacMillan

Hix, S., Noury, A. and Roland, G. (2007) *Democratic Politics in the European Parliament*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Hoffman, S. and Duncan, G. (1988) 'Multinomial and conditional logit discrete-choice models in demography', *Demography* 25(3): 415–27

King, G. and Benjamin, G. (1986) 'The stability of party identification among U.S. representatives: party loyalty, 1789–1984', paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago 10–12 April

Laver, M. and Benoit, K. (2003) 'The evolution of party systems between elections', *American Journal of Political Science* 47(2): 215–33

Manual del Grupo del Partito Popular Europeo del Parlamento Europeo (1993) Brussels: The Group

McElroy, G. (2003) 'In pursuit of party discipline: committee and cohesion in the European Parliament', PhD dissertation, University of Rochester

McFadden, D. (1973) 'Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behaviour', in Zarembka, P. (ed.) Frontiers in Econometrics. New York: Wiley

McKelvey, R. D. and Schofield, N. (1987) 'Generalised symmetry conditions at a core point', *Econometrica* 55(4): 923–33

Meija-Acosta, A. (1999) 'Explaining "camisetazos": the logic of party switching in the Ecuadorian Congress (1979–1996)', paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 15–17 1999

Poole, K. and Rosenthal, H. (1991) 'Patterns of congressional voting', *American Journal of Political Science* 35(1): 228–78

Powers, D. A. and Xie, Y. (2000) *Statistical Methods for Categorical Data Analysis*. Orlando: Academic Press

Reed, S. D. and Scheiner, E. (2003) 'Electoral incentives and policy preferences: mixed motives behind party defections in Japan', *British Journal of Political Science* 33(3): 469–90

Reif, K. (1997) 'Reflections: European elections as member state second-order elections revisited', *European Journal of Political Science* 31(1): 115–24

Reif, K. and Schmitt, H. (1980) 'Nine second order national elections: a conceptual framework for the analysis of European election results', *European Journal of Political Science* 8(1): 3–45

Schlesinger, A. (1966) *Ambition and Politics. Political Careers in the United States*. Chicago: Rand McNally

Strøm, K. (1990) 'A behavioural theory of competitive political parties', *American Journal of Political Science* 34(2): 565–98

Whitten, G. and Palmer, H. (1996) 'Heightening comparativists concern for model choice: voting behaviour in Great Britain and the Netherlands', *American Journal of Political Science* 40(1): 231–60

Wood, A. (1984) *The Times: Guide to the European Parliament*. London: Times Books

PART V

Conclusion

12 Intra-party politics and coalition governments

Concluding remarks

Kenneth Benoit and Daniela Giannetti

Introduction

This volume is hardly the first to make the strong case for treating political parties not as unitary actors, but rather as collections of individual political agents united, for whatever reasons, under a common label. Its contribution has been to demonstrate in practical research settings, at a variety of levels and using a wide range of methods, how political preferences and behaviour might be practically mapped and explored at the intra-party level. Despite the gains presented here, intra-party politics and the dynamics of political competition among political actors at the level below parties remains an exciting, and largely unexplored terrain. The purpose of these concluding remarks is to underscore some of the common threads that run through the earlier chapters.

What is intra-party politics?

Competition between different political parties is familiar and easy to recognize in almost any political setting, given the irreplaceable role that parties play in modern democratic political systems. It is widely acknowledged – although much less frequently addressed head-on – that parties are not singular entities when it comes to preferences, behaviour or competition for office (see Chapter 2 in this volume). Ignoring this fact about parties means that this rich sub-strata of political competition is precluded from study, although the 'unitary actor assumption' treating parties as if they were singular, homogenous entities is usually a sacrifice made for analytical gain in the study of inter-party politics. More likely than not, however, the unitary actor assumption may also simply reflect the practical difficulty in gaining reliable information on political competition at the sub-party level.

How would we define intra-party politics? At its simplest, intra-party politics refers to the political interplay of the individual political actors within a party – such as legislators, candidates, appointed officials and members – whose heterogeneous motivations lead them to pursue potentially competing behaviours. These motivations can take a variety of forms, but at their core involve a combination of office- and policy-driven objectives. An office-driven objective, for instance, might be an individual legislator's pursuit of re-election in a single-member

district electoral system where the median voter in the legislator's constituency held preferences opposed to the median voter targeted by the legislator's national party. Such conflicting motivations might lead a legislator to express dissenting views or even to vote against his national party in the event of a legislative vote. Other office objectives that have been explored in this volume include the attainment of additional positions within a legislature, such as key committee assignments or other privileged legislative positions – what Depauw and Martin in Chapter 6 call 'mega-seats', following Carroll *et al*. (2006).

A policy-driven objective, on the other hand, involves different factions within a party competing to realize their most preferred political objectives in the form of policy outputs. Driven by heterogeneity of political preferences, intra-party policy competition often takes place at party congresses when adopting political platforms, as documented in the internal debates of the Italian *Democratici di Sinistra* (DS) by Giannetti and Laver in Chapter 8. Sometimes the differences in preferences within parties are manifest as loose affiliations of like-minded members; however, in many cases different groups of like-minded members will be more formally organized into official party factions, such as in the Christian Democrats (DC) in Italy, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan or the Justicialist Party (Partido Justicialista, or PJ) in Argentina, where factions are so central to intra-party politics that their roles might almost be likened to those of fully fledged political parties. As several of the chapters in this volume exploring intra-party factions have shown, in fact, political competition among intra-party factions can influence policy (Depauw and Martin; Giannetti and Laver) portfolio allocation (Debus and Bräuninger) and even government duration (Saalfeld).

If competition between intra-party factions may approximate competition between political parties, then the same may also hold true for the study of governing coalitions – in essence temporary inter-party 'factions' formed for office-seeking reasons that will also hold heterogeneous (although most likely 'connected') preferences that will subsequently yield intra-coalitional competition over policy. How long these temporary coalitions hold together is a by-product of both office and policy-seeking motivations, as the survival analyses of Saalfeld have shown (Chapter 9), where intra-party coalitional failure rates are highest at the beginning and end of the electoral cycle. In practice, of course, it is not just in the formation and survival of governments where both office- and policy-seeking motivations trade off; in practice, these two motivations combine to influence intra-party politics at almost all levels. McElroy's study of party switching in the European Parliament in Chapter 11, for instance, shows that the desire to retain legislative privileges and special legislative positions, as well as preferences for policy, both influence the likelihood of MEPs changing their party group affiliation between elections. One cannot realize preferred policy objectives without first obtaining office, in other words, yet if office were the only objective then it would be impossible to explain much of the clearly observable dimensions of difference in both intra- and inter-party competition.

Despite the fact that parties are clearly not homogenous, singular entities, treating them as unitary actors, may nonetheless be sufficient for many analytical purposes.

Because of the importance to parties of cohesive behaviour – which explains the huge efforts many party organizations pour into maintaining discipline among party members – parties may often act 'as if' they were unitary actors, despite being collections of individuals with heterogeneous preferences. The possibility of acting as if unified, despite the existence of clear differences between individual politicians, points to the difference between party cohesion and party discipline – a theme highlighted by several of the contributors to this volume (e.g., Ştefuriuc, Depauw and Martin, Giannetti and Laver). As it has been pointed out in the literature many times (e.g., Ozbudun 1970; Krehbiel 1993), parties may act cohesively for one of two reasons: either their preferences are homogenous, and therefore they behave cohesively because their motivations lead them to identical behaviours; or their preferences are heterogeneous, yet party discipline causes members nonetheless to behave cohesively because the rewards and punishments meted out by the party overpower their tendencies to follow their divergent preferences. Only by observing a lack of cohesive behaviour can we more or less safely assume that preferences are in fact divergent, since it would make little sense for parties to act incohesively if their preferences were in fact united. Yet incohesive behaviour by parties tends to be the exception rather than the rule, since parties have clearly strong incentives to enforce discipline in the face of internal differences, as manifestations of internal divisions may affect participation in government (Bäck, Chapter 3; Depauw and Martin, Chapter 6), the duration of government (Saalfeld, Chapter 9), and portfolio allocation (Camões and Mendes, Chapter 4; Depauw and Martin, Chapter 6). Even when factional differences may also be exploited by parties in coalitional bargaining, such as the process described by Debus and Bräuninger (Chapter 7), these differences are nonetheless pointed to as reasons for reaching agreement. The strong incentives for party discipline may even operate when intra-party differences are clearly heterogeneous, and the payoffs to strict discipline are relatively weak, as in the case of the European Parliament. Bailer's contribution in Chapter 10 shows that following enlargement, political parties from new member states were nonetheless likely to behave cohesively within their 'party' groupings in the transnational European Parliament.

Intra-party politics – like any other behavioural phenomenon in the social sciences – can only be studied empirically if it gives rise to implications that are observable. As we have already stated, however, the difficulty of observing intra-party differences is one of the reasons why politics below the party level has received relatively little attention to date. A key question if we are to make further progress in this research area, then, is to identify how intra-party politics can be observed.

Manifestations of intra-party politics

The difficulty of observing preferences is hardly unique to the study of intra-party politics; such a challenge faces any research where theory validation hinges on the correct observation of preferences, ideal points, policy positions and other

inner states. Because preferences are inner states that are unobservable directly, only second-hand evidence can be gathered to make inferences regarding preferences. This evidence must also be subject to the normal requirements concerning validity, genearalizability and accuracy, as they are observable implications of the inner states about which inferences are to be drawn. When it comes to differences in preferences among actors within parties, several observable manifestations of difference have given rise to strategies for 'observing' these differences.

One such method, used successfully in measuring inter-party differences (e.g., Benoit and Laver 2006), is to ask experts to place party factions or even individual party members on scales where differences can be observed, such as left–right economic policy. As keen observers of politics within parties, experts are able to process and summarize the observable manifestations of policy differences among intra-party actors and to record these differences in judgments that can then be used by researchers to compare intra-party actors. This approach was used by Bäck (Chapter 3), for instance, to measure the extent of factionalization within Swedish parties at the local level. Expert judgments of differences in party policy also formed the basis for anchoring the positions used by Debus and Bräuninger (Chapter 7) to which intra-party differences based on text analysis were then compared. For success, the strategy of soliciting expert judgment assumes that experts have indeed observed intra-party differences, that they are assessing the same differences for the same intra-party units and that they are doing so for the same time period.

Another method is to survey intra-party actors directly concerning their preferences, and to compare responses among different respondents to build a picture of the differences that exist within parties. Such was the strategy of Bailer (Chapter 10), who relied on two surveys of members of the European Parliament to compare intra-party differences before and after the 2004 enlargement of the European Union to include ten new member states. For surveys of political actors themselves to yield valid inferences on intra-party differences, several conditions must hold. Sufficient numbers of the sub-party actors surveyed must participate in the survey; the patterns of response should be unbiased; that is, likelihood to respond should be unrelated to any of the quantities of intra-party difference about which inference is sought; the questionnaire must be worded in a fashion that will generate reliable and accurate information concerning actor preferences and political actors must be trusted to provide honest, non-strategic responses about their political preferences.

Other methods of inferring intra-party differences are based on observing behaviour. As we have already pointed out, if the behaviours of intra-party actors diverge, then it can be reasonably assumed that their motivations – and hence preferences – also diverge. The much more common situation, however, is to observe cohesive behaviour, in which case because of intra-party discipline it cannot necessarily be assumed that intra-party differences do not exist. This is the key problem with using roll-call votes to estimate the ideal points of intra-party actors: because parties in parliamentary settings exercise strong control through what Laver (1999) has called the 'whipping game' (see Saalfeld, Chapter 9),

party leaders are often able to enforce cohesive behaviour even in the face of incohesive preferences. As the most visible display of legislator activity, roll-call votes are typically much more cohesive than the preferences of their members, because party leaders rally members around key legislative votes – often selected for roll calls for precisely this purpose – with strong threats of punishment for defection. Measures based on agreement indexes such as those used by Depauw and Martin (Chapter 6) or legislative preferences based on multi-dimensional scaling techniques such as McElroy (Chapter 11) always understate the true heterogeneity of preferences. It is hardly coincidence, in other words, that all of the countries (except Finland) in Table 6.1 show mean agreement indexes in the 1990s, or that Figure 10.3 shows such clear party clusters of MEP ideological 'scores'.

Roll-call votes, on the other hand, are perfectly suitable if what we really wish to observe is the actual cohesiveness of intra-party legislative behaviour, regardless of whether this comes from cohesiveness of preferences or from discipline. What may matter more in terms of real consequences – for government participation or duration, for portfolio allocation or for the makeup and break-up of parties themselves – may be not whether parties really are unitary actors, but whether they can behave *as if* they are unitary actors. On that basis, the only concern with observing intra-party cohesiveness based on roll-call voting concerns whether roll-call votes are representative of legislative voting as a whole in the legislature in question – an assumption shown to be not unproblematic in many contexts (such as the European Parliament – see Carrubba *et al*. 2006).

Another behavioural manifestation of intra-party politics which has received increasing attention concerns sub-party actors changing their party affiliation: in short, exercising the ultimate form of dissent with their existing party by switching into a different party. While rare in some systems, especially single-member district systems with few parties, switching between parties or factions is extremely common in others, such as Italy, Japan, Brazil or the European Parliament. The European Parliament presents an especially interesting case for studying switching, since it largely lacks the electoral connection that often acts as a brake on legislative switching, and also because the European Parliament, unlike legislatures in parliamentary systems, does not form a governing executive from its members. The only answer to the question as to why MEPs bother to switch party, concludes McElroy (Chapter 11), is that members are enticed (or deterred) by office-related privileges (or loss thereof), conditioned by considerations of policy compatibility between the members and their prospective new parties.

The latest behavioural frontier for observing intra-party politics, however, may lie not in observing what sub-party actors *do* so much as what they *say*. In politics especially, talk is cheap, at least compared to the cost of incohesive behaviour, and individual politicians may often toe the party line while at the same time generating texts that show far less subservience to the mechanisms of party discipline. Text is also cheap in that in the information age, there is a veritable deluge of text not only generated by political actors in the form of speeches, debates, websites and party platforms but also recorded and made easily accessible, often

for minimal cost and effort. Even when only a consensus decision is reached or recorded – such as in committees or party congresses – text offers a way to measure actor preferences separate from observed outcomes. Text also vastly expands the empirical basis for studying intra-party preferences in legislatures, since legislative debate is frequently recorded for a wide variety of topics, including bills not subject to roll-call votes. The great strength of text as a source of data, however, also poses its main obstacle: the sheer volume of text and the richness of the information contained in it mean that suitable methods must be developed to extract this information and summarize it in a systematic, valid and meaningful way. The key to unlocking the power of text to provide insight on intra-party politics will thus depend on further methodological advances in text analysis, most likely in automated methods such as Wordscores (Laver *et al*. 2003) and related variants which use computer processing to apply statistical methods to analyze text.

Priorities for future research on intra-party politics

Considering the rich variety of politics that takes place beneath the level of the party as evidenced by the chapters in this volume, we offer a few remarks in closing as to the most promising avenues for future research in this area.

The first area concerns improving techniques of measurement of the differences that exist between political actors below the party level. Because inroads into understanding intra-party politics depend first on our ability to observe these differences, further gains will only be possible if we can find ways accurately and reliably to measure intra-party politics. Part of these gains will involve better understanding the distinction, drawn many times in this volume, between the cohesion of behaviour and the cohesion of underlying preferences. This involves not just better understanding the reasons to expect differences between the two in particular settings, conditioned by institutions, party discipline and political practice, but also the ways that specific observable manifestations of intra-party politics – be they roll-call votes, political speeches or party switching – provide implications of preferences versus behaviour.

Our insight of the workings of intra-party politics also depends on exactly what we mean by 'party'. In fact, it is precisely this question that we seek to better understand in analysing intra-party politics. A second avenue forward is then to explore intra-party politics in new, possibly creative ways by examining internal political competition in domains that stretch the traditional concept of the political party. If classic intra-party competition is represented by studies of defections from roll-call votes, for instance, then a new and creative avenue for studying intra-party competition might be to examine 'government' formation at the subnational level, to examine debates at party congresses between different party factions or to examine the behaviour of national political parties within transnational political groups or associations. Many of the chapters in this volume represent just such novel approaches, and we feel that much future insight remains to be gained from similar work. A great deal of progress in understanding intra-party competition has been gained in the last two decades, for instance,

by treating competition between coalition partners as 'intra-party' politics. Future gains point to more work at the level below that of the traditional 'party' organizational unit, such as formal or informal factions, but also could consist of individual legislators.

A final area, related to the second, concerns the effects of what might be termed *horizontal* versus *vertical* political competition within political parties. Heterogeneity among political actors below the party level may exist not only horizontally, such as between a party's elected legislators, but also vertically, when the 'party' is considered to include offices elected or appointed at different levels or government. The possibilities for vertical intra-party politics are especially evident in federal or decentralized political systems – such as Spain and Britain, as examined by Ştefuriuc (Chapter 5) – but also exist in differences between national and local governments in unitary settings, such as Sweden (Chapter 3) and Portugal (Chapter 4). The European Union as well offers rich possibilities for intra-party differences at different levels, in particular when there is a clash between the instructions MEPs might receive from their national party and their trans-national party grouping. MEPs are selected and elected in national settings by national political parties, yet carry out their main functions at the trans-national level where they are subject to the rewards and punishments, successes and failures of European Parliament party groups. Not only does the type of multi-level politics found in the EU represent a fascinating object of study for ongoing research, but also the subject matter continues to change as the powers of the European Parliament evolve and as the composition of the EU continues to change.

References

Benoit, K. and Laver, M. (2006) *Party Policy in Modern Democracies*. London: Routledge

Carroll, R., Cox, G. and Pachon, M. (2006) 'How parties create electoral democracy', *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 31(2): 153–74

Carrubba, C., Gabel, M., Murrah, L., Clough, R., Montgomery, E. and Schambach, R. (2006) 'Off the record: unrecorded legislative votes selection bias and roll-call vote analysis', *British Journal of Political Science* 36(4): 691–704

Krehbiel, K. (1993) 'Where's the party?' *British Journal of Political Science* 23(2): 235–66

Laver, M., Benoit, K. and Garry, J. (2003) 'Extracting policy positions from political texts using words as data', *American Political Science Review* 97(2): 311–31

Laver, M. (1999) 'Divided parties, divided governments', *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 24(1): 5–30.

Ozbudun, E. (1970) 'Party cohesion in Western democracies', *Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics* 1: 303–88

Index

Figures in **bold**, tables in *italics*