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Measuring Intra-Party Democracy

A Guide for the Content
Analysis of Party Statutes
with Examples from Hungary,
Slovakia and Romania



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A Guide for the Content Analysis of Party
Statutes with Examples from Hungary,
Slovakia and Romania

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Preface

This guide for the content analysis of party statutes for measuring intra-party democracy (IPD), was developed in the context of the research project “Europarties Heading East: The Influence of Europarties on Central and Eastern European Partner Parties” conducted at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES), at the University of Mannheim and funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG).¹ The project studies the interactions between the two largest and most powerful Europarties, the Party of European Socialists (PES) and the European People’s Party (EPP), with Central and Eastern European partner-parties from Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania. It focuses on the Eastern enlargement of these Europarties, namely on the process of integration of Central and Eastern European parties into the Europarties and the influence which is exerted by the latter on the former in this process. The coding scheme developed in the framework of this project is a theoretically derived instrument that includes questions (items) meant to measure a wide range of indicators for IPD. However, the main categories and sub-categories of the coding scheme are not limited to the specificities of Central and Eastern European parties and can thus be used to analyze the level of IPD of any political party across the world. In essence, this book presents a universally applicable integrated approach to measuring the level of IPD through deductive and standardized content analysis of party statutes.

We would like to thank Jan W. van Deth for his excellent comments and suggestions on this book. Furthermore, we also want to thank the external collaborators of the MZES research project Mihail Chiru (RO), Sergiu Gherghina (RO), Martin Kovanic (SK), Dávid László (HU), Kristína Marušová (SK), and Gergő Papp (HU) for their significant help with the coding of the party statutes from their respective countries and for their constructive comments and suggestions on the coding scheme. Our gratitude is also extended to the DFG for funding our research project.

Finally, it should be stated that this book was written under the aegis of Benjamin von dem Berge who also coordinated the data collection in Central and Eastern Europe within the MZES research project “Europarties Heading East”.

Mannheim and Düsseldorf, February 2013

The Authors

¹ Grant number DE 630/16-1. The principal investigators are Prof. Jan W. van Deth and Prof. Thomas Poguntke.

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Abstract

This book presents an integrated approach to measuring the level of intra-party democracy through deductive and standardized content analysis of party statutes. Following the two main criteria of intra-party democracy—inclusiveness and decentralization—three main categories of intra-party democracy are theoretically derived: members' rights, organizational structure, and decision-making. On the basis of theoretical considerations further sub-categories and individual items are deduced from these main categories and put together into a comprehensive coding scheme. Furthermore, precise coding instructions are presented. Since it is the ultimate aim of this book to present an approach to measuring the level of intra-party democracy for any party statute and to express this in numerical terms, the final step is the quantification of the coded data and the calculation of a numerical measure of intra-party democracy. The level of intra-party democracy ranges from -1 (lowest level of intra-party democracy) to $+1$ (highest level of intra-party democracy) and can be calculated for any statute of any political party. Additionally, we present some empirical examples from Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania.

Keywords Intra-party democracy • Party statutes • Content analysis • Party members' rights • Party organizational structure • Party decision-making • Central and Eastern Europe

Chapter 1

Introduction

Political parties are central actors in modern representative democracies and in the democratic decision-making process (Kittilson and Scarrow 2003). Therefore, they also play a crucial role in the consolidation of new and young democratic systems (Pridham 2011, 2005, 1990). The role of political parties in the democratic process can be best described by drawing on their functions in a political system. In modern democracies, political parties are intermediary institutions, which do not only help to organize parliamentary majorities, but are also the main source and mechanism of candidate recruitment and interest aggregation and, furthermore, they fulfill a representative function which links voters to the state (Hague and Harrop 2007, pp. 231–232; Lawson 1988; Poguntke 2000; Sartori 1976). The extent to which political parties are actually able to fulfill these functions, depends not least on the level of intra-party democracy (IPD) and its structuring effect. This structuring effect refers to the relationship between the rhetoric of party platforms and models of intra-party organization (Kittilson and Scarrow 2003, p. 64).

There are several schools of thought which refer to IPD as a more or less desirable goal for political parties. As our main goal is a contribution to the empirical measurement of IPD, we will only briefly mention the main lines of the theoretical debate here. From the perspective of a competitive model of democracy, Teorell (1999, pp. 365–366) identifies two potential reasons, why the idea of IPD might be rejected. The first is the need for efficiency of party organizations with respect to policy-making in a competitive political sphere (see also Bäck 2008, pp. 75–76). The second is the danger of distorted processes of preference aggregation through unequal treatment of citizens' interest. On the other hand, from the perspective of a deliberative theory of democracy, which calls for a form of participation more compatible with the requirements of representative government, it can be argued, that internally democratic parties are needed in order to ensure that the legislature remains sensitive to public opinion. Also according to Teorell (1999, pp. 363) such parties provide a 'vertical linkage between different deliberating spheres and a horizontal linkage between competing issues.'

Advocates of IPD usually highlight that democratically organized parties 'are likely to select more capable and appealing leaders, to have more responsive policies, and, as a result, to enjoy greater electoral success' (Scarrow 2005, p. 3). Furthermore, these parties are supposed to strengthen democratic culture in general (Scarrow 2005, p. 3; Zeuner 2003, p. 254). Even though IPD 'is not a

panacea', because some 'procedures are better suited to some circumstances than to others', and there are parties in stable democracies which lack IPD, IPD has an 'apparent potential to promote a virtuous circle linking ordinary citizens to government, benefiting the parties that adopt it, and more generally contributing to the stability and legitimacy of the democracies in which these parties compete for power' (Scarrow 2005, p. 3; see also Fraenkel 1991, p. 203). In the end, it is evident that IPD 'is a controversial notion. [...] As parties entrenched in civil society, they require wide enough channels through which to gain the support of the electorate. As parties in government, they need a centralization of power and resources to make them effective players in the decision-making process' (Karasimeonov 2005, p. 96).

But what exactly is IPD? IPD generally refers to the implementation of a minimum set of norms within the organizations of political parties (Zeuner 2003, p. 254). Ideally, in a democratic party, '[the] will should be formed "bottom-up" and (...) the internal distribution of power should be marked by dispersion at different levels, bodies and individuals rather than by the concentration in one organ' (Cular 2004, p. 34; see also Becker 1999, p. 28; Poguntke 2005; Tsatsos and Morlok 1982). This implies that IPD is not a one-dimensional concept. On the one hand, the extent to which individual party members are enabled to express their opinion or participate in intra-party decision-making is important. On the other hand, it is crucial that the entire decision-making process is not centralized in one organ at the highest national level and that subnational party units enjoy a certain level of autonomy. While the first point is usually referred to as *inclusiveness*, the second one is typically called *decentralization*. Overall, a certain level of inclusiveness *and* a certain level of decentralization should be attained simultaneously in order to achieve a decent level of IPD (Bojinova 2007; Hazan and Rahat 2006, 2010; Rahat and Hazan 2001; Ware 1996, pp. 257–285). This conceptualization of the IPD phenomenon combining the criteria of decentralization and inclusiveness is central to the approach presented in this book.

In order to determine the level of IPD we propose to draw on data generated through the content analysis of party statutes. Party statutes are the usual objects of investigation when analyzing IPD (Emminghaus 2003, p. 92; Katz and Mair 1992b; Norris 2006, p. 92). Even though statutes (and legal texts in general) do not guarantee their own implementation (Norris 2006, p. 93; Niedermayer 1989, p. 16; Karasimeonov 2005, p. 97), their mere existence might take a socializing effect on actors who are active within the respective institution, as we know from sociological institutionalism (March and Olsen 1998, p. 948; 1989, p. 22). In addition, Katz and Mair (1992a) make us aware of the importance of distinguishing between the official and the real story of the distribution of power within a given political party. While the rhetoric of party statutes does not tell us everything about the internal life of parties, it is nevertheless a useful indicator of changing attitudes concerning the relationships between party leaders, individual members and party organs (Kittilson and Scarrow 2003, p. 65). Furthermore, it is often the only available one, as tracing changes in behaviour is extremely time and cost consuming and often simply impossible when we want to go far back in time. Finally, formal rules

are resources often invoked in intra-party battles (Poguntke 2000) and, as such, determine the boundaries of legitimate intra-party action. Ultimately, it holds that ‘although rules can in principle be circumvented, they nevertheless are an important indication of the atmosphere in a party and its intentions. Rules by themselves can enhance democratic or autocratic tendencies: That is why they are an important aspect when we analyze IPD’ (Karasimeonov 2005, p. 97).

Scholars may use this book as a guide when collecting their own data. Our aim is to present an integrated approach of measuring the level of IPD through deductive and standardized content analysis of party statutes. By following the two main criteria for IPD (inclusiveness and decentralization)—and applying them to the three main theoretically derived categories for IPD: members’ rights, organizational structure and decision-making—we create a tool to measure numerical levels of IPD. On the basis of theoretical considerations further sub-categories and individual items are deduced from these main categories and put together into a comprehensive coding scheme. Furthermore, also precise coding instructions are presented. Since it is the ultimate objective of this book to present an approach to measuring the level of IPD for any party statute and to express this in numbers, the final step is the quantification of the coded data and the calculation of the level of IPD. The level of IPD ranges from -1 (lowest level of IPD) to $+1$ (highest level of IPD) and can be calculated for any statute of any political party. With this data it is possible to construct a sophisticated and robust Index of IPD which is grounded in official legal texts and which can be applied worldwide. This approach complies with Cular’s (2004, p. 34) observation that ‘[u]nlike most definitions of democracy at the level of political system, the definition of internal party democracy does not mean a state that can be distinguished from other forms of internal party order. It is rather about the scale by which we can measure the extent to which a party is democratically organized and eventually compare parties.’

The structure of the book follows the steps which have to be taken in the process of developing the measurement of IPD via content analysis of party statutes. As we follow a deductive approach for the development of our analytical categories, we begin with comprehensive theoretical considerations in [Chap. 2](#). This theoretical deduction is a necessary groundwork for the development of the actual coding scheme, which consists of analytical categories deduced from the theoretical considerations. The coding scheme, which constitutes the heart of every content analysis, is presented in [Chap. 3](#). How exactly it should be applied by the coders to the individual party statutes is explained in [Chap. 4](#). Here, the coding unit, coding rules, coding instructions and coding examples are presented which help the coders to apply the coding scheme to the statutes in the appropriate way. Finally, in [Chap. 5](#) we describe how to arrive at “the numbers”. First, we explain how the coding results are transferred into numerical terms (quantification). Then, we examine some weighting options before we present the results of reliability tests which are conducted with the data we have collected in our research project (see preface). Finally, for purposes of illustration, we present first empirical results on the development of IPD in Hungarian, Slovak and Romanian parties from 1988 up to 2011.

Chapter 2

Deduction of the Coding Scheme

Obviously, any deductive content analysis needs to begin with the theoretical deduction of the coding scheme. In this chapter we describe the theoretical considerations which lead us to the different main categories and sub-categories in the scheme. Based on this theoretical reasoning we specify the actual coding scheme in a second step (see [Chap. 3](#)).

As already outlined above, we conceptualize IPD on the basis of the two criteria of inclusiveness and decentralization. According to Scarrow (2005), who provides a comprehensive study of the concept of IPD, *inclusiveness* refers to the scope of the circle of party decision-makers. It can be observed on a continuum, where ‘[u]nder the most exclusive rules, key decisions are controlled by a single leader or a small group of leaders, and others have no binding role in the process. In the most inclusive parties, all party members, or even all party supporters, are given the opportunity to decide on important issues, such as the choice of party leader or the selection of party candidates [or on important policy issues]’ (Scarrow 2005, p. 6).

With regard to *decentralization*, it can be best defined by considering what centralization means. According to Scarrow, it ‘describes the extent to which decisions are made by a single group or decision body. In a highly centralized party, a national executive meets frequently and has the authority to make decisions that are accepted at all levels of the party. In especially decentralized parties, the national party committee probably meets much less often and tends to be focused more on coordination and communication than on providing definitive guidance to the party’ (Scarrow 2005, p. 6). In our context, decentralization refers mainly to the role and autonomy of subnational units within a party.

It should be stated that we ascribe greater importance to inclusiveness than to decentralization because ‘[d]ecentralization could mean only that control over candidate selection has passed from the national oligarchy to a local oligarchy. For example, if the selectorate is decentralized from a national party conference of several thousand participants to ten local committees each consisting of a few dozen activists and leaders, the overall selectorate has been decentralized, but has not become more inclusive—and has actually become more exclusive’ (Hazan and Rahat 2006, p. 112). In our coding scheme this is taken into account by including more items measuring inclusiveness than decentralization.

On the basis of these broad analytical criteria, we further ask what dimensions are best suited in order to study IPD. Scarrow (2005, pp. 7–20) identifies candidate selection, party membership and models of party organization as central dimensions for the study of IPD. More broadly, Mimpfen (2007) observes, that while there is no universal definition of IPD, two groups of instruments of internal democratization can be identified. The first involves the ‘organization of free, fair and regular elections.’ The second ‘involves a different group of instruments that entail the equal and open participation of all members and member groups in such a way that interests are more or less equally represented’ (Mimpfen 2007, p. 2). Also, the German Party Law from 1967 proposes a detailed interpretation of IPD, by setting up four basic intra-party requirements: (1) The political will of the party to be formed by the party members or delegates through free elections; (2) freedom of expression; (3) protection of minorities; (4) abiding by the rule of law (Zeuner 2003, p. 254; Niedermayer and Stöss 1993). These basic principles are taken into account in the theoretical deduction of the coding scheme.

Furthermore, there is an academic consensus about a set of minimum requirements, such as basic members’ rights and the existence of certain party organs fulfilling different functions, which must be met in order to realize IPD (Cular 2004; Goati 2005; Kajsiu 2005; Karasimeonov 2005; Rudzio 2006, pp. 138–144; Siljanovska-Davkova 2005; Vuletic 2005). Also, regarding the decision-making processes, democratic procedures need to be met in the areas of recruitment and programmatic decisions (Becker 1999, p. 19; Emminghaus 2003, pp. 91–92; Geser 1994, pp. 194–195; Mimpfen 2007, p. 2; Niedermayer 1989, p. 17; Scarrow 2005, pp. 7–11). Drawing on the theoretical debate outlined above, three dimensions of the concept of IPD can be brought together: members’ rights, organizational structures and decision-making.

At this point, in a brief anticipation of the actual coding scheme, we need to mention that these three conceptual dimensions of IPD (members’ rights, organizational structures and decision-making) constitute the three main categories of our coding scheme. These main categories are further divided up into sub-categories at different levels (see Fig. 2.1), which are comprised themselves of individual items (in our case, the individual items are designed as questions which are applied by the coders on the party statutes). Figure 2.1 also shows the principal logic of assigning codes in the coding scheme which will be explained in more detail in Chap. 3.

In accordance with the established procedure in deductive content analysis (for an overview see Neuendorf 2002, pp. 99–102), the following subchapters are dedicated to the deduction of the coding scheme. Therefore, what follows now are the respective theoretical considerations associated with each of the main categories and sub-categories in the coding scheme (for illustration see Fig. 2.1). This includes justifications for the specific items (questions) and their sequence within the different sub-categories.




Fig. 2.1 Categories of intra-party democracy

2.1 Members' Rights

2.1.1 General Members' Rights

General members' rights are the rights of all party members notwithstanding their position or function within the party. Scherff (1993, p. 24) defines the equality of all party members in forming the party's political will and decisions as a basic requirement of IPD. The general rights assessed in the first question battery correspond to individual democratic principles such as freedom of opinion and freedom of speech and are to a large extent self-explanatory in terms of substantive meaning. For a high degree of IPD, members with opinions diverging from the majority opinion should have good opportunities to present and discuss their positions within the party and thus attempt to form alternative majorities (Scherff 1993, p. 25). This aspect has been operationalized in the coding scheme through questions regarding the rights of members to be informed about party activities, the rights to express opinions within and outside of the party, the rights to participate in intra-party decision-making as well as the right to form factions supporting diverse positions within the party. The sub-category of general members' rights refers to the *inclusiveness* of a party.

2.1.2 Minority Rights

The importance of safeguarding minority rights in party decision-making is emphasized by various authors (e.g. Mimpen 2007, pp. 3–4; Norris 2004, pp. 29–38; Prasai 2007, pp. 3–4). Whereas women and youth are generally given the greatest importance in this context (Vuletic 2005, pp. 135–136; Norris 2004, pp. 29–38), the inclusion of ethnic minorities may also play a crucial role in ethnically diverse societies. The importance of minority rights within the party is assessed through questions regarding the existence and compulsory nature of minority quotas for intra-party and public office. Additionally, inclusiveness is also measured by the ex-officio membership of minority-group leaders in party leadership organs (executive). Party members who represent opinions that diverge from the official party line are treated in the general-members' rights section, as a diverging opinion does not equal minority rights as defined in this question battery (women, youth, ethnic). Similar to the general members' rights, this sub-category also refers predominantly to the *inclusiveness* of individual members and to the extent to which they are involved in party activities.

2.2 Organizational Structure

Party organs have to fulfill a basic list of criteria in order for a party to be considered democratic (e.g. Scarrow 2005, pp. 15–21). Therefore, this main category deals with formal structures within a party and their interaction. One central criterion of how to study these structures is the distribution of power and

competencies between the different party organs, especially the separation of the judiciary function from other functions within the party (Poguntke 1998; Rudzio 2006, p. 142). Characteristic for democratic parties are regulations that ensure that the competencies of all party organs (except the party judiciary) are derived from the members' will (inclusiveness). A high level of inclusiveness expresses itself through the right of members' assemblies and the party congress (inclusive or decentralized organs) to override the decisions of other (less inclusive, more centralized) organs.

2.2.1 Party Congress

The party congress is an assembly constituted by party members and delegates. Ideally, a subnational congress is the highest organ of any given subnational party level. From an IPD-perspective, the congress should decide about statutory issues, the party programme and the party line, it should elect the members for party organs of the organizational level it represents and it should elect delegates for the congress of the next organizational level (Rudzio 2006, p. 138; Scherff 1993, p. 24). Additionally to the fundamental question whether a party congress exists, it is important for the *inclusiveness* aspect to know how often it convenes (Rudzio 2006, p. 148). If the competencies of the party congress are extensive enough, the frequency of its sessions should indicate a high level of inclusion of the members in the opinion formation and decision-making processes. The question battery in the coding scheme measures the competencies of the national party congress, the frequency of its meetings and its official status as the highest authority within the party.

2.2.2 Conflict Solving Agencies

In the Federal Republic of Germany, party courts (so called "Schiedsgerichte") decide upon statutory and electoral disputes. They impose regulatory measures (reprimands, temporary activity bans, party exclusions) upon the members who act against party regulation (Rudzio 2006, p. 140). According to the principle of equality, the conflict solving agencies should have the right to rule upon request over all members including the party leadership whenever their behavior damages the party (Poguntke 2005, p. 643). For a high degree of IPD, it should further protect individual party members from arbitrary disciplinary measures by the party leadership. The question battery regarding conflict solving agencies within the party begins with a filter question about the existence of such agencies or mechanisms within the party and continues with qualifying questions meant to determine the nature and competencies of the conflict solving agencies. This sub-category refers to the *inclusiveness* of a party because it describes the ability of individual party members or party organs to exercise leverage (effective or potential) with respect to other party organs and members and therefore upholds an institutional balance in a party.

2.2.3 The National Executive

The party leadership is usually composed of the national executive and the executive committee (see [Sect. 2.2.4](#)) as decision-making organs (Poguntke 1998). In terms of IPD, the division of competencies plays a decisive role, as competencies should be distributed in such a way as to prevent autocratic leadership. Ideally, the executive level should be accountable to and controlled by more inclusive party organs, such as the party congress or a special control agency that is legitimized by the party congress. It is important that an intra-party board of inquiry can be invoked by the party members, the congress or a special control agency in order to investigate acts of misconduct by the party leadership. Since the division of power might take place between the different levels of the executive, this issue of control over the party executive is divided into two question batteries: one for the national executive and one for the executive committee. The question battery regarding the national executive starts with a filter question meant to establish whether the obligations of the organ are mentioned in the statute. It continues with questions about accountability and control mechanisms which are formulated in such a way as to determine the level of *inclusiveness* of a party.

2.2.4 The Executive Committee

The division between national executive and executive committee enables us to determine how power is distributed within the party and to discover differences between varying organizational layers of a party. The question battery concerned with the executive committee is structurally equivalent to the questions of the former question battery concerned with the national executive, starting with a filter question intended to establish whether the obligations of the executive committee are mentioned in the statute and continuing with questions about accountability and control mechanisms and therefore also aims at determining the level of *inclusiveness* of a given party.

2.2.5 The Party President

Because of his great importance, the party president is treated in a separate sub-category. When it comes to the party president we consider especially the extent to which he has prerogatives with respect to other party organs. From an IPD-perspective, the rights of the party president have to be limited lest he becomes a sole ruler of the party. This threat is particularly prevalent within Central and Eastern-European Parties: 'A specific phenomenon for post-communist parties is that through their emergence and role during the transition period, they are leader-centered parties. They are formed by the leader and his close friends and allies, who acquire great

power resources' (Karasimeonov 2005, pp. 104–105). The question battery regarding the prerogatives of the party president determines the degree of the president's power by assessing his statutory rights and the possibility to challenge the president in his position. Generally, it can be stated that the more prerogatives the party president has, the lower is the level of *inclusiveness* and *decentralization*.

2.2.6 Relationship Between the National Level and Subnational Levels

In the final sub-category of organizational structure, we need to consider how the relations between different levels of a party are designed. Decentralization in the relationship between the national and the subnational levels plays an important role in assessing the level of IPD (Bille 2001, pp. 103–104; Karasimeonov 2005): 'This aspect of IPD gives an idea of the level of centralization and concentration of power in the leadership and higher party institutions' (Karasimeonov 2005, p. 103). In this context the ability of subnational party units to make themselves heard on the national level plays an important role for IPD. In Germany, the existence of a party territorial council that is active on the national level proves the ability of the subnational organs to make themselves heard on the national level (regarding the party territorial councils of German parties see Poguntke 2005, p. 642; Rudzio 2006, p. 140). Since parties in some countries lack territorial councils, the level of *decentralization* can be determined by the mentioning of subnational units in the statute and by the kind of rights which subnational units enjoy on different organizational levels within the party.

2.3 Decision-Making

The levels of inclusiveness and decentralization are, as for the categories above, the two central criteria for IPD in the decision-making process. The more inclusive and decentralized the decision-making process in a political party is, the more democratic is the party (for inclusiveness see Hazan and Rahat 2010, 2006; Rahat and Hazan 2001; for decentralization see Bille 2001). For both public office and intra-party positions, the question batteries are focused on the national level unless otherwise specified. The reason for choosing this approach is that statutes might contain contradicting information about the different organizational levels of the parties. Furthermore, we focus on the national level because it is assumed that intra-party and public offices on the national level are of greater importance for the party and thus more indicative of the overall level of IPD. In addition, this approach reduces the level of complexity for coders. Finally, party statutes also tend to include more information about the decision-making processes on the national level which is useful for comparative purposes.

2.3.1 Recruitment

2.3.1.1 Recruitment to National Public Office

Candidate Nomination

Here it is relevant to find out whether candidates can nominate themselves (very inclusive), whether they have to be supported by party members or the congress (inclusive and/or decentralized) or if they have to be nominated by the party leadership (exclusive and centralized). Candidate nomination measures which party units or types of party members have the right to first suggest a candidate for a position. After starting with a filter question meant to assess whether the statute contains any information about candidate nomination, the question battery continues with questions reflecting inclusion, ranging from the most exclusive (leadership nominates) to the most inclusive (all members can nominate themselves) pole. Here the two criteria of *inclusiveness* and *decentralization* are intertwined.

Candidate Selection for Parliamentary Office

The selection process plays a central role regarding the inclusion of party members. As Schattschneider points out: ‘The [...] [selection] process has become the crucial process of the party. He who can make the [...] [selections] is the owner of the party’ (Schattschneider 1942, p. 101; Norris 2004, p. 26). In presidential systems the term, “selection” generally refers to the choosing of the presidential candidate (see next section). In parliamentary systems it is the assignment of positions on the party lists upon which the electorate votes. The questions in this battery range from questions indicating the very inclusive end of the continuum (closed primary) to the very exclusive end (selection process controlled by party leadership). Therefore, this sub-category focuses on the *inclusiveness* of a party.

Candidate Selection for Presidential Elections

In presidential or semi-presidential political systems, the president fulfills crucial executive and representative functions. Since the country’s president is popularly elected, presidential candidates are the central electoral face of the party. Within the party, presidential candidates play an important role because of their public exposure and, once they have won the election, because of their paramount position which flows from their directly earned legitimacy. Because of the importance of presidential candidates, the question of how they are selected is a good measurement of the division of power within the party and hence a good indicator of IPD. The question battery regarding the selection of the presidential candidates follows the same logic as the question batteries before, starting with two general filter questions, one establishing whether the statute provides any information about those responsible for selecting the presidential candidate and another one determining whether the party president is automatically the party’s candidate. The question battery continues with questions meant to capture the different selection possibilities

ranging from the most inclusive (closed primary) to the most exclusive (the executive). Similarly to the previous sub-category, the inquiry into the selection of candidates for presidential elections aims at capturing the *inclusiveness* of a party.

Relationship between the National Level and Subnational Levels with regard to Candidate Selection

This question battery focuses on whether subnational units play a role in the nomination of at least some candidates for national public office. The main goal is to indicate the degree of *decentralization* in the selection process. Research in this area usually relies on the typology of Bille (2001). Based on the data collected by Katz and Mair (1992), Bille (2001) designed six party categories from ‘the most centralized (national organs have complete control over the selection)’ to the ‘most localized (subnational organs have complete control over the selection)’ and used them to compare the recruiting rules of Western European political parties.¹ We follow this approach in our coding scheme. Similar to Bille’s categories, the question battery starts with questions indicating a high degree of *centralization* (all candidates for public office are selected by national party units), continues through questions indicating decreasing levels of centralization and ends with a question that indicates the highest possible level of decentralization (all candidates for national public office are selected by subnational party units).

2.3.1.2 Recruitment to National Intra-Party Office

Election of the National Executive

The central point of the two question batteries dealing with the party executive (the national executive and the executive committee) is to find out who determines the composition of the party leadership. As in the previous sub-categories, the question battery about the national executive starts with a filter question meant to determine whether the statute holds any information about the subject. The following questions stretch from the most *inclusive* (individual party members elect the national executive) to the most *exclusive* (the party president elects the national executive) rules for intra-party office recruitment.

Election of the Executive Committee

Treating the national executive and the executive committee separately allows a more precise insight into the power distribution of the party. Therefore, the former question battery concerned with the election of the national executive is repeated to assess the specific level of *inclusiveness* for the executive committee.

¹ For a similar categorization (albeit with more extreme poles) see Hazan and Rahat (2006, pp. 110–111).

Election of the Party President

Because of the high importance of this question, the election of the party president is treated in a separate sub-category. The question battery follows the same logic as those regarding the election of the national executive and the executive committee. The first question determines whether the statute contains any information about the election of the party president. The question battery continues with questions starting with the most inclusive (all members elect the party president) and ending with the most exclusive (the executive committee elects the party president) possibility to elect the party president. Therefore, this sub-category aims at studying the degree of *inclusiveness* of a party.

2.3.1.3 Procedures

Voting Procedures

After starting with a filter question aimed to determine whether the statute contains any information regarding voting procedures, this question battery continues with questions that determine whether the parties follow the generally accepted democratic standards such as having secret voting procedures when electing their leadership or public office candidates and making the election results available to party members. From a theoretical point of view, secret voting is considered as being more democratic because the possibility of influencing the voters to comply through intimidation or bribery is smaller than by open voting procedures, where dissenters might be encouraged to conform to the official party line. This sub-category refers to the *inclusiveness* criteria, because we are interested in the formal rules, which structure the participation in voting on an intra-party level.

Relationship between the National Level and Subnational Levels with regard to Candidate Selection for Subnational Public Office

This question battery aims to indicate the level of decentralization within the party by assessing the degree of autonomy of subnational party units when electing their candidates for public office. The questions in this battery are inspired by the typology of Bille (2001), starting with a filter question to identify whether the statute contains any information about how subnational units elect their public office candidates and continuing with questions that reflect a high degree of *decentralization* (regional autonomy when electing all candidates for public office) to a high degree of centralization (national units completely control the election of candidates for subnational public office).

Relationship between the National Level and Subnational Levels with regard to Candidate Selection for Subnational Intra-party Office

Similar to the former sub-category, this question battery also aims to indicate the level of decentralization within the party, this time by assessing the degree of

autonomy of subnational party units when electing their intra-party candidates. Also inspired by the typology of Bille (2001), the question battery starts with a filter question in order to establish whether the statutes contain any information about how subnational units elect their leadership. The question battery continues with questions ranging from a highly *decentralized* structure (subnational autonomy when electing subnational leadership) to a highly centralized structure (national units completely controlling the election of subnational party leadership).

2.3.2 Programmatic Issues

The party manifesto is central to the visibility of each political party and at the same time it is the official self-positioning of the party (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006). Therefore, it is important to know who has the right to decide upon the party manifesto (Scarrow 2005, p. 11). As in many other sub-categories, the question battery starts with a filter question in order to determine whether the statute contains any information about who is responsible for the party manifesto. The subsequent questions are classified from the most *inclusive* (all party members can vote upon the manifesto) to the most *exclusive* (the party president decides upon the manifesto). Additionally, the last question in the battery is about the role of subnational party units in voting on the manifesto and is meant to offer insights upon the degree of *decentralization* of the party.

Chapter 3

The Coding Scheme

The coding scheme presented in this chapter is developed on the basis of the theoretical considerations sketched out in the previous chapter. In other words, the coding scheme is the result of the operationalization of the theoretical considerations. In our case, it is created in such a way that it follows from general concepts to specific questions. The coders apply the coding scheme directly on the text (the party statutes).

The coding scheme indicates the level of a category/sub-category/question through its digit structure (see also Table 3.1). The first digit always represents one of the three main categories: members’ rights (code starting with “1”), organizational structure (code starting with “2”) and decision-making (code starting with “3”). All main categories are divided into sub-categories. The second digit of the code indicates these sub-categories. The main category “decision-making” consists for instance of the sub-categories “recruitment” and “programmatic issues”. Some sub-categories include further sub-categories down to the individual variable (item), which is the specific question. Categories in brackets, such as “(10-00-0-0)”, are not intended to be coded. The questions can be answered with YES, NO or NS (“Not Specified”). The complete coding scheme is provided in Table 3.1.

In general, there are two different kinds of questions in the coding scheme: Questions which refer to an explicit mentioning of an aspect and questions which refer to an implicit reference of an aspect in the statute. This plays an important role when it comes to the quantification of the coded data (see Sect. 5.1.1).

Table 3.1 The coding scheme

Members’ rights	(10-00-0-0)
General members’ rights	(11-00-0-0)
• Are the principles of intra-party democracy explicitly mentioned in the statute?	11-10-0-0
• Are party members’ rights explicitly mentioned in the statute?	11-20-0-0
According to the statute, do party members explicitly have the following rights:	–
...To be informed about party activities?	11-21-0-0
...To express a divergent opinion within the party and/or in public?	11-22-0-0
...To participate in party decision-making?	11-23-0-0
...To form factions within the party?	11-24-0-0
–	–

(continued)

Table 3.1 (continued)

Minority rights	(12-00-0-0)
• Is there an explicit reference to minorities in the statute?	12-10-0-0
• Are there any quotas explicitly mentioned in the statute with respect to minorities?	12-20-0-0
–Is it explicitly mentioned, that the quotas are binding?	12-21-0-0
–Does the statute explicitly mention minority quotas in party organs?	12-22-0-0
–Does the statute explicitly mention minority quotas in the party lists for public office?	12-23-0-0
• Do certain members (i.e. representatives) of the minority groups automatically become members of the party executive?	12-30-0-0
–	–
Organizational structure	(20-00-0-0)
Party congress	(21-00-0-0)
• Is the existence of a party congress or equivalent mentioned in the statute?	21-10-0-0
–Does the party congress play a role in defining the party statute?	21-11-0-0
–Is the party congress the sole organ responsible for elaborating/amending the statute?	21-12-0-0
–Does the statute mention that the party congress should meet at least once every three years?	21-13-0-0
–Does the statute explicitly mention that the party congress has the highest authority within the party?	21-14-0-0
–	–
Conflict solving agencies	(22-00-0-0)
• Are any conflict-solving agencies/mechanisms within the party mentioned in the statute?	22-10-0-0
–Is the existence of an independent party organ (e.g. party court) mentioned, which decides on disciplinary measures?	22-11-0-0
–Is it explicitly mentioned that the party court's decisions are equally binding for everybody, including the party executive?	22-12-0-0
–Is it explicitly mentioned that the party court's jurisdiction includes the party executive and the party president?	22-13-0-0
–	–
The national executive	(23-00-0-0)
• Does the statute mention the responsibilities and accountabilities of the national executive?	23-10-0-0
–Does the statute mention that the national executive is accountable to the party members or to the party congress?	23-11-0-0
–Is there any party body/mechanism explicitly mentioned, which is specifically entitled to control the national executive?	23-12-0-0
–	–
The executive committee	(24-00-0-0)
• Does the statute mention the responsibilities and accountabilities of the executive committee?	24-10-0-0
–Does the statute mention that the executive committee is accountable to the party members or to the party congress?	24-11-0-0
–Is there any party body/mechanism explicitly mentioned, which is specifically entitled to control the executive committee?	24-12-0-0
–	–

(continued)

Table 3.1 (continued)

Party president	(25-00-0-0)
• Does the statute mention that the party president can be challenged in his position?	25-10-0-0
• Does the statute mention the following rights (obligations) of the party president:	(25-20-0-0)
...To block the execution of decisions and other acts of the executive?	25-21-0-0
...To exclude a party member?	25-22-0-0
...To dismiss a member of the party executive?	25-23-0-0
...To act against the general provisions of the statute in certain cases?	25-24-0-0
...To form or to close subnational party units?	25-25-0-0
—	—
Relationship between the national level and subnational levels	(26-00-0-0)
• Does the statute mention subnational party units?	26-10-0-0
—Does the statute mention any rights of subnational party units?	26-11-0-0
—Does the statute mention that subnational units influence entities at higher levels?	26-12-0-0
—Is it explicitly mentioned that subnational units have autonomy?	26-13-0-0
Decision-making	(30-00-0-0)
Recruitment	(31-00-0-0)
—	—
<i>Public office—National level</i>	(31-10-0-0)
—	—
Candidate nomination	(31-11-0-0)
• Does the statute mention the rights to suggest/nominate candidates for public office?	31-11-1-0
—Do nominations for candidates come from the executive committee or a nomination committee chosen by the executive committee?	31-11-1-1
—Do nominations for candidates come from the national executive or a nomination committee chosen by the national executive?	31-11-1-2
—Do nominations for candidates come from the party congress (or individual members)?	31-11-1-3
—Do nominations for candidates come from subnational units?	31-11-1-4
—May each candidate suggest him- or herself for at least some public offices?	31-11-1-5
—	—
Candidate selection—parliament	(31-12-0-0)
• Does the statute mention who has the right to select candidates for parliament?	31-12-1-0
—Do registered party members select candidates by election (“closed primary”)?	31-12-1-1
—Do delegates select candidates by election?	31-12-1-2
—Does the national executive or a committee chosen by it select candidates?	31-12-1-3
—Does the executive committee, president or a committee designed by them select candidates?	31-12-1-4
—	—
Candidate selection—president	(31-13-0-0)
• Does the statute explicitly mention who has the right to select candidates for president?	31-13-1-0
—Can the party president select him-/herself as a presidential candidate?	31-13-1-1
—Do registered party members select a candidate by election (“closed primary”)?	31-13-1-2
—Do delegates select a candidate by election?	31-13-1-3
—Does the national executive or a committee designed by them select a candidate?	31-13-1-4

(continued)

Table 3.1 (continued)

–Does the executive committee or a committee designed by them select a candidate?	31-13-1-5
–	–
Relationship between the national level and subnational levels (national public office)	(31-14-0-0)
• Do national party units completely control the selection of candidates?	31-14-1-0
• Do subnational party units propose candidates, but the national party organs make the final decision?	31-14-2-0
• Do national party units provide a list of names from which the subnational party organs can select the final list?	31-14-3-0
• Do subnational party units have suspensive veto rights regarding candidate selection for public office?	31-14-4-0
• Do subnational party units completely control the process and make the final decision about public office candidates?	31-15-5-0
–	–
<i>Intra-party office—National level</i>	(31-20-0-0)
–	–
Election of the national executive	(31-21-0-0)
• Are there any rules regarding the election of the national executive explicitly mentioned in the statute?	31-21-1-0
–Are individual party members directly involved in electing the national executive?	31-21-1-1
–Are delegates in the party congress or a central committee directly elected by the congress directly involved in electing the national executive?	31-21-1-2
–Is the executive committee directly involved in the election of the national executive?	31-21-1-3
–Is the party president directly involved in electing the party executive?	31-21-1-4
–	–
Election of the executive committee	(31-22-0-0)
• Are there any rules regarding the election of the executive committee explicitly mentioned in the statute?	31-22-1-0
–Are individual party members directly involved in electing the executive committee?	31-22-1-1
–Are delegates in the party congress or a central committee directly elected by the congress involved in electing the executive committee?	31-22-1-2
–Is the national executive directly involved in the election of the executive committee?	31-22-1-3
–Is the party president directly involved in electing the executive committee?	31-22-1-4
–	–
Election of the party president	(31-23-0-0)
• Are there any rules to the election of the party president mentioned in the statute?	31-23-1-0
–Are all party members directly involved in electing the party president?	31-23-1-1
–Are delegates of the party congress directly involved in electing the party president?	31-23-1-2
–Is the national executive directly involved in electing the party president?	31-23-1-3
–Is the executive committee directly involved in electing the party president?	31-23-1-4
–	–

(continued)

Table 3.1 (continued)

<i>Procedures</i>	(31-30-0-0)
—	—
Voting procedures	(31-31-0-0)
• Do the statutes contain any information about the manner of voting for intra-party or public positions?	31-31-1-0
• Is a secret method used when electing candidates for either intra-party or public positions?	31-31-1-1
• Is a secret method always used when electing candidates for both intra-party and public office?	31-31-1-2
• Is it explicitly mentioned that the voting results are presented to all party members within the party to justify and legitimize the candidacy?	31-31-1-3
—	—
Relationship between national and subnational units—subnational public office	(31-32-0-0)
• Is it specified how subnational units elect their public office candidates?	31-32-1-0
–Do subnational units enjoy regional autonomy when electing their public office candidates?	31-32-1-1
–Is it explicitly mentioned that the subnational units cooperate with national branches when electing their public office candidates?	31-32-1-2
–Do the national units completely control the election of the subnational public office candidates?	31-32-1-3
—	—
Relationship between national and subnational units—subnational intra-party office	(31-33-0-0)
• Is it explicitly specified how subnational units elect their leadership?	31-33-1-0
–Do subnational units enjoy regional autonomy when electing their leadership?	31-33-1-1
–Do subnational units cooperate with national branches when electing their leadership?	31-33-1-2
–Do the national units completely control the election of the subnational party leadership?	31-33-1-3
—	—
<i>Programmatic issues</i>	(32-00-0-0)
• Does the statute explicitly specify who is in charge of the manifesto?	32-10-0-0
–May individual party members vote upon the manifesto?	32-11-0-0
–May the party congress vote upon the manifesto?	32-12-0-0
–May the party executive vote upon the manifesto?	32-13-0-0
–May the party president vote upon the manifesto?	32-14-0-0
–May subnational party units have a separate vote on a manifesto?	32-15-0-0

Chapter 4

The Coding Procedure

After making explicit the underlying theoretical considerations related to the study of IPD and presenting the coding scheme, special attention is now given to the coding procedure itself. Here we provide general coding instructions and rules as well as some coding examples. The specific coding instructions for each question are listed in Appendix A.

4.1 The Coding Unit

The coding unit used for coding the statutes and simultaneously to answer these questions is the argument. The argument can be a part of a sentence or phrase, which provides the answer to one of the coding questions. The possible answers to the coding questions are YES, NO and NS (“Not Specified”). The right answer is to be chosen on the basis of the provided definitions and coding instructions which are illustrated in this section and in Appendix A.

Table 4.1 Considering arguments from a given statute

Example from a statute	Examples of sufficient arguments
(1) The local organization terminates if: it dissolves itself; the number of its members falls under the number prescribed in paragraph §18; the National Assembly announces the dissolution of the local organization or if it states the termination of it.	The mention of the National Assembly (equivalent of a congress) is a part of a sentence that can be used as an argument to code the question ‘Is the existence of a party congress or equivalent mentioned?’ (21-10-0-0) with YES.
(2) After the termination of the local organization the regional council has the right to dispose of its properties.	The mention of the local organization is an argument for answering the question ‘Does the statute mention subnational party units?’ (25-10-0-0) with YES. The mention of regional councils having the right to dispose of the properties of closed local organizations is an argument to answer the question ‘Does the statute mention any rights of subnational party units?’ (25-20-0-0) with YES.

Unlike in the case of inductive content analysis, the coders do not have to code the entire statute, but rather answer all the questions with arguments from the statute. Issues that appear in the statutes but are not part of the coding scheme will be ignored in the coding procedure. Table 4.1 shows how coders can use the statute to answer the questions.

4.2 General Coding Instructions

In this paragraph the general coding instructions are given. The detailed coding instructions for each question are presented in Appendix A, where it is explained precisely for each question, in which cases the coders have to code “YES”, “NO” or “NS”. Before answering a question the coders are therefore obliged to check the definitions in the Appendix. The instructions illustrated below are more general in nature and are primarily related to the overall modus operandi of the coders. The coders should follow the order given here.

4.2.1 Identification of Party Organs

In the coding scheme, many generic and functional terms such as “party congress”, “national executive” or “executive committee” are used, which may vary across countries and parties. The questions in the coding scheme are targeted at specific organs; if the coders identify them differently, the results are not comparable and the obtained data is useless because there is no sufficient reliability. Therefore, the coders need to identify the party organs on the basis of the functional definitions given below for each of these organs. They also need to provide a list of the equivalent names of these party organs, which they have identified for each statute before the coding. Also, they are asked to report the reasons why they believe the organs they have selected are the correct ones. Thereafter, a country expert assesses whether the party organs identified by the coders are the correct ones. *The coding can only start after receiving the confirmation from the country expert.*

Identifying the party organs for coding purposes can be a challenging endeavor, especially for emerging parties with an unclear number of organs sharing similar functions. What follows is a functional guide based on Poguntke (1998, pp. 156–179) that enables the coders to correctly classify different party organs. Most importantly, the coders should not look at the real names of individual party organs. We are not interested in how the party calls its organs, but rather in their functions and their role within the party. In other words, coding is used to establish functional equivalence between party organs of different parties. In principle, there are rule-making and executive bodies. Generally, executive bodies are in charge of political and organizational leadership while rule-making bodies decide about party rules and the general guidelines of policy and programme. In reality it might happen that there is more than one body of each type.

Please note that we are using ideal types here. Essentially, the task is to identify party organs in a way that they can be reasonably categorized according to the ideal types suggested below. In empirical reality, there will be substantial deviation from these ideal types. However, the identification and measurement of these deviations is the focus of our empirical analysis. In other words, the ideal types are instruments of measurement which will be used to assess how democratic individual party bodies really are. To give an example: We may find parties where most of the “rule making functions” are located at the top, i.e. within the national executive. Nevertheless, such a party will most likely also have a party congress. To be sure, this party congress may have mainly ceremonial functions and this will then generate a low IPD score but it should still be coded as “party congress”. The ideal types are (see Poguntke 1998, pp. 146–179):

(1) *Executive Bodies*

- (a) *Executive committee.* The executive committee usually consists of 15–20 members. It is in charge of day to day political and organizational leadership. It usually meets more frequently than the national executive. In cases where parties have a dual executive structure, this is usually the top-level executive body.
- (b) *National executive.* The national executive usually consists of 40–100 members. Characteristically, it is involved in fundamental political debates about party ideology and strategy and meets around once a month. The national executive is the extended leadership body.

(2) *Rule-making Bodies*

- (a) *Party council.* The party council can have as many as several hundred members. It usually has the right to make fundamental policy decisions that are deferred to it by the congress and to decide on all matters not decided by the previous party congress. It is the highest party body between national party congresses. It meets more often than the congress, but less often than the national executive. Its composition is determined to a large degree by functional *ex officio* positions. The party council is a permanent law-making body. It is neither the principal rule-making body nor a truly executive body.
- (b) *Party congress.* The party congress is a large body of up to several hundred delegates that decides upon the fundamental organizational and ideological rules and guidelines of the party (unless they are devolved to membership ballots). It usually meets about once every year or every two years. The party congress is a non-permanent body made up by delegates of the party (in exceptional cases a general assembly of members can function as a party congress). The party congress is the primary law-making body.

4.2.2 The Coding Itself

- (a) Besides the content variables presented in Chap. 3, there are several formal variables to code: country, year of statute, party, statute no., statute length, coder ID and coding date. These formal variables are important for the organization and administration of the data collection and the data storage. In general, formal variables are coded first, followed by the content variables. A general overview of the coding sheet is provided in the figure below (see Fig. 4.1).
- (b) The coder should read the statute and code the parts that answer the questions from the coding scheme. First, the coders should write down the codes directly on the margin of the statute and add YES, NO or NS to the codes. Second, they should enter the codes from the statute immediately into the coding sheet. In order to decide which answer applies, coders need to follow the specific instructions and definitions for each question which are listed in detail in Appendix A. In cases of uncertainty the coder should use the comment row in the coding sheet to mark his/her comments to different issues. In addition, the coding sheet contains a row in which the coders should write down in which paragraph of the statute they have found the argument for answering the question. Each YES answer should have a reference to at least one paragraph in the statute. When NO answers measure the existence of an (negative) attribute, there should also be a reference to where the coder found the argument in the statute. As questions that are answered with NS usually do not correspond to arguments in the statute, the reference column can be left blank for questions that have been answered with NS.
- (c) After reading and coding the statute for the first time, the coders need to check the questions on the coding sheet that are not yet answered. They

Coding Sheet

Country	Year of statute	Party	Europarty	Statute Nr.	Statute length
Coderid	Coding Date				
Code	YES	NO	Not Specified	Found in §	Comment
Members' rights					
11-10-0					
11-20-0					
11-21-0					
11-22-0					
11-23-0					
11-24-0					
Programmatic Issues					
32-10-0					
32-11-0					
32-12-0					
32-13-0					
32-14-0					
32-15-0					

Fig. 4.1 The coding sheet

should re-read the statute and complete the missing codes. Depending on the questions, they will have to fill in the coding sheet with NOs and NSs. The final coding sheet should not contain any blank answers.

- (d) Finally, the coders should go over to the next statute (if there are more statutes to code for a specific party). In order to avoid confusions, they should not code more statutes at the same time.

4.3 General Coding Rules

In order to secure a good quality of the data a coding workshop is to be held, where the coders are familiarized with the coding scheme and made aware of potential pitfalls. Also a test of inter-coder reliability should be successfully conducted. But there are also some general coding rules which need to be followed by the coders in order to produce good data. These rules are listed below:

- (a) As a general rule, the coders need to ignore coding information that is not in the statutes, but is based on their prior knowledge about the coded parties. Only information from the statutes is to be coded.
- (b) Most sub-categories contain filter questions of the type ‘*is < indicator > mentioned in the statute?*’ that determine whether the relevant indicator is mentioned in the statute. If the answer to the filter question is NO, the answers to all the follow-up questions in the sub-category should also be NO or NS.
- (c) If the same question is answered more often by different arguments in different places in the statute, the coders should code these arguments each time in the statute and in the provided row on the coding sheet. This will generate data about the frequency of all relevant arguments which also might be useful (depending on the specific research question).
- (d) In ambiguous situations the coders are requested to code in a rather conservative manner. If, for example, there is a question whether the national executive is involved in electing the president (code: 31-13-1-4), and it is only indirectly involved (by being part of another organ that is itself only part of the electing body), they should code NO. If the national executive is part of the electing body by itself, they should code YES.
- (e) If one phrase in the statute contains the answers to more than one question, its arguments will be coded separately for all questions that apply (see also example B below).
- (f) Sometimes the coders will find the wording ‘explicitly mentioned’ in the coding scheme and in the definitions in Appendix A. In those cases especially, the coders are asked to look if the required information is clearly and directly mentioned in the statute (see also example C below).
- (g) When the statute provides conflicting or contradicting information, e.g. ‘each member has the right to express his/her opinion freely’ followed by ‘members who digress from the party line will be expelled’, the coders have to read the definition of the question in Appendix A very carefully. They are supposed

to provide the coders with all the information they need in order to decide on how to code when dealing with contradicting information. As a general rule, in cases of contradicting information the coders have to code each argument separately—one with YES and one with NO (see also example D below).

4.4 Coding Examples

4.4.1 Example A: General Coding Example

Party statutes are legal documents and therefore have the advantage of using a clear and straightforward language and presenting themselves in a structured manner. Considering that all questions are to be answered with YES, NO or NS, the level of personal interpretation considering possible answers should be minimal and dealt with in the individual definitions of the questions (see Appendix A). Table 4.2 provides two examples of the level of interpretation of the statutes that is expected from the coders.

Table 4.2 Sufficient and insufficient arguments

Example from a statute	Category	Explanation of coding
'A regular member is entitled to follow activities of the Movement and participate in them.'	Valid: Do party members have the general right to be informed about party activities? YES. Invalid: Do party members have the general right to participate in party decision-making?	The information from the statute (on the left) does not suffice to prove that members can participate in decision-making. Lacking additional information, the rights of the movement's members might be restricted to implementing the president's decisions. Therefore, the argument on the left on itself is invalid to answer the question. If the statute does not provide further information regarding participation in the decision-making process at some other point, the question has to be answered with NO.
'The regular member is entitled to participate in a convention or a congress of the Movement as an observer with the ability to express his views.'	Valid: Do party members have the general right to express opinions freely and without any consequences? YES. Invalid: Do party members have the general right to participate in party decision-making?	The information from the statute is sufficient to answer the question that party members do have the right to express their opinions freely. The ability to express views is not sufficient information to assume that the members have the right to vote though.

4.4.2 Example B: One Sentence, More Arguments

Take the sentence: ‘25 % of the eligible places on party lists for intra-party and public offices are reserved to members of the women’s organization.’ (example from a statute)

This sentence can be used to code YES on *all* the following questions:

12-10-0-0: Is there an explicit reference to minorities in the statute?

12-20-0-0: Are there any quotas explicitly mentioned in the statute in respect to minorities?

12-21-0-0: Does the statute explicitly mention minority quotas in the party organs?

12-22-0-0: Does the statute mention minority quotas in the party lists for public office?

4.4.3 Example C: The Term ‘Explicitly Mentioned’

Consider you have to answer the following question (code: 11-10-0-0): Are the principles of intra-party democracy explicitly mentioned in the statute?

In this case, the definition specifies, that the statute has to explicitly mention that the party follows the principles of IPD for the question to be coded YES. The term ‘explicitly mentioned’ refers to whether a right is directly referred to in the statute. Wording does not play a decisive role, rather the idea/argument has to be present:

‘The Christian-Democratic People’s Party is a democratically operating party both with regards to its public and internal affairs’ (example from a statute).

This paragraph from a statute qualifies a YES because democracy with respect to its internal affairs is explicitly mentioned. Please note that the following terms have been used interchangeable in the coding instructions (Appendix A) and in the coding scheme (Chap. 3): ‘explicitly mentioned’, ‘explicitly specified’, ‘explicit reference’, ‘explicit information’, or a ‘special paragraph’ refer to the same kind of question capturing explicit mentioning of a given aspect. Correspondingly, ‘any mention’, ‘at least mentioned’ and ‘implicitly mentioned’ all refer to the implicit mentioning of a given aspect. The term ‘mentioned’ on its own captures both aspects (explicit and implicit reference). We treat it as an implicit reference because there is insufficient information for further differentiation.

4.4.4 Example D: Contradicting Information

Consider you have to answer the following question asking for an implicit reference (code: 11-22-0-0): Do party members have the right to express a divergent opinion within the party and/or in public?

In the statute the following is written: ‘Members and organizations of the party shall have the right to free expression of opinion and criticism’, followed by ‘members, officials, and organizations may not represent any political lines in public life outside the party which may be contrary to the Party’s accepted political norms.’

In this case the coders have to code YES for the first sentence and NO for the second sentence. In this case we do not know which part of the statute is applied in the everyday political life of the party. As statutes are legal texts, violations of both parts can be invoked for legal intra-party action. According to these considerations both answers neutralize each other in the scope of the quantification strategy (see [Chap. 5](#)).

Chapter 5

The Proof of the Pudding: Arriving at Numbers

The main goal of our coding scheme is to present a comprehensive instrument for content analysis which can be applied to the study of party statutes. The overall intent is to measure the level of IPD for each of the coded statutes and to express this in numerical terms. In this chapter we explain how we arrive at the numbers. First, in [Sect. 5.1](#) the method for quantification of the raw data, the “robustness” and weighting options as well as the results of reliability tests are presented. Secondly, in [Sect. 5.2](#) we share some first descriptive findings of the development of IPD within the Hungarian, Slovakian and Romanian parties under study in our research project (see preface).

5.1 Quantification, Robustness and Inter-Coder Reliability

5.1.1 Quantification

In the process of quantification, each answer (YES, NO and NS) to each question is attributed the value +1, 0 or -1. The rationale behind this quantification is that all answers which have negative implications on IPD with regard to its two distinct aspects (i.e. inclusiveness or decentralization) are attributed the value -1, regardless whether the answer is YES, NO or NS. According to the same logic all answers which have positive implications on IPD are attributed the value +1, regardless whether the answer is YES, NO or NS. The value 0 is allocated to an answer when no specific effects on IPD can be identified. The coding scheme is framed in the manner that YES answers usually have positive implications for the IPD of a political party (example for an exception: prerogatives of the party president, codes 25-21-0-0 to 25-25-0-0). The decisions regarding the allocation of the values to the items (question/answer) are based on the definitions of the individual questions in [Appendix A](#), which in turn are based on the deduction of the coding scheme presented in [Chap. 2](#). The individual assignment of the values to each item is also presented in [Appendix A](#).

Regarding the quantification, it is important to differentiate between questions which are coded YES if a given aspect is explicitly mentioned and questions where an implicit reference is demanded for the answer to be coded YES as this

distinction reflects the different qualities of inclusiveness and decentralization within the specific categories.¹ If an *explicit mentioning* is required in a given question, then the answer YES is to be attributed the value +1 and the answers NO and NS the value 0 (if, e.g., a positive right is mentioned explicitly, then it is positive for IPD, but if it is not mentioned explicitly, it is not necessarily negative for IPD, not least because it may be implicitly defined anywhere else in statute). When it is asked for an *implicit reference*, the answer YES is to be attributed the value +1 and the answer NO the value -1 and NS the value 0. In the few cases where the answer YES has negative implications for IPD the assignment of the positive/negative values is reversed (i.e. YES is -1; NO is +1 etc.).

NS is coded with another value than 0 when the aspect is considered to be of substantial importance to IPD but no argument in the statute corresponds to its question. The values +1 and -1 are assigned for NS only if the given answer is feasible according to the definitions of the individual questions in Appendix A. This approach should guarantee that enough attention is paid to implicit mentioning of certain aspects of IPD in the statute.

Finally, because the categories in the coding scheme contain different numbers of questions, accounting for each question in the same way would lead to an over-consideration of some categories that have many aspects (for example decision-making) to the detriment of other, equally important categories (e.g. members' rights) that have less aspects to be accounted for through questions. The implementation of a calculating procedure that ensures that each category contributes equally to the degree of IPD solves this problem. This is done in the following manner (the procedure needs to be performed for each coded statute separately, without taking into account the values of other coded statutes):

1. We begin by calculating the values for each sub-category at the lowest hierarchical level which are the sub-categories on level 3 (see Fig. 1 in Chap. 2). The values of all items are summed up for each of these sub-categories separately and then divided by the number of items within each sub-category. Now we have the values for all the sub-categories at the lowest hierarchical level (level 3).
2. Then, the values of the sub-categories on level 3 are summed up for their respective sub-categories on level 2 and divided by their number (the number of the respective subcategories on level 3). Now we have the values for the sub-categories on level 2.
3. After that, the values of the sub-categories on level 2 are summed up for the respective sub-category on level 1 (which is "Recruitment") and divided by their number (the number of the subcategories on level 2, which is 3). Now we have the value for the sub-category "Recruitment" on level 1. For the calculation of the other subcategories on level 1 we need to proceed as explained in step 1. The values of all items are summed up for each of these sub-categories

¹ As a reminder: In general, there are two different kinds of questions in the coding scheme: Questions which refer to an explicit mentioning of an aspect and questions which refer to an implicit reference of an aspect in the statute (see Chap. 3).

separately and then divided separately by the number of items within each sub-category. Now we have the values for all the sub-categories at level 1.

4. Next, we apply the same procedure as explained in step 2. The values of the sub-categories on level 1 are summed up for their respective main category and divided by their number (the number of the respective subcategories on level 1). Now we have the values for the three main categories.
5. Finally, in order to calculate the final level of IPD for each statute, the values of the three main categories are summed up and divided by the number of main categories (which is 3). In this way we obtain the final IPD value for the respective statute which ranges from -1 to 1 .

Now that the data is quantified, it should to be stored in an appropriate database. For the analysis we suggest to use one of the common statistical packages like R, Stata or SPSS.

5.1.2 Examining Weighting, Robustness, and Variance

In the process of calculation the question arises if the different main categories should be weighted. First of all, there is no theoretical reason why one main category should be more important for IPD than the others (see also [Chap. 2](#)). However, we conducted some empirical analysis on the basis of the data collected in our research project (142 statutes of Hungarian, Slovak and Romanian parties from 1988 up to 2011). We applied a weighting procedure in which certain main categories were weighted by the factor 2 in order to examine the impact of weighting main categories differently on the final IPD score. With overall three main categories there are three possibilities where one main category is weighted and three further possibilities where two main categories are weighted. Subsequently, the correlations between the unweighted score and the weighted scores are considered. The results are displayed in [Table 5.1](#).

The unweighted IPD score is represented by IPD_nw. The three-digit structure of the other variable names indicates which main category was weighted by the factor 2. The first digit refers to the members' rights category, the second to the party organs and the third to the category of decision-making. The results show that the impact of weighting the main categories is rather limited. The unweighted

Table 5.1 Correlations between unweighted IPD score and different weighting options

	IPD_nw	IPD_211	IPD_121	IPD_112	IPD_221	IPD_212	IPD_122
IPD_nw	1.000	–	–	–	–	–	–
IPD_211	0.959	1.000	–	–	–	–	–
IPD_121	0.934	0.809	1.000	–	–	–	–
IPD_112	0.976	0.918	0.892	1.000	–	–	–
IPD_221	0.991	0.961	0.940	0.937	1.000	–	–
IPD_212	0.965	0.989	0.807	0.956	0.947	1.000	–
IPD_122	0.944	0.812	0.983	0.941	0.924	0.836	1.000

IPD score and the IPD scores generated by using the different weighting options are all positively and strongly correlated. Furthermore, the table indicates that there is a strong degree of correlation between the weighting options. Thus, it can be argued that the unweighted IPD score can be used for further analysis.

Therefore, also the basic rule for the calculation is that all main categories—members' rights, party organs and decision-making—are equally important and carry the same weight in terms of indicating the level of IPD. Also from a theoretical perspective it is evident that members' rights can only be enjoyed within a democratic institutional setting (organizational structure) in which the decision-making process is fair, inclusive and decentralized (see also [Chap. 2](#)).

According to our comprehensive understanding of IPD we chose a simple aggregation rule and assume that all of the components are fundamental for the overall characterization of the degree of IPD of a given party. In connection with this and in order to facilitate the understanding of the structure of the collected data, we also report some additional descriptive statistics on each of the calculated component variables (for further details see Appendix B). The statistics reported comprise the number of observations, the mean and the variance of the variables separately for each of the selected countries. Since all component items show at least a minimum degree of variance and the variance as such considerably differs between the cases we decided to consider all categories and subcategories equally.

5.1.3 Inter-Coder Reliability

In the context of our research project we conducted tests of inter-coder reliability with the collected data. Overall, we collected and coded 142 party statutes of political parties in Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. The coded data for the reliability tests comprises 15 randomly selected party statutes. This amounts to approximately 10 percent of overall material that was collected and coded. Furthermore, the selected statutes are evenly distributed across all countries included in the study. In each country two coders coded the statutes. The project members in Mannheim were not part of the coding procedure.

The overall results show a relatively high degree of agreement between the coders. Krippendorff's Alpha shows a value higher than 0.67 which indicates an acceptable level of agreement for ca. 68 % of all variables; Fleiss' Kappa reaches a value higher than 0.6 which indicates a substantial degree of agreement for ca. 78 % of the variables; Holsti shows a value higher than 0.8 which indicates a good degree of agreement for ca. 77 % of all variables (the exact results for each variable are reported in Appendix C).

We can conclude that the results of the reliability tests are satisfying because the data was collected in a rather "difficult" environment. Statutes from Central and Eastern European parties are partly extremely difficult to code because they are not clearly structured and therefore hard to code (this holds especially for the period shortly after the breakdown of the Soviet Bloc during the 1990s). Against this background, the

results of the reliability tests can be considered as very satisfactory. They show that the coding scheme works well, also in a rather “unfriendly” coding environment.

5.2 Intra-Party Democracy in Hungarian, Slovak and Romanian Parties

Finally, we present in a descriptive manner some of the data that were collected in our project using the approach illustrated in this book. The selected parties include Conservative/Christian Democratic and Social Democratic/Socialist parties from Hungary, Slovakia and Romania. The period of investigation covers the years from 1988 up to 2011. In this political context, even a simple descriptive analysis of IPD is very appealing. Over the last two decades, Central and Eastern European countries have undergone enormous transformations in the political, economical and societal spheres. The catchwords here are “democratic consolidation” and “Europeanization”, which arguably have a visible impact on political parties in the region (e.g. Pridham 2011). Both processes are interconnected and both contribute to the democratization of the political systems in Central and Eastern Europe (e.g. Pridham 2006; Schmitter and Phillippe 1999; Whitehead 1999). Therefore, both processes can be expected to have a “positive” impact on the development of IPD within Central and Eastern European parties and therefore contribute to an increase of IPD levels of the selected parties within the last two decades. With a simple descriptive analysis we can see if an increase in the IPD level effectively occurred or not.

5.2.1 Parties in Hungary

The parties we included in Hungary are FIDESZ² (Alliance of Young Democrats), KDNP (Christian Democratic People’s Party), MDF (Hungarian Democratic Forum), and MSZP (Hungarian Socialist Party). Descriptive statistics for the parties is reported in Table 5.2. Also, Fig. 5.1 shows the development of IPD in Hungarian parties.

We can observe that the overall degree of IPD varies considerably in the KDNP and MSZP, but is fairly straightforward in FIDESZ and MDF. Especially in the KDNP we see a downward movement between 1997 and 1998. The level of IPD remains on this rather low level for a period of almost 4 years and rises again in 2003. Also in the MSZP we see a strong increase of IPD between 1996 and 1999 which amounts to more than 0.3 growth leaving the MSZP—according to our standards—as the most internally democratic party in Hungary.

² In 1995 the FIDESZ added “-MPP”(Hungarian Civic Party) to its name and in 2003 “-MPSZ” (Hungarian Civic Union).

Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics for Hungarian parties

Party	Observations	Mean	Min.	Max.
FIDESZ	10	0.346	0.253	0.410
KDNP	11	0.368	0.166	0.518
MDF	18	0.371	0.315	0.417
MSZP	8	0.496	0.301	0.588

**Fig. 5.1** Development of intra-party democracy in hungarian parties

Regarding the overall development of FIDESZ, we cannot identify a general trend. We see an increase of IPD between 1991 and 1993 followed by a slow decrease between 1994 and 2003. Then in 2003 there is yet another increase in IPD in the FIDESZ. The development of IPD in MDF also shows a high degree of continuity. The measure ranges only between roughly 0.3 and 0.4 and the changes that arise are rather small. In the early years, there is an increase of IPD immediately followed by an equally strong decrease. After a second increase in 1994 the level of IPD seems to remain fairly stable. Finally there is a decrease between 2009 and 2011 leaving the level of IPD of the MDF where it began.

5.2.2 Parties in Slovakia

The parties we studied in Slovakia include the KDH (Christian Democratic Movement), MKDH (Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement), SMK³ (Party

³ Because of a high degree of organizational continuity we consider the development of IPD in the MKDH and SMK as following common development.

Table 5.3 Descriptive statistics for Slovak parties

Party	Observations	Mean	Min.	Max.
KDH	14	0.298	0.101	0.350
MKDH/SMK	10	0.312	-0.022	0.445
SDKÚ (-DS)	6	0.267	0.203	0.309
SDE	9	0.406	0.080	0.537
SDSS	10	0.401	0.135	0.509
SMER (-SD)	7	0.286	0.256	0.311




Fig. 5.2 Development of intra-party democracy in Slovak parties

of the Hungarian Coalition), SDKÚ(-DS)⁴ (Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – Democratic Party), SDE (Party of the Democratic Left), SDSS (Social Democratic Party of Slovakia) and SMER(-SD)⁵ (literally: “Direction” — Social Democracy). Descriptive statistics for these parties are listed in Table 5.3. Figure 5.2 depicts the development of IPD in Slovak parties.

As a general trend we see an increase of IPD right after the foundation for most of the parties, i.e. in the time period between 1990 and 1992, which is in some cases remarkably strong. Especially in the SDSS we see an increase equaling more than 0.4. A similar trend can be also identified in the SDL.

In the KDH the overall trend shows an increase of IPD in the already mentioned time period between 1990 and 1993 which seems to take place in two phases with a short delay in between. After this, the level of IPD remains fairly stable and is characterized by incremental increases between 1996 and 2001. In the MKDH/SMK we also see a strong increase between 1990 and 1992. After this we find two further

⁴ In 2006 the SKDÚ merged with the smaller DS and as a consequence added the “DS” to its name. We view the SDKÚ and the SDKÚ-DS as the same party when scrutinizing the development of IPD.

⁵ In 2005 the SMER merged with the smaller parties SDE (Party of the Democratic Left) and SDSS (Social Democratic Party of Slovakia) and added “-SD” (Social Democracy) to its name.

increases of IPD. The first is a gradual development that starts in 1995 and reaches its top in 1998. The second increase starts in 2004 and peaks in 2007 leaving the IPD at a relatively high level of 0.45. In the SDKÚ(-DS) we can see a trend towards a slight increase in the level of IPD. There has been only a limited development, even though we find a weak increase of IPD between 2000 and 2004.

The development of IPD of the SDL is characterized by a strong increase between 1990 and 1993. Afterwards the IPD further increases in an incremental manner until 2000 adding up to the strongest increase of IPD we find in Slovakia. This trend ends soon afterwards: until 2003 the IPD decreases by 0.16. In the SDSS we also see an increase of IPD between 1990 and 1992. After this, the IPD ranges around 0.4 and further increases between 1995 and 1997 stabilizing at 0.45 for the remaining time period. The SMER(-SD) is, according to our standards, the second least internally democratic party in Slovakia. The development of IPD in the party is rather limited; it ranges between 0.26 and 0.31 with a weak increase in 2001 followed by a decrease between 2003 and 2005.

5.2.3 Parties in Romania

In Romania we collected party statutes from FSN (National Salvation Front), PD (Democratic Party), PD-L⁶ (Democratic Liberal Party), PNȚCD (Christian-Democratic National Peasants' Party), PSD⁷ (Social Democratic Party), and RMDSZ/UDMR (Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania). Descriptive statistics for these parties are presented in Table 5.4. The development of IPD in Romanian parties is depicted in Fig. 5.3.

As a more general trend we see that the level of IPD does not necessarily rise at a fast pace in the period right after the foundation of the parties, as it was the case with the Slovak parties. Instead, we can observe an gradually rising level of IPD. This applies to the PD(-L), RMDSZ/UDMR and, although somewhat limited, also to the PSD. In the PD(-L) we can observe an increase of IPD in three phases. The first increase takes place between 1990 and 1991 and is followed by a slight decrease of IPD. The second increase follows right afterwards in 1994. After this, the level of IPD remains stable until the third increase between 1998 and 2001. Here the IPD stabilizes at a level of 0.5. In the PSD we see an increase of IPD between 1993 and 1996 followed by a weak decrease. The IPD in the PSD further increases in 2007, this does not persist for a long time leaving the IPD at a level

⁶ Here we need to consider that the party PD has its roots in the National Salvation Front (FSN) and was further transformed into the PD-L after the fusion with PLD (Liberal Democratic Party) in 2007. Therefore we treat the development of IPD in these parties along the organizational continuity and subsume the parties under the label "PD(-L)".

⁷ In 2001 the PDSR (Party of Social Democracy of Romania) merged with the smaller party PSDR (Social Democratic Party of Romania) and changed its name to PSD. We conceptualize the PDSR as the organizational predecessor of the PSD and treat both as one party when presenting the IPD development.

Table 5.4 Descriptive statistics for Romanian parties

Party	Observations	Mean	Min.	Max.
PD(-L)	10	0.401	0.135	0.509
PNȚCD	6	0.372	0.346	0.405
PSD	7	0.382	0.291	0.476
UDMR	10	0.193	0.092	0.271




Fig. 5.3 Development of intra-party democracy in Romanian parties

of 0.48 in 2010. In the RMDSZ/UDMR we see a more straightforward development which is characterized by three increases of IPD. The first increase takes place between 1990 and 1992, the second between 1995 and 1997 and the third between 2007 and 2009 equaling approximately a 0.05 increase each time. For the PNȚCD our data comprises only a somehow shorter period of time, and the development we can observe marks a slight decrease of IPD in the party between 2004 and 2006.

5.3 Conclusion

In sum, it can be stated that we found an overall increase in the level of IPD within the parties even though there are differences between them. Overall, this meets the expectation outlined at the beginning of this section. However, solely on the basis of this descriptive data we are not able to conclude that the illustrated overall increase in IPD can be traced to processes of democratic consolidation and Europeanization. Nevertheless, these processes suggest an increase in the level of IPD in Central and Eastern European parties and this is what we find. Furthermore, the assumption that these processes at least contributed to the observed changes in IPD seems very reasonable.

Chapter 6

Summary and Outlook

In this book we presented a guide for deductive and standardized content analysis of party statutes in order to measure the level of intra-party democracy of any political party at a given time. The results of the reliability tests showed that the presented coding scheme works well when it was applied to Central and Eastern European party statutes in the context of our research project (see preface). This is a hard test for the quality of our coding scheme as these statutes can be quite difficult to code because they are partially not clear or not well structured (this is especially true for statutes from the 1990s).

The data collected in the manner described in this book can be used for further research in several ways. Generally, our measure of IPD facilitates the study of IPD and its implications in a more systematic way. The data allows for comparisons across time and space. Individual parties, countries and groups of countries can be compared across any period of time (for which statutes can be found). Furthermore, the coding scheme allows us to figure out in detail which main category or sub-category contributes how much to the overall IPD value of any given statute of any political party. Of course, these findings may also be interesting for the political parties themselves and therefore useful in the area of political consulting. Finally, the data can be used to construct a sophisticated and robust IPD index of political parties covering all parties the researcher is interested in.

In combination with other data the IPD data may be used to (further) test existing hypotheses and expectations. For example, Bäck (2008) states that the likelihood of a party getting into government decreases with higher levels of IPD. This is due to the fact that intra-party politics affect coalition negotiations. According to Bäck, higher IPD can lead to the inability of party leaders to make bargaining decisions, as they have to seek support from a wide range of party members (Bäck 2008, pp. 75–76). This “efficiency argument” of a competitive model of democracy is also identified by Teorell (1999, p. 365). He states that ‘[w]ith decentralized authority structures and free discussion comes the risk on internal dissension’ (Teorell 1999, p. 364) which supports party splits. Also a high degree of inclusiveness may increase the risk intra-party factions or party wings splitting up from their respective party (Teorell 1999). The IPD-data enables scholars to test these IPD-related hypotheses.

With this book, we hope to encourage as many researchers as possible to measure the IPD of political parties in different regions of the world. The result of this might be the appearance of IPD indices, which could be stored and organized in one central database. From our point of view, this would mean an enormous gain for research on political parties in general.

Appendix A: Coding Instructions and Allocation of Values (Quantification)

Numerical Code	Coding Instructions	Quantification		
		YES	NO	NS
10-00-0-0	-	-	-	-
11-00-0-0	-	-	-	-
11-10-0-0	Code YES if the statute <i>explicitly</i> mentions that the party follows the principles of intra party democracy. 'Explicitly' means a direct reference to following intra-party democracy. Code NO if the statement is only implicit (the statute does follow the principles but does not refer to them at any point) or not at all mentioned.	1	0	-
11-20-0-0	Code YES if there is a <i>special paragraph</i> listing member's rights. Code NO if the member's rights are implicitly but not explicitly mentioned or if rights are not mentioned at all.	1	0	-
11-21-0-0	Code YES if <i>explicitly</i> stated that members have a right to be informed about party activities. Such rights could be (but are not limited to) reading the meeting protocols or request information from the party. If no reference is made to the members' rights to be informed or if the members do not have this right, code NO.	1	-1 ^a	-
11-22-0-0	Code YES if the statute gives members the right to express divergent opinions at least within the party. If the party members are allowed to express a minority opinion in public or in the media also code YES, because both the public and the media are more inclusive than the party. If there is no mention of this right, or if members are prohibited from expressing divergent opinions code NO.	1	-1	-

(continued)

(continued)

Numerical Code	Coding Instructions	Quantification		
11-23-0-0	Code YES if members' right to participate in the party decision-making is <i>explicitly</i> mentioned in the statute. Code YES for expressions such as: party members have the right to determine the policy/composition of the party, have the right to vote, etc. Code NO if there is no information about how individual members can contribute to the party decision-making or if the information is implicit.	1	0	-
11-24-0-0	Code YES if the right to form a faction is <i>explicitly</i> mentioned (the wording is not important—but it must be clearly and directly stated that members have a right to form factions). Code NO—if it is mentioned that forming faction is prohibited and NS if this right is not mentioned at all.	1	-1	0
12-00-0-0	-	-	-	-
12-10-0-0	Minorities are defined as women, youth, and ethnic minorities such as Roma (across all countries) or Hungarians (in RO and SK). Minorities in this category do not refer to regional representation and opinion minorities, their rights are covered by the general members' rights. Code YES if any <i>explicit reference</i> to minorities is made, be it a youth organization, women's organization or simply references to the rights of minorities. Code NO if no explicit reference is being made in the statute.	1	0	-
12-20-0-0	Any <i>explicit</i> mention of a quota, whether desired, legally required, binding or self-imposed is to be coded with YES. Code NO if the statute does not mention any quotas.	1	0	-
12-21-0-0	Code YES if it is <i>explicitly</i> mentioned that the existing quotas are binding. If not, code NO.	1	0	-
12-22-0-0	Code YES if the mention of quotas is <i>explicitly</i> regarding party organs (or lists for intra-party office). The statute might mention existing or strived for quotas to increase its representation in certain intra-party areas. Code NO if there is no mention of quotas explicitly regarding party organs.	1	0	-
12-23-0-0	Code YES if quotas regarding party lists for public office are explicitly mentioned. Code YES if there is any situation for which quotas are mentioned (even only on a subnational level). Code NO if there is no mention of quotas regarding party lists.	1	-1	-
12-30-0-0	Code YES if there is an <i>explicit</i> mention about certain members of minority organizations, such as the president or the executive committee automatically receiving a seat in the national board or executive committee because of his/her function in the minority organization of the party. Otherwise code NO.	1	0	-

(continued)

(continued)

Numerical Code	Coding Instructions	Quantification		
20-00-0-0	-	-	-	-
21-00-0-0	-	-	-	-
21-10-0-0	Code YES if a party congress or equivalent (i.e., any party agency that is representative for the entire party and is composed of delegates directly selected by the party members) is mentioned in the statute. Code NO if a congress or equivalent is not mentioned.	1	-1	-
21-11-0-0	Code YES if the party congress or equivalent is involved in the elaboration of the statute, has the right to make modifications or to vote on (or veto) the adoption or changes of the party statute. Code NO if the congress does not participate in the elaboration or change of the statute. Code NS if there is no information regarding the role of the congress in the definition of the party statute.	1	-1	0
21-12-0-0	Code YES if it is mentioned that only the congress can vote upon or change the existing party statute or if the party congress has to ratify a statute in order for it to be binding for the entire party. Code NO if other organs can vote upon or change the party statute. Code NS if there is no information about the role of the congress in the definition of the statute.	-1	1	0
21-13-0-0	Code YES if the party congress meets at least once every three years even if there are some restricting conditions/qualifiers to this. Code YES even for situations like the following 'The Party Congress usually reunites at least once a year' or 'under normal circumstances the Party Congress meets once every three years'. Otherwise code NO.	1	-1	-
21-14-0-0	Code YES if it is <i>explicitly</i> mentioned that the party congress has the highest authority within the party. Otherwise code NO.	1	0	-
(22-00-0-0)	-	-	-	-
22-10-0-0	Code YES for <i>any mention</i> of a problem-solving organ, agency or mechanism responsible for disciplinary issues, such as party exclusion. Code NO if there is no mention about organs or rules to enforce compliance with party rules.	1	-1	-
22-11-0-0	Code YES if there is mention of any independent party organ, whose sole role is to decide over conflicts inside party (e.g., disciplinary matters) and whose members are selected for this task for a fixed period of time. Otherwise code NO. Code NO also if there exists a conflict solving mechanism, but if the organ carrying out decision-making over the conflicts already has another function in the party or is an ad-hoc board formed by members of another organ.	1	0	-

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(continued)

Numerical Code	Coding Instructions	Quantification		
22-12-0-0	Code YES if it <i>explicitly</i> mentioned that the court's decisions are binding for everybody within the party. Code NO if the court's decisions can be overruled. Code NS if there is no information about the bindingness of the court's decisions.	1	0	0
22-13-0-0	Code YES if it is <i>explicitly</i> mentioned that the court is responsible for ensuring compliance with the statute for the executive or president. Code NO if there are special control organs (other than for the rest of the party) for the party president or party executive. Code NS if there is nothing mentioned regarding conflict-solving for the party president and party executive.	1	0	0
(23-00-0-0)	-	-	-	-
23-10-0-0	Code YES if there is <i>any mention</i> (explicit or implicit) of the responsibilities and accountabilities of the national executive. This question does not refer to the rights of the executive. Code NO if there is no information about the responsibilities of the national executive.	1	-1	-
23-11-0-0	Code YES if the accountability of the national executive towards the party members or party congress is at least mentioned in the statute. Formulations of the type 'the sole judge of the (...) are the party members/party congress' should be therefore coded YES. Also code YES if it mentioned that the members, the party congress or any other inclusive organ (elected by the members or congress) have the right to control the national executive (through votes of no confidence or other mechanisms). Code NO if there is no mention of instances to which the executive is accountable or if the controlling instances mentioned are exclusive (executive committee, president).	1	-1	-
23-12-0-0	Code YES only if there is an <i>explicit</i> mention of the rights of party members/the congress to impeach the national executive (vote of no confidence or other mechanisms) or of any other organ to control the decisions of the executive. This question goes one step further than the previous one and measures accountability that is backed up through control mechanisms (as opposed to simply stating a norm in the question above). Code NO if there is no mention about being able to change the national executive/influence its decisions except through the regular congress meetings.	1	0 ^b	-
(24-00-0-0)	-	-	-	-

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Numerical Code	Coding Instructions	Quantification		
24-10-0-0	Code YES if there is any mention (explicit or implicit) of the responsibilities and accountabilities of the executive committee. This question does not refer to the rights of the executive committee. Code NO if there is no information about the responsibilities of the executive committee.	1	-1	-
24-11-0-0	Code YES if the accountability of the executive committee towards inclusive organs (the party members or the party congress) is at least mentioned in the statute. Code NO if it is not mentioned that the executive committee is accountable to inclusive organs.	1	-1	-
24-12-0-0	Code YES only if there is an <i>explicit</i> mention of the rights of party members/the congress to impeach or control the decisions of the executive committee. This question goes one step further than the previous one and measures accountability that is backed up through control mechanisms (as opposed to simply stating a norm in the question above). Code NO if there is no mention about being able to change the executive committee/influence its decisions except through the regular congress meetings.	1	0 ^b	-
(25-00-0-0)	-	-	-	-
25-10-0-0	Code YES if the party president can be challenged in his position. This can happen through a limit to his term, votes of no confidence or other means. Code NO if the statute does not mention how the party president can be challenged in his position (also code NO if the president can only be challenged in “extreme” situations).	1	0	-
(25-20-0-0)	-	-	-	-
25-21-0-0	Code YES if the party president has the right (or obligation) to block, override or delay the decision-making process (e.g. by having the right to co-sign the decisions of the party executive). Code NO if no such rights are mentioned or if <i>explicitly</i> mentioned that the president cannot delay/block the executive’s decision-making process.	-1	1	-
25-22-0-0	Code YES if the president can decide to exclude party members (even if there are specific conditions which have to be met, for the president to be able to do this). Code NO if the statute does not mention the right of the president to exclude party members.	-1	0	-
25-23-0-0	Code YES if the party president has the right to expel a member of the party executive (either national executive or executive committee). This should be clearly deducible from the statute. Code NO if there is no information pertaining to the right of the president to expel members of the executive.	-1	0	-

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Numerical Code	Coding Instructions	Quantification		
25-24-0-0	Code YES if the statute makes reference to the fact that the president may under certain circumstances take more rights than granted by the statute. If this is not mentioned in the statute code NO.	-1	0	-
25-25-0-0	Code YES if the party president is able to form OR shut down subnational (regional or local) party units. Also code YES if the subnational units need the support/approbation/confirmation of the president in order to form or disband. Code NO if no such right of the president is mentioned in the statute.	-1	0	-
(26-00-0-0)	-	-	-	-
26-10-0-0	Code YES if the statute mentions the existence of regional or local party units. Code NO if there is no mention of subnational party units or if it is <i>explicitly</i> mentioned that subnational units do not (or should not) exist.	1	-1	-
26-11-0-0	Code YES if the statute mentions any other positive right for subnational units (i.e. the right to do something as opposed to a negative right—the right not to do something; candidates for different positions needing the recommendation of a given number of subnational units are to be coded as YES in this category). Code NO if either subnational units or their rights are not at all mentioned.	1	0	-
26-12-0-0	Code YES if there is any mention of subnational units playing a role on the national level, for example a subnational party congress is electing representatives for a national party congress or the right of one or more subnational units to call a national congress or suggest candidates for positions at the national level exists. Code NO if there is no mention of any such situation.	1	-1	-
26-13-0-0	Code YES if autonomy is <i>explicitly</i> mentioned in respect to subnational party units (regardless of the fact that other provisions might indicate that subnational units are not in fact autonomous). Code NO if there is no explicit mention of the autonomy of subnational units. “Explicitly” refers to the content not the wording.	1	0	-
(30-00-0-0)	-	-	-	-
(31-00-0-0)	-	-	-	-
(31-10-0-0)	-	-	-	-
(31-11-0-0)	Note: all the questions in this category refer only to the nomination of candidates for public office. Please keep in mind that intra-party nominations are treated in a different category.	-	-	-

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Numerical Code	Coding Instructions	Quantification		
31-11-1-0	Code YES if the rules on candidate nomination are mentioned in the statute. Candidate nomination refers to those organs/units/members having the right to first suggest a candidate for a position, be it for a list or for a direct election. The nominated candidates will be then selected for the final list (by another organ). Code NO if there is no mention of those responsible for candidate nomination (candidate lists) for public office.	1	-1	-
31-11-1-1	Code YES if the party president, executive committee or a committee chosen by them can suggest candidates for public office. Code YES especially if they have right to suggest party lists for any one public office. Otherwise code NO.	-1	0	-
31-11-1-2	Code YES if national executive or a committee chosen by it can suggest candidates for public office. Otherwise code NO.	-1	0	-
31-11-1-3	Code YES if organizations closer to the basis (congress, individual members) have rights drafting or amending the electoral list and suggesting candidates. Code NO if organs closer to the basis have very little (consultative) to no influence on the electoral list or if their rights are not mentioned.	1	-1	-
31-11-1-4	Code YES if subnational units have rights drafting or amending the electoral list and suggesting candidates. Code NO if subnational units have very little (consultative) to no influence on the electoral list or if their rights are not mentioned.	1	-1	-
31-11-1-5	Code YES if each candidate fulfilling the legal requirements may suggest him- or herself for a public position (even if they are then preselected by another organ). Code NO if this is not the case. Code NS if there is no information about whether each candidate can suggest himself for public office.	1	0	0
(31-12-0-0)	-	-	-	-
31-12-1-0	Code YES if the statute gives information about who is entitled to vote for candidates for parliamentary elections. "Selection" refers here to having the last word about (the list of) candidates for public office upon which the electorate will vote. Multiple answers are possible (e.g. the final list is made by aggregating the suggestions of different organs according to a pre-set rule). Code NO if there is no information about who can vote for candidates.	1	0	-
31-12-1-1	Code YES if a closed primary is mentioned, at which <i>all party members</i> vote and thus select the party candidates. Code YES even if this procedure applies to the selection of at least one single candidate on a list. Code NO if there is no election of party candidates or if the election result can be modified by another organ.	1	0	-

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Numerical Code	Coding Instructions	Quantification		
31-12-1-2	Code YES if the candidate list for parliamentary elections is selected by inclusive party organs or agencies. Inclusive organs (or agencies) are those directly confirmed by the party members or congress. They can be the party congress or delegate bodies that were especially selected for the purpose of drafting the party list. Agencies selected by the party congress count as inclusive. Code NO if the candidates are not selected by an inclusive party organ. Code NS if there is no information.	1	0	0
31-12-1-3	Code YES if the national executive, or an agency that has been selected by it, selects the candidates for parliamentary elections. Code NO if the national executive (or an agency created by it for this purpose) does not select the candidates for parliamentary elections. For no information code NS.	-1	1	0
31-12-1-4	Code YES if the executive committee, the party president or an agency that has been selected by them, selects the candidates for parliament. Code NO if they do not select the candidates. For no information code NS.	-1	1	0
(31-13-0-0)	-	-	-	-
31-13-1-0	Code YES if the statute gives <i>explicit</i> information about who is entitled to select candidates for presidential elections. "Selection" refers here to having the last word about the presidential candidate upon which the electorate will vote (nominations out of which the selection committee is choosing are dealt with in the category 31-12-1-0). Code NO if no information is given.	1	0	-
31-13-1-1	Code YES if the party president is automatically the party's candidate for the presidential elections or if <i>explicitly</i> mentioned that the president can select him/herself without needing the validation of another organ. Otherwise code NO.	-1	1	-
31-13-1-2	Code YES if a closed primary is mentioned, at which <i>all party members</i> vote and thus select the party candidate. Code NO if not all party members have a say in selecting the presidential candidate. Code NS if there is no mention how the party president is voted for.	1	-1	0
31-13-1-3	Code YES if the president is selected by an inclusive organ or agency. Inclusive organs or agencies are those directly selected by party members or congress. Code NO if the candidate is not selected by such an organ. Code NS if there is no information available.	1	0	0

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Numerical Code	Coding Instructions	Quantification		
31-13-1-4	Code YES if the national executive or an agency or committee created by the national executive selects the presidential candidate. Code NO if this is not the case. Code NS if there is no information.	-1	1	0
31-13-1-5	Code YES if the executive committee or an agency or committee created by the executive committee selects the presidential candidate. Code NO if this is not the case. Code NS if there is no information.	-1	1	0
(31-14-0-0)	-	-	-	-
31-14-1-0	Code YES if national units propose the candidates, select a list and vote upon that list of candidates for public office or otherwise select the candidates without any interference from subnational units. Code YES if this is true for at least one public office position. Otherwise code NO.	-1	0	-
31-14-2-0	Code YES if subnational units suggest or play a role in the suggestion of a list of candidates, out of which the national unit selects the final candidates. Code YES if this true for at least one public office position. Otherwise code NO.	1	0	-
31-14-3-0	Code YES if the national units preselect a list of candidates out of which the subnational units select the final candidates. Code YES if this is true for at least one public office position. If not, code NO.	1	0	-
31-14-4-0	Code YES if subnational units can delay the selection process through suspensive veto rights. If they do not have suspensive veto rights code NO.	1	0	-
31-15-5-0	Code YES if subnational units are completely in control of the selection of candidates for public office. Otherwise code NO.	1	0	-
(31-20-0-0)	-	-	-	-
(31-21-0-0)	-	-	-	-
31-21-1-0	Code YES if rules pertaining to either electing or dismissing the national executive are <i>explicitly</i> mentioned in the statute. Code NO if no such rules are mentioned.	1	0	-
31-21-1-1	Code YES if all party members are involved in the election of the national executive. Code NO if not all party members get to play a direct role in the selection of the national executive. Code NS if it is not mentioned how the national executive is elected.	1	-1	-1
31-21-1-2	Code YES if the national executive is elected in a party congress or by a central committee directly elected by the party congress. Code NO if the national executive is not elected by congress or by a committee elected by congress. For no information code NS.	1	0	0

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Numerical Code	Coding Instructions	Quantification		
31-21-1-3	Code YES if the executive committee is involved in the election of the national executive. Code NO if the executive committee is not involved in the election of the national committee. Code NS if there is no information.	-1	0	0
31-21-1-4	Code YES if the party president elects the national executive or if the party president proposes a list of candidates, upon which the election organ gets to vote. Code NO if the party president is not involved in electing the national executive. For no information code NS.	-1	0	0
(31-22-0-0)	-	-	-	-
31-22-1-0	Code YES if rules pertaining to either electing or dismissing the executive committee are <i>explicitly</i> mentioned in the statute. Code NO if no such rules are mentioned.	1	0	-
31-22-1-1	Code YES if all party members are involved in the election of the executive committee. Code NO if not all party members get to play a direct role in the selection of the executive committee. Code NS if it is not mentioned how the executive committee is elected.	1	-1	-1
31-22-1-2	Code YES if the executive committee is elected in a party congress or by a central committee directly elected by the party congress. Code NO if the executive committee is not elected by congress or by a committee elected by congress. For no information code NS.	1	0	0
31-22-1-3	Code YES if the national executive elects the executive committee. Code NO if the national executive does not elect the executive committee. For no information code NS.	-1	0	0
31-22-1-4	Code YES if the party president elects the executive committee or if the party president proposes a list of candidates, upon which the election organ gets to vote. Code NO if the party president is not involved in electing the executive committee. For no information code NS.	-1	0	0
(31-23-0-0)	-	-	-	-
31-23-1-0	Code YES if at least one of the following is mentioned in the statute: options on how the party president is chosen, who chooses the president, rules of how to challenge the president of the party in his/her function. Code NO if none of this information is mentioned in the statute.	1	0	-
31-23-1-1	Code YES if all party members are involved in the election of the party president (closed primary). Code NO if not all party members get to play a direct role in the selection of the party president. Code NS if it is unclear who elects the party president.	1	-1	-1

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Numerical Code	Coding Instructions	Quantification		
31-23-1-2	Code YES if the party congress (is among the organs that) elects the party president. Code NO if the party congress is not involved in electing the party president. Code NS if the role of congress in electing the party president is unclear.	1	0	0
31-23-1-3	Code YES if it is mentioned in the statute that the national executive is directly involved in electing the party president. Code NO if it is not mentioned in the statute that the national executive is directly involved in electing the party president. Code NS if the role of the national executive in electing the party president is unclear.	-1	0	0
31-23-1-4	Code YES if it is mentioned in the statute that the executive committee is directly involved in electing the party president. Code NO if the executive committee is not directly involved in electing the party president. Code NS if the role of the executive committee regarding the election of the party president is unclear.	-1	0	0
(31-30-0-0)	-	-	-	-
(31-31-0-0)	-	-	-	-
31-31-1-0	Code YES if the statute contains any information about voting procedures either for intra-party or for public office. The information should pertain to the manner of voting, e.g. postal vote, secret ballot, raise of hands, acclamation etc. Code NO if there is no information about voting procedures or if the information related to voting pertains only to persons allowed to vote and majorities required.	1	-1	-
31-31-1-1	Code YES if the selectorate votes the candidates for either public or intra-party office through a secret method. Code NO if all voting is done through a public method. Code NS if there is no information regarding the voting method on personnel issues.	1	0	-1
31-31-1-2	Code YES if the statute mentions secret voting methods for <i>both</i> intra-party and public office. Code NO if there is at least one public voting method used (such as raise of hands or acclamation). Code NS if there is no information regarding the voting method on personnel issues.	1	0	0 ^c
31-31-1-3	Code YES if the statute <i>explicitly</i> specifies that the results of the elections for either party positions or public office have to be/will be presented within the party in order to legitimize the results. Otherwise code NO.	1	-1	-
(31-32-0-0)	-	-	-	-

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Numerical Code	Coding Instructions	Quantification		
31-32-1-0	Code YES if there is an <i>explicit</i> mention about how subnational units of the party elect their public office candidates. Code NO if there is no such mention.	1	0	-
31-32-1-1	Code YES if it is <i>explicitly</i> mentioned in the statute that subnational units elect candidates for subnational public office (such as mayor) in all or most cases. Code NO if a national organ has to confirm the candidatures in all or most cases. Code NS if there is no information about how subnational units elect their public office candidates.	1	-1	0
31-32-1-2	Code YES if subnational party units propose candidates for subnational public office (such as mayor) but the national party units make the final decision upon the candidate OR if subnational party units decide subject to the approval of national party units in at least one case. Code NO if this is not the case. Code NS if there is no information available.	-1	1	0
31-32-1-3	Code YES if the national party units appoint the candidates for public office (such as mayor) or if they provide a list of names from which the subnational party units can select the final list of candidates in at least one case. Code NO if this is not the case. Code NS if there is no information regarding the election of subnational public office candidates in the statute.	-1	1	0
(31-33-0-0)	-	-	-	-
31-33-1-0	Code YES if there is an <i>explicit</i> mention of how subnational units of the party elect their leadership. Code NO if there is no such mention.	1	0	-
31-33-1-1	Code YES if it is <i>explicitly</i> mentioned in the statute that subnational units elect members of subnational party executive/subnational leaders. Code NO if a national organ has to confirm the candidatures in any one of the cases. Code NS if there is no information about how subnational units elect their intra-party office candidates.	1	-1	0
31-33-1-2	Code YES if subnational party units propose candidates for subnational functions (such as the subnational executive) but the national party units make the final decision upon the candidate OR if subnational party units decide, subject to the approval of the national party units. Code NO if this is not the case. Code NS if there is no information available.	-1	1	0

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(continued)

Numerical Code	Coding Instructions	Quantification		
31-33-1-3	Code YES if the national party units appoint the subnational leadership or if they provide a list of names from which the subnational party units can select the final list of candidates in at least one case. Code NO if the subnational party units elect their leadership without interference from above. Code NS if there is no information regarding the election of regional leadership in the statute.	-1	1	0
(32-00-0-0)	-	-	-	-
32-10-0-0	Code YES if the people or organs responsible for changes in the manifesto are <i>explicitly mentioned</i> in the statute. Code NO if this is not mentioned.	1	0	0
32-11-0-0	Code YES if individual party members have a vote on defining the party manifesto (e.g. through intra-party referenda). Code NO if individual members have no direct influence upon the content of the manifesto. Code NS if there is no information that enables you to deduce whether individual members have or do not have an influence on defining the party manifesto.	1	0	0
32-12-0-0	Code YES if the party congress has a vote upon the party manifesto (e.g. if the congress is either drafting OR voting on the party programme). Code NO if the congress has no direct influence upon the content of the manifesto. Code NS if there is not enough information that would enable you to deduce whether the congress has or does not have an influence on defining the party manifesto.	1	0	0
32-13-0-0	Code YES if the party executive has a vote upon the party manifesto (e.g. if the party executive is either drafting OR voting on the party programme). Code NO if the party executive has no direct influence upon the content of the manifesto. Code NS if there is not enough information that would enable you to deduce whether the party executive has or does not have an influence on defining the party manifesto.	-1	0	0
32-14-0-0	Code YES if it is <i>specified</i> that the party president votes or otherwise decides upon the manifesto of the party. Otherwise code NO.	-1	0	-

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Numerical Code	Coding Instructions	Quantification
32-15-0-0	Code YES if subnational party units have a separate vote on the manifesto of the party. This can be for example expressed by the need to the support of at least a number of subnational units for a manifesto to be accepted. If this is not mentioned, code NO.	0 -

^aAccording to the general quantification rules, here the value 0 should be attributed (see [Sect. 5.1.1](#)). However, since the answer NO refers to both the not mentioning of a given aspect and the negation of the right to be informed about party activities, in these cases the answer NO is assessed as providing reason enough to be allocated the value -1.

^bThese two values obviously diverge from the instructions for quantification outlined in [Sect. 5.1.1](#). This is due to the fact, that each of the previous questions (i.e. 23-11-0-0 and 24-11-0-0) is a type of a filter question. It follows that if the first answer is NO the second has to be NO too. Although the second question would imply negative consequences for IPD (therefore value -1), in order to prevent a double negative assessment of the same aspect the value 0 is assigned.

^cConsidering the question only, the value -1 should have been assigned here (see [Sect. 5.1.1](#)). But this aspect was already quantified in question 31-31-1-1. Therefore the value 0 is assigned to avoid multiple counting of the same aspect.

Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Hungary ^a			Slovakia			Romania		
	Obs.	Mean	Var.	Obs.	Mean	Var.	Obs.	Mean	Var.
10-00-0-0	53	0.302	0.065	56	0.364	0.162	33	0.364	0.162
11-00-0-0	53	0.519	0.118	56	0.485	0.228	33	0.485	0.228
12-00-0-0	53	0.085	0.076	56	0.242	0.154	33	0.242	0.154
20-00-0-0	53	0.546	0.034	56	0.369	0.009	33	0.369	0.009
21-00-0-0	53	0.615	0.037	56	0.364	0.221	33	0.364	0.221
22-00-0-0	53	0.646	0.028	56	0.689	0.117	33	0.689	0.117
23-00-0-0	53	0.371	0.358	56	0.030	0.303	33	0.030	0.303
24-00-0-0	53	0.434	0.456	56	-0.081	0.111	33	-0.081	0.111
25-00-0-0	53	0.268	0.067	56	0.236	0.511	33	0.236	0.511
26-00-0-0	53	0.943	0.049	56	0.977	0.005	33	0.977	0.005
30-00-0-0	53	0.244	0.025	56	0.253	0.006	33	0.253	0.006
31-00-0-0	53	0.175	0.019	56	0.279	0.013	33	0.279	0.013
31-10-0-0	53	0.029	0.012	56	0.281	0.029	33	0.281	0.029
31-11-0-0	53	-0.126	0.117	56	0.232	0.135	33	0.232	0.135
31-12-0-0	53	0.249	0.126	56	0.352	0.120	33	0.352	0.120
31-13-0-0 ^b	--	--	--	33	0.412	0.157	33	0.412	0.157
31-14-0-0	53	-0.075	0.008	56	0.121	0.012	33	0.121	0.012
31-20-0-0	53	0.098	0.017	56	0.098	0.017	33	0.098	0.017
31-21-0-0	53	0.098	0.052	56	-0.097	0.013	33	-0.097	0.013
31-22-0-0	53	0.113	0.019	56	-0.121	0.015	33	-0.121	0.015
31-23-0-0	53	0.083	0.024	56	0.193	0.006	33	0.193	0.006
31-30-0-0	53	0.399	0.062	56	0.563	0.055	33	0.563	0.055
31-31-0-0	53	0.113	0.189	56	0.386	0.016	33	0.386	0.016
31-32-0-0	53	0.274	0.157	56	0.614	0.223	33	0.614	0.223

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Variable	Hungary ^a			Slovakia			Romania		
31-33-0-0	53	0.811	0.146	56	0.689	0.203	33	0.689	0.203
32-00-0-0	53	0.314	0.013	56	0.227	0.014	33	0.227	0.014
<i>IPD</i>	53	0.364	0.014	56	0.328	0.015	33	0.328	0.015

^aPlease note, that for this report on descriptive statistics, we decided to include all information on the coded party statutes available to us. In Hungary we therefore have six “additional” observations, which we can draw upon and did not consider when discussing the developments of IPD in Hungarian parties (see [Sect. 5.2.1](#)). These are: FKGP (two statutes from 1990 and 1992), MKDSZ (three statutes from 1997, 2004 and 2006) and MSZDP (one statute from 2008)

^bDue to its content (state president), it is possible to code this variable only for Romania and Slovakia and only for time periods when the state president has been directly elected. In the case of Slovakia this results in a restricted number of cases

Appendix C: Reliability Test

Variable	Reliability Test		
	Krippendorff's Alpha	Fleiss' Kappa	Holsti's Method
(10-00-0-0)	-	-	-
(11-00-0-0)	-	-	-
11-10-0-0	1.000	1.000	1.000
11-20-0-0	0.742	0.734	0.933
11-21-0-0	1.000	1.000	1.000
11-22-0-0	0.710	0.700	0.867
11-23-0-0	1.000	1.000	1.000
11-24-0-0	0.266	0.244	0.600
(12-00-0-0)	-	-	-
12-10-0-0	0.742	0.734	0.933
12-20-0-0	0.732	0.722	0.867
12-21-0-0	0.847	0.842	0.933
12-22-0-0	0.741	0.732	0.867
12-23-0-0	1.000	1.000	1.000
12-30-0-0	0.606	0.609	0.800
(20-00-0-0)	-	-	-
(21-00-0-0)	-	-	-
21-10-0-0	1.000	1.000	1.000
21-11-0-0	0.742	0.734	0.933
21-12-0-0	0.597	0.595	0.867
21-13-0-0	1.000	1.000	1.000
21-14-0-0	n.a. ^a	n.a. ^a	0.933
(22-00-0-0)	-	-	-
22-10-0-0	1.000	1.000	1.000
22-11-0-0	1.000	1.000	1.000
22-12-0-0	0.091	0.172	0.300
22-13-0-0	0.741	0.737	0.867
(23-00-0-0)	-	-	-
23-10-0-0	0.732	0.730	0.867
23-11-0-0	0.819	0.815	0.933

(continued)

(continued)

Variable	Reliability Test		
	Krippendorff's Alpha	Fleiss' Kappa	Holsti's Method
23-12-0-0	0.642	0.634	0.867
(24-00-0-0)	-	-	-
24-10-0-0	0.582	0.600	0.867
24-11-0-0	0.194	0.189	0.433
24-12-0-0	0.623	0.617	0.720
(25-00-0-0)	-	-	-
25-10-0-0	0.456	0.448	0.667
(25-20-0-0)	-	-	-
25-21-0-0	n.a.	n.a.	0.933
25-22-0-0	1.000	1.000	1.000
25-23-0-0	1.000	1.000	1.000
25-24-0-0	1.000	1.000	1.000
25-25-0-0	n.a.	n.a.	0.933
(26-00-0-0)	-	-	-
26-10-0-0	1.000	1.000	1.000
26-11-0-0	1.000	1.000	1.000
26-12-0-0	1.000	1.000	1.000
26-13-0-0	1.000	1.000	1.000
(30-00-0-0)	-	-	-
(31-00-0-0)	-	-	-
(31-10-0-0)	-	-	-
(31-11-0-0)	-	-	-
31-11-1-0	0.768	0.762	0.933
31-11-1-1	0.869	0.865	0.933
31-11-1-2	0.846	0.842	0.933
31-11-1-3	0.861	0.857	0.933
31-11-1-4	0.420	0.444	0.667
31-11-1-5	0.539	0.545	0.800
(31-12-0-0)	-	-	-
31-12-1-0	0.742	0.734	0.933
31-12-1-1	0.597	0.595	0.867
31-12-1-2	0.894	0.891	0.933
31-12-1-3	0.539	0.531	0.667
31-12-1-4	0.732	0.722	0.867
(31-13-0-0)	-	-	-
31-13-1-0	1.000	1.000	1.000
31-13-1-1	1.000	1.000	1.000
31-13-1-2	0.840	0.833	0.900
31-13-1-3	0.853	0.846	0.900
31-13-1-4	0.573	0.565	0.700
31-13-1-5	0.315	0.286	0.600
(31-14-0-0)	-	-	-
31-14-1-0	0.613	0.602	0.800
31-14-2-0	0.731	0.727	0.867
31-14-3-0	1.000	1.000	1.000
31-14-4-0	1.000	1.000	1.000

(continued)

(continued)

Variable	Reliability Test		
	Krippendorff's Alpha	Fleiss' Kappa	Holsti's Method
31-14-5-0	0.697	0.695	0.867
(31-20-0-0)	-	-	-
(31-21-0-0)	-	-	-
31-21-1-0	0.869	0.865	0.933
31-21-1-1	0.732	0.727	0.867
31-21-1-2	0.642	0.640	0.800
31-21-1-3	0.847	0.842	0.933
31-21-1-4	0.846	0.844	0.933
(31-22-0-0)	-	-	-
31-22-1-0	0.768	0.762	0.933
31-22-1-1	1.000	1.000	1.000
31-22-1-2	0.857	0.853	0.933
31-22-1-3	0.591	0.612	0.800
31-22-1-4	0.751	0.743	0.933
(31-23-0-0)	-	-	-
31-23-1-0	1.000	1.000	1.000
31-23-1-1	1.000	1.000	1.000
31-23-1-2	n.a.	n.a.	0.733
31-23-1-3	0.867	0.878	0.933
31-23-1-4	n.a.	n.a.	0.733
(31-30-0-0)	-	-	-
(31-31-0-0)	-	-	-
31-31-1-0	0.751	0.743	0.933
31-31-1-1	0.049	0.118	0.533
31-31-1-2	0.584	0.580	0.800
31-31-1-3	0.455	0.463	0.733
(31-32-0-0)	-	-	-
31-32-1-0	0.566	0.573	0.800
31-32-1-1	0.436	0.436	0.667
31-32-1-2	0.469	0.468	0.667
31-32-1-3	0.441	0.492	0.667
(31-33-0-0)	-	-	-
31-33-1-0	0.494	0.450	0.733
31-33-1-1	0.275	0.218	0.933
31-33-1-2	0.437	0.431	0.733
31-33-1-3	0.028	0.079	0.267
(32-00-0-0)	-	-	-
32-10-0-0	n.a.	n.a.	0.667
32-11-0-0	1.000	1.000	1.000
32-12-0-0	1.000	1.000	1.000
32-13-0-0	0.805	0.800	0.887
32-14-0-0	1.000	1.000	1.000
32-15-0-0	0.816	0.819	0.933

^aAt least one of the considered observer variables is a constant; therefore the reliability test cannot be applied

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