

POLITICAL FACTIONS IN ALEPPO,
1760-1826

By

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INTRODUCTION

The abolition of the Janissary corps in 1826 and the massacre in Istanbul of large numbers of its members were the key blows against the reactionary elements which blocked the path of reform in the Ottoman Empire.¹ That reform was necessary became patently obvious as the Ottoman army, after having been the foremost Islamic power and the bane of the Christian kings, failed to match the military progress of the West and suffered ever more serious defeats. The attempt of Sultan Salīm III to revitalize the army and his failure need not be repeated here.² Sultan Maḥmūd II, after he had tested the opposition and found it too entrenched, made lengthy preparations to obviate the disaster that had befallen his uncle. He sought trustworthy subordinates, a military force in Istanbul on which he could depend, the support of the leading ulema, and the best possible control over the crumbling empire.

The fact that he was largely successful in his endeavour produced the necessary climate for reform and his successor, ‘Abd-al-Majīd, pursued the acquisition of what the West had developed with the aid of vizirs familiar and sympathetic with the accomplishments of European civilization.³ It was, however, too late for the Ottoman Empire. With Western techniques came liberal ideas and a quest for identity other than Islam which gradually tore the empire apart.

The effect of the attempted reforms of Salīm III on the Arab provinces of the empire was minimal. During his reign (1789-1807) there is no noticeable change in the direction of the downward trend; in fact, that trend appears to accelerate. In Istanbul the reformist movement developed slowly against entrenched opposition. But elsewhere in the empire it took shape only after the destruction by his nephew's orders of the roots of a military corporation essentially political in action. Subsequently, a beginning was made in the creation of a new army. In the province of Aleppo this took place in 1830 with the training of troops in the European manner in spite of religious opposition.⁴

In face of the invasion of Ibrāhīm Pasha from Egypt the following

¹ The best available account of the destruction of the Janissaries and the events that led up to it is Howard A. Reed, *The Destruction of the Janissaries in 1826; how Sultan Maḥmūd II Abolished the Corps* (Princeton, 1951; unpublished doctoral dissertation). It does not deal with the Janissaries of Aleppo.

² Cf. J. H. Kramers, "Selim III" *EI*¹.

³ For a commentary on Rashīd Pasha cf. Stanley Lane-Poole, *The Life of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, K. G.* (London: Longmans, Green, 1890), 205-208; Frank Edgar Bailey, *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement; a Study in Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1826-1853* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942), 181-184. On ‘Alī Pasha, see H. Bowen, "‘Alī Pasha Muḥammad Amin," *IEJ*². On Fu‘ād Pasha, see Cl. Huart, "Fu‘ād Pasha," *IEJ*¹.

⁴ *Infra*, 138.

year and the reforms he instituted during the nine years he held Syria,⁵ which so altered the traditional way of life that it could not be regained with the restoration of Ottoman rule, it can easily be overlooked that the events from 1826 to 1831 were the beginning of change for Aleppo. The process had already begun before Ibrāhīm Pasha's invasion.

This, then, is one of the two basic reasons for the terminal date of 1826 for this study of the political situation in the province of Aleppo before the era of reform. The second is that as elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire the Janissaries were one of the major local political factors. After their dissolution they retained some of their former influence and were even considered by the first Ottoman governor following the Egyptian occupation to be essential supporters of his government.⁶ There can be no doubt, however, that the elimination of their privileges broke their power, for it destroyed the foundation on which that power was based, namely, unity for the protection and exploitation of those privileges.

The date of the commencement of this study is less specific. It has been placed at 1760 to provide an adequate background for the first significant political event in the struggle between the factional forces treated. In 1768 the Janissary forces were drawn off for the war with Russia that ended so disastrously for the Ottoman Empire in the Treaty of Kūchūk Qaynārjih. This departure of the Janissaries gave the *ashrāf*, the genuine or spurious descendants of Muḥammad, an opportunity to enhance their political position in the city. With the return of the Janissaries the conflict that had been dormant between these two factions broke out with ever increasing frequency and bitterness.

This conflict between the *ashrāf* and the Janissaries shares the stage with the Ottoman attempts to control the city and province of Aleppo. Thus there are three principal elements in the political history of the city during this period: the Janissaries, the *ashrāf* and the administration. The latter element must be divided into two groups, the offices under the control of the *wāli*, or governor, and those relating to the ulema under the influence, if not the control, of the *qāḍi*, the magistrate. These were the two officials generally sent from Istanbul to Aleppo. A third, the sirdar, the appointed head of the Janissaries, more properly belongs with that group.

Other elements of the population were important, not the least of which were the religious minorities. Their economic importance cannot be denied. Their role as bankers and money-lenders was a vital, if elusive, factor in the administrative system; the imposition of *avānias*,

⁵ Cf. Henry Dodwell, *The Founder of Modern Egypt; a Study of Muhammad 'Alī* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931), 248-258.

⁶ [A. A. Paton], *The Modern Syrians; or, Native Society in Damascus, Aleppo, and the Mountains of the Druses, during the Years 1841-2-3* (London: Longman, 1844), 246.

or extortions based on actual or trumped-up charges, was a source of much needed financing for the politicians; and the intercession of foreign consuls on their behalf before the *wāli* or even the Istanbul government sometimes reflected on local politics.

The prepossession of Western contemporary or later authors with the affairs of the minorities, however, tends to exaggerate their importance during this period. The consular records in actual fact contain far more information on the minorities than on the majority.⁷ These records, moreover, indicate tellingly the circumstance most vitiating to the political influence of the Christian minorities: sectarian rivalries were of such overweening concern that any gain in the position of one minority was attacked by another⁸ to the ultimate detriment of both, for a sectarian squabble could easily be turned to the financial profit of the *wāli*.

For the minorities political influence derived from commercial and financial activities was not likely to reflect on the local communities as a whole to any material degree. Such influence as may have existed, and evidence of that in Aleppo is minimal, was on an individual basis; there are few indications that the *millahs*, or sectarian communities, in the city profited from the achievements of its successful members. In the first place, the individual in a position of political influence tended to identify himself with the majority, for through it his success might be enhanced or, in the case of the *şarrāf*, or banker, his investment protected. Self-interest was paramount. Or, in the second place, commercial and financial profit was derived from the possession of a *barā'ah*, or immunity, issued by a foreign power which provided the individual with commercial advantage and the aegis of the capitulations.⁹ These *barā'ahs* had originally been accorded to the foreign powers for issuance to interpreters, agents, vice-consuls, guards, and the like; in other words, for the necessary local employees of the foreign power.¹⁰ In time, however, the foreign ambassadors came to abuse this privilege by sell-

⁷ ". . . with the lower classes of Turks we [the consuls] have not the slightest acquaintance:" John Barker to the Levant Company, 30 June 1823, *SP* 105/141.

⁸ "Voulant des disciples aveuglément soumis à la voix de leurs chefs ecclésiastiques, les prêtres grecs commencent à leur inspirer une haine violente contre les chrétiens d'un autre rite:" Antoine de Juchereau de Saint-Denis, *Histoire de l'empire ottoman depuis 1792 jusqu'en 1844* (Paris: Guiraudet et Jouaust, 1844), II, 11-12. In 1818 there occurred a serious riot in Aleppo between the Greek Orthodox and the Greek Catholics in which 11 of the Catholics were killed. A full but biased account of this may be found in Bülus Qara'li, ed., *Ahamm Hawādith Halab fi al-Naşf al-Awval min al-Qarn al-Tāsi 'Ashar Naqlan 'an Mu-jakkiratin Makhjūṭatin li-al-Mutrān Bülus Arūtin Usqūf Halab al-Mārūni* (Cairo: Syrian Press, n.d.), 21-29.

⁹ For the benefits of the *barā'ah*, see Hamilton A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West; a Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the Near East* (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), I, pt. 1, 311.

¹⁰ Nasim Sousa, *The Capitulatory Régime of Turkey; its History, Origin, and Nature* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1933), 93.

ing *barā'ahs* to individuals having no connection with the embassy.¹¹ As the protégés armed with the advantages of such immunities captured more and more of the foreign commerce of the empire,¹² they lost whatever direct political influence they might have had. In fact, the political force of the minorities in Aleppo may even have been a negative one in that the activities of the foreign consuls on behalf of the *barā'atlis* and *naḡar firmānlis*¹³ and the increasing commercial activities of these individuals were instruments in the hands of the *ashrāf* party to arouse the Muslims to the support of the descendants of the Prophet.

It is on the basis of the above considerations that the minorities will be given no notice comparable to that of the administration, the Janissaries and the *ashrāf*. Only where particular events involving the minorities have a direct bearing on the political activities of the administration and the two political parties in their interrelation will they be considered as a group.

Another body of some political importance in Aleppo was the *a'yān*, the provincial notables who in former times represented the people vis-à-vis the government.¹⁴ By the latter part of the eighteenth century, however, the *a'yān* of Aleppo cannot be considered as anything but a group of provincial landlords usually so identified with the governor's party as to have lost any popular representative character. They will therefore be considered in the chapter dealing with the administration.

The Janissaries and the *ashrāf* were essentially urban parties, based on the city of Aleppo and attempting to control it. Although many individuals, especially among the latter, had land holdings, control of the countryside was beyond their capabilities. The province, exposed to the

¹¹ Cf. the letter of Robert Liston, British ambassador at Constantinople, to Lord Grenville, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 25 April 1795, in which Liston states:

This system was liable to gross abuses. . . . In many cases all idea of connection between the title and function of Dragoman was lost, and persons were seen strutting in the habit of a Diplomatic Interpreter, who were unable to read the Patent by which they held their privileges, and knew no language but the Jargon of their Province. The servant lived at a thousand miles' distance from his master . . . in the process of time it became the universal practice to dispose of Berats at a stated price. . . . On the arrival of a new Ambassador his confirmation of the Patents of his predecessor has been purchased for 300 p[iasters].” *FO* 78/16.

For further information on the *barā'ahs* and their abuses, see Sousa, *Capitulatory Régime*, 97-102; Kāmil ibn-Ḥusayn ibn-Muḡammad ibn-Muḡaḡa al-Pāli al-Ḥalabi, known as al-Għazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab fī Ta'rikh Ḥalab*, (Aleppo: Maronite Press, 1342-1345/1923-1926), III, 311; Pierre Arminjon, *Etrangers et protégés dans l'empire ottoman* (Paris: Chevalier-Marescq, 1903), I, 61-63; Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 310-311.

¹² Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 310.

¹³ *Barā'atlis* was the term used to designate those holding *barā'ahs*. *Naḡar firmānlis* was applied to those holding *naḡar firmāns*, that is, documents showing that they were servants of *barā'atlis*. They had lesser privileges, but the extent of these is not clear; Robert Abbott to Sir Robert Ainslie, British ambassador at Istanbul, 30 July and 13 August 1791, *SP* 110/53.

¹⁴ Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 198.

desert on the one hand and bordered by mountain refuges on the other, was increasingly prey to raids of Kurds, Turkomans and Bedouin to the extent that neither the government nor the urban parties can be said to have had any but nominal authority over it. The Janissaries and *ashrāf* did not seriously attempt to exercise such control, but the semi-nomadic peoples, by alliances with the urban parties, by their enfeeblement of the government forces, and by the economic effects of their depredations on the city, deserve considerable attention. The first chapter of this study is therefore devoted to the relationship of the province to the city, to the *wāli*'s attempts to control the province, and to the activities of the Kurds, Turkomans and Bedouin.

The second chapter is devoted to the composition of the administration, describing the functions of the administrative officials and their position relative to the chiefs of the two groups, the *wāli* and the *qāḍī*. Many of the problems that come to light in this discussion must be left unanswered because of the paucity of information regarding provincial administration.

The organization and composition of the Janissary party, its relation to the Janissaries in Istanbul and elsewhere in the empire, and its powers and privileges form the subject of the third chapter. The fourth chapter deals with the *ashrāf* in much the same manner, although the treatment of that party will contain more historical material of a general nature. This is based on the fact that the *ashrāf* and their position in Islamic history are less known than the Janissaries, yet for a study of Aleppo they are of manifest importance.

The fifth and last chapter before the conclusion is devoted to a survey of the struggle for predominance that took place within the city of Aleppo during the period under study. The relationship of that struggle to those taking place elsewhere in the region will be pointed out.

Much attention in recent years has been given to the impact of Western civilization on the Ottoman Empire and its successor states. Many of the works published on this subject, however, have been predicated on inadequately tested assumptions of the conditions extant in that area at the time contact with European civilization so increased as to have definite effect on the existing society.¹⁵ A worthy attempt

¹⁵ For instance, the dichotomy of Muslim and Christian in the social edifice of the Arab provinces explained in George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (New York: Putnam, 1946), 32-33, is oversimplified. As will be shown, there were groups of Muslims, i.e., Janissaries and *ashrāf*, who had privileges of exception over other Muslims nearly as great as those between Muslim and Christian.

Albert Hourani states that:

"After the rule of Jazzar had come to an end, Ottoman administration only functioned effectively in the large towns, where the garrisons of Janissaries were stationed, in a section of the coastal strip and certain portions of the countryside."

Syria and Lebanon; a Political Essay (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), 46. It is clearly revealed in this study that Ottoman control over the

has been made to fill this gap in Hamilton A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen's *Islamic Society and the West*, but in the words of the authors: "It began . . . to dawn on us that, far from being over-cultivated, much of our field of study was practically virgin soil."¹⁶ Although the achievement of a work of this depth is a tribute to the scholarship of its authors, it is hampered by the absence of detailed monographs on the provinces of the Ottoman Empire toward the end of the period in which the traditional way of life was dominant. On the basis of a number of such studies, certain valid and proven conclusions might be drawn to provide a base on which to build the pattern of the impact of external forces. A partial contribution to this base is the objective of this essay.

* * * * *

A study of this nature is never possible without extensive assistance from a multitude of individuals and institutions. In its original form as a dissertation submitted to the Department of Oriental Studies of Princeton University, it was directed by Professor Philip K. Hitti. His rigorous training in my field of study is recalled with nostalgia. If the product does not measure up to his expectations, the fault does not lie with his efforts to promote high standards of scholarship. The instruction of Professor Lewis V. Thomas, also of Princeton University, was inspiring and of inestimable value.

A research grant to reside in the Middle East and consult the archives in Paris and London was provided by the Ford Foundation. This invaluable support made possible the study of the primary sources and is gratefully acknowledged. The Foundation is, of course, in no way responsible for any of the statements made or views expressed herein.

During my residence in Beirut, Lebanon, the American University of Beirut was kind enough to offer its facilities for research. The association in Beirut with Nouredine Zeine and Nasri Azar Id in the unravelling of Ottoman and Arabic texts respectively was particularly enjoyable and rewarding. The opportunity of a teaching fellowship at the Institute of Islamic Studies of McGill University made possible the completion of the study. The acute and elucidating suggestions of Professor Niyazi Berkes and the careful reading of the manuscript by Dr. Howard A. Reed were invaluable.

cities was, at least in the case of Aleppo, in spite of the Janissaries, rather than because of them as the above quotation implies.

Hourani has revised this view in a subsequent article:

" . . . even in the cities and plains the double challenge of the Janissary threat to order and the Beduin threat to the country-side gave a premium to any ruling group which could master them; by so doing they could win the acquiescence of Istanbul and some support from the local population." "The Changing Face of the Fertile Crescent in the XVIIIth Century," *SI*, VIII (1957), 100.

¹⁶ I, pt. 1, 3.

My deepest gratitude is due to the members of the editorial board of the *James Sprunt Studies in History and Political Science* and to the Research Council of the University of North Carolina for their generous financial support in the publication of this study. It would not have been possible without it.

To my wife who endured tribulations and discomforts during the period of research and writing and who culminated years of dedication to my interests with the thankless task of preparing the index, I owe a debt that cannot be repaid. For Carlyle and Whitney, who hardly understood the meaning of my prolonged absences and their frequent changes of residence, I can only hope that the adventures and experiences are remembered more in pleasure than in pain. To them the product of that mysterious activity encompassing their childhood is lovingly dedicated.

Abbreviations

- AE B¹ Archives nationales. *Affaires étrangères B¹*
- CCAlep Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères. *Correspondence commerciale, Alep*
- EI¹ *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. 1st edition. Leiden: Brill, 1913-1934. 4 vols. and supplement
- EI² *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. 2nd edition. Leiden: Brill, 1960-
- FO Public Record Office. *Foreign Office 78*
- IA *İslam Ansiklopedesi*. Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1941-
- JA *Journal asiatique*
- REI *Revue des études islamiques*
- SI *Studia Islamica*
- SP Public Record Office. *State Papers 105 and 110*
- TMD Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères. *Turquie—Mémoires et documents*

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

The system of transliteration adopted by the Department of Oriental Studies of Princeton University is used in this dissertation for all Arabic words or words of Arabic origin employed in Turkish.


For words of Turkish origin the above-mentioned transliteration system has been adopted as a base with the following modifications adopted in conformity with the Turkish alphabet and Turkish phonetics :

پ	p
چ	ch
گ	g
ڭ	ñ

The above symbols have been recommended by the Royal Asiatic Society.

In Turkish words the letters *e* and *o* have been added as short vowels where proper pronunciation has so demanded.

Foreign words listed in Webster's Unabridged Dictionary have not been transliterated or italicized.



ENVIRONS OF ALEPPO

A—Antioch; AF—'Afrin; AR—'Ariha; AZ—'Azaz; B—Bab; BL—Baylan; D—Dir Küsh; E—Elbeyli; H—Halqah; HY—Haylan; I—Iskandarün; ID—Idlib; J—Jisr al-Shughr; K—Killis; KQ—Khän Qarahmurt; KT—Khän Tūmān; N—Nayrāb; P—Payās; S—Sarmin; SF—Safirah.

FACTORS AFFECTING THE POLITICAL CONTROL
OF THE WALĀYAH OF ALEPPO

It was natural that Aleppo, long a seat of government and one of the two largest and most important cities of Syria, should become the capital of a province at the time of the Ottoman conquest of the Arab lands.¹ In the eighteenth century this was still true; it was the residence of a vizir, a pasha of three *tugh*s, or horse tails,² but the area over which he ruled as *wāli* was officially much reduced and even more so in actuality. For instance, the district of Adana, a *walāyah*³ in the eighteenth century, had been a sanjak of the *walāyah* of Aleppo in the early seventeenth.⁴ In the mid-seventeenth century Ma'arrat al-Na'mān was independent of Aleppo as was Bīrahjik.⁵ The status of these districts and the borders of the *walāyah* of Aleppo not later than 1768 is revealed by the description of Alexander Russell:

The nominal Province, or Bashawlick [of Aleppo], is of great extent, reaching Eastward from the bay of Scanderoon [Iskandarūn] to the banks of the Euphrates, and from 40 miles North of the city, extending about fifty miles to the South East. But it is not near so extensive as it was in former times. Khillis, which was formerly dependent on Aleppo, has been erected into a distinct Province, on account of the frequent depredations of the Kurdeens who inhabit the neighbouring mountains; and since the year 1752, an alteration has taken place with respect to Bylan, which together with Caramoot [Khān Qarahmurt], Scanderoon, Byas [Payās], and the adjacent mountains [the Amanus Range], has been put under the government of a native of Bylan, who for that purpose was created a Bashaw of two tails.

¹ For the disposition of the provinces of Syria in the early years after their conquest, see George William Frederick Stripling, *The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs, 1511-1574* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1942), 50, 58, 66-68, and 71.

² *Infra*, 19.

³ In this monograph the term *walāyah*, a province governed by a *wāli*, will be used instead of the Ottoman designation, *iyālah*, spelled *eyalet* in modern Turkish, and the term *wilāyah*, the government of a *walāyah*, will be employed instead of the Ottoman term *wātilik*. *Vilayet*, the modern Turkish designation for province, results from the fact that the distinction between *walāyah* and *wilāyah* has been infrequently maintained.

⁴ Alphonse Belin, "Du Régime des fiefs militaires dans l'Islamisme et principalement en Turquie," *JA* series 6, XV, (1870), 276; Mustafa Nūri, *Natāyij al-Wuqū'at*, 3rd ed. (Istanbul: Ukhūwat Press, 1327/1909), I, 129; J.-G. Barbié du Bocage, "Notice sur la carte générale des pachaliks de Baghdad, Orfa et Hhaleb, et sur le plan d'Hhaleb de M. Rousseau," *Recueil de voyages et de mémoires publié par la Société de Géographie* (Paris, 1825), II, 220.

⁵ Barbié du Bocage, "Notice sur la carte générale," *Recueil de voyages et de mémoires*, *loc. cit.*

At present the Bashawlick on the north is bounded by the village Bailik [Elbeyli?], situated on the road to Aintab; Eastward, it is bounded by the desert; Bab, at a distance of 10 hours East North East, and Haglah [Ḥaqlah], about the same distance South South East, being among the last inhabited villages. On the South, it is soon bounded by the great Desert, between the skirts of which and the West, or West North West, are situated the most fertile and populous parts of the Province. Sirmeen [Sarmīn], is the last town Southward; and Antioch, with its dependencies, may be reckoned the Western boundary, which till of late years, reached to the sea: Scanderoon and Byas being then the two frontier maritime towns. Shogle [Jisr al-Shughr] is under the Government of an Aga whose jurisdiction extends also to Idlib, and he is named by the Porte independent of any Bashaw.⁶

The district of Killis, bordering Aleppo on the north, was a special case not only for the reason Russell mentions, but also because it had become a revenue source for the grand vizir after 1745, that is, it was given by the sultan as a *khāṣṣ*, or special, domain from which the grand vizir drew his *ma'āsh*, or means of subsistence.⁷ Presumably the grand vizir farmed the district to a *multazim*, or tax farmer, according to the usual custom, and auctioned the right to possess this *iltizām*, or tax farm. Thus its disposition varied greatly even during the period covered in this study, as various officials vied for possession of it. This was its financial status. Administratively, it appears to have been attached to the *walāyah* of Mar'ash, Urfa or Aleppo and governed by a sanjak bey, a *mutasallim*, deputy governor, or a voivode.⁸ At times its *mutasallim* appears to have been exercising independent authority, whether with the Porte's sanction or not. In 1812 Faḍli Agha, its *mutasallim* and *multazim*, was confirmed in his government in spite of the attempts of Shāmli Rāghib Muḥammad Pasha, the *wāli* of Aleppo, to obtain the *iltizām*. It was said that the *mutasallim* paid 150,000 piasters for its retention.⁹ In 1804 the town was under the jurisdiction of the *wāli* of Aleppo, Ḥamīd Ḥamūd Muḥammad Pasha, but he could not enter it in

⁶ Alexander Russell, *The Natural History of Aleppo*, 2nd edition, revised by Patrick Russell (London: Robinson, 1794), I, 314-315. Khān Qarahmurt is located at the foot of the Baylān pass outside of Antioch. Payās is a town and district on the Gulf of Iskandarūn, while Sarmīn is just east of Idlib: René Dussaud, *Topographie historique de la Syrie antique et médiévale* (Paris: Geuthner, 1927), viii and map xi, 503, 213-214 and map x. On Payās and Sarmīn see also Shams al-Dīn Sāmī, *Qāmūs al-'Alām* (Constantinople: Mihran, 1889-1898), 1571 and 2554.

⁷ İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilâtı* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1948), 165.

⁸ Kılıslı Kadri, *Kilis Tarihi*, ed. by Osman Vehbi (Istanbul: Bühraneddin, 1932), 54-55. The office and functions of *mutasallim* are discussed *infra*, 33-34.

⁹ Joseph Louis Rousseau, "Douzième bulletin," entries of 13 March and 20 March 1812, *CCAlep*, XXV, ff. 57r. to 58r. Kadri's version has Faḍli Agha as *mutasallim* for Muḥammad Rāghib Pasha: *Kilis Tarihi*, 73-74. On Shāmli Rāghib Muḥammad Pasha, cf. Muḥammad Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni yākhūd Tasakrah-i Mashāhīr 'Uthmāniyah* (Istanbul: 'Amīrah Press, 1308-1311/1890-1893), II, 360.

pite of an expedition against its possessor.¹⁰ Its administrative status may be characterized as an appendage to one of the neighbouring *walāyahs*, but from the numerous references to *mutasallims* who asserted their independence¹¹ it was often a potential *dereh beylik*, or an area ruled by petty dynasties of rebels against the Porte, called 'lords of the valley.'

Baylān had the same status in fact although not in theory. It was considered to be a part of the *walāyah* of Aleppo, but since 'Abd-al-Rahmān made himself independent in that key pass over the Amanus Range, the Porte recognized reality as Russell has indicated. By making him a *mūr-mūrān*, literally *amūr-i amūrān*, commander of commanders, a rank conferring two *tughs* upon him, and by acquiescing in his nomination of the *qāḍi*, it gained his allegiance against the Kurds and Turkomans and thus kept the pass open for caravans.¹² 'Abd-al-Rahmān Pasha soon became a *dereh bey* himself, however, and the Porte did not gain control over Baylān until Chapān Ūghlu Jalāl-al-Dīn Muḥammad Pasha of Aleppo defeated and killed his successor 'Abd-Allāh Bey in 1815.¹³ Another region that was frequently independent under a minor *dereh bey* was Jisr al-Shughr, while Payās was constantly a troublesome spot for the regularly constituted representatives of the Porte. That the borders of the *walāyah* were in fact so vague was the result of the inability of the *wāli* to assert his authority over the area assigned to him.

Limiting still further the *wāli*'s area of effective control were the various nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes of northern Syria. Because of the situation of the *walāyah* of Aleppo, its government was faced not only with the Bedouins to the south and southeast, but also with Kurds in the mountains to the north and the Turkomans who wintered in the Amq plain. For each of these peoples Aleppo was a market, either directly or through the medium of the villages in the surrounding areas.

The Turkomans provided the city with sheep, wool, firewood, butter, cheese and carpets, in addition to which they were the principal suppliers of camels and cameleers for caravans between Aleppo and Iskandarūn. In return they bought such necessities as cloth, dyes, guns and all metal objects which their scale of living required. They were also limited consumers of such luxury items as coffee, sweets and jewelry.¹⁴ Kurdish trade was not much different from that of the Turkomans. From their location and the imports to Aleppo therefrom,

¹⁰ John Barker, "Bulletin," 1 September 1804, *SP* 105/129, f. 362v. On Ḥamid Muḥammad Pasha, cf. Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, II, 256-257.

¹¹ Kadri, *Kilis Tarihi*, 63-85.

¹² De Perdriau, "Mémoire [of 1777]," *AE B¹*-94.

¹³ "Exposé" addressed by the consuls of Aleppo to their respective ambassadors at Istanbul, 15 September 1815, *SP* 105/135, ff. 75r.-76r. On Chapān Ūghlu Jalāl-al-Dīn Muḥammad Pasha, cf. Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, II, 80.

¹⁴ John Lewis Burckhardt, *Travels in Syria and the Holy Land* (London: Murray, 1822), Appendix I, 637-638. This is a detailed account of Turkoman life.

they must have been the main suppliers of gálnuts, used in tanning, and beeswax, and it was they perhaps who were the cultivators of tobacco in the region around Killis.¹⁵ Lacking camels, they did not take part in the caravan trade. The Bedouin, on the other hand, were the cameleers *par excellence*, which made them as indispensable to Aleppo's heavily mercantile economy as was that occupation, and the goods purchased with its proceeds, to them.

Yet to these same peoples the commercial activity of the city was a source of income in another way: the rich caravans were a constant temptation for pillage to those for whom a successful looting operation was not only a monetary concern but a matter of prestige in their own community and a testimony of opposition to control from without. Raiding and warring with the government that sought to impose its authority on them was a custom of ancient standing, and ruthless suppression had at best only a temporary dissuasive effect. Aleppo was never free from the danger of Turkoman, Kurdish or Bedouin raiders; rather, a strong government was essential to keep them from the very walls of the city.

The Turkomans were the least troublesome to the Aleppines of the three peoples. They are not mentioned nearly as frequently as are the Kurds and the Bedouin, and it is probable that they were the least numerous. Those in the region of Aleppo were divided into two main tribes, the Rishwân and the Rîhânlu. Both were predominantly sheep nomads, wintering near Aleppo and summering on the Anatolian plateau east of Ankara. The Rîhânlu pastured their flocks in the 'Amq plain and a few, in 1811, engaged in agriculture on the fertile plain during the months that they remained there.¹⁶ The Rishwân had made the plains around the salt lake of Jabbûl their winter pastures until sometime between 1798 and 1811 when they had shifted to the 'Amq plain, for in 1811 John Lewis Burckhardt found them at the latter place,¹⁷ and they are mentioned as having raided the Jabbûl area when the Janisaries and *ashraf* were fighting for control of Aleppo in 1798.¹⁸ Burckhardt implies that the reason for the change of pasturage was the result of a change in tributary relationship. While in the Jabbûl they paid tribute to Rishwân Ūghlu, "the governor of Besna [?] which lies at one day's journey from Aintab."¹⁹ In 1811, however, they like the Rîhânlu,

¹⁵ De Perdriau, "Mémoire [of 1777]," *AE* B¹-94; Jean Sauvaget, *Alep; essai sur le développement d'une grande ville syrienne, des origines au milieu du XIXe siècle* (Paris: Geuthner, 1941), 16.

¹⁶ Burckhardt, *Travels in Syria*, 634. Cf. Robert Mantran and Jean Sauvaget, *Règlements fiscaux ottomans: les provinces syriennes* (Beirut: Institut français de Damas, 1951), 102, and 102, n.1.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 643.

¹⁸ Robert Abbott to Samuel Manesty, 22 April 1798, *SP* 110/53, f. 125r.

¹⁹ *Travels in Syria*, 643.

paid tribute to Chapān Ūghlu Sulaymān Bey, "the powerful governor [*dereh bey*] of the eastern part of Anatolia, who resides at Yuzgat."²⁰

Although they paid tribute in their summer quarters and evidently paid none to the *wāli* of Aleppo, yet while in the *walāyah* of Aleppo they were under the authority of its governor. In 1777 Aḥmad 'Izzat Pasha sent a punitive expedition against them for their depredations against the Aleppo-Iskandarūn caravans and the success of this expedition made possible the renewal of trade.²¹

The tribute relationship of the Kurds, however, is not so clear. The indication is that they paid it to the *wāli* of Aleppo, for the consuls twice refer to payments to him. Both of these instances, however, are toward the end of the period under study. In 1823, the *mutasallim* of Dārandaḥli al-Sayyid Ḥasan Riḍā' Pasha, Aḥmad Bey, was sent against the Kurds near Killis to compel them to pay more than the usual tribute. He was defeated and retired to Killis.²² In 1825 the Kurds demanded a reduction in the usual tribute from Walīd Muḥammad Pasha, who was forced to give in to their demand when the Janissaries of Aleppo refused to march against them.²³ These two events are rather conclusive evidence that the Kurds were paying tribute to the *wāli* of Aleppo, at least after 1820, but it is curious that this is not mentioned in earlier sources nor included in the revenue accounts as such.

There appear to have been no large Kurdish tribes west of the Euphrates. The center of their influence having been considerably farther east, those living near Aleppo can be considered on the fringe. Joseph Louis Rousseau lists and locates six tribes living in the *walāyah* of Aleppo and the sanjak of Aintab: the Bakli, the Mūsa Bakli, the Baraq, the Ūqjah Uzūnli, the Qarah Bīzikli, and the Qiziq.²⁴ Of these the consuls mention only one by name: the Baraq tribe, termed nomadic, aided the inhabitants of Aintab in a revolt against Jalāl-al-Dīn Pasha in 1821.²⁵ If the Baraq were a nomadic tribe, they were the exception, for Burckhardt says that

the Kurds have spread themselves over some parts of the plain [the 'Amq] which the Afrin [Nahr al-'Afrin] waters, as well as some of the neighbouring mountains. They live in tents and in villages, are stationary, and are all occupied in agriculture and the rearing of cattle.²⁶

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 635 and 643. Cf Ḥaydar Aḥmad al-Shihābi, *Lubnān fī 'Ahd al-Umarā' al-Shihābiyyin*, ed. Asad Rustum and Fouad E. Boustany (Beirut: Catholic Press, 1933), 594.

²¹ De Perdriau, "Nouvelles d'Alep," 25 January 1777, *AE B1-94*. On Aḥmad 'Izzat Pasha, cf. Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, I, 268.

²² Barker to Levant Company, 9 May 1823, *SP 105/141*. On Dārandaḥli al-Sayyid Ḥasan Riḍā' Pasha, cf. Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, II, 167.

²³ Matthieu Lesseps to Ministry of Exterior Relations, 30 July 1825, *CCAleph*, XXVIII, f. 117r.

²⁴ Barbié du Bocage, "Notice sur la carte général," *Recueil de Voyages et mémoires*, II, 207-217 and map.

²⁵ Charles Guys to the Baron de Pasquier, 4 May 1821, *CCAleph*, XXVI, f. 65r.

²⁶ *Travels in Syria*, 646.

However sedentary they might have been, these Kurds were constantly raiding the caravans and the villages around Aleppo and the *wālīs* sent many punitive expeditions into the mountains to repress them. Although victory was often claimed, and duly reported by the consuls,²⁷ the very fact that another expedition had soon to be staged indicates that these reprisals did little to daunt the Kurds. The most fearsome aspect of the problem for the *wālīs* must have been the tendency of the Kurds to become allied with the Janissaries, which gave the latter a refuge and the former an assurance that the Janissaries would not attack them. Such an alliance occurred in 1807 and continued until 1811.²⁸ While this alliance might have had at least a temporary dissuasive effect on Kurdish depredation, it gave the Janissaries the upper hand in Aleppo and made the *wālīs* sent by the Porte mere ciphers in their hands.

In the eighteenth century the limit of other than sporadic agriculture was approximately thirty miles southeast of Aleppo. Beyond this limit extended the domain of the Bedouin. Of these there were two principal tribes, the Mawālī and the Ḥadīdī, while beyond them was the great federation of the 'Anazah.²⁹ Direct control of the Bedouin was virtually impossible: when under pressure they could always retire to the desert where the *wālī's* military forces were at their mercy. Khūrshīd Aḥmad Pasha declared war on them in 1818 at a time when the French consul, Charles Guys, was engaged in negotiations with the Bedouin for the purchase of Arab stallions for France. His comment testifies to the efficacy of such measures:

²⁷ The capture and strangling of two Kurdish chiefs in the Payās area: Thomas to Ministry of the Marine, 17 August and 23 October 1770, *AE B¹-90*; the impaling of more than 60 Kurds captured in battle: Louis Alexandre Corancez to Citizen Minister of Exterior Relations, 3 Fructidor Yr. 12/21 August 1804, *CCAlep*, XXIII, f. 213v.; impaling of the principal Kurds of two pillaging bands: Corancez, "Bulletin," April 1808, *CCAlep*, XXIV, f. 35v.

²⁸ Corancez, "Bulletin," 30 August 1807, *CCAlep*, XXIII, f. 417r.; Rousseau, "Nouvième bulletin," entry of 23 October 1811, *CCAlep*, XXIV, f. 417r.

²⁹ There is considerable confusion in the sources as to the number of tribes affecting the *walāyah* of Aleppo. Barbié du Bocage, based on Rousseau's map and notes, lists the following: the Banu Ghurayr, the Faḥl, the Ḥadīdī, the Mawālī, the 'Ukaydāt, and the Sachan, with the 'Anazah confederation beyond the confines of the *walāyah*: "Notice sur la carte générale," *Recueil de voyage et de mémoires*, II, 207-217 and map. (The names are transliterated from the Arabic of Rousseau.) G. A. Olivier speaks of "deux hordes nombreuses d'Arabes bédouins": *Voyage dans l'empire ottoman, l'Égypte et la Perse* (Paris: Agasse, Yr. 9/1800-1801), IV, 169. Robert Abbott, the British agent for the East India Company in Aleppo from 1791 to 1799, in a letter dated 15 August 1796 to his counterpart at Basra, Nathan Crow, mentions three tribes, the 'Anazah, the Mawālī, and the Ḥadīdī: *SP* 110/53. Finally Vital Cuinet lists the 'Anazah, the Mawālī and the Ḥadīdī as occupying the territory of Aleppo in 1891: *La Turquie d'Asie; géographie administrative, statistique, descriptive et raisonnée de chaque province de l'Asie-mineure* (Paris: Leroux, 1891), II, 121. Whatever may have been the exact tribal situation in the *walāyah* of Aleppo, the Bedouin with which the *wālī* had to contend were those mentioned in the text.

La Guerre que notre Pacha Vient de déclarer aux Arabes va les éloigner de notre Ville ou rendre du moins nos relations avec eux plus difficiles, mais comme cet état de choses peut changer d'un moment à l'autre il ne convient pas moins de se mettre en Mesure des bonnes occasions d'acheter qui pourroient se montrer.³⁰

For the same reason it was impossible to levy any tribute from the Bedouin. On the contrary, it was found that the most feasible means to protect the caravan lifeline and the villages was to pay one of the *shaykhs*, or chiefs, to restrain the others. Although the following statement of G. A. Olivier presupposes but two tribes involved, probably the Mawālī and the Ḥadīdi,³¹ it is nevertheless informative on the system employed:

Les Terres incultes, désertes, qui s'étendent à l'orient et au midi d'Alep, sont fréquentées par deux hordes nombreuses d'Arabes bédouins qui se disputent le titre d'*Emir*, que cette ville est dans l'usage d'accorder à l'un des deux chefs. Ce titre est accompagné d'un présent annuel assez considérable, et de la concession de quelques privilèges pour la vente des denrées que ces Arabes envoient au marché.³²

No more information is given regarding these marketing privileges, but concerning the payments there is considerable additional material, which, although conflicting on some points, clarifies the position of the Bedouin vis-à-vis the government. In a memoir to the Ministère de la Marine on the general situation in Aleppo Pierre Petro de Perdriau, the French consul, outlines the customary arrangement:

Il existe dans le Territoire d'Alep plusieurs Tribus d'Arabes Vagabonds. Le Pacha choisi parmi Eux un Chef qui porte le nom de Meraly Bey; Et auquel les Européens donnent communément celui de Prince des Arabes. A Sa nomination ou Confirmation Ce Vizir le fait revêtir d'une Pelisse de Martre; et la ville luy paye une pension de 10.000 piastres. Ce Prince des Arabes est Chargé de defendre les environs d'Alep contre les Incurssions des Arabes du desert.³³

Robert Abbott, in a letter in 1796 to Nathan Crow about the difficulties of maintaining the East India Company's postal route across the desert, gives a slightly different version of the custom of some years prior to that date:

. . . formerly the Pashaw or mutselim at this place, on his entering in to his office, used immediately to take in to his consideration the protection of

³⁰ Guys to the Duc de Richelieu, 30 March 1818, *CC Alep*, XXV, f. 312v. On Khūrshīd Aḥmad Pasha, cf. Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, II, 311. The quotations from French manuscripts are reproduced as written, without editing to correct the numerous errors in orthography.

³¹ At the time of his visit to Aleppo, they were plundering the caravans: Abbott to Nathan Crow, 15 August 1796, *SP* 110/53, f. 93v.

³² Olivier, *Voyage*, IV, 169.

³³ De Perdriau, "Mémoire [of 1777]," *AE B*¹-94.

the environs of Aleppo, that the Commerce and Passengers may be secured from the depredations of the different Tribes of Arabs, . . . and for which purpose he used to appoint one of the more Capable of the muwally arabs, a Prince over them, with an appointment of about Twenty thousand piastres, which was annually paid to him by the Town, and whose business was to Clear the Sourts of Aleppo from all Robbers. . . .³⁴

Our earliest informant reveals that it was the Sublime Porte which made the payment to the 'Prince of the Arabs' and that for the maintenance of his forces he was given the sum of 28 purses, equivalent to 14,000 piasters per annum.³⁵

The title given to the shaykh chosen as the protector of the city and its commerce was probably *al-amīr al-'ālī*, or supreme chief, for De Perdriau calls him the Meraly Bey. The same consul intimates that the office was auctioned,³⁶ but Abbott indicates that he was selected only from among the Mawālī. It is notable that the latter writer, in listing the chieftains in the same letter, while calling the leader of the 'Anazah, al-Shaykh Fāḍil and that of the Ḥadīdi, al-Shaykh Rājib, designated the chief of the Mawālī, Ḥasan Pasha.³⁷ The use of the title 'pasha' may be evidence that the title *al-amīr al-'ālī* also carried the rank of pasha.

If the statement of Pierre Thomas is to be given credence, it was the practice of the Ottoman government to pay for the protection of the *walāyah* from the Bedouin. The quotations from de Perdriau, Olivier, and Abbott, however, attribute the cost to the city. This may be one of many indications of the decline of the central government, for we find that in the year 1757 the *wālī* of Aleppo became the recipient of the money.³⁸ The responsibility for caravan and village security thus devolved solely upon him. To have continued the payments might have avoided trouble with the Bedouin. To stop them was to invite it. In 1765 the *amīr* of the Mawālī seized a caravan coming to Aleppo from Diyār Bakr with 30,000 sheep.

Les Choses en cet Etat le Pacha, le Molha, Cheleby Effendi, et les autres grands d'Alep lui ont expédié dernièrement des lettres par lesquelles ils l'exhortoient a rentrer dans son devoir, on dit que le Prince des Arabes leur a repondu qu'il étoit prêt a restituer les 30 mille Moutons et le Pillage de la Caravanne de Diarbekir, a condition qu'on luy payeroit annuellement les 28. Bourses que la Porte luy donnoit a commencer de cette année et qu'il demanderoit rien des 7. a 8. années qu'il avoit été privé de ces 28. Bourses,

³⁴ Abbott to Crow, 15 August 1796, *SP* 110/53, f. 93v.

³⁵ Thomas to Ministry, 19 February 1765, *AE B*¹-89.

³⁶ De Perdriau, "Mémoire [of 1777]," *AE B*¹-94.

³⁷ Abbott to Crow, 15 August 1796, *SP* 110/53, f. 95r. Prior to the mid-eighteenth century the Mawālī had been the strongest tribe of the Syrian desert and had lived in relative harmony with the Ottoman government: Hourani, "Fertile Crescent," *SI*, VIII (1957), 94.

³⁸ ". . . les Pachas d'Alep avoient trouvé depuis 7. à 8. ans le moyen de Se faire accorder par la porte ces 28. Bourses:" Thomas to Ministry, 19 February 1765, *AE B*¹-89.

on ne Sait point encore Si le Pacha et les autres grands adhereront à Sa demande.³⁹

What finally occurred in this case is not revealed in later letters. Perhaps the Porte in following years ceased the payment to the *wāli*, expecting him to collect it from the city. Certainly that officer would avoid payment whenever he could sufficiently intimidate the Bedouin, but one must assume that this was not frequently the case. Al-Ḥājj Ibrāhīm Agha Qaṭṭār Aghāsi (later a pasha) was in 1796 both *mutasallim* and *muḥaṣṣil*, or collector of taxes, and one of the wealthiest personalities in the city

. . . but as he is so Excessive fond of money, that he neglects ever object of Security of the Town, that he may advance his own Interest, by putting all in to his own treasury and Consequently the Twenty thousand Piasters which ought to have been paid to the Prince of the Arabs has not been paid him for these [three] or four years past, which has made that Prince regardless of his office and by that means, the muwally Arabs [who] inhabit Zor . . . , and the Hadidine Arabs finding no opposition from the part of the Government, have begun to plunder the Caravan passengers, etc. whenever they run meet with them, and lately they Carried of Eighteen Camels belonging to the muhasil [Ibrāhīm Agha himself] with some others belonging to the Janissaries of Aleppo, which were grazing about four hours distant from this place, this obliged the muhasil to go after them with four or five hundred men, but without the least Effect, the Camels are forever lost.⁴⁰

Ibrāhīm Agha evidently mastered the Bedouin by some means, however, for Burckhardt relates that "in the time of Ibrāhīm Pasha, the neighbourhood of Aleppo to the distance of four or five hours was kept in perfect security from all hostile inroads of the Arabs, by the Pasha's cavalry guard. . . ."⁴¹

The most elusive but attractive method employed by *wālis* against the Bedouin or, for that matter, against any refractory group, was to capitalize on either personal or group rivalries. It was attractive in that it was inexpensive, but it was difficult to achieve because at least in principle all groups were against the *wāli* as the symbol of established authority.⁴² The delicate artifice of playing upon rivalries was apparently doubly employed by Rāghib Muḥammad Pasha in 1811 as he sought to re-establish the Porte's authority in the *walāyah* of Aleppo.

A few months before his arrival peace had been made between the Aleppines and the Mawāli,⁴³ by an alliance between the Janissaries and the tribe, for the Janissaries were in complete control of the city. It

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Abbott to Crow, 15 August 1796, *SP* 110/53, f. 93v. On al-Ḥājj Ibrāhīm Pasha Qaṭṭār Aghāsi, cf. Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, I, 149.

⁴¹ Burckhardt, *Travels in Syria*, 655.

⁴² A possible exception were the *a'yān*. See *infra*, 34-36.

⁴³ Rousseau, "Bulletin," 12 July 1811, *CCAleph*, XXIV, f. 368v.

was this combination of the Janissaries, the Mawālī, and the Kurds⁴⁴ that Rāghib Pasha sought to split by inviting the *amīr* of the Mawālī to Aleppo and loading him with honors. This *amīr*, by the name of Genj, was the son of the powerful Amīr Muḥammad al-Khurfān who is reputed to have had 30,000 cavalry at his disposal and to have ravaged the environs of Hama some thirty years previously.⁴⁵ Genj, famous for his strength, courage and raiding ability,⁴⁶ was a worthy successor of his father. But his son, Muḥammad, lacking this character, appeared more tractable,⁴⁷ so Rāghib Pasha ordered Genj executed and appointed Muḥammad in his place.⁴⁸ The immediate effect was as desired: two shaykhs of the 'Anazah confederation came to pay their respects and to offer Rāghib Pasha 18,000 horsemen ready to march on order; the Janissaries, seeing their ally struck down, were intimidated.⁴⁹ But Rāghib Pasha was ultimately deluded. When he provoked a battle with the Janissaries, the promised 'Anazah support failed to materialize and he was defeated. It is surprising that under the circumstances Rāghib Pasha should have mounted an expedition against the rebels Ṭūpāl 'Ali and Muḥammad Sa'īd Agha of Jisr al-Shughr and Arīḥa respectively, expecting the 'Anazah cavalry to join him. When they did not appear, he nevertheless forced the issue and was defeated once again.⁵⁰ It is not too much to assume that given the general tenor of relations between the *wālis* of Aleppo and the Bedouin and given the assassination of Genj,⁵¹ the 'Anazah shaykhs in their abandonment of Rāghib Pasha were merely revenging the death of one who in relation to the *wālī* was their ally, although they were otherwise opponents.

Events in the second and third decades of the nineteenth century indicate a progressive deterioration of effective control over the Bedouin. Payment for protection, it is likely, became sporadic, for Charles Guys stresses the fact that in 1816 the 'Anazah had to be bought off by Jalāl-al-Dīn Pasha.⁵² This letter from Guys contains another significant statement: the 'Anazah had seized the Antioch caravan.⁵³ Their raiding therefore was no longer confined to the southeastern approaches of the

⁴⁴ *Supra*, 8.

⁴⁵ Shihābi, *Lubnān*, 584; Volney, *Voyage*, II, 161; Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 234.

⁴⁶ Rousseau, "Douzième bulletin," entry of 16 April 1812, *CCAleph*, XXV, f. 59r.

⁴⁷ Shihābi, *Lubnān*, 584, where it is also stated that an affair of honor was the cause of a feud between the 'Anazah and the Mawālī.

⁴⁸ Rousseau, "Douzième bulletin," entries of 16 April and 20 April 1812, *CCAleph*, XXV, f. 59v.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, ff. 59v. and 60r.

⁵⁰ Shihābi, *Lubnān*, 581; Rousseau, "Quinzième bulletin," entries of 18 July and 21 July 1812, *CCAleph*, XXV, ff. 64v-65r.

⁵¹ The receipt of the head of the Amīr Genj at the Porte is mentioned in a *khatt-i humāyūn*, or imperial rescript, published in: Cemal Tukin, "Mahmud II. Devrinde Halep İsyanı," *Tarih Vesikaları*, I, (1941), 257.

⁵² Guys to the Duc de Richelieu, 10 July 1816, *CCAleph*, XXV, f. 187r.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

city, but this activity could be extended to its western dependencies as well.

The relationship of the *wāli* of Aleppo to the Bedouin in the period as a whole can be summarized by pointing out a very definite trend: whereas there was initially an arrangement by which a degree of control was normally exercised over the Bedouin, by the end of the period this had vanished and the *wāli* attempted either repression or only temporarily effective bribery. One of the reasons for this trend and its acceleration in the latter part of the period can be found in the growing power of the Wahhābi movement in Arabia which forced the 'Anazah northward.⁵⁴ They in turn pressed upon the Mawālī and the Ḥadīdi. While in the last decade of the eighteenth century and the first of the nineteenth most references in the sources are to the Mawālī, in the second and third decades of the nineteenth one finds the 'Anazah increasingly mentioned. Before discussing a second basic reason the full picture of the disruptive elements in the *walāyah* of Aleppo must be given. A further group existed, different in quality from the Turkomans, the Kurds and the Bedouin, but no less destructive of security: the discharged troops of the *wāli*.

Every *wāli* had at his disposal a force of cavalry to keep order in the province and of infantry to police the city. These troops, called *dalis* and *tufinkjis* respectively,⁵⁵ were in the pay of the *wāli* himself and their number varied according to his means and needs. In referring to these brigands, the consuls called them "Capsis" or "Kabsisis," which Jean Sauvaget interpreted as a corruption of the Turkish word *chāpqi* meaning a marauding raid or 'razzia.'⁵⁶ This seems to be a forced and tenuous interpretation in view of the fact that the consuls gave an indication of what they meant by calling them "disbanded soldiers called Kabsisis."⁵⁷ There can be little doubt that "Capsis" and "Kabsisis" are phonetic transliterations of the Turkish word *qapūsuz* in a colloquial form, which by its meaning of "unemployed" fits much more closely the translation "disbanded soldiers."

Not infrequently the remaining active *dalis* had little success in defeating or driving off these *qapūsuz*. In 1760 the *wāli* lost about 100 men killed and several captured but later released. The brigands then combined with the Bedouin to raid the neighbourhood of Hama, driving

⁵⁴ In 1807 Su'ūd ibn-'Abd-al-'Azīz and his Wahhābis plundered 'Āna and Dayr al-Zūr: Alois Musil, *The Middle Euphrates; a Topographical Itinerary* (New York: American Geographical Society, 1927), 3, n.3. It was the advance of the 'Anazah which led to the decline of the Mawālī: Hourani, "Fertile Crescent," *SI*, VIII (1957), 94-95.

⁵⁵ See *infra*, 22-24, for the definitions of these terms. The concern here is only with those who were discharged.

⁵⁶ Sauvaget, *Alep*, 194, n. 711.

⁵⁷ Abbott to Crow, 15 August 1796, *SP* 110/53. "Capsis" are referred to in: Thomas to Ministry, 1 May 1760, 13 March 1761, *AE* B¹-88; De Perdriau, "Nouvelles," 10 April 1776, 17 May 1776, *AE* B¹-93.

off the sheep and cattle in pasture.⁵⁸ In the following year the *wālī* of Aleppo died and all his troops were therefore automatically discharged. In the interregnum *qapūsuz* and Arabs plundered the environs of the city.⁵⁹ After the Russo-Turkish war of 1768-1774 the returning *wālīs* discharged many of their personal troops but then had to turn and fight them when they massed together and ravaged southern Turkey. The remainder of this force, numbering some 800 to 1000 men, entered the *walāyah* of Aleppo and caused consternation among the *a'yān*. The *mutasallim* engaged them but lost 150 men and was himself captured.⁶⁰ A month later the new *wālī* went out against them with five thousand men and three cannon, but the *qapūsuz* retired without giving battle.⁶¹

A graphic description of the ruin that these former troops created is given by Thomas :

Le Pacha . . . ayant licencié environ quatre cents hommes à Cheval de Ses Troupes ces Gens-là commencèrent a courir le Pais et commettre une infinité de desordres dans les environs et même Jusques aux Portes d'Alep . . . personne n'osoit Sortir, Ils allèrent dans un village appelé Sphiré [Safirah] qui est à 6. lieuës d'icy à l'Entrée du desert où ils tuerent tous les hommes et violerent beaucoup de femmes [et] filles et brulerent ensuite ce village, et un [autre] a quelque distance de là, le Pacha tint [plusieurs] Conseils pour aviser aux moyens de répr . . . [réprimer] l'audace et les excès de cette Canaille, à [laquelle] s'étoient joints encore trois à quatre cents hommes, et on ne trouva pas de meilleur expédient que d'envoyer des Troupes [contr'eux] à la Tête desquelles le Kiaya et plusieurs Agas se mirent, ils Joignirent à environ huit [lieuës] d'icy les Rebelles dans un village où ils [s'étoient] renfermés, le Kiaya fit entourer ce village par ses Troupes, les rebelles firent une Sortie où elles furent fort malmennées et où elles auroient été infailliblement defaites Si dans le moment Il ne leur étoit arrivé un Secours de cent cinquante hommes qui prirent les rebelles en flanc et les obligerent de rentrer dans le village, et ne leur restant plus ni poudre ni Plomb, Ils furent forcés de l'abandonner et de Se Sauver comm'ils purent, on n'en pût prendre que Seize auxquels le Kiaya fit Sur le Champ couper la Tête qui furent apportées le 25 du mois passé Sur des piques et exposés dans la Cour du Serail du Pacha, on tira à cette occasion quelques Coups de Canon qui sont dans cette même Cour et le Pacha fit de grands Largesses au Kiaya, aux Agas, et aux Troupes qui avoient été employées dans cette expédition, on dit que les Rebelles Se Sont enfuis dans les Montagnes des Kurdes, Dieu veuille qu'ils ne fassent pas quelque nouvelle éxcurtion.⁶²

The magnitude of the celebration and the long discussions on the measures to be taken against these *qapūsuz* well indicate the gravity of the situation, and the fact that the rebels fled to the Kurdish mountains

⁵⁸ Thomas to Ministry, 1 May 1760, *AE B*¹-88.

⁵⁹ Thomas to Ministry, 13 March 1761, *AE B*¹-88.

⁶⁰ De Perdriau, "Nouvelles," 10 April and 19 April 1776, *AE B*¹-93.

⁶¹ De Perdriau, "Nouvelles," 17 May 1776, *AE B*¹-93.

⁶² Thomas to Ministry, 1 March 1763, *AE B*¹-89.

may be substantiation for Constantine F. C. Volney's assertion that the *dalis* were composed of Turkomans, Kurds and Qarahmānlis.⁶³

It is curious that after the eighteenth century one finds no reference to *qapūsuz* under that name. Thereafter all references are to "Arnaouts" or Albanians.⁶⁴ It is apparent from the references to these Arnāwūd in the sources⁶⁵ that they were not quite the same as *dalis*, but might have been *tufinkjis*, their infantry counterpart. It may be that as the Albanians displaced the Kurds and Turkomans in the composition of the personnel of these troops so *arnāwūd* replaced *qapūsuz* as the term denoting those discharged from the *wāli*'s service.

Against the spoliation of marauding Bedouin, Turkomans, Kurds and *qapūsuz* the villagers had no defense. Their communities being too dispersed and too small for self-preservation, the responsibility for protection was imposed on the city whose prosperity they supported. That in former times the marketing center could acquit this responsibility to mutual benefit is obvious from the numerous archaeological remains of the Byzantine period located between Aleppo and Antioch: they attest to a prosperous cereal and viniculturist economy. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, however, the necessary strong government was lacking, the plunderers were only momentarily checked by armed reprisals or monetary reprieves, and the villages suffered accordingly. The rapid decline of the Aleppo marketing area is frequently remarked upon by contemporary travellers: William Eton, writing about 1797 says that "fifty or sixty years ago were counted forty large villages in the neighbourhood [of Aleppo], all built of stone; their ruins remain, but not a single peasant dwells in them."⁶⁶ William G. Browne, who visited Aleppo in the same year, makes the contrast somewhat more striking by broadening the period:

The villages are so much deserted, that, in the neighbourhood of Aleppo, for instance, where within the present century stood three hundred villages, there now remain no more than ten or twelve.⁶⁷

Other quotations in the same sense, but equally vague as to either period or scope, can be found among the voyagers and the consuls,⁶⁸ but perhaps the most impressive of all are the figures given by Volney:

⁶³ Constantine F. C. Volney, *Voyage en Egypte et en Syrie* (Paris: Parmantier et Froment, 1825), II, 42.

⁶⁴ Corancez to M. Parandier, chargé d'affaires at Istanbul, 10 Brumaire Yr. 14/ 1 November 1805, *CCAleph*, XXIII, f. 290v.

⁶⁵ Corancez, "Bulletin des nouvelles," 24 Vendémiaire Yr. 13/16 October 1804; "Bulletin," 11 October 1807, *CCAleph*, XXIII, ff. 224r. and 436 v.; Barker to Captain Edward Stephenson, 10 July 1804, *SP* 105/129, f. 354r.

⁶⁶ *A Survey of the Turkish Empire*, 2nd edition (London: Cadell and Davies, 1799), 276.

⁶⁷ *Travels in Africa, Egypt, and Syria, from the Year 1792-1798* (London: Cadell and Davies, 1799), 399.

⁶⁸ Russell, *Natural History of Aleppo*, II, 338-339; Olivier, *Voyage*, IV, 190; the Deputies and Merchants composing the French 'nation' at Aleppo to De

. . . sur les anciens *daftar* ou registres d'impôts on lui comptait plus de trois mille deux cents villages; aujourd'hui le collecteur en réalise à peine quatre cents.⁶⁹

This *daftar*, based on a cadastral survey, undoubtedly included villages no longer belonging to the *walāyah* of Aleppo, but this does not detract from the point contained in these statistics: there was a marked decline in the number of villages in the market area of Aleppo and a consequent decline in the prosperity of the region, for these villages provided Aleppo with such basic items of consumption or trade as grain, vegetables, cotton, olives and pistachios, just as the peasants were, in turn, the consumers of the products of the urban artisans.

A number of the authors cited above speculated on the reasons for this abandonment of villages. Eton stressed the plague as the fundamental cause,⁷⁰ and the frequent incidence of this disease, as recorded in Russell⁷¹ and Kāmil ibn-Ḥusayn ibn-Muḥammad al-Pāli al-Ghazzi⁷² in no way discount this factor, but it is more applicable to the depopulation of the congested city. Browne more nearly approaches the true causes:

. . . this depopulation of the villages swells the cities and towns, not indeed in the same proportion, but still with a rising tide. The causes seem to be, 1. In the cities the modes of gaining a livelihood are more multifarious, and small or no capital is required, whereas in agriculture it is indispensable. 2. In the cities the property is not tangible, so to speak; it is veiled from the eye of the government, so as to be safe from the excessive exactions imposed on the peasants, whose property is of the most unwieldy and self-apparent description. The peasantry, both in Syria and in Egypt, are not *Villani*, but as free as any class of men; and it happens unfortunately, that even a good governor cannot sufficiently protect them, for he must either resign, or pay the usual tributes at the Porte. Money he must have, and the modern ministerial arts, of diving into the most secret recesses of property, being there unknown, he of course taxes that which is most apparent, and the most difficult to remove.⁷³

The necessary, and often unnecessary, avidity of the *wāli* was without doubt one of the most pressing reasons for the in-migration of the peasants, and the more that did so, the more difficult it became for those remaining behind, for, as Olivier says,

Perdriau, 6 September 1775, *AE B¹-93*; De Perdriau, "Mémoire" [of 1777], *AE B¹-94*; Antoine de Jucherau de Saint-Denys, *Révolutions de Constantinople en 1807 et 1808* (Paris: Brissot-Thivars, 1819), I, 134, n. 1.

⁶⁹ *Voyage*, II, 44.

⁷⁰ *Survey*, 276.

⁷¹ 1719, 1729, 1733, 1742, 1743, 1744, 1760, 1761, 1762, and 1787: *Natural History of Aleppo*, II, 336-338.

⁷² 1685, 1691, 1719, 1721, 1733, 1760, 1762, 1786, and 1814: *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 291, 292, 295, 302, 303, 309, and 320.

⁷³ *Travels*, 399. The reasoning apparent in this passage is of a caliber not found among other travellers of the period.

. . . le pacha exige les mêmes rétributions, et oblige ceux qui restent de payer pour ceux qui se sont enfuis : d'où il suit que tous les habitants disparaissent bientôt, et que le village est à jamais abandonné.⁷⁴

The *wāli* of Aleppo was not, however, the collector of the taxes for the *walāyah*; they were farmed to a *muḥaṣṣil*, an unusual characteristic of this province.⁷⁵ The "rétributions" mentioned in the above quotation were rather in the form of *avanas*, the result of fabricated injuries or complaints, which were continually aimed at the weaker elements by the *wāli* or any other official as a means of supplementing his revenues. It was natural that the villages would suffer frequently from such *avanas*, the burden of which, distributed proportionally among the families, gradually brought many to the verge of bankruptcy, forced them to leave the land, and to seek refuge in the anonymity of the city or among the brigands of the mountains. As this process, repeated over and over, destroyed villages, it set in motion an ever-accelerating spiral of decline: the *wāli*, unable to exact a sufficient amount to cover the cost of the *walāyah* and his normal and luxurious expenses, would cut down the number of *dalis*, thus leaving the villages more exposed and more of a temptation to plunderers. They, in turn, sapped the economic strength of the villages and thus indirectly that of Aleppo. The accumulated impoverishment reflected once more on the revenue of the officials. A strong and beneficial governor might alter this trend for a time, but this was all too infrequently the case.

One might add, therefore, to the reasons given by Eton and Browne for the abandonment of the villages the factor of the depredations of Kurds, Turkomans, Bedouin and *qapūsuz*. These, coupled with *avanas*, which were no more than a more acceptable form of plundering, were the basic causes for the depopulation of the rural districts. Depopulation led directly to a greater restriction of the area of the *wāli*'s effective control, for as the land became less inhabited, the brigand bands extended the scope of their search for remunerative targets, often even to the very suburbs of Aleppo.

⁷⁴ *Voyage*, I, 309.

⁷⁵ Volney, *Voyage*, II, 39.

CHAPTER II

OTTOMAN OFFICIALDOM IN ALEPPO

In order to administer effectively its far-flung empire, the Ottoman government relied on the principle of forming provinces that were financially self-supporting with a surplus payable to the central government, that possessed sufficient troops for internal order and for the needs of the campaigns of the empire, and that were largely self-governing under a *wāli*. The theme was thus decentralization; implicit within this decentralization was the danger of the governor transforming autonomy into independence. In order to prevent any such occurrence, the Porte resorted to frequent transferrals of *wālis* and to the appointment of officials independent of the *wāli* in certain areas of provincial administration. The role of these officials was to act as a check upon the acquisition by the *wāli* of the bases of personal power.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the *wālis*, generally called *beylerbeys*, were chosen for the most part from the ranks of the *qapū-qūlis*, the servants of the sultan converted at an early age to Islam and indoctrinated with unswerving loyalty to their master. In view of this background and the consequent lack of any unity of interest with the upper classes of the provincial populace, the *wālis* were effectively checked by the independent officials in the administration. In addition, there was the body of *a'yān* who formed the divan or consultative council of the *wāli* and represented the interests of the provincial populace.¹ The existence of this council is perhaps proof of the gulf between the governor and the governed.

But in the eighteenth century, the *devshirmeh* system having been allowed to lapse,² the *wālis* came to be drawn from the upper provincial classes. Intransigent loyalty to the sultan was lost through their association with the interests of the *a'yān* and a certain subordination to those of the ulema. While the effectiveness of the separation of administrative responsibilities in the province was not entirely annulled, it was certainly hampered and was often insufficient to prevent the rise of *wālis* considerably more independent of the Porte than was desired. It was therefore incumbent on the central government to find additional means of curbing the *wālis*. It seems indubitable that rivalries between provincial officials were, if not encouraged, permitted, and it is certain that where there were local political factions, such as the Janissaries and

¹ *Infra*, 34-36.

² The *devshirmeh* was the Ottoman system of the periodic recruitment of unmarried male children from the Christian communities for conversion to Islam and training for state service: cf. V. L. Ménage, "Devshirme," *EI*².

ashrāf in Aleppo, their opposition to the *wālī's* rule and attempts to arrogate it to themselves were not looked upon with particular disfavor so long as the fiction of the Porte's predominance was maintained. In general, therefore, one may consider the policy of the Ottoman government as one of expediency. Preoccupied with wars against Russia, Austria and France and with more serious uprisings in the Balkans, Arabia and Istanbul, continually embarrassed by shortage of money, and reluctant to advertise its lack of interior cohesion by mounting a concerted and powerful attack against recalcitrant subjects, the Porte would take advantage of any local dissensions to prevent any one individual from maintaining his authority over a period of time.³

This chapter will deal with the various governmental officials resident in Aleppo whom the harassed Porte balanced against one another in the hope of minimizing in so far as possible any wayward tendencies on their part. For the sake of clarity these officials may be divided into four basic groups: the *wālī* and the officers under him who dealt with matters of provincial administration in general and those of criminal justice; the *muḥaṣṣil*, responsible for the collection of taxes; the *qādi*, together with the mufti, who were primarily concerned with matters of civil justice and offenses against the Shari'ah; and the sirdar and *dizdār*, military commanders responsible for the troops of the Porte not directly under the command of the *wālī*. The officials of the first three groups will be discussed in this chapter. The sirdar and *dizdār*, having been a part of the Janissary organization, will be treated in chapter III.

The *wilāyah* of Aleppo was a post of great prestige in the Ottoman empire, for among its *wālīs* were at least four that had been grand vizirs and four that were raised to the grand vizirate from the *wilāyah* of Aleppo or very shortly thereafter.⁴ Therefore, the *wilāyah* carried with it the rank of vizir, pasha of three *ṭuġhs*, or horsetails. Those who were appointed to the *wilāyah* of Aleppo having only two *ṭuġhs*, or the rank of *beylerbey* or *mür-mürān* of Rumelia, were raised to the rank of three *ṭuġhs*.⁵ One exception to this exists: when in 1770 the

³ Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 200-201, 217.

⁴ The *wālīs* of Aleppo who had been grand vizirs were: 'Abd-Allāh Pasha al-Farāri, *wālī* in 1760: Ahmad Wāṣif Effendi, *Maḥāsīn al-Āihār wa-Ḥaqāyiq al-Akhbār* (Cairo: Būlāq, 1246/1830-1831), I, 125. (Hereinafter cited according to its more usual designation as Wāṣif, *Tārīkh*.) Muṣṭafa Pasha, *wālī* in 1761-1763: *ibid.*, 147; Yūsuf Diyā'-al-Dīn Pasha, *wālī* in 1808-1809: Ahmad Jawdat Pasha, *Tārīkh-i Jawdat*, 2nd edition (Istanbul: Ottoman Press, 1309/1891-1892), IX, 114; and Khūrshīd Pasha, *wālī* from 1817-1820: *ibid.*, XI, 47. Those raised to the grand vizirate were: Muṣṭafa Pasha in 1763: Wāṣif, *Tārīkh*, I, 147-148; Yāghliqī Zādah Muḥammad Amin Pasha in 1768: *ibid.*, II, 27; Silāhdār Hamzah Pasha in 1768, a year after he had left Aleppo: Thomas to Ministry, 24 September 1768, *AE B¹-90*; and Yūsuf Diyā'-al-Dīn Pasha in 1809: Jawdat, *Tārīkh*, IX, 52.

⁵ The instances of the *wālī* being raised to the rank of vizir were: Muḥammad Pasha in 1766: Thomas to Ministry, 20 February 1766, *AE B¹-90*; Ibrāhīm Pasha in 1777: De Perdriau, "Nouvelles," 10 September 1777, *AE B¹-94*; 'Azam Zādah Yūsuf Pasha in 1781: Jawdat, *Tārīkh*, II, 156-157; Muḥammad Pasha ibn-Ibrāhīm Pasha Qaṭṭār Aghāsi in 1804; Barker to Stephenson, 10 July 1804, *SP* 105/129; Muḥammad Sarūri Pasha in 1809: Jawdat, *Tārīkh*, IX, 114.

ashrāf revolted against the *mutasallim* and drove him out of the city, 'Abd-al-Rahmān Pasha, the *muhāfiḡ*, or warden, of Baylān and a *mīr-mīrān*, was appointed *qā'im-maqām*, or deputy for the *wāli*, and ordered to put down the revolt.⁶ On his successful completion of this mission,

ce Gouverneur, par une lettre recue dernièrement du Grand Vizir, apprend que la Porte luy a Conferé [le] Pachalik d'Alep, avec Permission de jouir des honneurs attribués aux Pachas à trois queues, quoyqu'il n'en possede que deux.⁷

This extraordinary arrangement may well have been dictated by political necessity.⁸

In addition to the prestige of the vizirate, the honors of that post consisted of the privilege of having a resplendent and full retinue, and of having the military band play twice daily before his palace.⁹ On the arrival of a vizir in Aleppo, the citadel greeted him with eleven salutes from its cannon.¹⁰ Presumably a *mīr-mīrān* received fewer or none at all. An additional honor which a *wāli* received was that of being met outside of the city and escorted into it in ceremonious procession; but the character of this procession was in great degree determined by the reputation of the *wāli* and the existing political considerations. The new governor might assess the notables favorable to him or seeking his assistance by whether or not they went out to greet him. For instance, in 1811, when Rāghib Pasha was approaching Aleppo which was then in the control of the Janissaries, he was met by the *a'yān* and the *muḥaṣṣil* Jābiri Effendi and escorted to the *maydān*, the camping ground just outside the city walls. There he was entertained at a feast by the Jābiri brothers currying his favor and met by the former vizirs, abu-Marāq Pasha and 'Abd-Allāh Pasha, both of whom were living in exile in the city and no doubt desirous that a good report of their conduct be sent to the Porte. But the Janissary *āghas* were conspicuous by their absence which presaged the conflicts to come.¹¹

But leaving aside the question of the prestige of one *wāli* as against another, no official held the same prestige in Aleppo as that of the *wāli* whether or not he had a good or bad reputation among the people. He more than anyone else was the "Shadow of the Sultan" and this was entirely due to his position and duties in the administration of the Ottoman province.

⁶ De Perdriau to De Praslin, 7 November 1770, *AE B¹-91*.

⁷ De Perdriau to De Praslin, 26 February 1771, *AE B¹-91*.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ De Perdriau, "Relation de ce qui s'est passé au sujet de l'expulsion d'Ali Pacha, gouverneur d'Alep," 22-28 December 1775, *AE B¹-93*. This account indicates in a negative fashion the honors which a vizir enjoyed by relating how 'Ali Pasha was drummed out of Aleppo after a successful revolt of the populace against him.

¹⁰ Thomas to Ministry, 22 April 1767, *AE B¹-90*.

¹¹ Rousseau, "Neuvième bulletin," entry of 13 October 1811, *CC.Alep*, XXIV, f. 415v.

Because of its all-pervasive quality, the single most important duty of the *wāli* was the maintenance of law and order both in the *walāyah* and in the city. It was also a most difficult task to acquit in spite of the broad powers he held. Generally he could summarily execute alleged malfactors without recourse to the central government. Numerous examples of the use of this power exist, and a few may be cited.

In 1765, under the rule of Şünbāt Zādah Muḥammad Pasha,¹² the people massed on the *maḥkamah*, or court of justice, in complaint over the lack of bread. The *qāḍi* escaped to the *wāli* who ordered out the sirdar and his forces to disperse the crowd. Two men were taken as ring-leaders, and the *wāli* ordered them hung immediately. This heavy-handed justice brought order once again to the city.¹³ Again in 1780, the *wāli* ordered the execution of three men who had robbed a Jew in the quarter of Bāb al-Naṣr, one of the more tumultuous sections of Aleppo.¹⁴

But perhaps the most notable examples of summary executions occurred at times when Aleppo was particularly restless and there can be little doubt that the Porte, if it did not order the executions, condoned them on being informed of the general situation. Jalāl-al-Dīn Pasha, having been commanded to restore order after the failure of Rāghib Pasha to do so,¹⁵ arrived in Aleppo in 1813 and shortly thereafter began a reign of terror in which many of the principal Janissaries were executed at one time through a ruse. Many others suffered the same fate during his rule. The English consul, John Barker, is quoted as having written of these executions:

Our Pasha put to death two innocent persons, because he began to fear a popular insurrection, and thought it necessary to inspire terror by fresh examples of his cruelty and power.

On the first day of his arrival here, before he had any power over the Janissaries, he walked through the streets *incognito*, followed by an executioner, with the express deliberate design of cutting off the heads of a few wretched shopkeepers, as a thing of authority in a new Government. Five innocent victims were seized (not selected), on frivolous prettexts, in the different quarters of the city, and murdered in cold blood before him!

Can one be charmed by the artificial and perfidious smiles of such a monster on a visit of ceremony? For my part, although I know there is no danger of my being decapitated too, I cannot help feeling a kind of involuntary horror and shudder as long as the audience lasts.¹⁶

¹² For a short biography of this *wāli*, cf. Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, IV, 254.

¹³ Thomas to Ministry, 30 September 1765, *AE B*¹-89.

¹⁴ Muḥammad Rāghib al-Ṭabbākh, *I'lām al-Nubalā' bi-Ta'riḫ-i Ḥalab al-Shahbā'* (Aleppo: Maronite Press, 1923-1926), III, 367.

¹⁵ Shāni Zādah Muḥammad 'Atā'-Allāh Effendi, *Ta'riḫ-i Shāni Zādah* (Istanbul: Hawāḍith Press, n.d.), II, 207-208.

¹⁶ Uncited letter by John Barker in Edward B. Barker, *Syria and Egypt under the Last Five Sultans* (London: Tinsley, 1876), I, 141-142. The style resembles that of Barker's letters.

Arab historians of this period cite this *wālī's* cruelty to demonstrate the misrule of the Ottoman governors¹⁷ but the attitude of the government toward the executions may best be gleaned from Aḥmad Jawdat's account of the activities of certain Aleppines prior to the 1819 revolt:

[Jalāl-al-Dīn Pasha having executed] through a ruse eighteen of the wicked leaders of Aleppo, comparative quiet came to the city. But it was not long before there again came into existence both within and without Aleppo a group of rebels and again order and the control of affairs deserted its streets. The Aleppines were once more in need of chastisement. Taking the bit firmly in their teeth, opposing the government, and accepting and hiding in the city a group of outlaws, they were increasing the blackness [of the situation] and laying the foundations for depravity.¹⁸

Grounds certainly existed for such repressive measures as were taken by Jalāl-al-Dīn Pasha against the Janissaries, but there was no specific safeguard that the power of summary execution would not be abused. Occasionally, however, when a *wālī* stepped beyond the limits of repression deemed suitable by the Porte to the circumstances, he would be punished. Such an instance occurred in 1775 when the Aleppines, after suffering from the misrule of Ibrāhīm Pasha Zādah Muḥammad Pasha, whose cruelties and avarice struck all classes,¹⁹ finally rose against his successor, Chatāljahli 'Ali Pasha, and ignominiously ejected him from the city after his conduct proved to be even more detrimental to the populace than that of his predecessor. In the face of petitions by the notables²⁰ and the accounting at the *maḥkamah* that 'Ali Pasha had managed to amass fourteen hundred purses, or 700,000 piasters, in four and a half months by means of his extortions,²¹ the Porte condoned the popular uprising.²²

The authority of the *wālī* over the lives of those living in the *walāyah* was, moreover, limited in another fashion: he had to petition the Porte for any judgment against another official or individual in a high station.²³ Thus we find that the *qāḍī* of Aleppo was deposed in 1764

¹⁷ E.g., Muḥammad Kurd 'Ali, *Khiṭaṭ al-Shām* (Damascus: al-Ḥadīthah Press, 1925-1928), III, 33; Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, III, 375-376.

¹⁸ Jawdat, *Ta'riḥ*, XI, 36.

¹⁹ De Perdriau to De Sartine, 19 May 1775, *AE B¹-93*. Ibrāhīm Pasha Zādah Muḥammad Pasha is not found in Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, under that name, but he is probably to be identified with the Muḥammad Pasha whose biography is given in Thurayya, IV, 260. If so, the fact that he had to make good the *miri* debt of his father may be a reasonable explanation of his avarice: *ibid.*

²⁰ De Perdriau to St. Priest, 4 January 1776, *AE B¹-93*.

²¹ De Perdriau, "Relation de l'expulsion d'Aly Pacha," Appendix of 4 January 1776, *AE B¹-93*.

²² *Infra*, 112-113. The biography of Chatāljahli 'Ali Pasha is given in Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, III, 547. Thurayya says that he was deprived of his vizirate as a result of his misconduct in Aleppo, but the dates appear to be incorrect.

²³ Russell, *Natural History of Aleppo*, II, 316, n. 2.

on the plea of the *wāli* and *a'yān*²⁴ and again that Rāghib Pasha petitioned the Porte for the execution of Muḥammad Pasha abu-Marāq, the former *wāli* of Jaffa living in exile in Aleppo, because he was siding with those opposing Rāghib Pasha. A *khaṣṣaki* was therefore sent from Istanbul to execute abu-Marāq and bring his head to the Porte.²⁵

For the task of maintaining order within the *walāyah* the *wāli* had two corps of troops to assist him, cavalry and infantry. The first of these corps was responsible for the countryside and was called the corps of *dalis*.²⁶ The *dalis* were recruited largely from Kurds, Turkomans and Qarahmānlis,²⁷ and their corps was divided into *bayrāqs*, or flags, each theoretically composed of twenty-four troopers.²⁸ In actuality, because its *bulūk bāshi*, or section commander, received for distribution the pay of the troopers, ten piasters per month each plus a horse and its fodder,²⁹ the *bulūk bāshi* expropriated much of the money for his own purposes so the *bayrāqs* were seldom composed of more than ten or twelve *dalis*.³⁰

The principal tasks of the *dalis* were to maintain the security of the roads and to collect the *mīri*, or royal revenue, from the villages.³¹ As demonstrated above, these troops were highly unsuccessful in the former task³² and the same judgment might well be passed on all their activities. This is hardly surprising since they were a completely mercenary corps,

²⁴ Thomas to Ministry, 13 June 1764, *AE B1-89*.

²⁵ Rousseau, "Dix-septième bulletin," entry of 21 November 1812, *CC Alep*, XXV, f. 79r.; Shāni Zādah, *Tārīkh*, II, 163; Jawdat, *Tārīkh*, X, 87.

²⁶ The original word of which *dali* is a corruption is the Arabic *dalīl*, or guide. Shāni Zādah reveals this derivation through his use of it in the original form: *Tārīkh*, II, 220. This reconstruction of the word is confirmed by İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, "Deli," *IA* and by Mehmet Zeki Pakalın, *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü* (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1946-), I, 420-422. Both describe the *dalis* in considerable detail. A. N. Poliak refers to the corps as "*dulāt* (sing. *dālī*[*bāsh*]):" *Feudalism in Egypt, Syria, Palestine, and the Lebanon*, 1250-1900 (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1939), 75, n. 3. The term 'Hawwārah' for these mercenary troops, which he states began to be applied after 1778 in Syria and Palestine, was evidently not used in Aleppo. Ghazzi calls the corps *dālātīyah*: *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 306. The European travellers appear to confuse the corps with its commander, calling it the "delibashes," or variants thereof: Burckhardt, *Travels in Syria*, 651 and 655; Volney, *Voyage*, II, 42, 220 and 221; Olivier, *Voyage*, I, 305. It is possible, however, that these authors unwittingly participated in a Turkish pun: *dali* also means 'mad' while *bāsh* basically means 'head'; therefore, the term *dali bāsh* can signify a 'madman' which might aptly have described their mode of riding. In a modern English work this equation has been made: "*Delis* or 'madmen'"; Alexander Pallis, *In the Days of the Janissaries* (London: Hutchinson, 1951), 41, n. 3.

²⁷ Volney, *Voyage*, II, 42. Uzunçarşılı indicates that the *dalis* were recruited from the Balkan peoples, but his frame of reference is the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century: "Deli," *IA*.

²⁸ Pakalın says that fifty to sixty troopers composed a *bayrāq*: *Tarih Deyimleri*, I, 421.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 43.

³⁰ De Perdriau "Bulletin des nouvelles," 13 April 1779, *AE B1-94*.

³¹ De Perdriau, "Mémoire [of 1777]," *AE B1-94*.

³² *Supra*, 13-14.

passing from the service of one *wāli* to another as the resources of the *wālis* fluctuated.³³

Russell³⁴ states that most of the *dalis* in the service of the *wāli* were quartered on the neighboring villages, only a few being barracked in the serail and the suburbs. The unruly nature of those few in the city was cause for several disturbances. A serious disorder occurred in 1769 when the Janissaries and the *dalis* fought in the city streets.³⁵ Nor were the *dalis* always on good terms with their urban counterparts, the *tufinkjis*, the infantry troops of the *wāli* within the city. In one case, the two groups fought over a woman of infamous character which resulted in the death of one *dali* and five or six *tufinkjis*;³⁶ it took several days and the best efforts of the *wāli* and *a'yān* to resolve the dispute.³⁷

These *tufinkjis* were an even less esteemed corps than the *dalis*. Recruited largely from the Maghribi, they too were divided into *bayrāqs*, but were paid only half the amount of the *dalis*, namely five piasters per month, and from this amount they had to buy their arms and clothing. The *wāli*, however, supplied their food.³⁸ All the *tufinkjis*, being infantry and the *wāli*'s foot-guard, were quartered in the city.

The commanding officers of these two corps were the *dali bāshi* and the *tufinkji bāshi*, respectively. There are indications that the former position was generally assimilated into that of the *kakkhuda* of the *wāli*, an office which might be termed that of deputy military commander. Shāni Zādah Muḥammad 'Aṭā'-Allāh Effendi, speaking of expeditions sent by Mufti Zādah Aḥmad Pasha³⁹ against the Kurds in 1817, calls the officer commanding the troops "‘Uthmān Agha, the *kakkhuda* of Aḥmad Pasha" in one place,⁴⁰ and in another, "‘Uthmān Agha, the *dali bāshi* of Aḥmad Pasha."⁴¹ This assumption is further supported by the many references to *dalis* being sent on punitive missions within the *walāyah* commanded usually by the *kakkhuda*, in contrast to the one mention of a *dali bāshi*.⁴² On the other hand, it is possible that the position

³³ On the arrival of Muḥammad Rāghib Pasha outside of Aleppo, a *dali bāshi* rode into his camp with 200 horsemen to offer his services: Rousseau, "Neuvième bulletin," entry of 18 October 1812, *CCAlep*, XXIV, f. 416v. Waḥid Pasha arrived in Aleppo in 1824 with a retinue of 50 and 1500 cavalry but soon discharged them and they went into the service of the *wāli* of Aintab: Barker to Levant Company, 1 July 1824 and Barker to John Cartwright, 5 August 1824, *SP* 105/142.

³⁴ *Natural History of Aleppo*, II, 324.

³⁵ Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, III, 347; Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 306. Little more information than that a fight occurred is available.

³⁶ Thomas to Ministry, 21 May 1766, *AE B¹-90*.

³⁷ Thomas to Ministry, 31 May 1766, *AE B¹-90*.

³⁸ Volney, *Voyage*, II, 43-44.

³⁹ The biography of Ich İlii Mufti Zādah Aḥmad Pasha is given in Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, I, 286. Cf. also Shāni Zādah, *Ta'rikh*, II, 374.

⁴⁰ Shāni Zādah, *Ta'rikh*, II, 325.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 337.

⁴² Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, III, 350. European writers mention the *dali bāshi* frequently, but because of their general use of "delibashi" in error for *dali* it is seldom possible to determine whether they are referring to a common trooper or to the corps commander.

of *dali bāshi* was seldom mentioned because it was deemed relatively unimportant.

This, however, was not the case with the *tufnkji bāshi*. The role of this commander of the *wāli*'s footguard is so intimately connected with the urban police and supervisory powers of the *wāli* that he must be discussed in the light of information available on those duties and on the officers who appear to have been charged, at least theoretically, with their execution.

It is apparent from the sources that the *wāli* also had certain police and supervisory powers over the markets and industries of the city. Gibb and Bowen, in *Islamic Society and the West*, lead one to believe that this was the responsibility of the *qāḍi* from the following quotations:

We need do no more, therefore, in this place than mention the facts . . . that in cities and towns the *Ḳāḍi* had an adjutant other than the *Şubaşı*, called *Muhtesib* or *İhtisâb Ağası*, meaning 'Censor' through whom he dealt with all matters concerning trade and industry.

The general responsibility for policing was shared by the market superintendent (*muhtasib* or *emîn ihtisâb*, formerly a religious office, but now apparently held by a civil or military office) and by an *ağa* or *kâhyâ* of the local Janissaries, known as the *Şubaşı* or *wâli*.⁴³

Our information indicates that this is not an accurate description of the situation in Aleppo. In neither the consular records nor the Arab sources on Aleppo in the period under study is any mention made of a *muhtasib*. Volney speaks of him only once in a general description of the police.⁴⁴ As for the *şübāshi*, or, as he is called by Volney, the *wāli*,⁴⁵ he was not under the authority of the *qāḍi*, as Gibb and Bowen imply,⁴⁶ but appointed by the *wāli* and definitely his deputy in the execution of his police duties. Laurent d'Arvieux reveals certain of his duties through the revenues he received, namely a tax on prostitutes, coffee-houses, and weddings, all exactions and fines which he imposed of a sum less than 100 piasters, and ten percent of those above that amount.⁴⁷ Volney credits him with duties of a broader nature: as an officer of the watch, he roamed the streets night and day, arresting robbers and

⁴³ I, pt. 1, 155 and 279. Cf. also *ibid.*, pt. 2, 80.

⁴⁴ *Voyage*, II, 229.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* In order to avoid confusion between the *wāli/şübāshi* and the *wāli/governor*, we shall employ the term *şübāshi* for the police officer under discussion. The term *wāli* with regard to a police official was probably of Fātimid origin: Emile Tyan, *Histoire de l'organisation judiciaire en pays d'Islam*, 2nd ed. (Leiden: Brill, 1960), 576.

⁴⁶ The *şübāshi* was originally an officer within the benefice system having police duties, but the term was broadened gradually to cover police officers in non-benefice areas: Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 153-155.

⁴⁷ Laurent d'Arvieux, *Des Herrn von Arvieux hinterlassene merkwürdige Nachrichten*, ed. by J.-B. Labat, anonymous German translation (Kopenhagen: Aclermann, 1775), VI, 388.

watching for any signs of unrest. He had the power of condemnation without appeal and was accompanied by executioners or *baltahjis* on his round to execute the death sentence on the spot. He had spies in the nature of pickpockets or the like who reported to him any suspicious activities. In addition he was the inspector of weights and measures in the markets.⁴⁸

None of the detailed narratives of the historical events of the period in Aleppo mention the *ṣūbāshi*, but rather attribute police duties to the *tufinkji bāshi*. De Perdriau says: "Les Tufenktchis font le guet, saisissent les Coupables, Et leur Chef a la garde des Prisonniers."⁴⁹ Russell does not mention any particular police power but says that he was "the person chiefly employed in the management of smaller Avaniyas, and he and his emissaries being perpetually on the watch, they have good intelligence, and are the constant terror of the city, more especially of the Christians and Jews."⁵⁰

The situation regarding police officers in Aleppo in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries may be summarized as follows: it cannot be established that the office of *muḥtasib* had ceased to exist, but it is certain that his prestige was far less than in Mamlūk times.⁵¹ The *ṣūbāshi* had taken over most of his duties. Since the *wāli* had troops with which to maintain order within the city, namely the *tufinkjis*, and was empowered to appoint the *ṣūbāshi*, he tended to appoint the chief of his city garrison, the *tufinkji bāshi*, as *ṣūbāshi*. This became so regular a practice that the term *tufinkji bāshi* replaced that of *ṣūbāshi* and came to signify the chief of police.⁵²

Some idea of the breadth of the *wāli*'s police powers, which he usually deputized to the *tufinkji bāshi*, but sometime carried out himself, may be determined from the following incidents. On the arrival of Kul Aḥmad Pasha Zādah 'Ali Pasha,⁵³ in April 1767, he ordered that all coffee-houses be closed at sunset and a general curfew be imposed at night. In addition he forbade the women of the city to promenade in the gardens outside the walls.⁵⁴ This latter order, and presumably also the former, lost its effect as soon as he was transferred a month later.⁵⁵ The reason for these orders was undoubtedly the laxity of

⁴⁸ Volney, *Voyage*, II, 229.

⁴⁹ "Mémoire [of 1777]," *AE* B¹-94.

⁵⁰ *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 316.

⁵¹ Cf. Nicola A. Ziadeh, *Urban Life in Syria under the Early Mamlūks* (Beirut: American Press, 1953), 122-125 for a summary of the information available on this official in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

⁵² E. B. Barker, *Syria and Egypt*, I, 80. In 'Akka the term *ṣūbāshi* was retained in a corrupted form: *shūbāsi bāshi* (a metathesis of the *ṣad* and the *shin* and resultant repetition of the *bāshi*) and was listed among the officials of the *wāli*: Ibrāhīm al-'Awrah, *Tārīkh Wilāyat Sulaymān Pasha*, ed. and annotated by al-Khūrī Kuṣṭantin al-Bāsha al-Mukhalliṣi (Sidon: Mukhalliṣ Press, 1936), 167.

⁵³ Kul Aḥmad Pasha Zādah al-Ḥājj 'Ali Pasha's biography is in Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, III, 543.

⁵⁴ Thomas to Ministry, 22 April 1767, *AE* B¹-90.

⁵⁵ Thomas to Ministry, 26 May 1767, *AE* B¹-90.

morals in the city at the time and its disorderliness at night. The coffee-houses had been closed for these reasons by 'Aẓm Zādah Muḥammad Pasha in 1764,⁵⁶ but evidently his measures also expired with his departure.

The authority of the *wāli* was particularly broad in business affairs where the historic revolutionary tendencies of the guilds and *akhi* organizations caused the Ottoman government to control them strictly, although it owed its development in good measure to their support. As a measure for its self-preservation it adopted a close supervision over their activities and this responsibility devolved upon the provincial governor among others. Rāghib Pasha, on one occasion, toured the *sūqs* in disguise, by no means an uncommon practice of oriental rulers, and finding that bread at several ovens was being sold at a very high price, arrested three bakers and had them pinned by the ears to the door of their shops.⁵⁷

It was also the *wāli*'s duty to see that the *sūqs* kept functioning, for they had a tendency to close in times of trouble; forcing them to reopen might impose upon the people a psychology of normality. After the deposition in December of 1780 of Qūchah 'Abdi Pasha,⁵⁸ one of the more destructive *wālis* of this period, and the refusal of the people of al-Raqqah to accept him as their *wāli*, he returned with his troops to Aleppo. Before the arrival of the *beylerbey* of Aleppo, 'Uthmān Pasha,⁵⁹ 'Abdi Pasha imposed an exaction upon the Aleppines and the commerce of the city came to a standstill in expectation of further trouble. The arrival of 'Uthmān Pasha, however, forced the departure of the former *wāli*, and the new governor took steps to bring the city back to normal.

[He] warned the *sūqs* that they should open and that the people should return to their trading; that should a soldier buy something and not pay the price, deduct something from it, or invade the rights of [a shopkeeper] and [that shopkeeper] to inform the pasha, he would be hung over his shop. Any shop-owner who did not open would have his shop plundered and be hung.⁶⁰

⁵⁶ Muḥammad Khalil al-Murādi, *Silk al-Durur fi A'yān al-Qarn al-Thāni 'Ashar* (Cairo, 1301/1883-1884), IV, 98-99. In addition to Murādi's biography of 'Aẓm Zādah Muḥammad Pasha, there is a biography of him in Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, IV, 260.

⁵⁷ Rousseau, "Neuvième bulletin," entry of 26 October 1811, *CCAlep*, XXIV, f. 417v.

⁵⁸ For the biography of Qūchah 'Abdi Pasha, cf. Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, III, 411-412.

⁵⁹ 'Uthmān Pasha was a protégé of Qūchah 'Abdi Pasha, according to his biography in Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, III, 435.

⁶⁰ Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, III, 359. There is considerable doubt as to what *beylerbey* means in reference to 'Uthmān Pasha. Previous to his arrival in Aleppo he has been of *mīr-mirān* rank and after he had been transferred to Diyār Bakr he seems to have become a vizir. It is not clear whether at this time *beylerbey* was a designation of rank or of function. Certainly 'Uthmān Pasha while in Aleppo acted like a *wāli*, but Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, III, 435, is precise in calling him the *beylerbey* of Aleppo.

The *wāli* likewise had certain powers over commerce itself. A letter from the agent of the Levant Company in Istanbul to the British ambassador to the Porte reveals that Jalāl-al-Dīn Pasha prohibited the exportation of raw silk from Aleppo, and was thought by foreign merchants in Aleppo to be planning the extension of the ban to galls.

The Pasha pretends to justify these arbitrary Acts by alleging that the purchases made by the Europeans enhance the prices of those Articles to the prejudice of the Country; Whereas it is evident that his only view is to monopolize them to his own profit and advantage, it being proved from the reporters of the Aleppo Customhouse that the quantity of Silk exported by the European Merchants has always been less than what they imported from the interior places of its growth, and that since the Pasha's prohibitory orders the price has risen about 10 pct.⁶¹

It is doubtful from the tenor of this letter that the action of the *wāli* in this case was the result of orders from the Porte. Additional support for this view may be gained from the firman sent to Jalāl-al-Dīn Pasha, the point of which was to allow the European merchants to purchase and export that Article [silk] only in case of a Superabundance after the manufacturers of the place shall have fully supplied their wants.⁶²

Among the other duties of the *wāli* was that of providing the city with grain. This was made especially difficult in that the Aleppo region no longer produced enough for self-sufficiency.

On Comptoit encore il n'y a pas plus de 30. ans 364. Villages dans le seul district de cette Ville, dont un seul luy fournissoit le Bléd qui S'y Consommoit par jour, en Sorte qu'Elle tiroit de ces Villages Sa Subsistence annuelle. Aujourd'huy ce nombre est reduit a 55. Villages.⁶³

For this reason it was necessary to import wheat from Urfa⁶⁴ or elsewhere and this presented opportunities for the *wālis* to make considerable profit on the transaction. After the ruinous revolt of the Aleppines against Khūrshīd Aḥmad Pasha, that *wāli* desperately needed to recoup the expenses imposed on him by the revolt. On February 27, 1820, four thousand *makkūks* of wheat arrived in Aleppo for the *wāli* from Rumelia.

On this date [June 1, 1820] the vizir gave permission to the peasants to import grain into the town. He had forbidden them to do so in order to sell his grain at the price of 36 [piasters the *shunbul*]. The price then began to fall until it reached 12 [piasters] the *shunbul*.⁶⁵

⁶¹ Isaac Morier to Bartholomew Frere, 19 March 1816, *SP* 105/135, f. 348v.

⁶² Morier to Levant Company, 10 May 1816, *SP* 105/135, f. 360r.

⁶³ De Perdriau, "Mémoire [of 1777]," *AE B¹*-94.

⁶⁴ Rousseau to the Duc de Cadore, 10 January 1811, *CC Alep*, XXIV, f. 299r.

⁶⁵ Qara'li, *Ahamm Hawādīth*, 59. Rousseau states that in 1811 the price in times of abundance was 9 to 10 piasters, while at times of famine it could rise as high as 30 piasters: Rousseau to the Duc de Cadore, 10 January, 1811, *CC Alep*, XXIV, f. 299r.

This is but one example of the manipulations which all those in authority in Aleppo, whether *wāli*, Janissary or *sharīf*, operated on the grain supply, always at the expense of the poor for whom it was the prime staple.

The *wāli* was also responsible for the maintenance of the water supply, the *sabils*, or public fountains, and the underground conduits which distributed the spring water from Ḥaylān throughout the city. The expenses for this maintenance were paid out of special *awqāf* for each mosque and *sabil*,⁶⁶ but the initiative rested with the *wāli*, if not with the *a'yān* acting as his council. For many years this canal from Ḥaylān had been falling into disrepair and there are many indications that the city was short of water. This lack was not always due solely to the disrepair of the canal but to the diversion of the water to the gardens of the powerful.⁶⁷

The basic problem, however, appears to have been that neither the Ḥaylān sources nor the Quwayq River supplied enough water, and it was in part Khūrshīd Pasha's avowed intention to correct the situation that brought on the revolt of 1819. In the fourteenth century the Amīr Sayf-al-Dīn Arghūn diverted by means of a canal the waters of the Sājūr River, a tributary of the Euphrates, into the Quwayq. Khūrshīd Pasha proposed to clear this canal of accumulated silt and restore it to use.⁶⁸ Either because of insufficient *waqf*, or mortmain, money available for this task or because the project presented a good excuse for an exaction, Khūrshīd Pasha levied a tax on the houses of the city.⁶⁹ After the suppression of the revolt, he demanded money again:

On the 1st of Shawwāl [July 3, 1820] the vizir demanded of the Christians and Jews 1000 purses for the expense of the Sājūr [project], so they began to collect it. Then he again demanded of the city 4000 purses for the conducting of the water of the Sājūr and they began to collect it on the lands and on the heads. The cost for each household was 120 piasters.⁷⁰

Barbié du Bocage noted that the project was started, but the fear that the gardens of Aleppo would be flooded in winter, and above all, representations and money from the people of Aintab, near the upper reaches of the river, prevented its realization.⁷¹

⁶⁶ S. Mazloum, *L'Ancienne canalisation d'eau d'Alep (le quanayé de Ḥaylān)* (Beirut: Institut français de Damas, n.d.), 33.

⁶⁷ Rousseau to the Duc de Cadore, 3 July 1811, *CCAlep*, XXIV, f. 357v. There is the record of an interesting case judged before the *wāli* over water rights between city and cultivators in Mazloum, *Canalisation*, 90-93. It is dated 6 June 1738.

⁶⁸ Barbié du Bocage, "Notice sur la carte générale," *Recueil de voyages et de mémoires*, II, 224.

⁶⁹ Qara'li, *Ahamm Hawādīth*, 40-41; the tax but not its purpose is mentioned by Guys in a letter to the Marquis de Desselte, 7 November 1819, *CCAlep*, XXV, f. 400r.

⁷⁰ Qara'li, *Ahamm Hawādīth*, 60.

⁷¹ "Notice sur la carte générale," *Recueil de voyages et de mémoires*, II, 224.

The *wāli* was required to provide for the entertainment and provisioning of other *wālis* passing through the region of Aleppo, for which he was compensated by a certain amount from the city.⁷² His maintenance of the postal system consisted of providing horses for the *ṭāṭārs*, or post messengers, passing through Aleppo on postal business. He also, no doubt, had his own *ṭāṭārs* to carry letters and documents to the *Porte*.⁷³ There is evidence, in addition, that the *wāli* was obliged to provide *ṭāṭārs* of the capitulatory powers with post horses:

I applied to the Governor to furnish me with Post Horses and a Safe Guard for Cassim Aga to pass through the Gate of the Town on the 16th Instant at noon. The Governor was either too much confused with the Terrible Embroils he has now on his hands, or would not permit the Tartar to depart without giving an Account of these Embroils to the *Porte*.⁷⁴

The latter explanation of the *wāli*'s refusal to provide horses at that juncture is based on the fact that these *ṭāṭārs* of the foreign representatives also carried personal mail of the city notables.⁷⁵

It is unfortunate that no list of the *wāli*'s retinue comparable to that of Ibrāhīm al-'Awrah⁷⁶ for 'Akka exists for the *walāyah* of Aleppo. Sufficient information is found in the sources, however, so that a list can be reconstructed, although not of the amplitude of that for 'Akka. Since the latter is contemporary, it may be used as a guide.

The *wāli*'s palace household shows every indication of having been copied from that of the sultan and grand vizir, although on a smaller scale as befitted his rank and financial resources. It was similar in composition, divided into Inside and Outside Services. Those officers mentioned in the sources on Aleppo which belonged to the Inside Service are as follows:

The *silāḥdār āgha*, or sword-bearer for the *wāli*, whose position was comparable to that of a lord chamberlain.⁷⁷

The *chuqahdār āgha*, or valet of the *wāli*. This officer is mentioned

⁷² De Perdriau, "Mémoire [of 1777]," *AE B*¹-94.

⁷³ There is no specific reference for this in regard to Aleppo, but Ibrāhīm al-'Awrah includes in the retinue of Sulaymān Pasha of 'Akka a *ṭāṭār āghāsi* and twenty-five *ṭāṭārs*: *Sulaymān*, 164.

⁷⁴ Abbott to Spencer Smith, 17 April 1798, *SP* 110/53, f. 124v. Aleppo was then under siege by the Janissaries against the *ashraf* with the government remaining ostensibly neutral. Cf. *infra*, 118-119. Qāsim Agha was a *ṭāṭār* employed by the East India Company agents.

⁷⁵ Certain responsibilities apparently shared by the *wāli* and *qāḍi* will be discussed under the functions of the latter official, *infra*, 46ff.

⁷⁶ *Sulaymān*, 156-166.

⁷⁷ The only reference to the *silāḥdār āgha* with regard to Aleppo pertains to his use as a negotiator by Rāghib Pasha when the Janissaries in 1811 would not allow him to enter the city: Rousseau, "Neuvième bulletin," entry of 6 October 1811, *CCAlep*, XXIV, f. 414v. Cf. al-'Awrah, *Sulaymān*, 161, and Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt 1, 339.

by al-Ṭabbākh,⁷⁸ but the same individual is called the *qūl chuqaḥdār*, an apparently non-existent office, in the journal of Būlus Arūtīn.⁷⁹

The *muhurdār*, or seal-bearer of the *wāli*. His duties were to affix the *wāli*'s seal on official documents.⁸⁰

No other officials of the Inside Service are specifically cited, but from the list of al-'Awrah, the following may be added as very likely to have existed:

A *bāsh chuqaḥdār*, or head valet, distinct from the above-cited *chuqaḥdār āgha*,⁸¹ an *ikinji chuqaḥdār*, his second in command; a *tūtünji bāshi*, or chief tobacconist; a *khaftān* or *qaftān āghasi*, keeper of the ceremonial robes of honor; an *ibrīqdār āghāsi*, keeper of the ewer, who poured water over the *wāli*'s hands when he washed,⁸² a *qahwahji bāshi*, chief coffee-server; a *sufrahji bāshi*, chief butler; a *sarāydār bāshi*, chief housekeeper; and *anakhtār āghāsi*, keeper of the keys; and, of course, one or more *ḥaram āghāsis*, keepers of the harem.⁸³

There may well have been others, such as the *bāsh chāwūsh* of the *īch ughlān*, or chief herald of the interior pages, the *sham'adān āghāsi*, lamp keeper and lighter, the *majī' bāshi*,⁸⁴ or official usher, and various others,⁸⁵ but of their presence in every *wāli*'s suite we cannot be certain. Probably one *āgha* filled more than one of these posts at once under impecunious *wālis*.

It is most difficult to determine the dividing line between the Outside Service and the administration *per se*,⁸⁶ but a tentative demarcation will be made according to the criterion of whether the duties of the particular officer were more in the nature of personal service to the *wāli*, or of general service in the *walāyah* administration. It may not then correspond to organizational reality but will be significant as functional reality.

Only two officers mentioned in the sources on Aleppo can be definitely classified among those of the Outside Service. They are the *sā'is bāshi*, chief groom of the *wāli*'s stable,⁸⁷ and the *arpah amīni*, or superintendent of the barley supplies for the *wāli*'s stables.⁸⁸ Probably

⁷⁸ Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, III, 390. Cf. Pakalın, *Tarih Deyimler*, I, 385-386.

⁷⁹ Qara'li, *Aḥamm Ḥawādiṭh*, 37. Cf. 'Awrah, *Sulaymān*, 161; Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 340.

⁸⁰ Abbott to Robert Ainslie, 4 October 1793, *SP* 110/53, f. 53r.; 'Awrah, *Sulaymān*, 162; Pakalın, *Tarih Deyimler*, II, 609.

⁸¹ Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 340 and 342; Pakalın, *Tarih Deyimler*, I, 162.

⁸² Cf. Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 342; Pakalın, *Tarih Deyimler*, II, 14.

⁸³ 'Awrah, *Sulaymān*, 161-162. Sulaymān had four *ḥaram aghāsis*.

⁸⁴ Called by 'Awrah, *mūji bāshi*: *Sulaymān*, 162.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ Cf. the comment in this sense referring to the household of the grand vizir in Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 363.

⁸⁷ Jawdat, *Ta'riḫh*, XI, 37.

⁸⁸ Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, III, 390; Qara'li, *Aḥamm Ḥawādiṭh* 37. This officer is not

the *sā'is bāshi* in rank was the *amīr ākhūr*, or master of the stirrup, of the *wāli*.⁸⁹ In addition there was a *sā'is ikinji*, or deputy chief groom, an '*alamdār* and *bayraqdār*, both of whom had duties relating to the banners and *tuḡhs*, a *qawwās bāshi*, chief porter who commanded several rifle bearers,⁹⁰ and several officers whose duties pertained to the *wāli's* travels: the *sirwān bāshi*, in charge of travel arrangements, the *mash'alji bāshi*, who procured men to carry torches in front of the *wāli* on his night journeys, the '*akkām bāshi* who was in charge of camels and their loads, and the *bāsh takhtriwānji* who procured litters for the *wāli* and his women.⁹¹

Another official who might be classified as being of the Outside Service from the point of view of the *wāli* but who, in fact, had great power in administrative matters was the *ṣarrāf*, the *wāli's* banker, usually a Jew or an Armenian. Since the *wāli* was compelled to pay for his post,⁹² it was generally necessary for him to borrow from the *ṣarrāf* against the revenues which the possession of the *wilāyah* would be likely to accrue to him. The *ṣarrāf* thereby acquired an interest in the administration of the province. No situation existed in Aleppo comparable to that in 'Akka where the *mu'allim Ḥayyīm*, *ṣarrāf* of Sulaymān Pasha, had powers second only to those of the *wāli*⁹³ but the necessity to repay the debts owed to the *ṣarrāf* was an underlying cause for the heavy exactions imposed on the people of the *walāyah*.

The *katkhuda* of the *wāli*, who appears to be the second most important officer in the administration of the *walāyah*, might be termed a member of the Outside Service but his duties are not entirely clear. From the information available he appears to have been assistant to the *wāli* in all matters military and administrative. He has already been mentioned in the role of deputy military commander⁹⁴ and this appears to have been his principal responsibility. This officer was the likely counterpart of the *katkhuda bey* who was "the Grand *Vesir's* general deputy, but particularly in home and military affairs."⁹⁵ Being a part of the household, he was not likely to be a native of Aleppo⁹⁶ and was apparently the nominee of the *wāli*. In general he may be characterized

mentioned in al-'Awrah's list, but may be the equivalent of its *jarbandi bāshi*, which the annotator describes as a commissary-general for food: 'Awrah, *Sulaymān*, 167, n. 2.

⁸⁹ 'Awrah, *Sulaymān*, 161.

⁹⁰ Būlus Arūtin speaks of the *qawwāsah* in the sense of 'police': Qara'li, *Ahamm Ḥawādith*, 58.

⁹¹ 'Awrah, *Sulaymān*, 167.

⁹² Cf. for example the comment on Ḥalabi Aḥmad Pasha Zādah 'Uthmān Pasha in Jawdat, *Ta'rikh*, VIII, 80.

⁹³ 'Awrah, *Sulaymān*, 159.

⁹⁴ *Supra*, 24.

⁹⁵ Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 120.

⁹⁶ Rousseau, "Neuvième bulletin," entry of 13 October 1811, *CCAleph*, XXIV, f. 416r. In one case he was the brother of the *wāli*: De Perdriau, "Bulletin," 14 July 1775, *AE B*¹-93.

as the representative of the *wāli*. Yet in this role he should not be confused with the *mutasallim*.

This officer was the representative of the *wāli* in his absence and charged with all his functions whereas the *katkhuda* only represented the *wāli* in a particular function. A *mutasallim* deputized for the Porte's appointed governor when the *wāli* was off with the Ottoman army, after a transferred *wāli* had departed and before the new one had arrived,⁹⁷ or, in a slightly different sense, the deputy of the *wāli* in one of the districts of which the *walāyah* was composed.⁹⁸ Marie Nicolas Alexandre Amé, one of the French consuls, defines the *mutasallim* as follows:

. . . un des Grands de la Ville, que quelquefois la Porte, et plus souvent le Pacha, nommé à un Gouvernement, désigne pour commander en son absence.⁹⁹

Sometimes the *a'yān* themselves selected one from their midst as *mutasallim*,¹⁰⁰ although he was not always from among the *a'yān* of Aleppo.¹⁰¹ Not being directly in the service of the sultan, as was the *wāli*, he received a fixed stipend from the city, the amount of which was determined by the Porte, although the *mutasallim* would attempt to augment it in any fashion he could.¹⁰² The fact that he did not have the financial resources of the *wāli* may be the explanation of the reduced effectiveness of the government of Aleppo when it was ruled by a *mutasallim*.

Cette Echelle Gouvernée par un mussalem se trouve susceptible de rumeurs, cet officer ne pouvant agir avec le despotisme d'un Pacha. Le Corps des Cherifs . . . dans une Emeute par lui causée, il a contraint le Moussalem à renvoyer la Garde ordinaire des Pachas et d'y suplérer par une Troupe de Canailles qui, la nuit, veille les Bazars.¹⁰³

At one point the *mutasallim* proved so ineffectual against the insurgent elements of the populace that he had to be replaced by a *qā'im-maqām*. A *qā'im-maqām* came to Aleppo only in emergencies such as this. Whereas the *mutasallims* of Aleppo were simple *āghas*, in the loose sense of the term,¹⁰⁴ the *qā'im-maqām* had the rank of a pasha, usually a *mīr-mīrān*. The one in question, 'Abd-al-Raḥmān, was a *mīr-mīrān*

⁹⁷ This was often a period of several months.

⁹⁸ In 1819 on the revolt of the Aleppines against Khūrshīd Pasha, the *wāli* ordered his *mutasallims* in the towns of the *walāyah* to come to his assistance with all available troops: Shāni Zādah, *Tārīkh*, III, 76.

⁹⁹ Amé to de Sartine, 23 August 1780, *AE B¹-95*.

¹⁰⁰ De Perdriau, postscript to "Bulletin," 14 July 1775, *AE B¹-93*. De Perdriau to De Praslin, 22 February 1770, *AE B¹-91*.

¹⁰¹ De Perdriau to De Praslin, 15 April, 1769, *AE B¹-91*; Thomas to Ministry, 23 June 1767, *AE B¹-90*; De Perdriau to De Sartine, 14 August 1778, *AE B¹-94*.

¹⁰² D'Arvieux, *Nachrichten*, VI, 369.

¹⁰³ De Perdriau to De Praslin, 8 October 1769, *Affaires étrangères B¹-91*; An incident similar to this occurred in 1778: De Perdriau, "Bulletin," 7 October 1776, *AE B¹-94*; C.f. Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 257.

¹⁰⁴ Thomas to Ministry, 23 June 1767, *AE B¹-90*.

and the *muḥāfiẓ*, the military defender, of Baylān.¹⁰⁵ The probable difference between a *mutasallim* and a *qā'im-maqām*, in addition to the factor of rank and consequent prestige, was that the *qā'im-maqām* enjoyed the status relative to the Porte of the *wāli* and therefore his remuneration. He was not supported financially by the city as was the *mutasallim*.

Among the administrative posts were those of the *ra'īs al-kuttāb*, the chief of all the administrative clerks under the *wāli*,¹⁰⁶ and the *dīwān efendīsi*, the secretary of the *wāli*'s consultative council, or divan.¹⁰⁷

This divan was composed of the major officials and notables of the city, the *wāli*, *muḥaṣṣil*, *qāḍi*, mufti, *naqīb al-ashraf*, sirdar, the principal ulema, and the *a'yān*¹⁰⁸ with the *diwan efendisi* and perhaps one or two of the clerks in attendance as secretaries. It met regularly every Friday morning at the serail, the effendis assembling beforehand at the *mah-kamah* to accompany the *qāḍi* in ceremonial procession to it. In addition, it could be called at any time into emergency session, the summonses being sent to each member by the *wāli*'s *chāwūshs*.¹⁰⁹ After the Friday morning session most of the members accompanied the *wāli* in procession to the grand mosque for the Friday prayers.¹¹⁰

The function of the divan was to discuss all matters pertaining to the city that the *wāli* saw fit to bring before it. It might advise the *wāli* in cases brought before him for adjudication and on the basis of its recommendations, he might make his decision. Although the *wāli* could ignore these recommendations, and no doubt often did, it was not an entirely useless body. In the first place, since the *wāli* was seldom resident for much more than a year, few *wālis* had knowledge of the details of the situation in the city. Thus the divan had an informative function. Secondly, in spite of his great authority the *wāli* would avoid an open break with members of the divan if he had any ability or foresight whatsoever, for a united petition against him to the Porte would not be lacking in weight.

The effectiveness of this divan, however, became increasingly impaired and that for two reasons. First, one of the two powerful factions, the Janissaries, was represented only by a figurehead, the sirdar.¹¹¹ Second, the position of the *a'yān*, or provincial notables, had gradually declined. The latter cause, more important than the former, merits attention.

The term *a'yān* is found in two contexts: the general and the re-

¹⁰⁵ De Perdriau to De Praslin, 7 November 1770, *AE B¹*-91.

¹⁰⁶ Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 295; Ṭabbākḥ, *I'lām*, VII, 237.

¹⁰⁷ Amé to De Sartine, 23 August 1780, *AE B¹*-95; Guys to the Marquis de Dessolle, 7 November 1819, *CCAlep*, XXV, f. 400v.; Qara'li, *Ahamm Hawādith*, 37, 48, and 49.

¹⁰⁸ Russell, *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 322.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 322-323.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 323.

¹¹¹ *Ci. infra*, 67-70.

strictive. In the form *a'yân wa-ashrâf*¹¹² the Ottoman authors used it to designate that class of provincials who had acquired *iqṭā'ahs*, or benefices, and had been able to pass this source of income on to their children, either directly or by constituting the lands *waqf* and designating their children as the *mutawallis*, or trustees.¹¹³ As the landed gentry they may be distinguished from the *ahl-i 'urf*, another term used by the Ottomans for the governmental authorities in the provinces who received stipends or similar non-inheritable incomes.¹¹⁴ Those who held *iltisāms*, or revenue farms, originally were, no doubt, classified with the *ahl-i 'urf*, but at the end of the seventeenth century the government converted many an *iltizām*, which was purchased yearly, into a *mālī-kānah*, a new form of revenue farm held for life but alienable on state approval, for the succession to which heritors received preference at auction.¹¹⁵ This conversion having taken place, the possessors of *mālī-kānahs* became assimilated into the *a'yân wa-ashrâf*.

The latter, having wealth and common interests to protect and being local gentry, became established as a political force demanding recognition. When this recognition was accorded them by the Porte has not been determined with precision,¹¹⁶ but it took the form of a number of them being added to the *wālī's* divan, the selection being made, it is claimed, by the people of each region.¹¹⁷ By the mid-eighteenth century, however, the *a'yân*, as they now came to be called in the derived, restrictive sense, inherited their positions in the divan.¹¹⁸

As the official representatives of the city they were at times given special authority to act on their own initiative. They might send petitions to the Porte against *wālī* or *qāḍī*, acting as a check on those offi-

¹¹² *Ashrâf* in this sense should not be confused with its meaning as used elsewhere in this study. For an explanation of the difference see *infra*, 90, n. 73.

¹¹³ Mustafa Akdağ, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Kuruluş ve İnkisafı Devrinde Türkiye'nin İktisadî Vaziyeti, II," *Bellekten*, XIV (July 1950), 330.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 329.

¹¹⁵ The exact date of this reform is in question. Gibb and Bowen have 1692 as the date on p. 259 of *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, but "after the Peace of Carlovitz" which occurred in 1699 on p. 255. Ghazzi has 1104/1692-1693, *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 292, while Ignatius Mouradgea D'Ohsson has 1695: *Tableau général de l'empire ottoman* (Paris: Didot, 1788-1824), VII, 243. İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı gives 1106/1694-5 as the date: "Âyân," *IA*.

¹¹⁶ Gibb and Bowen imply that it was in the late sixteenth or early seventeenth centuries: *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 198.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.* "La plupart de ces ayans sont choisis par le peuple." Juchereau de St. Denis, *Révolutions*, I, 245. With a primary source lacking, the claim to an elective process should be questioned. A general description of the *a'yân* may be found in Olivier, *Voyage*, I, 311-312. Russell does not describe them under the name of *a'yân*, but rather under the term "Agas," which he divides into a general and a restricted sense, the former meaning various individuals of high station, the latter the *a'yân*. He notes their decline from former power and splendor: *Natural History*, I, 159.

¹¹⁸ Rousseau, "Description succincte du pachalik d'Alep," *CCAlep*, XXV, f. 27v. Cf. on the *a'yân* generally H. Bowen, "A'yân," *EI*².

cials;¹¹⁹ they were sometimes ordered to select their own *mutasallim* for an absent *wāli*;¹²⁰ and were occasionally given the option to send troops to the army or pay an amount deemed equivalent by the Porte.¹²¹ Similarly the *wāli* might give them the decision on matters directly affecting the city, such as the occasion in 1772 when the *a'yān* bought off a detachment of imperial Janissaries, or *qapūqūlis*, from quartering themselves on the city while reprovisioning.¹²²

The *a'yān*, however, were fast losing any representative character they might once have had. An hereditary, landed group with personal interests and ambitions, they sided more often with the government than with the people.¹²³ Their administration and their counsel to the *wāli* were in their own interests, not in that of the city. They were no longer its protectors, so the people sought other means by which to make their voice heard and their persons and property safeguarded.

The most unusual factor in the administration of the *walāyah* of Aleppo was the separation in large part of the financial powers from the office of the *wāli* to that of the *muḥaṣṣil*. The reason for this was possibly the combination of a rich province and a center of export and transit trade. At the time of the Ottoman conquest of Syria, the Venetians were a significant factor in Middle East trade with Aleppo as one of their principal marts.¹²⁴ At the same time, it is known that Aleppo was the locale for the *daftardār*, or register-keeper, of the Arab provinces, instituted by Salīm I after their conquest,¹²⁵ and that the former name for the *muḥaṣṣil* of Aleppo was *daftardār*.¹²⁶ The combination of these factors may explain the special position of *muḥaṣṣil*.

Generally he was a wealthy Aleppine¹²⁷ who acquired the position through the use of personal influence and carefully placed bribes which might amount to 40,000 piasters, and which would assure him tenure for one year.¹²⁸ He then paid the Porte 400,000 piasters for the farm

¹¹⁹ De Perdriau to De Praslin, 8 October 1770, *AE B¹-91*; De Perdriau to St. Priest, 4 January 1776, *AE B¹-93*.

¹²⁰ De Perdriau to De Praslin, 22 February 1770, *AE B¹-91*.

¹²¹ Lesseps to Ministry, 21 March 1823, *CC Alep*, XXVI, f. 292v.

¹²² De Perdriau to De Boynes, 20 and 23 May 1772, *AE B¹-92*.

¹²³ As in the revolt of 1770 when they sided with the *mutasallim* because it was really against their monopolies that the insurrection was instigated: De Perdriau to De Praslin, 17 August 1770, *AE B¹-91*; *infra*, 108. In the revolt against Khūrshīd Pasha in 1819 the *a'yān* sided with the *wāli* and fled from the city: Qara'li, *Aḥamm Hawādith*, 37. In the revolt which ejected 'Alī Pasha in 1775 they were the cautious element in the population.

¹²⁴ Sauvaget, *Alep*, 200-201.

¹²⁵ Stripling, *The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs*, 60. He was of lower rank than those of Anatolia and Rumelia.

¹²⁶ Russell, *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 322; d'Arvieux, *Nachrichten*, VI, 371.

¹²⁷ But not always: in 1776 one was sent from Istanbul; De Perdriau to De Sartine, 22 February 1776, *AE B¹-93*.

¹²⁸ Volney, *Voyage*, II, 39; De Perdriau to De Praslin, 20 May 1769, *AE B¹-91*; De Perdriau to De Sartine, 16 February 1775, *AE B¹-93*.

itself, probably borrowing that sum from an Istanbul *şarrâf*, and in return received the right to collect for his own account the customs on goods imported into Aleppo, the *kharāj* and the *mīri*. On these, three sources are in agreement¹²⁹ but there is one conflict. Whereas Volney adds the transit dues on Turkoman and Kurdish flocks, de Perdriau definitely assigns this revenue to the *wāli*, describing it as follows:

Il en vient tous les Ans d'Erzerum à Alep 80. a 100:000. [moutons]; Moitié Se consomme à Alep et peuvent procréer 25:000 Agneaux; L'autre moitié Se distribuë dans toute la Syrie. Cellecy, qui n'est que de passage, paye un quart de piastre par Tête; Car pour les moutons destinés a l'aprovionnement de la Ville, ils ne doivent rien. Ce droit peut monter année commune de 12. a 13:000 Piastres.¹³⁰

Rousseau also credits the *wāli* with the revenue from this source,¹³¹ so it is likely that Volney is in error. On another point, that of assigning one fifth of the produce of the salt works of Lake Jabbūl to the account of the *muḥaṣṣil*, he may be more accurate, even though he is the only source mentioning this. Salt from the Jabbūl was historically a state monopoly.¹³² In spite of the absence of that farm from the list of those pertaining to the *muḥaṣṣil*, it may be assumed that salt revenues were part of his own income.

De Perdriau adds to the *muḥaṣṣil's* revenues the right to tributes and escheatage rights but unfortunately he does not clarify further the nature of these accounts. Perhaps the former refers to the payments by the Kurds mentioned above.¹³³ In Volney's time the revenues of the farmer-general, collected by his agents in Aleppo and in the other towns of the *walāyah*, were estimated by him at 600,000 piasters, sufficient to clear the cost of the farm and the necessary bribes.¹³⁴ Thus the *muḥaṣṣilliq* was not only a position of prestige but one of such profit that when 'Abd-Allāh Pasha al-Farāri died as *wāli* of Aleppo in 1761, the *muḥaṣṣil* could bid for the *wilāyah*.¹³⁵

This situation was not always to be the case. The bulk of the income probably came from the customs on goods imported from Persia, India and Europe. Towards the end of the eighteenth century the decline of

¹²⁹ Volney, *Voyage*, II, 39; Russell, *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 322; De Perdriau, "Mémoire [of 1777]," *AE B¹-94*; Rousseau, "Description succincte du pachalik d'Alep," *CCAleph*, XXV, f. 10r. Volney does not mention the *kharāj*, but this is probably an oversight.

¹³⁰ De Perdriau, "Mémoire [of 1777]," *AE B¹-94*.

¹³¹ "Description succincte du pachalik d'Alep," 1812, *CCAleph*, XXV, f. 27r.

¹³² It appears on the list of the Ayyūbid revenues from Aleppo: Sauvaget, *Alep*, 253, and there is a reference in Ghazzi which indicates that it was an imperial treasury revenue source in Ottoman times: *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 255. In d'Arvieux's time it was farmed by an *āgha* for the sultan: *Nachrichten*, VI, 395. Cf. also Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 2, 19f.

¹³³ *Supra*, 7.

¹³⁴ *Voyage*, vol. II, p. 39.

¹³⁵ Thomas to Ministry, 13 March 1761, *AE B¹-88*. On 'Abd-Allāh Pasha al-Farāri, cf. Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, III, 382-383.

these shipments, for many years gradual, accelerated until the figure of total trade of 17,500,000 francs in 1775 had become in 1844 no more than 8,000,000 francs.¹³⁶ By 1824, the Barker family was the only English family resident in Aleppo, a far cry from the situation a century before.¹³⁷ It is natural that this decline in trade should have affected the income of the *muḥaṣṣil*, and to this decline was added that of less revenue from the *mīri* because of the desertion of villages. Olivier states that the *muḥaṣṣil's* revenue in 1796 was no more than 200,000 piasters, whereas not long before it had been double that amount.¹³⁸ Thus the *muḥaṣṣiliq* had become in short space of time a position which involved financial loss, rather than profit, for the incumbent and it is not surprising that the position likewise lost much of its prestige value.

Jawdat Pasha analyzes the position of the office in 1785 as follows:

Heretofore the tax-collectorship of Aleppo was one of the choice revenue offices. For forty or fifty years wealthy individuals had acquired this collectorship by offering their services and spending a considerable amount of money. Gaining great wealth and fulfilling the requisite of magnificence, some of them gradually became vizirs and some commanders. In this manner did Mīr-mīrān Aḥmad Pasha gain the horsetail and banner and acquire fame. After a while the said collectorship was moulded into the pattern of "sale of what is surplus, and is there any additional?" by means of the conscienceless corruption of the century. By degrees it lost demand like alloyed money and became as useless as an old calendar in the eyes of those of reputation. Therefore some bankrupt individuals undertook the responsibility for it. Initially they paid bribes from the customs revenue which was quickly obtainable and the equivalent of cash and then spent the remainder on sensuous pleasures. Because they abandoned and left the other state revenues as arrears . . . , each year a few *qapūji bāshis* and, in the interest of haste, a few envoys of the grand vizir were successively sent to collect those arrears for the state. Drawing from the *walāyah* the daily pay which was assigned to them according to their rank and position for their expenses, these agents chose to establish themselves in Aleppo out of covetousness for the profit resulting from the collection of state revenue, and every year the people of Aleppo were thus as a whole exacted.¹³⁹

The *muḥaṣṣiliq* was, however, still a vehicle for the accumulation of wealth and power even after this time, as the career of Ibrāhīm Agha (later Pasha) Qaṭṭār Aghāsi reveals. A servant in the household of Chalabi Effendi, this man remained illiterate but came to be one of the outstanding figures of recent Aleppo history, received the favor of his master,¹⁴⁰ rose through the ranks of the household, and at some point

¹³⁶ M. Sobernheim, "Halab," *EI*¹.

¹³⁷ Alfred C. Wood, *A History of the Levant Company* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935), 196.

¹³⁸ *Voyage*, IV, 190.

¹³⁹ Jawdat, *Ta'rikh*, III, 269. "Cet emploi plus lucratif aujourd'hui en apparence qu'en réalité . . ." Amé to De Cabres, 10 December 1785, *AE B*¹-96.

¹⁴⁰ Abbott to Crow and Le Messurier, 15 August 1796, *SP* 110/53, f. 93v.

not long after Chalabi Effendi's death in 1786¹⁴¹ became *muḥaṣṣil* of the city probably through the influence of his patron's friends in Istanbul.¹⁴² One first hears of him in this post in early April, 1792 but it is apparent from this reference and others immediately subsequent to it that he had held the position for some time prior to this,¹⁴³ for Abbott in speaking of the situation within Aleppo at the time describes the power held by Ibrāhīm Agha as follows:

I am much afraid that we are going to Experience the severities of a Famine, no Wheat is brought to market for the subsistence of the Poor. Our New Governor can do nothing, as the Muhasil is so Powerfull, and having the Command of all the Villages, and being the Proprietor of all the Corn, delays bringing any to Town, that he may obtain his own Price for it.¹⁴⁴

It is not clear from the sparse sources of the late 1790's whether Ibrāhīm Agha's acquisition of power came through his retention of the position of *muḥaṣṣil* or not. Financially speaking, it would seem unlikely; more probably he gained the financial ascendancy in Aleppo through the gradual acquisition of choice villages and cornering the grain supply as indicated above. There is further testimony to this effect:

. . . this Ibrahim Aga Muhasil is got up to such a pitch of Greatness, by every unlawfull means in the sales of his Corn and other Grains and has heaped up such immense Treasures and by good and bad means appropriated to him self Forty Eight of the best and met [*sic. most*] opulent Villages, he saves annually great sums of money, to the Ruin of the Inhabitants of this part of Syria and Distruction to the Trade in General.¹⁴⁵

But certainly if the *muḥaṣṣilliq* was not particularly financially rewarding, a case may be made for its prestige value. It was essential for a man of ambition to hold public office and pay the necessary bribes to influential officials at the Porte. However hollow personal acquaintance might make his prestige in Aleppo, the fact that he held an office gave him standing with the government in Istanbul and a pathway to higher goals through the machinations of his supporters. In the case of Ibrāhīm Agha the *muḥaṣṣilliq* led to the conferral of the rank of the sultan's *amīr ākhūr*,¹⁴⁶ then to the position of *mutasallim*,¹⁴⁷ and finally to that of the *wāli* of Damascus, replacing 'Aẓm Zādah 'Abd-Allāh

¹⁴¹ Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, III, 366.

¹⁴² Burckhardt, *Travels in Syria*, 649.

¹⁴³ Abbott to Ainslie, 19 April 1792, 30 July 1792, and 1 September 1792, *SP* 110/53, f. 25r., 35r. and 38r.

¹⁴⁴ Abbott to Ainslie, 18 September 1792, *SP* 110/53, f. 40r.

¹⁴⁵ Abbott to Robert Liston, 14 June 1794, *SP* 110/53, f. 60r.

¹⁴⁶ Abbott to Liston, 5 September 1795, *SP* 110/53, f. 78v.

¹⁴⁷ Abbott to Liston, 13 May 1796, *SP* 110/53, f. 89v.

Pasha in 1798.¹⁴⁸ Aiding him in Istanbul were his *qapu katkhudāsi*, or steward at the Porte, Mūsa Effendi,¹⁴⁹ and the *walīdah sultān katkhudāsi*, steward of the sultan's mother, Yūsuf Agha.¹⁵⁰ To make assistance worth their while there was the increasing attraction of Ibrāhīm Agha's personal wealth: by 1796 he had increased the number of villages he owned to 110 and held the revenue farms normally independent of the *muḥaṣṣilliq*, those of tobacco, coffee and the stamp duty.¹⁵¹ The office of *mutasallim* also no doubt permitted the use of *avānias*, although a *mutasallim*, no matter how powerful, had to exercise caution in this field, for a protest to Istanbul against a *mutasallim* was more likely to be effective than one against a *wāli*.

With the ascendancy of the Janissaries in the first decade of the nineteenth century, however, the *muḥaṣṣilliq* appears to have lost a good part of the value it formerly held for its possessor. Mention of the official becomes increasingly rare and then in more and more disparaging terms. In 1805, 'Abdi Effendi, the mufti, doubled as *muḥaṣṣil*,¹⁵² and in 1806 the incumbent is termed "un homme de basse extraction qui doit sa fortune et sa place à un Commerce de grains, que les derniers malheurs d'Alep ont rendu tres-lucratif."¹⁵³ Finally, the Janissary leaders took over the responsibility for the payment of the *mīri* from the *muḥaṣṣil* and in 1811 the Porte's revenues from Aleppo were limited to:

. . . the Miri, or general land-tax, which the Janissaries themselves pay, the Kharatsh or tribute of the Christians and Jews, and the income of the custom house, which is now rented at the yearly rate of eighty thousand piasters. Besides these there are several civil appointments in the town, which are sold every year at Constantinople to the highest bidder: the Janissaries are in the possession of the most lucrative of them, and remit regularly to the Porte the purchase money.¹⁵⁴

Russell is unique in mentioning that the *muḥaṣṣil* had certain judicial powers limited to revenue matters and a prison in his palace where were incarcerated those he found guilty.¹⁵⁵ That author also points out that the merchants were more or less under the protection of the *muḥaṣṣil* from *avānias* imposed by the *wāli*.¹⁵⁶

As indicated, there were other state revenue farms in the *walāyah* of Aleppo not belonging to the *muḥaṣṣilliq*. A list of these is given in

¹⁴⁸ Jawdat, *Ta'rikh*, VI, 330. For the biography of 'Azm Zādah 'Abd-Allāh Pasha, cf. Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, III, 393.

¹⁴⁹ Abbott to Spencer Smith, 8 August 1796, *SP* 110/53, f. 93r.

¹⁵⁰ Abbott to Smith, 15 November 1796, *SP* 110/53, f. 101r. The biography of Yūsuf Agha is given in Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, IV, 668-669.

¹⁵¹ Abbott to Crow and Le Messurier, 15 August 1796, *SP* 110/53, f. 93v.

¹⁵² Corancez to Ruffin, 27 Brumaire Yr. 14/ 1 November 1805, *CCAlep*, XXIII, f. 295r.

¹⁵³ Corancez to Ruffin, 29 August 1806, *CCAlep*, XXIII, f. 309r and v.

¹⁵⁴ Burckhardt, *Travels in Syria*, 653.

¹⁵⁵ *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 322.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 330.

the description of the *walāyah* written by Joseph Louis Rousseau in 1812. Paid directly to the Porte by the *multazim* or revenue farmer, who then had the right to the income, they were as follows :

Soies nommé Kassabié	40,000	piastres
Tabac	60,000	
Galles et laines	500	
Caffé	20,000	
Commestibles, dite Dar-el-Wekalé	18,000	
Teinturerie	1,800	
Calandre, nommé Dak	10,000	
Toiles de coton	1,000	
Marque des étoffes nommé Tamgha	20,000	
Impots sur les soies	11,000	
Étoffes de lin de Trebizond	500	
Laitages	1,500	
Epices	3,000	
Droit de peser la Soie	4,000	
Khan de la Douane	7,000	
Khan dit Vizir où logent les Négotians	3,700	
Khan dit Nichandji où loge le Consul de France	1,000	
5 Khans où aboutissent les Denrées	5,500	
Grand Mosquée et de ses Dépenses	2,800	
20-25 villages des environs de Haleb	116,000	
	<hr/>	
	339,300	piastres. ¹⁵⁷

Several of these farms deserve comment and comparison with others appearing in a list dated 1583.¹⁵⁸ Six of them have to do with materials and it is difficult to sort out the basis of the revenue. The first item, "soies nommé Kassabié" seems to be the equivalent of what R. Dozy calls *qaşab* and describes as "étoffe brodée dans laquelle sont encrustées de petites lames d'or ou d'argent."¹⁵⁹ That this work was done in Aleppo is indicated by a khan bearing the name of those who made the gold thread, the Khān al-Qaşābiyah,¹⁶⁰ but although this khan was built *circa* 1510, there is no item in Mantran and Sauvaget's list which corresponds to this farm. One must assume that Aleppo manufactured this gold- or silver-encrusted brocade, for there existed a farm for the weighing of the silk which corresponds with a farm in the earlier list.¹⁶¹ The only possibility of an earlier equivalent is the one described as "ferme du khan d'Abtrak avec les boutiques, dans la ville même d'Alep . . .,"¹⁶² the khans appearing to be identical.

The farm relating to cloth in Rousseau's list, entitled "marque des

¹⁵⁷ "Description succincte du pachalik d'Alep," 1812, *CCAleph*, XXV, f. 27r. My total is 327,300 piasters.

¹⁵⁸ Mantran and Sauvaget, *Règlements fiscaux ottomans*, 111-118.

¹⁵⁹ R. Dozy, *Supplément aux dictionnaires arabes*, 2nd edition (Leiden: Brill, 1927), II, 353-354.

¹⁶⁰ Sauvaget, *Aleph*, 173, n. 650.

¹⁶¹ Mantran and Sauvaget, *Règlements fiscaux ottomans*, 111, item no. 6.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 113, item no. 20.

étouffes nommé Tamgha” corresponds to the citation of “Ferme de l'estampillage des étouffes d'Egypte, de Ghazza, et de Bosra . . . ,”¹⁶³ *tamgha* being a stamp. The nature and purpose of this printing of materials, however, is unknown, nor does it appear in Rousseau's list to be restricted to those materials coming from Egypt, Ghazza and the Ḥawrān area.

Other items in Rousseau's list pertaining to materials seem to have no equivalents in the earlier one, for the only other item in the latter is a farm entitled “Ferme du droit sur la soie et la coton du pays, ainsi que la soie d'autre provenance dans la ville d'Alep . . . ,”¹⁶⁴ which might possibly correspond either to Rousseau's “toiles de coton” or “impôts sur les soies.”

“Commestibles, dite Dar-el-Wekalé” might well be equated with the earlier “Ferme du pesage du beurre et autres . . . ” especially since the weighing charge on butter, fruits, vegetables and other perishable products brought into the central market, the Dār al-Wikālah, near Bab Anṭākiyah exists to this day.¹⁶⁵

That there were no corresponding farms in the 1583 list for tobacco and coffee is not surprising, for neither commodity then enjoyed the vogue later attained. Coffee was introduced into Anatolia in 1555,¹⁶⁶ and gained slow acceptance. By the late eighteenth century, however, it, like tobacco, was a popular luxury item, well suited as an object of indirect taxation.

Those who bought these revenue farms were sometimes protected by the Porte when *wālis* attempted to avoid payment of required dues. This occurred to Silāhdār Ḥamzah Pasha in 1768. When he came to Aleppo as *wālī*, he brought with him coffee on which he refused to pay customs to its farmers. The Porte, after having received a petition, ordered the *wālī* to pay the amount which was about 15,000 piasters.¹⁶⁷

The allotment of such large portions of revenue collection to the *muhaṣṣil* and to various *multazims* left little for the *wālī*, possibly by design in that this province was of such strategic value. Two lists of his revenues exist, having such disparities as to merit the reproduction of both.

De Perdriau gives the general picture in 1777:

Ce Gouvernement quoyqu'un des plus honorables de l'Empire ottoman, Alep, ayant la Prémience apres Bagdad, le Caire et Smyrne Est Cependant d'un tres modique revenue, puisqu'il ne Se monte qu'a 42:000 piastres de fixe.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 111, and item no. 6.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 116, item no. 43.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 111, item no. 2, and n. 2. Cf. Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 300, and 300, n. 3, for mention of Dār al-Wikālahs elsewhere.

¹⁶⁶ Pallis, *Janissaries*, 220. For tobacco, see Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 291.

¹⁶⁷ Thomas to Ministry, 15 March 1768, *AE B1-90*. For the biography of Silāhdār Ḥamzah Pasha, cf. Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, II, 254-255.

¹⁶⁸ *AE B1-94*.

One can deduce the meaning of the term "fixed revenues." Historically each *wāli*, then called *beylerbey*, had the right to the revenues of certain lands within his province for the support of the *siḫāhis*, or feudal cavalry, he was to maintain.¹⁶⁹ These revenues originally amounted to 817,000 *aqchahs*¹⁷⁰ but by the end of the eighteenth century this sum amounted to no more than 7,000 piasters.¹⁷¹ The old system may have existed at least in theory. It is possible, therefore, that the item mentioned by de Perdriau was in some manner a survival of the *siḫāhi*-supporting revenues, increased to a degree more proportional with maintenance realities.¹⁷²

In addition to this fixed revenue, the *wāli* is cited by de Perdriau as also receiving various sums which fluctuated in accordance with economic conditions:

1. The dues called 'mechaya' [*mushā'iyah*], paid by the artisan corporations each year, which amounted to 7,000 to 8,000 piasters.

2. The dues on sheep passing through Aleppo from the north to the rest of Syria,¹⁷³ the total of which generally amounted to some 12,000 to 13,000 piasters.

3. The fee on the repartition and collection of the *sāliyān*. This was the yearly budget of the city which comprised items for the maintenance and reparation of the water system, the expenses incurred in entertaining visiting or transiting officials, those incurred for the subsistence of the Porte's messengers and inspectors, and lesser items of a police nature. This budget was made up every six months in Muḥarram and Rajab, and the costs divided among the quarters of the city. Before the budget was deemed valid, it had to be signed by the *qādi*, which cost the city 6,000 to 8,000 piasters, and the *wāli*'s order was essential for its collection. The latter was one of the largest items in the *wāli*'s revenues, for this order often cost the city as much as 40,000 per annum.¹⁷⁴

De Perdriau makes no estimate of the amount a *wāli* could add to these yearly dues of approximately 103,000 piasters through the medium of *avanas* against individuals. It could, of course, vary greatly. According to his own statement, 'Ali Pasha, ejected ignominiously from Aleppo in 1775, amassed 700,000 piasters in four and a half months,¹⁷⁵

¹⁶⁹ Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 144 and 203.

¹⁷⁰ Nūri, *Natayij al-Wuqū'āt*, I, 129.

¹⁷¹ In 1815, 120 aspers equalled 1 piaster: Antoine Rabbath, *Documents inédits pour servir à l'histoire du christianisme en orient* (Paris: Picard, 1906, 1910-1921), I, 572, n. 2.

¹⁷² Volney also mentions a fixed sum that the *wāli* of Aleppo received, namely 80,000 piasters, but indicates that this was the total amount which he could officially accrue: *Voyage*, II, 39-40.

¹⁷³ *Supra*, 37.

¹⁷⁴ De Perdriau, "Mémoire [of 1777]," *AE B¹-94*.

¹⁷⁵ "Relation d'expulsion d'Aly Pacha," 22-28 December 1775, appendix of 4 January 1776, *AE B¹-93*. Volney comments that 'Abdi Pasha "qui commandait il y a douze ou treize ans enleva dans quinze mois plus de 4,000,000 de livres [10

and Rousseau comments that Ibrāhīm Pasha Qaṭṭār Aghāsi was said to have collected some two million piasters a year during his rule.¹⁷⁶

Rousseau's list is more extensive, but he includes certain items which would have been relegated to the category of *avanas*, if they had existed in de Perdriau's time:

1. Ses honoraires sur la Collecte du <i>Salian</i> , ou taxe que s'impose sur les Villages pour Subvenir aux depenses publiques, et sur le <i>miri</i> ou impots annuels des bien fonds.	72,000
2. [Ses honoraires] Sur les produits des Douanes du Gouvernement.	5,000
3. Droits sur les Bestiaux qui entrent dans la Ville à raison de 1/4 P. par mouton.	30,000
4. Taxe particulière et fixé qu'il perçoit par Tête sur ceux des Chrétiens et Juifs qui portent le Turban.	4,000
5. Sur boutiques et manufactures.	2,000
6. Impositions arbitraires sur les chrétiens et les Juifs	10,000
7. La Dime qu'il perçoit Sur les affaires Contentieuses soumise à son jugement.	6,000
8. <i>Avanas</i> , confiscations, Butin fait sur les habitans de la Campagne, et autres bénéfices Casuels.	70,000
	327,300 piastres. ¹⁷⁷

The first item is similar to the third on de Perdriau's list, but it is notable here that the repartition of the costs of the *sāliyān* was on the villages. In general, it may be said, the expenses of the city were passed on to the villages which it controlled. One of the demands of the notables of the city to the Porte in 1770 was:

Que les diverses Dépenses, même Surnuméraires du gouvernement, Seroient à l'avenir imposées Sur les biens Situes hors de la Ville, et non Sur les maisons d' . . . [Alep?], ainsy qu'il s'est practiqué jusqu'à présent.¹⁷⁸

Whether this principle, which may be said to be a distinction between the taxable *miri* property and the non-taxable *mulk* property, was carried over to the repartition of the *sāliyān* or not, cannot be asserted in the absence of more detailed information but the indication of this description of Rousseau is that it was, in fact if not in theory.

The second item does not complement any information available [million piasters], en rançonnant tous les corps de métiers, jusqu'aux nétoyeurs de pipes": *Voyage*, II, 40. He is mistaken as to when 'Abdi Pasha was *wālī* of Aleppo. This pasha was *wālī* of Aleppo from late 1779 to January 1781: Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, III, 354-359, VII, 278; Jawdat, *Ta'rikh*, II, 156-157.

¹⁷⁶ "Description succincte du pachalik d'Alep," 1812, *CCAlep*, XXV, f. 11r.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, f. 27r. and v.

¹⁷⁸ De Perdriau to De Praslin, 8 October 1770, *AE B1-91*.

concerning the conduct of the customs administration, wholly in the hands of the *muḥaṣṣil* as it appears to have been. The sixth is equally inexplicable.

The situation with regard to the head-tax has been clarified above.¹⁷⁹ The tax on Christians and Jews wearing the turban probably does not refer to the *bara'atli* interpreters and their *naḥar firmānlis*,¹⁸⁰ both classes being under the protection of foreign powers, but more likely to those Christians and Jews who were under the protection of the notables of the city. A letter from Abbott is informative on this point and gives a clue to the manner in which this income item should be considered.

. . . on the 4th Inst. His Excellency the Pashaw [Fayḍi Sulaymān Pasha] sent an order to our mulla, and to the four Christian Bishops, with directions to publish it, that hence forward the sons of the Baraatlees with their neffers [*naḥar firmānlis*] are not to wear Calpacks [*qalpaqs*], not to Cloath themselves as usual, but to appear in the Dress of other Christian Subjects of the Grand Signor, which is ordered to be in brown Colours, with Red Shoes, and who ever disobeys his Commands he would order him to be hanged . . . your Excellency may easily perceive, this can be the wook [*sic.*, work] of no body else but that of Ibrahim Aga our Muhasil [Ibrāhīm Agha Qaṭṭār Aghāsi] and Kutsi Effendi our Nakil, but by endeavouring to hurt us, they likewise felt the Effects of it themselves with much dishonor as his Excellency has extended the Order to them also, by Curtailing their numerous Attendance, to a small number, and obliging their Christian protected who wore Calpacks, to conform to the Rules proscribed by him to the Rayas.¹⁸¹

If the notables of the city had Christians and Jews under their protection who were permitted normally to wear the same dress as those under foreign protection, this permission must have been bought. The *wāli* would have received the money since he was the one likely to have granted such dispensation.

The seventh item, the tithes on litigations and disputes brought before the *wāli* for judgment, is a natural transfer of the fee of the *qādi* in the cases brought before him. Not infrequently were cases brought before the *wāli* sitting in full divan, and it is inconceivable that a *wāli* would overlook such a lucrative means of enhancing his income.

Among the "bénéfices casuels" in the last item may be included the presents from the consuls, from the notables of the city, and anyone wishing to curry favor with the governor. These were customarily given on feast days, on the arrival of the governor, and on any occasion of personal celebration, such as the birth of a child or a marriage. These might amount to an imposing figure.

Balanced against these revenues were the expenses which the

¹⁷⁹ *Supra*, 37.

¹⁸⁰ *Supra*, ix-x.

¹⁸¹ Abbott to Ainslie, 17 September 1793, *SP* 110/53, f. 50v.

wālis incurred in obtaining the province and in maintaining, if not enhancing, their influence at Istanbul, not to mention the upkeep of their troops and household, nor the expenses of the administration. Acquisition of the *wilāyah* of Aleppo cost about 200,000 to 240,000 piasters¹⁸² and there were additional payments for services rendered to the *wāli's qapu katkhudāsi*, the representative of his interests in Istanbul.¹⁸³ It can readily be appreciated that the *wāli's* tenure was not profitable unless the figure Rousseau allows for *avanas*, confiscations, and similar extraordinary revenues were materially increased. There can be little doubt that this fact and its logical effect on provincial misgovernment were recognized by the Porte, but the continuance of the policy may be attributed to two considerations on the part of the sultan and his advisors: primarily the need of the Porte for as much income as it could obtain from the provinces for the expenses of wars, administration, and palace luxuries; and secondly the sanguine policy of nullifying tendencies toward autonomy on the part of *wālis* by encouraging a dislike of their regimes among the people they ruled.

The institution of the ulema, those learned in Islam, was thoroughly organized in a hierarchical manner in the Ottoman empire, as was its military and administrative counterpart. Whereas Muslims had originally been excluded from personal service to the sultan, that is, from his *qapūqūli*, they were the sole recruits for the ulema. This institution had two principal divisions: those who served the ritual, the shaykhs, the *kātibs* or scribes, the imams and the muezzins on the one hand, and on the other, the judges and jurists. Both divisions were chosen from among the graduates of the *madrasahs*, or theological colleges, attached to the grand mosques throughout the empire.¹⁸⁴

To become a *qāḍi*, or judge, the aspirant was required to study longer at the *madrasah* than the candidates for ritualist positions. After passing a series of examinations, the former received the title of *mulāzim*, or novice. They might then make the choice between obtaining appointment as minor *qāḍis* or *nā'ibs*, deputy judges, or, by continuing their studies for an additional seven years, achieving the rank of *mudarris*, professor of jurisprudence. In the provinces this rank entitled the holder to the position of local mufti,¹⁸⁵ or of provincial *mudarris*.¹⁸⁶ Those in the capital, however, were entitled to rise by seniority through the ten grades of *mudarrises*, the final being that of the Sulaymāniyah

¹⁸² Rousseau, "Description succincte du pachalik d'Alep," 1812, *CCAlep*, XXV, f. 27r.

¹⁸³ Cf. Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 170, n. 3.

¹⁸⁴ Juchereau de Saint-Denys, *Histoire de l'empire ottoman*, I, 321-323. The students were called *şuṭṭahs*: *ibid.*, and Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 2, 146 and n. 3.

¹⁸⁵ *Infra*, 52-54.

¹⁸⁶ Juchereau, *Histoire*, I, 323-324; Alfred Howe Lybyer, *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1913), 204-205.

mosque, and then to graduate to the highest groups of judicial officers in the empire. The lowest category of this group included the offices of *qāḍi* in Galata, Uskudar, Eyup, Jerusalem, Izmir, Yenişehir, Aleppo and Salonika, termed collectively the *mukhraj mullālari*, "the extracted judges."¹⁸⁷ Above these were the *arba'ah mullālari*, "judges of the four," referring to the cities of Edirne, Bursa, Cairo and Damascus. Next were the *ḥaramayn mullālari*, the judges of Mecca and Medina, and then the *Istanbul qāḍisi*, judge of Istanbul proper, the *qāḍi-askar* of Anatolia, the *qāḍi-askar* of Rumelia, and finally the *shaykh al-Islām*, the chief of all the ulema of the Ottoman empire.¹⁸⁸

Appointments to the upper grades of the judicial hierarchy were annual, the appointee taking office the first of a designated month, usually that of Muḥarram.¹⁸⁹ After serving within one city appropriate to his rank the judge might well continue through the positions of his grade, through those of the next, and in this manner achieve the rank of *qāḍi-askar* of Rumelia, which position he might hold several times.¹⁹⁰

The *qāḍis* of *mukhraj* rank and above were nominated by the *shaykh al-Islām* by means of a list submitted to the sultan through the grand vizir.¹⁹¹ Lesser *qāḍis* were nominated by the *qāḍi-askar* of Rumelia, if the post was in that part of the empire, and by the *qāḍi-askar* of Anatolia if in Asia or Egypt.¹⁹²

This theoretical operation of the Ottoman judicial system, as with other elements of the governmental structure, was subject to abuses and corruption. The higher orders were a virtual monopoly of the important families of the empire and by bribery and influence their sons passed on paper through the lower ranks so that they might attain the *mukhraj* rank at the age of twenty-five or thirty.¹⁹³ Some obtained permission to remain in Istanbul, sending deputies or *mulla wakīlis*, to their posts.¹⁹⁴

¹⁸⁷ D'Ohsson, *Tableau général*, IV, 543; Olivier, *Voyage*, I, 275-276. Among the Ottomans the terms *qāḍi* and *mulla* were somewhat interchangeable, but the latter was usually restricted to those of the higher ranks.

¹⁸⁸ D'Ohsson, *Tableau général*, IV, 531-544; Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 2, 86-91.

¹⁸⁹ In the time of Sultan Sulaymān Qānūni the appointments were for life, until promotion, or during good behaviour: Lybyer, *Government*, 217; Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 2, 89 f.

¹⁹⁰ D'Ohsson, *Tableau général*, IV, 545. A *qāḍi* of these classes might be appointed to a post with the rank, termed *pāyah*, of a higher post. Thus, a certain 'Uthmān Zādah Ibrāhīm Effendi, "Being the mulla of Damascus in 1174 [1760-61], he received the rank [*pāyah*] of Mecca, . . . in 1183 [1769-70], being the *naqīb al-ashraf*, he was *qāḍi* of Istanbul for the second time with the rank of Anatolia": Jawdat, *Tārīkh*, II, 178. It is not clear whether it was the office that could not be held twice or the rank. From the above one would assume the latter, although the former would appear more likely.

¹⁹¹ D'Ohsson, *Tableau général*, IV, 544; Olivier, *Voyage*, I, 271.

¹⁹² Olivier, *Voyage*, I, 272. Volney states that the *qāḍis* of Aleppo, Damascus and Jerusalem were appointed by the *qāḍi-askar*: *Voyage*, II, 231. He does not seem to have been aware that there were two *qāḍi-askars*. His whole chapter on the administration of justice is inadequate and faulty.

¹⁹³ D'Ohsson, *Tableau général*, IV, 546-547; Juchereau, *Histoire*, I, 324.

¹⁹⁴ D'Ohsson, *Tableau général*, IV, 547.

In an attempt to correct this malpractice, Sultan 'Abd-al-Ḥamīd I ordered that *qādis* be present at their posts but the effectiveness of his decree is questionable.¹⁹⁵

A less common but equally disruptive abuse was the appointment of *qādis* of lower rank to that of *mukhraj*. Jābiri Zādah 'Abd-Allāh Effendi, an Aleppine *sharīf* and a *qādi* of the *dawriyah*, or circuit, rank, was promoted through the influence of the *maktūbji effendi*, the grand vizir's general secretary,¹⁹⁶ to the rank of *mukhraj* while *qādi* of Sofia.¹⁹⁷

Even those untrained in jurisprudence could obtain the *mukhraj* rank if their influence were sufficient. Two poets, 'Uthmān Effendi Zādah Dali Amīn Effendi and Diyurakli 'Uthmān Effendi known as Musannaf Effendi, both public lecturers at the Porte, were appointed *qādis* of Aleppo and Jerusalem respectively. Musannaf Effendi, having mismanaged the problem of repairing the Holy Sepulcher, was dismissed in the fall of 1813.¹⁹⁸ Dali Amīn Effendi in Aleppo, apparently of haughty and egotistical character, ridiculed the notables of Aleppo and finally sealed his fate by striking the mufti with a book in the *maḥkamah*. His deposition was demanded in the spring of 1814.¹⁹⁹

The ulema, of whom the *qādis* formed an important segment, were exempt from all taxation or general exaction and from arbitrary confiscation. Nor could they, as a general rule, be put to death.²⁰⁰

The *qādi* of Aleppo was thus of *mukhraj* rank, appointed yearly by the *shaykh al-Islām*, and the *qāḍīliq* of Aleppo was one of the lower rungs of the ladder leading towards the highest position. The rank of *qādi* of Aleppo was also known as that of a mulla of 400 aspers.²⁰¹ Like the *wālī*, the *qādi* paid a fixed sum to the Porte for the appointment.²⁰²

Since Aleppo was too large a city for one judge to administer, the *qādi* was permitted to appoint *nā'ibs*. One of these sat in the outer court of the *maḥkamah* to hear minor cases, and three or four more sat in various parts of the town.²⁰³ The post of *nā'ib* was farmed out by the *qādi* to various effendis of the city, but their judgments were not final, appeal to the *qādi* himself being possible.²⁰⁴

¹⁹⁵ Jawdat, *Ta'riḥ*, IV, 310.

¹⁹⁶ Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 120; Pakalın, *Tarih Deyimleri*, II, 466.

¹⁹⁷ Shāni Zādah, *Ta'riḥ*, II, 328. He was soon, however, dismissed and exiled to Keshān (now Tekirdağ) in 1232/1816-17: *ibid.*

¹⁹⁸ Jawdat, *Ta'riḥ*, X, 145.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 146.

²⁰⁰ Juchereau, *Histoire*, I, 328-329.

²⁰¹ De Perdriau, "Mémoire [of 1777]," *AE B¹-94*. In 1726 the rank is called that of a mulla of 500 aspers: Rabbath, *Documents inédits*, II, 361-362. D'Arvieux also has 500 aspers: *Nachrichten*, VI, 383.

²⁰² Rousseau, "Description succincte du pachalik d'Alep," 1812, *CCAlepp*, XXV, f. 10v.

²⁰³ Russell, *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 317; De Perdriau says that there were four *nā'ibs*: "Mémoire [of 1777]," *AE B¹-94*. D'Arvieux is in agreement with this figure: *Nachrichten*, VI, 384.

²⁰⁴ Russell, *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 317-318; De Perdriau, "Mémoire [of 1777]," *AE B¹-94*; Volney, *Voyage*, II, 232. Volney does not mention the *nā'ib*.

Assisting the courts were several *kātibs*, who acted as court secretaries, recording decisions, and as notaries in the sense that they drew up legal deeds, contracts, letters and the like, for which they received fees.²⁰⁵ No lawyers existed, each participant pleading his own case, but there were several *shuhūd*, or professional witnesses, whose duties were analogous to those of the modern notaries, with the addition of court testimony.²⁰⁶ The court also had a bailiff to issue summons to litigants.²⁰⁷

The revenue of the *qāḍi* was derived from the sale of the office of *nā'ib*, certain dues such as that for his signature on the *wālī's* municipal budget, which brought him six to eight thousand piasters,²⁰⁸ and the ten percent of the judgment in cases brought before him, paid by the one who won it.²⁰⁹ It is noteworthy that one of the interim reforms of the notables in 1770 was reported as follows: "Que les fraix des Procedures ne se payeroient au Mehkemé qu'à raison de cinq pour cent au lieu de dix qu'exigent le Cady."²¹⁰ In theory, the *qāḍi* received fees only when he was in need, but custom had long established the ten percent.²¹¹ To increase the judgment beyond reason was therefore a common practice enabling the *qāḍi* to reap profits.²¹²

The *qāḍi* also acted as executor of the Porte for the estates of those who died in Aleppo. In certain cases,²¹³ the Porte inherited a part or whole and to get an estate released the inheritors often had to bribe the *qāḍi*.²¹⁴ Another complaint to the Porte from the Aleppo notables in 1770 dealt with this:

Que lorsqu'une Succession passeroit aux Enfans du mort, le Mehkemé n'y mettroit point le Scelle, ni n'en demanderoit la dixième partie; que celles passant aux Collateraux en seroient susceptibles; mais qu'alors il ne seroit payé que quatre aspres par piastre du montant des biens laisses.²¹⁵

According to Juchereau de Saint-Denys, the custom in collateral inheritances was as follows: "Un homme qui hérite de son frère mort sans enfans doit payer au souverain un droit de trois pour cent. A défaut de frères, les biens passent aux neveux. Les cousins ne sont pas

²⁰⁵ Russell, *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 321.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 319; W. Heffening, "Shāhid," *ET*1.

²⁰⁷ Ferdinand Taoutel, ed., *Daftar Akhawiyat 'Uzbān al-Arman wa-Ma ilayhi min al-Fawā'id wa-al-Ta'limāt* (Beirut: Catholic Press, 1950), 53.

²⁰⁸ De Perdriau, "Mémoire [of 1777]," *AE B*¹-94.

²⁰⁹ Russell, *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 318; Juchereau, *Histoire*, I, 342.

²¹⁰ De Perdriau to De Praslin, 8 October 1770, *AE B*¹-91.

²¹¹ Tyan, *Organisation judiciaire*, 2nd ed., 333 and 337; d'Arvieux, *Nachrichten*, VI, 384.

²¹² Russell, *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 318; Juchereau, *Histoire*, I, 342.

²¹³ Juchereau, *Histoire*, I, 334.

²¹⁴ Russell, *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 318. The *qāḍi*, according to d'Arvieux, was entitled to 10 percent of these estates but means were devised to avoid the passage of an inheritance through his hands: *Nachrichten*, VI, 390.

²¹⁵ De Perdriau to De Praslin, 8 October 1770, *AE B*¹-91.

admis à hériter."²¹⁶ The piaster being rated at 120 aspers in the eighteenth century, a tax of four aspers per piaster was a little more than three percent.

The executorship for the sultan was one of the numerous administrative duties of the *qāḍi*. Others included the guardianship of incompetents, or orphaned minors, and of property of absentee or unknown ownership, the marriage of women of age,²¹⁷ the execution of wills, the administration of the *awqāf* and the mosques,²¹⁸ and the regulation of buildings and public works,²¹⁹ in addition to the supervision of the *shuhūd* and the *nā'ibs*.

By far the most important role was that of the adjudication of civil and personal conflicts between individuals. This duty together with the administrative requirements, however, are outside the realm of this study which concerns itself only with those facets of duties in conflict with the authority of the *wāli*. Such conflict served to strengthen the rivalry between the two officials, a rivalry inherent within the Ottoman system of government.²²⁰

This area of conflict is difficult to delineate, especially since the concept of separation of powers, to the degree understood in Western political science, is foreign to Islamic political ideals wherein the caliph was the chief of the Islamic community or *'umma*. Mawardi describes this: "L'institution de l'imāmat a pour raison d'être qu'il supplée le prophétisme . . . pour la sauvegarde de la religion et l'administration des intérêts terrestres."²²¹ Regarding the judicial institution, Emile Tyan has emphasized that

. . . cette institution ne constitue pas un pouvoir séparé et indépendant des autres pouvoirs de l'état; . . . en particulier, elle est dans un état de dépendance étroite à l'égard du pouvoir exécutif, qui relève en principe du même titulaire.²²²

²¹⁶ Juchereau, *Histoire*, I, 334.

²¹⁷ Tyan, *Organisation judiciaire*, 2nd. ed., 359-374. According to the implication of Russell, the *qāḍi* supervised all marriage contracts: *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 283 and 437.

²¹⁸ Tyan, *Organisation judiciaire*, 2nd. ed., 374-384, 393-397. The *qāḍi*, possibly as an extension of his authority over the mosques, could forbid the azan, thus signalling a revolt against the *wāli*: De Perdriau, "Relation de l'expulsion d'Aly Pacha," 22-28 December 1775, *AE B*¹-93.

²¹⁹ Tyan, *Organisation judiciaire*, 2nd. ed., 350-351. The above description of the administrative duties of the *qāḍi* is based on Tyan's analysis of al-Māwardi's *al-Ahkām al-Saltāniyah*. Either by extension of his supervision of the *awqāf* or under his regulatory powers over public works, the *qāḍi* directed the annual task of cleaning the Aleppo aqueduct, largely supported by *awqāf*: Russell, *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 43.

²²⁰ Cf. the statement of Juchereau, *Histoire*, I, 329-330.

²²¹ Abu-al-Ḥasan 'Alī al-Māwardī, *Les Statuts gouvernementaux ou règles de droit public et administratif*, translation by E. Fagnan of *al-Ahkām al-Saltāniyah* (Algiers: Jourdan, 1915), 5 and 30-31.

²²² Tyan, *Organisation judiciaire*, 2nd. ed., 11.

Authority was delegated, in part or in whole, by the sovereign, the caliph or sultan, or by his representatives,²²³ and any conflict of jurisdiction could have arisen by the mere overlapping of jurisdictional delegations.

It has been asserted that the Ottoman theory of government, applying the "maxims of the traditional Perso-Turkish political philosophy" was directed toward "centralization and the balance of force." Thus, "while the Pasha, in accordance with the traditional Islamic system, was possessed with judicial powers, the *qāḍī* and the other religious dignitaries enjoyed, and exercised, the right of sending protests and memorials direct to Istanbul, seldom without effect."²²⁴

It is probable, however, that the ulema had greater powers of checking the *wāli* than solely that of reporting to the Porte.

In the ordinary course of affairs he [the *wāli*] possesses no right to inflict capital punishment, without a formal trial at the Mahkamy, or, at least, without having previously procured the Mufti's sanction by a Fitwa: neither has he a right to seize any one's property. It is true, legal forms are too often disregarded . . . but the power of doing this, is an unconstitutional [!] usurpation, and in reality less frequently exercised than is commonly imagined.²²⁵

No corroborative material for this statement has been found; in fact Gibb and Bowen state that officers of the army and public administration could try and sentence offenders even to death without the intervention of any officer of the law as such.²²⁶ This is a reflection of the restricted competence of the *qāḍī* in Islamic law, together with the concept of the delegation of powers. A larger field of the extraordinary justice overlaid the ordinary law of the *qāḍī* in mediaeval Islam, the area of *maṣālim* jurisprudence, or the judging of wrongful acts. Here the restrictions of admissible evidence were relaxed in the interests of justice and the judge had to be one with the power to enforce his adjudications, generally the sovereign.²²⁷

Although the *maṣālim* system of justice decayed with the Mamlūks, due to the inaccessibility of the sultans, the effect was a broadening of the powers of the *qāḍī* through the acquisition of a certain competence in extraordinary justice termed *al-siyāsāt al-shar'īyah*, a procedure by which a solution conformable to the two considerations of utility and possibility might be reached in a particular case.²²⁸ This was less arbitrary than *maṣālim* justice and its domain of application was less vast.

²²³ *Ibid.* "Cette notion de délégation est très féconde dans l'histoire de la constitution, non seulement du pouvoir judiciaire, mais, de tous les autres pouvoirs, en Islam": *ibid.*

²²⁴ Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 201.

²²⁵ Russell, *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 225.

²²⁶ Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 12.

²²⁷ The whole concept of *maṣālim* justice is treated in Tyan, *Organisation judiciaire*, 2nd. ed., 433-446.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, 161-162.

It is probable that both the concept of *maẓālīm* and that of *siyāsah* were carried over in more restricted form to the Ottoman period, the *wāli* and the *qāḍī* both sharing the former, the *qāḍī* alone dispensing the latter in that it was an extension of the *sharʿ*, or ordinary justice. It is thus that the conflict in judicial matters existed.

The newly appointed *qāḍī* of Aleppo in 1781 released the prisoners of the former *wāli*, 'Abdi Pasha, from the citadel because the cases against them had not been proven, while the new *wāli*, 'Uthmān Pasha, ordered the *qāḍī* not to send anyone to the citadel nor to kill anyone except in accordance with *sharʿ* law.²²⁹

In 1775, the Janissaries refused to obey 'Ali Pasha, one of the most avaricious and incompetent *wālis* which Aleppo knew in the eighteenth century, and revolted against him. Their ardor soon cooled but the *qāḍī* took up the fight and forbade that the azan be cried from the minarets, and then issued a *ḥujjah*, legal decree, that the city take up arms and drive the *wāli* out.²³⁰

Both the *wāli* and the *qāḍī* policed the markets and streets. We have already noted the manner in which the *wāli* exercised this function.²³¹ The *qāḍī*, too, went personally into the *sūqs* to supervise them,²³² a general function of the rank as indicated by the practice in Istanbul.²³³ Ṣārī Muḥammad Pasha in his treatise of counsel to Ottoman officials adds that the policing of markets was the responsibility of the grand vizir's deputies and the military commanders as well as of the *qāḍīs*.²³⁴

The duties of the Ottoman *qāḍī* in Aleppo may be summarized as judicial, administrative and repressive. Repressive justice on the part of the *qāḍīs* could extend to the city in general, thus supplementing that of the *wāli*. Yet the principal task of the *qāḍī* lay in the realm of civil justice.

On a question of the interpretation of the *fiqh* in a civil case, the *qāḍī*, or anyone involved, might have recourse to the opinion of the mufti. This individual was drawn from the ranks of the provincial *mudarrises*, appointed annually by the *shaykh al-Islām*, but usually re-appointed over many years.²³⁵ His revenues, the sources of which re-

²²⁹ Tabbākh, *I'lām*, III, 359-360.

²³⁰ De Perdriau, "Relation de l'expulsion d'Aly Pacha," 22-28 December 1775, *AE B1-93*.

²³¹ *Supra*, 25-27.

²³² Tabbākh, *I'lām*, III, 352.

²³³ D'Ohsson, *Tableau général*, VII, 157.

²³⁴ Walter Livingston Wright, Jr., *Ottoman Statecraft: the Book of Counsel for Vizirs and Governors* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1935), 77-78.

²³⁵ Russell, *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 320. Olivier states that they were appointed for life: *Voyage*, I, 278. This is probably a mistaken transposition of former practice, for Lybyer indicates it was the practice in the time of Sulaymān Qānūni: *Government*, 207. Rousseau makes the extraordinary statement that the

main undefined, but which were undoubtedly based on fees for the delivery of a *fatwa*, were not of great magnitude²³⁶ but the post carried at least the potential of considerable local prestige. With respect to official position, he ranked lower than the *qādi* but since he was the highest continual representative of the ulema in a given city, he had an opportunity to build up an influential following.²³⁷ Theoretically the position of the mufti was the final grade for those who chose it, the only advancement being to cities of greater importance.²³⁸ In fact, however, this was not necessarily true, for the whim of the Porte could override legal restrictions. Muḥammad Qudsi Effendi, for example, was mufti of Aleppo in 1793, was deposed the following year,²³⁹ but was then appointed *qādi* of Erzerum with the rank of *mukhraj* in November of 1800 at the suggestion of Yūsuf Dīyā'-al-Dīn Pasha, the grand vizir.²⁴⁰

One subordinate post in this branch of the administration can be distinguished, that of the *amin al-fatwa*, the scribe of the *fatwas* and recorder of them as precedents.²⁴¹ 'Abd-al-Qādir Effendi al-Ḥasabi, a minor Aleppine poet, is recorded as having held the post while 'Abd-Allāh Effendi al-Jābiri was mufti.²⁴²

Since the mufti held the highest rank among the provincial *mudarrises*, it may safely be assumed that he was their chief. As there is no evidence that he selected them, his power over the *madrasahs* may not have been material. His influence over them, on the other hand, may well have been a function of his prestige.

The scope of the mufti's responsibility was limited to the *qaḍa*, as demonstrated by the fact that Arīḥa, Dīr Kūsh, and Ma'arrat al-Na'mān all had their own muftis.²⁴³ The latter, however, were of lower rank than that of Aleppo.

In addition to the official Ḥanafī mufti in Aleppo, there could be

position of mufti was an hereditary privilege: "Description succincte du pachalik d'Alep," *CCAlep*, XXV, f. 28r. Both the statements of Olivier and Rousseau are belied by evidence in the history of Aleppo: 'Abd-Allāh Effendi ibn-Muṣṭafa al-Jābiri was twice mufti of Aleppo. He was chosen to replace Chalabi Effendi on the latter's death in 1786: Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, III, 366, VII, 156. In 1794 he was re-appointed mufti when Muḥammad Qudsi Effendi was deposed from that position: Abbott to Liston, 26 August 1794, *SP* 110/53, f. 62r

²³⁶ Russell, *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 320.

²³⁷ "Ces Docteurs, malgré l'importance et la grandeur de leurs fonctions, n'occupoient cependant que la second rang dans l'ordre hiérarchique. Dans la Capitale comme dans les provinces, ils cédoient le pas aux *Cadys* qui sont les juges ordinaires de chaque ville": D'Ohsson, *Tableau général*, IV, 496.

²³⁸ Olivier, *Voyage*, I, 278.

²³⁹ Abbott to Ainslie, 29 June 1793, Abbott to Liston, 26 August 1794, *SP* 110/53, ff. 47v. and 62r.

²⁴⁰ Jawdat, *Ta'rikh*, VII, 94.

²⁴¹ Pakalın describes only the *fatwah amīni* of the *shaykh al-Islām: Tarih Deyimlerī*, I, 621. It may be assumed, however, that provincial *amin al-fatwahs* had the same duties.

²⁴² Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, III, 259.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*, 130, 149, and 276.

muftis for three remaining *madhhabs*, school of *fiqh*, if there were sufficient need. We know that there was a Shāfi'i mufti in Aleppo in the eighteenth century;²⁴⁴ there may have been others. These muftis, however, had no official standing before the *qāḍi*; their presence was only "for the private convenience of the followers of the other schools."²⁴⁵

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 191.

²⁴⁵ D. B. MacDonald, "Fatwa." *EI*¹.

CHAPTER III

THE JANISSARIES OF ALEPPO

'Janissaries' was the term applied by contemporary European authors to one of the factions into which the Muslim population of Aleppo was split. It connotes an institution peculiar to the Ottoman Empire, a standing infantry corps originally recruited from among the Christian population of the empire and trained in Islam and warfare to become the nucleus of the army.¹ Gradually the corps became corrupted to such a degree that it bore little resemblance to the prototype. This was certainly true of the Aleppo Janissaries in the early nineteenth century. They appear more as an armed political party than as a military unit.

This party, however, had no established organization; it was no political party in the modern governmental sense. Its leadership was not necessarily vested in one man. In fact, in the days of its greatest power in Aleppo, the number of leaders would have been difficult to determine. John Lewis Burckhardt put the leadership in the hands of a clique of six, yet with one Ḥājji Ibrāhīm Agha al-Ḥarbalī as the wealthiest and most powerful.² The French consul, Joseph Louis Rousseau, writing about the same time, however, calls ibn-Ḥarbalī merely one of the principal Janissaries.³ In later years it is true that the leadership rested with one person, Muḥammad Agha ibn-al-Qaṭṭān,⁴ and on his death another single leader was chosen,⁵ but this would seem to be the exception rather than the rule. One acquires a definite impression that it was a clique that controlled the Janissaries of Aleppo, not in general one individual.

It is notable that internal frictions did not rend the outward harmony of this ruling group. There is but one instance in which rivalry

¹ The principal sources on the Janissaries are: İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilâtından Kapukulu Ocakları* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1943-1944), I; Ahmed Djevad Bey, *État militaire ottoman depuis la fondation de l'empire jusqu'à nos jours*, tr. by Georges Macrides (Constantinople: Journal La Turquie, 1882); D'Ohsson, *Tableau général de l'empire ottoman*, VII, 310-372; Albert Howe Lybyer, *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the time of Sulaiman the Magnificent* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1913), 91-97; and Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 56-66 and 314-326.

² *Travels in Syria*, 653. Burckhardt gives the name of this *āgha* as "Hadji Ibrahim Ibn Herbely." Cf. Shihābi, *Lubnān*, 146 for the above rendering of his name.

³ "Bulletin," 10 September 1811, *CCAlep*, XXIV, f. 388r.

⁴ Matthieu Lesseps to Comte Guilleminot, 18 July, 1824, *CCAlep*, XXVII, f. 286v.

⁵ Lesseps, "Bulletin politique de la Syrie," August 1824, *CCAlep*, XXVII, f. 316v. In 1826, however, Lesseps speaks again of "les chefs des Janissaries": Lesseps to Ministry, 24 February 1826, *CCAlep*, XXVIII, f. 189v.

between two of the *āghas*⁶ threatened to disrupt this apparent harmony: in 1807 the arrest of Ibrāhīm al-Ḥarbali in a public assembly by Aḥmad Agha Ḥummuṣāh climaxed a long standing rivalry between the two, but al-Ḥarbali was later released, first on the conditions of exile, but then without condition.⁷ Perhaps the pressure of other Janissary *āghas*, the payment of money to Aḥmad Agha, or both were instrumental in the latter's reversal of position. In any case, an open breach that could have been exploited by the adversaries of the Janissaries was avoided. The constant vulnerability of the Janissaries' position forced them to compromise their differences and present a united front.⁸

It is quite apparent that the *āghas* were not elected; no evidence of an elective process has been discovered. It is equally apparent that they were not selected by any higher authority. In its political aspects, the dominant ones, the corps was a law unto itself. The *āghas* may have had comparable positions of military leadership.⁹ If so, it is likely that these military ranks were but confirmation of their established political positions. The usual method of patronage probably operated in the selection of the leadership clique.

Patronage could be of two general types: that accorded in return for household service, and that given in return for payment. Both were common in the Ottoman Empire. Because the households of officials were modelled on that of the sultan,¹⁰ their extent was an indication of prestige. It is therefore logical to assume that the *āghas* of the Aleppo Janissaries had their households, although it has been said that they lived modestly.¹¹ If the apprentice pleased the *āgha* by his loyalty and service, he might rise rapidly and ultimately be placed in a position outside the household, where he might be of use to his patron but exercise more independence.¹²

In the other type of patronage the protégé never was a part of the household but in need of the protection the patron's position and prestige might give him. The protégé thus would link his career to the fortune of the patron in return for payment in cash or favors. Any such relationship had its hazards as well as its advantages. The decline from favor of the patron reflected on the status of the protégé. For instance, the

⁶ The term *āgha* is here used, as it was at the time in Aleppo, as a general honorific, "a petty gentleman," rather than a title of office. Cf. James W. Redhouse, *A Turkish and English Lexicon* (Constantinople: Matteosian, 1921).

⁷ Corancez, "Bulletin," 30 August 1807, 11 October 1807, *CCAleph*, XXIII, ff. 417r and 436r.

⁸ Cf. *infra*, 126-127.

⁹ *Infra*, 67.

¹⁰ Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1. 363.

¹¹ Burckhardt, *Travels in Syria*, 654.

¹² The case of Ibrāhīm Agha Qaṭṭār Aghāsi may be cited as an example, although he was not a Janissary. He rose in the service of Chalabi Effendi from the position of a *qahwāhji*, became the *muḥaṣṣil* of Aleppo and finally *wālī*: Abbott to Liston, 22 October 1794, *SP* 110/53, f. 63v.; Burckhardt, *Travels in Syria*, 649-651.

deposition of the grand vizir, Yūsuf Dīyā'-al-Dīn Pasha, in 1805 decisively affected the fortunes of Ibrāhīm Pasha Qaṭṭār Aghāsī and his son Muḥammad. The latter lost the *wilāyah* of Aleppo thereby and Ibrāhīm Pasha was transferred from the *wilāyah* of Damascus to one carrying less prestige.¹³

Purchase of influence and protection was so common in the empire, both among the administrative officers and the ulema,¹⁴ that it is certain to have been employed among the Janissaries of Aleppo.

The advantages to the patron of having such protégés are quite apparent. Those in his household not only attended him but were a factor in his prestige; the cash payments of those outside his service swelled his revenues or rendered him favors which would accomplish the same purpose. Again, both types provided the nucleus of an organization under his control by which he might crush or at least hamper his opposition. Aḥmad Agha Ḥummuṣāh would have been unable to move against Ibrāhīm al-Ḥarbālī in the bold fashion described¹⁵ had he not had a personal organization on which he could rely.

To the protégé the advantages were two-fold: the possibility of advancement and protection. Security was vital to any career in a political system in which sudden arbitrary acts such as arrest or confiscation of property were the rule rather than the exception.

One position in the stages of advancement of Janissaries can be determined conjecturally: that of the leader or shaykh of the quarter, or *hārah*. It was generally true that at this time the quarters of a Syrian city were populated by those having some bond between them, "some natural tie, either of origin, occupation or religion, thus constituting a homogeneous group."¹⁶ Each of these quarters formed an administrative unit having a shaykh in charge of its affairs. This official was responsible for the maintenance of order, the collection of taxes, and the execution of regulations or commands pertaining to his quarter.¹⁷ Certain of the quarters of Aleppo were inhabited almost exclusively by Janissaries. These quarters were grouped in a suburban arc to the east of the citadel, the focal point of the city, and were agglomerated under the names Bānqūsa, Bāb al-Nayrāb, Qārliq, Bāb al-Malik and Bāb al-Maqām.¹⁸

¹³ *Infra*, 125.


¹⁴ Cf. for example, the role of Yūsuf Agha, the *wālidah sulṭān katkhudāsī*, in the advancement of Muḥammad Qudsi Effendi, one time mufti and *naqīb al-ashraf* of Aleppo: Jawdat, *Ta'rikh*, VIII, 130-131. For the influence of Yūsuf Agha at court, see J. H. Kramers, "Selim III," *EI*.

¹⁵ *Supra*, 55-56.

¹⁶ Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 279. Cf. also, Jean Sauvaget, "Esquisse d'une histoire de la ville de Damas," *REI*, VIII (1934), 453. That such was the case in Aleppo is amply demonstrated in Sauvaget, *Alep*, 61-64, 105-106, 108, 118, 146-148, 173-176, 179-181, and 223-231.

¹⁷ D'Arvieux calls the chief of the quarter the *imām*, the collector of the house tax the shaykh: *Nachrichten*, VI, 373. Sauvaget, however, calls the shaykh the responsible official: "Esquisse," *REI*, *loc. cit.*

¹⁸ Sauvaget, *Alep*, 230-231; Qara'li, *Aḥamm Ḥawādith*, 64.



ALEPPO AT THE END OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

A—the Citadel; B—Bāb al-Naşr; C—Bāb Antākiyah; D—Bāb al-Nayrāb; E—Bāb al-Malik; F—Bāb al-Maqām; G—Bānqūsa; H—Qārliq; I—Dallālīnah; J—al-Sakhānah; K—Ṭāṭārlar; L—Zabbālīnah; M—Qādi-'askar; N—Aghājiq; O—Badānjiq; P—Sashlūkhānah; Q—the *takkiyah* of al-Shaykh abu-Bakr; R—the Serail; S—the covered *suqs*; T—the Qaysariyat al-'Arab or Bedouin market; U—the Khān al-Qaşşābiyah; V—the camel market; ⊙ —mosque; ⊕ —church. Adapted by permission of the publisher from Jean Sauvaget, *Alep: Essai sur le développement d'une grande ville syrienne* (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1941).

The actual *hārahs*, or quarters enclosed by gates, in these districts are difficult to determine since the districts had no established boundaries, but they probably numbered at least twenty-five.¹⁹ It can be asserted with some certainty that since these quarters were populated by Janissaries, their shaykhs were likewise Janissaries. The leadership of a *hārah* would have been a logical step toward the inner coterie of *āghas*.

Any non-Janissary in the *hārah* would also have come under the *āgha's* jurisdiction, but the former, because of his non-affiliation with the party, had to pay protection money to the *āgha*. When the Janissaries gained control of the whole city,²⁰ they extended this system to all those who were not Janissaries.

Every inhabitant of Aleppo, whether Turk or Christian, provided he be not himself a Janissary, is obliged to have a protector among them to whom he applies in case of need, to arrange his litigations, to enforce payment from his creditors, and to protect him from the vexations and exactions of other Janissaries. Each protector receives from his client a sum proportional to the circumstances of the client's affairs. It varies from twenty to two thousand piasters a year, besides which, whenever the protector terminates an important business to the client's wishes, he expects some extraordinary reward.²¹

The clients of each Janissary *āgha* and his jurisdiction were at least theoretically inviolable by others.²² When two *āghas* were adversaries in a matter involving their respective clients, it was often the more powerful of the two who won for his client, but if they were approximately equal, a compromise "in such a way as to give justice only half its due" was likely to have been arranged.²³

This system entailed, to a degree at least, the by-passing of the *qāḍī*. Where that official did judge a case, the judgment was first approved by the Janissary *āghas*²⁴ so that the *qāḍī* was judge in name only.

Some contemporary observers were highly critical of the Janissary regime and indicated that the people were dissatisfied with it.²⁵ Burckhardt, however, has pointed out that the Janissary administration was on the whole favored over that of the *wāli*. Instead of avarias that struck a few and might bankrupt them, all but the Janissaries were subject to

¹⁹ This figure is derived from a comparison of a reconstructed plan of Aleppo in the mid-nineteenth century: Sauvaget, *Alep*, pl. LXX, and a modern map of Aleppo naming the quarters: Institut géographique national au Levant, *Alep, échelle 1:10.000* (edition of July, 1941).

²⁰ *Infra*, 125-130.

²¹ Burckhardt, *Travels in Syria*, 654.

²² Rousseau, "Description succincte du pachalik d'Alep," 1812, *CC Alep*, XXV, f. 10r.

²³ Burckhardt, *Travels in Syria*, 654.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 653.

²⁵ Rousseau to Champagny, Duc de Cadore, 3 July 1811, *CC Alep*, XXIV, ff. 357r. and 358r.

the same system of justice and had the assurance that the remainder of their fortunes would be safeguarded.²⁶ John Barker, the British consul, according to his son, sensed the same feeling among the people :

Mr. Barker frequently in his letters avers that the people were far happier under the rule of the Janissaries and the Shereefs, who dealt even-handed justice to all indiscriminately; and who, having local interests in common with the townspeople, refrained from tyrannising and harsh measures, than under the rapacious Osmanlee Pachas sent from Constantinople to govern the provinces, who had no such interests.²⁷

It should not be assumed, however, that the interests of the populace were in any way the guiding consideration of the *āghas*. On the contrary, self-interest predominated. "The Janissaries chiefly exercise their power with a view to the filling of their purses."²⁸ Their means of profit during the period from 1805 to 1813 when they virtually controlled the city may be derived from the conditions Rāghib Pasha sought to impose on the Janissaries in the fall of 1811. He demanded of them the following :

1) de rompre toutes vos relations d'intérêt avec les Kurdes qui ne Cessent d'inquieter les Caravanes et les habitans des Campagnes, dont ils Viennent Vous Rendre les Dépouilles aux prix que vous y avez mis vous-mêmes, par la plus infâme des Conventions.

2) de mettre fin au Monopole que vous avez inventé pour vous enrichir aux dépens du Peuple, dont la misère s'aggrave Journellement par l'effet de votre insatiable Cupidité.

3) de Supprimer tous les tribunaux arbitraires et Captieux Exigés par vôtre avarice et votre Orgueil, et où la loi Vient Se briser au mépris de notre Sainte Religion.

4) de renoncer à toute Espèce de pretentions sur les revenus des villages dont les Devastations actuelles sont dûe à votre administration oppressive et Vicieuse.

5) de vous engager enfin par un acte Juridique à Souscrire à toutes les mesures de police que je Serai dans le Cas de prendre et d'exécuter.²⁹

With regard to the second condition, the monopoly of food supplies and other basic necessities, it was common practice for those seeking power to attempt to gain control over them and hold them off the market for higher prices and consequent profit. Not infrequently a total lack of grain, the principal basic commodity, existed in the city after a relatively abundant harvest in the country.³⁰ For many the

²⁶ *Travels in Syria*, 654.

²⁷ Edward B. B. Barker, *Syria and Egypt*, I, 85.

²⁸ Burckhardt, *Travels in Syria*, 653.

²⁹ Rousseau, "Neuvième bulletin," entry of October 23, 1811, *CC Alep*, XXIV, f. 417r.

³⁰ Corancez, "Bulletin des nouvelles d'Alep," 9 Prairial Yr. 13/29 May 1805, *CC Alep*, XXIII, f. 243r.; De Perdriau to De Praslin, 17 August 1770, *AE B¹-91*; Ṭabākh, *Flām*, III, 352; Abbott to Ainslie, 18 September 1792, *SP* 110/53, f. 40r.; Jawdat, *Tārīkh*, VI, 117; Qara'li, *Ahamm Hawādith*, 60.

monopoly of grain yielded one of the necessities for power: money. Without it protection could not be bought nor prestige acquired. Ibrāhīm Agha Qaṭṭār Aghāsi's control over the grain of Aleppo was one of his principal weapons,³¹ and the same means was used by the Janissaries.

Je Citerai . . . la ville d'Alep où la population quoique très nombreuse et les Comestibles abondans, les Prix de ceux-ci ne laissent pas cependant d'être Excessivement cher; les Chefs des Janissaries y ayant tout accaparé de manière que rien ne s'y achète ni se s'y vend, que par leur entremise, ou du moins sous leurs auspices immediate. Il n'est donc pas étonnant que pouvant à leur gré en assigner le taux, les objets de consommation Eprouvent des differences marquantes. . . .³²

It was also the practice of the Janissaries, in keeping with their control of the grain supply, to pay the *mīri* themselves and then collect it from the villages.³³ This corresponded with their policy on the manufactured goods the city produced. On what they themselves did not own³⁴ they levied heavy taxes.³⁵ In addition, their principal *āghas* bought each year from the Porte the most lucrative *iltisāms* of the province.³⁶ From the total of all these sources of income it is not surprising that Burckhardt estimates "that the yearly income of several of them [the Janissary *āghas*] cannot amount to less than thirty or forty thousand pounds sterling."³⁷

The number of Janissaries in Aleppo is difficult to determine, but there are some estimates and related evidence. These have an important bearing on the discussion of the nature of the Aleppo Janissaries.

In 1769 about 2500 Janissaries left Aleppo to participate in the war then being fought against Russia.³⁸ Since there is no further mention of Janissaries in Aleppo that year, it is possible that most of them were included in this detachment. De Perdriau in his memoir on Aleppo in 1777 states that the Aleppo troops consisted of three to four thousand Janissaries.³⁹ The Janissary enrollment was considerably swelled during the 1768-1774 war with Russia⁴⁰ and therefore such an increase in Aleppo is not unreasonable. Michael Devezin, British consul in Aleppo from 1786 to 1791, credits the Janissaries with a membership of twelve

³¹ Abbott to Ainslie, 18 September 1792, *SP* 110/53, f. 40r.

³² Rousseau to Champagny, 10 January 1811, *CCAlep*. XXIV, ff. 298v. and 299r.

³³ Burckhardt, *Travels in Syria*, 653.

³⁴ The Janissaries and *ashraf* were exempt from certain dues which were levied on the manufacturing of silk. Many of them were active in this industry as a result: De Perdriau, "Mémoire [of 1777]," *AE B¹-94*.

³⁵ Burckhardt, *Travels in Syria*, 654.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 653.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 654.

³⁸ De Perdriau to De Praslin, 15 April 1769, *AE B¹-91*.

³⁹ *AE B¹-94*.

⁴⁰ Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu Ocakları*, I, 618-619.

thousand,⁴¹ and Browne, who visited Aleppo in 1797, says that they numbered no more than fifteen thousand.⁴² Devezin and Browne, however, are far above other estimates. Olivier, having spent several months in Aleppo in the winter of 1795-1796, renders an estimate of seven to eight thousand,⁴³ while Burckhardt, a keen and accurate observer, mentions the figure of three to four thousand.⁴⁴

The translation found in the British archives of a document delivered to the British minister at Istanbul, Spencer Smith, by the *ra'īs effendi*, or foreign minister, gives 5,000 as the official figure of the number of Janissaries ordered to march from Aleppo to the campaign against the French in Egypt. According to the letter from Smith to the Levant Company⁴⁵ to which the translation was appended, the orders were sent out during the year 1799.⁴⁶ This does not agree with the statement of the Aleppo consul of the Directorate, Jean Charles Marie Choderlos, that the first order had been for eight to ten thousand Janissaries from Aleppo and that this figure was later reduced to 3,600.⁴⁷

Faced with these numerous and divergent estimates it is unreasonable to attempt the determination of an exact figure. That the Janissaries numbered somewhat less than ten thousand in the early nineteenth century would be the maximum feasible estimate.

More important, perhaps, is the question of the composition of this party, from what classes and types of Aleppines its membership was drawn. Some idea may be gleaned from topographical and social information in the sources. The districts in which the Janissaries were concentrated have been noted.⁴⁸ With the exception of Bāb al-Maqām these districts owed their origin to the caravan trade, the gradual creeping of the settled area out along the highways to Baghdad and Diyār Bakr.⁴⁹ Qārliq and Bāb al-Malik were extensions of Bānqūsa and Bāb al-Nayrāb respectively. The names of the *hārah*s indicate the occupations of the residents of these districts: Dallālīnah, that of the caravan guides; Zabbālīnah, the quarter of the street cleaners; al-Sakhānah, the quarter of the people from Sakhnah, a desert caravan town; and Ṭāṭār-lar, the quarter of the post messengers.⁵⁰ But even more definite than

⁴¹ Michael Devezin, *Nachrichten über Aleppo und Cypern* (Weimar, 1804), 8-9, cited in Sauvaget, *Alep*, 197, n. 726.

⁴² *Travels*, 385.

⁴³ *Voyage*, IV, 170.

⁴⁴ *Travels in Syria*, 653.

⁴⁵ Dated 10 June 1799, FO 78/22.

⁴⁶ Killis was ordered to send 1,000 Janissaries, Mar'ash 500, al-Raqqah and Birahjik 1,000, Diyār Bakr 1,000, Damascus 10,000 and Antioch 1,000: *ibid.*

⁴⁷ Choderlos to the Citizen Minister of Exterior Relations, 14 Primaire Yr. 7/4 December 1798, *CCAlep*, XXIII, f. 129v. Choderlos was imprisoned in the citadel at the time, however. The fact that he got this information and moreover was able to forward it to Paris hardly speaks well for Ottoman military security.

⁴⁸ *Supra*, 57.

⁴⁹ Sauvaget, *Alep*, 175-176.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 230, nn. 859 and 860.

these connections with the caravan trade are the markets, buildings and the like within the quarters: Sūq al-Ghazl, or thread market for the tent makers, the shops for blacksmiths, saddlers, ostlers, and porters, the market for caravan food supplies, and the storehouses for grain.⁵¹ The slaughterhouses also were on the outskirts of this section, the carcasses being brought in to the butcher shops throughout the city by porters.⁵²

Few of the above trades may be classed as carrying prestige. Certainly that of the street sweepers did not, nor did those of the slaughterers and porters. But it was as much the origins of the people who inhabited these sections as their trades which tended to give the whole a lower class atmosphere. Many were nomads and peasants led to migrate into the city on account of economic distress. On the part of the nomad his way of life was marginal in the most prosperous times. On the part of the peasant the insecurity of the villages from raids caused many to in-migrate to lose themselves in the anonymity of the urban masses.⁵³ Since the trades were closely controlled by guilds with an apparatus of apprenticeship and with a close hereditary relationship of master and apprentice,⁵⁴ it was difficult for a recent in-migrant to attain a position of prestige. He was relegated to the low-class quarters, where he often engaged in agriculture or husbandry under the mantle of the city's protection.⁵⁵ The nomad turned naturally to the occupations with which he was most familiar, those related to the caravan trade.

This population was, in addition, linguistically quite heterogeneous. Most of them were Bedouin, but many are indicated to have been Kurds and Turkomans.⁵⁶ Not only were the Turkomans engaged in the caravan trade, but also many of the quarters in the districts of Bānqūsa and Bāb al-Nayrāb had Turkish names: Qārliq, Ṭaṭārlar, Qādī-'askar, Aghājiq, Badānjiq,⁵⁷ and Sashlūkhānah.

Knowing that the strongholds of the Janissaries were Bānqūsa and Bāb al-Nayrāb and that their principal rendez-vous, the Qahwat al-Agha, or *āgha's* coffeehouse, was located in the former,⁵⁸ it is reasonable to assume that most of the Janissaries were Kurds, Turkomans, former Bedouin and former peasants; that many of them were in occupations connected with the caravan trade, some even owning camels;⁵⁹

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 174, 229-230.

⁵² Russell, *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 40. The connection of the butchers' guild with the Janissaries is indicated below.

⁵³ Sauvaget, *Alep*, 230; Volney, *Voyage*, II, 44; De Perdriau, "Mémoire [of 1777]," *AE B¹*-94.

⁵⁴ Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 281-282; Russell, *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 160-161.

⁵⁵ Russell, *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 11.

⁵⁶ Russell, *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 11; Sauvaget, *Alep*, 230.

⁵⁷ Sauvaget calls this word a corruption of *maydānjiq*, a small square: *Alep*, 231, n. 868. It is conceivably a diminutive of the Turkish word *bādānah*, meaning "white-wash."

⁵⁸ [A. A. Paton], *The Modern Syrians*, 245, 250 and 252.

⁵⁹ Abbott to Crow and Le Messurier, 15 August 1796, *SP* 110/53, f. 93r.

and that, with the exception of the *āghas*, they were predominantly of the lower classes of Aleppo society. Evidence exists that further supports these topographical conclusions. Russell states that "the Janissaries of Aleppo, as in other provincial cities, are mostly persons who live in a domestic manner in the exercise of their respective trades,"⁶⁰ but he characterizes the artisans in general as "industrious and frugal" and says that among them "drunkenness, though not entirely unknown, is reckoned extremely scandalous, and is really unknown."⁶¹ The Janissaries, on the other hand, were famous for their immoral conduct: adultery,⁶² debauchery,⁶³ drunkenness⁶⁴ and irreligion.⁶⁵ They cannot therefore be counted among the "industrious and frugal artisans." These artisans of which Russell speaks must have been the higher class ones, those whose work gave them considerable prestige. His characterization seems out of keeping with the description of those trades having little prestige and whose practitioners therefore formed some of the more compact and powerful guilds. Such were those of the tanners and butchers⁶⁶ and it is significant that the guild which the Janissaries controlled most closely was that of the butchers.

Most of them [the butcheries] were in their hands. A man was not able to cook in his house any food except that which his butcher prescribed. It might happen that for several days he could cook only one kind of food, for the meat his butcher had was not suitable for any other kind. A man could not buy his meat from any other butcher, because should he do so, his butcher might kill him. It happened that the butcher of a certain man was named Raḥamūn Agha. Whenever the man's wife used to ask him, "What will we eat tonight?" he would answer her, "What Raḥamūn Agha wills." That expression was current as a proverb in Aleppo as exemplifying he whose will was subject to the will of those stronger than he.⁶⁷

Another custom of the Janissary butchers was that called the *dūmān*. It is described as follows by Muḥammad Khalīl al-Murādi :

The *dūmān* is the name for money collected by various oppressors who borrowed from some people at manyfold interest and spent it gaining mastery over this profession [of the butcher] for their venal objectives. Their reprehensible means of repayment was to sell meat at the highest prices to rich and poor, and to procure by force the skins, hooves, heads, livers and

⁶⁰ *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 324.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 161.

⁶² Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 298-299.

⁶³ Russell, *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 52 and 263; Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 303.

⁶⁴ Russell, *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 182-183; Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 303.

⁶⁵ Russell, *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 189; a *qāḍi* of Aleppo was deposed and disgraced because he had dressed as a Janissary and visited the coffeehouses. He was charged with indecency: Thomas to Ministry, 13 June 1764, *AE B*¹-89.

⁶⁶ Regarding the power of the tanners' guild, see Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. I, 284, 286 and 291.

⁶⁷ Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 350-351.

kidneys from the poor butchers at a low price. All this was continued by the lawless butchers and those of them who had become dominant until the wealthy as well as the poor forsook the eating of meat and disease became chronic.⁶⁸

Attempts were made to break the power of the butchers' guild in Aleppo: in 1176/1762-1763 the *qādi*, Aḥmad Effendi al-Karīdi, stamped out the practice of *dūmān*, but it arose again after his term of office had expired.⁶⁹ Two years later the *wāli* 'Aẓm Zādah Muḥammad Pasha executed the *ra'īs* of the guild.⁷⁰ These measures may have had an effect on the Janissary strength in the city, but there is no indication that it lasted for a protracted period.

According to al-Ghazzi, it was not only over a few guilds that the Janissaries asserted dominance. He says that one of the principal reasons for their oppression was "because they controlled the professions and trades."⁷¹ If so, this was a development posterior to Russell's information. It is surprising that the acute observation of the English doctor and his penchant for detail should have missed such an important fact, for his description of the artisans and their guilds makes no mention of a relation to the Janissaries.⁷²

The attractions of membership in this party were such that it is unlikely that active proselytizing was necessary at least among the lower strata of Aleppo society. These had little to lose by joining a party of such notorious reputation. Even before it achieved pre-eminence early in the nineteenth century, the Janissary party could offer material protection, if not political advancement. But in addition to its political character it was a military organization, the privileges of which at this time considerably outweighed the detriments. It is to the Janissaries as a military force that we shall now turn.

Out of the military aspect of the Aleppo Janissaries grew their political power. The latter came to dominate the former but never completely to obliterate it. The privileges granted the corps in the early days of its existence and jealously guarded by every Janissary throughout the empire thereafter were the keystone on which this power developed and flourished. As the *quid pro quo*'s, restricted recruitment, continual military duty, rigorous training and strict obedience to the will of the sultan, gradually became vacuous requirements and as the financial need of the state became ever more acute, the privileges acquired substantial value in the eyes of harassed subjects.

Basically the privileges were judicial in nature. They could be

⁶⁸ *Silk al-Durur*, IV, 98.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 99. A biography of 'Aẓm Zādah Muḥammad Pasha is given in Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, IV, 260.

⁷¹ *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 350.

⁷² *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 160-161.

judged and punished only by their own officers.⁷³ Minor crimes were judged by the *ūṭah* (*ūdah*) *bāshī*, or chief of the barracks,⁷⁴ while major ones were judged by the *yeñicheri efendisī*, called the judge of the corps,⁷⁵ and the punishment ordered by the *yeñicheri āghāsī*, the commander of the corps, or even by the grand vizir.⁷⁶ Punishments ranged from imprisonment in the *ūṭah*, or barracks, for a few days to death, usually by strangulation.⁷⁷

In Aleppo it was the sirdar, or local commander, who judged and ordered punishment for the local Janissaries, for it was only he that could imprison or inflict corporal punishment on one.⁷⁸ On a Janissary beating his servant, the French consul carried the complaint to the sirdar without success.⁷⁹ But more often it appears that the *wāli* exercised this function. There are frequent instances of Janissaries being executed by the *wāli* or the *mutasallim*.⁸⁰ Sometimes it was on orders from the Porte, but on other occasions the *wālis* appear to have acted on their own initiative in accordance with their police powers.

Whether Janissary immunity from the jurisdiction of the *qāḍī* existed in civil cases is not clear. There is an instance of Janissaries going to the *maḥkamah* as plaintiffs,⁸¹ but not as defendants. The distinction was not clear between civil and criminal cases in the Sharī'ah.

A further unspecified privilege may be said to have been derived from membership in the *ūjāq*, or corps. Since there were Janissaries throughout the empire, no city was friendless to one of the group. Wherever he went there would be Janissaries to assist him and provide him hospitality. For instance, Aḥmad Agha ibn-al-Za'farānji, the chief of the *qaḥūqūli* Janissaries in Damascus, revolted in 1788 against the *wāli* of that city, was unsuccessful, and was forced to flee. He found shelter among the Aleppo Janissaries on the condition that they need not imperil their relations with the Porte, should it demand his surrender.⁸² Again in 1824 Aḥmad Agha ibn-al-Qaṭṭān, the leader of the Aleppo Janissaries at the time, gave his personal safeguard to some sixty to eighty of the Janissaries of Lattakia who had slain Muḥammad

⁷³ Djevad, *État Militaire*, 68-71.

⁷⁴ Juchereau de Saint-Denys, *Révolutions*, I, 55. The most minor crimes could be punished on the order of subalterns: D'Ohsson, *Tableau général*, VII, 351.

⁷⁵ Juchereau, *Révolutions*, I, 54.

⁷⁶ D'Ohsson, *Tableau général*, VII, 351.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 351-352; Djevad, *État militaire*, 69.

⁷⁸ De Perdriau, "Mémoire [of 1777]," *AE B¹-94*.

⁷⁹ Bichot to Descorches, 5 August 1794, *CCAlep*, XXIII, f. 21r. and v.

⁸⁰ De Perdriau, "Nouvelles d'Alep," 17 August 1774, *AE B¹-92*; De Perdriau, "Nouvelle d'Alep, 17 May, 1776, *AE B¹-93*; De Perdriau, "Nouvelles d'Alep," 7 October 1778, *AE B¹-94*; Edward B. B. Barker, *Syria and Egypt*, I, 138-140.

⁸¹ Bichot to Descorches, 5 August 1794, *CCAlep*, XXIII, ff. 21v. and 22r.

⁸² Rislān ibn-Yahya al-Qāri, "al-Wuzarā' al-Iadhīn Ḥakamu Dimashq," in Ṣalāh-al-Dīn al-Munajjid, *Wulāt Dimashq fi 'Ahd al-'Uthmāni* (Damascus, 1949), 86-88. He remained there until called by Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār to be *mutasallim* in 1208/1793-1794: Shihābi, *Lubnān*, 174.

Pasha of Tripoli.⁸³ Membership in the Janissary corps was somewhat in the nature of a passport throughout the empire.

Originally it was not these privileges but the high favor shown the corps by the sultan which made membership attractive to the Muslims who were excluded. When the corps came to be entirely recruited from among the Muslims and to lose favor by its turbulence in the eyes of the later sultans, it was these privileges and the new factor of its political power that maintained its basic attraction.

In the early nineteenth century only vestiges remained in Aleppo of the earlier organizational aspects of the Janissaries. Their theoretical commander was the sirdar, appointed by the *yeñicheri āghāsi* in Istanbul and thus independent of the *wāli*.⁸⁴ He was chosen from among "old and invalided *āghas* living obscurely in the imperial palace and meriting retirement,"⁸⁵ and had to pay for his appointment, which payment formed a part of the fixed income of the Janissary *ūjāq*.⁸⁶ Although his duties had been usurped by the real leaders of the Janissaries, he was still accorded a certain respect, for meetings of the *āghas* were sometimes held at his palace.⁸⁷ Presumably he also remained a member of the *wāli*'s divan⁸⁸ and thus was the representative of the Janissaries before the *wāli*. The fact that he could thus mediate for the Janissaries was probably the reason for the retention of a certain amount of his former prestige.

That they were still called upon by the Porte to supply a contingent further indicates the military aspect of the Janissaries. In addition to having supplied troops to combat the French in Egypt, the Janissaries in 1810 sent about two thousand to fight the Russians.⁸⁹ In 1811 the four most powerful Janissary *āghas* received orders to march with three to four thousand men against the same enemy, but according to Rousseau, only about nine hundred men and three *āghas* departed, of which most soon deserted and returned to the city.⁹⁰ Perhaps recalling the difficulty of obtaining a Janissary contingent from Aleppo, the Porte, when next faced with war, demanded three thousand troops, half

⁸³ Lesseps to Ministry, 20 June 1824, *CCAleph*, XXVII, f. 228r.

⁸⁴ Russell, *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 324; Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 156, n. 2; Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu Ocakları*, I, 327; De Perdriau, "Mémoire [of 1777]," *AE B¹*.94.

⁸⁵ Nūri, *Natāyij al-Wuqū'āt*, III, 94.

⁸⁶ Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu Ocakları*, I, 327.

⁸⁷ Corancez, "Suite de Bulletin," 30 August 1807, *CCAleph*, XXIII, f. 419r.; Rousseau, "Bulletin," 10 September 1811, *CCAleph*, XXIV, f. 390r.; Rousseau, "Neuvième bulletin," 4-28 October 1811, *CCAleph*, XXIV, f. 417v.

⁸⁸ Russell, *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 322.

⁸⁹ Rousseau to Champagny, Duc de Cadore, 30 August 1810, *CCAleph*, XXIV, f. 247v.

⁹⁰ Rousseau, "Bulletin des nouvelles," 9 May 1811, *CCAleph*, XXIV, f. 334r.; Rousseau, "Description succincte du pachalik d'Alep," 15 February 1812, *CCAleph*, XXV, f. 11r.

cavalry and half infantry, but did not specify that they be Janissaries⁹¹ and in 1823 demanded for use against Persia two thousand picked troops or six hundred thousand piasters as a contribution toward the cost of the war. The city chose the latter alternative but countered with an offer of five hundred thousand piasters.⁹² Even in the short space of twelve years the military character of the Janissaries can be seen to have faded.

One duty which consistently remained a Janissary function and which was carried out conscientiously by those of the *nijāq* to whom it was assigned was that of providing a bodyguard for the foreign consuls. These men were known as *qälluqqis*⁹³ and received from the consuls no regular pay, but rather a tip whenever they were used.⁹⁴ The number of these *qälluqqis* appears to have varied according to need. In the mid-eighteenth century the British consul had two,⁹⁵ but Rousseau in a letter to the French minister of foreign affairs speaks of his intention to take another into service. He mentions the payment of a salary to this guard,⁹⁶ which renders the above statement of de Perdriau somewhat suspect. It was the duty of the *qälluqqis* to precede the consul through the streets carrying a staff with which he struck the pavement and calling upon the people to make way.⁹⁷ The provision of *qälluqqis* was mentioned in the capitulations granted to France in 1740,⁹⁸ but al-Ghazzi states that they had been provided at least prior to 1008/1599-1600.⁹⁹ Although they were often called "swine-herds" by the Muslims because of their occupation,¹⁰⁰ yet no mention of any complaint against them by the consuls in Aleppo has been found.

In the latter half of the eighteenth century the Janissaries, not having acquired in full the political power so evident later, appear more military, albeit disorganized and unreliable at best.

The rights and duties of the sirdar are in this period more clear than later because he was able to exercise them more effectively. On ceremonial occasions he preceded the *wāli* and held the stirrup when the pasha dismounted, a high honor.¹⁰¹ On other occasions when riding

⁹¹ Guys to the Baron de Pasquier, 4 July and 12 July 1821, *CCAleph*, XXVI, ff. 73r.-76v.; Barker to Levant Company, 5 November 1821, *SP* 105/129.

⁹² Lesseps to Ministry, 21 March 1823, *CCAleph*, XXVI, f. 292v.

⁹³ The term was also used in a more general sense for any Janissary stationed at a guard house.

⁹⁴ De Perdriau to M. le Bas, 24 November 1777, *AE B1-94*.

⁹⁵ Russell, *Natural History of Aleppo*, II, 4.

⁹⁶ Rousseau to Champagny, Duc de Cadore, 30 August 1810, *CCAleph*, XXIV, f. 248r.

⁹⁷ Russell, *Natural History of Aleppo*, II, 4.

⁹⁸ Article 50: Gabriel Noradounghian, *Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'empire ottoman* (Paris: Cotillon, 1897-1903), I, 288.

⁹⁹ *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 266; cf. Kurd 'Ali, *Khīṭaṭ al-Shām*, II, 250.

¹⁰⁰ Eton, *Survey*, 112.

¹⁰¹ De Perdriau, "Mémoire [of 1777]," *AE B1-94*. In Ottoman court ceremony he who held the sultan's stirrup was known as the *rikābdār*: Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 340.

in the streets he was preceded by a mounted officer carrying a bunch of rods, resembling the Roman *fascēs*.¹⁰² This was a symbol of his authority, his power to administer the bastinado to wrong-doers, for according to Russell he was the superintendent of the markets.¹⁰³ The description of this author, in fact, implies that the sirdar had broad police powers through the Janissaries he commanded. This is confirmed by the general descriptions of the Janissaries as police. In Istanbul they shared with other troops the patrolling of the city, each *ūrta*, or regiment, being assigned a quarter. The Janissary *āgha*, as well as the commanders of other detachments, made periodic inspections, as did the grand vizir in secret.¹⁰⁴ In Aleppo there occurred a riot in 1765 which the sirdar attempted to put down with about twenty men. He was stoned and barely escaped. But when the riot was renewed later in the day at the *maḥkamah*, he went there in force, dispersed the crowd, and arrested two whom he took to the *wāli*.¹⁰⁵ This corresponds quite well with the statement of Gibb and Bowen that "apparently in places where Janissary detachments were stationed, they furnished police patrols."¹⁰⁶ The authors then go on to say that in their police functions the Janissaries acted "on the local *ṣubaṣī*'s instructions, as in the capital."¹⁰⁷ It is possible that the sirdar acted in the mid-eighteenth century as *ṣībāshī* of the city, but that as the Janissaries became less reliable as police from the point of view of the *wāli*, he preferred to appoint his *tufinkji bāshī* as the chief of the urban police.

Possible confirmation for this hypothesis lies in the guardianship of the city gates. In the seventeenth and up to the mid-eighteenth century they were in the hands of the Janissaries, the keys being delivered to the sirdar each night after the gates were closed.¹⁰⁸ The sirdar received a duty on all produce and wares brought into the city for sale and levied it as the merchandise passed through the gates.¹⁰⁹ The fact that the guardianship of the gates carried with it the means to forbid entry or exit gave this officer a police power. In the nineteenth century, however, he no longer had it. One of the conditions of the city rebels for the cessation of hostilities against Khūrshīd Pasha in 1819¹¹⁰ was that the *wāli*'s *dalīs* might no longer control the gates, but that in the

¹⁰² Russell, *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 324.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ D'Ohsson, *Tableau général*, VII, 348-350; Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 66.

¹⁰⁵ Thomas to Ministry, 30 September 1765, *AE B¹-89*.

¹⁰⁶ Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 154.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ D'Arvieux, *Nachrichten*, VI, 363; Russell, *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 325.

¹⁰⁹ D'Arvieux, *Nachrichten*, VI, 387; De Perdriau, "Mémoire [of 1777]," *AE B¹-94*.

¹¹⁰ *Infra*, 132-135.

future they be guarded by a porter as they had been formerly.¹¹¹ By this date there was evidently no question of a right of the sirdar and the Janissaries to their control.

The information available regarding the military organization of the Aleppo Janissaries in the latter half of the eighteenth century is conflicting and meager. The interpolation necessary to supplement that knowledge depends in large part on the determination of the type of Janissary present in the city. By "type" is meant not such divisions of the *ūjāq* as the Jamā'ah, the Bulūk, and the Sakhān, nor the various *ūrtas* designated as the Ṭürnahjis, the Zagharjis, Khaṣṣakis or the Şamsūnjis, all of whom were *qapūqūlī* Janissaries, but rather those groups who were not strictly imperial Janissaries and would thus better be termed quasi-Janissaries. Such were the Serdengeçtis, the Gūñullus and the Yerli Qūlis. In the later years of the Janissaries' decline these groups seem to have shed to a large extent their 'quasi' qualification, if not in the eyes of the government,¹¹² at least apparently in the eyes of the people and the groups themselves.¹¹³ Realistically speaking, the latter attitude is the more important.

It is unfortunate that the unique characteristics of the Janissary *ūjāq* have lead to quite exhaustive study of the organization in its theoretical conception, at its acme, and in the early years of its decline without any comparable attention to the later phase of that decline and to its ramifications for the organization itself. What attention has been given to this aspect of the history of the Janissaries has been largely confined to their role in the capital and not in the provinces. Such a work as that of Uzunçarşılı on the Janissary *ūjāq*, for example, detailed as it is, hardly mentions the *yerli qūlis* on the basis that they were not true *qapūqūlīs*.¹¹⁴ This would be a sensible exclusion were it not for the fact that in the later years of the *ūjāq* any distinction seems to have been theoretical. Gibb and Bowen, while treating generally of the decline of the Janissaries and of garrison troops,¹¹⁵ do not show how what they call "Yerliya Janissaries" fit into the picture they have described.¹¹⁶

It is not our purpose to attempt to fill these gaps but to stress that they exist. It is questionable whether the various relationships can be

¹¹¹ Guys to the Marquis de Dessolle, 7 November 1819, *CCAlep*, XXV, f. 397r. and v.

¹¹² There is evidence that even the Porte considered them Janissaries. In a report to the British in 1799 listing the orders sent out to different provinces for troops to march to Egypt, Janissaries are listed in cities where no *qapūqūlī* Janissaries, the true Janissaries, are known to have existed: Spencer Smith to Levant Company, 10 June 1799, *FO* 78/22. This letter includes a French translation of the document delivered by the *ra'is effendi*.

¹¹³ There are numerous references to Janissaries in contemporary Arabic accounts: e.g., Qara'li, *Ahamm Hawādith*, 37, 45, 48 and 49; Shihābi, *Lubnān*, 186, 315, 416-417, and 423; Ṭabbākh, *l'lam*, III, 348, 350 and 351.

¹¹⁴ *Kapukulu Ocakları*, I, 3-4.

¹¹⁵ *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 180-184, and 192.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 218.

defined at this stage of knowledge concerning the Janissaries. What we may attempt is to establish what information has been found that might clarify the type and position of the Aleppo Janissaries within the framework of the *ūjāq* as a whole.

Until Sultan Murād III ordered that those who had pleased him among the entertainers at the circumcision feast of his son in 1582 be enrolled directly into the *ūjāq*,¹¹⁷ all the *qapūqūli* Janissaries were recruited from the ranks of the '*ajami ūghlān*, or "foreign boys." There had been previous fissures in the solidarity of the corps¹¹⁸ but none so overt and pernicious to its discipline, morale and exclusiveness, the three essentials for its effectiveness, as that one act of the sultan. It established the precedent for the direct recruitment resorted to in order to supply the troops necessary for the Iranian and Austrian campaigns which occupied the last quarter of the sixteenth century. Uzunçarşılı, after having shown that from the battle of Ankara in 1402 until the death of Sulaymān I in 1566 the number of Janissaries remained quite constant at some twelve thousand, states that "from the last half of the sixteenth century on, the strength of the *ūjāq* began to increase with rapidity."¹¹⁹ Between 1574 and 1595 the number of *qapūqūli* Janissaries doubled, and by 1609 it had reached 37,627.¹²⁰

One of the causes for the high number of Janissaries in the mid-seventeenth century was the increase in the number of those supposedly aged or invalided veterans called variously *ūtūrāqs* or *mutaqā'ids*¹²¹ many of whom at that time were capable of serving.¹²² Some idea of their number may be gained from the fact that "in the year 1663, the *ūjāq* strength was between thirty and forty thousand excluding the pensioners, while together with the pensioners it exceeded 54,000."¹²³

Another malpractice which inflated the *qapūqūli* Janissary rolls was that the *chorbahjis*, 'soup-makers,' or *ūrta* commanders, failed to strike off the names of deceased Janissaries from their lists, leaving the position *mahlūl*, or vacant, but continued to draw pay for that individual or enrolled one of their servants in his place.¹²⁴ The degree to which this malpractice and that of pensioning troops had reached by 1717-1718 has been shown by Uzunçarşılı:

. . . After subtracting the vacancies of Janissaries not on campaign, it may be determined that the number of Janissaries was 17,116; after sub-

¹¹⁷ Jawdat, *Ta'rikh*, I, 95, where the date is misprinted; Djevad Bey, *État militaire*, 77; Nūri, *Natāyij al-Wuqū'āt*, I, 140-141, where the date is also incorrect; Cl. Huart, "Janissaries," *EI*.

¹¹⁸ Lybyer, *Government*, 50, and 69, n. 3.

¹¹⁹ *Kapukulu Ocakları*, I, 614.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

¹²¹ Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 320 and 320, n. 4.

¹²² Kūchī Bey, *Risālah*, cited in Djevad Bey, *État militaire*, 71; Jawdat, *Ta'rikh*, I, 96.

¹²³ Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu Ocakları*, I, 616.

¹²⁴ Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 182.

tracting the vacancies of *ishkinji* [active] Janissaries and those not existing [a more flagrant form of padding the rolls], it was 22,500; the composite figure excluding pensioners was 39,616; . . . on occurrence of wars, the strength of the *ūjāq*, together with pensioners and vacancies, was in excess of one hundred thousand.¹²⁵

Since by this time the *devshirme* system of recruiting, the forced levy of non-Muslim children for the *‘ajami ūghlān* and other *qapūqūli* positions, had been abandoned,¹²⁶ those taken into the *ūjāq* were native-born Muslims. By this time also the pay of the *qapūqūli* Janissaries had become so low by progressive debasement of the coinage¹²⁷ that practically all of them had become artisans and no longer lived in the barracks,¹²⁸ two basic regulations of the corps thus having fallen into desuetude. In time of war, therefore, it became difficult to gather these artisan Janissaries into the army and to assemble an effective force of adequate size.¹²⁹ Faced with this problem the Porte deemed the best solution to be that of the recruitment of new troops once again, but in order not to burden the treasury with the pay of these in peace-time, at some date prior to 1687 the practice of *taṣḥīh bi-dargāh* was instituted.¹³⁰ The term literally means “verification at the Threshold, the Porte,” but was used in the sense of a roll-call, for it signified the enrolling of *gūñullus*, or volunteers,¹³¹ into the *ūjāq* for the period of hostilities. During this time they received pay and on the conclusion of the war, they were discharged.¹³² Having had the emblem of their *ūrta* tattooed on their arms and legs during their service,¹³³ on their return home they could easily make a pretense of continuing to be Janissaries, and indeed the only significant difference between them and the *qapūqūli* Janissaries was that they were not entitled to receive Janissary pay.¹³⁴ But since it

¹²⁵ *Kapukulu Ocakları*, I, 618.

¹²⁶ V. L. Ménage, “Devshirme,” *EF*².

¹²⁷ Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 180. The pay of the Janissaries was calculated in aspers. In the years 1493 to 1577 the *yıldız altını*, an Ottoman gold coin, was worth 60 aspers; by 1689 it was worth 400 aspers: Djevad Bey, *État militaire*, 115.

¹²⁸ Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 182; Jawdat, *Ta’rikh*, I, 96; Nūri, *Natāyij al-Wuqū’āt*, II, 96.

¹²⁹ Jawdat, *Ta’rikh*, I, 97; Nūri, *Natāyij al-Wuqū’āt*, II, 95.

¹³⁰ “. . . following the Vienna defeat, thirty thousand Janissaries and ten thousand *sipāhis* [the feudal *sipāhis* are not meant here; this refers to the *qapūqūli sipāhis*, or cavalry of the Porte] were all at once made *taṣḥīh bi-dargāh*”: Nūri, *Natāyij al-Wuqū’āt*, II, 94; cf. Djevad Bey, *État militaire*, 83. This is the earliest reference found to *taṣḥīh bi-dargāh*.

¹³¹ This term was used in the time of Sulaymān I to designate those “who came at their own expense [to the army] and fought with the hope, often realized, of receiving the benefices of slain men as the reward of signally brave conduct”; Lybyer, *Government*, 102. The technical term for volunteer Janissaries enrolled by the process of *taṣḥīh bi-dargāh* was *gūñullu yenicheriler*: Pakalın, *Tarih Deyimleri*, I, 675-676.

¹³² Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu Ocakları*, I, 331, 619, n. 1.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 619, n. 1; Nūri, *Natāyij al-Wuqū’āt*, II, 95.

¹³⁴ Uzunçarşılı states that the *gūñullu* Janissaries were bearded whereas the

appears probable that *qapūqūli* Janissaries by the beginning of the eighteenth century were selling their *asāmahs*, or pay certificates, to those not entitled to them,¹³⁵ this distinction became only technical. One can realistically say that by the end of the seventeenth century the *qapūqūli* Janissaries for all intents and purposes had ceased to exist.¹³⁶

There are even implications that *gūñullu* Janissaries were enrolled in *ūrtas* before they were called to the army, but registered in local roll-books.

Among the Janissaries also were payless *gūñullu* Janissaries. These were drawn from among the people of cities and towns and, in order to benefit from the privileges of the Janissaries and from the dignity of the position of Janissary, were a category accepted as Janissaries without pay. The likes of these were entered on the register of the Janissary sirdar of their locale. In return for the processing of this enrollment they used to give the Janissary sirdar money and a present.¹³⁷

If it were true that these volunteer Janissaries were enrolled on local *daftars* before they were called for service, then they must have had some form of organization, particularly since a sirdar commanded them.¹³⁸ The organization most likely to have fulfilled this function in Aleppo was that of the *yerli qūlis*, or local slaves.

It is questionable whether the *yerli qūlis* originally came under the term *yeñicheri* or whether this was a later extension of the term *yeñicheri*. Unfortunately there appears to be no precise information as to the date at which they were founded, but it probably was prior to the reign of Murād IV (1574-1595).¹³⁹ Certainly while the term *qapūqūli* Janissary retained any significance they could not have been considered closely attached to them. Although originally their number was limited and their pay derived from local sources such as the *'ushr*, the *jizyah*, and the *mīsān-i harīr-i rasmi*, or tax on the official weighing of silk,¹⁴⁰ they were not part of a *qapūqūli ūrta* but were troops permanently stationed in a particular locale, such as a city on the frontier or the capital

ājāq Janissaries were not: *Kapukulu Ocakları*, I, 331. Since there is every reason to believe that the former attempted to identify themselves with the *qapūqūli* Janissaries, this assertion may be doubted; no original source is cited to substantiate it.

¹³⁵ Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 183.

¹³⁶ Financially speaking, the *asāmahs* still created a heavy drain on the treasury. In that sense the *qapūqūli* Janissaries were a continual reality. But militarily the distinction between *qapūqūli* Janissary and *yerli qūli* appears to have been no more than nominal.

¹³⁷ Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu Ocakları*, I, 330. The same author says elsewhere that "a portion of the young city men in the provinces were enrolled as honorary Janissaries. To whichever *ūrta* they were related, they had tattooed on their arm or leg the insignia of that *ūrta*": *ibid.*, 619, n. 1.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 331.

¹³⁹ Djevad Bey, *État militaire*, 76.

¹⁴⁰ Nūri, *Natūvij al-Wuqū'āt*, I, 146; II, 95, III, 93.

of a *walāyah*.¹⁴¹ At times their place of service on the frontier coincided with that in which the fortress was garrisoned with *qapūqūli* Janissaries, in which case it is implied that the *yerli qūlis* were called *yamaqs*, or assistants.¹⁴² Such a situation occurred in Damascus where there were both *qapūqūlis* and *yerli qūlis*, the former in the citadel¹⁴³ and the latter in the town. Disputes between the two were frequent and violent.¹⁴⁴

As the *qapūqūli* Janissary system decomposed with time, so did the *yerli qūli* system. The pay of the *yerli qūlis* became diverted to others by usurpation.¹⁴⁵ As a reinforcement of their position and the better to protect their immunities, if they possessed those accorded the *qapūqūlis*, or to acquire them if they did not,¹⁴⁶ it is likely that they sought to become at least affiliated with an *ūrta*. Whether it was the only method or not, the process of *taşnîh bi-dargâh* was a likely means toward this end. The evidence revealed in the material on the Janissaries in Aleppo supports this reconstruction of a process by which Janissary organizations became so widely diffused in the provinces.

It is certain that there was no *ūrta* of *qapūqūli* Janissaries in Aleppo. A list from the Ottoman archives which notes the places where *nūbetjis*, or *qapūqūli* Janissaries on frontier sentry duty, were stationed in 1164/1760-1761 does not mention Aleppo, although Damascus had a force of 722, Tripoli 167; Jerusalem 259 and Urfa 91. Nor is Aleppo mentioned in a similar list for 1136/1723-1724.¹⁴⁷ In 1008/1599-1600, however, there were *qapūqūli* Janissaries in the city, but they were from Damascus and were not in the form of an *ūrta*. Their purpose of being there is given by al-Ghazzi :

In Rabī' II of the year 1008 Ibrāhīm Pasha attacked the Damascene Janissaries. They had extended their sway over the poor of Aleppo and had committed enormities against the *ra'āyah*. The means of so doing was the

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*; Walter Livingston Wright, *Ottoman Statecraft: The Book of Counsel for Vizirs and Governors* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1935), 122-123 and 122, n. 5.

¹⁴² Nūri, *Natāyij al-Wuqū'āt*, I, 146; Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu Ocakları*, I, 330. Some *qapūqūli* Janissaries served in cities on the frontiers and were known as *yāsāqjis*, or guards, and were paid by the local population: Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu Ocakları*, I, 324. Those of the *qapūqūli* Janissaries who served on rotation in citadels were known as *nūbetjis*, those doing a turn of sentry duty: *ibid.*, 329.

¹⁴³ Gibb and Bowen are uncertain that the *qapūqūli* in Damascus were those garrisoning the citadel because of Murādi's definition (cf. *Silk al-Durur*, II, 61): *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 218, n. 3. Uzunçarşılı, however, basing his information on the *Risālah* of Kūchi Bey, states that there were one thousand *nūbetjis* (cf. note 142 *supra*) in Damascus in 1651: *Kapukulu Ocakları*, I, 329. It is reasonable to assume that they were in charge of the citadel.

¹⁴⁴ Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 218; Corancez, "Bulletin d'Alep," 9 October 1806, *CCAlep*, XXIII, f. 356v.; Jawdat, *Ta'rih*, VII, 46-47.

¹⁴⁵ Nūri, *Natāyij al-Wuqū'āt*, III, 93. It is not clear whether or not the *yerli qūli* originally possessed *asāmahs* similar to those of the *qapūqūlis*.

¹⁴⁶ Uzunçarşılı was of the opinion that the *yerli qūlis* did not have all the privileges of the *qapūqūli* Janissaries, but was unable to specify the differences: personal interview, 15 September, 1953.

¹⁴⁷ Djevad Bey, *État militaire*, 166, 168, and 170-171.

collection of the royal dues [*mīri*] which they arrived at to their corrupt advantage to the extent that they married in Aleppo and acquired villages and property.¹⁴⁸

Muḥammad Kurd 'Ali quotes abu-al-Wafā' ibn-Muḥammad al-'Arḍī, *Mā'ādīn al-Dhahab fī al-A'yām al-Mashrafah bi-him Ḥalab* as saying that:

From an early period of the Ottoman state they used to send a party of men from the troops of Damascus and a *chorbahji* over them for the transfer of the revenues of the sultan and they used to profit thereby. They used to serve the *daftardār* and in the Dār al-Wikālah [the official establishment] and at the door of the foreign consul. Every time they used to send more with a *chorbahji* over them so that there lived in Aleppo great numbers of them. Their properties increased and their influence became great. They gained control over most of the villages of the sultan, paying the revenue of the sultan for the village and taking from their inhabitants twice two-fold. All the inhabitants of the village remained as servants to them. All that they gleaned was for others, not for themselves.¹⁴⁹

The Ibrāhīm Pasha mentioned by al-Ghazzi broke the power of the Janissaries in Aleppo and suggested to the Porte:

. . . that it should give a *qūl*, that is, an army [*jaysh*], to the city of Aleppo.¹⁵⁰

Ibrāhīm Pasha's successor was ordered to carry out the suggestion.

. . . when 'Ali Pasha al-Jadīd entered Aleppo, he assembled the new *qūl* and organized it on the lines of the Damascus *qūl* and others.¹⁵¹

The probable interpretation that should be given to this use of the word *qūl* is that it meant *yerli qūli*, for Muṣṭafa Nūri says that there were *yerli qūlis* in Damascus and Aleppo. Although he does not mention the date, the organization of his work implies a period in the neighborhood of 1600.¹⁵² When he discusses the situation with regard to the *yerli qūlis* in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries he again includes Aleppo among the cities that have *yerli qūlis*.¹⁵³

The conclusion that the Aleppo Janissaries were *yerli qūlis* is further supported by inferences of writers contemporary to the period under study.

¹⁴⁸ Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 266. He indicates that his source for this information is Muṣṭafa Na'ima, *al-Kawḍatayn*. The biography of al-Ḥājj Ibrāhīm is given in Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, I, 98.

¹⁴⁹ Kurd 'Ali, *Khiṭaṭ al-Shām*, II, 250-251. Kurd 'Ali mentions in the bibliography that he had access to a fragment of al-'Arḍī's book which was in the possession of Kāmīl al-Ghazzi of Aleppo: *ibid.*, I, 21. Since al-Ghazzi's death his library has been broken up.

¹⁵⁰ Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 266.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*; Bustānji 'Ali Pasha was *beylerbey* of Aleppo in the year 1000/1591-1592: Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, III, 504.

¹⁵² Nūri, *Natāyij al-Wuqū'āt*, I, 146.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, III, 93-94.

The corps of Janissaries, or the Odjak of Aleppo, was formerly divided, as in other Turkish towns, into companies or Ortas, but since the time of their getting into power, they have ceased to submit to any regular discipline.¹⁵⁴

The division into *ūrtas* would account for the "organizing" mentioned above by al-Ghazzi and it is unlikely that Burckhardt in this quotation would have referred to the *ūjāq* of Aleppo if the Janissaries there had been an integral part of the *qaḫūqūli* Janissary *ūjāq*.

There is no indication whatsoever in contemporary sources that the Aleppo *yerli qūli* received the pay they were ostensibly entitled to, but Muṣṭafa Nūri asserts that the reason for this was, as in the case of the *qaḫūqūli* Janissaries, that :

. . . by the disruption of their organization with the passing of time . . . their pay and fixed assignments became a source of exploitation for usurpers posing as notables and officers.¹⁵⁵

The situation became such that :

Although innumerable Janissaries, their arms and legs covered with emblems, existed in every part of the Ottoman Empire, these were an importunate group devoid of any military training or definite assignment and composed of low class roughs whose only value was as unconstrained marauders. Although conditions on the frontiers were better to a certain extent, their officers and some troops being selected and sent from the Janissary *ūjāq*, nonetheless the position of local *āgha* and citadel commander of places such as Damascus, Aleppo, Bursa and Kutahya were given as pensions to old and invalid *āghas* living obscurely in the imperial palace and meriting retirement.¹⁵⁶

The association of the practice of *taṣṭūḫ bi-dargāh* with the *yerli qūlis* was as a means, from their point of view, of raising their status from affiliation with the *yerli qūli* to affiliation with a *qaḫūqūli ūrta*. Russell indicates that in his time most of the Janissaries of Aleppo had attained the latter status :

The Janissaries of Aleppo . . . receive no pay, but, by being enrolled in one of the odas, or chambers, at Constantinople, they enjoy in times of peace, several privileges and exemptions. In war time they are liable to be called out, and are obliged not only to provide themselves with arms, but to find their way to the camp at their own expense; not entering into regular pay before they arrive there.¹⁵⁷

This corresponds strikingly with the description of the *gīvñullu* Janissaries. Uzunçarşılı relates that because of the long duration of the Russian war of 1768-1774, the total of *qaḫūqūli* Janissaries was greatly

¹⁵⁴ Burckhardt, *Travels in Syria*, 653.

¹⁵⁵ *Natāyij al-Wuḫū'āt*, III, 93-94.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁷ *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 324.

swollen and much of this increase could be attributed to the enlistment of *gūñullu* Janissaries.¹⁵⁸ Elsewhere he notes that *ṭurnahjis* or troops of the *ūrta* of 'crane-keepers,' or other officers were generally sent out from the *ūjāq* to enroll *gūñullu* Janissaries into the *ūjāq* as *yaḥwīmīyahli*, or troops paid by the day.¹⁵⁹ A French consular agent describes the levy of Aleppo Janissaries ordered in 1769 as follows:

... on a fait aussi une levée de plus de 2000 Janissaires qui attendent l'arrivée d'un tornagi qui Doit les Conduire, et que l'on Dit rendu à Antioche mais cet officier Devant rassemblé les levées des autres villes voisines, il n'y a pas a Se flatter que [le] Corps puisse partir d'un mois et plus.¹⁶⁰

Again in the spring of 1770 there is a duplication of the event of the preceding year:

Le Tournagi, officier envoyé de la Porte pour faire partir les Janissaires et autres troupes, est arrivé icy avant hier.¹⁶¹

The equation of these accounts with the general custom leaves room for little doubt that many of the Aleppo *yerli qūlis*, if not all, became *gūñullu* Janissaries in time of war and thus formed an affiliation with a *qaḥūqūli ūrta*. The duplication of this process elsewhere gave rise to the dispersion of *qaḥūqūli* Janissary adherents throughout the empire and gave the *ūjāq* a large reserve force. This reserve had little military value to the *ūjāq* but its political weight in support of the *ūjāq* was considerable.

A large number of oriental cities have been built around or adjacent to particular terrain features suitable for a military bastion. Aleppo is no exception; its citadel manifests in the remains of its walls and glacis an important fortification. It was a tradition born of consideration for the security of the dynasty that the citadel in provincial capitals be autonomous of the governor in order to act as a counterpoise to his possible ambitions. Should the city be on a frontier this practice logically became doubly important. Thus in the Mamlūk Empire the *nā'ib*, or deputy of the sovereign, in the Aleppo citadel was independent of and equal in rank to the *nā'ib* of the province.¹⁶² When Aleppo was conquered by the Ottomans the strategic role of the citadel diminished as a result of its position in relation to the frontiers, but it received nevertheless a *dizdār*, a fortress commander, appointed by a *khaṭṭ-i sharīf* of the sultan.¹⁶³ The duties of the *dizdār* were first and foremost the maintenance of the inviolability of the fortress. Since the citadel was em-

¹⁵⁸ *Kapukulu Ocakları*, I, 618-619.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 619, n. 1; Nūri supports this statement: *Natāyij al-Wuqū'āt*, II, 95, III, 94.

¹⁶⁰ Joseph Belleville to De Praslin, n.d. [January, 1769], *AE B¹-91*.

¹⁶¹ De Perdriau to De Praslin, 28 March 1770, *AE B¹-91*.

¹⁶² Maurice Gaudéroy-Demombynes, *La Syrie à l'époque des Mamelouks d'après les autours arabes* (Paris: Geuthner, 1923), cviii and 212.

¹⁶³ De Perdriau, "Mémoire [of 1777]," *AE B¹-94*.

ployed as a prison,¹⁶⁴ the *dizdār* was also a warder and he had the attributes of a civil governor over the village that was within its walls.¹⁶⁵

His official revenues were not large, consisting of a due paid to him by the butchers of the city and of certain *awqāf* pertaining to the citadel. But he had other sources of income, notably exactions from the prisoners in his care and from those who wished to join his garrison and enjoy its privileges.¹⁶⁶

For although the prestige of the *dizdār* declined with the disrepair of his domain,¹⁶⁷ he continued to command a small garrison of Janissaries. Volney gives as their strength 350 men.¹⁶⁸ These Janissaries lived in the citadel with their families but were hardly more trained than those living in the city, for they likewise were artisans and the like, having their shops in the city and only returning to the fortress before its gates were closed at night.¹⁶⁹

The fact that these Janissaries formed the citadel garrison gave them the designation of *qala'ahji*, he whose profession concerns the citadel, but this term does not seem to denote any organizational distinction beyond the fact that they were commanded by the *dizdār* rather than the sirdar. It is not, for example, included in Mehmet Zeki Pakalın's dictionary of Ottoman technical terms.¹⁷⁰ Sauvaget reports that the term is used today as a patronymic in Aleppo by the descendants of the former garrison.¹⁷¹ Even considering the particular duties theoretically assigned to them, they appear to have formed militarily speaking a part of the *yerli qūli*. Certainly in the realm of political affiliation they did so.

During the period treated in this study the principal significant fact regarding the Aleppo Janissaries is the progressive replacement of their military aspect by their role as a political party. By the turn of the century consideration of their military characteristics becomes somewhat superfluous. It was the fact that their leaders could offer a certain degree of security and personal inviolability in return for loyalty to their political and pecuniary ambitions that rendered the Janissaries powerful. It will be shown in the next chapter that this theme also applied to the *ashrāf*.

¹⁶⁴ Choderlos, the French consul, was imprisoned there when France invaded Egypt in 1798: Choderlos to De la Croix, 14 Vendémiaire Yr. 7/6 October 1798, *CCAlep*, XXIII, f. 127r.

¹⁶⁵ Sauvaget, *Alep*, 212.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁷ Cf. Sauvaget, *Alep*, 211-212.

¹⁶⁸ Volney, *Voyage*, II, 48.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*; Russell, *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 38.

¹⁷⁰ *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü*.

¹⁷¹ Sauvaget, *Alep*, 212, n. 800.

THE ASHRĀF OF ALEPPO AND THEIR POSITION
IN THE HISTORY OF THE ASHRĀF IN ISLAM

The *ashrāf*, the lineal descendants of Muḥammad's family, were the third major political element in the history of Aleppo from 1760 to 1826. Both the Janissaries and the *ashrāf* of this city were local segments of groups which extended throughout the Ottoman Empire. The political activity of the Aleppo Janissaries corresponded with that of their comrades elsewhere. The same is hardly true of the *ashrāf*. In the empire as a whole the *ashrāf* had little political influence. Aleppo is one of the few exceptions.¹ The stress laid on the *ashrāf*, their background, and their position in Aleppine society in this study therefore should not be taken as a reflection of their relative position elsewhere. Any correspondence, in fact, would be premature, for the study of the *ashrāf* is a quite neglected aspect of Islamic social history.² In addition, detailed histories of Islamic cities in the Ottoman period are as yet inadequate to establish such a correspondence.

In face of this situation it appears more necessary to enter into the historical background of the period under study with regard to the *ashrāf* than it was for the Janissaries. The organization of the Janissaries is well known, that of the *ashrāf* far less so. In this chapter only the history, background, and local organization of the *ashrāf* in Aleppo will be treated. Their actual political role in Aleppo will be discussed in the following chapter.

The term *sharīf*, of which *ashrāf* is one of the plurals, was not an Islamic creation but was an Islamic modification of its Jāhiliyah meaning. Among the Arab tribes the term *sharaf* was a tangible concept for "a high place," from which it was extended to the intangible of "an eminent position."³ Thus "one who held an eminent position" was a *sharīf*. A restriction of the sense of *sharaf* then took place with the requirement of *nasab* or purity of lineage, and, as such purity of lineage

¹ Aintab was another notable exception. The pattern there corresponded quite closely to that in Aleppo: John Barker, to Levant Company, 14 June 1824; Barker to John Cartwright, 5 August 1824, *SP* 105/142; Jawdat, *Ta'rikh*, V, 253-254, VI, 211-212.

² No study in a Western language exclusively on the *ashrāf* appears to exist. In many books there are sections or paragraphs devoted to them at various periods in history but little else. Most of them will be cited in the course of this chapter.

³ Bishr Fāris, "Ta'rikh Lafẓat al-Sharaf," *Mabāḥith 'Arabīyah* (Cairo: Ma'arif, 1939), 116.

gave superiority to its possessor in the genealogy-conscious Arab society, *nasab* came to be linked with *ḥasab*, genealogical superiority, and *sharaf* to embody both concepts.⁴

The possession of *sharaf* evolved to be an important criterion of prestige in the Jāhiliyah society. The whole basis of tribal society is by definition genealogical. One element of distinction between tribes relates therefore to some form of genealogical prestige rating. Among the Jāhiliyah Arabs it was "kinship with heroes of a semilegendary past."⁵

Not only did this criterion operate between tribes but within the tribe itself. The term *sayyid*, husband, or *ra'īs*, head, both having the sense of leader, were applied generally to the tribal chief, the term *shaykh* having been a later usage.⁶ Although there was apparently no precise method of appointing the *ra'īs*, his selection was based on certain characteristics. Not the least important of these was the requirement of noble ancestry, or genealogical prestige, for the Arab tribes believed that the qualities considered glorious in the ancestor were transmitted to the descendant.⁷ Thus the reputation of the tribe was enhanced by the selection of a *ra'īs* having *sharaf*.

. . . in any claim to authority the factor of birth was considered of paramount importance. Noble ancestry was the supreme test of nobility, and no person whose genealogy was not entirely free of hereditary taint—such as ancestors of servile or negro origin—could be regarded as conforming to the requisite standard.⁸

Thus was a tribal aristocracy, the *ashrāf*, formed in the Jāhiliyah. In Islam, however, there was no place for superiority based on genealogy. The emphasis was placed on piety. This is borne out by a verse in the Koran:

O ye people, verily have we created you male and female and made you tribes and clans in order that you may know each other. Verily the most honorable of you with God is the most pious of you. Verily God is the Knower, the Aware.⁹

On this verse 'Abd-Allāh ibn-'Umar al-Bayḍāwī, a thirteenth century commentator, wrote that:

We have created every one of you by means of a father and mother. All are equal in this and there is no reason therefore for boasting of one's lineage. . . .¹⁰

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Reuben Levy, *The Social Structure of Islam, being the second edition of the Sociology of Islam* (Cambridge: University Press, 1957), 65.

⁶ Emile Tyan, *Le Califat*, I of *Institutions du droit publique musulman* (Beirut: Catholic Press, 1954), 84.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 98.

⁸ Levy, *Social Structure of Islam*, 53-54.

⁹ 49:13.

¹⁰ 'Abd-Allāh ibn-'Umar al-Bayḍāwī, *Anwār al-Tanzīl wa-Asrār al-Ta'wīl*, ed.

In spite of this new Islamic accent the traditional emphasis remained. There was little to negate it as long as the Arab tribes were the dominant element in Islam. In the Umayyad period the tribal *ashrāf* retained their aristocratic position and reinforced it by the acquisition of vast domains in the conquered territories.¹¹

A more significant development for the future use of the term grew out of the Islamic movement itself as interpreted by a community steeped in Arab concepts of nobility. New criteria of distinction associated with the new force, but not sanctioned by it, took form to produce *ashrāf* among Muslims. The question, "Why was God's Word revealed to Muḥammad and not to someone else?" was surely posed. The answer of Arab tradition was that the Quraysh had *sharaf* in the eyes of God.¹² The basis for a new aristocracy thus was formed around the person of Muḥammad. Hāshim ibn-'Abd-al-Manāf, the grandfather of the Prophet, became fixed as the focal point of the kinship group possibly because of traditions of his virtuous character.¹³ It was these Hāshimi epigoni particularly, rather than the Quraysh tribe as a whole, that came to be designated as *ashrāf* in the 'Abbāsīd period.

The Hāshimis were early divided into two divisions, Ṭālibis and 'Abbāsīs, so called after the two uncles of Muḥammad who were his tribal protectors, first abu-Ṭālib and upon his death al-'Abbās. The *ashrāf* of the Ṭālibid branch were later further subdivided into Ja'faris, 'Aqīlis, 'Alawis, Ḥasanis, and Ḥusaynis,¹⁴ all descendants of abu-Ṭālib, but having varying degrees of *sharaf*. This fragmentation of the Ṭālibis reverts to the position of 'Ali in Islam. Not only did Fāṭimah, the daughter of Muḥammad, marry 'Ali and bear the only grandsons of the Prophet, Ḥasan and Ḥusayn, after whom two subdivisions were named, but also 'Ali lost the caliphate to Mu'āwiyah, scion of the Umayyads, and therefore created the controversy that divided Islam.

This schism had a profound effect on the future of the *ashrāf*. With the rise of the Shī'at 'Ali, or party of 'Ali, the Iranian concept of the epiphany of the ruler and dynastic legitimism began to bear upon the concept of *sharaf*, as far as these 'Alids were concerned. The death of Ḥusayn in attempting to regain the caliphate added a passion motif to that of the epiphany.¹⁵ Thus the concept of *sharaf* became influenced

by H. O. Fleischer (Leipzig: 1846-1848), II, 276, as quoted in Levy, *Social Structure of Islam*, 55.

¹¹ Henri Lammens, *Études sur le siècle des Omayyades* (Beirut: Catholic Press, 1930), 38, 63, 129, 134, 135, 188 and 342.

¹² Levy, *Social Structure of Islam*, 56 and 63; C. van Arendonk, "Sharīf," *EI*¹.

¹³ F. Buhl, "Hāshim b. 'Abd al-Manāf," *EI*¹; van Arendonk, "Sharīf," *EI*¹.

¹⁴ This is the list given by Jalāl-al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī in his unpublished manuscript *Kitāb 'Ujjālat al-Zarnabīyah fi al-Silālat al-Zaynabīyah* quoted in Fāris, *Mabāḥith*, 104; in Muḥammad As'āf al-Nashāshībī, *al-Islām al-Salūh* (Jerusalem: 1354/1935), 305, n. 2; and paraphrased in van Arendonk, "Sharīf," *EI*¹.

¹⁵ R. Strothmann, "Shī'a," *EI*¹; H. S. Nyberg, "al-Mu'tazila," *ibid.*; Tyan, *Caliphate*, 297; De Lacy O'Leary, *A Short History of the Fatimid Khalīfate* (London: Kegan Paul, 1923), 4-5.

strongly by politics, and verses from the Koran were interpreted to lend weight to the claim of a position superior to all others for the descendants of Ḥasan and Ḥusayn in particular and all descendants of 'Ali in general. One of these verses reads in part :

God only desires to take away the uncleanness from you, O people of the household! and to purify you thoroughly¹⁶

The key in this verse is the expression *ahl al-bayt*, here rendered "people of the household." The 'Alids restricted this term to 'Ali and Fāṭimah and their issue.¹⁷ Others extended it to include the sons of 'Ali by other wives, particularly Muḥammad ibn-al-Ḥanafīyah.

The 'Abbāsīs supported their contention of membership in the *ahl al-bayt* by a *ḥadīth* which prohibits to the *ahl al-bayt* the *ṣadaqah*, or alms, and those mentioned in the *ḥadīth* include both the 'Abbāsīs and the Ṭālibīs.¹⁸ The 'Abbāsīs claimed furthermore a close bond with Muḥammad within the banu-Hāshim, based on the fact that al-'Abbās as the uncle of Muḥammad and his last protector, was therefore his closest inheritor.¹⁹ This had the merit of being more in accordance with Arab tradition of hereditary authority, ill-defined though it was.²⁰ What the 'Abbāsīs were concerned with in advancing this argument was justification of their caliphate and incidentally their *sharaf*, for during their caliphate the *ashrāf* in Islam were institutionalized on the basis of the two families of the banu-Hāshim who were important at that time, the Ṭālibīs and the 'Abbāsīs.²¹

The date of the appearance of this institutionalization of the *ashrāf* by the creation of the office of *naqīb*, verifier, strictly speaking, but usually translated as 'marshal,' is quite unknown. References to *naqībs* are found in the ninth century A.D.,²² but no earlier. Nor is it clear whether the office of *naqīb* was one imposed by the state or evolved among the *ashrāf* and later sanctioned by the government. These facets have received little attention among those who have studied the *ashrāf*.

It is clear however that, whatever the origin, the office was necessary both from the point of view of the state and of the *ashrāf*. The state paid a pension of one dinar a month to all the *ashrāf* residing in Bagh-

¹⁶ 33:33. Another on which the concept of *sharaf* in Islam is based, especially by the Shī'īs is 42:23: "Say: I do not ask of you any reward for it [the revelation] but love for relatives."

¹⁷ van Arendonk, "Sharīf," *El*¹.

¹⁸ van Arendonk, "Sharīf," *El*¹. The Umayyads also claimed to be *ahl al-bayt*: Tyan, *Califat*, 291-293.

¹⁹ Tyan, *Califat*, 287.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 97-99 containing a discussion of the force of this principle in the Jāhiliyah.

²¹ The descendants of the first three caliphs, abu-Bakr, 'Umar and 'Uthmān, occasionally claimed to be *ashrāf* and were certainly of the aristocracy: Adam Mez, *The Renaissance of Islam*, tr. by Salahuddin Khuda Bukhsh and D. S. Margoliouth (London, 1937), 153-154.

²² *Ibid.*, 142 and 150.

dad. These were estimated to number some four thousand,²³ so it was to the interest of the government to prevent interlopers from receiving the dole.

But far more important was the aristocratic and religious position of the *ashrāf*. The title *al-sharīf* had implications far deeper than descent from the family of Muḥammad alone. The rise of Muslim *ashrāf*, and the consequent decline in the importance of tribal *ashrāf*, had gone hand in hand with a deepening veneration of the Prophet.²⁴ To have allowed the *ashrāf* to become the objects of public derision or contempt or even merely of a neutral attitude would have been repugnant to Shi'i views, more perhaps as reflection on 'Ali and Ḥusayn than on Muḥammad. It was also contrary to Sunni inclinations.²⁵ The 'Abbāsīd caliphs, too, had an interest in maintaining the esteem of the *ashrāf*, for they formed one of the divisions, the 'Abbāsīs, and on that rested their claim to caliphal legitimacy.

The duties of the *naqībs* were therefore based on the preservation of the nobility of the corps, genealogically, materially and morally. To this end registers were kept of the names and lineages of members, and new members were enrolled at birth. Deaths were also noted in order that the number of *ashrāf* might be always known and pretenders excluded.²⁶ The *naqībs* were also enjoined to make certain that *sharīfahs* should not marry men not their equals in *sharaf*, so that their lineage might not become polluted.²⁷

The *naqībs* were responsible for the material preservation of the corps by representing them collectively on the occasion of the distribution of *ḥaj*, property, especially land, acquired from unbelievers "without fighting,"²⁸ and *ghanimah*, booty. To the *naqībs* fell the task of distributing them to individuals "in the proportions fixed by God."²⁹ The *naqībs* were also the guardians of the *awqāf*, or pious trusts, established for the *ashrāf*. Should they not be the trustees the *naqībs* acted as auditors of the accounts.³⁰ They were in addition the representatives of the *ashrāf* in any defence of their rights.³¹

²³ *Ibid.*, 149. The sum was reduced under the caliph al-Mu'taḍid (870-892) to a quarter dinar per month: *ibid.*, and Tyan, *Organisation judiciaire*, 2nd ed., 552.

²⁴ van Arendonk, "Sharīf," *EI*¹.

²⁵ Gustave E. von Grunebaum, *Medieval Islam; a Study in Cultural Orientation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), 186 and 188.

²⁶ Māwardī, *Statuts*, 200.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 201-202; Tyan, *Organisation judiciaire*, 2nd ed., 555. This stricture was operative only with regard to women; *sharīfs* could marry a woman below their station, as did the caliphs: Tyan, *loc. cit.*, n. 1.

²⁸ Th. W. Juynboll, "Faī," *EI*¹.

²⁹ Māwardī, *Statuts*, 201. By the ninth century this duty must have been largely theoretical; conquests were minimal. When Muslim arms were once more successful under the Ottomans, the character of the *niqābah*, or office of *naqīb*, had sufficiently changed that it is unlikely this duty was carried out by the *naqīb*: *infra*, 90 ff.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 202; Tyan, *Organisation judiciaire*, 2nd ed., 556.

³¹ Māwardī, *Statuts*, 201.

The material or administrative duties of the *naqībs* were of minor importance, however, in relation to their duties regarding the moral preservation of the *ashrāf*. Their nature was such as to give the *naqībs*, in theory at least, considerable judicial powers. Again perhaps only in theory, there were two types of *naqīb* appointments, general and special.³² The responsibilities described above pertained to the special or limited appointments. The general appointments tended to give the *naqīb* the functions and jurisdiction of a *qāḍi* among the *ashrāf*. Administratively the general appointments included the guardianship of orphans; marriage of *sharīfahs* in the absence of parents or guardian, or, if a guardian were designated, in case that he opposed the match; and finally the determination of incompetence or the restoration of competence for the insane.³³

The special position of *naqīb* or *niqābat al-khāṣṣah* appears to have borne with it duties with regard to the *ashrāf* which closely approach those of the *ḥisbah*.³⁴ These duties were essentially disciplinary with the object of maintaining the prestige of the *ashrāf* community.³⁵ He was to prevent them from taking exorbitant profits or making malicious claims, from the commission of sins and forbidden acts, from false pride in their position and a haughty attitude toward others.³⁶ As can be seen the limits of his responsibilities in this field of morals were imprecisely defined, allowing him a wide latitude of discretion. As to punishments, the only strictures were that they should be less than those for the *ḥudūd*, those offenses the punishments for which were fixed in the Koran, that they should not involve the shedding of blood, and that they should be relied upon less than correctional admonitions.³⁷

The *niqābat al-‘āmmah*, or general post of *naqīb*, added two important jurisdictions, namely the execution of *ḥudūd* punishments, though not the determination of culpability, and the judgment of litigations between *ashrāf*.³⁸ As to the latter it was foreseen that there could arise a conflict of jurisdiction between the *naqīb* and the *qāḍi*, since this was an essentially juridical function. This conflict could, of course, be avoided by the express exclusion of the juridical function. If it were not, then there would be conflict only in case the litigants disagreed on

³² *Ibid.*, 200.

³³ *Ibid.*, 202. On the jurisdiction of the *qāḍi* in these realms, cf. Tyan, *Organisation judiciaire*, 2nd ed., 359-374.

³⁴ In Muslim juridical theory *ḥisbah* has two senses: 1) an action in justice brought by an individual having no personal interest in the matter but who has the interest of a third person or the community in mind, and 2) the larger, essentially religious sense of inciting good and prohibiting evil: *ibid.*, 618.

³⁵ Māwardi, *Statuts*, 200.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 200-201.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 202. According to some legists, a *sharīf* judged guilty of an offense not provided for in the Koran but derived from a principle of the *ḥudūd*, called *ta‘zīr*, should receive a punishment lighter than that for other social groups: Tyan, *Organisation judiciaire*, 2nd ed., 569-571.

³⁸ Māwardi, *Statuts*, 202.

the choice between two competent judges. Differences of legal opinion existed on this question, one saying the *naqīb* had the superior competence, the other that the pleader's choice was the more competent, but should it be impossible to establish the pleader, either the two drew lots or the case remained in suspense until one gave way.³⁹

Another possibility of conflict lay in a case between an 'Abbāsi and a Ṭālibi, each of whom had a *naqīb*. In this case the matter was either taken before the *qāḍī*, or failing his competence, to the sovereign, or the two *naqībs* attempted to compose the difference sitting in college, with the final competence to render the decision resting with the *naqīb* of the defender.⁴⁰

As seen from the above there was a close correspondence between the *niqābah* and the *qaḍā'*. This becomes more apparent when viewed organizationally. For the division of the *ashrāf* in the 'Abbāsīd Empire there was a chief *naqīb*, or a *naqīb al-nuqabā'*, who appointed the local *naqībs*, 'Abbāsi and Ṭālibi,⁴¹ just as the *qāḍī al-quḍāt* nominated the local *qāḍīs*.⁴²

But while this process of institutionalization was progressing, so was a movement which affected the *ashrāf* but in a degree difficult to gauge. The effect of Ismā'ilism on the *ashrāf* can only be surmised because as yet the study of this religious, philosophic, social and political movement is imperfect. Based on the fusion of various extremist ideas which appealed to the underprivileged masses, the Ismā'ili, or Bāṭini movement, as it has been called, gathered immense strength as the 'Abbāsīd Empire declined. A development toward syncretism and esoterism gave it the attraction of being all things to all men: it could appeal to the 'Alid faction, who, used by the 'Abbāsīs to procure the caliphate, had then been discarded to their resultant dissatisfaction. To those who had failed to find in the growing commercial and industrial 'Abbāsīd state the social betterment that Islam proffered, it set forth a principle of social idealism.⁴³ It is with these two aspects of the movement that we are here primarily concerned.

Through this movement which exoterically supported one branch of the 'Alids, the Sab'iyyah, and through the activities of the other Sh'i adherents, particularly the groups that formed the Ithna-'Ashariyyah, the Ṭālibis gradually gained ascendancy over the 'Abbāsīs. By the end of the tenth century, each division had in Baghdad its own *naqīb*.⁴⁴ The 'Abbāsīs lost the prestige they once had, never to regain it.

Yet another division within the *ashrāf* took on additional significance as the Ṭālibid branch gained strength. This was the split between the

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 203-204.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 204-205.

⁴¹ Mez, *Renaissance of Islam*, 142-143, 148; van Arendonk, "Sharīf," *EI*¹.

⁴² Tyan, *Organisation judiciaire*, 2nd ed., 132.

⁴³ Bernard Lewis, *The Origins of Ismā'ilism* (Cambridge: Heffer, 1940), 92-93.

⁴⁴ Mez, *Renaissance of Islam*, 148-149.

Ḥasanis and the Ḥusaynis. The latter subdivision, because it had produced the *imāms* of both the Sab'iyah and the Ithna-'Ashariyah, was the more important, yet the founder of the Ikhshīd dynasty (935-969 A.D.), Muḥammad ibn-Ṭughj, retained in his suite a Ḥasani *naqīb*, 'Abd-Allāh ibn-Ṭabāṭaba, and a Ḥusayni *naqīb*, al-Ḥasan ibn-Ṭāhir, who were in continual disagreement.⁴⁵

When the Ismā'īli movement acquired political recognition in the Fāṭimid dynasty the political leaders lost most of the movement's religious extremism. The Shī'ism of the rulers was not acceptable to the population as a whole and gradually the religious aspect of the dynasty modified until:

In the later part of the Fatimid period the only mark which distinguished its rule from that of the orthodox Khalif at Baghdad seems to have been that the *khutba* . . . was said in the name of the Fatimid, and that of the 'Abbasid was not mentioned.⁴⁶

It is here that attention may be focussed on Aleppo for the first time in this discussion of the background of the *ashrāf* as an eighteenth century political force in that city. From the tenth to the thirteenth century Shī'ism and to a lesser extent Ismā'īlism were important influences on the population. It is at the same time that the *ashrāf* come into prominence in the politics of the city. The juxtaposition of these two developments begs the question whether they are in any way related. The evidence, albeit meager, points to such a conclusion, but in order to understand the manner in which such a relationship, however tenuous, may have come about, a brief exposition of the political position of Aleppo in that period is called for.

From the last of the tenth to the beginning of the twelfth century Aleppo was one of the principal focal points of rivalries among large and petty dynasties, or would-be dynasts. Taken by the Ḥamdānid *amīr* 'Ali Sayf-al-Dawlah in 944, it became a base for that ruler's raids against the Byzantine Empire and was the capital of a state for the first time since the Hittites. But Byzantine retaliation soon trapped the city between Greek pressure on the north and that of the rising Fāṭimid dynasty to the south. Aleppo had to pay a heavy price for the glory that Sayf-al-Dawlah conferred upon it. Its resources were denuded by warfare and by the heavy tribute paid in the last years of the tenth century to Byzantium. Shortly thereafter the city passed under the suzerainty of the Fāṭimids when in 1008 the name of the Fāṭimid caliph al-Ḥakīm was mentioned in the *khutbah*.⁴⁷ In 1022 Ṣāliḥ ibn-Mirdās, an Arab of the Kilābi tribe, took Aleppo and commenced the Mirdāsīd dynasty

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 143. Gibb and Bowen state that in strict usage, especially in Arabia, *sharīf* was the term denoting descent from al-Ḥasan and *sayyid* descent from al-Ḥusayn: *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 2, 93, n. 1.

⁴⁶ O'Leary, *Fatimid Khalifate*, 259.

⁴⁷ M. Sobernheim, "Ḥalab," *ET*.

which lasted until 1078. Not strong enough generally to maintain complete independence and plagued by internecine quarrels, the Mirdāsids were frequently subjected to Fāṭimid sovereignty and, following the decline of that Shī'ite dynasty in the middle of the century, to that of the Saljūqs in Baghdad. The city then became a pawn in the struggles among aspiring Saljūq princes which exposed it to the attacks of the newly arrived Crusaders. It was not until the city was captured by the Turkish *atābeg* Zangi in 1127 that a reasonable stability was once more restored to Aleppo.

It was in response to the anarchy just described that a local militia known as the *aḥdāth* emerged to political prominence within the city. The *aḥdāth*, also found in other Syrian cities, originated as a body of young men recruited from the city to ensure public security in default of a *shurṭa*, or police corps, drawn from the regular army.⁴⁸ The *aḥdāth* were paid from taxes on local commerce, but since they were locally recruited, they tended to oppose the forces of those contending powers who sought to establish their foreign control over the city.⁴⁹ An Ismā'īli missionary was able to say in 1058 when a Fāṭimid governor was resident in the city that the *aḥdāth* in Aleppo were "stronger than the possessor of the city and governed it more than the governor."⁵⁰ They were, in other words, a vehicle to maintain a degree of urban autonomy against those considered to be outsiders and oppressors.

At the head of the *aḥdāth* was the *ra'īs al-aḥdāth*, who, when his position of political power became recognized by officialdom, was also known as the *ra'īs al-balad*, the chief of the city.⁵¹ Dependent on the support of the *aḥdāth* for his political influence, the *ra'īs* also begins to disappear from the pages of Aleppine history when the Zangids re-established central authority over the area in the twelfth century. But at the height of his influence the *ra'īs* was generally more powerful than the *qāḍīs*, also representative of the city vis-à-vis the sovereign authority, and was able to negotiate with the various princes on Aleppo's behalf.

Yet it is not by any means clear how much urban unity existed in Aleppo at the time of the *aḥdāth*. It is not clear whether they represented the city as a whole or only an element of it.⁵² The religious affiliation of the city was divided between Sunni and Shī'i, with the latter possibly predominating during the middle of the eleventh century. Yet the Fāṭimids were not regarded any better by the Aleppine Ithna-'Ashari Shī'is than they were by the Sunnis of Damascus.⁵³ Despite this, Shī'ism was a major force: Yāqūt ibn-'Abd-Allāh al-Ḥamawī in his *Mu'jam al-*

⁴⁸ Claude Cahen, "Mouvements populaires et autonomisme urbain dans l'Asie musulmane du Moyen Age," *SI*, V (1958), 245.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 240.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 237.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 246.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 240.

Buldān relates that the judgments of the *fuqaha'* of Aleppo were based on the Shī'i doctrine,⁵⁴ and even under the Sunni Hamdānids the Amīr Sayf-al-Dawlah built a Shī'i shrine near Aleppo although he maintained the 'Abbāsīd *khuṭbah*.⁵⁵ When in 463/1070-1071 the Mirdāsīd governor Maḥmūd ibn-Naṣr terminated the Fātimīd *khuṭbah* in favor of the 'Abbāsīd, the Shī'i rose against him.⁵⁶

Ismā'ilism also made its appearance in the city during this anarchic period. In fact, the Saljūq prince Ruḍwān, favored the Ismā'ilis and permitted them to establish a propaganda center there. For a period of a month he shifted his allegiance from the 'Abbāsīd caliph to the Fātimīd, and he tried to hand over the citadel of Aleppo to the Ismā'ilis. In this latter action, the pressure of public opinion, presumably the opposition of the *aḥdāth*, prevented him from carrying out his design.⁵⁷ When he died in 1113, the *aḥdāth* turned on the Ismā'ilis and massacred them,⁵⁸ but this setback did not eliminate them from the Aleppine scene. They continued to be an important factor in the city for some years to come,⁵⁹ perhaps until the Assassin stronghold Maṣyad was reduced to impotence in the thirteenth century.

It is now appropriate to examine the position of the *ashrāf* in Aleppo during this period. The city is said to have been a favorite of the Hāshimis from the early days of the 'Abbāsīd dynasty:

Lorsqu'Abou Moslim revint de Syrie, al-Manṣour nomma Ṣālih, fils de 'Ali fils de 'Abd Allāh fils d'al-'Abbās, gouverneur d'Alep, de Qinnisrīn et de Homs, en l'année 137/754-755. Il s'installa à Alep. . . Ibn Khaṭīb an-Nāṣiriyyah a dit: Certains hachimides s'installèrent à Alep et la choisirent comme séjour, à l'exclusion de toute autre ville. . .⁶⁰

These and the rest of the Aleppines were, according to Muḥibb-al-Dīn abu-al-Faḍl Muḥammad ibn-al-Shiḥnah, the author of *al-Durr al-Muntakhab fi Ta'rīkh Mamlakat Ḥalab*, all Sunnis of the Ḥanafī *madhhab* until the arrival of a certain *sharīf*, abu-Ibrāhīm al-Mamdūh, who caused them to become Shī'is or Shāfi'is.⁶¹ Whether this tradition

⁵⁴ Ed. F. Wüstenfeld (Leipzig: 1866-73), II, 308 as quoted in Charles Schefer, ed. and tr., *Sefer Nameh: Relation du voyage de Nassiri Khosrau* (Paris: Leroux, 1881), 32, n. 1.

⁵⁵ Jean Sauvaget, "*Les Perles choisies*" d'Ibn ach-Chihna (Beirut: Institut français de Damas, 1933), 85-88.

⁵⁶ Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 73.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 79; Sauvaget, *Alep*, 98, n. 289; Claude Cahen, *La Syrie du nord à l'époque des croisades et la principauté franque d'Antioche* (Paris: Geuthner, 1940), 189-190, 267-269.

⁵⁸ Cahen, *La Syrie du nord*, 268; Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 83. The massacre of the Ismā'ilis benefited the Shī'is more than the Sunnis; the former gained thereby undisputed possession of the grand mosque of Aleppo: Cahen, *La Syrie du nord*, 268, n. 16.

⁵⁹ Sauvaget, *Perles*, 58.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 53, n. 2. Ibn-al-Shiḥnah's narrative is replete with references to the *ashrāf*.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 108.

is true or not, it is reasonable to assume that the greater influence of Shī'ism in the city was favorable to the general position of the *ashraf* in view of the accent of that sect on descent from 'Ali. In a situation of such extreme instability and destitution as Aleppo experienced under the Ḥamdānids, the Mirdāsids, and the Saljūqs, it is understandable that a local aristocracy should have had an opportunity to assert itself with the support of the *ahdāth*. It is known that in Aleppo a *sharīf*, abu-'Ali al-Ḥasan ibn-Flibat-Allāh al-Ḥutayti al-Hāshimī, was *ra'īs al-ahdāth* from 1079 until 1086. In the latter year, in order to avoid the entry of a member of the Syrian branch of the Saljūqs, he rendered the city into the hands of the Great Saljūq, Malik Shāh, and unwittingly wrote his own fate thereby. Malik Shāh found him too powerful and exiled him.⁶²

Some years later the regent of Aleppo for the Saljūq prince Sulṭān Shāh sought to return the predominantly Shī'i population of the city to orthodoxy by constructing the first *madrasah*. Sulaymān ibn-'Abd-al-Jabbār ordered the work to be started in 510/1116-1117, but the opposition was so great that each night what had been erected that day was pulled down. It was not until the regent asked a Ḥusayni *sharīf*, Zuhra ibn-abu-Ibrāhīm al-Ishāqī al-Ḥusayni, to take charge of the work that it continued to completion. Ibn-al-Shīḥnah commented that this *sharīf* had a great influence in the city because of his good sense, his firmness, and his authority.⁶³

The Zangids continued the campaign to restore Aleppo to orthodoxy through Sunni propaganda in additional *madrasahs* and *zāwīyahs*, or dervish lodges. They also employed repressive measures against the Shī'is. Zangi's son, Nūr-al-Dīn, built three *madrasahs* in the city, plus two built by his supporters, two *zāwīyahs*, and by *waqf* a *dār al-ḥadīth*, a school particularly devoted to the study of the *ḥadīth*.⁶⁴ Thereafter more such religious institutions were built at frequent intervals. The effect of these institutions of Sunni propaganda may be typified in the case of the *naqīb* 'Izz-al-Dīn al-Murtaḍa ibn-Aḥmad al-Ishāqī al-Ḥusayni, who not only founded a *madrasah* and was at various times *naqīb* al-Ṭālibīyīn, *naqīb* al-'Abbāsīyīn, and *muḥtasib* of Aleppo, but also had a Shī'i 'ālim publicly disgraced for calumniating abu-Bakr, 'Umar and 'Uthmān in his presence.⁶⁵

The Mamlūk period appears to have had little significance for the *ashraf* either in Aleppo or elsewhere. There seems to have been but one innovation, the adoption of the color green as the usual but not universal badge of the descendants of 'Ali and Fāṭimah. It was not the

⁶² Cahen, "Mouvements populaires," *SI*, V (1958), 240.

⁶³ Sauvaget, *Perles*, 108-109.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 98, 110, 111, 114, 120, 121; Jean Sauvaget, "Les Trésors d'or" de Sibṭ ibn-al-'Ajami (Beirut: Institut français de Damas, 1950), 104.

⁶⁵ Sauvaget, *Perles*, 130, and *Trésors*, 97-98.

first time green had been associated with the 'Alids as opposed to the black of the 'Abbāsids. The 'Abbāsīd caliph al-Ma'mūn, strongly pro-'Alid in the early days of his reign, officially adopted the green as the standard of the 'Alids and designated the *imām* 'Ali al-Riḍa as his successor. But when these moves caused his expulsion from Baghdad by popular uprising, he repulsed the 'Alids and with them the green standard.⁶⁶ Prior to and following this event, the 'Alids had no special distinguishing mark until in the fourteenth century Sultan al-Ashraf Sha'bān ibn-Ḥusayn ibn-Qālūn (d. 778/1376-1377) revived the practice by ordering that the *ashrāf* should distinguish themselves by a green band on their turbans.⁶⁷ Thereafter this color was restricted to the *ashrāf*, although there is an intimation that those born on the pilgrimage were also permitted the green.⁶⁸ For the Christians, of course, it was a forbidden color.⁶⁹

Organizationally speaking there were two further differences between the position of the *naqīb* as developed in the 'Abbāsīd state and as it existed under the Mamlūks. The first was that under the decentralized administration of the Mamlūks the *naqīb* was appointed by the *nā'ib*, or governor, and secondly his *tawqī'*, or nomination, was of the class *al-amīri* which gave him the right to be classified among the functionaries of the sword, rather than among those of the pen.⁷⁰

Comparing the Turkish Islamic states, the Saljūq, the Mamlūk, and the Ottoman, with the Arab, one finds a marked degree of difference in the respect in which ancestry was held. A Turk was known by a given name, usually religious, and a sobriquet determined by place of origin, a moral quality, or physical defect.⁷¹ Often the Persian word *zādah* or the Turkish *ūghul*, both meaning 'son,' were used as the Arabs used *ibn*, but seldom was the lineage carried further. The Ottomans based nobility on office and public service, not on genealogy.⁷²

The *ashrāf* were thus somewhat of an anachronism in the Ottoman Empire, an inherited tradition which religious scruples and probably considerations of Muslim leadership induced them to maintain. Muḥammad II abolished the office of chief of the *amīrs*⁷³ which Muḥammad I

⁶⁶ Nashāshībī, *al-Islām al-Ṣaḥīh*, 299-301.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 301; Mez, *Renaissance of Islam*, 149, n. 3.

⁶⁸ Rabbath, *Documents inédits*, I, 48.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, I, 529; II, 413, and 413, n. 3.

⁷⁰ Maurice Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *La Syrie à l'époque des Mamelouks d'après les auteurs arabes* (Paris: Geuthner, 1923), 163 (for Damascus), and 209 (for Aleppo).

⁷¹ Juchereau de St. Denys, *Révolutions*, I, 13-14.

⁷² Lybyer, *Government*, 118.

⁷³ In the Ottoman Empire the descendants of the Prophet were termed *amīrs* (princes) or *sayyīds* (lords) rather than *ashrāf*. The term *ashrāf* was used only for the provincial dignitaries (cf. Mustafa Akdağ, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Kuruluş ve İnkişafı Devrinde Türkiye'nin İktisadi Vaziyeti," *Belleten*, XIV (1950), 333 ff.), and in the term *naqīb al-ashrāf* which was retained from Saljūq practice.

had adopted but his successor Bāyazīd II reinstated it and gave its possessor the title *naqīb al-ashrāf*.⁷⁴

That it was Bāyazīd II who laid the foundation for this position replete with ceremony and traditional significance is noteworthy. Constantinople had been captured; the state was developing into an empire. To the east a Shī'ah state was in the process of formation and the Shī'is within the Ottoman realm were troublesome.⁷⁵ The Ottoman sultans, like the Saljūqs before them, were becoming the new champions of official orthodoxy or Sunnism against the heterodox Shī'ism. Bāyazīd himself was a devout and austere Muslim who disliked court luxury.⁷⁶ It is not unlikely that the motivations behind the reestablishment of the *naqīb al-ashrāf* and a consequent rise in the prestige of the descendants of Muḥammad were to draw the *ashrāf* more closely to the Ottomans in face of the Shī'ah attraction and to reinforce the claim of the Ottomans to leadership of Sunnism.⁷⁷

In the early sixteenth century the position of the *ashrāf* in the Ottoman Empire was reflected in the *Multaqā' al-Abḥur* of Ibrāhīm ibn-Muḥammad al-Ḥalabi (d. 1549 A.D.).⁷⁸ This manual of Ḥanafite jurisprudence divided the population of the Ottoman state into four classes, the first of which was composed of the *ashrāf* and the *fuqahā'*, or jurists, the second of the *ru'asā'*, the ministers, officers and others administering the state, the third of the *ahl-i sūq*, or tradesmen and artisans, and the fourth of the *ra'āyah*, the peasantry, and the *dūmmi*, the tribute payers.⁷⁹ This ranking placed the *ashrāf* on a par with the ulema. Theoretically they were distinct from the ulema as a class, but since in fact large numbers of the *ashrāf* passed through the *madrasahs*, the distinction became in reality quite blurred. It is clear, however, that in keeping with tradition the *ashrāf* were to be respected and even revered not so much for themselves as for the fact that they bore a blood blessed by God. As such, they were entitled to privileges which emphasized and reinforced their peculiar position, that of an hereditary class in a state organized in principle on a merit and not on an hereditary basis.

⁷⁴ Joseph de Hammer [Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall], *Histoire de l'empire ottoman, depuis son origine jusqu'à nos jours*, tr. by J. J. Hellert (Paris: Bellizard, Barthès, Dufour et Lowell, 1835-1843), IV, 130; Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 2, 93.

⁷⁵ E.g., the revolt of Shāh Qūli, or as he was known to the Ottomans, Shayṭān Qūli, against Bāyazīd II in 1511; Joseph Marie Jouannin and Jules van Gaver, *Turquie* (Paris: Didot, 1840), 104; von Hammer, IV, 108-115.

⁷⁶ Jouannin and Gaver, *Turquie*, 105.

⁷⁷ In 1588 Sultan Murād III introduced officially into court ceremony the solemn celebration of the birth of the Prophet, the '*id al-mawlid*': H. Fuchs, "Mawlid," *EI*.

⁷⁸ Carl Brockelmann, *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur* (Leiden: Brill, 1937-1949), supplement II, 642.

⁷⁹ D'Oshson, *Tableau général*, I, 49-51. To the first class should be added the military benefice forces. Being free they were not in the same category as the *ru'asā'*. Cf. similar lists referred to in Lambton, *Islamic Society in Persia*, 3-4.

The privileges of the body of *ashrāf* lay largely in personal inviolability.

. . . out of reverence to [Muḥammad's] esteemed holy Blood . . . they cannot be vilified, affronted or struck by a Turk upon forfeiture of his right Hand.⁸⁰

D'Ohsson gives the text of a *fatwa* regarding a case of disrespect to a *sharīf*:

Si *Zeid* insulte *Amr* de la race des *Emirs* [*ashrāf*], le charge d'imprécations, lui et ses aïeux, en proférant même les noms des vénérables Imams *Hassan* et *Hussein* . . . , quelle peine mérite-t-il?

Le malheureux doit subir les punitions les plus sévères et un long emprisonnement: il ne doit même recouvrir sa liberté qu'à la suite d'actes de componction, et de signes certaines d'un repentir sincère et d'un parfait amendement.⁸¹

As in 'Abbāsīd times the *ashrāf* enjoyed their own judicial system, perhaps their most definite material advantage over other Muslims of the Ottoman Empire. *Naqībs* were in each provincial center to carry out the duties little different from those outlined by al-Māwardī, of maintaining a conduct on the part of the *ashrāf* that would reflect honor on the Prophet. The *naqībs* maintained special prisons for *ashrāf* found guilty of crimes or misdemeanors in their courts.⁸² Should a *sharīf* be judged guilty of an offense calling for the death penalty, he had to be pronounced unworthy of being related to the Prophet by blood and his name stricken by the *naqīb* from the rolls.⁸³

Although in date during the period of the occupation of Syria by Muḥammad 'Alī Pasha of Egypt, a document exists which has a bearing on the judicial functions of the *naqīb*. It is a copy of an official letter from the *qāḍī* of Jerusalem to the newly-appointed *naqīb* of Jaffa dated June 14, 1832:

To the cream of the most noble *sayyids* al-Sayyid Yāsīn Effendi Ilkī (may his nobility be increased!):

After salutations we inform you that the dean of the illustrious *mudarrises*, the bough of the pristine and fragrant tree, al-Sayyid Muḥammad 'Alī Effendi al-Ḥusaynī, *qā'im-maqām* of the *naqīb* of the most noble *sayyids* in the Jerusalem area, has appointed you *naqīb* over the *ashrāf* of the port

⁸⁰ Paul Rycart, *The History of the Present State of the Ottoman Empire*, 6th edition (London: Calvell, Robinson and Churchill, 1686), 209 and 211. A Christian who struck a *sharīf* suffered the death penalty: Olivier, *Voyage*, IV, 183; Eton, *Survey*, 106. A Jewish protégé of the French, having struck a *sharīf*, was threatened with the loss of his right hand. Only with difficulty did the consul save him: François Charles-Roux, *Les Echelles de Syrie et de Palestine au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: Geuthner, 1928), 49.

⁸¹ D'Ohsson, *Tableau général*, I, 522.

⁸² Carsten Niebuhr, *Voyage en Arabie et en d'autres pays circonvoisins*, anonymous French translation (Amsterdam: Baalde, 1774-1780), II, 177.

⁸³ Olivier, *Voyage*, IV, 182-183.

of Yāfa and has written you a letter on the *niqābah*. So according to his appointment of you we give you permission for the engagement in the affairs of the *niqābah* of the port of Yāfa and the preservation of the *ashrāf*. Should punishment and imprisonment be necessary for them, it will be done with your knowledge and within your jurisdiction according to what custom has established among [your] predecessors. You shall induce from them beneficial prayer for his excellency our master the Sultan (may the Noble and the Merciful assist him!). Know that, and peace. Written the middle decade of Muḥarram the Forbidden, year 1248.

From the humble Sayyid Muṣṭafa al-Khādimi, *qāḍi* of Jerusalem the Noble.⁸⁴

It is unfortunate that the judicial functions of the *naqīb* are not given more fully in the document but it is to be noted that he had the powers of punishment and imprisonment. Whether the granting of these authorities was the function of the *qāḍi* in the Ottoman Empire or not is not clarified elsewhere. The document was found in the archives of the *maḥkamah* of Jaffa and its purpose is obvious: to prevent the encroachment of the *qāḍi* of Jaffa into the jurisdiction of the *naqīb*, namely the *ashrāf*.

It is somewhat questionable whether the *ashrāf* were exempt from confiscation of their property. Lybyer includes them in his Moslem Institution the members of which he states:

... were exempt from taxation, were supported out of public revenues, and were left in enjoyment of their own government as a part of their general jurisdiction in the empire. They had an advantage over the *kullar* in that their property was not subject to confiscation.⁸⁵

This must be with reference to the ulema, for D'Ohsson states that although the ulema and the Janissaries were exempt from confiscation: Les Emirs mêmes, les descendants du Prophète, n'en sont pas exemptés.⁸⁶

D'Ohsson also makes particular reference to the fact that the *ashrāf*, ulema, and Janissaries were exempt from the tax on sheep called the *'ādad-i aghnām* if they possessed fewer than one hundred and fifty.⁸⁷ It must be assumed in the light of this statement that the *ashrāf*, although they might have had special financial privileges of a limited nature, were not generally exempt from taxes.

To maintain respect for the *ashrāf*, to control them, and to show the esteem in which the Ottoman dynasty held the family of the Prophet, the office of *naqīb al-ashrāf* was given absolute authority over the corps and an important position in court ceremonies which reflected the ortho-

⁸⁴ Asad Rustum, ed., *al-Uṣūl al-'Arabīyah li-Ta'rikh Suriyah fi 'Ahd Muḥammad 'Ali Pāsha* (Beirut: American Press, 1930-1934), II, 9.

⁸⁵ *Government*, 118-119, 225.

⁸⁶ *Tableau général*, VII, 148.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 239.

doxy of the sultans. The *naqīb* was originally chosen for life⁸⁸ but later during the pleasure of the sultan⁸⁹ from among whichever were *sayyids* of the two *qāḍi-askars* and the Istanbul *qāḍisi*.⁹⁰ The office of *naqīb* was usually held concurrently with that of the judgeship,⁹¹ but should its possessor be elevated to the office of *shaykh al-Islām*, he had to relinquish the *niqābah*.⁹² It was the *naqīb* who represented the *ashraf* as a corporation before the sultan by means of a *qaḍu chāwūshu*, or herald of the gate, who attended the divans of the grand vizir to receive orders pertaining to the corps or to hear judgments pronounced against its members, the execution of which rested with the *naqīb*.⁹³

Besides this *qaḍu chāwūshu* the *naqīb* had other *chāwūshs* to transmit his orders to the *nuqabā' al-ashraf qā'im-maqām*, or deputy *naqībs*, in the provinces, whom he appointed, and also a staff of clerks and secretaries to keep the *daftars* or registers of the office.⁹⁴

On the conversion of *muqāṭa'ahs*, or benefice lands, from annual possession to life-time possession, or *mālikānah*, in 1692,⁹⁵ the *naqīb*, in association with the *shaykh al-Islām* and the two *qāḍi-askars*, was given the supervision of the *muqāṭa'ahs* to ensure the maintenance of the legitimate rights of the possessors.⁹⁶

The *naqīb* received his investiture in the presence of the sultan with the same ceremony as that of the *qāḍi-askars* and had toward the sultan the same prerogatives as the *shaykh al-Islām*, namely of kissing his robe at the waist. But in the ceremonies at Bayrām and that of the *bay'ah*, or oath of fealty to the sovereign on his accession, the *naqīb* had precedence even over the *shaykh al-Islām*⁹⁷ and in the interment ceremony of the deceased sultan he was placed on a par with him.⁹⁸ The role of the *naqīb* in the ceremony of girding the new sultan with the supposed sword of the Prophet varied with the period in Ottoman his-

⁸⁸ Lybyer, *Government*, 206; Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 2, 94.

⁸⁹ Jawdat, *Ta'rikh*, II, 178, 250-251; III, 149, 272.

⁹⁰ D'Ohsson, *Tableau général*, IV, 555; Codrika the Greek, "Tableau synoptique de l'administration turque suivant les principes de la religion mahometane qui en est la base," January 1827, *TMD*, XIX, f. 287r.

⁹¹ Jawdat, *Ta'rikh*, II, 250-251; III, 272; IV, 262.

⁹² *Ibid.*, II, 178; III, 272; Codrika, "Tableau synoptique," *TMD*, XIX, f. 287v. "For it was feared that otherwise odious comparisons might be drawn between the honours due the Sultan (with his unfortunate lack of Apostolic blood) and those that might be commanded by a doctor endowed with this double authority." Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 2, 94.

⁹³ D'Ohsson, *Tableau général*, VII, 172-173.

⁹⁴ Rycaut, *Present State of the Ottoman Empire*, 211; Lybyer, *Government*, 207.

⁹⁵ *Supra*, 34-35 and 35, n. 115.

⁹⁶ [Government of Egypt], Administration des biens privés et des palais royaux, *Recueil de firmans impériaux ottomans adressés aux valis et aux khédives d'Égypte*, 1006 H.-1322 H. (1597 J.-C.-1904 J.-C.) (Cairo: Institut français d'archéologie orientale, 1934), 7, no. 22 dated 22 Muḥarram 1216/4 June 1801; D'Ohsson, *Tableau général*, VII, 243.

⁹⁷ Codrika, "Tableau synoptique," *TMD*, XIX, f. 287r. and v.; D'Ohsson, *Tableau général*, VII, 105, 106, 110, 112.

⁹⁸ D'Ohsson, *Tableau général*, VII, 117.

tory. Prior to the eighteenth century he had assisted at the ceremony but during the period of this study, because of the rivalry in this ceremony between the *shaykh al-Islām* and the grand vizir on the one hand and the Janissary-Baktāshi combination on the other, "the chief part in the ceremony was given to the *naqīb*, probably as being a politically insignificant figure."⁹⁹

The *naqīb* was also guardian of the *sanjāq-i sharīf*, the noble banner of the Prophet, which was the Ottoman war standard.¹⁰⁰ Its bearer, the *amīr-i 'alam*, was the other Ottoman official who had to be a *sharīf*. He had precedence over all the officers of the army.¹⁰¹

On the fifteenth day of Ramaçlān each year the *naqīb* used to bring the mantle of the Prophet out of safekeeping and, assisted by the *shaykh al-Islām* and in the presence of the sultan, dip a corner of it into water. The water thus made sacred was distributed in vials bearing the imperial seal to all the dignitaries of the empire.

Ceux qui la reçoivent sont obligés d'envoyer au Nakib-ul-Eschraf des riches présents et de récompenses pécuniaires, ce qui produit à ce grand dignitaire un revenu très-considérable en outre de grands bénéfices dont il jouit dans l'état.¹⁰²

The above exposition of the high rank which the *naqīb* enjoyed in the religious court ceremonies indicates the reverence the Ottoman dynasty considered due the *ashrāf*. Among the people, however, and even at times in the government¹⁰³ a corresponding degree of esteem was in fact not generally to be found. The decline in prestige of the *ashrāf* was not an Ottoman phenomenon: gross misconduct on their part was not unknown in the 'Abbāsīd period¹⁰⁴ and many of them lived in a poverty not conducive to esteem.¹⁰⁵ To maintain this class of nobility in public veneration within the mobile Islamic society, without greater benefit than a degree of personal inviolability, required at the very least constant high ability and organization. These were lacking. Thus it is not surprising to find that strict regulations against disrespect and a somewhat artificial generation of deference were continually necessary.

It was indeed the privileges accorded the *ashrāf* and the appeal of the residual esteem that created the abuse which in its cycle reduced still further the position of the *ashrāf*, namely the admission into the

⁹⁹ F. W. Hasluck, *Christianity and Islam under the Sultans*, ed. by Margaret M. Hasluck (Oxford: Clarendon, 1929), II, 612. In the nineteenth century the *naqīb* gave way to the *shaykh* of the Mawlawi dervishes: *ibid.*, 613-616.

¹⁰⁰ Codrīka, "Tableau synoptique," *TMD*, XIX, f. 287v.

¹⁰¹ Rycaut, *State of the Ottoman Empire*, 211; Lybyer, *Government*, 206; Olivier, *Voyage*, IV, 184.

¹⁰² Codrīka, "Tableau synoptique," *TMD*, XIX, f. 287v. Cf. D'Ohsson, *Tableau général*, II, 391-392.

¹⁰³ D'Ohsson, *Tableau général*, VII, 205.

¹⁰⁴ Mez, *Renaissance of Islam*, 152.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 151.

corps of those who possessed sufficient money or influence to overcome their lack of the necessary qualification. This abuse and its effect are described by Paul Rycaut :

And tho few of them can derive his Genealogy clearly from *Mahomet*: yet those who can but only pretend to it, are often helped out in their Pedigree; as often as the *Nakib* desires to favour any Person, or can have any colour to acquire a new Subject; and then to clear all scruple from the World, he gives him a Tree of his Lineage and Descent. The *Turks* being well acquainted with this abuse, carry the less respect to the whole Generation; so that as often as they find any of them drunk or disordered, they make no scruple to take off their Green Turbants first, kissing them and laying them aside with all reverence, and afterwards beat them without respect or mercy.¹⁰⁶

The lengths to which this lack of esteem for the *ashrāf* had progressed will become more fully apparent in the discussion of the *ashrāf* in Aleppo and in the historical chapter to follow.

The impressive characteristic of the Aleppo *ashrāf* in the eighteenth century lies in the large membership bound into an apparently organized body. Only an estimate can be made of the number, based on critical evaluation of contemporary figures. Neither d'Arvieux nor Russell, two of the more detailed observers, have left estimates. Michael Devezin states that there were 12,000.¹⁰⁷ Olivier, who spent three months in Aleppo in 1795 supplies two incompatible figures: three to four thousand families¹⁰⁸ and later, five to six thousand individuals.¹⁰⁹ An English traveller who visited the city in 1797 said that "they form a body of nearly sixty thousand,¹¹⁰ while de Perdriau, the French consul, like Olivier, gives two estimates which are not in agreement: more than ten thousand in 1769,¹¹¹ and in the following year more than fifty thousand.¹¹² Elsewhere the consul characterizes the *ashrāf* as follows:

Il n'est peut être pas de Ville dans la Turquie qui fourmille de Cherifs comme Alep. . . . C'est le Corps le plus redoutable de la Ville vû son nombre prodigieux.¹¹³

One cannot explain the wide variance between Browne's figure and the second one of de Perdriau, on the one hand, and those of Olivier,

¹⁰⁶ *Present State of Ottoman Empire*, 211. Cf. also Olivier, *Voyage*, IV, 182-183. Rycaut also mentions that many *ashrāf* were slave dealers, "it being a holy Profession to captivate and enslave Christians:" *loc. cit.*

¹⁰⁷ Michael Devezin, *Nachrichten über Aleppo und Cypern* (Weimar, 1804), 8-9 as cited in Sauvaget, *Alep*, 197, n. 725. This note also states that Ḥaydar al-Shihābī's estimate of the *ashrāf* in Aleppo was 12,000. The text cited is as follows: "His company was twelve thousand Janissaries (*sic!*)": Shihābī, *Lubnān*, 416.

¹⁰⁸ *Voyage*, II, 308.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, IV, 170.

¹¹⁰ Browne, *Travels*, 385.

¹¹¹ De Perdriau to De Praslin, 8 October 1769, *AE B¹-91*.

¹¹² De Perdriau to De Praslin, 17 August 1770, *AE B¹-91*.

¹¹³ De Perdriau, "Mémoire [of 1777]," *AE B¹-94*.

Devezin, and the 10,000 of de Perdriau on the other except by the clue that Olivier has given. It is conceivable that the lower group, varying from four to twelve thousand, related to the heads of families, a customary method of enumerating in the East, while the latter, higher group refers to individuals. In the case of the *ashrāf* a reckoning on an individual basis had particular pertinence, for women and children were full members of the corps.¹¹⁴

Ashrāf were present in all social classes in Aleppo, "from the highest *Imām* to the lowest peasant."¹¹⁵ One is found for example to have been a porter in the *sūq*.¹¹⁶ Others were the tenants of the gardens along Aleppo's river, the *Quwayq*, protecting them for the owners from the depredations of the Aleppines.¹¹⁷ Yet it is obvious that the social rank of the *ashrāf* as a whole was higher than that of the Janissaries, for

. . . all the Ulema and Effendis belong to their body and the generality of them have received some education, while out of one hundred Janissaries, there are scarcely five who know how to read or to write their own names.¹¹⁸

To say that all the ulema and effendis were *ashrāf* is too bold a statement but a great many of them were. Rousseau, after describing the *ashrāf*, continues his discussion with this phrase: "Pour ce qui est du reste des ulemas. . ."¹¹⁹ Such association of the *ashrāf* with the ulema was frequent and with good reason.¹²⁰ There seemed to be no difficulty in finding a candidate for *naqīb al-ashrāf* of the empire among the four highest ulema, and there were frequent occasions in Aleppo when a mufti became *naqīb* or vice versa.¹²¹

The *ashrāf* do not appear to have been so concentrated in a few quarters of the city as were the Janissaries. The greatest concentration was probably in the suburb just beyond *Bāb al-Naṣr*, north of the citadel.¹²² According to Russell many of the wealthy *ashrāf* lived in *Bānqūsa*,¹²³ which would place them somewhat east of this concentration. But in the battles for control of the city between the *ashrāf* and the Janissaries the former held the city, while the latter attacked it predominantly from

¹¹⁴ The line of descent, after all, was through *Fāṭimah*.

¹¹⁵ Browne, *Travels* 385; cf. Russell, *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 160.

¹¹⁶ De Perdriau to De Praslin, 8 October 1769, *AE B¹*-91.

¹¹⁷ Russell, *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 47. In the early 1840's the *ashrāf* were characterized as "for the most part, composed of merchants and tradespeople": [A. A. Paton], *The Modern Syrians*, 249.

¹¹⁸ Burckhardt, *Travels in Syria*, 652.

¹¹⁹ Rousseau, "Description succincte du pachalik d'Alep [1812]," *CCAlepp*, XXV, f. 28r.

¹²⁰ *Supra*, 91.

¹²¹ Cf. *Tabbākh, I'lām*, VI, 187f.; Russell, *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 337-338; Abbott to Liston, 26 August 1794, *SP* 110/53, f. 62r.

¹²² Taoutel, *Daftar*, 55, n. 1.

¹²³ *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 12.

Bānqūsa and Bāb al-Nayrāb.¹²⁴ This may indicate that most of the *ashrāf* lived within the walls.

Such was the diversity in the *ashrāf* ranks, the reasonable consequences of a genealogical criterion of affiliation. In face of this diversity the question arises: why were the *ashrāf* sufficiently organized to become a power in Aleppo, the "city party" as Russell called it?¹²⁵ It may be doubted that the bond of blood would have been adequate in itself to produce the cohesion present in the latter half of the eighteenth century. The veneration the Prophet's blood accorded the group, and the individual if his conduct merited it, gave the corps a particular influence among the Muslim rank and file. Often this influence was used to forward intolerance of the minorities, especially among the lower class *ashrāf* who envied the higher economic status of some Christians. The records are full of incidents of *ashrāf* inciting the Muslim population against the minorities on the basis of disrespect to a *sharīf* and therefore to Islam.¹²⁶ While these records reflect the minority point of view, yet the number of incidents and the manner in which they were reported leaves an impression of *ashrāf* vindictiveness. In many, if not most, there was in addition a financial motive: the probability that an avania would be successfully exacted for the real or imagined injury. A united *ashrāf* front on such occasions was an asset, for their proclivities for such conduct was well known and not infrequently resisted by the authorities as well as the minorities.¹²⁷ The threat of a riot might tilt the balance in favor of the *ashrāf*.

Far more inducive to strong community interest to be protected at all cost were the privileges the *ashrāf* received from a venerating government. Although it has been shown that there exists some doubt as to whether or not the group as a whole had any financial privileges,¹²⁸ those in Aleppo appear to have been exempt from certain dues, for de Perdriau not only to states¹²⁹ but also shows how these financial privileges operated in their favor in the manufacturing of silk, one of Aleppo's principal industries:

Les Chretiens precedement Seuls en Possession de ce travail, ont eu l'imprudence d'y employer des ouvriers Turcs; ce qui fait que ces derniers possedent presentement autant qu'Eux. Les Chretiens ne peuvent même soutenir

¹²⁴ Taoutel, *Daftar*, 72; Abbott to Samuel Manesty, 22 April 1798, *SP* 110/53, f. 125r.

¹²⁵ *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 326.

¹²⁶ Rabbath, *Documents inédits*, II, 413, n. 3; Eton, *Survey*, 34-35; David Hays to Cazalet and Cooke, London, 17 July 1772, *SP* 110/42; De Perdriau to De Praslin, 8 October 1769, *AE B¹-91*; De Perdriau to De Praslin, 17 August 1770, *AE B¹-91*; Taoutel, *Daftar*, 55.

¹²⁷ Eton, *Survey*, 34-35.

¹²⁸ *Supra*, 93.

¹²⁹ "Ils jouissent, ainsy que les Janissaires, de plusieurs privileges et de l'exemption de certains Droits, auxquels sont Soumis les autres habitans tant Turc que Chrétiens": "Mémoire [of 1777]," *AE B¹-94*.

la Concurrence dans le debit des Etoffes, parceque les fabriquants Turcs, lanissaires ou Cherifs pour la plus part jouissent de plusieurs Privileges et ne payent point pour leur Manufacture Certain Droits auxquels sont Soumis les Chretiens.¹³⁰

Such privileges not only forced a certain cohesion among the *ashrāf* but also were a powerful attraction for those outside the *ashrāf* ranks. The decline of the Ottoman Empire brought with it a decrease in security of life and fortune. The *ashrāf* privileges offered some measure of security of person, while the influence of the corps at least assisted in fending off the avaricious government officials. For those who had property, money and a lineage not entirely incompatible with the required pedigree became the criteria of admission to the *ashrāf* and the enjoyment of their protection.¹³¹ The addition of such individuals increased the power of the corps as a whole and in turn made adherence to it all the more attractive.

As the official inspecting the genealogies of potential *ashrāf*, the *naqīb*, more properly called *naqīb al-ashrāf qā'im-maqām*,¹³² admitted those with spurious or questionable genealogies and profited from the bribes offered therefor. Since he was the principal official of the corps on the local level, he was the obvious candidate for leadership but did not always acquire it. Appointed by the *naqīb al-ashrāf* in Istanbul in return for the usual remuneration, he might not always be a man of ability, and this the leader of the party had to be. As a member of the *wāli's* *divan*¹³³ and a resident of Aleppo, he had the opportunity to influence the transitory pasha through his knowledge of provincial affairs and through the power he represented. Under a strong *naqīb* the leading *ashrāf* could aspire to hold the position that the *a'yān* seem to have once had,¹³⁴ that of representing the city to the government. The *a'yān* had lost their power by the eighteenth century¹³⁵ and it is conceivable that the *naqīb* had gained the control they had had over the land.

It has been noted that the *naqīb al-ashrāf* of the empire was one of the four officials who guaranteed the new system of *mālikānahs*.¹³⁶ Aleppo was one of the provinces in which this system was introduced¹³⁷ and the duties the *naqīb* at the capital acquired may have been delegated to the local *naqīb*. He and the mufti were the permanent residents representing the central officials while the *qāḍi* was transitory. Mufti and

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ Taoutel, *Daftar*, 55 n. 1; Sauvaget, *Alep*, 197. Cf. *supra*, 95-96 for a statement of this abuse throughout the empire.

¹³² Also *naqīb al-ashrāf wakili* in Ottoman parlance, having the same meaning, the local representative of the *naqīb* in Istanbul: Pakalın, *Tarih Deyimleri*, II, 648.

¹³³ *Supra*, 34.

¹³⁴ Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, pt. 1, 198-199, 256-257; *supra*, 35-36.

¹³⁵ Russell, *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 326. His term for them is "Agas."

¹³⁶ *Supra*, 94.

¹³⁷ Administration des biens privés, *Recueil de firmans*, 7, no. 22.

naqīb were not infrequently one person. The system of auctioning and verifying these *mālikānahs* must have offered opportunities for personal acquisition of property and for rewards and exactions. Such a reconstruction appears to be a reasonable explanation in part of the wealth accumulated by leading *ashrāf*. Russell indicates that many of the ulema held much property and that most of them were *ashrāf*,¹³⁸ while the development of the situation is shown by Burckhardt's statement that at the apogee of *ashrāf* power in the late eighteenth century "most of the villages round Aleppo were then in their possession, they command the landed interests [and] all the Aleppo grandees of ancient families . . . belong to their body."¹³⁹ In his travels in the Aleppo region he mentions the owners of villages, many of whom were *ashrāf*:

1) Sarmīn owned by the family of Qudsi Effendi, *naqīb al-ashrāf* from 1793-1794 and ca. 1796 to 1800.¹⁴⁰

2) al-Bāra owned by Ṭālib Effendi, relative of the deceased Muḥammad Effendi Ṭaha Zādah, known as Chalabi Effendi, for many years *naqīb* of Aleppo.¹⁴¹

3) The whole plain of Khalaqah comprising eighteen villages west of Aleppo owned by 'Abbās Effendi, heir of Chalabi Effendi.¹⁴²

For the *ashrāf* party to flourish its leader had to be a man of wealth, political acumen, a resident of Aleppo, and preferably both an *'ālim* and the *naqīb*. Such a man existed in Chalabi Effendi, al-Sayyid Muḥammad Effendi Ṭaha Zādah, the central figure of the early part of the period under study and the patron of that of the latter part of the period, Ibrāhīm Pasha Qaṭṭār Aghāsi. His father, Aḥmad Effendi ibn-Ṭaha Effendi ibn-Muṣṭafa Effendi, had been a *qāḍi* and had amassed a considerable fortune with which he established and endowed the *madrasah* al-Aḥmadiyah in the city.¹⁴³ The emphasis in the *waqfiyah*, or deed of trust, on the employment of Kurds in the *madrasah*,¹⁴⁴ added to the non-Arab flavor in the family names,¹⁴⁵ leads one to believe that the family was of Kurdish origin.

Chalabi Effendi was the oldest son of Aḥmad Effendi¹⁴⁶ and inherited considerable wealth which "added to his personal qualities, rendered his influence and power so great that during twenty years he

¹³⁸ *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 326 and 327.

¹³⁹ *Travels in Syria*, 651-652.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 121-122; Abbott to Levant Company, 17 September 1793, *SP* 110/53, f. 51r.; Abbott to Liston, 26 August 1794, *SP* 110/53, f. 62r.; Abbott to Spencer Smith, 9 June 1797, *SP* 110/53, f. 110v.; Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, VII, 172-173.

¹⁴¹ Burckhardt, *Travels in Syria*, 129; Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 305.

¹⁴² Burckhardt, *Travels in Syria*, 633.

¹⁴³ For the extensive list of properties made *waqf* for the *madrasah*, see Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab*, II, 54-56.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 56.

¹⁴⁵ E.g., the use of *sādah*, *chalabi* and *Muṣṭafa*, the latter almost a Turkish innovation: Sauvaget, *Alep*, 196, n. 719.

¹⁴⁶ Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab*, II, 61.

obliged several pashas who would not yield to his counsels and designs to quit the town.¹⁴⁷ Although no exaggeration of his influence, this statement is inaccurate factually. Up to 1767 when Chalabi Effendi was first exiled,¹⁴⁸ there is no evidence that he had a hand in the transfer of any *wāli*. From his return in 1772 to his second exile in 1776, any such evidence is lacking. In fact, in the latter year the *wāli* 'Ali Pasha was driven out of the city, by order of the Porte. Chalabi Effendi and his brother 'Ali Effendi were exiled at the same time as the *wāli* for their part in the events that led to the revolt. The attributed reason was the suspicion that their grain monopoly had been the cause of the scarcity of food in the city.¹⁴⁹ In the latter exile there may have been political intrigue within the *ashrāf* ranks on the part of the Kawākibi family, bitter enemies of the Chalabi family.¹⁵⁰ One of its members, Ahmad ibn-abi-Su'ūd al-Kawākibi, thrice mufti of Aleppo, replaced him as *naqīb*.¹⁵¹ He in turn was banished and then exiled in 1780 for misusing the *miri* revenues.¹⁵² Chalabi Effendi returned from exile but at what date is unknown. He is heard of again in 1785 when the Porte named him *muḥaṣṣil* while he was mufti.¹⁵³ This was considered at the time to have been a means for the Porte to obtain his vast wealth by sequestration, for a *muḥaṣṣil*'s property could be sequestered while that of an *'alim* could not. Chalabi Effendi attempted to avoid this trap by not exercising the office himself but deputizing a certain Qara'li, his treasurer during exile.¹⁵⁴ On the death of Chalabi Effendi the following year, however, his property was sequestered although he was still mufti. It is noted that his brother and his son 'Abbās Effendi left immediately for Istanbul¹⁵⁵ and the presumption is that they were seeking to nullify the sequestration. Since 'Abbās Effendi is mentioned by Burckhardt as owning the Khalaqah,¹⁵⁶ they may have been at least partially successful.

The leadership of the *ashrāf* after Chalabi Effendi's death appears to have declined. It revived under Muḥammad Qudsi Effendi, *naqīb* and mufti in 1793, and a close associate of Ibrāhīm Agha Oaṭṭār Aghāsi, *muḥaṣṣil* and successor to Chalabi Effendi's supporters at the Porte.¹⁵⁷ Ibrāhīm Agha and Qudsi Effendi cooperated closely with each other at

¹⁴⁷ Burckhardt, *Travels in Syria*, 649.

¹⁴⁸ Thomas to Ministry, 6 February 1767, *AE B¹-90*; Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, III, 345; Wāṣif, *Tārīkh*, I, 185-186.

¹⁴⁹ De Perdriau, "Bulletin des nouvelles," 22 February 1776, *AE B¹-93*.

¹⁵⁰ Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, VII, 67.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 109.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, III, 357.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, III, 363; Amé to De Cabres, 10 December 1785, *AE B¹-96*. In this letter he is characterized as: "l'homme le plus puissant d'Alep, le chef du corps des gens de loy."

¹⁵⁴ Amé to De Cabres, 10 December 1785, *AE B¹-96*.

¹⁵⁵ Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, III, 366.

¹⁵⁶ *Supra*, 100.

¹⁵⁷ Burckhardt, *Travels in Syria*, 649.

first but whether this continued or not becomes doubtful when the strife between the *ashrāf* and the Janissaries broke out.

These were the important leaders of the *ashrāf* party in Aleppo. It was a risky but profitable enterprise for both Chalabi Effendi and Qudsi Effendi. Under them the *ashrāf* flourished but each had opponents within the party: Chalabi Effendi the Kawākibis, and Qudsi Effendi the Jābiris.¹⁵⁸ Had it not been for their greater influence at the Porte they would not have been so successful. Even in the days when the Ottoman government's control over the provinces appeared tenuous it was still able to affect local politics by its attitude toward the officials and agents at the capital who had protégés in the provinces. Again it is strikingly demonstrated that it was the power of money that determined the vicissitudes of personal political ambitions in the provincial parties. Precisely for this reason, however, a change of factional leadership seldom had a beneficial effect on the urban population, for the only road to power was through the accumulation of wealth and the inevitable means was exaction, either through *avānias* or through monopolies. In both cases it was the *ra'āyah* and the minorities who ultimately supported the burden. The ever-increasing weight of that burden led to the denudation of the country and its commerce.

¹⁵⁸ Abbott to Liston, 26 August 1794, *SP* 110/53, f. 62r.

CHAPTER V

THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN ALEPPO, 1760-1826

The three principal factions in the history of Aleppo from 1760 to 1826, the provincial government, the Janissaries, and the *ashrāf*, have been analysed separately. The picture of political conditions and developments in the city during this period is incomplete without a portrayal of the interaction of these three elements. It is a story of incessant struggle, of coalitions and their ruptures, of the growth of power and its decline, but throughout there is a constant downward trend, culminated perhaps by a natural disaster which left the city but a shadow of the great center of trade it had been in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

The first significant event in the history of this conflict of interests within the city occurred in 1769 when the Janissaries were called out to the Russo-Turkish war. A survey of the eight years prior to this event may sufficiently establish the background against which this and the events that followed it will have greater meaning.

Between 1760 and 1769 Aleppo had nine *wālis*, most of whom resided in the city. Some appear to have had certain repute, two having been grand vizirs,¹ and one the sultan's *nishānji*, or inscriber of the imperial cypher on firmans, the sultan's son-in-law, and later a grand vizir.² One of note was 'Aẓm Zādah Muḥammad Pasha of an important family of Hama. In the year he held the *wilāyah* of Aleppo he attempted to reform the moral standards of the city by closing the coffee houses at night and causing the dismissal of a *qādi* who was frequenting them dressed as a Janissary or a *tufinkji*.³ He also attempted to improve the economic lot of the city by lowering the price of bread and executing the leader of the butchers' guild, thus breaking the *dūmān* racket.⁴

Such action on the part of *wālis* was rare because of their short tenure, indifference and avarice. 'Aẓm Zādah Muḥammad Pasha was

¹ 'Abd-Allāh Pasha al-Farāri who died in Aleppo in early 1761: Thomas to Ministry, 13 March 1761, *AE B¹-88*: Wāṣif, *Ta'rikh*, I, 124-125; Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, III, 338; Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 302; Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, III, 382-383. In 1763 Muṣṭafa Pasha, twice grand vizir: Thomas to Ministry, 31 January 1763, *AE B¹-89*; Wāṣif, *Ta'rikh*, I, 134.

² Yāghliqji Zādah Muḥammad Amin Pasha: von Hammer, *Histoire*, XVI, 187; Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 306 (where it is "Bāghliqji"); Wāṣif, *Ta'rikh*, I, 197, 202, and 205, II, 27.

³ Thomas to Ministry, 3 March and 13 June 1764, *AE B¹-89*; Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 303; Wāṣif, *Ta'rikh*, I, 152; al-Mūradi, *Silk al-Durur*, IV, 98-102.

⁴ *Supra*, 64-65.

the notable exception. The conditions he wished to reform were the rule; famine was common and plague frequent.⁵ The *wālis* were accustomed to make the most of a shortage of grain, as did Aḥmad Pasha, the former *mīr-mīrān* of Killis and *wāli* of Aleppo from 1765 to 1767.⁶

In 1767 on the death of the *muḥaṣṣil* the new *wāli*, Silāḥdār Ḥamzah Pasha, also acquired the *muḥaṣṣilliq*, a rarity for Aleppo, although the rule elsewhere,⁷ and a situation that both the city and the consuls sought to avoid,⁸ combining as it did two posts favorable for exactions under one person, whose power was thereby increased.

As was frequently the case the *wāli's* troops, *dalis* and *tufinkjis*, were troublesome to him and to the city. Kūṣah Muṣṭafa Bāhir Pasha released four hundred of his *dalis* in 1763 and then had to drive them into the mountains after they had pillaged two villages.⁹ Two years later the *ashrāf* incited a riot when one of their number was wounded by a *dali*,¹⁰ and the following year the *dalis* and *tufinkjis* battled in the streets for several days as a result of a quarrel over a prostitute.¹¹

Similarly there was considerable trouble with the nomads in the province during these nine years. 'Aẓm Zādah Muḥammad Pasha was appointed *sar-'askar*, or army commander, over the *wālis* of Adana and Urfa in 1764 to attack the Kurds in the Iskandarūn region who were blockading the vital route along the coast. After a light engagement in which the principal brigands escaped the army disbanded and the heads of those captured were sent to the Porte.¹² In 1767 the *mutasallim* for the new *wāli* Silāḥdār Ḥamzah Pasha was more successful: the two

⁵ A plague the toll from which reached 190 persons per day occurred in the summer of 1762; Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 303. For other plagues, see *supra*, 16, nn. 71 and 72.

⁶ There is definite confusion in the sources as to the *wāli* of Aleppo from 1765 to 1767. Thurayya mentions two governors, apparently at the same time; Malik Aḥmad Pasha was appointed *beylerbey* of Aleppo in March 1765 and raised to the vizirate in November of the same year, becoming *wāli* of Qonya in March of 1767: *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, I, 260. But in 1765 Šūnbāt Zādah Muḥammad Pasha was appointed *wāli* of Aleppo as a *mīr-mīrān* and was given the vizirate in 1180/ began June 1766: *ibid.*, IV, 254. Wāṣif confirms that a *mīr-mīrān* by the name of Aḥmad Pasha went to Aleppo in Shawwāl 1178/March 1765: *Ta'rikh*, I, 172. Thomas records that on 17 February 1766 a *qaḥūji bāshi* arrived with a third *tuḡh* for the *wāli*; Thomas to Ministry, 20 February 1766, *AE B¹-90*. The lapse of time between the raising of Aḥmad Pasha to the vizirate in November 1765 and the arrival of the *qaḥūji bāshi* in February 1766 would not seem unreasonable. In February 1767 the *wāli* of Aleppo was Muḥammad Pasha: Taoutel, *Daftar*, 53. It is possible that Aḥmad Pasha was transferred in 1766 and Šūnbāt Zādah Muḥammad Pasha is the Muḥammad Pasha referred to above.

⁷ A. N. Poliak, *Feudalism*, 51. The biography of Silāḥdār Ḥamzah Pasha is in Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, II, 254-255.

⁸ De Perdriau, "Mémoire [of 1777]," *AE B¹-94*.

⁹ Thomas to Ministry, 1 March 1763, *AE B¹-89*. For the biography of Kūṣah Muṣṭafa Bāhir Pasha, see Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, IV, 440-441.

¹⁰ Thomas to Ministry, 30 September 1765, *AE B¹-89*.

¹¹ Thomas to Ministry, 21 and 31 May 1766, *AE B¹-90*.

¹² Thomas to Ministry, 13 July 1764, *AE B¹-89*.

principal Kurdish chieftains were captured and executed, thus checking the activity of their tribes for a few years.¹³

The Bedouin were less difficult but 1765 was marked by a serious revolt of the Mawālīs because the subsidy from the Porte for their *amīr* to maintain order on the eastward caravan route had been cut. This matter had finally to be settled by negotiations in which Chalabi Effendi was a notable participant.¹⁴

This *naqīb*, whose career has been sketched above,¹⁵ was then near the summit of his power if he had not attained it. He is described by a contemporary as "all-powerful" in 1763¹⁶ and when one of his wives gave birth the following year to his first son, great celebrations were held, everyone made congratulatory visits to him, and he received numerous presents.¹⁷ Wāṣif, in speaking of his deposition and exile, indicates how he attained this considerable position:

Ṭaha Zādah al-Sayyid Muḥammad Effendi of the *ashraf* of Aleppo, having acquired distinction and fame through being *naqīb* for a very long time and having gradually extended the sphere of his means of subsistence, had brought great and small into his service.¹⁸

Here may be seen the effects of the protégé system described in reference to Ibrāhīm Pasha Qattār Aghāsi, who was himself a protégé of Chalabi Effendi.¹⁹ One may assume that the extension of "his means of subsistence" implies that he developed monopolies of the city's essential supplies. This was one of the two roads to wealth, the other being the acquisition of revenue farms. But since Chalabi Effendi sought to avoid the *muḥaṣṣilliq*,²⁰ the revenue farm *par excellence*, it is not likely that he took the latter course.

Wāṣif goes on to describe how Chalabi Effendi became exiled:

His benefit was greater than his detriment to the people of Aleppo, but because the pauper's eye for opportunity has from of old been antagonistic to the fortunate and furthermore because the mullas of Aleppo were envious of him [yet] through the severity of his tyranny could not continually lay hand on the property of the people, they opened the door of slander and vituperation and closed the gate of virtues.²¹

Some of them reported to Istanbul the unfavorable aspects of his character "out of spite," and the Porte, "according to the rule: 'he who

¹³ Thomas to Ministry, 25 July, 17 August, 1 and 23 October 1767, *AE B*¹-90.

¹⁴ Thomas to Ministry, 19 February 1765, *AE B*¹-89, quoted in part *supra*, 10.

¹⁵ *Supra*, 100-101.

¹⁶ Thomas to Ministry, 5 July 1763, *AE B*¹-89.

¹⁷ Thomas to Ministry, 1 February 1765, *AE B*¹-89. This son was 'Abbās Effendi, the inheritor of his lands: Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, III, 366; Burckhardt, *Travels*, 633.

¹⁸ *Ta'rikh*, I, 185.

¹⁹ *Supra*, 38-39.

²⁰ *Supra*, 101.

²¹ *Ta'rikh*, I, 185-186.

hears, forsakes,' ” struck his name from the list of the ulema and banished him to Edirne. His father, Aḥmad Effendi, was also exiled for his attempts to clear the name of his son.²²

Little is heard of the Janissaries between 1760 and the beginning of 1769 but this does not signify that they were powerless. On the contrary, they had twice caused considerable difficulty prior to 1760 but had been severely repressed.²³ Evidence in the period of this study indicates that it took a number of years for a party such as the Janissaries to recover from a heavy blow to their organization, for such action invariably deprived them of their principal leaders.²⁴

One event that had a bearing on the fortunes of the Janissaries was 'Azm Zādah Muḥammad Pasha's execution of Kāwr Hājjī, the chief of the butchers' guild.²⁵ It is not clear in how far the Janissaries controlled this guild at the time, but the campaign waged against it between 1762 and 1764 may well have instilled caution in their minds.

The involvement of the Ottoman Empire in a prolonged war with the Russians in the fall of 1768 had a fundamental effect on Aleppo. It took away from the city not only its *wāli*, thus leaving it with a necessarily weaker *mutasallim*, but also the Janissary force. On the surface this would appear to have been advantageous but, in fact, it was the cause of considerable difficulty. In the first place, the levy of Janissaries was accompanied by great disorder which the government could not suppress,²⁶ but its attempts culminated in mid-March of 1769 in a pitched battle between the Janissaries and the *dalis* of the *mutasallim* in which the latter were bested.²⁷ But at last the *türnahji* arrived and led the Janissaries off to the army while the city counted its losses.

Vivant sans discipline, et rassemblé de diverses contrées, il [the corps of Janissaries] a commis icy beaucoup de desordre y ayant mis chacun à contribution. 50 Personnes des deux Sexes s'en sont trouvées les Victimes. . . . Ils ont mis une entrave au Commerce par les Bazars fermés pendant plusieurs jours.²⁸

It was felt at the time that a strong *wāli* could have avoided these disorders²⁹ but no sooner had the Janissaries departed than the *ashraf* took advantage of the absence of any counterbalance to their aspirations. Having created a pretext, they rioted and forced the *mutasallim* to dis-

²² *Ibid.*

²³ In 1745 by the *wāli* al-Hājj Aḥmad Pasha and in 1747 by Kūr Wazir Pasha: Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 298-299.

²⁴ A large number of the Janissary notables were massacred in 1813 and it was five years before they recovered even partially from that repression: *infra*, 130-131.

²⁵ *Supra*, 65.

²⁶ Joseph Belleville to De Praslin, n.d. [January 1769], *AE B¹-91*; cf. Wāṣif, *Ta'riḥ*, II, 17.

²⁷ Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, III, 347; Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 306.

²⁸ De Perdriau to De Praslin, 15 April 1769, *AE B¹-91*.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

charge the regular guard of *dalīs* and replace it with the *ḥurrās*, the night watchmen of the markets, who were described as a rabble.³⁰ A change of *naqīb* ordered by the Porte did little to improve the situation and again the *ashrāf* rioted, this time because the British consul, William Clarke, had jostled a *sharīf* in the street. Although protected by the capitulations, Clarke answered the summons of the *qāḍī* to the *maḥkamah*, and the latter had difficulty in preventing a lynching. It took the payment in private of a considerable sum to the plaintiff and his comrades to extricate the consul from the awkward situation.³¹

Ashrāf disorders persisted in spite of the appointment of a new *mutasallim*, Hunkārli Zādah Aḥmad Effendi, by the *qāḍī* and the *a'yān* in the absence of the newly appointed *wālī*, Ṭūpāl 'Uthmān Zādah Muḥammad Pasha.³² The chaos in the city was not lessened by the call for a new levy of Janissaries in the spring of 1770. This event is of interest as it concerns the question of the nature of the Janissary organization in Aleppo.

It has been pointed out that the Aleppo Janissaries were *yerli qūlis* but that during the Russo-Turkish war in question the need of the army for additional troops led to the enrollment of *gūñullus* throughout the empire by the process called *taṣḥīh bi-dargāh*.³³ With these circumstances in mind it may be postulated that the levy in the spring of 1769 was of the *yerli qūlis* already on the Aleppo rolls and that the 1770 levy was of *gūñullus* to supplement the previous force. On their return from campaign the *gūñullus* were officially mustered out but in fact remained Janissary partisans and through the growing strength of that corps participated in its privileges.

Unfortunately no estimate of the number that departed in 1770 has been found but their rebellious conduct while preparing for the march has been briefly mentioned in several sources. All the shops were closed for several days. The *a'yān* took all possible precautions seemingly in vain. Payments to defray the expenses of the march were extorted by threats.³⁴ Al-Ghazzi relates that in the year 1183 (May 7, 1769 to April 26, 1770) there was a battle between the Janissaries and

³⁰ De Perdriau to De Praslin, 8 October 1769, *AE B¹-91*.

³¹ *Ibid.*; Burckhardt, *Travels in Syria*, 649. De Perdriau's report may be prejudiced, but, it would appear, with justice, for Clarke's submission to the summons compromised not only his position but that of the whole European community by permitting an infringement of the capitulations.

It may be noted here that Ghazzi's account of the dismissal of Rajab Pasha for dalliance with his harem (*Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 306) is not correct. Rajab Pasha was never in Aleppo during his *wilāyah*. He was dismissed because he tarried in his harem in Bandar instead of marching to the relief of the citadel of Khūtīn: Wāṣif, *Ta'rikh*, II, 13; De Perdriau to De Praslin, 24 August 1769, *AE B¹-91*. A comparison of the texts indicates that Ghazzi copied from Wāṣif incorrectly. Rajab Pasha was originally from Aleppo: Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, II, 373-374.

³² De Perdriau to De Praslin, 22 February 1770, *AE B¹-91*.

³³ *Supra*, 72.

³⁴ De Perdriau to De Praslin, 12 and 28 March 1770, *AE B¹-91*; Robert Abbott to John Abbott, 2 May 1770, *SP* 110/41; Taoutel, *Daftar*, 54.

the *ashrāf*, that the Qaysarīyat-al-‘Arab, or Bedouin market, below the citadel was thereby destroyed, and that a number of *ashrāf* were banished.³⁵ The spring of 1770 would appear the logical time for such a battle to have occurred but corroborative evidence is necessary before this event may be accepted unconditionally as fact.

The fall of 1770 saw the free hand of the *ashrāf* somewhat checked. They rose against the *mutasallim*, Hunkārli Zādah Aḥmad Effendi, and drove him out of the city when he refused to deliver to them the banner of the Prophet which had rested in the citadel for thirty-five years.³⁶ The *a’yān* fled with him, for not only had he been their choice for *mutasallim* but their monopoly of the grain supplies was said to have been one of the fundamental reasons for the revolt.³⁷ Another was that the *mutasallim* and *a’yān* were considering an invitation to ‘Az̄m Zādah Muḥammad Pasha, who was passing by Aleppo on the road to Mar‘ash from the *walāyah* of Sidon, to enter Aleppo and take over its government with the objective of crushing the *ashrāf*.³⁸ Certain alleged malpractices of *wālis* and *qādīs*, to be described, added fuel to the flames.

Two deputations of *ashrāf* to the *mutasallim* finally persuaded him to return to the city. The *a’yān* reluctantly followed not long afterwards and the *ashrāf* met to attempt a redress of the city’s affairs. With regard to the grain supplies they determined to make a forced loan of all the *millahs* and threatened another revolt should their demands not be met.³⁹ Two days later they met again, this time with the *a’yān* and the *mutasallim*, at the home of the *naqīb* to petition the Porte for the suppression of the rights of *wālis* and *qādīs* which led to their taking advantage of the people. In the period elapsing until the granting of their request they decided to institute the following reforms:

1. Que les diverses Dépenses même Surnumeraires du gouvernement, Seroient à l’avenir imposées Sur les biens Situés hors de la ville, et non Sur les maisons d’interieur, ainsy qu’il s’est practiqué jusqu’a present.
2. Que les fraix des Procédures ne Se payeroient au Mehkemé qu’à raison de cinq pour cent au lieu de dix qu’exigeoit le Cady.
3. Que ceux qui porteroient leurs plaintes à ce Tribunal, ne pouvant en donner des preuves Seroient regardés comme avanistes [those who exact avanias], et contraints à Satisfaire a tous Dépense.
4. Que lorsqu’une Succession passeroit aux Enfants du mort, le Mehkemé n’y mettroit point le Scelle, ni n’en demanderoit la dixieme partie; que celles passant aux Collateraux en Seroient Susceptibles; mais qu’alors il ne Seroit payé que quatre aspres par piastre du montant des biens laissés.⁴⁰

³⁵ Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 306.

³⁶ De Perdriau to De Praslin, 17 August 1770, *AE B¹-91*. This banner was probably a replica of that held in Istanbul and brought forth on the occasion of *jihād*. No mention has been found of the occasion of its confiscation ca. 1745 other than the brief remark of de Perdriau cited above.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*; Ṭabbākh, *I’lām*, III, 347.

³⁹ De Perdriau to De Praslin, 8 October 1770, *AE B¹-91*.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

It has been shown that a ten per cent fee to the *qāḍī* in all court cases was customary, that with regard to inheritance the *qāḍī* levied ten per cent on the estate, and that a 4 asper per piaster rated fee on an estate passing to collaterals reflected the law.⁴¹ The usual tax on houses in the city was the *'awwāriḍ*, based on the area the building occupied, the revenue of which went to the sultan.⁴² Whether it is meant that an additional *'awwāriḍ* was collected for local expenses, or that this should be the only tax levied on houses in the city, is not clear. It is doubtful that the meaning of the passage is that the Aleppines should not pay the *'awwāriḍ* on the houses in the city. This would amount to revolt against the sultan and such was never the objective of the *ashrāf* or the Janisseries. Their rebelliousness was directed against the officers of the sultan, not against the sultan himself.

In addition the price of bread was fixed by this council at a low rate until the next harvest and a former *muḥaṣṣil*, Kūchūk 'Ali Agha, was charged with the purchase and distribution of the grain, as well as the supervision of the loan accounts. On these decisions having been taken, the *ashrāf* laid down their arms.⁴³

But this was by no means the end of the matter. The Porte had been aroused by what had occurred in Aleppo and determined that the situation must be corrected. But its resources were directed toward winning the war against Russia, so the government of Aleppo was given to a Kurd, 'Abd-al-Raḥmān Pasha of Baylān, a *mīr-mīrān*, not as a *pashaliq* but as a *qā'im-maqāmlīq*, that is, he deputized for the *wāli* of Aleppo who was with the army.⁴⁴

'Abd-al-Raḥmān approached the city but was refused entrance. For nine days negotiations were carried on, culminating at last in the *ashrāf* decision to permit him to enter with 900 cavalry, possibly on condition that he close his eyes to the conduct of the *ashrāf*.⁴⁵ This decision was taken with some of the more mutinous *ashrāf* dissenting, and it was they who the evening following his entry, November 5, 1770, attacked him in the serail. But 'Abd-al-Raḥmān Pasha seized the *naqīb* and the banner of the Prophet, which had reposed at the *naqīb*'s mansion since the eviction of the *mutasallim*, locked them both in the citadel, and proceeded to counterattack the rebels.⁴⁶ According to a contemporary resident in Aleppo about three hundred of the *ashrāf* were killed in battle.⁴⁷ Another reported that fifteen of the most mutinous were im-

⁴¹ *Supra*, 49-50.

⁴² D'Arvieux, *Nachrichten*, VI, 378; Pakalın, *Tarih Deyimleri*, I, 112-114.

⁴³ De Perdriau to De Praslin, 8 October 1770, *AE B*¹-91.

⁴⁴ De Perdriau to De Praslin, 7 November 1770, *AE B*¹-91.

⁴⁵ Olivier, *Voyage*, IV, 186. Olivier's account of this revolt is exaggerated and the other sources are silent on the conditions of his entry.

⁴⁶ De Perdriau to De Praslin, 7 November 1770, *AE B*¹-91; Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, III, 347; Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 307.

⁴⁷ Abbott to Edward Gally, 10 November 1770, *SP* 110/41.

paled and that the wealthy *ashrāf* were placed under contribution.⁴⁸ In February of 1771 the imprisoned *naqīb* and his son were exiled to Sidon and 'Abd-al-Raḥmān Pasha received the *wilāyah* of Aleppo with the privileges but not the rank of a three-tail vizir.⁴⁹ At the same time he was ordered to Damascus to join with the other governors of Syria in repelling the advance of 'Alī Bey, who had usurped the government of Egypt. It is at this point that the Janissaries re-enter the picture, for late in March 'Abd-al-Raḥmān Pasha departed for Damascus with about four thousand Janissaries and *dalis*, his troops having thrown the city into confusion by the usual exactions levied on the inhabitants.⁵⁰

No mention is made in the sources of any return of the Janissaries from the Russian campaign but it is said that in the fall of 1770 many of the troops with the grand vizir were disbanded, those of Diyār Bakr having been cited as an example.⁵¹ The *yerli qūli* of Aleppo may have been among these, for the diary of the Armenian celibates, in an entry under the date January 12, 1771, records that "this day the prayers were abridged because of disorder in the city arising from the insurrection of the Janissaries against the *wāli*."⁵²

The departure of the Janissaries for Damascus did not end the city's troubles, for it had to play the reluctant host to the contingent passing through from Urfa to Damascus. The *mutasallim* on this occasion avoided serious plundering by ordering the inhabitants of the quarters to arm themselves before the arrival of the troops.⁵³

No sooner had 'Abd-al-Raḥmān departed than some of the *ashrāf* who had been banished from the city after the insurrection of the preceding fall returned and sought once again to raise the city against the government. The *mutasallim*, however, acted with speed and severity: four were arrested and immediately impaled, and thus any repetition of the previous experience was avoided. The magnitude of this attempt may be judged from a remark by Russell regarding the then *naqīb*, Ṭrābulus Effendi:

In the year 1771, he happened to be Nakeeb, at a time when the Shereefs raised an alarming insurrection. He then lay confined by a dangerous sickness, which soon after brought him to the grave. He was unable to stem the torrent of the rebellion; but he told me, a few hours before he expired, that he foresaw his utmost efforts against measures he had all along condemned, would not save his family from ruin: a prediction, which in the sequel I had the mortification to see fulfilled.⁵⁴

⁴⁸ De Perdriau to De Praslin, 29 November 1770, *AE B¹-91*.

⁴⁹ De Perdriau to De Praslin, 26 February 1771, *AE B¹-91*.

⁵⁰ Robert Abbott to Captain William Sholl, 22 March 1771; Abbott to Gally, 5 April 1771, *SP* 110/41; De Perdriau to the abbot Terray, 2 April 1771, *AE B¹-91*; Taoutel, *Daftar*, 56.

⁵¹ Von Hammer, *Histoire*, XVI, 264.

⁵² Taoutel, *Daftar*, 55.

⁵³ De Perdriau to the abbot Terray, 23 May 1771, *AE B¹-91*.

⁵⁴ *Natural History of Aleppo*, I, 337-338.

Following the defeat of 'Uthmān Pasha at Damascus by the troops of Muḥammad Bey abu-Dhahab⁵⁵ on June 6, 1771 'Abd-al-Raḥmān Pasha fled from the field of battle, tarried but briefly at Aleppo and then sought refuge in his mountain stronghold of Baylān where he defied the commands of the Porte for a number of years.⁵⁶

The flight and disgrace of 'Abd-al-Raḥmān Pasha brought a new *wāli* to Aleppo and ushered in a four year period of comparative tranquility. During this period Chalabi Effendi was pardoned and reinstated to his former posts, thus becoming *naqīb* once more.⁵⁷ 'Uthmān Pasha, *wāli* of Damascus, was appointed *sar-'askar* to conduct a campaign against 'Ali Bey of Egypt and al-Shaykh Ḍāhir al-'Umar of Sidon,⁵⁸ but having been reinforced by a contingent of *qapūqūli* Janissaries from Istanbul he demanded of the *wāli* of Aleppo that he send 500 troops but remain himself in his government,⁵⁹ a relatively light burden for the city, especially as Dāmād Ḥusayn Pasha was a mild governor.⁶⁰ In 1773 'Uthmān Pasha himself replaced this *wāli*, but since he was also *wāli* of Damascus, he appointed the *muḥaṣṣil* as *mutasallim* for a monthly consideration of six thousand piasters.⁶¹

In 1774 the Janissaries were again called out to the army for the campaign against Russia when Sultan 'Abd-al-Ḥamīd I succeeded Sultan Muṣṭafa III. Again they acquired by force their campaign necessities from the hapless city, and after departing almost all deserted to return to Aleppo.⁶² These deserters threw the city into confusion with their quarreling, so the *mutasallim* of the new *wāli* Ibrāhīm Pasha Zādah Muḥammad Pasha, who had not yet arrived, had one executed as an example.⁶³

This new *wāli* inaugurated a period of strife between the city and the *wilāyah*. Muḥammad Pasha's *wilāyah* itself saw no change in the calm which pervaded the city but his replacement in the following year by Chaḥṭāljahli 'Ali Pasha who continued his oppressive measures resulted in an uprising which ended only with the latter's eviction. The essence of these oppressions were avanias not only against the rich but also against the poor and enforced by all the means at the *wāli*'s dis-

⁵⁵ al-Qāri, "al-Wuzarā' al-ladhīn Ḥakamu Dimashq" in al-Munajjid, ed., *Wulāt Dimashq*, 84; Volney, *Voyage*, II, 102-103.

⁵⁶ De Perdriau to the abbot Terray, 11 June 1771; De Perdriau to De Boynes, 6 July, 1771, *AE B¹-91*; Saint Marcel to De Fleuriere, 28 March 1791, *AE B¹-97*. The fact that abu-Dhahab, with Damascus in his grasp, suddenly retreated to Egypt placed 'Abd-al-Raḥmān Pasha in an even more prejudicial position in the eyes of the sultan; Volney, *Voyage*, I, 103.

⁵⁷ De Perdriau to De Boynes, 10 March 1772, *AE B¹-92*.

⁵⁸ Volney, *Voyage*, I, 105-108.

⁵⁹ De Perdriau to De Boynes, 20 and 23 May 1772, *AE B¹-92*.

⁶⁰ De Perdriau to De Boynes, 3 September 1772, *AE B¹-92*. He may be identified with the Ḥusayn Pasha mentioned in Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, II, 214.

⁶¹ De Perdriau to De Boynes, 31 March 1773, *AE B¹-92*.

⁶² De Perdriau to De Boynes, 7 March 1774; De Perdriau, "Nouvelles," 17 August 1774, *AE B¹-92*.

⁶³ De Perdriau, "Nouvelles," 17 August 1774, *AE B¹-92*.

posal. Many of the leading merchants of the city left it to avoid his tyranny.⁶⁴ Chalabi Effendi was one of the victims of this *wilāyah*, but the reason given was not that he had opposed this *wālī*'s designs but had been the instigator of his *avānias*.⁶⁵

Chaḥṭāljahli 'Ali Pasha arrived in Aleppo in early August of 1775 following the transfer of Muḥammad Pasha to Adana. The deposed *wālī*'s *katkhuda*, his brother, and his *tufinkji bāshi* were taken to Istanbul by a *qapūji bāshi* to answer charges of misconduct in office, and in the interim before the arrival of 'Ali Pasha the city notables named the well-liked Kūchūk 'Ali Agha as *mutasallim*.⁶⁶

'Ali Pasha's reputation of ferocity and bloodthirsty conduct had preceded him to Aleppo and his first actions did nothing to belie the reports. A mass of executions took place to render the populace submissive, followed by an *avānia* on the *ā'yān* of 100,000 piasters; the *bāsh chāwūsh* of the *naqīb*, al-Sayyid Khalīl ibn-al-Nawāni, was executed; the *ṣarrāfs* fled the city and its commerce languished in consequence.⁶⁷

But what brought down 'Ali Pasha was the opposition of the Janissaries of Aleppo to his punitive expeditions in the *walāyah* of Aleppo. In the fall of 1775 his *katkhuda*, Naqīb Zādah Muṣṭafa al-Ṭrābulusi,⁶⁸ led them against the Kurds and Turkomans but was unsuccessful, having had to make peace at the price of many sheep.⁶⁹ The hardships of this campaign disgruntled the Janissaries but their annoyance reached its acme when 'Ali Pasha ordered them to march to the assistance of the *katkhuda*, who after moving across the *walāyah* exacting and destroying villages was besieging the town of Jisr al-Shuḡhr with considerable difficulty. The *yerli qūlis* refused on the basis that they were required to march only on the orders of the sultan. 'Ali Pasha, furious, threatened them, and this was the signal for what grew to be a general revolt. The *qāḍi*, through fear or his own conviction, lent the Janissaries his official support by forbidding the *azān* and issuing a *ḥujjah*, or evidential document, authorizing the people to take up arms against

⁶⁴ De Perdriau to De Sartine, 16 February and 19 May 1775, *AE B¹-93*. Ghazzi's report has this *wālī*'s name as Muḥammad Pasha ibn-Muḥammad Pasha 'Uthmān Bey Zādah and says that being a drunkard he remained only a few days: *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 307.

⁶⁵ De Perdriau, "Nouvelles," 30 June 1775, *AE B¹-93*. His father, Aḥmad Effendi, who had been exiled to Aleppo on the reinstatement of his son, had died by this date: *ibid.*

⁶⁶ De Perdriau, "Suite . . . des Nouvelles," 14 July 1775, *AE B¹-93*. The destination of Muḥammad Pasha was later changed to Sidon: De Perdriau to De Sartine, 8 August 1775, *ibid.* Cf. *supra*, 109 for the role Kūchūk 'Ali Agha played in the 1770 revolt.

⁶⁷ The deputies and merchants of the French "nation" to De Perdriau, 8 September 1775; De Perdriau to De Sartine, 6 October 1775, *AE B¹-93*; Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, III, 348.

⁶⁸ Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, III, 348. This would appear to be the son of Ṭrābulus Effendi, mentioned *supra*, 110.

⁶⁹ De Perdriau, "Relation de ce qui s'est passé au sujet de l'expulsion d'Aly Pacha, gouverneur d'Alep," *AE B¹-93*.

the *wāli*. The mufti joined the rebels by the issuance of a *fatwah* declaring the *wāli* unworthy of governing Muslims.⁷⁰

'Ali Pasha, in the face of an armed and belligerent populace, Muslims, Christians and Jews, promised pardon to all, a *mutasallim* of their own choice, and his departure from the city, but then temporized. The Janissaries promised him safe conduct for his person, harem, and effects out of the city, but as the *wāli* dallied there arose demands from the excited population, in spite of the remonstrances of the cautious *a'yān*, that the serail be attacked by fire. Combustible materials were gathered but the *a'yān* made one final attempt to resolve the matter. The *mutasallim* was sent to the besieged palace to offer an ultimatum, and 'Ali Pasha accepted it. That day, December 28, 1775, he left the city

sans queues, sans musique, et sans drapeaux, n'ayant avec luy que le Mut-selim et le Serdar qui l'accompagnerent jusqu'à la Porte de la Ville moins par honneur que pour sa propre Sureté. Depuis la Porte du Seraï jusqu'à celle de la Ville, c'est à dire, pendant l'Espace d'une demie Lieüe, les rües et les Terrasses étoient couvertes d'une multitude innombrable de gens qui avoient le fusil à la main. Les uns l'accabloient d'injures; les autres luy crachoient au Visage. Les Enfants Juifs le monstroient au doigt en l'appellant Aly le Chien. On luy avoit assigné pour le lieu de sa retraite un couvent de derviches qui n'est qu'à une demie heure de la Ville. Mais . . . il quitta ce Couvent [Shaykh abu-Bakr] des le lendemain, et alla camper à deux lieües d'icy.⁷¹

Al-Ṭabbākh, citing the contemporary manuscript source of al-Ṭrābulusi, relates that 'Ali Pasha remained in this camp at Khān Ṭūmān, southwest of Aleppo, for seventeen days and then moved to Sarmīn where his *kakkhuda* joined him with cannon to place the city under siege. Any use of such force, however, was averted by the arrival of orders for his deposition and the appointment of a *mutasallim* until the arrival of his successor, Aḥmad 'Izzat Pasha from Kars.⁷²

The degree to which the populace of Aleppo had to be pushed by the tyranny of the *wāli* is impressive and reflects the passive attitude which centuries of misrule had engendered. Speculation as to the consequences had 'Ali Pasha not incited the Janissaries is not hazarded by contemporary observers, but it is conceivable that the corps acquired considerable strength through their leadership of the revolt itself, while the fact that the *ashrāf* are not mentioned as participants collectively, although they must have been so individually, indicates that Chalabi Effendi still held them in firm grip. This grip, however, was broken as a result of the revolt and the subsequent exile of Chalabi Effendi.⁷³

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, III, 349.

⁷³ Both Chalabi Effendi and his brother were banished from Aleppo for alleged collusion with 'Ali Pasha: *supra*, 101.

Without a leader the *ashrāf* were weak. The Janissaries, although not themselves very strong, were in virtual control of the city.⁷⁴ The events of 1775 demonstrate that an extremely oppressive *wāli* would be evicted but that a severe governor who conducted himself without undue injustice could dominate the situation within the city.

In 1778, however, there was not such a *wāli*. Ibrāhīm Pasha had been raised to the vizirate when he acquired the *wilāyah* of Aleppo⁷⁵ and evidently had little money with which to pay personal troops who could safeguard the city from disorder. Janissaries and *ashrāf* fought in the streets and it took the full efforts of the *a'yān* to effect a reconciliation.⁷⁶ The situation was not ameliorated by a general lack of bread and a *qāḍi* who evidently had something to do with the scarcity.⁷⁷ The *wāli* obtained enough wheat to avoid a revolt but his departure for another *wilāyah* shortly thereafter and the consequent vacuum gave rise to a new battle between the *ashrāf* and the Janissaries. Several *ashrāf* were the victims of this quarrel but it seems to have been somewhat of a draw for a number of Janissaries fled to the shaykh of the Mawālī Bedouins who refused to give them up to the *a'yān*.⁷⁸ A *mutasallim* sent from Istanbul by the new *wāli*, Ṭūpāl 'Uthmān Zādah Muḥammad Aṣif Pasha,⁷⁹ attempted to get control of the city by the execution of a number of Janissaries and *ashrāf*. News of this planned blow reached the populace and the two corps united to attack the serail to force the *mutasallim* to terms, namely, the dismissal of his *dalī bāshi* and restriction of his troops to those the city designated for him.⁸⁰ This situation was not, however, to last: another *mutasallim* was appointed by the absent *wāli*, followed closely by the reappointment of Aḥmad 'Izzat Pasha, who had been *wāli* in 1776.

Insurrections on the part of the Kurds reinforced by *qapūsuz* in the regions neighbouring Aleppo, particularly Killis, Aintab and the Iskandarūn area, occupied the successor of Aḥmad 'Izzat Pasha, Qūchah 'Abdi Pasha. Although appointed to Aleppo in the fall of 1779, he did not come to the city until the spring of 1780 but called for the Aleppo Janissaries to assist him in reducing first Aintab and then Killis. The removal of the Janissaries permitted greater freedom to the *ashrāf* in Aleppo⁸¹ but the expenses of the *wāli*'s campaigns, reflected in extraor-

⁷⁴ De Perdriau to De Sartine, 5 April 1776, *AE B*¹-93.

⁷⁵ Ibrāhīm Pasha had been the *kātkhuda* of 'Aẓm Zādah Muḥammad Pasha: Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, I, 139-140.

⁷⁶ De Perdriau, "Nouvelles," 30 April 1778, *AE B*¹-94.

⁷⁷ Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, III, 352.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ Ṭūpāl 'Uthmān Zādah Muḥammad Aṣif Pasha was *muhāfiẓ* of Bender, deriving his revenue from the *wilāyah* of Aleppo: Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, IV, 259-260.

⁸⁰ De Perdriau, "Nouvelles," 7 October 1778, *AE B*¹-94.

⁸¹ Marie Nicolas Amé to De Sartine, 30 May 1780, *AE B*¹-95; Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, III, 354-355.

ordinary taxes in kind, weighed heavily on the Aleppines and the depredations of his troops on the villages of the *walāyah*⁸² were serious. Even after this *wāli* had been transferred to al-Raqqah, he continued to appear in the vicinity of Aleppo, for the inhabitants of his new government resisted his entry which he did not press. He was then assigned to Aydīn⁸³ but it was not until May 1781 that he left North Syria, having been relieved from Aleppo the previous fall.⁸⁴

Three years later Aleppo came under the rule of Keki 'Abdi Pasha after a succession of *wālīs* who, for their effect on Aleppine history, remain merely names. This 'Abdi Pasha soon became as tyrannical as his namesake. His avanias were apparently extremely onerous and finally led to his expulsion from the city and the selection of a delegation to report in person to the Porte on his misconduct in office. This delegation was composed of five Aleppines: an *'ālim*, a *sharīf*, a Janissary, a subordinate of the *qāḍī*, and a townsman.⁸⁵ Their petition having been supported by similar ones from Aintab and Antioch, the Porte deposed him and sent him to Urfa; a *qā'im-maqām* replaced him until the designation of a new *wāli*, Ḥājji Muṣṭafa Pasha. Again it would seem that the city acted as a unit against the representative of the government, but there is so little information on this expulsion that one cannot determine the roles therein of the political factions.

Ḥājji Muṣṭafa Pasha likewise did not come to Aleppo immediately but permitted the city to appoint its own *mutasallim* while he in concert with other officers of the Porte attempted to chastize the *dereh bey*, or lord of the valley, Kūchūk 'Alī Ūghlu Khalīl Bey of Payās.⁸⁷ By the time Ḥājji Muṣṭafa Pasha reached Aleppo in December 1785 the city had been without a resident *wāli* for fourteen months.⁸⁸ It is evident that Muṣṭafa Pasha did not personally intervene in the affairs of the city, for on his transfer in August 1786 to Erzerum,⁸⁹ he sought an accounting from his *mutasallim*. The real authority in the city, however, did not rest with the *mutasallim* but with Chalabi Effendi primarily and with Genj Aḥmad Agha Ḥummuṣāh secondarily.⁹⁰ There followed a contest of influence between the *wāli* and Chalabi Effendi who was sheltering the *mutasallim*. When it became impossible to protect him

⁸² Amé de Sartine, 30 May 1780, *AE B¹-95*; Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, III, 358.

⁸³ Jawdat, *Ta'riḥ*, II, 156-157.

⁸⁴ Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, III, 360.

⁸⁵ His biography is given in Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, III, 411.

⁸⁶ Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, III, 363.

⁸⁷ Jawdat, *Ta'riḥ*, III, 323-326.

⁸⁸ Amé de Cabres, 10 December 1785, *AE B¹-96*.

⁸⁹ Jawdat, *Ta'riḥ*, III, 273.

⁹⁰ When Chalabi Effendi returned from his second exile cannot be determined but he was *muḥassil* in October 1785: Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, III, 363. The first mention made of Genj Aḥmad Agha Ḥummuṣāh was when he acquired the post of *ufukḥi bāshī* in June 1785: *ibid.* He was to become one of the leaders of the Janissaries in the next thirty years: *supra*, 56-57, and *infra*, 120-123, 126, 131, and 131, n. 194.

further, Chalabi Effendi brought him to the *takkīyah* of al-Shaykh abu-Bakr, but ostensibly because the *mutasallim* was a Janissary, two thousand of that corps turned out to menace the *wālī*. This show of force led to their conciliation.⁹¹ The issue apparently was a group of Janissaries that Muṣṭafa Pasha wanted surrendered to him but he was faced with the solidarity of the Janissary corps of which the *mutasallim* and Aḥmad Agha were members. It is difficult to determine the role of Chalabi Effendi in this incident. He was *muḥaṣṣil* and mufti, a leader of the *ashrāf* whether he was *naqīb* at this time or not, a power in the city and conceivably its spokesman. Certainly he was the tactician in this conflict and possibly its motivator. It is hardly conceivable that a leader of his strength and experience in Aleppo politics did not have some control over the Janissaries or at least some form of agreement with them.

He was not to enjoy the fruits of this victory, if it were his, for very long. An old man, worn out with age, according to a contemporary,⁹² he died at the end of this year, 1786, and was replaced as mufti by 'Abd-Allāh ibn-Muṣṭafa al-Jābirī, another rising power in the city.⁹³

The year 1787 was notable for an extremely serious plague that struck Aleppo with the deaths during that summer mounting, according to al-Ṭabbākh's source, to over one hundred per day.⁹⁴ Although the plague ceased with the approach of the winter cold, the scarcities of food supplies continued well into the following year,⁹⁵ in the spring of which the city was thrown into turmoil by the departure of the *yerli qūlis* for the campaign against Russia and Austria.⁹⁶ This war lasted until 1792 and during the course of it another *wālī*, Dayrakli Kūsah Muṣṭafa Pasha, was ejected by the populace of Aleppo after a siege of the serail for four days. This occurred in July 1791⁹⁷ but the reason for it is not given nor is it known whether Janissaries, dismissed from the army or deserted from it, took part. The only point that becomes evident through subsequent evidence is that the *muḥaṣṣil* Ibrāhīm Agha Qaṭṭār Aghāsi appeared in this revolt as an important Aleppine leader for the first time. After his expulsion Kūsah Muṣṭafa Pasha was sent by the Porte against a *dereh bey*, Baṭṭāl Agha Zādah Nūri Muḥammad Agha, in Aintab who had leagued with the *ashrāf* there to defeat the local Janissaries. Following a five month siege Kūsah Muṣṭafa Pasha entered Aintab and executed Nūri Muḥammad Agha.⁹⁸ He was now free to

⁹¹ Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, III, 363-364.

⁹² Amé to De Cabres, 10 December, 1785, *AE B¹-96*.

⁹³ Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, III, 366, VII, 156.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 367.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 368.

⁹⁶ Taoutel, *Daftar*, 67.

⁹⁷ Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, III, 368; Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 309; Jawdat, *Ta'rikh*, V, 254 (where the date is misprinted: 1200 A. H. instead of 1205).

⁹⁸ Jawdat, *Ta'rikh*, V, 254; Abbott to Ainslie, 3 December 1791, *SP* 110/53, f. 14r.

turn on Aleppo, appearing there in the spring with about six thousand troops. On his approach Ibrāhīm Agha and other notables fled to Istanbul but instead of assaulting Aleppo, the *wālī* camped outside the walls defended by the urban populace.⁹⁹ The transfer of Kūṣah Muṣṭafa Pasha, perhaps through Ibrāhīm Agha's influence at the capital, spared the city. The *muḥaṣṣil* returned from the Porte "more powerful than ever,"¹⁰⁰ and the new *wālī* Qiliji 'Uthmān Pasha entered the city on friendly terms with the *muḥaṣṣil* and with only 150 troops.¹⁰¹

Ibrāhīm Agha was now the dominant individual on the Aleppo scene. The growth of his power through *iltizāms*, petty avānias, the *muḥaṣṣilliq*, and especially through the support of the *wālidah sultān katkhudāsi*, Yūsuf Agha, has been described.¹⁰² The *naqīb* and mufti, Muḥammad Qudsi Effendi, was described as his "friend and Creature."¹⁰³ Certain of the essential factors of power in Aleppo were now combined as perhaps they had not been before under one individual. But both the Janissaries and the *ashraf* had gradually developed considerable authority, the former by accretions to their corps through the wars against Russia, the latter through the protégé system of Chalabi Effendi and because the Janissaries had been out of the city. The Porte, alarmed by this situation, over which it had but little control, sent Sulaymān Fayḍi Pasha to Aleppo in 1793 with instructions to correct it.¹⁰⁴ This *wālī*, however, could do little and retired outside the city, requesting the Porte to send a *qaḥūji bāshi* and a *ḥūrnahji* from the Janissary *ūjāq* to assist him. These officers reconciled the *wālī* with the two corps and departed once more.¹⁰⁵ On the 4th of April 1794 Sulaymān Fayḍi Pasha died at Aleppo,¹⁰⁶ but a *qāḍi* chosen perhaps because he was inimical to Ibrāhīm Agha was sent.¹⁰⁷ One can perhaps see his influence in the subsequent deposition of Muḥammad Qudsi Effendi as both *naqīb* and mufti,¹⁰⁸ 'Alī Effendi Ṭaha Zādah, brother of the deceased Chalabi Effendi, replacing him as *naqīb* and 'Abd-Allāh Effendi al-Jābiri as mufti for the second time.¹⁰⁹ The new *wālī*, 'Azḥm Zādah 'Abd-Allāh Pasha, had apparently no influence, leaving the government to Ibrāhīm Agha.¹¹⁰

⁹⁹ Abbott to Ainslie, 19 April and 7 May 1792, *SP* 110/53, ff. 25r. and 26r.

¹⁰⁰ Abbott to Ainslie, 30 July 1792, *SP* 110/53, f. 35r.

¹⁰¹ Abbott to Ainslie, 1 September 1792, *SP* 110/53, f. 38r.

¹⁰² *Supra*, 38-40.

¹⁰³ Abbott to Ainslie, 12 August 1793, *SP* 110/53, f. 49r.

¹⁰⁴ Jawdat, *Ta'rikh*, VI, 117.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, III, 90. He was nearly seventy years of age at the time of his death and was buried in the *sāwīyah* of al-Shaykh abu-Bakr. Thurayya also states that he had previously been *wālī* of Aleppo in 1204/1789-1790, but no confirmation of this has been found.

¹⁰⁷ Abbott to Robert Liston, 14 June 1794, *SP* 110/53, f. 59v.

¹⁰⁸ Abbott to Liston, 26 August 1794, *SP* 110/53, f. 62r.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

The influence of the supporters of Ibrāhīm Agha may be seen behind these and subsequent moves by the Porte. Qudsi Effendi was deposed but not Ibrāhīm Agha. His property acquisitions and monopolies were certainly the cause of some of the unrest in the city yet nothing was done to strike at the root of the problem. Instead the Porte gave him honors¹¹¹ and used him to put down a minor insurrection in Killis.¹¹² On the departure of 'Aẓm Zādah 'Abd-Allāh Pasha to take over the *wilāyah* of Damascus, he was made *mutasallim*. This post he held for three full years without a *wāli* entering the city. In effect Ibrāhīm Agha had become *wāli* of Aleppo. Not long after this Muḥammad Qudsi Effendi was restored to the offices of *naqīb* and *mufti* by the influence of Yūsuf Agha, the *wālidah sulṭān katkhudāsi*.¹¹³

Although Ibrāhīm Agha was thus acknowledged by the Porte as the master of Aleppo, in fact he was not absolutely so. He had both the Janissaries and the *ashrāf* to contend with. The absence of a *wāli* and his generally large force of personal troops had improved their relative positions and had removed to a great measure the third force against which they had coalesced. The rivalry between them, based largely on the efforts of the leaders of each to monopolize the food supplies,¹¹⁴ burst into the open in 1797 with an *ashrāf* attack. The combined strength of the Janissaries and the troops of Ibrāhīm Agha defeated them in a battle in which many of the *ashrāf* were killed and an uneasy tranquility returned to the city.¹¹⁵

It was to be of short duration. In Ramaḍān 1212 or about the end of February 1798 the Janissaries massacred a large number of *ashrāf* in the mosque of al-Utrūsh.¹¹⁶ Thus opened a battle within Aleppo that lasted until mid-May. The *ashrāf* fortified themselves within the city walls while the Janissaries held the citadel and the quarters of Bānqūsa and Bāb al-Nayrāb. Both sides brought Bedouin and mountaineers to assist them. The Kurds were allied with the Janissaries and so presumably were the Rishwān Turkomans.¹¹⁷ If the Bedouin were assisting the *ashrāf* it is difficult to understand in what way, for the *ashrāf* were blockaded within the city and there is no indication of fighting in the environs.

Ibrāhīm Agha sided with the *ashrāf* in this conflict but primarily he

¹¹¹ He was given the rank of *amīr ākhūr*, sometime shortly before September 1795: Abbott to Liston, 5 September 1795, *SP* 110/53, f. 78v.

¹¹² Abbott to Liston, 17 March 1795, *SP* 110/53, f. 70r.

¹¹³ Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, VII, 172-173.

¹¹⁴ Choderlos to Charles de la Croix, 14 Floréal Yr. 6/3 May 1798, *CCAlep*, XXIII, f. 103v.

¹¹⁵ Abbott to Smith, 26 September 1797, *SP* 110/53, f. 115v.

¹¹⁶ Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 312-313, which contains a *qaṣīdah* or poem by a contemporary shaykh bewailing the fate of the *ashrāf* and condemning the Janissaries for their atrocities.

¹¹⁷ Abbott to Samuel Manesty, 5 March 1798, *SP* 110/53, f. 123r.; Abbott to Manesty, 22 April 1798, *SP* 110/53, f. 125r.

was concerned with the termination of the strife. With the entry of a new *qādi* and the ensuing hopes for peace he refused post horses to Consul Abbott for his dispatches until he could report to Istanbul that peace had been made and thus overcome any derogatory letters sent by others.¹¹⁸

The accommodation made by the *qādi* was anticipated to be of short duration. On the 21st of April, two days after it had been made, several thousand Kurds arrived to reinforce the Janissaries and demanded 100,000 piasters of the government to prevent them from attacking.¹¹⁹ What happened at this point is not reported but by the 10th of May the city was quiet once again.

The impression left by Abbott's eyewitness account of this conflict is that the *ashrāf* suffered the heavier losses but were not defeated in any convincing fashion. The summary account of another observer, Choderlos, however, indicates that the Janissaries were more definite victors despite the intervention of Ibrāhīm Agha's troops on the side of the *ashrāf*.¹²⁰

The result of this civil war was that the Porte sent a *wāli* to Aleppo for the first time since 1795. Sharīf Muḥammad Pasha was transferred there from the *walāyah* of Mar'ash with the express command to prevent any recurrence of civil strife.¹²¹ But this was in no way a defeat for Ibrāhīm Agha, for he received the *wilāyah* of Damascus and the rank of vizir, no doubt his long-sought objective.¹²²

During the years of the French occupation of Egypt there is little information about Aleppo. Ḥaydar al-Shihābi wrote that Sharīf Muḥammad Pasha's entry into Aleppo was prevented by the Janissaries until he had offered to side with them against the *ashrāf*. After having gained entrance in this fashion, he then switched to the *ashrāf* and in league with them overcame the Janissaries. Once again he changed sides, attacked the *ashrāf* and defeated them with a loss to them of 250, then fined them five hundred thousand piasters. Later the Janissaries rose against him and expelled him from Aleppo.¹²³ Without any contradictory source on which to rely it is impossible to deny absolutely the validity of this account, but since it is immediately appended to the account of the massacre in the mosque of al-Utrūsh, it would reveal an unlikely compression of events to place this account in the summer of 1798, as is logical. Al-Shihābi's knowledge of events in Aleppo at

¹¹⁸ Abbott to Smith, 17 April 1798 with postscript of 19 April 1798, *SP* 110/53, f. 124v.

¹¹⁹ Abbott to Manesty, 22 April 1798, *SP* 110/53, f. 125r.

¹²⁰ Choderlos to De la Croix, 14 Floréal Yr. 6/3 May 1798, *CCAlep*, XXIII, f. 103v.

¹²¹ Jawdat, *Ta'rikh*, VI, 306-307; Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, III, 144.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 330; al-Qāri, "al-Wuzarā'" in al-Munajjid, ed., *Wulāt Dimashq*, 90.

¹²³ *Lubnān*, 186.

another time appears to have been faulty;¹²⁴ his history cannot be called a reliable source for Aleppo.

The Janissaries in the fall of 1798 were ordered to send eight to ten thousand men to the Egyptian campaign but this number was later reduced to 3,600. According to the French consul, Choderlos, who was at the time imprisoned in the citadel, the Janissaries refused to march, delaying any decision until the following spring.¹²⁵ When, however, the grand vizir Kūr Yūsuf Dīyā'-al-Dīn Pasha passed through the *walāyah* of Aleppo on his way to Egypt in the fall of 1799, seven thousand Janissaries under the command of Aḥmad Agha Ḥummuṣah departed with him.¹²⁶ The following year Muḥammad Qudsi Effendi, the *naqīb*, departed on the campaign with five to six thousand *ashrāf* as volunteers.¹²⁷ In return for this service the grand vizir nominated him as *qādī* of Egypt but the *shaykh al-Islām* rejected the nomination and Qudsi Effendi had to await his removal before obtaining his reward: the *qaḍa* of Mecca in 1219/1804-1805.¹²⁸

On the return of the army from Egypt Ibrāhīm Pasha Qaṭṭār Aghāsi became *wālī* of Aleppo and his eldest son, Ḥamīd Ḥamūd Muḥammad Bey, its *muḥaṣṣil*.¹²⁹ The situation with regard to the *ashrāf*-Janissary dissension in the fall of 1802 is not clear but there is general agreement that Ibrāhīm Pasha managed to get the Janissary leaders out of Aleppo. How it was done is the question. Burckhardt relates that on the approach of the grand vizir, Ibrāhīm Pasha had Muḥammad Bey make it known to the Janissary leaders that the grand vizir was annoyed with them. Muḥammad Bey even produced forged letters to better the impression. The desired effect resulted: all the Janissaries left the city and Ibrāhīm Pasha was able to represent them as rebels to the grand vizir, fleeing thus on his approach. A firman was therefore issued for their exile.¹³⁰

The version of al-Shihābi attests that the grand vizir demanded of the Janissaries pay for his troops but they refused. Ibrāhīm Pasha then persuaded them through Aḥmad Agha Ḥummuṣah to leave Aleppo

¹²⁴ E.g., his account of the role of abu-Marāq Pasha in the revolt of 1804 is without foundation in fact: *ibid.*, 423.

¹²⁵ Choderlos to Citizen Minister of Exterior Relations, 14 Frimaire Yr. 7/4 December 1798, *CCAleph*, XXIII, ff. 129v. and 130v.

¹²⁶ Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 315; al-Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, III, 373. It was Aḥmad Agha and another leading Aleppo Janissary, Yāsīn Agha, who planned the assassination of the French general Kléber in Cairo, and another Aleppine, Sulaymān, who executed the plan at their behest: Shihābi, *Lubnān*, 315; Jawdat, *Tā'rikh*, VII, 85-86. The biography of Kūr Yūsuf Dīyā'-al-Dīn Pasha is given in Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, IV, 670.

¹²⁷ Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 315; Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, VII, 173; Jawdat, *Tā'rikh*, VIII, 130.

¹²⁸ Jawdat, *Tā'rikh*, VIII, 130.

¹²⁹ Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 315; Louis Alexandre Corancez to Ministry, 1 Germinal Yr. 11/22 March 1803, *CCAleph*, XXIII, f. 167r.

¹³⁰ Burckhardt, *Travels in Syria*, 650. In this account Ibrāhīm Pasha was not yet *wālī* of Aleppo.

while the grand vizir was in the neighbourhood, so the whole corps numbering 12,000 did so.¹³¹

The differences between the accounts cannot be resolved. Neither Burckhardt nor al-Shihābi were in Aleppo at the time. Barker, the English consul, is silent on the question and no French consul was in residence. Nor do Burckhardt and al-Shihābi agree on the sequel. The former relates that Ibrāhīm Pasha offered to pardon the Janissary leaders at a price, that they accepted and came to Aleppo to pay it. But at that point they were arrested and imprisoned to await execution. The intervention on their behalf of Muḥammad Bey in return for large sums saved them.¹³² Al-Shihābi renders a less romantic version, namely that after the grand vizir had left, Ibrāhīm Pasha persuaded the Janissary leaders, with the exception of Aḥmad Agha Ḥummuṣāh, to return after protracted correspondence with them.¹³³

The first account is hardly in keeping with Ibrāhīm Pasha's character as analysed by Barker :

[He is] a man remarkably deficient in the only quality that could render him a dangerous instrument [of the Porte]. He is avowedly a most consummate coward. He has constantly been foiled in all his military enterprises. But allowing him indulgence for the failing of want of spirit, he possesses in an eminent degree every other quality necessary to form a perfect Turkish Governor; and is doubtless regarded by the Porte as one of their most valuable Servants.¹³⁴

But the second account, that of al-Shihābi, appears to be pointless. It begs the question: why did Ibrāhīm Pasha want the Janissary leaders back after he was rid of a formidable menace to his rule? There appears to be no logical answer. The better solution perhaps is that after a time the leaders with the exception of Aḥmad Agha merely drifted back by two's and three's. Whatever occurred in this period after the return of the Aleppines from the Egyptian campaigns, Ibrāhīm Pasha can be said to have been master of the situation. His son, Muḥammad Bey, as *muḥaṣṣil* was being groomed to become a pasha, as was another, Muṣṭafa Bey, although he at this time held no post.

A rival to Ibrāhīm Pasha existed in southern Syria, namely Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār, generally known to his contemporaries as Jazzār Pasha. Possessor of 'Akka in the latter part of the eighteenth century, his defeat with British assistance of Bonaparte in 1799 had increased his influence at the Porte and rendered him master of the coast from Tripoli to Sinai and a good part of the interior. Three times he had held the *wilāyah* of Damascus, the third time having taken it by intrigue from

¹³¹ *Lubnān*, 416.

¹³² *Travels in Syria*, 650.

¹³³ *Lubnān*, 416.

¹³⁴ Barker, "Bulletin," 24 May 1804, *SP* 105/129, f. 351r.

Ibrāhīm Pasha.¹³⁵ No love was lost between the two but on the part of the latter there was fear that Jazzār Pasha would attempt to extend his sway to Aleppo.¹³⁶ The indication that this was being attempted was there to be seen: Maḥmūd Bey ibn-Rustum, protected by Jazzār Pasha, had established himself in Jisr al-Shughr on the borders of the *walāyah* of Aleppo in defiance of Ibrāhīm Pasha.¹³⁷

Jazzār Pasha, however, was in the last year of his life. When news of his final lingering illness reached the Porte, it secretly ordered Ibrāhīm Pasha to be prepared to take over the *walāyahs* of Damascus and Tripoli as *wāli* and to sequester the booty of Jazzār for the Porte.¹³⁸ On the 12th of May 1804, the news of Jazzār's death reached Aleppo. Ibrāhīm Pasha immediately published the firmans he had received and departed for Damascus on the 21st after having appointed Muḥammad Bey *qā'im-maqām* of Aleppo and Muṣṭafa Bey, his second son, to the *muḥaṣṣilliq*.¹³⁹ He took with him his youngest son and three thousand troops among whom were some of the principal Janissaries, notably Ibrāhīm Agha al-Ḥarbali and Yāsīn Agha.¹⁴⁰

On his arrival in Damascus Ibrāhīm Pasha had the Aleppo Janissary *āghas* who accompanied him thrown into prison. Through the intervention of Aḥmad Agha Ḥummuṣah with the Amīr Bāshīr al-Shihābi and the latter's negotiations with Ibrāhīm Pasha, the *āghas* were released to the custody of the Amīr.¹⁴¹ It may have been the news of these arrests, as al-Shihābi asserts,¹⁴² that touched off the revolt of the *ashrāf* and Janissaries against Muḥammad Pasha, the son of Ibrāhīm Pasha,¹⁴³ but the consular sources tend to credit it to the composite weight of tyrannical acts over a period of years.¹⁴⁴ On the 1st of July the *ashrāf*

¹³⁵ al-Qāri, "al-Wuzarā'ī" in al-Munajjid, ed., *Wulāt Dimashq*, 85-86, 88-90; Burckhardt, *Travels in Syria*, 650; Browne, *Travels*, 367-371.

¹³⁶ Barker to Levant Company, 16 September 1803, *SP* 105/129, f. 178r.

¹³⁷ Shihābi, *Lubnān*, 405-406.

¹³⁸ Jawdat says that Ibrāhīm Pasha was to be *wāli* of Damascus, Tripoli and Sidon and to have the *sar-'askarliq* of the Ḥijāz: *Tārīkh*, VII, 271. Barker, on the other hand, notes: "Ibrāhīm Pasha's authority has not been extended to the Pashalick of *Seida*, but merely to a provisional Commission [*mubāshirlik*] to take such measures as may tend to secure the Property of the Deceased Pasha of Acri until the arrival . . . of Commissioners regularly appointed to receive it:" "Bulletin," 24 May 1804, *SP* 105/129, f. 351v.

¹³⁹ Barker, "Bulletin," 24 May 1804, *SP* 105/129, f. 350v.; Corancez, "Bulletin des nouvelles," 18 Floréal Yr. 12/8 May 1804 [*sic!*], *CCAlep*, XXIII, f. 204r and v.

¹⁴⁰ Barker, "Bulletin," 24 May 1804, *SP* 105/129, f. 350v.; Shihābi, *Lubnān*, 416.

¹⁴¹ Shihābi, *Lubnān*, 416-417.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 417, especially the reading of Ms. N. 2, which appears more appropriate.

¹⁴³ Shortly after becoming *qā'im-maqām*, Muḥammad Bey was raised to the rank of Pasha and given the *walāyah* of Aleppo in his own right: Corancez to Citizen Minister of Exterior Relations, 18 Messidor Yr. 12/7 July 1804, *CCAlep*, XXIII, f. 209r.

¹⁴⁴ Extract of a letter from Barker to Alexander Stratton, 12 July 1804, *SP* 105/129, f. 354v. Corancez places the blame on the youth, avarice and tactlessness

and Janissaries took up arms and soon joined by the Christians, drove Muḥammad Pasha and his troops out of the city.¹⁴⁵ A *qaḥūji bāshī* in Aleppo at the time was chosen as *mutasallim*, but in fact the power in Aleppo was shared by Yāsīn Agha of the Janissaries and al-Sayyid Ḥasan ibn-al-Khallāṣ of the *ashrāf* with the mufti, probably ‘Abd-Allāh Ḥeffendi al-Jābiri, as mediator.¹⁴⁶

Muḥammad Pasha, in an effort to save his prestige, went immediately to Killis where he warred against the Kurds and collected troops to regain Aleppo.¹⁴⁷ In the meanwhile the Porte acted, sending orders for the *qaḥūji bāshī* to continue to his assignment on the Persian frontier and announcing the departure of a *mubāshir* to settle the dispute.¹⁴⁸ Within Aleppo itself the situation was tranquil although the leaders of the revolt had but an uncertain mastery of the city.¹⁴⁹ There existed, however, the fear that the Janissary-*ashrāf* dissension would, under these circumstances, come into the open once again¹⁵⁰ and this fear was reinforced by the arrival of the *āghas* who had been imprisoned by Ibrāhīm Pasha, allegedly released from the custody of the Amīr Bashīr in order to engineer a reconciliation between Muḥammad Pasha and the city.¹⁵¹ Muḥammad Pasha returned in September with three or four thousand troops to besiege the city. The efforts of the *mubāshir* to effect a peace failed, Aḥmad Agha Ḥummuṣah, who had returned with the Janissary *āghas*, assumed the leadership of that corps, and the battle for Aleppo commenced in earnest.¹⁵² In the skirmishes that took place the Aleppines had the advantage, but within the city supplies were becoming short and the specter of famine loomed. This led to negotiations with the *wāli* who had been confirmed in that office by the Porte, but there was dissension among the various elements composing the city government over what should be the terms of reconciliation. The mufti, said to

of Muḥammad Pasha: Corancez to Citizen Minister of Exterior Relations, 18 Messidor Yr. 12/7 July 1804, *CCAlep*, XXIII, f. 209r.

¹⁴⁵ There is disagreement on the number of troops the *wāli* had with him. Barker reports six to seven hundred: Barker to Edward Stephenson, 10 July 1804, *SP* 105/129, f. 354r., while Corancez, who calls Muḥammad Pasha Aḥmad Pasha throughout, gives the number as 2,000: Corancez to Citizen Minister of Exterior Relations, 18 Messidor Yr. 12/7 July 1804, *CCAlep*, XXIII, f. 209r.

¹⁴⁶ Corancez to Citizen Minister of Exterior Relations, 18 Messidor Yr. 12/7 July 1804, *CCAlep*, XXIII, f. 209v.; Corancez to Chargé d’Affaires at Istanbul, 12 July 1808, *CCAlep*, XXIV, f. 64r.; Burckhardt, *Travels in Syria*, 651; Jawdat, *Ta’rikh*, VII, 271.

¹⁴⁷ Barker, “Bulletin,” 1 September 1804, *SP* 105/129, f. 362v.

¹⁴⁸ Jawdat, *Ta’rikh*, VII, 271.

¹⁴⁹ Corancez to Citizen Minister of Exterior Relations, 3 Fructidor Yr. 12/21 August 1804, *CCAlep*, XXIII, f. 213v.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁵¹ Corancez, “Bulletin des nouvelles,” 11 Fructidor Yr. 12/29 August 1804, *CCAlep*, XXIII, f. 218r.

¹⁵² Corancez, “Bulletin des nouvelles,” 24 Vendémiaire Yr. 12/16 October 1804, *CCAlep*, XXIII, f. 223r.; Barker to Levant Company, 11 October 1804, *SP* 105/129, f. 366r.

have been the instigator of the revolt and the principal beneficiary of the food shortages through his supplies of grain, was adamant in his opposition to any compromise. In October a basis for peace was negotiated. The city was to pay Muḥammad Pasha 300 purses or 150,000 piasters while he was to release the prisoners he held and dismiss eight hundred particularly predatory Albanians who formed a part of his troops. The truce that accompanied this compromise was broken, however, by the failure of the city government to raise the necessary sum, divided as they were as to the means of effecting the repartition.¹⁵³

Peace was established a short time later, namely the end of October, but under what conditions we are not informed. Muḥammad Pasha was but a governor in name, however; his *tufinkji bāshi* and the other officials in the city were either Janissaries or *ashrāf*. "The Janissaries were heard to declare that every body who should visit him would be looked upon as a spy; on Fridays alone, the great people paid him their visit in a body."¹⁵⁴

Muḥammad Pasha had not given up his efforts to gain control of his government. Capitalizing on the ever-present friction between Janissaries and *ashrāf*, he managed to win over the latter, who felt the increasing dominance of the Janissaries in the city's affairs.¹⁵⁵ Warfare broke out in the streets of the city, while the *wāli* residing outside the walls attended the enfeeblement of both parties. The *ashrāf* held the citadel, which had at some point come into their possession,¹⁵⁶ while the Janissaries were in the city below, holding some quarters while the *ashrāf* held others. Muḥammad Pasha then threw his own troops into the fray, the *ashrāf* were overcome in large measure by the Janissaries, and the battle now became one between the Janissaries and the *wāli*, with the *ashrāf* in the citadel supporting the latter. Among the people in the city there was great misery. Bread prices had quadrupled and the poorer people had been reduced to eating plant roots. Corancez marvelled at their submissiveness and underscored the fact that this was

¹⁵³ Corancez, "Bulletin des nouvelles," 24 Vendémiaire Yr. 12/16 October 1804, *CCAlep*, XXIII, ff. 223v.-225v. Corancez was requested to mediate the conflict by the city leaders but his conditions were not accepted.

¹⁵⁴ Burckhardt, *Travels in Syria*, 651. Cf. Edward B. B. Barker, *Syria and Egypt*, 80. The account of Edward Barker is based on letters of John Barker which have not been found; in the book this revolution is dated 1814 rather than 1804.

¹⁵⁵ Burckhardt, *loc. cit.*; Barker to Levant Company, 12 March 1805, *SP* 105/129, f. 166r.; Corancez, "Bulletin des nouvelles," 9 Ventose Yr. 13/28 February 1805, *CCAlep*, XXIII, f. 234r.

¹⁵⁶ The problem of how the *ashrāf* gained possession of the citadel is a vexing one on which the sources are confusing. The diary of the Armenian celibates proves that they had it: Taoutel, *Daftar*, 72; al-Ghazzi says that the Janissaries were expelled from it in 1802 and were replaced by Albanians: *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 316. A passage in al-Shihābi attempts to explain its acquisition by the *ashrāf*, but its context does not fit with the established facts: *Lubnān*, 427.

not a popular revolt but a revolt of the agents of the famine against the avarice of the government representatives.¹⁵⁷

Warfare was suddenly halted on June 9th, 1805 by the arrival of a firman transferring Muḥammad Pasha to the *wilāyah* of Tripoli and announcing the conferral of the government of Aleppo on 'Alā'-al-Dīn Pasha, the brother-in-law of Salīm III. In the interim before his arrival the mufti 'Abdi Effendi was appointed *mutasallim*.¹⁵⁸ Muḥammad Pasha still lingered in the neighborhood for a time. The reason given was that his father Ibrāhīm Pasha was attempting to nullify the transfer by offering huge sums of money to the Porte. But Yūsuf Ḍīyā'-al-Dīn Pasha, the principal supporter of the family at Istanbul, had been deposed as grand vizir and Ibrāhīm Pasha himself lost the *wilāyah* of Damascus, being relegated to that of Diyār Bakr.¹⁵⁹

The strife that has been described is the key event in the factional struggle for power in Aleppo during the period under study. It marks the end of the *ashrāf* as a serious contender for leadership and the beginning of an eight-year Janissary hegemony. There were still *ashrāf*, however, who were politically ambitious. Having lost their own vehicle they changed sides, joined the Janissary party and one of them at least became one of its leaders. This was al-Sayyid Ḥasan ibn-al-Khallās, leader of the *ashrāf* in the early stages of the revolt. His name is later found among those Janissary *āghas* who were executed in 1814.¹⁶⁰ This is indicative of the ease with which entry into this corps could be obtained, no doubt at a price.

Had a strong *wāli* come immediately to Aleppo after the departure of Muḥammad Pasha, the Janissaries might not have been able to consolidate their position. But 'Alā'-al-Dīn Pasha was ordered to subdue the rebellious *wāli* of Kars and therefore did not come to Aleppo until late in the fall of 1805.¹⁶¹ The Janissaries had therefore time to organize themselves as rulers of Aleppo, and the fact that Ibrāhīm Pasha, ostensibly on his way from Damascus to Diyār Bakr, was lingering in the vicinity of Aleppo¹⁶² could only have acted as an additional incentive to secure their position against any possible attack from him. This situation appears to have continued for two years. Ibrāhīm Pasha was sent on

¹⁵⁷ Corancez, "Bulletin des nouvelles," 8 Floréal Yr. 13/28 April 1805, *CCAleph*, XXIII, f. 238r.

¹⁵⁸ Corancez, "Bulletin des nouvelles," 2 Messidor Yr. 13/21 June 1805, *CCAleph*, XXIII, f. 248r. Burckhardt reports that the Janissaries were on the point of defeat and consequent ruin when they were saved by the transfer of Muḥammad Pasha: *Travels in Syria*, 652.

¹⁵⁹ Corancez, "Bulletin des nouvelles," 2 Messidor Yr. 13/21 June 1805, *CCAleph*, XXIII, f. 248r and v.; Shihābi, *Lubnān*, 434.

¹⁶⁰ Burckhardt, *Travels in Syria*, 651; Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 320-321.

¹⁶¹ Corancez, "Bulletin des nouvelles," 4 Fructidor Yr. 13/22 August 1805, *CCAleph*, XXIII, f. 258v.; Corancez to Parandier, Chargé d'Affaires in Istanbul, 10 Brumaire Yr. 13/1 November 1805, *CCAleph*, XXIII, f. 290v.

¹⁶² Corancez to Parandier, 10 Brumaire Yr. 13/1 November 1805, *CCAleph*, XXIII, f. 290v.

various missions into Anatolia and south to Damascus but he always appeared near Aleppo to menace the Janissaries by his maneuverings but never to attack them.¹⁶³

Aleppo meanwhile was officially being governed by a succession of *wālis* who came in person to the city but in fact their authority was purely nominal. At one point the Janissaries obtained the support of the *wāli* to a scheme to attack Ibrāhīm Pasha and actually began preparations but calmer heads appear to have prevailed.¹⁶⁴ How the Janissaries administered the city during their rule has been described above.¹⁶⁵ Although their power was great, they had to be wary in the use of it, for there was always the threat of action against them by the Porte. Since this would have required a great amount of money, and because the Janissaries could flee to the mountains in the neighborhood for refuge, thus nullifying the effect of a military expedition, the Porte would only resort to such drastic action in the extremity. The Janissaries were careful not to disturb the central government. They remitted the *māri*, the *khurāj*, and the customs duties each year at the appointed time and the Porte left them to profit from mastery over the city.¹⁶⁶ When war was declared by the Porte against England and Russia in 1807, the Janissaries were prepared to send a detachment if ordered but whether it was called for is not revealed.¹⁶⁷ If it was it does not appear to have affected the Janissary strength in the city.

With one party dominating Aleppo, one group controlling the sources of supplies, the manufactures, the *iltisāms*, and the petty avanias, it was inevitable that factions should appear within it. The leaders of the party, judging from the occurrence of their names in the sources, were Aḥmad Agha Ḥummuṣah, Ibrāhīm Agha al-Ḥarbalī, Yāsīn Agha, and the rising al-Sayyid Ḥasan Agha ibn-al-Khallāṣ. The first two of these became leaders of two opposed factions, the lower ranks of which quarrelled in the summer of 1807. Aḥmad Agha gained the undisputed leadership of the corps by a coup which has been described.¹⁶⁸ What may well have united the Janissaries despite this evidence of dissension was the news that Ibrāhīm Pasha, their inveterate enemy, had once more been appointed *wāli* of Aleppo. Assemblies of the leaders were immediately held and it was decided not to permit him entry unless it were without troops. His guard was to be composed of Kurds, with whom the Janissaries had recently concluded an alliance and whom they had called to help them defend the city.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶³ Corancez, "Bulletin," 22 June 1806, 14 July 1806, 29 August 1806, 10 September 1806, 19 September 1806, *CCAleph*, XXIII, ff. 315r., 326r., 337r., 347r., 350r.

¹⁶⁴ Corancez, "Bulletin," 19 September 1806, *CCAleph*, XXIII, f. 350r.

¹⁶⁵ *Supra*, 57-60.

¹⁶⁶ Burckhardt, *Travels in Syria*, 653-654.

¹⁶⁷ Corancez, "Bulletin," 16 February 1807, *CCAleph*, XXIII, f. 391r.

¹⁶⁸ *Supra*, 56.

¹⁶⁹ Corancez, "Suite de Bulletin," 30 August 1807, *CCAleph*, XXIII, f. 419r.

Ibrāhīm Pasha appeased the Janissaries with promises and appealed especially to the people. With popular opinion in his favor the Janissaries did not attempt to deny him entry but did not send a delegation to greet him and remained armed. Although he dismissed the majority of his troops, his eldest son, presumably Muḥammad Pasha, remained outside the city with troops to come to his assistance if necessary.¹⁷⁰ In spite of the continuing tension between the *wāli* and the Janissaries, no open break occurred, for neither side wanted to be thrown into the struggle that would inevitably ensue. The Kurdish allies of the Janissaries were in trouble with the Porte: 'Umar Agha, their chief and former *mutasallim* of Killis,¹⁷¹ had been imprisoned by the then *mutasallim* of Killis, Ismā'īl Agha, known as Ma'jūn Aghāsi, and many Kurdish notables had been executed by order of the Porte.¹⁷² The Janissaries' refuge and support was not available to them at least for a time. This disadvantage, however, was counterbalanced by the news of the Janissary revolt against Sultan Salīm III in Istanbul. The fact that the Janissaries were apparently masters of the capital gave their local comrades much more confidence in dealing with the representatives of the central government.¹⁷³

The transfer of Ibrāhīm Pasha in the summer of 1808 relieved the tension within Aleppo, especially since the *muḥaṣṣil* Ibrāhīm Agha was appointed *mutasallim* for the new *wāli*, the former grand vizir Yūsuf Dīyā'-al-Dīn Pasha. This *mutasallim* was apparently the tool of the mufti Aḥmad ibn-'Abd-Allāh al-Jābiri.¹⁷⁴ Yūsuf Pasha was not to remain *wāli* of Aleppo for long. Shortly after he had arrived, he was appointed grand vizir once again and left immediately for Istanbul.¹⁷⁵ For nearly two years after that no *wāli* resided in Aleppo, for the new *wāli*, Sarūri Muḥammad Pasha, also governor of Silistria, was with the army combatting the Russians.¹⁷⁶

The increasing intensity of the war against Russia created a demand for troops from the Janissaries of Aleppo. After the usual disorder accompanying the levy and preparation of troops for the march two thousand Janissaries left Aleppo in August 1810 and calm was once again restored to the city.¹⁷⁷ In spite of the departure of this large number there were still many Janissaries in Aleppo. There are indications that

¹⁷⁰ Corancez, "Bulletin," 22 September 1807, 11 October 1807, *CCAleph*, XXIII, ff. 431r. and 436v.; Shihābi, *Lubnān*, 523.

¹⁷¹ Killisli Kadri, *Kilis Tarihi*, 72.

¹⁷² Corancez, "Bulletin," April 1808, *CCAleph*, XXIV, f. 35v.

¹⁷³ Corancez to De Champagny, 4 June 1808, *CCAleph*, XXIV, f. 44r.

¹⁷⁴ Corancez, "Bulletin," 30 June 1808, *CCAleph*, XXIV, f. 55r.; Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, VII, 186 and 241; Jawdat, *Ta'rikh*, IX, 286.

¹⁷⁵ Jawdat, *Ta'rikh*, IX, 52; Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhabab*, III, 317.

¹⁷⁶ Burckhardt, *Travels in Syria*, 653; Shāni Zadah, *Ta'rikh*, I, 208, 259 and 294; Jawdat, *Ta'rikh*, IX, 114. Cf. Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, III, 13.

¹⁷⁷ Joseph Louis Rousseau to De Champagny, 30 August 1810, *CCAleph*, XXIV, f. 247v. and 248r.

the leaders were losing their hold over the lower ranks of the corps and that the leaders were becoming more bold in their exactions from the populace. Rousseau summarized the situation in a letter to the French Minister of Exterior Relations:

. . . toutes les affaires s'y traitent par l'intermédiaire des Chefs de cette milice, devenus aujourd'hui plus arrogans, plus puissans et surtout plus riches que jamais par les Dépouilles du Peuple que le monopole et des Ex-tortions de tout genre les mettent en état d'accumuler Journallement.¹⁷⁸

Another levy of troops the following year had the same effect on the city and Rousseau's analysis of conditions again gives a depressing picture:

Aujourd'hui la face des affaires commence à changer ici en devient de jour en jour plus critique. Les désordres de l'anarchie augmentent continuellement; le Commerçant est sans ressource; l'agriculture et l'industrie languissent; la cherté des vivres est à son comble; . . . en un mot, le Peuple gémit sous le poids des vexations. Déjà, de nombreuses émigrations ont eu lieu, et si la Porte persiste encore dans son indifférence politique et tarde à rémédier à tant de maux, Alep avec toutes ses dépendences, n'offrira bientôt plus dans quelques tems, que l'exemple de la plus désastreuse situation.¹⁷⁹

The Porte's change of policy for which Rousseau hoped was not long in coming. In September 1811 a new *wāli* was announced for Aleppo, Muḥammad Rāghib Pasha, a foe of the grand vizir Yūsuf Ḍīyā'-al-Dīn Pasha, who had been exiled by that grand vizir and restored to the rank of vizir on Yūsuf Ḍīyā'-al-Dīn Pasha's disgrace. His arrival at Aleppo was the beginning of the local reflection of the policy of Maḥmūd II. This sultan, having seen the power of the Janissaries throughout the empire over the government, was determined to correct that situation by reform. Any such reform, however, was impossible so long as most of the empire acknowledged only superficially the authority of the Porte. The first task, therefore, was to establish that authority in the provinces and to this end Maḥmūd II devoted much of his effort.¹⁸⁰

Having been a favorite of Sultan Salīm III and an officer in the Nizām-i Jadīd, the Western-style troops that that sultan had tried to introduce, Rāghib Pasha was considered to be a bitter enemy of the Janissaries and the news of his imminent arrival both intimidated the

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, f. 248v.

¹⁷⁹ Rousseau to Champagny, Duc de Cadore, 3 July 1811, *CCAlep*, XXIV, ff. 357v. and 358r. A measure of the commercial decline of Aleppo may be derived from the decline in the number of French merchants resident there. In 1630 there were thirty, in 1693 sixteen, in 1764 twelve, but in 1810 only three: Charles-Roux, *Les Echelles de Syrie*, 7 and 83; Rousseau to Champagny, 15 April 1810, *CCAlep*, XXIV, f. 205v. Cf. also Olivier, *Voyage*, IV, 181.

¹⁸⁰ Cf. the description of the manner in which Sultan Maḥmūd II reasserted his authority in most areas of the empire during his reign: Reed, *Destruction of the Janissaries*, 15-33.

Janissaries and cheered the populace of the city.¹⁸¹ He and his suite camped outside the city where the notables with the exception of the Janissary leaders went to visit him and pay their respects. He had few troops with him but began to hire more from among the *dalis* who were continually roaming the country and could be bought by whoever had the money to pay for them.¹⁸² The fall was largely spent in negotiations between the *wāli* and the Janissaries. Rāghib Pasha finally entered the city in late November or December and took up residence at the serail on condition that the Janissaries end their alliance with the Kurds, terminate their monopoly of the food supplies, abolish their extraordinary courts,¹⁸³ and generally obey the police regulations he established.¹⁸⁴

The career of Rāghib Pasha as governor of Aleppo did not continue in the auspicious manner in which it had begun. In an attempt to get allies he intervened among the feuding Bedouin, hoping by striking one down to get the support of the other. It has been shown how he got verbal assurances but how when he precipitated open conflict with the Janissaries this backing evaporated.¹⁸⁵ He was soundly defeated by the Janissaries and was thereafter little more than a puppet in their hands. Those who had tried to mediate the dispute received the full impact of the *wāli*'s ire. The *qādi*, Barbar Zādah Muḥammad Amīn Effendi, and a disgraced *wāli*, abu-Marāq Pasha, were reported to the Porte as obstructors of justice. The former was dismissed and the latter beheaded on orders from the Porte, but it was made clear in the *khatt-i humāyūn* of the sultan to the grand vizir regarding the deposition of the *qādi* that Rāghib Pasha was being tested with the *wilāyah* of Aleppo and should not be assisted in any undue degree by the Porte.¹⁸⁶

The prestige of Rāghib Pasha was to decline considerably further than it had after his defeat by the Janissaries. He then attempted to restore the authority of the Porte in Jisr al-Shughr where former *dalis* had usurped the government but was defeated.¹⁸⁷ Having acquired in the fall of 1812 the districts of Killis and 'Azāz, he sought to take over those governments from its *mutasallim* but it was not until November of 1812 that he was successful. It had required two expeditions and con-

¹⁸¹ Rousseau, "Bulletin," 10 September 1811, *CCAleph*, XXIV, f. 390r.; Rousseau, "Neuvième bulletin," 4 October-28 October 1811, *CCAleph*, XXIV, f. 415r.

¹⁸² Rousseau, "Neuvième bulletin," entries of 13 October to 18 October 1811, *CCAleph*, XXIV, f. 416r. and v.

¹⁸³ *Supra*, 60.

¹⁸⁴ Rousseau, "Neuvième bulletin," entry of 23 October 1811, *CCAleph*, XXIV, f. 417r.

¹⁸⁵ *Supra*, 11-12.

¹⁸⁶ Cemal Tukin, "Mahmud II. Devrinde Halep İsyanı," *Tarih Vesikalari*, I, (1941), 257-258; Rousseau, "Quinzième bulletin," 18 July-10 August 1812, *CCAleph*, XXV, f. 64r.; Rousseau, "Dix-septième bulletin," 7 November-13 December 1812, *CCAleph*, XXV, f. 79r.; Shāni Zādah, *Ta'rikh*, II, 163-164; Jawdat, *Ta'rikh*, X, 87.

¹⁸⁷ *Supra*, 12.

siderable troop reinforcements to overcome Faḍli Agha and his Kurdish allies.¹⁸⁸ From that base he undertook repressive expeditions against the Kurds and was still conducting operations against them when he was relieved of his *wilāyah* in April 1813.¹⁸⁹

Obviously Rāghib Pasha had not been successful in the execution of his mission. He had had little authority in Aleppo; the Janissaries there were still as strong as they had been prior to his arrival. His operations against the Kurds had not materially raised his prestige and had probably cost him the little money that he had possessed.¹⁹⁰

The choice of Chapān Ūghlu Jalāl-al-Dīn Muḥammad Pasha as the new *wāli* of Aleppo reflected another policy of Maḥmūd II. This new governor was of one of the famed *dereh bey* families that virtually ruled whole portions of Anatolia. The Buzuklu Chapān Ūghlu family, of Turkoman origin, had held a good part of east central Anatolia since 1764, and the then patriarch of the family, Sulaymān Bey, was extremely influential.¹⁹¹ It was part of the scheme of Maḥmūd II to break up the power of such families as these by employing the sons in areas other than those in which their control was traditional. It was thus that Jalāl-al-Dīn Pasha became *wāli* of Aleppo in 1813.

The void in the consular records at this point is most unfortunate for it was this *wāli* who broke the hold of the Janissaries on Aleppo and that of the minor *dereh beys* on places such as Jisr al-Shughhr, Baylān, Payās, and the Kurdish mountains to the north of Aleppo. With regard to the manner in which the Aleppo Janissaries were mastered, we are forced to rely for detail on two rather romantic sources but they are in substantial agreement.

At first Jalāl-al-Dīn Pasha did little to confirm the reputation for severity which had preceded him. He lulled the suspicions of the Janissaries, partly through indulging in hunting and partly through diplomacy by means of intermediaries, one of whom al-Ghazzi identifies as Ibrāhīm Agha ibn-al-Khallāṣ, no doubt a relative of the former leader of the *ashrāf* and then Janissary notable, al-Sayyid Ḥasan Agha ibn-al-Khallāṣ. He then invited the principal *āghas* to a conference at the *takkīyah* of al-Shaykh abu-Bakr where he was residing. As they entered the gate they were executed and their heads piled in the courtyard. There is some disagreement on the number: Edward B. Barker reports that there were 21,¹⁹² while al-Ghazzi, the other principal source, notes that

¹⁸⁸ Rousseau, "Dix-septième bulletin," 7 November-13 December 1812, *CCAlcp*, XXV, f. 79r. and v.

¹⁸⁹ Rousseau to Duc de Bassano, 11 April 1813, *CCAlcp*, XXV, f. 81r.

¹⁹⁰ There is every reason to believe that one of the difficulties that Rāghib Pasha faced was lack of money. He had been in exile; to be restored to the vizirate was generally expensive. He had arrived in Aleppo with few troops. His search for Bedouin allies betrays his inability to purchase mercenaries.

¹⁹¹ J. H. Mordtmann, "Derebeyler," *IA*, III, 540.

¹⁹² *Egypt and Syria*, I, 140.

there were 18, among whom was Ibrāhīm Agha ibn-al-Khallāṣ.¹⁹³ Others that no doubt were executed at this time, although al-Ghazzi places their execution in the following year, were al-Sayyid Ḥasan Agha ibn-al-Khallāṣ, al-Ḥājj 'Alī Agha al-Baylamāni, al-Ḥājj Muḥammad ibn-Ibrāhīm Ishbīb, and particularly Aḥmad Agha Ḥummuṣah, Ibrāhīm Agha al-Ḥarbali, and Yāsīn Agha.¹⁹⁴

There followed a campaign of repression against the remaining Janissaries. Many of the more minor leaders fled, a general proscription was instituted with criers going about the city warning that those who sheltered Janissaries would be fined.¹⁹⁵ The *qādi*, 'Uthmān Zādah Dalī Amīn Effendi, was most uncooperative throughout this effort to gain mastery over the city. The *khatt-i humāyūn* published by Cemal Tukin reveals the charges levelled against this *qādi* by Jalāl-al-Dīn Pasha:

The *qādi* of Aleppo has shown manifest opposition to his [the *wālī*'s] will and opinion by unworthy conduct incompatible with the nature of the affair, by raising conditions detrimental to the dignity of the vizirate and by unseemingly comments, and has shown gentleness and mildness toward the fugitive rebels.

The sultan replied as follows:

My vizir:

The said *qādi* being a man choleric of tongue, such things are expected of him. Let this report be sent to our emissary the effendi. Let him be conducted into exile at Tosya. Let the firman be written at once, let it be sent by a brave *mubāshir*, and let him be taken and brought to Tosya.¹⁹⁶

Having once established the authority of the Porte over Aleppo, Jalāl-al-Dīn Pasha next turned to the *walāyah*, in spite of the plague that had broken out all over Syria.¹⁹⁷ In 1815 the road through Baylān to Iskandarūn was opened for the first time in seven years.¹⁹⁸ Punitive expedition were carried out against Mursal Ūghlu Ḥaydar Agha, chief of the Rihānlu Turkomans, 'Umar Agha, a Kurdish leader, and Ṭūpāl 'Alī Agha and Sa'īd Agha, the two minor *dereh beys* of the region of Jisr al-Shughr. All were driven out of the *walāyah*, although the latter

¹⁹³ Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 319. Jawdat mentions the incident briefly, giving a certain Qūjah Katkhuda the credit for devising the ruse. His figure of the number killed agrees with that of Ghazzi: Jawdat, *Ta'rikh*, XI, 36.

¹⁹⁴ Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 320-321. Ṭabbākh mentions that Ibrāhīm Agha al-Ḥarbali and Yāsīn Agha were victims of this massacre but states that Aḥmad Agha Ḥummuṣah had died in 1811: *l'ām*, III, 375.

¹⁹⁵ Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 320. He places the amount of the fine at five hundred purses or 250,000 piasters! It would more likely have been 500 piasters.

¹⁹⁶ Cemal Tukin, "Mahmud II. Devrinde Halep İsyanı," *Tarih Vesikaları*, I (1941), 256-257.

¹⁹⁷ Edward B. Barker, *Egypt and Syria*, I, 164; Shihābi, *Lubnān*, 603; Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 320.

¹⁹⁸ "Exposé" addressed by the consuls of Aleppo to their respective ambassadors at Istanbul, 15 September 1815, *SP* 105/135, ff. 75r.-76r.

two, having taken refuge with the Bedouin, continued to be troublesome for a while.¹⁹⁹ Finally, the difficult position of Payās, which had been the locale of Kūchūk 'Ali Agha, his son, and his grandson, was reduced although Dedeh Bey and another rebel allied to him both escaped. This operation cleared the caravan route, a source of some concern to Istanbul.²⁰⁰ The return of the pilgrimage caravan late in 1816, however, faced the same difficulty, Dedeh Bey having returned to Payās once again.²⁰¹ This was no longer the concern of Jalāl-al-Dīn Pasha. He had been transferred early in the fall to the *wilāyah* of Erzerum.

The new *wāli*, Aḥmad Pasha, had formerly been the *wāli* of Anatolia. The one year of his rule over Aleppo was mostly occupied with the attempted suppression by order of the Porte of the rebels invading the *walāyah*. The *katkhuda* of Aḥmad Pasha appears to have been almost continually out in the province driving back the various invading groups. 'Umar Agha, the Kurdish clan chieftain whom Jalāl-al-Dīn Pasha had driven off, returned with allies and established himself within ten hours of the city. No sooner had he been driven out²⁰² than the Baraq Kurds were menacing; again 'Uthmān Agha, the *katkhuda*, defeated them and drove them off. The 'Anazah tribe of Bedouin were the next problem. The troops of Aḥmad Pasha seemed to have been equally successful there²⁰³ but none of these victories appear to have been decisive. Only one leader was killed,²⁰⁴ the others escaped to continue their depredations.

Under the circumstances Khūrshīd Pasha, a former grand vizir, was transferred to Aleppo and there were strong hopes, at least on the part of the French consul, that he would be able to suppress the brigands who were attacking the caravans.²⁰⁵ The following year, namely 1818, was one of almost continual skirmishes with the Bedouin, while at the same time there was trouble on the Persian frontier and the *wāli* was ordered to have troops in readiness to march there if necessary.²⁰⁶

In the fall of 1819 there occurred a serious revolt in Diyār Bakr against its governor, Bahrām Pasha, and Khūrshīd Pasha, adhering to an order from the Porte, sent 1,000 troops with their requisite supplies to assist in its repression.²⁰⁷ It may have been the example of the peo-

¹⁹⁹ Shāni Zādah, *Ta'rikh*, II, 256-260; Jawdat, *Ta'rikh*, X, 191-192.

²⁰⁰ Shāni Zādah, *Ta'rikh*, II, 292-293; Administration des biens privés, *Recueil des firmans*, 81, no. 258, 83, no. 264; Hyacinthe Guys to Richelieu, 10 July and 5 August 1816, *CCAlep*, XXV, ff. 187r. and v., 196r. and v.

²⁰¹ Shāni Zādah, *Ta'rikh*, II, 321.

²⁰² Shāni Zādah, *Ta'rikh*, II, 325.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, 337-339; Jawdat, *Ta'rikh*, X, 216. That the Wahhābi activity to the southeast was the undoubted cause of the Bedouin incursions has been pointed out *supra*, 13.

²⁰⁴ Namely, Kurd Ūghlu who was allied with the 'Anazah: Shāni Zādah, *Ta'rikh*, II, 339.

²⁰⁵ Guys to Richelieu, 3 September 1817, *CCAlep*, XXV, f. 271r.

²⁰⁶ Jawdat, *Ta'rikh*, X, 230.

²⁰⁷ Shāni Zādah, *Ta'rikh*, III, 57.

ple of Diyār Bakr that instilled in the minds of certain Aleppines the idea of revolt against Khūrshīd Pasha. Perhaps there was reason enough within Aleppo whether Diyār Bakr had revolted or not. Many reasons have been given. They can be divided into the immediate causes and the basic causes.

The people had to bear the weight of continual contributions. In spite of the facts that the population had declined through emigration and plague, that the commerce of the city and its industry had declined, and that money had become extremely scarce, the required payments had not decreased in the slightest.²⁰⁸ The expeditions of governors against the rebels in the province and areas neighboring to it had probably increased the financial burden on the city. The troops of the *wāli* were, in addition, quartered on the people. Not only did there result a loss of rents but the troops often severely damaged the houses.²⁰⁹

These were the basic reasons. The immediate reasons were more numerous. Bread was lacking in the market but the warehouses of some individuals were full. Plague was in Damascus and according to past experience it could be expected shortly in Aleppo, thus aggravating the food shortage.²¹⁰ The *wāli* was not residing within the city but at al-Shaykh abu-Bakr; the city was left in the hands of a *mutasallim*, Šāliḥ Qurj, who was also the *kathhuda* of Khūrshīd Pasha, a man who was a perpetual violent drunkard and tyrant.²¹¹ The people were discontented but the *wāli* did little to assuage their misery. On the contrary, having in mind the rerouting of the course of the Sājūr River so that it would flow into the Quwayq and give Aleppo more water, he levied a heavy contribution on the houses of the city on the pattern of the '*awwāriq*', an exaction that most of the people could not pay. This was the most immediate cause of the revolt which broke out apparently spontaneously on the night of the 23rd of October, 1819.²¹²

At first the insurrection had no central direction, no leadership, although Būlus Arūtīn, who kept a diary of it, reports that it was begun by a group of *ashrāf* notables.²¹³ Most of the government officials, servants of Khūrshīd Pasha, and notables of the city escaped to the *wāli* but many of his troops were killed in their quarters after holding out as long as possible.²¹⁴

It was not long before the city organized itself. A council of notables was formed, each one being responsible for a quarter of the city, and a

²⁰⁸ Guys to the Marquis de Dessolle, 10 October 1819, *CCAleph*, XXV, f. 396r.

²⁰⁹ Qara'li, *Ahamm Hawādīth*, 40.

²¹⁰ Guys to the Marquis de Dessolle, 7 November 1819, *CCAleph*, XXV, f. 400v.

²¹¹ Qara'li, *Ahamm Hawādīth*, 40; Shāni Zādah, *Ta'rikh*, III, 74.

²¹² Guys to the Marquis de Dessolle, 7 November 1819, *CCAleph*, XXV, f. 400r.; Qara'li, *Ahamm Hawādīth*, 37 and 40.

²¹³ Qara'li, *Ahamm Hawādīth*, 37.

²¹⁴ Guys to the Marquis de Dessolle, 7 November 1819, *CCAleph*, XXV, f. 400r. and v.

chief of this council was selected, Muḥammad Agha Qujah.²¹⁵ Agents were appointed according to the Sharī'ah for the fugitive *a'yān* to sell their grain at a fixed price and keep the accounts for them. The council sent a petition to the *wāli* outlining the causes for the revolt and requesting their redressment but this was rejected by Khūrshīd Pasha.²¹⁶

Khūrshīd Pasha was in the meantime organizing his campaign to repress the revolt. He recalled the troops he had sent to Diyār Bakr, ordered his *mutasallims* in the towns of the *walāyah* to join him with troops, blockaded the city, cut off its water, and informed the Porte.²¹⁷ The Porte, when informed, ordered the *mutasarrif* of Kayseri, abu-Bakr Pasha, to the assistance of the *wāli* of Aleppo and ordered Jalāl-al-Dīn Pasha, then *wāli* of Adana, to assist him if requested. Two thousand or more *topchis*,²¹⁸ *'arabahjis*²¹⁹ and *khumbarahjis*²²⁰ were on their way from Salonika to Iskandarūn, destined for Baghdad. But since the threat of full-scale war with Persia had been averted, they were ordered to Aleppo to assist Khūrshīd Pasha. In addition letters from officials were sent to their Aleppo deputies admonishing them for their conduct and ordering them to do all in their power to halt the conflict.²²¹

The city party also received reinforcements. Not only did the inhabitants of outlying villages enter the city to assist it but the Janissary leaders who had been exiled from Aleppo returned, led by Muṣṭafa Agha ibn-al-Ḥājī 'Isa al-Chāwūsh,²²² who took over the leadership of the military forces.

While there were daily sorties and skirmishes both sides attempted negotiations without success. Khūrshīd Pasha received the promised reinforcements, Jalāl-al-Dīn Pasha with 5,000 troops, abu-Bakr Šidqī Pasha with 3,000, the troops from Salonika, and finally Luṭf-Allāh Pasha from Sivas with 1,000.²²³ These *wālis* also attempted to gain the surrender of the city on terms through their own negotiations. In January a division appeared in the city party, the *ashraf* desiring to

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, f. 400v.; Qara'li, *Ahamm Hawādīth*, 40-41.

²¹⁶ Qara'li, *Ahamm Hawādīth*, 41.

²¹⁷ Shāni Zādah, *Ta'rikh*, III, 76. The motive for the revolt as recorded by Shāni Zādah is worth noting as an example of the official blindness of the Porte toward conditions in the provinces: certain groups of troublemakers used the debauchery of the retinue of Khūrshīd Pasha, himself a pious man of pure character, to incite revolt and to summon fugitive rebels to assist them: *Ta'rikh*, III, 74-75.

²¹⁸ Gunner.

²¹⁹ Gun-carriage driver.

²²⁰ Bombardier.

²²¹ Shāni Zādah, *Ta'rikh*, III, 76-77; Jawdat, *Ta'rikh*, XI, 37-38.

²²² Guys to the Marquis de Dessolle, 7 November 1819, *CCAlep*, XXV, f. 40lv.; Qara'li, *Ahamm Hawādīth*, 42. It is not mentioned when these Janissaries were exiled.

²²³ The sources do not agree on the names of these pashas, nor on where they came from. Qara'li has abu-Bakr Šidqī Pasha as Bakir Pasha and Luṭf-Allāh Pasha as Latif Pasha: *Ahamm Hawādīth*, 44-45. The reading of Jawdat, *Ta'rikh*, XI, 37-38, has been followed. Cf. also Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, I, 185 and IV, 89-90.

surrender but the Janissaries unwilling to do so at the price of their return to exile.²²⁴

By the first of February, 1820, however, both sides were ready for the conditional surrender that the consuls arranged. The terms were a full amnesty for the inhabitants of the city, the entry of the *mutasallim* with only five hundred troops, the destruction by the people of the barricades they had erected, and the departure within three days with safe conduct of the Janissaries who had been exiled but had returned to the aid of the city.²²⁵ The Janissary leader agreed to these terms but some of the lesser Janissaries and others took up fighting after the *mutasallim* had entered. The extent of this opposition, however, was limited and soon suppressed.²²⁶

There followed some months of severe repressive measures by Khūrshīd Pasha as he attempted to recoup the losses he incurred through the revolt. Many of the *ashrāf* and their supporters including Muḥammad Agha Qujah were executed, although the Janissaries who had been in exile were permitted to depart unmolested.²²⁷ The *wālī* levied heavy taxes on the inhabitants, one of which was of the amount of 120 piasters per household ostensibly for the Sājūr River project.²²⁸ The Christians alone were fined 500,000 piasters and besides the fines there were the repairs to three districts largely destroyed to add to the burden.²²⁹ By the time that Khūrshīd Pasha was transferred in mid-July, 1820, 147 Aleppines had been executed.²³⁰

As nearly as can be judged this was a popular insurrection of the Aleppines against the manifold abuses perpetrated by the subordinates of a weak governor. Although the *ashrāf* may have touched it off and later assumed the leadership, the people were apparently behind them. The frequent mention in Bülus Arūtīn's journal of the *ashrāf*²³¹ indicates that they had somewhat recovered their position since the Janissaries had lost their leadership through the massacre of Jalāl-al-Dīn Pasha. That there still was friction between the two corps is evident by the desire of the *ashrāf* to surrender when the Janissaries were unwilling to do so. After this rift appeared and was patched up, an all-out attack on the *wālis* was planned and executed but it failed largely because after the first rush the Janissaries were left to continue alone.²³²

²²⁴ Qara'li, *Ahamm Hawādīth*, 48.

²²⁵ Guys to the Marquis de Dessolle, 4 February 1820, *CCAlep*, XXVI, f. 2r.; Qara'li, *Ahamm Hawādīth*, 54-55.

²²⁶ Guys to the Marquis de Dessolle, 4 February 1820, *CCAlep*, XXVI, f. 3r.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, ff. 2v. and 3r.; Qara'li, *Ahamm Hawādīth*, 56. Guys praised Muḥammad Agha highly for his severe police measures to ensure order within the city during its defense.

²²⁸ Qara'li, *Ahamm Hawādīth*, 60.

²²⁹ Guys to the Marquis de Dessolle, 4 February 1820 and to the Baron de Pasquier, 7 March 1820, *CCAlep*, XXVI, ff. 3r. and 7r.

²³⁰ Qara'li, *Ahamm Hawādīth*, 60.

²³¹ Qara'li, *Ahamm Hawādīth*, 37-60.

²³² *Ibid.*, 49.

Aleppo apparently could not act as a unified city for any length of time.

Yet the achievement of the Aleppines in this case was notable. The Porte threw into the conflict a formidable army, considering that the foe was but one city with crumbling walls. The siege had lasted 101 days. It is either testimony of the determination of the inhabitants or of the inefficiency of the Ottoman besiegers. In the end the resistance proved to be useless. Aleppo lost through this insurrection much more than it gained. Whether it could have gained anything regardless of the outcome is highly dubious, but the desperation of men cannot be reasonably judged after the fact.

The new *wāli* for Aleppo was a fortunate choice. A good administrator, Baylānli Muṣṭafa Pasha, evidently from his name a native of the *walāyah*, tried to improve conditions.²³³ The sources report no exactions but rather his attempts to control his unruly troops, although he hesitated to make an example by executing one because he was dependent on them against brigands in the *walāyah*.²³⁴ But war against Persia created a demand for troops that the city found hard to meet. Three thousand, half cavalry and half infantry, were demanded and the cost to the city was estimated at a million and a half piasters.²³⁵ Presumably the troops were raised although no further mention is made of the question.

On the 13th of August, 1822 Aleppo was rocked by a violent earthquake, the damage from which was extreme not only in the city but throughout the whole *walāyah* and much of the rest of northern Syria. The number of lives lost is estimated as up to 30,000 and it is said that but a small part of Aleppo was left standing.²³⁶ But it was the after-effects of the earthquake that were the most difficult for the Aleppines. Forced out into the environs of the city by continuing shocks, they were prey for the marauding bands of Bedouin, Kurds, and even the Albanians of the city garrison.²³⁷ Muṣṭafa Pasha was absent at the time combatting the insurgent 'Abd-Allāh Pasha of 'Akka and the city was in the hands of a provisional governor, Bahrām Muḥammad Pasha. Shortly thereafter he was appointed *wāli*,²³⁸ only to gather troops and depart for Baghdad. But during the brief time that he was in Aleppo he caused the *naqīb al-ashrāf*, Nu'mān Effendi, a friend of

²³³ Guys to the Baron de Pasquier, 2 January 1821, *CCAleph*, XXVI, f. 54r. On Baylānli Muṣṭafa Pasha, see Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, IV, 470-471.

²³⁴ Guys to the Baron de Pasquier, 8 March 1821, *CCAleph*, XXVI, f. 62v. Guys reports: "La conduite sage et réservée du Pacha paroît lui avoir concilié l'attachement de tous les habitants." *ibid.*, f. 63r.

²³⁵ Guys to the Baron de Pasquiers, 15 November 1821, *CCAleph*, XXVI, f. 89r.

²³⁶ John Cartwright, Consul-general of the Levant Company at Istanbul, to Levant Company, 3 September 1822, *SP* 105/140. This report was based on a letter from John Barker, then in Antioch.

²³⁷ Lesseps to Ministry, 24 August 1822, *CCAleph*, XXVI, f. 176v.

²³⁸ Jawdat, *T'arikh*, XII, 74. Cf. Thurayya, *Sijil-i 'Uthmāni*, II, 33.

the former *wāli* Muṣṭafa Pasha, to be assassinated. The motivator of the assassination was Aḥmad Bey ibn-Ibrāhīm Pasha Qaṭṭār Aghāsi who coveted the post of *mutasallim* held by the *naqīb*'s brother, and the *naqīb* was the power behind the *mutasallim*.²³⁹

Aḥmad Bey received the position of *mutasallim* and held it through the *wilāyah* of Darandahli al-Sayyid Ḥasan Riḍā' Pasha, the successor of Bahrām Pasha. This *wāli* was vexatious to the Aleppines and the *mutasallim* apparently shared in the dislike of the people.²⁴⁰ The Kurds, Turkomans and Bedouin were all openly at war with the *wāli* but the attempts of Aḥmad Bey to suppress them were futile.²⁴¹ It was evidently the Janissaries who were the most opposed to Aḥmad Bey, possibly because he cherished the hatred of his father for them. When Baylānli Muṣṭafa Pasha was appointed once again to the *wilāyah* of Aleppo, all the Janissaries went out to greet him, while Aḥmad Bey and many of the notables, including the then *naqīb*, successor to Nu'mān Effendi, fled from the city.²⁴²

The assassination of Nu'mān Effendi had the effect of reestablishing the Janissaries as the power in Aleppo, for Muṣṭafa Pasha supported them. When in the spring of 1824 Muṣṭafa Pasha once more left Aleppo, he effected a reconciliation between the Janissaries and the *ashrāf* but placed two of the strongholds of the city in the hands of the Janissaries.²⁴³ It was also during this period that there arose a new Janissary leader, Muḥammad Agha ibn-al-Qaṭṭān.²⁴⁴

The new *wāli*, Muḥammad Waḥīd Pasha, entered the city with three thousand troops and the determination to be a *wāli* in fact. His first order was to forbid the Janissaries to bear arms and this, together with his show of force, gave him control over an uneasy city.²⁴⁵ His principal basis for this control was, however, his troops and it was not long before he dismissed many of them and others were drawn away to assist in suppressing a revolt at Aintab.²⁴⁶

In an attempt to reduce the tension in the city, some of the notables arranged a meeting between ibn-al-Qaṭṭān and the governor. The Janissary leader, holding his forces under strict rein, had them in readiness near al-Shaykh abu-Bakr when he met the *wāli* and the weak position of the latter became apparent. He conciliated the Janissaries and withdrew the disarmament order.²⁴⁷ At a later meeting he capitulated completely and agreed to the Janissaries' terms, namely that he would not

²³⁹ Ṭabbākh, *I'lām*, VII, 240; Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 334-335.

²⁴⁰ Barker to Levant Company, 12 February 1823, *SP* 105/141.

²⁴¹ Lesseps to Ministry, 10 May 1823, *CCAleph*, XXVI, f. 311v.

²⁴² Lesseps to Ministry, 15 June and 19 June 1823, *CCAleph*, XXVI, ff. 331r. and 341r. and v.

²⁴³ Lesseps to Ministry, 20 June 1824, *CCAleph*, XXVII, f. 227r.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁵ Lesseps to Ministry, 6 July 1824, *CCAleph*, XXVII, f. 270r. and v.

²⁴⁶ Lesseps to Guilleminot, 21 July 1824, *CCAleph*, XXVII, f. 286v.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, f. 287r.

torment the population of the city and would not introduce any new troops but rely on the Janissaries as his military force.²⁴⁸

Although in the following month ibn-al-Qaṭṭān was killed accidentally in a game of *jarīd*, the Janissaries were able to maintain their position. The *wāli* tried to dictate the choice of successor but was rebuffed decisively.²⁴⁹ Through the year 1825 there was little change in the situation. At one point a levy of half a million piasters caused dissension among the Aleppines but armed Janissaries and *ashrāf* toured the *sūqs* and forced the shops to open, placing those that remained closed under seal of arrest.²⁵⁰ Later in the year famine at the time of the harvest brought the threat of a revolt by the *ashrāf* but the arrest and exile of three of the principal leaders broke the impending insurrection.²⁵¹

In the early part of 1826 there were a number of incidents of attacks of *ashrāf* against the Christians over the Greek war but the *wāli* with the help of the principal Janissaries and *ashrāf* calmed the populace.

Neither of the consular records have any information on the destruction of the Janissaries in Aleppo, the British because Barker had been transferred in 1825, and the French for no apparent reason. Lesseps was still there, but there is a gap in the record. It is clear, however, that there was no difficulty. Al-Ghazzi mentions only that they were destroyed and then summarizes their later history in Aleppo.²⁵² There is one more item of definite information. The correspondent in Istanbul of the *Journal des débats*, writing on August 7th, 1826, reported that the firman of the sultan had been executed in Aleppo without opposition on the part of the Janissaries there.²⁵³

Subsequent reports from Lesseps made no mention of the Janissaries, while his successor reported in 1830 the organization of a new army corps. 'Ali Pasha, then *wāli* of Aleppo, received orders to make a levy of troops which would be trained in the European fashion. Instructors had arrived to accomplish the task but there was considerable religious opposition among the people toward the new regime. The ulema were leading the resistance and urging men to avoid the levy.²⁵⁴

As late as 1842, however, there were still indications that the Janissary party and that of the *ashrāf* were not dead in Aleppo:

Although the heads of the Janissary faction had long been taken off, the body itself remained, as well as the sons of those unfortunate individuals and the older chiefs of inferior note. The most influential man among them

²⁴⁸ Lesseps to Guilleminot, 28 July 1824, *CCAleph*, XXVII, f. 288r. and v.

²⁴⁹ Lesseps, "Bulletin politique de la Syrie," August 1824, *CCAleph*, XXVII, f. 316v.; Lesseps, "Bulletin politique de la Syrie," December 1824, *CCAleph*, XXVIII, f. 2r.

²⁵⁰ Lesseps to Ministry, 25 March 1825, *CCAleph*, XXVIII, f. 60v.

²⁵¹ Lesseps to Ministry, 11 September 1825, *CCAleph*, XXVIII, f. 129v.

²⁵² *Nahr al-Dhahab*, III, 335.

²⁵³ *Journal des débats* (Paris), 11 September 1826.

²⁵⁴ Joseph Malivoire to Ministry, 22 February and 15 November 1830, *CCAleph*, XXIX, ff. 16r. and 51v.

was an individual called Abdallah Babolsi, of low extraction, rough exterior, and destitute of education, but possessed of unbending energy, inflexible attachment to his own people, and generosity in pecuniary matters.²⁵⁵

When the Ottomans returned to Syria after the Egyptian occupation, they had used the Janissary organization that still existed, and the *ashrāf* remained constituted as a party of some influence well into the nineteenth century.²⁵⁶ But the power of both had been destroyed. They could no longer mount revolts as they had done. What existed after the Egyptian occupation were the mere vestiges of organizations which for their own interests had been able to oppose, although never fully successfully, the declining power of the Ottoman government in Syria.

²⁵⁵ [A. A. Paton], *The Modern Syrians*, 246.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 247 and 243.

CONCLUSION

The Islamic conception of the role of government may be said to be the establishment of the optimum conditions under which the Muslim, acting in his capacity as a member of the Islamic community, may serve and glorify God. The government of the Ottoman Empire in the latter part of the eighteenth century had strayed far from this ideal. As the institution to which the Muslims of the Empire looked for the God-ordained expansion of the domain of Islam, the Ottoman sultanate had failed signally to acquit its responsibilities: the domain of Islam was shrinking, not only through the loss of territory inhabited predominantly by Christians, but also through the loss of regions, such as the Crimea, in which the majority were Muslims. As the preserver of the orthodoxy of the Islamic community, the sultanate had likewise failed: Shi'ism had been permitted to maintain itself with impunity in Persia for three centuries. The impotence of the Ottoman Empire in the face of these external forces was a cause of concern to many thoughtful Muslims but most were not personally affected by them.

What was of direct concern to them was the patent inability of the Sublime Porte to safeguard their own lives and property. Furthermore, it was apparent that the Ottoman government was little concerned about its incompetence in internal affairs. The method of educating the sultan, possessor of supreme authority in the empire, was virtually guaranteed to produce the dangerous combination of ineptitude and willfulness. The grand vizir, responsible for the daily conduct of government in his place, was ineffectual. Authority was delegated to him and was subject to withdrawal at the whim of the sultan. Grand vizirs seldom remained in office long enough to have any beneficial effect on the conduct of government, even if the desire to do so had been there.

The morale of government officialdom, however, was deadened by systematic corruption. Office and influence were for sale at generally established prices. The grand vizir bought his post as did all lesser officials; *iltisâms* were sold at auction; and virtually all governmental actions for the benefit of an individual or group required monetary compensation. The attainment of office was thus not based on the criterion of merit but on influence and the ability to pay. The consequence was a governmental structure manipulated by its officials in their own self-interest, each one seeking to recoup his outlay for the position from the perquisites it made available to him before his inevitable dismissal.

What made the system the more noxious was that power, which should have been correlative to authority, ultimately resided not in the sultan, nor in the grand vizir, but in the Janissary corps, a political pressure group highly protective of its ancient privileges which it failed

to recompense by competent defense of the Empire. Recruiting its members largely from the artisan classes, it was a turbulent body, expensive to maintain, untrained in the rapidly developing arts of warfare, and therefore virtually useless for its originally intended purpose. Yet because it was armed, it was an instrument of power and could be employed to curtail the authority of the sultan and of the officials to whom he delegated it. The authoritative activities of the officials hence took place in an atmosphere tinged with an unreality that further nurtured irresponsibility, for their actions were always subject to cancellation by the exercise of the residual power in the hands of the Janissaries.

The role of the ulema under these circumstances should have been to act as the conscience of the government, recalling it to its responsibilities in promoting the Islamic ideal. But there were a number of reasons why the ulema failed to do so in any effective manner. Among the ulema there was a latent cynicism, born of a long experience with misgovernment, as to the capacity of temporal power to rule in any but a despotic manner. Government was assumed to have a predilection for contravening the Sharī'ah. The *ṣūfī* brotherhoods, rivals of the ulema but since the twelfth century progressing from an uneasy coexistence to a limited integration with them, originally reinforced this pessimistic view indirectly by accenting otherworldly concerns in their teaching, but their adherents had become increasingly worldly in their conduct the more their orders became institutionalized.

It was a similar institutionalization which perhaps most profoundly vitiated any inclination on the part of the ulema to act as the conscience of the government. We have described the character of the religious institution in the late eighteenth century, its hierarchical structure and the custom of purchasing both rank and exemption from following the prescribed course of advancement. The impression left is that the *qāḍīs* were fully as corrupt as the *wālis* and the muftis only a little less so because of their predominantly local origin. The ulema had little inclination and constituted too poor an example to play the role of idealists.

In fact, the teachings of the ulema and the *ṣūfīs* served rather to reinforce the government however much it departed from the Islamic ideal. Central to their views was the principle of quietism, the injunction that it was incumbent on the Muslim to obey the ruler however unjust and tyrannical he might be, for this was preferable to rebellion and anarchy. True, it was possible for the religious institution to approve the deposition of a sultan on the grounds that he had failed to rule in accordance with the Sharī'ah, and this was done twice in the period under study. This act, however, on the part of the *shaykh al-Islām* was consonant with that sense of pragmatism of the ulema which contributed to their poor stance as idealists, namely, a recognition of the ultimate validity of power, in these cases manifested in the actions first of the *qapūqūli* Janissaries and then of the troops of Bayrāqdār Muṣṭafa Pasha.

In sum, then, the Ottoman Empire, which had so spectacularly fulfilled the role of champion of Islam against the *dār al-ḥarb* in its earlier centuries, had reached the point where its institutions had become invalid now that a transition from territorial expansion to contraction had taken place. The essential conservatism of the ideology on which it was based, however, an ideology which emphasized that what had been established as good and true in the past should not be departed from, restricted change and confined it to aberrations of its traditional institutions. The Empire had, in essence, become parasitic, sapping the vitality of its inhabitants and demanding extra-legal, arbitrary control over their persons and possessions. The central authority of the sultan, having weakened, became rapacious in its need to maintain the fiction of its majesty. The effect extended down to the lowliest subject.

The reaction of the people depended on the status of the individual in the society. For those who had some power and influence the defense mechanism was to seek more. As the tentacles of a system of sale of offices and of influence reached out into the provinces, it bound the local notables, especially the *a'yān*, to the intrigues of the capital and divorced them from consideration of local interests. For the lesser folk it meant a search for personal security in whatever grouping appeared to promise them such a benefit. In Aleppo these groupings were those with special immunities, the Janissaries and the *ashrāf*. They sought in them a form of corporate defense and an outlet for localism in the face of governmental unconcern.

Neither one was particularly effective in this role. The *ashrāf* suffered from an absence of structural solidarity. As has been shown, no intermediate organization between the *naqīb* and the lower ranks appears to have existed, and thus control over the actions of the latter was weak and ephemeral. The leader and those immediately beneath him were able to maintain their positions through personal followings bound to them by the actualities or potentialities of patronage. But such rivalries as those between Chalabi Effendi and the Kawākibi family and between Qudsi Effendi and the Jābiri family show that the upper ranks lacked internal solidarity. Only in so far as they were Aleppines did they represent localism and in so far as their fortunes were protected, did they lead a corporate defense against governmental exactions. It is apparent that these leaders, wealthy and landed, had more interest in acquiring the authority by which to maintain the *status quo* than in any consideration of the common benefit.

This lack of organizational stability and control may have been the paramount reason for the defeat of the *ashrāf* by the Janissaries. The *ashrāf* were not the unified body with a strong corporate spirit and extra-urban liens that was the Janissary corps.

The military origins of the Janissary party were a definite basis for organizational strength. It has been established that the foundation of

the corps in Aleppo was through the creation of a military body for police purposes, the *yerli qūli*, with perhaps a subsequent assimilation of *ex-qapūqūli* Janissaries from Damascus. Accretion to this corps and a closer bond with the declining *qapūqūli* Janissaries came through the practice of enrolling volunteers into the *qapūqūlis* and possibly through the creation of a ready reserve in provincial cities in peacetime. A system of patronage similar to that of the *ashrāf* but reinforced by military gradation gave the Janissaries a compactness which provided better discipline in their ranks than in those of the *ashrāf*. The low class origins of the large majority if not all of the Janissaries further consolidated the bond between them. Probable ethnic ties with the Kurds, Turkomans and Bedouin produced a basis of understanding that at times flowered into alliance in spite of the distance which separated nomad or semi-nomad from the city. Opposition to the established authority abetted occasional collaboration.

As with the *ashrāf*, however, identity of the Janissary party with the urban population as a whole did not exist. The disparities were multifold. The very factors that drew them to the *walāyah* malcontents separated them from the Aleppines. Their moral conduct was notorious and the refuge of their privileges abused. Their control of the butchers' guild was exploited to the detriment of the Aleppines as was the control of essential commodities, other guilds, and the whole city when they acquired it. If their rule of Aleppo was better than that of the authorized administration in the years 1805 to 1813, it was because the burden of exactions was more evenly distributed, because the authority was local even if directed for the benefit of but a segment of the populace, and because there always existed the threat of concerted Ottoman action against them.

It was due to the vigor of Sultan Maḥmūd II, his manipulation of the more powerful *dereh beys*, and his gradual elevation of subordinates who had an interest in strengthening the empire that the disobedience of the Aleppo Janissaries was curtailed and at least a semblance of Ottoman control re-established. One bold stroke by Chapān Ūghlu Jalāl-al-Dīn Pasha was sufficient to cripple the party for some ten years. This is testimony of the disaffection between the corps and their fellow Aleppines, to the role personal leadership played in the actions of this group, and to the reputation of this *wāli*.

But if the *wilāyah* of Jalāl-al-Dīn Pasha represented the restoration of Ottoman control over Aleppo, it also demonstrated that however urgent the attainment of this objective was for Sultan Maḥmūd, it resulted in no immediate benefit for the Aleppines. On the contrary, it had the effect of removing the one remaining body, however imperfect it might have been, which sought a measure of local autonomy. This having been partially accomplished by the reduction of Janissary power to the level of the crippled *ashrāf*, the population of Aleppo was exposed

to the almost unrestrained despotism of the central government represented by the *wāli*.

The fact that a revolt should have broken out in 1819 when neither Janissaries nor *ashrāf* were in a strong position demonstrates the desperation of the population in face of continual Ottoman misrule. Pushed to extremities the Aleppines could produce a facsimile of unity. That this was a popular revolt is shown by the fact that no leadership evolved for several days. But unity was ephemeral; the traditional fission reappeared and remained until the abolition of Janissary privileges and the dissolution of their façade withdrew some of the essentials of their solidarity.

The period treated in this study witnessed a culmination of trends in the history of Aleppo which had a profound effect on the social outlook of its inhabitants. The failure of opposition to a parasitic sovereign authority, whose representatives were transitory and divided among themselves, fostered an attitude of deep disillusionment, of fatalism, and of distrust of all political formations. The denudation of the dependencies of the city served to isolate it both physically and mentally. This isolation penetrated into the city itself, dividing it into ever smaller nuclei. The city was a unit in name only in its internal interrelations. It was nothing more than a congeries of largely self-contained, mentally ingrown quarters.

It is perhaps desirable to place these conclusions in the larger context provided by the French orientalist Claude Cahen, who believes that a major weakness of Islamic society has been that it has not elaborated or preserved a true concept of the state or of public law.

Dans une société où la Loi, donnée par Dieu, est sous la sauvegarde de la Communauté, et où la Souverain, qui doit en organiser l'application, n'en est ni la source ni le garant, l'État ne peut être conçu que comme une superstructure avec laquelle la population ne ressent pas de solidarité, superstructure d'autant plus étrangère qu'en fait les princes sont amenés à prendre des mesures extérieures à la Loi. . . D'autant plus essentielle alors dans tous les milieux la recherche de formes de solidarité (en même temps que de protection) purement privés.¹

In Aleppo at the end of the eighteenth and early in the nineteenth centuries these forms of solidarity were not in fact purely private but were based on organizations which were the recipients of public privileges. These organizations had, however, been warped to serve private ends. The failure of either the Janissaries or the *ashrāf* to accomplish the purposes for which they were employed in the face of a recovery of the central government's authority threw the individual back on smaller, more personal, more tangible units such as the family in his

¹ "Mouvements populaires," *SI*, VI (1959), 26.

search for personal security. His focus of loyalty became more restricted.

It was only in the early twentieth century that the Aleppine sensed an appeal for confidence in a new form of loyalty, that of Arab nationalism. But the legacy of insecurity and mistrust is dying only slowly and has hindered the response to that appeal.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Because of the importance of the French and British consular records to this study, it has been deemed advisable to include this bibliographical note explaining their nature and value.

The French consular documents are composed of the letters, memoirs and information bulletins sent by the consuls to their responsible ministry in Paris. The French revolution divides these documents into two series, those prior to it sent to the Ministère de la Marine and at present lodged in the Archives nationales, those following the revolution sent to the Ministère des Relations extérieures and now to be found in the Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères. The former are entitled *Affaires étrangères B¹-89*, etc., the latter *Correspondence commerciale, Alep*, vol. XXIII, etc.

The British consular records are all lodged in the Public Records Office in London. Those prior to 1791 are in reality letter books of various merchants of the Levant Company resident in Aleppo, not necessarily those of the consul. In 1791 the Levant Company factory in Aleppo was closed, and the letter book of the first consular agent of the Levant Company and agent of the East India Company, Robert Abbott, has been preserved. It forms the major British manuscript source. Following Abbott's death in 1798, John Barker was appointed consular agent and remained in that post until 1825, but was absent on leave from 1818 to 1820. The only letters preserved from him are a few to the Levant Company direct, a few forwarded in copy from the Company's consular agent in Istanbul, and a few forwarded by the British ambassador.

For the purposes of this study the French records were indisputably the more valuable. The French consuls were direct representatives of their government and were its chief source of information on the area. The French government considered itself the protector of the Catholics in the Ottoman Empire. For this reason there is much information in the records concerning the minority communities. Some of the consuls were more valuable as reporters of information pertinent to this study than others, and it is to be noted that the longer the consul resided in Aleppo the more detailed were his reports as to local conditions. The most notable of the consuls in this regard was Pierre Petro de Perdriau whose letters have been cited frequently.

The letter books of the Levant Company merchants contain little political information, being for the most part concerned with commercial matters, shipments, rates of exchange, orders and the like. All of the letters appear to have been copied into the books by clerks whose knowl-

edge of English was probably faulty. Some of the errors in spelling are not those likely to be made by Englishmen.

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- Pierre Emmanuel Mazières de Saint Marcel, consul, 1787-1792
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