

**FROM**  
**KUNG FU**  
**TO**  
**HIP HOP**



Globalization, Revolution,  
and Popular Culture

**M. T. KATO**

# FROM KUNG FU TO HIP HOP

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HIP HOP

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*Globalization, Revolution, and Popular Culture*

M. T. KATO

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK PRESS

Published by  
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK PRESS, ALBANY

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Printed in the United States of America

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Cover art courtesy of Geces One "Dek." Photography by Bruce Behnke.

For information, address State University of New York Press,  
194 Washington Avenue, Suite 305, Albany, NY 12210-2384

Production by Diane Ganeles  
Marketing by Michael Campochiaro

**Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data**

Kato, M. T., 1961–

From Kung Fu to Hip Hop : globalization, revolution, and popular culture / M. T. Kato.  
p. cm. — (SUNY series, explorations in postcolonial studies)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN-13: 978-0-7914-6991-0 (hardcover : alk. paper)

ISBN-13: 978-0-7914-6992-7 (pbk. : alk. paper)

1. Popular culture. 2. Mass media and culture. 3. Mass media—Social aspects. 4. Kung fu.  
5. Lee, Bruce, 1940–1973. 6. Hip-hop. 7. Hendrix, Jimi. 8. Globalization. I. Title. II. Series.

CB430.K38 2007  
306.4—dc22

2006010146

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

*For Li'a and her ancestral spirits*

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## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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This book is inspired by the ongoing decolonization struggle of Kanaka Maoli (which means “true human being” in the Hawaiian language) or Native Hawaiians. During my academic residence in Hawai‘i, my involvement in campus and community activism led me to the frontline of Kanaka Maoli nonviolent struggles to protect their cultural, religious, ancestral, and living space from destruction, in confrontation with the armed occupying forces of the colonial power. This experience deeply affected my scholarly pursuit. I began to see culture, art, music, creativity, spirituality, affect, joy, and communal identity as an integral part of social transformation. After encountering difficulties in finding a relevant field in academia, I realized that the entire nation of Hawai‘i was an open university for my quest.

I was fortunate to have revolutionary Kanaka Maoli as my mentors during their time in this world, such as Kawaipuna Prejean, Thomas Maunupau Jr., Kamakahukilani von Oelhofen, and Didi Malie Lee Kwai. Through their actions, they taught me the importance of music, art, humor, aloha, militancy, joy, and sharing in resistance and social transformation.

My doctoral dissertation committee at the Department of Political Science, University of Hawai‘i at Manoa, allowed me to pursue this unorthodox study. My committee chair, Manfred Henningsen, and committee member Michael Shapiro helped foster my growth in political theory and philosophy. Together with the rest of the committee members, Peter Manicas, Alvin So, and Nevzat Soguk, they continue to support my scholarship even after graduation. The Department of Political Science also granted me a postdoctoral academic residence between 2000–2001 to facilitate the revision of my dissertation into a book manuscript.

The conversion of my dissertation into this book format could not have taken place without Arif Dirlik. Since he saw potential in my dissertation, he guided me through the entire process of writing a book manuscript. Also, through him I gained a chance to interact with other scholars and professionals who helped raise the level of my academic engagement. I thank Laikwan

Pang, Kwai-Cheung Lo, and Ching Hay Deng; Kirk Denton and the reviewers for *Modern Chinese Literature and Culture*; Mathew Hammon and a reviewer for Rowman & Littlefield for their criticism, encouragement, and inspiration.

Scholars, artists, and professionals provided assistance in the final stage of manuscript preparation. My gratitude goes to Jane Bunker, Larin McLaughlin, Diane Ganeles, Ryan Hacker, Michael Campochiaro, and the reviewers for the State University of New York Press, David J. Clarke, Allan Koss, Cope 2, Naomi Pritchard, Ron Dorfman, Shi Young, Bruce Behnke, Jordan “Iyaform” Pezel, and Penny Hirata-Knight.

Friends, mentors, comrades, colleagues, groups, and institutions who nurtured the growth of my work from a dissertation are: Kekuni Blaisdell, Noenoe Silva, Leandra Wai, Eric Po’ohina, Ras Karif, Taharba Essadi, Doug Margolis, Umi Perkins, Kawika Lam, Kealoha Pisciotta, Hanaloa Helelā, Hee-jong “Ichard” Sears, Karla Kral, Sulubika, Joy Ahn, Cornerstone Rockers, Pete Shimazaki Doktor, Doug Kuo, Kelly Kraemer, Richard Salvador, John Pincent, Tony Castanha, Katherine Waddell-Takara, Tim Baltzar, H’lane Resincoff, Thalia DeMott, Karen Taira Murray, Thumper, Aloha Liberation Front, Palani Kelly, Nichole Field, Liloa Dunn, Peter Miller, Val Johnston, Konrad Ng, Lilia McGuire, all my past students from the University of Hawai’i system, KTUH, Refuse and Resist Hawai’i, Revolution Books, University YWCA of Hawai’i, and others. Ikaika Hussey, April Durham, and Elssonne Baley carefully read my manuscript and gave me valuable comments and suggestions.

Finally, the affection and support of my family made this book possible. I thank my parents, Masaji and Michiko Kato, who gave me life and opportunities to spread the message of peace from Hiroshima. I am greatly indebted to my ‘Ohana from here in Hawai’i, Teale, Leong, and Gorai families for their unconditional love. I thank Noa Helelā, Li’a, and Lā’ie for their patience, understanding, and accommodation, and my spouse Laulani Teale for being a positive companion in this journey, sharing the workload as well as the emotional ups and downs involved in writing. With all the help and support I got from numerous individuals and institutions, I am solely responsible for any deficiency and errors in this book.

The photograph on page 35 is reprinted from James Yin and Shi Young, *The Rape of Nanking: An Undeniable History in Photographs* (Chicago: Innovative Publishing Group, 1996). I thank the editor, Ron Dorfman, for permission to reprint.

A shorter and condensed version of chapter 2, “Burning Asia: Bruce Lee’s Kinetic Narrative of Decolonization,” was first published in *Modern Chinese Literature and Culture* 17. 1 (2005) and is reprinted here with permission.

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## INTRODUCTION

### ON POPULAR CULTURAL REVOLUTION

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“If I Can’t Dance, I Don’t Want To Be In Your Revolution.” This quote attributed to Emma Goldman, circulates as “buttons, posters, banners, T-shirts, bumper stickers, and in books and articles”<sup>1</sup> in the sphere of cultural commodities, quite similar to the circulation of the popular cultural icons. According to Alix Kates Shulman, the famous quote is indeed a result of the conversion of Goldman’s philosophy into a T-shirt design, for which Shulman herself was partly responsible. Asked by an activist for a photo image of Goldman along with her phrase or slogan to print T-shirts for a fundraiser at the celebration marking the end of the Vietnam War, Shulman offered him a passage from Goldman’s biography, *Living My Life*.

The passage Shulman chose deals with Goldman’s introspective thoughts at the dances—today’s equivalent of raves, concerts, or park jams—where she was “one of the most untiring and gayest.”<sup>2</sup> On one evening, Goldman’s dance was interrupted by her comrade, Alexander Berkman, who criticized her behavior as “undignified for one who was on the way to become a force in the anarchist movement” and that her “frivolity would only hurt the Cause.”<sup>3</sup> In response, Goldman refutes Berkman, which inspired the genesis of the slogan:

I grew furious at the impudent interference of the boy. I told him to mind his own business, I was tired of having the Cause constantly thrown into my face. I did not believe that a Cause which stood for a beautiful ideal, for anarchism, for release and freedom from conventions and prejudice, should demand the denial of life and joy. I insisted that our Cause could not expect me to become a nun and that the movement should not be turned into a cloister. If it meant that, I did not want it. “I want freedom,



the right to self-expression, everybody's right to beautiful, radiant things." Anarchism meant that to me, and I would live it in spite of the whole world—prisons, persecution, everything.<sup>4</sup>

If one can say, in a somewhat stereotypical way, that the stoicism of Berkman represents the traditional left's approach to revolution, Goldman's insistence on the totality of revolution finds her coconspirator in an emerging subjectivity of the global popular movement, which David Solnit calls, a "new radicalism."<sup>5</sup> Surfaced on the radar of the international public and media at the "Battle of Seattle" in 1999, which shut down the proceedings of the World Trade Organization, the "new radicalism" is partly the deterritorialization of the Zapatista's struggle to transcend globalization or neoliberalism: the planetary recolonization by transnational capital and radical undermining of national sovereignty by supranational multilateral polity. Solnit gives a poetic definition to the "new radicalism" that suits the paradigm it represents:

The new radicalism is a movement of movements, a network of networks, not merely intent on changing the world, but—as the Zapatistas describe—making a new one in which many worlds will fit. It is a patchwork quilt of hope sewn together with countless hands, actions, songs, e-mails, and dreams into a whole that is much greater than the sum of its pieces.<sup>6</sup>

I am quite certain that the new radicalism would be a great dance partner for Goldman in the groove of revolution. The undercurrent of subjectivity that runs from Goldman to the global popular movement is a new paradigm where revolution pivots not so much on taking the power of the dominant institution as on reconstruction of society based on radical affirmation of desire and life force both on collective and individual levels. This eros or passion of revolution, as it were, is what became condensed in the form of a T-shirt design. And the Goldman T-shirt itself corresponds to the structural position that the popular cultural revolution, the central theme of this book, occupies in the totality of revolution.

The circulation of the popular cultural revolution, such as the kung fu films and hip hop culture discussed here, takes place primarily in the global cultural commodity market as a deviant by-product of the mass consumer culture. The popular cultural revolution arises from the historical context in which the commodity culture constitutes the infrastructure of communication among the masses, as C. L. R. James in his *American Civilization* observed of the culture of the Fordist mode of production in early 1950:

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During the last thirty years, *mass production* has created a vast populace, literate, technically trained, conscious of itself and of its inherent right to enjoy all the possibilities of the society to the extent of its means. No such social force has existed in any society with such ideas and aspirations since the citizens of Athens and the farmers around trooped into the city to see the plays of Euripides, Sophocles, and Aeschylus and decides on the prize-winners by their votes. The modern populace decides not by votes but by the tickets it buys and the money it pays. The result has been a new extension of aesthetic premises.<sup>7</sup>

Thanks to the progressive aesthetic expressions generated in already semiautonomous subcultures, the popular culture gains its potential for producing affects, aesthetic values, and communal identities autonomously, right in the reproduction process of capitalist social relationship. Accordingly, the mass's appropriation of the progressive aesthetics of popular cultural revolution can render the commodity to "speak" for itself against the grain of its commodity identity, similar to how Luce Irigaray demonstrates that women's autonomy undermines its imposed identity as a commodity: "For such actions turn out to be totally subversive to the economy of exchange among subjects."<sup>8</sup>

The popular cultural revolution thus offers a space in which autonomous subjectivity alternative to the dominant mode can be constructed. In the latest stage of capitalist modernity or globalization, according to Julio Mogel, the dominant subject takes on a mechanical mode based on:

the homogenizing logic of perspective which views social subjects (society, civil society and so on) not as fabric(s) of inter-subjectivities (obviously different and revitalized by their own interaction), but instead as joints of a mechanically existing body, whose reproduction is regulated "from outside" by the market.<sup>9</sup>

The mechanical mode of subjectivity is viable due to, as Frederic Jameson argues, the capitalist "penetration and colonization" of the "Unconscious" by the "rise of media and the advertisement."<sup>10</sup> Jameson's use of the term *colonization* is very significant in my discussion here as it enables us to see globalization as the latest stage of colonization,<sup>11</sup> not only in terms of territorial, economic, and political domination but also in terms of the domination over imagery and aesthetics. The popular cultural revolution therefore is also a decolonization struggle transcending the mechanical subjectivity of the globalization. Given that the popular cultural revolution in discussion here has its roots in the Third World popular culture, the decolonization struggle in the sphere of aesthetics is closely entwined with the struggle to attain an

autonomous sphere of existence from imperialism and transnational capital in the social field. Particularly, the constitution of progressive artistic expressions assumes a representative expression of the social movement of decolonization. As Kenneth Burke remarks: “Aesthetical values are intermingled with ethical values—and ethical is the basis of practical. . . . Probably for this reason, even the most practical of revolution will generally be found to have manifested itself in the ‘aesthetic’ sphere.”<sup>12</sup>

Further transcending Burke’s implicit distinction between the aesthetic and practical spheres, Jimi Hendrix sees the alternative horizon of communication conceived as the interface of affect and the aesthetic dimension of reality. In response to the question (by Dick Cavett) “Do you think music has a meaning?” Hendrix spells out such a new mode of communication:

Oh yes, definitely. It’s got to be more spiritually so than anything. Pretty soon I believe that we’re gonna have to rely on music to like get some kind of peace of mind, satisfaction or direction, actually. More so than politics. Because like politics is really an ego scene, you know. That’s how I look at it anyway. It’s one big fat ego scene, for instance. (“Ego scene?”) Oh Yeah it’s the art of words which means nothing, you know. So therefore we have to rely on more of an earthier substance, like, music, theater, acting, painting. . . .<sup>13</sup>

Hendrix’s concept of an alternative mode of communication and cognition, projected on the futurity of human communication, allows us to approach the affective mode of communication that forms the basis of decolonization from the power of global modernity. The affective mode of communication has particular relevance to the domain of the unconscious, as it has a great potential in establishing an autonomous sphere in the unconscious, thereby turning it into a liberated zone.

The colonization by the rational subjectivity of modernity, for instance, is problematized by the affective mode of communication. Audre Lorde finds the affect involved in poetics as an alternative paradigm to the so-called Cartesian subjectivity in Descartes’ famous axiom (i.e., *Cogito, ergo sum*):

The white fathers told us: I think, therefore I am. The Black mother within each of us—the poet—whispers in our dreams: I feel, therefore, I can be free. Poetry coins the language to express and charter this revolutionary demand, the implementation of that freedom.<sup>14</sup>

When Lorde talks about “I feel, therefore, I can be free,” the “I” that can free itself from any constraints through affect clearly departs from Descartes’ “I” as

a rationalized sense of being. It opens an alternative mode of flexible and mobile subjectivity which is singular yet collective, transcending the rigid boundaries of subject formation under the gaze of modernity. The transcending tendency of subjectivity based on affect seems to stem from the intersubjective (or even para-subjective) nature of affect, according to a revolutionary psychoanalyst, Félix Guattari: “affect is . . . essentially a pre-personal category, installed ‘before’ the circumscription of identities, and manifested by unlocatable transferences, unlocatable with regard to their origin as well as with regard to their destination.”<sup>15</sup> Affect, however, is neither asocial nor ahistorical ether. On the contrary, Guattari argues that it allows our access to “highly enriching existential truths.”<sup>16</sup>

Guattari’s assertion is corroborated by the artists who engage in the affective mode of communication, such as Janis Joplin, who states: “Playing is about feeling. It’s about letting yourself feel all those things you have inside of you.”<sup>17</sup> The affective mode of communication therefore can be a door to a singular yet collective experience, which is rendered unnamable or undefinable in the dominant mode of communication. Whether through artistic expression and/or shamanic mediation, affect could realize the articulation of social, historical, and perhaps cosmic context of being in a raw form that is communicated through the aesthetic media of sound, rhythm, kinetic movement, color, et cetera.<sup>18</sup>

Such totality of experience, grasped by the affective mode of communication is what John Coltrane felt in his artistic expression. Asked about his encounter with Malcolm X and its impact on his art, Coltrane touches on the eloquence and depth of his artistic expression: “Well, I think that music, being an expression of the human heart, or of the human being itself, does express just what is happening. I feel it expresses the whole thing—the whole of human experience at the particular time that it is being expressed.”<sup>19</sup> Like Coltrane’s “Alabama” (1963),<sup>20</sup> which captured the social contradiction that erupted in an instance during the civil rights and Black Power struggles (i.e., the bombing of the Black church in Alabama in which four young Black girls were killed), his artistic communication through affect could materialize, in Guattari’s term, the “means of expression that take an immediate, an immediately comprehensible form.”<sup>21</sup> The power of affect, however, goes beyond communicating contradiction or problems: when the communication takes place through affect, it simultaneously involves transformation or rearrangement of the dominant definition of reality, akin to the transformative aspect of voodoo that creates an altered state of reality. Coltrane’s “Alabama,” which is “based on the cadences of Martin Luther King’s speech about that tragedy,”<sup>22</sup> is a melodic ballad with a characteristic ending in a rising note, similar to that of

Billy Holiday's "Strange Fruit" (1939),<sup>23</sup> giving the tune a feeling of phoenix-like rebirth. Coltrane's "Alabama" thus transcends not only tragedy but also grief, anger, and condemnation. It thus helps listeners to reorient themselves to the liberation and reconstruction as a solution to the problem.

The transformative aspect of affect, as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri point out, has significantly to do with the fact that affective labor *directly* constructs the social relationships unmediated by the dominant institutions.<sup>24</sup> This unmediated and autonomous production of social relationships, made possible by affect, relates to Lorde's poetic redefinition of "freedom." The poetics of freedom here is immediate to the sense of being, experienced through an autonomous body, simultaneously on an individual and collective level. It is the actualization of liberation in the here and now, neither conditioned nor bound by dialectic, telos, vanguardism, language, or other types of institutionalization. As I will be presenting in what is to follow, the kine-aesthetic of Bruce Lee, the sound aesthetic of Jimi Hendrix, and the stylistic evolution of hip hop—as a progressive representative of the popular cultural revolution—create an immediate sphere of freedom. Thus the popular cultural revolution engages itself in channeling the individual and collective desires into immediate construction of a new social relationship, mode of communication, perception, and cognition, alternative to those imposed by the dominant institutions.<sup>25</sup>

In terms of periodization, I look at the late 1960s (1967 to be more specific) as the emergence of the popular cultural revolutions to be discussed here. This time frame coincides with the rise of student movements and also of a new type of social movement on the one hand and the rise of the power of multinational capital on the other hand. Chapters 1 and 2 discuss the kung fu cultural revolution and Bruce Lee's kine-aesthetic of liberation and their reverberation with the decolonization struggles in Asia. Bruce Lee's and other Hong Kong kung fu films will be the primary text in these first two chapters. In terms of political themes, those chapters cover the transition from imperialism and colonialism to neo-imperialism and neocolonialism as an incipient stage of globalization as well as the transition from anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggles to a nascent form of antiglobalization movements.

In chapters 3 and 4, I delve into the dynamics of power and subversion under global capitalism congealed in the makeup of *Enter the Dragon* as a global commodity. In chapter 3, the thrust of the kung fu cultural revolution and Bruce Lee's progressive artistic expressions are juxtaposed with the subversive ethos of the counterculture and its representative artistic expressions by Jimi Hendrix. Chapter 4 entails my attempt to configure the social subject of decolonization in the context of globalization, through deciphering

how the ethos of kung fu cultural revolution contested the aesthetics and narratives of transnationality, whereby it spawned a symbolic autonomous space within the construct of global commodity. I will demonstrate that such autonomous space is a symbolic expression of the then-emerging popular movements in the Third World in resisting and transcending the global recolonization by the transnational power (i.e., the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund).

Chapter 5 introduces the latest form of popular cultural revolution, hip hop culture, into discussion. Focusing on the affinity between hip hop aesthetics and Bruce Lee's martial concept of *Jeet Kune Do*, which was featured prominently in his unfinished film *Game of Death*, I will explore the revolutionary aesthetics that produce autonomous space, communal pleasure, and identity, in sum, a symbolic liberated zone. In the conclusion, the conceptual paradigm presented by the popular cultural revolution will be juxtaposed with the unfolding process of the social subject of decolonization in the latest context of globalization from the Zapatsita (EZLN) movement to the proliferating global popular movements or the "new radicalism" beyond the "Battle of Seattle."

The themes developed in each chapter are designed to follow, though roughly, a chronological order both in the areas of political-economic background and in the development of popular cultural revolution. In addition, the chapters will follow the order of Bruce Lee's films from *The Big Boss* (*Fists of Fury* in the United States, 1971), *Fist of Fury* (a.k.a. *The Chinese Connection* in the United States, 1972), *The Way of the Dragon* (a.k.a. *The Return of the Dragon*, 1972), *Enter the Dragon* (1973, 1997), and the reconstructed *Game of Death/Bruce Lee: A Warrior's Journey* (2001).<sup>26</sup> Although *Game of Death* was shot prior to Lee's involvement with *Enter the Dragon*, the reconstructed version released in this millennium revealed that it contained the most progressive aesthetic and philosophical explorations in Lee's works that echoed the latest form of popular cultural revolution. For this reason, I placed my analysis of *Game of Death* in the final chapter of this book, which befits the thematic order in chronological succession. Moreover, in the manner of *Game of Death*, five chapters can also be seen as a five-storied pagoda in which each floor reveals a theme in an evolutionary process of ascent. Accordingly, I attempt to engage in a freestyle scholarship, or academic *Jeet Kune Do*, going beyond schools of thought and disciplines in chapter 5 and the conclusion.

Needless to say, I am tracing just a few among many streams of popular cultural revolution in this book. Thus the focus here is not meant to exclude other instances, representative figures, and perspectives (i.e., gender, race, sexuality, etc.). Rather, by presenting certain types of popular culture and modes

of expression with which my life has intersected, I hope my particular approach here would help stimulate the growth of a forum on the revolutionary significance of popular culture.

Finally, in order to introduce chapter 1, I must address the colonization of the unconscious in a specific context of the cinematic mode of colonization. The Ethiopian-born Haile Gerima, a highly acclaimed director of decolonizing cinema (e.g., *Sankofa* [1993]), recounts his childhood encounter with the cinematic mode of colonization of the unconscious:

In fact, as kids, we tried to act out the things we had seen in the movies. We used to play cowboys and Indians in the mountains around Gondar. . . . We acted out the roles of these heroes, identifying with the cowboys conquering the Indians. We didn't identify with the Indians at all and we never wanted the Indians to win. Even in Tarzan movies, we would become totally galvanized by the activities of the hero and follow the story from his point of view, completely caught up in the structure of the story. Whenever Africans sneaked up behind Tarzan, we would scream our heads off, trying to warn him that "they" were coming.<sup>27</sup>

To apply Kenyan writer Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'O's perspective on the colonization and decolonization of the "mental universe" to cinematic colonization,<sup>28</sup> the decolonization in the cinematic mode necessitates reconstruction of vernacular imagery, narrative, and mode of reception, which can transcend the colonial imagery imposed upon the colonized. Similarly, the genesis of the kung fu cultural revolution lies in the need of Asian masses for their representative expressions in the historical context where Japanese cultural industry waged a neo-imperialist invasion in the unconscious of the Asian people.

CHAPTER ONE

KUNG FU CULTURAL REVOLUTION  
AND JAPANESE IMPERIALISM

---

We have no nation without a fight against those who oppress us. We have no culture but a culture born out of our resistance to oppression.

—Linda Harrison

With the power of hindsight, the proclamation of a popular cultural revolution, which swept the world from Hong Kong, can be traced back to Bruce Lee's statement on *gung fu* (Cantonese spelling of kung fu) made in 1965 when the term was virtually unknown to the rest of the world. A few years prior to the official outbreak of the revolution in Hong Kong, Lee happened to be interviewed by the Twentieth Century Fox studio as part of the screen test for an actor skilled in the "Oriental" martial arts. At this occasion, Lee in effect unleashed the power of ancient Chinese martial arts by removing the veil of hitherto kept secrecy:

Well, gung fu is originated in China. It is the ancestor of karate and jujitsu. It's more of a complete system and it's more fluid. . . . (What's the difference between a gung fu punch and a karate punch?) A karate punch is like an iron bar—"whack!" A gung fu punch is like an iron chain with an iron ball attached to the end, and it go[es] "wang!" and it hurt[s] inside.<sup>1</sup>

This screen test, which ultimately led Lee to his debut in Hollywood as Kato in *The Green Hornet* (1966–1967), was a by-product of his first appearance at a U.S. karate tournament. Consistent with his pedagogic activities in the field



of martial arts, Lee also demonstrated various forms of kung fu from diverse schools, such as Praying Mantis and White Crane, on the screen. His demonstration also included what appeared to be quite eccentric movements to unfamiliar eyes, the theatrical movements of the warrior and scholar figures of the Cantonese opera. The effortlessness shown in Lee's demonstration of operatic figures came from the fact that his father, Li Hoi-chuen, was a noted actor of the opera both on stage and screen. In fact, it was during his troupe's overseas tour on the West Coast that Li Hoi-chuen's Eurasian wife, Grace, gave birth to Bruce Lee in San Francisco.

Another noted Cantonese opera star, a contemporary of Lee's father, Kwan Tak-hing, is considered to be one of the progenitors of the kung fu film genre. Kwan earned national recognition first as a real-life patriotic heroic figure for dedicating his talent to the war of resistance against Japan during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945).<sup>2</sup> Kwan's bent for playing righteous martial arts characters in the opera and his real-life commitment to defend the nation converged in his main role in the film series of Wong Fei-hung, a Cantonese hero, launched in 1949. Wong Fei-hung from Guangdong Province is a legendary master of martial arts as well as Chinese medicine, who taught his disciples not only to defend themselves "but to protect their communities from thugs and foreign bullies."<sup>3</sup> The series lasted more than two decades, producing ninety-nine films of classic values and thereby establishing the foundation of kung fu movies as a genre.<sup>4</sup> Its enduring legacy and popularity can be gauged by the number of remakes such as Lau Kar-Leong's *Drunken Master 2* (1994, 2000), featuring Jackie Chan, and Tsui Hark's *Once Upon a Time in China* series (1991–1993), featuring Jet Li.

The Cantonese tradition of the kung fu film genre therefore provided a launching pad for Shaw Brothers' mass production of martial arts films, which catered to the Mandarin cinema circuit. From the mid-1960s, the Shaw Brothers' onslaught of kung fu movies began with swordplay action films (or *wuxia*) such as *Come Drink With Me* (1965), directed by King Hu, and *The One Armed Swordsman* (1967), directed by Chang Che, which featured Wang Yu (or Jimmy Wang Yu).<sup>5</sup> Wang Yu attained Hong Kong's kung fu stardom before Bruce Lee's reentry. *The Chinese Boxer* (1970), which Wang Yu both directed and starred in, consolidated the paradigm of the kung fu cultural revolution, which embraced the theme of struggle against Japanese imperialism as a narrative staple, the image of a lone hero as a protagonist, and the fistfight as an action format.

Despite the fact that the films were made primarily for Mandarin-speaking communities, the outbreak of the kung fu cultural revolution reflected major social upheavals that were taking place in Hong Kong. In

1966, what started as a lone hunger strike against the ferry fare increase quickly developed into mass demonstrations and riots in defiance against the colonial political structure.<sup>6</sup> Instigated by the Cultural Revolution in the People's Republic of China (PRC), the mass movement in the following year took a more militant form, involving organized industrial strikes, confrontations with the police force, and mass demonstrations.<sup>7</sup> However, it eventually degenerated into assassinations and indiscriminate bombings that claimed innocent lives.<sup>8</sup> Consequently, the mass movement of 1967 ended up alienating its mass base from organized antisystemic social movements. Nevertheless, the heightened political consciousness of the Hong Kong masses continued to thrive in demands for political reforms in colonial administration.<sup>9</sup> Distinct among those demands was the use of Chinese as an official language initiated by university students, which subsequently led to a surge in the student-led nationalist movement in the early 1970s. The culmination of the nationalist movement was the "Defend Diaoyutai Movement," which emerged in protest against the Japanese occupation of the Diaoyutai Islands near the northeast coast of Taiwan.<sup>10</sup> Benjamin K. P. Leung sums up the general sentiment of the movement:

To the student activists in Hong Kong, whose nationalist sentiments had already been awakened by the 1967 riots and the ongoing Cultural Revolution in China, Japan's territorial claim signified a revival of Japanese militarism and this invoked the memories of Japan's invasion of China during World War II.<sup>11</sup>

As the 1971 protest rally turned into a violent clash with the police force, the nationalist movement "developed into a campaign against the colonial establishment in Hong Kong" such as the anticorruption campaign of 1973.<sup>12</sup> The irrepressible decolonizing desire of the Hong Kong masses situated in a peculiar colonial condition thus gave birth to the popular cultural revolution, the kung fu cultural revolution.

What made the kung fu film boom during the late 1960s and early 1970s a popular cultural revolution instead of a mere commercial celebration of Chinese nationalism was the allegory of the imperial and colonial power and decolonization struggles. Cast in the kung fu dialectic of power relationships, in which "imperialists" or "foreigners" and the "Chinese collaborators" are designated as antagonists and the natives as protagonists, the Chinese national identity assumes a political agency in opposition to the colonial power structure, representing the people in their quest for social justice. Thus the nationalism of kung fu cinema conjured up an empowering political

agency for resisting the colonial order rather than nationhood in an abstract sense. It naturally developed into a well-spring of inspiration for the Third World masses and other oppressed people. Such progressive and universal potentials of the kung fu cultural revolution particularly came to the fore with the entry of Bruce Lee.

Lee became an actor at the age of three months and continued his career after the family settled back in Hong Kong until he was eighteen years old, appearing in twenty films.<sup>13</sup> Popularly known as Li Siu Lung (Lee Little Dragon), Bruce Lee's child and juvenile actor career intersected with yet another tradition of Cantonese cinema, the family melodrama with socially didactic themes (i.e., filial piety, friendship, and community).<sup>14</sup> Therefore, Lee's participation in kung fu cinema meant that the Hong Kong masses could now locate their true representative in the popular cultural revolution, as they did with Wong Fei-hung. Indeed, Lee's first kung fu film, *The Big Boss/Tang Shan Dai Xiong* (1971), out-grossed *The Sound of Music* as Hong Kong's all-time box office record.<sup>15</sup> It is, however, his second film, *Fist of Fury/Jing Wu Men* (1972), that boosted the political fervor of the kung fu cultural revolution. Directed by Lo Wei and produced by then-emerging Golden Harvest, *Fist of Fury* straightforwardly deals with the history of Japanese colonialism in a close-to-life context, with realistic combat choreography. The cataclysmic affect of the film upon the people under colonial subjugation was instantly and dramatically visible. When Robert Clouse, the director of Lee's later film *Enter the Dragon*, sat down in the theater with Bruce Lee as his interpreter, he witnessed the intense "voodoo" theater of decolonization, as the Hong Kong masses identified with the film with unparalleled passion:

At one point in the film, he [Bruce Lee] said the Japanese toughs were telling the member of Chinese dojo [*sic*] the Chinese were the "sick people of Asia." Silence. You could hear the bus traffic on Nathan Road outside the theater. . . . Bruce—as the character Chen Chen—went to the Japanese headquarters to confront the murderous villains. He single-handedly laid waste to the entire organization, sending the audience to hysteria. . . . Following a dramatic pause he said, "The Chinese are not the sick people of Asia." Pandemonium! Everyone rose to his [*sic*] feet. Wave upon wave of earsplitting sound rolled up to the balcony. The seats were humming and the floor of the old balcony was shaking!<sup>16</sup>

Such a phenomenal mode of reception was by no means limited to the people of Hong Kong. In the Philippines, for instance, *Fist of Fury* ran non-stop for more than six months, prompting the government to impose import restrictions on foreign films.<sup>17</sup> Phil Ochs, an American folk singer, also encountered

the Filipino audience's passionate involvement with the film, a total theater experience akin to the description given by Clouse.<sup>18</sup> In Singapore, in the meantime, the opening night of *Fist of Fury* paralyzed the city in the "country's first film traffic jam."<sup>19</sup>

The unprecedented transcultural popularity of *Fist of Fury* in Asia and Third World countries, beyond the confinement of the Chinese cultural world, can be attributed to the originality of Bruce Lee. His artistic expression arguably represents the most progressive and innovative component of the kung fu cultural revolution. In order to capture the original, hence autonomous, thrust of Lee's artistic expression, the context of the kung fu cultural revolution needs to be defined. Using *Fist of Fury* as an exemplar text, this chapter focuses on the constitutional aspect of the kung fu cultural revolution.

Whereas most films of the kung fu cultural revolution suffer from an elusive contextualization, *Fist of Fury* is packed with historical and social references providing a definitive historical and structural context to the theme of Japanese villainy.<sup>20</sup> Upon such a foundation, the symbolism and allegory in *Fist of Fury* not only link the film with the historical instances that betray the reality of Japanese imperialism but also contest the symbolic kernel of imperialist culture. Through an in-depth analysis of *Fist of Fury* in historical and social context (including Lee's biographical context) I will approach the universal paradigm of kung fu revolution as a popular aesthetic of decolonization. It is the aesthetic that is rooted in the people's historical response to the crisis in Asia brought by becoming imperialist of Japan.

#### DIALECTIC OF KUNG FU AND SAMURAI

The Shaw Brothers' empire, which reigned over the Hong Kong film industry through the 1960s and 1970s, originated in the Shao (original spelling of "Shaw Brothers," as they were later known) family's business in Shanghai. C. W. Shaw, the eldest of the six brothers, invested in a small theater in Shanghai to showcase Chinese modern drama, *wenmingxi* (civilized drama), in the early 1920s.<sup>21</sup> C. W.'s association with Shanghai filmmakers led to the establishment of Tianyi Film Company in the mid-1920s. Soon after Tianyi's inauguration, two of C. W.'s brothers (Runme and Run Run) were sent to Singapore and Malaya (now known as Malaysia) to create a market in Southeast Asia. C. W.'s encounter with a Cantonese opera theater troupe in Shanghai gave him an idea of producing the first Cantonese talkie, entitled *White Gold Dragon* (1933), which turned out to be a phenomenal success in Hong Kong, Macao, and Southeast Asia. Following the success of *White Gold*

*Dragon*, C. W. and Runme moved to Hong Kong to consolidate their studio, which elevated the Shaws to “a major force in Cantonese film production in Hong Kong.”<sup>22</sup> After a period of setbacks during the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong and Singapore (1941–1945), the Shaws reorganized their business and began distributing not only Chinese movies but also foreign films from the United States, England, France, and India.<sup>23</sup>

The postwar Hong Kong film industry, in the meantime, was dominated by the legacy of the Shanghai émigré who came during the war to produce the films of resistance to Japan.<sup>24</sup> However, this “leftist” Mandarin film tradition, characterized by social didactic themes, waned due to a dwindled market in mainland China and to a counter-ideological attack from the KMT and American-sponsored “rightist” film companies.<sup>25</sup> In place of the social didacticism and ideological debate, the apolitical Shaw Brothers and the Motion Picture and General Investment (MP and GI), run by the Malaysian mogul Loke Wan Tho, emerged to take hold of the Hong Kong film industry. Their preeminence can be attributed to a pure entertainment orientation, a vertically integrated studio system, and a Singapore base that covered the Southeast Asian market.

Run Run Shaw’s (the sixth brother) move from the Singapore headquarters to Hong Kong to establish Shaw Brothers in 1957 signaled the coming of a monopoly empire.<sup>26</sup> Run Run successfully welded the Fordist mass production structure into a tightly controlled patriarchal family business organization. The Asian despotic mass production exuded its philosophy on the screen, as well as in its infrastructure. Shaw Brothers’ production formula bore a close resemblance to that of the 1950s’ Hollywood musicals in its detachment from social reality, and in a glorification of materialism flaunted in lavish costumes and elaborate staging. The formulaic escape to a pseudo-historical fantasyland proved successful when its *The Kingdom and Beauty* (1959) claimed the Grand Prix at the Asian Film Festival.<sup>27</sup> Shaw Brothers’ Movietown, a mega-studio complex completed in 1961, embodied the acme of the Fordist (and Taylorist) factory system, in which the management exerted complete control over not only the production, but also the reproduction of the labor force. Enclosed in this forty-six-acre lot perched on the hillside of Clearwater Bay were outdoor and indoor sets, processing laboratories, preview rooms, manufacturing workshops of bolts and nuts, dorms for actors and actresses, and even its own talent school.<sup>28</sup>

As Run Run himself admits, his grand cinematic opera with its Chinese classical formula lasted only up to 1964.<sup>29</sup> A new trend was surging through the Asian film market: Japanese-made samurai movies. As soon as the post-war ban on samurai films imposed by the U.S. occupying forces was lifted,

Japan resumed its production with much vigor. The trend was epitomized by Akira Kurosawa's *Seven Samurai* (1954), which earned international acclaim. Between 1961 and 1962, the production of samurai films reached its apex where forty new titles were streamed from the Kyoto fantasy factory.<sup>30</sup> The outpouring of samurai movies into the Asian market took place against the background of Japan's postwar economic expansion, facilitated by the politics of aid.

Under the guise of war reparations, Japan's government renewed its investment into East and Southeast Asia from 1955 to 1968 (with the exception of North Korea, North Vietnam, and China), in sync with U.S. military advancement in the same region.<sup>31</sup> In other words, the Japanese government lay the groundwork for new market and investment opportunities for Japanese corporations. Since the mid-1960s, therefore, the entire region of Asia has come to confront the fierce force of "Japan Inc.": an inundation of "made in Japan" goods in the market, transfer of polluting factories, and direct investment in the development of commerce and mega infrastructure.

Within this political context of Japan's postwar expansionism, we can now decipher the ideological aspect of samurai movies. Samurai is a warrior class of Japan's feudal era, which lasted for more than a millennium. Since the consolidation of a centralized power structure by Tokugawa Shogun (1603–1867), the samurai class became superfluous, constituting a vast reserve army. With the dissolution of the samurai class in the modern era, according to Hiroshi Yoshioka, the image of "samurai" has come to assume a simulacrum of dominant selfhood, "a dummy to confront the Western subject."<sup>32</sup> Viewed from this angle, the postwar mass production of samurai movies can be interpreted as Japan's postwar reconstruction of nationalism in the popular aesthetic sphere. The exportation of samurai movies to Asia, accordingly, underscores Japan's quest for cultural hegemony in Asia, based on the colonization of the unconscious by the imagery of the imperialist subject.

While the West was fascinated with Kurosawa's stylistics, the Asian cultural market was inundated with B-grade samurai movies. Most popular among them was the *Blind Swordsman* (*Zato-ichi* in Japanese) series (1962–1973). Being a blind masseur, an outcast, *Zato-ichi* appears to be a marginal figure in the samurai genre. Yet his true identity as a supernatural swordsman is revealed in the combat situation, at the moment where the *katana*/sword is drawn from his cane sheath. Aesthetically, *Zato-ichi*'s speedy and economized annihilation of multiple assailants was the core of the film's appeal and intrigue to the Asian masses. The invasion of the technologically renovated image of samurai into Asia, paradoxically, gave an opportunity for the Hong Kong film industry to reinvigorate its tradition of the martial arts

genre and to revive its nationalistic tone in order to let the other side of the story be told. With the outreach of the Mandarin cinema market over East and Southeast Asia, production of such films could provide the Asian masses (beyond the Chinese world) with a representative expression and in return invigorate the Hong Kong film industry as their spokesperson for vernacular imagery.

*The One Armed Swordsman/Du Bi Dao* (1967), according to Run Run Shaw's definition, is "the first film that could be called a kung fu film."<sup>33</sup> It indeed marked the germination of the "kung fu paradigm" in response to the colonial imagery of samurai films. The "one armed-ness" of the one armed swordsman points to the film's apparent intertextual reference to the blind swordsman's disability. In the construction of "disability," however, *The One Armed Swordsman* inscribes its distinct kung fu identity upon the dominant image currency.

Ultimately, the blind swordsman's "blindness" is a disguise for his "supernatural power," with which he could single-handedly annihilate a multitude of opponents. His "blindness," hence, is an inverted expression of mythical power of the samurai and *katana*: the superiority of blind swordsman is veiled, yet exists a priori. On the other hand, the one armed-ness of the one armed swordsman merely marks the re-starting point for a martial artist who lost his arm in an accident caused by his *sifu's* (teacher) daughter. The plot revolves around the protagonist's struggle to attain excellence through self-discipline, aided by a young peasant woman who saved him, nourished him back to health, and passed to him a scroll on sword-fighting given to her by her father. The climax involves his successful fight against the school's enemy in order to defend the honor of his school, his *sifu*, and his father, who sacrificed his life to save the school. The superiority of *The One Armed Swordsman*, therefore, is derived from the toil, perseverance, respect for the traditional wisdom embodied in the scroll, and support of loved ones. It is the real, not the mythology, that endows the narrative. In other words, *The One Armed Swordsman* reflects the life, history, and social relationships of the common people.

The end of the 1960s saw a heightened intensity in Japan's expansionism and in the antagonism of Asian masses, indicated by the public criticism waged by North Vietnam and the PRC against Japan's renewed military buildup, coordinated with its economic expansionism.<sup>34</sup> Prevailing Asian popular sentiment therefore urged the Hong Kong film industry to delineate its kung fu identity much more clearly as an independent vernacular image against the current of samurai aesthetics. Thus the Shaw Brother's kung fu films of the early 1970s, such as *The Chinese Boxer/Long Hudou* (1970) and *King Boxer/Tianxia Diyiquan* (1971) established the paradigm of kung fu cul-

tural revolution in which a righteous hero/heroine would defend his/her nation and people against Japanese imperialism by means of a fistfight. The stylistic focus on the fistfight instead of sword play (tradition of *wu xia*) marked a paradigm shift where the decolonizing desire of the masses came to pervade not only narratives but also aesthetics.

Golden Harvest, established by Raymond Chow (who broke away from the Shaw empire in 1970), vigorously cultivated the formula of kung fu cultural revolution. The company initially capitalized on the popularity of Wang Yu—who defected from the Shaw Brothers—and his one armed-ness in *Zatoichi and the the One Armed Swordsman* (1971)<sup>35</sup> and *The One Armed Boxer/Dubei Quanwang* (1971). Equally important was Angela Mao Ying, a Taiwan-born Peking opera actress, whose performance in *Lady Whirlwind/Tiezhang Xuanfengtui* (1972), as Bey Logan observes, made her “one of Golden Harvest’s most prolific players.”<sup>36</sup> By pursuing the theme of Japanese villainy and the stardom of Wang Yu and Angela Mao Ying, Golden Harvest was on the rise to rival the Shaw empire in the Mandarin cinema market with a solid focus on arousing patriotic sentiments. Thus, the Hong Kong film industry’s commercial involvement in patriotic anti-Japanese themes came to resemble its previous noncommercial patriotic campaign during the Second Sino-Japanese War or the genre of national defense films.<sup>37</sup> The nationalism expressed in both cases remained partial, as the films bypassed the existence of Hong Kong owing to their focus on the Mandarin circuit. The superstardom of Wang Yu as a representative figure of Hong Kong—made kung fu films lent testimony to this slight disjuncture between the representative medium and the represented (i.e., culture, tradition, and people from whom the art originated). A former water polo player from Shanghai, Wang Yu’s appeal seems to have rested on his refined and sophisticated look and acting, which suited the Mandarin circuit. Stephen Teo goes to the heart of the problem:

Mandarin cinema’s adoption of kung fu in the 1970s seemed an opportunistic denial of the importance of Cantonese cinema’s contribution to Hong Kong pictures because the kung fu genre was identified as primarily Cantonese, not only because of its long-running Wong Fei-hung series but also because many of its real-life practitioners were Cantonese. Even the term “kung fu” is derived from Cantonese.<sup>38</sup>

In this context, one can fully appreciate the importance of Lee’s entry into the Hong Kong kung fu genre, particularly for those to whom Lee represented their identity (not only Hong Kong people but also Asian people in general). Lee was a refined and sophisticated Cantonese actor, who was also



a cutting-edge practitioner of kung fu. Yet, similar to *The One Armed Swordsman's* narrative of toil, it required a colossal struggle for Lee to climb up to the level of a popular cultural representative for the Asian masses in the Mandarin-dominated Hong Kong film industry.

Through his confrontations with the management over the script, character design, and choreography, Lee attempted to bring as much realism as possible to his films.<sup>39</sup> Beyond his intention, such an effort could place the kung fu cultural revolution back to its rightful context. For example, Lee's penchant for the character of a country bumpkin, whose moral integrity and extraordinary skill in kung fu makes him outshine other more sophisticated looking overseas Chinese (in *The Big Boss* and *The Way of the Dragon*), symbolically suggests the assertion of Cantonese identity in the Mandarin-dominated cultural world. Also through Lee's acting, the image of rebellious youth cultivated in the Cantonese cinema of the 1950s was imported into the kung fu cultural revolution. Moreover, in combat choreography Lee strove to sharpen the identity of the kung fu film, according to Verina Glassner, by convincing "his director Lo Wei to do away with the weaponry and trick effects that Chinese films to that point had relied on, and instead use his body alone to express all the force and control necessary."<sup>40</sup> The full realization of self, which Lee emphasized in his martial arts as well as in acting, vested Lee's films with realism, whereby the decolonizing narrative of the kung fu cultural revolution could be directly addressing the audience under colonial subjugation. This is particularly so when the narrative of anti-Japanese imperialism in the realm of representation comes to be aligned with Lee's real-life experience.

#### LEE'S ENGAGEMENT WITH JAPANESE IMPERIALISM

When Lee's family came back to Hong Kong from the American tour and from the birth of Jun Fan (Bruce Lee's given Chinese name), their homeland was besieged by the expanding power of Japanese colonial forces. On December 7, 1941, Japan invaded the Philippines, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, and Hong Kong simultaneously with their bombing of the American base in Hawai'i known as Pearl Harbor. On the "Black Christmas Day," as it is remembered by the people of Hong Kong, the British colonial forces finally ceded Hong Kong to Japan.

Following a period of widespread, indiscriminate killing and looting, Japan installed a totalitarian military regime in Hong Kong, where the military and civilian police (known as *Kenpeitai*) maintained the reign of terror.<sup>41</sup>

The Japanese occupational forces halted Hong Kong's commercial activities and took exclusive control over the food supply under a strict rationing system, reducing the food intake of the people to a bare minimum.<sup>42</sup> A chronic food shortage grew rampantly, resulting in mass death by starvation. The civilians, who formed a long line to receive a daily ration at the "rice station," became victims of arbitrary terrorism and killings—including beheading with Japanese swords—by the *Kenpeitai*. Those who did not comply with the occupational currency were also subjected to different types of torture, which in most cases resulted in death.<sup>43</sup> The surveillance by the *Kenpeitai*, in the name of census, also turned into occasions for terrorist attacks—looting, raping, torture, and massacre—on the civilians.<sup>44</sup> The death toll of Hong Kong civilians due to disease and starvation caused by Japan's invasion and military occupation reached the tens of thousands (four thousand were killed strictly in the initial combat situation).<sup>45</sup>

Lee's early childhood was in distress due to the brutal forces of the Japanese military occupation. The Japanese invasion nearly cost the life of Lee's father, who narrowly escaped a bombing at his friend's residence.<sup>46</sup> Nonetheless, Lee's rebelliousness and resilience had already shown their first signs, according to Linda Lee: "Bruce spent his childhood there during the World War II Japanese occupation. He once perched above Nathan Road to shake his fist defiantly at a Japanese plane flying overhead."<sup>47</sup> As Hong Kong reverted to a British colony in the postwar era and the people regained their normalcy, Lee resumed his child actor career and attended school. Intense gang rivalry at school and his inclination for street fighting prompted him to take a formal lesson in Wing Chun kung fu, taught by the master Yip Man, in his teens. Wing Chun kung fu, allegedly invented by a Shaolin nun specifically for a woman's self-defense, bestowed Lee with a solid foundation in Chinese ancient philosophy (Confucianism, *I Ching*, and Taoism). In 1959, shortly after his last film as a child-juvenile actor at the age of eighteen, Lee migrated back to his birthplace, San Francisco. His move to Seattle opened up an opportunity to study at the university and start a career as a martial arts educator.

The American martial arts scene in the early 1960s was thoroughly dominated by Japanese martial arts. The influence of Japanese cultural imperialism was also evident at the theater, where the tsunami of samurai films reached a Chinatown theater in Seattle.<sup>48</sup> Teaching kung fu under such conditions sometimes required Lee to confront the forces of hegemonic culture. The following episode of Lee's encounter with a Japanese karate practitioner captures a peculiar manifestation of Japanese imperialism and a peculiar terrain of his struggle:

“When I was a student at the University (University of Washington, Seattle),” Bruce once recalled, “I gave a demonstration of kung fu. While explaining the art is the forerunner of Karate, I was rudely interrupted by a black belt karateman from Japan who sat in front of the stage. ‘No no, Karate not from China. Come from Japan!’ he hollered.” Bruce reiterated superciliously, “Karate is from kung fu.” After the crowd left, the karateman challenged Bruce. “You want to fight?” “Anytime,” Bruce retorted. “OK, I fight you next week.” “Why not now?” asked Bruce. “It took me two seconds to dispose of him,” Bruce recalled. “He was too slow and too stiff.”<sup>49</sup>

Although an undeniable air of braggadocio in this episode may accentuate the competitiveness of the encounter between martial artists, the real point of contention is not over the superiority of styles, but history. Lee’s insistence on history, through a genealogical approach, is based on a necessity of totality in the understanding of the art, without which it could easily degenerate into a mere sport: “I hope martial artists are more interested in the root of martial arts and not the different decorative branches, flowers or leaves. It is futile to argue as to which single leaf, which design of branches or which attractive flower you like; when you understand the root you understand all its blossoming.”<sup>50</sup> The historical consciousness Lee represented in his demonstration came into conflict with a karate practitioner who is not conscious of the historical roots of his art.

As I will detail the formation of Okinawan *tou-di* as an original form of what is known as “karate” in the next chapter, I focus my analysis here on Japan’s colonial appropriation of *tou-di*. The base of *tou-di* was formed through the cultural exchange between China and Okinawa, since they entered a tributary relationship in the fourteenth century. The name *tou-di*, which literally means “Chinese hand” or “Tang (dynasty) hand” reflects Okinawa’s acknowledgment of China as its origin. Coterminous with the beginning of the Tokugawa shogun regime in the early seventeenth century, the southernmost domain of Japan, Satsuma, launched a military conquest of Okinawa. The development of Okinawan martial arts as a popular defense of Okinawa owes its momentum to their defense against Japanese colonialism. Under the colonial subjugation, *tou-di* emerged as an “Okinawan tradition of people’s self-defense against the foreign domination,” transmitted in guarded secrecy.<sup>51</sup> Japan’s “discovery” of *tou-di* traces back to the radical militarization of the nation in the Meiji era, in which Japan was seeking a system of discipline to construct the collective body for national mobilization.<sup>52</sup> The “importation” of *tou-di* took place during the 1920s, when hegemony of the militaristic and homogeneous culture reigned.

During the Meiji era, with the aim of preserving *bushido*, or the samurai ideology in art form, various types of Japanese martial arts (i.e., ju-jutsu, ken-jutsu, juken-jutsu, etc.) were integrated into a standardized national martial arts or *budo* (kendo, judo, aikido, etc.). The principal driving force of the nationalization of martial arts was an organization called the Dai Nippon Butoku Kai (Great Japan Martial Virtue Association), authorized by the Meiji emperor and headed by the members of the imperial household.<sup>53</sup> The colonial appropriation of *tou-di* thus entailed its fundamental transfiguration. As Muro Kenji observes, it was “forced to conform to the needs of the ideology of the Japanese empire, [it] was reshaped to become rightist, nationalistic, hierarchical and authoritarian.”<sup>54</sup>

The process of colonization of Okinawan art form was directly inscribed in the gradual change of the name *tou-di*. Indicative of a growing culture of fascism that entailed xenophobia (e.g., anti-Chinese sentiment), the schools in Tokyo saw the name as inappropriate and altered its spelling to “karate” by applying the Japanese phonetic system (*hiragana*) instead of the original Chinese ideogram.<sup>55</sup> A year after the establishment of Japan’s puppet regime, Manchukuo,<sup>56</sup> in China, the Dai Nippon Butoku Kai proclaimed the official name change by replacing “kara” with another Chinese ideogram of the same pronunciation, which signifies “empty” or “sky.”<sup>57</sup> The official name change proclaimed the birth of karate-do, a newly incorporated national martial arts of Japan. Once karate had been converted into the disciplinary art of the imperialist culture, it was widely circulated as a representative cultural property of Japan along the channels of postwar Japanese expansionism, greatly aided by the American importation of karate-do through the military. Thus, in contrast to the original *tou-di*, which developed and spread out through the channel of popular defense, largely in secrecy, karate as an art of imperialist discipline became integrated into the dominant cultural paradigm.

Given this historical context, Lee’s confrontation with the karate practitioner in effect reveals the latter’s claim to karate to be based on the notion of imperial ownership that eclipses history from the consciousness. This ahistorical consciousness in turn has its roots in the myth, or what Roland Barthes calls the “evaporation of history” into the realm of myth.<sup>58</sup> For such a notion of ownership is tenable only by the obliteration of history and filling of the void thus created with a mythological consciousness, which in the final analysis is rooted in the samurai ideology. Such mythological consciousness was naturalized and widely disseminated not only by samurai films as mentioned earlier, but also by Hollywood’s exotic rendition of Japanese culture. Lee’s struggle in the world of martial arts, in due course, came to intersect with the realm of representation.

At the Long Beach Karate International Tournament in 1965, the kung fu demonstration by Lee and his associates caught the attention of Jay Sebring, a Hollywood hairdresser who captured Lee's demonstration on 8 mm. The film was relayed to the producer of the Batman series, William Dozier, who was looking for an "Oriental" martial artist to star in the program called *Charlie Chan's Number One Son*, at which occasion the screen test mentioned in the beginning of this chapter was conducted. Twentieth Century Fox, however, decided to cast Lee for the sidekick Kato in *The Green Hornet* TV series, which was based on the popular radio action drama of the 1930s.

The construction of the image of Kato is anchored in the institution of cinematic or Hollywood "Orientalism," the Hollywood production of otherness imposed upon the image of the people, culture, and nation of East Asia.<sup>59</sup> In the "Orientalist" mode of image construction, Lee was placed in a contradictory position whereby his true identity is undermined by his own action and performance. For example, the contradiction becomes very acute in an episode in which Kato successfully busts Tong, the Chinese secret society, in Chinatown for its alleged criminal operation; Kato uses his kung fu expertise to overpower the Chinese kung fu master of Tong. Kato being Japanese, Lee's combative superiority contributes to the mythology of karate rather than to a revelation in Chinese martial arts even though Lee is demonstrating kung fu in his action. In other words, the more active he was in his role as Kato the more Lee de-realized his own identity.

Lee's refusal to play any Asian stereotypes further impeded his career in Hollywood. With the help of his Hollywood pupils (Steve McQueen, James Coburn, and Stirling Silliphant, an Academy Award-winning script writer), he made special appearances on TV shows and in a film. Lee was thus confronted both by the samurai myth of the Japanese film industry and by the American "cowboy" myth of Hollywood. At the point of convergence between those myths is thus the multinational "Orientalism" that Lee needed to overcome in order for his realism to be communicated to a wide audience. In the meantime, Lee's residence in Los Angeles provided him with opportunities to incorporate other Asian martial arts into a new system, which was on the path of evolution from its Wing Chun kung fu foundation. The environment in Los Angeles not only enabled Lee to cultivate the new martial arts concept of *Jeet Kune Do*, which transcends styles and other institutionalization; it also fostered a pan-Asian consciousness in Lee that embraces transcultural connections of Asia, beyond the boundary of Chinese cultural worlds. As Lee returned to Hong Kong, therefore, his experience and consciousness along with its sociohistorical context was brought into the kung fu cultural revolu-

tion, creating a vanguard expression of the genre. In *Fist of Fury*, through its historical realism, Lee's struggle in the worlds of martial arts and cinema coalesced with the historical narrative of anti-imperialist struggle.

#### IMAGES OF IMPERIALISM AND RESISTANCE IN FIST OF FURY

##### *Imperial Missive or "A Sheet of Paper"*

*Our story begins with the death of Ho Yun Chia, a legendary Chinese hero famous for his victories over a Russian champion wrestler and Judo experts. Poisoned by whom? For what? It was not known for certain. There has been speculation. Here is the most popular version.<sup>60</sup>*

The voice of a storyteller opens up *Fist of Fury*, seducing the audience into the timeless time and spaceless realm of legends. But *Fist of Fury* has a concrete reference to the true story of the Jing Wu (Jing Mouh in Cantonese) martial arts school, founded by Ho Yun Chia (Fock Yuen Kap in Cantonese) in Shanghai, who was "a famous patriot ready to defend his country anytime [*sic*]." <sup>61</sup> The master was also known by foreigners as the "yellow-faced tiger" for his fierce and triumphant combat with Japanese martial artists and Russian wrestlers. <sup>62</sup>

Although it pays homage to the formal historical reference of the Jing Wu school, *Fist of Fury* is thoroughly immersed within the folkloric world by engaging in its own version of storytelling that centers around the fiction of the grandmaster's mysterious death. In so doing, the narrative and image apparatus of *Fist of Fury* is augmented to freely absorb a wide spectrum of the historical contradictions and antagonism of modern China into a dimension of visualized oral history.

The designated time of the film's narrative, 1908, <sup>63</sup> falls in the mid-point between the Yi Ho Tuan (Society of Righteousness and Harmony) movement and the May Fourth movement in the chronicle of the people's struggle. It happens to coincide with the eruption of the Japanese goods boycott movement in Hong Kong, instigated by the "Tatsu Maru incident." <sup>64</sup> In the imperialist calendar, it lies between the Sino-Japanese War and World War I and in proximity to Japan's "annexation" of Korea.

Following the first scene at Grandmaster Ho's burial, the film takes the audience directly to an initial confrontation between Japanese occupational forces and the Chinese people at the funeral of the grandmaster. Led by a "lackey" Chinese interpreter named Hu, two Japanese judo wrestlers of the

Hongkew dojo<sup>65</sup> invade the funeral with a scroll. Presentation of scrolls for the deceased is part of the tradition called *wanlian*. They consist of parallel sentences customarily written, “The fragrance of the deceased’s name will last a thousand years,” and the giver of the scroll “mourns for him with tears (or humility).”<sup>66</sup> When the scroll is opened by *Daishidai* (the “senior apprentice” who now assumes the position of master), everybody present is shocked to find four Chinese characters on the scroll that say, “Sick Man of East Asia.”<sup>67</sup> The metaphor of nation and race implicated in this scroll of insult unfurls itself as the notion of “Chinese” is brought into question in the subsequent argument between Hu and one of the students from the Jing Wu school.

*Being unable to take any insults from Hu, a student steps forward and interrogates Hu: “Let me ask you, are you Chinese or not? Dismissing and at the same time ridiculing the solemn tone of the question, Hu replies with an ostensible casualness: “Although you are the same race as mine, our destiny has become very different.”*

The question of “Chinese identity” is posited several times throughout the film. This particular scene deserves close attention, for it renders the world of martial arts a window through which the interplay of national and international politics can be clearly glimpsed. Specifically, it presents a comprehensible analysis of the system of colonial oppression in which foreigners and Chinese collaborators are reaping benefits at the expense of suffering people and an imperiled nation. Historically speaking, such a diagnosis of the power structure of imperialism came into clear focus as soon as the Chinese masses struck against the British power in the wake of the British opium war in the 1840s (e.g., the San Yuan Li incident).<sup>68</sup>

This first sign of the anti-imperialist movement soon developed into the Yi Ho Tuan movement (commonly referred to as the Boxer Rebellion) against the entire imperialist bloc at the turn of the century. It was composed primarily of peasantry—conjoined by handicraftsmen and the urban poor—who had been doubly victimized by the predatory foreigners and the collaborative Ch’ing dynasty.<sup>69</sup> The Yi Ho Tuan movement presented a political perspective in a comprehensible language for the people to digest the process of colonization. It saw colonization as a system in which foreigners or *Yan Mao Tsu* (literally, “foreign haired child”) overruled China’s sovereignty, assisted by the native lackey or *Er Mao Tsu* (literally, “two or second hair child”). In the Yi Ho Tuan’s discourse, *Yan Mao Tsu* are “ferocious tigers and wolves” and *Er Mao Tsu* are “collaborating with the for-

eigners, currying their favour, bowing low to the powerful and tyrannizing over the plain people.”<sup>70</sup>

The bond between the foreign power and the lackey was fortified by a “treaty,” “covenant,” “agreement” and other types of diplomatic missives, which are the symbols and at the same time evidences of foreign domination. The legitimacy of a “covenant” is brought to a contested terrain in one of the episodes of the folktales wherein the Yi Ho Tuan attacks the cathedral in Beijing led by Chang Shao-Huan.<sup>71</sup> A *Yan Mao Tsu*, known as “prince,” who had monopoly over both the cathedral and embassy in Beijing, was caught by the Yi Ho Tuan during his escape from the cathedral. In the carriage of the “prince” were piles of gold and silver, two young Chinese women, a whip, and a covenant. One of the women captives explains to the leader of the Yi Ho Tuan that the covenant is a certificate issued by the emperor that allows the “prince” to indulge in arson, plunder, murder, and rape in China. The covenant symbolizes the grotesque reality in the unequal treaty, beyond the veneer of an international contract based on the Western treaty system. The Yi Ho Tuan movement identified the unequal treaty as the basis of imperialist destruction of their nation. It was clearly articulated in one of the most popular posters: “Most bitterly do we hate the treaties which harm the country and bring calamities on the people.”<sup>72</sup> This episode of the Yi Ho Tuan folktales effectively translates the meaning of unequal treaties into a language and imagery accessible to the masses.

In a similar vein, the scroll in the movie finds its meaning in the specific context of the relationship between China and Japan. While the scroll as a form represents the observance of tradition, the words of insult undermine the very legitimacy imbued in the observance of tradition. The significance of this seemingly contradictory existence of an insult within the observance of a traditional ritual framework must be sought in the unique historical background of East Asia. The radical transformation that Japan’s modernization scheme brought to the relationship between East Asian nations was etched in the changes of Japan’s diplomatic missives.

Since the declaration of the reign of the Ming court by Emperor Hung Wu, China had maintained tributary relationships with other Asian nations as a basis for international diplomacy, preceding the imposition of (unequal) treaty systems by the West. The emperor’s “Mandate of Heaven,” and edicts sent out to the rulers in Asia, outlined the cosmological and political order based on the Confucian worldview in which all nations were regarded equal “in the eyes of the emperor.”<sup>73</sup> In return for the exchange of tribute as a symbolic act of deference to China, each nation enjoyed the security umbrella and political legitimacy granted by China. The submission to the Chinese order,



however, did not mean subjugation to its power, nor loss of sovereignty.<sup>74</sup> It enabled the tributary nations to gain access to cultural and technical resources as well as to trade opportunities.

Viewed as a system of governance for international relations, the tributary system “served as a reintegrated process, removing or dissolving antagonism that might lead to conflict over commercial matters.”<sup>75</sup> In other words, it offered a relatively peaceful system of diplomacy based on the traditional cosmological order, and an alternative to war and conquest as a means of quelling antagonism between the nations. Particularly in East Asia (and Vietnam) where the nations share a cultural ethos (e.g., Chinese ideographic script, Confucianism, etc.) based on their ancestral connections, the diplomatic missives exchanged in traditional rituals “assumed primacy over all other forms of communication.”<sup>76</sup> Tributary relationships, therefore, contained the functionality of what the West called “treaty relationships,” which were sanctioned by the “kinship” of nations of a shared cultural origin. Although Japan limited its extent of involvement to “friendly trading relations,” and disengaged itself from a formal tributary relationship under the isolationist policy established during the Tokugawa shogun, the cosmological order based on the Confucian paradigm reigned as a norm in its East Asian international relations. As Japan launched its modernization cum imperialist nation building project, it came to contradict the relatively harmonious order in East Asia.

Korea was the first East Asian nation to come into cognizance of Japan’s transformation into *Er Mao Tsu*, or a lackey nation of the West, through Japan’s imperialist modernization scheme. After Japan’s first invasion in the sixteenth century by Shogun Toyotomi’s regime, Korea maintained a tributary relationship only with Tsushima *han*, the closest domain of Japan. The proclamation of the modern regime of Meiji was thus communicated to Korea through this diplomatic channel. The Korean government, however, was compelled to reject the diplomatic missive of this proclamation, as it found an unprecedented alteration in the mode of address. Japan used the term *huang san* (*kojo* in Japanese) to refer to the Japanese emperor and *ch’ik* (*choku* in Japanese) for his imperial edict.<sup>77</sup> Both of those terms were traditionally reserved to signify the position of China in relation to the tributary nations.

Japan interpreted that its establishment of a treaty relationship with China—based on the concept of the Western treaty system, outside the traditional jurisdiction of East Asia—gave Japan the position of “titular superiority” over Korea. Subsequently, Japan moved to forcefully impose an unequal treaty (the Kangwha Treaty of 1876) on Korea, emulating the gunboat diplomacy of the West. In leading up to the conclusion of the treaty, Korea observed drastic changes in the Japanese diplomatic envoys’ mode of address, as well as in their

attire.<sup>78</sup> At the ratification of the Kangwha Treaty, Japanese diplomatic corps made an appearance in Western morning coats, as if they were reenacting the ways in which the West imposed the unequal treaty on Asia, not excluding Japan. Though such a deed might have seemed incongruous to the rest of the East Asian nations, it was consistent with Japan's national policy of De-Asianization and Europeanization (*Datsu-A Nyu-Ou* in Japanese).

In defiance of Japan's imperialist scheme, the peasants in Korea rose up en masse against Japan and the West (the *Tonhak* movement of 1894), waving the banner "Get Rid of the West—Get Rid of Japan."<sup>79</sup> Japan, however, used this rebellion as a pretext for dispatching its military forces to Korea, the "right" to which it claimed to have garnered from China as a result of the Tientsin Treaty of 1889. Thereupon, Japan engaged in warfare with China: the First Sino-Japanese War. China yielded to Japan and concluded the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which gave Japan license to colonize Taiwan and Liutao Peninsula (the latter was returned due to the intervention of Germany, Russia, and France).

The collapse of the Confucian order in East Asia was confirmed in the so-called Twenty-one Demands, which Japan sent to the newly established republic led by Yuan Shih-ka'i, following the defeat of Germany in World War I:

It was on January 18, 1915, a dark and chilly evening, that Hioki Eki, the Japanese minister to China, instead of following normal diplomatic channels, presented in a private interview to the Chinese President Yuan Shih-ka'i a few sheets of paper watermarked with dreadnoughts and machine guns. On these pages were written the notorious Twenty-one Demands. . . . The demands hurt the pride of the Chinese people more than any real dreadnoughts and machine guns had ever done.<sup>80</sup>

In this aggressive missive, Japan proclaimed not only the colonization of Shangtung (the colonial sphere of Germany) but also of Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Southeast China, and the Yangtze Valley; in effect the colonization of the entirety of China.<sup>81</sup> The Twenty-one Demands shows a drastic degeneration from the diplomatic missive imbued with high ritual significance and courteousness to a vulgar note of threat. If one is to compare the missive to a mode of speech, the Twenty-one Demands can be seen as a loss of a formal language of deference and respect, only to be replaced by malevolent slurs. This factor perhaps multiplied the feeling of hurt and humiliation felt by the Korean and Chinese people, for unlike the Western imperialist power, Japan had been bound by a shared historical and cultural heritage based on a common cosmological and symbolic order.

Parallel with the degeneration of Japan's diplomatic missives to its neighboring East Asian nations was the growth of the Korean and Chinese people's resistance, which began to coalesce as a mass nationalist movement against imperialist domination. Incidentally, the year 1919 marked the bursting forth of nationalist movements in both Korea and China: in the March First movement and the May Fourth movement, respectively. The latter has a particular relevance to the film in our discussion. It was a mass patriotic movement in which a wide range of urban masses (including the lumpen proletariat, such as beggars, thieves, and prostitutes), along with merchants and factory workers, joined the struggle first instigated by students and intellectuals.<sup>82</sup> The maturity of the May Fourth movement as a social movement was indicated by its commitment to "the transformation of the Chinese economy and society" in conjunction with resistance to foreign invaders.<sup>83</sup> What was particularly remarkable in the context of our discussion is the manner in which the May Fourth movement delegitimated the authority of the imperialist missive.

In an alternative version of the May Fourth movement manifesto, one could find the redefinition of the imperialist contractuality from the viewpoint of the emergent decolonizing subject: "Japan, tiger like and wolf like, has been able to wrest privileges from China simply by sending up a sheet of paper, the Twenty-one Demands."<sup>84</sup> The imperialist missive, or a symbolic embodiment of its legitimacy, is hereby completely removed of authority, leaving behind its crude materiality: a sheet of paper.

Such symbolic overturning of the legitimacy of imperialist power was already existent, in the aforementioned Yi Ho Tuan folklore, in which the leader Chang destroys all the symbols vested with the colonial authority in the hands of *Yan Mao Tsu*. Chang's vociferation at the "prince" as he tears up the covenant is noteworthy: "The emperor might have made such a promise with you foreigners. But never once have we, the Chinese people, consented to such a thing."<sup>85</sup> The revolutionary tenor of Chang's statement stems from the configuration of the social subject ("we, the Chinese people") that is capable of abolishing the imperialist-comprador contract.

In *Fist of Fury*, the social subject of decolonization is singularly represented by Chen Zhen's first act of vengeance against the Japanese colonial establishment. Immediately after the funeral spoiled by the Japanese judo wrestlers, Chen Zhen, on his own initiative, takes the scroll back to where it belongs to, in the heart of the international settlement.

*Chen Zhen enters the Hongkew dojo with the scroll concealed in cloth. He leans it on the pillar, folds his arms over his chest and asks for the master, Suzuki. Suzuki's right-hand person, Yoshida, informs him*

*of the master's absence and interrogates Chen Zhen as to the purpose of his visit. Chen Zhen states sedately, yet with a menacing tone, "I have something to return to him." The cloth cover is removed, exposing the "Sick Man of East Asia." Yoshida shows a grin filled with scorn: "Little kid, got some nerve." The dojo gang accepts his challenge, and combat ensues. Chen Zhen is surrounded by every member of the dojo (except Yoshida). Chen Zhen's kicks radiate in all directions, flattening all of them on the floor. Halting a student who attempts to grab the sword, Yoshida finally stands up to take up Chen Zhen's challenge. Without any difficulty, Chen Zhen defeats Yoshida, finishing with a kick in his buttocks. He puts his traditional Chinese jacket on, devoid of emotion. Yet at the next moment, his emotion resurges and he proclaims: "Please remember, Chinese are not the 'Sick Man of East Asia.'" Chen Zhen turns around, walks toward the exit, grabs the encased scroll, shatters the glass, and removes the scroll. Holding up what is now reduced to a mere sheet of paper, Chen Zhen calls up those two wrestlers who rudely interrupted the grandmaster's funeral, at which occasion they promised they would eat up the four characters of the "Sick Man of East Asia" if they should lose the challenge. Now Chen Zhen reminds them of their promise by tearing the paper into pieces and feeding those wrestlers with the pieces of paper. Menacingly, he remarks: "Eat. This time it is paper but next time it will be glass." Chen Zhen walks out of the dojo with a triumphant stride.*

Challenging the entire dojo single-handedly, a rare yet legitimate practice in the world of martial arts, is hereby rendered a very instance (rather than a metaphor) of decolonization struggle in the hands of Chen Zhen. Although Chen Zhen's solitary act of resistance comes into conflict with the collectivity of the Jing Wu school, it is representative of the larger collectivity, which lies outside the world of martial arts.<sup>86</sup> In another scene of confrontation with the colonial authority, it becomes clear that the collectivity Chen Zhen represents in his action is more than that of the school as his struggle erupts over the boundary of the martial arts world into society as a whole.

*At the entrance of the park located in the "International Settlement," Chen Zhen is barred from entry by a Sikh guard who points to the sign that says "No Dogs and Chinese are allowed." (To insert a historical reference here, the Chinese were not allowed to enter the park until 1927.)<sup>87</sup> Chen Zhen, however, observes that an exception*

*applies to the dogs as long as they are owned by foreigners. While Chen Zhen argues the point with the guard, he is approached by a group of Japanese, one of whom summons Chen Zhen: "If you become our great Japanese dog and crawl on the ground, I will take you in." Chen Zhen's anger becomes uncontainable. Immediately after laying them on the ground with his punches and kicks, Chen Zhen flies into the air and kicks the sign into pieces. No sooner has the guard called for the police than a horde of Chinese people outside the park encircle Chen Zhen like amoebae in their effort to help him escape from impending arrest. The group depicted here consists of students, workers, and elders, representing a diverse populace of Shanghai in solidarity with Chen Zhen's brave deed.*

In contrast to the previous scene of confrontation, this scene forges a much more direct link with history. Chen Zhen's adversaries are not martial artists but agents of colonial authority (Sikh guard) and Japanese colonial settlers. Furthermore, the structural relationship between Chen Zhen and a diverse segment of the Shanghai masses corresponds to the constitution of the May Fourth movement and also the May Thirtieth movement, which emerged in Shanghai in 1925. Both movements were instigated by students who led their protests to the colonial settlements and were then joined by the merchants and workers who helped the movement to develop to a national scale.<sup>88</sup> Thus the youthfulness of Chen Zhen and the direct action he is engaged in conjure up the students as a vanguard of the movement, and the support of Shanghai masses for Chen Zhen corresponds to the mass base. The symbolic correspondence is effected by the realist orientation of the film (i.e., inclusion of the social context outside the world of martial arts) and Lee's performance with its high emotive power. As a result, the people's history of struggle from Yi Ho Tuan to May Fourth and beyond is represented by the singularity of Chen Zhen. Particularly when charged with Lee's intense emotion, Chen Zhen turns into a subject in the form of an affect—a spiritlike existence—which facilitates the intrusion of social and historical context outside the film into the realm of martial arts fantasy.

### Genocide and the Sword

Prior to our full exploration of the social subject of decolonization in the aesthetic sphere, one particular aspect of Japanese imperialism—which can be distinct from Western imperialism—needs to be addressed in order to identify the specific terrain of decolonization. It is the convergence of the imperi-

alist martial arts with the imperialist violence and colonial destruction in their extremity. This particular aspect is relevant to postwar Japanese cultural imperialism, as well as to the aesthetic and thematic foundation of the kung fu cultural revolution. The formative process of the atrocities committed by the Japanese is reenacted in the following scenes in *Fist of Fury*.

*Though frustrated by the gradual loss of his protégés who were involved in the poisoning of Ho Yun Chia, Suzuki seems to have no effective plan to counter the revenge carried out by Chen Zhen. Being unable to give any further commands to his right-hand person, Suzuki instead poses a question to Yoshida: "What do you think we should do?" Yoshida answers with confidence: "Remove the cause of the problem fundamentally. That means . . . get rid of everyone at the Jing Wu school." Suzuki further pursues his query: "Aren't you concerned with the consequence?" Yoshida states with conviction, "In the 'settlement,' Japanese power is paramount. As long as we don't leave any evidence, even if it's clear that we are the culprit, they can do nothing to us." Having been convinced by Yoshida, Suzuki finally issues a command in the definitive tone of a tyrant sweeping away all the traces of ambiguities he had harbored: "Good! Go there and do a clean job."*

*Meanwhile, the school's search for Chen Zhen at the grandmaster's graveyard is turning out to be a futile effort. The search group returns to the school. During their absence the entire school has been turned into a crucible of carnage. They find one survivor still trying to save his female colleague in spite of his own impending death. In the arms of his fellow student, he gathers all the strength to utter his last words: "Japanese did." Except for a few, all the Jing Wu school students were annihilated. After a tedious and depressing search for survivors, Daishidai sank deep into his seat. In his rage and remorse, he curses himself: "We did not live up to our grandmaster's expectation. I did not live up to his expectation." A dismayed student asks him: "Master, they died in such an atrocious way. What shall we do?" The question seems to put everything in a right perspective for Daishidai: "We tolerated and that was wrong. Chen Zhen was right." Daishidai's body trembles with an intense emotion and releases what has been built within him by uttering the following words: "Japanese beast."<sup>89</sup>*

These scenes actively engage with history outside the realm of fantasy. They follow the progression of atrocities from the decision making, actual

execution, to the aftermath. The symbolic reference to atrocities is so integral to the paradigm of the kung fu cultural revolution that even a less realist-oriented film, such as *The Chinese Boxer*, contains a scene in which the entire existence of a kung fu school (save for the protagonist who survives the atrocities) is annihilated by Japanese karate mercenaries and a Chinese lackey who establish a gambling place on the former school site. The reenactment of atrocities therefore creates a contact point with history and with the emotion aroused by the memories not only of Chinese but also of Asian people in general. As this part of history is still yet to be resolved, since Japan as a nation hasn't truly come to terms with its past record of brutality against its Asian neighbors, the pain and suffering of the victims and their descendents are left unhealed. In this context, the inclusion of the issue of historical atrocities in the narrative of the kung fu cultural revolution produces a common space for Asian people with shared history and experience, enhancing their emotional involvement with the film's narrative.

Owing to its realist orientation, *Fist of Fury* reveals the formative process of atrocities symbolically but with accuracy. In a dialogue between Suzuki and Yoshida, there is an allusion both to Japan's declaration of an all-out war on China (i.e., Declaration for Punishing Chinese Tyranny in 1937)<sup>90</sup> and to the policy of total annihilation (or the *San Guang* policy, which will be detailed shortly). The consequence of this policy of total annihilation and the reality of atrocities are captured in the scene of invasion of the Hongkew dojo gang into the Jing Wu school and its aftermath. The film, however, takes the audience beyond a mere reenactment of history. It delves into the psyche behind the atrocities by critically and symbolically scrutinizing the samurai ideology congealed in *katana*, the institutionalized martial arts of Japan, and the identity of the imperialist self.

The atrocities upon the Chinese civilian population, which began with Japan's initial invasion of China (i.e., the First Sino-Japanese War)<sup>91</sup> intensified drastically after the Nine Eighteen or Manchurian incident in 1931, in which Japan fabricated a Chinese conspiracy as a pretext for the invasion into Manchuria.<sup>92</sup> With the declaration of all-out war, Japan's aggression surpassed the threshold of humanity over to barbarism in what Chinese people termed the *San Guang* or "three all policy" of "kill all" (*sha guang*), "burn all" (*shao guang*), and "loot all" (*qiang guang*), or what Japanese called the "strategy of total annihilation" (*kaimetsu sakusen*).<sup>93</sup> This mandate of atrocities was implemented upon their landing at Shanghai and Hangzhou and culminated in Nanjing where the so-called Rape of Nanking took place.<sup>94</sup>

From December 13, when the Japanese army invaded the city of Nanjing, until early February, more than three hundred thousand people consist-

ing mainly of POWs and civilians were massacred within a matter of weeks.<sup>95</sup> Most killings were done by an assembly-line execution, hundreds and thousands by machine guns reinforced by bayonet, sword, and gasoline fire.<sup>96</sup> Other systematic slaughter of civilians and POWs involved cruel and abnormal methods of killing.<sup>97</sup>

Japan's wartime atrocities were brought to light for the first time at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, more commonly known as the Tokyo War Crime Trial, which was held immediately after the war. The total picture of wartime atrocities, however, was only partially presented at the tribunal due to the fact that the imperial household was given immunity. As U.S. occupational forces guided Japan's postwar reconstruction, Emperor Hirohito, the supreme commander of war, along with members of the imperial household were not just exonerated but transformed into the symbol of "peace," which preserved the fundamental structure of political legitimacy. The reorganization of political structure was undertaken by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party machine, which integrated the right wing and Yakuza underworld organizations. Accordingly, the A-class war criminals along with other veterans who played an important role in the imperialist war were placed back in powerful positions in the postwar decision-making process.<sup>98</sup> Thus, in stark contrast with Germany, which assumed a full responsibility for Nazi war crimes as a nation, Japan's postwar political reorganization induced an institutional obliteration of the history and avoidance of responsibility for the damages inflicted on those nations and people under Japan's aggression.

Coinciding with the eruption of the kung fu popular cultural revolution in Japan, a Japanese journalist, Honda Katsuichi, broke the imposed silence and laid fully bare the barbaric deeds of the Japanese military in China in his reportage, *Chugoku no Tabi* (Journey to China).<sup>99</sup> Thereafter, the controversy over the ignominious pages of Japan's history was stirred up and intensified periodically by the Japanese government's attempts to revise the standard school textbooks and by remarks by high-ranking governmental officials aimed at whitewashing their imperialist history. The so-called textbook controversy has caused Japan's diplomatic crises with the rest of Asia and in particular with China and Korea (the most recent took place in the spring of 2005).

In response to Honda's *Chugoku no Tabi*, the ultra-nationalist media and intellectuals launched a campaign of the revisionist rebuttal of the Nanjing massacre.<sup>100</sup> The rebuttal placed an exclusive focus on the account of a beheading contest between two Japanese soldiers included in Honda's chapter on the Nanjing massacre. The contest between two soldiers for one hundred heads was closely reported by none other than a Japanese newspaper, in the manner of reporting the progression of a baseball tournament. Contrary to the



bravado of samurai chivalry portrayed in the newspaper, the competition in reality had less to do with the combat field than the slaughter of prisoners and civilians.<sup>101</sup> In their attempt to deny the historical existence of atrocities, the ultra-nationalist intellectuals accused Honda and others of fabricating the beheading contest and extended the charge over to the entirety of the Nanjing massacre.<sup>102</sup> Their logic is similar to that of a revisionist holocaust scholar, Robert Faurisson, who attempted to deny the entirety of the Nazi holocaust by casting the historical existence of the gas chamber as a mere myth.

The ultra-nationalist's selective focus on the contest seems to stem from the way the Nanjing massacre was represented in Honda's book. In contrast to the previous works on the Nanjing massacre, Honda managed to include pictorial images of the genocide in process. They clearly showed that the soldier's use of *katana* was not for honoring samurai chivalry but for genocidal purposes. Thus the revisionist refutation of the beheading contest inversely points out the fallacy of *bushido* they desperately attempt to cover up. In the final analysis, the Japanese sword as a physical and aesthetic embodiment of *bushido* constitutes the symbolic substance of the imperial mythology. With the increasing international awareness of Japan's wartime atrocities, the historical existence of the "Rape of Nanking" strikes hard at the mythology of the "Chrysanthemum and the Sword." It affirms what Frederic Jameson said in a similar context, "the underside of culture is blood, torture, death and horror."<sup>103</sup> The "Rape of Nanking" can thus be seen not as an aberration but as a logical outcome of the culture and ideology of the samurai, once we locate it in a historical context.

Korean activist and writer Paek Ki Wong offers a systematic framework to scrape away the mythological layers of samurai ideology embedded in *katana*, thereby uncovering its violent and destructive historical formation.<sup>104</sup> Along with other ancient technological and cultural assets of Japan, *katana* has its origin in the Korean sword or *gum*. The ancient *gum* from Paekche (18 BC–AD 660), which is preserved at the Japanese Imperial Repository (*Shosoin*), provided a model for the Japanese sword.<sup>105</sup> The point of the delineation of *katana's* identity took place with Shogun Toyotomi's conquest of warring lords and subsequent centralization of the power structure in 1590, which led Japan to launch its colonial conquest on Korean soil.<sup>106</sup> The Japanese sword initiated in the blood of conquest was nurtured during the Tokugawa Shogun era, during which time *katana* had become an instrument of state terror against the masses, as the *Bushi* class turned into the agent of repression. Although the Meiji restoration put an official end to the *Bushi* class, the sword survived in the modernized military force. The Japanese sword, fortified by modern warfare technology, returned to the soil of Korea



FIGURE 1.1. Execution by *katana* in Nanjing from *The Rape of Nanking: An Undeniable History in Photographs*.

as a tool of genocide in the suppression of the *Tonhak* peasant uprising against imperialist expansionism in 1894.<sup>107</sup> With the annexation of Korea, Japanese colonial power forced the people of Korea to defer to *katana* at schools and through the presence of *kenpeitai*.<sup>108</sup>

By locating the development of two types of the sword that share the same origin in the context of historical antagonism (i.e., colonialism vs. anti-colonial struggles), Paek explains the bifurcation of *gum* and *katana*. While, as mentioned previously, the Japanese invasion and occupation from 1592 to 1598 stimulated a qualitative development of *katana* as a tool of conquest and oppression, the Korean peasants' resistance to the Japanese invasion fostered the growth of *gum* as a weapon of popular defense. The latter evolved in the milieu of the peasant culture, where agricultural tools could be converted to a weapon and vice versa.<sup>109</sup> Accordingly, whereas *katana* has become an incarnation of the samurai metaphysics with intricate rituals, *gum* has maintained a concrete relationship with production and subsistence, hence the historical existence of the Korean peasant.<sup>110</sup>

What is implicated significantly in Paek's analysis, therefore, is a fundamental bracketing of the Japanese martial/samurai ideology epitomized in *bushido* (samurai chivalry) and *budo* (martial arts). As discussed earlier, the Japanese "martial way" fostered the culture of militarism and fascism domestically. In its colony, *bushido* was also a part of the indoctrination imposed upon the Korean people under the policy of *Kokoku Shinmin Ka* (assimilation into the imperial subject), to coerce deference to Japan's imperial authority.<sup>111</sup> That which could have been a glorifying signifier for the Japanese imperial subject therefore is nothing but a harbinger of a lurking barbaric spirit for those under Japanese occupation.

Not coincidentally, in *Fist of Fury*, the camera captures the unusually large calligraphy of the word *bu* in Japanese or *wu* in Chinese on the wall of the Hongkew dojo a few times. *Wu* in the original Chinese corpus signifies "martial" in a generic sense. *bu*, on the other hands, as the root word of *bushido* and *budo*, encapsulates the core aspect of the Japanese imperialist subject. The excess in the character's size in the film seems to express distortion in the Japanese cultural appropriation as if *wu* was mutated by the imperialist irradiation. The calligraphy of *bu* appears on the screen most conspicuously in Yoshida and Chen Zhen's battles: first when Chen Zhen challenges the entire Hongkew dojo in the earlier part of the film, and secondly when Chen Zhen moves stealthily into the dojo to wage the final battle with Suzuki and a hired Russian wrestler. Yoshida meets Chen Zhen on these two occasions as a judo wrestler and a sword-bearing samurai, respectively. In addition to the horrendous tales of *katana*, the survivors of the Nanjing massacre, as well as the survivors of brutality at schools and factories



FIGURE 1.2. Scene from *Fist of Fury*. Notice the calligraphy of *wu/bu* in the background.

under Japanese occupation, testified that judo throws were also used to terrorize and murder the Chinese people.<sup>112</sup> The triangular image complex—*bu*, judo, and *katana*—deployed in *Fist of Fury* thus captures the fundamental aspects of the culture of Japanese imperialism with sobering accuracy from the viewpoint of Chinese and Asian people in general.

The counter-narrative and imagery to the imperialist symbolism conjured up with the “Genocide and the Sword,” unlike other counter-narratives and imagery in this chapter, involve Bruce Lee’s performative and kinetic expressions, to be discussed in the following chapter. However, it is pertinent to note at this juncture that Lee’s counter-imagery and narrative have their roots in the historical instances of popular resistance unabated in spite of the most barbaric and cruel acts of genocide emblazoned by the Japanese sword. Overcoming an inexorable sense of terror and fear of impending death during the atrocities in Nanjing, some did not give in and resisted the Japanese brutality until the end of their lives, fiercely crying out: “Dado Riben Diguozhuyi!” (Down with Japanese imperialism!).<sup>113</sup> At the other site of beheadings, the people sang together the “Song of Resistance to Japan” in tears.<sup>114</sup> The spirit of Chen Zhen can thus be found even in the most despairingly wretched condition under imperialist aggression.

## CHAPTER TWO

### BURNING ASIA

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#### BRUCE LEE'S KINETIC NARRATIVE OF DECOLONIZATION

Above, the dawn is changing itself,  
Making itself "other" and different.  
The rains followed suit, as well as  
The struggle . . .

—Subcommandante Marcos

In no other kung fu film, as most critics of the genre would agree, did a main character display such an intense outburst of emotion as did Bruce Lee in *Fist of Fury*. Lee as Chen Zhen reenacts the wrath of a Chinese youth whose nation and people are in peril under foreign occupation by channeling the existential truth of the character. Without Lee's emotional expression, the social and historical realism of *Fist of Fury* would have lacked the substance, and hence the power, to move the audience as it did. Undoubtedly, it is Lee's performance that renders *Fist of Fury* an exemplarily text of the kung fu cultural revolution that embraces the dialectic of pan-Chinese nationalist liberation, and Japanese neo-imperialism.

More careful attention to Lee's performance will unveil that his performance (and particularly his choreography) has a sphere of meaning of its own, above and beyond a mere reinforcement of the theme of the film. By this second kung fu film made by Lee in Hong Kong, he seems to have established an autonomous sphere of narrative via kinetic expression, which is tangential not only to the official narrative but also to the ideological scope of the kung

fu cultural revolution. The historicity, realism, and symbolism introduced to the film through the kinetic narrative lend themselves to a symbolic statement or commentary. Due to its symbolic language, the kinetic narrative operates beyond the border between consciousness and the unconscious and beyond the intention of Lee as an author.

Part of Lee's phenomenal popularity in Asia beyond the Chinese cultural sphere may be accounted for by the fact that Lee's performance not only touched the hearts but also the unconscious of the Asian people. Against the forces of image colonization of the unconscious by Hollywood and samurai movies, Lee's expressionism and realism, communicated through his trans-cultural orientation, imparted a vernacular image common to the people of Asia. Fortified by this shared image, his conscious portrayal of himself as a "common folk" hero in his films not merely affirmed the existence of the Asian masses, but also opened up an allegorical link with the mass movement toward decolonization in Asia.

However, only through rigorous historical and social contextualization can this symbolic narrative become legible, thereby unfolding the means by which it liberated the unconscious of the Asian people faced with image colonization by the neo-imperialist cultural industry. The most distinct example, which will be featured shortly, is the scene of Lee's battle against the samurai sword in *Fist of Fury*. The scene intimately interacts with the historical and social context of antagonisms between Japanese imperialism and the Asian people, represented by the symbolism of weaponry and choreography. This symbolically charged scene contests the mythology of Japanese imperialism with dramatic effect, while offering the audience a politically empowering narrative of popular defense and liberation.

Most of Lee's decolonizing kinetic narratives, however, convey more philosophical implications than the overt political symbolism laid out in the battle scene with the Japanese sword. They in fact cover a wide range of subject matters: Tao, Nature, self-expression, ontology, and freedom. It is this general mode, more or less in an abstract form, that comes face to face with the totality of the historical and social experience of a particular time, in this case the dawn of the age of globalization in Asia. As such, through a critical analysis of Lee's kinetic art in a social and historical context, one can unravel a sort of liberation philosophy in motion, which underscores the decolonization struggle of the Asian people on a symbolic level.

The allegorical link that renders Lee's artistic expression a symbolic representative of the mass movement in Asia can be elucidated by the configuration of the social subject of decolonization. As we will see, the nationalist liberation reified by Chen Zhen in *Fist of Fury* resonated deeply with the ethos

of the student movement in Hong Kong, Thailand, and the Philippines. Furthermore, in transcending the dialectic of liberation nationalism and imperialism, Lee's kine-aesthetic of freedom prefigured the evolutionary path of the Asian mass movement from nationalism to democratization, leading toward the antiglobalization movement.

Although the main cinematic text is *Fist of Fury*, Bruce Lee's two other kung fu films made in Hong Kong—*The Big Boss* (*Tang Shan Dai Xiong*, 1971) and *The Way of the Dragon* (*Meng Tang Guo Jiang*, 1973)—are also included, for Bruce Lee's autonomous domain of expression exists as a continuum in the path of constantly evolving concepts and *modus operandi*. In other words, it is the totality of Bruce Lee's artistic expression that is presented here as the basis of my political analysis.

#### THE POLITICS OF BRUCE LEE'S EXPRESSION

In *Fist of Fury*, Bruce Lee's kine-aesthetic and performative narratives are expressed in two intertwined modes: symbolic articulation and kinetic articulation. As mentioned earlier, these narratives appear to be at slight variance with the official narrative of the kung fu cultural revolution, due to their semi-autonomy from the dictate of the management. The variance here, however, is not a deviation from the thematic foundation of the kung fu cultural revolution (i.e., a decolonization struggle against Japanese imperialism). On the contrary, it is a creative reinterpretation of that foundation, whereby the narratives attain a more general level of allegory beyond the confinement of pan-Chinese nationalism. The symbolic articulation unpacks a historical and political narrative congealed in *nunchaku* (numchucks), and the kinetic articulation organizes philosophical concepts and ideas into a narrative of liberation.

#### Nunchaku: The Weapon of Popular Defense

The culminating battle scene in *Fist of Fury* involves Chen Zhen's final confrontation with Suzuki, the master of the Japanese dojo, who in the film was responsible for the assassination of the grandmaster of Jing Wu school. As Suzuki resorts to the ultimate weapon of Japanese martial arts, the *katana*, Chen Zhen responds to the incessant strikes of Suzuki's blade with *nunchaku*, two metal or wooden sticks joined by a chain.

Despite anticipated criticism for not using Chinese weapons in an overtly patriotic film, Lee chose *nunchaku* as a featured weapon for *Fist of Fury*. According to Linda Lee, Bruce Lee had done research on various



weapons for his choreography: “His library contained many books about weapons, both ancient and modern, Oriental and Western, and he saw the *nunchaku* as historically justified. . . .”<sup>1</sup> In perusing the history of *nunchaku*, one would ineluctably come into contact with the history of Okinawa, or Ryukyu. Two aspects of the history of Ryukyu have particular relevance to the formation of its marital arts, *tou-di*, and to the development of *nunchaku* as a weapon of self-defense. One is the history of cultural exchange between China and Okinawa, fostered through their tributary relationship, and the other is their shared history of colonial conquest by Japan.

The historical origin of *tou-di* can be traced back to the late fourteenth century when three kingdoms of Ryukyu responded to the Ming court’s call for a tributary relationship. The inauguration of the tributary relationship instituted a regular exchange of special envoys (*Sapposhi*) along with a delegation of young Ryukyu aristocrats to study abroad in China, leading to increased interaction between Chinese and Okinawan merchants and traders. Consequently this interactive process brought about a settlement of Chinese in Ryukyu called Kuninda Village.<sup>2</sup> The cultural, political, moral, and spiritual ethos of Confucianism and Taoism were thus introduced to the Ryukyu kingdoms along with arts, crafts, navigation, and the art of public administration.<sup>3</sup> The Chinese art of self-defense was one of the cultural assets brought to Okinawa through envoys, cultural experts in Kuninda, and merchants and traders.

In the early fifteenth century, having gained its power through the tributary relationship, the Sho clan of Chuzan (meaning the “middle country”) united the three kingdoms. King Sho Shin of the second Sho dynasty (1477–1526) implemented a policy of demilitarization on the *Anji*, or the lord class, relocated them to the capital, and stored the confiscated weapons in the royal armory to be used solely for national defense.<sup>4</sup> Taking advantage of the kingdom’s disarmament, the Satsuma domain of Japan invaded Okinawa in 1609 with approximately three thousand soldiers equipped with *katana* and firearms and subsequently colonized Okinawa.<sup>5</sup> As part of the colonial rule, Satsuma destroyed the government’s sword smithy and declared a total ban on the import of weaponry. As far as Okinawa’s ties to China were concerned, Satsuma in fact hid its colonial presence and encouraged the kingdom to maintain the tributary relationship.

The ban on weaponry imposed upon the Ryukyu populace—first by the kingdom and later by the colonizer—gave definite incentives for Okinawan people to develop a system of self-defense by actively assimilating the Chinese martial arts. According to Ryukyu historian Iha Fuyu, the cultivation of Ryukyu martial arts through an interface with Chinese martial arts transcended class boundaries and was widespread among merchants and peasants.

This was particularly so after the Satsuma invasion, wherein the cultivation of martial arts had gone underground in guarded secrecy.<sup>6</sup> The synergetic effect of the ban on weaponry and the active importation of Chinese martial arts prompted the birth of *tou-di*. It was thus a product of the metallurgical relationship between Okinawan indigenous martial arts or Ryukyu *Kobudo* (literally, the ancient martial way) and Chinese marital arts.

Taira Shinken, a native *tou-di* master who compiled an encyclopedia of Ryukyu *Kobudo*, defines this ancient system of self-defense as a “martial arts of the masses.”<sup>7</sup> Characteristically, *Kobudo*—composed of *Sai-jutsu* and *Bo-jutsu*—was based on the use of the “everyday tools” of fishing and farming people.<sup>8</sup> *Nunchaku*, for instance, originated in rice flails and the horse’s bit and bridle, along with *tonfa*, a boat oar or milestone handles and *kama*, a sickle.<sup>9</sup> From a practical standpoint, *Sai-jutsu*, the system to which *nunchaku* belongs, was designed specifically for a defense against the blade or *katana*.<sup>10</sup> *Tou-di*, which incorporated *Sai-jutsu* and *Bo-jutsu*, thus proved useful for “defending . . . against samurai at home, and pirates while at sea during trade missions.”<sup>11</sup>

The near-absence of recorded instances of major insurrections against the colonial rule by the Okinawan masses, in fact, suggests alternative and covert modes of decolonization struggle. The development and refinement of *tou-di* into a system of self-defense propelled by the Okinawan masses can therefore be viewed as a clandestine and creative expression of their historical antagonism toward Japanese colonial power. Thus, despite Japan’s attempt to erase its history of colonial appropriation of *tou-di* (Chinese hand) by changing its name to *karate* (empty hand),<sup>12</sup> *tou-di* as an embodiment of the Ryukyu people’s history and identity is preserved and reified in the form of *nunchaku*. In Chen Zhen’s final battle scene with Suzuki, Lee transfers the historical legacy of *nunchaku* to the context of Chinese anticolonial resistance, adding a symbolic dimension to the film .

*Upon seeing Chen Zhen defeating a Russian wrestler he hired, Suzuki hides himself behind the fusuma sliding door, grabs the sword ostentatiously exhibited on the Tokonoma (a display space), withdraws himself further interior, and awaits Chen Zhen’s entry. Chen Zhen opens one door after another with great caution ‘till he reaches Suzuki’s hiding place. When Chen Zhen finally opens the door of Suzuki’s study, he is immediately greeted with a quick strike of the sword. The sword mercilessly and incessantly falls upon Chen Zhen. Chen Zhen skillfully evades the attack. Flying into the air, Chen Zhen grabs a wood staff on the upper rail of the sliding door. The sword versus the wood staff. Suzuki’s sword chops off the staff with ease, reducing it to the size of a*

*baton. Before Suzuki can grin prematurely, Chen Zhen finds another weapon—gravel in an ash tray—and splashes them at Suzuki. While Suzuki is temporarily deprived of his eyesight, Chen Zhen pulls out his nunchaku, swings around his body, and tucks one end under his arm, making a ready position. Enter nunchaku. As if to conceal his bewilderment with this unknown weapon, Suzuki intensifies his attacks like a cobra's snap. The shrieking sound of two metals in collision. The sword versus nunchaku. Suzuki gapes as his sword proves to be impenetrable while Chen Zhen stares back at Suzuki with the strange calmness of a mongoose. The stalemate is broken by two quick whips of nunchaku to Suzuki's face, a sweeping low blow to his feet, and a high blow to the sword. Suzuki barely escapes what could have been a fatal blow to his head, which shatters the desk lamp behind him into pieces. Now that Suzuki is disarmed, Chen Zhen throws his nunchaku down on the floor with a fierce scream and enters into hand-to-hand classic kung fu combat.*

Incorporating *nunchaku*, perhaps the most efficient weapon against *katana*, into the narrative of decolonization struggles in modern China underscores a new way of telling the story about those struggles, and a new way of imagining an alternate history. Lee's fictional intervention salvages historical realism in the realm of symbolic narrative, where the antagonism between Japanese imperialism and the Chinese people is articulated in antinomy between *nunchaku* and *katana*. There are at least two levels of political connotation effected by this symbolic narrative. Firstly, the juxtaposition aesthetically contests the image of the samurai as it is constituted by the cinematization of samurai mythology. Secondly, it uncovers the nexus that unites the diverse historical instances of the Asian people's resistance to the Japanese empire.

As *katana* is reconstituted as an entertainment spectacle by Japanese Hollywoodism, it is processed into a simulacrum of Japan's invincibility, virtually nullifying the historical antagonism already embedded in the very existence of the samurai sword. David Desser dissects the symbolism of samurai films:

The key image in the genre is the samurai sword itself. The wearing in full view of the long killing sword (*daito*) immediately places one within the genre of the samurai. And it is the use of this sword to bring the narrative conflicts into resolution that basically defines the form.<sup>13</sup>

Consequently, the upholding of *katana* as a symbolic dominant, as a means of narrative resolution, in samurai movies, has rendered the symbolic adversary—that which represents the history and culture of resistance to Japanese impe-

rialism—totally unthinkable, or virtually nonexistent. Just as the “Cowboy and Indian” mythology in western movies has in effect yielded a revision of history through the conqueror’s point of view, the Japanese equivalent of samurai/*katana* imagery has contributed to the whitewashing of historical antagonism. And by extension, such mythology suppresses the historical existence of the myriad social movements against Japanese colonial domination in Asia. Positing *nunchaku* as a symbolic adversary to samurai/*katana* in the film brings the balance back to a contested terrain of history: whenever there is *katana*, there is *nunchaku*. Thus, by giving a figurative form to the voices of dissent and resistance (i.e., the other side of the history), *nunchaku* emerges as a perfect representative of the spirit of the kung fu cultural revolution, reinvigorating its decolonizing imagery.

On the second level of political signification, *nunchaku* illuminates an intimate historical relationship between the Chinese and Okinawan people. It facilitates the convergence of the people’s history between China and Okinawa on a symbolic level. Furthermore, a double identity of *nunchaku* as an agricultural tool and a weapon of popular defense evokes other historic instances of popular struggle against Japan’s colonial conquests in other parts of Asia such as Vietnam, the Philippines, and Korea. *Nunchaku* thus serves as a shifter that transfers our view of history from its particularity to a much more general level where the people’s history in Asia in its totality can be made comprehensible, overcoming a compartmentalized and imperialist centered representation of history. Though subtle in effect, such symbolic articulation nevertheless opens up the world of kung fu movies—which are primarily circumscribed by the Chinese lifeworld—to a transcultural space of Asia.

The symbolic articulation and transcultural orientation embedded in the adaptation of *nunchaku* ushers in a poetic reorganization of the prevalent mode of political and historical narratives of the kung fu film genre. Characteristically, they interject a general narrative of decolonization and anti-imperialist struggle into a particular political and historical context within the kung fu film genre, whereby the decolonizing social subject situated in the people’s history of Asia can be *figuratively realized*. Particularly, the symbolic space of solidarity of the Asian people generates a powerful narrative that not only represents history from the people’s perspective, but also engages with the course of history.

#### Having No Way as Wu Wei: Dance of Infinity<sup>14</sup>

Due perhaps to the fact that the choreography with *nunchaku* contains more symbolic than kinetic language, the meaning produced from it tends to be



FIGURE 2.1. *Katana versus nunchaku from Fist of Fury.*

more specific to the historical and geographical context of the thematic foundation of the kung fu cultural revolution. As we will see shortly, the kinetic language submerged in the *nunchaku* choreography is given a space of the articulation of more general themes (i.e., Taoist concepts) in another combat scene with multiple opponents. And the pinnacle of kinetic articulation comes with Chen Zhen's dramatic battle with a Russian wrestler. In this extended and elaborate piece of choreography, Lee was able to attempt preliminary exploration of a new philosophical paradigm based on a creative interpretation of ancient tradition as well as diverse strains of thoughts. This choreography introduces a synopsis of what would be fully developed into Lee's more refined combative choreography with Chuck Norris in *The Way of the Dragon*. In those spheres of pure kinetic articulation, Lee was able to engage in the foundational questions of being, nature, and self as means of attaining freedom in a total sense of the term.

In order to approach the signification by means of kinetic articulation, the first step would be to capture the aesthetic dimension of Lee's combat choreography. This can be done by reexamining the choreography from an angle of dance choreography, as Hsiung-Ping Chiao aptly observes: "In his films the solo number (his playing with nunchaku), the duet (usually with the arch-villain), or the chorus (with multiple opponents) are designed like the elaborate dance scenes in musicals."<sup>15</sup> Indeed, the more Lee exerts autonomy over his choreography the more aesthetically refined it becomes, closing the gap with a dance piece. For instance, there is a remarkable trace of refinement of the "chorus" choreography with multiple assailants from *The Big Boss* to *Fist of Fury*. The latter's appeal no longer rests on a speedy annihilation of the multiple assailants, but on the way Lee moves his body *with* the multiple assailants.

The "chorus" choreography in *Fist of Fury* comes in the early part of the film where Chen Zhen single-handedly defeats the entire membership (except the master) of the Japanese dojo as an act of revenge against the insult that Jing Wu school had to endure on the day of their grandmaster's funeral. After disposing of the right-hand man (Yoshida) of Hongkew dojo, Chen Zhen is encircled by almost every member of the dojo. Judo wrestlers launch their attacks on Chen Zhen simultaneously:

*As if Chen Zhen could sense each wrestler's move at the level of intention, he intercepts every incoming move with diverse kicks in multiple directions, keeping his position firmly grounded at the center of the circle. Now as the wrestlers flood toward the center of the circle, Chen Zhen crushes every move right before it touches his body. At this*

*stage, Chen Zhen's defensive moves (e.g., ducking), offensive moves (e.g., punching, kicking, and throwing), and neutral moves (e.g., rising and descending and turning) are all blended into a long sequence of movement with Judo wrestlers. The collective kinetic movement fills up the space of the dojo like an intense energy field. When the intensity of collective movement reaches its height, it begins to represent "chaos," constituted by a quasi-spontaneous movement of attraction and repulsion.*

The choreographic composition is constructed in such a way as to facilitate the convergence of the conceptual elements of "chaos" and "spontaneity." Starting off with a relatively homogenous kinetic composition of kicks, Lee gradually proliferates his movement with a combination of diverse techniques. The acceleration of heterogeneity in kinetic composition comes to its fruition, where it looks as though Chen Zhen were responding to the incoming forces spontaneously, utilizing his body in whatever way is appropriate at a particular moment. In order to generate such a simulated effect of spontaneity, Lee carefully avoids repetition of similar moves or techniques and pays a great attention to timing.

The representation of "chaos" (as the order of nature) and "spontaneity" by means of limitless use of the body is Bruce Lee's kinetic translation of the concept of *wu wei*. In his first book on martial arts, *Chinese Gung Fu: The Philosophical Art of Self-Defense*, Lee defined the notion of *wu wei* as "a spontaneous or spirit action" that is "according to the circumstances without prearrangement."<sup>16</sup> Through his approach to *wu wei*, Lee brings himself close to the writings of Chuang Tzu, which takes one's mind back to the infinity of Mother Nature and validates common folks who "d[o] not ponder or ratiocinate on the course of action," hence, are in tune with the working of Tao.<sup>17</sup> In fact, Chuang Tzu's episode of Cook Ding (*Pao Ding*)<sup>18</sup> recurs in Lee's writings on kung fu as a model for a "kung fu man [*sic*]" who could preserve himself "by following the movement of his opponent without opposition" or more fundamentally by "follow[ing] nature."<sup>19</sup>

Like Chuang Tzu, who sought liberation from the institutionalization that he found in the conventional system of values, standards, and signification, Lee questioned the systematization and formalization of the movement prevalent in the world of martial arts. In his search, Lee came to understand that one must strive to go beyond styles, systems, and other types of conditioning that limit one's kinetic capability at a given moment in order to fully realize freedom: for "life is wide, limitless—there is no border, no frontier."<sup>20</sup>

The more Lee took this path of "wander[ing] where there is no path,"<sup>21</sup> the further he began to expand the horizon of his philosophy and art. He

eagerly incorporated diverse strains of thought and styles into the base that he formed with the tradition of Chinese philosophy and the *Wing Chun* school.<sup>22</sup> The pursuit of freedom in action—expressed through the mind and body in their totality—thus became the paramount agenda of Lee’s artistic expression. In terms of Lee’s artistic, philosophical, and personal development, this state of new awareness marks the beginning of his *Jeet Kune Do* period, distinguishable from the previous *Gung Fu* period.

With *Jeet Kune Do* (which means “the way of intercepting fist”), Lee’s philosophical, artistic, and combative engagement assumes a dance with truth that he locates in an ever-changing flux, as the motto of *Jeet Kune Do* conveys: “Having no way as the only way. Having no style as the only style.” Due to its commitment to the immediate realization of freedom, the kinetic expression of *Jeet Kune Do* philosophy is more prone to political allegory than his Taoist-based philosophy of the *Gung Fu* period. Particularly when kinetic expression is communicated through a duet form—which translates concepts and ideas into a dialogic mode—the choreography could come into direct contact with the question of power.

The duet pieces common to the genre of kung fu films are exemplified in the climactic battle of *The Big Boss*, which fall short of generating any meaningful allegory, be it political or philosophical. The only kinetic narrative elements that can be gleaned from the duel between Lee as Cheng and the Big Boss are: technique versus technique and force versus force. Inevitably, therefore, the battle is drawn out and contains quite a few moments of stand-off as a result of the collision of two equal forces, contesting over the styles each represents. The interlocked state is resolved by the surrealist and occult hands of Cheng that penetrate into the belly of the opponent, releasing a shower of blood. Such escapism into metaphysics and goriness, common to the genre, shows the absence of a symbolic resolution to the purported contradiction represented by the duet (e.g., class antagonism), even if there is a formal resolution on the narrative level.

In *Fist of Fury*, Lee attained quasi-autonomy over his choreography and exerted artistic control over his duet piece by casting one of his students, Bob Baker, who plays a Russian wrestler. Although the inclusion of a Russian wrestler is a perfect tribute to the grandmaster of the Jing Wu school who became a legend in his triumphant combat with Russian wrestlers, it is clearly a “side track” from the narrative focus of the kung fu cultural revolution. In terms of political allegory, the battle with a Caucasian villain could elevate the theme of anti-Japanese imperialism to a more general level where the structure of imperialism as such can be visually decoded. Setting aside such political implications for now, the duet with Bob Baker primarily provided Lee a



creative space in which to engage in artistic expression beyond the convention of the kung fu genre.

In contrast to the chorus, the duet is capable of elaborating on the connection between an unlimited use of body and *wu wei* in a narrative sequence. The kinetic narrative discusses the path from a state of bondage/constraint to a dance of infinity as *wu wei*, in at least three stages or phases. The first stage, which culminates in a display of classical form, depicts the collision of forces based upon the institutionalized identity of a martial artist. The second phase shows the state of mutual destruction by two contending fighters whose physical structure, power, and mastery of art are on a comparable level. The third phase opens with Chen Zhen performing a technique unconventional for an established martial artist (i.e., the biting of a foot) that dissolves the deadlock as well as the self-imposed identity of a conventional martial artist. The combat thereafter becomes an intricate dance that exemplifies a triumph of mobility and freedom over stylized forms and moves.

Questions of style, form, and other types of institutionalization are posed in the first two stages. As Chen Zhen and the Russian wrestler engage in combat faithful to their styles and forms, the duel ineluctably resembles an institutionalized martial arts tournament or a conventional fighting scene of the kung fu movie genre. The pattern consists of variations of basic moves (i.e., punches, kicks, and blocks). In the second phase, the duel intensifies with the same combative principle, but it also proliferates into more complex techniques (i.e., hand trapping, grappling, and locking). Preceding to the second phase is an interlude in which both sides readjust themselves to the basic form/kata, capitulating the theme of those first two stages: the “institutionalized” or “robotic” use of body wherein one is “performing his [*sic*] stylized blocks and listening to his [*sic*] own screaming and not seeing what the opponent is really doing.”<sup>23</sup> The contest over the superiority of styles, upon which a martial artist’s identity hinges, is being critiqued here as a symptom of a trapped mindset where one is expressing conditioning or bondage rather than one’s self.

Given the basic narrative structure of the film, one would expect Lee to prove the superiority of Chinese kung fu over other styles of martial arts. The *Wing Chun*-style kung fu in which Lee was trained could have been a perfect vehicle for demonstrating its advantage over other styles, particularly the Japanese karate to which Bob Baker alludes in their duet piece. The combative principle of *Wing Chun*-style kung fu or *Wing Chun Kuen*, is based on the channeling of opponents’ energy back at themselves so that they will eventually defeat themselves with their own energy. Its principle is embodied in its “sticky hand” technique or *chi sao*, which is “quietly alive, that is, soft and supple but unyielding; forceful and firm but not hard or inflexible.”<sup>24</sup> If Lee were

to demonstrate the ascendancy of a Chinese martial arts characterized by its seemingly soft, yet flexible and efficient style over a masculine, powerful, yet rigid style such as Japanese karate, it would have spawned a somewhat predictable but convincingly clear narrative: the eventual triumph of feminized/oppressed China over masculine/imperialist Japan. As empowering as this may seem, such a parable would have left the power of institutionalization intact at the primary level of reality, as Lee contends:

Please do not be concerned with soft versus firm, kicking versus striking, grappling versus hitting and kicking, long-range fighting versus in-fighting. There is no such thing as “this” is better than “that.” Should there be one thing we must guard against, let it be partiality that robs us of our pristine wholeness and makes us lose unity in the midst of duality.<sup>25</sup>

In other words, a blind faith in styles and systems reflects a mindset caught up in duality: the legitimacy of forms, patterns, and styles rests on the exclusion of the “other” (possibilities and options) whereby the dual notions of “right” and “wrong” or “appropriate” and “inappropriate” can be conceived.<sup>26</sup>

Lee’s engagement with the conceptual foundation of styles and systems proposes an ontological revolution: freedom can be envisaged as transcendence of the “partiality of the being” that results from, in a manner of Zen discourse, the enslavement of the mind to the “imagined spiritual states as ‘objects.’”<sup>27</sup> Grounded in the institutionalization of styles and forms, one can “too easily become hypostatized and turn into idols that obsess and delude the seeker.”<sup>28</sup> Such an identity colonized by the institutionalization of art loses a sense of subjectivity and becomes something to be possessed (as “objects”). Thus the attainment of “pure being,” or the totality of being in an immediate sphere (in an ever-changing present or “thusness”), according to Lee, leads one to the path of freedom, to an infinite state of one’s being.<sup>29</sup>

The second stage of a combat, where the identity of a martial artist is clearly defined by the institution of forms and styles, comes to a logical dead end symbolized by a deadlock in which both combatants grab each other with maximum force. The Russian wrestler’s textbook-style arm lock on Chen Zhen demarcates the end of formal combat. If this combat were a tournament match, the arm lock would conclude the duel, marking the ascendancy of a style that effectively utilizes ground techniques such as grappling and locking. Nevertheless, the formal ending of a duel does not mean the end of a fight or a struggle.

The third phase opens with Chen Zhen’s biting of the Russian wrestler’s leg like a mad dog, which not only dissolves the arm lock but also spoils the

legitimacy of institutionalized combat altogether. Chen Zhen's "unruly" move brings about a moment of clarity, as it were, when the identity of a martial artist colonized by the institutionalization of forms and styles is undermined at its foundation. It is a moment where one encounters the real, "thusness," or "suchness," and becomes aware of the fact that "set patterns, incapable of adaptability, or pliability, only offer a better cage. Truth is outside of all patterns."<sup>30</sup> The infinite field opens up as one moves beyond the confinement of the colonized identity of a martial artist. The new identity is no longer based on the styles and forms external to the combat, but on the ever-changing reality of combat, and ultimately, on truth. Yet, truth is not external (as a transcendent absolute) but internal to the real, for truth is a "relationship with the opponent; constantly moving, living, never static."<sup>31</sup>

Lee's ontological revolution, therefore, seems to be comprehensible only as an active process, *in movement*, rather than as a mode of static philosophical speculation or preserved pedagogy. The realization of freedom by means of transcending the partiality of being can only be achieved through constant movement where one is in a dynamic relationship with an ever-changing and living truth. This "transcendence-without-a-transcendental-category," if kinetically translated, would take the form of a free-flowing dance, in which one is constantly changing positions in relationship with the ever-changing movement of an opponent, or more correctly, a partner.

Bruce Lee illustrates this philosophical concept by switching Chen Zhen's move from a combative collision to a rhythmic dance with the Russian wrestler, grooving into lively footwork reminiscent of Muhammad Ali. Instead of blocking, Chen Zhen now ducks, sways, and moves around to evade the opponent's punches and kicks. Chen Zhen no longer "performs" styles but becomes alive, engaging himself with what unfolds at every moment. The transcendence of institutionalized patterns and forms is sought further and finds its concrete expressions in trickery moves, feints, and other deceptive moves. For practical purposes, the deceptive moves in general are intended primarily to bait the opponent into a disadvantageous state and spoil his/her game plan. If combined with broken rhythms, these deceptive moves could entail a tactical disengagement with regulated, and hence predictable, movements whose foundation is based ultimately on stylization and routinization. On an ontological level, therefore, deceptive moves realize a dissolution of the institutionalized identity/being in an immediate sense.

The dance comes to a conclusion with Lee's "stop-hit" kick to the opponent. The concept of "stop-hit" gives a finishing touch to the whole question of the transcendence of institutionalization: "Essentially, a stop-hit arrests the opponent in the development of his [*sic*] attack. It can be direct or indirect. It

may be used as he [*sic*] steps forward to kick or punch, when he [*sic*] is preoccupied with feigning, or between two moves of a complicated combination.”<sup>32</sup> The concept of “stop-hit” is resonant with the original meaning of *Jeet Kune Do*, which literally means “the way of intercepting fist.” More importantly, “stop-hit” epitomizes the conceptual foundation of *Jeet Kune Do* in that it does not presuppose any positions nor form/kata, but is a pure engagement with an ever-changing moment of truth by any movements necessary.

The point can be made much more clear if we juxtapose the concept of “stop-hit” to the principle of *Wing Chun*. The *Wing Chun* style teaches one to sense and intercept the opponent’s moves at the “gates,” the perimeter of defense constituted by the positions of arms and legs, originating from the centerline of the body. The series of maneuvers are executed upon the entry of the opponent’s body at those “gates,” or predetermined zones. The “perimeter” of defense in “stop-hit” involves not so much a space—predetermined or otherwise—as a moment in which truth manifests in an ever-changing relationship between oneself and the opponent. In other words, it is a constant assessment and reassessment of “what is” and “thusness” in the ever-changing reality of a combat that confers one a power to approach the truth of combat. The pivotal aspect of the dance of infinity thus lies in this constant search for truth in an ever-fresh and emerging reality.

Although the duet piece in *Fist of Fury* contains distinct conceptual units in a narrative sequence, the kinetic narrative itself is not clearly articulated due to a lack of cohesive structure. The fact that Lee had limited control over his kinetic expression in the film as well as the editing process likely prevented Lee from fully exploring the kinetic narrative through movement.

### When the Dance of Infinity Turns into the Dance of Subversion

Lee’s kinetic narrative in *Fist of Fury* leans toward philosophical introspection rather than redundantly reinforcing an already politically charged narrative. The full exploration of kinetic narrative, to be continued from *Fist of Fury*, was materialized with a political vengeance in Lee’s subsequent, ostensibly pure-entertainment-oriented film, *The Way of the Dragon*. From this third film on, Lee expanded the arena of artistic expression into directing and script writing, as he cofounded Concord with Raymond Chow as a subsidiary of Golden Harvest.

Centered on the lives of struggling overseas Chinese during the Chinese New Year, the film is fraught with a festive atmosphere in which speedy action sequences, filled with serious martial arts choreography, remind the audience

of the film's kung fu identity. The themes of betrayal and revenge—narrative staples of a kung fu movie—are present, and yet the overall plot does not seem to sustain any historical nor political undertone. Tang Lung (literally meaning “Chinese Dragon”), played by Lee, is a country bumpkin from Hong Kong sent to Rome to help resolve a crisis faced by his relatives concerning their restaurant. After the death of the original owner, the restaurant was passed on to the owner's daughter, Chen (played by Nora Miao, who played Lee's fiancée in *Fist of Fury*), who now faces the threat of forceful eviction by the Italian Mafia. With his skill in kung fu, Tang Lung becomes an effective bodyguard who can impede the Mafia's plan. Having exhausted their local resources to subdue Tang Lung, the Mafia hires mercenaries, one of whom is a karate master from America named Colt (played by Chuck Norris). The dispute between the Mafia and the overseas Chinese community is to be resolved through a battle between Colt and Tang Lung that takes place at the Roman Colosseum. The entire plot seems to be designed for the sole purpose of setting up the stage for a climactic fight at the Colosseum.

The climactic kinetic narrative of *The Way of the Dragon* actualizes a symbolic political expression that remained a mere potential in the previous film. Through kinetic signification the climactic battle introduces a vivid social context of contemporary Asia (under Japanese and American neo-imperial hegemony) to the kung fu cultural revolution in the realm of the unconscious. The battle between Tang Lung and Colt thus contains a symbolic weaving of the paradigm of the kung fu cultural revolution with the actual process by which people were making history in Asia at that particular time. It is done not by way of a historical metaphor as in most conventional kung fu films, but by way of a direct engagement with the real, through kinetic and symbolic languages. Though the kinetic narratives of both *Fist of Fury* and *The Way of the Dragon* share a similar structure, the latter entails a higher degree of realism and brings pragmatic, yet highly metaphoric, questions into the film.

*“Prelude” and “Introduction.”* The scene of exercise preceding the battle, or the “prelude,” highlights the contrast between Colt and Tang Lung in terms of institutionalized identity: whereas Tang Lung spends time stretching his body to gain elasticity and flexibility, Colt emphasizes the Herculean quality of his body by pumping it up with karate kata practice. After maintaining classical stances for a while, Tang Lung and Colt synergistically announce the “introduction,” characterized by an intense exchange of kicks, a display of destructive forces that generates the conventional kinetic narrative of the kung fu genre (i.e., force vs. force and technique vs. technique). The progression of the

fight until the stand-off bears a close resemblance to the existential question raised in *Fist of Fury* pertaining to the immanent state of a martial artist's identity, conditioned by institutionalization. Nonetheless, in stark contrast to the latter, which moved to a phase of mutual destruction, the stand-off in *The Way of the Dragon* opens the "first chapter," which gives an ominous air to an audience whose hero is imperiled by a powerful opponent.

"*First Chapter.*" Some of the actions in the "first chapter" can be examined here as conceptual units of the kinetic narrative. Every time Tang Lung enters the combat range, Colt responds with massive destructive power. Like a flying insect fatally attracted to a fire, Tang Lung's moves are greeted by Colt's speedy offensive maneuvers, which pin him to the ground three consecutive times. During Tang Lung's second fall, there is a brief stand-off reminiscent of the duet in *Fist of Fury*, but in reverse order: this time it is the protagonist who is on the ground, completely overpowered by his opponent. The stand-off dissolves as Tang Lung grabs Colt's hairy chest, implicating the transgression in *Fist of Fury* that signaled the turning of the course of events. Betraying the audience's expectation, however, Tang Lung's renewed advance is crushed again by Colt's over-determining counteroffensive. Colt stands triumphantly over Tang Lung, who falls on the ground for the third time, and waves his fingers to the latter as if to warn him not to play with fire. The crisis falls on the hero and he is given a moment of introspection.

The kinetic narrative of the "first chapter" confronts us with a straightforward question of power. It is not only the institutionalization of one's identity but also a power difference or absolute inequality—difference in size, strength, and power—that Tang Lung must overcome in order to attain freedom. As the immanent state of a martial artist is thus recontextualized, realism and pragmatism are integrated into the question of transcendence. The recognition of absolute inequality accordingly shifts the ground from the philosophical to the political, involving the dialectic intertwined with dualism, as a central theme. As we shall see, overcoming the power difference is linked to the transcendence of duality: it is the recognition of absolute inequality that gives rise to the necessity of transcending the duality, and only through the latter can absolute inequality be overcome.

"*Second Chapter.*" The "Second Chapter" begins with the image of Tang Lung's rhythmically shuffling feet in fluid movement. In lieu of face-to-face confrontation with Colt, Tang Lung retreats in a circular direction, using his hands and arms not so much to block, but rather as to gauge safe distance. His escape from Colt is a purposive one as he immediately reappears on the border of combat range enticing Colt into another advance. Tang Lung keeps

slipping away from Colt's incessant attacks in circular retreat. Gradually, as Tang Lung moves out of passivity, he engages in a subtle gesture to bait Colt's powerful advance. Another sign of his regaining of the initiative is Tang Lung's shift from blocking to ducking in order to evade attacks. While Colt expends his energy vainly, Tang Lung not only conserves, but effectively rechannels energy into flexibility and mobility.

Tang Lung's attempt to regain initiative by becoming mobile and flexible conjures up the fundamental principle of guerrilla warfare systematically formulated by Mao Tse-tung during China's resistance against Japan's aggression.<sup>33</sup> Mao discerned that absolute inequality can be made relative by shifting engagement from strategic to a tactical terrain.<sup>34</sup> Underlying this paradigmatic shift is a transcendence of the most institutionalized form of duality (i.e., strong/weak, superior/inferior, active/passive, etc.) wherein inequality is perceived as "reality" or something "inevitable." Guerilla warfare therefore is premised on the paradoxical subversion of inequality by transcending such dualism, or more practically speaking, by seeking "offensive in defensive, superiority in inferiority, strength in weakness, advantage in disadvantages, and initiative in passivity."<sup>35</sup> In other words, transcendence of the dualistic mind is a necessity for overcoming an unequal relationship.

"*Third Chapter.*" With the "second chapter" the absolute inequality that existed between Tang Lung and Colt is dissolved, accordingly, bringing both to an equal level in a relative sense. Colt can no longer exert his superior force and strength upon the opponent, because there is no contact, hence, no entry point for engagement. Moreover, due to his unilateral expenditure of energy, his power gradually loses its absolute superiority. Creating relative parity, however, does not mean triumph for Tang Lung. He is now in the position to initiate the dance of infinity. Tang Lung's counteroffensive is characterized by creativity of movement, broken rhythm, accuracy, unpredictability, and the overall sense of flexibility. The creativity of movement restores the sense of subjectivity to the "disadvantaged" one.

Flexibility entails an active engagement with an ever-changing situation of combat. As such, flexibility ultimately ushers in spontaneity of action or *wu wei*. As the duet piece in *Fist of Fury* demonstrated, transcendence of institutions through *wu wei* takes its form as deceptive moves in a combat situation. This "chapter" makes Lee's deceptive moves more dramatic than those in *Fist of Fury* by spotlighting his kicks. The most exemplar display of creative deception involves an unusual kick with his rear leg crossing over his lead leg. By repeating this maneuver, Tang Lung draws Colt's attention to this anomaly at which point Tang Lung surprises Colt with his normal high kick. The aim of




FIGURE 2.2. The dance of infinity from *The Way of the Dragon*.



the repetition of unusual moves seems not only to mislead, but also to incite psychological irritation and confusion. The subsequent fall of Colt—the very first time in the battle—seems to be caused less by the weight and force of Tang Lung’s kick than by the element of surprise and psychological disorder induced by his perturbing moves. The strategic plane of combat—Colt’s domain of operation, in which the movement is more or less regulated—is undermined and rendered vulnerable by Tang Lung’s tactical maneuvers.

*“Fourth Chapter” and “Postscript.”* Due to the loss of his strategic advantage, Colt is now put in a defensive position. Although Colt attempts to join Tang Lung’s rhythmic shuffle, his movement as a whole is still homogeneous, failing to attain pure spontaneity. Colt’s repetitious sidekicks give a perfect opportunity for Tang Lung to intercept with the “stop-hit.” Given the context of an unequal power relationship, this “stop-hit” proclaims in unequivocal terms the subversion of the power relationship. It marks the pinnacle of the *Jeet Kune Do* philosophy, in that with a creative, flexible, and rhythmic approach to movement, one can overcome the opponent by leading him/her to the path of self-destruction. The most critical pedagogical message of the “stop-hit,” therefore, is the overcoming of the powerful not by superseding their power and force, which leaves the strategic plane intact, but by changing the ground and the rules of engagement altogether: a new paradigm.

The “Postscript” is a reversal of the “Second Chapter”: this time Tang Lung overwhelms Colt. Still, unlike the “Second Chapter,” the battle assumes a protracted nature as Colt’s superior physical make-up can absorb the impact of Tang Lung’s offense. This is also due to the fact that Tang Lung’s counteroffensive is more focused on inducing Colt’s self-defeat than on exceeding his physical strength. The intensity of the battle slowly winds down as Colt’s physical power runs its course. Tang Lung receives Colt’s final charge in a grappling position and puts an end to the battle by breaking his neck. The scene of a “funeral” follows as Tang Lung retains Colt’s karate *gi* and places it over Colt’s body—showing a deep respect for the gladiator.

The somberness of the “funeral” suspends the sense of “hero’s triumph,” opening up yet another space for Tang Lung’s introspection. This introspection suggests the possibility of reading the battle as a narrative of Tang Lung’s internal struggle to overcome the duality of the mind by taking a paradoxical leap into infinity. Accordingly, notions of triumph or defeat as such become merely consequential to the transcendental dance with truth. Such a layer of meaning is in fact consistent with Lee’s philosophical system, which views combative art as a means to realize selfhood. The ultimate combat, therefore, is with one’s ego or institutionalized selfhood.

In attempting to further bridge Lee's kinetic sphere of expression and a discursive terrain of decolonization struggle, I find it productive to interpolate a singular political reading of yet another kinetic art, tango, by Marta E. Savigliano. Situated in the history and ongoing material and cultural usurpation of the world by the regime of imperialism and its latest form, transnational globalization, Savigliano exposes complex layers of power relationships—based on the patriarchal, postcolonial, capitalist, and postmodern regimes of power—inherent in the constitution of tango as an exotic commodity packed with passion. In other words, tango can be reexamined as a site where the dialectic of “male/female,” “desire/passion,” “elite/mass,” “colonizer/colonized,” “development/ underdevelopment,” or “civilized/exotic” is being played out. A textual engagement with tango, too, inevitably locates her writing in yet another regime of power, that is, the power of academic discourse through which the colonizing power lurks in the form of schools of thought and academic disciplines even in those that posture as alternative to the mainstream.

As a native practitioner of tango, Savigliano subverts the paradigm by *tangonizing* the discourse, or by asking “theories to dance,” rather than exposing tango to further alienation in the discursive desert.<sup>36</sup> In other words, with rightful obstinacy she lets tango lead her discursive engagement with power. Savigliano's transgressive writing—in sync with the female tango steps that subvert the male dominance at the last instance—finds an intricate dance partner in her compatriot Che Guevara:

My project follows the same course [as Che's guerrilla warfare] in that it is entirely situational. I try to address the specific problem at hand, change tactics as often as necessary, so as to avoid the trappings created by “the rigidity of classical methods.” I place myself under no compulsion to “stick to the subject,” to be “consistent,” or to “follow the argument to its logical conclusion.” Rather, I cherish the ability to flee in the face of overwhelming force, to “trick-back” the colonizing discourse.<sup>37</sup>

Merging Che's guerilla philosophy with her tango writing enables the author to discern her steps with clarity: “The purpose is not to theorize, generalize, or totalize. The purpose is to decolonize.”<sup>38</sup> In this sense, therefore, there is no such thing as the “Last Tango” for her decolonizing struggle. The dance continues so long as the forces of institutionalization, formalization, totalization, and objectification over the selfhood exists in different forms.<sup>39</sup> The decolonization struggle in its totality is therefore not simply about regaining nationhood but autonomy in every sphere of life including the unconscious.

Similarly, there is no finality in Lee's discourse but only a continuous struggle to materialize the space of liberty and the totality of being, defying any type of institutionalization. Thus without telos, Lee's artistic expression and *Jeet Kune Do* as a dance of infinity will urge one to continuously evolve in pursuit of the realization of freedom in an immediate and total sense:

To realize freedom, the mind has to learn to look at life, which is a vast movement without the bondage of time, for freedom lies beyond the field of consciousness. Watch, but don't stop and interpret, "I am free"—then you're living in a memory of something that has gone. To understand and live now, everything of yesterday must die.<sup>40</sup>

Such ontology of liberation demonstrates that the dance of infinity is not only capable of transcending the institutionalized duality of mind but also of freeing one from the dialectic embedded in an unequal power relationship. In an engagement with the dialectic of superior/inferior, colonizer/colonized, strong/weak, oppressor/oppressed, ad infinitum, the dance of infinity does not conclude in the reversal nor overthrowing of the power relationship. Rather, it constantly seeks to destabilize and nullify the very foundation that constitutes these binary opposites in a hierarchical structure.<sup>41</sup> The dance of infinity seeks to materialize equality by dissolving the fundamental basis of contradiction that supports dualism, as well as dialectic, revealing the existence of self in totality and oneness or *wu wei*.

The allegory of this kinetic ontology of freedom on the social level yields empowering connotations for the Asian masses under a renewed form of imperialism, or a nascent form of globalization. The symbolic and kinetic articulation of the path of decolonization can now interface with the living social context. Such interface between the realm of representation and the street may help unravel the constitution of the social subject specific to the context of Asia.

#### BURNING ASIA

The time period in which both *Fist of Fury* and *The Way of the Dragon* were released (1972–1973) marks the zenith of the kung fu cultural revolution. Through its visual folklore, the kung fu cultural revolution articulated the power of the masses in its active role in making history, defying the subjugation to the dominant power.

The finale of *Fist of Fury* recapitulates the emotional core of the populist ideology of the kung fu cultural revolution. This is the scene where Chen

Zhen sacrifices his life for the protection of Jing Wu school. Confronted by a squadron of colonial law enforcers armed with pistols, Chen Zhen runs toward them and makes a leap into the air. The film ends with a freeze-frame of Chen Zhen suspended in mid-air with the apprehensive faces of his surviving classmates, fiancée, master, and the Chinese police inspector in the background. Over the freeze-frame, the sound of executing bullets ricochet, which is followed by a tune with melancholic yet hopeful tone:

The great hero takes revenge and saves his people.  
 Life and death lies at that moment.  
 Leaving behind his love for life.  
 Today the only hope is to see each other in heaven.

Chen Zhen's martyrdom for the imperiled nation is superimposed upon a tragic story of unfulfilled love. Nevertheless, allowing the audience to escape from the constraint of time, the freeze-frame materializes the utopian other world where nationhood and tragic love are released from the hold of colonial power. The freeze-frame thus provides a symbolic space in which one can identify the history of collective suffering and at the same time feel the necessity, or even inevitability, of redemption to come.

The boundary between the theater and the street eroded as *Fist of Fury* unfolded as an unprecedented blockbuster phenomenon throughout Asia. In Hong Kong, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the outbreak of the kung fu cultural revolution coincided with the emergence of a decolonization struggle propelled by the passion of pan-Chinese patriotism, particularly strident in the student movement. The kung fu cultural revolution manifested on the street as the students engaged in the campaign for Chinese as the official language of Hong Kong in 1970, and in the protest against the Japanese occupation of Diaoyutai Island off the coast of Taiwan in the following year, which resulted in a violent clash between the protestors and police force.<sup>42</sup> As Tai Lok Lui and Stephen Wing Kai Chiu explain, the students' direct confrontation with the colonial power precipitated their identification with communist China:

Experience of confronting the colonial government in the process of social participation reinforced the students' critique of colonialism and directed their attention to the look for an alternative. In the context of the early 1970s, this alternative was communist China—representing an alternative to both capitalism and colonialism.<sup>43</sup>

Hence, the student-led nationalist movement directed its energy toward sympathetic identification with communist China, whose status in world politics

had been dramatically boosted by its entry into the UN Security Council in the early 1970s.<sup>44</sup> The ideological make-up of student-led nationalism, accordingly, was a complex synthesis of diverse political orientations. Consequently, the movement itself gave the immediate problems facing Hong Kong under British colonial occupation a secondary priority and thus failed to establish an institutional link with the grassroots population.<sup>45</sup> As we will see later, however, the student-led nationalist movement would subsequently transform itself into a community-oriented social movement, which would then evolved into the democratic social movement of the 1980s.

On one hand, the kung fu cultural revolution did share the pan-Chinese nationalism of the Hong Kong student movement. Yet it was a rather official ideology, since it was based on the market strategy (i.e., a Mandarin format for a Mandarin market) of the Hong Kong film industry at that time. Beneath the surface, however, the nationalism of the kung fu cultural revolution had great potential to relate to a broader spectrum of decolonization struggles, because it reflected the raw social sentiment of the Hong Kong masses under multiple layers of colonization. This is particularly so in Bruce Lee movies where the local Hong Konger's identity was never sacrificed in spite of the official Mandarin format, and also where Caucasians played the role of villains, the allegorical power of the struggle could be far-reaching. The anti-imperialism expressed in the narrative of struggle against the Japanese in the kung fu cultural revolution, therefore, could allegorize Hong Kong's liberation from the British power as well.<sup>46</sup>

Another factor that potentially afforded the Hong Kong audience a metaphorical reading of the anti-Japanese theme was the rise of Hong Kong as one of the NICs (Newly Industrialized Countries) in the early 1970s. Despite the fact that Japan's second invasion by economic means was clearly felt, Hong Kong was no longer a victim of Japanese invasion as it was in 1941. The emerging sense of pride, in both the economic and cultural spheres could have allowed a Hong Kong audience to render the anti-Japanese sentiment less literally than audiences in other parts of Asia.

In the periphery of Asia, by contrast, the impact of the resurgence of Japanese imperialism on the day-to-day lives of the people was much more direct, and perhaps more devastating. *The Big Boss*, Lee's first kung fu film in Hong Kong—for which Golden Harvest chose Thailand as a low-budget location site—inadvertently uncovered the international division of labor within Asia. Lee's personal correspondence with his family draws attention to the dire poverty of rural Thailand (Pak Chong) where the film was shot.<sup>47</sup> The existence of Thailand as the backdrop of a Hong Kong-made kung fu film speaks of the condition of Southeast Asian coun-

tries into which Japan aggressively poured massive capital in manufacturing and resource extraction.

Japanese capital began to encroach upon Thailand's textile industry in the early 1960s, and gradually made its way into heavy manufacturing sectors, making Japan the number one foreign investor in Thailand by the early 1970s.<sup>48</sup> Japan's economic invasion was facilitated by the Thai dictatorial regime, which also gained strength from the invasion. At the other end of the spectrum stood the student movement, which had been in collision with military dictatorships since its inception in 1940 (i.e., the student protest against the French occupation).<sup>49</sup> The centralization of the movement into the National Student Center of Thailand (NSCT, hereafter) in 1969 consolidated the student population as a power bloc with support from peasants and the working class. The first student activism under the martial law of the Thanom dictatorship was an "Anti-Japan Goods Week," a ten-day boycott action launched in November, 1972. The blaze of protest lit in Bangkok soon spread across the country from Chiang Mai, Korat to Hong Khai on the Laoian border, arousing the support of the Thai masses.<sup>50</sup>

Prior to the outbreak of the boycott movement, there was a lesser-known incident that triggered the momentum for the nationwide boycott. In the early 1970s, there emerged a new type of marital arts entertainment in Japan called "kick boxing." It was none other than the colonial appropriation of Muay Thai, the national martial arts of Thailand. The Japanese kick boxing champion, Tadashi Sawamura, became an instant icon which begot a TV cartoon program. The myth of Sawamura was based on the labor of numerous Thai overseas workers who came to Japan as authentic Thai kick boxers to be beaten by the Japanese champion. In Thailand, however, people were enraged by this unscrupulous exploitation of their national culture and their compatriots: "For several years, rumors that Thai-Japanese kick-box matches held in Japan had been fixed in favor of the Japanese boxers have aroused resentment among Thai students both in Japan and in Thailand."<sup>51</sup> Following the path of neo-imperialist expansion in Asia, Japanese kick boxing entrepreneur and trainer inaugurated a kick boxing gymnasium, akin to a dojo, in Bangkok. A month before the launching of the boycott movement, crowds of Thai high school students and university students stood at the gymnasium for two days, "decrying it as a national humiliation."<sup>52</sup> The boundary between *Fist of Fury* and Thailand of 1972 indeed dissolved.

Following the example of the Thai student movement, the student movement in Indonesia conceived its own boycott movement that was crushed by Suharto's regime with the alleged involvement of Japan. Similarly, the Razak regime of Malaysia banned the Joint Student Council Union of Malaya University and Penang University of Science, which publicized their

solidarity with the Thai students' actions.<sup>53</sup> Undoubtedly, a striking semblance of Japan's aggression in the past and in the 1970s must have instigated the resistance of the Asian masses. Nonetheless, certain new aspects of neo-imperialism in Asia or proto-globalization must be analyzed in a historical light in order to illuminate the emerging social subject of decolonization.

In the realm of representation, those new aspects of proto-globalization in Asia are registered symbolically in *The Way of the Dragon*. The composition of the character Colt, in particular, relates to the postwar regime of power in Asia through allegorical association. In the film's narrative, Colt's existence hinges on the two karate killers who preceded him in their challenge against Tang Lung: a Japanese karateman and a Caucasian karateman. At the Italian mafia's office, those two engage in a demonstrative combat to determine which is superior. In the midst of a fight, Colt enters the office and the Caucasian karateman defers to him as "sensei" (teacher or master). The Japanese karateman challenges Colt, only to confirm the latter's superiority. As Colt's mastery of art and power supersedes the level of those two combined, he signifies a new breed brought by the synthesis of powerful physical structure and "technology" of karate. He is not a mere "blue eyed" karateman who attempts to assimilate an exotic cultural tradition into his identity: karate is already an integral part of Colt's being as an "American karate master."

To move closer to the social context of signification, this sense of "new breed" corresponds to the concept of multinationality or transnationality where dominant powers/cultures form a hegemonic hybrid. Specifically, the synthesis in Colt represents the postwar United States–Japan security treaty regime in which U.S. dominance in Asia and Japan's neo-imperialist recovery fed each other in the pursuit of aggressive capitalist development in Asia. The close collaboration of the United States and Japan—in the Vietnam War, in the establishment of neo-colonial dictatorships (e.g., Indonesia, Thailand, Korea, and the Philippines), in the reannexation of Okinawa, and in the expansion of the sphere of multinational corporations—spawned an institutional body called the Asian Development Bank (ADB, hereafter) in 1966. This multilateral agency—a regional equivalent of the IMF and the World Bank—demonstrated the institutional harmonization of the interests of imperialist nations, of neo-colonial dictatorship, and of transnational capital. In terms of political structure, the transnationality of the United States–Japan security treaty regime was also embodied by the establishment of ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) in 1967. ASEAN heralded an emerging paradigm of multilateralism, a sign of integration into global capitalism.<sup>54</sup>

Japan's prime minister's first visit to the ASEAN nations in 1974 thus divulged as much a new undercurrent of the Asian mass movement as the new

hegemony in Asia. When Prime Minister Tanaka landed in his first destination, Thailand, his entourage was engulfed by angry protesters from the airport to the hotel. The five thousand protesters gathered at the hotel where they burned Tanaka's effigies and destroyed Japanese-made TVs, cars, and transistor radios. Not far from the hotel, the protesters targeted the buildings of a Japanese trade representative and a Japanese department store. The student movements in Malaysia and Singapore also registered their dissent, albeit in a much more peaceful manner than their comrades in Thailand. The growing momentum of resistance finally exploded in Jakarta, where two thousand protesting students at the airport snowballed into a mass riot involving tens of thousands of protesters and lasting three days. Over eight hundred Japanese-made cars and motorcycles were destroyed, and over three hundred Japanese corporate offices and restaurants were burnt down.<sup>55</sup>

To the Asian masses, the significance of Japan's prime minister's ASEAN excursion is twofold. On one hand, as a declaration of Japan's reemergence as an imperialist power, it set the stage for the culmination of the masses' desire for nationalist liberation. On the other hand, in the wake of the formal closure of the Vietnam War—which demarcated the limit of classic (bilateral) imperialist domination in the region—the visit also heralded the beginning of a new era in which the hegemonic forces take a synthesis of multiple powers or multilateralism. Accordingly, the resistance of the masses manifested some characteristics of antiglobalization (e.g., the circulation of the struggles and the militancy of actions) within its expression of nationalism, which presaged the anti-IMF/World Bank riots in other parts of the Third World from the 1970s throughout the 1980s.

As the analysis by Hardt and Negri demonstrate, nationalism in the context of decolonization struggle—which they call in Gramscian terms “subaltern nationalism”—can have very progressive aspects, such as regaining the power of self-determination from the dominant power. Also, it wards off the discourse and images that are imposed upon the subaltern groups' identity and culture by the dominant power.<sup>56</sup> At the same time, the authors also remind us of a profoundly ambiguous aspect of subaltern nationalism that potentially imposes uniformity and homogeneity upon the multiplicity of the community.<sup>57</sup> The experience of Asian mass movement shows that the progressive aspect of subaltern nationalism could take an evolutionary path toward social transformation, embracing the diversity of the community at the heart of the movement.

Specifically, the emerging tendency toward antiglobalization in the subaltern nationalism of the Asian student movement can be found in its growing commitment to democratization, whereby the movement itself dissolved into a large coalition of students, workers, peasants, and lumpen proletariat. A month after its successful anti-Japanese boycott movement, the Thai student



movement shifted its locus of struggle to challenge the undemocratic institutions and the repressive actions of the neo-colonial dictatorship. Moved by patriotic sentiment, a large segment of the Thai masses joined the forces that strove for the “transformation of the entire society.”<sup>58</sup> The democratization movement formed a popular power bloc that eventually overthrew the dictatorial regime in 1973. From then to 1976, when a military coup finally shattered the people’s momentum, Thai society saw tremendous progress in democracy, unabated by right-wing terrorism as collective bargaining and strikes were legalized and became a common practice.<sup>59</sup>

In the Philippines, the nationalist movement—incubated in the student-led struggle for academic freedom—emerged in the early 1960s and by the end of the decade developed into a mass democratization movement, culminated in a general strike initiated by university students in 1969.<sup>60</sup> The beginning of the 1970s saw the burgeoning of a full-fledged constitutional movement called the “Quiet Storm Campaign,” in which the student movement merged with the worker and peasant movement, thereby forming an indomitable force for social change.<sup>61</sup> The movement kept growing despite intensified repression under martial law.

Meanwhile, Hong Kong’s student movement, imbued with pan-Chinese patriotism in the early 1970s, went through a transformation as it absorbed social service professionals whose concerns were immediately relevant to Hong Kong society. The community-oriented activism “include[d] protest movements in respect to housing, transport, social welfare, education and the environment.”<sup>62</sup> Community-oriented activism then turned into a democracy movement in the 1980s.<sup>63</sup> The democratizing tendency of the Asian mass movement seems to be a direct outcome of the convergence of the student movement, with the day-to-day struggle of the masses confronted by neocolonial oppression and marginalization.

The historical formation of the mass movement for democracy in Asia with its roots in nationalism illuminates the formative process of a decolonizing social subject at a nascent stage of globalization. The formation of such a social subject is metaphorically—and yet more comprehensively—inscribed in Chen Zhen and Tang Lung by way of Lee’s autonomous intervention.

## FINALE

Counterpoised to Colt, Tang Lung constitutes a representative figure of the Asian people faced with the monstrous apparatus of neo-imperialist power. The transition from Chen Zhen to Tang Lung allegorically underscores the



FIGURE 2.3. Finale of *The Way of the Dragon*.

evolutionary path of the Asian mass movement from nationalism to democratization. As we recall, Lee's overall performance as Chen Zhen is charged with an intense nationalist sentiment. The intensity of emotion is sometimes attained at the expense of kinetic rigidity. Lee's independent intervention in the transcultural orientation, the expression of *wu wei*, and a brief yet significant exploration into the dance of infinity balances the rigidity of a nationalistic performance. In *The Way of the Dragon*, Lee's overall performance is more fluid and relaxed, as his character is fundamentally a comic figure. In the battle scenes in general, accordingly, fluidity and flexibility comprise the foundation of his kinetic expression, the pinnacle of which is Tang Lung's dance of infinity.

Juxtaposing Tang Lung's dance of infinity with the Asian mass democratization movement, one can see a symbolic reflection of the social subject of decolonization in Asia at the dawn of globalization. Like Tang Lung, Asian mass democratization displayed sheer creativity and mobility, transcending the institutionalized political channels that are closed to the vast majority of the masses. In contrast to the revolutionary vanguardism, the locus of struggle did not necessarily rest on a frontal confrontation with the systemic power apparatus in a dialectic fashion (e.g., through armed struggles and partisan structure), but more so on overturning the nexus of power at its specific sites of manifestation: from the polluting multinational factories, swelling urban slums, and the colonial commodity culture to prostitution tourism and police brutality. However, the lack of institutionalized structure in the mass movement—which provided mobility and flexibility—constituted the very vulnerability to renewed counteroffensives by the mobile warfare and terror tactics of the neocolonial/neo-imperialist power bloc. Faced with the increasing power of reactionary political forces, some radical segments of the student movement in Thailand and the Philippines joined in the revolutionary vanguardism in order to continue the struggle in a more structured counter power bloc. And yet, as devastating as the backlash of the counterrevolutionary forces was, it wouldn't mean the end of the mass movement against neo-imperialism and globalization in Asia.

As we recall, at the finale of *Fist of Fury*, the subaltern nationalism symbolized and represented by Chen Zhen achieved a utopian state of being, liberated from foreign domination in his affirmation of death as sacrifice. The sublime of the reunited people and nation—metaphorically alluded to in the song about the reunion of Chen Zhen and Li-er in heaven—has thus come true through martyrdom. By contrast, in the finale of *The Way of the Dragon*, Tang Lung affirms life by moving on to the next terrain of struggle. Utopia is thus subsumed to *lotta continua* (struggle continues). It is this nontranscendent

pursuit of freedom, implicated in Tang Lung's existence, that represents the struggle as a constitutive process in the here and now, or, to re-cite Bruce Lee, freedom as a "vast movement without the bondage of time."

After *The Way of the Dragon*, Lee moved on to produce what could have been his fourth film from Hong Kong entitled the *Game of Death*, in which transcultural pan-Asianism and ontological and kinetic revolution were to be further pursued. The production was interrupted by *Enter the Dragon*, a historic Hollywood offshore project in Hong Kong. In the following two chapters, I will analyze *Enter the Dragon* as a global commodity in order to delve into the constitution of the social subject of decolonization in the stage of transnational globalization. The next chapter begins with Seattle, where the popular movement against global capitalism theretofore confined to the Third World came to the surface on the global stage. As mentioned earlier, Seattle is where opportunitites opened up for Bruce Lee to pursue his path as a martial artist as well as a philosopher. It is also home of yet another revolutionary figure of popular culture, Jimi Hendrix.

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## CHAPTER THREE

### MUTINY IN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE

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#### BRUCE LEE MEETS JIMI HENDRIX

And when the last red man shall have perished, and the memory of my tribe shall have become a myth among the White men, these shores will swarm with the invisible dead of my tribe.

—Chief Seattle (1853)

While the countdown to the end of the millennium was feeding popular imagination with the possibility of global catastrophe, smoke and tear gas rose in Seattle where the battle over the legitimacy of global capitalism took place. The home of Microsoft and Boeing, Seattle hosted the ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO), a formidable supra-governmental vanguard for transnational corporate power. Fifty thousand protesters halted the meeting, sending a sobering sense of reality back to the popular consciousness amid the hype of the millennium turnover. The diversity of individuals, groups, and organizations involved in the protest—ranging from labor, environmentalist, indigenous, feminist, gay and lesbian movements, AIDS activists, consumer advocates, animal rights activists to militant anarchists—exposed one of the great ironies of global capitalism: the expansion of the sphere of exploitation removes the barriers from among the oppressed. In other words, the global reach of transnational corporate power inevitably opens up the possibility of global popular alliances to arise. When the people's power converged in Seattle confronted police force armed with chemical weapons and “forced the WTO to cancel its closing ceremony, without an

agenda for continuity,” the “Battle of Seattle” demarcated a new chapter of decolonization struggle in the era of globalization.<sup>1</sup>

It seems as if the rebellion was the materialization of Chief Seattle’s prophecy in speaking to the occupying forces of America about the immortality of his people. The ferocity of Chief Seattle’s invisible tribe in a battle with the transnational corporate power was augmented by two invisible warriors, namely, Jimi Hendrix and Bruce Lee, whose bones are coincidentally laid to rest in Seattle. Just like the people-power convergence in Seattle that overturned the homogenizing and oppressive forces of global capitalism, both Bruce Lee and Jimi Hendrix subverted the paradigm of transnational capital from within the factory of global commodities at its early stage. Their subversions, however, entail subtlety as their primary field of engagement is in the aesthetic realm and the unconscious.

The type of subversion Bruce Lee and Jimi Hendrix were engaged in can be found where their autonomous self-expression created a rupture in the homogenizing forces of corporate intervention, upon which the possibility of liberation is actualized in a symbolic form. In order to discern this contested terrain, the process of a global commodity production must be approached as a dynamic one. Principally, this chapter analyzes the contradiction and antagonism embedded in the making of *Enter the Dragon* as one of the pioneering global commodities. The constitution of this particular commodity is interlaced with the real-life struggle between the transnational media corporate power on the one hand and the amalgamation of the forces of people and Nature on the other hand. A parallel excursion into Hendrix’s expression, as a counter aesthetic to the corporate processing of counterculture (specifically in relation to the film *Woodstock* as an incipient global commodity), is given in order to fortify the perspective of my analysis.

The social contradiction and antagonism that weave through the make-up of *Enter the Dragon* can be untangled by several levels of contextualization. First, in order to determine the strategic interest of Hollywood as a transnational media conglomerate, a brief history of Hollywood is presented, with specific attention to its historical entanglement with the strategic paradigm of late capitalism. Secondly, the transnational capital’s attempt to impose limits on the subjectifying power of the working class worldwide is examined conjointly with the new Hollywood’s attempt at the hegemonic control over the progressive thrust of popular culture (specifically, counterculture and kung fu culture). The third level of contextualization explores the condition of the Third World sweatshop production integrated in the transnational venture. Importing insights from instances of resistance at Malay microchip factories, we could unpack fundamental aspects of resistance in the transnational film production of *Enter the Dragon*.

## THE TRANSFORMATION OF HOLLYWOOD

By some curious play of fate, the birth of cinematography—incubated by the Lumière Brothers—coincided with America's rite of passage as a full-fledged member of imperialist nations, ostensibly celebrated in its conquest of Cuba, Hawai'i, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines.<sup>2</sup> The growth of American cinema and imperialism thereafter have been intermeshed, unfolding their common destiny, manifest or otherwise. Hollywood acted as a cocaptain of the conqueror's vessel sailing off to every corner of the earth, keeping the engine of American industrial capitalism pumping, and assisting in the navigation of American imperialism. Not surprisingly, therefore, Hollywood helped to transform the "gunboat" of American imperialism into a "space shuttle" of global capitalism. A close look at the metamorphosis of Hollywood from monopoly to transnational capitalism will unravel the strategic paradigm of the new Hollywood that aspires to control an entire sphere of mediated reality.

The initial phase of the American film industry at the outset of the last century was modeled after theater production, which was based on a small-scale, artisan mode of production. As the center of production shifted from the New York–New Jersey area to Southern California, the artisan mode of film production soon gave way to an industrial mode in Hollywood by the 1920s.<sup>3</sup> The shift took place against the background of the Fordist factory system that had come to consolidate the monopoly structure of the manufacturing industry in general. Through the merger of production, distribution, and exhibition companies, Hollywood came to assume its much touted organizational form: the studio system.<sup>4</sup> The studio system entailed a vertical integration of production, distribution, and exhibition under one management system. It also subsumed the cutting edge of the Fordist productive arrangement, which enabled films to be mass-produced "in the image of the assembly line, as in the auto and machinery industries."<sup>5</sup> Hollywood was thus instituted as the cultural factory of monopoly capital and the Fordist mass production system.

As a golden rule of monopoly capitalism, the rise of productive forces under Fordism was isomorphically linked with vigorous imperialist expansion. Accordingly, the philosophy and praxis of Fordism was upheld as the kernel of a new manifest destiny, that involved not merely exportation of American goods and productive systems, but also evangelical dissemination of the whole "lifestyle" package. An affirmation of individualism and privatism, coupled with glorification of materialism and consumption are communicated through the Hollywood aesthetics, as well as its star system. Armed with films made by such pioneers as Cecile B. DeMille, D. W. Griffith, and Adolph Zukor and featuring stars such as Norma Talmadge, Douglas Fairbanks, Mary Pickford,



and Rudolph Valentine, Hollywood films “would become the first American cultural export to conquer the world.”<sup>6</sup> Summing up this initial period of expansion toward the end of the 1920s, Sidney Kent, the then general manager of Paramount Publix, made an acute observation of the symbiotic relationship between the spread of Fordism and Hollywoodism:

Motion pictures are silent propaganda, even though not made with that thought in mind at all. . . . Imagine the effect on people . . . who constantly see flashed on the screen American modes of living, American modes of dressing, and American modes of travel. . . . American automobiles are making terrific inroads on foreign makes of cars (because) the greatest agency for selling American automobiles abroad is the American motion picture.<sup>7</sup>

The introduction of sound in the late 1920s consolidated the vertical integration and monopoly structure, due to the necessity of a higher level of capital investment and close collaboration with the cutting edge of a high-tech industry. Through this process, the Big Five or the Majors (Warner Brothers, RKO, MGM, Twentieth-Century Fox, and Paramount) and the Little Three (Universal, Columbia, and United Artists) emerged as the main players.<sup>8</sup>

After a brief period of setbacks during the Great Depression and considerable loss of market during World War II, Hollywood reemerged, heralding a global domination of the cultural market as the war turned in favor of the Allied Forces. As an “ambassador of goodwill,” in the parlance of President Truman, Hollywood kept loyal company to the internationalization of Fordism and the consolidation of the dollar as the global currency under the aegis of the Bretton Woods regime.<sup>9</sup> Reflecting on this trend was the restructuring of the Majors’ representative organization, Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America (MPPDA), which was established in 1922 originally to thwart extra-industry regulation (i.e., censorship).<sup>10</sup> The MPPDA was reorganized and renamed the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA hereafter). The MPAA along with its foreign department, Motion Picture Export Association (MPEA hereafter), became a legal cartel to protect and advance the major studio’s interest domestically and internationally.<sup>11</sup> Although it would be illegal if operated in the United States, the MPEA belligerently marched into still war-torn Europe, unleashing an inundation of Hollywood products, while staunchly blocking any foreign products from entering the U.S. continent.

Dubbed as the “little State Department,” the MPEA served as the cultural wing of the U.S. imperialist scheme and ultimately of the (monopoly)

capitalist offensive against any signs of autonomy.<sup>12</sup> The Italian experiments for autonomy pursued in their workers-management council in the wake of the war, for instance, became a target of the U.S. counterinsurgency program under President Truman, which included propaganda activities utilizing Hollywood-made celluloid.<sup>13</sup> The cinematic integration of the masses into the Fordist regime was not limited to the so-called Western bloc. Under the auspices of the MPEA, United Artists, for example, was able to infiltrate into the communist bloc countries such as Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.<sup>14</sup>

In the meantime, at home, the rise of a militant labor movement in the Hollywood factory in the wake of World War II was exposing the fallacy of the ostensibly well-publicized Fordist labor management system. As if it were attempting to seal the leakage of “reality” from the factory of fantasy, Hollywood resorted to every possible means to eradicate the voices of labor. It ranged from an outright violent repression—deploying thugs, private police, and the (social) department (in the case of Warner Brothers)—to the use of collaborative unions, and, most significantly, the rhetoric of “anti-communism.” Hollywood’s counteroffensives culminated in the most pivotal modern day “inquisition” by the House Committee on Un-American Activities.<sup>15</sup> The aggressive stance Hollywood took against the organizing effort of the workers, in fact, came from Henry Ford’s original method of labor control, which consisted of an “innovative combination of hired thugs, armed police and ‘Social Department’ conducting surveillance on his workers’ private lives.”<sup>16</sup>

The Hollywood studio system as a cultural factory of monopoly capitalism began to stumble during the 1950s, primarily due to three factors: the Paramount Decree in 1948 in which the Supreme Court declared the monopoly structure of vertical integration illegal, the intrusion of TV as an alternative mass cultural outlet, and increasing suburbanization that reinforced the popularity of TV. Hollywood as a whole came face to face with unprecedented pressure for a fundamental reorganization. Although the most visible stage of reorganization came with the final dethroning of the movie moguls in the late 1960s, some sectors of Hollywood had taken initiatives in transforming the organizational structure from that of the Fordist “intensive” mode of accumulation to a “flexible” mode of accumulation.<sup>17</sup> United Artists (UA hereafter), for example, has been a forerunner in the new “studio” system without a studio. Unlike the Majors, UA has specialized in the distribution of independent productions from its inception. On the brink of bankruptcy in the early 1950s, Charlie Chaplin and Mary Pickford, two main stockholders of UA, turned to lawyers well versed in financing for the new management position. UA thereby emerged as a prototype of the new (post-studio) system whose main

function rests, not so much on production, as on finance.<sup>18</sup> UA was thus clearly ahead of the times, pioneering the post-Fordist organization that “looks more to financial capital as its coordinating power than did Fordism.”<sup>19</sup>

Another facet of restructuring Hollywood adapted, before it became prevalent in the manufacturing industry, was the transnationalization of production. Transnationalization was originally a by-product of Hollywood’s somewhat reluctant reaction to the European nations’ measure against the Hollywood imports in the late 1940s. To counter this, the MPEA with the help of the State Department concluded treaties with the European nations to earmark a portion of Hollywood’s earnings into a “frozen fund” in exchange for access to the market without import quotas.<sup>20</sup> The dismal prospect of domestic film production, affected particularly by the rise of the TV industry, directed Hollywood’s attention to the “frozen fund” in view of the possibility of runaway productions. In addition to the “frozen fund,” Europe could offer other enticing incentives such as the pool of relatively inexpensive labor, “exotic” location sites and faces, and most importantly, European governmental subsidies.<sup>21</sup> Hollywood rightly assessed that producing nominally “British,” “Italian,” or “French” films could be enticingly cost efficient. UA, again, emerged as the forerunner of the runaway production, primarily due to its absence of a studio back lot, which bestowed on them the “complete freedom and mobility to deal with independent producers all over the globe.”<sup>22</sup> The most notable success UA reaped from transatlantic production was the *007* series, whose quintessential transnational structure will be analyzed in the following chapter.

Still, the reorganization of Hollywood remained partial until the mid-1960s. The high degree of mobility and flexibility, boldly exercised in Hollywood’s global conquest, however, only aggravated dissonance with its rigid internal structure. Ironically, such contradiction was keenly put forth by the phenomenal success of *The Sound of Music* (1965). While it was one of the first truly globally marketed Hollywood products, its philosophy and aesthetic—a big budget production geared toward a waning (nuclear) family audience—belied Hollywood’s nostalgic attachment to the moribund studio system.<sup>23</sup> The convulsion caused by such imbalance aggravated to a massive industrial hemorrhage (the seven Majors lost \$250 million between 1969 and 1972)<sup>24</sup> that required a radical structural overhaul. Through mergers, diversification, and reduction and replacement of production departments via outsourcing and subcontracting, Hollywood acquired a new institutional body. The main functions of Hollywood were narrowed down to financing, planning, and commanding. Seen from a slightly different angle, it is at this historical juncture that the “sovereign” existence of the contending empires of movie

moguls was formally brought to a closure by the forces of the conglomerate. Adolph Zukor's Paramount was the first such throne to be deposed by the industrial conglomerate Gulf and Western in 1966. UA, Warner Brothers, MGM, Twentieth-Century Fox, and Columbia followed suit, respectively sold to Transamerica (insurance and finance), Seven Arts (TV programs distributor), Las Vegas developer Kerk Kerkorian, oil businessman Marvin Harris, and Coca-Cola.<sup>25</sup> Through the process of integration into the multinational conglomerate, the new Hollywood would thus emerge as a gigantic factory of "mediated reality" in which films comprise only part of the package of mediation.

Hollywood's transformation presents a textbook case of the metamorphosis of monopoly capital (Fordist-Keynesian mode) into transnational capital (post-Fordist-Keynesian mode). In order to map out the strategic features of the new Hollywood, the transition must be viewed from the perspective of power dynamics—as an ongoing class struggle—in which capital's attempt to harness the power of living labor clashes with the subjectifying power (i.e., self-determination) of the living labor. The premise of the Fordist-Keynesian regime was ultimately based on capital's ability to tap into the dynamic power of the working class both in production and consumption.<sup>26</sup> In other words, the Fordist-Keynesian regime's relentless pursuit of the economic growth, through harmonization of the interests of public and corporate sectors, critically depended upon the growth of living labor's productivity and purchasing power. Yet, during the 1960s and early 1970s, the Fordist-Keynesian regime of accumulation was rendered inoperable by insurgent popular forces. The growth of living labor was channeled into antisystemic social movements worldwide from the civil rights movement, Black Power movement, and women's liberation to the national liberation of the Third World, particularly the struggle of Southeast Asian peasantry against American imperialism.<sup>27</sup> In its response to the self-determination of living labor, capital resorted to the restructuring of the global system of accumulation, specifically to impose a new limit on the subjectifying power of living labor, which was done under the misleading rubric of "energy crisis."

Therefore, all the characteristic features of post-Fordist restructuring such as "high-tech" innovation, dispersion of production, and decomposition of the labor force, pertain to the core of capital's strategic move to destroy the cohesiveness of living labor. George Caffentzis explains the interlinkage between capital's vigorous pursuit of technological innovation and the disempowerment and fragmentation of the labor force: "In order to finance the new capitalist 'utopia' of 'hightech,' venture-capital demanding industries in the energy, computer and genetic engineering areas, another capitalist 'utopia'

must be created: a world of 'labor intensive,' low waged, distracted and diffracted production."<sup>28</sup> Particularly, with the development of transportation and communication, that is to say, with increasing global mobility, capital has retained the position of power. It could blackmail the existence of organized labor with a threat of moving to another location or actually resorting to indentured servitude abroad and at home in place of organized labor.

The internal connection between disempowerment of labor and "high-tech" innovation under the post-Fordist-Keynesian regime is probably best illustrated in the case of the semiconductor industry. The organizational structure of this industry is characterized by its deconstructive integration. On the one hand, the executive proper (i.e., planning, R&D, commanding, networking, etc.) is drastically reduced to a limited personnel envired by the high intensity of technological apparatus. The core of the commanding center of capital is thus highly centralized and concentrated. On the other hand, the manufacturing proper is widely dispersed geographically, yet invariably located in the zone of the "South." This zone includes not only the so-called Third World but also the "Third World" within the industrial bloc (e.g., sweatshops, ghettos, prisons, etc.). The deconstructive organizational structure of the semiconductor industry, therefore, more than simply represents a normative organizational model. It articulates the strategic paradigm of the post-Fordist organization, in which the new Hollywood plays a critical role. Let us approach these two interlinked aspects of structural reorganization as they relate to the role of the new Hollywood.

The post-Fordist mode of organization entails the relocation of the commanding center of capital from the multiple points of managerial offices to the consolidated world of financial capital. In this new site of capital's collective body, the conglomerate comes into existence through mergers and diversification. Unlike a vertically integrated structure of monopoly capital, the existence of the conglomerate is rendered mobile in its pursuit of "flexibility." Indeed, flexibility is a prerequisite for the new management at the time when the market is ever more thoroughly permeated by the principle of ephemerality and constant change (e.g., trend, fashion, stock market, and diversification and specialization), due to the formal closure of the market frontier brought by industrial capitalism. Such a principle applies even to the very organizational forms, since any individual firms regardless of their size are exposed to the risk of merger, buy-up, or closure. The drawback of the pursuit of flexibility, therefore, is a diminishing stability in the organizational structure itself. To compensate for the volatility of the organizational structure, capital invests in a constant reproduction and circulation of image/simulacrum<sup>29</sup> that forms the foundational basis of the cyberspace, stock market,

and speculative economy. Through the post-Fordist strategy of “massive expansion into cultural and image production,”<sup>30</sup> the image/simulation economy replaces the conventional organizational form with the virtual power apparatus. Susan Sontag’s view on the role of commodified imagery in late capitalism points to the virtual existence of ideological power apparatus based on the image/simulation economy:

The production of images also furnishes a ruling ideology. Social change is replaced by a change in images. The freedom to consume a plurality of images and goods is equated with freedom itself. The narrowing of free political choice to free economic consumption requires the unlimited production and consumption of images.<sup>31</sup>

In a specific context of the image/simulation economy of Hollywood, George Lucas’s path from his debut in *THX 3800* (1971) to the *Star Wars* series (1977–2005) illustrates the new Hollywood’s representation of the virtual power apparatus endowed with a high concentration of capital intensive technology. In a more recent genre of action movies with the theme of high-tech dystopia (from *Blade Runner* [1982] to *Matrix* [1999–2003]), it has become clear that the appeal of the image of virtual power apparatus does not rest on its futuristic promises. Rather, it is the representation of the inevitability of technological development and its implicit autonomy from the sweat, blood, and tears of living labor that gives the image of the power apparatus’s strong sense of stability and permanence in the realm of the unconscious. In other words, the image of a technologically saturated power apparatus concurs with the ideological effect that mystifies the fact that the creation of values takes place in multitudinous sites of indentured servitude.

As we shift our focus to the “nightmare” of living labor beneath the surface of the simulacrum of the power apparatus, we see a global reorganization of labor for an unscrupulous exploitation. The geographical dispersion of production shifts the center of manufacturing proper to clusters of subcontracting firms where the mode of labor is recast into archaic ones such as “older systems of domestic, artisanal, familial (patriarchal) and paternalistic (‘godfather’, ‘guy’nor’ or even mafia-like) labor systems”<sup>32</sup> and also in the quasi-slavery in the prison labor system.<sup>33</sup> It is there that capital resorts to a highly exploitative “primary mode of accumulation” based on indentured servitude and slave labor. Incidentally, it was Lucas’s film school classmate, Francis Ford Coppola, who gave a figural expression to this newly emerged arrangement of production in a nostalgic, hence romantically idealized, fashion in *The Godfather* (1972) and *The Godfather II* (1974). The *Godfather* series glorified the paradigm of the

sweatshop, the return of the familial and patriarchal mode of production that the new regime of accumulation critically relied upon.

The success of the *Godfather* series, ironically, led Coppola to the heart of contradiction and the harsh reality of the new regime of accumulation. The financial gain from the *Godfather* series elevated him to a mobile semi-autonomous subcontracting firm for Hollywood, powerful enough to launch his own transnational production in the Third World. Coppola decided to revive an unfinished film project on the Vietnam War, which he initiated with his film school classmates (including George Lucas) back in the late 1960s. Coppola's *Apocalypse Now* (1979), as vividly and somewhat humorously exposed by Elenor Coppola's *Hearts of Darkness: Film Maker's Apocalypse* (1991), fully utilized the new international division of labor in close collaboration with the neocolonial regime of the Philippines.<sup>34</sup> The film was shot in the area where the military forces were actively engaged in warfare against the Moro independence movement in Mindanao.

In its efforts to recreate the experience of the Vietnam War, Coppola's offshore firm found itself to be trapped in the neocolonial contradiction in which his transnational venture played a part through the exploitation of a large pool of low-waged Southern Filipino workers and non-waged indigenous people (*Ifugao*) for a temporary sweatshop production. In *Apocalypse Now*, therefore, the new Hollywood came face to face with the presence of its Other, a crude reality of an expansion of the sphere of exploitation. What makes the film apocalyptic, therefore, is not so much its purported "realistic" portrayal of war, but rather the harsh realities and contradictions of global capitalism as it registered in the subterranean or unconscious layers of the film.

The strategic paradigm of the new regime of accumulation thus boils down to two basic interrelated effects that capital sought to achieve: centralization of the accumulation process and decentralization of the exploitation process.<sup>35</sup> While keeping the structural context of the post-Fordist restructuring in mind, our focus shifts back to the strategic role of the new Hollywood to see how transnational capital attempted to impose a new limit on a vibrant spirit of insurgency in the cultural sphere.

#### THE STRATEGIC PARADIGM OF THE NEW HOLLYWOOD I: JIMI HENDRIX AND THE COUNTERCULTURE

Among various features of reorganization, creation and proliferation of "separate profit centers" characterized the new Hollywood's strategic role.<sup>36</sup> It accelerated productivity to the point where imagery could be transformed into

a myriad of image commodities ranging from TV movies, videotapes, records, books, and comics to toys and video games, akin to a nuclear chain reaction. Quite exponential in this context is the strategy of the new Warner Brothers, which, as we will see, actively engaged in transforming the cultural expression of insurgency into a global image commodity.

Ted Ashley, president of the new Warner Brothers, started his career as an independent talent agent with Ashley's Famous Talent Agency, which was soon acquired by Steve Ross's Kinney National Service, Inc., a New York-based conglomerate specializing in funeral homes, parking lots, and car rentals. Their merger meant an augmentation of the new type of business engaged in intangible forms of commodity production (i.e., production of image and service) that could function as an antenna for the post-Fordist market strategy. The merger subsequently led Kinney National Service to acquire Warner Brothers-Seven Arts in 1969. Ted Ashley was then assigned as a new chair and chief executive of Warner Brothers (then a division within Warner Communication International). Under his command, Warner Brothers expanded its enterprise through a series of aggressive acquisitions. By 1971, Warner Brothers had placed various small- to mid-scale cultural industries under its new wing: traversing from comic magazines, a publishing house, and a recording company to a character licensing agency and a cable company.<sup>37</sup> By the late 1970s, the last item in the list, the cable company, had evolved into the most strident image factory of the youth culture to date, namely, MTV, in collaboration with American Express. Fortified by a grid spread over diverse arenas of cultural commodities, Warner Brothers could then fully exercise the multiplication process of image commodities.

Strong sales of a record under the Warner label, for instance a Rolling Stones album, can easily lead to Warner-produced television specials and video productions for Warner-Amex Cable music television channel (MTV), to Warner books, Warner-distributed magazines or Warner films featuring musicians.<sup>38</sup>

Warner Brothers' initial engagement with the youth culture goes back to the tail end of its studio system days. After its recovery from the trauma of complete failure during the 1920s (when it incorporated the Brunswick label), Warner Brothers Records made its comeback in 1958. By taking full advantage of its established niche in the TV industry, Warner Brothers Records scored hits with TV tie-in products such as *Hawaiian Eye* and *77 Sunset Strip*.<sup>39</sup> As its music business took a downward spiral in the early 1960s, Warner Brothers Records acquired Frank Sinatra's Reprise label. The acquisition enabled



Warner Brothers to test the boundary because of Reprise's commander in chief, Mo Ostin, who "by the end of the sixties, would prove the architect of Warner Brothers Records' success as a rock label."<sup>40</sup>

In January of 1967 when Ronald Reagan was sworn in as California's governor, the first large-scale countercultural event, called "Human Be-In," was held at the Golden Gate Bridge Park in San Francisco. Dubbed as "the joyful, face-to-face beginning of the new epoch," it made a conscious effort to break conventional boundaries (individual and collective, art and being, music and prayer, etc.), materialized the aesthetics of "happening," and exalted the value of raw (unmediated) experience.<sup>41</sup> A few months after the event, Warner Brothers Records announced its release of the first Grateful Dead album. Signing the Grateful Dead onto its label meant corporate intervention of the new cultural scene of psychedelics and hippies that was just beginning to take off from its home ground, Haight-Ashbury. Fred Goodman elucidates the strategic aim of Warner Brothers, at its crossroads:

Driven to underground rock by financial desperation, the company would do far more than figure out how to deal with the music. . . . Warner Bros. Records would successfully absorb and package the seemingly anti-theatrical counterculture—and do it well enough to convert the music into the financial engine for what would become America's largest media conglomerate.<sup>42</sup>

Indeed, for Warner Brothers, tapping into the psychedelic, hippies scene with the Grateful Dead at the end of its "studio system" days was merely a "practice round" for their forthcoming ride on the "big wave" of counterculture. It engulfed the psychedelic, hippies scene, student radicalism, the women's movement, and Black militant movements. As the "Human Be-in" and the Monterey Pop Festival exemplified, rock and folk music and gathering (in lieu of a concert) were blending together to contour the space of counterculture.

Immediately after Kinney National Service's takeover, Ted Ashley acquired the rights to film the Woodstock Music and Arts Fair. The film was tied in with the release of a double album soundtrack from Warner-Reprise/Electra/Atlantic, rendering *Woodstock* a total image commodity. The film was seemingly revolutionary by Hollywood standards in that it not only depicted the performance, but also captured the cultural milieu of the insurgent youth as it was being unfolded with the progression of the event. The cinematography, accordingly, adopts a groundbreaking, multiple-image juxtaposition, which enabled the film to capture the event in its simultaneity, in the process of "making history." Underneath its polite and even sympathetic view

of youth culture, the film betrays the strategy of containment of the counterculture on a symbolic level. The tension between the corporate agenda and the counterculture ruptures at the point of Jimi Hendrix's performance. The way in which the film depicts Jimi Hendrix exposes the strategic paradigm of the new Hollywood in its raw state.

By the time Hendrix came up to the stage as an anchor performer of the event, only thirty thousand souls remained (the peak attendance was four hundred thousand).<sup>43</sup> Hendrix's performance, nevertheless, was undoubtedly of critical historical significance, as revealed by the video that exclusively features his performance.<sup>44</sup> It marked the beginning of Jimi Hendrix's Band of Gypsies period, which broke free of the genre of Rock and the style defined by the psychedelic artistic paradigm of the 1960s. Dressed in a Native American fringed leather jacket, blue jeans, and moccasins, Hendrix led an unusual ensemble in which his conventional trio format was expanded with the addition of a rhythm guitarist and two bongo and conga players. What we see here is Hendrix's attempt to move out of the corporate image framework that was being imposed upon him as the "Jimi Hendrix Experience" format. The sound and imagery of the "Jimi Hendrix Experience" was based on a tenuous consensus between Hendrix's artistic orientation and the pop imagery manufactured by his management composed of Chas Chandler and Mike Jeffrey that created the phenomenal success of a pop rock band called the Animals. As the "Jimi Hendrix Experience" climbed the ladder of commercial success (around the time of the album *Electric Ladyland*), Hendrix began to actively incorporate the spontaneous element of "jamming" into the foundation of musical inspiration as a concept, which helped him transgress stylistic boundaries.

An alternative band, Gypsy Suns and Rainbows, was specifically organized for his Woodstock performance. As its name implied, the band stood for the creative spirit of jamming with the intermixture of diverse musical orientations as well as social identities. The Gypsy Suns and Rainbows was a sincere tribute to the original motive and intent of the Woodstock Music and Arts Fair, the communal spirit of a rural artist town, which manifested in impromptu freestyle jamming sessions at the Tinker Street Cinema in Woodstock prior to the event.<sup>45</sup> The members of the band underlined the direction of Hendrix's artistic expression, in which he would offer an intimate portrayal of who he was and where he was heading toward. Hendrix's past and roots in the "chitlin circuit" were supported by his Army band mates, Larry Lee and Billy Cox, while his free-floating Gypsy self was augmented by Juma Sultan, an acquaintance from his Greenwich Village days and a then-resident of Woodstock's artist community. Conceptually they represented a synthesis of social realism (born out of the condition of the reservation and ghetto)<sup>46</sup> and

spiritualism (based upon a deep understanding of African and Indigenous cultures). Hendrix thus rode on (without necessarily reconciling) the tension between the voices of the Black ghetto masses represented by Army band mates (one of whom had just returned from Vietnam) and the emerging Black/African consciousness represented by Juma Sultan (who was active in the Society for Aboriginal Music). Gypsy Suns and Rainbows was thus not simply a band but a *statement* transcending the corporate-manufactured image epitomized by the image package of the “Jimi Hendrix Experience.”

Although the performance itself suffered from occasional mistakes made by his Army band mates, the synthesis of social realism and spiritualism burst into explosive moments. Hendrix’s rendition of “The Star-Spangled Banner” clearly marked the pinnacle of such moments.

*After an intense jamming session on “Voodoo Child (slight return),” Hendrix slides into the national anthem, undoing the foundation of patriotism, while replacing it with a shamanic mediation of what “America” meant at this critical historical crossroads. Accompanied by the menacing, freestyle drumming of Mitch Mitchell and the subtle nuance of Billy Cox’s bass, Hendrix implodes the anthem with the smooth synthesizer-like sound of guitar and with merciless feedback that tears up the symbolic façade of the land of liberty. Through the cracks opened up in the sonic statue of liberty, we hear the wail, cry, and scream of those souls that have been killed, raped, exploited, and bombed by “America,” interspersed between the shrieking sounds of destruction and violence. With the use of pure sound as a sole medium of expression, Hendrix is able to represent the testimonial voices of the historical contradiction in their rawest form as the “other” of patriotism.*

Like Martin Luther King Jr.’s speech against the war on Vietnam, Hendrix’s own reference point in “The Star-Spangled Banner,” according to Monica Dannemann, was not only the Vietnam War but also “the daily war which was being fought on the streets of the USA.”<sup>47</sup> Through Hendrix’s shamanic mediation, the harsh reality of global contradiction and antagonism—emanating from the ghetto, village, reservation, campus, street, etc.—was drawn into Woodstock as a space of countercultural utopia. In other words, with Gypsy Suns and Rainbows, Hendrix offered a concrete reference point to which the totality of Woodstock was dedicated and upon which the counterculture as a whole was founded.

In the film *Woodstock*, however, Gypsy Suns and Rainbows as a statement is reduced to naught, leaving the image of Hendrix to signify the anticlimax. As for the performance of "The Star-Spangled Banner," the film decides to show it only from a single angle that captures partial images of Hendrix against the sky in a tilted frame.<sup>48</sup> Due to a close-up shot from a low angle, the camera somewhat nervously shifts between the images of Hendrix's upper torso and his guitar, at times missing both of them. Without a shot of the stage, nor band, nor audience, the cinematography here is devoid of the earthly elements, the stable ground upon which the figure can stand. Needless to say, there is no multiple-image juxtaposition deployed until Hendrix's entry, which engenders the effect of simultaneity and gives an "eternal life" to the imagery. The cinematic space in which Hendrix is situated is therefore unstable, one-dimensional, and devoid of life. When the band segues into "Purple Haze," the image of performance entirely disappears, replaced by the image of clean-up crews and heaps of garbage after the concert.

At first the viewers may feel at odds with the juxtaposition of the vibrant sound of "Purple Haze" and a desolate image of an after-the-concert wasteland. Yet these two are in perfect harmony on the level of ideological signification. The equation here between "Purple Haze," the song that trumpeted the beginning of psychedelics, and the aftermath of Woodstock does not simply connote the end of the event but the end of the counterculture identified with the time period of the 1960s. As "Purple Haze" drifts into a melancholic blues tune called "Vilanova Junction," the film finally returns to the scene of the performance only to show Jimi Hendrix's exit from the stage as if it were meant to be a eulogy for the rebellious souls of the counterculture represented by a solitary image of Hendrix. The viewers of the film have no access to Gypsy Suns and Rainbows as a statement, nor to the three-dimensional portrayal of Jimi Hendrix (in stark contrast to how the film treated Joan Baez with an insertion of her bibliographical context outside the event). Furthermore, the film seems to take no interest in the historical fact that Gypsy Suns and Rainbows' performance was embraced by the communal spirit of the people manifested in the way the audience surrounded the stage from all directions, swarming up to and above the stage.

It is apparent that the fundamental premise of the film is based on a selective memory whose purpose it is to contain the sphere of the counterculture in the ephemeral space of event, and in the time period of the 1960s. Jimi Hendrix's experiment with Gypsy Suns and Rainbows runs counter to such a principle. It attempts to forge a link between the counterculture and the social context. And it also asserts not merely continuation, but evolution of the counterculture beyond the confinement of the 1960s (as a time period as well



FIGURE 3.1. Gypsy Suns and Rainbows at the Woodstock Music and Art Fair. Photo by Allan Koss (copyright).

as a paradigm). The politics of cinematography deployed in *Woodstock* are far from an intentional design (by the producer or executives) but stem from an unconscious part of the corporate strategic paradigm. The hieroglyph of the corporate unconscious can be made accessible if *Woodstock* is juxtaposed with other films of the new Hollywood at this particular historical junction. In *Bonnie and Clyde* (1967), *Easy Rider* (1969), and *Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid* (1969), one can find the identical thematic pattern of endorsement of the rebelliousness of the youth culture within a contained framework.<sup>49</sup> In all of these films, the glorification of antiestablishment (represented by rebellious characters) is invariably counterbalanced by their eventual demise as they become engulfed by the larger forces of power. The existence of such forces, however, remains unarticulated, hence subliminal at this stage. By the time of *Enter the Dragon* they came to be more articulated and figurative as a symbolic expression of the strategy of transnational capital. In order to decipher the rationale behind the strategy of containment, one needs to delve further into the query as to what Hendrix represents that urged the emerging transnational media to try to contain his artistic expression.

Jimi Hendrix was born in Seattle in 1942 as Johnny Allen Hendrix (renamed James Marshall Hendrix when he was four years old). In his early childhood, Hendrix was cradled in the culture and music of his Cherokee Indian and African American heritage. He traded his first “instrument,” broom and cigar box, for ukulele and later guitar during his time at elementary school where Blacks, Whites, and Asians were all integrated.<sup>50</sup> In his high school days, Hendrix picked up an electric guitar, formed a Rock ‘n Roll band with other teenage musicians, and began performing in public. After dropping out of high school, he was on the path of becoming a petty criminal when joining the army offered a way out. While stationed in Kentucky he met with his bandmates, Billy Cox and Larry Lee. Hendrix’s discharge from the Army enabled him and Billy Cox to pursue a career as professional musicians in Nashville. This led Hendrix to the so-called chitlin circuit, the Black entertainment circuit named after serving of chitterlings, the characteristic diet of soul food.<sup>51</sup> From the chitlin circuit, he finally landed in New York in 1963 and gained an opportunity to enter the “package tour” circuit of the major players of R&B and Soul music such as the Isley Brothers, Gorgeous George, and Little Richard, as a lead guitarist. His dissatisfaction with the conformity required as a member of a back-up band, his perception of the aesthetic limitation of R&B and Soul music, and the strong influence of Bob Dylan drove Hendrix out of the Black entertainment circuit into the heart of Greenwich village, where experimental music and art were in full swing. It was during one of his Greenwich village performances that Hendrix was spotted by Chas

Chandler, the members of the Animals who was actively looking for new talent in New York to launch a new pop group in England. The Jimi Hendrix Experience was thus formed in 1966, with Mitch Mitchell on drums and Noel Redding on bass, creating a psychedelic rock phenomenon not just in the United Kingdom but the rest of Europe as well.

His return to the United States as part of the British Rock invasion in 1967 signaled the convergence of rapidly commercialized rock and folk music with the emerging sphere of the counterculture. Though the image of Hendrix is often enshrined as one of the most critical iconographic figures of the new consciousness movement (i.e., protest culture, psychedelics, spirituality, sexuality, etc.), his engagement with the various components of the counterculture was not about the *image* but the *real*. As alluded to earlier, what separated him from other figures of the countercultural scene was his realism based on the shamanic articulation of his historical and cultural existence.

About a month prior to Hendrix's redebut in the United States at the Monterey Pop Festival, the Black Panther Party and its supporters demonstrated with arms at the state capital of Sacramento to assert the constitutional rights to bear arms, which was about to be restricted.<sup>52</sup> Also in the same year, the greatest urban riots took place in the Black ghetto.<sup>53</sup> The Black Panther Party was founded in 1966 in Oakland, California, by two Black students—Bobby Seale and Huey Newton—who were well versed in Black nationalism and Maoism and were involved in community activism (i.e., North Oakland Poverty Center).<sup>54</sup> As it absolved the radical wing of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (or SNCC) such as Stokely Carmichael, H. Rap Brown, Kathleen and Harry Cleaver, the Black Panther Party began to emerge as the most strident organization of the Black Power movement. The proliferation of the Black Panther Party from “coast-to-coast” and “community-to-community” was met by the police and the FBI's all-out war on the Black Panther Party. It escalated particularly from 1968—the year Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated—in unison with the escalation of the U.S. war on Vietnam and Southeast Asia, as the Black Panther Party fostered international solidarity with Algeria, Cuba, North Vietnam, and China. Thus, the span of time of Hendrix's reengagement with the American music scene took place in the most critical stage of the post-civil rights Black Power movement.

The group identity and musical orientation of the “Jimi Hendrix Experience,” transferred in the U.S. context, however, connoted the integrationist approach of the civil rights movement. Therefore, from the perspective of the Black Panther Party and the Black Power movement in general that upheld decolonizing nationalism, Hendrix's own philosophy of transcendence of racial categories (or any categories for that matter) must have appeared as a

sign of integration into the dominant ideology. Members of the Black Panther Party approached Hendrix not only for monetary contribution but also for his dedication to the Black cause, urging Hendrix “to put his body on the line and his lyrics, melodies, words, and performances as well.”<sup>55</sup> Despite his ambivalence with the separatist orientation of the Black Power movement, Hendrix did lend his support for the Black cause by the formation of a short-lived (between October 1969 to January 1970) Black rock band called the Band of Gypsies with Billy Cox on bass and Buddy Miles on drums. At the New Year’s Eve concert at Fillmore East, Hendrix dedicated “Voodoo Child (slight return)” to the Black Panthers.<sup>56</sup> Hendrix also expressed his support for the Black cause and the antiwar cause in his appearance at the Jazz Street Festival in Harlem (1969), the Winter Festival for Peace, a benefit for the Vietnam Moratorium Committee (1970), and the Berkeley Community Theater concert held at the end of Berkeley’s hot week of student protest against the Vietnam War.<sup>57</sup>

Part of Hendrix’s ambivalence with the Black Panthers and the Black Power movement may be due to his strong identification with his Cherokee heritage, which was nurtured through his close relationship with his grandmother in the reservation.<sup>58</sup> The Native American’s struggle for decolonization developed side by side with the civil rights and the Black Power movements. Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, Native Americans took militant direct actions to assert their sovereignty and self-determination, based on the treaties their nations had with the United States. In the region of the Pacific Northwest, they manifested as a struggle over Native American’s fishing rights. Particularly, Nisqually River, Washington had become a fierce battleground between the police and vigilante fishermen on one hand and the Native Americans on the other hand since 1964, when the latter defied the state court-ordered closure of their traditional fishing rivers and began conducting “fish-ins.”<sup>59</sup> In late 1969, a dramatic event took place in San Francisco Bay that embodied the rising forces of the Native American decolonization struggle. Seventy-eight Indians landed on Alcatraz Island to reclaim their land, later joined by six hundred fellow compatriots representing more than fifty nations.<sup>60</sup> (Hendrix makes his tribute in an unreleased track called (*Lower*) *Alcatraz*, a.k.a. *Keep on Grooving* [1969]). A similar occupation by Native Americans took place on Ellis Island, New York and Fort Lawton, Seattle, paving the path toward the establishment of the American Indian Movement in 1968.<sup>61</sup> These struggles, according to Johansen and Maestas, are the “signs of militance in the new American Indian resolution to resist further decimation.”<sup>62</sup>

In “I Don’t Live Today” (1967), Hendrix expresses the existential condition of his Native American identity in which life is besieged by the ongoing



forces of extermination. Despite its pessimism in lyrical content, the rhythmic impulse of the song conveys a militant tone due to a war dance–like drumming, which can be also heard in “Are You Experienced” (1967) and “Voodoo Child (slight return)” (1968). The latter marks convergence of his Cherokee and African roots. The African spirit culture of voodoo was incorporated into the Caribbean protest culture during slavery days and it also constituted the core of the Blues music culture in the North American context.<sup>63</sup> Besides the sonic, rhythmic, and shamanic mode, Hendrix’s Cherokee identity was also positively and creatively expressed via poetic imagery. A fantastic and kaleidoscopic imagery that runs through the album *Axis: Bold as Love* (1968), particularly in songs such as “Little Wing,” “One Rainy Wish,” and “Bold As Love,” reveals its lineage back to the “beautiful Indian stories” he used to hear from his grandmother.<sup>64</sup> His engagement with the social and historical context of being Cherokee and African seems to be done most effectively through poetic and shamanic or transcendental means, rather than through a direct social political commentary. As Hendrix himself admits, his engagement is not through protest but through seeking a solution: “You know anybody can protest, for instance, like in records or whatever you use your music for, anybody can protest but hardly anybody tries to give a decent type of solution, at least a mean-time [*sic*] solution, you know.”<sup>65</sup> It is, therefore, the transcendental, poetic, and cosmic realm that our attention needs to be focused upon in order to decipher the solution for the social contradiction that Hendrix so vehemently sought.

Let us return to Hendrix’s “Star-Spangled Banner” to illustrate his transcendental perspective. As he himself interprets, the message in his version of “The Star-Spangled Banner” pertains not just to the physical aspect but to the spiritual aspect of war, that takes place “in the heads of the people.”<sup>66</sup> In other words, not being caught up in the dualism of peace versus war, he could express his dissent directly at the very system of thinking that creates “war” or to “the very essence of war,” to use Monica Dannemann’s words.<sup>67</sup> Hendrix’s engagement with the theme of war evolved into an epic tune called “Machine Gun,” the most powerful version of which was recorded live on New Year’s Eve, 1970. Hendrix dedicated it to “all the soldiers that are fighting in Chicago and Milwaukee and New York. . . . Oh yes, and all the soldiers that are fighting in Vietnam.”<sup>68</sup> Having his feet planted in the identity of both soldier and pacifist, Hendrix’s empathy is directed at all the victims of war, which in turn propels him to arrive at the fundamental cause of war. Through the juxtaposition of the war against the Black Panther Party (hardly a month had passed since the assassination of charismatic Fred Hampton of the Chicago chapter) with the expansion of the war into

Southeast Asia as its historical background, the song approaches the theme of war in the reified form of a killing machine.

In his lyrics, Hendrix transports the audience from the social context to the spiritual context, illuminating the image of the “machine gun” as a link between social reality and spiritual reality. Pushing the boundary of protest beyond an apparent perpetrator of the war (i.e., the U.S.) to an internal cause of war, represented by the notion of the “evil man” (that makes us kill one another), Hendrix penetrates into the depth of the human mind to locate the source of violence for which each of us is accountable.<sup>69</sup> Hendrix’s transcendental perspective is gained by confronting the dualism as a manifestation of the deep-seated social contradiction (e.g., spiritual/physical, masculine/feminine, patriot/rebel, pacifist/soldier, etc.),<sup>70</sup> which creates a new point of view that allows us to see the very source of contradiction.

Hendrix’s engagement with the social contradiction acquires an unusually high intensity and boldness in his shamanic mode of expression, where he engages social reality with pure sound. In both “The Star-Spangled Banner” and his epic solo of “Machine Gun,” Hendrix works on the contradiction of social reality, embedded in the form of the national anthem and the symbolic as well as material existence of the machine gun, with his voodoo magic. Instead of rejecting the signifiers of the oppressive power apparatus, Hendrix’s voodoo magic proactively engages with the symbolic and, at the same time, the material embodiment of American imperialism as a rising global power. Inasmuch as voodoo entails the transformation of energy, Hendrix’s sound voodoo seems to aim at transforming the primary source of violence and destruction immanent in the national anthem and the weapon of mass killing.

The sound voodoo-ing of the contradiction as an affective mode of transformation has its roots not only in the spirit magic of voodoo, but also in the Indigenous American’s creation myth of the earth, specifically in the notion of axis. According to the Hopi’s account of the genesis of the First World (Tokpela), or the beginning of the earth, the first child of the earth was to learn the vital connection that aligns the human body with the earth mother and universal father. In both the human body and the earth, there runs an axis that keeps each in equilibrium, and “along this axis were several vibratory centers which echoed the primordial sound of life throughout the universe or sounded a warning if anything went wrong.”<sup>71</sup> Hendrix translated the axis into his own language in the second album, *Axis: Bold as Love*:

Well like the axis of the earth, you know, if it changes, well it changes the whole face of the earth, like every few thousand years, you know. And it’s

like love in a human being, if he [*sic*] really falls in love, deep enough, it will change him [*sic*], you know. It might change his [*sic*] whole life so both of them can really go together.<sup>72</sup>

The voodoo magic, axis of the earth, and axis as love all synchronously bring to light the transcendental yet primordial reality in which the spirit world and physical world are undifferentiated, where consciousness and external reality are organically linked by sound.

Coincidentally, the year of Hendrix's entry into the American popular music scene also marked the passing of John Coltrane, who likewise devoted his artistry to a transformational affect of pure sound, particularly during his Impulse years (e.g., *A Love Supreme*, *Ascension*, *Meditations*, *Interstellar Space*, etc.). Like Hendrix, Coltrane took the audience to the cosmic sphere of primordial reality that transcends time, space, and human consciousness, as J. C. Thomas elucidates:

[H]is music is of the past and future tenses as well as the present. He takes the listener back to a time when the earth's crust was barely cooled and the sea creatures had not yet begun their long walk on land; and forward to an era yet uncharted and unpredicted when music may be transmitted from mind to mind in such an instantaneous accomplishment that there will no longer be any need for musical instruments as such.<sup>73</sup>

Through their engagement in the primordial sound, both Hendrix and Coltrane were able to demonstrate the possibility of reconstructing our perception of reality by removing the boundary that separates the spirit world and material world. Thus, to come back to the cosmogenesis of the Hopi, their artistic expressions assume an affect quite similar to the primary act of creation through sound, specifically that of Palöngwhoya, one of the twin beings assisting the Spider Woman in the creation of life on earth:

You are Palöngawhoya, and you are to help keep this world when life is put upon it. This is your duty now: go about all the world and send out sound so that it may be heard throughout all the land. When this is heard, you will also be known as 'Echo.' For all sound echoes the creator.<sup>74</sup>

The artistic expressions of Coltrane and Hendrix could indeed be seen as the return of the spirit Palöngawhoya at the dawn of global capitalism, as they too are caretakers of the new mode of consciousness sprouting on earth where Nature is under an incessant attack by capitalist development. Their transcen-

dental mode of expression provides an infinite space of reflection upon which one could glimpse a possible resolution for social contradiction in a collective planetary consciousness, by the revolution of mind via sound.

Jimi Hendrix's artistic expression arguably represents the most subversive elements of the counterculture, due to its capability of suspending the power of corporate-mediated reality, thereby unraveling social contradiction in a cosmic sphere of reflection. Such openings, created by Hendrix's voodoo shamanism, can turn into a space of decolonization of the mind, as well as the unconscious—particularly for the youth that are in need of a new paradigm beyond the corporate-mediated world. This explains, at least partially, the necessity of strategic containment of Hendrix's expression that we saw in the case of *Woodstock* and in other instances of corporate intervention in his artistic expression.<sup>75</sup> Corporate intervention can be read as the new Hollywood's "instinctual" reaction to the counterculture's potential as a catalyst for decolonization.

#### THE STRATEGIC PARADIGM OF THE NEW HOLLYWOOD II: THE CONTAINMENT OF KUNG FU AND THE *ENTER THE DRAGON* PROJECT

Similar to way in which the idioms of the kung fu cultural revolution helped Asian youth to identify the cause of their rebellion, the subversive elements of counterculture were shaped by the idioms of rock and folk music. As the counterculture came face to face with transnational corporate intervention intent on capitalizing the image of rebellion, so did the kung fu cultural revolution. The corporate mediation of kung fu culture proceeded from two strategic angles. In the domestic sphere, the new Hollywood saw a potential market in the increasing popularity and interest in Asian martial arts. In the international market, the new Hollywood had to confront an expanding circulation of kung fu movies from Hong Kong, which could undermine its global dominance, particularly in the Third World. At the intersection of these two stood Warner Brothers' *Enter the Dragon* project.

The domestic mediation of kung fu culture was quite similar to the way Hollywood transformed the image of the counterculture into a marketable commodity. The phenomenal rise of the counterculture in the latter 1960s indicated growing popular yearnings for an epistemology and ontology alternative to the paradigm of capitalist development and the Eurocentric culture of modernity. The ideological foundation of the counterculture was laid down during the latter 1950s by the beatnik generation (Jack Kerouac, Allen Ginsberg, Gary Snyder, etc.) that assimilated Zen, Taoism, Yoga, and Native American spirituality into their literary expressions.<sup>76</sup> The intrusion of LSD

into popular culture along with the ideologue of psychedelics who experimented with LSD, further proliferated popular interest in non-Western philosophy, spirituality, mysticism, and religion, which were reconceived and practiced as an alternative lifestyle by the community of the counterculture.<sup>77</sup> Coterminous with the evolution of the beatnik culture, other segments of youth were also tuning their minds to the alternative paradigm through Asian martial arts, thanks to pioneering practitioners (e.g., Ed Parker, Wally Jay, Jhoon Rhee, Daniel Lee, Bruce Lee, and others) who were able to offer true-to-life teachings of various Asian martial arts. As much as non-Western philosophy provided a cosmic angle to see the social reality, Asian martial arts fostered the awareness of self in a cosmic realm. Grasped in an immediate and physical experience through the body and its movement, such awareness provided a vital connection between individuality and the boundless universe (Tao or Nature). The cosmic awareness of self has had a great potential for facilitating an autonomous sense of self that could in turn form a basis for the culture of the rebel in defiance of any systematic imposition of a collective identity. Therefore, although it may not be as overtly pronounced as folk and rock music, the increasing popularity of Asian martial arts can be viewed as an intricate facet of the counterculture of insurgent youth.

As far as Hollywood was concerned, however, Asian martial arts had remained as yet another spice to season the fantasy of "Oriental." At best, they were either part of Marlon Brando's "Oriental" cosmetics or James Bond's secret weapon. As discussed earlier, the first intrusion of "non-cosmetic" Asian martial arts into Hollywood was let loose by none other than Bruce Lee in the Twentieth-Century Fox TV series *The Green Hornet*. Hollywood, however, seemed very unprepared for this unexpected intrusion of the "real" or the unprocessed "raw material" in its final product. As a power plant of fantasy, Hollywood must take an upper hand in "processing" the "raw material." Despite a virtual banishment from Hollywood after his appearance on *The Green Hornet*, Lee managed to reenter the new Hollywood in Paramount's TV series *Longstreet* (1971) with the help of one of his pupils, Sterling Silliphant, an Academy Award-winning screenwriter who designed a script exclusively for Lee. Although Lee was again a sidekick who taught martial arts to the main character, his pedagogic presentation of the art of self-defense and philosophical discourse on Taoism mesmerized American viewers, indicated by the positive reviews on Lee's performance in the *New York Times* and the *Los Angeles Times*.<sup>78</sup>

Seeing the commercial potential of yet another by-product of the insurgent youth culture, Warner Brothers became actively involved in the commodification of the martial arts culture. Immediately after the success of *Longstreet*,

Warner Brothers and ABC jointly launched the first martial arts TV project in the history of Hollywood, dispatching an independent producer, Fred Weintraub (who also acted as producer for *Woodstock* and later for *Enter the Dragon*) to meet with Bruce Lee for plot consultation. Hollywood's intent in "processing" Chinese philosophy and martial arts was confirmed by the fact that Warner Brothers-ABC did not consider casting Lee as the main character for this self-proclaimed "first authentic" treatment of "Oriental" culture.<sup>79</sup> The project finally materialized as *Kung Fu* and was delivered to living rooms throughout the United States from 1972 to 1975, breaking records previously set by America's theretofore number one TV program, *All in the Family*.

David Carradine was featured as the main character, a Caucasian actor who had no knowledge or interest either in Chinese philosophy or martial arts. The role of a blind Chinese monk, the second critical character, was played by Keye Luke who, according to Darrell Hamamoto, was "the prototypical 'Oriental' as constructed by the implicit racism of network television standards and practices."<sup>80</sup> To be sure, for the first time in the history of Hollywood, Warner-ABC did invest in a "realistic" portrayal of Chinese history, philosophy, and the art of self-defense by consulting Bruce Lee and hiring David Chow. The latter, a master of Chi Na, was hired for the production as a technical advisor who not only supervised the choreography but also the "Oriental behavior" in general.<sup>81</sup> Nonetheless, such investment was not to introduce "realism" but rather to refine the "prop" with sophistication so that the paradigm of the kung fu genre can be processed. The Hollywood "Orientalism," or the American representational mode of "East Asia" as Other, functions as a processing mechanism. David Carradine, who could perform kung fu only in slow motion, falls into Hollywood's inventory of an "Orientalized" White male, a convention established in the era of the studio system. Keye Luke, who devoted his life to playing roles of "Asian domestic servants, laundrymen, mystics, gangsters, and enemy soldiers," also solidified the institutionalized imagery of Hollywood "Orientalism."<sup>82</sup>

Setting aside historical analysis of Hollywood "Orientalism" for the following chapter, I will focus on the ideological signification of *Kung Fu*. In *Kung Fu*, one could see the strategy of containment similar to the one deployed in *Woodstock*. By locating the quasi-kung fu narrative in the Hollywood image and narrative-scape of the western genre, *Kung Fu* extends the hegemony of Hollywood over the paradigm of kung fu through the vehicle of Hollywood "Orientalism." The sphere of the real in *Kung Fu* brought by Bruce Lee and David Chow is processed by Hollywood "Orientalism" to the point that it becomes a marginal and invisible component of *Kung Fu*. As *Kung Fu* eclipses kung fu, the hegemonic power of the new Hollywood is retained, at

least in its own version of a quasi-kung fu film. The paradigm of kung fu as a rebel culture, resonant with the countercultural connotation of Asian epistemology and arts in an American cultural context, is thus contained by the production of its simulacrum. As it will be shown later, the basic framework of containment in *Kung Fu*, which is still embedded in the paradigm of the studio system, will assume transnationality in *Enter the Dragon* where the James Bond-type spy genre is subsumed to constitute the structure of the Hollywood version of a kung fu film.

While investing in the commodification of Asian martial arts culture domestically, the new Hollywood still had to confront the ultimate referent of kung fu culture. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Hong Kong's cinema industry was thoroughly monopolized by Shaw Brothers, whose corporate logo design happens to look identical to that of Warner Brothers. Founded in the 1920s, Shaw Brothers had rapidly climbed its way to becoming Hong Kong's movie tycoon in the late 1950s through the early 1960s, with the success of its mandarin cinematic opera, fortified by the completion of its self-contained mega-fantasy factory. By the mid-1970s, Shaw Brothers' became the largest among twenty-four Hong Kong companies with ownership of a "143 theater network in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, Canada and the United States."<sup>83</sup> Shaw Brothers was thus a typical vertically integrated studio system that extended direct control from the level of production and distribution down to the level of exhibition. In the eyes of the new Hollywood management, therefore, Shaw Brothers must have appeared as a zombielike entity, as Shaw Brothers represented what Hollywood had successfully rid itself of through post-Fordist reorganization. Furthermore, to the new Hollywood's surprise, Shaw Brothers not only preserved Hollywood's past but it also demonstrated an acrobatic adaptation of the post-studio system strategy of diversification. In addition to its mega-fantasy factory and an extensive distribution and exhibition network, Shaw Brothers had incorporated "hotels, banks, real estate, insurance firms and HK-TVB, one of the television channels."<sup>84</sup>

Capitalizing on Richard Nixon's historic visit to China in 1972, the head of Asian distribution at Warner Brothers initiated a business contact with Shaw Brothers. Warner Brothers imported six of the Shaw Brothers' kung fu flicks and selected *King Boxer* (retitled as *Five Fingers of Death* in the U.S.) to be circulated in the world market, which turned out to set "all kinds of records in France and Italy."<sup>85</sup> Riding on the high tide of the film's success, Shaw Brothers put *The Killer*, *New One-Armed Swordsman*, and *Cold Sweat* into an international circuit, further igniting the spark of the global kung fu craze.<sup>86</sup> Back at Warner Brothers, the head of Asian distribution was reporting on the performance of *King Boxer* to the executives at a biweekly market

meeting. The executives reacted more to Run Run Shaw than the film itself: "They were all interested, though none of them knew kung fu from Chiang Kai-Shek and they absolutely didn't want to deal with Sir Run Run. Why cut Sir Run Run in, they said?"<sup>87</sup> Their reaction to Run Run Shaw, president of Shaw Brothers, could be easily attributed to Shaw's well-known quaint and obstinate personality. Yet if we apply C. L. R. James's historicizing analysis of characters in a novel to this corporate decision-making process, some underlying structural issues may be discerned. "Run Run Shaw," or for that matter, "Warner Brothers executives" can be "seen as a specific type of person, at a specific point of historical time, produced by specific historical circumstances."<sup>88</sup> The reluctance of Warner Brothers' executives to deal with Run Run Shaw, therefore, is significantly related to a particular interest the new Hollywood had with Third World film industries at that particular point of history.

As we have observed, Shaw Brothers is a quintessential case of a quasi-autarkic industry, which typifies Hong Kong's indigenous capital. According to Clive Hamilton, the growth of industrial sectors in Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong has been quite different from those in other developing countries: "As a rule, direct foreign investment has been of no great significance and industrial development has been carried out largely by indigenous capital."<sup>89</sup> Therefore, Warner Brothers was confronted with an industry similar to Hong Kong's textile industry, from which it can only expect a finished product, hence, a trade. The interest of Warner Brothers as a representative of the new Hollywood, just as any transnational capital, lay not in a trading relationship, but in a new productive arrangement under which the low-cost labor force of the so-called periphery can be directly incorporated into a commodity production. What Warner Brothers was looking for instead was another type of productive arrangement that allowed foreign capital the power to finance as well as to command.

Raymond Chow, a graduate of American Christian University in Shanghai, joined Shaw Brothers after his brief career at an English-language newspaper and lent his expertise to bolster Run Run Shaw's growing empire. Chow broke away from Shaw Brothers in 1970 to launch Golden Harvest. Golden Harvest managed to acquire an aging Cathay's studio (Shaw Brothers' prime competitor throughout the 1950s and 1960s), which was located "among the squatter shacks and perched rather precariously on a Kowloon hillside."<sup>90</sup> In its inaugural year, Golden Harvest produced eight films, acquired theaters in Hong Kong and Taiwan, and gained access to Cathay's Malaysia and Singapore network.<sup>91</sup> Striving to forge a breakthrough in a totally monopolized market, Golden Harvest invested in the star system. As



mentioned earlier, it lured Wang Yu into switching his allegiance from Shaw Brothers to Golden Harvest and also cultivated Angela Mao Ying's stardom. Moreover, Golden Harvest invested in the recruitment of Bruce Lee by offering him a \$15,000 contract for two film-production engagements. It was not an impressive figure by Hollywood standards, but it was an amount and contract unprecedented in the history of Hong Kong cinema industry.<sup>92</sup> The two movies Lee starred in instantly shattered the box-office record, not just in Hong Kong, but practically all over Asia (except South Asia and Japan).<sup>93</sup>

Meanwhile, back at the Warner Brothers' executive meeting, a suggestion was made for contacting Chow and Lee as an alternative option to Shaw Brothers.<sup>94</sup> Having worked in Shaw Brothers' studio system, Chow was ready to explore a new direction in order to carve a niche in the industry. As he recalls about his departure from Shaw Brothers: "I felt that it was time the Hong Kong film industry stepped in and started supplying the world market, as other film centers around the world were suffering severe economic crises."<sup>95</sup> Chow, therefore, pursued the post-Fordist or post-studio system style of management whereby he kept "studio overhead costs low, centralize[d] his operation, prefer[red] well-known, freelance artists over contracted ones. . . ."<sup>96</sup> To the new Hollywood's eyes, Golden Harvest's openness to a new type of entrepreneurship must have appeared as conducive to its new strategy, an offshore venture with the fantasy factory in the periphery.

Warner Brothers' offshore venture with Golden Harvest, or the *Enter the Dragon* project (it was called *Steel and Blood* at the planning stage), was finally approved by Ted Ashley, despite the remaining executives' disapproval. Warner Brothers allocated the budget equivalent of a TV pilot program and designated the production as a nonunion project.<sup>97</sup> As Robert Clouse, the director of *Enter the Dragon*, points out, unlike Hollywood's conventional approach where it would bring all the people and equipment for a venture project, the *Enter the Dragon* project was "the first true co-production between an American company and a company from Asia."<sup>98</sup> In other words, *Enter the Dragon* was one of the first projects under the strategic paradigm of global capitalism.

The script written by Michael Allin, which will be detailed in the following chapter, was designed to introduce the Hollywood processed imagery of "Hong Kong" and "kung fu" to the global audience. The setting of the narrative is the contemporary Hong Kong of the 1970s. Han (played by Shek Kin), a renegade Shaolin monk, operates a criminal underworld organization based on his semi-autarkic domain on the island off the coast of Hong Kong. His drug and prostitution ring comes under the radar of an intelligence agency of unknown origin. The agency approaches the Shaolin Temple to

recruit a special agent to infiltrate into Han's island. The senior monk of the Shaolin Temple recommends "Lee"<sup>99</sup> (played by Bruce Lee) to get involved in order to restore the honor of the temple. "Lee" decides to attend the annual martial arts tournament on Han's island in defense of the Shaolin Temple and to assist the intelligence agency. "Lee" finds out that Han's protégé, Ohara (played by Bob Wall) was responsible for the death of his sister at the last tournament. Roper (played by John Saxon), a struggling American businessman and a marital artist, joins the tournament with hopes for the prize. Williams (played by Jim Kelly), a Black Power martial artist, also flies to Hong Kong as respite from the ghetto condition and his battle with police oppression. Williams and Roper turn out to be co-combatants in the Vietnam War. "Lee's" covert operation comes to the attention of Han. In the meantime, "Lee's" opponent in the tournament turns out to be Ohara. As Ohara transgresses the match and tried to attack "Lee" with a broken bottle, "Lee" exacts his revenge. In the meantime, Han interrogates and eventually executes Williams who refused to identify the infiltrator. During his second infiltration operation into Han's underground factory, "Lee" gets captured by Han who arranges him to fight Roper. Roper refuses, and the whole island breaks into a big brawl as another agent, Mei-lin (played by Betty Chung) releases all the prisoners. "Lee" corners Han into one-on-one combat. As "Lee" emerges from Han's fortress triumphantly, Han's forces are defeated by the prisoners and Roper. The narrative concludes with the landing of the armed forces called by the intelligence agency in the aftermath.

The existence of "Hong Kong"—its land, people, and culture—as a backdrop in the narrative of *Enter the Dragon* constitutes a symbolic "export zone" where Hollywood manufactures its own brand of kung fu film in relative isolation from the real Hong Kong. During the actual production of *Enter the Dragon*, however, the real Hong Kong was more complex than a simple "export zone" factory. Prior to its accommodation of transnational film production, Hong Kong was already introduced to a transnational productive arrangement through the semiconductor industry. The semiconductor industry originated in Santa Clara County, California (the so-called Silicon Valley) in the 1950s. After saturating its domestic expansion (Boston, Dallas, and Phoenix), it entered a phase of global expansion in the beginning of the 1960s, moving into Latin America (particularly Mexico) and Southeast Asia.<sup>100</sup> Hong Kong was selected as the primary landing site of the semiconductor industry in the Asian region. The shop floor was established in 1962 and extended over all Southeast Asia (except Brunei) during the 1960s and more conspicuously in the 1970s.<sup>101</sup> Aside from the low-cost labor, the primary reason for the selection of Hong Kong had to

do with the presence of a particular type of labor force “habituated in the kinds of labor process characteristic of semiconductor industry,” or Hong Kong’s familiarity with the electronic assembly line already existent since the 1950s.<sup>102</sup>

The same held true for the film industry: the new Hollywood had been attracted to Asian film capitals, such as Bombay and Hong Kong, that possessed the labor force already habituated to a particular type of labor process.<sup>103</sup> Hollywood could then occupy the position of a commanding center that is strikingly identical to that of Silicon Valley. The function of both Silicon Valley and Hollywood is to specialize in R&D, planning, budget allocation, and the final processing of the commodity at the high-tech factory. The high-tech factory, where a limited number of executives, professionals, and technicians perform their work, is located in an urban/suburban milieu suitable for reproduction of managerial, technical, and intellectual class. As Silicon Valley would send only core staff members to offshore manufacturing plants, Warner Brothers only dispatched selected personnel to Hong Kong: two executive producers (i.e., factory supervisors), a director (i.e., foreman), and his spouse (who acted as an informal art director), a camera person (i.e., technician), two Hollywood actors/actresses (i.e., professionals as well as model commodities), and a translator (or crosscultural liaison) to the new site of production. As a subcontract firm for Warner Brothers, Golden Harvest was required to furnish the majority of components from (Chinese) actors and actresses and extras to provide props and equipment (except camera).

The disparity of values and conditions of labor between the Hollywood and the Third World factories was all too visible to the director. Robert Clouse was rather shocked to find out the low-wages of a Golden Harvest star, Angela Mao Ying, who played the role of the main character’s sister. Mao’s elegant kung fu performance in the film generated a strong demand for her films to be released internationally. Despite the fact that her presence and performance/labor had much more visual impact on the audience than any Hollywood workers, the director found out that her wage as a contractual worker for Golden Harvest was \$100 “for two long day’s [*sic*] work.”<sup>104</sup> Her situation, nevertheless, seems fortunate compared with “hundreds of Chinese crafters and laborers”<sup>105</sup> who were employed for “behind the scenes” type of labor. Unlike Shaw Brothers, which integrated myriad aspects of production into the Fordist mass production mode, the newly inaugurated and post-Fordist-oriented Golden Harvest relied heavily on sweatshop production.<sup>106</sup> The sweatshop condition was perhaps more visible to the director’s wife, a volunteer (i.e., unwaged) art director. She recounts her experience with the artisan mode of labor embedded within the Golden Harvest factory:

Later they [craftsmen] 'gave' me the two huge statues of warriors that stood in Han's set painted in gold. I had not asked for them or anything like them. They were brilliantly executed figures put together with mud from the hill, broken wood and chicken wire. I remember a tiny Chinese woman carrying two buckets of mud on the ends of a bamboo pole arched across her shoulders time after time and children bringing the bits of wood. It's one of those fine memories of Hong Kong I hold dear.<sup>107</sup>

Ann Clouse's work, as with that of other "housewives," is the type of unwaged labor enveloped in Robert Clouse's wage. It is the typical labor relationship under Fordism where women's unpaid labor is concealed as "domestic" work in the nuclear familial/patriarchal mode of (re)production.<sup>108</sup> In a structural correspondence, the work of the women and children of Hong Kong sweatshops are also unwaged labor and the value thereof is concealed in the familial/patriarchal mode of production. The sense of solidarity between them, at least partially, derives from their similar positions in the wage relationship. The "cheap source of labor" that transnational capital cultivates is not only dependent upon undervalued actors and actresses (equivalent of factory workers), but relies more significantly upon the mass of under-waged or non-waged labor situated in adverse working conditions.

Although the transnationalization of kung fu movie production follows more closely with the transnational mode of production in the semiconductor industry, the ultimate goal of the former seems to go beyond that of increasing "efficiency" and "profit margins" as it has a direct impact on image currency. Unlike the semiconductor industry, the basic design and structure of kung fu movies (i.e., concept, narrative, aesthetics, and other components) have their origin in the sphere of Third World popular culture and fantasy factories, not in headquarters. An inundation of kung fu movies, which represents the liberating desire of the Third World masses, in the international cultural market constituted a counterflow to the global hegemonic image currency. The fact that Bruce Lee's made in Hong Kong movies far outgrossed such blockbuster Hollywood products as *The Sound of Music* and *The Godfather* in Asia itself bespeaks the powerful decolonizing potential of kung fu movies vis-à-vis the Hollywood cultural imperialism.

The motivation for Hollywood to intervene in kung fu film production, therefore, is not only based on the economic factor (i.e., potential loss of the market) but also on a political ground that kung fu movies could undermine the ideological function of Hollywood. Specifically, the rise of kung fu movies in the international market unequivocally meant an influx of a rebel culture born out of the reality of global capitalist contradiction in the Third World. The rebel culture of kung fu movies also provides an alternative epistemology:

it embraces historical understanding through legends and folklore, provides an anatomy of power (particularly of colonialism) through allegory and symbolism, and espouses a transcendental philosophy through Taoist discourse. In order to restore its cultural hegemony, it was necessary for the new Hollywood to reinvent the point of reference. In other words, to counter the ideological threat the kung fu rebel culture posed, the new Hollywood had to resort to recolonization of the kung fu movie genre.

The *Enter the Dragon* project thus marked the convergence of the two types of strategies discussed so far: the processing of the culture of Asian martial arts through the cutting edge of Hollywood "Orientalism" in the domestic sphere and the transnational colonization (or Hollywoodization) of the kung fu rebel culture. Considering the potential influence that kung fu movies would have on people under colonial occupation (and under other types of oppression in general), the new Hollywood's attempt at the transnationalization of the kung fu rebel culture is in harmony with the transnational capitalist restructuration of the hegemonic power. Both strategies seem to share the same intent to contain the culture of resistance by turning a rebel into a "rebel without a power."

#### FOUNDATION OF SUBVERSION IN THE MAKING OF GLOBAL COMMODITIES

As I have attempted to demonstrate thus far, deciphering the strategy of containment in the sphere of popular culture also brings to light the potentiality of the counterculture and kung fu rebel culture in overcoming the global contradiction. Such potentiality can be pursued in the ways in which they transcend the boundary between the social and the cosmic, the spiritual and the physical, and the universal and the individual. Such transcendental perspective implies a space of collective identity that extends beyond the totality of living labor or the human agency. It reaches out to embrace the universal cosmic sphere, and eventually, the totality of Nature, as the ultimate Other of capital.

At the root of this perspective, there seems to be a paradox in which the global expansion of capitalism's violent forces into Third World, Fourth World, ghetto, village, reservation, the unconscious, "sacred" places, and other undemarcated sites in the bosom of Nature, inevitably activate the Other of capitalism to life. Aihwa Ong's *Spirits of Resistance and Capitalist Discipline: Factory Women in Malaysia* takes us to ground zero in the collision between global capitalism and the forces of Nature. The book highlights the struggle beneath the sleek appearances of IBM and Macintosh computers, as if the

microchips were transmitting the voices and actions of the under-waged and over-exhausted women suffering at the bottom rung of the international division of labor.

Any reader of Ong's book will be taken aback by the phenomenon she describes on the shop floors of Japanese-owned semiconductor factories in the foreign trade zone of Malaysia. It is far beyond the scope of what we normally understand as "resistance" as it borders on the spiritual and the physical world. Faced with the nearly insurmountable forces of patriarchal cum capitalist control in a transnationally manufactured environment, working women see spirits in the microscope, factory floor, toilet, prayer room, and locker room. These sightings in turn induce a collective spirit-possession among other workers, the contagion of which ineluctably aggregates to a de facto large-scale, industrial sabotage. At another (American-owned) factory in the foreign trade zone, the director had encountered difficulty communicating to headquarters that "8,000 hours of production were lost because someone saw a ghost."<sup>109</sup>

As a variant of spontaneous direct action against work, spirit-possession immediately corrode the profit margin and commanding power of transnational capital. As Ong puts it, these sightings and possessions are "acts of rebellion, symbolizing what cannot be spoken directly, calling for a renegotiation of obligations between the management and workers."<sup>110</sup> Furthermore, it spontaneously engenders the space of autonomy, though temporarily, within a highly controlled and alienated environment of capital. To this temporally created space of autonomy, transnational management is forced to bring a traditional spiritual healer to dispel what the indigenous consider to be "filth" in the factory.<sup>111</sup> In some places, pictures of the spiritual healer are posted over the shop floor in an attempt to soothe the factory workers, a reminder of the space of autonomy.<sup>112</sup> With the creation of the space of autonomy, therefore, the sphere of the real—specifically, the totality of "village" (i.e., its tradition, culture, belief, and authority)—intrudes into the manufactured space of transnational capital. Although it is not necessarily the crux of Ong's argument, what is implicit in Ong's ethnography is an invisible terrain of struggle where the subjectivity of the most oppressed merges with the spontaneity of Nature, through a collective affective (i.e., shamanic) mediation, in defiance of the transnational modernity and capitalism.<sup>113</sup> It seems that precisely because of the well-nigh total control of transnational capital over Malay female workers' bodies, the forces of Nature, the ultimate Other of capital, manifest their reaction via the bodies of overworked and under-waged female workers.

Thus it is quite "natural" that the *Enter the Dragon* project was also cursed with the sphere of the real and the forces of Nature. Indeed, as we will see momentarily, it was afflicted throughout with the spirit of resistance. In

contrast to other global commodities produced under similar productive arrangement such as Benetton jeans or Nike shoes, where the trace of labor, not to mention of resistance, is completely erased in the final product, *Enter the Dragon* retained the traces of subversion in its final print due to the semi-autonomous space created in the process of production. As we scrape off the varnished surface, we begin to see a dynamic process within the global commodity factory.

### Intrusion of the Real Figures, Objects, and Livelihood

In Hollywood, the visible workers (actors, actresses, and extras) and the productive facilities (props and location sites) are completely institutionalized; however, the Third World fantasy factories oftentimes have to depend on the real-life world for want of such an institution. For the *Enter the Dragon* project, Golden Harvest was compelled to rely on the “informal sector” that was not officially integrated into the film industry or, in some cases, any industry for that matter. The extras who engaged in combat were organized by Hong Kong’s Triad society, an underworld organization, as a subcontracting firm. Due to the demand made by Warner Brothers’ production crew, Golden Harvest had to hire four hundred extras for the battle scene, which exceeded what one “family” of the Triad society could provide:

Many times when we needed more stuntmen than one family could supply, we would have to call in the stuntmen from rival families which led to near mortal fights. In any of the mass fights, such as the climactic encounter on the tournament field, the staged fight would quickly degenerate into a vengeful brawl. The fights did not necessarily stop when I yelled “cut.”<sup>114</sup>

For the prison scene in which Han, the villain, keeps what he calls “refuse” in incarceration, Golden Harvest recruited extras among “drunks and vagrants” who “were found on the street.”<sup>115</sup> Though the conditions of their recruitment and employment were uncertain, their discontent was clearly expressed to the director during the shooting:

As I moved among them, staging shots, they mumbled things in slurred Chinese. Chaplin, the first assistant director, was following along behind, shaking his head. I asked him what was going on and he said, “I’m embarrassed to tell what they are suggesting they want to do to you. In fact, I won’t tell you.”<sup>116</sup>

Furthermore, though *Enter the Dragon* was made for an international audience, it had to follow certain norms established in Hong Kong's cultural market, which reflected the audience's cultural and social norms as well as their long established tastes. One such example is the role of prostitutes in the film, as Han's underground business primarily involves narcotic production and prostitution. In the scenes where Han "offers" guest martial artists what he calls "gifts," Golden Harvest had no choice but to hire real prostitutes, as it was explained to the director: "If a Chinese woman was not considered a whore, she couldn't be cast as one. It would be a terrible disgrace. . . . In Hong Kong, if you're going to write a prostitute, then you had to cast a prostitute for the part."<sup>117</sup>

A quest for authenticity based on the cultural norm involved in the casting of prostitutes also applied to the casting of martial artists. In Hong Kong (as well as the entire Mandarin and Cantonese movie circuit), moviegoers—particularly martial arts moviegoers—are very harsh and honest critics. They have been known to directly express their dissatisfaction vocally, or in some cases, physically.<sup>118</sup> Michael Kaye, a director for Golden Harvest, cites an instance that bespeaks of the perspicacious eyes of the Hong Kong masses: "There is a small independent company here in Hong Kong with a star who is not a martial artist. The fights as shot . . . well . . . they are almost brilliant—they're very, very good fights. The films last about two days in Hong Kong because everyone knows this guy cannot fight."<sup>119</sup> All eight martial artists in *Enter the Dragon*, in due course, were real practitioners. Headed by Lee, arguably the most innovative professional martial artist, three other martial artists in the movie had won championships in national and international scale tournaments.

The intrusion of the sphere of the real is not only carried out by human figures but also by the objects used in production. The Hollywood crew, pampered in a high-tech milieu of production, were stunned by the labor-intensive conditions of Hong Kong's factory. In the scene where Han and Roper descend to Han's underground factory on a secret elevator, the camera crew encountered difficulty in capturing the smooth descending movement of the elevator. At that time, Clouse had assumed this was due to a malfunctioning of the hydraulic equipment. Years later, he was told that the elevator was manned by four workers operating on the ratchets, cranking them in a synchronic movement that required an overnight practice to simulate the smooth functioning of a hydraulic device.<sup>120</sup> Likewise, the lack of technological gadgets in the combat scene brings the action back to the days of Lloyd and Chaplin when acting was a matter of life and death: "They [extras] risked life and limb without the technology or expensive equipment taken for granted in



Hollywood. There was no breakaway glass or air bags to break falls."<sup>121</sup> We will see later that it was the intrusion of a real glass bottle during the shooting process that spurred the most emotionally laden resistance in the factory.

Finally, the reality of global contradiction also enters the transnational fantasy factory through the aesthetic orientation of the director. Abdellatif Ben Ammar, a Tunisian filmmaker, explains the Third World aesthetics born out of the reality of a global contradiction that does not allow filmmakers to indulge in fantasy: "In Third World countries, whether in Bolivia, Algeria or Tunisia or elsewhere, film-makers do not have the resources to do aesthetic research. A film in these countries is often the result of a chance or an 'accident.'"<sup>122</sup> Hollywood-trained Clouse was duly affected by the ghetto condition, as evident from the insertion of lengthy documentary imagery of Hong Kong at the outset of the film, beyond the orbit of the original script. Clouse gives an account of his accidental encounter with the sublime in the harsh conditions of a Hong Kong ghetto: "Aberdeen [Bay] is an enormous cauldron of smells, grit and effort. No one rests. No matter how old or how young, everyone seems to have a hundred jobs to do. I fell in love with it the moment I saw it. I tried to use this location as much as possible."<sup>123</sup> The camera, set on the boat, floats along the Aberdeen Bay, taking on the viewpoints of guest martial artists on small individual junks. These were rowed by real-life oarsmen and oarswomen, who in fact refused to sail on certain days based on their traditional beliefs.<sup>124</sup> With unusual meticulousness, the camera studies the lives of the boat people. Some of them, mainly children, respond to the camera in a casual manner: a reverse scrutiny full of curiosity, and an elated amusement with the blue-eyed invaders. The fortuitous aesthetics born from Third World conditions opens up a loophole for the sphere of the real; specifically, the everyday reality of the oppressed seeping through Hollywood's fantastic aesthetic grid.

Thus, as far as the production process was concerned, it was the communal existence of "ghetto," urban "village," or the real Hong Kong that encircled the *Enter the Dragon* project. The principle aim of the *Enter the Dragon* project, as in other transnational productions, was to recreate the temporary existence of the Hollywood factory system in the "export zone" in order to incorporate the labor and resources through economic or other coercion. As we will see, the Hollywood media conglomerate was confronted with the sphere of the real that overturned the boundary, as well as the principle, of the transnational fantasy factory. Similar to the case of the Malay microchip factory, the forces of Nature loom behind the erosion of yet another production site of transnational capital called filmmaking. In lieu of the spirit, it was the "dragon" as a catalyst that facilitated the merger of the social subject and the

forces of Nature in the case of Hong Kong transnational film production. It is therefore necessary to approach Bruce Lee as an independent factor in the return of the forces of Nature to the transnational factory.

### Enter Bruce Lee: Representative Figure of the Rebel Culture

From the beginning of his career, Lee has been an anomaly in the Hollywood fantasy factory. Unlike any other Hollywood factory worker, Lee had his own philosophy as an actor that was not in concordance with Hollywood's productive norm. It is eloquently expressed in his quasi-manifesto, written in his early adult career "as a sort of personal view of the motion picture industry and the ideas of an actor as well as a human being."<sup>125</sup> He opens his essay with a political analysis of the condition of an actor in a corporate-controlled art, à la Walter Benjamin: "To the business people in films—and I have to say that cinema is a marriage of art and business—the actor is not a human being but a product, a commodity."<sup>126</sup> With somewhat contrived innocence, he goes on to unravel his tactic of decommodification, locating himself in the midst of the gulf between a commodity and a human being and dissolving the split as he moves on: "However, as a human being, I have the right to be the best god damn product that ever walked, and work so hard that business people have to listen to you."<sup>127</sup> Lee then turns around the notion of "best" and strikes at the heart of the commodification process: "You have that personal obligation to yourself to make yourself the best product available *according to your own terms*. Not the biggest or the most successful, but the best quality—with that [*sic*] achieved everything else."<sup>128</sup> Whereas Hollywood's productive principle determines the qualitative value of an actor solely in terms of its commodity value (i.e., profitability), here Lee tries to take the valuation process back to the hands of the artist as a human being, capable of self-evaluating one's own object of production. His deviation from the productive norm of Hollywood widens in the conclusion wherein he crystallizes an autonomous valuation process in artistic and honest expression and, hence, in the unfolding of one's being:

An actor, a good actor that is, is an artist with depth and subtlety. Indeed, what the audience sees on the screen is the sum total of what that particular human being's level of understanding is. If he [*sic*] is ready, well prepared, radiating tremendous force of energy, and honest confidence of expression, working hard to grow and expand oneself in one's own process, well, this person is professional, an "efficient deliverer" in my book.<sup>129</sup>

With this manifesto in hand, Lee entered Hollywood as a rebel worker. His “activism,” however, was not focused upon unionization, strikes, or other organizing efforts to which rebel workers in other types of production would tend to commit themselves. In a manner quite similar to Jimi Hendrix, his artistic activism was a demand on the image currency and, ultimately, an autonomous control over the representation of self, as an artist. The control over image currency is a sacrosanct region, off-limits to the workers since it is where the fundamental premise—nay, the *raison d'être*—of Hollywood pivots upon. Lee’s demand, accordingly, assumes the most political demand specific to the stage of Hollywood as a power plant of commodified imagery.

Thus Bruce Lee’s political engagement, if one can call it such, is not so much premeditated as it is a result of his artistic expression as articulation of one’s being. In other words, the “political” or “subversive” effect generated in Lee’s artistic expression is not his primary objective, but it is engendered nonetheless in his quest for the real, for harmony with Nature or Tao. Due to his artistic orientation, the point of departure in Lee’s political engagement begins as a singular endeavor, and yet his singular struggle echoes the other workers’ sense of dignity. This spontaneously forges a collective dimension, first in the process of production, and subsequently in the sphere of mass culture as a whole, by involving the audience. In this way, Lee’s struggle is comparable to the eye of a hurricane, which amasses the forces of collectivity during its formation, gradually arousing a spontaneous gigantic whirlwind in its wake.

Lee’s pursuit of realism in his artistic expressions can erode the boundaries between the character he plays and his real-life experience, which includes his struggle with the management in the production process. In Lee’s Hollywood career prior to *Enter the Dragon*, from *The Green Hornet* (where he struggled with the Asian stereotype)<sup>130</sup> to *Longstreet* (where he was able to play himself as “Lee”), his struggle is an isolated and forlorn one, representing the constituency outside the production process. By contrast, back in Hong Kong, Lee’s quest for the real in film production entailed an immediate effect in the production process, as his voice and actions represented the underrepresented constituency.

In order to materialize his honest expression, Lee intervened in the plot and character development, which often involved his antagonistic confrontations with management. The immediate outcome of his struggle is quite visible in the structural similarities between Lee’s life and the characters in the films. Each character is uniformly a “stranger” to the community depicted in the film even though he shares the same collective identity (e.g., overseas Chinese workers in *The Big Boss* and *The Way of the Dragon* and the students of the martial arts school in *Fist of Fury*). As the story progresses, the main char-

acter's quest for justice and righteousness dissolves his initial alienation and, in the end, he becomes a spontaneous leader of the workers' or students' movement against the dominant power, be it a heroin tycoon, Japanese imperialists, or Italian Mafia.

Such a common narrative strand is identical with Lee's struggle in the Hong Kong movie industry. Although he had established himself as a popular Cantonese child and juvenile actor in Hong Kong, as a returning overseas Chinese with mild success in Hollywood, he was a "stranger" to the new factory in Hong Kong that catered to the Mandarin circuit. Nonetheless, his quest for artistic self-expression, moral sensibility, uncompromising attitude toward management, and local Hong Kong (Cantonese) identity fostered a solidarity among the rank-and-file workers of the Hong Kong fantasy factory:

It was during the making of *Fist of Fury* that tension between director and star exploded into angry confrontations. "After he'd given everyone their basic instructions for the scene, (Lo Wei) [director] liked to listen to the racing on the radio," alleges Lam Ching Ying [Golden Harvest actor]. "He'd be sitting in his director's chair, getting all excited over his horse winning or losing. Finally Bruce storms over to him: 'What are you doing? Okay, everybody go home!' In fact we didn't wrap but he made his point!" All of Lee's stuntmen and fellow workers admired the way he stood up to the bosses at Golden Harvest, constantly demanding better conditions for them.<sup>131</sup>

It is no surprise that Lee's activities during the production of *Enter the Dragon* held a close resemblance to the character system Lee had portrayed on the screen. In *The Big Boss*, Lee played the role of Cheng, a new kid to the ice factory in Thailand, which was owned by an overseas Chinese petty capitalist heroin lord. Cheng's leadership, demonstrated in his confrontation with the merciless Thai factory foreman and his protégé, prompted the factory owner to promote Cheng to the position of a factory supervisor. Realizing that his promotion is merely a trap to co-opt him, Cheng defies the management's scheme and confronts the Big Boss's entire criminal operation.

In real life, Lee was promoted to the rank of management from the time of making his third film, *The Way of the Dragon*. In the *Enter the Dragon* project, Lee officially shared producership with Raymond Chow in the form of co-ownership of a newly created subsidiary of Golden Harvest called Concord. Nonetheless, Lee consistently maintained his solidarity with the rank-and-file workers, reenacting Cheng in real life. For instance, a Hong Kong cameraman related to Clouse an episode in which Lee chose to eat the box lunch with all the workers and refused special treatment as the boss.<sup>132</sup>

Lee's consistent efforts to make himself a peer among his workers forged a solidarity between them, as Yeung Sze (who played Bolo in *Enter the Dragon*) testifies:

He was popular and a first-class man. No 'char hai' (which means he did not 'shine shoes' of the bosses.) Many big stars, even little stars, shine shoes of bosses, then they treat people 'jok wai jok fok' (which is to say they put down those in lesser positions). He talked to carpenters and plasterers. When they saw his car coming, they'd jump up. He's the boss, right? He got out and walked over to them. They thought he wanted them to do something. He said, 'Everybody sit down, I want to talk. Let's talk.' So they all squatted down on the ground and talked. This was very rare. You never saw Raymond Chow squat down on the ground and talk.<sup>133</sup>

Unlike other members of the management, Lee made a point of meeting with every worker involved in the production, especially with the stuntmen in their occasional nightly meetings after the shooting. At such meetings, Lee would listen to their opinions and demands, which sometimes involved dispensing loans to those who were hard up.<sup>134</sup> His solidarity with the undervalued and underpaid workers often resulted in his confrontation with the other managers of the factory. Yeung Sze again gives his testimony: "One day we saw Bruce bawl out the boss with our own eyes and ears. He yelled, 'Raymond Chow, come over here!' Mr. Chow came over and stood there. Bruce yelled at him and didn't even look at him. For the workers, this was very good. To the bosses, Bruce was tough."<sup>135</sup> Akin to the ice factory in *The Big Boss*, Golden Harvest (as well as other film factories in Hong Kong) lacked institutional representation of the workers' interests, a gap that Lee filled as a de facto workers' representative despite his formal position in the management. His confrontation with management did not stop at the level of Raymond Chow, but extended also to the Hollywood crews and managers, and finally to Warner Brothers' top managers in Burbank, California. Lee's "kinetic revolution" and real-life rebelliousness were thus bound to merge with the Hong Kong sweatshop workers' discontent in their decolonizing struggle within the transnational factory.

### The Emergence of a Subversive Subject

In viewing the case of the Malay factory women's resistance as a touchstone, we may now discern the foundation of subversion on a more general level. With its global mobility, the transnational corporate power can extend sites

of exploitation into zones theretofore not thoroughly incorporated into the logic of global capitalism. Within these zones, the gap between manufactured imagery (transnational capital's utopia) and reality manifests crudely as an irreconcilable split between the "factory" (i.e., decentralized sites of exploitation) and the "village," "ghetto," or the sphere of the real. An almost caricatural yet illuminating comparison in this context is the physical makeup of Disneyland. It recapitulates the structure and paradigm of global capitalism. The maintenance of the world of the corporate manufactured imagery of Disneyland, according to Alexander Wilson, is dependent upon the confinement of the sphere of the real, principally the workers' space such as a locker room and cafeteria, to the underground, "hidden from the spectator, much as productive forces are hidden in the image of the commodity."<sup>136</sup> On the one hand, the shiny surface of Disneyland corresponds to the "place" or the "structure" of the transnational capital such as the Malay transnational semiconductor factories and the *Enter the Dragon* project devised by the transnational media conglomerate. On the other hand, the "underground" is paradigmatic of the zone of the oppressed: village, ghetto, reservation, prison, and numerous other sites.

The forces arising from the "underground" or the sphere of the real can be formidable enough to overflow the boundary between the transnational surface and the "underground." Such an imposed boundary is so volatile that it only takes an accident or presence of a catalyst to unleash the power of subversion. The entwinement of spirit-possession and the Malay factory women's resistance indicates the blurring of the distinction between accidents and resistance, the spiritual and material, uncovering the total forces of Nature that square off with the global reach of capitalist power. As discussed earlier, when the contradiction attains a global level, capital does not simply confront the forces of human agency or living labor: it becomes increasingly vulnerable to the forces of Nature as a whole, its ultimate Other.<sup>137</sup>

An awestricken reminder of this has been mercilessly destructive and erratic tendency of Mother Nature, caused by the overdevelopment that impaired the ecological equilibrium of the planet to a catastrophic degree (i.e., global warming and the El Niño and La Niña phenomena, etc). The destructive forces of Nature revealed themselves dramatically in the summer of 1993 when it ravaged Japan, the United States, and Mexico with earthquakes, floods, and drought. Mumia Abu-Jamal, writing under perhaps one of the most oppressive and Nature-deprived conditions of the "factory" of the prison-labor system, observed the "world power of Mother Nature" emerging as the counterthesis to the rationale of global capitalism or as the limit of capitalist domination:<sup>138</sup>

Earthquakes, floods, heat waves? We're taught daily that man [*sic*] has harnessed the forces of Nature to power global economies and fuel technologies. . . . Then a week in summer 1993 demonstrates how puny humans are when confronting the fundamental forces of Nature. Earthquakes snap steel girders like children snapping popsicle sticks. Floods overrun levees and swallow whole cities. Heat waves drain power reserves causing brown outs and black outs, as the demand for power outstrips available stores generated.<sup>139</sup>

Abu-Jamal's concluding observation that destructive forces of Nature will only escalate "until humankind opts for harmony with nature over domination, oneness over otherness,"<sup>140</sup> sheds some lights on subversion in the transnational factories.

The cases of Malay factory women's resistance and the subversion in *Enter the Dragon* both display a merger of the forces of Nature and the social subject, facilitated by the spirit, or the catalyst. Abu-Jamal's solution to the chaos wrought by Nature's destructive forces is congruous with this merger, or the emergence of transcendental social subject. For what the spirit and the catalyst evoke is the harmony and oneness with Nature, whereby the social subject (the oppressed) becomes fine-tuned to Nature's will. The subversion of global capitalism then becomes inevitable, as long as Nature is rendered Other and poses the limit to the capitalist order with chaos. The subversion of the global capitalist order by human agency, thereby, becomes part of the balancing force that facilitates human society's oneness with Nature.

Lee, in a censored dialogue in *Enter the Dragon*, eludes to this merger of the will of human agency with the forces of Nature in a combat situation: "When the opponent contracts, I expand. And when he expands, I must let my defense flow with it. Defense and attack must be as one. If the advantage is clearly mine, I don't hit. It hits all by itself."<sup>141</sup>

Traversing through time from Seattle to Hong Kong in this chapter, I hoped to show the structure of the regime of globalization congealed in the composition of the global commodity manufactured by transnational media conglomerates. As the contour of global capitalism becomes more visible, so do the terrains of antagonism, and hence, the inevitable condition of resistance and subversion. In the following chapter, we will traverse from Hong Kong to Chiapas to further delve into the constitution of the social subject of decolonization in the sociohistorical context of global/transnational capitalism, by unpacking the aesthetic dimension of the global commodity.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### *ENTER THE DRAGON*, POWER, AND SUBVERSION IN THE WORLD OF TRANSNATIONAL CAPITAL

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In this century colonization is accomplished by the eye. At least that is its more subtle and “peaceful” form.

—Joyce Nelson

Robert Clouse and Francis Ford Coppola, two Hollywood directors involved in the early phase of transnational film production, both confessed that their productions were besieged by the phantom of war. Being at the frontline of transnational ventures, their shared experience of a haunting war betrays the nature of transnational production. Its exploitation of the land, people, and culture of the Philippines and Hong Kong for the production of exotic imagery entails the antagonistic undertaking of a “silent” war. Perhaps the intensive nature of film production translates the overall contradiction of the transnational recolonization of human and natural resources in a condensed form cognizable as a warlike experience.

As much as the directors’ perceptions of war reveal the nature of global capitalism, the culture of kung fu memorializes the history of the people’s resistance and subversion that defied colonial subjugation. Despite the transnational media conglomerate’s attempt to transmute kung fu into a global commodity, the spirit of kung fu haunted every phase of the making of *Enter the Dragon* and rearranged the transnational project. Throughout every phase of production, the *Enter the Dragon* project critically hinged upon a native martial artist who would engage in real-life kung fu, both in a symbolic and physical sense, not only with the representatives of the transnational media corporation and its local collaborator, but also with the image that they sought to impose on the genre of kung fu film.



One of the characteristics of the transnationalization of kung fu film is the nullification of the antagonism between natives and the foreign power in the narrative composition. Our first step, therefore, is to trace the antagonism that was displaced from the narrative, which is to be found in the production process, or in the sphere of the real. The antagonism did indeed erupt in an incident in the production process, wherein the most dramatic “kung fu” took place. It crystallized the discontent of the native workers against the transnational management along the line of colonial antagonism. This subversion in the transnational factory, in turn, created an autonomous narrative domain—the narrative of decolonization—within the construct of the global commodity. Real-life kung fu therefore transferred the antagonism back to the narrative structure, thereby imploding the framework of the transnationalized kung fu narrative.

Through the lens of this space of autonomy, the entire structure of *Enter the Dragon* can be critically reexamined. Seen from this vantage point, the normally elusive contour of transnational power is grasped in concrete form as the official narrative structure and aesthetic paradigm. By identifying the dominant narrative and aesthetic form, we will be able to discern the contestation made by the subversion in the production process that altered the dominant form in the final product. I will thus delve into the process of the alteration of the film’s transnational framework affected by the autonomous “kung fu” in the production process, as well as by Lee’s artistic expressions, which represented the autonomy of Hong Kong sweatshop workers.

To see the subversion of the transnational aesthetic paradigm requires as much sensitivity to Lee’s performance as Angela Davis applied to her study of Gertrude “Ma” Rainey, Bessie Smith, and Billie Holiday. Davis found an articulation of feminist consciousness by these artists in the way they transformed the dominant lyrical content that is generally bent on male supremacy.<sup>1</sup> Through the emotional content of their delivery and subtle nuances (e.g., melancholy, solemnity, ambivalence, playfulness, and sarcasm) articulated in their performances, they were able to transform the overt patriarchal content of the lyrics into critique while achieving a “state of autonomy and control” over their artistic expression as women.<sup>2</sup> For example, Davis points out that Billie Holiday was capable of producing “an independent meaning for her vocals out of their relation to the instrumental accompaniment and apart from the literal signification of the lyrics.”<sup>3</sup> Likewise, Bruce Lee’s performance reorganized the transnationalized aesthetic form with his kinetic self-expression, creating an autonomous kine-aesthetic narrative as a critique of the dominant aesthetic form.

When the real-life kung fu pervades into the realm of fantasy designed by the transnational media conglomerate, the generative process of space of

autonomy gains an allegorical dimension in the context of global capitalism. From the official product design of the film and the transnational mode of production emanates an allegory of the global strategy of transnational capitalism in general (e.g., strategic paradigm of “structural adjustment” and “low-intensity conflict”). The allegory of subversion, on the other hand, originates in the emergence of the space of autonomy in the sphere of production and in the film’s paradigmatic narrative and aesthetics. In other words, the way real-life kung fu spawns alternative narrative and aesthetic forms gives us a clue to the possibility of subversion and transcendence of globalization. Particularly, the seemingly enigmatic—in which “there is no actor or one being acted but the action itself”<sup>4</sup>—convergence of Bruce Lee’s autonomous artistic expression, the Hong Kong workers’ resistance, and the enduring legacy of kung fu culture inspires us to approach the emerging mode of decolonizing subjectivity. As we explore further into the allegorical dimension of the new subjectivity, we hear it echo with the paradigm of subversion presented by the outbreak of the anti-IMF–World Bank movements in the 1980s and the EZLN’s (*Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional* or Zapatista National Liberation Army) uprising against NAFTA in 1994.

#### SOUL REVOLUTION: IMAGERY OF ANTI-IMPERIALISM AND DECOLONIZATION

The age of global capitalism formally means capital’s transcendence of national boundaries and the sovereignties thereof by means of sheer mobility in every aspect of its activities. However, from the perspective of those under colonial occupation, it means the continuation of colonial/imperial subjugation, since the faces of “transnationals” haven’t changed from those of the past colonial power. Thus, at transnational factories, the workers’ confrontations with management can take a politically explosive form should they cast the antagonism in the historical context of anticolonial and anti-imperialist struggle. It is the Manicheism of the colonial context, which Frantz Fanon illuminated in *Wretched of the Earth*, that offers a very powerful tool for the workers of the transnational factories to problematize the crude form of unequal relationship, usually dimmed by the seemingly unlocatable source of transnational power.

That which instigates such a process of cognition is a cultural matrix of management (based on the imperialist cultural practices), which evokes the arrogance of the colonialists imprinted in the minds of the workers with the memory of unresolved agony and rage. Language plays a critical role in this

process of identifying the system of oppression with which they are confronted in the factory, the nation, and ultimately in the zone of the neocolony as a whole. Especially in places like a factory where the language of management is identical with the language of imperialist power, such language allows workers to see the entire colonial apparatus through the window of the shop floor. The agents of transnational power denude their veritable identity simply by speaking their mother tongue and by displaying—consciously or otherwise—a certain behavioral pattern characteristic of the colonial master. With the unveiling of the identity of transnational agents, the historical legacy of colonialism is restored in the minds of the workers, which coterminously helps them to retain their identity as natives.

Clouse narrates an episode of conflict between American producers and Hong Kong workers, which took place during the shooting of *Enter the Dragon*, illustrating the burgeoning of the natives' discontent against the American crew as part of the colonial force:

The Americans often forgot that although they did not speak or understand any Chinese, a great many Chinese understood English. Andre Morgan [translator] remembers Fred and Paul [American producers] were always screaming at the crew for props that were missing or late or equipment that had failed. The crew always nodded and said yes but that didn't mean anything. Since the Chinese were running around at every command, the producers believed they had established a wonderful rapport with the crew. Andre said, "The Chinese hated their guts and thought they were imbeciles. And the American crew would walk right up to the Chinese crew and smile and tell them to their faces that they sucked old army boots and keep on smiling. Freddie would say, 'See. They love me.' Well what, to do?" Andre said. "Do you tell Fred that's not exactly what they are saying? No, you say, 'Ya, you're absolutely right.'"<sup>5</sup>

Andre Morgan further reminded Clouse of another episode in which the American actor Robert Mitchum displayed a more explicit attitude of colonial arrogance to the Chinese crew during the shooting of *Amsterdam Kill*, the joint venture of Hollywood and Golden Harvest in the wake of *Enter the Dragon*: "Mitchum would call them [the Chinese crew] assholes and smile, thinking they didn't understand. But half the crew understood and the rest found out pretty quickly."<sup>6</sup> Due to the thin screen that separates the language of the command in the factory and that of the colonial power, the agents of transnational power could effortlessly take the position of power. By so doing, they in effect reduce the workers to the level of working animals, or "coolies," for the colonial master.

Clouse confesses yet another episode during the shooting of *Enter the Dragon*, in which Clouse himself became the colonial perpetrator. But this time, one of the Chinese crew took direct action against the colonial attitude displayed by the American “foreman.” In the shooting of a sailing boat streaming through overcrowded Aberdeen Bay, part of the crew stayed on board and the rest climbed to the rooftop of the twenty-story building to capture the bay from a high-altitude angle. Without a walkie-talkie, communication was made through the waving of flags, which drove the frustration of the Hollywood-trained director to a boiling point:

In my anger I made a big mistake. I yelled, “Goddamn Chinese!” I didn’t know what happened next, but I was told later. The Chinese script man who spoke English was so enraged by my epithet that he lunged at me with every intent of throwing me off the roof. I had no inkling of what was going on. I was so intent with the mess in the harbor. I am told that Chaplin Chang [assistant director] and Andre Morgan both intercepted the man with Chaplin clasping his arms around and telling him about “the heat of the moment” and all that. My curse was inexcusable, but believable under the stress of the situation. I didn’t even believe I said it until I heard it on tape. I learned to never make derogatory statements like that—especially when you’re 20 stories above the pavement.<sup>7</sup>

The anger of the Chinese scriptwriter stems from the recognition of his identity in an antagonistic colonial relationship “accidentally” revealed on the shop floor of the transnational factory. His action therefore could be read as a nascent act of resistance, born out of a rude awakening, as Fanon described, to one’s “humanity” and his/her rejection of treatment as an “animal” by the colonizer.<sup>8</sup>

The scriptwriter’s singular act of resistance represented the collective resentment of Hong Kong workers at the denigration of their being in the film production of their own cultural heritage. It is kung fu, and more precisely the “kung fu dialectic” that would offer the idiom of collective resistance. Intriguingly, this process of the natives/workers’ awakening to humanity on a collective level is enacted in the film, which happens to be one of very few scenes in the film that contain an actual idiom of “kung fu dialectic” with a limited degree of transnationalization. Although the scene is deprived of any kung fu action, Lee’s performance renders it as the art of kung fu without fighting. The scene opens with the shot of a boat sailing to Han’s island.

*On board are guest martial artists (Roper, Williams, “Lee,” and Parsons) and the manual laborers, mostly young males and some*

children. The workers are spending their leisure time in a little “martial arts duel” of praying mantis. The gambling addict Roper (John Saxon) joins the workers in betting. Williams (Jim Kelly) follows him but stays behind as a mere spectator. “Lee” (Bruce Lee) mingles with the workers by sitting down with them and places a counter bet against the foreigner. The smaller praying mantis “Lee” chose eventually wins and, in a subtle accentuation of the manner of “common” Chinese folk, he demands money from Roper. A friendly atmosphere prevails between the Chinese and foreigners. The next moment, however, peace on the boat is abruptly disrupted by Parsons (Peter Archer), a martial artist from New Zealand who speaks with an unmistakable “British” accent. In his attempt to show off his karate technique, Parsons kicks the basket that one of the workers is carrying. As the content of the basket spills over, so does the rage of the workers. Tension replaces the amicable atmosphere as Roper, Williams, and “Lee” observe his act in utter disgust. Tired of showing off his skills on a docile worker, Parsons now turns to “Lee,” thrusting his fist in provocation: “Am I bothering you?” “Lee” dismisses his agitation by saying: “Don’t waste yourself” [sic]. Parsons continues to irk him: “What is your style?” “My style?” “Lee” now engages in a Zen discursive combat with Parsons: “You can call it the art of fighting without fighting.” Unable to comprehend “Lee’s” witty response, Parsons pursues: “Show me some of it.” “Later,” says “Lee,” nonchalantly. Seeing Parsons more agitated, hence getting further into a trap, Lee now engages in the art of fighting without fighting: “All right. But don’t you think we need more room?” “Where else?” Parsons pushes himself further into the trap. “That island. On the beach. We can take this boat.” “Lee” now guides Parsons to a lifeboat. As Parsons gets on board, “Lee” unties the rope and lets the craft drift. “Lee” brings the rope to the stern and merges into the workers who are all amused with the retribution. “Don’t try to pull yourself up or I will let go of the line,” “Lee” yells at Parsons and, with a faint smile on his face, he hands the rope over to a little kid.

Parsons’s marked characteristic of “Anglo-ness,” particularly his accent, renders this scene very fertile for a political allegory in which British colonial forces are reified in the individuality of Parsons and his act of objectifying the workers as “coolies.” Side by side with reification of the power of British colonial forces, “Lee’s” circumscription of the ethnic and cultural identity of Chinese—in his mannerism, in his compact historical reference

from kung fu to Sun Tsu, and his solidarity with the workers—constitutes the subjectivity of the natives.

Whether the shooting of this particular scene helped instigate the outbreak of the real-life kung fu may not be ascertained. But it is clear that the resistance of Hong Kong workers/natives was to be couched in the idiom of the “kung fu dialectic.” While the rank-and-file workers under the command of Golden Harvest were faced with dehumanizing treatment from the American crew, Lee was also in a serious confrontation with the American scriptwriter (Michael Allin) who came along with the Hollywood crew on a vacation financed by Warner Brothers. Although, as we will see later in this chapter, the scriptwriter was skilled in translating the kung fu plot into a narrative format accessible to a Hollywood audience, he lacked a background in Asian philosophy or martial arts. As with other productions in the past, Lee attempted to work with him on revisions to bring a more realistic portrayal of the character of Chinese and kung fu philosophy into the script. The arrogance of the American scriptwriter, who would resort to the Asian stereotype in his retort in an argument with Lee, must have fanned Lee’s rage into a flame similar to the Chinese scriptwriter mentioned before.<sup>10</sup> Lee demanded a removal of the scriptwriter from the factory, meaning from Hong Kong. The American producers, however, maintained a double face: they consented to Lee’s demand, but secretly arranged a new accommodation for the scriptwriter for a designated period of vacation behind Lee’s back.<sup>11</sup> When Lee discovered their lack of integrity, his relationship with the American producers deteriorated and even after things were smoothed out Lee “never totally forgave the producers.”<sup>12</sup> In the meantime, Lee’s contention with Golden Harvest’s Raymond Chow also simmered, as the latter kept Lee out of managerial matters even though they were officially equal partners of the production company, Concord.<sup>13</sup>

Despite his superstar status, Lee shared a similar predicament with the rest of the Hong Kong sweatshop workers, inasmuch as he was in the same structural position with them: they were together in an antagonistic relationship with the transnational production crew, as well as the complacent Hong Kong management. It seemed to be just a matter of time before their discontent was consolidated as a collective expression of insurgency. And it did happen, during the shooting of the most politically potent scene in the film.

Let us first situate the scene in question according to the progression of the narrative and actions. “Lee” agrees to undertake a covert operation to gather information on Han’s underground activities as requested by Braithwait (Geoffrey Weeks), a representative of the intelligence agency of an unknown origin who visited the Shaolin Temple for the recruitment of a special agent.

“Lee” then goes to see his uncle and informs him of his decision to take part in the martial arts tournament organized by Han. “Lee’s” uncle is now compelled to tell “Lee” the truth about the untimely death of his sister, Su-Lin (Angela Mao Ying), which happened during Han’s previous tournament. Uncle’s story of recollection fades into a scene of confrontation.

*As Su-Lin and her uncle trod along the street, Han’s henchmen (led by his personal bodyguard, Ohara [Bob Wall]), surrounds them to harass Su-Lin. Su-Lin, however, dissipates the pursuers with her kung fu technique. When Han’s men get agitated, her uncle pulls out a knife and slashes Ohara’s face and shouts at Su-Lin, “Run!” In his rage, Ohara knocks down Su-Lin’s uncle with his brutal fists. In the meantime, Su-Lin subdues Han’s gang with deadly spin kicks, interspersed with a swift and accurate delivery of fists. But her desperate search for a hideout is met by a merciless old woman who shuts her window to Su-Lin’s cry of help. Su-Lin has no alternative but to hide in the warehouse. The windows of the warehouse are shattered as Han’s gang and the wounded Ohara enter. Having been cornered by Han’s men, Su-Lin decides to take her own life instead of facing an impending atrocity. She holds a piece of broken window and buries it into her abdomen, while maintaining her gaze of fury at Ohara until her last breath.*

The story of his sister’s death, caused by Han’s gang, if we are to follow an established kung fu narrative, is a plot for the story of vengeance that seeks rebuttal of the violence, destruction, and loss inflicted on the protagonist’s family. The story of revenge is staged at the tournament.

*“Lee’s” match is announced, and his contender turns out to be Ohara. Both pay obeisance to Han and turn to face each other. While “Lee” bows to Ohara in observance of an opening ritual, Ohara pulls out a wooden board and breaks it in front of “Lee’s” bowed head. “Lee” transcends this provocation with a wise remark: “Boards don’t hit back.” The contestants thrust their lead hands against each other in a classic ready position. With Han’s prompt, Bolo (Yeung Sze) screams to open the match. The flashback of the scene of Su-Lin’s suicide overlays with “Lee’s” unusually calm facial expression. In less than a fraction of a second, “Lee’s” punch lands on Ohara, who falls down without knowing what caused his fall. Ohara slowly rises to the same position. Again, before Ohara and the spectators can even register the trajectory of*

*“Lee’s” fist in their consciousness, “Lee’s” back fist hits Ohara. Ohara rises for the third time to a ready position. This time, Ohara deters “Lee’s” strikes with karate blocks. But “Lee’s” classic Wing Chun maneuver swiftly disarms Ohara and pins him on the ground for a third time. Realizing “Lee’s” technical superiority, Ohara resorts to sly tactics, grabbing “Lee’s” foot from the ground in spite of Han’s shout of admonition. Turning Ohara’s lawlessness to his advantage, “Lee” back-flips and lunges his kick in Ohara’s jaw. Now agitated beyond control, Ohara gnarls like a mad dog and jumps at “Lee.” Quickly positioning himself on the ground, “Lee” delivers a well-timed kick into Ohara’s groin. “Lee” quickly rises and begins to shuffle his feet in a dancing rhythm while Ohara is still glued to the ground. Ohara’s every attempt at aggression is intercepted by “Lee’s” spin kicks. “Lee” now dances around clockwise and counterclockwise, resembling the steps of a war dance. After receiving several deadly kicks, Ohara begins to stagger. “Lee” then takes a very long stride to land the only offensive and the most emotionally laden kick on Ohara’s chest with a scream, “Wha Chaaaaa . . . ,” which in turn lifts Ohara’s heavy body into the air. Ohara helplessly lands on the spectators. “Lee” turns around and bows down to Han, announcing the end of the match, and perhaps the completion of revenge. However, unable to accept the defeat, Ohara picks up two tall glass bottles and smashes them to produce lethal weapons, which he then thrusts at “Lee.” “Lee” walks slowly toward Ohara with a totally emotionless face and gradually accelerates his steps. Lee kicks Ohara’s hand, the glass bottle drops, Lee spins to deliver yet another decisive kick.*

And it was in this particular cut that the accident happened. Due to the absence of such a fancy gadget as a fake glass bottle (an established inventory item in Hollywood), Bob Wall was holding real broken glass bottles. In spite of careful rehearsals for this particular scene, Wall failed to drop the bottle at the final cut, inflicting a serious injury on Lee’s hand that halted the shooting for a week.<sup>14</sup> This incident, in a strikingly similar manner to the scene of the conflict on the boat, galvanized Bruce Lee and the Hong Kong workers into the formation of collective action against the colonial power singularly represented by Wall’s act of “treachery.” What was enacted in the scene of the boat had become reality in the production process:

Meanwhile, the stuntmen were starting to grumble. They began to say Bob deliberately tried to hurt Bruce. They met with Bruce that night in



a Kowloon cafe and Bruce got caught up in their accusations. Bruce had stated on several occasions that Bob was not a friend of his and he had even expressed outright antagonism toward Bob. A couple of days later I got a call from Raymond who said Bruce was in a fury. Bruce had been meeting with his stuntmen and agreed he had to exact revenge for this treacherous act.<sup>15</sup>

The term of revenge, and the extent of violence involved, was put within a strict limit by the American director/foreman, who lied to Lee that Wall needed to stay healthy for the scenes to be shot back at the "headquarters."<sup>16</sup> Nonetheless, Lee and the rest of the Hong Kong workers now found a vehicle for externalizing their feelings of defiance and discontent accumulated throughout the production in a "legitimate" and constructive manner in the very process of production. The real-life kung fu thus pushes the static dualism of colonial structure toward a dynamic process in which the natives engage in the decolonization struggle in a concrete form.

Kung fu, as one might suspect, is not the only popular art form that could play a catalytic role in decolonization. Cricket for the West Indian masses, for example, is equivalent to kung fu for the Asian masses. In his zealous study of the popular cultural idiom of the West Indians, "in the full tide of the transition from colonialism to independence," C. L. R. James saw the cricket field as a public forum where the experience of the "West Indian" masses was laid open: "What do they know of cricket who only cricket know? West Indian crowding to Tests [international matches] bring with them the whole past history and future hopes of the islands."<sup>17</sup> The cricket field is not a metaphor for but the very process of decolonization where race and class antagonism is fought out by "the selective individuals [who] played representative roles which were charged with social significance."<sup>18</sup> Likewise, Lee and Wall, Hong Kong workers and transnational film crew are all representative players of real-life kung fu, charged with the real antagonism inherent in the transnational production. Kung fu thus becomes a stage on which the decolonization struggle is played out and still remains as kung fu. To paraphrase James, "What do they know of kung fu who only kung fu know?"

The segment in which "Lee" gives a powerful kick to Ohara's chest was retaken. Lee demanded twelve takes of this particular segment.<sup>19</sup> In the retake of the battle with glass bottles, the final print shows Lee's kick to the back of Wall's neck with real contact. Toward the end of this scene, the emotional intensity not only of Lee but also of the extras present on the screen (as well as the tense expressions of Jim Kelly and John Saxon) had reached its peak, projecting a strong aura from the screen. And when "Lee" jumps onto Ohara's

lying body to take the last breath out of him, Lee's facial expression attains its apex of emotional expression. It bears likeness to Edvard Munch's *The Scream*, which directly transmits social contradiction in a singular affective expression. Imposing as the presence of Lee's expression on the screen may be, it comprises only a figure of the totality of the collective subject of resistance, in which the extras' peripheral expressions constitute the ground. As Siegfried Kracauer tells us, the expressions of non actors, who are not trained in "professional faking," often reveal spontaneous emotive actions from which the silhouette of social reality emerges.<sup>20</sup> Accordingly, the expression of the extras in this scene unmask the emotive actions rooted in the real antagonism in the production process.

If we are to follow the official narrative structure, the extras in karate uniforms (both in yellow and white) are rank-and-file workers for Han. During the tournament, the workers in yellow karate uniforms perform refereeing, judging, and other auxiliary functions, while those in white uniforms essentially play the role of spectators, clapping their hands at every decisive move made by the contestants. In conspicuous contrast to their ritual observance of clapping in other scenes of the tournament match (e.g., Roper and Willams's fight), the extras both in yellow and white uniforms become visibly electrified in this scene. As "Lee"/Lee triumphs over Ohara/Wall, they not only clap their hands with great enthusiasm, but they cheer and talk with each other with smiles on their faces. One of them even jumps up and down, openly registering his jubilation as "Lee"/Lee accurately delivers a kick in Wall/Ohara's groin. Such an unrestrained expression of admiration for "Lee"/Lee obviously contradicts the official narrative structure, as it could show lack of loyalty to Han. In this scene therefore the extras are manifesting their true identity in the production process, that of Hong Kong sweatshop workers involved in an act of resistance facilitated by real-life kung fu. To paraphrase Lee's favorite phrase, they are "honestly expressing themselves." In the scenes retaken after the glass bottle incident, the jubilation of the extras gives way to sheer solemnity, which transmits the gravity of the air from the site of resistance. As the scene approaches its climactic moment, every extra gazes intensely upon every move "Lee" makes, actively witnessing the unfolding of their representative expression. As "Lee's" expression culminates in the utmost degree of rawness together with the sullen air conveyed by the extras (powerfully captured with the slow motion), the common cultural basis of the mass of decolonizing subject emerges. Their shared political-historical identity and cultural roots are articulated as a citation of Lao Tsu's verse on war that is "conducted like a funeral."<sup>21</sup> The process of awakening to the "common cause" and "national destiny," in Fanon's term,<sup>22</sup> which took place in the production, pervades into the official realm of representation.

On the symbolic level, the scene of revenge was thus transformed, thanks to the glass bottle incident, into a highly politicized drama-within-a-drama, a quasi-independent space in which the decolonization struggle and rectification of injustice were being realized and reenacted simultaneously. Herein, Lee and the extras had successfully liquidated the boundary that separates them in the official script or the production guideline devised by the transnational management. The collective identity of the “natives” in resistance consolidated in the production process now makes its entry into the sphere of fantasy.

Consequently, the scene of revenge no longer revolves around the prescribed antagonism between “Lee” and Ohara, surrounded by the neutral spectator in accordance to the production guideline. The drama-within-a-drama reimposed the real antagonism between Hong Kong workers and the colonial presence of the transnational factory upon the representation of antagonism in the film’s official narrative. Thus, on the one hand, behind “Lee”/Lee there stands the Chinese scriptwriter who took direct action against the American director/foreman’s racial slur, the crew who had to manufacture smiles at arrogant American producers who treated them as “coolies,” and numerous other Hong Kong sweatshop factory workers who were awakened to the sense of humanity in search for every possible way to defend their integrity. On the other hand, behind Ohara/Bob Wall are the American crew, the Hollywood management, and ultimately the transnational headquarters in Burbank, California.

#### Allegory of “Vietnam”: The Door to the Unconscious of the Enter the Dragon Project

With the intrusion of real-life kung fu into the very constitution of the global commodity, the unconscious domain of the *Enter the Dragon* project can be made accessible. The contradiction in the production process, which instigated the explosion of real-life kung fu, is embedded in a larger social, historical, and political context. The legacy of colonialism that constitutes the foundation of the transnational production is a vital part of the unconscious. Yet there is a specific historical context lying at the base of the *Enter the Dragon* project, which is not encoded and therefore exists as the unconscious. As we have already established, *Enter the Dragon* was the hallmark of an overall strategic paradigm of transnational capital. Also, it was President Nixon’s visit to China—which signaled the dramatic change in U.S. geopolitics in Asia—that spawned the idea of producing a transnational kung fu

movie.<sup>23</sup> These conditions, which prepared for the birth of *Enter the Dragon*, would not have existed had it not been for a decisive historical drama that unfolded on the soil of Asia:

It seems to be a fact that after the failure of the Vietnam War, the so-called multinational corporations—what used to be called the “ruling classes” or later on the “power elite” of monopoly capitalism—have once again emerged in public from the wings of history to advance their own interest.<sup>24</sup>

Two months before the production of *Enter the Dragon* commenced, the Paris Peace Agreement was concluded, marking the official end of the so-called Vietnam War. This formal ending was preceded by “the U.S. B-52 carpet bombing—the severest conventional bombardment ever witnessed in history—of the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam].”<sup>25</sup> It was followed by the United States’s continued assistance to its puppet regime and the expansion of bombing into Cambodia and Laos until the war’s real closure in 1975. While America’s reencounter with “China” constitutes the conscious referents of the *Enter the Dragon* project, the existence of the Vietnam War guides us to a layer of the unconscious of the project. Much like the way in which the forces of Nature have infiltrated into the well-enclosed space of the sweatshop factories, “Vietnam” has managed to register its presence in *Enter the Dragon*, thanks to the subversion in the factory and the consequent opening of the space of autonomy.<sup>26</sup> Although the instance of sabotage was confined to the second part of the narrative of revenge (i.e., “Lee” vs. Ohara at the tournament), its transformative affect extends to the first part (Su-Lin and her uncle vs. Ohara and Han’s protégé).

Through the character system of Ohara, one can read the footsteps of American imperialism in Southeast Asia in allegorical terms. Han’s most entrusted bodyguard, Ohara, is introduced to the viewers in the recollection scene of “Lee’s” uncle as the only Caucasian stranger in the midst of Han’s all-Chinese gang. Initially, his brutality is submerged in Han’s gang that are, in “Lee’s” uncle’s expression, “bully [*sic*] and arrogant.” Yet faced with the natives’ (Su-Lin and her uncle) resistance, Ohara gradually unmask his true character, which leads to the suicide of Su-Lin. Ohara’s emergence from a “mercenary” to a “commander” in the scene of uncle’s recollection symbolically relates to the initial phase of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

From the Viet Minh’s victory over Dien Bien Phu and the subsequent Geneva Agreement of 1954 to President Kennedy’s approval of an aggressive military plan in 1961, the role of the United States in Vietnam was to fill the

vacuum created by the evacuation of the French colonial power, as a sort of “mercenary.” The United States’s involvement, however, stirred a sense of urgency among the people under the puppet regime to organize themselves into guerrilla forces (the so-called Viet Cong) toward the end of the 1950s and to launch successful counterattacks against the puppet Diem regime supported by the United States. The people’s resistance culminated in the establishment of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. Confronted with the growing power of resistance, U.S. policy escalated from a “limited risk gamble” to an “unlimited commitment” under President Kennedy’s administration, where the offensive strategy of “search and destroy” was implemented without restraint.<sup>27</sup>

Su-Lin and her uncle’s resistance to Han’s gang provides a historical allegory from the people’s perspective. Though Su-Lin’s character system merges into that of “Lee” in the scene of the tournament (underlining the evolutionary path of the natives’ resistance), it holds its own narrative unit as Su-Lin’s character system articulates a gendered experience of imperialist violence that specifically targets women as objects of destruction. Angela Davis illuminates the patriarchal-imperial manifestation of power in the Vietnam War: “Since the Vietnamese women were distinguished by their heroic contributions to their people’s liberation struggle, the military retaliation specifically suited for women was rape.”<sup>28</sup> Su-Lin’s struggle against the powerful and multitudinous perpetrators and her resoluteness in refusing to be a victim represent the often unrecorded stories of the bravery of grandmothers’, mothers’, and daughters’ struggles against patriarchal-imperialist violence.

Furthermore, the choreography of Su-Lin, which accentuates the nuance of “grace” (particularly pronounced in Angela Mao Ying’s balletlike kicks), attributes her strength not to force, but to art. This signification, beyond a gendered perspective, reverberates with the core aspect of the people’s resistance. In sharp contrast to the beastly movements of Han’s mob, Su-Lin’s way of combat accentuates the moral and spiritual superiority of the natives, which enabled the Vietnamese, according to General Vo Nguyen Giap, “to defeat material force with moral force.”<sup>29</sup> With tragic defiance, the scene of Su-Lin’s self-immolation also reconfirms the transcendental nature of the natives’ resistance and their triumph in the spiritual domain, reminiscent of the act of the South Vietnamese monks who burnt themselves in the lotus position in protest of the U.S.-Diem regime. The spiritual transcendence of the people’s resistance would come to acquire transcendence in the physical realm as well, as it galvanizes itself into the collective forces of popular defense. It is the character system of “Lee” in the scene of the tournament that embodies the formation of the people’s war against imperialism.

Accordingly, the progression of the U.S. involvement after 1961 is reified in the character system of Ohara.

At the tournament, the initial stage of the combat between “Lee” and Ohara seems to consist of “Lee’s” purely offensive moves against Ohara, despite “Lee’s” calm facial expression. The appearance of “Lee’s” offensiveness is due to his extraordinary speed of delivery. For the slow motion reveals that “Lee’s” seemingly simple straight punch is accompanied by trapping of Ohara’s arm with the other hand, a very classic textbook-style Wing Chun maneuver. In other words, “Lee” is in fact “reacting” to his opponent’s offensive moves at their early stage, thereby intercepting his impending attacks. Again, it is the art that confers upon the protagonist a decisive edge over the opponent. In the context of a martial arts tournament, the art here illuminates the tradition and historical legacy of kung fu, as well as the boundary of a combat based on the traditional protocol and rules. Although the breaking of the board prior to the match falls outside such a boundary, Ohara also gives due recognition to the boundary through his classic karate blocking in the third round. “Lee’s” superiority in maneuvering in the first three rounds, therefore, is derived less from a burning passion for revenge than from the weight of the tradition and history in martial arts that “Lee” represents.

The tradition and history articulated by “Lee” conjures up the legacy of the Vietnamese peasants, which includes their history of struggles against foreign invaders (i.e., the Mongolians, Chinese, French, and Japanese). The historical legacy of popular defense can be glimpsed in the following description of the peasant resistance against French colonial forces in the late nineteenth century: “The insurrection seemed to spring from the soil. . . . The fact was that the center of resistance was everywhere. . . . It would be more accurate to say that every peasant tying up a sheaf of rice was a center of resistance.”<sup>30</sup> In parallel with “Lee’s” combat—as if he were a fish in the water—the Vietnamese peasant’s resistance seems to be in harmony with the land and ultimately with the forces of Nature.

In stark contrast with Ohara, who pushes the boundary of martial arts into the brawl of pure aggression, “Lee” deepens his art based on the tradition and historical legacy of kung fu in pursuit of Tao. “Lee” responds to Ohara’s pure aggression with mobility, fluidity, and spontaneity in his “dance of infinity.” “Lee’s” intercepting moves, shown in the first three rounds, are rendered here more dynamic and graphic by the featuring of kicks, which give prominence to the sense of elegance like Su-Lin’s deadly ballet. Although the kinetic narrative enunciated by the flow of Lee’s combative action holds thematic continuity with the path to freedom in his works, there’s a marked dissimilarity from Lee’s previous choreographic pieces.

As we recall, the enunciation of totally fluid and spontaneous movements was invariably preceded by rigidity in combat, in which both the protagonist and adversary are locked in the institutional constraints of styles, forms, forces, and ultimately of ego. Confronted with the looming possibility of defeat, enlightening realization befalls the hero that the truth of combat in fact lies outside of styles, forms, and ego. Particularly in *The Way of the Dragon*, it was the protagonist's painful realization of the opponent's superiority in size and force—rather than his rigid adherence to style—that pushed the hero to break free of schemes, or even of the notion of “winning.” In contrast, the choreography in discussion entails neither a setback nor the impending possibility of doom. What we see instead is an expression of constancy in the transcendental state and spontaneity of movement. The only constraint imposed upon “Lee” is an emotional one based on a desire for revenge, which is constantly provoked by Ohara's sly tactics. “Lee,” however, maintains the transcendental state of calmness, as if ego has been liquidated from the outset of the combat.

The philosophical backbone of Lee's choreography in discussion was to be expounded in a dialogue between “Lee” and the Shaolin senior monk (played by Roy Chaio) immediately after the opening scene. This dialogue, written by Bruce Lee, was devoted to a zealous scrutiny of Taoist philosophy as well as his innovative reinterpretation. Roy Chaio was selected specifically for the senior monk's role as his fluency in English made it possible to shoot the scene “in sync sound.”<sup>31</sup> The scene of dialogue was censored by the American producer “for fear that Western audiences would not be able to comprehend it.”<sup>32</sup> Setting aside for the moment the symbolic implication of this transnational intervention, let us cite part of the dialogue that contains the philosophical exploration:

SENIOR MONK: I see your talents have gone beyond a mere physical level. Your skills are now at the point of spiritual insight. I have several questions. What is the highest technique you hope to achieve?

LEE: To have no technique.

SENIOR MONK: Very good. What are your thoughts when facing an opponent?

LEE: There is no opponent.

SENIOR MONK: Why is that?

LEE: Because the word “I” does not exist.

SENIOR MONK: So. Continue.

LEE: A good fight should be like a swordplay but played seriously. A good martial artist does not become tense but ready. Not thinking, yet not dreaming; ready for whatever may come. When your opponent expands, I contract. When there is an opportunity, I don't hit; it hits all by itself.<sup>33</sup>

The signification of constancy discussed previously—its complete state of transcendence of ego and movement without constraints—indicates the merger of the subject with the forces of Nature, emphatically articulated in a simple aphoristic phrase, “it hits all by itself.” This seemingly enigmatic notion of “it” is given a figurative expression in the way “Lee” moves against Ohara’s aggression with automatic reflexes, circumscribing the merger of his will to defend and the forces of Nature. Transferring the context back to the social field, the figurative enunciation of “constancy” could symbolically relate to the harmonic cohesion of the natives’ resistance with the forces of Nature. The kinetic narrative of “constancy” thus becomes synonymous with the Vietnamese people’s resistance that “springs from the soil” and “returns to the soil.” This central aspect of Vietnamese defense therefore transcends the defense of their nation and people and becomes part of the forces of Nature.

When Ohara descends into the spiral of destructive aggression, his rigid kinetic movement and expressions exhibit disharmony with Nature. And as Ohara resorts to a broken glass to assault “Lee,” Ohara crosses a critical threshold, at which point the boundary between the cinematic fiction and the real becomes very tenuous. Ohara is no longer simply disharmonious with Nature but in a state of antagonism against Nature. Such progression of symbolic narrative allows us to recount the U.S. imperialists’ footsteps into the plethora of atrocious destruction. As Ho Chi Minh described, “the greater their defeats, the more frantically they resort to the most cruel means, such as using napalm bombs and toxic gas to massacre our compatriots in the South.”<sup>34</sup> In the chronology of the Vietnam War, the critical threshold was the Gulf of Tonkin incident and the subsequent U.S. resolution that officially declared the war on Southeast Asia as a whole. David Hunt details the extent of the U.S. aggression beyond the critical threshold:

U.S. planes blanketed crops with poison sprays while bulldozers tore up paddies, orchards and homes. Aiming to provide heavy rainfall and destructive flooding, U.S. scientists seeded the clouds; to strip the guerrillas of ground cover, they endeavored to set fire to the forests of the Highlands; they experimented with ever more fiendish varieties of napalm and anti-personnel bombs.<sup>35</sup>





FIGURE 4.1. Dialogue between the Shaolin senior monk and “Lee” from *Enter the Dragon*.

At the other end of the spectrum of symbolic articulation stands “Lee’s” facial expression of meditative calmness in his movement and in the way he disarms Ohara. In such a state of harmony between Nature and action, the immortality of the natives’ resistance becomes conceivable, and the certainty of victory is as plain as the change of seasons. This transcendental state of resistance in the history of the Vietnam War corresponds to the Tet offensive, as a counterstatement to the total (i.e., genocidal and ecocidal) destruction of Nature. Tet, the Vietnamese New Year in the lunar calendar, is a time of festivities, of “universal renewal” where “communion of man [*sic*] and nature” takes place.<sup>36</sup> The preparation, mobilization, and simultaneously coordinated uprisings of numerous guerilla units—“which spread over the whole terrain of South Vietnam”<sup>37</sup>—were all finely intermeshed with the “natural” movement of the masses in celebration. In harmony with the forces of chaos and regeneration during the Tet celebration, the guerilla forces were able to attain a state of invisibility in which their identity became indistinguishable from the civilians, and in some cases, from the enemy forces.<sup>38</sup> Superseding any calculated scheme for its efficiency, precision, and natural coordination, the power of the Tet offensive—similar to the Malay factory women’s resistance—was derived from the intersection of resistance and Nature via cultural tradition.

The Tet offensive of 1968, accordingly, has precedence in the Vietnamese people’s history. In Tran Tu Binh’s memoir of the Vietnamese struggle in the French colonial plantation camp at Phu-rieng, entitled *The Red Earth*, we find a reference to the plantation workers’ general strike/uprising during the Tet celebration of 1930. Merged with what Mikhail Bakhtin calls the “carnavalesque” popular festivity—in which freedom materializes as established order and authority are suspended<sup>39</sup>—the plantation workers launched a strike that subsequently turned into a people’s takeover of the entire plantation camp.<sup>40</sup> Tran gives a vivid description of the procession of five thousand workers led by the dragon dance organized by the Red Guard fighters and their presentation of demands in the guise of traditional Tet greetings to the manager:

The manager was frightened and humiliated! Never before had he seen such “Tet greetings.” Our show of strength triumphed, especially on the spiritual level. We all returned laughing and talking noisily, some people mimicking Soumagnac’s [the manager] long-faced, dumbfounded expressions when he saw that not one of us was going to scramble after the money he had thrown out. The workers also recalled the demands we had made in the guise of a bittersweet “Tet greetings,” then fell to discussing them heatedly.<sup>41</sup>

In both cases of Tet offensives, being merged with the celebration of life and the cycle of Nature, the people's insurrection transcends the dialectic of the native and the colonizer, the oppressed and the oppressor, revealing the futility of the colonial domination as reified in the plantation manager's frightened and humiliated face.

At the culmination of "Lee's" triumph over Ohara, however, the calmness of his facial expression suddenly gives way to a flood of emotion. It reveals something far more complex than the completion of revenge denoted by the official narrative. "Lee's" face beams forth ever-changing impressions—from the wrath of righteous deity, to the indignation of a woman, to the ululation of a child victimized by war. At this shamanic moment, "Lee" channels the voiceless voice and faceless face of mortal as well as spiritual beings who condemn the violence and destruction, alluding to a universal dimension of decolonization and anti-imperialist struggles.

Bruce Lee had established this convention of the shamanic moment in *Fist of Fury* at the scene where Chen Zhen puts an end to the life of the Japanese dojo master who was responsible for the assassination of his master, personifying the entire apparatus of Japanese colonial power. Lee's affective mode of expression reaches its apex when he identifies himself with the existential question of a native who is forced to take the life of a representative of the colonial power. Although the shamanic moment in *Fist of Fury* carries as much intensity as that in *Enter the Dragon*, the former does not have as much complexity as the latter. The difference can be attributed to the fact that the latter holds the colonial legacy of American transnational venture in the production process as an immediate point of reference. It thus borders on the perimeter of acting and being the way he is; to use Lee's own words, it is "acting un-acting" or "un-acting acting."<sup>42</sup> Consequently, more powerfully than that of *Fist of Fury*, the shamanic expression in *Enter the Dragon* defies the mediation of the signifying category (e.g., "wrath," "fury," "rage," etc.), retaining an immanently raw state of affective force in his emotional expression.

Such a relatively unmediated expression of emotion at the level of pure affect parallels the mode of expression that Jimi Hendrix exemplified in his "Star-Spangled Banner" or "Machine Gun." Both Lee and Hendrix's artistic expressions open a direct channel with the crude reality of colonial and imperial contradiction in its historical and ever-present form, while creating a sphere of transcendental reflection. In such a sphere, a liberating pulse is presented not in a utopian sense but in the way their artistic expressions and their beings become identical with the power of emotive force that transforms symbolic conventions and authorities. This is communicated directly through an affective mode and deciphered primarily through feelings. At the same time,

firmly grounded in social realism, their transcendental expressions never lose their relationship with the concrete. It is in both the concrete and transcendental senses that Lee's shamanic expression—along with that of Hendrix—materializes the symbolic overthrow of American imperialism in the realm of the unconscious, which could multiply in myriad metaphorical expressions of the people's liberation.

THE SPIRIT IN THE MATERIAL WORLD OF THE TRANSNATIONAL:  
TEARING UP THEIR NARRATIVES AND AESTHETICS

In the aftermath of the drama of the revolutionary moment, the camera is glued to "Lee's" gaze, which is firmly fixed on Han as a panther would zoom in on its prey. Having eliminated the henchman, "Lee" is now ready to confront the ultimate power holder of the island to defend the honor of Shaolin Temple and his family.

After the exit of Ohara as a personification of imperialism, Han's character system as an allegory of the neocolonial dictatorship becomes more salient. Han's signatorial line, "I invest in corruption. The business of corruption is like any other," entails a caricatural portrayal of neocolonial dictators in post-Vietnam Asia, such as the Philippines' Ferdinand Marcos, South Korea's Park Chung Hee, Indonesia's Suharto, and others. At the initial stage of globalization, the existence of neocolonial dictatorship was quite essential for transnational capital to establish its foothold in the Third World. The official narrative of *Enter the Dragon*, however, forges its link with the post-neocolonial context in which the dictatorship poses an obstacle for transnational capital, necessitating an intervention. The battle between a native agent on contract with the "undefined (i.e., transnational) foreign power" and the native despot in the film's narrative, as we examine later, symbolizes the very mode of operation in the strategic paradigm of globalization: specifically "structural adjustment" and "low-intensity warfare." This strategic paradigm came to dominate the Third World since the late 1970s and thrived till the end of the century. The time gap can be explicated by what I call the "prescriptive" function of the ideology embedded in the official composition of the film, to which I will return shortly.

The strategic paradigm of globalization, imprinted on the official makeup of a global commodity, can be broken down into the official narrative and aesthetic mode. As discussed earlier, *Dr. No*, the first of the 007 series, preceded *Enter the Dragon* in terms of its identity as a global commodity produced under the transnational mode of production. Certain revisions made on the original literary version of *Doctor No* (by Ian Flemming) for the transnational production of its cinematic

version reflect the germination of the “transnational narrative.” Besides the spy genre via *Dr. No*, the official narrative of *Enter the Dragon* also incorporates the narrative of the “Orientalist” detective genre (e.g., *Charlie Chan* series, *Dr. Fu Manchu* series, etc.), particularly in its construction of the protagonist and antagonist. The character systems of “Lee” and Han in *Enter the Dragon* are the result of the transposition of detective and villain in the “Orientalist” tradition onto the global mode of operation. In other words, the imperialist narrative embedded in the “Orientalist” tradition is hereby updated in the context of transnational capitalism. As such, the official narrative of *Enter the Dragon* becomes contradictory to the decolonization narrative matrix of the kung fu cultural revolution. As I will demonstrate, the ideological component of an ongoing recolonization of the planet by the regime of globalization can be identified in the concrete process in which the official narrative of *Enter the Dragon* attempts to defuse an inevitable contradiction with the Third World popular cultural revolution.

The “transnationalism” in the aesthetic mode is synonymous with the existence of Han’s island. The contestation over this aesthetic mode intensifies, as the battlefield in the film moves from the outfield to the interior. Where “Lee” is confronted by the ubiquitous forces of Han, Lee is also surrounded by omnipresent Hollywood “Orientalist” aesthetics. By tracing the historical formation of image convention from the literary to the digital via the cinematic mode of Hollywood “Orientalism,” we could discern other related aspects of this strategic paradigm. They allude to the industrial production of exotic sight objects for the sake of image consumption. The post-modern or digital mode of “Orientalism” strategically organizes “ways of seeing,”<sup>43</sup> according to the dictate of the transnational gaze in which militarism (war industry) and tourism coalesce to form a new mode of recolonization of the unconscious. The rise of the power of the militaristic-touristic gaze in the field of perception prepares, as we will see, our assimilation of the latest strategic paradigm through its visual imagery.

Prior to further analysis, it is pertinent to present a tentative explanation for the question posed earlier regarding the capability of the official narratives and aesthetics in forecasting and prescribing the strategic paradigm of transnational capital. To begin with, the official structure of a film, stripped down to its basics, corresponds to product designs for other normative global commodities (e.g., Gap jeans or Sony Playstation) that are devised by its headquarters. As we have seen in *Woodstock* and other early global commodities where the affirmation of rebelliousness is encapsulated in the status quo, the product design affirms the future by containing its unpredictability. Thus the product design is quite similar to the concept of “Fashion” explicated by Roland Barthes:

. . . Fashion tames the new even before producing it and achieves that paradox of an unforeseeable and yet legislated “new”; in short, we can say that Fashion domesticates the unforeseen without, however, stripping it of its unforeseen character: each Fashion is simultaneously inexplicable and regular.<sup>44</sup>

The principle ingredients of the official structure concocted by Hollywood therefore do more than simply reinforce the status quo; they proactively define the parameter of the “possible” from the level of social relationship (gender, race, class, etc.) to the geopolitical configuration of the globe. It is in the product design where the dominant power relationship, as well as the system of thinking, is not merely registered but prescribed as a normative point of view, thus the function of the “prescriptive prognosis” of the official narrative and its aesthetic mode.

The product design, as it relates to those at the bottom end of the manufacturing process (such as sweatshop workers), also reifies the authority of command from the headquarters. Precisely because the official narrative, aesthetic mode, and other aspects of the design of the film represent the plan and strategy of management, the official structure of the product can become a target at which resistance is directed. As with other types of products, any intentional (or unintentional) reforming or outright sabotage of the official structure of a film constitutes an act of resistance, in the final analysis, to the authority of transnational capital.<sup>45</sup> This is particularly so when the very act of altering the official product design engenders an autonomous narrative or aesthetic alternative to the authorized one. In other words, the realm of narratives and aesthetics can turn into a contested terrain wherein class and decolonization struggles manifest themselves. The drama-within-a-drama discussed in our previous section is living proof that the workers do resist the command and insert their autonomy in the final product despite the highly regulated conditions of the transnational fantasy factory. Accordingly, the ethos of the kung fu cultural revolution pervades the *Enter the Dragon* project as alternative narrative and aesthetic mode through a contested productive process. The question then is how a new paradigm—spawned from the workers’ realization of the space of autonomy—challenges the strategic paradigm of the transnational capital engrained in the official structure of the film.

#### From the Imperialist Narrative to the Transnational Narrative

The official narrative of *Enter the Dragon*, prescribed by Warner Brothers via its scriptwriter, is a concoction of *Dr. No* and an aborted TV series called

*Number One Son* (which was the original TV series that Twentieth-Century Fox first had in mind for Lee), sprinkled with a little of the flavor of the kung fu movie genre (which is reduced to the theme of revenge). The protagonist's and antagonist's characters, which form the backbone of the official narrative of *Enter the Dragon*, are derived from the convergence of the spy genre and the "Orientalist" detective genre, which both *Dr. No* and *Number One Son* adhered to. A careful dissection of the scheme of the antagonist and the mission of the protagonist will inform us of the "transnationality" or "globality" of the official narrative of *Enter the Dragon* that evolved out of the imperialist mode in which those two conventional genres are anchored.

The original version of *Dr. No* was a novel written by Ian Fleming in 1958. With his real-life experience as a Naval Intelligence Officer during World War II, Fleming prepared fantasy stories of secret agent James Bond at his two-acre residence in Oracabessa, Jamaica.<sup>46</sup> Written at the eve of Jamaican independence (i.e., 1962), *Doctor No* reflects the author's postcolonial intervention in symbolically resolving the uncertainty of the upcoming change and the anxiety of the imperialist subject. In Fleming's story, Doctor Julius No was born as the illegitimate child of a German missionary and a Chinese woman of good family in Beijing. As a "revolt against the father figure," Doctor No came to get involved in Tongs, the Chinese secret society.<sup>47</sup> He was shipped out to America where he got caught in Tong wars and lost his arm. With the money he amassed at the dawn of World War II, Doctor No purchased an island, Crab Key, located between Jamaica and Cuba to implement his vision of "absolute independence."<sup>48</sup> Using the island's guano as a resource, he established a industrial plantation, hiring Chinese-Black labor from Cuba and Jamaica. The agents of the Audubon society, in their mission to survey their leasehold, die allegedly in accidents upon their arrival to Crab Key. James Bond's colleague in the British Secret Service (BSS) also gets killed while investigating the case, which leads to James Bond's dispatch to Jamaica. With the help of local agent Quarrel and femme fatale Honey Ryder, Bond infiltrates Doctor No's domain. Bond learns about Doctor No's technological interception program against the United States and his secret dealing with Russia. Bond and Honey escape, and Bond single-handedly destroys the existence of Doctor No's kingdom.

The film script of *Dr. No* contains significant revisions of the novel, particularly in the area of world politics. The CIA and the U.S. Navy, which are marginal in terms of their visual presence but which assume critical narrative importance to Bond's operation, are added as yet another institutional protagonist. Accordingly, the affiliation of Bond's right-hand man, Quarrel, shifts from the BSS to the CIA. Influenced by nuclear power politics, the film script

accords Dr. No's private kingdom with a membership to the world nuclear power club. His radio-wave interception of the rocket is now fortified by a gigantic nuclear power plant utilizing uranium (in lieu of guano) as the main natural resource. The upgrading of the energy power base boosts Dr. No's ambition in the game of international conspiracy, which goes beyond Cold War brokering and strives for "world domination."

As we recall, the *007* series was one of the first and the most successful transnational (within the industrial bloc) ventures for Hollywood. The James Bond project was initiated by two expatriate independent producers in the United Kingdom who had sought to combine a British governmental subsidy and the financial backing from the Hollywood majors to produce nominally "British" films aimed at breaking the Hollywood market from across the Atlantic Ocean. United Artists (UA) responded to their call, put up complete financing, dictated the scale of the budget, and restricted the casting and locations to remain "British," or within the commonwealth, primarily to qualify for the governmental subsidy.<sup>49</sup> More importantly, as the major financier, UA retained the final decision-making power over the "principal creative ingredients of each picture" of the series, which accounts for Hollywood's intervention in the narrative structure.<sup>50</sup> Thus the expatriate's firm, Danjaq/Eon, functioned as UA's virtual subsidiary on the European front, which in turn enabled Hollywood to exploit slightly "exotic" qualities in casting and location sites while enjoying the financial backing of a foreign government. As if it were the fanfare for the inauguration of the era of transnational production, UA went so far as to stage the Western Hemisphere premiere of *Dr. No* in Kingston, Jamaica, a newly independent former colony of Britain. *Dr. No* was thus constructed transnationally as a global commodity.

The "transnationality" of the narrative, therefore, can be traced to Hollywood's intervention, specifically, in the reconfiguration of the protagonist and the antagonist. Most visibly, the film's narrative transnationalizes the character system of James Bond. As the significance of the BSS and the British Colonial Office diminishes and is overshadowed by the U.S. Navy and CIA, Bond emerges as a transnational agent whose task is accountable to the multilateral interests of the imperialist bloc. However, James Bond's maneuvers in Jamaica and on Crab Key are unthinkable without the assistance of Quarrel, a Cayman Island native, and the affectionate relationship with Honey Ryder, a White settler who operates a minor trade with a Florida shell dealer. Thus the career of the mission, or the real protagonist, is a team composed of a transnational agent, a Jamaican native under the control of CIA, and an American settler. In the symbolic realm, this triad of protagonists charts the course of "post-independent Jamaica" and other ex-colonies that are subservient to the command



of transnational capital. Whereas Doctor No in the novel symbolizes the anomaly produced in the context of colonization at the end of classic imperialism, Dr. No in the film allegorizes the deviant path of the semi-autarkic neocolonial regime at the dawn of globalization. The desirability of a subservient neocolony is presented in the film as a solution to the possibility of autonomous power of the Third World nation states, as the imperialist mode of planetary governance turns obsolete.<sup>51</sup> The narrative solution formulated in *Dr. No* is thus imbued with a transnational “prescriptive prognosis,” whose condition came to fruition at the time of *Enter the Dragon*, as neocolonial dictatorship prevailed in the Third World.

In *Enter the Dragon*, the narrative convention of James Bond as a transnational protagonist is aligned with the genealogy of the “Oriental” protagonist. As I mentioned earlier, the character system of “Lee” is partially derived from the TV series Hollywood initially mustered up for Lee, *Number One Son*. This title refers to the son of *Charlie Chan*, a very popular mystery movie series during the 1930s and 1940s, which featured Caucasian actors Warner Oland and later Sidney Toler in “Oriental” makeup. The *Charlie Chan* series is based on the novel by an American mystery writer, Earl Derr Biggers, whose *House Without a Key* (1925), the first of what subsequently became the *Charlie Chan* series, “heralded the birth of what is now called the first golden age of mystery in the United States.”<sup>52</sup> The source of Biggers’s inspiration was a real-life Chinese-Hawaiian detective of the Honolulu Police Department whom Biggers encountered while he was on vacation in Hawai‘i.<sup>53</sup> The encounter inspired him to construct the fictional character of an “Oriental” detective with razor-sharp intelligence, enigmatic wisdom expressed through aphorism, exotic accent, and impeccable dress. According to Biggers himself, the character system of Charlie Chan was designed to be “a Chinese hero, trustworthy, benevolent, and philosophical,” and therefore, “a good companion.”<sup>54</sup> Just as in Fleming’s *Doctor No*, Biggers’s conception of Charlie Chan formed against the background of the U.S. colonial relationship with Hawai‘i. By the illegal overthrow of the constitutional monarchy, and the annexation through the U.S. domestic legislation (as opposed to annexation through international treaty), the United States took Hawai‘i as its territory and eventually its state. The image of Charlie Chan as benevolent Other can be deciphered as the unconscious affirmation of the outwardly non-antagonistic colonial relationship with Hawai‘i, facilitated by the “Oriental” law enforcer positioned in the system.<sup>55</sup>

The invention of Charlie Chan as the protagonist image of American literary “Orientalism” was also formed in reaction to the British literary convention of the diabolic “Oriental,” which, as we will see, is based on the British

imperial encounter with the Other in the framework of classic colonialism. The image of Charlie Chan thus comes into being as a proto-image of the “Oriental cop,” the conceptual foundation of an “Oriental” protagonist whose formula can be found in Biggers’s original motive for the character design: “Sinister and wicked Chinese are old stuff, but an amiable Chinese on the side of law and order had never been used.”<sup>56</sup>

In the cinematic version of the *Charlie Chan* series, the number one son of Charlie Chan was played by Keye Luke, who portrayed an upbeat, Americanized character distinguished by his natural inclination for action. What we can glean from these conventions is that the *Number One Son* series would have featured a character that synthesizes the character system of Charlie Chan and his son: a figure of a sharp detective who engages in actions and extols the “Oriental” martial arts to defend law and order. On top of that, the *Number One Son* series would have had an additional dimension of “transnationality” since, as Bruce Lee disclosed in an interview, it was going to be a “new Chinese James Bond.”<sup>57</sup> The James Bond aspect was indeed blended into the figure of the “Oriental cop” in the synthetic character design of “Lee”—as an agent rather than a detective—in *Enter the Dragon*. This ushered in the transnationalization of the “Oriental” protagonist (or “Orientalization” of the transnational protagonist) who defends the law and order of undefined foreign (i.e., transnational) power.

On the other side of the spectrum, Han as an “Oriental” antagonist appears to be an almost exact replica of Dr. No, due to his similar dress and prosthetic hand. Yet, in close reading, Han is also a synthesis of diverse character systems, one of which is the original “Oriental” villain, namely, Dr. Fu Manchu. Incidentally, Warner Oland (who made Charlie Chan a popular series in the 1930s) was the first one to act as Dr. Fu Manchu in *The Mysterious Dr. Fu Manchu* (1929, Paramount). The vital link between Charlie Chan and Dr. Fu Manchu embodied by Oland also dovetails the American literary “Orientalism” with its British predecessor, hence, Earl Der Biggers with Sax Rohmer. What Biggers referred to as “sinister and wicked Chinese” in the previously cited quote indeed is a literary convention sensationalized and popularized by Sax Rohmer.

Cradled by British literary Orientalism (e.g., Edward William Lane’s *Modern Egyptians* and Sir Richard Burton’s translation of *One Thousand Nights and a Night*, as well as his own tales of adventures in Africa and the Arab world), Rohmer developed a fascination with the exotic Other, mediated by the colonial relationship, in his formative years.<sup>58</sup> Naturally, Rohmer initially tried for a position in civil service, according to his biographer, “no doubt dreaming, as he did so, of a Colonial appointment that would take him to the

mysterious lands where he wished so ardently to visit.<sup>59</sup> Years later, however, the mysterious lands he sought for turned out to be nowhere but in the home of the British Empire, the Limehouse district of London populated by Chinese immigrants. When Rohmer was writing cover stories for popular magazines, he was assigned a commission to search for “Mr. King,” referred to as “a Chinese master criminal” in 1911.<sup>60</sup> His tedious search for “Mr. King” uncovered a deep-seated psychological struggle of the imperialist subject with its Other. The struggle was characterized by the ambivalent fascination in which the sense of awe coexisted with fear and repulsion. As Rohmer himself described in cogent self-analysis, the ambivalence stemmed from the mass psychosis manifested in the “yellow peril,” which in turn was aroused by the threat posed by the rebellion of the colonized: “Conditions for launching a Chinese villain in the market were ideal. I wondered why it had never before occurred to me. The Boxer Rebellion had started off rumors of a Yellow Peril which had not yet died down. Recent events in Limehouse had again drawn public attention eastwards.”<sup>61</sup> Rohmer thus tapped into a vulnerable spot in the unconscious of the imperialist subject, which could be vigorously capitalized for the hegemonic imagination, or for the symbolic imperialist recuperation.

Indeed, to the British imperial subject, the Boxer Rebellion, or the Yi Ho Tuan movement, exists as one of the most decisive historical instances of anticolonial struggle waged by a colonial subject. Reification of the mutiny of the colonized in the form of diabolic imagery of the villain and his evil scheme seems to serve as a device for the imperial self to overcome trauma and to reimpose its superiority over its colonial subject. The Yi Ho Tuan movement, on the other hand, holds its historical existence at the heart of the kung fu cultural revolution. It wouldn't be an overgeneralization to state that the constitutional narrative foundation of the kung fu cultural revolution has been the visual folklore of the Yi Ho Tuan movement from the perspective of the natives, the people who fought against imperialist conquest.<sup>62</sup>

Having been less traumatized by the mutiny of the colonial subject (until the Vietnam War) than the British, the American film industry seemed less hesitant to produce its own kung fu movies. The enormous success of the TV series *Kung Fu* must have given the new Hollywood confidence to cash in on transnational kung fu films. However, in producing its own kung fu flicks, Hollywood had to somehow resolve the contradiction between the imperialist mode and counterimperialist mode of representation inherent in the concoction of dialectically opposite character systems. In this context, a juxtaposition of the character system of Charlie Chan with that of Dr. Fu Manchu in *Enter the Dragon* can be seen as a device to divide and contain the counterimperialist mode of representation. For such a device could fundamentally

debase the narrative matrix of the Yi Ho Tuan movement, or what I have also referred to earlier as the kung fu dialectic.

The ultimate antagonist, according to the Yi Ho Tuan narrative matrix, is the “foreign power,” or the imperialist whose predatory colonial scheme is carried out by the Chinese lackey. The villainous figure therefore is conventionally assigned to the lackey, who enjoys special status accrued from collaboration with the foreign conqueror, and has no shame in undertaking crudely oppressive measures against his own people. It is therefore the lackey that stands on the “side of the law and order” of the “foreign power.” The protagonist, on the other hand, is the polar opposite of the lackey: s/he is the representative of the people, the nation, and an unyielding defender of cosmic law and moral order. The semiotic spark between the protagonist and the villain raises the issues of class, nation, and colonial power relationship. The confrontation between the protagonist and the villain in the end unravels the highest plateau of antagonism where the protagonist, directly or otherwise, confronts the ultimate antagonist, the “foreign power.” On this highest level of antagonism, the legitimacy of imperialism and colonialism is vigorously contested and symbolically overturned.

By contrast, the narrative intervention in *Enter the Dragon* seems to be designed to implode such implicated semiotic opposition of the kung fu movie genre. The displacement of potential political allegory is done by the revision of the relationship between the protagonist and the villain. Yet another segment of the “censored” dialogue discussed earlier makes reference to the modified opposition between the institutional protagonist (Shaolin temple) and the villain (Han as a renegade Shaolin monk):

SENIOR MONK: I am ashamed to tell you now. Of all the Shaolin men I have taught, there is one who has turned the ways of knowledge and strength to his own base ends. He has perverted all we held sacred. His name is Han. In defiance of all our beliefs, he has brought disgrace to the Shaolin temple. So it is now for you to redeem our lost honor. There is a man here, you will go to him.

LEE: Yes. I understand.<sup>63</sup>

The opposition between the protagonist and the villain so modified may still be capable of generating a political allegory only if Han is a lackey. Han’s villainy, however, is rooted in neither lackey nor foreigner, the categories of the kung fu film genre: it stems from the “Orientalist” villain category of Dr. No and Dr. Fu Manchu. If there is any narrative figure that comes close to a lackey, it would be the Shaolin temple—due to its collaboration with the “foreign

power”—which is unthinkable, as well as unintelligible in the conceptual category of the kung fu movie genre. Consequently, the conflict between the protagonist and the villain is confined to an internal feud within the Shaolin temple. The relationship between the protagonist and the villain in *Enter the Dragon* is thus so far removed from the narrative matrix of the kung fu genre that its vital lifeline to the allegory of the Manicheism of the colonial situation is seriously undermined. This explains at least partly why *Enter the Dragon* wasn't as popular as Lee's other films in Hong Kong and in Asia in general.<sup>64</sup>

The necessity of such displacement—apart from its apparent and immediate effect of containing the subversive edge of the kung fu genre—is predicated upon the obfuscation or even effacement of the narrative category of “foreign power” as such. At the end of the dialogue cited above, the Shaolin senior monk urges “Lee” to meet Braithwait (Geoffrey Weeks), the secret service agent who briefs “Lee” on the logistics of the mission. Although his pronounced British accent suggests his institutional origin to be the same as that of James Bond, the identity of the responsible power in the operation is left unmarked, for which reason I have referred to the ultimate power holder as an “undefined foreign power.” Braithwait's statement in the briefing provides some clues to approach this otherwise mystifying configuration of the ultimate power holder: “We aren't the agency of enforcement. We function as a gatherer of information. Evidence . . . upon which interested governments can act.”<sup>65</sup> The impersonal and distinctly bureaucratic nature of the operation is further reinforced by the faceless and voiceless presence-absence of a colonel in charge of the final landing, whose existence we are only allowed to detect through Braithwait's monologue phone conversation with a presumed secretary or aide of the colonel. In lieu of a personified figure of the imperial predatoriness conventionalized in the kung fu cinema genre, we are confronted with the figureless figure of undefined authority.

Divested of a locatable agency, the undefined foreign power manifests itself only as a trace of the commanding chain. This figureless figure, to adopt Jameson's persuasive analysis of the FBI agent in *Dogday Afternoon*, can be deciphered as the very mode through which the “immense and decentralized power network which marks the present multinational stage of monopoly capitalism” represents itself.<sup>66</sup> Due to its narrative homage to the spy genre, the existence of the ultimate authority in *Enter the Dragon* leaves its alibi through the command, which is presented as a *fait accompli* from the outset of the film as a “mission.” Indeed, it is the command, more significantly than the villainy of Han, that causes and sustains an entire narrative structure. In accordance with the figurelessness of the ultimate authority, the source of the command—its origin and intent—cannot be deciphered within the narrative structure. It

lies not in the composition but in the externality of the film, that is to say, the very commodity form of *Enter the Dragon* as a variant of the transnational spy genre. The command, in the final analysis, is the point of convergence between the mode of operation in the narrative and the mode of the production of the film.

The “undefined foreign power” and the Shaolin temple are mediated by the character system of “Lee,” for the common denominator of the agendas upheld by these two institutions finds “Lee” to be the real carrier of the mission. Similar to James Bond’s operation in *Dr. No*, “Lee’s” operation is assisted by the subsidiary protagonists composed of Mei-lin, a local agent of the undefined foreign power (who corresponds to Quarrel in *Dr. No*), and Roper and Williams, American tourists (who correspond to Honey Ryder in *Dr. No*). Moreover, through Mei-lin, the prisoners of Han’s island also become the protagonists at the finale (see figure 4.2). In contrast to the mode of operation in *Dr. No*, which still relies on the colonial power relationship, the covert action fully utilizes “outsourcing” to the point where the local subcontracting agent (i.e., “Lee”) is solely in charge of the operation, to which the ultimate authority is only responsible for financing and logistical support.




FIGURE 4.2. Principal character systems in the narrative of *Enter the Dragon*.

The relationship between the local subcontracting agent and the undefined foreign power is identical with that of Golden Harvest and Warner Brothers. The ultimate authority in *Enter the Dragon* actively engages in “outsourcing” from an institution that is well grounded in the locale and shares the common interest akin to the relationship between Warner Brothers and Golden Harvest in the production of *Enter the Dragon*. The mode of operation and the power in the narrative structure, mirroring those of the production process, thus set the normative model of the transnational venture.

The antagonism against the “foreign power,” an essential narrative ingredient of the kung fu genre, is thus made inconceivable by the transnationalization of the narrative structure. For the “foreign power” is not just rendered impossible to personify but more importantly, it is transformed into a protagonist whose undisputed basis of legitimacy stems from the very structure of the film itself. The transnationalization of the form in *Enter the Dragon* demarcates an attempt at the *cinematic recolonization* of the kung fu genre by the transnational media capital. Betraying its commitment to this ideological effect, Warner Brothers’ upper-level executives tried to reimpose the transnational framework by altering the title to “*Han’s Island*” at the last minute.<sup>67</sup> The change of the title would have circumvented the central role of “Lee” as the real protagonist, while subliminally fortifying the power of the undefined authority as the supreme protagonist since what *Han’s Island* denotes, in a strikingly similar manner with the title *Dr. No* or *Mission: Impossible*, is the objective or a summary statement of the mission issued from headquarters. Moreover, the title change would have elevated the significance of Roper, an “official” representative of Hollywood’s outpost in its cinematic recolonization scheme.

Bruce Lee, however, adamantly resisted the executives’ decision by insisting upon his withdrawal from future contracts were there a title change, which in turn forced them to retain the original title.<sup>68</sup> Consistent with the struggle for an autonomous space within the construct of the global commodity discussed earlier, Lee’s direct action against the command of Warner Brothers’ headquarters inevitably raises the level of Hong Kong labor’s resistance to its highest plateau of antagonism against the heart of transnational capital. The figuration of autonomy, situated on the highest level of antagonism in the film, has an immense allegorical ramification in the social field. Yet it remains partial if we delimit the thrust of autonomy to the narrative structure alone.

#### The Genealogy of “Orientalist” Imagery: From Its Literary Inception to Mass Production

As we move from the narrative realm to the aesthetic realm of “transnationality” or globalization, it is an opportune moment to submit my so far tactically

executed analysis of Hollywood “Orientalism” to a more systemic historical context. To do so, we must first go back to Sax Rohmer, for his invention of “Dr. Fu Manchu” aligned the British literary “Orientalism” with the cinematic “Orientalism” of Hollywood. The genealogical reckoning of the “Orientalist” imagery from its literary inception to mass industrial production in the field of entertainment could help historicize the emergence of Dr. Fu Manchu as a significant turning point in the imperialist mode of representation. The cinematization of Dr. Fu Manchu is a symbolic instance of the United States postwar strategic involvement in the so-called Far East (Japan, Okinawa, Korea, Southeast Asia).<sup>69</sup> Side-by-side with the American conquest of Asia as a new phase of imperialism, Hollywood “Orientalism” therefore represents the new set of imperatives in the imperialist mode of representation. Placing the imperialist mode of representation in a historical perspective could help identify not only the prototype of “Oriental” characters, but also of the latest postmodern modulation of such character systems as deployed in the *Enter the Dragon* project. A careful examination of the postmodern construction of “Oriental” protagonists and villains can inform us of the aesthetic manifestation of the strategic paradigm of globalization.

The trauma and anxiety of the imperial subject, which underlined the birth of the demonic “Oriental” villain, seems to constitute the *raison d’être* of the Orientalist canon as a whole. According to Barry Milligan’s study on Orientalist imagery in British literature, in specific reference to the representation of opium, the prototype imagery of the “Oriental” has been vested with a strong sense of ambivalence toward otherness since its inception. The coexistence of “attraction and repulsion, desire and dread, pleasure and pain” characterized the literati’s emotive reaction to the Other of the imperial subject, as a manifestation of fear and anxiety over the colonial relationship itself (such as the fear of contagion and reverse colonization that could result in the alteration of the imperial subject).<sup>70</sup> With industrial development inducing the influx of immigrants from China in the latter part of the nineteenth century, a heightened sense of ambivalence came to pervade the popular consciousness of the British subject—almost half a century prior to the Boxer Rebellion.

The imperialist selfhood expressed by pioneering works (late eighteenth century to early nineteenth century) of the Orientalist genre, such as Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s “Kubla Khan” and Thomas De Quincey’s *Confessions of an English Opium Eater*, symptomatically displayed a sense of dread with colonial contagion through commerce.<sup>71</sup> This nervousness stems from the writers’ own visionary experiences through the consumption of opium as the Oriental commodity, devoid of an actual encounter with the bodies of “Orientals.” In this respect, there is a certain sense of stability—albeit a paranoid one—in the imperial subject, for it was yet to be challenged by the reality of imperialist



contradiction. As the British Empire entered the phase of industrial capitalism, the relative stability of its imperialist selfhood came to be undermined.

The contradiction began to enter the consciousness of literati in the genre of popular writing with the influx of immigrants from the British colonies since the 1860s. Popular journalists and writers then came to view London's East End as opium dens "with both delight and trepidation, as miniature Orientals within the heart of the British Empire."<sup>72</sup> The perceived adverse effects from colonial expansion and intercourse, reified in the ambivalence of opium as well as of bodies of the "Orientals" in the popular journalism, set the standard imagery for the genre at least in respect to two characteristics:

(1) an almost superstitious dread of Orientals and a tendency to portraying them as animals and/or vampirelike living dead parasites and (2) a preoccupation with the role of English women in the opium den accompanied by the suggestion that they are being Orientalized and assimilated.<sup>73</sup>

Popular writers from the late nineteenth century to the turn of the twentieth century—such as Charles Dickens (*The Mystery of Edwin Drood*), Oscar Wilde (*The Picture of Dorian Gray*), and Arthur Conan Doyle (the *Sherlock Holmes* series)—reflect such perceptions in their representation of "Orientals." The intensification of ambivalence seems to stem from the paradoxical effect of capitalism—as the more expansive the sphere of imperialist control grows, with the help of industrialization, the more subjectified the colonized becomes expressed in mutinies (both in China and India), migration, and an ever-expanding, worldwide network of secret societies. Thus the psychological destabilization of the imperialist self, as Milligan explicates, is based on the realization of a new condition that the Empire building ushered:

Britons at the end of the century felt a growing awareness that the British Empire could no longer be viewed as an entity in which the home culture of England simply overwrote the Oriental culture of the colonies, as nor could "British culture" or even "British identity" be taken for granted as stable, objective essences. Instead, they began to realize, the British Empire must be viewed as an unpredictable multinational entity at every level from nation to individual and from the outposts in the colonies to the hearthsides of London.<sup>74</sup>

Prior to Sax Rohmer, the demonization of the "Oriental" in the earlier industrial phase was still somewhat elusive, in that it designated a milieu (e.g., opium dens) rather than a personified figure.<sup>75</sup> One can discern the emergence

of the protagonist, yet its power is limited to the surveillance (better known as “doing the slums” in the Oriental community), reflective of the activities of popular journalism at that time.<sup>76</sup>

As we discussed earlier, half a century after the discovery of Chinatown as the “Orient” at home, a popular interest in the personified figure of the “Oriental” demon gave birth to the image of Dr. Fu Manchu. Given this historical context, Sax Rohmer’s invention, as he himself analyzed, indeed is designed to offer a “way out” to the destabilized imperialist subject. The image of Dr. Fu Manchu, which reifies imperialist ambivalence with the otherness constituted in the process of colonization (from opium and opium dens, to the so-called yellow peril) lends a figurative form to the perceived cause of destabilization. The imagery of the demonized “Oriental” villain and its implied threat to domesticity—expressed through a threat to English womanhood—seems to be an effective means of reobjectifying the then-emerging subject of decolonization.

Coterminous with demonization in the form of the “Oriental” villain is the individuation of the protagonist, and his/her placement in the discourse of law and order. The protagonist’s activities thus came to assume an active role of “policing and enforcement.” The figure of Scotland Yard detective Nayland Smith in the *Dr. Fu Manchu* series presents a symbolic solution to the crisis of the imperialist subject, rather than a mere exposé of the problem. The augmentation of the power of the protagonist corresponds to the culmination of the collective desire of the imperialist bloc for a representative figure (“the man who fought on behalf of the white race”) in opposition to the diabolic Fu Manchu (“the head of the great Yellow Movement”).<sup>77</sup>

#### Hollywood “Orientalism” and Transnational Aesthetics: The Gaze of Militarism and Tourism

The clearly individuated “Oriental” villain and the Western protagonist in the *Dr. Fu Manchu* series are indicative of the fact that Sax Rohmer’s work was already imbued with cinematic potential, to be fully explored by Hollywood. However, while inheriting the visionary and narrative matrix of British “Orientalism,” Hollywood “Orientalism” introduced literally a new dimension, since it is firmly embedded in the logic of late capitalism. As Walter Benjamin and Susan Sontag have shown us, what is exotic in the late capitalist context is defined and valued by the photographic and cinematic visual grid.<sup>78</sup> The exotic, therefore, is no longer discovered, uncovered, or recreated by the visionary experience of literary production or by the legwork

of popular journalists, but rather it is industrially produced by the apparatus of the mass image factory.

The late capitalist technology and social organization of “sight” conveniently resolve contradiction posed by the subjectification of the Other, which British “Orientalism” has tackled. The gaze facilitated by the photographic-cinematic way of seeing enables one to produce otherness, yet simultaneously preempts and undermines its subjectifying potential. Sontag explains:

To photograph people is to violate them, by seeing them as they never see themselves, by having knowledge of them they can never have; it turns people into objects that can be symbolically possessed. Just as the camera is a sublimation of the gun, to photograph someone is a sublimated murder—a soft murder, appropriate to a sad, frightened time.<sup>79</sup>

The containment of the subjectifying power of the Other, developed throughout the British literary tradition up to Sax Rohmer, is already integrated in the very form that Hollywood “Orientalism” is based on. The power of a mechanical gaze could demonize and destroy the Other at its will with facileness and dramatic effect. The task of Hollywood, then, was to industrially reproduce the sight objects of otherness for destruction and consumption in its studio back lot, in the Californian landscape and, most importantly, on the body of Caucasian actors and actresses.

The incipient stage of Hollywood “Orientalism”—which featured a Japanese actor, Sessue Hayakawa, in Cecille De Mille’s *The Cheat* (1915)—was soon replaced by a pattern of Caucasian actors playing diabolical “Orientals,” and Caucasian actresses playing either seductive and ambivalent or pitiful “Oriental” women (for example, Norma Talmadge, who played the double role of a native Chinese woman and her illegitimate “half-American” daughter in *Forbidden City* [1918]). Thereafter, the body of the Caucasian actor/actress had become a “landscape” upon which the “essence” of the exotic was constructed, like an “Oriental palace” built in the studio back lot. The “Orientalized” body of the Caucasian actor/actress is essentially a simulacrum designed for ocular consumption. Moreover, by turning the Caucasian into the “Oriental,” Hollywood could retain the horror effect of becoming “Oriental” (of Caucasian women, in particular) cultivated in British literary “Orientalism.” A symbolic war of the imperialist subject, waged against its Other, implicit in literary “Orientalism,” seems to come to the forefront with Hollywood’s undertaking of “Orientalism.”

At this juncture, therefore, Hollywood “Orientalism” enters a symbiotic relationship with two of the main industries of late capitalism: the war/mili-

tary industry and the tourist industry, both of which are buttressed by the development of the communication and transportation industries. The principle of destructive consumption in both militarism and tourism can only be sustained by the development of the production of a sight object for consumption. Hollywood's technological innovation for "Orientalism" has thus enabled the industrial production of such a sight object.

The "2 1/2 hour makeup job," which Boris Karloff went through every morning during the shooting of MGM's *The Mask of Fu Manchu* (1932), illuminates the labor-intensive production of a diabolical "Oriental" in the era of Hollywood's studio system.<sup>80</sup> In fact, Karloff was recruited from Universal, where his role as Frankenstein had already made him an alluring commodity. The distinction between a sci-fi monster and the "Oriental" villain is blurred not only in terms of narrative function, but also of in terms of its identity as a simulacrum of "evil," "demon," or simply "Other." It is worth noting that the period immediately preceding World War II in Hollywood was rife with monstrous figures such as Frankenstein, Dracula, King Kong, and Dr. X. Such mass production of the simulacra of otherness in turn helps valorize the logic of destructive consumption. Those simulacra are produced specifically for arousing fear and anxiety, relieved by the eventual destruction or containment by a normative authority representing law and order.

The constant production of simulacra as a sight object of destruction has been an indispensable factor in the development of the militaristic perception, as it redefines the concept of "enemy" according to the logic of the mechanical gaze. To recapitulate Paul Virilio's main thesis in his *War and Cinema*: transforming the forces of the enemy into a sight object of simulacrum is the foremost productive principle of the war industry in which the "destruction and observation would develop at the same pace."<sup>81</sup> The sight object of simulacrum is not limited to the battlefield, where the figures on a high-altitude reconnaissance photograph, radar screen, infrared, or laser beam detection device constitute the image of an "enemy." It is also deployed on the screen as a monstrous reification of the intangible forces into which the masses' totalitarian desire of destruction can be effectively channeled. The "intangible forces," situated within the context of Hollywood "Orientalism," represent the specter of the subjectification of the Other, particularly the specter of the decolonization struggle by the colonized. Thus, in the reproduction of monstrous figures (from Dr. Fu Manchu to Dr. No), the war is already materialized and mobilized in the field of perception.<sup>82</sup> To modify Virilio's phrase, cinema has hereby become the fourth dimension of war.<sup>83</sup>

The intense makeup of the diabolical "Oriental" as a manifestation of the aesthetics of destruction of the Hollywood studio system is also surrounded by

equally outstanding visual objects, which are constructed particularly for the consumptive gaze: the “Oriental” interior, made up of an ensemble of signs rather than objects, the San Franciscan Chinatown and Californian landscape “reprocessed” as an imaginary “Oriental” town and country, and a horde of “Oriental” extras “interned” in the imaginary landscape. If war is the ultimate form of consumption of the Other by the imperialist subject, tourism can be viewed as a “sustainable” consumption of the Other that nurtures the health of the imperialist power.

As Lash and Urry persuasively argue, the development of mass-organized tourism since 1957—when the international jet flight became standardized and made more accessible—has institutionalized the “tourist gaze” in the social field of perception.<sup>84</sup> With the effect of the “tourist gaze,” the experience of travel has been transformed into a consumption of signs that are now industrially reproduced: “What is consumed in tourism are visual signs and sometimes simulacrum. . . .”<sup>85</sup> The tourist industry shares the same productive principle of the mass image and war industries, in that it critically hinges upon the constant production and circulation of imagery for consumption. Accordingly, what tourists look for is no longer the experience of a chance encounter, but preprocessed sight objects organized and packaged for their convenience. The visual codes of the exotic that are produced in cinema thus entail a simulation of the experience of organized tourism. Indeed, cinema has become the fourth dimension of tourism as well.

Let us now examine how the gaze of war and tourism intersects with the *Enter the Dragon* project as an exemplary visual text of postmodern “Orientalism.” The fact that *Enter the Dragon* featured real Chinese in both critical as well as marginal roles does not mean that it no longer affirms the aesthetic principle of Hollywood “Orientalism.” As the first all-Asian-cast Hollywood film *Flower Drum Song* (1961) had shown, the imagery of the exotic can be hypostasized as a pure code and reimposed upon Asian bodies (which dispenses with the “2 1/2 hour makeup job”). Han, as I touched on earlier, is the product of a repositioning of the visual code of Dr. No on the body of a Hong Kong veteran actor, Shek Kin, who had already carved his niche in the industry by playing villainous roles. His hyperreal “Oriental” body is further consolidated by the voice-over of Keye Luke (whose performance as an “Orientalized” monk in the TV series *Kung Fu* was being played on TV when *Enter the Dragon* hit the theater). Williams’s (Jim Kelly) line on Han in the film, “Man . . . You come right out of a comic book,” aptly summarizes this updated version of the simulacrum of the Hollywood-made diabolical “Oriental.”

The visual codes of Dr. Fu Manchu are also tactfully employed in the imagery of Han’s underground opium factory, his bizarre museum of pros-

thetic hands, and the appearance of a cobra—all designed to invoke the sense of “repulsion,” a tradition which Hollywood inherited from the British literary “Orientalism.” And the most sensational evocation of the diabolical “Oriental” is conjured up by the presence of Caucasian women under Han’s thumb. Tania (Ahna Capri), the chief hostess of the island and Han’s right-hand woman, and the zombielike White women drugged and incarcerated in the opium factory impart the devilish influence of the Oriental villain’s “mind control” project. The fear of losing Caucasian women to the domain of the “Oriental,” as discussed earlier, has been a consistent theme of “Orientalist” imagery since the British popular journalists’ fascination with London’s East End in the 1860s (whose legacy Hollywood carried on since *The Cheat*). Such visual codes surrounding Han reintroduce the reactionary fervor of the Yellow Peril merged with patriarchal power over women’s bodies. Han’s island as a milieu is thus demonized and monsterized through the aesthetic grid of “Orientalism,” which in turn seduces the audience into a militaristic perception, saturated with the desire for destructive consumption.

To take a rather heretical angle, Richard Nixon’s visit—as an incubating factor to the *Enter the Dragon* project—rendered the ideology of tourism an international diplomatic spectacle. It ostensibly proclaimed the advent of a new era of mass tourism that would penetrate into zones previously inaccessible, due to Cold War political boundaries. Except for exchanges of table tennis players and high-ranking officials, however, the door to China had remained firmly sealed to tourists until China officially launched its “Four Modernization” programs in 1978.<sup>86</sup> In the meantime, according to Alvin So and Stephen Chiu, Hong Kong tourism surfaced as an international commodity during the Vietnam War.<sup>87</sup> For those tourists eager to follow in Nixon’s footsteps, Hong Kong emerged as an alternative location for the consumption of “China” as a sight commodity. Although the actual number of tourists to Hong Kong dwindled around the time *Enter the Dragon* was released, the film provided a simulated trip to “Hong Kong,” heavily endowed with a collage of Hollywood-made “Oriental” sight objects.

The film’s initial credit section, following the opening scenes, is interlaced with images of airplanes hovering over Hong Kong, the arrival of Williams and Roper at the Kai Tak airport, and their excursions in downtown Hong Kong. These images set the tone of the film while unraveling the “hidden” aspect of *Enter the Dragon* as an extension of organized tourism. To compensate for the low payment to the Hollywood crew, Warner Brothers provided a package deal of air and accommodations in Hong Kong for the families of the production crew and for the scriptwriter, since, according to Robert Clouse, “many airline and hotel deals were available those days that film producers could manipulate.”<sup>88</sup>

The aesthetic embodiment of the “tourist gaze” accordingly marks its presence in the image reconstruction of the “Orient” in the film. Take, for instance, the scene of the feast at Han’s palace. It is a vertigo of divergent sight objects composed of dancing sumo wrestlers at the central stage, encircled by the busy actions of—as the director himself proudly notes—“acrobats, dragon dance, a sword swallower, fire spitter, jugglers and be vies of beautiful women.”<sup>89</sup> The most eccentric of all is a countless number of caged birds hanging from the ceiling. Such an idiosyncratic idea for the interior ornamentation was spawned by the director’s own sightseeing experience. Clouse’s initial feeling of repulsion with Hong Kong at arrival soon turned into fascination as he came to be more exposed to the variegated scenery of the downtown area: “It is a place of overwhelming commercial and creative enterprise, overflowing with humanity. It is alive and surging as few places are on this Earth.”<sup>90</sup> The aesthetic principle found in the scene of the feast, therefore, can be said to have been shaped by the collage of signifiers of “Hong Kong” processed through the power of the “tourist gaze”—which in turn is influenced by the “Orientalist” antecedent. The inclusion of caged birds, in particular, is a by-product of such a dreamlike condensing process through the gaze of a tourist interacting with the preexisting imagery and discourse of the “Orient.”<sup>91</sup> Although caged birds are found in the street of Hong Kong, their concentration was a pure invention of the director: “I couldn’t remember seeing anything like it and it was certainly *exotic* enough for Han’s *perverted* tastes.”<sup>92</sup>

Nevertheless, there is one scene where the Hollywood “Orientalism” via the director’s aesthetic choice is being rejected by “Lee”/Lee. At the opening of the tournament, everybody involved is called to attend the ceremony at the tournament ground in uniform. The contestants are all dressed in a bright yellow karate uniforms or *gi* except “Lee,” who wears a traditional Chinese silk suit. The referee confronts “Lee” and admonishes him for not wearing a uniform. “Lee” holds his stare back at him without a word until the referee backs off. Clothing the contestants in yellow *gi* was the director’s decision with the objective of getting “more colors into the fight scene.”<sup>93</sup> And “Lee’s” refusal is, according to Clouse, what exactly happened in the production process: “Everyone accepted that [yellow *gi*] but Bruce. He refused to get into a yellow *gi*. Instead, he would wear his brown silk suit.”<sup>94</sup> According to the kung fu film semiotics, the karate/judo *gi* is reserved to signify the Japanese, hence, foreign power/imperialism. Dyed in yellow, in harmony with the intense visual ambiance of Han’s island, the karate *gi* embodies the multinational “Orientalist” aesthetic. By the same token Lee/“Lee’s” refusal of the “Orientalized” *gi* materializes the counter gaze, opening a door to the field of contestation in the aesthetic realm.

### Shattering the Transnational Aesthetics

In the climactic battle scene between “Lee” and Han, we are invited to perhaps the most visually entrancing, if not intoxicating, space, where everything is exposed to infinite reflection by walls of mirror. The idea of the mirrored room is again a by-product of the tourist experience of the director and his wife.<sup>95</sup> In terms of its delusional effect, it could be read as a spatial and visual translation of narcotics, Han’s main basis of power. Lee’s artistic intervention, however, was to alter this exotically constructed milieu, creating a space for a didactic philosophical exploration. And yet, such pedagogical connotation was erased by yet another “censorship” of a crucial segment.

Unlike Han, who can maneuver to hide behind the infinite reflections, “Lee” is confronted with the colossal difficulty of distinguishing the real Han from the mirrored reflection. As “Lee’s” frustration reaches its peak, he suddenly hears the voice of his Shaolin teacher whispering to him: “Yes. The enemy has only images and illusions, behind which he hides his true motives. Destroy the image and you will break the enemy.”<sup>96</sup> This particular segment was omitted in the original Warner Brothers version, since the senior monk’s phrase is a reprise of the “censored” dialogue between “Lee” and his teacher. The “censored” segment in the mirrored room, therefore, was designed to give philosophical coherence to the film by providing the moral of the story, faithful to the spirit and format of a kung fu movie. Upon hearing the master’s voice, “Lee” begins to shatter the mirrors that reflect Han in his attempt to destroy the image behind which Han hides himself. Once “Lee” has inflicted considerable damage to the reflections, Han reappears in front of “Lee,” stripped of the mesmerizing effect of reflection: an apparition of the real in the realm of the imagery symbolized by the room full of mirrors. This is the first theme that animates the Shaolin senior monk’s teaching on images and on the notion of the enemy.

The second theme in the scene of the mirrored room is an illustration of “Lee’s” identification of self with the forces of Nature, also from his dialogue with the Shaolin senior monk. As soon as “Lee” recognizes the real Han, he throws a quick reflexive kick at him. Han flies into air and lands with his back against the entrance door. On the door is a spear, which Han himself stuck there prior to entering the room. Han’s body is pierced by the spear which he himself had already unknowingly set up. “Lee” trembles faintly at this awe-inspiring turn of events, which reaffirms his statement, “I don’t hit; it hits all by itself.” This anticlimactic climax, therefore, as if it were a pun for the joke, captures the forces of Nature that come to aid the one who is in harmony with Nature at a decisive instance.





FIGURE 4.3. Han and “Lee” in the room full of mirrors from *Enter the Dragon*.

The first theme in the contestation over imagery/illusion brings to the surface the latest mode of Hollywood "Orientalism," the postmodern or "digital mode," which is superimposed on the corporeality of Han. As discussed earlier, the "Oriental" image convention is hereby vaporized as a pure code that then is reimposed upon the "authentic" Chinese corporeality of Shek Kin, turning him into a hyperreal "Oriental" villain. Such a hyperreal dimension in the new Hollywood "Orientalism" marks a distinct instance of "technological innovation," in that it breaks with the obsolete simulacrum of the Caucasian "Oriental" and redefines the image of "Oriental" in a more refined mode of simulation. Seen in this context, the undeclared aim of transnational media capital at the climax of its global kung fu film boils down to a semi-surreal play of two conventional image codes of Dr. Fu Manchu and Charlie Chan on real Chinese bodies. The battle scene in the mirrored room thus would have been a perfect finale to celebrate the inauguration of the new Hollywood image power station, which had become so powerful as to produce "real-life" images of their favorite "Orientalist" commodities and make them fight one another like cartoon characters.

Such connotations notwithstanding, the postmodern mode of the "Oriental" villain is questioned at its conceptual foundation in the room of mirrors. As "Lee" redefines the notion of the opponent by shifting it from Han to the reflection or image of Han in the mirror, the antagonism between "Lee" and Han gains a new dimension. "Lee" now emerges as the real in opposition to Han as a residue of a simulacrum that has no power once the images and illusions are removed. What made Han appear to be an invincible figure was the mesmerizing power of his images, which are embedded in the illusionary power of "Orientalist" aesthetics. Thus when "Lee" triumphs over Han in the mirrored room, Lee in effect exorcises the totality of the "Orientalist" imagery of villain, the ghosts of Dr. Fu Manchu and Dr. No. In this way, Lee's philosophical intervention directly counters the productive principle of the Hollywood image factory, where the existence of the real is a taboo and needs to be either completely contained to the point of invisibility or to be thoroughly processed as commodified imagery. Although the Hong Kong film industry is no different from Hollywood as far as the production of imagery is concerned, the kung fu cultural revolution engages with the real in the realm of illusion. As Lee tried to import the ethos of the kung fu cultural revolution, the message conveyed through "Lee's" act of breaking the mirror shatters multiple layers of processed imagery, based on the Hollywood "Orientalist" aesthetics. In this sense, the infinite reflections in the room, as seen from the gaze of a camera (representing transnational power) symbolically demarcate the realm of transnational Orientalist aesthetics, which is contested by the insistence on the real over imagery.

Coterminous with the subversion of the real in the aesthetic sphere is the alternative paradigm presented in the second theme, harmonization of self with the forces of Nature, which shows the ontological way out from the cacophony of illusion and disguise. Ultimately, the second theme relates to the constitution of the social subject of decolonization, materialized in the Malay microchip factory as well as in the production process of *Enter the Dragon*. As discussed in the previous segment, the merger of the forces of Nature and the social subject transcends the dialectic of power (i.e., colonizer/colonized, oppressor/oppressed, capital/labor, etc.). This transcendence is expressed in the orientation toward autonomy in lieu of direct engagement with the structure of power. On the unconscious level, the second theme resonates with the autonomous space created by Lee and the Hong Kong sweatshop workers, and also the space of aesthetic autonomy in which Lee was involved in collaboration with the Hong Kong stuntmen. Through aesthetic autonomy, Lee introduces realism and historicism of the Asian popular defense, thereby imploding the “Orientalist” construction of the protagonist.

The image construction of the protagonist unfolds in the battle scenes in Han’s underground factory, designed to showcase the postmodern “Oriental” protagonist. The music of Lalo Schiflin—which invokes the image of *Mission: Impossible*—accentuates the clandestine action of the ninja in a contemporary setting. Viewed on the surface level, Lee’s actions in the underground factory seem to fulfill the “Orientalized” fantasy of “ninja,” “karate,” and “samurai” as well-established “Orientalist” codes of Hollywood. Such a new postmodern “Orientalist” imagery device, imposed on the corporeality of Lee, seems to be a digital infusion of Kato and Charlie Chan with Barney Collier (Greg Morris) of *Mission: Impossible*. The postmodern image package of Kato-Chan-Collier therefore would be a paradigmatic exotic sight object from the standpoint of Hollywood, to be placed in the new mode of the “Orientalist” aesthetic space of *Enter the Dragon*. However, as with his past films, Lee introduced an independent sphere of meaning into the transnational aesthetic domain, through choreography and the use of weapons with historical significance. Ahistoricism and cultural confusion of Hollywood “Orientalism” are therefore replaced by yet another autonomous narrative based on the historical and cultural import of popular defense in the Asian context.

One of the subtle yet important aesthetic contributions that Lee made in *Enter the Dragon* was to confront the Japanese self-“Orientalization” of the ninja with the power of realism and historicism. The “Orientalization” of the image of the ninja, according to one of today’s practitioners of *ninjutsu* (the art of ninja), is perpetrated by “uninformed writers and self-promoting entertainers” who “have merely used the art of *ninjutsu* to cater to audiences seek-

ing the exotic and unusual."<sup>97</sup> Lee was perhaps the first real-life martial artist to perform ninja in the film's history. In a somewhat similar way to the conception of the Okinawan *tou-di*, *ninjutsu* developed in the remote regions of Japan, away from the influence of warring lords, and under the tutelage of Taoist sages and military strategists of the Tang dynasty, who had sought asylum there. It was nurtured "as a highly illegal counter culture to the ruling samurai elite."<sup>98</sup> *Ninjutsu's* foundation in Taoism and its resonance is evident in its basic principle:

In tune with the providence of heaven and the impartial justice of nature, and following a clear and pure heart full of trust in the inevitable, the ninja captures the insight that will guide him [*sic*] successfully into battle when he [*sic*] must conquer and conceal himself [*sic*] protectively from hostility when he [*sic*] must acquiesce.<sup>99</sup>

One can find interconnection between *ninjutsu* and the theme of the harmonization of self and Nature raised in Lee's philosophical treatise in the film's censored dialogue. In contrast to the simulacrum produced by Hollywood "Orientalism," Lee attempts to take ninja to its historical roots in popular defense. With his focus on the realism of kinetic stealth movement, Lee shifts the viewer's attention from the externality of ninja to the philosophical foundation of *ninjutsu* translated in the kinetic form, as observed by Marilyn D. Mintz, the author of *The Martial Arts Films*:

"A human fly" in a dark blue ninja-style jump suit, he runs up the side of a hill and stone wall, lowers himself by a rope, and moves in the shadows gracefully aware, seeming to sense with his entire body any sound or movement. Each part of his body works in unified harmony, excellently demonstrating the capabilities of a superior martial artist. Watching feet, he prepares to fight by planting them firmly in a wide stance, weight on the outside. His walk varies from an even lope to a crablike stalking—all fluid, all extensions from his center.<sup>100</sup>

Starting off with *ninjutsu*, Lee showcases various styles of Asian martial arts through choreography and the use of weaponry. The performance is executed with such a high degree of sophistication and grace that the kinetic meaning thus articulated transcends the dictates of the official narrative while undermining the postmodern "Orientalist" aesthetics. Although Lee occupies the central position of the combat choreography, the performance entails a collective dimension and a labor-intensive mode of production in which Lee,

in collaboration with Hong Kong stunt laborers (one of whom was the young Jackie Chan), refined the choreography to a high aesthetic standard.

The performative autonomy reaches its apex when Lee picks up weapons with historical and cultural significance: a wood staff, *escrima* or *arnis* sticks, and a *nunchaku*, in sequential order. Universally available in the environment of common folk in Asia, the wood staff is undoubtedly the most widely adopted weapon of popular defense in Asia. Lee accentuates his Chinese cultural base by harnessing its movement to that of a Chinese spear. At the point where Lee uses his staff to invoke the imagery of a samurai duel with the multiple opponents exemplified by *Zatoichi/Blind Swordsman*, the pan-Asian identity innate in the historical and cultural significance of the wood staff comes to be externalized. Without any camera effects, Lee with the stuntmen highlights the kinetic realism, surpassing *Zatoichi's* choreography in terms of the speed and economy of motion. The kinetic realism thus simultaneously deconstructs the samurai imagery and opens up a symbolic space where a shared history of Asian popular defense can be conceived.

In the battle scene at the prison cells, Lee picks up two short sticks and engages in stick fighting. The fighting style Lee is alluding to here is the indigenous Filipino martial arts known as *escrima*, *arnis*, or *kali*. The ancient antecedent of Filipino martial arts—which is usually associated with the term *kali*<sup>101</sup>—was witnessed by Ferdinand Magellan's troop in 1521, who encountered a fierce resistance from the natives at Mactan Island near the island of Cebu. Led by Rajah (chief) Lapulapu, the native warriors armed with cutlass and spear, killed Magellan and subdued his troops.<sup>102</sup> The formation of the classic Filipino martial arts of *arnis* or *escrima* took place during the Spanish colonial period (1565–1898), during which the Filipino warrior class was dissolved and bladed weapons, spears, blow guns, and archery were all outlawed by the colonial power.<sup>103</sup>

The historical development of *escrima* and *arnis* is therefore intertwined with the natives' response to Spanish colonization by way of appropriation as well as resistance. According to Mark V. Wiley, *arnis*, a shortened Spanish word for *arnes de mano*, came from the costume of a theatrical play called *komedyas*, which the Spanish instituted in order to indoctrinate the natives into the colonial socioreligious views. The natives, however, used the play "as a mechanism through which to practice their martial arts under the guise of harmless entertainment."<sup>104</sup> Inscribed in the term *arnis* is the clandestine autonomous space of the Filipino people in which their traditional cultural practice, entwined with the system of popular defense, was sustained within the institution of colonial indoctrination. The term *escrima* (fencing, in Spanish), on the other hand, reflects the Filipino people's appropriation of the

Spanish rapier and dagger system, through which their stick fighting system underwent the process of refinement. In a clandestinely countercultural milieu, *arnis/escrima* thus evolved as an aesthetic as well as practical expression of the decolonization struggle: "Because the Spaniards' swords were sharp and readily cut through the Filipinos' wooden weapons, many strikes to nerve centers along the body and limbs were mastered, allowing Kalista to disarm and disable his opponent with one stroke."<sup>105</sup> As Lee shifts from *arnis* to the last weapon, *nunchaku*, showcased in the underground battle scenes, the historicity of decolonization inscribed in the weaponry and choreography begins to unravel in the kinetic narrative.

With Bruce's brush strokes, these weapons circumscribe a symbolic space in contradistinction with the official mode of the "Orientalist" aesthetics (e.g., manufactured image of "ninja," "samurai," "karate"). Lee uses the official mode as a stage upon which this alternative aesthetic mode can be performed. Through the weapons and choreography charged with historical significance, Lee facilitates the forum in the symbolic realm where historicity of various systems of self-defense in Asia can converge (which he had already begun constructing with real practitioners in *Game of Death*). The commonality that unites Asian popular defense in the symbolic space, in turn, delineates the autonomy of the Asian people that is nurtured in an everyday form of the decolonization struggle, hidden from the gaze of the imperialist and transnational power.

Furthermore, the fact that such symbolic articulation of pan-Asianism is based on the collective labor of Lee and the Hong Kong stuntmen adds yet another dimension to the symbolic configuration of autonomy. Under Bruce Lee's strict supervision, each battle scene required ten to fifteen takes.<sup>106</sup> Such a tedious process would demand Lee and the stuntmen have not only stamina, concentration, and patience but would also require a sense of camaraderie and solidarity. The articulation of symbolic martial narrative therefore rested upon the labor-intensive process of a collective artistic expression. The same collective energy that lent itself to the resistance in the production process is in this case channeled into the enhancement of the representative expression of kung fu culture. Thus through the intensive collective artistic labor, the autonomous space of kung fu cultural ethos within the transnational realm is actualized both in the aesthetic realm and in the production process.

As one may reasonably suspect, however, such a "deep" layer of meaning behind the fighting scenes isn't readily decipherable. Yet, it is precisely due to the covertness of the kinetic articulation (similar to the development of *arnis* and *tou-di*) that Lee and the stuntmen's performance could take its full effect on the unconscious of the film, and eventually the audience. The resistance to

the official structure of *Enter the Dragon* and its coterminous creation of autonomous space by the representative of the kung fu cultural revolution, accordingly, calls for an alternative dimension in allegory.

ALLEGORY OF POWER AND SUBVERSION  
IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION

There are two tangential lines of allegory in *Enter the Dragon* that are derived from the contradiction between transnational venture and kung fu culture in the constitution of the film. The official allegory, or the “allegory of power,” is the ultimate expression of the strategic paradigm of globalization, congealed in the production design, guidelines, and editorial policy of the film. I will demonstrate shortly how the official allegory entails an aesthetic manifestation of the strategic paradigm of “structural adjustment” and “low-intensity warfare.” The allegory alternative to the official one, which I call the “allegory of subversion,” was brought into existence by the resistance of those representing the kung fu cultural revolution of Hong Kong (Bruce Lee and the Hong Kong sweatshop workers). The allegory of subversion may contain some elements of a new paradigm that transcends the limitations imposed by the latest phase of capitalism.

Both lines of allegory owe their genesis to the homology of the production process and the narrative structure, or that of the spheres of the real and fantasy. Specifically, the homology of the principal participants and the principal narrative categories is what charges each allegory with persuasive power. By putting this homology into effect, the relationship between the participants in the making of the film can be recast into the mold of a narrative structure (see figure 4.4).

The antagonist in this real-life drama—the equivalent to Han in the film—is the semi-autarkic Shaw Brothers, the indigenous film industry whose virtual monopoly over the industry had raised a thick wall against the penetration of transnational capital into the Hong Kong film industry. One of the institutional protagonists—the equivalent of the Shaolin temple in the film—is Raymond Chow’s Golden Harvest, which was eager to open its business to a transnational production in order to thwart Shaw Brothers’ virtual monopoly. Just as an agent of the transnational power (Braithwait) makes contact with the Shaolin temple for a joint operation to undermine Han’s operation in the film, another institutional protagonist in real-life drama, Warner Brothers, dispatched its agent to Golden Harvest for the overthrow of Shaw’s kingdom. Finally, in an almost identical manner to the recruitment of “Lee” as the car-




FIGURE 4.4. Power dynamics in the production of *Enter the Dragon*.

rier of the mission, Bruce Lee was selected as the real protagonist for the Golden Harvest and Warner Brothers' joint venture, thereby serving as a mediating point between Hong Kong's then-emerging firm and the transnational media corporation. Since this real-life drama is a direct outcome of a strategic paradigm of transnational capitalism, its allegorical ramifications could extend to the geopolitical configuration as the ultimate horizon of globalization.

Han's allegorical allusion to the neocolonial dictatorship now attains three-dimensionality due to his symbolic correspondence to Run Run Shaw. In contrast to the two-dimensional representation of the Third World in *Dr. No*, the three-dimensionality of *Enter the Dragon* opens up a greater access to the logic and rationale underlining the geopolitical strategy of the imperialist-transnational bloc. From the perspective of transnational corporations like Warner Brothers, the indigenous industry (such as Shaw Brothers) posed rigidity as it could put limitation on the transnational expropriation of the Hong Kong labor and resources. The problematic existence of the despotic autarky of Shaw Brothers, translated in the arena of international politics, would be perhaps what the imperialist-transnational bloc saw in the neocolonial dictatorship.



Particularly toward the end of the 1970s, it became apparent that the authoritarian regimes that the imperialist bloc had vigorously installed in the neocolonies turned obsolete. One of the most catastrophic effects of the rigidity for the hegemonic bloc was the overthrow of the neocolonial regimes in Iran and Nicaragua by popular power. In those cases, the rigidity of the neocolonial dictatorship had paradoxically stimulated a lavish growth of mass-based dissidents throughout the 1970s. To make matters worse for the imperialist-transnational bloc, the spirit of Iran-Nicaragua was equally alive in other neocolonial zones, from El Salvador to the Philippines. Thus the authoritarian dictatorship was to be replaced by an alternative mode of neocolonial governance far more responsive to a precarious condition of global contradiction.

Since the early 1980s, transnational capital (in conjunction with the U.S. military as the global police force) has launched its counteroffensives by replacing authoritarian rules with regimes elected by the pseudodemocratic process most assiduously pursued in Central and Latin America.<sup>107</sup> Even the veneer of democracy has been strictly confined to electoral participation, which could be easily manipulated by the powers that be.<sup>108</sup> Such a limited arena of democratization is predicated upon the demolition of civil society with violence and terror—the so-called low-intensity conflict—which clearly aimed at annihilating the base of truly democratic social change.<sup>109</sup> Thus the term “low intensity democracy,” coined by Barry Gills et al., quite accurately recapitulates the core aspect of this new mode of governance.<sup>110</sup> Along the line of post-Fordist-Keynesian restructuring, the imperialist-transnational bloc has sought to deconstruct the authoritarian regimes for a much more efficient power apparatus. The drastic reductions in overhead and personnel were pursued for the centralization of the command structure of the state, which has transformed itself into a security apparatus for the transnational capital run by local technocrats and military personnel.

The IMF and the World Bank, established in conjunction with the Marshall Plan, have emerged as the headquarters for the collective interest of transnational capital, particularly since they set out the post-Fordist-Keynesian restructuring on a planetary scale in the early 1970s. Through the so-called debt crisis, the IMF-World Bank has been instrumental in eradicating the autonomy of Third World states. As a condition for loans and for the payment of interest, the IMF-World Bank has imposed the structural adjustment program, which is designed to subordinate the power of the state to a mandate of transnational capital. It forces the state to radically reduce public spending, do away with nationalized industries, and to remove all the legal barriers to foreign investment. In other words, through the structural adjust-

ment program, the IMF-World Bank facilitates transnational capital's access to the neocolony for sweatshop labor, unlimited extraction of natural resources, and unheeded destruction of human health, environment, and the ecosystem.

The "low intensity" democratic regime, which is predominantly run by the transnationally trained technocrats, constitutes an expedient governing body for the structural adjustment program, in contrast to the neocolonial despotism whose power base rested on the national sovereignty or autonomy of the state. Furthermore, the IMF-World Bank's economic warfare has been reinforced by a myriad of multilateral institutions and transnational treaties such as the WTO, the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), the more regionally focused NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), and the ADB.

On the political front of the war, the state-sponsored "military-death-squad-assassin complex" has complemented the IMF-World Bank mandate by playing the role of an enforcer whose job it is to "break down political barriers to the further transnationalization of capital."<sup>111</sup> As an alternative to the (Fordist) "assembly line soldiering of the Vietnam War," low-intensity warfare thus emerged, characterized by the combination of "capital-intensive weaponry" and the "slave labor soldiering" of "cheap Third World mercenaries."<sup>112</sup> In the current regime of armed globalization, the mercenaries (i.e., the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan and post-Sadam Hussein Iraqi security forces) are institutionalized and are fully integrated into the occupational forces that have been increasingly transnationalized as in the UN peacekeeping force and the "coalition forces." The national sovereignty of the Third World has thus come to be incarcerated by the global police force that readily deploys the power of destruction to liquidate political barriers.

The martial aspect of the strategic paradigm of globalization is proficiently captured by the "allegory of power" discerned in *Enter the Dragon*. The construction of the mission in the film's narrative, in which "Lee" overthrows Han's regime, gives a poetic account of the low-intensity warfare conducted by the "mercenary-assassin-death-squad complex." Such a symbolic link is also found in an artificial boundary created between "Lee" and the Shaolin temple—artificial in the sense that even though "Lee" is part of the Shaolin temple, his mission doesn't represent the institution for the strategic purpose of the operation. The artificial boundary corresponds to the nature of the relationship between the "mercenary-assassin-death-squad complex" and the low intensity democratic regime sponsored by the imperialist-transnational bloc. Furthermore, the last scene in which the military forces of the "undefined foreign power" arrive after the actual overthrow of Han's regime alludes to the

multinational military intervention facilitated by the global police force and the United Nations. This scene relates to the critical function of the so-called UN Peace Keeping Force in overseeing the transition from the authoritarian to the low intensity democratic regime, preventing the emergence of other possibilities (see figure 4.5).

At first glance, there seems little correspondence between the Shaolin temple and the low intensity democratic regime in terms of allegory, in contrast to other stronger associations, for instance, between Han and authoritarian regimes or undefined foreign power and the IMF-World Bank. However, the symbolic relationship that binds them can be made visible by the homology of the production and the narrative structure of the film. The Shaolin temple in the film's narrative, as mentioned earlier, is a structural equivalent of Golden Harvest in the realm of production—which Warner Brothers hoped to install in Hong Kong as its collaborating partner with the overthrow of Shaw Brothers' monopoly. Most significantly, the Shaolin temple in the film has less to do with the real Shaolin temple than with the simulacrum of Hollywood "Orientalism." What symbolically binds the simulation of Shaolin




FIGURE 4.5. Allegory of power in *Enter the Dragon*.

temple, Golden Harvest, and the low intensity democratic regime is thus more ontological than visual or discursive. Their commonality lies in their debt to the transnational power for their existence, they are not only supported but also reinvented by it.<sup>113</sup>

The more closely the official narrative of *Enter the Dragon* approximates the strategic paradigm of the “structural adjustment,” the more vigor and power the instances of resistance in the production process impose upon the allegory of subversion. Lee and the Hong Kong sweatshop workers’ struggle against transnational management—both in the production process and the realm of representation—created a chasm in the harmonious relationship between the official narrative and the normative production arrangement. Out of such a chasm a new homology was created between the instances of resistance and the autonomous narrative alternative to the official one. I will retrace the formation of autonomous narrative from the fissure created in the normative relationship in the production.

The core components of the autonomous narrative are direct offshoots of the formative process of resistance. Instead of being a mediator between Golden Harvest and Hollywood, Lee chose to stay with the Hong Kong sweatshop workers in solidarity against the background of highly exploitative—both in terms of conventional and image economics—nature of the transnational venture. Now projected onto the narrative domain of the film, this real-life narrative—which I call the narrative of “solidarity and autonomy”—affects the character system of “Lee.” It weakens his assigned role as an agent of the joint scheme by the “undefined foreign power” and the Shaolin temple. On the level of official allegory, such weakening of official signification creates an aberration, something akin in real life to the “defection” of an agent of the “mercenary-assassin-death-squad complex” for a revolutionary cause. The defection within the framework of the film highlights the sphere of autonomy submerged in the official structure of the film, which facilitates the alternative reading of the film against the grain of the official structure. The clandestine existence of the autonomous narrative in the film could then allude to the possibility of the political space, outside the low intensity democratic regime and the strategic paradigm (see figure 4.6).

The autonomous space of solidarity that Lee and the Hong Kong sweatshop workers created was by no means institutionalized but of a temporary nature built upon the web of resistance. Yet, as we recall, given the lack of institutional representation of workers’ interest in the Hong Kong film industry at that time, this space constituted a grassroots type of democratic body. Earlier, I compared the culture of kung fu with that of cricket in West Indian society in terms of its powerful decolonizing potential for the masses. At the




FIGURE 4.6. Allegory of subversion in *Enter the Dragon*.

root of their commonality, there seems to be a foundation of popular democracy. Lee's relationships with the Hong Kong sweatshop workers, and with the masses that are part of kung fu culture, are quite similar to the organic existence of the popular democratic body that C. L. R James saw in the relationship between cricket players and the West Indian masses:

The batsman facing the ball does not merely represent his side. For that moment, to all intents and purposes, he is his side. This fundamental relation of the One and the Many, Individual and Social, Individual and Universal, leader and followers, representative and ranks, the part and the whole, is structurally imposed on the players of cricket.<sup>114</sup>

The space of “autonomy and solidarity,” transposed onto the allegorical level, alludes to a new type of democratic body or people's self-organization in the process of making, which is not decodable through any conventional categories of institutional democracy. At about the same time *Enter the Dragon* had come to trickle down to Third World theaters, the capitals of the Third World were

beginning to be overtaken by the mass movement against the IMF-World Bank's strategic paradigm. Launched in Lima, Peru, in 1976, the popular protests against the IMF and the World Bank ran rampantly across the neocolonial zone from Egypt, Turkey, Argentina, the Philippines, Brazil, and Jamaica to Poland, growing much more fiercely and extensively throughout the 1980s.<sup>115</sup>

These popular protests are a direct collective expression of the masses whose lives have been gravely endangered by massive lay-offs, wage freezes, and steep rises in the price of basic commodities and the general cost of living—all due to the structural adjustment program of the IMF-World Bank.<sup>116</sup> The resistance involved the classic bread riots engaged in looting, direct actions at governmental institutions and symbols of wealth, general strikes (particularly in Latin America), and political demonstrations.<sup>117</sup> The main participants of the protests were drawn from the urban and suburban working class, the unemployed slum dwellers, the community/church organizers, and the students.<sup>118</sup> The unity and solidarity forged among diverse groups of the oppressed in their organizing effort might contain a blueprint for democratic self-organization in lieu of the low intensity democratic regime or other type of institutional democracy. The wave of protests, after a substantial human sacrifice was made, had forced the respective neocolonial government to curb or halt austerity measures (in Turkey, for instance, two thousand people were killed in clashes between the military-police force and protesters).<sup>119</sup> Although the global enforcement complex may temporarily crash the autonomous space with heavily armed forces, it reappears “elsewhere/elsewhere” spontaneously in different forms as the global contradiction of the transnational capitalism aggravates further.<sup>120</sup>

#### THE APPARITION OF “BRUCE LEE” IN THE LACANDONA JUNGLE

This last point leads us back to the merger of social and cosmic subjectivity or the forces of Nature that catapult the resistance to the transnational factory, as the ultimate Other of transnational capital. Precisely because the subversion of Bruce Lee and the Hong Kong workers stayed within the purview of kung fu culture (whether real-life kung fu or kung fu aesthetics) they were able to undermine the institution of neocolonialism and transnational capitalism effectively in the realm of representation, while prefiguring the type of subjectivity not yet prevalent in the social field. To be sure, the Hong Kong sweatshop workers were experiencing unscrupulous exploitation and degradation by the transnational management. To be sure, their common basis of culture was being transformed into a plastic global commodity at the factory. Moreover, there are other economic, social, and cultural incentives that encouraged Lee

and the Hong Kong workers to engage in resistance, symbolically or otherwise. Nonetheless, it was the art and spontaneity of kung fu, without preparation, without premeditated schemes, that sublimated their resistance to something immortal and paradigmatic. Lee himself expounds on the significance of spontaneous action “of which nature (Tao) [is] the great practitioner,” by contrasting with “action taken with design, premeditated or directed to chosen ends” that becomes “unreal.”<sup>121</sup>

The sociocosmic subjectivity, representing the voice of the ultimate Other of transnational capital, manifested its part of the contour in the formation of protests against the IMF-World Bank's strategic paradigm. And it seems to have found its home in the uprising of the EZLN in 1994. The Zapatistas, an indigenous subversion against global capitalism, self-consciously embrace such a new mode of subjectivity. As Subcommandante Marcos analyzes, in the constitutional process of Zapatistas, the conventional vanguardism or Marxist-Leninist modes of organization “were confronted by an ideological tradition that is, how can I say this, somewhat magical . . . in one sense, but very real in another.”<sup>122</sup> The Zapatistas' uncompromising practice of direct democracy is intricately interlaced with their embracing of Nature as part of their subjectivity, as Subcommandante Marcos again relates in the story of old *campesinos* (peasantry):

The oldest of the old in the Indigenous community say that there once was a man named Zapata who rose up with his people and sung out, “Land and Freedom!” . . . These old *campesinos* also say that the wind and the rain and the sun tell the *campesinos* when to cultivate the land, when to plant and when to harvest. They say that hope is also planted and harvested. They also say that the wind and the rain and the sun are now saying something different: that with so much poverty, the time has come to harvest rebellion instead of death.<sup>123</sup>

There is, however, a significant gap between the allegory of sociocosmic subjectivity in *Enter the Dragon* and that of the indigenous revolution of the EZLN—inasmuch as the latter is reflective of a new mode of subjectivity articulated in a much more mature stage of the popular cultural revolution. Thanks, ironically, to the ever-expansive reach of globalization, popular cultures of diverse origins begin to interact, and in some cases, to fuse with each other.

To bridge such a gap and to introduce the following, concluding chapter, it is noteworthy to relate to the Zapatista insurgent named Brusli, who seems to embody the mobile subjectivity that borders on the material and spiritual, society and nature, individual and collective:

In March of 1996, in a meeting with EZLN leadership, an insurgent called Brusli (or Bruce Lee) clearly explained what the Zapatistas expected from the people invited to the consultations. He recounted the history of insurgents who had been preparing to fight for many years to ensure never to wound a comrade. In the same way, he said those who are going to fight with the “weapons of intelligence” must be very careful not to hurt a comrade.<sup>124</sup>

As if it were a ghost or spirit, the name can impose a haunting affect on one’s consciousness, particularly when such a name involves revolutionary connotations. By naming the indigenous social movement after Emiliano Zapata, the Zapatistas were able to conceive a new space of collective identity. The name links the singularity of the movement with the totality of the historic forces of *campesinos* and the people’s power in Mexico, while it is also rendered a symbol of their distinct indigenous identity. Zapatistas are both singular and collective, indigenous and national (and global, as we discuss later), and involves material and spiritual forces without contradiction. In a similar vein, the name of an insurgent, Brusli, introduces the revolutionary force of the popular culture perceived by the masses into the depth of the Lacandona Jungle. Remarkably, the insurgent Brusli himself insists on esprit de corps of the revolutionary forces, instead of the individual heroism which the name tends to be associated with. The singularity of Bruce Lee takes on a collective dimension in the movement, mediated by the insurgent. Due to what the name represents, “Brusli” pertains to both a singular and collective identity. The collective desire and aspiration for decolonization and freedom, represented by a name among the oppressed, therefore overflows the boundaries demarcated by time, space, and identity. The most progressive element of the kung fu cultural revolution and real-life revolutionary struggles thus ceases to be separate from each other.

Such a new mode of subjectivity was conceived in Lee’s unfinished last film, *Game of Death*, which—as the title suggests—has indeed haunted the various boundaries. It is only when the kung fu cultural revolution and hip hop culture came to interface that the meaning of the film began to unfurl.



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## CHAPTER FIVE

### *GAME OF DEATH* AND HIP HOP AESTHETICS

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#### GLOBALIZATION OF POPULAR CULTURAL REVOLUTION

People need to see this all from our eyes, from the right perspective. Too many of us let someone else have control of what we should have control of. Expression of self.

—VULCAN

In 1978, Golden Harvest and Warner Brothers released *Game of Death*, which exploited Lee's image in a patchwork fashion, using the climactic fighting scenes Lee shot for the film as well as his images from previous films. As if it were an act of plagiarism, Lee's image was sometimes crudely superimposed upon the body of the actor who played the double. With the absence of Lee and the script he wrote, the film fell into the category of Bruce Lee imitation films. Despite all of its shortcomings, however, the footage of Lee, in his sporty track suit and Assics-brand shoes battling a seven-foot-tall Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, was a sensation unprecedented in the genre of kung fu film, and became a profound source of inspiration for the hip hop generation. As we will explore in-depth in this chapter, Lee's *Jeet Kune Do* and transcultural orientation explored in *Game of Death*, which was salvaged in a reconstructed version in *Bruce Lee: A Warrior's Journey* (2001), share a comparable aesthetic principle with the constitution of hip hop culture. The interaction of *Game of Death* with hip hop culture would help define one of the latest instances of popular cultural revolution as well as its aesthetic link to the decolonizing subjectivity in the latest stage of globalization.

THE AFTERLIFE OF BRUCE LEE AND THE  
“DEATH GAME” IN LOS ANGELES

The year of *Game of Death's* release signaled a drastic transformation for the city of Los Angeles. Proposition 13 was passed in 1978 as a result of an organized takeover of public policy by the suburbanites whose discontent with increased taxes and space density coalesced with their disdain for social spending. According to Mike Davis: “In rousing their neighbors, tax protesters frequently resorted to the inflammatory image of the family homestead taxed to extinction in order to finance the integration of public education and other social programs obnoxious to white suburbanites.”<sup>1</sup> Once put into practice as an austerity policy program, Proposition 13 adversely affected the inner city neighborhood. Particularly it constituted an assault on the at risk youth, by depriving them of opportunities for education, vocational trainings, and jobs. Proposition 13 thus offered ghetto youth little alternative except to join a gang and engage in the illegitimate economy that oftentimes involves narcotics trade.<sup>2</sup>

The passage of Proposition 13 coincided with the appointment of Darryl Gates as chief of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD, hereafter), who represented the other side of the same paradigm. The *raison d'être* of Gates hinged on the contradiction between the rising tide of people's power of the 1960s and the policing concept based on the Pax-Americana hegemonic model of his predecessor and mentor, William Parker.<sup>3</sup> The contradiction exploded during the Watts riot in 1965, which in turn formed the foundation for Gates's policing concept.<sup>4</sup> Gates militarized Parker's notion of “proactive policing” whereby policing entered a symbiotic relationship with the U.S. military strategic paradigm from the Vietnam War to the Gulf War. It also prefigured the concept of preemptive strike deployed in the “War on Terror.” Indeed, Gates compared policing L.A. with the war situation where “the Marine Corps invade an area that is still having little pockets of resistance.”<sup>5</sup>

Such drastic policy shifts were also synchronized with the globalization of L.A.'s economy. Faced with the onslaught of Japanese imports, L.A.'s manufacturing sector was compelled to undergo restructuring. The factories thus relocated to the industrial parks in adjacent counties (San Bernadino, Riverside, and Orange counties) and utilized the immigrant Latino labor, which displaced the Black male working class and erased their “ephemeral gains won between 1965 and 1975.”<sup>6</sup>

Thus, Proposition 13 and the appointment of Darryl Gates as LAPD chief, signified the advent of the strategic paradigm of the IMF-World Bank in L.A., with the L.A. version of “structural adjustment” and “low intensity

warfare” without the presence of the IMF or World Bank.<sup>7</sup> The wave of protest against the IMF-World Bank that swept Third World cities from the latter 1970s throughout 1980s finally reached the Southern California shore in 1992. Instigated by the acquittal of White police officers involved in the beating of Rodney King and also by the murder of Latasha Harlins by a Korean shopkeeper, the composition of the L.A. riot seemed very complex. Stemmed from the social rage evoked by the police brutality intertwined with racism, which had been exacerbated by intercommunity conflict, the L.A. riot was no longer decipherable from the conventional categories of “race riot” or “class riot.”<sup>8</sup> With the absence of the IMF and the World Bank in its physical existence as well as in the consciousness of the people of L.A., the riot can be seen as the coalescence of L.A. masses’ discontent expressed at the symptoms of globalization rather than at the institutions of globalization.

A year after the L.A. riot, Universal released a cinema biography of Bruce Lee entitled *Dragon: The Bruce Lee Story* (1993), directed by Rob Cohen, featuring a Chinese-Hawaiian actor, Jason Scott Lee. Timed with Bruce Lee’s inclusion into the “Walk of Fame” on Hollywood Boulevard and also with the twentieth commemoration of Lee’s passing, *Dragon* focused primarily on the narrative of Lee’s struggle and success as an Asian American actor. What was absent in this sophisticated version of Lee’s simulacrum is the revolutionary spirit of Bruce Lee that embodied a new conceptual cultural paradigm. The gap of consciousness was apparent between that of Hollywood’s representation of Lee’s legacy and of the totality of Lee’s artistic expression and philosophy.

The gap also existed between the latter and the L.A. ghetto youth culture even though it was L.A. that offered Lee an environment to develop *Jeet Kune Do*. Although Lee’s legacy had a direct relevance to the hip hop aesthetics, the L.A. ghetto youth were hooked onto narcissistic materialism and self-destructive nihilism articulated through the media of hip hop aesthetics called “gangsta rap.” The genre of gangsta rap was defined by *Straight Outta Compton* released in 1988 by N.W.A., composed of Ice Cube, Dr. Dre, Easy-E, MC Ren, and DJ Yella. In the album *Straight Outta Compton* as well as N.W.A. as an institution, the social reality of south-central L.A. sits upon a tenuous balance between delusion and allusion, or upon a crisis in the representation.

Since the late 1980s, ghetto youth have been under intensified attack by LAPD’s Operation Hammer backed by the legislation to criminalize the entire existence of the L.A. ghetto.<sup>9</sup> In the aftermath, Crips, Bloods and other gangs continued to maintain a truce they reached three days before the Rodney King verdict.<sup>10</sup> And the ghetto community concurrently worked for reconstruction with the help from community and national organizations (i.e.,

NAACP and Nation of Islam). Nonetheless, LAPD's renewed war on the gangs and the community, fortified by the state's commitment to combat "gang violence," escalated the criminalization of the ghetto community as a whole.<sup>11</sup> The increased production of "criminality," in turn, feeds the machinery comprised of security, law enforcement, military, and the prison industrial complex. Behind this machinery stands the formidable forces propelled by fascistic desire of suburban constituencies that place politicians who are "tough on crime" in the positions of power, endorsing the permanent war against the have-nots. The contradiction of the IMF-World Bank paradigm in L.A., which manifested as the war between the establishment and the ghetto fueled by the narcotic economy, formed the basis for the rise of gangsta rap in the popular aesthetic sphere.

The menacing beats with chest-pressing heavy bass, ominous sound frills, and the in-your-face delivery of rap in personal narratives in *Straight Outta Compton* vividly captured the ever-growing tension in the ghetto of pre-riot L.A. Most significantly, the tune, "Fuck Tha Police" circumscribed the common identity of the people of the L.A. ghetto as victims of the brutal state power, whose experiences transcended the barriers between gangs and communities. The affective element of the song prefigured the euphoria and optimism of the gang truce in the aftermath of the riot. However, contrary to cohesiveness of the gang and hip hop organizational structure, N.W.A. was an assemblage of materialistic individualists (who "don't give a fuck"), which explains its virtual dissolution after its landmark album.<sup>12</sup>

N.W.A.'s ideology of self-negating racism, misogyny, and crude materialism was partly derived from a "response" to the "call" from the East Coast, the birthplace of hip hop. N.W.A.'s response, in turn, defined a distinct West Coast identity. As we will examine shortly, the East Coast hip hop nation emerged as an alternative to gang violence and evolved in the direction of social consciousness. Public Enemy's *It Takes a Nation of Millions to Hold Us Back*, released in the same year as N.W.A.'s landmark album, espoused a message of a renewed decolonizing nationalism in the post-industrial social context. N.W.A.'s negativity as a response was, therefore, based on a regressive dialectic to the decolonizing nationalism and social consciousness of the East Coast, which in turn furnished their expressions with an appearance of "badness" and "illness," traits highly valued in the hip hop cultural scene. Ronin Ro breaks it down:

Just as hip-hop's more positive acts were trying to steer the audience into nationalism, unity and political awareness, NWA's nihilism was set to more appealing music. The "positive" acts were viewed as anachronisms

by a hyperprogressive audience and discarded while the one-dimensional gangstas signed six-figure album deals and dragged hip-hop away from its roots.<sup>13</sup>

Yet when it is targeted at the institution of power (as in “Fuck the Police”), N.W.A.’s regression made their lyrical protest as raw and uncontrollable as a slave revolt in the aesthetic realm, which put the FBI on alert to N.W.A. as a potential threat to the “national security.”<sup>14</sup> The subsequent releases of other anti-police oppression themes in gangsta rap all met with counterattacks orchestrated by the law enforcement establishment. Take for instance, “Cop Killer” (1992) produced by Ice T with the heavy metal band Body Count, which reflected a growing social consciousness in the aftermath of the L.A. riot. Under pressure from the law enforcement establishment (also involving both President Bush and Vice President Quayle), Time-Warner virtually forced Ice T to retract his track.<sup>15</sup> Rap’s confrontation with law enforcement in the aesthetic sphere can politicize the daily life experienced by the oppressed. It can generate a rallying point that could potentially raise the level of confrontation to a higher level, as was the case in Paris’s “Bush Killa” (1992), which the artist himself distributed independently after Time-Warner boycotted its distribution. The burgeoning political consciousness of gangsta rap was thus suppressed and incarcerated, which in turn left gangsta rap spiraling into nihilism and self-destruction.

The depoliticization of gangsta rap led to a further commercialization into visual media, churning music video and films that glorified the image of gangsters into “folk heroes.”<sup>16</sup> Consequently, the imagery of gangsta rap has become mere stereotypes, according to Cheryl L. Keyes, “that play into the racist, misogynist agenda of white supremacy.”<sup>17</sup> The corporate packaging of gangsta rap, accordingly, has found consumers and imitators among the White suburbanite youth and the fashion-conscious youth in Japan.<sup>18</sup> In the meantime, ghetto youth are jeopardized on multiple fronts by the increasing Black-on-Black murders (naturalized by gangsta rap),<sup>19</sup> the law enforcement’s war on the ghetto, increased incarceration,<sup>20</sup> and the legal streamlining of “convicts” into death row. This systematic siege of ghetto takes place against the background of the growing privatization cum industrialization of the prison system. If the entire phenomenon of gangsta rap can be put into perspective, there emerges a paradigm that is cacophonous yet in perfect pitch with the beat of the “death game,” laid down by the globalization regime thriving on permanent war.<sup>21</sup> Both represent a dead end paradigm mired in the plethora of destruction. In this context, Bruce Lee’s *Game of Death* helps to articulate the alternative to the “death” paradigm that is integral to the constitution of the hip hop aesthetics: Lee’s

kinetic philosophy of liberation, for instance, shares hip hop's aesthetic sublimation of violence, which is exemplified by the pioneers such as Afrika Bambaata who "asserted his concept of youth solidarity by rechanneling violent competition into artistic contests."<sup>22</sup>

#### THE LEGACY OF BRUCE LEE IN THE HIP HOP NATION

If there's any conscious attempt made to contest Hollywood's packaging of Bruce Lee's legacy in *Dragon*, it was done so by Beastie Boys, forerunners in treating Bruce Lee's art as a progressive foundational concept of the hip hop aesthetics. Organized by three punk rockers from New York City, Beastie Boys became an integral part of the hip hop nation when they joined a strident independent label called Def Jam that held Run DMC, Public Enemy, LL Cool J, and others under its wing. The uniqueness of Def Jam was its trans-genre orientation, particularly its fusion of rock, with hip hop's African-based beat. The existence of Beastie Boys under Def Jam embodied the trans-cultural, trans-ethnic tendency of hip hop culture that had been well under way in the writers' (graffitti) scene.<sup>23</sup>

Simultaneous with *Dragon*'s release, Beastie Boys made a unique intervention in the popular culture by publishing an irregular, yet widely distributed magazine called *Grand Royal* (1993–1997). Much like proliferating "zine culture" in the 1990s, *Grand Royal* marked a self-reflective turn in the popular culture, whereby the artists themselves would engage in the production of critical discourse vernacular to the realm of popular culture. At its most effective state, the magazine's use of underground lingua, styles, and other aesthetic codes materialized a discursive guerrilla "tagging" on the surface of the global commodity circuit. As a counterstatement to Hollywood's representation of Lee, the magazine chose Bruce Lee for the main feature of its very first issue. It proudly proclaimed the retention of Lee's legacy from the hip hop cultural perspective: "Bruce Lee is on the cover because Bruce Lee is dope."<sup>24</sup>

Bob Mack, one of Beastie Boys' close associates, located the "dope-ness" or conceptual depth of Lee in his "style" with no style, *Jeet Kune Do*. By tuning in to the key concept of *Jeet Kune Do*, Mack could match its "beat" with the hip hop cultural paradigm, where both blend into each other in a discursive groove:

Bruce dissected rigid classical disciplines and rebuilt them with fluid, pop-movements. . . . Classical techniques did not take into account the reality of street fighting. Jeet Kune Do did. It was pragmatic, reality-based, empirical—not a bunch of stances, postures and mumbo jumbo

handed down from antiquity. Bruce utilized all ways but was bound by none. "Efficiency is anything that scores." . . . As it happens, Bruce's outlook was remarkably similar to that of modern day rap artists: "I don't care where it comes from," he would insist. "If it is usable, it belongs to no one; it's yours."<sup>25</sup>

In comparing Mack's description of *Jeet Kune Do* with the following description of the constitutional aspect of hip hop aesthetics by Neil Strauss, the commonality between *Jeet Kune Do* and hip hop may begin to appear more distinctly:

From the beginning of hip hop's development, before there was even a word to describe it, hip hop was about looking for the perfect break and juggling it back and forth on two turntables. . . . And that perfect break could come from anywhere: Funk, Bebop, Classical, or Rock—any musician able to strike a groove for just a bar or two. . . . It is a music made up of bits and pieces of preexisting sounds—looped, collaged, and layered until they take a new identity.<sup>26</sup>

In both *Jeet Kune Do* and hip hop culture, creativity arises from the autonomy of self-expression. Accordingly, the quality of a work of art is gauged by the uniqueness of individual expressions that transcend the institutional boundaries. Hip hop comes from funk, rock, r&b, or reggae, but it's free from any genre boundaries. So is *Jeet Kune Do*: it incorporates different styles into an open-ended system that is not institutionalized by any styles. However, both hip hop and *Jeet Kune Do* are not a postmodern bricolage of cultural multiplicity with weak or no foundation. The flourishing individual expressions in hip hop and *Jeet Kune Do* are well embedded in the cultural foundations and historical legacies: the African culture for hip hop and the Chinese culture for *Jeet Kune Do*.

In the late 1990s, the hip hop nation saw the possibility of a new direction with the phenomenal success of Lauryn Hill's *Miseducation of Lauryn Hill* (1998). The subjectification of womanhood (as opposed to the objectification of women by gangsta rap) and the autonomous selfhood articulated by Hill (shared by other artists like Erykah Badu) offered a way out of the nihilism and "death game" of gangsta rap. *Vibe* magazine's special issue on Lauryn Hill, incidentally, included an article on Bruce Lee by Jeff Yang that attempts to "reset" hip hop to its conceptual foundation:

In inventing Jeet Kune Do, [Lee] took the lean and lethal kung fu style known as Wing Chun and stripped down to the primal beats. . . . Because



the art of Jeet Kune Do was motivated by practicality, it evolved like hip hop: It began in the old school—sparse, freestyle, with nothing separating the master from the rhythm. And then, only after locking down the basics, did Lee start sampling the best of what other disciplines had to offer, biting on world flavors like Muay Thai, Jiu Jitsu, and Tae Kwon Do. Even toward the end of his days, Lee was still remixing.<sup>27</sup>

In Yang's discursive beat, *Jeet Kune Do* and hip hop are locked into a conceptual groove, in perfect mix, no longer confined to a mere metaphorical relationship. Among all the existing imagery of Bruce Lee that might have inspired Yang's *Jeet Kune Do* remix of hip hop and vice versa, it must be the one with Lee and Kareem Abdul-Jabbar in *Game of Death*. Unlike other images of Lee, this particular one evokes a sense of "groove" in which the masters of kung fu and basketball engage in a freestyle battle. The image of Lee and Abdul-Jabbar was formerly registered in the corpus of hip hop aesthetics when Beastie Boys featured it as cover art of the first issue of their *Grand Royal* magazine. The instinct of the hip hop nation to find conceptual depth in *Game of Death* was confirmed by the release of *Bruce Lee: A Warrior's Journey* (2001), directed by John Little (who has been in charge of the posthumous production of Lee's works on behalf of his estate), which retained the surviving footage with the original script. In this reconstructed version of *Game of Death*, one can trace the emanation of the realization of freedom in the aesthetic realm with the trans-popular cultural orientation that is destined to flourish in the hip hop culture. In order to delineate the affinity of *Game of Death* with the constitutional aspects of hip hop, the totality of hip hop aesthetics needs to be retained first, against the tide of corporate manufactured representations of hip hop.

#### BIRTH OF THE HIP HOP NATION

One of the first signs of the corporate intervention and colonization of hip hop culture is the separation of rap from the totality of hip hop, which is composed of DJ-ing, MC-ing (rapping), breaking, and writing (graffiti).<sup>28</sup> The first commercial recording of rap was produced by Sugar Hill Records, a New Jersey-based Black independent label, which assembled three marginal figures of the hip hop scene as Sugar Hill Gang, after having failed to allure the real pioneers in the Bronx.<sup>29</sup> As the frontline hip hop artists (Grandmaster Flash, Whipper Whip, Grandmaster Caz, et al.) witnessed, the first recording of rap called *Rapper's Delight* (1979) by Sugar Hill Gang was a synthetically produced simulacrum of hip hop where borrowed rhymes were laid over a studio

recorded band instrumental track.<sup>30</sup> Since *Rapper's Delight* sold over two million copies worldwide, rap and rap artists became the focal point of commodification. As the development of technology enabled producers to replace DJs, rap came to be assimilated into the mainstream music industry. By 1986, according to Jeff Chang, rap had "eclipsed all other movements" of hip hop.<sup>31</sup>

In order to delve into the constitutional aspects of hip hop, I will put analytical focus on other movements that have been less susceptible to corporate intervention. The art of "graffiti" or "writing,"<sup>32</sup> for instance, may guide us through the totality of hip hop aesthetics, as this art adamantly defies commodification, being always at the frontline of struggle by demarcating the deterritorialized contour of the hip hop nation. Beyond the writers' conscious motivation and intention, their writings create a chasm in the urban spatial configuration wrought by capital/state thereby reopening the common space autonomous from the logic of global capitalist urban planning. Inevitably, therefore, the existence of the writers questions the fundamental jurisdiction of state in defense of such autonomous space as hip hop nation. AKA/TISLAM puts: "It's understood. You breaks [*sic*] the law because the law breaks you."<sup>33</sup> Until the regime of global power that ceaselessly colonizes every space is overthrown, writing will remain, as PINK vehemently declares, an "outlaw art."<sup>34</sup>

### Writing on the Wall

The practice of writing over the surface of one's immediate environment is as ancient as human history. The medium of spray paint, on the other hand, symbolizes a leftover from the era of Fordist mass production. Thus, aerosol writing reconstructed the means of primordial expression and communication in a post-industrial desert. The spontaneous formation of the culture and aesthetic of writing has come to represent the existence of a ghetto marginalized and incarcerated by the forces of post-industrialization and globalization.

Among the many strands of writing culture, the one that ignited the evolution of hip hop aesthetics started in 1967, coinciding with the beginnings of the kung fu cultural revolution. In Philadelphia, defying a heavy-handed police state run by Police Commissioner Frank Rizzo, signature writings like Cornbread and Philadelphia Phil sprouted up in public space.<sup>35</sup> Top Cat, Cornbread's student, moved to 126th Street in Manhattan and launched tagging of "Top Cat 126," which stimulated the growth of a Manhattan writers' scene as Broadway style.<sup>36</sup> Inclusive of prolific female writers such as Barbara 62 and Eva 62, Manhattan writers were the first to "bomb" subway trains (i.e., "saturate [them] abundantly with one's names") along the Broadway line, as



FIGURE 5.1. Graffiti piece on the New York subway train by Cope 2 (ca. 1997) from *Graffiti World: Street Art from Five Continents*.

the United States accelerated its bombing on Vietnam.<sup>37</sup> As spray paint came to replace markers, the signature writing began to evolve significantly, propelled by the pursuit of singularity: “The uniqueness of style and individuality was of utmost importance to a writer’s signature, for it was at one time, the only significant vehicle to represent one’s ‘existence.’”<sup>38</sup>

The most revolutionary stylistic innovation took place in the Bronx during the early 1970s where names painted with artistic complexity and conceptuality transformed themselves into “pieces.” Between 1973 and 1974, the letters began to grow, as if they were given a life of their own. The “soft” (the so-called bubble) letters were thus born (e.g., Comet, Jester, and Phase 2) that extended themselves into a foot, loops, and arrows (e.g., Phase 2) with pitchforks and cracks (e.g., Worm/Riff 170) and with a three-dimensional effect (e.g., Pistol).<sup>39</sup> The soft letters branched out and evolved into mechanical letters laying the foundation for the aesthetic of “wild style” by 1974–1975, during which time monumental masterpieces came to cover the entire car (e.g., Blade, Cliff, Vinnie, the Mighty Whiteys, The 3 Yard Boy, and Tracy 168).<sup>40</sup>

The New York subway system, or what writer Lee Quiñones calls the transportation of “corporate clones,”<sup>41</sup> was thus reappropriated by ghetto youth as a means of communication and aesthetic forum that can be called their own. In this mode of communication, the quest for fame and notoriety is inseparable from the pursuit of singularity of styles and the stylistic innovation. Outmaneuvering the establishment’s gaze, the writers created an autonomous space where they can adapt, elaborate, fuse styles for a dynamic process of innovation and evolution through a spontaneous and anonymous collaboration. The competitiveness expands the sphere of autonomy as the aesthetic dimension of writing transcends the normative mode of communication. By destroying the normative notion of legibility and decipherability, the writing would demand the readers to reinvent their own alternative mode of interpretation:

All one need to do is just study the “illegible” [*sic*] most complex style for a second. If the person who created it doesn’t have an explanation for its composition, how in the world is someone else going to have one? When it arrives “there” it’s in some other Hemisphere. That’s where style can lead to. That’s where one’s mind has got to travel to fathom it, to even get the slightest bit next to it, or try to “touch” it . . .<sup>42</sup>

The alternative to legibility and decipherability lies in the aesthetic sphere where communication rests on affect as a primary communicative medium, particularly when the piece is “more like an object to be absorbed, not to be

comprehended.”<sup>43</sup> It is very similar to the Free Jazz aesthetics that “elected to sacrifice harmonic complexity in exchange for the freedom to evoke certain feeling, and emotions with maximum immediacy.”<sup>44</sup> The affective mode of communication on the street that came to its prominence in the early '70s reflected a paradigm shift in the ghetto youth culture.

Between 1968 and 1973, Bronx gangs (two of the dominant ones being Black youths' Black Spades and Puerto Rican youths' Savage Skulls) had gone through a process of drastic change.<sup>45</sup> After the collapse of politicization of gang organization by the Black Panther Party and Young Lords (a Puerto Rican nationalist organization that grew out of a gang), a subsequent intensification of gang warfare took a dramatic turn when the gang truce dawned on the horizon of the ghetto in 1971. In response to the gang truce meetings that were publicized by the media, the New York Police Department declared war on gangs through its Bronx Youth Gang Task Force, which virtually decimated the gang leadership.<sup>46</sup> The search for an alternative to the warfare, inspired by the 1971 truce, catapulted the gang's aesthetic expression to a new type of movement from the ghetto. As gang members who became the pioneer practitioners of hip hop (e.g., BOM5, DJ Disco Wiz, Lucky Strike, Afrika Bambaataa) attest, writing, the war dance called “rocking,” “burning,” or “jerking” (predecessor of breaking), and the beat from the turntables had already been an integral part of the gang culture prior to the emergence of the hip hop nation.<sup>47</sup> In the place of political organization and in the ruins and despair of gang warfare, ghetto youth chose the cultural revolution in which creativity was unleashed through flourishing aesthetic styles with the militancy of the gang. As the gangs transitioned to the hip hop crew, the proclivity to violence was overtaken by aesthetic and kinetic pleasure along with increasing deterritorialization of the organizational structure.<sup>48</sup>

The generation of gangs and ghetto youth that became the catalyst for the cultural revolution were “the children of [Robert] Moses's grand experiment.”<sup>49</sup> Robert Moses is an equivalent of Daryl Gates in the context of New York in that he personified and made legible the intangible forces of capitalist development of New York City as a global city. An authoritarian urban planner with the position of park commissioner for both city and state from the late 1920s to the mid-1960s, Moses used bulldozers to mold the metropolitan New York and New York City into the privatized network that allows the flow of capital, commodity, and the “public” at its utmost efficiency. Moses's urban planning helped facilitate a metamorphosis of New York's infrastructure into the information based post-Fordist economy. Through colossal constructions of bridges, parkways, expressways, and an international airport, Moses laid the foundations of an inter-suburb network, which transplanted manufacturing and

middle class from city to suburbs. Particularly, in the postwar era up to the end of his career in the mid-1960s, Moses proclaimed a new order in New York's urban planning, according to Marshall Berman:

This new order integrated the whole nation into a unified flow whose obstructions to the flow of traffic, and as junkyards of substandard housing and decaying neighborhoods from which Americans should be given every chance to escape. . . . Nearly all he built after the war was built in a indifferently brutal style, made to overawe and overwhelm . . .<sup>50</sup>

Most brutal of all his projects was the Cross Bronx Express Way (from the late 1940s to the early 1960s) coupled with the Slum Clearance Project, which wiped out the communities, industries, businesses, and social networks of the Bronx consisting mostly of Jews, Italians, Irish, and Blacks.<sup>51</sup> The Public Housing Project merely led to a renewal of slums in which Blacks, Puerto Ricans, and others who were marginalized by de-industrialization would be left in abandonment.<sup>52</sup> The renewal of slums is, in effect, designed to yield a vast pool of low wage labor suitable for sweatshops and service jobs for New York's emerging post-Fordist industry composed of Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate (F.I.R.E., hereafter), particularly for the maintenance of the lifestyle of white-collar workers.<sup>53</sup> In the ruins of the destruction, the merciless and vulturous forces of the F.I.R.E. further consumed buildings in the arson, which brought windfall profits for the landlords and left the people homeless.<sup>54</sup> The willful disregard of the Bronx was clearly articulated by the post-Moses urban planning authority, Twentieth Century Task Force composed of the F.I.R.E. power bloc, which in 1979 declared: "At this late date, we believe that it makes more sense to accept the verdict of residents themselves that certain areas are unsalvageable."<sup>55</sup>

Given the context of metropolitan New York's reconfiguration into a global city, the writing and other affective means of expression and communication can be said to have emerged as a representative expression of the ghetto community and its culture. In order to appreciate the political or revolutionary significance of (graffiti) writing, it needs to be examined on a more general level where Roland Barthes, for instance, attempts to grasp its power (without his knowledge of the street form of writing): "Writing . . . is always rooted in something beyond language, it develops like a seed, not like a line, it manifests an essence and holds the threat of a secret, it is an anti-communication, it is intimidating."<sup>56</sup> Likewise, the street writing can be "anti-communication" and "intimidating," particularly to the establishment and those who conform to its ideology, for it challenges the reader to step out

of the normative mode of communication and cognition. As an organic and affective relationship is forged between writing and the people, writing as a representative popular expression can therefore become a powerful force of revolution in the aesthetic and symbolic realms. Through a juxtaposition of writing in the hop hop culture with a singular and elder writer of Hong Kong, Tsang Tsou Choi, who has been engaged in decolonization struggle in the realm of street aesthetics, at least part of what Barthes called the “secret” of writing may be unveiled.

“King of Kowloon”<sup>57</sup>

Calling himself the “King of Kowloon,” Tsang launched his writing career prior to, and independently of, the NYC writer’s scene. With traditional brush and paint, Tsang has been consistently inscribing calligraphy over the public space and “monuments” reminiscent of the colonial era (e.g., the Central Government Offices, postboxes, ferry terminal, Victoria Park, etc.) for several decades. His pieces are made up of the very proclamation of his claim to Kowloon, which belongs to his family according to the genealogy. His style has no precedent in the tradition of calligraphy and is flexibly executed on “vertical and awkwardly shaped surfaces.”<sup>58</sup> Tsang’s calligraphy struck a chord with the masses of Hong Kong who were undergoing crises in the process of decolonization and the “handover.” In the early 1970s when Tsang’s writing began appearing in Kowloon, public housing and squatter elimination projects were launched against the background of the postindustrialization process through which Hong Kong pursued the development in the information and service economy. The projects destroyed the community of the working class and lumpen proletariat and undermined their “group cohesion and collective consciousness.”<sup>59</sup>

The sense of dislocation among the Hong Kong masses were further exacerbated by the prospective handover of sovereignty from the British colonial power to the People’s Republic of China, which in effect bypassed the collective existence of Hong Kong people. The imminent handover created an alliance between Hong Kong’s business circle and the PRC bureaucracy, whose political interest lay in fostering Hong Kong’s “prosperity and stability” in their clear opposition to the democratic reform that would strengthen the power of the people of Hong Kong.<sup>60</sup> Economically they also found mutual interest in the post-Fordist economic restructuring. Since the 1980s, manufacturing has come to be transferred to the border to South China and Hong Kong, which in turn has displaced Hong Kong’s industrial workers.<sup>61</sup> The shift



FIGURE 5.2. Tsang Tsou Choi in action near Victoria Park, Causeway Bay, Hong Kong, September 27, 1996. Photo by David Clarke (copyright).



of economy stimulated the real estate market, which accelerated the “urban renewal” type of gentrification development. Tsang’s writing solitarily yet firmly stood in a rapidly changing urban landscape and disappearing landmarks of Hong Kong masses’ identity. Soon after the handover, Tsang subtly shifted his medium to the “property” clearly visible from a symbol of the PRC state authority such as the Bank of China (financial representative of the PRC), defying the speculation that he might lay low under Chinese rule.

In the course of time, Tsang’s act came to intersect with Hong Kong people’s insistence on their identity faced with the handover as well as the urban development of the global city.<sup>62</sup> As demonstrated by the popularity of Tsang among the local artists who chose his calligraphy as the provenance of local identity, Tsang’s writing thus has come to be the representative expression of Hong Kong people. His writing has lent street aesthetic form to “their otherwise contained identities”<sup>63</sup> (to borrow Tricia Rose’s words in the context of New York graffiti) on the space that duly belonged to them.

In the social field, Tsang’s solitary dissent to the colonial and postcolonial domination reflects the desire of the Hong Kong masses for democratization that has become quite salient since the 1980s. Fuelled by the Tiananmen Square massacre, the democratic movement sustained its growth despite the handover, whose recent (Summer 2003, Spring 2004, and Winter 2005) manifestations entailed a series of mass demonstrations against the restriction on the exercise of popular will imposed by the PRC via the authority of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Tsang’s writing as a singular representative of decolonization in the realm of street aesthetics opens up a new dimension where the masses can locate themselves outside the prison house of globalization development. The organic relationship between Tsang’s writing and the liberating desire of Hong Kong masses implicates the possibility of seeing the hip hop writing as an expression of decolonization from postindustrialization and globalization. Writing as a demarcation of an alternative sphere of existence blends with hip hop’s sonic exodus out of the postindustrial destruction. With the sheer power of sound, the pioneer DJs such as Afrika Bambaataa, Kool Herc, and Grandmaster Flash were able to materialize the autonomous space where the ghetto masses could actually feel the existence of the hip hop nation poetically, kinetically, and in a communal manner.

### Heavy Bass and Break Beat: The Sound Aesthetic of Hip Hop

As a leader of the Bronx’s gang Black Spade, Afrika Bambaataa took an active role in the transformation of gangs into the hip hop nation. During his for-

mative years in the late 1960s, Bambaataa absorbed the heightened political and social consciousness growing in the ruins of postindustrial destruction, as he himself puts it: “there was ‘broken glass every where.’<sup>64</sup> . . . But it was also an area where there was a lot of unity and a lot of social awareness going on, at a time when people of color was [*sic*] coming into their own, knowin’ that they were Black people. . . .”<sup>65</sup> Being aware of the importance of unity among the oppressed, Bambaataa could traverse the gang boundaries and acted as a mediator between rival gang members.<sup>66</sup> His love for music, nurtured by his socially conscious mother’s record collections and hi-fi system, combined with his charisma, led him to become a DJ in 1970, when he was still with Black Spade.<sup>67</sup> The shift of a paradigm in the ghetto brought by the gang truce inspired Bambaataa and others to reorient gang activities “from a negative thing to a positive thing.”<sup>68</sup> Bambaataa conceived an organizational form of the hip hop nation called Universal Zulu Nation by welding his ideological influences, from Black nationalism to Flower Power, onto the infrastructure of the gang, finessed with the militant image of Zulu warriors taken from the film *Zulu* (1964, Paramount UK).<sup>69</sup> Founded in 1974, this first organizational form of a hip hop nation reintegrated the four elements of hip hop aesthetics in its original totality, as a movement of what the gang peace process stood for. Naturally, Bambaataa and his organization have been peacemakers in the hip hop community as well.<sup>70</sup> The “Universal” or transcultural aspect of the Nation was represented by Bambaataa’s eclectic or transversal music orientation, which transcended genre boundaries of Funk, Rock, Techno, and even Bugs Bunny’s tune. The existence of Afrika Bambaataa and Universal Zulu Nation itself thus bespeaks of the origin of hip hop in the gang, specifically in its search for peace and in nurturing the African consciousness.

Similarly, DJ Kool Herc, aka Clive Campbell, personifies hip hop’s roots in Jamaican ghetto culture, particularly, in its positive turn for social and spiritual consciousness. The beginning of writing as a street art (i.e., 1967) coincided with Clive Campbell’s landing in the Bronx from Jamaica at the age of 12. After getting involved in the writers’ scene, Campbell launched his career as a DJ and sound system operator for his sister’s birthday party at the recreation room of a housing project in 1973.<sup>71</sup> At this ghetto party, DJ Kool Herc brought forth the sonic apparatus of hip hop—two turntables hooked on to the amplified speaker systems—as well as its characteristically loud yet clear sound with booming bass range. Kool Herc’s sound aesthetic, particularly his bass range, attracted the ghetto people as Sha-Rock, one of the pioneer female MCs, testifies: “they go for the bass. Just to hear the bass was like everything, and that’s what made me rebel: to hear the bass. You know? Whether or not it was right or wrong, I just went to hear the bass.”<sup>72</sup> The foundation of Kool

Herc's characteristic sound was a direct import of Jamaican sound system through which he nourished his sensitivity to the sound and the beat. By bridging the ghetto popular cultures of Jamaica and the Bronx, Kool Herc in effect facilitated the convergence of the emerging cultural movements and the circulation and evolution of revolutionary sound aesthetic.

The emergence of Jamaica's sound system culture, which goes back to the 1950s, came as a result of Jamaica's encounter with R&B through Black radio stations from the U.S. continent which could be caught in Jamaica.<sup>73</sup> In lieu of a radio program, Jamaican record dealers, such as Coxon Dodd, set up their own sound systems (both outdoors and indoors) and played R&B for the masses to dance. The rhyming jives of Black radio disc jockeys inspired the sound system operators to incorporate "Dee Jays" (equivalent to MCs in the hip hop culture), whose primary function was to control the crowd and maintain peace at the dances with the art of "toasting" in between tunes and along the beats. The shift from R&B to Rock 'n' Roll in U.S. popular music market compelled the Jamaican indigenous music industry—which primarily consisted of sound system operators—to launch an "import substitution" strategy, like any other Third World industry under economic dependency. The appropriation and substitution of R&B took place during Jamaica's transitional period from British colonial rule to official national independence.

Since the 1930s, there emerged a spiritual, social, and political movement in the ghetto sufferer's communities, which came to embrace Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia as Jah Rastafari, the Almighty God prophesized by their national hero Marcus Garvey. The Rastafarian movement took a quantum leap when their cultural expressions came into contact with Jamaican popular music. Against the backdrop of the vigor of a new nation, the new beat of Ska was conceived by Jamaican jazz musicians who found faith in Rastafari (i.e., Skatalites). By the end of the 1960s Ska evolved into Reggae, after a brief transitional phase of Rock Steady. This evolutionary process was characterized by the deepening of the bass range, and the transformation of an up-tempo beat into a more relaxed and reflective groove effected by the strong emphasis on the after-beat.

On the one hand, the sonic transformation represented the growth of Rastafarian cultural ethos, which refused to be incorporated into neocolonial society. On the other hand, it was also rooted in the paradigm shift in the ghetto community, specifically in the "rude boys" or "rudies," an equivalent of youth gangs. Influenced by the spiritual awakening in the ghetto community, some rudies came to attain a level of consciousness that "transcend[ed] gang and neighborhood boundaries" and also a class consciousness by becoming aware of

“the suffering of people of his own color and his own class.”<sup>74</sup> The Wailers typified such conscious turn of rudies that then formed the basis of the militant and socially conscious Rockers movement, within the genre of Reggae, based on the harmonization of Rastafarian cosmology and the ideology and practice of “social living” or ghetto communalism. The aesthetic innovation and radicalization involved in the consolidation of Reggae was directly influenced by the sound system as a popular democratic forum wherein ghetto sufferers defined their tunes on the dance floor. Hence the radicalization of Ska into Reggae, in the final analysis, underlines an aesthetic expression of the decolonizing struggle in a time of deepening social contradiction of postindependent Jamaica.

A Guyana literary critic, Gordon Rohlehr’s commentary on Calypso has particular relevance to the evolution of Reggae music:

Each new weight of pressure (in the society) . . . has its corresponding effect on music, and the revolution is usually felt first at a perceptive change in the bass, the basic rhythm, the inner pulse whose origin is in the confrontation between the despair which history and iniquitous politics inflict, and the rooted strength of the people.<sup>75</sup>

By the inception of Reggae, the concept of “beat” was already impregnated in the rhythm. The subgenre of Reggae called Dub—which originated in the instrumental version of a song designed for the toasters at dances—gave a concrete shape to the “beat” in its skeletal drum and bass structure. Instead of a focus on melodic vocals and harmony as a regular Reggae tune would have, Dub accentuates the rhythm (or *riddim*) over which other instrumentations and vocals are layered as aural effects. Dub also prefigured the art of remixing in the hip hop sound production, which creates a new tune through deconstructing and reorganizing already existing tunes, harnessed by a creative use of available technology or, what I would call, the “labor intensive” technological innovation.

Back in South Bronx in 1973, what Kool Herc introduced at the ghetto party essentially boils down to a translation of the concept of Dub into an audience more keen on Funk music. In lieu of a dub or version tune, Kool Herc took instrumental breaks—the JB’s instrumental breaks between James Brown’s tunes, for instance—as a unit of what he called “break beat,” which became the sonic as well as conceptual foundation of hip hop culture. His presentation of break beat, however, was still immersed in the Jamaican Sound System in that it did not sustain a continuous groove. It took the stylistic and “labor intensive” technological innovation of Grandmaster Flash (“Flash”), aka Joseph Saddler, to define the identity of hip hop beat.

Flash's encounter with Kool Herc's sound system inspired him to produce a continuous break beat by having two identical records and mixing them smoothly like the style of Disco DJs at that time (e.g., Pete DJ Jones).<sup>76</sup> With the knowledge he gained from Samuel Gompers Vocational High School and through experiments based on his own study, Flash invented what he calls the "peek-a-boo" system, which enabled a DJ to match one beat to another by monitoring them with headphones: "Now I was able to play the break[s] of all these songs in succession, back to back to back to back to back."<sup>77</sup> Together with his disciple Grand Wizard Theodore, Flash also came up with the technique of "scratching" (also called "rubbing") the record, which produced a unique sound of an eerie percussive instrument adding a sense of disruption in the seamless, continuous groove. Flash's contribution, therefore, rests on the type of technical and technological innovation based on creativity overcoming the limitation imposed by the wretched condition of the ghetto, which was being engulfed by the forces of deindustrialization. This type of innovation, in the final analysis, is not intended for the valorization of capital but for the enhancement of aesthetic value and communal pleasure.

The delineation of break beat by DJs opened up a creative and competitive space for a kinetic, stylistic forum on the dance floor, called "breaking." Originated from the gang war dance, as mentioned earlier, breaking evolved as an aesthetic sublimation of gang warfare, a peaceful and artistic alternative to violence. Crazy Legs, aka Richard Colón, who led the second generation of a prolific breaking organization called Rock Steady Crew, brought breaking to a national and international arena. He retraces history back to the beginning of the breaking:

See, the whole thing when hip-hop first started . . . was the music was played in the parks and in the jams for the dancers, and those dancers were B-Boys. And when those break [beats] would come on, it would be like, 'B-Boys, are you ready?' And a B-Boy very specifically was a break boy, not a break-dancer; that's media terminology.<sup>78</sup>

Just like the identity of Reggae music, which was significantly shaped by the groove of dancers at the sound system, it was B-Boys (and B-Girls) that "drove the music forward."<sup>79</sup> The involvement of Puerto Rican youth (such as Crazy Legs) in the break scene since 1976 onward contributed to the stylistic innovation as well as its competitiveness.<sup>80</sup> With the mobility of the "boom box," breaking spread across every available social space (including subway stations, sidewalks, gyms, etc.), beyond the boundaries of parks, parties, clubs, and beyond the whole notion of territoriality. The kinetic components of

breaking spring from African American dance tradition, Afro-Brazilian martial arts, and other martial arts moves taken from the Asian as well as Black martial arts movies.<sup>81</sup>

The kine-aesthetic of breaking is also closely related to the movement found in other elements of hip hop. For instance, breaking moves on the floor such as head spins and arm glides approximate the spinning motions of turntables. Moreover, the mechanical body movement of “locking,” “popping,” and “electric boogie” in standing positions suggests a three dimensional kinetic rendition of “wild style” writing. Breaking, like writing, engages with spontaneous and immediate creation of autonomous space, which rehumanizes an otherwise alienating urban environment. As Sally Banes sums it up: “Breaking is a way of using your body to inscribe your identity on streets and trains, in parks and high school gyms.”<sup>82</sup>

### Hip Hop Subjectivity

The relationship between an individual body, identity, and breaking as a collective practice articulated in Banes’s comments may contain a key to unlock the subjectivity of the hip hop nation. Although it may seem paradoxical, the pursuit of uniqueness in styles is the very driving force that valorizes the collective identity of hip hop. Propelled by proliferating individuality of styles, the collective identity is constituted not in a static institution but rather in action, in practice, and in a constant movement for evolution.

The most fundamental facet of collective identity, as mentioned earlier, is based on the transformation of gang violence and rivalry into aesthetic competition and innovation. Ultimately, therefore, it is the act of peacemaking or the peace movement in the ghetto as alternative to the spiral of violence that causes every rhyme dropped and every line painted. Accordingly, the collective identity transcends the immanent condition of gang and ghetto since a collective practice of hip hop produces space of autonomy overcoming the confinement of territoriality. The spatial practice of hip hop, however, is not so much resistance against the forces of the global city, for it is not dialectically engaged with the dominant power; rather, hip hop’s production of space is autonomous from the dominant power, actualizing the materiality (i.e., social relations) of freedom in its most immediate sense.<sup>83</sup>

Hip hop is also productive of techniques and technologies that enhance stylistic, affective, and aesthetic values. Due to postindustrialization, ghetto youth not only suffered dislocation, but also, deskilling, devotionalization, and underemployment. Well-known hip hop practitioners, just as other

aspiring ghetto youths who sought job training at vocational schools, found their skills to be increasingly obsolete.<sup>84</sup> As exemplified by the use of aerosol spray, turntables, vinyl records, ghetto blaster, and “labor intensive” technological innovation (i.e., Kool Herc and Grandmaster Flash), hip hop could transform by-products of deindustrialization into a tool for aesthetic production as Tricia Rose analyzes:

Worked out on the rusting urban core as a playground, hip hop transforms stray technological parts intended for cultural and industrial trash heaps into sources of pleasure and power. . . . In hip hop, these abandoned parts, people, and social institutions were welded and then spliced together, not only as a source of survival but also as a source of pleasure.<sup>85</sup>

The hip hop subjectivity thus seems to be anchored in the transformative process, through which hip hop as a whole alters the actual makeup of dominant institutions, be it urban planning, letters, musical genres, and language, in order to produce autonomous meaning, aesthetic values, and communal pleasure: “The degrees of . . . transformation can only be limited if one chooses to limit it.”<sup>86</sup> The paradox of individual-collective relationship, deterritorialized and deinstitutionalized organizational structure, production of space, meaning, aesthetic value and communal pleasure, and other aspects of hip hop subjectivity may prefigure an emerging social subject of decolonization in the latest stage of globalization. A far more vigorous exploration of the link between Bruce Lee’s *Jeet Kune Do* (presented in *Game of Death*) and the hip hop cultural paradigm is necessary to further clarify the contour of such subjectivity.

#### GAME OF DEATH

Due to the death of Bruce Lee before its completion, *Game of Death* is normally associated with something ominous or even accursed; an unfortunate misperception attributed to the 1978 version of *Game of Death*. Such gloomy connotations are, in fact, contrary to the original meaning Lee intended for the title. The general thematic paradigm of *Game of Death* is pronounced at the climactic battle between Hai-tien, the main character played by Lee, and Kareem (based on the original script, which used his real name), played by Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, both in monologue and dialogue.

Reminiscent of the battle choreography in *The Way of the Dragon*, the protagonist is given a moment of reflection in the midst of an intense battle




FIGURE 5.3. Kareem and Hai-tien's Battle Break from *Bruce Lee: A Warrior's Journey*.



with an unusual opponent who towers over him like a giant. Hai-tien discerns that the advantage of the opponent is not necessarily his external but internal quality: "His big advantage is that he gives no thought to life or death. And with no disturbing thoughts, he is therefore free to concentrate on fighting against the attack from outside."<sup>87</sup> It is the calmness of mind and soul attained by transcending the fear of death, Hai-tien observes, that makes Kareem an invincible fighter. The transcendence of the fear of death, in the following dialogue between the two characters, parallels the transcendence of ego articulated in Lee's previous works:

KAREEM: A little fellow. You must have given up the hope of living.

HAI-TIEN: Uh huh. On the contrary, I don't let the word "death" bother me.

KAREEM: Same here.

HAI-TIEN: Then what are you waiting for?<sup>88</sup>

However, the transcendence of the fear of death has a slightly different implication from the transcendence of ego articulated, for instance, in the dialogue in *Enter the Dragon*: "Because the word, I, doesn't exist. . . . I don't hit; it hits all by itself." In *Game of Death*, the transcendence is envisioned not via detachment, but through an active use/involvement of death, which explains the "game" part of the signification. Lee, in his philosophical prose, explicates this point further where death is linked to the attainment of freedom: "To express yourself in freedom, you must die to everything of yesterday. From 'old' you derive security, from the 'new' you gain the flow."<sup>89</sup> The overall concept of *Game of Death* can be grasped as an attempt to put an end to the old paradigm, hence the death of the old paradigm, out of which a new paradigm can spring forth.

Indeed, *Game of Death* is, first of all, an attempt to seek a new paradigm within the kung fu cultural revolution, which was becoming more institutionalized and stagnant both kinetically and thematically. The stagnation was evident in a trend toward escapist fantasy over realism, wrought by acrobatics and special effects. In *Game of Death*, Lee's pursuit of realism attains its pinnacle in his career by involving a significant number of his former students, training partners, and colleagues in the film production. They include Dan Inosanto, the master of Filipino *escrima*/kali as well as a co-innovator of *Jeet Kune Do*; Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, Lee's student from LA who was the star player of the Milwaukee Bucks at the time of production; and Ji Han Jae, Lee's colleague from his LA days, the master of Korean hapkido.<sup>90</sup> By incor-

porating his close associates into the film, the collective expression, or “team expression,” could attain a high degree of realism in a friendly ambience of cooperation. Due to the cutting-edge styles and techniques, as well as innovative martial arts concepts they shared, the collective kinetic expression could present a new paradigm not only for the kung fu cultural revolution, but also for the martial arts world in general, which tends to dismiss cinema as a mere fantasy.

One such component of a new paradigm is the redefinition of Asian martial arts beyond the kung fu dialectic. As we examined in the first two chapters, the kung fu cultural revolution developed in a dialectical relationship with Japanese cultural imperialism. In Lee’s previous films, karate and other Japanese imperialist martial arts culture functioned as the symbolic dominant against which traditional cultural roots were asserted to demarcate the identity of kung fu. In the climatic battles of *Game of Death*, however, the symbolic dominant is characteristically absent, replaced by symbolic parallels between various strains of Asian cultural traditions. The film’s setting in Korea reinforces such symbolic parallels, for it provides the “third” or alternative space of symbolic cultural interchange that enables the viewers to imagine an Asian identity outside the dialectic of a pan-Chinese world and foreigners. The transcendence of dialectic implicated in Lee’s previous choreographic work in *The Way of the Dragon* is now brought to the “game of death,” hence the death of dialectic. With the absence of dialectical constraint, the combat choreography, albeit its deadly performance, becomes an arena of artistic contestation much like the street aesthetics of hip hop, in which a new concept is produced through a competitive exchange of styles. Such a free-spirited space of artistic expression engenders a transcultural artistic expression based on the pan-Asian identity, as it creatively transcends cultural boundaries.

Let us see how such a creative space is actualized in the film. The main part of the film’s narrative is set in Korea. The Korean Mafia schemes to pilfer the treasure hidden in the highest floor of the Buddhist temple pagoda. Each floor of the pagoda is guarded by a superb martial artist. Hai-tien, a retired martial artist, is forced to infiltrate into the pagoda as an agent of the Mafia, which took his family members hostage. Hai-tien’s operation is assisted by two Chinese martial artists; one in karate *gi* and the other in casual clothes, played by James Tien who is a familiar face in Lee’s films in Hong Kong. Hai-tien, on the other hand, is dressed in a yellow track suit with black lines and Assics brand shoes—the totality of which is to signify that his style has no reference to any existing styles.<sup>91</sup>

The character system of Hai-tien, at its initial stage, seems to be an autobiographical reflection of Lee’s *Jeet Kune Do* period in L.A. Yet as the bat-

tle progresses, it begins to unravel the state of Bruce Lee at the time of the film's production, where Lee was attempting to transcend the dichotomy of West and East in search of a transcultural identity rooted in Asia. His teammates, on the other hand, symbolize Lee's roots in Hong Kong as well as the normative kung fu film genre. Three of them together appear to represent the state of the kung fu cultural revolution at that particular time. Thus the team's encounter with different styles of Asian martial arts urges the kung fu cultural revolution to step out of the pan-Chinese world and relocate itself in the totality of Asia. The combat is thus conceived as a process of cultural learning as well as self discovery. However, there is significant demarcation of differences between Hai-tien and his teammates: while the former is ready to jump into the unknown water, the latter insists on staying on shore, as it were. Hai-tien's willingness to surrender himself to infinite possibility is articulated in the significance of flexibility and adaptability in combat, alluded in the battle on the third floor or "the floor of Tiger," where the reconstructed *Game of Death* begins.

Hai-tien enters on the third floor with a thin bamboo stick upon which a small bag containing *nunchaku* is hoisted. Just when his second teammate is ready to be annihilated by the master of stick fighting, Hai-tien thrusts his bamboo stick, intercepting a potential fatal blow to his teammate. Hai-tien, then, proclaims the key concept of *Jeet Kune Do*: "You know baby! This bamboo is longer, more flexible, and very much alive. And when you flash your routine, you cannot keep up with the speed and the elusiveness of this thing here."<sup>92</sup> From the outset, Hai-tien embarks on a dance, as seen in the fight choreography with Chuck Norris, fully engaged in feint and other deceptive moves. With an ostentatious air, Hai-tien preaches to his opponent, who seems to be having a hard time penetrating Hai-tien's rhythmic dance: "I'm telling you. It's difficult to have a rehearsed routine to fit in with a 'broken rhythm.'"<sup>93</sup> As the master of stick fighting is disarmed by Hai-tien, he switches from *escrima* sticks to *nunchaku*. Hai-tien calls up his teammate to hand over his *nunchaku*, a particularly untraditional one, with a coordinated bright yellow color and black stripes. Due to an equal level of technical expertise, the *nunchaku* fight comes to an inevitable deadlock. The standoff is resolved when Hai-tien begins a dance on the border between *nunchaku* fighting and a total fighting method in which nothing is left unused. By tactically shifting the focus between weapon combat and other modes of combat, Hai-tien slowly dissolves the boundary and attains a significant degree of freedom in combat. In contrast, the opponent adamantly stays within the perimeter of stick and *nunchaku* fighting, which causes his demise as Hai-tien cautioned him earlier: "You see, rehearsed routines lack the flexibility to adapt."<sup>94</sup>

The importance of adaptability is pursued in the battle on the next floor, “the floor of Dragon,” guarded by the master of hapkido (played by Ji Han Jae), a tribute to the story’s setting, Korea. In contrast to the previous opponent, who showed a noticeable degree of rigidity in his moves and even in his facial expressions, the master of hapkido is so relaxed that he shows smiles as he handles Hai-tien’s teammates. His style is very flexible and versatile, making use of grapples and throws like aikido, combined with deadly tae kwon do kicks and leg sweeps. After the defeat of his teammates, Hai-tien enters into combat with somewhat conventional kung fu-style fighting. As the duel progresses he slowly begins to incorporate the opponent’s style, which uses grapples and throws. Hai-tien even mobilizes jujitsu-like locking. At the height of the battle, Hai-tien materializes a spontaneous formation of a style that can transcend that of the opponent in a specific context of the particular battle. The theme of stylistic evolution through flexible adaptation of other styles is a fresh concept in the paradigm of the kung fu cultural revolution, which tends to conserve stylistic boundaries. In hip hop aesthetics, however, the stylistic forum in a competitive milieu comprises the foundation of the collective stylistic innovation, such as in writing:

Style came to be as writers independently created them. As those styles were adapted by other writers, variations as well as different styles were then created from them, thus expanding the stylistic forum. The latter is a direct result of the other which initially had no connections until this process or second stage took place.<sup>95</sup>

Lee’s unraveling of the constitutive process of *Jeet Kune Do* in the evolutionary process through a stylistic forum therefore also reveals its structural parallel with hip hop aesthetics.

*Jeet Kune Do* is put to the test on the final floor guarded by the master of unknown style, Kareem. Since Abdul-Jabbar’s formal training in martial arts was with Bruce Lee during his *Jeet Kune Do* period in L.A., Abdul-Jabbar himself did not have adherence to any conventional styles. Abdul-Jabbar thus represented a symbolic threshold beyond which there is no style, or the death of all styles. Unique among the martial artists in Lee’s films, Abdul-Jabbar was one of the finest basketball players in history who helped his team win six championships in his career (one with the Milwaukee Bucks and five with the L.A. Lakers). Accordingly, Kareem’s movement, despite his size, is quick, rhythmic and fluid, a stark contrast to that of Chuck Norris, which was heavy and destructive, but rigid. With high-speed kinetic action without any adherence to styles and rituals, the battle between Hai-tien and Kareem turns into

a feast of kinetic expressions in competitive spirit, much like the freestyle battle in hip hop culture. Although there are shared kinetic narratives with Lee's previous choreographic works such as deceptive moves, stop hits, and other critical components of *Jeet Kune Do* kine-aesthetic, the most important kinetic narrative in this choreography is a new concept in the kung fu cultural revolution called the "groove." Not coincidentally, Hai-tien introduced this concept unfamiliar to the martial arts audience in Asia at the outset of the battle on the third floor: "I hope you don't mind if we move our man so that two of us have more room to *groove*."<sup>96</sup>

BEYOND *GAME OF DEATH*: GROOVE AND THE  
SOUL OF THE POPULAR CULTURAL REVOLUTION

Lee himself was already "in the groove" since he took on Mohammed Ali-like footwork in *Fist of Fury*. But because no opponents were able to groove like Lee, he could only present a broken rhythm. It was as if Lee lacked another turntable to create a break beat. But with Abdul-Jabbar's entry, the battle choreography turns into two turntables upon which two grooves can generate a continuous break beat, laying a rhythmic foundation for a creative dance.

The concept of a groove is the convergence and harmonization of rhythmic, kinetic, and sonic elements of human expressions. Speaking on the notion of groove in the Black cultural context, William C. Banfield locates its source in the "rhythmic life or life force" cherished in African cultural traditions.<sup>97</sup> He approaches the cultural foundation of groove or, what he calls, the "Undeniable Groove," through Duke Ellington's statement on art: "It don't mean a thing if it ain't got no swing."<sup>98</sup> This notion of "swing," which spontaneously moves body and soul, an original notion of groove, is also addressed by Malcolm X in a sociopolitical context. Referring to a social movement beyond the confinement of the civil rights movement, Malcolm X agitated the audience with a light sense of humor: "You do too much singing. Today we need to stop singing and start swinging."<sup>99</sup> The groove, therefore, could be grasped as a spontaneous and natural momentum that unifies body and soul (on an individual as well as collective level) in a movement harmonized with the rhythm of life or the forces of nature. The groove, as Malcolm X insinuated, can be conceived as a force of social transformation.

To bring back the Taoist framework of *Jeet Kune Do* in our discussion, the groove may be best described as *wu wei* in a rhythmic motion where transcendence is actualized in a dynamic process of physical, spiritual, and affective involvement with the infinite. Likewise, transcendence of death on the

final floor of the pagoda is actualized by the groove that comes out of the battle break between Hai-tien and Kareem. In such a dynamic process of transcendence, the “soul” of a fighter seems to become more transparent, as if the battle break would hack away all physical externalities. As mentioned earlier, Hai-tien saw Kareem’s strength in the internal stability achieved by transcending the fear of death. At an imperiled state, Hai-tien’s soul also manifests itself in his monologue: “I’m so tired. No, no. Hai-tien, he must be much more tired than you. Calm down your *soul*.”<sup>100</sup> Elsewhere in his philosophical prose, Lee links creativity with the distillation of the soul: “Creativity in art is the psychic unfolding of the personality, which is rooted in nothing. Its effect is a deepening of the personal dimension of the soul.”<sup>101</sup> The “soul,” in Lee’s neo-Taoist framework, seems to configure Tao in one’s being, which serves as a bridge between physical and spiritual, individual and collective, culture and nature thereby enabling universality to manifest in singularity.

On Abdul-Jabbar’s side of the turntable, or in the Black popular cultural context within which Abdul-Jabbar was brought up, the “soul” represents an aesthetic movement that incorporated Jazz, Blues, and Gospel. The emergence of the sound of soul, Charles Keil analyzes, was a response to the Supreme Court decision of 1954.<sup>102</sup> Keil, in consonance with Malcolm X, sees soul music as representing an “incipient movement” in the post-civil rights struggles, for soul aesthetics are “much more interested in freedom and self-respect than in integration per se. . . .”<sup>103</sup> Moreover, Abdul-Jabbar, in an interview, identified Free Jazz as his source of artistic inspiration.<sup>104</sup> Free or avant-garde Jazz was also an aesthetic movement that attempted to transcend the “integrationist” paradigm, insisting on the identity of Black people.<sup>105</sup> The incipient social movement captured by soul music and Free Jazz unveiled itself as a Black Power movement. Thus, unlike the “blaxploitation” action films epitomized by Jim Kelly’s black belt karate actions, Abdul-Jabbar’s “unknown” styleless kung fu, therefore, introduced the most creative and transcultural aspect of Black Power movement in kine-aesthetic form to the kung fu cultural revolution. In other words, Abdul-Jabbar’s freestyle kung fu symbolically redefined the Black Power movement as a decolonizing struggle that transcends all forms of boundaries, as it came to intersect with *Jeet Kune Do* as decolonizing aesthetics.

The sociopolitical allegory of Lee’s *Jeet Kune Do* in the *Game of Death*, on the other hand, can be decoded by contrasting the combat choreography of *Game of Death* with the kinetic narrative of his previous combat choreographies. With the absence of personification of imperialism (i.e., Japanese and Caucasian villains) and dialectic engagement with it, the kine-aesthetic of freedom in *Game of Death* configures the convergence of cultures and

autonomous power of the people in Asia. Given that *Game of Death* entails the most vigorous pursuit of transcultural pan-Asianism, the kine-aesthetic forum of styles rooted in Asian cultures prefigures a social subject of decolonization at the stage of global capitalism. The social subject of decolonization from globalizaton in the social field, as mentioned in chapter 4, came to appear in Latin America and Africa in concrete forms as people's resistance to the IMF and World Bank's strategic paradigm. An allegory of the battle breaks between Lee and Abdul-Jabbar, therefore, could foreshadow the global circulation of people's struggle in the context of the post-Black Power and post-Third World social movements. Now the intermixture of political allegory of *Game of Death* with hip hop subjectivity can take us to the ultimate groove of the popular cultural revolution.

In his effort to extirpate the foundational aspect of hip hop culture, a hip hop video director Arthur Jaffa identifies three concepts of stylistic constancy that runs through breaking, writing, MC-ing, and DJ-ing or break beat: "*flow, layering and ruptures in line.*"<sup>106</sup> In DJ-ing, for instance, the smooth groove is interrupted by scratching, mixing of different sonic elements, or by momentarily muting, which accentuates the continuous line of groove. Reinterpreting these concepts on a sociopolitical plane, Tricia Rose sees hip hop as a "blue print for social resistance and affirmation":

Create sustaining narratives, accumulate them, layer, embellish, and transform them. However, be also prepared for rupture, find pleasure in it, in fact, *plan* on social rupture. When these ruptures occur, use them in creative ways that will prepare you for a future in which survival will demand a sudden shift in ground tactics.<sup>107</sup>

Let us now overlay these foundational concepts of "flow, layering, and ruptures in line" with Lee and Abdul-Jabbar's transcendental battle break. The groove is set from the beginning, which is embellished by tactical moves, only to be interrupted by brief moments of imperiled situation, similar to the effect of "scratching" in an otherwise continuous and smooth groove. The final rupture comes when Hai-tien accidentally hits the window, which brings a beam of light into the final floor. The light literally exposes the vulnerability of Kareem whose eyes are extremely light sensitive. Thus in *Game of Death*, it is neither a passion for redemption of the imperiled nation as in *Fist of Fury*, nor the transcendence of ego as in *The Way of the Dragon* but the forces of Nature that bestow victory upon the hero in the climactic battle, as in the Han-Lee battle break in *Enter the Dragon*. Now if ruptures are to "highlight the continuity as it momentarily challenges it,"<sup>108</sup> as Tricia Rose interprets, the rupture

brought by the forces of Nature in *Game of Death* is to “highlight” the continuity of life that transcends the dialectic of life and death. Such transcendental grooves highlight the existence of “soul” or “spirit” in motion.

Despite the triumphant victory of Hai-tien, the camera continues to capture Hai-tien’s state of overexhaustion. From the torn-up windows, Hai-tien shouts for rescue. The answers from below, however, are not encouraging. Without any assistance, Hai-tien has no alternatives but to drag himself down the stairs. The film spends considerable time in keeping Hai-tien’s struggle within the frame, with no fanfare, not even a sense of relief. Again intertextual reference to Lee’s previous works can dispel the enigma of this particular anticlimactic ending, divulging the symbolic way out from the existential condition. Unlike the martyrdom of *Fist of Fury*, based on the mythologizing of death and a heroic stride onto the path of *lotta continua* in *The Way of the Dragon*, *Game of Death*’s ending deals with the question of life and death with much deeper introspection and realism. Hai-tien’s struggle in the finale suggests more than mere survival, as it emphasizes the determination to persist.

Speaking on the new condition of revolution in the monologic world of capitalism (i.e., globalization), Hakim Bey refers to the mode that goes beyond survival: “It would seem that our tactics will be defined not so much by history as by our determination to remain within history—not by ‘survival’ but by persistence.”<sup>109</sup> Lee’s performance thus gives figurative form to this state of “persistence,” which transcends the dialectic of life and death. The surviving, or more correctly, persisting footage of *Game of Death* itself is literal evidence of the amalgamation of life (i.e., living labor) and the forces of Nature that together insist its existence in history as a “soul,” despite the tragedy of misrepresentation (i.e., the 1978 version) and abandonment.



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## CONCLUSION

### FROM POSSIBILITY TO ACTUALIZATION OF ANOTHER WORLD

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And what is the result of decolonizing the spirit?  
It is as if one truly does possess a third eye, and this eye opens.  
One begins to see the world from one's own point of view;  
to interact with it out of one's own conscience and heart.

—Alice Walker

Having traversed from the decolonizing nationalism of the kung fu cultural revolution to the autonomous forum of hip hop and *Jeet Kune Do* aesthetics in a loosely evolutionary framework, we may now be able to reexamine the development of popular movements transcending globalization. The first step in such an endeavor is to return to Chiapas, arguably the birthplace of the latest (yet ancient) subjectivity of global subversion. When the Zapatistas took up arms to single-handedly oppose the forces of globalization, it demarcated the turning point of the so-called antiglobalization movement as a whole. The Zapatista's organizing principle, "directing by obeying, and for everyone—everything,"<sup>1</sup> which they vigorously applied to the praxis of grassroots democracy, created a breakthrough both in the reformist partisan and the revolutionary vanguard tradition in the conventional social movements.<sup>2</sup>

The uniqueness of the Zapatistas has been its flexibility and openness, which are conducive for the evolution of its movement. As the EZLN (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional or Zapatista National Liberation Army) entered the phase of a dialogue process with the Mexican government, beginning with the peace talks in San Cristobal in 1994, it began to demote the Zapatista Army to a "largely symbolic role."<sup>3</sup> Armed with "sticks made

from different kinds of jungle trees” and the “word,” the EZLN engaged with the creation of a political space where grassroots democracy could proliferate.<sup>4</sup> Their call for a national democratic convention—as a nonviolent political alternative—soon developed into a “national, nonviolent, independent civilian and political force with its base in the EZLN,” called the Zapatista Front of National Liberation (ZFNL) in 1995–1996.<sup>5</sup> By 1996, the ZFNL was able to host both the “Continental” and “Intercontinental” Encounters for Humanity Against Neoliberalism. The Intercontinental Encounter (or *Encuentro*), which assembled three thousand activists from forty countries, marked the historical threshold beyond which the Zapatistas’ struggle converged with the global grassroots movement transcending globalization.<sup>6</sup>

From the second encounter in 1997 held in Spain onward, the global circulation of a subversive paradigm as well as direct actions began to accelerate remarkably, owing significantly to the expansion of cyberspace.<sup>7</sup> People’s Global Action (PGA, hereafter) embodies such a process of global circulation. Founded at the Second Encounter as an offshoot of the international Zapatista movement, PGA catapulted the networks of grassroots democracy toward the united front against the forces of globalization, specifically against the existence and mission of the World Trade Organization (WTO).<sup>8</sup> Thus, rather than being a centralized and rigid organizational center, PGA became an empowering common space (just as the Zapatistas provided its space for diverse movement) for various struggles—indigenous people, women’s rights, environmentalists, animal rights, workers, farmers, etc.<sup>9</sup>—to forge vital links for concerted actions. Accordingly, their global network enabled coordinated and simultaneous global resistance across the globe. The global protest against the third WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle in 1999 covered seventy-four cities from India, Brazil, Turkey, and Mexico, to Australia, with other places like Korea, the Philippines and Greece where actions were organized without a call.<sup>10</sup> PGA’s solidarity with the Direct Action Network of the United States lay the groundwork for the people’s power to converge in Seattle.

The post-Seattle global social movements saw a significant sign of growth of what was sown by the Zapatistas’ idea of *Encuentro*. In the early 2000, a group of Brazilians planned to organize a meeting to counter the World Economic Forum, the convention of political and economic elites of global power in Davos, Switzerland. The earnest search for a movement beyond the “Battle of Seattle” was a central concern for the organizers, as one of the initiators, Francisco Whitaker, remarks: “Over and beyond the demonstrations and mass protests, though, it seemed possible to move on and to offer specific proposals, to seek concrete responses to the challenges of building ‘another world. . . .’”<sup>11</sup> The blueprint for the World Social Forum (WSF) or the

Forum, hereafter) was laid out in collaboration with the leader of ATTAC (Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens) movement in France, which had already been active in the global networking of grassroots social movements. Deviating from the trend of global protest movements that followed the sites of transnational congregation, the WSF chose to host its first meeting in the place of conception, Porto Alegre, Brazil, on the same dates with the meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos. With the slogan of “Another World Is Possible,” the first meeting of the WSF literally actualized the space—autonomous from the transnational power—where reconstruction of social relationship can begin to take place, involving 4,000 delegates from 117 countries (16,000 registered participants).<sup>12</sup>

The search for a new direction in the movement and the vibrant spirit of the first Forum was put into a form as the Charter of Principles. This charter and subsequent development and proliferation of the Forum (i.e., European and Asian regional Forums) provides a profound insight in the emerging mode of autonomous social subjectivity. The Forum is defined, most importantly, as a space (or horizontal space) neither as an organization, institution, nor network.<sup>13</sup> As such it does not have a “locus of power” or assembly to make decisions for the participating groups and individuals but allows diversity of groups and orientations to coexist, with contradiction and conflict, preserving “individual identities of its parts” and enabling them “to join together into a large, open movement to which everyone could contribute.”<sup>14</sup> One of the manifestations in which the Forum exemplified its organizing power sans organizational body was the day of mobilization against the second Iraq war held between its third and fourth Forum. It brought tens of millions of people to the street “without establishing a traditional directive process.”<sup>15</sup>

The growth of *Encuentro* into the WSF represents the undercurrent of emerging social subjectivity in the global popular movements. The constitution of the movement, which is based on the dynamics between the pursuit of individuality and diversity on the one hand and the evolution and growth of collectivity on the other hand, begins to unfold one of the characteristics of what Toni Negri and Félix Guattari called “the new revolutionary subjectivity”: the subjectivity that is constructed upon “a plurality of relations within a multiplicity of singularities—a plurality focused on collective functions and objectives that escape bureaucratic control and overcoding.”<sup>16</sup> Particularly, the Forum’s shift of focus from dialectical engagement with the dominant power, to the production of space, subjectivity, difference, autonomy, and direct democracy signifies exodus from the fundamental logic of capital. To borrow Negri’s terms, it reflects the shift of the logical universe from “dialectical logic” to “the logic of separation.”<sup>17</sup> The social energy expended in the movement is

thus channeled into the autonomous growth of its multiple constituencies and the collective totality in lieu of valorizing the capitalist system that usurps the social energy.<sup>18</sup>

Set in this logic of separation, or in the exodus from the capitalist logical universe, one can better appreciate the relevance of nonviolence (advocated by the Zapatistas, the WSF, and the global popular movements) to the direction of the movement.<sup>19</sup> The active affirmation of life force that lies at the basis of nonviolence can be reinterpreted as a search for transcending capital's dialectical logic of life and death that imposes death upon beings in order to perpetuate the system of capital and its logical universe. Furthermore, separated from the dialectical logic, the affirmation of diversity ("for a world that contains many worlds," in the Zapatistas' vocabulary) and life force constitutes "a call for tolerance in different spheres of life."<sup>20</sup> As we discussed in the context of the Zapatistas' subjectivity, the affirmation of multiple spheres of life force entails the merger of social subjectivity and the forces of Nature. It is a reconstructive subjectivity that offers a way out from the mechanical mode of subjectivity determined by the forces of market-driven societal logic.

The paradigm of nonviolence assumes exigency in our current context of armed globalization in which the diversity in the spheres of life (or biodiversity) is catastrophically being destroyed, and conflicts arising from differences are mired in the crucible of violence and destruction. The affirmation of life force in order to eliminate violence, a paradigm formed by the global popular movements, seems to be the only viable approach to achieve ontological separation and autonomy from the never-ending destruction and to persist collectively in history, as Félix Guattari remarks: "Making history . . . is to stop making death."<sup>21</sup>

As a transcendental revolution in the aesthetic sphere, the hip hop and *Jeet Kune Do* aesthetics can offer global popular movements an inspiring groove of exodus from the monological universe of globalization. Through aesthetic sublimation, hip hop and *Jeet Kune Do* convert the potential conflict and violence into the production of autonomy, communal pleasure, and immediate realization of freedom. And indeed the groove seems to be located whenever there is realization of autonomy. The Zapatistas' struggle, for instance, cannot be separable from dance, music, and festivity based on their indigenous cultural practices.<sup>22</sup> The global popular protest marches and rallies today are unthinkable without the presence of giant puppets, costumes of endangered species and other creative props, and a militant yet festive beat of drum corps.<sup>23</sup> The fourth WSF held in India in 2004<sup>24</sup>—which gathered the largest number of participants of 135,000 to 150,000 from 117 countries—demonstrated the centrality of aesthetic communal pleasure in the growth of the movement:

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The popular and militant character of the fourth WSF resulted in part from the efforts and resources dedicated to the cultural dimension of the event, conceived not as “entertainment” or a “show,” but essentially as political expression. . . . The cultural initiatives were not shows by professional artists, but they were part of the current struggles in communities and movements.<sup>25</sup>

Thus the millenium sees the signs of convergence of global popular movements and the popular cultural revolution—which hitherto have existed primarily as a parallel universe—on the plateau of revolutionary “carnavalesque.”<sup>26</sup> The eros and passion of revolution released by the convergence enables a temporal, spatial, spiritual, and ontological mass exodus to an alternative society. Such convergence and realization of revolutionary carnivalesque, however, depends on the ceaseless pursuit of creativity and singularity both on individual and collective levels, which is the very driving force of evolution as hip hop and *Jeet Kune Do* aesthetics exemplify. The future of the social subject, on its evolutionary and autonomous path, can be possible if the popular movement would continue to “break the plane of what is considered to be the norm”<sup>27</sup> as Lee and Abdul-Jabbar’s battle break in the realm of the “unknown” and hip hop’s creative and active engagement with “rupture.” In lieu of the focus on a unifying ideology in the past examples of revolution, it would perhaps involve affect, sound, movement, poetics, beat, and an overall groove.<sup>28</sup>

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## NOTES

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### INTRODUCTION: ON POPULAR CULTURAL REVOLUTION

1. Alix Kates Shulman, "Dances with Feminists," *Women's Review of Books* 11. 3 (1991): 13.
2. Quoted in Shulman.
3. Shulman.
4. Shulman.
5. David Solnit, "The New Radicalism: Uprooting the System and Building a Better World," in David Solnit, ed., *Globalize Liberation: How to Uproot the System and Build a Better World* (San Francisco: City Lights, 2004) xi–xxiv.
6. Solnit xiv.
7. C. L. R. James, *American Civilization*, ed. Anna Grimshaw and Keith Hart (Cambridge and Oxford: Blackwell, 1993) 36.
8. Luce Irigaray, *This Sex Which Is Not One*, trans. Catherine Porter (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985) 158.
9. Ana Esther Ceceña et al., "Civil Society and the EZLN," in Midnight Notes Collective, ed., *Auroras of Zapatistas: Local and Global Struggles of the Fourth World War* (New York: Autonomedia, 2001) 40.
10. Frederic Jameson, *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991) 36.
11. Arif Dirlik systematically presents this perspective in order to delineate the power relationship that tends to be obscured by the discourse of globalization (e.g., postcoloniality). Arif Dirlik, "The End of Colonialism? The Colonial Modern in the Making of Global Modernity," *boundary 2* 32.1 (2005): 1–31.
12. Kenneth Burke, *The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1967) 234.
13. *Jimi Hendrix: The Dick Cavett Show*, DVD, Experience Hendrix L.L.C., 2002.
14. Audre Lorde, *Sister Outsider* (New York: Crossing, 1984) 38.



15. Félix Guattari, "Ritornellos and Existential Affects," *Discourse: Theoretical Studies in Media and Culture* 12.1 (1990): 66.

16. Guattari, "Ritornellos" 72.

17. Laura Joplin, *Love, Janis* (New York: Villard, 1992) 236.

18. Guattari, likewise, sees affect belonging to aesthetic and ethical paradigms as it pertains to the production of heterogeneous meaning in opposition to the general law of homogeneity in the realms of linguistics and discourse: "Affect is a process of existential appropriation though the continual creation of heterogeneous durations of being and, given this, we would certainly be advised to cease treating it under the aegis of scientific paradigms and to deliberately turn ourselves toward ethical and aesthetic paradigms." Guattari, "Ritornellos" 67.

19. Frank Kofsky, "John Coltrane: An Interview from *Black Nationalism and the Revolution in Music*," in Carl Woideck, ed., *The John Coltrane Companion: Five Decades of Commentary* (New York: Schirmer, 1998) 133.

20. John Coltrane, "Alabama," rec. 8 October 1963, *Coltrane Live At Birdland*, GRP Records, 1997.

21. Félix Guattari, *Molecular Revolution: Psychiatry and Politics*, trans. Rosemary Sheed (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1984) 167.

22. Peter Watrous, "John Coltrane: A Life Supreme," in Carl Woideck 65.

23. Billie Holiday, "Strange Fruit," rec. 30 April 1939, *Strange Fruit*, LP, Atlantic, 1972.

24. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire* (New York: Penguin, 2004) 110, 147.

25. In this sense, the popular cultural revolution finds its counterpart in Guattari's notion of "molecular revolution." Guattari, *Molecular Revolution* 253–261.

26. As my preference for the international titles of Lee's Hong Kong films suggest, I am using the original Golden Harvest versions with Mandarin subtitles in a video format as primary texts for analysis, since those dubbed versions released in the United States do no justice to the original scripts.

27. Quoted in Roy Armes, *Third World Film Making and the West* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987) 44.

28. Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, *Decolonizing the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature* (London: James Currey, 1986).

#### CHAPTER I. KUNG FU CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND JAPANESE IMPERIALISM

1. *Bruce Lee: A Warrior's Journey*, dir. John Little, DVD, Warner Home Video, 2001.

2. Law Kar, "The American Connection in Early Hong Kong Cinema," in Poshek Fu and David Desser, eds., *The Cinema of Hong Kong: History, Arts, Identity* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 64–65.

3. Law 64–65.

4. Bey Logan, *Hong Kong Action Cinema* (Woodstock: Overlook, 1996) 10.

5. I am following Stephen Teo's distinction between swordplay (*wuxia*) and kung fu, which features the fistfight rather than sword fighting. While the former is a common property of Chinese cinema in general, the latter is considered to be a genre peculiar to Cantonese cinema. Stephen Teo, *Hong Kong Cinema: The Extra Dimensions* (London: The British Film Institute, 1997) 97–109.

6. Ian Scott, *Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989) 82–96.

7. Scott 96–103.

8. Scott 82–106.

9. Scott 107–126.

10. After World War II, the Diaoyutai islands were transferred to Okinawa Territory under the United States. When the United States announced the reannexation of Okinawa to Japan in 1970, it also entailed the Japanese occupation of the Diaoyutai islands, which originally belonged to Taiwan. Benjamin K. P. Leung, "The Student Movement in Hong Kong: Transition to a Democratic Society," in Stephen Wing Kai Chiu and Tai Lok Lui, eds., *The Dynamics of Social Movement in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2000) 214.

11. Leung 214.

12. Leung 214–216.

13. Linda Lee, *The Bruce Lee Story* (Santa Clarita: Ohara, 1989) 21.

14. Poshek Fu, "The 1960s: Modernity, Youth Culture, and Hong Kong Cantonese Cinema," in Poshek Fu and David Desser, eds., *The Cinema of Hong Kong: History, Arts, Identity* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 77.

15. Felix Dennis and Dan Atyeo, *Bruce Lee: King of Kung Fu* (London: Wildwood, 1974) 49.

16. Robert Clouse, *The Making of Enter the Dragon* (Burbank: Unique, 1987) 12, 17.

17. Dennis and Atyeo 53.

18. Linda Lee 117.

19. Dennis and Atyeo 53.

20. A very good contrast in this case is *The Chinese Boxer/Long Hudu*. Although *Fist of Fury* borrows the imagery of Japanese villains from *The Chinese Boxer*, which was an international blockbuster prior to the entry of Bruce Lee, *The Chinese Boxer* (and also *King Boxer/Tianxia Diyiquan*) lacks a realistic historic framework and also is devoid of the structural contextualization of Japanese colonial power.

21. According to Law Kar and Frank Bren, the genre of “civilized drama” emerged in China from 1907 when Chinese students in support of Sun Yat-sen organized a theater troupe to stage “all spoken” plays in the Western mold. The popularity lasted until the mid-1920s. Law Kar and Frank Bren, *Hong Kong Cinema: A Cross-Cultural View* (Lanham: Scarecrow, 2004) 38, 57.

22. Law and Bren 61. Stephen Teo also points out that the governmental ban on “martial arts fantasies and tales of superstition” drove them from Shanghai to Hong Kong. Teo, *Hong Kong Cinema* 6–7.

23. Law and Bren 193.

24. Teo, *Hong Kong Cinema* 3–28.

25. According to Stephen Teo, some of the leftist companies (Longma, Great-wall, and Fenghuang) received financial support from the Bank of China, the PRC’s official agency. Teo, *Hong Kong Cinema* 18, 26.

26. Law and Bren 220–221.

27. Dennis and Atyeo 43.

28. Dennis and Atyeo 38–39; Verina Glaessner, *Kung Fu: Cinema of Vengeance* (New York: Bounty, 1974) 29.

29. Dennis and Atyeo 44.

30. David Desser, “Toward a Structural Analysis of the Post War Samurai Film,” in Arthur Nalletti Jr. and David Desser, eds., *Reframing Japanese Cinema: Authorship, Genre, History* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992) 145–164.

31. Ostensibly “gratis” reparations for war damages were distributed to various Asian nations between 1955 to 1968 covering mainly the Southeast Asian region from Burma, Thailand, and the Philippines to Indonesia and South Vietnam. The reparation payments were soon followed by the yen loan program set out in 1957, which included South Asian nations as recipients. Although gratis by name, the reparations were designed to sell specific commodities designated by the Japanese government and supplied by the Japanese monopoly conglomerates (*zaibatsu*). Kamakura Takao, *Nihon Teikokushugi No Gendankai (The Present Stage of Japanese Imperialism)* (Tokyo: Gendai Hyoronsha, 1970) 252–256; Jon Halliday and Gavan McCormack, *Japanese Imperialism Today: Co-prosperity in Greater East Asia* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973) 21–23; “Ampo 70, Part 3: South Korea in the Ampo System,” *Ampo* 3.4 (1970): 5–6.

32. Hiroshi Yoshioka, “Samurai and Self-colonization in Japan,” in Jan Nederveen Pieterse and Bhikhu Parekh, eds., *The Decolonization of Imagination: Culture, Knowledge, and Race* (London and New Jersey: Zed, 1995) 107.

33. Glaessner 32.

34. In 1968, the premier of North Vietnam, Pham Van Dong, “reportedly told a visitor that his country, having successfully fought the Chinese, the Japanese, the French and the Americans, would next have to fight the Japanese.” The following year, Beijing launched a series of criticisms against the Nixon-Sato communiqué that dis-

closed that the security of South Korea and Taiwan are “essential to Japan’s own security.” “The Region,” *Far Eastern Economic Review Yearbook 1971* (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, 1972) 28; Halliday and McCormack 242.

35. This film was coproduced with Japan’s Toho. The Golden Harvest version, however, has a different ending in which the one armed swordsman triumphs.

36. Logan 155.

37. According to Law Kar and Frank Bren, national defense films flourished between 1937 to 1939, involving the resources and talents from Shanghai, Chungking, and Hong Kong. As regards the content: “Some showed armed resistance in occupied territory while others had Hong Kong’s oppressed lower classes assisting war refugees from China, fighting against the foreign enemy and traitors, or criticizing the colonial elite who continued flaunting a luxurious lifestyle regardless of the war. Otherwise standard romantic melodramas sometimes injected patriotic slogans and philosophy.” Law and Bren 136.

38. Stephen Teo, “The 1970s: Movement and Transition,” in Poshek Fu and David Desser, eds., *The Cinema of Hong Kong: History, Arts, Identity* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 97.

39. Linda Lee 119.

40. Glaessner 24.

41. Wingtak Han, “Bureaucracy and the Japanese Occupation in Hong Kong,” in William H. Newell, ed., *Japan in Asia: 1942–45* (Singapore: Singapore University Press) 8–9.

42. The description of Hong Kong under Japanese occupation is from Ye Dewei, *Xiang Gang Lun Xian Shi (History of Hong Kong under Occupation)* (Hong Kong: Guang Jiao Jin, 1984).

43. Ye 120–121.

44. More than two thousand people were either killed, captured, or disappeared during the period of census. Ye 126.

45. Ye 125–126; 171.

46. Robert Clouse, *Bruce Lee: The Biography* (Burbank: Unique, 1988) 7.

47. Linda Lee 22–26.

48. According to Linda Lee, Lee and his martial arts students used to frequent a theater in Chinatown where samurai films were shown along with one of Lee’s juvenile films, *The Orphan*. Linda Lee 8.

49. The Editors of Blackbelt Magazine, *Legendary Bruce Lee* (Santa Clarita: Ohara Publications, 1986) 6.

50. Bruce Lee, *The Tao of Jeet Kune Do* (Santa Clarita: Ohara, 1975) 23.

51. Muro Kenji, “Cultural Imperialism in Action: Enter the Sanitized Dragon, the Politics of Karate,” *Ampo* 6.3–4 (1974): 57.

52. Japan's first exposure to *tou-di* was, according to Patrick McCarthy, through the draft system of the Meiji regime. Two recruits from Okinawa were singled out for their exceptional physical strength due to their *tou-di* training. Patrick McCarthy, *Ancient Okinawan Martial Arts, Volume Two: Koryu Uninandai* (Boston: Tuttle, 1999) 78.

53. McCarthy 71–84.

54. Muro 57.

55. McCarthy 59–69. This particular chapter consists of the translation of a transcript of the meeting of Okinawan *tou-di* practitioners in 1936. Beneath a seeming consensus to adopt “karate-do” instead of *tou-di* as an official name, some of the masters expressed, what seems to me, an ambivalent feeling toward the name change, by pointing out the factor of anti-Chinese attitude in Japan and also the fact that *tou-di* is widely accepted in China as a legitimate name.

56. The Manchukuo, which meant “land of Manchus,” was headed nominally by the ex-emperor Puyi, along with a number of former Manchu grandees and officials from the Ching court. Johnathan Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (New York and London: Norton, 1999) 370–371.

57. McCarthy 91.

58. Barthes analyzes: “Myth deprives the object of which it speaks of all History. In it, history evaporates. . . . This miraculous evaporation of history is another form of a concept common to most bourgeois myths: the irresponsibility of man.” Roland Barthes, *Mythologies*, trans. Annette Lavers (New York: Hill and Wang, 1972) 151.

59. Although focused primarily on the literary manifestations and largely European culture of imperialism, Edward Said's *Orientalism* helps one to critically examine Hollywood's role in the ideological production of otherness based on mass-produced imagery. I will touch on various aspects of Hollywood “Orientalism” throughout this book, culminating in chapter 4 with its historical contextualization, identifying its debt to the British literary tradition. Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage, 1978).

60. The description of scenes and dialogue from the film are indicated in italic in this chapter. I thank Ms. Zoe Zhou and Dr. Kate Zhou of the University of Hawai'i for assisting the translation. *Jing Wu Men* (Fist of Fury), dir. Lo Wei, Video, Golden Harvest, 1972.

61. Bruce Lee, *The Tao of Gung Fu: A Study in the Way of Chinese Martial Art*, ed. John Little (Boston: Charles E. Tuttle, 1997) 160–161.

62. Bruce Lee, *Gung Fu* 160–161.

63. Although there is no designation of time period in the film itself, both Linda Lee and Dennis and Atyeo mention 1908 as the time setting of the film's narrative. Linda Lee 116; Dennis and Atyeo 51. Considering the film's plot in the historical context, it could be any time after 1895 when Japan joined the Western imperialists in the

colonization of China, and hence, the beginning of its presence in Shanghai's international settlement and before 1927 when Chiang Kai-shek took over Shanghai, which left the foreign concessions intact but lifted a ban on the Chinese access to the park in the international settlement.

64. A Japanese freighter called *Tatsu Maru II* was seized by Chinese gunboats off Macao for its engagement in illegal arms and ammunition smuggling in February, 1908. The Japanese government demanded of the Chinese government a public apology, an indemnity, release of the freighter, punishment of the officials responsible for the incident, and remuneration of arms and ammunition. The Chinese government, under coercion, yielded to the demands. Seeing the whole affair as an erosion of sovereignty and national humiliation, merchants in Canton organized a Japanese goods boycott movement that soon spread to Hong Kong. The unity of the boycott movement, however, came to be overshadowed by the rivalry between the supporters of the constitutional monarchy (Pao-huang-hui revolutionaries) and the Republicans loyal to Sun Yat-sen (T'ung-meng-hui revolutionaries). Since the latter held a strategic interest in the arms shipment from Japan, the Republicans opposed the boycott, which only increased the militancy of the boycott movement. Amidst the heat of the boycott movement, the Japanese freighter (*Kumano Maru*) arrived with large quantities of Japanese sea products, which drove the anger of Hong Kong masses to the boiling point: a riot broke out for two days, which caused some death and injuries. The boycott movement lasted from March to December of 1908. Jung-Fang Tsai, *Hong Kong in Chinese History: Community and Social Unrest in the British Colony, 1842-1913* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) 207-237.

65. The name Hongkew is derived from that of the Japanese quarter in the so-called international settlement.

66. Chow Tse-tung, *The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960) 108.

67. In a historical context, according to S. C. M. Paine, the term "Sick Man of East Asia" represented the European power's perception of China in the aftermath of the First Sino-Japanese War. It was a modification of the original phrase "Sick Man of Europe," which referred to the Ottoman Empire. Perre Leroy-Beaulieu, a French writer, remarked in his *The Awakening of the East: Siberia—Japan—China* (1900): "the existence in the East of Asia . . . of another Sick Man, an even greater invalid and infinitely richer than the better known patient at Constantinople." S. C. M. Paine, *The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 18.

68. Alvin Y. So and Stephen W. K. Chiu point out the significance of the incident: "It was unimportant that only a dozen British soldiers were actually killed in the incident; what was important was the belief that the landed upper class and the peasantry in South China defeated the British." Alvin Y. So and Stephen W. K. Chiu, *East Asia and the World Economy* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1995) 39.

69. The Compilation Group for the "History of Modern China" Series, *The Yi Ho Tuan Movement of 1900* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1976) 20.

70. The Compilation Group 20, 33.

71. *Giwadan Minwashu: Chugoku No Koshou Bungei (The Anthology of Yi Ho Tuan Folklore: The Oral Literature in China)*, trans. and eds. Makita Eiji and Kato Chiyo (1973; Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1982) 155–172.

72. The Compilation Group 31.

73. Wang Gungwu, “Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia: Background Essay,” in John King Fairbank, ed., *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968) 50.

74. In the case of Okinawa, according to Okinawan historian Miyagi Eisho, both China and Okinawa recognized Okinawa’s political independence, inasmuch as the tributary relationship concerned only the ritualistic, symbolic, and formal aspect of the diplomatic relationship. Miyagi Eisho, *Ryukyu No Rekishi (The History of Ryukyu)* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1996) 214–215.

75. Mark Mancall, “The Ch’ing Tribute System: An Interpretative Essay,” Fairbank 78.

76. Mancall 64.

77. Key-Hiuk Kim, *The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order: Korea, Japan and the Chinese Empire, 1860–1882* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980) 118.

78. Shoji Yamada et al., *Kin Gendai Shi No Naka No Nihon to Chosen (Japan and Korea in the Modern History)* (Tokyo: Tokyo Shoseki, 1991) 27.

79. Zainichi Chosenjin Sorengokai (The Association of Koreans in Japan), *Nihon Gunkoku Shugi no Chosen Shinryakushi (A Brief History of the Invasion of Japanese Militarism into Korea)* (Tokyo: Zainichi Chosenjin Sorengokai, 1975) 16.

80. Chow 20.

81. Chow 20; Richard Rigby, *May 30 Movement: Events and Themes* (Canberra: Australian National University, 1980) 2.

82. Chow 158.

83. Chow 152.

84. Chow 107.

85. *Giwadan* 168. My translation.

86. The imagery of the Jing Wu school—composed of its physical (temple-like) structure, system of address (*Daishidai* for senior apprentice and *Yishidai* for junior apprentice), and ascetic discipline—insinuates the Yi Ho Tuan. Yet its reference to Yi Ho Tuan remains only formal as the school as a whole is devoid of the militant direct actions that comprised the core element of the movement. The essential characteristics of Yi Ho Tuan are instead congealed in the individuality of Chen Zhen.

87. Quoted in Rigby 21.

88. Chow 109–116; Rigby 34–37.

89. Literally it is “Japanese kid (small one).” However, as it was common among the Chinese people to refer to Japanese invaders as *Dongyang guizi* (East Asian devil) or *Riben guizi* (Japanese devil) during wartime and even today among the survivors, I used this term to salvage the emotional content of the words. As for the term *Dongyang guizi* and *Riben guizi*, see Honda Katsuichi, *The Nanjing Massacre: A Japanese Journalist Confronts Japan’s National Shame*, ed. Frank B. Gibney, trans. Karen Sandness (Armonk and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1999) 47.

90. Fujiwara Akira, Commentary, in Honda Katsuichi, *The Nanjing Massacre: A Japanese Journalist Confronts Japan’s National Shame*, ed. Frank B. Gibney, trans. Karen Sandness (Armonk and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 295.

91. During the Japanese invasion of Port Arthur, the Japanese army committed atrocities upon civilians (including women and children) in retaliation against the mutilation of Japanese soldiers by Chinese insurgents. An American journalist, James Creelman, made his observation in *The World* published in New York: “The Japanese troops entered Porth Arthur on Nov. 21 and massacred practically the entire population in cold blood. . . . The defenseless and unarmed inhabitants were butchered in their houses and their bodies were unspeakably mutilated. There was an unrestrained reign of murder which continued for three days. The whole town was plundered with appalling atrocities.” Quoted in Paine 213.

92. A year after the Nine Eighteen, three thousand villagers were massacred in an assembly-line execution by machine gun fire at Pingding mountain village, adjacent to Fushun. Yin and Young 292.

93. Yin and Young 296.

94. Honda, in his *The Nanjing Massacre*, traces the footsteps of the tenth army landed on Hangzhou Bay and the Shanghai Expeditionary Force landed on Shanghai with the testimonies of survivors in Suzhou, Wuxi, Changzhou, Jurong, and Zhenjiang.

95. According to James Yin and Shi Young, the population of Nanjing prior to the Japanese invasion was 500,000 to 600,000, which dropped to 170,000 in April 1939. They also point out that while the daily death toll at Auschwitz between June 1940 to January 1945 was 879, it was 8,095 in Nanjing in a mere six weeks. Yin and Young 279–280.

96. Honda records the story of survivors who witnessed the execution of over two thousands, three to four thousands, seven to eight thousands, and also the testimony of a Japanese army officer who was involved in the execution of 13,500 prisoners. The death toll of this incident from the Chinese side based on a commissioned officer of the Nanjing Defense Corps, however, is over twenty thousand. Honda, *The Nanjing Massacre* 236–246.

97. They included beheading with the Japanese sword, bayonet drills, live burials, and rapes and gang rapes—which targeted young girls of barely ten years old to old women in their seventies—usually followed by murder and mutilation (including the killing of the unborn by ripping the mother’s belly). The IMTFE or Tokyo War Crime Trial concluded that the twenty thousand cases of rape occurred during the first month of the occupation. The international community in the Safety Zone compiled the sta-



tistics of eighty thousand cases of rape between February to the summer of 1938, which occurred after the most intense phase of the atrocities. Yin and Young 186–217.

98. JPRI (Japan Policy Research Institute), *Special Report: The CLA and Japanese Politics* (Working Paper No. 11) (Washington, DC: Japan Policy Research Institute, 1995); John G. Roberts, “Lockheed-Japan Watergate Connection: A “Kwantung Army” on the Multinational Front,” *Ampo* 8.1 (1976): 6–15.

99. Honda Katsuichi, *Chugoku no Tabi* (Journey to China) (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1981).

100. The articles written by Yamamoto Shichihei and Suzuki Akira first appeared in the journal published by Bungei Shunji that was responsible for white-washing the Nanjing massacre during the war. Takahashi Ryuji, “Kabushiki Gaisha Bungei Shunju No Sensochu To Genzai O Kangaeru (Investigating the Bungei Shunju Inc. in its role in wartime and the present), in Honda Katsuichi, Hora Tomio, and Fujiwara Akira, eds., *Nankin Jiken O Kangaeru* (Investigating the Nanjing Atrocities) (Tokyo: Otsuki Shotten, 1987) 201–223.

101. Yin and Young 182–183; Honda, *The Nanjing Massacre* 125–135; Iris Chang, *The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II* (New York: Basic, 1997) 55–59.

102. Fujiwara 294.

103. Jameson, *Postmodernism* 5.

104. Paek Ki Wong, *Ko-nichi Minzoku-ron* (On Anti-Japanese Nationalism), trans. Kosugi Katsuji (Tokyo: Takushoku Shobo, 1975) 10–20. I thank my former colleague In-Young Kim for supplying me with background information on Paek Ki Wong.

105. Paek 11–12.

106. Paek 12.

107. Paek 15.

108. Paek 15.

109. Paek 16.

110. Paek 13, 16.

111. Zainichi Chosenjin Sorengokai 84.

112. Honda, *The Nanjing Massacre* 117, 261.

113. Honda, *The Nanjing Massacre* 164, 217.

114. Honda, *The Nanjing Massacre* 130.

## CHAPTER 2. BURNING ASIA: BRUCE LEE'S KINETIC NARRATIVE OF DECOLONIZATION

1. Linda Lee 116.

2. Miyagi 54–66, 77–80; George Kerr, *Okinawa: The History of an Island People* (Tokyo: Tuttle, 2000) 65–82.

3. Miyagi 78–80; Kerr 75–76.
4. Miyagi 87.
5. Miyagi 178–179; Mitsugu Sakihara, “Part A: Pre-modern Okinawa,” afterword, Kerr 543–544.
6. Iha Fuyu, *Iha Fuyu Senshu: Jokkan* (The Selected Works of Iha Fuyu: Volume One) (Naha: Okinawa Taimususha, 1961) 420–421.
7. Taira Shinken, *Ryukyu Kobudo Taikan* (The Encyclopedia of Ryukyu Kobudo) (1964; Ginowan: Yojushorin, 1997) 43, 44, 47. According to Taira, it is indicated by the fact that some aspects of *Kobudo* have converged with folkdance whose variegated styles are preserved and performed today. Furthermore, Taira observes that the techniques of *Bo-jutsu* are focused around certain positions designed specifically for a defense against poisonous snakes, a common encounter in rural settings.
8. Don Chaplan, “Ryukyu Kobudo: Ancient Weaponry of the Ryukyu Islands,” *Gateway Network News* 2.1 (2001): 27. I thank Pete Shimazaki Doktor for providing me with this journal.
9. Chaplan 55–59; McCarthy 21.
10. Taira 55.
11. “The Empty Hand—A Century of Karate,” *Gateway Network News* 2.1 (2001): 25.
12. McCarthy 60, 82–83, 90–91.
13. Desser 146.
14. For the kinetic analysis of this section and the following section, I am indebted to my martial arts teacher, Mr. Kawika Lam, who shared his knowledge and expertise in wing chun do, small circle jujitsu, and boxing in our training sessions.
15. Hsiung-Ping Chiao, “Bruce Lee: His Influence on the Evolution of the Kung Fu Genre,” *Journal of Popular Film and Television* 9.1 (1981): 34.
16. Bruce Lee, *Chinese Gung Fu: The Philosophical Art of Self-Defense* (Santa Clarita: Ohara, 1963) 7, 82.
17. Burton Watson, introduction, *Chuang Tzu: Basic Writings*, by Chuang Tzu (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964) 5. Hakim Bey also expounds on Chuang Tzu’s grassroots orientation in contradistinction with Lao Tzu: “Lao Tzu’s goal seems to have been the conversion of the Emperor to Taoism on the assumption that if the ruler does nothing (wu wei) the empire will run itself spontaneously. Chuang Tzu however shows almost no interest in advising rulers (except to leave him alone!), and his examples of ‘real humans’ are almost always workmen (butchers, cobblers, cooks) or drop-out hermits, or bandits. If Chuang Tzu can be said to advocate a social program—I’m not sure he does—it certainly has nothing to do with any imperial/bureaucratic/Confucian values or structures. His ‘program’ could be summed up in the phrase AIMLESS WANDERING.” Hakim Bey, *Aimless Wandering: Chuang Tzu’s Chaos Linguistics* (La Farge: Xexoxial Editions, 1993) 5

18. Chuang Tzu, *Basic Writings*, trans. Burton Watson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964) 46–49. One of Cook Ting’s statements goes: “What I care about is the Way, which goes beyond skill. When I first began cutting up oxen, all I could see was the ox itself. After three years I no longer saw the whole ox. And now—now I go at it by spirit and don’t look with my eyes. Perception and understanding have come to a stop and spirit moves where it wants.”

19. Bruce Lee, *The Tao of Gung Fu: A Study in the Way of Chinese Martial Art* (Boston: Charles E. Tuttle, 1997) 31, 119, 139.

20. Bruce Lee, *Jeet Kune Do: Bruce Lee’s Commentaries on the Martial Way*, ed., John Little (Boston: Charles E. Tuttle, 1997) 356.

21. Lao Tsu, *Tao Te Ching*, trans. Gia-Fu Feng and Jane English (1972; New York: Vintage, 1989) 53.

22. According to Gilbert L. Johnson, Lee sought philosophical inspiration outside Chinese philosophy, such as Spinoza and Krishnamurti, for the formulation of *Jeet Kune Do* philosophy. Lee himself talks about his intention of going beyond Chinese classical arts even though he still identifies his arts Chinese. Gilbert Johnson, introduction, *Tao of Jeet Kune Do*, Bruce Lee 5; Bruce Lee, *Jeet Kune Do* 53.

23. Bruce Lee, *Tao of Jeet Kune Do* 18.

24. David Chow and Richard Spangler, *Kung Fu: History, Philosophy and Technique* (Hollywood: Unique, 1980) 59–60.

25. Bruce Lee, *Tao of Jeet Kune Do* 23. Here once again Lee is having a close encounter with his predecessor, Chuang Tzu: “Thus the sage does not bother with these distinctions but seeks enlightenment from heaven. So he sees ‘this,’ but ‘this’ is also ‘that,’ and ‘that’ is also ‘this.’ ‘That’ has elements of right and wrong, and ‘this’ has elements of right and wrong. Does he still distinguish between ‘this’ and ‘that’ or doesn’t he? When there is no more separation between ‘this’ and ‘that,’ it is called the still-point of Tao. At the still-point in the center of the circle one can see the infinite in all things. Right is infinite; wrong is also infinite. Therefore it is said, ‘Behold the light beyond right and wrong.’” Chuang Tsu, *Inner Chapters*, trans. Gia-Fu Feng and Jane English (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974) 29.

26. Lee phrases this point as: “Classical concentration is exclusion, whereas awareness is total and excludes nothing.” Bruce Lee, *Jeet Kune Do* 333.

27. Bruce Lee, *Jeet Kune Do* 355.

28. Bruce Lee, *Jeet Kune Do* 355.

29. Bruce Lee, *Jeet Kune Do* 33, 62, 334, 335, 355.

30. Bruce Lee, *Tao of Jeet Kune Do* 15.

31. Bruce Lee, *Tao of Jeet Kune Do* 18.

32. Bruce Lee, *Tao of Jeet Kune Do* 65.

33. Mao’s martial philosophy intersects with that of Lee only at this particular stage where the paradigm of “guerilla warfare” reigns predominant. As the Red Army

shifts its focus from guerilla warfare per se to an integrated approach in mobile warfare, their shared area of interests diminishes. Mao saw guerilla warfare only in transitory significance: “when the Red Army reaches a higher stage, we must gradually and consciously eliminate them [the characteristics of guerilla warfare] so as to make the Red Army more centralized, more uniform, more disciplined, and more methodical and exact in its work—in short, more regular in character.” Mao Tse-tung, *Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1954) 121.

34. Mao 106–107.

35. Mao 107.

36. Marta E. Savigliano, *Tango and Political Economy of Passion* (Boulder: Westview, 1995) 4.

37. Savigliano 17.

38. Savigliano 19.

39. Under a rubric of the “Latest Tango Steps,” Savigliano engages with feminism, postmodernism, and postcolonialism, which provide a liberating insight on the one hand and yet ossify the very liberating process on the other hand in the sphere of cultural politics. Savigliano 207–238.

40. Bruce Lee, *Tao of Jeet Kune Do* 16.

41. David Clarke's analysis of the decolonizing artistic expression in Hong Kong's contemporary arts situated in the handover from Britain to China reinforces the points made here. Given the condition in which the course of Hong Kong's future was overdetermined by two external powers, the people in Hong Kong were made to feel to be the “passive objects of history.” The artists therefore have resorted to tactical engagement to dissolve the binary that Britain and China represented (i.e., west/east, modern/tradition, capitalist/socialist, colonial/postcolonial, etc.) by the active use of irony, mimicry, return to the private realm, and fragmentation of conventional imagery and its reconstitution in a new context, in order to retain selfhood, temporary as it may be. David Clarke, *Hong Kong Art: Culture and Decolonization* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002).

42. Alvin Y. So, *Hong Kong's Embattled Democracy: A Societal Analysis* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999) 35.

43. Stephen Wing Kai Chiu and Tai Lok Lui, “Changing Political Opportunities and the Shaping of Collective Action: Social Movements in Hong Kong,” introduction, in Stephen Wing Kai Chiu and Tai Lok Lui, eds., *The Dynamics of Social Movement in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2000) 7.

44. So 29, 35.

45. So 37.

46. From Alvin Y. So's comments at the oral presentation of my doctoral dissertation in May, 1998.

47. Linda Lee 102–103.

48. Rob Steven, *Japan's New Imperialism* (Hampshire and London: Macmillan, 1990) 171–187.
49. Ross Prizzia and Narong Sinsawasdi, *Thailand: Student Activism and Political Change* (Bangkok: Allied, 1974) 16–44.
50. Ohara Ken, “On the Boycott Movement: Dynamics of Imperialist Politics,” *Ampo* 17 (1973): 56.
51. Ohara 5.
52. Ohara 5.
53. Ohara 5.
54. Renato Constantino, *The Second Invasion: Japan in the Philippines* (Quezon City: Karrel, 1989) 32.
55. “Tanaka Blows Up a Storm,” *Far Eastern Economic Review* (January 21, 1974): 13–16; “Tonan Ajia no Han Nichi Kanjo (The Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Southeast Asia),” *Kiwado Uochingu Nihon 1948–1992* (Japan’s History According to Key Words) (Tokyo Jiyu Kokuminsha, 1992) 78–79.
56. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2000) 105–109; 132–134.
57. Hardt and Negri, *Empire* 107–109.
58. Jinatasana, “An Independent Thai Student Movement?: Some Comments on Ammuaychai’s Article,” in Asian Students Association, ed., *Imperialism—No! Democracy—Yes: Student Movements in the ASEAN Region* (Kuala Lumpur: Institute for Social Analysis, 1984) 100.
59. National Anti-Fascism Front of Thailand, “Three Years of Thai Democracy,” *Ampo* 8.3 (1976): 3.
60. League of Filipino Students, “The Philippines Student Movement: Gong Beyond the Classroom Walls,” in Asian Students Association, ed., *Imperialism—No! Democracy—Yes: Student Movements in the ASEAN Region* (Kuala Lumpur: Institute for Social Analysis, 1984) 125–126.
61. League of Filipino Students 126.
62. Leung 220.
63. So 52–54.

CHAPTER 3. MUTINY IN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE:  
BRUCE LEE MEETS JIMI HENDRIX

1. The description of the Seattle uprising is based on: John Nichols, “Now What: Seattle Is Just a Start,” *Progressive* (January 2000): 16–19; Louis Hernandez Navarro, “The Revolt of the Globalized,” *Darknight Field Notes* 16: 5–6; *This Is What Democracy Looks Like*, dir. and prod. Jill Freidberg and Rick Rowley, film, The Inde-

pendent Media Center and Big Noise Films, 2000; José Corrêa Leite, *The World Social Forum: Strategies of Resistance*, trans. Traci Romine (Chicago: Haymarket, 2005) 55–63.

2. Armes 46.

3. According to Allen J. Scott, the emergence of Hollywood has more to do with the search for a new mode of industrial structure than the climate and exotic imagery as conventionally held. Allen J. Scott, *On Hollywood: The Place, The Industry* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005) 11–34.

4. Tino Balio, “Part II/Struggles for Control, 1908–1930,” in Tino Balio, ed., *The American Film Industry* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985) 122.

5. S. Christopherson and M. Storper, “The City as Studio; the World as Back Lot: The Impact of Vertical Disintegration on the Location of the Motion Picture Industry,” *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 4 (1986): 306.

6. Richard Koszarski, *An Evening’s Entertainment: The Age of the Silent Feature Picture, 1915–1928* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1990) 100.

7. Quoted in Thomas Guback, “Hollywood’s International Market,” in Tino Balio, ed., *The American Film Industry* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985) 466.

8. Balio, “Part II” 128–131; “Part III/A Mature Oligopoly, 1930–1948,” in Tino Balio, ed., *The American Film Industry* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985) 253.

9. Guback 473.

10. Balio, “Part III” 268; Allen J. Scott 30–31.

11. Allen J. Scott 154.

12. Guback 471–473.

13. Guback 471–473; Noam Chomsky, *World Orders Old and New* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) 42.

14. Tino Balio, *United Artists: The Company that Changed the Film Industry* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987) 223.

15. Balio, “Part III” 271–279.

16. Les Levidow, “Foreclosing the Future,” *Science as Culture* 8 (1990): 65.

17. David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Oxford and Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1989) 141–172.

18. Tino Balio, “Part IV/ Retrenchment, Reappraisal, and Reorganization, 1948–,” in Tino Balio, ed., *The American Film Industry* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985) 419–420.

19. Harvey, *Postmodernity* 164.

20. Guback 474.

21. Throughout the 1960s, American films produced abroad rose from 35 percent to 60 percent of total output. As far as the governmental subsidy is concerned, in

1965, for example, 80 percent of the British subsidy (known as the Eady Pool fund) was drained to the British subsidiaries of Hollywood majors. Guback 479; Richard Maltby, *Harmless Entertainment: Hollywood and the Ideology of Consensus* (Metuchen and London: Scarecrow, 1983) 82.

22. Balio, *United Artists* 233.

23. Maltby 305–307; Balio, “Part IV” 438.

24. Maltby 307.

25. Balio, “Part IV” 439–440.

26. Toni Negri, *Revolution Retrieved: Selected Writings on Marx, Keynes, Capitalist Crisis and New Social Subjects 1967–1983* (London: Red Notes, 1988) 29; Eloina Palaez and John Holloway, “Learning to Bow: Post-Fordism and Technological Determinism,” *Science and Culture* 8 (1990): 23.

27. George Caffentzis, “The Work/Energy Crisis and the Apocalypse,” in Midnight Notes Collective, ed., *Midnight Oil: Work, Energy, and War, 1973–1992* (New York: Autonomedia, 1992) 215–271; *From Capitalist Crisis to Proletarian Slavery: An Introduction to Class Struggle in the U.S., 1973–1998* (Jamaica Plain: Midnight Notes, 1998); Mario Montano, “Notes on the International Crisis,” in Midnight Notes Collective, ed., *Midnight Oil: Work, Energy, and War, 1973–1992* (New York: Autonomedia, 1992) 115–141; Selma James and Mariarosa Dalla Costa, *Sex, Race and Class* (Bristol: Falling Wall, 1975).

28. Caffentzis, “Work/Energy Crisis” 249.

29. Jean Baudrillard sees that in postmodernity the capitalist commodity relationship has been overtaken by the relationship between simulacrum, virtuality which exists on its own without an organic link with the real. Jean Baudrillard, *Simulacra and Simulation*, trans., Sheila Glaser (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994).

30. David Harvey, “Flexibility: Threat or Opportunity?” *Socialist Review* 21.1 (1991): 67.

31. Susan Sontag, *On Photography* (New York: Noonday, 1989) 178–179.

32. Harvey, *Postmodernity* 152.

33. Caffentzis, *Capitalist Crisis* 18–21. For a discussion on prison labor in the age of global capitalism, see Dark Night Field Notes’ special issue on the prison industrial complex, *Prisons in the Era of Neoliberalism*, *Dark Night Field Notes*, 11.

34. *Hearts of Darkness: Film Maker’s Apocalypse*, dir., Elenor Coppola, Video, Paramount, 1991.

35. Caffentzis, “Work/Energy Crisis,” 234; Harvey, “Flexibility” 73.

36. Harvey, “Flexibility” 73; Balio, *United Artists* 306–309.

37. Robert Gustafson, “‘What’s Happening to Our Pix Biz?’ From Warner Brothers to Warner Communication Inc.,” Balio, ed. 577.

38. Gustafson 580–581.

39. Fred Goodman, *The Mansion on the Hill: Dylan, Young, Geffen, Springsteen, and the Head-On Collision of Rock and Commerce* (New York: Vintage, 1997) 46.

40. Goodman 49.

41. The description of the “Human Be-in” is by the *San Francisco Oracle*, a journal out of the Haight-Ashbury based countercultural community between 1966 and 1968. Quoted in Robert S. Ellwood Jr., *The Sixties Spiritual Awakening: American Religion Moving from Modern to Postmodern* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1994) 28–29, 33.

42. Goodman 43.

43. Harry Shapiro and Caesar Glebbeek, *Jimi Hendrix: Electric Gypsy* (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin Press, 1995) 384.

44. *Jimi Hendrix: Live at Woodstock*, video, Experience Hendrix L.C.C., 1999. Prior to the release of the video in the United States by Hendrix’s estate, it was available only through a bootleg copy of a video released exclusively in Japan.

45. Since Bob Dylan’s move to Woodstock in the early 1960s, “the town became a mecca for musicians like the Band, Paul Butterfield, Van Morrison, Tim Hardin, and Geoff and Maria Muldaur.” The jam sessions at the Tinker Street Cinema included Buddy Miles, Taj Mahal, Paul Butterfield, David Sanborn, members of Santana, Jimi Hendrix, and others. Goodman 102; Shapiro and Glebbeek 382.

46. Jimi Hendrix himself defines his engagement with social realism in response to the critics’ misrepresentation of his expression: “My world—that’s hunger, it’s the slums, raging ‘race hatred’ and it is happiness of the kind that you can hold in a hand, nothing more.” Jimi Hendrix, *Jimi Hendrix in His Own Words*, ed. Toni Brown (New York: Omnibus, 1994) 76.

47. Monika Dannemann, *The Inner World of Jimi Hendrix* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995) 108.

48. As the video *Jimi Hendrix at Woodstock* shows, the film was originally shot from at least four different angles.

49. Maltby 307–309.

50. Hendrix himself states, “But on the whole my school was pretty relaxed. We had Chinese, Japanese, Puerto Ricans and Filipinos.” Hendrix, *In His Own Words*, 10.

51. Shapiro and Glebbeek 70.

52. Dourba Bin Wahad et al., *Still Black and Still Strong: Survivors of the U.S. War Against Black Revolutionaries* (New York: Semiotext[e], 1993) 223.

53. Howard Zinn, *A People’s History of the United States* (1980; New York: Harper Perennial, 1990) 451.

54. Bin Wahad et al. 221–222; Philip S. Foner, introduction, *The Black Panthers Speak*, ed. Philip S. Foner (1970; New York: Da Capo Press, 1995) xxvi.

55. David Henderson, *Jimi Hendrix: Voodoo Child of the Aquarian Age* (New York: Doubleday, 1978) 379.



56. Jimi Hendrix. *Band of Gypsies Live at the Fillmore East*, LP, Experience Hendrix, L.L.C., 1999.

57. David Henderson 391; Shapiro and Glebbeek 737–739.

58. According to Hendrix himself, “My grandmother used to tell me the beautiful Indian stories. I used to see her a lot, you know, and she used to make these clothes for me. And so then, after I stayed with her for a while, you know, I used to go back and take these clothes to school and wear them and all that and, you know, people would laugh and all this mess.” Jimi Hendrix, *In His Own Words* 9.

59. Zinn 516–517; Bruce Johansen and Roberto Maestas, *Wasi'chu: The Continuing Indian Wars* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979) 186–193.

60. Zinn 517–518.

61. Johansen and Maestas 200, 202.

62. Johansen and Maestas 200.

63. Hendrix's grip on the rhythmic component of voodoo was so authentic that a musician of Ghanan descent (Rocki aka Kwasi Dzidzornu), whose father was a voodoo priest, asked Hendrix where he had learned a particular voodoo rhythm that his father used to dedicate to the “god of thunder and lightning.” David Henderson 301.

64. See note 58.

65. David Henderson 304.

66. Dannemann 108.

67. Dannemann 108.

68. Dannemann 118; Hendrix, *Band of Gypsies Live at Fillmore East*.

69. Hendrix, *Band of Gypsies Live at Fillmore East*.

70. Michael Fairchild, introduction, *Cherokee Mist: The Lost Writings of Jimi Hendrix*, by Jimi Hendrix, Bill Nitopi, ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 1993) xxv.

71. Frank Water, *Book of Hopi* (New York: Viking, 1963) 9.

72. Hendrix, *In His Own Words*, 50–51.

73. Quoted in Mark Summer Harvey, “Jazz Time and Our Time: A Viewpoint Outside In,” in Angela M. S. Nelson, ed., *This Is How We Flow: Rhythm in Black Cultures* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1999) 20.

74. Water 4.

75. One of the examples of corporate intervention is the case of the *Electric Ladyland* album. In the production of the album, Hendrix made a conscious effort to move beyond his psychedelic pop image both in terms of the sound and the visual content, thereby presenting a concept-based album in its totality. He attempted to exert self-control over the image package of *Electric Ladyland* as a producer of an album by laying out the design of a record cover and inner sleeves that reflected the new sound aesthetics beyond the confinement of psychedelic imagery. Warner Brothers, however,

rejected the new cover design and reimposed an earlier (recycled) image of the psychedelic “Jimi Hendrix Experience.”

76. Robert S. Ellwood Jr., *Alternative Altars: Unconventional and Eastern Spirituality in America* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1979) 136–166.

77. Ellwood, *The Sixties* 25–35, 81–87, 192–200.

78. Linda Lee 96.

79. Linda Lee 97.

80. Darrell Y. Hamamoto, *Monitored Peril: Asian Americans and the Politics of TV Representation* (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1994) 238.

81. David Chow and Richard Spangler, *Kung Fu: History, Philosophy, and Technique* (Hollywood: Unique Publications, 1980) 194.

82. Hamamoto 238.

83. John A. Lent, *The Asian Movie Industry* (London: Christopher Helm, 1990) 99.

84. Lent 99.

85. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 18. According to David Desser, the commercial success of *Superfly*, the TV series *Kung Fu*, and the distribution of *King Boxer (Five Fingers of Death)* orchestrated by Warner Brothers ignited the kung fu craze in the U.S. market, which in turn set the stage for the success of *Enter the Dragon*. David Desser, “The Kung Fu Craze: Hong Kong Cinema’s First American Reception,” in Poshek Fu and David Desser, eds., *The Cinema of Hong Kong: History, Art, Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 24–27.

86. Dennis and Atyeo 60.

87. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 18–22

88. C. L. R. James, *Mariners, Renegades and Castaways: The Story of Herman Melville and the World We Live In* (Detroit: Bewick/ED, 1978) 63.

89. Clive Hamilton, “Capitalist Industrialization in the Four Little Tigers of East Asia,” in Peter Limquaco and Bruce McFarlane, eds., *Neo-Marxist Theories of Development* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983) 165

90. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 18.

91. Lent 99.

92. Linda Lee 106.

93. Due to the centrality of anti-Japanese imperialism in kung fu films and also to the dominance of right-wing forces in the Japanese film industry, kung fu films from Hong Kong weren’t imported by Japan until Bruce Lee’s international break with *Enter the Dragon* in 1973.

94. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 22

95. Glaessner 36.

96. Lent 100.

97. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 22.

98. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 62.

99. In order to differentiate Bruce Lee from his character name, Lee, in *Enter the Dragon*, I put the character name in quotations.

100. J. W. Henderson, "The New International Division of Labor and American Semiconductor Production in Southeast Asia," in C. J. Dixon, D. Drakakis-Smith, and H. D. Watts, eds., *Multinational Corporations and the Third World* (London: Croom Helm, 1986) 95.

101. J. W. Henderson 95.

102. J. W. Henderson 99.

103. It is pertinent to note here that prior to his return to Hong Kong, Bruce Lee—with Sterling Silliphant and James Coburn—was working on the film *The Silent Flute*. Warner Brothers financed their location-hunting in India, where it had a sizable "frozen fund." Linda Lee 90, 92.

104. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 117.

105. Linda Lee 141.

106. Saskia Sassen demonstrates the sweatshop production as integral to the post-Fordist mode of production in contrast to the Fordist mass production. Saskia Sassen, *Globalization and Its Discontents: Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money* (New York: The New Press, 1998) 111–131; 153–172.

107. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 91.

108. For a discussion on women's unwaged labor in the reproduction process of labor, see James and Dalla Costa.

109. Aihwa Ong, *Spirits of Resistance and Capitalist Discipline: Factory Women in Malaysia* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1987) 204.

110. Aihwa Ong, "The Production of Possession: Spirits and the Multinational Corporation in Malaysia," *American Ethnologist* 15.1 (1988): 38.

111. Ong, *Spirits of Resistance* 204–209.

112. Ong, *Spirits of Resistance* 205.

113. Ong points out that the scientific and medical discourse of modernity "medicalizes" the spirit possession out of its cultural context thereby delegitimizing the religious and cultural ground of the workers' resistance, which in turn shores up the authority of capitalist discipline at transnational factories. Ong, "Production of Possession" 39–40.

114. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 72.

115. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 116.

116. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 116.

117. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 152–154.
118. Linda Lee 107; Robert Clouse, *Bruce Lee: The Biography* (Burbank: Unique, 1988) 107.
119. Dennis and Atyeo 51.
120. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 102.
121. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 72.
122. Abdellatif Ben Ammar, “Putting Forward a Clear View on Life,” in John D. H. Downing, ed., *Film and Politics in the Third World* (New York: Autonomedia, 1987) 110.
123. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 172–174.
124. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 174–175.
125. Linda Lee 119.
126. Linda Lee 119.
127. Linda Lee 119.
128. Linda Lee 119. My emphasis.
129. Linda Lee 119–120.
130. Bruce Lee registered his protest with the producer in a letter demanding equality between the Green Hornet and Kato: “True that Kato is a house boy of Brit, but as the crime fighter, Kato is an ‘active partner’ of the Green Hornet and not a ‘mute follower.’” Bruce Lee, *Letters of the Dragon: An Anthology of Bruce Lee’s Correspondence with Family, Friends, and Fans, 1958–1973*. ed. John Little (Boston: Charles E. Tuttle, 1998) 77.
131. Logan 29.
132. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 142.
133. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 120–122.
134. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 70.
135. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 122.
136. Alexander Wilson, *The Culture of Nature: North American Landscape from Disney to Exxon Valdez* (Cambridge and Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) 176.
137. George Cafftentzis points out that the rise of the information industry is related to the pressing necessity for capital to prevent the growing intrusion of entropy (i.e., an increase in the unavailability of energy for work) into the capitalist work/energy system induced by the forces of nature: “The problem . . . is that Nature spontaneously loves chaos; it is a perpetual upsetting of plans, orders and weary doom of accumulated work, just like the lazy anarchic, drunken and riotous workers of the past. (If God is not on the side of the working class, certainly Nature is its darling.) Systems that apparently upgrade energy are eventually doomed; systems like the steam engine, or capitalism that transform energy into work (“upgraded” energy) are contin-

ually threatened with disaster, with accidents and the catastrophes of entropy invasion.” Caffentzis, “Work/Energy Crisis” 262.

138. Beyond the popular resentment with the Bush administration’s indifference to the plight of New Orleans, the entire fiasco following Hurricane Katrina in the summer of 2005 revealed the limit of privatization as a paradigm in constituting the common as the basis of humanity.

139. Mumia Abu-Jamal, “It’s Not Nice to Fool with Mother Nature,” *All Things Censored*, CD, Prison/Quixote Center, 1998. Alice Walker, in her foreword to Abu-Jamal’s *All Things Censored*, links Abu-Jamal with Zapatistas via the cosmic subjectivity in their mode of political consciousness (“trustful of nature,” to use her own words). It seems that Walker is referring to the evolving form of revolutionary consciousness in the age of transnational capitalism—where she herself is included—which I will return to toward the end of the following chapter. Alice Walker, foreword, *All Things Censored*, by Mumia Abu-Jamal (New York: Seven Stories, 2000) 15–19.

140. Abu-Jamal.

141. This is from a scene of conversation between Lee and the Shaolin senior monk, which was edited out by the producer immediately after the passing of Bruce Lee. The existence of this scene of dialogue was first brought to my attention when I watched a Mandarin version of *Enter the Dragon* produced by Golden Harvest. This version was presumably circulated in the Mandarin circuit such as Southeast Asia and Chinatowns in the United States and Europe. Here I cited an English subtitle of the Mandarin version that slightly differs from the original censored script. More discussion on the censored dialogue follows in the next chapter. *Enter the Dragon*, dir., Robert Clouse, video, Golden Harvest, 1973.

#### CHAPTER 4. ENTER THE DRAGON, POWER, AND SUBVERSION IN THE WORLD OF TRANSNATIONAL CAPITAL

1. Angela Y. Davis, *Blues Legacies and Black Feminism: Gertrude “Ma” Rainey, Bessie Smith, and Billie Holiday* (New York: Vintage Books, 1998) 25–33; 161–180.

2. Angela Y. Davis, *Blues Legacies* 175.

3. Angela Y. Davis, *Blues Legacies* 179–180.

4. Bruce Lee, *Jeet Kune Do* 34.

5. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 104.

6. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 104.

7. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 177.

8. Frantz Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Constantine Farrington (New York: Grove, 1963) 43.

9. As discussed in chapters 1 and 2, the decolonizing nationalism of the kung fu cultural revolution is based on the dialectic relationship between the Chinese and the

Japanese imperialist or the natives/people and the colonizer in which the former overcomes the formidable power of the imperialist/colonizer by means of the spiritual and material forces of kung fu.

10. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 59–60. According to Robert Clouse, Allin claimed that “he rewrote the script to include as many ‘r’s in Bruce’s dialogue as he could.”

11. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 59.

12. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 60.

13. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 122, 126. Concord was supposed to be the official partner with Warner Brothers in this project, not Golden Harvest.

14. Linda Lee 140; Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 165.

15. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 165. Even if one supposes Wall made an innocent mistake, such a mistake would be unimaginable from the perspective of Hong Kong stuntmen/women, a highly skilled and trained labor force in the Hong Kong film industry.

16. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 167.

17. C. L. R. James, *Beyond a Boundary* (1963; Durham: Duke University Press, 1993) 232–233.

18. C. L. R. James, *Boundary* 66.

19. Logan 39.

20. Siegfried Kracauer, *Theory of Film: The Redemption of Physical Reality* (New York: Oxford Press, 1960) 98–99.

21. A relevant part of the verse is as follows: “Peace and quiet are dear to his heart, / And victory no cause for rejoicing. / If you rejoice in victory, then you delight in killing; / If you delight in killing, you cannot fulfill yourself. . . . This means that war is conducted like a funeral. / When many people are being killed, / They should be mourned in heartfelt sorrow. / That is why a victory must be observed like a funeral.” Lao Tzu 33.

22. Fannon 93.

23. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 18.

24. Frederic Jameson, *Signature of the Visible* (New York and London: Routledge, 1992) 51.

25. R. L. Walli, *Vietnam: Long Road to Freedom* (Bombay: Allied, 1975) 151–152.

26. The reference to Vietnam, however, does exist marginally in the official narrative. The bond between Roper and Williams is implied in their relationship as “Vietnam Vets.” Yet it seems that its primary function is to preempt the racial relations. Similarly, the absence of interaction between Lee and Roper also seems to deter the configuration of solidarity between Black and Asian peoples.

27. Walli 132, 146.

28. Angela Y. Davis, *Women, Race and Class* (New York: Random House, 1981)
- 24.
29. General Vo Nguyen Giap, "The Political and Military Line of Our Party," in Marvin E. Gettleman et al., eds., *Vietnam and America: A Documented History* (New York: Grove, 1995) 199.
30. Quoted in Walli 12.
31. Logan 39.
32. "Martial Arts as Allegory: The Bruce Lee Films," *Official Karate* (Fall 1995): 12.
33. Twenty-five years after the theatrical release, Warner Brothers retained the scene of dialogue, as well as a segment of "Lee's" recollection of a dialogue in the final battle scene, for its anniversary special edition video (from which I cited part of the dialogue). Unfortunately, however, the retention turned out to be incomplete as the voiceover was used instead of the original sound recording. *Enter the Dragon* (25th anniversary edition), dir. Robert Clouse, 1973, video, Warner Brothers, 1998.
34. Ho Chi Minh, "Defeat American Escalation: Report to the National Assembly of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam," in Marvin E. Gettleman et al., eds., *Vietnam and America: A Documented History* (New York: Grove, 1995) 275.
35. David Hunt, "Remembering the Tet Offensive," in Marvin E. Gettleman et al., eds., *Vietnam and America: A Documented History* (New York: Grove, 1995) 360.
36. Hûu Ngoc, *Sketches for a Portrait of Vietnamese Culture* (Hanoi: Thê Giói, 1985) 60–62.
37. Hunt 359–360.
38. Hunt 361, 367–368.
39. Mikhail Bakhtin in *Rabelais and His World* alludes to the subversive potential of popular culture particularly in the power of laughter, humor, festivities, and the abundance of life and nature. Mikhail Bakhtin, *Rabelais and His World*, trans. Helene Iswolsky (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984).
40. Tran Tu Binh, *The Red Earth: A Vietnamese Memoir of Life on a Colonial Rubber Plantation*, trans. John Spragens Jr., ed. David G. Marr (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1985) 65–78.
41. Tran 69.
42. *Bruce Lee: The Lost Interview*, video, The Wolff Creative Group, 1994.
43. I borrowed the concept from John Berger. See John Berger, *Ways of Seeing* (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1972).
44. Roland Barthes, *The Fashion System*, trans. Matthew Ward and Richard Howard (1967, New York: Hill and Wong, 1983) 289.
45. Aihwa Ong talks about the Malay factory workers' spontaneous resistance through an intentional production of "defective components" that "at the end of the month, constituted an anonymous protest against mounting work pressures rather than

a collective action with specific demands on the management.” Ong, *Spirits* 211. The instances of such spontaneous acts of resistance abound in the *Processed World*, a journal dedicated to the working-class resistance in the industrialized world. The *Processed World*, however, takes the thesis to a much higher social level where making oneself as a “defective” individual—in the sense of not being compliant with the productive norm of the society or simply of having a “bad attitude”—in the milieu of factory, school, and society in general would constitute a resistance to the overall logic of capital. See their anthology, Chris Carlson and Mark Leger, eds., *Bad Attitude: The Processed World Anthology* (London and New York: Verso, 1990).

46. John Pearson, *The Life of Ian Fleming* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1966) 141.

47. Ian Fleming, *Doctor No* (New York: Macmillan, 1958) 133.

48. Flemming 135.

49. Balio, *United Artists* 257.

50. Balio, *United Artists* 259.

51. The “post-independent Jamaica” came to existence in real life when Michael Manley’s regime, which attempted to maintain the semi-autonomy with social democratic programs, was defeated in the 1980 election by Edward Seaga, a Syrian settler who collaborated with CIA and implemented the IMF programs as soon as he assumed the presidency.

52. Barbara Gregorich, “Charlie Chan’s Poppa: The Life of Earl Derr Biggers,” *Timeline: A Publication of the Ohio History Society* 16.1 (1999): 12–13.

53. Gregorich 9, 12.

54. Gregorich 11, 17.

55. One could even see Charlie Chan as the prefiguration of statehood in Hawai’i, whose bureaucratic apparatus came to be dominated by the descendants of Asian immigrant plantation workers.

56. Quoted in Chris Steinbrunner and Otto Penzler, *Encyclopedia of Mystery and Detection* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1976) 27.

57. *The Lost Interview*. Hollywood had to abandon this image formula for Bruce presumably for the same reason that it would not cast real Asians for Charlie Chan: the image of a real Asian has to be reserved for the role of a “butler” for a White master, which lies at the kernel of Hollywood “Orientalism.”

58. Cay Van Ash and Elizabeth Sax Rohmer, *Master of Villainy: A Biography of Sax Rohmer* (Bowling Green: Bowling Green University Popular Press, 1972) 18–19.

59. Van Ash and Rohmer 20.

60. Van Ash and Rohmer 68, 73.

61. Van Ash and Rohmer 75.

62. The thematic centrality of the Yi Ho Tuan movement in kung fu movies is not limited to those of the golden years during the 1970s. Jackie Chan’s *Drunken Master 2* (1994)—which was rereleased theatrically in the year 2000 as *Legend of Drunken*



*Master*—reintroduces the spirit of the Yi Ho Tuan movement to the audience in the new millennium. In this film, Wong Fei Hung, a legendary martial artist who is very popular in the kung fu movie genre, played by Jackie Chan, successfully dismantles the British colonial scheme of plundering Chinese ancient treasures. It is in fact a “counternarrative” to that of *The Mask of Fu Manchu* (1932) where Fu Manchu’s attempt at retaining Genghis Khan’s treasure in defiance of the British Museum is rendered as an evil scheme for world domination. In other words, the ongoing production of kung fu movies is none other than a ceaseless contestation over the imperial mode of representation of the Boxer Rebellion by Hollywood.

63. *Enter the Dragon* (25th anniversary edition).

64. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 194; Dennis and Atyeo 63.

65. *Enter the Dragon* (25th anniversary edition).

66. Jameson, *Signatures* 50.

67. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 194

68. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 194.

69. Edward Said touches on the American bifurcation of Orientalism involving the Far East. Said 2.

70. Barry Milligan, *Pleasures and Pains: Opium and the Orient in Nineteenth-Century British Culture* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1995) 86.

71. Milligan 38, 44–45,

72. Milligan 13.

73. Milligan 86–87.

74. Milligan 117.

75. Milligan 85.

76. Milligan 85.

77. Sax Rohmer, *The Insidious Dr. Fu-Manchu, Being a Somewhat Detailed Account of the Amazing Adventures of Nayland Smith in His Trailing of the Sinister Chinaman* (New York: McBride, Nast, 1913) 168.

78. Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations*, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken, 1969); Susan Sontag, *On Photography*.

79. Sontag 14–15.

80. Gregory William Mank, *Hollywood Cauldron: Thirteen Horror Films from the Genre’s Golden Age* (Jefferson: McFarland, 1994) 67.

81. Paul Virilio, *War and Cinema: The Logistics of Perception*, trans. Patrick Camiller (London: Verso, 1989) 68.

82. The juxtaposition of a demonized image of Saddam Hussein and the digitally reproduced image of the target of destruction, deployed during two Gulf Wars, has revealed that the war has already taken place on our retina prior to the actual destruction of Baghdad.

83. The original phrase of Virilio is “war has finally become the third dimension of cinema.” Virilio 85.

84. Scott Lash and John Urry, *Economies of Signs and Space* (London: Sage, 1994) 252–278.

85. Lash and Urry 272.

86. Linda K. Richter, *The Politics of Tourism in Asia* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1989) 25–26.

87. So and Chiu 196.

88. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 95.

89. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 181.

90. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 38.

91. Edward Said talks about “strategic formation” of Orientalist discourse and imagery based on an individual Orientalist’s “strategic location” vis-à-vis the Orient through an established mold: “Every writer on the Orient (and this is true even of Homer) assumes some Oriental precedent, to which he relies.” He gives examples of such precedent in the form of “philological studies, of anthologies of extracts from Oriental literature, of travel books, of Oriental fantasies.” Said’s point thus sheds light on the formation of Hollywood “Orientalist” imagery. Said 20.

92. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 181. My emphasis.

93. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 126.

94. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 126.

95. Clouse, *Enter the Dragon* 119.

96. *Enter the Dragon* (25th anniversary edition).

97. Masaaki Hatsumi, *Ninjutsu: History and Tradition* (Burbank: Unique, 1981) 1.

98. Hatsumi 7.

99. Hatsumi 5.

100. Marilyn D. Mintz, *The Martial Arts Films* (Rutland: Charles E. Tuttle, 1983) 82.

101. Some Filipino scholars have questioned this assumption that *kali* designates an older form of *arnis* or *escrima*. Felipe P. Jocano Jr., “A Question of Origins,” in Mark V. Wiley, ed., *Arnis: History and Development of the Filipino Martial Arts* (Boston and Rutland: Charles E. Tuttle, 2001) 3–8; Ned Nepangue, “Questioning the Origins of Eskrima,” Wiley, ed. 9–14.

102. Mark V. Wiley, *Filipino Martial Arts Culture* (Charles E. Tuttle, 1996) 39–41.

103. Mark V. Wiley, “A History of Arnis in Manila and Surrounding Areas,” in Mark V. Wiley, ed., *Arnis: History and Development of the Filipino Martial Arts* (Boston

and Rutland: Charles E. Tuttle, 2001) 57; Pedro Reyes, "Filipino Martial Tradition," in Mark V. Wiley, ed., *Arnis: History and Development of the Filipino Martial Arts* (Boston and Rutland: Charles E. Tuttle, 2001) 130.

104. Wiley, *Culture* 45, 49.

105. Mark V. Wiley, *Filipino Martial Arts: Cabales Serrada Escrima* (Rutland and Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, 1994) 23.

106. Linda Lee 141.

107. "By late 1989, the dictatorships of Latin America, many originally put in place with U.S. help and afterwards supported by it against their own people, had virtually all been replaced by 'democratic governments.'" Barry Gills, Joel Rocamora, and Richard Wilson, "Low Intensity Democracy," in Barry Gills, Joel Rocamora, and Richard Wilson, eds., *Low Intensity Democracy: Political Power in the New World Order* (London and Boulder: Pluto, 1993) 9.

108. Speaking on the post-Duvalier Haiti, Paul Farmer asserts: "As in Central America, elections were deemed absolutely necessary to lend the appearance of democracy." Paul Farmers, *The Uses of Haiti* (Monroe: Common Courage, 1994) 139.

109. Richard Wilson, "Continued Counter-Insurgency," in Barry Gills, Joel Rocamora, and Richard Wilson, eds., *Low Intensity Democracy: Political Power in the New World Order* (London and Boulder: Pluto, 1993) 145; Chomsky, 53.

110. Gills, Rocamora, and Wilson 3–34.

111. Gills, Rocamora, and Wilson 11.

112. Midnight Notes Collective, "Oil, Guns and Money," in Midnight Notes Collective, *Midnight Oil: Work, Energy, and War, 1973–1992* (New York: Autonomedia, 1992) 15. It cites "the Afghan mujahedin, the Nicaraguan contras, the Angolan UNITA troops, the Cambodian Khmer Rouge, the Mozambican Renamo troops" as examples of "Third World mercenaries."

113. As history witnessed, after several venture business deals with Hollywood, Golden Harvest took its own initiative in transnationalization in the 1980s, such as joint ventures with Australia-based Village Roadshows, and thereby emerged as a transnational media power competitive with Hollywood in the 1990s and 2000. Michael Curtin, "A Hong Kong Studio Has Wide Influence, but an Uncertain Future," *The Chronicle Review: The Chronicle of Higher Education* (1 December 2000): B16ff. I thank Kelly Kramer for supplying this information.

114. C. L. R. James, *Boundary* 197.

115. John Walton, "Urban Protest and the Global Political Economy: The IMF Riots," in Michael Peter Smith and Joe R. Feagin, eds., *The Capitalist City: Global Restructuring and Community Politics* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987) 370–377. According to Karla Kral, the popular uprising against the IMF on the street and the people's infatuation with *Enter the Dragon* and Bruce Lee took place side by side in Ghana in the late 1970s. (Personal correspondence.)

116. Walton 368–369.

117. Walton 378–382.

118. Walton 378–382

119. Walton 371.

120. I am partly inspired by Hakim Bey's concept "TAZ," or Temporary Autonomous Zone. I am, however, using his concept in a much broader sense than he does (which is focused on clandestine movements without confrontation with the State). Hakim Bey, *TAZ: The Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological Anarchy, Poetic Terrorism* (New York: Autonomedia, 1991).

121. Bruce Lee, *Tao of Gung Fu* 141.

122. *Zapatistas: Documents of the New Mexican Revolution* (New York: Autonomedia, 1994) 294.

123. *Zapatistas* 40.

124. Ceceña et al., "Civil Society" 35.

#### CHAPTER 5. *GAME OF DEATH* AND HIP HOP AESTHETICS

1. Mike Davis, *City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles* (London and New York: Verso, 1990) 183.

2. Jeff Chang, *Can't Stop Won't Stop: A History of the Hip-Hop Generation* (New York: St. Martin's, 2005) 314; Mike Davis, *City of Quartz* 307–316.

3. William Parker's classic American imperialist approach, accordingly, made active use of the Hollywood studio system as a hegemonic project. According to Ronald Schmidt Jr., Parker's LAPD took an active part in the 1950s' popular TV series *Dragnet*, wherein the normative image of citizenry was represented by a character, Joe Friday, as an exemplary model of a police officer. Ronald J. Schmidt Jr., *This Is the City: Making Model Citizens in Los Angeles* (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2005) 69–86.

4. Schmidt 91.

5. Quoted in Schmidt 91.

6. Mike Davis, *City of Quartz* 304–305.

7. Mike Davis sees the parallel between the political and economic condition of L.A. that led to the riot in 1992 and that of the Third World countries under siege by the IMF. Mike Davis, "Uprising and Repression in L.A.: An Interview with Mike Davis by *CovertAction* Information Bulletin," in Robert Gooding-Williams, ed., *Reading Rodney King Reading Urban Uprising* (New York and London: Routledge, 1993) 142–154.

8. Cornel West grapples with the definition as: "What happened in Los Angeles this past April was neither a race nor a class rebellion. Rather, this monumental upheaval was a multiracial, trans-class, and largely male display of justified social rage.

For all its ugly, xenophobic resentment, its air of adolescent carnival, and its downright barbaric behavior, it signified the sense of powerlessness in American society.” Cornel West, “Learning to Talk Race,” in Gooding-Williams, ed., *Reading Rodney King Reading Urban Uprising* (New York and London: Routledge, 1993) 255.

9. Operation Hammer consisted of militarized scare tactics: sweep arrests of “suspects” on the street and assaults on supposed “rock houses” that resulted in innocent casualties in its wake. By 1990, LAPD and the sheriffs rounded up as many as 50,000 such “suspects” mostly for trivial offenses that were processed into the gang database. Operation Hammer was also accompanied by legislation called the Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act of 1988. This Act stretched the notion of criminality to include affiliations and associations such as “gang membership” and even extended to “gang parents.” Mike Davis, *City of Quartz* 267–284.

10. Chang 366.

11. LAPD not only engaged in the destruction of the gang peace process but also manipulated the media (*L.A. Times* in particular) to promulgate propaganda, demonized the gangs, and disseminated false information concerning an imminent attack on LAPD by the gangs under truce. Ronin Ro, *Gangsta: Merchandizing the Rhymes of Violence* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1996) 25–26; Chang 381–387.

12. Ronin Ro’s interviews with Dr. Dre and MC Ren demonstrate that N.W.A. disintegrated due to materialistic individualism. Dr. Dre’s reason for not having associated with the gang culture is quite illustrative of N.W.A.’s orientation: “I went to a Blood high school and a Crip school, but I never got involved with that shit. I think my thing was, ‘If you ain’t gonna make no money out of it, don’t do it.’” Ro 61–78, 111–118.

13. Ro 6–7.

14. FBI Office of Public Affairs sent a letter to Priority Record condemning *Straight Outta Compton*, representing the law enforcement complex: “I believe my views reflect the opinion of the entire law enforcement community.” Chang 325–326.

15. Chang 396–398; S. H. Fernando Jr., *The New Beats: Exploring the Music, Culture, and Attitudes of Hip Hop* (New York and London: Doubleday, 1994) 267.

16. Ro 11.

17. Cheryl L. Keyes, *Rap Music and Street Consciousness* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2002) 220.

18. Keyes 220.

19. Ro 7.

20. The prison population expanded “from fewer than 200,000 in 1965 to nearly 2 million today” of which approximately 50 percent are African Americans. Bakari Kitwana, *The Hip Hop Generation: Young Blacks and the Crisis in African American Culture* (New York: Basic Civitas, 2002) 53.

21. Mario Africa raps on the real gangsta: “Understand something, George Bush is a gangsta. With a one word command, he can, and has, annihilated entire societies. Dick Cheney is gangsta. Here is a dude that with the wave of a hand, can wipe

out an entire species of Life from the planet. Colin Powell is gangsta. From his participation in the My Lai massacre in Vietnam, to being responsible for the genocide of Iraqi civilians in the Gulf War I & II, to his expansion of JROTC throughout high schools, his thug game is deep." Mario Africa, "On A Move," *AWOL Magazine* (Winter 2004): 4.

22. Keyes 47.

23. According to a (graffiti) writer, COCO 144: "I started in the late '60s, painting mainly on the Broadway trains, the No. 1 line. I wouldn't say it was different then, but we were doing it for different reasons. There was definitely a lot more respect for each other. It broke a lot of barriers. I'm talking about racial barriers—people from different neighborhoods, different boroughs. It wasn't a color thing, it was more like a family. We looked forward to meeting each other." Stampa Alternativa and IGTimes, *Style: Writing from the Underground (R)evolution of Aerosol Linguistics* (Vietrbo: Nuovi Equilibri, 1996) 24.

24. Bob Mack, "Bruce Lee: Still Dope After All Those Years," *Grand Royal* 1. <http://www.grandroyal.com/Issue1/feature/BruceLee/Dope.html>

25. Mack.

26. Neil Strauss, "Rap and Rock," in Alex Light, ed., *The Vibe History of Hip Hop* (New York: Three Rivers, 1999) 240.

27. Jeff Yang, "Immortal Combat," *Vibe* (August 1998): 94.

28. Coming from the Bronx where the original concept of hip hop was formed, Ronin Ro defines MC-ing, which is close to the roots, in contrast to Rap: "A real MC (mic controller) says what they feel from the heart; they don't exploit sex and violence: they'll deliver good punch lines, insults, similes and metaphors." Ro 2–3.

29. Chang 130.

30. Jim Fricke and Charlie Ahearn, *Yes Yes Y'all: Oral History of Hip-Hop's First Decade* (Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 2002) 188–189.

31. Chang 229.

32. Graffiti writers identify themselves simply as writers, according to, IZ THE WIZ: "First of all it's not even called graffiti, it's writing. Graffiti is some social term that was developed (for the culture) some [*sic*] where in the '70s." Stampa Alternativa and IG Times 6.

33. Stampa Alternativa and IGTimes 13.

34. Chang 121.

35. Stephen Powers, *The Art of Getting Over: Graffiti at the Millenium* (New York: St. Martin's, 1999) 10; Stampa Alternativa and IGTimes 20. In 1967, three thousand Black high school students with some teachers of North Philadelphia marched peacefully to the Board of Education to demand a better education relevant to their cultural heritage. Frank Rizzo, the police commissioner, ordered to meet them with brutal force that injured a dozen and hospitalized fifteen. Terry Bisson, *On a Move: The Story of Mumia Abu-Jamal* (N.p.: Litmus, 2001) 27–30.

36. *Stampa Alternativa* and *IGTimes* 38; Powers 10.
37. *Stampa Alternativa* and *IGTimes* 4, 24.
38. *Stampa Alternativa* and *IGTimes* 32.
39. *Stampa Alternativa* and *IGTimes* 46; Fricke and Ahearn 16
40. *Stampa Alternativa* and *IGTimes* 50–51; Fricke and Ahearn 20.
41. Chang 122.
42. *Stampa Alternativa* and *IGTimes* 113.
43. *Stampa Alternativa* and *IGTimes* 104.
44. Frank Kofsky, *John Coltrane and the Jazz Revolution of the 1960s* (New York: Pathfinder, 1998) 317.
45. Chang 41–64
46. Chang 62.
47. Fricke and Ahearn 5–6, 8–9, 12.
48. DJ Disco Witz testifies: “A lot of people from my era say that the gangs really never left, that the gangs became crews. I could validate that, but when I’m talking about street gangs, I’m talking about the ones that were ready to bust you up. When they transferred into crews, they more or less made the transition to hip hop. They weren’t looking for trouble. They were more or less partying and making sure nobody came in there and wrecked their party.” Fricke and Ahearn 12.
49. Chang 48–49.
50. Marshall Berman, *All That Is Solid Melts Into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (New York: Penguin, 1988) 307–308.
51. Berman 292.
52. Daniel J. Walkowitz, “New York: A Tale of Two Cities,” in Richard M. Bernard, ed., *Snowbelt Cities: Metropolitan Politics in the Northwest and Midwest since World War II* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990) 198.
53. For the postindustrial transformation of New York City, see Saskia Sassen-Koob, “Growth and Informalization at the Core: A Preliminary Report on New York City,” Smith and Feagin 138–154. For the role of Financial, Insurance, and Real Estate capital in the reconfiguration of urban space, see Robert Fitch, *The Assassination of New York* (London: Verso, 1996).
54. According to Nelson George: “In the pivotal year of 1975, there were 13,000 fires in a twelve-square-mile [sic] radius that left more than 10,000 people homeless and earned landlords \$10 million in insurance settlements.” Nelson George, “The Will to Joy,” introduction, Fricke and Ahearn viii.
55. Fitch 161.
56. Roland Barthes, *Writing Degree Zero*, trans. Annette Lavers and Colin Smith (New York: Hill and Wang, 1968) 20.

57. For a discussion on Tsang Tsou Choi, see David Clarke, *Hong Kong Art* 175–185 and “Subaltern Writing: Tsang Tsou Choi: The King of Kowloon,” *Art Asia-Pacific* 29 (2001): 68–71.

58. Clarke, *Hong Kong Art* 177.

59. So 40–41.

60. So 93–94, 119–122.

61. So 119–120, 205.

62. David Clarke refers to an art installation by a contemporary Hong Kong artist, Warren Leung, whose work is similar to Tsang’s inscription of calligraphy. In Leung’s *Dream of a Path*, the names and prices of food dishes taken from a street stall menu of the 1960s are engraved onto the floor of the former shop space. Like Tsang’s writing, the installation is not so much an act of nostalgic return to the past as an active process of demarcating the local identity of Hong Kongers against the forces of displacement catapulted by globalization as well as the handover of sovereignty. Clarke, *Hong Kong Art* 75.

63. Tricia Rose, *Black Noise: Rap Music and Black Culture in Contemporary America* (Hanover and London: Wesleyan University, 1994) 22.

64. It refers to the lyrics of Grandmaster Flash and Furious Fives’ “The Message” (1982).

65. Fricke and Ahearn 44.

66. Chang 95–96.

67. Fricke and Ahearn 45.

68. Fricke and Ahearn 45.

69. Fricke and Ahearn 44.

70. Nelson George, *Hip Hop America* (New York: Penguin, 1998) 18–19.

71. Fernando 4.

72. Fricke and Ahearn 43.

73. The description of the development of the Rastafarian artistic movement in Jamaica in this section is based on chapter 3 of my doctoral dissertation. Masa-hide Kato, *Bruce Lee Meets Bob Marley: Revolutionary Figures in the Age of Global Transnational Capitalism*, diss., University of Hawai‘i at Manoa, 1999. Ann Arbor: UMI, 1999.

74. Garth White, “Rudie, Oh Rudie,” *Caribbean Quarterly* 13.3 (1965): 43.

75. Quoted in Linton Kwesi Johnson, “Jamaican Rebel Music,” *Race and Class* 17. 4 (1976): 400–401.

76. Fricke and Ahearn 58.

77. Fricke and Ahearn 59.

78. Fernando 17.

79. Fricke and Ahearn 31.



80. Fricke and Ahearn 31; George, *Hip Hop* 15.

81. George, *Hip Hop* 18; Rose 49.

82. Quoted in Fernando 17–18.

83. The film *Bomb the System* (2002) made an interesting contrast between the urban activist scene and the writers' scene. The former engages in spreading the message of resistance to the system with the use of stencils, which does not necessarily reverberate with the overall purpose of writing. *Bomb the System*, dir. Adam Bhala Lough, Film, Palm Pictures (2002).

84. Rose 34–35; 63–64.

85. Rose 22.

86. *Stampa Alternativa* and *IGTimes* 104.

87. *A Warrior's Journey*.

88. *A Warrior's Journey*.

89. Bruce Lee, *Tao of Jeet Kune Do* 16.

90. Lee also recruited Tacky Kimura, one of Lee's first students from Seattle who became one of his trusted instructors, to the film production but his appearance was obstructed by Lee's death. *A Warrior's Journey*.

91. *A Warrior's Journey*.

92. *A Warrior's Journey*.

93. *A Warrior's Journey*.

94. *A Warrior's Journey*.

95. *Stampa Alternativa* and *IGTimes* 105.

96. *A Warrior's Journey*.

97. William C. Banfield, "Some Aesthetic Suggestions for a Working Theory of the 'Undeniable Groove': How Do We Speak about Black Rhythm, Setting Text, and Composition?," Angela M. S. Nelson 33.

98. Banfield 33.

99. Malcolm X, *Words from the Frontlines: Excerpts from the Great Speeches of Malcolm X*, LP, BMG Music, 1992.

100. *A Warrior's Journey*.

101. Bruce Lee, *Tao of Jeet Kune Do*, 10.

102. Charles Keil, *Urban Blues* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1966) 165.

103. Keil 185.

104. Michael Diamond, "A Conversation with Kareem: Thoughts on His Friend and Sensei, Bruce Lee," *Grand Royal* 1.

105. For the relationship between Free Jazz and Black nationalism, see Kofsky, *Jazz Revolution* 107–135.

106. Quoted in Rose 38. This principle also applies to the latest art form of the street, skateboarding.

107. Rose 39.

108. Rose 39.

109. Hakim Bey, *Millennium* (New York and Dublin: Autonomedia and Garden of Delight, 1996) 52.

### CONCLUSION: FROM POSSIBILITY TO ACTUALIZATION OF ANOTHER WORLD

1. Ceceña et al., “Zapata in Europe,” Midnight Notes Collective, *Auroras* 80. Other Zapatistas’ slogans that indicate a “new political, social and organizational model” are: “look down, not up,” “propose, not impose,” “convince, not destroy to win,” “build instead of destroy,” “for a world that contains many worlds.” Ceceña et al., “Civil Society and the EZLN,” Midnight Notes Collective, *Auroras* 32, 42.

2. Harry Cleaver, for instance, observes the epistemological as well as practical break brought by the Zapatistas: “For example, the Zapatistas aren’t tempted to constrain ruling party domination by carving out a larger piece of the governance pie for themselves. They believe that would confine politics to the illusionary democracy of the electoral arena. They prefer to transcend such activities by creating a space where democracy can be lived. This deeper understanding of the difference between the illusion and the reality of democracy informs everything they do and it is at the bottom of their call for creative and viable alternatives outside and transcending the state. The Zapatistas have quite explicitly rejected the dominant revolutionary project of the twentieth century: seizing state power and consolidating it in the hands of a revolutionary elite. Instead, they believe and practice the idea that their struggle is just one among many in a civil movement exercising power rather than taking it.” Harry Cleaver, “The Zapatistas and International Networks of Struggles,” *Dark Night Field Notes* 12.13: 12.

3. Cleaver, “The Zapatistas,” 12; The EZLN, “EZLN Arms Policy (Excerpt from December 26, 1997 Communiqué),” *Dark Night Field Notes* 12.13: 93.

4. The EZLN 93.

5. Joshua Paulson, “Notes from the Field: Zapatista Papers,” *Dark Night Field Notes* 12.13: 49.

6. Cleaver, “The Zapatistas” 15.

7. Cleaver, “The Zapatistas” 16–20.

8. Oliver de Marcellus, “People’s Global Action: Dreaming Up an Old Ghost,” in Midnight Notes Collective, ed., *Auroras of Zapatistas: Local and Global Struggles of the Fourth World War* (New York: Autonomedia, 2001) 105–113.

9. de Marcellus 109.

10. de Marcellus 112.
11. Quoted in Leite 77.
12. Leite 82.
13. Leite 81, 99, 136.
14. Leite 101, 106.
15. Leite 132.
16. Toni Negri and Felix Guattari, *Communists Like Us: New Spaces of Liberty, New Lines of Alliance* (New York: Autonomedia, 1990) 107.
17. Negri, *Marx Beyond Marx* 181.
18. For a theoretical overview of the subjectivity that transcends dialectical logic, see Harry Cleaver, "Marxian Categories, the Crisis of Capital and the Constitution of Subjectivity Today," in Werner Bonefeld, ed., *Revolutionary Writing: Common Sense Essays in Post-Political Politics* (New York: Autonomedia, 2003) 39–72.
19. At the first WSF, after a debate over the "use of violence in politics," the Charter of Principles adopted the policy that "neither party representations nor military organizations shall participate in the Forum." Leite 100–101.
20. Ceceña et al., "Civil Society and the EZLN" 42.
21. Felix Guattari, *Molecular Revolution* 184.
22. Monty Neil, "Encounters in Chiapas," Midnight Notes Collective, ed., *Auroras of the Zapatistas: Local and Global Struggles of the Fourth World War* (New York: Autonomedia, 2001) 49–50.
23. I have personally observed the convergence of the indigenous movement and the nonviolent antiglobalization mass movement in a festive mode of resistance in the spring of 1991. The peace camp held at Nevada Nuclear Test Site, which sits in the Shoshone Nation, climaxed in the march to the test site led by the indigenous contingent, which included giant puppets, drum corps, and also a sit-in with chanting and drumming by Buddhist monks.
24. Leite 146
25. Leite 155.
26. Mikhail Bakhtin's reckoning of the future of revolution in popular festive form seems to have become reality in the global popular movements: "Carnival with all its images, indecencies, and curses affirms the people's immortal, indestructible character. In the world of carnival the awareness of the people's immortality is combined with the realization that established authority and truth are relative. Popular-festive forms look into the future. They present the victory of this future, of the golden age, over the past. This is the victory of all the people's material abundance, freedom, equality, brotherhood. The victory of the future is ensured by the people's immortality." Bakhtin 256.
27. Stampa Alternativa and IGTimes 77.

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28. The so-called Tin Pot insurrection in Argentina in 2002 is one of the instances in which the creativity and spontaneity of the masses opened up a new possibility of social transformation. Jennifer Whitney and John Jordan, "Que Se Vayan Todos: Argentina's Popular Rebellion Part 1," in David Solnit, ed., *Globalize Liberation: How to Uproot the System and Build a Better World* (San Francisco: City Lights, 2004) 313–338; Patricio McCabe, "Argentina's New Forms of Resistance," Solnit 339–346.

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ISBN: 978-0-7914-6991-0

