

BASIC MOTIVATION AND HUMAN BEHAVIOUR

Control, Affiliation and Self-expression

VELIBOR BOBO KOVAČ

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Velibor Bobo Kovač
University of Agder
Kristiansand, Norway

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1

Introduction

Introduction

The principle aim of this book is to provide an answer to the fairly simple question Why do people do what they do? However, asking a simple question does not automatically imply that the answer will be just as simple. Indeed, it is safe to say that there are several possible theoretical alternatives when trying to supply the answer. Bearing this in mind, it is important to begin immediately by precisely defining the intentions, expectations and aims of the project being presented here. We can begin by stating that the main theme in this book is the identification and description of fundamental aspects of human motivation, their underling mechanism(s) and the effects they have on consequent behaviour. The aim is to describe a few basic underlying motivational tendencies that are common to all people when exploring the diversity of human actions. This aim is difficult and frustrating to satisfy because as we all know, human behaviour is complex, variable and above all unpredictable. Furthermore, the workings of underlying motives are per definition merely postulated, as these assumed processes are generally hidden, non-observable and, as such, difficult to study empirically. Indeed, although

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acknowledging the primacy of some motives, strong voices will suggest that there is no such thing as a basic foundation of motivation when it comes to ranking them according to importance (Pelham, 1997). For this reason, the main aim of this book is quite ambitious and therefore requires a systematic approach, convincing and credible arguments and above all clarity of the presented text.

It is safe to say that human motivation is a difficult and complex theoretical field. In defining motivation, psychological dictionaries predominantly underline two points: (1) that the field of motivation is extremely important in understanding human behaviour and (2) that the concept of motive (or motivation) is most controversial, least satisfactory (Chaplin, 1985), definitionally elusive (Reber, 1995) and has ill-defined boundaries (Evans, 1989). In contemporary theory, the notion of motivation is considered to be a hypothetical construct that causes behaviour to arise, and provides further "fuel" for its execution, direction, selection of goal(s), pause(s) and ultimately its end. The classical definitions of motivation place emphasis on behaviour as *"the activation of internal desires, needs, and concerns, [it] energizes behavior and sends the organism in a particular direction aimed at satisfaction of the motivational issues that give rise to the increased energy* (Pittman, 1998, p. 549)." Similarly, Bandura (1991, p. 69) perceives motivation as "*attempts to explain the motivational sources of behavior [which] therefore primarily aim at clarifying the determinants and intervening mechanisms that govern the selection, activation, and sustained direction of behavior toward certain goals*". Although our understanding of the basic underlying motivational processes or our ability to predict and account for specific behaviours is still unsatisfactory, it is nevertheless difficult to argue that the field of motivation represents a neglected field in both the history of human thinking and contemporary literature. Over the past five to six decades a number of specific theories, books, periodicals and research articles have been produced that delineate the most relevant motivational topics. Over the years, many subtopics have emerged, while others have vanished for good and some have reappeared, perhaps in a different form or with a new focus and using refurnished terminology. Perceived from this historical point of view, it can be noted that the main focus of analysis has gradually but steadily shifted from investigations of basic processes that organise

behavioural responses (e.g. traits, drives, instincts and needs), through behavioural theories (stimulus–response, reinforcements and contingencies) and finally towards explicit emphasis on self-regulatory processes and attempts to precisely calculate and predict the probability of goal attainment.

Thus, the existing theoretical models predominantly attempt to combine the processes of basic motivation with the processes that are involved in self-regulation of behaviour, putting a little more emphasis on the latter (i.e. goal-directed behaviour in which cognition, emotion and automaticity are combined). Put another way, one could say that over the years, the original interest in basic motivational processes has gradually faded and the theories that analyse the manner in which people energise and regulate their own behaviour towards intended goals have become more prominent. These analyses have also become more and more comprehensive, wherein they attempt to integrate the basic components of human functioning into one broad theoretical model. An illustration of this can be seen in the noticeable differences between the chapters labelled "Motivation" in the widely influential and acknowledged two-volume editions of the *Handbook of Social Psychology*. I am here referring to editions four (Gilbert, Fiske, & Lindzey, 1998) and five (Fiske, Gilbert, & Lindzey, 2010).

In the fourth edition, Thane S. Pittman, the author of the chapter on motivation, looks back on the history of the field and declares that motivation has returned as a major theme in psychological analyses. It is easy to see that Pittman organised this chapter by focussing on broad, basic and fundamental motives, and far less on particular areas of motivational theory. However, in the 2010 edition, the chapter on motivation begins, not with a presentation of basic motivation processes, as was the case in the 1998 edition, but rather with the goal concept and achievement of desired outcomes (see Bargh, Gollwitzer, & Oettingen, 2010). The chapter's later pages continue to emphasise self-regulation, goal setting and goal pursuit, and further elaborate on these themes. All in all, it is evident that the main focus of this chapter is centred on the differences and similarities between conscious and unconscious routes towards goal pursuit and achievement, and their respective effectiveness. Thus, these two chapters on motivation, that is, the 1998 and 2010 editions, noticeably differ

in terms of the main focus and theoretical emphasis (basic motivational processes as opposed to self-regulation and goal attainment). This tendency is also acknowledged by Thrash and Elliot (2001), who note that current theory is dominated by a variety of goal approaches with the aim of attaining consciously articulated ends or purposes at the expense of analyses of underlying processes. Pittman and Zeigler (2007) also explicitly state that the topic of basic human needs is surprisingly neglected and call for more analyses on this issue. In fact, these authors basically predict that exploration of basic human needs in terms of structures and different levels of analyses will be a recurring subject in the future. Despite these promising words, it still seems that the quest to find basic motivators which energise and organise behavioural acts has become somewhat less important compared to analyses of the goal construct and the provision of more precise accounts of the specific behavioural directions towards desired end states (e.g. Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007). In other words, exploration of the former is becoming an alarmingly neglected field in contemporary literature compared to the quantity of studies focussing on analyses of the processes immediately prior to the execution of behaviour.

For several reasons, I am not going to discuss here the background regarding for the increase in a preference for self-regulatory processes, as this is not important for this study. After all, shifts in emphasis in research are quite common and expected as accumulation of knowledge works as a wave that dynamically influences the emergence of new subjects of inquiry. Moreover, analyses of possible causes of any given action are always subjected to the fact that motives operate on different levels of abstraction, ranging from concrete tasks and situations, over to more general domains and dispositions, and finally to fundamental levels on which all human behavioural activity might rest (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987).

Explicit Focus on Basic Motivation

Regardless of the above-mentioned contributions of contemporary research to a detailed analysis of human action, it is unfortunate when research attention leans too far in one direction. This may directly result

in the shortage of theoretical frameworks that aim to identify and analyse the workings of the most fundamental human motivational tendencies. Although pairing motivation and self-regulation in one theoretical model is both desirable and necessary, the accentuated emphasis on the latter might blur the distinction between triggering factors (i.e. causal events prior to behaviour) and fundamental psychological tendencies that are hard-wired in human nature. This is an important distinction to make as it delineates a fundamental question: how far back in the causal chain do we have to go to provide a full account of specific human actions and, more importantly, to fully understand human nature in general?

Using a domino analogy, we can ask how far back in the causal chain we have to explore if we are to understand, for instance, why the 376th domino tile "suddenly" collapses. A complete understanding of the collapse is indeed difficult if we do not have sufficient knowledge about the structural organisation of the very first domino tiles. Even though it is difficult to develop empirical procedures that would imply the existence and the nature of these hypothetical entities, this should not stop us from developing a sound and argument-based theoretical proposition that would indicate their existence and their possible effects on human behaviour. The searches for satisfactory explanations are, however, predominantly focussed on all the neighbouring dominos, which indeed represent good candidates (the 375th domino, for example, looks particularly suspicious). Nevertheless, in many ways most of these proximate dominos, although certainly having a hand in the collapse, could be perceived as "mere" triggers. One known effect of triggers is the provision of comfort or closure in the sense that people need and want some form of explanation, no matter how dubious or superficial it might be. As a minor, yet necessary digression, it is important to note the difference between the superficial, which is definitely not good, and the simple, which might be a good and even preferred explanation. Even when explanations are made in the best manner of modern science, they still might be insufficient as they usually include variables that mainly originate from the recent steps in the causal chain.

It should be clear that it is not my intention that the opening pages of this book should offend a great number of accomplished and skilled members of the scientific community with an apparent if unintended

arrogance. The majority of the recently published work in the realm of motivation is complex in terms of detail and impressive when it comes to the use of various methodological approaches. As such, motivational theory has made clear advances, especially when it comes to understanding the workings of specific variables, such as self-efficacy, attitudes, intentions, norms and similarities, which tend to "behave" differently under various conditions. These evident contributions notwithstanding, the apparent disadvantage is that the majority of these approaches are too specific and can hardly provide a deep and multi-chained explanation of the given action ranging from visible behaviour to fundamental motivational tendencies. Excessive focus on identification of all possible proximate triggers sometimes only results in finding convenient scapegoats, with assignment of responsibility and "guilt" when it comes to how these specific variables work.

Another potential limitation of "trigger" analyses is that many complex behaviours often have a different surface expression from the original motivational background they come from, just as two brown-eyed people can give birth to a blue-eyed child. As an illustration of the difference between non-observable or hypothetical underlying motivational tendencies and motivational processes that occur prior to behavioural expression, the conceptual difference between genotype and phenotype might be used. "Genotype" is the term that refers to hereditary information about an individual, even if the genes are not expressed or directly observed. Thus, the origin of potential change is "hidden" yet has a powerful effect on human behaviour. On the other hand, the term "phenotype" refers to visible or directly observable characteristics, such as hair or eye colour. This type of information also has evident effects on human behaviour, but the information is incomplete without knowing the person's genetic code in the cells. It follows that phenotype descriptions are powerful as the evidence lies in "seeing is believing". Similarly, postulating the effects of genotypes might be difficult as their workings might not always be evident to external observation or be manifested externally. Another similar illustration, which also vividly shows the difference between non-observable and directly observable processes, is the widely used conceptual difference between homology and analogy (e.g. see Elster, 1999, on the phenomenon of addiction). Homology refers

to similarity between entities based on deeper underlying mechanisms, such as sharing a common ancestor. Analogy is the type of similarity that is based on somewhat superficial resemblance and does not necessarily indicate there is a recent common link between two organisms, or the motivational processes as is the case with the purposes of this illustration. Analogy thus refers to the several changes and adaptations between two relatively unrelated entities for the sole purpose of obtaining similarity in appearances. The widely used example of this difference is the comparison between sharks and dolphins, which indeed look strikingly similar in terms of visible characteristics. But the scientific fact is that one of them is a fish and the other is a mammal. I could go on and identify several other instances of common underlying characteristics and superficial similarity, such as the apparent etymology of certain words that only superficially look alike, the difference between surface and source traits (Cattell, 1946) or even the notion of structuralism as an example of the theoretical tradition in which the relation-specific elements and overarching structures are underlined. But the general point would be the same: the things we observe directly or the things that take place either close in time or in space might just represent scapegoats that distract us from identifying the actual causal forces. Thus, the analyses of the most recent causal effects might be misleading and not always match the basic origins of the phenomenon in question.

It is again important to clarify that the analyses of causal factors that occurred prior to the event and a better understanding of goal-oriented behaviour in general are extremely important, as they provide a viable explanation of the specific actions and are informative in terms of the prediction of behavioural outcomes. However, the possible consequence of a noticeably increased focus of contemporary theory on proximate causal mechanisms is the neglect of theoretical models that address the question of which underlying processes influence the selection of goals initially, and equally important, why. After all, motivation is more about the why of behaviour and less about the how and what. In other words, the predictive knowledge and calculations of probability about the how, and which goals should be attained, may represent qualitatively different aspects of the motivational theory than analyses of the processes that delineate why people do what they do in terms of innate fundamental tendencies com-

mon to all people. It follows that if we are to really understand a person's behaviour, we have to work our way back in the causal chain all the way to the underlying motivational agents that created the background for the given act. We have to go back or perhaps down, depending on the viewing perspective, to identify the very first dominos representing the basic building blocks of human nature. The knowledge about these a priori innate basic processes that stand for organisation of the complex human behaviour that emerges many years later is extremely important in understanding human nature and people's consequent actions.

As an alternative to the search for "triggers" and proximate causal mechanisms, the main idea in the present book is based on the premise that there are only a few underlying fundamental human motives which shape human existence and ultimately guide behaviour. The central point argued in this book is therefore the postulation that the complexity of human behaviour can be meaningfully explained by identifying a small number of fundamental motivational tendencies common to all people that are hard-wired in human nature. The identification and description of these few tendencies, or three to be precise, comprise the main aim of this book. The ultimate aim is the development of a multilevel theoretical tool that can help us to understand the motivational background of any given act. To fully understand the commonalities between people, regardless of race, gender or cultural/situational context, we have to go back and identify the very first dominos and understand their structural organisation. According to Weiner (1992, p. 4), *"the task of the motivational psychologist is to account for or explain as broad a swath of behavior as possible with as few constructs as possible".* The most useful explanations are the ones that can be applied in many different situations and across various contexts, accounting for seemingly different actions by means of one or a few underlying mechanisms. It follows that scientifically based explanations of human actions typically postulate the existence of general principles that transcend the characteristics of specific instances. Similarly, Staats concludes that "*our science is presently characterized by separatism, a feature that has a pervasive effect and that constitutes an obstacle to scientific progress. The concept of separatism describes our science as split into unorganized bits and pieces, along many dimensions.…Our field is constructed of small islands of knowledge organized in ways that make no*

connection with the many other existing islands of knowledge" (Staats, 1981, p. 239). These words precisely describe my intentions with the present book. Individual theories having a specific focus on a particular process, drive or mechanism are undoubtedly both necessary and useful for advancements in the specific field but, as Weiner and Staats jointly imply, without reference to the field as a whole, these no matter how insightful propositions run the risk of representing an isolated thinking system.

Following and exploring this idea further, the present book attempts to integrate the existing knowledge in the field of motivation into a greater theoretical framework. This aim will be achieved by developing the proposition that all human behaviour evolves from the three fundamental underlying tendencies connected to the concepts of control, affiliation and self-expression. The tendencies towards control, affiliation and self-expression can be conceptualised as systems of interrelated psychological needs that guide and govern the variety of human actions. Thus, the motivational tendencies towards control, affiliation and self-expression are considered to be a priori given coordinators of human motivation. These systems represent separate, independent and autonomous but still interactive psychological tendencies in charge of organising a variety of needs in the larger pattern. The apparent contradiction between simultaneous independency of the systems and subsequent interdependency between various human needs will be addressed in Chap. 7, where the critical theoretical concerns are analysed. Each of the three systems is assumed to be capable of satisfying multiple goals of the actor. Put in this way, the proposition is relatively simple. The obvious challenge is how to make this proposition credible. Therefore, in the process of making my arguments strong and credible, I attempt to present a great number of concepts, theoretical views and empirical results that support and further reinforce the idea of central underlying motivations. Considering that the submitted literature covers a wide range of various behavioural manifestations, I am also obliged to make credible connections between these processes, as well as to establish the connection between these processes and the three proposed fundamental tendencies. This clearly indicates that the conceptualisation of the motivational systems is compatible and includes, but also goes beyond, the existing theoretical knowledge in the field of motivation and goal-oriented behaviour. The motivational systems

proposed here consist of various need processes that are widely discussed in the psychological literature, although frequently as separate issues. My task here is to convince the reader that (1) various need processes are indeed interrelated and that (2) this cluster of interrelated need processes indicates the existence of some major and overarching, yet underlying and hidden, human motivations. Thus, if the attentive reader feels that he/she is being exposed to some "razzle-dazzle" or blinded by the quantity of the presented research and the rather dry academic writing style, it will be good to keep in mind that the main aim of this work is fairly simple: to present separate pieces of evidence to support the argument that human existence in general, as well as any specifically given behaviour, inevitably contains traces of the three fundamental above-mentioned motives. I also urge the reader not to be preoccupied with the names of the motivational systems that are used here. Assigning proper and precise labels is always a tricky business in scientific theory, as unfortunately the chosen labels might miscommunicate the main message and bring imprecise connotations to mind. Thus, theoretical terms are always related to fortunate or unfortunate choice and related to historical changes in the field, as it is always difficult to predict the connotative weight one word has. In that sense, the label "control" could easily be replaced by the terms "mastery" or "achievement", "affiliation" by "belonging" or "relatedness", and "self-expression" by "growth" or "self-actualisation", and all of them with the notions of balance or management. Nevertheless, regardless of the name or label, the main point remains: all aspects of any human action may ultimately be traced back to only three basic motivational tendencies that are related to controlling, belonging and expressing.

Why Write This Kind of Book?

This is indeed a fair question at this point, bearing in mind the quantity of existing literature on the topic of motivation, as well as acknowledging the obvious fact that this clearly represents an ambitious task. As is commonly known, many theorists in the past have attempted to describe the processes that define human nature. Aside from personal reasons and motivations that are not relevant here, I also perceive that the task of

initiating this type of analysis at this point in time is both needed and timely. This is based on the observation that the contemporary literature, in nearly all scientific fields, is frustratingly fragmented. Nowadays there are literally thousands of channels through which scientific work can be published. Although the majority of these channels are relatively credible, applying rigorous peer-review procedures, this overwhelming information flow presents at least two problems. The first of these relates to the vast quantity of this literature[em-dash]although easily retrievable by means of electronic search, the magnitude of the task basically forces the reader to undertake a superficial examination of the "evidence", which is usually restricted to a very specific scientific area. Second, and more importantly, the requirements for scientific publications are narrow, forcing researchers to direct their focus on technical elements of writing, strict methodological approaches and stringent delivery of scientific messages. Although these requirements are part of my formal training and I certainly perceive these as essential in the sense that they elevate the quality of any scientific work, people in the field might lose interest in attempts to make connections between seemingly unrelated phenomena on the grounds that such work would be hard to publish. Hence, the argument here is that advances in any scientific field require, from time to time, a pause in the form of theoretical-philosophical works that attempt to organise and make sense out of the rapid accumulation of existing knowledge. Indeed, at the present time there are very few books in contemporary psychology that aim to integrate existing knowledge in one larger framework and simply, but efficiently, provide an account of diverse behavioural occurrences. The present work addresses this limitation and attempts to provide a theoretical framework that analyses the basic origins of human behaviour common to all people, regardless of historical, cultural, social or any other diversity.

Structure of the Book

The book has seven chapters, including this introduction. In the second chapter, I present a brief historical background on the issue of fundamental motivation by mainly focussing on two main themes given in chrono-

logical order. The first adopts a historical approach and identifies several theoretical traditions and influential theorists who in one or another way have worked with the idea of fundamental motivation. This brief overview includes the ideas preceding the rise of evolutionary theory and the consequent emergence of such contemporary theoretical traditions as psychoanalysis, behaviourism and humanistic psychology. Furthermore, several other individuals of theoretical importance, such as Lewin, Cattell and Murray, will be mentioned. The second theme centres on the identification of the most recent contemporary contributions that are quite similar to the main ideas of this book. This is a necessary first step as it represents generally accepted scientific methodology, wherein one considers the obvious possibility that present propositions have already been elaborated on earlier and elsewhere, truly enough in different forms and structural organisations. In other words, I have no delusions that the present work is extremely original and totally unrelated to existing propositions.

The next three chapters (Chaps. 3, 4 and 5) will then describe in detail the content of the three proposed fundamental motivations. The main aim of these chapters is to clarify the meaning of the central concepts in terms of definitional boundaries, to describe and analyse the main need processes through which these motivations are articulated and finally to suggest that all these need processes are interrelated, thus attesting for the existence of one fundamental underlying motivation. More specifically, in Chap. 2, the concept of control will be presented using historical and contemporary literature. Based on this introduction, the need for control will be further analysed in the three all-embracing life domains: mastering environmental cues where the need for achievement is prominent, balancing interpersonal relations leading to the emergence of the need for power and managing the intrapersonal processes resulting in employment of the various self-strategies. The chapter closes with the argument that all presented evidence in different life domains strongly suggests the existence of one unifying motivation for control (i.e. control motivational system).

Similarly, in Chap. 4, the concept of affiliation will be presented as a general human disposition and fundamental motivation. The chapter will analyse the concept of affiliation in the light of interpersonal and group dynamics. Some of the most prominent and established human

needs on the interpersonal level, such as attachment, intimacy and love, will be presented. It will be also argued that these needs are interrelated and imply the existence of the larger underlying belonging motivation. The second part moves up to the collective level and analyses the way people interact with each other in terms of in-group and inter-group relations. Similarly, as was the case with control motivation, the chapter ends by suggesting that all belonging needs, on both the interpersonal and the group levels, are part of the single basic motivational force that drives and bonds people together in various social constellations. In addition to this, the closing pages of this chapter will discuss the somewhat controversial suggestion that the conceptualisation of the human need for belonging should also include the need for distance, and in this way articulate affiliation as a two-way balancing process between the opposing needs.

Chapter 5 attempts to provide a viable definition of self-expression motivation. Considering that the amount of literature on self-expression, matched to the concepts of control and affiliation, is practically non-existent, the definition of self-expression will be clarified by comparing it to some other similar concepts, such as self-realisation and autonomy. Furthermore, the concept of art, as a domain in which the underlying tendency for self-expression is clearly manifested, will be considered. The chapter will also develop and strengthen the argument that self-expression should indeed be accepted as a fundamental human motivation. This aim will be achieved by submitting the literature review that shows whether or not this process fulfils the criteria of fundamental motivation put forward by Baumeister and Leary (1995). As in the previous two chapters, Chap. 5 will come to an end with the assessment of the presented evidence and summarise the arguments that suggest self-expression is indeed worthy of consideration as a basic motivational concept. Considering that the complexity of the presented literature might be overwhelming, the conclusion sections at the end of Chaps. 3, 4 and 5 will serve the purpose of reminding the reader that the main point here is not centred on details and particularity, but rather on building the argument that all individual needs mentioned here can be classified according to a proposed tripartite motivational division.

Chapter 6 will move the focus of enquiry from the descriptions of motivational domains towards the analysis of possible underlying mechanism(s). In other words, although Chaps. 3, 4 and 5 delineate and clarify in detail the definitional boundaries of each of the proposed systems, the question relating to which mechanism(s) is/are at work in shaping behavioural expressions in these domains is still left unanswered. In general, the theoretical difference between the description of the main motivational processes and the delineation of their underlying mechanisms represents a somewhat neglected subject of enquiry in contemporary literature. Considering the importance of this issue, the point of departure in Chap. 6 is the identification of the one possible candidate that might complete the understanding of the previously presented motivational systems of control, affiliation and self-expression. The chapter starts with a brief historical overview and recognises the existence of the one single mechanism which throughout the past has repeatedly tended to rise to the surface, admittedly in different forms, having slightly different theoretical labels and depending on specific scientific traditions. This mechanism is presently termed "balanced dual tension". The chapter also includes the somewhat speculative discussion on the possibility that there are distinct kinds of balanced dual tension that are characteristic for each of the above-mentioned motivational systems.

After the aims and scientific positions have been introduced (Chap. 1), after a historical and contemporary review of the theories that are similar to the reasoning in this book have been presented (Chap. 2), after domains of motivational systems have been delineated (Chaps. 3, 4 and 5) and after the underlying mechanism(s) have been identified (Chap. 6), I am certain that the attentive reader will have noted a number of critical theoretical questions that have been left open without being properly clarified, nuanced and addressed. Hence, in Chap. 7 several questions that might challenge the arguments presented in the book will be identified, raised and addressed. The implicit point in this chapter is to clearly communicate to the reader my awareness of the existence of multiple limitations in the present analyses. Many of these points have been intentionally omitted during the presentation of the systems and underlying mechanism(s) on the grounds that some of them represent theoretical digressions that might distract the reader from grasping the main points of the present book.

And finally, the book ends with a closing Chap. 8 in which the main conclusions are summarised, implications of the present work are outlined and possible avenues for future research are presented.

All in all, the present approach adopts both analytical or molecular (examining the parts) and holistic or molar (grasping the whole) perspectives. The main aim represents an ambitious attempt to provide a meaningful theoretical tool for understanding the underlying structures (i.e. processes, forces, mechanisms) that govern human behaviour specifically and human nature in general. However, each book on motivation is unavoidably doomed to be criticised for omitting or ignoring specific traditions, processes, aspects, positions, perspectives and/or relevant persons. For example, although the term "human needs" will be frequently mentioned, a discussion on the meaning of this concept will not be provided. Similarly, the recognition of basic human instincts or the importance of the human physiological make-up and a subsequent discussion on how these interact with motivational systems of control, affiliation and self-expression will also be omitted. Before criticising this approach, I urge the reader to bear in mind that the main aim of the present analysis is the identification of the very first dominos responsible for the organisation and interaction of all subsequent developments that form human nature and behaviour. The omitted discussions on the number-specific aspects of human motivation, concepts, persons of importance, and other relevant motivational processes, are considered to be persuasively elaborated on elsewhere in numerous books and articles on general motivational processes that have been written over the course of history. All of the processes and concepts omitted here are considered to be important, but also secondary to control, affiliation and self-expression, as they tend to emerge later in the causal chain. Thus, the main theme, common to all chapters, goes beyond the proximate and even distant levels of motivational analyses and centres on the very first processes and mechanisms that shape all human existence.

I am also relatively certain that the reader might find the text here a little daunting in terms of complexity and the amount of presented research. However, I am also hopeful that the reader will find this thought provoking and inspiring. Considering the evident indefinability of the

topic in focus in this book, I strongly encourage the reader to employ his or her critical abilities in reading and judging the material. And finally, concerning the personal motivation to write this book, I take the liberty at the end of this introduction to borrow the words of Tolman (1959, p. 159) who accurately describes my academic drive. Enjoy.

> *I have liked to think about psychology in ways that have proved congenial to me. Since all the sciences, and especially psychology, are still immersed in such tremendous realms of the uncertain and the unknown, the best that any individual scientist, especially any psychologist, can do seems to be to follow his own gleam and his own bent, however inadequate they may be. In fact, I suppose that actually this is what we all do. In the end, the only sure criterion is to have fun. And I have had fun.*

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2

Historical and Contemporary Background

The Impact of Evolutionary Theory

As noted in the introduction, the main intention of this book is to outline the most fundamental human processes that affect human behaviour. Considering the importance of the subject in question, it is reasonable to assume that this kind of project, in various forms, has been attempted before. Thus, it is clear that over the course of history many thinkers have in one way or another explored questions relating to the basic components of human nature. In fact, it is possible to say that philosophy's "million dollar question" in the history of human thinking has often been centred on attempts to meaningfully reduce the enormous diversity of human behaviour to basic processes that are common to all people. However, answering the question Does diversity of human action have some common ground? depends mainly on which point of view is adopted when it comes to understanding and defining human nature. Indeed, the answer to this question might only be provided by postulating some rudimentary motivational forces that shape human existence and guide subsequent behaviour. It also logically follows that these processes should be equally common and applicable to all people, regardless of social class,

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background or origin. Moreover, and in a wider sense, such universal and comprehensive models of human motivation should also be applicable in part to the animal kingdom. As much as these requirements might sound reasonable and even trivial from the perspective of our time, the beliefs in mystical, supernatural, discriminatory and prejudicial understandings of human life and behavioural manifestations were quite influential and dominant in the distant past. As is commonly known, the development of a comprehensive theory of human existence that is applicable to all people was impeded to some degree by the dominant views on human nature that suggested different classes of human beings are not equally worthy. Thus, there is a rich human history of exclusion, segregation, ostracism, devaluation and marginalisation, and it is still strongly present where there are many examples of some categories of people being considered better or more valuable than others. Under such circumstances and under the domination of such a basic view on human nature, it is clear that it was difficult to develop models capable of explaining the apparent diversity of human behavioural manifestations, ranging from kings and nobles to the poor and developmentally challenged. In fact, it was not uncommon to postulate that men and women were also driven by qualitatively different processes in terms of motivation, as well as in terms of cognitive abilities. All this suggests that some important premises essential for developing one comprehensive theory of human motivation and subsequent behaviour were lacking. Perhaps even more importantly, the powerful existence of some other premises impeded advancements in human thought in this particular area. One of the most fundamental premises in the past that directly represented a major obstacle to the advancement of scientifically based models of human functioning was the notion of divine creation. In historical terms, one could say that the postulation of divine creation represented one of the most powerful, and in many ways most unfortunate, ideas on which all discussions concerning human nature started and ended. One of the main problems was that ancient philosophical discussions did not sufficiently distinguish between the "why" and "how" of behaviour. One could say that the "why" did not represent a problem because the majority of the postulations prior to 1850 have, without hesitation or doubt, been based on the notion of God as an initiator of all actions. In many ways, in the history of ideas

dating before the publication of evolutionary theory, the idea of divine creation could be considered an ultimate ad hoc solution or the missing link attached to the motivational explanation of human behaviour. God was also a convenient first and last variable in the line of causal explanation of both behaviour and the miracle of creation.

Although Darwin's theory of evolution (Darwin, 1859) has made many specific contributions to science, there are at least three distinct points that should be emphasised for the purposes here. First, his theory changed the basic theoretical principles for understanding human nature by moving the focus in analyses from the divine to human and physical processes. Perhaps unwillingly, and certainly not specifically aiming to attack the idea of divine creation, Darwin's work more than any other work in the realm of the natural sciences introduced the possibility that the notion of God was not necessary in understanding the origin of life in general and human beings in particular. This is why this relatively simple theory had a tremendous influence on the development of later scientific thinking, and its influence cannot be underestimated as it directly changed the basic premises (i.e. some of the first dominos) on which all the previous thinking had been built. Second, as with any good theoretical postulation, the basic ideas in the theory are fairly simple as they have a wide explanatory utility. The theory is certainly advanced in terms of specific details, but in its simplest form it suggests that behaviour is created gradually over a long period of time by promoting the "survival of the fittest". Furthermore, the theory suggests that the complexity of life on earth is only apparent or superficial in the sense that all life forms are related and originate from a common ancestor(s). The fact that the theory of evolution is so fundamental and the empirical evidence so overwhelming means that subsequent and future theories of motivation must have a reasonable degree of compatibility with the basic evolutionary principles. This kind of somewhat reductionist reasoning, which could be clearly detected in evolutionary theory, is very similar to the basic premises and arguments that will be presented in this book: the complexity of human behaviour originates from only a few (i.e. three) motivational tendencies that in turn comprise the many interrelated need processes. The third important contribution of evolutionary theory is the introduction of the whole range of new theoretical possibilities, as well as the establishment

and development of new explanatory concepts, and this led to a basic shift in research focus in terms of novel and emerging paradigms. For science, this postulation was the springboard from which to launch fresh ideas on human nature. "Suddenly", divine intervention concerning human life was neither the dominant nor necessary component for understanding and explaining human actions. The human race, once considered the chosen species and believed to be created from the image of God, was now reduced to being a relative of the apes and other animals, which was a major challenge to the religious reasoning that had dominated the history of discourse on this subject. In fact, according to evolutionary thinking, humans were perceived as playing a relatively marginal role on earth in terms of duration of existence. Evolutionary theory also deserves a high degree of credit for opening for the somewhat forbidden idea that humans have a strong animalistic side and resemble in some aspects other creatures in nature. According to pre-nineteenth-century philosophy and religion, the notion of the instincts and the general connection between animal and human behaviour were used more to point out differences than similarities. Animal motivation was exclusively considered automatic, irrational and free of choice. Human actions and life in general, although having some irrational impulses and instincts shared with the animal kingdom, were believed to have completely different motivational antecedents. Animal aspects of humans were recognised up to a point, but were never given the status of a constitutive motivational force. In other words, in the pre-Darwinian period, the motivational forces that propelled and formed human existence were considered to be qualitatively different in nature than "simple" mechanisms that have driven animals. In the post-Darwinian period, the concepts of instinct, drive and other dark sides of human nature have become popular discussion points and have been explicitly associated with human behaviour. The further development of these evolutionary concepts had a tremendous influence on the emergence of new theoretical fields, such as behaviourism, psychoanalysis and ethology.

It is important to bear in mind that this brief overview represents a somewhat simplified presentation of history on many points. For many distinguished thinkers, both those close to religious circles and those more dedicated to scientific investigation, the belief in divine creation

was fairly unproblematic. For example, although St. Augustine (354–430), as a representative of theological philosophy, assumed the existence of free will and responsibility for one's actions, and adopted many relatively modern views on education and philosophy, he nevertheless firmly considered unity with God to be the ultimate goal of human existence leading towards self-realisation. This comes as no surprise considering that the prominent figures in history who are also known for their scientific achievements still included the notion of God in their equations. Descartes (1596–1650), who brought the understanding of science to a higher level by introducing the possibility of "mapping" the forces that underpin behaviour and explaining them in a purely mechanistic way, still accepted a divine creation that initiated all motion in the universe. Similarly, Isaac Newton (1642–1726), one of the most important promoters of scientific thought and method in history, considered with little hesitation that God was the master creator of all things. The list of thinkers in the course of history who felt the need to include faith in their otherwise impressive theoretical and scientific systems is remarkably long and includes Nicholas Copernicus (1473–1543), Francis Bacon (1561–1627), Johannes Kepler (1571–1630), Galileo Galilei (1564–1642), Blaise Pascal (1623–1662), Gregor Mendel (1822–1884), Louis Pasteur (1822–1895), Max Planck (1858–1947), Albert Einstein (1879–1955), Werner Heisenberg (1901–1976), John Eccles (1903–1997) and Francis Collins (1950). Even Darwin himself was reluctant to take part in the discussions about divine creation. Although the above-mentioned list is not complete, and the main argument I am attempting to illustrate is insufficiently nuanced, it is still possible to see that the timeline for thinkers who had both religious and scientific belief systems is chronologically consistent, stretching from the far past to present times. This strongly suggests that the relation between scientific and religious explanations of human behaviour in particular, and the nature of the processes that are responsible for human existence in general, is a volatile topic of public debate, but also a debate many choose to leave dormant. Indeed, although historical (Thomas Henry Huxley opposed to Samuel Wilberforce) and contemporary debates (Richard Dawkins opposed to all types of religious believers) are still very much alive, it is apparent that a vast number of people and cultures around the globe manage

to combine these two somewhat-opposing belief systems into one meaningful, or at least functional, system. For those readers who are particularly interested in challenging the status quo, I suggest following the quest of Richard Dawkins and his unrelenting attempts to awaken this sleeping monster.

Leaving Divine Creation Behind and the Rise of Modern Theory

In the following section, the ideas on understanding the fundamental forces behind human behaviour in various psychological traditions will be briefly presented. Each of these postulations represents in itself a detailed and comprehensive theoretical perspective. Hence, the present overview does not aim to provide an all-round analysis of the field or the underlying thoughts of the given theorists, nor does it attempt to resolve any controversies over the interpretation of ideas. The main purpose here is to present various theoretical traditions and to identify the most important concepts that have marked the history of the research on the fundamental motivational and basic psychological processes. Thus, the aim is to identify authors and ideas that have, throughout history, collectively addressed the question What are the most basic building blocks of human motivation and subsequent behaviour?

Psychoanalytic Tradition

The field of psychoanalysis is in many ways a prototype of the theoretical system in which the search for the most basic processes is important. According to Westen (1990), the field of psychoanalysis in general represents a comprehensive theory of the complexities of human motivation and the ways in which motives interact and possibly come in conflict with one another. In Freud's early postulations, the concept of energy is identified as important when it comes to understanding human motivation and general functioning, implying a mind–body dualism (Rosenblatt & Thickstun, 1970). Physical laws applied to energy in nature were

considered to be similar to those that propelled the mental activities of personality. It is believed that energy is released through biological processes and instincts, but also that biological processes were considered to be sources of energy, thus making the cycle of energy flow complete. More specifically, following Freud's structural division of human personality, this means that the id, as a representation of nature and instinctual potency, controls energy, while energy simultaneously aims to satisfy the needs of the id. In this view, the biologically based instincts represent the basic building blocks of human motivational processes and subsequent behaviour. It was theorised that if suppressed, energy will often be transformed into the symbolic form of expression, and these actions will commonly result in what Freud called tension reduction or drive discharge (Freud, 1933). In other words, if instinctual energy is prevented from direct expression, it will eventually come to the surface, either displaced onto another object or in some symbolic representation quite unrecognisable from its original underlying form (Freud, 1893). As with the energy concept, this principle is also connected to the physical sciences and basically describes a process, applied by several theorists in history (e.g. Lorenz, 1950; McDougall, 1923), commonly known as the "hydraulic" model. On the other hand, if the form of expression is integrated into permissible cultural norms, anxiety, which is taken to be a warning signal related to how the id, ego and superego coexist, is successfully avoided. Put another way, the main point is that internal processes, similarly to the concept of energy, cannot be destroyed, they can only change form and the manner in which they are manifested. It is again easy to see the resemblance between these positions and the basic physical laws of thermodynamics and laws of energy. Thus, it is not unusual, and in fact rather common, that specific theoretical approaches are embedded in the historical scientific paradigms and employ the concepts that are dominant in that particular era of thought. After all, despite the awareness of historical contributions and accumulated knowledge of the past, we all tend to use the contemporary tools available and known to us.

In addition to the concept of energy, the early thinking of Freud was also characterised by structural divisions of the human psyche, identification of important defensive mechanisms and processes and delineation of specific developmental paths common to all people (Fine, 1990).

However, Freud later became noticeably more philosophical and abstract and aimed to identify the workings of even more basic underlying processes that affect human nature and behaviour (Freud, 1949). Although the notion of energy was still detectable, in his later works Freud developed the idea of tension between two basic forces, each of them pulling the individual in the opposite direction. Life instincts (Eros), whose role is preservation of human existence, are considered responsible for the perpetuation of life itself. An opposite "dark" force is a death instinct (Thanatos), which draws an individual towards the end of life. Two basic forms of energy, life instincts and death instincts in the form of sexual and somewhat aggressive energy, are used as an explanatory tool for the understanding of the broad range of human behaviour. Again, the dynamic between "Eros" and "Thanatos" results in the need to reduce tension. When "Eros" is satisfied, tension is held to a minimum. It is hypothesised that, until death comes as a representative of an ultimate non-tension area, an individual is motivated towards gratification of the instincts, an act that results in pleasure. Ideas about death instincts appeared relatively late and were reinforced, as some Freud biographers assume (Schur, 1972), by the sheer amount of destruction and aggression caused by WWI and were also influenced by the work of some younger colleagues in the field of psychoanalysis.

Many other prominent psychoanalysts had quite a few alternative suggestions concerning basic human functioning. One of the earliest and most prominent alternative accounts of human behaviour is found in the work of Alfred Adler (1979/1933). To a much higher degree than Freud, Adler tended to incorporate social aspects of human functioning in his perspectives on personality development. Setting aside the complexity of Adlerian heritage, certainly one of the most key positions in Adler's theories was the focus on strengths and weaknesses of human nature and the view the development of inferior feelings is a major device behind the development of personality. The logic behind this reasoning is that feelings of inferiority are quite natural considering how helpless human beings are at birth. It follows that these feelings are created in the early stages of life during which children are completely dependent on support from adults. Inferiority is considered an unpleasant state that pushes individuals to strive for accomplishment. Feelings of superiority and

perfection represent alternative motivating forces and pull the individual towards success. Paraphrasing Adler (1930), the urge to move from minus or below to plus or above never ceases. Pushed by inferiority and pulled by superiority, the individual, as well as the community at large, is motivated to strive for perfection. As noted, Adler was perhaps one of the first psychoanalysts who adopted a holistic view of personality by explicitly combining individual differences and social influences (Hoffman, 1994). The ultimate aim was centred on the process of personality development that is able to satisfy the needs of the larger community, provide benefits for society and serve a wider social interest.

The incorporation of historical, cultural and social aspects in explanations of human functioning is perhaps one of the most important points on which Freud and his followers have diverging perspectives. This is also highly visible in the work of Karen Horney (1950/1991). Horney was preoccupied with the manner in which people deal with psychosocial challenges and potentially disturbed human relationships that in turn might obstruct healthy development and self-realisation. Such socially and environmentally created inner conflicts are behind the emergence of basic anxiety in early childhood, which is identified as an important process affecting later development. In general, anxiety is considered to be created by basic human feelings of being isolated, helpless, afraid and eventually hostile. Contrary to early psychoanalytic premises, Horney suggested that basic anxiety is not created by a structural discrepancy between hypothetically created components of the mind or somewhat mystical and elusive notions of energy, but rather is a result of unsettling social conditions and interpersonal relationships. Horney believed that two fundamental needs of the infant in the early stages of development are satisfaction and safety. Satisfaction refers mostly to the physiological needs and, as such, is considered by Horney as less complex than safety needs. At the core of the need for safety resides the need for a secure existence. If a basic sense of existence is threatened, primarily by actions and the projection of the hostile feelings of the caregiver, a state of fear and general insecurity is created. This kind of fear provides a solid ground for the development of the neurotic personality in adulthood. Thus, a dynamic between hostile parents and the child results in the development of the basic hostility that is over time projected onto the world in

general. According to Horney (1950/1991), this process leads further towards the development of basic anxiety or feelings of being abandoned, which is considered to be a major contributor to the development of neurosis. Over the years, this kind of basic thinking about the impact of primary caregivers on child development has been further developed in terms of methodology and theory. Contemporary theorists have adopted advanced digital observation techniques to study on the micro level all nuances between the child and primary caregivers (e.g. Tronick & Cohn, 1989; see overview in Korja, Latva, & Lehtonen, 2012). This has directly resulted in theoretical advancements concerning development of various communication styles and stages of self-consciousness (e.g. Stern, 1971; Trevarthan, 1977), as well as further elaborations on the concepts of the real self and human growth (e.g. Maslow, 1968).

Needless to say, there are a number of alternative theoretical postulations in the field of early psychoanalysis that deeply penetrate human nature, such as the creative and inspiring work of Carl Gustav Jung. Jung added a clear philosophical flavour to original psychoanalytic ideas, giving the field a spiritual and metaphysical direction. In general, all these above-mentioned "rebels" influenced and enriched the later psychoanalytic movement by proposing new variables, perspectives, basic human tendencies and novel processes. One of the most significant "deviations" from the original psychoanalytic thoughts was the introduction of human motivation as something that is proactive and generally positive, as opposed to the relatively simple process of drive reduction, defensiveness and basically a gloomy perception of human functioning. As commonly known, the early psychoanalysis field represents a turbulent philosophical system with a number of strong personalities in constant debate and rivalry. The intensity of these debates is in part understandable considering the nature of the topic. It must be borne in mind that the majority of psychoanalytic theorists were trying to provide answers to fundamental questions: which processes are central to human functioning and what are the building blocks of human behaviour? At this level of analysis, it is quite easy to maintain intransigent positions, insisting that there is only one correct answer: one's own, needless to say. Nevertheless, the majority of later generations of psycho-explorers noticeably changed the focus of analysis in the direction of investigating the influence of

wider interpersonal relations, as well as the effects of cultural and social processes on basic human functioning. In this sense, it is possible to suggest that later or modern psychoanalytic theory is noticeably less philosophical in nature, centring analyses predominantly on the process of the caregiver-child relationship, the nature of early interactions, influences of social and historical conditions and advancements of clinical approaches. All of these approaches are expected to influence and shape adult functioning in all stages of personal development.

Learning Theories and Fundamental Motivation

In comparison to psychoanalysis, learning theory in general is far less concerned with the identification and exploration of fundamental motives that shape human existence. In fact, using a simplified and somewhat-drastic formulation, one could easily argue that the idea of human fundamental motivation in the early learning or behaviouristic theories is basically non-existent. Although later behaviouristic tradition incorporates to an increasingly higher degree some internal and even cognitive motivational terms, the terminology, theoretical toolbox and general approach are completely different compared to the psychoanalytic tradition. As seen in the previous section, there are many creative postulations relating to fundamental motives in psychoanalytic tradition, ranging from hypothetical underlying forces inside human structure to personality classifications, opposing needs, energy, drives, instincts, and emotional and cognitive states based on the results, for example, of interpersonal interaction. Contrary to imaginative psychoanalytic reasoning, most specific learning theories hold the firm position that behaviour is best explained by pairings between conditioned and unconditioned stimuli. Thus, the notion of classical conditioning portrays human behaviour and learning processes as a formation of relatively passive responses to the presented stimuli. Later development of learning theory was to a higher degree focussed on a more active form of instrumental learning wherein it was proposed that behaviour is actively shaped by its consequences or the nature of external contingencies of reinforcement. This means that the learning scientist in general perceives

the variables that originate in the environment and the nature of their structural organisation (i.e. contingency) as essential for forming behaviour. The evolution of this perspective is very important in historical terms as it moves the centre of analyses from internal processes to environmental causes. More specifically, this shift in theoretical priorities and basic positions is historically significant as acceptance of these premises moves the focus away from investigation of fundamental structural properties of human nature towards investigation of the circumstances under which probability of behaviour increases or decreases depending on environmental organisation. It is then not surprising to discover that the majority of learning theorists echoed Aristotle and Locke by advocating the view of the human psyche as a "tabula rasa" or "blank slate". If one accepts this as the fundamental premise, it logically follows that it is possible, with the help of strategically designed learning techniques, to train a dozen healthy infants to be *"a doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-chief and, yes, even burglar, and thief, regardless of his talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations and race of his ancestors"* (Watson, 1924, p. 104). However, and similar to the psychoanalytic movement, the theoretical positions among the learning psychologists tend to vary considerably, even though there was basic agreement on the main premises relating to explanations of human nature. For example, Hull, one of the most prominent learning psychologists, believed that an organism is an automatic entity without mind, soul or spirit that is propelled by internal drive stimulation and the effects of environmental cues. The understanding of human functioning, in the spirit of mainstream behaviourism, should be based on strict scientific criteria and should preferably be expressed through mathematical equations (Hull et al., 1940). At any rate, descriptions of human action should not involve any mentalistic or introspective terms. Survival of the organism is understood through a process that could be called an adaptive automatic behaviour mechanism. Drive is seen as the primary stimulation of behaviour (Hull, 1943). The power of any given drive depends on the length and strength of deprivation. Such states of deprivation result in the need for drive reduction, which is in turn considered to be a primary motivating force that moves an organism towards action. The establishment of such a pattern of behaviour increases the probability of responses in the

future. It is interesting to note that Hull's theory, although employing a completely different set of theoretical tools, could nevertheless easily be interpreted as endorsing similar postulations to those of Freud. Both thinking systems were deterministic in nature in the sense that there was a cause of the behaviour and it was possible to identify the processes under which behaviour is developed. An even more important similarity between these theorists is detected in the suggestion that behaviour is caused by physiological disequilibrium, which further motivates an organism towards tension reduction. Thus, the level of satisfaction of instincts and drives is considered a primary motivational force, and it was anticipated that action would not appear in the state of equilibrium.

However, according to other influential learning theorists, such as Skinner, the reduction of drive in particular was not considered a necessary variable. In fact, it is fair to say that Skinner was not at all interested in analysing underlying unobservable (cognitive or biological) processes to explain human behaviour (but for his more nuanced view on this issue, see Skinner, 1976). Skinner's basic reasoning was similar to Watson and could be easily considered a form of radical behaviourism. Although this term was used by both theorists, history associates the radical behaviourist approach more with Skinner (Schneider & Morris, 1987). The basic assumption in this strict or radical approach was that an organism will be motivated to learn or perform a particular action based solely on the nature or frequency of the delivered reinforcement (contingency). Simply put, the complexity of human behaviour could be sufficiently explained as a consequence of various learning contingencies, and all further analyses of human nature and fundamental motives should stop there. It follows that Skinner was not interested in identifying the underlying processes behind reinforcement, as these presumed internal determinants of the behaviour were not considered to be worthy of scientific investigation (Skinner, 1950). This position is a key point in behaviouristic theory and reflects a rather dubious combination of epistemological positions on what sort of knowledge science can and should obtain and a basic understanding of human nature. Thus, although the behaviouristic tradition produced research results of the utmost importance and value when it comes to understanding and prediction of human action, the odd combination of origins of knowledge and understandings of human

nature was quite restrictive, resulting in obvious limitations in this line of reasoning. Hence, it is understandable that this type of radical environmentalism was quickly challenged by a number of theorists who saw the necessity of including additional concepts in the investigations of basic human functioning. One of the most influential alternative perspectives is found in Tolman's theories. While still operating under the learning paradigm, he succeeded in incorporating several cognitive terms and processes in his investigations of overt behaviour. According to him, behaviour is not a passive response to the environmental stimulus. Behaviour has a purpose and is directed towards a selected goal (Tolman, 1932). In this view, organisms (mice as well as man) tend to use cognition and develop expectations relating to goal-oriented actions (Tolman, 1948). This position represents a broader perspective on learning in the realm of behaviourism by suggesting that reinforcement in itself is not responsible for learning. An organism has to be sufficiently motivated to perform an action and only then will learning be displayed in behaviour. Tolman (1932) argued that there are two kinds of motivation: deprivation and incentive motivation (values or the qualities of the goal). He believed that when a primary drive (hunger) is connected with a reinforcement (food), this will eventually result in an organism's wanting to obtain reinforcers (food), even if it is not hungry.

This cognitively loaded line of thinking had a tremendous influence on the later development of the motivation theories emphasising the importance of expectations and goal-oriented behaviour. Gradually, several parallel theoretical postulations emerged that combined the effect of internal processes with environmental influences. One of the most influential contributions is the well-known and widely used expectancy-value theory (Atkinson, 1957). This line of thinking basically states that behaviour in terms of choice, persistence and performance is a result of the multiplication of the individual expectations of achieving the goal (i.e. how well a person will perform in terms of success or failure) and the subjective value of the goal (i.e. relative attractiveness of succeeding or failing in a task). In other words, people select goals according to their expectancy of reaching the goal, combined with the positive value they place on attaining the goal and the negative value they place on not attaining the goal (Wigfield, 1994). The expectancy component in this

equation refers to the perception that performance is contingent on effort (greater efforts result in greater performance). The value component informs us how important it is for a person to achieve a desired outcome (Shepperd & Taylor, 1999). Negative aspects of both components refer to the expectancy of failure and the negative value associated with this possible outcome. In its essence, the multiplication of expectancy and value is a hedonistic line of reasoning that includes strong cognitive, rational and purposive components. Consequently, many famous psychologists have had a tendency to apply this influential reasoning in one form or another, including Tolman, Atkinson, Lewin, Rotter and Bandura. In addition to general applications of expectancy-value reasoning, the model itself has been developed by several researchers and applied in different contexts (e.g. Eccles et al., 1983; Wigfield, 1994). Later developments have also made more attempts to establish a theoretical link between motivational concepts, such as expectancy, value and achievement, and the concept of goal with the aim of providing further insight into the specific manner in which these processes interact (see Plante, O'Keefe, & Théorêt, 2013). These impressive developments in the realm of achievement motivation reflect the ideas presented in the introduction where it was argued that contemporary motivational theory is dominated by specific analyses of direct, mediating and moderating effects between relevant variables.

Basic Motivation in Humanistic Views of Human Nature

The explorations of fundamental motivational forces that propel human existence are also evident in the tradition commonly and somewhat imprecisely known as the humanistic movement. While a psychoanalytic line of reasoning, similar to the majority of the learning theories and that part of the theories connected to achievement motivation, could clearly be linked to hedonistic processes, the overriding motive in the humanistic approach in general is the notion of human growth, self-realisation and personal development. Thus, the theorists belonging to the humanistic tradition objected to the absence of a unique human factor in explanatory models of human nature. Humanistic theorists in general

believe that humans are positive, good and above all able to develop inner resources and potential. However, these recommended paths of self-realisation and personal growth are frequently inhibited by various social and cultural conditions that are embedded in a person's environment. As is the case with almost any theoretical postulation, the main argument here is not entirely new. Ideas of this kind are traceable in ancient Greece (e.g. Socrates), in the Enlightenment and Romantic movements, in the rise of existentialist philosophy and also in recent developments in modern positive psychology (see overview in Schneider, Pierson, & Bugental, 2014). This partly concealed rebellion against established authorities and commonly accepted truths in many ways resonates with Rousseau (1755/1967, p. 5) who famously declared that *"man is born free, and he is everywhere in chains"*. Thus, it is clear that there are multiple origins of humanistic ideas and that they come from various theoretical and philosophical sources. In many ways, the humanistic movement represents a fairly unorganised set of a variety of postulations wherein even the ideas from psychoanalysis (i.e. clinical investigations) and learning theories are combined with rich theoretical heritage and further strengthened by adding a strong cognitive and, above all, human and existentialist component (Wong, 2006). In general, the humanistic theorists see the individual as an integrated whole, and when a need arises the complete person is motivated to satisfy that need (e.g. Maslow, 1970, p. 19). In much the same way as so-called instinct theories, humanistic theory emphasised the similarities between humans and the animal world. However, although these similarities are explicitly acknowledged, it is also strongly argued that the human race possesses aspects that are unique to the species, especially when we talk of characteristics that are and should be somewhat admirable. It follows that the majority of "third force" psychologists, contrary to their "first" and "second" force colleagues (i.e. psychoanalysis and learning theories), tend to emphasise the process of understanding and meaning making (Wong & Fry, 1998). In other words, the focus is less on what went wrong in terms of personal development, fault contingencies or personality disorders and more on the subjective definitions, understandings and existential issues of the average individual who is an active meaning maker and the ruler of his or her own world. Therefore, it was not unusual in the humanistic tradition to conduct case studies

of outstanding persons who were considered as scoring highly on the "mental health" scale in an attempt to identify some recommended core processes that might reveal true human nature (see Maslow, 1970). This tendency has in many ways paved the way to the emergence of a research field that is now generally referred to as positive psychology (Seligman, Rashid, & Parks, 2006).

In historical terms, the general ideas of humanistic psychology are discernible in the work of Carl Rogers, probably one of the most influential representatives of this tradition. To Rogers (1986), the notion of self is connected to continuous change with the aim of achieving growth and reaching full and mature development. Rogers (1951) suggested that the mature development and level of positive experience of the self (i.e. self-regard) is highly influenced by the type of love, seen as warmth, sympathy and acceptance, an individual receives in childhood. Conditional love, that is, love that is conditioned by behaviour that is in accordance with norms external to the self, is considered to promote development of a negative self-image. On the other hand, unconditional love, which is love that is experienced as unrelated to our actions and behaviour, in which individual faults are accepted as human, tends to promote positive self-regard and results in the fully functioning person. Feedback is provided on the basis of what people truly are, and the need to defend the self-concept is consequently not necessary. The important point is that these circumstances are not considered to be a subject of objective truths but rather a matter of subjective experiences of the given circumstances. Thus, the development of a positive self-image and self-confidence and the stability of the general self-concept are achieved through interaction with the environment and the subjective experience of "reality" (Rogers, 1951). The consequent rise of anxiety, which is considered to be related to the degree an individual feels conditionally or unconditionally loved, represents, according to Rogers, an obstacle to personal growth and self-realisation, resulting in the development of an incongruent personality.

As with Rogers, the work of Maslow (1970) also must be acknowledged for establishing humanistic psychology as a distinct and recognised area of psychological research. Among several interrelated processes, Maslow (1968) considered the process of self-realisation to be a main motive behind human development. Establishing and developing the

basic premises of humanistic theory, Maslow and Rogers jointly perceived the value of subjective reality as a primary guide for human behaviour. Maslow is commonly known for the idea that motives (needs) are organised in a hierarchy. People who succeed in climbing high up on the need pyramid are considered to be governed by "being values" or meta-motives. Examples of such values are beauty, truth and justice. Self-knowledge and self-understanding are considered by Maslow to be the most important processes that strengthen personal growth and in some cases result in self-actualisation. However, people who can be called "self-actualisers" are rare. The characteristic of such development is resistance to conformity, experience of "psychological freedom", accurate "reality" perception, independence, creativeness and so on (Maslow, 1970). Although later empirical research has found the potential for specific flaws in this thinking, these ideas in general represented an important springboard for the analyses of human existence that include both psychopathology and processes which lead to positive experiences and development (see Alderfer, 1972, for further discussion and development of Maslow's ideas).

Other Influential Theoretical Systems

Needless to say, there are a great number of other prominent theorists who have sought to understand and explain the basic mechanisms that drive human behaviour and existence. One influential researcher who had an explicit focus on the analysis of assumed internal processes was McDougall. He believed that all life processes are directed towards the preservation of human existence and clearly influenced by the basic premises of evolutionary theory. His insistence on perceiving behaviour as goal directed and purposive was a direct challenge to the school of behaviourism (McDougall, 1923). Indeed, the famous debate between McDougal and Watson that took place in 1924 is historical evidence of how wide the gap between various views on human motivation and action was between highly intelligent and educated researchers. According to McDougal, purposive behaviour was a direct result of innate motivational energy initially called instincts, and in later work propensities. Instincts or propensities are considered to serve two purposes: (1) they organise the whole

mental life of the individual and (2) they direct behaviour towards specific goals. Over the years, his classification included approximately 18 of these "innate propensities". Instinct is originally defined as "*an inherited or innate psycho physical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to experience an impulse to such action* (McDougall, 1908, p. 29)." Every instinct is seen as eliciting a specific emotion. More specifically, flight (instinct) corresponds to fear (emotion), disgust to repulsion, curiosity to wonder and so on. Repetitive behaviour through the process of learning can gather several instincts around one object or activity. Such a system of grouped instincts or propensities is called a "sentiment". Sentiments are further considered to be organised in larger patterns called "character". The underlying reasoning of McDougall clearly favours the role of internal processes in shaping human behaviour at the expense of including multiple external influences and any interaction between these two domains.

Ideas similar to McDougall's are found to a certain extent in Murray (1938), who preferred to use the rather common and intuitive concept of "need". However, Murray explicitly underlines the influence of environment and the interaction between environmental and human needs. He considered needs to be the basic components of human functioning that govern and direct human behaviour. The "Personology" of Murray is a classificatory theory listing approximately 20 needs. To Murray, the concept of need was more or less synonymous with the concept of drive. However, Murray considered "need" to have dynamic properties as opposed to descriptions of a process or concept that has static properties. The dynamic and ever-changing part was a result of both internal and external forces that act upon the individual at any given time. According to Murray, a division can be made between primary (viscerogenic) and secondary (psychogenic) needs. They could also be positive (forcing an organism towards an object) and negative (forcing an organism away from an object). Although needs were presented as independent entities, they could be interrelated by fusing with each other, or by being in the service of or in conflict with one another. Moreover, needs could be manifested, latent, conscious or unconscious. Murray believed

that needs have a strong tendency to project themselves into fantasy. To measure latent needs, he and his colleagues developed the well-known Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), which is conceptually related to the psychoanalytic technique of free association. In much the same way as McDougall, Murray found that emotions are accompanying conditions of needs. When stereotypes of responses have been established, what Murray refers to as mechanization of behaviour, a habit pattern may to some extent replace need as an explanatory concept. The strength of need is dependent on a genetic starting point and a degree and manner of gratification (reward or punishment). However, there are clear conceptual differences between McDougall and Murray. In his meta-definition of motivation, which is also a critique of McDougall's instinct theory, Murray (1938) pointed out that general motivation theory must include concepts that go beyond the primitive, impulsive and physiological levels of action, thus paving the way for the later establishment of the cognitive revolution.

Raymond Cattell is another devoted and highly productive student of human behaviour. Inspired by advances in the realm of the physical sciences, Cattell adopted a strict and advanced methodological approach for providing explanations of human action. Perhaps the most characteristic feature of Cattell's theory is the application of multivariate factor analysis as a means of identifying the basic and universal underlying dimensions of personality and other subsequent levels (Cattell, 1945). In other words, Cattell represents an attempt to provide the empirical identification of the various levels of human motivation, ranging from the one most basic to those placed in the proximity of behavioural manifestations. He identified a definite number of primary motivational components which are considered to be the building blocks of personality (i.e. source traits). These structures are considered to be the founding structural grounds on which personality is built. Building further upon the work of Allport, McDougall and Murray, the taxonomy or model of personality factors included 16 basic source traits (Cattell & Eber, 1957). The idea is that source traits provide a basis for development and are workings of other important structures, such as ergs, meta-ergs, sentiments and attitudes. As is rather typical in the field of research, theorists insist on using theoretical terms to differentiate their work from other researchers. Hence,

instead of using terms such as drives, needs and instincts, Cattell (Cattell & Child, 1975) coined the term "erg" to avoid any theoretical links to animal studies and other research with similar aims. In its essence, the definition of the "erg" is not very different from the previously presented definition of McDougal's propensities. The word has its origin in the Greek root and means a source of power or work. Ergic tension is considered to be relatively stable over time, even though the level of tension may differ from person to person and vary in cases of direct provocation, deprivation and personal history. Some examples of ergs are food-seeking activities (i.e. hunger), mating activities (i.e. sex) and exploration (i.e. curiosity). Meta-erg or engram (Cattell & Child, 1975) is considered the same as an erg except that it is not innate but acquired and has its origin in the environment. Engrams were defined as structures that arise from experience with objects, in situations or with individuals, giving rise to persistent sentiments. Examples of sentiments are the superego sentiment, the religious sentiment, the career sentiment and the sweetheart (wife) sentiment. The structure and workings of sentiments over time provide a further foundation for the emergence of attitudes (Cattell, 1957). Cattell's multi-level approach to personality, similar to Murray's intercorrelation between needs, advocates the view of the constant interactive effects of all levels of human behavioural manifestations. Cattell represents an attempt at a strict quantitative synthesis of the psychoanalytic theory of Freud and McDougal's classification of "propensities" in terms of providing structural formation of the human personality.

And finally, this far from complete list must include the work of Curt Lewin, who focussed his analysis on the interactive effects between internal and external variables, framing these in the realm of systems thinking. The comprehensiveness and inclusiveness of his efforts are of historical significance when it comes to the impact these ideas have had on the later development of the systems-based thinking applied to human functioning and further developments of field theory. As was the case with Cattell, Lewin was inspired by the physical sciences and consequently tended to present his ideas in mathematical equations (Lewin, 1943). According to him, the totality of the psychological experience of the individual consists of a life space that is in turn determined by the interaction of the person and the environment. In other words, interaction of the internal (person)

and the external (environment) factors constitute behaviour (Lewin, 1935). An inner personal region can result in the state of tension aroused by needs (either psychologically or physiologically based). Tension then is directed towards the environment, which is divided into areas of positive or negative valence. A positive valence region contains the goal object that will reduce the tension when a person enters that region. Negative valence regions push individuals in the opposite direction. An individual is never moved by just one force. Behaviour is always a function of all forces acting upon the individual in a given place and time. As noted, the field reasoning of Lewin (1946) clearly represents a theoretical step towards understanding human behaviour in terms of systems thinking. The function of internal processes is perceived as being inseparable from the specific position of the actor in the given system and the influence of external factors.

This section could easily be expanded by presenting many other individual efforts that over the course of human thinking have tried to "break the code" of human nature, but this would take us away from the main aims of the present book. The present review clearly shows that the history of human thinking is replete with many theoretical postulations, such as static personality structures, opposing underlying forces, needs, instincts and other variations of these terms, overriding motives in terms of personal growth, interactions between inner processes and external influences, and essentially many other theories on what can be identified as potential first dominos or fundamental motives responsible for all subsequent human action.

Contemporary Theory and Fundamental Aspects of Human Nature

The above historical review is perhaps too brief an overview of the theories that address the question of fundamental human processes. But it is a concise and purposive overview of the important names and developments that does not include the most recent theories. It would be wrong and contrary to common scientific customs to leave the reader with the impression that the basic postulations of this book are completely new or

otherwise absent in contemporary theory. In fact, it is fairly easy to identify several theoretical frameworks that in their own way and terminology suggest the existence of similar fundamental processes.

For example, these ideas, admittedly clothed in somewhat different terminology, are clearly present in one of the most comprehensive overviews of the theoretical themes in the realm of social psychology, namely the previously mentioned two-volume editions of *The Handbook of Social Psychology* (1998 and 2010). In these handbooks, the prominent researchers in the field of social psychology have been challenged to present a broad overview of the literature on different topics with the aim of reducing the complexity of the research findings to some basic and manageable classifications. It is interesting that some of these attempts, although employing quite different conceptual tools, are indeed quite similar in their underlying logic and direction with the reasoning presented in this book. For example, the detailed literature review that most aims to explore the complexity of goal-orientated behaviour is authored by Cialdini and Trost (1998). This review analyses the process of social influence by focussing on the three major areas: social norms, conformity and compliance. These authors have come to the conclusion that the majority of the literature in the realm of social and interpersonal influence can meaningfully be seen in the light of the three basic motivations: to behave effectively, to build and maintain relationships and to manage a self-concept. These three goals were presented as organising structures that offer valuable insights into the circumstances and motivations that lead to interpersonal influence. Hence, it is easy to detect the conceptual similarity between the three basic motivations suggested by Cialdini and Trost (1998) and the motivational systems of control, affiliation and self-expression that are the main topic of this book.

In his analysis of "selfhood", Baumeister (1998) postulates in a similar way that there are three powerful and prototypical ways in which the self can be viewed: through reflexive consciousness, interpersonal being and executive function. The process of reflexive consciousness refers to attention which is turned back towards its own source, that is, the self. It is fairly clear that the nature of this process is highly problematic and several philosophers in the past, including Hume, Kant and James, have attempted to find a way around it. The problem is, this process involves

a perception of something that is more or less unknown: the notion of the mighty "Self". In other words, although self-awareness is identified as a key process here, there still remains the question Awareness of what? Nevertheless, Baumeister presents a wide range of evaluative self-processes and posits that all these activities lead to increased and accumulated self-knowledge and consequently help people to grasp the meaning of the "self". This accumulated self-knowledge is in turn supposed to be predominantly guided by the three main types of motives. First, there is motivation for appraisal, which is about gathering knowledge or information on how other people appraise us. During this process people predominantly prefer accurate feedback about themselves or how they function. Second, there is motivation for self-enhancement. Although people might indeed prefer and value accurate feedback, they still might have a slight preference to receive favourable descriptions of themselves. And last, there is motivation for consistency. This motive also relates to the type of feedback one receives. However, in contrast to preferring slightly positive responses, people also show clear preferences for receiving feedback which confirms their own self-conceptions over time, hence the consistency motive. As noted above, these three motives are identified as important if self-knowledge is to be increased over time along with reflexive consciousness. In addition to reflexive consciousness, Baumeister identifies another important and defining aspect of selfhood in the area of interpersonal relations. In this view, the most important way in which the "self" interacts with the social environment is through self-presentation, which is an important mechanism that actively transforms external influences and projects them into the interpersonal domain. In other words, the self is not a static structure that straightforwardly and passively receives external inputs. It follows that the notion of self in this view is seen as receiving, sending and transforming various types of information in a constant cyclic loop. The third aspect of selfhood relates to its executive function. This aspect encompasses processes such as self-efficacy, autonomy and self-regulation, decision making, agency, choice and control. It is worth noting that the executive function of the self also includes the human motivation to have control, which Baumeister considers to be one of the most fundamental and pervasive features of human selfhood and one of the main human motivations.

Again, the conceptual similarity to the reasoning used in this book is evident, although Baumeister's divisions differ considerably when it comes to specific details and groupings.

Another review that more or less uses the same classification is the examination of motivation provided by Pittman (1998). He establishes three broad domains: the construction of understanding, acting on and in the world and coming to terms with self. These domains attempt to describe the way in which individuals make sense of the social and non-social world around them, the ways individuals engage in changing the environment and the ways in which they manage the self-concept. The construction of understanding is theoretically connected to accuracy and control motivation. One of the sections in this review pays particular attention to the motivation to be consistent in terms of internal processes. The main theme that runs through all three domains is the suggestion that people's perception of reality is not a simple reflection of objective circumstances. Pittman predominantly focusses his analysis on the interplay between the human ability for accurate explanations and a tendency towards illusion and biased conclusions. As such, the review represents an extensive elaboration on some important topics in motivational theory with specific focus on the manner in which cognition affects general human functioning and understanding of external reality. On the other hand, as acknowledged in conclusions of this review, by extensively focussing on the analysis of cognitive processes, the overview fails to acknowledge the importance of other important motivational processes, such as motivations for growth and belonging. The inclusion of these is quite necessary if we are to provide a comprehensive account of the various forms of human behaviour, as well as complete our understanding of the basic processes that define human nature.

In addition to these specific theoretical overviews of existing contributions in the field that aim to reduce the extensive amount of literature to some basic and recognisable units, there are several larger theoretical postulations that aim to identify and analyse the workings of the most fundamental motivational processes. For example, self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1991, 2012), the theory of basic human motivation, offers an integrative view on this topic by suggesting that there are three innate fundamental psychological needs: the need for competence, the

need for autonomy and the need for relatedness. The conceptualisation of this theory could be theoretically connected to humanistic psychology and the influences of external sets of norms on human functioning (e.g. Rogers, 1951). The theory also has roots in research on intrinsic motivation where the concept of control is contrasted to the experience and perception of autonomy (Deci & Ryan, 1980). The basic premises of the theory strongly underline the difference between acts that originate from within the self (self-determined or self-caused) and acts that are controlled by the power of the various external conditions. Thus, the basic reasoning of self-determination theory goes conceptually beyond the simple internal/external dichotomy by emphasising the importance of personal causation in the course of behavioural initiation, execution and further regulation. It is also evident that the concept of autonomy has a prominent place in the theory as this process is supposed to underlie both competence and belonging. Autonomy refers to regulation that is undertaken solely by the "self" and involves a high degree of self-endorsement or self-governance (for conceptual analysis of the term autonomy, see Ryan & Deci, 2006). Consequently, the majority of empirical studies have focussed on the role of autonomy in different contexts, providing overwhelming support for the basic theoretical assumptions that this theory advocates (Ryan & Deci, 2006). All in all, these studies show that the basic sense of autonomy is beneficial for human functioning and commonly leads to positive effects. Furthermore, research findings also suggest that failure to satisfy basic needs leads to frustration and consequently to vulnerability, illness and psychopathology (Vansteenkiste & Ryan, 2013). However, considering the fact that people often have difficulties behaving in a self-determined manner also indicates that external control indeed represents a powerful source of motivation. Consequently, a fair amount of research has been focussed on the identification of the factors that undermine self-determined behaviour (Ryan & Deci, 2000). One condition that is found across many studies to result in diminished persistence, surprisingly enough, is the influence of extrinsic rewards on intrinsically motivated tasks (see Deci, Koestener, & Ryan, 1999, for meta-analysis). This theory suggests that in order to achieve an optimal balance between external and internal forces, one is advised to open for the development of autonomy, as well as to stimulate the internalisation

of the processes that later on will result in the sense of self-determined behaviour. The one clear valuable aspect of this theory that increases its credibility is the quantity of empirical evidence that has been accumulated over the past few decades of research covering several themes and contexts, such as education, health care, relationships, psychotherapy, organisations, leisure activities, and environmental and cultural contexts.

Another theory also aiming to reduce the complexity of human action to a few underlying processes is terror management theory (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1997). This theory presents an integrative motivational perspective which postulates that all specific motives can be traced back to an instinctive desire for continued life. This evolutionary approach considers the fear of death and awareness about the inevitability of death as a main motive behind the human tendency towards self-preservation. Terror management reasoning consists of a tripartite hierarchical motive system beginning with direct biological motives, such as food, air and water. The next level includes symbolic-defensive motives that are predominantly directed towards pursuits of meaning and value. The nature of the second level is described as "symbolic means of self-preservation". The highest level is directed towards satisfaction of the self-expansive motives that primarily encompass the need for growth, exploration and expansion of the individual internal capacities. Terror management theory attempts to explain a wide range of behaviours as an (in)direct consequence of human beings' awareness of their own mortality.

Yet another theoretical framework that has similarities to the reasoning in this book is Glasser's choice theory (Glasser, 1998). Prior to 1996, this theory was commonly known as control theory, but, due to conceptual advances, has changed names to accentuate the role of choice in human need-oriented behaviour. The theory emphasises people's internal processes and argues that these processes, and not external forces, guide human action. The theory postulates the existence of five fundamental needs that directly influence behavioural choices: the need to survive, belong, have power, have freedom and have fun. The need for survival refers to both physical need, such as the need for food, water, air and sex, and the need for safety, shelter and security. The need for belonging refers to the innate psychological need to show love and care for other

people. The belonging need also includes the perception that we receive love from others and are part of larger social constellations, such as family structures, intimate friendships and working relationships. In choice theory, the need for power is conceptually connected to competence, self-efficacy and achievement, as well as to the general sense of worthiness. Power in this framework is not defined in reference to exploitation of other people or the exercise of dominance, as is the common definition in contemporary literature. The need for freedom relates to the sense of independence and autonomy, as well as to the ability to make choices. In many ways, this need resembles the theme of growth motivation, which was a popular subject in humanistic motivation and includes the human tendency to create, explore and express oneself freely. And finally, there is the need for fun, which encompasses enjoyment in having interests in both work-related and leisure activities. This need is conceptually related to positive aspects of human existence and emphasises the need to laugh and relax. In much the same way as the reasoning in this book, choice theory explicitly states that these internal needs are hard-wired into the genetic structure and represent a building block of human nature (Glasser, 1998). It is also possible to detect a notion of systems thinking as these fundamental needs are perceived to be interrelated and thus jointly contributing to behavioural manifestations. Indeed, the idea of systems thinking in general and the conceptualisation of motivation as a system of interrelated need processes are frequently applied in the relevant literature. This is somewhat expected considering that the usage of the term "systems" underlines the dynamic aspect of the underlying motivational process as opposed to the static description of the underlying structure. This also precludes the understanding of the various needs as elementary or overriding concepts that are distinct, as opposed to being interrelated. Hence, over the years there has been growing dissatisfaction with an atomistic view of human nature and doubt that such an approach is able to explain in a satisfactory manner all the complexity of human nature. Systems thinking in psychological literature is noticeable in the reasoning of Bowlby (1969), Ryan (1995), McCombs (1991), Hill (1987) and, more explicitly, in Lichtenberg (1989), who holds that motivation is best conceptualised as a series of systems designed to promote the fulfilment and regulation of basic needs.

Concluding Remarks

Based on the presented literature review, several points are found worth mentioning. First, the identification of the basic processes that can be seen as the impetus for human existence depends, as any logical construction does, on the strength of underlying premises and assumptions. As long as it is possible that these are questionable or directly false, the model or final conclusions might consequently be imprecise. Furthermore, considering that the present level of analysis concerns the most fundamental elements of human existence, very small initial errors in thinking might result in major inaccuracies in later steps of inquiry. Thus, the importance of having correct assumptions cannot be overstated. For example, in the opening pages of this chapter, I suggested that the notion of divine design and its presumed influence on human action, including the myth of the creation of life, is only one of the basic ideas wherein the initial flaws in thinking tended to interfere with the final results. Thus, belief that God-like forces had something to do with behavioural outcomes and origins of human motivation was somewhat disturbing and led to imprecise scientific analysis. The relatively slow development of more accurate models of human functioning in the course of history was primarily due to the existence of these basic, powerful and flawed premises, which precluded advances in the field. Somewhat mystical notions of God, soul, destiny and so on were regularly employed as important in understanding human actions, even though they have yet to contribute anything of consequence to improve our understanding of human actions, aside perhaps from aesthetic aspects. Therefore, the emergence of evolutionary theory, among many other sound pieces of scientific work, represented a clear advance in human thinking by undermining the weak foundation of the old thinking and establishing a new, more credible elementary understanding of human behaviour and how it might be studied. The existence of initial flaws in the thinking is by no means only linked to religious beliefs, as scientific assumptions and empirical evidence can be used blindly and narrowly to provide exactly the same results. For example, for science it would be catastrophic to discover that the basic premises of evolutionary theory are false. Many previously accepted scientific models would collapse

and new attempts would have to be made to identify new cornerstones on which to build new models of human behaviour.

Second, it is important to admit that this chapter contains only a small fraction of all possible postulations that have been made over the centuries on this topic. Thus, the list of people who, in one or another manner, attempted to accurately delineate the basic building blocks of human motivation and reliably identify processes that govern human behaviour is indeed long. As such, many other theorists, ideas and theoretical traditions could, and perhaps should, have been included in this chapter. The reasons for their exclusion lie in the purpose of the chapter and the book as a whole. The main purpose has been to provide an exemplification or illustration to show that the topic of fundamental motivation is indeed well-covered in literature. As I believe that this point has been communicated relatively clearly and copiously, the inclusion of other similar theoretical contributions might indeed be perceived as repetitive and redundant.

Third, in addition to historical coverage of this theme, it is also evident that there are several postulations in contemporary literature that are similar to the reasoning presented in this book. Although this could be seen as challenging the originality of the present contribution, I rather choose to consider this as supportive and a reinforcement of the credibility of the postulations presented in my work. In other words, the fact that my postulations coincide and on many points concur with previous theory could easily be taken as confirmation that I am on the right track. It would be arrogant to assume that I am suddenly able to provide a universal model of basic human motivation out of the blue. It is also important to note that the majority of previously presented approaches, although certainly being insightful and sound, suffer, nonetheless, from being predominantly one-sided. For instance, psychoanalytic theory in general, regardless of the theorist in question, has a tendency to accentuate one specific process at the expense of other equally important processes that govern human behaviour. Although this line of reasoning offers many inspiring and fascinating observations concerning human nature in general, the psychoanalytic theory is nevertheless firmly locked on personality and individual dispositions and, above all, theoretically connected to psychopathology.

Learning theories, on the other hand, exclude themselves from the possibility of including several other useful concepts that properly illuminate human nature because they insist that internal processes are not worthy of scientific examination. Humanistic theory, similarly to scientific forces 1 and 2, tends to oversimplify human existence by putting the explicit focus on possible culturally biased processes of self-realisation, human growth and the nature of interpersonal relations. Contemporary theories are not exempt from this criticism, either. The self-determination perspective, perhaps one of the most comprehensive contributions in the field of motivation, basically frames all human action along the continuum between external and internal causality points. Truly enough, self-determination theory is seemingly analogous to the present conceptualisation of basic motivation considering that concepts of control, affiliation and self-expression are strikingly similar to competence, belongingness and autonomy. On the other hand, as it will hopefully be evident at the end of this book, self-determination reasoning is narrower in scope by considering that virtually all human action is explained by focussing on the internal-external dichotomy and the autonomy concept.

This final remark logically introduces the obvious problematic question regarding similarities and differences between the model of fundamental motivation presented here and historical literature on this topic. In other words, after presenting an overview of the historical and contemporary contributions that address the issues of basic human motivation and in some ways resemble the basic postulations of this book, the reasonable question that logically arises is What are the novel ideas of this book and in what way do these ideas expand our understanding of basic motivational processes more than the previous historical postulations? Addressing this question now, before the reader has the chance to read the presentation of motivational systems (Chaps. 3, 4 and 5) and the underlying mechanisms (Chap. 5), might indeed be premature. Therefore, at this stage I choose to leave this important question unanswered. I will, however, return to this point in the final chapter where I intend to clarify the unique contributions of the present theoretical framework, along with acknowledging again the potential overlaps between the present ideas and contemporary theory.

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3

Control Motivational System

The General Need for Control

The idea of control, being in control or having control is a relatively intuitive and familiar concept for people in general. The popularity and wide usage of this term in everyday life is probably due to the fact that control is easily recognisable and relevant to many aspects of human functioning. On the other hand, this concept tends to cover multiple behavioural manifestations in a wide range of different life domains. As such, the term "control" awakens multiple meanings and connotations, many of which are negative. Considering the wide applicability of the control concept, it therefore comes as no surprise to learn that the notion of control represents a relatively well-researched theme in the contemporary literature. In fact, one could easily say that control is one of the terms used just as often in everyday life as it is in research. Indeed, the quantity of historical and current literature on this topic clearly indicates that control is employed in a broad range of applications, conditions and contexts. In a somewhat simplified definition, the idea of control refers to human efforts to master the challenging situations in life by exerting influence on the environment, regulating one's own actions and coping with the actions of oth-

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ers. The link between control and the evolution of the human species is obvious in the sense that having control is quite adaptive and important for survival (Friedman & Lackey, 1991; Thompson & Schlehofer, 2008). With proper identification, categorisation and accurate understanding of the relation between various stimuli, the individual is more likely to avoid unwanted outcomes and maintain self-preservation. In contrast, the signs of a loss of control are potentially threatening because they suggest an important shortcoming in the individual's abilities to cope with a demanding environment. In the current literature, the notion of control is in one way or another associated with a wide range of psychological phenomena, including *attitude-related behaviour* (Brehm, 1993; Pittman, 1993), *power motivation* (Baumeister, 1998; Depret & Fiske, 1993), *agency* (Brandtstädter, 2006), *choice* (Leotti, Iyengar, & Ochsner, 2010), *the sense of autonomy* (Deci & Ryan, 2012), *self-preservation and awareness of mortality* (Fritsche, Jonas, & Fankhänel, 2008), *the promotion of psychological well-being* (Skinner, 1996), *learning and goal-oriented behaviour* (Alloy, Clements, & Koenig, 1993), *causal attribution and information processing* (Anderson & Deuser, 1993; Burger, 1993), *self-esteem* (Hodgins, Brown, & Carver, 2007; Judge, Erez, Bono, & Thoresen, 2002), *self-perception and self-appraisal* (Strube & Yost, 1993), and *achievement striving and need for superiority* (Adler, 1979/1933), to name but a few.

Early research on this topic shows that it is crucial to perceive control not only for our psychological well-being, but also for our physical health (Langer, 1983). There is an astonishing degree of consensus on the importance of control across very different theoretical perspectives ranging from psychoanalysis (Adler, 1956) and psychology (DeCharms, 1968) to naturalistic observations based on field studies in the realm of social anthropology (e.g. Malinowski, 1955). Moreover, the importance of control is not limited to human functioning. Indeed, early experiments in the domain of animal research show that if allowed to predict the deliverance of shock, rats do not develop ulcers (Weiss, 1968). This suggests that shock itself is relatively unimportant as a cause of ulcers in as much as whether the organism can control and predict that shock. These findings from classical studies on animals are further reinforced by the mounting general empirical evidence showing that prediction and control over

events, as well as experiences of mastery and efficacy, result in improved psychosocial conditions in general (see overview in Schwarzer, 2014). Following the same logic, the exposure to stressors without the ability to control them impairs the immune system (Segerstrom & Miller, 2004).

However, although the concept of control is in some cases explicitly connected with negative outcomes, in some other cases the link is implicit. For example, the importance of the predictability and controllability of events is linked to the development of phobias through the concept of self-efficacy (Bandura, Reese, & Adams, 1982). Similarly, the sense of control also plays a role in the well-known learned helplessness theory (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Kofta, 1993; Seligman, Abramson, Semmel, & Baeyer, 1979), in which the experimental studies show that exposure to an uncontrollable situation (no perception of the contingency between behaviour and outcomes) lowers the cognitive, emotional (decreased mood) and behavioural (decreased action) abilities of the individual, thus establishing a theoretical connection between control and depression (Taylor & Brown, 1988; Weary, Marsh, Gleicher, & Edwards, 1993). All in all, the results of the experimental research are clear. There is little doubt that having a sense of control or having a strong belief in control facilitates the ability to cope with challenging situations and significantly improves physiological and psychological adjustment to various health challenges (see overview in Taylor, 2010).

The results of these studies are hardly surprising. In fact, they are quite intuitive. It is easy to agree that some of the most emotional moments in anyone's life are connected to situations in which people are faced with conditions wherein the sense of personal control is weak and the hope of being able to influence the situation is reduced to a minimum. Consequently, loss of control regularly results in negative emotional states, such as shame, embarrassment, humiliation and high levels of undesirable emotional arousal.

Considering the presented quantity of theory and research that clearly and overwhelmingly shows that the human need for control indeed represents a fundamental process, it is not surprising to discover that people generally tend to act as if they have control in situations that are actually determined by chance, seek choice and control even in situations when there is none, treat non-contingent situations as if they were contingent,

behave as though outcomes are dependent on responses when they are not and as though one event can be predicted from another when it cannot (see review in Taylor & Brown, 1988). Thus, the idea of having control comes naturally to people, leading frequently to illusions of control (Langer, 1975; Presson & Benassi, 1996).

However, regardless the quantity of research showing the importance of control, and the fact that the concept of control is relatively intuitive and frequently used both by experts and lay people, the term is still both complex and unclear. In terms of conceptual complexity, the notion of control has been theoretically defined as well as operationally used in many different ways in contemporary research. For example, control could refer to a number of response choices available to the individual, to the response effectiveness of the contingency between responses and outcomes or to the response-outcome contingency plus the achievement of a desired outcome (Alloy et al., 1993). Furthermore, control could also be attained through an active response (behavioural control) or through the cognitive-emotional evaluation of the situation (psychological control). The clear theoretical complexity of this concept is visible in postulations made by Averill (1973, pp. 286–287) who adopts a tripartite typology of personal control in relation to stressful situations. First, there is a notion of behavioural control that refers to the availability of a response that may directly influence or modify the objective characteristics of a threatening event. Behavioural control is further divided into two basic subdivisions in which both are related to the possibility of modifying or influencing the situational conditions, namely regulated administration and stimulus modification. The second type of personal control refers to cognitive efforts to interpret or appraise given events. In much the same way as the two-fold division of behavioural control, cognitive control is also divided into two basic types, namely information gain (i.e. slight preference for collecting information in the situations when the evaluation of threat is relatively objective) and appraisal (i.e. when the experience of threat is altered or modified to conform to the needs and desires of the individual). And finally, there is also decisional control, which refers to the range of choices or number of options open to an individual, as well as the opportunity to choose between various courses of action.

Bearing Averill's postulations in mind, one of the basic classifications of control in psychological literature refers to the division between primary and secondary control (Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982). The original reasoning on this issue emphasises the importance of optimal adaptation that is achieved by coordinating these two basic forms of control. Primary control represents an attempt to actively change the environment. Secondary control is directed towards attempts to alter oneself and fit in with the environment (see overview in Chipperfield, Perry, Bailis, Ruthig, & Chuchmach, 2007). Thus, in the words of Morling and Evered (2006, p. 285) "*primary and secondary control are two strategies that meet different human motives in response to everyday events or stressful challenges*" (but see also Skinner, 2007, for critical discussion on the relation between primary and secondary control).

In addition to these specific typologies of control, there are virtually dozens of other theoretical frameworks across different disciplines and traditions which maintain that a sense of personal control is integral to human functioning. Indeed, the list of themes used in psychological theory directly involving the notion of control is quite impressive: predictive control, personal control, illusory control, vicarious control, interpretative control, locus of control, decisional control and sense of control. Moreover, a number of concepts are also indirectly, yet clearly, connected to control: competence, effectance, self-efficacy, mastery, capacity, ability, capability, skill, proficiency, agency and autonomy, to name but a few (for an overview of research and different control constructs, see Fritsche et al., 2008; Skinner, 1996, 2007; Thompson & Schlehofer, 2008).

At this point, I believe that one thing is fairly clear: there are undoubtedly grounds to propose that the need for control can indeed be linked in one way or another to fundamental motivation (Friedman & Lackey, 1991). However, the formulation "one way or another" is problematic and represents the point where the current theories on control are unsettling. On one hand, it is easy to agree with Skinner's (2007) conclusion that secondary control (i.e. efforts to fit the environment) is less about control and more about accommodation and should be conceptualised and studied as such. At the pragmatic level of analysis, this represents a useful suggestion in terms of gaining a theoretical overview and clearing up the potential chaos of interrelated concepts. On the other hand, at

the level of analysis that explores the fundamental motivation tendencies, this postulation creates a problem by coupling control with other presumed basic motivations, such as autonomy and belonging, and consequently runs the risk of blurring the distinction between these concepts.

One possible way of resolving the apparent theoretical challenges is to analyse this term across distinct life domains. In other words, one of the possible reasons why there is a relatively unsettling theoretical understanding of this term could be the fact that there has been little precision in any relevant theory about what exactly people are motivated to control (Depret & Fiske, 1993, p. 186). Bearing this observation in mind, in the following I will conceptualise control as a system of interrelated need processes revealing itself differently depending on the specificity of a particular life domain. The basic idea is that the human propensity for control is potent and visible in many aspects of human functioning, but its effects and display differ according to the restricting boundaries of the specific behavioural domain. Hence, in the following three sections, the underlying need for control will be analysed as reflecting itself in the three distinct life domains: (1) controlling environmental cues (e.g. need for achievement, competence or mastery), (2) controlling interpersonal relations (e.g. need for power or domination) and (3) controlling the "self" (e.g. internal self-strategies and self-processes).

Controlling Environmental Cues

The first life domain to be presented here with a potent need for control is the inherent human propensity for obtaining a reasonable level of control over stimuli that originate in the proximate environment (i.e. controlling environmental cues). The concept of control here is understood in a wide sense and related to management, mastery, achievement and coping strategies people apply in the course of development related to environmental challenges. This kind of behaviour in which people generally feel playful joy in being a cause, transforming and controlling their environment, has been recorded in psychological literature for many years (Groos, 1901). It is also a well-known fact of life that people are concerned with, and in some aspects disturbed by, the presence and influence of environmental

cues in their proximate environment. By environmental cues I mean various challenges in responding to, managing and overcoming many of the tasks and challenges that reside in the environment without implying interpersonal relations. The number of these activities is infinite and in general concerns all kinds of developmental mastery and tasks that emerge during childhood and subsequent phases in life. In the life course, people are obligated to develop appropriate responses, be apt, exert agency and develop suitable strategies to provide protection and security, but also to show a sense of meaningful existence. The confrontation with various environmental stimuli and the subsequent management of these is hardwired in human nature in the sense that this motivation is based on the inherent motoric disposition to (successfully) interact with the environment. Interaction with and challenges that reside in the proximate environment, as well as those that are a product of developmental changes, are easily provoked without previous learning and appear in the early stages of life when infants show a clear and almost reflexive preference for controllable situations. However, although most certainly innate, the disposition for achieving the goal of managing environmental stimuli is further formed through the experience of having success or failure during childhood and later development. The motivational domain I am referring to here was originally introduced in psychological theory as achievement motivation (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953). Based on the extensive literature on achievement, it is easy to conclude that there is a strong theoretical relation between this concept and the idea of control in the area connected to various types of task performance. For example, one of the most prominent researchers of human needs in history, Murray (1938), considered the striving for achievement to be one of the basic human needs. To define achievement, Murray used such descriptions as efforts to accomplish something difficult in the best possible way and as quickly as possible, to master, manipulate or organise physical objects, human beings or ideas, and to overcome obstacles (Murray 1938, p. 164). The notion of achievement, as related to task performance, is similar to what White (1959) referred to as the notion of competence. In the attempt to promote a neglected aspect of human motivation, White defines competence as an organism's capacity to interact effectively with its environment (White, 1959, p. 297). His argument includes the innate

inclination to explore one's environment, and the search, activity within and manipulation of one's surroundings. Furthermore, White explicitly states that although the importance of developmental challenges for children and adults in terms of adaptation to the environment has been acknowledged and studied, there is no common term that would incorporate all these separate behaviours under one common, overarching concept. Hence, White (1959) posited the existence of an innate propensity for competence that he termed effectance and further argued that it should be acknowledged as an important motivational concept. It is easy to see in the descriptions of Murray and White that the notions of achievement and effectance to a large degree involve the ability of the organism to exert control over environmental stimuli and manage the increasing number of possible challenges in this domain.

The early work of Murray, White and other prominent researchers in this field had a major influence on the emergence of later empirical research that specifically focussed on achievement motivation. One of the specific focusses in this line of research was given to measurement challenges, that is, how the given motive is measured in the first place. Following and developing the premises of a sound scientific approach, over the years a number of specific studies emerged that investigated how individuals either with a low or high need for achievement respond when they are faced with task difficulty, task responsibility, persistence of work, success or failure feedback, the perception of achievement-related words, performance improvement, mental arithmetic and so on (see overview in McClelland, 1987). All in all, this line of research indicates that a natural incentive for the achievement motive is doing something better and faster. The interesting point, which also supports the idea that the human tendency for manipulating and managing environmental cues is inherent, is that differences between the high and low need for achievement tend to disappear when external achievement cues are present. This tendency indicates that the need for achievement is intrinsically driven by the very interest in the task and further reinforced by competition and performance feedback (Deci & Ryan, 1987; Pervin, 1990). For example, finding that parental authoritarianism is connected with a low need for achievement suggests that external sources of self-regulation might interfere with a child's autonomy when it comes to gaining control over

various environmental cues. Indeed, the general body of research indicates that the achievement pattern is shaped by events in the early stages of life. Data summarised by McClelland (1987) show that mothers of boys who have a high need for achievement report that they tended by the age of five or six to be active and energetic, tried hard to do things on their own, did well in school, looked after their own possessions and so on. These early tendencies are further consolidated later in development and show that the way adults gain control over their own actions reveals a characteristic pattern: people with a high need for achievement tend to enjoy variety and avoid simple repetitive motions, they tend to be more restless and avoid routines during task performance, they are more likely to travel and migrate, more likely to seek out information to find a better way of doing things and to be more innovative. Furthermore, there are indications that the achievement motive is connected to progressive improvement or mastery in one specific domain rather than showing interest in different unrelated activities. Again, doing something better and faster and developing control of autonomic functions seems to be one of the main incentives behind achievement motivation.

On the other hand, it is interesting to note that individuals with a high need for achievement tend to find and use shortcuts, when available, to achieve the desired outcomes. Experimental research also shows that they even tend to change the rules of the given activity (i.e. cheat) if given the chance to do so. This suggests that the desire to "get things done" is of more concern than the nature of the means used (honest or dishonest) to obtain the desired outcomes. Considering the explicit focus on attainment of specific goals, it is therefore not surprising to discover that individuals with a high need for achievement cope better with the difficulties of the real world by being more realistic in occupational choices, finding more satisfactory jobs, showing good work adjustment, not seeing work as interfering with family, reporting few symptoms of ill health, not taking drugs to relieve tension and generally showing a better adjustment ability and satisfaction with life. It is also logical to find that such people are more innovative but also more restless and likely to migrate to introduce a change in their environment, persist in various tasks if feedback about task performance is provided and achievement incentive present, and achieve higher levels of identity formation and maturity in general

(see overview in McClelland, 1987; Pervin, 1990). As noted above, although theoretically expanded to accommodate the approach (hope for success) and avoidance (fear of failure) motivation, it is easy to see that this line of empirical investigation on achievement motivation concurs with Murray (1938) and White (1959). For example, in conceptualising effectance motivation, White made explicit reference to such behaviour as that of a suckling infant, grasping, visually exploring, crawling, walking, undertaking acts of focal attention and perception, using memory and language, thinking, anticipating, exploring novel places and objects, effecting stimulus changes in the environment, manipulating and exploiting the surroundings, and achieving higher levels of motor and mental coordination as a starting point for achieving the sense of control over environmental cues and an effective interaction with the environment. Not entirely accidentally, this position also concurs with contemporary definitions of achievement motivation that focus on attempts to explain people's choice of achievement tasks, persistence on those tasks, vigour in carrying them out and performance on them (Wigfield & Eccles, 2000).

However, although the general direction in research on achievement motivation is relatively stable over time, the quantity of contemporary theory on the concept of achievement and the emergence of new insights has literally exploded. Thus, over the past four decades, we have witnessed greater activity in relation to this subject and the emergence of detailed approaches to such achievement processes as goal pursuit, self-regulation and self-control, learning and so on. As noted in the introduction, in many ways it is fair to say that modern theory has moved its focus from exploration of basic human motivations to detailed investigation of the number of specific relevant processes and conditions that affect human efforts to gain mastery. The net result of this activity is the current existence of many interrelated, overlapping and partly competing theoretical propositions with the aim of mapping the specific elements of human (goal) achievement. For example, the past research on achievement motivation is theoretically related to expectancy-value reasoning (Atkinson, 1957). Over the years, this basic research has inspired several other researchers (e.g. Eccles et al., 1983) to develop an expectancy-value model of achievement and performance and to embed this thinking in the realm of educational psychology. More specifically, goal orientation

theory of motivation represents an influential theoretical and empirical framework attempting to define the manner in which people are trying to achieve various objectives (see Kaplan & Maehr, 2007; for an overview of spin-off theories and controversies, see Senko, Hulleman, & Harackiewicz, 2011). This theory is mostly designed for and used in various educational contexts where various adaptive and maladaptive strategies of learning and achievement are studied. This complex theory also includes a number of specific motivational constructs, such as the basic division between mastery and performance goals as well as such specific variables as self-efficacy, capability beliefs, attributions, control beliefs, intrinsic motivation and values (for an overview of specific constructs, see Wigfield & Cambria, 2010; see also the meta-analytic overview in Hulleman, Schrager, Bodmann, & Harackiewicz, 2010).

Another similar line of research that builds further on achievement motivation is goal-setting theory. The idea of goal setting explicitly focusses on the relationship between defined performance goals and the level of task performance (Locke & Latham, 2002). A slightly different theoretical framework, but also inspired by the expectancy-value model of achievement, is the highly influential reason-action approach, consisting of theory of reasoned action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980), theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) and subsequent additional variables (Kovač, Rise, & Moan, 2010). It is worth noting that the reason-action approach, which, surprisingly, is rarely used in educational contexts (for exceptions, see Kovač, Cameron, & Høigaard, 2014), is probably one of the most applied theoretical frameworks in the realm of the social sciences.

All in all, the quantity of theoretical and empirical work on achievement motivation is enormous, especially considering that this influence is to be found in many other subfields and theoretical directions, such as self-regulation (Vohs & Baumeister, 2011), intrinsic-extrinsic motivational orientation (Rawsthorne & Elliot, 1999) and identity (Schwartz, Luyckx, & Vignoles, 2011). Hence, although the present text hardly represents an extensive overview of historical and contemporary studies on achievement motivation, I nevertheless believe that the reader at this point is convinced that the idea of managing, achieving or controlling environmental tasks is indeed well-covered in contemporary theory.

However, considering the quantity of the presented research, it is important to maintain the focus on the main aims of this book and not to be distracted or overwhelmed by the sheer amount of research in this area. In this section, I attempted to show that (1) there is an innate need to master/alter environmental tasks and cues (e.g. achievement motivation) and (2) this disposition represents a manifestation of the more fundamental human need for control. The first point is relatively unproblematic considering the amount of available literature on this topic, as well as the fact that this proposition is intuitive and directly observable. The second point, however, is far from obvious and represents a theoretical challenge. Nevertheless, it is possible to argue that there is a causal connection between the concepts of achievement and control wherein the variety of behavioural patterns commonly associated with achievement are seen as a specific manifestation of the more fundamental and underlying motivation for control (see the concluding section of this chapter for research-based arguments). The assumed connection is evident and directly observable in many different behavioural manifestations of adult activities, but the tendency is especially visible during the early years of human development. Achieving a satisfactory level of control over challenges in proximate environments facilitates the avoidance of uncontrollable life challenges that eventually might result in the development of anxiety and general insecurity and negatively affect psychosocial functioning. By setting a goal of moderate difficulty and then experiencing success in completing that task, the individual is likely to experience that he/she is not helpless in this world. The number of tasks in life is infinite, starting with the early ages. Thus, control over environmental cues concerns the management of the basic (e.g. the life of infants) and complex (e.g. the life of adults) motoric abilities, as well as the constant challenge of knowledge management through the life course (e.g. various school and occupational activities).

I have also noted that, in addition to the provision of protection and security, developing control over environmental challenges also tends to provide a general sense of meaning over one's own existence. Every small success in this domain, no matter how insignificant it might appear to the outside observer, seems to serve the function of establishing a meaningful relation between the person and the given context. By perform-

ing an action well, whether it is a case of some "insignificant" child activity or "important" adult mastery, the individual is helped in finding his or her own place in the world. This also highlights the important conceptual difference between contemporary research on achievement motivation and the present reasoning. It seems that studies on achievement motivation are predominantly preoccupied with the exploration of the processes that promote efficient self-regulation, yielding the best possible results and identifying the most optimal conditions for behavioural performances. Thus, contemporary theory implicitly perceives, defines and ultimately analyses motivational processes in terms of success and failure, and according to the nature of behavioural outcomes. Put simply, the main aim often is to increase productivity and to get people to be better at doing things. This is certainly a sensible and necessary approach in terms of understanding the complex relation between multiple processes that affect human behaviour. However, as indicated above, contemporary motivational theory has become painfully detailed, failing thus far to "see the forest for the trees" (i.e. the links between fundamental motivation and specific performances). In the attempt to even out the skewed research focus, one of the aims of the present reasoning is to renew the interest in the basic psychological processes on which all human functioning is developed. As such, the ideas presented and argued here are conceptually similar to the above-mentioned effectance motivation (White, 1959), in which the focus of analysis is on the argument that there is an innate propensity towards an exploration of the environment, meaning search, activity and manipulation of one's surroundings, regardless of the level of productivity, success, talent or exploration of mechanisms that result in doing something better and faster. In other words, behavioural manifestations of control over environmental cues are presently viewed and analysed as an innate and inevitable psychological motivating state that sets a frame for the development of specific behavioural responses.

All in all, I believe that we can find overwhelming empirical evidence suggesting that there is an inherent human motivation towards achieving control over environmental cues and tasks. This relatively simple yet distinct type of motivation is conceptually related to many existing, somewhat competing, specific theoretical frame-

works that include such concepts and processes as achievement motivation, competence, efficacy, self-regulation, goal orientation, goal setting, goal abstraction (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989), goal difficulty (Atkinson, 1957), learning orientation (Dweck, 1996) and deliberative processing. If we ignore the apparent conceptual complexity, the reasoning here is centred on identification of commonalities rather than on pointing out the specificities. All these concepts and theoretical propositions are listed here as possible support for arguments that testify to the existence of motivation that is directed towards control over environmental cues. Put another way, many different theoretical frameworks in current literature only represent specific ways in which underlying control motivation over environmental cues is channelled into visible behaviour.

Controlling Others

In the previous section, I attempted to show that achievement motivation is conceptually linked to the basic human need to control environmental cues. In the following section, I will make a similar attempt to argue that the need to manage interpersonal and group relations in terms of power or dominance is also about control. Certainly, the control of interpersonal and group relations does not concern environmental cues, but rather the processes that influence the power distribution between people.

We can start this analysis by acknowledging that controlling environmental cues and developing achievement abilities constitute only one of the challenges we encounter at birth. From an early age, we are also concerned about, and in some aspects disturbed by, having an at least minimal sense of control over existing interpersonal relationships. The establishment and preservation of relationships is an unavoidable fact of life considering that some sort of human relations exist and are noticeable in every society and every individual situation. Thus, the importance and existence of the human need to establish manageable bonding ties in the form of family constellations, friendships, workplace relations, interactions with neighbours, leisure activities, romantic relationships and so on is indisputable. The significance of interpersonal relations represents

one of the most used motives in fictional literature and is often poetically contrasted to the metaphor of man as an "island, entire of itself". However, the one very unfortunate aspect of interpersonal and group relations is that these types of interaction are inherently not neutral in terms of physical strength, social position, age, sex or resources. Actually, interpersonal and group relations are commonly and universally asymmetrical in terms of dominance, as people inevitably tend to exert an influence on each other. Establishing, balancing and maintaining a wide variety of different relationships is one of the most fundamental as well as frequent projects every person encounters in his or her life. In much the same way as achievement motivation, the management of a variety of interpersonal relations is hard-wired in human nature in the sense that this motivation is based on the inherent disposition to establish a satisfactory and non-threatening interaction with people around oneself and to find one's own place in the proximate social environment. By power perception and distribution, I mean here the various challenges in controlling, responding, managing and overcoming human relations. As noted, these challenges are considered to be similar to managing tasks and other environmental cues as they also represent a manifestation of the underlying need for control.

The exploration of the processes and mechanisms that influence the nature of interpersonal relations is conceptually related in the literature to a theoretical subfield that is commonly referred to as power motivation or social dominance. Research in this domain generally shows that having an optimal or satisfactory level of power in interpersonal relationships is fundamentally beneficial for human beings and affects our cognitive functioning and general development (Barkow, 1975; Bugental & Cortez, 1988; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Marmot, 2004). However, although fairly intuitive and familiar to all people, psychological theory understands and defines the concept of social power in various ways. For instance, some definitions emphasise the social and relational aspects and focus on the individual's ability to influence another person(s) (see overview in Anderson, John, & Keltner, 2012). Other researchers use power to describe political structure, using it as a construct to describe links between actors, or as a construct inferred from the consequences of interaction (Depret & Fiske, 1993; also Fiske, 2010). Fiske and Berdahl

(2007) have attempted to group the existing definitions of power into three broad categories. The first is related to power as outcome control in which the focus of analysis is on sources of power. The second category relates to power as the potential for influence which underlines the capacity to exert effect. And finally, the third category concerns power as influence which focusses on effects of power. These authors explicitly posit that the definition of power in terms of effects (i.e. what power does to something or somebody) is problematic on the grounds that this approach defines power in terms of what it does and not in terms of what it is. On the other hand, the interest in power in terms of what the possession of power does to people is hardly surprising considering that the effects of power are multiple and affect a wide range of cognitive and affective processes. For example, the research findings indicate that power influences conformity, creativity and persuasion (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008), interpersonal sensitivity (Schmid Mast, Jonas, & Hall, 2009), sexual infidelity (Lammers, Stoker, Jordan, Pollmann, & Stapel, 2011), communication style (Dunbar & Burgoon, 2005), and social distance (Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten, 2012).

As with other important motives in the literature, a great deal of research has paid attention to questioning how people with a strong power motive behave under various conditions. Early research revealed that individuals who have a high need for power are likely to show symptoms of anxiety, are more prone to heart attacks and coronary artery diseases and have more health problems in general. They also tend to describe themselves as being more dissatisfied with various aspects of their lives, having drinking or substance abuse problems due to the need to relieve tension and having more emotional problems and troubles with their sleep cycle (McClelland, 1987). It is interesting to find that the level of alcohol has different effects on people and the need for power. In general, alcohol leads to the progression of sexual, aggressive and power concerns and decreases inhibitory mechanisms. Small amounts of alcohol result in the exhibition of power that is directed more towards the world in general (being important in work, in family, status and so on). Drinking more is found to lead towards thoughts of personal dominance ranging from being a winner to assaulting people (McClelland, 1987). It seems that

the more actual control over existence decreases, as seen by objective measures, the more the need for power and domination increases.

In much the same way as achievement motivation, the sensitivity towards a power balance in the realm of interpersonal relationships is a basic need that originates from the early stages of life. The need to manage the nature of interaction with significant others, as well as the variety of interpersonal challenges that reside in the proximate social surroundings, is easily provoked without previous learning and appears in the early stages of life when infants show clear and almost reflexive preference for safe and manageable situations. Thus, there is an inherent sensitivity towards balancing the power relations right from the early stages of life. In that sense, the primary caregiver-child relationship is an interpersonal relation of the utmost significance. Parents and other significant persons are the first people a child relates to, and this establishes a tone that serves as a base line for the variety of future social interactions. We find a large amount of empirical research, clinical evidence and theoretical propositions suggesting that in threatening interpersonal environments, children tend to invest a great deal of energy (i.e. cognitions, emotions and actions) in establishing non-threatening relations with the people around them. This is highly visible in the realm of traditional psychoanalytic research where the focus on the interplay between the primary caregivers and the child is explicit and accentuated. For example, Horney (1950/1991) believed that if the child-parent relationship is not founded on security, then a child will unmistakably develop anxiety and eventually also hostility towards the world in general. Rogers (1951) also emphasises the type of love an individual has received in childhood, distinguishing between two basic forms. Conditional love is considered to promote a negative self-image. Thus, the individual will only enjoy affection from the people around him if he performs accepted actions and behaves properly. On the other hand, unconditional love is experienced as unrelated to our actions and behaviour. Having faults is accepted as part of being human and the need to defend the self-concept is not necessary. Only under these conditions is it considered that positive self-image and self-confidence arise (i.e. positive self-regard). Anxiety, which is considered to be related to the degree an individual feels conditionally or unconditionally loved, represents, according to Rogers, an obstacle that impedes personal growth and

self-realisation. It is reasonable to assume that if the child has to invest a great deal of its own cognitions and emotions in "reading" adults and their responses, its sensitivity towards power distribution and potential threats will increase. These basic experiences in the realm of the interpersonal domain are later projected out onto the world in general and across many different relations. Indeed, recent research findings suggest that although the personal sense of power might be specific to particular relationships, it is also moderately consistent across the variety of other interpersonal relations (Anderson et al., 2012).

These developmental issues notwithstanding, it is a common fact of life that people have to relate to other people, not only in terms of the community dimension and "simple" belonging (Anderson et al., 2012), but also in terms of power distribution. In other words, it is an indisputable fact of life that all people at some point in time will either actively exert some kind of power over others or passively activate power issues by means of their own characteristics and dispositions. The exertion of passive power might be embedded in the position the individual has in any given social system or may even be a product of a person's physical characteristics and other individual dispositions. Hence, the need to manage relations based on power, even in situations where there is no objective threat, might easily be activated reflexively. In the cases where an objective threat exists, people readily mobilise all their resources to either attain the advantage or retain the balance in the existing relations. In some extreme cases, people might even actively seek subordination, submissive admiration and other forms of compliant behaviour. People who are oversensitive to human stimuli in their relations tend to judge the power balance in a majority of situations. This kind of oversensitivity might lead to an interpretation of neutral stimuli as threatening and awaken a prompt reaction that will restore the desired distribution in accordance with their understanding of how power should be distributed between the different parties involved. Considering that people (i.e. potential threats) are everywhere, this type of oversensitivity is certainly costly as people might invest a great deal of psychological effort in establishing interpersonal balance, often damaging their own physiological well-being and immune system. It is therefore understandable that these people are familiar with interpersonal conflicts and tend to create them,

even in situations where the initial conflict was perhaps more about the manner in which goals should be achieved (i.e. attached to control over environmental cues) and had less to do with interpersonal "chemistry".

As noted above, the growing interest in the processes that regulate and influence the manner in which people relate to each other in terms of power, dominance and subordination is understandable considering the obvious effects power exhibits on human behaviour (for a nuanced examination of the conceptual relation between power and dominance, see Dunbar & Burgoon, 2005). However, the analysis of power in terms of effects on behaviour is conceptually different from the analysis of power in terms of motivational sources and underlying mechanisms. As with the contemporary research on achievement motivation, it seems that research on the power motive has been predominantly preoccupied with effects that result in more or less fortunate or fair conditions, and the allocation of various resources that affect power distribution. In other words, following the general trend in science, research on power has gradually become more and more detailed in terms of exploring specific instances and examining direct, moderating and mediating effects. Indeed, as with research on achievement, we are currently in possession of detailed and overwhelming knowledge, possibly at the expense of understanding the origins of power. In contrast to the general trend in contemporary research, the power motivation is presently being analysed in terms of antecedents, that is, the search for even more principle and fundamental motivational processes than power that are responsible for existence and the development of skewed relations. When it comes to power, I again suggest that such an underlying main process is the concept of control, not, however, over environmental cues, but over people. The distinction between achievement and power motivation becomes clearer if we say that the incentive for control over interpersonal relations is not related too much to performance feedback (e.g. how fast or well I do things). The incentive for this type of motivation is fundamentally social in nature and ranges from experience of not being threatened by others to achieving complete domination over other people. For example, let us say that a person decides to build a tall fence in his backyard along his neighbour's border. At first sight, this act obviously includes achievement motivation and control over environmental cues, as the accomplishment of this

action requires mechanical or motoric competences and skills. However, in these and many other similar examples, the actions might also be motivated by seeking control over existing relations with the neighbour and affecting the general distribution of power. Thus, fences are not goals in themselves. They are just the means that serve the function of managing the nature of the specific interpersonal relation. It follows that the need to exert power over other people is similar to achievement and mastery, only not directed at control over environmental cues, but over existing relations between people.

All in all, the aim of the present section is to make a case for the fact that (1) there is an innate motivational propensity for constant surveillance and management of interpersonal and group relations in terms of power and (2) the tendency towards power management merely represents an indicator of the more fundamental and underlying motivation for control, which is manifested in the domain of interpersonal and group relations. In its basic form, control over interpersonal and group relations manifests itself as an experience or perception of (satisfactory) power distribution. In other words, the suggestion here is that the underlying need for control in the realm of interpersonal relations is often visible in the perception and distribution of power among people.

Controlling the "Self"

In addition to the need to have control over environmental cues (i.e. achievement or mastery) and interpersonal/group relations (i.e. power or domination), there is a third life domain within which the basic motivation for control is highly prominent. This domain, focussing on the management of intra-personal processes, is currently referred to as "controlling the self". In the same ways as I reasoned in the previous two sections, in the following I will attempt to provide arguments postulating that human efforts to manage internal impulses, cognitions and emotions are strikingly similar to achievement and power in terms of motivational origins.

We can start the analysis by viewing the first years of human development. As was the case with environmental challenges and power

distribution, the task of managing the variety of cognitive-emotional processes is an unavoidable practice every human being must undertake from an early age. In current psychological theory, many theoretical propositions address this type of human functioning, and the literature on this topic is just as overwhelming in terms of specificity and detailed theoretical frameworks as the literature on achievement and power. However, the processes and mechanisms that are at work when people attempt to manage internal challenges is the type of regulation that is not commonly associated with control motivation. In fact, this topic generally covers literature that concerns analyses and understanding of the entity that we arbitrarily choose to call the "self". The great quantity of literature on this topic is not entirely surprising as the very idea of "self" represents a sensitive, fragile and continuously evaluated entity that has fascinated and irritated researchers for centuries. The source of irritation is of course the elusive and dubious nature of the concept, if one is prepared to consider the existence of "selfhood" to begin with. Nonetheless, the process and challenge of achieving internal satisfaction and balancing all kinds of inner states is very real in terms of behavioural consequences. The social world around us has never been more complex and complicated when it comes to the various role demands and methods of self-presentation. In the modern informational, globalised and digital age, there are virtually hundreds of ways in which inner processes might be interfered with. Thus, the modern multi-input social surroundings tend to interfere with the variety of internal processes and intrude into the privacy that we all, truly enough in various degrees, cherish. Clearly, it is fair to say that modern people need all the help they can get in dealing with their own "self".

Considering the amount of available literature on the subject, I arbitrarily choose to present the most typical theoretical frameworks on this theme and briefly delineate the main features of their postulations. We can start with one of the earliest theories in the realm of social/cognitive psychology that address the question of the discrepancy between thoughts and (self-) observed behaviour. This state of imbalance has been termed cognitive dissonance and, in a simplified version, was originally defined as being caused by holding two or more inconsistent cognitions (Festinger, 1957). The subsequent definitions focussed on the relation

between cognition and behaviour in the sense that it was considered dissonance was caused by performing an action that deviates from one's customary, typically positive self-conception. The deviant actions are considered to commonly result in negative emotional states, such as anticipated regret, anxiety, remorse and anticipation of negative consequences. Thus, the specific performance was considered to awaken a discrepancy between the objective presentation of what the person has actually done in the particular situation and some "ideal" or merely alternative image of some other course of action that was possible in a given situation. It is easy to accept the original suggestion that dissonance is not a comfortable state and people are motivated to do something about it in terms of achieving consistency. Considering the amount of published work on this process and the role of dissonant states in attitudes, decision making and potential anxiety, it is somewhat surprising to learn that the concept of cognitive dissonance is fairly elusive, both theoretically and in terms of measurement (see overview in Sweeney, Hausknecht, & Soutar, 2000). Nevertheless, the accumulated evidence indicates that there is a virtually compulsive human need to manage internal dissonance (i.e. cognitions and emotions) with the aim of achieving consistency between thoughts and behaviour.

A similar postulation that also accentuates the discrepancy of elements that typically cause uncomfortable states is Heider's concept of balance (Heider, 1958). Although the theory is complex and applicable to multiple levels of social interaction, Heider's original postulation is centred on the mechanisms located internally, that is, those residing in a person's mind. The theory focusses on the achievement of harmonic relations between the individual and two additional elements[em-dash]either two other persons, or two other issues, or a combination of these. Inconsistency between elements creates tension, and this tension is regarded as a motivating force behind the cognitive efforts that are put into establishing balance. Thus, it is assumed that there is a natural tendency towards a balanced state that is considered to be a stable condition. According to Heider, all unstable conditions are expected to balance over time into stable ones. It is easy to see that both cognitive dissonance theory and balance theory have been conceptualised within the realm of consistency motivation, which was a relatively popular theme in the 1960s. Although

certainly very different in terms of specific circumstances, positions and perspectives, both theories point out in a powerful way the existence of the virtually compulsory human struggle to achieve balanced/consonant internal states.

In many ways, these two theories represented a springboard for the development of several other similar and specific lines of thinking, as well as the creation of some of the most popular subfields in psychology (e.g. attribution theory, general cognitive psychology, decision making and self-theories). In the majority of these subsequent fields, some of the most frequent and common themes are conceptually related to management of internal processes. Thus, in other theories the general states of dissonance or imbalance are analysed more specifically from the position of alternative perspectives and traditions that attempt to understand and describe the internal processes of the mighty "self".

For example, self-affirmation theory holds that people tend to harmonise positive and negative aspects of the self-image by underlining and reinforcing positive aspects when there is a possibility that the negative ones could be salient and gain advantage (Steele & Liu, 1983). The principal motivation for these tendencies is the preservation of self-integrity in terms of moral values, competence and general worthiness (Steele, 1988). According to this theory, people generally tend to express positive features of themselves, especially in the situations they experience as threatening. Furthermore, people tend to cope with threats to their self by attempting to affirm an aspect of their selfhood in a completely different domain. The net result of this balancing process is that people are motivated to focus on their good qualities and emphasise these during social interaction. The theory is relatively well-explored in terms of empirical investigations (see overview in Harris & Epton, 2009, 2010). Experimental procedures typically design situations in which people experience some sort of negative or unfavourable feedback and threat that in turn awakens the need for self-defence in the form of justifications, self-serving attributions, personal and group disparagement and so on (see also Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009).

Responses to threatening situations where the need to promote the internal sense of the "self" is created also represent a main theme in self-evaluation maintenance theory (Tesser, 1988). This theory assumes

people behave in a manner that will maintain or increase self-evaluation and that their relationships with others have a substantial impact on self-evaluation. The degree of this impact is influenced by (1) the level of our performance relative to another person, (2) the emotional closeness of another person and (3) how relevant the task is to our self-definition (for a more comprehensive review on the self-evaluation process in general, also see Tesser, 2003). The list of theories that in one way or another are concerned with the way in which people tend to manage and above all protect or defend internal self-processes is excruciating long. There are also several other theoretical frameworks that emphasise some sort of internal struggle, including those in which the use of symbolic expressions is used with the aim of "self-protection" (e.g. Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982, and symbolic completion theory).

However, other theories reject the notion that people are exclusively motivated for enhancement, self-protection, balance and consonance. For example, self-verification theory (Swann, 1990, 2011) suggests that people have a need to seek confirmation of their self-concept and verify self-views, whether the self-concept is positive or negative. Such self-confirmation may satisfy the need to maintain a consistent and stable sense of the self that parallels one's own perception of reality. In other words, confirmation of our own beliefs about the self and the world in general provide individuals with a sense of meaningful existence. Swann (2011) maintains that this self-verification process bolsters our perception that the world is a predictable and controllable place (for theoretical nuances considering unification of self-verification and self-enhancement, see Swann, 1990). The way in which people tend to self-verify themselves is not accidental. In fact, people are proactive in designing conditions and employing strategies that provide support for existing self-views. For example, Swan postulates that people might actively pursue and participate in social environments (e.g. relationships) that confirm their self-definitions, clearly communicate visible signs of identity (e.g. appearances) and work hard to obtain confirmation that coincides with their existing self-views, either confirming positive or negative descriptions (see Swan, 2011, for interesting insights into the origins and development of the theory).

The list of similar theories on internal self-processes represents a book project in itself and could be easily expanded by including a variety of

self-handicapping strategies, defence mechanisms, and even theories on self-regulation and self-control. Hence, in this book, any attempt to list more self-strategies might seem repetitive and redundant. At this point, the critical reader could perhaps accuse me of presenting an over-simplification of such a complex field, which is actually in desperate need of nuances and theoretical distinctions. But this is precisely why it is important to note that I am well aware that all these explicitly mentioned theories, along with those not cited here, have their differences when it comes to behavioural prediction, underlying mechanisms and theoretical premises. For example, the empirical findings indicate that the critical factors of cognitive dissonance that have to occur include freedom of choice, commitment, aversive consequences and personal responsibility. Self-affirmation is presented as a process that also includes the presence of affect (i.e. "emotional dissonance"). Self-evaluation is dependent on the level of performance relative to another person, the emotional closeness of another person and task relevance to self-definition. Self-verification is based on the need for prediction and controllability. Self-enhancement is based on praise and love while self-definition, in addition to the number of processes that reside on the interpersonal level, is also based on culturally approved symbols. The way the self-strategies are applied is certainly dependent on an individual history of success in using that particular strategy, one's developmental stage, the specificity of the facilitating and inhibitory factors that are characteristic for the situation individuals are caught in and the cultural conceptualisation of the self-concept (Markus, Kitayama, & Heiman, 1996). In other words, I believe I do not need to elaborate further to convince the reader that all these theoretical contributions represent complex lines of thought that include detailed exploration of specific conditions, instances and situations. Indeed, such an overwhelming theoretical and empirical quantity of postulations has resulted in the frequently cited description of this theme as the "self-zoo" (Tesser, Martin, & Cornell, 1996).

However, the nuances between these theories, and details that are characteristic for each individual theory, although representing valuable and necessary knowledge for further advances in the field, are not the main issue here. The main point is, I believe, clearly communicated in the previous two sections on controlling the environment and controlling others. The reason for omitting specific instances is that I am attempting

to apply a "bird's-eye view" on the issue of human motivation. Such a macro or meta-approach is in many ways quite different from the "worm's-eye view", and has possible advantages (identification of overarching as well as underlying mechanisms) and clear disadvantages (lacking nuances, danger of simplification, neglecting specific conditions). Nevertheless, my deliberate and intended neglect of the important differences between these theoretical positions is found to be quite necessary if I am to achieve the aim of identifying the paramount motivational principles that are common to all the mentioned theories of the "self". Indeed, recent works attempt to elaborate on the nuances between these theories and offer postulations for more unequivocal approaches to the existing theoretical complexity on the subject of self-processes (e.g. Hart, 2014; Nussbaum & Dweck 2008; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008; Tesser, 2000, 2003). Furthermore, some theorists (e.g. Hart, 2014, p. 34) have even pointed out that we are possibly "beating around the same bush" and have encouraged the emergence of integrated theoretical knowledge that would successfully balance between "jangle fallacy" (i.e. having multiple names for the same phenomenon) and "jingle fallacy" (i.e. oversimplifying). Other theorists have also noted that specific analyses, although frequently documenting short-term positive effects, fail to address and identify the underlying causes of such self-behaviour (Nussbaum & Dweck, 2008, p. 599).

All in all, it must be borne in mind that in this chapter all these different theoretical frameworks on the issue of "self" represent different manifestations of the underlying propensity for having control over internal self-processes. It follows that the human need to manage internal processes, in addition to management of environmental cues and interpersonal/group relations, represents an integral part of assumed motivational propensity that is presently termed the control motivational system.

Concluding Control Motivation

In the life course, all people are inescapably exposed to numerous stimuli emanating from multiple sources. It is a rather unfortunate and common fact of life that humans do not easily fit in demanding social and

non-social contexts. It takes effort to be effective, to buffer social threats and to manage internal processes. People have no other choice but to gradually assimilate and integrate pieces of new knowledge. We must all move gradually on the developmental scale, stage by stage, and follow appropriate developmental cycles and cope with bumpy transitions. Fortunately, compared to other species, humans relatively easily learn adaptive strategies that result in the protection, recognition, prediction and ultimately control over threatening stimuli. This is possibly facilitated by the remarkable ability of the human species to transmit accumulated knowledge to the next generation. This is a gradual, almost compulsive process whereby the integration of new information is commonly facilitated by its resemblance, contrast or other types of associative link with previous knowledge. Every person in his own way, depending on personal history, psychological characteristics and a variety of contextual factors, is motivated to create a congruent wholeness out of such stimulation. Not all people are equally successful in this process. In its essence, the control motivational system refers to the human propensity to exert control in various life domains. Three of the most important domains that have been identified here are environmental challenges (i.e. controlling the environment), interpersonal and group relations (i.e. controlling others) and internal self-processes (i.e. controlling the "self"). Although the ability, success and failure to deal with these challenges vary across domains, the general sense of control depends on the harmonious contribution of all aspects of control and the actor's ability to deal with these specific demands. In this book, I argue that every time people complete a variety of environmental tasks for the sake of the task performance alone, or for managing the power distribution provoked by a possibly non-existent perception of threat, affirming or verifying the self, completing the self in some symbolic way, maintaining the self in an evaluative situation, establishing the balance or consonance of the cognitive elements, as well as using self-handicapping, defensive and self-protective mechanisms, they are engaging in the selection of strategies that are motivated and governed by the control motivational system.

In the above four sections, I have presented the concepts of control, achievement, power and the many self-theories. Although this presentation was detailed on some points, the main aim has not been to debate,

discuss or promote our specific knowledge on human performance, achievement, power or internal self-processes. The relation between relevant concepts in these subfields in terms of direct, moderating and mediating effects is extremely complex. The research that has been presented and the conclusions that have been drawn based on this research are relatively unproblematic, mainly because each of these sections separately represents a field that is well-acknowledged and analysed in the current literature. In others words, the role of achievement, power and self-processes in human motivation is unquestionably strong in current theory. Numerous theories and a considerable amount of research convincingly show that people are motivated to develop different strategies in these domains. The parts of my argument that are problematic consider the proposition that all these above-mentioned processes share the same motivational antecedent, namely the innate propensity for achieving at least a minimal level of control that makes sense to an actor. In other words, the less credible part of this argument is that all the above-mentioned aspects of human functioning could be unified by postulating or assuming the existence of one single underlying motivation (i.e. control).

Although this position might appear to be a "theoretical stretch", the postulation that some kind of control-like process is governing all these domains is not entirely theoretically unfounded. Thus, in many academic texts centred on descriptions of achievement, power and self-processes, it is possible to detect and identify clear links to the concept of control. Achievement motivation is directly linked to the general sense of control over task-related actions through several concepts, such as locus of control, self-efficacy, autonomic control and perceptions of behavioural control. For example, although giving primary importance to achievement motivation, Brehm (1993, p. 10) also explicitly makes a theoretical connection between control and task performance. Similarly, Sorrentino (1993), building on the work of Kagan (1972), linked control and achievement motivations to the human need to reduce uncertainty that is in turn considered to govern some other motives, including the need for affiliation. In their attempt to delineate a general theory of human control and purposive behaviour, Friedman and Lackey (1991) make constant explicit references in their book to achievement motivation, work

organisation and increased productivity. Many early measures of achievement motivation directly include hopes for success and failure, thus linking these processes to a basic sense of exerting control on desired outcomes. In other words, it is reasonable to expect that experiences of success and failure will to a high degree involve having control over behavioural performances and subsequent outcomes. Early research in this domain also saw a connection between entrepreneurial efforts and achievement on both the individual (i.e. among people) and collective (i.e. among different countries) levels. This is not surprising considering that an important part of human history is connected to the struggle to make progress in achieving control over environmental challenges and the design of tools that make life "easier". Indeed, achievement motivation is explicitly associated in the literature with the rise of modern capitalism and science in terms of economic growth, innovation and knowledge management (McClelland, 1961).

As in achievement motivation, the notion of power is frequently described in terms of having or not having control over some aspects of other people's lives. Indeed, in their description of power motivation, Galinsky et al. (2008, p. 1450) say that

> *Power is often defined as asymmetric control over valuable resources and outcomes within a specific situation and set of social relations. This definition of power implicitly involves both control over and independence from others in obtaining important outcomes. As a control mechanism, power often involves putting pressure on others, driving others to do the things that will help the powerful accomplish their own objectives.*

Similarly, Fiske and Berdahl (2007, p. 679) define power as having relative control over another's valued outcomes. Moreover, the concept of control is frequently used in closer definitional clarifications of relations between people in terms of asymmetric roles. Power motivation is also explicitly associated with control over others or social control (Depret & Fiske, 1993, pp. 185–188). Interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978) describes dyadic relationships in terms of various aspects of control over valued outcomes. The theory highlights the importance of fate-control, which concerns control over other people's outcomes, frequently

in a threatening or punitive manner. All in all, these selected examples represent only one of the many instances wherein the idea of control is explicitly related to descriptions of interpersonal and group relations in terms of domination, hegemony, power and asymmetrical abilities to exert influence over each other's existence.

And finally, the connection between internal processes and control is equally evident in the realm of theory which focusses on the relationship between human motivations, behavioural executions, goal pursuit and everything in between. This is logical considering the explicit relation between the notion of "self" and the regulation of behaviour. In other words, control over internal processes is often visible in challenging situations when people are overwhelmed by the power of their own emotions and cognitions. Consequently, the topic of self-regulation or self-control represents an extensively elaborated theme in contemporary research (e.g. Vohs & Baumeister, 2011), containing literally hundreds of different views on the issue of human management of internal challenges. Psychotherapeutic literature is also full of descriptions that identify control as an important mechanism in shaping human behaviour. For example, the cognitive approach of Beck (1970) and the rational-emotive therapy of Ellis (1973) both maintain that taking control over negative thoughts, ongoing experience and the future, as well as correcting errors in thinking, plays an important preventive and therapeutic role in the formation of depressive tendencies. The self-control behaviour therapy programme for depression posits that poor management of such internal processes as self-monitoring, self-evaluation and self-reinforcement results in self-control difficulties and consequently depression, thereby making an explicit link between self-processes and control (Fuchs & Rehm, 1977; Kanfer, 1971). Control motivation is also explicitly connected in the literature to self-seeking and further to processes of self-enhancement, self-appraisal and self-verification, among others (Strube & Yost, 1993). Indeed, the edited volume on the topic of control motivation and social cognition (Weary, Gleicher, & Marsh, 1993) is replete with references to various self-processes, some of which are self-assessment, self-awareness, self-consistency, self-esteem and self-knowledge.

To be fair, it should be noted that control in many of these examples is used more as a convenient, intuitive and recognisable description of

people's motivations, and less as a fundamental underlying mechanism. Nonetheless, there are still many texts in the current literature that clearly apply the idea of control in relation to management of environmental cues, interpersonal and group relations and internal processes.

In addition to these specific instances of empirical research in which control is either implied or explicitly connected to achievement, power and various self-strategies, it is also possible to view the effects of control in a wider temporal or historical perspective. After all, as noted in Chap. 1, any proposed fundamental motivational tendency should ultimately be related and even be compatible with the evolutionary line of reasoning. In that respect, it is fair to say that humans, similar to all living things, are extremely sensitive to the perception of various forms of threat. In particular, human existence is also characterised by being a subject of constant cognitive evaluation and comparison. Based on our specific knowledge about the existence and eventual disappearance of many animal species in the past prior to the presence of humans, it could be said with confidence that human preservation, in many ways, is related to the idea of "evolve or perish". In other words, according to historical evidence, it is arrogant and naive to think that humans will inhabit the planet Earth regardless of the consequences of their own actions or other perhaps more random circumstances. Therefore, the exertion of control in various situations and life domains is one of the first priorities of all individuals in particular, and should represent a priority of the human race in general.

Indeed, although interrelated, the needs that comprise the three abovementioned life domains represent distinct processes. In other words, it is important to acknowledge that there are profound differences and nuances between achievement, power and self-processes, as these needs are manifested differently and affect human functioning in different ways. For example, it seems that power could be visualised as a somewhat vertical dimension. This means that power positions are notoriously associated with "looking up" and "looking down", desperately needing both directions simultaneously. The majority of people need interpersonal and group relations that shift between domination and submission in some individually and culturally preferred balance. It follows that although some people who have a high need for power are constantly striving to be on top or above others in order to function properly, the

majority of them will still have the opposite tendency to admire some other people and follow their instructions. In contrast to power motivation, control over tasks and environmental cues (e.g. achievement motivation) seems to be most adequately presented in a somewhat horizontal way, whereby people, to varying degrees, try to keep ahead of others; they are "locked" in on their intended target. The essence of achieving and accomplishing tasks is linked primarily to environmental tasks whereby people try to do something better and faster than other people, as well as to master without necessarily being motivated by competition or comparison with others. The differences are even more pronounced on the micro level of specificity, where very specific processes are compared.

Thus, it is clear that the differences and nuances between various processes mentioned in this chapter are real. Each search for common denominators unavoidably includes some degree of simplification or generalisation, thus running the risk of ignoring the natural variations among the subjects in question. My approach here, in which I choose to overlook important distinctions in terms of motivations and effects, might irritate the discerning reader. However, the differences between specific domains or processes on the micro level do not necessarily undermine the main overall argument that sees the role of control as the common causal agent. I believe it is still logically possible to entertain the idea that the apparent similarity in behavioural manifestations between achievement, power and internal self-processes, although commonly treated and analysed as separate motivational topics in the current literature, is neither random nor accidental. After all, small bats and enormous whales, despite their apparent difference in size and appearance, share the common underlying feature of being mammals. In other words, having a wing or hand or some other body part refers to functionality that is adapted to a specific species and the nature of historical circumstances. These apparent variations do not necessarily mean that different outward characteristics do not share a common origin. Extending this analogy to the psychological domain, the aim of this text is to provide arguments suggesting that control governs achievement, power and internal self-processes, regardless of the overt differences between these processes. The general function of control motivation, as a common underlying principal motivational tendency, is to establish and maintain at least sufficient levels of control

in any given situation. Thus, the main function of the control system is to govern control-related issues of human motivation in different life domains. The specific function of the various control needs in particular life domains, such as achievement, power and self-regulation, is designed to buffer the challenging (not necessarily always threatening) effect of external and internal stimuli and provide the "fragile" self the sense of meaningful existence. Whatever the apparent nuances, there is a striking parallel between the development of the ability to manage interpersonal relations (i.e. power) and the learning process associated with controlling the environmental cues (i.e. achievement motivation). The same logic is applicable to the manner in which people balance internal processes in the sense that this parallel or equivalence between different life domains is not accidental but rather causal in nature and due to workings of a common denominator, namely the underlying control motivation. Bearing this in mind, just as artistic need can be manifested in a number of ways (painting, sculpture, film, music and so on), many psychological phenomena and mechanisms described frequently in the literature as separate, even opposing, tendencies can in a similar way be meaningfully understood as alternative manifestations of the control motivation.

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4

Affiliation Motivational System

The General Need for Affiliation

In addition to the human tendency to exert control over various life domains, the general need for affiliation or belonging is also frequently identified as a typical representative of fundamental motivation (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). The identification of belonging as one of the basic motives is hardly surprising considering the evident importance of social aspects of human existence on human behaviour. In general, the need for belonging or affiliation refers to various behaviours in the domains of interpersonal and group relations, initiation and perseveration of social contact and the establishment of relatedness. The affiliation motivation is expressed in many specific behaviours, such as in forming friendships and associations with other people, in greeting and recognising the presence of others, in joining and living with people, cooperating and conversing sociably, and in loving and intimate relations. A common feature running through all aspects of the affiliation system is the way an individual relates to others and creates meaningful and satisfactory coexistence with others. This tendency to establish interpersonal and group relations comes easy to people in the sense that human nature, similar to many other animal

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species, seems to be inheritably tuned into the formation of social bonds. In fact, belonging motivation is especially robust in the sense that various social connections might arise, even in the presence of previous "inhibitory" factors, antagonistic positions and adverse circumstances. The various forms of belonging also tend to provide an individual with structure and position in the social world by means of such specific roles as son, daughter, mother, father, wife, husband and so on. The common descriptions of belonging frequently found in the relevant literature point out that this type of motivation represents an innate human tendency, with a clear biological base and strong evolutionary value. A strong sense of belonging reinforces bonds between people and creates an experience of interdependent destiny. Furthermore, in various cultures and to varying degrees, belonging to near relatives has deep meaning for identity in terms of the basic "who I am". For this reason, the answer to this question goes beyond the person and frequently includes significant others. In such settings of combined and shared existence, life's grief and joys are practised, and this tends to reinforce cooperation and mutual identification in terms of self-definition.

Behavioural manifestations based on affiliation motivation tend to produce some of the most extreme emotional reactions, ranging from pleasant (e.g. love and care) to unpleasant (e.g. jealousy, hate and anger). In other words, behaviours that are associated with affiliation motivation tend to produce profoundly satisfying as well as directly hostile affective reactions. There are many examples of situations in which belonging affects emotion, such as those that are evoked when forming a family or breaking up with close friends or lovers, as well as emotions that arise in the frame of abstract and remote group connections, such as nation, patriotism and race. All these descriptions above clearly suggest that the need for some form of relatedness has the properties of a true fundamental and universal motive. Indeed, it is widely accepted that, as any true motive does, interpersonal and group relatedness affects, energises, selects and guides a number of behavioural manifestations. In support of this, the detailed descriptions of anthropological studies testify to the fact that the formation of small primary groups and various conceptualisations of family ties represent, in one way or another, a true universal human characteristic. Human sensitivity towards experience

of external threats is often "cushioned" by the formation and strength of the relational attachments. In theory, affiliation motives were commonly studied by focussing on either approach affiliation or avoidance affiliation. Approach affiliation is predominantly concerned with the establishment of "positive" and beneficial behavioural patterns, such as love, secure attachment and intimacy. Avoidance affiliation, on the other hand, is mainly concerned with "negative" actions, such as fear of rejection, of not being accepted and of disapproval.

All in all, it is commonly accepted that there are numerous positive effects of having, establishing and maintaining interpersonal and group relations. Abundant evidence tells us that the quality and strength of relational ties and the capacity to maintain intimate relationships have a clear protective impact on our general psychophysical functioning and provide people with a healthier and happier life (see the overview in Gardner, Gabriel, & Diekman, 2000). It also seems that the establishment of interpersonal and group relations is a gradually evolving process starting from an early age and the manner in which children and adults "connect". For example, the general findings in the research area that focusses on formation of early bonds indicate that people with a secure attachment style show high levels of adaptability and general psychological and physiological well-being in adult life (Hazan & Shaver, 1990). Thus, it seems that having a secure base during early development positively influences later functioning.

On the other hand, unsatisfactory conditions, such as rejection, disapproval, unacceptance and poor quality of relational interactions, might be a source of serious psychological harm. It follows that there can be many possible consequences of social deprivation that seriously affect both humans and animals. Classical research on animal behaviour has vividly illustrated the importance of the affiliation needs where it has been shown that infant monkeys prefer a surrogate mother who provides warmth to a mother who provides food and drink (Harlow & Zimmermann, 1959). In another example, monkeys (Masserman, Wechkin, & Terris, 1964) and rats (Rice, 1964) are prepared to starve rather than obtain food if acquiring the food means that their animal "friends" will receive an electroshock. Furthermore, an interesting modification of these experiments revealed that this tendency is even stronger if animals spend some time in

the same cage before the experiment, suggesting that aversion to harming others is reinforced by the strength of the already established belonging bonds. These examples clearly show that the need for belonging or relatedness is highly developed among animals and as such does not exclusively represent a human disposition.

Considering that human mental and cognitive functioning, compared to animals, is substantially more complex, the possible effects of social deprivation on human functioning are even more severe and numerous. For example, children who are or feel rejected have a higher incidence of psychopathology and experience difficulties later in life in terms of psychosocial adaptation. There are also indications that the rate of mental problems is higher among divorced and separated people compared to people who are cohabiting. The level of social belonging also seems to impact the rate of crime-related behaviour and is also related to the incidence of depression (see the overview in Baumeister & Leary, 1995). People who are socially isolated are found to be less healthy, both in the physiological and psychological sense, and they represent a major mortality risk (Lynch, 1979). Apart from incidental evidence based on specific studies, the importance of belonging is easily recognisable in multiple sources originating from historical records. It is well documented and common knowledge that throughout history, ostracism and banishment from the group and family membership has been considered in some cultures to be a punishment more severe than death. Moreover, ostracism as punishment or retribution was historically practised on all levels of social conduct, ranging from interpersonal relations to group and governmental policies (see the overview in Williams, 1997).

The above-mentioned examples represent only a fragment of the accumulated evidence that clearly reinforces the rather intuitive human knowledge about the significance of social bonds.

In an attempt to further illuminate the effect of affiliation motivation and to promote the idea of belonging as an example of fundamental motivation, this chapter will examine this tendency on two interrelated but nevertheless hierarchically different planes: the individual and group levels. The first section of this chapter will be centred on individual aspects of human interaction and provide a short conceptual and empirical overview of the relevant literature on three major needs in which the

tendency for affiliation is manifested: attachment, intimacy and love. In the second part of the chapter, the issue of the in-group and inter-group dynamic will be considered using the framework of social identity theory as a starting point for the analysis. In the concluding section, I will suggest the possibility that current conceptualisations of affiliation motivation overemphasise the approach aspect, whilst neglecting the common observation that people frequently might have difficulties in connecting with others, as well as the fact that people in general are selective and restrictive in their search for and formation of social constellations. Bearing this in mind, I will suggest that, in addition to the tendency to seek proximity to others, which is the important and commonly cited feature of belonging, the need for distance should also be included as part of the definition. In other words, I will argue that affiliation is not only about blind and straightforward unification with others, as this might easily be concluded according to general descriptions of this motive. It will be shown that this postulation, although seemingly controversial, can in fact be found in existing theories in the current literature. All in all, the aim of the presented text is similar to the chapter on control motivation: to build a compelling argument stating that many interpersonal and group processes are interrelated and represent a manifestation of the fundamental underlying tendency to form and maintain relationships, which is presently called the affiliation or belonging motivational system. As was the case with control motivation, affiliation motivation will be presented as a key aspect of human existence that underpins behavioural tendencies in a wide variety of settings and needs no special or supportive circumstances.

The Interpersonal Level

Attachment

It is well-known that newborn babies and small children need emotional support and stimulation provided by adults. The need for social interaction emerges almost immediately after birth, when babies show a preference for human faces, the exchange of gazes and clear signs of

distress if adults behave in a passive or ignoring manner (Nagy, 2008). This means that active social interaction and versatile stimulation, in addition to the care and satisfaction of basic physiological needs, is of vital importance for later adaptive development. The manner in which parents and other caregivers support their offspring and the relatively long period of time needed for youngsters to be able to cope with life challenges is obvious and directly observable. The process of establishing strong relations between significant adults and newborns is fundamentally natural in the sense that some form of attachment behaviour is common not only to humans but to many other species. The fact that this process is so obvious is perhaps the reason why the nature of the relationship between small children and primary caregivers has only relatively recently been the focus of serious research attention, and more importantly become embedded in scientifically sound theoretical frameworks. Thus, in the course of the past five or six decades, the process of attachment has been widely acknowledged as the fundamental social platform on which later development builds (Bowlby, 1969). The process and the concept of attachment represents a well-explored research area, and presently there is an overwhelming amount of literature that, in one way or another, explores the nature of the human tendency to make social connections with significant others (for a specific overview, see Shaver & Mikulciner, 2007; also the edited volume by Cassidy & Shaver, 2008, among many others).

The term "attachment" was traditionally used to refer to the child part of the relationship, while the term (parental) "bonding" was used to describe the role of the parent in the process of forging the nature of the relationship with the child. Such a dual division in terms of assigned roles explicitly underlines the point that attachment is a reciprocal process. The success of making at least satisfactory relations is thus dependent on the abilities and predispositions of both adults and children, certainly without implying that children have responsibility for the outcomes of the interaction. Either way, the majority of descriptions of the attachment process clearly point out that the development of an adaptive attachment style is a sensitive, fragile and gradually evolving process. The theory of attachment basically represents an attempt to analyse (1) the manner in which children tend to establish various types of relations with primary

caregivers, (2) the effects of potential maternal (i.e. caregiver's) deprivation and (3) the manner in which young children cope with such deprivation. Thus, the whole idea of attachment theory rests on the relatively simple notion of the total dependency of infants on the caregiving provided by adults. Attachment is commonly taken to be formed through the interrelated and regulative behavioural dynamic between caregiver and infant resulting in the characteristic patterns of behaviour. Such a process has a strong communicative aspect in which the innate anatomical and psychological apparatus of the child encounters the demands and challenges of the social and non-social world. It is assumed (Bowlby, 1973) that the variety of interactions between the caregiver and the child will over time result in the creation of the enduring associative memory networks that are stored and used as the basis for future interactions. These continuously growing cognitive structures were in theory termed mental representations or working models. Attachment figures are in theory characterised as targets for proximity seeking in which the youngsters actively regulate their distance to caregivers. Adults are also identified as being providers of a secure base in terms of protection, comfort, support and relief (see Shaver & Mikulciner, 2007, for an overview). It is clear, however, that some aspects of the attachment process might easily be conceptually connected to control motivation when considering that infants need and actively seek security and protection. For the purposes of clarity, the discussion on the role of control needs in the process of attachment is found in Chap. 7 where unclear conceptual issues are identified and commented on.

Whatever the conceptual links to both affiliation and control motivations are, the original theories on attachment, similar to many other processes that aspire to achieve the status of fundamental human motivation, were predominantly influenced by and thus embedded in evolutionary thinking. The effects and development of attachment-based relations are commonly assumed to be deeply rooted in human nature and closely associated with the manner in which the human anatomy is constructed. According to Ainsworth (1967, pp. 429–430), attachment is built into the nervous system and "*this internalized something that we call attachment has aspects of feelings, memories, wishes, expectancies, and intentions, all of which constitute an inner program acquired through experience and somehow*

built into a flexible yet retentive inner mechanism". The quotation clearly suggests that the process of attachment is assumed to have a strong biological component that is hard-wired in human nature. This also implies that, defined and understood in a wider sense, the ability, need and even compulsion of the newly born to make connections with persons in its close social environment is not unique to humans. A very similar process of interpersonal connection and dependency can be traced to other theoretical and empirical contributions, such as in Lorenz's (1937/1957) work on the critical periods for the establishment of social behaviours in birds, or Harry Harlow's work (Harlow & Harlow, 1965) on the development of social abilities in monkeys, among many others. The fact that there are implicit positions of attachment theory that can be associated with the natural sciences is perhaps not surprising considering Bowlby's background and interest in the fields of biology and ethology.

Based on these descriptions and the strong evolutionary aspect, it is expected that the nature of attachment development has clearly measurable effects on human development. Indeed, the research findings almost unanimously show that infants desperately need the presence and involvement of adults and that children actively tend to seek the proximity of primary caregivers in order to achieve proper psychosocial development. For example, some researchers postulate that clear, forceful, empathic parental responses enhance the development of altruism and empathic compassion in children. Similarly, some other findings reveal a similar pattern in which persons with a secure attachment style generally show much higher levels of adaptation abilities and psychological well-being as compared to the persons having an anxious/ambivalent and attachment-evasive style (Hazan & Shaver, 1990). On the other hand, possible prolonged separation from caring significant adults is found to result in distressing behavioural, emotional and cognitive development. Behavioural or emotional ambiguity, as well as responses that are either too weak or too rigid from the parental side, can promote the development of anxious, shameful or guilty feelings (Lichtenberg, 1989). Early theories on the close relation between the primary caregiver and the child suggest that the perception of stress and uncomfortable states in others during the establishment of interpersonal ties in early childhood very often leads to the development of self-distress (Horney, 1950/1991).

Such negative patterns are in theory considered to promote the development of emotional dependency instead of the development of secure and autonomous interpersonal relations. All in all, the importance of this innate biological disposition in terms of direct and indirect effects on later development and establishment of interpersonal relations is widely acknowledged in the relevant literature. There is convincing evidence that testifies to the existence of a fundamental need to reduce the distance (i.e. seeking "proximity") to supportive others and the subsequent development of the strong relation that the literature commonly terms attachment.

However, there are also indications that the effects of various attachment styles are not limited to early childhood. Indeed, although having the explicit focus on the early period of human development, Bowlby explicitly conceptualised attachment as a process that lasts from the "cradle to the grave". Although these postulations are not undisputed, there is still an indication that the experiences associated with attachment behaviour early in life influence and determine to a degree the way in which people form and develop interpersonal relations later in life. Historically, it seems that attachment theory has shifted its focus of analyses over time from detailed explorations of the critical periods in child development, in terms of belonging, towards attempts to expand attachment theory to include adult social functioning and explore the potential lifelong negative and positive effects (Slade, 2009; see also Obegi & Berant, 2009). Furthermore, attachment theory has also been gradually expanded to include explorations of the links to other conceptually related affiliation processes, such as love and intimacy (Kerpelman et al., 2012; Land, Rochlen, & Vaughn, 2011). These findings directly support the basic premises of this book, which state that all needs comprising given motivational systems are interrelated and imply the existence of greater underlying and common motivation. It follows that the accumulated evidence on attachment originating from various sources that has been presented here, along with all other similar behavioural tendencies not specifically discussed here (e.g. the process of imprinting as described by Lorenz, 1937/1957), clearly suggest the existence of the innate and more general propensity for belonging or affiliation. Furthermore, as noted above, it seems that the basic pattern of attachment behaviour and children's

responses to potential threats are not an exclusive characteristic of human species based on our ability to form cognitive representations and working models (Cassidy, Ehrlich, & Sherman, 2013). Indeed, research of animal species shows that attachment is not dependent on the existence of higher cognitive structures (Suomi, 2008). Either way, there are grounds to believe that the need for attachment represents one of the very first steps in the development of the innate disposition to form interpersonal and group social affiliations. Considering the importance, fragility and longevity of this process, it is a miracle in itself that humans have over the years succeeded in producing offspring and managed to survive in nature.

Intimacy

The other social need of great importance in which the human need for belonging is clearly manifested is the notion of intimacy. The one obvious challenge with the idea of intimacy is the evident elusiveness when it comes to pinpointing firm definitional boundaries that are able to capture all possible aspects of this process. Indeed, several theorists have pointed out the need in this area of research for the development of the guiding conceptual model that goes beyond the positions of the particular theorists and their disciplinary "spectacles" (Laurenceau, Rivera, Schaffer, & Pietromonaco, 2004).

Nevertheless, the idea of intimacy is a surprisingly well-researched area that has attracted a substantial amount of attention over the years. In a wider meaning and somewhat simplified form, the basic notion of intimacy refers to the quality of interaction between people in terms of closeness in communication. Even though in psychological literature intimacy is analysed from several theoretical positions, the recent interest in intimacy as a scientific concept is in part a by-product of the ongoing fascination in the field of psychology for the process of identity formation. For example, in elaborating on phases in identity development, Erikson (1980) maintains that intimacy is a capacity of the individual involving openness, sharing and mutual trust. According to Erikson (1980, p. 101), real intimacy is only possible after a reasonable sense of identity has been established because *"the youth who is not sure of his*

identity shies away from interpersonal intimacy, but the surer he becomes of himself the more he seeks it in the form of friendship, combat, leadership, love and inspiration". However, probably primed with the psychoanalytic point of view, Erikson also maintains that intimacy involves processes of self-abandonment, fusion and the paradox of finding oneself in the process of losing oneself in relation to another person, echoing in fact some basic premises of the fundamental psychoanalytic tradition related to the idea of self-love (i.e. narcissism). It is therefore no surprise that this understanding is not completely compatible with the view of the majority of contemporary theorists who tend to point to a much wider area where intimate interactions can be observed, as well as express a slightly different understanding of the concept. For example, Whitbourne and Weinstock (1979, p. 152) point out that *"numerous types of relationships may be intimate: close friendships between persons of the same or opposite sex, relationships between older and younger adults, homosexual and heterosexual relationships between adults that have not been legally sanctioned and the various encounters a person may have with others through the adult years".* Even though this quotation is also a product of its time and specific theoretical framework, the emphasis is clearly placed on the various ways in which two people can intimately connect. The approach that is also closely connected to explorations of identity achievement is the work of Orlofsky and colleagues (Orlofsky, Marcia, & Lesser, 1973). Over the years and based on the results of many separate empirical studies, these researchers postulated that there were five intimacy statuses. The division between them is based on three main criteria: (1) presence or absence of close relationships with male and female friends, (2) presence or absence of an enduring (committed) relationship with a girlfriend or wife and (3) "depth" versus "superficiality" of peer relationships. The five intimacy statuses defined with respect to these criteria are intimate, pre-intimate, pseudo-intimate, stereotyped and isolate. The research findings indicate that when intimacy was related to the ego identity status (Marcia, 1966, 1980), intimate individuals were almost invariably identity achievers, the pre-intimate were most frequently in the moratorium status and the stereotyped and pseudo-intimate tended to lean towards a foreclosed or diffused identity status. In other words, higher levels of intimate relationships were found to be connected with higher

levels of identity achievement, while lower levels tended to be associated with a diffused sense of personal identity to a higher degree (Orlofsky et al., 1973). Overall research findings show, as expected, that the scores of individuals high on the intimacy motive measured earlier in life were significantly related to psycho-social adjustment later in life (McAdams, 1982). These findings suggest that a capacity to maintain intimate relationships is rewarding in the sense that it provides people with a healthier and happier life and promotes psychological well-being in general.

Yet another theoretical approach is the view of intimacy as a transactional process consisting of two principal components: self-disclosure and perceived or partner responsiveness (Reis & Shaver, 1988). In this perspective, the process of establishing intimacy starts with a disclosure of feelings or other self-relevant information. Obviously, at least minimal levels of trust are necessary if one is to disclose inner emotions and cognitions. Some form of trusting basis is important considering that further development of intimate relationship is logically enough reinforced by the nature of the response from another person. Understandably, the responses that are interpreted as positive in terms of empathy, validation and caring create grounds for the development of mutual closeness and intimate relationships (see also Reis & Patrick, 1996).

All in all, it seems the ability to establish interpersonal relations in terms of intimacy does not represent an isolated disposition or simple process that directly leads to an elevated quality of social bonds. Intimacy rather represents an assembly of the many minor yet conceptually similar processes in the social domain, such as development of identity and trust.

Just as these minor processes lead to the establishment of intimate abilities, the joint workings of such major needs as attachment, intimacy and love indicate the existence of one greater underlying process, namely the affiliation motivation. However, this does not imply that the relation between minor needs, major needs and fundamental motivation in the given system is straightforward. The minor needs in one person might very well be major in another person as these priorities are open to various influences. This also implies that some major needs, such as intimacy, are not conceptually identical under all conditions with a corresponding fundamental motivation (i.e. affiliation). Indeed, research findings indicate that it is meaningful to distinguish between the need for quantity

of interpersonal relations (i.e. mere affiliation) and the establishment of quality-based relationships (i.e. intimacy). More specifically, research shows that intimacy and affiliation cannot be equated in the sense that these motives represent quite different dispositional tendencies and also affect cognitions, emotions and behaviour differently (McAdams, 1980). For instance, even though people with high affiliation and intimacy motives regard themselves as more gentle, natural, loyal, contented and realistic compared to people who score low on these motives, only people who have high affiliation see themselves more often as unselfish, cooperative, sociable and thoughtful. It is possible to speculate that people who have a high need for affiliation are engaging in a conscious effort to be nice to others and generally seem to show a more active approach to interpersonal relations. On the other hand, by setting higher standards for interpersonal interaction, individuals with a high intimacy motive are more prone to being self-critical about their relationships and perceive themselves in less positive terms. In other words, people who have a high need for intimacy do not consider intimacy to be something they "do" to please others as might be the case with people with a high need for affiliation. Indeed, some researchers have conceptualised intimacy as a competence and further explored the links between the ability to form close relationships and empathy (Chow, Ruhl, & Buhrmester, 2013). These conceptualisations are in no way contradictory to the postulations here about the existence of the three paramount motivational tendencies. In fact, the mentioned theoretical difference between general affiliation and intimacy might indicate a hierarchical relation between these two motives, viewing intimacy as a specific quality aspect of social interaction, and affiliation as a general or principal motivation. Thus, similar to attachment, the process of intimacy contributes to an overall organisation of affiliation motivation and testifies to the existence of the same.

Love

And finally, the third important human need in the realm of interpersonal relations that will be presented and analysed here as an inclusive part of the fundamental tendency for affiliation is the notion of love. At first

sight, the concept of love is an even more conceptually elusive term than intimacy and can easily be characterised as outside the bounds of science or even non-researchable. The concept of love can mean everything and nothing and its subjective nature, wide application possibilities and the wide variety of domains in which loving sentiments can be manifested make it difficult to apply the generic term "love" to a wide variety of specific interpersonal and group behaviours. Nevertheless, even with these indisputable theoretical concerns, the love connections between people are directly observable and have a direct effect on other types of human motivation and subsequent action. It is therefore understandable that the phenomenon of love, in its various forms, has been a popular subject of inquiry in the well-known ancient dramatizations of human existence and philosophical contemplations (e.g. Plato's dialogues in *Symposium*), as well as a featured central motivational force within a wide range of fictional products. Without dismissing the evident and thought-provoking contributions of fictional literature and philosophy on this subject, the influences of this kind of writing, for the purposes of conceptual clarity, will be omitted here. We can begin the review of relevant scientific literature with Erich Fromm who was clearly interested in capturing the essence of the phenomenon of love and achievement of conceptual clarity concerning this process. To Fromm (1956), who continuously tended to cross the lines between psychoanalysis, philosophy and sociology, the idea of love represented an active power in man. Fromm (1956, p. 21) also acknowledges the power of attraction in loving relationships and points to the human challenge of preserving the integrated sense of self by saying, "*In love the paradox occurs that two beings become one and yet remain two".* This quote shows that Fromm perceives the true act of love (i.e. mature love) as an active state that is traditionally, oddly enough, and frequently described in passive terms. In contrast to descriptions of love as something that happens to people, Fromm underlines the importance of choice and commitment in "doing" love. Probably liberating himself from the psychoanalytic heritage, Fromm also suggests that love is not the mere expression or a sublimation of the sexual instinct, but rather that sexual instinct represents just one particular manifestation of the need for love and union. The essence of the loving sentiment that underlies the overall position of Fromm is best visible in the following quotation:

"If a person loves only one other person and is indifferent to the rest of his fellow men, his love is not love but a symbiotic attachment or an enlarged egotism.... If I truly love one person I love all persons, I love the world, I love life" (Fromm, 1956, p. 46). This passage reveals an important predisposition for the development of true love, which Fromm holds as crucial: it is the ability to love oneself in order to love other people.

In addition to these brief and particular examples of philosophical considerations on the concept of love, this sentiment has also been well-elaborated on and extensively empirically analysed within a scientific framework and from various theoretical perspectives. Indeed, there is an impressive amount of literature on love, especially if we include theories and research on such related concepts as general interpersonal behaviour, attachment, intimacy, romantic relations and sexuality. Hence, the amount of literature on this subject is surprisingly large and includes contributions from psychoanalysis, behaviourism, humanistic psychology and cognitive "revolutionaries". All these subdisciplines in psychology tend to explain love through the concepts typical for a corresponding scientific approach. Hence, based on the selected theoretical background, the scientists in these disciplines offer their explanations as to why and how people love each other. For example, one way of understanding love in the psychoanalytic tradition is through a hydraulic model in which love is seen as sublimation of sexuality. Behaviourist researchers tend to explain loving behavioural patterns in terms of positive and negative reinforcement, and types of contingencies the organism is exposed to. As would be expected, humanistic psychology frequently uses the prefix "true" in front of love and perceives love as an expression of advanced self-development (i.e. self-realisation). And finally, some of the explanations of cognitive "revolutionaries" focus on the conceptualisation of love as a product of cognitive consistency.

In addition to these rather generic understandings and descriptions of what love is and how it happens to people, a number of theorists have adopted a taxonomic approach by proposing specific and detailed theoretical models for classification of different dimensions that presumably underlie loving connections (see Sternberg & Weis, 2006). For example, the triangular theory of love (Sternberg, 1986) is an attempt to structurally classify a number of different loving relationships into recognisable

categories. The theory postulates that love is based on three dimensions: intimacy, passion and decision/commitment. Intimacy refers to feelings of closeness, connectedness and the warmth one experiences in loving relationships. This conceptualisation is rather similar to the majority of postulations that have been presented in the previous section on intimacy. The passion component refers to the drives that lead to romance, physical attraction and sexual consummation. The conceptualisation of love as passion points largely to descriptions and considerations of this process as presented in popular or fictional literature over the course of many centuries. These somewhat romanticised aspects of loving connections also match to a high degree the understandings of love that are popular among the general public. The decision/commitment component of love, as the label suggests, consists of two aspects. Decision refers to the conscious decision that one loves another person, while commitment refers to efforts to maintain that love over a long period of time. Decision also implicitly refers to acknowledgement of existing relations and per definition denotes a short-term process. The expression of commitment, on the other hand, can be understood as a statement of dedication to another person over a prolonged period of time, implicating a long-term connection between people. The emergence and manifestation of these three components has, according to Sternberg (1986), quite different origins. While not defined in absolute terms, the intimacy component is theoretically linked to emotional investment in the relationship, thus representing a "warm" aspect of love. Similarly, the passion component is found to be derived from motivational involvement in the relationship with a "slightly" stronger intensity, representing a "hot" aspect of loving relationships. As a balance to these affectively loaded motivations, the decision/commitment component is considered to be based on cognitive/evaluative processes, representing a "cold" aspect of love. These three components of love interact with each other and combine to produce eight subtypes of loving relationships that are graphically represented in the triangle; hence the triangular theory of love. Balanced relationships are represented in the equilateral triangle, while unbalanced relationships point in the direction of the largest component. The triangular theory, along with the theory of love as a story (Sternberg, Hojjat, & Barnes, 2001), represents an inclusive part of the more general understanding

of loving relations called a duplex theory of love (see Sternberg, 2006). This theoretical framework is probably one of the most used tools in the current literature when it comes to empirical investigations of love and development of the appropriate measuring instruments (e.g. Madey & Rodgers 2009; Overbeek, Ha, Scholte, de Kemp, & Engels, 2007; Sternberg et al., 2001).

Another theoretical framework that uses a taxonomy approach with a similar intention of specifying and identifying different types of loving relationships is Lee's (1977) approach. With the help of a colour analogy, Lee proposed three primary love styles that consequently create additional styles through combinations. The identified primary styles of love are Eros (love based on passion, romance and physical attraction), Storge (love based on the relatively slow development of affection, friendship and companionship) and Ludus (love based on playing or games). Additional secondary love styles involve the notions of mania (possessive, obsessive or dependent love characterised by feelings of jealousy), pragma (practical aspect of love involving the considerations of realism in given situations) and agape (altruistic or self-sacrificing love). Following the colour analogy literally, the theory in essence suggests that the principal and secondary love styles mentioned above create as many different types of love as there are colours, including all the gradients of shades and nuances. And similar to the colours, the various love styles, according to Lee, are most appropriately understood as a matter of individual preferences as opposed to normative or generally recommended choices that should be adopted by all people. Lee's theory attracted considerable attention in terms of empirical testing (Borello & Thompson, 1990; Kanemasa, Taniguchi, & Daibo, 2004; Neto, 2002) and development of measuring instruments (e.g. Hendrick, Hendrick, & Dicke, 1998). Moreover, several studies have been performed with an explicit focus on one specific love style (for overviews, see Lin & Huddleston-Casas, 2005; Fehr, Harasymchuk, & Sprecher, 2014).

In addition to taxonomies of love, philosophical reflections and emotionally inflammatory literary contributions, there are theories that attempt to understand the basic love sentiment as an inclusive part of the larger and lifelong motivational system that affects interpersonal relations. In much the same way as the conceptual relation between intimacy

and other belonging needs was implied and exemplified in theory, the concept of love is frequently theoretically associated with other belonging processes, such as intimacy and attachment. For example, Shaver, Hazan, and Bradshaw (1988) connect romantic love with attachment theory and place this in the evolutionary framework. By comparing the features of attachment and adult romantic love, they highlight the existence of three motivational systems[em-dash]attachment, care giving and sexuality[em-dash]and argue that in the biological sense, all of these systems are connected with romantic love (Hazan & Shaver, 1987). In other words, the theory states that the biological system directing affective, cognitive and behavioural interaction between a child and primary caregiver (i.e. attachment) is the same one governing adult relationships in terms of romantic connections. It follows that attachment-based "working models" of early childhood are stable over time and readily transformed into working models of adult relationships that guide behaviour in the interpersonal domain (see overview in Shaver & Mikulincer, 2009; also Fraley & Shaver, 2000). As with other models of love, and following the spirit and demands of modern science, these theories have also undergone empirical testing. Based on the basic reasoning of Bowlby and Ainsworth, the self-reporting measure of the attachment style has been developed with the aim of applying attachment theory to romantic relationships. The general findings show that the ability for mature love is associated with a secure attachment style, as well as greater happiness, friendship and trust in relationships (Shaver et al., 1988). On the other hand, individuals who are identified as anxious/ambivalent tend to score higher on jealousy and a more obsessive preoccupation with their loved ones. Moreover, individuals who tend to adopt avoidance strategies also tend to show high levels of fear of engaging in close relationships.

In concluding this section, one can with confidence say that love represents an unavoidable product of the developmental process that describes the nature and quality of interpersonal interaction. Love relations may function as a passionate expression, an intimate bond, a committed decision, playful activity or a search for variation. Love often represents a belonging need with strong affective loading that defines the relation between the people in question within the realm of the social environment. Based on the literature review, it is evident the analysis of love as

a social process that influences human behaviour is complex and ranges from cultural or historical developments to context-specific or individual practices (see Felmlee & Sprecher, 2006, for a further discussion on the relation between sociological and psychological perspectives on love). It is also clear that the interest in the social communication we arbitrarily choose to call love is not just a matter of philosophical or literary interest. Over the years, the concept of love has achieved the status of respectable area of empirical investigations. As shown here, there are several theoretical propositions that in one or another way dissect this term and offer a more nuanced understanding of the interrelational process we call love. Moreover, several of these theories are advanced by the development of specifically designed instruments for empirical testing (see the overview over various love scales in Masuda, 2003). The point that is relevant for the purposes of this book is the relatively recent theoretical effort to combine several interpersonal processes under one theoretical framework (Hazan & Shaver, 1987). More importantly, the emerging theory is that attachment, intimacy and love might be interrelated in terms of underlying biological mechanisms and may mutually influence human functioning (for a theory that explores the relation between attachment and intimacy, see Tidwell, Reis, & Shaver, 1996). Although this position is quite similar to the basic propositions made in this book, I aim to expand this argument by suggesting that various needs for making a connection with our surroundings in terms of social relations (i.e. attachment, different types of love, intimacy, bonding, preferred proximity to caregiver, acceptance and so on) represent the clear indication of the existence of the underlying need for belonging or affiliation.

The Collective or Social Level

Although the emergence of relations between people based on working models of attachment, love and intimacy are important and unavoidable, it is also a common fact that humans do not only connect with each other in terms of interpersonal relations. Thus, creating some kind of group affiliation seems to be an innate disposition for all people everywhere in the world. This means that the creation of social bonds exceeds one's own

existence as other people's births and deaths affect the manner in which we tend to experience the world in general. Although historically, group belonging was not sufficiently acknowledged as an inclusive part of self-concept, the collective aspects of human relations, group dynamics and the real consequences of these processes are, in many ways, more important than the dynamic created on the interpersonal level. The formation of the tribe or the nation establishes in-group recognition, and distant "relatives" are created and experienced without actual "blood connections". These sentiments of collective unity give rise to the variety of pleasant events and feelings that help the individual to experience the world as one big meaningful whole. However, the possible negative consequences of collective thinking in terms of "we" versus "them" might have catastrophic results. If I have a quarrel with my neighbour, usually there is a reason (justified or not) for such a confrontation, and the consequences are hardly important to the world if the conflict is focussed on "me" hating "him". On the other hand, the conflict between my neighbour and me is much more serious if it is based on "us" hating "them". The paradox is apparent. Using the world-viewing spectacles of the young child, it is difficult to understand how it is possible, and based on recorded history we know that it is, to be at war with country X far away and hate their citizens without ever physically meeting them.

Based on the previously presented literature, it is easy to argue that interrelated belonging needs on the interpersonal level promote life and well-being in general by having a clear evolutionary value. Processes such as seeking proximity, fostering acceptance and forming loving and intimate relationships are undoubtedly advantageous in terms of survival, as they maintain and reinforce the feelings of belonging and consequently minimise threats and increase security. This evolutionary logic is equally applicable to collective aspects of human relations and the basic need to form group affiliations. Human beings, as most animals do, automatically screen, recognise and define who is eligible to be characterised as an "in-group" member and who is a member of the "out-group".

As mentioned above, the formation of the same sort of group belonging is an inescapable part of everyone's life. Even though some individuals might actively avoid specific group memberships in the course of their

lives, there are a number of unavoidable and a priori given domains in which people automatically and perhaps unwillingly form significant group identifications, such as place of birth, ethnicity, colour (or shade) of skin, nationality, gender, interest in a particular activity, line of work, religious conviction, shared ideological opinion, physical characteristics and so on. As we saw with the processes on the interpersonal level, the formation of groups and the subsequent behaviour of people when they are involved in group dynamics have fascinated both experts and lay people throughout history. The past six to seven decades are also characterised by a noticeable increase in efforts to understand group processes by means of empirical research and advanced theoretical models. Many studies in different contexts have shown that people tend to form social group bonds relatively easily without having the need for supporting circumstances or other kinds of additional drives that might propel affiliation motivation. Thus, interpersonal relations and group social bonds are often only formed according to proximity (Festinger, Schachter, & Back, 1950) or minimal criteria (Tajfel, Flament, Billig, & Bundy, 1971). The accumulated evidence based on the analyses of group dynamics in the realm of the social identity paradigm strongly suggests that people quickly recognise and categorise other people as belonging to their own group (in-group members) or as the members of some other defined or undefined group (out-group members). It follows that people regularly express the belonging need based on evaluative judgments of "whom to belong to", having the strong need to distinguish not only "I" from "you", but also "us" from "them". In other words, as famously summarised by Tajfel, there is a tendency towards group differentiation when we say that "*we are what we are because they are not what we are*" (Tajfel & Forgas, 1981 p. 124). Furthermore, after establishing a perception of the differences between "us" and "them" we do not stop there. People tend automatically to attach values and show preferences for an in-group. This means that people do not only define the connection to their own group and simply affiliate without simultaneously evaluating members of other groups. The in-group bias affecting behaviour seems to be an inseparable component in the examination of the factors that influence group cohesion. The general body of research suggests that the mere salience of

social categories is enough to generate such biased differentiation (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994). Indeed, it seems that the mere salience of social categories is enough to generate cognitive differentiation attaching "positive distinctiveness" to the members who share a common social identity (Knippenberg & Ellemers, 1997; Oakes et al., 1994). Classical experiments in natural settings also show that boys randomly assigned to newly created groups and under competitive circumstances exhibit clear group identification, loyalty and bonding. Findings also suggest that even when circumstances are altered from competitive to cooperative, the group bonding is maintained and continues to be potent (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961). "Laboratory" experiments on the "minimal group" paradigm also show that once groups are formed, even in an arbitrary and minimally significant way, people are prone to develop behavioural actions as well as emotional reactions that tend to favour one's own group (Tajfel, 1970, 1972; Turner, 1975).

Seeking Proximity but Also Distance: Affiliation Re-conceptualised

In their influential paper on the subject of belonging, Baumeister and Leary (1995) persuasively argued that the human tendency to establish social relations on all levels of abstraction (i.e. from individual to collective) satisfies the selected criteria that define any fundamental motivation. The influence of this and other related theories has resulted in an unprecedented consensus amongst researchers on the importance of affiliation motivation. In fact, the status of affiliation as a fundamental motivation is so strong that attempts to emphasise its importance might be seen as cliché, tautology, redundant or a matter of stating the obvious. Consequently, although the number of specific interpersonal and group processes still attracts extensive research attention, very few academic attempts have been made recently to explicitly select and analyse belonging needs in general in the light of being a principal human motivation. Furthermore, there are very few recent attempts to re-conceptualise the commonly accepted understandings of this important human tendency.

This might be unfortunate considering the potential danger of accepting theories as established certainties. Thus, temporary satisfaction with the status of scientific knowledge in one specific area, especially when it comes to basic premises, might be cognitively paralysing and deceptive, stimulating cognitive inertia and preventing development of deeper analysis and more precise knowledge on the specific phenomena in question.

Despite the firm status of affiliation motivation in literature, in the present text the definitional foundation of affiliation motivation will be explored through the theoretical possibility that affiliation motivation is not complete if it is only analysed as a straightforward need for belonging. If the basic premise is accepted that the affiliation motive is only about "blind" belonging and nothing else, it is then difficult to understand why and how people in general have problems connecting to, including and accepting others, while being at the same time very proficient in exerting rejection, exclusion and other forms of antagonistic strategies when it comes to establishment of group constellations. Moreover, although people have never before lived so "near" to each other in terms of physical proximity, phenomena such as depression and loneliness are flourishing in modern societies, along with prejudice, discrimination and exclusion. This implies that the basic need for belonging may very well be at the heart of the affiliation system as generally assumed, but the fact that people are very specific, sometimes reluctant and even hostile in their choice of social connections suggests the existence of the additional or parallel process that interacts and ultimately complements the human need for group affiliation.

We can start this analysis by looking into definitions. For example, Baumeister and Leary (1995, pp. 497, 520) find that the belonging need consists of two main criteria: (1) people need frequent, affectively pleasant or positive interactions with the same individuals or with a few other people and (2) these interactions must occur in the context of a temporally stable, enduring or long-term framework of affective concern and caring for each other's welfare. Initially, although certainly requiring stability over time, these criteria do not seem difficult to achieve. Most people have a sufficient number of frequent and affectively positive interactions that are relatively stable over time. Given the potency of the belonging need, seemingly naïve yet fairly reasonable questions

arise: why do people not have more of these interactions? Why are we so selective when it comes to relations? What stops people from establishing long-term enjoyable relations on a larger scale, and why are such aims so difficult to achieve and demanding of effort? At this point in time, the empirical evidence, as well as common observations from daily life in various contexts, suggests that contact alone is hardly enough for developing and stimulating belonging needs. More importantly, we are also fairly certain that contact between people, even in the absence of clearly conflicting interests, does not necessarily lead to better social conditions. This inability of the affiliation motivation to repair interpersonal and group difficulties might indeed be difficult to understand considering the amount of empirical evidence and theories that glorify the strengths of the belonging urge. The simple answer to the questions above might lie in the implicit understanding of affiliation motivation (or any motivation, for that matter). Affiliation motivation, similar to many other human basic motivations, is often tacitly understood as a direct, straightforward and, most importantly, independent force moving from zero to the point of diminishing return. In other words, if one posits that affiliation represents a strong motivation in people, the "more the better" in terms of quantity and quality of relationships would be automatically implied until the need is reduced by reaching the point of natural satisfaction. This understanding of belonging might be correct as it implies the existence of social processes and mechanisms that result in the need to "get closer" to other people (i.e. a kind of approach motivation). However, such a one-sided understanding of the need for belonging is problematic due to the possibility that there are powerful opposing mechanisms that limit or restrict affiliation motivation. This assumed restriction does not refer to the reduction in the intensity of the need due to natural satiation. The assumed restriction or limitation refers to the human tendency to achieve optimal relations between seeking proximity and maintaining distance in the realm of social interactions and most importantly balancing these two processes. If this assumption is correct, the result would be the necessity to re-conceptualise affiliation motivation as a two-component process that involves a balanced dual tension between the need to seek interpersonal proximity and the need to maintain individual and/or group distance. Later, in Chap. 6, I intend to describe and discuss

this assumed mechanism, which I refer to as "balanced dual tension". However, at this stage there is a more urgent need to clarify the effects of optimal distance and its relation to the belonging motivation. We can begin by saying that maintenance of distance in the realm of interpersonal relations is not readily associated with belonging or the affiliation motivation. In fact, the postulation that people might actively "seek optimal distance" in relation to belonging might be understood as a contradiction in terms and conceptually collide with the notion of "seeking proximity" as associated with attachment behaviour. Even though this seemingly novel suggestion might seem radical, there are theoretical models that support this postulation and suggest that this type of reasoning is not so novel after all. For example, this type of theoretical reasoning can be traced in optimal distinctiveness theory, which has roots in social identity approach theory and in many ways echoes and further elaborates on the basic premises of this theory. Optimal distinctiveness theory postulates that human beings have two powerful social motives or opposing needs (Brewer, 1991; see also Leonardelli, Pickett, & Brewer, 2010). The first one is defined as a need for assimilation and inclusion that is satisfied by immersion of the self into larger collectives. The second one is an opposing need for differentiation that is satisfied by distinguishing the self from others. The optimal level of being part of something bigger than oneself (i.e. the collective level) and one's own uniqueness (i.e. the individual level) is continuously balanced according to incoming input and personal inclinations. In other words, it is possible to talk about a need to make favourable distinctions between ourselves and certain classes of stimuli and the simultaneous need to belong to those very stimuli we tend to distinguish ourselves from. The theory clearly implies that closeness has its limits, resulting in a somewhat uncomfortable state and activation of the processes that regulate distance between us and any given belonging entity, ranging from individual levels (e.g. primary caregiver) to collective ones (e.g. ethnicity or nationality).

It is, however, important to note that the specific analysis of biased and preference-based intergroup relations is of less importance here, as it is possible that this dynamic represents a joint effect of control (i.e. balancing the relations between the groups in terms of power, domination and self-esteem) and affiliation belonging. The relation and interrelation

between major needs and fundamental motivations, as well as the relation between the fundamental motivations and any given manifested behaviour will be explored in Chap. 7 where some unanswered critical issues will be analysed. In this chapter, the main focus of the analysis is centred on the postulation that the human tendency to connect with others is governed by two opposing needs that commonly tend to balance each other. The first need refers to the widely accepted premise of affiliation, which states that people are generally disturbed if the distance to a significant belonging entity is too detached. The second need, which in many ways represents a neglected or rarely discussed aspect, is the tendency to shy away from others if the distance is excessively proximate. Hence, the conceptualisation of belonging here portrays this process as an optimal relation between seeking proximity and maintaining distance. It is of course implied that distance refers to both physical and psychological types of interpersonal relations. It is also clear that the process of seeking distance is not limited to group behaviour. For example, in the realm of psychoanalytic theory the pioneering work of Mahler (Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975) centres on the analysis of the process in which young children tend to differentiate themselves from their primary caregiver with the aim of developing an autonomous sense of self. This period of the emergent self has been described as a separation-individualisation process wherein the child abandons the symbiotic union and pursues the development of its own unique and individual characteristics. Development of constant individualisation, on one hand, and the balancing need for constant relatedness, on the other, is, according to Mahler, a complex and gradually evolving process consisting of several stages during early childhood. Blos (1967) also views the period of adolescence as being governed by the process of continuous disengagement of the young person from his or her parental affiliations. In contrast to Mahler, who confines the empirical investigations of this process to early childhood, Blos argues that some form of separation-individualisation is also highly present later in life. This tendency to grow out of existing relationships is also based on being responsible for one's own actions and on a growing awareness of one's own identity. Indeed, the prominent literature on identity can in many ways be interpreted as reflecting various stages in the process of differentiation between self and parental representations (Marcia, 1966).

However, the majority of these examples are developed in the realm of psychoanalytic tradition where the themes of unresolved issues, development of neuroses, identity diffusions and other similar psychosocial challenges are highlighted. Moreover, the nature of these processes is complex both in a theoretical and in an empirical sense (e.g. for the relation between separation and individualisation, see Meeus, Iedema, Maassen, & Engels, 2005). It is therefore important to underline that I am not using these examples to discuss the details of this research, but merely to illustrate we already have theories that are not exclusively concerned with the celebration of the need for affiliation, and also describe the equally powerful human tendency to distance ourselves from unions with others.

Bearing these arguments in mind, there are grounds to believe that affiliation motivation is not only about straightforward belonging aiming only in one direction, but rather that the process of establishing interpersonal and group relations is a product of a balanced tension between two interactive needs. The first one, representing basically the "good news", is the evident and intuitive human need to connect with other human beings and form interpersonal and group relations. This belonging tendency converges with the common meaning of affiliation motivation as it is represented both in literature and understood by people in general. Although taking different forms in different societies, the tendency of belonging is an unavoidable first step and represents a main component in the creation of any social constellation. As mentioned and exemplified above, people automatically and easily tend to create interpersonal relations, affiliate with others, form strong interpersonal attachments and create groups that in turn increase their chances of survival. So far so good, indeed. However, as implied and argued above, common observations as well as various relevant theories indicate that there is a second need that completes the affiliation motivation by producing a balance between establishing closeness and seeking distance. In other words, people tend to find extreme closeness during social interaction to be disconcerting and therefore might seek optimal distance levels with social entities in the environment. This need for distance, representing in many ways the "bad news", is poorly understood in terms of direct and indirect effects on the formation of human social affiliations. Although these theories might seem counterintuitive, I nevertheless believe there are com-

pelling arguments to suggest that affiliation motivation is not complete if conceptualised merely as a straightforward desire for finding a place to fit in interpersonal and group social constellations. This theory also implies that the concept of optimal distance, which constrains or reduces the need for further pursuit of belonging, should be an inclusive and equal part (i.e. embedded) of the model as opposed to being perceived as something that emerges at some later point due to natural satiation or the nature of unfortunate situational circumstances and undesirable psychosocial development. To put it definitively, the desire for optimal distance is a part of belonging as much as the need for proximity and closeness.

However, it is important to note that there are potential situations under which people might prefer to avoid social interactions without necessarily implicating the assumed need for maintaining distance. Thus, the postulation here aims to describe general and fundamental tendencies of affiliation motivation as opposed to specific circumstances under which the desire to be alone or maintain distance might be activated. These situations include the effects of stress, anxiety, concerns about social evaluation, potential embarrassment, shyness, psychosocial difficulties, social withdrawal and more (see Leary, 2010, for an overview). In all these conditions, there are clear and understandable reasons to explain why people might choose not to interact with others or might be prevented from doing so. But rather than looking for reasons, I attempt to describe a quite natural inborn human inclination to experience discomfort when another social entity invades our private zone. In this situation, the basic needs for formation of interpersonal and group affiliations may come into conflict with the equally basic need to distance oneself from coming too close to objects of belonging. This basic process of balancing individualisation and belonging is further reinforced by the frequent favouring of "I" versus "you" and comparisons of "us" versus "them". The tragicomedy aspect of this is that such biases and discriminations often have an arbitrary basis, as shown in the minimal group experiments (Tajfel et al., 1971).

All in all, it is possible that people have an equally strong propensity for maintaining distance as they have for closeness, generally enjoying an optimal level between these two tendencies that are a product of personal, situational, cultural and other circumstances. This inclination

is further transmitted to collective levels of affiliation connections and propelled by the mechanism of cognitive and social categorisation. Hence, the perception that some people are not what we are quickly leads to a distancing attitude and behaviour. One can certainly speculate whether or not such conduct and a display of discriminatory behaviour might also be based on the need for control and not necessarily only a result of belonging dynamics. But one thing is more or less certain: the many neutrally distancing behaviours in the realm of affiliation motivation require alternative theoretical explanations in the sense that they are not sufficiently explained solely by the theories on the straightforward need for belonging and closeness.

Concluding Affiliation Motivation

According to Aristotle (328 BC), man is by nature a social animal and society is something that precedes the individual. This statement, originating from the early age of recorded history, reveals the ancient belief that there is an innate need to form interpersonal relations on all levels of abstraction. This means that people automatically tend to form bonds of belonging ranging from the interpersonal to the collective level right from birth. Thus, the urge to establish different belonging needs and the formation of various family relations seem to be an inevitable aspect of human life. People have no other choice but to "find" the most appropriate way to relate to their own social world. All cultures, in their own way, operate with some form of family-based categories, and these categories help individuals to define their own existence. In addition to the fact that people need the presence of and psychological feedback from other people in order to survive, we are also bound to develop category-based social relations such as father, mother, wife, son and so forth. Various interrelated belonging processes, such as attachment, intimacy and love, along with various forms of group attachments, seem to be innate motivational dispositions of human nature right from birth. However, one cannot choose one's parents and certainly not the parenting style. Even though there are indications that babies very early, even within the hours after birth, prefer images of their mothers to those of complete strangers

(Bushnell, Sai, & Mullin, 1989), it is evident that the need for belonging and establishment of safe relations surpasses specific blood connections. Newborn ducklings will follow a mother chicken and adoptive children will love their adoptive parents, not based only on the innate disposition to belong to the specific species or people, but also on the innate preprogramed tendency to develop meaningful interpersonal and group relations with the social world around us.

Based on such conceptual complexity, it is easy to acknowledge that various social connections, their nature, forms and underlying mechanisms could be analysed from many different angles and theoretical positions. In an attempt to summarise the presented text on affiliation and to narrow down the focus of the analysis here, in the following I will briefly discuss the three main theoretical points that are underlined in the present chapter. First, in line with a number of existing theories in the relevant literature, it was postulated here that the human propensity to establish social connections in terms of belonging represents a prototype of fundamental motivation. Based on historical and current literature, it is fair to say that this theoretical postulation is fairly unproblematic. Indeed, as Baumeister and Leary (1995) have previously shown, belonging clearly satisfies the requirements that should be fulfilled so that one process could achieve the status of fundamental motivation.

Second, it was noted that there is a vast amount of literature on specific belonging processes on the interpersonal level, such as attachment, intimacy and love. The majority of this literature makes an effort to provide sound conceptual definitions of these processes and delineate possible differences between them. Furthermore, the analysis identified noticeable efforts to argue that all these processes are in fact interrelated and could meaningfully be analysed as the manifestation of one greater underlying motivation. Thus, the purpose in increasing the number of studies is to detect, identify and acknowledge any commonalities between belonging needs. Based on these tendencies, several researchers have called for the development of a theoretical framework that can integrate belonging processes. Although the aim of theoretical integration could be reached by following several possible paths, this book proposes that the nature and relation between various belonging needs points to the existence of one central governing process. In other words, it is believed here that

there is sufficient evidence to postulate the existence of a bigger and more general motivation (i.e. affiliation) around which different specific and interrelated belonging needs are clustered (i.e. attachment, intimacy, love and so on). Based on the number of similar postulations in recent literature, this theoretical postulation could be evaluated as only partially problematic. Thus, I believe that the postulation has merits and could be further developed with the aim of expanding our understanding of belonging motivation. This is both intuitive and logical, considering that people do not start adult interpersonal relations with a "*tabula rasa*". In fact, quite the opposite is true. People commonly tend to transfer the nature and tone of the old relations to new ones and cope with diverse belonging challenges according to their own past experiences.

Finally, the third theoretical point that has been posited in this chapter suggests affiliation motivation should be conceptualised as a need that inheritably consists of two interrelated processes. The first one is belonging in terms of seeking closeness or proximity on all levels of abstraction, ranging from interpersonal relations to the formation of various group attachments. Such an understanding is similar to traditional descriptions of belonging in the literature and ordinary life. However, this understanding is poorly related to common observations wherein people, in some circumstances, tend to show a preference for withdrawal from social participation by regulating the distance to a given social entity (e.g. individual or group). Thus, there are theoretical grounds for suggesting that the powerful urge for unification with others might in some situations be counteracted by the workings of opposing processes that primarily aim to preserve the individual sense of self. I realize that such a conceptualisation of affiliation is contrary to established understandings of this process as a one-directional motivational tendency. Hence, this third theoretical point could perhaps be categorised as directly problematic considering that people ordinarily do not think about belonging in terms of distance. On the other hand, this is perhaps exactly the reason why this aspect of belonging is, more or less, either neglected or completely omitted from the most recent definitions. In other words, the evident counterintuitive undertone of this postulation is perhaps the reason why the role of optimal distance is insufficiently researched when it comes to meaningful integration of these two somewhat opposing forces within one theoretical

framework. Nevertheless, I believe there are sufficient theoretical grounds for developing a hypothesis stating that the need for optimal distance represents an inseparable part of affiliation motivation and as such should be included in theoretical conceptualisations of this process.

In conclusion, it is also important to point out that the distinction between the interpersonal and the group level is not considered here to be categorical but rather linear. Although the present chapter on affiliation motivation was presented in the light of two distinct levels of abstraction (i.e. individual and group levels), there are credible arguments to suggest that the nature of needs residing on the individual level could be theoretically related to group behaviour. Both levels, although certainly differing when it comes to the role and conceptualisation of the "self", are considered here to be an inclusive part of the greater fundamental tendency towards the creation of affiliation bonds. Indeed, some theorists (Smith, Murphy, & Coats, 1999) have proposed that psychological systems regulating affect and behaviour in interpersonal relationships and systems regulating group behaviour are conceptually connected. Accordingly, it is suggested in the literature that further cooperative contributions between empirical and theoretical research on the way the affiliation needs interact and create larger patterns is required (Reis & Patrick, 1996). These ideas agree to a large degree with the basic proposition of the present book where it is assumed that all needs inside one particular motivational system (e.g. affiliation, control and self-expression) are interrelated. Hence, the affiliation motivation, through the diversity of related belonging processes, is responsible for establishing the meaningful relations between people in terms of interpersonal relations and group membership.

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5

The Self-expression Motivational System

The Need for Self-expression

Although the previous chapters on control and affiliation provide several novel and therefore to some extent controversial propositions, it is nevertheless fair to say that the main postulation argued in these chapters is difficult to dispute: we find overwhelming empirical evidence and sound theoretical reasoning to suggest that basic needs for control and affiliation are indeed highly qualified to be called fundamental human motivations. Bearing this in mind, it is therefore easy to realise that the aim of introducing self-expression as a fundamental motivational agent will be difficult to achieve considering that the status of this concept in motivational literature is far from being firmly established. In fact, it is difficult to find any literature at all on self-expression motivation.

One possible way to approach this challenge is to pose a simple question: what aspects, if any, of human existence are left unexplained by control and affiliation motivation? In other words, after people have obtained control over environmental cues, interpersonal relations and self-processes, and after all belonging needs have been sufficiently satisfied, are there some forms of human action that cannot be explained

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solely by control or belonging needs? Simply put, can these aforementioned needs completely explain human nature and human behaviour? Needless to say, there is no clear-cut answer to this question due to the elusiveness of these concepts. However, it is easy to see that although control and belonging are unquestionably important when it comes to general life satisfaction, and although these processes are essential for psychosocial adaptation, most people may still feel unfulfilled and experience difficulty enjoying life and their own existence. It is not unthinkable to imagine that people might do strange, unexplainable and highly unpredictable things that cannot be directly attributed to the need for affiliation or control. There are also many human actions that seem to be illogical, unreasonable and even meaningless from the point of view of the traditional motivational science. People are known to act in ways that are puzzling to external observers, as well as potentially self-destructive or self-damaging. Moreover, it seems people are capable of actions that even work against affiliation or control motivations. For example, people are often compelled to say things that might break or undermine belonging bonds with others, things that perhaps are not personally beneficial (e.g. say things against political regimes), stubbornly insist on their own ideas and visions despite the lack of public recognition (e.g. in art, science, politics and similar domains), perform actions that increase the risk of individual and public exclusion (e.g. express identities related to sexual issues) and essentially many other similar behaviours in which typical motivational agents are not only absent, but also overridden.

However, although this might sound reasonable and intuitive, there is a leap from common sense and anecdotal experiences to the development of compelling arguments about the existence of self-expression as a new motivational agent. The theoretical difficulty in postulating this idea is embedded in the evident fragmentation of the self-expressive tendency in current literature compared to the fields of control and affiliation motivations. In other words, in contrast to the belonging motivation in which clear attempts have been made to develop the idea that all needs on the interpersonal and group levels are interrelated, implying the existence of one greater underlying motivational tendency, an attempt of this kind is only rarely applied to other important human needs, such as the need for curiosity, playfulness, artistic expressions, autonomy and so on. In addition

to these specific processes, I also refer here to a wide range of conceptually interrelated research themes, such as self-disclosure, self-actualisation and self-determination. All of these processes are acknowledged individually and separately as being valid and important motivational tendencies, but are seldom linked together in terms of underlying causality. This is somewhat extraordinary considering that all of these concepts commonly aim to provide accounts of human action typically characteristic for human beings and involve meaning-making and other abstract or meta-motives that are seldom observed in animals. Furthermore, although many of these listed behaviours evidently share the idea of the basic urge to communicate inner states with the attempt to create a meaningful existence, there have been relatively few attempts to integrate these subfields into one greater theoretical framework. Hence, in this chapter, similar to the chapters on control and affiliation, the line of argument that will be presented promotes the idea that the human need for self-expression also deserves the status of fundamental motivation. In other words, the aim of the present chapter is to show that many of the different human processes that are presented and analysed in the current literature as separate motivational topics, represent in fact different manifestations of the one underlying self-expression motivation.

Taking into account the relative novelty of the present proposition, the text in this chapter will consist of the following sections. First, I will endeavour to define self-expression, delineate the definitional boundaries and explain the main characteristics of this process. In this process, I will ask and answer some critical definitional questions to further illuminate the essence of this concept. Second, an expression of artistic sentiment will be analysed as an illustration of the behavioural example in which self-expression motivation is highly visible. The third section will concisely assess the degree to which self-expression fulfils the criteria of fundamental motivation as proposed by Baumeister and Leary (1995). Although this kind of argumentation could certainly be considered arbitrary (i.e. selective choice of literature that supports the argument), the aim of this section is to show that self-expression represents an important motivational process that, in addition to control and belonging, completes our understanding of human nature and subsequent action. Furthermore, and equally important, it will be implied that the idea of

self-expression is able to unite several seemingly unrelated motivational tendencies under one theoretical frame. And finally, the closing section of this chapter will summarise the main points and further clarify the essence of self-expression motivation.

What Is Self-expression Motivation?

Self-expression motivation is conceptualised here as a relatively simple yet powerful urge to convey the *self-related inner states* from the inside out and to establish *meaningful*, *yet aimless, communication with the world* through the *various forms of expression*. Clearly, this definition is in need of further clarification. I will focus on four potentially unclear terms in this definition. First, by "*self-related inner states*" I refer to intimate cognitions and emotions but also in some cases to pure behavioural expressions (e.g. rhythmic movements) in which the self is involved. In other words, self-expression does not refer only to deep emotional and cognitive processes, but also to seemingly shallow and simple reactions or behavioural patterns under the condition that self-processes are at least minimally involved. This position in many ways echoes Allport, who states that

> *…(self)-involvement, or its absence, makes a critical difference in human behaviour. When a person reacts in a neutral, impersonal, routine atmosphere, his behaviour is one thing. But when he is behaving personally, perhaps excitedly, seriously committed to a task, he behaves quite differently. In the first condition his (self) is not engaged; in the second condition it is.* (Allport, 1943, p. 459)

This quotation clearly points out the importance of self in overt behaviour. Moreover, the present conceptualisation of self-expression as a fundamental motivator also includes established routines and habitual performances, as long as self-processes are or were at some point involved in initiation or preservation of these behavioural manifestations. The present conceptualization also implies that the core process of self-expression include or go beyond culturally conditioned expressions of the "self" (Kim & Chu, 2011). This means that self-expression motivation is

considered to be dependent on having sufficient amounts of something we arbitrarily call the "self", whether "self" is seen as independent, interdependent in nature or operates under automatic and semiautomatic modes. Thus, the fact that behaviour at some point has become a matter of automatic processing does not necessarily mean that "self" is not involved.

However, it is important to note that this is a book about basic human motivations and their accompanying behavioural manifestations. This is not a book about the "self". I will strive to avoid opening the "self" door and risk being hit by the falling objects, meaning that literature on "self" is an enormously large and somewhat chaotic theme including a wide variety of perspectives. On the other hand, the reference to "self" is conceptually necessary, even unavoidable, if we are to explore the many behaviours that are insufficiently explained by control and affiliation motivation. One illustrative method of clarifying the involvement of "self" in self-expression is to draw a parallel between human and animal functioning in terms of shared characteristics, and more importantly the characteristics on which they differ. In terms of commonalities, although on a lesser scale, it is possible to argue that humans share many features of control (not counting controlling internal self-processes) and affiliation motivations with the majority of animal species. Animals, similar to humans, are bound to manage their environment in terms of developing skills, and some of them even use tools. Animals also show a clear motivation to relate to each other, in terms of both interpersonal relations and the group dynamic. However, what animals clearly cannot do at this point in history is express themselves in the variety of manners we humans tend to do, such as create art, place themselves in various temporal frames, contemplate the meaning of existence and actively search for the same, contemplate self-existence, reflect on others, reflect on themselves, reflect on what others think about them, create traditions and transfer knowledge, and so on. The simple explanation for the lack of these abilities is that animals do not possess the sense of self in sufficient quantity. Put simply, we (arrogantly) assume that animals have little to share or disclose. Humans, on the other hand, are both blessed and cursed by having the ability to experience and express the "self". For the simplicity of discussion, I choose for the time being to ignore the knowledge that indicates

chimpanzees, dolphins and some other animals are indeed capable of showing that they possess the sense of "self". The reason for this is that a discussion of this type will be off-target when it comes to the intended aims of the present chapter. In other words, the self-related inner states in the aforementioned definition of self-expression presuppose having the sense of "self" in sufficient quantities in terms of self-consciousness (i.e. being aware and able to contemplate one's own existence). Involving the self in motivational explanations of human action and making a parallel to animal behaviour are actions that reinforce the argument that controlling and belonging alone are hardly sufficient to explain the complexity of human nature and the variety of human behaviours.

Second, the notion of the establishment of "*communication with the world*" in the definition of self-expression needs further clarification. The term "world" includes both social aspects (i.e. conveying something to other people) and the idea of world as an external reality in general (i.e. conveying ideas). This means that we do not primarily express ourselves for the sake of others and also implies that having an emphasis on communication with others, although representing a vital component of self-expressive process, is of secondary importance here. In fact, the behavioural products of self-expression, although perhaps beneficial or meaningful to people in general, are nevertheless self-centred and serve the sole purpose of some sort of purification and renewal. As such, this process comes very near to understandings of catharsis in philosophy, art and psychoanalysis.

Third, the formulation "*meaningful, yet aimless*" seems to be contradictory. On this point, the basic descriptions of self-expression are similar to the notion of self-realisation or self-actualisation, as they originate from the humanistic psychological tradition. For example, Maslow (1970, p. 46) holds the position that *"a musician must make music, an artist must paint, a poet must write, if he is to be ultimately at peace with himself. What a man can be, he must be. He must be true to his own nature. This need we may call self-actualization"*. These words clearly describe the human tendency to establish a communication with outside "reality" by actualising, as Maslow suggests, the essence of its being. However, according to the point I am trying to make here, it is important to note that the actualisation of the self is considered to be only of secondary importance or a by-product of the more basic motivational process of expressing the inner

state. In other words, self-expression is first and foremost about expressing, and only consequently and additionally about reaching potentials and goal-oriented actions, although the success or failure of this is important in terms of repetition of behaviour later on. Again, in the perspective here, the fundamental motives represent unlearned predetermined dispositions that are embedded in human nature and as such are originally goalless or aimless. Goals, targets and specific aims are the characteristics of an environment that provide the means for satisfying the fundamental tendencies. This implies that all selected objects or activities are somewhat random and based on the nature of available circumstances or anatomical predispositions of the actor. The opportunity for self-expression helps the individual to define his own place by establishing a connection between results of the inner psychological states and the external world, regardless of reaching (or not) some ambitious point of self-development. Consequently, meaning in self-expression is in the possession of the actor, considering that seeing meaning in various activities varies greatly from one person to the next (see Chap. 7 for a deeper discussion on the role of meaning in all three motivational systems). In other words, self-expression represents a conceptually much wider human motivation than the notion of self-actualisation. The self-actualisation process focusses on what we can call luxury aspects of self-development and as such represents merely one of the many different forms of self-expression.

The phrase "*various forms of expression*" refers to the proposition that behaviours or products of self-expressive motives might be diverse and basically visible in any type of behaviour. This might include drawings on a cave wall, the creation of myths and literature, sports, dancing and singing, and art in general, as representatives for creative and active forms of expression. However, this description also includes the more dormant ways in which the "self" is expressed, such as fishing, watching television, gardening and so on. It follows that the area of self-expression is wide and captures the whole complexity of human nature (i.e. thoughts, feelings and behaviours) providing people with meaningful existence without necessarily being meaningful for other people. This also presupposes that behaviourally expressed motives of the "self" are made for their own sake and not motivated by doing something for other people (i.e. affiliation or power motive) or having some instrumental purpose (i.e. achievement motive).

The whole idea of self-expression rests on the basic observation that people tend to insist on following their own behavioural paths that are in accordance with their inner states (i.e. cognitions and emotions). Although not undisputed in the course of scientific discourse, there is a long-standing perception of people's behaviour as being inheritably proactive as opposed to being merely reflexive, automatic or a product of conditioning and reinforcing processes. This tendency towards proactive behaviour typically provides people with meaning, even in the situations where meaning is difficult to find (Frankl, 1946/1985). In other words, self-expression motivation represents a system of interrelated need processes in which the complexity of human nature in terms of thoughts and feelings is conveyed from the inside out in the search for the establishment of a meaningful and satisfactory existence. The interrelated need processes are the complex product of many different influences, such as developmental stage, individual abilities, emotional maturity and cultural and normative restrictions that act upon every person at any given time.

What Is the Status of Self-expression?

As noted, the status of self-expression as an established motivational concept is practically non-existent. On the other hand, the loose application of this concept in research is fairly common. Self-expression, as a straightforward description of one particular aspect of self-definition, is used in the current literature when referring to persuasion (Aaker, 1999), Western individualism (Kim & Sherman, 2007), civic behaviour (Welzel, 2010), choice and variety-seeking tendencies (Kim & Drolet, 2003), as a tool for face-to-face communication (Razzino et al., 2003), Internet communication (Bargh, McKenna, & Fitzsimons, 2002), as a mediator of intrinsic motivation (Sanacore, 1997), assertiveness (Galassi, DeLo, Galassi, & Bastien, 1974) and essentially much more. However, the use of self-expression is seldom defined or conceptually analysed in these studies. The term is rather employed as if it were relatively self-explanatory and intuitive, mainly as a noun or a verb, but seldom as a motivational concept (for rare exceptions, see McCall, 1963). Hence, although the phrase "self-expression" or "expressive behaviour" is frequently used both

by lay people and experts in the field, the review of relevant literature clearly reveals that historical and contemporary literature on psychology is predominantly silent when it comes to the motivational aspects of self-expression. Moreover, strong voices suggest that the concept of self-expression should be dropped because it is empty, explains nothing and is culturally biased (Tobin, 1995). One of the clearest and strongest statements of this kind can be found in Maslow (1970), who is explicit in insisting that expressive behaviour and self-expression cannot be considered as motivational constructs. According to Maslow, the concept of expression is opposed to the coping behaviour which simultaneously represents differentiation between "useless" (expression) and "useful" (coping) reactions (p. 132). He maintains that expression simply mirrors, reflects, signifies or articulates some state of the organism and that it has no aim or goal. Expression, thus, is not considered to be voluntary behaviour. This position is understandable considering that traditional motivational processes, such as control and belonging, are typically characterised by the existence of the explicit targets and the efforts to achieve balance between own actions and intended aims. However, as noted above, the common understanding of motivational processes as strictly purposive is a somewhat unfortunate stance when it comes to self-expression that does not necessarily involve the presence of predefined aims, specific goals, purposes and explicit instrumentality (McCall, 1963). On the other hand, the basic tendency for the development of self-expression motivation relates to a high degree to an unlearned process that is inheritably embedded in people at birth. Specific acts of manifested behaviour are certainly a product of learning in terms of the somewhat random choice of possibilities, availabilities and accessibility in any given environment. Nevertheless, the basic inclination to engage in these behaviours is governed by the urge for self-expression. The type of motivation of this kind could be theoretically associated with push motivation, as opposed to the existence of pull motives in terms of predefined goals and self-regulatory strivings to achieve them.

Based on the literature review, it is also possible to argue that, although the explicit theories connecting self-expression to motivational processes are absent in the relevant literature, the basic thinking related to expression of the self is nevertheless noticeable. In other words, the core

underlying process of self-expression is hidden, fragmented and portioned, yet noticeable in contemporary literature. For example, an established concept in psychological literature is the notion of self-disclosure, which is commonly defined as the process of revealing personal facts, thoughts and emotions to another person. Based on the general descriptions and understandings of this process, it is obvious that the essence of self-disclosure comes very close to the portrayal of self-expression here. The concept of self-disclosure is used primarily as a mechanism that facilitates the development of close interpersonal relations (e.g. as in social penetration theory; see Altman & Taylor, 1973), but is also linked to the mere expression of inner states. In addition to specific concepts elsewhere in the literature, we also find descriptions that strikingly resemble self-expression motivation as conceptualised here. For example, Tesser (2003, p. 284) writes that some attitudes "*are important because they validate who we are. Simply expressing those values seems to boost self-evaluation. Examples of this kind of mechanism are easy to see. People wear clothing that indicates the teams they support, the hobbies they pursue, the social groups to which they belong*". It follows that I am not attempting to invent or propose the existence of a completely new motivational concept, but merely suggest that the idea of expressing inner states already exists in various forms in the literature. What I do suggest is that the present conceptualisation of self-expression includes and theoretically expands these previous suggestions, provides an economical explanation for many different types of behaviour and, most importantly, offers an overall account of human action that is not a product of a somewhat romanticised or biased view on human motivation.

Self-expression Is Not a Normative Concept

The remark about romanticised and biased views on human motivation is noticeably critical and targets the way in which many recent motivational theories have been conceptualised. Hence, this somewhat controversial remark deserves further clarification. I can start by saying that self-expression, although representing a powerful source of human motivation, is not conceptualised here as capable of accounting for the diversity

of human behaviour alone. Thus, the present approach advocates the conceptualisation of human motivation as consisting of several (i.e. three) equally important motivational processes. This in part contradicts some influential theoretical frameworks in the realm of motivational science that aim to explain the complexity of human action by suggesting there is one particular primary need, drive, structure, mechanism or process of extreme importance that is capable of explaining everything. The traces of such thinking can be found in many humanistic, behaviouristic and learning theories. Moreover, this kind of thinking, although well-masked behind theoretical complexity and advanced empirical procedures, can also be traced in part in some contemporary approaches to motivation, such as in the previously mentioned self-determination (e.g. primacy of autonomy, internal and external dichotomy) and terror management (e.g. fear of death) theories.

Such "master drive" approaches, although in many ways inspirational, informative and useful, typically fail to acknowledge the existence of other, equally important, processes that shape and complete the understanding of human nature. Furthermore, the common premise in some of these theories is linked to a normative view of human nature in which development is portrayed as something that progresses, and should progress, only in one, usually positive, direction (e.g. the notion of the real self, self-actualisation, autonomy motives and similar). It is therefore not surprising to discover that these tendencies, existing across different scientific traditions, are often used in connection with various talents and skills that tend to only emphasise the positive aspects of the individual in terms of development. Such descriptions as "real self" or "deep source of growth" or "true self" are relatively common (Horney, 1950/1991; Maslow, 1970). More specifically, it seems that descriptions of the popular human need for self-actualisation, autonomy, self-esteem, creativity and curiosity are often portrayed as one-sided processes that are often romanticised and glorified and are consequently reserved for a minor portion of the human population. As such, these theoretical models that aim to promote the importance of one chosen fundamental motivational concept fail to account for all types of behaviours, ranging from those that have positive or healthy consequences (actualisation, autonomy, creativity) to those that are perceived as immoral, destructive and/or self-destructive.

More specifically, it is possible to identify two interrelated questions that might pose some problems for such a somewhat idealised logic. The first challenging question is Is it possible to conceptualise fundamental motivation as somewhat exclusively positive? If the answer is yes, then there is a real risk of mixing up clinical or health psychology on one hand, and motivational theory on the other. To clarify, the conceptualisation of self-actualisation and other similar concepts is typically primarily portrayed as a positive process (e.g. actualisation, autonomy, curiosity and so on), while the counterpart is perceived as situations where something went wrong in terms of development (inauthentic self or externally controlled behaviour). The possible problem with this assumption is the potential cultural and historical bias in conceptualisations of fundamental human motives. It is difficult to see how it is possible to predispose an innate human motivational force that is "accidentally" identical with the specific social and cultural norms and beliefs about what is good or bad. Such a parallelism between innate fundamental motivational forces and accepted human norms at one specific point in history in terms of the good-bad dichotomy is too much of a coincidence to be accepted as credible. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how a fundamental human motive that is supposed to be neutral and account for both positive and negative human actions and everything in between can be described primarily as a moral or normative tendency. In contrast to these positions, I argue here that explorations and subsequent conceptualisations of fundamental human motives should ideally transcend the demands of specific historical phases or cultural influences. In other words, motives should account equally for all types of behaviours, regardless of dubious moral judgments or health consequences. For instance, focussing particularly on the concept of self-actualisation, it is easy to argue that this idea is conceptually closely related to the notion of the "real self" that facilitates "free healthy development" in accordance with the potential in one's genetic and individual nature. For the purposes of clarity and illustration, let us take a brief and comparative look into two randomly chosen historical figures: Mahatma Gandhi and Adolf Hitler. Many people would agree that Gandhi was a person who was well-respected and positively described in the historical archives. He is an example of a person whose self-expression motivation, as conceptualised here, is in accordance with

the ideas of self-actualisation, as conceptualised by the humanistic and psychoanalytic traditions. However, the fundamental difference between these concepts arises when the case being analysed is Adolf Hitler. Can we say that Hitler achieved self-actualisation? Hitler's life and actions were frequently explained by psychopathology, meaning that something went terribly wrong in terms of development and specific historical and contextual conditions. Hence, most likely the answer is no, if we follow the basic premises of self-actualisation reasoning. However, based on the premises of self-expression motivation there is actually little difference between these two historical figures. Thus, seen from the motivational point of view (as opposed to clinical or health-related issues), these two figures equally succeeded in expressing their own ideas, their views of the world and the inner tendencies of the self. The point that Hitler's manner of expression, contrary to Gandhi's, was aggressive, hateful and destructive in nature is irrelevant if we follow the few basic premises on which self-expression motivation is conceptualised. The self (the notion of self-awareness) is always motivated to express itself, whether we talk about the "real" one or the one who is crippled by child-rearing and genetic and/or pharmacological misfortune. Although there is an apparent necessity to explicitly acknowledge the fact that the notion of the real self is extremely important considering moral, health-related or clinical analysis, attempts to apply this thinking in motivational theory can be misleading. In other words, insistence on conceptualising fundamental motivation in exclusively positive terms might be problematic and inaccurate when considering that the aim of motivational science is to explain the whole person regardless of historical, cultural or situational influences. We also must remember that although Hitler was probably a person with deep psychological issues seen from the clinical point of view, his actions were found to be meaningful to the millions of people who "agreed" to follow him. The creation and consumption of meaning is a tricky business and represents a process that is created in the complex interaction between the individual, other people, and cultural and historical circumstances. Therefore, the general similarities between Gandhi and Hitler are probably very few, apart from one extremely important point: the common motivation to express inner states. Thus, apart from superficial similarities, such as following a vegetarian diet, probably motivated by different reasons, both

these historical figures were motivated to express and communicate their messages to the world in general. And both of them have actually succeeded in doing just that. As noted, the fact that Hitler "succeeded" in the most regretful and tragic manner, and that Gandhi is still celebrated for his approach, is actually beside the point if the aim is to analyse the participation of self-expression in the formation of human behaviour. In other words, much more conceptualisation and understanding of self-expression motivation is focussed on the process of expressing the self and far less is focussed on the process of discovering or realising the true self.

The second challenging question that is conceptually related to the previous one is Should fundamental motivation be conceptualised as a capacity or a talent that is desirable and recommended for healthy development? Intellectual development, emotional maturity and specific talents are descriptions of the particular capacity of the individual made upon the arbitrary process of social comparison. Specific talents emanating from and promoting self-actualisation, autonomy and curiosity do not represent a sudden or accidental process in the sense that these dispositions are developed in the complex interaction between nurture and nature. If a person runs fast, sings well or paints magnificently, this is still just a description of competence. The social world is informed of how well the person in question performs a particular activity. It follows that it is difficult to see a straightforward and direct causal connection between the degree of skill and the basic motivation (i.e. he has success as an artist ergo he realised himself). What about the rest of us who live ordinary lives without being blessed by specific talents or extraordinary circumstances? How can we account for the wide range of behaviours that are situated on the lower part of the success scale? Many people write poems, but only a few deserve the right in the eyes of society to call themselves poets. The self-expression motivation being presented here is the theoretical postulation that is able to explain many seemingly unrelated behaviours, ranging from positive to negative or extraordinary to directly common. In this framework, skills, abilities and eventual success are not motives, but rather represent modifiers of the consequences that can create a need to exhibit an activity. Again, fundamental motivations are goalless and aimless in the sense that they do not have initial specific targets. Self-expressions in terms of specific targets, talents or domains emerge

later and are influenced by the above-mentioned process of availability and accessibility possibilities that reside in the proximate environment. In other words, the self-expression motivation is about communicating the inner states or ideas with the help of a specific, yet arbitrarily chosen activity, such as singing or painting. It follows that, although showing different skills and performing under different circumstances, a bad singer, a good singer or a shower singer for that matter, can all still be motivated to express thoughts and emotions from the inside out, using singing as a means to inform the world. All three singers in this example might use singing as a means of expressing the self, but according to the dominant theories, only the successful singer would be qualified to be given the self-actualisation label in the eyes of the world, as well as in his own eyes, most likely. In that respect, the suggestion here is that although self-actualisation certainly represents a vital human need, it nevertheless only represents a partial description of the particular capacity of the individual. As such, self-actualisation as a sign of inner growth represents an important but only minor part of the more general self-expression motivation. These words echo the "forgotten" thinking of McCall (1963, p. 302) who said that "*the principle of self-expression, unlike Maslow's curiously popular version of self-actualization, is not a special kind of motive but an overarching principle applicable to human motives generally*".

It is important to note that I am not criticising Maslow on narrow and specific points, by attempting to invalidate the well-known pyramidal description of human needs. After all, Maslow does not have a patent on specific processes, such as self-actualisation, especially considering that many other theorists before and after him tended to use this concept (e.g. Goldstein, 1939). The present criticism is much wider in scope and directed at many similar postulations in the current literature that tend to blur the distinctions between fundamental motivations and their subsequent and domain-specific effects on human functioning.

All in all, the three fundamental motivations of control, affiliation and self-expression are not conceptualised here in terms of "the more the better" or the primacy of one of these. Human behaviour unavoidably always consists of all three, but at optimal levels that are distributed and adjusted according to a complex interaction between personal dispositions and contextual/situational circumstances. Thus, it is the interaction

and subsequent balance (or lack of balance) between the needs that correctly portray people and not the workings of one particular drive or motive. Accepting the assumption that fundamental motivation is something that is hard-wired in human nature and thus present at birth, it follows that all people are forced to cope with challenges in the areas of control, affiliation and expression, regardless of moral judgments, success or the extremity of performances.

Art as a Typical Example of Self-expression

In a further attempt to clarify the basic premises of self-expression motivation, one of the most typical domains of human conduct in which expression of the self plays a prominent role will briefly be analysed here. This is the notion of art. It is fairly clear that throughout the course of history, we have had a tendency to express our inner states in the form of pictures on the cave wall, a song, a building, a totem or a sculpture, a painting, sorrow chants after a family loss, a motion picture on the cinema wall and so on. Despite the earlier suggestion that self-expression is in part aimless or not undertaken for the sake of others, self-expressive behavioural manifestations have nevertheless direct effects and consequences. All expressions of the self are at some point in time a subject of continuous evaluation and comparison regardless of the original motivation of simply sharing or expressing inner states. In other words, although many human undertakings are motivated by expressing and communicating emotions and ideas for the sake of expression itself, all these attempts are inevitably judged and evaluated for the purpose of differentiation. The effects and consequences notwithstanding, the artistic activity represents a perfect symbol system in which the self has the opportunity to be fully expressed, especially considering that the forms in which art could be created are essentially limitless. At its extremes, it is a birth-like process (i.e. something from inside comes out) providing the artist with the feeling of temporary relief if the "product" is presented in a satisfactory form. The analogy to a birth-like process indicates the fragility of the artistic self-expression, which in many ways can be seen as a curse because it is partly dependent on external recognition or validation. Partial support

for the existence of self-expression motivation is visible when artists often insist on their ideas even if their manuscript has been rejected many times (e.g. James Joyce), if they never succeed to sell more than one painting (e.g. Vincent Van Gogh) or go to prison due to the compulsion to express their own convictions (e.g. a long list of Russian writers). Thus, artists sometimes insist on their own ideas despite the total lack of public recognition or threatening consequences. The expression of artistic thoughts and feelings in the wider understanding represents a serious activity and one of the most important means through which we try to relate to external reality. Artistic expression in many ways creates a part of the world as one's own. It is a highly vulnerable state of being in which misunderstanding between an artist's own ideas and external responses (audience and critics) is a very likely outcome, whether the audience likes the "product" or not. An audience or critics are not able to fully understand the sensitivity of the process in which the artist is compelled to give birth to something physical using only the strength of emotions and thoughts. However, one thing should be clarified here. In portraying general self-expression motivation through the need for particular artistic expression, I am not suggesting that only artists, and even more only acknowledged artists, are involved in this process. On the contrary, from the point of view of self-expression motivation, every person attempting to express his or her inner state in some form is an artist, regardless of success, public recognition or the general acceptance of how the product should be defined. It is also not necessary, in terms of definition, that the expression communicates something important, has purpose, a predefined aim or a function. This is not to say that possible effects of one particular expression are not important in terms of consequences. However, effects and consequences are not a defining element of nor required for specific acts to be labelled as artistic expressions. As noted above, the present view of self-expression is fundamentally different from common conceptualisations and understandings of expressive behaviour as some kind of passive projection of inner states. For example, Maslow clearly states that *"the creation of art may be relatively motivated (when it seeks to communicate, to arouse emotion, to show, to do something to another person) or it may be relatively unmotivated (when it is expressive rather than communicative, intrapersonal rather than interpersonal)"* (Maslow, 1970, p. 234). In fact,

Chap. 14 of *Motivation and Personality*, which further clarifies the distinction between coping as an example of purposive behaviour, and self-expression as an example of being-becoming acts, is called "unmotivated behaviour". To be fair, Maslow was also somewhat ambiguous concerning the existence of the basic need for expression, especially when it comes to the expression of artistic sentiments. In fact, some of his words could be understood as encouragement for the conceptualisation of general and universal self-expressive motivation, which in turn, according to Maslow, would result in a tremendous reconstruction of all existing motivational theory (p. 234).

Again, the aim of the present book is not to provide an accurate or thorough interpretation of Maslow's ideas. Regardless of Maslow's unsettling and ambivalent positions on the issue of self-expression, the reasoning in this paper suggests that in the very essence of the artistic feeling lies the notion of motivated self-expression that cannot be separated by such dichotomies as coping versus expression, communication versus expression, useful versus useless behaviour or intrapersonal versus interpersonal processing. It follows that the self-expressive motivation takes place every time an individual moves a body in a particular manner, picks up the brush or a pen, or any other given instrument, independently of success or the deliberate or instrumental intention to communicate some message, as long as the "self" is involved. From the motivational point of view, all activities, regardless of their value or worth, and in which the intimate thoughts and feelings of the self are organised around in some thematic declaration from the inside out, are considered to be governed by the expression motivational system. Whether it is possible or meaningful to describe an artist as talented or to call the product of such an activity as artistic achievement worthy of admiration or costly in terms of monetary value depends on the dubious processes of art evaluation in any given cultural or historical context. Such processes, although seemingly similar to expressive motives, often represent pure "politics" and are conceptually unrelated to self-expression motivation.

However, these postulations might be conceptually problematic as they imply that any form of self-expression might automatically be the subject of judgment and eventual feedback from other people. It is indeed unavoidable that products of self-expression are tested and confirmed by

means of responses that originate in the external world and are further modified by the facilitating and/or inhibitory mechanisms that develop during the feedback period. Nevertheless, the existence of powerful external regulatory forces does not diminish the existence of the original or underlying need to express the inner states. If the demands of self-expression are not satisfied in direct ways, the self will find alternative ways to relate to the world. Very often these alternative ways represent unfortunate solutions and give rise to a great variety of needs whose only function is to satisfy the imbalance in self-expression, or any given motivational systems, for that matter.

All in all, art is considered to be a prototype of self-expression motivation. However, as noted above, many different activities could easily be called artistic as they also are motivated by expressing the inner state. This should be the case regardless of success, talent or public recognition for what these artistic acts produce. Without self-expression motivation many ideas and emotions would simply remain buried in the artist (i.e. people in general) without ever being transferred to visible forms. More dramatically perhaps, we could say that humans could exist merely by controlling and belonging, but without expression we would have limited knowledge about the way we are, who we are and who we could be in terms of variations of behavioural manifestations.

Fundamental Motivation: The Theoretical Requirements

I realise that I have not yet managed to convince the critical reader about the importance of expressing the self in terms of motivation. Considering the relatively weak (i.e. non-existent) position of self-expression in the current literature, the necessary next step would be the attempt to accumulate evidence and show that there indeed are grounds for postulating that self-expression is a fundamental human motivation. This raises some interrelated questions: what is fundamental motivation? What are the requirements and definitional boundaries that set the standard according to which any concept of fundamental motivation has to be compared? And more importantly, does self-expression satisfy these criteria?

Baumeister and Leary (1995, p. 498) offer useful theoretical directions and postulate eight criteria that must be satisfied if any concept can be called a fundamental human motivation. The criteria set boundaries for the concept of motivation as a general domain in which the variety of the particular goal-oriented behaviour evolves. These authors argue that fundamental motivation should (1) be able to operate in a wide variety of settings and readily produce effects without the requirement of highly specific or supportive circumstances, (2) have affective consequences, reflect subjective importance and guide emotion, (3) direct cognitive processing, reflect subjective importance and guide cognition, (4) show that satisfied needs promote adjustment and health of the general well-being and unsatisfied needs result in pathology, (5) elicit goal-oriented behaviour and once a goal is reached it should reduce the need for pursuing that goal, (6) be universal in the sense of applying to all people, (7) not be derivative of other motives and (8) affect a broad variety of behaviours. Thus, the important question is Does self-expression motivation fulfil these requirements? The next section will briefly address this question.

Evaluation of Requirement One

The first requirement states that fundamental motivation should be able to operate in a wide variety of settings and readily produce effects without the need for highly specific or supportive circumstances. The key point that supports the requirement that self-expression motivation should possess no need for supportive circumstances is visible in the involvement of the "self" in human action. According to Deci and Ryan (1991, p. 274), the processes of the self are fundamentally motivational. These authors maintain that "*actions that emanate from the self are experienced as spontaneous and volitional because they stem from processes that reflect the most vital and integral aspects of one's personality*". This can be associated with Allport (1943, p. 459), who maintains that "*…(self)-involvement, or its absence, makes a critical difference in human behaviour*". Thus, it follows logically that existence of self-consciousness (i.e. awareness of the self) is enough to trigger the wide range of behaviours that are not directly related to or dependent on the support of other fundamental

motivations. Furthermore, the acts of self-expression represent an example of behaviour that is relatively effortless and easily achieved with the common aim of establishing the communication with some external reality, either directed towards interpersonal and group relations or mere expressions of internal states in the form of ideas and emotions. Various forms of artistic tendencies, regardless of initial talent, are easily traceable in the wide variety of settings and are often expressed with no apparent or external provocation. Anthropological studies reveal the existence of a number of different rituals, customs and ceremonies in various cultures around the world where emotions and ideas are spontaneously exhibited. People also tend to insist on their own ideas and worldviews despite the lack of public recognition or stimulation, or the presence of other incentives. Moreover, people persist in expressing their views, even in possibly risky situations where their own lives are threatened or where they might lose interpersonal and group affiliations. Research shows that the mere chance of expressing inner states of personal importance occurs even in the absence of social feedback (Czajka, as cited in Pennebaker & Chung, 2007). Thus, there are good arguments to suggest that people do not need supportive circumstances to express their inner states. Although the expressions of self tend to vary in strength and uniqueness, and may appear in a variety of forms, these expressions are nevertheless relatively easy to make without the need for external provocation, specific instrumentality or purpose.

Evaluation of Requirements Two and Three

The second and third requirements state that fundamental motivation should (2) have affective consequences, reflect subjective importance and guide emotion and (3) direct cognitive processing, reflect subjective importance and guide cognition. One of the experimental procedures that explicitly aim to study the manner in which inner states in the form of emotions and cognitions are communicated is the expressive writing paradigm (Pennebaker & Beall, 1986). A number of studies over the years show that expressive writing and self-disclosure that involve emotional topics are associated with significant reductions in distress

(see meta-analytic review in Smyth, 1998). Although this is certainly true for the treatment of traumatic experiences, the studies also show that under some specific conditions the act of expressive writing about one's own emotional states has a positive effect, not only on mental states, but also on academic achievement and performance (i.e. cognition). For example, experimental procedures show that people who are given the chance to write about their thoughts and emotions on losing their job were re-employed more quickly than those who wrote about non-traumatic topics, or who did not write at all (Spera, Buhrfeind, & Pennebaker, 1994). Similar research also shows that other kinds of expression, such as talking into a tape recorder, also positively influence moods and cognition, as long as people are allowed to discuss topics of personal significance (see the overview in Pennebaker & Chung, 2007). The surprising point in expressive writing research is the noticeable absence of underlying motivational agents that have been postulated to explain these effects. In fact, according to Pennebaker and Chung (2007) there is no single reason that explains the effectiveness of expressive writing. Even though, as in the search for any causality, this certainly represents a complex issue, one of the simple explanations as to why expressive writing and disclosure positively influence general well-being could be attributed to the effect of being able to express personally significant emotional energy. In many ways, this postulation is in accordance with other theories in the current literature stating that a primary component of emotional response is the motivation to express oneself (Baumeister & Tice, 1987). Considering this apparent absence of theoretical postulations that might explain the effects of disclosure and writing on human functioning, the conceptualisation here of self-expression as a fundamental human motivation seems to represent a fairly good candidate that can explain why there is a positive outcome when people are allowed to express themselves. This implies that essentially many forms of expression involving free manifestation of emotions and cognitions would have a similar effect. In fact, finding the proper means of expression of previously blocked emotions is traditionally taken to be a basic step in achieving therapeutic change and the grounds for activation of cognitions needed to carry out these changes (Ullrich & Lutgendorf, 2002). The process of self-disclosure is also found to be related to the ease or difficulty associated with processing information

(Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). In other words, the effortlessness of cognitive processing promotes the willingness to disclose information that is not commonly known to others. It has been postulated in the literature that the basic process of self-disclosure revolves around the process of "making the self known to others" (Jourard & Lasakow, 1958, p. 91). Considering that self-expression is an intimate and fragile process, the information that is revealed must always undergo a cognitive processing inspection. Nevertheless, although the disclosure of personally relevant inner states might be risky in terms of being emotionally upsetting or hurtful, this process has a clear positive effect on the quality of various interpersonal (Collins & Miller, 1994) and group relations (Ensari & Miller, 2002; Turner, Hewstone, & Voci, 2007).

In concluding requirements two and three, it should be noted I do not suggest that any form of emotional and cognitive expression, under all conditions and circumstances, is advisable and beneficial for human functioning. Certainly, more research is needed if we are to understand the effects of the expression of inner states under various conditions. This complex issue represents, nonetheless, a qualitatively different type of analysis. The main point here is centred on providing arguments stating that (1) many processes (e.g. self-disclosure, expressive writing, self-actualisation and so on) previously considered to be somewhat separate issues could be united under one common underlying motivation for self-expression and (2) in relation to requirements two and three, self-expression is always a complex interplay of emotion and cognition. The existence of self-expression is able to account for many apparent paradoxes of human action and even self-destructive human tendencies. For example, it is common knowledge that emotionally based and cognitively formed ideas might frequently be expressed with strong passions even when such expression is not the most advisable strategy. From the motivational point of view, it is difficult to explain why, historically, people have been prepared to choose death and severe punishment over suppression of their inner thoughts, convictions and feelings. Many works of art, either cave drawings or paintings in the museum, are created with no other purpose than to materialise the most intimate parts of the self. An artist or any other person has accumulated emotions and cognitions and is forced (i.e. motivated) to find the most convenient way

to capture and present his or her own inner world. Based on the above, it is easy to acknowledge that human beings are compulsively motivated to express and communicate emotions and thoughts (criteria two and three) and that this often happens without apparent external provocation or the existence of supportive circumstances (criterion one).

Evaluation of Requirement Four

The fourth requirement states that any fundamental motivation should show that satisfied needs promote adjustment and general well-being. Conversely, it is expected that unsatisfied needs associated with such motivation should result in pathology or difficulties in psychosocial adaptation. As argued in the previous point, self-expression motivation regularly governs a display of emotions and cognitions in any given moment during the developmental cycle. Although these kinds of sentiments might be centred on some major needs, such as art, and expressed in an unusual or talented manner, the basic expressive motive is also visible in every human activity, no matter how insignificant it may appear, in which the self is intimately engaged. It is perhaps a valid conclusion to make that people need recognition for their efforts, but it is also possible that people in general have the need to merely express their inner states. This process of autonomous expression is described in detail in many studies in the realm of self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1991, 2012). However, as noted above, the difference between the reasoning here and the basic premises of self-determination theory is that expressions of all kinds are rarely seen as being determined by internal causality alone. More importantly, in the framework here, the manifestations of expressive behaviour are frequently facilitated by the optimal effects of internal and external factors. Nevertheless, in extreme cases the prevention of expression might be damaging to general functioning. It is relatively well-documented that blocking emotions or thoughts from direct expression might have serious psychological and physiological consequences and detrimental effects on general well-being (e.g. see King & Emmons, 1990; also Greenberg, Wortman, & Stone, 1996). However, I again point out I do not suggest that any form of straightforward cathartic expression would necessarily

be beneficial, especially when it comes to clinical situations in which the explicit aim is to introduce therapeutic changes. In these cases, expressed experiences should probably be meaningfully framed, consciously examined and properly articulated if they are to have a positive effect on psychosocial well-being (see Whelton, 2004, for similar discussion; also King & Emmons, 1990). In other words, not all problems can be solved if only we could allow people to self-express. As noted above, although the expressive writing paradigm clearly produces some beneficial effects on general well-being from writing expression and disclosure, the paradigm also has studies that fail to obtain positive effects (for nuances considering inconsistency of results, see Pennebaker & Chung, 2007; also Smyth & Pennebaker, 2008).

Nevertheless, on general grounds, accumulated historical and contemporary evidence suggests that the suppression of basic needs may cause psychosocial problems, whereas free expression might improve mental and physical health (Esterling, L'Abate, Murray, & Pennebaker, 1999). Expression of the underlying distress or conflict has also been previously connected to various somatoform disorders. The communicative model of explanation of conversion (hysteria) establishes "*that conversion reactions 'talk'.... They are a cry for help, particularly among individuals who are reluctant or unable to talk about their emotional distress"* (see Rosenhan & Seligman, 1995, pp. 290–291). Thus, the communicative view suggests that people "communicate" their emotional distress through physical symptoms. Similarly, growing yet sporadic and relatively unorganised research suggests that self-expression in the form of artistic activities (i.e. painting, writing, playing music) plays a significant role in the recovery process of schizophrenic patients. Clinical studies suggest that even normal conversations with other people seem to play an important role in the general improvement of the illness. The extraordinary point, with clear relevance for the theory in this book is that the benefits of these conversations are recorded in part in situations that took place outside a structured therapeutic framework. Indeed, the signs of recovery were detected even after conversations with friends, acquaintances and treatment staff who had no formal therapeutic training, nor an explicit aim or strategy to achieve specific therapeutic effects (Topor, 2001, pp. 224–226). Self-expression motivation in reference to somatoform disorders is compatible

with a psychoanalytic point of view as well. Traditional psychoanalysis states that unconscious conflict causes anxiety and that blocking the expression from reaching consciousness results in physical symptoms. Recognition of the conflict and a conscious expression of it are considered to constitute the first step in the therapeutic treatment of the somatoform symptoms. All in all, it is argued here that self-expression motivation satisfies the fourth requirement of fundamental motivation. There is solid, yet poorly organised and sporadic evidence supporting the postulation that blocking or preventing the basic need for self-expression might cause serious psychological and physiological damage. Therefore, blocking the communication of the most intimate emotions and thoughts may in part play a causal role in a variety of neurotic behaviours, and push the individual towards loneliness, depression and perhaps even suicide.

Evaluation of Requirement Five

The fifth requirement states that fundamental motivation should elicit goal-oriented behaviour and once a goal is reached it should reduce the need to continue pursuing that goal. This point is theoretically very important and will be addressed in-depth in the next chapter where the analysis of underlying mechanisms will be presented and discussed. Therefore, I will provide here only some brief comments on this issue. On the previous point, I commented on differences between conceptualisations of intrinsic motivation (i.e. truly self-determined behaviour) and self-expression. Continuing this idea, the point that self-expression is frequently toned down by external feedback could be further emphasised. Despite the existence of the clear conceptual link between self-expression and intrinsic motivation, the connection between these concepts begins and stops at the locus of causality. In other words, many forms of self-expression, as with self-determined behaviour, might be autonomous and caused by truly intrinsic motivation. However, self-expression is still self-expression even though intrinsic and extrinsic influences are inevitably intertwined later in the causal chain. Self-expression does not exist in a vacuum and is dependent on a balance between internal self-expressive determinations and external modifiers. It follows that those behaviours

that are defined and understood in negative terms (i.e. the actions of Hitler) according to widely accepted standards might just as easily be propelled by expressive motivation as those that are consistently positively valued (i.e. the actions of Gandhi). We can also take another example and focus on addictive actions. Explaining addiction in terms of causality is a complex issue (for an overview, see Kovač, 2013). More specifically, the actions of an extremely addictive person are, per definition, not perceived as autonomous or self-determined and are most likely due to the fact that the locus of causality is externally situated. However, from the point of view I am using here, the actions of this person are motivated in part by self-expression in the sense that addictive motoric movements that lead to consumption or self-destructive behaviour represent the specific means of conveying the current status of internal states to the external world (social and non-social). This means that the internal versus external dichotomy, although certainly important when it comes to understanding human behaviour in general, has lower priority or primacy when the basic motivational processes are the subject of analysis. Thinking metaphorically once again, one could say that the "wind" of expressive motivation represents a basic energy that is constantly blowing whatever the nature of the manifested behaviour, and which might vary between being internally and externally caused, positive and negative and everything in-between. However, it should be noted that self-expression could certainly be seriously damaged in situations wherein external behavioural modifiers are extremely dominant. Thus, in these extreme cases it is not possible to make internal inferences if external forces are too influential.

In an attempt to further clarify the theoretical foundations of expressive motivation in relation to requirement five, one could also add that self-expression is expected to be conceptually related and to promote the general experiences of flow (Csikszentmihalyi 1991). The experience of flow is dependent on the optimal level of the two factors: skills and challenges. In other words, (increasing) the skill level has to be optimally related to (increasing) the challenges from the given activity. If the skills are too low and challenges too high, it is likely that the individual will give up on any behavioural commitment because the activity would be too difficult. In a similar way, if the skills are too high and challenges too low, people will not pursue the activity because it fails to stimulate

them (i.e. boredom). The behavioural acts that are propelled by self-expression motivation, either manifested through the display of fanatic religious convictions, artistic ideas or simply visible in fishing or gardening activities, promote communication as well as personal satisfaction with the given activity. These actions also provide people with a subjective (i.e. not necessarily objective) experience of freedom, frequently create experiences of "flow" and are adjusted by dispositional tendencies, skills, opportunities, feedback, success and other modifying mechanisms. Nevertheless and as noted above, these actions are not necessarily based on truly intrinsic causality. This means that although autonomy is important, it does not mean independence, implying that self-expression levels are always (hopefully optimally) controlled and therefore regulated by external input and feedback.

Evaluation of Requirements Six and Seven

Criteria six and seven are conceptually interrelated. The sixth criterion involves the always risky assumption of universality in the sense that assumed motivational tendencies should apply to all people. Criterion seven states that fundamental motivation should not be derived from any other motive, implying that such a process should represent the very first "domino piece" in the causal chain of behavioural initiation. Considering first criterion six, this specifically means that if we are to call a specific process, domain or phenomenon a fundamental motivator, people all around the world, regardless of their economic and social development, must show an identical or similar tendency. This also implies that such universal motivation should be relatively stable over time. Having such unyielding requirements in mind, it is reasonable to pose the question as to whether or not it is possible to talk about universal motivations that apply to all people regardless of situational, individual, cultural or historical variations. Although satisfying this requirement seems ambitious, I nevertheless believe there are sufficient grounds to claim that manifestations of self-expression, visible in shifting forms and appearances depending on specific cultural contexts or historical periods, are equally universal and stable over time. Thus, it is a matter of direct

experience and common observation that such activities as art, religious ideas, dance, music, various games and sports in which self-expression motivation characteristically play a part are an easily recognisable feature of every culture. On the other hand, I realise that postulations of this kind are too generic, and the supporting evidence too elusive such that we risk explaining everything and nothing. It follows that it is notoriously difficult to provide support for the universality of some assumed process. The best argument for universality of any given motive is often embedded in historical records and field studies. This kind of evidence firmly indicates that across the world, different species, historical times and scientific disciplines, there have been many interrelated behavioural manifestations that testify to the existence of fundamental motivation for self-expression. Indeed, in discussing what it takes to identify fundamental and general motives of human motivation, Friedman and Lackey (1991, p. 8) state that "*history, myth, legend, literature, biography, religion, economics, politics, sociology, anthropology, palaeoanthropology, our personal experiences and introspections, philosophy, and modern psychological findings are all likely and necessary places to search for our fundamental patterns.*" This postulation basically means that a search of this kind should not be limited to a specific database, scientific discipline, limited research area, results of meta-analyses or any other narrow parameter that might exclude important pieces of available knowledge.

A similar logic applies to criterion seven where it is stated that fundamental motivation should not be derived from any other motive. This criterion is also difficult to satisfy in terms of solid empirically based arguments. At this point I can only refer to the reams of literature on "self" and point out that several theorists have noted many self-processes in terms of self-involvement and expression of inner states are fundamentally motivational (Allport, 1943). For example, Tesser (2003, p. 284) underlines, *"Nothing in particular seems to be necessary to trigger the expression of our values. We seem to give our opinions and identify ourselves in various ways with no apparent provocation whatsoever".*

Weak as these arguments might be in terms of experimental evidence, what is suggested is that sometimes we must rely on first- and second-hand experiential knowledge and make inferences according to direct and indirect observations, computed probabilities and, above all, theoretical

assumptions. Fundamental motivations represent, as the wording implies, the basic and generic processes that indirectly shape human nature and behaviour. This implies that processes of this kind are too immense and consequently, per definition, not directly observable, assessable or measurable. When attempting to provide compelling evidence for the existence of these fundamental motivators, the starting point is only a directly observable behaviour and the ability to infer or postulate the existence of hypothetical underlying constructs that influence human action. Formally, this is certainly not a valid way of reaching conclusions, but as commonly known, the aim of comprehending the forest might in some cases be undermined by the excessive focus on the analysis of separate trees. All in all, the evidence for these two requirements exceeds the specificity of experimental procedures or particularity of some research design. Hence, it is difficult to find satisfactory evidence that will unequivocally support this requirement, paradoxically enough because it is reasonably evident and easily recognisable in recorded human history.

Evaluation of Requirement Eight

And finally, the eighth criterion states that fundamental motivation should affect a broad variety of behaviours. One of the starting points for the discussion here is that self-expression motivation is involved in every activity of the self, no matter how apparently insignificant it might be to the outside observer, where one is attempting to communicate inner states using various forms of expressive channels. Hence, a wide range of behaviours and life domains might be affected by self-expression motivation: religious actions, art, rituals, games, sports, music, dance and so on. Formulated in this manner, self-expression is thus considered to affect almost every domain of human functioning. Obviously, this formulation might present a theoretical problem. In particular, this suggestion opens for a discussion on the relation between motivational systems in terms of assumed original independency and a subsequent interdependency in formations of manifested behaviours. Considering the depth of this discussion, this point will be analysed in detail in Chap. 7 where critical theoretical concerns will be raised and commented on. The fundamental

connection between self-processes and human motivation in general is also visible in McCall (1963, p. 301) who claims that "*human motivation involves awareness of self not only after the operation of the motive or independent of the motive, but in the motive itself*". According to Csikszentmihalyi (1991), there is a close and ancient connection between religion, music, games and art as mediators of flow experiences. These activities are considered to be the most efficient way of establishing a connection with presumed supernatural forces and fundamental elements of life. They are also probably the oldest and most efficient way of providing meaning in human consciousness (Csikszentmihalyi, 1991). All in all, self-expression is the process that makes the "self" known and visible to others. The early distinctions in theory between the "self as knower" and "self as known" are not of relevance here, although it is tempting to conceptualise self-expression in terms of self-agency produced by "I" (James, 1890). Nevertheless, the point is that expression of the self in terms of inner processes participates in the formation of many different behavioural manifestations that are not merely governed by control or affiliation needs. If people's behaviour is merely a matter of belonging or control, cultures and human actions would be much more constant and uniform. In other words, the apparent diversity of human actions would be far less colourful without the existence of the self-expression motivation.

Concluding Comments on the Chapter

It is clear that the conceptualisation of self-expression and the attempt to convincingly persuade the reader that this process indeed represents fundamental human motivation is one of the biggest challenges in this book. Hence, it is easy to acknowledge that the presented arguments, in comparison to other candidates for fundamental motives, such as control and affiliation, are relatively weak. Moreover, an understandable criticism might be aimed at the somewhat-elusive conceptualisation of self-expression and relatively weak arguments for its existence. Although these shortcomings could possibly be attributed to a lack of competence on my part, this is not, it is fair to say, entirely my fault. My job of collecting convincing arguments was not difficult when it

came to control and affiliation. Although the previous chapters contain several novel and perhaps contentious postulations, the amount of existing literature that supports the general idea of control and affiliation being fundamental motivations is overwhelming. This has hardly been the case with self-expression. As noted, not only has this term not previously been considered as a good candidate for a new motivational concept, there actually are postulations that explicitly state self-expression is useless in terms of providing a deeper account of human action. It is possible to name four possible reasons why self-expression is a neglected variable in psychological theory. First, the nature of self-expression is indeed elusive as it is conceptually dependent on the existence of another elusive concept, namely the notion of the "self". Although the advances in theoretical conceptualisations and empirical investigations of the "self" are indeed impressive over the past five decades, the motivational aspects of self-expression are still difficult to study in ways that will satisfy the rigorous requirements of the contemporary research process. Thus, it is possible the analysis of the underlying motivations that are the impetus for various forms of human expressions, even though they are representing truly universal features of human nature, are so obvious that they are taken for granted. Second, many social processes that are linked to control and affiliation have behavioural consequences that are in many ways more important to society than the results of self-expression. The issues of self-expression that are similar to self-actualisation, curiosity and autonomy, might sound like a "luxury" problem for many people who struggle with fundamental issues in life. Third, the core underlying idea of self-expression is not totally non-existent in the current literature. Indeed, it would be rather odd to give the impression that I have suddenly invented an entirely new concept that has been completely overlooked by other researchers. Although I have commented on this point earlier, the importance of this argument prompts me to repeat again: the core reasoning of self-expression and its subsequent effects are "hidden", "masked" or portioned behind a number of similar processes, such as self-actualisation, self-disclosure, autonomy and so on. All in all, I argue that organisation of the specific needs comprising self-expression motivation are nearly identical to those of control and affiliation, but the elusive nature in which self-expression

is manifested makes it difficult to formulate this postulation in a credible manner. This means that people would be more willing to "buy" or "see" this idea in the realm of affiliation motivation where it is intuitive that the process of attachment is, for instance, conceptually related to the manner in which adult relations are established and maintained. Thus, it is much easier to make a theoretical link between the needs in the affiliation or control system than is the case between the needs that comprise self-expression motivation.

And fourth, from the evolutionary point of view, it is possible to argue that the needs comprising the self-expression motivational system are the "youngest" needs in human development. This is logical when we take into account that the human need for self-expression is dependent on having the "self" in sufficient quantities. After the sensation of "self" (consciousness) is created, there is an inborn urge to convey emotional states and ideas from inside out. As noted above, the central point is that the motivation for expression is considered to be a common process for all people in the sense that self-expression will emerge whether the person possesses a highly developed self or not. It is enough that he possesses "self" in sufficient quantity. All behaviours that are propelled by self-expressive motivation serve the function of establishing communication between the individual and the external world through the expression of the inner states (i.e. emotions and cognitions). The further development of self-expressive impulses is commonly shaped by the facilitating and inhibitory responses of the social and non-social world, that is, the existence of fortunate and unfortunate feedback. Either way, the unfortunate theoretical possibilities are that (1) self-expression in historical terms represents a relatively new account of human actions and (2) the relation between needs that comprise self-expression motivation is far from being obvious, making it difficult to argue about the existence of one underlying fundamental motivation.

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6

The Mechanisms of Control, Affiliation and Self-expression

The Difference Between Processes and Mechanisms

In the previous chapters I have described the nature of the three fundamental human motivational tendencies: control, affiliation and self-expression. The structural organisation of these chapters and the general description of the aforementioned motivational systems were more or less similar in all three cases. The basic reasoning behind the postulation of fundamental motivations was relatively simple. I have basically argued that many similar needs in one specific life domain tend to interact, thus indicating the existence of one larger underlying process that unites these needs into one greater whole. I collected compelling evidence that supports this assumption and organised it in a discernible manner for readers. This book is predominantly descriptive in nature and focussed on the delineation of the main processes comprising the presumed motivational systems. Now it is time to address the question of difference between a simple description of motivational processes and identification of the mechanisms that govern these processes. Indeed, the given description of motivational tendencies has little to tell us about the mechanism(s) that

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organise and govern this apparent complexity. It follows that the description of the one particular process (e.g. attachment or achievement) might represent a quite different kind of theoretical approach than an analysis of the mechanisms that propel and determine the direction of these tendencies. To put it in a perhaps more complicated way, one could say that an analysis of mechanisms represents a way of analysing the "how" of "why", at least when it comes to the field of motivation. Descriptions of the one particular process, as are given in Chaps. 3, 4 and 5, are portrayals of the main components in the given system without necessarily identifying the tools or the machinery that are responsible for their execution. Thus, the notion of process represents a more generic term that denotes the description of the given system, the delineation of the different domains of which the system might consist and recognition of possible influences between the components. On the other hand, the notion of mechanism implies to a higher degree the identification of forces causing commotion in the system and the interaction between different parts with the aim of producing some effects. As a further illustration of the distinction between processes and mechanisms, let us examine a brief example, gravity, which incidentally also represents a powerful tendency that is not directly observable and must be inferred by the apparent effects on people and objects. People generally know what gravity does considering the easily observable effects of this force. The effects of gravity are also relatively easy to describe. The more complicated and in part still unanswered question in science is how gravity does what it does, meaning that the mechanism of gravity is still not clear-cut and well understood. As we know, there are several theories in the current literature, such as the curvature of space-time created by mass, the postulation that particles influence the relation between different objects and other more complicated theories. The analysis of this phenomenon goes beyond the scope of this book, as indeed it also certainly exceeds my competence in this particular area. Nevertheless, the main point here is that these types of analysis are per definition more difficult, and theoretically and empirically demanding, needing more than descriptions of directly observable effects. Furthermore, analyses of this kind also raise questions that we usually tend to ignore as being too obvious: why, for example, is there a need for affiliation? Where does this urge come from and what is it based

on? For most people, this is a rather superfluous and therefore somewhat unnecessary question. The answer, most likely, is that it is the way nature operates, the way things simply are. However, attempts to illuminate these theoretical issues are important when considering the possibility that the domino tiles that have been widely accepted as the first motivational forces in the complex chain of causality are perhaps not really the first initiators of human action as previously assumed.

Balanced Dual Tension

As I have noted above in many appropriate places, the complex field of motivation has many perspectives and scientific traditions. This complexity notwithstanding, it is possible to identify one sole process, or mechanism, as termed here, which repeatedly tends to surface and appear in various forms in different theoretical postulations throughout the history of human thinking. This mechanism is here called "balanced tension duality" and is assumed to be responsible for governance of human tendencies towards control, affiliation and self-expression. Obviously, this term is in need of further clarification. I will address first the notion of tension duality. Tension between dual forces refers to the workings of the two somewhat-opposite processes that pull or push an action in opposite directions. These processes can be contrary or conflicting (e.g. both are active but one dominates), competing (e.g. one wins at the end) and contradictory or contrasting (e.g. one is the flip side of the other). Either way, overt behaviour is frequently the result of such dialectic tension. These descriptions are easily recognisable for most people, considering that the struggle between some kinds of opposites represents a fairly ordinary fact of life. Therefore, it is not surprising that these kinds of tensions have been mentioned in various forms by many theorists in the past. In fact, I believe it is possible to state that this exact theme, and the multiple variations of it, is one of the most mentioned ideas in the history of thought. As such, descriptions of the conflict and competition between opposing forces is traceable in all types of academic disciplines and represents a popular account of the motivational dynamic that organises human existence. For example, one of the most common and

recurring motives in Eastern philosophy is the idea that human behaviour is driven by passions or desires of the flesh that have to be controlled if pain is to be avoided. By taking a Buddhist "middle way" that ranges between control over physical impulses of the body and the deep development of the internal world through meditation and contemplation, the individual has the chance to enter a "state of being" where initial motivational forces are reduced to a minimum. In this state of "nothing", one is able to truly see "everything" and the quantity of deep pain is equal to the presence of euphoric pleasure; both are absent or at least visibly restrained. Only then, according to the general Eastern philosophical heritage, can one fully participate in the world with "open eyes". The management of internal contradicting forces and execution of control over self and environment is achieved by reducing the experience of the (deceitful) external reality to a minimum. This is a paradox in itself in which the need for self-realisation and achievement is satisfied through non-development and by not pursuing the impulses and the possibilities that the illusion of external reality offers. Pleasures of life and temptations are considered to be beautiful sirens that eventually will lead the individual metaphorically to the bottom of the sea. Although the heritage of Eastern philosophy is impressively large with the important differences between the various philosophical systems that certainly exceed the present simplification, the notion of the two opposite forces is clearly visible in many theories and very much in evidence in such concepts as yin and yang in Taoism and Confucianism. In addition to Eastern philosophies, the same or at least similar idea is figuratively and frequently described in Western myths and stories about crossroads and choices between tempting alternatives, such as the stories about the tempting voices of sirens luring sailors into lethal traps or the challenges of the sea where they must navigate between two dangerous alternatives. Popular dramatizations of the strong internal conflicts are also frequently presented as a quarrel between angel-like and devil-like creatures standing on the shoulders of the confused actor and persuading him, with equally strong arguments, to undertake a particular behaviour. Ordinarily, the proffered courses of action represent choices between short-term pleasures and long-term benefits. Regrettably, this temporal conflict is often resolved in favour of the short-term goals wherein people often succumb to the temptation of

immediate gratification and exhibit weakness of will (Ainslie, 2001). In fact, one could easily argue that these kinds of struggles represent universal themes that have their origins in the ancient views of human nature. For example, Plato divided human nature into the two opposing forces represented by the senses and the passions. The metaphor of man's will controlling a carriage with two horses, black (passion and impulse) and white (cognition), is quite picturesque and easy to remember. Horses can work together or struggle against each other, either each pulling in its own direction or one of them dominating the other. Either way, the notion of dualism is assumed. Based on our fairly rich historical heritage, it is not surprising to discover there are now many contemporary theories that all, in one way or another, advocate the existence of the relatively simple process in which the notion of dual tension is important.

Second, I implied that all kinds of dual tension tend towards balance over time. This is the traditional understanding of this process in both the historical and contemporary literature. The tendency towards balance is also commonly known and easily observed in daily life in the sense that the dualistic tension is ordinarily not won by any separate force, although in extreme cases one of these tendencies might dominate. The sum result of human effort is frequently a balance between opposing forces concerning the areas of controlling life domains, establishing and maintaining affiliation bonds and expressing the self. Therefore, average human existence tends to be rather balanced, producing a form of relative behavioural stability that is interrupted by sporadic disturbances. The notion of balance is conceptualised in the literature in many different ways. Some theorists refer to these processes as tension reduction (Freud, 1893), others use the terms drive discharge or tension reduction (Hull, 1943), psychological equilibrium (Murray, 1938; Piaget, 1977), hydraulic (Lorenz, 1950; McDougall, 1923) or homoeostatic principles (ethology theory represented in the work of Lorenz (1937/1957) and Tinbergen (1951), equanimity (Shaver & Mikulincer, 2007, p. 653), compatibility (Kagan, 1972), optimal stimulation (Deci & Ryan, 1985), or merely balance (Heider, 1958; Lewin, 1935), consonance (Festinger, 1957) or the Buddhists' "middle way". All in all, the majority of the theories point out that the desired outcome is a state of balance wherein the initial deprivation levels of the need, instinct, drive, erg, propensity

or cognitive structures are stabilised and the experience of arousal, either psychological or physiological in nature, is reduced to some controllable level. For instance, in psychoanalytic tradition it is originally assumed that instinctually charged action commonly leads towards tension reduction (drive discharge) and is governed by a process commonly known as the "hydraulic" model (see also Lorenz, 1937/1957; McDougall, 1923). Support for the postulation that dual tension is indeed balanced over time is even found in humanistic and cognitive theories. For example, anxiety that is considered to be related to the degree an individual feels conditionally or unconditionally loved represents, according to Rogers (1951), an obstacle that impeded personal growth and self-realisation. He believed that in order to experience growth, an individual must balance between taking into consideration the feelings of others and following his own "inner voice". Similarly, but using completely different terminology, Piaget (1977) describes equilibrium as a balancing or self-regulating process that occurs between human internal cognitive structures and environmental inputs. The individual must produce a certain response, either physical or mental, or a combination of both, to achieve balance. In this view, the achievement of balance represents an ongoing process whereby the assimilation and accommodation of external inputs is relatively constant and frequent in people's lives. This Piagetian view could also be related to Kagan (1972) who maintains that the reduction of uncertainty, motivated by a deeper need for knowing, is created by incompatibility between different structures or inputs. In this perspective, the notion of cognitive conflict and its resolution in terms of reaching consonance or equilibrium is also underlined. Thus, it is clear that the idea of some sort of equilibrium or balance represents a popular and widely applied theme when attempting to explain human action.

Below I will give a brief presentation and attempt to catalogue some of these processes that are conceptually related to the notion of balanced dual tension. By brief presentation I mean that only a few of the most typical representatives, distributed across a prolonged historical line, will be mentioned here. It is also important to underline that a classification of these processes is far from being absolute, meaning that all subsequent dual categories merely represent a different conceptualisation of the same mechanism. In other words, although presented in different forms and

sometimes belonging to completely different theoretical traditions, the common denominator underlying the basic reasoning of all of these theories is the idea that there are two opposite motivational forces that (1) evoke the initial commotion in the given system and (2) achieve eventual stabilisation (the system tends to become less disturbed and more balanced over time). Therefore, such achieved balance organises and governs human action.

Balanced Dual Tension: Different Names for the Same Underlying Mechanism

The first basic classification of human motives in terms of balanced dual tension to be presented here is the division between **primary or physiological** (hunger, thirst, sex) and **secondary or psychological** (achievement, power) motives. The idea that human anatomy is formed and eventually shaped by the nature-nurture interaction is strongly embedded in the literary legacy of the past. In other words, the conflict between mind and body represents a popular idea that is often echoed in the history of motivational explanations. In historical terms, this kind of dualism has frequently been associated with Plato and Descartes. The position of later theorists on this issue has predominantly been focussed on elaboration of this basic dual division and dividing it into such subgroups as mind versus brain or mental versus physical states. The relation between human physiology and psychology is in many ways the background for the eternal discussion on the relation between the **affect and cognition** or the emotion (i.e. affect involving appraisal) and reason. As noted, Eastern philosophy has a tendency to be sceptical about desires of the flesh and the influences of emotions. In the Western line of thought, although the essence of the problem is the same, the general approach is quite different. William Faulkner (1939) said, "*Given the choice between the experience of pain and nothing, I would choose pain. Given a choice between grief and nothing, I'd choose grief*". Conflict between emotion and cognition, will and passion, sense and sensibility, mind and body, are easily traceable motives in the large quantity of scientific theories as well as in the literature. Some philosophers, for example, Hume (1739/1888, p. 415),

surprisingly gave prominence to the emotions by saying, "*reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them",* irritating thus a number of rationalist philosophers and the view that people are guided by conscious thought. Nonetheless, in Western tradition, reason is highly valued, especially considering that cognitive activities are in agreement with powerful religious systems wherein humans are viewed as creatures of will and sense.

The second widely popular theme concerning dual tension is the friction between the forces acting from within and the forces influencing human action from without. Thus, in the search for the behavioural roots of any specific action, it is possible to focus on the processes that act on the person (**external**) as well as the forces that act within the person (**internal**). Considering that this twofold perspective on human motivation is easily recognisable and intuitive, it is not surprising to learn that the dualistic tension between external incentives and internal determinations is a well-documented research area. However, the theories that include this perspective are not concentrated on one particular theoretical field but rather scattered across different disciplines and paradigms. As noted in Chap. 2, Lewin (1935) argued that human action is best understood as an interactive result between the personal characteristics of the individual and the nature of the given environment in the sense that environment is influenced by the function of personality and vice versa, that the emergent personality is a function of the environment. The individual's existence is then sandwiched between forces acting from within and forces acting from without, resulting in the state of psychological tension. Lewin postulated that this tension is resolved through the existence of a dynamic balance that is dependent on the relative strength of opposite forces in the given field. In other words, Lewin sees that the concept of balance has a central position, stating that the interaction of two opposing sets of forces (i.e. driving forces and restraining forces) might be disturbed but eventually tend to settle into equilibrium or achieve a balanced state if none of the specific forces dominates.

The very same idea, yet formulated in a more abstract manner, is visible in a basic humanistic view on human nature. The main premise in the majority of today's humanistic theories is the belief that humans are good in nature but that consequent development, self-realisation and

growth are inhibited by various social and cultural conditions. This position certainly does not represent an entirely novel idea as similar theories were postulated a few hundred years earlier. The general idea of the conflict between innate human tendencies and the nature of the contextual features in many ways echoes Rousseau (1755/1967, p. 5) when he said that *"man is born free, and he is everywhere in chains"*. Consequently, a large number of theories have in one way or another attempted to explain human behaviour as a result of the clash between two these two profoundly opposite processes. On one end of this continuum, we find a number of postulations that promote the importance of innate tendencies, such as growth and self-actualisation (Maslow, 1970), fundamental needs (Deci & Ryan, 2000) learning/mastering goals (Ames & Archer, 1988; Dweck, 1986) and many others. These influences are traditionally described in positive and virtually idealised and romanticised terms. On the other end of this continuum, we find external feedback functioning as "reality-check" forces in the sense that they tend to impede these celebrated innate human characteristics. As expected, these are usually described in negative terms in the sense that they are perceived as representing an impediment to free development. Moreover, considering that "positive" forces are portrayed as something deeply embedded in human nature (i.e. internal), the description of "negative" forces is often represented as the influence of external attributes that reside in the given context or the nature of externally produced feedback the individual receives, such as the effects of reinforcements in the rich behavioural tradition.

Perhaps the most elaborate and persuasive voices on the relation between internal and external determinants of human actions are those of Deci and Ryan (2000). Over the years the self-determination paradigm has provided compelling and sound theoretical reasoning and also solid empirical evidence that clearly shows the circumstances under which internally initiated actions in terms of causality are beneficial for general well-being (see the overview in Vansteenkiste & Ryan, 2013). Although this theory is open to criticism, as it is one-sided and normatively built, their studies almost unanimously show that need-supportive environments, such as those that provide meaningful choice, stimulate curiosity and encourage exploration are indeed closely associated with autonomy, authenticity and intrinsic motivation, and further down the line, with

general well-being. Not surprisingly, self-determination reasoning perceives all types of contingent rewards, either in the form of material compensation or critical evaluation and social feedback, as potentially in need of being thwarted, as they have a diminishing effect on truly intrinsic motivation and self-determined behaviour.

The third alternative way in which dual tension is frequently presented in literature is the understanding of motivation as a "**push**" or "**pull**" force. In general terms, push motives refer to internal changes that set behaviour in motion, while pull motives are typically represented as external goals that influence behaviour. The psychoanalytic tradition is full of references to this type of dual tension. For example, Alfred Adler (1933/1979) maintains that the development of personality is driven (i.e. pushed) by the emergence of inferior feelings. The sensations of inferiority are expected considering children's total dependence on support from primary caregivers. Such uncomfortable and unpleasant starting points produce a striving for accomplishment that tends to pull people towards the attempt to reach various targets, and eventually success. Again, the notion of personal growth, as opposed to thwarted development, is clear. A characteristic feature of the healthy person is then visible in the striving towards self-realisation and growth, simultaneously escaping and battling the feelings of inferiority that are pushing from below. Similarly, Freud's final basic view of human nature is also framed in terms of twin forces pulling and pushing the individual in two opposite directions. The struggle between life instincts and death instincts results in the need for tension reduction. The conflict between positive (i.e. approach) and negative (i.e. avoidance) needs in Murray's personology theory also leads to a push and pull tension. Needs that are based on desires tend to push individuals in a certain direction while the effects of aversive needs function as a force that pulls people away from specific targets. As with some other theorists (e.g. Lewin, 1935), Murray did not see "need" as a static concept but more as the result of both internal and external forces acting upon the individual.

Fourth, the dual motivational tension is often portrayed as the human tendency to decrease the distance to the desired object (i.e. **approach**) and equally strong readiness to avert contact with some entities (i.e. **avoidance**). The variety of different behavioural patterns over time

is established in the region of balancing predominantly positive experiences of approaching a desired object or psychological state with predominantly negative sensations of avoiding unpleasant stimuli. Hence, it is not surprising to learn that many researchers have been fascinated, in one or another way, by the human quality of **seeking pleasure and avoiding pain**. Different theories use different terms, such as expectancy, pleasure, reward and reinforcement, but in essence the basic principle is the same. In general terms, the main assumption of all these theories is that there is a hedonistic continuum with pleasure on one end and displeasure on the other. In between is a neutral zone where stimuli have no pleasant or unpleasant properties. Experiences that awaken pleasant reactions are associated with approach behaviour while experiences that awake unpleasant reactions are found to be associated with avoidance behaviour. With repetitive actions, which are logically enough directed towards seeking pleasant stimuli, learning and habit are commonly established. Thus, an organism is motivated to learn behaviour that results in pleasure and avoids behaviour that results in displeasure. Examples of hedonistic tendencies in the philosophical heritage of the ancient Greeks can be found in the ideas of Democritus and Epicurus. Later in history, Hobbes, Spencer, Benthram and Mill underlined the pleasure-pain relation in their own way. With the development of psychology as a distinct scientific field, the idea of hedonism as a powerful modifier of behaviour was even more pronounced, although appearing in different forms. Some theorists, such as Murray (1938), believed that an individual is not seeking pleasure, but rather the avoidance of pain or some aversive consequence of an action. These somewhat gloomy views on human nature are also underlined in the work of Plato, Kant and Schopenhauer. As an ultimate pain avoidance tendency, it is worth mentioning the Buddhist line of reasoning in which all stimuli originating from the illusion of external reality are considered to be possible sources of pain. However, whatever the specific conceptualisation, the tendency towards achieving an individually based middle ground between maximising positive outcomes and avoiding the state of deprivation is a key point in both historical and contemporary literature. In fact, the idea of hedonism and the corresponding variations of the same theme could easily qualify as one of the three most frequently mentioned mechanisms in the history of human thinking.

Fifth, this hedonistic line of reasoning is the theoretical background for the development of the widely popular notion of the multiplication of expectancy and value, in which the strong cognitive, rational and purposive components are underlined. In this view, behaviour is seen as the result of two interactive processes. The first denotes the individual expectations of achieving a certain goal. The second refers to perceptions of value in relation to reaching that particular goal. The net result of this interaction is in many cases the state of optimal balance between these two processes.

If the notion of balanced dual tension is understood in the wider sense, the list of theoretical postulations that qualify to be included is close to never-ending. For instance, the idea of dual processing in the field of psychology is a well-developed area with many interrelated specific, yet strikingly similar, conceptualisations. Compatible evidence has been accumulated over the years in support of two distinct processing modes that shape human behaviour. This approach has resulted in a number of dual-process theories, including systematic and heuristic processing (Chaiken, 1980), central and peripheral route (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), deliberative and automatic attitude formation (Fazio, 1986), effortful processing and automatic stereotyping (Devine, 1989), rule-based and associative reasoning (Sloman, 1996), rational and experiential thinking (Epstein, 1991), rule-based and associative memory systems (Smith & DeCoster, 2000), reflective and impulsive systems (Strack & Deutsch, 2004) and indeed many more. Recently, this theme has been further developed by theorists interested in self-regulation in terms of motivational and behavioural ambivalence or conflict (Ainslie, 2001; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Rachlin, 2000). This situation commonly implies the existence of two parallel processes, namely the desire/intention to stop doing/feeling/thinking about something, and the urge/desire/intention to continue in the very same manner. Regrettably, it is a well-known fact that these mixes of optimistic desires, plans and intentions are often unstable; that is, people often fail to act on their intentions (Sheeran, 2002). In other words, the cognitive abilities that enable people to value larger delayed rewards are frequently undermined by the presence of automatic and emotional processes that accentuate the value of immediately available smaller rewards. Nevertheless, most people manage to

successfully combine the effects of these two somewhat-opposite processes, implying the possibility that automaticity and deliberation jointly guide human action and produce both success and failure (see Kovač, 2012, for this discussion).

Balanced Dual Tension in Control, Affiliation and Self-expression

In this section, I will attempt to show that balanced dual tension is the dominant mechanism of motivational tendencies towards control, affiliation and self-expression. One way of accentuating the role of balanced dual tension in all three systems is through the relation to the mechanisms of satiation and substitution. Baumester and Leary (1995) point out that these mechanisms are some of the most important criteria for any fundamental motivation. The widely accepted premise is that all true motivations have their optimal levels and once these levels are obtained or satisfied, the individual should not be motivated to invest any additional energy in obtaining the intended goals, or at least show reduced effort. In relation to control motivation, this means that having too much control might prevent people from pursuing the goals or reacting to incentives that are normally used to satisfy control needs. Indeed, McClelland (1987) concludes that power motivation can be aroused in those individuals who have little to start with, but will reduce the power motive of those who had a strong motive to begin with. It follows that once emotional security, power or ultimately control is achieved, a commitment to actions leading towards a balancing of the general sense of control should be reduced. Following and developing a similar idea, Deci (1975) provides a review of theories that focus on optimal stimulation. He suggests that the need to feel competent and self-determining motivates two kinds of behaviour: behaviour that seeks optimal challenge and behaviour that "conquers" challenge. Behaviour is thus maintained on the optimal level by opposing processes: factors facilitating behaviour and factors inhibiting behaviour, or in other words, by achieving a balance between induction and reduction of a given stimulation. The optimal level of the motivating states that in turn results in some form of balance

and relative stability is the important point that is characteristic of nearly all types of human action. This tendency is able to give nuances to the simple dichotomy stating that control or any other fundamental motivation is always good and people always need more of it, while no control, for example, is seen as directly bad. It also provides a partial explanation for the specific cases in which people actively seek less control or less contact with other people (Brehm, 1993). Previous experiences of control deprivation were found to influence how a person will respond to new situations even if they are unrelated to the actual source of the increase in the desire for control. To summarise the role of balanced dual tension in control motivation, I turn to Thompson (1993, p. 90) who said that "*in order to fully understand control motivation, we need also to understand forces that balance that motive and reduce the desire to have control*".

As in the control motivation, the needs that cluster and form the affiliation motivational system show a similar tendency towards balance and relative stability by means of achieving the optimal levels of stimulation. Most people show a preference for a few close interpersonal relations over a large number of less intimate relationships. In other words, people prefer to have a satisfactory balance between quality (intimate and close relations) and quantity (number of interpersonal relations) when considering the formation and maintenance of social ties. The development of a romantic relationship may, in a restrictive way, influence the motivation to interact with other people. People are also motivated to leave or break both romantic and friendship relationships if the possibility of making a new one is available (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). As with other fundamental motivations, the number of affiliation behaviours was studied in two different ways using the basic division between approach and avoidance tendencies. Approach affiliation refers to the establishment of "positive" needs, such as love, secure attachment and intimacy. Avoidance affiliation, on the other hand, refers to the fear of rejection and disapproval. Indeed, various attachment theorists have frequently described the smooth operation of the attachment system as a dynamic homeostatic process aiming to restore emotional equanimity (Shaver & Mikulincer, 2007, p. 653). For example, Fralay and Shaver (2000, p. 133) claim that "*the internal dynamics of the attachment system are similar to those of a homeostatic control system in which a 'set goal' is maintained by the constant*

monitoring of endogenous and exogenous signals and by continuous behavioral adjustment. In the case of the attachment system, the set goal is physical or psychological proximity to a caregiver". A similar process is later visible during the more mature developmental cycles in which the more complex interpersonal relations tend to emerge, along with the formation of various group attachments. The needs that comprise the affiliation motivational system have, inside its specific cultural frame, their optimal point that is commonly placed between dependency, on one hand, and individualisation of self on the other. Thus, in accordance with specific cultural norms, people tend to seek the optimal levels between belongingness and separation-individualisation (Blos, 1967; Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975). This tendency is also recognised in other theoretical frameworks in contemporary psychology. As noted above, according to optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer & Picket, 1999), which represents a theoretical extension of the social identity and self-categorization theory, human beings have two powerful motives: the need for inclusion (assimilation of the self into a larger collective) and a need for differentiation (distinguishing the self from others). A harmonious balance between the two extreme points of being an indistinguishable member of one certain group and being unique is usually desired and might be regulated by the person him- or herself, depending on situational circumstances and individual preferences. However, in some extreme situations, self-presentation strategies are not sufficient because social perception is frequently guided by stigmatising and prejudicial attitudes. All in all, balanced dual tension in a belonging system refers to the challenges of achieving the optimal proximity with others that permits free and self-determined development. This is concisely expressed by From (1956, p. 20) who claims, *"Love makes him overcome the sense of isolation and separateness, yet it permits him to be himself, to retain his integrity"*.

And finally, balanced dual tension is also visible in self-expression motivation. As noted above, self-expression is conceptually related to the basic sense of autonomy as formulated in self-determination theory. Although it is theoretically tempting to describe the expression of the self entirely in terms of intrinsic motivation and self-determining behaviour, neglecting extrinsic influences would cover only part of the behavioural range that is motivated by expression of the inner states. Thus, self-expression

motivation is unavoidably dependent on a balance between internal expression and external modifiers. The self-determination paradigm provides an important frame for understanding conditions that are beneficial to human functioning, but it is commonly accepted that real-life circumstances are rarely purely intrinsic. The pure internal locus of causality is only possible to find in conditions of total physical or psychological isolation where social feedback is completely absent. In any other conditions, people are doomed to be evaluated, judged and compared, and all of these reactions, critical or not, have a clear effect on further human functioning. Following this premise, it is then possible to argue that the one-sided stimulation of autonomy is perhaps not recommended or realistic as the best option for all people, regardless of individual characteristics and specific cultural framings. The recommended conditions would thus be those that establish the optimal level of expressive motivation, consisting of both internal causality and external feedback, and are suited or specifically designed for each individual person. Nevertheless, the notion of autonomy, pure intrinsic motivation and the internal sense of causality are important parts of self-expressive motivation. In other words, any optimal self-expression activity, either represented in the display of religious convictions, artistic ideas or simply fishing or gardening, promotes communication (clear or unclear), sense of growth or development (not necessarily a positive connotation as hate and moderate aggression can also be experienced as growth and development) and a subjective (not necessarily objective) experience of freedom and meaning.

Dual Tension and Balance: A Call for Nuances

I believe there is clear evidence to support the postulation that some form of dual tension is characteristic of human action in particular and human existence in general. As has been shown above, many researchers over the years have in one way or another incorporated this idea in their theoretical constructions. More recently, the notion of dual tension is theoretically coupled with the idea of balance or equilibrium. Establishments of this particular theoretical connection have origins in the general influences of natural sciences on all other types of scientific conduct and consequently

in the development of system and field understandings of human interaction. Thus, in historical terms, the increased attention on contextual aspects of human existence is (in)directly connected to paradigm shifts in the field of social sciences from atomistic understandings of people's behaviour based on personality dispositions to holistic interpretations of human action as a product of a multitude of factors (e.g. field theory by Lewin, 1943), systemic influences (e.g. ecological or contextual system theory by Bronfenbrenner, 2009) and cultural framings (e.g. cultural self-construal by Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Even though claiming that the idea of balance is a more recent development is somewhat arbitrary, it is irrelevant for the intentions here. The important point is that it is evident that ideas of balance and dual tensions are the themes that are constantly renewed and employed by thinkers from different traditions during the history of human thinking. I believe that the quantity of registered interest in these topics shows the strength of this argument. It is therefore surprising that less attention has been given to advances in knowledge relating to the possibility that different types of balanced dual tension exist and what role they might play in general human behaviour (for an attempt to explore the process of equilibrium, see Piaget, 1977). Hence, a number of fundamental questions considering this important subject have largely gone unanswered. Furthermore, there are questions connected to balanced dual tension that are not only left unanswered but rarely even discussed. The lack of literature on these nuances is the reason why this section is somewhat speculative in its approach and far less founded on compelling arguments, compared to Chaps. 2, 3, 4 and 5.

One, Two, Three or Many Different Forms of Balanced Dual Tension?

The literature review makes it clear that there are many different names for the mechanism of balanced dual tension. The number of works on this topic clearly reinforces the postulation that this mechanism is indeed essential for understanding human functioning in general. However, the next logical question arises: disregarding the variations in terminology, are we talking about one large underlying mechanism or are there several

types of this mechanism? In addressing this problem, I intend to divide this question into three interrelated critical issues. **The first one** concerns the variety of different types of underlying mechanisms that are mentioned in literature. Although I have argued that balanced dual tension is associated with all three motivational systems, consisting of control, affiliation and self-expression, the variety of descriptions of this mechanism invites a more nuanced analysis. In other words, it is fairly clear that a number of psychological processes might show some opposition to this theory, but it is not always clear what kind of opposition is in question. As noted above, these processes could be conflicting (both are active but one dominates), competing (one wins or has to win at the end), contrasting (one is the flip side of another) or have a causal connection (one creates or is created by the other). The example of conflicting dual tension could be the relation between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation wherein it is expected that human behaviour is influenced to varying degrees by both of them. The competing tensions are visible in situations wherein people have two different kinds of desire relating to future actions (Davis, 1984). On one hand, one might have an appetitive desire, such as the wish to sleep in early in the morning. On the other hand, one might also have a volitional desire, such as the wish to get to work on time. Frequently, this duality is resolved when one actually "wins" and the other "loses" (i.e. the individual chooses to sleep in a little longer, just enough to be late for work). The example of contrasting dualities in which there is a tension between different tendencies is visible in everyday actions and the relation between automaticity and deliberation. Thus, all people typically switch between these modes on multiple occasions during the day, depending on the difficulties with behaviour and the level of previous experience. The role of deliberation and automaticity in understanding human motivation and action has been at the centre of an ongoing debate over the past three decades (Ajzen, 2002). The main problem seems to be that intentional and automatic actions represent two contrasting aspects of human functioning and some theorists even suggest that these concepts are in effect counterparts in the sense that the existence of one precludes the functioning of the other (Triandis, 1977; but for a counterargument, see also Kovač, 2013). And finally, dual tension might also have attributes of causality. For example, opponent process theory, originally designed

as the psychological theory of motivation (Solomon & Corbit, 1974), posits that there are two opposing processes in terms of dynamics and organisation. The a-process is characterised by being intense, immediate and tolerant. The b-process appears as a reaction to the a-process and after the a-process has diminished. It is considered slow to increase and slow to abate, and tends to become more powerful with repeated exposure (Solomon, 1980). This general homeostatic principle in which two opposing processes tend to influence mutual emergence and consequently balance each other has been applied to addiction treatment, where it has been argued that initial drug-taking behaviour is similar to the a-process, where euphoric sensations are experienced, whilst a period without intake is a situation in which the system tends to reverse to a stand-by or middle ground position (see the overview in Kovač, 2013).

The existence of all these variations and different manifestations of balanced dual tension that are mentioned in the historical and current literature logically lead to the **second critical theoretical question:** is the same type of balanced dual tension present in all three of the proposed motivational systems? If so, what kind of balanced tension is it? In my attempt to address these questions in the following, I will (1) argue that motivational systems of control, affiliation and self-expression are governed by three different types of dual tension and (2) describe the nature of these differences. The analysis is based on the supposition that it is difficult to find a logical argument that precludes the existence of quite different mechanisms and is still in the realm of balanced dual tension. This is theoretically important considering that similarities between various types of balanced dual tension might erroneously prompt us to take for granted that this process is indeed the same in all three systems.

I begin my analysis by proposing that balanced dual tension in the control motivational system resembles the feedback process as described by Carver and Scheier (1998). In simplified form, the basic terms in the feedback process are the desired/intended goal, also called a reference point or a target, and one's location with respect to that goal. A comparison process, which could be seen as an innate human tendency to obtain control over the aforementioned control domains, reduces the discrepancy between the sensed value and desired standard. Thus, human behaviour is constantly regulated by the tension between the present states

or points and some remote points of reference, either by reducing the gap or actually strategically or impulsively moving away from the target (i.e. an approach-avoidance situation). This line of thinking is also explicitly embedded in homeostatic principles (Cannon, 1932) in the sense that the discrepancy-reducing process (i.e. moving towards) is considered to be constrained by discrepancy-enlarging actions (i.e. moving away), and the other way around. The problem is that this initially relatively simple process is multiplied by (1) the interaction of every single action in the control domains and (2) all levels of abstractions that each of these actions can contain, ranging from the very specific and concrete to the very abstract. This initial theoretical simplicity portrays a very complex picture of human behaviour as a system that contains an overwhelming number of interrelated components and possible trajectories. Hence, the number of possible human actions in any given moment is enormous, supporting the fact that human behaviour is notoriously difficult to predict, especially under prolonged timeframes that enlarge the number of additional variables in the equation.

All in all, the main point argued here is that a specific form of balanced dual tension that theoretically resembles the feedback process as described by Carver and Scheier (1998) underlies *all three domains of the previously described* ***control motivation***. Most goal-oriented behaviours, that is, those having an external point of reference or some form of standard, use all available resources to "chase" or "escape" from the target. The important point in this picture is that targets, whatever they are, are constantly moving (i.e. not static) as one approaches them. This would imply that the notions of thermostat or cruise control, which are frequently used to describe how the feedback process works, are not quite sufficient for explanations of human action. Most behavioural aims are dynamic in the sense that new targets immediately start to emerge after the previous one has been met. If the premise about constantly moving targets is true, then it might create a paradox in which the underlying "normal" state in balanced dual tension, considering control needs, is actually unbalanced rather than balanced. This imbalance is in turn balanced by the efforts, strategies, plans, resources and many other self-regulative strategies when it comes to human behaviour, or physical forces when it comes to natural phenomena. In other words, it is possible that an

imbalance, not a balance, represents a normal position, at least when it comes to understanding psychological processes. Assuming imbalance as a middle ground does not necessarily undermine the argument that dual tensions lean towards some kind of equilibrium. They in fact do, under the condition that some forms of external or internal efforts (i.e. human or physical forces) are active, turning this imbalance into balance.

What about the affiliation system? Do needs that comprise the affiliation system also follow the basic principles of feedback theory? I believe that it is possible to argue that the answer to this question is no. In other words and bearing in mind that some sort of dual tension is characteristic of all human behaviour, it is nevertheless possible to suggest that the affiliation system is governed by a slightly different form of regulation in terms of dualistic balancing forces, compared to the control system. As noted above, the characteristic of the control system is the constant balance or regulation between tendencies of moving closer (i.e. attracting forces) and moving away (i.e. repelling forces) in relation to given standards that are in constant movement as new targets are instantly created upon the achievement of the previous ones. Similarly, the main dynamics in belonging needs is also centred on attraction to the desired object (i.e. moving closer to a specific person or a group), including also the possibility for the state of repulsion (i.e. moving away). The noticeable difference is that processes describing affiliation motivation are predominantly attractive until they reach the point when entities come painfully close to each other. In these situations of extreme proximity, the opposite or balancing process is activated, and this regulates the distance between the entities on some optimal level. This means that although both control and affiliation involve attracting and repelling forces, the difference between them is that control is more about actually "catching" or "hitting" the target, while the affiliation mechanism starts reversing in the face of extreme proximity, before the target is "reached". Thus, despite the desire for extreme proximity (i.e. hitting, obtaining, or having the target), the target is never actually achieved, as might be the case in behaviours that are predominantly guided by control motivation. For example, people have an innate tendency to develop attachment, love, intimacy and closeness until the strength of this relation begins to be threatened by the increasingly developing private sphere and the notion

of individual self-conception. The postulation stating that there exists such a basic mechanism would allow one to account for the emergence of separation-individualisation processes in early childhood and later in adolescence (Blos, 1967; Mahler et al., 1975). This tendency is especially visible during the first individualisation process when young children clearly manifest the need to abandon their symbiotic relationship with their primary caregiver and seek a more distant yet still warm and proximal relationship, depending on their developmental maturity and other relevant influences. Later in life, this type of individually appropriate psychological distance and closeness with family members is continuously regulated according to internalised standards and the nature of their own self-conception (i.e. identity status), as described by attachment theorists. Clearly, there are situations in which individuals might have a tendency to manifest avoidance behaviour by increasing the distance to some social targets. In these cases, people will actively avoid other people, either in a direct physical manner or psychologically by expressing different attitudes or values. However, these behaviours, although sharing superficial similarity with affiliation motivation, are possibly governed by the control system. Thus, the signs of eventual repulsion in the affiliation system might be conceptually confused with a control need to balance interpersonal and group relations, as described in Chap. 2 and the section on power. The balanced dual tension of belonging needs is rather characterised by the possible danger of annihilation wherein one larger entity (e.g. one central person or a group of major significance) threatens to overwhelm the individual, while the individual typically reacts with unease to such a threat and is trying to escape his own identity obliteration by re-establishing his inner resources and developing a distinct, private and unique self-identity. The nature of this process is more or less described in the basic reasoning of optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1991).

All in all, I have so far proposed that the central characteristic of the control motivational system is similar to feedback loop regulation, including both enlarging and reducing loops and the constant attempt to "catch" or "hit" moving targets and standards. I have also proposed that the type of balanced dual tension that characterises affiliation motivation is somewhat different. On one hand, affiliation motivation is similar to control

motivation because it also mainly involves approach regulation in which people tend to seek constant proximity to one steady target of utmost significance (e.g. primary caregiver). On the other hand, however, the difference between these two types of balanced dual tension is the existence of a relatively strong repulsion force in affiliation motivation long before the point of the "target" is reached. As noted in the chapter on affiliation motivation, the present theoretical postulation is that the belonging process is regulated by having a relatively strong repulsion point where unpleasant proximity to a given entity is experienced, leading an individual to withdraw, either physically or psychologically, and obtain some optimal level of closeness. Thus, over time, people tend to develop a sense of their own existence, pushing the belonging relation to some optimal distance depending on individual characteristics of the involved actors, the type of communication and various contextual factors.

As the attentive reader by now probably can deduce, the same logic applies to the role of the assumed balanced dual tension in self-expression motivation, namely the postulation that the expression system is governed by the third form of dual regulation, compared to the control and affiliation systems. We can begin by saying that as with the two aforementioned types of balanced dual tension, the dynamics of self-expression motivation are also characterised by having the features of some sort of pursuit or direction towards some imaginary targets. As many theorists have pointed out in the past, people in general have a strong urge to explore and are interested in curiosity, play, expansion and growth. These innate and relatively straightforward propensities accurately describe the basic need to express the inner states, from inside out, according to one's own developmental stage and the specific situational or contextual position. This mechanism, similar to belonging and control, is predominantly characterised by approach tendencies. The one important aspect on which self-expression motivation differs from control and affiliation is the apparent aimlessness in the sense that this type of dual tension does not have a well-defined target to begin with. This would mean that this type of dual tension does not have a clear break or cessation point (satiation) when the target, standard or aim has been achieved as is the case with control motivation, or a repulsion point based on extreme proximity to some entity as is the case with belonging needs. The self-expression motivation

is always set to maximum expansion, and it is relatively constant over time. People tend to express their inner states to their best ability and according to given conditions. This sounds as if it should be a simple and straightforward process, and in some cases it is if the external conditions are fitting or stimulating. However, the clear problem is that maximum expansion is frequently limited by the effects of external determinants, as thoroughly described in self-determination theory. This does not mean, however, that external influences are always detrimental to expression. External influences, in some form or another, are the unavoidable fact of life and the inseparable part of human existence. When appropriately integrated in a harmonious manner (Vallerand et al., 2003), it is expected that such a combination of internal states and appropriate external conditions might have positive effects on behavioural expressions, especially in terms of achieving outstanding mastery in one specific domain and pushing one's own limits. Nonetheless, the postulation that sets the self-expression tendency to a maximum and constant expansion creates a theoretical problem, namely what, if any, are the opposing processes that balance this initial expression? It is possible to find indications that suggest that, although self-expression is relatively straightforward in terms of direction, a contra mechanism can be found that under some conditions might result in the opposite process of contraction. In some extreme cases and under the effects of powerful conditions, people might be caught in the state of thwarted expression. It is important to point out that states of contraction (i.e. prevented self-expression) are not only a matter of impeding and discouraging, nor are they merely strong and dominating influences that originate from external conditions. The contraction might be caused by having a genetic misfortune, or experiencing some sort of trauma either in the psychological or physiological sense. Either way, when expression is endangered or for various reasons impeded, the opposite contraction process might be activated and become potent, working from outside in, resulting in a reduction in the behavioural manifestations and less variety in expression. In fact, the consequences of the thwarted expression of inner states at its extremes can result in various forms of psychopathology exemplified in some forms of catatonic states or even autism. As with the expressive direction, the strength and form of the contracting states might vary considerably according to individual

differences and many other factors. Thus, although expression of the self is ordinarily directed from inside out, there is an opposite process of possible contraction in which inside processes are so dominating that very little expression is able to escape the inner "world". This means that anyone could be "developing" in the two different directions: self-expressive and self-contracting. The ordinary lives of most people are often balanced between these two directions. In some other cases, one of these two directions might be dominating (e.g. artists versus catatonic patients), usually disturbing the balance and causing problems in psychosocial adaptation.

And finally, **the third critical theoretical question** relating to balanced dual tension refers to the understanding of the "stand-by" or middle-ground position in human existence. Although this point has been addressed in part in the previous section, further clarification is necessary. We can again begin the discussion by stating that there is clearly some form of striving in the human behavioural system towards achieving a balanced state. However, what is unclear is the following: is this a tendency towards balance representing a "stand-by" mode, or is it an imbalanced state representing a normal position? Several theories in the current literature operate with the concept of balance between opposing tendencies wherein they clearly favour a balance as being the state towards which any given system is likely to aim. For example, both Festinger (1957) and Heider (1958) explicitly postulate that balance, harmony or consonance represent the state towards which behaviour tends to settle. These positions are understandable considering the direct (i.e. Heider) and indirect (i.e. Festinger) influences of gestalt theoretical background in shaping these ideas. As commonly accepted, the basic gestalt principle is the creation of a unifying whole or grouping of the parts based on basic principles of similarity, continuation, closure and so on. As famously stated by Koffka (1935, p. 176), "*the whole is something else than the sum of its parts*", indicating that human experience tends to organise external stimuli in a way that favours regularity, order and symmetry. This powerful theoretical background is visible in further descriptions of human behaviour in the light of consistency motives that drive behaviour towards the states of psychological balance. In other words, the dominating position is that people strive to achieve balance and consonance and try to avoid opposite states. In a broader sense, these ideas are

also connected to the notion of self-concept and the possible incongruence between self-conceptualisation and actual actions; they are further applied in the original psychoanalytic tradition of Freud, and subsequent therapeutic contexts, including the work of Horney and Rogers. All in all, it is safe to say that across scientific disciplines it is widely accepted that people generally tend to prefer states of less tension (i.e. balance or harmony), which reinforces the indication that people prefer simplicity and order.

This is certainly a reasonable and logical assumption considering the extensive amount of theoretical material supporting the development of this idea. The assumption is also frequently supported in common observations of human behaviour in various situations and under various conditions. Nevertheless, stating that people's behavioural patterns tend to settle towards balanced states is a different kind of theoretical statement than the identification of a "stand-by" position in the behavioural or motivational system. The difference is that individual and more complex behavioural patterns do not spontaneously tend towards balance without the existence of some form of energy input. This means that the existence of behavioural order relies on the existence of some kind of energy, process, force or mechanism that keeps the components of the given system in balance. This also implies that any behaviour that is completely free of external influences tends to become more disordered or chaotic over time. The behaviours that could be labelled as chaotic or disordered are commonly described as irrational. It is a common fact that living life represents a challenging task. Hence, under demanding life conditions where some sort of system malfunction exists, people might experience difficulties in maintaining behavioural harmony. In fact, the trouble begins immediately after babies leave the comforting security of the womb. In just a few seconds after birth, as they are introduced to all the human senses and stimulations and the efforts to preserve some form of balance, tension reduction or harmony begin to emerge. Fortunately, people are equipped with tendencies towards control, affiliation and self-expression that represent innate forces with the aim of restoring balance between the needs in the given system. Achievement of balance in the fundamental motivational areas provides people with meaning, both

subjectively and in the eyes of others. But there are multiple sources of possible malfunction ranging from a variety of physical imbalances to psychological challenges. The sum result of this dynamic is that human behavioural systems naturally tend towards an unorganised state unless they are kept together by the fundamental motivational tendencies of control, affiliation and self-expression, and the ensuing major and minor needs. All this of course is conditional on the needs and fundamental motivations being properly satisfied. Apart from serving to restore balance, motivational processes can certainly also increase tensions in specific domains. After life has begun and major and minor behavioural patterns begin to emerge, the innate tendencies towards control, affiliation and self-expression might be formed in such a way that they either help the individual to cope with life challenges or actually cause problems in psychosocial adaptation. Thus, although initially "designed" to help people to cope with the various challenges in life, the level and the form of the motivational tendencies might sometimes be "mistuned" or not properly calibrated. In these cases, there are a number of fortunate (e.g. warm and caring adults) and less fortunate (e.g. alcohol and drugs) conditions and strategies that reduce such tension. This also implies that the existence of secondary drives and motives might be self-induced by the proper or improper effects of the fundamental motivators. Nevertheless, although individuals vary when it comes to achieving control in various life domains and the need for belonging or self-expression, all people around the world are bound to deal with the challenges related to these three propensities.

All this suggests that imbalance is a "natural" state of human affairs when it comes to formation and manifestation of behavioural patterns. Balance in behaviour emerges at some point in development, but only as a result of psychological and physiological development, and consequently tends to diminish in the elderly, possibly because these forces tend to become weaker over time. In other words, if you want to introduce balance into someone's behaviour, then you need some kind of energy or force to produce that change. Otherwise, the apparent randomness of behavioural manifestations that we perceive as chaotic, imbalanced or irrational would be the most likely result.

Concluding Remarks on Balanced Dual Tension

Considering the complexity and depth of the theme in question, a brief summary is in order. Here I have presented some of the existing evidence linking fundamental motivation to the underlying mechanism of dual tension. Even if I present just a part of the evidence, it is fairly clear that the idea of balanced dual tension represents one of the most used processes for providing an understanding of human existence. It is also clear that this idea has been formulated differently and presented in various versions in the past. I have proposed and argued in Chaps. 3, 4 and 5 that there are three paramount motivational tendencies embedded in human nature (i.e. control, affiliation and self-expression). In this chapter, I have advanced these postulations by suggesting that the underlying mechanism for all three tendencies is balanced dual tension. I have also suggested, perhaps somewhat speculatively, that the type of balanced dual tension, although sharing superficial similarity, is rather different in all three systems. And finally, I also suggested that human behavioural systems tend actually to strive towards imbalance, unless fundamental forces of control, affiliation and self-expression act and start an opposite process towards some form of harmony or consonance. In other words, although they might also cause adaptive problems, motivational systems in general push a person into action to re-establish balance or to minimise the discrepancy between their own characteristics and the demands of a given situation. At birth, people meet a strange, unfamiliar and confusing world that in many ways could be experienced as a state of disorder. That is why all living creatures must from the very beginning begin to develop competencies or abilities that can restore satisfactory sensations of balance. The sense of balance is restored only if there is a presence of active motivational forces. Proper psychosocial adaptations result only in situations where the acting forces are complementary. This means that control, affiliation and self-expression should ideally work jointly to support adaptive development. The effects of fundamental motives are not a matter of direct symmetry among acting processes. Some of them might be dominating in some situations or life phases and others might be "dormant". The important point is that they complement each other, reduce the discrepancies created by dual tension and establish an optimal level of motivation that enables a person to keep progressing. Thus, the discrep-

ancy between structures is not diminished but rather reduced to provide manageable levels of motivations needed to help people to see meaning in their own actions, as well as in the actions of others.

I realise that the credibility of these postulations gradually and then dramatically drops from the first to the third point and that the speculative postulations proportionally increase in the reverse order. Thus, I tend to be far more speculative when it comes to examinations of underlying mechanisms (i.e. balanced dual tension) compared, for example, to the postulations stating that human tendencies and preferences for control and affiliation represent fundamental motivations. Therefore, it is important to note that although the text is written in the form of theoretical postulations using seemingly appropriate and available arguments, the intention behind this speculation is directed more towards raising questions that should be investigated in the future, rather than providing full answers to such advanced and complex matters. This is understandable considering that any analyses made of the motivational processes on these levels are extremely difficult. Furthermore, the speculations here might also be excused due to the fact that detailed investigations of fundamental forces and their underlying mechanisms represent a relatively uncharted theoretical territory in the current literature.

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7

Critical Theoretical Concerns

Identifying and Commenting on Dubious Assumptions

The main aim of this book has been to present a relatively novel perspective on human motivation by introducing the three distinct motivational systems and their corresponding underlying mechanisms. I have attempted to develop ideas that suggest that the complexity of human behaviour has its origins in only three independent, yet interrelated, motivational tendencies: control, affiliation and self-expression. Described in this way, the main idea is relatively simple. However, before the summary, conclusion and suggestions for further analysis, appropriate scientific conduct compels me to raise some critical theoretical concerns associated with the present reasoning and attempt to answer or comment on them. After all, I presume that several unresolved issues that emerged during the presentation of the motivational systems might be troubling to the attentive and critical reader and consequently some questions might call for particular attention. Indeed, at this point it is both expected and desired that critical and attentive readers point out some theoretical inconsistencies and

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demand more clarity in the presented arguments. This chapter represents an attempt to anticipate some of these objections and comment on possible answers and solutions.

What Are the Main Theoretical Assumptions of the Present Reasoning?

Any attempt to build a given theoretical construct depends on the strength of the underlying assumptions or premises. After all, the compelling arguments and subsequent conclusions are valid only if they are based on credible assumptions. By assumptions, I first and foremost mean accepted and credible premises that are the foundation for all later thinking. The term "assumption" implies that these starting points do not represent well-developed arguments, evidence or truths; they merely represent the first cornerstones on which the present theoretical construct has been built. In this book the ideas on the conceptualisation of human motivation through three independent systems of interrelated needs is based on three main assumptions. It is important to note that even though there are additional minor assumptions that might be found in this section, they all are still related in one way or another to these three basic starting points.

The first assumption is that fundamental human motivation and the subsequent diversity of human behaviour, no matter how varied and colourful different manifestations might be, are still the result of only a few independent forces that shape human nature. This means that the behavioural diversity in which human nature is manifested has a common and clearly identifiable foundation. Thus, all that we are (i.e. human nature) and all that we do (i.e. human behaviour) are the product of the interactive effects of only a few basic processes and their corresponding mechanisms. I am well aware that this kind of reasoning is generally called reductionism, and as such tends to awaken negative connotations. Nevertheless, it is important to note that despite the reductionist starting point, the present understanding of human nature fits well with system thinking and the view that human behaviour is a product of a complex interplay between multiple processes acting on people and the system in

which people are situated. This would imply that the present perspective offers a highly dynamic view on conceptualisations of human nature and explanations of behaviour, regardless of the postulation that all this diversity is based on and could be reduced to the effects of the three firm and independent starting points. I am also aware of the fact that human behaviour is notoriously diverse and unpredictable, making it difficult to get this assumption across to others. On the other hand, I also find it astonishing that the ways in which people live, their organisation, basic interpersonal and group processes, thinking and reasoning, and material expressions of such thinking are basically uniform across time, place and history. Various motives and fundamental structures in architecture, engineering, mythology, philosophy and literature tend to be similar anywhere in the world, in time and across different cultures that most probably have not had any contact with one another. Similarly, various manifestations of behaviour, interpersonal and group arrangements, language, emotion and cognition, and many other important aspects of human existence, although superficially different in terms of particular place or time in history, nevertheless show remarkable homogeneity in terms of their underlying structure. Even though human cognition has over time made noticeable and quite remarkable advances, the basic motivations that shape human actions have remained more or less unchanged throughout history and are common to all versions of man, starting from the caveman to people enjoying comfortable modern living conditions. Moreover, in a wider perspective, this homogeneity might be extended to the animal kingdom, referring more or less to all living species on earth. Applied to psychological processes, this consistent uniformity, masked behind apparent variations, provides a reasonable ground for assuming that there are some independent, yet interactive, fundamental building blocks (i.e. mechanisms and processes) of human nature that are responsible for such manifested variety.

The second assumption is also simple and connected to a number of possible processes that are needed to explain human behavioural diversity. Thus, after accepting the first premise about the existence of some fundamental building blocks of human nature, the next logical question is How many of these are required to make a simple model of human motivation? Of course, the fewer components the better if we are to

satisfy William of Ockham's "sharp" recommendation. After an extensive literature review in the fields of social and natural sciences, combined with philosophical contemplations concerning human nature and the inevitable influence of life experiences, observations and introspective abilities, I was inclined to conclude that it is difficult to explain human behavioural diversity through only one or two systems, such as control and affiliation. Furthermore, very early in this process I was also fairly convinced that explorations of this kind are limited if they only concentrate on the effects of the one single master process, no matter how powerful such postulated motivation might be. Based on the presentation in this book, it is clear that self-expression motivation played a role as the "missing link" in the conceptualisation of the one comprehensive theoretical model. After the work on inclusion and conceptualisation of self-expression emerged, it became apparent that this type of motivation is able to complement the tendencies for affiliation and control. It was also evident that there was no need for an additional system in the sense that control, affiliation and expression, combined with the mechanisms of balanced dual tension, were indeed able to explain all types of basic human behavioural manifestations. Thus, these three motivational systems are able, in a quite uncomplicated way, to integrate the existing knowledge in the field of psychology, ranging from personality variations to cultural diversities.

Finally, the third assumption is that these motivational tendencies are hard-wired in human nature in the sense that they are potent from birth. Moreover, the assumption is that systems represent motivational forces that existed prior to the beginning of the recorded history of mankind. In other words, people are born within the effects of these forces and have no choice but to cope with the challenges in these areas. Even though stating that the foundation of human motivation existed before man was on earth may sound somewhat absurd, it could also be arrogant to assume that belonging and control are motivations that were created solely when humans entered the stage. After all, today, humans only play a supporting role in the long story of life on this planet. These basic natural motivations are perhaps further developed by humans in terms of complexity, but the very basic process of belonging to some specific species and attempts to control our own basic existence are without doubt something we share

with our animal relatives. As noted above, self-expression motivation is the kind of motivation that to some degree is specific to humans, probably because it is dependent on having a minimal amount of self-consciousness, self-awareness and other self-processes that are dependent on higher levels of cognition. All in all, the final assumption is that these three motivational domains coexist in advance of birth, constantly influence the creation of human action and jointly shape the foundations of human existence by producing interactive effects.

What Is the Relation Between Motivational Systems?

The answer to this question is connected to the basic reasoning that is embedded in all three previous assumptions and refers to the relation between the implied (1) independence of the systems and (2) interactive and joint effects from producing human actions. The problem with this postulation is that at several places in this book, I explicitly state that systems are independent, but that they are interactive as well. How might this inconsistency be explained? I can start by clarifying what is meant by independence. The notion of independence means that systems exist as separate forces and operate independently of one another in shaping human consciousness. It is also assumed earlier that these tendencies have shaped life on earth over millions of years during pre-human and human history. The primacy of the systems in terms of emergence is unclear at this point, but it is relatively clear that the self-expression tendency is of a newer origin, mainly because it presupposes the existence of "self" in sufficient quantities. It follows that this tendency in other species could be described as mere "expression" (i.e. without the prefix "self"). Nevertheless, at this point in general human development, all three systems are considered to be potent at all times and embedded or hard-wired in human nature a priori to individual existence. Even if initially there is this independence, the systems also inevitably tend to interact, thus providing a stage for development of the complex and varied human manifestations. In other words, these tendencies represent active, constantly searching and dynamic processes that irrevocably tend to interrelate with one another at some point creating a complex network of interconnected

processes. In other words, while systems are independent, needs, as products of motivational systems, are interactive. This thus says that an infinite number of larger or smaller needs at all levels of abstraction interact with one another and, at one later yet rather immediate point in the chain of causality, tend to interconnect. With continuously increased distance from fundamental motivational forces, the degree of interdependence is considered to increase immensely. Therefore, the closer we come to manifestation of the one specific behaviour, the more complex motivational background emerges, consisting of multiple forces acting at the same time. Acceptance of the credibility of this assumption has important consequences for further theoretical reasoning and understanding of human behaviour. This implies that all specific behavioural manifestations represent a joint product of all three systems in different proportions and depending on multiple circumstances. In other words, each one of the specific manifested behaviours inevitably and constantly contains, in varying proportions, the traces of all three fundamental tendencies, along with the possible multiple interaction effects between the major and minor needs. This suggestion is perhaps one of the most important theoretical consequences of the reasoning in this book. It implies that although some behaviours might seemingly be driven by one single basic motivation, such as belonging, control or self-expression, these behaviours are actually loaded by all three motivations at the same time. For example, let us look at the role of being a parent and the many different specific types of behaviour attached to this role. A person might behaviourally act as a parent in the manner that emphasises belonging. This is indeed the most common and perhaps most desirable approach in which the relation between caregivers and children is perceived and the role of being a parent is conceptualised. However, it is not uncommon that some people perform this role with an emphasis on the controlling aspects of caregiving (i.e. power motivation or even satisfying achievement motivation in terms of having ambitions). Indeed, the common conceptualisations of attachment processes as described in Chap. 4 have theoretical fragments from both affiliation (i.e. mere need for belonging) and control (regulation of distance). Moreover, for some other people, having children represents the most meaningful event in their lives and the opportunity to express their inner states. Thus, parenting could also be a

form of self-expression. Certainly, it is easy to object that parenting or any other behaviour is not a matter of only one fundamental motivation. It is common knowledge that two seemingly identical behaviours might be propelled by completely different motives. Similarly, the present perspective posits that all three basic motivations, along with a number of major and minor needs originating from all three systems, take part in the formation of the way in which we tend to relate to children. Some might use predominantly control, some affiliation, some self-expression and some might have an equal distribution of all three motivations or some other proportion of distribution. The exact distribution between the specific motivations and percentages for the degree to which they influence behaviour are difficult to establish with certainty because of the constantly changing dynamic relations between the systems. Furthermore, the relation and potency of the specific motivation are sensitive and depend on the infinite number of particular parameters, ranging from individual differences to situational and cultural influences. Even though the presence and effects of one of the basic motivations might be under the detection level, the assumption is that the motivational nucleus consisting of all three fundamental motivations is always present. I have applied similar reasoning to explanations of addiction (Kovač, 2013). Briefly here, an addict's inability to stop performing self-destructive actions, despite serious and potentially fatal consequences, is a puzzle to his family, physician, outside observers, community and experts in the field. That this is seen as a puzzle is somewhat surprising considering that it is well-documented that addiction, in terms of causality, is explicitly associated with unfortunate social conditions, historical developments, situational circumstances, underlying psychological processes, neurophysiological changes, establishment of habitual and automatic past actions, identity issues and general life history and more. Thus, the simultaneous and joint effects of all these processes, originating from multiple sources, are logically possible. Putting all of this together, it is easy to see that a person might be inclined to perceive his own addiction as a rational choice in a given situation, even when facing fatal consequences. The self-destructive aspect of addiction is then not a puzzle but rather an effect of multiple and powerful motivations operating at the same time. The main point argued here is that all the above-mentioned processes are more or

less compatible and might jointly support the development of addiction. It follows that each behaviour, no matter how simple or effortless it might be, has a synergic effect between multiple compatible motivational sources where many social, environmental, historical, personal, neurological and chemical mechanisms might simultaneously work together to form behavioural patterns that are extremely resistant to change. As noted above, such a multi-sourced view of human motivation does not favour any one mechanism, process or paradigm as being a primary cause of any given behaviour. People's drinking might be related to their basic belonging needs, but might also be a matter of control or self-expressive tendencies in various proportions. This is of course disconcerting for any person who still hopes to discover a "formula" or a "key" that explains specific human actions. In the present view, every specific case or any behaviour is a unique combination of potentially fortunate and unfortunate circumstances consisting originally of all their fundamental motivational tendencies, and subsequently of major needs and many other individually based processes and mechanisms. In other words, just as no two people are completely identical in terms of all characteristics, there is little chance that two behaviours, although apparently similar, will be identical in terms of all underlying processes and mechanisms. Two persons or two behaviours might look the same (e.g. phenotype or analogy), but without sharing an underlying commonality (e.g. genotype or homology). The only common denominator in each behaviour is the constant presence of the three underlying motivational tendencies of control, affiliation and self-expression.

What Is the Relation Between Motivational Systems and Major Needs?

After addressing the relation between motivational systems, the question of how major needs, such as achievement and power (control system), attachment and intimacy (affiliation system) and artistic expressions (self-expression system), are related to the three fundamental tendencies represents a logical next step. Thus, it is understandable that this question should be raised when we consider that proper motivational theory

must establish credible links between imagined theoretical constructs (i.e. motivational systems) and at least partly manifested or directly observable behaviour (i.e. achievement or attachment). We can begin by saying that motivational systems of control, affiliation and self-expression are considered to comprise major needs. As noted above, the examples of such needs are achievement, interpersonal and group relations in terms of power, management of self-processes, intimacy, attachment, love, art and so on. These needs exert a directly observable and measurable influence on human behaviour. All these needs are acknowledged in contemporary theory as being important for human functioning. This means that this part of the theory is not problematic. However, two interrelated issues connected to such reasoning might be problematic. First, in Chaps. 2, 3 and 4 I have implied that there is a direct causal relation between these needs and the fundamental tendencies of control, affiliation and self-expression. This means, for example, that human needs for achievement, power and balance of internal processes merely represent a different way of manifesting the underlying tendency for control. Second, I have also postulated that interdependency is found between these needs. This means that all needs inside one system tend to fuse and merge with one another, making a series of minor systems inside the main one. It is easy to imagine how such interaction between various needs results in great complexity and, in addition to situational, genetic, cultural, historical and other influences is able to create an infinite number of different behavioural manifestations.

I will briefly comment on these issues below. The first part of the present theoretical postulations that is not quite convincing is the statement that all major human needs originate from and are governed by one of the three fundamental tendencies. In other words, the possible gap in argumentation is not that achievement is fundamental. The theoretical gap is that achievement means control. Although some arguments for the assumed relationship between achievement, power and self-balancing needs, on one hand, and the fundamental tendency for control, on the other, have already been provided in Chap. 3, I must acknowledge that there is not sufficient empirical support for this postulation. The number and strength of these sporadic voices that point to the possibility of a connection between visible behaviour and underlying motivations

of any kind is per today indeed weak, and knowledge in this area is underdeveloped and above all poorly organised. The research on explorations of major needs is advanced in terms of specific processes and conditions, but we know very little about deeper levels of motivation forming human nature. On the other hand, I believe that the idea of needs as a product of some few underlying tendencies is logical and has merit. As an illustration, we can take the common observation that there is considerable variation in the appearances of living creatures on earth. Yet, as we know today, many of the seemingly similar-looking animals are only superficially related to each other, and conversely, many of the creatures that look much different from each other are in fact linked through a common ancestor. There is no reason why this logic could not be applied to psychological processes. The exploration of various human behavioural manifestations in terms of analogy-homology distinction represents a relatively uncharted research area, and we are merely taking our first steps into this phenomenon. I believe that specific knowledge on many psychological processes is advanced enough to make an attempt to "connect the dots" of isolated data. This kind of analysis would provide us with insight into the whole new level of understanding. It would also represent a viable tool for integration of knowledge originating from various scientific disciplines.

Second, it is also problematic to suggest that major needs, although a product of motivational systems, begin to interact with one another almost immediately after their creation. Even though this point has been addressed to some degree in Chap. 3, the importance and elusiveness of the subject matter clearly calls for further clarification. We can begin by saying that, in contrast to the independence of motivational systems, major needs that comprise the specific system are at all times taken to be interdependent in the sense that they tend to interact and merge to motivate specific actions (Cattell, 1957; Murray, 1938). This also means that needs can work together with the aim of jointly reaching desired/intended goals, but also be in opposition or competition, confusing and spoiling a person's plans and making self-regulation difficult. Causality at this point is not a matter of direct influence but rather an interaction of all units at the system level where all possible combinations and interactions are conceivable. The term "system" is here loosely defined as a set of interrelated

elements that jointly work together, either to support or to obstruct each other to achieve specific objectives. Thus, following the basic premises of general system theory, the effects and impacts between major needs are considered to be sensitive to small changes and often provoked by disturbances in the remote parts of the system. Based on such complexity, it is understandable that predicting human behaviour, especially over prolonged periods of time, represents, at best, a matter of probabilities rather than certainties. Nonetheless, motivational systems, as well as the majority of major needs, represent distinct motivational entities with clear definitional boundaries and relatively independent effects on human behaviour. Many of these processes represent well-explored research areas where the specific effects of most important human needs are extensively studied through the means of empirical research. For example, research shows that individuals with a high need for achievement prefer and work better after performance feedback than after other types of feedback, for instance, affiliation feedback. Similarly, if the aim behind an action is to satisfy the affiliation motive, then persons who have a high need for affiliation should perform better than persons who score low on this motive or high on some other motivational tendencies, for example, achievement motivation. Indeed, in these situations high achievers tend to perform poorly or at an average level (McClelland, 1987). All this indicates that needs operate in terms of both relative autonomy (i.e. being independent entities) and interdependency (i.e. being interactive).

What Are the Consequences of Such Interaction on Human Behaviour?

The assumption of the initial independence of motivational systems and the subsequent interaction between major and minor needs has direct consequences for understandings of the stability of human actions in terms of causality. This dynamic is especially visible in behaviours that are notoriously known to be resistant to change, such as religious activities or addiction. One possible reason why these behaviours exhibit resistance to change is the postulation that there is simultaneous influence from all three fundamental motivational forces at the same time.

As noted previously, I have applied this reasoning above to provide a multi-sourced motivational account of addiction (Kovač, 2013). These ideas fit all types of complex behaviours that are known to be resistant to change. For example, religious acts are generally well-known as types of behaviours that are motivated by strong and resistant beliefs and convictions. During the history of human development, religious ideas have always represented congruently formed meaning systems with a strong explanatory aspect. Consequently, a structural constellation of every society is formed through some form of shared beliefs, and religion in general has functioned as a tool that keeps people together in one meaningful whole. Society and religion also tend to create symbiotic coherent forces that bring individuals together towards the formation of shared social identities. Following the basic premises of the present reasoning, the reason why religious convictions are so strong is the possibility that all three systems have been embedded in the basic core of believing in supernatural creations. In other words, one possible explanation for why religion is so powerful is because it contains, in suitable proportions, the elements of control, affiliation and self-expression. For instance, control tendencies are visible in many aspects of religious practices. When conditions of the external reality cannot be meaningfully explained or technically controlled, humans tend to become anxious. Religious institutions and leaders in general and religious rituals in particular have a cathartic component that functions to control and lower feelings of anxiety. Religious ceremonies declare the fearful respect human beings have towards their own mortality and in turn increase the sense of control over their own existence, as well as legitimise the control of religious institutions over human conduct. This reasoning, which accentuates the role of control in the formation of religious beliefs, is related to terror management theory (Pyszcynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1997), which posits that human awareness of mortality based on the knowledge of the inevitability of death is a principal of human existence. The theory posits that terror, which is based on the human intellectual capacity to recognise the inevitability of death, is managed by a dual-component cultural anxiety buffer, consisting of an individual's personalised version of the cultural worldview and sense of personal value. Regardless of the existence of defence or buffering mechanisms, it is clear that fear in general and fear of death in particular always represent an important motivational force

that never ceases to influence human existence. Considering that the aim of the present analysis is to delineate the nature of the mechanisms that reside at the very beginning of the behavioural causal chain, the inclusion of human fear of death is logical. Death-related issues in terms of motivation and behaviour can be conceived as a fundamental struggle to achieve control over different life domains. Thus, following and including the ideas of terror management theory in the present reasoning, the postulation here is that death and fear of death are subordinated to a more principal mechanism of control and represent "merely" a descendant of control beliefs.

Yet another path through the fundamental tendency for control that is channelled into religious practices is the general sense of insecurity, anxiety and fear of the unknown. At the core of many important aspects of religion, we find a process of making the meaningless meaningful and explaining the unexplainable. On the collective level, religious rituals represent legally accepted ceremonies that control the way in which the whole group relates to the understanding of the external reality as well as define the relations inside the group. Religious efforts that are based in part on general anxiety and insecurity provide human existence with meaning and security in relation to God, but with power over other people as well, placing humans who follow recommended rules and values in the dominant position. It follows that when people claim that divine determinism is behind uncontrollable events, this creates comforting meaning that helps them to gain control over their own existence by fearfully looking up to heaven and showing the recommended amount of fear and respect that, they believe and hope, will guarantee their protection. Put simply, one could say that saying, "in god we trust", is not an expression of trust or faith but of fear and desire for control.

Following a similar logical approach in an attempt to connect religion to affiliation, it is fair to say that religious institutions represent an arena where different generations and classes of people can be brought together and mesh through specific rituals. Thus, it is evident that belonging plays a prominent part in almost all aspects of religion and religious conduct. Furthermore, the religious process plays a socialising role in securing the stability of society and cushioning transitional issues between generations through commonly accepted norms, thus reinforcing the general sense of belonging.

The role of self-expression is also prominent and often visible in religious rituals that provide, in an approved manner, a plateau where the needs for either a calm or euphoric display of sentiment towards a totemic materialisation of the spiritual forces are expressed. All in all, religion is an example of the synergetic effect of the three fundamental motivational forces that throughout history have tended to guide social conduct in a highly organised fashion and have created a powerful system of coherent beliefs, symbols and meanings.

Clearly, the specific distribution of fundamental motivational forces and the nature of the interaction between major needs certainly vary from individual to individual, as well from one cultural context to the next. But if these assumptions are correct, they would explain why some specific behaviours, such as religious convictions or various types of addictions, are so powerful and resistant to change.

What About the Many Other Motivational Processes That Have Been Omitted From This Discussion?

This point is important for understanding the present model and refers to the theoretical positions of each and every researcher. Researchers in the field are generally preoccupied with their own research areas and consequently ask how their themes and concepts fit in the present model. More possibly, they might object to the fact that many of these processes have been omitted from the analyses of central motivational forces that influence human action. The reason for this omission is quite simple. The main aim in this book is to explore the possibility that all aspects of human action have origins in just three fundamental motivational tendencies. Thus, the focus of inquiry has been centred on collecting compelling arguments to demonstrate the existence of these motivations. To achieve this aim, the examination of the prominent and established psychological processes was considered necessary to establish the connection between these latent tendencies and observable behaviour. This means that the analysis in this book starts and ends with the most basic fundamental motivational urges and the manner in which they are manifested or displayed. It also means that analyses of many important

psychological, physiological, instinctual, genetic, social and contextual processes that are essential for understanding human functioning are of minor relevance here. This choice is based on the theoretical assumption that many of these processes appear later in the causal chain and, as such, do not contribute or change the basic descriptions of fundamental human tendencies. Although many of these processes play an important role in the formation of human behaviour, they do so mostly as modifiers (e.g. moderators and mediators) of existing fundamental innate motivational tendencies. For that reason, an analysis of these processes would exceed the scope of this book. Certainly, postulations of this kind are arbitrary when considering that some of the omitted processes are perhaps defined by other researchers as fundamental. For example, Chap. 2 provides a list of many theoretical frameworks and processes that at one time or another have been considered basic to the understanding of human functioning. Although I have built further on these theories and used them as building blocks that support the reasoning here, very few of them directly correspond to control, affiliation and self-expression.

One of the important differences between the majority of the previous theories and the reasoning here is that the conceptualisation of the three innate fundamental motivational tendencies does not explicitly presuppose that human behaviour is always organised and goal oriented. Although the ability of all organisms to execute direct actions towards one predetermined goal is undisputed and an important theme in scientific analyses, it has little to do with explorations of behavioural origins. The motivational tendencies of control, affiliation and self-expression are originally aimless or targetless. They have direction but no specific goals, meaning that the goals are somewhat random and based on geographical or historical chance and a number of other modifying factors. It follows that the present analysis goes beyond debates about the primacy of conscious (i.e. deliberation) versus unconscious (i.e. automaticity) functioning (e.g. Ajzen, 2002), or feedback control versus self-determined effects on self-regulation (e.g. see Carver & Scheier, 2000). On the other hand, the present reasoning has the potential to provide a basis for the theoretical integration between these perspectives by suggesting that different types of dual tension mechanisms are at work in specific motivations. Thus, all these competing ideas might be correct in their assertions,

only limited to specific conditions and circumstances. Nevertheless, these modes of behavioural organisation, along with the influence of many other processes, such as the effects of different inner states, contextual or situational conditions, individual differences and/or cultural contexts are certainly relevant for the final behavioural manifestations. All in all, even though some of these processes are found in the current literature to represent fundamental psychological processes, they all come relatively late in the causal chain and are based on the underlying tendencies for control, affiliation and self-expression.

What Is the Relation Between Needs in Terms of Origin?

In Chap. 1, it was suggested that some psychological processes, as well as many directly observable behaviours, might deceptively look alike, without necessarily having a common motivational origin. As an illustration, I have used the distinctions between phenotype and genotype, analogy and homology, and superficial similarity between many words that do not share a common etymological origin. If this postulation has merit, the consequences might affect the existing theoretical definitions and classifications in contemporary literature. In other words, this would imply that the current literature is filled with examples wherein some control needs, for example, are mistakenly associated with affiliation motivation, or vice versa.

The possible confusion between different needs in terms of origin is understandable and common considering that control, affiliation and self-expression interact and jointly form behavioural manifestations. For instance, it can be directly observed that people are eager to seek companionship, social approval and acceptance and to stop behaviour that results in social disapproval. Usually these behaviours are perceived and interpreted in the light of affiliation motivation. Indeed, in situations where the actor is seeking companionship, social approval and acceptance with the aim of coming closer to a certain class of people, one would certainly be inclined to deduce the domination of belonging tendencies. However, the quest for companionship, social approval and acceptance in

situations where there is some predefined standard or constantly moving target that has to be conquered would imply the effect of the need for balancing interpersonal relations in terms of power. Thus, two seemingly identical behaviours may differ when it comes to underlying processes and mechanisms. More specifically, Gardner, Pickett, and Brewer (2000) suggest that one possible consequence of a basic need to belong might be the development of a social monitoring system that guides social information processing. Thus, the basic need for belonging is explicitly linked to self-regulatory efforts in the realm of social interaction. In contrast to this view, social monitoring that has the purpose of calibrating the range to some specific target is in the perspective here assumed to be governed by control motivation. A social monitoring system is primarily a monitoring system designed to monitor power distribution and balance in the realm of social interactions, and only secondarily a process that refers to belonging needs. In fact, all motives that serve the purpose of hunting for predefined standards with the aim of providing security could be conceptually linked to control motivation rather than reflecting the need for belonging. Although the purpose of these mechanisms is directed towards the area of interpersonal and group dynamics, monitoring serves a protection function and self-preservation of self-processes in terms of control. This would imply that mechanisms of this kind are rather a matter of balancing either the power distribution between various actors or the internal processes, representing therefore an inclusive part of control motivation.

An additional example in the literature is the influential work of Baumeister and Leary (1995), in which the need for belonging is conceptually differentiated from attachment and affiliation. More specifically, these authors assume that attachment serves the role of being a mediating mechanism in the service of the more overarching motivation for belonging. Thus, the attachment process is generally seen as a manifestation of the major fundamental need to belong to "someone", that is, to form and maintain caring relationships over time. Similarly, the general belonging need is seen as being something more than the mere affiliation motivation. Whatever the differences in conceptual labels, these positions clearly correspond to the view being presented

here in which attachment and belonging, as representatives of the specific needs, are part of the larger motivational system of conceptually similar interrelated needs. However, although conceptualisations of the need to belong in Baumeister and Leary (1995) converge in many ways with the present view, they also have some marked differences. In the view presented here, attachment, not as a fundamental underlying tendency but as a behavioural manifestation, is also conceptually connected to control motivation. Thus, it is easy to argue that the effects of control needs are also highly visible in the attachment process. This is especially pronounced in situations where security, domination and protection are more potent than the "simple" need for proximity to the caregiver. To fully understand the present position, it is important to note once again that the present perspective on fundamental human motivation holds that any specific behaviour unavoidably contains traces of all three basic motivations. So, although the attachment process is initially propelled by the affiliation motivation, the behavioural manifestation commonly represents an interactive effect of all three fundamental motivations. Thus, there is no simple unequivocal answer to the question of what the underlying motivation behind some specific act is. On the other hand, one could attempt to identify the dominating motivation while acknowledging at the same time the possible presence of other important motives. This would include analyses that incorporate the totality of assumed fundamental forces acting simultaneously on people's behavioural actions. Regrettably, conceptual confusion often emerges because it is frequently taken for granted that all types of social interaction are primarily propelled by affiliation motivation. Indeed, Baumeister and Leary (1995, p. 522) find that the need to belong is a major source of the desire for power. In an attempt to conceptually link these two motivations, these authors tend to blur the difference between the need for power and the need to belong by assuming common origin. This stands in sharp contrast to the model of human motivation being presented here, in which the need for power, directed at interpersonal and group relations, is the manifestation of the underlying tendency for having control over others. This is somewhat surprising considering that the division between mere belonging (i.e. "communion" dimension) and control (i.e. power dimension) is known and acknowledged in contem-

porary literature (for an overview, see Anderson, John, & Keltner, 2012). Nonetheless, the discussion on the relation between fundamental motivations and their subsequent joint role in shaping behavioural manifestations reveals a neglected research area in need of further attention and theoretical clarification.

All in all, the instances of misplaced motivations in terms of origins, especially those mixing affiliation and control, are numerous in the current literature. On the other hand, there are examples of many self-processes that are not necessarily regulated by self-expression. In other words, in addition to saying that not all social processes are necessarily regulated by affiliation motivation, I also suggest that many self-related processes are not under the governance of self-expression. For example, the number of defensive mechanisms and self-presentational strategies might be related to a higher degree to control motivation and the urge to balance internal processes. Although all fundamental motivations tend to work together in shaping overt behaviour, the origins and interactive effects are still quite different. Such motivational complexity might certainly create problems for people. Despite the fact that control needs tend to complement affiliation motivation and secure the strength of interpersonal and group relations, they also tend to disturb some aspect of human functioning in this domain. Without the influence of control (e.g. monitoring, categorisation, excessive protection and security), people would probably form and maintain their relationships in the easier and lasting way.

However, all these postulations are doomed to remain theoretical speculations because it is difficult to provide direct empirical support for processes that represent amalgamation to begin with. This assumption is theoretically linked to one of the previous points suggesting that each directly observable example of behaviour unavoidably contains varying degrees of traces of all three fundamental motivations. Thus, suggesting that some control needs are mistakenly classified as affiliation needs in the current literature would be imprecise without pointing out the shared motivational impact of control, affiliation and self-expression in the formation of overt actions. Nevertheless, in many situations it is possible and indeed meaningful and useful to identify the dominant motivation in any given behaviour.

What Is the Role of Meaning in All Systems?

Although this point is also partially beyond the scope of the present analysis, a few brief remarks might help to clarify the basic premises relating to which reasoning fundamental motivational systems are built on. We can begin by explicitly acknowledging that the notion of meaning is a tricky concept. Therefore, in the following I will adopt an epistemological approach as such a line of reasoning comes closest to illuminating the role of meaning in motivational systems of control, affiliation and self-expression. Aside from being a source of motivation, all three systems unavoidably provide, stimulate, encourage and ultimately force people to engage in knowledge management of some kind. Although people preferably learn and acquire both abstract and concrete knowledge in a systematic manner, the general learning process is an inescapable fact of life that occurs in almost all situations. In other words, people might learn things systematically or randomly and everything in-between, but the fact is that they are bound to accumulate some sort of knowledge. People have no choice but to gradually assimilate and integrate pieces of new knowledge and move further on the developmental scale, stage by stage and following appropriate developmental cycles. This is a gradual, almost compulsive procedure in which the integration of every piece of new information is facilitated by its resemblance with previous knowledge structures. It is a commonly accepted view that people are drawn towards familiar stimuli partly because they fit in with their pre-existing cognitive and emotional structures. Thus, various types of knowledge provide grounds for meaning constructions and help in creating a coherent perception of "reality". This implies that new meanings are not created solely on the power of new stimuli. Every person in his or her own way, depending on personal history and psychological characteristics, is motivated to create a congruent wholeness out of emotional and cognitive stimulation. Not all people are equally successful in this process.

This process of meaning making is potent in all three systems. For example, control over life in general is created according to the actor's ability to create a meaningful background, either emotional or cognitive, for any particular situation. People show a tendency (compulsion) to see meaning even where there is none (Rorschach ink pictures, thematic

apperception stories, illusory control). The perception of objective contingency (Langer, 1975) does not appear to be a crucial variable governing behaviour. In other words, no matter how unimportant thought or emotion seems to the rest of the world, it is possible that it is perfectly reasonable and sensible when it is incorporated in the existing meaning system of the actor. If the long distances between emotional and cognitive pieces inside human structures are not properly bridged, the organism is motivated to engage in mobilisation of its own resources to achieve some sort of internal congruence wherein "things" hang together. The cases of gaps between internal structures and processes can result in the creation of the extreme needs that serve the purpose of providing the individual with satisfactory feelings and filling the blanks between distant internal discrepancies. Under these conditions, the subjective understanding of situations can create wonders and provide meaning, even in circumstances where meaning is well-hidden. This suggests that the role of the interpretative meaning attached to the action is considered to be a crucial component that plays an integrative part in all other understanding of the control aspect (Thompson, 1981). Furthermore, such tendencies towards interpretative control seem to be a common theme under which different theoretical types of control can be unified.

The meaning-making process is constant and certainly not limited to control motivation. Meaning appears to be a paramount property that must be actively created in every motivational domain. As earlier suggested, newborn ducks will follow a mother chicken and adopted children will love their adoptive parents, not based only on the innate disposition to belong to the specific species or certain kind of people, but also on the cognitive abilities of the reality perception, meaning formation and a restricted range of choices in every particular situation. In other words, affiliation, or any other motivational tendency, is empty without the ability to perceive and create meaning.

All in all, seeing meaning and freedom in one's own actions and finding meaning in the actions of others represents an important aspect of any motivated behaviour, and this point cannot be easily excluded. Success in gaining control, developing satisfactory affiliation needs and expressing the self is directly dependent on the nature of the subjective norms and values the individual holds. Meaning is considered here to represent a

unifying mechanism of all three motivational systems. The more meaning is attached to a particular action, emotion or thought, the more control, affiliation and self-expression is expected to be experienced. As noted, the apparent theoretical problem with meaning is its highly subjective nature. What makes sense or feels right varies from person to person and across situations. Thus, meaning is formed in complex interactions between situational circumstances and pre-existing emotional and cognitive structures of the individual and, as such, "escapes" attempts to pinpoint universal aspects of this term that would fit all people. This also implies that meaning is a human construct. From the point of view of the reasoning in this book, meaning that is separated from human thinking does not exist.

What Are the Origins of Fundamental Tendencies and the Corresponding Mechanisms?

As noted above, one of the basic assumptions of the present reasoning is that three basic motivations existed prior to the appearance of the human species in recorded history. This means that people are born into the effects of these forces and have no choice but to cope with the challenges in these areas. This assumption inevitably leads to some disturbing questions: why then affiliation, control or self-expression? Why balanced dual tension? Where are these tendencies coming from? In other words, if people need to have control or to belong, why is this so? This is indeed the question above all other questions. For many theorists as well as for a majority of lay people, it is probably a most improbable and somewhat redundant question to pose. The most common and simple answers are evolution, survival and "that's the way things are and have always been done".

However, it is very legitimate and prescient to pose the question about the origins of fundamental motivations. After all, science is based on pushing the limits of knowledge and questioning commonly accepted and taken for granted assumptions. It is reasonable to assume that the formation and origin of these tendencies should have some previous history in terms of development over time and hidden mechanisms. Even more,

the analyses of this kind might reveal that the assumed first "domino" tiles might not be the first ones at all. Bearing this in mind, the unanswered question, or better said, the still unasked question is What are the mechanisms behind affiliation, control and self-expression? We can begin by repeating that humans represent literally very recent, in fact one of the most recent, contributions to the diversity of species on earth. Affiliation, many aspects of control and some aspects of self-expression have existed in an almost identical form for many millions of years prior to mankind's appearance. As implied in Chap. 2, it is possible that the combination of some form of arrogance, self-centrism and religious dogma on the primacy of human existence prevents us from raising these indeed quite logical doubts that fundamental motivations and behavioural patterns are exclusively human characteristics. Whether one accepts or rejects the credibility of my postulations, it is an unavoidable fact that people are born with these tendencies and have no choice but to cope with the challenges in developing appropriate competencies and strategies related to some form of control, affiliation and self-expression. Thus, it was relatively easy to show the primacy of the three fundamental motivations in this book, in the sense that I described processes that are familiar and easily recognisable both to experts in the field and to lay people. Thus, the research of specific behavioural patterns, such as achievement, attachment, power and even the majority of self-processes refers to something that is commonly experienced by most people.

I will in the following present a speculative postulation about the origins of fundamental motivations and balanced dual tension. However, the delineation and theoretical construction concerning balanced dual tension as well as identification of the processes that propel the fundamental motivations represent themes that are not easily recognisable or identifiable for most people. I would assume that this form of telling a story is somewhat different from other forms of writing where the writer captures "things" that are perhaps more concrete and accessible in the minds of others. The obvious and fairly common challenge arises when one assumes and then additionally attempts to describe the causal connection between non-observable or hypothetical processes and directly observable behaviour. Hence, considering the high level of

speculation, as opposed to well-developed arguments, this concluding section will be brief.

The present theoretical postulation starts by promoting the idea that basic human motivations (i.e. control, affiliation and self-expression) are the reflection of fundamental physical forces that influence and ultimately regulate the relationship between objects in nature. Briefly and simply put, two of the most important fundamental forces that shape all "reality" around us are gravity and electromagnetism. The force of gravity "looks" strikingly similar to the control motivational system. Gravity causes all matter to be attracted to all other matter, either by orbiting around each other in a perfect balance or clumping together into one object. Metaphor or not, the human tendency to hunt and achieve goals, either in terms of achievement, power or managing the self, is in many ways comparable to the manner in which gravity works. Unless the balance is obtained by invested efforts or some other acting forces, human behavioural patterns related to control attempt to hit targets on their way, creating new ones immediately.

Tendencies towards affiliation, on the other hand, resemble to a higher degree the basic relations that are commonly "observed" in the realm of electromagnetism. In a very simplified metaphor, one could say that the closer an electron (i.e. a person or individual) is to the nucleus (e.g. significant others, person of importance, group of significance), the greater is the attractive force, and more energy is required for the electron (i.e. a person) to escape. However, electrons (i.e. persons), which are per definition attracted to the nucleus (significant others or group of importance), will experience (electrostatic) repulsion if they come too close to a positively/neutrally charged nucleus. Thus, the proximity and location of electrons (i.e. persons) are constantly regulated by their distance to the nucleus (i.e. significant others), their relative position in the orbit (i.e. behavioural patterns, behavioural trajectories and other life situations) and the position of other electrons (other individuals). In short, there is a striking parallel between belonging processes between people and the electromagnetic pattern of attraction, including the process of repulsion (i.e. symbiotic situations in which people come too close to one another and experience a threat to their self-definition).

And finally, the question remains: what kind of physical force might resemble self-expression? The most intuitive answer at this point is to suggest the influence of solar energy. Thus, the influence of the sun on everything on earth is indisputable. Virtually all energy on earth comes from the sun. This kind of energy is frequently used as a metaphor that generally describes the process of blossoming and to the human need to convey/communicate internal states. People, similar to other species on earth, tend to reach out to the sun, turn to the sun and be attracted to it. The central point here is focussed on heat or thermal energy (the sun but also any powerful source of thermal energy) which might have an effect on expansion of matter or expression of people's ideas. Pursuing and extending this idea further, it follows that the human need for self-expression might constantly be stimulated by the hot-cold conditions embedded in any given context, resulting in expansion, contraction or the status quo. This might refer to influences that range from single parent (or any other significant other) to generally supportive communities consisting of many individuals. However, although the amount of energy can make an expression stronger or weaker, it is important to note that there is a constant urge in people to express their inner states in various forms and to convey them to the outside world.

Considering the level of speculation when it comes to these postulations, it is important to keep this section brief. Nevertheless, there are virtually hundreds of possible metaphors that can illustrate the similarity of fundamental human functioning and elementary forces in nature. Indeed, this parallelism could fill a book in itself. I am careful to imply causality between basic physical forces and human nature for two interrelated reasons: (1) lack of sufficient evidence that shows the possibility that physics influences the mind, behaviour and human nature in general and (2) a personal and professional fear of being attacked for postulating something such as this without having strong enough footing in point 1. Nevertheless, I still posit that the questions "why control" and "why affiliation" are worth asking. Saying and uncritically accepting that survival and evolution favours those who are high in these tendencies is built on a weak and somewhat pragmatic argument. Therefore, a theoretical consideration that some other processes might be at work in shaping human nature might be worth exploring.

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8

Summary and Conclusions

Brief Summary and Delineation of Contributions

As noted, the field of motivation is a broad topic area that can be approached in many ways. Displays of human needs take different forms in everyday life and vary with individual differences, personality variations, situational circumstances and cultural diversities. One of the important goals of psychological science is to identify behavioural patterns that influence and form human existence at all levels of abstraction, ranging from immediate triggers to fundamental underlying tendencies. The initial assumption in this book has been, as underlined and exemplified in Chap. 1, that similarities in overt appearances in many situations might be superficial and thus poorly reflect the underlying origins of the given phenomenon or any entity in question. I have listed many examples of these differences, such as phenotype and genotype or analogy and homology. The focus in this book has been centred on the delineation of the "hidden" mechanisms and the identification of the most fundamental motivational agents that organise human action. The main aim was to provide an answer to the question Do apparent behavioural variations

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and diversities share some common underlying ground that reveals a universal feature of human nature? Certainly, it would be presumptuous of me to state that I have provided a clear answer to this complex question. Balancing academic ambitions with basic human humility, I can, at best, say that the present answer is probably merely a proxy for the real one. Nevertheless, I presented arguments that (1) dispositions towards control, affiliation and self-expression represent three fundamental motivational tendencies, (2) the variety of psychological needs tend to cluster around these issues and consequently create larger patterns of behaviour that could be meaningfully conceptualised as systems of interrelated need processes, (3) the underlying mechanism for all three fundamental motivational tendencies is balanced dual tension, and finally (4) the existence, formation and effects of fundamental motivation are closely connected to the influence of fundamental physical processes that act on all objects on earth. Moreover, meaning construction seems to be a unifying mechanism of all three motivational systems. Although the search and creation of meaning could easily be specifically ascribed only to control motivation, seeing meaning in one's own actions and finding meaning in the actions of others seems to be an important aspect of any motivated behaviour.

In an attempt to evaluate the postulations in this book, it is fair to say there are many arguments that support the idea of control as a fundamental motivator. Numerous theories and a considerable part of research convincingly show that people are motivated to develop different strategies and mechanisms that are directed at satisfying the various needs for control. The one apparent challenge is the fact that the display of control needs varies across behavioural domains, cultures and situations. This unfortunate circumstance makes it difficult to persuasively argue that it is indeed control that underlies human tendencies for achievement, power and self-management. Nonetheless, it is relatively clear that all people, regardless of situation or historical or cultural context, are extremely focussed on achieving and maintaining some form of regulation over aspects of the non-social environment and social relations, and they invest a great deal of effort in achieving the management of internal self-processes. Thus, I believe that further exploration of the connection between control and specific motivational concepts, such as achievement

or power, are warranted, even though they are not traditionally associated with control motivation.

In a similar way to control motivation, the urge to display different belonging needs and the formation of various relations at all levels of abstraction seems to be an inevitable aspect of human life. All cultures, in their own way, operate with some form of family-based categories, and these categories help individuals define their own existence. As noted, many strong voices suggest that various belonging processes, such as attachment, intimacy and love, are interrelated and represent innate motivational dispositions placed upon human nature. Hence, people have no other choice but to construct or negotiate the most appropriate way to relate to their own social world. This part of the theory is not problematic. I have, however, also suggested that the need for some sort of distance or differentiation should also be an inclusive part of the definition of affiliation motivation. Although this postulation seems counterintuitive, there are still many theoretical models that support this assumption. Hence, the possible re-conceptualisation of affiliation motivation in terms of both closeness and distance would perhaps contribute to a better understanding of many seemingly odd behavioural manifestations in the domain of interpersonal and group relations.

And finally, although I have done my best, it is fair to say the arguments that support the notion of self-expression as a fundamental motivational concept are still weak and their theoretical foundations unclear. Nevertheless, considering that the human motivation to express the inner self-related states is both obvious and pervasive, the insufficient amount of overwhelming empirical and theoretical evidence and the lack of interest of the research community in general to explore this motivation is surprising. Self-expression is often used imprecisely and interchangeably with related processes, such as self-disclosure, self-realisation and intrinsic behaviour. I have made an attempt to convince the reader that self-expression, exactly as control and motivation, is able to account and unite many of these self-processes in one theoretical framework. In other words, the suggestion is that self-expression is the fundamental motivational process that unites many seemingly unrelated manifestations of the "self". Furthermore, self-expression is capable of accounting for a wide range of universally dispersed behaviours that cannot be satisfactorily

explained by control or affiliation. Based on these theoretical assumptions, it would not be surprising to discover that self-expression grows to be a promising concept in future motivational research.

In addition to the delineation of the three basic motivations, I have also attempted to identify the underlying mechanism(s) that propel human behaviour in these domains, namely the notion of balanced dual tension. Although this chapter is speculative and occasionally too general, we should, after all, always be able to pose a simple, yet necessary, question: where are these assumed fundamental motivations coming from? Consequently, it was suggested that some form of balanced dual tension, an ancient idea that appears and reappears in different forms throughout the history of human thinking, lies behind all three motivational systems. However, it was also speculated that there are three different forms of dual tension corresponding to the three fundamental motivations.

And finally, I attempted to provoke the reader at the end of Chap. 6 by pushing the "why" question even further. I directly, yet cautiously, opened for the possibility that balanced dual tension, fundamental motivations, major and minor needs and all processes on the way to directly observable behavioural manifestations are influenced and up to a point shaped by fundamental physical forces that influence all objects on earth. It is important to note that I did not use this comparison as a possible metaphor (Weiner, 1992), but rather as a causal relation. Although these kinds of speculation are rarely used in psychological science, causal connections of this kind and scale can be detected in classical German idealism and the attempt to make functional theoretical connections between natural forces, human consciousness and human functioning. Indeed, postulations that are strikingly similar to those made in this book, certainly coloured by the effects of the specific historical framing, philosophical vocabulary and unavoidable religious background that is typical of theories in the past, are clearly detectable in the work of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775–1854). All in all, although the connection between physical forces and human mental processes is certainly highly speculative, the main point is again that we should never stop asking the question "why". Settling on the answer that "that is the way things are and always have been" should not be good enough for any scientific theory.

It is obvious that I could not make these postulations using the traditional point of view. Each novel theoretical framework unavoidably introduces new concepts, rearranges the relation between existing terms and offers a new way of viewing and understanding "things". The common consequence of such work is the promotion of some new processes, mechanisms and concepts, and the degradation of some others that perhaps previously held a prominent place in the literature. Although the present thinking is firmly embedded in previous theory and indeed may be used as a literature review on central motivational topics, the book also provides clear contributions that advance our understanding of basic human motivation. Some of these novel contributions are the conceptualisation of control in relation to various life domains, the connection between control and achievement, power and self-processes, inclusion of distance in the conceptualisation of affiliation, introduction of self-expression as fundamental motivation, and identification of balanced dual tension as an underlying mechanism connected to all basic motivations. Moreover, the present portrayal of human actions as an assembly of specific motivational forces might also offer an alternative view on conceptualisation of identity and self. The constant and interactive effects of the three motivational systems and indefinite numbers of subsequent need processes represent a dynamic view on the anatomical-psychological construction of each unique individual. Such a view implies that generalisations and typologies, although certainly useful in some cases, are largely inaccurate when it comes to explaining the actions of specific individuals. As noted, elsewhere I have proposed a similar model in which the development of addiction is seen as the synergy effect between various motivations and the matter of individual distribution between the effects of the multiple forces, making each specific case of addiction unique (Kovač, 2013). And finally, the postulation that final behavioural manifestation always and inevitably contains, in different degrees and proportions, traces of all three fundamental motivations also offers an alternative way to perceive human action. This specifically means that any particular behaviour is not informative in itself without being connected to dynamic relations between the basic motivations. For example, seemingly caring behaviour and the general relation between the child and the caregiver might indeed be motivated by belonging needs as

commonly interpreted, but also by self-expression and the mutual need for control. All in all, the overall contribution of the present postulations is the construction of the theoretical tool that is able to combine many seemingly unrelated processes into one single theoretical framework.

Criteria for the General Theory of Motivation

As noted in the introduction, this is a book about fundamental human motivation, and in the wider perspective also a book about human nature. Writing such an academic story in which the notion of basic motivation is in the centre of the analysis would perhaps be incomplete without briefly assessing how the postulations in this book fulfil the criteria proposed by Weiner (1992) for the construction of a general theory of motivation. Specifically, Weiner (pp. 358–364) suggests that the general theory of motivation must (1) be built on reliable (replicable) empirical relations, (2) be based on general laws rather than individual differences, (3) include the self, (4) include the full range of cognitive and emotional processes, (5) include sequential (historical) causal relations, (6) be able to account for achievement endeavours and affiliative goals and (7) consider some additional commonsense concepts.

Of all the above-mentioned criteria, requirement one (theory supported by empirical evidence) is the one that is most challenging for the theoretical framework in this book. However, this only refers to empirical procedures that would aim to test the theory as a whole. Many of the specific postulations here are, as shown, firmly embedded in empirical approaches. The credibility of these ideas, perceived in isolation, is relatively unproblematic. This refers, for example, to the research area that emphasises the motivational aspects of achievement, power and internal self-processes. Hence, the next crucial step in the development of the present thinking would be to provide empirical support for the statement that all these processes are governed by a more fundamental need for control. Although the design of empirical procedures of this kind is certainly necessary, the potential gains in terms of advances in the field of motivation are enormous. Furthermore, in promoting the importance of empirical support, Weiner directly compares classical natural sciences

and motivational theory. In many ways, this comparison could easily be understood as rigid. Mixing hydrogen with oxygen (Weiner, 1992, p. 359) is after all different than describing complex underlying and not directly observable processes that are typical to the social sciences. Furthermore, the comparison is neither appropriate nor fair considering that the social sciences often operate with non-observable theoretical constructions as opposed to directly observable physical elements. In that respect, the comparisons between motivational theory and theoretical physics might be more appropriate. Although theoretical physics are also dependent on the result of experimental studies and observations of the physical world, the initial starting point is nevertheless frequently embedded in abstract models that are typically ahead of existing empirical procedures and thus currently untestable in relation to the theory as a whole. Certainly, this does not mean that any given theory should aim to develop concepts that are completely unmeasurable, and I do not think that this is the case with the theoretical model presented in this book.

The second requirement states that the general theory of motivation should be based on general laws rather than individual differences. This aim echoes the thought that has been noted repeatedly throughout the book, namely that motivational theory should attempt to identify general laws that exceed the specific interactive effects between person, environment and particular situation. Thus, although the specific knowledge about particular processes is extremely important, the produced understandings based on such particularity rarely transcend individual differences and the effects of relatively narrow contexts. The main aim of the present theoretical framework is the attempt to reveal universal underlying processes and mechanisms by identifying common principles that apply to all people, or better said, apply to general human nature. So the possible and expected criticism of these lines could be directed not only at specific statements, arguments, speculations, simplifications and generalizations presented here, but also at the idea of the existence of these common principles that presumably govern human action, as well as the meaningfulness of searching for them.

The third requirement states that the general theory of motivation should include the self in one or another manner. I am certain that this requirement is presently covered when considering the introduction of

self-expression as a fundamental motivation, as well as when grouping internal self-processes under control motivation. Indeed, one of the relative novelties regarding the inclusion of "self" in general motivation thinking is the present differentiation between self-expressive actions and those governed by control or affiliation. In fact, it is possible that this particular differentiation could in the future be investigated by using the appropriate empirical procedures.

The fourth requirement states that the general theory of motivation should include the full range of cognitive and emotional processes. This requirement is also relatively non-problematic for the reasoning in this book. In relation to self-expression, I have shown in Chap. 5 that this process is connected and affects cognition and emotion in the most fundamental way. This connection is certainly just as strong for control and affiliation motivation. For example, Alloy, Clements and Koenig (1993) suggest that people's perception of control as related to the response-outcome contingencies is due to the interaction of several motivational (e.g. self-esteem, impression management) and cognitive (e.g. associative learning, expectancies, schemata, self-focussed attention) mechanisms. Uncontrollable situations are in general linked to shame, embarrassment and humiliation. People who believe they cannot manage potential threats experience high levels of emotional (anxiety) arousal (Bandura, 1992). Some authors maintain that most emotional moments in a person's life are those when he or she is threatened by the circumstances over which he or she has no hope of control (Friedman & Lackey, 1991). Learned helplessness theory (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Seligman, Abramson, Semmel, & Baeyer, 1979) states that exposure to an uncontrollable situation (no perception of the contingency between behaviour and outcomes) lowers the cognitive, emotional (decreased mood) and behavioural (decreased action) abilities of the individual and suggests a connection between control and depression. Similarly, attachment, intimacy, love and belonging to the larger collective also involve a high degree of emotional reactions and the cognitive abilities of the individual. According to Hill (1987), four different aspects of interpersonal contact that have both cognitive and emotional dimensions serve as potential sources of gratification: (1) positive stimulation, or the ability of affiliation to provide enjoyable affective and cognitive stimulation,

(2) attention, or the potential for enhancement of feelings of self-worth and importance through praise and the focussing of other's attention on oneself, (3) social comparison, or the capacity for reducing ambiguity through the acquisition of self-relevant information and (4) emotional support or sympathy. It is also an undisputed fact that the most affective reactions, both pleasant and unpleasant, are created when a family is formed or dissolved, between close friends and lovers, and as emotions that arise in the frame of abstract and remote group connections, such as nation, patriotism and race. Emotional aspects of interpersonal relations are especially fragile in the early stages of life. The nature in which individuals form and develop their social world in childhood is repeatedly identified in theory as a way of setting the course in which emotional relations in general can be displayed (Bowlby, 1969; Erikson, 1980; Horney, 1950/1991). All in all, it is clear that emotion and cognition are intimately connected to all three motivational systems (i.e. control, affiliation and self-expression).

The fifth requirement states that the general theory of motivation should include sequential (historical) causal relations. The idea here is that any general theory of motivation must address the sequential order between the central concepts. This requirement also fits well with the thinking in this book even though it is important to note that the analysis here centres primarily on identification of the most fundamental human tendencies and their relation to the most prominent needs in which these tendencies are commonly manifested. In other words, the main focus in this book is restricted to an analysis of the "first dominos" that organise the complexity of subsequent action. For example, it was postulated that at the very beginning, physical forces initially influence the existence of balanced dual tension, which in turn influences everything in nature. Consequently, the formation and manifestations of motivational tendencies towards control, affiliation and self-expression are in one or another way influenced by this underlying dynamics of opposites. At this level, as argued in Chap. 7, there is an assumed independence for each of these tendencies. At the next level, the combination of fundamental tendencies forms major human needs. These needs, although not "pure" in terms of motivation (i.e. containing the traces of all fundamental motivations), are nevertheless typically associated with one specific motivational system,

such as achievement, power, self-processes with control or attachment, love and intimacy with affiliation. Thus, although the analysis here stops after the major needs have been identified, it is nevertheless clearly possible to detect sequential thinking. Furthermore, taking the word "history" in requirement five literally, the present model of human motivation is also meaningful in terms of human evolution. The present theoretical framework exceeds human and animal existence and suggests that fundamental conditions important for our present existence were in fact present prior to the arrival of the animal species. Thus, it is easy to see that control and affiliation were important aspects of any species even before the recent appearance of humans. With our appearance, the inclusion of self-processes has further enriched the possible manifestation of human behaviour and added colourful variations in terms of individual differences.

The sixth requirement states that the general theory of motivation should be able to account for the endeavours for achievement and affiliative goals. I believe I have covered this here as well, as these concepts are a key part of the thinking in this book and have been extensively elaborated on in the previous chapters. Hence, the connection is relatively obvious, and further notes on these issues might at this point be redundant and repetitive.

And finally, the seventh requirement states that the general theory of motivation should consider some additional commonsense concepts. Weiner (1992, p. 364) mentions, for example, value, interest and importance, and this can be clearly connected to the introduction of self-expression as a fundamental motivation. In other words, self-expression is one such commonsense concept that in an overarching way includes the significance of expressing inner processes in terms of values, interests and importance, but also many other self-related processes. In many ways the commonsense aspect is perhaps part of the reason why self-expression is not recognised as a fundamental motivational concept. It is intuitive, nearly self-explanatory, widely used and common to all people. For illustrative purposes, let us say that someone suggested a few hundred years ago that the feeling of belonging is a fundamental motivational concept of scientific significance that consists of many sub-processes (i.e. attachment, love, intimacy) that are important to human functioning.

My guess is that a postulation of this type would have been ridiculed or ignored in many scientific circles on the grounds that it is obvious and therefore banal. However, following and adopting the suggestion of Weiner, I also posit that commonsense concepts and an explicit focus on the "bigger picture" (e.g. human development over time) should always be a part of any general theory of human motivation.

A Final Optimistic Note

Certainly, many of the postulations in the present book are presented in a generalized and simplified manner. Hence, it is obvious that these ideas need further theoretical refinement and calibration and, above all, development of empirical approaches that might provide support for the validity of present conclusions. Nevertheless, and disregarding any apparent theoretical and empirical obstacles, I believe that further exploration of the fundamental tendencies of human nature are an important area of scientific research, especially when it comes to cooperative contributions of theory and empirical support. Thus, we cannot expect to reveal basic non-observable processes solely by employing empirical procedures without the help of theory, assumptions and viable speculation. It is advisable that we let our knowledge penetrate behind visible and immediate triggers towards an understanding of the underlying origins of behaviour and eventually combine these two levels into a single, more extensive theoretical framework that (1) is coherent and (2) is useful or functional. However, if we are to make these advancements, human thought should be liberated from faulty premises. In Chap. 2, I mentioned the notion of God as a potential obstacle in developing viable models of human action. But the problem is bigger than that. Models that explain human nature should also be liberated from romanticised and self-centred views of human nature in which motivational processes that explain the behaviour of hominids are fundamentally different from other species and the manner in which basic physical forces influence everything around us. So in the end, there is a choice when it comes to how to read and understand the propositions in this book. One could easily take a pessimistic position considering that I tend to present human nature in relatively

gloomy colours. In simplified form I basically suggest that people are merely a dot, with reduced free will, in the chain of varying forms of existence, starting with non-living matter on to living creatures. It is easy to argue that humans indeed represent a very special dot that is situated in a somewhat superior place in that chain, but at the end of the day, human existence is just a dot. However, to balance this somewhat-depressing insight with the title of this concluding section (i.e. a final optimistic note), I firmly believe that the human need for knowledge is stronger than our innate self-centrism that often limits the expansion of general understanding, as shown during the history of thinking and development of science. Therefore, as underlined by many theorists previously, the ultimate quest of motivational theory continues to be to provide explanations of "everything" with as few constructs as possible, regardless of specific scientific tradition or discipline. The accumulated specific domain knowledge in the history of research on motivation gives a solid foundation and optimistic prospects for the future development of more integrative approaches.

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