

High-Skill Migration and Recession

Gendered Perspectives

Edited by

Anna Triandafyllidou

Irina Isaakyan



Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship

Series Editors: **Robin Cohen**, Former Director of the International Migration Institute and Professor of Development Studies, University of Oxford, UK, and **Zig Layton-Henry**, Professor of Politics, University of Warwick, UK.

Editorial Board: **Rainer Baubock**, European University Institute, Italy; **James F. Hollifield**, Southern Methodist University, USA; **Jan Rath**, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

The *Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship* series covers three important aspects of the migration process: Firstly, the determinants, dynamics and characteristics of international migration; secondly, the continuing attachment of many contemporary migrants to their places of origin, signified by the word 'diaspora'; and, thirdly, the attempt, by contrast, to belong and gain acceptance in places of settlement, signified by the word 'citizenship'. The series publishes work that shows engagement with and a lively appreciation of the wider social and political issues that are influenced by international migration.

Titles include:

Anna Triandafyllidou and Irina Isaakyan (*editors*)
HIGH-SKILL MIGRATION AND RECESSION
Gendered Perspectives

Cindy Horst, Godfried Engbersen, Maria Lucinda Fonseca and
Oliver Bakewell
BEYOND NETWORKS
Feedback in International Migration

Bridget Anderson and Vanessa Hughes (*editors*)
CITIZENSHIP AND ITS OTHERS

Bridget Anderson and Isabel Shutes (*editors*)
MIGRATION AND CARE LABOUR
Theory, Policy and Politics

Floya Anthias and Mojca Pajnik (*editors*)
CONTESTING INTEGRATION, ENGENDERING MIGRATION
Theory and Practice

Fiona Barker
NATIONALISM, IDENTITY AND THE GOVERNANCE OF DIVERSITY
Old Politics, New Arrivals

Loretta Bass
AFRICAN IMMIGRANT FAMILIES IN ANOTHER FRANCE

Michaela Benson and Nick Osbaldiston
UNDERSTANDING LIFESTYLE MIGRATION
Theoretical Approaches to Migration and the Quest for a
Better Way of Life

Glenda Bonifacio and Maria Kontos
MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS AND FAMILY LIFE
International Perspectives

Michael Collyer
EMIGRATION NATIONS
Policies and Ideologies of Emigrant Engagement

Daniel Conway and Pauline Leonard
MIGRATION, SPACE AND TRANSNATIONAL IDENTITIES
The British in South Africa

Rosie Cox (*editor*)
SISTERS OR SERVANTS
Au Pairs' Lives in Global Context

Saniye Dedeoglu
MIGRANTS, WORK AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION
Women's Labour in the Turkish Ethnic Economy

Asuncion Fresnoza-Plot and Itaru Nagasaka (*editors*)
MOBILE CHILDHOODS IN FILIPINO TRANSNATIONAL FAMILIES
Migrant Children with Similar Roots in Different Routes

Jane Garnett and Sondra L. Hausner
RELIGION IN DIASPORA
Cultures of Citizenship

Eleonore Kofman and Parvati Raghuram
GENDERED MIGRATIONS AND GLOBAL SOCIAL REPRODUCTION

Catrin Lundström
WHITE MIGRATIONS
Gender, Whiteness and Privilege in Transnational Migration

Majella Kilkey, Diane Perrons and Ania Plomien
GENDER, MIGRATION AND DOMESTIC WORK
Masculinities, Male Labour and Fathering in the UK and USA

Amanda Klekowski von Koppenfels
MIGRANTS OR EXPATRIATES?
Americans in Europe

Dominic Pasura
AFRICAN TRANSNATIONAL DIASPORAS
Fractured Communities and Plural Identities of Zimbabweans in Britain

Helen Schwenken and Sabine Ruß-Sattar
NEW BORDER AND CITIZENSHIP POLITICS

Shanthi Robertson
TRANSNATIONAL STUDENT-MIGRANTS AND THE STATE
The Education-Migration Nexus

Olivia Sheringham
TRANSNATIONAL RELIGIOUS SPACES
Faith and the Brazilian Migration Experience

Evan Smith and Marinella Marmo
RACE, GENDER AND THE BODY IN BRITISH IMMIGRATION CONTROL
Subject to Examination

Helen Taylor
REFUGEES AND THE MEANING OF HOME
Cypriot Narratives of Loss, Longing and Daily Life in London

Holly Thorpe
TRANSNATIONAL MOBILITIES IN ACTION SPORT CULTURES

Louise Waite, Gary Craig, Hannah Lewis and Klara Skrivankova
VULNERABILITY, EXPLOITATION AND MIGRANTS
Insecure Work in a Globalised Economy

Vron Ware
MILITARY MIGRANTS
Fighting for Your Country

Harald Bauder and Christian Matheis
MIGRATION POLICY AND PRACTICE
Interventions and Solutions

Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship

Series Standing Order ISBN 978-0-230-30078-1 (hardback) and

978-0-230-30079-8 (paperback)

(outside North America only)

You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above.

Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England

High-Skill Migration and Recession

Gendered Perspectives

Edited by

Anna Triandafyllidou

Professor, European University Institute, Italy

Irina Isaakyan

Research Associate, European University Institute, Italy

palgrave
macmillan



Selection and editorial matter © Anna Triandafyllidou and
Irina Isaakyan 2016

Individual chapters © Respective authors 2016

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2016 978-1-137-46710-2

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this
publication may be made without written permission.

No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted
save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence
permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency,
Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS.

Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication
may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this
work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First published 2016 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited,
registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke,
Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin's Press LLC,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies
and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States,
the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.

ISBN 978-1-349-56261-9 ISBN 978-1-137-46711-9 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9781137467119

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully
managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing
processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the
country of origin.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

High skill migration and recession : gendered perspectives /
Anna Triandafyllidou, Irina Isaakyan.

pages cm. — (Migration, diasporas and citizenship)

1. Skilled labor.
 2. Labor supply.
 3. Women—Employment.
 4. Women foreign workers.
 5. Women in the professions.
 6. Emigration and immigration—Economic aspects.
 7. Recessions.
- I. Triandafyllidou, Anna, editor. II. Isaakyan, Irina, 1970—editor.

HD5706.H535 2015

331.4086'912—dc23

2015023914

Contents

<i>List of Figures and Tables</i>	vii
<i>Preface</i>	x
<i>Notes on Contributors</i>	xii
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	xvi

Part I Female High-Skill Migration: Concepts and Dynamics

1 Female High-Skill Migration in the 21st Century: The Challenge of the Recession <i>Irina Isaakyan and Anna Triandafyllidou</i>	3
2 European Policies to Attract Talent: The Crisis and Highly Skilled Migration Policy Changes <i>Lucie Cerna and Mathias Czaika</i>	22
3 Female High-Skilled Emigration from Southern Europe and Ireland after the Crisis <i>Carmen González Enríquez and Anna Triandafyllidou</i>	44
4 Crisis and Beyond: Intra-EU Mobility of Polish and Spanish Migrants in a Comparative Perspective <i>Paweł Kaczmarczyk and Mikolaj Stanek</i>	69

Part II Female High-Skill Migration: A Sector-Specific Approach

5 Migration of Nurses and Doctors in the EU and the European Free Trade Association <i>Gilles Dussault, James Buchan and Isabel Craveiro</i>	103
6 Migration of Engineers and the Gender Dimension <i>Matthew Dixon</i>	124
7 Southern European Highly Skilled Female Migrants in Male-Dominated Sectors in Times of Crisis: A Look into the IT and Engineering Sectors <i>Ruby Gropas and Laura Bartolini</i>	160
8 International Students' Mobility, Gender Dimension and Crisis <i>Marta Moskal</i>	193

9	Exploring the Intersecting Impact of Gender and Citizenship on Spatial and Academic Career Mobility <i>Kyoko Shinozaki</i>	215
Part III Problems and Solutions: Towards a New Understanding of the Female High-Skill Migrant in Europe		
10	The Problem of Skill Waste among Highly Skilled Migrant Women in the UK Care Sector <i>Sondra Cuban</i>	241
11	American Women in Southern Europe: A New Source of High-Skill Workforce for the Eurocrisis Zone <i>Irina Isaakyan</i>	265
12	Re-Thinking the Gender Dimension of High-Skill Migration <i>Anna Triandafyllidou and Irina Isaakyan</i>	293
	<i>Index</i>	306

Figures and Tables

Figures

2.1	Salary thresholds and ratios compared to gross annual salaries per member state	30
3.1	Gender distribution per country of origin	50
3.2	Gender and age distribution	51
3.3	Field of studies and gender	52
3.4	Type of employment contract at the country of origin and gender	52
3.5	Reasons for leaving (multiple unlimited choice)	53
3.6	Type of occupation at the destination country and gender	55
3.7	Monthly income and gender	56
3.8	Monthly gross earnings among engineers	57
3.9	Monthly gross earnings among IT and computer professionals	57
3.10	Monthly gross earnings among economics, management and business professionals	58
3.11	Main destination countries	59
4.1	Real GDP growth rates of EU-27 and selected member states (%)	72
4.2	General government gross debt of EU-27 and selected member states (% of GDP)	74
4.3	Unemployment rates of EU-27 and selected member states in total active population and unemployment rates of active persons aged less than 25 (%)	75
4.4	Unemployment rates of tertiary-educated persons of EU-27 and selected member states	77
4.5	Stock of Polish and Spanish recent migrants in EU countries (2008–2014) (third quarter)	80
4.6	Stock of Polish and Spanish migrants in EU countries	82
4.7	Stock of recent Polish and Spanish migrants (three years or less since arrival) residing in the EU, selected age groups, 2008–2014 (third quarter)	83
4.8	Share of women among Polish and Spanish migrants in the EU (three years or less since arrival), 2008–2014 (third quarter)	84
4.9	Share of tertiary- and primary-educated persons among Polish and Spanish migrants in the EU (three years or less since arrival), 2008–2014 (third quarter)	85

4.10	Share of tertiary- and primary-educated persons among Polish and Spanish female migrants in the EU (three years or less since arrival), 2008–2014 (third quarter)	86
4.11	Occupational position of Polish and Spanish tertiary-educated female migrants in the EU (three years or less since arrival) 2008–2014 (third quarter)	87
6.1	Percentage of women in science and engineering professional occupations (ISCO 210) in EU member states, 1 – highest ‘Female Fraction’	148
6.2	Percentage of women in science and engineering professional occupations (ISCO 210) in EU member states, 2 – intermediate ‘Female Fraction’	149
6.3	Percentage of women in science and engineering professional occupations (ISCO 210) in EU member states, 3 – lowest ‘Female Fraction’	150
6.4	Percentage of women in science and engineering associate professional occupations (ISCO 310) in EU member states, 1 – highest ‘Female Fraction’	151
6.5	Percentage of women in science and engineering associate professional occupations (ISCO 310) in EU member states, 2 – intermediate ‘Female Fraction’	152
6.6	Percentage of women in science and engineering associate professional occupations (ISCO 310) in EU member states, 3 – lowest ‘Female Fraction’	153
7.1	Share (%) of degrees awarded to women, selected fields of study (2012)	164
7.2	Sector of employment before migration: Share on total employed by sex and country of origin (%)	173
7.3	Country/area of destination, by sex and country of origin	174
7.4	Share of employment before (in country of origin) and after emigration (at destination), by sex and country of origin	175
7.5	Type of employment after emigration (at destination), by sex and country of origin (only employed)	176
7.6	Income classes (€) after migration (at destination), by sex	176
7.7	Satisfaction with income after migration, by sex	177
9.1	‘Highly qualified’ category of migrants by gender	222
9.2	‘Highly qualified’ migrants from 2005 to 2013	222
9.3	The number of non-German academics at German HEIs	226
9.4	Academics in German HEIs by citizenship	227
9.5	Share of women academics in non-migrant and migrant academics	228

Tables

2.1	Immigration rate and gender composition of high-skilled immigrant stocks (in %)	32
2.2	High-skilled immigration under national schemes and EU Blue Card (in thousands)	33
2.3	Gender–pay gaps in the EU (in %)	36
3.1	Occupational situation and family status	54
3.2	Type of work contract	55
3.3	Difficulties faced at destination country (multiple unlimited choice), by gender and country of origin	60
3.4	Socio-demographic variables and gender	63
3.5	Labour market insertion and gender	64
4.1	Outflows from Spain by nationality and country of birth (2008–2014)	82
5.1	Push-and-pull factors motivating the decision to migrate	112
6.1	Structure of the engineering workforce	129
6.2	Broad work areas within some engineering ‘disciplines’ (showing some safety-critical/regulated specific activities)	134
6.3	Graduates from tertiary education, by field of education and sex, EU-28, 2011	146
6.4	Female percentages of engineering tertiary-education outcomes and in relevant workforce occupations, by country	147
7.1	Total and female emigration rate by country of birth (age 15+)	165
7.2	Highly skilled emigrants in engineering and IT, demographic characteristics by sex and country of origin	171
7.3	Share of employed respondents before migration, by sex and country of origin	172
7.4	Ordered logistic model for the level of income (odds ratios)	179
7.5	Logistic regression model – satisfaction with current income (odds ratios)	183
8.1	HE students in the UK in 2013/2014, by sex and selected domicile	195
8.2	HE postgraduate student enrolment in the UK in 2013/14	195
8.3	Top non-EEA countries in 2013/14 and 2012/13 for HE overseas students in the UK	196
8.4	Top EEA countries in 2013/14 and 2012/13 for HE overseas students in the UK	196
9.1	‘Highly qualified’ migrants from 2005 to 2013	221
9.2	Share of academics by citizenship and gender	228
10.1	Sample of 60 participants	245

Preface

The idea for this book emerged through long conversations and exchanges that took place during the course of Irina's Marie Curie Fellowship project '*FEMIDE: Female Migrants from Developed Countries in Southern Europe: A Study of Integration*'. *FEMIDE* was conducted under the auspices of the Marie Curie Actions Intra-European Fellowship (298752) in 2012–2014 and hosted by the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) at the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence, Italy. It looked at the processes of US- and British-national women living in Italy and Greece. Early on, while Irina was conducting interviews with Anglophone women in different parts of Italy and Greece, it emerged that even these highly educated women who usually migrate for personal reasons (marriage, love) faced important problems of labour market insertion as well as overall integration with their host societies. Indeed, it came as a surprise that highly skilled migrant women, usually with a stable residence status, had trouble securing employment in their area of expertise and were often met with suspicion. It was even more surprising that often these women were themselves very closed towards cultural diversity and came with several preconceptions about what was 'good' and what was 'bad' in life. Throughout their lives many went through processes of both acculturation and reskilling, only for their careers to be hampered by the economic crisis that has plagued Southern Europe in the last five years. This made both of us dig deeper into the emerging literature on the current global recession and on the Eurozone crisis, only to find that not much was written about women migrants, particularly highly skilled ones.

The *FEMIDE* project also showed that the category of highly skilled migrants is very slippery as one may be highly skilled and move without a visa or with a tourism visa, or one may be a marriage-migrant but apply for a highly skilled migrant status. We thus started questioning *who* actually the high-skill migrant is, *what specific problems* highly educated women migrants may have when facing the crisis and *what coping strategies* these migrants may develop. Initially, thinking about Anglophone women in Southern Europe, we eventually decided to look at other national contexts and professional sectors of female high-skill migration and to engage more scholars working across a range of academic disciplines in the reconceptualization of state-of-the-art women's high-skill migration in Europe.

We wanted to compare the experiences of both traditional and non-traditional female migrants in Europe, as well as to make further comparisons with the intra-EU migrations and between and within specific professional sectors of women's migration in terms of both the women's experiences and policy responses. This is how the idea of this inter-disciplinary book came to life. We have found a stimulating academic environment in the Global Governance Programme of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies of the EUI in Florence where we developed our arguments, recruited contributors and discussed draft versions. We would like to specially thank Sabrina Marchetti, Ruby Gropas, Laura Bartolini and Davide Calenda for the stimulating discussions and comments. *We greatly appreciate the financial support of the Marie Curie Intra-European Fellowship scheme (grant no. 298752).*

We dedicate this book to all the highly skilled women migrants in the EU, who are now struggling towards socio-economic integration and professional success within the extremely challenging environment of the global financial crisis.

Contributors

Laura Bartolini has been working as a research associate at the EUI's Global Governance Programme, Italy, since 2011 and collaborating with the International and European Forum on Migration Research Forum (Forum Internazionale ed Europeo di Ricerche sull'Immigrazione/FIERI) since 2013 on migrants' transnationalism and integration at Italian and European levels. She has worked for various NGOs and consultancies on development and migration issues in Italy and Spain, developing a sound knowledge of migrants' integration policies, economic transnationalism and quantitative data analysis.

James Buchan is Professor, Faculty of Health Sciences, Queen Margaret University, UK, and Adjunct Professor, WHO Collaborating Centre, University of Technology (UTS), Australia. He has 30 years of experience in policy analysis, research and consultancy in health-care human resources. He offers in policy advice to several ministries of health/governments on HR elements and the implications of health-sector reorganization and health-care reform.

Lucie Cerna is a research associate at the Centre for Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), University of Oxford, UK. Previously, she was a lecturer in politics at Merton College, University of Oxford, UK, and an assistant professor in global challenges (political economy) at Leiden University, the Netherlands. Her research interests include the political economy of skilled migration, the internationalization of higher education, innovation, comparative public policy and EU politics. In addition to her academic work, she has been a consultant for a number of international organizations.

Isabel Craveiro is a researcher at the Institute of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, New University of Lisbon, Portugal. Her areas of research focus on qualitative and mixed methods applied to social sciences and health research. She has professional experience in Portugal, Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. She has been involved in 16 national and international collaborative research projects financed by the EU and the Foundation for Science and Technology (Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia).

Sondra Cuban is a professor at Western Washington University, USA. She has published extensively on women and immigration. Her 2013 publication *Deskilling Migrant Women in the Global Care Industry* (Palgrave Macmillan) focuses on highly skilled immigrant women who were caregivers to older persons in England and their downward mobility in the

labour market. Her scholarship focuses on the nexus of economic justice and migrancy in the US.

Mathias Czaika is leading an interdisciplinary research group on ‘The Drivers and Dynamics of High Skilled Migration’ at the International Migration Institute (IMI), University of Oxford, UK, conducting research on the determinants of international migration processes and, in particular, on the role and relative importance of migration policy in shaping patterns of international migration. His current research interest is to understand international migration processes and the relative importance of migration policy.

Matthew Dixon is a fellow at the Centre on Skills, Knowledge and Organizational Performance (SKOPE), University of Oxford, UK. He is a skills policy researcher and consultant specializing in the labour markets for engineering and information technology (IT) skills. He has served in senior positions both in the UK and internationally, spanning various fields as public policy, research, development, technology transfer, training and enterprise support. Following eight years at an international policy research institute, he held senior positions in national-level knowledge transfer and technician training organizations for IT. He was awarded Honorary Fellowship of the British Computer Society and appointed an associate of the Engineering Council.

Gilles Dussault is a professor at the Institute of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (IHMT), Portugal, and Coordinator of the WHO Collaborating Centre on Health Workforce Policy and Planning. Before joining IHMT in 2006, he worked as Senior Health Specialist at the World Bank Institute, Washington DC. Between 1985 and 2000, he was Professor and Director of the Department of Health Administration, University of Montreal, Canada.

Carmen González Enríquez is a full professor at the National University of Distance Education, Spain, and Senior Analyst on Immigration at the think tank Elcano Royal Institute. She has taken part in several EU-funded research projects, such as ITHACA (Integration, Transnational Mobility and Human, Social and Economic Capital Transfers) and METOIKOS (Circular Migration Patterns in Southern and Central Eastern Europe: Challenges and Opportunities for Migrants and Policymakers).

Ruby Gropas is a research fellow in the Global Governance Programme of the EUI, Italy. She is a visiting professor at the College of Europe, Belgium, and holds a Lectureship in International Relations in the Law Faculty of the Democritus University of Thrace, Greece. She is currently working on European high-skill migration and transnational migration patterns. She holds a PhD from Cambridge University.

Irina Isaakyan is a research associate at the European University Institute, Italy, in the research area of Cultural Pluralism for the ITHACA (Integration, Transnational Mobility and Human, Social and Economic Capital Transfers) project. She recently completed her Marie Curie Intra-EU Fellowship awarded for the project *FEMIDE/Female Migration from Developed Countries in Southern Europe*. She holds a PhD from the University of Edinburgh, UK, and an MA from the University of Minnesota, USA. After completing her PhD, she received an ESRC (Economic and Social Research Council) Post-Doctoral Fellowship (2008–2009) for the study of European integration and new researchers' mobility in Scotland. In 2010, she researched the issues of integration and civic engagement of US-national academics in the United Kingdom. Before joining the European University Institute she was a reader at the Ryazan State Radio-Engineering University in Russia (2011–2012) and a research fellow at the University of Edinburgh (2008–2010). Her research interests include nationalism and diaspora studies, immigrants' identities and social remittances, and interpretive sociology.

Paweł Kaczmarczyk is Vice Director of the Centre of Migration Research and Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw, Poland. He was a member of the Board of Strategic Advisers to the Prime Minister of Poland (2008–2011). His main research areas include causes and consequences of labour migration (with special attention paid to analysis of migration processes in Central and Eastern European countries), highly skilled mobility, methodology of migration research, labour economics, international economics and migration policy.

Marta Moskal is Lord Kelvin Adam Smith Research Fellow in Social Sciences at the University of Glasgow, UK. She was Marie Curie Research Fellow at the Centre of Educational Sociology, University of Edinburgh, UK, and a lecturer in Social and Political Geography at the Institute for European Studies, Jagiellonian University, Poland. Her research focuses on the processes of international mobility and education from the perspective of culture, identity change and social inclusion.

Kyoko Shinozaki is a senior lecturer at the Faculty of Social Science, Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany. Between 2013 and 2014, she was a visiting professor in the Sociology of Culture at the Goethe University, Frankfurt. She has been looking at processes of contemporary international migration of both 'less-skilled' and 'skilled' flows. She is particularly interested in how these processes recreate and reconstitute inequalities along the intersecting divisions of 'race'/ethnicity, class and gender. Her long-standing area of research is migrant domestic and care workers and their transnational family life.

Mikolaj Stanek is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Coimbra, Portugal, with the FCT-funded project 'Comparative Study on the Segregation and Concentration of Immigrant Populations in European Labour Markets during Economic Crisis'. His current research interests include immigrants' labour market integration, international mobility patterns of post-communist populations, migrants' coping strategies and study of religious changes in post-authoritarian countries.

Anna Triandafyllidou is Professor at the Global Governance Programme (GGP) of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), European University Institute, Italy. Within the GGP, she coordinates the research area on cultural pluralism. Since 2002, she has been Visiting Professor at the College of Europe in Bruges. She is the editor-in-chief of the *Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies*. Her recent books include *Migrant Smuggling: Irregular Migration from Africa and Asia to Europe* (2012, co-authored with T. Maroukis, Palgrave Macmillan); *Irregular Migrant Domestic Workers in Europe: Who Cares?* (2013); *Circular Migration Between Europe and Its Neighbourhood: Choice or Necessity?* (2013); *The Greek Crisis and Modernity in Europe* (2013, with R. Gropas and H. Kouki, eds, Palgrave Macmillan; also in Greek, by Kritiki Publishing SA); *European Immigration: A Sourcebook* (2014, with R. Gropas, second edition); *Employers, Agencies and Migration: Paying for Care* (2014, with S. Marchetti); *What is Europe?* (2015, co-authored with R. Gropas, Palgrave Macmillan); *The Routledge Handbook on Immigration and Refugee Studies* (2015).

Abbreviations

APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
DBIS	Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (UK)
EHEA	European Higher Education Area
EMC	European Monitoring Committee (FEANI)
EMF	Engineers Mobility Forum
ENAAEE	European Network for Accreditation of Engineering Education
ETMF	Engineering Technologist Mobility Forum
EUR-ACE	EUROpean ACcredited Engineer
EUR ING	<i>European Engineer</i> title (awarded by FEANI)
FEANI	Fédération Européenne d'Associations Nationales d'Ingénieurs (European Federation of National Engineering Associations)
HR	Human Resources
IEA	International Engineering Alliance
IntET	International Engineering Technologist
IntPE	International Professional Engineer
ISCO	International Standard Classification of Occupations
MAC	Migration Advisory Committee (UK Home Office)
MPI	Migration Policy Institute (US-based)
MRPQ	Mutual Recognition of Professional Qualifications
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NMC	National Monitoring Committee (FEANI)
SKOPE	(Centre of Excellence for) Skills, Knowledge and Organizational Performance, University of Oxford
UKCES	United Kingdom Commission for Employment and Skills
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

Part I

Female High-Skill Migration: Concepts and Dynamics

1

Female High-Skill Migration in the 21st Century: The Challenge of the Recession

Irina Isaakyan and Anna Triandafyllidou

1.1 Introduction

‘When I was packing for Greece, I thought that my MBA from Harvard would allow me to easily find a good job in Athens, something like the chief executive officer or, at least, the project manager in a large firm.’ Georgia, who is now 47, moved from Boston to Greece in the mid-1990s, following her Greek husband. Since then, she has been helping her father-in-law with their family poultry business in a small Greek city, switching between the duties of their family-owned shop assistant and that of the housewife. Her co-national Vicky, who had grown up in Washington DC and received the law degree from the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), also moved to Southern Europe as a marriage-migrant to reunite with her Italian husband in Rome in the late 1990s and to discover eventually that she ‘has always been no more than a housewife’ there. Like Georgia, she admits, ‘It was not only the new language that I had to master. It was everything: the children, the in-laws, the local economy and the growing corruption. Many doors were closed for me from the very beginning.’ A former business executive from California, Odette, who arrived in Greece only five years ago and who has been unemployed all this time, concludes, ‘It is both very funny and sad to see that our American degrees have not been really demanded here.’

These testimonies come from a larger study (Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 2014) on Anglophone women who migrated to Italy and Greece in the last 20 years for personal or professional reasons. They testify to the difficulties that even highly skilled migrant women face in their insertion to the labour market and in maintaining the balance between family and work. Such skilled migration from more affluent to less affluent countries within Europe or from the United States (US) to Europe remains under-researched. However, it casts light on the important dynamics of de-skilling among university-educated women and complements those more acute cases of

downward socio-economic and professional mobility that migrant women from less developed countries experience in Europe or the US. Indeed, the de-skilling that Eastern European women experience in both Western and Southern Europe, where they are often employed as cleaners or carers regardless of their educational qualifications or previous work experience, has been extensively researched (Cuban 2013; Nikolova and Marouf 2010; Vianello 2013; Vouyioukas and Liapi 2013). Several studies actually document (Cuban 2013; Vianello 2013) the desire and hope of these highly skilled professionals from Georgia or Ukraine to find employment in their field of specialization, but the hope has seldom materialized.

According to the Eurostat release from 2011, almost 30% of all tertiary-educated migrants in Europe (which is around ten million) are over-qualified and de-scaled women of active working age. Alongside the structural and cultural factors that explain this disadvantage of high-skilled women migrants, the scholarly literature documents also the negative impact of the global financial crisis and related economic austerity measures on high-skill migration (HSM) (Arslan et al. 2014; Bettio 2012; Cerna 2010; Cerna and Hynes 2009; Ghosh 2013; Kofman 2013; Kuptsch 2012).

Generally speaking, HSM remains an underdeveloped area of research, particularly when applied to women as high-skill migrants (Boyd and Grieco 2003; Kofman 2012; 2013; Mahroum 2001; Morokvasic 1984; Piper 2008; Rubin et al. 2008). In this reference, Kofman (2013), however, notes that similar to the overall HSM scholarship, which has largely ignored the gender dimension, studies of the relationship between the current economic recession and HSM flows have been persistently gender blind. What particular socio-economic needs do highly skilled migrant women have when facing the crisis? What strategies of economic integration and re-skilling can they develop in such conditions? How does their ability to survive through or surrender to the crisis interact with the social structures of the family and community? To what extent is the European policy responsive to their problems while focusing on the post-crisis recovery?

Seeking the answers, this book explores the complex relationship between gender and HSM in general and focuses specifically on the impact of the current economic crisis on highly skilled female migrants. The purpose of the book is to produce new inter-disciplinary knowledge bringing together these three areas of research – *gender studies*, *recession scholarship* and *studies of high-skill migration* – that have so far developed in isolation. This book focuses specifically on the impact of the global financial crisis on the high-skill migration of women – an impact that is difficult to measure. It looks not only at typically gendered labour market sectors (such as nurses) but also at engineers, entrepreneurs or academics, with a special focus on the crisis-afflicted eurozone (which consists of Ireland and the four Southern European countries of Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal). Our findings lead to the development of a relevant research agenda on female HSM.

This chapter starts with a critical discussion about who is considered a highly skilled migrant and what kind of gender bias there can be behind such definitions and related policy measures targeting the ‘best and brightest’ of the world. We actually discuss in some more detail the gendered aspects of HSM policies before turning to the special challenge of gender, migration and the economic crisis that has affected during the last seven years both the more affluent and the less affluent countries across the world. Although we are focusing on Europe in relation to case studies and empirical data, non-EU countries such as Canada and the US are also discussed as part of the overall policy context. The chapter concludes by tying these threads together and outlining the specific research questions that this book poses and how these are addressed in the different chapters.

1.2 Beyond the HSM definition: Who and how many?

While the term ‘highly skilled migrant’ appears unambiguous at the first instance, there are several competing and complementary definitions of who the highly skilled migrants are or what is recognized as ‘high skills’ within a migration policy context. Indeed, high-skill migrants are broadly categorized as people with tertiary (college or university) education and beyond. However, it remains unclear whether this refers to the actual human capital (the education and professional skills) of the person or to the channel through which a migrant entered (or is applying to enter) a country or actually to the job that the highly skilled migrant does at the destination country. As already discussed briefly in the previous section, there is often a gap, particularly for women migrants, between their actual education or skills and their migration status.

Even among OECD countries where an effort for data standardization and comparative analysis is made, highly skilled migration categorizations often differ and thus related data on stocks and flows of highly skilled migrants may be missing. Indeed, some countries define the highly skilled by the level of education (Borjas 2003), while others by the occupation (Bouvier and Simcox 1994), while still others by the level of salary included in a job offer (see also Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 2014). Indeed, a mere definition of highly skilled migrants by the level of education is likely to include students, researchers, spouses and intra-company transferees, a highly heterogeneous group of people who are highly qualified. Thus, an education-focused definition of HSM tends to obscure the misrecognition of educational qualifications and professional experience that often highly skilled migrants are faced with. For example, immigrants may have completed their college education abroad but because of non-transferability of their credentials may be under-employed or ‘brain-wasted’ (Lowell 2006). Thus the question is not only who the high-skill migrant is but mostly how this status can be proven and what to do with this status after it is proven.

Combining the three criteria – educational level, sector of occupation and salary threshold – is often the strategy adopted by destination countries to ensure that migrants' actual qualifications will match their migration status (Batalova and Lowell 2007; Cerna 2010; Iredale 1994). As Lowell (2006) notes, 'the term "skilled workers" does not have the same meaning in different socioeconomic contexts' (e.g., the economic boom vs the current economic crisis).

The way in which a certain country's migration policy defines the eligibility criteria for entrance as 'highly skilled' has important implications for prospective migrants (IOM 2008; OECD 2012; Wiesbrock and Herczog 2010). Destination countries employ two basic strategies through which all HS immigration policies are designed: (a) the 'employer-driven' strategy and (b) the open or 'points-based' system.¹ Chaloff and Lemaitre (2009) note that most HSM in OECD countries (including Japan and the entire European Union (EU)) is employer-driven. An employer secures a job for a high-skilled immigrant before he/she is allowed to enter the country. This is an effort to specify the HSM definition and policy through the strategy of job placement: migrants are recognized as 'highly skilled' only after they find adequate jobs (in addition to professional qualifications and/or educational credentials). This employer-driven strategy reduces overall the number of HSM entries.

In addition to this strategy, some OECD countries (e.g., the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Denmark) implement points-based systems of entry where the human capital of the migrant is 'measured'. Naturally, in this case the entry is based on an assessment of the level of skills that the migrant worker brings but does not secure nor guarantee that the highly skilled migrant will find employment at his/her level of skills. One problematic aspect of the points-based system is that it does not take into account that younger people, for instance young professionals, may not have the necessary work experience to score high but may have a high innovation potential; or, for instance, that migrant women may have had limited professional experience because of childrearing but may still have higher education degrees and actually more versatility than employees.

Overall, one important puzzle both for HSM policy design and for analysing the dynamics of HSM is that of the matching of migrants' skills with an assigned policy category. The definitional problems outlined above are reflected in problems of measurement and analysis of HSM. While earnings can be precisely measured in concrete – although constantly state-modified – numbers, professional experience is usually the hardest to evaluate, especially when it comes to the assessment of soft skills (like team work, creativity, innovation and ability to learn). In this regard, it is important to remember that salaries and skills are gender-constructed in most cases. Women are often paid less than men and more often become the bearers of soft skills related to the feminized sectors of public services (Andall 2003; Kofman 2012; 2013). This means that they are, from the

very beginning, epistemologically excluded from the economically privileged category of high-skill migrants as they intrinsically have fewer chances to be appropriately evaluated on the qualification-and-income scale of entry, especially in times of economic austerity.

Depending on their economic and political prerogatives, different countries may place different emphasis on each of the above-mentioned criteria (see Chapter 2 by Cerna and Czaika, this book). While there is a delicate balance between education and qualifications, the majority of OECD countries base their HSM definitions on the criterion of education, and high-skill migrants are usually associated with tertiary-educated people (Batalova and Lowell 2007; Lowell 2001; Wiesbrock and Hercog 2010). Taking into account this rather broad definition, Arslan et al. (2014) note the overall improvement of the educational level of OECD immigrants: there are 35 million tertiary-educated foreign nationals in the EU, which is an unprecedented increase of 70% over the last ten years. Thirty per cent of these people are comprised of university-educated women of active working age. Moreover, their number grows rapidly and now shows an 80% increase over the last ten years, which is 17% higher than the increase of tertiary-educated male immigrants.

1.3 High-skill migration policy dynamics

Thinking about global migrations of highly skilled people, an interesting observation can be made about the dynamics of immigration law and the vulnerability of their status, especially during times of crisis. Whenever a crisis expands, migrants feel the most unprotected as they are subjected to downsizing and also to public xenophobia, which often act in tandem. On the one hand, immigrants are discursively constructed as scapegoats responsible for the economic downfall and unemployment in the host country (Ghosh 2013; Kofman 2012). On the other hand, they are often employed in the 'boom-and-bust' sectors of construction and therefore often become the first to be fired or placed in other types of discriminatory conditions, such as reduced payment or increased work hours (Khitarishvili 2013; UN 2014). In response to the deteriorating economy and the rise in migrant phobia, governments often impose bans on immigration and make restricted immigration part of their overall public policy (Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 2013; Johnson 2012; Soames and Field 2013). Immigration in general and high-skill immigration in particular have been historically impaired by economic crises, which can be illuminated by the immigration policy dynamics during the main three crises of the modern history: (1) the 1929 Great Depression, (2) the 1973 oil crisis and (3) the current global financial crisis.

In the aftermath of the huge post-First World War immigration wave to America and Europe, the Great Depression in 1929 immediately led to the restriction of entry to such countries as the US and Germany (Kofman 2013;

Wennersten 2008). Following the no-less global immigration wave within the post-Second World War context, the 1973 oil crisis then drastically changed the world economy and caused a new series of immigration law restrictions (Kubat 1993). Thus, in 1974, the formerly immigrant-friendly France enacted an immigration stop due to rising unemployment in the country, while Germany introduced a ban on the recruitment of skilled workers around the same time (Hammar 1985; Hollifield 1992).

In the 1990s, leading world economies were competing for international leadership and prestige and made HSM a strong tool for constructing competitive national knowledge economies (Ghosh 2013; Kofman 2013; Martin 2012). Attraction of skilled immigrants was especially important for European countries such as the UK, Germany and France, which soon became the global rivals of the US in their war over international talent and innovation. Even new immigrant states such as Greece and Italy started to attract HSM and attempted to develop their immigration laws.

The HSM-friendly environment changed quite radically in the late 2000s with the onset of the global financial crisis. This crisis, coupled with a dominant view of neo-liberal austerity policies aiming at fiscal balancing, has contributed to turning leading HSM magnets into quite restrictive hosts (De Witte 2013; Ghosh 2013; Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 2013; Kofman 2013). For example, in response to the crisis and to the immigrant application backlog, Canada modified – or severely restricted, to be more precise – its Federal Skilled Worker Program (FSWP) for HSM on 4 May 2013 (Boyd 2013; Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 2013). The FSWP is, nevertheless, probably one of the very few OECD schemes that tries to keep the balance between the restriction and naturalization of its immigrants. Thus, by showing maximum respect to the Canadian experience, the FSWP makes the transition from the student status to the HSM status automatic, which is in sharp contrast with Europe.

An interesting case of an OECD country that in a period of less than ten years has converted from being an international talent magnet to a closed labour market and an extremely restrictive HSM host is the UK. In 2008, the country introduced a rather flexible HSM policy associated with Tier 1 or the points-based system of entry. However, in 2010, the number of high-skill migrants became much higher than projected (255,000) and the new government started closing the doors to third-country nationals (TCNs) by imposing a very low cap on the number of permits for non-EU workers, which in reality is equivalent to almost null entry. As a result, the net high-skill immigration in 2012 was 163,000 persons (Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 2013; Martin 2012; Soames and Field 2013).

Adopted as the chief instrument for monitoring labour migration, the HSM control in the UK includes (1) complete erasure of Tier 1 (and consequently a more obstructed entry for new professionals); (2) establishment of persistently raised caps on HSM to non-EU nationals; and (3) incessant

reconsideration of the shortlist occupational list (Soames and Field 2013). Moreover, the latter two principles significantly limit the traditional work-permit entry to skilled migrants. Such over-nationalization of the British job market is under the direct influence of a negative public opinion on high-skill immigrants as ‘asylum seekers’ and ‘job stealers’, which is observed more and more frequently throughout the OECD countries (Soames and Field 2013). Even in the ‘promised land’ of the US, the H1B visa scheme for HSM is represented in mass media and perceived by the general tertiary-educated public as ‘a national abuse’ and ‘American middle class destruction’ (Johnson 2012). Although the current financial crisis is said to block low-skill migration to a much greater extent, HSM flows have been significantly affected while the economically desirable balance between restricting and sustaining international high-skill labour has not been successfully managed in Europe (Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 2013).

The eurozone countries that have been most hardly hit by the economic crisis (notably Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland) are losing their highly skilled youth who, faced with rampant unemployment rates, have chosen to emigrate (see also Chapter 3 by Triandafyllidou and González Enríquez and Chapter 7 by Gropas and Bartolini, this book; Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2014). It may be argued that the crisis has caused new HSM patterns from European countries to other continents. Media reports put the numbers of new emigrants from Southern Europe at extraordinarily high levels: 98,000 high-skill professionals are reported to have left Portugal since 2009 for the oil-rich Angola; 30,000 of their co-nationals are reported to have left for the construction-sector-welcoming Brazil; while 75,000 tertiary-educated people from Ireland and an estimated 50,000 high-skill Greeks are reported by the media to have moved to Australia (BBC 2013; Bugge and Simoes 2012; Khaaledi et al. 2013; Pidd 2011). The validity of these data is to be taken with a pinch of salt because they are based on journalistic reports or expert ‘guesstimates’ which are not substantiated by actual research (with the exception of the Irish case, see Glynn et al. 2013). The presence of a high-skilled labour force is strategically important for planning the post-crisis recovery in Europe, while there is extremely limited knowledge about the dynamics of such migration patterns and their impact upon the EU, as well as about the interaction between the austerity measures and emerging gender issues.

1.4 Female employment and economic crisis

In general terms, the relationship between recession and gender is rather controversial as women are portrayed as both victims and winners of austerity measures. The effect of an economic crisis upon female labour force participation (LFP) is not understood completely as there are various forces at play while directing women’s labour-market activity at such times (Ghosh

2013; Khitarishvili 2013; Kofman 2012; 2013). Specifically, in relation to the global financial crisis of 2008, there is a frequent false assumption – an epistemological illusion – that migrant women have been lesser victims of the current recession and downsizing than migrant men. The initial failure to recognize the changing dynamics of the recession – as well as the intrinsically gendered division of the labour market into the male-dominant economic sector (such as construction) and the female-dominant non-economic sectors (such as public spheres or the service sector) – has shaped the overall scholarly and public understanding that women might have experienced less damage from the recession than men and therefore should not be placed at the heart of any anti-crisis policy (Bettio 2012; UN 2014). The majority of studies have fallen insofar into the methodological trap of making speedy assumptions based entirely on the outcomes of the first stage of the crisis – during 2008–2010 (Khitarishvili 2013; UN 2014). This first wave of the crisis hit most severely the financial and construction sectors, known for traditional over-representation of men. Therefore, the pre-2010 reports on the crisis tend to conceptualize it as the ‘*he*-cession’ and associate its adverse effect and related recovery policy entirely with men (Baird and Williamson 2010; Rampell 2009; Salam 2009).

During the consequent two years, when the second wave of the recession hit, non-economic spheres of production, including the sectors of public and social services, were also affected. The 2010–2012 time shift has thus caused unrecognized – yet severe – damage to women, who have been traditionally employed in the public/service domain. Therefore, post-2010 studies and reports are making emergency calls for incorporating the gender aspect into post-crisis recovery politics and policymaking (Khitarishvili 2013; Rodino-Colocino 2014).

If to realistically assess the socio-economic suffering of women in Europe over the last five–seven years, the recession has actually had a triple negative effect upon their well-being. In addition to the unavoidable job losses within the de facto feminized public sector in 2010–2012, the unemployment of women has been caused by inappropriate policy planning, at the heart of which has been the reduction of the public sector. Also, the post-crisis recovery – with its emphasis on the economic production – is now gathering momentum much faster for men, whose unemployment has shown a 0.7% decline over the last three years, while that of women has been marked by a 0.5% increase (UN 2014). As a result of this compound effect on the European labour market, the historically male-favouring gender gap in employment has been persistently widening, having already reached a level higher than that before the crisis (Kofman 2012; Rodino-Colocino 2014; UN 2014).

The overall economic activity of women during austerity times is another complex issue. Many studies note the ‘discouraged worker effect’, associated with high unemployment rates during any recession and consequent uneasy

transition back to the labour market as a result of such prolonged inactivity (Bettio 2012; Khitarishvili 2013; UN 2014). It means that women, who have been downsized and jobless over the last few years, may eventually feel discouraged because they were de-skilled and therefore not competitive enough to resume their job search after the crisis.

At the same time, scholars note the frequently increased LFP of women across time shifts and nation-state contexts at such austerity moments. For example, the largest female LFP was observed in 1993–1995 in Buenos Aires during the Mexican Peso Crisis of the 1990s (Cerrutti 2000; Skoufias and Parker 2005). Scholars often attribute such growth to the ‘added worker effect’ of the crisis, meaning that women enter the job market temporarily to compensate for temporal unemployment of their husbands and thus turn into ‘additional workers’ or men’s ‘substitutes’ (Khitarishvili 2013; Skoufias and Parker 2005). There is an implication here that such LFP success is short term and cyclical as it is related to a particular phase of a crisis rather than to women’s ability to resist the crisis. Scholars also admit that during such times, employers often welcome the cyclical ‘buffering’ of women: as temporary employees, they are usually paid much less than men and may not demand improvement of working conditions. They are actually expected to return to their housewife role once the crisis has passed.

It can be assumed from the discussion above that, regardless of imposed austerity measures, women are always subjected to gender discrimination in employment. Even the added-worker effect, which seems to welcome women to the job market while men are jobless, is very deeply gender-constructed as women, from the very beginning, are assumed to be bound to their households and active only on temporary – substitute – grounds. Thus, from the very beginning, women seem to be constructed as outsiders to the high-skill professional category. The political interest in saving and raising the national economy on the basis of women buffers’ lesser salaries is another confirmation of the extremely gendered imagination of the public and the state, through which various forms of gender discrimination against women and inappropriate employment conditions for them are constantly reproduced.

Deterioration of working conditions for women is another critical issue related to their economic activity during times of crisis. Especially now, more and more qualified women are being placed in insecure (such as short-term contracts, low salaries and unsalaried/informal work) and even dangerous conditions (such as informal work) (Arslan et al. 2014; Bettio 2012; Cuban 2013; Kofman 2012; 2013).

The persistent gender bias in employment and the cyclical nature of career success for women also add to key attributes of their international mobility. The de-scaling of women migrants is a common feature of their migration, which has become extremely acute during the current recession. It has been generally noted that many highly educated women (including nurses

and doctors) may work within the lower-level employment sector, such as domestic work in emigration (Cuban 2013; Marchetti 2014). In this reference, studies prove that, more than ever before, women migrants now suffer from the labour market double disadvantage or unfair treatment on the job market and/or in employment compared to both local women and foreign men (Cuban 2013; Ghosh 2011; 2013; Khitarishvili 2013; King and Sweetman 2010; Kofman 2012; 2013; Kuptsch 2012; Rubin et al. 2008; Solimano 2008). Moreover, due to the currently restricted work-permit quotas in destination countries and stricter return programmes (specifically in the EU), highly skilled female migrants are the first to be fired and therefore the first to forcefully return and/or enter illegal work (Arslan et al. 2014; OECD 2012).

There are thus unnoticed points of intersection between the flows of high-skill migration and low-skill migration, while women's migratory trajectories in the current milieu are especially illuminative of this trend. The complexity is compounded by the unconventionality of their migration biographies, to which is added the current recession and related uncertainty of their social status. For instance, foreign women may enter the EU as students or work-permit-holding professionals but convert to family migrants (upon marriage) only to reconvert to low-skill or disqualified migrants in the course of their further settlement (Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 2013).

1.5 Gender, migration and recession: What this book is about

Thinking about current HSM flows and policies across crisis-stricken Europe, Kofman (2013, p. 116) notes that although women migrate more often than men, labour migration policies, including EU policies, do not specifically respond to their needs and remain highly gendered in their general construction. The long-standing gender differences in salaries and the traditionally gendered economic divisions of labour cannot be appropriately reflected in existing HSM definitions. Bettio (2012) concludes that, despite recognizing the importance of gender equality in both employment and immigration policy, policymakers are unable to find solutions based on the gender balance and therefore fail to design gender-sensitive policies on either high-skill labour force or HSM.

The problem is that the impact of the current financial crisis on female high-skill migration is particularly difficult to pin down. One challenge is of a methodological nature. HSM is generally hard to measure due to the absence of reliable databases (Arslan et al. 2014; Chaloff and Lemaitre 2009; Haas 2012; Lowell 2001). Highly skilled women migrants are especially difficult to study because of their frequent 'irregular migrant' status and because of the above-mentioned instability of their professional situation (Cuban 2013; Kofman 2012).

The complexity is compounded by the difficulty in evaluating the immediate effects of the global economic crisis as researchers have not managed

to follow the rapidly changing labour market situation and the related developments in migration law (Ghosh 2011; 2013). Even the most recently published studies of HSM (e.g., Cuban 2013; Halkias et al. 2010; Labrianidis 2010) are actually based on fieldwork and/or desk research conducted, in the majority of cases, either before or at the very beginning of the crisis. That is why it has been so far very problematic to find answers to a number of strategically important questions. In what ways has female HSM been affected by the crisis? How do HSM policies shape related flows and what are the overall lessons that we learn from past and current high-skill migratory flows?

This book explores the complex relationship between HSM and times of recession while particularly addressing the gender dimension and the European context. *The purpose of this book is to produce new inter-disciplinary knowledge about the gendered features of HSM, for instance its overlaps with family-related migration as well as its connections with atypical forms of mobility like au pair work; the dynamics of highly skilled female migration in sectors that are typically male dominated (like engineering) versus sectors where women play a leading role (such as medical jobs and paramedics or academics); and the impact of the global crisis on female high-skill migration in a variety of labour market areas.*

Our book brings together research at the forefront of labour market developments, focusing (a) on specific labour market sectors (nurses/doctors, engineers, academics and entrepreneurs, see chapter outline in the following paragraphs for details) and (b) on specific sets of countries (notably female HSM between OECD countries and also emigration from the crisis-ridden countries of the EU (Southern Europe and Ireland)). The book has a double focus: on the one hand, it discusses female high-skill migration and its dynamics in specific sectors and geographical areas; on the other hand, it takes a sector-specific approach while particularly concentrating on the impact of the crisis on specific job sectors.

From the empirical point of view, this book focuses on the case of the crisis-afflicted eurozone, which consists of Ireland and the South European countries of Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain. These five countries are characterized by the highest levels of public and private debt in the EU (De Witte 2013; Ghosh 2013). This is compounded by the highest in the EU rates of labour market disadvantage for (migrant) women, particularly in the Southern European states (Rubin et al. 2008). *With regard to Europe, we thus look particularly at the emigration of highly skilled women from the most crisis-afflicted countries (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain) (see Chapter 3 by Triandafyllidou and González Enríquez; and Chapter 7 by Gropas and Bartolini, this book).*

While placing emphasis on European immigration and drawing from the most recent empirical data from the crisis-afflicted eurozone, the book also touches upon the transatlantic aspect of female high-skill migration, looking at North American women in Southern Europe, at foreign female students and researchers in the UK and Germany, and at the problem of

skill wastage of highly skilled women employed in the domestic work sector in the UK. All the chapters highlight the complex transcontinental dynamics of high-skill female migration into and out of developed countries (see Chapter 10 by Cuban, Chapter 11 by Isaakyan, Chapter 9 by Shinozaki, this book).

The book is organized into three parts. Part I offers an overview of female HSM during the global financial crisis by looking at the broader picture, introducing basic definitions and concepts and discussing policy developments (Chapter 2) and regional trends in Southern, Central, Eastern and Western Europe (chapters 3 and 4).

Chapter 2 provides a comparative overview of various national and supra-national HSM policy initiatives that have been implemented across Europe over the last two decades, with a particular focus on the recent years after the global financial and economic crises. In addition, Cerna and Czaika look at how these policies may affect disadvantaged (highly skilled) female migrants, for instance, by implementing certain salary threshold levels or by providing preferential access to male-dominated occupations such as IT, science or engineering. The chapter offers a new perspective on HSM policies during the crisis and their impact on the gender composition of high-skilled migration.

Chapter 3 moves the focus from the comparative policy analysis to the comparative macrosociological analysis by studying patterns of emigration of highly skilled women from Southern Europe and Ireland in the last five years, notably from 2007 till 2013, based on both quantitative and qualitative data from a large-scale e-survey conducted in these countries. The analysed dataset comes from an e-survey conducted in five countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) in 2013. Comparing the socio-demographic profiles of men and women, Triandafyllidou and *González Enríquez* examine specific motivations and experiences that characterize female high-skill mobility. The authors investigate the socio-demographic features that influence the emigration project of highly skilled migrant women (family status, area of studies) and their success (employment situation, level of income, prospects for the future) and show that, along with gender, it is the professional sector that often determines women's migration trajectory, type of work contract and level of income.

The patterns of female HSM are further explored in Chapter 4, which compares the current intra-European emigration flows from Eastern and Southern Europe. Specifically looking at novel patterns of post-enlargement mobility in the EU, Kaczmarczyk and Stanek seek to assess the scale, dynamics and structure of migration from Poland and Spain in the post-2008 period. They also analyse how migrants from these countries – particularly those well-endowed with human capital – responded to changing economic conditions. The authors argue that significant differences in the post-crisis migration patterns of Poles and Spaniards are attributable mostly

to the labour market dynamics in the countries of origin and, specifically, to absorptive capacities with regard to the well-educated and younger part of the population.

Based on the insofar provided background information and facilitated by the discussion from the above section, Part II adopts a sectorial approach in looking at doctors and paramedics (Chapter 5), engineers (chapters 6 and 7) and academic staff (chapters 8 and 9). Their mobility is explored against different host-country settings: the overall context of Europe and, more specifically, the Southern European region, illuminated by Italy and Greece and compared with such Western European countries and leading global talent magnets as the UK and Germany. In this part, chapters 5–7 concentrate on two different sectors: doctors and nurses, a sector where the female presence is strong, and the engineering sector, one where women are clearly a numerical minority.

Chapter 5 focuses on the migration of female nurses and physicians to, within and out of EU/EFTA countries in terms of volume and direction of migratory flows and of reasons to migrate. Dussault and colleagues argue that nurses are the largest group of migrants who tend to be young and single. The reasons for migration tend to be the same for men and women. Reportedly, it is more difficult for migrating nurses than for physicians to have their qualifications recognized, but this appears to relate to variations in training modalities rather than gender. Nurses also have a greater probability than doctors to work at a level below their qualifications. The authors conclude that it is unclear whether the current economic crisis has a more negative impact on migrating female doctors and nurses.

Chapter 6 moves to the analysis of the engineering workforce and the context of migration of engineers and technicians. Dixon explains factors that create barriers to the international mobility of professional engineers and technicians and the measures undertaken, by both intergovernmental cooperation and the profession itself, to tackle these barriers within Europe and beyond. First, he examines the economic aspects of the migration of engineers and then presents evidence on what is known about the gender make-up within different countries of key engineering occupations as well as of relevant tertiary education. The chapter summarizes factors that affect the gender dimension of engineering migration and prepares the epistemological background for the discussion later provided in Chapter 7.

In Chapter 7, Gropas and Bartolini specifically look at high-skilled migrant women from Greece, Spain and Portugal with university degrees in engineering and IT. The authors use new quantitative and qualitative data from an e-survey they conducted to explore where they are migrating to, the characteristics of their migratory experience and whether their employment situation (form and type of employment, career development and prospects) has changed through their migration. Gropas and Bartolini examine the

impact of the crisis and the extent to which these women are satisfied with their current situation.

Chapters 8 and 9 then look at the issue of academic mobility in the UK and Germany, which at the moment have adopted quite different immigration policies. In Chapter 8, Moskal examines how students' migration, frequently synonymous to highly skilled mobility, constitutes the largest category of migration to the UK during the current economic downturn. The requirements of the globally integrated economy (the global competitiveness of the education sector) are currently at odds with UK policy on immigration, which aims at reducing the numbers of international students and slowing down their progression in the UK. The chapter draws on a longitudinal study that investigates the drivers and resources of students' international mobility to the UK's universities and the challenges they confront upon graduation. Moskal explores the role of mobility for education as an integrated part of individual life projects, and the future opportunities linked to these projects. She stresses the gender-differentiated nature of experiences of international postgraduate students in relation to socio-economic barriers and opportunities they encounter in the UK in the milieu of the global financial crisis.

Developing the theme of academic mobility further, Chapter 9 offers a gendered analysis of spatial and academic career mobility in the context of Germany – a country, which, despite its historical experience of being a country of immigration, has officially proclaimed to be an immigrant state only recently. The liberalization of German immigration policy can be understood as skill-based or rather skill-*biased*, which is in official discourses being argued as a response to its demographic deficits as well as an (alleged) crisis related to skilled labour shortages. Even if there is no explicit reference to gender in skill-based immigration law and regulations, flows into (highly) skilled sectors are male dominated. Using the sector of tertiary education and science as an example, Shinozaki explores the role gender and citizenship play in their intersection when shaping spatial and academic career mobility.

In a summative note, the three chapters presented in Part III engage in a discussion about the basic problems around female HSM and explore ways towards their solution. Chapter 10 addresses the persistent and intersecting problems of gender discrimination, de-skilling and consequent underemployment. Looking at the experiences of highly skilled US national women in Italy and Greece, Chapter 11 relates to their survival strategies such as re-skilling and ethnic entrepreneurship (the latter developing as a strong counter-flow to the European crisis).

The latest OECD (Arslan et al. 2014) report shows that 30% of tertiary-educated migrants in OECD countries are found to be overqualified in their current jobs, while the widespread practice of recruiting highly skilled migrant women for care work has been a major strategy for the new global care industry. In this reference, Chapter 10 discusses the ways the domestic

care sector in the UK incorporates the labour of highly skilled migrant women. Here Cuban explores the reasons for why professional women migrated for jobs for which they were overqualified and what strategies they used to manage both their decisions and disappointments. According to Arslan et al. (2014), there are at the moment 25 million and 27 million migrants from Asia and Latin America respectively – the regions the majority of tertiary-educated migrants originate from. Based on narrative interviews with 60 women who migrated to the UK from selective care-labour-exporting countries of Asia and Latin America (e.g., India and the Philippines), Cuban's research challenges notions of upward mobility of transnationals and the highly skilled as a privileged group. The author shows that although these women initially migrated for opportunities, they lost ground in the process of becoming care assistants and were paralyzed to move forward in their careers; the place that highly educated women took hold segmented their experiences in the host country.

The problem of surviving through under-scaling is further analysed in Chapter 11, yet with a focus on success stories of non-traditional women migrants. The chapter pays attention to the fact that amidst the global migration flows of the highly skilled, there is an under-researched – though not quite new – tendency of the reversed transatlantic migration which is intensified in crisis-like contexts. To what extent can they be used as a course of competitive advantage for Europe, which is hardly surviving the current crisis? Seeking to answer this question, Isaakyan studies the experiences of economic integration and entrepreneurship of 50 US national women who live in the Euro-crisis countries of Italy and Greece. The chapter explores the interaction between such concepts as 'entrepreneurship', 'ethnic niche', 'crisis' and 'patriarchy'. Despite having come to Southern Europe not always on the high-skill work permit, the informants have managed to convert themselves into successful – although unusual – 'ethnic entrepreneurs' who can create their own labour-market niche and therefore resist the crisis.

The concluding chapter (Chapter 12) provides an overview of female HSM dynamics and trends, their interaction with policy developments overall and particularly under the current crisis, and develops a reconceptualization of the HSM phenomenon in the light of the new knowledge formulated in the chapters of this book. Triandafyllidou and Isaakyan conduct a critical reflection on who a high-skill migrant actually is – particularly so when thinking about highly skilled women in emigration. The authors stress the fact that real-life situations are more complex and more fluid than static policy definitions and that applied social science research needs to provide for necessary evidence that can lead to appropriate (flexible and focused) policy measures that can make the most of (female) HSM for the benefit of migrants themselves, the countries of destination and if possible also the countries of origin. On a final note, the chapter outlines an inter-disciplinary research agenda for studies of female HSM.

Note

1. The 'employer-driven strategy' means that the migrant can enter the country of destination only when he or she has a concrete job offer from a specific employer. On the contrary, the 'points-based system' provides high-skill migrants with access to the country independently from the job offer: the high-skill migrant is expected to have a number of qualifications (e.g., age, education, professional experience, etc.) for which he or she is awarded points to further qualify for the entry. For more detail, see Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou (2013).

References

- Andall, J. (2003) 'Introduction: The Space between Gender Politics and Immigration Politics in Europe', in J. Andall (ed.) *Gender and Ethnicity in Contemporary Europe* (Oxford/New York: Berg Publishers), pp. 1–22.
- Arslan, C., J.-C. Dumont, Z. Kone, Y. Moullan, C. Ozden, C. Parsons, T. Xenogiani. (2014) 'A New Profile of Migrants in the Aftermath of the Recent Economic Crisis', *OECD Social Employment and Migration Working Papers 160*. Available online at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jxt2t3nnjr5-en> (accessed: 2 April 2015).
- Baird, M. and S. Williamson (2010) 'Women, Work and Industrial Relations in 2009', *Journal of Industrial Relations*, 52(3), 355–369.
- Batalova, J. and L. Lowell (2007) 'Immigrant Professionals in the United States', *Society*, 44(2), 26–31.
- BBC (2013). 'Portuguese Flee Economic Crisis', *BBC News* 25 January 2013. Retrieved 7 April 2015, from: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-21206165>.
- Bettio, F. (2012) *The impact of the Economic Crisis on the Situation of Women and Men and on Gender Equality Policies. Synthesis Report of the Expert Group on Gender and Employment for the Directorate-General for Justice of the European Commission*. Available online at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/documents/130410_crisis_report_en.pdf (accessed: 2 April 2015).
- Borjas, G. (2003) 'The Labor Demand Curve is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market', *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 118(4), 1335–1374.
- Bouvier, and D. Simcox (1994) *Foreign-Born Professionals in the United States* (Washington, DC: Center for Immigration Studies).
- Boyd, M. (2013) 'Recruiting High Skill Labour in North America: Policies, Outcomes and Futures', *International Migration*, 52(3), 40–53.
- Boyd, M. and E. Grieco (2003) 'Women and Migration: Incorporating Gender into International Migration Theory', *Migration Information Source* 03/01/2003. Available online at: www.migrationinformation.org/feature/print.cfm?ID=106 (accessed: 7 April 2015).
- Bugge, A. and E. Simoes (2012). 'Feature – Biting Crisis Drives Portuguese to Brazil', *Reuters* 14 March 2012. Retrieved 7 April, 2015, from: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/14/portugal-emigration-idUSL5E8E8BV120120314>.
- Cerna, L. (2010) 'Policies and Practices of Highly Skilled Migration in Times of the Economic Crisis', *ILO International Migration Papers 99*. Available online at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---migrant/documents/publication/wcms_179666.pdf (accessed: 2 April 2015).
- Cerna, L. and W. Hynes (2009) 'The Deeper Impact of the Economic Crisis: Changes in High-Skilled Immigration Policies', in *COMPAS Annual Conference*. Oxford,

- UK, 21–22 September 2009. Available online at: http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/files/Events/Annual_conferences/conference_2009/H_Cerna-Hynes_High%20skilled%20Immigration%20Policies.pdf (accessed: 2 April 2015).
- Cerrutti, M. (2000) 'Economic Reform, Structural Adjustment and Female Labour Force Participation in Buenos Aires, Argentina', *World Development*, 28(5), 879–891.
- Chaloff, J. and G. Lemaître (2009) 'Managing Highly-Skilled Labour Migration: A Comparative Analysis of Migration Policies and Challenges in OECD Countries', *OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers No. 79* (Paris: OECD Publishing).
- Cuban, S. (2013) *Deskilling Migrant Women in the Global Care Industry* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan).
- De Witte, B. (2013). 'Using the law in the Euro Crisis Causes and Consequences', *ARENA Working Paper No 4*. Available online at: <http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-publications/workingpapers/working-papers2013/wp4-13.pdf> (accessed: 2 April 2015).
- Ghosh, B. (2013) *The Global Economic Crisis and the Future of Migration: Issues and Prospects. What Will Migration Look Like in 2045?* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Ghosh, B. (2011) *The Global Economic Crisis and Migration: Where Do We Go From Here?* (Geneva: International Organization for Migration).
- Glynn, I., T. Kelly and P. MacEinri (2013) Irish Emigration in an Age of Austerity, *Report for the Émigré project*. Available online at: <http://static.rasset.ie/documents/news/emigration-in-an-age-of-austerity.pdf> (accessed: 6 May 2015).
- Haas, H. (2012) 'Migration and Development Pendulum: A Critical View on Research and Policy', *International Migration*, 50(3), 8–25.
- Halkias, D. et al. (eds.) (2010) *Female Immigrant Entrepreneurs: The Economic and Social Impact of a Global Phenomenon* (Farnham, UK: Gower Publishing Ltd.).
- Hammar, T. (1985) *European Immigration Policy: A Comparative Study* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press).
- Hollifield, J.F. (1992) *Immigrants, Markets, and States: The Political Economy of Postwar Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
- IOM/International Organization for Migration (2008) *World Migration 2008: Managing Labour Mobility in the Evolving Global Economy* (Geneva: IOM).
- Iredale, P. (1994) *The Policy Challenge of Ethnic Diversity: Immigrant Politics in France and Switzerland* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
- Isaakyan, I. and A. Triandafyllidou (2013) High-Skill Mobility: Addressing the Challenges of the Knowledge-Based Economy at Times of Crisis. *RSCAS Policy Papers 2013/14*. Available online at: http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/27706/RSCAS_PP_2013_14.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed: 3 April 2015).
- Isaakyan, I. and A. Triandafyllidou (2014) 'Anglophone Marriage-migrants in Southern Europe: A Study of expat nationalism and integration dynamics', *International Review of Sociology*, 24(3), 374–390.
- Johnson, F. (2012) *Big Step Forward on High-Skilled Immigration Bill*. Available online at: <http://www.nationaljournal.com/thenextamerica/immigration/big-step-forward-on-high-skilled-immigration-bill-20120712> (accessed: 7 April 2015).
- Khaaledi, H., H. Smith, and D. Smith (2013). 'The Great Escape: European Migrants Feeling the Recession', *The Guardian* 13 January 2013. Retrieved 7 April 2015, from: <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/jan/30/great-escape-european-migrants-fleeing-recession>.

- Khitarishvili, T. (2013) 'The Economic Crisis of 2008 and the Added Worker Effect in Transition Countries', in Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, *GEM-IWG summer seminar*. Krakow, Poland, 16–18 July 2013. Available online at: <http://www.gem-europe.eu/attachments/article/1035/Tamar%20Khitarishvili.pdf> (accessed: 3 April 2015).
- King, R. and C. Sweetman (2010) 'Gender Perspectives on the Global Economic Crisis', *Oxfam International Discussion Papers*, February 2010. Available online at: <http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/gender-perspectives-global-economic-crisis-feb10.pdf> (accessed: 6 May 2015).
- Kofman, E. (2013) 'Towards a Gendered Evaluation of (Highly) Skilled Immigration Policies in Europe', *International Migration*, 52(3), 116–128.
- Kofman, E. (2012) 'Gender and skilled migration in Europe', *Cuadernos de Relaciones Laborales*, 30(1), 63–89.
- Kubat, D. (ed.) (1993) *The Politics of Migration Policies, Settlement and Integration: The First World into the 1990s* (New York: Center for Migration Studies).
- Kuptsch, C. (2012) 'The Economic Crisis and the Labour Migration Policy in European Countries', *Comparative Population Studies*, 37(1–2), 15–32.
- Labriandis, L. (2010) 'Migrant Entrepreneurship in Greece: Diversity of Pathways for Emerging Ethnic Business Communities in Thessaloniki', *International Migration and Integration*, 11(2), 193–217.
- Lowell, L. (2006) 'High Skill Mobility: Changes and Challenges', in United Nations *International Symposium on International Migration and Development*. Turin, Italy, 28–30 June 2006. Available online at: http://www.un.org/esa/population/migration/turin/Turin_Statements/LOWELL.pdf (accessed: 3 April 2015).
- Lowell, L. (2001) 'Policy responses to the international mobility of skilled labour', *International Migration Papers* 45 (Geneva: ILO). Available online at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---migrant/documents/publication/wcms_201774.pdf (accessed: 3 April 2015).
- Mahroum, S. (2001) 'Europe and the Immigration of Highly Skilled Labour', *International Migration*, 39(5), 27–43.
- Marchetti, S. (2014) *Black Girls: Migrant Domestic Workers and Colonial Legacies* (Leiden, NL/Boston, MA: Brill).
- Martin, P. (2012) 'Attracting Highly Skilled Migrants: US Experience and Lessons for the EU', *CARIM-India Research Report 2012/01*. Available online at: <http://www.india-eu-migration.eu/media/CARIM-India%20RR2012-01.pdf> (accessed: 3 April 2015).
- Morokvasic, M. (1984) 'Birds of Passage are also Women', *International Migration Review*, 18(4), 886–907.
- Nikolova, M. and M. Maroufouf (2010) 'Georgian and Ukrainian Migrants in Greece' in A. Triandafyllidou and T. Maroukis (eds.) *Migration in 21st Century Greece* (Athens: Kritiki, in Greek), pp. 339–381.
- OECD (2012) *Connecting with Emigrants: A Global Profile of Diasporas*. Available online at: <http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2012/11326.pdf> (accessed: 3 April 2015).
- Piper, N. (2008) 'Feminisation of Migration and the Social Dimensions of Development: The Asian Case', *Third World Quarterly*, 27(9), 1287–1303.
- Pidd, H. (2011) 'Europeans Migrate South as Continent Drifts Deeper into Crisis', *The Guardian* 21 December 2011. Retrieved 7 April 2015, from: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/21/europe-migrants-crisis-irish-portuguese>.
- Rampell, C. (2009) 'The Mancession', *Economix The New York Times*, 10 August 2009. Available online at: <http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/10/the-manceSSION/> (accessed: 3 April 2015).

- Rodino-Colocino, M. (2014) 'The Great he-cession: Why Feminists Should Rally for the End of White Supremacist Capitalist Patriarchy', *Feminist Media Studies*, 14(2), 343–347.
- Rubin, J., M. Rendall, L. Rabinovich, F. Tsang, C. van Oranje-Nassau, B. Janta. (2008) *Migrant Women in the European Labour Force: Technical Report Prepared for the European Commission* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation). Available online at: http://www.google.it/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCEQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fec.europa.eu%2Fsocial%2FfbiobServlet%3FdocId%3D2098%26langId%3Den&ei=-FKJVD-mNcvtUva5tPgD&usg=AFQjCNFJuvF7Tk6NrHF9C2MqM6ZOILa_Tw (accessed: 23 June 2015).
- Salam, R. (2009) 'The Death of Macho', *Foreign Policy*, 22 June 2009. Available online at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/18/the_death_of_macho (accessed: 3 April 2015).
- Skoufias, E. and S. Parker (2005) 'Job Loss and Family Adjustments in Work and Schooling During the Mexican Peso Crisis', *Journal of Population Economics*, 19(1), 163–181.
- Soames, N. and F. Field (2013) 'Britain can't Afford this Level of Immigration', *The Telegraph*, 28 March 2013. Available online at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/9959813/Britain-cant-afford-this-level-of-immigration.html> (accessed: 3 April 2015).
- Solimano, A. (ed.) (2008) *The International Mobility of Talent. Types, Causes, and Development Impact* (Oxford, UK: WIDER Studies in Development Economics, Oxford University Press).
- Triandafyllidou, A. and Gropas, R. (2014) "Voting with their Feet": Highly Skilled Emigrants from Southern Europe, *American Behavioral Scientist*, November 2014, 58, pp. 1614–1633, first published online, 27 May 2014, doi:10.1177/0002764214534665.
- UN WOMEN (2014) *The Global Economic Crisis and Gender Equality* (New York: UN Women). Available online at: <http://www.unwomen.org/~media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2014/theglobaleconomiccrisisandgenderequality-en%20pdf.ashx> (accessed: 3 April 2015).
- Vianello, F.A. (ed.) (2013) 'A Transnational Double Presence: Circular Migration between Ukraine and Italy', in A. Triandafyllidou (ed.) *Circular Migration between Europe and its Neighbourhood. Choice or Necessity?* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press), pp. 187–212.
- Vouyioukas, A. and M. Liapi (2013) 'Coping with Deskillling: Strategies of Migrant Women Across European Societies', in F. Anthias, M. Kontos and M. Morokvasic-Muller (eds.) *Paradoxes of Integration: Female Migrants in Europe* (Dordrecht, NL: Springer), pp. 79–97.
- Wennersten, J. (2008) *Leaving America: The New Expatriate Generation* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers).
- Wiesbrock, A. and M. Hercog (2010) 'The Legal Framework for the Highly Skilled Migration to the EU: EU and US Labour Migration Policies Compared', *Maastricht Graduate School of Governance Working Papers 2010/001*. Available online at: http://www.merit.unu.edu/publications/mgsog_wppdf/2010/wp2010-001.pdf (accessed: 6 May 2015).

2

European Policies to Attract Talent: The Crisis and Highly Skilled Migration Policy Changes

Lucie Cerna and Mathias Czaika

2.1 Introduction

Most European states consider the immigration of foreign workers as an important means to decelerate the decline of national workforces as a consequence of population ageing and have developed strategies and policies to respond to the increasing demand of employers for certain types of skills in short- or long-term shortages. This chapter aims to give an overview and to compare various national and supra-national high-skilled migration (HSM) policy initiatives that have been implemented across Europe over the last two decades, with a particular focus on recent years after the global financial and economic crisis. European immigration policies (discourses) are increasingly characterized by a stark contrast between high-skilled and low-skilled migration policies. While the immigration of lower skilled migrants from poorer countries is increasingly perceived as in need of control, over the past two decades most European countries have implemented policies to attract skilled and high-skilled migrants, such as academics, medical personnel, engineers and, more generally, high-income earners. Consequently, the global competition for the highly skilled has intensified and most European states and companies have become involved in a battle for the 'best and brightest'.

With expanded global migration opportunities for the highly skilled, the number and potential of recruitment countries may be shrinking, partly because an increasing number of nations in the global South are starting to attract (and recruit) high-skilled migrants themselves. This explains to some extent why European states, also as a consequence of the European Union (EU) Blue Card Directive, have implemented selective immigration policies specifically to attract the highly skilled and have not abandoned them in recent years of economic crisis. In addition, and as a rather explicit complement of policies to attract high-skilled labour migrants in general,

this chapter will also look at how these policies may have disadvantaged (high-skilled) female migrants, for instance, by implementing salary threshold levels or by providing preferential access to male-dominated occupations such as information technology (IT), science or engineering.

The chapter contributes to the growing literature on HSM policies (Boeri et al. 2012; Boucher and Cerna 2014; Cerna 2009; 2014a; 2014b; Chaloff and Lemaitre 2009; Chiswick 2011; Kahanec and Zimmermann 2010; Wiesbrock and Hercog 2010), HSM policy effectiveness (Czaika and Parsons 2015), HSM and gender (Boucher 2007; 2009; 2013; Iredale 2005; Kofman 2014), and the impact of the economic crisis on HSM (Cerna 2010; Ghosh 2013; Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 2013; Kuptsch 2012; Nieuwenhuysen et al. 2012; Papademetriou and Terrazas 2009; Papademetriou et al. 2010). It links these different literatures together and offers a new perspective on HSM policies during the crisis and their impact on the gender composition of high-skilled migration.

2.2 Trends in European HSM policies

Many European states and companies have become involved in a battle for the 'best and brightest' (Boeri et al. 2012; Boucher 2015; Cerna 2014a; EMN 2011; 2013). While the immigration of non-EU workers is at the competence of the national member states, which means that national governments have the right to determine volumes and regulate conditions and admission procedures for foreign workers, various EU policies and directives have been introduced in order to increase the EU's attractiveness for international skilled and highly skilled migrants.

Over the past two decades, Europe and the EU member states went through some significant economic, political and social transformations which also affected migration perceptions and policies. The introduction of a common currency, the integration of 13 new EU member states (since 2004), as well as the ongoing demographic transition with an accelerated ageing of most European societies have some long-term implications not only on European labour markets but also on the design of labour migration policies. In addition, the most significant economic shock in the postwar era, initiated in 2007 by a global financial and economic crisis, hit most European labour markets in a way from which the majority of economies and national labour markets have not yet recovered (as of 2015) (see Cerna 2010; Ghosh 2013; Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 2013; Kuptsch 2012; Nieuwenhuysen et al. 2012).

At the same time, all European countries are experiencing a transformation to knowledge-based economies and societies, which creates new demands for skills and talents that cannot be immediately met by domestic supply (EMN 2011; 2013; OECD/EU 2014). As a consequence of these societal trends, many European countries consider labour migration policy

as an instrument to address short-term labour shortages and long-term skill shortages. However, European governments have implemented various labour migration policies in a non-harmonious way, meaning at different paces and with varying strategies depending on national priorities. One group of countries (Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK) have implemented some skill-selective labour migration policies (EMN 2011). Others, mostly Eastern European countries, rather aim to address labour shortages through an improved utilization of their national labour forces, and as a consequence are still rather inactive in attracting talent on the global labour market (EMN 2011). This heterogeneity in European HSM policies largely reflects differences in national labour market situations, with varying degrees of quantitative and qualitative shortages, priorities regarding the national educational system, the long-term development and projection of the domestic workforce, and also the openness for integrating foreign workers and visions about national identity, social inclusion and societal coherence.

As a consequence, the evolution of European HSM policies has been dynamic in some parts and rather 'observant' in others. In the following section, we will describe some of the major policy developments over the last two decades and try to identify whether the economic crisis has had an effect on HSM policymaking.

2.3 European HSM policies prior to 2007

Provision of preferential access and treatment for workers with certain occupational skills began in various European countries in the 1990s and gained momentum only in the early 2000s. For instance, during the mid-1990s, France facilitated access to work and residence permits for highly skilled foreigners; Austria introduced a sub-quota for persons with special qualifications (*Schlüsselkräfte*)¹ that were in high demand in the Austrian labour market; and Finland offered tax deductions (flat rate)² for foreigners with special expertise and an income above a certain level. In the late 1990s, attracting highly qualified workers such as information and communication technology (ICT) experts, scientists and engineers, simplified entry procedures or new visa categories gained momentum. For instance, France has implemented several policies that enabled high-skilled immigrants from outside the EU to fill labour shortages, particularly in science, ICT and engineering sectors (Mayda 2010). Across the border, Germany implemented the 2000 Green Card for ICT professionals that allowed 20,000 non-EU IT specialists with a university degree or an annual salary above a certain level to work and reside for up to five years (OECD 2003).³ In 1998, Italy implemented the 'Turco-Napolitano' law,⁴ providing labour market access outside

the existing quota for highly qualified persons in certain occupations (Di Pascale 2002; Finotelli and Sciortino 2009).

In the early 2000s, the UK became the forerunner in introducing various skill-selective policies aimed at attracting workers. For instance, it implemented a fast-track work-permit system for skilled foreign workers by companies experiencing severe skill shortages (OECD 2001), launched an initiative to issue special work permits to employers in the teaching sector and introduced the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme, which gave access to the UK labour market to those with exceptional skills, which were assessed – for the first time on the European continent – through a points-based system (OECD 2003). Norway and Sweden opened their labour markets for specialists and other workers with special skills (such as artists or athletes). In 2000, Norway started to provide skilled applicants a job search visa, and two years later the country amended its immigration act by introducing an annual quota for specialist workers exempted from a labour market test (OECD 2003). At the same time, Denmark implemented a special scheme for shortage jobs (job card scheme), introducing a positive list of shortage occupations. Non-EU workers in shortage occupations were immediately granted a three-year work permit (Danish Immigration Service 2008). Later, in 2007, Denmark created a Green Card scheme giving a six-month job-seeker permit to those passing the evaluation through a points-based system (Danish Immigration Service 2008). In 2003, one year after the UK, the Czech Republic also launched a programme that assessed skills and qualifications through a points-based system. A fixed number of applicants (quota) above a certain point threshold qualified to receive permanent residence rights after 2.5 years (OECD 2005). In the context of a thriving economy in the early 2000s, Spain exempted highly qualified technical and scientific personnel from a labour market test and created a research visa which authorized the holder and his/her family to reside and engage in a gainful activity without renewal of the visa (Ventura 2013). In 2004, Spain introduced a ‘Catalogue-of-Hard-to-Fill-Occupations’ (*Catálogo de ocupaciones de difícil cobertura*), which exempted a broader range of workers with the respective skills from an individual labour market test (Finotelli 2012). During the mid-2000s, various other countries such as Belgium and France also created a list of skilled occupations exempt from a labour market test.

The Netherlands introduced a highly skilled migration scheme in 2004, which provided labour migrants who were able to earn more than €45,000 a residence permit (no work permit required) for a maximum of five years with the option for a permanent residence permit thereafter (OECD 2006). Later, in 2007/2008, the Netherlands lowered the required income threshold and started to implement a points-based system for self-employed workers (OECD 2007; 2008). Third country students, graduating from a Dutch university, were granted full access to the labour market for 12 months.

Germany's new immigration act entered into force in 2005 and replaced the Green Card for IT specialists, allowing highly qualified non-EU nationals such as scientists or top-level managers with an annual income above €84,000 to obtain a permanent residence and work permit at the outset. However, other high-skilled persons generally remain subject to a labour market test. With the new law, also foreign (non-EU) students, who had to leave after graduation, are granted a post-study visa of 12 months to search for an adequate job (Focus Migration 2007).

In 2007, Ireland's New Employment Permits Act established a 'Green Card' for any position in any sector paying an annual salary above €60,000 or for a position in a shortage occupation with a lower salary (OECD 2008). Green Card holders obtained long-term residence after two years. As part of the same reform, Ireland established a new intra-company transfer scheme to facilitate the transfer of key personnel and trainees during the height of the Irish economic boom (Devitt and Murphy 2012).

In 2007, at the onset of the global financial and economic crisis, most European countries implemented the 2005 EU Scientific Visa (Council 2005) for admitting third country nationals (TCNs) for the purpose of carrying out scientific research.

Until 2007, nearly all European countries had introduced some skill-selective migration policies in order to attract not only the 'best and brightest' but also those most in demand in national labour markets. The overall trend up to this point was labour market tests as the general barrier to enter European labour markets, combined with exemptions for certain occupations and sometimes a required job offer with a certain minimum salary. Only a few countries (the UK, Netherlands and Czech Republic) started to experiment with 'supply-driven' schemes evaluating individual characteristics through a points-based system. These skill-attracting migration policy modifications and reforms were mainly taking place in the early 2000s in those European countries with strong economic growth and increasing labour market shortages. Other countries with some economic difficulties, such as Germany, were much more reluctant to open up their labour markets for skilled TCNs. The debate around the new German Immigration Act in 2005 is a good example of a 'semi-transition' to a modern immigration policy in which the points-based system scheme was dropped in the end.

2.4 European HSM policies after 2007

With the financial and subsequent economic crisis hitting most European countries at the end of 2007, the labour market situations in all European countries have changed significantly. A decreasing number of job vacancies and increasing unemployment reduced the overall demand for foreign labour across Europe. However, as in most economic crises before, it was mainly the young, low and semi-skilled labourers who were dismissed at

first and in highest numbers, while more experienced workers in skilled and highly skilled occupations were often retained, if possible on reduced hours. Employers, aware of the increasing scarcity in certain types of human capital even in times of economic crisis, were reluctant to stop the recruitment of skilled workers. Competition for the 'best and brightest' has become far too intense to dismiss skilled workers desperately needed for the time after the crisis (Cerna 2010; Ghosh 2013; Kuptsch 2012).

Nevertheless, the recent economic crisis has had severe consequences for immigration policies, including towards the highly skilled. According to the OECD, labour migration policies have tended 'to become restrictive, partly in response to the economic downturn, through tightening existing administrative mechanisms' (OECD 2010, p. 81). Restrictive policy changes across countries have included giving preferential treatment to native workers, omitting sectors from shortage occupation lists, reinforcing labour market tests, decreasing numbers of quotas and numerical limits, limiting non-discretionary flows (e.g., family reunification, work permits for spouses) and halting certain immigration programmes (OECD 2009). However, overall, the global financial and economic crisis has not led to a reversal in skill-attracting migration policies, although some countries reconsidered some programmes and initiatives while other European destinations have slowed down their pre-crisis 'best and brightest' enthusiasm.

De facto, only a few countries 'reversed' their migration policies after 2007/2008, not necessarily only for economic but also for broader political reasons. In 2008, the UK opened Tier 1 (highly-qualified), Tier 2 (skilled workers with job offer) and Tier 5 (youth and temporary workers) of their points-based system created in 2006 (OECD 2008). But already in 2009, stricter labour markets tests and higher minimum salary levels for Tier 2 were introduced. In 2011, a quota for Tier 1 and 2 workers was implemented. Tier 2 workers required graduate-level education and the respective shortage occupation list was severely reduced. Since 2012, Tier 2 workers are constrained to a (also retrospectively) six years stay, and salary criteria were further tightened. Tier 1 was de facto closed except for a relatively small number of 'exceptional talent'. Tier 4 on students was introduced in 2009 and required that foreign students were to be sponsored by a licensed college or university.

In 2009, Ireland, hit significantly by the economic crisis, removed dozens of occupations from its shortage list, which used to allow workers with a certain salary to enter the Irish labour market without a labour market test (OECD 2010). For about two years (2011/2012), France also has temporarily reduced its shortage list by removing more than a half of the occupations that were exempted from a labour market test (OECD 2012a). The Netherlands (in 2011) and Portugal (in 2012) have also tightened their respective highly skilled migrant schemes. And the Czech Republic terminated in 2010 its 'Programme of active selection of a qualified foreign labour

force', which was in place since 2003 and selected qualified people through a points-based system (OECD 2011).

Most other European countries kept their skill-attracting policies largely unchanged or have even further liberalized entry and stay regulations for high-skilled workers. For instance, Denmark has expanded its job card scheme in 2008 and lowered required qualifications and salary requirements. Luxembourg has set out a faster procedure and less restrictive conditions for highly skilled workers with special knowledge or professional skills or other highly qualified TCNs who earn a salary three times the guaranteed minimum wage for unskilled workers (EMN 2009). In addition, Sweden liberalized considerably its labour immigration policy in 2008, facilitating the recruitment of both high- and low-skilled immigrants for shortage occupations especially in ICT and engineering. The temporary policy allows for a path to permanent migration after four years of residence (Cerna 2014a). In 2009, Germany has lowered the income threshold for granting unlimited residence to highly skilled workers. Furthermore, labour market tests were removed for all migrants (including family members) from newly accessed EU member states holding a tertiary degree as well as for international students graduating from a German university (OECD 2010). In 2011, the labour market test was also removed for a positive list of shortage professions.

The Netherlands has introduced a new admission scheme for highly skilled migrants in 2009, which is based on a points system that provides a one-year job-search visa or a permit to start an innovative firm. In 2013, the Modern Migration Policy Act that only allowed 'authorized employers' access to the highly skilled migrant scheme entered into force. By providing a 'sponsor statement' on the qualification of the applicant, the sponsoring employer de facto decides on whether a residence permit is granted (OECD 2012a).

Norway implemented in 2010 a new immigrant act, which simplified the issuance of (permanent) residence permits for highly skilled migrants with a job offer with an annual salary above a certain level – though, this requirement was completely abolished in 2013 (OECD 2013).

In 2011, Austria created the Red-White-Red Card (RWR) for highly qualified persons and skilled workers in shortage occupations, and its validity was for one year, after which it can be transformed into an ordinary residence permit. The RWR card is granted on the basis of a points-based system and replaced the previous quota system.

Most European countries have also eased access to their higher education institutions for foreign students and provided more generous rights for accessing the labour market during study and post-graduation. In addition, several countries have developed strategies to attract larger numbers of foreign students (such as Ireland and Finland). At the same time, and regardless of the economic crisis, almost all European countries have intensified

their efforts to improve their attractiveness for investors and entrepreneurs by providing fast-track and preferential entry procedures and eased access to (long-term) residence permits. It seems that in times of crisis efforts in attracting entrepreneurial capital have only intensified and are considered part of economic crisis management (such as in Greece). Most European governments tend to consider the recruitment of 'high potentials', no matter whether specialists, students, investors or entrepreneurs, as part of an economic stimulus programme.

Thus, only a few European countries have restricted their HSM policies (such as Ireland and the UK), while most others have not changed their policies or even became more open by implementing skill-selective and attractive HSM policies (except for Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Malta, Romania and the Slovak Republic). The reason for the absence of a crisis-induced policy reversal is that labour shortages can persist at times of high unemployment (Cerna 2010). However, the crisis has disproportionately affected vulnerable groups such as women, migrant workers and youth (Cerna 2010).

With expanded global migration opportunities for the highly skilled, the number and potential of countries from which to recruit these migrants may be shrinking, partly because an increasing number of nations in the global South (including Brazil, China, India, some Gulf countries) are starting to attract (and recruit) high-skilled migrants themselves. This has been facilitated by opportunities created during the crisis. The increasing global competition for talent has triggered most EU member states to implement the EU Blue Card as another skill-attracting entry modus besides their own national HSM policies.

2.5 EU Blue Card

The EU Council approved the Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of TCNs for the purpose of highly qualified employment (Blue Card) on 25 May 2009 (Council 2009). It entered into force on 19 June 2009. The Directive seeks to establish more attractive entry and residence conditions for work in EU member states (Council 2009). Member states had two years to transpose the Directive, though due to some considerable delays some only did so by 2013. Twenty-five out of 28 member states implemented the Directive (Denmark, Ireland and the UK opted out). The Directive provides an additional entry route for states to recruit highly skilled migrants from non-EU countries.

Benefiting from a single application procedure, Blue Card holders can reside and work in an EU country for a maximum of four years and move to another member state after 18 months (but need to apply for a new permit). Eligible applicants have to show a recognized diploma or should have at least five years' professional experience; holders can bring their families;

and the application procedure is expected to take less than three months. Applicants need to demonstrate a salary of at least 1.5 times the average gross salary in the country, or 1.2 times in the case of shortage occupations, though some member states have set different thresholds (Cerna 2014b). The Directive, however, does not create the right of admission. The scheme is entirely demand-driven, respecting the principle of Community preference and member states' jurisdiction to decide on the number of persons admitted.

Nevertheless, the Directive was transposed differently across member states, and thus conditions for entry and rights of Blue Card holders vary greatly (see Cerna 2013). The national versions of the Blue Card demonstrate different admission requirements and conditions. This creates additional hurdles for highly skilled migrants to come to Europe. For example, member states can impose quotas restricting the number of high-skilled migrants and reject an application for ethical reasons for the Blue Card (such as to limit brain drain). In addition, member states can decide whether to apply certain derogations (such as professional experience) and set their own level of salary threshold, processing time, period of validity of the Blue Card and so on. The Directive thus only sets minimum standards and leaves much leeway to member states.

While the qualification requirements are more or less the same in all member states, differences prevail in categories such as actual salary needed (€12,000–68,000), the necessity of a labour market test (and under which condition/s), the duration of the permit (one to four years) and processing time (seven to 90 days) (Commission 2014). The variation is especially pronounced at the level of salary thresholds, which has important consequences for female migrants. A recent report by the Commission (2014) shows that salary thresholds differ across member states, ranging from Hungary and Latvia to Luxembourg at the high end. In addition, the ratio of salary threshold to mean annual gross earnings varies widely, and Figure 2.1 suggests that it does not always correspond to 1.5 times the annual gross salary. For




Figure 2.1 Salary thresholds and ratios compared to gross annual salaries per member state

Source: European Commission 2014.

example, the ratio is greater than 1.5 times in some countries (like Lithuania and Sweden), while it is smaller in others (such as Italy, Hungary and Malta).

The success of the Blue Card is also debatable. In 2013, about 12,322 Blue Cards were granted, though the distribution across member states is uneven. While some countries received a relatively large number of Blue Card holders (such as over 11,000 cards in Germany though only 21% were granted to women as main applicants), the numbers were much more limited in many other member states (Commission 2014). In addition, the data indicate that most member states prefer recruiting high-skilled migrants through their national policies which offer better conditions than the Blue Card, even if the Blue Card is the first entry point in other EU countries (such as Germany and Luxembourg). Hence the Blue Card is seen both as complement and as competition to the separate national policies. However, the Commission (2014) report also points out that the communication of data and other measures (especially Blue Card salary thresholds) from member states to the EU and to potential applicants through online portals is insufficient.

2.6 Trends in European high-skilled immigration

Partly as a consequence of the described policy developments of the last two decades, the European immigrant population has become much more high skilled and significantly more female (Table 2.1). In the 2000s, before the global economic crisis in 2008, in nearly all European countries, skilled and high-skilled migrants established the largest group of non-European third country migrant workers (EMN 2011). Between 1990 and 2010, immigrant stocks of European and non-European migrants hosted in the 15 European countries displayed doubled from 14 million to 28 million, based on new migration data compiled by Brücker et al. (2013).⁵ But not only absolute stocks of foreign-born migrants have doubled but also the share of high-skilled, that is tertiary educated, migrants has more than doubled in this period, reaching 29% (more than eight million) in 2010. At the same time, high-skilled immigration into European destinations has further feminized; this trend has not been stopped during the economic crisis. While in 1990 about 44% of all high-skilled immigrants were female, this ratio has increased to 52% in 2010. This trend is not singular to Europe but is also seen in other OECD and non-OECD countries (Özden et al. 2011).

Across European destinations, the intensity of high-skilled immigration in general, and female high-skilled immigration in particular, varies significantly. Some of this variation can be explained by different needs for high-skilled immigrants, distinct approaches on balancing focus on domestic workers and recruiting foreign workers and language issues. Interestingly, it is the (predominantly) German-speaking countries, Austria, Germany, Switzerland and Luxembourg, that have the lowest immigration rate of

Table 2.1 Immigration rate and gender composition of high-skilled immigrant stocks (in %)

Destination	HS immigration rate					Female HS migrants ratio				
	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010
Austria	10	13	13	18	17	41	39	44	43	45
Denmark	18	22	26	27	25	48	48	48	50	53
Finland	16	21	24	24	25	46	52	55	57	57
France	10	12	16	20	23	41	44	47	47	51
Germany	11	16	16	19	22	38	39	39	44	47
Greece	16	18	19	28	29	48	52	57	57	58
Ireland	27	34	40	41	50	47	50	50	52	49
Luxembourg	15	18	20	21	23	43	44	46	48	49
Netherlands	14	17	20	24	26	50	50	53	52	54
Norway	25	27	29	33	37	51	52	52	55	54
Portugal	18	20	23	25	24	53	55	56	58	59
Spain	20	21	19	25	26	45	48	51	49	52
Sweden	17	20	24	28	33	51	50	52	53	53
Switzerland	16	19	22	21	22	37	40	44	45	47
UK	20	26	35	42	49	49	50	51	58	54
All	14	18	21	26	29	44	46	48	51	52

Source: Based on data from Brücker et al. (2013).

high-skilled migrants: only one in five immigrants in these countries are tertiary educated (Table 2.1). On the other end of the spectrum are the English-speaking countries, the UK and Ireland, which are able to attract highly qualified migrants in much larger numbers. About half of their immigrant population is tertiary educated. In terms of the ratio of highly skilled female migrants, the variation across European destinations is much smaller and the increasing trend is the same in all countries. Only high-skilled immigrant stocks in German-speaking countries (Austria, Germany and Switzerland) are still less ‘feminized’ compared to stocks in other European destinations, but even in these countries the gender ratio of high-skilled migrants has become almost even and balanced.

Any potential effects of the economic crisis on high-skilled immigration are hard to identify based on these stock data. Comparing high-skilled immigration rates and respective female ratios between 2005 and 2010, only Austria and Portugal have seen a decline in the high-skilled immigrant stock, whereas solely Ireland and the UK experienced a relative decline in the female high-skilled immigrants measured by the gender ratio (see Table 2.2).

The annual inflow of non-European high-skilled migrants since the onset of the global economic and financial crisis in 2008 has continued on a

Table 2.2 High-skilled immigration under national schemes and EU Blue Card (in thousands)

Destination	First permits under national schemes					EU Blue Cards	
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2012	2013
Austria	827	575	668	868	1,158	124	NA
Belgium	3,77	1,202	106	119	98	0	5
Cyprus	393	436	634	551	600	0	NA
France	1,681	2,366	2,554	3,148	3,030	126	304
Germany	96	119	122	177	210	2,584	11,580
Italy	NA	NA	1,984	1,563	1,695	6	112
Latvia	NA	85	114	97	106	17	13
Luxembourg	NA	96	74	102	21	183	306
Netherlands	6,411	4,895	5,531	5,594	5,514	1	3
Portugal	288	307	342	282	313	2	4
Spain	2,884	2,071	1,244	1,650	1,136	461	313
Sweden	NA	2,810	3,476	4,406	4,751	Not in force	2
EU-25	16,157	14,980	16,999	19,604	19,988	3,664	12,830

Source: EU Commission (2014, p. 11), based on Eurostat.

moderate level (Table 2.2). Compared to other global destinations for high-skilled migrants, Europe is an important but still not the prime destination for the world's 'best and brightest', and the 2009 Blue Card Directive has not (yet) been able to change this trend. Since 2008, the EU-25 countries have annually admitted between 15,000 and 20,000 high-skilled migrants through national schemes, and since 2012 almost another 16,000 through the EU Blue Card system. In the upcoming years, the EU Blue Card might fully replace national schemes of entry for high-skilled TCNs and make Europe a more attractive region of free movement for male and female high-skilled migrants alike from a non-European background.

2.7 HSM policies and female migration

Despite the evidence that skilled women migrate more than men (Docquier et al. 2008; Widmaier and Dumont 2011), immigration policies impact differently on women and men and can result in gender inequalities (Kofman 2014).⁶ Many European countries use criteria such as salary levels and educational qualifications which can produce gendered outcomes, also with the differential evaluation of skills, focusing on formal qualifications and less so on soft skills and competences (Kofman 2014). Boucher (2013; 2015) argues that the choice for proxies of skill carries with them considerable gender implications, since policies vary considerably in their definitions, ranging from educational attainment, human capital features, including on-the-job training, to measures of productivity, such as salary.

The literature analysing gendered outcomes from the criteria adopted by immigration policies has focused on the points system (see Boucher 2007; 2009; 2013; 2015; Iredale 2005; Kofman 2007; Kofman and Raghuram 2006). Even though points systems are considered gender neutral (OSCE 2009), several scholars highlight that these systems are not gender neutral in their selection criteria, in particular regarding occupations, types of skills and salary levels (Boucher 2007; 2009; Kofman 2007: 2014). In Europe, countries who have adopted points systems are the UK, Ireland and Denmark.

For example, under the points-based system in the UK, highly skilled migrants could qualify previously for a Tier 1 general route permit if they had enough points as a combination of four criteria (education, age, work experience in the country and previous earnings). In fact, applicants could receive enough points if their previous earnings were higher than £150,000 (Cerna 2011). This would have likely disadvantaged female applicants, which was visible in the data on main applicants. As part of the immigration policy changes implemented by the Conservative–Liberal government, the Tier 1 general route was discontinued in 2011 and a new exceptional talent visa was put in place with a quota of 1,000 permits per year. It is up to five competent bodies to sponsor candidates with exceptional talent, as evidenced by prizes, educational qualifications, publications and research funding awarded (Cerna 2011). The number of these visas has remained very low, since it is difficult to qualify as exceptional talent and how it has affected gendered outcomes remains to be seen.

Besides the UK, Ireland and Denmark, most European countries have adopted policies to attract high-skilled migrants that fit with the notion of the knowledge economy, by encouraging migrants in the technology, engineering and science sectors (Kofman 2014). Kofman (2014) further argues that with the adoption of the Blue Card the EU also pursues this policy. ‘What distinguishes European policies (PBS and knowledge migrants) is the inclusion of salary earned as a key determinant of eligibility to enter as a (highly) skilled migrant’ (Kofman 2014). Female high-skilled migrants are disadvantaged by salary levels because women tend to earn less than men and also work in less well-paid occupations (such as the health-care and education sectors).

As mentioned before, the Blue Card places great importance in the salary levels for applicants, which disadvantages female applicants. Member states have identified the high salary level as an obstacle to the recruitment of high-skilled migrants because it does not reflect the realities of the labour markets (EMN 2013).

The salary level is also an important selection criterion in national HSM policies in Europe (including Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK) (EMN 2013). For instance, applicants for the German Green Card had to have a degree in information and communication technology from a university or polytechnic or be

paid a sufficiently high salary (Kolb 2004). The subsequent 2005 Immigration Law facilitated the entry of highly skilled professionals, but the salary level continued to play an important role. Since the inflow of high-skilled migrants was considered unsuccessful, the salary threshold was reduced through the 2009 Labour Migration Control Act. Nonetheless, Germany then shifted its focus to the EU Blue Card and decreased the salary level even further in order to correspond with the threshold of 1.5 times the average annual gross salary (or 1.2 times for shortage occupations).

In 2007, the Netherlands set up a scheme for knowledge workers, defined as anyone with a higher vocational or higher academic qualification. Applicants had to meet a pre-defined salary, which was determined according to age and whether the degree was obtained in the Netherlands (Kofman 2014). The salary criteria are thus similar to the EU Blue Card, even though the Dutch give preference to their national policy.

Among European states with routes for the highly skilled, such as the UK, earnings prior or post-entry are an important criterion which becomes relevant when gender-pay gaps are taken into consideration. EU-wide, the wage gap between men and women averages about 17% (Table 2.3). This means that on average women earn 17% less than men with an equivalent job. Across EU member states, these gender-pay gaps vary between 30% in Estonia and almost equity in Slovenia. Across the entire 28 EU member states, the average gender-pay gap has continued to decline until 2010 when the gap reached 16.2%. Since then this gap has slightly increased again (Table 2.3). Unfortunately, comparable data on gender-pay gaps between foreign and domestic high-skilled workers are not available, and therefore we have to assume that the data presented largely reflect gender-wage gaps also for non-European workers. Obviously, European destinations with relatively low female ratios among high-skilled immigrants are also those with relatively large gender-pay gaps (like Germany, Austria and the Slovak Republic). However, aside the fact that female migrants might respond to differences in gender-wage gaps, the causality may also go in the opposite direction with an increasing feminization of migration flows affecting gender-wage gaps in one way or the other. Evidence for this is not yet available though.

Besides salary levels, another criterion that might disadvantage female migrants is educational qualification. Even though the level of women with tertiary degrees has increased, the subjects that women pursue in their studies pose challenges for equity as these fields are not highly sought after (OECD 2012b). Women are underrepresented in science, technology, engineering and mathematics, and this has consequences for the opportunity to migrate to countries where these subjects are the most in demand. In contrast, the demand for health professionals (a feminized profession) has been limited or is protected (Kofman 2014).

Available data on the gender breakdown of skilled migrants are limited (Canada is a notable exception with data and detailed evaluative

Table 2.3 Gender-pay gaps in the EU (in %)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Austria	25.5	25.5	25.1	24.3	24.0	23.7	23.4
Belgium	9.5	10.1	10.2	10.1	10.2	10.2	10.0
Bulgaria	12.4	12.1	12.3	13.3	13.0	13.0	14.7
Croatia	NA	NA	NA	NA	15.5	17.6	18.0
Cyprus	21.8	22.0	19.5	17.8	16.8	16.4	16.2
Czech Republic	23.4	23.6	26.2	25.9	21.6	22.6	22
Denmark	17.6	17.7	17.1	16.8	15.9	16.3	14.9
Estonia	29.8	30.9	27.6	26.6	27.7	27.3	30.0
Finland	21.3	20.2	20.5	20.8	20.3	19.6	19.4
France	15.4	17.3	16.9	15.2	15.6	15	14.8
Germany	22.7	22.8	22.8	22.6	22.3	22.2	22.4
Greece	20.7	21.5	22.0	NA	15	NA	NA
Hungary	14.4	16.3	17.5	17.1	17.6	18.0	20.1
Ireland	17.2	17.3	12.6	12.6	13.9	11.7	14.4
Italy	4.4	5.1	4.9	5.5	5.3	5.8	6.7
Latvia	15.1	13.6	11.8	13.1	15.5	13.6	13.8
Lithuania	17.1	22.6	21.6	15.3	14.6	11.9	12.6
Luxembourg	10.7	10.2	9.7	9.2	8.7	8.7	8.6
Malta	5.2	7.8	9.2	7.7	7.2	6.2	6.1
Netherlands	23.6	19.3	18.9	18.5	17.8	17.9	16.9
Poland	7.5	14.9	11.4	8.0	4.5	5.5	6.4
Portugal	8.4	8.5	9.2	10	12.8	12.5	15.7
Romania	7.8	12.5	8.5	7.4	8.8	11.0	9.7
Slovakia	25.8	23.6	20.9	21.9	19.6	20.5	21.5
Slovenia	8.0	5.0	4.1	-0.9	0.9	2.3	2.5
Spain	17.9	18.1	16.1	16.7	16.2	17.8	17.8
Sweden	16.5	17.8	16.9	15.7	15.4	15.8	15.9
UK	24.3	20.8	21.4	20.6	19.5	20.1	19.1
EU-27/28	17.7	17.5	17.3	17.2	16.2	16.3	16.4

Source: Eurostat (2014).

reports). In Europe, such gendered data exist in the UK and the Netherlands, which suggest that only over a quarter of women are in the highly skilled migrant category, and it differs according to nationalities (Kofman 2014). This indicates that female high-skilled migrants are disadvantaged by selection criteria. According to Kofman (2014), female employment tends to be concentrated in a few labour market sectors (OECD 2012b). Many of the feminized professional sectors are highly regulated by the state and professional bodies compared to the less regulated ICT sector. It would be useful for governments to undertake gender-sensitive auditing of immigration policies and collect immigration data for main and secondary applicants which are disaggregated by gender (Kofman 2014).

Boucher (2013; 2015) has created an index for 37 visa classes in 12 OECD countries; the index is composed of different indicators, such as gender-disaggregated data, gender auditing, acknowledgement of career breaks, acknowledgement of part-time work, age limits, selection of applicants, preference of certain sectors, recognition of care and treatment of language proficiency. The 12 countries vary widely across these indicators and no one country ranks consistently high on the index (even though Canada scores highly due to gender-disaggregated data, gender analysis of immigration laws and institutionalized gender unit within the immigration bureaucracy). But overall, permanent visas rank more highly than temporary ones, and visas needing general human capital skills such as education or languages tend to rank higher than those with specific sectoral demands (Boucher 2013; 2015).

The crisis has had consequences for skilled immigration and gender. Chaloff and Lemaitre (2009, p. 35) remark that governments developed more targeted occupation-shortage lists due to concerns over the protection of domestic workers. The gender implications depend on the ways in which such lists are created and the occupations on the list (Boucher 2015). But the narrowing of occupational lists in several countries has led to the removal of key professions in which women dominate (such as domestic work and care) (Boucher 2013; 2015).

Besides sectorial targeting, the economic crisis has also led in several OECD countries to an increased focus on employer-driven models of skilled immigration selection (Boucher 2013; Chaloff and Lemaitre 2009, p. 21). Employer-driven approaches can have discriminatory effects, since when choosing immigrants employers rely not solely on relevant qualifications but also on soft skills and existing networks (Boucher 2013). Hence, employers can undertake subtle forms of ethnic or gender-based adjudications which are limited in more transparent forms of state-based immigration selection (see also Hawthorne 2011).

However, despite the inequalities between male and female employment, states have considerable opportunities to reduce the gendered nature of their skilled immigration selection programmes by avoiding certain selection mechanisms and promoting others (Boucher 2013; 2015).

2.8 Conclusions

Immigration of skilled and highly skilled workers has become an important element in the 2010 Lisbon Strategy and the Europe's 2020 Growth Strategy. Immigration of necessary skills to ensure and promote competitiveness and growth is often so specialized and in such short supply that immigrants need to be recruited from outside Europe.

But national policies and Blue Card versions differ considerably across member states, and this heterogeneity is mostly due to differences in

national labour market situations with different degrees of shortages, priorities regarding the education systems, long-term development and protection of domestic workforce and openness for integrating foreign workers. However, on a more political level, this variation also depends on the extent of lobbying of stakeholders and the result of negotiations between different stakeholders, especially employers, unions and the government (Cerna 2014a). This has led to liberal policies towards high-skilled immigrants in some countries, but more restrictive ones in others.

Highly qualified female migrants employed in highly skilled occupations represent only a small share of shortage occupations. However, their numbers have been steadily increasing during the past two decades. Some occupational segregation, that is, the preponderance of male migrants in highly skilled occupations, is in part a reflection of the fact that European immigration policies tend to favour medical, high-level management, engineering, information technology and scientific research skills, which are in occupations that are still predominantly chosen by (migrant) men. However, despite gender disparities across these most sought-after occupations, the proportion of female migrants who hold a tertiary degree is in most European countries almost on a par with male immigrants.

Immigration policies influence the size and attributes of the migrant workforce relative to the national labour demand. The selection of new foreign workers is usually assessed on the basis of acquired skills, exercised occupations, or prior or future earnings. When foreign workers' applications for work permits are assessed, tertiary-educated female migrants may be discriminated in all three categories: disadvantages in the recognition of foreign degrees, difficulties with immigrating into female-dominated non-shortage occupations and gender-pay gaps that establish additional barriers where earnings are part of the assessment system.

Given these obvious obstacles for skilled female TCNs to enter European labour markets, skilled females may choose other categories of migrants (family, asylum or study) outside labour-migration channels, which are usually not regulated on the basis of skill or gender criteria. In this respect, categorical substitution effects – that is, the shifts of immigration flows from one legal avenue to another (e.g., from labour to family migration) as a result of policy changes introduced for one particular immigration category – are very likely (Czaika and de Haas 2013). Thus, skilled (female) migrants using other entry channels than labour migration might actually explain the significant discrepancy between relatively low numbers of skilled (female) immigration flows admitted through national entry schemes, or recently the EU Blue Card, and the overall presence of skilled and highly skilled non-European (female) workers.

Since female migrants are predominantly working in sectors such as health care and education, they can be considered as 'skilled' rather than 'highly skilled' in national and international statistics, which are usually incomplete

and often do not disaggregate data by skills and gender. This might have misrepresented the extent of the economic crisis on female migrants in different analyses. In addition, the economic crisis may have also reduced employment opportunities for female highly skilled migrants, despite continuing labour shortages, especially in sectors such as health care across Europe (ILO 2009; Kuptsch 2012).

This chapter has mainly focused on legal highly skilled migrants, though it is possible that the crisis has also affected female (highly skilled) migrants in irregular or low-skilled occupations (ILO 2009). Female migrants could find themselves in such vulnerable positions if their qualifications were not recognized, they could not find employment in their trained field or when they came under a different immigration status than employment, for instance as 'trailing spouses' with family reunification. These issues require further consideration and more in-depth analysis in future research.

The Blue Card presents an additional venue to recruit high-skilled immigrants to Europe – it provides some visibility, especially for small countries which have not been natural destinations for migrants. It also gives the opportunity to member states to offer better conditions than their national policies, as the EU regulation allows them to circumvent the national political arena. Nevertheless, the uptake of Blue Card permits has been slow and about two-thirds of holders have already resided in the EU before. Female migrants are disadvantaged by the scheme because salary threshold plays an important role for the application. In addition, the Blue Card does not provide a long-term perspective for migrants from the start as it is only valid up to four years, and migrants are eligible for a long-term residence permit after five years. Thus, the number of Blue Card holders remains limited so far, and Europe does not compete well with Canada or Australia, for instance. Changes in the Blue Card will be necessary; this is also a point that the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker (2014), announced among his top priorities for the first term. Hence, more policy changes to attract high-skilled immigrants to Europe are expected in the future.

Notes

1. This term refers to educational attainment, but also to skills acquired over time through experience, and which are considered scarce (EMN 2007).
2. If the stay is less than six months, foreign works are taxed at a 35% flat tax rate, after deducting €17 per day. There are special provisions for students, artists and athletes. Teachers and researchers from certain countries are fully exempt for a maximum of two years. Key foreign personnel staying for more than six months are eligible for a 35% flat tax rate if working as researchers or teachers at a Finnish institution of higher education or possess special skills and their salary exceeds €5,800/month, and if they have not resided in Finland at any time during a five-year period preceding the beginning of their employment (Kahanec and Zimmermann 2010).

3. Applicants needed to have a guaranteed salary of at least €51,000 per year.
4. The law implemented an annual decree that determined the entry contingent for non-EU citizens. Work-related residence permits had to be issued in agreement with the contingent system with some exceptions for artists, high skilled workers and academics (Finotelli and Sciortino 2009, p. 124).
5. This increase by 14 million migrants was largely driven by the inflow of TCNs, while intra-European migration only contributed about three million migrants to this increase during this period.
6. Gender does not operate in isolation but intersects with other social categories such as age, class and ethnicity/race (Kofman 2014).

References

- Boeri, T. et al. (2012) *Brain Gain and Brain Drain: The Global Competition to Attract High-Skilled Migrants* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press).
- Boucher, A. (2015) *Gender, Migration and the Global Race for Talent* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press).
- Boucher, A. (2013) 'Gendering Skilled Immigration Policy Across the OECD', Paper prepared for *APSA Annual Conference*. Chicago, USA, 28 August-1 September 2013.
- Boucher, A. (2009) 'Picking the Best and the Brightest: Gendering Skilled Immigration Policy in Australia and Canada', in the European Consortium of Political Research (ECPR), *First European Conference on Politics and Gender, Queen's University*. Belfast, Ireland, 21–23 January 2009.
- Boucher, A. (2007) 'Skill, Migration and Gender in Australia and Canada. The Case of Gender-Based Analysis', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 42(3), 383–401.
- Boucher, A. and L. Cerna (2014) 'Current Policy Trends in Skilled Immigration Policy', *International Migration*, 52(3), 21–25.
- Brücker, H., S. Capuano and A. Marfouk (2013) 'Education, Gender and International Migration: Insights from a Panel-dataset 1980–2010', mimeo.
- Cerna, L. (2009) 'The Varieties of High-skilled Immigration Policies: Coalitions and Policy Outputs in Advanced Industrial Countries', *Journal of European Public Policy* 16(1): 144–161.
- Cerna, L. (2014a) 'Attracting High-skilled Immigrants: Policies in Comparative Perspective', *International Migration*, 52(3), 69–84.
- Cerna, L. (2014b) 'The EU Blue Card: Preferences, Policies and Negotiations between Member States', *Migration Studies*, 2(1), 73–96.
- Cerna, L. (2013) 'Understanding the Diversity of EU Migration Policy in Practice: The Implementation of the Blue Card Initiative', *Policy Studies*, 34(2), 180–200.
- Cerna, L. (2011) *Policy Primer. Selecting the Best and the Brightest*, The Migration Observatory. Available online at: http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/migobs/Selecting%20the%20Best%20and%20Brightest%20Policy%20Primer_0.pdf (accessed 4 April 2015).
- Cerna, L. (2010) 'Policies and Practices of Highly Skilled Migration in Times of the Economic Crisis', *International Migration Papers 99* (Geneva: International Labour Office).
- Chaloff, J. and G. Lemaitre (2009) 'Managing Highly-Skilled Labour Migration: A Comparative Analysis of Migration Policies and Challenges in OECD Countries', *OECD Social Employment and Migration Working Paper 79* (Paris: OECD).
- Chiswick, B. (ed.) (2011) *High-Skilled Immigration in a Global Labour Market* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield).

- Czaika, M. and C. Parsons (2015) 'The Gravity of High-Skilled Migration Policies' *IMI working paper No. 110* (University of Oxford).
- Czaika, M. and H. de Haas (2013) 'The Effectiveness of Immigration Policies', *Population and Development Review*, 39(3), 487–508.
- Danish Immigration Service (2008) *Statistical Overview – Population Statistics on Foreigners 2007* (Copenhagen: Danish Immigration Service).
- Danish Immigration Service (2008) *Statistical Overview – Population Statistics on Foreigners 2008* (Copenhagen: Danish Immigration Service).
- Devitt, C. and E. Murphy (2012) 'Ireland', in *Migration, Employment and Labour Market Integration Policies in the European Union* (Brussels: IOM).
- Di Pascale, A. (2002) 'The New Regulations on Immigration and the Status of Foreigners in Italy', *European Journal of Migration and Law*, 4(1), 71–77.
- Docquier, F., B. Lindsay Lowell and A. Marfouk (2008) *A Gendered Assessment of Highly Skilled Emigration* (Washington DC: World Bank).
- European Migration Network (2013) *Attracting Highly Qualified and Qualified Third-Country Nationals*, *EMN Study* (Brussels: Home Affairs). Available online at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/emn-studies/attracting/emnsr_attractinghighworkers_finalversion_23oct2013_publication.pdf (accessed 29 April 2015).
- European Migration Network (2011) *Satisfying Labour Demand through Migration*, *EMN Synthesis Report*. Available online at: http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/policies/immigration/docs/Satisfying_Labour_Demand_Through_Migration_FINAL_20110708.pdf (accessed 4 April 2015).
- European Migration Network (2007) *Conditions of Entry and Residence of Third Country Highly-Skilled Workers in the EU*, *EMN Synthesis Report*. Available online at: http://emn.ie/cat_publication_detail.jsp?clog=1&itemID=32&t=6 (accessed 4 April 2015).
- EU Commission (2014) *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of highly qualified employment (EU Blue Card)*, COM(2004)287 final, Brussels, 22 May 2014.
- EU Council (2009), *Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment* (Brussels: Official Journal of the European Union).
- EU Council (2005) *Council Directive 2005/71/EC on a specific procedure for admitting third-country nationals for the purposes of scientific research* (Brussels: Council of Ministers).
- Eurostat (2014) *Gender pay gap in unadjusted form*. Available online at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Gender_pay_gap_statistics (accessed 4 April 2015).
- Finotelli, C. (2012) 'Labour Migration Governance in Contemporary Europe. The Case of Spain', in A. Cangiano (ed.) LAB-MIG-GOV Project, 'Which labour migration governance for a more dynamic and inclusive Europe?' *FIERI Working Papers*. Available online at: http://www.labmiggoevu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/LABMIGOV_WP1_SPAIN_Final-report.pdf (accessed 29 April 2015).
- Finotelli, C. and G. Sciortino (2009) 'Importance of Being Southern: The Making of Policies of Immigration Control in Italy', *European Journal of Migration and Law*, 11(2), 119–138.
- Focus Migration (2007) 'Germany', *Country Profile No. 1*. Available online at: <http://focus-migration.hwwi.de/Germany.1509.0.html?&L=1> (accessed 5 April 2015).

- Ghosh, B. (2013) *The Global Economic Crisis and the Future of Migration: Issues and Prospects. What Will Migration Look Like in 2045?* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Hawthorne, L. (2011) *Competing for Skills: Migration Policies and Trends in New Zealand and Australia* (Wellington: Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship/ Department of Labour).
- ILO (2009) *GMG Factsheet on the Impact of the Economic Crisis on Labour Migration and Migrant Employment* (Geneva: ILO).
- Iredale, R. (2005) 'Gender, Immigration Policies and Accreditation: Valuing the Skills of Professional Women Migrants', *Geoforum*, 36(2), 155–166.
- Isaakyan, I. and A. Triandafyllidou (2013) High-Skill Mobility: Addressing the Challenges of the Knowledge-Based Economy at Times of Crisis. *RSCAS Policy Papers 2013/14*. Available online at: http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/27706/RSCAS_PP_2013_14.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed 3 April 2015).
- Juncker, J.-C. (2014) 'My 5-point plan on immigration', Available online at: <http://juncker.epp.eu/my-priorities> (accessed 5 April 2015).
- Kahanec, M. and K. Zimmermann (2010) 'High-Skilled Immigration Policy in Europe', *IZA Discussion Paper 5399* (Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labour).
- Kofman, E. (2014) 'Towards a Gendered Evaluation of (highly) Skilled Immigration Policies in Europe', *International Migration*, 52(30), 116–128.
- Kofman, E. (2007) 'The Knowledge Economy, Gender and Stratified Migrations', *Studies in Social Justice*, 1(2), 30–43.
- Kofman, E. and P. Raghuram (2006) 'Gender and Global Labour Migrations. Incorporating Skilled Workers', *Antipode*, 38(2), 282–303.
- Kolb, H. (2004) *Einwanderung zwischen wohlverstandemem Eigeninteresse und symbolischer Politik. Das Beispiel der deutschen Green Card* (Münster: Literatur Verlag).
- Kuptsch, C. (2012) 'The Economic Crisis and Labour Migration Policy in European Countries', *Comparative Population Studies*, 37(1–2), 15–32.
- Mayda, A.M. (2010) 'International Migration: A Panel Data Analysis of the Determinants of Bilateral Flows', *Journal of Population Economics*, 23(4), 1249–1274.
- Nieuwenhuysen, J., Duncan, H. and Neerup, S. (eds) (2012), *International Migration in Uncertain Times*, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- OECD/European Union (2014) *Matching Economic Migration with Labour Market Needs* (Paris: OECD Publishing).
- OECD (2013) *International Migration Outlook (SOPEMI)* (Paris: OECD Publishing).
- OECD (2012a) *International Migration Outlook (SOPEMI)* (Paris: OECD).
- OECD (2012b) *Gender Equality in Education, Employment and Entrepreneurship: Final Report to the MCM 2012*, C/MIN(2012)5. Available online at: <http://www.oecd.org/employment/50423364.pdf> (accessed 29 April 2015)
- OECD (2011) *International Migration Outlook (SOPEMI)* (Paris: OECD Publishing).
- OECD (2010) *International Migration Outlook (SOPEMI)* (Paris: OECD Publishing).
- OECD (2009) *International Migration and the Financial Crisis: Understanding the Links and Shaping Policy Responses* (Paris: OECD Publishing).
- OECD (2008) *International Migration Outlook (SOPEMI)* (Paris: OECD Publishing).
- OECD (2007) *International Migration Outlook (SOPEMI)* (Paris: OECD Publishing).
- OECD (2006) *International Migration Outlook (SOPEMI)* (Paris: OECD Publishing).
- OECD (2005) *International Migration Outlook (SOPEMI)* (Paris: OECD Publishing).
- OECD (2003) *International Migration Outlook (SOPEMI)* (Paris: OECD Publishing).
- OECD (2001) *International Migration Outlook (SOPEMI)* (Paris: OECD Publishing).

- Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (2009) *Guide to Gender Sensitive Labour Market Policies* (Vienna: OSCE).
- Özden, C. et al. (2011) 'Where on Earth is Everybody? The Evolution of Global Bilateral Migration, 1960–2000', *World Bank Economic Review*, 25(1), 12–56.
- Papademetriou, D. and A. Terrazas (2009) *Immigrants and the Current Economic Crisis: Research Evidence, Policy Challenges and Implications* (Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute).
- Papademetriou, D. et al. (2010) *Migration and Immigrants: Two Years after the Financial Collapse: Where do We Stand?* (Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute).
- Ventura, G.G. (2013) 'Highly Skilled Indian Migrant Population in Spain', *CARIM-India Research Report 2013/39* (Florence: EUI). Available online at: <http://www.india-eu-migration.eu/media/CARIM-India-HSM-2013-39.pdf> (accessed 29 April 2015).
- Widmaier, S. and J-C. Dumont (2011) 'Are Recent Immigrants Different? A New Profile of Immigrants in the OECD based on DIOC 2005/06', *OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers No. 126* (Paris: Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs, OECD Publishing).
- Wiesbrock, A. and M. Hercog (2010) 'The Legal Framework for the Highly Skilled Migration to the EU: EU and US Labour Migration Policies Compared', *Maastricht Graduate School of Governance Working Papers 2010/001*. Available online at: http://www.merit.unu.edu/publications/mgsog_wppdf/2010/wp2010-001.pdf (accessed 5 April 2015).

3

Female High-Skilled Emigration from Southern Europe and Ireland after the Crisis

Carmen González Enríquez and Anna Triandafyllidou

3.1 Introduction

Highly skilled migration is generally an underdeveloped area of research, particularly so when it comes specifically to women as high-skill migrants. Women have been traditionally overshadowed as subject-actors of high-skill migration (HSM) (Boyd and Grieco 2003; Kofman 2012; Rubin et al. 2008). The impact of the global financial crisis and related economic austerity measures on patterns of HSM has attracted a relatively substantial number of studies in the first years of the crisis (studies published in 2010–2012, such as Cerna 2010; Cerna and Hynes 2009; Ghosh 2011; 2013; Kuptsch 2012) but appears to have been forgotten by scholars and policymakers alike as the financial crisis in the US has appeased and the eurozone has been showing signs of slow recovery. However, there remain many unclear issues as the unfolding of both the global financial crisis and the more regional eurozone crisis has affected different European countries in different ways. Thus, on the one hand, the impact of the crisis and its effect on emigration patterns and particularly on high skill-emigration has been significant in the crisis-afflicted countries in Southern Europe (Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal) and in Ireland. On the other hand, countries like Germany, Sweden or the Netherlands have rather kept looking for immigrant workers as their economies were not particularly affected by the economic crisis. In addition, countries like the UK, which suffered from increasing unemployment rates and had to implement important cuts on welfare and other social policy areas, continued to attract immigrants, particularly highly skilled workers.

This chapter aims at making a contribution to the discussion on the effects of the current economic crisis by studying patterns of emigration of highly skilled women from Southern Europe and Ireland in the last five years, notably from 2007 till 2013, based on both quantitative and qualitative data from a large scale e-survey conducted in these countries. In terms

of destination, while the study covers both Europe and other continents, it is worth noting that the vast majority of the respondents in the survey analysed here moved to an EU country.

The chapter starts with a short discussion of the double disadvantage that migrant highly skilled women face (being discriminated both as women and as migrants) and the ways in which their movement is framed within existing HSM policies. We also consider the overall framework of intra-EU mobility and the gender dimension within it, particularly as regards recent emigration from Southern Europe and Ireland because of the ongoing economic and financial crisis. Thus, after having provided for the policy and research context within which our study is placed, we present our dataset which comes from an e-survey conducted in five countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) in 2013. Section 3.3 presents the socio-demographic profile of both men and women emigrants that responded to our survey by looking at their age, education, profession, family situation, as well as destination country. We compare the two profiles and highlight the particular motivations and experiences that characterize female high-skill mobility.

Section 3.4 investigates which socio-demographic features influence the emigration project of highly skilled migrant women (choice of destination country) and its success (employment situation, level of income, prospects for the future). We hypothesize that along with gender important factors are the professional sector in which women are specialized and which can determine their migration project and the type of work contract they have, as well as their level of income. There is however a close relationship as we know between gender and profession that allows us a nuanced understanding of the intersection between gender and high skills in migration. In the last section of this chapter we outline our main findings and discuss their relevance for future research as well as for policy design concerning HSM in Europe.

3.2 Double disadvantage despite high qualifications

3.2.1 Atypical career pathways and mismatch with policies

In a recent study, Chaloff and Lemaitre (2009) note how difficult it is to operationalize the definition of a high-skill migrant. There is a delicate balance between education, income and professional qualification criteria (Batalova and Lowell 2007; Lowell 2001; Wiesbrock and Hercog 2010). The case of women high-skill migrants is particularly challenging not only for the above conceptual difficulties but also because women migrants tend to develop unconventional migration biographies: for instance, they may enter as students or high-skill professionals but convert to family migrants (upon marriage) only to reconvert to low-skill migrants when marriage breaks down and they experience de-skilling (Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 2014).

Such atypical paths and shifts between migration categories fit uneasily with current HSM policy designs which tend to assume that 'high-skill migrants' are a clear cut and watertight category of 'good' migrants with relatively few problems of labour market insertion and socio-cultural integration (Kofman 2013).

In addition, the rather extensive research on women migrants who work in the cleaning and care sector shows that there are important points of intersection between the areas of low-skill migration (such as domestic work) and high-skill migration (such as the medical and paramedical sector) (Cuban 2013). For example, many highly educated women (including nurses and doctors) may work within the domestic sector after emigration (Cuban 2013; Tkach 2011).

HSM policies in Europe in particular strongly emphasize income as a criterion for defining who can qualify as a high-skill migrant, disregarding the fact that highly skilled women are underrepresented in the sectors with higher incomes, such as engineering or information technologies, but over-represented in less well-remunerated even if highly skilled professions, such as doctors and social scientists (Kofman 2013). In addition, high-skilled migrant women appear to be the first to be fired and therefore the first to forcefully return and/or enter illegal work (OECD 2012).

The impact of the current financial crisis on female HSM is particularly difficult to pin down. One challenge is of a methodological nature. HSM is generally difficult to measure due to the absence of reliable databases (Chaloff and Lemaitre 2009). Highly skilled women migrants are especially difficult to study because of their frequent irregular migrant status and because of the above-mentioned fluidity of their professional situation (Cuban 2013; Kofman 2012).

The complexity is aggravated by the difficulty in measuring the immediate effect of the global economic crisis, as researchers do not manage to follow the rapidly changing labour market situations and the related developments in migration law (Ghosh 2011; 2013). Even the most recently published studies of HSM (e.g., Cuban 2013; Halkias et al. 2010; Labrianidis 2011; 2014) are actually based on fieldwork and/or desk research conducted, in the majority of cases, either before or at the very beginning of the crisis.

This study is particularly concerned with highly skilled women emigrating from the countries most affected by the eurozone crisis in the last six years, notably Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Since a lot of this emigration is actually intra-EU mobility, the most recent developments in this domain are worth discussing, with a view to place our own findings within the relevant context.

3.2.2 The gender dimension in intra-EU mobility

Eurostat data on the number of EU nationals living in a member state other than their own show low levels of overall intra-EU mobility (Recchi

2013; Recchi and Triandafyllidou 2010). Intra-EU mobility has significantly increased, mainly after the accession of the new member states of Central Eastern Europe in 2004 and 2007. Earlier studies, that is before the integration of the new member states into the EU, show also low levels of mobility within Central Eastern Europe (Paci et al. 2007). This may in fact suggest that high mobility from these countries was an exceptional phenomenon, intricately linked with their transition experience and access to EU membership.

Studies on international migration show that in the late 2000s women migrants exceeded men in overall flows towards developed regions (passing from 48.9% in 1960 to 52.2% in 2008) (Docquier et al. 2009). Docquier and co-authors suggest that actually it is the rise in women's educational attainment, along with the increased demand for female workforce participants in areas such as health care and services at large, that has fuelled this increase, along with a change in attitudes towards emigration in origin countries. However, recent studies on Central Eastern Europe (Paci et al. 2007) and Southern Europe (Jauer et al. 2014) find that men, younger people and more educated individuals are more likely to emigrate than older and less educated women.

In addition, unemployment in the country/region of origin is neither the only nor the main cause of emigration (Docquier et al. 2009). In other words, those who are unemployed and lower skilled are more likely to be stuck into a localized unemployment trap and may not be responsive to regional labour market disparities. With regard to Central Eastern Europe, Paci et al. (2007) find that regional disparities may favour commuting (notably that the person keeps their place of residence in one region but works in another region) rather than outright migration. They also find that men are more likely to commute than women. The above findings point to interesting and yet unresolved research questions as to the different types of mobility that women may engage in today, the age, gender and skill factors' influence on such mobility, and the often-hidden tensions between subjective experiences and objective measurements of 'successful' mobility.

Studies on recent emigration from Southern Europe and Ireland are scarce. The study by Glynn et al. (2013) stands out for its representative sample of the Irish emigrant population and its comprehensive scope. A few findings of this study invite reflection on the patterns of youth mobility today: the study finds that the new Irish emigrants are predominantly young (between 20 and 29 years of age, equally divided between 20–24 and 25–29) and well educated (more than 60% of those leaving hold a tertiary education degree or higher compared to 47% of all Irish people aged 25–34 holding a tertiary education degree). Interestingly, the study shows that there is a gender balance in terms of who is leaving (51% are male compared to 49% that are female), but as the authors comment, other studies have suggested an imbalance, with two-thirds of men leaving rural areas and two-thirds of women

leaving densely populated urban areas with a high representation of young couples or single people with no children and with higher-than-average education levels (Glynn et al. 2013, pp. 32–33). The study finds that there is no ‘typical’ profile of the new Irish emigrant. Interestingly, the Irish go predominantly to the UK and Australia, but also to the US, New Zealand and Canada, and to a much lesser extent to continental European countries.

Another recent study by Ralph (2014) on Irish Euro-commuters suggests a special type of intra-EU mobile citizens which he labels as *semigrants* (since they are half-way between staying and emigrating) – those who have been led to this semi-commuting condition by the crisis. The decision to be spatially mobile has been driven in this case by a desire to avoid social demotion at home due to rising unemployment, pay cuts, tax increases and increased job precariousness. This study does not cover the gendered aspects of such semi-mobility however.

Research on highly skilled emigration from Greece and Italy conducted by Triandafyllidou and Gropas (2014), albeit without distinguishing on the gender issue, suggests that highly skilled migrants from these two countries mainly go to European destinations, including not only traditional receiving countries like Britain or Germany but also to a number of other countries such as Belgium or Switzerland. The authors’ analysis of the reasons that guide the choice of the destination countries points to the importance of work offers or study opportunities and an overall appreciation of the quality of life (including respect for the citizen, security, and a good health and education system) in that particular country on the part of the migrant. Kinship and family networks appear to only marginally affect the emigration plan, and there appears no connection with earlier Southern European emigrations to Northern or Western Europe from the postwar period. This finding is evident across all the responses in the study (Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2014), leading to the conclusion that it is the migrant – and not the receiving country – that is the selecting agent.

The limited number of studies concentrating particularly on emigration from Southern Europe and Ireland suggests also the need for a comprehensive, representative and systematic analysis of the out-migration patterns that the crisis has triggered, particularly their gendered aspects.

3.3 Methodology

The analysis presented in this chapter is based on the data collected through the first quantitative survey made in Europe on recent out-migration from the four South European countries and Ireland, the five countries hit hardest by the economic crisis and the austerity measures (The EUI Global Governance Program, GGP, e-survey 2013). The e-survey took place from 21 May to 18 August 2013; it was conducted through the internet, with a self-administered questionnaire in five languages (English, Greek, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish), and received valid answers from 6,750 persons,

2,430 of which were women (36%). Valid answers were from people who had already left their country of origin and included those from all possible destination countries. The vast majority of interviewees were university graduates (88%), and most of them had left their respective home countries from 2009, as a result of the shrinking domestic labour markets.¹ To obtain a homogeneous sample, a selection has been made over the database which excluded those who had not achieved a tertiary educational degree and those who migrated prior to 2007. This allowed for a sample of 4,638 highly qualified migrants who moved after the outbreak of the 2007 crisis. Of these respondents, 1,898, a total of 41%, were women. It is interesting that the percentage of women among the university-educated respondents is higher than within the general survey population.

The absence of reliable statistical sources on the size and demographic features of people leaving Southern Europe and Ireland in the last years has prevented us from designing a representative sample for this survey. However, this difficulty is shared by most of the studies looking at new emigration from the crisis-afflicted countries. The IOM study (2010) on Spain has circumvented the problem by using alternative techniques such as snowball sampling, while Glynn et al. (2013) have sampled on the basis of households that had a member who had migrated recently.

Our study has used systematically online newspapers, social media (Facebook, twitter) and other networks (institutions, civil society, media) to reach as large a number of people as possible. Interestingly, in all the studies that have appeared so far, the majority of respondents has a higher education degree: 66% in Glynn et al., 92% in the IOM research on Spain and 88% in our survey. Thus, there are good reasons to believe that there is a very high presence of people with a university degree among the new emigrants from Southern Europe and Ireland overall.

Our survey explores the main socio-demographic and educational features of migrants, the reasons for leaving their home country, their placement in the host-country labour market, the success or failure of previous migratory experiences, the main problems found in the process of integration and the future plans of these migrants. Based first on a descriptive and then on a multivariate statistical analysis of the results of this survey, the following sections provide an overview of the main differences between men and women as regards their overall features, trajectory and achievements as highly skilled migrants.

3.4 Comparing highly skilled men and women migrants

3.4.1 Gender, age and family situation

The first outstanding result of the survey is the high male predominance among our sample of highly skilled emigrants: men surpass women in all countries, with the exception of Ireland, while in Greece and Italy male




Figure 3.1 Gender distribution per country of origin

Source: GGP e-survey 2013.

mobility more than doubles female migration. This result is even more striking when taking into account that women already surpass men as holders of a university degree in all the countries of the sample, especially in the youngest age groups (25–34 years).² This in fact forces us to pose the question of what elements are preventing the migration of women. Our survey cannot provide answers to this question, as respondents have only included persons who did actually decide to migrate (Figure 3.1).

Interestingly also, the highly skilled women migrants who responded to our survey are mostly young: 59% of them are under 30 years of age and only 2.5% are over 45. The representation of young women among the respondents is particularly noticeable when compared with the age distribution of the male respondents (see Figure 3.3 below), where 49% are under 30 years of age and 5% are between 46 and 65 years old.

The difference in the age structure of the women and men respondents is not related to the time they departed from the origin country, as the analysis is restricted to those leaving from 2007 onwards, and since then the statistical curves of exit are similar among both genders (Figure 3.2).

A lower percentage among the women respondents had children at the time of emigration (12%) compared to men (18%), although the shares of those who are married or partnered are similar (42% of women, 44% of men). This difference may be attributed to the younger average age of women, but it may also be that women with children are more reluctant to emigrate than women without children. This is a question that merits further research. As said, the present study concerns only women who left, hence




Figure 3.2 Gender and age distribution

Source: GGP e-survey 2013.

we do not have information about the decision-making process of those who eventually stayed in their country of origin.

3.4.2 Field of studies

Men and women in our sample have achieved a similar educational level, with 10% holding PhDs, 51% holding graduate degrees and 39% having completed undergraduate tertiary studies. But it is notable that their areas of expertise are clearly different: men are concentrated in engineering, computers and IT sciences, economics, management and business, while highly skilled mobile women are mostly found in social sciences, medical and health professions, humanities and education. This gender distribution of professional profiles reflects the gendered selection of university disciplines which is common across Europe (Bobbitt-Zeher 2007). These differences in the area of studies are later reflected in differences in economic sectors in which highly skilled men and women work and explain part of the income differences between the two genders, as engineering, business, IT and computer science offer work opportunities with higher salaries (Figure 3.3).

3.4.3 Employment situation at the country of origin

Our female survey respondents were overall worse off than men before leaving. They were more frequently unemployed (40% versus 36%) and, among those employed, employment stability was lower (a higher share of women worked without a proper contract or with a short-term contract) (Figure 3.4).




Figure 3.3 Field of studies and gender

Source: GGP e-survey 2013.




Figure 3.4 Type of employment contract at the country of origin and gender

Source: GGP e-survey 2013.

The survey also found a difference in the subjective evaluation of the respondents' professional situation at the home country prior to departure: while 29% of men declared themselves satisfied or very satisfied with their previous employment situation, only 24% of women respondents expressed the same feeling.

3.4.4 Reasons for leaving

In line with the Triandafyllidou and Gropas (2014), IOM (2010) as well as Glynn et al. (2013) findings, this study suggests that unemployment as such is only one of the various motivations for leaving and it accounts for around a third of the reasons that caused the decision to migrate. Indeed, the study on Ireland (Glynn et al. 2013) showed that only 23% of those who left were unemployed and an additional 13% were employed part-time at the time of departure. The IOM study on Spain (2010) shows that only 39% of the respondents were unemployed before their departure, while the study on Italy and Greece (Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2014) shows that 21% of Greeks and 14% of Italians indicated unemployment as a reason for leaving. In this last study, low wages were chosen too as a main reason for leaving by 19% of respondents in Greece and 17% in Italy (Figure 3.5).

Indeed, it is rather the desire to improve academic and professional training and the lack of general prospects in the origin country that are the main driving forces enhancing mobility both for men and women. However, unemployment, the mobility of partners and the desire to improve




Figure 3.5 Reasons for leaving (multiple unlimited choice)

Source: GGP e-survey 2013.

academic/professional training are more frequently mentioned by women as the main reason for leaving, while, on the contrary, the bad political climate in the origin country (mentioned by 12% of all respondents in Greece and Italy) and the existence of business opportunities in the host country are more often stated as reasons to leave among men.

3.4.5 Labour market integration at the destination country

Gender affects decisively all relevant variables of labour integration at the destination country, in terms of access to employment, satisfaction with the job or income. First, unemployment among women in the host country is higher (17% vs 12% among men); second, their position in the occupational ladder is lower; third, their labour stability is also lower; while, fourth, they earn less and, finally, their satisfaction with the job is relatively lower than that of men.

When linking the occupational situation variable (employed/unemployed) with the family structure in the host country, a clear relationship between them appears. Those women who migrated with their partner and children are those who are most often unemployed, followed by those who migrated with their partner but without children. On the contrary, women with children in the host country but without a partner are more frequently employed, most probably because they cannot rely on the economic support of a partner. The relevant difference of 24 points between the two extremes on the level of occupation of highly qualified mobile women according to their family status shows that the family migration project is usually led by the male partner and the woman follows, whether with or without children. Once at the destination country, it is probably harder for a woman who has the responsibility of caring for children to find a job (Table 3.1).

The comparative weakness of the highly qualified female position in the labour markets of the host countries is also made evident by the disparity between the level of stability at work of men and women, as there are nine points of difference in their access to long-term contracts (Table 3.2).

Table 3.1 Occupational situation and family status

Did you move...?	% Unemployed	% Employed
Alone	15	85
With partner/spouse	21	79
With partner and children	35	65
With children but without partner	11	89

Source: GGP e-survey 2013.

Table 3.2 Type of work contract

%	Long-term contract	Short-term contract	No contract
Female	54	39	6
Male	63	31	5

Source: GGP e-survey 2013.

Both highly qualified men and women are concentrated in professional or managerial positions, but a small percentage is underemployed, engaged in jobs that require lower qualifications or that are not related with their area of studies or expertise. In this underemployed group, women are predominant among service workers (14% of women, 10% of men).

The ensemble of elements which define a lower and weaker position of women in the occupational structure is again reflected in the distribution of earnings. A third of highly qualified mobile men get more than €4,000 monthly (gross income), while the percentage of women in this income level is less than half (16%). On the contrary, almost 30% of women obtain between €1,000 and €2,000 monthly, while only 19% of men fall in this range. The amount of women earning less than €1,000 per month (10%) doubles that of men (Figure 3.6 and 3.7).

As already mentioned, the differences between men and women regarding the type of degrees they received from university partly explain the disadvantaged position of women at the destination country. Highly skilled mobile men are concentrated in the most marketable and well-paid professions while women are most frequently found in those careers related with




Figure 3.6 Type of occupation at the destination country and gender

Source: GGP e-survey 2013.




Figure 3.7 Monthly income and gender

Source: GGP e-survey 2013.

the care of persons, social sciences or education, all of which are less profitable. But this is only a partial explanation as women gain less even when they belong to the best-paid professions, engineering, IT, computer science, economics, management and business. A more specific research should be carried out to explain the disadvantage of women in these best-paid sectors, a disadvantage that suggests discrimination and the existence of 'glass ceilings' (Figure 3.8 and 3.9).

The wage disparity between men and women is actually larger in the highest echelons of monthly income. In the business sector the percentage of men earning €4,001 or more is 38% while that of women is only 16%. By contrast, women are overrepresented in the income brackets of €2,000 or less, and 10% of women have no income, while the related percentage for men stands at 3% (Figure 3.10).

These income differences are reflected in the level of satisfaction that men and women feel when evaluating their earnings. Taken globally, satisfaction with income level is very high among both genres, but it is higher among men (70% feel satisfied or very satisfied) than among women (64%).

3.5 Choice of destination country, integration challenges and plans for the future

South European and Irish high-qualified migrants, both men and women, are moving for the most part within the EU and particularly going to a western European country. Indeed, 83% of women and 81% of men have




Figure 3.8 Monthly gross earnings among engineers

Source: GGP e-survey 2013.




Figure 3.9 Monthly gross earnings among IT and computer professionals

Source: GGP e-survey 2013.

migrated to another EU country, and there is no apparent gender difference as regards the chosen destination. Britain is top on the list (977 migrants in the sample), followed by Germany (704) and, at a distance, the Netherlands (284), Belgium (270), Switzerland (260), France (208) and Spain (192). Host countries outside Europe were less frequent: only the US (148), Canada (53),




Figure 3.10 Monthly gross earnings among economics, management and business professionals

Source: GGP e-survey 2013.

Australia (76), Angola (64) and the Arab Emirates (41) amounted to more than 40 answers in the e-survey (Figure 3.11).

As the choice of destination countries is similar among men and women, many of the obstacles or challenges they face are also analogous. The fact that the destination country is more than likely an EU member state simplifies significantly the legal/administrative problems related with permits to stay and work. Indeed, very few respondents mentioned those as one of the difficulties they faced upon arrival at their destination country. Fluency in the host country language is, on the other hand, the most cited difficulty, which affects equally men and women (36%). As expected, Irish migrants are less affected by language problems (18%), as they are native English speakers, followed by Portuguese (31%), Italians (34%) and Greeks (37%). Spanish emigrants, on the other hand, are those with major difficulties in terms of language competence. More than half (55%) of all Spanish respondents mention speaking the language of the destination country as a difficulty. Renting accommodation is the second-most relevant problem, again this is equally shared by both men and women respondents.

Although both genders face the same type of challenges in settling at the destination country, the weaker position of women surfaces when we look at difficulties related to labour market integration. Women mention more frequently difficulties to find a job (19% vs 14% of men), experience more problems related with the recognition of their qualifications (12 vs 9%), a fact that may be related to the different type of qualifications women and




Figure 3.11 Main destination countries

Source: GGP e-survey 2013.

men have achieved, and as a whole they encounter more difficulties: 26% of women and 31% of men said they did not find any difficulty (Table 3.3).

In comparison to the other nationality groups, Spaniards do not only suffer more from the difficulty of host country language, but also face more obstacles in several other aspects, including recognition of degrees, transfer of social benefits, getting health insurance or finding a job. The fact that Spaniards moved more recently than the four other groups can explain their comparatively weaker position: 74% of Spaniards that responded to the survey emigrated in 2011 or later compared with 57% of the Irish, 53% of the Italian, 68% of the Greek and 67% of the Portuguese. Also, the weaker language fluency among Spaniards can make these problems more difficult to solve for them.

3.5.1 Previous migration experience and plans for the future

The migratory project of women is slightly shorter than that of men. In fact, 43% of men plan to stay in the host country for more than five years, compared with 36% of women, a difference that can be explained by the more consolidated position, in terms of both family status and occupation, of men compared to women respondents. Only one-fifth of women (21%) have plans to bring their family members to the host country, compared with one-fourth of men (26%). This can be explained by the fact that mobile women are on average younger and more frequently without children, while a higher percentage of women have moved to accompany

Table 3.3 Difficulties faced at destination country (multiple unlimited choice), by gender and country of origin

	Problems with the language	Difficulties in finding a job	Over-qualified for the available/offered jobs	Difficulties in getting health insurance	Difficulties in renting accommodation	Problems related to the recognition of degree/qualification	Problems related to transferring social benefits (unemployment, others)	Did not face any difficulties
Women	36%	19%	10%	8%	31%	12%	4%	26%
Men	37%	14%	10%	7%	32%	9%	6%	30%
Greece	37%	20%	8%	7%	36%	7%	5%	30%
Ireland	18%	20%	13%	5%	29%	7%	5%	32%
Italy	35%	10%	9%	7%	20%	5%	3%	37%
Portugal	31%	13%	5%	5%	33%	10%	5%	32%
Spain	55%	25%	23%	13%	34%	16%	9%	17%

Source: GGP e-survey 2013.

their partner. Indeed, this demographic profile of migrant women versus men confirms a traditional mode of migration where the main actor is the man who may bring the whole family (spouse and children) while women, when they are the primary actors in the migration project, move alone. Thus, while 'birds of passage' are also women, as Mirjana Morokvasic wrote over 30 years ago (Morokvasic 1984), their migration role appears still highly gendered, even when the women migrants in question are highly skilled workers.

Almost half of high-qualified migrants (49% of women and 48% of men) have lived previously abroad, in a different mobility experience devoted to study (39%) or work (44%). While men and women are equally represented among those who moved earlier to improve their education and/or training, men clearly surpass women as regards their previous work experiences in other countries (48% of men had previous overseas experience, compared with 38% among women). This difference is only partly explained by the average higher age of men, as it implies that they have had more time to live other mobility experiences. Even among those between 46 and 65 years of age with a previous stay in another country, two-thirds (66%) of men but under half of the women (44%) had migrated there for employment reasons.

3.6 Differences between genders

The previous descriptive analysis has showed relevant and sizeable differences between both genres as regards elements which affect their migratory experience. Hereafter, we use a regression logit analysis to test the level of significance of relationships we have earlier highlighted and to identify the most significant differences. Those differences turn out to be area of occupation, income, age, country of origin and family status. The designed model classifies correctly the 71% of cases.

Regarding the area of employment, there are important differences: women are over-concentrated in education and research, health, psychology and humanities, while their presence is scarce in engineering and IT. The statistical significance of this relationship is high. The probability of women being employed in the psychology and humanities sectors is four times that of men, while it is twice as likely that they are employed in health occupations and education or research. On the contrary, the probability of women being employed in IT or engineering is less than half that of men.

As already mentioned, women are clearly underrepresented among those migrants who earn more than €3,000 monthly and overrepresented among those who obtain less than €1,000. In the first case, the relation between gender and income is stronger: other factors of the model being equal, the probability of finding a woman in the highest income group is barely half of

that of finding a man in that same group, with gender registering the highest statistical significance as an explanatory factor.

Looking at the family situation of our respondents, other factors being equal, women emigrate more frequently with their partners or spouses, although here the importance of gender as an explanatory factor is less strong and less statistically significant.

Upon examination of the age factor, the logit model confirms the significance of the age difference among men and women. Highly skilled women are more likely to be found in the youngest age cohort (under 30 years old) and much less present in the older age bracket (over 46 years of age) (Table 3.4).

3.7 Success of the migration project

In this section we will isolate the effect of the variables that influence the success or failure of the migration experience. To measure success our analysis has used employment as an indicator (e.g., to be employed will be identified as a successful experience) and has not considered the subjective satisfaction level of migrants, as this satisfaction is too dependent on previous expectations, of which we do not have information. The logit analysis allows us to identify the effect of each independent variable on the dependent one, in this case employment. The value of each variable where the difference between men and women was the smallest has been selected as the basis for comparison.

According to our model, which classifies correctly 86% of cases, the probability of being employed at the destination country depends on gender, age, origin country, residence country, date of departure, previous employment and discipline of studies. Among those elements, the date of departure is the most relevant.

Taking as the basis for our comparison those who left their origin countries in the period 2012–2013, which is the most recent period in our survey, it is clear that they experience the most difficult situation in terms of finding employment, when compared with those who arrived earlier. The logit model shows that the probability of being employed increases with the time of stay: those who arrived in the first years of the crisis, 2007–2009, are more than twice as likely to be employed than those who arrived during 2012 and 2013. This relation can be interpreted in three ways: first, integration into the labour market requires a certain period of previous stay in the destination country; second, those who emigrated in the most recent period did it taking more risks, moving without having previously arranged a job or with scarce contacts and weak networks at destination; and third, those who migrated earlier could have filled most labour posts in the sectors where most highly skilled emigrants concentrate, making it more difficult for latecomers to find a job (Table 3.5).

Table 3.4 Socio-demographic variables and gender

		Probability of being female – logit model					
Observations: 3,214		Coefficients	Standard error	Wald	Significance	Odds ratio	
Age group (Base: 31–45)	Under 30	0.254***	0.090	7.919	0.005	1.289	
	Over 46	−1.001***	0.293	11.658	0.001	0.367	
Married/ partnered	Yes	0.183**	0.089	4.186	0.041	1.201	
Monthly income gross (Base: Between 1,000 euros 1,000 and 3,000 Euros)	No income	0.178	0.657	0.073	0.787	1.195	
	Less than 1,000 euros	0.362**	0.177	4.199	0.040	1.437	
	More than 3,001 euros	−0.625***	0.091	47.310	0	0.535	
Area of current job (Base: Trade)	Agriculture and Fishery	0.535	0.528	1.026	0.311	1.707	
	Architecture	0.270	0.266	1.028	0.311	1.309	
	Construction	−0.430	0.378	1.297	0.255	0.651	
	Education and Research	0.884***	0.230	14.757	0	2.420	
	Engineering	−0.721***	0.238	9.224	0.002	0.486	
	Hotels, restaurants and bars	0.279	0.278	1.006	0.316	1.321	
	Industry	−0.208	0.285	0.530	0.467	0.812	
	Information Technology	−0.700***	0.241	8.411	0.004	0.497	
	Law	0.665**	0.338	3.874	0.049	1.944	
	Medicine and paramedical jobs	0.758***	0.247	9.446	0.002	2.134	
	Military and police	0.660	0.955	0.478	0.490	1.934	
	Provision of services	0.325	0.238	1.863	0.172	1.384	
	Psychology and humanities	1.462***	0.351	17.295	0	4.314	
	Constant		−0.766***	0.252	9.275	0.002	0.465

“p” is the logarithm of the probability

***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.

Source: GGP e-survey 2013.

Women experience the most significant disadvantage when looking for a job in the destination country. The relation is of the maximum significance: 0,000. As for the age, compared with the central group (31–45), those over 46 years of age face greater difficulties. The most successful in terms of employment are those under 30, although in this case the statistical significance is much smaller (and can probably be related to their higher level of qualifications, see more in the following).

Table 3.5 Labour market insertion and gender

		Probability of being currently employed – logit model				
Observations: 4287		Coefficients	Standard error	Wald	Sig.	Odds Ratio
Gender (Base: Male)	Female	-.458***	.098	21.884	.000	.632
Age group (Base: 31–45)	Under 30	.113	.100	1.281	.258	1.119
	Over 46	-.393*	.230	2.916	.088	.675
Birth country (Base: Spain)	Ireland	.827***	.267	9.605	.002	2.287
	Greece	-.071	.142	.250	.617	.931
	Italy	.332**	.164	4.086	.043	1.394
	Portugal	.819***	.121	46.129	.000	2.269
Residence country (Base: Germany)	France/Belgium/ Netherlands/ Switzerland	-.097	.156	.389	.533	.908
	Rest of EU	-.701***	.147	22.874	.000	.496
	Rest of World	.347*	.178	3.789	.052	1.414
	UK	-.043	.160	.071	.790	.958
Date of departure (Base: 2012–2013)	2007–2009	.830***	.133	39.070	.000	2.293
	2010–2011	.622***	.111	31.261	.000	1.862
Employed previously in origin country	Yes	.478***	.096	24.822	.000	1.613
Discipline of studies (Base: Mathematics and Natural Science)	Economics	-.054	.179	.090	.764	.947
	Management and Business					
	Engineering and Architecture	.132	.167	.623	.430	1.141
	Humanities and Education	-.393**	.183	4.604	.032	.675
	IT and Computer Sciences	.553**	.215	6.633	.010	1.738
	Law	-.057	.284	.041	.840	.944
	Medical and Health Professions	.483**	.217	4.980	.026	1.621
	Social Sciences	-.239	.179	1.778	.182	.787
Constant		1.075***	.198	29.566	.000	2.931

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$.

Source: GGP e-survey 2013.

The country of origin of the highly skilled migrants appears also to shape the success of the migration project. Highly skilled migrants born in Ireland and Portugal are more than twice as likely to be employed than those born in Spain. Probably, this advantage is related to their fluency in English, an

element which was not tested in the survey, but which is coherent with the fact that language was less mentioned as a difficulty in the integration process by Irish and Portuguese respondents.

The most significant and negative relation is that existing between employment and destination in European countries other than Germany, the UK, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland. Among those other countries are Spain, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Portugal, which have become sending and receiving countries simultaneously. The relationship found here expresses the impact of the crisis on intra-EU migrants which in the last years have moved to South European countries or Ireland, where, according to our results, they face greatest difficulties in finding a job.

Being employed previously in the origin country is a predictor of success of the mobility experience. Other factors being equal, the probability of being employed is 60% higher for those who were employed before leaving. Some of these emigrants may have been intra-company transferees or people moving with jobs pre-arranged through their employer in the home country, and it is also likely that those who were working before leaving had more time to prepare for their move. This set of migrants was not under acute pressure to find work and probably had developed their contacts and/or had arranged a job before leaving.

Turning to the area of studies, having a degree related to IT and computer science or with medicine and health sciences offers a significant advantage in labour market insertion, while, on the contrary, those migrants with a degree in the humanities face greater difficulties in finding a job.

3.8 Concluding remarks

This chapter presents an exploratory study of the profile and experiences of highly skilled women leaving Southern Europe and Ireland as a result of the eurozone economic crisis to search for better employment opportunities and quality of life in other European (and non-European) countries. The chapter offers new data based on a large e-survey administered in the five countries concerned.

The study largely confirms the gender gap in the migration project of high-qualified migrants and in the migration success that the current literature shows. In the host countries, women are more unemployed than men, face more difficulties to integrate, receive on average lower incomes, are less satisfied with their mobility experience and their labour situation is more unstable. Differences begin when still residing in the home countries: a much smaller number of highly skilled women than men decide to migrate, a phenomenon that requires specific research. Also, women tend to specialize in the lower paid areas, such as social sciences, education, research and the humanities (instead of the better-paid engineering or computer science and IT fields), and are more represented among the unemployed before leaving.

But even when women specialize on those more profitable disciplines, their labour and income results in the destination country are worse, a fact which requires further research and which can suggest gender discrimination.

Unsurprisingly, the family migration model observed among many of the respondents leads to less successful mobility experiences for women. Those female migrants who emigrated with their partners are more frequently unemployed than those who moved alone.

Gender and the time of migration are strong factors that influence negatively labour market insertion and income levels. Thus women (and men) who migrated most recently (2012–2013) have worse outcomes in terms of their migration project and are more likely to be unemployed and have a lower income than those who migrated in the early years of the crisis (2007–2008).

This difference can express a relevant stable phenomenon (integration improves with the time of stay) and/or can be the consequence of high levels of immigration of highly skilled workers due to the Southern European and Irish crises. These migrants who were latecomers faced more difficulties in finding a job, as those who arrived earlier could have occupied the best available posts.

Alongside this relatively gloomy picture which confirms the disadvantage women face in migrating, our data confirm the argument that policies designed to attract HSM which use high income as a criterion for defining high qualifications are gender biased (Kofman 2012) and can discriminate against women, since on average women with the same high qualifications receive lesser income than men.

Notes

The authors are grateful to Laura Bartolini for her constructive comments and her proposal to include a logit analysis and to Jose Pablo Martínez for his statistical work.

1. The first results of the e-survey are available online at: <http://globalgovernanceprogramme.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/SURVEY-REPORT-Emigrating-in-times-of-crisis.pdf> (accessed: 26 March 2015).
2. See database available online at: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database> (accessed: 10 April 2015).

References

- Batalova, J. and L. Lowell (2007) 'Immigrant Professionals in the United States', *Society*, 44(2), 26–31.
- Bobbitt-Zeher, D. (2007) 'The Gender Income Gap and the Role of Education', *Sociology of Education*, 80(1), 1–22.
- Boyd, M. and E. Grieco (2003) 'Women and Migration', *MIP* 01/03/03. Available online at: <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/women-and-migration-incorporating-gender-international-migration-theory>

- Cerna, L. (2010) 'Policies and Practices of Highly Skilled Migration in Times of the Economic Crisis', *ILO International Migration Papers* 99. Available online at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---migrant/documents/publication/wcms_179666.pdf (accessed: 2 April 2015).
- Cerna, L. and W. Hynes. (2009) 'The Deeper Impact of the Economic Crisis: Changes in High-Skilled Immigration Policies', in *COMPAS Annual Conference*. Oxford, UK, 21–22 September 2009. Available online at: http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/files/Events/Annual_conferences/conference_2009/H_Cerna-Hynes_High%20Skilled%20Immigration%20Policies.pdf (accessed: 2 April 2015).
- Chaloff, J. and G. Lemaître (2009) 'Managing Highly-Skilled Labour Migration: A Comparative Analysis of Migration Policies and Challenges in OECD Countries', *OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers No. 79* (Paris: OECD Publishing).
- Cuban, S. (2013) *Deskilling Migrant Women in the Global Care Industry* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Docquier, F., B. Lindsay Lowel and A. Marfouk (2009) 'A Gendered Assessment of Highly Skilled Emigration', *Population and Development Review*, 35(2), 297–321.
- Ghosh, B. (2013) *The Global Economic Crisis and the Future of Migration: Issues and Prospects. What Will Migration Look Like in 2045?* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Ghosh, B. (2011) *The Global Economic Crisis and Migration: Where Do We Go From Here?* (Geneva: International Organization for Migration).
- Glynn, I., T. Kelly and P. MacEirni (2013) *Irish Emigration in an Age of Austerity, Report for the Émigré Project*. Available online at: <http://static.rasset.ie/documents/news/emigration-in-an-age-of-austerity.pdf> (accessed: 11 May 2015).
- Halkias, D. et al. (eds.) (2010) *Female Immigrant Entrepreneurs: The Economic and Social Impact of a Global Phenomenon* (Farnham, UK: Gower Publishing).
- IOM (2010) *Migration and the Economic Crisis in the European Union: Implications for Policy* (Brussels: IOM).
- Isaakyan, I. and A. Triandafyllidou (2014) 'Anglophone Marriage-migrants in Southern Europe: A Study of Expat Nationalism and Integration Dynamics', *International Review of Sociology*, 24(3), 374–390.
- Jauer, J., T. Liebig, J.P. Martin, and P.A. Puhani (2014) Migration as an Adjustment Mechanism in the Crisis? A Comparison of Europe and the United States, IZA Working Paper, IZA DP NO. 7921, January 2014.
- Kofman, E. (2012) 'Gender and Skilled Migration in Europe', *Cuadernos de Relaciones Laborales*, 30(1), 63–89.
- Kofman, E. (2013) 'Towards a Gendered Evaluation of (Highly) Skilled Immigration Policies in Europe', *International Migration*, 52(3), 116–128.
- Kuptsch, C. (2012) 'The Economic Crisis and the Labour Migration Policy in European Countries', *Comparative Population Studies*, 37(1–2), 15–32.
- Labrianidis, L. (2014) 'Investing in Leaving: The Greek Case of International Migration of Professionals', *Mobilities*, 9(2), 314–335.
- Labrianidis, L. (2011) *Investing in Leaving: The Greek Case of International Migration of Professionals in the Globalization Era* (Athens: Kritiki, in Greek).
- Lowell, L. (2001) 'Policy Responses to the International Mobility of Skilled Labour', *International Migration Papers* 45 (Geneva: ILO). Available online at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---migrant/documents/publication/wcms_201774.pdf (accessed: 3 April 2015).

- Lowell, L. (2006) 'High Skill Mobility: Changes and Challenges', in United Nations *International Symposium on International Migration and Development*. Turin, Italy, 28–30 June 2006. Available online at: http://www.un.org/esa/population/migration/turin/Turin_Statements/LOWELL.pdf (accessed: 3 April 2015).
- Morokvasic, M. (1984) 'Birds of Passage Are also Women', *International Migration Review*, 18 (4), 886–907.
- OECD (2012) *International Migration Outlook* (Paris: OECD Press).
- Paci, P. et al. (2007) 'Internal Labour Mobility in Central Europe and the Baltic Region', *World Bank Working Paper No. 105*, (Washington DC: World Bank).
- Ralph, D. (2014) "'Always on the move, but going nowhere fast": Motivations for Euro-commuting between the Republic of Ireland and Other EU States', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, published online 22/4/2014.
- Recchi, E. (2013) *Senza frontiere* (Bologna, IT: Il Mulino).
- Recchi, E. and A. Triandafyllidou (2010) 'Crossing Over, Heading West and South: Mobility, Citizenship and Employment in the Enlarged Europe', in G. Menz and A. Caviedes (eds.) *The Changing Face of Labour Migration in Europe* (London: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 125–148.
- Rubin, J. et al. (2008) *Migrant Women in the European Labour Force: Technical Report Prepared for the European Commission* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation).
- Tkach, O. (2011) 'Professionalisation of Domestic Cleaning: Shaping Frontiers', in P. Romanov and E. Yarskaya-Smirnova (eds.) *The Anthropology of Professions* (in Russian), Library Journal of Social Policy Studies). Moscow: TSSPGI, pp. 304–334.
- Triandafyllidou, A. and R. Gropas (2014) "'Voting with their Feet": Highly Skilled Emigrants from Southern Europe', *American Behavioral Scientist*, November 2014, 58, pp. 1614–1633, first published online, 27 May 2014, doi:10.1177/0002764214534665.
- Wiesbrock, A. and M. Hercog (2010) 'The Legal Framework for the Highly Skilled Migration to the EU: EU and US Labour Migration Policies Compared', *Maastricht Graduate School of Governance Working Papers 2010/001*. Available online at: http://www.merit.unu.edu/publications/mgsog_wppdf/2010/wp2010-001.pdf (accessed: 3 April 2015).

4

Crisis and Beyond: Intra-EU Mobility of Polish and Spanish Migrants in a Comparative Perspective

Paweł Kaczmarczyk and Mikolaj Stanek

4.1 Introduction

The 2004 and 2006 EU enlargement rounds have opened a new chapter in the contemporary history of European migration. Both accessions have not been comparable to previous enlargement experiences. Altogether 12 countries have joined the EU and as a consequence its population has increased by around 26%. The EU enlargement has changed significantly the institutional and socio-economic context of intra-EU mobility. As a consequence of introduction of the free mobility regime, the scale and dynamics of the outflows from Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have increased significantly. According to the EU Labour Force Survey (LFS) data, within the ten years following the 2004 EU enlargement, the total number of EU-12 nationals residing in the 'old' member states increased 5.4-fold, from 1.1 million in 2004 to 6.1 million in 2014. This number can be translated into a total net inflow of five million mobile persons from the new member states (i.e., 500,000 per year) (Fihel et al. 2015).

Importantly, the 'new migration' from the region is highly selective with respect to several socio-economic characteristics. First, the main line of selectivity became the skill level. Mobile persons from the new member states of the EU are on average much better educated than their not-mobile counterparts. Second, even if the mobile population is relatively balanced in terms of gender structure, still the share of female migrants from particular countries can vary dependent on the structure of demand for foreign labour at destination and structural conditions at origin (Brücker et al. 2009; Fihel et al. 2015).

The global economic crisis that hit harshly most European countries has laid the foundations for another change in mobility patterns within

this continent. The deterioration of the socio-economic environment after 2007 affected particularly the Southern European countries positioned already in different stages of the migration cycle and commonly described as new immigration countries (Arango 2012). As a consequence, a new stream of south–west mobility has been established and in the post-crisis environment intra-EU mobility is to be analysed in terms of both east–west and south–west migration. This is an approach we apply in this chapter.

Against this background, an aim of this chapter is to comparatively assess the scale, dynamics and structure of migration from Poland and Spain in the post-2008 period. We are looking at two intriguing cases in terms of migration experience: Poland is traditionally one of the most important migrant-sending countries in the EU and its role as labour supplier has even increased since the 2004 enlargement. In the 2000s, Spain became one of the most important immigration countries in the EU to change its migration profile after the economic crisis. Specifically, in this chapter we analyse how migrants from these countries – particularly those well endowed with human capital – responded to changing economic conditions. We argue that significant differences in the post-crisis migration patterns of Poles and Spaniards are attributable mostly to labour market dynamics in the countries of origin and, specifically, their absorptive capacities with regard to well-educated and the younger part of the population. As labour market conditions are commonly different for males and females, migration strategies of men and women are expected to differ as well.

The chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 looks at several critical economic indicators to give an enquiry into the economic situation in Europe in the post-crisis period and to present the economies of Poland and Spain in a broad European context. Additionally, a brief literature survey on the linkages between crisis and intra-EU mobility is provided here. Section 4.3 presents Poland and Spain as emigration countries in the post-crisis period. In this section we provide a comparative analysis of migration trends from Poland and Spain and also basic patterns of insertion of these migrants into the labour markets of receiving countries. We focus on well-educated mobile persons and, particularly, on female migrants. An interpretation of those trends is provided in Section 4.4. Particular emphasis is put on labour market dynamics in both countries as we hypothesize that labour market conditions in the countries of origin are the main factors responsible for particular migration strategies being implemented.

4.2 Background – crisis and beyond

Linkages between the state of the European economies and migration have emerged as one of the most important topics in recent scientific debates on migration. A growing number of papers have assessed the dynamics of the

crisis and its impacts on the behaviour of would-be migrants, migrants and return migrants (Kahanec and Kurekova 2014; OECD 2011; 2012). What is being emphasized is that the current crisis is to a large extent different from past recessions. First, it began in the well-developed countries and spread all over the globe. As a consequence, it is commonly described in terms of its symmetry from the angle of its geographical coverage (Kahanec and Kurekova 2014). Second, the effects of the crisis are not equally distributed among the different sectors of economy, with seasonal and trade-sensitive sectors such as construction and manufacturing being hit the most. This is particularly visible in the case of those economies that hitherto relied on heavy investments in those sectors (which seems particularly relevant in the case of Spain, discussed in this chapter). Accordingly, many scholars expect that the current recession can affect migration patterns differently than in the case of previous recessions. Martin (2009) suggests that some of the sectors may not recover in the short term, and in some cases (particularly manufacturing) some of the jobs can eventually disappear, which will impact both recent and future migration flows. This is mainly due to changes observed in the productive structure of well-developed economies since the last recession.

In addition, the magnitude and the range of the recent economic crisis have been at least partly determined by the process of intense economic and monetary integration, with the most prominent example being the EU. The freedom of capital movement and especially monetary unification in an environment of global excess of liquidity boosted the debt financed by economic expansion, especially in the peripheral Southern EU countries. As is well known, unprecedented global expansion of cheap credit led to the growing fiscal and payment imbalances and eventually came to an end with the outbreak of the economic and financial crisis. On the other hand, the European integration project implied progressive extension of the freedom of movement within the EU. In this regard, the recent economic crisis developed within the new institutional scenario defined by free-movement policies which set a fairly unrestricted space for EU member states citizens' mobility within Europe. In addition, freedom of movement is not only a mobility regime but it also generates additional rights, including social rights in the member states of destination (Bauböck 2007; Boeri and Brücker 2005; Dustmann et al. 2010). Therefore, the analysis of the migration propensity should take into account the fact that EU integration and particularly free-movement policies constituted a new structure of opportunities and alternatives for populations affected by the crisis.

Nonetheless, even if the recent crisis is portrayed as a symmetrical one in general terms, there are still differences between particular economies to be noted. This is clearly shown in Figure 4.1, which compares annual growth rates of EU-27 and selected EU economies, including Poland and Spain, as well as the most important migrant destination countries in the EU.




Figure 4.1 Real GDP growth rates of EU-27 and selected member states (%)
 Source: Authors' elaboration based on Eurostat.

As shown above, there is a clear decline in the pace of growth in the mid-2000s and a subsequent radical drop in growth rates in 2008 and 2009 for the EU-27 as a whole and most of the EU economies (considering GDP growth rates, we consider the years 2008–2009 as a crisis period and post-2010 years as a post-crisis period). These changes have been particularly dramatic for several Southern European countries, including Spain which recorded

almost 4% decline in 2009, as well as a few new EU member states (particularly the Baltic States with over 15% drop in 2009). Nonetheless, there were no signs of the crisis or recession visible in the case of Poland until late 2012. By contrast, during the first phase of the crisis (2008–2010), Poland was doing exceptionally well, with GDP growth rates at around 3–5%. In fact, serious economic decline only became visible by 2012/2013, but even in this case it was much less severe than in the case of Spain.

The outburst of the global financial crisis revealed that the spectacular economic growth and job creation had unstable foundations. As a result of the macro-financial downturn, the Spanish economy went from intense growth and job creation to a sharp slowdown with a rocketing increase of unemployment rates. The rate of growth since then has shown a fluctuating pattern, with a low point in 2009, slight recovery in 2011, followed by a subsequent decrease and an inversion of the trend in 2014 when the GDP growth rate amounted to 1.4%. Even though Spanish GDP loss was not extremely high when compared to overall EU performance, its labour market deterioration places it among the hardest hit by the economic crisis. On the contrary, the global financial crisis revealed that the Polish economy, even if lagging behind in terms of economic development, has more diverse growth foundations, with an important role of export, internal consumption and, last but not least, a considerable flow of EU funds.

In this context, the evolution of the economic situation in Poland and Spain can be considered a very illustrative example of differential structural responses to the crisis (Lewandowski and Magda 2013). First of all, a significant difference between Poland and Spain regarding fiscal sustainability should be pointed out. Figure 4.2 portrays the development of the general government gross debt, which is to be treated as one of the main indicators of countries at risk. In debt terms, the situation of Poland remains relatively favourable, although it is worth noting that this is attributable not only to general economic conditions but partially to strict rules on public debt imposed by the Polish constitution. On the contrary, in the case of Spain, the extraordinary growth of public debt and, subsequently, EU demands of urgent fiscal consolidation pushed Spanish governments to radically reduce public spending in crucial spheres of the welfare state, such as health care and education. These budget cuts affected their performance in terms of quality, individual costs and accessibility.

In terms of migration propensity, labour market situation is of the highest importance. Analysis of the labour market dynamics reveals that the Spanish labour market has been far more volatile in terms of inflows to unemployment (as compared with Poland) which translated into significant increases in unemployment rates. Figure 4.3 presents the general unemployment rate as well as the unemployment rate of youth. With regard to these variables, differences between Poland and Spain are the most striking. On the one hand, the situation in the labour market in Poland has improved




Figure 4.2 General government gross debt of EU-27 and selected member states (% of GDP)

Source: Authors' elaboration based on Eurostat.

significantly after EU enlargement (Figure 4.3 – left panel). In 2008, the unemployment rate reached a very low level (by Polish standards) and was at 7% (compared to 20% in 2002). While it has since been growing, the pace of change is relatively slow. Nonetheless, the situation in the labour market in Poland after the crisis is far more favourable than in many EU-15 countries.

On the other hand, the data indicate worsening of the labour market situation in the EU-27 and selected destination countries, including the UK. Against this background, the situation in the Spanish labour market is far




Figure 4.3 Unemployment rates of EU-27 and selected member states in total active population (left panel) and unemployment rates of active persons aged less than 25 (right panel) (%)

Source: Compiled by authors based on Eurostat data.

more difficult, if not dramatic. Since 2007, the unemployment rate has risen by around 18% and has reached 26% in 2013 (to decline only slightly in 2014). The situation is quite similar in the case of young people; however, with respect to persons aged below 25 years, the labour market prospects seem to worsen significantly in most of the EU economies. Even though the situation in Poland is still far from being favourable, it is much better than in Spain. In the latter case the youth unemployment rate skyrocketed and reached 55% in 2013. This variable is of critical importance because in the new member states of the EU, youth unemployment was presented as one of the main pro-migratory factors in the post-accession period (Grabowska and Okolski 2009; Kaczmarczyk and Okolski 2008).

In regard to the differential impact of the crisis on gender, it is undeniable that on an aggregate level employment imbalances between men and women have improved during the crisis. Nonetheless, this apparent progress was due mainly to a faster decline in men's employment and a levelling down of men's positions in the labour market, especially during the first few years of the crisis (Périer 2014). On the other hand, women suffered particularly from a decrease in quality of life and deterioration of employment conditions resulting from the austerity measures being implemented since 2010. More specifically, the above-mentioned cuts in public spending affected the Spanish population in general and women in particular, as the public sector constitutes almost a third of total female employment.

Consequently, the deterioration of employment conditions and especially the increase of underemployment affect especially the female population (Gálvez-Muñoz et al. 2013). In sum, male and female populations suffered consequences of the recent crisis but with different levels of intensity and at different periods, which may have a differential impact on the patterns of mobility. On the contrary, the situation of women in the Polish labour market is gradually improving and this tendency was even levelled in the crisis and post-crisis phase – female participation and employment rates grew relatively faster than in the case of their male counterparts (CSO 2014). This is partially attributable to the fact that, on average, Polish women are better educated than men and they are overrepresented in the public sector which is usually immune to the effects of the crisis (see also Section 4.4).

Figure 4.4 looks at another ‘usual suspect’ in terms of amplifying the propensity to migrate: the unemployment of well-educated persons. In most EU countries it remains lower than the general unemployment rate but still severe differences are to be noted. The data show that even those who invested in their human capital are not immune to the deteriorating changes in the labour market. Since 2008, unemployment rates of tertiary-educated persons are on the rise in the EU-27, and particularly in those economies lagging behind the best developed countries. In the case of Poland, the respective unemployment rate increased from 3% in 2008 to 5% in 2013. In the case of Spain those changes have been far more radical and accounted for over 9% (from 5.8% to 14.9%). Again, these developments would suggest a relatively high propensity to migrate, both in the cases of Poland and Spain. These differential features of unemployment dynamics are closely linked to changes in the employment structure during the crisis. Although in the initial phase of the crisis the increase of unemployment in Spain was caused mainly by the job destruction in construction and related sectors, soon all sectors and market services experienced significant cuts in terms of employment. By contrast, in Poland most of the sectors remained ‘untouched’, with the exception of the financial services sector.

Notwithstanding, it is important to note that despite the fact that Poland is doing well in the time of crisis, particularly as compared with Spain, it does not mean that reasons to migrate have disappeared. Eurostat data clearly show that the wage gap in the EU remains very significant six years after the EU enlargement, even if accounting for the differences in costs of living (purchasing power parity). In the case of Poland mean monthly earnings (in PPP EUR) in 2010 were as low as €1,363 as compared to €2,082 in Spain and €2,758 in Germany and €2,899 in the case of the UK. In the case of Spain, however, the high unemployment rate has been accompanied by a considerable fall in salaries as a direct result of the government’s competitiveness improvement strategy based mainly on cuts in labour costs (Fernández 2014). All in all, the perception of employment insecurity caused by the




Figure 4.4 Unemployment rates of tertiary-educated persons of EU-27 and selected member states

Source: Authors' elaboration based on Eurostat.

intensive job destruction, the deterioration of welfare state provisions and, finally, the worsening economic conditions of work implied a generalized perception of deprivation of professional aspirations and life expectations and might be considered another factor of the intensification of mobility within the EU.

From a theoretical perspective, in the case of a symmetrical crisis (which affects all countries in a given migration system) the changes in migration patterns are far from being unequivocal because they may depend on the relative situation in sending and receiving countries. In the end, it is still possible that the situation in the destination countries hardly hit by the

crisis is more favourable than in origin countries, being, in general, relatively less developed and more susceptible to economic fluctuations. In the case of receiving countries, the most common expectation would be that new entrants are not welcome and that already residing immigrants are among those who are the first to lose their jobs (Beets and Willekens 2009; Martin 2009). In this context, strong push factors related to the stark increase in unemployment rates and overall deterioration of working conditions in the countries hardest hit by the economic crisis might be debilitated by unfavourable conditions in potential destination countries.

All in all, there are a large number of factors responsible for the fact that migration does not necessarily constitute a good buffer for the economy at the time of crisis in the case of both sending and receiving countries.

With regard to migrants' flows, Dheret et al. (2013) showed that the recent crisis comprised two phases: during the first phase (until 2010) migration rates tended to fall, which was attributable to the deterioration of pull factors and the rise in the significance of push factors, where unemployment played a particular role. During the second phase (since 2010) a rise in migration has been recorded, as confirmed by the two case studies in this chapter. Shortly after the outbreak of the crisis, the outflows from Poland experienced a relative decrease. After a brief period of stagnation, the outflows from Poland reactivated at the beginning of the new decade. In Spain, the outbreak of the crisis first provoked a relatively sharp decrease in arrivals in the first years of the crisis, followed by the gradual increase of exits. Although the vast majority of outflows is due to return or re-emigration of the foreign population, the increase of emigration of Spanish nationals can be also observed (for more details, see Section 4.3 in this chapter). The dynamics observed in the second phase of the economic crisis can be explained by the simultaneous process of the intensification of push factors in Spain (mainly unemployment) and the economic recovery in major destination countries (Dheret et al. 2013). The last comment is of particular importance for this chapter. As noted by Bertoli et al. (2013), a significant feature of post-crisis migration is that – contrary to previous intra-EU migration flows – local unemployment became an important pro-migratory driver. This is in line with an observation of general shifts in directions of migration flows. While pre-crisis EU migration was predominantly east to west, driven mainly by deeply entrenched differences in economic conditions, the post-crisis movements are more and more commonly described in terms of south–north migration which reflects severe changes in economic conditions in the EU (Canetta et al. 2014; Dheret et al. 2013). Similarly, Elsner and Zimmermann (2013) claimed that recent patterns of immigration to Germany reflect the 'structure' of the crisis experience around Europe, noting an increase in immigration from countries that were mostly hit by the crisis. To summarize, diverse patterns of migration result from a complex set of factors which are a subject of analysis in following sections of this chapter.

4.3 Post-crisis migration patterns: Poland and Spain as emigration countries

Until the start of the current economic crisis, Poland and Spain were key actors in the European migration system. On the one hand, post-2004 labour migration from Poland turned out to be one of the most spectacular migratory movements in contemporary European history with a stock of more than two million Polish residents staying abroad for over three months in 2011 (Grzymała-Kazłowska 2013). On the other hand, in approximately the same period, Spain became an important destination on the map of migration flows. Between 2004 and 2009, Spain received an average of almost half a million foreign-born individuals annually, becoming the largest recipient of immigrants in absolute terms within the EU (Arango 2012). However, the outbreak of the economic crisis changed the migratory trends in both countries. The spectacular increase in the stock of Poles staying abroad has notably slowed, although it still remains relatively high. In the Spanish case, the deterioration of the economic situation and especially the drastic increase of unemployment rates led to a gradual decrease in the number of new arrivals and an increase in outflows. As a result, the volume of Spanish nationals residing abroad, especially in other EU countries, has been steadily rising over the last few years.

In this section we provide a comparative analysis of migration trends from Poland and Spain during the period of the economic crisis and also basic patterns of insertion of these migrants into the labour markets of receiving countries. Since some studies indicate that the destinations of the vast majority of the flows from both countries are EU countries, in this chapter we will focus on migration within the EU. This focus is also motivated by the fact that, as has been stated in previous sections, free circulation within the EU should help to relocate the labour force from areas most affected by the crisis to countries with more and better job opportunities (Holland and Paluchowski 2013). The way migration from Poland developed over the previous decade seems to confirm this assumption. As pointed out by Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2008), one of the most important challenges for the Polish economy was an enormous oversupply of labour, which had an influence on the very high rates of unemployment. Accession to the EU, which also coincided with a favourable economic cycle, has facilitated the outflow of this 'redundant' part of the labour force. A number of studies point to the possible regulatory role of intra-EU mobility in the crisis and post-crisis period (see Elsner and Zimmermann 2013; Holland and Paluchowski 2013; Kahanec et al. 2014; Krause et al. 2014). Therefore, it is extremely important to determine whether in the current context, marked by a deep unemployment crisis in the south and economic instability in the EU as a whole, the current intra-EU mobility of Poles and Spaniards plays a similar regulatory role.

The initial impact of the economic downturn that affected almost all EU countries provoked an overall decline in intra-EU mobility, one that can be considered a short-term response to fewer job opportunities (Castles and Vezzoli 2009). These flows have restarted as the situation in some countries has gradually improved. However, their intensity and composition are slightly different than the mobility observed during the period prior to the outbreak of the economic crisis in 2008. Unlike previously, migration from the new accession countries is less intense compared to earlier tendencies (Herm and Poulain 2012).

In the case of Poland, the data on the economically active population provided by the Labour Force Survey reveal that after a brief period of stagnation in the years following the downturn (2008–2009), the number of Poles residing in other countries of the EU has once again grown (see Figure 4.5). Between 2008 and 2014, the volume of Polish nationals residing in other EU countries has grown by 400,000, which represents a 54% increase. Despite an increase in the stock of Poles staying abroad, dynamics of the process is far lower than in the direct post-2004 period. On the other hand, it should be noted that although the expiration of the transitional arrangements for the free movement of workers in 2011 has opened the German labour market – historically one of the main receiving countries for Polish migration – this has not provoked a significant increase in migrations from Poland. This




Figure 4.5 Stock of Polish and Spanish recent* migrants in EU countries (2008–2014) (third quarter)

*Less than three years residing abroad.

Source: Authors' elaboration based on the EU LFS data.

continuous, but more moderate, increase reveals that Poland still has a relatively large migration potential, although no longer comparable to the levels observed before the enlargement of the EU. The same picture is revealed by the annual estimates published by the Central Statistical Office of Poland (including both data from Polish and foreign sources). The most recent estimate as at the end of 2013 provided a number of 2.2 million of Polish permanent residents staying temporarily abroad, which meant a slight increase as compared to previous years (3% with respect to 2012 and 7% with respect to 2011), but still the number was smaller than in the peak period (in 2007 the estimated stock was as high as 2.3 million) (CSO 2014). Figure 4.5 shows that post-crisis migration (recent migrants) in terms of scale is not comparable to previous flows.

Available emigration data show that the total annual outflow from Spain between 2008 and 2013 increased at least two times (González Gago and Segales Kirzner 2013). However, it should also be highlighted that the absolute growth in emigration is mainly due to foreign residents leaving to return home or moving on to other countries. *Migration Statistics*, which is one of three data sources on emigration elaborated by the Spanish National Institute of Statistics,¹ shows that the share of Spanish nationals within the total volume of exits has not exceeded 13% in 2013 (increase of 2% compared to 2008). On the other hand, the data show that Spaniards born abroad (mainly naturalized immigrants) comprise approximately one-third of the total number of Spanish nationals who have left the country in recent years.

If we focus on the evolution of the economically active population Poles and Spaniards residing in other EU countries drawn from the EU LFS (see Figure 4.5), it can be observed that the number of Spanish nationals has increased from 200,000 in 2008 to 300,000 people in 2014, which is an increase of approximately 50%. LFS data also reveal that the biggest increase in the number of Spanish nationals abroad occurred after 2013, which coincides with general tendencies reflected by the outflow data provided by the Spanish National Statistical Institute. The relative increase in the exits occurs in the period during which unemployment reached its highest levels in the aftermath of the so-called 'second recession within a recession', which took place in 2011 and 2012 (Oliver Alonso 2013). Even though these numbers may be somewhat inaccurate and underestimated, these figures suggest that emigration is not the main strategy of the Spanish population to deal with the economic crisis. However, the picture changes if we consider the foreign-born population, which has been the main driver of the outflows to date, as can be seen in Table 4.1. In the case of Spanish nationals, it appears that only in the last few years of the crisis has unemployment reached levels high enough to become a determining factor for a somewhat more significant increase in the geographic mobility of this population (Figure 4.6).

As for the main destinations of the Polish migrants after 2008, the general trend seems to follow patterns established in the post-accession period

Table 4.1 Outflows from Spain by nationality and country of birth (2008–2014)

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Mid-2014
Spanish nationality – born in Spain	25,479	26,352	29,220	40,184	38,778	48,136	27,026
Spanish nationality – foreign-born	8,026	9,638	10,937	15,288	18,489	25,193	15,659
Foreign nationality	254,927	344,128	363,222	353,562	389,339	458,974	163,807
Total	288,432	380,118	403,379	409,034	446,606	532,303	206,492

Source: Authors' elaboration based on the Migration Statistics data, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Spain.




Figure 4.6 Stock of Polish (left panel) and Spanish (right panel) migrants in EU countries

*Total and the most important destinations, 2008–2014 (third quarter)

Source: Authors' elaboration based on the EU LFS data.

(Grabowska-Lusińska and Okólski 2009; Kaczmarczyk 2011). The UK is the most important receiving country followed by Germany. It has become the main migration destination since the EU was enlarged in 2004. One of the obvious reasons why this kind of change has been observed is that the UK along with Ireland and Sweden decided not to introduce the transition arrangements with respect to the labour access that the other EU-15 countries implemented. Available empirical evidence shows that it is rather the UK's favourable economic cycle and dynamic and flexible labour market that made the UK the main receiving country of Polish migration, replacing

Germany, which had been the traditional destination for flows from that country of origin (Fihel et al. 2015). However, Germany remains an important destination for Polish migrants due to the proximity, well-established networks and good economic performance it has had during the economic crisis. On the other hand, available data do not reveal the considerable impact of the conclusion of the transitional periods on the free movement of the labour force in 2011; this would be comparable to the massive inflow of Polish migrants to the UK seven years earlier.

In contrast to the Polish case, the geographic mobility map of the Spanish is characterized by greater diversity. The main countries receiving Spanish emigrants are the UK, Germany, France and also Belgium. More than half of the Spanish emigrant population resides in the UK and Germany, which is similar to the Polish case, the absolute number of Spaniards in these countries is significantly smaller when compared to Poles. However, without minimizing the importance of a favourable economic situation in these destination countries, there are additional factors that have made these the preferred destinations of flows from Spain. In the case of the UK, one of the factors that attracts emigrants is the diffusion of the English language. Moreover, the UK has been a preferred destination for Southern European migrants since the 1990s (Morgan 2004). Even though this flow has been relatively small in comparative terms, it could have given rise to basic support networks. In the case of Germany, one of the most powerful attractions is its policy to actively recruit highly qualified workers, especially from Southern EU countries (Klekowski von Koppenfels and Höhne, forthcoming).

Figure 4.7 shows stock of Polish and Spanish migrants residing in the EU broken down by age. In order to reveal the main trends in the most recent migration flows, we focus on Polish and Spanish nationals recently arrived in any of the EU member states other than their own (three or less years of residency). Interestingly, the economic crisis and posterior economic and also




Figure 4.7 Stock of recent Polish (left panel) and Spanish migrants (right panel) (three years or less since arrival) residing in the EU, selected age groups, 2008–2014 (third quarter)

Source: Authors' elaboration based on the EU LFS data.

institutional changes seem to have an important impact on the age structure of Polish migration. Young Poles (20–24 and 25–29), who were key actors in the post-accession migration, experienced significant reduction (Grabowska-Lusińska and Okólski 2009; Kaczmarczyk 2011; Kaczmarczyk and Okólski 2008). On the other hand, we can observe a gradual but persistent increase of the volume of older migrants, especially those aged between 35 and 54 years. By contrast to the recent trends in Polish migration, the deepening of the economic crisis in Spain has mobilized young Spanish adults (25–29), which lately has proved to be the most numerous age category among recent migrants from Spain. This age group is followed by mid-age migrants (note, however, that the magnitude of changes is far smaller in the case of Spain as compared to Poland) (Figure 4.7).

In both analysed cases, the share of women in the total stock of migrants amounts to 47–49% and remains relatively stable over time. If we consider all migrants, the stock of migrants from Poland is almost equally distributed with respect to sex, and in the case of Spain, however, male migrants predominate. Nonetheless, if we focus on the most recent migrants (three years or less residency abroad), the picture changes slightly. First, the gender balance is far more volatile in the post-crisis period, which is particularly visible in the case of Spain and can indicate some seasonal and gender-specific mobility patterns. Second, the share of women in the total stock of recent migrants is generally lower than in the case of all migrants residing in the EU (Figure 4.8).

Figure 4.9 presents the educational profile of recent Polish and Spanish economically active migrants residing in the EU. While in the case of the total stock of migrants the share of well-educated migrants in total increases slowly since 2010, in the case of the recently arriving mobile Poles and Spaniards the picture is unequivocal. In both cases a significant increase in shares of tertiary-educated migrants has been observed between 2008 and 2014 (for Poland around 10% and for Spain over 20%). The change of




Figure 4.8 Share of women among Polish (left panel) and Spanish (right panel) migrants in the EU (three years or less since arrival), 2008–2014 (third quarter)

Source: Authors' elaboration based on the EU LFS data.




Figure 4.9 Share of tertiary- and primary-educated persons among Polish (left panel) and Spanish (right panel) migrants in the EU (three years or less since arrival), 2008–2014 (third quarter)

Source: Authors' elaboration based on the EU LFS data.

educational attainment of migrants is particularly striking in case of Spain: if we consider all migrants residing in the EU, the share of well educated in the total stock of Spanish migrants amounted to 29% in 2008 and over 50% in 2014. Mobility of well-educated Poles is almost exclusively due to migration to the UK, which became a magnet for tertiary-educated migrants from Central and Eastern Europe. The Spanish stream is far more diverse with relatively small differences in terms of educational profiles of migrants choosing the UK and Germany as two of the most prominent destinations. This feature points to the fact that the structure of migration is attributable not only to push factors related to countries of origin but also to varying modes of incorporation of Polish and Spanish migrants on the EU labour market.

The share of primary-educated migrants remains relatively stable in both countries (see Figure 4.9), notwithstanding that there is a striking difference to be noted between Polish and Spanish migrants. In the case of recent arrivals from Poland, the share of low-educated migrants oscillates at around 18%, while for Spain the number is far lower (around 10–11%) and on the decline (as indicated by the data on the total stock of Spanish migrants). This point is particularly interesting when considering the labour market dynamics in both countries in the post-crisis period (see next section).

Figure 4.10 shows the stock of recent female migrants from Poland and Spain broken down by educational level. If we focus on female migrants it becomes clear that mobile women are very well educated and their levels of education are much higher than their male counterparts.




Figure 4.10 Share of tertiary- and primary-educated persons among Polish (left panel) and Spanish (right panel) female migrants in the EU (three years or less since arrival), 2008–2014 (third quarter)

Source: Authors' elaboration based on the EU LFS data.

This is particularly visible with Spanish migrants who constitute around 50–70% (over the period 2008–2014) of all female migrants with completed tertiary education. In Poland, the propensity to migrate is higher for women than for men, and as a consequence, the share of well-educated migrants in the total number of female migrants increased from around 25% in 2008 to 40% in 2014. Thus, in both countries the scale of mobility of well-educated women has increased significantly in the post-crisis period.

The educational structure of female migrants reflects to some extent the general migration structure. The number of female Spanish migrants with only a primary education remains negligible (note, however, that the reliability of the data is relatively low due to small sample sizes); however, with Polish migrants it amounts to around 20% of the total. These differences are mainly attributable to well-established migration patterns of Polish women who traditionally migrate to countries like Germany, Italy or Spain and are commonly employed in household services there.

Last but not least, Figure 4.11 shows patterns of insertion of recent tertiary-educated female migrants into receiving countries' occupational structure. In comparative terms, Spanish women with higher education seem to face significantly fewer obstacles to find jobs which match with their levels of experience. Taking into account mean value for all the periods examined, approximately 45% of Spanish women with tertiary-education diplomas have been working in high-skilled jobs. This contrasts clearly with the occupational attainments of Polish women with tertiary-level education among




Figure 4.11 Occupational position of Polish (left panel) and Spanish (right panel) tertiary-educated female migrants in the EU (three years or less since arrival) 2008–2014 (third quarter)

Source: Authors' elaboration based on the EU LFS data.

whom, on average, less than 20% have been working in high-skilled occupations. On the other hand, highly educated Polish women have considerably greater probabilities to find jobs in the most elementary occupations when compared to highly educated Spaniards for whom this category of jobs has remained a rather exceptional option during the examined period. However, despite these differences, in both cases the incidence of education/occupation mismatch has been on the rise since 2008. The share of highly educated in highly skilled occupations decreased by approximately 12% and 15% for Poles and Spaniards, respectively. In the same period, the share of female workers in jobs for which they are clearly overqualified increased by almost 25% among Polish and by 10% among Spanish migrants.

4.4 Discourses on post-crisis migration patterns from Poland and Spain

As indicated by several authors, migration can be considered an element of the regulatory mechanism for the labour market that provides workers to fill job vacancies that cannot be filled by the native labour force during the intensive economic growth. On the other hand, in times of economic downturn, migration helps to reduce the volume of redundant workers by relocating them to countries or regions where labour shortages and scarcity occur (Dobson, Latham and Salt 2009). As a labour market adjustment mechanism, migration should play a special role within the European Union, where the freedom of movement constitutes one of the fundamental individual rights and allows for free circulation of labour. From this perspective, in the area without internal borders and where national policies play an increasingly

irrelevant role, migration should become a crucial element that links the labour force supply and demand (Kremer et al. 2013; see also Section 4.2).

However, as can be seen from the above analysis, the recent emigration from Poland and Spain proves this perspective to be simplistic. It shows that the comprehensive interpretation of mobility patterns based on merely a supply–demand model without taking into account complex social contexts is hardly possible. Nevertheless, it also shows that there is a clear link between macroeconomic factors, specifically those related to labour market phenomena, and current migration trends. In other words, the labour market dynamics and structures in both countries shape considerably but are not exclusive to the intensity and composition of recent flows. Therefore, without any claim to being completely comprehensive, in this section we provide an interpretation of those trends in light of the socio-economic processes that have been taking place in Poland and Spain in the last decades.

Available data show that there are several features that clearly differentiate post-crisis migration patterns of Poles and that of Spaniards. The Polish population is apparently far more mobile than the Spanish. Even if less intense than in the pre-crisis period, the absolute growth of the Polish migrant population was still five times higher when compared to Spanish nationals residing in the EU. Poles also seem to be more responsive to changes in socio-economic conditions in destination countries. The relative improvement of economic conditions and unemployment rates in the main destination countries, such as Germany and the UK, at the start of the current decade has reactivated the migration flow that had temporarily diminished during the period immediately after the financial crisis. The relatively higher intensity of Polish migration is to be explained in terms of a few factors. First, despite positive developments noted in the post-accession period, there remains a significant wage and income gap between Poland and the main destination countries. This gap is even higher if we consider wage levels in the most important migrant-sending regions in Poland (Kaczmarczyk 2011). Second, Poland is still a country marked with a relative oversupply of labour. The presence of a ‘redundant’ workforce is commonly described as one of the major drivers of post-accession migration (Grabowska-Lusińska and Okólski 2009; Kaczmarczyk and Okólski 2008). Third, due to a very long tradition of intra-European and transatlantic migration, there are common and well-established migration traditions supported by extremely well-developed migrant networks. Unequivocally, presence of migrant networks makes migration from Poland a self-perpetuating process that goes beyond simple institutional explanations – as it was proven by relatively intensive migration to Germany despite imposition of transitional arrangements over the period 2004–2011 (Fihel et al. 2015). Nonetheless, data presented in Section 4.3 reveals that recent migration from Poland is less numerous than in the pre-crisis period. Again, reasons are manifold. Lower propensity to migrate can be attributed to

gradual improvement in living conditions and, particularly, labour market conditions in Poland. At the same time, the Polish population is ageing and due to complex socio-economic reasons this process is happening much faster than in Western European countries (particularly attributable to unfavourable labour market conditions and non-efficient family policies responsible for dramatically low fertility rates). Thus, the lower rate of mobility is partially due to the fact that migration potential is slowly running dry. Last but not least, as a consequence of massive post-accession migration Polish migrants became important ethnic groups in numerous European destination countries. This glut of Poles in popular destination countries brings high competition and 'crowding' in the labour markets, leading to a deterioration of working standards and a decline in wages. As a consequence, migration to the EU-15 countries ceases to be as attractive an option as it was before.

In the case of Spain, the post-crisis outflows have been dominated by the foreign-born population returning or re-emigrating to countries that have a more favourable economic situation. Although emigration of Spaniards had been growing steadily after the financial crisis of 2008, the outflow has increased considerably in intensity only since 2013, the year when unemployment reached its peak. In other words, even though the volume of emigration from Spain is still under discussion, the available data suggest that the extraordinary deterioration of the labour market in Spain has not led to a commensurate increase of the outflow of Spanish nationals. This apparent paradox can be at least partly explained by the recent position and role of the foreign labour force in the Spanish labour market. Although in all developed countries migrants are among groups most hit by economic downturns (Taran 2011), in the case of Spain their situation seems to be especially vulnerable. This is mainly due to a high level of labour market sensitivity to changes in the rate of economic growth. In Spain this phenomenon is hardly new: previous economic downturns also resulted in significant increases in the stock of unemployed workers (Dolado and Jimeno 1997). However, there is also another side of the coin where the labour market creates a plethora of jobs during periods of expansion. Although divergent interpretations abound, there is a generalized agreement that one of the main reasons of labour market instability is the production sector's excessive dependence on labour-intensive and low-skilled sectors (Bentolila et al. 2012; Bentolila et al. 2012). This feature solidified during the pre-crisis economic growth due to access to cheap credit that fuelled a property boom and demand for consumer goods and services which subsequently generated extraordinary demand for low-skilled unstable jobs (Bernardi and Garrido 2008). As shown by Godenau et al. (2012), prior to the crisis, the Spanish economy grew almost exclusively through expanding employment (with an annual average of 5.3% during 1998–2007), creating 6.5 million additional jobs between 1998 and 2007, while real labour productivity per

hour worked expanded by an average of only 0.9%. On the other hand, the rise in the standard of living, the drop in birth rate, the increase in education and training levels and, consequently, of aspirations and expectations meant that this kind of labour demand could not be met by the native population (Pumares Fernández et al. 2006). Since the 1990s, this shortfall has been remedied in view of the massive arrival of foreign workers which were concentrated mainly in construction, hospitality services, domestic work and agriculture (Carrasco et al. 2008; Veira et al. 2011).

After the economic and financial crisis, job losses affected mainly low productivity sectors where the immigrant population was concentrated. As a consequence, a gap between the unemployment rate of foreigners and natives has been systematically increasing over the course of the recession. In 2013, the unemployment of foreign nationals reached 37%, approximately 13 percentage points above the value for Spanish nationals. For some sub-groups, such as migrants from Latin America and Maghreb countries, unemployment was even higher. In the light of the heavily deteriorating employment situation, return migration or re-emigration of migrants became one of the crucial resilience strategies of the foreign population. On the side of the pull factors, it should be taken into account that the profound economic crisis in Spain has coincided with an improvement in the economic outlook of various countries of origin of these migrants (mainly in Latin America), which has also influenced the increase in return flows (González Ferrer and Cebolla Boado 2013). Thus, emigration has been playing an important role in regulating the surplus of labour force generated during the growth cycles of the Spanish economy, mainly among foreign workers. This is firstly due to their extraordinary vulnerability in the Spanish labour market and also because of the relative improvement of the economic situation in some of the main sending areas.

In addition to the particularities of Spanish labour market dynamics, several other factors should be taken into account in order to interpret the relatively low mobility of Spanish nationals in the context of very high rates of unemployment. Firstly, the reduction of demand in potential destination countries for medium and low-skilled workers who were mostly affected by the crisis could be considered an important factor that has restrained the mobility of Spaniards. Secondly, migration and insertion of this category of workers could be attenuated by competition from workers from the new EU member states. Finally, it is also likely that the new Spanish migrants lack the support structures and social networks to help to offset the cost of moving because of the considerable time gap between the old migration wave of the 1950s and 1960s and the current one.

The migratory dynamics and intensity are not the only features that differentiate recent intra-EU migration of Poles and Spaniards. Although in the case of migrants from Poland the age structure is relatively diversified, recent years witnessed a gradual increase in the share of middle-aged migrants. Also,

our analysis confirms that in general terms the recent Spanish migration to other EU countries is dominated by young adults.

Post-accession migration from Poland has been commonly described in terms of mobility of young and well-educated persons – this feature has been proven by selectivity indexes showing a clear overrepresentation in both categories (Grabowska-Lusińska and Okólski 2009). This pattern was a result of two processes: educational boom observed in Poland since mid-1990s and difficulties with labour market entry of the younger part of the population. One of the most important aspects of socio-economic transition in Poland has been a change from an elite to a mass tertiary education. The net enrolment rate grew from 9.8% in the academic year 1990/1991 to over 40% in 2010. As a consequence, the share of people aged 25–64 attaining tertiary education grew between 1997 and 2010 by 7.2% annually (twice as high as the OECD average over this period) (Herbst et al. 2014). At the same time, however, structural changes in the economy were not fast enough to absorb the growing pool of well-educated persons. As a consequence, young persons faced severe problems with transition from education to work, which was amplified by relatively high and often unrealistic expectations concerning remuneration and working conditions in their first job (CSO 2010).

Several studies point to the importance of this particular group when examining post-accession migration from Poland. As shown above, since the early transition phase, the human-capital endowment of the younger part of the Polish population improved significantly and this change was not matched by structural changes on the domestic labour market. In other words, a large share of the working-age population became redundant in economic terms or even ‘trapped’, particularly in rural areas or small towns that cannot offer many prospects in terms of the labour market options. Importantly, the major motivation for migration for a large part of Polish youth was not necessarily a lack of employment opportunities but could be a means of completing or beginning education, gaining professional experience or accumulating financial capital (Kaczmarczyk and Okólski 2008).

Analysis presented in the previous section shows that mobility from Poland is no longer a clear domain of young professionals and workers. Again, this can be attributed to the fact that the migration potential of this group is diminishing due to previous massive migration waves. However, it can also be interpreted in terms of labour market developments. Comparison of labour market performance in the crisis and post-crisis period reveals striking differences across EU member states. First, persons aged 15–24 turned out to be the most vulnerable group, but this observation refers particularly to the case of Southern European economies and to a much lesser extent to Polish nationals. On the contrary, those groups which suffered enormously high unemployment in Poland prior to the financial and economic crisis (15–24 and 25–54) are in a relatively good situation since 2008 (with some worsening due to the so-called second wave of recession). In fact, recent

unemployment rates in Poland are comparable to the EU average (Magda et al. 2013). The same refers to the employment rates which over the period 2008–2012 dropped dramatically in Spain and remained relatively stable in case of Poland (or even increased for persons aged 55–64). Additionally, the share of NEETs (Not in Education, Employment, or Training) among persons aged 15–24 over the period 2006–2012 has increased significantly in case of Spain from around 15 to 25%, whereas in Poland it remains relatively stable at around 15% (Magda et al. 2013).

Spanish young adults have been hardest hit in the economic crisis with the highest unemployment rates. After the outbreak of the economic crisis, the unemployment rate for the age group 16–24 has increased from 17.3% in 2007 to 53.3% in 2013. Among young adults (25–34) the increase was less abrupt but still very pronounced with an unemployment rate in this category at 28%. This exponential increase in youth and young adults' unemployment is partly due to particularities of the recent transformation of the educational structure in Spain. On the one hand, Spain experienced extraordinary improvement of educational attainment of young generations driven by the dynamic development of higher education institutions. Nevertheless, this growth was not accompanied by the commensurate transformation of the productive sector which would equate to jobs for these newly educated masses (Dolado et al. 2013). As a consequence, many of the overqualified individuals with a tertiary education ended up in temporary jobs well below their level of academic preparation. Parallel to the expansion of higher education, Spain suffered from very high dropout rates, which were especially acute during the economic boom period. In 2007, Spain had a 33% dropout rate, which was the highest rate among EU countries. This was due largely to the fact that the booming construction sector combined with a large growth of the consumer services sectors, which raised the wages for unskilled jobs and thus indirectly discouraged youths from continuing their education (Aparicio-Fenoll 2010; Felgueroso et al. 2014).

Another factor that contributed to the vulnerability of Spanish youth in the labour market is the dual characteristics of the employment regulations. Labour market regulation sets several conditions for dismissal of workers with permanent contracts (high severance pay, long notice periods and complex administrative procedures in the case of collective dismissals), whereas the fixed time contracts have very low or no severance pay and are renewable for limited periods of time.² As reported in numerous studies, the heavy protection of permanent workers and parallel vulnerability of temporary workers leads to significant volatility of the labour market with the expansion of fixed-term contracts during the economic boom period and intensive job destruction during the economic crisis (Bentolila et al. 2012b; Bentolila et al. 2012a). In this context, young workers are the main victims of this volatility as they are clearly overrepresented among the workers in temporary or fixed-contract jobs.

An entirely different situation is noted in Poland. Paradoxically, even if the share of fixed-term employees is higher in Poland than in Spain (in 2012 this number was as high as 27% in Poland), the effects of this tendency seem to be beneficial. In Spain, however, the majority of those who lost their jobs between 2008 and 2012 were employed on fixed-term contracts (which is attributable to the labour laws described above), whereas in Poland fixed-term contracts worked rather as a business cycle buffer and therefore acted as a mechanism to control the level of unemployment.

Our data show that the current intra-EU migration of Spaniards is highly selective with regard to educational level. As indicated, those with a tertiary education represent a half of the economically active Spanish population residing in the EU countries. The same situation holds true in case of Polish migrants, but this feature is traditional for Polish mobility in the last few decades (Kaczmarczyk and Tyrowicz 2015). Thus, one of the most intriguing questions is as follows: Why did the unemployment crisis in Spain affect mainly workers in low added value sectors, paradoxically expelling mainly highly skilled workers? In the absence of conclusive and sufficient empirical studies, we are only able to provide speculative answers to this question. While the higher education levels of emigrants may reflect partly the improvement in educational attainment of the country as a whole, the overrepresentation of highly educated among those who leave Spain may be also related to access to specific resources needed for successful adaptation in receiving countries in the context of the current crisis. Decreasing demand for low-skilled labour and strong competition from workers from the new EU accession countries may be an important factor discouraging less skilled workers from moving abroad. On the other hand, the absence of developed migrant networks in the context of general economic instability may require more resources such as 'transnational human capital', defined by Gerhards and Hans (2013) as the 'knowledge and personal skills that enable a person to operate in different fields beyond the individual nation state'. The youngest Spanish graduates may be considered as representatives of this category of human capital largely because of the improvements in their educational system (including increased language lessons in the curricula). We should not underestimate the intra-EU mobility experience of young Spaniards gained from the international students exchange programmes either, as Spanish students benefit most from EU student exchange programmes.

Last but not least, the analysis provided in previous sections reveals a few interesting characteristics concerning mobile women, particularly those well endowed with human capital. First, there is only a small overrepresentation of male migrants in both cases. Second, female migrants from both countries are, on average, very well educated and this feature is particularly visible in the case of Spain, but there are striking differences with regard to labour market integration of tertiary-educated female migrants. Spanish well-educated

migrants seem to face significantly fewer obstacles to find jobs which match their skill level as compared to Polish mobile women.

The first point seems intriguing, particularly in the Polish case. Many prior studies on migration from Poland pointed to a significant overrepresentation of men in the total population of mobile persons, with an exception of those migrating to Southern European countries, notably to Italy. Polish female migrants used to be – on average – better educated and significantly younger than their male counterparts. In the first post-accession phase, the majority of female migrants constituted young persons, commonly not married and without children – thus their migration has been described in terms of individualistic and not family-driven migration strategies (Grabowska-Lusińska and Okólski 2009; Kaczmarczyk 2011). Interestingly enough, in the post-crisis period, the situation for women in the labour market improves relatively faster than for men: between 2010 and 2013 the employment rate of women increased by 2.2% and of men by 1%. This could be attributable, among others, to more and more efficient solutions in terms of family policies, allowing for a better work–life balance. At the same time, data on the Polish labour market reveal that women with a tertiary education are able to attain a similar labour market position to men. For women, the participation rate is roughly 5% smaller than in the case of men, while in the case of other skill levels, those differences vary between 15 and 23% (CSO 2014). Moreover, well-educated women are overrepresented in the public sector (particularly in the education and health services sectors) and those sectors were relatively immune to the economic crisis. Against this backdrop, a relatively high share of female migrants in the total stock of mobile persons from Poland seems surprising. Considering the change in the average age of recent migrants, data presented in previous sections can be interpreted in terms of a growing importance of family driven migration and, partially, are attributable to a growing scale of migration to Germany following its labour market opening in 2011. Another possible factor responsible for the high propensity to migrate of well-educated Polish and Spanish women is an overrepresentation of female workers employed on fixed-term contracts; however, this hypothesis would demand further in-depth analyses.

Second, there are striking differences between Polish and Spanish female migrants in terms of labour market incorporation. We argue that this feature goes beyond a gender-based explanation and reflects rather the very nature of recent mobility from both countries. As noted above, emigration from Spain is a very recent phenomenon and, additionally, refers particularly to well-educated and relatively young persons (at a mobile age). While mobility of people well endowed with human capital is a traditional feature of Polish migration (Kaczmarczyk 2011), even if post-accession migrants can find work that fits their skill levels, they still face

severe difficulties with actually being selected for those appropriate jobs abroad. This feature has been documented particularly well in the case of the UK labour market, which attracts the best-educated Polish migrants (Clark and Drinkwater 2008; Dustmann et al. 2010). Kaczmarczyk and Tyrowicz (2015) studied explicitly the propensity of Polish migrants to return to or advance their studies and how that impacts their position vis-à-vis the British labour market. They found that, whereas immigrants from the new member states (except for Poland) are not able to reach the wage premium for tertiary education (or the wage premium is negligible only), well-educated Polish migrants statistically suffer a significant wage penalty. There are several possible explanations of this phenomenon. First, there is no statistical data available to fully incorporate a cohort effect (and possible catching-up). Second, comparison with other migrants from CEE countries points to the fact that due to the massive scale of inflow from Poland, the level of concentration in particular labour market niches of Polish migrants is much higher than observed among other newcomers from the CEE. Third, low returns on education as observed for Polish well-educated migrants can be interpreted in terms of a low ability to transfer their skills. Fourth, it is possible that Polish migrants are not that interested in obtaining highly skilled jobs due to their tendency for circular migration strategies within Europe. The last point is important when looking at well-established migration patterns of Polish women traditionally engaged in household services in Germany, Belgium, Spain or Italy. These types of jobs can still be beneficial as a part of their short-term migration strategies.

4.5 Concluding remarks

One of the scientific outcomes of the recent financial and economic crisis was a broad discussion of the role of migration as a labour market adjustment mechanism. Such a role should be particularly important within the EU, where there are no formal obstacles to free circulation of labour and thus migration should become a crucial element that links labour suppliers and employers in the common economic area. In this context, one of our aims was to assess if, in the current context marked by a crisis that resulted in high unemployment in the south and economic instability in the EU as a whole, the current intra-EU mobility of Poles and Spaniards plays a similar regulatory role.

The answers and interpretations provided are far from being unequivocal, but the data presented show that there are several features that clearly differentiate the post-crisis migration patterns of Poles and Spaniards. The Polish population is by far more mobile than the Spanish. Poles also seem

to be more responsive to changes in socio-economic conditions in destination countries. We argue that massive migration from Poland is a product of a complex set of factors, including labour market developments (steady oversupply of labour, labour market mismatches) as well as a change in life and migration aspirations in the post-2004 period, particularly on part of the younger generations. On the other hand, considering the crisis and labour market developments in the EU, one could expect a significant increase in the scale of Spanish migration, which has not happened so far. Again, there are several possible reasons. First, the wage gap is significantly smaller in the case of Spain than it was (and still is) in the case of Poland. Second, there are no recent migration traditions or active migrant networks to rely on. Third, even during the crisis, the social welfare system provides a potential protection for most vulnerable persons. Fourth, potential Spanish migrants would face serious competition in the EU labour market, also from workers from the new EU member states and other crisis-affected countries in Southern Europe. Last but not least, in the case of Spain the outflows have been dominated by the foreign-born population returning or re-emigrating to countries with more favourable economic situations. This out-migration has led to a slight improvement of the labour market positioning of native workers with low and medium skill sets.

It is important to note that recent migration from Spain is highly selective with regard to educational level and scale of its selectivity is far greater than migration from Poland. This can be partially attributed to the fear of possible competition from other intra-EU migrants as noted above. Apart from this, we argue that the overrepresentation of highly educated migrants among those who leave Spain can be related to access to specific resources needed for successful adaptation in receiving countries in the context of the current crisis. Those skills and resources are necessary to 'compensate' for lacking migrant networks. Also this can explain the striking differences with regard to labour market integration of tertiary-educated female migrants, as documented in this chapter. Spanish well-educated migrants seem to face significantly fewer obstacles to find jobs which match their skill levels as compared to Polish mobile women. Nonetheless, further studies are needed to assess the modes of labour market incorporation of female migrants in the crisis environment, including role of labour market intermediaries, structural features of migrant networks and so on.

In summation, in this chapter we showed that although the post-crisis intra-EU migration patterns of Poles and Spaniards play a similar regulatory role, their sources and characteristics are very different. In this regard, the comparison of mobility patterns of highly skilled women from both countries may serve as a good illustration of these disparities. Given its relatively low intensity and high selectivity, migration seems to constitute a strategy of dealing with short- or medium-term unfavourable economic conditions within the specific sub-category of the Spanish female population.

By contrast, intra-EU mobility of the Polish highly skilled women could be considered a dimension of a deeply socially embedded pattern of response to a long-lasting and structurally conditioned mismatch between the labour supply and demand in Poland.

Notes

1. The Spanish National Institute of Statistics provides three data sources on stock and emigration flows from Spain. (1) *Residential Variation Statistics* includes raw data regarding registrations and cancellations due to changes in of residence registered by local authorities. (2) Another source is *Migration statistics* that draws mainly on the Residential Variation Statistics but is also complemented by additional data. The information provided by this source is the result of estimations based on statistical models. (3) Finally, the *Registry of Spanish Nationals Residing Abroad* is another statistical source that collects data on Spanish nationals who registered in Spanish consulates abroad. There is general consensus that all the above-mentioned data sources grossly underestimate the actual emigration figures as they depend on voluntary information provided by citizens who have little incentive to do so. For more discussion on the limitations of Spanish statistics on emigration, see Romero Valiente and Hidalgo-Capitán 2014; González Enríquez and Martínez Romera 2014; González-Ferrer 2013.
2. Several labour market reforms with the last one in 2012 have been introduced in order to reduce the incidence of temporary jobs. However, to date their effects have been rather limited and to some extent counterproductive.

References

- Aparicio-Fenoll, A. (2010) 'High School Dropouts and Transitory Labor Market Shocks: The Case of the Spanish Housing Boom', *Institute for the Study of Labour Discussion Paper No.5139* (Bonn: IZA).
- Arango, J. (2012) 'Early Starters and Latecomers. Comparing Countries of Immigration and Immigration Regimes in Europe', in M. Okólski (ed.) *European Immigrations. Trends, Structures and Policy Implications* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press), pp. 45–64.
- Bauböck, R. (2007) 'Why European Citizenship? Normative Approaches to Supranational Union', *Theoretical Inquiries in Law*, 8(2), 453–488.
- Beets, G. and F. Willekens (2009) 'The Global Economic Crisis and International Migration: An Uncertain Outlook', *Vienna Yearbook of Population Research 2009* (Vienna: Vienna Institute of Demography), 19–37.
- Bentolila, S., P. Cahuc, J. Dolado and T. Le Barbanchon (2012a) 'Two-Tier Labour Markets in the Great Recession: France Versus Spain', *The Economic Journal*, 122(562), F155–F187.
- Bentolila, S., J. Dolado and J. Jimeno (2012b) 'Reforming an Insider-outsider Labor Market: The Spanish Experience', *IZA Journal of European Labor Studies*, 1(1), 1–29.
- Bernardi, F. and L. Garrido (2008) 'Is There a New Service Proletariat? Post-industrial Employment Growth and Social Inequality in Spain', *European Sociological Review*, 24(3), 299–313.

- Bertoli, S., H. Brücker and J. Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2013) 'The European Crisis and Migration to Germany: Expectations and the Diversion of Migration Flows', *IZA Discussion Paper Series No. 7170* (Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labour).
- Boeri, T. and H. Brücker (2005) 'Why are Europeans so Tough on Migrants?' *Economic Policy*, 20(44), 629–703.
- Brücker, H. et al. (2009) *Labour Mobility within the EU in the Context of Enlargement and the Functioning of the Transitional Arrangements: The Macroeconomic Consequences of Labour Mobility* (Nürnberg, GE: IAB).
- Canetta, E., E. Fries-Tersch and V. Mabilia (2014) *2014 Annual Report on Labour Mobility*, Network Statistics FMSSFE (Brussels: European Commission).
- Carrasco, R., J.F. Jimeno and A.C. Ortega (2008) 'The Effect of Immigration on the Labor Market Performance of Native-born Workers: Some Evidence for Spain', *Journal of Population Economics*, 21(3), 627–648.
- Castles, S. and S. Vezzoli (2009) 'The Global Economic Crisis and Migration: Temporary Interruption or Structural Change?' *Paradigmes*, 2, 69–75.
- Central Statistical Office (2014). *Kobiety i mężczyźni na rynku pracy* (Warsaw: CSO).
- Central Statistical Office (2010) *Entry of Young People into the Labour Market in Poland in 2009* (Warsaw: CSO).
- Clark, K. and S. Drinkwater (2008) 'The Labour-market Performance of Recent Migrants', *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 24(3): 495–516.
- Dhéret, C., A. Lazarowicz, F. Nicoli, Y. Pascouau and F. Zuleeg (2013) 'Making Progress Towards the Completion of the Single European Labour Market', *EPC Issue Paper No. 75* (Brussels: European Policy Centre).
- Dobson, J., A. Latham and J. Salt (2009) 'On the move? Labour Migration in Times of Recession. What can we learn from the Past?' *Policy Network Paper*. Available online at: http://www.geog.ucl.ac.uk/research/transnational-spaces/migration-research-unit/publications/pdfs/on_the_move.pdf (accessed: 6 May 2015).
- Dolado, J., M. Jansen, F. Felgueroso, A. Fuentes, A. Wöflf, (2013) 'Youth Labour Market Performance in Spain and its Determinants: A Micro-Level Perspective', *OECD Economics Department Working Paper 1039* (Paris: OECD Publishing).
- Dolado, J. and J.F. Jimeno (1997) 'The Causes of Spanish Unemployment: A Structural VAR Approach', *European Economic Review*, 41(7), 1281–1307.
- Dustmann, C., T. Frattini and C. Halls (2010) 'Assessing the Fiscal Costs and Benefits of A8 Migration to the UK', *Fiscal Studies*, 31(1), 1–41.
- Elsner, B. and K.F. Zimmermann (2013) '10 Years After: EU Enlargement, Closed Borders, and Migration to Germany', *IZA Discussion Papers No. 1730* (Bonn: IZA).
- Felgueroso, F., M. Gutierrez-Domenech and S. Jimenez-Martin (2014) 'Dropout Trends and Educational Reforms: The Role of the LOGSE in Spain', *IZA Journal of Labor Policy*, 3(1). Available online at: <http://www.izajolp.com/content/3/1/9> (accessed: 6 May 2015).
- Fernández, M.J. (2014) 'Spain's internal devaluation and export growth', *SEFO – Spanish Economic and Financial Outlook*, 3(5), 45–52.
- Fihel A., A. Janicka, P. Kaczmarczyk and J. Nestorowicz (2015) *Free Movement of Workers and Transitional Arrangements: Lessons from the 2004 and 2007 Enlargements* (Warsaw: CMR). Available online at: <http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=14000&langId=en> (accessed: 29 May 2015).
- Gálvez-Muñoz, L., P. Rodríguez-Modroño and T. Addabbo (2013) 'The Impact of European Union Austerity Policy on Women's Work in Southern Europe', *DEMB Working Paper Series 108* (Modena: Centro di Analisi delle Politiche Pubbliche, Department of Economics, University of Modena and Reggio Emilia and University

- of Bologna). Available online at: http://www.capp.unimore.it/pubbl/cappapers/Capp_p108.pdf (accessed: 6 May 2015).
- Gerhards, J. and H. Silke (2013) 'Transnational Human Capital, Education, and Social Inequality. Analyses of International Student Exchange', *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, 42(2): 99–117.
- Godenau, D., D. Vogel, V. Kovacheva and Y. Wu (2012) 'Labour Market Integration and Public Perceptions of Immigrants: A Comparison between Germany and Spain During the Economic Crisis', *Comparative Population Studies – Zeitschrift für Bevölkerungswissenschaft*, 37(1–2), 55–76.
- González Enríquez, C. and J.P. Martínez Romera (2014) *Country Focus: Migration of Spanish Nationals During the Crisis* (Madrid: Elcano Royal Institute).
- González Gago, E. and M. Segales Kirzner (2013) 'Geographical Labour Mobility in the Context of the Crisis Spain', *European Employment Observatory, ad hoc request*.
- González-Ferrer, A. (2013) *La nueva emigración española. Lo que sabemos y lo que no* (Madrid: Fundación Alternativas).
- González-Ferrer, A. and H. Cebolla Boado (eds.) (2013) *Inmigración ¿Intergración sin modelo?* (Madrid: Alianza editorial).
- Grabowska-Lusińska, I. and M. Okólski (2009) *Emigracja ostatnia?* (Warsaw: Scholar).
- Grzymała-Każłowska, A. (2013) 'Migration and Socio-Demographic Processes in Central and Eastern Europe: Characteristics, Specificity and Internal Differences', *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, 2(1), 5–11.
- Herbst, M., P. Kaczmarczyk and P. Wójcik (2014) 'Migration of Graduates within a Sequential Decision Framework: Evidence from Poland', *IZA Discussion Paper 8573* (Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labour).
- Herm, A. and M. Poulain (2012) 'Economic Crisis and International Migration. What the EU Data Reveal?' *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales*, 28(4), 145–169.
- Holland, D. and P. Paluchowski (2013) *Geographical Labour Mobility in the Context of the Crisis European Employment Observatory Ad hoc Request* (Brussels: European Commission).
- Kaczmarczyk, P. (ed.) (2011) *Mobilność i migracje w dobie transformacji – wyzwania metodologiczne* (Warsaw: Scholar).
- Kaczmarczyk, P. and J. Tyrowicz (2015) 'Winners and Losers among Skilled Migrants – the Case of Post-accession Polish Migrants to the UK', *IZA Discussion Paper 9057* (Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labour).
- Kaczmarczyk, P. and M. Okólski (2008) 'Demographic and Economic Impacts of Migration on Poland', *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 24(3), 600–625.
- Kahanec, M. and L. Kurekova (2014) 'Did Post-Enlargement Labor Mobility Help the EU to Adjust During the Great Recession? The Case of Slovakia', *IZA Discussion Papers No. 8249* (Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labour).
- Kahanec, M., M. Pytlikova and K. Zimmermann (2014) 'The Free Movement of Workers in an Enlarged European Union: Institutional Underpinnings of Economic Adjustment', *IZA Discussion Papers No. 8456* (Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labour).
- Klekowski von Koppenfels, A. and J. Höhne (forthcoming) 'Gastarbeiter Migration Revisited: Consolidating Germany's Position as an Immigration Country', in J.-M. Lafleur and M. Stanek (eds.) *South-North Migration of EU Citizens in Times of Crisis*.
- Krause, A., U. Rinne and K. Zimmermann (2014) 'How far Away is a Single European Labor Market?' *IZA Discussion Papers No. 8383* (Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labour).

- Kremer, M., E. Schrijvers and J.W. Holtslag (2013) 'How to Make Migration Work?' in J.W. Holtslag, M. Kremer and E. Schrijvers (eds.) *Making Migration Work. The Future of Labour Migration in the European Union* (The Hague/Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press), pp. 13–37.
- Lewandowski, P. and I. Magda (eds.) (2013) *Zatrudnienie w Polsce 2012. Rynek pracy w okresie wyjścia z kryzysu* (Warszawa: CRZL).
- Lewandowski, P., M. Antosiewicz and J. Baran (2013) 'Wielka Recesja', in P. Lewandowski and I. Magda (eds.) *Zatrudnienie w Polsce 2012. Rynek pracy w okresie wyjścia z kryzysu* (Warszawa: CRZL), pp. 7–60.
- Magda, I., M. Potoczna and M. Lis (2013) 'Wielka Recesja i nierówności', in P. Lewandowski and I. Magda (eds.) *Zatrudnienie w Polsce 2012. Rynek pracy w okresie wyjścia z kryzysu* (Warszawa: CRZL), pp. 61–98.
- Martin, P. (2009) *The Recession and Migration Alternative Scenarios*. Available online at: www.age-of-migration.com/uk/financialcrisis/updates/1c.pdf (accessed: 6 May 2015).
- Morgan, T. (2004) *The Spanish Migrant Community in the United Kingdom* (Cambridge, UK: Anglia uskin Polytechnic University).
- OECD (2012) *OECD Employment Outlook* (Paris: OECD Publishing).
- OECD (2011) *OECD Employment Outlook* (Paris: OECD Publishing).
- Oliver Alonso, J. (2013) 'La inmigración y la doble recesión del mercado de trabajo en España 2011–2012', in E. Aja, J. Arango and J. Oliver Alonso (eds.) *Inmigración y crisis: entre la continuidad y el cambio. Anuario de Inmigración en España* (Barcelona: CIDOB), pp. 28–58.
- Pérvier, H. (2014) 'Men and Women During the Economic Crisis Employment Trends in Eight European Countries', *Revue de l'OFCE/Debates and policies*, 2/2014 (133), 41–84.
- Pumares Fernández, P., A. García Coll and A. Asensio Hita (2006) *La movilidad laboral y geográfica de la población extranjera en España* (Madrid: MTAS).
- Romero Valiente, J.M. and A.L. Hidalgo-Capitán (2014) 'El subregistro consular: Magnitudes y efectos en las estadísticas de emigración españolas', *OBETS. Revista de Ciencias Sociales*, 9(2), 377–407.
- Taran, P. (2011) 'Crisis, Migration and Precarious Work: Impacts and responses', in *ITC-ACTRAV European Trade Union Conference on Conversion of Precarious Work into Work with Rights*, Budapest, Romania, 22–23 November 2011.
- Veira, A., M. Stanek and L. Cachón (2011) 'Los Determinantes de Concentración étnica en el mercado laboral español', *Revista Internacional de Sociología*, 69(M1), 219–242.

Part II

Female High-Skill Migration: A Sector-Specific Approach

5

Migration of Nurses and Doctors in the EU and the European Free Trade Association

Gilles Dussault, James Buchan and Isabel Craveiro

5.1 Introduction

5.1.1 Background

Health workers have been mobile for many decades. In the past, doctors from countries like Canada, Australia and New Zealand travelled to France, the US or the UK to acquire a specialty not available at home or which was more developed in the country of destination. From the 1950s on, doctors from newly independent countries started doing the same; some stayed and then others came, attracted by better working conditions or pushed by an insecure environment at home. The first ones to emigrate in significant numbers were from the Indian sub-continent, soon followed in the 1960s by others from Africa, both South and North of the Sahara and from the Caribbean. The direction of migratory flows was basically determined by language and historical links, and the vast majority of migrants were men, as medicine was little feminized at the time.

The pattern of migration for nurses was comparable, with the difference being that almost all were women; some migrated to complete a research degree or a specialty not available in their country of origin, whereas others moved to improve their economic condition, encouraged by demand in higher income countries for nursing personnel. In some 'source' countries, like the Philippines, women deliberately chose nursing as a field of study to be able to work abroad, a choice supported and even encouraged by their families and by the government.

The permanent emigration of qualified professionals can represent a significant economic loss for countries where the education of health professionals is financially supported by public funds. More importantly, if the country experiences a shortage of qualified health workers, the loss of doctors and nurses leaves segments of populations with unattended needs.

These undesirable effects have long been known, but until recently they had not received much attention from policymakers. In the late 1970s, the commitment of 134 countries to ensuring access to primary care to all by 2000 (WHO 1978) threw light on the need for a sufficient number of health workers with the right competencies to create enabling conditions for the achievement of this ambitious objective. Some researchers then stressed that the emigration of health professionals from countries with a small health workforce was a major obstacle that policymakers needed to address (Mejia 1978; Mejia et al. 1979). Their advice was not heard as little if any action followed.

More recently, at the end of the 1990s, numerous international initiatives were launched to alleviate the burden of evitable and treatable diseases in low-income countries; examples are Roll Back Malaria (RBM) in 1998, the World Bank Multi-country HIV/AIDS Programme (MAP) in 1999, the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI Alliance) in 2000, the Stop Tuberculosis Partnership (STOP-TB) in 2001, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) in 2002. In 2000, the United Nations Assembly unanimously adopted eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), of which three were specifically health related.¹ At first, policymakers focused on raising additional financial resources, seen as the main pre-requisite to the achievement of these goals. In contrast, the World Health Report 2000 stressed that human resources were 'the most important of the health system's inputs' on which the achievement of the health MDGs ultimately depended (WHO 2000, p. 77), but again the message was ignored.

It took a private initiative, by the Rockefeller Foundation, to bring health workforce issues to the policy/political agenda. A 'Joint Learning Initiative' produced an advocacy report, *Human Resources for Health: Overcoming the Crisis* (JLI 2004), which rang the alarm, mainly that a quantitatively and qualitatively insufficient workforce was identified as the most important obstacle to achieving the MDGs and the emigration of qualified professionals was an aggravating factor that needed to be mitigated. The *World Health Report 2006: Working Together for Health* (WHO 2006) reinforced this message and triggered efforts to understand better the emigration of health professionals, its determinants and its impacts. However, the gender dimensions of the mobility of qualified health workers have not received due attention thus far (Dumont et al. 2007). Issues such as gender differences in intentions to migrate or in the processes of migration itself and of integration in a new country have little been explored. Also the issue of the impact of migration on the professional and personal life of women migrants deserves attention.

This chapter's main objective is to identify and analyse the gendered features of the mobility of doctors and nurses, focusing on long-term migrants, for instance those who intend to stay, to and from the European Union and the European Free Trade Association (EU/EFTA), which comprises Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. These two professional

groups represent the vast majority of migrant health professionals; others like dentists and pharmacists are also known to move, but their mobility has been even less studied. Long-term migrants are one of many types of mobile health professionals; it includes those who move for economic reasons (the livelihood migrant), for professional development reasons (the career oriented), for adventure (the backpacker) (Glinos et al. 2014) and for personal reasons, such as family reunion. In addition, others are pushed to move for security reasons, as in the case of professionals from countries in conflict. In the EU/EFTA zone, short-term mobility and even commuting are common; however, this would deserve a separate analysis.

The analysis in this chapter will focus on the recent years during which Europe experienced a severe economic crisis. The question we will raise is how the crisis has affected the mobility of doctors and nurses and whether men and women have been affected differently. Finally, a complementary objective is to identify the policy issues emerging from this analysis and the options to address them.

The next section describes the methods and sources of information used. The presentation of available data on migratory flows and their dynamics (trends, directions of flows, determinants) selected follows. The focus will be on three sub-groups: long-term migrants coming to an EU/EFTA country from outside the zone, those moving within the EU/EFTA zone and those moving from an EU/EFTA country to a country outside the zone. The focus will then be on the specificities of the experience of women migrants in relation to the decision to move, to the experience of work in the country of destination and to its impacts. This section will be based on studies and on accounts of migrants' experiences. A final section will discuss policy issues emerging from a better understanding of gender differences in health professionals' mobility.

5.2 Methods and sources

We searched the two most comprehensive databases of references in the field of health services research, Pubmed and BVS (Biblioteca Virtual em Saúde), as well as a selection of websites of governments, of international organizations and of documentary repositories covering health-services-related topics, including the health workforce,² for articles and other documents in English, French, Portuguese and Spanish, referring to migratory flows of doctors and nurses to, within and out of EU/EFTA countries and including information on the mobility of women health professionals. No period limitation was set. Information extraction was done according to a template reflecting the objectives of this chapter.

Caution is warranted about the validity and reliability of data available on mobile health professionals (Dumont et al. 2014). First, no country monitors exits of health professionals; the only data available to estimate the number

of emigrants are the number of requests for certificates of qualifications and for admission to the register of a foreign country; however, these only indicate an intention to emigrate. Whether this intention was followed by action can only be confirmed by verifying if the professional has registered in a foreign country. Second, statistics available in EU/EFTA countries use different definitions of 'foreigners', for instance foreign-born, foreign national or foreign-trained. For example, a foreign-born doctor or nurse may have spent most of his/her life and trained in the country of registration; a foreign national may be someone who kept his/her foreign nationality even if s/he trained in the country (a frequent occurrence in the EU); finally, a foreign-trained professional may be a national who studied abroad and then returned to practice in his/her country of origin. It is estimated that more than 2,000 Portuguese study medicine in foreign countries, such as Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Spain or the Czech Republic (Ribeiro et al. 2014). As a result, it is difficult to identify who really is a migrant.

Third, no systematic information is available on doctors and nurses who move to a different country but do not obtain recognition of their qualifications and are therefore unable to practice their profession. This is frequently the case of professionals trained outside the EU/EFTA zone. Finally, there is considerable variation in the quality, periodicity and comprehensiveness of data on migratory flows between countries and between professional groups within the same country. This is recognized by international agencies which collect data on the health workforce, and major efforts are currently made by Eurostat, the OECD and the WHO to harmonize databases through a 'Joint Questionnaire on Non-Monetary Health Care Statistics'.

5.3 The dynamics of the mobility of doctors and nurses to, within and out of EU/EFTA countries

Health workforce issues have received more attention from EU/EFTA policy-makers since the beginning of the economic crisis. In many countries, if not most, shortages of doctors, nurses and other care personnel are already being experienced or forecasted as a consequence of the ageing of the population and of the health workforce itself, which results in increasing demand for health services, just as the supply of professionals who deliver such services is diminishing. This has created a sense of a 'looming crisis' (OECD 2008). In a consultation paper, the European Commission (2008) recognized the need to strengthen the European health workforce and questioned the sustainability of reliance on foreign health workers. At the same time, numerous international organizations, with the WHO in the lead, were advocating to put an end to the active recruitment of health workers from low-income countries.

At least three major projects on migratory flows of health professionals were funded by the European Commission: *Health PROMeTHEUS* (Buchan

et al. 2014; Wismar et al. 2011), which analysed the mobility of health professionals in 15 EU countries and in two candidate countries; *Mobility of Health Professionals (MoHProf)* (Tjadens et al. 2013), which did the same in 12 EU countries and in a mix of 13 source and destination countries outside the EU/EFTA zone; and *Migración calificada en salud, impacto financiero, reconocimiento de títulos*, which focused on migratory flows from a selection of South and Central American countries to Europe, principally to Spain (OPAS 2013).

The main observations from these studies coincided. First, all showed that mobility takes a variety of forms: temporary, fixed-term, long-term, resulting from active recruitment or from individual initiative, or pushed by adverse conditions at home as in the case of refugees, and there are various types of migrants as shown by Glinos et al. (2014). Second, reasons to migrate are a mix of professional and personal ones which vary according to the characteristics of the individual migrant and of the environment of origin (Young et al. 2010). Third, in the EU/EFTA zone, the proportion of foreign doctors and nurses varies from less than 1% in Bulgaria, Estonia and Poland, to more than 20% in Ireland, Malta, Luxembourg, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (UK) (Glinos et al. 2014). Migrant health professionals tend to concentrate in countries which were part of the EU before 2004, the so-called EU-12. Fourth, flows from outside the EU/EFTA zone have diminished significantly in the last ten years due to policy or economic changes. For example, the UK, which recruited abundantly in Africa, the Caribbean and the Indian sub-continent until the early 2000s, significantly reduced this activity, switching international recruitment to EU countries and the Philippines, and also scaled-up its domestic production of doctors and nurses after it adopted a Code of Practice recommending not to recruit from specified low-income countries. Later in the decade, the government tightened immigration policies which discouraged would-be immigrants. Similarly, Spain stopped receiving doctors and nurses from Latin America as the economic crisis developed after 2008. Actually, some countries which were a destination for migrants ceased to be so and even started to experience emigration of their own doctors and nurses: this is the case of Ireland (Humphries et al. 2012) and Portugal (Ribeiro et al. 2014), for instance. Finally, mobility within the EU/EFTA seems to have increased after 2008, in the context of the crisis. These studies did not focus specifically on gender issues, while recognizing that it deserved more attention.

5.3.1 Long-term migrants from non-EU/EFTA countries

The highest absolute numbers in this category are found in the UK, France (Francophone Africans, Haitians) and Spain (Central and South Americans). From the mid-2000s, the pressure increased on higher-income countries to stop recruiting from countries with unmet health workforce needs. The adoption in 2010 of the WHO 'Global Code of Practice on the International

Recruitment of Health Personnel' accentuated the pressure on governments, and as a result recruitment from poorer countries outside the EU/EFTA zone diminished radically. This obliged potential migrants from these countries to look for other destinations (Adhikari and Grigulis 2014), or to review their migration project. For example, older nurses whose qualifications do not meet the current requirements for recognition have to reduce their expectations and look for work as health assistants or auxiliaries (Bruyneel et al. 2013). Many nurses who are unable to get on the register take-up unqualified jobs and are not accounted for in statistics on nursing migrants (Policy + 2014).

An assessment at the end of the last decade reported that the most numerous contingent of non-EU/EFTA doctors registered in the UK came from India, followed by Pakistan and South Africa, and that of nurses from the Philippines, followed by Nigeria and South Africa (Young et al. 2010). There are more doctors trained in Ghana practicing in the UK than in Ghana, and trained in Benin practicing in France than in their country of origin. Until the economic crisis hit in 2008, Spain was a natural destination for doctors and nurses from Spanish-speaking countries from the Americas. Between 2002 and 2009, 16,871 requests for recognition of qualifications came from doctors from countries of the Andes region (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela); of that 47% were women. During the same period, 4,708 requests were made by nurses from these countries, and 89% of them were women (Nuñez et al. 2012).

Portugal is the preferred destination of Brazilians and of Portuguese-speaking Africans. However, numbers are relatively small: in 2013, there were 157 Brazilian doctors and 49 nurses working in the National Health Service, where almost all foreigners work, and 301 doctors and 135 nurses from the five Portuguese-speaking African countries; this represented less than 0.5% of the total workforce (ACSS 2014). In the last three to four decades, all countries north of France have recruited from outside the EU/EFTA zone, principally from the Philippines, but they have now almost ceased to do so for the reasons mentioned above, except through bilateral agreements as the one signed in 2013 by Germany and the Philippines (Terre des Hommes Germany 2013).

An OECD study showed that contrary to intra-EU migrations which equally involve qualified men and women, the average emigration rate for tertiary-educated African women is at 27.7% and is almost 11 percentage points higher than for men. A similar trend is also found for Latin America and Oceania and, to a lesser extent, for Asia (Dumont et al. 2007). The study concludes that poorer countries are more affected by the emigration of highly skilled women, among whom doctors and nurses are included. One possible explanation is that the opportunities for highly educated women are much narrower than for men because of higher gender

inequalities, leading to higher potential returns from migration for women. This effect may be supplemented by a pull effect associated to the fact that women tend to be concentrated in sectors (notably education, health) for which the demand is particularly high in OECD countries (Dumont et al. 2007, p. 16).

5.3.2 Long-term migrants from one EU/EFTA country to another one

Mobility within the EU is facilitated by a number of factors: the free movement of persons – a fundamental right guaranteed to citizens of member countries; the recognition of qualifications which is now quasi-automatic; and because of the *Bologna Process* which harmonized the structure of higher education programmes and created a unique system of credits.³ Historically, there has been little internal long-term migration, though there is a long-standing tradition of ‘cross-border’ mobility, for instance, German/French/Italian nurses working in Switzerland (Ruedin and Widmer 2010), Belgian doctors working in France and in the Netherlands, Germans in Austria (Tjadens et al. 2013) and Spaniards in Portugal (Ribeiro et al. 2014); in such cases of cross-border mobility, often the doctor or the nurse simply commutes. The two EU enlargements, in 2004 (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) and in 2007 (Bulgaria, Romania), were expected to generate outflows from new member countries to older ones; many health professionals did migrate, but the flows were relatively modest, at first at least (Ruedin and Widmer 2010).

Internal flows of migrant health professionals are sensitive to policy changes. For example, Spanish doctors and nurses used to go to Portugal to find employment and to specialize. When the Government of Spain improved the working conditions in the health sector in the mid-2000s, by opening more positions and more specialty training places, migrants established in Portugal started returning to their country. Flows have also been affected by the economic crisis. For instance, new registration of nurses from Ireland and Portugal in the UK went respectively from 100 and 20 in 2006–2007 to 400 and 550 in 2011–2012, as unemployment increased in these two countries. On the other hand, new registrations of nurses from Poland, where the crisis hit less, went from almost 600 to 200 during the same period (Buchan and Secombe 2012). Flows from Greece are also reported to have significantly increased, since 2008, to the UK and Germany in particular (Cavounidis 2013).

5.3.3 Long-term migrants from an EU/EFTA country to another country

Doctors and nurses from the region are also known to migrate to countries such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US (Dussault et al.

2009). These countries are actively recruiting abroad and offer more attractive working conditions than in Europe. There is anecdotal information of Portuguese health professionals moving to Angola and Brazil, and of Spaniards to Ecuador, as these new destination countries also actively recruit and offer better compensation packages. Recent agreements between France and the province of Quebec (Canada) have facilitated the mobility of nurses, and 900 French nurses registered in Quebec between 2009 and 2013.⁴

Another phenomenon, which is not well documented yet, is the return to their country of origin of migrants from outside the EU/EFTA zone. This is the case of Indians returning to the medical tourism sector, which has grown exponentially in the last 10 years. Other cases are Brazilians and South Americans leaving countries in crisis, namely Portugal and Spain, and going back home where conditions have improved.

In sum, mobility patterns change more and more rapidly under the influence of a number of factors, such as individual motivations, experiences and expectations, working conditions and general circumstances in the home and destination country, and legal frameworks and policies. According to Glinos et al., 'Health professional mobility reflects and responds to the factors and context that surround it' (2014, p. 17).

5.4 Discussion: The gendered migration experience of female doctors and nurses

Most of the literature on the migration of health professionals overlooks its gender dimensions, even if nursing is a predominately female occupation. The application of a gender lens to the migration of doctors and nurses is needed to identify and understand differences in the experience of migration between men and women. This knowledge is important to inform policies and management practices, so that they respond to the specific needs of women migrants. In this section, we ask whether such gender differences exist in the profile of migrants, their motivations to migrate and in the experience of migration itself, which includes the recruitment and integration processes, and the impact on women's professional and personal life and future plans. Another question is whether the economic crisis has affected more women migrants.

5.4.1 Is the profile of women migrant doctors and nurses different than men?

The majority of women migrants relocate for family reasons, but qualified ones, such as doctors and nurses and midwives, rather tend to migrate for work-related reasons. Some features of their profile can be drawn from recent studies. For example, nurses migrating to Europe are more often younger and single (Young et al. 2010). In Poland, a study of intentions to migrate showed that the probability to emigrate decreases with

age more rapidly among women than among men (Krajewski-Siuda et al. 2012).

Many nurses leave children behind, and the disruption of family life is an additional source of stress for them (Jones et al. 2009). Irrespective of their family status, a majority of migrant nurses from lower income levels are the main source of revenue for their families left behind. In a survey of migrant nurses conducted in Ireland, 85% were women, most of whom originated from the Philippines (52%) or India (33%), and 87% of the sample sent remittances on a regular basis to their home countries (Humphries et al. 2012). No similar information is available for doctors; however, as they tend to come from a better-off social background, they are less under pressure to remit part of their income. There is evidence that the more qualified migrants in general remit less than the less qualified ones (Niimi et al. 2008). There is also evidence that women are more regular in sending remittances.

In sum, there is still much to be learned about the profile of women migrant doctors and nurses. At present, most but not all databases disaggregate figures by sex, but rarely do they provide data on age group, marital status or number of dependents, which would help characterize better their profile.

5.4.2 Do women doctors and nurses migrate for different reasons than men?

The reasons which bring a qualified individual to leave one's country to seek work in another one are relatively well known: these are usually categorized into 'push and pull factors'. According to this approach, doctors and nurses decide to migrate in reaction to a mix of factors which incite them to leave their country, and of others which attract them to another one. These factors tend to mirror each other as illustrated in Table 5.1, which lists the most commonly mentioned factors in the literature.

Depending on the individual's characteristics such as age, professional background or family status, and on the context, a single factor can play a more or less important role in influencing the decision to migrate. Both men and women are influenced by some or all of these factors. For example, Young et al. (2014) studied the 'instigating factors' for health professionals to migrate to the UK. A nurse from Bulgaria expressed her desire to improve her working and economic condition as follows:

I was happy working and the job was satisfying until I reached the point where I was just working, and couldn't go on holiday, couldn't buy my children new clothes or shoes when they needed them, couldn't provide anything else. I mean I was just working and nothing else. My husband was on and off from work and changing from one to another job and it was very difficult.

(Young et al. 2014, p. 184)

Table 5.1 Push-and-pull factors motivating the decision to migrate

Push factors	Pull factors
Working conditions	
Unemployment/underemployment	Work opportunities
Low salary and poor benefits	Good compensation package, possibility to support relatives at home (remittances)
Absence of career prospects	Opportunity for career progression and promotion
No access to continuing professional development	Easy access to continuing professional development
Deficient and arbitrary management	Professional and transparent management
Occupational risks	Occupational safety
Work overload	Regulated workloads, time to attend training activities
Health system environment	
Poorly organized care services	Well-structured care services
Lack of tools and supplies	Access to modern equipment and supplies
Economic, political, social environment	
Low-income country	Higher-income country, prospect of improved standard of living
Poor education facilities for children	Access to good quality schools
Lack of security, context of conflict	Peaceful, politically stable, secure environment
Little cultural diversity	Culturally diverse environment

Source: Authors' own compilation summarizing the relevant scholarly literature.

Another nurse, from Austria, rather points to the lack of career prospects:

In Austria with nursing not being an academic profession, the training system is an apprenticeship style which delivers a very good basic training. You come out of training with a lot of practical skills actually, fully able to do the work, but the disadvantage is that not having much in terms of specialized pathways you then hit a bit of a ceiling.

(Young et al. 2014, p. 184)

A female doctor from Italy rather emphasized the importance of educational opportunities: 'The salary was not the important thing. For me, my main ambition is my academic career more than the economic career' (Young, Humphrey and Rafferty 2014, p. 185).

On the other hand, women can be motivated by factors specific to them; an example is gender discrimination, real or perceived, in access to a career path. Eke et al. (2011) report the case of a young doctor, aged 24, who graduated in Hungary in 2004 and started a residency in neurology. Her

first preference was neurosurgery but, as she was the only female applicant, she believed she stood no chance. She worked in Hungary for 18 months, three of which were spent in Finland on a Leonardo scholarship, an EU programme which supports internships abroad for young graduates at the end of their studies. She did not want to work abroad, but the contrast between her experiences at home and the stay in Finland made her decide to look for work there and she eventually found some. She earns five times more than in Hungary and can double this with four locums per month. She sees a clear career pathway, in contrast to Hungary, where professional options are often determined by social/family networks.

A review of issues and evidence on health professionals' mobility in Europe (Young et al. 2010) quotes a study indicating that Polish women, including nurses, may be increasingly migrating as a reaction to conservative policies and social values in relation to gender roles. A study of health professionals leaving Germany identified the lack of flexibility in work arrangements as an incentive for female doctors with children to migrate to a more family-friendly environment (Ognyanova et al. 2014).

Gender discriminatory employment practices can encourage some women to migrate. A study of Caribbean nurses in the UK reported that for some of the respondents gender inequality was a key factor in the decision to relocate to the UK (Jones et al. 2009). The undervaluing of nurses as 'women's work' in some countries may be a driver for nurses to leave that country (Buchan and Dovlo 2004). Finally, women may be more vulnerable to domestic violence or to violence in general in certain countries, and emigration may become a strategy of escape (Jones et al. 2009).

5.4.3 Is the experience of migration different for women doctors and nurses than for men?

The experience of migration starts with the process of looking for a job. Some individuals find work abroad by themselves; they respond to announcements on the internet or to information provided by personal contacts in the destination country. Many hospitals, the main employers of migrant health professionals, arrange visits to foreign countries to attract potential candidates, a direct recruitment strategy that appears to be productive. There are also numerous private agencies specializing in the recruitment of health personnel, offering their services as intermediaries between the would-be migrant and the hiring organization. These are generally not regulated and little information is available on their activities, on who they recruit, on their fees and on who pays them. Some EU/EFTA governments have published guidance for the fair recruitment of foreign health personnel; examples are Finland ('Developing Fair Recruitment Practices'), Ireland ('Guidance for Best Practice on the Recruitment of Overseas Nurses and Midwives'), Norway and the UK (Attree et al. 2011; Dussault et al. 2012). However, it is not known if these 'good practices' are observed.

Factors known to facilitate access to work in another country include familiarity with the language, knowing colleagues who have already migrated or a social network in the destination country, having qualifications that meet the requirements for recognition and previous knowledge of the destination country (Young et al. 2014). No information is available on gender differences in the recruitment process, though we can speculate that there are some as most recruits are women; however, women with children may not have the same probability of being recruited than a man with children.

Then the integration into a new work environment follows. It is more difficult for nurses than for doctors to have their qualifications recognized. This is because of the lack of standardization of titles and of education processes and contents. This affects more nurses from outside the EU/EFTA region, except for those from Australia, Canada, New Zealand and of lower income countries whose education standards are modelled on that of a European country, or of countries which passed an agreement that facilitates the recognition of qualifications (Germany–Philippines). Within the EU/EFTA zone, there are still variations in the qualifications of nurses, but these are gradually diminishing as efforts towards harmonization have been implemented (Davies 2008). Doctors have fewer problems as qualification requirements are more standardized. In Europe, the recognition of qualifications is easy for them, but other obstacles to access to the register remain, namely language requirements. This obstacle may be more difficult to overcome for women professionals who have childcare responsibilities and therefore less time available to attend language classes.

Women qualified as health professionals, because they are mostly nurses, have a higher risk of working at a level below their qualifications. In the UK, it is reported that migrant nurses working in the private sector are frequently employed as auxiliaries or care assistants. Adhikari and Grigulis (2014) report that ‘the general consensus amongst Nepali and Malawian nurses was . . . that the tasks they were assigned to did not match their prior experiences and training or their expectations about what working life in the UK would entail’ (p. 241). Some nurses from Malawi, and many from Nepal, reported that the jobs in private care homes were menial and repetitive in nature, which in essence amounted to ‘brain waste’. However, nurses working in the National Health Service are more likely to work in nursing and not experience de-skilling (Kofman 2012)

Discrimination, attributed to race or to country of origin, has been reported by nurses in various countries (Kofman 2012), but this cannot be generalized. Female doctors and nurses, who migrated to France, Italy and Spain, interviewed in the study of the migration experience of health professionals from countries of the Andes region, all stated that their professional objectives had been achieved (Nuñez et al. 2012).

Female nurses who migrate with their family experienced a different process of adjustment compared to nurses who migrate by themselves and leave

his/her partner and children behind. The latter are well regarded for bringing in remittances and better living conditions for those left behind, but at the same time, they can be criticized for 'abandoning' their husbands and children (Gündüz 2013). Both face sources of stress, which their male colleagues may not experience. The UK National Health Service has provided support to nurses to bring their partners and dependent relatives with them; however, the relocation of whole families is costly, can be extremely difficult to execute and, given the short-term nature of contracts, is often considered risky (Jones et al. 2009). Generally speaking, migrant doctors and nurses working in public services report more satisfaction, as they are treated just like their national colleagues.

5.4.4 Has the economic crisis affected migrant female doctors and nurses?

Between 2005 and 2010, there has been a narrowing of employment and unemployment rates, of poverty levels and of salaries between men and women. This is the result of the greater deterioration of the working conditions of men and of the fact that employed women concentrate in sectors such as education and health which were less affected by the crisis than others like construction or manufacturing (Bettio et al. 2013). However, because they are more numerous in the public sector, women have been more affected by budget cuts and staff reductions. Even though they are smaller, gaps remain in both salaries and employment rates (de Jong 2013). Educated men and women were in general more protected from the effects of the crisis on employment, though younger professionals were more affected. In the health sector, the crisis did not stop the ageing of the population and the associated growth of the burden of chronic illnesses, and demand for doctors and nurses has continued to increase.

Much has been written on the impacts of the crisis on the health status of populations, most often by looking at aggregate data on mortality, funding, provision and utilization of health services, or the consumption of drugs (Dubois and Molinuevo 2014). Research on how the crisis impacted the health of different age, sex, occupational or ethnic groups, on men and women, has been neglected thus far (Escolar-Pujolar et al. 2014). The health sector was hit more in some EU/EFTA countries than others, such as in Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy and Spain than in Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Norway or Switzerland. Also, affected countries have reacted differently: most have cut or frozen salaries and pensions, reduced recruitment, augmented co-payments and even limited access to certain services, for example by letting waiting lists that allow access to services grow (Mladovsky et al. 2012). In some rarer cases (Lithuania, Poland, the UK), the government explicitly 'protected' health services and focused on improving efficiency while maintaining and even improving access, accepting that the crisis increased the need for health services. Some countries were already engaged in the process of reforming their health sector, most with a perspective

of containment of public expenditures, and they accelerated the process. As doctors and nurses mainly work in public services, they were subject, like the rest of the public administration staff, to measures such as salary cuts, longer hours of work or reduction of pension benefits. Many countries imposed the partial replacement of leavers, which mechanically resulted in increased workloads for those who stayed and in less job opportunities for new graduates.

The information available on mobility flows of nurses and doctors is sketchy and inconsistent: in some countries data are available on the number of registrations for example, but access to this information is variable in different countries, and there is often no national database which compiles these numbers (Maier et al. 2014). No country monitors outflows with precision, which limits our capacity to rigorously analyse the impact of the crisis on mobility.

In 2009, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) forecasted that the crisis would impact differently on male and female migrant workers but expected demand for migrant workers to remain stable in sectors such as health care and domestic workers (Beets and Willekens 2009). However, the number of available positions has diminished in countries where economic constraints have been greater, such as in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, where unemployment of doctors and nurses has grown and out-migration has ensued, first of nurses and later of doctors. Ireland and Spain were destination countries for foreign health professionals until the crisis struck; at that point in time, they stopped recruiting from abroad, and foreign staff and also nationals started moving to other countries. Greece and Portugal were not major destination countries, but they also stopped receiving foreigners and saw their own doctors and nurses emigrating in increasing numbers (Ribeiro et al. 2014; Simoue and Koutsogeorgou 2014). Nurses were more affected than doctors, and therefore more women than men. In the UK, the number of foreign nurses and doctors diminished after 2008, but this was already a trend before the crisis, which makes it difficult to conclude that it was a result of the impact of the crisis. Indeed, there has been a notable increase in nurses entering the UK from EU crisis countries of Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Romania in recent years (Buchan 2014).

Another effect of the crisis may be that nurses from certain countries of the EU zone will find it more difficult to get recognition of their qualifications. The crisis may bring some countries to improve efficiency in the provision of health services by scaling-up the skills of nurses (Mladovsky et al. 2012). This can be done so that they can assume expanded functions, such as taking charge of stable chronic patients, normal pregnancies or healthy children, and they can prescribe drugs and exams, which is already the case in a number of countries (Delamaire and Lafortune 2010). This scaling-up would have a negative impact on nurses from countries where the functions of nurses are still more limited. In fact, it has been the case even before the crisis

for nurses from Eastern (Ukraine) and Southern (Romania) Europe, where thousands ended up working as carers in private homes in Germany (an estimated 150,000, Bettio et al. 2012) and Italy. In the latter case, the estimate is that 25% of the between 900,000 and 1,600,000 *badanti* (home carers) were nurses in their country of origin, a number which has grown continuously in spite of crisis, pursuing a trend that already existed before 2008.⁵

In sum, it is unclear whether the crisis has had a more negative impact on female doctors and nurses. This is not to say that there has been no differential impact, but that it may or may not be gender related.

5.5 Policy issues

Even though the evidence on gender differences in the migration of doctors and nurses is far from sufficient, there is enough information to suggest that health workforce policies and management practices need to be more sensitive to the specificities of women's experience of working in a different country in order to minimize the negative impacts of migration and to optimize its positive ones. The EU/EFTA member states could find inspiration in the efforts of Canada in that direction. According to Focus Migration, Canada has explicitly,

recognized the inherent gender-selectivity involved in skilled migration programmes. It has instituted a gender-based analysis (GBA) of immigration policy as well as settlement and integration programmes, which is described as: 'a process that assesses the differential impact of proposed and/or existing policies, programs and legislation on women and men'.

(Focus Migration 2009, p. 5)

The availability of better, more reliable and more accessible data and information on migrant health professionals is needed to raise the awareness of policymakers and managers about the specificities of women migrants' needs. It is necessary first that data on migratory flows use definitions which ensure that the real migrants are identified, so as to have a valid measure of the flows. Then, the description of the population of migrants requires that variables other than age and sex be monitored, such as marital status, number of dependents (at home and in the receiving country), qualifications on arrival, previous experience, type of employment and time spent in the destination country. Registration bodies must be engaged and supported in harmonizing their data bases and in monitoring flows, the obvious difficulty being to monitor outflows.

The mobility of doctors and nurses between EU/EFTA countries is there to stay. There are risks in ignoring this reality, both for source and for destination countries. This is why consideration must be given to deciding if migratory flows need to be managed and how. Policy challenges are not the

same for a country which loses health professionals which it needs than for a country which receives them, or for a country that 'loses' workers it does not require because it has produced them in excess of demand, like Greece. Source countries are typically poorer than receiving countries, but recently some richer countries like Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain are now experiencing out-migration of doctors and nurses as a result of the economic and financial crisis. Given the costs induced by these losses, retention becomes a policy issue. Since most migrant health professionals are women, policies should be informed by a better knowledge and understanding of their specific needs and of the reasons which motivate their decision to leave. It should be noted that in receiving countries retention is also an issue.

Another policy issue is that of 'ethical' recruitment or how to ensure that migrants access working conditions and career opportunities equal to those of nationals. The challenge is to guarantee that in less regulated and less-unionized environments, such as in private clinics and hospitals or homes, the rights of migrant professionals are respected. A related challenge is that of the regulation of the activities of recruitment agencies for which the production of profit is the *raison d'être*. This is not to say that private agencies do not protect the rights of migrants, but it may not be sufficient to expect that they use 'good practices' recommended by governments on a voluntary basis. The decision to migrate is most often related to constraints experienced in the country of origin, which makes the potential migrant more vulnerable. Public policies must ensure that migrants are not taken advantage of by recruiters.

Policymakers and managers are also challenged by the fact that the reality of migration is different for different professional categories and for sub-groups in each profession. Differences between men and women in terms of their reasons, as individuals, to relocate, specific needs and expectations have to be taken into account if policies are to reach their objectives. This is made even more difficult by the need to continuously monitor and review these policies and practices as the reality of the migration experience can change rapidly. At present, health workforce policies and practices in the EU/EFTA, with rare exceptions such as Finland, tend to be rather gender blind rather than gender sensitive (de Jong 2013). This raises the issue of how to bring gender issues to the policy agenda.

5.6 Conclusions

It is difficult to provide an accurate picture of the gender dimension of the mobility of doctors and nurses as data limitations prevent any clear assessment of flows and stocks in a way that allows comparisons between men and women. However, we know that nursing, the largest health profession, is mainly comprised of women, and that medicine, the second-largest, has

been rapidly 'feminizing' in most countries.⁶ We can therefore assume that women health professional migrants are a significant and likely a growing component of overall flows.

The main underlying drivers for migration of health professionals, such as the shortages in high-income countries due to demographic factors, and the relative lack of opportunities in lower income countries (OECD 2010), are unlikely to change to a great extent in the foreseeable future, and perhaps growing flows are the likely scenario. The mobility of doctors and nurses remains a moving target, particularly in the EU/EFTA zone, where constraints on moving from one country to another are reduced (Buchan et al. 2014).

The crisis has had short-term impacts in terms of reduced flows of health professionals from outside the EU/EFTA zone, but this reduction had been observed before the crisis, as the pressure to stop active recruitment from poor countries was mounting. This trend is likely to continue. On the other hand, the crisis has stimulated increased outflows in countries most affected by it, like Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. It is impossible to say if this trend will continue for long or whether doctors and nurses who left will eventually return if the economic situation improves. One question then arises: Should policymakers try to intervene to 'manage' these flows, and if they intervene, how should gender issues be addressed?

The WHO Code is a potentially useful international policy instrument which promotes equal opportunities/treatment of workers, but it is yet to become a mainstream policy driver in most countries. One simple improvement would be to develop mechanisms to monitor flows that take into account gender differences, because without basic data of this type, policy analysis and recommendations cannot be expected to pay much attention to gender issues as is presently the case.

The mobility of women deserves more attention as they now constitute the vast majority of migrant doctors and nurses. Better-informed policies can benefit source and destination countries which want to ensure that migratory flows bring more benefits and costs to the country and to migrants themselves. All governments in the EU/EFTA region are committed to giving access to all citizens to quality health-care services on the basis of need. They therefore have the responsibility to ensure that the migration of doctors and nurses contributes, rather than be an obstacle, to achieving this objective.

Notes

1. '[T]o have reduced maternal mortality by three quarters, and under-five child mortality by two thirds, of their current rates. To have, by then, halted, and begun to reverse, the spread of HIV/AIDS, the scourge of malaria and other major diseases that afflict humanity' (Article 19 of the United Nations Millennium Declaration).

2. OECD, IOM, World Bank, CapacityPlus, Eldis, Human Resources for Health Global Resource Center, WHO, ILO, International Centre for Human Resources in Nursing (ICHRN), Global Health Workforce Alliance.
3. For more information, see http://ec.europa.eu/education/policy/higher-education/bologna-process_en.htm (accessed: 7 May 2015).
4. For information on these agreements, see www.oiiq.org/uploads/periodiques/infostats/vol06no03/index.htm (accessed: 7 May 2016 5).
5. Information available online at: <http://www.qualificare.info/home.php?id=678> (accessed: 7 May 2015).
6. Information available online at: http://www.who.int/gho/health_workforce/physicians_density_gender_text/en/ (accessed: 7 May 2015).

References

- ACSS (2014) *Boletim informativo: Recursos Humanos Estrangeiros no Ministério da Saúde – Atualização de dados (2011–2013)* (Lisbon: Administração Central dos Serviços de Saúde).
- Adhikari, R. and A. Grigulis (2014) 'Through the Back Door: Nurse Migration to the UK from Malawi and Nepal, a Policy Critique', *Health Policy and Planning*, 29(2), 237–245.
- Attree, M., Flinkman, M., Howley, B., Lakanmaa, R.-L., Lima-Basto, M. and L. Uhrenfeldt (2011) 'A review of Nursing Workforce Policies in Five European Countries: Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Portugal and United Kingdom/England', *Journal of Nursing Management*, 19(6), 786–802.
- Beets, G. and F. Willekens (2009) *The Global Economic Crisis and International Migration: An Uncertain Outlook* (The Hague: Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute).
- Bettio, F., Corsi, M., D'Ippoliti, C., Lyberaki, A., Samek Lodovici, M. and A. Verashchagini (2012) *The Impact of the Economic Crisis on the Situation of Women and Men and on Gender Equality Policies* (Luxembourg: European Commission, Directorate-General for Justice, Publications Office of the EU).
- Bruyneel, L. Li B., Aiken L, Lesaffre E. K. and W. Sermeus (2013) 'A Multi-country Perspective on Nurses' Tasks Below Their Skill level: Reports from Domestically Trained Nurses and Foreign Trained Nurses from Developing Countries', *International Journal of Nursing Studies*, 50(2), 202–209.
- Buchan, J. (2014) 'No Problem with Europe', *Nursing Standard*, 29(1), 30–30.
- Buchan, J., Wismar M., Glinos I.A. and J. Bremner. (eds.) (2014) *Health Professional Mobility in a Changing Europe, New Dynamics, Mobile Individuals and Diverse Responses* (Copenhagen: WHO Regional Office for Europe on behalf of the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies).
- Buchan, J. and D. Dovlo (2004) *International Recruitment of Health Workers to the UK: A Report for DFID* (London: DFID Health Systems Resource Centre). Available online at: <http://www.equinet africa.org/bibl/docs/BUChres310108.pdf> (accessed: 6 April 2015).
- Buchan, J. and I. Seecombe (2012) *Overstretched. Under-resourced. The UK Nursing Labour Market Review 2012* (London: Royal College of Nursing).
- Cavounidis, J. (2013) 'Migration and the Economic and Social Landscape of Greece', *South-Eastern Europe Journal of Economics*, 1(2013), 59–78.
- Davies, R. (2008) 'The Bologna Process: The Quiet Revolution in Nursing Higher Education', *Nurse Education Today*, 28, 935–942. Available online at: <http://www.cesruc>.

- org/uploads/soft/130221/1-130221160950.pdf (accessed: 6 April 2015).
- De Jong, W. (2013). *European Women and the Crisis*. Library Briefing of the European Parliament, 14 February 2013. Available online at: [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2013/130441/LDM_BRI\(2013\)130441_REV1_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2013/130441/LDM_BRI(2013)130441_REV1_EN.pdf) (accessed: 6 April 2015).
- Delamaire, M.L. and G. Lafortune (2010) 'Nurses in Advanced Roles: A Description and Evaluation of Experiences in 12 Developed Countries', *OECD Health Working Paper No. 54* (Paris: OECD Publishing).
- Dubois, H. and D. Molinuevo (2014) *Access to Healthcare in Times of Crisis* (Luxembourg: Eurofound, Publications Office of the European Union).
- Dumont, J.C., J.P. Martin and G. Spielvogel (2007) 'Women on the Move: The Neglected Gender Dimension of the Brain Drain', *IZA Discussion Paper No. 2920*. Available online at: <http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/40232336.pdf> (accessed: 6 April 2015).
- Dumont, J., Lafortune, G. and Zurn, P. (2014) 'Monitoring Trends in International Migration of Health Personnel: A Critical Review of Existing Data Sources', in A. Siyam and M. DalPoz (eds.) *Migration of Health Workers: WHO Code of Practice and the Global Economic Crisis* (Geneva: World Health Organization), 75–94.
- Dussault, G., G. Perfilieva and J. Pethick (2012) *Implementing the WHO Global Code of Practice on International Recruitment of Health Personnel in the European Region* (Copenhagen: World Health Organization). Available online at: http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/173054/Policy-Brief_HRH_draft-for-RC62-discussion.pdf (accessed: 6 April 2015).
- Dussault, G., I. Frontiera and J. Cabral (2009) *Migration of Health Personnel in the WHO European Region* (Copenhagen: World Health Organization). Available online at: http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/95689/E93039.pdf (accessed: 7 April 2015).
- Eke, E., E. Girasek and M. Szocska (2011) 'From Melting Pot to Laboratory of Change in Central Europe: Hungary and Health Workforce Migration', in M. Wismar et al. (eds.) *Health Professional Mobility and Health Systems: Evidence from 17 European Countries* (Brussels: European Observatory of Health Systems and Policies), 365–394.
- Escolar-Pujolar, A., A. Bacigalupe and M. San Sebastian (2014) 'European Economic Crisis and Health Inequities: Research Challenges in an Uncertain Scenario', *International Journal for Equity in Health*, 13. Available online at: <http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/13/1/59> (accessed: 8 April 2015).
- European Commission (2008) Green Paper on the European Workforce for Health. *Commission of the European Communities*, COM (2008) 725 Final. Available online at: <http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0725:FIN:EN:PDF> (accessed: 7 April 2015).
- Focus Migration (2009) *Skilled Female Labour Migration. Policy Brief No 13*. Available online at: <http://focus-migration.hwwi.de/index.php?id=6029&L=1> (accessed: 7 April 2015).
- Glinos, I., J. Buchan and M. Wismar (2014) 'Health Professional Mobility in a Changing Europe: Lessons and Findings', in Buchan, J., Wismar, M., Glinos, I.A. and J. Bremner (eds.) *Health Professional Mobility in a Changing Europe: New Dynamics, Mobile Individuals and Diverse Responses* (Copenhagen: WHO Regional Office for Europe on behalf of the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies), pp. 17–32.

- Gündüz, Z.Y. (2013) 'The Feminization of Migration. Care and the New Emotional Imperialism', *Monthly Review*, 65, 7. Available online at: <http://monthlyreview.org/2013/12/01/the-feminization-of-migration/> (accessed: 7 April 2015).
- Humphries, N., R. Brugha and H. McGee (2012) 'Nurse Migration and Health Workforce Planning: Ireland as Illustrative of International Challenges', *Health Policy*, 107(1), 44–53.
- Joint Learning Initiative (2004) *Human Resources for Health: Overcoming the Crisis* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University). Available online at: http://www.who.int/hrh/documents/JLi_hrh_report.pdf (accessed: 8 April 2015).
- Jones, A.D., A. Bifulco and J. Gabe (2009) 'Caribbean Nurses Migrating to the UK: A Gender-focused Literature Review', *International Nursing Review*, 56(3), 285–290.
- Kofman, E. (2012) 'Gender and Skilled Migration in Europe', *Cuadernos de Relaciones Laborales*, 30(1), 63–89.
- Krajewski-Siuda, K. et al. (2012) 'Emigration Preferences and Plans Among Medical Students in Poland', *Human Resources for Health*, 10(8), 1–6.
- Maier, C., Buchan, J., Wismar, M., Ognyanova, D., Girasek, E., Kovacs, E. and R. Busse (2014) 'Monitoring Health Professional Mobility in Europe', in Buchan, J., Wismar, M., Glinos, I.A. and J. Bremner (eds.) *Health Professional Mobility in a Changing Europe, New Dynamics, Mobile Individuals and Diverse Responses* (Copenhagen: WHO Regional Office for Europe on behalf of the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies), pp. 95–127.
- Mejia, A. (1978) 'Migration of Physicians and Nurses: A World Wide Picture', *International Journal of Epidemiology*, 7(3), 207–215.
- Mejia, A., H. Pizurki and E. Royston (1979) *Physician and Nurse Migration: Analysis and Policy Implications* (Geneva: World Health Organization), xiii–476.
- Mladovsky, P., Srivastava, D., Cylus, J., Karanikolos, M., Evetovits, T., Thomson, S. and M. McKee (2012) 'Health Policy Responses to the Financial Crisis in Europe', *Policy Summary No 5* (Copenhagen: World Health Organization, on behalf of the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies).
- Niimi, Y., C. Ozden and M. Schiff (2008) 'Remittances and the Brain Drain: Skilled Migrants Do Remit Less', *IZA Discussion Paper No. 3393* (Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor).
- OECD (2010) *International Migration of Health Workers. Policy Brief* (Paris: OECD Publishing). Available online at: http://www.who.int/hrh/resources/oecd-who_policy_brief_en.pdf (accessed: 7 April 2015).
- OECD (2008) *The Looming Crisis in the Health Workforce: How Can OECD Countries Respond? OECD Health Policy Studies*. Available online at: <http://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/41509461.pdf> (accessed: 7 April 2015).
- Ognyanova, D., Plotnikova, E. and R. Busse (2014) 'Why do Health Professionals Leave Germany and What Attracts Foreigners? A Qualitative Study', in Buchan, J., Wismar, M., Glinos, I.A. and J. Bremner (eds.) *Health Professional Mobility in a Changing Europe: New Dynamics, Mobile Individuals and Diverse Responses* (Copenhagen: WHO Regional Office for Europe on behalf of the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies), pp. 203–232.
- Organización Panamericana de Salud (2013) *Migración Calificada en Salud, Impacto Financiero, Reconocimiento de Títulos: Retos y Perspectivas en los Países de la Región Andina* (Lima: OPAS). Available online at: http://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8493%3Amigracion-calificada-salud-impacto-financiero-reconocimiento-titulos-retos-perspectiva-los&catid=526%3Ahuman-resources-health&Itemid=2054&lang=pt

- Padilla, M. (coord.) (2012) *Panorama de la Migración de Médicos y Enfermeras de la Región Centroamericana y República Dominicana* (San Salvador: Pan American Health Organization). Available online at: http://www.observatoriorh.org/sites/default/files/webfiles/fulltext/2013/libro_migracion_ca/libro_migracion_ca.pdf (accessed: 7 April 2015).
- Policy (2014) 'Nurse Migration from the EU: What are the Key Challenges?' *King's College London*. Issue 42, March 2014. Available online at: <http://www.kcl.ac.uk/nursing/research/nrru/policy/By-Issue-Number/Policy--Issue-42.pdf> (accessed: 7 April 2015).
- Ribeiro, J.S., Conceição, C., Pereira, J., Leone, C., Mendonça, P., Temido, M., Pacheco Vieira, C. and G. Dussault (2014) 'Health Professionals Moving to... and from Portugal', *Health Policy*, 114(2–3), 97–108.
- Ruedin, H. and M. Widmer (2010) 'L'immigration du personnel de santé vers la Suisse', *Obsan Rapport*, 39 (Neuchâtel: Observatoire Suisse de la santé).
- Simoue, E. and E. Koutsogeorgou (2014) 'Effects of the Economic Crisis on Health and Healthcare in Greece in the Literature from 2009 to 2013: A Systematic Review', *Health Policy*, 115(2), 111–119.
- Terre des hommes Germany Help for Children in Distress (2013) *HW4all Case studies: Germany* (Berlin: terre des hommes Germany – Help for Children in Distress).
- Tjadens, F., J. Eckert and C. Weilandt (2013) *Mobility of Health Professionals: 'Health Systems, Work Conditions, Patterns of Health Workers' Mobility and Implications for Policy-Makers* (Berlin: Springer).
- Wismar, M., Maier, C.B., Glinos, I.A., Dussault, G. and J. Figueras (2011) *Health Professional Mobility and Health Systems: evidence from 17 European countries* (Copenhagen: European Observatory of Health Systems and Policies).
- World Health Organization (2006) *World Health Report 2006: Working Together for Health* (Geneva: WHO).
- World Health Organization (2000) *World Health Report 2000. Health Systems: Improving Performance* (Geneva: WHO).
- World Health Organization (1978) 'Alma-Ata 1978. Primary Health Care' in WHO-UNICEF, *International Conference on Primary Health Care*, Alma-Ata, USSR, 6–12 September 1978 (Geneva: WHO).
- Young, R., C. Humphrey and A.M. Rafferty (2014) 'Motivations and Experience of Health Professionals who Migrate to the United Kingdom from Other EU Member Countries', in J. Buchan et al. (eds.) *Health Professional Mobility in a Changing Europe: New Dynamics, Mobile Individuals and Diverse Responses* (Copenhagen: WHO Regional Office for Europe on behalf of the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies), pp. 177–202.
- Young, R., H. Weir and J. Buchan (2010) *Health Professional Mobility in Europe and the UK: A Scoping Study of Issues and Evidence* (London: National Institute for Health Research Service Delivery and Organisation Programme). Available online at: http://www.netscc.ac.uk/hsdr/files/project/SDO_FR_08-1619-134_V01.pdf (accessed: 8 April 2015).

6

Migration of Engineers and the Gender Dimension

Matthew Dixon

6.1 Introduction

Engineers are useful people – they make things work!¹

A recent comprehensive international survey of engineering by UNESCO confirms the massive contribution made by engineers to socio-economic development around the world:

The critical roles of engineering in addressing the large-scale pressing challenges facing our societies worldwide are widely recognized. Such large-scale challenges include access to affordable health care; tackling the coupled issues of energy, transportation and climate change; providing more equitable access to information for our populations; clean drinking water; natural and man-made disaster mitigation, environmental protection and natural resource management, among numerous others. As such, mobilizing the engineering community to become more effective in delivering real products and services of benefit to society, especially in the developing world, is a vitally important international responsibility.

But it also flags challenges:

Engineering as a human endeavour is also facing . . . challenges of its own, including attracting and retaining broader cross-sections of our youth, particularly women; strengthening the educational enterprise; forging more effective interdisciplinary alliances with the natural and social sciences and the arts; enhancing our focus on innovation, entrepreneurship and job creation, and promoting increased public awareness and support for the engineering enterprise.

(UNESCO 2010)

The purpose of the chapter is to introduce the fairly complex realities of the engineering workforce and factors influencing the international mobility of engineers and technicians offering their services in the labour market, and so to set the scene for the analysis of more specific empirical evidence on engineering migration presented by Gropas and Bartolini in the next chapter.

The chapter addresses this purpose with methods that combine presenting knowledge gained by direct experience as a practitioner within the relevant communities along with quantitative evidence based on data from key public surveys within Europe. The explanations of the workforce make-up and structure are based on observation over many years of working both within the engineering profession (handling links between the UK national regulatory body and the equivalent national authorities in a number of other key countries) and within UK skills policy for engineering. The analysis points to factors that are generally little understood but are of major importance in determining workforce activity and work opportunities for the individual.

In particular, the author has been engaged since 1995, directly and indirectly, in the development of a number of multilateral mutual recognition agreements on professional engineering qualifications, both within Europe and beyond. The analysis draws on this professional experience, the knowledge base of which has been written up in detail for the Migration Policy Institute (Dixon 2013). The barriers to international mobility arise from different approaches by the national regulatory authorities in different countries to the task of ensuring that engineering work is safely conducted. Some countries have responded to serious incidents with engineering artefacts and systems that have caused damage to things and people with comparatively light regulation of work, and others with much 'heavier' regulatory requirements. Mobility issues are greater when a practicing engineer or technician moves from a country with 'light touch' regulation to one with rather imposing requirements on engineering practice.

While female engineers and technicians undoubtedly experience many of the generic challenges of migration as women (and also as spouses and mothers) who are new to the country, the regulatory requirements for engineering work are generally gender blind. However, it is indeed the case that women represent a comparatively small fraction of those engaged in engineering work in most countries – the chapter provides data, from the European Union Labour Force Survey (EU LFS), on the development of the male–female split over recent years in EU member countries for those working in science and engineering professional and associate professional occupations.

Section 6.2 introduces the structure of the engineering workforce, explaining the different dimensions of importance (occupation, sector, engineering discipline and skill level) and pointing out the pitfalls of assuming that

qualification levels equate to skill levels. Section 6.3 considers engineers' mobility in the context of migration generally, while Section 6.4 addresses the reasons for occupational regulation in engineering work and differences of the scope of occupational regulation which are the root cause of barriers to mobility between jurisdictions. This section also examines attempts, first by governments, and then by engineers themselves, to overcome – or at least reduce – these barriers. The section concludes with an examination of the limitations of these approaches.

In the light of these realities of the workforce structure and barriers to mobility, Section 6.5 introduces the gender dimension, presenting the main evidence of the gender split in both relevant tertiary education (for OECD countries) and workforce numbers in relevant occupations. It then scrutinizes empirical evidence across the EU on career progression of female migrant engineers. This section examines variables from EU LFS datasets.

The chapter points out a certain number of important factors affecting the professional experience of individual engineering migrants who have migrated from key Southern European countries and concludes with a summary of the findings and some thoughts for future research.

6.2 Context of engineering work in the global world structure of the engineering workforce

Three quotes from the comprehensive UNESCO report are helpful for setting the scene for the migration of women engineers:

Engineering is one of the most diverse professions in terms of fields of engineering, types and levels of engineer, where and how they are employed as well as the status of engineers and engineering, and this diversity is reflected around the world. . . . Although engineering is both global and local, most engineers work in larger countries and economies where most engineering activity takes place in terms of the production of knowledge, patents and technology. Most technology is shaped in such societies, in accordance with perceived market and consumer needs and demands, and the associated support systems and infrastructure in engineering. This technology is then innovated and used around the world where such support systems and infrastructure may be weaker; technology transfer is a complex process. Very few countries have the engineering resources to design and manufacture jet engines for example, and few have the resources to maintain them.

Similar considerations apply to the latest automobile technology – cars require increasingly sophisticated diagnostic and maintenance tools and equipment, and the home or back-street adjustment of carburettors,

points and plugs of a generation ago, as with other modern 'non user serviceable' technologies, is no longer possible.

(Marjoram, T. 'Engineering similarities and diversities' in UNESCO 2010)

Change factors for the mobility of the Engineering workforce

Comparing two periods – even a period as close as the years 1990–95 and the present period 2005–2010 – new factors that have an impact on engineering education and international mobility can be identified:

- **globalization** is considered as a new dimension of economic activity: with the development of international markets for nearly everything (products, raw materials, resources, manpower, services, ideas) where companies and now universities are directly affected;
- **information and communication technologies** (the internet, electronic documents, new media, new networks) are penetrating many domains and changing habits, and education is of course immediately affected;
- **competence frameworks** are considered as a way to move beyond traditional definitions of jobs and skills, where the outcomes of an educational process are becoming more important.

(Michel, J: 'Mobility of engineers: the European experience' in UNESCO 2010)

For nearly three decades, governments and industries across the industrialized world have sponsored efforts to increase the representation of women in professional engineering, recognizing the (largely) untapped pool of talent amongst women. These efforts have had some impact, but engineering remains a heavily male-dominated occupation in most countries. There is clearly room for improvement – not only in recruiting women into engineering, but also in retaining and promoting those women who do enter the profession.

(Faulkner, W. in 'Women in Engineering: Gender dynamics and engineering – how to attract and retain women in engineering' in UNESCO 2010)

As indicated above, engineering work covers a wide range of activities, involving many different engineering occupations (operating at different skill levels) and working for a range of different employers, in different sectors. For example, some companies are engineering companies, some are not: the person who checks and maintains the engines on an aircraft will generally be working for an airline, not for the company which manufactured the engines. The work, the workplace and the relationship

with the employer might be very different between these different situations, as might the gender issues at work and the opportunities (and challenges) of moving between countries in such work.

It is therefore important, before considering migration and gender issues in engineering work, to consider the structure of this workforce. In national bodies representing the engineering workforce at all levels, there are, generally speaking, three major categories of 'professional': the 'theoretical' engineer, the 'applied' engineer (in some countries termed 'technologist') and the 'engineering technician'. While different terms are used in different countries, the recognition of these three categories of engineering professional seems fairly universal in developed economies. The three categories are generally thought of as being at different skill 'levels', though, since excessive attention to skill level can have pitfalls, it is generally better to think in terms of types of work.

So, as an example, the essence of work in these three categories is summarized – in ascending order of skill level – by the UK Engineering Council (2014) as follows:

- **Engineering Technicians** are concerned with applying proven techniques and procedures to the solution of practical engineering problems.
- **Incorporated Engineers**² maintain and manage applications of current and developing technology, and may undertake engineering design, development, manufacture, construction and operation. Incorporated Engineers are variously engaged in technical and commercial management and possess effective interpersonal skills.
- **Chartered Engineers**³ are characterized by their ability to develop appropriate solutions to engineering problems, using new or existing technologies, through innovation, creativity and change.

As well as these 'types' of engineering professionals, engineers and technicians work in a wide range of disciplines or branches of engineering, for example civil engineering, mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, chemical engineering, production engineering and so on. A more detailed and illustrative list of specialist engineering disciplines is given in UNESCO (2010).

It is important to recognize that, in addition to the professional categories within the engineering workforce, there are also very significant numbers of people working in engineering activity in other occupational categories, which are generally viewed as operating at a lower skills level. Such categories are generally termed engineering 'skilled trades' and engineering 'operatives'. While traditionally larger in number than those in the professional categories and still of importance to the engineering team, these categories tend both to move about internationally rather less and (generally) to experience fewer problems when they do.

Table 6.1 Structure of the engineering workforce

	Industry sector 1 Manufacturing	Industry sector 2 Construction	Industry sector 3 Transport
Occupation 1 Mechanical Engineers	n_{11}	n_{12}	n_{13}
Occupation 2 IT/Telecommunications Managers	n_{21}	n_{22}	n_{23}
Occupation 3 Civil Engineering Technicians	n_{31}	n_{32}	n_{33}
Occupation 4 Electricians (a 'Skilled Trade')	n_{41}	n_{42}	n_{43}

Note: Where n_{11} , n_{12} and so on would be the numbers employed in each occupation/sector combination (thus n_{11} would represent the numbers of mechanical engineers working in manufacturing, while n_{33} would be the employment level of civil engineering technicians within the transport sector).

Source: Author compiled.

There are two main dimensions of the structure of any workforce: sector and occupation. It is important for an adequate understanding of the engineering workforce to be clear about these two concepts as they do not overlap but rather are independent dimensions of a workforce, as shown in Table 6.1.

Engineering careers often involve movement across sectors and occupations, generally (a) between supplier and user sectors (e.g., between an aerospace manufacturer and an airline, or between a civil engineering contractor and a local authority), and (b) from lower skilled occupations to higher ones.

Professional engineering careers even start off with entry into a range of different sectors and occupations. The reality of the tertiary/higher education (HE) 'supply channel' into the engineering profession, at least in the UK, is that the flows of engineering graduates into the workforce are sometimes surprising. A 'linear pipeline' is often assumed – that chemical engineering graduates generally go on to start work in manufacturing chemical products, aeronautical engineering graduates start work in the aerospace sector and electrical engineering graduates tend to go into the production of electrical equipment. Recent analysis of the 'first destinations' of engineering graduates in the UK (Dixon 2015) confirms very great 'leakage', in particular away from the relevant manufacturing sector. Over the last ten years for which data are available, in all cases, fewer than half of the graduates from each engineering discipline who are in employment six months

after graduation are recruited by the corresponding manufacturing sector. In general, the fraction is less than a quarter, and for chemical engineering, electronic engineering, mechanical engineering and electrical engineering graduates, the fraction who find work within six months of graduation in the corresponding manufacturing sub-sector is less than 10%.

It is important to recognize that the level of educational qualification does not automatically or always correspond to the level of engineering skill. In any work, competence and, beyond that, excellence of performance depend on qualities well beyond the understanding of technical principles that is the focus, and essence, of academic learning. As a particularly practical area of endeavour, good engineering work depends especially on the practical skills that come with experience working with engineering products and systems and teams over an extended period. While sound theoretical knowledge of the broad principles of engineering and of the branch being worked in is important, and can support innovation and creativity, the reliable handling of complex and perhaps dangerous systems that comes from having acquired a familiarity through practical experience is fundamental. This means that HE qualifications in engineering, while valuable, are by no means the crucial element of ensuring competence in higher levels of engineering work, or indeed the 'sparks' and insights of innovative approaches.

6.3 Engineers' mobility: Trends and patterns

Labour migration beyond national boundaries has been in place for many centuries. There has been very considerable analysis – both economic and beyond – as to the relative benefits and disadvantages to a nation's economy and society of migrant labour, and a useful recent summary of such analysis and the wide range of considerations involved is provided by the UK Migration Advisory Committee in MAC (2012). There are many dimensions and complexities to migration, and the Committee chairman indicates in the foreword that 'it cannot be emphasised too strongly that there are no unambiguous answers to ... [three key] questions [of interest to the public debate on inward migration]' (MAC 2012, p. 1). Immigration is recognized as becoming one of the 'hottest' political issues in many countries, and sharp disagreements continue to exist around reports of both its benefits and its disadvantages. Possible displacement of resident workers is a widespread (if sometimes exaggerated) concern, and it inevitably influences – to some degree – groups representing particular occupations and/or professions within a country, irrespective of whether the group might have international dimensions. An element of 'protecting their own' can never be eliminated from the influences of national professional associations, even where their memberships include those from other countries.

The broader debate about international migration and possible policy measures to 'manage' it generally focuses on perceived barriers to mobility.

As international travel has grown – and become cheaper and easier – over recent decades, the international dimension of labour markets has naturally grown with it. Most national governments have developed policy approaches to admission of economic migrants, and in general such policies act to limit flows and so bring barriers to international mobility. On the other hand, a prevailing recognition that mobility of labour can bring considerable economic benefits has led governments, and particularly regional groupings of nations, to seek to reduce such barriers. Probably, the most significant example is the European Union (EU), within which there is generally freedom of movement between the member states for those seeking work. Migrant flows around the EU have been significant in recent decades, in particular following the accession to the Union in 2004 of the former ‘Eastern European’ countries. However, barriers to mobility exist beyond formal migrant admission policy constraints. There are a range of ‘non-formal barriers’ to movement between countries, including language problems and pension-transfer arrangements, for example. But the most significant barrier of relevance to the international movement of engineers and technicians is the degree to which work in a particular field (occupation/profession) is regulated. This is because occupational regulation of engineering activity creates barriers to mobility, and in particular, where the extent, and type, of regulation of engineering activity varies between countries, movement between these countries comes up against barriers. The causes of the barriers, together with approaches of different kinds to overcoming them, are examined in Section 6.4. International movement of engineers has grown steadily over recent decades, for a number of reasons:

- growth in international travel generally;
- growth in international trade;
- growth in economic migration and global mobility, enabling cost reductions for employers.

While the focus of this chapter is particularly on barriers arising from differences between countries in the regulation of engineering activity, the migration of engineers is also, of course, affected by the inward migration policies of destination countries, which are considered elsewhere in this book.

6.4 Problems/Barriers for mobility and their solution

6.4.1 Ensuring the safety of engineering products and services

The new artefacts that engineers create are intended to benefit people in many different ways. However, sometimes such creations can operate in ways that cause risks to people, whether as a result of poor design or construction, inadequate care in operation or unexpected behaviour of some

kind, and sometimes in response to extreme environmental conditions. Other artefacts, such as those involving high-voltage electrical supplies and devices and processes involving hazardous chemicals or flammable or explosive substances, contain inherently dangerous elements. It is thus not surprising that an important element of the work of engineers involves the need to ensure the safety of the 'users' of the artefacts and technologies, and of the public in general.

While in principle the public interest would seek confidence that all engineering activities would be carried out safely, certain tasks involve considerably greater elements of risk to users and to the public than others. For example, in building services engineering, the reliable installation and commissioning of gas-fired appliances would generally be accepted as involving more potentially life- or health-threatening risk than the plumbing of cold water systems. In marine engineering, the ensuring of a stable and watertight hull to a ship would be viewed as more important from a safety point of view than the installation of a public address system on the vessel, though the latter is potentially crucial in an emergency situation. And electrical systems involving high voltage are accepted as being potentially dangerous to humans, so that a range of protective measures must be taken in work on such systems.

It is therefore natural that authorities responsible for the safety of potential users of engineered products and systems – as well as of the public as a whole – focus on certain particular engineering tasks and activities to ensure – through regulation of some kind – that these tasks are safely and reliably carried out. However, the threshold between regulated and unregulated activities, and the mode of regulation, can vary considerably between countries (jurisdictions) and will be determined in different countries by a number of factors such as

- public attitudes arising from specific serious incidents (a government in a country which has suffered from a major accident in a particular field such as a rail or marine transport disaster could be forgiven for introducing 'stronger' regulation than one that hasn't);
- cultural attitudes to risk arising perhaps from the nature of the society (former communist societies were used to more regulated governance generally than those with market economies);
- the way in which damage liability and insurance are handled in national legal systems (in some cases the company operating systems and services is responsible in law for accidents, while in others liability can be pinned on to individual designers or operators).

While governments are often the arbiters of regulation (as the place where 'the buck stops'), some assessment of risk, and specification of the measures required to reduce risk to reasonable levels for society, can only come from those with a deep technical understanding of the products and systems involved. This has led the engineering profession, like all serious professions,

to take its responsibilities to society seriously enough to develop and refine its own view about the requirements for the competence and commitment of individual professionals where their work involves safety-critical activities.

6.4.2 The breadth and depth of professional competence

The range of engineering disciplines (the European Engineers' Federation (FEANI) focuses on 15 disciplines,⁴ and 28 are listed in UNESCO 2010) is such that no single individual professional engineer can be expected to have competence (or even significant knowledge) in all these areas. However, such is the breadth of engineering activity that even within a particular engineering discipline (e.g., civil engineering or marine engineering) there are a number of distinct broad technical areas of work specialization. Most individual engineers would generally spend the whole of their careers within one (or at most two or three) of these 'broad work areas'. The tasks/activities with the greatest risk to society generally constitute only a small part of one of these areas. (Table 6.2 shows examples of such high-risk (or 'safety critical') tasks/activities for civil engineering, mechanical engineering, electrical/electronic engineering, marine engineering and building services engineering.)⁵ In addition, the high-risk engineering activity would generally be handled directly by a particular category of engineering occupation – typically, the design element by professional engineers and implementation and maintenance aspects by engineering technicians or even skilled engineering trades-people.

These realities raise fundamental questions about how safety-critical tasks should be regulated. The issue is how 'precise' the regulation is. Different national authorities have chosen to set the regulated context more or less narrowly, and these differences become fundamental for international mobility of the engineers and technicians involved.

For the civil engineering discipline, for example, a civil engineer could spend his/her whole career in building construction, without having to know about the earth and water-related issues of dam design.

As can be seen from Table 6.2, the safety-critical areas of engineering, while extremely important, represent overall a comparatively small part of the domains of work in the different branches of engineering.

It is, in principle, possible to regulate

- (just) the very specific safety-critical activities (e.g., dam design);
- the broad work specialization area within the discipline (e.g., water resources);
- the engineering disciplines that include each such activity (such as civil engineering);
- practice as professional engineers or technicians in all disciplines (all engineers); and/or
- perhaps some combinations between these aforementioned areas.

Table 6.2 Broad work areas within some engineering 'disciplines' (showing some safety-critical/regulated specific activities)

Civil Engineering

	Construction Engineering	Earthquake Engineering	Environmental Engineering	Geophysics	Geotechnical Engineering	Water Resources	Structural Engineering	Transport Engineering	Surveying	... (other)	... (other)
Professional Engineer (theoretical)	Sign-off on new structure safety in E. areas					Dam/reservoir design	Tall building/bridge design sign-off				
Professional Engineer (applied)/Technologist						Reservoir inspection		Rail signalling			
Professional Engineering Technician								Rail signalling			
'Skilled Trades'											

Mechanical Engineering

	Fluids	Product Design	Hydraulics & Pneumatics	Manufacturing Engineering	Combustion, engines, fuels	Strength of Materials	Computer Aided Design/CAM	Energy conversion	Mechanics/Control	... (other)	... (other)
Professional Engineer (theoretical)		Gaining regulatory approval for aircraft safety			Pressure Vessel design						
Professional Engineer (applied)/Technologist		Compliance with regulatory requirements			Pressure Vessel design/manufacture						

Table 6.2 (Continued)

	Ship Design, Construction	Marine Safety	Defence/ Naval	Ports & Harbours	Offshore operations	Underwater operations	Marine Leisure	Systems & Equip-ment	Fishing technology	... (other)	... (other)
Professional Engineer (applied)/ Engineering Technologist		<i>Duties of Engineering Officers on board</i>									
Professional Engineering Technician											
'Skilled Trades'											
Building Services Engineering											
Professional Engineer (theoretical)	Energy supply to buildings	Escalators & Lifts	Fire detection & protection	Heating, Ventilating, Air Cond'ng	Security & Alarm systems	Water, drainage & Plumbing	Artificial Lighting/ facades	Cabling/ICT systems/ networks	Refrigeration systems	... (other)	... (other)
Professional Engineer (applied)/ Engineering Technologist	gas equipment installation/ checking										
Professional Engineering Technician				Wiring regulations							
'Skilled Trades'	gas equipment installation/ checking			Wiring regulations					Wiring regulations		

Source: Author's own compilation.

Regulation of engineers and technicians in different countries varies – that is, the broader the regulated area of work, the greater the barriers to entry; in some cases, broader regulation may not be necessary and/or appropriate.

A study by the European Federation of National Engineering Associations⁶ (FEANI 2005) of approaches to regulation in engineering within Europe tentatively classified national approaches into four categories:

National engineering professions

- (a) which were not regulated;
- (b) where only the professional title was protected (without any associated ‘reserved tasks’);
- (c) which are partially regulated in that the professional title was protected, with ‘tasks reserved’ in a limited number of areas; and
- (d) those that were totally regulated, with tasks reserved in all areas (protected title and ‘full licensure’).

It is important to note that all four types of regulation exist within Europe.

An analysis of different types of occupational regulation more generally across the economy was carried out in 2011 by the London-based National Institute for Economic and Social Research for the UK Commission for Employment and Skills (UKCES 2011). The institute considered different types of regulation and examined the theoretical impacts of regulation on occupational labour markets, drawing, *inter alia*, on evidence from other countries, including the US and Canada. The review of the economic principles involved in regulation is particularly interesting, as these often get sidelined in a focus on the nitty-gritty of detailed discussion of regulation specifics.

6.4.3 Potential economic drawbacks of occupational regulation and inter-governmental efforts to reduce barriers to international mobility

While regulation of activity in response to accepted engineering risk is very natural, regulation of activity can have an economic downside. In principle, regulation, while introduced for laudable reasons, can *inter alia*

- restrict the supply of labour to a profession and so, in principle, keep remuneration at higher levels than might be necessary, and
- provide a pretext for restrictive practices, including unnecessary barriers to entry to an occupation or profession, in order to ‘protect’ the livelihoods of ‘those already in the club’.

In general, the greater the mobility within a labour market, the more efficiently economies can perform. The question, of course, is the geographical scope of the labour market: as with many aspects of society and the

economy, people's natural starting point tends to be the nation state (or at least the 'current relevant jurisdiction' – like States in the US), while those with broader policy horizons argue for reduced barriers for 'regional groupings' (European Union, North American Free Trade Agreement – NAFTA), and ultimately for 'level playing fields' in global labour markets, in order to capture the economic benefits of greater international trade. It is no coincidence that current arguments for action at the European level to try to stimulate growth include pressure to reduce barriers to mobility, and this played a role in the finalization of the recent Review of the European Directive on Mutual Recognition of Professional Qualifications (MRPQ)⁷ (2005/36/EC) and its implementation.

For example, the UK response to the formal European Commission consultation on the review of the Directive (DBIS 2011) starts as follows:

With the European Union in the midst of the worst economic crisis for over a generation, reforms are needed that cost little, while also having the greatest positive effect on growth and job creation. Recent evidence suggests that there is significant untapped potential in EU services, both in terms of productivity and employment. Reforms that improved the single market in services could have a significant impact on growth within the EU.

Reforming the process for mutual recognition of professional qualifications in the EU is a key achievable priority in improving the single market in services, and creating growth.

Experience over a number of years with the MRPQ Directive⁸ is of particular value in considering issues of engineering skills and credentials, since the countries of the EU exhibit a remarkable richness of diversity, which provides the starting point for considerations of 'mutual equivalence' in engineering practice, skills and qualifications.

To begin with, there is a range of 'degree of regulation' of engineering practice within the different national economies. A FEANI study in 2005 showed that, at that time, of the 31 European countries surveyed, five had no regulation of engineering practice, 14 countries operated only some activities in one or more engineering disciplines, eight nations had protection of professional title (with seven of these regulating some activities in one or more disciplines) and four countries regulated all modes of practice in most engineering disciplines. For whatever reason, a clear geographical pattern emerged: such regulation was less in the more Northern countries, more in the more Southern countries.

The major differences that exist in the degree of regulation produce asymmetrical situations when, for example, an engineer from (and trained in) a Southern European country wants to go and work in a Northern European

country, as compared to the inverse situation. In very broad terms, the engineer ‘moving North’ would be expected to encounter little if any barriers to being able to practice, while one ‘moving South’ might well not be able to earn his/her living for a while. Such realities have resulted in cases where the European Commission has proceeded against governments and the ‘Competent Authorities’ (specified in the Directive) in (generally) Southern European countries for non-compliance with the Directive, and – in some cases – to significant fines being applied.

Another major element of the diversity within Europe relates to the scope of the technical professional activity. Different traditions in the development of practice have led to a number of cases where ‘adjacent’ professions (both within engineering and beyond) carry out different elements of related work. An example here might be the split of legal responsibilities between architects and civil or structural engineers in different countries: in some cases, formal ‘sign-off’ on safety-critical elements of a new building might lie with the architect, in some it might lie with the engineer. Such different ‘competence coverages’ have led to arrangements that have sometimes presented real barriers for individual engineers. A much-cited example mentioned in the UK government’s concerns about the implementation of the MRPQ Directive related to Aeronautical Engineering is as follows:

A UK aeronautical engineer working on jet engines in another (EU) Member State was required to have training in building runways in order to be registered, so he could sign off his repairs. The UK Competent Authority intervened on his behalf, and the Member State allowed him to register on the condition that he did not work on runways.

(DBIS 2011)

The challenge for each ‘host’ national authority (in some cases government departments, in others the ‘Competent [non-governmental] Authorities’) is to establish whether the engineer or technician’s professional formation is adequate to allow him/her to practice safely in the host (‘receiving’) country straight away, or whether there is any additional competence or expertise that the person needs to acquire before s/he can ‘be allowed to’ start work. In principle, this is a balance-striking judgement that is influenced whereby the regulation arrangements in the desired host EU member state, the need to protect public safety and (in some cases) to ‘reasonably protect’⁹ the resident labour market are traded off against employers’ needs for skilled labour where it might not be available domestically, and the desire to conform with both the Directive and broader economic principles.

The basis of these judgements is naturally around a series of bilateral comparisons of relevant ‘credentials’, largely involving the details of the education and initial training arrangements for engineering staff in the

two countries. While there are a wide range of training approaches (often designed by individual employers) so that comparisons must generally be made on a one-to-one basis, the formal tertiary education systems, and in particular the engineering degrees, of different countries naturally form the core focus of the assessment. It is not surprising that education systems, reflecting a major element of a country's culture, are richly diverse within Europe, with particular differences between the 'Anglo-Saxon' HE traditions and those of continental universities. In short, continental university degrees have traditionally been longer, by one or more years, than those in the UK and Ireland, and – since duration of tertiary education courses is often used as a proxy for 'level' or 'quality' – this difference has posed real challenges in considering degree equivalence.¹⁰

There has therefore been considerable experience within Europe of 'legal frameworks' within which the 'initial formation' of professionals in different member states can be compared, and where there are any significant differences between those of the 'host' country and country of 'origin' of the 'applicant', what measures are required to overcome any shortfall.

6.4.4 Engineers' own solutions to perceived barriers to mobility

Links between national engineering bodies that have developed over the years appear to operate more efficiently than links between national bodies in some other professions. This is perhaps because engineers are often asked to work abroad and/or because they are used to working in collaborative transnational teams in order to solve practical problems. For whatever reasons, there are two significant international groupings of national engineering bodies that have worked for several decades on the challenge of comparing the 'professional formation' processes and standards and then of addressing the barriers to mobility that engineers face.

Europe: The *Fédération Européenne d'Associations Nationales d'Ingenieurs* (FEANI) was founded in 1951. Today associations from 32 European countries are represented in FEANI (bringing together more than 350 national-level engineering bodies of different kinds), all of which are recognized in their countries as the representatives of the engineering profession at the national level. Through these national associations, FEANI represents the interests of some 3.5 million professional engineers in Europe.

Because FEANI was convinced that the engineering profession in Europe could not be strengthened without mutual recognition of the professional qualifications provided by the numerous and diversified national systems of tertiary education, the European Federation has worked to set up structures to facilitate such recognition. Two main 'registers' have been established to progress this goal: the FEANI Index (which lists the engineering degrees that are recognized in each country by the National Member association) and the European Engineer ('EUR ING') Register, whereby all professional engineers who have submitted their access-to-practice credentials via their National

Monitoring Committees (NMCs) and whose credentials are approved by the FEANI European Monitoring Committee (EMC) are registered with the EUR ING title, which they may then use in their work.

In addition, FEANI has been active in the establishment of the European Network for Accreditation of Engineering Education (ENAE), which with FEANI's support maintains a database of bachelor's- and master's-level courses in ENAE member countries that have been formally accredited by the relevant national Degree Accrediting authority. The database contains engineering degree programmes at Bologna (EHEA) 'First Cycle' (Bachelor) and 'Second Cycle' (Master) which have been accredited by Degree-Quality Assurance agencies in the European HE area. These agencies have applied agreed accreditation criteria and procedures in line with the EUR-ACE Framework Standards and the ENAE Standards and Guidelines for Accreditation Agencies. Thus they have been authorized by the European Network to award the EUR-ACE label to these programmes.¹¹

FEANI continues to work on arrangements to help mutual understanding of national tertiary education arrangements and support mobility of engineers between member association countries. The key point to recognize is that FEANI has focused on working to strengthen mutual recognition both on

- national engineering tertiary education arrangements (and so of national engineering qualifications – in particular engineering degrees); and
- national requirements for access-to-practice as professional engineers

While a good engineering degree is a key requirement to be able to practice as a professional engineer, its role in relation to full access-to-practice varies significantly between different European countries. In particular, in some countries, the degree is the (only) credential required for practice; in others, it only represents the first step, with such things as structured training and validated experience required in addition. This difference introduces a significant asymmetry to comparisons of engineering 'formation' and produced the need, when the requirements for access to the FEANI 'European Engineer' (EUR ING) title were negotiated, for a flexible model, with a compromise formula, to cater for the different national 'professional formations'.

Beyond Europe: The same 'two-tier' structure for mutual recognition – at the stage of completing the Engineering degree programme and at the stage of access-to-practice – has been addressed by the national engineering bodies working together in the International Engineering Alliance (IEA).¹² The Alliance, now involving the national accrediting or regulating bodies of some 19 countries in the six multilateral agreements it administers, grew from the 'Washington Accord', which was signed in 1989 by the engineers' bodies of six English-speaking countries with common educational origins.

The Accord is an international agreement among bodies responsible for accrediting engineering degree programmes. It recognizes the substantial equivalence of programmes accredited by those bodies and recommends that graduates of programmes accredited by any of the signatory bodies be recognized by the other bodies as having met the academic requirements for entry to the practice of engineering.

There are now six agreements administered by the IEA – three relating to the tertiary education ‘base’ of the professional engineer/technician and three to standards required for national ‘access-to-practice’.

6.4.5 Agreements covering tertiary academic qualifications in engineering

There are three agreements covering mutual recognition of HE qualifications in engineering:

- *The Washington Accord* signed in 1989 was the first; it recognizes substantial equivalence in the accreditation of qualifications in professional engineering, normally of four years duration.
- *The Sydney Accord* commenced in 2001 and recognizes substantial equivalence in the accreditation of qualifications in engineering technology, normally of three years duration.
- *The Dublin Accord* is an agreement for substantial equivalence in the accreditation of tertiary qualifications in technician engineering, normally of two years duration. It commenced in 2002.

6.4.6 Agreements covering competence standards for practicing engineers

The other three agreements cover recognition of equivalence at the practicing engineer level; it is individuals, not courses or qualifications, that are seen to meet the benchmark standard. The objective of these agreements is that a person recognized in one country as reaching the agreed international standard of competence should only be minimally assessed (primarily for local knowledge) prior to obtaining registration in another country that is party to the agreement.

- The oldest such agreement covers the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Region: the ‘APEC Engineer’ agreement which was established in 1999. This has government support in the participating APEC economies. The representative organization in each economy creates a ‘register’ of those engineers wishing to be recognized as meeting the generic international standard.
- The Engineers Mobility Forum (EMF) agreement commenced in 2001. It operates the same competence standard as the APEC Engineer agreement but engineering bodies of any country/economy may join. EMF members

have the authority to admit to the national section of the register of International Professional Engineers (IntPE).

- The Engineering Technologist Mobility Forum (ETMF) agreement was signed by engineering representatives of participating economies/countries in 2003. ETMF members have the authority to admit candidates to the national section of the register of International Engineering Technologists (IntET).

The focus of mutual recognition aspirations in these multilateral agreements is on the concept of substantial equivalence. This recognizes not only that there are detailed differences between both tertiary education systems and practice requirements but also that in most cases such differences would neither make significant limitations to the capabilities of the individuals who have passed through them nor would they after say five years of practical experience in engineering work be detectable when those involved are part of international engineering teams (which many are, particularly when working for large multinational engineering companies).

6.4.7 Engineers' own solutions to perceived barriers to mobility – some issues

So engineers themselves, desirous of seeking solutions to mobility problems before others (in particular governments) force *their* solutions on the engineering community, have explored the challenges and come up with a number of approaches to the issue of mutual recognition of engineering qualifications. To what extent can such an approach be effective? This is a key question that engineers would seek to understand.

The first point to make is that cooperation in the groupings in Europe and beyond has proved valuable and interesting for the bodies themselves. The processes involved in the multilateral groupings include a range of 'peer review' elements that provide those influential in national engineering activity both new insights into how things can be done differently and a growing body of evidence about differences between national systems that a) help clarify understanding on both perceived strengths and weaknesses of other systems and b) can result in adjustments in national systems that lead, incrementally, to greater convergence of approaches.

Since the national engineering bodies involved do not in all cases directly control all aspects of regulation of practice, it is understandable that there are certain limitations to the direct benefits of the various arrangements that have been established. It is not yet the case that engineers and technicians from any one country involved with FEANI or the International Engineering Alliance can be guaranteed, by virtue of these arrangements, to move from one member's country to another and immediately start to practice just as they did in their country of origin. Indeed, it must be accepted that constraints on the members' abilities to 'deliver' on removing all barriers to mobility have limited the value to the individual of these agreements. It is

because the European Engineer title 'EUR ING' is not directly recognized by authorities in all the different FEANI national member countries that the Federation continues to work on different approaches to reducing barriers. And while the IEA's aspirations in developing the 'access-to-practice' agreements mirrored FEANI's original barrier-reducing aspirations for EUR ING, the Alliance has, in reviewing the EMF/ETMF approach, decided that the most valuable contribution of such agreements is likely to be as international standard benchmarks, rather than measures that in all cases reduce barriers.

Does this mean that engineers' own efforts have failed? The answer to this question lies with the challenge of building mutual confidence between authorities in different countries. It is worth reflecting that the bodies engaged in these multilateral relationships are essentially all regulatory authorities, whose broad objectives, culture and natural instincts are those of 'gatekeepers' – institutions responsible for upholding standards and who, rightly, are good within their national jurisdictions at saying 'no' to things that don't achieve agreed standards.

It is therefore inevitable that progress towards full confidence in the arrangements of others, and ultimately full mutual recognition, will be particularly slow. But there is a risk. The risk is that in national bodies' desire to cooperate constructively with partners from other countries, and with the need to succeed in establishing structures and systems, some of the more complex and subtle challenges of mutual equivalence can be brushed over, leaving arrangements that hold the seeds for later problems that can result in confidence being lost. This again emphasizes the importance and value of the mutual learning process, and perhaps the acceptance that structures might be more effective, if arising from an extended and particularly cautious familiarization process.

Certainly, experience so far with the flows of engineers and technicians between countries who have made use of (or benefited from) such multilateral agreements suggests that considerably more use has been made of the 'tertiary education' agreements than the 'access-to-practice' agreements.

While it is natural for the leaders of the engineering profession to aspire to a world in which barriers to mobility would be removed, until they are there are inevitably ways round the problems that such barriers pose. The most obvious one is the use – perhaps on the basis of very short consultancy assignments – of professional engineers from the 'host' nation's labour market to carry out the formalities required to comply with the prevailing regulation. So, an engineering company might employ engineers and technicians recruited from abroad to perform all tasks up to the formal sign-off (e.g., to certify the safety of large structures) and then 'buy a day or two' of the time of a 'local' structural engineer for the sign-off itself.

This then leads to a broader question: How much value do employers place, when recruiting, on qualifications of any kind, and in particular on qualifications awarded in other countries?

Most evidence from the recruiting process suggests that qualifications do not weigh particularly heavily in the criteria on which new recruits are selected (Keep and James 2010). This is true within national labour markets, and almost certainly even more true in international labour markets, since the reasons are partly related to a lack of adequate understanding (and often even clarity) about what precisely possession of a title or qualification tells a recruiting employer about what the person can actually do. Experience around efforts to clarify qualification equivalence between countries – not least over recent years within the EU in relation to the emerging European Qualifications Framework – raises real questions about confidence both in level equivalence and in the meaning of such equivalence and its value to employers (Dixon 2010).

The numbers involved in the various arrangements (i.e., numbers of EUR ING^s and IntPE^s awarded) remain comparatively small. However, without data on international flows of engineers who benefit from these arrangements – and indeed given the limited available data on international flows of any kind – it is difficult to know what fraction of those flows is affected by the mutual recognition arrangements into which very considerable effort has been invested. Overall, the conclusion is that, as indicated, such activity must – over time – lead to greater mutual understanding and ultimately convergence and must therefore be considered beneficial, notwithstanding the probably limited direct benefits that arise at present.

6.5 The gender aspect of engineering mobility: Tendencies, problems and solutions

6.5.1 Women in engineering higher education and engineering work in Europe

The complexities of the world of engineering regulation in different countries and the various approaches to overcoming the barriers to international mobility caused by differences in this regulation between countries appear to include little, if anything, by way of gender distinctions. Clearly, some disciplines of engineering, and some sectors, will have a) more experience with women, b) higher ‘female fractions’ in the workforces and/or workplaces and c) perhaps as a result more ‘women-friendly’ or more ‘women-aware’ cultures than other disciplines and sectors. However, there appear to be little if any gender-specific issues in relation to regulatory requirements. In principle, this is encouraging from a gender perspective, since presumably the standards required of the people carrying out this important, and in some cases potentially dangerous, work should be neither more nor less demanding – or difficult – for women than for men, and those who monitor and assess the professional competence of such people should indeed be ‘gender blind’.

This does not, however, mean that there are no gender issues in relation to the international mobility of engineers and technicians, and this section

attempts to explore some of the areas where women might get viewed, and perhaps treated, differently.

The first and most obvious gender issue relating to engineering and engineers is that considerably fewer women than men are active and involved in this work. There are, as with the above analysis, two stages in an engineering career in which the 'gender split' must be considered:

- (1) at the stage of the education base of the profession, and in particular in numbers involved in engineering higher education, and
- (2) following completion of the engineering education, at the stage when engineers and technicians have joined the workforce.

As is comparatively well known, the number of women taking HE courses and working as engineers and technicians is generally considerably less than the number of men.

As far as those taking and successfully completing university and other tertiary education courses in engineering are concerned, the average across the EU appears to be about three times as many men as women. In terms of those completing HE courses in Engineering, Manufacturing and Construction, Eurostat figures confirm that the fraction of women is around a quarter to a third of the total.

However, there are considerable variations in the 'female fraction' between countries, and some significant changes to the fraction over recent years. Figures from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are shown in Table 6.4.

However, as flagged in Section 6.2, education levels do not automatically translate into skill levels in the workplace, and the gender split within the workforce is crucial for any consideration of labour market experience. Against the tertiary qualification percentages, Table 6.4 shows the percentages of the national workforces in Science and Engineering Professional occupations (allocated to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) category 210) that are female for the EU countries that are in the OECD. Since those working in science occupations are included,

Table 6.3 Graduates from tertiary education, by field of education and sex, EU-28, 2011

	Male	Female
Engineering, manufacturing & construction	467,000	168,000
Total female participation		26.5%

Source: Eurostat online database. See: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/education-and-training/data/database> (accessed 7 May 2015).

Table 6.4 Female percentages of engineering tertiary-education outcomes and in relevant workforce occupations, by country

Country	% women achieving Higher Education qualifications in Engineering, manufacturing & construction		% change (2000 -> 2011)	Female percentage of employed Science and Engineering Professionals (ISCO 210) in EU National Workforces
Year	2000	2011		2011
Australia	21.5	24.6	14.6	–
Austria	18.0	25.0	38.9	26.3
Belgium	21.1	25.7	22.2	26.6
Canada	22.7	23.1	1.6	–
Czech Republic	27.2	26.6	–2.4	19.3
Denmark	25.8	32.4	25.7	29.9
Finland	18.6	22.4	20.1	26.1
France	23.8	30.4	27.6	22.6
Germany	19.6	22.1	13.0	22.2
Hungary	20.5	23.2	12.8	21.4
Iceland	24.5	40.3	64.3	–
Ireland	23.6	20.7	–12.7	29.1
Italy		33.0		28.2
Japan	8.9	11.2	26.4	–
Korea	23.3	23.8	2.4	–
Mexico	22.2	28.9	30.1	–
Netherlands	12.5	20.1	60.5	21.8
New Zealand	32.8	31.1	–5.1	–
Norway	26.6	26.5	–0.5	–
Poland	24.3	33.9	39.3	26.0
Portugal	34.5	31.2	–9.7	31.3
Slovak Republic	29.8	30.5	2.2	21.5
Spain	27.0	32.1	18.7	24.9
Sweden	24.8	30.4	22.2	33.7
Switzerland	11.2	19.8	77.4	–
Turkey	24.2	29.8	23.2	–
United Kingdom	19.6	22.6	14.9	16.7
United States	21.2	21.8	2.8	–
Israel	23.7	27.3	15.5	–
Average (OECD):	22.6	26.6	Average (EU):	23.6
Brazil		30.2		–
Chile		26.2		–
Estonia		35.1		–
Russian Federation		30.2		–
Slovenia		33.9		–
South Africa		27.7		–

Source: For Tertiary Education figures: OECD Education Statistics Database: See <http://stats.oecd.org/viewhtml.aspx?datasetcode=RGRADSTY&lang=en#>; for EU occupational employment: EU Labour Force Survey: Tailored retrieval (Eurostat).

direct comparison is not possible, but it is likely that numbers employed in engineering occupations would be significantly greater than those working in science.

While the education base of people working in these occupations would vary, the majority would have completed higher education, so the comparison in Table 6.4 of the 2011 fractions between HE and working employment would – recognizing that most of those in employment would have completed their full-time education in earlier years, when HE characteristics may have been different – show movement of such graduates out of the expected type of work following completion of university. Where the percentages in employment are notably lower than those in HE, this might suggest decisions of graduating women not to follow their course of study into the workplace. This is the case for France, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic (shown in bold), and to a lesser extent Spain and the UK. However, it should be noted that the female fraction in 2011 is greater in some countries and the OECD Average has increased by over 17% since 2000.

Figures 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 show how the female fractions of those working in Science and Engineering Professional¹³ occupations have developed over




Figure 6.1 Percentage of women in science and engineering professional occupations (ISCO 210) in EU member states, 1 – highest ‘Female Fraction’

Source: Eurostat, EU LFS, ISCO version changed in 2011.




Figure 6.2 Percentage of women in science and engineering professional occupations (ISCO 210) in EU member states, 2 – intermediate 'Female Fraction'

Source: Eurostat, EU LFS, ISCO version changed in 2011.

the most recent eight years for which data are available from the EU LFS. The time series developments of the 28 countries (plus the EU average) are split into three charts for readability:

- (1) countries with the highest (most recent) fraction of women S&E professionals;
- (2) countries with intermediate 'female fractions' of this workforce; and
- (3) countries with the lowest (most recent) female fractions.

The above figures show a range of variations between countries in terms of the development over time of the female fraction of the Science and Engineering Professional Workforce classified in ISCO category 210.

Some notable examples are as follows:

- steady growth in the fraction of women in France working in these occupations – more or less doubling over the eight years;
- similar growth in Portugal, although this stalled after 2012;

- a fall in 2009 and then a steady growth of the ‘female fraction’ in this workforce in Latvia;
- the UK, while the EU country with the lowest fraction of women in these occupations, showed clear growth over recent years, nearly doubling since the 2008 ‘credit crunch’;
- considerable volatility in Estonia, probably associated with relatively low numbers; and
- overall, consistent increases between 2010 and 2011 (almost certainly arising from the measurement change from the introduction of ISCO 2010), followed by falls in a number of countries.




Figure 6.3 Percentage of women in science and engineering professional occupations (ISCO 210) in EU member states, 3 – lowest ‘Female Fraction’
 Source: Eurostat, EU LFS, ISCO version changed in 2011.

It is also important to examine the corresponding development of the female part of the workforce for technicians. These roles are captured in ISCO category 310 – science and engineering associate professionals. These are shown in the following pages – the percentages between 2005 and 2013 in the 28 EU member countries are again shown on three separate charts (Figures 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6).




Figure 6.4 Percentage of women in science and engineering associate professional occupations (ISCO 310) in EU member states, 1 – highest ‘Female Fraction’

Source: Eurostat, EU LFS, ISCO version changed in 2011.

In general, the ‘female fractions’ of EU-national workforces working in science and engineering associate professional (mainly technician) roles lie below those in science and engineering professional roles, and the broad trend in most countries is a reduction in these percentages, while a number of the female percentages are growing in the professional roles.

One interpretation of this comparison might be encouraging for women, in that their presence is broadly growing in the (higher skilled) professional roles and falling in the lower skill level technician roles. However, in principle the ‘female fractions’ do not appear in either group of occupations to be showing significant or steady growth, and this suggests, overall, a significant loss of potential talent to engineering work. It is worth noting that the comparatively low numbers of women taking Engineering Higher Education courses and working in Engineering occupations appear generally to arise from comparatively low interest in this study and work, rather than any significant discrimination. Serious initiatives to try to raise these percentages in a number of countries over a number of years have had very limited effect, and the leaders of the profession continue to seek ways of




Figure 6.5 Percentage of women in science and engineering associate professional occupations (ISCO 310) in EU member states, 2 – intermediate ‘Female Fraction’
 Source: Eurostat, EU LFS, ISCO version changed in 2011.

making engineering more attractive to girls and women in order to ‘harness’ more of the considerable amount of talent that is currently not contributing to engineering.

6.5.2 Assessing the ‘fortunes’ of migrant female engineers from public survey data

The EU LFS tracks, in the countries which participate through Eurostat, the employment status of respondents (inter alia by occupation). Thus it is possible in principle to examine ratios, for both men and women, of those in the two occupational categories studied above, between those unemployed and those employed, as well as ratios of those (economically) ‘inactive’ and those in employment. In theory it would also be possible to distinguish, for these ratios, between those born in the country and those who were not.

Scrutiny of initial datasets retrieved from the EU LFS for this analysis found, for five countries that are assumed to be popular destinations of intra-EU migrants over recent years: that sample size limitations prevented results from being of sufficient statistical significance to enable robust conclusions (or indeed to allow publication). This is not a great surprise, since




Figure 6.6 Percentage of women in science and engineering associate professional occupations (ISCO 310) in EU member states, 3 – lowest 'Female Fraction'

Source: Eurostat, EU LFS, ISCO version changed in 2011.

the number of cross-tabulations necessary to elicit such ratios inevitably 'tests' the survey sample size very substantially. With a rather larger sample size for the EU LFS, it might be possible, for example, to compare for the two occupational categories in various countries the following ratios between genders. For those born in the (EU member state) country,

- numbers of science and engineering professionals unemployed compared to numbers of employed S&E professionals;
- numbers of science and engineering professionals 'economically inactive' compared to numbers of employed S&E professionals; and the same ratios for those not born in the country; as well, in principle, for those not born in the country who have been resident for less than a certain number of years (since there are questions on this in the national LFS that contribute to the overall EU LFS).

Such ratios (if statistically reliable) would provide useful indicators of the gender dimension of the 'work fortunes' of both the indigenous populations and of recent migrants, which could inform assessment of the

relative challenges of male and female professional scientists and engineers following migration.

The datasets initially received suggest that the increase in EU LFS sample sizes in the countries of interest would need to be substantial to achieve this, and in a world of widespread and probably increasing pressures on public expenditure, such strengthening of publicly funded surveys is not expected to be forthcoming, at least for a while.

6.6 Conclusions

This chapter has examined the reasons behind, and attempts to tackle, barriers to the international mobility of engineers and technicians, and of engineering professionals. It is possible to distil, from the picture that emerges from this macro-level/top-down summary, certain important elements of the individual migrant experience that are to be expected, which can be considered in relation to the individual migrant experiences documented in the valuable findings of the empirical survey evidence of reports from engineers who have migrated from key Southern European countries presented by Gropas and Bartolini. The key factors are described in detail below.

6.6.1 Work opportunities in the country of origin and the chosen destination country

Economic migration arises because, on balance, people feel that they are more likely to be able to earn a satisfactory living in a different country, and thereby to enjoy a 'better life'. While in principle an economy in growth is more likely to provide more work opportunities in general, it is by no means the case that all sectors or occupations in an economy are in the same growth state. Different countries have different levels of engineering activity (within both engineering sectors and non-engineering sectors), and – depending on the engineering discipline of the potential migrant (whether male or female) – particular countries would therefore have different levels of work opportunities. That having been said, the recent massive growth in online recruitment has considerably reduced national boundaries in terms of work opportunities, and today adequately capable candidates can receive serious consideration irrespective of their current location, provided that inward migration policy in the potential destination country does not put 'foreign applicants' at a disadvantage. In general, except at the professional level, intra-EU movement does not suffer such barriers.

It is known that different employers, even within one country, can have rather different attitudes to the recruitment of women, and their workplaces can be more or less 'women-friendly'. Given that gender perceptions and attitudes are known to vary between different cultures, it is clearly possible that employment opportunities for women engineers may be affected by such variations between countries.

6.6.2 Barriers to entry to engineering work in the chosen destination country

While issues arising from professional regulation differences between country of origin and chosen destination country pose real, and often non-trivial, barriers to entry to certain engineering work, these generally arise and often non-trivial, barriers to entry to certain engineering work in different countries generally arise for plausible health and safety reasons, as summarized in Section 6.4. In spite of major efforts over many years by the European Commission, barriers do still exist between EU member states, and these can have a greater or lesser effect on migrant engineers. It is, however, not clear how such barriers would be affected by gender considerations. The barriers tend to relate to differences in an engineer's education base and/or initial professional development (post full-time education training and experience). While it is possible that there might perhaps occasionally have been certain differences between national regulatory requirements for initial experience (perhaps involving traditional concerns about women being exposed to certain risky environments), in general the education and training phases would be unlikely to prove different to men and women.

Intriguingly, the specifics of migration examined in detail by Gropas and Bartolini do involve a significant factor in relation to barriers to mobility. As explained in Section 6.4, occupational regulation is generally significantly stronger in Southern European countries, and as a result barriers to mobility are, in broad terms, asymmetrical on a north–south axis. Since a number of countries whose economies have suffered worse than others since the 2008 economic and financial crisis are located in Southern Europe, the mobility of those leaving those countries is overall likely to be less restricted than it would have been if the movement had been from north to south. Hence, Greece, Portugal and Spain – the countries of origin of particular focus in the Gropas and Bartolini survey – are indeed countries where engineering professional regulation is particularly strong, so that migrants from these countries encounter comparatively limited barriers when moving to work in a Northern European country.

Interestingly, professional mobility for those in IT work is generally not really constrained at all. This is partly because, by its very nature, and by virtue of the major multi-national corporations involved in its supply, it is a particularly global activity, and partly because, at least so far, IT work has not been proven to cause physical damage¹⁴ of the kind that engineering activity has done. As a result, occupational regulation is generally limited if present at all, and there are essentially few differences between countries in this respect.

6.6.3 Satisfaction of engineering work in the country of origin and the destination country

Satisfaction at work is influenced by a wide range of factors. Remuneration is clearly important, but so are a number of other aspects of work. The annual

competition for Best Employer managed by the (UK) *Sunday Times* judges companies by the staff experience of employer leadership, line manager relations, personal growth, well-being, team relations, ‘giving something back’, employer culture and fair remuneration. The series of large-scale and very thorough ‘skills surveys’ carried out by Felstead, Gallie and Green in the UK in 1997, 2001, 2006 and 2012 (see Felstead et al 2012) examine aspects like the degree of autonomy over one’s work and other factors that would no doubt be considered important in different countries. These factors vary widely between employers within any one country and there would presumably also be certain broad differences in some of these between employers in the same sectors in different countries. In terms of differences in employee experiences between gender, this would presumably vary. The subjective perceptions of the migrants themselves, as reported in Chapter 7, are therefore the best measure.

6.6.4 Remuneration from engineering work in the chosen destination country as compared with remuneration from engineering work in the country of origin

In broad terms, pay for equivalent work is still not equal between males and females in most countries: presumably the ‘pay gap’ in the countries of origin and destination could be something an aspiring female migrant might need to consider. However, generally more important would be the average levels of pay (for women) for broadly equivalent types of work – in particular for relevant engineering occupations. In addition, of course, pay measures are relevant for those in work: good salaries in the destination country are fine, provided the new immigrant can successfully secure and retain work. Some of the evidence from the Gropas and Bartolini survey suggests, in addition, that there might be certain trade-offs between salary level and satisfaction level. Finally, any figures for salary levels on their own are less important than their buying power for items the migrant will want: a 20% higher nominal salary is of little value in a country where the effective cost of living of the migrant is also 20% above that in the country of origin.

6.7 Summing up...

Engineers are a strategically important resource for economies and societies and for our world more generally. The contributions of all members of the ‘engineering team’ at a number of levels are important, and in today’s world skilled workers, technicians and professional engineers often spend some time abroad. As with other technical skill sets, there is continuing demand around the world for the best talent, and there can be shortages from time to time in particular specialist areas. Flows of ‘new’ professional engineers onto the labour market do not always follow the assumed ‘linear model’ – that those with degrees in aeronautical engineering go and work in the aerospace

industry, those with electronic engineering degrees work in the electronics sector, and so on. Generally, the fraction of women who enter both engineering courses (whether in vocational or higher education) and thereafter who enter engineering work remains small (averages of between 20% and 25% in both cases across the EU and OECD), although there are important variations between countries. The ease of economic migration of those with specialist engineering skills depends significantly on whether, and if so how, their main work activity is regulated in the 'destination country' or not. There is a wide range of variations between countries and geographical jurisdictions (e.g., between the States in the US and the Provinces in Canada) in terms of how the engineering profession is regulated, which often leads to real challenges for mobility in practice. This chapter puts women's mobility issues in the context of migration of engineers and technicians more generally and examines the limited evidence available of how women migrants fare within this world.

While there are many excellent women engineers, in most OECD and EU member countries, the fraction of women satisfactorily completing tertiary education in engineering subjects and the fraction of women working in the relevant occupations are rather low – generally between a fifth and a quarter of the total.

Growth in international economic activity results in an increased internationalization of labour markets, including those of engineers and technicians. Because engineering work can involve risks to users and society, such work is regulated to a greater or lesser extent in all countries. Variations in regulation between countries, and especially in the breadth of professional regulation between countries, result in certain barriers to international mobility for engineers and technicians. Governments and professional engineering bodies have cooperated with their partners in other countries over recent decades to try to reduce unnecessary mobility barriers, but progress is limited and often slow.

The arrangements for professional formation of engineers do not in general put women at a disadvantage for entering professional engineering work, and barriers to mobility do not have any obvious female-unfriendly dimensions. However, women with engineering qualifications and work experience would not be likely to escape the challenges of migration raised elsewhere in this book. In the absence of significant increases in sample sizes of the national Labour Force Surveys on which the EU LFS is based, the findings of Gropas and Bartolini could be reviewed, strengthened and broadened to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the position and migration experience of women engineers and technicians. This could be done by extending the survey to incorporate a small number of additional questions to pick up factors described in this chapter, and by extending the geographical scope to include both other countries whose economies have been struggling and at least some that have not.

Notes

1. Point frequently made in public speeches about engineering.
2. The UK Profession's term for 'applied engineer' or 'engineering technologist'.
3. The UK Profession's term for 'theoretical engineer'.
4. The 'European Engineering Discipline Cluster' (FEANI 2005) comprises aeronautical, agronomic, bio-engineering, civil, chemical, electrical and electronic, environmental, IT and telecommunications, management, materials, mechanical, mining, naval, surveyor, and transportation engineering.
5. The tables in Table 6.2 are only intended to be illustrative – not definitive or comprehensive – and it should be noted that there are often cross-over points between the different disciplines (e.g., rail signalling work is directly relevant to the rail engineering element in transport, but it would generally be carried out by a telecommunications engineer or technician). In practice, large engineering projects generally need to bring to bear expertise in a wide range of engineering disciplines.
6. Available online at: <http://www.feani.org/site/> (accessed: 31 March 2015).
7. And indeed the review of the related Services Directive, and 'Single Market' policy more generally.
8. The first 'General Systems' Directive, going beyond arrangements agreed for individual professions dates back to 1989.
9. For example, where there might be significant numbers of people with such skills unemployed.
10. The 1999 Bologna Declaration of Ministers of EU member states, establishing governmental commitment to creation of a European Higher Education Area (EHEA) has addressed some of the differences, but this has brought additional comparative complexities in its wake.
11. There can be more than one ENAEE member from each country, and fewer European countries have ENAEE members than FEANI members.
12. Available online at: <http://www.washingtonaccord.org/> (accessed: 1 April 2015).
13. This occupational category – rather than specific engineering categories – is shown because of its greater statistical reliability for some of the smaller countries.
14. Although a range of other serious problems – arguable involving 'damage' of other kinds – have nevertheless emerged.

References

- Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (DBIS UK) (2011) *UK Government Response to European Commission Public Consultation on the Mutual Recognition of Professional Qualifications Directive* (UK: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills).
- Dixon, M. (2015) 'The Scale of "Leakage" of Engineering Graduates from Starting Work in Engineering and its Implications for Public Policy and UK Manufacturing sectors' *SKOPE Research Paper, Centre on Skills, Knowledge and Organisational Performance*, January 2015. Available online at: <http://www.skope.ox.ac.uk/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/M-Dixon-The-Scale-of-Leakage.pdf> (accessed: 8 April 2015).
- Dixon, M. (2013) *Skills, Professional Regulation, and International Mobility in the Engineering Workforce* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute). Available online at: <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/skills-professional-regulation-and-international-mobility-engineering-workforce> (accessed: 25 March 2015).

- Dixon, M. (2010) 'The European Qualifications Framework: Important European Enabler or Questionable Diversion for Bureaucrats?' *SKOPE Issues Paper 23*, ESRC Centre of Excellence for Skills, Knowledge and Organisational Performance, University of Oxford. Available online at: <http://www.skope.ox.ac.uk/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Issues-Paper-23.pdf> (accessed: 8 April 2015).
- Engineering Council (UK) (2014) *UK Standard for Professional Engineering Competence: Engineering Technician, Incorporated Engineer and Chartered Engineer Standard*. Available online at: <http://www.engc.org.uk/engcdocuments/internet/Website/UK-SPEC%20third%20edition%20%281%29.pdf> (accessed: 8 April 2015).
- European Federation of National Engineering Associations (FEANI) (2005) Survey on the Regulation of the Engineering Profession in Europe. *Special FEANI News 10/2005*. Available online at: http://www.ordemengenheiros.pt/fotos/editor2/eventos/colagro_feani_news_10_2005.pdf (accessed: 8 April 2015).
- Felstead, A. et al. (2012) *Skills at Work in Britain. First Findings from the Skills and Employment Survey, 2012* (Cardiff University, UK). Available online at: www.cardiff.ac.uk/socsi/ses2012/%5Bhidden%5Dresources/1.%20skills%20at%20Work%20in%20Britain%20-%20mini-report.pdf (accessed: 25 March 2015).
- Keep, E. and S. James (2010) 'Recruitment and Selection – the Great Neglected Topic'. *SKOPE Research Paper No. 88*. (Cardiff, UK: Centre of Excellence on Skills, Knowledge and Organisational Performance, Universities of Oxford and Cardiff).
- Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) (2012) *Analysis of the Impacts of Migration* (London, UK: MAC). Available online at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/257235/analysis-of-the-impacts.pdf (accessed: 8 April 2015).
- UNESCO (2010) *Engineering: Issues, Challenges and Opportunities for Development*. Available online at: <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001897/189753e.pdf> (accessed: 25 March 2015).
- United Kingdom Commission for Employment and Skills (UKCES) (2011) 'A Review of Occupational Regulation and its Impact'. *Evidence Report 40*, October 2011. Available online at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/306359/ER40_Occupational_regulation_impact_-_Oct_2011.pdf (accessed: 25 March 2015).

7

Southern European Highly Skilled Female Migrants in Male-Dominated Sectors in Times of Crisis: A Look into the IT and Engineering Sectors

Ruby Gropas and Laura Bartolini

7.1 Introduction

Why are Southern European highly skilled women with degrees in engineering and information technology (IT) migrating? What is affecting their decisions to leave Greece, Portugal and Spain respectively? Where are they migrating to? And, just as importantly, how are they doing in their countries of destination, and how satisfied are they with the outcomes of their decision to migrate, particularly when compared to their male co-nationals who have made a similar decision to move?

Since the outbreak of the crisis in Southern Europe, there has been a plethora of news reports on young, highly educated, qualified and skilled Spaniards, Portuguese and Greeks increasingly taking their talents and expertise to other countries in search of better funds, better career opportunities and better payoffs. The economic and political crises in these countries, the austerity measures and rampant unemployment rates, and the dramatic decreases in salaries and welfare allowances have pushed young Greeks, Spaniards and Portuguese to 'vote with their feet', leaving for other countries or continents. The departure of Southern Europe's highly educated youth in particular has been described as one of the harshest consequences of the crisis, triggering alarmed public debates as to the medium- and long-term potential consequences of this flight of brains at a time when innovation and creativity are critical for these economies to grow again.

Recent studies (Focus Migration 2013; OECD 2013) suggested that the new Southern European emigrants were motivated particularly by expectations for better career prospects and quality of life at destination. However, overall,

there has been rather limited data on who is actually emigrating, why they are leaving, where they are going or for how long they plan to emigrate. Disaggregating the available data according to gender and field of specialization is an even more daunting challenge. While it would be fascinating to be able to shed light into the gendered patterns of high-skilled emigration from Southern Europe, or the gendered patterns of high-skilled intra-EU mobility, our ambition is slightly more contained in this chapter.

In the following sections, we present new empirical data on female highly skilled emigrants from Portugal, Spain and Greece, the three Southern European countries that have been the most intensely hit by the global financial and eurozone crisis. We focus on two particular fields of specialization among the high skilled, namely engineers and specialists in the fields of IT and computer science, for two reasons: First, because these are considered to be among the most relevant fields for competition and innovation and, second, because they tend to be overwhelmingly male-dominated sectors. We consider it would be particularly insightful to shed light on the female segment of these migrants and see whether, and to what extent, there are differences with their male colleagues who have also chosen to move to a country other than their own. It is pertinent to note here that we focus only on individuals who are graduates of engineering, manufacturing and construction studies and of computer science and IT, namely individuals who hold a degree, bachelors, masters or equivalent, or PhD from these disciplines, not individuals who may be generally employed in these sectors.

Overall, most research on high-skill migration has tended to focus on the contributions that skilled migrants bring to the knowledge economy of the receiving state. Scholars have concentrated on the science, ICT (information and communication technologies), financial and managerial sectors as the driving forces behind global wealth creation, innovation and productivity. Research on high-skill emigration has also explored the consequences of the brain drain for the source countries (Kofman 2012) or the potential of brain circulation, the value of social remittances and return migration. Engineers and IT specialists in particular have been epitomized as the mobile workers at the forefront of the new knowledge economy and innovation (Freeman 2006; Martin 2012). And, the focus has been overwhelmingly on male migrants that by and large undoubtedly dominate these sectors. Research that has concentrated on skilled female migrants has tended to focus on female-dominated occupations and in particular education, health, social and care work.

We wish to address part of the gap in the literature by focusing on female engineers and IT specialists who have chosen to migrate.

The data that we use in this chapter have been generated by an e-survey conducted in late spring and summer 2013 which was primarily aimed at tracing the main characteristics and motivations for the emigration of

highly skilled, young Europeans from Southern Europe and Ireland. The survey investigated their socio-demographic profile, the 'push and pull' factors of their migration, their preferred destinations and the conditions of their employment before and after their emigration. The empirical evidence collected by this e-survey on emigration patterns, the main difficulties in settling abroad and the plans for the future of highly skilled emigrants from Southern Europe has been also addressed in other chapters of this book (see Chapter 3 by Gonzalez Enriquez and Triandafyllidou in this book).

For the purposes of our chapter, we use a sample selection from the e-survey which includes nationals only from Greece, Portugal and Spain who hold a tertiary degree in engineering or computer science and who have chosen to leave their country of origin. This selection allows us to compare female and male emigrants belonging to a homogeneous, highly skilled, technical field of study, in order to compare their performance in these male-dominated sectors of employment. In particular, we want to investigate the employment conditions of highly skilled female migrants from Southern Europe, the characteristics of their migratory experience, whether their employment situation (form and type of employment, career development and prospects) has changed through their migration and the extent to which they are satisfied with their current situation. We are also interested in exploring whether the time period of their migration is a variable that is likely to affect their employment conditions – in other words, we wish to compare those who migrated before or at the outbreak of the crisis with more recent emigrants who migrated during the most severe peaks of the economic downturn in their origin country so far.

In the next section, we present a literature review of studies that have focused on female migration in traditionally male-dominated sectors of the economy. We then present our selected sample, describing their main socio-demographic characteristics and professional situation before and after migration, and the degree of satisfaction with their current situation. In Section 7.4, we run a model to examine what distinguishes the female respondents with a degree in engineering and IT from their co-national male counterparts as regards their employment situation, while in the concluding section we discuss our findings against the wider background of female high-skill migration.

7.2 Female Migration in Male-Dominated Sectors of the Economy

According to data presented by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs and the OECD, in 2013¹ global migration continued to grow in spite of the economic and financial crisis. The migration of tertiary-educated men

and women in particular has been increasing since the early 2000s, and in fact, across the world, the emigration rates of the highly skilled exceed the total emigration rate, reflecting what is referred to as ‘the selectivity of migration by educational attainment’ (OECD-UNDESA World in Figures 2013, p. 4). Interestingly, the ‘brain drain’ phenomenon appears to be more pronounced among women than men, as the share of tertiary-educated women living outside their country of birth is higher than that of men. This is correlated with the gender gap that exists in educational attainment of women and men in the source countries worldwide in spite of the impressive rise in the percentage of women with post-secondary education since 1990. While there has been convergence as regards the educational attainment of men and women in the case of high-income countries, across all continents low-income countries have been converging at a much slower pace, given that women still face unequal access to tertiary education (Docquier et al. 2009).

Changing expectations about future labour force participation among women in most parts of the world have been considered among the key factors associated with women’s increased participation in tertiary education. Indeed, in the OECD and the EU, mainly between 1990 and 2010, gender gaps in educational attainment have been closed or even reversed (Salvi del Pero and Bytchkova 2013, p. 7). However, even in these countries there exists a very wide and persistent gender gap concerning the choice of the field of study. In 2010, women made up only 27% of the graduates in engineering and 20% in computer science – and in fact there has been a decreasing share of women in the computer science field over the past decade (Salvi del Pero and Bytchkova 2013, p. 19).

As shown in Figure 7.1, gender gaps in Greece, Portugal and Spain are quite in line with the OECD and EU averages. In 2012, Greece registered a slightly more balanced situation than Portugal and Spain with respect to the number of graduates in technical fields. Nevertheless, women are still overrepresented in the education and health and welfare fields (consisting of approximately 70–80% of total graduates), while they hardly reach one-third of all graduates in engineering and one-fifth of all graduates in computing.

The underrepresentation of women in these fields and sciences overall has been precluding access to a number of occupations that often offer better earnings and career potential. The dynamics of highly skilled emigration are strictly interconnected with issues related to the choice of the field of education and of the subsequent labour market specializations between sexes (Bobbitt-Zeher 2007). There is scarcity of comparable data on the role of women in international migration flows in general and of the most highly educated in particular (Docquier et al. 2009), with few datasets which try to provide reliable estimates for a considerable number of countries. In spite of its limitations, the Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC)

	% of degrees awarded to women				
	All fields	Of which: IT	Eng.	Edu.	Health & welfare
Greece	62.4	35.1	40.0	79.0	61.4
Portugal	60.5	22.4	31.1	81.4	79.0
Spain	57.5	17.0	31.4	72.2	74.2
EU22	59.5	18.5	29.1	79.1	73.6
OECD	56.1	21.1	24.9	75.3	74.1




Figure 7.1 Share (%) of degrees awarded to women, selected fields of study (2012)

Source: Authors calculations from OECD stats: UNESCO–OECD–Eurostat (UOE) education statistics, 2012².

(2015) provides emigration rates by level of education. According to these data, the strongest growth in emigration rates between 2000 and 2010 was experienced by Europe and Latin America (Arslan et al. 2014, p. 37), and the share of tertiary-educated among migrant women is higher than among migrant men in many countries (Arslan et al. 2014, p. 45). In particular, patterns of emigration vary consistently among our three selected countries. Portugal is among the countries with the highest total emigration rate and highly skilled emigration rate (both at about 14%). Spain on the other hand shows a low level of total and female emigration, while Greeks are close to the European averages (Table 7.1).

Out-migration of the highly skilled from these countries is not a new phenomenon. However, the economic crisis that has been unravelling in all three countries since 2008–2009 has magnified the observed mismatches

Table 7.1 Total and female emigration rate by country of birth (age 15+)

	Emigration rate		Emigration rate of the highly skilled*	
	Total	Female	Total	Female
Greece	6.6	6.2	5.9	5
Portugal	14	13.1	14	12.2
Spain	2	2.1	2.5	2.5

Note: *estimates based on BL dataset (Barro and Lee 2013).

Source: DIOC 2010/2011; Arslan et al. 2014, pp. 63–65.

between labour market and labour force qualifications. Labriandis and Vogiatzis have argued that migration of professionals from Greece could be mostly attributed to the low demand for graduates from the private sector (2012, p. 474). Greece indeed has not been able to occupy a higher position in the global value chains; thus, the labour markets in which engineers and IT specialists could be actively engaged in have been lacking even before the crisis outbreak. A similar situation can be noted in the other two countries, although the phenomenon is relevant for the EU well beyond the geographic confines of the Southern EU member states. In fact, the EU's shortage in skilled workers in engineering, science, technology and mathematics (STEM) is growing in a disconcerting manner with increasing numbers of highly qualified Europeans emigrating (to the US primarily but not exclusively), while at the same time the EU's Blue Card scheme³ has had rather limited results in attracting foreign talent (Campanella 2014; Hewitt 2013; Morel 2013; Pelletier 2011). The labour markets of the EU's Southern European countries in particular have not been able to absorb the highly skilled workers they themselves educate (through public universities) largely due to the lack of investment (both public and private) in high-tech and innovative economic sectors. For many highly skilled workers, the choice often seems a binary one, between a more limited employment in their country of origin (in terms of skill requirement, level of responsibility below their qualifications and with limited career development and professional opportunities) and wider, potential employment and career prospects abroad.

Among the highly skilled, scientists and engineers tend to be among the most mobile due to the international transferability of their knowledge and the fact that they are usually 'wanted and welcome' migrants, thanks to their contribution to economic innovation and the development of new technologies and products (Freeman 2006). Economic studies on the migration of science and engineering graduates have concentrated on

wages and other work-related determinants of migration, as well as 'qualitative' labour market incentives such as utilization of skills or involvement in research and development (see de Grip et al. 2010). Indeed, qualitative research has emphasized the importance of career prospects in migration decisions and has suggested that non-monetary drivers such as the ability to achieve a better match between skills and job, the reputation of a country as regards the prospects offered by its labour market (in terms of openness, meritocracy and potential for upward professional mobility) and the potential for intellectual achievement constitute particularly strong drivers for migration in the cases of scientists and engineers (see, inter alia, Massey et al. 1993; Constant and D'Agosto 2008; de Grip et al. 2010). In short, the expectation that future employment and wage prospects and opportunities in their country of destination will be better than in their home country has long been acknowledged as a core determinant in an individual's cost-benefit analysis when making the decision to migrate. Similarly, the highly selective nature of migration has also been long highlighted, indicating that individuals with better labour market perspectives and high levels of human capital are more likely to migrate (de Grip et al. 2010; Fratesi and Riggio 2007).

Research that has focused on science and engineering migrants in particular has suggested that they seem to value wages relatively less and non-pecuniary aspects of their job relatively more than migrant workers with other qualifications. In short, finding a 'better' job match seems to matter more than specific wage gains in their decision to migrate, and this is particularly the case for people choosing to migrate to the US, Australia and Canada (de Grip and Willems 2003; de Grip et al. 2010).

Moreover, previous migration experience, including stays abroad during studies, may facilitate migration choices since these individuals have accumulated experience in living in 'other' countries (da Vanzo 1983; Parey and Waldinger 2008). In fact, internships abroad or student exchange schemes such as ERASMUS may be extremely beneficial in terms of gaining invaluable experience in personal and academic development and in decreasing the costs of future migration, for instance through foreign language acquisition, adapting to diverse cultural environments and even establishing a social network. At the same time however, they have recently raised concerns as regards intensifying the risk of brain drain from Southern to Northern Europe.⁴

Against this background, it is interesting to examine the migration decisions of female graduates and the outcomes of their migration experiences in these male-dominated economic sectors. Indeed, the interest in highly skilled women in sectors traditionally dominated by male workers has been growing recently. Scholars have looked at skilled migrant workers in medicine (Raghuram and Montiel 2003), academia (Czarniawaska and Sevón 2008), business (Cooke 2007; Grigoleit 2010) and science (Ackers 2004;

Ackers 2011; Ackers and Gill 2008). As regards the ICT sector, women form a small but significant minority among migrant ICT professionals entering any of the major countries of immigration (Raghuram 2008, p. 48). Research has probed into career trajectories and blockages, career mobility and prospects, gender relations in the workplace and the differential impact of immigration regulations according to gender and sector (Kofman et al. 2005).

Female high-skill migration has also been studied from the perspective of intra-EU mobility. Adrian Favell's study on EU 'free movers' (2009) identified a small yet dynamic segment of intra-EU migrants: single, young women from Southern European countries who left the rigid economic structures of their home countries for attractive European urban locations (mainly London, Brussels and Amsterdam). He found these young women to be generally employed or self-employed in business and management, international law, scientific research and design and media.

Overall however, the participation of women in the competitive and innovative sectors of the so-called knowledge economy tends to be ignored, or as Raghuram has actually noted:

[I]t is usually argued that increasing participation of women in ICT can limit dependence on migrant workers (European Commission 2004; National Science Foundation 2007). In this narrative, women and migrants are considered as exclusive categories; women are assumed to be non-migrants while migrants are assumed to be men, leaving little room for exploring the experiences of female migrant ICT workers.

(Raghuram 2008, p. 49)

This narrative is not unique to the EU context, rather the contrary. In 2008, the *Harvard Business Review* published a research report that has since become a landmark in examining the career trajectories of highly credentialed women with degrees in science, engineering and technology (SET) in the private sector. The study examined global companies across the US but also in Geneva, Hong Kong, London, Moscow, Shanghai and Sydney. Named the 'Athena Factor', this research indicated that highly skilled women with degrees in SET who make it through the educational system and onto the lower rungs of the corporate career ladder eventually quit in their mid- to late thirties (up to 52%) overwhelmed by hostile workplace cultures and extreme work pressures. The report notes that given the increasing demand and critical shortages in the supply of high-calibre talent across SET, the private sector has been lobbying in favour of more open immigration policies for highly qualified foreign workers that are needed to fill critical jobs in software engineering, computer science and basic research. What the private sector should be more engaged in, or in the words of the authors, 'Gates, Barrett and Sweeney would be well advised

to focus on the female talent in their own backyard...The female talent pipeline in SET is surprisingly rich and deep and can be leveraged to fill the labour gaps' (Hewlett et al. 2008, p. 1). Similar to the argument above, the participation of women in these sectors is contrasted with high-skill migrants, ignoring the participation of female high-skill migrants in these sectors.

Gender has increasingly been recognized as a significant axis of differentiation in migration studies, relevant in the pre-migration period, in the process of migration itself and in the post-migration experiences. Why is it useful then to probe further in studying skilled female migrants in male-dominated sectors? First of all because it widens the scope of research questions concerning female migration. Gender relations or the ways in which identities are negotiated between male and female colleagues may play out in very different ways in different workplaces. Moreover, it enriches our insights into career trajectories, career progression and the impact of gender in shaping careers and career aspirations. Furthermore, again as Raghuram has underlined, focusing on women in male-dominated sectors may highlight gender biases that may exist in immigration regulations (2008, p. 49). Relevant to this, though beyond the scope of our current chapter, is the work of Reay (2004, p. 31), who has suggested that women who do succeed in the 'new masculinized economies' are often those who assume masculine ways of being. It is interesting to examine these ideas further and to study the different experiences that high-earning migrant women may have from migrant women in female-dominated sectors that also tend to be associated with lower paid jobs. The potential of upward mobility that migrant women in male-dominated sectors face and the related questions of glass ceilings or glass cliffs become relevant in this context. There is in fact a significant gap in the literature as regards the glass ceilings that skilled migrant women may encounter in the labour markets of their field of specialization in the countries they migrate to. In connection with this, it would be interesting to further explore the glass ceilings that they may be trying to circumvent in their home countries through their decision to migrate, where gender discrimination may be even more acute in their field of work.

As already noted above, migration statistics indicate an increase in female highly skilled migration to OECD countries. A possible explanation of this would be that in poorer countries the opportunities for highly educated women are much narrower than for men because of higher gender inequalities, thereby leading to higher potential returns from migration for women. Dumont et al. (2007) examined the Gender Related Development Index (which reflects inequalities between men and women in life expectancy, knowledge and earned income), the GEM Empowerment Measure (a composite index focusing on gender inequality in political participation, economic participation and power over economic resources),

the gender difference in the tertiary enrolment rate and the relative participation rates of males and females. These indices concluded that the emigration of highly skilled women tends to be higher the poorer their country of origin is. This same rationale would be very relevant for the three Southern European countries of origin that we are studying in this chapter, given the spectacular increase of poverty and the collapse of their labour markets which suggests even fewer opportunities than previously available for female engineers and ICT experts in Greece, Spain and Portugal respectively.

A final dimension which may be equally interesting to study further is the ways in which class and gender intersect in these cases. Engineering and ICT tend to be considered as middle-class professions in specific sending-country contexts (Raghuram 2008, p. 53). Exploring the female migrants within these professions may also give insights into understanding whether or not gender and nationality supersede sectoral working conditions.

These fascinating questions offer a very wide potential for future research to probe deeper into the interplay between gender, labour and migration, and in fact this book explores a number of these dimensions. In the following sections, we try to tackle some of these questions where we examine the experiences of female engineers and ICT professionals from Greece, Spain and Portugal who have decided to migrate from their crisis-stricken countries.

7.3 An e-survey on highly skilled emigrants

The data we present here are taken from the e-survey on High-Skill Migration in Times of Crisis that was coordinated by Triandafyllidou and Gropas.⁵ The e-survey was launched in five languages (English, Greek, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish), aiming to investigate the main features of the migrants' experiences, their profile and their expectations. Open for three months, from 21 May to 18 August 2013, it gathered 6,750 valid answers. The survey collected information about key issues such as type of studies, occupation, earnings, family status, registration in consulates, labour situation prior to emigration, family dynamics, the main problems encountered at the destination country, the obstacles that they may have faced in their intra-EU mobility and plans for return. The survey consisted of approximately 70 questions with multiple choice answers and options for additional comments and clarifications to be inserted and four open-ended questions on the reasons for leaving the country of origin, the aspects that the migrants like and dislike in the origin and destination countries and an overall evaluation of their migratory experience.

Although the e-survey was disseminated through many different channels, some constraints and shortcomings associated with the reliability of this type of sample data have to be taken into account (see Gropas and

Triandafyllidou 2014). In addition to the challenges faced by ‘paper-and-pencil’ interviews, data collected through internet-based surveys can be affected also by the special conditions of the online context that include perceived anonymity, less control over respondents’ selection and transmission errors. In particular, there are three main issues regarding open e-surveys that are relevant for the empirical analysis we are presenting in this chapter. Firstly, the survey was designed to address the possibility of fraud and includes open-ended questions and a number of interconnected questions that were meant to test for consistency. Secondly, the dataset was cleaned to exclude those individuals who answered although they had not (yet) migrated to another country and those who didn’t complete the entire questionnaire. Finally, the inherent sample bias due to the fact that answers were collected only from internet users is only slightly mitigated by the fact that the survey was addressed to highly skilled, young individuals who are more likely to be using the internet than the average population.

In spite of these drawbacks, we consider the data collected through this e-survey as rich and insightful, concerning a tranche of migrants that is not easily traced by official statistics: highly skilled, young Southern European individuals who have moved, particularly those who have moved to another EU member state, who do not necessarily register their change of residence with the local authorities as they can move and reside freely without authorization. These data are also able to capture the newest waves of emigration (up to the first half of 2013), avoiding the time lag of data produced by administrative records and official statistical offices. Moreover, they cover a wide geographical range in terms of origin and destination countries: the original dataset includes Greek, Irish, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese respondents who had moved to many different parts of the world, from Switzerland to the UK, from Canada to Australia, from Brazil to the United Arab Emirates and Angola. For the empirical analysis in this chapter, we selected a sub-sample of tertiary-educated individuals from Greece, Portugal or Spain with a degree in engineering (manufacturing, construction and architecture) and IT (computer science, programming). We kept in our selection both males (1,381) and females (472) to compare the situation of women to that of men with the same level and field of education.

7.3.1 Demographic structure

Females represent almost a quarter of our selected sample of 1,853 interviewees. They tend to be slightly more educated in terms of formal qualifications (56% hold master’s degrees and 7% have PhDs against 52% and 7% of males respectively), and they are younger than their male counterparts, with more than half of all respondent women being under 30 years of age. Almost 70% of the total sample, with small differences between sexes and regardless of their marital status, decided to move abroad alone (Table 7.2).

Table 7.2 Highly skilled emigrants in engineering and IT, demographic characteristics by sex and country of origin

	Greece						Portugal						Spain					
	Male			Female			Male			Female			Male			Female		
	Freq.*	%		Freq.	%		Freq.	%		Freq.	%		Freq.	%		Freq.	%	
Education level	73	31.5		21	33.3		420	51.7		140	45.0		63	18.7		14	14.3	
	128	55.2		39	61.9		352	43.3		146	46.9		244	72.4		78	79.6	
	31	13.4		3	4.8		40	4.9		25	8.0		30	8.9		6	6.1	
Age	124	53.4		40	63.5		328	40.4		163	52.4		138	40.9		49	50.0	
	102	44.0		23	36.5		451	55.5		145	46.6		173	51.3		47	48.0	
	6	2.6		0	0.0		33	4.1		3	1.0		26	7.7		2	2.0	
Time of migration	21	9.1		0	0.0		94	11.6		30	9.6		27	8.0		13	13.3	
	28	12.1		10	15.9		151	18.6		71	22.8		50	14.8		15	15.3	
	74	31.9		25	39.7		164	20.2		82	26.4		90	26.7		17	17.3	
	109	47.0		28	44.4		403	49.6		128	41.2		170	50.4		53	54.1	
Moved alone	170	73.3		46	73.0		581	71.6		208	66.9		232	68.8		66	67.3	
Total	232	78.6		63	21.4		812	72.3		311	27.7		337	77.5		98	22.5	

Note: * Acronym for absolute frequency.

Source: High-Skill Migration in Times of Crisis – Survey 2013.

Table 7.3 Share of employed respondents before migration, by sex and country of origin

	Greece	Spain	Portugal
Male	48.9	52.8	74.2
Female	64.5	51.0	64.2
Total	52.6	51.6	66.8

Source: High-Skill Migration in Times of Crisis – Survey 2013.

7.3.2 The employment situation before leaving

Descriptive statistics on the employment situation of respondents before migration could help us contextualize their condition before deciding to leave the origin country. More than half of the engineers and computer scientists from Greece, Spain and Portugal who responded to our survey were employed in their respective country of origin prior to migration. With the exception of Greeks, however, women tend to be less employed than men (see Table 7.3).

As for the area of employment, men tend to be more present than women in the IT sector, while there are proportionally more women than men in the engineering sector, but with strong differences across countries (ranging from 35% in the case of the Greek female respondents to 71% in the case of the Portuguese ones). The distribution of employed respondents across sectors confirms a slight overrepresentation of women in education, research and in the residual category of ‘other sectors’ (services, health care and so on) even when they have a degree in technical fields, particularly in the case of Spanish respondents (Figure 7.2).

7.3.3 Destination countries

The total list of destination countries is very long: practically all continents are represented, although the majority of respondents declared to be living in Europe. The UK and Germany attract the largest shares of emigrants: for instance, half of the Spaniards declared to live in Germany. Along with the UK, Greeks seem to prefer other continental European destinations (France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland), while in comparison the Portuguese show a stronger propensity to move outside Europe: about one quarter of them live in countries of North and Latin America (the US, Brazil) and Africa (Angola and Mozambique). This trend has in fact already been noted in an EU-funded IOM study that indeed registered an increase in migration from the EU to Latin America (mainly Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and Mexico) and the Caribbean. According to the report, the largest group of emigrants were young, single, Spanish and Portuguese men with higher levels of education in social sciences or civil engineering who emigrated to Latin American




Figure 7.2 Sector of employment before migration: Share on total employed by sex and country of origin (%).

Source: High-Skill Migration in Times of Crisis – Survey 2013.

and the Caribbean countries (LAC) and to Lusophone countries in Africa hoping to advance their careers (Alcaraz 2012) (Figure 7.3).

7.3.4 Employment situation and satisfaction after migration

The employment situation of respondents after migration can be described through a number of questions included in the original questionnaire. Employment grew for both sexes in all country sub-groups, but the share of females employed after migration is on average lower than that of men (around 83% compared to almost 90%). Also, there is a visible improvement in the stability of employment conditions: after migration the strong majority of those employed declared to have an open-ended, long-term contract and only in the case of Greeks there seems to be a non-negligible amount of short-term contracts (especially for females) and of respondents who declared they were employed but without formal arrangements (Figures 7.4 and 7.5).

Regardless of the country of origin, the analysis of the distribution of income between genders at the time of the survey shows a strong difference in earnings in favour of males, who are overrepresented in the highest income bracket defined in the survey (€4,000 per month and above). Monthly income of females seems to be more equally distributed in all




Figure 7.3 Country/area of destination, by sex and country of origin
 Source: High-Skill Migration in Times of Crisis – Survey 2013.




Figure 7.4 Share of employment before (in country of origin) and after emigration (at destination), by sex and country of origin
 Source: High-Skill Migration in Times of Crisis – Survey 2013.

classes, with 17% of respondents earning less than €1,000 (Figure 7.6). Data on the level of earnings are coupled with information on the satisfaction levels with the present situation in terms of income, with females declaring a lower level of satisfaction than males on average (Figure 7.7).

7.4 The empirical test: wages and satisfaction after migration

As shown by the descriptive tables of the previous section, our dataset provides a lot of information regarding the employment conditions of this sample of highly skilled female and male emigrants before and after their decision to migrate. Our empirical investigation aims at highlighting gender differences in the outcome of migration. From the analysis of the reasons and type of migration, we know that not all interviewees had migrated because they were unemployed. Many of them were actually employed in their origin countries, but they nonetheless decided to move in order to try to improve their career prospects or their economic conditions. In fact, most respondents are critical of the low wages and limited jobs (both in numerical terms but also in terms of the scope of responsibilities given to them) in their field of study in their country of origin. Others decided to




Figure 7.5 Type of employment after emigration (at destination), by sex and country of origin (only employed).

Source: High-Skill Migration in Times of Crisis – Survey 2013.




Figure 7.6 Income classes (€) after migration (at destination), by sex.

Source: High-Skill Migration in Times of Crisis – Survey 2013.




Figure 7.7 Satisfaction with income after migration, by sex
 Source: High-Skill Migration in Times of Crisis – Survey 2013.

move primarily to further improve their skills and qualifications (mainly through pursuing a specialization at an MA level or engaging in doctoral or post-doctoral research), or to follow their partner. In this sense, simply measuring the level of employment at destination could be misleading. In their open-ended answers, the respondents expressed their frustration with the lack of infrastructure and investment in R&D, as well as the lack of open and meritocratic labour markets, opportunities and career prospects in their origin countries. At a more personal level, they have highlighted the general sense of economic precariousness associated with the crisis in their countries of origin.

For these reasons, we decided to measure the differences between women and men in our selected sample in terms of their current level of income and of their satisfaction with their current economic situation. To do so, we ran two distinct models:

- (a) an ordered logistic regression to test variation in the level of income, measured in classes;
- (b) a logistic regression to test the probability of being satisfied or very satisfied with the current economic situation.

Each model has been tested on the total sample (of the engineers and computer scientists from Greece, Spain and Portugal) and separately on the female and male respondents and uses almost the same list of explanatory variables. Along with some control demographic covariates, we included a set of variables which we consider to be associated with different aspects

of the migration experience and with the probability of having a higher income:

1. Demographic profile:

- Sex
- Age
- Time of migration
- Previous migration experiences
- Children and/or partner
- Moved with or without partner and/or children
- Country of origin

2. Employment conditions:

- Improved employment conditions in comparison with the period prior to migration measured as becoming employed or, for those already employed, improving the contract conditions in comparison with the last job in the country of origin (from no contract to contract, from a short-term to a long-term one).
- Area of employment: we distinguish between those who are employed in a sector which corresponds to the field of education (engineering or IT), those who work in the education and research sector and those who are employed in other sectors and are presumably not (completely) using the skills acquired through their degrees.

3. Choice of destination:

- The country of destination has been specifically chosen by the emigrant.
- The reasons for choosing to move to a specific country have been clustered in five categories: legal or administrative reasons, the willingness to grasp better career or study opportunities, the appreciation of the quality of life and language of the destination country, the need to stay or join family/partner/friends, the desire to earn a better income.
- Destinations disaggregated by most common country/area among respondents: the UK, Germany, Continental Europe (France, Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland), other EU countries, rest of the world.

7.5 Rewarding education with income

Table 7.4 reports the full estimation results for the ordered logistic regression employed to test the probability of having a higher income. Models 1, 2 and 3 include the variable ‘country of destination’, while Models 4, 5 and 6

Table 7.4 Ordered logistic model for the level of income (odds ratios)

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	OR	OR	OR	OR	OR	OR
	Total	Female	Male	Total	Female	Male
Age classes (base: below 30)						
- 31-45	2.677*** (0.343)	2.761*** (0.707)	2.659*** (0.404)	2.596*** (0.324)	2.659*** (0.680)	2.573*** (0.379)
- 46+	9.801***		9.747***	9.120***	26.98***	8.570***
Education level (base: BA)						
Masters	1.502** (0.175)	1.706** (0.393)	1.494*** (0.206)	1.578*** (0.187)	1.610* (0.402)	1.579*** (0.216)
PhD	2.932*** (0.700)	4.004*** (2.154)	2.860*** (0.777)	3.150*** (0.713)	3.518*** (1.638)	3.139*** (0.808)
Time of migration (base: before 2007)						
- 2007-2009	0.627** (0.143)	0.512 (0.231)	0.665 (0.180)	0.717 (0.162)	0.655 (0.315)	0.749 (0.199)
- 2010-2011	0.451*** (0.0993)	0.410** (0.183)	0.462*** (0.119)	0.592** (0.130)	0.582 (0.280)	0.599** (0.152)
- 2012-2013	0.339*** (0.0716)	0.240*** (0.106)	0.379*** (0.0932)	0.408*** (0.0853)	0.283*** (0.137)	0.452*** (0.108)
Moved alone (YES)	0.880 (0.123)	0.606* (0.168)	1.006 (0.166)	0.908 (0.123)	0.687 (0.187)	0.998 (0.156)
Children (YES)	1.366* (0.230)	0.912 (0.376)	1.466** (0.279)	1.409** (0.229)	1.057 (0.408)	1.474** (0.271)
Married/partnered (YES)	1.348** (0.157)	1.522* (0.370)	1.330** (0.180)	1.503*** (0.178)	1.456 (0.363)	1.522*** (0.209)
Lived in other countries (YES)	1.311** (0.139)	1.094 (0.222)	1.433*** (0.180)	1.350*** (0.139)	1.053 (0.213)	1.479*** (0.178)
Area of employment (base: others)						
Engineering/IT	2.060*** (0.412)	1.937** (0.617)	2.236*** (0.577)	2.276*** (0.447)	2.121** (0.692)	2.410*** (0.609)
Education/Research	0.528** (0.154)	0.699 (0.318)	0.477** (0.172)	0.612* (0.174)	0.660 (0.286)	0.590 (0.213)
Destination specifically chosen (YES)	0.862 (0.126)	0.726 (0.233)	0.945 (0.158)	0.899 (0.131)	0.617 (0.209)	1.005 (0.163)
Improved employment conditions (YES)	0.403*** (0.0447)	0.628** (0.141)	0.348*** (0.0458)	0.462*** (0.0496)	0.627** (0.136)	0.415*** (0.0523)
Reason for choosing destination:						
- Chosen for legal reasons	0.677*** (0.0770)	0.524*** (0.120)	0.723** (0.0971)	0.614*** (0.0667)	0.458*** (0.0998)	0.655*** (0.0838)

Table 7.4 (Continued)

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	OR	OR	OR	OR	OR	OR
	Total	Female	Male	Total	Female	Male
– Chosen for career/study opportunities	1.317* (0.194)	1.671* (0.480)	1.163 (0.202)	1.308* (0.193)	2.007** (0.592)	1.114 (0.192)
– Chosen for language, quality of the country	1.028 (0.150)	0.909 (0.271)	1.098 (0.190)	0.900 (0.125)	0.798 (0.230)	0.941 (0.154)
– Chosen for friends/family/partner	0.710*** (0.0815)	0.646** (0.143)	0.766* (0.106)	0.688*** (0.0762)	0.631** (0.138)	0.728** (0.0963)
– Chosen for better income	2.337*** (0.298)	2.096*** (0.535)	2.450*** (0.370)	2.322*** (0.283)	2.482*** (0.604)	2.365*** (0.337)
Country of Destination (base: UK)						
– Germany	1.648*** (0.260)	2.173** (0.726)	1.558** (0.286)			
– Continental Europe	2.461*** (0.367)	3.468*** (1.045)	2.253*** (0.398)			
– Rest of EU	1.013 (0.172)	1.150 (0.409)	1.006 (0.197)			
– Rest of the World	2.286*** (0.399)	2.338** (0.808)	2.450*** (0.515)			
Sex: Female	0.524*** (0.0635)			0.526*** (0.0619)		
Country of Origin (base: Greece)						
– Spain				1.449** (0.260)	1.752 (0.684)	1.373 (0.278)
– Portugal				2.079*** (0.313)	1.582 (0.529)	2.231*** (0.379)
Constant cut1	0.0388*** (0.0167)	0.0553*** (0.0415)	0.0483*** (0.0265)	0.0686*** (0.0301)	0.0613*** (0.0531)	0.0856*** (0.0462)
Constant cut2	0.381** (0.157)	0.513 (0.374)	0.509 (0.262)	0.650 (0.272)	0.565 (0.472)	0.852 (0.434)
Constant cut3	1.944 (0.800)	2.948 (2.155)	2.555* (1.316)	3.095*** (1.294)	2.992 (2.489)	3.985*** (2.022)
Constant cut4	6.162*** (2.542)	9.537*** (6.976)	8.200*** (4.240)	9.382*** (3.923)	9.377*** (7.753)	12.14*** (6.159)
Observations	1,445	351	1,094	1,511	363	1,148

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses – ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

Source: High-Skill Migration in Times of Crisis – Survey 2013.

include the variable 'country of origin'. Estimated coefficients in the tables are the proportional odds ratios for one unit increase in a variable while others are held constant. Odds ratios above 1 indicate a positive estimated relationship with the outcome variable.

Interestingly, results show that our explanatory variables for the variations in the level of income present the same sign and almost the same significance for the models with only females (2.5) and those with only males (3.6).

In all model specifications, income increases with age and level of education: other things being constant, younger people earn less, and those with graduate or postgraduate education earn more than undergraduates. Also, individuals who migrated before the crisis are economically better off than those who migrated during the crisis. This might be due to unfavourable labour conditions encountered abroad during the crisis but also due to the fact that it generally takes time to settle, grow and thrive in any professional setting. Hence, the shorter the time spent abroad, the higher the chances to be still in search of an occupation which really fits one's skills and qualifications.

Having emigrated alone is associated with slightly lower earnings: rather than a cause in itself, this might be a sign that those with better economic conditions have been able to move with families, which is a difficult decision to take both from an economic and social (networks of family and friends) perspective. This interpretation is consistent with the fact that married individuals and those with children show a positive relation with higher incomes: building a family and eventually deciding to move with a partner and children are choices connected with better economic conditions. Interestingly, those who registered past migration experiences are more likely to earn more (especially in the case of men), as well as those who are able to match their degrees with their specific sectors of activity: highly skilled educated emigrants in technical skills are earning more if they work in engineering and IT than in any other sector.

The variable 'improved employment conditions' is negatively associated with earnings in all model specifications. This essentially means that other things being equal, those who have stable, long-term employment in the country of destination are not necessarily those who also earn more. Two explanations may be relevant here. First, stable jobs that offer long-term prospects may be associated with lower remunerations than those granted to freelance and in more mobile positions. Second, it is possible that respondents may have selected their jobs in the country of destination according to a range of criteria and not only based on salary level (e.g., to better match with their skills, greater potential for future career development, acquiring additional skills).

Not surprisingly, the respondents who identified economic reasons as having defined their decision to select a specific country (e.g., better income

and better career opportunities) are more likely to be linked with higher incomes than those who based their choice of destination country on family reasons/links or administrative and bureaucratic reasons. Moreover, countries of destination do not seem equal in terms of earning possibilities for our sample of highly skilled emigrants in the fields of engineering and IT. Respondents who have moved to Germany, to other Continental European countries and to countries that we have grouped as 'rest of the world' (Brazil, Angola, the US, United Arab Emirates and Canada, among others) have declared earning higher salaries than their co-nationals who moved to the UK and the other EU countries. When considering the data from the perspective of the origin countries, we noted that Spaniards and Portuguese (especially males) seem to earn more than their Greek counterparts.

As mentioned above, there is no general difference in the way the explanatory variables included work on the probability of having a higher income. The estimated model seems to confirm that for highly educated people in technical fields the level of education together with the positive matching between acquired skills and the sector of employment plays a role both for sampled men and women. However, as shown in Models 1 and 4, sex is per se a significant variable in explaining variations of income, meaning that after controlling for all other variables and keeping everything else constant female emigrants earn less than their male counterparts.

7.5.1 Satisfaction with current income

The second model examines whether there is a difference not only in the monetary reward that men and women with similar characteristics receive even when emigrating but also in the subjective perception of their condition abroad in terms of satisfaction with income.

Table 7.5 presents regression results again in the form of odds ratios, substantially mirroring the model presented above concerning the list of explanatory variables. Results are in line with the relations already explained, but estimates are far less significant than in the previous model. This can be at least partially due to the fact that the outcome variable tries to capture personal perceptions, which are always difficult to measure in a standardized way. Also, since not all observations report non-missing information on the outcome variable, we only present the specifications with the total sample.

Again, higher levels of education and proper matching between the field of education and the sector of employment seem to be rewarded with a higher probability of being satisfied with the current income. Also, the expectations of those who chose their country of destination on the basis of economic reasons (better earning) and of the preference for the destination in terms of quality of life and knowing the language are associated with a higher probability of being satisfied with their current income.

Table 7.5 Logistic regression model – satisfaction with current income (odds ratios)

Variables	(1) Total – CoO	(2) Total – CoD	(3) Total – CoO	(4) Total – CoD
Age classes (base: below 30)				
– 31–45	1.238 (0.278)	1.350 (0.312)	0.862 (0.206)	0.936 (0.229)
– 46+	1.527 (0.896)	7.468* (8.028)	1.077 (0.663)	5.506 (6.453)
Education level (base: BA)				
Masters	1.197 (0.252)	1.182 (0.248)	0.914 (0.214)	0.912 (0.212)
PhD	1.992 (0.913)	2.058 (1.033)	0.893 (0.406)	0.982 (0.466)
Time of migration (base: before 2007)				
– 2007–2009	0.926 (0.338)	0.910 (0.366)	0.893 (0.372)	0.986 (0.431)
– 2010–2011	1.099 (0.403)	0.950 (0.379)	1.199 (0.487)	1.252 (0.538)
– 2012–2013	1.349 (0.465)	1.276 (0.481)	1.735 (0.668)	1.886 (0.777)
Moved alone (YES)	0.962 (0.223)	0.990 (0.238)	1.068 (0.263)	1.089 (0.278)
Children (YES)	0.906 (0.248)	0.827 (0.239)	0.769 (0.227)	0.757 (0.234)
Married/Partnered (YES)	1.141 (0.247)	1.084 (0.242)	1.016 (0.235)	0.977 (0.230)
Lived in other countries (YES)	1.009 (0.188)	0.926 (0.180)	0.853 (0.169)	0.822 (0.168)
Area of employment (base: others)				
Engineering/IT	1.764** (0.471)	1.839** (0.520)	1.278 (0.351)	1.479 (0.415)
Education/Research	1.310 (0.690)	1.188 (0.652)	2.251 (1.285)	2.207 (1.255)
Destination specifically chosen (YES)	1.136 (0.316)	0.999 (0.273)	1.399 (0.392)	1.230 (0.351)
Improved employment conditions (YES)	0.881 (0.181)	0.833 (0.177)	1.122 (0.246)	1.093 (0.244)
Reason for choosing destination:				
– Chosen for legal reasons	0.553*** (0.120)	0.531*** (0.123)	0.662* (0.152)	0.607** (0.148)
– Chosen for career/study opportunities	1.290 (0.296)	1.258 (0.284)	1.118 (0.275)	1.076 (0.262)
– Chosen for language, quality of the country	1.286 (0.334)	1.369 (0.357)	1.452 (0.396)	1.483 (0.402)

Table 7.5 (Continued)

Variables	(1) Total – CoO	(2) Total – CoD	(3) Total – CoO	(4) Total – CoD
– Chosen for friends/family/partner	0.948 (0.200)	1.009 (0.221)	1.167 (0.266)	1.212 (0.288)
– Chosen for better income	2.302*** (0.518)	2.255*** (0.511)	1.723** (0.419)	1.716** (0.415)
Not satisfied with occupation before migration (YES)	0.599*** (0.117)	0.636** (0.129)	0.595** (0.125)	0.634** (0.140)
Country of Destination (base: UK)				
– Germany		0.642 (0.215)		0.470** (0.174)
– Continental Europe		1.122 (0.372)		0.763 (0.274)
– Rest of EU		0.595 (0.190)		0.526* (0.187)
– Rest of the World		0.723 (0.239)		0.526* (0.195)
Sex: Female	0.612** (0.129)	0.589** (0.129)	0.891 (0.207)	0.857 (0.200)
Country of Origin (base: Greece)				
– Spain	0.820 (0.281)		0.629 (0.232)	
– Portugal	1.392 (0.381)		0.932 (0.276)	
Income class (base: 0–1000)				
– 1001–3000			5.646*** (3.736)	4.985** (3.405)
– 3001–+			42.18*** (29.26)	34.73*** (24.56)
Constant	1.571 (1.036)	2.764 (1.881)	0.199* (0.174)	0.289 (0.276)
Observations	1,002	955	994	947

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses – ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Also CoO stands for Country of Origin and CoD stands for Country of Destination.

Source: High-Skill Migration in Times of Crisis – Survey 2013.

As for a comparison of the situation and perception of one's status before migration, we also included a variable which codifies the level of dissatisfaction with the occupation prior to migration: those who declared to be not satisfied before migration are also those who are more likely to not be satisfied with their situation in the country of destination as regards level of income. This tends to be the case even when their migration has 'objectively' improved, that is in terms of level of income or occupational

stability, thereby indeed suggesting the subjective nature of any individual's expectations as regards his or her career prospects, career development, personal fulfilment and migration experience overall.

Although the general significance of the model is lower than the previous one, the most interesting finding here is that the gender variable, which in Models 1 and 2 signals a lower probability for women to be satisfied with their present condition, is no longer significant when we include as a control also the income variable. Hence, if we control for the level of income, there is no more significant difference in the level of satisfaction with income reported by women and men.

7.6 Concluding remarks

Let us return to the questions we set out to explore in this chapter. We set out to understand what has affected the decisions of young Greek, Spanish and Portuguese women with degrees in engineering, IT and computer studies to leave Greece, Portugal and Spain respectively. We also set out to identify where they are migrating to and how they are doing in their countries of destination. Basically, we have sought to understand whether and in what ways their employment conditions may have changed through their migration experience and how satisfied they are with the outcomes of their decision to migrate, particularly when compared to their male co-nationals who have made a similar decision to move.

Lack of employment opportunities, lack of professional development prospects, lack of meritocracy and low levels of remuneration that do not permit financial independence are the common push factors across all three countries. Gender seems irrelevant in this context as the answers of the male and female respondents are similar throughout, without any particular reference to gender as a further restricting factor in the origin countries.

Given the international transferability of their skills, IT professionals and engineers are in an advantageous position in terms of being able to seek employment that will allow them to improve their income and career potential across borders. In our study we found that indeed Greeks, Spaniards and Portuguese who hold degrees in these fields and who have chosen to emigrate from their countries of origin documented overall positive outcomes from their migration project. We do, however, note some differences between the male and female respondents which we return to below.

The first encouraging finding is that education, regardless of gender, does in fact pay. In other words, an individual's investment in terms of financial resources, time and effort are indeed rewarded in labour markets other than their country of origin if they choose to emigrate. The second interesting finding is that men and women in this highly selected group of emigrants with tertiary education in technical skills that tend to be 'male dominated'

seem to behave similarly: they earn more if they succeed in finding an employment which matches with their qualifications. Nevertheless, there is an income gap between females and males. With all other things being equal, and when controlling for all other factors that may affect the earnings while abroad, female respondents earn less than their male counterparts. On the contrary, satisfaction with the present situation does not seem to vary between sexes: controlling for income, men and women are equally likely to declare that they are satisfied with their current income. Since we know that women earn less, this might be a signal that women tend to appreciate more than men what they obtain, or to give more importance to other factors other than earnings in their evaluation of their present conditions (which we are unable to identify with the data that we have at our disposal).

As regards the time of migration and the length of stay, the same information can be read in two different ways. Those who migrated during the crisis have lower earnings because they were unable to find general better conditions abroad too; they escaped with no clear plans and they have not (yet?) found the 'Eldorado' abroad that they were seeking. But it is also true that those who migrated during the crisis have simply had less time to adapt and grow professionally in their new professional contexts. Those who have a longer length of stay are those who have settled in a more stable way and have experienced through time vertical mobility (earnings generally, not always and not everywhere, increase with seniority). Lastly, prior migration experience (irrespective of the reason for which they were living in a country other than their country of origin or the duration of stay) has a positive effect on the income levels of the male respondents but seems to have no relevant consequence on the income levels of women.

Thus, our findings present a mixed picture of successes combined with persistent gender gaps. Young Greek, Spanish and Portuguese women with degrees in engineering, IT and computer studies who have chosen to emigrate during the crisis certainly appear to be overall improving their employment conditions when compared to their prior situation in their country of origin, but alas not to the extent that their male colleagues are doing. This is the case for those who have migrated to another EU member state just as much as it is the case for those who have migrated to destinations outside the EU, thereby underlining what OECD reports have consistently flagged out, namely that even in OECD countries underlying features in the education systems or societies continue to foster gender gaps.⁶ Many OECD countries are implementing various policy actions to address the issue of low female participation in science and engineering and in computer science. Greece, Spain and Portugal are far from leaders in this field. This is particularly disconcerting given the impacts of the crisis and the austerity policies on their education systems and related policies, and given the precious female and male human capital that emigrate during this crisis.

ANNEX: Entries from the e-survey on High-Skill Migration from Southern Europe and Ireland in Times of Crisis Used in the Empirical Models in this Chapter

Variable in the models	Type	Relevant question(s) in the original questionnaire
Sex: Female	dummy	What is your gender? – Female – Male
Age	categorical	What is your age: – Under 30 – 31–45 – 46–65 – Over 66
Time of migration (base: before 2007)	categorical	When did you leave your country of citizenship/previous residence?
Lived in other countries (YES)	dummy	Have you ever lived in another country (i.e. different from your country of origin) before?
Children (YES)	dummy	Do you have children
Married/partnered (YES)	dummy	Are you married/partnered?
Moved alone (YES)	dummy	Did you move: – Alone – With spouse/partner – With spouse/partner and children – With the children but without the spouse/partner
Education level	categorical	If you hold a higher education degree, indicate if it is a: – Undergraduate degree (ex. BA, BSc, Licence, etc.) – Masters’ degree (graduate, ex. MA, LLM, MPhil, etc.) – PhD
Field of education	categorical	Please mark your discipline of studies; – Social Sciences – Economics, Management, Business – Engineering – Medical and Health professions – Humanities and Education – Mathematics and Natural Sciences – Law – IT and Computer Science – Other

(Continued)

Variable in the models	Type	Relevant question(s) in the original questionnaire
Dissatisfaction with occupation before migration	dummy	How satisfied were you in this occupation? – Very satisfied – Moderately satisfied – Indifferent – Not very satisfied – Not satisfied at all
Improved employment conditions (YES)	dummy	1. Prior to leaving your country of citizenship/previous residence, were you employed (i.e. in the 6 months before your departure) 2. If you were working in the last 6 months before living, what type of contract did you hold? 3. Are you currently employed? 4. What type of contract do you currently hold?
Area of current employment	categorical	What is your current area of employment? – Engineering – Architecture – Law – Construction – Agriculture and Fishery – Information Technology – Industry – Education and Research – Medicine and paramedical jobs (ex. nursing, physiotherapist) – Psychology and Humanities – Trade – Hotels, Restaurants and Bars – Provision of Services (ex. journalism, banking, insurance, consulting) – Military and Police – Other
Country of destination	categorical	What is your current country of residence
Destination specifically chosen (YES)	dummy	Did you specifically choose this country to move to/emigrate to?

Reason for choosing destination:	set of dummies	<p>What reasons made you choose this country? (more than 1 allowed)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Because I can work here (no visa restrictions, or I am a citizen of this country) - Better career opportunities - I speak the language - Better income - Better quality of life - I have friends here - I have family/relatives here - My spouse/partner lived here/or found a job here - I had studied here - I had always wanted to live here
Income (classes)	categorical	<p>Could you please mark which of these intervals fits your currently monthly income (gross)?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - I do not have an income - Less than 1000 euros - Between 1000 and 2000 euros - Between 2001 and 3000 euros - Between 3001 and 4000 euros - More than 4001 euros
Satisfaction with income	dummy	<p>How would you rate your level of satisfaction with your income?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Very satisfied - Satisfied - Indifferent - Not satisfied - Not at all satisfied

Notes

1. See the World Migration in Figures 2013 available online at: <http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/World-Migration-in-Figures.pdf> (accessed: 2 April 2015).
2. According to the classification adopted by OECD, engineering includes manufacturing and processing, construction, architecture; IT includes computer science and use; education includes teaching and education science; health and welfare includes medicine and social services (childcare and social work) (Andersson and Olsson 1999). See the Eurostat manual on fields of education and training based on ISCED 97 codes: https://circabc.europa.eu/sd/a/a18b5ec8-01fe-44b8-9524-afe1c55c0818/manual_final.pdf (accessed: 2 April 2015).
3. Permit allowing high-skill non-EU citizens to work and live in any EU member state with the exception of Denmark, Ireland and the UK (Council Directive 2009/50/EC).

4. Available online at: <http://publications.europeintheworld.com/expert-student-exchange-encourages-young-brains-flee-southern-europe/> (accessed: 2 April 2015).
5. High-Skill Migration in Times of Crisis – Survey at: <http://globalgovernanceprogramme.eui.eu/survey>
6. See <http://www.oecd.org/gender/data/wherearetomorrowsfemalescientists.htm> (accessed: 2 April 2015).

References

- Ackers, L. (2004) 'Managing Relationships in Peripatetic Careers: Scientific Mobility in the European Union', *Women's Studies International Forum*, 27(3), 188–201.
- Ackers, L. (2011) 'Internationalisation, Excellence and Mobility: Examining Relationships and Gender Consequences', in *Going Global? (Highly) Skilled Migrants and Societal Participation*, RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany, 17–18 March 2011.
- Ackers, L. and G. Gill (2008) *Moving People and Knowledge. Scientific Mobility in an Enlarging European Union* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar).
- Alcaraz, R.C. (2012) *Migratory Routes and Dynamics between Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) Countries and between LAC and the European Union*. A. Detrell, O. Grosjean and T. Keating (eds.) (Brussels: IOM).
- Andersson, R. and A.K. Olsson (1999) *Eurostat Fields of Education and Training Manual*. Available online at: https://circabc.europa.eu/sd/a/a18b5ec8-01fe-44b8-9524-afe1c55c0818/manual_final.pdf (accessed: 2 April 2015).
- Arslan, C. et al. (2014) 'A New Profile of Migrants in the Aftermath of the Recent Economic Crisis', *OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers*, No. 160 (Paris: OECD Publishing).
- Barro, R.J. and W. Lee (2013) 'A New Data Set of Educational Attainment in the World – 1950–2010', *Journal of Development Economics*, 104(C), 184–198.
- Campanella, E. (2014) 'Come Home, Europeans. Europe's Brain Drain Problem Is Becoming a Major Crisis', *Foreign Affairs*, 16 October 2014. Available online at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142218/edoardo-campanella/come-home-europeans> (accessed: 2 April 2015).
- Constant, A. and E. D'Agosto (2008) 'Where do the Brainy Italians Go?' *IZA Discussion Paper No.3325* (Bonn, GE: Institute for the Study of Labour).
- Cooke, F.L. (2007) "'Husband's Career First": Renegotiating Career and Family Commitment among Migrant Chinese Academic Couples in Britain', *Work, Employment and Society*, 21(1), 47–65.
- Czarniawaska, B. and G. Sevón (2008) 'The Thin End of the Wedge: Foreign Women Professors as Double Strangers in Academia', *Gender, Work and Organization*, 15(3), 235–287.
- Da Vanzo, J. (1983) 'Repeat Migration in the United States: Who Moves Back and Who Moves On?' *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 65(4), 552–559.
- De Grip, A. and E. Willems (2003) 'Youngsters and Technology', *Research Policy*, 32(10), 1771–1781. Available online at: <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0048733303000799> (accessed: 2 April 2015).
- De Grip, A., D. Fouarge and J. Sauer mann (2010) 'What Affects International Migration of European Science and Engineering Graduates?' *Economics of Innovation and New Technology*, 19(5), 407–421.
- Docquier, F., B. Lindsay Lowell and A. Marfouk (2009) 'A Gendered Assessment of Highly Skilled Emigration', *Population and Development Review*, 35(2), 297–321.

- Dumont, J.-C., J. Martin and G. Spielvogel (2007) 'Women on the Move: The Neglected Gender Dimension of the Brain Drain', *IZA Discussion Paper No. 2920* (Bonn, GE: Institute for the Study of Labour).
- Favell, A. (2009) *Eurostars and Eurocities. Free Movement and Mobility in an Integrating Europe* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing).
- Focus Migration (2013) 'Does the Crisis Make People Move? EU Internal Migration and Economic Disparities in Europe', *Policy Brief, No. 20*, February 2013.
- Fratesi, U. and M.R. Riggi (2007) 'Does Migration Reduce Regional Disparities? The Role of Skill-selective Flows', *Review of Urban and Regional Development Studies*, 19(1), 78–102.
- Freeman, R. (2006) 'Does Globalisation of the Scientific/ Engineering Workforce Threaten US Economic Leadership?' in A.B. Jaffe, J. Lerner and S. Stern (eds.) *Innovation Policy and the Economy Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 6* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 123–157.
- Grigoleit, G. (2010) 'Making a Career? The Integration of Highly Skilled Female Migrants into the German Job Market' in APPAM International Conference. *Migration: A World in Motion A Multinational Conference on Migration and Migration Policy*, Maastricht, Netherlands, 18–20 February 2010.
- Gropas, R. and A. Triandafyllidou (2014) 'Survey report. Emigrating in times of crisis. Highlights and new data from an e-survey on high-skilled emigrants from Southern Europe and Ireland', Global Governance Program, European University Institute. Available online at: <http://globalgovernanceprogramme.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/SURVEY-REPORT-Emigrating-in-times-of-crisis.pdf> (accessed: 2 April 2015).
- Hewitt, G. (2013) 'Jobs Crisis. Europe's Great Migration', *BBC NEWS* 26 June 2013. Available online at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-23047678> (accessed: 2 April 2015).
- Hewlett, S.A. et al. (2008) 'The Athena Factor: Reversing the Brain Drain in Science, Engineering and Technology', *Harvard Business Review Research Report No. 10094*. Available online at: <http://documents.library.nsf.gov/edocs/HD6060-.A84-2008-PDF-Athena-factor-Reversing-the-brain-drain-in-science-engineering-and-technology.pdf> (accessed: 2 April 2015).
- Jauer, J. et al. (2014) 'Migration as an Adjustment Mechanism in the Crisis? A Comparison of Europe and the United States', *IZA Discussion Paper No. 7921* (Bonn, GE: Institute for the Study of Labour).
- Kofman, E. (2012) 'Gender and High Skilled Migration in Europe', *Cuadernos de Relaciones Laborales*, 30(1), 63–89.
- Kofman, E., P. Raghuram and M. Merefield (2005) 'Gendered Migrations: Towards Gender Sensitive Policies in the UK', *Asylum and Migration Working Paper 6* (London: Institute of Public Policy Research).
- Labrianidis, L. and N. Vogiatzis (2012) 'Highly Skilled Migration: What Differentiates the "Brains" Who are Drained from Those Who Return in the Case of Greece?' *Population, Space and Place*, 19(5), 472–486.
- Martin, P. (2012) 'High-Skilled Migrants: S&E Workers in the United States', *American Behavioural Scientist*, 56(8), 1058–1079.
- Massey, D.S., Joaquin Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino and J. Edward Taylor (1993) 'Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal', *Population and Development Review*, 19, 431–466.
- Morel, S. (2013) 'En Espagne, la fuite des cerveaux face à la crise', *Le Monde*, 20 May 2013.

- OECD (2015) *Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries: DIOC 2010/2011*. Available online at: <http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/dioc.htm> (accessed: 2 April 2015).
- OECD (2013) *International Migration Outlook 2013* (Paris:OECD Publishing). Available online at: DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/migr_outlook-2013-en (accessed 3 April 2015).
- OECD-UNDESA (2013) *World Migration in Figures, A joint contribution by UN-DESA and the OECD to the United Nations High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development, 3–4 October 2013*. Available at: <http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/World-Migration-in-Figures.pdf> (accessed 3 April 2015).
- Parey, M. and F. Waldinger (2008) 'Studying Abroad and the Effect on International Labor Market Mobility: Evidence from the Introduction of ERASMUS', *IZA Discussion Paper No. 3430* (Bonn, GE: Institute for the Study of Labour).
- Pecoraro, M. (2011) 'Gender, Brain Waste and Job-education Mismatch Among Migrant Workers in Switzerland', *International Migration Paper No. 111* (Geneva: International Labour Office).
- Pelletier, B. (2011) 'L'Europe en crise et la fuite des cerveaux', *Gestion des Risques Interculturels*, 9 October 2011.
- Raghuram, P. (2008) 'Migrant Women in Male-dominated Sectors of the Labour Market: A Research Agenda', *Population, Space and Place*, 14, 1, 43–57.
- Raghuram, P. and D. Montiel (2003) 'Skilled Migratory Regimes: The Case of Female Medical Migrants in the UK', in A. Montanari (ed.) *The New Geography of Human Mobility: Inequality Trends* (Rome: Società Geografica Italiana), pp. 67–84.
- Reay, D. (2004) 'Cultural Capitalists and Academic Habitus: Classed and Gendered Labour in UK Higher Education', *Women's Studies International Forum*, 27, 31–39.
- Salvi del Pero, A. and A. Bytchkova (2013) 'A Bird's Eye View of Gender Differences in Education in OECD Countries', *OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers No. 149* (Paris: OECD Publishing).

8

International Students' Mobility, Gender Dimension and Crisis

*Marta Moskal**

8.1 Introduction

University student migration, which is frequently synonymous to high-skilled mobility, has continued to be the largest category of migration to the UK during the current economic downturn. A highly competitive education sector which is part of a globally integrated economy is at odds with current UK policy on immigration, which aims at reducing student migration.

The term 'highly skilled' commonly assumes these people to have a tertiary educational qualification or its equivalent (Koser and Salt 1997, p. 287). For the purposes of this chapter, the postgraduate students, both at the master's and doctoral levels, who were often employed as academic staff in their home countries, fall under the loosely defined category of 'highly skilled', as in this study they were involved in academic mobility, which can be seen as a form of highly skilled migration. The international students are often perceived to be highly mobile because of their skill sets and qualifications and because of the increasingly globalizing and internationalized higher education (HE) sector in the UK (Mavroudi and Warren 2013, p. 264).

As a result of the international economic and financial crisis of 2008, the British government has tried to reduce levels of labour immigration to the UK. In other words, during the recession, the UK went from being an international talent magnet to a closed labour market and extremely restrictive high-skilled migration host (Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou, Chapter 1, in this book). Concerns over foreign students using the student migration system as an entryway into the labour market prompted the British government

*I would like to thank the British Academy/Leverhulme Trust for funding the research. I am also extremely grateful to the students who found time to take part in the project.

Pseudonyms are used throughout.

to restrict the rights of students to work in the UK (Devitt 2014, p. 457). However, the total number of international students continues to grow and a significant disjuncture could be observed between current immigration policies and levels of immigration (Freeman 1995; Hollifield 2004; Joppke 1998). The argument is that the preference of the state/government for low levels of immigration is often not reflected in actual levels of immigration due to neo-liberal constraints on government actions (Devitt 2014). The higher education sector as a result is becoming increasingly transnational and partially independent from the state (Kauppinen 2015). As Bauman and Bordon (2014) observe, in the 'state of crisis' the globalized integrated economy and migratory flows (including highly skilled migrant workers and international student flows) have been separated from politics, which continues to operate at the national and local levels. This has created a situation of 'liberal paradox' where international students have become problematized by migration authorities, while simultaneously being vital to the higher education and academic life of the UK (Madge et al. 2014).

Globalization, internationalization and the difficulties of maintaining a funding base for higher education have all interacted to influence how universities function today in the developed world. One aspect of globalization is the increasing number of foreign students studying at higher education (HE) institutions in the UK (Asmar 2005, p. 291). International student mobility reflects the general trends in contemporary migration, identified by Castles and Miller (2009) as 'globalization, acceleration and differentiation', with increasing numbers of countries and higher education institutions affected by students' mobility. 'Feminization' as the 'fourth trend' also applies to students' mobility, as women play an increasing role in international student migration. The trends above highlight the links between student international mobility and economic and cultural change in the context of globalization.

Students are by far the largest component of those moving to the UK. The rise in the number of international students has been encouraged by the recruitment efforts of UK universities, much of which have focused on Asian countries, particularly China. This recruitment drive has coincided with the internationalization of education in sending countries, with an increasing number of academic exchanges and more students venturing abroad for their education. The statistical release from the Higher Education Statistical Agency (HESA 2014) shows that the number of students from outside the UK coming to study in the UK increased by 3% to 435,500 in relation to the previous academic year. This constituted almost 19% of all the students (see Table 8.1) and 58% of full-time postgraduates (see Table 8.2). Females form the majority of students (59%) among European Economic Area (EEA) born migrants. Among non-EEA-born migrants, males constituted the majority of the students at 58%. International students constitute the majority in many postgraduate courses,

Table 8.1 HE students in the UK in 2013/2014, by sex and selected domicile

All students	UK	Europe	Africa	Asia	Middle East	North America	Non-UK	Total
Female	57%	54%	42%	51%	35%	61%	51%	56%
Male	43%	46%	58%	49%	65%	39%	49%	44%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Percentage by domicile	81%	6%	1.5%	8.5%	1.2%	1.2%	19%	100%

Source: Compiled by author on the basis of data provided by the Higher Education Statistical Agency (HESA), 2014.

Table 8.2 HE postgraduate student enrolment in the UK in 2013/14

All modes		Full time	
UK	62%	UK	42%
Other EU	9%	Other EU	11.5%
Non-EU	29%	Non-EU	46.5%
All overseas	38%	All overseas	58%

Source: Compiled by author on the basis of data provided by the Higher Education Statistical Agency (HESA), 2014.

especially in subjects like business and administrative studies or engineering and technology.

Most students, actually 13% of total population, come from outside of Europe, with the number of Chinese students far exceeding any other nationality at 87,895 students in 2013–2014. Indian students are the next largest cohort, with 19,750 students, although this represents a drop of 13% from the previous year 2012–2013. These countries are followed by Nigeria, Malaysia, the US and Hong Kong respectively (see Table 8.3). European countries provide a less significant number of students (6% of the total student population), with Germany, France, Ireland and Greece being at the top of the list; however, since the beginning of the economic crisis, attendance from these countries had a tendency to decrease, and Italy and Spain are showing the most significant increase in numbers (see Table 8.4).

The question is whether the onset of the economic crisis, the UK's labour market and changes in UK policies on highly skilled migration affect the patterns in international student educational and labour mobility and whether there is a particular impact of the crisis on female international students.

This chapter begins with a critical overview of UK immigration policy modifications during the economic recession, followed by a discussion on

Table 8.3 Top non-EEA countries in 2013/14 and 2012/13 for HE overseas students in the UK

1	China (PRC)	87,895	83,790
2	India	19,750	22,385
3	Nigeria	18,020	17,395
4	Malaysia	16,635	15,015
5	US	16,485	16,235
6	Hong Kong	14,725	13,065
7	Saudi Arabia	9,060	9,440
8	Singapore	6,790	6,020
9	Pakistan	6,665	7,185
10	Canada	6,350	6,190

Source: Compiled by author on the basis of data provided by the Higher Education Statistical Agency (HESA), 2014.

Table 8.4 Top EEA countries in 2013/14 and 2012/13 for HE overseas students in the UK

1	Germany	14,060	14,520
2	France	11,500	11,725
3	Ireland	11,490	12,620
4	Greece	10,670	10,910
5	Cyprus	10,295	10,840
6	Italy	9,550	8,320
7	Spain	6,585	5,995
8	Romania	6,515	6,460
9	Bulgaria	6,355	6,060
10	Poland	5,200	5,280

Source: Compiled by author on the basis of data provided by the Higher Education Statistical Agency (HESA), 2014.

the split between the changing national policy measures and the HE and various business sector strategies to attract the 'best and the brightest'. The policy analysis compliments the perspectives of international students presented. Special focus on female graduates in comparison to male graduates is given, as they seem to be more dependent on the family and the social ties of their home countries, which influence their future professional career and spatial mobility. The chapter concludes with assumptions about an indirect impact of the crisis upon international student mobility which have made the incorporation of foreign graduates into the UK labour market more difficult.

8.2 UK immigration policy and international students

Considering that almost half of recent immigration to the UK concerns EU and EEA citizens, these significant migration flows can hardly be controlled. Also family reunification migration from third country nationals (TCNs) is difficult to curb significantly, since the restriction of such migration may be seen as violating basic human rights. As a result, the UK government has focused its restrictive migration policies on labour and student migration from non-EEA countries.

Since the late 1990s, the UK, like many other Western countries, has adopted labour immigration policies that increasingly differentiate migrants on the basis of skill (Mavroudi and Warren 2013, p. 261). The implementation of the points-based system (PBS) in the UK since 2008, together with the introduction of an annual limit on immigration numbers for skilled migrants, and the termination of immigration visas for highly skilled individuals not linked to job offers have been the key elements of the labour immigration policy that is focused on a particular selection of skills (Bach 2010; Devitt 2014). Although the UK government wishes to restrict immigration, Mavroudi and Warren observed, it also appears to acknowledge that certain types of highly skilled migrants are good for the economy by introducing, what they term, 'high value' Tier 1 categories such as 'entrepreneur', 'investor' and 'exceptional talent'. However, since the Conservative Party gained votes in the 2010 general election, the government now pushes an agenda that brings migration numbers down, and it is making it harder for these 'desirable' migrants to apply for work in the UK (Mavroudi and Warren 2013, p. 262).

Devitt points out that some qualitative changes have been made to the largest Tier of the PBS, Tier 2 (for highly skilled migrant workers with a job offer in the UK), in order to reduce the number of applicants, raising the job skill level, language and the minimum pay thresholds. Furthermore, the list of occupations on the shortage occupation list was also shortened in September 2011. Most controversially, the government also introduced an annual cap on some categories of non-EEA economic migrants for Tier 2 and Tier 1 and restricted the entry channel which does not require a job offer in the UK prior to entry (Devitt 2014, p. 451).

An important target of net migration is higher education. Under the PBS, people travelling to the UK to study have been classified as Tier 4 applicants. However, they do accumulate points in the same way as the other Tiers because all applicants need 40 points to apply for a visa (30 for a valid confirmation of acceptance for studies and 10 points for having enough funds to attend). In March 2011, following a public consultation on the student immigration system (UKBA 2010), the government announced that the Tier 1 Post-Study Work visa category would close from April 2012. The Post-Study Work visa enabled foreign students to remain in the UK for up to

two years after obtaining a UK degree. Since April 2012, international graduates are only able to remain in the UK by switching into Tier 2 of the PBS or if they have a strong business proposition, which now falls under the new provisions for student entrepreneurs (Devitt 2014, p. 451).

One of the results of the student visa restriction is a decline in the number of students getting Tier 4 student visas, particularly from India and Pakistan. These are countries that send large numbers of students and are also important countries for the UK in terms of international trade and industry engagement so that education-related mobility cannot be considered on its own. The fall in student numbers from India and Pakistan could be partly attributed to the growing perception that Britain is not a welcoming place for international students and partly due to the recent visa rules that do not allow students to work during or after their studies, which is a major obstacle to gaining experience and repaying study fees. The actual impact of the phasing out of the Post-Study Work visa is, however, unclear, as it is difficult to estimate how many students were discouraged from applying to courses in the UK. Nevertheless, the reduction in student visas is not enough to reduce the net migration of students, which is intended to bring overall net migration down to the 'tens of thousands' (Cameron 2013).

Many of the student migrants enter the labour market after originally coming to the UK for non-work purposes. According to Cooper et al. (2014), the employment rates for migrants who came to study in the UK was 66% (for EEA students) and 62% (non-EEA). The non-EEA students wishing to stay in the UK beyond the terms of their initial student visa can apply for an extension of their student visa, or apply for a new visa under a work or family category. Some might even stay on illegally, without a visa. The outcomes of extension applications made by non-EEA students have been rather positive, and refusals have been relatively rare, although they were higher during the initial stages of the PBS. In 2014, about 85% of student extension applications were accepted, while about 15% were rejected (Home Office 2014).

8.3 State vs university: Academic capitalism and crisis

The changes to immigration policy have created a 'liberal paradox' (Hollifield 2004), with states caught between open and closed borders. On the one hand, open borders are deemed beneficial to the economy; on the other, borders are selective, with workers being categorized and facing different types of restrictions (Wills et al. 2009). Madge et al. (2014) describe this paradox in the HE context as one where policies involve an explicit drive to use international students' fees as a mode for enhancing income (Mulley and Sachrajda 2011), while concurrently placing increasingly stringent visa restrictions and greater responsibilities for educational institutions to keep track of their international students.

Due to the hegemony of neo-liberalism and global economic integration, human capital competitiveness has come to be viewed as the lynchpin of economic growth in developed economies (Crouch 2005). As a result, highly skilled migrants are viewed to be important actors in this global skills competition in the most developed economies. This perspective is significantly fuelled by employer groups, in particular those representing multinational companies, which lobby for access to skilled mobile workers (Devitt 2014).

In *State of Crisis*, Bauman and Bordoni (2014) suggest that the economic and social crises we face, and the impotence in governmental response, are not temporary but profound and enduring. They argue that in a globalized world real power is located in the global flow of capital and it has been taking over the agency of the state. The higher education institutions in a global, neo-liberal context are networking and building transnational consortia, growing beyond the state and state powers (Guo 2010). The higher education sector is becoming increasingly transnational and partially independent from the state, with international student mobility being one of the features of 'academic capitalism' (Kauppinen and Kaidesoja 2014). The term 'academic capitalism' refers to a multidimensional process of integration between higher education and the knowledge-based economy. Moreover, the theory of academic capitalism emphasizes that this integration is based on the blurring of boundaries between higher education, states and markets and recognizes that academic capitalism is related to economic globalization, new technologies and reduced state funding of higher education. On an organizational level, the theory of academic capitalism argues that higher education institutions have increasingly started to commodify knowledge in order to finance their core functions, research and instruction (Kauppinen 2015, p. 336).

Kauppinen argues for the usefulness of the notion of transnational academic capitalism (TAC) that implies cross-national activities, practices and networks that possess certain stability over time (Portes et al. 1999). Some empirical examples of TAC include 'transnational student markets; that is, students who cross nation-state borders to study in foreign universities and pay tuition fees' as well as 'establishing branch campuses and joint ventures with higher education institutions located in another nation state' (Kauppinen 2015, p. 336).

International students have significant impact on the HE sector as formal study is the biggest reason for net migration into the UK (Migration Statistics Quarterly Report 2014). UK universities point out that foreign students bring significant economic benefits to the UK, which in fact help to finance higher education for domestic students. The recent report by *In Focus* shows that the HE sector generated an estimated £11.7 billion export earnings for the UK in 2011–2012; these funds mainly came from fees and accommodation

expenditures as well as goods and services bought off-campus by non-EU students (*In Focus* 2014).

In the debate around UK immigration, representatives of the business and higher education sector have expressed concerns that the decline in student numbers is not necessarily a good thing, since it may reflect the deteriorating image of the UK as a potential destination for students and high-skilled labour. This may harm British universities and long-term economic growth in general. For instance, James Dyson (prominent inventor and business leader), writing in the *Guardian* (Dyson 2015), criticized Home Secretary May's manifesto pledge to require overseas students to leave the country and apply for a new visa if they wanted to work in Britain as 'a short-term vote winner that leads to long-term economic decline'. His criticism echoed concerns about growing shortages of qualified scientists and engineers in Britain from science and industry leaders. According to the CEO of Universities UK, the government's increasingly tough rhetoric around immigration and the impression that overseas students were no longer welcome do have a potentially damaging impact internationally. According to the *Guardian*, universities had been campaigning to exclude international students from net migration figures and tried to encourage politicians and decision-makers to portray the UK as being open and welcoming to international students (Taylor 2013).

One could point out the problem of perception here: because overseas students are counted as immigrants, their numbers have been often translated in the popular media and political rhetoric into a 'flood of immigrants'. At the same time, student migration is often difficult to categorize, but it is nonetheless an important aspect of academic mobility.

8.4 The study focus and methodology

The chapter draws on a transnational qualitative study that focuses on the experiences of international students in the UK and follows them after graduation back to their home countries. The research explores the role of mobility for education as an integrated part of individual life projects and the future opportunities it provides linked to these projects. The chapter focuses, in particular, on drivers and benefits of student international mobility to UK universities and the challenges students confront during study and upon graduation. It considers the extent to which educational migration can be considered a transformative process and argues that the local constraints both in the host and home countries constitute powerful limitations to the students' future mobility, work and life choices. It emphasizes the gender-differentiated nature of the experiences of the postgraduate students in terms of social and economic barriers and opportunities.

Postgraduate students (master's and doctoral) were selected to participate in the study as they are close to the labour market and are more pressed to think about their professional future in contrast to undergraduate students

who might not be that focused. Several participants were employed as academic staff on a temporary basis in the host country and/or permanently in the home country.

For the UK part of the data collection, three universities were chosen to represent some of the variation within the sector: two 'older' more prestigious universities and a 'newer' institution, which was considerably less prestigious. In the selected universities, in-depth interviews were conducted with at least two members of staff responsible for international students (seven staff in total), and students themselves were interviewed, again using a narrative approach (Czarniawska 2004). Students (from developing countries) were recruited through a variety of means, including placing advertisements in newsletters for international students or asking members of staff to forward information about the project to any postgraduate students they knew, and snowballing from individuals who volunteered to take part in this research. In the second part of the study, four non-developed countries that were most represented in the project were selected and alumni interviews were conducted in the students' home countries, which included China, Thailand, Indonesia and Tanzania.

Overall, 88 students took part in the research, including 48 female and 40 male students and alumni: 28 were interviewed in the UK during their studies and 69 were interviewed in their home countries upon return. These two groups included 14 people that participated in the longitudinal study and were interviewed several times (at least twice) during and after their international study period. The initial project recruited 17 students from older and 11 from newer universities and included postgraduate degree students (master's and doctoral students from 11 countries).

8.5 Drivers, benefits and challenges of global education

A discussion on the impact of UK immigration policy on students' mobility needs an examination of the motivations behind such mobility. There were varied explanations as to why students come to the UK. Many were drawn by the reputation of the UK HE system and the prospect of participating in an international experience (Brooks 2015). Personal networks were often very important in helping to decide on the country as well as particular location, with many relying extensively on these as well as on the Internet for information on the UK and other countries, which they often compared to the UK. Some students also mentioned that getting a degree abroad was seen as important in their home countries; this was particularly the case for those arriving from China. They believed a degree, particularly from a 'Western' university, would help them 'stand out from the crowd', an observation supported by other research stressing the educational capital invested by students and their families in order to get ahead (King et al. 2011; Mavroudi and Warren 2013; Waters 2006; 2007).

In the narratives of several respondents, for the most part female, the decisions about where or what to study had been often mediated by a range of social factors like the influence of parents or other family members and friends (Brooks and Waters 2010). Waters (2006) has argued that international education has been pursued by the Hong Kong Chinese middle classes because of the opportunities it offers for their children to develop ‘cosmopolitan competencies’, which are highly valued when they return home, and thus help to reproduce the social status of the family. It also provides middle-class families with an alternative route to success, should their children be at risk of ‘failing’ within the highly competitive local education system (Waters 2007). For example, Jessica admitted:

I did exams in China, and I failed the exam to a very good university, so I couldn’t apply for a post-graduate degree in China, but I needed to, because you have to have a good degree like that, so I applied for UK post-graduate degree.

(Jessica, 21 years old, Chinese, MS in Education)

The growth in global trade in higher education is closely linked to the increase in opportunities for individuals within a transnational labour market (Rizvi 2009). However, while individual competitiveness may be an important driver of international student mobility, the ways in which this is achieved, and the resources to which individuals have access to facilitate such mobility, are strongly patterned by the social networks within which individuals are located (Brooks and Waters 2010). The family, in particular, has been shown to play a critical role in such processes of ‘educational migration’ (Brooks 2015). For instance, Jessica’s parents chose the university for her to go abroad. Their decision to send their daughter to a foreign university was stimulated by other parents in their friends’ circle who had children studying abroad.

Andrew (28 years old, Indonesian, MS in Media and Communication) is another example. After obtaining a BA degree in marketing from an Indonesian university, he worked for two years in the country. He did not really want to further his studies at the time because he did not associate himself in an academic way. Then, he came to the UK to do his MS degree because he was the boy in the family and the only one without a postgraduate degree (his three sisters had already MA diplomas). He felt the need to satisfy his parents and to make them proud, and he accomplished this by obtaining a higher degree.

The considerable efforts which students make in order to finance their education in the UK suggest that many are strongly motivated to attend university there. Habu (2000) suggested analysing student’s motivations as a combination of two sets of factors: pull and push factors. Thus, these push–pull factors are described by students as (1) a way of pursuing academic

goals and new career opportunities and (2) a way of disengaging from the constraints and difficulties of life in their home societies. Most students' motivations are somewhere in between the two. Generally speaking, their more openly expressed reasons, those that come out first in discussion, are concerned with their academic and career ambitions; their underlying and more private reasons are concerned with the social pressures they face in their home countries.

Many students who travel abroad have educational aspirations that are concerned not primarily with economic betterment but rather with gaining self-fulfilment that they cannot achieve in their home countries. Although they may be motivated to study abroad by pull factors, including improving their job prospects, they may also travel as a result of push factors (Habu 2000). For instance, Carolyn admitted:

I feel like maybe life is more exciting and enjoyable to me because I have travelled a lot, I have seen a lot of things so I feel like I'm satisfied with my life, if I would not get the chance to come abroad, I wouldn't be satisfied with my life so much because I would just stay at the same place, doing the same thing and seeing the same people.

(26 years old, Thailand, MBA in Business Management)

In the UK, the increased recruitment of international students has contributed to the rapid diversification of the student population in these universities. More students from culturally diverse regions are being admitted and enrolling in programmes. Universities, considering their responses to cultural difference, often see international students as requiring extra attention, if not remediation of supposed 'deficits' (Asmar 2005). The newly restrictive visa policy contributes to the negative image that the UK displays towards foreign students, which has an effect on students' perception of their status in UK universities. Several participants in the study expressed the lack of confidence and experience of negative expectations, often associated with students whose first language may not be English. Jessica (22 years old, China, MS in Education) describes her experience of being different from other students:

I think the native speakers may have some confidence here and it's become hard to make friends with the native speakers. The people, also teachers, help me, but they might think I'm a disabled person or just an idiot. I can tell from their eyes.

She comments broadly:

It's not easy to say something about 'inclusive', especially for a Chinese girl in the UK. I have got the passport back without a new BPR... can you

be more bitch? [BPR is a biometric residence permit, part of the visa to prove the identity and the permit to study or work in the UK]

Many participants admitted that although prospects of working in the UK are very limited, the degree from the UK provided them with the opportunities to work for international companies in their home countries. For instance, Susan reflects on the limitations to get working experience after studying in the UK:

It is hard, especially for Asian people, to find an internship in terms of the time, we are not allowed to stay there long and also in terms of maybe our language ability, and also the British culture, we are not quite familiar with. Actually, I sent my resume, but there were no replies, so I just continued the part-time job in the restaurant and after my student visa expired, I left.

(Aged 24, Chinese, MS in International Accounting)

Neo-liberal universalism denies migrant students opportunities to be successful in a new society. Adopting a neo-liberal set of 'value-free' criteria leads to a deficit model of difference and to conflation of 'difference' and 'deficiency', as well as to a belief that the knowledge of high-skilled migrants (including international students), particularly those from 'developing countries', is incompatible and inferior and hence invalid (Guo 2009). In tracing its root causes, Guo (2009) attributed the devaluation phenomenon to the epistemological misperceptions of difference and knowledge. He argues that knowledge has been racialized and materialized on the basis of ethnic and national origins. Furthermore, an objectivist ontology and liberal universalism exacerbate the complexity of this process. Objectivists believe that if something exists, it can be measured. By adopting a set of 'value-free' criteria, it is argued that knowledge can be measured without accounting the social, political, historical and cultural contexts within which it is produced. In a similar vein, by applying a 'one-size-fits-all' criterion to measure immigrants' credentials and experience, liberal universalism denies immigrants the opportunities to be successful in a new society. The claimed neutral assessment and measuring usually disguises itself under the cloak of professional standards, quality and excellence without questioning whose standard is put in place and whose interests it represents (Guo 2010, p. 162).

Peter, for instance, talked about the misconceptions he had before entering university in the UK:

Yeah. First time I think I underestimated myself, but after a while I thought 'OK, I'm not that bad.' I can compare with other students abroad and what I've learned in Indonesia is still useful. In the UK, I have

a knowledge of what they're talking about, so OK. It's going to be good for me. Never underestimate yourself about studying.

(26 years old, Indonesia, MS in HR Management)

With time, many international students began to perceive their abilities differently. In the narratives about the competences acquired abroad, the participants seemed to be less concerned with the technical, specialized knowledge and more concerned with the acquisition of generic skills, personal and cultural capital and personal development. For example, Andrew said:

There is a language barrier sometimes I am around people and have more knowledge than them and will speak up. When I first arrived, I was quiet and afraid but I learned not to do that. I started speaking up in class and I think I improved. I have more courage to share my opinions now. In Indonesia there are not many people who have the courage to speak up, especially the young people. This is an advantage that those who have studied abroad have in comparison to those who haven't studied abroad.

I learned how people work here. I got involved in the community. I like music and I play the drums, so I tried to find a music community. From one community I met lots of other people and I learned a lot. I spoke to people and it enriched my experience here.

(28 years of age, Indonesia, MS in Media and Communication)

International mobility of students is a process that both depends on and creates social networks. Social networks often guide migrants into or through specific places and occupations. Local labour markets can become linked through specific networks of interpersonal and organizational ties surrounding migrants (Poros 2001). For instance, Susan also comments on the benefits of social networking:

I would say also in terms of the personal network, it helped me a lot because I made more friends in Britain who shared the same ideas as me. So in terms of network, my friend who introduced me to this job, also I met her in Britain so the experience in Britain gave me a new job, so that's a benefit of social networking.

(24 years old, China, MS in International Marketing)

The movement of students could be seen as an integral part of transnational migration systems, not least because the networks they forge often lay the tracks of future skilled labour circulation. According to Portes and Bach:

It is transnational networks that precondition, arise out of, and perpetuate the intermittent and short-term patterns of movement typifying contemporary skilled workers and students. Mobility itself, including students' international movement, can be conceptualized as a process of network building, which depends on and, in turn, reinforces social relationships across space.

(Portes and Bach 1985, p. 10)

Carolyn combined her background in pharmaceuticals with a degree in business to explore some opportunities 'to open her own business in the future, possibly associated with the health and wellbeing industry'. She reflects on the end of her study period abroad:

When I'm here I can get a chance to meet new people, see new things, to know a lot of things, and then it's more about working, in the end, if I want to go to another country, I have friends there. I can contact them, if I want to do business there, I can ask them what it's like and maybe do business together or contact people, make connections in the same way, because my plan in the future is maybe to do international business, so I need international friends to help me do something like this.

(26 years old, Thailand, MBA in Business Management)

Carolyn's case illustrates that students do think strategically about how they use their global education to build their social and professional networks. Simultaneously, Carolyn expresses her fears of working globally:

If I would open my own business, I will go back to Thailand for sure, because I feel it is easier as a native to open or to do something there. When I'm abroad I feel like I just stay here. I don't really belong to is place. I feel that it would be difficult to start a business because I don't have enough friends, a solid network of people here.

(26 years old, Thailand, MBA in Business Management)

Globalization in education is sometimes presented in terms of employer requirements for a workforce with the skills needed to operate in an international environment. Susan, who works in an international marketing research company in China, admitted:

I think in China today, many international, multi-cultural companies require a lot of work experience, especially, if they have branches in China, they want to recruit people who have a high level of English, you know, especially for your spoken language, or writing and in terms of listening, so the year I spent in Britain last year just enhanced my language ability. There is a lot more job opportunities in terms of this and also

because the cultural aspects are different from people in China, so they would like to hire people with those experiences. I would say that was a big benefit.

(24 years old, China, MS in Marketing)

That was also the case of Yvonne (24 years old, China), who completed her one-year postgraduate marketing in the UK. Just after graduation she applied for a job in the UK to be placed in China as an international officer for one of the British universities. Her role in the new job is marketing UK university education to prospective Chinese students.

8.6 Gender differences

As Brooks (2015) observes, in many ways these gender patterns articulate with the wider literature on family and educational migration. Indeed, as Coles' and Fechter's work (2007, cit. in Brooks 2015, p. 229) demonstrates, although recent years have witnessed an increase in the extent to which women are involved in skilled migration, this has not necessarily meant a 'detachment from previous social ties, norms and expectations'. This can be seen in what Anita describes:

I wanted to do [a] PhD immediately after my master's degree in the UK, but I thought there was some things that pulled me back first. I'm missing my family, I needed to start a family, so many things going on at the same time, so I prioritized and thought 'family first', I went back to Kenya for my wedding, got two children and as I moved along, I gained some finances to finance my studies, then we'll get there.

(32 years old, Kenya, PhD in Business Management, mother of two)

Several participants, especially from China, admitted that family pressure and a traditional understanding of gender roles that position women and men differently in the labour market and within the society do so without regard to their foreign qualifications. For example, Victoria reflects:

Chinese society is still very patriarchal. So they still expect women to do all the housework, to be in charge of the family issues. If you want to be successful in your career then you need to work really hard, like twice as hard as a man to be appreciated, and at the same time, maintaining your family relationship, raising a kid. Many Chinese parents just want their girls to get married. They provide good education for them to get married to a proper guy, with proper class, with a proper family background.

(24 years old, China, MS in Sociology)

Sabrina came back to her home city after studying three years for her undergraduate and postgraduate diploma in the UK. With the international

education sponsored by her parents she is supposed to fulfil their expectation to find a stable job and a suitable boyfriend. She was helped by family connections to get a job in the secure public sector financial leasing company associated with the city government. She comments, after one year after coming back to the home country:

I lived with my parents every day now, they just tell me to do this and that, and they also asked me to find a high-quality boyfriend. At our age, we need to look after our parents and my parents only have one child. A boy is supposed to go out and achieve more, and be independent, and the girl should be more with the family.

(25 years old, China, MS in Accounting)

The liberalizing effect of globalization on countries like China has been uneven: in the field of education women have much greater opportunities; however, their job possibilities are limited even when they are highly qualified, and their personal lives are subject to considerable social constraints. Push factors that encourage Chinese women to study abroad, therefore, include domestic conditions that limit both their personal autonomy and their career opportunities. Lia (29 years old, China, PhD in English Literature) reported that her parents make her worry about her age and that she will not get married and have children because she is getting too old. She tries to be independent and does not ask her parents for money, so she works while studying in all sorts of student jobs at university, such as conference assistant, occasional caterer, and at times as Chinese-language teacher, translator and transcriptionist. She wants to do a post-doc in the UK and then come back to China to be an academic.

The male Chinese may enjoy far more freedom, but their lives are charged with different expectations. Rod talks about the difficulties of being a boy in the family:

The boy [is] supposed to be more independent, earn more money, be able to buy a house and provide a home for a family in the future. Boys are supposed to save the money whereas girls can spend more on their own needs and can still get support from their parents on house rent.

(25 years old, MS in Finance, works in an international company in a major Chinese city)

For example, Kate works as an English-language teacher in an international school in one of China's major cities for one year and a half after graduation. She explains the differences between being a local (Chinese) teacher with foreign qualifications in her international school and being a foreign teacher:

At the beginning I felt like the base salary was like really . . . well not really but comparatively low, especially compared to the foreign teachers in our schools. I could have the same qualification from the UK as any other foreign teacher, but the nationality matters, they are native English speakers. They get twice even three times better pay as our local teachers. But that is something that is inevitable. You just have to accept it.

(24 years old, MS in Education)

According to Kate, being a woman and a local teacher is sort of the worst position, because all the managerial positions are taken by mostly foreigners and males. The situation is worse for females, despite improvement in gender equalities in her company. A few years ago there was only one woman employed as a Director of Studies in the entire city where her school has several centres. Now, there are three female managers in the whole of China in her company.

On the other hand, Kate feels somehow privileged to be a female, although in the past males had a better position in society; however, now it is not the case anymore, and being a male is actually more challenging. On the one hand, the male after graduation needs to get a good job to make enough money to buy a house and a car in order to be able to set up a family and prove his value. Females, on the other hand, usually do not need to follow this same path, and that is why Kate could live in a rented studio-flat covered by her parents and use her salary only for other living expenses. If she would like to buy a flat in the future she would need to have her parents' help or get married. She also comments on other peers that have a degree from abroad and what it is like to get married without any professional prospects. Even her mother, whom she admired before for being able to manage the family and her professional career rather well, constantly comes back to the subject of marriage at the right stage of life.

8.7 Difficulties in getting job experience in the UK

Many students comment on the opportunity or lack of opportunity to gain work experience in the UK after their study. Anita was fortunate enough to do her MS degree in business management and benefited from work experience:

After the master's programme, I stayed because there was the Fresh Talent Scheme Working in Scotland. So, I grabbed that opportunity because I wanted to save up some money I had spent on my master's programme as an international student. I had a great opportunity to earn back what I had spent, but it was a good experience because I managed to work within the hospitality and tourism industry, which are kind of my specialty, and it was a great experience because that's where I got to

know about the Scottish culture and how to appreciate this culture and traditions.

(32 years old, Kenya)

When Emma went back to her home country, she spent a lot of time looking around for jobs and found it very difficult. She describes:

Before I went to the UK, I worked for an international accounting firm with the headquarters in London. Coming to the UK I just wanted to experience another country, but I knew that I was going back, I was not staying forever. So I lived in the UK for three years, and I enjoyed my time there. I did my best and when I was going back, I had expectations that I will have different ability, advanced knowledge or advanced experience than other people in my country.

(28 years old, Indonesia, MS International Accounting)

She applied to the same company she worked for before going to study abroad, and when she went back, they did not want to offer her a better position or raise her salary. As Emma recounts:

Because I already studied to advance my knowledge I expected my salary would be double, but perhaps, it's also hard for companies to hire students like me from abroad, because we want a high salary, but the company, they didn't know our abilities.

Now I'm working in a Japanese company, so it's not really a big company, but people having degrees from abroad cover a lot of the managerial positions. I feel like I'm good to stay in this company. But I still think because we are from developing countries and have different languages, my English is not good enough yet to communicate with people living in the UK or something. For business, my English is not really good yet, but still, it's more comfortable to communicate in English with Japanese clients. Their English is also not perfect like my English so as long as they understand what I mean and I understand what they mean it's OK.

Among postgraduate students, the vast majority expressed a wish to leave the UK following the completion of their studies. However, a significant number of interviewees intended to apply for a work visa in order to work for a short time to get experience in the UK, after which they proposed to return to their country of origin. This was either because they thought the job market was better in the country of origin or due to restrictive UK immigration policy, as Emma explains:

I went to Indonesia. I met all my friends, and 90 per cent of my friends said, 'Why did you not find a job in the UK? Why did you come back to Indonesia?' I needed to explain to them that 'it's not about my capability, it is about the restrictions to have a job there'. The requirement is very hard. The rules to stay are changing. I've had friends, who thought they would stay, and they haven't, friends who have been called up and told their visa might be taken away, and it seems like one has to go through a lot of hassles to stay in the UK.

(28 years old, Indonesia, MS in International Accounting)

This highlights the increasingly temporary nature of mobility for skilled and highly skilled migration where entry does not necessarily result in permanent settlement (Baláz and Williams 2004). For PhD students, the situation was slightly different as they were often more flexible about future plans and willing to travel widely to find the best employment prospects. In some cases they were more restricted as some PhD funding imposed the obligation for students to come back to their country of origin and work for extensive periods of time in the home county and institutions; this was the case for Indonesian or Thai government scholarships or World Bank programmes.

8.8 Conclusions

The research presented in this chapter suggests that the international HE sector in the UK seems to be crisis neutral. The drop in labour migrants with the onset of the economic crisis while the global education market grew meant that students have been the largest group of international migrants in the UK for some years now. The rising presence of non-EU students and graduates poses a significant challenge for the UK immigration system, forcing the policymakers to restrict the visa policies controlling the access of the highly skilled (Jasiewicz 2013). Although, many of the international students settle in the UK upon graduation, there is no accurate data on the numbers of those who remained.

The research discussed here shows that international students' motivations to come to the UK to study are encouraged by the forces of globalization, including economic, cultural and intellectual factors, but also pushed by social constraints in the home countries. The students' narratives indicate the contradictory consequences of globalization in education. Students associated with difference may feel their presence is merely tolerated, rather than positively valued for their scholarly contributions (Habu 2000). Globalization has helped to give new educational opportunities. However, it has also created an international recruitment market in which some higher education institutions view students in financial benefit terms and not as members of a mobile academic community.

In the global picture sketched above, students themselves may appear to have little agency (Asmar 2005). The experiences of international students in the UK can be analysed in the context of the uneven development of globalization. The overlapping processes that make up globalization have meant that some students and ex-students find themselves in a contradictory position in both home countries and the UK. For example, in China the partial movement towards equal opportunities has increased women's educational options, including the chance to study abroad. This, however, has not been matched by improved job prospects for women, with long-term careers remaining largely the prerogative of men (Habu 2000, p. 44).

The sense of responsibility towards or even dependence from the family and the other kinds of ties with the home country were the important factors that bring the participating students, particularly female, back home. The research findings show an indirect role the crisis played in affecting foreign students' trajectories (both female and male). The decision to return was in some cases related to the lack of career opportunity in the UK, being a kind of 'forced' by the difficulties in obtaining work visa or a high-skilled job offer while in the UK. The project included only the postgraduates who still studied in the UK or who returned to their home country. Thus, interviewing those who returned after graduation produced possible underestimation of factors that help people stay after study.

References

- Asmar, C. (2005) 'Internationalising Students: Reassessing diasporic and Local Student Difference', *Studies in Higher Education*, 30(3), 291–309.
- Bach, S. (2010) 'Managed Migration? Nurse Recruitment and the Consequences of State Policy', *Industrial Relations Journal*, 41(3), 249–266.
- Baláz, V. and A. M. Williams (2004) '“Been there, done that”: International student migration and human capital transfers from the UK to Slovakia'. *Population, Space and Place*, 10(3), 217–237.
- Bauman, Z. and C. Bordon, (2014) *State of Crisis* (Cambridge: Polity Press).
- Brooks, R. (2015) 'International Students with Dependent Children: The Reproduction of Gender Norms', *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, 36(2), 195–214.
- Brooks, R., and J. Waters (2010) 'Social Networks and Educational Mobility: The Experiences of UK Students', *Globalisation, Societies and Education*, 8(1), 143–157.
- Cameron, D. (2013) *David Cameron's Immigration Speech*, University Campus Suffolk, Ipswich. Available online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/david-camerons-immigration-speech> (accessed: 7 May 2015).
- Castles, S. and M. Miller (2009) *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World* (New York: The Guilford Press).
- Coles, A. and A-M. Fechter (eds.) (2007) *Gender and Family among Transnational Professionals* (London: Routledge).
- Cooper, J. et al. (2014) 'The Reason for Migration and Labour Market Characteristics of UK Residents Born Abroad', *Home Office Occasional Paper 110*. Available online at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/350927/occ110.pdf (accessed: 7 May 2015).

- Crouch, C. (2005) 'Skill Formation Systems', in S. Ackroyd, R. Batt, P. Thompson and P.S. Tolbert (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Work and Organization* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press).
- Czarniawska, B. (2004) *Narratives in Social Science Research* (London: Sage).
- Devitt, C. (2014) 'Government Responses to Foreign Worker Demand During Economic Crises. The Cases of Britain and France 2008–2013', *Comparative Migration Studies*, 2(4), 445–467.
- Dyson, J. (2015) 'No Theresa May, we Need those Foreign Graduates', *The Guardian*, 4 January 2015.
- Freeman, G. (1995) 'Modes of Immigration Policies in Liberal Democratic States', *International Migration Review*, 29(4), 881–913.
- Guo, S. (2010) 'Toward Recognitive Justice: Emerging Trends and Challenges in Transnational Migration and Lifelong Learning', *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, 29(2), 149–167.
- Guo, S. (2009) 'Difference, Deficiency, and Devaluation: Tracing the Roots of Non-recognition of Foreign Credentials for Immigrant Professionals in Canada', *Canadian Journal for the Study of Adult Education*, 22(1), 37–52.
- Habu, T. (2000) 'The Irony of Globalization: The Experience of Japanese Women in British Higher Education', *Higher Education*, 39(1), 43–66.
- HESA (2014) *Higher Education Statistics for the UK 2013–14*. Available online at: <https://www.hesa.ac.uk> (accessed: 7 May 2015).
- Hollifield, J. F. (2004) 'Migration and International Relations: the Liberal Paradox', in H. Entzinger, M. Mariniello and C. Wihtol de Wenden, (eds.) *Migration between States and Markets* (Aldershot: Ashgate).
- In Focus* (2014) *The Impact of Universities on the UK Economy*, Universities UK. Available online at: <http://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/highereducation/Documents/2014/TheImpactOfUniversitiesOnTheUkEconomy.pdf> (accessed: 11 May 2015).
- Jasiewicz, J. (2013) 'Labor Mobility of Chinese Graduates from British and Spanish Universities: What Happens to the "Talent Migration?"', *Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals IBEI Working Papers 2013/36*. Available online at: <http://www.ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/928bcafd-8780-42a4-aebc-d5a755208e9d.pdf> (accessed: 7 May 2015).
- Joppke, C. (1998) 'Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration', *World Politics*, 50(2), 266–293.
- Kauppinen, I. (2015) 'Towards a Theory of Transnational Academic Capitalism', *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, 36(2), 336–353.
- Kauppinen, I. and T. Kaidesoja (2014) 'A Shift Towards Academic Capitalism in Finland', *Higher Education Policy*, 27(1), 23–41.
- King, R. et al. (2011) 'Reproducing Advantage: The Perspective of English School Leavers on Studying Abroad', *Globalisation, Societies and Education*, 9(2), 161–181.
- Koser, K. and J. Salt (1997) 'The Geography of Highly Skilled International Migration', *International Journal of Population Geography*, 3(4), 285–303.
- Madge, C., P. Raghuram and P. Noxolo (2014) 'Conceptualizing International Education: From International Student to International Study', *Progress in Human Geography*. Early View Available online at: <http://phg.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/03/30/0309132514526442.abstract> (accessed: 7 May 2015).
- Mavroudi, E. and A. Warren (2013) 'Highly Skilled Migration and the Negotiation of Immigration Policy: Non-EEA Postgraduate Students and Academic Staff at English Universities', *Geoforum*, 44, 261–270.

- Mulley, S. and A. Sachrajda (2011) *Student Migration in the UK* (London: Institute for Public Policy Research).
- Office for National Statistics (ONS) *Migration Statistics Quarterly Report (2014)*. Available online at: <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/migration1/migration-statistics-quarterly-report/november-2014/index.html> (accessed: 11 May 2015).
- Poros, M. (2001) 'The Role of Migrant Networks in Linking Local Labor Markets: The Case of Asian Indian migration to New York and London', *Global Networks*, 1(3), 243–259.
- Portes, A. and R. Bach (1985) *Latin Journey: Cuban and Mexican Immigrants in the United States* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press).
- Portes, A., L.E. Guarnizo and P. Landolt (1999) 'The Study of Transnationalism: Pitfalls and Promise of an Emergent Field', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 22(2), 217–237.
- Raghuram, P. (2013) 'Theorising the Spaces of Student Migration', *Population, Space and Place*, 19(2), 138–154.
- Raghuram, P. (2009) 'Caring about the Brain drain in a Post-colonial World', *Geoforum*, 40(1), 25–33.
- Rizvi, F. (2009) 'Global Mobility and the Challenges of Educational Research and Policy', in T. Popkewitz and F. Rizvi (eds.) *Globalization and the Study of Education* (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell), pp. 268–289.
- Taylor, M. (2013) 'Immigration Crackdown Deterring Foreign Students, Says Universities Chief', *The Guardian*, 9 January 2013.
- UKBA (2010) *The Student Immigration System: A consultation* (Croydon: UKBA). Available online at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/268985/student-consultation.pdf (accessed: 7 May 2015).
- Waters, J.L. (2007) '“Roundabout Routes and Sanctuary Schools”: The Role of Situated Educational Practices and Habitus in the Creation of Transnational Professionals', *Global Networks*, 7(4), 477–497.
- Waters, J.L. (2006) 'Geographies of Cultural Capital: Education, International Migration and Family Strategies between Hong Kong and Canada', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 31(2), 179–192.
- Wills, J., J. May, K. Datta, Y. Evans, J. Herbert, and C. McIlwaine (2009) 'London's Migrant Division of Labour', *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 16(3), 257–271.

9

Exploring the Intersecting Impact of Gender and Citizenship on Spatial and Academic Career Mobility

Kyoko Shinozaki

We have never been a country of immigration and until today we are not one [D]ifferent from a country of immigration like Canada, Germany has never selectively sought after migrants and recruited people with occupations in demand.

(Wolfgang Schäuble quoted by Dernbach 2006, translated by Shinozaki)

'Make it in Germany' is the multilingual 'Welcome to Germany' portal for international qualified professionals [It] informs qualified professionals who are interested in informing about their career prospects and shows them how to organize their move to Germany – and what makes it worthwhile to live and work here 'Make it in Germany' . . . is the expression of a whole 'culture of welcome'. It portrays Germany as a modern, diverse society and helps convey the friendly, cosmopolitan nature of the country.

(BMWV et al. 2015)

9.1 Introduction

The above two epigraphs pinpoint just how fundamentally Germany's official discourse about (not) being a country of immigration has changed in the matter of only a decade. Then-Minister of Interior Wolfgang Schäuble repeated the long-lived, common official understanding of German nationhood as not a country of immigration, as many other politicians have done. Despite Germany's historical experience of receiving a large number of migrants in both the distant and more recent past (Bade 2000; Hoerder 2002), his statement reaffirmed the widespread discourse that Germany has formally maintained its stance of no new labour recruitment, the principle that has been in place since the ending of its guest-worker programme in the mid-1970s (Brubaker 1992; Pries 2012; Thränhardt 1992).

'Make it in Germany' sends out a quite contrasting message. Its mission, in which two federal ministries and the state employment agency play a big part, is not simply to receive migrant workers but also to make Germany attractive to potential labour migrants and welcome them by various means: the portal posts vacancies in labour-shortage occupations and testimonies of successful migrants. Additionally, it provides potential employers with information about international recruitment from third countries. Demographic change and skilled-labour shortages are said to be the main drivers of this historical shift in its changing self-understanding to be the nation of immigration (Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration 2013). In addition, despite the Euro crisis, the German labour market has largely remained robust, and skilled workforces are sought after for vacancies by the local population (OECD 2013). However, more remarkably still, this shift in migration policy did not mean the opening of a door to any potential labour migrants. Rather it went hand in hand with the creation of the 'highly skilled' and 'skilled' category of migrants (OECD 2013) and joined the 'global war for talent' (Brown et al. 2011) to seek out highly skilled and skilled migrant workers. Along with a general policy trend of the skill-based migration regime in a number of European and other post-industrial countries (Kofman 2013), German immigration policy is currently witnessing a historic turning point. Several elements make up this shift: the Immigration Act and the 'Blue Card' are both being put in place; the state selectively seeks out highly skilled and skilled workers in the global labour market; and some politicians, the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration and the Council of Migration are putting forward a claim that 'Germany is a country of immigration'.

However, to what extent is the skill-based admission policy gender neutral? Does the German state's attempt to secure skilled and highly skilled labour forces influence migrant women and men in the same way? This chapter begins with analysing the recent policy and regulation reforms connected to skilled and highly skilled migration to Germany. We show that the new legal frameworks have gendered implications for the admission of groups of highly skilled migrants, which are relevant to understanding spatial mobility of migrant scientists. Also, how good is the chance for these migrant professionals, both women and men, to make a career? Drawing on the data on the higher education sector of the labour market, we then conduct an exercise to demonstrate that, despite the recent policy call for welcoming skilled and highly skilled migrants, career progression seems to be differentiated along the intersecting categories of gender and citizenship.

9.2 Recent reforms of the legal frameworks¹

Despite the heterogeneity of skilled flows, given the importance placed on technological advancement in the post-industrial knowledge economy, the

highly skilled have commonly been defined as intra-company transferees in the financial sector and those who are working in science and technology, all of which are male-dominant sectors. Thus, this definition entails a deep-seated gender bias, rendering invisible as a result other skilled migrations in education and welfare, sectors in which women make up a significant majority (Kofman 2000). Skills required in these sectors are seen as inherent to ‘natural’ qualities of women, and consequently caring and pedagogic skills tend to be classified as semi-skilled rather than highly skilled (Kofman and Raghuram 2005). Nonetheless, the previously dominant focus on corporate professionals has lately been widened considerably by research on the mobility of scientists and students (Ackers 2010; Bilecen 2014; Brooks and Waters 2011; Findlay et al. 2006; Leung 2011).

Moreover, the labour shortage in receiving countries often influences what is considered to be ‘skills’, and thus the selectivity of ‘skilled’ migrants. Once ‘labour-shortage areas’ have been identified, the skills required in these areas tend to get valorized (Kofman 2000; Kofman and Raghuram 2005), as we shall see in the next section. Thus, the definition of skilled workers is often demand-driven, constructed and fluid (Erel 2003). In addition, what constitutes a ‘high skill’ or ‘skill’ in legal terms is often constructed in a gender-differentiated way (Kofman 2014; Shinozaki 2014a). We must note that less skilled migration is not to be conflated with less skilled migrants (Kofman 2000). There is ample empirical evidence that (highly) qualified migrants experience de-skilling, engaging in employment in ‘less skilled’ sectors (Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration 2011; Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou in this volume; Lutz 2011; Nohl et al. 2014; Parreñas 2001; Shinozaki 2015). Thus, in this chapter, skilled and highly skilled flows refer to those streams entering into skilled and highly skilled sectors of the labour market respectively, independent of the actual skill levels of migrants, with the constructed nature of skills in mind.

9.2.1 Law and regulations: Skilled and highly skilled migration into Germany

Skills have become one of the most important admission criteria for migrants entering Germany (Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration 2013; Shinozaki 2014b) as well as a number of other European countries (Kofman 2014; Raghuram 2004). The current skill-based, selective immigration policy has took shape in three different stages, although a general ban on the recruitment of migrants, which has been in place since the 1973 oil crisis, continues to be effective to date. It was first set in motion with the ‘Green Card’ programme (2000–2004), which lifted the ban only towards those working in the information and communication technology (ICT) sector. It marked a symbolic, if not numerically substantial, turn in German migration policy (Kolb 2003).² When the Immigration Act (*Zuwanderungsgesetz*) went into force in 2005 (second stage), the Green

Card programme was phased out.³ Seven years later, the 'Blue Card EU' was then introduced (third stage).

With the introduction of the 2005 Immigration Act, Germany more clearly articulated its skill-based policy, opening the door to 'skilled' and 'highly skilled' personnel (Section 19), the categories created for the first time in its history. A strong economically driven rationale is evident here: the Immigration Act highlights the demand of labour markets as a factor to be taken into account when considering further admission of workers in 'labour shortage' occupations (Section 18). While there is no single visa category which encompasses newly arriving academics with different ranks, the most relevant permits are the 'highly qualified (*Hochqualifizierte*)',⁴ researchers and 'EU Blue Card holders'. 'Highly qualified workers' are defined not in terms of an exhaustive list of concrete occupations but rather in the sense that their residence suits the economic and social interests of Germany, with illustrative examples of occupations being researchers with special technical knowledge or teachers in prominent positions, such as university chairs (Residence Act, Section 19). There is no income criterion imposed; however, we can safely assume that university chairs and leading researchers earn a relatively high level of income – although probably not always as high as the annual minimum income of €86,400 once imposed on the category of 'other professionals'. That is to say that the migrant ought to have good prospects of integration into society and her/his own secure financial means of subsistence without recourse to public funds (Federal Ministry of the Interior, n.d.).

Previously, the highly qualified used to include a category of 'other professionals', and these were at the time foreseen to be those working in non-academic sectors (i.e. private firms); however, this was dropped when the EU Blue Card (to which we will return below) was introduced in August 2012 (Federal Ministry of the Interior 2012).⁵ The deletion resulted in essentially narrowing down highly qualified workers to highly skilled scientists and academics in higher education institutions (HEIs).

Another entry route is through the category of 'researchers' (Section 20). This stream was instituted in August 2007 as the national implementation of the European Council's Researcher Directive (2005),⁶ which can be issued to researchers working in HEIs as well as in private firms or research institutions. Generally, a hosting agreement and a minimum monthly income of €1,703.33 in Western Germany or €1,493.33 in Eastern Germany (as of 2011) are required. However, doctoral researchers and humanities scholars, who are frequently hired on a part-time basis, do not fulfil the income requirements. Given this disparity, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees recommends to check on a case-by-case basis the ability of subsistence without recourse to public funds (Klingert and Block 2013).

The third group of highly skilled workers consists of holders of the EU Blue Card, originating in the European Council Directive. This has further

reinforced skill-based selectivity while being aimed at lowering the bureaucratic hurdle that applies to highly qualified workers. This permit is largely relevant to university graduates (or those who have five years of work experience). In contrast to highly qualified workers who do not have to fulfil any minimum income requirements, applicants for the EU Blue Card must earn a minimum annual gross income of €48,400 as of 2015.⁷ However, the income requirement goes down to as low as €37,752 per annum for labour-shortage occupations, including natural scientists, mathematicians, engineers, medical doctors/practitioners and qualified workers with an academic degree working in the ICT sector.⁸

These recent changes in the legal frameworks opened an avenue for third country nationals (TCNs) to enter Germany as labour migrants. If entering through the highly qualified stream, they will be granted the right to permanent residency from the very beginning of their stay (Shinozaki 2014a). In addition, the law does not impose any restrictions upon the citizenship of highly skilled workers. This substantially departs from the German (and other European) state's previous logic/principle of making an entry difficult for new workers from third countries as their potential citizens (Bhabha 1999), which went hand in hand with the long, tirelessly repeated claim that 'Germany is not a country of immigration' (Pries 2012). Since the ending of the guest-worker programme, the recruitment of new migrants from third countries has officially been and still continues to be considered an exception. Instead, Germany, along with other Western European countries, has relied and continues to rely on abundant (cheap) labour, both (highly) skilled and less skilled, from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration 2011). This mode of procurement of migrant labour draws on the free movement of people: historically, CEE migrants have not only enjoyed considerably fewer legal constraints in entering Germany, but they have also been going back and forth between their countries of origin and Western Europe, taking advantage of geographical proximity (Morokvasic 2003). The gradual removal of visa requirements after the fall of the Berlin Wall has facilitated *de facto* temporary and circular labour migration, usually within a period of three months, a duration for which no stay permit was required (Morawska 2001; Morokvasic 2003). In more recent years, this tendency of circular mobility has been further accelerated through the eastbound enlargement process of the EU, making obsolete the conventional notion of migration as a one-way linear process from emigration to permanent settlement. In this 'new European migration system' (Favell 2008, p. 711), European citizens do not migrate in order to settle in a new society but rather they are 'settled in mobility' (Morokvasic 2004, p. 7). In brief, these mobile workforces from CEE as well as those from Southern Europe, seriously hit by the euro crisis, currently fill labour deficits (OECD 2013). Nonetheless, in the light of perceived/acknowledged labour shortages in occupations requiring (high) skills

not filled from *within* (Germany or the EU) through mobile workers, the German state has anchored a rule in the Immigration Act to admit only these workers from outside the Schengen space (e.g., third countries).

9.2.2 Engendering migration regulations concerning highly skilled and skilled migrants

The size of the highly qualified migrant population is relatively small. Between 2005 and 2013, a total of 1,488 highly qualified workers' permits were issued (see Table 9.1). Germany's primary reliance on European migrant labour (OECD 2013) and its relatively recent move to admitting highly skilled workers could be a reason for this. Although the highly qualified stream is small in volume, the overall trend was on the rise until 2011, from 70 people in 2005 to almost 370 in 2011. A sharp fall in the following two years (a decrease of roughly 34% and 90%, respectively) can be accounted for by the change in the regulations: the category of 'other professionals' was removed from highly qualified workers and some entered as Blue Card holders (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 2015). The application for the highly skilled category is both costly and involves high requirements, so that other more 'easily' accessible entry routes are in practice more often preferred and advised by placement agencies and local administrations (Personal Communications 2014).

With regard to the period from 2005 to 2013, we can see that women form a small minority, a total of 278, which corresponds to approximately 19% of the highly skilled migrants arriving during the same time period. The proportion of women grew during the first few years, from 11.26% to above 20%; however, since 2011, the growth of women's share has begun to decline again (see Figure 9.1). Although the proportion of women grew in 2013 again, reaching almost 30%, an interpretation is elusive, since the overall number of highly skilled stream considerably declined in 2013, presumably due to the regulatory change discussed above (Figure 9.2). Whether this trend is sustainable needs to be monitored in the next years.

In contrast, the number of researchers has increased over the years, from 140 in 2009 to 444 in 2013 (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 2015). However, here again, women are a small minority, comprising merely 31% (or 139) in 2013 (see also Klingert and Block 2013). Nonetheless, the share of women among researcher visa holders is much more significant than that among highly qualified migrants.

Why do so few women enter through the highly qualified stream? To begin with, it is not that women are per se lesser qualified than men, but rather that the statistical categories do not necessarily tell us about the actual level of skills/qualifications or the actual occupation/job ranking. There is ample evidence that highly skilled women tend to migrate as family dependents, while their male spouses/partners migrate as 'lead' migrants (Iredale 2005; Man 2004; Shinozaki 2014b; Yeoh and Willis 2004). This has led to

Table 9.1 'Highly qualified' migrants from 2005 to 2013

Year	Before 2005*		2005		2006		2007		2008		2009		2010		2011		2012		2013		Total	
	Total	Women	Total	Women	Total	Women	Total	Women	Total	Women	Total	Women	Total	Women	Total	Women	Total	Women	Total	Women	Total	Women
Citizenship																						
US	70	15	23	3	45	6	82	8	71	15	73	16	69	17	107	31	92	18	5	2	567	116
India	34	1	3	0	3	0	2	0	10	2	21	3	17	1	38	2	25	3	2	0	121	11
Canada	15	4	6	1	6	0	13	0	7	2	10	1	16	6	14	2	7	3	2	0	81	15
Russia	135	41	6	1	1	0	7	2	13	4	6	1	15	5	50	10	23	4	3	0	124	27
China	38	8	5	1	0	0	5	2	5	2	1	0	13	6	13	3	3	0	1	0	46	14
Turkey	179	81	3	1	3	1	3	0	5	1	5	1	12	1	12	2	7	0	2	2	52	9
Australia	3	2	5	1	2	0	5	0	7	2	9	0	11	1	16	4	5	0	1	1	61	9
Japan	26	5	7	1	5	0	9	0	4	0	13	0	5	0	19	0	17	0	1	0	80	1
Other	472	171	13	1	15	2	25	5	35	8	31	9	61	13	101	24	65	12	10	2	356	76
Total	972	328	71	10	80	9	151	17	157	36	169	31	219	50	370	78	244	40	27	7	1,488	278

Notes: *Those who had arrived before 2005 have their previous immigration category changed after the introduction of the 2005 Immigration Act. Data compiled from *Migrationsbericht*, from 2006 to 2015, and missing data provided by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees on 2 June 2015.




Figure 9.1 'Highly qualified' category of migrants by gender

Source: Data compiled from *Migrationsbericht*, from 2006 to 2015, and missing data provided by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees on 2 June 2015.




Figure 9.2 'Highly qualified' migrants from 2005 to 2013

Sources: Data compiled from *Migrationsbericht*, from 2006 to 2015, and missing data provided by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees on 2 June 2015.

a tendency for the latter's entry category to reflect a more accurate picture of their skill status while the former do not appear in the category of their actual level of qualifications. Second, women's access to higher education and the labour market in their countries of origin/previous residence as well as in their countries of residence influences highly skilled migrant women's access to employment. In Germany, not only do women in general experience the glass-ceiling effect and wage gaps, but female professionals such as managers in particular are also confronted by these hurdles (Busch and Holst 2009).

Finally, the previous income-based definition of the highly qualified had salient gendered repercussions: while the single-biggest income stratum for men (roughly 30%) was a top salary category of more than €105,000 per annum, almost half of highly qualified women congregated in the lower income strata between €35,000 and €55,000 (Heß 2009). Thus, it may be argued that some women, although highly qualified in terms of their skills, may have not fulfilled the income criteria and therefore did not qualify for the highly qualified stream. Since this income-based provision has now been repealed, one of the salient hurdles for highly skilled women to enter through the highly skilled stream is also eliminated. While a large number of academics and researchers have entered through the highly qualified stream (Heß 2009), the recent deletion of corporate professionals from this category meant that highly qualified workers defined by the current legal provision are essentially only highly skilled scientists and academics in HEIs. Since education, together with health, has long been overshadowed by male-dominated financial or IT sectors, conventionally associated with highly skilled occupations (Kofman and Raghuram 2005), this regulatory change invites us to have a closer look at the largely neglected but important area of skilled and highly skilled occupations.

Visa categories discussed above represent a mobility perspective pertaining to routes of entry. While these are a useful means to grasp the volume and extent of status and occupation-related spatial mobility, there are also some shortcomings. Apart from the lack of a single visa category encompassing migrant academics entering HEIs (see discussion above), European researchers are not captured by stay-permit categories as they, without immigration clearance, enjoy the freedom of mobility within the EU (Klingert and Block 2013). In addition, it also fails to show a non-negligible number of migrants who work in HEIs but have other stay permits. This applies especially to (highly) skilled women, who change their usual country of residence as spouses in terms of their visa category (Iredale 2005; Zlotnik 1995). In other words, their motivations of international migration, route of entry and actual labour market participation cannot entirely be captured by stay-permit categories. Mirjana Morokvasic (1984) has already pointed this out three decades ago when referring to the invisibility of migrant women then in migration research more generally, although admission categories

do provide some important indications concerning the scale of mobility in question. One of the ways to redress the invisibility of (highly) skilled migrant women would be then to bring in a labour market perspective. Harald Bauder (2015) succinctly summarizes this point:

Academics... are not only knowledge producers but also workers who are, like all migrants, embedded in employment relations and social and cultural contexts. The contemporary literature, however, rarely assumes a labour market perspective when examining transnational academic mobility.

(Bauder 2015, p. 83)

His view echoes other authors arguing for the importance of bringing together issues related to international mobility/migration and those related to labour markets, which have largely been treated in isolation from one another (Pries 2008; Raghuram 2004). Here, using higher education (HE) personnel statistics would help to integrate a labour market perspective.

In addition, while education is said to be a significant sector of employment for highly skilled migrant women (Kofman 2000), when it comes to tertiary education, female faculty members are overall still underrepresented in the German and other contexts (Beaufaÿs et al. 2012). How are gender and migration played out in the tertiary education sector of the labour market when knowledge plays a key role in post-industrial economies?

9.3 HEIs as a labour market sector for highly skilled migrants

The remainder of this chapter examines German HEIs in the context of the internationalization of HEIs, in particular focusing on the implications of gender and legal citizenship among migrant academics. Internationalization, involving the movement of students, faculty staff and programmes, is occurring at a high speed and with increasing intensity (Knight 2007). In 2012, worldwide more than 4.5 million students were enrolled in tertiary education programmes outside their country of citizenship, which was a 7.5% increase from 2000 (OECD 2014, pp. 342–343). In absolute terms, while the US and the UK continue to be the two most significant destinations, as they conventionally used to be, Germany, next to Australia and France, has emerged as the third most-popular destination for foreign students worldwide, hosting some 6% of the total foreign students (OECD 2014). In the study of internationalization of HE, much attention has been paid to international students around the issues of the ‘global war for talent’ (Brown et al. 2011, pp. 83–84), the enhancement of ‘employability’ through international education (Brooks and Waters 2011) and the role of tacit knowledge in it (Baláž and Williams 2004), the role of parental educational achievement in promoting children’s international education (Jahr and Teichler 2002),

and social and economic class reproduction through international education (Findlay et al. 2012; Ong 1999; Waters 2006; Xiang and Shen 2009). Although seldom analysed, more recently, the issue of gender roles and their reconfigurations among international students are being addressed by some scholars (Sondhi 2013).

To be sure, international students are a key group constituting migration- and mobility-driven diversity in HE (DAAD 2014). In particular, in the face of skilled labour shortages, students are commonly seen as a 'brain gain' to be 'retained', who will be turning into 'useful' future highly skilled workforces. Despite their undeniable importance both for the receiving and sending society as well as policy-concerned scholarship, they constitute one of the multiple driving forces in this terrain. The imbalanced emphasis on students went hand in hand with the relative neglect of other involved actors such as HEIs (Findlay 2011). Notably, there have been intensive, coordinated institutional efforts to attract German international graduates and academics in North America for return through networks and fairs,⁹ as well as the international recruiting of academics (e.g. workshops organized by the DAAD Akademie). In addition, academics have also received much less attention than students, although they are an emerging subject of research in different strands of scholarship: from the perspective of gender studies (Bouffier and Wolffram 2012; Lötter 2012), in the study of higher education and science (Bauschke-Urban 2010; Neusel et al. 2014), and in mobility studies (Ackers 2010; Bauder 2015; Jöns 2011; Leung 2011; Shinozaki 2014b). Within the literature looking at academics, there are even fewer works which integrate the spatial mobility and labour market perspectives.

In the following exercise, an annual periodical series compiled by the Federal Statistical Office is used, which contains the full-scale (rather than selectively sampled) aggregated statistics of academic employees by citizenship in German HEIs. This is collected by the respective HEIs for administration purposes (Federal Statistical Office 2014, p. 5). The full coverage provides us a good starting point to map out the citizenship-based scale of migrant academics. This has an advantage compared to estimates, which can be generated from other sources based on a selected sampling, in particular given the small number of highly skilled migrants (see discussion above; Federal Statistical Office 2013). In addition, the periodical distinguishes two different career stages – that of professors and non-professors – which are conducive to understanding academic career progression.

This said, however, while using this set of statistics we have to bear in mind that citizenship cannot and should not be the sole indicator of migration and mobility: migration can include different types of migration. It can be a self-experience or parental one, having to entail different operationalizations of a category of 'migration', which has been made possible since the introduction of the classification 'persons with a migration background' (Gresch and Kristen 2011).¹⁰ The long tradition of the *jus sanguinis* principle

anchored in German citizenship left many Germany-born children of immigrants little room for acquiring German citizenship,¹¹ imposing on them an identity as migrants. It should be noted that those who do have dual citizenship appear in official statistics only as Germans. Finally, the experiences of German citizens who ‘returned’ to Germany after their studies or work abroad are not reflected in the citizenship-based statistics either. Some authors point out that short-term mobility but not necessarily migration can have a significant impact on career progression (Ackers 2010). With these problematic aspects in mind, we use interchangeably the terms ‘non-German’ and ‘migrant’ academics to denote academic employees who do not have German citizenship for the sake of readability.

9.3.1 Internationalization of faculty members: Gender and citizenship

Since the collection of data on citizenship among faculty members began in 2005, the number of migrant academics has been increasing, from roughly 20,000 to 38,000, over the past several years (see Figure 9.3). During the same period, their proportion in the overall academics registered a modest increase from 8% to 10%, which can be explained as a larger increase of German academics (DAAD 2014) (Figure 9.4).

Over the last few years, the internationalization of academics in German HEIs essentially means Europeanization, as European citizens numerically predominate than any other regions of origin (DAAD 2014). In 2013, the first top five source countries were Italy (2,589), China (2,502), Austria (2,110), Russia (1,981) and the US (1,977) (Federal Statistical Office 2014).




Figure 9.3 The number of non-German academics at German HEIs

Source: Data compiled from *Bildung und Kultur, Personal an Hochschulen*, from 2006 to 2014.




Figure 9.4 Academics in German HEIs by citizenship

Source: Data compiled from *Bildung und Kultur, Personal an Hochschulen*, from 2006 to 2014.

If we additionally take gender into consideration, in 2013 German men made up more than a half of the total academic employees (56.49%), followed by German women (33.23%), non-German men (5.77%) and non-German women (4.51%). Non-German women and men make up a very small minority – together some 10%; the proportion is very close to their respective composition in the overall population, although men score slightly higher in the academic profession than their female counterparts (Table 9.2). Their weak presence can be accounted for partially by the overall small number of non-German citizens in the national population and their younger age structure (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 2015).

By contrast, German male academics are overrepresented and their female counterparts clearly underrepresented, relative to their respective share in the overall population (see Table 9.2). We also notice that men in general also tend to be better represented. However, interestingly, the gender gap is bigger among German academics than migrant academics, while in both instances, the gap has become narrower over the years (Figure 9.5). Actually, the share of women migrant academics ranges from 40% to 45%, whereas it is 31%–37% among Germans. This suggests that the experiences of women academics may not be monolithic, not only drawing our attention to the salient underrepresentation of female professionals as a whole in the labour market of higher education (Kahlert 2012), but also requiring us to probe

Table 9.2 Share of academics by citizenship and gender

Source Citizenship	Hochschulstatistik 2013		Census (in 1,000; 31 December 2013)		Hochschulstatistik 2013	
	Female academics	Male academics	Female	Male	Female professors	Male professors
Non-German	16,674 (4.51%)	21,341 (5.77%)	3,440.2 (4.26%)	3,575.1 (4.43%)	797 (1.77%)	2,086 (4.63%)
German*	122,887 (33.23%)	208,945 (56.49%)	37,770.4 (46.76%)	35,981.9 (44.55%)	8,790 (19.53%)	33,340 (74.07%)
Total	139,561 (37.74%)	230,286 (62.26%)	41,210.5 (51.02%)	39,556.9 (48.98%)	9,587 (21.30%)	35,426 (78.70%)

Sources: Calculated based on *Bildung und Kultur: Personal an Hochschulen* (2014) and *Population Based on the 2011 Census* (2015).

Notes: * "German" citizens include those whose citizenship is not unknown or not identifiable.




Figure 9.5 Share of women academics in non-migrant and migrant academics

Source: Data compiled from *Bildung und Kultur, Personal an Hochschulen*, from 2005 to 2013 (2006–2014).

into their potential differential experiences along the intersecting axis of gender and migration and the reasons why.

Just as any other sectors of the labour market, in the academic labour market also there is a status-based hierarchy. In this, professorship is the highest

rank of status groups, and obtaining a professorship also has profound implications for financial security and long-term career prospect, given that there is otherwise hardly any other position than professorship to hold a permanent academic post in German academia (Kreckel 2008). If we focus on professors, then the proportion of the four groups changes quite considerably. As Table 9.2 shows, German men make up almost three quarters of the entire professorial positions, which is much higher than their share in overall academic positions and in the national population (roughly 1.3 times and 1.7 times, respectively). Female German professors are the second biggest; however, their proportion (around 20%) is much lower than their share in the overall university academic employees at roughly 33%. Thus, what women academics, both non-German and German, have in common is that they face gender-based career disadvantages. While the ratio of migrant men also slightly declines at the level of professors, the percentage of migrant women, again, is the lowest among the four. But their proportion also becomes lower in the professorial rank than the academic employee total (1.77% vs 4.51%) and the rate of decrease is much more significant than their female German counterparts (Table 9.2). This suggests that when considering academic career progression, highly skilled migrant female academics seem to face multiple, intersecting inequalities along the line of familial or own migration experience and gender when striving for an academic career.

Highly skilled migrant women seem better represented in the higher education sector than in male-dominated occupations in the highly skilled labour market sectors, confirming the existing studies (Kofman 2000). Nonetheless, their lower proportion in the professorial rank than that in the overall academic positions shows that they 'disappear' as the career ladder goes up higher. Similar observations are being made by Andrea Löther (2012), who examined the intersection of gender and migration background drawing on the 2008 micro-census and the primary data gathered in an original survey conducted by the Centre of Excellence Women and Science.

It may be argued that migrant academics' 'disappearance' is due to the generation and age effect, in that the overall relatively young age structure of non-German citizens also mirrors in professorial ranks. This can explain the small proportion of non-German professors as a whole but not the smaller share of non-German women in the professorial rank vis-à-vis their non-German male counterparts. This exercise shows that it is not sufficient to examine *either* the role of migration *or* gender in achieving academic career progression. Instead, it calls for the necessity of an intersectional analysis in highly skilled migration (Kofman 2014). For the study of spatial and career mobility of academics, this would mean engaging with the analysis of the relationship between gender, different types of international migration and mobility, and differentiated academic positions (such as PhD researchers, postdoctoral researchers/lecturers and tenured/non-tenured professors).

9.4 Conclusions

Germany is becoming an emergent destination for scientists and other skilled and highly skilled migrants. At the federal and local level in a number of cities, efforts have been made to accommodate the needs of these migrants. The portal 'Make it in Germany' is a testament to the making of a welcoming culture on the part of Germany, which in its official discourse gradually begins to belatedly recognize its role as a country of immigration. The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees has recently launched a model project to train employees of the Foreigners' Affairs Office – the authority regulating admissions and (non-)extension of stay permits – of selected cities on the culture of welcoming.¹² At the level of HEIs, too, the International Office has been set up and the Welcome Centre established in a number of institutions, some of which have been supported by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.¹³ This emerging self-identification as a country of immigration is, we must note, taking shape, in large part through its move to skill-based migration policy. As Yvey Leterme, Deputy Secretary-General of the OECD, remarked:

For highly qualified workers with a matching job, Germany's labour migration policy is now among the most open in the OECD. Employers may recruit these workers quickly and without paying high fees. For many, the new EU Blue Card makes procedures simpler. Conditions for international students to work and stay on after studies are among the most favourable in the OECD.¹⁴

Behind the changing landscape of Germany's immigration policy is the series of crisis pertinent to demographic change and (highly) skilled labour shortages. The explicit focus on the immediate economic utility of these migrants begs the question about long-term consequences of migration when, for example, these migrants are not in the 'productive' phase or needing state support. Moreover, the lack of a gender dimension in the debates on skilled stream is conspicuous. Even though there are some acknowledgements in policy analysis on the gendered imbalance in the skilled and highly skilled streams (Heß 2009; Klingert and Block 2013), there seems to be hardly any systematic engagement so far to address this issue. We may argue that this reflects Germany's conventional gendered division of labour and the reaffirmation of alleged gender-neutrality in spatial mobility within migration scholarship (Morokvasić 1984).

As the discussion in the policy section has shown, spatial mobility is being eased for highly skilled and skilled migrants, without making a specific reference to gender. Although not identified as a shortage sector as such, there have been increasing efforts to make Germany an internationally competitive place for higher education and research. However, the main stay-permit

categories relevant for academics are male dominated. Looking at the statistics of HEI personnel through the lens of labour markets, the number of non-German academics has been on an increase, thus strengthening Germany's recent embracing of the internationalization of HEIs. However, we suggested that observations convey a rather mixed message: female academics have a bigger share among non-German academics. Although the migration stream and citizenship-based statistics are not a quite compatible unit, this observation has led us to suggest that highly skilled migrant women seem to be better represented in the tertiary education sector than other highly skilled and skilled sectors.

However, the descriptive statistics have also shown ambivalence: if we consider the overall HE labour market, non-German academics make up only 10% of the overall academics, of which migrant women are the smallest minority. In addition, *within* the academic sector, their share becomes even smaller at the highest rank of professors. Despite this clear multiple unequal access to the top rank of the academic sector, owing to intersecting categories of gender and migration (operationalized through citizenship), interestingly, we nonetheless found out that the gender gap among non-German academics is much smaller than that of Germans. Given the male-dominated nature of academic fields, which are created in social processes (Beaufaÿs, 2003), and migrant women's general disadvantaged positioning in the labour market, as highlighted in a number of studies, this begs a question as to the ways in which women migrant academics pursue their career and what strategies they craft in doing so.

However, if career mobility, especially for female (migrant) academics, continues to be constrained, as we have seen in the final section, the liberalization of admission would not be as attractive as it aspires to be. Research findings show that 'international professors' at HEIs in the *Bundesländer* of Hessen and Berlin, broadly defined as those professors who have an own or familial migration background, have been internationally mobile in different stages of their education and academic career (Neusel et al. 2014). For these migrants, further geographical mobility is not only an envisioned but rather realizable option (Bauschke-Urban 2010). Future research is necessary to examine these quantitatively small but important groups of workers and to understand their career and life strategies. This calls for operationalizing migration in a more differentiated way than through citizenship, as well as analysing the intersecting effect of migration and gender (Lenz 2013; Löther 2012) in different career stages.

Notes

1. This section is a revised and updated version of my earlier work (Shinozaki 2014a). I thank the Westfälisches Dampfboot for graciously allowing me to do so.
2. A total of some 17,900 work permits were issued between 2000 and 2004 (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2006).

3. ICT workers continue to be admitted through the (highly) skilled stream or 'Blue Card EU' holders.
4. 'Highly qualified workers' is used here in accordance with the official translation of the *Hochqualifizierte*, whose definition can be found online at: http://www.bmi.bund.de/EN/Topics/Migration-Integration/Immigration/labour-migration/labour-migration_node.html (accessed: 7 May 2015).
5. This group of migrants now falls under the 'EU Blue Card' provision (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 2014, p. 74).
6. The Council Directive 2005/71/EC of 12 October 2005 on a Specific Procedure for Admitting Third Country Nationals for the Purposes of Scientific Research. Available online at: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_aufenthg/englisch_aufenthg.html#p0268; <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:32005L0071> (accessed 10 June 2015).
7. While the income requirements became considerably lower than the level of annual income once set at €65,000 in the past (Federal Ministry of the Interior, n.d.), it still lies at a comparable level to that previously imposed on 'other professionals' among 'highly qualified workers'.
8. Available online at: <http://www.bamf.de/DE/Infothek/FragenAntworten/BlaueKarteEU/blau-karte-eu-node.html> (accessed: 7 May 2015).
9. Available online at: <http://www.gain-network.org/DAAD> (accessed: 7 May 2015).
10. 'The population group with a migration background consists of all persons who have immigrated into the territory of today's Federal Republic of Germany after 1949, and of all foreigners born in Germany and all persons born in Germany who have at least one parent who immigrated into the country or was born as a foreigner in Germany. The migration status of a person is determined based on his/her own characteristics regarding immigration, naturalization and citizenship and the relevant characteristics of his/her parents. This means that German nationals born in Germany may have a migration background, too, be it as children of ethnic German repatriates, as children born to foreign parents (in accordance with the so-called *ius soli* principle) or as German nationals with one foreign parent. This migration background is exclusively derived from the characteristics of the parents. And those concerned cannot pass the migration background on to their offspring. As regards immigrants and foreigners born in Germany, however, they can pass their background on. In accordance with the relevant legal provisions concerning foreigners, this definition typically covers first to third generation immigrants.' Available online at: <https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/SocietyState/Population/MigrationIntegration/PersonsMigrationBackground/MigrationBackgroundMethods.html> (accessed: 7 May 2015).
11. However, this is changing. The restrictive rules governing the ascription of German citizenship were reformed in the 1990s, giving long-term settlers the possibility of, and later the right to, naturalization (Diehl and Fick, 2012). This expansionist trend was further facilitated through the introduction of the 2000 citizenship law, which stipulates *the right* to German citizenship for the offspring of regularly residing immigrants. The novelty of the new citizenship law is the *partial* adaption of the *ius soli* principle, which allows dual citizenship only until German-born children of immigrants reach adulthood (Diehl and Fick, 2012; Gerdes and Faist, 2006). The historically ethnic-origin-driven mode of German citizenship, as Rogers Brubaker (1992) conceptualized seems to be becoming further weakened. The grand coalition of the Social Democrats and

- Christian Democrats has put the right to retain dual citizenship among German-born and German-raised children of immigrants into the coalition agreement. For a detailed discussion, see Shinozaki (2014a).
12. Available online at: <http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2014/20140325-0010-pressemitteilung-bamf-abh-projekt.html> (accessed: 7 May 2015).
 13. Available online at: <http://www.humboldt-foundation.de/web/welcome-centres.html> (accessed: 7 May 2015).
 14. Available online at: http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/LETERME%20BERLIN%20ENG_final.pdf (accessed: 7 May 2015).

References

- Ackers, L. (2010) 'Internationalisation and Equality: The Contribution of Short Stay Mobility to Progression Science Careers', *Recherches sociologiques et anthropologiques*, XLI(1), 83–103.
- Bade, K.J. (2000) *Europa in Bewegung: Migration vom späten 18. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart* (München, C.H. Beck).
- Baláz, V. and A.M. Williams (2004) '“Been There, Done That”: International Student Migration and Human Capital Transfers from the UK to Slovakia', *Population, Space and Place*, 10(3), 217–237.
- Bauder, H. (2015) 'The International Mobility of Academics: A Labour Market Perspective', *International Migration*, 53(1), 83–96.
- Bauschke-Urban, C. (2010) *Im Transit: Transnationalisierungsprozesse in der Wissenschaft* (Wiesbaden, GE: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften).
- Beaufaÿs, S. (2003) *Wie werden Wissenschaftler gemacht Beobachtungen zur wechselseitigen Konstitution von Geschlecht und Wissenschaft*, Bielefeld, transcript.
- Beaufaÿs, S., A. Engels and H. Kahlert (2012) 'Einleitung: Einfach Spitze?' in S. Beaufaÿs, A. Engels and H. Kahlert (eds.) *Einfach Spitze? Neue Geschlechterperspektiven auf Karrieren in der Wissenschaft* (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus), pp. 7–22.
- Bhabha, J. (1999) 'Belonging in Europe: Citizenship and Post-National Eight's', *International Social Science Journal*, 51(1), 11–23.
- Bilecen, Başak (2014) *International Mobility and Transnational Friendships* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
- BMW, BMAS and BA (2015) *Make It in Germany* [Online]. Available online at: www.make-it-in-germany.com/en/for-qualified-professionals/make-it-in-germany/the-initiative (accessed: 20 April 2015).
- Bouffier, A. and A. Wolfram (2012) 'Welcher Weg führt zum Ziel? Migrations- und Karrierewege von Ingenieurinnen und Naturwissenschaftlerinnen aus osteuropäischen Staaten an deutschen Universitäten', in S. Beaufaÿs, A. Engels and H. Kahlert (eds.) *Einfach Spitze? Neue Geschlechterperspektiven auf Karrieren in der Wissenschaft* (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus), pp. 145–173.
- Brooks, R. and Waters, J.L. (2011) *Student Mobilities, Migration and the Internationalization of Higher Education* (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Brown, P., H. Lauder and D. Ashton (2011) *The Global Auction: The Broken Promises of Education, Jobs and Incomes* (New York: Oxford University Press).
- Brubaker, R. (1992) *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).

- Busch, A. and E. Holst (2009) 'Glass Ceiling Effect and Earnings: The Gender Pay Gap in Management Positions in Germany', *DIW Discussion Papers* 905. Available online at: <http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/99981/dp905.pdf> (accessed: 7 May 2015).
- DAAD (2014) *Wissenschaft Weltoffen 2014: Daten und Fakten zur Internationalität von Studium* (Bielefeld: Bertelsmann).
- Dernbach, A. (2006) 'Wir sind kein Einwanderungsland', *Der Tagesspiegel*, 7 December 2006. Available online at: www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/wir-sind-kein-einwanderungsland/783936.html (accessed: 7 May 2015).
- Diehl, C. and P. Fick (2012) 'Deutschsein auf Probe: Der Umgang deutsch-türkischer junger Erwachsener mit dem Optionsmodell', *Soziale Welt*, 63, 339–360.
- Erel, U. (2003) 'Skilled Migrant Women and Citizenship', in M. Morokvasić, U. Erel and K. Shinozaki (eds.) *Crossing Borders and Shifting Boundaries: Gender on the Move* (Opladen: Leske + Budrich), pp. 261–283.
- Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration (2013) *2013. Jahresgutachten 2013 mit Migrationsbarometer* (Berlin: SVR).
- Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration (2011) *Migrationsland 2011: Jahresgutachten 2011 mit Migrationsbarometer* (Berlin: SVR).
- Favell, A. (2008) 'The New Face of East–West Migration in Europe', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 34(5), 701–716.
- Federal Ministry of the Interior (n.d.) *Labor Migration*. Available online at: www.bmi.bund.de/EN/Topics/Migration-Integration/Immigration/labour-migration/labour-migration_node.html (accessed: 7 May 2015).
- Federal Ministry of the Interior (2012) *Hinweise des Bundesministeriums des Innern zu wesentlichen Änderungen durch das Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Hochqualifizierten-Richtlinie (vom 1. Juni 2012, BGBl. I S. 1224)*. Available online at: www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/MigrationIntegration/Auslaender/hochqualifiziertenrichtlinie.pdf?__blob=publicationFile (accessed: 7 May 2015).
- Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (2006–2015) *Migrationsbericht* (BAMF).
- Federal Statistical Office (2015) *Population Based on the 2011 Census*. Available online at: https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/SocietyState/Population/CurrentPopulation/Tables/Census_SexAndCitizenship.html (accessed: 9 September 2015).
- Federal Statistical Office (2013) *Hochqualifizierte in Deutschland: Erhebung zu Karriereverläufen und internationaler Mobilität von Hochqualifizierten 2011* (Federal Statistical Office).
- Federal Statistical Office (2006–2014) *Bildung und Kultur: Personal an Hochschulen* (Wiesbaden: Federal Statistical Office).
- Findlay, A.M. (2011) 'An Assessment of Supply and Demand-side Theorizations of International Student Mobility', *International Migration*, 49(2), 162–190.
- Findlay, A.M., R. King, F.M. Smith, A. Geddes, and R. Skeldon (2012) 'World Class? An Investigation of Globalisation, Difference and International Student Mobility', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 37(1), 118–131.
- Findlay, A., R. King, A. Stam, and E. Ruiz-Gelices (2006) 'Ever Reluctant Europeans: The Changing Geographies of UK Students Studying and Working Abroad', *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 13(4), 291–318.
- Gerdes, J. and T. Faist (2006) 'Von ethnischer zu republikanischer Integration: Der Diskurs um die Reform des deutschen Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetzes', *Berliner Journal für Soziologie*, 16(3), 313–335.

- Gresch, C. and C. Kristen (2011) 'Staatsbürgerschaft oder Migrationshintergrund? Ein Vergleich unterschiedlicher Operationalisierungsweisen am Beispiel der Bildungsbeteiligung', *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, 40(3), 208–227.
- Heß, B. (2009) *Zuwanderung von Hochqualifizierten aus Drittstaaten nach Deutschland: Ergebnisse einer schriftlichen Befragung*, Working Paper der Forschungsgruppe des Bundesamtes 28.
- Hoerder, D. (2002) *Cultures in Contact: World Migrations in the Second Millennium* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press).
- Iredale, R. (2005) 'Gender, Immigration Policies and Accreditation: Valuing the Skills of Professional Women Migrants', *Geoforum*, 36(2), 155–166.
- Jahr, V. and U. Teichler (2002) 'Employment and Work of Former Mobile Students', in U. Teichler (ed.) *ERASMUS in the SOCRATES Programme* (Bonn: Lemmens), pp. 117–135.
- Jöns, H. (2011) 'Transnational Academic Mobility and Gender', *Globalisation, Societies and Education*, 9(2), 183–209.
- Kahlert, H. (2012) 'Was kommt nach der Promotion?: Karriereorientierungen und -pläne des wissenschaftlichen Nachwuchses im Fächer- und Geschlechtervergleich', in S. Beaufays, A. Engels and H. Kahlert (eds.) *Einfach Spitze? Neue Geschlechterperspektiven auf Karrieren in der Wissenschaft* (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus), pp. 57–86.
- Klingert, I. and A.H. Block (2013) *Ausländische Wissenschaftler in Deutschland*, Working Paper der Forschungsgruppe des Bundesamtes 50.
- Knight, J. (2007) 'Cross-Border Tertiary Education: An Introduction', in OECD (ed.) *Cross-Border Tertiary Education: A Way Towards Capacity Development* (Paris: OECD; World Bank), pp. 21–46.
- Kofman, E. (2014) 'Towards a Gendered Evaluation of (Highly) Skilled Immigration Policies in Europe', *International Migration*, 52(3), 116–128.
- Kofman, E. (2013) 'Gendered Labour Migrations in Europe and Emblematic Migratory Figures', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 39(4), 579–600.
- Kofman, E. (2000) 'The Invisibility of Skilled Female Migrants and Gender Relations in Studies of Skilled Migration in Europe', *International Journal of Population Geography*, 6(1), 45–59.
- Kofman, E. and P. Raghuram (2005) 'Gender and Skilled Migrants: Into and Beyond the Work Place', *Geoforum*, 36(2), 149–154.
- Kolb, H. (2003) 'Pragmatische Routine und symbolische Inszenierungen: zum Ende der 'Green Card'', *Zeitschrift für Ausländerrecht und Ausländerpolitik*, 7, 231–235.
- Kreckel, R. ed. (2008) *Zwischen Promotion und Professur: Das wissenschaftliche Personal in Deutschland im Vergleich mit Frankreich, Großbritannien, USA, Schweden, den Niederlanden, Österreich und der Schweiz* (Leipzig: Akad. Verl.-Anst).
- Lenz, I. (2013) 'Von den klassischen Dualismen zur Differenzierung der Differenzen?' in L. Pries (ed.) *Zusammenhalt durch Vielfalt? Bindungskräfte der Vergesellschaftung im 21. Jahrhundert* (Wiesbaden: Springer VS), pp. 83–100.
- Leung, M. (2011) 'Of Corridors and Chains: Translocal Developmental Impacts of Academic Mobility between China and Germany', *International Development Planning Review*, 33(4), 475–489.
- Löther, A. (2012) 'Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler mit Migrationshintergrund', *die hochschule*, 1, 36–54.
- Lutz, H. (2011) *The New Maids: Transnational Women and the Care Economy* (London, New York: Zed Books).
- Man, G. (2004) 'Gender, Work and Migration: Deskillling Chinese Immigrant Women in Canada', *Women's Studies International Forum*, 27(2), 135–148.

- Morawska, E. (2001) 'Gappy Immigration Controls, Resourceful Migrants, and Pendel Communities: East-West European Travelers', in V. Guiraudon and C. Joppke (eds.) *Controlling a New Migration World* (London: Routledge), pp. 173–199.
- Morokvasic, M. (2003) 'Transnational Mobility and Gender: A View from Post-Wall Europe', in M. Morokvasić, U. Erel and K. Shinozaki (eds.) *Crossing Borders and Shifting Boundaries: Gender on the Move* (Opladen: Leske + Budrich), pp. 101–133.
- Morokvasić, M. (1984) 'Birds of Passage are also Women ...', *International Migration Review*, 18(4), 886–907.
- Morokvasic, M. 2004. "'Settled in Mobility': Engendering Post-Wall Migration in Europe", *Feminist Review* (77): 7–25.
- Neusel, A. et al. (2014) *Internationale Mobilität und Professur: Kursfassung ausgewählter Ergebnisse aus dem Forschungsprojekt 'Internationale Mobilität und Professur'* (Berlin: MOBIL).
- Nohl, A.-M. et al. (2014) *Work in Transition. Cultural Capital and Highly Skilled Migrants' Passages into the Labour Market* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press).
- OECD (2014) *Education at a Glance 2014: OECD Indicators* (Paris: OECD Publishing).
- OECD (2013) *Recruiting Immigrant Workers: Germany* (Paris: OECD).
- Ong, A. (1999) *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press).
- Parreñas, R.S. (2001) *Servants of Globalization: Women, Migration and Domestic Work* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press).
- Personal Communications (2014) Interview with the Foreigners' Affairs Office Frankfurt a.M., 22 January.
- Pries, L. (2012) 'Migration and Integration in Deutschland: Lebenslügen, Stereotypen und wissenschaftliche Befunde', in A. Heinz and U. Kluge (eds.) *Einwanderungs-Bedrohung oder Zukunft? Mythen und Fakten zur Integration* (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus), pp. 213–232.
- Pries, L. (2008) 'Internationalisierung von Arbeitsmobilität durch Arbeitsmigration', in F. Böhle (ed.) *Handbuch Arbeitssoziologie* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften), pp. 729–747.
- Raghuram, P. (2004) 'The Difference that Skills Make: Gender, Family Migration Strategies and Regulated Labour Markets', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 30(2), 303–321.
- Shinozaki, K. (2015) *Migrant Citizenship from Below: Family, Domestic Work, and Social Activism in Irregular Migration* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Shinozaki, K. (2014a) 'Skill-Based and Gendered Access to Citizenship and Transnational Mobility', in J. Gruhlich and B. Riegraf (eds) *Geschlecht und transnationale Räume: Feministische Perspektiven auf neue Ein- und Ausschlüsse* (Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot), pp. 45–63.
- Shinozaki, K. (2014b) 'Career Strategies and Spatial Mobility among Skilled Migrants in Germany: The Role of Gender in the Work-Family Interaction', *Journal for Economic and Social Geography*, 105(5), 526–541.
- Sondhi, G. (2013) *Gendering International Student Mobility: Gendering International Student Mobility: An Indian Case Study*. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Sussex. Available online at: <http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/46066/> (accessed: 7 May 2015).
- Thränhardt, D. (1992) 'Germany: Undeclared Immigration Country', in D. Thränhardt (ed.) *Europe – A New Immigration Continent: Policies and Politics in Comparative Perspective*, (Münster: LIT), pp. 198–223.

- Waters, J.L. (2006) 'Geographies of Cultural Capital: Education, International Migration and Family Strategies between Hong Kong and Canada', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 31(2), 179–192.
- Xiang, B. and W. Shen (2009) 'International Student Migration and Social Stratification in China', *International Journal of Educational Development*, 29(5), 513–522.
- Yeoh, B. and K. Willis (2004) 'Constructing Masculinities in Transnational Space: Singapore Men on the "regional beat"', in P. Jackson, P. Crang and C. Dwyer (eds.) *Transnational Spaces* (London, New York: Routledge), pp. 147–163.
- Zlotnik, H. (1995) 'The South-to-North Migration of Women', *International Migration Review*, 29(1), 229–254.

Part III

Problems and Solutions: Towards a New Understanding of the Female High-Skill Migrant in Europe

10

The Problem of Skill Waste among Highly Skilled Migrant Women in the UK Care Sector

Sondra Cuban

10.1 Introduction: The nexus of disadvantages faced by highly skilled migrant women

The widespread practice of recruiting highly skilled migrant women for care work has been a major strategy for the new global care industry (Cuban 2013; Kofman et al. 2000). This chapter discusses a case study about the ways the domestic care sector in England captured the labour of highly skilled migrant women (HSMW). Although statistical accounts of immigrants in the care sector in England exist, they compose 20% of this workforce and are mostly female; there is practically no information on these care assistants' backgrounds, including their education levels and former professional occupations. It is as if they are an invisible labour population whose stories have yet to be told. We asked why so many women professionals migrated to become care assistants and why they persisted despite the difficulties they faced. More specifically, questions were posed as to why professional women migrated for jobs for which they were overqualified and what strategies they used to manage both their decisions and disappointments. The insights for this chapter are based on the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) research (2008–2010). Sixty women who were care assistants to the elderly migrated to England from selective care-labour-exporting countries (i.e., India and the Philippines). The study focused on the participants' downward mobility.¹

Through this study it was discovered that although these women initially migrated for opportunities, they lost ground in the process of becoming care assistants and were paralyzed to move forward in their careers; the place that HSMW were in segmented their experiences in the host country (Fitzgerald 2006). The initial loss of their human capital – accumulated through their higher education and professional experiences in their home countries – sent them into a race to the bottom of the labour market in England, preventing

their social mobility (ICMPD, 2005, in Mollard and Umar 2012). In this chapter, we challenge notions of upward mobility of transnationals and the highly skilled as a privileged group. The main aims of this project² were as follows:

- *Understand the post-welfare society and its dependence on gendered skilled migrant care.* This involved examining professional migrant women's participation in the care sector and their mobility/immobility, including the educational capital they brought to their work and the drivers that pulled them from their previous professions into the global care economy and its effects on their career trajectories.
- *Unearth the 'hidden' curriculum of the care industry workplace.* This was done by examining workplace issues for migrants, especially exploitation, understanding these issues and developing supportive policies for them.
- *Develop knowledge about how individual HSMW's home and community lives interconnect with their work lives.* This involved investigating the social support networks of the participants: the ways in which these networks shaped their mobility, opportunities and identities in local and international contexts, especially their de-skilling and its effects on their lives and families.

Examining these contextual factors, the global and national socio-political forces that pull skilled women to migrate, the workforce and labour market practices and policies, and the women's responses, enabled us to see the disadvantages they faced and the policies and practices that reinforced their subjugation (Rubin, et al 2008). The intent was to make these women's labour and lives visible by detailing a more specific debate about women migrants in care work and fill a gender gap in the research on highly skilled migrants. Most of the literature on women immigrant care workers misses their real problems. First, the research collapses the work of care workers – immigrant nurses, domestics, care assistants, nannies and *au pairs* – making it seem as if each group is the same and has the same issues. Second, the literature assumes a male migration model of highly skilled migration (Kofman et al. 2000; Mahler and Pessar 2006), where women follow men (as spouses) rather than serve as breadwinners to their families. Factoring in both gender and care work into the picture warrants the existence of women migrants who are pioneers (meaning they are the first of their families to migrate to a specific country and employment niche) and highly skilled even if they are not viewed as such.

Not only in research, but also in international gender policies skilled migrant women often slip through the cracks. Although a number of international policies since the 1990s have focused on gender issues, none of these focuses on those who are skilled or on women who are transnational

migrants (see, for instance, the World Bank and UNESCO's Education for All (EFA) Initiative, the United Nations, (UN) Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Gender Mainstreaming Agenda (UN 2002)). EFA, starting in 1990, coordinates with UNESCO and has a commitment to bring the benefits of education to 'every citizen in every society'. Its six goals focus heavily on education in developing countries for children, aiming to eliminate gender disparities that girls experience. These two goals were actually adopted by the MDGs established in 2000. The MDGs contain eight goals, focused heavily on ending global poverty through development partnerships, environmental sustainability, childhood mortality and maternal health, as well as combating HIV. There are numerous criticisms of the MDGs – one point in particular is its lack of 'teeth' to make genuine reforms around gender equity, and these policies neglect the issues of cross-border migration of women (Cuban and Stromquist 2009). When women are given attention, the MDGs focus only on women as mothers (through maternal health as an example). Therefore, more in-depth research is needed to make these skilled migrant women visible in policies that help move them from being de-skilled to being able to exploit their skills and for them to receive proper compensation for their expertise. It is at this juncture that the research study begins.

This chapter first introduces the problem of skill waste in both practical and theoretical terms. Then it sets the context with a discussion about the political landscape that undergirded high-skilled migrants' work in the care sector in England. It will then discuss the critical issue of gender selectivity among HSMW, especially the influencing roles of universities. Next we will discuss the gamble that women with tertiary education take in migrating for lower paid work, believing it is a stepping stone, the effects it has on them and their responses. Related to this, the effects of skill waste on society as a whole are discussed. Lastly, there will be a discussion on women's capabilities and equity in education and across institutions and policy recommendations to address HSMW's advancement.

10.2 Methodology and data sources

The study focused on a select group of professional women in diverse fields and regions of the world that migrated to England, taking jobs in the care sector as part of a strategy to improve their capabilities and livelihoods. The focus of the study was on the reasons behind their migration in wagering on an industry and country they believed would leverage their career trajectories and improve the quality of their lives and those of their families. This study of 60 HSMW 'grounds' their experiences and perspectives in local and global contexts, using the research to build themes about this transnational phenomenon. The extended case method (Burawoy et al. 2000) situated the participants' experiences in global contexts. Ethnographic

methods (Spradley 1979; 1980) were used to collect the data and gauge these participants' practices and experiences over time. This included 150 hours of observations, including photographs, field notes and project diaries, in addition to recorded and transcribed interviews. Participants were given hour-long semi-structured interviews,³ which were interpreted, recorded and transcribed, about their education and work histories, their decisions to migrate and about their experiences in England. Themes and narratives were generated to capture the meanings of their words and highlight their voices and reveal close-up social changes (Yin 1994). Furthermore, a Delphi study of 60 experts in different fields was conducted to link national and international issues with the participants' experiences and which allowed for a holistic view of the problem.

All participants in the study had a university education and many arrived with professional experience, often in feminized fields like nursing and teaching, but not always. Some of them worked as business owners, engineers, web designers, economists and university instructors (see Table 10.1). Table 10.1 shows that although the participants were professionals from a variety of backgrounds, most held nursing degrees from health-care-exporting countries. The majority of participants came from the Philippines, revealing thus the importance of bilateral agreements between the countries in question (compared to, for instance, previous colonial ties or mere geographical proximity) for care labour migration of skilled women. Although they used their professional skill sets for supporting England's elderly to upgrade the English care sector, it was not on their own terms. Their work was invisible and they became de-skilled. There were a number of complex factors that led to their de-skilling, including the lack of harmonized systems for translating their qualifications, exclusion in English and EU immigration and workplace policies, a legacy of feminized work in care and a segmented labour market and poor opportunity structures in both sending and receiving countries. In addition, they had little available access to social services and higher education opportunities in the UK. These women migrated to make their investments in a university education pay off. However, their plans went astray when they got stuck in a sector they initially thought would launch them on professional paths.

10.3 Definitions: HSMW and de-skilling processes

The participants are referred to as 'highly skilled' as a proxy for their education levels, specifically their university degrees and the professional experiences they accumulated in their workplaces after they graduated. However, in actuality, the highly skilled category in England is reserved for businesspersons, although it is commonly understood as 'persons with a tertiary education' who are taken in as a temporary brain stock to fill skills shortages (Lowell 2008, p. 52). Because migrants in this category are seen as

Table 10.1 Sample of 60 participants

Nationality (60 sampled)	Degrees (last one earned)	Professions (primary)	Degree-profession-work divergence
Filipino (28 persons)	Nursing (18); midwifery (4); physiotherapy (3); occupational therapy (2); medical administration	Nurses including a nurse educator (15); nursing attendant (3); midwife (3); occupational therapist (2); physiotherapists, including a physiotherapy educator (3); volunteer nurse (2)	5 nurses were nursing attendants and volunteers
Polish (16 persons)	Medicine; tourism/recreation; master's in economics; social work; business; language and literature; teaching (2); engineering, human resources; nursing (2); master's in psychology; accounting; postgraduate in public administration; economics	Paramedic; tax officer; unemployed; social worker; business owner; teacher (3); insurance broker (2); recent human resources graduate; nurse (2); occupational psychologist; IT specialist; web designer	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Engineering to insurance broker – Social work to waitress – School of public administration to web designer – Accounting to IT specialist – Master's in economics to unemployed
Indian (8 persons)	Nursing	Nurse (8) including a nurse educator	0
Romanian (4 persons)	Nursing	Nurse (4)	0
Various migrant groups (4: Chinese, Thai, Cuban, Zambian)	Nursing (2), business administration; philosophy and linguistics	Receptionist; nurse (2); university lecturer and translator	Business administration to receptionist

Source: Chart drawn from Sondra Cuban (2013) *Deskilling Migrant Women in the Global Care Industry*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.

carrying academic and cultural capital, they are also assumed to have economic resources and are therefore less likely to be in low-end occupational niches. The assumption is that these migrants' brain power, middle-class status and networks shield them from the low-wage labour market in the host country (Brown and Lauder 2006); their education reflecting their human capital worth. Yet this was not the case for the HSMW in this sample, nor in the research on this population group.

Raghuram and Kofman have produced an in-depth gender analysis of HSMW and their gender-based discrimination, specifically focusing on gender bias in high-skill mobility (Kofman et al. 2000; Kofman 2007; Kofman and Raghuram 2009; Raghuram 2004; 2012; Raghuram and Kofman 2004). They start with the premise that labour migration of women was underestimated by policymakers and had a male bias which historically justified women's subsidiary roles and legal, economic and social positioning in receiving countries and contributed to limited knowledge of the mechanisms of their migration. Such mechanisms and migratory trajectories of HSMW are rather complex. These mechanisms include economic and social policies and practices as well as institutional and colonial histories. These particular mechanisms are referred to as a 'migration regime' (Lutz 2011, p. 27; Yeates 2009; 2012). This regime connects to migration management systems, such as the visas that determined their labour market value. The visas, for example, put HSMW in precarious and weak labour market positions that gave them little negotiating power, which in turn encouraged their exploitation by employers. These care jobs were temporary, low-paid and took place under poor work conditions. This transient situation, of living 'betwixt and between' sending and receiving countries' labour markets, made them wonder what their futures held (Grillo 2007, p. 199). Thirty per cent of the sample (representing the national population) migrated on student visas, which was valid for a period of two years. They aligned their entire lives to their visas, including work, housing, friendships and learning. For example, they were required to take short-term vocational courses from institutes or colleges while they worked as care assistants and they easily passed these exams but wondered how they would translate these credentials to any kind of professional development (Cuban 2009).

Once in these jobs, they felt, as one participant expressed, 'stopped to do the things I'm quite capable of doing'. They didn't receive support to move from care assistants to professionals and couldn't achieve their potential. June, a former Chinese nurse, stated: 'I have to think: how I will develop myself? I think if I stay in the nursing home I can't develop my skill. My manager knows I'm a qualified nurse but she didn't help me.' Another participant felt the care assistant work consisted of 'unusable skills... if you have unusable skills, you can do nothing really with them. In Poland there simply are no such thing as "carers," just nurses. To be nurse you have to finish nursing college.' To make matters worse, these paid care assistants

were often referred to in the sector by their managers and colleagues as 'carers', which usually means informal and volunteer caring. This terminology became a type of symbolic violence, degrading their worth and was sometimes internalized, as these anecdotes reveal. Their biggest problem was that, from the onset, they were viewed as 'unskilled migrants' and consequently faced special risks in the recipient country (Jubany 2009). Their skills were in essence wasted.

In this chapter, the terms 'de-skilling' and 'skill waste' are used interchangeably. De-skilling is defined as a situation in which migrant workers occupy jobs not commensurate with their qualifications and experience. This means their qualifications, such as their diplomas and degrees, are not recognized in the receiving country (Mollard and Umar 2012). Their professional skill levels were not taken into consideration because the system of assessing skills is 'ideologically constructed, with some competencies being defined as skills and others being excluded from the definition, mostly on the basis of gender stereotypes' (Mollard and Umar 2012, p. 14). This means that social reproduction professions are viewed as having feminine qualities and therefore lacking in skills (Kofman et al. 2000). These stereotypes influence immigration systems to hierarchically grade workers along these lines, where expertise does not consider context or is culture-bound, making women's work more invisible (Kofman 2007). This has consequences for HSMW, who are prone to underemployment, downward occupational mobility, degrading of skills, over-education, job mismatch and skill erosion. These are termed 'invisible underemployment', which occurs when a migrant does not make use of her skills over time (Mollard and Umar 2012). Clearly, for these participants, there was 'mismatched underemployment' because their knowledge and capacities could be better utilized in an occupation other than in the care sector (Mollard and Umar 2012). The participants in this study had skills that were lost through 'information asymmetry' between sending and receiving countries (Dumont and Monso 2007). Throughout this chapter, it will become clear that 'having a higher education degree does not specifically protect a person from over-qualification and indeed tends to increase the risk of mismatch between education and job' (Dumont and Monso 2007, p. 146). Therefore, low-skill, low wages and low-trust work (Grugulis et al. 2004, p. 4) characterize de-skilling, especially for HSMW in England's care sector.

HSMW are doubly disadvantaged due to their gender and nationality which increases their de-skilling in relation to native women and migrant men. They are, for example, disproportionately in cleaning and caring and refer to each other as the 'BBC', meaning 'British bottom cleaners' (McGregor 2008). They were assigned the 'dirty work' in society (Anderson 2000; Cox 2006). Those HSMW outside of the EU were even more vulnerable, having triple disadvantages (Rubin et al. 2008). The key problem, as previously discussed, was their entry status – as this had implications for the variety of

jobs that were available to them and the recognition of foreign degrees in the country to which they migrated (Iredale 2001). These participants never became socially and economically integrated into England, and they were seen as disposable labour; that is, their skilled labour could be exploited and then they could be gotten rid of through their short-term visas. In the following section, the context of these participants' de-skilling will be examined.

10.4 The context: The political landscape affecting the migration of highly skilled women

10.4.1 The feminization of labour migration

The global pattern of women migrating *en masse* from capital-poor countries to capital-rich ones is relatively new as it started in the 1990s. Known as 'the feminization of migration' (Castles and Miller 2009), it includes women of diverse races, ethnicities and nationalities, documented and undocumented. With the expansion of a globalized low-wage economy and the concentration of wealth in certain countries like the UK that draw workers, women migrate to work in low-paying service sectors that pay them much higher wages than in their countries of origin (Wills et al. 2010, p. 7).

The feminization of labour migration is often seen as a development strategy (Phillips 2009): women migrate to work and remit to compensate for structural adjustment policies in developing countries and, in this way, are able 'to mitigate the crisis' (Lipszyc 2004, p. 6). Migration policies go hand in hand with economic liberalization (Fudge 2010). When state agencies become privatized, subsidies are cut on goods and import policies are liberalized, which have the effect of reducing wage, health and safety regulations, leading to major inequalities, unemployment and debt repayments, thereby inducing migration (Sassen 1998). Regional proximity often directs and 'manages' these flows too, where England saw an influx of migrants from the newer A-8 EU countries (Polish came for care work), but colonial histories can also play a role in migration (e.g., India,). Increasingly though, there is a global market for care labour which is filled with workers from the Philippines. These workers are considered to be 'top exports', for which 'live human bodies, outstrip electronics, garments, agricultural products and other trade exports' (UNPAC 2005). Yet, the feminization of migration thesis has not focused on labour nor made distinctions between skill levels among women. Skilled women have been part of an invisible flow in the labour migration stream, which makes it difficult to study the impact of their existence in the care workforce (Kofman et al. 2000).

10.4.2 How the English care sector captured HSMW

Deregulation and cost-cutting of public services in advanced economies like England produce high rates of growth, which usually means lowering wages,

and results in high levels of inequalities. England's care governance can be viewed as a liberal system of social care and as an example of a 'migrant in the market model'; this outsourcing of public services (van Hooren 2012, p. 12) is occurring across Europe's 'welfare regimes' (Esping-Anderson 1990; Lutz 2011). Migrants tend to be employed in countries with more radical welfare restructuring than those with a stable welfare regime (Misra et al. 2006). It should be noted that all of the participants in the study worked in private care companies, which make up most of the care delivery today in the UK (Froggatt et al. 2009). Care employers can 'attract talent' through overseas recruitment of a population believed to have higher-than-average qualifications over British-born workers (Skills for Care 2007). They do this by lobbying the government to brand care as an occupation with 'skills shortages' that can only be met through migrant workers. In reality, these 'shortages' are relative to sudden spikes in demand, 'inflexible' supplies of workers and the fact that the state disbars certain work from paying (Ruhs and Anderson 2010, p. 4). A comprehensive case study of care assistants published by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in England (Cangiano et al. 2009; Spencer et al. 2010) shows that migrants currently compose about a fifth of the care workforce for older persons, about 100,000 persons, or around 19% – a figure also reflected in the US. However, this number jumps for London, where migrants constitute around 60% of the elder-care workforce. The authors of the reports show that the number of migrants in care employment is expected to grow in line with England's ageing population, similar to other OECD countries, and they will likely be highly skilled.

England, as discussed, has always had a historical dependence on HSMW, especially from India and Caribbean nations, as doctors, nurses and teachers. Yet with the new points-based system created in the context of the economic recession where employees' preferences prevailed, it was possible to select more nationalities for certain occupations. India, the Philippines and Poland are the major suppliers of care workers and were the major nationalities represented in this sample. This 'managed migration' system, beginning in 2008, focused on tiers of workers, giving a more prominent role to employers, with 'what they think they can get' (Ruhs and Anderson 2010, p. 8). In this way, a system of 'tied labour' was created (McDowell 2009, p. 32). The state played a regulatory role with care employers for risk-selecting migrant workers but was *laissez faire* with these migrants' problems of de-skilling. This is an important point because in their roles as care workers they are only supposed to engage in supportive activities and are not allowed to do what many former health-care providers had done before: assess, diagnose, treat and design medical plans for clients, including directly dealing with medical problems and managing and giving therapeutic guidance.

10.5 Gender selectivity and the roles of universities in skilled female migration streams

Migrating individuals are often from highly selective groups moving to and from particular places (Borjas 1987). Most of the women in this study came from care-labour-exporting countries, being targeted by British and overseas recruiters for this work. The participants were also 'pioneers', as they were the first of their generation in their immediate families to migrate to England under care employment visas. This meant they neither received information nor support to help them settle in the host country (Lindstrom and Ramirez 2010, p. 54). It also meant that they relied exclusively on recruitment agencies for information about England. This is a common pattern for highly skilled migrants (Johnston et al. 2006) and for women especially (Feliciano 2008).

Gender selectivity is related to migration selection. It means that a woman with a university education will be more likely than a man from a particular country to migrate (Docquier et al. 2008). In this case, women's higher education degree increases the likelihood of their migration (Kanaiaupuni 2000) due to the fact that they have few opportunities after graduating from professional schools in their home countries and would 'have to go further in order to reduce the risk of discrimination' (Docquier et al. 2008, p. 23). This trend has been studied in places like Mexico and the Philippines, which have high rates of female skilled migration (Kanaiaupuni 2000; Parrenas 2005). These women migrate to receiving countries like the US for service work that is in demand there. They believe, like the participants in this study, that they can rise through the ranks when their competencies are recognized, recovering from their employment dips in the care sector (DuMont and Monso 2007; Rabe 2011).

Various agencies started them on this path, universities being the first step in the migration journey. Their university degrees became a key selection criterion and impelled them through institutional, rather than network migration, channels. Furthermore, England's government, in wanting the correct package of skills (Raghuram and Kofman 2004, p. 309), pursued these university-educated women for care work through its points-based system that treated them as unskilled and ineligible for professional posts. The question as to whether or not universities are an affordance in women migrants' trajectories or whether they reproduce gendered niches is the focus here. Regardless, higher education is critical to the migration industry. The 'internationalization of higher education' has been a major factor in the migration of students and as well as workers (Iredale 2001, p. 7; Kingma 2006). These universities in the sending countries push up costs as well as expectations for women graduates who invest much and have high hopes for their career trajectories. After graduating they have to compete within the 'knowledge economy', which has inherent gender disadvantages (Walby 2007). This is

because markets and states exert indirect control through setting qualification standards and defining expertise in particular ways that disadvantage women (Koser and Salt 1997). In addition, professional recognition processes are also selective and are based on formal citizenship status and place of accreditation, creating a hierarchical and gender-segmented system (Mollard and Umar 2012).

Women in particular 'need to have comparatively higher levels of education to compete in the global auction' (Stromquist and Monkman 2000, p. 10). They seek out higher education as a way to leverage their opportunity structures in a globally discriminatory labour market. Nearly all regions of the world have shown increases in higher education enrolments for women since the 1970s. Additionally, when they access higher education they 'tend to exceed men in grades, evaluations and degree completion' (UNESCO 2010, p. 71). Yet enrolments have been the focus of women's increased participation in higher education rather than their subject specializations in relation to labour market returns (Carnoy 2005; Jacobs 1996). The outcomes for women's higher education often disadvantage them because many of the subject areas, such as nursing and teaching, which are social reproductive professions do not pay as well as lucrative financial and IT fields that tend to be male dominated. The gender tracking of women into feminized subject specialties at universities and then into gender-segmented labour markets reduces HSMW's opportunities from the beginning. Gendered drivers therefore guided women's trajectories (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2000; Mahler and Pessar 2006).

The research draws on Mirelle Kingma's framework (2006) for how women in developing countries move through a female-dominated profession like nursing and their resulting migration. Likewise, the participants in this study made itineraries for their careers. They then created routes to migrate to advance their careers and livelihoods and their families, only to reach dead ends in England's labour market. The itineraries the participants made for their futures began by obtaining university degrees. Then, they made routes to migrate, through recruitment companies, to get returns on their educational investments. Next, when they attempted to become professionals again in England, they experienced institutional barriers that prevented their adaptation and conversion of their qualifications. This state left them in a poorly paid occupation and they were unable to secure a good quality of life. Their decision-making was not flawed, but their plans went off track.

These women chose to receive a higher education as a type of 'passport' due to a mismatch between strong schooling and university systems and weak labour markets in their countries (Isaksen et al. 2008). One participant commented: 'Teachers don't get exported, but nurses do. Money talks. The amount we earn here is [more than] what we would get in the Philippines.' Many participants said they dreamt of their future fields with their universities as a gateway to success. These university experiences also activated

networks, thereby encouraging migration. One woman said, 'I had a three-year course in Kerala in a convent. It was a good experience and I mingled with a lot of people. I wanted to go abroad.'

Mara's case highlights gender segmentation in the earliest stages of this process. Thirty-two, and from a small town in Poland with one technical college, she earned an engineering degree but could not locate sustainable work in this field. She originally wanted to go to a nursing school like her sister (who was a nurse), but at 15 she didn't pass the exam and realized she had to take a different direction. She realized there were few options to study and work as a woman:

When I started university, not a big choice to learn. The school where I was, it was typical technical the directions of school, mechanic, for men. For women, nothing. Typical men's school, technical university, where I went. . . . It was difficult to find a job. Everyone wants to have a person with degree and experience. It was difficult as a woman.

Mara's experiences signal the difficulties of pursuing fields that are not feminized and the lack of support and networks to advance. The participants believed that staying in their own countries would not guarantee a successful career. They viewed care assistant work as an entry-level job while they investigated new opportunities and adjusted to a new country. One participant who was a former university lecturer said: 'I would like to do social work or occupational therapy in the future, so I think I'm on the right path.' Those on student visas were promised good training opportunities by recruiters. One participant, for example, was told that the National Vocational Qualification (NVQ) system in the UK was an international degree that was transferable to other countries and therefore valuable. She reflected: 'So I really wanted to learn and to widen my horizons because I think the NVQ here is known to Canada and Australia.' Yet this qualification was not accepted in other countries nor did it count towards professional adaptation in the UK.

In India, Sara finished a three-year nursing course and worked in various hospitals but seemed to be getting little job satisfaction. She migrated to England in 2005 after a friend suggested an agency to her in India which issued her a work permit. She reflected on her decision to migrate: 'I wanted to work abroad and I wanted to study more because here [UK] there is more advanced technologies and everything. I had to work with these old technologies in India, which is why I came here.' She thought she could apply her nursing skills if she were in an English hospital setting. She said: 'I have to improve my career. Money is OK, money is important, a very important matter for living standard but my career is also important for me.' She believed that working in 'hospitals can give us more experience'. Sara was

frustrated because she realized that it would be difficult to move upwards without adapting her credentials and that her nursing home was not improving her skills or knowledge as would a hospital setting: 'In the nursing home, they don't give us much experience because all of the people are elderly. We don't get any chance to deal with medical equipment. In the nursing home they don't have much equipment.' She furthermore stated: 'We know how to take the blood but we are not allowed to. So, we have no chance to deal with it. We are losing our chance to do these things.'

10.6 Effects of skill waste on HSMW trajectories: Gambling and absorbing losses

These women were unable to convert their 'academic capital' (Bourdieu 1986, p. 51) in a new place of settlement. Academic capital refers to higher education degrees and the status it confers in society. Normally it can be further converted into both human capital (labour market opportunities) and economic capital (financial resources). Yet academic capital is also dependent on academic institutions and those outside of England were rendered invisible through its immigration system. This erasure was due to HSMW being perceived as coming from newly accessed EU countries and 'third' countries outside of Europe. Their 'out group' status (Waters 2009) was reproduced in the care sector, which offered them short-term vocational courses for the knowledge-based society ('for those that do not know'), not the university-based, 'knowledge-based economy' ('of those that do know') (Brine 2008, p. 347).

The participants believed that someday their academic capital would be recognized if they put in time to be care assistants. Once they fulfilled their obligations at the bottom of the career ladder, they could use this as leverage to climb to the top. In this way they gambled with a type of 'prisoner's dilemma' (Folbre 2001). June, for example, believed her care assistant work could someday be traded in the care market and that she could become a nurse again in England. Her decision-making was guided by the information given to her by her recruiter who promised her that this work would launch her career if she worked hard and persisted. Others bargained on this societal trade too but became trapped by this deal. One physiotherapist wondered why:

The recruitment companies have very high requirements, like when they took me from my country – in the Philippines they said you have to have at least three years' experience in the hospital, and I wondered, 'hmm, why is that?' Then when you get here it's not recognized and then the people that you are going to be working with, the locals, didn't even go to college.

As pioneer migrants they took risks to migrate on precarious visas in care work and expected that they could use these positions as stepping stones to fulfil their aspirations. While these expectations could be seen as naïve, they are the grand narrative of immigration: that you start at the bottom and work your way up in a new country. Yet June and the other 59 participants were retained in this employment niche through disciplinary social policies that offshored skills and expected them alone to bear the burden (Castles 2006). All the participants however played fairly by the rules of this unequal game.

After they migrated, the participants accommodated to their situations, deciding to focus on other issues in their personal lives, like family matters. Through their bridging and bonding with new co-ethnics and others in and around the care sector, they could both validate their former identities and build their social capital within ethnic enclaves. Again, these connections did not yield greater opportunities as the participants were cut off from 'professional diasporic networks' of people who could open doors for them (Rizvi 2007, p. 227). Yet they began to see themselves as hard-working 'ideal migrants' securing greater human capital for their families, if not for themselves, by sponsoring their education and starting skilled migration chains (McLaren and Dyck 2004). One participant put it bluntly, 'I am here because I want my children to be educated. I want them to have a bright future', while another explained her sacrifices for her daughter: 'I gave her the best school possible for a good foundation, which is the best school back home. I enrolled her in a private school, which is expensive.' These women knew that their children would need more academic capital in order to succeed in a highly stratified globalized labour market. The participants' focus on family made sense, given their career disappointments. They began to view care assistant work as a type of survival employment while they gathered their family resources and networks. One participant concluded: 'The opportunity presented itself and the value of the pound to the peso is great, very big – I will support my daughter and myself.'

They turned to their family relationships not only as a refuge from the setbacks they experienced in failing to live up to their expectations but because they needed more support. As I recall, most of these women were pioneers and lacked migration networks and so this strategy contributed to creating wider support systems for themselves. Those participants whose children lived with them began to see care assistant work as a way to spend more time with their children, using the unsociable hours as an advantage. One participant, Sarita from Cuba, said she would prefer to 'pursue something on the professional side of things, the intellectual side', but in the meantime, as a care assistant, she could spend more time with her young son. Another participant 'had no plans to do the adaptation [of her qualifications], it's very expensive and I have children to support'. She felt that her 'brain is already

stagnant', and went on to say, 'I never used my skill. I forget so many skills. I'm just looking for work only for my kids.' Another midwife, Cara sponsored her ill son from the Philippines and once in England focused on helping him balance his disease with his adolescent development. Most participants visited their families in their home countries but felt they could never return permanently and sometimes thought about onward migration, especially to the US, Canada and Australia, where their extended family lived. England, in this case, was a staging ground for family migration. These participants used their higher education and professional experience to set in motion a chain of migration of family members; as pioneers, the participants helped family members adopt a migration pathway, thereby decreasing the shock for them that they experienced when first arriving (Lindstrom and Ramirez 2010). Maria sponsored her brother to migrate to England, finding him a job at a care company as payback for helping her divorce her husband in the Philippines, which then enabled her to marry her British boyfriend – all of them forming a new family in a new place.

Finding new partners made sense, given their situations. Ania was a former teacher in Poland and had hoped to become one in England after a care work stint. However, learning how long it would take to convert her qualifications, she decided to continue in care work but focus on finding a husband and settling in England, which she did. For some others, it was more complicated. One Filipina participant in her thirties on a student visa decided that she should find a British partner to better secure a future for herself and her family. Knowing that she had limited time before her two-year visa expired, she invested all of her energies in online dating, explaining:

I am Filipina and I want to bring my children here. I put my real life on [this match making service] and I said I am separated and have three kids and they [two men in their forties and sixties] are interested in me and I give them a chance. The reason is because it is hard to stay in England.

Securing more support through creating a local family did not resolve all of their problems. However, it buffered their negative experiences in the care sector. Although these care jobs were introduced to the participants as stepping stones by recruiters, as previously discussed, they functioned more as 'trampolines', bouncing them about rather than forward (Warhurst 2008, p. 79). These short-lived posts were not sustainable for long-term and professional employment. These women, by most accounts, then, could be considered 'losers' in the system. They migrated to make the cost and opportunities lent to them by a higher education degree pay off. However, they ran into detours when they became stuck in these jobs, unable to exploit their expertise. Although they blamed themselves for failing to 'win', structural barriers prevented their success. The loss was not only to them but to society as well.

10.7 Conclusion: Skill waste and crisis

To summarize, the major barriers the women experienced were, first, their higher education, which forced them to locate jobs outside of their countries of origin to sustain their livelihoods. Then, recruitment brokers and employers in England early on locked them into inescapable situations. The immigration laws linked their low-level employment to their immigration status, thereby limiting occupational mobility and advancement from the start. Their visas restricted any viable and economical professional pathways with the downgrading of their qualifications. The poor workplace conditions and salaries in the UK made it difficult to accrue enough relevant resources to advance creating a system of bonded labour with a lack of social protection and enforcement. Moreover, there were no social services or educational institutions that could provide genuine support and advocacy and progress their careers. Last but not least, exclusionary and discriminatory policies and practices in British society undergirded the laws and created double and triple axes of disadvantages at all points in time for HSMW.

These structural barriers led to their de-skilling – an inability to practice or use the skills they learned in universities and in their past workplaces. However, for each and every one of these points, brain waste was also a result. In economic terms, brain waste involves ‘a triple loss’ to HSMW in the form of de-skilling through failed investments of their education, to the destination country’s labour market and to the country of origin through lower remittances due to poor wages (Chammartin 2008; Portes 2009). Brain waste importantly and ultimately affects the public good. Consider the shortages of teachers and nurses, for example, in England – many of these women could have been contributing to these professions with their backgrounds and expertise, and beyond this to critical public services. The medical tips and pointers these care assistants dispensed while in private care companies were valued by clients, but there was no systematic knowledge transfer of this to inform government policies and services for older people. This is an example of brain waste. Brain waste means the loss or underutilization of human capital resources in a destination country, where the migrant workers’ skills, qualifications and professional experiences are not made use of in the labour market (Chammartin 2008; Mollard and Umar 2012). Meanwhile, England benefited from the capital accumulation of their skills at the lowest levels and for a low cost in a way that would be considered ‘accumulation through dispossession’ (Harvey 2005, p. 178). In other words, the participants contributed to welfare reforms at their own expense. Yet they migrated with the idea that they could escape inequalities. Devi, for example, was drawn to England because ‘there is a caste system – here everyone is equal. I saw that on the telly program... a lot of people go to women and they have opportunities abroad’. Devi represents the greatest proportion of HSMW who are now educated in non-OECD countries but migrate

to OECD ones and experience downward pressures leading to devaluation. At the same time, it is important to note that Devi's emigration meant India lost a nurse. This then includes the concept of 'brain drain' from the perspective of sending countries – since these workers and citizens 'no longer [are] contributing directly to their home country's economy, infrastructure, provision of public services and overall development' (Mollard and Umar 2012, p. 15). Many of these sending countries lost experienced professionals to emigration; this especially impacted on its public who couldn't take advantage of their expertise. However, the literature tends to note that when women emigrate it is usually considered to be a 'care drain' rather than 'brain drain' in the sending country.

10.8 Concluding remarks for integrated transnational feminist policies: Focusing on HSMW's capabilities

All of the participants aspired to increase their professional capabilities. Martha Nussbaum defines human capabilities simply as 'what people are actually able to do and to be' (Nussbaum 2003, p.33., Nussbaum, 2011). She sees capabilities that emphasize the whole person and which improves the quality of life for people. Quality of life can include bodily health and integrity, emotions, practical reasoning, affiliation and control over one's environment. Although these have been critiqued as reductive, it is effective for calling attention to HSMW's needs and aspirations as well as the global distribution of their rights, opportunities, services and protection as they move across borders (Unterhalter 2003; 2007).

Capabilities are linked directly to education with its remit of social mobility and the expansion of opportunities (Rao 2012). In fact, Nussbaum sees education as 'the key to all human capabilities' (2004, p. 17). Education, from literacy training to higher education, reflects an enlargement of freedoms to act in the world (Nussbaum 2004, Sen 1993). Yet education is not necessarily empowering in and of itself, as we have seen. Although participants in this study had a higher education, they weren't 'educated for world citizenship' (except for those who joined unions) (Friedman 2000, p. 586), which left many of them without support to overcome the inequalities they faced upon migrating. Their professional education was for accessing their discipline and professions, not for building their own capabilities and rights as workers in the labour market. Yet more of the same type of higher education was not the answer for the dilemmas HSMW faced in their host countries. Therefore, what is needed is to fold the feminization of skilled labour migration into a type of education that calls attention to a multidimensional and gendered notion of social equity that focuses first and foremost on HSMW's comprehensive rights and building their capacities.

Generally, women's higher education is ignored in international neo-liberal policies, with the assumption that higher education, in and of

itself, raises women's levels of labour market advantage. Yet, under globalization processes this is not always the case as the participants' experiences evidenced in this study. Very little has been done to address the mismatch of women's skills with wage differentials in developing or advanced economies (Mollard and Umar 2012). As we have seen, wages, employment, professional development, networks, and socio-economic and political conditions drive international professional migratory flows of women. Although 'brain circulation' has been proposed as a solution to these issues, that is, where migrants obtain higher educational opportunities in advanced economies and then return to resolve problems in developing countries, it often results in permanent migration where people stay put in the host country or migrate onwards (Portes and Dewind 2007). To what extent is migration an inevitable turn for professional women without decent opportunities for their livelihoods in their countries of origin? What reforms should be made under globalization processes that destabilize HSMW trajectories, like the global care industry that captures their labour? Improving conditions and rights of professional women all over the world, as well as regulations and enforcement, needs to occur at international and integrated levels.

The socio-political and economic implications, as the study poses, are large and transnational, and feminist policies are needed to rectify these problems. A feminist critical policy analysis (Marshall 1999) focuses on women, gender and power relations in all institutions and highlights strategies that need to be developed to educate those in low and high places about the feminization of skilled labour migration and the reasons that migrant professional women end up in low-paying care work with few opportunities to advance. Policy development processes would integrate and inform the voices and concerns of HSMW. Dialogues already happen through organizations like Public Services International (PSI), UNIFEM, UN Women, the Gender and Migration Virtual Community, IOM Gender Division and the European Network of Migrant Women, as well as other internationally based organizations. However, these are not woven together for coherent policy development nor do they tackle HSMW's invisibility in the global economy. Resourcing these organizations to support transnational programmes to develop comprehensive and long-term feminist policies would be important.

An international and integrated approach that involves systematic efforts to improve HSMW's progress in a global labour market that clearly disadvantages them is needed. The UN Women's Gender Mainstreaming initiative aims specifically at gender inequities in international policies.⁴ It is 'an organizational strategy to bring a gender perspective to all aspects of an institution's policy and activities through building gender capacity and accountability' (Reeves and Baden 2000, p. 2). It is a practical equity tool that allows for gender-based budgeting, assessments and ways to assess women's capabilities in the system, as well as concrete outcomes for women's development in the labour market (Walby 2005). Importantly, it focuses on ending

systemic gender discrimination by creating more opportunities for women to enter into institutions on more equal terms. The central idea of the Gender Mainstreaming initiative is driven by a gender analysis of all public spheres that aims at transforming gender roles and relations in society. Yet the Gender Mainstreaming initiative has been critiqued not only for neglecting to focus on migrants (Paiva 2000) but also because of its vagueness (Walby 2005) and, importantly, its limited potential as a 'radical political reform' tool (Clisby 2005, p. 23; Moser and Moser 2005). Harmonization across the world of HSMW's expertise and qualifications needs to occur to avoid de-skilling and brain waste. One possible place to start for policy development is UN Women which was established by the UN General Assembly in 2010. The aim of UN Women is to expand opportunities and confront discrimination around the globe against women. Through feminist policies and research, UN Women, working with organizations like the IOM and ILO, as well as with grassroots and feminist groups, can create interventions that prevent HSMW's downward trajectories. While symbolically important, without substantial global policy direction, resources and tools, the mission of gender equity is missed (Cuban and Stromquist 2009). Policies and practices that promote a robust feminist citizenship would see high rates of return for HSMW's higher education, which lifts them from the 'service pools' (Lutz 2011, pp. 187–188) where they are sinking and empowers them to achieve the livelihoods to which they aspire.

Notes

1. The study was titled: Home/Work: The Roles of Education, Literacy and Learning in the Social Networks and Mobility Patterns of Migrant Carers, which began in 2006. Available online at <http://www.esrc.ac.uk/my-esrc/grants/RES-000-22-2554/read> (accessed: 1 April 2015).
2. This chapter draws on discussions in the author's book, *Deskilling Migrant Women in the Global Care Industry* (Palgrave Macmillan 2013).
3. All quotes presented in this chapter were drawn from interviews with the participants that occurred during the study time period.
4. Available online at <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/gendermainstreaming.htm> (accessed: 31 March 2015).

References

- Anderson, B. (2000) *Doing the Dirty Work: The Global Politics of Domestic Labour* (London: Zed Books).
- Borjas, G.J. (1987) 'Self-Selection and Earnings of Immigrants', *American Economic Review*, 77(4), 531–553.
- Bourdieu, P. (1986) 'The Forms of Capital', in J. Richardson (ed.) *Handbook Of Theory Research For The Sociology Of Education* (New York: Greenwood Press), pp. 241–258.
- Brine, J. (2008) 'The Boundaries of Competency Within Lisbon and Bologna: The Short-Cycle/Foundation Learner', *European Educational Research*, 7(3), 344–357.

- Brown, P. and H. Lauder (2006) 'Globalisation, Knowledge and the Myth of the Magnet Economy', *Globalisation, Societies and Education*, 4(1), 25–57.
- Burawoy, M., Blum, J.A., George, S., Gille, Z., Thayer, M., Gowan, T., Haney, L., Klawiter, M., Lopez, S.H., and Riaian, S. (2000), *Global Ethnography* (Berkeley: University of California Press).
- Cangiano, A. et al. (2009) *Migrant Care Workers In Ageing Societies* (Oxford, UK: Compass Centre on Migration, Policy and Society).
- Carnoy, M. (2005) 'Globalization, Educational Trends and the Open Society', in Open Society Institute, *Education Conference 2005: A Critical Look At New Perspectives and Demands*. Available online at: http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/carnoy_english.pdf (accessed: 7 May 2015).
- Castles, S. (2006) 'Guestworkers in Europe? A Resurrection', *International Migration Review*, 40(4), 741–766.
- Castles, S. and M.J. Miller (2009) *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements In The Modern World*, 4th edn. (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Chammartin, G.M. (2008) 'Migration, Gender Equality and Development', in *International Conference On Gender, Migration, Ration and Development: Seizing Opportunities, Upholding Rights*, Manila, Philippines, 25–26 September 2008.
- Clisby, S. (2005) 'Gender Mainstreaming or Just More Main-Streaming? Experiences of Popular Participation in Bolivia', *Gender and Development*, 13(2), 23–35.
- Cox, R. (2006), *The Servant Problem: Domestic Employment in a Global Economy* (London: I.B. Tauris).
- Cuban, S. (2013) *Deskilling Migrant Women in the Global Care Industry* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan).
- Cuban, S. (2009). "“Talking Was A Great Experience”: Destabilising Gendered Communication in the Workplace", *International Review of Education*, 55(5–6), 579–596.
- Cuban, S. and N. Stromquist (2009) "“It is Difficult to be a Woman with a Dream of an Education:” Challenging U.S. Adult Basic Education Policies to Support Women Immigrants' Self-Determination", *Journal of Critical Education Policy Studies*, 7(2). Available online at: <http://www.jceps.com/wp-content/uploads/PDFs/07-2-07.pdf> (accessed: 7 May 2015).
- Docquier, F. et al. (2008) 'Are Skilled Women More Migratory Than Skilled Men?' *Discussion Paper 2009–21* (Louvain: Université Catholique De Louvain) Available online at: <http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/2009021.pdf> (accessed: 7 May 2015).
- Dumont, J. and O. Monso (2007) 'Matching Educational Background and Employment: A Challenge for Immigrants in Host Countries', in *International Migration Outlook*. (Geneva: OECD). Available online at: <http://www.Oecd.Org/Dataoecd/19/5/41561786.Pdf> (accessed: 31 March 2015).
- Esping-Andersen, G. (1990) *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism or More? A State-of-the-art Report* (Cambridge: Polity Press).
- Feliciano, C. (2008) 'Gendered Selectivity: U.S. Mexican Immigrants and Mexican Nonmigrants, 1960–2000', *Latin American Research Review*, 43(1), 139–160.
- Fitzgerald, D. (2006) 'Towards a Theoretical Ethnography of Migration', *Qualitative Sociology*, 29(1), 1–24.
- Folbre, N. (2001) *The Invisible Heart: Economics And Family Values* (New York: The New Press).
- Friedman, M. (2000) 'Educating For World Citizenship', *Ethics*, 110(3), 586–601.
- Froggatt, K., S. Davies and J. Meyer (2009) 'Research Development in Care Homes', in K. Froggatt, S. Davies and J. Meyer (eds.) *Understanding Care Homes: A Research And Development Perspective* (London: Jessica Kingsley Pub), pp. 9–22.

- Fudge, J. (2010) *Global Care Chains: Transnational Migrant Care Workers*. Available online at: <http://www.lalsnet.Org/Meetings/Labour/Papers/Fudgecanada.Pdf> (accessed: 7 May 2015).
- Grillo, R. (2007) 'Betwixt and Between: Trajectories and Projects of Transmigration', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 33(2), 199–217.
- Grugulis, I., C. Warhurst and E. Keep (2004) 'Whats Happening to Skill?' in C. Warhurst, I. Grugulis, and E. Keep (eds.) *The Skills That Matter* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 1–18.
- Harvey, D. (2005) *A Brief History Of Neoliberalism* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press).
- Hondagneu-Sotelo, P. (2000) 'Feminism and Migration', *ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 571, 107–120.
- Iredale, R. (2001) 'The Migration of Professionals: Theories and Typologies', *International Migration*, 39(5), 7–24.
- Isaksen, L.W., S.U. Devi and A.R. Hochschild, (2008) 'Global Care Crisis: A Problem of Capital, Care Chain, or Commons?' *American Behavioral Scientist*, 52(3), 405–425.
- Jacobs, J.A. (1996) 'Gender Inequality and Higher Education', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 22, 153–185.
- Johnston, R. et al. (2006) 'Sustaining and Creating Migration Chains among Skilled Immigrant Groups: Chinese, Indians and South Africans in New Zealand', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 32(7), 1227–1250.
- Jubany, O. (2009) 'Skilled Female Labour Migration', *Focus Migration Policy Brief 13*. Available online at: http://Focus-Migration.Hwwi.De/Typo3_Upload/Groups/3/Focus_Migration_Publikationen/Kurz dossiers/PB_13_Skilled_Fem_L_M.Pdf (accessed: 7 May 2015).
- Kanaiaupuni, S.M. (2000) 'Reframing the Migration Question: An Analysis of Men, Women, and Gender in Mexico', *Social Forces*, 78(4), 1311–1347.
- Kingma, M. (2006) *Nurses on the Move: Migration and the Global Health Care Economy* (Ithaca, NY: ILR Press).
- Kofman, E. (2007) 'The Knowledge Economy, Gender and Stratified Migrations', *Studies in Social Justice*, 1(2), 122–135.
- Kofman, E. and P. Raghuram (2009) *The Implications of Migration for Gender and Care Regimes in the South* (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development).
- Koser, K. and J. Salt (1997) 'The Geography of Highly Skilled International Migration', *International Journal of Population Geography*, 3(4), 285–303.
- Lipszyc, C. (2004) 'The Feminization of Migration: Dreams and Realities of Migrant Women in Four Latin American countries', in *URBAL, Reclaiming the Streets*, Montevideo, Uruguay, 13–15 April 2004.
- Lindstrom, D.P. and A.L. Ramirez (2010) 'Pioneers and Followers: Migrant Selectivity and the Development of U.S. Migration Streams in Latin America', *ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 630(1), 53–77.
- Lowell, L. (2008) 'Highly Skilled Migration', in G. Appave and R Cholewinski (eds.) *IOM World Migration 2008: Managing Labour Mobility in the Evolving Global Economy* (Geneva: IOM), pp. 51–76.
- Lutz, H. (2011) *The New Maids: Transnational Women and the Care Economy* (London: Zed Books).
- Mahler, S.J. and P.R. Pessar (2006) 'Gender Matters: Ethnographers Bring Gender from the Periphery toward the Core of Migration Studies', *International Migration Review*, 40(1), 27–63.

- Marshall, C. (1999) 'Researching The Margins: Feminist Critical Policy Analysis', *Educational Policy*, 13(1), 59–76.
- McDowell, L. (2009) *Working Bodies: Interactive Service Employment and Workplace Identities* (Chicago, IL: Wiley-Blackwell).
- McGregor, J. (2008) "'Joining The BBC (British Bottom Cleaners)": Zimbabwean Migrants and the UK Care Industry', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 33(5), 801–824.
- McLaren, A. and I. Dyck (2004) 'Mothering, Human Capital, and the "Ideal Immigrant"', *Women's Studies International Forum*, 27(1), 41–53.
- Misra, J., J. Woodring and S. Merz (2006) 'The Globalization of Care Work: Neoliberal Economic Restructuring and Migration Policy', *Globalizations*, 3(3), 317–332.
- Mollard, B. and S. Umar (eds.) (2012) 'Gender, Migration, and Deskilling', in *Crushed Hopes: Underemployment and Deskilling Among Skilled Migrant Women* (Geneva: International Organization for Migration), 11–36, available online at http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/Crushed_Hopes_3Jan2013.pdf (accessed on 11 May 2015).
- Moser, C. and A. Moser (2005) 'Gender Mainstreaming since Beijing: A Review of Success and Limitations in International Institutions', *Gender and Development*, 13(2), 11–22.
- Nussbaum, M.C. (2011) *Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
- Nussbaum, M.C. (2004), 'Beyond the Social Contract: Capabilities and Global Justice,' *Oxford Development Studies*, 32(1), 3–18.
- Nussbaum, M.C. (2003) 'Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice', *Feminist Economics*, 9(33–59).
- Paiva, R.G. (2000) 'Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the Twenty-First Century,' *IOM Statement*, 9 June 2000. Available online at: <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/followup/beijing+5stat/statments/omi9.htm> (accessed: 7 May 2015).
- Parrenas, R.S. (2005) *Children of Global Migration: Transnational Families and Gendered Woes* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press).
- Phillips, N. (2009) 'Migration as Development Strategy? The New Political Economy of Dispossession and Inequality in the Americas', *Review of International Political Economy*, 16(2), 231–259.
- Portes, A. (2009) 'Migration and Development: Reconciling Opposite Views', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 32(1), 5–22.
- Portes, A. and J. DeWind (eds.) (2007) *Rethinking Migration: New Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives* (New York: Bergahn Books).
- Rabe, B. (2011) 'Dual-Earner Migration: Earnings Gains, Employment and Self-Selection', *Journal of Population Economics*, 24(2), 477–497.
- Raghuram, P. (2012) 'Global Care, Local Configurations – Challenges to Conceptualizations of Care', *Global Networks*, 12(2), 155–174.
- Raghuram, P. (2009) 'Caring About "Brain Drain": Migration in a Postcolonial World', *Geoforum*, 40(1), 25–33.
- Raghuram, P. (2004) 'The Difference that Skills Make: Gender, Family Migration Strategies and Regulated Labour Markets', *Journal Of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 30(2), 303–321.
- Raghuram, P. and E. Kofman (2004) 'Out of Asia: Skilling, Re-skilling and Deskilling of Female Migrants', *Women's Studies International Forum*, 27(2), 95–100.
- Rao, N. (2012) 'Migration, Education and Socio-Economic Mobility', in N. Rao (ed.) *Migration, Education, and Socio-economic Mobility* (London: Routledge).

- Reeves, H. and S. Baden (2000) *Gender and Development: Concepts and Definitions* (Sussex: University of Sussex, Institute of Development Studies).
- Rizvi, F. (2007) 'Brain Drain and the Potential of Professional Diasporic Networks', in L. Farrell and T. Fenwick (eds.) *Educating the Global Workforce: Knowledge, Knowledge Work, and Knowledge Workers* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge), 227–238.
- Rubin, J. et al. (2008) *Migrant Women in the European Labour Force. Current situation and future prospects* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation).
- Ruhs, M. and B. Anderson (2010) 'Introduction', in R. Ruhs and B. Anderson (eds.) *Who Needs Migrant Workers? Labour Shortages, Immigration, and Public Policy* (Oxford, UK: COMPAS, Oxford University Press), 2–14
- Sassen, S. (1998) *Globalization and Its Discontents: Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money* (New York: New Press).
- Sen, A. (1993) 'Capability and Well-Being', in M.C. Nussbaum and A. Sen (eds.) *The Quality of Life* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press), pp. 30–53.
- Skills For Care (2007) 'Overseas Workers In The UK Social Care Sector, Draft Final Report,' http://www.Skillsforcare.Org.Uk/Research/Research_Reports/Overseas_Workers.AspX.
- Spencer, S., Martin, S., Bourgeault, I.L., and O'Shea, E. (2010) *The Role of Migrant Care Workers in Ageing Societies: Report on Research Findings in the U.K., Ireland, The U.S. and Canada* (Geneva: IOM).
- Spradley, J.P. (1980) *Participant Observation* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston).
- Spradley, J.P. (1979) *The Ethnographic Interview* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston).
- Stromquist, N.P. and K. Monkman (2000) 'Defining Globalization and Assessing its Implications on Knowledge and Education', in N.P. Stromquist and K. Monkman (eds.) *Globalization and Education: Integration and Contestation Across Cultures* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Pub.), pp. 3–26.
- UN (2002) *Gender Mainstreaming: An Overview* (New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs).
- UNESCO (2010) *Global Education Digest: Comparing Education Statistics Across the World* (Montreal, Quebec: UNESCO Institute For Statistics) Available online at: http://www.Uis.Unesco.Org/Library/Documents/GED_2010_EN.Pdf (accessed: 7 May 2015).
- UNPAC (2005) *Women and the economy*. Winnepeg: CA. www.unpac.ca/economy/introglob.html.
- Unterhalter, E. (2007) 'Cosmopolitanism, Global Social Justice and Gender Equality in Education', in *HDCA Conference*, New York, July.
- Unterhalter, E. (2003) 'Education, Capabilities and Social Justice', UNESCO EFA Global Monitoring Report 2003/4, *Gender and Education for All: The Leap To Equality*. Available online at: <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001469/146971e.pdf> (accessed: 7 May 2015).
- van Hooren, F.J. (2012) 'Varieties of Migrant Care Work: Comparing Patterns of Migrant Labour in Social Care', *Journal Of European Social Policy*, 12(2), 133–147.
- Walby, S. (2007) 'Introduction: Theorizing the Gendering of the New Economy: Comparative Approaches', in S. Walby et al. (eds.) *Gendering The Knowledge Economy: Comparative Perspectives* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 3–50.
- Walby, S. (2005) *Measuring Women's Progress In A Global Era* (Oxford: UNESCO).
- Warhurst, C. (2008), 'The Knowledge Economy, Skills and Government Labour Market Intervention', *Policy Studies*, 29(1), 71–86.

- Waters, J.L. (2009) 'Transnational Geographies of Academic Distinction: The Role of Social Capital in the Recognition and Evaluation of "Overseas" Credentials', *Globalisation, Societies and Education*, 7(2), 113–129.
- Wills, J., Datta, K., Evans, Y., Herbert, J., May, J., and McIlwaine, C. (2010) *Global Cities At Work: New Migrant Divisions of Labour* (New York: Pluto Press).
- Yeates, N. (2012) 'Global Care Chains: A State-of-The-Art Review and Future Directions in Care Transnationalization Research', *Global Networks*, 12(2), 135–154.
- Yeates, N. (2009) *Globalizing Care Economies and Migrant Workers: Explorations in Global Care Chains* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Yin, R. (1994) *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage).

11

American Women in Southern Europe: A New Source of High-Skill Workforce for the Eurocrisis Zone

Irina Isaakyan

I remember Athens as an exclusively hospitable place, with plenty of gourmet restaurants and welcoming people. I remember locals smiling at me in the street. It was like a little paradise, a god-blessed land. It was many years ago, when I first came here in the early 1980s, following my Greek husband. Now it has changed drastically. People are not smiling anymore. Their faces are exhausted. It is not the land of abundance anymore – it is the land of poverty. I often see quite decent people collecting stuff and eating from the garbage, and I keep asking myself who is next. They are not bad people – they are just very much stressed at the moment, and they look like they need help. There is a precise word for it – CRISIS.

(Bliss, a former lawyer from Chicago, age 52)

11.1 Introduction

The current financial crisis has affected the world not equally, having divided it into relatively safe and extremely shaky segments. Its epicentre, or the ‘eurocrisis zone’, is uniformly associated with Southern Europe – the region that has been recently hit not only financially and economically but also socio-politically, with a lot of damage to its social fabric (Gatopoulos 2013; 2014; Halkias 2013). Particularly in Greece, people have lost their jobs, become desperate and committed suicide at unprecedented rates. Some live in poverty while others leave for other – economically safer – countries and continents and send remittances on which their families may somehow survive back home (Halkias 2013).

Another aspect of the crisis is its human dimension or the impact upon people’s mentalities and attitudes. There are persistent splashes of xenophobia in Southern Europe in general and in Greece in particular, and increasing tensions between hosts and migrants (Triandafyllidou and Kouki

2013; 2014). More than ever before, the public imagination turns migrants into 'scapegoats', responsible for 'stealing' local jobs, often without considering the potential positive impact of their human capital upon deteriorating host economies (Triandafyllidou and Kouki 2014). In this milieu, women migrants become more and more subjected to double discrimination in Southern European job markets, which are usually biased against local women and also against migrant men because socio-economic discrimination on the grounds of both gender and ethnicity becomes intensified at such societally vulnerable moments (Kofman 2013; Rubin 2008). However, it would be rather simplistic to think about women migrants merely as victims of the economic and financial crisis. In economically challenging situations, their agency (or their capacity for transformation and change) may work in the opposite direction and point to their increased resilience rather than submissiveness to the current unpredictable societal order (Andall 2003; Farris 2013; Lim 2000; Milkman 1976; Morokvasic 1984; 1991; Morokvasic et al. 2008; Piper 2008).

Scholars seek to better understand robustness and survival strategies of women migrants (Anthias et al. 2013; Morokvasic 1984; 1991; Morokvasic et al. 2008; Rath 2011). Questions that could be answered by such scholarship are as follows: How do highly educated immigrant women manage to survive in what is often an immigrant-hostile labour market and in a restructuring economy? To what extent and how do they manage not to become 'lost' as a workforce while many highly qualified hosts themselves are not protected from this destiny?

One such survival strategies is immigrant entrepreneurship, or running one's own business (Rath 2011; Schrover et al. 2007). There are many examples (both successful and not) of entrepreneurship in Southern Europe – a relatively new although rapidly expanding phenomenon for this particular region (Ambrosini 2012; 2014; European Foundation 2012; Shawwa 2012). In this reference, both scholars and policymakers are eager to learn more about the profiles of immigrant entrepreneurs and the barriers they may encounter while facing an economic recession and austerity measures (European Foundation 2012; Hiebert et al. 2015; Kloosterman and Rath 2002; Rath 2011). Immigrant entrepreneurs are usually imagined in scholarship as migrants from 'traditional' sending societies, who follow the 'East–West' and 'South–North' trajectories in their sojourner careers. At the same time, there has been a persistent, though under-examined, stream of reversed high-skill migration – particularly illuminated by the relocation of US nationals to continental Europe (Wennersten 2008).

The history of US emigration is two centuries old and relates to the mobility of highly educated people who come to Europe both to gain professional or cultural experience and to make an impact upon a local community (Smith 2013; Wennersten 2008). There are many didactic examples of such migrants that may be also conceptualized in the sociological

language of today as ‘innovators’, ‘pioneers’ and, consequently, ‘immigrant entrepreneurs’, thus implicating a high potential of this national/social group for both engaging in entrepreneurship and resisting the hardships of expatriation.¹ However, the majority of iconic images and success stories of Americans surviving through the French Commune, the Great Depression and the Second World War in European contexts relate to people who were not bound by local matrimonial ties. They can be therefore understood as high-skilled ‘free-wheelers’, settling in Europe temporarily before returning to the US. It is, in fact, much easier to be an active agent of change when you are exempt from traditionally orthodox laws of a local gender regime imposed by certain gender expectations from your local family and community.

In reality, this pattern of US emigration has by now become almost 60% gender-unbalanced, while the majority of prevailing women migrants settle in such Southern European countries as Italy and Greece (rated among the top ten destinations for US expats) through the traditional route of cross-border marriage (Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 2014).² In this case, they may face disqualification much faster than those who enter such countries as business migrants or high-skill migrants who work in transnational corporations (Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 2014; Kofman 2012; Rubin 2008; Trundle 2009). In the light of all this, it seems reasonable to ask to what extent highly skilled US women who settle in Southern Europe as ‘marriage-migrants’ can engage in entrepreneurship in the milieu of the crisis.

To explore this issue, this chapter draws on narrative-biographic interviews conducted in 2013–2014 with 50 US-national women of working age between 30 and 60 who have been living in Italy or Greece for at least ten years. None of them appears in the text under her real name and no identifiable information on any of the informants has been provided. Their stories were analysed through such techniques of narrative-biographic analysis as turning point analysis, epiphanies and narrative segment analysis.³

The chapter has the following structure. The theoretical part gives an overview of the history of US emigration to Europe from the angle of sociological analysis. It shows five different waves of this emigration, with particular attention to the agency of US expats living in Europe during different timeframes. Here the most iconic figures of the US expat community who could be conceptualized as ‘pioneers’ or ‘expat entrepreneurs’, thus proving the potential of US expats for entrepreneurship, associated with risk-taking and innovation in critical conditions, will be examined. This section also shows the peculiarities of the Southern European context from the angle of existing immigration laws and the current socio-economic changes and discusses the social positioning of women migrants, with specific focus on their survival strategies in times of austerity.

The analysis of the findings starts with three case studies. These are the lifestories of three different US expat women which illuminate the dynamics of their agency and entrepreneurship in relation to the escalation of the crisis. Supported by the data from the rest of the interviews, the discussion then invites the reader to think about the interaction between such concepts as entrepreneurship, gender and crisis. Despite having come to Southern Europe not always on a high-skill work permit, the informants have managed to convert into successful, although at times unusual, immigrant entrepreneurs who have managed to sustain their own labour market niche and therefore resist the crisis. Moreover, their entrepreneurial success is going counter to the direction of the overall local economy, which for the most part is negatively affected by the crisis. The study further shows that although the women's creativity and capacity for change have been stimulated by the current financial crisis in Italy and Greece, the traditional gender order in their local community may still act as a serious barrier for their entrepreneurship.

11.2 The eurocrisis zone and American expatriates

11.2.1 Americans in Europe: An overview of US emigration

'They kept saying: "What are you going to do there? You should stay with us in New York and prepare for medical school at Columbia!" But I just packed my suitcase and left for Paris, where my college friend was having a whale of a time.' It was 'one of those post-Vietnam hippie years' – 1974 – when Alicia, an American girl of 22, had decided to engage in her spontaneous European tour to the surprise and even shock to her well-to-do parents just because she wanted to see the world. At that moment, she was not planning her future and had a very vague idea of where she might eventually end up. En route to Paris, she however 'got stuck in Naples', where she wanted just to spend a few days and ended up living for several decades because she had fallen in love there. 'This is what usually happens to us', smiles Alicia, 'very young and naïve, we leave America in a whirl of circumstances and life chances. There are many American women like me who have been living in Italy for years.'

Alicia is not over-exaggerating. It may come as a shocking discovery for many people that the discursively constructed 'promised land' can be also affected by the exodus of its own nationals (Oldenburg 1989; Smith 2013; Wennersten 2008). Scholars who study American expats recognize five waves of US emigration. In his provocative book, the historian McCullough (2011) explores the first wave, which can be conceptualized as the time of European voyage pioneers – aristocratic young people from American elite circles who were seeking adventure in the Paris of 1830–1900 and who had built the foundation for the US bohemian expat culture in Europe. If in the language of today's migration scholarship, they were aspiring high-skill professionals

and elite migrants in their twenties who came to Europe to better understand their own cultural roots and values and to learn new insights that would enrich their careers upon return.

Their social and economic remittances back home were enormous, having produced an agglomeration effect upon their home society. For example, the anti-slavery positioning of Senator Charles Sumner, which became a decisive factor for abolition, had been impacted upon by the ideals of liberty and democracy he learned at the Sorbonne during the formative years of his Parisian pilgrimage (McCullough 2011). Paris also became a key source of innovation for the novice painter and future telegraph inventor Samuel Morse, as well as for his co-national fellow artists and sculptors Augustus Saint-Gaudens, Mary Cassatt and John Singer Sargent – a large part of whose masterpieces convey French or Italian themes (Mathews 1998; McCullough 2011).

During the first two decades of the 20th century, American expatriation became even more dynamic, although less visible amidst the overall geopolitical changes that stigmatized these decades. The second wave covers the famous years of US immigration from 1890 to 1921; this was a time when 17.6 million foreigners entered the US while six million departed (Wennersten 2008). The third wave refers to the years between 1920 and 1950, which embraced three distinct time shifts: post-First World War self-exile, the Great Depression and post-Second World War resettlement. This third period is characterized by a complex migratory pattern that included a wider range of destination countries in Europe (Wennersten 2008). Some scholars also note a very short fourth wave in reference to the ‘dissident escape from Vietnam’ in the 1960s and early 1970s, while the fifth wave is the longest and the most complex in its coverage of the period from 1976 until now (Oldenburg 1989; Putnam 2000; Wennersten 2008).

According to the US Census from 2010 and Smith (2013), more than 20 million US nationals are now living abroad. From the angle of their socio-demographic profile, the prevailing majority of US expats have always been highly (tertiary) educated and had a generally high standard of living in their country of origin (Oldenburg 1989; Putnam 2000). McCullough (2011) notes that, since these five waves cover both prosperous and economically stringent years, there are indeed many overlapping drivers of US emigration. Economic emigration is usually well planned whereas American emigration is mostly spontaneous, driven by a particular emotionally intense event happening to quite a wealthy individual (like a romantic encounter, divorce, split-up, post-alcoholic depression and unfinished suicide attempt) (Belsky 1994; Collins and de Zerega 2002; Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 2014; Wennersten 2008).

In summary, they can be conceptualized as ‘lifestyle migrants’ or ‘life-quality migrants’, who may be also affected by an economic or romantic pull. While being generally happy with the US, they still long for new

life opportunities and a better quality of life, associated with romanticism, slow pace of living or less economic responsibility. For this particular reason, continental Europe becomes their most common destination, where they are usually seen as ‘economic dissents’ escaping from US taxes, thus adding to their idea of a better life (Dickinson 1989; Lenzer and Mao 1994; Wennersten 2008).⁴ It is a complex tapestry of lifestyle decision-making, which is strongly supported by the fact that, from the very beginning, most US emigrants have reliable economic means to engage in the rather expensive overseas relocation project (Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 2014; Wennersten 2008).

Searching for an alternative lifestyle, US expats in Europe can now also transfer – in this way or another – their rich human capital to their countries of destination more than ever before. As Wennersten (2008, p. 19) notes, around the world in general and across Europe in particular ‘stretches an archipelago of American expatriate professionals’, represented by management consultants, bankers, writers and high-tech specialists. However, European countries are all very different from each other. For example, the majority of foreigners still enter the Southern European region as ‘marriage-migrants’ or ‘retired migrants’, who may not need to work at the very beginning yet may later seek to realize their potential (Dickinson 1989; Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 2014; Trundle 2009).

Due to their high levels of education and frontier-like national consciousness, they frequently behave like US cultural missionaries by advocating American values in their new communities (Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 2014; Smith 2013; Wennersten 2008). They have transformed from adventure-seeking, temporary visitors of the past to rather ambitious expats, who are eager to enrich their host societies and economies with the American tradition. However, to what extent are they really ready for the challenges of a new modality, which is often far beyond their traditional thinking?

11.2.2 The context of Southern Europe: Immigration law and gender order

The primary region of their destination traditionally remains Europe while its Mediterranean countries of Italy and Greece are within their top ten destinations. At the moment, there are approximately 300,000 US nationals living in the countries of Italy and Greece (Wennersten 2008), which only became immigrant states in the 1980s and whose immigration regimes fall within the ‘Mediterranean model of immigration’ (Campani et al. 2006). Its distinct features are grounded in the overall failure of the national welfare regimes, the outcomes of which are labour market segmentation and rampant informal economies (Campani et al. 2006; Chiapelli and Cabral 2006).

The insufficient welfare systems in these countries make their citizens dependent almost entirely on migrants (and especially on women migrants)

for care work, who are often employed on informal terms (Ayres and Barber 2006). For example, 40% of all immigrants (or more than 1.5 million people) and particularly 52% of female immigrants are employed in the Italian service sector while more than 63% of foreign women in Greece are engaged in domestic work or hospitality (Campani et al. 2006; European Foundation 2012). The growing feminization of immigration to Southern Europe (or the over-representation of women migrants in social and private services) is another 'structural feature' of the national economies (Campani et al. 2006). This has eventually caused, in the case of Italy, the 'consolidation of a parallel welfare – the tendency of Italian families to recruit migrants for caretaking activities' (Kofman 2013, p. 591). Such imported care or domestic workers are often highly educated: for example, 50% of all immigrants in Italy possess a university degree (Kofman 2013).

Despite the increasing inflows of highly educated migrants in general and highly educated women migrants in particular, the major routes of naturalization remain traditionally patriarchal and ethno-cultural (through marriage in Italy and ethnic descent in Greece), while ethno-cultural immigration is not supported by any appropriate legislature. Immigration laws addressing high-skill migrants are either missing or obscure in Southern Europe. Regarding high-skill and business migration, the Greek legislature has become especially restrictive over the last 20 years (Ayres and Barber 2006; European Foundation 2012; Labriadinis 2010; Zeis and Liapi 2006). For example, the immigration law of 1991 allowed a relatively fast entrance of immigrants who wanted to open a business. To receive a residence permit for five years, they only needed a pre-approval from the Greek Consulate from their country of origin. Ten years later, the 2001 law imposed a series of bureaucratic procedures on the entry and independent economic activity of immigrants (e.g., finding a building and signing a rent contract; getting permission from the city planning department; registering at the tax office; obtaining necessary permits from multiple inspections; getting all papers stamped). Further bureaucratic measures were added in 2005 to include a €60,000 financial threshold for immigrants to open an enterprise.⁵

Compared with Greece, the dynamics within Italian legislature in relation to immigration resemble a rollercoaster. The first two laws on immigration from 1986 and 1990 focused entirely on controlling inflows of illegal immigrants while generally approaching immigration as a temporary phenomenon and therefore denying the importance of socio-economic integration. Although the Turco-Napoletano Law of 1998 introduced some liberal elements in support of high-skilled and business immigrants (such as their sponsorship by Italian citizens or other naturalized migrants and local institutions; the expansion of family reunification to include more extended relatives; etc.), the 2002 law then severely restricted their labour market entry by equating their residence permit to the length of their employment contract (Geddes 2003).

Another legal issue that may limit the economic activity of highly skilled immigrants in Italy and Greece is the highly bureaucratic process of recognition of their degrees and professional qualifications. In relation to overseas credentials, Italy may visually appear more flexible than Greece, as there are a number of professions where recognition of overseas credentials is not required (CIMEA 2015; Schuster and Desiderio 2012). Among the so-called professions not regulated by law are those in advertising, marketing, arts and languages. The remainder of professions in Italy and absolutely all professions in Greece fall within the classification of 'being regulated by law' and therefore require the recognition of any non-EU-received credentials by the national Italian or Greek law. The overall recognition procedures in Southern Europe may take up to five years, while Italian recognition of 'regulated' professions is in practice much more immigrant-unfriendly and bureaucratically structured than that in Greece.⁶ The foreign degree recognition process in both Italy and Greece may be further confirmed as 'subordinate to compensatory steps', such as 'apprenticeship' and/or 'passing the qualifying examination'.

In Southern Europe, women migrants usually encounter many more barriers than men in having their qualifications recognized. This is especially the case for those foreign women who 'enter as a spouse and who may eventually end-up in jobs below their educational levels' (Kofman 2013, p. 590). As immigrant skill assessment is gender-constructed, women migrants are often over-educated for the work that they are doing in the host country. Moreover, the gender bias in skill recognition is rapidly increasing in the region, resulting in brain waste. In particular, those who entered Italy in the last 15 years are 90% over-qualified (Kofman 2013). In general, in Italy and Greece, only 30% and 13% of foreign women are in high-skill employment equivalent to their qualifications (Kofman 2013, p. 591). Specifically in Italy, only 15% of medical degrees and 34% of intellectual degrees were recognized in 2005, while the majority of domestic workers are holders of degrees that go unrecognized (Schuster and Desiderio 2012).

Existing migratory policies are thus extremely non-systematic and slow in both Italy and Greece (Campani et al. 2006). As a result, female migrants are almost invisible as both workers and naturalized citizens. In striking contrast with the increasing tendency of feminization of migration, the institutional frameworks that exist respond mainly to the needs of migrant men and address migrant women to a very small degree (Anthias et al. 2013). Even when addressing gender issues on an ad hoc basis, existing welfare programmes target exclusively local rather than migrant women (Kofman 2013; Zeis and Liapi 2006). The current legal framework in Italy and Greece provides almost nothing with regard to everyday problems that migrant women may have, such as mixed marriage, domestic violence or informal employment. Compounded to that, there are no provisions in either country with reference to immigrants who are single mothers or who are dependent

on their local husbands in Italy (Ayres and Barber 2006; Campani et al. 2006).

Over the last five years, the complex bureaucracy has been compounded by the fact that the 'Mediterranean model' states now also fall within the so-called eurocrisis zone, with Italy and Greece being the most severely damaged by the crisis. The outbreak of sovereignty debt, follow-up austerity measures and various reforms caused the downsizing of the national economies and became the starting point for the most severe recession (Ellinas 2013; Triandafyllidou and Kouki 2014). For example, in November 2012, unemployment in Greece rose to a record of 27%. As a result of the financial crisis and austerity measures, more than 30,000 Greek people had lost their jobs while almost 30% of the overall population (compared with 9% in 2008) were living below the poverty level. In absolute numbers 1.5 million Greeks remain unemployed, whereas half a million Greek families remain without anyone working at all (Gatopoulos 2014). Within this economic context, Greece has seen increasing levels of intolerance towards migrants and xenophobia, which have added to the overall immigrant-hostile milieu (Triandafyllidou and Kouki 2013; 2014).

11.2.3 Mobility strategies of women migrants

All this makes the issues of immigrants' social mobility rather problematic, especially for American expats, who are strong civic actors yet weak cultural learners (Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 2014; Trundle 2009; Wennersten 2008). How do such ambitious migrants manage to survive in times of the crisis? Erhan et al. (2014) observe that during any crisis capital mobility becomes a strong asset for success: only those migrants who can transfer their skills to the new context will eventually survive through the hardships. In this reference, Morokvasic (1991) generally notes that, despite the overall inability of the legal system and the welfare regime to take care of women migrants, they still manage to exercise their agency. She argues that, when encountering such barriers, most women migrants 'try to go beyond the restricted market, adopting a more varied spectrum of products and services and introducing new features in their marketing strategies' (Morokvasic 1991, p. 414). Other studies also prove that during times of recession, women in general and women migrants in particular may become quite active players in the job market (Di Bartolomeo and Marchetti 2014; Farris 2013; Lim 2000).

To foster their own social mobility, female migrants often choose to become entrepreneurs. Waldinger et al. (1990, p. 17) define entrepreneurship as 'a process of starting and running one's own business', and entrepreneurs can be respectively understood as 'owners and/or operators of business enterprises'. Waldinger (1994) believes that immigrant entrepreneurship is a powerful way in which immigrants can respond to the limitations of the labour market and to the structural changes of Western economies. Often excluded

from local economic planning, immigrant entrepreneurs have, nevertheless, always been a strong source of economic development in American and European urban areas (Halkias 2013; Ramirez and Hondagneu-Sotelo 2009).

Even in the current conditions of restrictive immigration policies and negative public attitudes towards immigrants across Europe, immigrant entrepreneurs still manage to create jobs, to foster European economies and to change societal values in a drastic manner. Research conducted by the European Foundation (2012) shows that, despite the overall suffering of women migrants in Southern Europe, the prevalence of an informal economy can be quite supportive of their self-employment. For example, the informal practices of tax evasion in Greece can make the establishment of an enterprise much easier for an immigrant. Although a rather novel practice, immigrant entrepreneurship is rapidly growing within such informal economic contexts of both Italy and Greece (European Foundation 2012; Rath 2011). Thus, in Italy, the number of immigrant entrepreneurs showed a 111% increase between 2000 and 2008, while in the South they comprise 16% of all enterprise owners, compared with 6% of native entrepreneurs (Shawwa 2012).

Prior research shows that women migrants can be attracted by entrepreneurship primarily because it offers them decision-making autonomy. Thus the findings from the work of Morokvasic (1991, p. 412) show that women who decide to start their own businesses may search for an opportunity 'to escape the condition of a domestic servant, to increase the income of the household' or merely to engage in a creative activity for self-realization. In all these cases, entrepreneurship becomes a gateway to the Italian labour market for immigrant women (Morokvasic 1991). Studies also recognize the increased self-esteem of self-employed immigrant women compared to their counterparts who work for a salary (Bastia 2007; Daniş 2007; Morokvasic 1991). Schrover et al. (2007, p. 553) stress that to migrant women, entrepreneurship offers possibilities to work 'in or near the home and on the cusp between the public and the private sectors' and allows them to achieve herein a better work-life balance.

Scholars also acknowledge that by becoming entrepreneurs, (women) migrants may often form or join a niche market (Schrover 2001; Schrover et al. 2007). In her classic work, Model (1993, p. 164) defines the niche as the 'over-representation of ethnic minorities in a particular job', without however imposing specific (quantitative or contextual) limitations upon the niche definition. Research further shows that immigrant niches are 'not limited to retail and can include such activities as public and civil services' (Waldinger 1994). Neither do they depend on quantitative dominance of a particular group of immigrants in a particular occupational domain or geographical area; thus when women immigrants form a niche, it may simply mean that it is the only option available to them as skilled professionals (Schrover et al. 2007, p. 532).

Immigrant niching is indeed a complex, interactive process that illuminates the interplay between the immigrant (as the service provider) and the host society (as the customer). An immigrant niche develops when the structure of opportunity within the host society is 'matched by the characteristics of the migrants themselves' (Morokvasic 1991, p. 409). This means that there should be a societal demand for a product or service that immigrants can offer. Schrover (2001, p. 297) further notes that 'under certain conditions, immigrants may break through into the broader market where their niches respond to demands for special products for customers in the society at large'. When demanded by the host society, the human capital accumulated by immigrants can become a source of competitive advantage in certain sectors (Ambrosini 2012; 2014; Kloosterman and Rath 2002; Rath 2011), while the gendered and ethnically constructed stereotypes act as the 'rationale' behind the service employment of female migrants in particular. Migrant women are, in fact, expected more often than men to possess certain salient features that are predetermined by a combination of their ethnicity and gender – so-called ethnicized capital.⁷ They are often imagined by both employers and clients as naturally gifted and generous, meaning 'perfectly suited for service work', which may give them a competitive edge over the natives applying for the same kind of job (Morokvasic et al. 2008, p. 16).

As for activation of the ethnicized capital by American expat women in particular, their stories are rather encouraging and often an illuminative example of entrepreneurship, although not completely understood by scholars. For many years, the agency of American expat women has been overshadowed by more active and more visible sojourner experiences of their male compatriots (Wennersten 2008; Wisner 1991). Wennersten further notes that, except for the famous Gertrude Stein, American expat women were for many years associated with depressed alcohol addicts or silent wives of talented American men. Only in the most recent fiction and cinematography, Europe has become known as a creative and emancipatory space in the labyrinth of which an American woman can not only disappear without any traces but also reinvent herself and try a variety of new social roles as an intellectual rebel to the orthodoxy of the American morale (Louis 2004; Wennersten 2008; Wisner 1991).

Throughout the history of their migration, US expat women in Europe continue to release their entrepreneurial spirit by setting up their own businesses of various kinds. This includes the life-stories of such famous US expatriates as the 19th-century artist Mary Cassatt (Mabee 1969; Matthews 1998) and the early 20th-century writer Gertrude Stein (Bowers 1991; Hobhouse 1975). Both Gertrude Stein and Mary Cassatt for years played the role of the hostess and/or operators of artistic salons in Paris for both American expatriates and European artists. Those salons functioned as artistic incubators where artists could exchange ideas and explore artistic styles (such as the feminization theme in painting that was pioneered by

Mary Cassatt in the 19th century, and the post-First World War 'lost generation' literary culture, associated with Gertrude Stein as its producer and benefactor). Another more recent example is the journalist Lisa Frankenberg, who established *The Prague Post* in the 1990s (Belsky 1994; Taylor and Napier 1996) – an electronic newspaper for businessmen, which still has a large readership in Eastern Europe (Wennersten 2008).

There is, however, very limited knowledge about the agency of American expat women and their capacity for entrepreneurship specifically during the current financial crisis, especially when they are placed directly in its epicentre (Italy and Greece) and when they are married to local men. In this instance, it is important to remember that the majority of iconic figures of the US female entrepreneur expat community were single. We can therefore question the extent and ways in which American women in Italy and Greece, who in many cases settle as 'marriage-migrants', engage in entrepreneurship and become an active workforce for their host societies.

11.3 Women-in-crisis

11.3.1 Case 1: Recovered alcoholic

Pearl (age late fifties) grew up in a Greek diaspora family in San Francisco, speaking Greek fluently since childhood. After her divorce, she started to have alcohol problems and to seek professional support. A professional clinical psychologist herself, she was helping many other people to survive their broken marriages and eventually found herself unable to cope with her own problems of the same kind. Her psychotherapist suggested that she should change her residence as a new environment may help her condition.

As Wennersten (2008) notes, US emigration is often unplanned and triggered by an unexpected event. For the highly educated Pearl, it was the escalation of her alcoholism when her aunt, who had been living in Greece for a few years with her Greek husband, invited Pearl 'to stay with them for some time and to rehabilitate in the historical homeland'. A few months after her arrival in Greece, she started to work as a practicing psychologist in a firm owned by one of her family friends. Soon she got married. Following her husband's untimely death a few years ago, Pearl decided to work even harder and eventually opened a private counselling firm of her own, providing psychotherapeutic services to local people – a business that is now proliferating and has added meaning to her life.

Her colleague Monica (age 60), who is originally from Detroit and who now lives in another Greek city, also learned from her expat life to look for new resources within herself. As a result of expat housewife conversations and complaints, she came to the conclusion that the career of a cross-cultural psychotherapist was what she would like to do and that she should by all means resume her counselling practice which was interrupted by her cross-border marriage. She had some savings in the US left by her

wealthy parents, who always wanted her to divorce her ‘bullying Greek husband’ and to return to the US. After she had told them that it would not be possible because of the kids, they opened a savings account for her career development – her ‘future career fund’. ‘You should not give up on your career of a psychotherapist’, they kept saying.

She eventually divorced her husband when their children were graduating from high school and preparing for college. At that moment she had nothing to lose. Monica enrolled part-time in a UK university to update her degree in clinical psychology, originally received from the University of Chicago, and eventually opened her own practice of psychotherapy in Greece.

11.3.2 Case 2: Obedient daughter

Kingsley, who is in her late forties, also comes from a Greek diasporic family in Boston, speaking fluent Greek from childhood. Her parents came to the US from Greece many years ago, and eventually repatriated. They persuaded the college graduate Kingsley to follow them, where she started to work as an English teacher in a private language school. She immediately disliked the idea of ‘working for somebody’ and, one year after, decided to resign and open a private English-language school of her own. Her parents had bought a house in Greece before leaving for the US, which was empty just waiting for them to return. Later, they bought the adjoining house and joined them together. This is how they ended up having a rather big house part of which is now Kingsley’s school. So she lives and works in one building – that is, as Morokvasic (1984) remarks, ‘on the cusp between the private and the public’, like the majority of immigrant women entrepreneurs do.⁸ Kingsley confesses that, from the very beginning, her parents started to sponsor her career development because that was ‘the only way for them to keep their only daughter in Greece’. It was their diasporic strategy.

Yet no one was helping Kingsley technically in the establishment of her enterprise: she was doing everything on her own, moving through the unfriendly and slow Greek bureaucracy – a problem that the majority of immigrant entrepreneurs in Greece and also in Italy encounter, according to the data from other studies (European Foundation 2012; Labrianidis 2010; Rath 2011). She did not have any social resources at the beginning because she did not know anyone, while that knowledge would be extremely important in the conditions of the Greek informal economy. So she was actually shaping her new connections by talking to people in the street while searching for clients and administrative support. By doing this, she was mostly relying on herself and her business-minded intuition. She believes she is a very entrepreneurial immigrant woman who does not need anyone to guide her. She has been happy that she has started all this in her Greek town because it had fewer resources and a poorer infrastructure than in Athens at that time. Local people would have not found such cultural and educational services without her project, which adds to her sense of empowerment.

Another source of such entrepreneurial pride for Kingsley is her new status as the family bread-winner. For years, she has been married to a local businessman, who was against her project in the very beginning and insisted that she should quit. He could not tolerate the public humiliation of having a working wife as it contradicted his sense of Greek masculinity. Kingsley admits hearing from him all the time: 'Your business-oriented personality makes me look like an idiot in the eyes of my neighbours and friends. Who do you think I am? I am a Greek man! Don't make a loser out of me!' However, a year ago, when his own pharmacy had been severely affected by the crisis, he started investing in her school and stopped creating any barriers for her work.

11.3.3 Case 3: Reborn woman

Annette comes from Rhode Island and now lives in Turin. Her story resonates with that of Pearl. Before coming to Italy, she was mentally abused by a man who kept her at home without any social life and with minimum freedom. After a painful divorce, she decided to go to Italy feeling that this would help her cope with traumatic memories, the post-divorce depression and escalating drinking problems that she was having. She chose Turin because a few of her close friends were already there.

At the moment, she is 'working in four different places and not drinking anymore'. First, she teaches part-time English and Cross-Cultural Communication at an Italian university. Second, she has her own English-language private school and gives many private lessons to very rich students throughout the city. Third, she is an online translator for one of the US scientific societies. Fourth, she also works as a freelance translator for a number of international insurance companies in Italy and France as she is fluent in both Italian and French. Since her two online translator jobs do not require her presence in an office, she can therefore easily work from home and structure her own working routine.

However, her major job is her private school project. She has been doing this for almost 16 years. She is proud to have very many private students, whom she teaches English for years. They come to her as little children, stay with her throughout their high school studies and sometimes throughout their university studies. Many of them speak very good English now and have eventually found lucrative jobs in the US.

Annette teaches them not only the English language but also about American culture and offers invaluable information on how this culture may work for them and what inter-cultural differences they may encounter when they are in the US. She thus prepares aspiring young Italians for emigration.

She likes helping Italian scientists because '[they] are usually very shy' and she believes 'they are not really good at tuning their own horns' and at advertising themselves in the job market. That is why she always helps them to fill out job application forms and to highlight their most salient

professional skills. As a native English speaker and an insider with a US post-graduate degree, she knows specific words and phrases that US employers want to hear and that make their applications stronger. She has thus helped many people, who are now in the States in a professional capacity.

She often tutors young Italian scientists on how to make their careers in the US, acting as their ‘cultural ambassador’. For example, she was tutoring a young surgeon in English; he was very shy but wanted to work in the US. He wanted to teach surgery at a high-rank US university, and Annette found a fellowship for him. However, during the application process he discovered that applicants were required to have achieved the position of Assistant Professor by the age of 30. In Italy, medical career progression is very slow; one can achieve the level of Assistant Professor only after they are 40 and never earlier. Annette wrote an explanatory letter to the selection committee in the US, where she explained why he was not an Assistant Professor in his early thirties and about the academic career progression in Italy. They considered that explanation satisfactory and gave him the scholarship to study and teach in the US. Now he is based in Seattle, and Annette is very proud of having helped him.

Annette runs her educational project not only because of the money but also because in Turin she feels like a ‘unique expert’:

There are not many people like me here, who could speak native English and teach it effectively and who could also be knowledgeable about the US culture and bureaucracy. On the contrary, I would be one of the many if in the States. For me, it would not be interesting or useful. So I really love this opportunity to be a unique and irreplaceable person here in Turin rather than a cog in a big wheel in the States. This is how I have eventually recreated myself here.

11.4 New insights into immigrant entrepreneurship

11.4.1 Catching the wave: Smart entrepreneurship

Apart from their sort of gloomy past and matrimonial complexities, another thing that Pearl, Kingsley and Annette surely have in common is entrepreneurship. Scholars note that the phenomenon of immigrant entrepreneurship can be observed anywhere in Europe, including Italy and Greece (Rath 2011; Shawwa 2012). Pearl, Kingsley, Annette and other respondents successfully run their own small and medium-size businesses. Both Pearl and Kingsley started their overseas careers as salaried workers but later converted into business owners within their occupational domains. As for Annette, she started working for herself from the very beginning – expanding her business from occasional private lessons to a small yet continuous multi-service enterprise. Her English-teaching business is a very small enterprise as she is the owner, the operator and only staff member. Pearl has

a secretary (office assistant) in her counselling firm who connects Pearl with her clients and monitors her working schedule. Kingsley now owns a medium-sized business, with seven employees in her school who teach English, French and social skills as well as provide administrative support services for the school and its outreach activities.

For the respondents, these businesses have become the best way to convert their rich cultural capital into economic capital. After Pearl, Kingsley, Annette and other respondents had settled in Italy or Greece, they realized at a certain point in their lives that in their destination countries there was a growing demand for the human capital that they could offer as a result of their American origin and upbringing. They discovered the opportunities and gaps in the local Italian/Greek markets and filled a demand for specific services (such as language instruction or psychological support) that was matched by what skills they could offer. They took advantage of their native knowledge of English and professional knowledge of psychology and community development, an advantage that has been part of their ethno-cultural heritage, part of their being US nationals, part of having grown-up and having received a university education in the US.

It is not completely by chance that Pearl quickly became a prolific counsellor in Greece. The field of clinical psychology, from which she comes, is marked by strong national features of her country of origin that are to create an increased demand for US nationals all over the world (Collins and De Zerega 2002; Wennersten 2008). Although clinical psychologists are trained both in Italy and Greece, US universities undeniably rank much higher in this training. For example, World Ranking of Universities annually published by the British Quacquarelli Symonds Company (QS) shows that in the academic year of 2013/2014, US universities formed the majority of the top 200 Clinical Psychology Departments in the world – there are no Italian or Greek schools on this list (QS 2014). Moreover, apart from Oxford and Cambridge, the top 20 clinical psychology schools in the world are comprised almost entirely of US universities from which the participants have graduated. For example, the Universities of Yale and Chicago, from which Kingsley and Monica have respectively obtained their professional degrees, rank fifth and twenty-first in this list.

There is also more experience in training and dealing with such specific areas as cross-cultural counselling and cross-cultural adoption in the US than in Southern Europe, given the novelty of the immigration modality and multiculturalism practices in the region. All this makes the psychology-trained respondents highly demanded and, to a certain extent, irreplaceable in the local market (although they do not quantitatively dominate the sector of their employment).

This ability to utilize the new modality of expatriation, to be able to understand and to make use of the uniqueness and irreplaceability of one's own culture and human capital and to sell it in the local market has turned

them into resilient entrepreneurs, capable of resisting the crisis and even succeeding within this difficult economic environment. Shawwa (2012) conceptualizes such migrants as ‘smart entrepreneurs’, who utilize resources from their countries of origin ‘as a brand to promote their own economy... and work in the product line where the demand exists’ (Shawwa 2012, p. 20).

Another such entrepreneurial field is that of private English lessons to Greek and Italian clients. The participants either give private language lessons or own a private language school. In some cases, they start their entrepreneurial careers with private lessons and progress to owning a private English school, which helps them to further employ their co-nationals to provide language lessons to the local population (see the case of Kingsley).

As smart entrepreneurs, they use any opportunity to expand their business both quantitatively (by hiring new staff) and qualitatively (by creatively modifying their services). Their first-hand and hard-to-replicate knowledge of English and Anglophone culture adds value to an otherwise straightforward programme, as Kingsley explains:

I own an English-language school, in which we privately teach English for local Greeks. We have recently introduced French instruction because of the crisis demand. Many Greek people who want to migrate to French Canada or just to feel more linguistically confident in any part of Canada want to learn French. I am the school principal and one of the English teachers. My team includes other US national women and also three francophone colleagues – one from France and two from Quebec.

Velvet (who is the owner of an English school in a Greek island), another participant, has also recently expanded her business by hiring an Argentine national to provide native instruction in Spanish because Argentina is another alternative destination for Greeks escaping from the crisis.

The respondents stress that their entrepreneurial activities contribute to local community building. In fact, they offer *very high-quality* professional counselling support in the form of psychotherapy, community mentorship or social work, for which they have obtained qualifications from leading US universities prior to emigrating to Europe. This kind of support is especially important for Greece, which has extremely high unemployment and now high suicide rates (with a 45% increase during the crisis), yet an underdeveloped domestic system of counselling (Gatopoulos 2013; 2014).

This service is provided not only through specialized counselling firms (like the one owned by Pearl) but also within the overall framework of the private English school. Apart from running their own English schools, Olive, Kingsley and Velvet also counsel students in their schools to help guide them through various types of psychological problems. Annette (who also

holds a degree in psychology) provides this additional service absolutely for free during her English lessons. Thus, in response to the economic crisis, they expand their English-teaching enterprises not only quantitatively but also qualitatively by adding a variety of gratis community-support services within provided curricular and extra-curricular packages. As smart entrepreneurs, they creatively use their social capital to mobilize the local community and to recruit new clients and colleagues for their anti-crisis therapeutic civic projects. Their schools act as hubs for finding new clients (people who would like to study English and receive guidance) and also as ‘social anti-crisis laboratories’ in which their clients have a chance to practice their new survival skills such as compassion, tolerance, conflict resolution and anger management. Kingsley explains this new niche as follows:

I am not only teaching English in my class, I am also teaching them basics of civic culture: how to be nice, how to love animals and people. I also do a lot of personal consultancy as I have a degree in clinical psychology. They come to talk to me about their problems – both kids and their parents. I have a couple of other colleagues with counselling degrees. We often work as a therapeutic group.

11.4.2 Dealing with formalities

As smart and adaptable entrepreneurs, the participants use any opportunity to sustain the continuity of their businesses, including the support channels provided by the Southern European informal economy. In analysing interaction between immigrant entrepreneurship and the informal economy, Ramirez and Hondagneu-Sotelo (2009, p. 70) argue that the most successful immigrant businesses are often grounded on ‘the mix of informal and formal economic transactions’, such as those underpinning the work of Mexican gardeners in California. The authors further explain that the hidden economy that underpins immigrant entrepreneurship on a daily basis includes ‘income-generating activities that are not always illegal but occurring outside of state regulations’.

Practices such as tax evasion and not registering employees with the social insurance agency are widely present everywhere in Greece, and most ethnic entrepreneurs follow this general pattern (European Foundation 2012). The inability of the Greek authorities to control all tax evasion and formal employment contracts has given immigrants chances to find new business opportunities. Local hidden economies enabled the participants to work prior to getting their degrees formally recognized by the state. In the case of Greece, they all had to reconfirm their US degrees since they were obtained outside the EU. In many cases, they ‘just started to work “unrecognized” because no one really cared’, as one of the informants admits, and a few years

later, they either completed the lengthy national recognition procedure or obtained new degree from a UK university.

The participants also confessed that there are many language schools (*frontistiria*) all over Greece, and a formal language teaching qualification from a US national is not a prerequisite for recruitment.⁹

11.4.3 Empowerment: Reliving the community and the self

Their businesses, which have survived various challenges of local bureaucracies, make the participants feel empowered both economically and emotionally. They are capable of earning money and also of impacting upon their communities, as Kingsley explains:

We are capable of doing something meaningful here....Here in my school, we teach both the kids and their parents not to be racist and to accept other people. It is more than just English teaching. It is community shaping, and the parents are extremely happy to see that we are protecting their kids from the street influence. We are actually *reviving* the local community, *reliving* our neighbourhood.

The respondents' fees are usually very low because many of them come from wealthy American families. As Pearl notes, 'It is not for the money because I have inherited it from my parents, who were the American upper class. It is mostly for socialization with people and for moving on with my life.' However, their enterprises are rather lucrative. Although the informants charge each client very little, their experimentation with service packages and alternative clientele strategies enables them to increase the number of clients and consequently the overall income of their businesses. Despite the decreasing capacity of local people to pay for such services, the number of clients is increasing disproportionately. There are indeed many local people who seek either to learn English or to benefit from counselling or do both at a low cost.

The participants admit that the expanding crisis has made their economic situation much better, as Velvet recounts:

My economic situation is much better than what I would have in America. I teach English in the private school owned by me and earn a lot of money on that. People are interested in learning English from a native speaker because for them it is an opportunity to prepare for emigration. The crisis has made them dependent on our instruction. The foreign language demand is just huge and we are making a lot of money on it. Just ridiculous how the crisis has helped us! So many Greeks now want to emigrate! Our prices are not very high – but all in all we are earning a lot of money. It is good for both sides: for them because we are charging a small amount for the good quality of native instruction in English while for

us it turns to be good money because of the overall increasing demand. I think my school has become a very successful entrepreneurial project.

The entrepreneurial activities of the respondents become a strong source of competitive advantage both for themselves as professionals and for their destination countries, which have been hit by the crisis. At the heart of a country's competitive advantage is its capacity to use high-quality labour force that would cover the country's urgent socio-economic needs, especially in the areas of human capital deficit (Ghosh 2013). Thus, for the Greek and Italian economies and societies, high-quality language instruction and counselling provided by native speakers and Ivy League degree holders at a symbolic charge is a rare socio-economic gift. Pearl explains this community service:

I am helping the Greek society a lot. Just think, because of the crisis, many Greeks have lost their jobs and started to drink. Here an excellent US-trained psychologist like me offers these poor people highly qualified help almost for free. The payment for my services is very symbolic – just the pocket money. That is why I have very many patients.

11.4.4 Creating a 'special service' niche

Immigrant entrepreneurship is often associated with niches. Although niche is sometimes in terms of immigrants' over-representation (Model 1993), Schrover et al. (2007) further elaborate on the *qualitative* interpretation of niche, stressing the existence of different levels of immigrant over-representation. They explain that the over-representation to be qualified for niching may be achieved not necessarily on the host community level but rather on the immigrant group level. In some sectors, immigrants from a particular country may not form the majority of those employed in that sector. There may be many more hosts working there. Yet for the immigrants of a particular national group, they may gravitate towards a specific sector because it may be one of the very few options available in the job market. This is, for example, the case of Filipino seafarers in California (McKay 2007; Schrover et al. 2007).

The importance of the sector may also be justified by the constellation of historical and ethno-cultural factors that would place the expertise of particular immigrants in high demand. This ethnic niching is intensified by the overall architecture of the service sector, within which there are many sub-sectors, each forming a niche within a niche and each requiring a particular type of (immigrant) worker. For example, the overall service sector of care work consists of several subsectors or specific niches, one of which is serving specifically the Christian household. Thus, Iraqi domestic workers in Turkey are employed specifically in Christian households and form their own niche (Daniş 2007; Schrover et al. 2007). The same can be said about the overall

service sector of decorative gardening in the US, which includes a specific subsector of Japanese gardening – a very specific niche created by Japanese immigrants (Ramirez and Hondagneu-Sotelo 2009).

The overall sector of private English lessons is not homogeneous either (Hill 2009; Lankov 2009; Limb 2008). It has such subsectors as preparation for school/university examinations, improvement of linguistic skills beyond the school curriculum or preparation for immigration to an Anglophone country. Each of these sub-areas requires a different degree of knowledge from the tutor. For example, the preparation for a test does not require the presence of a native speaker but of someone who is familiar with the local school system. At the same time, the preparation for living in the US would benefit from the native instruction and insider knowledge of the US culture. English instruction is thus a constellation of niches, one of which is teaching English for immigration. Both the literature and the respondents stress that more than ever before people in these crisis-afflicted countries now plan their emigration to the US, Canada or Australia. And who can teach the language and associated culture better than the native speaker? Thus, although US nationals may not dominate the overall sector of teaching English in Italy and Greece, they dominate it on the level of their immigrant group.¹⁰

11.5 Where is the final crack?

The truth is that Gertrude Stein, an iconic figure of US female entrepreneurship and the avant-garde movement abroad, was never married to a local man. On the contrary, the majority of participants have experienced such matrimony. While Kingsley's career has survived through her difficult Greek marriage, the entrepreneurial spirit of Debora (aged late forties) has not. Holding an MA in Fashion Design from the Illinois Institute of Art, Debora initially came to Italy from Chicago 20 years ago to start her own textile business on the money inherited from her wealthy parents. However, after she got married to a local pizza baker, her forceful husband persuaded her to sell her rather successful business and to invest the money in his new restaurant. While helping him with his family-owned business, she found herself absolutely devoid of any opportunity to manage finances and clientele and to make any life decision in general. Her duties were restricted to dishwashing and cooking. She was, in fact, positioned as a male-dominated and male-controlled half-servant and half-operator in her new family-owned business, which is in many cases an emblematic figure of the woman-migrant who engages in entrepreneurship (Morokvasic 1984; 1991; Piper 2008). After a rather painful divorce and a no less painful division of property, both her finances and self-esteem were severely damaged and therefore inadequate for restarting an enterprise of her own.

In many cases, the Greek and Italian families of the respondents were far from supportive of their business initiatives. For example, Miriam (a qualified English and Learning Disabilities teacher from Oregon, who had also completed a coursework in Clinical Psychology at a high-rank university in the US) was for a long time engaged in family entrepreneurship together with her Greek husband, who was running a shipping company and an online store in Greece. Only after her husband's business had suffered because of the crisis, he closed it and started investing their family money into her new private English school project, about which she was dreaming for years and which is now expanding.

One more example is Lola from Minneapolis who came to Greece in the 1980s as an exchange student and soon married one of the local men; she has been giving private English lessons for years while at the same time helping her husband with his photography business. Only after his enterprise closed as a result of the crisis were their family investments redirected into the private English school that she opened a year ago.

11.6 Conclusions

Having settled in Italy and Greece as marriage-migrants, the respondents have eventually become dynamic entrepreneurs, contributing a lot to their local communities. The most successful examples of immigrant female entrepreneurship are those engaged in private English instruction and psychological counselling. The migrants run their own private English-language schools and counselling firms, with specialization in cross-cultural counselling and teaching English for immigration. Some of them have a very small enterprise, in which the owner is also the operator and the only staff member, while others have one or more employees.

A particular example of a dynamic, medium-size immigrant enterprise is the private English-language school, which offers a package of educational and social services such as language instruction, counselling and community building. The majority of the informants can be thus conceptualized as niche-entrepreneurs who work in the immigrant niche of private language instruction and cross-cultural training for the purposes of emigration. Although the gendered dimension of such practices may not be relevant, they are clearly grounded in the cultural characteristics of the participants as US nationals and native speakers of English, as well as in the structure of opportunity that has emerged in the eurocrisis zone.

In general, what these US expat women do to survive through the crisis fits very well with a broader picture of immigrant entrepreneurship in their destination countries: both Italy and Greece clearly have 'ethnic specialization maps', which indicate that migrants position themselves in specific labour niches along national, linguistic, religious or gendered features (Model 1993; Schrover et al. 2007; Shawwa 2012). Their niche-based entrepreneurship

provides them with a relatively high income, work autonomy and self-esteem, which resonates with the general situation of female immigrant entrepreneurship across national contexts and different periods of time.

However, the niching of these participants is a different category, which deviates from the traditional niche enclave. Previous studies stress that, in many cases, immigrant enterprises tend to downsize and experience difficulties in attracting non-ethnic clients during times of recession (European Foundation 2012; Phizacklea 2003). As Rath (2011, p. 25) notes, 'Even in advanced economies, most of the immigrant enterprises are funnelled toward markets at the lower end, and their earnings are typically relatively low.'

On the contrary, these respondents' businesses are now expanding and gaining popularity among the local population more than ever before, turning their agents into (to a certain extent) irreplaceable professionals. A rather complex and ironic relationship between economy and society thus underpins such practices: the more devastated the local economy, the more powerful their enterprise. Compared with other types of the immigrant entrepreneur (such as ethnic shop or restaurant owners),¹¹ this is perhaps an illustration of the new and smarter entrepreneurial class, comprised of highly educated migrants whose niches are located in quite proliferating post-industrial markets such as languages and social services.¹²

On a final note, when these enterprises close down, it has little to do with the crisis as such, but rather with persistent historical features of societies not accepting their services which could be intensified during a recession, and which even such intelligent entrepreneurs are defenceless. While the participants' agency is being invariably triggered by the escalating crisis, their entrepreneurship and persistence keep jumping over barriers imposed by traditional gender and ethno-cultural relations in their host societies.

Notes

1. See, for example, the research on famous Americans abroad conducted by McCullough (2011) and Wennersten (2008).
2. This chapter is part of a larger project *FEMIDE: Female Migrants from Developed Countries in Southern Europe: A Study of Their Integration*, emerging from the Marie Curie Fellowship held in 2012–2014 at the European University Institute in Florence. This overall project is about dynamics of integration and factors affecting integration of Anglophone women who live in Italy and Greece. During this fellowship, an online survey was conducted among 350 female migrants from Anglophone countries who had migrated to Italy and Greece over the last 40 years after having, at least, completed their tertiary education in their countries of origin. Among the 350 participants, 60% were US nationals, while the majority of all women (60%) and particularly these American women (70%) have been married to a local – Italian or Greek – man. The overall divorce rate is very small – no more than 5%. The survey thus shows that the majority of the respondents are US-national women who can be conceptualized as 'marriage-migrants'. It means that

- they could enter either as migrant wives or fiancés, romantic tourists, exchange students or high-skill professionals – but, at a certain stage of their migratory careers, they became marriage-migrants. The survey also indicates that more than 50% of all respondents have been employed at the moment either full-time or part-time, although not necessarily in the area of their initial specialization.
3. For narrative-biographic analysis, see Creswell (1993).
 4. US federal tax legislation exempts the first \$84,000 of earned income from tax if earned abroad.
 5. Zeis and Laipi (2006) show that the law was generally biased specifically in relation to immigrant entrepreneurs because by having restricted their access to the country, it still provided new opportunities for the self-employment of local entrepreneurs.
 6. The recognition in Greece is the prerogative of DOATAP, a special national accreditation agency. The recognition is undertaken by a scientific committee within the DOATAP, consisting mainly of university professors who review the foreign university to determine whether it is fundamentally equivalent to Greek institutions as well as the department offering the degree and the whether the precise programme is equivalent to those offered in Greece (European Recognition 2013; Soilemetzidis 2008). Similar procedures are applied in Italy when a degree needs to be confirmed. According to the Law from 2005, the application for recognition must be made to the appropriate Ministry along with the necessary documentation, which must be suitably translated and authenticated (Schuster and Desiderio 2013). The appropriate ministry calls an inter-ministerial conference at which a legal representative of the applicant is heard. The ministry decides within four months of the presentation and the decision is then published in the Official Gazette of the Italian Republic.
 7. Elaborating on the term ‘ethnicized capital’, Marchetti (2014) illuminates it by domestic care skills associated with post-colonial women migrants in the domestic work sector.
 8. See also Morokvasic (1991) and Schrover, van der Leun and Quispel (2007).
 9. See also Hill (2009) and Wennersten (2008).
 10. For more on US nationals teaching English abroad, see Collins and De Zerega (2002), Hill (2009), Lankov (2009), and Wennersten (2008; 2009) and Limb (2008) note on the ‘cram-school’ (*‘hagwon’*) phenomenon, illuminated by the historic proliferation of private language schools in which US nationals teach English to local people worldwide often within the framework of informal economy.
 11. See, for example, Ramirez and Hondagneu-Sotelo (2009), who study Mexican gardeners in L.A. See also Morokvasic (1991), who writes about the garment industry immigrant workers in Paris.
 12. For more on post-industrial entrepreneurship, see Kloosterman and Rath (2002).

References

- Ambrosini, M. (2014) ‘Migration and Transnational Commitment: Some Evidence from the Italian Case’, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 40(4), 619–637.
- Ambrosini, M. (2012) ‘Migrants’ Entrepreneurship in Transnational Social Fields’, *International Review of Sociology*, 22(2), 273–292.
- Andall, J. (2003) ‘Introduction: The Space between – Gender Politics and Immigration Politics in Europe’, in J. Andall (ed.) *Gender and Ethnicity in Contemporary Europe* (Oxford and New York: Berg), pp. 1–22.

- Anthias, F., M. Morokvasic-Müller and M. Kontos (2013) 'Introduction: Paradoxes of integration', in F. Anthias, M. Kontos and M. Morokvasic-Müller (eds.) *Paradoxes of Integration: Female Migrants in Europe* (Dordrecht/Heidelberg: Springer), pp. 1–16.
- Ayres, R. and T. Barber (2006) 'Statistical Analysis of Female Migration and Labour Market Integration in the EU', *FeMiPol Working Papers* 3. Available online at: http://www.femipol.uni-frankfurt.de/docs/working_papers/wp3/Statistical_analysis.pdf (accessed: 7 May 2015).
- Bastia, T. (2007) 'From Mining to Garment Workshops: Bolivian Migrants in Buenos Aires', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 33(4), 655–669.
- Belsky, G. (1994) 'Escape from America', *Money*, July 1994. Available at: <http://sks.sirs.bdt.orc.scoolaid.net/cgi-bin/hst-article-display?id=SZZRES-0-9968&artno=0000010815&type=ART&shfilter=U&key=Political%20alienation&title=Escape%20from%20America&res=Y&ren=Y&gov=Y&Ink=Y&ic=Y>.
- Bowers, J. (1991) *'They Watch Me as They Watch This': Gertrude Stein's Metadrama*. (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press).
- Campani, G. et al. (2006) 'Mapping of Policies Affecting Female Migrants and Policy Analysis: the Italian Case', *FeMiPol Working Papers* 6. Available online at: http://www.femipol.uni-frankfurt.de/docs/working_papers/wp1/Italy.pdf (accessed: 7 May 2015).
- Chiappelli, T. and I. Cabral. (2006). 'Analysis of Policy Formation and Policy Implementation- the Italian case', *FeMiPol Working Papers* 6. Available at: http://www.femipol.uni-frankfurt.de/docs/working_papers/wp2/Italy.pdf.
- CIMEA (2015) *Professional Recognition of Foreign Qualifications*. Available at: <http://www.cimea.it/default.aspx?IDC=130> (accessed: 8 May 2015).
- Collins, J. and S. De Zerega (2002) *How to Live Your Dream of Volunteering Overseas* (New York, NY: Penguin Books).
- Creswell, J. (1993) *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches* (London: Sage).
- Daniş, D. (2007) 'A Faith that Binds: Iraqi Christian women on the domestic service ladder of Istanbul', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 33(4), 601–615.
- Di Bartolomeo, A. and S. Marchetti (2014) 'Care work and the Feminization of Labour Migration to Italy through the Current Economic Crisis', *EUI Policy Briefs*. Available online at: <http://blogs.eui.eu/migrationpolicycentre/care-work-and-the-feminization-of-labour-migration-to-italy-through-the-current-economic-crisis/> (accessed: 8 May 2015).
- Dickinson, P. (1989) *Travel and Retirement Edens Abroad* (New York: Dutton).
- Ellinas, A. (2013) 'The Rise of Golden Dawn', *South European Society and Politics*, 18(4): 543–565.
- Erhan, A., F. Docquier, C. Ozden, and C. Parsons (2014). 'A Global Assessment of Human Capital Mobility. The Role of Non-OECD Destinations', *World Bank Policy Research Working Papers* WPS6863. Available online at: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/05/12/000158349_20140512160809/Rendered/PDF/WPS6863.pdf (accessed: 8 May 2015).
- European Foundation (2012) *Ethnic Entrepreneurship: Case Studies: Athens, Greece*. Available online at: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ef_publication/field_ef_document/ef1121en13.pdf (accessed: 8 May 2015).
- European Recognition (2013) *The European Recognition Manual for Higher Education Institutions*. Available online at: <http://eurorecognition.eu/Manual/EAR%20HEI.pdf> (accessed: 8 May 2015).

- Farris, S. (2013) 'Neoliberalism, Migrant Women, and the Commodification of Care', *Scholar & Feminist Online* 11(1/2). Available online at: <http://sfonline.barnard.edu/gender-justice-and-neoliberal-transformations/neoliberalism-migrant-women-and-the-commodification-of-care/> (accessed: 8 May 2015).
- Gatopoulos, D. (2014). 'Greek Crisis: Numbers Improving but Social Problems Likely to Worsen in 2014', *The Chronicle Herald*, 1 January 2014. Available online at: <http://thechronicleherald.ca/business/1176884-greek-crisis-numbers-improving-but-social-problems-likely-to-worsen-in-2014> (accessed: 8 May 2015).
- Gatopoulos, D. (2013). 'Suicides in Greece Spike During Financial Crisis', *The World Post*, 9 October 2013. Available online at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/10/greece-suicides_n_3900906.html (accessed: 8 May 2015).
- Geddes, A. (2003) *The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe* (London: Sage).
- Ghosh, B. (2013). *The Global Economic Crisis and the Future of Migration: Issues and Prospects. What Will Migration Look Like in 2045?* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Halkias, D. (2013) 'Business and Social Profiles of Immigrant-Owned Small Firms: The Case of Pakistani Immigrant Entrepreneurs in Greece', *International Migration*, 53(2), 263–273.
- Hiebert, D., J. Rath, and S. Vertovec (2015) 'Urban Markets and Diversity: Toward a Research Agenda', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 38(1), 5–21.
- Hill, D. (2009) *The Rich World and the Impoverishment of Education* (London: Routledge).
- Hobhouse, J. (1975) *Everybody Who Was Anybody: A Biography of Gertrude Stein* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons).
- Isaakyan, I. and A. Triandafyllidou (2014) 'Anglophone Marriage-migrants in Southern Europe: A Study of Expat Nationalism and Integration Dynamics', *International Review of Sociology*, 24(3), 374–390.
- Kloosterman, R. and J. Rath (eds.) (2002) *Immigrant Entrepreneurs: Venturing Abroad in the Age of Globalization* (Oxford, UK: Berg).
- Kofman, E. (2013) 'Towards a Gendered Evaluation of (highly) Skilled Immigration Policies in Europe', *International Migration*, 52(3), 116–128.
- Kofman, E. (2012) 'Gender and Skilled Migration', *Cuadernos de Relaciones Laborales*, 30(1), 63–89.
- Labrianidis, L. (2010) 'Migrant Entrepreneurship in Greece: Diversity of Pathways for Emerging Ethnic Business Communities in Thessaloniki', *International Migration and Integration*, 11(2), 193–217.
- Lankov, A. (2009) 'Original English boom', *The Korea Times*, 10 April 2009. Available online at: http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinion/2007/10/165_11302.html (accessed: 8 May 2015).
- Lenzer, R. and P. Mao (1994) 'The New Refugees: American who gave up their Citizenship to Save on Taxes', *Forbes*, 154(12) [21 November 1994]. Available at: <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/727504/posts>.
- Lim, J. (2000) 'The Effects of the East Asian Crisis on the Employment of Women and Men: The Philippine Case', *World Development*, 28(7), 1285–1306.
- Lim, J. (2008) 'English Teachers Complain about Certain Hagwon', *Korea Joongang Daily* 8 December 2008. Available online at: <http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2898300> (accessed; 8 May 2015).
- Louis, L. (2004). *Butterflies of the Night: Mama-sans, geisha, strippers, and the Japanese men they serve* (New York: Tengu Books).
- McCullough, D. (2011) *The Greater Journey: Americans in Paris* (New York and London: Simon & Schuster).

- McKay, C. (2007) 'Filipino Seamen: Constructing Masculinities in an Ethnic Labour Niche', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 33(4), 617–633.
- Marchetti, S. (2014) *Black Girls: Migrant Domestic Workers and Colonial Legacies* (Leiden, NL/Boston, MA: Brill).
- Mathews, N. (1998) *Mary Cassatt: A Life* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).
- Milkman, R. (1976) 'Women's Work and Economic Crisis: Some Lessons of the Great Depression', *Review of Radical Political Economics*, 8(1), 73–97.
- Minghuan, L. (1999) *We Need Two Worlds: Chinese Immigrant Associations in a Western Society* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press).
- Model, S. (1993) 'The Ethnic Niche and the Structure of Opportunity: Immigrants and Minorities in New York', in M. Katz (Ed.) *The "Underclass" Debate* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), pp. 161–193.
- Morokvasic, M. (1991). 'The Underside of Fashion: Immigrants as a Source of Flexibility in Garment Production in Paris. Perspectives for Berlin', *ISSR Working Papers in Social Sciences 1989/1990*, 5(14). Available online at: <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/4217p95h> (accessed: 8 May 2015).
- Morokvasic, M. (1984) 'Birds of Passage are also Women', *International Migration Review*, 18(4), 886–907.
- Morokvasic, M., A. Münst and S. Metz-Göckel (2008) 'Gendered Mobilities in an Enlarged Europe', in S. Metz-Göckel, M. Morokvasic and A. Münst (eds.) *Migration and Mobility in an Enlarged Europe: A Gender Perspective*. (Farmington Hills, MI: Marbara Budrich Publishers), pp. 9–26.
- Oldenburg, R. (1989) *The Great Good Place* (New York, NY: Paragon House).
- Phizacklea, A. (2003) 'Gendered actors in migration', in J. Andall (ed.) *Gender and Ethnicity in Contemporary Europe* (Oxford and New York: Berg), pp. 23–38.
- Piper, N. (2008) 'Feminisation of Migration and the Social Dimensions of Development: The Asian Case', *Third World Quarterly*, 29(7), 1287–1303.
- Putnam, R. (2000). *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York and London: Simon & Schuster).
- QS Top Universities (2014). *QS World University Rankings by Subject 2014 – Psychology*. Available online at: [www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings/university-subject-rankings/2014/psychology#sorting=rank+region="+country="+faculty="+stars=false+search=](http://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings/university-subject-rankings/2014/psychology#sorting=rank+region=) (accessed: 8 May 2015).
- Ramirez, H. and P. Hondagneu-Sotelo. (2009). 'Mexican Immigrant Gardeners: Exploited Workers or Entrepreneurs?' *Social Problems*, 56(1), 70–88.
- Rath, J. (2011) *Promoting Ethnic Entrepreneurship in European Cities* (Luxembourg, LU: European Commission Publications Office). Available online at: www.coe.int/t/democracy/migration/Source/migration/congress_public_3.pdf (accessed: 8 May 2015).
- Rubin, J. (2008) *Migrant Women in the European Labour Force: Technical Report Prepared for the European Commission* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation).
- Schrover, M. (2001) 'Immigrant Business and Niche Formation in Historical perspective: The Netherlands in the Nineteenth Century', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 27(2), 295–312.
- Schrover, M., J. van der Leun and C. Quispel (2007) 'Niches, Labour Market Segregation, Ethnicity and Gender', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 33(4), 529–540.
- Schuster, A. and M. Desiderio (2013) 'Country Report: Italy', in A. Schuster, M. Desiderio and G. Urso (eds.) *Recognition of Qualifications and Competences of Migrants* (Brussels: International Organization for Migration), pp. 89–118.

- Shawwa, H (2012) *Italy's New Immigrant Entrepreneurship: The Paths of Development of this New Phenomenon* (Ferrara, IT: Università degli Studi di Ferrara). Available online at: <http://eprints.unife.it/718/1/Al%20Shawwa%20TESI%202009-2012.pdf> (accessed: 8 May 2015).
- Smith, P. (2013) *Time No Longer: Americans After the American Century* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).
- Soilemetzidis, I. (2008) 'Greece: Education Issues, Outgoing Students and Recognition of Foreign Degrees', *EAIIE Forum*, 10(1), 22–25.
- Taylor, S. and N. Napier (1996) 'Working in Japan: Lessons from Women Expatriates', *Sloan Management Review*, Spring 1996. Available online at: <http://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/working-in-japan-lessons-from-women-expatriates/> (accessed: 8 May 2015).
- Triandafyllidou, A. and H. Kouki (2014) 'Naturalizing Racism in the Centre of Athens in May 2011: Lessons from Greece', *Journal of Ethnic and Refugee Studies*, 12(4), 418–436.
- Triandafyllidou, A. and H. Kouki (2013) 'Muslim Immigrants and the Greek Nation: The Emergence of Nationalist Intolerance', *Ethnicities*, 13(6), 703–728.
- Trundle, K. (2009) 'Romance Tourists, Foreign Wives, or Retired Migrants? Cross-cultural Marriage in Florence, Italy', in K. Benson and K. O'Reilly (eds.) *Lifestyle Migration: Expectations, Aspirations and Experiences* (Farnham, UK: Ashgate), pp. 51–68.
- Waldinger, R. (1994) 'The Making of an Immigrant Niche', *International Migration Review*, 28(1), 3–28.
- Waldinger, R., H. Aldrich and R. Ward (1990) *Ethnic Entrepreneurs: Immigrant Business in Industrial Societies* (London: Sage).
- Wennersten, J. (2008) *Leaving America: The New Expatriate Generation* (Westport, CT: Praeger).
- Wiser, W. (1991) *The Great Good Place: American Expatriate Women in Paris* (New York: Norton & Company).
- Zeis, T. and M. Liapi (2006) 'Mapping of Policies Affecting Female Migrants and Policy Analysis: The Greek Case', *FeMiPol Working Papers 10*. Available online at: www.femipol.uni-frankfurt.de/docs/working_papers/wp1/Greece.pdf (accessed: 8 May 2015).

12

Re-Thinking the Gender Dimension of High-Skill Migration

Anna Triandafyllidou and Irina Isaakyan

I would advise American women who want to relocate to Europe to think twice about whether they really need it. Everything will be difficult: finding the right people, organizing your own business, confirming your university degree . . . all this may actually take a few years, which is very challenging, especially if you are highly educated.

(Pearl, psychotherapist who owns a private counselling firm in Greece)

As explained in the previous chapter, she and other US-national women in Italy and Greece admit to having problems with the initiation of their own enterprises, recognition of their professional credentials and generally dealing with a local immigrant-unfriendly infrastructure. 'I keep asking myself', further confesses Pearl, 'Was it just because I was a foreigner or because I was a foreign woman?'

The question that Pearl asks herself is what sociologists of migration have called the 'double disadvantage' that migrant women, including those who are highly skilled, face. This term means that they face double challenges as both migrants and women (Bettio et al. 2012; Borjas 2003; Boyd and Grieco 2003; Ghosh 2013; Rubin 2008; Solimano 2008). The chapters in this book have tried to shed light on the particular patterns along which this double disadvantage evolves (or indeed may be challenged and overturned) under the conditions of economic recession like the current one.

12.1 Women vs men

Part I of this book concentrates on the challenges that highly skilled women who move within Europe without permit restrictions, taking advantage of their EU citizenship, face. There would be good reason to believe that the right to free movement creates a level playing field for both men and women

as mobility is relatively smooth and settling in a different EU member state comes with a whole set of social and economic and even local political rights. However, the contributions to this book (particularly Triandafyllidou and González Enríquez, Kaczmarczyk and Stanek, and Gropas and Bartolini) show that gendered disadvantages persist even under those conditions of free mobility for a number of reasons.

Gropas and Bartolini show that although both female and male high-skill migrants may encounter a number of similar settlement problems in the European Union (EU) (such as mastering a new language and culture), their labour integration specifically points to the inferior positioning of women, who more often come across barriers in job searches (20% compared with 14% of men). The authors note that most highly skilled women moving from Southern European countries to northern and western ones find occupations in typically female occupational sectors such as education, psychology or paramedical professions. By contrast, men are more often employed in such highly paid and male-dominated fields as engineering and managerial professions.

At the same time, the proportion of women who get higher degrees from their countries of origin in Southern Europe, Eastern Europe and Third World countries (from which the majority of high-skill migrants come) is larger than that of men since the 1990s. The same can be said about their educational attainment. However, the global financial crisis and the persistence of restrictive structures of patriarchy in the countries of origin decrease women's chances to find appropriate employment in the countries of origin. Such a growing gap between their educational attainment and professional development initially strengthens their propensity for emigration. In fact, the persistent gender gaps in source countries make the brain drain among women more pronounced because, as the chapter by Moskal also shows, high-skill women, much more often than men, view their emigration as 'a second chance' that they otherwise would not have at home.

The survey data analysed in Gropas and Bartolini illustrate that professional women in the EU are indeed underrepresented among the 'high-quality' engineering and managerial immigrants with monthly earnings of more than €3,000 and overrepresented in the category of highly skilled intra-European migrants earning less than €1,000 a month. Their findings show that the discrepancy between men and women is actually larger at the higher end of the monthly income continuum. Thus, in the business sector, the percentage of men earning €4,000 or more is 40% while that of women is only 16%. By contrast, women from the eurocrisis zone are overrepresented at the income end of below €2,000, and there is approximately 10% of women that earn less than €1,000 and 10% of women that have no income, while the related figures for men are respectively at 2% and 3%.

Actually, the question of income is particularly important for highly educated migrant women of third countries. This is so not just for the salary

in itself but also because often high-skill migration (HSM) policies use the salary threshold as a criterion for inclusion into a certain type of HSM permit (Batalova and Lowell 2007; Cerna 2010; Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 2013; Triandafyllidou and Isaakyan 2014). Cerner and Czaika in this book show that female migrants find themselves particularly disadvantaged by the EU Blue Card (BC) scheme, which uses the salary threshold as the primary criterion for applying for a Blue Card. Indeed, as Triandafyllidou and Isaakyan (2014) show, the majority of BC holders are therefore men.

It would be simplistic to understand the gender differences of HSM as merely related to initial gender segregation in their countries of origin. The gendered construction of women's positioning continues on the transnational level, revealing a complex tapestry between the employment tradition in source countries, the gender-blindness or gender-negligence of immigration law in destination countries and gender bias at the institutional level (patriarchal biases of the majority of individual employers). The chapters of Gropas and Bartolini and of Triandafyllidou and González Enríquez show that even in the highly selective male-dominated category of migrants with tertiary education in technical skills there is an income gap between men and women. When controlling for all other factors that may affect overseas earnings, intra-EU highly skilled migrant women (HSMW) earn less than their male counterparts.

This complex architecture of existing barriers affects the length of women's migratory cycles and the matching between the individual migration project and the family project. In the study conducted by Triandafyllidou and González Enríquez, 43% of male migrants plan to stay in the host country for more than five years, compared with 36% of women. In addition, as independent or principal migrants (who come on the work permit), men more often bring their families (in almost 30% of all cases), compared to 20% of women. Actually, the data suggest that highly skilled women migrating from Southern to Northern or Western Europe often do so following their spouse or partner who is the principal migration agent. They thus often face difficulties in finding a job at the destination country. Interestingly, highly skilled women migrating with their spouse and children face unemployment or underemployment more often than their male counterparts.

In a nutshell, highly skilled women migrants, including those who circulate freely within the EU, tend to be under-paid and over-qualified, while their migration projects are more fragile than those of men.

12.2 Sectorial differences in HSMW

This book pays special attention to sectorial differences, looking at how highly skilled migrant men and women perform in different occupational sectors that may be more or less gendered (in the sense of being occupied

predominantly by men or women, and being characterized as typically 'female' or 'male'). The contributions to this book concentrate on engineers' mobility, medical staff mobility and academic mobility.

12.2.1 Engineer mobility

If we examine cross-sectorial differences in the high-skill migration of women, we have a mixed picture of success intertwined with persistent gender gaps. Working in the information technology (IT) and engineering sectors provides women with a relative labour market advantage. This can be illustrated by the migration of Greek, Spanish and Portuguese graduate women with degrees in engineering, information technology and computer studies, who have chosen to emigrate during the crisis and who expect their migratory project to become their second chance to compensate for the inability of resources within the eurocrisis zone. Gropas and Bartolini show that, given the international transferability of their skills, women migrants who are IT professionals and engineers are in a relatively beneficial position in terms of securing good employment, at least better than in their home countries. However, Western and Northern Europe provides thinner opportunities to satisfy their non-pecuniary motivations, compared with those in the US, Canada or Australia (see also Boyd 2013). Apart from that, as the chapters of Matthew Dixon and Dussault et al. suggest, there are fewer problems with degree and professional experience recognition in fields such as engineering in Europe compared, for instance, to medical occupations.

The research presented by Dussault et al. and Isaakyan (in chapters 5 and 11 respectively) shows that for migrants in medical professions in general and female migrants in particular, economic integration is more problematic as it is directly related to the recognition of professional and educational credentials, which is often difficult. Isaakyan shows that even US nationals in Europe are not exempt from this requirement.

Dussault and colleagues argue that it is more difficult specifically for nurses than for doctors to have their qualifications recognized throughout the EU, which places female doctors in a sort of 'quasi-privileged' position. This difficulty for migrant nurses persists because of the lack of standardization of titles and educational requirements, while doctors have fewer problems because qualification requirements are more standardized. This obstacle – as well as the language barrier – becomes more difficult to overcome for women, on whom the traditional gender order imposes the household responsibilities and consequently restricts their time available for language training. That is why women nurses, who are in the majority of health professional migrants in Europe, run a higher risk of working at a level below their qualifications, which, as Sondra Cuban further proves, is especially the case for the UK.

In her provocative article, Elenore Kofman (2013) points to 'emblematic figures' of the EU immigrant – the gainfully employed and economically

well-integrated IT professional man versus the socio-economically vulnerable figure of the overqualified woman-nurse who is persistently employed in the domestic work sector. She then asks a no-less provocative question: Who actually stands in the middle of this continuum? In fact, who would be the third – balancing – emblematic figure?

In the milieu of various austerity measures and responsively restrictive immigration policies, international students are seen as the most dynamic class of the high-skill professional: they always have an easier entry to the country (Boyd 2013; Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 2013). However, unlike in North America, in Europe they do not always have a *de facto* entry to the job market and naturalization, which is specifically illustrated in the case of the UK. In the majority of EU countries, job market entry is tied to short-listed occupations and certain levels of income, which may be traditionally exclusive for women. Thus, female students may have equal chances as men to enter EU universities – yet not European job markets.

Moskal's chapter shows that, in spite of the restrictiveness of the EU immigration law, the mainstream of international students continues to grow, pointing to a discrepancy between the immigration law and immigration reality. But is there indeed a disjuncture? On the one hand, in its expanding transnationalism, the higher education sector becomes kind of autonomous from the state. On the other hand, the changes to immigration policy have created a 'liberal paradox' (Hollifield 2004), sharpened by austerity measures, and a double bind for international female students: western states use international students' fees as a tool for the post-crisis recovery, while persistently introducing visa restrictions to monitor international students. In reality, the herein-restricted visa policies significantly impede the entrance of foreign students to the job market as well as their naturalization. In this connection, the chapters of Cerna and Czaika and of Shinozaki stress that the majority of HSM laws remain exclusively in favour of the historically male-dominated 'shortlisted' occupations such as engineering and management, whose professionals are granted work permits more easily than the female-dominated service sector employees. In this connection, all authors recognize women's historical underrepresentation in such occupational domains. As is argued in this book, the majority of women who come to Europe for a higher education (and such inflows are rapidly increasing, as Marta Moskal shows) are those who receive degrees in humanities and social sciences – the areas excluded from the occupational shortlists. In the milieu of the increasing feminization of international education, this means that the growing inflow of female students is to contribute significantly – through their overseas educational fees – to the state income in destination countries while, at the same time, the destination country is not going to pay them back in the form of long-term employment and consequent naturalization. In other words, they come to EU universities and, as Moskal shows in her chapter, upon graduation seek employment outside the EU, while the money they have paid

for their persistently increasing overseas enrolment fees stays in the EU forever. We may argue therefore that overseas female students become a key source of the state income in EU member states.

Moskal illustrates that such feminization, which becomes a new striking feature of academic capitalism and international education, is more pronounced in the intra-EU level. For example, in the UK, females form the majority of the student category (60%) among migrants born within the European Economic Area (EEA), while among non-EEA-born migrants, males constitute 58%. This is not surprising because EU nationals do not need to undergo naturalization in order to access EU markets in other countries, which actually makes us think about fine gradations within the international female student category – EEA nationals versus non-EEA nationals in the EU.

12.2.2 Academic staff mobility

Another interesting aspect of global academic migrations and Europeanization of higher education is the mobility of academic personnel. Looking at the case of Germany (which is one of the few EU countries noted for strong liberalization of HSM law and Blue Card scheme implementation), Kyoko Shinozaki recognizes persistent gender discrimination practices in the selection and recruitment of academic staff – both on the national and on the international levels. She shows that, despite the widespread discourse of feminization and internationalization of higher education in Germany, foreign female academics constitute only 4.5% of the national academic workforce while their representation is even much lower at higher professional levels. Moreover, their legal positioning remains rather ambiguous as there is generally no single visa category and, consequently, naturalization scheme for foreign academics in Germany.

12.3 EU destinations

Castles et al. (2013) acknowledge the global patterns in the mass migration of women from capital-poor to capital-rich countries and East/South-West/North migrations, which have developed since the 1990s. In relation to the HSM of engineers and medical staff who find employment within their occupational categories, this pattern is still prevailing and the host countries do not show significant variations in accommodating women migrants. Under the impact of the crisis, the countries of Western and Northern Europe are among the main recipients of foreign engineers, students and academic and medical staff, since Southern Europe is marked by the massive and unidirectional emigration of such professionals.

Due to the impact of the crisis, some HSMW categories are increasing while others may be decreasing in certain countries of Western and Northern Europe. However, this region is generally marked by some pattern of

accepting foreign talent. For example, in the UK, the number of foreign students has increased (because their fees are important for the financial sustainability of UK universities), while the number of nurses has diminished even before the crisis. In the latter case, it is really hard to determine to what extent the crisis has impacted upon their mobility.

More often than not, the responsibility for accepting and controlling HSMW rests on institutions and agencies rather than on the state. In their chapter, Dussault et al. argue that many hospitals, which function as the main employers of migrant health professionals, arrange visits to foreign countries to recruit candidates. Such 'direct recruitment strategies' appear to be productive. At the same time, there are many intermediate institutional actors in the recruitment of medical staff from overseas – such as numerous private agencies – which are decentralized, weakly regulated and not sufficiently researched. On the one hand, EU governments consistently publish guidelines for such private recruiters, including *Developing fair recruitment practices* in Finland, *Guidance for Best Practice on the Recruitment of Overseas Nurses and Midwives* in Ireland, as well as a number of other documents in Norway and the UK. On the other hand, there is no evidence on the successful implementation of such policies.

The crisis has added to the overall fall of the EU welfare state and the consequent inability of the state to deal with recognition as well as the expansion of the hidden economy of the service sector in such domains as care and domestic work, where foreign nurses find – often illegal – employment (Bettio et al. 2012; Cuban 2013; Khitarishvili 2013; Kofman 2013). Cuban's chapter in this book shows that the widespread practice of recruiting highly skilled migrant women for care work has been a major strategy for the new global care industry. Her research shows that these highly qualified women with medical degrees from their countries of origin, who were seeking their second chances overseas, have eventually 'lost their ground in the process of becoming care assistants'. Sondra Cuban concludes that downward social mobility is a frequent outcome of medical staff migrations and actually demonstrates that the borderline between the high-skill migration of women and low-skill migration may be very blurred. In her chapter, the UK becomes an interesting example of downward social mobility of highly skilled foreign women who were trained initially as nurses and doctors, which resonates with the experience of Southern Europe, as described by Di Bartolomeo and Marchetti (2014).

However, the chapter by Isaakyan shows that such women often use marriage migration and entrepreneurship as alternative strategies of entering an EU country and the EU job market. In addition, the South European second or black economy makes it easier for women migrants to negotiate their socio-economic positioning in Italy and Greece than, for example, in the UK.

12.4 The UK case

Cuban and Moskal show in their chapters that the UK has been a rather interesting case as a destination country for HSMW, representing a mixture of colonialism and neo-liberalism. This is particularly illustrated by the migration of care workers and international students to the UK. As a destination context, the UK is, in fact, an interesting example of this state, in that in less than ten years, it has transformed from an immigrant-friendly country into a rather closed-door host. The chapter by Cerna and Czaika shows that, under the impact of the global financial crisis, a number of privileges for high-skill migrants have been abolished, including first of all the Tier 1 track (or the post-study work permit) for foreign students to the British labour market, on whose educational fees the national British economy depends nevertheless (see also Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 2013). As a result, HSM to the UK is now entirely dominated by persistently decreasing immigration quotas while the high-skill inflows are inconsistently monitored by individual institutions (Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 2013; Triandafyllidou and Isaakyan 2014). In this reference, the chapters of Cuban and Moskal clearly point to two interesting – yet underexplored – phenomena that can be observed in this immigrant-dependent and, at the same time, immigrant-hostile milieu: the under-scaling of overseas medical staff and the temporary immigration of international students.

Exploring the under-scaling of medical staff in the UK, Cuban argues in her chapter that the UK has always had a historical dependence on HSMW, especially doctors and nurses from its former colonies. The new points-based system created in the context of the economic recession and its dependence on employers' choices has expanded the range of donor nationalities to include Eastern European countries. In the herein-created preferential labour system of HSMW management, the state plays a carefree role, with the responsibility for HSMW selection resting almost entirely on individual employers' shoulders. Exclusive reliance on recruitment agents is a stable pattern in HSMW to the UK.

As a result, recruitment brokers and employers in England placed migrants into the deadlock situation, while the immigration law (as embodied in their visas) 'restricted any viable and economical professional pathways with the downgrading of their qualifications'. The poor workplace conditions and the overall failure of the welfare regime to provide immigrants with social services and protect their other rights make the UK not much different from the countries of Southern Europe.

While the immigration of nurses presents a strong case of downward social mobility and de-scaling, the mobility of international students to the UK illuminates its temporary – although to a certain extent privileged – nature. According to the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) (2015), international students in the UK form the largest immigrant category and constitute

20% of all students and almost 60% of all postgraduate students. Moskal shows that female students from Asia follow the neo-colonial pattern of migration by positively viewing their temporary mobility to the UK as a source of their transnational human capital, which allows them either to locate a prestigious job back home or to find a husband.

12.5 Comparing sending countries

Thinking about the difficulties that HSMW may face, the authors recognize that one of the foremost problems that women migrants have is the new language acquisition, which is a gender-neutral problem in all cases. There are, however, some socio-cultural differences among nationalities. The chapter of Kaczmarczyk and Stanek shows that Irish migrants (who more frequently migrate to the UK) are the less affected by language problems (18%), as they are native English speakers, followed by Portuguese (31%), Italians (34%) and Greeks (37%). Spanish emigrants, on the other hand, are those with major difficulties (50%), shared equally by men and women. Isaakyan also demonstrates that US nationals usually have no problems with mastering Italian while many ethnic Greeks from the US know Greek as their second language.

Analogous socio-economic differences can be observed in relation to skill transfer. Female migrants from all presented countries are very well educated, which is the most visible feature of US national and Spanish women (analysed in the chapters of Isaakyan and Kaczmarczyk and Stanek). These women seem to face significantly fewer obstacles to find jobs to generally conform to their qualifications when compared to Polish mobile women.

12.6 Policy crisis

Kofman (2013) notes that studies of the relationship between the current economic recession and HSM flows have been persistently gender blind. As Kaczmarczyk and Stanek note in their chapter, 'migration, as a labour market adjustment mechanism, should play a special role within the European Union, where freedom of movement constitutes one of the fundamental individual rights and allows for free circulation of labour'. They further conclude that, when from this policy angle, state policy should matter a lot and immigration should organically become – in the expanding borderless space of the EU – a key element to bring together the European demand and external supply for the post-crisis recovery.

The overall findings from our book show that the state is, in most cases, sort of 'absent' from integrating HSMW into the labour market while existing agencies often disrupt the integration of these migrants. There is the whole chain of intermediary agents and recruiters between the high-skill female migrant and the state, who are often completely gender-ignorant or

unaware of women's problems. Universities recruit international students without supporting their labour market integration. Recruitment agencies that recruit qualified nurses do not support their recognition endeavours or negotiation of their family problems. As Cerna and Czaika admit in their chapter, there is no consensus in the negotiations between different stakeholders such as employers, unions and the government, which has led to liberal policies towards high-skilled immigrants in some countries, but more restrictive ones in others.

As Dussault and colleagues note, another policy issue is that of 'ethical' recruitment or providing female immigrants with opportunities and working conditions that would be the same as for local people. In this connection, doctors and nurses who work in hospitals and private clinics have more labour market advantages and protection of their rights than the informants of Sondra Cuban who work as care assistants. The explanation may be that such agencies fall into the trap of misinterpreting the state guidance. But how can the structure of opportunity become equal when the selection of new high-skill immigrants is intrinsically constructed as biased and exclusionary?

In fact, their selection is usually evaluated on the grounds of professional skills and (prospective) earnings. When applications for work permits are considered, tertiary-educated female migrants may be discriminated across the following three categories: recognition of foreign degrees, processing with female-dominated non-shortage occupations and gendered salary gaps that create new obstacles with earnings as part of the overall evaluation procedure. Encountering such barriers for HSMW, skilled foreign women often choose other routes of migration (such as family or study), though even the study channel often becomes a route to temporary migration.

12.7 Concluding remarks

In summary, we can make the following assumptions about the gendered nature of HSM during the current economic crisis. There is persistent gender negligence in HSM policy and practice throughout the EU. This means that high-skill women are marginalized in the labour market, not on purpose, but due to a number of historical factors, thus their discrimination in the job market in destination countries has become unavoidable. This is proven by the following tendencies:

- (a) Although intra-EU mobility dominates some of the HSM sectors (such as mobility of engineers and students), even these sectors are marked by gender gaps in payment, career progression and so on. In other words, gender discrepancies are omnipresent in relation to HSM.
- (b) Specifically for high-skill women, there are persistent problems with degree recognition.

- (c) However, women who receive degrees from European universities also find it very hard to seek employment and consequently settle in the EU. This signals the irresponsiveness of the overall system of European higher education to take care of high-skill women.
- (d) In solving the 'women's question', the state proves to be inefficient, while institutional practices are fragmented and inconsistent.
- (e) As a result of such decentralization and historical negligence, high-skill women migrants become either de-scaled or undergo reskilling through alternative strategies of socio-economic integration such as the informal economy and entrepreneurship.

Strange as it may sound, highly skilled migration is still perceived a second chance by foreign women, many of whom are denied career or lifestyle opportunities back home. In this respect, immigration provides tertiary-educated women either with a certain line of career development through settlement (like reskilling through entrepreneurship) or with new human capital yet through temporary migration (such as the mobility of students). Thus, Moskal observes that although the UK offers very limited opportunities to foreign students to stay after their graduation, a UK degree can enable their employment for international companies in their home countries. In China, international mobility also provides middle-class families with an alternative route to success if the children find it difficult to progress within the highly competitive local education system.

The impact of the crisis upon HSMW is very indirect yet extremely powerful. The crisis may impact upon HSMW indirectly by, for example, intensifying (or quantifying) an existing problem (such as deterioration of the welfare regime or immigration law). The crisis can also create another problem or change a particular existing structure such as immigration law or the institute of the family. The outcome of any of such impacts is the skill waste or the situation when highly skilled women immigrants work as personal care assistants or find themselves unemployed.

An alternative strategy for overcoming the problem of disqualification can be that of migrant women engaging in entrepreneurship. In the milieu of the extending crisis, this trajectory has a positive counter-direction. It happens because the intensified collapse of the welfare state in a number of countries creates better conditions for the hidden economy, which becomes supportive of entrepreneurship. The crisis also changes the existing family structure when the husband loses his job and starts investing in the wife's business.

In the light of the discussion above, future research should pay attention to the intersection between different types of women's migration such as HSM and marriage migration by looking at the settlement experience of tertiary-educated women who entered as spouses of local men. Future research should also analyse the migration cycles of highly skilled migrant

women, especially of those who return from EU universities and target to restore their careers in the EU, as well as study the role of recruitment agencies as mediators for the employment of highly skilled migrant women whether in public or semi-public jobs (such as medical or paramedical staff in hospitals, or in universities) or in private firms.

References

- Batalova, J. and L. Lowell (2007) 'Immigrant Professionals in the United States', *Society*, 44(2), 26–31.
- Bettio, F., M. Corsi, C. D'Ippoliti, A. Lyberaki, M. Samek-Lodovici, A. Verasgachina (2012) *The Impact of the Economic Crisis on the Situation of Women and Men and on Gender Equality Policies. Synthesis Report of the Expert Group on Gender and Employment for the Directorate-General for Justice of the European Commission*. Available online at: https://www.bmbf.gv.at/frauen/ewam/130410_crisis_report_en_25890.pdf?4dz8a1 (accessed: 5 May 2015).
- Borjas, G. (2003) 'The Labor Demand Curve is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market', *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 118(4), 1335–1374.
- Boyd, M. (2013) 'Recruiting High Skill Labour in North America: Policies, Outcomes and Futures', *International Migration*, 52(3), 40–53.
- Boyd, M. and E. Grieco (2003) 'Women and Migration: Incorporating Gender into International Migration Theory', *Migration Information Source [Online Journal of the Migration Policy Institute]*, 1 March 2003. Available online at: <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/women-and-migration-incorporating-gender-international-migration-theory> (accessed: 5 May 2015).
- Castles, S., H. de Haas and M. Miller (2013) *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*, 5th edn. (New York: Guilford Press).
- Cerna, L. (2010) 'Policies and Practices of Highly Skilled Migration in Times of the Economic Crisis', *ILO International Migration Papers* 99. Available online at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-ed_protect/-protrav/-migrant/documents/publication/wcms_179666.pdf (accessed: 5 May 2015).
- Cuban, S. (2013) *Deskilling Migrant Women in the Global Care Industry* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Di Bartolomeo, A. and S. Marchetti (2014) 'Care Work and the Feminization of Labour Migration in Italy Through the Current Economic Crisis', *EUI Policy Briefs*. Available online at: <http://blogs.eui.eu/migrationpolicycentre/care-work-and-the-feminization-of-labour-migration-to-italy-through-the-current-economic-crisis/> (accessed: 5 May 2015).
- Eurostat (2011) 'Demography Report 2010. Latest Figures on the Demographic Challenges in the EU', *Eurostat News Releases* 50/2011, 1 April 2011. Available online at: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/5036506/3-01042011-BP-EN.PDF/9de3b492-69a9-42df-a47c-e8a28aaad261?version=1.0> (accessed: 2 April 2015).
- Ghosh, B. (2013) *The Global Economic Crisis and the Future of Migration: Issues and Prospects. What Will Migration Look Like in 2045?* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan).
- HESA (2015). *Student Record 2014/15*. Available online at: https://www.hesa.ac.uk/index.php?option=com_studrec&Itemid=232&mnl=14051 (accessed: 5 May 2015).

- Hollifield, J.F. (2004) 'Migration and International Relations: the Liberal Paradox', in H. Entzinger, M. Martiniello, C. Wihtol de Wenden (eds.) *Migration Between States and Markets* (Aldershot: Ashgate), pp. 3–18.
- Isaakyan, I. and A. Triandafyllidou (2013) 'High-Skill Mobility: Addressing the Challenges of the Knowledge-Based Economy at Times of Crisis', *RSCAS Policy Papers 2013/14*. Available online at: http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/27706/RSCAS_PP_2013_14.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed: 5 May 2015).
- Khitarishvili, T. (2013) 'The Economic Crisis of 2008 and the Added Worker Effect in Transition Countries', *Levy Economics Institute of Bard College Working Papers* 765. Available online at: http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_765.pdf (accessed: 5 May 2015).
- Kofman, E. (2013) 'Towards a Gendered Evaluation of (Highly) Skilled Immigration Policies in Europe', *International Migration*, 52(3), 116–128.
- Rubin, J. (2008) *Migrant Women in the European Labour Force: Technical Report Prepared for the European Commission* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation).
- Solimano, A. (ed.) (2008) *The International Mobility of Talent: Types, Causes and Development Impact* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press).
- Triandafyllidou, A. and I. Isaakyan. (2014) 'EU Management of High-skill Migration', *RSCAS Global Governance Programme Policy Briefs* 2014/04. Available online at: http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/34706/RSCAS_GGP_2014_04_PolicyBrief.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed: 5 May 2015).

Index

- academic career, 11, 212, 225, 228–33, 279
- academic capitalism, 196–8, 211, 298
- academic work, 12, 247–55, 294, 298

- Blue Card, 165, 216–19
- brain drain, 30, 161, 163, 166, 294

- capital
 - ethnicized, 275, 288
 - gendered, 294, 295, 317
 - human, 288, 292, 297
 - (un)recognized, 10, 272, 283
- career
 - academic, 33, 236, 247, 250–5, 301
 - entrepreneurial, 299, 303
 - career mobility, 16, 176, 215, 230, 231
 - career progression, 130, 144, 187, 150–252, 237, 247, 301
 - gap in, 316
 - interruption of, 130, 144
 - career trajectory, 31, 66, 325
- citizenship, 33, 206–7, 236–7, 240–53
- community
 - building, 263, 288
 - development, 263, 286, 288
 - local, 288
- competition, 22, 27–31, 89
 - see also* Talent
- competitive advantage, 275, 284
 - see also* knowledge economy
- crisis
 - Euro- 4, 13, 17, 44, 49, 285
 - financial, xi, 4, 9
 - global, xi, 4
 - impact of, xi, 4, 8–10
 - studies of, 4–10
 - Zone of Euro-, 17

- de-skilling, 15, 45, 114, 217, 242

- economy
 - Greek, 160–90, 270–90
 - hidden, 282, 299, 303
 - informal, 282, 299, 303
 - knowledge, 34, 161, 167, 218, 250
 - masculinized, 168
 - second, 282, 299, 303
- education
 - community, 243–6
 - global, 201, 206, 211
 - higher, 246–54
 - international, 202, 225, 297–8
 - tertiary, 246–54
- employment
 - high-skill, 272
 - illegal, 12, 47, 198, 271, 282, 299
 - irregular, 12, 39, 46
- engineers, *see* sectors; mobility
- entrepreneurs
 - ethnic, 33
 - female, 270–90, 321, 325
 - immigrant, 270–90
 - transatlantic, 270–90
 - women, 274, 277

- EU
 - enlargement of, 69, 70, 74, 76, 81
 - Germany, 7–8, 13–16, 24–8, 31–6, 41, 298
 - Southern Europe, 126, 139, 154, 155, 160
 - UK, 170–84
- Europe
 - Central Europe, 131, 219, 276, 294
 - crisis-afflicted, 4, 13, 44, 49, 285
 - Eastern Europe, 131, 219, 276, 294
 - Germany, 7–8, 13–16, 24–8, 31–6, 41, 298
 - Greece, 160–90, 270–90
 - Italy, 4, 13, 44, 49, 285
 - Southern Europe, 126, 139, 154, 155, 160
 - Spain, 4, 13, 44, 49, 285
 - UK, 170–84
 - Western Europe, 14, 15, 48, 56, 89
- European Economic Free Trade Area, 103–20

- family migration, 38, 54, 66, 255
 family policy, *see* family reunification
 family reunification, 17, 39, 197, 271
- gender bias, 5, 11, 66, 168, 272, 295
 gender differences, 29, 122–8, 132–7,
 194, 227, 316, 318, 324
 greek crisis, *see* Euro-crisis
 Greek migrations, 9, 48, 53–5
- immigration
 Law, 156, 267, 270, 271, 295, 297, 300
 Policy, 7, 14, 26, 28, 34, 117, 195–201
- income gap, 317–18
- integration, 216–19, 288, 296
 community, 263, 286, 288
 cultural, 140, 144–5, 154–6
 economic, 199, 271, 296, 303
 labour-market, 54, 58, 96
 socio-economic, xi, 4, 303
- interviews, 170, 201, 244
see also methods
- intra-EU migrations, 294, 298, 302
 Italy, 4, 13, 44, 49, 285
- labour market, 294
- market
 entrance to, 6, 271, 297
 entrepreneurial, 29, 268, 275
 gender-constructed, 6, 272, 296
 job, 278, 285, 297
 labour, 266, 268, 270, 273, 294–301
 meritocracy, 166, 185
 national, 127, 205, 206
 niche, 17, 95, 242, 246, 250, 252, 268,
 274
see also market
- methods
 interview, 170, 201, 244
 qualitative, 170, 201, 244, 281–4
 quantitative, 14, 15, 24, 44, 48, 104,
 125, 232
 statistical, 241; *see also* methods,
 quantitative
- migrants
 female, x, 5, 12, 23, 30–7
 highly educated, 96, 271
 high-skill(ed) 271, 294
 low-educated/skilled migrants, 85
 tertiary-educated, 17, 84, 85
 transatlantic, 106
 transitional arrangements for, 80, 88,
 97
 women, 295–303
- migration
 East-West, 70, 236
 economic, 131, 154–8
 family, 38, 39, 66, 236, 255, 262
 female, 13–15, 289
 feminization of, 35, 121, 272
 illegal, 12, 47, 198, 271, 282, 299
 intra-EU, 294, 298, 302
 irregular, 12, 39, 46
 marriage, 299, 303
 regulatory role of, 16, 28, 39, 282
 reversed, 34
 selectivity of, 163
 South-North, 98–9, 266
 transatlantic, 34
 migration regulation, 16, 28, 39, 282
 migration strategies, 70, 94, 236, 262
- mobility
 academic, 194–200
 career, 16, 176, 215, 230, 231
 doctors, 4, 11, 15, 46, 103–20, 299–302
 engineers, 64, 65, 124–6
 international, 224, 233, 303
 intra-eu, 294, 298, 302
 medical staff, 4, 11, 15, 46, 103–20,
 299–302
 nurses, 4, 11, 15, 46, 103–20, 299–302
 spatial, 196, 223, 231, 236
 student, 194, 234–7
 transatlantic, 13, 17, 88
- naturalization, 232, 233, 271, 297
 nurses, 4, 11, 15, 46, 103–20, 299–302
- OECD
 EU-enlargement, 69, 70, 74, 76, 81
 Germany, 7–8, 13–16, 24–8, 31–6, 41,
 298
 UK, 170–84
 United States, 265–92
 over-qualified migrants, 4, 60, 272, 295
- policy
 blue card, 165, 216–19
 European Blue Card, 165, 216–19

- policy – *continued*
 - family, 17, 39, 197, 271
 - immigration Blue Card, 165, 216–19
 - national, 35, 119, 196
 - recognition, 248, 251, 272
- post-study worka
 - UK, 170–84
- programmes
 - ERASMUS, 166, 235
 - exchange, 275, 286, 288
 - integration, 199, 271, 296, 303
 - student exchange, 275, 286, 288
- recognition
 - degree, 283, 294
 - European, 288–9
 - national, 283, 288
- recruitment
 - academic, 298
 - foreign, 8, 22, 302, 304
 - high-skill, 8, 22, 302, 304
 - sectorial, 298, 299
 - strategies of, 299
- sector
 - academic, 12, 247–55, 294, 298
 - care, 34–9, 45
 - computer science, 51–3, 64
 - domestic work, 34–9, 45
 - engineering, 64, 65, 124–6
 - feminized, 103, 244, 251
 - information technology, xiii, 60, 296
 - labour-intensive, 89
 - male-dominated, 251, 285, 294
 - medical, 13, 22, 38, 46, 51, 294–6, 304
 - science, 51–60
- skills
 - deficit, 203, 204, 219, 284
 - labour-market, 16, 17, 22
 - loss of, 15, 45, 114, 217, 242
 - recognitions of, 293–99
 - transferability of, 295, 302
- students
 - exchange, 93, 94, 166, 288
 - female, 13, 297–301
 - foreign, 28, 193, 197, 199, 225, 299
 - graduate, 166, 171, 181, 190
 - international, 28, 193, 197, 199, 225, 299
- survey, *see* methods
- talent
 - competition for, 29
 - foreign, 299
 - international, 8, 193
- transatlantic migrations, 34
- transitional arrangements, 80, 88, 97
- under-scaling, 300
- unemployment
 - high-skill, 7–9
 - rates of, 9, 10, 44, 73
 - youth, 75
- wage gap, 324
- women
 - American, 265–93
 - high-skill(ed), 294, 303
 - tertiary educated, 294, 303
 - US-national, 265–93
- work
 - academic, 12, 247–55, 320
 - care, 34–9, 45
 - domestic work, 34–9, 45
 - gendered, 294, 295, 317
 - illegal, 12, 47, 198, 271, 282, 299
 - irregular, 12, 39, 46
 - niche, 17, 95, 242, 246, 250, 252, 268, 274
 - work-life balance, 94, 274
 - work permit, 12, 25, 26, 232, 295, 297, 300