

THE MEDIEVAL MEDITERRANEAN * BRILL

The Mamluks in Egyptian and Syrian Politics and Society

*Edited by
Michael Winter and Amalia Levanoni*



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THE MAMLUKS IN EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN
POLITICS AND SOCIETY

THE
MIEVIAL MIEITERRANEAN

PEOPLES, ECONOMIES AND CULTURES, 400-1500

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VOLUME 51



THE MAMLUKS IN EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY

EDITED BY

MICHAEL WINTER AND AMALIA LEVANONI



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PREFACE

This volume on the Mamluks of Egypt and Syria grew out of an international conference, which took place in May 2000 at the Universities of Haifa and Tel-Aviv. This conference was a sequel of a similar symposium that had convened in 1994 at Bad Homburg, Germany, which resulted in the volume entitled *The Mamluks in Egyptian politics and society*, edited by Thomas Philipp and late Ulrich Haarmann (Cambridge University Press, 2001).

The conference at Haifa and Tel-Aviv (and subsequently this book) differs from the previous project in one significant aspect. The first book was limited to Egypt; the present volume includes the history of the Mamluks in Syria as well. Egypt was the center of the Mamluk Empire (1250–1517); the provinces known as Greater Syria (*Bilād al-Shām*) were wholly dependent on the capital Cairo, the seat of the sultan and the caliph, and was politically and strategically of a secondary importance. In addition, while Mamluks assumed a central role in the politics of Ottoman Egypt (1517–1798; particularly in the eighteenth century), they all but disappeared from Syria after the Ottoman conquest.

The editors would like to extend their gratitude to the persons and departments at the Haifa and Tel-Aviv Universities for their assistance in financing and organizing the Mamluk conference and the present volume.

We would like to thank Mrs. Genoveba Breitstein for efficiently and thoughtfully preparing the text for publication.

M.W. A.L.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<i>ANSMN</i>	<i>American Numismatic Society Museum Notes</i>
AS	Annales Islamologiques
BIFAO	Bulletin de l'Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale
BRIJMES	British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
BSOAS	Bulletin of School of Oriental and African Studies
CNRS	Centre National de Recherche Scientifique
EI ²	Encyclopaedia of Islam (new edition)
IFD	Institut Francis de Damas
IFAO	Bulletin de l'Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale
IJMES	International Journal of Middle East Studies
JAOS	Journal of the American Oriental Society
JESHO	Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient
JRAS	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society
JSS	Journal of the Semitic Studies
MSR	Mamluk Studies Review
REI	Revue des études Islamiques
SI	Studia Islamica

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INTRODUCTION

The nineteen articles that have been collected in the present volume cover the politics and society of the Mamluks from 1250, when the Mamluk Sultanate was established in Egypt until the end of the eighteenth century, when the French invasion of Egypt announced the end of the three centuries long, direct Ottoman rule of Egypt. The Syrian provinces were an integral part of the Mamluk Empire, and despite the strong union between Egypt and Syria during the Mamluk Empire (stronger than in any period before or since), there were different conditions in Syria in certain respects. Therefore, Parts IV and VII discuss respectively the conditions in Mamluk Palestine, a part of Greater Syria at the time, and Syria.

Part I, “The formative stage of the Mamluk state”, consists of two quite different studies. Hannah Taragan describes the portal to the Red Mosque in Safed, discussing its artistic themes and political messages, comparing that specific portal to other monuments commissioned by Sultan Baybars, the architect of the Mamluk Empire. Reuven Amitai looks at the meaning of loyalty among Mamluk amirs against the background of the Mongol occupation of Damascus in 1300, when several amirs crossed the lines to the Mongols and back.

It is well known that despite the richness of literary sources of the period, the archival documents from the Mamluk chanceries did not survive. In Part II, Frédéric Bauden uncovered at the University of Liège a unique manuscript. It is an imperial decree dating from the mid-fourteenth century. The document was used by the al-Maqrīzī, the famous historian, as scrap paper to write a passage from one of his chronicles. Complementing historical sources with Mamluk chancery documents, Bauden constructs more accurate pictures of political events in mid fourteenth century. Using the Ḥaram al-Sharif documents in Jerusalem, Donald Richards suggests first hand information on Mamluk material culture.

Turning to the military aspects of the Mamluk society in Part III, Amalia Levanoni uses the study of Mamluk regal titles (*alqāb*) during the Circassian period to look at factional politics within Mamluk society. She challenges the model of Mamluk factionalism prevalent in research literature and shows that the Mamluks developed instead

a bi-polar political system in which regal titles were used as symbols uniting various Mamluk groups through the generations. Robert Irwin challenges the theory of the late David Ayalon, arguably the founding father of Mamluk studies, that the Mamluks did not adopt firearms for social and psychological reasons despite the fact that they knew the technology. Irwin examines carefully all the relevant evidence of the Arabic chronicles and the technical pros and cons of the effectiveness of firearms of the time and concludes that not only did the Mamluks not reject firearms, but also “they could not get enough of them”.

The two articles of Part IV are concerned with society and administration in Mamluk Palestine. Donald Little offers new facts and fresh perspectives on Mamluk Jerusalem. Little describes the administration of the city under Qāyṭbāy, the most powerful sultan in the fifteenth century. Joseph Drory’s study of Safed describes the considerations, which caused the Mamluk government to turn Safed from a small and politically insignificant town into a *mamlaka*, a province in Greater Syria. Drory surveys in some detail the officeholders in Safed, giving a list of the military and administrative personnel under the Mamluks.

In Part V, Yossef Rapoport gives an analysis of the significance of the attacks on divorce oaths by Taqī al-Dīn b. Taymiyya, the most famous and original theologian and polemicist of the Mamluk period. His rulings about this matter got him into trouble with the authorities, as did other things he said or wrote. Rapoport explains that divorce oaths were widely practiced throughout society, by commoners and the ruling elite alike. By attacking them on religious grounds Ibn Taymiyya challenged some basics of families and households, such as authority and control.

Part VI consists of three articles on the economy. Warren Schultz discusses the circulation of silver coins in the Bahri (or Turkish) period of Mamluk history (1250–1382). He rejects Balog’s assumption that Mamluk *dirhams* passed by count and argues that the Mamluks minted silver coins of changing alloys and weight and that their value was determined in the market in comparison to the money of account. Jonathan Berkey takes a close look at an ancient Islamic institution, the *muḥtasib* (market inspector) in the Mamluk environment. He shows that there was transformation in the character and functions of the office; from a position of an ethical and religious

character, filled in by men from the religious-legal establishment in the early Mamluk period, it turned into a political and administrative office of the state, subordinate to the ruler's interests. Carl Petry describes the estate and the economic activities of a woman, a royal spouse, who had been widowed several times and amassed considerable fortune. This study is based on archival documents that are relatively abundant for the last decades of the Mamluk Sultanate.

Part VII, "the Mamluks in Syria", consists of three different studies. Nimrod Luz combines field research in Jerusalem and written historical and topographical sources to examine Mamluk residential houses planning as reflecting Islamic culture in specific towns during the Mamluk period, thus contributing to the ongoing scholarly debate about "the Islamic city". Michael Winter uses *waqf* and *milk* (charitable endowments and private estates) documents from the Istanbul archives to examine Mamluk amirs—their religiosity, their families, households, and women, as well as some demographic data about family size and number of wives and children. The article is an example how early Ottoman documents can be used for late Mamluk social and economic history. Thomas Philipp describes the Mamluk household and military forces of Aḥmad Pāshā al-Jazzār, the ruler of Acre in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The article proves that the Mamluk phenomenon did not vanish entirely from Syria after the Ottoman conquest.

In Part VIII, "Mamluks in Ottoman Egypt", André Raymond describes the wealth of the Egyptian amirs at the end of the seventeenth century, basing his study on the documents of legal bequests. He illustrates the economic differences among the various military units and ranks and between the military grandees and the civilian wealthy men. As he does in his previous studies, Raymond also presents the economic geography of Cairo. Daniel Crecelius discusses the political problems of leadership of 'Abd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā, an outstanding military and political figure in eighteenth century Cairo. The study is based on contemporary Arabic chronicles. Jane Hathaway challenges the notion, prevalent in the research literature, of "Mamluk revival" in Ottoman Egypt, after their defeat by the Ottoman in 1517. Hathaway strongly calls to differentiate between the historical realities of Ottoman politics that were based on households and had no relation to the defunct Mamluk Sultanate and the nostalgia that evoked Mamluk historical memories, often used for

political purposes, as to gain historical legitimacy. Finally, Reuven Aharoni compares the similarities and differences between the two warlike societies, Mamluks and the Bedouin Arab tribes of Egypt. He shows how they often needed each other, but also how they could be fierce rivals.

PART ONE

THE FORMATIVE STAGE OF THE MAMLUK SULTANATE

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CHAPTER ONE

DOORS THAT OPEN MEANINGS: BAYBAR'S RED MOSQUE AT SAFED*

Hanna Taragan

Eight years after Baybars had conquered the Citadel of Safed from the Templar Crusaders in July 665/1266, he restored it and turned it into a new Mamluk stronghold that dominated the entire Galilee and functioned as a rear base for attacking Acre and the coastal region. Subsequently, having laid the foundations for the new Muslim city of Safed, which became the center of Mamluk rule in the Galilee¹ Baybars built the so-called Red Mosque (al-Jāmi' al-Aḥmar), not far from the citadel.² In spite of the fact that the mosque as seen today was repeatedly damaged by the earthquakes that wreaked havoc on Safed, the various renovations it has undergone over the years, and the pilfering of its *minbar* and the marble panels that decorated the *miḥrābs*, it can still be studied both as a work of art and as a document reflecting the religious and political outlook of its Mamluk builders.

* I wish to acknowledge the generous assistance of the Israel Antiquity Authority: Mr. Imanuel Damati, Regional Inspector for Safed, and the archivists of the Rockefeller Archaeological Museum in Jerusalem: Nurit Feig, Arieḥ Rochman-Halperin and Yael Barschak.

My special thanks to Mr. Zeev Pearl former mayor of Safed, whose love for his city inspired me so greatly.

¹ Nicola A. Ziadeh, *Urban Life in Syria*, Beirut, 1970, 11–14.

² According to al-Nuwayrī, after the conquest of Safed Baybars built a mosque in the Citadel and another one in the suburbs (*rabad*). It is quite possible that the 'other' one is the Red Mosque. See: Al-Nuwayrī, Aḥmad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb Shihāb al-Dīn, *Nihāyat al-arab fī funūn al-adab*, Cairo, 1990, vol. XXX, 290. See also: Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn 'Abd al-Zāhir, *al-Rawḍ al-Zāhir fī Sirat al-Malik al-Zāhir*, al-Riyad, 1986, 263. According to Arab sources, Baybars also built in Safed (and in its citadel) towers, markets, khans, a public bath (*ḥammām*) and a residence for the governor. See: Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Yūsuf Abū al-Maḥāsin. *al-Nujūm al-zāhira fī mulūk Miṣr wa'l-Qāhira*, Cairo, 1972, vol. VII, 195. See also: Ibn Shaddād, Muḥammad b. 'Alī, *al-A'āq al-khaṭira fī dhikr umarā' al-shām wa'l-Jazīra*, Damascus: al-Ma'ḥad al-Faransī li'l-Dirāsāt al-'Arabiyya bi-Dimashq, 1952, 150.

The Red Mosque, which has a fortress like appearance (fig. 1.1) was built in 674/1274–5 of high quality limestone, surrounded by massive outer walls of ashlar masonry, which have been preserved to a height of 7 meters. In certain sections, the walls reach a thickness of 3.4 meters.³

The plan of the mosque is rectangular, measuring 40.5×28.3 meters (fig. 1.2). A deep, rectangular portal niche is set into the wall of the northern facade, crowned with a vault whose upper part contains an elaborate, four-tiered *muqarnas* of the ‘Syrian’ type, topped by a gored conch design, only part of which has been preserved (fig. 1.3). The portal, built of reddish-orange limestone, was once higher than the wall, as evidenced by the broken fragments on both sides of the conch. It is flanked by the stone benches characteristic of Mamluk portals. An inscription can be seen on a marble panel in between the doorway and the *muqarnas* vault.

The portal leads into the inner open courtyard, and is surrounded on three sides by cross-vaulted arcades, supported by piers (fig. 1.4). In the north corner of the western arcade it is still possible to distinguish the flight of stairs leading to the now-collapsed minaret. The western arcade opens southward on to a small, slightly raised grass-covered garden that adjoins the main courtyard. To the south, behind the garden wall, is another courtyard with two gates opening to the street. A side entrance leads from here to the mosque itself.

The prayer hall is located on the southern side of the complex. Its interior—as seen today, is of square dimensions, measuring 15.5 meters wide and 15.1 meters deep. The *qibla* contains two *mihrabs* (fig. 5). Four pillars with flat capitals, looking like “a rudimentary *muqarnas* element”⁴ divide the hall into nine equal-sized bays. Seven of the bays, on the north, west and east sides are cross-vaulted and reach a height of 5.30 meters. The central bay is likewise cross-vaulted, and its four folded grooves, meeting at its center, create a rosette design. This bay leads into the *ante-mihrāb* which features a dome on pendentives, reaching a height of about 8 meters. Seen from the side, the two bays, with their stepped vaults, form a rhyth-

³ L.A. Mayer, I. Pinkerfeld and J.W. Hirshberg, *Some Principal Muslim Buildings in Israel*, Jerusalem, 1950, 44–46, figs. 46–51.

⁴ Cf. M.H. Burgoyne, *Mamluk Jerusalem*, London, 1987, 140, note 40.

mically graded axis that conducts the eye from the hall entrance toward the *mīhrāb* and serves to make the square hall appear oblong.

An expedition to the site in 1950 under the auspices of Israel's Ministry for Religious Affairs, conducted by L.A. Mayer, I. Pinkerfeld, and J.W. Hirschberg—the only modern source to document the building—found the wooden *minbar*, which has since been lost, in place, measuring 5 meters high.

Mayer's claim that the prayer hall as seen today dates from the nineteenth century, and that it was then covered with a single, central dome, is to my mind, inaccurate,⁵ since the mosque clearly features architectural and decorative elements from three different phases.

The first phase is characteristic of the period of Baybars and comprises the main portal with its inscription, also the general layout of the hypostyle mosque (fig. 6). I believe that the prayer hall originally extended to the west toward the outer wall and contained five aisles running from north to south, toward the *qibla* with its' present western *mīhrāb*. If this was indeed the case, it follows that Baybars had the *mīhrāb* placed in the central aisle exactly opposite the middle entrance, where it is usually located in this type of mosque.

The second phase, still Mamluk, but probably dating from the first half of the fourteenth century, can be seen in the present, small prayer hall (fig. 2), with the eastern *mīhrāb* and vaulted bays, which attests to a decline in artistic quality compared to the portal of Baybar's period. Since the overall style of this latter phase of the Mamluk period is not covered in this article, only several of its major features will be mentioned below.

The third phase is characteristic of the Ottoman period, although the mosque clearly underwent repeated restorations in the course of the last two centuries. However, the photograph that appears in Mayer's report—and which was certainly not taken after 1950—would seem to document what is no longer found in situ: the huge Ottoman decorated *minbar* and the *tughrā* which appears above the *mīhrāb* (see fig. 7).⁶

Today, the mosque contains two inscriptions. The one which has already been mentioned, appearing on the portal, is a foundation inscription (fig. 8), written by Baybars, reading:⁷

⁵ Mayer, Pinkerfeld and Hirshberg, 45.

⁶ *Ibid.*, fig. 49.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 46.

bi-ism Allāh al-rahmān al-rahīm amara bi-inshāʾi hādihā al-jāmiʿ al-mubārak mawlānā al-sultān al-Malik al-Ẓāhir (al-sayyid al-ʿajall al-kabīr al-ʿālim al-ʿādil al-mujāhid al-murābiṭ al-muʿayyad al-muzaffar) al-mānṣūr rukn al-dunyā waʾl-dīn () (sultān al-Islām waʾl-Muslimīn) qābil al-kafara waʾl-mushrikīn qāhir al-khawārij waʾl-mutamarridīn Baybars al-Ṣāliḥī (qasīm Amīr al-Muʾminīn) wa-dhālika fī sanat arbaʿ wa-sabʿīn wa-sittamīʾa.

In the name of Allāh the merciful and compassionate.

The building of this blessed Friday-mosque was ordered by our lord the Sultan al-Malik al-Ẓāhir (the venerated, the great lord, the learned, the just, the wayer of *jihād* against the unbelievers, the frontier warrior whom God supports and renders victorious, the pillar of the world and faith (), the sultan of Islam and the Muslims, the fighter against the infidels and polytheists, the oppressor of the transgressors and rebels, Baybars al-Ṣāliḥī (co-ruler with Amir of Believers [the Abbasid Caliph] in the year of 674 [1274/5]).

The second inscription (fig. 5), which dates from the first half of the 14th century (our second phase), is an endowment inscription that is located above the eastern *miḥrāb*.⁸

bi-ism Allāh al-rahmān al-rahīm innamā yaʿmuru masājida Allāhi man āmana bi-Allāhi waʾl-yawmī al-ākhirī wa-aqāma al-ṣalawāta wa-ātā al-zakawāt wa-lam yakshā illā Allāha fa-ʿasā ūlāʾika an yakūnū minā al-muhtadīna amara bi-inshāʾi hādihā al-masjīd al-mubārak waʾl-turba allatī dākhilīhi al-ʿabd al-faqīr ilā Allāh taʿālā Najm al-Dīn Fayrūz al-Mālikī al-Nāṣirī wa-waqafa ʿalayhimā wa-ʿalā ʿasharat nafar imām wa-muʿadhdhīn wa-qayyim wa-qurrāʾ wa-farsh wa-tawwīr jamīʿ al-ṭabaqatayn waʾl-iṣṭabalāt allatī ilā janībīhā wa-nisf al-bustān al-māʾrūf biʾl-rashīdī waʾl-hammām allatī anshaʾahā biʾl-ʿaṭṭārīn yuṣraf min ujrāt tilka mā yuḥtāj ilayhi kamā dhukira fī kitāb al-waqf wa-mā faḍala ʿan dhālika fa-li-awlādīhi wa-ʿqbīhi wa-naslihi.

In the name of God the merciful and compassionate.

None should visit the mosques of Allāh except those who believe in Allāh and the Last Day, attend to their prayers and pay the alms-tax and fear none but Allāh. These shall be rightly guided.

The building of this blessed mosque and the tomb inside it was ordered by the humble servant of Allāh, Najm al-Dīn Fayrūz al-Mālikī al-Nāṣirī and he endowed a *waqf*, for [their maintenance] and for [salaries] of an *imām*, a muezzin, an acting manager and Quran reciters, and for the carpets and illumination, [consisting of] all [the following]: the adjacent two barracks and stables, half of the fruit gardens known as al-Rashīdī and the bath that he had built in al-ʿAṭṭārīn [the drug-

⁸ *Ibid.*, 45–46.

gist market]. Expenditures [on the mosque and tomb maintenance] will be paid from the rent of those [the aforementioned properties] as was specified in the *waqf* document and the remaining [of the rental income] should go to his children, grandchildren and descendants.

This inscription, which provides an illuminating document for the study of the local history of Safed, raises questions that fall beyond our present context. I will confine myself to some details that are important for our purpose here.

After citing verse 18 of Sura 9, (which is highly popular for inscriptions chosen for mosques),⁹ it states that the mosque and the *turba*, or tomb therein¹⁰ were built by Najm al-Dīn Fayrūz, officer of al-Malik al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, who made *waqf* (*waqafa*) in favor of ten mosque functionaries, among them Qoran reciters. Mention of the latter may point to the funerary nature of the complex at that time.¹¹ In any case, today the site contains no *turba*. Emanuel Damati, the Israel Antiquities Authority archeologist of Safed, has identified the still-remaining podium, attached to the *qibla* wall by means of a door that was blocked by Damati, as the *turba*. However, Mayer and his colleagues in the 1950 expedition, while referring to the inscription and its location above the *mihṛāb*, made no mention of a *turba*.

It is also worth noting that Evliya Tshelebi, who recorded his visit to the mosque in 1649, said nothing about the *turba* and the endowment inscription but did mention Bayabars's portal inscription,¹² as well as an additional, contemporaneous inscription; the latter must also have been lost during one of the restorations of the mosque. In

⁹ See S.S. Blair, *Islamic Inscriptions*, New York, 1998, 68: “. . . Undoubtedly chosen because it is one of the only three Qur'anic references to God's mosques (*masājid Allāh*) a special term distinct from any *masjid* or place of prayer.” See also W.M. Thackson, “The Roll of Calligraphy” in M. Frishman and H.-U. Khan (eds.), *The Mosque*, London, 1994, 43–44. For different opinion see: R. Hillenbrand “Qur'anic Epigraphy in Medieval Islamic Architecture” in *REI* (Melanges Dominique Sourdel), vol. LIV (1986) 171–84, esp. 171–4.

¹⁰ Integration of tombs in madrasas or mosques, also as a later addition, was quite usual in Ayyubid and Mamluk Syria, in the framework of religious popular institutions. See: Y. Tabbaa, *Constructions of Power and Piety in Medieval Aleppo*, Pennsylvania 1997, 156. Humphreys explains it as “The inward-looking face of the *Jihād*”. See: R.S. Humphreys, “Ayyubids, Mamluks, and the Latin East in the Thirteenth Century” in *Mamluk Studies Review*, vol. II (1998), 8–9.

¹¹ Blair, 71.

¹² Evliya Tshelebi, “Travels in Palestine 1648–1650”, in *Quarterly of the Department of Antiquities in Palestine*, vol. V (1936), 1 & 2, 159–60 (tr. From the Turkish by S.H. Stephan).

any case, I believe that if the building indeed comprised a *turba*, built in the second phase, in the early years of the 14th century, it would have been located in the western part of the prayer hall.

Baybars ostensibly built the mosque as a place of prayer and as part of the development plan for a new neighborhood on the outskirts of Safed, which was designed to attract numerous inhabitants and thus strengthen the Muslim settlement of the city. Indeed, we know that he encouraged the civil population from Damascus and the villagers of Galilee to move to the city. He also sought to attract religious dignitaries, and absorbed refugees that were in flight from the Mongols. We should also bear in mind that Safed was close to the fertile agricultural heartland and enjoyed a proportionally large part of its produce.¹³ However, above all, it would appear that Baybars built the mosque as a monument of the victory to Islam over the Crusaders, thus commemorating his own glorious conquest of the Citadel.

Examining the “expressive intent” of Mamluk architecture in Cairo, Humphreys analyzes its structure, function, and metaphorical or symbolic quality.¹⁴ This inherent quality—which is ‘beyond’ structure and function—relates to values and ideas that the patron seeks to convey to the viewer, and it is independent of the building itself. It should be noted that Medieval rulers, were fully conscious of the symbolic level of architecture, employing it deliberately and shrewdly, exploiting the building’s various elements, such as the dome and the portal, to convey overt as well as covert messages. Furthermore, in Medieval Islam a ruler who built solely for functional purposes would be suspected of putting his faith in the everlastingness of material things and hence be accused of self-aggrandizement. Even the Qoran admonished against edifices that were intended only to glorify the builder.¹⁵ Hence, investing the building with a symbolic significance

¹³ J. Prawer, “Safed ba-tequfa ha-tsalbanit,” *Yedi’ot ha-Hevra le-Heqer Eretz Israel va-‘Atiqoteha*, vol. XXIII (1959) (Hebrew), 90–92. Prawer quotes Benoit d’Alignan, Bishop of the city of Marseille who initiated construction of the Citadel of Safed. The bishop describes the fertile agricultural areas in the vicinity of Safed.

¹⁴ R.S. Humphreys, “The Expressive Intent of the Mamluk architecture of Cairo: A Preliminary Essay” *SI*, 1972, 74.

¹⁵ Qur’ān 26: 128–129. And see Ahmad Y. Ghabin “The Qur’ān Verses as a Source for Legitimacy or Illegitimacy of the Arts in Islam”, *Der Islam*, vol. LXXV (1998), 204.

gave it justification as the embodiment of a truth upheld by the society that had produced it.

Baybars indeed enlisted both the verbal and the visual media to relay political and religious messages with the aim of institutionalizing the power apparatus of Mamluk rule in general, and to legitimize his own rule as a defender of Islam and protector of the Muslims in particular. After all, we should bear in mind that al-Malik al-Zāhir Baybars al-Bunduqdārī (658–677/1260–1277), and all other Mamluks, were not born Muslims but had been purchased as slaves, converted to Islam, and conscripted into the army, from where some succeeded in rising to power or to senior positions. Their rule was justified primarily by presenting themselves not only as devout Muslims but also as *Jihād* warriors and guardians of Islam. It appears that “The concept of *Jihād* is a plastic one, which can be employed in widely varying ways for varying ends . . . For thirteenth-century Muslim rulers, there was a happy and all too rare marriage of values and interests.”¹⁶

I intend to examine to what extent the portal of the Red Mosque at Safed reflects Baybars’s ambitious aims. This will be done by making a stylistic analysis of the portal with its decorative elements and its inscription; by investigating his ambitious use of stone and stone *muqarnaş* and by considering the portal and the mosque generally in the context of the regional art that evolved in Syria and its environs.

Baybars’s emphasis on the portal of his monumental buildings is evinced both in written sources and in the actual examples familiar to us. Our knowledge of the portal of the Great Mosque in Cairo for example, relies on two biographies of Baybars, which were written in his lifetime and under his patronage, one by Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir¹⁷ (died in 692/1292), the other by Ibn Shaddād ‘Izz al-Dīn¹⁸ (died in 684/1258), and on a third record, written two centuries later by al-Maqrīzī¹⁹ (died in 845/1442). They all dwell on Baybars’s special request, prior to his destruction of Jaffa, in 666/1268,

¹⁶ Humphreys, “Ayyubids, Mamluks and the Latin East in the Thirteenth Century” 4.

¹⁷ Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir, Muḥyī al-Dīn, *al-Rawḍ al-Zāhir fī Sirat al-Malik al-Zāhir*, edited and translated by S.F. Sadeque, *Baybars I of Egypt*, Oxford-Dacca 1956.

¹⁸ Ibn Shaddād, Muḥammad b. ‘Alī, *Tārīkh al-Malik al-Zāhir*, ed. A. Ḥuṭayt, Wiesbaden, 1983, 346.

¹⁹ Al-Maqrīzī, Aḥmad b. ‘Alī, *Kitāb al-Mawā‘iz wa’l-‘tibār bi-dhikr al-khiṭaṭ wa’l-āthār*, 1967–1968, 299–300.

that the portal of his new Great Mosque be identical to the portal of the *Zāhiriyya Madrasa* at Bayn al-Qaṣrayn in Cairo, built by Baybars himself in 660/1262–63, and that the dome match that of Imām al-Shāfī, built by the Ayyubids in 1211. In all other respects, Baybars gave the architect a free hand. From the said texts we thus learn that the elements of the portal and the dome were of central importance to Baybars.

Another example is provided by an inscription in the mosque of Ramla commemorating Baybars's victory over Jaffa. In their survey of inscriptions found in this area (the *R.C.A.*) Combe, Sauvaget, and Wiet claim that the inscription was located in the White Mosque at Ramla.²⁰ Rosen-Ayalon has it that the inscription is located on the minaret to the north of the ruined White Mosque, and suggests that Baybars had restored the dome over the now-ruined prayer hall.²¹ Although literary *amara bi-inshā'* means that he ordered the establishment of the dome, according to S. Blair restoration texts generally used the same form as foundation texts.²² According to another source, the inscription came from the Great or 'al-'Umarī' Mosque, a former Crusader church situated in the market of Ramla²³ (incidentally, I have found no trace of such an inscription at either site).

The inscription opens with verse 18 of Sura 9—one of the most common Qur'anic inscriptions, being one of three references in the Qur'an ran to the mosques of God (*masājid Allāh*), as distinct from any earthly *masjid* or place of prayer. It continues:

*Bi-ism Allāh al-Rahmān al-rahīm wālamamā arāda Allāhu jalāluhu infādh hukim-
ihi limā sabaqa fī 'ilmīhi adhina li-'abdīhi al-faqīr al-mutawakkil 'alayhi wa-
tā'ib fī umūrihi 'alayhi al-mujāhid fī sabīlihi al-nāṣir li-dīn nabīyīhi wa-ḥabībīhi
wa-khalīlihi al-sultān, al-ajall al-kabīr al-mujāhid al-murābiṭ al-muthāghīr al-
ghāz (ī) rukn al-dunyā wa'l-dīn sultān al-Islām wa'l-muslimīn Baybars bin
'Abdallāh qasīm amīr al-mu'minīn amta'a Allāh bi-baqā'ihī fa-kharaja bi-jayshīhi
al-manṣūr fī al-'āshir min[shah]r Rajab al-fard min al-diyār al-Miṣriyya 'āqī-
dan niyyat al-jihād ghāziyan ahl al-shirk wa'l-'inād fanazala bi-thaghr Yāfā*

²⁰ Et. Combe, J. Sauvaget et G. Wiet, *Repertoire chronologique d'epigraphie Arab*, Le Caire, 1943, 123–24.

²¹ M. Rosen-Ayalon, "Between Cairo and Damascus: Rural Life and Urban Economics in the Holy Land during the Ayyubid, Mamluk and Ottoman Periods" in: ed. T.E. Levy, *The Archaeology of the Society in the Holy Land*, London, 1995, 516.

²² S. Blair, 32.

²³ J. Drory, "Pamey ha-tqufa ha-mamlukit," in Amnon Cohen (ed.), *Ha-historiya shel Eretz Israel*, Jerusalem, 1981 (Hebrew), 20.

bukrat al-nahār wa-fataḥahā bi-idhni Allāhi fī thālīth sā'a minhu thumma amara bi-inshā' hādhihi al-qubba fawq al-manara al-mubāraka wa-hādihā al-bāb 'alā hādihā al-jāmi' al-mubārak 'alā yad al-faqīr al . . . [sanat sitta wa-sittīn] wa-sittim'a ghafara Allāh lahu wa-li-wālidayhi wa-li-jami' al-muslimīn.

In the name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate.

None should visit the mosque of Allāh except those who believe in Allāh and the last day, attend their prayers and pay the alms tax and fear none but Allāh. These shall be rightly guided.

When Allāh may his greatness be exalted, wanted to carry out his decree because of his foresight, he allowed his humble servant, trustful in Him, labouring on [carrying out] His orders, wager of His holy war, supporter of the religion of His prophet, beloved and true friend, the sultan, the venerated, the great, the wager of Holy War, the frontier warrior, the raider in the name of Islam, the pillar of the world and faith, Sultan of Islam and Muslims, Baybars b. 'Abd Allāh, co-ruler with the Amir of Believers, may Allāh [bring] enjoyment by his longevity. He departed with his victorious army from the land of Egypt on the 10th of Rajab resolved to wage Holy War, raiding the polytheists and infidels. He camped early that morning in the port-city of Jaffa and conquered it with Allāh's will, in the third hour of the day. Then he ordered the establishment of this dome above the blessed minaret and this gate of this blessed Friday-mosque by the humble al . . . [in the year] of six hundred [and sixty-six] may God forgive him his parents and all the Muslims.

Whereas the two aforementioned examples demonstrate how the construction of a portal was intended to symbolize Baybars's triumphs over the Crusaders, the two that follow show how the transfer of an extant portal likewise connoted his victory by appropriating enemy property as part of the spoils of war. This was decidedly the very purpose of Baybars's transfer of Bāb al-'Īd from the Fatimid palace in Cairo, as recorded by Mujīr al-Dīn:²⁴

Wa-lahu bi'l-Quds ḥasanāt minhā: innahu i'tanā bi-'imārat al-masjīd wa-jad-dada fuṣūṣ al-ṣakhra al-sharīfa allatī 'alā al-rukhām min al-ẓāhir wa-'ammara al-khān al-kā'in bi-ẓāhir al-Quds al-Sharīf min jihat al-gharb ilā al-shamāl al-ma'rūf bi-Khān al-Ẓāhir wa-kāna binā'uhu fī sanat ithnatayn wa-sittīn wa-sittim'a.

²⁴ Mujīr al-Dīn, Abū al-Yaman al-Qāḍī al-Ḥanbalī, *Al-Uns al-jalīl bi-ta'rīkh al-Quds wa'l-Khalīl*, Miṣr, 1973, vol. II, 87. See also: al-Maqrīzī, Aḥmed b. 'Alī, *Kūṭāb al-Sulūk li-ma'rīfat Duwal al-Mulūk*, eds. M.M. Ziyāda and S. 'Ashour, Cairo, 1936, vol. I, 491.

wa-naqala ilayhi bāb qaṣr al-khulafā' al-Fāṭimiyyīn wa-waqafa 'alayhi niṣf qaryat Liftā wa-ghayrihā min al-qurā bi-ā'māl Dimashq wa-jā'ala bi'l-khān fūrnan wa-tāhūnan wa-jā'ala li'l-masjūd alladhī fihi imām wa-sharaṭa fihi ashyā' min fī'l al-khayr min tafriqat al-khubz 'alā bābihi wa-iṣlāh ḥāl al-nāzilīn bihi wa-aklihim wa-ghayr dhālika.

He did in Jerusalem charity acts among which are the following. He . . . took care to establish the *khān* [caravansary] outside noble Jerusalem, to the north-west, known as al-Zāhir's *khān*. Its establishment was in the year six hundred and sixty two. He transferred the portal of the Fatimid Caliph's palace. He endowed half of the village of Liftā and other villages in the provinces of Damascus as a *waqf* [for its maintenance]. He set up a bakery and a mill in the *khān*. He nominated an *imām* in the mosque which is inside [the *khān*] and stipulated that acts of charity be carried out there such as distributing bread at its gate and improving the conditions of its guests and their food and the like.

Finally, we are told that when Baybars recaptured Aleppo from the Mongols, he removed the iron plates and nails from the portal of Qinnaṣrīn at Aleppo and took them to Damascus and Cairo for some purpose. If this transfer from Aleppo may seem to be primarily utilitarian, the aforementioned Cairo transfer appears to be at least partly symbolic.²⁵

In these chronicles, I believe, the portal figures as a metonym for a comprehensive idea. Indeed, generally the medieval chroniclers do not investigate art or architecture according to aesthetic criteria. Any ruler would be extolled for his building activity for contributing to the prosperity and civilized existence of his subject;²⁶ for architecture that rivaled that of other nations in order to glorify Islam: "*wa-inshā'i maḥāsīn yubāhūna al-umam bi-bahā'ihā*";²⁷ or for his self-reflection as a great builder.²⁸ This is of course not contradicted by the fact

²⁵ L.A.A. Sherif, *Layers of Meaning: An Interpretive Analysis of Three Early Mamluk Buildings*, Ph.D. Diss., 1988.

²⁶ D. Behrens-Abouseif, *Beauty in Arabic Culture*, Princeton 1999, 169.

²⁷ These words were written by the judge Khālid b. 'Isā al-Balawī who spent the years 1336–1240 on pilgrimage to Jerusalem. The record is contained in B.M. Or. 9252 and Paris (B.N.) 2286. See: A.S. Triton, "Three Inscriptions from Jerusalem" *BSOAS*, vol. XX (1957), 539.

²⁸ See, for example, Muḥammad b. 'Abdus al-Jahshiyārī, *Kitāb al-Wuzarā' wa'l-kuttāb*, Cairo, 1938, 48, where al-Jahshiyārī (d. 942) describes the reasons for the foundation of al-Ramla by Sulaymān. See also: N. Luz, "The Construction of an Islamic City in Palestine. The Case of Umayyad al-Ramla", *JRAS*, vol. VIII/i, 47.

that Mamluk rulers also built religious edifices and charitable institutions under the auspices of the *waqf* in order to secure their descendants' income and circumvent the *iqṭā'* system. Thus, when the portal element is mentioned by the chronicles as a separate and emphasized item in Baybars's building activity—sometimes in conjunction with the dome and/or minarets—it is afforded a special role among the other elements of the building, signifying, in our case, the victory of Islam, and of Baybars himself, over their enemies. It should be borne in mind that portals and gateways had constituted a declaration of the patron's power and victory already in the Eastern and Western Roman and Christian Empires, and from the early Islam period on. We already find clear examples of this in the monumental entrance gates to the Umayyad palaces as well as to the prayer hall of the Great Mosque of Damascus, in the city gates of Baghdad, Fatimid portals, etc.

The importance assigned by Baybars to the portal element is likewise evinced by the *mashhad* of Abū Hurayra at Yavne, also known as the tomb of Raban Gamliel—where the cushion *voussoir* frieze adorns the arches of the portal in the same way as on the main portal of Baybars' Great Mosque in Cairo.²⁹ This element was deliberately borrowed by Baybars from Crusader buildings such as the Holy Sepulcher on the one hand, and the Fātimid gate Bāb al-Futūḥ on the other as well as from other monuments. Both buildings—in Safed and in Yavne—also feature inscriptions commemorating Baybars's victory over his enemies.

If the portal is indeed a bearer of Baybars's political and religious message, its inscription declares this publicly. Even if the foundation inscription is often a “banal formulation,”³⁰ it perpetuates both the metaphorical quality of the mosque portal and the name of the ruler inscribed on it, and automatically establishes a link between the two. Anyone passing by or through the portal would have to read it, and the name of Baybars would be impressed on his mind.³¹ In a culture

²⁹ H. Taragan, “Politics and Aesthetics: Sultan Baybars and the Abū Hurayra/Rabbi Gamliel Building in Yavne”, in (ed.) A. Ovadiah, *Milestones in the Art and Culture of Egypt*, Tel-Aviv, 2000, 117–45.

³⁰ J. Bloom, “The Mosque of Baybars al-bunduqdari in Cairo”, *Annales Islamologiques*, vol. XVIII (1982), 51. See also S. Blair, 29–42.

³¹ L. Siedel, “Images of the Crusades in Western Art: Models as Metaphors” in V.P. Goss and C.V. Bornstein (eds.), *The Meeting of Two Worlds*, Kalamazoo, 1986, 79.

that could not present a visual image of the ruler or patron who had endowed the building, unlike the custom in Christian edifices and portals, the written word—that is, in our case, the name of the ruler—became a surrogate means of magnifying his deeds. The Mamluks in Syria kept up this practice, which originated in the Ayyubid period with Nūr al-Dīn (541–569/1146–1174). The later, in the wake of the battles against the Crusaders at Edessa, Antioch, and Tripoli, had his epithets as a warlord of the *jihād* inscribed in Arabic on the portals of the buildings that he erected, emphasizing his dedication to the holy war against the infidels as well as his affirmation of Sunni orthodoxy.³²

The foundation inscription appearing on the portal of a mosque or other edifice thus clearly proclaims the agenda of the ruler. Sheila Blair even singles out this type of inscription as an insignia of ruling power, similar to the mandatory *khuṭba* in the Great Mosque.³³

It is no coincidence that Baybars built a hypostyle mosque of the arcades open courtyard type in Safed, repeating the plan of his Great Mosque in Cairo. We should keep in mind that mosques of this type were predominant in the Umayyad period, with the Great Mosque of Damascus constituting a likely prototype. The open courtyard mosque soon turned into a symbol and, throughout the Middle Ages, such mosques would be erected wherever Islam made a new conquest and its victorious presence was to be declared.³⁴ The legitimacy of rule is founded, *inter alia*, on the continuity of a glorious past. Thus, just as the Umayyads had fought against Byzantine Christianity, the Mamluks fought against the Crusaders; this historical memory is clearly manifested in the Red Mosque.

Baybars's mosque at Safed is built and decorated entirely in stone. The use of stone had been prevalent in Syria and Palestine already in the Roman-Byzantine period. However, the Ayyubids and Mamluks

³² Y. Tabbaa, "Monuments with a Message: Propagation of Jihād under Nur al-Din" *ibid.*, 223–24. See also other opinion by: C. Hillenbrand, "Jihād Propaganda in Syria from the Time of the First Crusade until the Death of Zengi: The Evidence of Monumental Inscriptions" in K. Athamina and R. Heacock (eds.), *The Frankish Wars and Their Influence on Palestine*, Birzeit, 1994, 60–70.

³³ Blair, 68.

³⁴ O. Grabar, "The Iconography of Islamic Architecture" in P.P. Soucek (ed.), *Content and Context of Visual Arts in the Islamic World*, Pennsylvania and London, 1988, 55. See also: B. O'Kane, "Monumentality in Mamluk and Mongol Art and Architecture", *Art History*, XIX/iv (1996), 514.

most probably chose stone because masonry, being both strong and workable, can be used to great effect to make even the functional elements of a building look grand and imposing. Hence, cut and dressed stone would be almost exclusively employed both inside and outside mosques for walls, piers, columns, and vaults, and their decorative motifs. Furthermore, the stone *muqarnas* ornamentation of portals and vaults called for the best limestone and for the most highly-skilled masons and craftsmen, since the stone had to be cut with great precision in order to coordinate elements of structure, color and geometry. More than a technical feat, then, the *muqarnas* was an exquisite work of art, which only rulers could afford to commission as a symbol of their status and patronage.³⁵ Hence, it is not surprising that this type of portal was also adopted for palatial architecture.

Most of the preserved Mamluk buildings in the area have a portal niche of the type seen at Safed (although each portal is unique and there are hardly two examples with the same structure or decoration), and their decorative elements—quite frequently only the *muqarnas*—are concentrated in, if not restricted to the portal section. The portal through which the monument is entered thus becomes one of the most ambitious elements of the building.

In the Red Mosque at Safed, as in other Mamluk mosques in Syrian cities, the facade is plain and devoid of decoration, apart from the monumental portal, so prominent in its height and warm reddish limestone shade. It was the latter that gave the mosque its name, first mentioned by al-‘Uthmānī in 1372 who described the mosque as a resplendent source of grace.³⁶

Apparently this reddish stone was brought from elsewhere, since the stone quarry near the entrance to the city provided a white stone, as it does to this day.

The portal, with its stone *muqarnas* vault, is 7.20 meters high, rising some 20 cm above the wall, 1.50 meters deep and 3 meters wide. It is thus twice as wide as deep. According to Terry Allan’s “Muqarnas Questionnaire”³⁷ these became the standard proportions

³⁵ Y. Tabbaa, “Construction of Power”, 81–83.

³⁶ Al-‘Uthmānī, *Tārīkh Safad*, 1372–1376, in B. Lewis, “An Arabic Account of the Province of Safed-I”, *BOAS*, vol. XV/iii (1953), 487.

³⁷ T. Allen, *Ayyubid Architecture*, California, 1999, Appendix A: “Muqarnas Questionnaire”.

for any vaulted portal in Damascus built after Nūr al-Dīn. There are still remnants of the stone benches on either side. The doorway is topped by a plain monolithic lintel, that rests on two corbels (fig. 8). Although this is a feature rarely found in Ayyubid Syria, it can be seen in Damascus in the Madrasa Ṣāliḥiyya al-Murshidiyya (654/1253)³⁸ and in the early Mamluk period, in the portal built by Ashraf Khalīl in 692/1292 at Yavne.³⁹

In the portal of the Red Mosque at Safed, between the monolithic lintel and the *muqarnaṣ* vault above, a framed slab panel with five lines of inscription appears in the center (fig. 3). This is a typical Damascus *tabula ansata* (inscription cartouche).⁴⁰ The *muqarnaṣ* vault springs from corner brackets (fig. 8) and can be compared for example, to the corner brackets in the al-Ṣāliḥiyya al-Ṣāḥiba madrasa in Damascus (630–643/1233–1245) (fig. 9).⁴¹

The vault in our portal rises up steeply through four tiers of *muqarnaṣ* terminating in a big scalloped shell. The back corners of the vault form an “arch”. These back corners are developed in the second tier into two recessed squinch-like domelets whose inner apexes contain little globular pendants carved with a floral pattern (fig. 10). Each tier alternates cells of the ‘Syrian’ type (somewhat triangular in profile), with dominating branched massive brackets. In the first tier the central cells are divided into two. In the second tier they are divided into three-petaled “conch-like” flowers (fig. 11). Three-petaled flowers like those we find within the cells are not common, perhaps because of the difficulty in carving the stone. However, we can find similar examples from the late Ayyubid period on the portals of al-Farafra khānaqāh (635–8/1237)⁴² and Kamāliyya Madrasa (639–649/1241–1251)⁴³ in Aleppo, as well as on the entrance portal to the mausoleum of Baybars (676–680/1277–1281) which is the only part that remains of the original Madrasa al-Zāhiriyya in Damascus (fig. 12).⁴⁴

³⁸ E. Herzfeld, “Damascus: Studies in Architecture-III”, *Ars Islamica*, vol. XI/xii (1946), 65, Fig. 87.

³⁹ Targan, Fig. 13.

⁴⁰ Allen, *Ayyubid Architecture*, 20. See also: T. Allen, “Five Essays”, 102.

⁴¹ Herzfeld, “Damascus III”, 12, Fig. 11.

⁴² E. Herzfeld, *Materiaux pour un Corpus Inscriptions et Monuments d’Alep*, Le Caire, 1954, tome II, Pl. CXXXIV/a.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, CXXXVI/a.

⁴⁴ K. Wulzinger and C. Watzinger *Damaskus II: die Islamische Stadt*, Berlin and

The third tier is lower and the cells vary in height and depth. The fourth tier is flat, with fluted cells functioning as a “base” to the tall gored half conch above. Because of the crude cement filling applied in the modern period to repair the cracks, it is difficult to detect the boundaries between the tiers.

The portal of the Red Mosque is an impressive artistic feat indeed. Its complexity is expressed not only in the virtuosity of the stonework, but also in the relationship between the units: the geometry, the light and shade effects, the rhythm of the protrusions, the proportions of the three-dimensional forms, and the numbers of tiers. Baybars’s portal thus masterfully demonstrates what T. Allen observed, referring to Ayyubid architecture: “This is what geometry means. . . the display of skill and the harnessing of the abstract in the service of a patron or institution.”⁴⁵

It is worth mentioning here that notwithstanding the repeated restorations and repairs that it has undergone over the centuries, the Red Mosque at Safed manifests elements of a well-defined regional style in type, scale and ornamentation that characterized the artistic centers of both Damascus and Aleppo and, from 1293 on, also of Tripoli, which was rebuilt by Qalāwūn after the Crusaders were repelled.

The stylistic characteristics that we find in the Red Mosque from the second phase, i.e., the first half of the fourteenth century, link it to the above-mentioned local tradition⁴⁶ The architecture stresses the interior and as in Aleppo the mosque in Safed also tended to vault all interior bays with cross vaults after Crusader models, which remained the basic type of vaulting system in Syria throughout the Mamluk period (fig. 5). The arcades are supported by piers, and the vaults in the hall are supported by columns with *muqarnas* capitals, dividing the prayer hall into bays, with the line of cross vaults meeting in a central concave rosette, a feature commonly seen in buildings in Tripoli. Another element deriving from Tripoli is the dome

Leipzig, 1924, Tafel 5/a. I would like to thank Mr. Hans-Ulrich Kuhn, Tubingen, friend and colleague, for the photograph.

⁴⁵ Allen, *Ayyubid Architecture*, 47–48.

⁴⁶ M. Meinecke, “‘Mamluk’ Architecture, Regional Architectural Traditions: Evolution and Interrelations” in: *Damaszener Mitteilungen*, vol. II (1985), 164–75. See also: H. Salam-Liebich, *The Architecture of the Mamluk City of Tripoli*, Harvard, 1983, 207–25.

on pendentives in the ante-*mihrāb*. These and other elements which are typical of the second phase will be discussed in a separate article.

We should now address the question of why Baybars chose to adorn the portal of the Red Mosque with *muqarnas*. After all, it would indeed have been possible to ornament it differently.⁴⁷ For example, Baybars could have installed gates like those at Yavne, intended to remind the local population of the Great Mosque—his “coronation” mosque—in Cairo. This question brings us back to an additional aspect of the discussed metaphorical quality, namely, the believer-beholder, to whom the patron and ruler sought to impart his message: How, could the viewer be made to grasp the ruler’s message, as formulated in architectural terms?

We know that the manner in which a building conveys a message or connects with a community relies on special, fixed codes crystallized in the textual and visual collective memory which that community has itself established.⁴⁸ Innovations are confusing whereas stability is reassuring. A portal that looked familiar to the local population thus signified continuity, and so facilitated identification with the ruler who built it. Hence, it was mandatory to effect a visual experience common to the ruler or architect and the viewer.

In other words, by stressing the link with the local population while concomitantly dominating it with the sheer impact of overpowering architecture, the sultan’s right to rule was underlined. The portal of the Red Mosque indeed constituted a dominant element in the architectural vernacular evolved by Baybars. Whereas the stone *muqarnas* portal featured in Cairo only from 1298,⁴⁹ and in Jerusalem

⁴⁷ O. Grabar, “The Iconography of Islamic Architecture”, 57–59. For the technical aspects of the *muqarnas* (on portal, dome or squinch) see: J. Rosintal, *Pendentifs, trompes et stalactites dans l’architecture Orientale*, Paris, 1928. See also: D. Jones and G. Michele, “Squinches and Pendentives, Problems and Definitions”, *Art and Archeology Papers (AARP)*, vol. I (1972), 9–25. For ‘Geometry’, see: I.I. Notkin “Decoding Sixteenth-Century Muqarnas Drawings”, *Muqarnas*, vol. XII (1995), 148ff. See also: Mohammad al-Asad, “The Muqarnas: A Geometric Analysis” in G. Necipoglu, *The Topkapi Scroll-Geometry and Ornament in Islamic Architecture*, Santa Monica, 1995, 349–59. For meanings, or visual metaphors (cosmological, theological and anthropological etc.), see, for example, Y. Tabbaa “The Muqarnas Dome: Its Origin and Meaning”, *Muqarnas*, vol. III (1985), 61–74; and O. Grabar, *The Alhambra*, London, 1978.

⁴⁸ Serageldin, “Introduction: Regionalism” in M. Frishman and H.-U. Khan (eds.), *The Mosque*, 72–76. T. Allen, *Five Essays*, 91–110.

⁴⁹ Only in the Zāwiya of Zayn al-Dīn Yūsuf, see: *ibid.*, 107. See also Behrens-Abouseif, *Islamic Architecture in Cairo*, 112.

from 1295,⁵⁰ it had appeared in Aleppo as early as 589/1193 in the *madrasa* of Sadbaht, and in Damascus in 1213,⁵¹ subsequently becoming prevalent throughout Syria. In other words unlike Cairo, which adapted earlier architectural elements—e.g. Fātimid at least in the early Mamluk period—to express and enhance the intent of the imperial patrons, Syria's prevailing architectural style perpetuated the patterns set by local tradition.

This conclusion goes counter to the view of Creswell, who, on the basis of Cassas and Roberts's drawings from the early 19th century, claimed that the portal of the al-Zāhiriyya Madrasa built by Baybars at Bayn al-Qaşrayn in 660/1260, was the first *muqarnas* portal in Cairo, and that it was destroyed or disappeared soon after being visually represented by Roberts.⁵² Creswell was aware of, but did not explain, the time lapse between the alleged appearance of the *muqarnas* portal of the *madrasa* in 1260 and its actual appearance in Cairo in the early 14th century.⁵³ However, as we have seen above, according to the chronicles, Baybars wanted the portal of his Great Mosque, built in the years 1266–69, to reproduce the portal of his *madrasa*—which is not a *muqarnas* portal, but features arches elaborately decorated with *cushion voussoir* and zigzag patterns, which were chosen because of their association with the architecture of their enemies

⁵⁰ Burgoyne, *Mamluk Jerusalem*, 92: “the earliest and one of the most remarkable is the Dawādāriyya (695/1295) which is of a particular type developed earlier in Damascus . . . In a series of fine eighth/fourteenth-century portals (at the Sa’diyya, Bāb al-Qaṭṭānīn, Kilāniyya, Manjakiyya, Ṭashtamuriyya and Palace of Sitt Tunshuq) the recesses are covered by semidomes carried on three, four or five tiers of *muqarnas* corbelling”. See also, K.A.C. Creswell, *The Muslim Architecture of Egypt (MAE)*, Oxford, 1952–1960, vol. II, 146–47.

⁵¹ T. Allen, *Five Essays*, 101.

⁵² Creswell, *MAE*, 146–7. See also: J. Bloom and T. Allen, who concur with Creswell in his state of mind J. Bloom, “The Mosque of Baybars”, 64. T. Allen, *Five Essays*, 105–108. Allen claims that Syrian artists were imported to Cairo and built this portal.

⁵³ Creswell, Bloom and Allen thought that Roberts and Cassas painted the portal exactly as they had seen it in Cairo. I believe that European painters who came to the ‘Orient’ in the 19th century saw visions or sites exactly in the way they were expected to: “Specific objects to be seen in specific ways by specific audiences”. See: D. Gregory, “Scripting Egypt-Orientalism and the Culture of Travel” in J. Dancan and D. Gregory (eds.), *Writes of Passage—Reading Travel Writing*, London, 1999, 114–50. I believe that they identified ‘*muqarnas*’ with terms like ‘typical Islamic Cairo’, ‘exotic Egypt’ etc. and not with the desire to paint the ‘truth’ or to be ‘realistic’. We should therefore be very cautious in using these paintings as a scientific document. See my forthcoming article on Roberts and “his” Mamluk Cairo paintings.

the Crusaders and/or the Fātimid Ismā‘īlis. Moreover, had Baybars indeed built a *muqarnas* portal in his *madrassa*, it is possible that other sultans would have been likely to imitate him and this did not occur. In the final analysis, therefore, Baybars would have appealed to a local model for his *Zāhiriyya Madrasa*, familiar to the population of Cairo, rather than a *muqarnas* portal.

According to al-Nuwayrī and in the (now lost) wall inscription of the Citadel, Baybars pledged to replace the Crusader bell tower with the *adhān* (the call for prayer by *mu’adhdhin*), and the Gospel with the Qoran.⁵⁴ Eight years after capturing the citadel Baybars announced the fulfillment of this oath by founding a Muslim city in Safed, in the center of which he constructed the Red Mosque, whose unique and prestigious portal proclaims not just Baybars’ power and might as a patron, but also his wielding of an ideology of religious guardianship.

The *muqarnas* in this portal, as we have seen is not a ‘functional’ element. Its semiotic or symbolic ingredients pose a complex interpretative challenge. Being a kind of ornament,⁵⁵ the *muqarnas* “refuses” to receive any iconographic interpretation unless there is an accurate inscription that implies a specific meaning.⁵⁶ However, we may conclude that in a region in which the Christian memory—in the form of Byzantine churches and Crusaders fortresses—was so dominant, the *muqarnas* portal constitutes a kind of bearer and signifier not only of Muslim presence but also of the victory of its patron Baybars over the infidels.

Today no Muslims live in Safed as most of its Arab inhabitants fled the city during the war in 1948. The Red Mosque currently serves as a wedding and banquet hall. While this metamorphosis may seem to flaunt the cynical, postmodern *Zeitgeist*, it also highlights, if ironically, the fact that throughout history, architectural constructions have conveyed the ideological message of the establishment.

⁵⁴ Al-Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-arab*, vol. XXX, 137–8.

⁵⁵ Grabar, *The Iconography*.

⁵⁶ Grabar, *The Alhambra*.

CHAPTER TWO

THE MONGOL OCCUPATION OF DAMASCUS IN 1300: A STUDY OF MAMLUK LOYALTIES*

Reuven Amitai

The direct inspiration for this paper is an article by Jürgen Paul which recently appeared in a collection of studies dealing with Iran during the period of Mongol rule. In this article, entitled “The Mongol invasion as a ‘revealer’ of Iranian society,” Dr. Paul suggests that the examination of times of crisis can be a useful opportunity to analyse aspects of a society.¹ When things are running normally or at least quietly, the sources are often apt to pass over interesting phenomena, be they social, political or otherwise: why write about something that is working or obvious? It is during a crisis that various hitherto unnoticed matters become noteworthy, and thus recorded by contemporaries for posterity.

In the present case, the crisis in question is that of the Mongol occupation of Damascus following their victory over the Mamluks at the battle of Wādī al-Khaznadār near Homs on 22 December 1299. The Mongols, led by the Īlkhān Ghāzān, completely trounced the Mamluks under the titular command of the young sultan al-Malik al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn.² Not only were the Mamluks, under the real command of the viceroy (*nāʿib al-saltāna*) Salār, ultimately unsuccessful on the battlefield, they behaved less than commendably in the aftermath of their defeat. In the words of the contemporary historian, the Ayyūbid scion Abū al-Fidāʾ:

* A version of this paper was also read at a forum sponsored by the Middle East Center at the University of Pennsylvania in October 2000. I am grateful to the participants for their comments.

¹ J. Paul, “L’invasion mongole comme ‘révéléateur’ de la société iranienne,” in D. Aigle (ed.), *L’Iran face à la domination mongole* (Teheran, 1997), 37–53, esp. 37–38.

² This battle is discussed in detail in R. Amitai, “Whither the Ilkhanid Army?: Ghāzān’s First Campaign into Syria (1299–1300),” in N. DiCosmo (ed.), *Inner Asian Warfare* (Leiden, 2002, 221–264; a review of previous research on the battle is found there in note 7. See also the short discussions in R. Irwin, *The Middle East in the Middle Ages: The Early Mamluk Sultanate 1250–1382* (London, 1986), 100; R. Amitai, s.v. “Wādī al-Khaznadār,” *EI*², vol. XI, 18.

The Muslim forces fled pell-mell in utter rout to Egypt the divinely protected. The Mongols pursued them. They occupied Damascus, and pressed after the fugitives to Gaza, Jerusalem and the territory of al-Karak, robbing and plundering much from the fugitives.³

Before proceeding to the actual Mongol occupation of Damascus,⁴ it is worth noting the presence in the Mongol army of a group of Mamluk renegades, led by the former governor of Damascus, Sayf al-Dīn Qipchaq al-Manṣūrī. Since Qipchaq and company are one of the test-cases of Mamluk loyalty examined in this paper, it is important to review, even briefly, the circumstances in which they abandoned the Sultanate for the Īlkhānate: In the fall of 1298, during the reign of Sultan al-Manṣūr Lāchīn (1296–9),⁵ word had been received that the Mongols were planning an offensive to Syria. Orders had been sent to Damascus dispatching the governor, Qipchaq, to the north along with the local army. There is some disagreement among the sources as to the exact sequence of events, but there is agreement about the end result: a group of senior Mamluk amirs, accompanied by at least some of their personal mamluks and under the leadership of Qipchaq, fled to the Īlkhānate in order to escape their arrest ordered by the then viceroy Mengü-Temür al-Ḥusāmī. Originally Qipchaq himself appears to have had nothing to fear personally from this over-weening personality, but his attempts to protect other amirs—most notably Bektemür al-Siḥlādār and Elbegi—put him in the viceroy's bad graces. Realizing that his own arrest and possible execution were imminent, Qipchaq along with the others fled to the north-east, soon crossing the Euphrates into Mongol territory. In the meantime, a number of amirs in Cairo formed a con-

³ Abū al-Fidā', 'Imād al-Dīn Ismā'īl, *al-Mukhtaṣar fī ta'rīkh al-baṣhar* (Istanbul, 1286/1869–70), vol. IV, 43; the translation is from P.M. Holt, *Memoirs of a Syrian Prince: Abū al-Fidā', Sultan of Ḥamāh (672–732/1273–1331)* (Wiesbaden, 1983), 35. For the Mongol raids to the south, see R. Amitai, "Mongol Raids into Palestine (A.D. 1260 and 1300)," *JRAS*, 1987, 243–47.

⁴ A short account of this occupation is offered by Muria Tora, "The Salihyya Quarter in the Suburbs of Damascus: Its Formation, Structure and Transformation in the Ayyubid and Mamluk Periods," *Bulletin d'études orientales*, vol. XLVII (1995), 161–63. Muria, however, gives a misleading rendition of Qipchaq's joining the Mongols, implying that it was just before Ghāzān's occupation of Damascus; he does not mention Qipchaq's desertion to the Mongols months before their 1299 offensive to Syria.

⁵ For his reign, see P.M. Holt, "The Sultanate of al-Manṣūr Lāchīn (696–8/1296–9)," *BSOAS*, vol. III/VI (1973), 521–32.

spiracy against Sultan Lāchīn, and murdered him and his *nā'ib*, setting up a temporary junta until matters could be sorted out. Given the cruelty of Mengü-Temür, the conspirators appear to have understood the fears and actions of Qipchaq and friends, but not fully to have comprehended the extent that they were willing to go. When news of the coup reached Qipchaq, he thought it was a trick to get him to return, and then be arrested. When the news was finally confirmed, it was already too late for him to turn back, since he was already deep in Mongol territory; to his great sorrow, he realized that his desertion had been unnecessary.⁶ The Īlkhānid *wazīr* and historian, Rashīd al-Dīn, also writes that Qipchaq, upon receiving news of Lāchīn's deposition, regretted his decision to desert, but that it was too late to go back.⁷

Qipchaq and his friends were well received by the local Mongol commander and then sent on to Īlkhān.⁸ Upon reaching the *ordo* (the mobile camp of the ruler), Ghāzān himself went out to meet them, showing the importance which he attributed to the desertion of such senior personalities. The Mamluk amirs and their entourages (there were ten amirs altogether and 500 soldiers) were well received, the senior amirs receiving grants of money in accordance with their ranks. Qipchaq is reported to have received Hamadān as an *iqṭā'*,

⁶ For these events see the anonymous chronicle published in K. Zetterstéen, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Mamlükensultane* (Leiden, 1919), 52; Quṭb al-Dīn Yūnīnī in Li Guo, *Early Mamluk Syrian Historiography: al-Yūnīnī's Dhayl Mir'at al-zamān* (Leiden, 1998), vol. I, 107–13 (translation); vol. II, 48–56; Aḥmad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-arab fī funūn al-adab*, vol. 31, ed. al-Bāz al-Arīnī (Cairo, 1412/1992), 352–56; Aḥmad b. 'Alī Maqrīzī, *Kitāb al-sulūk li-ma'rīfat duwal al-mulūk*, ed. M.M. Ziyāda and S. 'A.-F. 'Ashūr (Cairo, 1934–73), vol. I, 872; Yūsuf Abū al-Mahāsīn ibn Ṭaghūrī Birdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira fī mulūk Miṣr wa'l-Qāhira* (rpt. [n.d.] of Cairo, 1930–56), vol. VIII, 129, writes that Qipchaq, after he returned to the Mamluk fold, requested forgiveness for his actions from the senior amirs, since the knowledge of the Lāchīn's assassination reached him when he was at Ghāzān's camp, and had already told him of the unsettled conditions in Syria (thereby whetting his appetite to invade that country).

⁷ Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmi' al-tawārikh*, in Karl Jahn, *Geschichte Gāzān-Hān's aus dem Ta'rīḥ-i-mubārak-i-gāzānī* (London, 1940), 122; this is translated in W.M. Thackston (tr. and ann.), *Rashiduddin Fazlullah's Jami'u't-tawarikh: Compendium of Chronicles. A History of the Mongols* ("Sources of Oriental Languages and Literature," 45) (Cambridge, MA, 1994), 643.

⁸ On their way they passed by Mārdīn, where the local Artuqid ruler—a Mongol vassal—received them well. This prince feared the Qipchaq would reveal that he had maintained secret contact with the Mamluks, a fear which was evidently not realized; Zetterstéen, 49; Abu Bakr b. 'Abdallāh ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar wa-jāmi' al-ghurar*, vol. 8; *al-Durra al-kanzīyya fī akhbār al-dawla al-turkiyya* (*Die Berichte über die frühen Mamluken*), ed. U. Haarmann (Freiburg-Cairo, 1971), vol. VIII, 375.

although it is not clear if this refers to a Mamluk-type appanage, a local governorship or something else.⁹ The various amirs were granted Mongol spouses, Qipchaq receiving the sister of one of Ghāzān's wives. The sources note that Qipchaq, who was of Mongol origin, found his father and brothers among the Mongol officers.¹⁰ Ibn Ḥajar reports that Qipchaq actually encouraged the Īlkhān to launch his campaign into Syria.¹¹ This possibility cannot be completely rejected, but given Qipchaq's behaviour in the long run (discussed below), it is perhaps more likely that it was the news of the fractured state of politics in the Sultanate that Qipchaq brought which strengthened Ghāzān's growing resolve to invade Syria.¹² A more measured judgement, with less direct blame attributed, is provided by Ibn Abī al-Faḍā'il: "[Qipchaq's desertion] was one of the reasons which propelled Ghāzān to attack Syria . . ."¹³

The question of Qipchaq's origins is of some interest in the present context, as it may tell us something of how Mamluk loyalties, or rather the loyalties of Mamluks, were shaped. The young Qipchaq had been captured at the battle of Abulastayn in 1276 (together with Salār, it might be added),¹⁴ and was subsequently enrolled in the personal mamluk unit of Qalāwūn. This was not a unique occurrence: the future sultan al-ʿĀdil Kitbughā was also a Mongol, captured in 1260 in the first battle of Homs, eventually also becoming a Mamluk of Qalāwūn.¹⁵ Some writers tell that Qalāwūn sensed that Qipchaq,

⁹ Ibn al-Dawādārī, vol. VIII, 375, reports that when Ghāzān gave the *iqṭāʿ* to Qipchaq, the latter refused it, so as to remain in the Īlkhān's presence. On this case, and the larger question of Ghāzān's later granting of *iqṭāʿāt* to his army, see R. Amitai, "Turco-Mongolian Nomads and the *iqṭāʿ* System in the Islamic Middle East (1000–1400 A.D.)," in A. Wink and A. Khazanov (eds.), *Nomads in the Sedentary World* (London: Kegan, Paul, in press).

¹⁰ Ibn al-Dawādārī, vol. VIII, 375–76; Zetterstéén, 49–50; Aḥmad b. ʿAlī Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, *al-Durar al-kāmina fī aʿyān al-miʿa al-thāmina* (Hyderabad, 1348–50/1929–32), vol. III, 214; Maqrīzī, vol. I, 871–2; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, vol. VIII, 97–98.

¹¹ Ibn Ḥajar, vol. III, 214.

¹² See the evidence cited in note 5 above.

¹³ Mufaḍḍal Ibn Abū al-Faḍā'il, *al-Nahj al-saʿīd wa'l-durr al-farīd fīmā baʿda Ibn al-ʿAmīd (Histoire des sultans mamlouks)* ("Patrologia orientalis," vols. XII, XIV, XX), ed. and tr. E. Blochet (Paris, 1919–28), 445 (of continuous pagination); see also Maqrīzī, vol. I, 872. For a more detailed discussion of the causes behind Ghāzān's campaign, see my paper cited in note 2 above.

¹⁴ R. Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks: The Mamluk-Īlkhānid war, 1260–81* (Cambridge, 1995), 174.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 51.

whom he greatly liked, was still not to be completely trusted. Supposedly that Sultan had a hunch that this mamluk, were he to be stationed in Syria, would avail himself of the opportunity to flee to the Mongols and “sow the seeds of great discord (*fitna kabīra*).” This, of course, is what eventually happened.¹⁶ The non-contemporary nature of these sources, and the fulfilled prophecy lend it a post-facto air, but it does give expression to the perception that some mamluks of Mongol origin might have had divided loyalties. How Qipchaq was to resolve this in the end will be discussed below.

Qipchaq and the other amirs accompanied Ghāzān on the campaign into Syria in late 1299, and were present at the battle of Wādī al-Khaznadār, in which he played a certain role. First, it is reported that he convinced Ghāzān not to flee during the battle, when the Mongols initially suffered a setback; later on, he explained this action as a means by which he hoped that the Īlkhān would be taken prisoner.¹⁷ Secondly, in the aftermath of the battle, Qipchaq was instrumental—so he claimed in retrospect—in dissuading the Īlkhān from pursuing the retreating Mamluks, and thus a complete rout and much larger Mamluk casualties were prevented.¹⁸ It is not unlikely that Qipchaq, who eventually returns to the Mamluk fold, was engaged in some urgent damage control: not only was he attempting to minimize the impact of his desertion, he was also hoping to show that in reality he had assisted the Mamluk cause. In this vein, it is noteworthy that the contemporary Armenian writer Het’um, who describes in some detail the campaign (in which an Armenian contingent participated), reports that Qipchaq secretly sent messages to the Mamluks before the battle.¹⁹

¹⁶ Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Raḥman Ibn al-Furāt, *Ta’rīkh* [= *Ta’rīkh al-duwal wa’l-mulūk*], vol. VIII, ed. Q. Zurayk and N. ‘Izz al-Dīn (Beirut, 1939), 94–95, where this mamluk’s name is given as Qunjāq/Qunjaq, which of course is a corruption of Qibjāq/Qibjaq (<Qipchaq). This author writes that this information was attained by Qalāwūn during a scapulamancy ceremony. On this whole matter, see Linda S. Northrup, *From Slave to Sultan: The Career of al-Mansūr Qalāwūn and the Consolidation of Mamluk Rule in Egypt and Syria (678–689 A.H./1279–1290 A.D.)* (Wiesbaden, 1998), 67.

¹⁷ Nuwayrī, vol. XXXI, 385; Maqrīzī, vol. I, 887.

¹⁸ Ibn Ḥajar, vol. III, 214.

¹⁹ Het’um [Hayton/Hethoum], “La Flor des estories de la Terre d’Orient,” in *Recueil des historiens des Croisades: Documents arméniens*, 2 (Paris, 1906), vol. II, 192. Het’um’s evidence does not have to be accepted at face value. Although he provides a fairly detailed account of the battle of Wādī Khaznadār, he apparently arrived at the scene at the end of the fighting, together with the Armenian contingent (see Amitai, “Whither the Ilkhanid Army,” 251). Qipchaq was certainly a

We are now in position to deal with the Mongol occupation of Damascus. My intention, however, is not to provide a detailed rendition of the hundred days or so during which the local population suffered under Mongol depredations and exactions, but rather to examine how three cases—two Mamluk amirs and one civilian notable—behaved “under fire,” i.e. how they weathered this period of disruption and uncertainty, and how this tested their traditional loyalties and identities. As can be ascertained from the previous discussion, one of these military case studies will be Qipchaq al-Manṣūrī; the other will be ‘Alam al-Dīn Sanjar Arjuwāsh al-Manṣūrī, commander of the Damascus citadel, who throughout this period led a spirited resistance against the Mongols, holding out until the end of their occupation. The civilian figure to be examined is no less than Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyya, a well-known personality in the religious and social life of Damascus (and beyond) both before and after this episode.


While the civilian population of Damascus is not my main concern here, it is useful and not without interest to present briefly the reaction of the civilian leadership to the Mamluk defeat, the imminent arrival of the Mongols and the subsequent occupation. Our main source for the Mongol occupation in general, and the experiences of the civilian population in particular, is an account found in several contemporary Damascene works, which according to the researches of Li Guo are all evidently based on the original report given by al-Birzālī in his *Muqafā*.²⁰ Since the latter is not readily available,²¹ I will base the following discussion on the version given by al-Yūnīnī, now presented in a well-edited edition (accompanied by a good translation) prepared by Li Guo.²²

convenient scapegoat for the lack of a decisive victory. On the general bias of Het’um’s writing, see P.-Jackson, “The Crisis in the Holy Land in 1260,” *English Historical Review*, vol. XCV (1980), 486–6.

²⁰ Li Guo, *Early Mamluk Syrian Historiography*, vol. LV, n. 78; 75–77.

²¹ Birzālī, *al-Muqafā li-ta’rīkh al-shaykh Shihāb al-Dīn Abī Shāma*, MS. Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III 2951/1–2. For the poor state of this manuscript, see the comments in Little, *Mamlūk Historiography*, 46–7; Northrup, *From Slave to Sultan*, 41.

²² For the relevant events in 699/1299–1300, see: Yūnīnī, in Li Guo, *Early Mamluk Syrian Historiography*, vol. I, 132–65 (trans.); vol. II, 97–126. See also J. Somogyi, “Adh-dhahabī Record of the Destruction of Damascus by the Mongols in 699–700/1299–1301,” in S. Löwinger and J. Somogyi (eds.), *Ignace Goldziher Memorial Volume*, vol. 2 (Budapest, 1948), 353–86, a not always accurate translation of Dhahabī, *Ta’rīkh al-Islām*, MS. British Library, Or. 1540, fols. 123a–131a. The corresponding section



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from Jazari's *Ḥawādīth al-zamān* has been lost. Henceforth, I will mainly cite the Arabic of Yūnīnī's account, adding from other sources which contain unique evidence. The sources for the events of this year have been thoroughly and conveniently analyzed by D.P. Little, *An Introduction to Mamlūk Historiography* (Wiesbaden, 1970), chapter 1, *passim*; this is supplemented by the discussion in Li Guo's introductory chapters, 54–80.

As news, often confused, arrived in Damascus about the Mamluk defeat, there was terrible confusion and disorder in the city, including the breakout of several prisoners from jail. On one hand, there were reports that Ghāzān was a good Muslim, and that the majority of his troops had converted, and therefore, there was no reason to worry. On the other hand, the Shāfiʿī and Mālikī judges, the *muḥtasib*, the prefects of the city and the countryside (military positions), and many civilians—both notables and lesser folk, fled from the city. Damascus, however, was not bereft of leaders: prominent citizens, including the army judge (*qāḍī al-ʿasākīr*), the Shāfiʿī Najm al-Dīn Ibn Ṣaṣrā,²³ and the Ḥanbalī Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyya, soon gathered to discuss the dispatch of a delegation to Ghāzān to ask for an *amān*, a formal guarantee of safety.²⁴

After this delegation had set off,²⁵ Sanjar Arjuwāsh, commander of the Citadel, the one important military figure who remained in the city, issued an announcement: “Not a single item of army equipment is allowed to be put on sale! Your sultan is still in power.” His call seems to have been pretty much ignored. Equipment was indeed sold, and the first Mongol representatives who arrived were well received. On Friday, 1 January 1300, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad’s name was omitted from the *khuṭba*, although the Īlkhān’s was still unmentioned. The next day, the first substantial group of Mongol soldiers arrived, bringing with them Ghāzān’s *farmān*; Yūnīnī and others give the text of this document *in extenso*.²⁶ Basically, the people of Damascus were promised security of life and property by Ghāzān, who emphasized his own commitment to Islam, and the tyranny and misgovernment of the Mamluks.

²³ He was to become chief Shāfiʿī judge only in 702/1302; see W. Brinner, “Ibn Ṣaṣrā,” *EP*, III, 930b.

²⁴ Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 97–100. Muria, “Salīhiyya Quarter,” 162, writes that only the leaders of all the schools but the Ḥanbalīs fled the city, and only the last mentioned played a role in the submission of the city to Ghāzān. This statement is belied by the list provided by Yūnīnī (ed. Li Guo, 99–100) of notables—including the above-mentioned Shāfiʿī Najm al-Dīn Ibn Ṣaṣrā—who participated in the consultation in Damascus.

²⁵ The meeting with Ghāzān, on the march from Homs, is reported in Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 138.

²⁶ Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 102–4; see also Zetterstéen, 62–4; Nuwayrī, reproduced as an appendix in Maqrīzī, vol. I, 1011–12. Somogyi did not translate this document, found in Dhahabī, fols. 125a–126a.

The emptiness of these words would soon be fully revealed to people of Damascus, especially those living outside the walls in the villages of the Ghūṭa, and particularly in the suburb of al-Ṣāliḥiyya. This, however, was not obvious at the very beginning. But, even had the full extent of the Mongol exactions, as well as the depredations executed by them (especially those of the Armenians who were found in their army),²⁷ been known ahead of time by the remaining notables, it is doubtful that they would have or could have behaved any differently. They had been abandoned by the Mamluk army, which bypassed it on its retreat south to Egypt. The job of the notables was to protect themselves and their fellow townspeople, which was best accomplished by an orderly submission to the new powers that be. It certainly was not their business to engage in hopeless resistance for the sake of a sultan or military caste which had proven themselves incapable on the field and had deserted them without further ado. The fact that the Mongols were now ostensibly Muslims made this submission that much more palatable. The policy of surrender to the Mongols, first revealed in 1260,²⁸ was *a fortiori* applicable in 1300.²⁹

The notables of Damascus, those that remained that is, generally kept a low profile during the months of Mongol occupation. They, like the rest of the population, were candidates for expropriations, including “mugging” in the streets (the expression is used by Li Guo) by either Mongols or local ruffians taking advantage of the unsettled situation.³⁰ Perhaps not surprisingly, the one notable example to this admittedly understandable meekness is Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyya, who more than once sets out from the city walls—certainly at great

²⁷ For these activities, see Yūnīnī, vol. II, 105, 108, 109, 110–11, 113–5, etc. For the role of the Armenian troops in the despoilation of Ṣāliḥiyya, see Baybars al-Manṣūrī al-Dawādārī, *Ẓubdat al-fikra fī taʾrīkh al-ḥijra: History of the Early Mamluk Period*, ed. D.S. Richards (Beirut, 1998), 332.

²⁸ On this, see Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, 29–31.

²⁹ A similar policy was adopted by the notables of Damascus in 1400, when Tamerlane threatened the city; see Muira, “Ṣāliḥiyya Quarter,” 163–64. The submission of local notables to conquerors was an honored tradition in the Islamic world: It is reported that Maḥmūd of Ghazna admonished the civilian leaders of Balkh for having resisted an invader, and thus causing unnecessary destruction. Resistance was to be left to the military class. C.F. Bosworth, *The Ghaznavids*, 2nd edn. (Beirut, 1973), 253. My thanks to Dr. Peter Jackson for this reference.

³⁰ See the passage of Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, vol. II, 114, lines 21–115, line 6 (= vol. I, 153 of translation).

risk to his life—to confront the Mongols, even seeking an audience with the Īlkhān. He first sought out Ghāzān’s *shaykh al-mashā’ikh* in the city,³¹ but this was to no avail. Ibn Taymiyya then left the city for Ṣāliḥiyya; supposedly, the Mongol troops engaged there in looting withdrew upon his arrival.³² This was on 12 January. Two days later, having returned to Damascus, Ibn Taymiyya set out again for Ghāzān’s camp (*ordo*)³³ near Tall Rāhiṭ. He was introduced to the Īlkhān’s presences, but could not speak with him, having to make due with a short prayer for his sake and to leave quickly. Ibn Taymiyya was shunted aside with the excuse that Ghāzān was indisposed.³⁴ Besides, if Ibn Taymiyya complained, the Īlkhān would execute some Mongols in rage, and this in turn would lead to only greater confusion and suffering. The Shaykh, however, did have a chance to talk with Ghāzān’s two *wazīrs*, Sa’d al-Dīn Sawajī and Rashīd al-Dīn, the latter the well-known historian. They told him that if he wanted the Mongols to desist from their detrimental activities, the senior officers would have to be satisfied, i.e. paid off with large bribes. This being said, Muslim prisoners were released to Ibn Taymiyya, who returned to Damascus two days later.³⁵ Later, we have Ibn Taymiyya’s account of this adventure, transmitted personally to Birzālī. This story includes a report of the Shaykh’s interview with Quṭlu(gh)-Shāh, the senior general in the Īlkhān’s army, which contains *inter alia* some important and unique information showing how the newly converted Mongols understood Islam.³⁶ This,

³¹ This was Niẓām al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. ‘Alī al-Shaybānī; see Yūnīnī, 109, line 8. On him, see: Rashīd al-Dīn, *Ĵāmi‘ al-tawārīkh*, ed. Jahn, index, s.v. “Maḥmūd, Shaykh al-Mashāyikh.” Muira, “Ṣāliḥiyya Quarter,” 162, appears to think that this individual was one of the Damscene notables, and not an official who arrived in the city with the Mongols.

³² Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 108.

³³ Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 109, line 10 has *irdūwā’*, which in the translation (1:147) is rendered “al-Ardawā’,” as if it were a place-name; any doubts to its true meaning is cleared up by the parallel passage in Badr al-Dīn al-‘Aynī, *‘Iqd al-jumān fi ta’rīkh ahl al-zamān*, vol. IV, ed. M.M. Amīn (Cairo, 1312/1992), 34, line 13.

³⁴ Yūnīnī (and others) write that Ghāzān suffered from a sore leg and was preoccupied with other matters. Cf. Maqrīzī, vol. I, 892, who writes that Ghāzān was occupied with drinking. Since this latter report is both late and unique, its credibility can be doubted. Little, *Introduction to Mamluk Historiography*, 79, first noted this incongruity.

³⁵ Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, vol. II, 109.

³⁶ Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 119; here the version in Dhahabī, fols. 129b–130a, is slightly different; cf. the translation in Somogyi, 377–8. In Yūnīnī, Rashīd al-Dīn

however, is a subject beyond the present concerns. What does interest us is that even such an uncompromising figure as Ibn Taymiyya, who in his famous *fatwā* was to call for the waging of *jihād* against the Mongols even after their embracing of Islam³⁷—half-baked in his eyes—was now willing to find a *modus vivendi* with the conquerors. His brave and forthright manner towards the new masters of the city had nothing to do with lingering loyalty to the Sultan or his kingdom, but rather was meant to protect the local Muslims for whom he felt responsible. We will soon see another example of this Ibn Taymiyya's realistic approach.

But whereas Ibn Taymiyya's loyalty was to his fellow Muslims and Islam at large, Sanjar Arjuwāsh, commander of the citadel, from the beginning of the Mongol occupation made clear that his allegiances were somewhat different, or at least in part could be interpreted differently. As will be remembered, Arjuwāsh, as he will henceforth be called, had announced to the townspeople that "Your sultan is still in power!" Not only was he not to surrender, he maintained a spirited resistance to Mongol attempts to capture the citadel, even launching raids into the city to destroy Mongol positions and disrupting their plans. No less important, he unequivocally rejected every call from the local notables to surrender for the sake of the local population. His actions, which initially must have appeared to have been hopeless, reveal great bravery, fortitude, presence of mind and the ability to command men—not necessarily all professional soldiers—under the most difficult conditions.³⁸ The uniqueness of his story demands a somewhat detailed rendition.

is described as *al-ṭabīb*, while in Dhahabī, he is called Rashīd al-Dawla, hinting thus at his non-Muslim origin. For these passages, and the matter of Rashīd al-Dīn's presence at Damascus at this time, see R. Amitai-Preiss, "New Material from the Mamluk Sources for the Biography of Rashīd al-Dīn," in J. Raby and T. Fitzherbert (eds.), *The Court of the Ilkhans, 1290–1340* (= *Oxford Journal of Islamic Art*, vol. XII) (Oxford, 1996), 28.

³⁷ For a thorough analysis of this *fatwā*, see the important study, regrettably hard to obtain, by Thomas Raff, *An Anti-Mongol Fatwā of Ibn Taymiyya* (Leiden: privately printed, 1973).

³⁸ Short appreciations of his personality, which only briefly mention his actions in 1299–1300 are found in the biographical dictionaries: Ibn al-Ṣūqā'ī, *Tālib kitāb wafayāt al-a'yan*, ed. and tr. J. Sublet (Damascus, 1974), 91–92 (no. 133); Khalīl b. Aybeg al-Ṣafādī, *al-Wāfi bi'l-wafayāt*, ed. H. Ritter et al. (Wiesbaden, 1931–), vol. VIII, 338–9 (no. 3766); Ibn Hajar, vol. I, 371 (no. 865). We know little of Arjuwāsh's early career beyond that he was one of Qalāwūn's early personal mamluks and

The first efforts to get Arjuwāsh to surrender were made by Qipchaq and his associates, saying that the “blood of the Muslims was on his hands,” i.e. if he did not give up, Muslims would be killed. Arjuwāsh rebuffed them thus: “It is you that are responsible for the shedding of Muslim blood. You are the ones who have caused all this. It is because of you that it happened.”³⁹ This was on 4 January. The next morning, at the instigation of a senior Mongol commander, a group of ‘*ulamā*’, righteous people (*ṣulaḥā*), shaykhs (*mashā’ikh*), and leaders (*ru’asā*) were ordered to talk Arjuwāsh into surrendering. If he did not submit, the Mongols would enter the city and wreak much havoc. The notables complied and were joined by *ṣūfis*. Arjuwāsh treated this group with contempt, calling them “lying hypocrites that are traitors to the Muslims (*munāfiqūn kadhdhābūn al-khā’iṣn li’l-muslimīn*), who had surrendered the city to the enemy.” He further related that he had received a notice (*biṭāqā*) via pigeon post that the Mamluk forces had regrouped and defeated at Gaza the Mongols who were pursuing them. Nothing more was to come of this parleying, or that of the next day.⁴⁰

Arjuwāsh’s resolve was not only expressed verbally. He worked to strengthen the citadel.⁴¹ That he meant business was shown a few days later, when two Mongol mangonel operators were killed, evidently by men from the citadel.⁴² Arjuwāsh seemingly ignored a call from Ghāzān, now extremely annoyed, to surrender or bring destruction upon the city.⁴³ A couple of weeks later, at the beginning of Jumādā I/25 January, the siege of the citadel began in earnest. The Mongols began taking up positions around the citadel, setting up mangonels in the precincts of the grand mosque. No details of actual combat are given at this time;⁴⁴ it appears that the Mongols were hoping to starve out the defenders, and were primarily preoccupied with looting and extorting the local population.

during his reign was first appointed commander of the citadel of Damascus; he had a run in with Sultan al-Ashraf Khalīl (1290–3), for which he was briefly punished before being reinstated as commander of the citadel. See also: Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya wa’l-nihāya fī al-ta’rīkh* (rpt., Beirut, 1977), vol. XIV, 20; Baybars, *Ḥubda*, 176; ‘Aynī, vol. IV, 40–41.

³⁹ Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 105.

⁴⁰ Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 105–6.

⁴¹ Dhahabī, fol. 126b. This is not in Yūnīnī’s account.

⁴² Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 110, lines 7–8.

⁴³ Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 110, lines 18–19.

⁴⁴ Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 113.

Twelve days later (12 Jumādā I/5 February), Ghāzān himself left the city with part of his army, leaving Quṭlugh-Shāh in charge together Qipchaq who was the titular governor. The reasons for this sudden withdrawal back across the Euphrates are interesting but need not detain us here.⁴⁵ Mongol forces in the city were reduced, but a light force (*al-yazak*, literally “scouts” or “advanced force”) kept a watch on the citadel. Mangonels from inside the citadel lobbed stones at them, and the defenders launched a sortie, in which some Mongols were killed; the Mamluk troops returned safely to the citadel.⁴⁶

Up to now, we have been following Yūnīnī. The impression gained is one of resolution shown by Arjuwāsh and his men, but this in the face of a somewhat desultory siege carried out by relatively small Mongol forces. A greater appreciation of Arjuwāsh’s actions can be gained by studying additional material found in the al-‘Aynī’s *‘Iqd al-jumān*. Al-‘Aynī, it may be mentioned, initially renders a slightly shortened version of much of the same account found in Yūnīnī,⁴⁷ but at some point⁴⁸ begins a somewhat different account, based to some degree on the short report in Baybars al-Manṣūrī’s *Ḥubda*,⁴⁹ but with additional material whose source is not yet clear.

For example, Baybars al-Manṣūrī—and thus al-‘Aynī—report explicitly that Arjuwāsh destroyed buildings by fire around the citadel, including the Dār al-Sa‘āda, so that the Mongols would have difficulty seeking cover, especially for their mangonels.⁵⁰ Al-‘Aynī notes that Mongols responded by a concerted effort to build more mangonels, placing them in the Umayyad mosque. When Arjuwāsh learnt this, he sent out a force at night, who fell upon the mangonels with *naḥḥ* (Greek fire); the Mongol guards fled at this time, and the fires continued for two days.⁵¹

This particularly annoyed Ghāzān, who entered the city to inspect the matter at first hand.⁵² He ordered that the moat around the

⁴⁵ See the comments in Amitai, “Whither the Ilkanid Army?” (note 2) and references there.

⁴⁶ Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 115, lines 10–16.

⁴⁷ ‘Aynī, vol. IV, 29–40.

⁴⁸ This would be around Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 114.

⁴⁹ Baybars, *Ḥubda*, 332–33.

⁵⁰ Baybars, *Ḥubda*, 332–33; ‘Aynī, 41.

⁵¹ ‘Aynī, vol. IV, 41–2.

⁵² This was evidently the second time Ghāzān was in the city. The first time he

citadel be filled in, an order which does not appear to have been carried out. Meanwhile Qipchaq and others approached to speak to Arjuwāsh, promising him the Īlkhān's favor. The latter, in fairly harsh language, basically told them to jump in the proverbial lake, reserving some choice phrases for the Īlkhān himself. Qipchaq *et alia* ran off in a barrage of arrows, *naft* and other objects. Arjuwāsh thereupon bid his time until new mangonels were almost ready. Then he sent down again at night a specially prepared squad, who killed the mangonel specialist and others and set the machines on fire with *naft*.⁵³ In short, this parallels the information in Yūnīnī, but this report is more detailed, and we gain a greater appreciation of Arjuwāsh's activities and initiatives.

An additional anecdote can be recounted: Sometime late in the siege, the *khaṭīb* Badr al-Dīn Ibn Jamā'a and Ibn Taymiyya approached the citadel and tried to mediate a ceasefire (*sulh*) between Arjuwāsh and the Mongol commanders. Arjuwāsh, not surprisingly, does not agree, and the matter was left to rest.⁵⁴ We see here that Ibn Taymiyya's activities were not limited to trying to mitigate Mongol excesses and release Muslim prisoners, but to end the siege of the citadel, which was causing so much suffering to the people of Damascus, not the least since the Mongols were taking out their anger by demanding more money.⁵⁵ Ibn Taymiyya, as we know, was a tough character, willing to take on Sultans, the majority of 'ulamā', *ṣūfīs*, etc., and even the Mongols about their excesses. But at the same time, in the interest of avoiding bloodshed of Muslims, he was willing to tell the citadel commander, who he perhaps admired for his resistance, to desist. There were limits even for Ibn Taymiyya.⁵⁶

was accompanied by Rashīd al-Dīn and other members of his entourage; 'Aynī, vol. IV, 40.

⁵³ 'Aynī, vol. IV, 43. His source may be Mūsā b. Muḥammad al-Yūsufī, *Nuḥḥat al-nāẓir*, which is cited on the next page. For this important writer, widely cited by 'Aynī, see: D.P. Little, The Recovery of a Lost Source for Baharī Mamlūk History: al-Yūsufī's *Nuḥḥat al-Nāẓir fī Sirat al-Malik al-Nāṣir*," *JAOs*, vol. XCIV (1974), 42–54; *idem*, *Introduction to Mamlūk Historiography*, 80–87.

⁵⁴ Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 123; Ibn al-Dawādārī, vol. IX, 35.

⁵⁵ On these additional extortions, see 'Aynī, vol. IV, 43–44.

⁵⁶ This description would seem to be contradicted by information in Ibn Kathīr, vol. XIV, 7–8, who writes that early on in the siege, Ibn Taymiyya had actually written to Arjuwāsh to encourage him to continue resistance, as long as he had "one rock left". There are reasons to doubt the veracity of this statement: firstly, it seems to be unsubstantiated by any other source; secondly, it is not contempo-

Having reviewed Arjuwāsh's actions in some detail, we can see in hindsight that his resolute and cool-headed behaviour enabled him to resist successfully all Mongol attempts—verbal, psychological or military—to gain possession of the citadel. This successful result, however, was not at all obvious at the beginning of the Mongol occupation, or during most of the siege. It should be noted initially that Arjuwāsh was under no compulsion whatsoever to remain in the city and resist. As mentioned above two of his colleagues, the perfect of the city and perfect of the countryside had absconded right after receiving news of the Mamluk defeat at Wādī al-Khaznadār. Arjuwāsh could easily have done the same, without fear of reprimand or reprobation. Likewise, he could have easily submitted to Mongols, joining his *khushdāsh* (comrade)⁵⁷ Qipchaq, looking forward to a warm reception by the Īlkhān, and a cushy life ahead. Yet he chose neither of these options, but rather a third route, fraught with difficulties, dangers and uncertainties. Of his tenacity there can be no doubt, but his motivation is not obviously clear. I think that we can do best by looking at his statements, especially during his repartee with the local notables or Qipchaq. Even before hand, he sends out an announcement that “Your sultan is still in power” as Yūnīnī and others put it.⁵⁸ The intention is clear: loyalty is to be rendered to the Mamluk sultan, even if he is far away. True, this loyalty appears to be conditional on the correct behavior, or at least the absence of overtly incorrect conduct. Arjuwāsh is reported to have said to Qipchaq relatively late in the siege: “O hypocrite, who is drawing close to the citadel? By God, even if my patron al-Malik al-Manṣūr (Qalāwūn) drew close, he would have received an arrow in the breast. Tell Ghāzān to come forth so to see what will happen to him.”⁵⁹ Yet it would seem that this statement is a rhetorical device to emphasize his resolve in the face of Mongol threats, Mamluk traitors and local dithering. I doubt whether Arjuwāsh really thought that his *ustādh*

rary; and, third, Ibn Kathīr had been a student of Ibn Taymiyya and was greatly influenced by him (see *EI*², vol. III, 817b). He may have thus been hoping thus to portray Ibn Taymiyya's behavior during the Mongol occupation in a more positive manner. It is possible that Ibn Taymiyya is himself the source of this account.

⁵⁷ Between *khushdāshīyya* (plural of *khushdāsh*), mamluks of the same patron, there was a bond of loyalty, at least in principle. See D. Ayalon, “Mamlūk,” *EI*², vol. VI, 314a.

⁵⁸ Other sources write: “Your sultan is the ruler of Egypt.”

⁵⁹ ‘Aynī, vol. IV, 42.

(patron) Qalāwūn would have done anything like calling on him to surrender to the Mongols.

Arjuwāsh's use of terminology is interesting and probably not a coincidence. In his first parley with the Damascene notables he states that Qipchaq *et alia* are "lying hypocrites, that are traitors to the Muslims, who have surrendered the city to the enemy."⁶⁰ *Munāfiqūn* is, of course, an emotionally packed word. The falseness of Qipchaq's and his associates' loyalty to Islam—or at least the lack of full commitment—is contrasted to that of Arjuwāsh, willing to fight the enemy, who in spite of his recent embarrassment of Islam does not even rate the name *munāfiq*.

We see then that two motives have combined here: loyalty to the Sultan, and perhaps by extension, the Mamluk state which he led; and, willingness to fight the enemy in the name of Islam. As a corollary, there is no truck with backsliders and those who were faint of heart. Sultan and Islam (and the Muslims in an abstract way) appear as two of the foci of the loyalty of this mid-ranking Mamluk officer, who was willing to wager all in their name. An even cursory look at the events surrounding Wādī al-Khaznadār clearly shows that not all Mamluk officers and troopers were cut from the same cloth as Arjuwāsh (but he was not alone in the Citadel either). But between a willingness to fight to the end for ideals, and a total lack of principles and ideology there is a large distance. I am suggesting that Arjuwāsh's attitude, albeit extreme, was somehow representative of Mamluk identity, or rather the identity of many of the Mamluks, at least in principle.

Principles are all well and good, but they become much more readily applicable when backed up by force, or at least the hope of such. Arjuwāsh and his companions may have been alone up in the citadel, but they were not completely cut off. Mention has been made of a message which he received early on from Gaza, telling that the Mamluks had regrouped there, and even defeated a Mongol advanced force. This may have been nothing more than wishful thinking on the part of the Mamluk authorities, but it seems to have succeeded in raising Arjuwāsh's spirits. More important may have been subsequent messages which he may well have received. Baybars al-Manṣūrī, who was stationed at Ṣāliḥiyya in Egypt with a Mamluk

⁶⁰ Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 106.

advanced force, writes that secret couriers (*quṣṣād*) were sent out to the commanders of the fortresses in Syria with messages encouraging them and reporting that the Mamluk army was organizing to return to Syria. This, according to our source, emboldened the commanders, and thus not one fortress—including the citadel of Damascus we might add—fell during the entire period of Mongol occupation.⁶¹

The interplay of resolution, personal capabilities, ineffectual attacks and the knowledge that help was on the way combined to enable Arjuwāsh to hold out in the citadel until the last of the Mongols left Damascus in March 1300.

Another example shows the complexity of loyalties among high ranking Mamluks. This is the story of Qipchaq, whose earlier history has already been reviewed, and whose actions in Damascus during the Mongol occupation have been briefly alluded to. During much of the Mongol period, Qipchaq acted as a sort of commissar *cum* ombudsman: on one hand representing the Mongols to the local population, and on the other hand, trying to mitigate some of the more drastic measures adopted by the Mongols. Certainly, as a former governor of Damascus and of Mongol origin, he was apparently well suited to this job. We find him trying to convince Arjuwāsh to surrender the citadel, to absolutely no effect as has been seen. He collects money from the local population for the Mongols, but here and there makes an effort to restrain Mongol avarice.⁶² In other words, he is the “human face” of the Mongol occupation. On the whole, however, it cannot be stated that he was particularly successful in this role, if the actual suffering of the local population is any indication.

With the withdrawal of Ghāzān from Damascus in early February, he is appointed governor of Damascus, as is Bektemür al-Silādār of Aleppo; and Elbegi of the coastal region.⁶³ This arrangement, however, was under the clear tutelage of the Mongol commander Quṭluḡ-Shāh. The last mentioned withdrew from Damascus with part of the Mongol army less than a month later, and he was followed by Mulai (also called Bulai)—who had led the Mongol forces raiding in Palestine—with the remaining Mongols. Around this time Ibn Taymiyya

⁶¹ Baybars, *ẓubda*, 344–5.

⁶² Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 106–25, *passim*.

⁶³ Ghāzān’s *farmān* to Qipchaq making him governor is found in Baybars, *ẓubda*, 340–1.

met with this officer in order to negotiate the release of prisoners.⁶⁴ Baybars al-Manṣūrī reports that Qipchaq may have encouraged Quṭluḡ-Shāh's withdrawal with a timely gift of a large sum of money.⁶⁵ What is significant, to my mind, is that Qipchaq himself did not return to the east. There are reports that he even briefly displayed some of the signs of sovereignty,⁶⁶ perhaps indicating that he toyed with the idea of some type of local rule along the lines attempted earlier by Sanjar al-Ḥalabī (1260) and Sonqor al-Ashqar (1279).⁶⁷ Whatever Qipchaq's local aspirations, they were soon abandoned, and he and his comrades left Damascus in early April 1300 to meet the Mamluk army then making its way into Palestine.⁶⁸

No explicit evidence has come down to us to explain Qipchaq's actions, so I admit that the following may be somewhat speculative. One could ask, what was to prevent him from accompanying Quṭluḡ-Shāh or Mulai back across the Euphrates and continuing to enjoy the *dolce vita* with the Mongols, where he had family and even a new wife? At the same time, was he not heading back to reproach, punishment and even death at the hands of his former Mamluk peers? One initial thought, perhaps a little tongue in cheek, is that Qipchaq's brief stay in the Īlkhānate had shown him that life at the *ordo* could be even rougher and less secure than that in the upper echelons of Mamluk society.

The answer, however, is to be found elsewhere.⁶⁹ Qipchaq had decided to throw in his lot with his Mamluk comrades. In spite of his Mongol origins, family ties and the fine treatment which he had received from the Īlkhān, Qipchaq's Mamluk loyalties were to predominate in the long run. It is difficult to say which component or components of these "Mamluk" loyalties were the most decisive: was

⁶⁴ Yūnīmī, ed. Li Guo, 125; at this time Ibn Taymiyya had a "wide ranging discussion" (Li Guo's translation) about Islam with this Mongol general.

⁶⁵ Baybars, *Zubda*, 345.

⁶⁶ Ibn al-Dawādārī, vol. IX, 63; Yūnīmī, ed. Li Guo, 122; see the editor's comments on vol. I, 161, note 322.

⁶⁷ Irwin, *The Middle East in the Middle Ages*, 45, 63; Northrup, *From Slave to Sultan*, 92–3.

⁶⁸ Yūnīmī, ed. Li Guo, 125.

⁶⁹ These ideas were first briefly expressed in R. Amitai-Preiss, "Northern Syria between the Mongols and Mamluks: Political Boundary, Military Frontier and Ethnic Affinity," in N. Standen and D. Power (eds.), *Frontiers in Question: Eurasian Borderlands c. 700–1700* (London, 1999), 147–48.

it fidelity to the Sultan, to his Mamluk comrades, to Islam as represented by the Sultanate, or perhaps longing for his family in Syria? Or perhaps it was to the whole structure of “Mamlukdom,” the complex of identities and loyalties which had been inculcated since his youth which overcame any residual loyalty to the Mongols due to birth and family connections?

The behavior of both Arjuwāsh and Qipchaq during the above-described events each show in its own way an underlying commitment to certain ideals, which can be called “Mamluk ideology,” combining on one hand vague principles of loyalty to the sultan as well as to the Muslim faith, with notions of fidelity to comrades—primarily *khushdāshiyā*—and family. One is reminded of a formulation by Robert Irwin, where Mamluks, albeit the Muʿayyadīs of the fifteenth century, operated “within a single ideology, a one party state, whose leader is the Sultan and whose ideology is Islam.”⁷⁰ This seems to apply equally to the Mamluk Sultanate in the “heroic age.” Further research may yet reveal that other ideals were also held by members of the Mamluk elite at this time.

Of course, loyalty would go only so far, without some knowledge how his return to the Mamluk fold would be received. Feelers had been sent out before the actual meeting took place, even before Qipchaq even left Damascus. There are indications that the senior amirs were not of one mind about receiving him, but eventually decided to absolve him.⁷¹ Qipchaq and company met with Salār and Baybars al-Jāshnakīr on their way to Damascus. The former suffered a certain admonishment, but considering their ostensibly traitorous activities, they got off rather easy: He and his companions were sent off to the Sultan, camped not far from Cairo, and were well received.⁷² Qipchaq himself was sent off to the governorship of Shawbak, and subsequently played a certain role in Mamluk affairs.⁷³ One might have expected that he would have received a harsher treatment.⁷⁴

⁷⁰ R. Irwin, “Factions in Medieval Egypt,” *JRAS*, 1986, 237; see the discussion on 235–37.

⁷¹ Ṣafadī, vol. VIII, 184; Abū al-Fidāʾ, vol. IV, 43.

⁷² Ibn Taghrī Birdī, vol. VIII, 129.

⁷³ Ṣafadī, vol. VIII, 184.

⁷⁴ For the harsh punishment—including execution—of local collaborators with the Mongols, see Yūnīnī, ed. Lī Guo, 129. These collaborators included both non-Muslims and some Muslim notables.

How can we explain the relative equanimity of the Mamluk elite to Qipchaq at this stage? I think it derives from two reasons. The first is the understanding that he and his companions had fled to the Īlkhānate under duress: Sultan Lāchīn and his viceroy Mengütemür had unjustifiably persecuted these officers, and they had no choice but to flee for their lives. This understanding of Qipchaq's actions is seen by the attempts to return him to the Mamluk fold immediately after that Sultan's assassination (but to no avail). When he had met the senior Mamluk amirs after the Mongol occupation, they further admonished him for his contribution to Ghāzān's campaigns. He was able to extradite himself by saying that he had no alternative, given what Lāchīn had attempted to do to him.⁷⁵ The second reason is that Qipchaq appears to have been playing a double game all along. We have seen that the Armenian historian Het'um accused Qipchaq of secret contacts with the Mamluks early on, and this contributed to Ghāzān's initial difficulties at Wādī al-Khaznadār. This may be taking things too far, but there appears to be a whiff of truth in this. Qipchaq himself says he tried to maneuver Ghāzān during the battle for the advantage of the Mamluks. Baybars al-Manṣūrī, who certainly was in a position to know, reports that Qipchaq bribed Qutlugh-Shāh to encourage him to leave Damascus. Finally, there is a particularly important piece of evidence transmitted by al-Ṣafadī: "He secretly communicated (*yubāṭīnu*) to Arjuwāsh *not* to surrender the citadel."⁷⁶

Thus, to the mind of the Mamluk elite, Qipchaq was not such a bad fellow, and he could thus be taken back into the fold and rehabilitated, albeit he would not return to the high position which he had previously held. In other words, the Mamluk grandees recognized the prevailing nature of Qipchaq's Mamluk loyalties and the secondary characteristics of his ties to the Mongols.

And what of Arjuwāsh, the true hero of this story? With the withdrawal of the Mongols and Qipchaq's departure to the south, he did his best to restore order until the arrival of Mamluk forces.⁷⁷ Meeting Salār and Baybars al-Jāshnakīr and the other senior amirs when they arrived at Damascus, he was praised for his actions, given

⁷⁵ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, vol. VIII, 129.

⁷⁶ Ṣafadī, vol. XXIV, 183.

⁷⁷ Yūnīnī, ed. Li Guo, 125–26.

a robe of honor and reinstated in his command of the citadel.⁷⁸ With this, he drops out of the limelight and high Mamluk politics, and is mentioned again only at his death at the end of 701 (summer of 1302). In many ways, he had saved the honor and perhaps more of the Mamluk Sultanate in 1299–1300, but he was now shunted aside and forgotten. One might use this as an opportunity to mediate on the nature of fame and real achievement, as opposed to opportunism and posturing, and not only in the Mamluk Sultanate.

⁷⁸ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, vol. VIII, 130. Neither Yūnīnī nor Baybars al-Manṣūrī mention Arjuwāsh's reception by the Mamluk commanders, indicative how unimportant this was in the eyes of the Mamluk elite.

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PART TWO
MAMLUK ARCHIVAL EVIDENCE

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CHAPTER THREE

GLIMPSES OF PROVINCIAL MAMLUK SOCIETY FROM THE DOCUMENTS OF THE ḤARAM AL-SHARĪF IN JERUSALEM

Donald S. Richards

As is well recognized, our view of Mamluk society and institutions is mostly an indirect one, mediated to us by literary sources. We lack large quantities of archival material in brute form. Most of our information has passed through a selective and re-shaping process. Furthermore, such collections as are extant largely represent the non-Muslim *dhimmī* communities. That is why the documents now generally known as the Ḥaram documents are so important.¹ With particular concentration on a range of years towards the end of the 14th century A.D. they offer a broad picture of social, economic and cultural life in a minor but also special part of the Mamluk state, Jerusalem. What is more, the picture is not confined, as the literary sources so often are, to the higher echelons of society but illuminates lower levels. The people of whom we catch a glimpse in the Ḥaram documents do not generally leave any trace elsewhere, although two of those whom we shall mention were connected with individuals known through the major literary sources.

The documents which provide the bulk of the collection are those which in a small variety of forms give notification of a death and list the effects of the deceased or which list a person's effects during an illness and apprehension of death, or which are concerned with the appointment of executors (sing. *waṣīy*). (For present purposes I am not interested in the formal differences in the documents but in the general subject matter they cover.) Testamentary bequests are often specified as are the identities and relationships of heirs. It is generally accepted that, apart from any quite natural desire to

¹ Donald P. Little, *A Catalogue of the Islamic Documents from al-Ḥaram aš-Šarīf in Jerusalem*, Beirut, 1984.

have such matters clearly and legally stated for family or internal purposes, one aim from the authorities' point of view was to establish whatever rights the public Treasury (*bayt al-māl*) might have had as an inheritor of last resort. However, in none of the small selection I have looked at is the *bayt al-māl* expressly named as an "heir" although it is in others in the whole collection.

These inventories and allied documents have been very usefully studied in bulk for a broad picture by Huda Lutfi.² There is still scope, I hope, to look at a small group in greater detail and I have isolated a small number (fourteen in all). The persons who feature in these appear to belong to what I believe can be characterised as "Mamluk society" in the widest sense. They do so by the nature of their service, by their affiliation, kinship or marital status. To what extent this view is justified will become clear later. Not all the individuals had an essential association with Jerusalem, as it is often the case that people who appear in the Ḥaram inventories were visiting or passing through Jerusalem when illness or death struck them. However, the non-residents of Jerusalem among the fourteen are generally associated with Syria or Palestine and do not represent the centre at Cairo. One of the strengths of the Ḥaram documents is that they provide a corrective to the Egyptian bias of so many Mamluk sources and studies.

I am certainly not going to pretend that a selection of fourteen documents will provide a meaningful statistical basis. In the long run not even the whole collection does that. As has been stressed before, the collection is not a complete and organised archive but a mass of random survivors and therefore at its best it is suggestive and illuminatory—and that is the way in which I approach this selection.

The documents in question are the following: nos. 56, 141, 193, 242, 256, 284, 331, 411, 525, 533, 540, 544, 593 and 757. All remain unedited, as far as I am aware, except for no. 331, which has been published by Kāmīl al-ʿAsalī.³ Their dates fall between Shawwāl 793 and Šafar 797, that is, September 1391 and December 1394, a period of a little over three years. As it happens, not one falls in 1392. Of those we may call the "principals" in the docu-

² Huda Lutfi, *al-Quds al-mamlūkiyya. A History of Mamlūk Jerusalem based on the Ḥaram documents*, Berlin, 1985.

³ K.J. al-ʿAsalī, *Wathāʾiq maqdisiyya taʾrīkhiyya*, Beirut, 1985, vol. II, 59–60.

ments nine were male (three of them already deceased) and five female. None of the females had yet died when the documents were drawn up.

Who were the individuals we are concerned with and why are we connecting them with Mamluk society, even in the broadest possible definition? Amongst the men, firstly, only two principals are qualified as *al-amīr*. Nāṣir al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Salā (no. 256) is described as *al-amīr al-kabīr*. Normally a resident of Damascus, he is here said to be ill in a stable block (*iṣṭabl*) of someone or something illegible in Jerusalem. Even if the title "amir" is an inflation, a mere courtesy, the further information is given that he was the *ustādār* of Āqbulāṭ, one of the amirs of Damascus. His wife, Asin, was at home in Damascus with their two sons, Muḥammad and Aḥmad.

Otherwise, name and *nisba* and mention of a manumitter may serve as a good indication. We have a Sayf al-Dīn Tulaktimur b. ‘Abd Allāh al-Manjakī (no. 525). One would love to think that this man was a freedman of the famous Manjak, who had connections with Damascus. However, two daughters (Umm ‘Umar and Umm Faraj), resident in Damascus, are said to be the heirs of his deceased *mu‘tiq* and the well-known Manjak had sons. The *nisba* al-Manjakī appears again in the name (Arghūn b. ‘Abd Allāh al-Manjakī) of the husband of the Ḥājj Malik who is the subject of no. 56.

Aḷṭunbughā b. ‘Abd Allāh al-Shihābī (no. 533) was probably a mamluk in legal status but whether he was a military man is perhaps doubtful as his manumitter is named as the Shaykh Fūlādh. No. 544 gives us an ‘Izz al-Dīn Aybak al-Ḥusāmī and no. 593 a Quṭlūbughā b. ‘Abd Allāh al-Damurdāshī, who had been the husband of Sitt al-‘Aysh, herself, as it happens, a daughter of *al-amīr al-ajall* ‘Alā’ al-Dīn ‘Alī b. ‘Uthmān b. Bakhtiyār, whose *iqrār* (dated in Rajab 795/May 1393), made during an illness, constitutes no. 193. The latter served as a member of the Ḥalqa in Damascus. His wife, Sutayt, was made his executor under the oversight (*naẓar*) of an Amir Mubārak Shāh b. ‘Abd Allāh.

No. 331 contains legal arrangements in the event of death made by, as ‘Asalī has it, a Sayf al-Dīn Qabaqjī b. ‘Abd Allāh. The personal name has probably not been correctly read in my view but no alternative springs to mind.⁴ Nevertheless, he had connections

⁴ Little, *A Catalogue*, 232, gives (in Arabic script) ṣ-ṣ-ḥ-y.

with past great men in that his detailed and involved *nisba* shows him to have been a freedman of the Amir Nāṣir al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Baktimur al-Sāqī, who along with his father had been high in the favour of al-Malik al-Nāṣir Muḥammad and then fell catastrophically.

Of the two remaining men, the nature of one, called Yalbughā b. ‘Abd Allāh, must remain in question, at least until the details of his quite extensive inventory (no. 284) can be made to give a clue. In no. 540 we meet Urunbughā b. ‘Abd Allāh, known as al-Ḥājj Mūsā, who died in the *zāwiya* of Muḥammad Beg.⁵ He was the freedman of the deceased Amir Sayf al-Dīn Yalbughā al-Khaṣṣakī, whom it is tempting to identify with the amir who was the effective ruler of the state until he was killed in 768/1366. The money from the sale of Urunbughā’s effects was received by Ṭaybughā b. ‘Abd Allāh in the presence of other officials. This ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Ṭaybughā⁶ was *ra’s nawba* of Shihāb al-Dīn b. Yalbughā al-‘Umarī and acting as his agent (*wakīl*). It is equally tempting to take it that only one Yalbughā is involved, i.e. Yalbughā al-‘Umarī al-Khaṣṣakī, who indeed did have a son Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad. This son was *amīr majlis* in 791/1389⁷ and died in Sha‘bān 802/April 1400.⁸ If this identification is correct, then Shihāb al-Dīn received the proceeds of the estate as Urunbughā’s heir, being the son of Urunbughā’s deceased *muṭtiq*.

We now come to the women, the better half of Mamluk society, associated with it as daughters and wives, or as both. We have already met Ḥājj Malik bint al-Sayfī. . . (?), who was the wife of Arghūn al-Manjakī (no. 56). In no. 141 a Bint ‘Abd Allāh al-Turkiyya (her given name is illegible) was ill in the Bāb Ḥiṭṭa quarter. She was wife to *al-amīr al-kabīr* Ṭulbughā al-Qashtimūrī. A comparable case is that of Quṭlūmalik bint Yällū b. ‘Abd Allāh (no. 757), who was the wife of *al-amīr al-kabīr* Sayf al-Dīn Qarābughā al-Ruknī, in the service of (*min aṣḥāb . . .*) a one-time *na‘ib* of Jerusalem, Sayf al-

⁵ A summary from Ḥaram no. 643 of the three *waqfiyyas* (dated 748–754/1348–53) of Amir Muḥammad Beg b. Zakariyyā’s foundation is in M. Burgoyne and D.S. Richards, *Mamluk Jerusalem*, British School of Archaeology in Jerusalem, 1987, p. 72b.

⁶ See Ḥaram, no. 331 and ‘Asalī, *Wathā’iq maqḍisiyya ta’rikhiyya*, vol. II, 37–39.

⁷ Ibn Taghribirdī, Yūsuf Abū al-Mahāsīn, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira fī mulūk Miṣr wa’l-Qāhira*, Cairo, 1930–72, vol. XI, 280.

⁸ Al-Sakhāwī, Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Raḥman, *al-Ḍaw’ al-lāmi’ li-ahl al-Qam al-tāsi’*, Cairo, 1353–5 A.H., vol. II, 246.

Dīn Jantimur.⁹ In no. 411 the principal is an Armenian woman, Yāsmīn bint ‘Abd Allāh, whose *mu‘tiq* was an Amir ‘Alā’ al-Dīn ‘Alī al-Ḥalabī. The last of the women is a Khadīja bint Muḥyī al-Dīn b. Shihāb al-Dīn (no. 242), “weak [and ill] in the Ribāṭ of Sallār”, whose interest for us arises from the fact that her husband, Zayn al-Dīn Ṣadaqa b. Nāṣir al-Dīn Muḥammad b. ‘Alam al-Dīn Sulaymān, is described as the *naqīb al-tulb* in the service of the *nā’ib* of Jerusalem Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Yaghmurī. To the best of my understanding this would mean that the husband was an officer of the *nā’ib*’s personal body of troops,¹⁰ responsible for their marshalling and discipline. It should be noted that the woman Khadīja herself is said to be known as “*bint naqīb al-zayt . . .*”,¹¹ but the significance of this escapes me.

Out of the fourteen principals three name no spouse: Alṭunbughā (no. 533) and Urunbughā (no. 540) and the Armenian Yāsmīn (no. 411). There are no children to inherit, so in these cases, as there are no agnate or collateral relatives, the manumitter or, if deceased, the children of the same, may be named as heirs. Of the remaining eleven persons, as halves of couples, five have no offspring to name among their heirs and in these cases children of the *mu‘tiq* are again mentioned alongside the spouse and, in two instances, brothers. Children are distributed as follows: no. 56—one son (Amīr ‘Alī), no. 256—two sons, no. 284—three sons and one daughter (the latter absent in Damascus), no. 544—three sons, no. 595—a son and a daughter, and no. 193—four sons and four daughters. For what it is worth, the average number of children per couple was 1.27. It is as well to remember, when thinking of apparent single status and also lack of children in a marriage, that hardly anywhere in the Ḥaram documents is there any indication of a person’s age.

Potentially the interest of these document resides in the detail of the inventories, although I have to admit that they are a little less interesting than I hoped. Those that designate executors do not deal

⁹ It would be rash to suggest that Quṭlūmalik was the daughter of the Yallū, who had himself been *nā’ib* of Jerusalem. A Yallū was given an appointment in Damascus in 798/1394 and is described as “a former *nā’ib* of Jerusalem” (*Tārīkh Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba*, ed. ‘Adnan Darwish, Damascus, 1977, vol. I, 574). He is perhaps better known as the Bulūwā in Little, *A Catalogue*, see index, 434.

¹⁰ Note that I read *tulb* and not *ṭalab* (Little, *A Catalogue*, 89).

¹¹ Little (*loc. cit.*) fills this gap with “. . . al-Maḡribī (?)”.

with property details and in those cases the interest lies in the family details or the affiliations. It should also be remembered, as mentioned already, that some persons involved were not permanent residents of Jerusalem and therefore their full possessions are not represented.

Two documents record the sale of effects and therefore give monetary values in dirhams. Qutlūbughā's property (no. 593) was sold for 4,783 dirhams and that is property that was expressly "at Jerusalem in particular (*khāṣṣatan*)". It included a quantity of wheat and a horse. Against the latter is written "in the name of Sayf al-Dīn Abū Bakr al-Dawādārī", the significance of which is not immediately clear, unless it indicates the purchaser. The Amir Nāṣir al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Salā, normally resident in Damascus (see no. 256), had two horses (*farasayn ikdīshayn*) with him in Jerusalem. Qutlūbughā, apart from personal apparel, had other typical equipment, which included a saddle, boots, spurs, sword, quiver and arrows. It is of course gratifying actually to find weapons in the belongings of several principals, whom we are interpreting as members of the military society. Oddly, in the case of Qutlūbughā I can see no mention of a bow but bows appear in other lists. Our member of the Damascus *ḥalqa*, 'Alā' al-Dīn 'Alī b. 'Uthmān b. Bakhtiyār (no. 193) had with him a bow, a leather quiver (called *tarkash burghālī*, otherwise *bulghārī*), arrows and a mace (*dabbūs*). From Qutlūbughā's 4,783 dirhams a large proportion (1,375) was deducted for administrative expenses (quite a lot for the storing and brokering of the wheat) and for funeral expenses, including "readings of the Koran and cost of food according to the contents of his *waṣīyya*." The last are items regularly found. This left 3,408 for his heirs. His wife received her eighth or 3/24 (that is, 426 dirhams) and his son, *al-amīr al-ajall* Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad got 1996 dirhams (i.e. 14/24) and his daughter Baykhātūn 986 (i.e. 7/24).

The other *makhzūma* (sale of effects) is no. 540. Unfortunately in this document the items sold from the estate of Urubughā are not specified and the global sum was only 425 dirhams, from which thirty-seven were deducted for administrative expenses. This left 388 dirhams, which, as we have said, perhaps went to the treasury.

One notable feature is the provision made for freedmen and freedwomen through bequests or through their being named amongst the heirs as part of an "extended" family. The woman Ḥājī Malik, wife of Arghūn al-Manjakī, set out her bequests in document no. 56. Her

heirs were her husband and her son, Amīr ‘Alī. However, she made bequests to various people she had freed and to Bulāt, her son’s *lāla*, which totalled 8,300 dirhams. Since no more than a third of an estate can be given in bequests, this means that the minimum value of her whole estate was 24,900 dirhams. In document no. 544 ‘Izz al-Dīn Aybak al-Ḥusāmī bequeathed 1000 dirhams to a freedwoman Qamarī, 500 to his freedman Sunqur and 100 to the latter’s wife Ṭughāy, which makes 1,600 dirhams altogether.

The inventory (no. 242) of the woman whose husband was *naqīb al-ṭulb* for the *nā’ib* of Jerusalem, provides a rather full list of apparel and other effects, if only all could be reliably deciphered and identified. A gold object of some sort, weighing six *mithqāls*, was on pawn (*marhūna*) with a woman and it was her will that a ten year-old slave girl called Mubāraka should be freed after her death and that 400 dirhams should be held by the Shāfi‘ī Qāḍī to pay for a surrogate *Hajj* performed for her benefit.

In the document published by ‘Asalī (no. 331) the person who is making the *waṣīyya*, himself described as *al-amīr al-kabīr*, appointed three people as his executors, the Amir Shihāb al-Dīn Khanjar, a Shaykh ‘Alā’ al-Dīn, a servitor at the shrine of Moses (*khādīm sayyidnā Mūsā*), and al-Qāḍī ‘Alam al-Dīn, who was the clerk (*dīwān*) of the testator’s former master, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Baktimur al-Sāqī. In addition to the testator’s wife, called Zumurrud and absent in Cairo, the two sons of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad are named as the legal heirs (again in the absence of other kin). Apart from an inventory of possessions, which has no surprises, the declaration is made that the testator has received his allowance (*murattab*) of fodder (*‘alīq*) for the two preceding months from Shihāb al-Dīn Khanjar, one of his executors, and also from the same man his pay (*ma‘lūm*), that is, 300 dirhams for one preceding month. In addition, and puzzlingly, he has also received his *jāmakīyya* (how is this different?) from another of his named executors, ‘Alam al-Dīn. That amounted to 360 dirhams for the current month. Can one perhaps guess that our man was on some official duty in Jerusalem? Or was it private business for the family of his *mu‘tiq*?

In no. 525 we find Tulaktimur al-Manjakī ill in a house in the Jerusalem quarter of al-Ghawānima, a house which he had previously made a *waqf*. The house could therefore no longer be considered among his personal assets. Real estate is mentioned in only one other of these selected documents (no. 284, see below). There

the person involved must have been in rented accommodation, because, although he died *fi dār saknihi*, the property is not recorded as one of his assets. Amongst Tulaktimur's personal clothing, items of interest include "a black Turcoman fur", and two cotton *takhfīfas*, the characteristic head-dress of a mamluk. He also has a bow, a quiver with arrows and a chest (*sundūq buġja*) containing 200 dirhams. All the household furnishings and chattels are said to be the property of his wife, as is the Abyssinian slave girl (a Muslim), called Nasīm, who was purchased by his wife's own money. Tulaktimur also had some interest in the *sūq al-khila'* in Jerusalem (which is not fully understood) and was due the next two months' rent for a shop.

The Alṭunbughā b. 'Abd Allāh al-Shihābī, whose background we queried as being a freedman of a Shaykh Fūlādh, was a military man to the extent that his inventory (no. 533) contained "a Damascened iron sword, a quiver with nineteen arrows and a bow." He also had to his credit *matājir* (commercial interests) in the villages of Bayt Unya and Bayt 'Arīk from his salary as *mushidd* (enforcer) over those two places (60 dirhams worth) and an allowance (*jirāya*). Does this mean that he had *matājir* because his salary was in kind and the cash value had to be realised or had he invested his salary in local undertakings?

The last person to consider is Yalbughā b. 'Abd Allāh (no. 284), the one whose status is perhaps also in doubt. He lacks the affiliating *nisba* of the others. He died in his place of residence in Jerusalem (*dār saknihi*), given no precise location. His inventory stands out, firstly because he is the only man to have had, as it appears, two wives, neither of whom is named, and secondly because he possessed books. They comprise two Korans, a book of [dream] interpretation (*ta'bir*), a Ḥadīth book, two books of sermons, a collection of *qiṣaṣ*, a book on eschatological signs (*malḥama*), a law book and another expressly on the Ḥanbalī *madhhab*, a book on arithmetic (*hiṣāb*), two miscellanies, and a book in Persian (*bi'l-'ajamī*). He also had the following titles: *Riṣāḍ al-ṣāliḥīn*,¹² *Sayf al-mulūk*,¹³ *Mukhtaṣar al-taysir*, *Faḍā'il al-Quds*¹⁴

¹² Probably the work by al-Nawawī (631–676/1233–1278), see C. Brockelmann, *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur*, Leiden, 1943–9, vol. I, 397.

¹³ The document date rules out the *Sayf al-mulūk wa'l-ḥukkām* of al-Kāfiyājī (788/879/1386–1474), see Brockelmann, *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur*, vol. II, 138ff. & Suppl. II, 141.

¹⁴ Perhaps this is the work of Ibn al-Jawzī (510–597/1116–1200), see Brockelmann, *op. cit.*, vol. I, 506 and Suppl. I, 920.

and *Kashf al-asrār*.¹⁵ The list of his effects, much of which is obscure (as is the case with all the documents considered), mentions some other intriguing items. He seems to have owned some sort of time-piece (*ālāt li-maʿrifat al-waqt*) and *arbaʿa shukhūṣ dhahab miṣrī*, which I initially took to be, rather unusually, four gold figurines but, as has been suggested to me, possibly means four Egyptian gold coins.

There follows the transcription of document no. 593, as complete as it can be made at the present, and a reproduction of the original text. *Siyāqa* numerals do present problems, despite many years of struggling to decipher them. I am confident about the numerals for the main figures, that is the total value of the estate, the total of the deductions and then the residue to be distributed among the heirs and its detailed breakdown, especially as one can apply arithmetic based on the Koranic shares. However, the details of the deductions, as I have read them, cannot be reconciled with the stated total. The fact that some items cannot be deciphered is an obstacle. A very useful note by Little on Mamluk *siyāqa* should be consulted.¹⁶

¹⁵ There are several titles that begin thus, see Brockelmann, *op. cit.*, Suppl. III, Index, 935.

¹⁶ D.P. Little, "Documents related to the estates of a merchant and his wife in late fourteenth century Jerusalem," *MSR*, vol. II, 1998, 93–193. See Appendix B: Notes on the Mamluk *siyāqah*, 178–80.

- Verso: ٣٤٠٨ وصار الحاصل بعد ذلك للورثة .١
- ٤٢٦ يخص الزوجة بحق الثمن مما تسلمته بحضرة شهوده .٢
- ٢٩٨٢ يخص اليتيمين الباقي مما تسلمه الوصي المذكور بحضرة شهوده .٣
- ١٩٨٨ احمد الذكر [٩٤]٩ بيخاتون الانثى .٤
- () .٥
- ان شا الله تعالى .٦
- الحمد لله رب العالمين وصلى الله على محمد واله وصحبه وسلم .٧
- حسبنا الله ونهمل الوكيل .٨
- a) far left
- مخزومة .١
- بما تحصل من تركة المرحوم قطلوبغا .٢
- المخلفة بالقدس الشريف خاصة .٣
- فى مدة اخرها تاسع عشر المحرم سنة اربع وتسعين وسبعماية .٤
- b) written vertically:
- حضرت بيع ذلك على ما شرح فيه وشهدت .١
- على (المعين بقبضه؟) .٢
- وكتبه على بن حسن(؟) [] .٣
- حضرت .١
- بيع ذلك على ما شرح فيه وشهدت .٢
- على الوصى بقبض ما عين باطنا .٣
- كتبه عبد الله [] .٣
- حضرت .١
- بيع ذلك على ما شرح فيه .٢
- وشهدت على الوصى بقبض .٣
- ما عين باطنها .٤
- كتبه خليل بن موسى .٥
- حضرت .١
- بيع ذلك على ما شرح فيه .٢
- وشهدت على الوصى بتسلم ما [] .٣
- كتبه [] الشافعى .٤

Recto:

١. بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم وهو حسبي وكفى وصلوته علي سيدنا محمد وصحبه وسلامه
 ٢. مخزومة
 ٣. بما تحصل من ثمن تركة المرحوم قطوبغا ابن عبد الله الدرمداشي
 ٤. المخلفة عنه بمدينة القدس الشريف خاصة المتوفي بالقدس الشريف
 ٥. الي رحمة الله تعالى في يوم عرفة المبارك سنة ثلاث وتسعين وسبعماية
 ٦. المباع ذلك بعد وفاته في تواريخ اخرها يوم تاريخه
 ٧. المنحصر ارثه في زوجته ست العيش بنت الامير الاجل
 ٨. علا الدين علي بن عثمان بن بختيار الوصي علي الائتام الاتي
 ٩. ذكرهما والمربي وولديه من الزوجة المذكورة وهما الامير الاجل
 ١٠. شهاب الدين احمد وبيخاتون مما تولي بيع ذلك خلا القمح
 ١١. الوصي المذكور وللقمح امين الحكم العزيز بالقدس الشريف
 ١٢. في مدة اخرها تاسع عشر شهر الله المحرم الحرام عام اربعة وتسعين وسبعماية
 ١٣. [] من الدراهم ٤/٣+٤٧٨٣

١٤. بيعات قمح ٣٧٩٦ بيعة [] ٢٠
 ١٥. []
 ١٦. فرس باسم سيف الدين ابي بكر النوادري ٤٥٠ سيف باسم [] ١٠٥
 ١٧. كبر ٢٢+١/٢ قبا سلاري عتيق ١٩
 ١٨. كبر ايضا ٢٢+١/٢ ملوطة بيضا عتيقة ١٠
 ١٩. ملوطة بيضا ايضا ١٠ خلق [] ٣٦

١. جبة اخضر صوف عتيق ٢٧+١/٢ خف ومهماز ومشامة (?) ٣٠
 ٢. شاش عتيق دشت ٧+١/٤ سروال وطاقة ٧
 ٣. خلق قبا جوخ بوجهين ٣٠ سرج كامل يرغالي عتيق ٢٤
 ٤. ترকাশ ونشاب ٣١ سفرة جلد ٥

انصرف

٦. من ذلك فيما يذكر بحضرة شهوده ١٣٧٥

٧. اجرة دلالي القمح وسمسارة الفرس والقماش ٣١
 اجرة تخزين القمح [] ونسخ الوصية ٥٦
 ٨. اجرة صيرفي ٤ اجرة قاصد الي الوصي [] وحق ٣٥
 ٩. اجرة شهود بيعة (?) قمح ٦ في ثمن كفن ومونة التجهيز ٦٤
 ١٠. في عمل ختمات وثمان طعام حسبما تضمن كتاب وصية صرفه بالقدس الشريف ٤٠٠
 عوض عن موخر صداقه وحق النائب (?) [] حسبما تضمن الوصية ٦٢٠
 قرا ٤

ثمان طعام بقية ذلك ١

مصارفه عن ذهب ٣١

في () الوصي ٣٦

بحضور شاهد [] ٣٢٤

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CHAPTER FOUR

THE RECOVERY OF MAMLUK CHANCERY DOCUMENTS IN AN UNSUSPECTED PLACE

Frédéric Bauden

I

The discovery of an unknown manuscript of al-Maqrīzī (d. 845/1441) has always to be considered as an important event. When it proves to be a specimen of his note-books, which necessarily implies that it is a holograph copy, it becomes even more exciting and fascinating.¹ Specialists of the history and historiography of Islam, particularly during the last decades, have considered the question of the working method of the medieval historians. Al-Maqrīzī's unpublished note-book represents a missing link between the moment when a historian hit upon the idea of writing a book and the final result, and so will help to fill a gap which hitherto has puzzled us.² The discovery is all the more important as the author acquired such a reputation that he is better known as *shaykh al-mu'arrikhūn*.

This paper is the shortened version of a booklet to appear under the provisional title "Maqriziana III. Scraps of paper to the rescue of History: the reconstruction of Mamluk chancery documents from the reign of sultan 'Imād al-dīn Ismā'īl (743/1342–746/1345)".

¹ The manuscript was discovered in the holdings of the library of the University of Liège/Belgium, where it is preserved under the shelf-mark 2232. For an accurate description of the contents of the manuscript and its history, see my "Maqriziana I. Discovery of an autograph manuscript of al-Maqrīzī. Towards a better understanding of his working method. Description: Part 1", *Mamlūk Studies Review* vol. VIII (2003) (to appear). The present writer is currently preparing a critical edition of this note-book, which should be published by the Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale in Cairo.

² This theme will be the subject of a paper to be presented at a conference on the legacy of the medieval Egyptian historian al-Maqrīzī, to be held at Notre Dame University on 29–30 September 2001. It should be published in the proceedings of this conference under the title "Maqriziana II. Discovery of an autograph manuscript of al-Maqrīzī. Towards a better understanding of his working method. Analysis".

Moreover, texts such as the manuscript in question shed new light on matters which are only imperfectly known through other sources. Some of the epitomes made by al-Maqrīzī as well as his notes preserve the unique versions of texts which are otherwise lost, or, at least, of which we had merely brief excerpts thanks to the quotations of later historians, like al-Maqrīzī himself. These resurrected texts finally deal with historical facts sometimes unknown. And so any historian should be delighted when new data come to light as a result of the discovery and analysis of texts such as that under investigation here. However, the manuscript in itself, I mean as a codex and in the frame of codicology, can bring us much more than is conceivable.³

II

When I discovered the manuscript in question, I became deeply intrigued by some inscriptions in larger characters than those of al-Maqrīzī's script, sporadically written at different places on various folios. These had nothing to do with al-Maqrīzī: on the pages where such inscriptions appear, it is clear that he endeavored to fill in the blanks, writing around them as closely as possible (see picture at the end of this study). This demonstrates conclusively that the paper had already been used for another purpose prior to al-Maqrīzī and that, at some stage of its history, it was treated as, in effect, scribbling paper. But what had this paper been before? After some time, it became clear to me that the script was a chancery one, and that therefore I had found fragments of chancery documents utilized by al-Maqrīzī as scrap paper. It remained to be determined what kind of documents these were (either *marsūm*, or *amān*, or *tawqīʿ*, or *man-shūr*, or *ʿahd*, etc.) and to which period they belonged. As al-Maqrīzī lived most of his life in Egypt, it seemed logical to surmise that they were most likely issued by the Egyptian chancery. But from which

³ A codicological analysis of the manuscript has permitted me to understand its internal organization and particularly how it was constituted with time by al-Maqrīzī. The results were presented in a paper at the 3rd International Conference on Palaeography and Codicology of Middle Eastern Manuscripts (Bologna, 4–6 October 2000) and will appear in the proceedings of the conference under the title “Maqriziana IV: Le carnet de notes d'al-Maqrīzī: l'apport de la codicologie à une meilleure compréhension de sa constitution”, *Manuscripta orientalia* (to appear).

period: the Fāṭimid, Ayyūbid, or Mamluk? I was not at all sure, due to the complexity of the task, that I could reach a satisfying result, i.e., reconstruct a consistent text and afterwards date it exactly or even approximately.

III. *Method developed for the reconstruction of the documents*

First, it was necessary to put the manuscript back in order, on the basis of both textual analysis and external evidence. Quires were not at all in the right places; some folios that had become detached over time had been inserted at the wrong places. Once this chore was completed, it was still necessary to reconstruct the inscriptions. For this, I used a scanner which allowed me to put the beginning of each inscription appearing on a folio together with its end, which, of course, is not to be found on the immediately opposite leaf, but rather on the opposite leaf in the second half of the quire. I then produced a list of reconstructed sentences, which demonstrated that there are such inscriptions in only nine quires of the manuscript.⁴

At this stage, in order to reconstruct the text as coherently as possible, it was necessary to analyze the script. Of course, it was easier to discern various scripts once each line had been reconstructed. A thorough study of them led me to differentiate five distinct groups: nine lines for group I, twenty-one for group II, five for group III, five for group IV, and finally three for group V. It thus became easier to reconstruct each document, through comparison with examples in the preserved chancery manuals.⁵ However this task could not have been successfully carried out without taking into account other important factors, such as the space left blank when the documents were originally written (in other words the size of the space between the lines), and also the width of the right margin.⁶ As the

⁴ The ms. is composed of 21 quires.

⁵ For the Mamluk period, these are: Ibn Nāzīr al-Jaysh, *Kitāb Tathqīf al-taʿrīf bi'l-muṣṭalaḥ al-sharīf*, R. Vesely (ed.), Cairo, 1987; Ibn Faḍl Allāh, Al-ʿUmarī Aḥmad b. Yahyā, *al-Taʿrīf bi'l-muṣṭalaḥ al-sharīf*; al-Qalqashandī, Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā fī sināʿat al-inshāʿ*, Cairo, 1913–1919.

⁶ It is a well known fact that the space between two lines as well as the width of the right margin, which was left blank too, varied in chancery practice according to the importance of the person for whom the document was issued. See al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*, VI, p. 196.

original documents had been cut in smaller pieces of paper, it was necessary to be satisfied with the measurement of the space between the top edge of the leaf and that of the inscription, as well as that separating the bottom of the inscription from that of the leaf. These measurements have stood me in good stead for the reconstruction, since an average value could be established for each document. Any significant big discrepancy compared with this average value might indicate that the proposed ordering of the leaves was not the correct one; alternatively, I had to consider the possibility that there were sometimes lacunae and that some parts of a document were missing in the manuscript.⁷

Considering all these factors, my textual and physical analysis suggests that the following reconstruction is accurate.⁸

IV. *Reconstruction of the documents*

A. *Group I*

1. *Text*

(1) *al-majlis al-sāmī al-anīr al-ajall al-kabīr al-mujāhid* (2) *al-ghāzī al-muḥibbī al-mukhtār al-aʿazz al-akmal al-murtaḍā* (3) *ḥusām al-dīn majd al-islām bahāʾ al-anām nuṣrat al-mujāhidīn* (4) *[zayn al-qabāʾil . . . ʿumdat al-mulūk [wa] al-[salā]t[īn]* (5) *Bāligh ibn Yūsuf ibn [. . .]* (6) *jazīl hādihā al-isʿāf fa-li-dhālika kharaja al-amr* (7) *al-sharīf al-ʿālī al-mawlawī al-sulṭānī al-malakī* (8) *al-Ṣāliḥī al-Imādī lā bariḥa yuʿtī jazīlan wa-yū[lī maʿrūfan?]*⁹

⁷ For instance, in group IV, the extreme values for the spacing between the lines are 12–13.8 cm. We could not imagine that the inscription on ff. 187b–1a would come after the one on ff. 188b–195b, just because the value obtained in this case would have been of 21.5 cm, which is completely inconsistent with the preceding extreme values.

⁸ For reasons of space, only documents I, II and III are transcribed and analyzed in this paper. Documents IV and V are by far less consistent and could not be linked to a particular event, even though their contents gives some indications which permit us to guess why their were issued. The most interesting ones are indeed the first three documents which seem to be closely connected to the same historical fact, as I shall try to prove it. The texts of the five documents in Arabic characters will be found in the full version of this paper.

⁹ Line 9 consists only in the article followed by a *kāf* and a *rāʾ*.

2. *Translation*

[When] (1) his eminence, the most splendid and the grand amir, the fighter, (2) the conqueror, the lover, the favorite, the mightiest, the most perfect, the appreciated, (3) the sword of the Faith, the glory of Islam, the splendor of mankind, the aid of the fighters, (4) [the ornament of the tribes, the support of the] Kings and the Sultans, (5) Bāligh b. Yūsuf ibn [. . .].

(6) [. . .] the abundance of this assistance, that is why the (7) noble and exalted order of our Lord, the Sultan, the King (8) al-Şālīḥ ʿImād [al-dīn]—he never ceases to give profusely and to [do favor?]—, was decreed (9) [. . .].

B. *Group II*1. *Text*

(1) *wa-jaʿala ḥarama-nā al-ghālib maṣṣūran biʿl-muʿminīn min [. . .]* (2) *la-hu shahāda yazīd ikhlāṣuhā al-qulūb yaqīnan* (3) *wa-yahdī tikrāruhā ahl al-walāʾ ilā al-ʿamal al-nājiḥ [. . .]* (4) *wa-shayyada ṣallā Allāh ʿalayhi wa-ʿalā ālihi wa-ṣaḥbihi* (5) *alladhīna lam yazālū fī imtūthāl amr Allāh wa-amrihi ʿalā* (6) *amr jāmiʿ wa-alladhīn qāmū bi-nuṣrat dīnihi fa-malaʾū bi-faḍlihim* (7) *al-qulūb wa-aqarrū al-ʿuyūn wa-shannaḥū al-masāmiʿ [. . .]* (8) *man ḥajara al-awṭān waʿl-awlād fī maḥabbat abwābinā al-sharīfa* (9) *bi-ḥamd al-surā fī ṣabāḥ al-najāḥ ulāʾika lahum ʿuqbā [. . .]* (10) *udkhlilū bāb man sajjada [. . .]* (11) [. . .] *wa-lahum lisān al-ʿafw [. . .]* (12) *maʿāqid al-maʿāqil al-islāmiyya bi-ṭāʿat imām al-mahdiyyīn [. . .]* (13) *al-kabīr al-ghāzī al-naṣīr al-akmal al-muqaddam* (14) *al-awḥad al-naṣīr ḥusām al-dīn majd al-islām* (15) *bahāʾ al-anām zayn al-qabāʾil ʿumdat al-mulūk waʿl-salāṭīn* (16) *Bāligh ibn Yūsuf ibn Ṭayyīʿ—adāma Allāh tāʿālā iqbalahu* (17) *huwa alladhī shahadha sayf al-naṣr wa-shahara [. . .]* (18) *wa-badhala nafsahu fī marādī Allāh wa-marādīnā al-sharīfa [. . .]* (19) *ʿal[ā] al-ṭāʿa min birrīnā ḥazzahu wa-nūfiru [. . .]* (20) *fa-ḥajara li-abwābinā wa-li-awṭānihi ḥajara fa li-dhālika* (21) *kharaja al-amr al-sharīf al-ʿālī al-mawlawī [. . .]*

2. *Translation*

(1) [. . .] and He let triumph our victorious sacred precinct with the help of the believers from [. . .].

(2) [and we testify that there is no god but God alone, without associate, that] being a creed which, when faithfully observed, increases

the heart in certainty and, (3) when frequently uttered, guides those who are loyal to act successfully [. . .].

(4) [. . .] and he erected (?), God bless him, his family and his companions (5) who never ceased complying with God's command and his one [of the Prophet] on (6) a gathering matter,¹⁰ and who attended to support His Faith, thus pleasing, (7) comforting and delighting their merit [. . .].

(8) [. . .] Those who abandon their homes and their children for the sake of our noble portals, (9) with patient endurance, those will be rewarded [. . .].

(10) [. . .] They were let in [through] the door of whom prostrate himself [. . .].

(11) [. . .] apologizing [. . .].

(12) [. . .] of the fortresses of Islam by obeying the leader of the rightly guided [. . .].

[When his eminence], (13) the most splendid and grand amir, the conqueror, the defender, the most perfect, the commander, (14) the unique, the supporter, the sword of the Faith, the glory of Islam, (15) the splendor of mankind, the ornament of the tribes, the support of the Kings and the Sultans, (16) Bāligh b. Yūsuf ibn Ṭayyī⁹—may God, how exalted He is!, make lasting his welfare—(17) was the one who whetted the sword of victory and unsheathed [the scimitar. . .].

(18) [. . .] and sacrificed himself for God's favors and our noble favors [. . .].

(19) [. . .] the obedience . . . his prosperity and we give abundantly [. . .].

(20) [. . .] Thus he emigrated to our portals and left behind him his home, (21) and that is why the noble and exalted order of our Lord, [. . .], was decreed [. . .].

C. *Group III*

1. *Text*

(1) *li-yuthbat bi-dīwān al-nazar 'alā al-mamlaka al-Karakiyya wa 'l-Shawbakīyya in shā'a Allāh ta'ālā* (2) *uthbita al-ḥamd li-Allāh li'l-mustaḥiqq al-ḥamd* (3) *akhṣaba li-awliyā⁷ dawlatinā al-marām wa-aksa[ba]* [. . .] (4) *ṣallā Allāh*

¹⁰ Cf. Koran XXIV, 62.

‘alayhi wa-‘alā ālihi wa ṣaḥbihi alladhīna aff[rada] (5) *Allāh minhum al-sāda al-ghurr al-amjād wa* [. . .] (6) *wa-ba‘du fā-inna awlā man saja‘at hamā‘im al-ni[‘am] [. . .]* (7) *mulḥid fā-mā ‘adala ‘an nuṣrat hādhā al-dīn wa-mā ḥa[basa ‘an?’]*

2. Translation

(1) Let it be registered in the Office of Supervision on the District of al-Karak and al-Shawbak, if God, how exalted He is!, wills.

(2) It has been registered, praise be to God! Praise be to Him who deserves it.

(3) He made the desire abundant for the friends of our state and let gain (?) [. . .].

(4) God bless him, his family and his companions from among whom (5) God set aside the generous and illustrious lords and [. . .].

(6) Now then, he who deserves the more that the doves of favors coo [for him . . .].

(7) [. . .] a heretic for he did not turn away from supporting the Faith and did not withhold from (?) [. . .].

V. Analysis

Let us now proceed to the analysis of these documents. Just a few lines have survived for the first document, but these nonetheless provide us with two titles. The first one is royal (ll. 7–8): *al-sultānī al-malakī al-ṣāliḥī al-‘imādī*. The last two words are the only ones that can help us to identify the ruler. This ruler must have had as ruling name al-Ṣāliḥ and as *laqab* ‘Imād al-dīn. In the complete list of all the rulers of Egypt, there were only two who bore these two elements: either the Ayyūbid al-Ṣāliḥ ‘Imād al-dīn, who reigned from 635/1237 to 635/1238 and from 637/1239 to 643/1245,¹¹ or the Mamluk sultan Ismā‘īl, son of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn,¹² whose complete titulature was al-Sultān al-Malik al-Ṣāliḥ ‘Imād al-dīn Abū al-Fidā’ Ismā‘īl.¹³ He ruled only for three years, from

¹¹ C.E. Bosworth, *The Islamic Dynasties*, Edinburgh, 1980, 59.

¹² *Ibid.*, 63.

¹³ Al-Ṣafadī, Khalīl b. Aybak, *al-Wāfi bi’l-wafayāt*, J. Van Ess (ed.), Damascus-Wiesbaden, 1931–1983, vol. IX, 219–20.

743/1342 to 746/1345, the date of his death. Thus the first document could be dated quite precisely to one of two periods. But to which ruler did the text refer? For this, the document provides us a major clue. In the chancery manuals, titles such as those found in this document typically end with a name. On line 5 of the present document, this name is almost illegible; yet we can barely decipher the name “Ibn Yūsuf ibn”. Here document II, for which twenty-one lines are preserved, provides further evidence. We find in ll. 13–16 almost the same royal titles as in document I, but this time, the name is clearly legible: Bāligh b. Yūsuf b. Ṭayyiʿ. This name is rarely attested in the sources. However, this same name appears in some chronicles of the Mamluk period, during the reign of the sultan Ismāʿīl.

Before going further, we must study the political events that followed al-Nāṣir Muḥammad’s death, events soundly described as “ceaseless power struggles”.¹⁴ Indeed, we remark that between al-Nāṣir Muḥammad’s death (741/1341) and 762/1361, no fewer than eight of his sons succeeded him to the throne. Aḥmad, being twenty-four years old in 742, was the eldest of his sons. His accession to the throne followed the short reigns of two of his brothers: Abū Bakr (twenty years old) and Kujuk (seven years old).¹⁵ But unlike his two brothers, Aḥmad was not merely a puppet in the hands of the emirs. He had spent most of his life since the age of eight in al-Karak, following the customs of the local Bedouin, dressing himself like them and hunting with them. Informed that he had been chosen as sul-

¹⁴ A. Levanoni, *A Turning point in Mamluk history: the third reign of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qalāwūn (1310–1341)*, Leiden, 1995, 81. The presentation of these events is based on the following primary sources: al-Shujāʿī, Shams al-Dīn, *Tārīkh al-Malik al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qalāwūn al-Ṣāliḥī wa-awlādihī*, B. Schäfer (ed.), Wiesbaden, 1978, Part I; al-Maqrīzī, Aḥmad b. ʿAlī, *al-Sulūk li-maʿrifat duwal al-mulūk*, M.M. Ziyāda (ed.), Cairo, 1941, vol. II; *Idem, al-Muqaffā*, M. Yaʿlāwī (ed.), Beirut, 1991, vol. I, 627–36 (biography of Sultan Aḥmad); al-Ṣafādī, Khalīl b. Aybak, *al-Wāfi biʾl-wafayāt*, vol. VIII, 86–90 (biography of Sultan Aḥmad); *Idem, Aʿyān al-ʿaṣr wa-ʿawān al-naṣr* (facsimile by F. Sezgin), vol. I, 114–16 = ff. 57b–58b; Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Aḥmad b. ʿAlī, *al-Durar al-kāmīna fī aʿyān al-mīʾa al-thāmina*, M.S. Jād al-Ḥaqq (ed.), Cairo, n.d., vol. I, 314–16 (biography of Sultan Aḥmad); Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Abū al-Maḥāsin Yūsuf, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira fī mulūk Miṣr waʾl-Qāhira*, Cairo, 1963–1972, vol. X, 68 sqq; *Idem, al-Manhal al-ṣāfi waʾl-mustawfi baʿda al-wāfi*, M.M. Amin (ed.), Cairo, 1984, vol. II, 158–64 (biography of Sultan Aḥmad); Ibn Ḥabīb, al-Ḥasan b. ʿUmar, *Tadhkirat al-nabīh fī ayyām al-Manṣūr wa-banīhi*, M.M. Amin (ed.), Cairo, 1976–1986, vol. III (*ḥawādīth wa-tarājīm 741–70*).

¹⁵ A. Levanoni, *op. cit.*, pp. 81–82.

tan by some emirs, he took his time before coming to the capital in order to receive the oath of allegiance. He did not leave al-Karak without his faithful Bedouin. The struggles for influence made him change his mind quickly, and two months later he decided to return to al-Karak, where he intended to rule, taking with him the main dignitaries of the *dīwān* together with all the money and the treasures kept in the citadel of Cairo. Under such conditions, having declined the offer to come back to Cairo, his position as sultan was clearly untenable. His brother *Ismāʿīl*, then seventeen years old, succeeded him. However, he could not rule peacefully, since his brother *Aḥmad* at al-Karak refused to return the treasury and scoffed at him. During the short reign of *Ismāʿīl* (743/1342–746/1345), the outstanding event was the siege of al-Karak, for which successive expeditions (seven or eight, according to the sources), in which all the emirs of Egypt and Syria took part, were necessary.¹⁶ Indeed, the city and the fortress of al-Karak were reputed to be impregnable, as long as food was supplied to the inhabitants, a task generally fulfilled by the local Bedouin, and this was still the case during this siege. When the city was built, a network of cisterns was developed in order to collect rainwater, so the defenders had a steady supply of water.¹⁷ Even though the Mamluk troops surrounding the city succeeded in imposing a more or less efficient blockade, the siege was brought to an end only by perfidy of some of the most trusted persons in *Aḥmad*'s entourage, in other words of those he considered as his loyal friends and fellows: the Bedouin and the local Arabs.

The best historical source for the period that has come down to us is the chronicle of al-Shujāʿī (*adhuc viv.* 756/1356–7), who was an eyewitness of the events in question.¹⁸ The following passage,

¹⁶ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira*, vol. X, 71.

¹⁷ For a general history of the city of al-Karak under Mamluk rule, see M.ʿA. al-Bakhīt, *Mamlakat al-Karak fī al-ʿahd al-mamlūkī* (1976); translated in German by A. Scheidt, under the title *Das Königreich von al-Karak in der mamlukischen Zeit* (Frankfurt am Main, 1992).

¹⁸ Another contemporary source must have been even more accurate: *Mūsā b. al-Shaykh Yaḥyā al-Yūsufī* (d. 759/1358), who wrote *Nuzhat al-nāẓir fī sirat al-Malik al-Nāṣir*. This history covered, as it seems, the years that followed al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's reign. Unfortunately, the fragments preserved deal only with the years mid-733 to mid-738. See on this D.P. Little, "The Recovery of a Lost Source for Bahārī Mamluk history: al-Yūsufī's *Nuzhat al-nāẓir fī sirat al-Malik al-Nāṣir*", *JAOs*, vol. XCIV (1974), 42–54. For al-Shujāʿī's indebtedness to al-Yūsufī, see B. Schäfer, *Beiträge zur*

quoted in full because of its importance for my analysis of the chancery text, refers to an event dating to 744, a few months before Aḥmad's surrender to his brother's troops.

The Sultan [Ismā'īl] had corresponded with Bāligh, the *muqaddam* of the foot soldiers who was at al-Karak, making him promises and tempting him because it was he who led the prince Aḥmad to resistance. So he tried to win his confidence and wrote him. He answered favorably to this and betrayed the prince Aḥmad. He left al-Karak, fleeing Aḥmad, and he presented himself to the noble portals on Monday 6th *Dhū al-Qa'da* of that year [744/21st March 1344]. The Sultan honored him and rewarded him and those of his friends who came with him. He guaranteed to the Sultan the capture of al-Karak saying: "O Lord! All the people in the fortress of al-Karak are my friends and those in the city are my family and my kinfolk. No one among them contradicts me. Send with me whom you trust and I will surrender him al-Karak". The Sultan sent with him eight mamluks chosen from among the royal ones and they set out on Thursday [9th *Dhū al-Qa'da* 744/24th March 1344].¹⁹

This passage must be compared to the following one, from the same source:²⁰

Al-Karak could not be seized because those who were in al-Karak were, for the greater part, Arabs and Jabaliyya, and their *muqaddam* was Bāligh b. Ṭayyī' and Mas'ūd.

These texts identify Bāligh as the *muqaddam*²¹ of the soldiers (Arabs and Jabaliyya) of al-Karak.²² Incidentally, al-Maqrīzī describes him as "[Aḥmad's] most important confidant among the people of al-Karak".²³ At first he set his hopes on his master, hoping upon the return of Aḥmad to the throne to obtain a reward for his loyalty. However, he must have changed his mind as Aḥmad's position became more fragile.²⁴ In 744, Bāligh took the decision to betray his master on

mamlukischen Historiographie nach dem Tode al-Malik an-Nāsirs (Freiburg, 1971); D.P. Little, "An Analysis of the Relationship between Four Mamluk Chronicles for 737–45", *JSS*, vol. XIX (1974), pp. 252–68.

¹⁹ Al-Shujā'ī, *Ta'rikh*, 264. Cf. al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. II, 654 and 661.

²⁰ Al-Shujā'ī, *Ta'rikh*, 258.

²¹ One must understand here that his title was probably *muqaddam al-ḥalqa*. On this title and its implications, see D. Ayalon, "Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army", *BSOAS*, vol. XV/iii (1953), 448–51.

²² See D. Ayalon, "The Auxiliary-Forces of the Mamluk Sultanate," *Der Islam*, vol. LXV (1988), 31–32.

²³ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. II, 661 (*ajall thiqāṭihī min al-Karakīyyīn*).

²⁴ This is confirmed by al-Maqrīzī (*ibid.*) who says "due to the abundance of his

behalf of the legitimate sultan. First he wrote a letter to the emirs besieging the fortress, in which he promised that he would facilitate their capture of the town; but before doing so he requested to be allowed to go to Cairo and speak to the sultan Ismā'īl. The sultan agreed and gave an order for an *amān* to be delivered to him. Bāligh escaped from al-Karak and went to the capital where he arrived on the 6th *Dhū al-Qa'da* 744²⁵ with other dignitaries of the city. As a reward for his treason and his help, he solicited *iqṭā's* and lands with an average revenue of 450,000 dirhams per annum, while his fellow conspirators received a similar amount (these details are not provided by al-Shujā'ī). They all left Cairo three days later and went back to al-Karak, which surrendered on the 22nd *Ṣafar* 745 [15th July 1344].²⁶

Here are the facts. What links can we establish between these and documents I and II? The Bāligh b. Yūsuf b. Ṭayyī' who is mentioned there is undoubtedly the same as the one about whom the sources speak concerning the aforementioned events, even though these sources simply name him as Bāligh or Bāligh b. Ṭayyī'. The period in question (the first document clearly indicates now that it goes back to sultan Ismā'īl's reign) and the singular name of Bāligh, rarely found in chronicles and biographical dictionaries, make this identification certain. It remains to be determined what kind of documents these are? Here again, it is al-Maqrīzī who helps us as he indicates²⁷ that Bāligh and his fellows received from the sultan *man-shūrs* for the *iqṭā's* they asked for. Originally, the word *man-shūr* meant in the chancery terminology an unsealed document, an open decree.²⁸ For the Mamluk period, the use of this term was reserved for documents issued on the occasion of the grant of *iqṭā'*, or land tenure.²⁹

expenses, al-Nāṣir Aḥmad's wealth came to depletion and a cruel need for money was rife. Bāligh began to work upon him".

²⁵ According to al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. II, 654, they arrived in Cairo on the 8th of the same month [23rd March 1344] and that they set out for al-Karak the 11th [26th March 1344].

²⁶ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. II, 660–62; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira*, vol. X, 71.

²⁷ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. II, p. 661.

²⁸ See S.M. Stern, *Fāṭimid Decrees: Original Documents from the Fāṭimid Chancery*, London, 1964, 85–90 and 116.

²⁹ See al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-a'shā*, vol. XIII, 157; S. Imamuddin, "Diwān al-inshā' (Chancery in Later Medieval Egypt)", *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society*, vol. XXVIII (1980), 76.

Several elements prove that documents I and II are these famous *manshūrs* which were given to Bāligh in exchange for his betrayal and his assistance for the surrender of the fortress.

First, there is the textual evidence, mostly in document II. Lines 8–9 and 20 and even 12 seem to be as a direct allusion to the role played by Bāligh, his flight from al-Karak to Cairo, and his submission to the authority of sultan Ismā‘īl: “Those who abandon their homes and their children for the sake of our noble portals with patient endurance, those will be rewarded” (ll. 8–9); “Thus he emigrated to our portals and left behind him his home” (l. 20).

Secondly, there are the rigid rules of the chancery, as they are described in the manuals and other sources:

(1) In the Mamluk period, the formula “*fa li-dhālīka kharaja al-amr al-sharīf*” was exclusively reserved to the *manshūrs*.³⁰

(2) As we have seen, Bāligh received *iqṭāʿs* annual revenue of which was 450,000 dirhams. The sources do not tell us what title he received on that occasion, except al-Ṣafadī³¹ who simply indicates that he received an *imrat miʿa*, which means the title of *amīr miʿa* and *muqaddam alf*. However, everything leads us to believe that this information provided by al-Ṣafadī is erroneous.³² On the one hand, it is known that the highest title received by the emirs of Arab tribes was the rank of *ṭablkhāna*.³³ Now, there is no doubt that Bāligh was an Arab Bedouin, but certainly not an emir of his tribe.³⁴ On the other hand, the revenue of an *amīr miʿa* was by far superior to the rev-

³⁰ Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-ʿUmarī Aḥmad b. Yāḥya, *Masālik al-abṣār fi mamālik al-amṣār*, A.F. Sayyid (ed.), Cairo, 1985, 45; al-Maqrīzī, *Khiṭaṭ*, Būlāq, 1270/1853, vol. II, 211.

³¹ Al-Ṣafadī, *al-Wāfi biʾl-wafayāt*, vol. VIII, 90.

³² This is even more curious when one thinks that he was working at the *dīwān al-inshāʿ* in 745 and that he must have been well aware of the affairs of the state. See D. Little, “al-Ṣafadī as biographer of his contemporaries,” in *Essays on Islamic Civilization presented to Niyazi Berkes* (Leiden, 1976), 208–9.

³³ See M.A. Hiyari, “The Origins and Development of the Amirate of the Arabs,” *BSOAS*, vol. XXXVIII (1975), 523.

³⁴ The occurrence of the *ism* Ṭayyiʿ in his name seems to indicate that he was a member of the Rabīʿa tribe which was part of the Ṭayyiʿ. They were divided into two major clans: the Faḍl and the Mīrā. So far, I have not been able to determine to which clan Bāligh belonged. It must be noted that the Arabs who lived around al-Karak up to the borders of Ḥijāz were the Banū ʿUqba. See A.S. Tritton, “The Tribes of Syria in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries,” *BSOAS*, vol. XII (1947–8), 567.

enues obtained by Bāligh.³⁵ So, we must prefer the title of *ṭablkhāna*. Indeed, according to al-Maqrīzī,³⁶ the bearer of such a title received an *iqṭāʿ* the value of which was 40,000 dinars per annum, in proportion of 10 dirhams for one dinar (that means 400,000 dirhams), if he was a *khāṣṣakī*, or if this was not the case an *iqṭāʿ* the value of which was 30,000 dinars per annum, in proportion of 8 for 1 (that means 240,000 dirhams). Bāligh was not a Mamluk. So he could not have received a revenue superior to 30,000 dinars per annum. Notwithstanding, we know that the values mentioned by al-Maqrīzī refer to a given period and that these values are not valid for the whole Baḥrī period. For instance, we know that there was inflation and an exaggeration in the value of the *iqṭāʿ*s during the reign of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad.³⁷ My hypothesis is confirmed by the chancery manuals. The width of the sheet of paper used in the chancery varied according to the hierarchical position of the person for whom the document was issued.³⁸ The more important he was, the wider the sheet of paper was. The width reserved for an *amīr ṭablkhāna* was half a cubit (*niṣf dhīrāʿ*).³⁹ The value of the Egyptian cubit (also known as the cloth cubit, *dhīrāʿ al-qumāsh*)⁴⁰ being of about 58 cm.,⁴¹ a document issued in favor of an *amīr ṭablkhāna* could not be wider than about 29 cm. The width of two leaves in al-Maqrīzī's note-book is 27.4 cm, but it must not be forgotten that part of it was trimmed when the documents were cut into pieces, and once more when the manuscript was bound. Moreover, the titles (*alqāb*) reserved to an *amīr ṭablkhāna* who was not a *khāṣṣakī*, or who did not exercise a function (*wazīfa*), were the following: *al-majlis al-sāmī* followed by epithets (*alqāb*) devoid of the emphatic final *yāʾ*.⁴² This is exactly what we have in documents I and II. On the other hand, a *manshūr* did

³⁵ The value of the *iqṭāʿ*s attributed to an *amīr miʿa* ranged from 85.000 to 100.000 *dīnār jāyshī*, that is to say from 1 million to 850.000 *dirhams* per annum. See S. Tsugitaka, *State and Rural Society in Medieval Islam: Sultan, Muqtaʿs and Fallahum*, Leiden, 1997, 154.

³⁶ Al-Maqrīzī, *Khīṭaṭ*, vol. II, 218; S. Tsugitaka, *ibid*.

³⁷ See A. Levanoni, *op. cit.*, 53 sqq.

³⁸ Al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*, vol. VI, 313.

³⁹ Al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*, vol. VI, 191.

⁴⁰ Al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*, vol. III, 443 and VI, 190.

⁴¹ See W. Hinz, *Islamische Masse und Gewichte*, Leiden, 1955, 56.

⁴² Ibn Nāzir al-Jaysh, *Tathqīf al-taʿrīf*, 190.

not begin with the *ḥamdala* unless it was issued for an *amīr miʿa* or an *amīr ṭablkhāna*.⁴³ Document II contains part of the *ḥamdala*, as it is attested by the presence of the end of *shahāda* (l. 2).⁴⁴

To conclude, all the collected elements clearly indicate that Bāligh received the title of *amīr ṭablkhāna* in reward for his treason, that the value of the *iqṭāʿ*s he received on that occasion was about 450,000 dirhams per annum, that documents I and II must be identified as two *manshūrs* in relation with his obtaining this title. I would like to stress the fact that, until now, we have possessed a single example of a *manshūr iqtāʿī* from Egypt. This unique item goes back to the reign of Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī (916/1511) and concerned an *amīr ṭablkhāna* too.⁴⁵ So, the two documents that I have reconstructed and analyzed perfect our knowledge of this kind of document, considering that they are more ancient than the one preserved hitherto. They will give us the opportunity to study what differences may be detected between them and how the chancery evolved between the Bahri and Burji periods.⁴⁶

What happened to Bāligh after this? Maqrīzī quotes his name once more for the year 745 (*Rabīʿ* II/init. 12th August 1344), but for a murder case:⁴⁷ a certain Ḥasan b. al-Radīnī, a camel merchant, was found murdered in his house in the horse-market, in Cairo. His son charged a ʿĪsā b. Ḥasan, who was responsible for the sultan's camels, and Bāligh al-Aʿraj, in other words Bāligh the lame, because of enmity between them and his father. The *nāʾib* ordered that they be arrested and stripped, and he planned to bastinado them, but they succeeded in deferring the punishment for some days, while the *nāʾib* was supposed to make investigations in order to discover the murderer. They took advantage of this to exercise influence on some emirs and to be released only a few days later, against the *nāʾib*'s opinion. Was this Bāligh the same person? I think

⁴³ *Manshūrs* issued in favor of the sons of the Sultan, the *amīr miʿa* and *muqaddam alf*, and *amīr ṭablkhāna* were to begin by the *ḥamdala* (al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*, vol. XIII, 167, 169 and 184). Inferior titles received *manshūrs* beginning by *ammā baʿdu* and in case of the lowest titles, these began by *kharaja al-amr al-sharīf*. Bedouin could receive *manshūrs* of the three types according to their function (al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*, vol. XIII, 198).

⁴⁴ The *ḥamdala* section comprised three elements: the *ḥamdala* itself, followed by the *shahāda* and beginning by *naḥmaduhu*, then the *baʿdiyya (wa-baʿdu)*. See, for instance, al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*, vol. XIII, 168.

⁴⁵ M.M. Amīn, "Manshūr bi manḥ iqtāʿ min ʿaṣr al-Sulṭān al-Ghawrī," *AI*, vol. XIX (1983), 2–22.

⁴⁶ This comparison will be treated in the full version of this article.

⁴⁷ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. II, 668.

so. On the one hand, his name was quite rare, and on the other hand, al-Maqrīzī mentions him only a few months later after the facts in connection with al-Karak.⁴⁸ This time, however, he is described as lame, and this is not unlikely. It is again thanks to this historian that we learn that during the fourth expedition an intense fight took place between the people of al-Karak and the Mamluk army, on the 8th *Rabīʿ* II 744 (/30th August 1343), a fight during which a lot of people were injured and killed. Maqrīzī gives no name, except that of Bāligh, who, he says, was injured. This happened exactly one year before he was arrested as an accessory to a crime, and we may surmise that he had been hurt in the leg the preceding year. This is the last occurrence of Bāligh in the historical sources. After all these events, in which he played a central role, the chronicles send him back to anonymity.

Let us now proceed to document III. The text of this document can be reconstructed acceptably, despite its many lacunae, especially in those essential parts which might allow us to identify its destination more clearly. That is, it lacks any mention of titles or names. However, the spacing between the lines (18,3 cm) and the width of the document seem to indicate that it was issued for a person of the same rank as documents I and II (*qaṭʿ al-nisf*). The preserved text in itself is quite vague and we could not date it with certainty, were it not for a very important registration mark. This one is to be found at the head of the first leaf and must be read like this: *li-yuthbat bi-dīwān al-naẓar ʿalā al-mamlaka al-karakiyya waʾl-shawbakiyya in shāʾa Allāh taʿālā*, and just below: *uthbita al-ḥamd li-Allāh liʾl-mustaḥiqq al-ḥamd*. These notes require a commentary. It is well known that once written, a document went through the different services of the chancery, where it had to be registered by secretaries. The order was given by a high dignitary who wrote it on the document itself. Once fulfilled, the clerk indicated, just below the order, that it had been executed (*uthbita* in our case) and then he added his personal motto/*ʿalāma*⁴⁹ (here, *al-ḥamd li-Allāh liʾl-Mustaḥiqq al-ḥamd*). So, document III was clearly registered at the *dīwān al-naẓar*, that is the

⁴⁸ Moreover, ʿĪsā b. al-Ḥasan and his tribe were among those Bedouin who brought their support to al-Nāṣir Muḥammad when he was at al-Karak (see A. Levanoni, *op. cit.*, p. 182). This link brings us clear evidence that Bāligh al-Aʿraj must be identified as the Bāligh who betrayed al-Nāṣir Aḥmad.

⁴⁹ See S.M. Stern, "Petitions from the Mamluk Period: Notes on the Mamluk Documents from Sinai," *BSOAS*, vol. XXIX (1966), 248–49.

Office of Supervision, in the department responsible for the affairs of the *mamlaka* (the *mamlaka* being a region administered by a *nāʿīb*) of al-Karak and al-Shawbak (Montréal). Now then, it may be surmised that document III, is certainly linked to documents I and II and that it must have been a *manshūr iqtāʿī* probably issued in favor of one of Bāligh's fellows.

6. Now we must ask ourselves how al-Maqrīzī had access to these documents and why he used them as writing material. As ever, it is the protagonist himself whom we must consult. It is indeed al-Maqrīzī who gives us the answer in his *Khīṭat*,⁵⁰ where he declares that he worked at the *ḍiwān al-inshāʿ* as a secretary until about the year 790/1388. Still it is not this passage which is important for us, because we can hardly suspect him to have taken for himself documents in the chancery during this period; however, the following sentence is fundamental for our purpose:

When the reign of al-Zāhir Barqūq came to an end and was afterwards re-established, many things went in confusion. Among them, there was the affair of the room of [the *ḍiwān*] *al-inshāʿ* at the Citadel [. . .] and the documents (*awrāq*) that it kept were taken, sold by weight (*biʿl-qinṭār*) and the information they contained was forgotten (*nusiya rasmuhā*).

Thus it was during a particularly terrible period (791–2/1389–90) during the reign of sultan Barqūq (784/1382–791/1389 and 792/1390–801/1399), when this sultan had to abandon temporarily Cairo because of a coup d'état organized by certain emirs, that the documents preserved in the room of the *ḍiwān al-inshāʿ* were sold by weight, probably to the paper merchants.⁵¹ Indeed, some of the documents issued by the chancery in medieval Egypt took the form of rolls (*darj*) made up of several sheets of paper (*waṣl*) pasted one to

⁵⁰ Al-Maqrīzī, *Khīṭat*, vol. II, 225–26; M. Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *La Syrie à l'époque des Mamelouks d'après les auteurs arabes*, Paris, 1923, LXXI.

⁵¹ We are aware that original documents were normally given to their beneficiaries and that only copies of them were kept in registers. However, we don't understand what use the paper merchants could have made of such registers as these were not suitable for their purposes once filled (see a unique example of these registers, although from the Fāṭimid period, in G. Khan, "A copy of a decree from the archives of the Fāṭimid chancery in Egypt", *BSOAS*, vol. XLIX (1986), 439–453). Moreover, al-Maqrīzī clearly states in the passage quoted above that these *awrāq* were documents and not just blank paper. It remains to be proven if original documents could be kept by the chancery, as it seems to be implied by those studied here.

the other on a margin of about 1–2 cm.⁵² The secretaries of the chancery had to leave spacing between the lines, which spacing varied according to the width of the sheet, and so according to the person for whom the document was issued. This waste of paper was the sultan's prerogative.⁵³ The *warrāqūn* made haste to cut the documents at the most convenient size in order to transform them into scraps of paper,⁵⁴ which they offered for sale in the shape of quires of 5 sheets.⁵⁵ This could explain why documents connected to the same event and period are to be found in our manuscript. During the critical period mentioned, it may be presumed that paper had become a luxury product. In this respect, Qalqashandī informs us that the price of paper had risen during the 8th/14th century.⁵⁶ It was clearly after these events that al-Maqrīzī took in a supply of scribbling paper in order to write down on it his reading notes, but also his personal works, because the Liège manuscript is not the only one to contain such paper. It is possible that other autograph manuscripts of al-Maqrīzī were written on the same kind of paper.⁵⁷ So,

⁵² See Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *La Syrie*, LXX–LXXXI.

⁵³ See St. Heidemann, Chr. Müller and Yū. Rāḡib, “Un décret d'al-Malik al-ʿĀdil en 571/1176 relatif aux moines du Mont Sinai”, *AI*, vol. XXXI (1997), 84.

⁵⁴ In the case of our documents I to III, the spacing between the lines was of at least 18 cm.

⁵⁵ This is proven by the internal organization of al-Maqrīzī's note-book. See our article entitled “Maqriziana IV: Le carnet de notes d'al-Maqrīzī: l'apport de la codicologie à une meilleure compréhension de sa constitution”, *Manuscripta orientalia*, to appear.

⁵⁶ Al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*, vol. XI, 132 (it must have taken place sometime after al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn, as the text seems to imply it). E. Ashtor (*Histoire des prix et salaires dans l'Orient médiéval*, 366) dates also this increase of the price of paper from the beginning of the 15th c. A.D. He noticed that this price doubled in the lapse of one century (early 14th–early 15th c. A.D.).

⁵⁷ At this time, I have identified such fragments of chancery documents, the Liège ms. apart, in the following autograph mss. of al-Maqrīzī: 1) *al-Khabar ʿan al-bashar*, Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi (ms. Fātiḥ 4340), see F. Tauer, “Zu al-Maqrīzī's Schrift *al-Ḥabar ʿan al-Baṣār*”, *Islamica*, vol. I (1925), 359; 2) *Musawwadat al-Mawāʿiz wa'l-ʿitibār*, Istanbul, Topkapı Saray (ms. Ahmet III 1472), Ayman Fuʿād Sayyid (ed.), London, 1995; 3) *al-Muqaffā*, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale (ms. 2144), see G. Wiet, “Kindī et Maqrīzī” (*BIFAO*, vol. XII (1915), 61–73), 62 (note 1), Leiden, University Library, mss. or. 1366a, 1366b, 3075, 14533. To date, this kind of scrap paper has not been found for the Islamic world but in the autograph manuscripts of al-Maqrīzī. This is undoubtedly due to the fact that a link between the genre of inscriptions and chancery documents could not be established prior to my discovery, although it was already noticed almost a hundred years ago (G. Wiet, *ibid.*) that some leaves found in an autograph manuscript of al-Maqrīzī had been used for another purpose before this author scribbled them.

one would only have to gather the inscriptions preserved on the leaves, sort them out, and analyze them, as I have been doing, in order to reconstruct documents coming from the Mamluk chancery, documents, it is needless to say, that historians terribly miss. These would allow us to throw a new light on this institution, but also on historical facts sometimes reported in the chronicles. These scraps of paper would then come to the rescue of History.

ملكته ان عياني الوره حيوا عندي من لقيت فان ك
 راس الموده حسن لنا كان راس العداوه سوالنا اذا و
 امرافا بعد عنك الاستوار فان مع عيوبهم مفيوبه اليك
 حيوا لامورا وسطها الصوبعين كل على من اسرع
 بوشلان يكن عتاه اذا المترك على الرجل اعلم الاشيا
 عليه كان هلا كره اعلم الاشيا عليه كون مع والديت
 كما يجب ان يكون نورا بعد نيق
 للعاملان كما طبا جاهلا
 محاطبه الطبيب للريض
 طالب الدنيا قبح العركشيو
 الفكر الفنيه مخدومه ومن علم
 عنودانه فليس بحر وسيل ما قرب شي فعال الاجل وما
 في فعال الاجل وما السوت في فعال صاحب النواتي وما
 او جيش في فال لوت من كان شررا فالوت سب راج
 العالم من شمه اما جعل للانسان لسان واحد وادمان
 ليكونا يسه اكثر ما يتكلمه الذلا شيا استفاده الادب
 واستماع احبوا ولكن سمعت افجع ما اقتناه الانسان
 الصدق الحليم الصامت نسب الي العي والمكلم نسب
 الفضول ينعم الفنيه الخوله ما يمواعيل الاتفاق التكون
 كتر من ان يستكمه واما من استكمه سيرا فذلك واجب عليه
 الخ

PART THREE

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE MAMLUK ARMY

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CHAPTER FIVE

THE SULTAN'S *LAQAB*—A SIGN OF A NEW ORDER IN MAMLUK FACTIONALISM?

Amalia Levanoni

I

The regnal title, or *laqab* (pl. *alqāb*) first came into use during the Abbasid period. From the outset, it was designed to convey the image that a new ruler sought to accord himself.¹ While we are unable to examine the motives of the sultans of the Turkish Mamluk period (648–784/1250–1382) in choosing particular *laqabs* when they took the throne, it appears that we can discuss these intentions in the Circassian period (784–923/1382–1517), and show the new order in Mamluk factionalism that was undergirded by the *laqabs* they chose. All the sultans who came to power from within the ranks of the Mamluk army, rather than inheriting power from their fathers (with the exception of al-Muʿayyad Shaykh and Ṭūmanbāy), bore one of two regnal titles: al-Ẓāhir or al-Ashraf.

Behind the systematic recurrence of these two regnal titles lies, in fact, a political reality that differs from the model of Mamluk factionalism to which we have become accustomed. According to this model, the Mamluk sultan ensured his rule by fostering a faction of his own mamluks, purchased, trained and emancipated by him during his period of rule. The unity of the faction was based upon the mamluks' loyalty to their master, *ustādh*, and on solidarity among them, *khushdāshiyya*, throughout their master's life and afterward. The sultan's authority was assured when, in the course of his rule, he

¹ Jere L. Bacharach, "Laqab" for a Future Caliph: The case of the Abbasid al-Mahdi", *JAOs*, vol. CXIII (1993), 273–74. See: al-Qalqashandī, *Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad, Kitāb Ṣubḥ al-ʿashā fi šināʿat al-inshāʿ*, Cairo, 1913–1919, vol. V, 477, 486–88; Ibn Khaldūn, 'Abd al-Raḥmān, *Kitāb al-Ibar wa-dīwān al-mubtada' wa'l-khabar fi ayyām al-ʿArab wa'l-ʿAjam wa'l-Barbar wa-man ʿāṣarahum min dhāwī al-sultan al-akbar*, Beirut, n.d., vol. I, 227–28.

placed his mamluks in the highest echelons of the army and in key government positions in place of mamluks from his predecessor's faction. The unity of the Mamluk faction after the sultan's death ensured both its durability and its ability to continue holding the reins of power by supporting the sultanate of one of the amirs from within its own ranks. The cyclical nature of this process—the rise of new Mamluk factions triggering the fall of their predecessors—stood at the centre of the system of Mamluk factionalism.²

During the Circassian period, however, there were practices that did not fall into line with this model. Mamluks of the ruling sultan were promoted only minimally during his lifetime and, at the zenith of their power, were generally unable to unseat old factions from the higher echelons of the army. In reality, old Mamluk factions continued to be politically active long after the deaths of their founders, and as a result, fragments of factions, yesterday's allies and rivals, and individual mamluks could unite in coalitions in struggles for power through relationships that crossed factional boundaries. This perpetual relationship between old and new factions that extended through generations of mamluks created a new order in Mamluk factionalism. This new order necessitated general and permanent symbols that went beyond the *khushdāshiyya* of a specific faction in order to unite the Mamluk factions through the generations. One such symbol, perhaps the most important, was the sultan's regnal title. The aim of the present article is to clarify the new pattern of Mamluk factionalism in the Circassian period and the place of the sultan's *laqab* in it.

II

During the Circassian period there was a recurring phenomenon in the way in which the sultans built up their armies. Even sultans like al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh (815–824/1412–1421), al-Ashraf Barsbāy

² David Ayalon, "Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, vol. XVI/i (London, 1953) (hereafter—Ayalon, "The Mamluk Army"), 206–10; idem, "l'Esclavage du Mamelouk", *Oriental Notes and Studies*, Jerusalem, 1951 (hereafter—Ayalon, "l'Esclavage"), Introduction, IV–V; idem, "The System of Payment in Mamluk Military Society", *JESHO*, vol. I/i (Leiden, 1958), 43–45.

(824–841/1422–1438) and al-Zāhir Jaqmaq (841–857/1438–1453), whose periods of rule were sufficiently long for them to build up Mamluk units of their own, promoted only a few of their *julbān*,³ the new mamluks they had purchased and trained during their rule. This was because they maintained separation between the commanding levels and the rank-and-file mamluks. They filled the ranks of the amirs mainly with veteran mamluks who had not grown up in their own Mamluk households, while the *julbān* were hardly ever granted amirate ranks.

After sixteen years of rule al-Ashraf Barsbāy left behind a class of amirs holding the rank of *muqaddam alf* (commander of a thousand), of whom only two were Ashrafi (that is, members of Barsbāy's personal household): Jānim al-Ashrafi and Qarājā al-Ashrafi, whose entry into the ranks of the senior amirs came after long periods of service. Jānim was a relative of Barsbāy who reached Egypt with some other relations at the beginning of Barsbāy's rule, and was an Amir of Forty (*amīr arbaʿīn*) for many years until, in 836/1432, he was awarded the rank of *muqaddam alf*.⁴ Qarājā was purchased by Barsbāy while the latter was still an amir, and was awarded the rank of *muqaddam alf* only in 838/1436.⁵

Throughout the period of Jaqmaq's rule, there was not a single amir from his *julbān* among those holding the rank of *amīr miʿa* (Amir of a Hundred) and *muqaddam alf*. At his death in 1453, there were only three of his mamluks among the amirs of lower rank: Qarājā served as keeper of the sultan's treasures (*khāzindār*) and held the rank of Amir of Forty, Lājīn was head of the royal armoury (*zard-kāsh*) with the rank of Amir of Ten (*amīr ʿashara*) and Timurbughā was second executive secretary (*dawādār thānī*) with the rank of Amir of Ten.⁶

³ *Julbān* often appear in the sources also as *ajlāb* or *mushtarawāt*.

⁴ Al-Sakhāwī, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Raḥman, *al-Dawʿ al-lāmiʿ li-aḥl al-qam al-tāsiʿ*, Beirut, n.d., vols. I–X (hereafter—al-Sakhāwī, *Dawʿ*), vol. III, 63–64; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Jamāl al-Dīn Yūsuf Abū al-Maḥāsin, *al-Manhal al-Ṣāfi waʿl-mustawfi bāda al-wāfi*, ed. Muḥammad Muḥammad Amīn, Cairo, 1985–1999, vols. I–VIII (hereafter—Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*), vol. IV, 217–18.

⁵ Al-Sakhawī, *Dawʿ*, vol. VI, 214.

⁶ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Jamāl al-Dīn Yūsuf Abū al-Maḥāsin, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira fi mulūk Miṣr waʿl-Qāhira*, Cairo, 1963–1972, vols. VII–XVI (hereafter—Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*), vol. XV, 450–51; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 304.

The custom of filling the ranks of the amirs with senior mamluks explains the fifteenth century phenomenon of numerous mamluks reaching a ripe old age and passing away while they still held senior positions. Jaqmaq rose to power when he was sixty-six years old and died at the age of eighty.⁷ Sultan Īnāl was a mamluk purchased by al-Zāhir Barqūq (784–801/1382–1399) and emancipated by Barqūq's son, al-Nāṣir Faraj. He was elevated from the post of commander-in-chief (*atābakiyya*) to rule in 857/1453, when he was seventy-two years old.⁸ Sultan Yalbāy, who was one of al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh's mamluks, was elevated from the *atābakiyya* to rule in 872/1467, when he was eighty years old.⁹ Al-Ashraf Barsbāy appointed Sūdūn min 'Abd al-Raḥmān, one of al-Zāhir Barqūq's veteran mamluks, governor of Syria in 837/1433 because he was ill and weak.¹⁰ Qānim min Ṣafar Khuḡā died at the age of seventy while still serving as commander-in-chief (*atābak al-ʿasākīr*).¹¹ Taghrī Birdī al-Baklamūshī died in 846/1442 at the age of eighty, while he held the rank of *muqaddam alf*.¹² Amir Tānībak al-Burdbakī, also one of al-Zāhir Barqūq's mamluks, held prominent posts consecutively under Barsbāy, Jaqmaq and Īnāl and died in 862/1457 at the age of ninety, still holding the office of *atābak al-ʿasākīr*.¹³ The chronicles and biographical dictionaries that address the Circassian period contain numerous other examples like these.¹⁴

⁷ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Jamāl al-Dīn Yūsuf Abū al-Maḥāsīn, *Mawrid al-laṭāfa fī man waliya al-saltana wa'l-khilāfa*, ed. Nabīl Muḥammad 'Abd al-ʿAzīz Aḥmad, Cairo, 1997, vol. II (hereafter—Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Mawrid al-laṭāfa*), 162; al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍawʿ*, vol. III, 71–72; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 454; Ibn Iyās, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad, *Badāʾiʿ al-zuhūr fī waqāʾiʿ al-duḥūr*, Cairo, 1982–1984, vols. I–V (hereafter—Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ*), vol. II, 451, 456; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 295.

⁸ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 60, 157; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Mawrid al-laṭāfa*, 269; al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍawʿ*, vol. II, 329; Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ*, vol. II, 367.

⁹ Al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍawʿ*, vol. X, 288; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 371; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Mawrid al-laṭāfa*, vol. II, 179.

¹⁰ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 20, 40.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, vol. XVI, 351.

¹² Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 56.

¹³ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 195–96.

¹⁴ Al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍawʿ*, vol. II, 269, 272, 273, 275, 311, 312, 315, 317, 330; vol. III, 2, 8, 26, 34, 36, 39, 42, 45, 56, 59, 60, 61, 67, 73, 75, 78, 174, 176, 177, 210, 276, 280, 285, 287, 306, 322; vol. IV, 7, 12, 13; vol. VI, 194, 195, 197, 198, 201, 216, 222, 223, 228, 229, 230, 231; vol. X, 164, 206, 269, 275, 280, 288, 292, 346; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. II, 329–32, 327, 434, 437–40, 449, 479; vol. III, 7–8, 80, 82, 83–84, 198, 216, 278, 493, 505; vol. IV, 13–16, 212, 215, 256–58, 259–60; vol. V, 10–12, 210–11, 213, 214, 286, 329, 330–31; vol. VI, 86, 140–49,

The recurrence of this separation between the amirs and *julbān* during the Circassian period indicates that it was an intentional policy which was designed to safeguard the sultan's position and rule from both his mamluks and the amirs. The *julbān*, whose power gradually increased and eroded the sultan's authority and the status of the amirs as early as the fourteenth century, were prevented from establishing a leadership of their own that would threaten the sultan's position. To the same extent that the alienation of the amirs from the *julbān* enabled the sultan to curb the latter, the *julbān* constituted a guarantee of his security from the aspirations of the senior, office-holding amirs. The terror sown by the *julbān*, with almost no intervention on the part of their master, cast fear into the hearts of the amirs and assured their submissiveness to the sultan.¹⁵

In 832/1428, the riots that the *julbān* staged against their master al-Ashraf Barsbāy and the amirs reveal the political balance achieved by the sultan in separating the command level from his rank-and-file mamluks. The riots began when the *julbān* learned of a consultation held between the sultan and his prominent amirs on ways and means of dealing with the *julbān*'s constant violations of public order and abuse of office-holders, which caused agitation among the senior mamluks. At this meeting, the *atābak al-ʿasākīr*, Amir Jār Quṭlū, advised the sultan to deal with the *julbān* rioters with an iron fist and to destroy them. His reasoning was that at any time of his choosing, the sultan could bring new mamluks into his service and that the veteran mamluks were preferable, for a hundred veteran mamluks were better than a thousand from the *julbān*. When the sultan tended

166, 172–73, 174, 175, 177–78, 180, 186–87, 345; vol. VII, 16, 17; idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 155, 198; vol. XV, 40, 151, 157, 160–61, 179, 200, 470, 477, 525, 526, 551; vol. XVI, 19, 20, 162, 163, 174, 176, 183, 188, 189, 192, 196, 199, 200, 205, 207, 211, 213, 312, 315, 316, 330, 332, 335, 338, 339, 343, 351; idem, *Hawādith al-duhūr fī madā al-ʿayyām waʿl-shuhūr*, ed. Muḥammad Kamāl al-Dīn ʿIzz al-Dīn, Cairo, 1990, vols. I–II (hereafter—Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Hawādith*), vol. II, 391, 466, 473, 474, 507, 550, 554, 601; Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ*, vol. II, 66, 322–23, 341, 342, 345, 348, 351, 360, 388, 389, 393, 403, 411, 417, 422, 431, 433, 434, 435–36, 438, 441, 443, 446, 470; vol. III, 18, 35, 41, 42, 55, 92, 116, 125, 148, 150, 152, 176, 177, 178, 183, 192, 193, 194, 199, 207, 318, 321, 411–12, 414, 421, 433.

¹⁵ Amalia Levanoni, "The Mamluk Conception of the Sultanate", *IJMES*, vol. XXVI (1994) (hereafter—Levanoni, "Sultanate"), 386; idem, *A Turning Point in Mamluk History: The Third Reign of al-Nasir Muhammad ibn Qalawun 1310–1341*, Leiden, 1995 (hereafter—Levanoni, *A Turning Point*), 93–132. For examples see: Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XII, 92; Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ*, vol. II, 407, 411.

to accept Jār Quṭlū's opinion, Baybughā al-Muẓaffarī, who was then supervisor of the royal council chamber (*amīr majlis*), explained the importance of the *julbān*, even at the cost of compromise with their rebellious conduct, in these words: "By God, had it not been for the *mushtarawāt* mamluks, no one of us would have obeyed you" [*wa-allāhi lawla al-mamālik al-mushatrawāt mā aṭā'aka wāḥid minnā*].¹⁶

When the *julbān* got wind of the meeting and its content, they attacked one of Jār Quṭlū's mamluks; he was able to repel them and managed to reach his master's house, which was promptly attacked by the *julbān*. Jār Quṭlū and his mamluks, who had fortified themselves in the house, succeeded in defeating the *julbān* and putting them to flight. The defeat of the *julbān* despite their large number [*ma'a kathraṭihim*]¹⁷ stemmed, so the historian Yūsuf Ibn Taghrī Birdī (d. 874/1470) tells us, "from the lack of unanimous agreement among them and the flight of most of them" [*li-'adm ijimā' kalimatihim wa-li-firār aktharihim*].¹⁸ Their defeat also stemmed from "their lack of experience in wars, lack of training and weapons" [*li-'adm ma'rifatihim bi'l-ḥurūb wa-li-qillat durbatihim wa-silāḥihim*].¹⁹ Next day the *julbān* demanded that the sultan hand over their enemies from among Jār Quṭlū's mamluks, but the sultan was at a loss and decided not to accede to this demand but to punish Jār Quṭlū's mamluks himself, a solution that would not arouse the ire of the amirs. And so he "flogged them, but not with the necessary seriousness" [*wa-ḍarabahum ḍarban laysa bi-dhāka*].²⁰ The *julbān*, who realized the significance of the previous day's defeat, viewed this solution as a reasonable fulfillment of their demands. This incident created tension between the amirs and the sultan. The latter was unable to ignore the amirs' anger and again found himself at a loss until he managed to make peace between the *julbān* and the amirs.

This revolt by the *julbān*, like numerous other cases of their breaches of public order, highlights their weakness despite their great power. Their military experience was limited in the extreme, and this might

¹⁶ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 327.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 328; al-Jawharī, 'Alī b. Dāwud al-Ṣayrafī, *Nuḥat al-nufūs wa'l-abbān fi tawārikh al-zamān*, ed. Ḥasan al-Ḥabashī, Cairo, 1970–1994, vols. I–IV (hereafter—al-Jawharī), vol. III, 158.

¹⁸ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 329.

¹⁹ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 328; al-Jawharī, vol. III, 158.

²⁰ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 329.

well have been part of the sultan's intentional policy of limiting their power. We learn from the sources that although their numbers were great, their weapons were limited in quantity.²¹ The sultans also avoided sending them on military campaigns, possibly because they feared risking the investment they had made by purchasing and training them, and perhaps because they feared the possibility of any relationship emerging among the *julbān*, the amirs and the senior mamluks, who almost exclusively bore the brunt of the wars.²² David Ayalon believes that the sultans did not send the *julbān* out of Cairo for fear that if they did, they would be overthrown.²³

A result of the sparse representation of the *julbān* in the ranks of the amirs was that they lacked political experience, too, and they were deprived of a mature leadership which could have unified them and initiated them in the political secrets of the mamluks' inter-factional struggles after the deaths of their masters. Barsbāy purchased numerous mamluks during his reign; their number reached two thousand at one point, but some died in the epidemics of 833/1429 and 841/1437.²⁴ After his death he apparently left some fifteen hundred *julbān*.²⁵ Despite their numbers, the majority were left in disarray after the death of their master in 842/1438, when they failed to unite around his son, al-ʿAzīz, and secure his rule from the threat of the veteran Mamluk coalition led by Jaqmaq, one of al-Zāhir Barqūq's mamluks. First, a group of *julbān* led by a non-senior amir, Īnāl al-Abū Bakrī, broke away from the main body of *julbān* as a result of internal strife and joined Jaqmaq.²⁶ The remainder of the Ashrafiyya mamluks, who were the majority, enjoyed a number of advantages that enabled them to defeat their opponents. The Abbasid shadow-caliph was at the Citadel, Qalʿat al-Jabal, with al-ʿAzīz, thus lending legitimacy to his rule. They were fortified in the

²¹ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nijūm*, vol. XIV, 328; al-Jawharī, vol. III, 158.

²² Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nijūm*, vol. XVI, 231.

²³ Ayalon, "The Mamluk Army", 205; Idem, "The Plague and Its Effects upon the Mamluk Army", *JRAS* (London, 1946) (Reprinted in *Studies on the mamluks of Egypt (1250–1517)*, London, Variorum Reprints, 1979), 72.

²⁴ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nijūm*, vol. XV, 108; idem, *Maʿrūd al-laṭāfa*, 154; al-Jawharī, vol. III, 192, 194, 416.

²⁵ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nijūm*, vol. XV, 240; al-Jawharī, vol. III, 440.

²⁶ Al-Jawharī, vol. III, 438–39, 424–25; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nijūm*, vol. XV, 234, 241; Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ*, vol. II, 193; al-Maqrīzī Aḥmad b. ʿAlī, *Kiṭāb al-Sulūk li-maʿrīfat duwal al-mulūk*, ed. Muṣṭafā Ziyāda and Saʿīd ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ ʿAshūr, Cairo, 1930–1973, vols. I–IV (hereafter—al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*), vol. IV, 1094.

Citadel, which commanded the surrounding area and protected them from the senior mamluks at the foot of the hill. And most important, they controlled the treasury and the sultan's arsenal. Yet after a short battle they surrendered.²⁷ Ibn Taghrī Birdī estimates that their failure stemmed from the fact that “they were ignorant of the stratagems of conflicts . . . They had no experience and they had not practiced wars. And what is more, they never brought close any one of the veterans or the experienced. Therefore they went astray [*illā annahum juhhāl li-makā'id al-akḥsām . . . lam tamurrā bihim al-tajārib walā mārasū al-waqā'ī wa-a'zam min hādhā annahum lam yuqarribū aḥadan mina al-akābir wa-arbāb al-ma'rifa fa-dallū*].”²⁸

Jaqmaq had no difficulty in overcoming the Ashrafi mamluks. In the negotiations he held with them after the battle, with the mediation of the chief judges, they displayed no political sophistication. Their inexperienced leaders submitted to the terms laid down by Jaqmaq in return for peace, evacuated their barracks (*tibāq*, sing. *tabaqa*) in the Citadel, and went down to their dwellings in Cairo. Approximately fifteen hundred mamluks left the Citadel.²⁹ The attempts at revolt by the Ashrafiyya mamluks against Jaqmaq that came after their expulsion from the Citadel were likewise unsuccessful, again because of their inexperience and the dissension among them.³⁰ On the other hand, in 857/1453, a short time after the death of Jaqmaq, these same Ashrafiyya mamluks were already well-acquainted with the intrigues of the inter-factional power struggles, both political and military.³¹

The young mamluks, the *julbān*, of al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh were also expelled from their barracks in the Citadel and sent down into Cairo.³² After they were dispersed, leaving them to their own devices, Amir Ṭaṭar, who administered government matters on behalf of al-Mu'ayyad's son, began to conciliate them and calm their fears until

²⁷ Al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 1074, 1076.

²⁸ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 235–36, 253; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 1074–76; al-Jawharī, vol. III, 438.

²⁹ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 240, 241; al-Jawharī, vol. III, 439, 440, 443; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 1074–76; al-'Aynī, Badr al-Dīn Maḥmūd, *Iqd al-jumān fī ta'rīkh ahl al-zamān*, ed. Muḥammad Muḥammad Amīn, Cairo, 1988 (hereafter—al-'Aynī, *Iqd*), 511.

³⁰ Al-Jawharī, vol. III, 440, 433–48; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī*, vol. II, 386–87.

³¹ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 31, 35–37, 38, 40, 44, 227, 229, 234.

³² Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī*, vol. II, 73.

“each of them joined one of Ṭaṭar’s followers [*‘alā anna kull wāḥid minhum intamā li-shakḥ min ḥawāshī Ṭaṭar*].”³³ The *julbān* of al-Zāhir Jaqmaq suffered the same drawbacks; there was no agreement among them [*‘arā’uhum maftūka wa-kalimatuhum ḡayr mundabīta*].³⁴ As in previous cases, they were in the Citadel with their master’s son, al-Manṣūr ‘Uthmān, and despite their large number and the weapons they had at their disposal, they were passive and did not plan their battle against the multi-faction mamluk group that formed against them. Despite their awareness of the strategic importance of the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan, which commanded the approach to the Citadel, they did not go out and place guards on it.³⁵ On the last day of the battle, when their opponents burst into the hippodrome at the foot of the Citadel, the *julbān* fled the Citadel, leaving its gates open wide for no reason.³⁶ Once again, their failure stemmed from “their being young and inexperienced; they had no practice in wars and did not know which deception or stratagem to employ against their enemies, and they had no amirs . . . who understood these things . . . [*li-kawnihim shabāban lam tamurra bihim al-tajārib, wa-lā lahum mumārasa bi’l-ḥurūb, wa-lā ya’rifūna naw’an min anwā’ al-khadī’a wa’l-makr bi-akhṣāmihim wa-ayḍan lam yakun ‘indahum mina al-umarā’ . . . mimman lahu khībra bi-hādhihi al-anwā’*].”³⁷

Neither did the *julbān* of al-Ashraf Īnāl succeed in defending the rule of his son, al-Mu’ayyad Aḥmad, which would have been in their interest. Once they saw that they would be unable to withstand a battle with the veteran mamluks, they became indifferent and “each one cared only for his own interest [*wa-akhadha kull wāḥid . . . fī maṣlaḥat nafsihi*].”³⁸

These examples, and many others, of *julbān* who, at the beginning of their careers, were inexperienced and lost in the Mamluk political maze, but who became wily foxes in the army and in politics after they had achieved seniority in the system, confirms the impression that the sultan had every intention of limiting the *julbān*’s experience.

³³ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nijūm*, vol. XIV, 196.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. XVI, 41.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 42, 46.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 51–52; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Hawādith*, vol. II, 420.

³⁷ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nijūm*, vol. XVI, 49; idem, *Hawādith*, vol. II, 420.

³⁸ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nijūm*, vol. XVI, 247, see also 240, 242, 246.

The breakup of the *julbān* and their departure from the Citadel, which became a matter of routine during this period,³⁹ left the political and military arena empty of the biggest and strongest Mamluk faction. However, the sultans' practice of filling the ranks of the commanding class with senior mamluks granted the amirs a position in government. That status, albeit monitored, in the face of the *julbān*'s inexperience and disintegration, accorded the minority factions an advantage and power that under the circumstances were sufficient for them to take power.

III

In the interim phase between the expulsion of the *julbān* from their barracks in the Citadel and their return to the political-military arena united as a minority faction, they were absorbed into new frameworks. Some of those expelled from the Citadel were reinstated in the Mamluk sultan's household (known as *sultani*), usually after they had been carefully screened and classified.⁴⁰ The employment possibilities that faced the majority of the *julbān* were in the Mamluk households of the amirs in Egypt and Syria. We learn from the sources that in 805/1402, two hundred and thirty *sultani* mamluks were left unemployed.⁴¹ As mentioned earlier, the majority of al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh's *julbān* entered the service of the amirs who were followers of Ṭaṭar on an individual basis.⁴² After the death of Sultan Barqūq (801/1399), Ṭaṭar himself was one of the *julbān* who fled from al-Nāṣir Faraj and wandered from place to place in Syria. Ṭaṭar joined the Mamluk household of Amir Jakam min 'Awd, and with the latter's death he joined up with the two rebel amirs in Syria, Nawrūz al-Ḥāfiẓī and Shaykh al-Maḥmūdī, who later became sultan. Later, when these two fought each other for rule, Ṭaṭar chose to join Shaykh al-Maḥmūdī, and when the latter came to power, Ṭaṭar returned to the *Sultani* household, gaining continuous promotion until he attained the rank of Amir of a Hundred.⁴³ In con-

³⁹ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 197 see also, *ibid.*, vol. XVI, 368.

⁴⁰ See for example: *ibid.*, vol. XIV, 204; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī*, vol. II, 73.

⁴¹ Al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. III, 1103.

⁴² Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 196.

⁴³ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. VI, 397–98; idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 35, 56, 64, 103; idem, *Mawrid al-laṭāfā*, 144; al-Sakhāwī, *Daw'*, vol. IV, 7. See also page 105 of this article.

trast, Yashbak al-Sāqī joined Nawrūz, and this choice cost him years of incarceration during the period of al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh's rule.⁴⁴ A similar fate awaited Taghrī Birdī al-Maḥmūdī al-Nāşiri.⁴⁵ After the death of his master, Sultan al-Nāşir Faraj, Qānī Bāy al-Abū Bakrī served various amirs, such as Arghūn Shāh al-Nawrūzī and Bardbak al-Jakamī al-ʿAjamī, finally entering the service of Ṭaṭar, who promoted him when he rose to power.⁴⁶

It is worthy of note that with the death or removal of amirs by the sultan, their mamluks, too, moved into new mamluk households. Some were taken by the sultan and made sultani mamluks, while others sought positions with the amirs. Īnāl al-Jakamī was one of Amir Jakam min ʿAwd's mamluks, and when his master died he entered the service of Amir Sūdūn Buqjā al-Zāhirī. He later moved into the service of al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh when the latter was still an amir. As a result, he was advanced during al-Mu'ayyad's rule.⁴⁷ Qānī Bāy al-Ḥamzāwī was one of Tanam al-Ḥasanī's mamluks, and after his master's death he was purchased by Sūdūn al-Ḥamzāwī during the rule of al-Nāşir Faraj. After Sūdūn's death, Qānī Bāy consecutively served a number of amirs and finally entered the service of al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh, who, on taking the throne, awarded him an amirate. Qānī Bāy's case was not exceptional, for he was one of a large group of Ḥamzāwī mamluks who served al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh for a long while after their master's death.⁴⁸ Al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh held the opinion that the *ṣayfiyya*, i.e., the amirs' mamluks, were experienced soldiers, and therefore he employed and promoted many of them.⁴⁹

The sources note the entry of mamluks into the service of the amirs, using terms like *ittaşala bi . . .*, *inḍamma ilā . . .*, *intamā li . . .* and

⁴⁴ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 151; al-Jawharī, vol. III, 140; al-ʿAynī, *Iqd*, 347; al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍawʿ*, vol. X, 276; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. III, 205, 206; Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Aḥmad b. ʿAlī, *Inbāʿ al-ghumr bi-abnāʿ al-ʿumr*, HaydarAbad, 1974–1975 (hereafter—Ibn Ḥajar), vol. VIII, 166. For more examples see: Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 157, 179, 180–81.

⁴⁵ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 179. See also 130; idem, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 52.

⁴⁶ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 520–21. For more examples see: *Ibid.*, 339; idem, *Manhal*, vol. II, 476; vol. IV, 91–92; al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍawʿ*, vol. III, 39, 53; vol. VI, 194, 220–21; vol. X, 275.

⁴⁷ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. III, 197.

⁴⁸ Al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍawʿ*, vol. VI, 195; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 201–2. See also al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍawʿ*, vol. II, 319, 328; vol. III, 39, 77, 277, 279, 283, 284; vol. X, 165; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. II, 438; vol. IV, 21, 257; vol. VI, 167; idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 195, 240; vol. XV, 130, 161, 184, 239, 240; al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍawʿ*, vol. X, 275; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Ḥawādith*, vol. I, 195, 238, 305, 308; vol. II, 351, 394, 465, 550–51.

⁴⁹ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 112.

others.⁵⁰ These terms indicate the voluntary relationship between the mamluk and the amir. The entry of the sultani mamluks into the service of the amirs was based on the mutuality required by a relationship between free men. This was because these mamluks were already emancipated when they were expelled from the Citadel. Those mamluks who were included in the *kuttābiyya* at the deaths of their masters, were still in training and retained the status of slaves. Therefore they were left in the barracks and purchased by the new sultan. While the master was alive, the master-mamluk relationship was binding. The only way the mamluk could break this tie was to desert his master even when, *prima facie*, he was already a free man.⁵¹ In contrast, there was no such obligation in the relationship between emancipated mamluks and amirs, who were not their masters. The relationship could be severed whenever one of the parties wished, and we have indeed found that these mamluks moved from the service of one amir to another without limitation.

The status of mamluks who joined the amirs' households was, no doubt, also different from that of mamluks who were purchased by the amirs. The sources define their status as *atbāʿ* (s. *tābiʿ*), in the sense of 'followers', i.e., those who were only attached to the household and were not part of its nucleus. The different status of the brothers Ḥasan and Ḥusayn, who both served in an amir's household, explains the difference between the status of the *atbāʿ* and that of the amirs' own mamluks. The two brothers fled their hometown of Bahasnā (a fortress in Aleppo province) when Timur invaded Syria, and reached Egypt some years later. Ḥasan, the older of the two, served Amir Qarā Sunqur al-Zāhirī under terms defined by Ibn Taghrī Birdī as *tabāʿan*, i.e., he had the status of a *tābiʿ*.⁵² Mubārak Shāh al-Muzaffarī, too, was employed by Sultan Barqūq under the same conditions while the latter was still a rank-and-file mamluk and certainly could not purchase mamluks of his own.⁵³ Therefore the historian Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Sakhāwī (d. 902/1497)

⁵⁰ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nijūm*, vol. XIV, 239, 244; vol. XV, 150, 170; al-Sakhāwī, *Dawʿ*, vol. VI, 194; vol. X, 165, 345.

⁵¹ See for example: Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nijūm*, vol. IX, 104–5; idem, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 59; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. II, 356.

⁵² Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nijūm*, vol. XV, 471–72; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 1152; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 51–52. For further examples see: al-Sakhāwī, *Dawʿ*, vol. II, 312; vol. III, 71; vol. IV, 12; vol. VI, 197; vol. X, 289.

⁵³ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nijūm*, vol. XIV, 125.

defines Mubārak Shāh as one of Barqūq's *atbā'*.⁵⁴ To return to Ḥasan's brother, after working as a tailor's apprentice in Cairo he, too, entered the service of a Mamluk amir, Īnāl Ḥaṭab al-'Alā'ī, but as a mamluk of his *kuttābiyya*. On the death of the amir, he was transferred to Amir Taghrī Birdī, who changed his name from Ḥusayn to Taghrī Barmish and continued his training as one of his mamluks in the barrack; Ḥasan, by contrast, had no need to change his name. It should be remembered that in the Mamluk elite it was customary for the mamluks' names to be Turkish or Circassian as this was a marker of their status.⁵⁵ Another indication of a strong bond between Ḥusayn and his master is that when the former fled with two other mamluks, it caused their master and instructor great sorrow, and steps were taken to bring them back and punish them. The case of Ḥasan and Ḥusayn, then, shows clearly that the status of the *tābi'* was inferior to that of the amir's mamluk.

Not by chance, the expressions that became commonplace in the sources for describing the *julbān*'s moving from one Mamluk household to another also reflect their hardship and humiliations during this period. Examples of such expressions are "He suffered the various vicissitudes of fate after the death of his master [*qāsā khuṭūb al-dahr alwānan ba'da mawt ustādhihi*]",⁵⁶ "His life was spent in remote places [*inqaḍā 'umruhu fī ashtāī*]",⁵⁷ "Later, fate humiliated him after the death of his master and he served a number of amirs [*thumma haṭṭahu al-dahr ba'da mawt ustādhihi wa-khadama 'inda jamā'a mina al-umarā'*]]."⁵⁸

⁵⁴ Al-Sakhāwī, *Daw'*, vol. VI, 237. There is a clear difference in the sources between the amir's mamluks and his *hawāshī*, see for example: Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nijūm*, vol. XVI, 44; vol. XV, 117; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī'*, vol. II, 322.

⁵⁵ David Ayalon, "The Mamluk City and the Mamluk Military Aristocracy", *Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities*, vol. II (Jerusalem, 1968), 322; idem, "Names, Titles and 'Nisbas' of the mamluks", *Israel Oriental Studies*, vol. V (Tel-Aviv, 1975) (Reprinted in idem, *The Mamluk Military Society*, Variorum Reprints, London, 1979), 193; See also: Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nijūm*, vol. XV, 354.

⁵⁶ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 237; vol. VII, 13, 15; idem, *Hawādith*, vol. II, 551; al-Jawharī, vol. III, 324; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 953, 1061; al-Sakhāwī, *Daw'*, vol. III, 7, 8, 45, 62, 63, 279, 285; vol. VI, 199, 201, 225, 231; vol. X, 170, 205, 276, 279; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī'*, vol. II, 467; vol. III, 51, 91.

⁵⁷ Al-Sakhāwī, *Daw'*, vol. X, 276; see also *ibid.* vol. IV, 93, 149; vol. VI, 220–21, 222; al-Jawharī, vol. III, 140, 206, 340; al-'Aynī, *Iqd*, 347.

⁵⁸ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nijūm*, vol. XV, 520. For additional examples see: idem, *Mawrid al-laṭāfa*, 183; al-Sakhāwī, *Daw'*, vol. II, 197, 327; vol. X, 272–80; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 239; idem, *Nijūm*, vol. XVI, 316; idem, *Hawādith*, vol. II, 452, 466; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī'*, vol. II, 4, 62, 71, 417; vol. VI, 174.

The conditions of the *atbāʿ* in the amirs' households were, perhaps, the reason for their great mobility, for it might well be that they sought to improve their lot. The mamluks' mobility in the service of the amirs created a dynamic and intricate system of relationships that connected various Mamluk factions and blurred the boundaries of the *khushdāshiyya*. The network of personal relationships created by the mamluks during this phase of their career was based upon friendships in far smaller and more intimate frameworks than those of the sultanic factions of *julbān* housed in the Citadel barracks; these factions consisted of thousands of mamluks. The above-cited examples of the mamluks' service to the amirs, and particularly of those who later rose to power and promoted their followers, show the importance of this system of personal relationships in the building of the amir stratum in the Mamluk regime. It was also important for the formation of coalitions that supported the government, for behind the amirs stood Mamluk households that extended the factional fabric. As a research case of this system of relationships, I will later show the networks of personal friendships of the sultans Ṭaṭar, Barsbāy and Jaqmaq prior to their rise to power, and the role these networks played in filling the ranks of the amirs during their regimes.

IV

The entire picture of the network of personal relationships in the Mamluk system is incomplete without an examination of the framework in which the mamluks were trained to be soldiers. During the training period, there were certain practices which, by their very nature, fostered deeper personal relationships among the *julbān* than the somewhat abstract *khushdāshiyya* that was supposed to unify them in the *ṭibāq*, or barracks, into a consolidated Mamluk faction. We shall limit ourselves here to two practices. The first is the custom of dividing the *julbān* into groups, each of which lived in one of the Citadel's barracks.⁵⁹ The *ṭibāq* classification system was usually based on the *julbān*'s ethnic origins.⁶⁰ Thus, for example, mamluks who had

⁵⁹ Ayalon, "Esclavage", 9–12; Levanoni, *A Turning Point*, 12–13.

⁶⁰ Al-Maqrīzī, Aḥmad b. ʿAlī, *Kitāb al-Mawāʿiẓ wa'l-ʿiṭibār fī dhikr al-khūṭaṭ wa'l-*

been brought from al-Ghūr (in today's Afghanistan) were housed in the Ṭabaqat al-Ghūr.⁶¹

The second custom was to bind fresh mamluks, *inyāt* (sing. *inī*), with senior mamluks, *aghāwāt* (sing. *aghā*),⁶² in an apprenticeship bond so that the latter would guide the former during the training period, aside from the curriculum, which was the responsibility of the *ṭibāq*'s professional staff. Thus, for example, during Barqūq's rule Qaşrūh min Timrāz was one of Jāribāsh al-Shaykhī's *inyāt* and Tānibak al-Burdbakī was one of Taghrī Birdī's.⁶³ Yashbak al-Jakamī had *inyāt* from among the mamluks of Sultan al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh.⁶⁴ Taghrī Birdī, Qaşrūh's relative, was Khushqadam's *aghā*.⁶⁵ Tanibak al-Bijāsī and Sūdūn al-Māridānī were Jār Quṭlū al-Zāhirī's *inyāt*.⁶⁶ During Barsbāy's period of rule, Khujā Sūdūn had *inyāt* in the Ṭabaqat al-Ṭāziyya and Īnāl in Ṭabaqat al-Ashrafiyya.⁶⁷

The division of the mamluks purchased by the sultan in the course of his rule into groups housed in different barracks, and the special relationships that existed between the trainees and their instructors from among their elder colleagues, quite naturally created hierarchical categories of loyalty and solidarity among the *julbān* that can be described simply in terms of circles of affiliation. In the inner, nuclear circle stood the relationship between the *inyāt* and the *aghāwāt*

athār, Cairo, 1987, vol. II, 213; al-Zāhirī, Ghars al-Dīn, Khalīl b. Shāhin, *Zubdat kashf al-mamālik wa-bayān al-turuq wa'l-masālik*, ed. Paul Ravaisse, Paris, 1894, 27; Ayalon, "l'Esclavage", 9–12; Robert Irwin, "Factions in Medieval Egypt", *JRAS*, 1986 (hereafter—Irwin, "Factions"), 239–40.

⁶¹ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 504.

⁶² The word *aghā* is used in the sources to define the veteran Mamluks, see for example: Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIII, 116; vol. XIV, 200, 243; idem, *Manhal*, vol. III, 262; al-Sakhāwī, *Daw'*, vol. X, 272. Eunuchs serving as instructors and supervisors of the mamluks in the sultani barracks were often called *aghāwāt*: Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 399; vol. XVI, 117. Sometimes sultans and amirs were approached out of respect with the title of *aghā*: *ibid.*, vol. XVI, 47; idem, *Hawādith*, vol. II, 416; idem, *Manhal*, vol. II, 501; vol. IV, 262.

⁶³ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 199; vol. XVI, 196. See also: idem, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 149.

⁶⁴ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 217.

⁶⁵ Idem, *Mawrid al-latāfa*, 173.

⁶⁶ Idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 38; vol. XV, 120–21, 188; idem, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 212, 213.

⁶⁷ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. VI, 169. For other examples see: idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 201; vol. XVI, 255, 260, 267; al-Sakhāwī, *Daw'*, vol. II, 329; vol. III, 26; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. III, 6, 169, 279; vol. IV, 59; vol. VII, 12; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī*, vol. I/ii, 665; vol. II, 81; vol. III, 197, 246, 284, 308; vol. IV, 247, 296, 308, 399; al-Jawharī, vol. III, 437.

that was the most personal and intimate. In the second circle, there was the bond among the mamluks from the same *ṭabaqa*. The outer, widest circle contained all the sultan's mamluks, the *khushdāshīyya*. In contrast to the Mamluk system model, whereby the Mamluk faction is shown as a single unified collective, this order of affiliation of the *julbān* presents different levels in the *khushdāshīyya* and endows it with a more qualified meaning.

An example illustrating the three circles of mamluk affiliation can be found in the division of the *julbān* after the death of Sultan al-Ashraf Barsbāy in 842/1438. The Ashrafiyya split into two groups that fought each other for power. The first was consolidated around the mamluks' identification with their *ṭabaqa* and *aghā*. Its members were defined in the sources as the *inyāt* and brothers of their leader, Īnāl al-Abū Bakrī from the Ṭabaqat al-Ashrafiyya [*min inyāt Īnāl wa-ikhwatihi*].⁶⁸ The second group consisted of *julbān* defined as their *khushdāshīyya*, i.e., their colleagues from other barracks. With regard to the measure of solidarity in each of the groups, Īnāl al-Abū Bakrī's group was smaller and more consolidated and knew how to negotiate with veteran Mamluk factions, though eventually their demands were not met due to their weakness. The rival faction, however, consisted of the majority of al-Ashraf Barsbāy's *julbān*, but due to the great schism among them [*ikhhtilāf arā'ihim*],⁶⁹ they were easily dispersed by the senior mamluks and even easily driven out of their *tibāq* in the Citadel, despite the strategic and political advantage they held.⁷⁰

The importance of the *ṭabaqa* as a place enabling the consolidation of the mamluks housed in it into an organized group with its own specific interests, which did not fall into line with the *khushdāshīyya* of the whole Mamluk faction, is borne out by the skirmish among the mamluks of the *tibāq* in the Citadel that took place in Dhū al-Ḥijja 920/February 1515. The mamluks from Ṭabaqat al-Ṭāziyya attacked those from Ṭabaqat al-Zammāmiyya with clubs because the latter had backed down from their demands to Sultan Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī (906–922/1500–1516) for a wage increase in order to curry favour with him and thus gain an advantage over their fellows. The

⁶⁸ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 235. For another example see: al-Sakhāwī, *Daw'*, vol. X, 272; al-Jawharī, vol. III, 437.

⁶⁹ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 236; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 1049.

⁷⁰ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 236, 239–40; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 1074, 1076.

Ṭabaqat al-Ṭāziyya mamluks felt that the mamluks from all the barracks should unite in their demand for a raise of a hundred dinars for each mamluk. When each party maintained its position, a split opened among the sultan's mamluks between those who sided with the sultan and those who opposed him. The crisis was resolved when the sultan promised all the mamluks a raise of fifty dinars per person, with payment being deferred for two months.⁷¹

The relationship between the *aghā* and the *inī* took on the characteristics of patronage that was bound up in moral commitment throughout their careers.⁷² There were even mamluks who were named after their respective *aghās*. One such mamluk was Ṭūkh Māzī, who was one of al-Nāṣir Faraj's mamluks and was named after his *aghā*, Māzī al-Zāhirī.⁷³ Similarly Sūdūn al-Qāḍī was named after his *aghā*, Tanibak al-Qāḍī.⁷⁴

As was mentioned earlier, Sūdūn al-Māridānī and Tanibak al-Bijāsī were Jār Quṭlū's *inyāt*, and much later, when both had surpassed their *aghā*'s status, Ibn Taghrī Birdī tells us, Tanibak al-Bijāsī was grateful to him for the education he had given him and continued to honour and respect him in recognition of days gone by.⁷⁵ On the recommendation of Sūdūn al-Māridānī, Sultan Barqūq enrolled Jār Quṭlū into his bodyguard, or *khāṣṣakiyya*.⁷⁶ Normally, it was the *aghā* who was the *inī*'s advocate with the sultan and was concerned with his promotion and advancement.⁷⁷ In his youth, Sultan al-Zāhir Khushqadam was made a *khāṣṣakī* in Barsbāy's bodyguard on the recommendation of his *aghā*, Taghrī Birdī.⁷⁸

The bond between the *aghā* and the *inī* stood also at the center of the friendships among the *inyāt* who were affiliated to the same *aghā*, thus forming exclusive groups within the *ṭabaqa*. Mamluks who belonged to such groups felt very close and preserved their friendship many years after their manumission. Thus Asandamur was one

⁷¹ Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī*, vol. IV, 430–31; for another example see: idem, *Badā'ī*, vol. III, 147.

⁷² Ayalon, "l'Esclavage", 31–34.

⁷³ Al-Sakhāwī, *Daw'*, vol. IV, 9; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. VII, 12.

⁷⁴ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 159.

⁷⁵ Idem, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 212. For another example see: idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 200.

⁷⁶ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 212, 213.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 213. For other examples see: *Ibid.*, vol. II, 338–39; al-Sakhāwī, *Daw'*, vol. III, 30, 281.

⁷⁸ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 255.

of Jārikas al-Muṣārī's *inīs* in the Ṭabaqat al-Zammāmiyya (see also later). Many years after they left the *ṭabaqa*, Asandamur and his friends were described by Ibn Taghrī Birdī as Jārikas' band [*rifqa*].⁷⁹

The special relationship between the *inyāt* and the *aghāwāt* in the barracks and the solidarity that the mamluks had with their colleagues of the same *ṭabaqa* explain the phenomenon, which was common during the Circassian period, of the confusion felt by *kuttābiyya* mamluks who were purchased by the new sultan from the estate of his predecessor. These mamluks lacked a sense of solidarity and often even felt alien to the *julbān* purchased during the rule of their new master. All were formally the sultan's mamluks as they had been purchased, trained and emancipated by him. However, the *kuttābiyya* mamluks were of two minds. They identified with the previous sultan's veteran mamluks, with whom they had been trained during their first period of *kuttābiyya*. It is not difficult, therefore, to imagine the crisis they underwent when their masters changed. This was because the custom of an ascending sultan during this period was, as mentioned above, to dispose of their predecessor's *julbān*, and so, quite suddenly, the *ṭibāq* were emptied and the *kuttābiyya* were bereft of their older colleagues. Furthermore, in many cases they had to adapt to a new professional staff.⁸⁰ Therefore, despite the advantage of their status as the ruling sultan's *julbān*, they often rebelled against their new master and even joined their older colleagues, with whom they really identified.

The revolt which broke out in 859/1455, some two years after Sultan al-Ashraf Īnāl rose to power, brought to the surface the solidarity between the mamluks of the *julbān* the sultan had purchased from the *kuttābiyya* of his predecessor, al-Zāhir Jaqmaq, and their senior colleagues from the Zāhiriyya. It is worthy of note that there was no prior liaison between the *julbān* and Jaqmaq's Zāhiri mamluks. The *julbān*'s protest began because of their demand for higher wages, or *jawāmik*. In order to further their claims they surrounded Amir Yūnus, the sultan's ink bearer (*dawādār*) at the time, as he left the Citadel and asked him to intercede with the sultan on their

⁷⁹ Idem, *Manhal*, vol. II, 448. On the place of old friendship for the Mamluk see: Abū Hāmid, Muḥammad b. Khalīl al-Qudsī, *Kitāb Duwal al-Islām al-Sharīfa al-bahiyya*, Ṣubḥī Labīb and Ulrich Haarmann (eds.), Beirut, 1997, 114.

⁸⁰ See for example: al-Jawharī, vol. III, 440; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 203–4; vol. XV, 248; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 1076.

behalf. When it appeared to Yūnus's mamluks that the *julbān* intended to harm their master, they attacked them, wounding several. As a result, the *julbān* rioted and demanded that Yūnus be handed over to them. When this did not happen, they moved to his house to loot it and burn it down, but there, too, Yūnus's mamluks beat them off. Sultan Īnāl tried to appease the *julbān* by compensating their wounded, but they were not to be conciliated and stood in the Horse Market throughout the night, albeit they were unarmed. When the sultan sent four amirs to negotiate with them, the amirs were taken hostage. An expeditionary force was, coincidentally, to have set out to engage the Bedouin in al-Buḥayra (a western province in the Nile Delta), and in the force were Jaqmaq's Ṣāhiri mamluks. This force, however, refused to go to al-Buḥayra as the mamluks had not been given camels, as was customary before a military campaign. Initially the Ṣāhiri mamluks stood aloof and watched the *julbān*, but once it became clear that the latter were rebelling against their master, they joined them in order to avenge the injustice they believed he had done them. The Ṣāhiri mamluks instructed the *julbān* to recruit the Abbasid caliph to their cause in order to improve their position in the struggle. Once the caliph took their side, they were joined by numerous mamluks from various factions and a large mob from the civilian population. In the end, the size of the camp mustered against the sultan frightened the *julbān* and they fled the scene, one by one. The *julbān*, then, intended to protest against the sultan but not to depose him.⁸¹ The sources tell us that from that time the schism within the *julbān* was clear-cut. They split into two groups, one consisting of those mamluks bought by Sultan Īnāl from the *kuttābiyya* of al-Ṣāhir Jaqmaq and his son (the latter had ruled for only one month), and the second composed of the *julbān* Īnāl had purchased during his period of rule.⁸²

Whereas the above case shows that the *julbān* "of two minds" got cold feet and eventually backed down from their revolt for fear of losing their status as a privileged Mamluk faction, with the downfall of their new master, in a period of changing rule, they had no compunction about identifying entirely with their colleagues from

⁸¹ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Ḥawādith*, vol. II, 528–32; idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 87–90.

⁸² Idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 91; idem, *Ḥawādith*, vol. II, 532; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ir*, vol. II, 326–28.

their initial training period. The same two *julbān* groups of al-Ashraf Īnāl openly faced one another after his death in 865/1461. At the side of his successor, al-Mu'ayyad Aḥmad, who ruled for only a few months (February–June 1461), stood the *julbān* purchased by Īnāl during his rule, their number reaching one thousand mamluks, while those he had purchased from the estate of al-Zāhir Jaqmaq and his son joined the Zāhiriyya at the instigation of Amir Jānībak, who supported the candidacy of one of its number, Khushqadam, for the throne. Apart from the attractive benefits he granted to them, Khushqadam played on their group affiliation, saying, “You are Zāhiriyya and your purchase by al-Ashraf is not right [*antum Zāhiriyya wa-shirā' al-Ashraf lakum ghayr saḥīḥ*]”.⁸³ It should be noted that the problem of the technical transfer of the *kuttābiyya* mamluks from one sultan to another had arisen earlier in the above-mentioned revolt of these *julbān* against Īnāl. After this revolt, Īnāl had arrested a number of Zāhiri mamluks and driven a large number of the *julbān* out of the Citadel barracks into Cairo, when the following words of one of his *julbān* from the *kuttābiyya* of al-Zāhir Jaqmaq came to his ears: “We are the emancipated slaves of al-Malik al-Zāhir and were trained by him. I cannot be an emancipated slave of al-Ashraf Īnāl [only] by a piece of paper . . . [*nahnu 'utaqā' al-Malik al-Zāhir wa-tarbiyatuhu walā aṣīr 'atīq al-Malik al-Ashraf Īnāl bi-qiṭ'at waraqa*]”.⁸⁴

Towards the end of al-Ashraf Qāyṭbāy's reign (900/1494), a conflict broke out between two groups of Ashrafi mamluks that ultimately encompassed the entire army and threatened the sultan's rule.⁸⁵ One group was led by Āqbirdī, who was not only one of Qāyṭbāy's mamluks but also his brother-in-law.⁸⁶ The second was headed by Qānṣūh Khamsmī'a. According to Muḥammad b. Aḥmad Ibn Iyās (d. 931/1524), one version has it [*yuqāl*] that Qānṣūh Khamsmī'a was purchased from the *kuttābiyya* of al-Zāhir Khushqadam.⁸⁷ At a consultation held by Qāyṭbāy it became clear that most of the army had in fact gathered around Uzbek,⁸⁸ who was then commander-in-chief,

⁸³ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 242.

⁸⁴ Idem, *Hawādith*, vol. II, 538.

⁸⁵ Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, vol. III, 311. In fact this conflict between these two groups of Mamluks goes back as early as 892/1486; see: *ibid.*, 237, 285, 309, 311–12.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 178, 421.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 354.

⁸⁸ He was the founder of Uzbekiyya quarter west to Fāṭimid Cairo; *ibid.*, 116–18.

or *atābak al-ʿasākīr*. Further information gathered from the sources shows that he had joined the rebels because Qānṣūh Khamsmīʿa was his son-in-law⁸⁹ and that Uzbek, like Qānṣūh, was a Zāhirī. He was identified with al-Zāhir Jaqmaq and close to him also because he had married two of his daughters.⁹⁰ After Qāyṭbāy's death (902/1496) the *julbān* were again split according to the lines drawn in this revolt.⁹¹

It should be noted that the daring of the *julbān* from the previous sultan's *kuttābiyya*, who did not form a majority among the *julbān* of the ruling sultan, and their open identification with their senior colleagues stemmed from the new factional order that had been created in the Circassian period. In this new order, there was room for the Zāhiriyya or Ashrafiyya veteran mamluks to take part in Mamluk politics for a very long time after their masters death and it was from among them that the new sultan came to power. Therefore, when the *julbān* were driven out of the *ṭibāq* and dispersed after the death of their master, there was an advantage in the *kuttābiyya* identifying with their senior colleagues as this could rapidly bring them closer to the new regime and winning offices in it. I will expand on this in the last part of this article.

V

The mamluks' personal relationships during their training period in the barracks and those created during their service in the amirs' Mamluk households were intertwined, forming a network on which Mamluk politics were based. This network determined the movements of mamluks between the government's coalition and opposition on which the stability of the regime actually depended. To illustrate the way in which this network of personal relationships worked, I will focus on the way in which Sultans Ṭaṭar and Barsbāy filled the ranks of their amirs and the implications of this strategy on the constituents of the coalition that supported their rule.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 241, 242, 311.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 412.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 342–51.

Fortunately, the sources have left us sufficient information on the history of these sultans from the beginning of their training in the barracks to their rise to power. Al-Zāhir Ṭaṭar was originally from Sultan Barqūq's *julbān*, and like Barsbāy and Jaqmaq was trained in the Ṭabaqat al-Zammāmiyya, but he was more senior by one intake, or *kharj*.⁹² Clearly, the three knew one another in their *ṭabaqa* during their training in the *kuttābiyya* and this relationship was the centre of personal connections which, in one way or another, continued throughout their lives. Ṭaṭar and Barsbāy were very close friends.⁹³ Thus Ṭaṭar protected his friend when al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh wanted to imprison him, and then facilitated his promotion in Damascus, far away from al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh's eyes. When Ṭaṭar took the reins of rule and became the *de facto* ruler on behalf of al-Mu'ayyad's son (824/1421), Barsbāy was appointed *dawādār kabīr* with the rank of *muqaddam alf*⁹⁴ after being redundant in Damascus.⁹⁵ Barsbāy was sent to Syria as Ṭaṭar's trusted right arm to settle a disagreement with the latter's opponents, and as a result of his blandishments they came to Damascus, where they were liquidated, thus paving Ṭaṭar's way to rule.⁹⁶ A short time after Ṭaṭar's rise to power, he fell ill and on his deathbed he willed his rule to his son, who was a minor, with Barsbāy as his legal guardian and Jānībak al-Ṣūfī responsible for management of rule.⁹⁷

"There was a firm friendship [*suḥba akīda*]" between Barsbāy and Amir Ṭarabāy.⁹⁸ This amir returned from Iraq immediately after hearing that Ṭaṭar was the man making the decisions in government.⁹⁹ Ṭaṭar was unable to give him an office immediately, but promised him that he would do so when he took the throne. Upon his ascension, he appointed Ṭarabāy grand chamberlain (*ḥājib al-ḥujjāb*).¹⁰⁰ Later, when Barsbāy rose to power he appointed Ṭarabāy

⁹² Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. III, 256; idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 199.

⁹³ Al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 583; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī*, vol. II, 72, 81; al-'Aynī, *Iqd*, 502.

⁹⁴ Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī*, vol. II, 72; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 201; al-Sakhāwī, *Daw'*, vol. III, 8; al-'Aynī, *Iqd*, 503.

⁹⁵ Al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 581.

⁹⁶ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 192; idem, *Manhal*, vol. III, 207–8.

⁹⁷ Idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 206; idem, *Manhal*, vol. III, 258–59; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 587; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī*, vol. II, 74.

⁹⁸ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 277; vol. XV, 195.

⁹⁹ Idem, *Manhal*, vol. III, 260; vol. VI, 374–75; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī*, vol. II, 72.

¹⁰⁰ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. VI, 375; idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 201.

atābak al-‘asākīr, the most senior position in the mamluk army. Ṭarabāy helped Barsbāy overcome Jānībak al-Ṣūfī, who vied with Barsbāy for rule.¹⁰¹ Even later, when Ṭarabāy wanted power for himself and openly opposed him,¹⁰² Barsbāy did not forget their friendship. He released Ṭarabāy from prison in 827/1423, granted him a thousand dinars and sent him to Jerusalem “to stay there without being in a plight [*li-yuqīma bihi ghayr muḍayyaq ‘alayhi*]”.¹⁰³ Those around Barsbāy thought that Ṭarabāy’s release ran counter to any political logic, but Barsbāy paid them no heed because of “the old affection and friendship they had from their early days [*līmā kāna baynahumā minā al-wudd al-qadīm wa’l-ṣuḥba min mabādī‘ amrihimā*]”.¹⁰⁴ In 831/1427, Barsbāy appointed Ṭarabāy governor of Tripoli, an office he held until his death in 838/1434. Ibn Taghrī Birdī estimates “that had it been anyone else he would not have treated him this way”.¹⁰⁵

With regard to Ṭaṭar’s relationship with Jaqmaq, once Ṭaṭar’s status had risen, he appointed Jaqmaq prefect of the Citadel with the rank of *muqaddam alf*¹⁰⁶ and named him his deputy when he went to quell a rebellion in Syria.¹⁰⁷ There was also a close friendship between Barsbāy and Jaqmaq as both were *inyāt* of Jārikas al-Muṣārī‘, who was Jaqmaq’s older brother. As Jārikas was one of Barqūq’s favourite mamluks of the *khāṣṣakiyya*, it was due to the latter’s request that Jaqmaq came to the Ṭabaqat al-Zammāmiyya and became Jārikas’ *inī*.¹⁰⁸

Another of Jārikas al-Muṣārī‘’s *inīs* was Asandamur al-Nūrī.¹⁰⁹ This relationship gained the latter access to Ṭaṭar’s coterie and the

¹⁰¹ Idem, *Manhal*, vol. III, 259, 260; vol. VI, 375–76; idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 211–20, 230; al-Jawharī, vol. II, 517, 518; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 591.

¹⁰² Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 226–31; Ibn Iyās, *Badā’i‘*, vol. II, 76.

¹⁰³ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 277.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. XV, 195; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 952; al-Jawharī, vol. III, 324. For another friend of Barsbāy see: Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 224.

¹⁰⁶ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 212; Ibn Iyās, *Badā’i‘*, vol. II, 119, 140.

¹⁰⁷ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 203; Ibn Iyās, *Badā’i‘*, vol. II, 66–67; al-Jawharī, vol. II, 503.

¹⁰⁸ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 258, 260; idem, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 211, 275–76; idem, *Hawādith*, vol. II, 461; Ibn Iyās, *Badā’i‘*, vol. II, 81; al-Sakhāwī, *Daw’*, vol. III, 71; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Mawrid al-laṭāfa*, 152; idem, *al-Dalīl al-shāfi fī al-Manhal al-sāfi*, ed. Fahīm Muḥammad Shaltūt, Cairo, 1983 (hereafter—Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *al-Dalīl al-shāfi*), vol. I, 234.

¹⁰⁹ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. II, 447–48. See also: Ibn Iyās, *Badā’i‘*, vol. II, 77.

appointment of amir with the rank of *muqaddam alf*. When Barsbāy took power, he first appointed Asandamur governor of Alexandria, leaving him with his rank. Later, when one of Barsbāy's opponents escaped from the Alexandria jail, Asandamur's negligent and selfish life style was brought to the surface. Yet Barsbāy pardoned him after a short time and even gave him the rank of *muqaddam alf* in Damascus. When Jaqmaq rose to power (841/1437), Asandamur expected promotion as he was his close colleague and his brother's *im̄*.¹¹⁰ Because of his commitment to Asandamur, neither Jaqmaq got rid of him, but awarded him a monthly salary of five thousand dirhams until his death at seventy in 848/1444.¹¹¹ Asandamur was out of the ordinary because of his problematic character. In fact, Jaqmaq promoted during his reign many of his brother's *inyāt* and his company [*rifqatuhu*].¹¹² Thus, for example, Qānī Bāy al-Jārikasī, who was also a relative of Ṭaṭar, was included at the beginning of his career in the latter's *khāṣṣakiyya*. Later, during Jaqmaq's reign, due to his family ties, he was rapidly promoted to the highest rank in the army and nominated consecutively as *shādd al-sharāb khāna* (supervisor of the royal buttery), *Dawādār kabīr* and *amīr ākhūr kabīr* (grand supervisor of the royal stables).¹¹³

Taghrī Barmish was a mamluk who was given to Jārikas al-Muṣārī' as a gift by his brother Jaqmaq. With the removal of Jārikas by al-Nāṣir Faraj for joining a revolt against him, Taghrī Barmish was taken from his estate into Faraj's *kuttābiyya*. With the elimination of Faraj, he was again moved to al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh's *kuttābiyya*. When Jaqmaq demanded ownership of him with the claim that he was his brother's legal heir, al-Mu'ayyad did not give him up, arguing that Taghrī Barmish was an asset to his household because he was well-versed in the Koran and knew fiqh. Al-Mu'ayyad compensated Jaqmaq with money and another mamluk. When Ṭaṭar rose to power and Jaqmaq had free access to him, he returned Taghrī Barmish to him because Ṭaṭar had sought legal grounds for his return and made him his own *khāṣṣakī*. Barsbāy, however, banished this Taghrī Barmish

¹¹⁰ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. II, 448.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 448–49.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 448.

¹¹³ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 198; vol. XVI, 316; al-Sakhāwī, *Daw'*, vol. VI, 194. See also: al-Sakhāwī, *Daw'*, vol. X, 288; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 170; idem, *Hawādith*, vol. II, 349, 390, 507.

to Qūs, apparently because of his coarse behaviour, and for the same reason, Jaqmaq did not accede to Taghrī Barmish's requests for a senior amirate. Yet, because of his commitment to Taghrī Barmish, Jaqmaq did grant him an *iqṭā'* and an Amirate of Ten in 844/1440. Then he appointed him vice regent of the Citadel, a post he held until 851/1447.¹¹⁴ In the same way, Jaqmaq's commitment to 'Ali b. Īnāl al-Yūsufī—his master before he moved to Barqūq's household at his brother's request—ultimately made him include 'Ali's two sons, Aḥmad and Ṭūmān Bāy, among his amirs.¹¹⁵

A gift sent to Sultan Barqūq by Amir Duqmāq al-Muḥammadī, who at the time was governor of Malatya, included eighteen mamluks, among whom were Barsbāy and Timrāz al-Qurmushī. The friendship between the two, which had begun in Duqmāq's Mamluk household, continued throughout Barsbāy's life and brought him into the close circle round Jaqmaq. When Barsbāy rose to power Timrāz became one of the amirs who were closest to him [*muqarraban ilā al-ghāya*]¹¹⁶ and maintained this status until Barsbāy's death. When Jaqmaq rose to power Timrāz became one of the senior office-holders in his regime, with the rank of *muqaddam alf*. A short time later he was appointed *amīr silāh*, or the sultan's arms bearer, a position he held for a long period until his death in the epidemic of 853/1449.¹¹⁷

Qaṣrūh min Timrāz, Timrāz al-Qurmushī's mamluk, was another of the stalwarts of Barsbāy's rule. When Ṭaṭar rose to power, Qaṣrūh was given the office of *ra's nawba* (head of the royal guard) and, after a short time, served as *amīr ākhūr* with the rank of *muqaddam alf*. He was very active in preparing the ground for Barsbāy's rise to power. Barsbāy kept him in this position and later appointed him *amīr ākhūr* and governor of Tripoli, Aleppo and Damascus consecutively.¹¹⁸

Qaṣrūh min Timrāz and Uzbek al-Muḥammadī were *inīs* of Barsbughā al-Muzzaffarī at the Ṭabaqat al-Rafraf. This connection brought Uzbek close to Ṭaṭar and Barsbāy. Upon Ṭaṭar's rise to power, Uzbek was promoted to an amirate of Forty and later to an

¹¹⁴ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 68–70; idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 530–32; al-Sakhāwī, *Daw'*, vol. III, 33; al-Jawharī, vol. IV, 133–34.

¹¹⁵ Idem, *Hawādīth*, vol. II, 352, 501–2.

¹¹⁶ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 149; vol. V, 310; al-'Aynī, *Iqd*, 500–2.

¹¹⁷ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 460, 536–37; idem, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 149. For another example see: idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 213–14.

¹¹⁸ Al-Sakhāwī, *Daw'*, vol. VI, 222; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 202; vol. XV, 199.

amirate of a Hundred and *taqdimat alf*. When Barsbāy rose to power he served as *ra's nawbat al-nuwwāb* and later as *dawādār kabīr*. In 831/1427 he was removed from office as a result of a false accusation that he wanted to rebel against the sultan.¹¹⁹

Barsbāy's forgiveness towards Ṭarabāy and that of Jaqmaq towards Taghrī Barmish and Asandamur al-Nūr, in contrast to his severity towards Uzbek al-Muḥammadī, show the existence of different levels of personal connections within the same Mamluk household. The relationship between Ṭarabāy and Barsbāy and that between Jaqmaq, Taghrī Barmish and Asandamur al-Nūrī were closer and therefore more binding than relationships among mamluks from different barracks, even if they were all affiliated to one master.

It is worthy of mention that during the Circassian period it was customary to recruit relatives into the Mamluk army, and special envoys were often sent by sultans and dominant amirs to bring them to Egypt from the Caucasus. Amirs and mamluks also entered the sultans' families by marriage. These familial relations by both birth and marriage were also instrumental in the formation of the sultan's coterie. Thus Ḥasan b. Sūdūn, Ṭaṭar's brother-in-law, was appointed Amir of a Hundred and *muqaddam alf*.¹²⁰ Yashbak, Barsbāy's eldest brother, reached Egypt when Barsbāy was already sultan and died in 833/1429, holding the rank of *muqaddam alf*.¹²¹ Jānim, too, was a relative who was brought to Egypt by Barsbāy in 828/1425. Initially he was one of Barsbāy's *khāṣṣakiyya*, and by 836/1432 he already held the rank of *muqaddam alf*.¹²²

Another way in which the mamluk network of personal relationships became stronger was, as mentioned earlier, through the mamluks' service in the amirs' Mamluk households after the deaths of their masters. During the civil war that lasted for some twelve years after the death of Barqūq, Ṭaṭar, like many other mamluks, moved from

¹¹⁹ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nijūm*, vol. XIV, 201; vol. XV, 157–58.

¹²⁰ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. VI, 164. For further example see: idem, *Hawādith*, vol. II, 471; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i*, vol. II, 472–73; al-Sakhāwī, *Daw'*, vol. II, 274, 275, 312, 315; vol. III, 4, 7, 8, 21, 37, 53, 64, 65, 220, 284, 286, 287; vol. VI, 196, 221–22, 223, 227; vol. X, 166, 270, 271, 280, 336; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 101, 217–18.

¹²¹ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nijūm*, vol. XIV, 291; vol. XV, 165.

¹²² Al-Sakhāwī, *Daw'*, vol. III, 63. For further example see: Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Hawādith*, vol. II, 476; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i*, vol. II, 309, 319, 367, 369, 423, 430, 469; vol. III, 104, 107, 110, 145, 153, 171, 175, 190, 213, 249, 276, 288, 298; al-Jawharī, vol. III, 258; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. II, 346; vol. V, 15, 327; vol. VI, 164–65, 186; Ibn Ḥajar, vol. VIII, 396.

the service of one amir to another. He first deserted from al-Nāṣir Faraj b. Barqūq's army, finding refuge with Jakam min 'Awḍ, who rebelled in Egypt in 804/1401 and who later, in 809/1406, occupied Syria with the support of Nawrūz al-Ḥāfiẓī, declaring himself an independent sultan.¹²³ It is worthy of note that in 807/1404, Jakam's rebel camp in Syria included Jārikas al-Mūṣārī' and Qarā Yūsuf, the Turcoman ruler of Iraq who had fled before Timur's invaders.¹²⁴ When Jakam was defeated and murdered by the Turcomans in Syria, Ṭaṭar moved into the service of Nawrūz al-Ḥāfiẓī in Syria.¹²⁵ After the removal of al-Nāṣir Faraj from the Egyptian throne, Nawrūz did not recognize al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh's sultanate too and rebelled in Syria.¹²⁶ With Nawrūz's defeat, his mamluks and amirs and those who had joined him were pursued by al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh.¹²⁷ In contrast, Ṭaṭar found a way of entering al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh's service,¹²⁸ advancing to the rank of *muqaddam alf* and serving in senior positions such as *ra's nawba* and *amīr majlis*.¹²⁹ Before his death, al-Mu'ayyad bequeathed the throne to his son Aḥmad, who was then only one year old, and appointed Ṭaṭar as Aḥmad's legal guardian until the return of Aḷtunbughā al-Qirmishī, the *atābak al-ʿasākir*, from a campaign in Syria.¹³⁰

Prior to Ṭaṭar's rise to power, during the short period in which he ruled in the name of the young al-Muzaffar Aḥmad, the sources indicate that mamluks from the Jakamīyya and the Nawrūziyya, i.e., mamluks of Jakam min 'Awḍ and Nawrūz al-Ḥāfiẓī respectively, were already in his service.¹³¹ Yashbak al-Jakamī was one of Jakam's

¹²³ Al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. III, 1084–85; vol. IV, 13, 17–18, 20–21, 35, 41; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 314–17; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Abū Bakr b. Aḥmad, *Tārīkh Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba*, ed. 'Adnān Darwīsh, Damascus, 1997 (hereafter—Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba), vol. IV, 266–67; al-Jawharī, vol. II, 140–42, 229–31, 513–14; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī*, vol. II, 71.

¹²⁴ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 317; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. III, 1159–60; al-Sakhāwī, *Daw'*, vol. III, 76.

¹²⁵ Al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 45–46; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī*, vol. II, 71–72.

¹²⁶ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nijūm*, vol. XIV, 6–7; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 246–50; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī*, vol. II, 71–72; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, vol. II, 318.

¹²⁷ See for example: Taghrī Barmish al-Maḥmūdī: Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nijūm*, vol. XV, 179; al-Sakhāwī, *Daw'*, vol. IV, 9. See below also the amirs that found asylum in Iraq.

¹²⁸ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. VI, 397; al-Jawharī, vol. II, 513.

¹²⁹ Al-Jawharī, vol. II, 353, 393, 415.

¹³⁰ Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī*, vol. II, 64, 71–73; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. VI, 398; idem, *Mawrid al-laṭāfa*, 140.

¹³¹ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nijūm*, vol. XIV, 208.

mamluks who had fled from al-Mu'ayyad and found refuge with Qarā Yūsuf, who in the meantime had returned to rule Baghdad and Tabriz. When he heard that Ṭaṭar had taken power, he returned from Iraq and was immediately appointed *amīr ākhūr kabīr*.¹³² Jānibak al-Jakamī was another mamluk of Yashbak al-Jakamī; he served as a *khāṣṣakī* during the rule of Barsbāy, and during Jaqmaq's rule, he was first the sultan's cupbearer (*sāqī*) and later was awarded an amirate. Among the positions he filled were *ra's nawba*, *wālī* (prefect) of Cairo and *ḥājib* (chamberlain).¹³³ Qānī Bāy al-Abū Bakrī was one of al-Nāṣir Faraj's mamluks who first served Burdbak al-Jakamī, i.e., one of Jakam's mamluks, and later served Ṭaṭar during the period of his amirate.¹³⁴ On his rise to power, Ṭaṭar appointed him *ra's nawba* and awarded him an amirate of forty.¹³⁵ During the rule of Barsbāy and Jaqmaq he was among the amirs with the rank of *Muqaddam alf*. He served as vice regent of Malatya, and *atābak* in Aleppo and Damascus, among other positions.¹³⁶ Shād Bak al-Jakamī, Sūdūn al-Jakamī, Qānī Bāy, Burdbak al-Jakamī and Īnāl al-Jakamī were all Jakam's mamluks who were promoted by Ṭaṭar, Barsbāy and Jaqmaq.¹³⁷

Yashbak al-Sāqī, known as al-A'raj, was one of Barqūq's mamluks, serving first in the *khāṣṣakiyya* and later as Barqūq's *sāqī*. Yashbak was a close friend of Ṭaṭar since their training period [*wa-kāna min ikhwat Ṭaṭar*]. They both served in Jakam min 'Awd's and Nawrūz al-Ḥāfiẓī's households. Because he had served Nawrūz, Yashbak was exiled to Mecca by al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh. From the outset al-Mu'ayyad intended to exile him to Yemen because he was concerned that he would incite the mamluks when they made the pilgrimage, or *ḥajj*. Ṭaṭar, however, begged al-Mu'ayyad for mercy and succeeded in having Yashbak's punishment commuted to exile in Mecca rather than in Yemen. In the same way, Ṭaṭar later facilitated Yashbak's

¹³² *Ibid.*, 201; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī*, vol. II, 72; al-Sakhāwī, *Daw'*, vol. X, 275.

¹³³ Al-Sakhāwī, *Daw'*, vol. III, 61–62; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. IV, 242. For another example see: al-Sakhāwī, *Daw'*, vol. II, 330.

¹³⁴ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 520.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. XIV, 202; vol. XV, 520.

¹³⁶ Al-Sakhāwī, *Daw'*, vol. VI, 194.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. III, 56; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. III, 196–200, 252–53, 263; vol. IV, 242; idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 469, 511, 547; vol. XVI, 196; idem, *Hawādith*, vol. II, 512–13; al-Sakhāwī, *Daw'*, vol. III, 7. Jakamiyya and Nawrūziyya mamluks joined Jaqmaq's camp in 842/1438. See: al-Jawharī, vol. III, 437.

transfer from Mecca to Jerusalem. When Ṭaṭar rose to power, he brought Yashbak back to Egypt and made him his close adviser. When Ṭaṭar went to Syria to quell a rebellion, he left Yashbak in the Citadel to guard his wives.¹³⁸ Ṭaṭar died before he could award Yashbak an amirate, but Barsbāy did so, awarding him the ranks of Amir of a Hundred and *muqaddam alf* in one fell swoop [*daf'atan wāḥidatan*] and appointing him *amīr silāḥ*. From this rank he moved to the highest office, *atābak al-ʿasākīr*, serving in this capacity until his death in 831/1427.¹³⁹

Uzbek al-Ṭūmān Bāyī was one of Barqūq's mamluks who was promoted by Nawrūz al-Ḥāfīzī, al-Muʿayyad's rival in Syria, to the most senior amirate rank. After Nawrūz's rebellion had been suppressed, Uzbek was imprisoned for a number of years in Marqab (a fortress in Syria near the Bāniyās). He was released by al-Muʿayyad in 822/1419 and was awarded an insignificant amirate, Amir of Five, in Damascus. When Ṭaṭar came to power, Uzbek became one of his confidants. He was awarded the rank of Amir of a Hundred and *muqaddam alf*, and with the death of Ṭaṭar, Barsbāy awarded him the office of *ra's nawbat al-nuwwāb*. In 827/1423 he was appointed to the office of *dawādār kabīr*, which he filled most admirably until 831/1427.¹⁴⁰ Qānshūh al-Nawrūzī, Arghūn Shāh al-Nawrūzī, Arkamās al-Nawrūzī, Sūdūn al-Nawrūzī, Īnāl al-Nawrūzī and Jānībak al-Nawrūzī were all Nawrūz al-Ḥāfīzī's mamluks who were promoted during the rule of Ṭaṭar and Barsbāy, and part of them even during Jaqmaq's.¹⁴¹

A clear illustration of the interweaving of personal relationships within the *khushdāshiyya* and outside it into a single network that influenced the mamluks' decisions as to which faction to join during power conflicts over rule, can be found in the power struggle between Barsbāy and Jānībak al-Ṣūfī after the death of Ṭaṭar in 824/1421.

¹³⁸ Al-Sakhāwī, *Dawʿ*, vol. X, 276–77; al-ʿAynī, *ʿIqd*, 346–47; al-Jawharī, vol. III, 140–41; Ibn Ḥajar, vol. VIII, 166–67.

¹³⁹ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 225; vol. XV, 151; al-Sakhāwī, *Dawʿ*, vol. X, 277. See also Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. II, 207–8; vol. IV, 51–52.

¹⁴⁰ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. II, 338–40; idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XV, 157. For another example see: al-Sakhāwī, *Dawʿ*, vol. III, 7.

¹⁴¹ Al-Sakhāwī, *Dawʿ*, vol. III, 61; vol. VI, 199; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. II, 324–27, 334; vol. IV, 248; vol. VI, 166, 172–73, 177; vol. VII, 16; idem, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 220; idem, *Hawādith*, vol. II, 472; al-Jawharī, vol. II, 437, 509; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 1074.

Zāhiri amirs like Ṭarabāy, Jānibak al-Ḥamzāwī, Sūdūn min ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, Qurmuṣh al-A‘war, Mūsā al-Karkarī and others, were *khushdashīyya* of Ṭaṭar and Barsbāy. They were honoured and awarded offices by Ṭaṭar on their return from Iraq, and likewise by Barsbāy immediately after the death of Ṭaṭar. However, they joined Jānibak al-Ṣūfī against Barsbāy because they felt closer to him.¹⁴² When Barsbāy asked Qurmuṣh al-A‘war to leave Jānibak al-Ṣūfī’s group and join him, Qurmuṣh replied: “How can I not be with him, for I bore him on my shoulders in the land of Jarkas and raised him like a child [*Kayfa lā akūnu ma‘ahu wa-qad ḥamaltuhu ‘alā kitfayya fī bilād Jarkas wa-rabbaytuḥu ka’l-walad*]”.¹⁴³ Thus Barsbāy was unable to compete with Qurmuṣh’s commitment to Jānibak, but this commitment of friendship and the recognition of Jānibak’s leadership and seniority by these amirs did not prevent them from eventually leaving him and joining Barsbāy.¹⁴⁴ Their hatred of Yashbak al-Jakamī, who was in their camp, tipped the balance. He had treated them with a lack of respect when they were with Qarā Yūsuf in Iraq, and they could not bear the idea that Jānibak, too, had made him one of his close companions, just as Qarā Yūsuf had done, and demanded that he be sent to Syria. Jānibak al-Ṣūfī, however, found it difficult to renounce Yashbak al-Jakamī because he had recruited his *imī*, Dūlāt Bāy al-Mu’ayyadī, into his camp, bringing with him his colleagues from among the Mu’ayyadiyya mamluks. It should be noted that Yashbak al-Jakamī entered the service of al-Mu’ayyad Shaykh when the latter was still an amir, and it was during this period that Dūlāt Bāy was

¹⁴² Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 36–37, 69, 164, 201, 212, 214, 215, 224; vol. XV, 120, 157, 179, 180–81; idem, *Manhal*, vol. VI, 274–75; al-Sakhāwī, *Daw’*, vol. III, 275; vol. IV, 7; vol. VI, 153–54, 200; vol. X, 276. For other amirs who came back from Iraq upon Ṭaṭar’s rise to power see: Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Manhal*, vol. II, 297.

¹⁴³ Al-Sakhāwī, *Daw’*, vol. VI, 221; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 235–36. See another example of personal commitment instrumental in promoting a mamluk: Ibn Iyās, *Badā’i‘*, vol. II, 69. It might well be that Qurmuṣh al-A‘war’s words refer to the Circassian practice known as *ataliqate* whereby boys of noble families were entrusted at an early age to vassals to be raised and trained in military fashion. Amjad Jaimoukha, *The Circassians*, Richmond (England), 2001, 175–77. During the Circassian period relatives were brought from the old country and at times mamluks’ offsprings born in Egypt were sent to the homeland to be raised traditionally. My thanks are due to Jane Hathaway for this information and her useful comments on this issue.

¹⁴⁴ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 215.

his *in̄*.¹⁴⁵ When the demands of these amirs were not met, they moved over to Barsbāy, thus deciding the power struggle in his favour. Ṭarabāy, who was Barsbāy's close friend, as was mentioned earlier, was also a member of this group of amirs. Quite naturally, he served as the mediator between these amirs and Barsbāy, and it was through his efforts that they moved over to Barsbāy's coalition.¹⁴⁶

The above case illustrates the convergence of the various types of personal relationships discussed in this work, creating a network that activated Mamluk factionalism. We have seen that the *khushdāshiyya* was split into groups with disparate interests and that it did not remain united as required by the Mamluk system model. The way in which the *khushdāshiyya* sub-groups were reunited indicates the links of personal friendship and the relationship between the *aghā* and the *in̄* as focal points in group unification. And finally, relationships that were formed in the amirs' Mamluk households crossed factional borders, binding sub-groups from different factions, like the Zāhiriyya and the Mu'ayyadiyya in this case, into new coalitions.

VI

Against the background of the structure of Mamluk factionalism described here, not a single coalition (*ḥizb*) was found in the Circassian period that formed around a candidate for rule in which *khushdāshiyya* was the central and the only unifying factor. Instead, Mamluk groups and individuals integrated into coalitions through a multi-dimensional network of connections. These forms of Mamluk coalitions stemmed from the two above-mentioned common practices in Mamluk politics during this period. One was the filling of the amirs' ranks with veteran mamluks, the faction of the majority of whom had been dispersed many years earlier. The second practice was the removal of the *julbān* from the *ṭibāq* in the Citadel. These two practices created a situation in which the *julbān* and the senior Mamluks had to cooperate as, first of all, the latter were left active in the political arena

¹⁴⁵ Al-Sakhāwī, *Daw'*, vol. X, 275; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 217. Even though the sources call Timur's invaders Tatars, they were no longer Mongol speakers. My thanks are due to Reuven Amitai for this information.

¹⁴⁶ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XIV, 214–17, 226–27.

side-by-side with new generations of mamluks. Second, with their removal from the barracks, a great number of *julbān* were forced to move through the amirs' Mamluk households. This phenomenon lessened the tension between senior and younger mamluks, thus making their participation in a single *ḥizb* easier. This kind of cooperation between the senior and younger mamluks called for new symbols of unity that would allow the integration of various Mamluk groups into a single coalition. The sultan's *laqab* became one of these symbols. With his rise to rule, the new sultan bore the *laqab* of the master of the coalition's dominant group, thus creating a new generation that carried the same name. When, in time, there were a number of factions bearing the same name, the *laqab* became the symbol of party allegiance.

The precedent of using the *laqab* of the faction's founder was set with the rise of Ṭaṭar to power in 824/1421. He took the *laqab* "al-Zāhir", which was that of his master, al-Zāhir Barqūq.¹⁴⁷ His aim was to gain legitimacy for rule as the Zāhiriyya were split and each faction viewed itself as the legitimate political heir of their common master, al-Zāhir Barqūq. Al-Ashraf Barsbāy's mamluks adopted the *laqab* "al-Ashraf".

Jaqmaq's ascent to power in 841/1438 was facilitated by a coalition formed of Barqūq's Zāhiriyya mamluks (Ṭaṭar had not managed to build up a Mamluk household of his own), Nāširiyya, Mu'ayyadiyya and individuals from the amirs' households—that is to say, *sayfiyya* mamluks—and even some Ashrafiyya mamluks of al-Ashraf Barsbāy.¹⁴⁸ Lack of cunning on the part of the Ashrafiyya leader gave the Zāhiriyya a dominant position in this coalition. Therefore, Jaqmaq was called al-Malik al-Zāhir, like his master, al-Zāhir Barqūq [*watalaqqaba bi'l-Malik al-Zāhir mithl laqab ustādhihi al-Zāhir Barqūq*].¹⁴⁹

Khushqadam, who rose to power in 685/1461, was one of al-Mu'ayyad's mamluks. In the coalition that brought him to power were mamluks from the Zāhiriyya, Nāširiyya, Mu'ayyadiyya, Ashrafiyya and *sayfiyya*. The Zāhiriyya already included Barqūq's and Jaqmaq's mamluks. The Ashrafiyya of this coalition included, as noted above,

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. XIV, 198; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī*, vol. II, 71; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Mawrid al-laṭāfa*, 146; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 582.

¹⁴⁸ Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī*, vol. II, 198–99.

¹⁴⁹ Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī*, vol. II, 198; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nijūm*, vol. XV, 246–47, 252–54; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 1086, 1087–88; al-Jawharī, vol. IV, 19.

those mamluks who were purchased by Īnāl, the deceased sultan, from the *kuttābiyya* of Jaqmaq and therefore they regarded themselves as part of the *Zāhiriyya*.¹⁵⁰ As the *Nāṣiriyya* and *Mu'ayyadiyya* were by then small and very old minority factions, the *Zāhiriyya* formed the dominant majority in this coalition. In the negotiations with the rival *Ashrafiyya* party, Jānibak al-*Zāhiri*, the *Zāhiriyya* coalition leader, succeeded in persuading Īnāl's *Ashrafiyya julbān* to put *Khushqadam* in power until their candidate for the sultanate, Jānim al-*Ashrafī*, then the vice-regent of Damascus, returned from Syria, arguing that *Khushqadam* was weak and could be easily deposed. It is of importance to note that this case exposes the peaceful nature of Mamluk politics achieved by a factional system based on two parties only. *Khushqadam*'s ascent to power was concluded by negotiations between the two rival parties which took place in his own dwelling.¹⁵¹ Once the *Ashrafiyya* agreed on *Khushqadam*'s election, his *laqab* became "al-*Zāhir*".¹⁵²

In the struggle between the *Zāhiriyya* and the *Ashrafiyya* in 872/1467 that brought about al-*Zāhir* Yalbāy's rise to power, the *Zāhiriyya* already included two groups of mamluks. One was *al-Zāhiriyya al-kibār* (the elder *Zāhiriyya*) and the second was *al-Zāhiriyya sikhār* (the younger *Zāhiriyya*). It is not entirely clear whether *al-Zāhiriyya al-kibār* included *Barqūq*'s veteran mamluks in addition to those of *Jaqmaq*, for if they were still alive then, they would have been very old indeed. It is clear, however, that the *al-Zāhiriyya al-sikhār* were *Khūshqadam*'s freshest mamluks, who were dominant in this coalition.¹⁵³ A similar coalition brought *Timurbughā* to power a few months later, and therefore he also bore the *laqab* "al-*Zāhir*".¹⁵⁴

Qānṣūh min Qānṣūh, who ruled for approximately two years, from *Rabī' al-Awwal* 904/October 1498 to *Dhū al-Ḥijja* 905/June 1500, was an *Ashrafī* who bore the *laqab* "al-*Zāhir*". His rule was backed by part of *Qāyṭbāy*'s *Ashrafiyya* faction. This is, *prima facie*, the first

¹⁵⁰ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 40, 242.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 237–40, 245, 253, 324; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī*, vol. II, 377–78, 381, 382, 387. See another example, Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī*, vol. II, 465, 469; vol. III, 5, 6.

¹⁵² Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 237. On the dominance of the al-*Zāhiriyya* in this coalition see: Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī*, vol. II, 410–11, 455, 458–59, 462.

¹⁵³ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 306, 356, 359; al-Sakhāwī, *Daw'*, vol. X, 288; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī*, vol. II, 455, 458–59.

¹⁵⁴ Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī*, vol. II, 474; al-Sakhāwī, *Daw'*, vol. X, 288; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 383; idem, *Mawrid al-laṭāfa*, 181.

deviation from the custom of the sultan bearing the *laqab* of the dominant faction in the coalition that brought him to power. As a matter of fact, the leader of the faction that brought Qānṣūh to power was Qānṣūh Khamsmi'a, who, it will be remembered, was from al-Zāhir Khushqadam's *kuttābiyya* and who, on the latter's death, was purchased by Qāyṭbāy.¹⁵⁵ This is also the reason why Tānībak al-Jamālī, who was identified with Qānṣūh Khamsmi'a's group within the Ashrafiyya, was the one who awarded him this *laqab*.¹⁵⁶

The *laqab* "al-Ashraf" referred to al-Ashraf Barsbāy. Sultan Īnāl was one of Barqūq's mamluks and was inherited by his son, al-Nāṣir Faraj. He was elevated to the sultanate in 857/1457 by a coalition of the Ashrafiyya, Mu'ayyadiyya and *sayfiyya* mamluks. The Ashrafi mamluks forced him to become sultan because he was elderly and would pose no problems for them, and thus his *laqab* was that of their master, al-Ashraf Barsbāy.¹⁵⁷

Qāyṭbāy rose to power (872/1468) with the help of a coalition in which both senior and younger Ashrafiyya mamluks were dominant [*al-Ashrafiyya al-kibār wa'l-Ashrafiyya al-sighār*], that is to say, mamluks of Barsbāy and Īnāl.¹⁵⁸ Although Qāyṭbāy was formally a Zāhiri, he had strong roots as Ashrafi because he was purchased by al-Zāhir Khushqadam from al-Ashraf Barsbāy's *kuttābiyya*.¹⁵⁹ He was, therefore, quite naturally supported by the Ashrafiyya groups, and his *laqab* was decided accordingly.¹⁶⁰ By the same principle Jān Balāṭ (905/1499), Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī and Ṭūmānbāy min Qānṣūh al-Nāṣirī successively bore the *laqab* of Qāyṭbāy¹⁶¹ because Qāyṭbāy's long period of rule left only some insignificant remnants of the Zāhiriyya. It should be mentioned that many of the Zāhiriyya mamluks were

¹⁵⁵ Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī'*, vol. III, 353–54. See also note 87.

¹⁵⁶ Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī'*, vol. III, 404–5; Ibn Ṭūlūn, Muḥammad b. 'Alī, *Mufākahat al-khilān fī Hawādith al-zamān*, Beirut, 1998 (hereafter—Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahat al-khilān*), vol. II, 167.

¹⁵⁷ Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī'*, vol. II, 304, 305, 307; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 36, 38, 57.

¹⁵⁸ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 366, 367; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī'*, vol. II, 473–74, 475; vol. III, 3, 8.

¹⁵⁹ Al-Sakhāwī, *Daw'*, vol. VI, 201; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 395; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī'*, vol. II, 307, 308.

¹⁶⁰ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm*, vol. XVI, 394; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī'*, vol. III, 3.

¹⁶¹ Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī'*, vol. III, 439; vol. IV, 2; vol. V, 102; Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahat al-khilān*, vol. II, 186, 192.

decimated in the campaigns in Syria and the recurring plagues during Qāyṭbāy's reign.¹⁶²

It is not entirely clear why Ṭūmānbāy, who ruled for approximately three months in 906/1500 and initially took the *laqab* al-Mu'ayyad with his ascension to power in Syria, changed it to al-ʿĀdil when he returned to Egypt.¹⁶³ The change of *laqab*, however, shows that he had some difficulty in bearing a *laqab* (namely, al-Mu'ayyad) inappropriate to the accepted custom.

The centrality of the *laqab* as a symbol of unifying identification among different generations of mamluk factions within the coalition is borne out by the fact that towards the end of the Mamluk period, even a sultan's son, like Qāyṭbāy's son Muḥammad, was compelled, on ascending to power, to consider the issue of the *laqab*. The rule of a sultan's son was perceived throughout the fifteenth century as an interim period aimed at preparing the transition from the rule of one Mamluk sultan to the next.¹⁶⁴ As a result, a son's period of rule was typically short, and the Mamluks did not expect the rise of a new Mamluk unit during this reign that would have to join one of the two Mamluk coalitions, the Zāhiriyya or the Ashrafiyya. Therefore there was no importance attached to a sultan's son bearing one of these two *alqāb*.

Muḥammad b. Qāyṭbāy's *laqab*, however, was changed twice. The first time was immediately after he was brought to power before the death of his father in 901/1495, when his *laqab* was changed from al-Manṣūr to al-Nāṣir.¹⁶⁵ In other words, those who brought him to power thought that his *laqab* should be changed but did not yet think that the new *laqab* should be either al-Zāhir or al-Ashraf. The problem arose when al-Nāṣir Muḥammad inaugurated his first intake of mamluks. As a result, some of his supporters were called Ashrafiyya in accordance with the *laqab* of Qāyṭbāy, his father, while others were known as Nāṣiriyya after his own *laqab*. When the new *laqab* threatened to split his camp, the rank-and-file mamluks demanded that the amirs change Muḥammad's *laqab* from al-Nāṣir to al-Ashraf

¹⁶² Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ*, vol. III, 206, 210, 218; see for examples: *ibid.*, 289, 293, 325–26.

¹⁶³ Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ*, vol. III, 465.

¹⁶⁴ Levanoni, "Sultanate", 385.

¹⁶⁵ Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ*, vol. III, 333.

so that all the mamluks in his coalition would have the same name: “Give the Sultan the *laqab* al-Ashraf so that all of us will be Ashrafiyya [*laqqibū al-sultān bi'l-Ashraf, naṣīr kullunā Ashrafiyya*]”.¹⁶⁶ Despite the embarrassment involved, the mamluks’ ultimatum brought about a change in his *laqab*. Appointments had already been sent to Syria and sermons had been delivered in the mosques under the old *laqab*. The confusion was so great that some of the sermons were delivered in the name of al-Nāṣir and others in the name of al-Ashraf.¹⁶⁷

At the end of the fifteenth century, then, the dichotomy of the Zāhiri and Ashrafi parties in Mamluk politics was strongly established, to the extent that when a third party, not even a dominant one but only bearing a different name, was introduced into the military-political arena, it threatened the regime’s stability. To restore stability, steps were immediately taken to change the party’s name by changing its master’s *laqab* in order to facilitate its absorption into one of the two “recognized” parties.

In conclusion, the dichotomy in Mamluk factionalism into Zāhiriyya and Ashrafiyya parties indicates that during the Circassian period the Mamluk political system, in practice, underwent a change. It moved from a one-generation and uni-factional structure to a multi-generation and bi-party structure. This kind of political system inevitably imposed a change in the conception of *khushdashiyya*. Whereas *khushdashiyya* had been understood—but not always practiced—as solidarity shared strictly by mamluks who belonged to the same manumitter and formed a single cohort, in the political reality of the Circassian period, *khushdashiyya* was generally extended to solidarity among successive Mamluk factions by linking them to an ancient, quasi-mythological ancestor by handing down the master’s *laqab* from generation to generation. The common framework created by the *laqab* for Mamluk factions and individuals from different generations and background created an atmosphere that blurred the traditional factional borderlines. It not only curbed the tension between younger and senior generations of sultani mamluks but also opened the way for the integration of the amirs’ households into the fabric of the political system through the inclusion of individuals and groups of mamluks of amirs in the coalitions. This heterogeneous makeup of

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 351–52.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 351.

the Circassian Zahirî and Ashrafi coalitions for power might well explain the relatively non-violent character of Mamluk politics after al-Nasir Faraj's reign; power struggles were now largely bloodless.

Finally, a word on the place of *khushdashîyya* in Mamluk political system. The model of Mamluk factionalism laid by the late David Ayalon some fifty years ago, is based on the assumption that the ideal of *khushdashîyya* was an indispensable factor in Mamluk politics reality. For, according to this model, it was *khushdashîyya*, the solidarity and loyalty of all mamluks who belonged to the same manumitter, that determined who belonged to a Mamluk faction and who were excluded as their rivals or ad hoc allies. However, we have seen that, *khushdashîyya* included, at least in the Circassian period, a variety of categories of loyalty and solidarity among mamluks included in the same Mamluk faction and that coalitions for rule reflected, in fact, a wide network of relationships that crossed the "traditional" factional borderlines. In his study of the history of the Mu'ayyadiyya,¹⁶⁸ the Mamluk faction established during al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh's reign, Robert Irwin has concluded that *khushdashîyya* had never constituted a strong bond in Mamluk factions. Judging from the information scattered in the sources regarding the Bahri period about mamluks discarding factional solidarity bonds for more vital political interests, my impression is that during this period too *khushdashîyya* had never been such an essential requisite for Mamluk factional unity.¹⁶⁹ In light of these observations, it seems that the Mamluks' attitude to the idea of *khushdashîyya* was not different from the pragmatism they showed to other political or social issues they encountered. *Khushdashîyya* was essentially an idea liable to change in accordance with practice in Mamluk politics and not to inflexibly determine them. Seen from this angle, even the move from the traditional conception of *khushdashîyya* to the more pluralistic perception of solidarity of the Circassian coalitions for rule might appear to us not so revolutionary. These new perspectives on factional solidarity should, perhaps, encourage us to reexamine the validity of the "classical" model of Mamluk political factionalism throughout the Mamluk period.

¹⁶⁸ Irwin, "Factions", 237-38.

¹⁶⁹ Levanoni, *A Turning Point*, 81-132.

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CHAPTER SIX

GUNPOWDER AND FIREARMS IN THE MAMLUK SULTANATE RECONSIDERED

Robert Irwin

David Ayalon's *Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom: A Challenge to a Medieval Society* was published in London in 1956. The argument of this important book has been summarized by Reuven Amitai as follows: "A more direct reason for the demise of the Mamluk Sultanate is the failure of the mamluks to adopt the use of firearms; thus they were not able to meet the challenge of both the Ottoman Empire and the Christian West. This inability to modernize the army was rooted in the social psychology of the mamluks. The adoption of firearms contradicted their training and vocation as mounted archers, as the use of primitive handguns required dismounting; this would have meant the transformation of the mamluks into infantrymen . . . it made inevitable the defeat of the mamluks by the Ottomans at Marj Dābiq in 1516 and their conquest of Egypt and Syria".¹ *Gunpowder and Firearms* in the Mamluk Kingdom presented a Toynbean model of the collapse of an empire, as the Mamluk Sultanate was presented with a challenge—new military technology—to which it failed to respond. In this failure to adapt, the Mamluks differed from the Ottomans and from the various European nations. *Mutatis mutandis*, Ayalon had offered a Middle Eastern version of the line taken in J.F.C. Fuller's *The Decisive Battles of the Western World* where, according to Fuller, "Gunpowder blasted the feudal strongholds and ideals of their owners. By changing the character of war, gunpowder changed the medieval way of life".²

¹ Reuven Amitai, "The Rise and Fall of the Mamluk Institution; A Survey of David Ayalon's Works" in M. Sharon (ed.), *Studies Islamic History and Civilization in honour of David Ayalon*, (Jerusalem, 1986), 28.

² J.F.C. Fuller, *The Decisive Battles of the Western World 480 B.C.–1757* (London, revised ed. 1970), 323.

Ayalon's book has had a remarkable influence on other historians, among them Mamlukists like M. Holt and Carl Petry, and, outside the obsessively narrow field of Mamluk studies, also on such important figures as the historian of the Islamic world, Marshall Hodgson, and on the wide-ranging military historian, John Keegan. That it should have had such an influence is hardly surprising. It was written by the leading historian in the field. Ayalon's establishment of the chronology of the introduction of *Gunpowder and Firearms* into the Sultanate was based on an extensive reading of the sources. He had a discriminating approach to the problems of terminology and translation, as well as a properly cautious attitude regarding the dating of technological firsts. On many key issues in chronology and terminology, it is most unlikely that Ayalon's monograph will ever be superseded.

However, there are grounds for unease with the more general portrait of the mamluks as an arrogant and obsolete military caste who were incapable of appreciating the usefulness of the cannon and musket (as it were the dinosaurs of the late medieval Levant.) First, if the Mamluk elite was indeed hostile to firearms, then this was an unusual attitude for a medieval military elite to take. In the medieval West, finely worked guns were produced specially for princes. Guns were christened in churches. Nobles and knights competed for the office of Master of the Ordnance. Fifteenth-century noblemen put guns on their blazons. Anthony the Great Bastard of Burgundy, one of the greatest joustors of the fifteenth century, chose a wooden barbican with gun ports as his emblem and Louis of Bruges chose a bombard as his blazon. Cannonades featured in the chivalric romance of *Amadis de Gaule*.³ The Earl of Warwick lost the second Battle of St Albans in 1461 because of his enthusiastic over-reliance on guns and other bits and bobs of military gadgetry. The guns with their fixed emplacements fatally reduced the mobility of the Earl's forces and the gunners were overrun before they could fire their pieces off.⁴ (I will return to the Battle of St Albans later.) The point is that in late medieval Christendom, the deployment of cannons and musketry were considered of as being an extension of chivalry rather than as its antithesis.

³ Maurice Keen, *Chivalry* (New Haven and London, 1984), 241–42; Malcolm Vale, *War and Chivalry*, (London, 1981), 155.

⁴ John Goodman, *The Wars of the Roses: Military Activity and English Society*, (London, 1981), 171.

Again, in sixteenth-century Japan, the Samurai, elite horse-archers, were similarly enthusiastic. "Within months of the first guns being brought into Japan they were being copied and mass produced for the daimyo armies".⁵ In China, the Ming were making use of artillery from the fifteenth century onwards.⁶ Even in desolate, backward and impoverished Circassia with its illiterate kleptocracy, or robber-aristocracy, the noblemen rode about with guns slung over their back.⁷ It is worth noting here that the Mamluk elite in the late Middle Ages were mostly recruited from the Circassians of the Caucasus. But it is perhaps also worth noting that Germans and Hungarians were also prominently represented in the ranks of the mamluks and such renegades or captured soldiers were also likely to be already familiar with firearms.⁸

Muslim regimes in the Near East and North Africa were not slow to adopt firearms. Indeed they may have been ahead of Europe in doing so. The first reference to cannon being used in Europe is in Florence in 1326. By the 1340s references to the deployment of cannons become common. The first unambiguous reference to the English using cannon is at Crecy in 1346. The earliest reference to European use of handguns is 1346. A fourteenth-century Swedish handgun still survives. By 1411 the matchlock was in use. However, the handguns of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were not of the sort that could be fired from the saddle. That sort of firearm only became available in the sixteenth century.⁹

According to Lisān al-Dīn ibn al-Khaṭīb, a fourteenth-century courtier and historian in the service of Granada, the Nāṣirid prince

⁵ Stephen Turnbull, *The Book of the Samurai: The Warrior Class of Japan* (London, 1989), 78.

⁶ On the Chinese development of gunpowder technology, see Joseph Needham's classic work, *Science and Civilization in China*, vol. V, *Chemistry and Chemical Technology Part 7: Military Technology: The Gunpowder Epic* (Cambridge, 1986).

⁷ Georgio Interiano, (1502) cited in Shauket Mufti, *Heroes and Emperors in Circassian History* (Beirut, 1972), 79.

⁸ On Europeans in Mamluk service, see, for examples, Jacques Heers and Georgette de Groer (eds. and trs.), *Itinéraire d'Anselme d'Adorne en Terre Sainte (1470-1)*, (Paris, 1978), 199. Jacques Masson (ed. and tr.), *Voyage en Egypte de Felix Fabri, 1483* (Paris, 1975), vol. II, 431-4.

⁹ On the early history of firearms in the West, see Claude Blair, *Pollard's History of Firearms* (Feltham, Middlesex, 1983), 25-61; O.F.G. Hogg, *English Artillery 1326-1716* (London, 1963), 10-49; William McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force and Society since A.D. 1000* (Chicago, 1982), 81-8.

Abū Walīd Ismāʿīl I used cannon at the siege of Huesca in 1324.¹⁰ Because of the overlapping use of the Arabic term *naft* to refer to both naphtha, or Greek fire, and to gunpowder, it is difficult to determine when precisely gunpowder was first used in warfare in the Mamluk sultanate. Ayalon argued that naphtha, or *naft*, ceased to be used by the Mamluks in either battles or siege warfare at around the end of the Crusading period. The very word *naft* fell out of use for about a century or a century and a half. When the word did come back into circulation, it no longer meant naphtha, but rather referred to gunpowder. Therefore in the fifteenth century *naft* effectively means *bārūd*.¹¹ Professor J.R. Partington in his *History of Greek Fire and Gunpowder* (1960) doubted this. Ayalon replied that “*naft* cannot be the same as naphtha, for the simple reason that in spite of its being used in fighting many hundreds of times, it never causes fire, it is never aimed at inflammable targets and none of the normal measures of protection work against it”.¹²

But the matter is not so clear-cut. In 1400, when Tīmūr deployed a siege tower against the Damascus citadel, the garrison hurled *naft* at it and the tower burned down.¹³ Also in factional fighting in Damascus in 1412, both sides were using arrows and naphtha, which set shops on fire. In 1439 in a naval skirmish in the Delta a Mamluk boat was set on fire by “*midfaʿ naft*”, they shot it but the fire blew back, burning some of the supplies and injuring some of the crew.¹⁵ The conclusion seems inescapable. Greek fire was being used as late as the early decades of the fifteenth century.

The Burgundian traveller, Bertandon de la Brocquière, makes it clear beyond any shadow of doubt that in the 1430s the Mamluks and their subjects were still accustomed to deploy both cannons and naphtha-throwers. Bertrandon’s sojourn in Beirut coincided with a Muslim festival, during which the garrison of the citadel fired off their cannons. At the same time “the people launched into the air,

¹⁰ I.S. Allouche, “Un texte relatif aux premiers canons”, *Hesperis*, vol. XXXII (1945), 81–84.

¹¹ Ayalon, *Gunpowder and Firearms*, 9–21.

¹² Ayalon, “A Reply to Professor J.R. Partington”, *Arabica*, vol. X, (1963), 72.

¹³ Abū al-Maḥāsīn Yūsuf ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Nujūm al-zāhira fī mulūk Miṣr waʾl-Qāhira*, W. Popper ed., (Berkeley, 1926–29), vol. VI, 65; cf. 54.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. VI, 266.

¹⁵ Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī al-Maqrīzī, *Kitāb al-Sulūk*, M.M. Ziyāda, ed. (Cairo, 1934–58), vol. IV, 1165; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, vol. VII, 106.

very high and to a great distance, a kind of fire larger than the greatest lantern I ever saw lighted. They told me they sometimes made use of such at sea, to set fire to the sails of an enemy's vessel". Bertrandon spent a ducat on acquiring recipe and he returned to France with the recipe, the ingredients and even the wooden moulds.¹⁶ However, it is necessary to note that Ayalon was in general right to suggest that in the fifteenth century *naft* normally refers to gunpowder and Partington was wrong to doubt this.

Setting the *naft* problem aside, there are ambiguous references in Mamluk sources to the use of *makāhil* (maybe handguns) and *madaāfiʿ* (maybe cannons) in the 1340s and 50s. In an untranslatable passage in al-ʿUmarī's chancery manual, *al-Taʿrīf bi'l-muṣṭalaḥ al-sharīf*, there is a reference to *makāhil al-bārūd* (guns using gunpowder). (Al-ʿUmarī died in 1349.)¹⁷ There are numerous and unequivocal references to Mamluk use of cannons from the 1360s onwards (which is earlier than we have evidence for Ottoman Turkish use of cannons). It is again difficult to be precise about the date of the introduction of the handgun into the Mamluk Sultanate, because of the looseness of usage of terms used to refer to firearms. For a long time *madāfiʿ* and *makāhil* were used indiscriminately in the sources to refer to both cannons and handguns. For example when Ibn Taghribirdi discussed the fighting in Cairo between the Sultan Jaqmaq and rebellious mam-luks in 854/1450, in the *Nujūm* he referred to Jaqmaq's warden of the armoury setting up *madāfiʿ* on the towers of the Citadel. However when Ibn Taghribirdi wrote up the same incident in the *Hawādith*, he reported that *makāhil* were set up on the citadel.¹⁸ Also, *bunduqīyya*, which in the early Mamluk period referred to the crossbow, in the later Mamluk period came to mean arquebus.¹⁹

¹⁶ "The Travels of Bertrandon de la Brocquière A.D. 1432, 1433", in Thomas Wright (ed. and trans.), *Early Travels in Palestine* (London, 1848), 296. Clearly it is not true as Guilmartin has claimed, that the secret of Greek fire was lost with the sack of Constantinople in 1204. (John Francis Guilmartin Jr, *Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing technology and Mediterranean warfare at sea in the sixteenth century* (Cambridge, 1974), 60 and n).

¹⁷ Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā b. Faḍl Allāh al-ʿUmarī, *Al-Taʿrīf fī al-Muṣṭalaḥ al-Sharīf*, (Cairo, 1894), 208; cf. Ayalon, *Gunpowder and Firearms*, 5n. and 41–42n.

¹⁸ Ibn Taghribirdi, *Nujūm*, vol. VII, 192; *idem*, *History of Egypt, 1382–1469 A.D.*, (William Popper, tr.) University of California Publications in Semitic Philology (Berkeley, California, 1960), vol. XIX, 129 and note.

¹⁹ The use of *bunduqīyya* to mean both crossbow and arquebus has led to occasion confusions in modern scholarshi In "The Problem of the *Bidaʿ* in the Light of

However, the Leningrad *furūsiyya* manuscript, entitled *Collection Concerning the Various Branches of the Art*, which is a late fifteenth-century (1474) copy of an early fourteenth-century manuscript, describes what is unambiguously a handgun, calls it a *midfaʿ* and has a picture of it.²⁰ Ayalon claims that the first unambiguous reference to use of the handgun in the Mamluk Sultanate dates from 1490. This was when Qāyṭbāy offered members of the *ḥalqa* extra pay if they managed to learn to handle the arquebus.²¹ However, I have found an earlier reference, albeit a trivial one. In 1424 a Circassian mamluk captured in the raid on Cyprus turned out to be a considerable acrobat and marksman. He entertained Barsbāy's Cairo with displays of a *mukḥala* and a bow while walking a tightrope.²² Moreover, Western sources, which Ayalon did not use, suggest that the Mamluks were using handguns well before 1490. For example, Bertrandon de la Brocquière, who was in Mamluk Syria in the years 1432–3, noted how the pilgrim caravan returning from Damascus was provided with an escort some of whom carried “small harquebuses which they fired off every now and then”.²³ Jacques Couer was accused by his enemies in 1451 of having supplied guns to the Mamluk sultan Barsbāy.²⁴ According to the traveller, Joos van Ghistele, Ferdinand of Naples sent the Sultan Qāyṭbāy a shipload of weapons including culverins, arabesques, serpentine and other firearms in 1482 and the Sultan was delighted by the gift. The following year, 1483, the

an Arabic Manuscript of the 14th century”, in *JESHO*, vol. VII (1964), 191–96, Subhi Y. Labib erroneously deduced from certain passages in al-Turkomanī's treatise on *bidaʿ* (1397) that the *shuṭṭār*, raffish huntsmen who specialised in targeting certain birds, were using arquebuses to do so. However, it is perfectly clear from the context that they were using crossbows. Al-Buduqīyya is also the Arabic for ‘Venice’ and this may have led the sixteenth-century historical romancer, Ibn Zunbul, to deduce erroneously that the gun was a Venetian invention. Aḥmad b. Zunbul al-Maḥallī, *Ākhirat al-Mamālik: wāqīʿat al-Sulṭān al-Ghawrī maʿa Salīm al-ʿUthmānī*, A.T. ʿĀmir, ed. (Cairo, 1962), 58–59.

²⁰ Leningrad, Institute of Asian Peoples Arabic MS C686. On the manuscript, see J.R. Partington, *A History of Greek Fire and Gunpowder* (Cambridge, 1960), 204–7; A. Rahman Zaki, “Gunpowder and Arab Firearms in the Middle Ages”, *Gladius* (1967), 49–50; Needham, *Science and Civilization*, vol. V, pt. 7, 43–44.

²¹ Ayalon, *Gunpowder and Firearms*, 59.

²² Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī b. Ḥajar, *Inbāʾ al-ghumr bi-abnāʾ al-ʿumr*, Ḥasan Ḥabashī, ed. (Cairo, 1969), vol. II, 348; cf. ʿAlī ibn Dāwud al-Jawharī, *Nuḥḥat al-nufūs waʾl-abdān fī tawārīkh al-zamān*, Ḥasan Ḥabashī, ed. (Cairo, 1974), vol. III, 73.

²³ Bertrandon de la Brocquière, 301.

²⁴ Eliyahu Ashtor, *Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages* (Princeton, 1983), 349.

pilgrim Felix Fabri in Egypt was escorted by an arquebus-bearing mamluk.²⁵

However, it is, of course, useful to distinguish between the introduction of a weapon and the first instances of its effective deployment in a battle or a siege. When are guns used to do more than frighten the horses? In the West, cannons were used for siege warfare as early as the late fourteenth century.²⁶ But cannons on the battlefield were hardly more than noise-making machines until the mid-fifteenth century. It is true that artillery did play a crucial part at the Battle of Castillon in 1453, but the guns in question were not field guns, but siege guns in deeply entrenched positions deployed against densely packed infantry.²⁷ By common consent, the Battles of Ravenna (1512) and Marignano (1515) were the first European battles to be won by field artillery.²⁸ As for the handgun, the Swiss made effective use of them in the 1430s, as did the Hussites a decade or so earlier. Even so, the Italian wars of 1494–1559 were still largely fought by heavy cavalry with lances, even though the Spanish army in Italy had some arquebusiers.²⁹ Arquebuses only replaced the crossbow in France in 1567.³⁰ English armies were similarly slow to switch to the handgun.

Turning now to the Middle East, it is a mistake to think that it lagged behind Europe in the deployment of firearms in the battlefield. More or less contemporaneously with Marignano and Ravenna, artillery was playing some part in the battles of Chaldiran (1514), Marj Dābiq (1516) and Raydāniyya (1517). Moreover, somewhat earlier, Ottoman cannons and arquebuses seem to have played a decisive role in Mehmed II's victory over Ūzūn Ḥasan and the Āqqūyūnlū at the Battle of Bashkent in 1473.³¹

²⁵ Rene Bauwens-Praux (ed. and tr.), *Voyage en Egypte de Joos van Ghistele 1482–1483* (Paris, 1976), 40–41; Jacques Masson (ed. and tr.), *Voyage en Egypte de Felix Fabri, 1483* (Paris, 1975), vol. III, 918.

²⁶ Goodman, *Wars of the Roses*, 164.

²⁷ Ross, *Wars of the Roses*, 112.

²⁸ Carlo M. Cipolla, *Guns and Sails in the Early Phase of European Expansion 1400–1700* (London, 1965), 28.

²⁹ Vale, *War and Chivalry*, 70.

³⁰ Vale, *War and Chivalry*, 136.

³¹ John E. Woods, *The Aqqyūnlū, Clan, Confederation, Empire: A Study in 15th/9th Century Turko-Iranian Politics* (Minneapolis, 1973), 132–4; Franz Babinger, *Mehmed the Conqueror and His Time*, Ralph Manheim tr., William C. Hickman ed. (Princeton, 1978), 315.

The Mamluk sultanate made significant use of handguns from the late fifteenth-century onwards and it was ahead of the Ottomans and Safavids in doing so. Qāyrbāy had the *awlād al-nās* trained to fire *bunduq al-raṣāṣ*. (*Raṣāṣ* means lead or bullet. According to Ayalon, *bunduq al-raṣāṣ* can refer to both the arquebus and its ammunition.)³² The musketeers received extra pay and were equipped with camels and were sent off to fight the Ottomans in 895/1490).³³ It was a remarkably successful campaign. The mamluks reached Kayseri and sacked its suburbs and the following year Bayezid II sued for peace. It has been suggested that it was Ottoman defeats in this war that persuaded Bayezid II to reform his army and equip it with firearms.³⁴ The earliest references to Ottoman troops having handguns dates from 1465. Spandugino, writing in 1510, says that the Janissaries had only recently learned the use of handguns.³⁵ Venetian consular reports of the Ottoman struggle against the Safavid Shah Ismāʿīl in the opening decades of the sixteenth century make it clear that only a minority, albeit a large minority, of the Janissaries were *schiofeteri* (marksmen). At that stage most Janissaries still carried bows and the maritime historian, John Guilmartin, is of the opinion that most of the Janissaries who fought at Lepanto (1571) were still bowmen.³⁶

It is true Middle Eastern generals were slow to equip their infantry with handguns. However, there may have been good reasons for this. The handgun in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries offered very few advantages over the composite recurved bow used by the mamluks and the Janissaries.³⁷ The composite recurved bow, com-

³² Ayalon, *Gunpowder and Firearms*, 59.

³³ Ibn Iyas, *Badāʾiʿ al-zuhūr fī waqāʾiʿ al-duhūr*, Muḥammad Muṣṭafā ed. (Cairo and Wiesbaden 1960–63), vol. III, 269; Ayalon, *Gunpowder*, 59, 63–64, 67; Shai Har-El, *Struggle for Domination in the Middle East: The Ottoman-Mamluk War, 1485–91* (Leiden, 1995), 201–2.

³⁴ Halil İnalcik, *The Ottoman Empire: the Classical Age 1300–1600* (London, 1973), 31, 33.

³⁵ Paul Wittek, “The Earliest References to the Use of Firearms by the Ottomans”, Appendix II in Ayalon, *Gunpowder and Firearms*, 143; cf. R.C. Jennings, “Firearms, Bandits and Gun Control”, *Archivium Ottomanicum*, vol. VI (1980), 339.

³⁶ Guilmartin, *Gunpowder and Galleons*, 251.

³⁷ On the composite recurved bow, see J.D. Latham and W.F. Patterson, *Saracen Archery* (London, 1970), *passim*; Guilmartin, *Gunpowder and Galleons*, 149–55; Ahmad Y. Al-Ḥassan and Donald R. Hill, *Islamic Technology: An illustrated history*, (Cambridge, 1986), 98–9; Ulrich Haarmann, “The late triumph of the Persian bow: critical voices on the Mamluk monopoly on weaponry” in Thomas Philipp and Ulrich Haarmann (eds.), *The Mamluks in Egyptian politics and society* (Cambridge, 1998), 174–87.

posed of layers of horn and sinew and a little over three feet long, was more accurate and had a longer range than the sixteenth-century handgun. An arrow, fired from such a bow, could hit a target 500 yards away. That arrow could pierce plate armour at fifty yards. In the hands of a trained archer a composite recurved bow fired six shots a minute (as against the one or two shots a minute that a man with a matchlock might manage). Unlike the early matchlocks, the recurved bow could be managed from the horse. A study of the seventeenth-century wars between the Tartars and the Poles and the Russians has shown that even at so late a date and after the adoption of the musket, the horse-archer still usually had the advantage of infantry using firearms. The bows of the Tartar cavalry had a longer range and fired faster than the Russian muskets and, of course, the horse archer had the additional advantage of mobility.³⁸

The chief disadvantage of the composite recurved bow was that it was difficult to handle and it had a heavy drawing weight—heavier even than that of the famous English longbow. It took years to train the men who used these bows and it was expensive to maintain such a skilled force.³⁹ However, if one did actually possess such a skilled force, as the Mamluk sultans did, then plainly it would have been a regressive step to dismount those cavalry archers and give them guns. It made more sense to give these guns to low-grade infantry troops and that is precisely what Mamluk sultans in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries did. the sultans recruited sons of mamluks, Egyptian peasants, Maghribis and so forth and then gave them the small amount of training necessary.

In general, firearms gave no very clear advantage on the battlefield in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The deployment of cannons on the field could actually contribute to defeat by creating a static defence line and making the troops less mobile. The Earl of Warwick's defeat at the second battle of St Albans has already been mentioned. Similarly, as we shall see, Ṭūmānbāy, the last Mamluk Sultan of Egypt, placed too much faith in fixed emplacements defended by

³⁸ L.J.D. Collins, "The military organization and tactics of the Crimean Tatars during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries", in V.J. Parry and M.E. Yapp (eds.), *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East* (Oxford, 1975), 257–76.

³⁹ On the training of the Mamluk horse-archer, see Hasanein Rabie, "The Training of the Mamluk Fāris" in Parry and Yapp, *War Technology and Society*, 153–63.

cannons, and it was this faith in gunpowder as some kind of victory-bearing talisman and this contributed to his decisive defeat at Ray-dāniyya in 1517.

The medieval cannon had several serious weaknesses, a few of which can be noted here. First, first because of poor casting techniques, the early cannons had a low life-expectancy. Sooner or later they blew up quite a few on their first trial—especially cannons cast from iron.⁴⁰ Secondly, they had a slow rate of fire. One reason for this was that the cannon needed cooling and washing with vinegar and water before it could be reloaded. If all went well, ten shots might be fired in an hour, but evidently, if the cavalry charged the guns, then the gunners would only be able loose off one shot before the attackers were upon the guns. Thirdly, the projectile force of a medieval cannon was not as great as it would become by the seventeenth century. Medieval gunners used serpentine powder. Modern gunpowder is nearly twice as strong. Corned (or granulated) powder was introduced in the West in the 1430s (at about the time the handgun began to be used in battles) and it was somewhere between the two in strength. However, one problem with corned powder is that it needed to be fired from stronger-cast barrels. Fourthly, in the case of the earliest guns, each shot needed individual ignition by the gunner and the gunner needed to keep a match alight for this purpose. (Matchlock ignition only began to appear in Europe in the mid-fifteenth century.) Fifthly, the early handgun, or arquebus, had a short range and its shots had relatively little penetrating power. Musket-shot had much greater range and penetrating power, but use of the musket only became general in the late sixteenth century. Sixthly, the stone balls fired by early guns were labour-intensive to make. There was no standardisation of calibre, so ammunition had to be specifically tailored to a specific gun. Seventhly, the recoil from early guns was such that it could break an unwary gunner's ribs. Eighthly, early cannons were cumbersome and it might take a long time to bring them to the field. It took twenty-four horses to pull a heavy gun and three to pull a light gun (or falcon). Once on the field artillery hampered the free movement of one's own cavalry.

⁴⁰ See, for examples of guns exploding on trial during Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī's reign, Carl Petry, *Protectors or Praetorians? The Last Mamluk Sultans and Egypt's Waning as a Great Power* (Albany, N.Y., 1994), 192–3.

(When one considers these and other problems, it seems a miracle that gunpowder technology ever took off at all.) Probably the early guns were most effective in frightening the horses (and this may have been what happened at Chaldiran).⁴¹

However, though gun-carriages and munitions carts might slow the progress of an army, once they had arrived on the battlefield, they might, if disposed in a ring or some other line of defence, provide a cover quite independent of the fire of the guns themselves. One way of looking at Selīm's victory over the Mamluks is as the triumph of Turkish "wheel culture" over "Egypto-Syrian camel and mule culture".⁴² The Ottoman *'arabas* (carts) were chained together and used as *Wagenburgs*, or *Lagers*, which could easily be defended against cavalry charges. This was also the practice of the Bohemian Hussites.⁴³ Such *Lagers* were defended by both cannons and bows. The Ottomans were masters in the use of wagons for defence. When in 1516, the Damascan chronicler, Ibn Ṭūlūn went to visit the Janisaries camped outside Damascus, he was most impressed by the carts used to carry the big guns and which were chained together to form a line of defence. He said that he had never seen anything like that before. Safavid cavalry failed to penetrate the Ottoman line of wagons at Chaldiran.⁴⁴ Thereafter, they adopted the practice themselves and Shah Ṭahmāsp successfully deployed 700 *'arabas* and four cannons against the Uzbeks in 1528. Previously, the Mamluk Sultan Ṭūmānbāy had deployed wagons (less effectively, of course) at Raydāniyya—the wagons serving to defend his cannons as well as his Maghribi and Sudanese musketeers.⁴⁵

It has been argued above that there were good military reasons for being cautious about the wholesale adoption of firearms, whereas Ayalon and others have suggested that the Mamluk elite resisted the

⁴¹ On the problems and disadvantages of firearms in general, see Cipolla, 27–28; John Francis Guilmartin, Jr., *Gunpowder and Galleons*, 157–75; Gillingham, *Wars of the Roses*, 19; Geoffrey Parker, "The Gunpowder Revolution" in Geoffrey Parker (ed.), *The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare* (Cambridge, 1992), 107–9.

⁴² On the relative rarity of carts in the Arab lands in pre-modern times, see Richard Bulliet, *The Camel and the Wheel* (Cambridge, Mass., 1975).

⁴³ Guilmartin, *Gunpowder and Galleons*, 256n., 258; Christopher Allmand, "New Weapons, New Tactics", in Parker *The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare*, 97.

⁴⁴ On Chaldiran, see *EI*² (2nd ed.), s.v. Çaldiran. [J.R. Walsh]; R.M. Savory, "The Sherley Myth", *Iran*, vol. V, (1967), 73–81; idem, *Iran under the Safavids* (Cambridge, 1980), 41–47.

⁴⁵ On the sources for the Battle of Raydāniyya and its outcome, see below.

adoption of firearms for psychological and chivalric reasons. However, evidence for a chivalric ethic or ideology attached to the science of *furūsiyya* (horsemanship and the related military skills) would appear to be very slight indeed. *Furūsiyya* manuals dealt with practical skills and did not waste any space on expounding a chivalric ethos.⁴⁶ It is perhaps worth noting that Faraj, who of all the Mamluk sultans was the one most praised for his *furūsiyya*, was also one of the most enthusiastic users of artillery (in his struggles against the Emir Shaykh).⁴⁷ At the very end of the Mamluk period, the Sultan Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī sought to revive the skills of *furūsiyya* and built a new maydān for the mounted exercises.⁴⁸ But Qānṣūh was also enthusiastic about guns. He had guns cast in Egypt. He bought guns from abroad. He raised an arquebus regiment to go and fight the Portuguese in the Red Sea.⁴⁹ As remarked above, since it would have been wasteful to issue arquebuses to the highly (and expensively trained force of extremely effective Mamluk horse archers, guns were customarily issued instead to *ḥalqa* troopers, Maghribis and other low grade footsoldiers.

I do not think that the Mamluks had a psychological problem regarding the acquisition of firearms. Their problem was rather material and logistical. Copper had to be imported from Europe for the most part. (The Tyrol was a major source of copper in the Middle Ages.)⁵⁰ The best source for wood (charcoal) and saltpetre, as well as iron was Ottoman-controlled Anatolia (and hence vulnerable to an embargo on the part of the Ottomans).⁵¹ The Mamluks may also have had problems recruiting skilled gun-casters, for there was, of course, no tradition of casting church bells in the Middle East and the Mamluks were less well-placed than the Ottomans when it came to enslaving or recruiting skilled European workmen.

⁴⁶ On Mamluk *furūsiyya* in general, see Ayalon, "Notes on the *Furūsiyya* Exercises and Games in the Mamluk Sultanate" in Myriam Rosen-Ayalon (ed.), *Studies in Memory of Gaston Wiet* (Jerusalem, 1977), 267–95; Rabie, "The training of the Mamluk Faris".

⁴⁷ On Faraj's *furūsiyya*, see Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, vol. VI, 271.

⁴⁸ 48. On the revival of *furūsiyya* under Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī, see Ayalon 'Notes on Furusiyya Exercises', 43–44, 45, 51–52; Petry, *Protectors or Praetorians*, 191.

⁴⁹ Petry, *Protectors or Praetorians*, 192–96; Petry, *Twilight of Majesty: The Reigns of the Mamluk Sultans al-Ashraf Qāyṭbāy and Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī in Egypt* (Seattle, 1993), 189–90, 205–6.

⁵⁰ Eliyahu Ashtor, *A Social and Economic History of the Near East in the Middle Ages* (London, 1976), 305, 325; Ashtor, *Levant Trade*, 157.

⁵¹ On measures to preserve the Lebanese forest, see Bertrand de la Brocquière, 297.

When he came to discuss Qāyrbāy's alleged indifference to artillery, Professor Ayalon observed that "[h]is indifference is of special interest in the light of the costly and protracted battles which Qāyrbāy waged against the Ottomans and their satellite Shāh Siwār. In none of these battles is there any reference to the Mamluk army using artillery, whereas we may deduce from a casual remark that the Ottomans and Shāh Siwār did".⁵² However, this is not the case. In the years 1465–71 the Mamluks fought a war against Shāh Siwār, a rebellious Dhū'l-Ghadrid prince in south-west Anatolia, whom the Ottomans were covertly sponsoring as a thorn in the flanks of the Mamluks. Then again in the years 1488–91 the Mamluks fought a war with the Ottomans over the status of Qaramān beylicate. The first thing to note is that the Mamluks won both these wars. Secondly, in discussing these wars, Ayalon cites Ibn Taghrī Birdī and Ibn Iyās as sources for the first war and Ibn Iyās alone for the second war. (So he has relied on rather few sources.) Thirdly, if the Mamluks had in fact failed to use artillery in these late-fifteenth-century wars, this would have been strange, for the Mamluk prince Ibrahim used cannon against the Qaramānid town of Laranda as early as 1419.⁵³ A little later Barsbāy used cannons against the Cypriot fleet at sea in 1424.⁵⁴ Then again, after Barsbāy had failed to take Āmid from the Āqqūyūnlū ruler Qara 'Uthmān in 1433, he ordered the casting of a brass canon weighing 1,20 qintars.⁵⁵ Finally, when the Mamluk general Nawkar set out against Ibn Qaramān in 1457, he took with him naphtha gunners.⁵⁶

In the light of these precedents it is not surprising to find that the Mamluks did in fact make decisive use of artillery in their war against the Dhū'l-Ghadrid Amir Shāh Siwār. Ibn Ajā's "History of the Amīr Bashtak" (sic), also known as *Rihlat al-Amīr Yashbak* ("Journey of the Amir Yashbak") is the most detailed account to have survived of Yashbak min Mahdī's campaign in 1471 against Shāh Siwār. The Amir Yashbak min Mahdī was the Sultan Qāyrbāy's leading general and the most powerful of all the amirs. While he lived, Yashbak

⁵² Ayalon, *Gunpowder and Firearms*, 48.

⁵³ Jawharī, *Nuzhat*, vol. II, 438.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. III, 80; cf. *ibid.*, 91.

⁵⁵ Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. IV, 906; Jawharī, *Nuzhat*, vol. III, 275; Ahmad Darrag, *L'Égypte sous le règne de Barsbāy 825–841/1422–1438* (Damascus, 1961), 378–79.

⁵⁶ Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nūjūm*, vol. VII, 483.

seems to have been even more powerful than the Sultan himself. Since Ibn Ajā (d. 1476) was not only Yashbak's military *qāḍī*, but also his confidante, ambassador, and civilian aide-de-camp, he was in a position to know about what he wrote about.⁵⁷ It is important to note that in the course of this war the Ottomans did not use artillery, for the simple reason that they were not directly involved in the fighting. Indeed they sent what purported to be a friendly embassy to Yashbak.

Yashbak however did make use of artillery. In 1471 having marched north through Syria with a lot of infantry, he waited at Marj Dābiq for the *makāhil* to catch up.⁵⁸ In the opening stage of the campaign, 'Ayntāb, intimidated by the Mamluk deployment of artillery and the subsequent nine days of bombardment, surrendered.⁵⁹ Thereafter the Mamluks used the city as their arsenal and the place where their gunpowder was stored.⁶⁰ Later on in the campaign the Mamluk general Īnāl, having invested Adana and demolished one of its towers through artillery, had to send for more gunpowder to finish off the operation.⁶¹ Shāh Siwār himself did possess two cannons at Khirmān, but we only hear about these pieces when they were surrendered to the Mamluks. Indeed, they and the castle seem to have been surrendered to the Mamluks without a shot being fired and Yashbak subsequently used the captured guns against the fortifications of Zamanti. (It also seems, though the Arabic is not clear, that additional guns were cast for the siege of Zamanti.)⁶² Zamanti was Shāh Siwār's final redoubt and, with its surrender in June 1472, the war was over. While it is true that artillery was not used by the Mamluks on the battlefield during this war, this was because Shāh Siwār never dared offer battle in the open field.⁶³ This was a war of sieges.

⁵⁷ Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd b. Ajā, *Tārīkh al-Amīr Bashtāk al-Zāhirī*, ed. Aḥmad Tulaymat, (Cairo, 1974); on Ibn Ajā's life and writings, see Tulaymat's preface.

⁵⁸ Ibn Ajā, *Tarikh*, 74, 79–80.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 79–83; Har-El, 93.

⁶⁰ Ibn Ajā, *Tarikh*, 123.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 128.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 140, 142.

⁶³ On the general progress of this campaign see Evrard, *Zur Geschichte Aleppos und Nordsyriens in letzten Halben Jahrhundert der Mamlukenherrschaft (872–924 AH) nach Arabischen und italeinischen Quellen* (Munich, 1974), 23–24; Har-El, 93–96.

It is indeed striking that in his account of the war against Shāh Siwār, Ibn Iyās, who was a Cairo-based civilian, makes no reference at all to the use of artillery. Neither for that matter does the *ḥadīth* expert and historian, Ibn Ḥajar, though he gave a much fuller account of the campaigning than Ibn Iyās's scrappy jottings. If we did not have Ibn Ajā's *Rihla*, and we had to rely only on sources of the kind produced by Ibn Iyās and Ibn Ḥajar, then we might indeed conclude that the Mamluks ignored the potential of firearms and gunpowder. But the truth is that it was Arab, civilian, religious scholars who (not surprisingly) failed to register contemporary developments in military technology. Incidentally, this leads one to the broader reflection that the conventions, clichés and vocabulary employed by traditionally minded chroniclers of the Mamluk period similarly prevented them from registering other economic and technological changes. For one example among the many possible of this negative phenomenon—the numerous dogs that did not bark in the night—no Mamluk chronicler notes the rise of a luxury carpet industry in Cairo in the late fifteenth century, though that is what seems to have happened. But, to return to the firearms problem, Ibn Ḥajar, who was an admired literary stylist, may well have shrunk from such neologisms as *makāhīl al-naft*, *zamburaq*, *bunduqīyya* and so forth. (Similarly, Froissart in his chronicling of the Hundred Years War omitted all reference to the English guns at Crecy, lest they be offensive to his cultivated French readers.)

As for the second war, that between the Mamluks and Ottomans, which was fought over the Tarsus-Adana region, this has been the subject of a well-researched and discriminating study by Shai Har-El, entitled *Struggle for Domination in the Middle East. The Ottoman Mamluk War, 1485–1491*.⁶⁴ The Egypto-Syrian army sent out to confront the Ottomans cast cannons at their camp at Ayas.⁶⁵ The Mamluks customarily cast their cannons at Ayas, before proceeding further into Cilicia or Anatolia. Subsequently, the Mamluk general Uzbek, having defeated the Ottomans in the field, laid siege to Adana and attacked it, using cannons, mangonels and ballistas.⁶⁶ An Ottoman

⁶⁴ For the campaign itself, see Har-El, 133–51; see also Evrard, *Zur Geschichte Nordsyriens*, 32–40.

⁶⁵ Jawharī, *Imbāʿ*, 263–64; Har-El, 139.

⁶⁶ Har-El, 140.

relief army engaged the Mamluk besiegers and succeeded in disabling some of their cannons, before it was crushingly defeated. Adana and Tarsus thereupon surrendered to the Mamluks.⁶⁷

In renewed fighting in 1488, the Ottomans recaptured Cilicia and they then tried to use naval artillery to block the Syrian pass of Bāb al-Malik. However, strong winds sank some of the ships and dispersed the rest. The Mamluks advanced into the Cilician plain and at the Battle of Aga-Çayiri defeated the Ottomans. This was a cavalry battle in which firearms do not seem to have played a significant part. However, when, in 1490, fighting on a smaller scale continued in the region, Qāyrbāy sent a force of *awlād al-nās*, equipped and trained to use the arquebus (*bunduq al-raṣās*) as part of the Mamluk force which ravaged Ottoman Anatolia.⁶⁸

If the Mamluks did not neglect firearms, then why did they lose to the Ottomans at the Battle of Marj Dābiq in Syria in 1516 and then again at Raydāniyya in Egypt in 1517? According to Professor Partington, a historian of *Gunpowder and Firearms* (and also one of Ayalon's *bêtes noires*) ("In 1514 an Ottoman army of 12,000 completely routed a Mamluk army much larger through the use of hand-guns.")⁶⁹ But nothing is correct in Partington's statement—not even the date! I turn now to the causes for the Mamluks' defeat in battle and the termination of their Sultanate.

The Mamluk Sultan Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī, who was to command the Mamluk army at Marj Dābiq, was crazy about guns. Gun casting was intensive throughout his reign.⁷⁰ He also raised an arquebus regiment (as indeed Qāyrbāy had done before him). However, it must be borne in mind that during the final crisis years of his reign many (perhaps all?) of the arquebusiers that had been raised in Egypt were actually campaigning in the Ḥijāz and Yemen where they were deployed against the Portuguese.⁷¹ As for the cannons cast

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 141–42.

⁶⁸ See note 33.

⁶⁹ Partington, *A History of Greek Fire and Gunpowder*, 209.

⁷⁰ On Qānṣūh's gun foundry at Rajab, which after early difficulties, was casting cannons from 1511 onwards, see Petry, *Twilight of Majesty*, 162–63; *Protectors or Praetorians*, 192–93.

⁷¹ On the despatch in 1513, of the Fifth Corps, equipped with muskets to the Red Sea campaign, see Ayalon, *Gunpowder and Firearms*, 73–83; L.O. Schuman, *The Political History of the Yemen: Abu Makhrama's Account of 906–16/1500–21*, (Göttingen, 1960), 16–20, 69–78; Petry, *Protectors*, 60, 195; Halil Inalcik, "The Socio-Political

on al-Ghawrī's orders, many of those had been sent to defend the Delta ports, especially Alexandria, against an anticipated Ottoman naval attack (though no such attack ever came).⁷²

In 1516, Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī led an army out of Egypt into Syria. His aim may have been the purely defensive one of defending Syria from a possible attack by the Ottoman troops led by Selīm the Grim. On the other hand, al-Ghawrī may have believed that Selīm was planning to invade Safavid Iran once more, in which case the Mamluk army might attack the Ottomans on the flank. Ghawrī's motives remain unclear.⁷³ The Mamluk Sultan, straining every resource, brought with him 5,000 royal mamluks from Egypt to the field at Marj Dābiq, but plainly his army was larger than that, for the royal mamluks were only an elite force within the larger body of the Sultan's army. In fact, the Venetian consul in Alexandria reported that the Sultan left Egypt with 15,000 mamluks and *awlād al-nās*, as well as between 25 and 30 pieces of artillery. (These last would presumably have been relatively light pieces of field artillery, rather than large guns of the size used, for example by Mehmed II to bring down the walls of Constantinople in 1453.) He also reported that a vast number of camels had had their ears stopped up so that they could be sent against artillery. The Venetian added that the Sultan was alleged to be able to add 150,000 Arabs (that is to say bedouins) to his army. However, the consul doubted this figure.⁷⁴ Even so, it seems likely that the Sultan would have recruited some thousands of auxiliary troops from the Bedouins and others.

The Sultan would certainly have added to his forces as he passed through Syria. Syrian troops had previously borne the brunt of the fighting against the Turkomans, the Safavids and rebellious Bedouins. Apart from Mamluk elite forces garrisoned in the cities, the Syrian troops seem to have been predominantly foot-soldiers. Many of these

Effects of the Diffusion of Fire-arms in the Middle East" in Yapp and Parry, *War, Technology and Society*, 202–3.

⁷² Ayalon, *Gunpowder and Firearms*, 50, 112n., 113n.

⁷³ On the political and diplomatic background to Marj Dābiq, see H. Jansky, "Die Eroberung Syriens durch Sultan Selīm I", *Mitteilungen zur Osmanischen Geschichte*, vol. II (1923–26) 173–224; Jean-Louis Bacqué Grammont, *Les Ottomans, les Safavides et leurs voisins: Contribution à l'histoire des relations internationales dans l'Orient Islamique de 1514 à 1524*, (Istanbul, 1987), esp. 187–209; Michael Winter, "The Ottoman Occupation" in Carl Petry (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Egypt*, vol. I, *Islamic Egypt, 640–1517* (Cambridge, 1998), 492–96.

⁷⁴ Marino Sanudo, *Diarii* (G. Berchet ed.), (Venice, 1877–1900), vol. XXII, 485–86.

would have been *ʿushrān*, semi-nomadic Arabs who usually fought as infantry—often as archers on foot. The highlands of Palestine and Lebanon were major recruiting grounds for such troops. Ibn Ajā's account of the earlier war fought by Yashbak against Shāh Siwār provides quite lot of detail about the recruitment of Syrian auxiliary forces. (Press-gang tactics, as well as promises of money were used to bring such men into the field.) Apart from Arab tribesmen, Kurds and Turkomans were regularly recruited for major campaigns.

It seems that likely that some of the Syrian troops, both from the towns and the countryside, possessed firearms. As early as 1498 Kurtbāy, the *Nā'ib* of Damascus, was training men to handle handguns and assigning uniforms and barracks to them.⁷⁵ Moreover, official initiatives apart, it would be surprising if the Druze, the Kurds and Arab tribesmen of Syria had not sought to acquire guns for their own use. The Banū Sakhr were using arquebuses in their attacks against Syrian villages as early as 1502–3.⁷⁶ (An Ottoman *firmān* for Palestine in 1527 sought to address the problem of Bedouin buying muskets—often muskets that were superior in quality to the ones that the Janissaries possessed—from ports like Acre. In that year there were already an estimated 7,000 muskets in the *Sanjak* of Safad alone. It seems that Italian and French merchants were trading guns for local cotton).⁷⁷

Mamluk numbers had of course been depleted by the plagues of 1505 and 1513. According to Paolo Giovio, Qānṣūh brought 13,000 mamluks with him into Syria, though the total number of his army was much larger than that.⁷⁸ According to the sixteenth-century Syrian, Najm al-Dīn al-Ghazzī, Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī advanced northwards out of Aleppo with 30,000 men.⁷⁹ However, Michael Winter believes that Qānṣūh's army may have numbered as few as 5,000–7,000 soldiers.⁸⁰ Selīm's army was certainly larger than the Mamluk one.

⁷⁵ Ibn Tūlūn, *Mufākahat al-khillān fi ḥawādith al-zamān*, Mohamed Mostafā, ed., (Cairo, 1962–64), vol. I, 201–02.

⁷⁶ Henri Laoust, *Les Gouverneurs de Damas sous les Mamlouks et les Premiers Ottomans (658–1156/1260–1744)*, (Damascus, 1952), 92–93.

⁷⁷ R.C. Jennings, "Firearms, Bandits and Gun Control", *Archivum Ottomanicum*, vol. VI (1980), 339–58.

⁷⁸ Paolo Giovio, *Historiarum Sui Temporis*, vol. I, (Paris, 1558–60), lxxxv–lxxxia.

⁷⁹ Najm al-Dīn al-Ghazzī, *Al-Kawākib al-sā'ira*, ed. Jibrāil Sulaymān Jabbūr, (Beirut, 1945–59), vol. I, 296.

⁸⁰ Winter, "The Ottoman occupation", 496, cf. 498.

When one thinks of Ottoman armies, one tends to think first and foremost of the famous Janissaries, or “New Troops”. It is true that the Janissaries furnished an important part of the Ottoman army. However, they were, in a sense, the rejects of the Ottoman *devshirme* and palace school system. They did not furnish the bulk of Selīm’s army, for they were outnumbered by the *sipahi* cavalry and by the *yaya*, or free-born infantry. In Selīm’s reign they do not seem to have been a particularly well-disciplined force. They had mutinied soon after the Battle of Chaldiran. Then they mutinied again at their winter quarters in Amasya and had to be sent back to Istanbul for reorganisation. In the fifteenth century the Janissaries seem still to have been predominantly a force of infantry archers and it was only slowly that they were equipped with guns. However, as has been noted, it has been suggested that the process of re-equipping the Janissaries may have speeded up somewhat after Ottoman defeats at the hands of the Mamluks in the war of 1485–91. Even so, according to Guilmartin it was only by the end of the sixteenth century that most of the Janissaries were equipped with *tüfek*s, or muskets. At the naval Battle of Lepanto (1571) most of the Janissaries seem to have been archers.⁸¹

It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to determine how large a proportion of Selīm’s army in 1516 consisted of Janissaries. However, various contemporaries offered guesstimates of the size of the Ottoman army as a whole. According to Contarini, who was based in Cyprus at the time, Selīm passed through the Taurus region en route for Syria with 200,000 men, though he added that Selīm’s army was for the most part ill-disciplined and poorly equipped.⁸² According to the Damascan chronicler, Ibn Ṭūlūn, the Ottoman army that entered Damascus after the Battle of Marj Dābiq numbered 130,000. He added that Selīm’s army was a heterogenous lot, including Rūmis,

⁸¹ Guilmartin, *Gunpowder and Galleons*, 251. The Turkish cavalry elite, like the Mamluk cavalry elite was reluctant to handle guns themselves, preferring to leave them in the hands of low grade infantry. Ogier de Busbecq reported that when, in 1552, Rustam Pasha prepared for the third campaign against the Persians, he armed his cavalry with muskets. However, many of the cavalymen promptly broke or lost their guns and they all complained about the way gunpowder dirtied their uniforms and they successfully argued that they should revert to using bows and arrows. (*The Turkish Letters of Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, Imperial Ambassador at Constantinople 1554–1562*, tr. Edward Seymour Forster, Oxford, 1927, 123–24).

⁸² Letter from Andrea Contarini in Sanudo, *Diarii*, vol. XXII, 659.

Armenians, Tatars, Siwāriyya (who were presumably troops formerly in the service of Shāh Siwār?), Franks and others.⁸³ According to Ibn Iyās, a renegade from the Ottoman army reported that the Ottoman force that subsequently advanced on Egypt consisted of 60,000 men.⁸⁴ (It should be borne in mind that Selīm would have left substantial garrisons in the main Syrian cities.) Thomas Venier gave an even smaller figure. According to his contemporary report, Selīm's forces, which subsequently fought against Ṭūmānbāy in Egypt, numbered 25–30,000 horsemen and 8,000 Janissaries of which half were *schiopeteri* (marksmen, presumably both gunners and archers) and half were *ronchonieri* (pikemen).⁸⁵ (Several other European reports confirm the estimate of half the Janissaries as being *schiopeteri*.) Returning to the Battle of Marj Dābiq in 1516, Ibn Zunbul, in his account of the battle, says that the Mamluk army was heavily outnumbered, with 2,000 mamluks facing an Ottoman force of 150,000—for what that is worth.⁸⁶ However, the historical testimony of Ibn Zunbul is worth very little. (I will come back to him.)

One reason, then for the Mamluk defeats at Marj Dābiq and subsequently was that they were outnumbered. Secondly, the Mamluk commander, Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī, who was some eighty years old, died of a fit (of apoplexy?) half way through the battle. Thirdly, there were traitors in the Mamluk ranks, most notably the Emir Khāyrbak, who led his section of the army off the battlefield. (Ibn Zunbul placed particularly heavy stress on role of traitors in turning what had begun as a Mamluk victory into a defeat.) Fourthly, there were tensions between the *qarāniṣa* (seasoned mamluks) and the *julbān* (recent recruits). The former resented the fact that they were being used in the charges on Ottoman positions, while the *julbān* were held back. Fifthly, the ill-disciplined looting of Ottoman supplies by Mamluk cavalry played a part in the Mamluks' ultimate defeat.⁸⁷

⁸³ Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahat*, vol. II, 29.

⁸⁴ Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ir*, vol. III, 121.

⁸⁵ Sanudo, *Diarii*, vol. XXIV, 171.

⁸⁶ Ibn Zunbul, *Ākhīrat al-Mamālīk*, 129.

⁸⁷ On the Battle of Marj Dābiq, see Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ir*, vol. V, 66–70; Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahat*, vol. II, 23–24; Ibn Zunbul, *Ākhīrat al-Mamālīk*, 26–33; Sanudo, *Diarii*, vol. XXIII, 107–36; Ayalon, *Gunpowder and Firearms*, 60; Winter, "The Ottoman Occupation", 498–99.

It is also possible that firearms contributed to the Mamluk defeat. But let us consider the matter carefully. Ibn Iyās mentions Ottoman firearms. Ibn Ṭūlūn writes of the Mamluks being driven off by men firing *bunduq al-raṣāṣ* (lead pellets?). However, what was used to fire off this sort of ammunition? One may be tempted to think that musketry fire is being referred to here. However, a subsequent mention of *bunduq al-raṣāṣ* by Damascan chronicler, Ibn Ṭūlūn, in the context of his account of Selīm's entry into Damascus, reveals that each *bunduq al-raṣāṣ* was as big as a fist and they were fired by field-guns on boxes mounted on wagons which could be chained together. Selīm entered Damascus with 30 of these guns. They were field cannon then rather than muskets or handguns.⁸⁸ As for artillery, it seems to have caused more panic than actual damage. What caused more of a problem for the Mamluk horsemen was their inability to break through the Ottoman Lager of chained wagons. Even so, Marj Dābiq was a close run affair. At noon it was still looking as though the Mamluks were going to win.⁸⁹ Venetian and Rhodian observers, as well as Ottoman informants, agreed that Selīm's losses had been heavy. Approximately 15,000 Turks had been killed. Mamluk losses were relatively light (500–1,000), as so many of them preferred to run away and fight another day.

Turning now to the second big battle, that fought at Raydāniyya, a little to the north of Cairo in 1517, no source, not even Ibn Zunbul, claimed that Raydāniyya was lost because the Mamluks failed to use artillery.⁹⁰ In fact, a contemporary letter by an Arab scribe in the Ottoman army reveals that Ṭūmānbāy's men collected guns from all over Egypt, including *makāḥil*, *kufiyāt*, *sabaqiyāt*, and *bunduqiyāt*.⁹¹ According to Ibn Iyās, Ṭūmānbāy initially mustered more than thirty cannons mounted on carts, and more guns were deployed by gunners mounted on camels and others were carried by footsoldiers. (As Ayalon has noted, Ṭūmānbāy was extremely keen on guns.) By the eve of battle, Ṭūmānbāy had increased his firepower to more

⁸⁸ Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahat*, vol. II, 29.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 24.

⁹⁰ On the Battle of Raydāniyya, see Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾir*, vol. V, 142–3; Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahat*, vol. II, 43–47; Ibn Zunbul, *Ākhirat al-Mamālīk*, 50–52; Sanudo, *Diarii*, 162–63, 171; Paolo Giovio, *History of the Turks*, lxxxviii–lxxxix; Ayalon, *Gunpowder and Firearms*, 51–52, 83–85; Winter, “The Ottoman Occupation”, 502–3.

⁹¹ Quoted in extenso in Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahat*, vol. II, 45.

one hundred brass cannons on carts. Additionally, he had recruited 200 Turkoman and Maghribi artillerymen, plus black slave gunners (*‘abīd naftīyya*). The Egyptian army dug ditches and raised screens at Raydāniyya and placed Frankish and other marksmen there. When the Egyptians attacked the Ottoman vizier, Sinān, on the right wing, they did so with guns and the Ottoman Turks drove them off with swords.

What happened at Raydāniyya was that Ṭūmānbāy’s redoubts and entrenched positions were outflanked by the more mobile Ottoman troops who outflanked and attacked the gun emplacements from the rear. Ṭūmānbāy’s faith in artillery had led him to adopt too inactive a role on the battlefield. (Moreover, according to report by the Grand Master of the Hospitallers at Rhodes, Ṭūmānbāy’s flight from the field was provoked by reports of a Maghribi uprising in Cairo.)⁹² The Ottoman victory at Raydāniyya proved to be decisive. Even so their losses had again been heavy.

From all the foregoing, it should be clear that the Mamluks’ failure to appreciate fully the significance of firearms did not contribute significantly to their defeat by the Ottomans in the early sixteenth century. The only prejudice the Mamluk sultans had regarding firearms was a prejudice in their favour. The only problem they had with firearms was that could not get enough of them. The contrary view relies heavily on Ibn Zunbul’s narrative of the struggle between the Mamluks and the Ottomans. Ibn Zunbul placed heavy emphasis on the role of gunpowder in bringing about the ruin and destruction of Mamluk chivalry. According to Ayalon, “The evidence gathered from Ibn Zunbul’s work proves beyond any shadow of doubt that by far the most important cause of Mamluk defeat was the Ottoman use of firearms”. But Ibn Zunbul’s narrative of the Ottoman conquest of Egypt and Syria is not the sort of source on which one can rely for indubitable proof of anything whatsoever. Ibn Zunbul’s background, chronology and literary aims are so far poorly explored and the issues raised by his various books are so complex, that I am publishing an article devoted specifically to his shadowy life and confusing writings.⁹³ For the time being, it suffices to remark that it is

⁹² Sanudo, *Diarii*, 171.

⁹³ Forthcoming, as “Ibn Zunbul and the Romance of History”, to be published in *The Status of Medieval Arabic Literature*, Julia Bray and James Montgomery, eds.

not clear when Ibn Zunbul was born, or when he died, or when he produced the various versions of his story of the conflict between Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī and Selīm. On the other hand it is also clear that much of what Ibn Zunbul reports could not possibly have happened (unless, that is, one believes in telepathy, magic and witchcraft). It also seems probable that he was only a child at the time of the Ottoman occupation of Egypt. (He certainly was not Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī's court astrologer, as Benjamin Lellouche has recently claimed.)⁹⁴ Rather this fascinating writer, who flourished in the 1560s and 70s, has claims to be considered as the Arab world's first historical novelist. It is true that, in his romanticised version of the downfall of the Mamluks, (the correct title of which is *Kitāb inḫisāl dawlat al-awān wa'l-ittiṣāl dawlat Banī 'Uthmān*), he stressed the importance of gunpowder and firearms in bringing about the defeat of the Mamluks. However, he made use of this as an excuse to explain the downfall of his chivalrous Mamluk heroes. The speeches in which Mamluk officers denounce firearms and their effects are clearly fictitious. Moreover, though Ibn Zunbul did indeed stress the importance of firearms, he laid even greater stress on the role of traitors within the Mamluk ranks and, above all, he repeatedly observed that when God has decreed the end of a dynasty, that dynasty is indeed doomed.

While it is the case that the deployment of firearms brought with it certain problems, the fact that the Mamluk empire maintained so grand a presence in the eastern Mediterranean for so long was in some measure due to its adoption and deployment of firearms. Indeed, the Mamluk Sultanate may be regarded as the first, though one of the most short-lived, of the "gunpowder empires" of the Islamic world.

⁹⁴ Benjamin Lellouche, "Ibn Zunbul, Un Égyptien Face à l'Universalisme Ottoman (Seizième Siècle)", *SI*, vol. LXXXIX (1994), 144–55.

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PART FOUR

PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION IN MAMLUK PALESTINE

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CHAPTER SEVEN

THE GOVERNANCE OF JERUSALEM UNDER QĀYTBĀY

Donald P. Little

Thanks to Carl Petry we have a clear and well documented understanding of the nature of Qāytbāy's long reign as sultan as seen by contemporary historians from the Mamluk capital in Cairo, most, but not all, of whom regard him with favor, the exception being Ibn Taghrī Birdī, with his criticisms based on the early years of the sultanate. Petry concurs in the majority judgment and depicts Qāytbāy as "esteemed custodian . . .", "the principal monarch of Sunni Islam . . .", who "radiated an aura of majesty that inspired many of his subjects to revere their overlord as a conservator of grandeur they recalled from days when Egypt's primacy was uncontested."¹ Moreover, for Qāytbāy's sultanate we are fortunate to have an additional, non-Cairene source, written from a provincial point of view, namely *al-Uns al-Jalīl bi-ta'rīkh al-Quds wa'l-Khalīl* written by Qāytbāy's contemporary, the Ḥanbalī scholar and historian of Jerusalem, Mujīr al-Dīn al-'Ulaymī.² This source Petry did not use. In his desire to record as much as he could about the merits and history of the city, Mujīr al-Dīn divided *al-Uns* into sections discussing its Islamicity within the monotheistic tradition, its shrines, and biographical notes on its notables, both religious and political.³ Unexpectedly, the work ends with an annalistic account of the reign of Qāytbāy, beginning with the year of his installation as sultan in 872/1468 and ending, conveniently but not conclusively, with 900/1495, even though Qāytbāy

¹ Carl F. Petry, *Protectors or Praetorians? The Last Mamlūk Sultans and Egypt's Waning as a Great Power* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), 13, 16. Cf. his *Twilight of Majesty: The Reigns of the Mamluk Sultans al-Ashraf Qāytbāy and Qānsūh al-Ghawrī in Egypt* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1993), 4–5.

² 2 vols. (ʿAmmān: Maktabat al-Muhtasib, 1973).

³ For a full study of this work see Little, "Mujīr al-Dīn al-'Ulaymī's Vision of Jerusalem in the Ninth/Fifteenth Century," *JAOs*, vol. CXV (1995), 237–47, and "Mujīr al-Dīn al-'Ulaymī's Vision of al-Quds around 900/1495," in *Research Papers of the International Symposium on al-Quds* (Rabat: ISESCO, 1995), 182–205.

continued to rule for another year and Mujīr al-Dīn himself lived until 928/1522. Somewhat surprisingly, Mujīr al-Dīn passes up the opportunity to eulogize a reigning sultan in an introduction characterizing his reign, stating merely that “He spread justice among his subjects (*al-raʿīyya*) so that the people (*al-nās*) had confidence in his reign. Jerusalem was decorated and the good news was proclaimed when the report of his sultanate arrived.”⁴ But the titles that Mujīr al-Dīn bestows on Qāyrbāy give some indication of his admiration: “Animator of Justice in the Worlds, Righter of the Oppressed against the Oppressors, Fighter of Unbelievers and Polytheists, Destroyer of Despots and Renegades, Uniter of the Faith, and Suppressor of Tyranny and Aggression”, even though these may well be stereotypes.⁵ This favorable impression in Jerusalem is confirmed for the most part throughout the detailed annals that follow. These I will use to reconstruct aspects of how the city was governed during Qāyrbāy’s reign and at the end examine briefly its governance in the context sketched by Petry for Qāyrbāy’s rule in Syria in general.

Appointment and dismissal of officials, both political and religious, in Jerusalem figure prominently in the annals. Here I will focus on the political. Not surprisingly, following the custom of his predecessors, Qāyrbāy initially retained the two Mamluk officials appointed before he came to power, but not for long. These two held the titles of Supervisor of the Two Shrines in Jerusalem and Hebron (*Nāzir al-Haramayn bi’l-Quds al-Sharīf wa’l-Khalīl*) and Viceroy of the same two places (*Nāʿib al-Saltāna . . .*). Although Mujīr al-Dīn never spells out the distinction between the two offices, it would seem that the viceroy acted as the sultan’s deputy in all matters except oversight of the endowments of the shrines of both cities. As might be expected the two officials did not always work together in harmony. In fact, the first two appointed after Qāyrbāy’s accession in 872/1468, had a serious falling out that divided the city into two factions after the Nāzir Bardbāk al-Tājī was wounded in an attack by the Nāʿib Damurdāsh al-ʿUthmānī. Amidst the resultant civil strife and the *nāzir*’s poor management, supervision of Jerusalem’s endowments suffered so that theft and brigandage became rampant, to the extent

⁴ *Uns*, vol. II, 283.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 282.

that an envoy was sent from Cairo to investigate the matter.⁶ As we shall see, this was the first of many incidents in which the sultanate intervened in the public affairs of Jerusalem. Otherwise, relations between the two representatives of Mamluk authority pass without Mujīr al-Dīn's notice, though there is mention of animosity between the viceroys of Jerusalem and Gaza in 896–900/1491–95.⁷ Another element of ambiguity comes from the fact that we know from the Ḥaram documents that at an earlier period there were Shāfiʿī judges who bore the title of Supervisor of Pious Endowments (*Nāzīr al-Awqāf al-Mabrūra*) in Jerusalem and Hebron,⁸ but their relationship to the Mamluk *nāzīrs* has not been defined. More vexing still is the scarcity of Mamluks in Jerusalem in Mujīr al-Dīn's pages, other than the two top officials. True, there is occasional mention of Mamluks who had retired in or been exiled to the city, and there are brief references to officers such as the *mutasallīms* and *dawādār*s in the service of the *nuwwāb* as well as the commanders of the citadel, but we know very little about these Mamluks, less, in fact, than about those sent on missions to the city from Cairo.

In any event for the twenty-eight of the twenty-nine years of Qāytbāy's reign recorded by Mujīr al-Dīn, three Mamluk amirs served as *nāzīr* al-Ḥaramayn exclusively, as well as one *qādī* who in 873–75/1468–71 served as an interim appointee.⁹ Twelve Mamluks served exclusively as viceroys. But in 893/1488 Qāytbāy for some reason decided to combine the two offices, and they remained so through 900/1495. From 893, after an interregnum when the *dawādār* of the viceroy of Gaza served until new appointments could be made, through 900, three amirs served in the dual capacity. Thus under Qāytbāy fifteen viceroys served a little less than two years on average, including Khaḍīr Bāk, who served once in 891/1486 and was appointed to the two offices in 896/1491; in contrast, six *nāzīrs* served for an average of four-and-a-half years. Whether or not these figures reveal anything significant about the stability of Mamluk rule in the

⁶ *Ibid.*, 285.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 359, 367, 373.

⁸ Huda Lutfi, *Al-Quds al-Mamlūkiyya: A History of Mamlūk Jerusalem Based on the Haram Documents* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1985), 199; Little, *A Catalogue of the Islamic Documents from al-Haram ash-Sharīf in Jerusalem* (Beirut: Orient-Institut DMG, 1984), 10.

⁹ *Uns*, vol. II, 286.

city is problematic, since we have no comparative figures for other times and places. It is noteworthy, though, that one *nāẓir*, al-Amīr Nāṣir al-Dīn Muḥammad b. al-Nashāshībī, remained in office for almost eighteen years (875–93/1470–1487) until, exceptionally, he resigned rather than being dismissed. He is one of the few Mamluks singled out for praise by Mujīr al-Dīn, “for serving with decency and vigor, providing civility to the Holy Land through his presence. He held frequent sessions with the ‘ulamā’ and jurists, whom he treated well, receiving them with a joyful countenance.”¹⁰ More specifically, he undertook to rebuild the endowments and to restore the serving of free meals in Hebron.

What were the circumstances of these appointments? Although there is disagreement as to precisely when the sultans, as opposed to the viceroys of Damascus, began naming the two officials in Jerusalem, whether 1391, 1394, or 1413,¹¹ there is no doubt whatsoever that during Qāyrbāy’s reign the positions were firmly in the hands of the sultanate. Occasionally, to be sure, there are indications that Qāyrbāy’s highest notables played an active role in the process, especially in depositions. Thus in 896/1491 Duqmāq Dawādār Īnāl al-Ashqar was dismissed as *nā’ib* and *nāẓir* by al-Amīr Āqbirdī al-Dawādār al-Kabīr while he was in the vicinity of Ramla on an official mission for the sultan.¹² This was the same powerful official of Qāyrbāy’s court whose support Duqmāq had previously bought the previous year against complaints lodged against him in Jerusalem.¹³ It is clear that graft was an element in political and other appointments. When, for example, Duqmāq was appointed in Cairo to the two positions, he paid 10,000 dinars to the royal treasuries in addition to the gratuities he conferred on the pillars of the state (“*istaqarra . . . fi nazar al-Haramayn al-Sharīfayn wa-niyābat al-salṭana bi’l-Quds al-Sharīf wa-balad Sayyidinā al-Khalīl . . . bi-badhil ‘asharat ālāf dīnār li’l-khazā’in al-sharīfa ghayra mā takallafahu li-arkān al-dawla.*”).¹⁴ In 899/1494, one of

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 288.

¹¹ Little, “Relations between Palestine and Egypt under the Mamluks according to Literary and Documentary Sources,” in *Egypt and Syria: A Millennium of Association (868–1948)* ed. Amnon Cohen and Gabriel Baer (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), p. 75; Boaz Shoshan, “On the Relations between Egypt and Palestine: 1382–1517 A.D.,” in *Egypt and Syria*, 97.

¹² *Uns*, vol. II, 358.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 353.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 342.

his successors, Jān Balāṭ, after being summoned to Cairo to answer complaints lodged against him from Jerusalem, was allowed to remain in office, like Duqmāq, after he had paid a sum of money.¹⁵ Further evidence of the prevalence of graft comes in a dispute between the two viceroys of Jerusalem and Gaza during the same year over the post of amirate of the Jurm Arabs. In any event, the viceroy of Gaza wrote to the sultan, opposing the Jerusalem viceroy's candidate on the grounds that he was not suitable for the post because "he could not put up the donation (*al-qawd*) nor the amount specified for the royal treasuries."¹⁶ Accordingly the sultan instructed that a council be convoked in which the two viceroys, their judges, and all the candidates who were qualified for the post "and were satisfactory to the subjects (*al-raʿiyya*) consider the stipulated amount and submit a legal report (*maḥḍar*) to Cairo."¹⁷ In the end the Jerusalem nominee prevailed because its viceroy agreed to pay five hundred dinars in excess of the customary donation and the stipulated amount. Other than willingness and ability to pay the price, little is known about the process of selecting political officials. According to al-Qalqashandī, in 777/1376 the viceroyship of Jerusalem was established for an amir of forty.¹⁸ While it is evident from *al-Uns* that all the viceroys during Qāyṭbāy's reign were Mamluk amirs (except for the one temporary appointee), I have been unable to determine their ranks from the biographical dictionaries. In addition we know that all the *nāʿibs* and *nāẓirs* were appointed in Cairo with a diploma (*tawqīʿ*) issued by the sultanate. These designees then set out for Jerusalem, preceded usually by a *mutasallim*—an assistant or vice-governor. In at least two instances when Mujīr al-Dīn provides names, it is evident that these officers were also Mamluks. In fact, one of them, Khaḍīr Bāk, who represented al-Amīr Jānim Bāk upon the latter's appointment in 888/1483, later became viceroy himself, in 891/1486.¹⁹ Shortly after the *mutasallim*'s arrival, the viceroy came to Jerusalem, dressed in viceroy's robes, accompanied by his entourage and notables of Jerusalem who had come out to meet him, and was greeted

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 367–68.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 370.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Subḥ al-aʿshā fi šināʿat al-inshāʿ* (Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya, 1913–19), vol. IV, 199.

¹⁹ *Uns*, vol. II, 336.

by the populace. By custom the diploma of investiture was read on the most public occasion possible, that is in al-Aqṣā Mosque, following the Friday prayers. Obviously the sultanate felt the need to demonstrate the legitimacy of the appointment to the people, making manifest his will in governing the city.

What, precisely, did the two Mamluk officers do? Given the nature of our one source, this is difficult to determine: annals, like newspapers, rarely report routine activities but focus instead on the unusual. In fact, in a section listing the governors of Jerusalem Mujīr al-Dīn states that there is no advantage in discussing them at length but is content to mention those who were known for good deeds.²⁰ Among these meritorious acts, it can be deduced, are construction activities in and around the city. The most notable building erected during Qāyṭbāy's reign was, of course, the Ashrafiyya Madrasa. The complicated history of the building/s has been written in detail.²¹ Suffice it to say here that the original building was built for Qāyṭbāy's predecessor, Khushqadam, by the *nāẓir*, al-Amīr Ḥasan al-Zāhirī, with his own funds, but that when he was dismissed from office he persuaded Qāyṭbāy to accept it as his own, whereupon the sultan's name was inscribed over the door.²² Ḥasan's successor presided over the finishing touches in 873/1468–69, installing the doors and furnishing the building with carpets.²³ Later, when Qāyṭbāy decided he did not like the *madrasa* and had it reconstructed, this was apparently done at his own expense and under the supervision of one of his elite Mamluks sent from Cairo for that purpose.²⁴ The fountain bearing his name also dates from this reconstruction according to Mujīr al-Dīn.²⁵ Other construction works at the Jerusalem Ḥaram are mentioned. In 877/1472–73, for example, the *Nāẓir* Ibn al-Nashāshībī rebuilt and enlarged one of the staircases leading to the Dome of the Rock, and in 884/1479 he undertook to replace the old lead on the Dome with new, like that recently installed on al-Aqṣā. But he was vociferously opposed in this project by an official called

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 269.

²¹ Michael Hamilton Burgoyne and D.S. Richards, *Mamluk Jerusalem: An Architectural Study* (Great Britain: World of Islam Festival Trust, 1987), 589–605.

²² *Uns*, vol. II, 284.

²³ *Ibid.*, 286.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 325.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 330.

Shaykh al-Ḥaram, who was not a Mamluk but a member of the religious notables. His insistence that the old lead was better than the new was confirmed by Mujīr al-Dīn's observation that it was still in use "until today."²⁶ Fourteen years later, in 895/1490, the Shāfi'ī Shaykh al-Islām al-Kamālī complained to Qāytbāy about the poor state of al-Aqsā and the need to repair and restore it; this was but one complaint lodged against the *nā'ib/nāẓir* Duqmāq.²⁷ In 892/1487 the Nā'ib Khaḍir Bāk rebuilt the judgment seat at the Dār al-Niyāba (al-Jāwiliyya) in the Egyptian style, complete with a roof. Here I cannot resist pointing to Mujīr al-Dīn's sharp critical sense, for even though he relied heavily on documents and inscriptions, he notes that the date inscribed on the seat commemorating its completion was an error: 891 should read 892.²⁸ Building projects outside the Ḥaram include repairs to waterworks such as the Qanāt al-Sabīl lying outside the city at Birkat al-Sulṭān, supervised by the *nāẓir* in 873/1468–69, and to the Qanāt al-ʿArrūb and the Birkat al-Marjī' in 888/1483.²⁹ At Qāytbāy's instruction the ex-governor of Damascus, now resident in Jerusalem, was given four thousand dinars for expenses and a thousand as a fee for his supervision of the latter projects.³⁰ Upon completion of the work, the amir sent a report to Qāytbāy along with the plans he had used, reflecting, I think, the sultan's close interest in the project, having dispensed, Mujīr al-Dīn observes, "a large sum" on it.³¹

Besides attention given to public works and the Muslim shrines of Jerusalem, the Mamluks were also involved in the tumultuous controversies over the holy places claimed by the Dhimmis. I have written at some length about the fights during Qāytbāy's reign over a synagogue and Christian shrines on Mt. Zion.³² These were waged primarily between Muslim legists on one side and representatives of the Dhimmis on the other but resulted in numerous investigations and interventions from the sultanate in Cairo that required convocation of councils in Jerusalem attended by the *nā'ib* and *nāẓir*. The

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 292.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 349.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 337.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 285, 330.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 330.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 331.

³² "Communal Strife in Late Mamluk Jerusalem," *Islamic Law and Society*, VI (1999), 69–96.

case of the synagogue developed into a public contest of will and jurisdiction between the Mamluk state and its provincial judiciary, involving as well Mamluks in both Jerusalem and Cairo. In the end Qāyrbāy prevailed of course, given his power of appointment, dismissal, and punishment of judges. The case of the shrines on Mt. Zion was similar but ended with a touch of humor when the Muslims, including the viceroy and Qāyrbāy's own envoy, became convinced that Qāyrbāy was on his way to Jerusalem and upon entering the city would forbid demolition of the Christian monastery. Thereupon they rushed to level the structure before the false alarm of the sultan's arrival could materialize.

Of special interest might be the impact of Mamluk-Ottoman relations on Jerusalem, Ramla, and Nablus. What Mujīr al-Dīn characterizes as a *fitna* between Qāyrbāy and Sultan Bayazīd b. ʿUthmān Malik al-Rūm began for these places in 888/1483, when a Mamluk expeditionary force bound for battle against the Ottomans arrived in Ramla. The viceroy of al-Quds, al-Amīr Jānim, accompanied by semi-nomadic tribesmen (*ashīr*) recruited from Jabal al-Quds, marched to Ramla to meet the Egyptian troops.³³ A similar expeditionary force, led by the Grand *Dawādār* Āqbirdī, arrived in Ramla the following year, where he enlisted men from the area under the jurisdiction of Shaykh Jabal Nābulus, but there is no mention of the participation this year of Jabal Qudsīs.³⁴ Such was not the case in 893/1488 when an expedition led from Egypt by the grand *dawādār* and the powerful *Kātib al-Sirr* Ibn Muzhir again reached Ramla. This time they were met by the viceroy Duqmāq, a Shāfiʿī *qāḍī*, and other notables of Jerusalem. The viceroy and the *qāḍī* were given five thousand dinars from the royal treasuries for disbursement to the men recruited from Jabal al-Quds and Hebron. When the viceroy fell ill, responsibility for recruitment and pay fell upon the *qāḍī*, who delivered the men to the Mamluks at the staging ground in Ramla, where they were joined by troops from Jabal Nābulus.³⁵ As is well known these troops disgraced themselves on the battlefield in Anatolia by deserting and returning to Palestine. There in 894/1489 the grand *dawādār* demanded repayment of their disbursements from Duqmāq.

³³ *Uns*, vol. II, 332.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 335.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 343.

Duqmāq set about retrieving these funds by force, flogging and jailing the deserters when they could be found along with their relatives, friends, and neighbors when they could not be. “The people were treated in a way unheard of since the Jāhiliyya,” Mujīr al-Dīn comments, “to the extent that one man sold his daughter like a slave, and the people remained in dire straits and tribulation unparalleled in the Holy Land before that time.”³⁶ Nevertheless, additional troops were levied the next year from Jabal al-Quds and Jabal al-Khalīl for still another expeditionary force, apparently without incident.³⁷ Finally, in 896/1491, the Mamluk-Ottoman strife ended, for Mujīr al-Dīn’s purposes at least, with a visit to Hebron and Jerusalem by the Ottoman peace envoys, on their way back to Istanbul from Cairo. Thus ended the eight-year *fitna* in which men in the vicinity of Jerusalem and surrounding towns were conscripted to serve in the sultan’s armies.³⁸

So far, economic matters and government attempts to manipulate Jerusalem’s resources have been touched upon only briefly, as in, for example, the payment of bribes, the expenditure of funds for construction, and the payment of troops recruited from around the city. In addition, however, we know from *al-Uns* that there were occasional attempts from Cairo to monitor the estates of persons who died in Jerusalem and elsewhere in Syria (as well as other resources) in an attempt to assign to *Bayt al-Māl* portions of estates that contained residues after distribution of shares to the legal heirs. Unfortunately, the Ḥaram collection of documents contains inventories conducted by the Bureau of Escheat Estates in conjunction with the Shāfi‘ī and Ḥanafī courts for only a short period at the end of the fourteenth century.³⁹ As a result there are no inventories dating from the reign of Qāytbāy around a century later. Nevertheless, we can probably assume that the practice of making such inventories continued, especially since there are occasional references to them in *al-Uns*. Thus in 898/1493 a *khāṣṣakī* sent to Damascus to inspect its endowments and *madrasas* stopped in Jerusalem where, in the presence of the political and juridical notables, had a royal edict

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 345. Cf. Shai Har-El, *Struggle for Domination in the Middle East: The Ottoman-Mamluk War 1485–91* (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 191.

³⁷ *Uns*, vol. II, 348.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 359.

³⁹ Lutfi, *Al-Quds*, 12–13.

read relating to a totally different matter, namely, “inspection of the documents and proceeds of those who had died in the plague, earmarked for Bayt al-Mal.”⁴⁰ Since there had been many plague deaths throughout the Mamluk empire, the government clearly felt obliged to reap such financial benefits as this pandemic bestowed. But the Mamluk envoy in Jerusalem also took the opportunity to extract around 1500 dinars from the *waqfs* of the city, “causing injury thereby to the poor and the jurists.” As in similar trials and tribulations Mujīr al-Dīn remarks only that “Judgment belongs to God the Great and High.”⁴¹ Beyond the harvest from the estates of plague casualties in Jerusalem, there are at least three references to estates in which inventories were conducted on behalf of the state. The first reference is to the estate of a viceroy of Damascus, Jānibāk Qilqīs—conducted by a *qāḍī* sent from Cairo in 885/1480 for this purpose.⁴² In fact, the only reason he appears in *al-Uns* is that he stopped off in Jerusalem, accompanied by one of Qāyṭbāy’s elite Mamluks, to oversee the demolition and reconstruction of the Ashrafiyya Madrasa. In 888/1483 the assets of the Jerusalem viceroy Aḥmad Mubārak Shāh were inventoried after his dismissal and replacement by Jānim al-Ashrafī.⁴³ This, of course, was an exceptional case of an inventory made before death or even terminal illness, perhaps in an effort by the government to determine whether it had any entitlement to his assets. The third case does involve an estate inventory of an individual in Jerusalem, namely that of the viceroy Khaḍīr Bāk, who died of plague in 897/1492 and was replaced by his brother Jān Balāṭ. When the estate had been itemized, seven hundred gold dinars were deposited in Jān Balāṭ’s strongbox in al-Madrasa al-Arghūniyya along with other items.⁴⁴ When the box was produced in the presence of the viceroy, a *Shaykh al-Islam*, and *qāḍīs*, it turned out to be broken and the contents missing and never found. Be that as it may, the point is that the Mamluk authorities kept close tabs on any possible source of revenue in Jerusalem during Qāyṭbāy’s reign.

In this respect the most detailed reckoning provided by Mujīr al-Dīn concerns the manipulation of the olive-oil market in the area—

⁴⁰ *Uns*, vol. II, 365.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *Ibid.*, 325.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 330.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 364.

one of its chief business enterprises—to the benefit of the Cairo regime. This is a complicated story. In the good old days, according to Mujīr al-Dīn, oil was brought from Jabal Nābulus and sold in Jerusalem and Ramla at the market price “without any difficulty for anyone.”⁴⁵ This continued until 890/1485 when a market middleman became involved and began cornering the oil and imposing its purchase on its consumers, namely the soap merchants in Jerusalem and Ramla, paying them a fixed amount, again “without bothering anyone else.”⁴⁶ At first there was an amir present to accept payments. But, then, every year one of the mamluks in the service of the grand *dawādār* started coming to Jabal Nābulus and sequestered the oil, sold it to its consumers, and received payments. In other words, until 890 the olive-oil market had been free; thereafter the Mamluks began intervening and taking a cut, without, apparently, any complaint, since the soapmakers had a monopoly on its purchase. This arrangement changed, however, in 896/1490, when the viceroy in Jerusalem, Duqmāq, allegedly taking revenge for the complaints lodged against him in Jerusalem, persuaded the grand *dawādār* during one of his periodic visits to Ramla, to issue an edict imposing the forced sale of Nablus oil at fifteen gold dinars per *qinṭār* on all the people of Jerusalem, including “the elite and the general public, whether Muslims, Jews or Christians.”⁴⁷ In collaboration with the *dawādār*'s agent, Duqmāq had lists of all the citizens of Jerusalem drawn up with a set number of *qinṭārs* of oil that each had to buy. Those who resisted were pursued without mercy. Those who did not appear were beaten and jailed, or, in their absence, their neighbors, relatives, and casual acquaintances, until the amount levied was paid. The necessity to procure gold resulted in a selling spree of clothing and other goods and a rise in the price of the dinar, with the result that oil purchased at the fixed price of fifteen dinars was sold for 250 silver dirhams worth only five dinars. According to Mujīr al-Dīn, Duqmāq imposed a similar levy in Hebron:

This was a disgusting ordeal, unheard of in any era or in any religious community (*millā*), especially in this noble spot where one of the three mosques was frequently visited, at the sacred site of God's Prophet

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 356.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

and His friend, Abraham, peace be upon him. Judgment is God's, the High and Great!⁴⁸

Ironically, when Duqmāq presented the approximately twenty-thousand dinars he had extorted to the grand *dawādār* at Ramla, the latter deposed him from his two offices and “drove him from the Holy Land.”⁴⁹ But two years later when al-Amīr Jān Balāṭ (who had returned from campaigning in Anatolia in 897/1492), had become viceroy and supervisor, the forced sale of Nablus oil was renewed, this time by an edict from the Grand *Dawādār* Āqbirdī, who once again had come to Ramla. In spite of the public proclamation that the subjects were not to be molested, along with the promise of security to the general public and the restriction of the forced sale of oil, again for fifteen dinars per *qinṭār*, to soapmakers, the levy was extended to others, including Jews and Christians.⁵⁰ Over a period of forty days, money was extorted for 1340 *qinṭārs* in Jerusalem, 160 in Hebron, 1000 in Gaza, and an unspecified amount in Ramla. Although people were again flogged and imprisoned during this ordeal, they were not treated as badly as they had been before, thanks to the intercession of Jān Balāṭ for the people of Jerusalem, according to Mujīr al-Dīn. Further evidence for Cairo's exactions from its provinces is the fact that before the grand *dawādār* left Ramla he received delegations from the viceroys and amirs of Tripoli, Ḥamāh, Ṣafad, al-Bīra, and Damascus bearing gifts of money and livestock.⁵¹ Two years later in 900/1494–95, the forced sales were renewed, this time on the basis of a royal edict sent to Jerusalem. Because of the intervention again of Jān Balāṭ, the inhabitants of the towns were not molested as they had been in the past, but the poor still suffered, Mujīr al-Dīn notes, because they lost almost half their money between the purchase and sale of the oil imposed on them.⁵²

To conclude this survey of the Mamluk, as opposed to civilian, governance of Jerusalem, let us look more closely at the relationship of its officials to the sultanate in Cairo by focusing on the regimes of two of the Mamluk officers characterized by Mujīr al-Dīn as

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 358.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 365.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 366.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 373.

unjust and tyrannical and the measures adopted by the central government to deal with them. In Mujīr al-Dīn's opinion, Duqmāq was the worst of the offenders. Appointed in 893/1488 as viceroy and supervisor of Jerusalem and Hebron after paying his dues to the royal treasuries and the pillars of the state, he retained these two positions for about three years until his deposition in 896/1491, when Mujīr al-Dīn says, God took revenge on him for his evil deeds. The arrival in Jerusalem of this "wicked tyrant (*al-ẓālim al-fājir*), clothed in his robes of office, was "among the most distasteful and offensive of events,"⁵³ especially in contrast to the tenure of the benevolent Nāzīr Ibn al-Nashāshībī. Duqmāq immediately incurred Mujīr al-Dīn's ire when he took the unprecedented step of curtailing the practice of distributing free meals in Hebron for almost five months. After recovering from illness, Duqmāq's "tyranny increased so that the conditions of social life were crushed and order was upset: thieves multiplied and committed atrocious acts of banditry and murder on the roads."⁵⁴ But in addition to being a poor administrator, Duqmāq was also a public object of ridicule for his careless speech and unseemly acts. More serious, however, was his brutality in reclaiming the money that had been paid to the Palestinian recruits who deserted in Anatolia, foreshadowing his ruthlessness in exacting the olive-oil levies. In the meantime, his closing of the Hebron soup kitchen elicited a royal edict from Cairo condemning him as an accursed non-Muslim. This edict was read publicly at the *Dār al-Niyāba*, in the presence of the common people and the notables, but its only practical result was the temporary dismissal of an implicated Ḥanafī *qāḍī*.⁵⁵ In the following year, 895/1480, the distinguished *shaykh* of al-Madrassa al-Ṣalāhiyya, the most prestigious educational institution in Jerusalem, wrote to Cairo complaining of Duqmāq's injustice and tyranny along with the sad state of al-Aqṣā and the Christians' claim to institutions on Mt. Zion. In response Qāytbāy sent one of his elite Mamluks, al-Khāṣṣakī Azbak, with a decree authorizing him to look into and settle the many complaints of the *ra'yya* lodged against Duqmāq. Curiously, Duqmāq himself attended a hearing held in Hebron in which Azbak heard the complaints. In

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 342.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 344.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 347.

Jerusalem the decree was read at al-Aqṣā, also in Duqmāq's presence, before the shaykhs of Islam and the general public.⁵⁶ Indignant, the people addressed him with insults, and the next day at al-Ashrafiyya attacked him before the *qādīs* with accusations, some of which he denied and confessed to others. Thereafter the pressure on him seems to have abated as he participated in the various councils convoked regarding Mt. Zion. Nevertheless, the *khāṣṣakī* eventually decided that the charges were serious enough to put him into custody, and a report accusing him of misconduct and oppressing the *ra'īyya*, signed by the notables of Jerusalem, was sent to Cairo.⁵⁷ In secret Duqmāq's *dawādār*, Ṭurbāy, went to Cairo and won the grand *dawādār*'s support by paying a bribe. The envoy from Jerusalem entrusted with the report enumerating Duqmāq's sins was apprehended and prevented, temporarily, from meeting with the sultan. In the meantime the investigation of Duqmāq continued in Jerusalem for twenty-six days.⁵⁸ The whole affair now took a comic turn when Ṭurbāy returned to Jerusalem with a royal edict, probably obtained by bribing the grand *dawādār*, which denounced the *khāṣṣakī* for detaining Duqmāq without authorization from the sultanate and summoned the viceroy to Cairo. There he succeeded in retaining his offices, again by a payment to the grand *dawādār*, as did the shaykh of al-Ṣalāḥiyya, Ibn Jamā'a, also summoned for interrogation, upon payment of one thousand dinars. The *qādī* Ibn Nusayba, also implicated, Qāyṭbāy sent into exile. This episode ends with a curious anecdote concerning the envoy who had come to Cairo bearing the official report of the proceedings against Duqmāq—the *imām* of al-Ṣakhra. Placed in detention upon his arrival in Cairo, he eventually succeeded in meeting with Qāyṭbāy. After giving him a tongue lashing for interfering in matters that did not concern him, Qāyṭbāy pardoned the *imām* and, for some unknown reason, invited him to demonstrate his skill in archery. Pleased by his performance, Qāyṭbāy ordered him "to wear his turban like those of the soldiers (*jund*), as it had originally been."⁵⁹ More importantly, however, the sultan confirmed him in his post of half the imamate of the Dome of the

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 350.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 353.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 354.

Rock and deposed the man whom Duqmāq “had appointed illegally, without a royal decree.”⁶⁰ Back in Jerusalem Duqmāq continued in his evil ways by arranging for the dismissal of the chief Ḥanafī *qādī* because of abusive language he had used against Duqmāq during the investigation, replacing him with the dismissed half-time *imām* of al-Ṣakhra as a reward for his support. Duqmāq was also responsible for having three more members of the religious establishment summoned to Cairo, where, after the usual payments, one of them succeeded in retaining his position.⁶¹ Otherwise, Duqmāq sought revenge, as we have seen, through his strict enforcement of the sale of olive oil imposed from Cairo but was dismissed in 896, without any reason cited except God’s revenge on malefactors.

A parallel case is that of al-Amīr Khaḍīr Bāk, appointed viceroy of Jerusalem in 891/1486. According to Mujīr al-Dīn his regime was also marked by “tyranny, bloodshed, and seizure of the people’s money,” so that the shaykh of al-Madrasa al-Ṣalāḥiyya, Ibn Jamā‘a, wrote in protest to the sultan. Again Qāyṭbāy sent a *khāṣṣakī* to investigate the matter through public hearings. These lasted more than ten tumultuous days while people from Jerusalem and Hebron denounced Khaḍīr Bāk in petitions. An official report of the viceroy’s oppression, signed by ‘ulamā’ and *qādīs* was sent to the sultanate. But the issue was complicated by accusations lodged against the Mālīkī *qādī*, charging him with taking bribes in return for supporting Khaḍīr Bāk.⁶² In a dramatic confrontation during prayers conducted at al-Madrasa al-‘Uthmāniyya, the *Nāẓir* Ibn al-Nashāshībī accused the *qādī* of taking bribes in exchange for his judgments, and the latter accused the *nāẓir* of accepting bribes related to enowments. Furthermore, when the *nāẓir* produced a report from the Kātib al-Sirr Ibn Muzhir announcing the deposition of the *qādī*, the latter refused to recognize the *kātib*’s power to dismiss him in the absence of any authorization from the sultan. Nevertheless, faced with a vocal uproar from those in attendance and the argument that “the *kātib al-sirr* was the voice of the ruler in dismissals and appointments,” the *qādī* was deposed, sent to Cairo, and shipped off to Yemen.⁶³

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 356.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 340.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 341.

Reports of the hearings signed by dignitaries from Jerusalem and Hebron were sent to the sultanate. As a result the viceroy was summoned to Cairo. When he was unable to refute the charges brought against him, he was flogged, imprisoned, and required to repay those people he had fleeced. The *nāzīr*, also questioned, was allowed to resign.⁶⁴

Beyond this summary of two evil regimes, some generalizations regarding Mamluk rule in the city are warranted. First it is evident that Qāytbāy and his coterie carefully supervised and controlled the government of the city through appointments, investigations, recalls, confirmations, and dismissals of officials in both the political and the religious cadres. Although Mujīr al-Dīn's references to bribery and sweeteners in these processes are only occasional, they are sufficient to indicate that the positions were certainly marketable. So far I have not reviewed the numerous instances in which officials and functionaries of all categories—*qādīs*, *shaykhs*, *imāms*, *mubāshūrīn*, et al.—were summoned to Cairo, but they are frequent enough to warrant the suspicion that money was definitely an important factor in holding office. Moreover, the fact that there was special place where the “*ahl al-Quds*” were flogged (at least on one occasion by the sultan himself) as well as an official who kept “*ahl Bayt al-Maqdis*” in custody also indicates that their activities were closely monitored.⁶⁵ In addition to recalls, public investigations were conducted in Jerusalem with the participation of the *nā'ib/nāzīr* and judicial and religious establishment of the city as well as occasional Mamluk and judicial envoys. Official reports of these proceedings, signed by the notables, were routinely submitted to Cairo. When the sultan was displeased with the progress or findings of these hearings, he convoked panels of his own in Cairo, and in the case involving the synagogue, overruled the provincial findings and recommendations. I find it interesting that these hearings were conducted in a variety of public places in al-Quds—al-Madrassa al-Tankiziyya, al-Aqṣā, Qubbat Mūsā, Dār al-Niyāba, al-Madrassa al-Ashrafiyya, al-Madrassa al-‘Uthmāniyya, Jāmi‘ al-Maghāribā—in the presence, moreover, of the populace (*al-khāṣṣ wa'l-‘amm*) as well as legists and notables (*al-fuqahā' wa'l-a'yān*) in addition to the official members of the panels. There was obviously, then,

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 314.

an attempt to get many people involved and spread the sessions among a number of public institutions. I was also surprised to learn that private citizens sometimes took the initiative in launching protests to the sultanate against perceived misdeeds of officials in Jerusalem. Thus, in 879/1474 in the synagogue dispute, an unidentified dervish sent a letter to Cairo by which he persuaded Qāyṭbāy to reopen the affair on a new legal basis.⁶⁶ Earlier, a commoner had actually gone to Cairo and through his complaint to the sultan was instrumental in the convocation of a deliberative council.⁶⁷ Moreover, as already noted, Mujīr al-Dīn sometimes refers to the welfare of the subjects during the reigns of different Mamluk officers. Besides convoking judicial councils, the central government also made use of periodic visits to the area, most notably by the grand *dawādār*, for the obvious purpose of implementing measures dictated by the sultanate: the forced sale of olive oil, conscription of troops, and collection of residues from escheat estates and pious endowments being examples. Sometimes these officials, acting presumably under the sultan's authority, intervened decisively in Jerusalem affairs, as in 895/1410, for example, when the amir Azbak, in Ramla, ordered Jerusalem notables to determine whether the Tomb of David on Mt. Zion was an asset of the Christians and, if so, to come to terms with them.⁶⁸

But the clearest evidence for Qāyṭbāy's desire to control the administration of Jerusalem comes from his own visit to the city, and Hebron, in 880/1465. In both towns he took matters into his own hands. In Hebron he revoked the right of the viceroy of Jerusalem to appoint the *muḥtasib* and to collect the bribe imposed upon the designee. Instead, the *muḥtasib* was to be appointed thereafter by royal decree, without payment of a donation (*kulfa*). This measure proved to be temporary, however.⁶⁹ In Jerusalem Qāyṭbāy was accompanied by many of the leading officers of his state, including the Grand Amir Azbak; al-Amīr Yazbak al-Dawādār; al-Qāḍī Zayn al-Dīn Ibn Muzhir, *Kātib al-Sirr*; al-Amīr Khushqadam al-Ṭawāshī, *al-Wazīr*; and al-Qāḍī Tāj al-Dīn al-Maqdisī, *Nāzīr al-Khawāṣṣ*; as well as eminent judges.⁷⁰ Sitting in state at both Qubbat Mūsā in the

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 305.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 301.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 348.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 314.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 315.

Ḥaram and in a window at his *madrasa*, he heard complaints and received petitions from the people against the ruling viceroy, Jār Quṭlī, that accused him of oppression and tyranny.⁷¹ Summoning him into his presence, Qāyṭbāy ordered him to come to terms with his complainants, to pay his debts in full, and to repay half the amount of the fines he had imposed. Assured by the *dawādār* that Jār Quṭlī had complied with these demands, Qāyṭbāy bestowed a robe of continuance (*khilʿat al-istimrār*) on him with the following admonition: “Treat the people well and rule them with justice and fairness by the *Sharīʿa*. If after today anyone complains about you, I will cut you in half!”⁷²

Writing in a different context but summing up, nevertheless, aspects of Qāyṭbāy’s character and career from a Cairo perspective, Carl Petry concludes, “We are thus left with the impression of an individual who was not only authoritative, resolute, and trustworthy, but prudent as well.”⁷³ Although Mujīr al-Dīn in Jerusalem has little to say about the sultan’s trustworthiness and prudence, his pages offer ample corroboration of Qāyṭbāy’s authoritativeness and resolution in his determination to oversee the governance of the city. His piety is also demonstrable through his construction of a major shrine in the city and his determination to protect the Dhimmī holy places in accordance with the *Sharīʿa*. “His fascination with judicial proceedings, alternately appreciated and resented by judges, attests to his familiarity with the *Sharīʿa* and his belief that a ruler’s sworn oath to uphold it meant more than mere enforcement of cases subordinates had decided.”⁷⁴ This concern for legal procedure and responsiveness to the expectations of the *raʿīyya* are also evident in Jerusalem. Petry’s observations on Qāyṭbāy’s administration of Syria seen from the vantage point of its two major cities, Damascus and Aleppo,⁷⁵ are also applicable, with reservations, to the special case of Jerusalem as a small but important town because of its religious status. The apparent lack of a sizeable Mamluk garrison in Jerusalem meant that it could not be used, like Damascus and Aleppo, as a center of opposition to the central government, and the appointment of

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 316.

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ Petry, *Twilight*, 33.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 31.

⁷⁵ Petry, *Protectors*, 35–37.

rather obscure, evidently low or medial ranking Mamluks to the *niyāba* and *naẓar* militated against the building up of long-lasting households, especially since with one exception these officials were frequently changed by the sultanate. But the frequency of change did not prevent the development of rivalries among the officers in Jerusalem or between the viceroys of Gaza and Jerusalem, paralleling the situation elsewhere in Syria. Nevertheless efforts were made in Palestine to patch up these differences, so that they did not become so disruptive as in the major cities. Finally, though I have not dwelt on Qāyṭbāy's manipulation and control of the judiciary in Jerusalem, I can verify that his policy there is similar to that which Petry describes for Damascus and Aleppo. For al-Quds also "the sultan jealously guarded his prerogative of choosing the senior *qāḍīs*"⁷⁶ as well as lesser jurists and officials in other religious institutions. But it is my impression that Qāyṭbāy did not try to play off local appointees against Cairenes, relying instead, with exceptions, on "local 'ulamā' families" in Jerusalem. Control, then, was exerted not so much by encouraging regional rivalries but by constant monitoring of judicial and religious affairs in Jerusalem. Finally, Mujīr al-Dīn provides evidence for what Petry characterizes as the regime's tolerance of economic "exploitation in the provinces,"⁷⁷ which would include in the case of Jerusalem, and I suspect elsewhere, trafficking in public offices.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 36.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

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CHAPTER EIGHT

FOUNDING A NEW *MAMLAKA*: SOME REMARKS CONCERNING SAFED AND THE ORGANIZATION OF THE REGION IN THE MAMLUK PERIOD

Joseph Drory

After undergoing a setback in his attempt to raid coastal Acre, the main Crusader stronghold and political focus in Palestine, in Ramaḍān 664 (June 1266), the Mamluk Sultan Baybars turned instead to subdue another Frankish bulwark, that of Safed in eastern Galilee. Forty days of siege ending in 18 Shawwāl 664 (July 1266) led to the conquest of that immense fortification.

The aim of the first part of this article is to demonstrate the distinctive local consequences of Baybars' success, which has generally been disregarded or not properly evaluated in scholarly literature. The second part reviews a variety of offices carried out in the province of Safed, a province which was established purely thanks to Baybars' feat. This is principally intended to present a view of everyday administration in a medieval Syrian district.

Evidence of any noteworthy urban settlement in Safed prior to its conquest by Baybars is scarce. No clear mention of Safed in antiquity can be cited. In a Geniza document, dated 1034—perhaps the earliest mention—a transaction involving the purchase of a shop in Tiberias was conducted by a trustee of a boy named Mūsā b. Hiba.¹ Mūsā, or one of his forefathers, was nicknamed “He who comes from Safed”. The chapter allocated to Safed in the *A'lāq* of Ibn Shaddād (d. 1285) states that “formerly Safed was a flourishing village [*qarya 'āmira*] beneath the ‘orphan’s castle’ [*buḥj al-ya'ām*] until

¹ M. Gil, *A History of Palestine 634–1099* (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 213–14. In 1023 in the marriage deed of Hiba's wife, written in Tyre, her husband is referred to as “ha-Ṣefati” (coming from Safed). This leads M. Gil to determine: “There is no doubt, therefore, that there was a Jewish community in Safed . . .”

its occupation by the Crusaders in the twelfth century”.² But this statement is undermined by a more insightful observation by the same author: “Safed [according to Ibn Shaddād] was not referred to in any of the books composed about early Islamic history.”³

More apparent is the total omission of Safed by Jerusalem-born and local patriot Muqaddasī in his geographical work. Conversely, Muqaddasī’s *Aqālīm* (assumed to have been written in 985) did not fail to record other minor settlements in the eastern Galilee (such as Farādhiyya, Qadas or Jesh).⁴ Moreover, Yāqūt, the thirteenth-century composer of the geographical voluminous dictionary *Muġjam al-buldān*, who visited Palestine and included tiny places (such as Yabrūd north of Jerusalem, Bayt Māmā in the Nablus district, or Bayt Nūbā east of Ramla on the road to Jerusalem) in his book, leaves Safed unmentioned.⁵

A year after the blow inflicted on the Franks by Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn (1187), he was able to conquer the fortress of Safed. He then placed a remote relative (a son of Saladin’s niece) named Mas‘ūd b. Mubārak⁶ in charge of that place (d. 608/1211). This Mas‘ūd bequeathed this position to Aḥmad, his son. No information on their activities as rulers is recorded in history books.

Some information regarding the existence of a Jewish community in 1211 comes from R. Samuel b. Samson who traveled from Tiberias and nearby Kfar Ḥanania to the eastern Galilee and preferred Safed as a resting-place on Sabbath.⁷ Jehūda al-Ḥarīzī in his “Taḥkemōnī”, believed to be written around 1215, mentioned a certain “righteous Ṣadōq”, the head of the seminary of Jewish learning in Safed.⁸

² ‘Izz al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād, *al-A‘lāq al-khaṭīra fī dhīkr umarā’ al-Sha‘m wal-Ḥazīra (Ta’rīkh Lubnān wal-Urdunn wa-Filastīn)*, ed. S. Al-Dahhān (Damascus, 1962), vol. III, 146.

³ *A‘lāq*, vol. III, 146.

⁴ Muqaddasī, *Aḥsan al-taqāsīm fī ma‘rifat al-aqālīm*, ed. De-Goeje, BGA no. 3, Leiden 1906, 161, 162, 163 (trans. B.A. Collins under the title “The Best Divisions for Knowledge of the Regions”, Center for Muslim Contribution to Civilization, 1994, 148, 149, 150).

⁵ Safed does get a paragraph in Yāqūt’s *Muġjam*, but its erroneous location, “a city in Jabal ‘Āmila, looking over Ḥimṣ, accounted from the Lebanon mountains”, makes his observation and judgment totally incompetent and irrelevant. (Yāqūt al-Rūmī, *Muġjam al-buldān*, Dār Ṣāder, Beirut 1957, vol. III, 412).

⁶ ‘Abd al-Qādir b. Muḥammad al-Nu‘aymī, *al-Dāris fī ta’rīkh al-madāris*, ed. Ja‘far al-Ḥusnī, 2 vols., Damascus 1948–1951, vol. I, 374.

⁷ Ya‘arī, *Igrōt Erez Israel*, Tel Aviv, 1943, [in Hebrew] (Tel-Aviv, 1943), 80.

⁸ Al-Ḥarīzī, *Taḥkemōnī*, ed. Toporowski (Tel Aviv, 1952), 350.

The description of the castle of Safed, written in 1260 by Benedict of Alignan, the archbishop of Marseilles, attests to a “civic quarter on slopes of the citadel”. Benedict even describes this undefended district as a “large town comprising a market and a large population”.

Although the description of Baybars’ siege in 1266 does not record contacts or friction with the civilian population in Safed, and given that Benedict’s description is not devoid of tendentiousness—its aim being to augment the Templars’ undertaking, even with regard to the non-combatants—it seems that we cannot categorically rule out the possibility that, alongside the Crusaders’ castle, there did exist a permanent urban population of Jews and Moslems. This could entail an infrastructure of buildings, tenements, streets, alleys, water supply and markets, albeit in a limited scale and only in one district, namely: the western one. That puzzle, the extent of urban life in pre-Baybars’ Safed, is far from solved.

In any event, a remarkable change was about to follow. Although the lists drawn up by Baybars’ chroniclers, in the enumeration of their sultan’s conquests, do not lend a special emphasis to Safed, this accomplishment was apparently characterized by a number of unique aspects.

Firstly, Safed—in contrast to other cities and castles mainly on the seashore, such as Arsūf and Caesarea (and later Jaffa)—was not razed to the ground. It would have been an enormous blunder for Baybars to fail to profit from Safed’s splendid advantages. These may be outlined as follows: topography—the city is located on top of an insurmountable mountain; fortifications—whose power and endurance Baybars personally experienced; and environment, since there was no menacing Frankish town or castle within a periphery of at least 40 km.

Baybars, possibly as early as 664/1266, appointed a governor to the castle, ranked as *wālī*. Just less than two years later, Baybars paid a second visit to Safed (Rajab 666/March 1268), at which time he carefully took pains to reconstruct its Templar citadel. According to a contemporary biographer of Baybars,⁹ these reconstructions consisted of establishing gateways to the fortress, construction of a reservoir with scales flanking its four sides and an extremely high tower

⁹ ‘Izz al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād, *Ta’rīkh al-Malik al-Zāhir*, ed. A. Ḥuṭayṭ (Wiesbaden, 1983), 353.

adjacent to the reservoir, deepening and widening the ditch which surrounded the fortress, constructing a (probably new) bath and transforming a former church into a mosque. In the inner (or forward) barbican [*bāshūra*]¹⁰—a section rebuilt by Baybars after, atypically, demolishing this unsatisfactory Crusader post—he installed turrets, curtain walls [*badana*], machicolation [*tallāqa*], shooting stands, and a gateway together with a moveable bridge, and made arrangements for a permanent water supply from a nearby hill.

The next aspect—the reshaping of Safed's castle—was of further significance, apart from strengthening Safed's military perseverance and defensive valor. It spurred and promoted the development of a civilian city next to the castle, for the first time in the history of this site.

Baybars' activities in reconstructing the fortress were supplemented by other actions, destined to amplify the hitherto humble urban and civil nature of this newly-conquered site. These involved, to cite the author of *al-A'lāq*, constructing *khans*, markets, baths and gardens. The plural form, while it might be exaggerated, points to the evident intention. In addition, Baybars set up a mosque in the city, second to that of the citadel, which was simply a church modified to comply with Muslim ritual requirements. The location of that city mosque, intact to this day, allows determination of the location of the residential core of thirteenth-century Safed.

All of this shows that Baybars' accomplishment consisted of transforming what had been primarily a military fortress into a prosperous civilian town.

The third distinctive dimension which characterizes Baybars' role in shaping the fortunes of Safed is its transformation into a bureaucratic territorial center. Safed and the neighboring region were entrusted to a *nā'ib*, 'Izz al-Dīn Aybak al-'Alā'ī,¹⁰ it is, however, hard to tell what his authority was and who yielded to his command. One can only speculate as to whether this was Baybars' abrupt decision immediately after his takeover; but in any event, the decision may be assumed to have been made not too much later and to have been based on weighty strategic grounds.

The Crusaders never ceased to constitute a military threat from the coastal area. Even if it were possible for Acre to be occupied

¹⁰ *A'lāq*, vol. III, 150.

and destroyed, a sudden sea-invasion could not be discounted. Safed offered a perfect location as a rear headquarters to carry on the struggle against the Franks, and its surrounding fertile districts could be awarded as compensation to Baybars' deserving warriors.

Expelling the Templars from Safed facilitated the annexation of areas in the eastern Galilee, previously cultivated and administered by the Franks. In his efforts to replenish the newly-annexed area with a trustworthy population, Baybars allocated portions of land to 54 of his Mamluks in the region.¹¹ At the head of this group of Mamluks, he placed several of his Amirs. The officer "responsible for the new allowances" [*iqṭā's*], 'Alā' al-Dīn Kundughdāy,¹² was an additional pillar of the new regional order. His nomination with these powers enhanced the chances of Safed—the probable residence of 'Alā' al-Dīn—to officiate, successfully, as the regional focus of the veteran residents.

The decisive factor in promoting the singling out of Safed as a center of *niyāba* (later to become an independent *mamlaka*) was its tenable citadel, which derived its might both from the Templar initiative phase—which Baybars had found difficult to subdue—and from Baybars' efforts of renovation. That citadel guaranteed the survival of a huge military garrison which could, if needed, endure a prolonged blockade by potential foes. As already mentioned, Acre and Tyre were not to be disparaged as active Frankish menaces. The existence of a defensible citadel and the lack of similar fortress in the region lent clear priority to Baybars' decision to designate Safed as the core of what would become a Galilean province.

It should be pointed out that, in all of the other conquests by Baybars, who styled himself the extirpator of castles from infidels'

¹¹ Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad b. 'Alī al-Maqrīzī, *Kitāb al-sulūk li-ma'rīfat duwal al-mulūk*, ed. M.M. Ziyāda & S. 'Abd al-Fattāḥ 'Ashūr, 12 vols., Cairo 1934–1973, affirms that people were summoned from Damascus to live in Safed, vol. I, 548. This could hardly be carried out without material incentives. Badr al-Dīn al-'Aynī, *Iqd al-jumān fī tā'rīkh ahl al-zamān*, ed. M.M. Amīn, Cairo 1987, vol. I, 422 refers to this explicitly: "And he [Baybars] installed for them salaries and allotments." In an inscription from Khālid b. al-Walīd's mausoleum in Ḥimṣ, Baybars prides himself on his conduct following the victory over Safed, saying that he "allocated the country to the combatants [*mujāhidīn*]" and thus did justice towards living and dead alike. *R.C.E.A.*, vol. XII, 129, no. 4593.

¹² *A'lāq*, vol. III, 153. Also known as Aydughdāy, Ibn al-Furāt, *Ta'rīkh al-duwal wa l-mulūk*, ed. U. and M.C. Lyons, *Ayyūbids, Mamlukes and Crusaders* (Cambridge, 1971), 120.

seizure [*muqtalīʿ al-qilāʿ min aydī al-kuffār*]¹³—i.e., taking over Frankish towns and fortresses, or seizing control over old Muslim towns in Syria, Asia Minor or Nubia—no new (annexed) town was assigned a Mamluk administrative center. Safed is an exception to the rule. (A similar, exceptional status awaited Tripoli, following its capture by Qalāwūn in 1289.)

The overall impact of Baybars' actions in Safed: conquest, reconstruction of the citadel, lending it an unprecedented administrative status, summoning men-of-capacity and apportioning land—thus fostering commitment—to loyal officers, is described by the historian in these phrases: “Safed turned out to be, owing to what [Baybars] established there, one of the prettiest and most defensible castles and best and most fertile regions (*fa-šārat bi-mā aḥdathahu fihā min aḥsan al-qilāʿ wa-amnāʿihā wa-atyab al-biqāʿ wa-akhṣabihā*).”¹⁴

A more thorough appreciation of the Mamluk creativity in Safed must take into account additional factors: The administrative organization generated by the Mamluks was a completely new one. The Galilee—at least since its occupation by the Franks—could not have adhered to the Muslim secretarial tradition accountable for correspondence, taxation, justice procedures, land allocation or agricultural control. The Safed province officials had to start from scratch, bereft of any relevant local precedent which they could follow. Safed's former population was meager, lacking wealth or education. The site suffered from inconvenient weather (in the winter) and poor accessibility, which explains its having being overlooked during previous centuries; moreover, it could not claim any Islamic heritage and prestige whatsoever, due to past neglect and the desolate nature of the place.

These poor starting points notwithstanding, the Mamluk authorities were able to institute, within a short period of time (its exact duration cannot yet be determined)—a multifaceted executive structure constructed after the model of long-standing, well-established Syrian provinces. This administrative structure contributed to—and was certainly sustained by—the arrival and settling of a greater civilian population, which catered to the bureaucrats' needs.

¹³ As stated in the Nabī Mūsā inscription, *R.C.E.A.*, vol. 12, 142, no. 4612.

¹⁴ *Aḡlāq*, vol. 3, 150.

The second part of the article will describe and evaluate the main functionaries in the *mamlaka* of Safed. Such a description portrays the routine outlines of an administrative province in Mamluk Syria with regard to officeholders: main positions, officers' ranks, their influence, survival, capacity and further stages of career. Studying Safed from a bureaucratic point of view helps to engender a wider outlook on Syrian towns in the Middle Ages.

Governors (Nuwwāb)¹⁵ of Safed

We are able to trace the whereabouts of Safed's viceroys for the entire two and half centuries of the Mamluk period. Ample information is produced by Khalīl b. Aybak al-Ṣafadī in both of his books, *al-Wāfi bil-wafayāt* and *A'yan al-'asr*. Born in 1296 to a local family who later moved to Damascus, and operating in Safed at the beginning of his career, Ṣafadī was familiar with senior officeholders in the town and is thus qualified to supply extensive first-hand information concerning them. Even without consulting Ṣafadī's voluminous works, it is possible to compile a full list of Safed's governors, based upon the chroniclers' writings and the biographers' supplements.

If we review the biographies of the municipal governors, the following conclusions arise:

- (One) The ordinary duration of a governor's time in office shortened as time passed. From the establishment of the governorship (*niyāba*) in 1266 until the mid-fourteenth century, 26 governors were counted (i.e. an average term in office of more than three years for each governor). By contrast, during the period from 1347 to the last days of the Mamluk state, a

¹⁵ The *nā'ib* is a functionary also referred to, by and large, in official terminology, inscriptions and documents, as *kāfil*. *Nā'ib* could have meant deputy or representative of any officeholder including agents of the sultan in other Syrian towns and castles. *Kāfil*, less frequently in use (Zāhiri's constant use of the term *kāfil*—see e.g. Khalīl ibn Shāhīn al-Zāhirī, *Ṣubdat kashf al-mamālik*, facs. of P. Ravaisse edition (Paris, 1894) by F. Sezgin, Islamic Geography Series no. 79, Frankfurt 1993, 131–34—is an exception), was definitely a more prestigious term, used, for example, for Yashbak al-Ḥamzāwī as stated in Zāwiyat banāt Hāmid's inscription. This Yashbak served as governor of Safed between 1447 and 1451 and came to Safed, very typically, from the *niyāba* of Gaza.

time-span of 170 years, we have listed more than 100 governors—or, to be precise, more than 100 appointments, since several governors ruled more than once. Among those governors nominated for more than one term are Timurbughā al-Manjikī in 1400 and 1401; Timurbāy al-Dimurdāsh in 1376, 1380 and 1383; Alṭūnbughā al-‘Uthmānī in 1399, 1406, 1409 and 1414 (four times); and Qurqumās b. akhī al-Dimurdāsh in 1408, 1410, 1411 and 1412. It means that each governor held his office—on average—for slightly more than one and a half years.

- (Two) The governor who remained in office for the longest period, Aruqtāy al-Qipchaqi, officiated for more than 18 years. He is entitled to be considered the most eminent governor of Safed in the Mamluk period, the like of Tankiz in Damascus or Sinjar al-Jāwīlī of Gaza. His long tenure of office might serve to mitigate some scholars’ impression that al-Nāṣir Muḥammad’s suspiciousness and ill-temper could not enable talented officers to hold a post for a long period of time. The days of Aruqtāy in Safed constitute an example of perseverance and an expression of the trust bestowed on him by his Sultan.¹⁶
- (Three) Every now and then, mostly in the period following the Black Death—a pivotal point in the nature of provincial government in the state—some second-generation mamluks (*awlād al-nās*) managed to infiltrate to the highest post of power. Such were the cases of ‘Umar b. Arghūn in 1363¹⁷ and Mūsā b. Aruqtāy in 1371,¹⁸ to name but a few.

¹⁶ Aruqtāy’s accomplishment is even worthier of praise, considering the fact that Tankiz was not always in his favor and made several efforts to get rid of him. Sultan Nāṣir Muḥammad expressed his appreciation of Aruqtāy’s capacity for survival: “By God, you managed to escape him as a prey from his lion”: *Muqaffā*, vol. II, 288.

¹⁷ Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad b. Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī, *al-Durar al-kāmina fī a’yān al-mī’a al-thāmina*, ed. M.S. Gad al-Hack, 5 vols. Cairo, sec. edition, 1966, vol. III, 229, no. 2984; Muḥammad b. Aḥmad Ibn Iyās, *Badā’i’ al-zuhūr fī waqā’i’ al-duhūr*, ed. Mohamed Mostafa, Wiesbaden 1974, vol. I, Part 2, 11.

¹⁸ Jamāl al-Dīn Yūsuf ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira fī mulūk Miṣr wal-Qāhira* [English title: *Abu ‘l Mahasin Ibn Taghri Birdi’s Annals*] ed. W. Popper, 7 vols., Berkeley 1909–1929, vol. V, 273.

- (Four) It is hazardous to generalize where caretakers of Safed placed themselves on the political map, or to ascertain whether they demonstrated rebellious separatist inclinations, taking advantage of their almost impregnable castle. The chronicles of Safed's governors include manifestations of opposition to the Egyptian rule, a result of the ruling sultan's weakness or political energetic ambitions of a local ruler. They do, however, relate instances of co-operation with the Egyptian sultan vis-à-vis irredentist local political troopers and commanders in Syria.

The case of 'Alā' al-Dīn Aydughdāy¹⁹ al-Kubakī in 1280 is an example of rebellious tendencies of governors in Safed. This Amir supported the disobedient ruler of Damascus, Sunqur al-Ashqar, against Sultan Qalāwūn.²⁰ When Qalāwūn managed to do away with Sunqur, he did not spare the governor of Safed from punishment. Another case is that of Arāq al-Fattāḥ in 1346, who supported the Damascene viceroy Yalbughā al-Yaḥyāwī against the weak Sultan of Egypt, al-Kāmil Sha'ḥbān.²¹

Contrary examples are that of Baktamur al-Zāhirī (also referred to as Jilliḡ) who, in 1405, supported Faraj—or rather, the adherents of the ten-year-old Sultan—against insubordinate governors of Damascus and Aleppo,²² or Shaykh al-Maḥmūdī—the future Sultan al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh—who backed Sultan Faraj in 1407 against the Amir Jakam, as the latter proclaimed himself Sultan [al-Malik al-ʿĀdil] in northern Syria.²³

- (Five) The title of the governors of Safed was *muqaddam alf*—the highest of the officers' ranks in the Mamluk regime. A force numbering hundreds of *mamluks* was at the governor's command. One unclear report illustrates his command over one²⁴

¹⁹ On Aydughdāy, consult Khalīl b. Aybak al-Ṣafadī, *Kitāb al-wāfi bil-wafayāt*, various scholars, Istanbul, Wiesbaden in. al., 1931–, 29 vols., vol. IX, no. 4447.

²⁰ Baybars al-Manṣūrī, *Ṣubdat al-fikra fī ta'rikh al-hijra*, ed. D.S. Richards, Berlin 1998, 184.

²¹ *Sulūk*, vol. II, 708–09.

²² *Nujūm (Popper)*, vol. VI, 120.

²³ *Nujūm*, vol. XIII, 58 [= *Nujūm (Popper)*, vol. VI, 183].

²⁴ Other sources [*A'yān*, vol. 1, 707; Jamāl al-Dīn Yūsuf ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Manhal al-ṣāfi wal-mustawfi ba'da al-wāfi*. Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, 8 vols., Cairo

hundred mamluks, a number resembling the amount of soldiers stationed regularly in Safed's castle. The routine obligations of this governor included the appointment of deputies to enforce law and order in the district.

- (Six) A personal assistant [*dawādār*] escorted the governor in his main duties. Sometimes the *dawādār* was sent to the villages as the governor's representative²⁵ and acting with his master's full approval. Analogous powers were conferred upon the private caretaker [*ustādār*]. In the only instance found, this *ustādār* was responsible for the hospital erected (not later than 1327)²⁶ by Tankiz.²⁷
- (Seven) The rulers of Safed originally came from other Syrian territories, or were later sent to such territories for a further assignment. The main Syrian regions mentioned are that of Gaza or Tripoli; less frequent are those of Aleppo, Karak and Ḥamāt. There is a tendency to assume that, in this period, a civil servant's career followed certain common stages.²⁸ A "provincial" superintendent served at a given time in one of the Syrian cities mentioned above,²⁹ but was rarely promoted to a higher post, such as the governor of Damascus or a similar esteemed position in Egypt.

1980–, vol. III, 399; *Muqaffā*, vol. II, 460] mention eight hundred mamluks, a more likely number.

²⁵ A *dawādār* named Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad won Ṣafadī's attention when he was dispatched in 1352 together with the *ḥājib* Muḥammad b. al-Bakhātī (hence a civilian, non-military *ḥājib*) to arrest an eccentric in the village of Ḥiṭṭīn who claimed to be Mamluk Sultan, a descendant of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad [*Aṣṣān*, vol. II, 25].

²⁶ *Aṣṣān*, vol. IV, 478.

²⁷ Mūsā b. Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā al-Yūsyufī, *Nuzhat al-nāẓir fī sīrat al-Malik al-Nāṣir*, ed. A. Ḥuṭayt, Beirut 1986, 287.

²⁸ See the formula cited by Qalqashandī (*Ṣubḥ*, vol. VII, 199) of the regular procedure for the exchange of governors between the Syrian provinces. The references to the Gaza-Safed or Safed-Tripoli track must be examples derived from genuine documents.

²⁹ The career of Kumushbughā al-Ḥamawī may be viewed as typical. This mamluk, originally from Ḥamāt, carried out several important duties in Syria around 1380, until he was imprisoned. When freed, he was shipped off to Safed; after six months, however, he was sent to Tripoli to replace its former amir. After some vicissitudes in his occupation, he was again sent off to Safed where he served for about a year. His next station was again Tripoli; this time he remained four and a half years in office. *Muqaffā*, vol. V, 10. His is but a random case.

(Eight) There are few indications of exclusive secessionist movements in Safed. They differ from the above-mentioned examples [paragraph (d)] in that they were initiated and stimulated in Safed. One of them occurred in the days of Tankiz. Until 1314, Safed was administered directly by the Egyptian head of state, at which point it was decided to subordinate Safed, like other Syrian cities, to the dominion of Damascus;³⁰ the Syrian viceroy Tankiz was empowered to operate as a mediating link between Syria and Egypt. The erstwhile governor of Safed, Balabān Ṭurnā, considered this reform harmful and superfluous and let his mind be known. Tankiz, the apparent protagonist of this administrative reshuffle, who had an influential say in the court of his Sultan, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, recommended to arrest the incompatible governor. This was eventually done. In the course of a visit to Damascus, Balabān was jailed and spent a period of ten years before returning to his former high status.³¹

A second incident is that of Aḥmad al-Sāqī, who revolted in 751/1350, seized control over the castle and filled it with provisions and ammunition. The reason he gave for the revolt was an attempt on his life. The governor of Damascus, who had to deal with this insurrection, sent military forces to Safed which laid siege to the castle. When Aḥmad found out that his ally, Baybughārūs, was confined, his willingness to rebel dwindled. He later discovered that his other supporter had transferred his loyalty, joined the government and was now willing to arrest him. Aḥmad halted his mutiny and proclaimed willingness to obey, but was arrested and sent to the prison of Alexandria.³²

(Nine) The governors of Safed constructed considerable installations and buildings in Safed and the surrounding regions. Among these were a public bath and a tomb edifice (by

³⁰ *Muqaffā*, vol. II, 609.

³¹ *Wāfi*, vol. X, 283; *Muqaffā*, vol. II, 487.

³² *Sulūk*, vol. II, 826, 831; Abū al-Fidā' Ismā'īl b. 'Umar, Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya wal-nihāya*, Beirut and Riyad, 1966, vol. XIV, 238; Khalīl ibn Aybak al-Ṣafādī, *Aṣṣūn al-ʿaṣr wa-aḥwāl al-naṣr*, ed. A. Abū Zayd et al., 6 vols., Beirut and Damascus 1998, vol. I, 178–81.

‘Alā’ al-Dīn Ayduḡday al-Aldakuzī [or: al-Ildikzī]),³³ the renovation of Jacob’s cave (by Baktamur al-Jūkāndār),³⁴ a monumental tomb-edifice to the governor’s wife, a primary school [*kuttāb sabīl*] and a high school [*madrasa*] (by Aruqtāy),³⁵ the tomb of Sitt Sukayna in Tiberias (by Fāris al-Dīn Ilbakī),³⁶ two shops in the vegetable market³⁷ and a bath in the nearby village of ‘Ayn Zaytūn³⁸ (by Balabān al-Jūkāndār), another bath (by Ṭashtamur al-Sāqī),³⁹ and a family tomb edifice (by Mūsā, son of Aruqtāy) which remains standing to this day.

The governors—who functioned outside the castle in *dār al-niyāba*—molded a conventional administrative organization which included soldiers, communication clerks, correspondence writers, financial employees and personal assistants. They were answerable to the Syrian governor, and that subordination was often a source of tense frictions. Aytamish, Aruqtāy’s successor, refused to concede to Tankiz’s orders, asserting “I am not your governor, but my sultan’s”.⁴⁰ A new governor was made to promise that he would not have to comply with Tankiz’s regulations and that he should communicate with Egypt directly in all matters.⁴¹

- (Ten) The governors of Safed overshadowed the concurrent commanders of the castle in rank and command. While we can produce a full list of the city *nuwwāb*, we are less equipped and far less informed with regard to the castle commanders (*nuwwāb al-qaṣa*). Although much was invested in the castle during Baybars’ reign, it played only a limited role in the history of the city. After the extirpation of the Crusaders in

³³ *Wāḡfī*, vol. IX, 486.

³⁴ *Wāḡfī*, vol. X, 199.

³⁵ *Muḡaffā*, vol. II, 33; mentioned in a *waḡf* document written in 901/1496, Mehmed İpşirli and Daoud al-Tamimi, *The Muslim Pious Foundations and Real Estates in Palestine*, Research Center for Islamic History, Art and Culture, Istanbul 1982, 70, doc. 48.

³⁶ *R.C.E.A.*, vol. XIII, 127, no. 4981.

³⁷ Y. Yadin, “Arabic Inscriptions from Palestine” [in: *L.A. Mayer Memorial Volume* (= *Eretz Israel*, vol. VII), Israel Exploration Society, Jerusalem 1964, in Hebrew], 116.

³⁸ *Aḡyān*, vol. II, 44.

³⁹ *Aḡyān*, vol. II, 591.

⁴⁰ *Yūsufī*, 319.

⁴¹ *Yūsufī*, 321.

1291, the castle is referred to mostly as a prison for local Amirs who went astray or were suspected as such.

(Eleven) An appointment to Safed was at times an alternative to punishment. Arghūn-Shāh al-Ustādār was said to be haughty with his young Sultan, al-Muzaffar Ḥājji, and talked to him in a vulgar manner. The sultan decided to arrest him. The then strong-man in Egypt, Aruqtāy,⁴² formerly a Safedi ruler, recommended mitigation of the punishment. Subsequently, Arghūn-Shāh was sent to be a governor in Safed.⁴³ This is a clear-cut indication of the limited importance placed upon Safed, from where no threat could come. Two other examples in the same vein which appear in the accounts of Safedi governors, during the rule of Barqūq and Faraj, support the same conclusion. The main rationale for sending officers to perform from Safed was to check their danger.

A certain Baktamur was given an appointment to Safed in 722/1322, since the Sultan considered it inappropriate that such an old officer should still be present in daily service [*khidma*]. By appointing him to a position in Safed, the Sultan aimed at relieving him [*qaṣada irāḥatahu*].⁴⁴ The supposition concerning Safed's limited significance remains unaltered.

Other officials in Safed

Following the choice of Safed, immediately after its conquest, to be the region's capital, an administrative establishment similar to that of other Syrian provinces was constructed in the town.

Within this establishment, the following main military officials operated on behalf of the Mamluk authority:

⁴² Aruqtāy succeeded where most Safedi governors failed. He was summoned to Cairo, where he was given an influential position and authority. *Wāfi*, vol. 8, 362. Baktamur al-Jūkandār was another example of a Safedi ruler who rose to prominence in Cairo.

⁴³ *Sulūk*, vol. II, 720.

⁴⁴ *Muqaffā*, vol. II, 458.

The ruler of the castle (*nāʾib al-qaʿa*). The earliest *nāʾib al-qaʿa*, Majd al-Dīn al-Ṭūrī,⁴⁵ was nominated by Baybars in 1266. He was then only a low-ranking *wālī*.⁴⁶ Years afterward, the officer in charge of the castle became *nāʾib* and was promoted to the rank of Amir of Forty.⁴⁷ The commander of the castle, apart from his obligation to maintain its various sections (e.g. moat, fortifications, towers, water reservoirs, warehouses, mosque and probably living rooms, ammunition and provisions for men and livestock), was also in charge of supervising the municipal governor.

Having received his mission directly from the sultan,⁴⁸ rather than the local or Syrian chief governor (*nāʾib al-Sham*), the castle-commander felt committed to him.⁴⁹ The officer of the castle was, consequently, entrusted with the control and supervision of the performance, initiatives and behavior of the local governor.⁵⁰

In 905/1500, the Egyptian sultan al-Ashraf Qānṣūh directed the castle-governor to detain the city governor, whom he suspected of treason.⁵¹ It should be noted here that a wing of the castle served as a prison where high-ranking inmates were confined.

Some of the castle commanders progressed to become local or territorial governors. Sinjār al-Kurjī (in 1280), Baylīk al-Ṭayyār (in the same year) and Arāq al-Fattāḥ⁵² (in 1344) are a few examples.

The chamberlain (*ḥājib [al-ḥujjāb]*). This was a senior post frequently held by a *muqaddam alf* officer, but more often by an Amir

⁴⁵ Ibn al-Furāt, *Taʾrīkh* (ed. Lyons, cited above in note no. 12), 120; *Aʿlāq*, vol. II, 150.

⁴⁶ The story of the soldier who caused damage to the castle's ammunition and whom Aydamur refrained, out of piety, from executing, mentions the officer who eventually slew the criminal, fearing the Sultan's rage. That officer was *wālī al-qaʿa*, and the affair could not have taken place later than 676/1277. *Muqaffā*, vol. II, 362.

⁴⁷ *Subḥ*, vol. IV, 149; *Aʿyān*, vol. II, 630.

⁴⁸ *Subḥ*, vol. IV, 150 "This castle has an independent governor . . . appointed by the sultan . . . and there is no rule of the region-governor upon him, but rather, he is independent."

⁴⁹ When Syrian amirs led by Yalbughā al-Yaḥyāwī plotted to wipe out Sultan al-Kāmil Shaʿbān, the Safed castle governor did not join this malicious initiative and was, when proved wrong, reprimanded for this loyalty. *Sulūk*, vol. II, 717.

⁵⁰ Although the name of *nāʾib al-qaʿa* is not mentioned, it may be assumed that the Safedi military force that routed the disloyal former ruler Baybars al-Aḥmadī was directed and led by the commander of the castle. *Muqaffā*, vol. II, 556; *Aʿyān*, vol. II, 82. However, the chief chamberlain (*ḥājib al-ḥujjāb*) was as likely a candidate to command the pursuit.

⁵¹ Muḥammad Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Flām al-warā*, ed. M.A. Dahmān (Damascus, 1964), 108.

⁵² *Wāḥī*, vol. 8, 332.

of Forty. The chief chamberlain (*ḥājib al-ḥujjāb*) was responsible for resolving disputes and arbitrating between amirs, or between amirs and soldiers. Actually this post was a non-religious judiciary organ. Two officers operated under the chief *ḥājib*; each of these was referred to merely as *ḥājib* (or: *amir ḥājib*) and was ranked an Amir of Ten.⁵³

Those engaged as *ḥājib* or his aide, minor *ḥājib* (*ḥājib ṣaghīr*) were not exclusively mamluks. There are a few examples of civilian *ḥājibs*. Such is the case of ‘Uthmān b. Ismā‘īl, dating from the first half of the fourteenth century,⁵⁴ or Rukn al-Dīn ‘Umar, who was reported to be wounded after chasing a mutinous Safedī ruler, Baybars al-Aḥmadī.⁵⁵

A certain *ḥājib* named Aqṭuwān, alias ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Kāmīlī, carried out several missions. He was a comptroller of the bureaus [*mushidd al-dawāwīn*], responsible for minor district counties [*wālī al-wulāt*], and commander of the castle [*nā’ib al-qaṣ’a*].⁵⁶ It is perhaps an irregularity in Safed’s administrative organization that one person occupied various key duties. His son, Qurmushī, an adherent of Ibn Taymiyya who was on friendly terms with the governor Aruqṭāy, operated first as a *ḥājib*, and later ascended to the rank of commander of the castle.⁵⁷ This almost certainly reflects the genuine hierarchy.⁵⁸

Atābik. This was an officer in charge of the army in the town and the district. Also called *muqaddam al-‘askar*, this function is well-known from the time of the establishment of this *niyāba*. Among the *atābiks* of Safed were: ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Aydughdāy [or: Kundughdāy, see above] in 1266,⁵⁹ Khalīl ibn Shāhīn al-Zāhirī, around 1440,⁶⁰ and Yūsuf b. Yaghmur in 1452, who was designated shortly thereafter as commander of the castle.⁶¹

⁵³ *Aḡyān*, vol. V, 38, 39.

⁵⁴ *Aḡyān*, vol. III, 215.

⁵⁵ *Aḡyān*, vol. II, 82.

⁵⁶ *Aḡyān*, vol. I, 557; vol. IV, 663.

⁵⁷ Ṣafadī himself, when in Egypt, wrote down the official promotion letter for Qurmushī, the embellished text of which he inserted into his *Wāfi*, vol. XXIV, 228.

⁵⁸ *Aḡyān*, vol. IV, 105, 106.

⁵⁹ Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir, *al-Rawd al-zāhir fī sirat al-Malik al-Zāhir*, ed. A.A. Khuwairī (Riyad, 1976), 261; Quṭb al-Dīn al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl mir’at al-zamān*, Hyderabad 1955, vol. II, 343.

⁶⁰ Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Sakhāwī, *al-Daw’ al-lāmi’ li-ahl al-qam al-tāsi’*, ed. Ḥusām al-Dīn al-Qudsi, 12 vols., Cairo 1934–1936, vol. III, 195.

⁶¹ *Daw’ Lāmi’*, vol. X, 338.

A permanent force of 1000 *ḥalqa* troopers garrisoned in the castle was under the orders of the *atābik*. He could call into action—when needed—another 1000 soldiers, those obeying the castle ruler, the local governor or the Amirs. Their number varied according to circumstances. This high officer was also known as the *amir kabīr*.⁶²

Wālī/Wālī al-wulāt. The *wālī* was a police officer in charge of keeping law and order in town. His rank: Amir of Ten. One should not confuse him with *wālī al-wulāt*, who was higher in authority and rank, being an Amir of Forty,⁶³ and who was responsible for the minor sub-sections (*wilāya*) of the entire region (*niyāba*). The number of the *wilāyas*, however, grew throughout the years from 10⁶⁴ to 11.⁶⁵

This task was fulfilled either by mamluks⁶⁶ or civilians,⁶⁷ but was repeatedly coupled with the office of *mushidd al-dawāwīn* in a way which makes it difficult to distinguish the particular demands or qualifications of each duty.

Shādd [or: *mushidd*] *al-dawāwīn*. This was a high-ranking officer whose duty it was to check and observe the collection of the Sultans' dues and taxes from state estates. He took over the function of controlling the proper conduct of government offices. Quite often, the *wālī al-wulāt* operated as *mushidd al-dawāwīn*.⁶⁸

An amir named Badr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā, a non-Mamluk officer in the *ḥalqa*, was recorded as a *shādd* (in Egypt) in the *ḏūwān* (government bureau) of Salār, the executive head of state around 1305–1310. He later gained importance and was promoted by Tankiz, in 1324, to become *mushidd al-dawāwīn* and *wālī al-wulāt*.⁶⁹

⁶² Tūghān (d. 847/1443) is recorded as *amir kabīr*, *Nu'aymī*, vol. II, 257. On the prospective *amir kabīr* in Safed see *Ẓubda*, 134; Ibn Jirān, *al-Qawl al-Mustazraf* [see note no. 123], 29. Perhaps the *malik al-umarā'* who is mentioned in *Uthmānī*, 485 as the officer in charge of spilling forbidden wine produced by the Druze in the village of Zābūd is another title for the *atābik*.

⁶³ *Aḡyān*, vol. II, 63.

⁶⁴ *Uthmānī*, 480.

⁶⁵ Ibn Faḡl Allah al-'Umarī, *Masālik al-abṣār fī mamālik al-amṣār, Dawlat al-Mamālik al-Ūlā*, ed. D. Krawulski (Beirut, 1986), 207; *Ṣubḥ*, vol. IV, 150–55.

⁶⁶ Documentation of mamluks operating as *wālī al-wulāt* can be found in the following sources: Aqtuwān, *Aḡyān*, vol. I, 557; Bahādūr, *Aḡyān*, vol. II, 63; Sinjar al-Sāqī, *Aḡyān*, vol. III, 116.

⁶⁷ The civilians included 'Umar, *Aḡyān*, vol. I, 703 and 'Alī b. Ḥasan, *Aḡyān*, vol. III, 232, 331.

⁶⁸ *Aḡyān*, vol. III, 116, 232, 331.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, vol. V, 303.

Another *mushidd al-dīwān*, Ibn Runqush (?) al-Turkumānī, is reported to have informed Tankiz in Damascus of apparent blunders made by the city governor. He is blamed for having caused the rift between Tankiz and Aruqtāy, as well as later between Tankiz and Aytamish.⁷⁰

Commander of the Post (*muqaddam al-barīd*). There are no exact data on the names or ranks of officials holding this post. However, their attendance in the center of a *niyāba* is more than likely. They are said to have managed a vast set-up of stables, road-stations,⁷¹ horse riders, letter writers and scribes.

Treasurer of the Castle (*Khāzindār al-qaḥ'a*). This official was in charge of the castle's treasury, storerooms, household and ammunition stocks.⁷²

Commander of the Tribes (*muqaddam al-ushrān*). This office-holder was honored with the rank of Amir of Forty. In all likelihood, he was a tribal leader acknowledged by the sultanate or the provincial governor. One report has it that such a commander, residing in Kafr Kannā (north of Nazareth), stemmed from *Qaysi* groups.⁷³ Members of the rival tribal group (the *Yamanis*) lived in Nazareth and in Lajjūn (Biblical Megiddo), the main village in Marj banī 'Āmir (now known as the Jezreel Valley).⁷⁴

It is very likely, though there is a lack of documentation, that other officials held esteemed posts in Safed. Such officials are usually to be found in neighboring provinces. The following posts and their revenue were traditionally assigned to mamluks: [a] the *mih-mandār*, who was in charge of ceremonies and organized receptions to missions or honorable guests; [b] the *naqīb al-juyūsh*, who was accredited with land appanages pertaining to the army; [c] the *shādd al-awqāf*, an officer controlling religious endowments.

Among the bureaucratic officeholders in the *niyāba* of Safed, the chief functions were:

⁷⁰ *Yūsufī*, 286, 318.

⁷¹ *Uḥmānī*, 483 writes that Jenīn has a *Barīd* center which is never vacant of post-staff (*barīdiyya*).

⁷² Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn 'Abd al-Zāhir, *Tashrīf al-ayyām wal-ūṣūr fī sīrat al-Malik al-Manṣūr*, ed. Murād Kāmil (Cairo, 1961), 57; *Yūsufī* gives an account of the *khāzindār* of Aytamish who, when his master passed away, cared for his private bequest, *Yūsufī*, 333.

⁷³ *Uḥmānī*, 485.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 483, 484.

Overseer (*nāẓir*) of the region in charge of the routine financial management of government departments, money expenditure and the officials' salaries. Sometimes judges functioned as *nāẓirs*, as in the case of Jamāl al-Dīn Sulaymān who executed both jobs in 1318–1323.⁷⁵ A certain Akram, who served in Egypt as the prestigious chief overseer [*nāẓir al-dawla*], was blamed of having behaved improperly and was sent to Safed in 724/1324. There he did very well in improving the town's situation until he was confined and his wealth confiscated.⁷⁶ Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Ya'qūb came from Damascus, where he filled the posts of both *nāẓir* and *ṣāhib dīwān* (head of a department), and visited Safed on official duty several times.⁷⁷

Inspector (*kāshif*) of bridges, agricultural lands and irrigation canals. It is not certain whether this office was held continuously or only occasionally. It seems that not only scribes and clerks held this post, and that it was conferred upon Mamluk amirs as well.

That the *kāshif* was authorized with controlling rights is clear from the case of Baktamur, who was sent, as *kāshif*, to conduct an investigation of an Amir named 'Umar who apparently filled the posts of both *mushidd al-dawāwīn* and *wālī al-wulāt*. His findings were recorded in a certain document by the *qāḍī* Mu'īn al-Dīn who escorted him.⁷⁸ This investigation aroused the rage of the chief scribe, even more so because Baktamur was himself formerly a governor of Safed (in 716/1316) and the scribe considered this decision wrong. He uttered his criticism against the wicked deed and faced the painful consequences.⁷⁹ The judge Ghāzī b. al-Wāsiṭī, an author of a notorious pamphlet directed against non-Muslims, was sent as a *kāshif* to Safed in Jumādā al-Ūlā 687/June 1288, together with other financial controllers, but a month later he was called back to Cairo.⁸⁰

Market inspector (*muḥtasib*). This was a post common in every large Islamic town. It can be ascertained from Qalqashandī,⁸¹ who

⁷⁵ *Aḡyān*, vol. II, 427.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. I, 583.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. V, 194.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. I, 703.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, vol. I, 703, 705.

⁸⁰ Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Raḥīm Ibn al-Furāt, *Ta'rikh Ibn al-Furāt*, ed. Constantine Zurayk and N. Izzedin (Beirut, 1938), vol. VIII, 67–68.

⁸¹ *Ṣubḥ*, vol. IV, 240; on the other hand, he is not mentioned in the detailed books of Ṣafadī.

records the resemblance in posts between Safed and Tripoli,⁸² that such a commissioner did operate in Safed at the time, but the lack of other evidence seems bewildering.

Chief secretary (*kātib al-sirr* or *kātib al-inshāʿ*). This was the highest executive with the duty of composing the governor's letters and documents and of reading incoming mail. As a senior scribe, the holder of this post was expected to have high linguistic capabilities and erudition in Arabic culture. We find at times a few judges who annexed this post to their judicial commitments. A local celebrity named ʿUmar b. Ḥalāwāt was given an official sultanīc appointment letter [*tawqīʿ*]. He was then removed from Safed to Tripoli, following a row with Tankiz of Damascus whom he, ʿUmar, admonished and even tried to harm.⁸³ Below the chief secretary operated *kātib al-darj* (a minor correspondent); the best known among those who acquired literary fame for generations was Khalīl b. Aybak al-Ṣafadī, who launched around 723/1323 his stately career as *kātib al-darj* of a certain amir, originally from Anatolia, named Ḥusayn b. Abī Bakr.⁸⁴ Higher in the hierarchy was the *kātib al-dast*, and above him the *muwaqqiʿ* (ratifier), whose job it was to sign and confirm the accuracy, validity and eloquence of the governor's epistles, including their copies. A certain ratifier (*muwaqqiʿ*) is said to have served his master for nine years, a rare phenomenon.⁸⁵ Another *muwaqqiʿ* operated as preacher, probably in the castle mosque. The governor of Damascus took care to separate his duties.⁸⁶ Najm al-Dīn, Ṣafadī's admired teacher, was simultaneously *kātib inshāʿ* and *muwaqqiʿ*.⁸⁷ A dominant role in the correspondence-bureau was played by the Ibn Ghānim family: Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad (d. 1336), was head of the chancellery both in Gaza and in Safed, and Bahāʿ al-Dīn Abū Bakr filled this

⁸² Zāhirī points out the *muḥtasibs* of Karak, Aleppo and Tripoli (*Ḍubda*, 132, 133).

⁸³ *Aṣyān*, vol. III, 596.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. II, 261–262; *Durar*, vol. II, 49, no. 1655.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. II, 5.

⁸⁶ *Wāfi*, vol. XII, 256–257; *Aṣyān*, vol. II, 233. There are some examples of preachers who operated simultaneously as ratifiers, though this was not considered a most desirable state of affairs. *Aṣyān*, vol. II, 234.

⁸⁷ *Aṣyān*, vol. III, 611. Perhaps *kātib sirr* pertains to the official's authority while *muwaqqiʿ* reflects his professional quality. Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Sharaf al-Dīn ʿIsā served in Safed as *kātib sirr* after a period in Gaza as *muwaqqiʿ*, which might not reflect an enhancement in career. *Aṣyān*, vol. V, 43. ʿUmar b. Ḥalāwāt is another case of *muwaqqiʿ* and *kātib sirr*, *Aṣyān*, vol. III, 595.

post in Safed until 1327 (then removed to Tripoli).⁸⁸ Scribes of different ranks were not exclusively officials of the governor's court. Other high executives were assisted by scribes, whom they found reliable and sufficient enough to travel with from one site to another.⁸⁹

Superintendent of fiefs (*nāzīr dīwān al-jaysh*). This was a civil position involving the supervision of fiefs allotted—as salary—to soldiers. This job was often carried out by judges.⁹⁰ In a unique incident, a man holding the post of *muqābil al-istifā'* is also recorded as being the *nāzīr al-jaysh*. This is a rare instance in the regular Mamluk government offices. He was probably given financial authority and entrusted with the mission of tax collection and control of expenditures.⁹¹ Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Dāwud, a descendant of Ayyūbid rulers from Ba'albek, performed this duty in Safed but then moved to Tripoli, where he filled the same post.⁹²

Financial controller (*nāzīr al-māl*). A *qāḍī* by education named Sulaymān b. Abū al-Ḥasan was appointed as *nāzīr al-māl* three times in Safed, where he stayed for a total of five years. He had previously operated as *nāzīr al-jaysh* in Aleppo and afterwards held the posts of *nāzīr* and *wakīl bayt al-māl*⁹³ in Karak.

In the category of religious functions (*al-wazā'if al-dīniyya*) the following are the most outstanding functions:

Judges

Chief among these was *qāḍī al-quḍāt* of the Shāfi'ī school. The Shāfi'ī magistrate held his office from 1266. Other high judges of different rites were appointed later, the Ḥanafī around 1360 and the Mālikī and Ḥanbalī in 1384. These last two posts were not very active, and those who—through dubious means—were able to maintain them, could therefore not claim much esteem or public regard.⁹⁴

⁸⁸ *Aṣṣān*, vol. V, 282.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, vol. III, 530. About 'Alā' al-Dīn, 'Alī b. Muḥammad, a *kātib al-dajj* of the castle governor, it is related that he—surprisingly, one may assume—did not escort his superior when the latter was ordered to transfer to a remote place. *Aṣṣān*, vol. III, 530.

⁹⁰ So the *qāḍī* Fakhr al-Dīn, *Aṣṣān*, vol. IV, 101 or the *qāḍī* Muḥammad b. Dāwud, *ibid.*, vol. V, 9.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, vol. III, 530.

⁹² *Ibid.*, vol. IV, 439.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, vol. II, 427.

⁹⁴ Though the following episode occurred in Gaza, it does seem typical and could

In the mid-fifteenth century, Zāhirī depicts four judges, one from each school, and each assisted by his deputies (*nuwwāb*), mainly in the villages.⁹⁵ The judges (probably not the chief ones, but rather, the ordinary *qādīs*), were forced—certainly due to poor income—to engage in other offices besides. Such were *nāzir al-juyūsh*, as in the case of Shams al-Dīn b. al-Ḥāfiẓ in 1316; *kātib al-sirr*, as in the case of Ibrāhīm b. Aḥmad al-Biqāʿī (d. 840/1437);⁹⁶ or Jamāl al-Dīn b. al-Bāʿūnī, who held both offices in 1432 and 1435⁹⁷ as well as the office of *muwaqqiʿ*.⁹⁸

An instructor of Ṣafadī, ʿAbd al-Qāhir b. Muḥammad (d. 740/1339), was appointed temporarily in provincial towns (ʿAjlūn, Salamiyya) before settling in Safed as *qādī al-quḍāt*.⁹⁹

A prominent family of judges was that of Nihāwandī. The father, Jalāl al-Dīn, occupied the office from the Mamluk takeover in 1266 until his last days.¹⁰⁰ He was followed by his son, Sharaf al-Dīn, who officiated in ʿAjlūn, Tripoli and Nablus and returned in 1316 to Safed, not for the first time during his governmental career.¹⁰¹ Jamāl al-Dīn al-Tibrīzī, another *qādī al-quḍāt*, relates in rhyme the details of his former stay in ʿAjlūn.¹⁰² The provincial chief judges were subordinate to the *qādī al-quḍāt* of Damascus.¹⁰³

A certain Nāṣir b. Maṣṣūr, a regular *qādī* (not *qādī al-quḍāt*), arrived in Safed after many other regional petty stations, such as Zuraʿ (in Ḥawrān), Adhruʿāt (the chief town in Ḥawrān), ʿAjlūn, Nablus, Ḥimṣ and Tripoli.¹⁰⁴

ostensibly have happened in Safed as well. A certain ex-official of Gaza, eager to return to a distinguished job, asked the chief *kātib al-sirr* of Egypt to be nominated as a Shāfiʿite judge, and if this was not possible, then as a Ḥanafī *qādī*, and, should this also be impossible, then to the Mālikī magistracy, and if not, then to the Ḥanbalī job. The recipient of that letter could not avoid adding a personal comment to the pathetic request. *Nujūm*, vol. XIII, 40. Such undignified behavior was not unusual among aspiring officeholders.

⁹⁵ *Zubda*, 134; We came across Zayd b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān who officiated as *qādī* in a *nāḥiya* (village or a district) in the Safed province, *Aḡyān*, vol. II, 385.

⁹⁶ *Dawʿ Lāmīʿ*, vol. I, 13–14.

⁹⁷ *Dawʿ Lāmīʿ*, vol. X, 298.

⁹⁸ *Aḡyān*, vol. II, 5.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, vol. III, 124.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, vol. III, 218.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, vol. II, 683, vol. IV, 570. Sharaf al-Dīn married his daughter to a preacher in Jerusalem where he himself also served in a similar position; *Aḡyān*, vol. III, 635.

¹⁰² *Uṭhmānī*, 480.

¹⁰³ *Aḡyān*, vol. III, 124, 125.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. V, 495.

The regional judges were ordinary *qāḍīs*. One of them chose the Crusader castle of Mi'ilyā as his abode.¹⁰⁵

There are frequent cases in which judges adhered to the governors with whom they moved to new administrative provinces.¹⁰⁶ The judges, like other public officials, were typified by the trend of local interchange, and those serving in Safed usually moved to Karak or Tripoli.¹⁰⁷

The best known judge among the magistrates of Mamluk Safed was Shams al-Dīn al-ʿUthmānī (d. 1378), author of the detailed local history *Taʾriḫ Ṣafad*, which is presumed to have been written in 1372 and has come down to us in only partial form.¹⁰⁸

Muftī. A post assumed, by the afore-mentioned resemblance of functions in Safed and Tripoli, to include the office of supplying legal advice in Safed as well. ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Ṣafadī (d. 891/1485) and his tutor in Safed, Shams al-Dīn b. Ḥāmid, his father-in-law, both served as *muftīs*.¹⁰⁹

Prayer leader (*imām*). In one note concerning a peculiar person called ʿAlī b. Ismāʿīl al-Ṣafadī, he is described as an *imām* and a Qurʾān reader (*muqrʾ*) in the Shayzarī mosque. He later disappeared and was rumored to have been seen in Yemen.¹¹⁰ A *waqf* donation dating from 890/1485 registers the *imām* of Safed's mosque as one of its beneficiaries.¹¹¹

Sermon preacher (*khaṭīb*). The sources signify two serving seats, in the town and in the castle. Najm al-Dīn, another teacher of Ṣafadī, was active as preacher in both duties.¹¹² His father, Kamāl al-Dīn, is named as the preacher only in the castle (*khaṭīb qaʿat ṣafad*).¹¹³ The often-mentioned ʿUmar b. Ḥalāwāt is recorded as giving sermons in the castle,¹¹⁴ a task which suited his many talents.

¹⁰⁵ ʿUthmānī, 484.

¹⁰⁶ *Aḡyān*, vol. II, 233.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. II, 194. The above-mentioned ʿUmar b. Ḥalāwāt, apart from his high scribal duties, was also a *qāḍī* serving in Safed and Tripoli. *Aḡyān*, vol. III, 592.

¹⁰⁸ ʿUthmānī, 477.

¹⁰⁹ *Dawʾ Lāmiʿ*, vol. IV, 338.

¹¹⁰ *Aḡyān*, vol. III, 297.

¹¹¹ *Ipṣirli*, 69, doc. 38.

¹¹² *Aḡyān*, vol. II, 232, 235, vol. III, 627, vol. V, 498.

¹¹³ *Wāfi*, vol. XII, 256–57; *Aḡyān*, vol. II, 233.

¹¹⁴ *Wāfi*, vol. XII, 257; *Aḡyān*, vol. III, 594, 595.

Supervisor of the State treasury (*wakīl bayt al-māl*). This officer was held accountable for the moral and just supervision of the treasury (*bayt al-māl*) branch in Safed. This government department dealt mainly with the rights of orphan beneficiaries of the *waqf*, the validity of transactions where the State is involved (such as selling and buying public estates), and the disposition of wealth left with no heirs. This post was entrusted to an administrator (*wakīl*) of religious repute, and was considered a religious post. Two *wakīls* are named in Ṣafadī's *A'yān*. One was 'Alā' al-Dīn al-Kaḥḥāl who was renowned for timidity and non-exploitation of his powerful authority.¹¹⁵ A second one was 'Alā' al-Dīn 'Alī b. Muḥammad, who was one of Ṣafadī's instructors; he initially served as a teacher in the mosque of Baybars (the Red Mosque)¹¹⁶ and was then promoted to the post of *wakīl*. This 'Alī perished in the Black Death.¹¹⁷

A summary of this list of public officers might raise surprise due to its small number of teachers, Shaykhs, lecturers, educators or instructors common in other Syrian centers. This is related to the absence of *madrasas*, an institution which characterizes the philanthropic and pietistic construction initiatives in the Mamluk state. Even Ṣafadī, who mentioned several of his instructors, fails to mention their "working" place. If there were educational endeavors, they were probably managed on a private, rather than a public, basis. In his criticism, though exaggerated and intended to amuse, an inhabitant of Safed grumbles that the town has "no *madrasa* and no *ribāf*".¹¹⁸ It is true that al-Zāhirī, an authority on Safed, does mention, a century later than 'Uthmānī, *madrasas*¹¹⁹ (in the plural), among other merits of the flourishing city; even this, however, is done in a rather general way, with no specific establishments of study cited.

Teaching and learning were carried out in the Red Mosque, built by Baybars. It is even possible to name several scholars¹²⁰ who contributed to its daily tutoring activity. Nevertheless, the fact that the

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. III, 455.

¹¹⁶ See the statement by Sakhāwī, *Daw' Lāmī*, vol. IV, 338, "The Zāhirī mosque, alias the Red".

¹¹⁷ *A'yān*, vol. III, 520; *Durar*, vol. III, 179–180, no. 2867.

¹¹⁸ 'Uthmānī, 486. Ṭ. Ṭarāwna in *Mamlakat Ṣafad fī al-'ahd al-mamlūkī*, Beirut 1982, 258, points to the fact that the praiser of Safed, who had to refute the claims of the critic [referring to the same 'Uthmānī text], could not point out a single *madrasa*, but had to resort to other reputable edifices.

¹¹⁹ *Zubda*, 44.

¹²⁰ Zayn al-Dīn 'Umar b. Ḥamza, renowned as the "*muḥaddith* of Safed", who

Red Mosque¹²¹ is almost the only institution which can be recorded as providing study services attests to the insufficiency and weakness of Safed in this domain of traditional education.

Summary

Safed, after its conquest in 1266 could look forward to promising opportunities. It had almost no urban infrastructure which could have enabled original state initiatives without encountering the veteran population or existing ancient monuments. Safed was subject to nearly no threats from surrounding foes. It was centrally located in the fertile region of the eastern Galilee, indisputably commanding the region (after the fall of Acre) as far as the Carmel and the coastal area, and was relatively distant from the inspection of Damascus, and certainly from that of Egypt.

The conferral of an administrative status to Safed and its consequent urban expansion could have animated a building surge initiated by local entrepreneurs, and encouraged immigration; this, in turn, could have resulted in a more significant demographic growth.

In post-1266 Safed, there was indeed a wave of establishing buildings, baths, markets and caravanserais. It may be assumed that people moved to Safed, or at least expressed their satisfaction with the lifestyle there.¹²²

was adored in his town (d. Ramaḍān 782/1380); Abū Bakr b. Aḥmad Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, *Taʾrīkh Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba*, ed. A. Darwich (Damascus, 1977), vol. 1, 50. Two others are ʿAbd al-Laṭīf b. Muḥammad, *Dawʾ Lāmiʿ*, vol. IV, 338 and his father-in-law Shams al-Dīn b. Ḥāmid. The above-mentioned ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Rassām is considered the man who enriched knowledge (this term is usually used to refer to *Ḥadīth*) in Safed, *Durar*, vol. III, 179–80, no. 2867. A man of knowledge who composed voluminous books was Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad b. Mūsā, who turned down high posts and preferred to dwell in a village near Safed, where he could till the soil and thus earn his own living. *Durar*, vol. I, 343, no. 808.

¹²¹ Other *madrasas* mentioned in this article are those built by Governor Aruqtāy (see “Governors of Safed”, paragraph h) and the Jāmiʿ al-Shayzarī (see the paragraph on the *imām*). A certain Shaykh Sharaf al-Dīn Maṣṣūr gave lessons in two *madrasas* at Safed (al-Shihābiyya and al-Shamsiyya), which later fell totally into oblivion: Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba [see note no. 120 above], vol. I, 126.

¹²² An amir named Dirbās was sent from Safed to officiate in Damascus. There he composed a poem expressing longing for his former city. “There are my friends, family and abode [*waṭan*] . . . these do I cherish openly and secretly”, *Aʿyān*, vol. II, 453. In the comical debate on the merits and drawbacks of Safed, the arguments in its favor (among others, the healthy air, delicate fruits for export, edifices enabling

At the same time, the subsequent shortcomings were apparent. These included inadequate transportation to and from Safed, a paucity of accommodation for temporary visitors (pilgrims or merchants), a dearth of institutions of learning and the rapid turnover of (mostly second-rate) ruling officials. Though a “new” town, conceived by an innovative and vital regime, Safed’s significance never surpassed its territorial boundaries. Sultans rarely paid a visit there (Qā’itbāy’s nocturnal stay¹²³ was exceptional), imperial building initiatives were limited and its appeal to population was debatable. Safed lacked indigenous holy sites (apart from that of Jacob’s cave), and was passed over by scholars and students.

Its castle, which was the key reason for Baybars’ decision to strengthen Safed, suffered from diminishing importance after the expulsion of the Crusaders, and its former value was reduced to a prison for mutinous elements.

The low status of Safed can be clarified by the essential topographic and climatic flaws which engendered its isolation prior to the thirteenth century, as well as by the determined resolution of the Mamluk rulers. Consequently, Safed, in the broad medieval context, remained a provincial center.

a spacious sight, singing of the birds at dawn, technical achievements in the castle, healing virtues of Jacob’s cave . . .) can count as evidence of (at least relative) local contentment: *Uthmānī*, 487.

¹²³ In 882/1477; see: Abū al-Baqā’ Ibn Jī’ān, *al-Qawl al-mustazraf* (tr. by R.L. Devonshire: “Relation d’un voyage du sultan Qāitbāy . . .”, *I.F.A.O.* 20 (1922), 29.

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PART FIVE

IBN TAYMIYYA AND MAMLUK SOCIETY

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CHAPTER NINE

IBN TAYMIYYA ON DIVORCE OATHS

Yossef Rapoport

I

Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyya (661–728/1263–1328), arguably the most illustrious scholar of the Mamluk period, was brought to trial and imprisoned on account of his views regarding three theological and legal issues.¹ First, Ibn Taymiyya was convicted of anthropomorphism by several tribunals in Damascus and Cairo during the year 705/1305. In 726/1326, Ibn Taymiyya was imprisoned in Damascus for his attacks on the visitation of tombs. Less well known are his trials regarding his views on oaths undertaken on pain of divorce.² While the established doctrine was that oaths on pain of divorce were considered as conditional divorces, Ibn Taymiyya wrote in 718/1318 a short treatise in which he argued that the legal rules that apply to

¹ There is no shortage in studies of Ibn Taymiyya, but the seminal works are probably still those by H. Laoust, *Essai sur les doctrines sociales et politiques de Taqī-d-Dīn Aḥmad b. Taymīya* (Cairo: IFAO, 1939), and Muḥammad Abū Zahra, *Ibn Taymiyya: Hayātuhu wa-ʿAṣruhu—wa-Ārāʾuhu al-Fiqhiyya* (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, 1952). The most detailed biography of Ibn Taymiyya was composed by his disciple Ibn ʿAbd al-Hādī (d. 744/1344), *al-Uqūd al-Durriyya fī Manāqib Shaykh al-Islām Aḥmad Ibn Taymiyya*, ed. Muḥammad Ḥāmid al-Fiḳī (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Ḥijāzī, 1938). Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Munajjid has compiled a useful collection of material about Ibn Taymiyya from contemporary chronicles, published as *Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyya. Sīratuhu wa-Akḥbāruhu ʿinda al-Muʿarrikhīn* (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1976). The trials of Ibn Taymiyya are described in detail by Ḥasan Q. Murad, “Ibn Taymiyya on Trial: A Narrative Account of his *miḥan*”, *Islamic Studies*, vol. XVIII (1979), 1–32; and D. Little, “The Historical and Historiographical Significance of the Detention of Ibn Taymiyya”, *IJMES*, vol. IV (1973), 313–27 (reprinted in his *History and Historiography of the Mamluks* (London: Variorum, 1986)).

² The only separate treatment to date of Ibn Taymiyya’s views on divorce oaths is H. Laoust’s translation of Ibn Taymiyya’s first treatise on the subject, which he prefaced by a short introduction (“Une risāla d’Ibn Taimīya sur le serment de réputation”, *Bulletin d’études orientales*, vols. VII–VIII (1937–8), 215–36). Discussions of Ibn Taymiyya’s views on divorce oaths appear also in the general works of Laoust and Abū Zahra mentioned above (*Essai*, 424–34; *Ibn Taymiyya*, 414–37).

oaths in the name of God apply also to oaths under pain of divorce. Ibn Taymiyya reasoned that, since violation of an oath in the name of God requires the expiation prescribed in the Qurʾān, so too violation of a divorce oath requires expiation, not the actual dissolution of marriage.³ After having been prohibited twice from issuing *fatwās* on this subject, Ibn Taymiyya was eventually arrested for five months, until his release in 721/1321.

The debate over divorce oaths provides an insight into the social context of Ibn Taymiyya's intellectual work, mainly because this was a legal debate, not a theological one. It is not always easy to draw the line between Islamic theology and law, but there is little doubt that the question of divorce oaths had much more immediate implications than the abstract issue of the attributes of God, or even Ibn Taymiyya's attack on the visitation of tombs. Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 756/1355), the Shāfiʿī jurist who composed the most effective refutation of Ibn Taymiyya's views on divorce oaths, commented that Ibn Taymiyya's theological positions constituted an abominable heresy, but only the select few could grasp them. Ibn Taymiyya's innovative opinions on divorce oaths, however, have a far greater impact on the laymen, "who rely on his opinion and rush to endorse it, and as a result take lightly the laws of divorce".⁴

This essay will outline the development of Ibn Taymiyya's ideas on the issue of oaths under pain of divorce, and propose an explanation for the way state authorities responded to them. The debate over divorce oaths, I believe, reflects some of the basic structures of social organization during the Mamluk era. Since the debate over

³ In classical legal literature, the sentence 'If I do such-and-such my wife is repudiated' is discussed under the category of *ḥilf bi'l-talāq*, but is considered as a conditional repudiation, the repudiation taking place upon the fulfillment of the condition specified. Norman Calder, who studied the early Islamic legal doctrine on oaths, suggested translating the Arabic *ḥilf bi'l-talāq* as 'swearing on the basis of divorcing' ("Hinth, Birr, Tabarrur, Tahannuth: An Inquiry into the Arabic Vocabulary of Oaths", *BSOAS*, vol. LI (1989), 215). For the purpose of this essay, and without any prejudice towards Ibn Taymiyya's position, I believe that 'an oath on/under pain of divorce', or simply 'divorce oath', reflect better the actual social use of these phrases by Ibn Taymiyya's contemporaries.

⁴ Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī, *al-Rasāʾil al-Subkiyya fī al-Radd ʿalā Ibn Taymiyya wa-Tilmūdhīhi Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya* (Beirut: ʿĀlam al-Kutub, 1983), 151–52. Al-Subkī notes that Ibn Taymiyya has influenced in particular the peasants, the Bedouin, and the inhabitants of the peripheral lands (*al-bilād al-barrāniyya*), meaning probably the Jazīra and northern Syria.

divorce oaths was essentially about their violation and its appropriate punishment, it was therefore a debate about the value of oaths and their meaning in society. The debate prompted by Ibn Taymiyya points also to a link between the means of effecting social bonds in the public sphere and the relations of power in the domestic sphere. In this essay I will try to show that this link between the internal structure of households and the means of creating political and social commitments was a cornerstone of social organization.

The organization of this essay is as follows. First, I will describe the use of, and importance attached to, divorce oaths during the early Mamluk period. The second section will analyze the writings of Ibn Taymiyya on divorce oaths, as well as his work on the related issue of triple divorces. The third section will focus on the response of the state and the scholarly elite to Ibn Taymiyya's challenge, and will examine the immediate reasons leading to his persecution. In the last section I will attempt to explain the social significance of the debate over divorce oaths by analyzing the link between the domestic and the political spheres during the early Mamluk period.

II

Oaths on pain of divorce have had a long history in Muslim societies, going back to the early Islamic community. Oaths on pain of divorce, along with oaths on pain of manumission, had a special legal status, recognized by the earliest compendia of Islamic law. They were considered as conditional phrases, the act of divorce or manumission being contingent on the fulfillment of the condition. Thus, when a man says 'If I do such-and-such my wife is divorced', the divorce takes place immediately following the specified action.⁵ Oaths of divorce and manumission are therefore, according to most Muslim jurists, distinguished from oaths in the name of God, which are not construed as conditional phrases. The violation of oath in the name of God requires legally prescribed expiation. They are also distinguished from vows, which are conceived of as commitments

⁵ On oaths of divorce and manumission in the early compendia of Islamic law, such as al-Shāfi'ī's *Kitāb al-Umm*, al-Shaybānī's *Kitāb al-Aṣl*, and Saḥnūn's *al-Mudawwana*, see N. Calder, "Ḥinth", 216–23.

towards God. Oaths on pain of divorce and manumission were included in the oath of allegiance (*bay'ā*) introduced by the Umayyad governor al-Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf, and used by many Muslim rulers in subsequent centuries.⁶ Anecdotes regarding oaths on pain of divorce are interspersed in early Islamic belles-lettristic and legal literature, and reflect actual use of this kind of oath.⁷

The development and the spread of oaths on pain of divorce in medieval Muslim societies are beyond the scope of this essay. There is no doubt, however, that by Ibn Taymiyya's time divorce oaths were conceived as the most solemn form of oaths. The importance of divorce oaths is best exemplified by an anecdote concerning al-Zāhir Baybars, the founder of the Mamluk state. In 661/1263 Baybars conducted elaborate negotiations with the Ayyūbid ruler of Karak, al-Malik al-Mughīth, promising not to cause him any harm. However, when al-Malik al-Mughīth agreed to meet Baybars outside the citadel of Karak, Baybars immediately arrested him and sent him to Cairo, where he was duly executed. As al-Malik al-Mughīth was sent off to Egypt, we are told by the Damascene chronicler Quṭb al-Dīn al-Yūnīnī, 'signs of abhorrence appeared on the faces of several *amīrs*, for he [Baybars] had undertaken forty oaths, including an oath on pain of triple divorce from [his wife] the mother of al-Malik al-Sa'īd. It has been said that she resorted to a *tahlīl* marriage with a slave, who was afterwards murdered'.⁸

Under Islamic law, after a husband has repudiated his wife three times, the couple cannot re-marry until the divorcee contracts and

⁶ Several early Islamic oaths of allegiance, which include oaths on pain of divorce, are cited in al-Qalqashandī's *Subḥ al-A'shā* (Cairo, 1913–18), vol. XIII, 211–15. Al-Qalqashandī ascribes the common form of the oath of allegiance to al-Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf, as do Ibn Taymiyya and al-Subkī in their treatises. See also E. Tyan, "Bay'ā", *ET*².

⁷ For a couple of examples out of many, dating from the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries, see R. Mottahedeh, *Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 152; Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, *Rafʿ al-Isr ʿan Quḍāt Miṣr*, ed. ʿAlī Muḥammad ʿUmar (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Khānjī, 1998), 178. The Ḥanbalī scholar Ibn Baṭṭa (d. 387/997) devoted a treatise to polemic against *hiyal* circumventing oaths on pain of divorce, quoted by Ibn Taymiyya in *Iqāmat al-Dalīl*.

⁸ Al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl Mūrʾāt al-Zamān* (Hyderabad: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1954–5), vol. I, 532–3; vol. II, 192–94. Baybars' *Bahriyya* regiment as a whole was accused by the ruler whom they later deposed, al-Muʿizz Aybak, of being notoriously unfaithful to their oaths (al-Maqrīzī, *Kitāb al-Sulūk li-Maʿrifat al-Duwal wa'l-Mulūk*, ed. Muḥammad Muṣṭafā Ziyādah & Saʿīd ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ ʿAshūr (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, 1934–72), vol. I, 393.

consummates a marriage with a different man. It is lawful for the divorcee to re-marry her former husband only after the dissolution of this second marriage. At times, this second marriage would only be arranged with the intention and for the sole purpose of permitting the woman to her first husband, in which case it is called marriage of *taḥlīl* (making lawful) and the contracting man is called *muḥallil*. In spite of violating numerous other oaths, it was the violation of the oath on pain of divorce that most outraged the chronicler and Baybars' own allies. Whether Umm al-Malik al-Saʿīd did actually contract a *taḥlīl* marriage remains unverifiable, a rumor more than a fact. But for al-Yūnīnī and his contemporaries, a *taḥlīl* marriage must have followed such an overt violation of an oath on pain of divorce.

Members of the military elite considered oaths of divorce to supersede any other form of commitment. The biography of the *amīr* Sayf al-Dīn Karāy provides another example. According to the chronicler al-Ṣafadī, Karāy's only weakness was his addiction to sex. Karāy took his wives and concubines everywhere, even on his hunting journeys. In 711/1311–2, upon being appointed governor of Syria, Karāy made it publicly known that he had undertaken an oath, under pain of divorce, not to accept any gifts during his tenure of office. Shortly afterwards, Karāy married in Damascus the daughter of a former governor, not an unusual step for a new governor consolidating his power. In compliance with his oath, he refused to accept the customary wedding gifts, thus causing embarrassment to other *amīrs*, and especially to his *khushdāshs*. When one of them sent a representative to urge the governor to accept his presents, Karāy instructed the emissary to tell his master: 'You know his [viz., Karāy's] nature, and his love (*maḥabbatihī*) for his wives and concubines; and that he has undertaken an oath, on pain of divorcing the wives and manumitting the concubines, not to accept anything from any human being during the tenure of this governorship. . . . My *khushdāsh*, if you wish to see his wives divorced and his concubines manumitted, the choice is yours (*fa'l-amru amruka*)'. The excuse was accepted.⁹ The point of

⁹ Al-Ṣafadī, *Aʿyān al-ʿAṣr wa-Aʿwān al-Naṣr* (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1998), vol. III, 1473–74. Karāy had also undertaken an oath of divorce to amputate the hand of any thief, in adherence with the strict letter of the law—an edict that Damascenes apparently considered excessively harsh.

the story, of course, is that an oath on pain of divorce superseded, at least for Sayf al-Dīn Karāy, the mutual friendship emanating from ties of *khushdāshiyya*.

Karāy's exceptionally powerful libido notwithstanding, it seems that other members of Mamluk social elites shared his respect for divorce oaths. Chroniclers often report oath-taking among the military elite without specifying the form of the oath taken. When they do wish to emphasize the binding power of an oath, they refer either to the taking of an oath on a copy of the Qur'ān,¹⁰ or to an oath of divorce. In 735/1333–4, the chief bureaucrat Ibn Hilāl al-Dawla, under arrest and torture, denied on pain of triple divorce having any knowledge of the whereabouts of the money he was accused of embezzling.¹¹ In 742/1340–1, the vice-regent Ṭuquztimur had taken an oath on pain of divorce not to remain in office under the new sultan.¹² In 776/1374, the Sultan al-Ashraf Sha'bān took an oath on pain of divorce not to accept the resignation of the chief *qādī* Burhān al-Dīn Ibn Jamā'a, a resolute act that convinced the *qādī* to remain in his office.¹³ The oath on pain of divorce was also part of the oath of allegiance inaugurating the reign of every new sultan.¹⁴

It would be a mistake to assume that oaths on pain of divorce were limited to the elites, military or civilian. The chronicles contain sporadic references to oaths on pain of divorce taken by commoners.¹⁵ But it is the extant contemporary *fatwā* collections that

¹⁰ For an oath on a copy of the Qur'ān by an Ayyūbid ruler, see al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. II, 398–400; for an oath on a copy of the Qur'ān taken by a Mamluk amīr in 690/1291, see al-Ṣafadī, *Aṣyān al-ʿAsr*, vol. III, 1432.

¹¹ Mūsā b. Muḥammad al-Yūsufī, *Nuzhat al-Nāṣir fī Sīrat al-Malik al-Nāṣir*, ed. Aḥmad Ḥuṭayṭ (Beirut: ʿĀlam al-Kutub, 1986), 248.

¹² Shams al-Dīn al-Shujāʿī, *Taʾrikh al-Malik al-Nāṣir Muḥammad Ibn Qalāʾūn al-Ṣāliḥ wa-Awladihī*, ed. Barbara Schafer (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner Verlag, 1977–1985), vol. I, 139.

¹³ Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, *Inbāʾ al-Ghumr bi-Abnāʾ al-ʿUmr*, ed. Ḥasan Ḥabashī (Cairo, 1971–76), vol. I, 73; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, vol. III, 242.

¹⁴ See, for example, the text of the *bayʿa* given to the Sultan Aḥmad in 742/1342, preserved in the contemporary chronicle of al-Shujāʿī (*Taʾrikh*, 199). The texts of two oaths of allegiance to new caliphs, composed by al-Qalqashandī in the beginning of the ninth/fifteenth century, retain the same order of oaths, opening also with an oath on pain of divorce (*Subh*, vol. IX, 312–13, 318–19).

¹⁵ Muḥibb al-Dīn Ibn Daqīq al-ʿĪd (d. 716/1316), the son of the famous jurist and *qādī*, refused to begin a petition he composed on behalf of a commoner with the word '*al-Mamlūk*' (your slave). The commoner then took a divorce oath not to let Muḥibb al-Dīn send the petition without this customary symbol of humility, leaving the jurist no choice (*Aṣyān al-ʿAsr*, vol. III, 1244; al-Uḍfuwī, *al-Ṭālib al-Saʿīd al-Jāmiʿ li-Asmāʾ al-Fuḍalāʾ wa'l-Ruwāt bi-ʿĀlā al-Ṣaʿīd* (Cairo, 1966), 404; a badly

leave little doubt about the prevalence of divorce oaths among all classes of society, as real-life problems arising from divorce oaths were brought before contemporary jurists. In a case undoubtedly originating from the lower classes, brought before Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ (d. 643/1245), a man who had undertaken a divorce oath to make up for a debt by working for his creditor, eventually paid the debt in cash.¹⁶ Al-Nawawī (d. 676/1277) was asked about a master-artisan who, when his apprentice excused himself from performing a certain job by claiming lack of competence, swore on pain of divorce that the apprentice knew the dwelling place of Satan himself.¹⁷ Ibn Taymiyya was asked about a husband who warned his wife not to leave the house until he returned from a journey, on the pain of divorcing her three times. When he came back, the wife told him that she had to go out for a dire necessity (*darūra*).¹⁸ Jurists were often asked about divorce oaths undertaken by husbands during marital strife.¹⁹ All in all, divorce oaths appear in the *fatwā* collections in a baffling variety of economic and social contexts.

deformed version of the anecdote appears in Ibn Ḥajar, *al-Durar*, vol. III, 113). Ibn Daqīq al-ʿId himself was appointed as chief *qāḍī* as a result of the determination of a certain famous Sufi shaykh, who undertook a divorce oath to approach the sultan and bring about the nomination (*Aḡyān al-ʿAṣr*, vol. II, 821).

¹⁶ In this case, Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ ruled that violation and divorce occurred if the oath-taker refused to continue to work for his creditor (Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ al-Shahrazūrī, *Fatāwā wa-Masāʾil Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ*, ed. ʿAbd al-Muʿṭī Qalʿajī (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifā, 1986), 687 (no. 1048). In another case brought before the same *muftī*, a creditor undertook a divorce oath not to allow the release of his debtor (*Fatāwā*, 445 (no. 399)). For other *fatwās* of Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ on divorce oaths, *ibid.*, nos. 396, 399, 402. For another example of the use of divorce oaths in a commercial context, see Ibn Taymiyya, *Majmūʿ Fatāwā Shaykh al-Islām Aḥmad Ibn Taymiyya*, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad al-ʿAṣimī al-Najdī (Riyadh, 1961–63), vol. XXX, 315–16. (A case of a man who lent something to another person, and then mistakenly took a third person to be the debtor, undertaking an oath of divorce to support his claim).

¹⁷ The legal problem was, of course, whether the apprentice does or does not know where Satan lives (*Fatāwā al-Imām al-Nawawī al-musammā biʾl-Masāʾil al-Manthūra*, ed. ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-ʿAṭṭār (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1982), 140). In other cases, al-Nawawī was asked about men who swore on pain of divorce that a certain *muftī* never errs, or that a certain school of law was the best and most noble of all schools (*ibid.*, 140–1, 146, 147).

¹⁸ Ibn Taymiyya ruled that the oath was not violated, as necessity exempted the wife from strictly following her husband's instructions. Ibn Taymiyya also exempted from liability a husband whose wife claimed to have forgotten his warning against entering a certain house (Ibn Taymiyya, *Fatāwā al-Nisāʾ*, ed. Ibrāhīm Muḥammad al-Jamal (Cairo, 1987), 253–258; *Majmūʿ Fatāwā*, vol. XX, 205–6; vol. XXX, 315–6). All these *fatwās* do not refer to the expiability of divorce oaths, and therefore date, most probably, before 718/1318.

¹⁹ In fact, most of Ibn Taymiyya's preserved *fatwās* on divorce oaths were responses

The collections of *fatāwā* provide evidence for the prevalence of divorce oaths in yet another way. Many of the questions sent to these jurists concerned the permissibility of *taḥlīl* marriages and other legal subterfuges designed to allow triply-divorced wives to return to their husbands. In those cases for which we have details, the need to use one of these legal devices arose as a result of a violation of an oath.²⁰ In addition, jurists discuss the permissibility of legal subterfuges specifically designed to circumvent the violation of divorce oaths, the most popular being a method called *khulʿ al-yamīn*. Under this legal device, the husband and his wife agree on a consensual divorce (*khulʿ*) just before the husband is about to violate an oath he has undertaken. When the oath is actually violated, the spouses are no longer married, and the triple divorce invoked upon the breach of the oath cannot take place. The spouses are therefore allowed to re-marry immediately.²¹

By the eighth/fourteenth century divorce oaths were used, apparently for the first time in the history of Islamic law, in judicial processes. Under Islamic procedural law, in certain circumstances one of the litigants, usually the defendant, is required to take an oath in the name of God in order to support his or her claim. Some jurists, in particular from the Shāfiʿī school, allow the *qāḍī* to bolster the sanctity of the oath (*taḡhlīz al-yamīn*) by adding to the oath formula certain attributes of God, or requiring the litigant to take the oath in the city's mosque after the Friday prayer. However, the chief Ḥanafī *qāḍī* of Damascus, Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭarsūsī (d. 758/1357), allowed the *qāḍī* to bolster the sanctity of an oath by requiring the litigant to take an oath on pain of divorce or manumission. Al-Ṭarsūsī acknowledges that this view has no precedent in legal literature, but comments that 'in our days, however, it is said that he

to cases originating in marital conflicts (Ibn Taymiyya, *Fatāwā al-Nisāʾ*, 253–58). For other instances of the use of divorce oaths within marital strife, see Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, *Fatāwā wa-Masāʾil*, 443 (no. 395), 684 (1032); *Fatāwā al-Nawawī*, 140; Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī, *Fatāwā al-Subkī* (Cairo, 1936–38), 311.

²⁰ Ibn Taymiyya, *Majmūʿ Fatāwā*, vol. XXII, 97–101; *Fatāwā al-Nisāʾ*, 260.

²¹ Shāfiʿī jurists at this period generally approved of *khulʿ al-yamīn*. The disadvantage of this method, as used by the Shāfiʿīs, was that it could only be used twice. *Khulʿ* separations, according to the Shāfiʿīs, counted as divorces and not as judicial dissolution of the marriage (*faskh*). Therefore, if this legal device is repeated three times, a triple divorce ensues. See Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, *Fatāwā*, 443 (no. 395); al-Nawawī, *Fatāwā*, 136, 139; Ibn Abī al-Dam (d. 642/1244), *Kitāb Adab al-Qaḍāʾ*, ed. Muḥammad Muṣṭafā al-Zuhaylī (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1982), 671–4.

[viz., the *qāḍī*] can do that, if he considers it in the public interest (*maṣlahā*).²² His contemporary, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, also refers to litigants swearing an oath on pain of divorce, at a *qāḍī*'s instigation, in order to acquit themselves of a debt.²³ The change in judicial procedure was a result of adaptation to social practices, and demonstrates again that oaths on pain of divorce had come to be considered the most solemn form of oath.

III

In 718/1318, Ibn Taymiyya wrote a short epistle, entitled *al-Ītimāʿ wa'l-Ifṭirāq fī al-Ḥilf bi'l-Ṭalāq* (The Meeting and Parting of Ways concerning Oaths on pain of Divorce).²⁴ In this work, he propounded a novel doctrine regarding divorce oaths, contradicting not only established doctrine but also his own earlier views on the subject. Succinct and sometimes sloppy, this first treatise contained a rudimentary outline of a distinction between conditional divorces and oaths on pain of divorce. In the following years, Ibn Taymiyya composed many

²² G. Guellil, *Damaszener Akten des 8./14. Jahrhunderts nach at-Tarsusis* Kitāb al-Īlām. *Eine Studie zum arabischen Justizwesen* (Bamberg: aku, 1985), 276–7. In earlier legal manuals, the possibility of making a litigant take an oath of divorce is not even considered. See Ibn Abī al-Dam, *Kitāb Adab al-Qadāʾ*, 252–7 (Shāfiʿī); al-Simmānī, *Rawḍat al-Qudāh*, ed. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Nāḥī (Beirut: 1984), 282 (Ḥanafī).

²³ Ibn al-Qayyim describes an impermissible legal subterfuge used to circumvent this judicial divorce oath. He does not discuss the legality of requiring a litigant to take a divorce oath, which suggests it was common practice (*Īlām al-Muwaqqiʿin ʿan Rabb al-Ālamīn*, ed. Ṭāḥā ʿAbd al-Raʿūf Saʿd (Beirut: Dār al-Jil, 1964), vol. III, 248). In the Ḥaram documents, originating from the *qāḍī*'s court in Jerusalem at the end of the eighth/fourteenth century, there are many examples of ancillary oaths taken by litigants, especially in cases of debt. To date, the documents have not been fully published, but according to D. Little's catalogue these oaths were taken solely in the name of God. Only in one case did the *qāḍī* order the defendant to undertake his oath in the city's mosque, *al-Masjid al-Aqṣāʿ* (D. Little, *A Catalogue of the Islamic Documents from al-Ḥaram aṣ-Šarīf in Jerusalem* (Beirut: Orient-Institut der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 1984), 47; for *taghlīz al-yamīn*, see no. 648).

²⁴ *Al-Ītimāʿ wa'l-Ifṭirāq fī al-Ḥilf bi'l-Ṭalāq*, ed. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Razzāq Ḥamza (Cairo: al-Manār Press, 1346/1926–27). H. Laoust translated this epistle into French in “Une risāla”, 221–36, suggesting the title ‘Du serment de répudiation; rapports des deux notions’. The manuscript used for the published edition contains an *ijāza* by Ibn Taymiyya, dated 27 Rabīʿ I 718 (10 May 1318), and it can be assumed that he completed the treatise shortly prior to that date. There is little doubt that *al-Ītimāʿ wa'l-Ifṭirāq* was his first elaboration of this doctrine, for Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī's response, written half a year later, refers only to this treatise.

more treatises and *fatwās* on this issue, which seems to have occupied him until his final arrest in 726/1326. For the sake of clarity, the following exposition will generally be based on these later works, as well as the discussions by his disciple, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya.²⁵ It should be stressed, however, that it was *al-Ītimāʿ wa'l-Ifṭirāq* that led to Ibn Taymiyya's trials in 718/1318 and 720/1320.

At the crux of Ibn Taymiyya's doctrine was his broad definition of intention. In his view, intentions supersede the explicit or formal meanings conveyed in speech; for speech has no significance in and of itself, but serves only to indicate the intention of the speaker. When a man says to his wife 'If you agree to forfeit your *ṣadāq*, you are repudiated', he has the intention to divorce her provided she absolves him of these debts. The conditional form of the sentence conveys the real intention of the speaker. Ibn Taymiyya argues, however, that when a man says 'If I do such-and-such, my wife is repudiated', he has no intention to repudiate his wife, even if he was to commit the specified action. The intention is merely to assert his determination, as in the sentence 'By God, I shall not do such-and-such'. Accordingly, when a man says 'If I do *not* take such-and-such action, my wife is repudiated', his real intention is to convey determination to perform the specified act, rather than to commit himself to a divorce. The same applies to testimonies on past events, such as 'May my wife be repudiated if this had happened'. When a man has the intention of either deterring (*manʿ*) or inciting (*hathth*) himself or someone else from or to a certain action, or attesting (*taṣdīq*) or denying (*takdhīb*) a certain information, he is in fact undertaking an oath.²⁶

²⁵ The most elaborate, and probably the latest, work of Ibn Taymiyya on oaths of divorce is found in the fifth and final chapter of his *Bayān al-Uqūd* (The Elucidation of Contracts), devoted to oaths and vows (*Majmūʿat Fatāwā*, vol. III, 349–84). A shorter treatise, called *Lamḥat al-Mukhtaṭif fī al-Farq bayna al-Ṭalāq wa'l-Ḥilf* (A Quick Glance on the Difference between Divorces and Oaths), as well as several *fatwās* on the subject, were published in *Majmūʿat Fatāwā Ibn Taymiyya* (Cairo, 1326–29/1908–11), vol. III, 2–8, 27ff. Ibn Taymiyya's biographers list at least ten additional titles composed by Ibn Taymiyya on this subject (Ibn ʿAbd al-Hādī, *al-Uqūd*, 214). Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's eloquent exposition of his master's views on divorce oaths is found in his *Flām al-Muwaqqiʿīn*, vol. III, 50–80; vol. IV, 97–118; *Ighāthat al-Lahfān min Maṣāʾid al-Shayṭān*, ed. Muḥammad Ḥāmid al-Fiḳī (Cairo, 1939), vol. II, 87–97. It should be noted that the cause of Ibn Taymiyya's final trials, on account of his doctrine on the visitation of tombs, was a treatise he wrote seventeen years earlier (Murad, "Ibn Taymiyya", 24–26). Thus it appears that he was occupied by divorce oaths until his final years.

²⁶ The litmus test distinguishing between divorce oaths and conditional divorces,

If a man pronounces a conditional divorce with the intention of undertaking an oath, the legal rules pertaining to oaths must apply. God commanded men to respect their valid oaths to the utmost of their ability, but also allowed men to violate them, provided they perform proper expiation.²⁷ The Divine legislation, argues Ibn Taymiyya, must apply to all oaths, including oaths on pain of divorce. According to the existing doctrine, a violation of an oath on pain of divorce is immediately penalized. Thus, a man who has taken such an oath has no way out, even if he had undertaken to commit an act of disobedience towards God. What Ibn Taymiyya proposes, therefore, is to allow men who had undertaken oaths on pain of divorce a way out, through an act of expiation.²⁸ A violation of an oath on pain of divorce, like the violation of any other oath, should be expiated, not punished. For example, he reminds his readers that oaths on pain of pilgrimage, charity, manumission and divorce were all customarily included in the oaths of allegiance (*bayʿa*), and therefore should all be subject to the same rules. If oaths on pain of pilgrimage or charity included in the *bayʿa* are expiable, the same should hold for oaths on pain of divorce and manumission. Ibn Taymiyya considers it a religious duty to abide by one's oaths, and even more so with regard to an oath of allegiance to the sultan. But

according to Ibn Taymiyya, is whether the speaker finds divorce more repugnant than the action specified in the phrase. A more formal way to decipher the intention of a conditional sentence is to re-phrase it in the form of an oath. If the conditional sentence 'If I do such-and-such, my wife is divorced' can be re-phrased as an oath sentence, such as 'May my wife be divorced, I shall not do such-and-such', it follows that the speaker had the intention of undertaking an oath (*Majmūʿat Fatāwā*, vol. III, 6). However, when a man says to his wife 'If you commit adultery you are divorced', there is little doubt that he finds the adultery more abhorrent, and will wish to divorce her once she has committed adultery (*Majmūʿat Fatāwā*, vol. III, 6–7, 352–54; *al-Ijtīmāʿ wa'l-Iftirāq*, 7–8).

²⁷ The rules of expiation for violation of oaths are laid down in Q 5:89, "God will not call you to account for what is futile (*laghw*) in your oaths, but He will call you to account for your deliberate oaths. For expiation, feed ten indigent persons, on the scale of the average for the food of your families; or clothe them; or give a slave his freedom. If that is beyond your means, fast for three days. That is the expiation for the oaths ye have sworn, but keep to your oaths."

²⁸ The outline of these ideas appears already in *al-Ijtīmāʿ wa'l-Iftirāq*, 14ff. Ibn Taymiyya's opponents have argued that men who had undertaken an oath on pain of divorce do have a way out, for violation results only in divorce. According to Ibn Taymiyya, however, divorce should be considered as too severe a punishment, especially when the spouses are attached to each other and have had children together. Ibn Taymiyya goes on, somewhat taken by his own rhetoric, to say that experience shows that spouses would rather lose their property and be banished from their homeland than be separated (*Majmūʿat Fatāwā*, vol. III, 364–69, 381).

oaths, whatever their form, can never supersede the obedience due to God.²⁹

Ibn Taymiyya's view of conditional divorces was in agreement with contemporary social practice. The one problem with this doctrine, however, was that no one seems to have held it before—at least no one who counted. The *Zāhirīs*, to be sure, hold that oaths on pain of divorce are invalid, not even requiring expiation. But their argument was based on their fundamental rejection of any conditional divorces, a methodology Ibn Taymiyya was not inclined to follow, and they were, in any case, on the margins of orthodox Sunni Islam. Neither could Ibn Taymiyya, the Sunni zealot, fully embrace the *Shī'ī-Imāmī* doctrine, which rejects both conditional divorces and the utterance of triple repudiations at any one time.³⁰ The established Sunni legal doctrine did recognize oaths of divorce as a separate legal category,³¹ but held that these oaths are subject to the rules of conditional divorces.³² There was no precedent to Ibn Taymiyya's position among the Sunni schools, and the established doctrine seemed to rely on a consensus (*ijmā'*) of the jurists.

Ibn Taymiyya resorted to a subtle defense against the claims of *ijmā'*. In his later works he claimed that there is no sound tradition from the Companions on the issue of divorce oaths, and that all the traditions supporting the doctrine of his opponents date from the Umayyad period. This means, argued Ibn Taymiyya, that in the Prophet's time no one undertook such oaths, and they were intro-

²⁹ Ibn Taymiyya, *Majmū'at Fatāwā*, vol. III, 28, 53, 351, 375; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, *Flām al-Muwaqqi'in*, vol. III, 73–80; Laoust, *Essai*, 287–88.

³⁰ On the *Zāhirī* and *Shī'ī* doctrines on divorce oaths, see *Majmū'at Fatāwā*, vol. III, 8–9. See also Abū Zahra, *Ibn Taymiyya*, 419, 427.

³¹ The definition of divorce oaths varied slightly among the schools. The *Ḥanafīs* considered all conditional divorces as divorce oaths, excluding divorces that depend on the will of the wife (as these belonged to the separate legal category of *tamlīk*). The *Ḥanbalīs* held that divorce oaths are defined as any conditional divorce contingent on an action that can either be taken or avoided. The *Shāfi'īs* held that divorce oaths are any conditional divorce made with the purpose of either inciting or desisting to or from an action, or confirming a certain item of information. The *Shāfi'ī* definition of divorce oaths is practically similar to Ibn Taymiyya's definition (Ibn Qudāma, *al-Mughnī*, vol. VIII, 335). However, this distinction between conditional divorces and divorce oaths carried almost no practical legal consequences for the orthodox schools.

³² Earlier legal literature already contained references to an *ijmā'* in support of the established doctrine on divorce oaths. See Ibn Qudāma (d. 620/1223), *al-Mughnī* (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1984), vol. XI, 220–21; Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198), *Bidāyat al-Mujtahid wa-Nihāyat al-Muqtaṣid* (Beirut: Dār al-Ma'rifa, 1985), vol. I, 411.

duced only a generation after the Companions, in the time of the Followers. Thus, Ibn Taymiyya turned the absence of evidence into a useful weapon. If the Prophet and his Companions never resorted to oaths on pain of divorce, the practice itself is an innovation (*bidʿa*), and no *ijmāʿ* concerning it could be considered valid.³³ The evocation of the age of the Prophet came late in the development of Ibn Taymiyya's argumentation. One finds no trace of it in *al-Ijtīmāʿ wa'l-Iftirāq*. Ibn Taymiyya, at least in this case, was not motivated by a *salafī* yearning to follow the practices of the Prophet. His doctrines were no idealist preaching. On the contrary, Ibn Taymiyya was consistently engaged with contemporary social issues. The reference to the age of the Prophet was not an end in itself, but rather a tool, used as a last resort to defend his heterodox doctrine against strong claims to an *ijmāʿ* to the contrary.

Some time after 718/1318, and perhaps as a result of the ban on his doctrines concerning divorce oaths, Ibn Taymiyya began to issue *fatwās* on the invalidity of triple repudiations.³⁴ In these *fatwās*, Ibn Taymiyya ruled that repudiation is valid only if it is made in the way recommended by the Prophet, so-called *ṭalāq al-sunna*. In Islamic law, a distinction is made between a *sunnī* divorce, that is a single revocable repudiation uttered when the wife is in a state of purity, and *bidʿī* divorces, that is acts of divorce made in any other way, including the utterance of a triple repudiation. While the orthodox schools unanimously agreed that *bidʿī* divorces are reprehensible yet valid, Ibn Taymiyya now argued that *bidʿī* divorces do not bind at all. For example, when a man says 'You are repudiated thrice', the established doctrine was that triple divorce follows; but Ibn Taymiyya ruled that the result is only one single revocable divorce, as the two other repudiations uttered are *bidʿī* divorces.³⁵ In effect this was

³³ *Majmūʿat Fatāwā*, vol. III, 53, 59–60, 375; *Flām al-Muwaqqiʿin*, vol. III, 54.

³⁴ The debate on the expiability of divorce oaths must have preceded Ibn Taymiyya's *fatwās* on triple divorces. Ibn Taymiyya's doctrine regarding triple divorces is not mentioned in his *al-Ijtīmāʿ wa'l-Iftirāq*, nor in al-Subkī's refutation written shortly later. Were Ibn Taymiyya's *fatwās* on triple divorces already issued by that time, both authors surely would have taken note of them.

³⁵ Ibn Taymiyya was, however, again holding views similar to those of the *Zāhirīs* and the *Shiʿīs* (Abū Zahra, *Ibn Taymiyya*, 419, 427). For Ibn Taymiyya's treatises on *bidʿī* divorces see *Majmūʿat Fatāwā*, vol. III, 13–27; Ibn Taymiyya, *Majmūʿat al-Rasāʾil* (Cairo, 1905–6), vol. II, 203–16. See also Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, *Ẓād*

another indirect attempt to mitigate the power of divorce oaths.³⁶ Divorce oaths were usually undertaken on pain of triple repudiation. When the oath was breached, re-marriage was possible only after the woman had contracted a *taḥlīl* marriage and had had sexual intercourse with another man. In contrast, the implication of Ibn Taymiyya's position was that a breach of an oath taken on pain of triple repudiation causes only a single, and revocable, divorce.

Ibn Taymiyya again had recourse to the model of the Prophet and the Companions. According to a tradition attributed to Ibn 'Abbās (d.c. 68/687), during the age of the Prophet a triple repudiation issued in one utterance had been in fact considered only as a single revocable divorce. The law, however, was changed by the second caliph, 'Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb. 'Umar was troubled by the fickleness with which Muslim men were divorcing their wives, and wanted to deter them from issuing unnecessary repudiations. He therefore decided to hold men to their word, and ruled that the utterance of a triple repudiation would, from now on, actually evoke triple divorce. Ibn Taymiyya used this tradition to show that the *ijmā'* reached by subsequent generations of jurists was based on 'Umar's legal reasoning (*ijtihād*) rather than on Divine legislation. Moreover, Ibn Taymiyya argued that the tradition demonstrates the need to adapt the laws of divorce to public interest (*maṣlaḥa*). In 'Umar's time *taḥlīl* marriages were either unknown or strictly prohibited. In our days, says Ibn Taymiyya, the corruption resulting from *taḥlīl* marriages overrides the need to deter husbands from fickle divorces. Just as 'Umar changed the laws of divorce in the interests of the community, jurists must now revert to the practice of the

al-Mi'ād fī Hady Khayr al-'Ibād, ed. Shu'ayb & 'Abd al-Qādir al-Arnā'ūt (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Risāla, 1979), vol. V, 218–71; *Flām al-Muwaqqi'īn*, vol. III, 30–50. Ibn Taymiyya's argumentation has already been lucidly explained by Abū Zahra. At the core of his argument lay the claim that divorce is in its essence (*asl*) a reprehensible act, and is therefore allowed only in a manner prescribed by the Lawgiver, that is *sunni* divorce. If a divorce is not done in the prescribed manner, it is necessarily prohibited, and therefore invalid. See Abū Zahra, *Ibn Taymiyya*, 414–27.

³⁶ It is noteworthy that Ibn Taymiyya's biographers grouped together all his doctrines on divorce. In a list of Ibn Taymiyya's independent legal opinions, his biographer Ibn 'Abd al-Hādī singles out his master's doctrines on divorce as 'his well known legal opinions, which caused him many tribulations, were that divorce oaths are expiable, that a triple divorce effects only a single divorce, and that a forbidden (*muḥarram*) divorce is invalid.' (*al-'Uqūd*, 214; cf. Ibn al-Wardī, *Ta'rīkh* (Najaf, 1969), vol. II, 411).

Prophet and the Companions, in order to combat the evil practice of *taḥlīl*.³⁷

At the heart of Ibn Taymiyya's doctrines regarding divorce oaths and *bid'ī* divorces was his desire to eliminate *taḥlīl* marriages. Laoust, perceiving Ibn Taymiyya's concern about social mores, interpreted these doctrines as an attempt to limit husbands' unilateral power of divorce.³⁸ Ibn Taymiyya occasionally did condemn divorces in general, but it seems to be a rhetorical tool rather than an end in itself. He did not attack the institution of divorce as such, and—as Laoust has noted—claimed that, in contrast to Christian matrimonial laws, the possibility of divorce in Islam demonstrates God's clemency towards the believers.³⁹ In fact, Ibn Taymiyya was trying to tackle formalistic interpretations that lead to *taḥlīl* marriages and other legal subterfuges. For Ibn Taymiyya, the perils of *taḥlīl* furnish the ultimate confirmation of his doctrines. Let us concede, he argues, that the evidence with regard to divorce oaths in the Qur'ān and the Ḥadīth is contradictory and ambiguous. In that case, the correct analogy must lead us to support the expiability of divorce oaths, for this is in the interest (*maṣlaḥa*) of the Muslims. Otherwise, as happens in our day, the believers find themselves in a quagmire, having no way out other than *taḥlīl* marriages or other types of legal subterfuges.⁴⁰ In one of his later works, summarizing all his doctrines on divorce, Ibn Taymiyya offers the following rationale:

When oaths on pain of divorce were innovated, many jurists believed that they were binding upon violation, with no possibility of expiation; subsequently, many jurists believed that forbidden (*muḥarram*) divorces

³⁷ Ibn Taymiyya, *Majmū'at Fatāwā*, vol. III, 22–3; *Majmū'at al-Rasā'il*, 206. Ibn Taymiyya argued that holding men liable for utterances of triple divorces should therefore be seen as a punishment for reckless husbands. On the need to adapt the law to changing circumstances, see Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, *Flām al-Muwaqqi'im*, vol. III, 30–50; *al-Ṭuruq al-Hukmiyya fī al-Siyāsa al-Shar'iyya* (Cairo, 1317/1898–9), 16–17.

³⁸ *Essai*, 422–34, esp. 428ff. Laoust claimed that Ibn Taymiyya had recognized the dangers posed by frequent divorces to the solidarity of the family institution, and, moreover, to wives' rights to justice. According to Laoust, “[c]ette dernière considération laisse déjà se dessiner, dans le doctrine d'Ibn Taimīya, un féminisme discret dont on trouverait aisément d'autres exemples.” (“Une risāla”, 217). Ibn Taymiyya's ‘feminism’ seems to me purely wishful thinking.

³⁹ *Essai*, 429; “Une risāla”, 218–19. Ibn al-Qayyim states that: “Sometimes divorces are a Divine grace (*nīma*), by which a husband's collar and cuffs are removed. Not every divorce is a Divine retribution (*nigma*) . . .” (*Ẓād al-Ma'ād*, vol. V, 239).

⁴⁰ *Majmū'at Fatāwā*, vol. III, 5, 29, 375–78.

were valid, and some thought that it was not even forbidden to utter triple divorces; many of them believed that a divorce issued by a drunkard or under coercion was valid. Some of these questions were matters of dispute among the Companions and some were introduced later. The people have come to believe that divorces occur [in these cases], in spite of the immense harm and corruption, both in religious and in temporal affairs, that result from the separation of a husband from his wife.

When faced with divorces resulting from these controverted legal questions, men were divided into two groups. One group consisted of those who prohibited *tahḷīl*, in accordance with the example of the Prophet and the Companions, while at the same time also prohibiting what the Prophet himself did not [with regard to these questions of divorce]. Their legal rulings imposed heavy burdens and yokes (*al-aghḷāl wa'l-āṣār*)⁴¹ and immense oppression, which lead to corruption in religious and temporal affairs, not least the apostasy of those who are told by a *muftī* that [their pronouncement of divorce] is binding, shedding of innocent blood, loss of sanity, enmity between people, replacement of Islamic law with a multitude of sins, as well as many other evils of this kind.

The other group consisted of those who thought that they would remove this immense oppression by using legal subterfuges to allow the return of the wife to her husband. First, the marriage of *tahḷīl* was introduced, and some jurists even believed that God rewards those who contract *tahḷīl* marriages, for they permit the wife to her husband and remove the cause of corruption. This legal subterfuge was used to circumvent all other forms of binding divorce. Later, other legal subterfuges were introduced with regard to oaths [of divorce] . . . However, all past authorities and men of knowledge have denounced these legal subterfuges and their likes, regarding them as nullifying the wisdom of the Divine law and the true essence of the verses of the Qurʾān, and as nothing less than derision and mockery of the Divine word.⁴²

Through a new interpretation of Islamic history, Ibn Taymiyya's thought had come full circle. At the time of the Prophet, he argues, the Divine law must have been interpreted correctly. Divine clemency was apparent, and the believers were free from the shackles and fetters that bound followers of other religions. However, when the interpreters of the Divine law started following rigid and formalistic

⁴¹ Reference to Q 7:15, "He releases them from their heavy burdens and from the yokes that are upon them."

⁴² *Majmūʿat Fatāwā*, vol. III, 54–55.

doctrines, swerving from the correct path, they burdened the believers with intolerable yokes. Only then were legal subterfuges introduced, sometimes by well-meaning jurists, in order to relieve the believers of these burdens. But, since God could not have prohibited something and then allowed it through trickery and deceit, these legal subterfuges are of no use, adding to the sources of corruption rather than reducing them. Legal subterfuges would not—indeed, could not—have been introduced to Muslim society if God’s laws had been interpreted correctly, that is through the understanding of their divine cause rather than according to their formal meaning.

IV

As soon as Ibn Taymiyya began propagating his views on the expiable nature of oaths on pain of divorce, leading jurists in Damascus and Cairo rushed to refute them. Among these jurists was Kamāl al-Dīn Ibn al-Zamlakānī, the most prestigious Shāfi‘ī authority in Damascus. But it was the works of the much younger Cairene Shāfi‘ī jurist Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī that made the most impact. Ibn Taymiyya himself, we are told, acknowledged that ‘no jurist has refuted me except al-Subkī’.⁴³ Born in 683/1284 in lower Egypt, in 718/1318 Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī was still a relatively young and not particularly famous immigrant Shāfi‘ī *muftī*. It was his refutations of Ibn Taymiyya that paved his way to higher offices. He was eventually appointed chief Shāfi‘ī *qāḍī* of Damascus in 739/1338, gradually acquiring several other offices in the city, many of which he was able to transmit to his sons. Compared to Ibn Taymiyya, al-Subkī represents, as a Shāfi‘ī Egyptian who amassed official appointments,

⁴³ Al-Ṣafādī, *Aḡyān al-‘Asr*, vol. III, 1196. Al-Subkī’s son notes that Ibn Taymiyya’s counter-refutation was directed only against his father’s work, disregarding the works of other detractors (Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfi‘iyya al-Kubrā*, ed. Maḥmūd Muḥammad al-Tanāḥī and Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Fattāḥ al-Ḥilw (Cairo, 1964–76), vol. X, 183–84). On the treatise of Ibn al-Zamlakānī refuting Ibn Taymiyya’s doctrine on divorce, see *Aḡyān al-‘Asr*, vol. IV, 1769–88; Jackson, “Ibn Taymiyya on Trial”, 48–49. The Ḥanafī jurist Aḥmad b. ‘Uthmān Ibn al-Turkamānī (d. 744/1343) also composed a couple of treatises against the doctrines of Ibn Taymiyya regarding *tahlīl* (see *Aḡyān al-‘Asr*, vol. I, 167–68). These authors’ refutations of Ibn Taymiyya did not survive—another proof of al-Subkī’s success.

the opposite end of the social spectrum of Mamluk *‘ulamā’*. Ironically, unlike the ever-celibate Ibn Taymiyya, al-Subkī was married to several wives, divorcing his first, who was also his paternal cousin, at the age of fifteen.⁴⁴

Al-Subkī composed his first refutation of Ibn Taymiyya’s doctrine on divorce oaths almost immediately following the appearance of *al-Ijtīmā’ wa’l-Iftirāq*, and later authored at least four more treatises about divorce oaths and triple divorces.⁴⁵ At the core of al-Subkī’s refutation was his adherence to the established doctrine that considered divorce oaths as conditional divorces. It is true, al-Subkī admits, that laymen refer to conditional divorces as oaths, a term that was even accepted into the jargon of the jurists (*‘urf al-fuqahā’*). The jurists, however, do not use the term in a literal sense, and the term has no bearing on the legal rules that apply to this action.⁴⁶ Even if, like Ibn Taymiyya, one assumes the primacy of the speaker’s intention, this intention could only be inferred from social practice. And as is well known, the praxis is that no expiation is allowed in divorce

⁴⁴ The most detailed biography of Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī was composed by his son, Tāj al-Dīn, and included in his *Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfi‘iyya al-Kubrā*, vol. X, 139–338. In spite of being one of the most important legal thinkers of the Mamluk period, al-Subkī has not received the scholarly attention he deserves (see J. Schacht & C.E. Bosworth, “al-Subkī”, *EI*²). For a detailed study of a *fatwā* by al-Subkī regarding commercial law, see Nissreen Haram, “Use and Abuse of the Law”, in Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Messick & David Powers (eds.), *Islamic Legal Interpretation. Muftīs and their Fatwas* (Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University Press, 1996), 72–86. For al-Subkī’s legal opinions regarding non-Muslim minorities, see Seth Ward, “Dhimmi Women and Mourning”, in *Islamic Legal Interpretation*, 87–97, and the sources cited there.

⁴⁵ Al-Subkī’s first treatise on divorce oaths was *al-Taḥqīq fī Mas’alat al-Ta’līq* (The Determination of Truth in Conditional Phrases), of which apparently only extracts survive in a Damascus manuscript (Brockelmann, *GAL*, S II, 103). A second treatise, *Naqd al-Ijtīmā’ wa’l-Iftirāq fī Mas’al al-Aymān wa’l-Talāq*, completed on 20 Ramaḍān 718 (15 November 1318), was a direct refutation of Ibn Taymiyya’s first treatise. It was published in al-Subkī, *Kūtb al-Fatāwā* (Cairo: Maṭba‘at al-Qudsī, 1937), 303–9. At a later date, al-Subkī added a more detailed treatise, *al-Durra al-Muḍiyya fī al-Radd ‘alā Ibn Taymiyya* (The Shining Pearl on the Refutation of Ibn Taymiyya), which dealt with triple divorces as well as with divorce oaths. These last two, together with another extremely short treatise on divorce oaths completed in Muḥarram 725/January 1325, were published in *al-Rasā’il al-Subkiyya*, 151–91. An abridgement of al-Subkī’s first treatise, composed by al-Subkī himself and entitled *Mas’alat al-Ta’lāq al-Mu‘allaq* (On Conditional Divorces), is found in the Princeton Manuscripts Collection (Yahuda 878, 135a–139a). After Ibn Taymiyya’s death, al-Subkī composed a refutation of his opponent’s doctrines on the visitation of tombs, entitled *Shifā’ al-Siqām fī Ziyārat Khayr al-Anām* (published in Hyderabad, 1952).

⁴⁶ Al-Subkī, *al-Rasā’il*, 179, 190; *Mas’alat al-Ta’lāq*, 136b–137a.

oaths. Therefore, argues al-Subkī, a man who undertakes a divorce oath consciously commits himself to a divorce upon violation of his oath; otherwise he would not have taken the oath in the first place.⁴⁷

At the time al-Subkī was writing his refutations of Ibn Taymiyya's doctrines on divorce oaths, the state had already started to exert its coercive power. In Jumādā al-Ūlā 718/July 1318, no more than a couple of months after *al-Ijtīmā' wa'l-Iftirāq* was completed, an edict of the sultan arrived from Cairo prohibiting Ibn Taymiyya from issuing *fatwās* on the subject of divorce oaths.⁴⁸ The chroniclers tell us that the matter was brought to the attention of the sultan by his chief Ḥanafī *qāḍī*, the Syrian-born Shams al-Dīn al-Ḥarīrī. The edict, however, did not come as complete surprise, for the chief Ḥanbalī *qāḍī* of Damascus had already approached Ibn Taymiyya two weeks earlier and asked him to discontinue issuing *fatwās*. The chroniclers suggest that Ibn Taymiyya complied with the sultan's edict for more than a year, but then returned to the subject, claiming that he was not permitted to conceal true knowledge.⁴⁹ Ibn Taymiyya received another royal reprimand in Ramaḍān 719/November 1319, and a council of the leading *amīrs* and jurists summoned by the local governor confirmed the earlier prohibition. Finally, in Rajab 720/August 1320, Ibn Taymiyya was summoned again to the governor's palace, this time to receive a sentence of imprisonment in the citadel of the city for his *fatwās* on divorce. He remained in prison for five months until receiving a royal amnesty on the Day of 'Āshūrā' 721/January 1321.

Modern scholars have been puzzled by the state's intervention in what was ostensibly a legal debate. Contemporary chroniclers explain the conflict between Ibn Taymiyya and the state in terms of persons rather than doctrines. Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya, for example, explains that his shaykh's enemies 'found no way to refute his doctrines other than petitioning the sultan'.⁵⁰ Most modern scholars followed the

⁴⁷ Al-Subkī, *al-Rasā'il*, 155, 171, 190.

⁴⁸ This account mainly relies on the comparative study of the relevant chronicles by H. Murad, "Ibn Taymiyya", 21–23. See also Ibn 'Abd al-Hādī, *al-Uqūd*, 214–16; Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya wa'l-Nihāya* (Cairo, 1932–39), vol. XIV, 93, 97–98; al-Ṣafādī, *A'yān al-Āṣr*, vol. I, 138; Laoust, *Essai*, 143–45.

⁴⁹ The chroniclers note that the first royal reprimand, in 718/1318, dealt specifically with Ibn Taymiyya's *fatwās* on divorce oaths, while the trials in the following years dealt with questions of divorce in general (Ibn 'Abd al-Hādī, *al-Uqūd*, 214–16).

⁵⁰ *Flām al-Muwaqqi'in*, vol. IV, 114; vol. III, 62. Another fascinating illustration of the personalized way in which Ibn Taymiyya's sympathizers perceived his trials

same path, and argued that the coercive power of the state was more or less manipulated by Ibn Taymiyya's enemies from among the ranks of the jurists and other members of the 'ulamā'.⁵¹ I believe, however, that it is misleading to accept uncritically contemporary chroniclers' interpretations of Ibn Taymiyya's trials. Contemporary chroniclers, at least before the breakthrough in the philosophy of history made by Ibn Khaldūn and al-Maqrīzī in the ninth/fifteenth century, understood history as the sum of individual personalities. Events were almost always explained through the personal traits of individuals. If we were to accept the analysis offered by medieval chroniclers *en masse*, we would still believe that affairs of state were dependent on the noble or ignoble character of the reigning sultan. In the same way, while one should acknowledge that contemporary chroniclers understood the trials of Ibn Taymiyya as being rooted in individual rivalries and enmities, the subject matter of these trials had some significance in its own right.

All the more so with regard to these particular tribulations, in which personal enmities seem to have played little part. All of Ibn Taymiyya's detractors in 718/1318—apart from al-Subkī, who was too young—had stood by his side during previous trials. The Ḥanafī *qādī* Shams al-Dīn al-Ḥarīrī, who instigated the first royal reprimand in 718/1318, was previously deposed from his offices in 705/1305–6 because of his alleged support for Ibn Taymiyya.⁵² Ibn al-Zamlakānī,

is found in al-Bazzār's biography of Ibn Taymiyya. At the end of the extant manuscript, copied in the middle of the eighth/fourteenth century, the copyist made for himself two lists, one of Ibn Taymiyya's friends and one of his enemies. Abū Ḥafṣ 'Umar al-Bazzār (d. 749/1348), *al-A'tām al-'Alīyya fī Manāqib Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyya*, ed. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Munaḥḥid (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-Jadīd, 1976), 79–87.

⁵¹ Laoust argued that the trials of Ibn Taymiyya on the issues of divorce and visitation were instigated by opposition to his views among scholarly factions, especially the Mālikīs (*Essai*, 477). Little, more cautiously, noted that contemporary chroniclers stress the rivalry among the 'ulamā' as the leading factor in the arrests of Ibn Taymiyya ("The Detention", 323–27). E. Ashtor also believed that the military elite was acting at the behest of the scholarly elite. According to Ashtor, the alliance between the military elite and the scholarly elite required that the Mamluks act against any threat to the spiritual domination of their allies ("L'inquisition dans l'état mamlouk", *Rivista degli Studi Orientali*, vol. XXV (1950), 14). M. Chamberlain argued that in the trials of Ibn Taymiyya, as in other contemporary heresy trials, the point was not only the doctrinal issues themselves, but rather the power to determine true knowledge (*Knowledge and social practice in medieval Damascus, 1190–1350* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 167–73).

⁵² At the time, al-Ḥarīrī was the chief Ḥanafī *qādī* in Damascus (Murad, "Ibn Taymiyya", 14). Their mutual acquaintance went back even further. In 702/1302,

who would write a refutation of Ibn Taymiyya's doctrine on divorce oaths, was previously known as an admirer and close associate of the Ḥanbalī jurist. In his own copy of a work by Ibn Taymiyya he wrote verses of admiration for Ibn Taymiyya's unrivaled knowledge in all fields of science, and for acquiring all the conditions necessary for independent reasoning (*ijtihād*).⁵³ Although Ibn al-Zamlakānī joined Ibn Taymiyya's prosecutors in the Damascus trial of 705/1305, he was later summoned to Cairo to be reprimanded for his ties with Ibn Taymiyya, and eventually dismissed from his position as the administrator of the city hospital.⁵⁴ As for the reigning sultan, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, not only did he release Ibn Taymiyya from his Cairo imprisonment, he reportedly befriended Ibn Taymiyya during his sojourn in Egypt. Now, it is possible to speculate about shifts in factional politics that transformed allies into enemies, and such speculation was in fact made by the historian al-Ṣafadī, puzzled by the relationship between Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Zamlakānī.⁵⁵ But it makes much more sense to assume that al-Ḥarīrī, Ibn al-Zamlakānī, and the sultan himself were averse to Ibn Taymiyya's views on divorce rather than to any of his personal faults.

According to Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, three specific accusations led to Ibn Taymiyya's arrest. First, the state authorities persecuted Ibn Taymiyya for his breach of the *ijmā'* on questions of divorce.⁵⁶ The

they were both accused of corresponding secretly with the recently repelled Mongols, together with another future detractor of Ibn Taymiyya, Kamāl al-Dīn Ibn al-Zamlakānī. The accusations arose after the discovery of a letter written by the three jurists and directed to one of the Mongol generals. Later, however, the letter was proved to be a forgery (Murad, "Ibn Taymiyya", 4; Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya*, vol. XIV, 22; *A'yān al-ʿAsr*, vol. I, 266).

⁵³ Ibn ʿAbd al-Hādī, *al-Uqūd*, 7–8. Ibn Rajab claims that he read this praise, in Ibn al-Zamlakānī's own handwriting, in a text dating from the 690s/1290s (*Dhayl Tabaqāt al-Hanābila*, ed. Muḥammad Ḥāmid al-Fiḳī, vol. II, 391). See also Ibn al-Wardī, *Taʾrīkh*, vol. II, 411.

⁵⁴ On Ibn al-Zamlakānī's dismissal from this office as a result of his support (*intimāʾ*) for Ibn Taymiyya, see Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya*, vol. XIV, 41, 48–49; Murad, "Ibn Taymiyya", 18; S. Jackson, "Ibn Taymiyya on Trial in Damascus", *Journal of Semitic Studies*, vol. XXXIX (1994), 48–49; Ibn Ḥajar, *al-Durar*, vol. IV, 193.

⁵⁵ Al-Ṣafadī quotes Ibn al-Zamlakānī's panegyric about Ibn Taymiyya, and then comments: 'I think that Kamāl al-Dīn wrote this poem when Ṣadr al-Dīn Ibn al-Wakīl [a Shāfiʿī jurist who headed Ibn Taymiyya's persecution in 705/1305] was still alive, for he had disagreements with him, and wanted to prevail over him through Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyya. But God knows best.' (*A'yān al-ʿAsr*, vol. I, 143).

⁵⁶ This reference to Ibn Taymiyya's trials appears at the end of Ibn Qayyim

concern of jurists over Ibn Taymiyya's breach of the *ijmā'* is echoed also in the accounts of chroniclers.⁵⁷ Ibn Taymiyya's breach of the Sunni consensus takes up much of al-Subkī's refutations.⁵⁸ From a political point of view, however, a breach of *ijmā'* was not merely a methodological error, but also a threat to the increasing uniformity of the judicial system since al-Zāhir Baybars established the four chief *qāḍīs* in Cairo and Damascus, one for each school of law. *Qāḍīs* and their deputies were no longer allowed to render justice according to their own reasoning, but only according to the established and dominant (*mashhūr*) view of their school.⁵⁹ Ibn Taymiyya's *fatwās* posed a threat to legal uniformity. Outside the centers of Damascus and Cairo, among nomads, peasants and inhabitants of small towns, *qāḍīs* were still scarce and the interpretation of the law was in the hands of local *muftīs* or shaykhs. The doctrine of *ijmā'*, the consensus of the community on a particular interpretation of the law, was the only way to impose some legal uniformity outside the urban centers. For this reason al-Subkī bemoans in particular the spread of Ibn Taymiyya's 'vile views' among the Bedouins, peasants and the inhabitants of the peripheral lands. The claim to *ijmā'* had social as well as

al-Jawziyya's argumentation against the claim to *ijmā'*. After demonstrating the absence of *ijmā'* on divorce oaths, Ibn al-Qayyim laments: "How can anyone, who believes he is at God's mercy, declare a *muftī* to be a heretic, try to kill him and imprison him, and deceive kings, *amīrs* and commoners by claiming that an *ijmā'* has already been reached" (*Flām al-Muwaqqi'īn*, vol. III, 62).

⁵⁷ Ibn Rajab states that jurists, traditionists and pious men detested Ibn Taymiyya's support of weak opinions, which were already refuted by past authorities (*Dhayl*, vol. II, 394). Ibn Rajab probably refers here to the Ḥanbalī *qāḍī* Ibn Muslim, who requested Ibn Taymiyya to discontinue his *fatwās* on divorce oaths in 718/1318. For similar remarks, see al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān al-'Asr*, vol. I, 137. Following the chroniclers, modern scholars have also concluded that Ibn Taymiyya's alleged breach of *ijmā'* was partly responsible for his tribulations (Abū Zahra, *Ibn Taymiyya*, 79–82, 437–38, 451; Little, "The Detention", 326).

⁵⁸ Al-Subkī cites several scholars, including Ibn 'Abd al-Barr (d. 463/1071) and Ibn Rushd, who had claimed that an *ijmā'* already existed on this question (al-Subkī, *al-Rasā'il*, 156–57). For lists of Followers who supported al-Subkī's position, see *al-Rasā'il*, 159–61; *Mas'alat al-Ṭalāq*, 136a–136b.

⁵⁹ In the appointment decrees for *qāḍīs* cited in al-Qalqashandī's manual for secretaries, the *qāḍīs* are almost always instructed to follow the dominant view of their school (*Ṣubḥ al-'Ashā*, vol. XI, 95, 175–203; vol. XII, 40–58). Beginning in the seventh/thirteenth century, Shāfi'ī and Mālikī jurists agreed that *qāḍīs* must follow the leading view of their school, recognizing that a judge's freedom of interpretation severely undermines public confidence in the judicial system. (M. Fadel, "The Social Logic of *Taqīd* and the Rise of the *Mukhtaṣar*", *Islamic Law and Society*, vol. III (1996), 213–14).

legal implications. By demonstrating that Ibn Taymiyya had breached the consensus of the jurists, al-Subkī was identifying a threat to the legal system, in which both the state and the jurists had a stake.

The problem was exacerbated because the breach of the *ḥimā*⁶⁰ concerned a particularly sensitive branch of law. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya notes that Ibn Taymiyya was arrested also on account of ‘the lowly and sheepish people who belittled him [viz., Ibn Taymiyya], and claimed that he prevented Muslims from divorcing their wives, and caused the number of bastards to grow. And those who have but a whiff of sense in them said that he prohibited conditional divorces altogether’.⁶⁰ Indeed, al-Subkī feared that Ibn Taymiyya’s doctrines would lead laymen to disregard the laws of divorce and live in a state of sin.⁶¹ As a practical result of the popularity enjoyed by Ibn Taymiyya’s views, many husbands who had formally divorced their wives would be allowed to continue living together and having sexual relations with them—sexual relations that al-Subkī regarded adulterous. In that sense, al-Subkī refuted Ibn Taymiyya’s views in order to protect the believers’ children from becoming bastards. His friend, the historian and encyclopedist Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-‘Umarī (d. 749), believed that one of al-Subkī’s lasting achievements was safeguarding lineage and noble descent (*mahfūz al-ansāb wa-ma’zūz al-aḥsāb*) from the danger posed by the doctrines of Ibn Taymiyya.⁶²

But there was another accusation that probably tipped the balance against Ibn Taymiyya. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya says that Ibn Taymiyya’s opponents told their patrons from among the *amīrs* that ‘he [viz., Ibn Taymiyya] has released those who had undertaken the oath of allegiance to the sultan from their obligations’.⁶³ The oath of allegiance was the most important sworn undertaking in the political sphere, and Ibn Taymiyya’s doctrines posed a threat to this

⁶⁰ *qad rafā’a al-ṭalāq bayna al-muslimīn wa-kaththara awlād al-zinā fi al-‘ālamīn* (*Flām al-Muwawqi‘īn*, vol. IV, 115). The historian Ibn al-Wardī also thought that Ibn Taymiyya’s contemporaries were simply too feeble-minded to follow his logic: “He has assisted his enemies by dealing with complicated questions with which neither the minds of our contemporaries, nor their learning, are incapable of coping, such as the expiation of divorce oaths, and [the view] that triple divorce affects only a single divorce, and that divorce during menstruation is invalid” (*Ta’rīkh*, vol. II, 411).

⁶¹ Al-Subkī, *al-Rasā’il*, 152.

⁶² Cited by Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfi‘iyya*, vol. X, 150.

⁶³ *hādihā ḥalla bay‘at al-sulṭān min a’nāq al-ḥālīfīn* (*Flām al-Muwawqi‘īn*, vol. IV, 115).

central symbol of the regime. If his views were to be accepted, a violation of the oath of allegiance would require the violator only to perform an act of expiation. Ibn al-Qayyim attempted to demonstrate that these allegations were unfounded, and that Ibn Taymiyya explicitly prohibited a breach of an oath of allegiance given to the sultan. To a certain extent, Ibn al-Qayyim had it right. Ibn Taymiyya tackled oaths of allegiance as a subsidiary issue, mainly because these oaths included oaths on pain of divorce and on pain of manumission. And Ibn Taymiyya did rule that one should obey the sultan as a moral obligation, whether this obedience is supported or not by an oath. Unfortunately, however, Mamluk political authorities were less interested in moral obligations. To Ibn Taymiyya's contemporaries, oaths of divorce were the principal way by which a man could be made accountable for his sworn undertakings. Al-Subkī hints at the political ramifications of the debate when he comments that 'Ibn Taymiyya began his innovation with this issue [i.e., oaths of divorce]. But his intention was to achieve, if he were to succeed, a further goal'.⁶⁴

IV

It is obvious, but nonetheless worth stating: only men could undertake an oath on pain of divorce. From a legal point of view, oaths on pain of divorce or manumission were interpreted as conditional phrases because divorce and manumission caused changes in the status of others. But this legal reasoning reflected social realities. A man could affect these changes in status only towards those members of his household who were under his authority. Divorce and manumission were extreme manifestations of this authority, as well as its symbols, precisely because they severed the ties that held a household together. The most common example of a divorce oath, appearing already in the early Islamic legal literature, but also in numerous *fatāwā* from the Mamluk period, is that of a husband threatening his wife, 'If you leave the house without my permission, you are

⁶⁴ *wa-hādhihi al-mas'ala allatī ibtada' a Ibn Taymiyya bid'atahu wa-qaṣada al-tawaṣṣul bihā ilā ghayrihā in tammat lahu* (al-Subkī, *al-Rasā'il*, 156).

divorced'.⁶⁵ In this example, the husband warns his wife against transgressing the spatial boundaries of the household, physical boundaries that serve also as a symbol of his authority. The warning is accompanied by a threat to use the extreme manifestation of this authority, the power to unilaterally sever the matrimonial ties. In the same way, a husband could threaten his wife with divorce in the event of other transgressions of his authority, like unauthorized meetings with her family and friends, pilfering his money, or refusal to have conjugal relations.⁶⁶ In the domestic sphere, divorce oaths were used as legally binding threats that owed their credibility to the husband's authority over his wife, to his mastery over his household.

Divorce oaths were borrowed into the public sphere, and employed in a variety of social contexts. However, their use in the public sphere continued to reflect, in several ways, their original use in the domestic sphere. First, because social power in early Mamluk society was located in the household over which a man held authority, the undertaking of a divorce oath was used to invoke this power. For example, when Sayf al-Dīn Karāy, the aforementioned governor of Damascus, wanted to impose severe punishments against bribery and theft, he undertook an oath on pain of divorce to execute these punishments. Instead of issuing his new policy in the form of edicts, deriving authority from his official position as governor, Karāy backed up the threats against bribery and theft with his authority as a head of a household.⁶⁷ The same logic underlined the use of divorce oaths in commercial or social contexts. When a man committed himself

⁶⁵ Ibn Taymiyya, *Fatāwā al-Nisā'*, 253, 256–7; Ibn al-Ṣalāh, *Fatāwā*, 443 (no. 395); al-Subkī, *Fatāwā*, 35–41, 642–44; *Flām al-Muwaqqi'in*, vol. III, 51. For discussions of the same question in early Islamic legal literature, see Calder, "Ḥinth".

⁶⁶ Ibn Taymiyya, *Fatāwā al-Nisā'*, 253–54, 257–58; al-Nawawī, *Fatāwā*, 140. A husband could use divorce oaths to impose upon himself obligations in the wife's interest, such as not to beat her, or to pay her maintenance on time—oaths that were equivalent to similar stipulations inserted in marriage contracts. For a divorce oath prohibiting the husband from beating his wife, see Ibn al-Ṣalāh, *Fatāwā*, 684 (no. 1032). For an oath regarding the husband's payment of a debt to his wife, see al-Subkī, *Fatāwā*, 311.

⁶⁷ Official edicts were, of course, also used. A year later, when Karāy was no longer in office, a royal edict was sent from Cairo to Damascus, again prohibiting any form of bribery and laying down the implementation of the legal punishment in cases of murder (Laoust, "Le hanbalisme sous les Mamlouks Bahrides (658–784/1260–1382)", *Revue d'études islamiques*, vol. XXVIII (1960), 27–29; cf. Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya*, vol. XIV, 66).

to perform a certain action in the political or public sphere, on pain of divorce, he was attesting to his authority as head of a household, and therefore to his ability to fulfill his commitment.

Second, taking an oath on pain of divorce, both in the domestic and the public spheres, was almost always construed as a threat or an obligation. Threats and obligations were expressed through reference to the authority conferred on heads of households, just as 'positive' loyalties and alliances were expressed through the household language of intimacy and friendship.⁶⁸ When al-Zāhir Baybars made a pledge on pain of divorce to the Ayyūbid prince al-Malik al-Mughīth, he was expressing his commitment not to harm the Ayyūbid prince. The same is true of other instances in which *amīrs* undertook oaths on pain of divorce to maintain the safety of a rival *amīr*, and for the use of divorce oaths in non-political contexts. Men undertook oaths on pain of divorce not to marry off their daughter to their brother's son, not to speak with their in-laws, not to eat together with a fellow-traveler, or not to reside in a certain house.⁶⁹ All these oaths were made with the purpose of deterring the oath-takers from a certain action, in the same way that husbands tried to deter their wives from leaving the house without their permission.

Third, since the use of divorce oaths in the domestic sphere hinged on the legal authority of husbands to divorce their wives, their use in the public sphere also invoked a legally enforceable commitment. When a husband threatened his wife with divorce, he was referring to an authority enshrined in the law, and the credibility of his threat emanated from his ability to exercise this legal privilege. In this respect, undertaking an oath on pain of divorce differed from expressions of love, which were always symbolic rather than legally enforceable. Betraying an alliance cemented with declarations of love and friendship was morally reprehensible, but was not penalized by law. Divorce oaths, on the other hand, were grounded in the husband's

⁶⁸ This distinction between 'positive' loyalties, serving as a basis for cooperation, and 'negative' commitments, is borrowed from Roy Mottahedeh's discussion of loyalties in the Buyid period. However, in Mottahedeh's analysis of Buyid political culture, 'negative' commitments were based on shared interests rooted in common membership in an ethnic, geographic or professional group (*Loyalty and Leadership*, 40).

⁶⁹ Ibn Taymiyya, *Fatāwā al-Nisā'*, 255, 256; al-Nawawī, *Fatāwā*, 139, 140, 143, 145 (also an oath not to purchase or eat meat, and an oath not to allow someone to use a certain shop).

legal privileges, and were therefore considered legally binding, leading to actual divorce upon violation of the oath. A failure to perform a commitment in the public sphere affected the domestic sphere in a very real and direct way. Divorce meant the severing of the matrimonial ties that constituted the cornerstone of the household, the husband's source of social power—from Ibn Taymiyya's point of view, too severe a punishment for merely violating an oath.

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PART SIX

MAMLUK ECONOMY

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CHAPTER TEN

THE CIRCULATION OF *DIRHAMS* IN THE BAHRI PERIOD

Warren C. Schultz

Introduction

Shortly after assuming rule in 658/1260, the sultan al-Zāhir Baybars had a new silver coin minted in the Mamluk domains.¹ These coins were known as *zāhirī dirhams* after Baybars's royal *laqab*. These *dirhams* differed from the Ayyubid-style silver coins of the first Mamluk rulers most notably in appearance. Unlike the square-in-a-circle format of most of those earlier coins, the *dirhams* of Baybars featured several horizontal lines of legend, surrounded by a circular border. The most distinctive aspect of these coins was the presence of a feline figure—likely the heraldic symbol of Baybars—in the exergue of one side of the coin.² This epigraphic design and format, minus the feline, would remain the norm for Mamluk silver coins for the next 150 years of the sultanate.³ While this design was altered during the reign of al-Zāhir Barqūq—when coins were issued bearing the name of that sultan inscribed in a circle in the middle of the coin—even these coins did not represent any major change in Mamluk silver money. That came later in the early decades of the ninth/fifteenth century, when lighter, thinner silver coins of a higher alloy and more consistent

¹ Paul Balog, *The Coinage of the Mamluk Sultans of Egypt & Syria* (New York: The American Numismatic Society, 1964), 89–103, henceforth *CMSES*. For corrective views of Baybars's coinage, see Michael Bates, "The Coinage of Mamluk Sultan Baybars I, Additions and Corrections," *American Numismatic Society Museum Notes* (henceforth *ANSMN*), vol. XXII (1977), 161–82; and Michael Broome, "The Silver Coins of Baybars I Without Mint Name," *ANSMN*, vol. XXIV (1979), 219–23.

² For the debate over the use of heraldic symbols on Mamluk coins, see Paul Balog, "New considerations on Mamluk Heraldry," *ANSMN*, vol. XXII (1977), 183–212; and J.W. Allan, "Mamluk Sultanic Heraldry and the Numismatic Evidence, A Reinterpretation," *JRAS* (1970), 99–112.

³ After the death of Baybars, the only sultan to put a feline on precious metal coins was his son, Berke Khan; *CMSES*, types 105–111, 107–9.

weight were issued.⁴ Those developments in the silver coinage of the ninth/fifteenth century lay outside the borders of this study.⁵

The role of silver *dirhams* in the Mamluk monetary system to the end of the eighth/fourteenth century has been much debated. A widespread interpretation holds that these coins initially were the “standard” Mamluk money. The *dirhams* are thus said to have “supported” the irregular-weight Mamluk dinars (in actuality little more than ingots). The *dirhams* could then be exchanged with gold or copper coins at the varying exchange rates given in the chronicles. These exchange rates are often read as referring to actual coins of fixed weight and standards. By the end of the eighth/fourteenth century, however, silver is said to have become increasingly scarce. It therefore lost its role as the “monetary standard,” being replaced by copper *fulūs*, which in turn “supported” the silver.⁶

This view and its component parts are neither theoretically sound nor supported by the numismatic evidence. Thanks to the work of Hennequin and others, the inadequacy of such concepts as “standard coinage,” “metallic standards,” and “basis of system” for understanding the Mamluk or indeed other medieval monetary marketplaces has been firmly illustrated, and need not be repeated.⁷ Here, based upon a meshing of the literary and numismatic evidence, I offer a

⁴ Other than the design change, these *dirhams* of Barqūq are similar to those of the preceding sultans in their flan size, thickness, alloy, and irregular weight. There is some evidence suggesting a possible decrease in purity for these coins of Barqūq, but it is inconclusive. See Jere Bacharach and Adon Gordus, “Studies on the Fineness of Silver Coins,” *JESHO*, vol. XI (1968), 298–317. And as Bacharach as pointed out, there is no other literary nor numismatic evidence to support the allegation by al-Maqrīzī that low quality “*hamawī*” *dirhams* caused problems in the year 781/1379. Bacharach, “Circassian Monetary Policy, Silver,” *Numismatic Chronicle*, 7th series, vol. XI (1971), 267–81.

⁵ In addition to the work of Bacharach cited in the preceding note, see Boaz Shoshan, “From Silver to Copper, Monetary Changes in Fifteenth Century Egypt.” *SI*, vol. LVI (1982), 97–116.

⁶ This interpretation is most explicitly stated in the works of Balog, but is also used by Hassanein Rabie, *The Financial System of Egypt. A.H. 564–741/A.D. 1169–1341*. London, 1972; and William Popper, *Egypt and Syria Under the Circassian Sultans, 1382–1468 A.D., Systematic Notes to Ibn Taghri Birdī’s Chronicles of Egypt, University of California Publications in Semitic Philology*, vol. XV–XVI (1957–58). See Paul Balog, “The History of the *Dirham* in Egypt from the Fatimid Conquest until the Collapse of the Mamluk Empire,” *Revue Numismatique*, vol. III (1961), 109–45.

⁷ See the discussion of these issues in Warren C. Schultz, “The Monetary History of Egypt, 643–1517,” *The Cambridge History of Egypt*, vol. I, edited by Carl F. Petry (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), 319–24.

revised assessment of how Mamluk silver coins circulated in this period. Mamluk *dirhams* were not the “standard” coinage of the sultanate; they were but one currency circulating amongst others of different metal, provenance, and fineness. Moreover, for all but the smallest transactions they passed by weight and not by tale, their value being determined by a money of account. The basic unit of this money of account was also called a *dirham*, and was based on the weight unit of that same name. Only in this latter context can “*dirham*” be understood as a denominational value. By far its most common meaning in the sources is generic, referring to a coin minted in silver.

The essential elements of this argument are all found in the following passage, written sometime between 1302 and 1309 C.E. by Eshitori Ha-Farhi, a Jewish traveler from Spain to Mamluk Jerusalem. It makes several claims about Mamluk *dirhams*, claims which serve as central reference points for an overview of how this coinage both circulated and was valued.

In the land of Israel we now use a coin that passes by weight; it is white and its name is *dirham nuqra*. It is round and its diameter is roughly one-half a thumb [breadth]. This coin is also current at the same rate in Amon and Moab, Sihon and Og, in Syria and the land of Egypt, and it is the Egyptian *drachmon* that Maimonides of blessed memory refers to. . . . Its weight never changes, it is sixteen grains of carob, which grain is called a *habba* or *kirat*. . . . for the *dirham* is always two-thirds pure silver and one-third copper.⁸

Metrology, “We now use a coin that passes by weight . . .”

The silver coinage of the first century and a half of the Mamluk sultanate should be considered as one type of coin when it comes to the question of how these *dirhams* circulated. As Ha-Farhi observed, these coins passed by weight and not by count. This conclusion is supported both by the numismatic and the literary evidence. I will examine the numismatic data first. Mamluk silver coins of this period

⁸ Cited by Daniel Sperber, “Islamic Metrology from Jewish Sources, II,” *Numismatic Chronicle*, vol. XII (1972), 275–82. Eshitori Ha-Farhi lived 1282–1357. The passage is excerpted from his *Caftor va-Perah*.

survive today in the thousands, the vast majority of which are unpublished. I have analyzed many of these *dirhams* by making use of frequency tables of coin weights. A frequency table plots the number of coins (of determined shared characteristics) which fall within set weight intervals, and the shape of the resulting graph can reveal much information about the coin sample plotted.⁹ Although not without its limitations, the frequency table is a useful tool in revealing metrological tendencies and developments. As the frequency tables which follow illustrate, the weight of Mamluk *dirhams* varied considerably and it cannot be said that they were prepared to a specific weight standard. There can be little doubt that this variance in weight affected their use in the market place.¹⁰

Mamluk *dirhams* were struck with regularity in the mint cities of Cairo, Damascus, Tripoli, Ḥamāt and Aleppo.¹¹ While the hoard evidence (discussed below) indicates that mint of origin would seem to have had little impact on subsequent coin usage and circulation, for reasons of space, discussion is limited here to *dirhams* struck in Cairo.¹² Figure 1 plots the weights of 274 *zāhirī dirhams* minted in the Mamluk capital. Several comments are in order. The first concerns the shape of the graph. There is a prominent peak, but there is also a wide range of the weights. While the average weight of such a sample is sometimes said to represent a “weight standard” for the coinage, such a wide dispersal pattern renders such assertions meaningless. Next, the peak interval falls in the range of 2.70 to 2.79 grams. This is much less than any of the commonly encoun-

⁹ There is a wide literature on the use and the abuse of frequency tables. The basic starting point is G.F. Hill, “The Frequency Table,” *Numismatic Chronicle* series 5, vol. IV (1924), 76–85. The tables here were first produced with a program prepared by David Sellwood, “A Basic Program for Histograms,” *NC* (1980), 201–4, as modified by Michael Bates.

¹⁰ The coins weighed for this study come from numerous public (chief among them the American Numismatic Society, the British Museum, the Ashmolean Museum, the Israel Museum, the Israel Antiquities Authority, and the L.A. Mayer Institute of Islamic Art) and private collections. I am indebted to the many curators and collectors who granted me access to the coins in their care.

¹¹ Very few silver coins have been identified from the other major mint of Alexandria. Limited numbers of Mamluk coins were also struck at certain times in the provincial cities of Lādhiqiyya, Malatya, and even the fortress of al-Marqab.

¹² The conclusions hold for the other cities as well; see my “Mamluk Money from Baybars to Barqūq, A Study Based on the Literary Sources and the Numismatic Evidence,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, the University of Chicago, 1995, 103–41.

tered values for the *dirham* weight unit, and it is doubtful that it could represent a standard value for that unit.¹³

What conclusions can be drawn from such a table? First of all, the table shows that a desire for precisely controlled weight was not a factor governing the minting of the coins. Second, in light of the high intrinsic value of silver, it is difficult to imagine that a silver coin that weighs less than another coin would not have been worth less than that heavier coin. These conclusions are further supported by the remaining graphs, all of which reveal the same characteristics to varying degrees. Figure 2 graphs 104 *dirhams* of al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn, Figure 3 graphs 65 *dirhams* of the period 741–784/1340–1382, all from the reigns of the descendants of al-Nasir Muḥammad.¹⁴ Figure 4 plots 30 weights of the new design *dirhams* of al-Zāhir Barqūq. Finally, Figure 5 charts 715 *dirhams* from the reign of Baybars through that of Barqūq. This large sample amplifies the same characteristics of its component parts, most importantly the extremely wide dispersion of the weights. Coins weigh anywhere from less than one to more than six grams, although the majority are clumped in between those extremes.

Furthermore, in every graph, more than half of the coins lay outside the peak weight interval, shedding little light from the coins themselves on a possible value for the *dirham* weight unit. In addition, no sample exhibits a rapid drop-off in the number of specimens that weigh more than that peak range. Such a drop-off would be expected in a situation where coins circulated at a par value greater than the intrinsic value of their bullion content. That heavier coins did not disappear from circulation is another argument against the applicability of Gresham's Law to the Mamluk monetary situation.

¹³ The actual value of the *dirham* weight unit in the Mamluk era is not clear. Given their widely irregular weights, the surviving silver coins for this period give little help in this matter. However, the numerous glass weights from Mamluk Egypt, although beyond the scope of this study, when combined with other numismatic evidence, suggest a *dirham* of approximately three grams. I believe further precision is as yet not possible. See my "Mamluk Metrology and the Numismatic Evidence," *al-Masaq* 15.1 (2003), 59–75.

¹⁴ This bundling is made necessary by a shortage of specimens sufficient for a statistically viable sample from any one reign.




Figure 1. Cairo, *Dirhams* of al-Zāhir Baybars (274 coins).




Figure 2. Cairo, *Dirhams* of al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn (104 coins).




Figure 3. Cairo, *Dirhams* of the Descendents of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad (65 coins).




Figure 4. Cairo, *Dirhams* of al-Zāhir Barqūq (30 coins).




Figure 5. Cairo, Combined Mamluk *Dirhams*, Baybars to Barqūq (715 coins).

As is apparent from these tables, Mamluk *dirhams* were not struck with great accuracy in regard to weight standards.¹⁵ Graphs similar to these have been plotted before, but usually with far less data.¹⁶ The interpretations drawn from those tables have been varied. Some have found the graphs “baffling.”¹⁷ Others have concluded that the graphs do indeed indicated that the Mamluk *dirham* was indeed stuck to a weight standard.¹⁸ Given the wide weight distribution, these *dirhams* must have circulated by weight. And once it became neces-

¹⁵ These tables confirm the suspicions raised by Michael Broome, *A Handbook of Islamic Coins* (London, Seaby, 1985), 123–25.

¹⁶ The exception is Saleh Khaled Sari, who plotted over 1400 silver coin weights from the Karak Hoard. See “A Critical Analysis of a Mamluk Hoard from Karak,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1986.

¹⁷ See John M. Smith, “Mongol Money and Medieval Trade, a Metrological Investigation,” *Studies in Islam*, vol. XVII (1980), 192–203.

¹⁸ Sari, “Karak Hoard,” 436–44. Sari has done monetary historians a great service in his analysis of this hoard, but his metrological conclusions should be treated

sary to weigh coins used in transactions, it no longer was necessary for them to be prepared with any metrological precision.

But in the passage by Ha-Farhi, he went on to write that the weight of the silver coins “never changes.” At first glance, this statement is difficult to reconcile with his first assertion, let alone the surviving numismatic evidence as seen in the frequency tables. Upon closer examination, however, a reconciliation is possible. The weight that “never changes” is not the weight of any actual coin, but that of an ideal silver coin, weighing exactly one *dirham*-weight unit. This unit is the basis of the money of account by which the actual coins were valued. The actual coins clearly vary tremendously in weight, but the money of account by which they are valued is fixed, and extrapolating from Ha-Farhi, is based on an ideal *dirham* weighing “sixteen grains of the carob.”

Therefore, Mamluk silver coinage circulated in a fashion similar to Mamluk gold. Their primary value lay in the amount of bullion they contained. Coins passed by weight and not by tale, with their value determined by comparison to a money of account. The basic unit of this money of account for silver coins was also called the *dirham*, which has no doubt contributed to much of the confusion encountered regarding Mamluk silver. The following scenario illustrates how such a system would have operated. If a buyer contracted an obligation to purchase 30 *dirhams* worth of a commodity, he fulfilled that obligation with a payment of 30 *dirhams* worth of silver coins as determined by weight, regardless of the actual number of silver coins it took to reach that amount.¹⁹

Such a scenario not only fits the numismatic evidence cited above, but is also supported by the literary evidence. It is attested to in numerous written sources from the Mamluk era, ranging from the later *Geniza* material which mention the use of sealed purses of predetermined value, to anecdotal mention in the Mamluk literary sources. It is common, for example, to encounter in the chronicles the idiomatic expression *wazana lahu* (“to weigh out [in payment]”)

with caution. His graphs show the same dispersion of weights seen here. There are no sudden drop-offs after his peak values, and those peaks are not so prominent as to justify the confidence with which he announces exact values for the *dirham* weight unit and its fractions.

¹⁹ See, for example, al-Suyuti, *Husn al-Muhadarah*, Cairo, 1321 A.H., vol. II, 180, where gold and silver to the amount of 30,000 *dirhams* were distributed to the poor.

when commercial transactions are mentioned.²⁰ This expression is found in instances involving large and small amounts, ranging from the purchase of sweets to the payment of taxes.²¹ In such a system, where the primary determinant of value was weight, a heavier coin was more valuable than a lighter coin, but only in proportion to its greater weight. The coins circulated side by side because there was no deceit in such a system, weight was easily determined.

Purity, "It is white . . ."

When Eshtori Ha-Farhi described the current silver coins as "white," he was referring to their silver content. Coins of high silver content stay lighter in color once they enter circulation, while low-content silver coins darken, and are thus frequently referred to as "black." Ha-Farhi returned to this matter of purity when he wrote that these *dirhams* were always two-thirds silver in content. This statement reinforces what is already known of the fineness of Mamluk *dirhams* from Baybars to Barqūq.

Both the contemporary literary evidence and modern metallurgical analysis indicate that the *zāhirī dirhams* issued under Baybars contained approximately two-thirds silver, with the remainder being mainly copper.²² In the literary sources two traditions exist, al-Maqrīzī wrote that the *zāhirī dirhams* were 70% silver;²³ while al-ʿUmarī gave

²⁰ I am grateful to Amalia Levanoni for suggesting this line of research. A corollary is that the word *zīnah* (verbal noun of the verb *wazana*) may often be translated as "value" and not "weight." See, for example, al-ʿAynī, *Iqd al-jumān fī taʾriḫh ahl al-Ḥamān*, edited by Muḥammad Muḥammad Amīn, Cairo, 1987, vol. I, 201 where a candelabra is said to have a "value" of 1000 *dīnars*.

²¹ See, for example, Yūsuf Abū al-Maḥāsīm, Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *al-Manhal al-ṣāfi waʾl-mustawfi bādā al-wāfi*, Muḥammad Muḥammad Amīn (ed.), Cairo, 1984–86, obituary no. 345, II, 277; al-Maqrīzī, Aḥmad b. ʿAlī, *Kitāb al-Mawāʿid waʾl-ʿitibār fī dhīkr al-khiṭaṭ waʾl-āthār*, Būlāq, 1270 (reprint), II, 393; idem, *Kitāb al-Sulūk li-māʿrifat duwal al-mulūk*, Muḥammad Muṣṭafā Ziyādah and Sayyid ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ ʿAshūr (eds.), Cairo, 1934–73, II, 420; Mūsā b. Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā al-Yūsufī, *Nuzhat al-nāzir fī sirat al-Malik al-Nāṣir*, Aḥmad Ḥuṭayṭ (ed.), 1986, 313.

²² The later round-flan silver coins of the Ayyubid were also two-thirds silver. See Balog, "The History of the Dirham," 128.

²³ Al-Maqrīzī, Aḥmad b. ʿAlī, *Shudhūr al-ʿUqūd fī Dhīkr al-Nuqūd*, edited and translated by D. Eustache, "Études de numismatique et de métrologie musulmanes, II," *Hesperis Tamuda*, vol. X (1969), 96–189, 131.

the alloy as two-thirds silver.²⁴ Modern analysis has vindicated both authors, as the *dirhams* of Baybars and his successors have consistently tested in the 65% to 75% range for silver content.²⁵ This is true for both the Egyptian and Syrian mint issues, and irrespective of the size of the coin. While the possibility exists that this alloy dropped during the reigns of Barqūq, there is little evidence to suggest that the Mamluks, unlike their Ayyubid predecessors, minted silver coins of different alloys simultaneously. As Cahen pointed out, the issuance of coins of different alloys is not always done to deceive, but could also be done to provide for fractional money.²⁶ In light of the consistent 65–75% purity range of Mamluk *dirhams* in the Bahri period, and considering the metrological evidence discussed above, the Mamluks evidently met their need for smaller change by minting coins of widely variant weight.

Terminology, "Its name is dirham nuqra . . ."

Eshtori Ha-Farhi clearly stated that a Mamluk silver coin of two-thirds silver content was called a *dirham nuqra*, and this term is also encountered frequently in the Mamluk chronicles. It would seem that there is little problem in accepting that this was indeed what these coins were called. There is, however, contradictory evidence for the meaning of the term *nuqra*. This is yet another example of the familiar complaint that the terminology of money was not used consistently in the contemporary sources. As mentioned earlier, the basic term *dirham* can have different meanings depending on the context in which it is used.²⁷ Often the only clue as to what meaning was

²⁴ Al-ʿUmarī, Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā, *Masālik al-Abṣār fī mamālik al-amṣār*, A.F. Sayyid (ed.), Cairo, IFAO, 1985, 14–15.

²⁵ See especially Jere Bacharach, "Monetary Movements in Medieval Egypt," in *Precious Metals in the Later Medieval and Early Modern Worlds*, J.F. Richards (ed.), Durham, NC, 1983, 178; and Bacharach and Gordus, "Studies on the Fineness of Silver Coins," *JESHO*, XI (1968), 298–317; and Andrew Ehrenkreutz, et al., "Contributions to the Knowledge of the Standard of Fineness of Silver Coinage Struck in Egypt and Syria During the Period of the Crusades," *JESHO*, vol. XXXI (1988), 301–3.

²⁶ Claude Cahen, "Monetary Circulation in Egypt at the Time of the Crusades and the Reform of al-Kamil," in *The Islamic Middle East, 700–1900*, A.L. Udovitch (ed.), Princeton, 1981, 317.

²⁷ Cf. George Miles, "Dirham," *EF*, vol. II, 319–20.

intended is found in any accompanying adjectives. Some *nisbas*, such as *zāhirī*, have been assumed to refer to the ruler whose *laqab* appears in the coin's legend. Other modifiers, such as black, white, and *nuqra*, usually refer to the fineness of the coin. When silver coins of different alloys and hence value circulated in the market place, these terms are crucial to understanding what coin is being used in the transaction.

A discussion of this terminological problem for the money of the Mamluk Sultanate must begin with the silver coinage of the late Ayyubid period. As is clear from both the numismatic and literary evidence, it is known that coins of different silver alloy were struck by the Ayyubids and circulated throughout their domains. Three basic types of Ayyubid *dirhams* are known, coins of close to 100% silver usually referred to as *dirham nuqra*; *dirhams* of 50% silver usually called *dirham nāṣirī* since they were issued by al-Nāṣir Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn; and *dirhams* of one-third silver—*dirham kāmīlī*—issued by al-Kāmīl Muḥammad in 622/1225.²⁸ Exchange rates between gold and silver vary tremendously depending upon which silver coin was used in the transaction. Unfortunately, the important adjectives are not always found in the chronicles, and on occasion when they are, they are used incorrectly. In particular, this is the case with the term *kāmīlī*.

This term has caused much confusion in modern analyses of Mamluk money, primarily due to the description and accounts of it found in the works of al-Maqrīzī. Writing more than 150 years after the *kāmīlī dirham* was first issued, al-Maqrīzī alleged that it was both still in circulation well into the Mamluk period, and that its alloy consisted of two-thirds silver and one-third copper.²⁹ In the abstract, there is nothing inherently wrong with the first assertion, as it was quite common for coins to circulate well after their date of issue, as is supported by both literary and coin hoard evidence. In this case, however, it should be noted that no *kāmīlī*-type *dirhams* have as yet

²⁸ Andrew Ehrenkreutz, "Contributions to the Knowledge of the Fiscal Administration of Egypt in the Middle Ages. I," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, vol. XVI (1954), 503. This typology of Ayyubid silver is confirmed by metallurgical analysis, see P. Balog, *The Coinage of the Ayyubids*, London, 1980, 36–38.

²⁹ Al-Maqrīzī, *Shudhūr al-Uqūd*, 130–31. Cf. Adel Allouche, *Mamluk Economics, A Study and Translation of al-Maqrīzī's Ighathah*, Salt Lake City, 1994, esp. 93, where Allouche rightly raises the question of what al-Maqrīzī meant when he used the term *kāmīlī*.

been found in the numerous Mamluk silver hoards that have been found and studied.³⁰ His second assertion—that the *kāmīlī dirham* was two-thirds silver—is clearly wrong however. Both Ayyubid era sources and modern chemical analyses indicate that the *kāmīlī dirham* had an alloy of only one-third silver.³¹ Thus when al-Maqrīzī wrote that these coins circulated in Egypt at the end of the eighth/fourteenth century, did he mean coins that he incorrectly said were two-thirds silver, or was he referring to the actual one-third silver coins issued by al-Kāmil Muḥammad? If the former is true, then it is possible that the meaning of the term *kāmīlī* had changed, or even that it was then applied to a different coin type. If the latter allegation is accepted, then the contrary numismatic information must be acknowledged; not only are there no *kāmīlī dirhams* in the available hoards, there are no lower alloy coins either. Of course, given that the supposed re-appearance of the *kāmīlī dirhams* is mentioned only by al-Maqrīzī and not by other contemporary observers, it is possible that al-Maqrīzī was simply wrong. Until, if ever, this confusion is cleared up, conclusions about Mamluk silver based on al-Maqrīzī's passages about the *kāmīlī* must be regarded cautiously.³²

Similar difficulties are encountered with the term *nuqra*. Drawing upon the evidence in the Ayyubid-era mint manuals, many scholars have pointed out that *nuqra* in those contexts always refers to high-quality silver, approaching 100% fineness.³³ This meaning is also supported by the Geniza documents of the same period, where, as Goitein has pointed out, the word *dirham* alone refers to a low silver coins, but high silver coins are always described with a second term, usually *nuqra* or *fiḍḍa*.³⁴ Such usage would be expected for the Ayyubid era, since coins of different alloys were in circulation together. But the situation is somewhat different for the first 150 years of the

³⁰ See pp. 236–242 below.

³¹ Ehrenkreutz, "Contributions, I," 504.

³² See Boaz Shoshan, "Exchange Rate Policies in Fifteenth-Century Egypt," *JESHO*, vol. XXIX (1986), 28–51.

³³ Ehrenkreutz, "Contributions, I," 501–4; Rabie, *Financial System*, 174; Christopher Toll, "Minting Techniques According to Arabic Literary Sources," *Oriental Suecana* vols. IXX–XX (1970–71), 138–39.

³⁴ S.D. Goitein, "The Exchange Rate of Gold and Silver Money in Fatimid and Ayyubid Times. A Preliminary Study of the Relevant Geniza Material," *JESHO*, vol. VIII (1965), 37. Despite the title, this article does contain several documents which date from the early Mamluk period.

Mamluk sultanate. From the *dirhams* of Baybars to those of Barqūq, the numismatic evidence indicates that only coins of two-thirds silver were struck. There is no evidence of any type to indicate that the Mamluks minted *dirhams* of a higher silver purity. Yet the term *nuqra* is still found in the sources. One possible explanation is that by the Mamluk period, a coin of two-thirds silver was considered as having a “high-enough” alloy to deserve the label.³⁵

Another possible nuance exists, however. Perhaps the term “*dirham nuqra*” refers not to the actual coins but to the money of account used to determine the value of those irregular weight coins. Eshtor Ha-Farhi did, after all, write that the weight of the *dirham nuqra* never changed. This meaning of the term *dirham nuqra* has been suggested before, and is endorsed here.³⁶ The question remains unanswered, however, whether this fixed-weight, money of account unit was assumed to be of pure or two-thirds silver content.

Appearance, “It is round . . .”

Eshtori Ha-Farhi mentioned that these silver coins were round and the size of a thumb. In the course of my research I found that this was not always the case. It is true that many of the thousands of Mamluk *dirhams* that have survived are circular in shape and approximately 20 millimeters in diameter. But there are many which are smaller and some that are larger. The thickness of these coins can also vary tremendously. In addition, it is evident from the appearance of these coins that the Mamluks utilized at least two methods for the preparation of blank silver flans to be struck by the coin dies. The first produced blank flans that yielded round coins after striking. The second evidently produced blank flans from cutting strips of silver. (It is clear that the cutting took place prior to striking.) The coins produced from these cut flans are immediately rec-

³⁵ This would seem to be the usage in the following passage from Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-Durar*, vol. VIII, Ulrich Haarmann (ed.), Cairo, 1971, 305, which describes a large confiscation that took place in 689–1290. He wrote that 170 Egyptian *qintārs* of *dirham nuqra* were seized. The value of this amount can be calculated easily, at 100 *ratls* to the *qintār*, and 144 *dirhams* to the *ratl*, the result is 2,448,000 *dirhams*’ worth of silver.

³⁶ Rabie, *Financial System*, 188, note 3; Goitein, “Exchange Rates,” 42–43.

ognizable by their near-rectangular shape. While usually smaller in diameter than the round-flan *dirhams*, they are often thicker, but other than that, few conclusions are possible. Coins of either type are not consistently lighter or heavier, but exhibit the same wide variance in weight. They are found co-mingled in hoards. Nor was there any apparent difference in silver content. Examples have also been identified where the same dies were used on flans of both types.³⁷ While it is unknown why these two production methods were utilized, it is extremely unlikely that they represent any attempt at denominational differentiation.

This leads to a final repercussion of the circulation of these *dirhams* by weight. Just as these coins were not minted to a precise *dirham*-weight standard, neither were they minted to half- or quarter-*dirham* units as well. Such labels have meaning only in terms of the money of account, and not for the coins themselves, nor do these terms appear in any coin legends from the period under consideration. As the tables discussed above clearly indicate, the weight of Mamluk silver coins can vary from less than one to more than six grams. There are no clearly demarcated peaks to indicate the difference between a quarter-*dirham* and a half-*dirham*, or for that matter a third-*dirham*. The most precise label that could be applied to these coins is fractional, as their value was determined by their weight.

Therefore terms such as “half-*dirham*” should be used very carefully in discussions of these Mamluk silver money. They should be used only when discussing amounts in terms of the money of account. And, as Figure 6 indicates, it is not accurate to use such labels for those Mamluk silver coins struck with special smaller dies.³⁸ These coins exist from the reigns of Baybars and his son Berke Khān.³⁹ Figure 6 plots the weights of 58 such coins minted in Cairo. The weights of these specimens vary from less than one gram to more than two. Despite the special smaller dies, this sample was struck

³⁷ I have benefited from conversations with Stephen Heidemann on this topic.

³⁸ The terms may be used for the second period of Mamluk coinage, during which terms such as “half” and “quarter” were actually incorporated into the coin legend. This is yet another way in which these later *dirhams* differ from the coins under consideration here.

³⁹ These coins were struck in Cairo and Damascus, Balog, *CMSES*, 91–3, 98, 108. While many of the surviving specimens are technically “mint-missing” or “mint off flan,” they can be attributed to either mint on stylistic grounds.




Figure 6. Cairo. Fractional *Dirhams* Struck with Smaller Dies (58 coins).

with the same metrological imprecision seen in the *dirhams* struck with larger dies. Thus they too can only be regarded as small-change fractionals, and not possessing any denominational consistency.

Currency, "This coin is also current . . . in Amon . . ."

When Eshtor Ha-Farhi wrote that silver coin in use "in the land of Israel" was also current at the "same rate in Amon and Moab, Sihon and Og, in Syria and the land of Egypt," his meaning is clear despite the use of Biblical place names. He was asserting that Mamluk *dirhams* circulated throughout the Mamluk domains. Significantly, he made no mention of the mint of origin of these *dirhams*, an omission that raises the possibility that mint of origin played little role in how Mamluk *dirhams* circulated. This possibility is further supported by the numismatic evidence. Not only have the few modern metallurgical studies shown no differences in alloy between the various Mamluk

mints, the available hoard evidence also provides abundant proof that mint of origin did not affect the value or circulation of Mamluk *dirhams* of the period studied.

Table 1 provides a summary description of sixteen hoards of Mamluk *dirhams*. The table is not exhaustive but it does reveal three important observations. The first is that regardless of mint of origin, *dirhams* circulated throughout the sultanate. All but one of the hoards listed, regardless of provenance, contain *dirhams* from multiple mints. There is nothing to indicate that coins of Ḥamāt, for example, were not accepted in Damascus or Cairo. Secondly, the hoards clearly indicate that coins remained current long after their date of issuance. It is not at all uncommon to encounter the coins of a particular sultan in hoards with terminal dates decades after his reign. The objection might be made that hoards containing such widely dated coins might represent the bullion troves of jewelers and silversmiths, if it were not for the fact that such wide chronological dispersions are the norm and not the exception for Mamluk hoards. Thirdly, it is also the norm to find *dirhams* that are either partially or even completely effaced in such hoards. While such coins cannot always be linked to a sultan or a mint, their presence in the hoard is proof that they still had value, and that their anonymity did not affect their currency. (Hoard number 11 is especially noteworthy in this respect, as fully a quarter of the trove, or 545 out of 2244 coins cannot be linked to a specific sultan.) Leaving aside the wider issues of literacy of the money-using population and whether they would have been cognizant of the minute differences catalogued by modern numismatists, these effaced coins suggest that it did not matter where or when the Mamluk *dirham* originated as long as it had the acceptable two-thirds silver content. This is further evidence that the primary determinant of value for Mamluk *dirhams* was their bullion content.

Table 1. 16 Mamluk Silver Hoards

1. Bedoukian, "Some Armenian Coins Overstruck in Arabic," <i>Armeniaca, Melanges d'Études Armeniennes</i> , Venice, 1969, 138–47.	
Number of coins,*	21
Description,	4 Mamluk, 17 Armenian
Terminal Date,	1374 (by the Armenian coins)
Sultans,	al-Šāliḥ Ismāʿīl, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad
Mints,	Ḥamāt, MM

Table 1 (*cont.*)

2. Hoard no. 231. <i>Coin Hoards</i> 4 (1978), 71.	
Number of coins,	74
Description,	39 Ayyubid, 28 Mamluk
Terminal Date,	658/1259
Sultans,	al-Mu'izz Aybak, al-Manşur 'Alī
Mints,	Cairo, Damascus, Aleppo
3. Hoard no. 2. Balog, "Three Hoards of Mamluk Coins," <i>ANSMN</i> 16 (1970), 173–78.	
Number of coins,	367
Description,	2 Ayyubid, 355 Mamluk, 10 Ilkhanid, 1 Armenian
Terminal Date,	741/1340
Sultans,	al-Mu'izz Aybak to al-Nāşir Muḥammad
Mints,	Cairo, Damascus, Ḥamāt, MM
4. Hoard no. 3. Balog, "Three Hoards of Mamluk Coins," <i>ANSMN</i> 16 (1970), 173–78.	
Number of coins,	30
Description,	30 Mamluk
Terminal Date,	801/1399
Sultans,	al-Nāşir Muḥammad to al-Zāhir Barqūq
Mints,	Cairo, Damascus, Tripoli, Ḥamāt, Aleppo
5. Mitchell, "Notes on Some Mamluk <i>Dirhams</i> ," <i>ANSMN</i> 16 (1970), 179–84.	
Number of coins,	17
Description,	17 Mamluk
Terminal Date,	748/1347
Sultans,	al-Zāhir Baybars to al-Muẓaffar Ḥajjī
Mints,	Cairo, Damascus, Ḥamāt, Aleppo, MM
6. Miles, "A Mamluk Hoard of Ḥamāt," <i>ANSMN</i> 11 (1964), 307–9.	
Number of coins,	305
Description,	305 Mamluk
Terminal Date,	689/1290
Sultans,	al-Manşur Qalāwūn
Mints,	Ḥamāt
7. Rahmani and Baer, "A Fourteenth Century Hoard from Tiberius," <i>INJ</i> 2 (1964), 47–55.	
Number of coins,	116
Description,	90 Mamluk, 23 Venetian, 3 Armenian
Terminal Date,	741/1340

Table 1 (*cont.*)

Sultans, Mints,	al-Mansūr ‘Alī to al-Nāṣir Muḥammad Cairo, Damascus, Ḥamāt, Aleppo, MM
8. Kfar Vitkin Hoard. Porath, <i>Hadashot Arkheologiyot</i> (January, 1980).	
Number of coins,	28
Description,	26 Mamluk, 2 Venetian
Terminal Date,	c. 1400 (from the Venetian coins)
Sultans,	Not identified, coins are extremely worn
Mints,	Not identified
9. Mayer, “A Hoard of Mamluk Coins,” <i>QDAP</i> 3 (1933), 161–67.	
Number of coins,	406
Description,	Ayyubid, Mamluk, and “effaced.”
Terminal Date,	815/1412
Sultans,	al-Manṣūr ‘Alī to al-Nāṣir Faraj
Mints,	Cairo, Damascus, Ḥamāt, Aleppo, MM
10. The Broach Hoard. Codrington, “On a hoard of coins found at Broach,” <i>JBBRAS</i> 15 (1882–83), 339–70.	
Number of coins,	approximately 1200
Description,	approximately 1000 Mamluk, some Armenian, a few Rasulid, others
Terminal Date,	1382
Sultans,	Most are from reign of al-Ashraf Sha‘bān
Mints,	“Egyptian and Syrian”
11. The Karak Hoard. Sari, “A Critical Analysis of a Mamluk Hoard from Karak,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1986.	
Number of coins,	2244
Description,	2244 Mamluk
Terminal Date,	696/1297
Sultans,	al-Muzaffar Quṭuz to al-‘Ādil Kitbughā, with 545 unidentifiable
Mints,	Cairo, Damascus, Ḥamāt, Alexandria
12. Hoard no. 1, unpublished. In the collection of the Forschungsstelle für islamische Numismatik, Tübingen.	
Number of coins,	276
Description,	251 Mamluk, 24 Artukid, 9 Armenian, 1 Venetian
Terminal Date,	801/1399
Sultans,	al-Zāhir Baybars to al-Zāhir Barqūq
Mints,	Cairo, Damascus, Ḥamāt, Aleppo, al-Lādhiqiyya, MM

Table 1 (*cont.*)

13. Mamluk Hoard AH 804, unpublished. Information courtesy of Stephen Album.	
Number of coins,	2301
Description,	2261 Mamluk, 23 Armenian, 9 Artukid, "assorted miscellaneous"
Terminal Date,	804/1402
Sultans,	al-Muẓaffar Quṭuz to al-Nāṣir Faraj
Mints,	Cairo, Damascus, Ḥamāt, Aleppo, Tripoli, Malatya, al-Lādhīqiya
14. Hoard, coins no. 220–366. Ploug et al., <i>Hama, Fouilles et Recherches 1931–38</i> , vol. IV, <i>Les petits objets médiévaux sauf les verreries et poteries</i> . Copenhagen, 1969.	
Number of coins,	139
Description,	122 Mamluk, 27 Venetian
Terminal Date,	815/1412
Sultans,	al-Nāṣir Muḥammad to al-Nāṣir Faraj
Mints,	Ḥamāt, Aleppo, MM
15. Hoard, coins no. 477–538. Ploug et al., <i>Hama, Fouilles et Recherches 1931–38</i> , vol. IV, <i>Les petits objets médiévaux sauf les verreries et poteries</i> . Copenhagen, 1969.	
Number of coins,	62, plus 84 uncatalogued and unidentified Mamluk <i>dirhams</i>
Description,	42 Mamluk, 18 Venetian, 1 Armenian, 1 Timurid
Terminal Date,	801/1399
Sultans,	al-Zāhir Baybars to al-Zāhir Barqūq
Mints,	Damascus, Ḥamāt, Aleppo
16. Hoard, coins no. 377–401. Ploug et al., <i>Hama, Fouilles et Recherches 1931–38</i> , vol. IV, <i>Les petits objets médiévaux sauf les verreries et poteries</i> . Copenhagen, 1969.	
Number of coins,	25, plus 25 uncatalogued and unidentified Mamluk <i>dirhams</i>
Description,	23 Mamluk, 2 Armenian
Terminal Date,	784–1382
Sultans,	al-Zāhir Baybars to al-Šāliḥ Ḥajjī
Mints,	Cairo, Damascus, Aleppo

* Refers to number of silver coins only.

In such a system, therefore, it is not surprising that silver coins from neighboring states are commonly found in Mamluk hoards. I interpret their presence in these hoards not as a sign of a foreign victory in a battlefield of money, but as a recognition by the hoarder that once again, what determined the value of these coins was their bullion content. Silver was silver, after all, regardless of country of origin. That this was the case is most clearly indicated by the case of the Armenian silver coins found in half of the hoards listed above. These coins became common in the Mamluk sultanate in the first half of the eighth/fourteenth century courtesy of the large annual tributes paid by the rulers of Cilician Armenia.⁴⁰ They were frequently released into circulation right away, sometimes with Mamluk overstrikes, but often not. Their presence has often been interpreted as evidence of a silver shortage in the Mamluk domains, although that interpretation is not endorsed here.⁴¹

Nevertheless, the numismatic evidence proves that these coins circulated alongside Mamluk *dirhams*. Figure 7 plots the weights of 70 such Armenian silver coins, all of which either bear a Mamluk overstrike or were found in Mamluk contexts (hoards or archeological sites). The table clearly shows that these Armenian coins did not adhere to any known Mamluk metrological system. The peak weight interval of 2.10 to 2.19 grams, followed closely by the 2.20 to 2.29 range, is less than what was seen in the Mamluk tables above. Neither of these ranges is close to a possible range of value for the Mamluk *dirham* weight unit. Yet this did not affect the way these coins circulated in the marketplace for we may assume that they too circulated by weight and not by tale.

The key to this assumption is the fact that these fourteenth-century silver coins from Cilician Armenia were also two-thirds silver. This is known from contemporary Venetian sources.⁴² Venetian merchants called these two-thirds silver coins *taccolino* to distinguish them from the earlier Armenian coin of higher silver content known as

⁴⁰ Balog, *CMSES*, 146–47; Paul Z. Bedoukian, “Some Armenian Coins Overstruck in Arabic,” *Armeniaca* (1969), 138–47.

⁴¹ Balog, *CMSES*, 146–47; Cf. Eliyahu Ashtor, “Etudes sur le System monetaire des Mamluks circassiens,” *Israel Oriental Studies*, vol. VI (1976), 264–87, esp. 273–74.

⁴² Alan Stahl, “Italian Sources for the Coinage of Cilician Armenia,” *Armenian Numismatic Journal*, vol. XV (1989), 59–66. Cf. Bacharach, “Monetary Movements,” 178.




Figure 7. Armenian Trams found in Mamluk Contexts (70 coins).

the *tram*. The Armenian name for the two-thirds silver coin was apparently *takvorin*. They began to be minted around the beginning of the fourteenth century, or shortly before the massive tributes paid to the Mamluks. It is thus no wonder that they are frequently found in Mamluk contexts, for their fineness and weight-variance would have made them no different from any fractional Mamluk silver coins of that era.

The question of silver scarcity

While the passage from Eshtor Ha-Farhi does not address it, ultimately those interested in the history of Mamluk silver money must confront the topic of silver scarcity. Not only do the major numismatic collections frequently lack large numbers of Mamluk *dirhams*, but there are also passages in contemporary chronicles that refer to shortages of silver. The existence of a silver shortage is thus frequently encountered in modern discussions of Mamluk money.

But is this picture of silver scarcity completely accurate? Two objections must be raised. The first is that modern collections often do not reflect ancient reality as many scholars have stated. The choices made about what to include in a collection often tell us more about the collector than the objects collected.⁴³ Secondly, it must be pointed out that the Mamluk literary sources provide contradictory information on this matter. Throughout the accounts of the eighth/fourteenth century, for example, we frequently read of the huge amounts of silver money mulcted from imprisoned officials or confiscated from the estates of the deceased.⁴⁴ The amir Maḥmūd b. ‘Alī, for example, is said to have been mulcted of over one million *dirhams* shortly before his death in 799/1397.⁴⁵ Yet this event occurred after the date al-Maqrīzī asserted that silver *dirhams* had disappeared from Egypt.⁴⁶

I believe that an accurate assessment of this matter falls between simplistic assumptions of either silver shortage or silver abundance. It must be remembered that coin scarcity *in the marketplace* can result from more than bullion shortages.⁴⁷ Silver could be used for things other than coins. But given the frequency with which personal treasuries are said to have contained large sums of *dirhams*, the greatest drain on silver from the marketplace in this period may have been thesaurization. It seems that those who held large amounts of silver chose not to advertise that fact by investing the money—and therefore risk confiscation should their status change—but rather hoarded it.⁴⁸ It is thus possible that increased hoarding contributed to the alleged scarcity of silver in the marketplace. In effect, the coins were there, but they were not all in circulation.

⁴³ It is safe to assert, for example, that the nondescript appearance of Mamluk *dirhams* does not engender widespread collector appeal.

⁴⁴ In addition, in his *Les Metaux précieux et la balance des paiements du proche-orient a la basse époque*, Paris, 1971, Ashtor highlighted the large sums of money frequently given to leading amirs, 38.

⁴⁵ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *Nujūm* (Popper translation), vol. XIII, 201–2. There are many such citations.

⁴⁶ Al-Maqrīzī, *Khiṭaṭ*, vol. I, 110.

⁴⁷ Cahen, “Monetary Circulation,” 20.

⁴⁸ Such hoarded coin would then be what Abraham Udovitch has called “unproductive money.” See his “Bankers Without Banks, Commerce, Banking and Society in the Islamic world of the Middle Ages.” *The Dawn of Modern Banking* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1979), 255–73.

Conclusion

It is worthwhile to compare this interpretation of the circulation of Bahri Mamluk silver *dirhams* to that of Paul Balog, who more than any other individual, laid the foundation for modern scholarship on Mamluk monetary history.

It has often been said of the Mamluks that their gold and silver coinage does not belong to any weight system. Each specimen of a Mamluk gold or silver coin was supposed to have an individual, irregular, weight, and whenever two coins were of the same weight it was considered a coincidence. We now know that this is untrue . . . Though the weight of the individual silver pieces was not very accurate, it was close enough to the *dirham*, and the adhesion to the *dirham* system is clearly recognizable in the coinage. Although there are considerable deviations from the theoretical weight of the *dirham*, the figures are mostly within reasonable limits.⁴⁹

Underlying this passage is the assumption that Mamluk *dirhams* passed by count. In light of the metrological evidence presented in part II of this paper, Balog's description of Mamluk silver must be rejected. The frequency tables clearly show that the most generous description that can be applied the weight of Mamluk *dirhams* is imprecise. In particular, his vague vocabulary cannot be defended. How close is "close enough" when talking about metrological standards and divisions? In graphs of samples where more than half of the coins weighed fall outside of intervals supposedly marking a full-*dirham*, a half-*dirham*, or a quarter-*dirham*, where are the limits between such distinctions drawn? If a coin of 1.70 grams is "close enough" to a half-*dirham*, what do you call a coin of 2.00 grams? Is it a heavy half-*dirham* or a lightweight full-*dirham*? It has been argued here that such coins are fractional *dirhams*, and that their value is determined only in comparison to the money of account. There is thus only one conclusion that fits the numismatic and literary data, Mamluk *dirhams* in the Bahri period circulated by weight and not by count.

⁴⁹ Balog, "II. Observations on the Metrology of the Mamluk Fals," *JNC* (7th ser.) vol. II (1962), 263.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE *MUḤTASIBS* OF CAIRO UNDER THE MAMLUKS:
TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF AN
ISLAMIC INSTITUTION

Jonathan P. Berkey

The *ḥisba*, noted Gaudefroy-Demombynes many years ago, represented in the classical Islamic period “une notion assez vague.”¹ Muslim tradition ultimately constructed an understanding of the *ḥisba* as a specifically Islamic institution, one tied to the familiar Qurānic injunction to “order what is good and forbid what is evil,” and the term *muḥtasib* derives from the verb *iḥtasaba*, which means “to seek God’s favor by acting righteously.” Of course reports attributing its origin to an act of the pious caliph ‘Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb must be apocryphal.² But by the early ‘Abbasid period, at least, we have more reliable reports of individuals appointed to the office of the *muḥtasib*.³ It must have been relatively easy to find religious inspiration for the office. The Qurānic duty to “order what is good and forbid what is evil” is incumbent upon all Muslims, but it was also a duty which might, under certain circumstances, prove advantageous—that, at least, is the impression left by the complaint of a Jewish merchant from Alexandria from the mid-twelfth century. “Everyone in the city,” he said, “behaves as if he were a *muḥtasib* set over us.”⁴ By virtue of his appointment, however, the *muḥtasib*

¹ M. Gaudefroy-Demombynes, “Sur quelques ouvrages de ḥisba,” *Journal Asiatique* 230 (1938), 449–50.

² For example, Aḥmad b. ‘Alī al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-a’shā fi sinā‘at al-inshā’*, in 14 vols. (Cairo, 1964), vol. V, 452.

³ R.P. Buckley, “Introduction,” in ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. Naṣr al-Shayzarī, *The Book of the Islamic Market Inspector* (Oxford, 1999), 5; *idem*, “The Muḥtasib,” *Arabica*, vol. XXXIX (1992), 59–117, esp. 65–7.

⁴ S.D. Goitein, *A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the Arab World as Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza*, vol. 2: *The Community* (Berkeley, 1971), 369.

assumed a personal obligation for enforcing the *ḥisba* within the Muslim community.⁵

On the other hand, it has also been customary to search for the origins of the office in the Greek *agoranomos* or “market inspector.” Although this view has recently been criticized,⁶ it has a long history in Western scholarship: the Latin “*argumentum*” to the nineteenth-century edition of Ṭabari’s history renders the term *muḥtasib* as *agoranomos*.⁷ The approach of Emile Tyan, in his study of the administration of Islamic law, is typical of the older view in Western scholarship. Strip the office of the “porté exorbitante” with which, in view of its perceived religious foundations, doctrine invested it, and “the *ḥisba* appears as an administrative, municipal institution having, for its principal object, the supervision of markets and morals.”⁸ Others have been willing to associate the office of *muḥtasib* even more exclusively with the *sūq*, translating the term, for example, as “inspector of weights and measures.”⁹ The effect of these arguments is to bring the *muḥtasib* functionally within the sphere of the officials who supervised and regulated activities in the markets of the Hellenized Near East in Late Antiquity, whether we apply to them the term *agoranomos* or another.¹⁰

Nor is this manoeuvre entirely misleading. It may be, as Benjamin Foster argued, that it is “probably inaccurate” to assert that the *ḥisba* “derived” directly from the *agoronomia*, in part because it seems that there is no evidence that the Greek term *agoranomos* was in use, at least in Syria, in the centuries immediately preceding the Arab conquests.¹¹ But late Roman cities did nonetheless have officials who regulated affairs in the markets, even if they were known by other terms, and it is quite likely that the Muslim officer who came even-

⁵ Ibn Khaldūn, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, *The Muqaddimah*, trans. Franz Rosenthal in 3 volumes, 2nd edition (Princeton, 1980), vol. I, 462–3.

⁶ Benjamin R. Foster, “Agoranomos and Muhtasib,” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, vol. XIII (1970), 128–44.

⁷ H.F. Amedroz, “The Ḥisba Jurisdiction in the Aḥkām Sulṭāniyya of Māwardī,” *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1916), 288.

⁸ Emile Tyan, *Histoire de l’organisation judiciaire en pays de l’Islam* (Leiden, 1960), 622.

⁹ David W. Myhrman, “Introduction,” in Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī, *Muʿīd al-niʿam wa-mubīd al-niḡam*, ed. David W. Myhrman (London, 1908), 45.

¹⁰ See Foster, “Hisba Jurisdiction,” 135 et *passim* for a discussion of the various terminology which was applied to the Greek “market inspector.”

¹¹ Foster, “Agoranomos and Muhtasib,” 145 et *passim*.

tually to be known as the *muhtasib* exercised in some fashion the responsibilities of his pre-Islamic predecessors.¹² Moreover, there is some evidence for individuals who were appointed by the very earliest Muslim leaders to supervise the affairs of the markets, in Mecca, Medina, and elsewhere, individuals who were identified by the less ambiguous term *ṣāhib al-sūq* (alternatively, *ʿāmil al-sūq*).¹³ Moreover, as the *ḥisba* manuals and, as we shall see, the evidence of the medieval chronicles show, the focus of a *muhtasib*'s attention did indeed lie in the activities of the *sūq*, broadly conceived as "all those things that constitute the entirety of social life," as Ibn ʿAbdūn's treatise on the *ḥisba* phrased it.¹⁴ In Spain the *muhtasib* lacked much of the religious orientation as a guardian of morals with which, at least theoretically, he was imbued in the central Islamic lands, and there the term *ṣāhib al-sūq* remained the more common, perhaps because, under the Umayyads who fled to the west in the eighth century, the office retained its purely secular original character.¹⁵ Indeed, the very nature of the *muhtasib*'s jurisdiction, even as defined by religious scholars such as al-Ghazālī, al-Māwardī, and others, served to fill a gap left by Islamic jurisprudence, a gap which was felt most deeply in the urban markets. Ibn Taymiyya acknowledged as much when he described the *muhtasib*'s jurisdiction as embracing "those spheres not reserved to the governors, the judges, the administrative officers [*ahl al-dīwān*]." ¹⁶ Several writers emphasized that the *muhtasib*, *qua muhtasib*, had no authority to exercise *ijtihād* in matters concerning the *Shariʿa*.¹⁷ But as they left much scope for "custom" in the law of sales, so the *fuqahāʾ* left the *muhtasib* with a weapon far more significant in the context of the market, namely, the right to interpret custom, *ijtihād al-ʿurf*. Al-Māwardī defined the competence of the *muhtasib*: "He may exercise independent reasoning [*ijtihād*] in matters pertaining to

¹² Patricia Crone, *Roman, Provincial, and Islamic Law: The Origins of the Islamic Patronate* (Cambridge, 1987), 107–8.

¹³ Buckley, "The Muhtasib," 59–62.

¹⁴ ʿAbd al-Majīd Ibn ʿAbdūn, *Seville musulmane au debut du xii^e siècle*, trans. E. Lévi-Provençal (Paris, 1947), 45.

¹⁵ Tyan, *Histoire*, 621, note 1; M. Gaudefroy-Demombynes, "Un magistrat musulman: le muhtasib," *Journal des savants* (1947), 33–34; R.P. Buckley, "Introduction," 8.

¹⁶ Ibn Taymiyya, ʿAbd al-Salām, *al-Ḥisba fī ʿl-Islām* (Cairo, 1318 A.H.), 9.

¹⁷ Al-Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad, *Ihyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn*, in 5 vols. (Cairo, 1967), vol. II, 414; *idem*, *L'Obligation d'ordonner le bien et d'interdire le mal*, trans. Léon Bercher (Tunis, 1961), 38f.

custom, and not law, as, for example, rules of the marketplace.”¹⁸ This judgment was not lost on those closer to the *ḥisba* as practiced in the Mamluk state; Ibn al-Ukhuwwa’s *ḥisba* manual *Maʿālim al-qurba* reproduces al-Māwardī’s comment to the letter.¹⁹

Despite its religious veneer, the institution as it developed acquired more and more of what Emile Tyan described as a “praetorian power.”²⁰ By assigning to the *muḥtasib* the right to interpret, invalidate or enforce custom, while denying to him *ijtihād* proper, the *fuqahāʾ* had already, in a sense, removed him from the confines of the *Shariʿa*. In theory, this restricted a *muḥtasib* as much as it released him. Al-Māwardī, for instance, wrote that a *muḥtasib* might prevent the over-burdening of pack animals on his own initiative, because this is not an interpretation of law but an “interpretation of custom which derives from the custom of the people and their practices;”²¹ he could only prevent the over-burdening of a slave, however, if the slave himself complained. The *muḥtasib*, too, was granted the authority to inflict discretionary punishments (*taʿzīr*); the legal punishments (*ḥudūd*), however, were outside the limits of his competence.²² In practice, we may question the consistency and effectiveness of these restrictions. Certainly, as we will see below, the punishments inflicted by a *muḥtasib* could prove very severe indeed. By the fourteenth century, Ibn Khaldūn perceived that the *muḥtasib*’s principal objective lay in ensuring “that people act in accord with the public interest in the town.”²³ That is a wide mandate; and in a world in which the *muḥtasib* was responsible only to political authority, “public interest” itself might have a very unstable character. It was public interest which, according to Ibn Taymiyya, justified the *muḥtasib* in fixing the prices of foodstuffs in the market, in times of dire need.²⁴ As we shall see, this became one of the *muḥtasib*’s principal functions. But the association with the vague concept of “public interest” also pushed the *muḥtasib* further beyond the bounds of the *Shariʿa*: a true *Ḥadīth*,

¹⁸ Al-Māwardī, Abū al-Ḥaṣan, *al-Aḥkām al-sultāniyya* (Cairo, 1966), 240.

¹⁹ Ibn al-Ukhuwwa, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad, *Maʿālim al-qurba fī aḥkām al-ḥisba*, ed. Reuben Levy (London, 1938), 11.

²⁰ Tyan, *Histoire*, 648.

²¹ Al-Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām al-sultāniyya*, 257.

²² Ibn Taymiyya, *al-Ḥisba*, 38–9; al-Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām al-sultāniyya*, 240.

²³ Ibn Khaldūn, *Muqaddimah*, vol. I, 463.

²⁴ Ibn Taymiyya, *al-Ḥisba*, 15–16.

Ibn al-Ukhuwwa declared, grants the *muhtasib* the prerogative to use threats not permitted in the law, on the basis solely of his own suspicion, if public necessity demands it.²⁵

At the same time, we must acknowledge that medieval writers regularly described the post as a “religious position.”²⁶ This is most evident in the writers’ discussions of the qualities required of the *muhtasib*,²⁷ which, in varying formulae, demand of him faith (*īmān*), legal competence (*taklīf*), and a sense of justice (*‘adāla*). The high standards were retained by writers of the Mamluk period, even one with as practical a bent as al-Qalqashandī, who wrote of the ideal *muhtasib*: “His attributes are erudition and virtue and integrity, firmness of determination, and strength of will, and rigor, and great dignity, for encouraging the ordering of the good and the forbidding of evil, and caring for the improvement of the Muslims.”²⁸ Whether or not the *muhtasib* was to be *mujtahid* in matters of the *Sharī‘a*, it is clear that ideally he was to have some understanding of the law,²⁹ so that he might know exactly what to order and what to forbid. On the other hand, such ideals did not have the same force as, say, the informal but nonetheless generally compelling system by which religio-legal scholars were trained and evaluated and which, therefore, provided some effective standards for those appointed to professorships or judge-ships. In comparison to that of a *qāḍī* or a *mudarris*, the office of the *muhtasib* was considerably less “professionalized.”

It is not my purpose here to explore in detail the *ḥisba* as it developed in the writings of the jurists; rather, my concern is to investigate the character of the office and the activities of its holders in Egypt between 1260 and 1517 C.E. Practical manuals for the *muhtasib*, such as that of Ibn al-Ukhuwwa or the fourteenth-century Egyptian

²⁵ Ibn al-Ukhuwwa, *Ma‘ālim al-qurba*, 219, English summary, 88.

²⁶ Al-Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām al-sultāniyya*, 258–9; Ibn Khaldūn, *Muqaddimah*, vol. I, 462; Ibn al-Ukhuwwa, *Ma‘ālim al-qurba*, 7, English summary, 4; Buckley, “Introduction,” 2. For a survey of the medieval sources which discussed the *ḥisba*, including the practical manuals for the *muhtasib*, see *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (2nd edition), art. “HISBA” (by Cl. Cahen and M. Tarbi).

²⁷ See, for example, al-Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām al-sultāniyya*, 241; al-Nuwayrī, *Nihayat al-arab fī funūn al-adab* (Cairo, 1928–), vol. VI, 291; al-Ghazālī, *Ihyā’*, vol. II, 398–414, *L’Obligation*, 13–38.

²⁸ Al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ*, vol. XI, 89; al-Maqrīzī, Aḥmad b. ‘Alī, *Kitāb al-Mawā‘iz wa’l-‘tibār fī dhikr al-khiṭaṭ wa’l-āthār*, vol. II, 342.

²⁹ Ibn al-Ukhuwwa, *Ma‘ālim al-qurba*, 8; al-Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām al-sultāniyya*, 241.

writer Ibn Bassām,³⁰ provide a sort of bench mark for the contemporary understanding of the *muhtasib* and his responsibilities. But this study is essentially a prosopographic one; moreover, its scope is fairly broad. Rather than investigating any one *muhtasib* in depth, the goal is to see whether there is sufficient evidence in the chronicles and biographical dictionaries of the period to chart in broad outline the evolution of the office over the entire two and a half centuries of Mamluk rule.

My starting point is this: that the Mamluk *muhtasib* was heir to the tensions which reflected the office's dual roots in a Quranic injunction and the custom of the market. Gaudefroy-Demombynes noted in 1947 that the *muhtasib*'s responsibilities broke down naturally into two categories, first, matters regarding the *sūq*, its industry and commerce, and second, those with a more specifically "religious" character, such as the observance of prayer and fasting, and forbidding the sale and consumption of wine. The two charges—to encourage commerce and industry, and to enforce the Islamic moral code—gave the *muhtasib* a somewhat schizophrenic character: "Il est probable," Gaudefroy-Demombynes wrote, "que l'agoranome ne se sent pas toujours à l'aise dans la peau du parfait mohtasib."³¹ To be sure, we might object to Gaudefroy-Demombyne's characterization of the office, and insist that any distinction between commercial concerns and ethical/legal/religious ones is somewhat arbitrary, especially in the Islamic case. On the other hand, from a more general perspective, Gaudefroy-Demombynes may have had a point. Should a blurred dividing line obscure the almost palpable difference in tone and purpose between, say, enforcing the Muslim obligation to pray on the one hand, and on the other ensuring that sufficient wheat was available for purchase at a particular price? If we see the two constructs, not as absolute models of behavior, but as poles of a spectrum of activities associated at different times with the office of the *muhtasib* because of its complex roots, can the ensuing tension between them help us to understand the evolving character of the office as it was actually practiced in the Mamluk state? Given the

³⁰ Ibn Bassām, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad, *Nihayāt al-rutba fī ṭalab al-ḥisba*, Baghdad, 1968.

³¹ Gaudefroy-Demombynes, "Un magistrat musulman," 39–40; cf. Buckley "Introduction," 8–10; idem, "The Muhtasib," 81f.

potential breadth of the *muḥtasib*'s power—guided by his own *ijtihād al-ʿurf*, or the more nebulous concept of “public interest”—it was perhaps inevitable that his ethical duties should be eclipsed by an increasing preoccupation with the marketplace. But the tension was never entirely resolved, and, combined with a growing pattern of patronage, corruption, and cooptation by the political powers, contributed to the complex development of the *ḥisba* in Mamluk Egypt.

The Ḥisba as an institution

By the Mamluk period, if not before,³² the *ḥisba* had acquired a precise administrative structure. The chief *muḥtasib* had his seat in Cairo, from which he was responsible also for the district of Lower Egypt, to the exclusion of Alexandria, which had its own *muḥtasib*. Another *muḥtasib*, sitting in Fustat, was charged with the supervision of Upper Egypt, as well as his base city. (The cities of the Syrian provinces, too, had their own *muḥtasibs*).³³ Obviously the responsibilities were too great for any one man; accordingly, each *muḥtasib* assigned agents or deputies, who assisted him in his regulatory and administrative duties.³⁴ Contemporary writers—for example, al-Qalqashandī, Ibn Khaldūn, and Ibn al-Ukhuwwa—agreed with their predecessors in seeing the *ḥisba* as a “religious office” (*wazāʾifa dīnīyya*). As al-Maqrīzī explained, the *muḥtasibs* of Cairo and Fustat would sit in the principal mosques of the two cities, al-Azhar and ʿAmr respectively, to hear complaints and administer their judgments.³⁵

It is almost a commonplace to speak of a degeneration—political, social, and economic—in late Mamluk Egypt, a process linked to endemic power struggles among the *amīrs* and the resulting patterns of patronage, bribery, and extortion. Of course the notion of “decline” is psychologically seductive, and Carl Petry has now given us a far

³² Evidence for the Fatimid period is of course scantier; it seems, however, that under the Fatimids, the post of *muḥtasib* was periodically attached to that of the *shurṭa*. Al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ*, vol. 4, 452.

³³ *Ibid.*, vol. 4, 37.

³⁴ Ira Lapidus, *Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 277.

³⁵ Al-Maqrīzī, *Khīṭat*, vol. I, 463; see also Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Rāziq, “Le *Ḥisba* et le *Muḥtatsib* en Égypte au temps des Mamluks,” *Annales islamologiques*, vol. XIII (1977), 121, note 2.

more nuanced understanding of the period.³⁶ Still, the Mamluk state was certainly subject to extraordinary and ultimately crippling pressures. The *muhtasib* was no better insulated than any other official; he, too, was affected by the chaos. Aḥmad Darrag has described how, in the fifteenth century, the feuding Mamluks increasingly secured the office for their own proteges and, ultimately, themselves, and the destructive economic role played by these self-serving, military-minded *muhtasibs*.³⁷

To speak simply of the degeneration of the official and his functions, however, does not do justice to the gradual, but hardly subtle transformation of the office, a transformation in the *muhtasib*'s activities, his relation to the state, and his perception in the popular mind—a transformation reflected in the unconscious witness of the chronicles. The transformation was part of a longer-term process of political evolution, one which picked up speed in the later Mamluk period. Ibn Khaldūn, in the *Muqaddima*, had already noted how “in many Muslim dynasties, such as the dynasties of the ‘Ubaydid (-Fatimids) in Egypt and the Maghrib and that of the Umayyads in Spain, (the office of market supervisor) fell under the general jurisdiction of the judge, who could appoint anyone to the office at discretion. Then, when the position of ruler became separated from the caliphate and when (the ruler) took general charge of all political matters, the office of market supervisor became one of the royal positions and a separate office.”³⁸ Nonetheless, as we have seen, writers of the Mamluk period continued to see the *ḥisba* as a *wazīfa dīniyya*: the *muhtasib* might be appointed by the Sultan, but was thought of together with the *qādī al-quḍāt*, the *qādī al-‘askar*, and the *mufṭī dār al-‘adl*.³⁹ But by the time Ibn Taghrī Birdī wrote his chronicle in the mid-late fifteenth century, the popular conception of the *muhtasib* had changed. No longer did he list the position among others of a specifically religious character. Rather, in his periodic

³⁶ Carl F. Petry, *Protectors of Praetorians? The Last Mamluk Sultans and Egypt's Waning as a Great Power* (Albany, 1994).

³⁷ Aḥmad Darrag, “*al-Ḥisba wa-āthāruhā ‘alā al-Hayāt al-iqtisādiyya fī Miṣr al-Mamlūkiyya*,” *al-Majalla al-tārīkhīyya al-Miṣriyya*, vol. XIV (1968), 116 et *passim*, repeated in abbreviated form in Aḥmad Darrag, *L'Égypte sous le règne de Barsbay* (Damascus, 1961), 77f.

³⁸ Ibn Khaldūn, *Muqaddimah*, vol. I, 463.

³⁹ Al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ*, vol. IV, 37.

lists of those holding important offices, Ibn Taghrī Birdī grouped it with political and military appointees in a carefully graded list, just above the *wālī* of Cairo, and just below the *nāẓir al-jaysh*.

The Muḥtasibs and their careers

From the prosopographical data on the *muḥtasibs* of Cairo in the Mamluk period available in the contemporary chronicles and biographical dictionaries,⁴⁰ patterns in the appointments to the post of *muḥtasib* of Cairo emerge which reflect the transformation in the character and functions of the office. For the purposes of clarity, the entire two and one-half centuries should be subdivided into six successive periods of unequal duration, each of which marked a stage in the development of the *muḥtasib*'s character and responsibilities.

(1) From 658/1260 until approximately the end of the seventh/fourteenth century.⁴¹ Particularly in the earliest period, the records are incomplete.⁴² Nonetheless, some general conclusions can be drawn concerning the *muḥtasibs* of this period. In particular, the post was dominated by members of the 'ulamā'; Cairo's *muḥtasibs* in this period included some of its best known scholars and religious functionaries, such as the Shāfi'ī jurist Ibn Bint al-A'azz. This is not to say that every *muḥtasib* was an accomplished *faqīh*, but they were almost all 'ulamā', often serving as *qādīs* of the Mālikī, Ḥanafī, and especially Shāfi'ī schools. This does not imply that *muḥtasibs* in this period were uniformly pious, incorruptible men: the first *muḥtasib* who the chronicles specifically mention paid a certain (unknown) sum for the post was a former *qādī* appointed in 793/1391.⁴³ Still, the dominant image of these men is one of scholarship and training in the law: a

⁴⁰ A convenient starting point for research into Mamluk-era *muḥtasibs* can be found in the lists supplied by 'Abd al-Rāziq in "La ḥisba," 115–78, and *idem*, "Les muḥtasibs de Foṣṭaṭ au temps des mamluks," *Annales islamologiques*, vol. 14 (1978), 127–46.

⁴¹ Numbers 1 to 37 in 'Abd al-Rāziq's list.

⁴² Cf. Linda Northrup, *From Slave to Sultan: The Career of al-Manṣūr Qalawun and the Consolidation of Mamluk Rule in Egypt and Syria (678–689 A.H./1279–1290 A.D.)* (Stuttgart, 1998), 237–8, who found little detail in the evidence of the chronicles and other sources for the period of Qalawun's reign.

⁴³ Al-Maqrīzī, Aḥmad b. 'Alī, *al-Sulūk li-ma'rifaṭ duwal al-mulūk* (Cairo, 1934–72), vol. III, 748, 872.

sizeable number, for example, at one point or another taught *fiqh* in the various schools and *madrasas* of Cairo. More importantly, the evidence suggests a consensus that the *ḥisba* was, indeed, a *wazīfa dīniyya*, one to be filled by men with a training in the *Shariʿa* and related disciplines.

(2) From approximately 798/1396 to 816/1413, i.e., shortly after the accession of al-Muʿayyad Shaykh.⁴⁴ The most striking feature of the *muḥtasibs* of this period is their short tenure: in these seventeen years, there were seventy-five appointments to the post (many of those appointed had held the position previously), indicating an average term of office of less than three months. More than one served for only a few days. The experience of Nūr al-Dīn al-Jīzī, who was removed from office after less than a month in 798/1396 because he was unable to pay the money for which he had been appointed,⁴⁵ suggests that the unstable character of *ḥisba* appointments may be related to the growing role of the post in the collection of revenue—or, more precisely, in the extortion of money from the *sūq*—which, as we shall see, became one of the *muḥtasib*'s principal functions. This period also witnessed a breakdown in the consensus for the appointment of *fuqahāʾ* to the *ḥisba*. Although men such as al-Maqrīzī and his rival Badr al-Dīn al-ʿAynī were appointed, it was not unusual to find as *muḥtasibs* men from outside the religio-legal establishment: a sugar-merchant,⁴⁶ a perfumer/druggist (an “ignoramus in the guise of a *faqīh*,” said al-Maqrīzī),⁴⁷ even one who had begun his career as a bath-house attendant.⁴⁸ The chroniclers, such as al-Maqrīzī, who was himself a *muḥtasib* on several occasions and who was, presumably, aware of the higher professional and moral standards which the position might demand, disparaged such appointees as “scoundrels,” “devoid of learning,” and “famous for abominable deeds of stupidity, shamelessness, and evil conduct.”⁴⁹ However, even a *qāḍī* appointed

⁴⁴ Numbers 38 to 111 in ʿAbd al-Rāziq’s list.

⁴⁵ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. III, 852.

⁴⁶ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 11.

⁴⁷ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 598.

⁴⁸ Ibn Ḥajar, Ahmad b. ʿAlī, al-ʿAsqalānī, *Inbāʾ al-ghumr bi-abnāʾ al-ʿumr*, in 9 vols. (Haydarabad, 1975), vol. VI, 83; al-Sakhāwī, Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Rahmān, *al-Dawʾ al-lāmiʿ li-ahl al-qam al-tāsiʿ* (Cairo, 1934), vol. X, 122.

⁴⁹ For example, al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 64; Ibn Ḥajar, *Inbāʾ al-ghumr*, vol. VI, 83; al-Sakhāwī, *al-Dawʾ al-lāmiʿ*, vol. VI, 83; Yūsuf Abū al-Mahāsīn, Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira fī taʾrikh Miṣr waʾl-Qāhira*, in 16 vols. (Cairo, 1929–72), vol. XIV, 165.

in 805/1403 and dismissed one month later was, in al-Maqrīzī's estimation, "without virtue."⁵⁰

(3) From approximately 816/1413 to 825/1422.⁵¹ In this period, coinciding with the relatively stable rule of al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh, we can perceive the beginnings of a radical transformation in the office—not necessarily a "decline," since the transformation may also be read as a tentative effort to reform the office and restore some of its authority, albeit in a different form. In the first place, the average tenure more than doubled, to over six months. A number of prominent scholars were appointed in this period, several of whom were simultaneously chief *qāḍīs*, a development which might suggest an effort to strengthen both the moral stature and practical authority of the office. On the other hand, for the first time, Mamluk amirs were themselves appointed *muhtasibs*. By and large, however, the chronicles comment favorably on the intelligence, training, and activities of those appointed to the *ḥisba* in this period, regardless of their background. Ṣadr al-Dīn b. al-ʿAjamī, whom we will encounter later as one who took the religious and ethical sides of the *ḥisba* especially seriously, was appointed *muhtasib* in 822/1419, and twice in 824/1421. The Arabic sources judge even the amirs who held the post in this period in a more favorable light: one had a deep interest in the religious sciences and is called a *faqīh*;⁵² another, although "tyrannical and unjust" (and nicknamed "*Shayṭān*"), was also "intelligent, skillful, shrewd, and of good morals as well as expert in administration."⁵³ In one case, al-Jawharī directly implies that an individual was appointed *muhtasib* with a mandate to reform the office, although he was unsuccessful in the attempt.⁵⁴ One month after his removal from office, the Sultan felt obliged to appoint himself *muhtasib* for a short period. The evidence suggests that above all, this was a period of transition. In it representatives of virtually all types held the post at one time or another: pious scholars, efficient amirs, *qāḍīs* appointed

⁵⁰ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 1235.

⁵¹ Numbers 112 to 130 in ʿAbd al-Rāziq's list.

⁵² Al-Sakhāwī, *al-Ḍawʿ al-lāmiʿ*, vol. X, 173. Al-Sakhāwī appreciated the firmness of Mankalī Bughā—as *muhtasib* he was, the historian said, especially hard on women.

⁵³ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 428; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira*, vol. XIV, 151; Ibn Ḥajar, *Inbāʿ al-ghumr*, vol. VII, 331.

⁵⁴ Al-Jawharī, ʿAlī b. Dāwud, *Nuzhat al-nufūs wa'l-abbān fī tawārīkh al-zamān* (Cairo, 1970–73), vol. II, 357.

through bribery, others who saw the office chiefly as a source of personal income. The repeated appointment of men such as Ibn al-‘Ajamī suggests that the *ḥisba* was still, in the minds of some, a *wazīfa dīniyya*. Such an opinion must have been considerably more difficult to justify later in the century.

(4) From 825/1422 to 841/1438, covering the reign of al-Ashraf Barsbāy.⁵⁵ This was an interlude of relative stability, in which only four appointments were made. The historian and scholar Badr al-Dīn al-‘Aynī, a favorite of the Sultan, was appointed twice. Another *muḥtasib* was a leading Mamluk amir, Īnāl al-Shashmānī, who held the office for more than four years.⁵⁶ The last individual to hold the post during this span of time, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ḥasan b. Naṣr Allāh, from a prominent bureaucratic family, had an interesting and successful career, which blurred the usual distinctions between professional streams, and during which he held several important financial and administrative offices; his six-year tenure as *muḥtasib* was cut short only by the plague.⁵⁷

(5) From 841/1438 until 910/1505.⁵⁸ This period, covering the bulk of the Circassian period, including the strong tenure of Qāyt Bāy, witnessed the triumph of the military establishment in securing appointments to the *ḥisba*. In terms of tenure it was a relatively stable period: the average term of office for a *muḥtasib* was over sixteen months, although there existed a wide variation among individual appointees. Religious or legal figures were eclipsed, however: few of those appointed to the post had any significant legal training. Of these, two were relatively short appointments of Badr al-Dīn al-‘Aynī at the beginning of the period. A third was a minor scholar who had become a companion and *Ḥadīth* reciter to Sultan Barsbāy, who appointed him at the end of his reign; when Barsbāy’s son was replaced by Jaqmaq, the *muḥtasib* quickly fell out of grace with the new sultan and was dismissed.⁵⁹ Most of the others who had some

⁵⁵ Numbers 131 to 134 in ‘Abd al-Rāziq’s list.

⁵⁶ al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 706; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Yūsuf Abū al-Mahāsīn, *al-Manḥal al-ṣāfi wa’l-mustawfi ba’da al-wāfi*, vol. III, 207–8.

⁵⁷ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 1063; Ibn Ḥajar, *Imbā’ al-ghumr*, vol. XIX, 25–6. Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira*, XV, 218–19, gently mocked Ibn Naṣr Allāh as “the amir—then the *qādī*.”

⁵⁸ Numbers 135 to 177 in ‘Abd al-Rāziq’s list.

⁵⁹ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Yūsuf Abū al-Mahāsīn, *Hawādīth al-duhūr fi madā al-ayyām*

training in the *Sharʿa* and the religious sciences, such as Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Makīnī (who was appointed *muḥtasib* for a payment of 3,000 *dīnārs*)⁶⁰ and Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr b. Muzhir,⁶¹ principally pursued bureaucratic rather than academic or religious careers. Others who were from outside the military establishment all were appointed through the patronage of powerful Mamluks, a development which, of course, marks the subordination of the post to political interests.⁶² But above all, *muḥtasibs* of this period were high-ranking amirs, or Mamluks on their way to that distinction. The contrast to the earliest period is stark; in fact, *fuqahāʿ* had lost control over the institution, and with their departure the activities of the *muḥtasibs* were—to say the least—“secularized.” It must have been increasingly difficult to conceptualize the *muḥtasib* as a religious official; as we have seen, Ibn Taghrī Birdī, who wrote his chronicle in this period, did not even try.

6) From 910/1505 until the capture of Cairo by the Ottoman armies in 923/1517.⁶³ This final decade is distinguished from the five which preceded it only by the dominance of one man, who held the post of *muḥtasib* for all but seven months of the period. The chronicles at several points refer to Zayn al-Dīn Barakāt b. Mūsā as a “*qādī*,” but this simply seems to reflect a certain looseness in the use of the title. Of apparently humble origins (his father was a Bedouin), he began his rise to the top as the “squire” (*rākīb*) of an amir, and was appointed—and for the most part held—the *ḥisba* of Cairo by becoming and remaining a close and (more or less) loyal companion of the Sultan (although he also developed an independent base of power, which contributed to a certain tension in his relationship with the sultan).⁶⁴ His activities as *muḥtasib* will be discussed more fully below; for the present it is enough to comment that, under his direction, the post of *muḥtasib* shed any religious vestiges, and was fully incorporated as an arm of the government, not

waʿl-shuhūr (University of California Publications in Semitic Philology, vol. VIII [1930]), 599; al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 1089; al-Sakhāwī, *al-Ḍawʿ al-lāmiʿ*, vol. V, 126–27.

⁶⁰ Al-Sakhāwī, *al-Ḍawʿ al-lāmiʿ*, vol. II, 99–101.

⁶¹ Al-Sakhāwī, *al-Ḍawʿ al-lāmiʿ*, vol. VIII, 197–98.

⁶² See, for example, al-Sakhāwī, *al-Ḍawʿ al-lāmiʿ*, vol. VI, 47–8 (ʿAlī b. Naṣr Allāh, known as ʿAlī al-Ṭawīl), and Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira*, vol. XVI, 190–91 (ʿAlī b. Muḥammad b. Aqbars).

⁶³ Numbers 178 to 184 in ʿAbd al-Rāziq’s list.

⁶⁴ Cf. Petry, *Protectors or Praetorians?*, 144–46.

only with responsibilities for the *sūq* at least conceivable within the original framework of the *ḥisba*, but also with functions of a strictly political, administrative nature.

The transformation in the character of the *ḥisba* may be approached from a slightly different angle: by comparing the career patterns of two *muḥtasibs* for whom we have comparatively more information. Jamāl al-Dīn Maḥmūd al-ʿAjamī, known as Abū al-Thanāʾ (d. 799/1397), a Ḥanafī *qāḍī*, had arrived in Cairo “in the prime of his youth, poor and penniless, and lived in the Sarghitmishiyya *madrasa* for a while in the service of the jurists.” After his legal training, he became a teacher to the Mamluks in the Citadel, and received his first appointment—to the *ḥisba*—in 778/1377. His appointment as *muḥtasib*, as Ibn Taghrī Birdī explained, was the beginning of his career, as it was for other men advancing through the ranks of the *fuqahāʾ*, such as Badr al-Dīn al-ʿAynī. He was *muḥtasib* on three further occasions, for a total of seven years, but what is of particular interest is the wide range of positions he held. It is true that his appointments included bureaucratic and financial posts as well as religious and academic ones. While serving in the *ḥisba*, for example, he was also appointed controller of hospitals (*nāẓir al-māristān*), as well as professor of *Ḥadīth* in the same *madrasa* in which he had first sought shelter. Later, he rose to become *nāʾib qāḍī al-quḍāt*, *nāẓir al-awqāf*, *qāḍī al-ʿaskar*, and, finally, *nāẓir al-jaysh*, *qāḍī al-quḍāt*, and head *shaykh* at the Shaykhūniyya monastery. But clearly the foundations of his career lay in his academic training.⁶⁵

The career of Dūlāt Khujā (d. 841/1438), one of al-Zāḥir Barqūqʾs mamluks, presents a striking contrast.⁶⁶ He held successively a number of military and administrative posts, including that of governor of Cairo. Only at the end of his career was he appointed *muḥtasib*, and then, it seems, because, at a moment of crisis during an outbreak of plague, the Sultan had need of an “energetic” man to enforce order in the *sūq*. His career is typical of later *muḥtasibs* in two respects, first and foremost because the *ḥisba* appears amidst a succession of military and political, and not religious or legal, appoint-

⁶⁵ See al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. III, 292, 335, 357, 400, 469, 522, 582; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira*, vol. XII, 158–59; Ibn Ḥajar, *Inbāʾ al-ghumr*, vol. III, 362–4.

⁶⁶ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. 4, 1033, 1063; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira*, vol. XV, 217–18.

ments. But secondly, in contrast to the earlier *fuqahā'*, for whom the *ḥisba* was often the first step in a long career ladder, later *muhtasibs* of a character and training similar to Dūlāt Khujā's seem to have become *muhtasibs* at a more arbitrary stage: for some, most notably Barakāt b. Mūsā, the appointment came at the peak of personal power; for others it came earlier, or at a middle stage. The shift occurred at that time during which, as we shall see, the *muhtasib* acquired new administrative and above all, financial functions. Appointment to the *ḥisba*, in short, depended less on one's training or "seniority" in the hierarchy of the legal establishment, than it did on a particular conjunction of personal power, energy, connections, and bribery.

Taken together, the evidence indicates, at a minimum, that the men appointed to the *ḥisba* throughout the fifteenth century were increasingly unsuited, both professionally and temperamentally, for a religious or legal post. To be sure, that a man was an *ʿālim* did not guarantee his piety or attachment to those principles which a just enforcement of the *ḥisba* demanded. We have already noted, for example, that the first clear evidence of payments for the privilege of occupying the *ḥisba* appears during the tenure of certain *qādīs*. The amirs appointed to the office might even be, from an ethical standpoint, superior: Yashbak al-Jamālī was appointed in 873/1468 for the quality of his character, for during his eleven-year tenure he "conducted himself according to the standards of the office, and brought to it great reverence," in the opinion of Ibn Iyās.⁶⁷ On the whole, however, even if we leave room for exaggeration, the chroniclers' negative opinion of the *amīr-muhtasibs* predominates. Since many of the chroniclers were *ʿulamā'*—al-Maqrīzī himself of course having served as *muhtasib*—there may be something of "sour grapes" in their accounts. But behind them, too, lay a genuine transformation in the character of the office. Al-Maqrīzī relates that when, in 841/1438, the Sultan sought a new appointee to the *ḥisba*, a man who was energetic and strong, he determined to confer the office on the afore-mentioned Dūlāt Khujā, for he "was not a Muslim and did not fear God."⁶⁸ Al-Maqrīzī's account indicates just how far, in the contemporary mind, the office had been transformed. The

⁶⁷ Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ al-zuhūr*, vol. III, 25.

⁶⁸ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 1033.

amirs who became *muhtasibs* in this period, even if they were pious and principled, were first and foremost soldiers. Ibn Iyās praised Yashbak al-Jamālī for his conduct as *muhtasib*, but those of his activities which the chronicler records were of a political, or even military nature: personally advising the Sultan, or acting as ambassador to the Ottoman court. When, after several years in office, he was also named director of the armory (*zardkāsh*), he neglected even his market duties, so that prices rose, and bread became scarce—the worst that could be said of a *muhtasib*. Eventually the people complained, and he was removed from office.⁶⁹ Would al-Ghazālī, or al-Māwardī, or even Ibn al-Ukhuwwa recognize these men as *muhtasibs*?

The Muhtasib in action

The vague, ethical origins of the *ḥisba* were, of course, never entirely forgotten, even in the Mamluk period. When the duties of the *muhtasib* were discussed in a general way, the traditional obligation—“to command the good and forbid evil”—was usually cited.⁷⁰ They might even be conceptualized in the broadest sense: the *Māʿālim al-qurba*, example, cites with approval a *muhtasib* who censured a certain sultan of Damascus for the purely ethical lapses of using silken cushions and wearing golden rings.⁷¹ Nonetheless, in Western scholarship we frequently find the term *muhtasib* translated as “market inspector,” or “inspector of weights and measures”—phrases which suggest a more limited, or at least more precise conception of the *muhtasib*’s duties. In the Mamluk period at least, these translations are justified, for the *muhtasib* was increasingly associated with activities in the *sūq*. When al-Qalqashandī attempts to define the duties of the *muhtasib* more precisely, he lists, among other things, the inspection of weights and measures, the preparation of food and drink, the supervision of prices and quack doctors (*mutaṭabbib*), and combating the fraudulent practices of astrologers (*ahl al-nujūm*), and in general, al-Qalqashandī says, he is to have jurisdiction over the *sūq*.⁷²

⁶⁹ Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ al-zuhūr*, vol. III, 94, 99, 159, 160, 165.

⁷⁰ See, for example, al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ*, vol. IV, 37, vol. V, 451.

⁷¹ Ibn al-Ukhuwwa, *Māʿālim al-qurba*, 13; cf. al-Shayzarī, *Book of the Islamic Market Inspector*, 31.

⁷² Al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ*, 96–97.

Al-Maqrīzī's description of the *muhtasib*'s activities in his *Khiṭaṭ* ties the "market inspector" no less clearly to the *sūq*, to the inspection of weights and measures, and to the regulation of various commercial activities.⁷³ That connection to the marketplace accelerated the transformation in the character of the office over the course of the Mamluk period.

Activities of a religious or ethical nature

In the eyes of those Muslim scholars who wrote on the *ḥisba* and (in theoretical terms) on the duties of the *muhtasib*, those obligations were clearly to include what we might call activities of a "religious" or "ethical" nature. Al-Māwardī, in *al-Aḥkām al-sultāniyya*, described this aspect of the *ḥisba* most explicitly. When discussing the duties which fell to the *muhtasib* under his mandate to "order the good," he mentioned first the enforcement of prayer regulations.⁷⁴ Other duties included specifically religious obligations, such as enforcing the Ramaḍān fast, and the payment of *zakāt*, as well as issues of public morality, such as the illicit public mixing of men and women, public displays of drunkenness, or the use of musical instruments.⁷⁵ Responsibilities involving market activities were also mentioned, but only when there was a recognized basis for action in the *Sharī'a*, for example, preventing illicit exchanges (*al-mu'āmalāt al-munkara*), such as contracts for usurious interest and invalid sales, provided, of course, there was no disagreement among the *fuqahā'* over the transaction in question.⁷⁶

In the Mamluk period, however, the chronicles and biographical dictionaries provide little evidence that *muhtasibs* engaged in such activities. It is possible that their silence simply indicates that it was commonplace for *muhtasibs* to take seriously their supervision of

⁷³ Al-Maqrīzī, *Khiṭaṭ*, vol. I, 463–64.

⁷⁴ Al-Māwardī, *Aḥkām*, 243f.

⁷⁵ Al-Māwardī, *Aḥkām*, 247–49 and 249f. For a full treatment of the *muhtasib*'s religious and ethical duties as outlined in the *ḥisba* manuals, see Buckley, "The Muhtasib," 97–107.

⁷⁶ That is, so long as the *muhtasib* was not required to use *al-ijtihād al-shar'i*; al-Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām*, 253.

religious and ethical matters.⁷⁷ But the sources also lend themselves to a subtler reading, one attuned to an evolution in the character and function of the office. In the earliest period of Mamluk rule, in which the post was dominated by men of legal and religious training, the chronicles do occasionally reveal the *muḥtasib* engaged in these activities. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Burulusī, a Mālikī scholar who held the post in the mid-eighth/fourteenth century, ordered the muezzins to call out the evening prayer on Friday, “Peace upon you, O Apostle of God, prayers and peace upon you, O Apostle of God.”⁷⁸ Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭanbādī, *muḥtasib* between 789/1388 and 791/1389, repeated the order when a *shaykh*, “in whose sanctity the people believed,” insisted that the Prophet had commanded him in a dream so to instruct the *muḥtasib*.⁷⁹ This same al-Ṭanbādī once dispatched a number of poor legal scholars among the vendors, to teach them the necessary Quranic verses for prayer, and charged each shopkeeper “two coins” per day for the scholars’ troubles.⁸⁰ In 779/1378, another *muḥtasib* supervised the destruction of a church whose members obstinately insisted on ringing its bells during the Friday prayers, “so that one almost could not hear the *khaṭīb*’s sermon.”⁸¹

In later periods, evidence for activities of a strictly ethical or religious character all but disappears from the chronicles. When *muḥtasibs* did invoke their powers to “order the good and forbid evil” in matters religious and moral, they did so in one of two circumstances. On more than one occasion, *muḥtasibs* issued proclamations calling for public prayers, or fasts, or enforcing orders confining women to their homes.⁸² In each case, however, the action was undertaken as a direct response to a public crisis—a famine, for instance, or an epidemic—not, that is, to enforce a pious act for its own sake, but to command an exceptional one as a means of promoting public order. More significantly, the chroniclers frequently tie the *muḥtasib*’s activities in enforcing public morality specifically to the state of affairs in the market, as al-Ṭanbādī once took a special interest in the

⁷⁷ For this argument, see Buckley, “Introduction,” 15.

⁷⁸ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. III, 94; Ibn Ḥajar, *al-Durar al-kāmina*, vol. IV, 81.

⁷⁹ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. III, 639.

⁸⁰ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. III, 574.

⁸¹ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. III, 340–41.

⁸² See, for example, al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 487, 1038; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira*, vol. XIV, 78, vol. XV, 217–18, 424.

prayers of the merchants. In 876/1471–72, the *muhtasib* proclaimed that women should not wear silk headbands, and should wear shawls that did not expose their hair; Ibn Iyās relates specifically that the *muhtasib*'s agents went through the streets of the markets, arresting offending women, and parading them before the public with their shawls suspended from their necks.⁸³ A half-century earlier, a different *muhtasib* had ordered that women abandon their custom of sitting in the merchants' stores, as the caravan gathered for the pilgrimage to Mecca, in order to catch a glimpse of the *maḥmal al-ḥajj*, decorated and adorned for the festive occasion.⁸⁴ We need not force the evidence in an attempt to prove that the *muhtasib*'s role as moral guardian was strictly limited to the markets; it is enough simply to say that the *muhtasib* was perceived as an officer whose interests, if not competence, were bounded by the *sūq*.

The exception may prove the rule. Ṣadr al-Dīn b. al-ʿAjāmī, a Ḥanafī *qādī* first appointed *muhtasib* in 808/1406, and then again on four separate occasions over the next sixteen years, was, in the opinion of more than one chronicler, “an outstanding, learned leader, a jurist, grammarian, versatile in many branches of science, esteemed among the Ḥanafī scholars for acumen, excellence of perception and apprehension”⁸⁵—a cut, one could say, above the rest. His character, and the activities he undertook while *muhtasib*, suggest that he may have owed his appointments to those tentative attempts at reform described above. The chroniclers repeatedly recount his attempts to instill pious behaviour in his Muslim charges, or to enforce restrictions against the *dhimmīs*: upbrading the Coptic Patriarch and publicly shaming the Christian secretary to the *wazīr*, in retaliation for the mistreatment of Muslims in Ethiopia;⁸⁶ ordering women not to pass through the al-Ḥākīm mosque, so that it might be “made clean, may God be praised, from the shameful acts which occurred in it between men and women;”⁸⁷ shouting through the streets of Cairo the regulations against the *dhimmīs*, that they might not ride on horse

⁸³ Ibn Iyās, *Badaʿīʿ al-zuhūr*, vol. III, 67.

⁸⁴ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 614.

⁸⁵ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira*, vol. XV, 167–8; cf. al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 848; Ibn Ḥajar, *Inbāʾ al-ghumr*, vol. VIII, 208; al-Sakhāwī, *al-Dawʾ al-lāmiʿ*, vol. II, 223–24.

⁸⁶ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 494.

⁸⁷ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 511.

or donkey within the city limits, and wear the proper clothing, and hang bells around their necks when visiting the *ḥammām*.⁸⁸

In fact, the career of Ibn al-ʿAjamī highlights the extent of the transformation of the office in the eyes of his contemporaries. In 822/1419–20, Ibn al-ʿAjamī, as *muḥtasib*, began to investigate the “places of wickedness” (*amkān al-fasād*), and to take appropriate action: he emptied the contents of and destroyed 1,000 jars of wine, forbade women to wail in lamentation for the dead, proscribed the use of *ḥashīsh*, and clamped down on prostitution in the markets.⁸⁹ Al-Māwardī, or al-Ghazālī, would have approved, but al-Maqrīzī—who of course himself had experience as *muḥtasib*—expressed some surprise that the *muḥtasib* should do such things himself (*bi-nafsihi*), as if the event were out of the ordinary. In the career of such a pious man, we can perceive the frustration encountered by one who sought to energize the ethical dimensions of an institution which by then was dominated by a practical, secular, even mercenary approach. It was Ibn al-ʿAjamī who sought to end the custom popular among women of sitting in the merchants’ shops at the beginning of the *ḥajj* festivities, “so that they see the [decorated] *maḥmal* on the following day, and mix freely with the men for a period of two days and a night.”⁹⁰ The people were not prepared to accept such an order from a *muḥtasib*, however, and soon the women “returned as they had been before and neglected the order.”

Ibn al-ʿAjamī himself discovered, through a bizarre event in 822/1419–20, the extent to which the office of *muḥtasib* had lost its moral authority. The *fuqahāʾ* had agreed that the *muḥtasib* was empowered, by the terms of his mandate to “order the good and forbid evil,” to censure and correct *imāms*, *qādīs*, even rulers: al-Ghazālī had dedicated an entire chapter to the exercise of the *ḥisba* in relation to amirs or sultans, indicating that at least a verbal exhortation to the prince to amend his behavior was well within the purview of the *muḥtasib*.⁹¹ Ibn al-ʿAjamī, perhaps naively, accepted this duty at face value. When the Sultan was taken ill, a group of *fuqahāʾ* ruled, conveniently, that he might combine two prayers, in order, pre-

⁸⁸ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 495.

⁸⁹ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 486.

⁹⁰ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 614.

⁹¹ Al-Māwardī, *Ahkām*, 256–7; al-Ghazālī, *Ihyāʾ*, 437–55.

sumably, not to tax him in his weakened condition. Such laxity, Ibn al-‘Ajamī felt, violated the principles of the Ḥanafī school to which both he and the Sultan belonged, and the *muhtasib* reminded the ruler of his own obligations. His impertinence, however, was rewarded, for he was accused of, and punished for, having disparaged ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Abbās in favor of Abū Ḥanīfa during the ensuing debate over the propriety of combining the prayers. According to the chronicler, however, the accusation was made without proof, and evidence was never offered. The circumstances strongly imply that Ibn al-‘Ajamī’s true offense was to have stepped beyond the accepted bounds of his office.⁹²

Prices and food supplies

In 862/1458, a group of Mamluks complained to the *nāzir al-jaysh* about the high cost of certain garments. “He replied to them, “This does not enter into my jurisdiction and is not one of my concerns; it is under the authority of the *muhtasib* of Cairo.”⁹³ In fact, throughout the Mamluk period, the *muhtasib* was responsible, both practically and in the popular mind, for prices in the market and for the supply of certain items, in particular foodstuffs.

There existed some disagreement among the *fuqahā’* as to whether price-fixing (*tas‘īr*) was a licit activity. While the general principle that “the only price-fixer is God” was accepted, it was also recognized by some that, at least in time of famine or dire public necessity, it might be necessary to stabilize prices by official intervention in the markets.⁹⁴ In practice, one can only say that the terms of the scholarly dispute bore less and less resemblance to the practicing *muhtasib* in Mamluk Egypt. In the chronicles, the setting of prices, particularly on foodstuffs, is the most often cited function of the *muhtasib*, even in the early phase of Mamluk rule. In 776/1375, following an epidemic, the *muhtasib* attempted to lower the cost of bread

⁹² Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 498–50.

⁹³ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira*, vol. XVI, 118–19.

⁹⁴ This, for example, was the opinion of Ibn Taymiyya, *Hisba*, 15–16. On the role of the *muhtasib* in the fixing of prices in Mamluk Cairo, see Boaz Shoshan, “Grain Riots and the ‘Moral Economy’: Cairo, 1350–1517,” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, vol. X (1980), 459–78, esp. 466.

to consumers by fixing its price, and ordering millers to buy wheat only at a certain price. Wheat merchants, however, refused to sell at that level, and took their grains elsewhere; as a result, wheat became scarce, and the price of bread rose, despite the *muhtasib*'s efforts.⁹⁵ Two decades later, another *muhtasib* sought to resign when prices rose, but the Sultan ordered him to return to his post, and to bring down the price of wheat, to accomplish which the market inspector, acting with the *Wāḥ* of Cairo, summoned a group of millers and had them flogged.⁹⁶ In 821/1418, the *muhtasib* gathered together the "chiefs of the professions," and ordered a general reduction of prices, not in response to a famine or epidemic, but corresponding to a reduction in the price of gold and silver.⁹⁷ The practice continued through the end of our period; increasingly, the fixing of prices seems to have been less a response to a particular shortage or crisis than a standing government policy.

The chronicles confirm the primacy of price-watching/fixing among the *muhtasib*'s duties indirectly as well. Reasons for the removal of a *muhtasib* are rarely mentioned; when they are, however, the chronicles usually indicate "high prices."⁹⁸ The public mind clearly associated the *muhtasib* with prices in the *sūq*. Shortly after Bahā' al-Dīn Muḥammad b. al-Burjī was appointed *muhtasib* in 799/1397, prices rose steeply, an event the people regarded as an evil omen for his, and their future. In less than a month, he had been replaced.⁹⁹ The results of that mental association could be ominous for a *muhtasib* unable to keep inflation in check. Sharaf al-Dīn al-Iskandarī, *muhtasib* in 798/1396, was forced to hide in his house for three days, fearing the violence of the crowds unhappy with the prices which he had set for foodstuffs.¹⁰⁰ Mamluks, too, might be displeased with a *muhtasib* for similar reasons. In 891/1486, a group rioted and attempted to burn down the home of Badr al-Dīn b. Muzhir, because he had set the prices of certain commodities, including meat, bread, and

⁹⁵ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. III, 239.

⁹⁶ Ibn Ḥajar, *Inbā' al-ghumr*, vol. III, 280–81.

⁹⁷ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 437.

⁹⁸ See, for example, al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. II, 394; vol. III, 219–21; Ibn Taghārī Birdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira*, vol. XI, 394, vol. XVI, 118–19; Ibn Iyās, *Bada'ī' al-zuhūr*, vol. IV, 146.

⁹⁹ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. III, 872.

¹⁰⁰ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. III, 860.

cheese, at levels unsuited to their taste.¹⁰¹ Badr al-Dīn al-ʿAynī was forced to flee for his life from a crowd upset that he had negligently allowed the price of bread to rise while that of wheat was falling.¹⁰²

Intervention in the market by the *muhtasib* might be justifiable in times of famine, or more generally by a vision of the *ḥisba* which required a concern for the welfare of the Muslim community. When prices rose sharply in 894/1489, the Sultan was presented a petition accusing the *muhtasib*, Kasbāy al-Sharīfī, of “not looking into the interests of the Muslims.” After the Sultan had reprimanded him, and ordered him flogged, Kasbāy returned to the market, and took action against the retailers, action which, the chronicler somewhat ambiguously explained, “caused some disorder.”¹⁰³ But in the increasingly desperate circumstances of the fifteenth century, the *muhtasib* began to intervene in the market more directly, more frequently, and above all, less on behalf of the whole community than for his own benefit, and that of his patrons.

It has been convincingly suggested that the “rapacious” Mamluk policies of the fifteenth century were, at least in part, a consequence, and not an original cause, of the agricultural and industrial decline of Egypt, an attempt to extract more revenue from a shrinking economy.¹⁰⁴ Changes in the administration of the *ḥisba* reflect the general pattern. We caught a hint of the change in the two instances, one from the tail end of the fourteenth century, the other from the last quarter of the fifteenth, in which crowds rioted against the *muhtasib* for *having fixed* prices—implicitly, at too high a level. More importantly, the *muhtasib*’s activities themselves changed: their intervention became deeper, more arbitrary, less “correctional.” It was not simply that the *muhtasibs* showed a greater inclination to use flogging and other punishments to attain their ends, although this did occur: it is not difficult to believe al-Maqrīzī that Dūlāt Khujā, the *muhtasib* appointed because “he was not a Muslim and did not fear God,” increased the number and severity of the punishments he administered.¹⁰⁵ Increasingly throughout the final phases of the Mamluk

¹⁰¹ Ibn Iyās, *Badaʿī al-zuhūr*, vol. III, 233.

¹⁰² Ibn Ḥajar, *Inbāʾ al-ghumr*, vol. VIII, 77–8; al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 698.

¹⁰³ Ibn Iyās, *Badaʿī al-zuhūr*, vol. III, 263.

¹⁰⁴ A.L. Udovitch, “England to Egypt, 1350–1500. Long-term Trends and long-distance Trade, Part III,” in *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East*, ed. M.A. Cook (London, 1970), 115–28.

¹⁰⁵ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 1033.

Sultanate, the *muḥtasib* would enter the market directly, forbidding the sale of foodstuffs on the open market, and allowing sales only from supplies which he provided or controlled.¹⁰⁶ In addition to helping supply a hungry capital with food,¹⁰⁷ such measures might also prove effective in *supporting* prices, or, since the grain distributed by the *muḥtasib* was often from the Sultan's personal supplies, in increasing royal revenues.

Such activities implied a deepening reliance on the military government. When civilians, such as Badr al-Dīn al-ʿAynī (in one of his later appointments as *muḥtasib*), or the aged Jamāl al-Dīn al-Bisāṭī (appointed 824/1421), held the post, they might rely on the services of amirs to distribute grain to the millers,¹⁰⁸ or simply to perform the normal *ḥisba* duties.¹⁰⁹ When the *muḥtasib* sold the sultan's grain, he acted, at one level, as the ruler's personal agent. All pretense of the *muḥtasib*'s independence disappeared when, at the end of the year 818/1415, the sultan himself assumed the office, and dispatched a eunuch to Upper Egypt to search for supplies of grain, and return them to the capital for distribution.¹¹⁰

Less and less as the sultanate stumbled toward its fall could the *ḥisba* be considered a *wazīfa dīnīyya*. The *muḥtasib*'s authority possessed an increasingly arbitrary, coercive, political character—a point to which we will return. His role in the setting of prices and the supply of food became less that of a disinterested referee than a willing cog in direct state intervention in the economy—intervention for the dual purposes of feeding the capital and boosting the government's revenue (or that of a powerful patron or, for that matter, his own). These developments occurred, of course, simultaneously with the growing statistical dominance of the amirs among *ḥisba* appointees. The change in the *muḥtasib*'s functions, as well as in the character of those who held the office, should be seen as a response to a demographic and economic crisis, and as a reflection of the state's reaction to that crisis. The change in the office's character and functions could not be hidden, even from contemporaries, and so Ibn

¹⁰⁶ For example, al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 334, 820.

¹⁰⁷ Which certainly was often the object, or, at least, one of several goals; e.g., Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ al-zuhūr*, vol. III, 238.

¹⁰⁸ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 343.

¹⁰⁹ Al-Jawharī, *Nuzhat al-nufūs*, vol. II, 507.

¹¹⁰ Al-Jawharī, *Nuzhat al-nufūs*, vol. II, 358; cf. al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 337.

Taghrī Birdī, as we have seen, unconsciously reclassified the *muḥtasib* as an officer of the political and military authority.

Revenue collection

In a society which demanded a financial contribution from those who would participate—*zakāt* from believers, *jizya* from *dhimmīs*—we should not be surprised to find the *muḥtasib* collecting the taxes, as a part of his duty to “order the good.” In 779/1378, the *muḥtasib* of Cairo assumed responsibility for collecting the “alms-tax,” *zakat*, from, significantly, the “merchants and financiers.”¹¹¹ Ibn al-Ukhuwwa listed the collection of the *jizya* among the *muḥtasib*’s responsibilities,¹¹² and al-Maqrīzī described the *muḥtasib* Ṣadr al-Dīn b. al-‘Ajāmī accomplishing precisely that in 815/1412.¹¹³ In general, however, the chronicles are silent on this score. Of course, the chronicles’ silence may simply indicate that the practice was common. The knowledge that the one *muḥtasib* whom the chronicles actually mention collecting the *jizya* was Ibn al-‘Ajāmī, whose devotion to the supposedly standard duties of the *ḥisba* caused such a stir, may arouse our suspicions, but the meager state of the evidence precludes firm conclusions.

Merchants and artisans were burdened with taxes of a more arbitrary nature, in the collection of which the *muḥtasib* also played a prominent role, especially near the end of the fifteenth century. Though they mention the new taxes frequently, the chronicles generally speak of them as an accomplished fact, rather than an innovation requiring comment, so that their development is difficult to trace. Goitein cited a Geniza document from the Mamluk period (date?) which referred to a tax levied on each store and workshop as the “*ḥisba*, or payment to the *muḥtasib*,” a payment regular enough to form an important part of a contract of partnership.¹¹⁴ In all likelihood, the Geniza document refers to a monthly tax (*mushāhara*), payable to the *muḥtasib* by those practising a craft or trade in the markets, which was in existence by the mid-fourteenth century—a

¹¹¹ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. III, 564.

¹¹² Ibn al-Ukhuwwa, *Ma‘ālim al-qurba*, 45, English summary, 16.

¹¹³ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 247.

¹¹⁴ Goitein, *A Mediterranean Society*, vol. I, 270.

decree of 762/1360–61 proclaimed its abolition.¹¹⁵ In the fifteenth century, however, the chronicles mention it regularly, usually by recording its (temporary) abolition.¹¹⁶ Though at times the tax occasioned dissatisfaction among the people, it must also have become a regular and expected burden: Barakāt b. Mūsā, though repeatedly collecting the *mushāhara* during his long tenure as *muḥtasib*, nonetheless retained the good feeling of the populace, so much so that the population of Cairo once hung large banners of white silk, lit festive lamps, and perfumed themselves, all to celebrate his return to the post after a brief imprisonment.¹¹⁷

The repeated references to the *mushāhara* leave no doubt that its collection constituted one of the *muḥtasib*'s principal duties. Certainly contemporaries understood the connection. In the chaotic final year of Mamluk rule, a group of Mamluk recruits revolted after their pay had been discontinued; significantly, they demanded the abolition of the monthly taxes, as well as the dismissal of the *wazīr*, the *Wālī* of Cairo, but especially the *muḥtasib*, on whose firing (and, for that matter, execution) they were particularly insistent.¹¹⁸

By the fifteenth century, then, the *muḥtasib* functioned as much as a tax collector as a market inspector, let alone as the guardian of public morals which al-Ghazālī, al-Māwardī and others had envisioned. More *muḥtasibs* in the final century of Mamluk rule had previously held the position of “controller” (*nāzīr*) in the various bureaus than any other post.¹¹⁹ But under the Mamluk sultanate, driven by a shrinking tax-base with no proportionate decline in expenditures, the collection of revenue became an ever more arbitrary practice. It was a process in which the *muḥtasib* participated; he became, in one scholar's estimation, “an arm of the royal extortion network.”¹²⁰ When in 865/1461 the sultan demanded 100,000 *ḍīnārs* “out of the price of spices” for distribution to his mamluks, the *nāzīr al-khāṣṣ*, responsible for the sum, fled his post. His task was entrusted to the *muḥtasib* who, along with the new *nāzīr* and the *dawādār*, satisfied the sultan's demands—“I mean they exerted themselves to collecting the money

¹¹⁵ Lapidus, *Muslim Cities*, 99–100.

¹¹⁶ For example, Ibn Iyās, *Badaʿī al-zuhūr*, vol. IV, 77, 304, vol. V, 17–18.

¹¹⁷ Ibn Iyās, *Badaʿī al-zuhūr*, vol. IV, 274; cf. Petry, *Protectors*, 144–45.

¹¹⁸ Ibn Iyās, *Badaʿī al-zuhūr*, vol. IV, 483–84.

¹¹⁹ Cf. Petry, *Civilian Elite*, 224.

¹²⁰ Petry, *Civilian Elite*, 224.

from various quarters.”¹²¹ Ibn Taghrī Birdī’s account does not specify how exactly the funds were collected, but no doubt their methods were not wholly dissimilar to those of the *muhtasib* who, in 892/1487, on the sultan’s command convened the “notable merchants of the markets” and simply ordered that they help defray the cost of a military expedition; after some negotiation, he squeezed from them some 12,000 *dīnārs*.¹²²

The new functions certainly detracted from the *muhtasib*’s duties as originally conceived, but they were by no means without advantage for the individuals appointed to the post. The same period in which the *muhtasib* became intimately linked to the process of revenue collection witnessed the transformation of the position from one dominated by the *fuqahā*’ to one in which most appointees were military figures; the proportion of amirs acting as *muhtasibs* was, in fact, higher than that for any other position in the legal category.¹²³ Indeed, the post became one which potential appointees, amirs, merchants, and unscrupulous *qāḍīs* actively sought. In 813/1410, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Sha’bān, a *qāḍī* though “without virtue,” who had previously held the appointment and (presumably) tasted its rewards, traveled as far as Damascus, where the Sultan was staying, to secure from him—al-Maqrīzī does not say how, or for how much—a decree conferring upon him the *ḥisba* of Cairo.¹²⁴

The reason for the job’s popularity was simple: the opportunities for remuneration which the new functions offered.¹²⁵ Ibn al-Ukhuwwa had indicated that the *muhtasib* was to receive a regular payment—a salary—from the public treasury;¹²⁶ al-Maqrīzī, who served as *muhtasib* himself, suggested that his revenues were approximately 30 *dīnārs* per month.¹²⁷ By the fifteenth century, the *muhtasib* was able to capitalize on his tax-collecting duties to supplement whatever emolument he might receive from the state. Exactly how much wealth a *muhtasib* might appropriate we cannot say, but the figures must have been considerable: if those who held the post sought it one-half as

¹²¹ Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira*, vol. XVI, 260.

¹²² Ibn Iyās, *Bada’i’ al-zuhūr*, vol. III, 242.

¹²³ Petry, *Civilian Elite*, 224.

¹²⁴ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 160.

¹²⁵ Cf. Darrag, “*al-Ḥisba wa-āthārahā*,” 127.

¹²⁶ Ibn al-Ukhuwwa, *Ma’ālim al-qurba*, 11.

¹²⁷ Al-Maqrīzī, *Khūṭaṭ*, vol. I, 464.

eagerly as did Ibn Sha‘bān, then the rapid turnover would indicate an intense competition. The chronicles furnish more direct evidence that the post was a profitable one. Ibn Sha‘bān himself returned to the *ḥisba* in 815/1412 for a payment of 500 *dīnārs*, plus 100 *dīnārs* for every month which he held it,¹²⁸ a practice which seems to have become more frequent in the later Mamluk period. Other amounts paid for the *ḥisba* varied, but on the whole increased over time: 5,000 *dirhams*, 150,000 *dirhams*, 1,000 *dīnārs*, then 3,000, finally 15,000 *dīnārs*.¹²⁹ Presumably the post was worth more than those figures—or at least, such was reasonably hoped—to justify the gamble.

The methods by which a *muḥtasib* might recoup his investment varied according to his functions. As a price-setter, the *muḥtasib* might hope to benefit from the manipulation of prices and supplies, through any one of those devices by which unscrupulous monopolies are still recognized. The *muḥtasib* Badr al-Dīn al-‘Aynī once reported that an amir had asked him to sell his supplies of wheat at an inflated price; when he refused, the amir became enraged, and al-‘Aynī was forced to resign his commission. Only al-Maqrīzī, al-‘Aynī reported, was willing to accept the post under these conditions.¹³⁰ No doubt al-‘Aynī’s report is distorted by his rivalry with al-Maqrīzī; even so, it indicates how a less scrupulous *muḥtasib* might earn his reward. Or he might falsify the accounts of projects for which he had assumed responsibility, as did one who had been charged with supervising the construction of two towers over a gate beneath the Citadel.¹³¹ But the most important source of income for a *muḥtasib* lay in his share of—or surcharge upon—the *mushāhara* it was his duty to collect from the merchants and craftsmen in the market. The *muḥtasib* appointed in 823/1420 recovered his initial payment by “taxing the vendors and the like.”¹³² Ibn Sha‘bān, too, probably recovered his investment through the monthly taxes collected in the market. Such sums could be substantial indeed. In 922/1516, Ibn Iyās reports that these taxes provided 76,000 *dīnārs* annually to the royal treasury, *in*

¹²⁸ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 253.

¹²⁹ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. III, 566, 872, vol. IV, 534; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira*, vol. XVI, 112; Ibn Iyās, *Badā’i‘ al-zuhūr*, vol. V, 27–28.

¹³⁰ Darrag, “*al-Hisba wa-ātharuhā*,” 117–18.

¹³¹ Ibn Ḥajar, *Imbā’ al-ghumr*, vol. VII, 275.

¹³² Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. IV, 534.

addition to whatever the *muhtasib* retained for himself or which he distributed to other officials, perhaps his deputies.¹³³

Political and administrative duties

The tax-collecting duties which the *muhtasib* assumed in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries represent only the most prominent instance of a broader phenomenon: his progressive transformation into a political and administrative officer of the state, and an agent of royal coercion. Appointed by the sultan, the *muhtasib* came to perform, at the personal behest of the ruler, a variety of tasks which drove him well beyond the marketplace, and light years from the ethical duties which may once have been his domain. Once the sultans and *muhtasibs* were routinely drawn, broadly speaking, from the same military elite, it became natural to find the *muhtasib* acting (when circumstance and personal relationships permitted) as a personal advisor to the ruler on political matters. On several occasions, the *muhtasib* served as ambassador to a foreign court.¹³⁴ At other times, the *muhtasib* served the sultan as an officer of arrest.¹³⁵

The administrative and, especially, coercive role of the *muhtasib* blossomed in al-Zaynī Barakāt b. Mūsā, a man of humble, Bedouin origins who held the *ḥisba* for all but seven months during the final twelve years of the Mamluk sultanate. While in office, Ibn Mūsā amassed an unprecedented amount of power; indeed, so close was he to the sultan that when the ruler left Cairo to advance against the Ottomans, he placed Ibn Mūsā “in charge of all his personal interests.”¹³⁶ The nature of Ibn Mūsā’s responsibilities, and the depth of his power, not to mention his extended term of office, might suggest that he was an aberration, to be considered in a category entirely separate from the *ḥisba*. In fact, however, Ibn Mūsā merely developed and exercised more fully the power, and benefitted from the

¹³³ Ibn Iyās, *Badāʿiʿ al-zuhūr*, vol. V, 17–18.

¹³⁴ For example, as ambassador to the Ottoman sultan Bayezid; Ibn Iyās, *Badāʿiʿ al-zuhūr*, vol. III, 94.

¹³⁵ For example, Ibn Iyās, *Badāʿiʿ al-zuhūr*, vol. III, 466; Ibn Taghrī Biridī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira*, vol. XVI, 266.

¹³⁶ Ibn Iyās, *Badāʿiʿ al-zuhūr*, vol. V, 46.

relationship to political authority, which his predecessors had acquired. What is striking about that authority is its thoroughly political character; more, its personal attachment to the sultan. Ibn Mūsā, like his immediate predecessors, served the ruler in administrative tasks utterly unconnected to his duty (still?) to “order the good and forbid evil,” and unconnected to the market and its practices. On a number of occasions, he served as the sultan’s paymaster in distributing funds to the troops, or—a less pleasant task—informing the mamluks of the cancellation of their expected bonus.¹³⁷ Twice following the pillaging of the *sūq* by packs of marauding mamluks or ruffians from the countryside, the *muhtasib* took inventory of goods damaged or stolen as a preliminary toward compensation—not surprising, perhaps, for a “market inspector,” but on both occasions specifically at the order of the sultan.¹³⁸ For the sultan’s benefit, he combined—to put it gently—the power to arrest which his predecessors had acquired, with their role as revenue-collector, which perhaps they had sought. More bluntly, he acted as a royal “inquisitor,” not in matters religious, but in matters financial; more specifically, he imprisoned, flogged, tortured, even unto death, those whom the sultan had fined but who refused to pay, or those who, simply by means of their wealth, tempted extortion.¹³⁹

Ibn Mūsā was *muhtasib* in name only. Could al-Māwardī or al-Ghazālī even have recognized the office? Would not even Ibn al-Ukhuwwa have been shocked?

Conclusions

In the early period of Mamluk rule, the *muhtasib* was strong enough institutionally—aided, we are tempted to add, by the moral integrity and authority of those who held the post—to proclaim and enforce the principles of his office in the face of selfish opposition from amirs. In 737/1336, during a period of food shortages and high prices, the *muhtasib*, a religious scholar beloved by the people of Cairo for the quality of his legal rulings, was actively involved in supplying grain

¹³⁷ Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ al-zuhūr*, vol. IV, 291, 430.

¹³⁸ Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ al-zuhūr*, vol. IV, 86, 178–9.

¹³⁹ Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ al-zuhūr*, vol. IV, 114–15, 131, 190, 393, 445.

to millers, and in fixing its price. When word reached him that several amirs were selling their own grain at higher prices, he arranged to have them brought before the sultan, humiliated and beaten. "After this," al-Maqrīzī commented, "not a single amir dared to open his granary without the *muhtasib*'s order."¹⁴⁰ It is not hard to imagine, on the basis of the prosopographical data examined at the outset of this study, that those who filled the post in the latter half of the Mamluk sultanate possessed little inclination to maintain the principles of their predecessors. Indeed, the table had turned. When a more conscientious *muhtasib* found himself in office, he might be unable to maintain his standards in the face of current expectations: that, at least, was the experience of one *muhtasib* who resigned in 798/1395, when more powerful Mamluk officials pressured him to compel millers to purchase wheat at inflated prices.¹⁴¹ From one perspective, there was this simple fact: that standards (as we are fond of saying) had declined.

More important than any decline of standards, however, the *ḥisba* experienced a transformation in its functions and in the nature and source of its authority, a process outlined in the pages above. The traditional notion of an official appointed to enforce public morality, to "order the good and forbid evil" within an Islamic ethical framework, bore less and less resemblance to the Mamluk *muhtasibs*. Market inspector, price-fixer, supplier of food, tax-collector, political agent and royal inquisitor—the *muhtasib* passed through a variety of guises, but one tendency predominated: the replacement of ethics by politics as the source of the *muhtasib*'s authority.

The prosopographical evidence adds another perspective to the transformation of the office. By the end of the sultanate, legally-trained men were all but excluded from (or uninterested in) the post: during the sixty years before the Ottoman conquest, only one *muhtasib* can certainly be said to have been drawn from the ranks of the *ʿulamāʾ*. Carl Petry suggested that the absence of religiously-trained men from the *ḥisba* in the fifteenth century indicates that they no longer sought the office,¹⁴² a reaction, no doubt, not simply to the

¹⁴⁰ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, vol. II, 395; cf. Ibn Ḥajar, *al-Durar al-kāmina*, vol. V, 257–58.

¹⁴¹ Lapidus, *Muslim Cities*, 53.

¹⁴² Petry, *Civilian Elite*, 224.

decline of standards, but to the transformation of the office to one for which a *Shariʿa*-minded individual would have no interest, let alone skill.

That contemporaries perceived the transformation of the office—the more important half of the phenomenon—suggests a final question: why was the *hisba* in particular subject to this vicissitude? Three causes, above all, contributed to the office’s vulnerability. First, tradition did not require that the *muhtasib* be trained in the law, or any other religious science. While the loose but widely-appreciated system of education and the transmission of religious knowledge could, in theory, at least restrict the sultan’s choices in the appointment of the chief *qāḍīs* and other prominent religious officials, no institutional safeguards for *hisba* appointments existed. Second, a distinct lack of “professionalism” characterized *hisba* appointments. It is striking, for instance, how rarely the sources provide evidence that a *muhtasib* had previous experience as a *nāʾib al-hisba*. *Muhtasibs* transferred to the office from other posts; in particular, the high proportion with previous experience as the “controller” (*nāẓir*) of various bureaus must have accelerated the *hisba*’s transformation into an office of revenue collection. Most importantly, in the chaotic atmosphere of late Mamluk Egypt, characterized by economic crisis and extortion by virtually all levels of the ruling military elite, the vagueness of its definition doomed the *hisba* to manipulation and distortion—to its transformation. Guided not by legal or religious principles but by those of “custom” and “public interest,” even an honest *muhtasib* “ordering the good and forbidding evil” in the *sūq* wielded a weapon of enormous power. But under the prevailing circumstances of the last century of Mamluk rule, the association with the marketplace—with, that is, a source of exploitable wealth—proved fatal. Whether manipulating the price and supply of food, or collecting the *mushāhara*, or simply extorting money from merchants and artisans, the *muhtasib* sat on a potential gold mine.

CHAPTER TWELVE

THE ESTATE OF AL-KHUWAND FĀṬĪMA AL-KHAṢṢBAKIYYA: ROYAL SPOUSE, AUTONOMOUS INVESTOR

Carl F. Petry

The prominence of women as supervisors of charitable trusts (*awqāf*) during the medieval and Ottoman periods is widely known.¹ Islamic Law allows both men and women to administer property autonomously, and the narrative chronicles that constitute the primary foundation of our anecdotal knowledge about pre-modern Islamic History refer frequently to women in this context. But these narrative sources rarely provide statistical data about the estates of individuals they describe. Their tabulated information is confined for the most part to rates of exchange, commodity prices and, in Egypt, crests and troughs of the annual Nile flood. Archival sources, which are quintessentially statistical, have not survived in their original form throughout most of the medieval Islamic period. After the ninth hijrī/fifteenth common era century, they become progressively more replete as the Ottomans absorbed most of the central Islamic lands into their empire. Prior to the Ottoman conquest of Egypt and Syria in 922/1517, surviving archival material is limited for the most part to charitable trust documents (*ḥujaj awqāf*) and related deeds. Scholars had made sporadic use of this material for decades before Muḥammad Amin published his path-breaking *Al-Awqāf wa'l-Hayāt al-Ijtimā'iyya fi Miṣr* (Cairo, 1981). As is common knowledge to participants at this

¹ See Ronald C. Jennings, "Women in Early Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Judicial Records—The Sharia Court of Anatolian Kayseri," *JESHO*, vol. XVIII/1 (January, 1975), 53–114; C.F. Petry, "A Paradox of Patronage during the Later mamluk Period," *The Muslim World*, vol. LXXIII/3–4 (July–October 1983), 195–203; C.F. Petry, "Class Solidarity vs. Gender Gain: Women as Custodians of Property in Later Medieval Egypt," in *Women in Middle Eastern History; Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender*, ed. by Nikki Keddie and Beth Baron (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 122–42.

conference, Amin went on to compile a catalogue listing trust-related documents in Egypt, issued in the same year.²

I became interested in these documents when I worked through Amin's monograph and began examining the deeds associated with the last significant rulers of the independent mamluk period: al-Ashraf Qāyṭbāy (872–901/1468–96) and Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī (906–22/1510–16). Even before Amin's catalogue was printed, I had already realized that the documents issued, or amended, by these two sultans accounted for an astonishing thirty-three percent of all deeds surviving from the mamluk era. But my understanding of Fāṭima al-Khaṣṣbakiyya's role as a *wāqifa* developed after I had the opportunity to consult Amin's catalogue. I then ascertained that the thirty-eight to forty documents she commissioned, depending on how their transactions are counted, stood out as the most thoroughly recorded legacy of a female estate builder during the Mamluk Sultanate.

Fāṭima al-Khaṣṣbakiyya descended, according to my reconstruction of her genealogy, from Sayf al-Dīn Khaṣṣbak al-Nāṣirī (d. 734/1433), a prominent officer in the service of Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad (third reign 709–41/1309–40). Ibn Taghrī-Birdī states that he was the “progenitor” (*wālid*) of Ghars al-Dīn Khalīl ibn Shāhīn al-Shaykhī (b. 813/1410), who would be Fāṭima's paternal grandfather.³ Khalīl's biography in al-Sakhāwī's *al-Daw' al-Lāmi'*⁴ makes no reference to this ancestral tie. Nor does Fāṭima's father, 'Alī, appear in the work. Since Fāṭima died in 909/1504, al-Sakhāwī did not include her in his twelfth volume that lists women. Nor did he mention her in his detailed accolade to her spouse, Qāyṭbāy. The particulars of Fāṭima's life therefore remain unknown. The lengthiest commentary about her appears in Ibn Iyās's *Badā'ī' al-Duhūr* and merits quoting:⁵

On Wednesday the twenty-second (of Dhū'l-Hijja 909/6 June 1504), expired al-Khawand Fāṭima ibnat al-'Alā'ī 'Alī ibn Khaṣṣbak. She was the wife of al-Malik al-Ashraf Qāyṭbāy. After him she married al-'Ādil

² Muḥammad M. Amin, *Catalogue des documents d'archives du Caire de 239/853 à 922/1516* (Cairo: Institut Français d'Archéologie orientale), 1981.

³ Ibn Taghrī-Birdī, *al-Manhal al-Sāfi wa'l-Mustawfi ba'd al-Wāfi*, edited by M.M. Amin (Cairo, 1988), 5:197, no. 975 (for Khaṣṣbak); 258, no. 1003 (for Khalīl).

⁴ Khalīl's biography in al-Sakhāwī, *al-Daw' al-Lāmi' fi Aṣyān al-Qam al-Tāsi'*, edited by Ḥusām al-Qudṣī (Cairo, 1934), vol. III, 195, no. 748.

⁵ Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī' al-Zuhūr fi Waqā'ī' al-Duhūr*, edited by M. Mustafa, H. Roemer, H. Ritter (Cairo and Wiesbaden, 1960–75), vol. IV, 64, line 6.

Ṭūmānbāy and it was rumored that she had married al-Ashraf Qānṣūh Khamsmi'a morganatically (*fi'l-khafifa*). She was one of the most eminent princesses, possessing a vast fortune. She left behind an immense patrimony (*taraka ḥāfila*). She was mistress of the royal court (*qā'a*) for some thirty years, with her own apartment in the Citadel. She was honored and respected as was no other princess. She died having exceeded the age of sixty. Upon her death she was carried on a dais embossed in gold. Before her walked the four *qāqīs* and the senior amirs (*muqaddamūn*). The Sultan (Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī) descended from the Citadel to preside over her funeral prayers at the Mu'minī (corpse washing) font. The masses surged forward disrupting the penitence (*kaffāra*) of the official mourners when her cortege entered the Cross Street (*Salība*). Her funeral was (thus) festive.

I add: At the end of her life, she encountered difficulties and adversity. The Julbān recruits had invaded her residence next to the Sunqur Bridge. They demanded a bonus (*nafaqa*) from her. They insulted her and intended to (continue) harassing her (further). The instigators of this (affront) were a cohort of mamluks belonging to the faction of Aqbirdī, the Executive Adjutant (*Dawādār*). When al-Malik al-Nāṣir (Muḥammad, Qāyṭbāy's son by a concubine and immediate successor) learned of this, he placed her under his protection. He proclaimed in Cairo that all mamluks were forbidden to approach the residence of al-Ashraf Qāyṭbāy's widow nor even to stand outside her gate. Any violator of this decree was to be hanged with no exceptions. These abuses then ceased. Their cause: These mamluks had surmised that the Khawand had married Qānṣūh Khamsmi'a in secret. After his assassination, they intimidated (*taḥarrasha*) her and demanded a bonus from her. She had remained in hiding away from her residence for some time after that. Subsequently, al-Zāhir Qānṣūh mulcted her, extracting a large sum of money from her and placing her in the custody of the *khuddām* eunuchs until she yielded up the demanded sum. Similarly, al-Nāṣir (Muḥammad) extracted a sum of money from her. She then married al-ʿĀdil Ṭūmānbāy but remained with him (only) two months (approximately). These events are known. After this, she became ill, suffering from an ulcer (*ākila*) in her side over a protracted period. When her condition worsened, she proceeded to Būlāq where she died. Her body was transported to her residence next to the Sunqur Bridge, from whence her funeral cortege departed.

The details Ibn Iyās provided focused on the precariousness of Fāṭima's estate after Qāyṭbāy's death. While the stance of the mamluk elite may appear draconian, it almost certainly reflected their concept of rights to a deceased peer's patrimony. Property accumulated by individual members of the mamluk caste seems to have been regarded as part of a vast fiscal reservoir held collectively by the entire military oligarchy. Since a substantial portion of an individual's

legacy had been alienated from land formally held by the Sultanate and allotted as *iqṭāʿ*s on a usufruct basis in return for service, his peers' perception that they were improperly denied access to lucrative real estate that should have been restored to the *ḍiwān al-jaysh* for redistribution led to feelings of intense resentment.

Although Fāṭima had amassed her holdings autonomously from her spouse's properties, she could not avoid this deeply ingrained sense of collective entitlement after her powerful husband had died. Her marriages to the men who fought each other over the succession to her husband's office should be interpreted as a last-ditch effort by which Fāṭima strove to maintain the integrity of her estate, if not ultimate control over its disposition. The impression left by Ibn Iyās of an aging and infirm woman who once enjoyed enormous social prestige entering into marriages of convenience with ruthless claimants to ward off confiscation is not edifying. Ibn Iyās was not impressed by their conduct, and remained an acerbic critic of the man who eventually consolidated his position as sultan: Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī.

But the rapacity of these claimants was in all probability the inevitable consequence of a political tradition that recognized no succession by inheritance as binding and regarded fortunes amassed by even the most esteemed of their caste as a common patrimony to be divided among successors as fiefs. Fāṭima clearly understood the implication of this deeply embedded attitude and indulged in no illusions about her own fate after her spouse had died. Yet by placing a substantial portion of her estate in *waqf*, Fāṭima sought to preserve at least part of her holdings for charitable posterity. Fāṭima's trust deeds that survive should therefore be interpreted as tangible remnants of a strategy assiduously pursued over a period exceeding three decades to insure the preservation of her legacy.

The earliest document issued by Fāṭima is dated 21 Rabīʿ I 878/16 August 1473. The latest appeared soon before her death with a date of 27 Rajab 909/15 January 1504, and confirmed on 25 Šafar 910/7 August 1505. This latter date certified a transaction enacted sometime during Fāṭima's last months but was legally validated after her demise. The span of time elapsing between these two documents thus encompasses thirty-two years. Six kinds of transaction were concluded in these deeds. In descending order of frequency they were: *bayʿ* or sale/purchase with prices provided irregularly; *waqf* or charitable trust with foundation objectives mentioned only sporadically;

intiḡāl or transfer/reassignment of a unit of property of an alternate status of title; *istibdāl* or exchange/substitution of a unit of property for another of presumably equivalent value; *ījār* or rent/lease of a unit of property with the monthly fee provided; and *tamlīk* or alienation of a unit of property with permanent transfer of ownership.

References to acquisition of property already held in waqf actually occurred only in Fāṭīma's initial deed. Document 469, dated 21 Rabī' I 878, proceeded through three transactions, the latest certified on 28 Dhū'l-Ḥijja 887/7 February 1483. All sixteen units were acquired during the first transaction of 21/03/878, however. Of these sixteen, ten were listed as trusted waqf property transferred under title to Fāṭīma. The remaining six were purchased. No distinction between the two categories is discernible with regard to the type of real estate acquired, although the six agricultural properties located in the Delta provinces of Gharbiyya, Sharqiyya and Qalyūbiyya were uniformly listed as waqf. The other properties were located within the former Fāṭimid district (*dākhil al-Qāhira*, "inside Cairo"), the zone extending from the Bāb Zuwayla to the Citadel (*zāhir al-Qāhira*, "outside Cairo"), and the city's environs (*day'a al-Qāhira*). They included six residences (*sakan*), four retail shops or stalls (*hānūt*), three of which were listed as a single unit, and a larger urban residence (*qaṣr*). The irregular incidence of purchase prices may indicate inconsistent reporting of sums paid, or may certify acquisition in which Fāṭīma actually turned over money to possess the property. Final tallies of acquisition payments will be noted subsequently in this essay.

The confinement of transactions in which Fāṭīma acquired title to existing trust properties to this document warrants attention. All of Fāṭīma's following transactions involved purchases, transfers, substitutions, rents or alienations. All of the six rural agrarian properties had initially been held in the *dīwān al-jaysh* for allotment as iqtā' usufruct. Document 469 passed over Fāṭīma's acquisition of these properties without comment on either their alienation from regime disposition to charitable trust, or to the gender of their final supervisor (*nāzira*).

Fāṭīma's subsequent acquisitions are summarized on the List.⁶ Several years seem to have intervened between her initial foray into

⁶ The list is divided in two sections. Deed i.d. numbers (from Amin) are repeated in section two to facilitate location of properties according to district. Deed #652

estate building and later agendas of acquisition. Document 502, transaction one, is dated 11 Rabī' I 886/10 May 1481. From that time, no more than three years separate the occurrence of a transaction until Fāṭima's death. When I initially reflected on the chronological timing of Fāṭima's transactions, I noted heightened activity concentrated between the years 894–896/1488–1491.⁷

I hypothesized that these years followed closely upon the first of Qāyṭbāy's serious accidents in which he fractured his upper leg and verged on death. Although Qāyṭbāy recovered, he did not regain his former vigor and his health began a prolonged decline. I speculated that the increased frequency of Fāṭima's acquisitions may have been tied to her apprehension over the implications of her husband's waning health and possible death for her own status and the integrity of her holdings. Upon reconsideration of the chronological incidence of deeds, however, I do not find the salience of this particular interval of two and one half years persuasive. If the surviving deeds offer an accurate pattern of Fāṭima's transactions, she was consistently engaged in property acquisition at the same rate until her death.

The List summarizes the range of property Fāṭima sought: uniformly real estate with reliable rates of return. These properties do not differ in type or preference from the profiles of real estate appearing consistently within trust documents of the Mamluk period. They are divided more or less equally between rent-generating residences, commercial sites for sale or storage of commodities, and agrarian

refers to the primary waqf instrument of Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī and indicates appropriation of a property from one of Fāṭima's deeds. tr. = transaction, always identified by date in the waqf text. Districts are designated according to terminology used in the waqf/transaction deeds: Dākhlī Q. refers to 'within' Cairo (Qāhira) or the section south of Bāb al-Naṣr and north of Bāb Zuwayla; Ṣāhir Q. refers to 'outside' Cairo or the section extending from Bāb Zuwayla to the Maydān Rumayla below the Citadel; Ḍay'a Q. refers to 'environs' of Cairo and includes the sections between the preceding districts and the Nile; the Delta refers to the provinces of Qalyūbiyya, Sharqiyya, Manūfiyya, Gharbiyya, Dakahliyya and Buḥayra; the Valley refers to the provinces of Jīziyya, Fayyūmiyya, Aṭfihiyya, Bahnasawiyya, Ushmunayniyya, Manfalūṭiyya, Asyūṭiyya, Akhmīmiyya and Qūṣiyya. Kh. refers to khuṭṭ or quarter of Cairo. N. refers to nāhiyya or rural fiscal district, usually but not always corresponding to a village and attached farmland. Transaction terms: *Waqf* or charitable trust, *bay'* or sale, *ijār* or rental, *tamlik* or alienation/appropriation, *intiḡāl* or transfer, *istibdāl* or substitution. dr = *dirham*, dn = *dīnār*, dj = *dīnār jayshū*. *ashr*, *zāh* = *ashrafi*, *zāhiri* dīmār. Dates are A.H.: day/month/year.

⁷ C.F. Petry, *Protectors or Praetorians? The Last Mamluk Sultans and Egypt's Waning as a Great Power* (Albany, 1994), 201.

lands or irrigation sources. No manufacturing or processing centers of any sort emerged, confirming a disinclination sustained throughout the waqf-related documents of this era for investment in agencies that produced commodities or processed foodstuffs. No reference to any kind of cartage, shipping or transferral agencies appeared. Fāṭīma's investments were restricted to fixed properties that yielded set rents on a reliable basis.

Because of the irregular incidence of purchase prices provided by the deeds, no accurate estimate of Fāṭīma's expenditures is possible. Also, given our inexact understanding of currency values, equivalencies or exchange rates, final tallies are certain only in their imprecision.⁸ As summarized in the List, I came up with a total of 9,747 dinars listed as *danānīr* only; 6,443 dinars calculated from 8,053 *danānīr jayshī* or units of account (one *dj* worth ca. eighty percent of a genuine dinar); 1,500 *ashrafi* dinars; 700 *zāhirī* dinars; 2,250 *nuṣṣ faḍḍas* worth ninety full dinars; and 10,125 dirhams, so severely debased at this time that 300 equalled one full dinar, for a figure of 34 dinars. The resultant total came to 18,513 dinars. Quite obviously, these figures can be useful only as the broad estimates they are. Given the frequent lacunae in the documents, coupled with the errors built into these estimates, I suspect that these totals underestimate substantially the amounts Fāṭīma actually spent.

Nonetheless, a contravening tendency should be considered at this juncture. We cannot be certain that Fāṭīma actually paid the amounts listed in the deeds. Many of these figures may have represented 'front prices' that concealed far more complex, covert arrangements involving laundered sums calculated by individuals occupying supervisory positions in the fiscal bureaus. I previously observed that Fāṭīma bought shares in properties already held or controlled by persons closely allied with her husband.⁹ Her attempt to hedge against the likelihood of confiscation by so doing emerges as a readily discernible

⁸ See Richard S. Cooper, "Land Classification Terminology and the Assessment of the Kharāj Tax in Medieval Egypt," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 17 (1974), 91–102 for an introduction to fiscal terminology associated with agrarian revenues; R.S. Cooper, "A Note on the Dīnār Jayshī," *JESHO*, vol. XVI (1973), 317–18 for a discussion of this currency of account; for an overview of currency terminology generally, see Warren C. Schultz, "The Monetary History of Egypt, 642–1517," *The Cambridge History of Egypt*, vol. 1, edited by C.F. Petry (Cambridge, 1998), 318–38. Note bibliography, 585–91.

⁹ Petry, *Protectors*, 201, note 39.

strategy. Less detectable would be the hidden deals that were struck over how much money actually changed hands, between whom and when. These caveats complicate our sense of the monies Fāṭima actually had at her disposal to lay out for her autonomous estate. Whether a more precise understanding of currency values and their rates of exchange would facilitate a better sense of the situation is unclear since these other matters of covert deals pose barriers that may defy a more accurate analysis.

One final issue merits comment: the ultimate disposition of Fāṭima's holdings. In the year following her death, on 24 Ṣafār 910/6 August 1504, Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī formally appropriated Fāṭima's properties into his own trust (Amin #652). As noted previously, this procedure was conducted according to past precedent. The entries in parentheses on the List indicate where specific units of property acquired by Fāṭima appeared in al-Ghawrī's primary waqf. Qāyṭbāy and Fāṭima had produced no children who survived them. As noted previously, Qāyṭbāy's heir, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, was the result of a concubinal union. Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī therefore violated no inheritance rights when he assumed title to Fāṭima's estate. It is worth noting, however, that al-Ghawrī did not tamper with Qāyṭbāy's own holdings that he (Qāyṭbāy) had placed in his primary trust (Amīn #475). Again, the likelihood here is that Qāyṭbāy's spouse could not expect the integrity of her personal estate to last after she died. An individual man of equivalent social rank, such as Qāyṭbāy's eventual successor and consolidator, Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī, could lay legitimate claim to it.

Yet this claim was not filed until after Fāṭima's demise. Ibn Iyās wryly noted the marital ploys Fāṭima was compelled to attempt in order to ward off confiscation of the legacy she had carefully built up over thirty years. The fact that she apparently succeeded in her own lifetime, as a widow without surviving male issue, should attract notice at least equivalent to the unpleasant realities of her status within the mamluk elite at the end of her days. It is unlikely that Fāṭima or her male contemporaries wasted time lamenting the fate of an aged widow confronting the avarice of ambitious rivals for rule over the Sultanate. Their actions were predictable and all parties involved anticipated such behavior. Fāṭima's achievement as the creator of an autonomous estate that rivalled the holdings of many prominent men in her caste merits respect as the legacy of a sophisticated investor fully attuned to the financial and political conditions

of her time. Fāṭīma was an active participant rather than a passive bystander, who enjoyed the benefits of royal status and suffered the liabilities of royal widowhood.

List of Charitable Trusts (*Awqāf*) Endowed by al-Khawand Fāṭīma al-Khaṣṣbakiyya (Section 1)

Deed	Dākhlil Q	Zāhir Q	Ḍay'a Q
469, tr. 1 21/03/878	sakan kh. J. Azhar waqf	Qaşr kh. AqSanqur waqf	
	sakan kh. Mashhad Ḥusaynī waqf	sakan kh. J. Mardīn bay'	
(652, tr. 1, #14)	8 ḥānūt kh. Khān Khalīlī waqf	sakan kh. Qubba Barmāk bay'	
10/11/881	sakan kh. Ḥārat Daylam bay'	3 ḥānūt kh. Sab' Saqābāt bay'	
28/12/887	riwāq kh. Kāfūrī bay'		
09/03/884 (652, tr. 1, #20)	sakan kh. Kāfūrī bay'		
502, tr. 1 11/03/886 (652, tr. 1, #3)	sāḥa, makhzan Sūq Warrāqīn Ijār: 500dr		
506, tr. 3 15/01/888			bustān anshāb Maṭariyya: kh. Jabal bay': 1500ashr
504, tr. 2 03/12/888		iṣṭabl 3 ḥānūt	

Table (*cont.*)

Deed	Dākhil Q	Zāhir Q	Ḍayʿa Q
(652, tr. 1, #38)		kh. Ḥusayniyya tamlīk: 510dn	
481, tr. 2 11/01/890		sakan kh. Ḥusayniyya bayʿ: 110dn	
450, tr. 2 19/12/890 (652, tr. 1, #55)			ard: biʿr sāqiyya Maṭariyya Intiqāl: 560dn
518, tr. 1 19/12/890 (652, tr. 1, #55)			ard: 2 qaʿa Ḍawāḥī Maṭariyya bayʿ: 600dn
			biʿr Ḍawāḥī Maṭariyya bayʿ
528, tr. 1 11/11/891 (same as 481)		sakan kh. Ḥusayniyya bayʿ: 110dn	
543, tr. 4 05/03/894		8 qaʿa, makhzan Būlāq bayʿ: 272dn	
376, tr. 4 12/04/894 (652, tr. 1, #28)		18 ṭabaqa, 9 ḥānūt kh. Qanṭara, Ḥārat Kirmān bayʿ: 700zāh	
544, tr. 2 12/04/894 (652, tr. 1, #28) (same as 376?)		ṭibāq, 9 ḥānūt kh. AqSanqur bayʿ: 4800dr	
545, tr. 1 12/04/894		ṭibāq, 9 ḥānūt	

Table (*cont.*)

Deed	Dākhlil Q	Zāhir Q	Ḍay‘a Q
(652, tr. 1, #28) (same as 544?)		kh. Qanṭara AqSanqur bay‘: 4825dr	
435, tr. 3 23/08/894 (652, tr. 1, #29)		7 ḥānūt kh. Qanṭara AqSunqur bay‘: 250dn	
519, tr. 8 06/11/894		sakan kh. Qanṭara AqSunqur bay‘: 52dn	
546, tr. 2 23/11/894			
548, tr. 1 25/11/894			
430, tr. 5 22/12/895 (652, tr. 1, #81)			
439, tr. 3 22/12/895 (652, tr. 1, #81)			
442, tr. 2 17/03/896	sakan kh. Bazbazāt bay‘: 300dn		
553, tr. 1 17/03/896 (652, tr. 1, #24) (same as 442?)	sakan kh. Bazbazāt bay‘: 240dn		
556, tr. 1 18/10/896 (652, tr. 1, #32)	sakan kh. Dār Naḥḥās bay‘: 50dn		
565, tr. 2 06/10/899 (652, tr. 1, #54)		arḍ: anshāb junayna Birkat Raṭlī, kh. Fawwākhīn bay‘: 150dn	

Table (*cont.*)

Deed	Dākhlil Q	Zāhir Q	Ḍay'a Q
502, tr. 2 06/03/900	ḥāṣil, makhzan Sūq Warrāqīn Ijār: 500dr		
566, tr. 3 06/05/900 (652, tr. 2, #4)	wakāla, khān Sūq Warrāqīn bay': 1740dn		
576, tr. 3 15/11/901 (652, tr. 1, #30)		istabl, 5 ḥānūt kh. Qanṭara AqSunqur bay': 670dn	
577, tr. 2 15/11/901 (652, tr. 1, #30)		5 ḥānūt kh. Qanṭara AqSunqur bay': 750dn	
583, tr. 2 16/02/903 (652, tr. 1, #41)		sakan, junayna Bāb Sha'riyya intiḡāl: 2100dn	
427, tr. 6 02/06/903 (652, tr. 1, #36)		sakan kh. Qanṭara AqSunqur bay': 340dn	
510, tr. 2 26/06/903 (652, tr. 1, #36)		sakan kh. Qanṭara AqSunqur bay': 160dn	
421, tr. 5 24/10/904		sakan kh. Qanṭara AqSunqur intiḡāl: 20dn	
555, tr. 3 06/11/904 (652, tr. 1, #37)		sakan kh. Qanṭara AqSunqur intiḡāl: 27dn	

Table (*cont.*)

Deed	Dākhlil Q	Zāhir Q	Ḍayʿa Q
592, tr. 1 10/11/904 (652, tr. 1, #37) (same as 555?)		sakan kh. Qanṭara AqSunqur bayʿ: 191dn	
595, tr. 3 14/04/905 (652, tr. 1, #20)		sakan kh. Khūkhat Awaz bayʿ: 400dn	
594, tr. 2 14/04/905		Riwāq, 4 ṭabaqa kh. Khūkhat Awaz bayʿ: 2250nf	
438, tr. 4 22/12/905 (652, tr. 1, #81)			
608, tr. 1 20/05/905 (652, tr. 1, #40)		sakan kh. Kaddāshīn bayʿ: 200dn	
622, tr. 2 22/09/906 (652, tr. 1, #17)	sakan kh. Raḥbat Aydamurī bayʿ: 155dn		
567, tr. 3 27/07/909	khirba intiḡāl: 150dn		
660, tr. 1 27/07/909	sakan kh. Raḥbat Aydamurī bayʿ: 70dn		
469, tr. 2 25/02/910	qāʿa, ḥawānīt klh. Mashhad Ḥusaynī istibdāl khān arwiqa kh. Mashhad Ḥusaynī istibdāl		
469, tr. 3 29/09/910	sakan kh. J. Azhar istibdāl: 700dn		

Summary of Property Units and Expenditures

<i>17 Units</i>	<i>21 Units</i>	<i>4 Units</i>
9 sakan	1 qaṣr	1 bustān
9 ḥānūt	10 sakan	1 anshāb
1 riwāq	32 ḥānūt	2 arḍ
1 sāḥa	2 iṣṭabl	2 bi'r
2 makhzan	8 qā'a	1 sāqiyya
1 ḥāsil	22 ṭabaqa	
1 wakāla	1 arḍ	
2 khān	1 anshāb	
1 khirba	2 junayna	
1 qā'a	1 riwāq	
500dr	9625dr	1160dn
3905dn	5842dn	1500ashr
	700zāh	
	2250nf	
Calculated Totals		
9747dn		
6442dn	(calculated from 8053dj at 80%)	
1500ashr		
700zāh		
90dn	(calculated from 2250nf)	
34dn	(calculated from 10,125dr)	
18,513dn	total	

List of Charitable Trusts (*Awqāf*) Endowed by al-Khawand Fāṭima al-Khaṣṣbakiyya (Section 2)

Deed	Delta	Valley
469, tr. 1 21/03/878	Arḍ Gharbiyya N. Tajrīj waqf	
(652, tr. 1, #14)	arḍ Sharqiyya N. Inshā' Buṣṣ waqf	
	arḍ Gharbiyya N. Minyat Sharīf waqf: 202dn	

Table (*cont.*)

Deed	Delta	Valley
10/11/881	arḍ Sharḳiyya N. ‘Abbāsa waqf: 350dn	
28/12/887 (652, tr. 1, #79)	arḍ Gharbiyya N. Nasāhnā waqf: 360dn	
09/03/884 (652, tr. 1, #20)	arḍ Qalyūbiyya N. Mīnyat Marzūq waqf	
502, tr. 1 11/03/886 (652, tr. 1, #3)		
506, tr. 3 15/01/888		
504, tr. 2 03/12/888 (652, tr. 1, #38)		
481, tr. 2 11/01/890		
450, tr. 2 (19/12/890 (652, tr. 1, #55)		
518, tr. 1 19/12/890 (652, tr. 1, #55)		
528, tr. 1 11/11/891 (same as 481)		
543, tr. 4 05/03/894		
376, tr. 4 12/04/894 (652, tr. 1, #28)		

Table (*cont.*)

Deed	Delta	Valley
544, tr. 2 (12/04/894 (652, tr. 1, #28) (same as 376?))		
545, tr. 1 12/04/894 (652, tr. 1, #28) (same as 544?))		
435, tr. 3 23/08/894 (652, tr. 1, #29)		
519, tr. 8 06/11/894		
546, tr. 2 23/11/894		arḍ Ashmūnayn N. Sayf Almās intiḳāl: 916dj
548, tr. 1 25/11/894 (same as 546?))		arḍ Ashmūnayn N. Sayf Almās bayʿ: 1000dj
430, tr. 5 22/12/895 (652, tr. 1, #81)	arḍ Gharbiyya N. Matbūl bayʿ: 3600dj	
439, tr. 3 22/12/895 (652, tr. 1, #81) (same as 430?))	arḍ Gharbiyya N. Matbūl bayʿ: 325dj	
442, tr. 2 17/03/896		
553, tr. 1 17/03/896 (652, tr. 1, #24) (same as 442?))		

Table (*cont.*)

Deed	Delta	Valley
556, tr. 1 18/10/896 (652, tr. 1, #32)		
565, tr. 2 06/10/899 (652, tr. 1, #54)		
502, tr. 2 06/03/900		
566, tr. 3 06/05/900 (652, tr. 2, #4)		
576, tr. 3 15/11/901 (652, tr. 1, #30)		
577, tr. 2 15/11/901 (652, tr. 1, #30)		
583, tr. 2 16/02/903 (652, tr. 1, #41)		
427, tr. 6 02/06/903 (652, tr. 1, #36)		
510, tr. 2 26/06/903 (652, tr. 1, #36)		
421, tr. 5 24/10/904		
555, tr. 3 06/11/904 (652, tr. 1, #37)		
592, tr. 1 10/11/904		

Table (*cont.*)

Deed	Delta	Valley
(652, tr. 1, #37) (same as 555?)		
595, tr. 3 14/04/905 (652, tr. 1, #20)		
594, tr. 2 14/04/905		
438, tr. 4 22/12/905 (652, tr. 1, #81)	arḍ Gharbiyya N. Matbūl intiḡāl: 1300dj	
608, tr. 1 20/05/905 (652, tr. 1, #40)		
622, tr. 2 22/09/906 (652, tr. 1, #17)		
567, tr. 3 27/07/909		
660, tr. 1 27/07/909		
469, tr. 2 25/02/910		
469, tr. 3 29/09/910		
Summary of Property Units and Expenditures		
	<i>8 units</i>	<i>1 unit</i>
	5 Gharbiyya 2 Sharḡiyya 1 Qalyūbiyya	1 Ashmūnayn
	6137dj	1916dj

PART SEVEN

THE MAMLUKS IN SYRIA

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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

MAMLUKS AND THEIR HOUSEHOLDS IN LATE MAMLUK DAMASCUS: A *WAQF* STUDY

Michael Winter

The sources

The importance of *waqf* (and *milk*) documents for the study of Muslim social and economic history is well known. For the Mamluk period, which is rich in literary sources, but relatively poor in surviving archival materials, the *waqf* and *milk* documentation has special value. Unfortunately, the majority of such documents that came down to us are limited to the last decades of the Mamluk sultanate; most of them originate in Cairo. These documents have been the basis for studies of Egyptian culture, society and economy by several scholars, among them Muḥammad Amīn, Carl Petry, Jonathan Berkey, L. Fernandes, U. Haarmann, D. Behrens-Abouseif, and others.¹ The present study is based on *waqf* and *milk* documents from the Vilayet (Province) of Damascus (*Shām*) prepared after the Ottoman conquest of Syria in summer 1516 and located in the Ottoman archives in Istanbul.² These documents give us an opportunity to look at some

¹ See, for example, Muḥammad M. Amīn, *al-Awqāf wa'l-ḥayāt al-ijtimā'iyya fī Miṣr, 648–923/1250–1516*, Cairo, 1980; Carl F. Petry, *Protectors or Praetorians? The Last Mamluk Sultans and Egypt's Waning as a Great Power*, (Albany, 1994); Jonathan Berkey, *The Transmission of Knowledge in Medieval Cairo; A Social History of Islamic Education* (Princeton, 1992).

² The main registers consulted for this study are located at Başbakanlık Arşivi, (the Prime Minister's Bureau Archive), Istanbul. *Tapu Defteri* nos. 127, 263, 393, *Maliyeden Müdever*, no. 247. My main source, however, is a unique register (although resembling in form *Maliyeden Müdever*, no. 247, which is much shorter and less detailed). It is an untitled manuscript and without pagination (the page references in the present paper are mine). The register, Mualim Cevdet O. 83:936, is located at the Atatürk Kitaplığı in Istanbul. I am preparing a study on the *awqāf* in the province of Damascus in the late Mamluk and early Ottoman periods for which this *defter* is a central source. In addition to the data that is presented here concerning Mamluks' *awqāf*, the register contains information about the early Ottoman period and aspects of the ways in which the Ottoman administration dealt with *awqāf*, which are outside the subject of this conference.

aspects of the Damascus elites (since only members of the elites could afford to establish *awqāf* or possess *amlāk* (private real estate). The present paper attempts to use these documents for a closer look at Mamluk sultans, amirs, mamluks' sons (*awlād al-nās*), and their households. The collection contains descriptions of hundreds of *waqfs*, including scores of mamluks' *awqāf* and *amlāk*. Although the sample is modest in size, it seems representative, and allows several observations about the mamluks and their households, as well as their religious and social values as these are expressed in their pious endowments that are not available from other sources.

The archival documents are mostly registers (*defters*) prepared by Ottoman officials, who surveyed, among other taxable properties, the existing *awqāf* and *amlāk* around 950/1543, some 30 years after the conquest. As in most cases, the two categories were listed together, since neither were state lands, and thus could not be parceled out as military *iqṭā'* during Mamluk times, or *timar* under the Ottomans. Some of these registers summarize in Arabic (often clearly influenced by the clerks' Turkish) the essence of the *waqf* and *milk* documents that had been drawn up before and after the Ottoman takeover; and then, in Turkish, the Ottoman administration's decisions as to the status of the properties and the rights of the claimants. Most of the *defters* available to me and, as far as I am aware, to other researchers,³ represent later surveys (made some 30 years after the conquest) of the earlier survey conducted by Ottoman bureaucrats immediately after the conquest. These, as well as the majority of the original documents from the Mamluk sultanate, seem to have been lost.

Not surprisingly, the *waqf* founders were men and women of means—a few sultans and amirs, merchants, high-ranking bureaucrats and 'ulama', qadis, and a considerable number of women from such families. As usual, *waqfs* were typically lands or houses in the city or in villages in the province. These could consist of entire villages or parts thereof (particularly important were revenues from the

³ For some of the principal studies using *waqf* documents on Damascus, see Muḥammad Adnan Bakhiit, *The Ottoman Province of Damascus in the Sixteenth Century*, Beirut, 1982; J.-P. Pascual, *Damas à la fin du XVI^e siècle d'après trois actes de waqf ottoman*, Damascus, 1983; R. Deguilhem (ed.), *Le waqf dans l'espace islamique, outil de pouvoir socio-politique*, Damascus, 1995; Richard van Leeuwen, *Waqfs and Urban Structures: The Case of Ottoman Damascus*, Leiden, 1999.

fertile al-Ghūta villages surrounding Damascus), *khans*, warehouses, water mills, orchards, gardens and vineyards and other revenue-producing properties.

As is well known, *waqf* foundations could be *khayrī*, charitable, when the revenue is designated for the funding of public, religious, educational or charitable institutions and projects, or *dhurrī*, in which the founder designates the money for his or her family, usually starting with the donor and often including funds for manumitted slaves (*‘utaqā’*). In such *awqāf*, the final religious, that is, public, beneficiaries for whom the funds are designated after the family becomes extinct must be specified in the *waqf* deed (*waqfiyya* in Arabic or *vakıfname* in Turkish). By far, the most frequently mentioned beneficiaries in such cases were institutions in the two holy cities of the Hijāz (*al-Haramāni al-Sharīfāni*: Mecca and al-Madina); mostly for the poor residents in the hospices (*ribāt*, pl. *arbiṭa*), especially in al-Madina. Many founders of *awqāf* donated the revenues to institutions in Damascus: the great Umayyad mosque and lesser mosques in the city and its suburbs, primarily the important suburb of al-Şāliḥiyya that had been founded in the twelfth century by Ḥanbalī refugees from the crusaders in Palestine. The city’s numerous *madrasas*, the soup kitchen (*maṭbakh al-dashīsha*) near the Bāb al-Barīd gate and numerous mausolea (*turbas*) were also favored objectives. Sometimes the *waqf* documents mention “poor Muslims” generally, lepers, money to ransom prisoners of war and other people in need of help. It is important to note that almost all the *waqf* funds from local (the Province of Damascus) sources were to be spent in the province (the exception being, of course, the Holy Cities in the Hijāz). Most of the supported institutions existed in the city of Damascus itself, but a few religious institutions were in villages. The holy sanctuaries of Jerusalem (al-Aqṣā mosque) and Hebron (al-Khalīl) are also mentioned among the recipients of *waqf* charities. It is important to note that only rarely do we come across a case in which sources of revenue in Syria were to support an institution in Egypt.

Despite the distinction between the *khayrī* and *dhurrī waqf* (these terms are not used at the time in our sources), the *waqfiyya* in many cases combined both of them by dividing the funds at the time of establishing the *waqf* between family and charitable or religious projects (the two were really inseparable).

We learn from the chronicle of Muḥammad b. Tulun, a Damascene *‘ālim* and important historian, who was an eyewitness to the Ottoman

conquest of Damascus, about the methods by which the Ottomans conducted the survey of *awqāf* and *amlāk*.⁴ This procedure was extremely unpopular, and it was interrupted by the rebellion of Jānbirdī al-Ghazālī, the Mamluk amir who was appointed by the Ottomans as their first governor of Syria (end of 1520-early 1521). The rebellion was crushed quickly, however (February 1521), and the Ottomans completed the survey of the province, including that of the *waqf* and *milk* entitlements. The official who carried out this survey was Defterdār Nūḥ Çelebi. He must have been as harsh a man as he was an indifferent administrator, perhaps also tainted by corruption, as is claimed in later Ottoman documents. He was dismissed owing to many complaints from the people to the authorities.⁵ His register was called *Defter-i Nūḥ Çelebi*, and has not survived. Some 30 years later, a revision was conducted on the basis of documents and oral testimony. The results were written down in the *Defter-i Cedīd-i Haqqānī*, the New Imperial Register. This new register points out many mistakes made by Nūḥ Çelebi. Sometimes he had registered *milk* and *waqf* properties as *timar*, either arbitrarily or because the luckless owners were outside the country at that time, occasionally for the hajj pilgrimage. By contrast, the procedures used during the new survey seem accurate and fair.

Finally, a note about the dates of the *awqāf*: Although some of them, mostly those established by sultans- date from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the great majority of the *waqf* deeds in our collections are from the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Generally speaking, the lifetime of most *awqāf* does not seem to have exceeded one century. Usually by this time either the family died out or the revenues ceased for one reason or another. Often the dates of the purchase of the property, its conversion into a *waqf* and its registration are close. In many cases, however, the time gap between the establishment of a *waqf* and its registration is significant, in a few extreme cases, more than a century. It is probable that when it became known that an inspection was imminent, the trustees hurried to register their rights.

⁴ Muḥammad ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahat al-khillān fī ḥawādīth al-zamān*, ed. M. Muṣṭafā (Cairo, 1962), vol. II, 33, 36, 65.

⁵ Ibn Ṭūlūn writes that Nūḥ Çelebi issued an order that all men when walking in the streets on pain of castration had to wear trousers (*sirwāl*). This was not enforced, however. *Ibid.*, 59.

Mamluk Sultans' awqāf in Syria

According to our documents, several Mamluk sultans founded *awqāf* for Syrian projects. It is important to emphasize this point, since Syria, or rather the Syrian provinces (*al-Bilād al-Shāmīyya* in Mamluk administrative terminology) were totally under the control of the sultan in Cairo. Nevertheless, it seems that the good sense of the center usually prevailed, and the resources funding *awqāf* in Syria were used for the benefit of local projects. In our sample, only one of the Mamluk sultans, Barqūq, used Syrian funds to support his *madrasa* in Cairo (in the Bayn al-Qaṣrayn Quarter).⁶ All other Mamluk sultans established *waqf* for religious men and institutions in the Province of Damascus. Only al-Malik al-Zāhir Baybars established *awqāf* for his own children and descendants, in addition to his *waqf* on his *madrasa* and his *turba* in Damascus.⁷

The Mamluk sultans' prominent support for Sufis and their institutions is also obvious from their Syrian *waqf* policies. A farm in the Ḥawrān region financed an ancient *waqf*, established at the beginning of the Mamluk sultanate by Baybars for the upkeep of a Sufi *zāwiya*. The *waqf* was eventually confirmed by other sultans. Qalā'ūn, Khushqadam and Qāyitbāy gave their confirmation to the continuity of that *waqf* (*murabba' al-istimrār wa'l-musāmaḥa*). Nevertheless, Nūḥ Çelebi registered it as *timar*. Here religious beliefs (or rather superstitions) find their way into an official document. The clerk writes that two men (soldiers) who received this property as *timar* were afflicted with blindness (as a result of the holy man's *karāma* or miracle), and gave up their rights to their *timar*.⁸

Baybars also established another *waqf* for a certain Sufi shaykh and his descendants.⁹ Other sultans who donated *awqāf* for Sufis are al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalā'ūn (on Shaykh al-Suyūfī and the Sufis who resided in the *zāwiya* on the slopes of the famous Qāsiyūn mountain at the Šāliḥiyya quarter near Damascus), Īnāl, and Jaqmaq (on

⁶ *Atatürk Library Defter* (will be quoted as *ALD*, my pagination), fol. 57b. Also *Tapu Defteri* (*TD*) no. 263, 471.

⁷ *ALD*, fol. 76b; *TD* no. 393, 190. The Ottomans did not find Baybars's *waqfiyya* for his *madrasa*; it was not necessary, since the terms of the *waqf* were engraved on stone on the gate of the *madrasa*.

⁸ *ALD*, fol. 38b.

⁹ *TD* no. 263, 536.

a *zāwiya* in a village, as well as a *madrasa* near the Umayyad mosque).¹⁰ Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's *zāwiya* for an ascetic Sufi shaykh (Ibn al-Baṭā'ihī) and his progeny is also mentioned as a continuously active *waqf*. Even the *waqf* established by his uncle Asad al-Dīn Shīrkūh (incorrectly called "sultan" in the Ottoman documents) to support a *madrasa* and a *khānqāh* in Damascus was functioning in the early sixteenth century.¹¹

Sultan Khushqadam, who focused special attention on Damascus to enhance his religious prestige there, built his *turba* in Damascus at the Bāb al-Jayrūn quarter, and endowed it with rich *awqāf*. It was a large institution, known by the name al-Wajīziyya. In some documents it is called a *madrasa* rather than *turba*. A school probably grew around the sepulcher. The *waqfiyya* provides for salaries to the functionaries, such as an imām, a teacher, and custodial and maintenance personnel, as well as candles, rugs and mats.¹² Al-Malik al-Nāsir Faraj was another sultan whose *turba* was built in Damascus.¹³

Governors of the province of Damascus

Unlike the sultans' *awqāf* which, as we have seen, survived until the early Ottoman period, there are no traces in our sources of the endowments established by the governors of the province (singular: *nā'ib al-saltāna*) apart from the last ones. For example, one looks in vain for *awqāf* founded by Tankiz, al-Nāsir Muḥammad b. Qalā'un's eminent governor of the province during the sultan's long reign. What survived (at least in the collections that I have seen) were the *awqāf* of governors of the late Mamluk period, either their own endowments, or, in some cases, those established to honor them by their mamluks after their death.

For example, *Nā'ib al-Shām* Arkmās (or Arkmāz) combined a family *waqf* with a large *turba*, his mausoleum, which was a center for dispensing charity in the name of this amir who was interred there. Three Qur'ān readers were to recite at the site for a fee every day

¹⁰ *TD* no. 393, 38 (al-Nāsir Muḥammad b. Qalā'un); *Ibid.*, 20 (Īnāl); *ibid.*, 55 (Jaqmaq).

¹¹ *ALD*, fol. 28a (Saladin). Shīrkūh's *khānqāh* in Damascus, *TD* no. 393, 76, his *madrasa*, *ibid.*, 77.

¹² *ALD*, fol. 4b; *TD* no. 263, 418.

¹³ *TD* no. 127, 101.

after the afternoon prayer. Every Friday night, 300 loaves of bread were to be distributed to poor people at the gate of the *turba*. Drinking water in a cistern and oil for lamps were made available. The *waqf* deed specifies the monthly salaries of the custodian (*qayyim*), 300 dirhams, and the director (*mutawallī*), 1,000 dirhams. The *waqfiyya* sees to it that the founders' wives and concubines who had given birth to his children will be provided for after his death. What remained should be paid to the founder's children, his brother's son, and to the governor's manumitted slaves. If no one remained, the money should be given to the poor wherever they are.¹⁴ It should be noted that this is a typical *turba*: a mausoleum, a devotional center that also functioned as an agency for dispensing charity. Some *turbas* were more modest, and others larger and more elaborate. A *turba* could be a teaching institution, and even a place where people could stay. We have evidence of numerous *turbas*, which had a budget for distributing sweets on certain festivals and feasts and meat during the nights of Ramaḍān. An amir establishes a dinner (*ṣimāṭ*) on the first Friday of Rajab, and the night of mid-Sha'bān and the nights of the two Muslim festivals (*al-ʿīdāni*).¹⁵ In Damascus, there were many such *turbas*, which no doubt contributed a great deal to the well-being of the general population.

The largest and richest *awqāf* in late Mamluk Damascus were established by Sībāy, the last Mamluk governor of the province, who was killed at the battle of Marj Dābiq at which Sultan Selīm defeated the Mamluk army. Sībāy's *awqāf* were funded from the revenues of many villages throughout the province, as well as from shops, bathhouses and caravansaries (*khāns*) in Damascus. Sībāy provided for his children and manumitted slaves through his *awqāf*. There is even an entire *waqf* known as "Sībāy's children". Sībāy also established a *madrasa* and a mosque. In his family *awqāf*, Sībāy mentions the poor people in the holy cities in the Ḥijāz and at al-Aqṣā mosque in Jerusalem and at the Hebron sanctuary as the *waqf*'s delayed beneficiaries, as befits a governor of al-Shām. Among his *khayrī waqfs*, there is one for a Rifāʿī Shaykh and for the Sufis who lived in his *zāwiya* in the village of Ṭabgha.¹⁶

¹⁴ *TD* no. 393, 112.

¹⁵ For example, *ibid.*, 60.

¹⁶ See Sībāy's *awqāf*, *ALD*, fol. 52a, *TD* no. 263 (*madrasa*); *TD* no. 127, 43 (a)

Mamluk amirs as founders of awqāf

Many amirs founded *awqāf*, both family and charitable foundations, or a combination of both kinds. As is well known, it is not difficult to identify the mamluks among the names of civilians, whose *awqāf* and *amlāk* are naturally included in the same registers. The mamluks are immediately recognizable by their Turkish names and the fact that their fathers were always called Ibn ‘Abdullāh, a name indicating a convert to Islam. The same signs applied to female slaves of similar background about whom more will be said below. Mamluk amirs constituted a relatively small minority of those who founded *awqāf*, but not surprisingly, their *awqāf* were among the richest. Their religious beliefs and values, as can be judged from the documents, were quite similar to those of the civilian elite, that is, impeccably orthodox Sunnism. Yet, it seems that the Mamluk amirs, more than other wealthy founders of *waqf*, were inclined to donate money by means of the *awqāf* to public (i.e., *khayrī*) projects, although most of their *awqāf* had a *dhurrī* component as well. It should be mentioned in this connection that *awqāf* founded by ‘ulama’ were very rarely of the charitable type. The ‘ulama’ are associated with *khayrī waqf* as beneficiaries, functionaries and teachers, but not as founders. Yet the amirs, more than others, could afford to be generous. These charitable endowments increased their reputation and enhanced their legitimacy, which as converts and of foreign background they were concerned about as well.

It is interesting to note that only one *waqf* in our documents provides for a purely military project: A fund for the strengthening and arming with gunpowder, cannon, bows and arrows a tower (*burj*) defending the coastline at Şaydā against the Franks. Yet this *waqf* was established by a member of the wealthy al-‘Adawī family who were civilians. A Qur’ān reader was be hired to recite at that post.¹⁷

mosque); *TD* no. 393, 7 (on a Rifā‘ī Sufi, his descendants and their *zāwiya*; *ibid.*, 125 (family *waqf*, then Jerusalem and Hebron sanctuaries); *TD* no. 263, 247 (for his children).

¹⁷ *ALD*, fols. 81a–b. The *waqfiyya* is dated 867 (1462 or 1463), when the Syrian coastline was frequently attacked by hostile ships. A question may be asked whether this defense post was still active and even necessary under the reign of Süleymān when the Ottomans had the strongest fleet in the eastern Mediterranean and after the island of Rhodes had been taken.

The family *waqf* of mamluks included support for many relatives, such as brothers, nephews, cousins, children, wives and concubines, and almost always also *ʿutaqāʿ*, freed slaves and their descendants. The causes for which Mamluk amirs founded charitable *awqāf* were similar to the civilians': *al-Ḥaramāni al-Sharīfāni*, with a clear preference to the *ribāṭs* of al-Madina (they were more numerous than those in Mecca), mosques and *madrasas*, sometimes an institution founded by a former master of that mamluk, the local hospitals, and again their own *turba*, to commemorate their name after their death through prayers and acts of charity centered at their sepulcher.

The following is a typical case of an amir's pious foundation. Jānī Bek b. ʿAbdullāh al-Nāṣiri registered two *waqfiyyas*, in the year 858 (1454) and 864 (1459 or 1460) respectively. He donated the revenues of two villages as *waqf*. In the first document, the administrator (*nāzir*) is ordered to spend what is needed for the *waqf*'s maintenance and improvement. Then a certain sum (the figure is missing in the document) is allocated to the poor residents of the *ribāṭs* in the two Holy Cities. Every month a Qurʾān reader was to be paid 60 dirhams to recite at the sepulcher (*darīh*) of Barsbāy, which is adjacent to his mosque at Suwayqat (or Sūq) Ṣārūja (a market and a quarter in Damascus). The same sum was to be paid to a reader (i.e., teacher) of *tafsīr* (commentary on the Qurʾān), Arabic, and *fiqh* (jurisprudence) at that mosque. The same salary is allotted to a reader of *ḥadīth* there. The *muʾadhdhin* of the mosque will receive 150 dirhams annually. Whatever remains after these expenses would go to the founder himself, his children and their descendants, after them to the manumitted slaves and their descendants. If no one remains, the money is designated for the interests of Barsbāy's mosque. The founder's attachment to the memory of Barsbāy is obvious, although the exact relationship is not clear. He could have been one of Barsbāy's mamluks.¹⁸

The second *waqfiyya*, prepared 6 years later, reveals Jānī Bek's concern for his own sepulcher and memory after he is gone. A *turba* has not yet been erected, but he already makes provisions for acts of charity and piety that are to be performed at his sepulcher "wherever it may be". Seven Qurʾān readers are to recite portions from

¹⁸ This Barsbāy al-Ḥājib (d. 851) was the governor of Ṭarābulus al-Shām and Ḥalab and built the mosque at Sūq Ṣārūja in Damascus.

the Book at his grave. Every week one kantar of wheat bread should be distributed to the poor at the site. At the Rajab festival, sweets will be distributed. During Ramaḍān nights, cows and sheep for a sum of 500 dirhams are to be slaughtered at the sepulcher, and the meat is to be given to the poor. Whatever remains afterwards should be given to the founder's children and their children, and afterwards to his freed slaves. When all the family and the 'utaqā' die out, the money should go to the interests of the Barsbāy mosque.¹⁹

The Ottoman clerk adds after the *awqāf*'s summaries that a certain woman who claimed descent from one of the manumitted slaves was in charge of the *waqf*. Its supervision was taken away from her, however, and given to the Ottoman chief qadi of Damascus (*Mevlānā Shām efendisi*) in his capacity as supervisor of the *awqāf* (*nāzir al-awqāf*), since she had not given anything to the Holy Cities or to the other religious institutions. In addition, her claim to have descended from one of the former slaves seems to have been false. Also, most of the *waqf* properties that had been abundant under the Circassian sultans had been sold, and only a small part remained. When Ibn Sulṭān, the local Ḥanafī mufti, was consulted, he issued a fatwa ruling that the manumitted slaves deserved nothing, since the *al-Ḥaramāni al-Sharīfāni* that had been mentioned first (in the earlier *waqfiyya*) took precedence.

Awlād al-Nās

There are a few cases of *awqāf* founded by *awlād nās*, yet identification of the fathers as mamluks is not always certain. The following example is clear: Shādī (or Shādhī) Bek al-Julbānī (d. 887) was a prominent amir in Damascus. According to some Arab biographers he was a tyrant, with false pretensions to religious knowledge. His son, al-Ṣarīmī Ibrāhīm established a *waqf* for a Sufi *zāwiya* in a village in the Ḥawrān region.²⁰ The *waqf* was to provide a meal every morn-

¹⁹ *ALD*, fol. 22b.

²⁰ *ALD*, fol. 40b. A biographical notice about this amir can be seen in *Muḥat al-adhhān min al-tamattūf bi'l-iqrān bayna tarājīm al-shuyūkh wa'l-aqrān* by Aḥmad al-Ḥaskafī (on the basis of works by Muḥammad b. Ṭūlūn and Yūsuf b. Ḥasan b. 'Abd al-Ḥādī), ed. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Khalīl al-Shaybānī al-Mawṣilī (Beirut, 1999), vol. I, 373.

ing and evening in the *zāwiya*. The *nāzīr* (director of the endowment) should read portions from the Qurʾān with the Sufis (*fuqarāʾ*) every night after the evening prayer and the *dhikr* ritual. The founder and his descendants would receive the (religious) reward for these pious deeds. One can speculate that the son of that oppressive amir felt the need to atone for his father's life-style, using the property he had inherited from him to support a Sufi *zāwiya* in the remote Ḥawrān region. His insistence on the daily Qurʾān reading after the *dhikr* ceremony and the evening prayer is an indication of his intention to keep the Sufis firmly within the fold of orthodox Islam.

There are more founders of *awqāf* whose fathers or grandfathers could have been mamluks, such as al-Ḥājj Sharaf al-Dīn Mūsā b. Shādī al-Turkmānī, Aḥmad b. Sunqur, al-Nāṣiri Muḥammad b. Tashbughā, or ʿAlī b. Muḥammad b. Qorqmāz.²¹ Yet, as has been said above, there may be doubts whether all the men behind these Turkish names were really mamluks.

The Manjak family were a special case of *awlād nās*. The head of this aristocratic family was Sayf al-Dīn Manjak (d. 776/1374) a Mamluk governor of Damascus. His grandson, Nāṣir al-Dīn Manjak, became extremely rich and bought lands and founded two mosques outside of Damascus, in the Maydān al-Qaṣab and al-Qubaybāt quarters. The family maintained its strong standing with the Mamluk authorities. Later, the family was prominent under the Ottomans.²² Our sources are filled with information about vast *awqāf* founded by the family, as well as by others for the support of mosques that are named after them. The following is an example of one of the family's religious projects. In the year 830 al-Nāṣiri Muḥammad b. al-Ṣārimī Ibrāhīm b. Manjak established a *waqf* for the mosque at Maydan al-Ḥaṣā. The document specifies the salaries of the *imām*, the *khaṭīb*, the porter, the custodian, nine *muʾadhdhins*, a *ḥadīth* reader, etc. On the floor that was on the level of the water fountain (*sabīl*) a Qurʾān school (*maktab*) for ten orphans (a standard number at the time) had been established, with a budget to support them and their shaykh. The houses north of the mosque were prepared to serve as a residence for ten Sufis and a shaykh to teach them. The *waqfiyya*

²¹ See *ALD*, fols. 37b, 45b, 61a. *TD* no. 393, 182.

²² M.A. Bakhit, *The Ottoman Province of Damascus in the Sixteenth Century* (Beirut, 1982), 189–90.

goes on to give details about the necessary expenses that would be needed to maintain this religious complex. The family also founded a separate Sufi *zāwiya*.²³

Mamluk families and Mamluk women as visible in the waqf documents

One of the most striking characteristics of Mamluk society in the Province of Damascus that emerges from the *waqf* documents is the cohesiveness of Turkish-Mamluk families and their households. They lived as an ethnic and socio-economic elite, and were less integrated socially in the local, Arabic-speaking, elite than is often assumed. Of course, because the mamluks' sons no longer belonged to the ruling military class, this solidarity weakened naturally in the second generation that lost its Turkish characteristics. That the mamluks took measures to provide for the economic future of their children and descendants by *awqāf* is predictable, and abundantly clear from our documents as well.

The mamluks' Turkishness in speech²⁴ and personal names set them apart from their Arabic-speaking subjects. Mamluk status was a one-generation phenomenon, however. As a general rule, the mamluks gave their children typical Muslim (that is, Arabic) names, Muḥammad, Aḥmad and Maḥmūd being the most common choices. And yet, our sources show that some of the *awlād al-nās* were given Turkish names. A daughter of the Mamluk amir Baybars al-Jāliqī was called Gerildi Khātūn.²⁵ Another case is the daughter of amir Jānbek al-Ḥamrāwī (or al-Ḥamzāwī) who founded a *waqf* for her son, Timūrbāy b. al-Sayfī Mughlabāy (or Mu'labāy).²⁶

²³ *ALD*, fols. 8b, 68b, 105a; *TD* no. 393, 7 (in which the Manjaki amir creates a charity fund and the rest for his two wives, both of them Turkish (Telek Khātūn and Yilğan Khātūn). *Ibid.*, p. 17 (a whole village in the Karak region is a *waqf* for the family's two mosques in Damascus. *Ibid.*, p. 49 (a mill and orchards are for a *waqf* on a *zāwiya*).

²⁴ Even when they were Circassians who only learned to speak Turkish after they arrived in Egypt and Syria!

²⁵ *ALD*, fol. 56b. This woman established in the year 737 a family and a charitable *waqf*. It was still active under the Ottomans; the evidence of the *khatīb* of the Umayyad mosque and other Muslims confirmed its validity.

²⁶ *TD* no. 393, 133.

In addition to the famous solidarity of Mamluk factions, the *waqf* documents show the strength of solidarity, commitment and support within Mamluk families. One would like to know more about how the strong ties between brothers, sisters, cousins, nephews and other family relatives were maintained within a recruiting system according to which, in principle, every imported mamluk arrived as an isolated individual. It stands to reason that the slave traffic which brought mamluks and slave girls into the Sultanate did not disrupt all families, but brought members of the same families in clusters, at least in many cases. The pious endowments also reveal the loyalty to the memory of the mamluk's master by donating *waqf* funds to institutions associated with him. Yet this kind of donation usually falls in the category of the delayed *waqf*, operative only after the founder's family died out. This attitude, which is also supported by self-interest, applies to "Mamluk" women as well as to men.

For example, a woman, named Elchibāy bint 'Abdullāh al-Yaḥyāwī, founded in the year 908 a *waqf* for herself and then for her brother's son. The brother is called Dawlatbāy, a mamluk, and his son, al-Zaynī Maṣṣūr. The *waqf* provides financial support also to her nephew's children and to her own manumitted slaves. Finally, if no one remains, the funds should go to the *turba* of Qānṣūh al-Yaḥyāwī outside the Bāb al-Jābiya in Damascus. Qānṣūh al-Yaḥyāwī was a governor (*nā'ib al-saltāna*) of Damascus who died in Shawwāl 902. The woman had a Turkish name, and was most probably Qānṣūh's concubine, hence her *nisba* al-Yaḥyāwī, unusual with regard to women. At the time of the Ottoman inspection of the *awqāf*, the *waqf* property, a village in the Biqā' valley, was under the control of Maṣṣūr b. Dawlatbāy, technically one of *awlād al-nās*.²⁷

Another typical example: Ardabesh Bek issued a *waqfiyya* in the year 918. It was a family *waqf* for himself, his children, his brother Tīmūr Bek, his sister Yalmās (reading uncertain), and his nephew Qāyitbāy. Only then came the turn of the founder's own children and their progeny. After them were covered his own manumitted slaves and their progeny, and finally the manumitted slaves of his master Sībāy, the governor of Damascus, and their descendants. In another *waqfiyya*, granted at the same year, the beneficiaries were the

²⁷ *Ibid.*, fol. 56b.

founder himself, his children, his brother, and finally, Sībāy's *madrasa*. Four years later, Ardabesh Bek issued another *waqfiyya*, providing support for his own *turba* and also, at the end, Sībāy's *madrasa* again.²⁸

The central role of women as founders and administrators of *waqf* is well attested. Our documents reaffirm this general fact. The percentage of the women in the registers of the Province of Damascus who owned private property (*milk*), converted it into *awqāf*, administered it, laid claims to *milk* and *waqf* privileges, and were named as beneficiaries of *waqf* funds is very high indeed. In one case, a *waqf* established in the year 830 by Zaynab bint Shāms al-Dīn al-Ṣābūnī, was a century later under the control of a woman who was her descendant after five generations. The documents mention the names of all five women while no men's names are given.²⁹

Since mamluks are the subject of present paper, the following discussion will deal only with women who were Turkish slaves themselves, or who belonged to Mamluk families and households. Again, it is easy to recognize a "Mamluk" female slave by her Turkish name and the appellation "bint 'Abdullāh". Several female slaves were called by Arabic rather than Turkish names, but not names that would be given to freeborn women.³⁰ According to our sample, mamluks' wives and concubines were predominantly, though not exclusively, Turks (or Circassian) like themselves, who had been imported to the Mamluk Empire by slave traders. Although in the Mamluk regime it was unthinkable that a civilian would own a mamluk, there is evidence of Turkish slave women as the concubines (*jawānī*, singular *jārīya*) of rich civilians. As far as our evidence shows, those Turkish concubines were for all practical purposes considered as their master's wives; sometimes they were referred to as *zawja*, a legally married wife. The following example demonstrates the point. A founder of a *waqf* (in 901) stipulates in his *waqfiyya*, among other things, that his wife (*zawja*) Zaynab (a common Arabic name) will be given 720 dirhams each year. Exactly the same amount goes to Malakbāy (a Turkish sounding name) bint 'Abdullāh, his *umm walad*, a maid who had borne a son to her master.³¹

²⁸ *Ibid.*, fol. 91a–b.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, fol. 95b.

³⁰ Farah al-nās bint 'Abdullāh, *ibid.*, fol. 23a; Sitt al-Awwal, *TD* no. 393, 43.

³¹ *Ibid.*, fol. 3a.

In another case, a civilian stipulated in a *waqfiyya* that his *jāriyya*, Savarbāy bint ‘Abdullāh, be paid 800 dirhams annually. His children would receive whatever remains.³² In a similar case, al-Najmī Yahyā b. Muḥammad al-Madanī willed his property as *waqf* to his wife Sakarbāy bint ‘Abdullāh.³³ Another Turkish *jāriyya* who was manumitted, Azwān Khātūn by name, previously in possession of a civilian, founded her own *waqf*.³⁴ Yet it seems that such cases were rare. In most cases, the Turkish *jawāri* became wives and concubines of Mamluk amirs.

The determination of the *waqf* founders, regardless whether they were mamluks or civilians, to care for the future of women in their families is obvious from the provisions of the *waqfiyyas*. In many documents the portions of what women obtained from the estate through *waqf* were explicitly higher than what they would have received by the Qur’ānic laws of inheritance (*bi’l-’irṭh al-shar’ī*). The reverse did occur, but was considerably rarer. The general impression is that the interests of the women in families were at least as close to the founder’s mind as those of his sons. It is possible, of course, that the sons got their share through the mechanism of *shar’ī* inheritance or by other means. Our documents certainly do not give the entire picture. It was evidently realized that widows and unmarried daughters whose fathers had died might more than men need the economic safety that the *waqf* could provide. The same applies to *’utaqā’*, manumitted slaves.

An amir called Tanam b. ‘Abdullāh min Sībāy (indicating that he had been a mamluk of Sībāy, the governor of Damascus) provided in his *waqf* document financial support for his wife Balqīs, who was also his female cousin. Her name appeared first before other beneficiaries, including his children.³⁵ In another *waqf*, established in 917, the amir Azbak (Özbek) b. ‘Abdullāh al-Sayfī Qachmās set up a family *waqf* for himself, his wife (*zawja*) Jān Sivār (Jan Sever) and their daughter Satīta. The *waqf* provided financial support also for Jān Ḥabīb, his manumitted female slave (*’atīqa*). After the family became extinct (*ba’d al-’inqirād*), the revenues would go to the Turbat

³² *Ibid.*, fol. 119a.

³³ *ID* no. 393, fol. 111.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

³⁵ *ALD*, fol. 5b.

al-Qachmāsiyya and Turbat Īnāl. This amir was obviously a mamluk of Qachmās al-Zāhirī, the governor of Damascus from 886 until his death in 892. Qachmās built a *turba* and a *madrasa* that were named after him. When the Ottoman bureaucracy surveyed the entitlements decades later, the clerk noted that the property, which was 12/24 (half the revenues) of a village, was now in the hands of the above-mentioned women, both wives (*zawjatāni*) of the founder.³⁶

In the year 921, amir Tīmūr Bāy b. ‘Abdullāh al-Yaḥyāwī granted a *waqf* for his daughter Faraj and her mother (*sic*) Sulṭān Bāy, also a Turkish former slave girl. In the year 947, already under the Ottoman rule, the same Faraj founded her own *waqf*.³⁷

Khushqadam min Sibāy, another former mamluk of the governor made a *waqfiyya* for his wife Wardqān (unclear in the text, but certainly a Turkish name) and his daughter Balqīs (a favorite name). When the family no longer existed, the revenues were to go to the *ribāṭs* in al-Madina. No other beneficiaries are mentioned.³⁸ What is remarkable in this short document (it is really only a summary) is the date of the *waqfiyya*—925 (1519), three years after the Ottoman conquest of Syria. Several Arab writers praised the Ottomans at the time for respecting the *awqāf* that had been established by the Circassian mamluks, their fallen enemies.³⁹ Since the Ottomans wished to respect the *Sharī‘a*, it should have been self-evident. Yet, recognizing legally established *awqāf* that had been founded before the Ottoman Empire annexed the Arab lands is one thing, permitting mamluks or members of their families to make new *waqfs* from mamluks’ private properties is another. Nonetheless, there is evidence of such new *awqāf* dating from 927, 932, 928, 936, 946 and even 947.⁴⁰ This lenient approach on the part of the Ottoman administration can be explained by the Empire’s policy with regard to Syria. The number of mamluks in Syria was always much smaller than in Egypt. After the Ottoman conquest, the number of surviving mamluks must have been very small (in contrast to the situation in Egypt), and they

³⁶ *Ibid.*, fol. 110a.

³⁷ TD no. 393, p. 132; *ibid.*, 226.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 56.

³⁹ See, for example, Muḥammad al-Ishāqī, *Kitāb akhbār al-uwal fīmā taṣarrafa fī Miṣr min arbāb al-duwal* (Cairo, n.d.), 305–307. Several Arab writers who praise the religiosity of the Ottomans are mentioned in my *Egyptian Society Under Ottoman Rule, 1517–1798* (London and New York, 1992), 29–30.

⁴⁰ *ALD*, fol. 5b; TD no. 393, 14, 38, 95, 226.

did not pose any threat to Istanbul. It is true that Jānbirdī al-Ghazālī, the Mamluk amir who was appointed by Sultan Selīm as the Ottoman governor of greater Syria (not only the Province of Damascus), rebelled against Süleymān when the young sultan ascended the throne (end of 1520–early 1521). But this was a personal revolt, not a Mamluk uprising, and it was crushed immediately.

Now we must discuss the activity of Mamluk women as founders of *awqāf*. From the *waqf* documents, the role of women in Mamluk families as active providers for the economic future of themselves and other members of their families emerges prominently. The following examples illustrate the point. While promoting the religious values of the community at large by pious endowments, women took care to ensure the interests and reputation of their Mamluk households.

Jān Sivār (Sever) bint ‘Abdullāh, a manumitted slave girl of Yilbāy had a *milk* of 6/24 (a quarter) of the revenues of the Dayr al-‘Aṣāfir village in the Marj region.⁴¹ In the year 928 (6 years after the Ottoman conquest) Faraḥ al-Nās bint ‘Abdullāh converted a mill on the al-A‘waj river in Wādī al-‘Ajam, which was her *milk*, into a *waqf* for al-Sharafī Maḥmūd b. Özbek and his progeny. It is not known what her relationship to the recipient was, but this is a case of a former *jārīya* making a donation for one of the *awlād al-nās*.⁴²

The wife of a high-ranking Mamluk amir, Şaṅṭbāy al-Ḥājib by name, made a *waqf* for herself and then their son (significantly, the text says only “her son”), al-Nāşiri Muḥammad b. Şaṅṭbāy. She also wills an income for another mamluk’s son, called Nāşir al-Dīn b. Sunqur. It is not clear what he was to her. Half of the *waqf*’s income was to be paid to these two men and the other half to her manumitted slaves and for charity. The *waqfiyya*’s date is 936 (1529 or 1530).⁴³ It is interesting to note that in the year 919, Şaṅṭbāy al-Ḥājib himself founded a much richer *waqf* for his two sons, the above-mentioned al-Nāşiri Muḥammad and al-Shihābī Aḥmad, who was not mentioned in his widow’s *waqfiyya*. It is possible that he fathered him by another woman.

Kamā (reading uncertain) Khātūn bint Aybak b. ‘Abdullāh granted a *waqf* for her son Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad b. Özdemir, subsequently

⁴¹ *ALD*, fol. 7a.

⁴² *Ibid.*, fol. 23a.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, fol. 59a.

for his children, and finally for her and her father's manumitted slaves. This is a case of a Mamluk amir's daughter who was married to a mamluk. Neither her husband nor his slaves are mentioned in the *waqfiyya*, only hers and her father's.⁴⁴

Another former slave girl, called Jān Sivār, who gave birth to the child of Bard Bek (*mustawladat* Bard Bek) set up a *waqf* for her sister (*shaqīqa*, having the same parents) Jān Ḥabīb, a former slave girl of Sībāy.⁴⁵ Several women of Mamluk families founded their own *turbas* or donated money through *waqf* to support *turbas* established by their relatives.⁴⁶

There is a rare record of a *waqfiyya* granted in 866 of a Mamluk couple establishing *together* a pious foundation, which was unusual. Gömüşbugha and his wife Aq Melek bint 'Abdullāh made a *waqf* for themselves and for their (*sic*) children. After their family died out, part of the revenues was to be given to the soup kitchen, another portion to buy bread for the (poor) residents of the Umayyad mosque, and another for the poor residents of the *ribāṭs* in al-Madina, and to the founders' manumitted slaves.⁴⁷

Acknowledging the limitations of information in these *waqf* registers, one still may venture certain general observations about the size of families, Mamluk and civilian, by using the information provided by the documents. It seems that families (not households, which include persons other than the biological family) were rather small. If a man or women named their children, sons and girls, in a legal document as beneficiaries of the *waqf* they were establishing, it can be assumed that they did not omit names. Only rarely more than three or four names of children were mentioned. The number of children in Mamluk families that appear in the *waqfiyyas* was not larger than civilian families. Indeed, the reverse seems to be the case. As to the number of wives, in practice, it was also limited to two, and that already included the *jawārī* (slavewomen), who, as shown above, enjoyed the same privileges as the *zawjāt* (legally married wives), and were often referred to as such. This indicates that almost all men, even those who belonged to the wealthy elite, usually dispensed with

⁴⁴ *ALD*, fol. 64a.

⁴⁵ *TD* no. 393, 126.

⁴⁶ See, for example, *ibid.*, 33, 43, 97.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 22, *ALD*, fol. 93a.

their right to be married to four wives simultaneously and to keep indefinite number of concubines. The only time I have encountered a text which explicitly mentions more than two wives is a *waqfiyya* made in the year 919 by Arkmās, the governor of Damascus, who provided clothes and money after his death to “his wives and concubines who had borne him children (*zawjātuhu wa-mustawladātuhu*—in the Arabic plural), as long as they remain unmarried”.⁴⁸ Even in this isolated case it, is not clear whether the plural form was used with regard to specific women (no names are mentioned), or whether it was a general statement to cover future eventualities in the amir’s life.

Concluding remarks

The limitations of the sources for this study notwithstanding, the *waqf* (and the less frequent *milk* documents) offer a perspective on the mamluks and their families, which is not available from other sources. In many cases, the *waqfiyyāt* themselves have not survived, and all we have are summaries of the originals. Sometimes the Ottoman bureaucrats who prepared the registers did not see the *waqfiyya* itself and they had to rely on *maḥḍar*, the qadi’s court records, or in some cases on other documents and witnesses. Yet, the documents seem orderly and accurate overall and enable us to see social and economic aspects of the wealthy people in the province of Damascus who could afford to establish *awqāf*. As *waqf* researchers are well aware, these documents can serve as informative sources for the history of education, religious institutions, urban history and the like. I am preparing a more comprehensive study in which I hope to use the documents for some of these subjects. In this paper I have attempted to focus on the mamluks themselves and have not discussed other *waqf* founders, notably the ‘ulama’, bureaucrats or merchants.

The fact that, in the view of the entire Mamluk elite—from the sultans down—the relevant space for creating *khayrī awqāf* from Syrian resources was Syria, *Bilād al-Shām*, and in this case the Province of Damascus, generally to the exclusion of Egypt, the center of the empire, is striking.

⁴⁸ *TD* no. 393, 17. See his short biographical notice in *Muʿat al-adhhān* (see note 20 above) vol. I, 299–300.

There are indications, however, that the amirs were less inclined than the civilian elite to invest in purely residential institutions, such as mosques and school associated with a certain quarter or *madhhab*. This is not surprising, given their self-view as orthodox rulers of the whole population. Yet the mamluks did donate *waqfs* for the benefit of charity, education and religion. They seem to have preferred institutions on which there was a “consensus”, such as the Umayyad mosque, *awqāf al-Ḥaramayni al-Sharīfayni* and Jerusalem and Hebron. They emphasized naturally the mosques, schools and *turbas* established by themselves or their masters. The subject requires further research.

The family *awqāf* and the *dhurrī* components of the *khayrī* foundations reveal important aspects of the Mamluk military society in late Mamluk Syria. We are considering not only individual mamluks or Mamluk factions, which are so important in understanding Mamluk politics, but families with widespread Mamluk (Turkish, even if these “Turks” were Circassian at the time) ties, common interests and loyalties that are reflected in the ways in which *waqf* funds were allocated. The Mamluk identities merged with family ties.

The centrality of women in creating and administering *awqāf* is well known, and obvious also in our documents regarding women with “Mamluk” background, as well as civilians. The women in Mamluk families fully exercised their economic and social power to enhance the solidarity of their families and households. We know from various studies of Mamluk society that mamluks married either women of a background similar to theirs, or daughters of the wealthy civilian elite. In our *waqf* documents at least, the women who were married to mamluks were predominantly former slave girls or, in some cases, daughters of mamluks. I have found very few other women. On the other hand, there are cases of former slave girls with Turkish names who were wives and concubines of rich civilians.

Finally, according the evidence of the *waqf* documents, I have ventured the generalization that the average Mamluk family was small. Frequently, only one wife was mentioned, and almost never more than two, including concubines. The number of children in the *waqfiyyas* was also low, rarely more than three, including daughters. The general impression is that civilians had more children than mamluks. This, too, is a preliminary impression that needs further investigation.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

THE LAST MAMLUK HOUSEHOLD

Thomas Philipp

The appearance of fully functioning, power wielding mamluks in Bilād al-Shām at the end of the eighteenth century was certainly an oddity. The Mamluk system in Syria had vanished with the conquest of the Ottomans. In sharp contrast to the situation in Egypt there also occurred later no resurrection of the system under Ottoman sovereignty. Why and how the Mamluk system should have survived and reorganized itself in Ottoman Egypt and how the mamluks there could again take over power, albeit recognizing officially the Ottoman Sultan—has been discussed extensively by Winter.¹ He argues that from early on the Ottomans had decided to use the mamluks in Egypt for their own administrative and military purposes. When the weakness of the Ottoman Empire reached its nadir in the eighteenth century the mamluks used the opportunity to regain almost all their power in Egypt. Winter adds that especially for the early period of Ottoman rule much about the fate of the mamluks remains conjecture because of the dearth of information.

After the conquest of Syria the Ottomans experimented also there briefly with coopting the mamluks. Jānbirdī al-Ghazālī was appointed governor of Damascus. But when he rebelled upon the news of the death of Selim I his resistance was quickly crushed by the Ottomans. Southern Syria was reorganized into different provinces and sancaqs while the officials and governors were appointed from among the Ottomans, not the mamluks. From then on we do not hear of any mamluks in Syria for the next 250 years.

¹ Michael Winter “Military connections between Egypt and Syria (including Palestine) in the early Ottoman period” in: Cohen, A. and Baer, G. *Egypt and Palestine*, New York, 1984, 139–149; “The re-emergence of the mamluks following the Ottoman conquest” in: T. Philipp and U. Haarmann (eds.). *The mamluks in Egyptian politics and society*, Cambridge, 1998, 67–107.

It is perhaps easier to tackle the question why there occurred no re-emergence of mamluks in Ottoman Syria than to answer the question why, indeed, they did re-emerge in Egypt. The first point that comes to mind is that the mamluk realm always had its center in Egypt. Syria was administered by mamluks sent from Egypt and mostly returning to Egypt again.² Once the mamluks had lost their sovereignty in Egypt, they obviously could not project their power to Syria. While the Ottomans chose to keep the administrative system of Egypt unchanged they reorganized Syria. In Egypt seven military corps were organized, one of them manned by the defeated mamluks, paving the way for the later “mamlukization” of the Egyptian army.³ In Syria Janissaries and Timariots constituted the new army. In addition, the importance of Egypt over Syria was signified by the size of the local Ottoman armies: while in Egypt the army counted in the sixteenth century between 10,000 to 15,000 men in Syria it had only one tenth the size.⁴ To the greater demands for manpower by the army in Egypt was added the Ottoman unwillingness (practically a taboo) to use Egyptians or, for that matter, local Arabs anywhere, in the Ottoman army. In the ethnically very homogeneous Egypt this taboo forced the authorities to make use of the mamluks and tolerate the imports of new mamluks. In Syria one always could, in case of need, mobilize auxiliary troops among the Kurds, local Turkmens and possibly even Druze.

The appearance of mamluks in Syria, in Acre to be more precise, at the end of the eighteenth century occurred, ironically, at the very moment when the Mamluk system in Egypt began to disintegrate.⁵ But it is also the one moment in neo-Mamluk history when the Egyptian mamluks reached again for Syria: When ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr forged an alliance with Ḍāhir al-‘Umar in 1770 and sent troops against the Ottoman *wālī* of Damascus. Eventually the mamluks in Acre outlasted the Egyptian mamluk system by a decade. If

² Boaz Shoshan, “On the relations between Egypt and Palestine 1382–1517 A.D.” in: Cohen, A. and Baer, G. (eds.) *Egypt and Palestine*, 94–101; Peter M. Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent 1516–1922*, Ithaca, 1966, 33–45.

³ Winter, “Military Connections”, 140.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 142.

⁵ For the reasons of this disintegration see Daniel Crecelius, “The Mamluk beylicate of Egypt in the last decades before its destruction by Muḥammad ‘Alī Pasha in 1811” and Thomas Philipp “Personal loyalty and political power of the mamluks in the eighteenth century.” Both in: Philipp and Haarmann, *op. cit.*

it did not sound too pedantic we could call them the post-neo-mamluks but we shall simply speak of the last mamluk household that wielded effective political power.

In the early seventies of the eighteenth century we hear for the first time of the appearance of the man in Syria who was to be the founder of the Mamluk household in Acre: Aḥmad Bey al-Jazzār, later better known as Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār. It is not surprising that he should have been a mamluk from Egypt, the only place where the system still existed.

In a way Aḥmad Bey's career in Egypt was already symptomatic for the disintegration of the Mamluk system. He came from a for mamluks untypical region: the Balkan, not the Caucasus. It is also not very likely that he came as a slave, and he certainly was already over twenty when he arrived in Egypt.⁶ Eventually, however, the mamluks in Egypt accepted him as one of their own and he did acquire two essential Mamluk qualities: he became a superb warrior and he developed a fierce loyalty toward his mamluk masters and comrades. It was indeed this latter quality which made him refuse to participate in a treasonable plot and consequently forced him to flee from Egypt. When he surfaced, after some meandering, in Lebanon he had no claim to more than the clothes on his back. But as a true soldier of fortune he made his career in the shifting alliances, the intrigues, and the wars between Ḍāhir al-ʿUmar, the Druze, the governor of Damascus and the Egyptian mamluks of Abū al-Dhahab. After the death of Ḍāhir al-ʿUmar in 1775 he was appointed governor of the province of Sidon (with residence in Acre). This position he was to keep for almost thirty years until his death in 1804.

Given Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār's Mamluk background it was hardly surprising that he should have made the Mamluk patterns of military rule the principle of his own rule in Acre. He built up his own Mamluk household from which he drew his own bodyguard, his personal advisors, and trusted lieutenants who ruled various parts of the realm in his name and commanded most military expeditions. The inner circle of this group were Salīm Pasha al-Kabīr (the Elder), Salīm Pasha al-Ṣaghīr (the Younger), Sulaymān Pasha al-ʿĀdil, and ʿAlī Aghā Khāzindār. Apparently all were of Georgian origin and

⁶ For his biography, especially in Egypt, see ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jabartī *ʿAjāʾib al-āthar fī ʿl-tarājim waʿl-akhbār*, vol. III, 321.

had been bought by or given to al-Jazzār in Egypt,⁷ though it is not clear when and how they reached him in Acre. During al-Jazzār's first years in Syria, after 1770 and before becoming governor of Sidon, we do not hear of them. Yet his emotional attachment to this group of mamluks must have been very close. When his first mamluk, Salīm Pasha the Elder, died of the plague in 1786, al-Jazzār "cried like a child."⁸ He was profoundly shaken by the rebellion of his mamluks in 1789, but when one of its leaders, Sulaymān Pasha, returned to him thirteen years later, he received him like a lost son. Al-Jazzār's mamluks were somewhat apart from, and above all other units. They served as guards of the palace and the treasury, as commanders of various units and of specific military campaigns, or as *mutasallims* (temporary governors) in various cities, and formed a typical Mamluk household with al-Jazzār its head; hence their particular loyalty to al-Jazzār and his trust in them.

Recently it has been seriously questioned,⁹ whether the appearance of the so-called neo-mamluks in Ottoman Egypt implied indeed a reemergence of the Mamluk system of old or whether this was rather part of a much more general phenomenon, namely, the Ottoman household, understood as a "patron-client and kinship grouping, both for political solidarity and economic activity."¹⁰ It was "neither rigidly defined nor a static entity" and "evolved to serve the needs of a highly competitive society that frequently received new members from far-flung places."¹¹ Military and administrative elites, freeman and Mamluk, local elements and newcomers were integrated in it. Widening the concept from a strictly Mamluk military household of the Middle Ages to an Ottoman household of the kind described above has its advantages. The concept certainly reflects

⁷ Ibrāhīm al-ʿAwra, *Tārīkh wilāyat Sulaymān Bāshā al-ʿĀdil*, Sidon 1936, 14 claims that Salīm the Elder had come with him from Egypt and that Salīm the Younger was a present from Ibrāhīm Bey al-Kabīr. But on p. 111 al-ʿAwra himself writes that al-Jazzār bought all of them only after he had settled in Acre; Ḥaydar Aḥmad Shihāb, *Tārīkh Aḥmad Bāshā al-Jazzār*, Beirut 1955, p. 87. Hananya Munayyir, *al-Durr al-marūf fī tārikh al-Shūf, al-Mashriq* 69 (1955), p. 265 claims he came with a slave, a mamluk and a groom.

⁸ Archives Nationales, Affaires étrangères, Paris (AN AE) B1 979, CC Acre, May 1, 1786.

⁹ Jane Hathaway *The politics of households in Ottoman Egypt* (Cambridge, 1997), see especially ch. II and the Conclusion.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 169.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 21.

much better the reality of the household in Acre. As we had seen it was even doubtful whether al-Jazzār himself was a mamluk properly speaking. In one source he is even quoted as claiming that he always was a free man and hence disliked by the Mamluk establishment.¹² Though he later acquired other mamluks, he also bought or hired a variety of other troops. Numerically the mamluks were always a minority in al-Jazzār's household and seemed to have vanished after their rebellion in 1789. Sulaymān Pasha, al-Jazzār's successor, rebuilt the system but also hired mercenaries and concluded alliances with the Metualis and Druze and used their tribal forces. Administrators of local origin also belonged to the household in Acre. 'Abdallāh Pasha finally included also elements of local elites in his household.

Notwithstanding the argument that these were not Mamluk households in the classical sense,¹³ it is important to point out that their members considered themselves mamluks and referred to themselves as such. If this was "a calculated, if genuinely felt, nostalgia,"¹⁴ as Hathaway claims, it was, nevertheless, a politically relevant sentiment. It could generate loyalties which caused al-Jazzār to risk his life. It identified political factions such as the party supporting Abū Nabbūt. Having been comrades (*khushdāsh*) under the same chief (*ustādh*) legitimized competing claims to power as was the case with 'Alī Aghā Khāzindār, Abū Nabbūt and Sulaymān Pasha. The mamluks under al-Jazzār and then again under Sulaymān Pasha self-consciously styled themselves as mamluks and over long periods they were the decisive element in the household in Acre. It seems, therefore, not unreasonable to call this particular "patron-clients and kinship grouping" a Mamluk household even if it did not reproduce the classical form of that model.

In a more general manner Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār subscribed to the principle of using only imported soldiery. In contrast to his predecessor, Ḍāhir al-'Umar, he never entered alliances with local tribal

¹² "The serving [low ranking] Mamluk race did not like anybody to serve their master who was not one of them, lest he would take precedence over them, because he was a free man. He [al-Jazzār] was a free man, a Bosnian . . ." This might, however, have been a strictly self-serving statement, to explain why he left Egypt. *Mishāqā*, 5. (I am translating here from the Arabic version, as the English translation is totally garbled at this point.)

¹³ Maybe even the classical Mamluk households were much more porous and flexible than they appear today in the retrospective view.

¹⁴ Hathaway, 170.

forces nor did he try to mobilize other local forces.¹⁵ He hired Maghrebi mercenaries, bought Albanian soldiers (both Christian and Muslim), and relied on Bosnian troops. He also hired some of the former Dalāt cavalry troops which had been officially dissolved by the Ottoman sultan. A small group of Kurds under their leader Ṭāhā became responsible—in as far as such distinction was made at all—for internal security, i.e., they ran the prisons and carried out tortures and executions. How large was this army of al-Jazzār? As so often in our attempt to reconstruct the history of the period, we encounter the greatest difficulties when searching for some quantitative information. We do not have any record of the troops themselves, their employment, or their provisions. French consuls and Arab monk chroniclers were not usually eyewitnesses to battles and warfare in general. Chroniclers and later historians supply us with numbers whose roundness alone must make us suspicious. Whether the numbers of participants in a battle, the numbers killed, wounded, or prisoners—they are all guesses, often with the purpose of emphasizing the might or the courage of one side. We have one eyewitness' report by the French consul Renaudot describing the caravan-cum-parade of troops when Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār left Acre to assume, for the first time, the position of *wālī* of Damascus. He was at the peak of his power, and all the political and economic signs promised a great future for al-Jazzār. Leaving Acre for Damascus he was demonstrating his might. An important moment, and it is worth giving the description in full.

The caravan left Acre on 18 April 1785. It included 400 camels and 200 mules with baggage. Seventy-five banners¹⁶ of the Maghrebi infantry were followed by fifty-four banners of the Albanians, each group with its own music. Twenty banners of mounted Maghrebis and some 300 Dalāt marching in pairs were next. Four field cannons and baggage carriages drawn by mules followed, together with twenty artillery men on camels equipped with fuses.

Une bande des santons et prophètes burlesquement accoutrés qui portaient tous les attributs de démence, en avoient les mascers et leurs chansons s'en resentoient bien qu'elles fussent à la gloire de Dgezzar qui suivait immediament avec Selim et ses grands officiers de sa maison.

¹⁵ Only once, during the mutiny of his mamluks, did he arm craftsmen and other people in Acre. See below.

¹⁶ A banner consisted of ten soldiers.

The litter of the Pasha was accompanied by nine hand-led horses. Musical bands followed and “100 mamluks curassés, bardis de fer, ayant les casques en tête et la visier basse.” The parade was concluded by 200 slaves mounted and bizarrely dressed, armed with rifles, two pistols, a sword, a dagger, and some even with hatchets. Renaudot commented:

tout cet appareil avait quelques choses de fort ridicule pour un homme accoutumé aux évolutions d’arms. Mais les gens du pays en étoient effrayés. Dgezzar lui même, quoique bon comedien, paraissait étonné de la grandeur de spectacle.¹⁷

The total was somewhat more than two thousand troops plus the baggage train, apparently enough to establish his authority in Damascus. How many more troops can we assume would have been left to garrison Acre, Sidon, Beirut, and perhaps in the Metuali region and assisting Amīr Yūsuf in the Mountain as well? Even a generous estimate could not more than triple the number at the time to reach a total of perhaps six thousand troops. We have a variety of estimates by eyewitnesses and other contemporaries but none of them indicates by which methods such numbers were reached. Volney in 1784 estimated all troops to consist of 900 Bosnian horsemen and 1,000 Maghrebi infantry. This would mean that practically the whole army participated in the expedition to Damascus. This seems extremely unlikely, and other sources indicate that in earlier years the army probably was larger. Most estimates, and this constitutes another difficulty, relate to specific military actions without telling us how many troops were left elsewhere in al-Jazzār’s realm. When al-Jazzār, who himself rarely left Acre for military operations, sent troops for one battle or another the Arab chronicists most frequently use the terms “he appointed” (*ʿayyana*), “collected” (*jammaʿa*), “equipped” (*jah-haza*) troops (*ʿaskar*)—which makes it sound almost as if he *raised* new troops each time. This is unlikely but perhaps partially true, especially considering the high casualties of his troops in many lost battles. We know he imported troops directly from the Balkans, hired Maghrebi and Dalāt troops locally, and bought individual mamluks. In the early years at least he also paid them well, so that they felt a certain amount of gratitude and loyalty to him.¹⁸ How many of

¹⁷ AN AE B1 979, April 30, 1785.

¹⁸ AN AE B1 1040, July 21, 1784.

these were demobilized after a particular military campaign, how many belonged to a standing army, what were the losses?

We shall probably never know the precise numbers but estimates, coming from different sources, albeit some copied from each other, seem to be fairly consistent. An upper limit of 7,000 to 8,000 troops altogether appears to have been the rule. Military expeditions of a 1,000–2,000 seem to have been logistically sustainable; corps larger than this were rather the exception. This means in any case a regular army three to four times as large as any Ḍāhir al-‘Umar had commanded. In contrast to the latter’s army it saw almost continuous action.

The vaguely ethnic character of the units had its advantages. It served as an organizing principle of the army and it guaranteed a minimum of loyalty and cooperation within these units. Typically their immediate commanders were of the same origin and could successfully establish some discipline. In fact it was they who commanded the loyalty of the troops, rather than the governor of Sidon who paid for them. But this arrangement also had its shortcomings. Troops of similar background and origin confronting each other on opposing sides in a battle were liable to refuse fighting. Dalāt troops refused to fight when facing other Dalāt units on the opposing side. In another incident Dalāt troops of al-Jazzār accepted orders from a Dalāt commander on the Damascus side, because most of the officers of the Dalāt troops “were his protégés.”¹⁹ Any expeditionary corps containing troops from more than one of the above-mentioned ethnic units risked an outbreak of fighting between them. Joint military expeditions between troops of Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār and the Druze of whichever faction was momentarily allied with him can serve as an example: Returning from one such expedition in 1795 the troops under Amīr Bashīr’s command, Druze and Maghrebis, broke into a fight over the distribution of booty they had collected in the Mountain. In the following mêlée 500 people were killed. A few days later the two sides attacked each other again and another 300 lost their lives.²⁰ A year earlier fighting had broken out between Dalāt troops and Maghrebis, stationed in the Mountain. When the

¹⁹ Shihāb, *al-Jazzār*, 139–40.

²⁰ Rufāʿil Karāma, *Hawādith Lubnān wa-Sūriyya*, al-Bushriyya, n.d. 146.

Albanian units decided to side with the former the Maghribi troops were defeated and dispersed.

The troops were usually well paid and constituted a continuous financial burden. On occasions al-Jazzār would delay payments to Istanbul in order to pay his troops; at other times, the troops would get restless, when not receiving their pay.²¹ Once firmly established in Acre, al-Jazzār also seems to have had more resources available for paying his troops. They appeared to be “*fort attachés à lui*,”²² badly trained and undisciplined. Frequently the desire to plunder won out over military discipline and fighting spirit. In one of the many campaigns against the Druze, an Albanian unit of five to six hundred soldiers disregarded explicit orders and advanced to plunder a Druze village. They were ambushed, and 100 were killed and as many wounded.²³ We never read about any particular training. The soldiers’ discipline usually was limited to a certain ethnic identity and loyalty to their immediate commanders. After each defeat or dispersal of troops Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār spent enormous sums to buy and hire new troops at the cost of economic impoverishment.

The army of al-Jazzār distinguished itself by the variety of its organization, ranking, and payment of its units. The mamluks were only one of several military units, albeit the highest ranking one, mamluks seem to have been frequently in command positions. They manned the defenses of Acre and in particular of the palace of al-Jazzār. The highest ranking mamluks were regularly entrusted with the command of military expeditions, commanded occasionally the Pilgrimage instead of him, and filled high administrative posts. They were also in a true Mamluk sense his *khushdāshiyya*, his comrades, confidants and friends. We know very little about their background, how they joined al-Jazzār’s household, and when. Some were said to

²¹ AN AE B1 1037, CC Seyde, vol. XXI, March 21, 1777: “Le Pacha est pressé; il lui faut absolument de l’argent. Les troupes réclament leur solde et murmurent;” *ibid.*, April 2, 1777 “Mémoire”; *Ibid.*, 1038, CC Seyde, vol. XXII, March 21, 1781: “Ses troupes s’étant déjà révoltées deux fois pour le paiement de leur solde, et l’ayant menacé de s’en prendre à lui personnellement, et de mettre la ville et notre kan au pillage. Les officiers de la Porte le persecutant d’un autre côté pour le paiement des mirhy, et l’irritant sans cesse a force de le presser tandis qu’il n’avoit pas un sol.”

²² AN AE B1 1040, CC Seyde, vol. XXIV, July 1784: “il a mis sa confiance en ces soldats, qui, de leur côté, luy paroissent fort attachés. Il le pays assez bien, pour devoir leur inspirer des sentiments de reconnaissance a son endroit.”

²³ AN AE B1 1040, CC Seyde, vol. XXIV, June 2, 1784.

have accompanied him from Egypt, though there is very little evidence for that. Most he could have only bought after his governorship and the trade of Acre provided him with the necessary means to do so. Some were bought as late as 1785. We can deduce al-Jazzār's intention to train new mamluks and to establish full-fledged Mamluk household from the fact that in 1789 there lived also a number of young mamluk boys at his court. Once more, we encounter difficulties when we want to estimate the numerical size of the Mamluk establishment. We know—mainly from Ibrāhīm al 'Awra, but also some other sources—about twenty of al-Jazzār's mamluks by name. Renaudot had talked of "100 mamluks curassés." Ḥaydar Aḥmad Shihāb mentions for 1789 "seventy" mamluks being in the palace of al-Jazzār while an undetermined number was at the same time participating in a military expedition under Salīm and Sulaymān Pasha against the Druze.²⁴ Compared to other military units, the mamluks seem to have been few. But there can be no doubt that they were at the core of the military and administrative organisation of al-Jazzār's rule. The whole Mamluk system in Acre, however, seemed to come apart in a gigantic crisis of loyalty and rebellion.

The rebellion of the mamluks in May 1789 was—apart from the French invasion and siege of Acre—Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār's gravest military and political crisis. In many ways it was more serious since it arose from an internal threat. It apparently also affected the personality of al-Jazzār profoundly. On May 4, 1789, Salīm Pasha al-Ṣaghīr was dispatched by Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār with 2,000 cavalry troops (presumably in their majority Albanian and Bosnian) to Ḥāṣḥayya to convince Amīr Yūsuf to pay his taxes. Sulaymān Pasha was sent for the same purpose with some 800 infantry troops along the coast to the north. The French consul Renaudot suspected that behind this rather large campaign lay an attempt by al-Jazzār to deflect any possible demand from Istanbul to contribute troops to the war against Russia by demonstrating the need to fight against the Druze. From Renaudot's own account it also could very well be that al-Jazzār sent his chief mamluks off on an expedition so that he could deal with the those remaining in Acre.²⁵

²⁴ Shihāb, *Tārīkh Aḥmad Bāshā al-Jazzār*, 92–93.

²⁵ Mishāqa, M., *Murder, mayhem, pillage and plunder*, Albany 1988, 39–40, makes this suspicion explicit. The two early Lebanese chroniclers, the monks Karāma and

Four days after the departure of these troops he discovered, or perhaps exposed, illicit relations between some of his mamluks and some women of his harem. He had the arms of many of the mamluks, who worked in the seraglio, cut off, and in following night he had some women drowned, “*ce qui design le motif du châtement des premiers.*” The next morning al-Jazzār continued with his purge. With a unit of thirty Bosnian soldiers he arrested more mamluks and killed some. At this point, the remaining mamluks offered resistance and defended themselves in the treasury which was situated in the Big Tower. The *Khāzindār*, brother of Salīm Pasha, freed the imprisoned mamluks and moved with them to the tower, joining the other mamluks.²⁶ According to the French reports, he was pushed into action after al-Jazzār killed his beloved valet. Barricaded in the Big Tower the mamluks turned the heavy guns, placed there to defend the city against enemies, on to the seraglio itself and threatened to blast it to pieces. In the ensuing stalemate the *muftī* of Acre played a mediating role and negotiated free departure with their weapons and horses for the mamluks, about seventy to eighty altogether. Their personal belongings were to be sent after them. Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār had no choice but to let them go. Only the prepubescent mamluks remained. Al-Jazzār killed many of them and had others exiled to Egypt.²⁷ Under the command of the *Khāzindār* the mamluks rode to the north and linked up with Salīm Pasha and Sulaymān Pasha. After an unsuccessful attempt at reconciliation with Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār, they all decided to fight against him. They reached a truce with Amīr Yūsuf and gained the support of the commander of the Maghrebi troops in Beirut, al-Jabūrī, who had actually been ordered by al-Jazzār to deliver him the head of Salīm. Sidon, where Sulaymān Pasha had been appointed previously as *mutasallim*,

Munayyar are remarkably uninterested in and uninformed about the internal events in Acre. The whole rebellion is barely treated. As its motive Karāma, *Hawādith*, 111, suggests that Salīm Pasha received orders from the Ottoman government to kill al-Jazzār as a rebel; al-Munayyar, *al-Durr*, p. 415, and al-Munayyar *Tārīkh*, p. 413, follow basically this story. In this case the French reports from Acre seem to be more trustworthy. They, like Shihāb, *al-Jazzār* and al-Jabartī, ‘Abd al-Raman ‘*Ajā’ib al-āthar fī ‘l-tarājīm wa ‘l-akhbāi*, Cairo 1879–1880, 4 vols. vol. III, 321, mention the illicit relationships between mamluks and women of the harem as the trigger for al-Jazzār’s revenge which led in turn to open rebellion by the mamluk leaders in the field; see especially AN AE B1 1041, “Extrait de la correspondance entre M. Renaudot et Beaussier au sujet de l’insurrection contre Dgezzar”.

²⁶ Shihāb, *al-Jazzār*, 92.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 93; al-Jabartī, ‘*Ajā’ib*, vol. III, 321.

served as the base for the rebels. They then proceeded south to Tyre, which refused to open its gates. The result was the sacking of the town and a subsequent looting in which the commanders lost control over their soldiers. This was the turning point of the whole rebellion: discipline among the troops could not be restored and they remained more concerned with plundering than with fighting. More importantly, the population in Acre, witnessing the events in Tyre, was no longer convinced that Salīm's rule would be a liberation from oppression. Still, for the moment Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār's position was desperate. All he had left for the defense of Acre were some 200 Albanian soldiers under their commander, Juwāq 'Uthmān.²⁸ But al-Jazzār's good fortune was that his opponents displayed a lack of planning and decisiveness of action which led Renaudot to observe: "*leurs démarches ne portent point ce caractere d'Energie qui annonce les grands actions, ces sont des Esclaves dechainés plutot occupés à considerer leurs chaines qu'au soin de les rompre.*" On June 3 the rebels finally appeared on the plain of Acre, some 1,200 troops altogether, but had no clear idea about how to proceed from there. In the meantime Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār had worked feverishly to strengthen the defense of the city. He collected all the workers and masons from the government workshops and armed them. Upon the advice of Shaykh Muḥammad al-Qāḍī he prepared for a night assault on the camp of the rebels and at the same time had a ship in the harbor ready to sail with him in case of defeat.²⁹ The rebels underestimated the resolve and initiative of al-Jazzār and his resourcefulness. The sortie from Acre and the simultaneous bombardment from the cannons on the fortifications took them completely by surprise. In the ensuing five-hour battle Salīm Pasha and Sulaymān Pasha were defeated and their troops dispersed. The French consul commented that both sides fought without great conviction and were mainly concerned with plundering. But Salīm's troops did not know anything about tactics, defected partially, and "those who fought did so only by fleeing." Betrayal also seems to have played a role. Supposedly the Kurdish commander Shaykh Ṭāhir had contacted one of Salīm's allies, Mullā Ismā'īl, commander of the Dalāt troops, before the battle and had persuaded him to prevent his troops from fighting. A number of

²⁸ Shihāb, *al-Jazzār*, 95; AN AE B1 980, CC Acre, III, May 28, 1789.

²⁹ Munayyar, *al-Durr*, 416.

mamluks had been killed, others already exiled, and the rest fled defeated. Salīm and Sulaymān reached the Mountain and then Damascus, for a while still hoping to raise new troops against al-Jazzār. For the moment the Mamluk household of al-Jazzār was destroyed, and ceased to exist as part of the military establishment and political institution. Renaudot wondered why, in the end, people such as Sulaymān and Salīm rebelled against their master. They had made their careers under him, had been pampered and become rich.³⁰

Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār must have asked himself the same question that Renaudot asked: Why would his top lieutenants rebel against him? Given his own identification with the Mamluk system and his keen sense of loyalty he was deeply traumatized by these events. Latent fears, suspicions, and distrust now jelled into a sense of paranoia: “After this event he became like an untamed animal. Nobody could stand up to him and he imagined that the whole world was against him.”³¹ Not surprisingly, he began a wave of purges, exiling and liquidating people from all ranks in society.

The military activities of al-Jazzār certainly continued on an undiminished level, but he must have had difficulties finding qualified commanding officers. He seems to have dealt with the problem by relying increasingly on a sort of military professionals who had flourished in an atmosphere of diminished Ottoman authority. These were military entrepreneurs who gathered volunteers around them: soldiers from dissolved units like the Dalāt but also tribal people, criminals and other dubious elements. They fed them, clothed them and provided them with money. The military entrepreneur—unlike the typical warlord—did not seek to control a particular region or province so as to ensure his and his soldiers livelihood, rather, he tried to hire out his military services to the various governors and amirs. These commanders looked at their military-for-hire services strictly as a business, not bound by territorial interests nor impeded by political loyalties. This explains also their frequent changing sides, which should not be understood so much as fickleness, but rather as a constant look-out for the greater benefits for his enterprise.

³⁰ All the above information, unless indicated otherwise is drawn from the “Premier Cahier—Extrait de la correspondance entre M. Renaudot et Beaussier au sujet de l’insurrection contre Dgezzar,” AN AE B1 1041, CC Seyde, vol. XXV.

³¹ Shihāb, *al-Jazzār*, 95.

The name of Qarā Muḥammad, head of Dalāt units, appears now more frequently.³² He was charged with leading an expeditionary corps of different units during the all-out war against the Druze in 1791. Ten years later he was still performing the same tasks.³³ Kanj Yūsuf, later to become governor of Damascus, started his career, too, as officer and later independent military entrepreneur.³⁴

The most famous and typical was probably Mullā Ismā‘īl, another “commander of Dalāt.” We have already encountered him above in the battle of the mamluks against al-Jazzār. He had probably predetermined the defeat of the mamluks, once he had been swayed to stay out of the battle. Later he fought on al-Jazzār’s side and also on supported Sulaymān Pasha against Kanj Yūsuf. Eventually Mullā Ismā‘īl was appointed by Sulaymān Pasha *mutazim* of Ḥamāt and Ḥomṣ.³⁵

The short but steep career of Ismā‘īl Pasha, an Albanian, who had come with the grand Vezier Yūsuf’s army to dislodge the French from Egypt is also symptomatic for the shortage of officers in al-Jazzār’s army. After the campaign Ismā‘īl Pasha accepted service with Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār and was immediately given command of a siege around Jaffa where a protégé of the vezier Yūsuf, Abū Maraḡ, had been appointed governor. Later Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār regretted his choice. He suspected Abū Maraḡ of conspiring with Ismā‘īl Pasha and had the latter imprisoned.³⁶

Sulaymān Pasha, one of the oldest and most trusted of al-Jazzār’s mamluks, but also one of the leaders of the Mamluk rebellion in 1789, returned in 1802 to al-Jazzār who received him like a lost son and immediately appointed him *mutasallim* of Sidon and commander of a campaign against Amīr Bashīr.³⁷ Eventually, Sulaymān Pasha was to succeed al-Jazzār as governor of Sidon and quite a number of Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār’s mamluks continued to serve under him. But before we deal with the question of the role of the Mamluk

³² Mishāqa, *Murder*, 41; Munayyar, *al-Durr*, 416 explains that after the mamluks were dispersed al-Jazzār used in their stead the units of Qarā Muḥammad and ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Ṭawīr (possibly also Kurds).

³³ Shihāb, *al-Jazzār*, 116, 151; Munayyar, *Tārīkh*, 428, 434.

³⁴ Shihāb, Ḥaydar Aḥmad, *Lubnān fī ‘ahd al-umawā’ al-Shihābīn*, (ed. by A. Rustum and F. Bustānī), 3 vols., Beirut 1984, vol. I, 197; vol. II, 422f., 523f.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. I, 182–202.

³⁶ Shihāb, *al-Jazzār*, 167.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 156.

establishment under Sulaymān Pasha's rule we have to acknowledge a considerable lacuna in our information. From the contemporary reports it would appear that al-Jazzār's reaction to the rebellion of 1789 dealt a final blow to the Mamluk establishment. The mamluks were either liquidated by him or had fled into exile. Apart from the surprising and touching return of Sulaymān a dozen years later we hear of no other mamluks playing any further role in al-Jazzār's government. It is the more surprising then to see how under Sulaymān's rule quite a number of mamluks, identified as mamluks of al-Jazzār, resurface and obtain positions of power and influence, 'Alī Aghā Khazindār and Muḥammad Aghā Abū Nabbūt being the most prominent ones. Whether they had returned still during the rule of al-Jazzār or, perhaps, never left after the rebellion or whether they had been called back by Sulaymān Pasha, we do not know. The fact is that under the rule of Sulaymān Pasha the Mamluk household of al-Jazzār reconstituted itself again.

When Sulaymān Pasha acceded to power in 1805 the region was exhausted. Not only the French military expedition against Acre, but subsequent campaigns from Acre against Jaffā, Nablus, and the Druze, had devastated the economy. Trade stagnated and the exorbitant tax burden forced the peasants to flee from their villages. By force of financial circumstance but also, it seems, by political inclination of Sulaymān Pasha, the military was to play a much smaller role. After having dislodged Abū Marāq from Jaffā at the very beginning of his rule, Sulaymān Pasha was to fight only one further major battle, in 1810 against Kanj Yūsuf Pasha, governor of Damascus. But a major element of his army in that battle were the Druze troops of Amīr Bashīr. Sulaymān Pasha himself was reluctant to spend too much money on the military. The French consul observed in 1808 with amazement that he was dismissing his Albanian troops, the best he had. All this while he had no more than a thousand soldiers stationed from Beirut to Ghaza.³⁸ Mishāqa, without specifying the year, speaks of some 1,500 or 2,000 troops.³⁹

In December 1811 Muḥammad Abū Nabbūt, *mutasallim* in Jaffa, came to visit Sulaymān Pasha in Acre. He brought 500 troops, while in Acre itself barely 200 guards were garrisoned. As he was, like

³⁸ AN AE, CC Acre, vol. I, April 6, 1808.

³⁹ Mishāqa, *Murder*, 58.

Sulaymān Pasha, a mamluk of al-Jazzār, Abū Nabbūt considered himself very much the equal of Sulaymān Pasha.⁴⁰

The French consul Pillavoine described the regime of Sulaymān Pasha as follows:

La Syrie depuis Lataquie, jusqu'a Gaza est une Republique dont le Sénat composé d'affranchis qui ont toutes les places es soumis au juif Haim Farhi qui la gouverne Despotiquement sous le nom de Soliman Pacha, Mamlouc qu'en est le Doge.⁴¹

—a sort of republic *à la Venicienne* in which the mamluks held all the important positions. Pillavoine's claim that they were, however, all subjected to the control by Ḥaim Farḥī is only somewhat of an exaggeration. We know of at least a dozen and a half high-ranking mamluks whose names appear again and again. The chief of the treasury and closest confidant of Sulaymān Pasha was 'Alī Aghā [later: Pasha] Khāzindār. He was Sulaymān Pasha's lieutenant in Acre while the latter was governor in Damascus. He remained the second in command until his death in 1814. His son 'Abdallāh Pasha was later to succeed Sulaymān Pasha. Most other high-ranking mamluks served as *mutasallims* in the various cities. There were occasionally changes but on the whole the permanence of the appointments was remarkable. Only in regions or cities that were beyond the immediate reach of Sulaymān Pasha would he make use of local strongmen: the Ṭūqāns in Nablus, Muṣṭafā Aghā Barbir in Tripoli, and, of course Amīr Bashīr in Mt. Lebanon. The coastal cities and the inland towns of the Galilee and the Jabal 'Āmil regions and a few of the high administrative positions in Acre were always controlled by the same small group of mamluks who had already belonged to the Mamluk household of al-Jazzār. They were all *khushdāshs* of the same *ustādh*. This comradeship cemented their loyalty to each other, and was essential for the functioning of the mamluk system as a whole. For Sulaymān Pasha this personal loyalty was the best means to ensure his rule over Acre and its realm. New mamluks were bought, and they served at the court of Sulaymān Pasha.

In fact, Sulaymān Pasha was master of the last functioning Mamluk system in history. Understandably, there was great concern in Acre about the fate of the mamluks in Egypt who had been massacred

⁴⁰ AN AE, CC Acre, vol. II, Dec. 23, 1811.

⁴¹ AN AE, CC Acre, vol. II, Jan. 20, 1812.

by Muḥammad ʿAlī. Two English travelers reported it in May 1811 and, soon after, a first-hand report was given by Amīn Bey, the famous mamluk who escaped the massacre in the Citadel by a daring jump over the wall with his horse. He settled for a time in Acre and worked as a cavalry commander for Sulaymān Pasha.⁴² Additional mamluks who escaped the massacre seem to have made their way to Acre.⁴³ In September of this year the French consul reports that Sulaymān Pasha began to buy mamluks left and right after the massacre in Cairo “*tout les Chrétiens qui se font Turcs sont amis dans ce corps à qui tous les emplois sont confiés.*”⁴⁴ Slave dealers flocked to Acre to sell their merchandise and by the summer of 1812 Sulaymān Pasha’s army had increased to some 2,500 troops.⁴⁵ Partially these purchases must have been the result of a treasury flush with money from the grain exports to England in 1811. But we may suspect a more self-conscious motive: Listening to the travellers and the the escaped mamluk himself, the mamluks in Acre were quite aware that they were the last of their kind, and perhaps the massive purchase of further mamluks was less a question of enlarging the army than an attempt to ensure their own way of life. From all the information we have, the mamluks seem actually not to have played a large role in the military. The 700 artillery troops in Acre were almost by definition not mamluks and probably not mamluk commanded. But even in the cavalry, the very service branch of the mamluks, we rarely hear of them. More frequently mentioned are the Kurdish Dalāt cavalry with their commander Shamlīn or Shamdīn Aghā who seems to have been another military entrepreneur.⁴⁶ Mishāqa described the army as follows: “There was no longer any necessity for many soldiers [after settling relations with the Metualis], so only about two hundred infantry men were put under the command of an Albanian officer named Muḥammad Aghā al-Nuʿmān who lived in Tyre and

⁴² AN AE, CC Acre, vol. II, May 22, 1811; Shihāb, Lubnān, vol. III, 785; for the literary dramatization of the incident see Jurjī Zaydān, *al-Mamlūk al-Shārid* (Cairo, 1891).

⁴³ Al-Jabarti, vol. IV, 130–131.

⁴⁴ AN AE, CC Acre, vol. II, Sept. 30, 1811.

⁴⁵ AN AE, CC Acre, vol. II, Jan. 20, 1812, Aug. 11, 1812.

⁴⁶ Originally he had served in the troops of Kanj Yūsuf Pasha and had later accepted service under Sulaymān Pasha. Eventually he was made “head of the officers of the army.” He was also to serve ʿAbdallāh Pasha until the end: al-ʿAwra, *Tārīkh*, 221–22, Shihāb, Lubnān, vol. III, 560.

about five hundred cavalry men were put under the command of three Kurdish officers, Shamdīn Aghā, Ni‘mat Aghā and Ayalyaqīn Aghā; and two officers, ‘Alī Abū Zayd Aghā and Mūsā al-Ḥāsī Aghā where put in charge of around four hundred Hawwāra Arab horsemen, while an officer called the *sāgbān bāshī* was posted over a few infantry soldiers stationed as guards at the palace gate in Acre. A group of canoneers [was also stationed] on the city walls, just as there were artillerymen and officers in every city.”⁴⁷

The role of the mamluks during the rule of Sulaymān Pasha should not be looked for in their military tasks, though some clearly had also commanding functions there. As during the early period of al-Jazzār’s regime the major function of the Mamluk household was it to provide coherence and stability to the rule of Sulaymān Pasha who appointed them to major political and administrative posts and could count on their loyalty. Sulaymān Pasha, like Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār, drew his legitimacy as a ruler from the fact that he was appointed governor of Sidon by the sultan. But neither ruler could count much on support or even acquiescence from the population in view of their stringent policy of monopolies applied to all cash crop cultivation and export.

The Mamluk system had been in decline since the rule of ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr in the last third of the eighteenth century. In fact, his attempt to achieve absolute power, had been a symptom of the end of the traditional Mamluk system—just as Amīr Bashīr’s concentration of power in his own hands would bring another traditional order to its end: the feudal system of Druze and Christian lords in Mt. Lebanon. The Mamluk system was beginning to suffer internally from lack of good manpower, negligent training and increasing lack of loyalty.⁴⁸ Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār had been an early victim of such disloyalty in Egypt. Later his own Mamluk rebellion caused an almost complete destruction of the system in Acre. As worrisome were other signs of decay. As in Egypt before, mamluks in this last phase were not only inclined to marry and establish kinship relations but to promote their offspring: ‘Abdallāh Pasha, son of ‘Alī Pasha Katkhudā

⁴⁷ Mishaqa, *Murder*, 58.

⁴⁸ See D. Creelius “The Mamluk beylicate of Egypt in the last decades before its destruction by Muḥammad ‘Alī,” and T. Philipp “Personal Loyalty and Political Power of the mamluks in the Eighteenth Century,” both in: Philipp and Haarmann, eds., *Mamluks*.

being the most glaring example. This added fuel to internal tensions. In April 1818 Sulaymān Pasha had been very sick, and people began to anticipate the time after his death. Possibly Abū Nabbūt had already insinuated in Istanbul that he would be the most suitable to take over the governorship from Sulaymān Pasha.⁴⁹ The mamluks of Acre were in close contact with Abū Nabbūt in Jaffā. They wanted to recreate an exclusive Mamluk regime such as they believed had existed in Egypt.⁵⁰ The son of the late ‘Alī Aghā Khāzindār had no place in their planning. Perhaps Abū Nabbūt was acting out of a sense that he was Sulaymān Pasha’s equal, and perhaps he was willing to betray him.⁵¹ But perhaps the mamluks altogether wanted only to safeguard their own existence and system. Natural children of mamluks had no place in this system. ‘Abdallāh Pasha, only twenty years old, and never truly part of the Mamluk establishment, tried to forge an alliance with local elements from religious and land controlling circles. This alliance was still shaky and he also depended on the support from Ḥaim Farḥī, the powerful secretary and finance administrator of Sulaymān Pasha. Ḥaim Farḥī “*détesté de tous les parties*,” also worried that his patron might die. Sulaymān Pasha seemed inclined to recognize Abū Nabbūt as his successor but Farḥī was opposed to this because he feared the latter’s strong position.⁵² It was probably this fear that motivated Ḥaim Farḥī in the summer of 1818 to convince Sulaymān Pasha to move against Abū Nabbūt. He was removed from Jaffā through an internal coup. This step initiated the campaign against the mamluks which ‘Abdallāh Pasha began even before being confirmed as governor of Sidon. Ibrāhīm Aghā, chief of artillery since the time of Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār, was replaced in September 1819 with Muṣṭafā Aghā al-Istanbūlī. Another mamluk lost his life under obscure circumstances, but probably was killed by ‘Abdallāh Pasha who suspected him of disloyalty.⁵³ Throughout the summer of 1820 *mutasallims* of various places, all mamluks of al-Jazzār, were removed. Salīm Aghā Abū

⁴⁹ Shihāb, Lubnān, vol. III, 644.

⁵⁰ AN AE, CC Acre, vol. III, April 27, 1818.

⁵¹ In early 1818 a French traveler, observed that Abū Nabūt may be aiming at independence in southern Palestine: C. de Forbin, *Travels in Greece, Turkey and the Holy Land in 1817–18* (London, 1820), 132.

⁵² AN AE, CC Acre, vol. III, Nov. 12, 1818.

⁵³ AN AE, CC Acre, vol. IV, Sept. 22, 1819, and Sept. 1, 1820.

Şayf, *mutasallim* of Beirut, barely appointed to Sidon, was soon exiled, like Hasan Aghā and ‘Alī Aghā ex-*mutasallims* of Beirut—all three mamluk comrades of Abū Nabbūt. They were suspected of having contact with him in Istanbul.⁵⁴ The *mutasallim* of Nazareth was replaced by a certain seventeen-years-old Salīm Aghā. It seems that ‘Abdallāh Pasha preferred to employ people as young as himself while pensioning off the old mamluks.⁵⁵ Some mamluks survived, and stayed with ‘Abdallāh Pasha until the bitter end. But from the list of his commanders who fell during the siege of Acre it is evident that among the troops ‘Abdallāh Pasha used there were no Mamluk commanders any more: Ḥusayn Aghā, and Ḥamādī Aghā, both *hawāra bāshās*, militia commanders, ‘Alī Aghā Farahāt, *maghribī bāshā*, commander of Maghrebi troops, and Shamlīn, commander of Dalāt cavalry, who survived.⁵⁶ All were units which with the exception of Shamlīn’s troops did not exist during Sulaymān Pasha’s time. The mamluks ceased to exist as the group they had been under Sulaymān Pasha’s rule with specific exclusive functions, political ambitions, and loyalties. Just as with the assassination of Ḥaim Farḥī, it was ‘Abdallāh Pasha’s aim to eliminate all elements that had been too close to Sulaymān Pasha and were perceived as a potential danger to his rule.

We know little about the military establishment during ‘Abdallāh Pasha’s time. A rough estimate would indicate a standing army of less than two thousand men. In moments of war ‘Abdallāh Pasha obviously counted on the tribal levies of the Druze and possibly the Metualis. In 1824 ‘Abdallāh Pasha sent to battle some 3,000 troops, most of them Ḥawwāra militias under Abū Zaid Aghā, but also consisting of Dalāt, Albanians, and Maghrebis.⁵⁷

In conclusion, we should ask ourselves why the Mamluk system was reintroduced in Syria at such a late point in time and how it could last for almost fifty years. The most obvious explanation is, of course, the personal one. Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār was a mamluk and clearly believed, at least initially, in the advantages of the system. This was especially true as he tried to ascertain his rule over a region to which he himself was a stranger, in contrast to his predecessor Ḍāhir al-

⁵⁴ AN AE, CC Seyde, vol. XXVII, July 10, 1820.

⁵⁵ AN AE, CC Acre, vol. IV, Jan. 3, 1820.

⁵⁶ Shihāb, *Lubnān*, III, 852.

⁵⁷ Shihāb, *Lubnān*, III, 766.

‘Umar, and where he could not rely upon local alliances and patronage systems to support his regime.

But I would suggest that there was a second more general reason leading to the attempt to govern with the help of a Mamluk household. These were times of enormous change in Acre and its hinterland. For the first time the region had been integrated into the European dominated world economy. The profits to be made from cash crop exports, mainly cotton, but later also grain, could be huge. The question was how this new economy could be used most profitably and by whom.

The organisation of the military forces in Acre reflected this challenge and the ambivalent responses to it. In fact, the whole spectrum of military options in Islamic history was tried out: from troops consisting of or controlled by a family clan to tribal alliances (predominant under Ḍāhir al-‘Umar) from hired mercenaries, vaguely organized along ethnic lines, to military entrepreneurs, and to a well-defined Mamluk household, from infantry troops to cavalymen—all traditional patterns of military organisation, together with their known advantages and disadvantages, were used at one point or another in the short century of Acre’s power. It depended on the political circumstances and also on the personal inclinations of the respective rulers which sort of traditional military organisation would be preferred. The emphasis on fortifications and their defense was, at least since the crusades, in this region a particularly well-established military strategy. New tactics, new military technology or organization were not sought or needed, since the neighboring rivals and potential military opponents fought with equally traditional means and troop formations as the rulers of Acre. The contribution of the unique state monopoly on cotton and grain exports consisted in supplying the means to pay for more troops than the neighbors usually could afford. The policy of government monopolies, introduced by Ḍāhir al-‘Umar but continued and elaborated upon by al-Jazzār and Sulaymān Pasha, necessitated the exclusion of local classes, such as merchants and primary producers, from the political process. To maintain the monopoly over cash crops and their export an imported foreign military elite, with no ties to the local population and only loyal to themselves, seemed the most suited, though the simultaneous use of all the above mentioned other military options shows that there reigned a great ambivalence about how to cope with the new economic situation. In any case, the revenues from the economic monopoly could

pay for and reinforce the foreign military elite. But once the cash crops were not in demand anymore on the world market, the mamluks were the least suited to deal with the economy and to respond to the changes. Once the economic basis had vanished, so did the mamluks.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

URBAN RESIDENTIAL HOUSES IN MAMLUK SYRIA: FORMS, CHARACTERISTICS AND THE IMPACT OF SOCIO-CULTURAL FORCES*

Nimrod Luz

The house can be described as a manifestation and an epitomizing symbol of the self.¹ This is a truism in the sense that our house represents us as it reflects our morals, ideas, needs, social understanding and conduct. To no lesser extent, houses represent and are by-products of group social values and norms.² Empirical studies have indicated that individuals who belong to a group which is typified with weak relations would be more inclined to be unique and self representative as far as the architecture of the house is concerned. Those who identify with stronger groups (usually of more traditional nature) would be less concerned with the presentability of their house. That is to say, houses that belong to individuals whose social status is known and established in their peer group would be less self expressive.³ However, I am not suggesting that such individuals would not build impressive and formidable houses, rather that they would be inclined to follow similar architectural patterns. This can partly explain the extravagance of mamluks' houses within the urban context. These houses are supposed to inform "ignorant

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¹ C. Cooper, "The House as a Symbol of the Self", in J. Lang, C. Burnette, W. Moleski, and D. Vachon, eds., *Designing for Human Behavior* (Stroudsburg, 1974), 130-146.

² G. Pratt, "The House as an Expression of Social World", in J.S. Duncan, ed., *Housing and Identity* (New York, 1982), 135-180.

³ *Ibid.* See also on the importance of social networks, J.S. Duncan and N.G. Duncan, "Housing as Representation of Self and the Structure of Social Networks", in G.T. Moore and R.G. Golledge, eds., *Environmental Knowing, Theories, Research, and Methods* (Stroudsburg, 1991), 247-253.

others” of the current status of the proprietor. At the same time, the house is also a manifestation and a product of physical conditions such as building materials, technology, site availability and such like mundane matters. The latter are more often than not external and independent to any socio-cultural forces.⁴

Thus, there are multiple variables one has to consider in order to fully understand the house as a manifestation of the human agent responsible for its construction. It would be a mistake to highlight one aspect and play down others. To say that home architecture is responsive only to the immediate needs of its owner, which stems from reciprocal relations to the particular surrounding, is a partial and insufficient conclusion. On the other hand, playing down the socio-cultural realm and its effect on the final outcome would again lead us to a crude streamlining of a complex reality. This, as I will suggest below, was more often than not a current theme concerning the houses of the Islamic Middle East. The house is a fundamental and indispensable part of almost any human settlement. In the urban scene clusters of houses form neighborhoods, and on a larger scale they comprise the matrix of entire cities. In order to understand cities—in a more abstract manner the society that exists within a particular city—the house may be regarded as a source and a meaningful evidence of the latter. As with any other “text” we have to know how to read the language, familiarize ourselves with the cultural symbols and signs, and put it in the correct context. A full analysis of houses within a broad urban reality exceeds the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, it needs to be stressed that it is inconceivable to understand historical cities as a portrayal of past societies without a full scale view of houses within the broad urban context. In this paper I would like to focus on the types and forms of houses in cities of Syria during the Mamluk period. The analysis of the individual types and forms of houses will be complemented by a critical review of the common and recurrent notion regarding the Islamic origin and nature of the courtyard house. Bringing to the fore the socio-cultural influence on the shape and forms of houses does not in any way imply that I consider it more important than other variables. On the contrary, it serves as a way to mitigate the

⁴ The various variables effecting house form and type are heavily considered in A. Rapoport, *House Form and Culture* (New Jersey, 1969).

notion regarding the allegedly colossal impact of religion (i.e., Islam) on the residential dwellings.

A methodological note

The data and analysis put forward in this paper are the outcome of an extensive research regarding the provincial cities of Mamluk Syria.⁵ The main goal of this survey was to establish a set of indicative characteristics of the urban vernacular architecture during the Mamluk period within the Syrian region.⁶ This was a preliminary, yet indispensable, step toward a closer and more intimate acquaintance with the urban layers of the said period. The secondary goal was to enforce the results of the survey in the entire city and thus make it possible to define and classify various building artifacts of the Mamluk period and to distinguish them from other periods; a problem inherent in any discussion of the built environment in historical multi-layered cities. The physical evidence was corroborated with relevant studies and complemented with literary sources. Thus, I was able to arrive at a more coherent and reliable picture of types and forms of houses. This method further enabled me to map out and appreciate the contribution of different variables and their impact on the built environment.

Vernacular architecture⁷—the term refers mainly to architecture that is created without architects.⁸ It is usually characterized by a lack of any theoretical or esthetical presumptions. A rigid set of rules is hardly in existence rather a practical need that is responded by functional acts. The lack of an elaborate theory implicates that the work is carried out in the basis or previous knowledge. The main

⁵ N. Luz, *Provincial Cities of mamluk Syria 1260–1517*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2000. The field survey was conducted throughout 1997 in several cities in Israel (mainly Jerusalem).

⁶ The findings were corroborated with data collected in other cities of the region. I am currently preparing for publication the results of the field survey.

⁷ I am following here the meaning of the term as Amos Rapoport articulated it. See, Rapoport, *House Form and Culture. Ibid.*, “Vernacular Architecture and the Cultural Determinants of Form”, in A.D. King, ed., *Building and Society* (London 1980), 283–305.

⁸ Regarding architects-less architecture see, B.S. Hakim, *Arabic-Islamic Cities, Building Principles* (London, 1986).

emphasis would be on the relations among the building particles rather than the nature of the particles themselves. This would indicate that the location of a window in a wall is essentially of higher importance than the style or the material of that window. This type of architecture is typically found in private houses, streets, and neighborhoods. It is, by and large, the sum of collective, yet independent, decisions of individuals. It is the absence of sufficient data regarding this type of architecture—as opposed to public-monumental Mamluk architecture—that necessitated the conduct of an extensive field survey in search for a better understanding of that particular manifestation (houses as in the case in point) of Mamluk urban society.⁹

The following discussion is based on the results of the field survey which by and large defines the material evidence to be found today. As always, with regard to morphological reality and findings, we can only examine what has survived in contemporary urban landscape. In the case of residential housing, this approach bears an inherent bias that needs to be explained.¹⁰ Most of the houses that have survived belong to the wealthier and upper strata of society. It is within reason to speculate that houses of lower socioeconomic classes were less resistant to the vicissitudes of time. In addition, it would seem logical to assume that these houses (i.e., those of lower socio economic status) are less represented in various documentations and literary references. This is all the more apparent in the number of studies concerned with public and monumental architecture compared to those of vernacular architecture and common residential dwellings.¹¹ Our knowledge concerning the private house, or to put it more strongly, the house of the less fortunate members of society is considerably less than that relating to palaces and mansions. We can only speculate as to how many mud and straw bricks houses or wooden huts have existed in Tripoli in the fourteenth century. The nature of these materials as opposed to that of stone, a common enough building material in the area, is to be remembered

⁹ Luz, 2000.

¹⁰ This idea was already put forward in A. Raymond, *The Great Arab Cities in the 16th and 18th Centuries, An Introduction* (New York, 1984), 70–71.

¹¹ This is aptly demonstrated in the voluminous research regarding houses in Cairo, J.-C. Garçin et al., *Palais et Maisons du Caire I: Époque Mamelouke (XIII^e–XVI^e siècles)*, (Paris, 1982), where the compounds discussed are mainly palaces or amiral houses due to their very existence and the extensive source material related to them.

in such assumptions about cities of the past. The case may very well be that due to the natural limitations of different building material the hundreds of years that elapsed have weeded out dwellings that were constructed of less durable materials. This, as I will relate later on, is a rather important fact that should at least make us realize how difficult it is to arrive at firm and definitive conclusions. And as the case maybe, any conclusion should be understood in the proper light of these research limitations.

Private houses

The Syrian city in the Mamluk period features few types of individual or private houses. The common term found in various sources for the house is *dār*. This term usually refers to a house composed of several units: residential units or rooms, courtyards and different necessary amenities such as cistern, oven, warehouse (*makhzan*), toilet and other facilities as the case may be. Houses were built of local stone (usually limestone) to be found throughout the region. Ornamental components, found mainly in luxurious houses, were made out of marble, (either imported or in secondary use), or in rare cases, of basalt.

The field survey highlighted the following morphological characteristics and architectural traits of private houses:

HOUSE FACADE—the frontal side of the house (i.e., the part facing the street), includes a single entry gate. The gate is usually lower than the average person's height and not wider than 1 m. The entrance itself constitutes a massive door (either wood or metal) that stresses the transition and passage from the public, or semi-public, street into the private domain. Most of the houses surveyed had no more than two stories. In cases where a third story did exist, it usually carried indications of being constructed at a later date, i.e., Ottoman or modern period. This should not lead to the conclusion that Syrian Mamluk houses, unlike those in Cairo for instance, were limited to two stories height. It stands to reason that since upper floors were more exposed to eroding factors they were more accessible to dilapidation and hence to renovations and changes in the course of time.

WINDOWS AND PORCHES—front windows are relatively small and few variants were found. On the whole, windows are not be found

in the entrance floor (street level). In the rare cases that windows were to be found at street level, they were usually very small and shaded, or covered with a grille. Porches were not a common feature in simple houses. In the few cases where a porch was built, it was on a much smaller scale than that of the type known as *kishk*, which is commonly found in Mamluk public buildings.

ROOF—the roof was built, as in the rural building tradition of the area, in the shape of a masonry dome. This concurs perfectly with Mujīr al-Dīn's descriptions of the construction style in Jerusalem:

In regard to the building of Jerusalem it is of the highest order and craftsmanship all made of white carved stones and the roofs are vaulted (*ma'qūd*). No bricks are to be used in the buildings and no wood in the [construction of] the roof.¹²

THE COURTYARD—In some of the houses, a corridor leads from the gate into a courtyard. The corridor is usually angular, and along its route a few twists and turns are a recurrent feature. The size of the courtyard varies considerably. The residential units (*bayt*, pl. *buyūt*) are built at the perimeter of the courtyard and their entrances face it. In cases where a second floor was built, a flight of stairs was constructed, usually at the side of the courtyard. The second floor is a mirror image of the first one that is, it is built of rooms/apartments facing the center of the courtyard. The central courtyard is but one of a few options of houses' ground plan. Many of the courtyard houses were arranged along a different pattern altogether, namely the courtyard was not an inner one, i.e. not completely enclosed.

Thus far, I have focused on the exterior part of the house. There is a marked difference between the external and internal parts of houses in the sense that the latter are far more accessible and viable to changes. The survey established the fact that the exterior parts of houses kept, for the better part, their original features. The situation remarkably differs in regard to the interior of the house. Recurrent renovations or changes of ownership or economic status are among the factors that lead to this state of affairs. In addition, the current problematic political situation in Old Jerusalem prevents us from a full scale survey of houses interiors. In order to overcome

¹² Mujīr al-Dīn al-Ḥanbalī al-'Ulaymī, *Al-Uns al-Ḥalīl bi-Ta'rikh al-Quds wa-'l-Khalīl*, vol. II, (Baghdād, 1995), 55.

this impediment, literary evidence and various sources were used to further our understanding in regard to inner components and layout of houses. It was at times the only plausible way to traverse the threshold of the residential unit.

COURTYARD HOUSES—In 4 Rabī^ʿ II, 778/21 August 1376, a house was purchased in the Christian neighborhood (*Ḥarāt al-Naṣārā*) of Jerusalem.¹³ The house, known as Dār ibn al-Launayn, comprised three vaulted units (*buyūl*), a kitchen and toilet facilities. The residential units encompassed a courtyard in which two cisterns and fruit-bearing trees were to be found. An additional vaulted room that functioned as a warehouse was constructed below the courtyard. The entrance opened onto an alley located to the east of the house. Indeed several houses of this type were found in the survey but as is elaborated below this was not the sole plan in existence.

The house of Shaykh Burhān al-Dīn represents yet a different type and form of house plan. The house (*dār*) was purchased by Shaykh Burhān al-Dīn on 21 Dhū al-Qa^ʿda 780/12 March 1379 at the price of 825 dirhams.¹⁴ It is composed of two vaulted parts; upper and lower. The transaction deed reveals that a courtyard and an external toilet unit were also within its legal domains. The courtyard in this case lay adjacent to the house. Few houses of the same plan were found in the field survey.

INDIVIDUAL HOUSES OF IRREGULAR PLAN—I have already established the fact that the term *dār* does not refer exclusively to houses that adopted the central courtyard plan.¹⁵ More than that, it can refer to houses which do not have any form of courtyard at all. *Dār*, as the equivalent of a residential house or unit, is a term constantly being used in hundreds of documents from the Mamluk period found in the Ḥaram al-Sharīf in Jerusalem. Only rarely is a courtyard mentioned and even then one can not be certain that this refers to a central courtyard. The early Ottoman *sijill* records not less than two hundred and twenty eight houses. Only forty two of them had a

¹³ D.P. Little, *A Catalogue of the Islamic Documents from al-Ḥaram aš-Šarīf in Jerusalem*, Beirut 1984, 255, no. 35. I am indebted to Mr. Kh. Salāmeḥ for enabling me to examine the original documents of the mamluk sijill of al-Ḥaram al-Sharīf library in Jerusalem.

¹⁴ Little, *Catalogue*, 278, no. 39.

¹⁵ See for example the description of a house from Tripoli, N.H. al-Khimṣī, *Taʾrīkh Tarabulus* (Beirut, 1986), 352.

courtyard (either enclosed or adjacent).¹⁶ As with many other characteristics, the early Ottoman documents reflect the reality of the Mamluk period, in this case regarding the quantities of the various house plans and forms. So it is apparent that most of the houses were not of the courtyard type but rather what Raymond humorously called “atypical houses”.¹⁷

Luxurious private houses

As with any other society, that of the Syrian cities included people of means. This was reflected on the urban scene in the existence of several houses that were considerably large in size featured on different plans than those of common private dwelling. In addition to a large plan, these houses are characterized with substantial investment in building material and ornamentation. The houses of this category (again one needs to stress the fact that the survey focused on external aspects of the house) employed architectural styles and features usually found in monumental Mamluk buildings. The facade of one such house, located above one of the main intersections of Ṭarīq al-Wād in Jerusalem, features the typical mamluk monumental style known as *ablaq*. The windows of that wall are reminiscent in size and style of the ones that are usually found in public buildings. The entrance of the house located opposite Dār al-Sitt Tunshuq is also monumental in style. The house is surrounded with an external high wall containing a single entry gate. As one enters through the gateway, one encounters an imposing entrance to the house. The house itself comprises two stories; on the upper floor large windows are to be found as well as a beautifully decorated porch. A decorated roof terrace and windows were found in a house located adjacent to the Madrasa al-Mu‘aṭṭamiyya on the street leading to the Lions Gate in Jerusalem. Parts of the roof terrace were built of basalt, which is not to be found in the vicinity of Jerusalem, and was therefore obviously imported.

¹⁶ Kh. Salāmeḥ, ‘Aspects of the *Sijills* of the *Shari‘a* court in Jerusalem’, in S. Auld, and R. Hillenbrand, eds., *Ottoman Jerusalem*, vol. I (London, 2000), 128–132.

¹⁷ Raymond, *Great Arab Cities*, 87.

The luxurious houses that were surveyed in Jerusalem were highly accessible to main routes in the city. This clearly indicates that residential location within the city was not altogether disconnected from economic status and personal preferences. In a period in which transportation was mostly on foot, proximity to main arteries of the city was indeed important. One cannot establish a firm conclusion based on the exiguous data presented here but as far as the field survey allows one to speculate, individuals of sufficient means chose to live in more accessible locations within the city. Again, this is a fundamental and well-recorded social behavior of people who belong to high socioeconomic strata.¹⁸ This in itself is not highly innovative as far as current geographical theories are concerned, but it is put forward here to further undermine notions that were commonly found in previous studies of cities of the vast Islamic world.¹⁹ This issue will be engaged with at the last section of this paper.

Collective houses

At least three types of collective houses were common in Syrian cities. However, the data, both literary and morphological, is somewhat sporadic in comparison to that available for private houses. In order to overcome this lacuna, analogies and references were made to the abundant material regarding urban life in Egypt.

KHĀN as a dwelling compound—*khāns* served as dwellings for parts of society that were in transitional phases (i.e., new immigrants) or for those who practised a life style of constant mobility (soldiers, merchants). Thus one may find merchants, soldiers who were not living in barracks, and new arrivals in town all living in *khāns*. Shaykh Ibrāhīm b. Aḥmad b. Fallāḥ al-Sa‘dī resided in a place called *khān Banū Sa‘d* which was located in the north-western external area adjacent to wall of Jerusalem.²⁰ The name *Banū Sa‘d* indicates a

¹⁸ On the life and luxurious home of a certain merchant (Abu Taqiyya) in Cairo circa 1600 see in N. Hanna, *Making Big Money in 1600. The Life and Times of Isma‘il Abu Taqiyya, Egyptian Merchant* (Syracuse, 1998), esp. 138–164. I would like to thank Warren Schultz for pointing out the relevance of this work to the current paper.

¹⁹ See for example, P. Knox, and S. Pinch, *Urban Social Geography, An Introduction* (London, 2000), 77–128.

²⁰ Muḥīr al-Dīn, 2, 167.

tribal group that immigrated to Jerusalem. The *khān* in question served probably as their collective dwelling site. Residence in a *khān* must have been a transitional stage for that particular group, along their sedenterization process from a nomadic and rural way of life to an urban one. The Banū Saʿd eventually settled down within the city, as the name of a residential area, al-Saʿdiyya, aptly demonstrates.²¹ In addition to their traditional function as inns for various visitors and normative role as commercial compounds, some of the *khāns* were built (or at least served) as residential compounds for city dwellers. This conclusion may be inferred and supported not only by documentation, but also from their locations. Some of the *khāns* are situated within residential areas, as opposed to commercial or peripheral parts of the city. In this manner we find in Jerusalem a *khān* named al-Jubaylī in the heart of a neighborhood called Marzubān as well as *khān* al-Sitt in Khaṭṭ Bāb al-ʿAmūd.²²

RAB^ʿ—the *rab*^ʿ is a collective residential unit that was built for rental purposes.²³ It resembles, at least morphologically, the modern apartment building. It is a multi-story building in which each story contains several apartments with their own private entrance. The apartments share a common staircase and street entrance. The apartments were facing the streets (i.e., had windows to the facade side of the building). The ground floor housed shops and warehouses while apartments were to be found on the upper floors. The data concerning *rab*^ʿ compounds in Syria is restricted to literary evidences. As it so happens, no compound that even partially resembles the Cairene type has been discovered in the survey. In Jerusalem we learn about several compounds bearing the term *rab*^ʿ, such as *rab*^ʿ al-Ḥusaynī, *rab*^ʿ ibn al-Ḥanbalī and *rab*^ʿ Tankiz.²⁴ Raymond's survey of Cairo provides us with ample data about existing *rab*^ʿ buildings. His conclusions are that the residence in such compounds was not based on kinship ties or other social connections, but rather on

²¹ See a map of the city's neighborhoods, including that of the Banū Saʿad, in A. Arnon, "The Quarters of Jerusalem in the Ottoman Period", *Middle Eastern Studies* 28 (1992), 13–14.

²² For Khan al-Jubaylī see Mujīr al-Dīn, 2, 53, and regarding Khān al-Sitt see Little, *Catalogue*, 116, no. 432.

²³ The following description is based on: S.D. Goitein, *A Mediterranean Society*, Vol. IV (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1983), 13–14; Raymond, *Great Arab Cities*, 83–85.

²⁴ Little, *Catalogue*, 66, 85, 140.

the needs of Cairene citizens, mainly small artisans and shopkeepers, to minimize distances between home and work. The burden of costly private house in a central location was mitigated by existence of cheaper collective house apartments. Entrepreneurs of substantial means responded to the need middle class citizens by supplying them with the *rabʿ*. This collective housing style was thus a commercial investment for the entrepreneur and an affordable solution for its residents.

ḤAWSH—this is a residential collective unit that is characterized by the low income of its residents and poor standard of the building. It is a cluster of residential units that share a common courtyard and other utilities. The entrance is through a single gate from which a corridor leads into the heart of the compound. It differs from the regular courtyard house in measurements and ownership. It is usually bigger than the common *dār* and belongs to a proprietor who leases it to the residents. A *ḥawsh* by the name of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ṭūrī is mentioned in Jerusalem as located not far from Bāb al-Asbāt (one of the northern gates of Ḥaram al-Sharīf). This compound is mentioned in the estate inventories of two men and a woman. The two men are described as pilgrims (*ḥājj*), one being called al-Sūdānī and the other al-Turkumānī.²⁵ The woman is referred to as al-Dimashqīyya, meaning, from Damascus. Judging from their *nisbas*, as well as the fact that no relatives are to be found in the city, one may assume that the three figures were newcomers to the city and, even more likely, temporary residents. The dates of the documentary evidences put them together in the same compound simultaneously, which means that they shared accommodations although they shared no family ties. It stands to reason that in the absence of sufficient means the people in question could not meet with a better residential solution save the very basic and cheapest option, i.e., a *ḥawsh*. *Ḥawsh*-type residences may still be found in the historical parts of Syrian cities. The morphology basically has not changed from the earlier periods, that is residential units encompassing and facing a central courtyard with a single entrance.²⁶

²⁵ *Idem*, 87, 120, 138.

²⁶ See for example Y. Ben Arieh, *A City Reflected in Its Times* (Jerusalem, 1986), 360 (in Hebrew).

Characteristics of the residential house

TYPE AND PLAN—various house types and plans existed in Syrian cities. It seems that personal economic status was one of the primal forces leading to the choice of the house plan. The typical dwelling solution of lower strata was the collective residential house known as *hawsh*, or as the case may be the *khān*. Again, I should stress that houses of less durable material (that is, not solely of stone), did not survive, or may will not have existed at all, and therefore could not be dealt with in this current work. The private house, be it a courtyard house in several types or other “atypical forms” or the collective house called *rabʿ*, were used by classes of more substantial means. Only a small minority of the city dwellers could afford a luxurious type of house. Some of the houses of the latter group adopted architectural styles that are drawn from monumental Mamluk buildings.

ARCHITECTURE—this may be defined as inside-out architecture.²⁷ That is architecture that involves excessive use of methods and styles which enable maximum separation between the private domain and the street. Morphologically, this means a single entry point to the house, windows and other openings are usually found in upper floors while the ground floor is on the whole windowless. This type of architecture is an efficient tool for transferring activities of all sorts into the inner or rear parts of the house. It is an indication that privacy was a crucial factor for the contingent constructor or dwellers of these houses. Nevertheless, this building style, that helps preserve the privacy of the family, is not unique in any way to the Syrian region nor for that matter to Islamic domains. It is to be found in various traditional societies.²⁸ But cultural demands were not the sole constraint that shaped the house plan and architecture. A substantial role was played by climatic conditions, technology, building materials, and other variables that existed in the region prior to the presence of Islam. This will be elaborated upon in the closing section of this paper.

PREFERRED LOCATIONS—within the residential areas it was possible to discern a gradient of housing types that was an outcome of

²⁷ For inside-out architecture see Rappoport, *House Form and Culture*, 48–49.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

economic status. The luxurious houses were more accessible to the main routes of the city. Location within one's neighborhood and city was dictated, as the few examples allow us to conclude, by one's economic position and ability. This conclusion is based on what might be legitimately criticized as only exiguous examples. Nevertheless, it can be corroborated by David's survey of 16th century Aleppo.²⁹ The survey and classification of house types in Aleppo disclosed the existence of a gradient of residential rings surrounding the urban center. The crucial factor in regard to house location was land cost. The price of land parcels drops as one draws away from the city center. Therefore, in addition to socio-cultural factors (kinship, ethnic affiliation) one has to consider economic and other personal issues when one is analyzing houses' location within the city. The decision concerning house plan and location were directly linked to a person's economic constraint.

In search of the socio-cultural impact: The case of the courtyard house

One of the most prominent plans, found in this survey of Mamluk Syrian cities, was the courtyard house type in its various manifestations. The data collected in the field survey did not refute or minimize either the existence or the occurrence of this plan. However, it is clear that the courtyard house was not the only type in existence. More than that, any assessment of its relative occurrence within Mamluk cities in comparison to other house types is impossible. There is no way one can estimate the ratio of houses that disappeared without leaving a trace in the landscape of cities or the literary evidences. One can only assume that for the lower strata of society the obtaining or constructing of a courtyard house was beyond reach. In spite of such limitations, a marked tendency in numerous previous studies was to play down or totally ignore the existence of other building plans and house types. Instead, the role and existence of the courtyard house, as an outcome of Islamic culture and its omnipresence and influence on the urban environment, was usually

²⁹ J.C. David, "Alep, dégradation et tentatives actuelles de rédaction des structures urbaines traditionnelles", *Bulletin d'Études Arabes* 28, (1978), 19–50.

highlighted.³⁰ I would like to conclude this paper with a critical analysis of the traditional approach in regard to the Islamic traits and origins of the courtyard house.

Houses are, as any other human product, cultural and social artifacts. As such, they may be examined as a non-verbal document reflecting the agents/agencies that were responsible for their construction. Throughout this paper, I have stipulated the existence of various types and forms of houses within urban societies of Syria. This state of affairs leads to the understanding that many variables are responsible for the final outcome: the individual house. Be that as it may, the quest for a clear cut definition and origin of the house throughout the vast Islamic world has not yet exhausted itself. This is aptly demonstrated in George Marçais's article regarding the term *Dār* in the Encyclopedia of Islam. Marçais is of the opinion that the traditional courtyard house is the optimal physical manifestation of Islamic moral values and needs. He is well aware to the existence of such houses prior to the Islamic era, but prefers to underscore their advantages as an ideal infrastructure for Islamic life:

It is well adapted to the patriarchal view of the family and creates for it an enclosed sphere; it conforms easily with the element of secrecy dear to the private life of the Muslim, and this idea is reflected in the architectural arrangement both in elevation and in plan.³¹

This house type supposedly fulfills, by its introverted plan, Islamic social demands. The unified facade of houses allegedly bring together members of the community and helps to establish social harmony within cities. One may also find that this house plan carries with it, in addition to other cultural symbols, a cosmic meaning, because it enables its residents to communicate with the entire universe but not with other people.³² In the face of such rampant generalization Raymond supplies us with two critical observations that need be

³⁰ See for example, G.E. von Grunebaum, "The Structure of the Muslim City", in *ibid.*, *Islam, Essays in the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition* (London, 1955), 147–150, and also a quintessential and stereotyped description in G. Marçais, "Dār", *ET*², II, 113–115.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² A. Abdel Nour, "Types architecturaux et vocabulaire de l'habitat en Syrie aux xvi^e et xvii^e siècles", in D. Chevalier (ed.), *L'espace social de la ville arabe* (Paris, 1979), 51–99 esp. 82–83.

remembered in any discussion concerning the “typical” house form in Islamic domains:³³

1. The origins of the central courtyard house are Mediterranean. Plans of courtyard houses have been excavated throughout the Middle East and along the Mediterranean basin and dated as early as three thousand B.C.E.³⁴ The reasons for its widespread dispersion derive from climatic conditions and cultural demands that existed in the region long before the emergence of Islam.
2. Houses and other dwelling solutions of lower classes of society were not always documented, and in the same manner may have been less durable, and thus left us with fewer material findings than middle and upper class house types. I referred earlier to the inherent bias regarding the alleged typical house plan in historical cities.

The methodology applied in this research has helped to define few types of houses within the urban context. Most of the houses were not of the central courtyard type. But even if we cast aside all other options save the central courtyard house, we should remember that this plan pre-dates the introduction of Islam to the area. This in itself does not negate the religious realm as a crucial factor but rather indicates that the reasons are by far more general than just applying Islamic codes. It is indeed within the socio-cultural sphere that one can perhaps but explain the abundance of this house form. At the same time, it was a direct result of the climatic conditions. Indeed several studies have already demonstrated that the inner courtyard’s key function is to serve as a regulator and modifier of micro-climatic conditions of residential solutions in hot environments and arid and semi-arid climates.³⁵ The introverted plan is a practical solution and

³³ Raymond, *Grand villes arabes*, 305ff.

³⁴ See for example the excavation at Catal Huyuk where a radio-carbon dating has established its earliest levels to 5600 B.C., J. Mellart, *Catal Hüyük* (London, 1967). See also a similar ground plan of houses in, L. Woolley, *Ur of Chaldees* (Ithaca, NY, 1982). (revised and updated edition by P.R.S. Moorey).

³⁵ Y. Belkacem, “Bioclimatic Patterns and Human Aspects of Urban Form in the Islamic Cities”, in I. Seragldin and S. El-Sadek, eds. *The Arab City, Its Character and Islamic Cultural Heritage* (Riyadh, 1982), 2–12; B. Givoni, *Climate Consideration in Building and Urban Design* (New York, 1998), 343–351; G.T. Petherbridge, “Vernacular Architecture: The House and Society”, in G. Michell (ed.), *Architecture of the Islamic*

morphological prop in shutting the house to outside effects such as excessive sunlight, hot winds and dust. Focusing on the climatic reasons for the development of house plans is not to be understood as minimizing or ignoring cultural aspects that have affected the morphology of dwelling places. The concept of the introverted house, with its various facilities and functions hidden from the outside world, is without dispute an expression of an outlook that stresses the role of the family as the primal social nucleus of a person's life. It is also a perfect house form for cultures which aspire for privacy and the protection of the female side of the family from outsiders. These notions are not innovations introduced by Islam, as they were already existing throughout the Middle East and parts of the Mediterranean long before the seventh century. Thus, one may deduce that the view, so often expressed in various studies, of the cultural demands of Islam as the primary and critical reasons for the overwhelming occurrence of the courtyard house plan, is simplistic and misleading. In addition, the cities of the Syrian region, and elsewhere, as the Egyptian case demonstrates, featured many different plans and house forms. And what about places where no courtyard houses were found; should they be considered atypical? Are they to be considered non-Islamic? The case of Thulā in Yemen may serve as an example for a different urban reality. The houses depicted by Golvin and Formont in Thulā had no inner courtyard and more than that, the walls facing the streets were supplied with excessively wide windows.³⁶ Within the confinements of climate, religious codes, other socio-cultural norms this was probably the best solution for the local population in Thulā.

The tendency to highlight the role of Islam and the omnipresence of the courtyard house is, more than anything else, an expression of a modelistic view. Models may be defined as selective approximations which, by the elimination of incidental detail, allow some fundamental, relevant or interesting aspects of the real world to appear in generalized form. Naturally, only by being unfaithful in some

World (London, 1987), 176–208, esp. 199–201; J. Akbar, “Courtyard Houses: A Case Study from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia”, in I. Serageldin and S. El-Sadek eds., *The Arab City, Its Character and Islamic Cultural Heritage*, Riyadh 1982, 162–176.

³⁶ L. Golvin and M.C. Formont, *Thula, Architecture et Urbanisme d'une Cité de Haute Montagne en République Arabe du Yémen*, Mémoire no. 30 (Paris, 1984).

respect can a model represent its original.³⁷ This in itself is not a vice, as generalizations are a product of many scientific works. But in regard to the house plan, as with many other traits of the physical urban manifestations within the Islamic world, the reduction to a single house plan has yielded a forbidden fruit. The courtyard house is not Islamic in its essence nor does it derive from any Islamic law. It is first and foremost the optimal dwelling solution found under climatic and other constraints, mostly within the expanded Middle East. Islamic societies inherited this house plan and adopted it in accordance with private needs and abilities. Stressing the role of Islam as a cultural factor is misleading, because under the vague heading of culture, other traits that have nothing to do with Islam coexist. The ongoing attempt to create a complete congruence between the Islamic sphere and the urban milieu through the prism of a house plan is not successful since Islam (if one can accept such a clumsy definition) is not the sole factor that shapes the urban landscape. The house plan is surely a morphological expression of culture and it is, as I have portrayed it in the current paper, highly affected by socio-cultural forces. But as culture itself, the house should not be defined under a sole characteristic. The plan, space and use of a house are malleable subjects. They keep changing according to our viewpoint, sometimes dramatically within the same society from one individual to another due to the fact that so many variables are responsible for the final outcome. The search for socio-cultural impact is far from over. But it is better to unburden ourselves of the many chimeras and postulates regarding the typical and atypical house forms in the area.

³⁷ M. Black, *Models and Metaphors* (Ithaca, NY, 1962), 220.

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PART EIGHT

THE MAMLUKS IN OTTOMAN EGYPT

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CHAPTER SIXTEEN

THE WEALTH OF THE EGYPTIAN EMIRS AT THE END OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

André Raymond

I

At the time when I was using the archives in Cairo to work on the preparation of my book, *Artisans et commerçants au Caire*,¹ I had the occasion to note that the records of the Tribunal of Bāb al-‘Ālī, where I was researching the estates of the artisans and merchants, naturally also contained a wealth of information with regard to the Egyptian emirs, whose estates were, generally speaking, set forth in the records of the “military” (*askariyya*) section of the Tribunal.² At the time, I made a collection of those estates for the two periods, each covering some 20 years, which then constituted the principal object of my attention: 1679–1700 and 1776–1798.

I thought it would be of some interest to study some of those documents, those having to do with the years between 1679 and 1700, because this important aspect of the ruling class—the financial means that was at the disposal of its members—has not yet been addressed in any systematic work. The basic studies which have been devoted to that elite, especially those by S.J. Shaw, P.M. Holt, Michael Winter, Doris Behrens-Abouseif, Jane Hathaway and Daniel Crecelius,³ cover other characteristics.

¹ *Artisans et commerçants au Caire au XVIII^{ème} siècle*, Damascus, IFD, 1974, 2 vols.; reprinted in Cairo, IFAO, 1999.

² The sample includes only three cases of liquidation of the estates of those emirs in the *qisma ‘arabiyya* of the *Mahkama*: Qayṭās Bey, vol. 60, 103, December 8, 1681; ‘Ālī Bey, vol. 70, 266, February 15, 1695; Musā Aghā, vol. 64, p. 29, November 14, 1686.

³ S.J. Shaw, *The Financial and Administrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962. P.M. Holt, *Studies in the History of the Near East*, London, Frank Cass, 1973. Daniel Crecelius, *The Roots of Modern Egypt*, Minneapolis, 1981; “The Mamluk Beylicate of Egypt”, in *The Mamluks in*

For the purpose of composing this compendium, I have perused Vols. 75 to 89 of the *qisma 'askariyya* of the Tribunal of Bāb al-‘Ālī (for the years 1679–1700). From those volumes, I have studied the estates of 14 beys and 99 aghas and *katkhudās* of the seven militias, for a total of 113 high-ranking dignitaries of Ottoman Egypt.⁴ I am certain that this is only the outline of the study which should be devoted to the problem, given that this enumeration is neither as exhaustive nor as detailed as would be desired, and also given that the sample used was too small in dimensions to enable the drawing of truly definitive conclusions in figures. Nonetheless, I hope that this study will constitute an apposite starting point for the consideration of this question, and will encourage scholars to develop their investigations in this direction—that is, by consulting the archives of the Tribunals, which have already been widely exploited in the study of the native society and economy, and are naturally likely to provide no less valuable information on the ruling class.

II *The wealth of the emirs at the end of the seventeenth century*

The data relative to the estates of the emirs studied, dating from the years 1679–1700,⁵ may be summarized in the following table, in which the amounts are expressed in constant paras, based on the value of that silver currency in the years 1681–1688.⁶

Egyptian Politics and Society, T. Philipp and U. Haarmann ed., Cambridge, 1998. Michael Winter, *Egyptian Society Under Ottoman Rule*, London, 1992. Doris Behrens-Abouseif, *Egypt's Adjustment to Ottoman Rule*, Leiden, Brill, 1994. Jane Hathaway, *The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt*, Cambridge, 1997. See also: *The Cambridge History of Egypt*, Cambridge, vol. 2, 1998, with contributions by M. Winter, J. Hathaway, D. Crecelius and N. Hanna.

⁴ The beys (*sanjaq bey*), successors of the great Mamluk emirs, governed provinces and exercised the highest powers in Egypt. The aghas were the commanding officers of the regiments (of which there were seven in Cairo). In actual fact, the command of the *ojaqs* was exercised by their assistants, the *katkhudās* (or *kāhyas*). See the works cited in the previous note.

⁵ The wealth of the emirs was evaluated according to the total assets, prior to the various deductions to which the estates were subject.

⁶ On the determination of a constant para, see *Artisans et commerçants au Caire*, LIII.

Table 16.1. Wealth of the emirs between 1679 and 1700

	No. of cases mentioned	Wealth of total sample	Average
Beys	14	25,332,747	1,809,482
Officers:	99	36,042,705	364,068
of which, aghas	61	20,244,713	331,880
katkhudās	38	15,797,992	415,737
of which, mutafarriqa	33	5,689,885	172,424
janissaries	24	13,053,500	543,896
‘azab	23	10,891,755	473,555
Grand total	113	61,375,452	543,146

The first comment elicited by this table obviously concerns the vastness of the average overall wealth of the members of the ruling elite, which appears in all its glory if we compare these figures with those concerning individuals who belonged to “civilian society”. For the same period, the 468 estates of artisans and merchants which I studied in my *Artisans et commerçants* amount to an average of 138,272 paras—four times lower. It is true that our sampling of emirs naturally provides us with the most important estates, because it concerns the superior officers of the militias and the beys. It would be interesting to be able to access comparable information on the wealth of ordinary soldiers and mamluks; the comparison between those classes and the average strata of the urban population would be significant.⁷ Nonetheless, we may note that even the wealthier representatives of native society, the major merchants (*tujjār*) of coffee and textiles, were far from that level: the average of the 169 estates studied was 299,344 paras, just slightly over half the average estates of the emirs. The exploitation of Egypt and its active population (citizens and *fellahin*) produced a surplus which generated far more wealth than commercial speculation.

Within the group studied, the superiority of the beys over the officers (estates five times as large) is quite striking, especially as the emirs included were not always the most powerful of the period. Only three of them appear in the list provided by P.M. Holt, which

⁷ Several comments on this problem appear in my article “Soldiers in trade: the case of Ottoman Cairo”, *BRIJMES*, 1991, 18–1.

mentions the emirs who played the most important roles and political life and who may also be assumed to have been among the wealthiest. These are Qayṭās Bey, d. 1691, who left an estate in the amount of 5,978,617 paras (Holt, 88); Ḥusayn Bey, *daftardār*, d. 1696, whose estate totaled 134,308 paras (Holt, 32); Murād Bey, d. 1696, who left an estate amounting to 933,744 paras (Holt, 71).⁸ The most considerable estate recorded by us is that of Ibrāhīm Bey, son of Dhulfiqār Bey, *amīr al-ḥajj*, d. 1696, in the amount of 7,130,124 paras. This was an extremely important personage, to whom, by the way, Jabartī devotes an obituary notice.⁹ We may appreciate the vastness of such an estate by noting that Muṣṭafā, a *tājir* dealing in coffee, left, upon his death in 1695, an estate in the amount of 2,423,540 paras—the largest estate observed by us for a “civilian” during that period, at the end of the seventeenth century: that of the emir is three times as large.

Another striking characteristic is the great inequality of the wealth of the emirs whose estates we studied. The case of Yahyā Bey, whose estate, liquidated in 1681, amounted to only 4,170 paras, should no doubt be set aside, because he was only a follower (*tābiʿ*) of the *kathhudā* (lieutenant) of ʿUthmān Pasha; it is possible that he had only been in Egypt for a limited time. On the other hand, Qayṭās Bey *mīr liwā*, d. 1681, left only a meager estate in the amount of 57,053 paras—definitely comparable to that of an average artisan or merchant from Cairo.¹⁰

The superiority of the wealth of the beys, relative to that of the superior officers of the militias, appears extremely important. While there is only a rather limited number of beys in the sample proposed, the gap nonetheless appears significant. If we rank the largest of the estates, we see that the richest of the officers (Muṣṭafā Aghā of the *ʿazab* corps, d. 1691) ranks no higher than fourth (with an estate in the amount of 2.8 million paras)—rather far behind Ibrāhīm Bey (7.1 million), Qayṭās Bey (5.9 million) and Dhulfiqār Bey (2.9

⁸ See P.M. Holt, “The Beylicate in Ottoman Egypt”, in *Studies of the History of the Near East*, 177–219. *Mahkama, qisma ʿaskariyya*, vol. 85, p. 8, August 15, 1691; vol. 90, p. 514, June 2, 1696; vol. 93, p. 312, October 4, 1700 (these references are abridged in subsequent notes as follows: *Mahkama*, 85, 8, August 15, 1691).

⁹ *ʿAbd al-Rahmān al-Jabartī’s History of Egypt*, translation, T. Philipp and M. Perlmann, ed., Stuttgart, Franz Steiner, 1994, 3 vol., I, 90/147; *Mahkama*, 89, 382, October 25, 1692.

¹⁰ *Mahkama*, 76, 578, November 22, 1681; *q. ʿarabiyya*, 60, 103, December 8, 1681.

million).¹¹ The beys do appear to have been the dominant element of the class which governed and exploited Egypt. In any event, their financial means were far greater than those of the officers. This situation leads us to reflect upon a theme, frequently developed in the history of the time, to the effect that, in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the position of leader of an *ojaq* (and particularly of the militia of janissaries) was more important, and quite possibly more profitable, than that of bey. We have several examples of high-ranking officers who were accordingly subjected to the "sanction" of being expelled from their *ojaq* and "raised" to the exalted position of bey.¹² Reality, however, does not appear to comply exactly with this stereotype.

The wealth of the militia officers

In the course of my study of the *Maḥkama* records, I turned my interest to the superior officers of the Cairo militias: the aghas (regimental commanders) and the *kathhudās* (lieutenant colonels) who were effectively in charge of the *ojaqs*. The 99 estates compiled by me were those of superior officers in the seven militias then existing in Cairo, all of which (albeit unequally) were represented in the sample: the *mutafarriqa* militia (32 aghas and 1 *kathhudā*); the janissaries, or *mustahfizān* militia (eight aghas and 16 *kathhudās*); the *ʿazab* (10 aghas and 13 *kathhudās*); the *gamāliyya* (four aghas and two *kathhudās*); the *chāwīshiyya* (three aghas and three *kathhudās*); the *tufukhiyān* (two aghas and three *kathhudās*); the *charākisa* (two aghas).¹³ These numbers certainly confirm the extreme numerical superiority of the three principal *ojaqs*: those of the *mutafarriqa*, the *mustahfizān* and the *ʿazab*.

The modest size of the sample studied hardly permits us to draw conclusions with regard to the greater wealth of the *kathhudās*, relative to that of the aghas: an average of 415,737 paras (for 38 individuals), as against 331,880 (for 61 persons). The difference does not appear to be very significant. However, it is slightly more noticeable

¹¹ *Maḥkama*, 84, 441, 28 May 1691; 89, 382, 25 October 1696; 85, 8, 15 August 1691; 80, 411, 7 September 1687.

¹² Among the best-known cases, let us mention: Muḥammad Kathhudā al-Habashī, d. 1682 (see A. Raymond, "The sabīl of Yusuf Aghā", in *The Cairo Heritage, Essays in Honour of Laila Alī Ibrāhīm*, Doris Behrens-Abouseif, ed., Cairo, 2001) and Ifranj Aḥmad, d. 1711 (A. Raymond, "Une 'Révolution' au Caire", *AI*, 6 (1975)).

¹³ See M. Winter, *Egyptian Society*, and J. Hathaway, *The Politics of Households*.

among the janissaries, where the average wealth of the aghas was 446,822 paras, and that of the *kathudās* 592,433 paras. This superiority would seem logical, given that the *kathudās* constituted the element which effectively commanded the *ojaq* at the time.

By contrast, the difference between the average amount of the estates of the janissaries (543,896 for 24 persons) and the *ʿazab* (473,555 for 23 individuals), relative to that of the remaining officers of the other five *ojaqs* (232,643 for 52 persons), may well reflect the greater financial power of the officers of the two *ojaqs* which, at that time, were in the final stages of ensuring control over the urban population, by means of protection (*himāya*), and that of production and commerce, by means of tax farming (*muqāṭaʿa*).¹⁴ From this point of view, the relative wealth enjoyed by the *kathudās* of the janissaries, who controlled the *ojaq* and its resources and were very actively engaged in commercial speculation, particularly the coffee trade, appears quite significant: the average figure of 592,433 paras should again be compared with the average fortune of a Cairo trader (*tājir*) at the same time: 299,344 paras.

The majority of the “millionaires” (four and five respectively) came from the *ʿazab* and the janissaries, as against only one each for the *chawāshīyya*, the *mutafariqa* and the *charākisa*. The richest of all, Muṣṭafā Aghā of the *ʿazab* corps, left an estate in the amount of 2,891,928 paras upon his death in 1691—the largest of our sample, at least were the officers are concerned.¹⁵ The details of the estates indicate that it essentially consisted of property owned by the officer in 16 villages, held in *iltizām*; part of the estate, however, consisted of merchandise which had arrived from Turkey—a fact which may indicate a certain degree of implication in commercial activity. This is even more evident in the case of Sulaymān “Kūrjī”, *kathudā* of the *mustahfizān*, the wealthiest of the janissary officers, whose estate, liquidated in 1690, amounted to 2,878,062 paras. Over and above the property related to his possession of four villages held in *iltizām*, this officer left a large quantity of coffee and real estate, which attested to his interest in commercial activities: a bathhouse, a mill (*tāhūn*), an caravanserai (*wakāla*) and a *rab*^c (building acquired for rental pur-

¹⁴ On this question, see *Artisans et commerçants au Caire*.

¹⁵ *Mahkama*, 84, 441, 28 May 1691; 462, 13 June 1691.

poses) in the Shawwāʿīn quarter and another *wakāla* in Būlāq.¹⁶ Sulaymān “Kūrjī” is the worthy predecessor of those who were to become the great emirs of the Qāzdaḡhlī “house” of janissaries at the beginning of the following century, on even a grander scale: Ḥasan Katkhudā (estate in the amount of 4.5 million paras in 1715) and especially ʿUthmān Katkhudā (estate in the amount of 21.5 million paras in 1736).¹⁷

It is interesting to note, with regard to officers as well as beys, the remarkable disparity of wealth disclosed by our sample—from the modest estate of 4,005 paras left by Muḥammad, agha of the *mutafarriqa* in 1694 to that of Muṣṭafā Aghā of the *ʿazab*, cited above (2,891,928 paras in 1691).¹⁸ This disparity is accentuated in the *ojaq* of the janissaries, where the smallest estate is 14,905 paras (Salīm Katkhudā, in 1686) and the largest, that of Sulaymān “Kūrjī”, is 2,878,062 paras in 1690. Given the fact that our sample gives us no data with regard to simple soldiers, we must conclude that military society was as inegalitarian as “civilian” society.¹⁹

III *Wealth and places of residence*

It would be interesting, in order to improve our knowledge of the general structure of the city, to be able to cross-match two sets of data: those which concern the wealth of the emirs and those which concern their places of residence within Cairo. Part of the documents which I studied in the *Mahkama* archives actually mention the “addresses” of the emirs whose estates were liquidated. Unfortunately, this applies to only a few of the estates of beys: only four out of 14. This low proportion, in a sample which is already small, does not enable the drawing of general conclusions. I shall therefore merely mention that Darwīsh Bey, who died in 1690 (estate in the amount of 1,163,647 paras), lived in Darb al-Gamāmīz (*Description de l’Égypte*:

¹⁶ *Mahkama*, 83, 93, 21 January 1690.

¹⁷ See André Raymond, *Le Caire des janissaires*, Paris, CNRS, 1995.

¹⁸ *Mahkama*, 87, 465, 6 August 1694; 84, 462, 13 June 1691.

¹⁹ *Mahkama*, 79, 57, 21 February 1686; 83, 93, 21 January 1690. As we know, this inequality was especially pronounced among “civilians”; see *Artisans et commerçants au Caire*, 373–378; see also C. Establet, J.-P. Pascual and A. Raymond, “La mesure de l’inégalité dans la société ottomane”, *JESHO*, 37 (1994).

46 R 10, near Birkat al-Fīl); Qayṭās Bey, who died in 1691 (estate in the amount of 5,978,617 paras), lived in Qanāṭir al-Sibā' (*Description*: 252 U 13); Salīm Bey, who died in 1692 (estate in the amount of 2,482,922 paras), lived in Khurunfish (*Description*: 164 G 7) within Qāhira; Ḥusayn Bey, who died in 1696 (estate in the amount of 134,308 paras), lived in the Muẓaffar quarter (*Description*: 124 T 8, near Birkat al-Fīl).²⁰ Two of the entries in this short list mention Birkat al-Fīl, but there is no sensible way of exploiting this fact.


The situation is more favorable with regard to the militia officers, where 50 (one-half) of the estates studied between 1679 and 1700 provide the information necessary with regard to domiciles. Although the sample is limited, it allows us to propose certain general tendencies. These 50 documents concern 17 *mutafarriqa*, 15 *ʿazab*, nine janissaries, three *gamaliyya* and two representatives of each of the other three *ojaqs*. The following table summarizes these data, according to the various large areas of the city: Qāhira, the southern region, the western region, and, within those regions, according to the characteristic areas:²¹

Table 16.2. The residences of the militia officers

	Number	Average estate
Qāhira	6	168,679
Southern region	33	364,529
of which, Darb al-Aḥmar	6	124,208
Citadel	7	95,691
Birkat al-Fīl	20	530,719
Western region	11	777,991
of which, Qanāṭir al-Sibā'	7	768,588
ʿAbdīn	3	958,071
northern section	1	303,576
Grand total	50	431,998

²⁰ *Mahkama*, 84, 112, 22 October 1690; 85, 8, 15 August 1691; 86, 3, 31 August 1692; 90, 514, 2 June 1696.

²¹ I divide the city into three large parts: Qāhira, the Fatimid foundations of the city, within the walls and east of the Khalīj; the southern area, beyond the southern Fatimid wall (Bāb Zuwayla), east of the Khalīj (Canal); the western area, beyond the Khalīj.



The distribution of residences which may thus be sketched falls within the framework of a development which had begun during the Mamluk era and continued throughout the first two centuries of the Ottoman period, as I had the occasion of pointing out in my article "The residential districts of Cairo's elite".²²

The tendency to leave the Qāhira region, which henceforth became a center of economic activity and a residential area for the native population, is evident in this sample. It is marked, on one hand, by the small number of officers living there, and, on the other, by the mediocrity of their wealth: the average of 168,679 paras is barely higher than the average of the estates of "civilians" during the same period (138,272 paras). This move out of Qāhira by the elite was somewhat masked by the existence of "little houses"—residences which were in some way "secondary", which could be used by the emirs to store part of their wealth in order to protect it in case of misfortune, and, if necessary, as a place of refuge. Still, none of the wealthier officers maintained a dwelling place in the old part of the city.

The southern area of Cairo, outside the Fatimid walls, remained the area most preferred by the officers. Their residences, however, were primarily concentrated in the region of Birkat al-Fīl, which—as early as the fifteenth century—had begun to be the elite quarter. In the rest of that area, the decline in the number of emirs' residences was quite marked. To the south of Bāb Zuwayla and in Darb al-Aḥmar, as well as around the Citadel, the number of residences owned by superior officers was small—six and seven respectively; these, moreover, were officers of relatively modest wealth, as we will see by comparing the average amount of their estates (124,208 and 95,691) with the average amount for the total sample. It seems logical to explain this gradual decrease in terms of the growth of the native population in the southern region of the city—a population which was also relatively poor—and the development of business activity in that region, which motivated the officers to move else-

²² A. Raymond, "The residential districts of Cairo's elite", in *The Mamluks in Egyptian Politics and Society*, 207–223. In that publication, referring to the end of the seventeenth century, I supplemented the *Mahkama* documents with information from various chronicles. Accordingly, the figures are not comparable with those of the present study.

where. With regard to the regions adjacent to the Citadel, there was undoubtedly an additional, and understandable, hesitancy to settle in a region often disturbed by demonstrations among the common people and commotion among the military forces, inspired by the presence of the ruling power (the Pasha's palace) and the large barracks; this region may have been preferred as a place of residence by ordinary soldiers.

The high-ranking officers were concentrated around Birkat al-Fīl (Elephant's Pool), as shown by the number and importance of the estates registered. The region around that pool, which was flooded whenever the Nile waters rose—an occasion of festivity, as described by chroniclers and travelers—was favored by this military elite: 20 individuals (out of 50) whose estates averaged 530,719 paras, far above the overall average for the sample (431,998 paras). Four of the seven “millionaire” officers appearing in the sample had residences which were located around the *Birka*. The residences were particularly numerous in several of the streets which surrounded the pool: Ḥabbāniyya (66 Q 10), three officers; Darb al-Gamāmīz (46 R 10), five officers (this was apparently the most prestigious address); Qawsūn (74 R 7), five officers; Sheikh al-Zalām (138 S 8); Hadrat al-Hanna (near 183 U 9). It may be assumed that, over and above the pleasant surroundings (a pool with greenery), the officers were attracted by the convenience of a site relatively close to the Citadel—a center of power and the location of the janissary and ‘Azab barracks, which naturally facilitated their incessant movements back and forth between their residences and the *Qal‘a*. It is interesting to note that Birkat al-Fīl was particularly popular as a place of residence for the janissary officers: out of nine whose dwelling I could identify, seven lived in that quarter. By contrast, of the 15 superior officers of the ‘Azab appearing in the sample, only three lived near Birkat al-Fīl. This attests to a double tropism, positive and negative: we cannot assume that it was due to pure chance, or that there was no collective “regimental” behavior in the case of these two *ojaqs*. It is entirely logical that the officers of the same *ojaq* would have a tendency to take up residence in the same quarter. It is just as interesting to observe that Birkat al-Fīl—which was to remain the favorite place of residence of the *ojaq* officers until the end of the eighteenth century—was almost entirely closed to natives, even those belonging to the elite. Only a very few merchants resided there. That quarter, from this point of view, was apparently more tightly closed, during

the eighteenth century, than Azbakiyya, which was then also inhabited by some rich members of native society.²³

The existence of a large core of residences maintained by members of the military elite in the southern part of the western area of Cairo, beyond the Khalīj, constituted the continuation of a movement which had begun during the Mamluk era. The largest group was located in the area of Qanāṭir al-Sibāʿ (*Description*, 252 U 13) and Suwayqat al-Lālā (115 T 12), with a total of seven residences maintained by officers whose estates averaged 768,588 paras, a figure higher than that in the area of Birkat al-Fīl; nonetheless, the limited number of documents makes it impossible to draw conclusions in this matter as well. Nor can we do so with regard to the ʿĀbdīn quarter (138 O/P 11), which had only three residences, although the average amount of the estates pertaining to those residences was quite high (958,071 paras). This entire region was subsequently to undergo a great degree of development and to become, during the eighteenth century, one of the principal places of residence of the military elite. In the course of research on the last two decades of the eighteenth century, I succeeded in locating, within that area, 18 of the 69 officers located, or more than one-quarter.²⁴

The present study, however, indicates that the trend by members of the ruling elite to move into the northern half of that western area (especially the area adjacent to Azbakiyya) had not yet begun at the end of the seventeenth century. In my sample, this region is only mentioned once, in connection with the estate of Iqbāl, agha of the *chāwīshiyya*, whose domicile was located at the extreme southern end of that area (M 10). Moreover, this was only a relatively mediocre estate, in the amount of 303,576 paras.²⁵ The movement which was to lead the ruling elite to colonize the Azbakiyya area had not yet begun; at the time, the merchant bourgeoisie of Cairo maintained summer residences in that quarter, which subsequently became permanent homes. This migration would not develop until after 1725; still, it was rapid enough for the situation to have entirely

²³ Certainly, however, toward the end of the century, Azbakiyya was increasingly taken over by members of the Mamluk elite.

²⁴ Results of an extensive search of the *Maḥkama* archives for documents related to the estates of the emirs between 1775 and 1798.

²⁵ *Maḥkama*, 90, 468, 24 May 1696.

changed by the end of the eighteenth century. In my study of the estates of officers between 1775 and 1798, I noted that the northern part of the western area been included seven residences (of a total of 69 estates studied).

In my opinion, these considerations—which admittedly must remain rather general, in view of the incomplete nature of the available documentation—appear to confirm that the location of the residences maintained by members of the ruling elite complied with a particular type of logic. Many of the residences were concentrated in the two (neighboring) areas of Birkat al-Fīl and Qanāṭir al-Sibā^c—a total of 27 of the 50 residences studied—far from the areas where the native population lived and worked; in this respect, some type of segregation was very strictly observed. On the other hand, the choice of location of the residences maintained by members of the ruling caste was largely determined by the extent of their personal fortunes, with the preferred quarters inhabited by the richer elements of that caste. With few exceptions, only the less well-to-do members of the elite resigned themselves to living in less prestigious quarters, where they found themselves in contact with the native population; this proximity was undoubtedly one of the reasons for the shunning of those areas by the wealthiest members of that caste.

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CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

PROBLEMS OF ‘ABD AL-RAḤMĀN KATKHUDĀ’S LEADERSHIP OF THE QAZDUGHLI FACTION

Daniel Crecelius

‘Abd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā was one of the most important Egyptian amirs of the eighteenth century, yet his career remains somewhat out of focus. His longevity was itself unusual, but he is best known for the large number of constructions with which he endowed Cairo in the period 1744–1765.¹ His lineage and the incredible wealth he accumulated would suggest that he would have also assumed the leadership of his *bayt* (faction), but this was not the case. Following the lead of the famous late eighteenth century Egyptian historian al-Jabartī, whose career overlapped with ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā for approximately the last two decades of the amir’s life, modern historians have concluded that ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā eschewed the rough and tumble of political life and preferred to devote his energies, and considerable wealth, to the large number of constructions which have beautified Cairo and immortalized his name. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān’s seeming unwillingness to participate actively in the political plots and counter-plots that remained a constant during his long career have been said to be a function of his character, that is, a preference for the cultural life, a desire to avoid the political arena, and a devotion to construction.² This paper will question that view and suggest that it was the political culture of the prevailing Mamluk

¹ These constructions are listed and described in André Raymond, “Les Constructions de l’Émir ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā au Caire,” *Annales islamologiques*, vol. XI (1972), 235–251.

² The best review of ‘Abd al-Raḥmān’s career is André Raymond’s *Le Caire des Janissaires: L’apogée de la ville ottomane sous ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā* (Paris: CNRS Editions, 1995). Raymond notes ‘Abd al-Raḥmān’s superior education, his ability to draw and understand architectural plans, and his command of Arabic. He also feels that the manner in which ‘Abd al-Raḥmān led the Janissaries demonstrates his lack of interest in politics and preference for construction. See page 42.

system of the period that prevented him from actively pursuing the leadership of his powerful political faction, a faction that dominated the political and economic life of Egypt from the 1730s to the arrival of French forces in 1798.

We are not certain of the exact date of ‘Abd al-Raḥmān’s birth, but it is usually attributed to a period shortly before the death of his father, Ḥasan Jāwīsh al-Qazdughli, in 1716. His mother, Āmina, the daughter of the amir Ḥasan Shurbaji Muṣṭafā, was the free-born wife of Ḥasan Jāwīsh, so ‘Abd al-Raḥmān was himself a free-born Muslim. I believe this freeborn status made the difference in his subsequent career.

In the late seventeenth century the politically astute Ḥasan, the *agha* of the Gönüllüyan corps, had formed a triumvirate with his son-in-law Ismā’il Bey al-Daftardār and his former *sarrāj* Muṣṭafā al-Qazdughli to dominate the political life of Cairo. Ḥasan Aghā had been instrumental in placing Muṣṭafā al-Qazdughli as *katkhudā* of the most powerful Ottoman regiment in Egypt; the Janissary corps controlled the most lucrative tax farms, particularly the customs houses of the ports, was heavily involved in the extensive coffee trade of the Red Sea, and acquired significant payments from the estates of deceased corps members and from local and foreign merchants upon whom it imposed a “protection” tax. It is to Muṣṭafā Katkhudā, who died in 1704, the same year as his patron Ḥasan Aghā, that the Qazdughli faction traces its roots.

The Qazdughli faction split into two upon the death of Muṣṭafā Katkhudā in 1704. One branch was headed by his manumitted mamluk Ḥasan Jāwīsh, who remained dominant; the other was headed by Sulaymān Jāwīsh, another of Muṣṭafā Katkhudā’s freed mamluks.³ The base of Qazdughli power remained firmly established in the Janissary corps and upon the death of Ḥasan Jāwīsh in 1716 the faction, and the Janissary corps, was headed by ‘Uthmān Katkhudā al-Qazdughli.⁴

³ The genealogical lines of the Qazdughli faction are laid out by Jane Hathaway, *The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt: The Rise of the Qazdağlıs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 65f.

⁴ Among ‘Uthmān Katkhudā’s freed Mamluks were Sulaymān Jāwīsh, Ibrāhīm Katkhudā, ‘Abdallāh Katkhudā, Riḍwān Kāshif, ‘Uthmān, ‘Alī and Ḥasan Odabāshi of the Janissaries, ‘Abdallāh, *shurbāji* of the Janissaries, Khalīl, Bashīr *Aghā Dār al-Sa’āda*, Muṣṭafā al-Khāzindār, Aḥmad Kāshif and ‘Uthmān Kāshif. See Michel

When Ḥasan Jāwīsh died, his infant son 'Abd al-Raḥmān suffered the first of many disappointments that marked his career and which have been attributed to his passivity. His father's senior mamluk, 'Uthmān al-Qazdughli, married his master's widow Āmina, the mother of 'Abd al-Raḥmān, and withheld the considerable inheritance due the infant 'Abd al-Raḥmān. In maintaining control of the Janissary corps 'Uthmān, who was *katkhudā*, designated his own freed mamluk Sulaymān al-Çuhadār the *bash odabashi* of the unit and executor of his will, and in 1734 made his stepson a *jāwīsh* in the unit.⁵

'Uthmān Katkhudā had a hand in a wide range of economic activities that made him a very wealthy amir and permitted him to undertake numerous constructions. He was actively involved in the lucrative trade between Cairo and the Hijaz, held many rural tax farms, gained control of the customs houses of Egypt's ports, and as a result of the great plague of 1736 acquired much from the inheritances of the members of his corps and of those rich merchants who died without heirs. He also profited from offering his protection to the foreign merchant community, particularly to the French. His fortune was therefore considerable when he was assassinated in the plot that was organized by the Ottoman governor Bākir Pasha in November 1736.⁶

Upon the death of 'Uthmān Katkhudā his freed slave and heir, and executor of his will, Sulaymān Jāwīsh, became head of the Qazdughli faction and laid his hand on his master's entire fortune, leaving 'Abd al-Raḥmān, who was then around 21 years of age, a rural tax farm producing only four purses, or 100,000 *nisf fidḍas* profit per year. Finding no support among his Janissary comrades, 'Abd al-Raḥmān in disgust transferred to the 'Azab corps, vowing not to return to the Janissary corps while Sulaymān Jāwīsh was alive.⁷

Tuchscherer, "Le pèlerinage de l'émir Sulaymān Ğāwīš al-Qāzdughli," *Annales islamologiques*, vol. XXIV (1988), 157.

⁵ 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Ḥasan al-Jabartī, *Abd al-Raḥmān al-Jabartī's History of Egypt*, Thomas Philipp and Moshe Perlmann, eds. (Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag, 1994), vol. I, 275; Aḥmad Katkhudā 'Azabān al-Damurdāshī, *Chronicle of Egypt: 1688-1755*, Daniel Crecelius and 'Abd al-Wahhāb Bakr, eds. and trans. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1991), 309. Ḥasan Jāwīsh had another son, Ḥasan Çelebi, who took no significant part in political life. His title, *çelebi*, suggests that he pursued a scholarly or commercial life. His name is mentioned among a long list of those who died in the plague of 1736. See al-Jabartī, *op. cit.*, vol. I, 274.

⁶ See Tuchscherer, "Le pèlerinage de l'émir Sulaymān Ğāwīš al-Qāzdughli", 158-159.

⁷ Al-Damurdāshī, *Chronicle of Egypt: 1688-1755*, 315; al-Jabartī, *op. cit.*, vol. II, 5.

In 1739 Sulaymān Jāwīsh was named *sirdār* of the troops assigned to guard the pilgrims on their journey to the Hijaz. Suffering from syphilis, and infirm, he was carried on a palaquin to Birkat al-Ḥājj, the starting point for the departure of the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan. He was accompanied by his wife, the Sitt Shuwaykar, the former concubine of his deceased master ‘Uthmān Katkhudā. Sulaymān Aghā, the *katkhudā* of the Jāwīshiyya and freed mamluk of ‘Abd al-Raḥmān’s father Ḥasan Jāwīsh, who had married ‘Abd al-Raḥmān’s mother Āmina after the assassination of ‘Uthmān Katkhudā in 1736, was present in Sulaymān Jāwīsh’s tent when he expired. As described by al-Damurdāshī, Sulaymān Aghā then “took the registers from the assistant (*mustawfi*) and put them in a trunk. He took the keys to the other trunks, boxes and crates and informed ‘Uthmān Bey Zayn al-Faqār (the *amīr al-Ḥājj*). He then brought his heir, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Jāwīsh, and bestowed upon him the robe of the *sirdār* of the Mustahfizān guards. Sulaymān Aghā handed him the keys, and he took charge of the pavillion with its furnishings, necessities, ground coffee and all other comestibles.”⁸ Al-Damurdāshī comments that “This was a gift of the powerful Lord, given without any effort [on ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Jāwīsh’s part].”⁹ While ‘Abd al-Raḥmān left the ‘Azab corps and returned to an important post within the Janissary regiment, the estates of ‘Uthmān Katkhudā and Sulaymān Jāwīsh were not settled until 1740 when ‘Abd al-Raḥmān had returned from his service with the troops guarding the pilgrims. Shuwaykar, Sulaymān Jāwīsh’s widow, was taken by Ibrāhīm Jāwīsh, one of Sulaymān Jāwīsh’s manumitted mamluks who would assume the leadership of the main Qazdughli faction.¹⁰

Although ‘Abd al-Raḥmān finally came into the immense delayed inheritances of his father, ‘Uthmān Katkhudā, and Sulaymān Jāwīsh Ḥuhadār in 1740 he was unable to claim the leadership of the Qazdughli amirs, which instead was seized by the ambitious and

At least part of ‘Uthmān Katkhudā’s fortune by law should have gone to the son of his master Ḥasan Jāwīsh, that is, to ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā. See André Raymond, *Le Caire des Janissaires*, 34. Hathaway, *op. cit.*, 79, notes that Sulaymān Jāwīsh had received an imperial order entitling him to inherit ‘Uthmān Katkhudā’s tax farms, some of which he was to divide among the other heirs, including ‘Abd al-Raḥmān.

⁸ Al-Damurdāshī, *op. cit.*, 320.

⁹ *Loc. cit.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 380 cites Shuwaykar as one of Ibrāhīm Katkhudā’s wives.

astute Ibrāhīm Jāwīsh.¹¹ Some historians have sympathized with 'Abd al-Raḥmān's fate on the death of his father in 1716, but 'Abd al-Raḥmān's misfortune was not unusual, whether among the general public or the mamluks. Several points can be made to explain the events surrounding the transfer of power and wealth from Ḥasan Jāwīsh to 'Uthmān Katkhudā.

While recognizing that 'Abd al-Raḥmān had a clear claim to his legal share of his father's inheritance, it must be remembered that he was still a child at the time of his father's death; he had neither the age, political acumen, retainers of his own well placed to leverage his claim to his father's succession, nor the political power to challenge his father's senior freed mamluk. Nor was he able to contest Sulaymān Jāwīsh's usurpation of the inheritance of his master 'Uthmān Katkhudā. Finding little support within his Janissary ranks, he transferred to the 'Azab corps and attempted to establish friendly relations with the remnants of the defeated Qāsimī faction. The problems faced by 'Abd al-Raḥmān, and his frustrated claim to his rightful inheritance, can be explained satisfactorily with reference to the prevailing mamluk culture of that period.

Within Mamluk political culture of the eighteenth century the senior manumitted slave held a special position within his master's household. It was generally he to whom the rest of the household looked for leadership when the head of the household died. He usually was connected by marriage to his master. He frequently was given one of his master's daughters or concubines in marriage and, on the death of his master, married his master's senior wife, moved into his master's house, and, as in the case of 'Uthmān Katkhudā, acquired much of his master's wealth and positions. As the recognized new head of the household he was expected to maintain the "open house" for the faction and to maintain or expand the faction's control of positions and revenues within the province's administration.¹² All of these aspects of a "succession" can be seen in the

¹¹ 'Uthmān Katkhudā's partial inheritance amounted to 21.5 million *paras*, while Sulaymān Jāwīsh Ḥuhadār's partial inheritance totalled 6.8 million *paras*, most probably making 'Abd al-Raḥmān the richest man in Egypt. It should be remembered that these figures do not include all of the deceased amirs' passive assets, such as potential income from tax farms and other sources of income controlled but not owned. See Raymond, *Le Caire des Janissaires*, 36.

¹² For the meaning of "open house" see David Ayalon, "Studies in al-Jabartī I:

career of Dhū al-Faqār Aghā, the retainer of Qānṣawh Bey al-Qāsimī. Jabartī notes that upon the death of Qānṣawh Bey in 1715, “his offices of amir and *sancak bey* were given to his retainer Dhū 'l-Faqār Aghā, who married his daughter and maintained the splendor of his master’s house.”¹³ Another example would be Muṣṭafā Kāshif, who acquired all the inheritance of his master ‘Alī Bey Zayn al-Faqār (died in 1734), including his widow.¹⁴ This special relationship between a master and his freed mamluk was consolidated in several ways, given legal status, and became a tradition.

First of all, the bond between master and slave remained unbreakable even after the manumission of the slave. At that moment the master often gave a woman of his own harem, either a concubine or his own daughter, in marriage to his slave. Examples abound throughout the century of the marriages of favorite manumitted mamluks being arranged by their masters.¹⁵ Another tradition was for the most powerful (usually the senior) manumitted mamluk to marry the senior wife of the deceased master, as ‘Uthmān Katkhudā did in marrying ‘Abd al-Raḥmān’s mother Āmina.¹⁶ The other wives or favorite concubines of the deceased master were taken by other of his powerful manumitted slaves; some of these, such as Shuwaykar or Nafīsa Khātūn, the famous wife of ‘Alī Bey who was claimed by Murād Bey following the death of ‘Alī Bey, played significant roles in the political careers of their new husbands, bringing considerable wealth and legitimacy to their new households.

Notes on the Transformation of Mamluk Society in Egypt under the Ottomans,” *JESHO*, vol. III (1960), 290–97.

¹³ Al-Jabartī, *op. cit.*, vol. I, 182. Likewise, when ‘Alī Bey Zayn al-Faqār died in 1146 (1733–34), Muṣṭafā Kāshif acquired all his inheritance, including retainers and mamluks, paid the *hulvan* for his tax farm villages, and married his master’s widow. See al-Damurdāshī, *op. cit.*, 319.

¹⁴ Al-Damurdāshī, *op. cit.*, 319.

¹⁵ ‘Alī Bey Bulut Kapan, for instance, married his sister to his favorite mamluk, the famous Muḥammad Bey Abu al-Dhahab. See Daniel Crecelius, *The Roots of Modern Egypt: A Study of the Regimes of ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr and Muḥammad Bey Abū al-Dhahab, 1760–1775* (Minneapolis & Chicago: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1981), 45; 58–59. An interesting essay among the Mamluks of the eighteenth century is Jane Hathaway’s “Marriage Alliances among the Military Households of Ottoman Egypt,” *AI*, XXIX (1995), 133–149. See also Mary Ann Fay, “Women and Waqf: Toward a Reconsideration of Women’s Place in the Mamluk Household,” *IJMES*, vol. XXIX (February 1997), 33–51.

¹⁶ Upon the death of ‘Alī Bey Bulut Kapan in 1773 Muḥammad Bey Abū al-Dhahab took his master’s senior wife ‘Ā’isha Qādin in marriage and permitted his

The tradition of the senior manumitted mamluk being brought closer to the master of the household through marriage with one of the chosen women of the master's harem was not just a reward to a favorite, but was meant to provide continuity and protection to the household. That this was a tradition nurtured by mamluk grandees themselves can be seen in the stipulations they frequently included in the documents (*waqfiyyāt*) establishing their *awqāf*. It is common to find among the stipulations that the senior manumitted slave is named supervisor (*nāẓir*) of the *waqf*, even when children of the donor/master are cited as beneficiaries.¹⁷ It is clear that the children could not defend the wealth and property endowed in their father's *waqf* as well as a senior, well-placed manumitted mamluk amir. It is equally clear that a freeborn son, even one who had reached manhood, did not have the leverage and power to protect the family's inheritance against the increasingly frequent usurpations of the inheritance of deceased amirs as the century unfolded. 'Abd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā is a good example, for he would not have acquired the fortune he came to possess without the intervention at a propitious moment by his father's freed mamluk Sulaymān Aghā, who was his stepfather. An amir often designated his senior manumitted mamluk to act as supervisor of his *waqf* with the clear intention that this was a better way to hold the inheritance together and to insure its benefits to his wives and children. Moreover, in the lawless decades following the death of Muḥammad Bey Abū al-Dhahab in 1775 mamluks frequently usurped the inheritances of their deceased colleagues and of citizens alike. It was a particularly tumultuous time.

Of the pandemic plague of 1790–1791 which killed off so many citizens, among them entire mamluk households, al-Jabartī mentioned that “It happened that succession was transferred three times in one

own mamluk Murād Bey to marry 'Alī Bey's second wife, the famous Nafīsa Qādin. 'Ā'isha was the freed slave of 'Alī Bey's master, the famous Ibrāhīm Katkhudā. 'Alī Bey's other two wives were Munawwar Khātūn bint 'Abdallāh al-Bayḍā and Gulsan bint 'Abdallāh al-Bayḍā. This information is recorded in 'Alī Bey's *waqfiyya*, preserved as Number 743 in the Ministry of Awqāf in Cairo. See also Crecelius, *op. cit.*, 116–17.

¹⁷ Many *waqfiyyāt* include this stipulation, even stipulating that the eldest surviving mamluk should always hold the supervision of the *waqf*. Jabartī, vol. II, 352–53, gives an example of a mamluk taking care of the family of his deceased master, noting that Muḥammad Aghā al-Bārūdī married his master's widow and took care of his stepsons.

week.”¹⁸ When the plague had passed and the Ottoman-supported government of Cairo, including virtually the entire household of Ismā‘īl Bey the *shaykh al-balad*, had been carried away, the forces of Ibrāhīm Bey and Murād Bey returned to Cairo. Al-Jabartī describes the return of the rebel amirs thusly:

The amirs entered their houses and spent the night there, forgetting what had happened, for in most of the houses that had been occupied by amirs who had died of the plague, their wives had remained in them, while most of the wives of those who had been absent had died. Then when they returned, they found the houses populated by women, servant girls and slaves, so they married them and renewed their beds and made their wedding feasts. Whoever had no house, entered whichever house he liked best and took it with everything in it without hindrance. He sat in the places of the men and awaited the completion of the waiting period, if any of it remained. So God bequeathed to them their land and houses, their wealth and their wives.¹⁹

Although ‘Uthmān Katkhudā acted illegally when he denied ‘Abd al-Raḥmān his inheritance and had no clear intent to benefit his young stepson, his actions are understandable within the context of mamluk political culture in eighteenth century Egypt. Sulaymān Jāwīsh likewise disregarded the rules of inheritance to usurp the inheritance of his master ‘Uthmān Katkhudā. That Sulaymān Aghā would restore the lost inheritance to ‘Abd al-Raḥmān upon Sulaymān Jāwīsh’s death in 1739 demonstrates that Sulaymān Aghā felt that ‘Abd al-Raḥmān had been denied his share of the inheritance of his father, and he was fulfilling an obligation to the son of his deceased master Ḥasan Jāwīsh. Was Sulaymān Aghā acting in an altruistic manner, or in self-interest? By turning Sulaymān Jāwīsh’s fortune over to ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, he was insuring that his own wife Āmina (‘Abd al-Raḥmān’s mother) and stepson now had one of the grandest fortunes in Egypt.

The leadership of the Janissary corps, and of the Qazdughli faction whose base of power was within the corps, now fell to Ibrāhīm Jāwīsh, the manumitted slave of the deceased Sulaymān Jāwīsh Çuhadar. This paper will not examine the duumvirate that Ibrāhīm Jāwīsh formed with the Julfi leader Riḍwān, the *katkhudā* of the ‘Azab

¹⁸ Al-Jabarti, *op. cit.*, vol. II, 315.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, vol. II, 321.

corps, or the transformation for which Ibrāhīm Jāwīsh and Riḍwān Katkhudā are responsible in appointing their mamluks not only to positions within their respective corps, but to the beylicate. Instead, it shall continue to examine the relationship between 'Abd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā and the succession of Qazdughli leaders.

With Riḍwān Katkhudā as a junior, one might almost say silent, partner, Ibrāhīm Jāwīsh dominated the politics of the 1740s and the early 1750s and controlled a great portion of the revenues of the richest of Ottoman provinces. The contemporary historian al-Damurdāshī remarked that, "The leadership of Egypt devolved upon Ibrāhīm Katkhudā Qazdughli and Riḍwān Katkhudā al-Julfī. Everything first went to Ibrāhīm Katkhudā Qazdughli, whether the spice revenues, bribes, or the like, and then he gave one-third to Riḍwān Katkhudā al-Julfī."²⁰ Although in possession of the largest fortune in Egypt, 'Abd al-Raḥmān was denied an active political life by the imposing will of Ibrāhīm Jāwīsh and contented himself with the income from the customs revenues of Alexandria, which the Janissaries held as a tax farm, and from his association with the Jewish and foreign (particularly French) merchant communities from whom he extracted an income in return for his "protection."²¹ During the 1740s 'Abd al-Raḥmān accompanied several pilgrimages to Mecca and Medina in his capacity as *sirdār* of the troops guarding the pilgrims and began the massive building program that left Cairo and environs with so many religious edifices, both restored and newly constructed. 'Abd al-Raḥmān played no direct role in the continuing plots and counterplots of the 1740s which saw the elimination of Ibrāhīm Jāwīsh's rivals such as the Qaṭāmishiyya and Damiyāṭiyyā factions, the flight of 'Uthmān Bey Dhū al-Fiqār and the deposition of the governor Rāghib Pasha in 1748, but was said to instigate many of these conflicts.²²

²⁰ Al-Damurdāshī, *op. cit.*, 376. Much like 'Abd al-Raḥmān himself, Riḍwān Katkhudā refrained from taking an active role in the political life of the capital and devoted his energies to constructions of his own.

²¹ See, for example, Raymond, *Le Caire des Janissaires*, 37.

²² Al-Jabartī, *op. cit.*, vol. II, 9–10. Raymond, *Le Caire des Janissaires*, 34, notes the remark made by 'Abd al-Raḥmān's own stepfather, Sulaymān Jāwīsh, who had secured 'Abd al-Raḥmān's fortune for him. When he was exiled in 1765 by 'Alī Bey, Sulaymān Jāwīsh was asked if he didn't want to say something in his defense. "My son," said Sulaymān Jāwīsh, "is a hypocrite who has endeavored to create dissension among people. He has deserved (his exile)."

Towards the end of 1747 Ibrāhīm Jāwīsh suddenly ordered the exile of ‘Abd al-Raḥmān to Mecca, where he stayed for slightly more than three years, when Ibrāhīm permitted his return to Cairo in the company of the *amīr al-ḥājī* ‘Alī Bey, one of his mamluks whom Ibrāhīm Katkhudā had raised to the beylicate.²³ Upon his return Ibrāhīm, who himself had finally assumed the office of *katkhudā* of the Janissaries, named ‘Abd al-Raḥmān to that important office for a two year period. Ostensibly, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān was now the head of the Qazdughli faction and in control of the most powerful Ottoman corps in Egypt. While he continued to enrich himself by access to the many ways in which the Janissaries were able to exploit the rich revenue system in Egypt, he remained subordinate to Ibrāhīm Jāwīsh/Katkhudā until the latter’s death in November 1754. It was then that ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā married the oft-widowed Sitt Shuwaykar.

One can rightfully ask why ‘Abd al-Raḥmān was so easy to push around and why he seemed to accept exile to the Hijaz without resistance. The answer, I believe, lies in his status as a freeborn “outsider” within the network of Mamluk households. There are, of course, examples from the eighteenth century of the freeborn sons of Mamluk amirs being named to their father’s positions and assuming the control of their tax farms, but this was not the rule. Far more often, these sons were passed over, forgotten, or given a small stipend or tax farm to sustain them, but they seldom were accepted within the inner circles of Mamluk ranks and seldom played a significant role in the politics of the period. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā was unique because of the enormous wealth he commanded, and even though Jabartī states that he purchased mamluks and concubines of his own, these were not placed in prominent positions within

²³ Al-Damurdāshī does not state that ‘Abd al-Raḥmān was exiled, but that he decided to accompany the *amīr al-ḥājī* ‘Umar Bey on pilgrimage in 1747. He incorrectly has ‘Abd al-Raḥmān returning to Cairo in 1748 in the company of the *amīr al-ḥājī* ‘Alī Bey and being made *katkhudā* of the Janissaries for the next two years. See al-Damurdāshī, *op. cit.*, 365; 372. In 1760 ‘Abd al-Raḥmān would name ‘Alī Bey the *shaykh al-balad*. The chronicle by al-Jabartī is equally vague on this period. But Raymond used French consular reports for establishing a more accurate chronology for ‘Abd al-Raḥmān’s career. Moreover, ‘Alī Bey served as *amīr al-ḥājī* in 1751, not in 1748. For a list of the amirs who led the pilgrimage, see Shaykh Aḥmad al-Rashīdī, *Husun al-Ṣafā’ wa al-İbtihāj bi dhikr man İmārat al-Hājī*, edited by Laylā ‘Abd al-Laṭīf Aḥmad al-Ṣafā’ (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khanjī, 1980), particularly 217.

the Ottoman regimental corps or the beylicate controlled by mamluks. While he was the recognized head of both the faction and the Janissaries between 1754 and 1765, the year of his second exile to Mecca, the officers of the corps and the mamluks who dominated the beylicate were not his own creatures, but rather the amirs appointed by Ibrāhīm Katkhudā and Riḍwān Katkhudā.²⁴

As a freeborn Muslim, 'Abd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā had no *khushdāshīyya* to support his political ambitions, to defend him when under attack, or to intervene as mediators on his behalf. Without a well placed cadre of mamluks or *khushdāshīyya* willing to fight for him, he was an easy person to manipulate. Despite his enormous wealth, he could not defend himself against a powerful bey or regimental commander. He accepted passively his exile in the Hijaz and was rewarded for his submission to his fate when Ibrāhīm Katkhudā brought him back to Cairo and installed him as *katkhudā* of the Janissary corps. We might repeat al-Damurdāshī's earlier remark "This was a gift of the powerful Lord, given without any effort [on 'Abd al-Raḥmān Jāwīsh's part]."

Upon the death of Ibrāhīm Katkhudā in November 1754 'Abd al-Raḥmān could finally claim the leadership of the Qazdughli faction. With his influence in the Janissary corps and his enormous wealth, he could prosper even greater than before by exploiting the wide range of tax farms controlled by the faction's high ranking officers. The customs of Egypt's busy ports, the "protection" taxes that the Qazdughlis extracted from the various domestic and foreign merchant communities, the revenues of the urban tax farms and the vast revenues of the agricultural tax farms and *awqāf* now controlled by Qazdughli beys and *kāshifs*, all these sources and more were manipulated by 'Abd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā.

In May 1755, just six months after the death of Ibrāhīm Katkhudā, 'Abd al-Raḥmān provoked his allies to attack and kill Riḍwān Katkhudā al-Julfī. Perhaps remembering how he had been poorly treated when his own father died, 'Abd al-Raḥmān assured the sons

²⁴ Al-Damurdāshī, *op. cit.*, 382 reveals that Ibrāhīm Katkhudā had sons and grandsons who had been assigned the tax farms of villages before his death, yet these did not engage in the contest for power. It was his mamluks and the mamluks of his ally Riḍwān Katkhudā al-Julfī who dominated the Ottoman corps and the beylicate following Ibrāhīm Katkhudā's death.

of Riḍwān Katkhudā a respectable income from rural tax farms that were registered in their names.²⁵ Although free of serious challengers from rival factions, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān continued to demonstrate a personal aversion to direct involvement in the political infighting that characterized the struggle for leadership following the death of Ibrāhīm Katkhudā and the murder of Riḍwān Katkhudā. Even so, he could not contain splintering within his own faction. For instance, he absented himself from the capital and made a long five month tour of the delta to avoid the dispute among the amirs over the succession of Ibrāhīm Katkhudā.²⁶ And in October 1760, when he was challenged by one of the senior mamluks whom Ibrāhīm Bey had elevated to the beylicate, he fell back on countering this threat by elevating another of Ibrāhīm Katkhudā’s mamluks to the leadership of the beylicate. Upon learning that ‘Alī Bey al-Ghazzāwī was plotting his assassination, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā called a council of Qazdughli amirs and officers, explained the threat posed by ‘Alī Bey al-Ghazzawī who had left Cairo with the pilgrimage, and asked, “O amirs, who am I? They all replied, ‘You are our master, son of our master, to whom we owe allegiance.’” He then proclaimed that “‘Alī Bey (Bulut Kapan) here shall be *shaykh al-balad* and chief; and I will be the first to obey and the last to oppose him.” The next day ‘Abd al-Raḥmān “rode to ‘Alī Bey’s residence; the *dīwān* and the assembly were transferred there as of that day, and ‘Alī Bey’s power became momentous.”²⁷

Available manuscript sources, including al-Jabartī’s famous history, remain largely silent on the period 1760, when ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā elevated ‘Alī Bey to the *mashyakha* of the beylicate, so we know little of the activities of the two amirs until April 1765, when

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 386. The sons, one an adult, one a minor, were assigned villages producing a profit of 30 purses, or 750,000 *paras*.

²⁶ Raymond, *Le Caire des Janissaires*, 42.

²⁷ Al-Jabartī, *op. cit.*, vol. I, 418–19; I, 637. Jabartī notes that “Since ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā was the son of their chief and the mainstay of their power, (‘Alī Bey) became his ally. (‘Abd al-Raḥmān), for his part, befriended him in order to win influence through him over the leaders of the *ikhtiyārīyya* of the ocaks. All the while, ‘Alī Bey and ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā were each vying for supremacy.” Jabartī, *op. cit.*, vol. I, 418. ‘Alī Bey was eligible to assume the leadership mantle of the Qazdughlis by virtue of being the manumitted mamluk of Ibrāhīm Katkhudā, the Qazdughli leader who had firmly established the dominance of this faction over both the Janissaries and the beylicate only a few years earlier.

'Alī Bey, who strengthened his own household considerably by the acquisition of many mamluks and retainers and the appointment of senior mamluks to important positions within the regiments and the beylicate, suddenly ordered the banishment of a group of amirs to the delta and the exile of 'Abd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā to Mecca. The contemporary historian al-Jabarti remarked the ease of this coup d'état by 'Alī Bey.

On that day Cairo was in a commotion, especially at the departure of 'Abd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā, for he had been the most important of the lot, the son of their former master, and a man of power, authority, and reputation. Because of him, the power of the Janissaries had increased over that of the 'Azab. Furthermore, he had so large a clan and so many Mamluks, retainers, Maghribi and other troops that the people supposed that on that day there would be great civil strife. However, all that occurred was a great deal of popular confusion and astonishment.²⁸

This second exile of eleven years effectively ended 'Abd al-Raḥmān's career. He was brought back, in ill health, in March 1776, after the deaths of 'Alī Bey and his mamluk and successor Muḥammad Bey Abū al-Dhahab, and died only 11 days after his return.

How does one explain 'Abd al-Raḥmān Katkhudā's passive acceptance of his second exile to the Hijaz? He put up no resistance, did not assemble the mamluks and retainers of his own household to defend him, and apparently made no effort to return from exile and reclaim his position of leadership of the Qazdughli faction. "He lived during that time in Mecca as a lonely stranger."²⁹ Once again, I believe his inability to assume effective leadership of the now dominant Qazdughli faction was owing to his freeborn birth. He could call on no one to defend him because he was not a mamluk himself, hence was not truly a part of the governing system. It was in deference to his lineage that the mamluks of the Qazdughli faction paid him respect and it likewise was his enormous wealth that made his residence the "open house" used by the Qazdughlis between the death of Ibrāhīm Katkhudā in 1754 and his own exile in 1765. His control of the Janissaries and the respect he had from the 'ulama

²⁸ Al-Jabartī, *op. cit.*, vol. I, 419–20.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, vol. II, 10, had also noted that when 'Alī Bey turned on him like a mad dog, "he found nobody to defend him."

and the common people who benefited so magnificently from his constructions and endowments could not be translated into political influence when he was suddenly ordered to leave Cairo.

He had been unable to insert his personal mamluks into positions of leadership within the regiments or the beylicate, hence had little political leverage within these two centers of political power. His household, despite supporting numerous personal mamluks, played no significant political role after his exile or death. Nor could the few remaining representatives of imperial power, such as the governor and the *kizlar agha*, intervene on his behalf. In reality, he might be compared to a rich merchant like the head of the Sharāyibī family, who possessed enormous wealth, a luxurious house, and mamluks and servants of his own. But Sharāyibī would not presume to interfere in the politics of the dominant ruling households.

In his review of ‘Abd al-Raḥmān’s career, André Raymond asks if his freeborn status was not a hindrance to his leadership of the regiments since virtually all the officers of these corps were mamluks.³⁰ I believe the answer is an emphatic “Yes.” It was not merely his personality, his alleged aversion for politics and preference for construction, that affected the course of his political career, but the norms and traditions of a political system that assigned little influence or roles to those of freeborn status.

³⁰ Raymond, *Le Caire des Janissaires*, 35.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

MAMLUK “REVIVALS” AND MAMLUK NOSTALGIA IN OTTOMAN EGYPT

Jane Hathaway

A key question in the historiography of Ottoman Egypt is whether the administrative leadership of the province continued or revived the administrative usage of the Mamluk sultanate.¹ The very manner in which this question is posed, however, reflects an unexamined assumption—one of several in the historiography of Ottoman Egypt. It assumes that Mamluk Egypt was an objective reality of which the administrative elite of Ottoman Egypt had unmediated knowledge. This seems a dangerous assumption when one considers, for example, that nineteenth-century Egyptian observers had a distorted view of conditions in eighteenth-century Egypt, even though these conditions had existed less than a century before. A prominent exponent of these distortions is Ismā‘īl al-Khashshāb, who composed a modern history of Egypt at the request of the French occupying force in the opening years of the nineteenth century. His treatment of Egypt’s grandee households and political factions in the eighteenth century contains lacunae and errors obvious to anyone familiar with the corpus of eighteenth-century chronicles of Egypt.² Al-Khashshāb is, by his own admission, relying on the accounts (*akhbār*) told him by his own father.

¹ P.M. Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent: A Political History, 1516–1922* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1966), 71–98; Michael Winter, *Egyptian Society Under Ottoman Rule, 1517–1798* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 20–27, 31–32, 47–54, 65–68, 72–77; Daniel Crecelius, *The Roots of Modern Egypt: A Study of the Regimes of ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr and Muḥammad Bey Abū al-Dhahab, 1760–1775* (Minneapolis and Chicago: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1981), 22–34; Doris Behrens-Abouseif, *Egypt’s Adjustment to Ottoman Rule: Institutions, Waqf, and Architecture in Cairo, Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 114–16, 128, 133.

² Ismā‘īl al-Khashshāb, *Tadhkirā li-ahl al-baṣā’ir wa’l-abṣār ma’a wajh al-ikhtisār*, Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, MS Arabe 1858, fo. 2r.

We are accustomed nowadays to take European travellers', diplomats', and administrators' accounts of Egyptian and other Middle Eastern societies with a large grain of salt, expecting their descriptions and opinions to be colored by Orientalist preconceptions. Yet this skepticism seems not to extend to sources generated from within such a society but at one or more centuries' remove. How can we know that an eighteenth-century Egyptian grandee's view of Mamluk Egypt is accurate? By the same token, if such a grandee claims to recreate Mamluk institutions, should we take him at his word? If, on the other hand, it seems to us that he is recreating Mamluk institutions, can we be sure that this is his perception, as well? How can we know that he is not, like al-Khashshāb, relying on popular stories?

To be blunt, we cannot know because, in fact, he is. A scholar such as 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Jabartī was familiar with the major "canonical" Mamluk chronicles—those of al-Maqrīzī, Ibn Taghri Birdī (Tanrıverdi), and Ibn Iyās³—and drew his perceptions of the Mamluk sultanate largely from them. Ottoman-era administrators, for their part, were certainly aware of the most prominent Mamluk sultans, particularly those who left behind mosques, tombs, and pious foundations with which they had to contend. Thus, a document of the seventeenth or eighteenth century may refer in passing to "the *waqf* of Sultan Qānṣūh-i Gavri" or "the mosque of Sultan Barqūq."⁴ Ottoman-era chroniclers can identify a character as "among the emirs of Qāyrbāy" without further explanation,⁵ evidently confident that their readers will be familiar with Qāyrbāy and other leading rulers of the late Mamluk era. But can we be sure that a chance reference to Qāyrbāy reflects a solid knowledge of the conditions and institutions of the Mamluk sultanate?

What evidence we have of Ottoman-era depictions of the Mamluk sultanate should leave us far from certain. The Mamluk sultans most

³ Tāqī al-Dīn Aḥmad b. 'Alī al-Maqrīzī (1364–1442), *Kitāb al-sulūk li-ma'rifat duwal al-mulūk*; idem, *Al-Mawā'iz wa'l-ṭibār fī dhīkr al-khiṭaṭ wa'l-āthār* (a.k.a. *Al-Khiṭaṭ*); Abū al-Maḥāsīn Yūsuf b. Taghrī Birdī (1411–1470), *Al-Manhal al-ṣafī wa'l-mustawfi ba'd al-wafī*; idem, *Al-Nujūm al-zāhira fī mulūk Miṣr wa'l-Qāhira*; Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Iyās (1448–c. 1524), *Badā'ī al-zuhūr fī waqā'ī al-duhūr*.

⁴ Istanbul, Başbakanlık Arşivi, Mühimme Defteri 104, no. 1024 (mid-Sha'bān 1104/late April 1693); *Mühimme-i Miṣr* vol. V, no. 757 (late 1155/early 1743).

⁵ For example, Aḥmad Shalabi (Çelebi) b. 'Abd al-Ghanī, *Awḍaḥ al-ishārāt fī man tawalla Miṣr al-Qāhira min al-wuzarā' wa'l-bāshāt*, ed. A.A. 'Abd al-Raḥīm (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khānī, 1978), 283.

frequently mentioned in Ottoman-era chronicles are, on the one hand, the most recent—Qāytbāy (r. 1468–1496), Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī (r. 1501–1516), and Tumanbay (r. 1516–1517)—and, on the other hand, the “founding fathers”: Baybars (r. 1260–1277), who founded the Mamluk sultanate; Qala’ūn (1279–1290), who founded his own century-long dynasty; and Barqūq (r. 1382–1399), the first of the Circassian Mamluk sultans. These five sultans are all “fabled,” whether because of their great accomplishments or, as in the case of al-Ghawrī, because of their appalling failures. Familiarity with any or all of them could be the result of common knowledge, as well as proficiency in Mamluk history.

The specific contexts in which these sultans appear, furthermore, point not so much to a profound appreciation of the “realities” of the Mamluk sultanate as to a sort of Mamluk nostalgia, nurtured by folkloric⁶ presentations of key sultans. Thus, the perception that Ottoman-era grandees had of the Mamluk sultanate was a largely folkloric perception, comparable to the manner in which every American schoolchild learns the story of George Washington chopping down the cherry tree, then refusing to lie about it. Moreover, the reasons why grandees had such a perception were similar to the reasons why American schoolchildren learn about George Washington and the cherry tree: the transmission of such stories was part of the future grandee’s education and acculturation. In the end, these folkloric accounts tell us much more about Ottoman Egypt than they do about Mamluk Egypt.

In this essay, I shall examine the presentation of several key Mamluk figures in Ottoman-era literary sources in order to demonstrate the folkloric qualities inherent in these presentations, and the correspondingly folkloric appreciation that Ottoman grandees must have had of Egypt’s Mamluk past. Ultimately, I shall consider the utility of such folkloric presentations, both for the grandees themselves and for the Ottoman administration.

⁶ I use the terms “folkloric,” “folklore,” and “folktales” as layperson’s terms, not intending to invoke the theoretical issues attached to the academic discipline of folklore studies. The terms “popular histories” and “popular narratives” could also be applied to the sorts of stories I discuss here.

Baybars: Myth and Reality

Baybars al-Bunduqdārī, the founder of the Mamluk sultanate, was evidently by the eighteenth century a legendary figure not unlike Alexander the Great as he appears in medieval Persian literature.⁷ A Kıpçhak Turk, probably from the territory of what is now Ukraine, Baybars was purchased as a mamluk by the Ayyūbid sultan al-Şalīḥ Ayyūb (r. 1240–1249). Ten years of bloody coups and counter-coups followed al-Şalīḥ's death in 1249, as the late sultan's mamluks struggled for supremacy. In perhaps the most notorious episode of this interregnum, al-Şalīḥ's widow, Fāṭima Şajar al-Durr, married the mamluk commander Quṭb al-Dīn Aybak al-Turkomānī; both were ultimately assassinated by rival mamluks. After scoring a critical victory over a Mongol army at 'Ayn Jālūt in Syria in 1260, Baybars participated in the assassination of the Mamluk general Quṭuz and ascended the throne himself.⁸

That said, the folkloric persona of Baybars bears only the most tenuous resemblance to the historical reality, hazy as the latter is. Baybars is the hero of an immense and varied epic cycle, originally orally transmitted, known as the *Sīrat al-Żāḥir Baybars*. Several manuscripts of this epic exist, most dating from the nineteenth century.⁹ Like other tales from the Arabic oral tradition, all are chock-full of accretions from the Ottoman era, so that the Baybars of the epic routinely fires off cannon and drinks coffee. Moreover, Ottoman titles and institutions abound in the tales; provincial governors are termed pashas, for a notable example.¹⁰ Notwithstanding, much of the story line centers on continual struggles against the Crusaders, on the one

⁷ The three most popular literary sources in which Alexander (Iskender) appeared were the tenth-century poet Ferdowsī's *Shāhnāme*; the fifteenth-century poet Aḥmedī's Persian epic known as the *Iskendernāme*, itself derived from a Byzantine source; and the fifteenth-century poet Niẓāmī's cycle of poems known as the *Khamsa*.

⁸ These events are described in some detail in Robert Irwin, *The Middle East in the Middle Ages: The Early Mamluk Sultanate, 1250–1382* (Beckenham, Kent: Croom Helm Ltd., 1986), 22–34.

⁹ At least two versions of this epic have been published: *Sīrat al-Żāḥir Baybars*, 2nd printing, 50 parts in 5 vols. (Cairo: Maṭba'at al-Ma'āhad, 1923), reprint ed. Jamāl al-Ghītānī (Cairo: Al-Hay'a al-Miṣriyya al-Āmma li'l-Kitāb, 1996); and Jean-Patrick Guillaume, ed., *Le Roman de Baiibars*, 10 vols. (Paris: Actes Sud/Sindbad, 1985–1998). The Topkapı Palace Library also owns two unpublished manuscripts, MS Revan 1606–1607.

¹⁰ See, for example, *Sīrat al-Żāḥir Baybars*, vol. II, 821.

hand, and the Mongols, on the other. We can conclude only that these tales reflect Ottoman-era popular memory of the events of the early Mamluk sultanate, embellished with stock elements of shape-changing wizards and damsels in distress.

As depicted in these tales, Baybars is not really a Turkish mamluk at all but the "Persian" (*ʿAjam*) prince Maḥmūd, son of the last Khwarazm-shah, "Alqān Shāh Jamak," whose kingdom has been overrun by "Hulaʿūn" (Hulagu) and the Mongols. This legendary identity does, to be sure, retain a hazy connection to historical reality, for the Kıpçak tribe from which Baybars came was driven into the Crimea by the Mongol incursions; moreover, Baybars married the daughter of the historical last Khwarazm-shah, Ḥuṣām al-Dīn Berke Khān. His son by this marriage was named Berke Khān after his grandfather.¹¹ In the stories, Baybars' comrades-in-arms, improbable as it may seem, are the Ismāʿīlī guerrillas who inhabit the mountains of Lebanon. Different manuscripts present different versions of the rivalries between Baybars and other mamluks. In a late-nineteenth-century Egyptian manuscript, Aybak is Baybars' chief rival,¹² while in the most extensive manuscript, copied in nineteenth-century Aleppo, his nemesis is Qalaʿūn. In this latter manuscript, Baybars and Qalaʿūn are purchased from the same slave market and transported to Egypt jointly. Qalaʿūn is contemptuous of Baybars' degraded physical state, which is only exacerbated by a bout of diarrhea during the journey to Egypt.¹³ Qalaʿūn himself is portrayed as an arrogant Turk who speaks a broken Arabic replete with Turkicisms. (This feature may have some basis in historical fact, since Qalaʿūn was enslaved at a relatively late age and never achieved fluency in Arabic.)¹⁴ When Baybars dies, Qalaʿūn attempts to promote his son Khalīl for the succession.

How do we know that these tales were widespread in the eighteenth century and before if the only extant specimens date from

¹¹ *Sīrat al-Ẓāhir Baybars*, vol. I, 277, 295, 703–04; vol. III, 1480–1487; Irwin, *The Middle East in the Middle Ages*, 17–18.

¹² *Sīrat al-Ẓāhir Baybars*, vol. II, 783, 823–26, 992, 1016.

¹³ *Roman de Baïbars*, vol. I: *Les Enfances de Baïbars*, trans. and annotated by Georges Bohas and Jean-Patrick Guillaume (Paris: Actes Sud/Sindbad, 1985), 37–38. In the manuscript summarized by Lyons, it is "Alā al-Dīn," another mamluk, who complains of Baybars' physical maladies; see *The Arabian Epic*, vol. III, 82.

¹⁴ For example, *Roman de Baïbars*, vol. X: *Le Procès du moine maudit*, trans. and annotated by Georges Bohas and Jean-Patrick Guillaume (Paris: Actes Sud/Sindbad, 1998), 148. See also Irwin, *The Middle East in the Middle Ages*, 64.

the nineteenth century? Intriguingly, allusions to the *Sīrat al-Ẓāhir Baybars* appear in a group of chronicles on which historians commonly rely. This is the Damūrdāshī group of chronicles, so-called because all four of the chronicles in question derive from a common *urtext* and have some connection to officers of Egypt's 'Azeban regiment who bear the sobriquet al-Damūrdāshī.¹⁵ These allusions, moreover, appear right at the beginning of all four chronicles, when the chroniclers are explaining the origins of Sa'd and Ḥarām, Bedouin factions allied with the Faqārīs and the Qāsimīs, two political and military factions whose rivalry permeated Egypt during the seventeenth century and the early years of the eighteenth.

The Damūrdāshī chroniclers never explicitly state that they are referring to these folktales; rather, they make a metaphorical comparison between the implacable opposition of Sa'd and Ḥarām, on the one hand, and that of a series of opposed pairs from Arabic folklore. Thus, Muṣṭafā b. Ibrāhīm al-Maddāḥ al-Qīnālī, the author of one of the earlier chronicles, known as *Majmū' laṭīf*, explains, "The people of Egypt since ancient times were in two factions (*firqatayn*), soldiers and Bedouin (*urbān*) and reaya, white flag and red flag; the white was Tubba'ī and the red Kulaybī, Zughbī and Hilālī, Qala'ūnī and Baybarsī, until the reign (*dawla*) of Āl 'Uthmān, may God make it victorious, [when they became] Faqārī-Sa'd [and] Qāsimī-Ḥarām. . . ."¹⁶ "Qala'ūnī and Baybarsī" clearly refer to Baybars and Qala'ūn, his archrival in some versions of the *Sīra*.

¹⁵ On the Damūrdāshī chronicles, see P.M. Holt, "Al-Jabartī's Introduction to the History of Ottoman Egypt," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, vol. XXV, 1 (1962): 38–51; idem, "Ottoman Egypt (1517–1798): An Account of Arabic Historical Sources," in P.M. Holt, ed., *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt* (Oxford and London: Oxford University Press, 1968); Daniel N. Crecelius, "Aḥmad Shalabī ibn 'Abd al-Ghanī and Aḥmad Katkhudā 'Azabān al-Damūrdāshī: Two Sources for al-Jabartī's *'Ajā'ib al-āthār fi'l-tarājim wa'l-akhbār*," in Daniel N. Crecelius, ed., *Eighteenth Century Egypt: The Arabic Manuscript Sources* (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 1990), 92–101. On the 'Azeban regiment, see "Mıṣır Kanunnāmesi," in Ömer Lütfi Barkan, ed., *XV ve XVI'ncı asırlarda Osmanlı imparatorluğunda zira' ekonominin hukukî ve malî esasları* (Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1943), vol. I, chapter 105; Stanford J. Shaw, *The Financial and Administrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt, 1517–1798* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), 191–92.

¹⁶ Quoted in P.M. Holt, "Al-Jabartī's Introduction to the History of Ottoman Egypt," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, vol. XXV (1962): 42. My translation differs slightly from Holt's.

Likewise, the other two pairs of binary opposites that al-Qīnālī presents allude to other figures in Middle Eastern folklore. Like "Qala'ūnī and Baybarsī," "Tubba'ī and Kulaybī" have undeniable historical resonances. *Tubba'* was the title of the Himyarite kings who ruled northern Yemen in the early centuries of the Common Era.¹⁷ Kulayb, meanwhile, could be a diminutive form of Kalb, a southern, or Yemeni, Arab clan who supported the caliph Marwān b. Ḥakam in the Umayyad civil war of 683 C.E.¹⁸ On the other hand, Kulayb could as easily refer to the pre-Islamic northern, or Qaysī, Arab tyrant Kulayb b. Rabī'a al-Taghlibī.¹⁹ More to the point, however, the characters Ḥasan al-Tubba'ī and Kulayb, both drawn, in somewhat distorted fashion, from historical figures, play prominent roles in the Arabic folktale known as the *Qiṣṣat al-Zīr*.²⁰ In this story, Kulayb is the brother of Salīm, known as al-Zīr. Aḥmad Katkhudā 'Azabān al-Damūrdāshī, putative author of the latest and most detailed chronicle, makes an unmistakable reference to this tale when he includes, among his own string of binary opposites, "Kulayb the brother of al-Zīr."²¹

As for al-Qīnālī's remaining pair of opposites, "Zughbī and Hilālī," these derive from the great epic cycles memorializing the migration of the Banū Hilāl Bedouin into the region of the central Arabian peninsula known as al-Najd, then westward into Egypt and, ultimately, as far as Morocco and Spain.²² What al-Qīnālī is doing, in

¹⁷ Muḥammad 'Abd al-Qādir Bāfaqīh, *L'Unification du Yemen antique: La lutte entre Saba', Himyar, et le Hadramawt du I^{er} au III^{ème} siècle de l'ère chrétienne* (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1990), chapter 2.

¹⁸ Abū Ja'far Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, *The History of al-Ṭabarī*, vol. XX: *The Collapse of Sufyānid Authority and the Coming of the Marwānids*, ed. and trans. G.R. Hawting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989); idem, *The History of al-Ṭabarī*, vol. XXI: *The Victory of the Marwānids*, ed. and trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990).

¹⁹ *EF²*, s.v. "Basūs," by J.W. Fück; s.v. "Kulayb b. Rabī'a," by Giorgio Levi Della Vida. See also Reynold A. Nicholson, *A Literary History of the Arabs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 55–61; Adel Sulayman Gamal, "The Beginnings of Classical Arabic Poetry," in Mustansir Mir, ed., *Literary Heritage of Classical Islam: Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of James A. Bellamy* (Princeton: The Darwin Press, Inc., 1993), 45–54. I am grateful to Adel Sulayman and Irfan Shahid for drawing my attention to this connection, and to Adel Sulayman for recommending the last two sources.

²⁰ Lyons, *The Arabian Epic*, vol. III, 651–60.

²¹ Aḥmad Katkhudā 'Azabān al-Damūrdāshī, *Al-Durra al-muṣāna fī akhbār al-Kīnāna*, British Museum, MS Or. 1073–1074, 1.

²² There are three cycles: *Sirat Banī Hilāl al-kubrā*, *Taghrībāt Banī Hilāl*, and *Sirat*

fact, is alluding to irreconcilably opposed enemies from well-known bodies of lore or Islamic tradition in order to underline the opposition of Sa'd and Ḥarām.

The strategy of al-Qīnālī and the other chronicles of the Damūrdāshī group becomes comprehensible only if we bear in mind that the chroniclers are telling stories. This is, indeed, how Aḥmad Katkhudā 'Azebān presents his endeavor: "Some of the brothers (*ikhwān*) had asked me about events in Cairo among the *sancak beys* (*ṣanājiq*) and the aghas and the officers (*ikhtiyārīyya*) of the seven *ocaks* since the deposition of Sultan Mehmed [IV, r. 1648–1687]."²³ He, like al-Qīnālī, proceeds to tell them by letting loose a string of binary oppositions. This strategy is reminiscent of the formula with which Turkish fairy tales typically begin: "*Bir varmıṣ, bir yokmuṣ,*" "There was and there was not." Thus, although they are recounting "real" events, chronologically arranged, that occurred in history,²⁴ these chronicles exploit the framework of popular folktales.

Barqūq and the Fabricated Genealogy

Sultan Barqūq makes a striking appearance in the fabricated seventeenth-century genealogy of one Riḍvān Bey. P.M. Holt erroneously identified this Riḍvān as Riḍvān Bey al-Faqārī, who monopolized the office of pilgrimage commander (*amīr al-ḥājj*) for an astonishing twenty-five years, from 1631 until his death in 1656.²⁵ As I have indicated elsewhere, the true identity of the genealogy-commissioner must be the contemporaneous Qāsimī leader Riḍvān Bey Abū'l-Shawārib.²⁶

Banī Hilāl fī qiṣṣat Abī Zayd al-Hilālī wa'l-Nā'isa wa-Zayd al-'Ajjāj. See Lyons, *The Arabian Epic*, vol. III, 237–300; *EI*², s.v. "Hilāl: The Saga of the Banū Hilāl," by J. Schleifer; s.v. "Hilāl," by Hadī Roger Idris.

²³ Al-Damūrdāshī, *Durra*, 1.

²⁴ On the genre of the Damūrdāshī chronicles and that of other Arabic chronicles of Ottoman Egypt, see Jane Hathaway, "Sultans, Pashas, *Taḳwīms*, and *Mūhimmes*: A Reconsideration of Chronicle-Writing in Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Egypt," in Creelius, ed., *Eighteenth Century Egypt*, 51–78.

²⁵ P.M. Holt, "The Exalted Lineage of Riḍwān Bey: Some Observations on a Seventeenth-Century Mamluk Genealogy," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, vol. XXII (1959): 221–230.

²⁶ Jane Hathaway, "Egypt in the Seventeenth Century," in Martin W. Daly, ed., *The Cambridge History of Egypt*, vol. II: *Modern Egypt: From 1517 to the End of the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 46–47.

Barqūq in this genealogy is not the historical mamluk of the emir Yalbugha but, instead, a descendant of one Kīsa b. 'Akrama, a member of the Prophet's clan of Quraysh. This Kīsa had fled the Arabian peninsula after accidentally putting out the eye of a bedouin, who complained to the caliph 'Umar (r. 634–644 C.E.); the Byzantine emperor had allowed him to settle in what is now Circassia. Generations later, his descendant Barqūq was kidnapped by Bulgar slave traders and brought to the Mamluk court.²⁷ Barqūq's story is one of several included in the genealogy to illustrate the noble descent of Riḍvān Bey, who is himself supposed to be a descendant of Barqūq and, by extension, of the Quraysh. Barqūq's fictionalized origins bear a striking resemblance to those of the fictionalized Baybars, who is likewise supposed to have been kidnapped by Bulgar merchants and brought to Egypt. The genealogist may well have used some version of the *Ṣirat al-Ẓāhir Baybars* as a model; when he first introduces Barqūq, he implausibly claims that he was initially sold to the Ayyūbid sultans. This was, of course, Baybars' fate; by Barqūq's time, however, the Ayyūbids had long since vanished from the scene. More broadly, the genealogy taps into a well-established tradition that the Circassians and other Caucasian peoples descended from Arabs; typically, however, their ancestors are not the Quraysh but the southern, or Yemeni, Arab rulers of the kingdom of Ghassān, a Byzantine vassal state conquered by the early Muslims.²⁸ This tradition features in the chronicles of Badr al-Dīn Maḥmūd al-'Aynī (1361–1451)

²⁷ Anonymous, *Nisba sharīfa wa-risāla munīfa tashtamīl 'alā dhikr nasab al-Jarākisa min Quraysh*, Princeton University Library, Garrett Manuscript Collection, MS 186H. Holt consulted manuscripts in the John Rylands Library, Manchester, England; and in the British Museum. He also had access to a published edition entitled *Kitāb qahr al-wujūh al-'ābbisa bi-dhikr nasab al-Jarākisa min Quraysh*, published under the auspices of one Muḥammad Efendi Hāfīz al-Jarkasī al-Bājī by al-Maṭba'a al-Baḥiyya al-Miṣriyya in 1316 A.H. In this edition, *Nisba sharīfa* . . . is the first line of text after the opening invocations. I am grateful to Professor Holt for supplying me with a copy of this publication.

²⁸ On the Ghassānids, see Irfan Shahid, *Byzantium and the Arabs in the Fourth Century* (Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1984), 119–21, 75, 91, 374–75, 526–27; idem, *Byzantium and the Arabs in the Fifth Century* (Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1989), 175; idem, *Byzantium and the Arabs in the Sixth Century*, vol. I (Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1995), Part 1, 53–54, 144–47, 365–67, 547; Part 2, 728–31; idem, "Ghassān Post-Ghassān," in C.E. Bosworth et al., eds., *The Islamic World from Classical to Modern Times: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lewis* (Princeton: The Darwin Press, 1989), 323–336.

composed for the sultans al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh (r. 1412–1421) and al-Zāhir Tatar (r. 1421); it is later represented in the *Majālis* sponsored by Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī.²⁹ The same tradition is reported by Evliya Çelebi (c. 1611–1682), and also appears in a nineteenth-century collection of Circassian folklore.³⁰

The purpose of Riḍvān Bey's genealogy was most likely to make the point that Riḍvān Bey, by virtue of his Circassian-cum-Qurashī lineage, deserved to be appointed pilgrimage commander at the expense of the likes of Riḍvān Bey al-Faqārī, who could boast neither an exalted lineage nor an ancestral tradition of service to the Holy Places.³¹ The appearance of the genealogy, I believe, points to another element of "Mamluk nostalgia" that had evidently emerged by the middle of the seventeenth century and that seems to have found a champion in Riḍvān Bey Abū'l-Shawārib: namely, a form of Circassian self-assertion. Abū'l-Shawārib evidently gloried in his Circassian ethnicity, using it to justify appointment to high office and even naming two of his sons Khushqadam and Özbek, an unmistakable allusion to a sultan and a general, respectively, of the late Mamluk sultanate.³² There were a large number of Circassian grandees in Egypt toward the middle of the seventeenth century, as Evliya Çelebi tells us.³³ In all probability, the Mamluk emirs pardoned by Selim I after the Ottoman conquest of Egypt continued to purchase mamluks from Circassia, as, no doubt, did the beys and regimental officers assigned

²⁹ P.M. Holt, "Literary Offerings: A Genre of Courtly Literature," in Thomas Philipp and Ulrich Haarmann, eds., *The Mamluks in Egyptian Politics and Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 8–11. The chronicles are *Al-Sayf al-muhammad fī sirat al-malak al-Mu'ayyad* and *Al-Rawḍ al-zāhir fī sirat al-Malik al-Zāhir*. 'Abd al-Wahhāb 'Azzām, ed., *Majālis al-sultān al-Ghūrī: Ṣafahāt min ta'rīkh Miṣr fī'l-qarn-āshir al-hijrī* (Cairo: Maṭba'at Lajnat al-Ta'lif wa'l-Tarjama wa'l-Nashr, 1941), 85–108, cited in Behrens-Abouseif, *Egypt's Adjustment to Ottoman Rule*, 133 n. 126.

³⁰ Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, ed. Ahmed Cevdet, 10 vols. (Istanbul: İkdām Maṭba'ası, 1314 A.H.), vol. II, 100–101; Schora-Bekmursin-Nogmow, *Die Sagen und Lieder des Tscherkessen-Volks* (Leipzig: Verlag von Otto Wigand, 1866), 44–46.

³¹ See Hathaway, "Egypt in the Seventeenth Century," 46–47.

³² Anonymous, *Nisba sharifa*, fo. 20r. On Khushqadam (r. 1461–1467), see Carl F. Petry, *Twilight of Majesty: The Reigns of the Mamluk Sultans al-Ashraf Qāyibāy and Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī in Egypt* (Seattle: Middle East Center, Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington; distributed by University of Washington Press, 1993), 20–21, 29, 47, 58; on Özbek (Azbak), see *ibid.*, 46–50, 59–69, 78, 92–100, 113–15. Kushqadam, however, was not himself Circassian but Greek (*Rūmī* in the sense it carried under the Mamluk sultanate).

³³ Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname*, vol. VII, 723.

to Egypt from Istanbul. By the mid-seventeenth century, the number of Circassian grandees in Egypt may have reached the "critical mass" necessary to support a Circassio-philic political culture and, by extension, a nostalgia for the late Mamluk sultanate, when Circassian grandees dominated.

Large numbers of Circassians, however, do not suffice to explain a culture of "Mamluk nostalgia." Following the Ottoman conquest, after all, Selim had sought to prevent such a development by, among other things, forbidding the grandees of Egypt to take Circassian names; they were obliged instead to settle for Turkicized Arab Muslim names. Yet little over a century after the conquest, Abū'l-Shawārib Riḍvān Bey apparently felt no compunction about naming his sons Özbek and Khushqadam, to say nothing of commissioning a genealogy glorifying his Circassian identity. The key to this change may be simply the passage of time. Naming one's sons after Mamluk notables and ordering a pro-Circassian genealogy in 1524 would have been construed as an act of near-rebellion, a thinly-veiled call for the resurrection of the Mamluk sultanate. And of course, the Ottomans had had to put down three major rebellions of this kind in the years immediately following the conquest: those of Janbirdī (Canverdi) al-Ghazālī, the governor of Damascus, in 1521; two sub-provincial governors of Egypt, Jānim al-Sayfī and Ināl, in 1522; and the Ottoman governor of Egypt, Aḥmed Pasha "al-Khā'in" ("the traitor"), in 1523–1524.³⁴ By 1640, on the other hand, the Mamluk sultanate was only a dim memory. Such nostalgic touches as names of Mamluk sultans and Circassian pedigrees were now tolerable, if not necessarily welcome. Moreover, the grandees were drawing their visions of Mamluk and Circassian identity not from memories of the Mamluk sultanate—which they, of course, could not have had—or even from histories produced under the Mamluk sultanate, but from folktales. Both Mamluk nostalgia and Circassian self-assertion were, by their very nature, heavily folkloric.

The Influence of Ibn Z̧unbul

Much the same could be said of another seemingly pro-Mamluk, anti-Ottoman demonstration described by Evliya Çelebi: the grandees

³⁴ Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, 46–51.

of Egypt, he tells us, bowed their heads toward the tomb of the last Mamluk sultan, Ṭümānbāy, whenever they passed it, as well as that of the Mamluk emir Kurtbāy, who in the course of the Ottoman conquest had killed the grand vezir Sinan Pasha. In contrast, they averted their heads from the tomb of Khayrbāy, whose collaboration with Selim had made the Ottoman victory possible.³⁵ In his survey of Egyptian society under Ottoman rule, Michael Winter adduces this custom as proof of the seventeenth-century grandees' hostility toward the Ottoman Empire and, by extension, their eagerness to re-establish Mamluk institutions.³⁶ Such an analysis, however, neglects the context in which this custom was practiced. Evliya was resident in Egypt during the 1660s and 1670s, when, as noted above, nostalgia for the Mamluk sultanate and assertion of Circassian identity were apparently a tolerated feature of provincial political culture.

Beyond this, however, this sort of analysis assumes that grandees of the seventeenth century subscribed to an unchanging, linear narrative of the Ottoman conquest of Egypt centered on verifiable events and consistent with the account of Ibn Iyās, which forms the basis for most present-day accounts of the conquest. This was in all likelihood not the case. The version of the Ottoman conquest story with which Ottoman-era grandees would have been familiar was most likely that of the chronicler Aḥmad b. Zunbul, composed around 1553 and entitled *Wāqī'at al-sultān al-Ghawrī ma'a Salīm al-'Uthmānī*; indeed, numerous Turkish translations of Ibn Zunbul's short chronicle had appeared by the early eighteenth century.³⁷ Ibn Zunbul's account, as opposed to that of the more scholarly Ibn Iyās, is decidedly ahistorical; in fact, it is reminiscent of the *Sīrat al-Ẓāhir Baybars*, complete with imagined conversations among the protagonists. In Ibn Zunbul's pages, Ṭümānbāy is depicted as a noble warrior who is laid low by Ottoman gunpowder weaponry and the treachery of the Mamluk emirs Khayrbāy and Jānbirdī (Canverdi) al-Ghazālī.

³⁵ Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname*, vol. X, 581, cited in Winter, *Egyptian Society under Ottoman Rule*, 54.

³⁶ Winter, *Egyptian Society under Ottoman Rule*, 54.

³⁷ Aḥmad al-Rammāl b. Zunbul, *Wāqī'at al-sultān al-Ghawrī ma'a Salīm al-'Uthmānī*, ed. 'Abd al-Mu'nim 'Āmir, *Adab al-Ḥarb* (Cairo: Al-Hay'a al-Miṣriyya al-'Āmma li'l-Kitāb, 1997). For Turkish versions, see, for example, 'Abdullah Çelebi Rıdvan Paşazade, *Tārīḫ-i Mısr*, Istanbul, Süleymaniye Library, MS Fatih 4362; Yüsus Efendi, *Tārīḫ-i Mısr*, Süleymaniye Library, MS Esad Efendi 2148.

Time and again, Ibn Zunbul stresses that the Ottomans were poorly skilled in the equestrian arts and would never have defeated the Mamluks had it not been for their cannon and rifles.³⁸ Selim, meanwhile, is portrayed as a worthy sultan who, however, is misled by the Mamluk traitors on whom he relies. Decisive battles take place not between massed armies but between single combatants, one pro-Mamluk and one pro-Ottoman; such combats are a hallmark of the heroic narrative, familiar from the *Sīrat al-Ẓāhir Baybars* and other Arabic folktales.³⁹ On being captured by the Ottomans, the emir Kurtbāy and, later, Ṭūmānbāy lecture Selim on the cowardice of using firearms.⁴⁰ As if to underscore the folkloric context in which he writes, Ibn Zunbul compares the well-nigh superhuman heroism of the Mamluk emir Sharbak to that of 'Antar, the Herculean pre-Islamic hero of the *Sīrat al-'Antar*.⁴¹

Ibn Zunbul's tale exhibits the binarism typical of heroic folktales: heroes and villains are clearly distinguished in almost cartoon-like fashion. Ṭūmānbāy, in particular, is clearly a hero—in fact, a martyr—while Khayrbāy is just as clearly a traitor. If grandees in seventeenth-century Cairo had been exposed to this version of the Ottoman conquest of Egypt, then it is little wonder that they bowed toward Ṭūmānbāy's tomb and were repulsed by Khayrbāy's. Their behavior would have reflected not a genuine rejection of Ottoman rule but a folkloric nostalgia for an idealized late Mamluk order.

'Alī Bey's Revolt

This reconceptualization of Mamluk nostalgia can likewise be brought to bear on the most far-reaching revolt in pre-nineteenth-century Ottoman Egypt—and, not coincidentally, the one that historians of the province invariably single out as the epitome of Mamluk revivalism: that of Bulut Kapan 'Alī Bey, also known as 'Alī Bey al-Kabīr,

³⁸ For example, Ibn Zunbul, *Wāqī'at*, 53, 71–74, 118, 165.

³⁹ For example, Anonymous, *Sīrat al-Ẓāhir Baybars*, vol. II, 1289–92, 1297, 1468; vol. III, 1497; Lyons, *The Arabian Epic*, vol. III, 334, 439, 447, 479, 569, 575, 578, 581, 582, 627. Doris Behrens-Abouseif also notes the prevalence of single combat in Ibn Zunbul's account; see *Egypt's Adjustment to Ottoman Rule*, 121–22.

⁴⁰ Ibn Zunbul, *Wāqī'at*, 71–74, 165.

⁴¹ See Lyons, *The Arabian Epic*, vol. III, 17–76.

in 1768–1770. After leading an expedition to the Ḥijāz on the Ottoman sultan’s orders, in order to settle a dispute between two rival candidates for *sharīf* of Mecca, ‘Alī Bey invaded Syria in collaboration with the Bedouin chieftain of Tiberias, Ḍāhir al-‘Umar. ‘Alī Bey’s general, his freedman Meḥmed Bey Abū al-Dhahab, succeeded in conquering Damascus but then, for reasons that remain obscure, turned back.⁴² In justifying his rebellious actions, ‘Alī Bey is said to have remarked, “The kings of Egypt were mamluks like us; these Ottomans took Egypt through superior force and the treachery of [Egypt’s] people.”⁴³ Modern-day historians cite this alleged remark, put into the bey’s mouth by al-Jabartī, as evidence that ‘Alī Bey, too, had a “realistic” picture of the Mamluk sultanate drawn from canonical Mamluk-era chroniclers such as al-Maqrīzī and Ibn Taghri Birdī.⁴⁴ Yet it is not difficult to recognize in the bey’s remark the rhetoric of Ibn Zunbul, from the vague reference to “kings of Egypt” to the trope of the unchivalrous Ottoman deployment of firepower to the allusion to the treacherous emirs who engineered Selim’s victory. Indeed, it seems possible that the works to which ‘Alī Bey was exposed more closely resembled that of Ibn Zunbul than those of the “canonical” Mamluk chroniclers. They may, in fact, have included Ibn Zunbul’s own chronicle or Turkish translations based on it.

If ‘Alī Bey did make this remark or remarks similar to it, perhaps our focus should be not his veiled allusion to Ottoman illegitimacy but his mention of “mamluks like us,” a reference that was not to be taken lightly at a time when mamluks from Georgia in particular had achieved unprecedented administrative authority in the Ottoman Empire. As I have noted elsewhere, we might even speak of a Georgian mamluk preponderance in the late eighteenth-century Ottoman Empire.⁴⁵ ‘Alī Bey’s archrival, Gürcü Osman Pasha, the governor of Damascus, was, as his name implies, a Georgian mamluk—specifically, the Georgian mamluk of former governor As‘ad Pasha al-‘Azm. Indeed, ‘Alī Bey’s antagonism toward Osman Pasha

⁴² Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, 94–98; Crecelius, *Roots of Modern Egypt*, 72–90.

⁴³ Quoted in Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, 96.

⁴⁴ See n. 3, above, and Crecelius, *Roots of Modern Egypt*, 65.

⁴⁵ Hathaway, *Politics of Households*, 170.

has been adduced as an incitement to his invasion of Syria.⁴⁶ At the same time, the strategically vital province of Baghdad was governed by the Georgian mamluk “dynasty” founded by the governor Ḥasan Pasha (1704–1723) and his son Aḥmed (1724–1747).⁴⁷ In Egypt, in contrast, a Georgian mamluk purchased by the governor or by a provincial grandee and trained in the province could never hope to attain the governorship. Instead, governors were still sent out from Istanbul, and by the mid-eighteenth century, they were more likely to be free-born Anatolian bureaucrats, “efendis-turned-pashas,”⁴⁸ than slaves of any kind. This can only have seemed a gross injustice to the ambitious ‘Alī Bey. Although a re-examination of his motives lies well beyond the scope of this essay, I believe it is plausible that his true goal was not to revive the Mamluk sultanate—which he knew only in the mythologized form supplied by the likes of Ibn Zūnbul—but to become governor of Ottoman Egypt.

A usable past

So far from representing hostility toward the Ottoman Empire, these rather fanciful legends and invented traditions were an integral part of Ottoman rule in Egypt during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Nor were Egypt’s grandees unique in constructing an idealized vision of their province’s pre-Ottoman past. Grandees in other Ottoman provinces certainly exploited spurious genealogies and legends of ancient heroes to enhance their own status within their respective localities.

The Afrāsiyāb household, a localized clan who governed the southern Iraqī port of Basra during the seventeenth century, claimed descent from the Great Seljuks, whose empire had straddled Iran and Iraq during the eleventh and twelfth centuries C.E.⁴⁹ It seems

⁴⁶ Abdul-Karim Rafeq, *The Province of Damascus* (Beirut: Khayats, 1966), 250–84; Creelius, *Roots of Modern Egypt*, 76, 80–83, 88.

⁴⁷ Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, 143–148; Thabit A.J. Abdullah, *Merchants, Mamluks, and Murder: The Political Economy of Trade in Eighteenth-Century Basra* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), 11–12, 87–91.

⁴⁸ Norman Itzkowitz, “Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Realities,” *Studia Islamica*, vol. XVI (1962): 73–94, esp. 86–87.

⁴⁹ Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, 134–135, 140, 142.

more than coincidental, furthermore, that the clan's collective patronymic, that of Afrāsiyāb, the clerk of the Ottoman garrison, evoked a hero of the Persian epic *Shāhnāme*: Afrāsiyāb, in this work, is the king of the Turanians, or Turks, the perennial enemies of the Iranians. In the course of the epic, he fights lengthy wars against the Iranian forces, led by the hero Rostam; he is finally killed by the Iranian king Key Khusrau.⁵⁰ In the sixteenth century, the Turanians appear in a magnificent illuminated manuscript of the *Shāhnāme*, produced at the Safavid court in Tabriz, as virtual stand-ins for the Ottomans, while the heroic Iranians represent the Safavids.⁵¹ In this context, the patronymic of the Afrāsiyāb clan arguably emphasized their military and ideological opposition to the Safavids, who, in southern Iraq, posed an ever-present threat to Ottoman authority.⁵² This interpretation makes it seem unlikely that the Afrāsiyābs' manufactured Seljuk pedigree conveyed a desire to return to the pre-Ottoman past, the more so since the Seljuk sultan, according to legend, sent a flag and a military band (*mehter*) as symbols of legitimacy to Osman, the founder of the Ottoman dynasty.⁵³ On the contrary, the genealogical myth can itself be interpreted as an anti-Safavid statement since it evoked a time when the Great Seljuks, an ethnically Turkish, albeit Persophone, dynasty, ruled both Iran and Iraq. This makes it all the more ironic that the last Afrāsiyāb governor, caught in a regional struggle for influence, fled to the Safavids in 1668.⁵⁴

Over a century later and far to the west, the Phanariot Greek governors whom the Ottomans appointed to govern the Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia (present-day Romania) employed a similar strategy, albeit for slightly different reasons. The Phanariots took their name from Istanbul's Fener quarter, the traditionally Greek neighborhood on the Southern shore of the Golden

⁵⁰ Ferdowsī, *The Epic of the Kings: Shāh-Nāma by Ferdowsī*, trans. Reuben Levy, 2nd ed., foreword by Ehsan Yarshater, preface by Amin Banani, new introduction by Dick Davis (Costa Mesa, CA, and New York: Mazda Publishers, in association with Bibliotheca Persica, 1996), 49, 69–70, 92–145, 150–51, 155–74.

⁵¹ See, for example, Stuart Cary Welch, *A King's Book of Kings: The Shah-Nameh of Shah Tahmasp* (New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1972), 136–39, 140–41, 156–57.

⁵² Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, 140.

⁵³ Fevzi Kurtoğlu, *Türk Bayrağı ve Ay Yıldız* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1938, 1987, 1992), 59–60, quoting the histories of Aşıkpaşazade, Neşri, and Oruç; Riza Nour, "L'histoire du croissant," *Revue de Turcologie*, vol. I (1933): 113/342.

⁵⁴ Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, 142.

Horn, west of Balat. Here most of their leading families, wealthy Greek Orthodox merchants and government functionaries, originated. Known as *hospodars*, they were assigned to the Principalities to replace the *voivodas*, governors drawn from the provincial elite who showed too many signs of independence.⁵⁵ Aside from their religion, they had little in common with the indigenous population of these regions. By the mid-eighteenth century, however, the Phanariots had evolved their own elaborate provincial court culture, which in turn spread throughout the Romanian nobility. It was modeled on the usages of the Byzantine empire: the court language was Greek; Byzantine titles, ceremonies, and even costumes were used.⁵⁶ Yet the Phanariots were unquestionably the sultans' servants; they cannot have wished to rebuild Byzantium in actual fact. Rather, they used their own Byzantine heritage, as well as the distant Byzantine past of Romania, to project authority at the local level.

In fact, all three of these provincial authorities—the Afrāsiyābs in Basra, the Phanariots in Romania, and the *grandees* of Egypt—exploited the pre-Ottoman past of their respective locales as a source of the grass-roots authority with which the Ottoman center could not supply them. Nonetheless, this local authority was not so much a threat to Ottoman authority as a complement to it. Claiming authority by reimagining the pre-Ottoman past seems, indeed, to have been a key strategy in Ottoman provincial administration by the seventeenth century. By this time, Ottoman territorial expansion had slowed, and incorporating conquered empires and kingdoms into the Ottoman domain was no longer a constant military and administrative challenge. Hence, the Ottoman central authority could allow its provincial elites a usable past.

Ironically, the elites who posed the greatest threat to Ottoman authority in the provinces during the seventeenth century came from within the Ottoman palace. These were Abaza Mehmed Pasha, governor of Erzurum, who rebelled in 1623, and Abaza Ḥasan Pasha, governor of Aleppo, who rebelled in 1657–1659. Both Abkhazian

⁵⁵ Peter F. Sugar, *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354–1804*, A History of East Central Europe, vol. V (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977, 1996), 128–29, 132–41.

⁵⁶ William H. McNeill, *Europe's Steppe Frontier, 1500–1800* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 107–10, 140–41, 173–76; Sugar, *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule*, 135–136.

mamluks reared in the imperial palace, the two were assigned to the provinces, where they raised personal armies of mercenaries (*sekbans*) culled largely from the Caucasus and eastern Anatolia. Gabriel Piterberg has demonstrated that Abaza Mehmed's rebellion in particular constituted a delayed reaction against the deposition and murder of Sultan Osman II (1618–1622) by the Janissaries, whom he sought to replace with *sekbans*.⁵⁷ This regicide resulted in a reinforcement of Janissary-based palace culture that would culminate in the regime of the Köprülü grand vezirs from 1656–1676; indeed, Köprülü Mehmed Pasha's reforms triggered Abaza Hasan's revolt.⁵⁸ Nonetheless, the image of the rebellious, untrustworthy Abkhazian itself became legendary.

It is this image, ironically, that the Ottoman statesman Şemdanizade Fındıklılı Süleyman Efendi evokes to explain 'Alī Bey's rebellion in Egypt. Claiming that 'Alī Bey was Abkhazian,⁵⁹ Şemdanizade interprets his overtures to Russia as a scheme to ensure a steady supply of Abkhazian mamluks, and even has the bey exclaiming, after the disastrous Ottoman naval defeat by the Russians at Çeşme in 1770, "There can be no more auspicious time for Abkhazian supremacy than this!"⁶⁰ If Şemdanizade's account is a fair indication, representatives of the Ottoman central authority unquestionably saw 'Alī Bey as a threat, but not as a Mamluk revivalist threat. They had their own alternative lore within which to frame his uprising.

Folklore as a tool of acculturation

Even if we agree that Egypt's grandees were not attempting to resurrect the Mamluk sultanate, we still face the question of why

⁵⁷ Gabriel Piterberg, "The Alleged Rebellion of Abaza Mehmed Pasha: Historiography and the Ottoman State in the Seventeenth Century," in Jane Hathaway, ed., *Mutiny and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2002).

⁵⁸ Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, 105.

⁵⁹ In all likelihood, he was either Abkhazian or Georgian; on his ethnicity, see Crecelius, *Roots of Modern Egypt*, 40–41, n. 5.

⁶⁰ Şemdanizade Fındıklılı Süleyman Efendi, *Şemdanizade Fındıklılı Süleyman Efendi Ta'rihi*, ed. M. Münir Aktepe, 4 vols. in 3 (Istanbul: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1976), vol. III, 99. On 'Alī Bey's overtures to Russia, see W.F. Reddaway, ed., *Documents of Catherine the Great: The Correspondence with Voltaire and the Instruction of 1767 in the English Text of 1768*, reissue (New York, 1971), 96, 143, 326.

they exploited legends of the Mamluk sultans, as well as tales of other heroes, both historical and fictional. Again, the *Damūrdāshī* chronicles' connection to the 'Azeban corps provides a clue. Aḥmad Katkhudā 'Azabān's claim that "the brethren" asked him to recount the deeds of past heroes makes sense if we consider the circumstances of soldiers in the 'Azeban or any other regiment. Egypt's regiments and grandee households in the early eighteenth century contained young men—mamluks, mercenaries, members of the palace soldiery—from a disparate array of locales: Abkhazia, Albania, Anatolia, Armenia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Circassia, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Macedonia, Romania, Russia, Serbia.⁶¹ These young men suddenly found themselves in a strange land, attached to the troop or household of a patron and, perhaps, to a political faction for no self-evident reason, although some may well have shared ethnicity, language, or even blood ties with the heads of their households.⁶² In any event, they needed to be socialized and to make sense of their new environment. More than that, they needed to internalize their new identities as members of a particular household and faction.

Folktales provide an instrument for this sort of acculturation, much as the story of George Washington and the cherry tree introduces American children to one of their country's founding fathers. To this analogy, we might add that of a child at the Jewish holiday of Passover. At the ritual Passover meal, or *seder*, the youngest child makes sense of the unfamiliar holiday traditions by asking ritual questions that begin with "why": "Why is this night different from all others?" "Why on this night do we eat unleavened bread?" and so on. By the same token, we can imagine a raw recruit from Bosnia or Georgia or eastern Anatolia asking his commanding officer, Why do we hate the Qāsimīs? How did these two factions originate, and why? Why do we carry a white banner while the Qāsimīs carry a red one? (We must bear in mind, of course, the difference between a highly ritualized annual holiday and the presumably more casual, *ad hoc* atmosphere of barracks story-telling.) Just as the youngest child, over years of *seders*, internalizes the story of the Hebrew exodus from Egypt, so the recruit internalized a body of lore repeated by successive household heads and barracks commanders.

⁶¹ On this point, see Hathaway, *Politics of Households*, 44–46, 101–03.

⁶² See *ibid.*, 57, 61–62, 71 and n. 79, 103–05.

Thus, the tales of the Mamluk sultans aided the indoctrination of recruits to an Ottoman-era provincial political culture. The typical seventeenth- or eighteenth-century grandee viewed the Mamluk sultanate through an Ottoman provincial lens that presented a highly idealized, anachronistic picture, heavy with larger-than-life heroes and heroines in dire struggles with irredeemably evil villains. Nonetheless, we should view these stories as fluid rather than fixed, and as having a genuine relationship with the historical figures and events on which many of them loosely draw. The Mamluk sultanate portrayed in the *Sīrat al-Ẓāhir Baybars*, the chronicle of Ibn Zunbul, or the genealogy of Riḍvān Bey was not a wholly fictitious creation; rather, these stories represented a point in the transformation of historical reality into myth and fable. This “mythologization” was an ongoing process to which events were—and, arguably, are, even in our own societies—susceptible. True, the aforementioned literary works testify to the mythologization of the Mamluk sultans and transmitted that mythologized history to new generations, such as al-Damūrdāshī’s “brethren”. At the same time, however, the Ottoman-era events documented by the Damūrdāshī chronicles and other chronicles—which are, to some degree, mythologized in the pages of the chronicles by virtue of the authors’ arrangement and presentation—would later be transformed into myths and fables by the likes of al-Khashshāb.

Indeed, al-Khashshāb’s purpose in writing *Tadhkira li-ahl al-baṣā’ir* was not unlike that of the authors of the Damūrdāshī chronicles: to instruct a population—in this case, the French—new to Egypt, who knew little or nothing of its history and customs. The French, like the raw barracks recruits of earlier years, did not know any better than to take al-Khashshāb’s memoir at face value, although they were presumably aware that he was not an historian and was drawing on popular tradition. We historians, I fear, too often assume the same position: we take our narrative sources’ evocations of the Mamluk sultanate at face value and ignore the fact that they are, blatantly or not, stories, with all the insights and distortions that stories can offer. We, however, are supposed to know better.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

BEDOUIN AND MAMLUKS IN EGYPT—CO-EXISTENCE IN A STATE OF DUALITY

Reuven Aharoni

The destinies of the Bedouin and the Mamluks¹ in Egypt, were intimately linked ever since the mid-thirteenth century, when the Mamluks founded their sultanate and established its ruling center in Cairo, lasting until they vanished from the stage in 1811 with the massacre of their leaders by Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha. During this period of almost 600 years, the Bedouin elite developed complex symbiotic relationships with the Mamluk military elite. These relationships were rooted in historical and cultural heritage, which each of the Bedouin and the mamluks had practiced. From the start, the Mamluk Sultanate granted some Bedouin shaykhs the title of amir in the Mamluk military administration. The Bedouin amirs built *bayts* (households) and had mamluks at their disposal. Despite their social marginality in Egypt, the Bedouin were significantly involved in most of the historical developments in which the mamluks played a role.

The article shows that the Bedouin were both natural enemies and natural allies of the Mamluks simultaneously: the Bedouin needed the Mamluk backing in order to maintain a reasonable degree of independence, local military strength and political power, while the central government and their mamluks found it useful to integrate the Bedouin, who were a key element in the countryside and in the peripheral desert regions, into the local Ottoman/Mamluk military and fiscal administration. With the elimination of the Mamluk leaders, the Bedouin became marginal in the Egyptian life, both socially and politically.

¹ The discussion in this article refers to the elite groups—the Mamluk leaders of factions and their households, and the Bedouin chiefs of clans and other tribal groupings, i.e., the amirs and the shaykhs and their associate groups.

A two-sided mirror: Similarities and dissimilarities

Bedouin tribal society and the Mamluk militaristic and slave-based society were characterized by a complex set of similarities and dissimilarities, that may be viewed as a two-sided mirror. Politically and socially, Mamluk society was based on a singular origin and a military lifestyle of the group. Young boys were imported to Egypt from the Caucasus and neighboring regions in Central Asia and sold to high-ranking military figures—amirs—who educated them and trained them to be skilled cavalrymen. In return, the recruit was loyal to his master and felt solidarity with his master's other slaves—the *khushdāshīn* ("brothers"). The "brothers" formed the Mamluk household (*bayt*) made up of the master, his retinue and allies. The recruitment of this society from distant ethnic and religious backgrounds strengthened the loyalty of the recruit, or at any rate reduced any temptation to leave. Like the Bedouin tribesmen, they came from a rough background and were not accustomed to comforts that often weaken urban rulers. Unlike the Bedouin, however, they were also severed from the pull of kin links. Ernest Gellner has argued that the Mamluk system was an alternative to a tribal base and pure versions of either one constitute the two endpoints of a spectrum. It endeavored to dispense with the kin or tribal element altogether. The mamluks, in effect, constituted a replacement tribe, forged by a specific type of education.²

Like the Mamluk amirs, each of the Bedouin shaykhs also had an armed protective retinue. Kin societies generally have self-created warrior bands that are rarely distinct from their descent groups, forming for other lineage activities, i.e. to acquire and secure means of productivity, like pasture and water, usually through the threat of force. Secondly, they are responsible for controlling the population and securing its continuity against any threat of rebellion from within or attack from without.³ The military element in both Mamluk soci-

² E. Gellner, "Tribalism and the State in the Middle East", in P. Khoury, and J. Kostiner (eds.), *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 115, 121.

³ See a broad discussion in H. Rosenfeld, "The Social Composition of the Military in the Process of State Formation in the Arabian Desert", *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, vol. XCV, part I, January 1965; part II, July 1965, 75–86, 174–94.

ety and in tribal society was relied on to achieve and maintain power. This meant that the milieu of both Mamluk amirs and Bedouin shaykhs, was made up of slaves and a sedentary population. Both, Bedouin tribal groups and Mamluk houses solved conflicts by military means and they carried on their feuds for long periods.⁴ In the process, not only were rival lineages destroyed, but also close relatives within a ruling clan or house, eliminated one another when power and prestige could not be equitably divided. Power transferred among the Mamluk factions from the leader of the clan to his chief mamluk or another prominent amir. Among the Bedouin, the successor to the shaykh might be a son, but equally he could be an uncle or a cousin.⁵ Both Mamluk amir and the Bedouin shaykh were regarded as the ideal linchpin for binding the household/clan together as a durable and effective military faction.

A parallel historical heritage: Heroic epics

The mamluks were descendants of nomadic tribes from Central Asia, masters of a culture of perpetual movement. Based on expertise in horsemanship and martial arts. The firm bond to horse, lance and bow went back to earliest childhood in Mamluk culture, when the fighters still lived in the wild prairies or mountains of their homeland. Similar values underlay Bedouin society. Knighthood (*furūsiyya*), which was also based on horsemanship, was the pivot of Bedouin tribal life, viewed as society's pride and strength. The role models in both societies were male warriors.

Poetic Epics reflecting these ancestral customs, emerged in both societies in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The heroes of these epics are tribal horsemen—in Central Asia Turkish speakers, and in the Arabian epics famous Bedouin horsemen of the pre-Islamic period.⁶ The motifs in these epics are similar and became integral to the cultural heritages of both the mamluks and the Bedouin.

⁴ See on the relations and distribution of power among the mamluks in Egyptian Society, 65–68.

⁵ A. Musil, *Arabia Deserta*, New York: American Geographical Society, 1927, 238.

⁶ The epics of the Turkomans' *Dede Korkut*, the Azars' *Köroğlu*, the Uzbeks' *Alpamiş*, and the Kirghizians' *Manas*, for example, are based on the tribal and nomadic traditions. The epics emphasized the characteristics of glory in the battlefield, splendor

The similarity of social patterns between the Bedouin leading clans and the Mamluk houses resulted in a conceptual blurring on both parts between the two elite-groups upon their encounter with each other in Egypt. David Ayalon has pointed out that the Bedouin terms *‘ashīra* (tribal confederation) and *qabīla* (tribe) were used to signify a Mamluk faction. A member of Mamluk “*qabīla*” was precisely parallel to a *khushdāsh* in his obligatory loyalty to “tribe”.⁷ The growing influence of the Bedouin during the sixteenth century was a factor in closing the gap between the mamluks and the other sectors of Egyptian society, as compared to their superior status at the time of the Mamluk Sultanate (1250–1517). However, in Ottoman Egypt, the intimate relationships that developed between various Mamluk factions and certain Bedouin clans, paradoxically inflamed the hatred between the factions and the clans, compared with the situation in the earlier period. Conceivably, these links heightened the practice of blood revenge, which was already inherent in the structure of Mamluk society under the Ottomans,⁸ especially as relationships in the Mamluk *qabīla* were based on quasi-kin relationship as in the tribal structure.

So blurred did the boundaries become between mamluks and non-mamluks, implies intermarriage as well, during the Ottoman period, that the nineteenth century Egyptian chronicler ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Jabartī used the terms *‘ashīra* and *qabīla* interchangeably with *bayt* (household) and *‘ā’ila* (clan, family), i.e., he viewed Mamluk factions as tribes and clans rather than households precisely as the Bedouin social structure. It also indicates that there was an interaction between the Bedouin and the mamluks at that time.⁹

and honor of the tribe, respect for the elders, etc. A similar picture was provided by the epics of the Bedouin poet ‘Antar b. Shadād, the Yemenite prince Sayf b. Dhū al-Yazan, and the great epic of Banī Hilāl. See, on the *furūsiyya* (horsemanship), A.N. Poliak, *Feudalism in Egypt, Palestine, Syria and the Lebanon 1250–1900*, London, 1939, 15 and n. 6; D. Ayalon, *Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom*, Jerusalem: Magnes, 1994, 68, n. 45, (Hebrew). See, on the epics, W. Barthold, *Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion*, 3rd ed. London 1968. In some Egyptian villages, reciting the epic of Banī Hilāl is still common as part of the oral tradition. See D.F. Reynolds, *Heroic Poets, Poetic Heroes*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995.

⁷ D. Ayalon, “Studies in al-Jabartī I”, in: *Studies on the Mamluks of Egypt (1250–1517)*, London: Variorum, 1977, 301.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 303.

⁹ ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Jabartī, *‘Ajā’ib al-āthār fi l-tarājim wa’l-akhbār*, Cairo: Būlāq, 1879–80, I, 127, line 1–6; III, 171, line 5–6.

Michael Winter, examining the use of the term *awlād al-ʿArab* (lit. sons of the Arab, local Arabic speaking population) as referring to the Ottoman army, reached the conclusion, similarly, that in Ottoman Egypt no distinctions existed between the mamluks and other local social groups, which meant Bedouin in certain cases. He argued that most of the Janissaries and the *ʿazab* regiment were *awlād al-ʿArab* in a broad sense, i.e., that Bedouin Arabs were included as well.¹⁰ With this, however, the tension between mamluks and *awlād al-ʿArab* did not vanish.

The burden of coexistence: The mamluks, the Bedouin and the Ottomans

The mamluks settled in Egypt after succeeding in suppressing a resistance by a coalition of tribal groups in 1253. The resistance was widespread throughout several provinces beginning in Upper Egypt (al-*Ṣaʿīd*) in 1249 and spreading to the provinces of Manūfiyya, Gharbiyya and Buḥayra. It marked a turning point in the history of Muslim Egypt in the Middle Ages. The failure of the resistance, according to Maqrīzī, boded ill for the destiny of the Egyptian Bedouin, and their power diminished over time.¹¹

The Mamluk army, which was based exclusively on Mamluk soldiers then, showed decisive military superiority over the Bedouin, heightening from then on the alienation between the mamluks and the Bedouin and turning it into rivalry. With their weakness exposed, the Bedouin had no choice but to accept the supremacy of the mamluks. Although more numerous, the Bedouin did not manage to unite for a joint struggle against the mamluks. Rivalry became an integral

¹⁰ M. Winter, "Turks, Arabs and Mamluks in the Army of Ottoman Egypt", *Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlands*, vol. LXXII (1980), 113. He was referring to the chronicle by al-Ḥallāq (al-Khallāq). He also pointed out that in 1698–9 the Hawwāra Bedouin refused to pay taxes in cash or in goods, pleading that they were *ʿazab* and *inkishāriyya*. He posits the theory that the semi-nomads of Upper Egypt could claim this because the barriers that had been set up against the entry of the *raʿiyya* (subjects) into the army were removed. See also Aḥmad Shalabī, (Çelebi) b. ʿAbd al-Ghanī, *Awḍaḥ al-ishārāt fīman tawalla Miṣr waʾl-Qāhira min al-wuzarāʾ waʾl-bāshāt al-mulaqqab bi-taʾriḫ al-ʿAynī*, Cairo, 1978, 203, 442.

¹¹ Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Maqrīzī, *Kitāb al-sulūk limāʾrifat duwal al-mulūk*, ed. Muḥammad Muṣṭafā Ziyāda, Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, 1934–1942, 5 Vols., Part I, vol. II, 386–388; Y. Shwartz, *The Bedouin in Egypt During the Mamluk Period*, Ph.D. Thesis, Tel Aviv University, 1987, 282, (Hebrew).

part of the relationship between the two populations, yet reality, which forced them to live close to each other, ultimately led to an interweaving of the Bedouin into the Mamluk order.

A vital aspect of this reality was the necessity for the mamluks to rely on the Bedouin as mercenaries. This was problematic from the Mamluk point of view for several reasons. The Bedouin were fickle and wayward. They took advantage of every opportunity to profit from the battlefield losses of those who hired their services by plunder. They did not hesitate to desert the battlefield the moment they realized that victory would elude their masters. They perceived warfare as a business transaction with no political commitment whatsoever, not even to the shaykh of their fighting unit, through whom they were recruited. Moreover, the Bedouin never forsook their traditional economy—livestock and seasonal arid agriculture, which gave them their basic economic security. All Bedouin fighters left behind grazing animals and fields that needed care. Their behavior stemmed from their perception of the heads of the Mamluk factions for whom they fought not as ruling authorities but more as local partners or allies. This enabled the Bedouin to allow themselves a large degree of freedom of action.

The Ottoman conquest of Egypt in 1517 fanned the Bedouin-mamluk hostility to a new peak. The Bedouin exploited the unsettled situation at the time of the conquest to retaliate against the mamluks for their bloody repression whenever the Bedouin would rebel. Bedouin vengeance underlay the betrayal of Ṭūmān Bāy, the last Mamluk sultan. Ṭūmān Bāy escaped when the Ottomans invaded Egypt in 1517 and was given asylum in the camp of Shaykh Ḥasan b. Marṣī.¹² The shaykh however, handed him over to the Ottomans, an act contradictory to the Bedouin tradition of asylum. The mamluks, seeking to avenge this betrayal, could do so only after they were integrated into the new Ottoman order in Egypt. Indeed, they recovered their authoritative status and restored their position as provincial governors. In March 1519 mamluks murdered Ḥasan b. Marṣī and his nephew.¹³ That same month *Shaykh al-ʿArab* ʿAlī al-

¹² Ḥasan b. Marṣī was the shaykh of al-Muḥārib Bedouin. He was murdered in March 1519. See Aḥmad al-Rimāl Ibn Zunbul, *Aḥirat al-Mamālīk, wākiʿat al-Sultān al-Ghūrī maʿ Salīm al-Uthmānī*, Cairo: al-Maʿādī, 1962, 105.

¹³ Ibn Iyās argued that following this event, the Circassian mamluks increased their power at the Bedouin's expense. See Muḥammad b. Aḥmad Ibn Iyās, *Badāʿi*

Asmar b. Abī al-Shawārib was invited to visit the *kāshif* (provincial governor) of Minūfiyya. He was served wine and became drunk. Afterwards, he was murdered by the *kāshif*'s deputy.¹⁴ In this case, the *kāshif* was forced to pacify the Bedouin's anger and execute his deputy. The shaykhs of 'Arab al-Sawālim were murdered in a similar way in December 1519 by mamluks who were assisted by Bedouin from other tribes. The Bedouin were forced to appeal for help to the Ottoman authorities.

*Faqāriyya-Nisf Sa'd and Qāsimiyya-Nisf Ḥarām:
Imagined genealogies*

The Ottomans incorporated tribal structures in paradigmatically Ibn Khaldūnian¹⁵ fashion, on one hand, and the rival Mamluk/slave bureaucracy on the other, exploiting both in various proportions in the formation of Ottoman state in Egypt. The central authority made use of the sociopolitical link between mamluks and Bedouin in Egypt through two traditional supra-structures or leagues, Sa'd and Ḥarām. They were the largest traditional social grouping to be found in Mamluk and Ottoman Egypt. Sa'd and Ḥarām were loose informal twofold factions that gained a hold among both nomad and sedentary groups in Egypt. This social grouping resembled in several respects the kind usually referred to by the term "moiety" or "dual" organization. Entire tribes and Mamluk factions belonged to one or the other of such dual groupings, which were known by name pairs in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East, such as Qaḥtān and 'Adnān, Yafa' and Ḥamdān, Hināwī and Ghāfrī, and Qays and Yaman. Sa'd and Ḥarām as the other pairs, were actually, old and mythological tribal confederate groupings. This division into groups of tribes went back to tribal conflicts in pre-Islamic period and the emergence of Islam.

al-zuhūr fī waqā'i al-duḥūr, Cairo: Dār iḥyā al-kutub al-'Arabiyya, 1963, vol. V, 298. See also 'Abd al-Karīm Rāfiq, *Bilād al-Shām wa Miṣr min al-fath al-'Uthmānī ilā ḥamlat Nabūliyyūn Būnabārt (1516-1798)*, Damascus, 1968, 138.

¹⁴ Ibn Iyās, 298.

¹⁵ On Ibn Khaldūn's theory of the tribe and state, see S. Caton, "Anthropological Theories of Tribe and State Formation in the Middle East: Ideology and the Semiotics of Power", in Khoury and Kostiner, 85-90.

Perhaps the clearest indication of the interwoven social history of the Bedouin and mamluks in Ottoman Egypt was the bond that emerged between the Bedouin Sa'd and Ḥarām groupings and two major Mamluk factions—Faḳāriyya and Qāsimiyya.¹⁶ Tribes and Mamluk factions were associated with either one of the two factions. Through their association with Sa'd and Ḥarām, the various Mamluk factions forged on identification with historic populations and ancient mythologies of Arabia. This identification had only a loose connection to their actual roots, and was based on an imagined genealogy that blended Egyptian Bedouin, Mamluk and classic Arab tribal characteristics.

The major Egyptian-based Faḳāriyya-Niṣf Sa'd faction comprised mamluks, urban elements and Bedouin belonging to the Niṣf Sa'd. The other major faction, Qāsimiyya-Niṣf Ḥarām, comprised rival mamluks, other urban elements and Bedouin of the Niṣf Ḥarām. According to the chronicle by al-Qinālī:

[3a] From ancient times the people of Egypt, soldiery, Arabs (*urbān*) and civilians (*ra'iyya*) were two parties: white flag and red flag. The white was Tubbā'ī and the red was Kulaybī: Zughbī and Hilālī, Qalā'ūnī and Baybarsī until the time of the House of 'Uthmān . . . when the two parties became Faḳārī-Sa'd and Qāsīmī-Ḥarām.¹⁷

By the seventeenth century, the Bedouin were fully involved in most of the political intrigues and military disputes between the Mamluk factions, exploiting this situation in their favor. The link between the Faḳāriyya and Sa'd and between the Qāsimiyya and Ḥarām positioned the Bedouin as a pivot in the political arena. The weaker the central government became and the stronger the Mamluk *beys* grew, the greater the influence of clans and tribal groups.

Further evidence of the imagined Mamluk genealogy as a reflection of Mamluk assimilation in Egyptian society is discernible in the struggle between the two Mamluk factions, the Faḳāriyya and the

¹⁶ The *Faḳāriyya* and the *Qāsimiyya* first appeared in 1640. See P.M. Holt, "The patterns of Egyptian political history from 1517 to 1798", in *idem: Modern Egypt: Historical Studies from the Ottoman Conquest to the United Arab Republic*, London: Oxford University Press, 1968, 86. For an exhaustive review on the *Qāsimiyya* by Holt, see *EF*², vol. IV, 722b–723a.

¹⁷ Mustafā b. Ibrāhīm al-Maddāḥ al-Qinālī, *Majmū' laṭīf*, Nationalbibliothek, Vienna (MS. Hist. Osm. 38), 3a. The chronicle is part of the eighteenth century Dimurdāshī group.

Qāsimiyya, during the eighteenth century. Their symbols of identity were a white flag (Faqārī) and a red flag (Qāsimī). The white flag embraced the Tubbā'ī, Ḥusaynī, Zughbī, Qalā'ūnī, Sa'd and Faqārī groupings. The red flag, the Kulaybī, Yazīdī, Hilālī, Baybarsī, Ḥarām and Qāsimī.¹⁸ The genealogical differences between mamluk and non-mamluk, by then, were ambiguous.¹⁹

Historiographically, too, the non-differentiation between the Bedouin tribal groups and the Mamluk factions was almost complete by the eighteenth century, to the extent that a distinction made between *sanjaqs* [*beys*] (high ranking amirs) of Nişf Sa'd and *sanjaqs* of Nişf Ḥarām referred in actuality to the Faqārīyya and the Qāsimiyya.²⁰ This was also the case regarding the various Bedouin groupings in Egypt. "The Bedouin of Buhayra their flag is red, [they are] always with the Qāsimiyya."²¹ The tribal confederation of the Ḥabāyba, which dominated parts of central Egypt under the leadership of Shaykh Ḥabīb and his sons Sālīm and Suwaylīm in the second half of the eighteenth century, was identified with the Faqārīyya.

The mamluks, acknowledging the Bedouin's link to these ancient confederations, defined their own political loyalties accordingly. When the amir Ibrāhīm Abū Shanab appointed in 1703–4 his mamluk Aḥmad al-As'ad governor, he posted him in the province of Buhayra "because it always belonged to him, since the Bedouin there are Nişf Ḥarām without exception."²² However, the Bedouin were not always faithful in their group affiliation. Bedouin groups transferred from one camp to the other according to pragmatic interests, state of relationship and personal connections with particular mamluks. The Bedouin were clearly involved in the armed conflict of 1711, between the Faqārīyya and the Qāsimiyya, known as the *fitna* (lit. rebellion). However, the support they gave to one or the other of the rivals was not necessarily determined by their belonging to the Nişf Sa'd

¹⁸ Anonymous (Dimurdāshī group), *Kitāb (majmū') al-durra al-muṣāna fī waqā' al-kināna*, Cambridge University Library (MS. Add. 2787, Bodleian Library, MS. Bruce 43, 2a, 5a–6b. On the historical background of the groups, see P.M. Holt, "al-Jabartī's introduction to the history of Ottoman Egypt", in: *Studies in the History of the Near East*, London: Frank Cass, 1969, 174, n. 4.

¹⁹ Ayalon, *Studies*, 157–60.

²⁰ *Majmū'*, 306.

²¹ Al-Qinālī, 68a.

²² Aḥmad (*Kahīya 'Azebān*) Dimurdāshī, *al-Durra al-muṣāna fī akhbār al-kināna*, The British Museum, MS. Or. 1073–74.

or the Nişf Ḥarām. Al-Zaydiyya Bedouin, who belonged to the Nişf Ḥarām, found themselves in the Ḥabāiba camp, which belonged to the Nişf Sa'd. In contrast, Muḥammad Bey Çerkes, the leader of the Qāsimiyya, managed to unite most of the groups identified with Nişf Ḥarām around himself, in addition to the Zaydiyya. These groups were Bedouin of Buḥayra province, Ḥanādī Bedouin and others.²³ Sa'd and Ḥarām existed as Bedouin groupings in Egypt at least until the end of the eighteenth century.

The primary manifestations of the close mamluk-Bedouin relationship were marriage alliances and the granting of asylum to each other's rebels and to rebels from allied camps. Ibn Zunbul noted that the Mamluk amir Qanṣuh al-ʿAdlī had marriage alliances with the Bedouin of Qatāra, and that he escaped there after his defeat by Sultan Selim's army during the Ottoman conquest.²⁴ The remnants of the Qāsimiyya, who took refuge in Upper Egypt after their defeat by the Ottomans, settled there and intermarried with the Hawwāra Bedouin. This may have been the reason that they named ʿAlī Bey al-Armanī *Abū al-ʿArab*.²⁵ The Abwāziyya, one of the households within the Qāsimiyya faction that had an alliance with Nişf Ḥarām, established marriage alliances with the ʿĀ'id tribe in the Sharqiyya province. This intermingling produced the Abāza clan, which played an important role in the local political life of the Sharqiyya in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Amirs and shaykhs: *Similarities between households*

Mamluk society in Egypt was divided internally by factional rivalries. The mamluks, who held senior ranks and had a high income, established households, *bayt* or *ṭāʿifa*—a cluster of groups and indi-

²³ Anonymous (Dimurdāshī group), *Kitāb al-Asrār al muṣāna fī waqāʿi al-kināna fī Miṣr ilā sana 1123*, Paris, L.O. Arabe 437, 112.

²⁴ Ibn Zunbul, 106.

²⁵ He held a governmental post in Jirja, later becoming responsible for the granaries in Cairo. See *al-Asrār al-muṣāna*, 71. It appears that in this case the granting of asylum should be ascribed to political considerations and not necessarily to the close relations that led to marriage alliances (and certainly not to the Bedouin custom of hospitality). As is known, marriages in contemporary Bedouin societies, are agreed upon mainly because of economic considerations, and it is absolutely reasonable to assume that the considerations were the same then.

viduals, bound to the head of the household. In time, these households coalesced into factions based on kinship and origin. The household provided the context for the various components of Mamluk elite, including marriage alliances aimed at consolidating political and economic interests. This practice led to the absorption of rootless clients and associates and increased the household membership, enhancing the political power of the household and its control over sources of wealth. Ultimately, the goal was to create political alliances and attain access to economic resources. The wives, concubines and daughters of the head of the household exercised influence and contributed to the economic strength of the household.²⁶ This social structure closely resembled Bedouin society, which was a system of tribal organizations based on a common origin according to mythological, imagined or real blood kinship and divided into rival tribes and sub-tribes that carried on persistent struggles against each other.

Evidence shows that Bedouin shaykhs bearing the title of amir established households with similar features in Upper Egypt at the end of the Mamluk period (late fifteenth—early sixteenth centuries).²⁷ Moreover, marriage alliances were made between Bedouin and Mamluk households. Like the mamluks, the Bedouin tribes used this strategy to enhance the power of the group. Such households consisted of kin living in the same compound, although they could vary greatly in composition and size. Large households could also include non-kin, such as servants and retainers. Furthermore, the Bedouin shaykh's residence was a center for political gathering. These households were part of a diversified system of tribal frameworks, each of which filled certain functions. They were organized sociopolitically and territorially according to economic tasks. For example, the pasturing of camels and other flocks demanded the organization of small groups for wandering in search of pasture, while agriculture called for seasonal settlement in larger groups. The distinguishing feature of the household was the maintenance of a shared set of resources,

²⁶ See J. Hathaway, "The Military Household in Ottoman Egypt", *IJMES*, vol. XXVII, 1995, 46.

²⁷ The Bedouin amirs of Banū 'Umar of the Hawwāra federation held the *iqṭā'* (tax farm) of Girga since the end of the fourteenth century. See the list of the Hawwāra beys and amirs edited by J.-C. Garcin, "Emirs Hawwāras et beys de Girga aux et XVII siècles", *Annales Islamologiques*, tome XII, 1974.

including land and all other property, to which all members contributed and from which they subsisted. In short, the Bedouin household was a corporate political unit.²⁸ In this it differed from the households of the mamluks, who were not nomads and whose economy rested on a different base (mainly income from taxation and government allowances). Although when Bedouin shaykhs moved from the tribal areas and settled on lands granted to them by the authorities, or shifted to sedentary settlements, they did not cut themselves off from the tribal federations. These groupings, acting as territorial organizations and controlled a *dīra* (moving territory),²⁹ secured their members' rights to pasture and water resources.

The Bedouin shaykhs kept fewer mamluks than the amirs, in their households, despite the fact that their households were fairly similar to those of the mamluks. Perhaps the Bedouin feared the emergence of Mamluk clans within the tribal framework, which were likely to threaten the integrity of the Bedouin social organization and even block the option of entering into alliances with the mamluks in Cairo. Perhaps the mamluks of Cairo themselves would have not been favorable to the establishment by Bedouin of their own separate Mamluk units. In a similar vein the Ḥabāyba, who belonged to the Niṣf Saʿd and were the most important nomadic element in Central Egypt, had quotas of black slaves who could participate in battles.³⁰ Only *Shaykh al-ʿArab* Humām, the shaykh of the Hawwāra confederation and the de facto ruler of Upper Egypt during the second half of the eighteenth century, held a large number of mamluks in addition to black slaves and concubines.³¹ He belonged to the Niṣf Ḥarām camp, and making him an ally of the Qāsimiyya. After their defeat in battle against the Faqāriyya in 1730, many members of the Qāsimiyya found refuge with the Hawwāra, worked in Humām's service, and eventually were assimilated into the local tribal society. Humām

²⁸ See E. Marx, "Are there pastoral nomads in the Arab Middle East?" in U. FABIETTY, and P.C. SALZMAN (eds.), *The Anthropology of Tribal and Peasant Pastoral Societies*, Pavia: Ibis, 1996, 143–157; E. WOLF, *Peasants*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1966, 65ff.

²⁹ Bedouin did not regard the *dīra* as a fixed geographical location; rather it was a territory for moving, which could in principle be delineated spatially around any moving individual male. On the distinction between the concepts of *dīra* and territory, see A. MEIR, *As Nomadism Ends*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1997, 23–24, 77–78.

³⁰ *Ajāʿib*, I, 345, 346.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 343.

successfully dominated Upper Egypt, where the rebel mamluks who sought refuge in the area benefited by his benevolence and became totally reliant on his good will.

The households established by prominent Bedouin shaykhs in the nineteenth century functioned as political units. They resembled kin factions and had some of the characteristics of the Mamluk households of the eighteenth century and the *kapt*³² of the Ottoman-Egyptian elite of the nineteenth century, which Kenneth Cuno termed joint family households.³³ The members of these households consisted of his wives, his married sons with their families, and a retinue of attached persons who included Coptic and other clerks, soldiers, black slaves, concubines and various protégés. ‘Alī Mubārak, in his biography of *Shaykh al-‘Arab* ‘Alewa Abū Kuraysha, provided evidence that Bedouin shaykhs kept slaves in the nineteenth century. “When Abu Kuraysha went for a ride, all his slaves followed him on foot.”³⁴ The residence of the shaykh’s estate functioned as an administrative and center of control. The primary impetus of notable Bedouin families to establish joint family households was their wish to reproduce their political and economic status into the new reality and to perpetuate their control and entrench sedentary settlement.³⁵ The greater the threat to group solidarity, the stronger the impetus of the shaykhs and notables to strengthen the familial household structure. Such households were evidence of the growing wealth of the Bedouin shaykhs in the nineteenth century. Many of the shaykhs went so far as to build a castle (*qaṣr*) in a strategic location close to the tribal *dīra*. For example, the shaykhs of the Lamlūm clan of the Fawā’id tribe built a castle, which they named Lamlūm. *Shaykh al-‘Arab*

³² Literally, door or gate. The *kapt* was a variation of a political/military/administrative unit based on status and descent.

³³ The composition of the Bedouin households under the leadership of amirs and shaykhs approximates Cuno’s version more than the structure that Hathaway outlines. See K. Cuno, “Joint family households and rural notables in 19th century Egypt”, *IJMES*, vol. XXVII, no. 4, 1995, 485–502.

³⁴ ‘Alī Bāshā Mubārak, *al-Khiṭaṭ al-Taṣfiqīyya al-jadīda li-Miṣr al-Qāhira wa-mudumhā wa-bilādihā al-qadīma wa’l-mashhūra*, 20 vols., Cairo (Būlāq): 1888–89, vol. XIV, 38. See also G. Baer, “The settlement of the Beduin”, in: *Studies in the Social History of modern Egypt*, Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 1969, 11.

³⁵ Cuno argued that setting up a joint household was a tactic by rural notables to prevent the fragmentation of the land as an outcome of divided inheritances. See “Joint family”, 485.

al-Sa‘dāwī al-Jabālī of the Ḥarābī tribe built several castles, one in the town of al-Fayyūm and others in a nearby suburb.³⁶

The households of the shaykhs, who held offices in Muḥammad ‘Alī Pasha’s administration, became foci for the buildup of large estates. The shaykhs enjoyed an advantage over the rest of Bedouin society because they could acquire land both legitimately, through grants from the ruler or by purchase, and through coercion. The wealthiest shaykhs were those who held positions at the lower level of the provincial hierarchy (for example district chiefs).³⁷ An outstanding example was Muḥammad Sulṭān (1825–1884), whose acquisition of large tracts of land had a significant sociopolitical effect: the land became a source of benefits to the members of the shaykh’s clan while also enhancing their personal influence in the province or the district (*nāḥiya*) in the same way as had occurred with the Mamluk leaders of the past. The shaykhs had a retinue of their own warriors, which enabled them to impose control in their area as well as fulfill missions assigned by the authorities, for example, supplying horsemen to the pasha’s army. A Bedouin shaykh who built up a sedentary settlement or an estate elevated his status in his tribe. His tribesmen favored and supported him in this move, perceiving him as having gotten close to the governing center and thus better able to promote their interests. For this reason they were not distressed at his leaving the tribal territory and did not try to harm his interests or the social and economic rights of his kin group in his absence. So long as the shaykh could manage to represent his tribesmen successfully, no one undermined him or challenged his leadership. However, one can see some problematic aspects of the *Shaykh al-‘Arab*’s status.

With this, the shift of the status of some shaykhs to landlords engendered certain problems. It exposed them to greater dependency on the authorities. They were obliged to pay taxes and to carry out various tasks for the government. The pasha, for his part, preferred that the shaykhs reside in their tribal vicinity in order to control the tribe and the tribal territory more efficiently.

³⁶ See “settlement”, 11; *al-Khiṭaṭ*, vol. XVII.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. IX, 14, 99; vol. XV, 73.

Amirs and shaykhs: *Integration in the administration and the military*

Bedouin shaykhs were regarded as an integral part of the Mamluk Sultanate military and government. The most prominent and the powerful among them were granted the title amir, with military and administrative functions. Mamluk amirs and prominent Bedouin shaykhs appeared to have the same level of political power. Both of them were at one and the same time leaders of groupings and commanders of military structures. The military Mamluk society, was open to assimilate military structures of tribal society, such as the kin base of the warrior bands. The last Mamluk sultans appointed Bedouin shaykhs to high positions in their administration, such as post of amir *ṭablkhāneh* and *kāshif* (provincial governor).³⁸ From the period of the rule of Sultan Barqūq (1382–1398) onward, prominent shaykhs of the ‘Ā’id Bedouin bore the title *amīr*.³⁹ Toward the end of the Mamluk period, Bedouin shaykhs were also employed in the *hāj* caravans in administrative posts traditionally held by mamluks.⁴⁰

Clearly, the Bedouin ruled Upper Egypt during the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries as part of the Sultanate administration. The Banū ‘Umar clan of the Hawwāra Bedouin in Upper Egypt had a close relationship with the Mamluk authorities and its shaykhs bore the title *amīr*.⁴¹ After the death of the Mamluk amir Yashbaq in 1480, the central government appointed Muḥammad b. Yūnis of the Hawwāra as *amīr*, marking the beginning of the continuous rule of the clan for over 120 years. From 1493 their ruling center was at

³⁸ Literally Turkish, the amir of the orchestra. He commanded 40–80 mamluks. See D. Ayalon, “Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army”, *BSOAS*, XV, 1953, 448–476; XVI, 1954, 57–90. In this case it was the Shaykh of the ‘Ā’id Bedouin Muḥammad b. ‘Īsā, who was also appointed in 1388 as *Kāshif al-Jusūr* in the Sharqiyya. See *Kutāb al-sulūk* vol. II, Part 3, 544, 585, 589. The nominations were made by *tawqī‘* (signature) of the sultan. See Aḥmad b. ‘Alī, al-Qalqashandī, *Subḥ al-‘ashā fi sinā‘at al-‘inshā‘*, Cairo: al-Mu‘asasa al-Misriyya al-‘āma lil-ta’līf, 1964, 14 vols., vol. XI, 211.

³⁹ Shwartz, 304.

⁴⁰ Amir al-Hawwāra Dā‘ud b. ‘Umar in 1488, the amir Aḥmad b. Baqar and Ḥusām al-Din b. Baghdād in 1511. See Ibn Iyās, part III, 257, part IV, 249, 256; ‘Abd al-Qādir b. Aḥmad Al-Jazīrī (al-Jazarī), *Durar al-fiwā‘id al-munazzama fi akhbār al-hāj wa-tarīq Makka al-mu‘azzama*, ed. Ḥama al-Jāsir, Riyād: Dār al-Yamāmah, 1983, 1054.

⁴¹ Shwartz, 226–229; J.-C. Garcin, “Émirs Hawwāras et Beys de Ġirġe aux et XVII Siècles”, *Annales Islamologiques*, Tome XII, Cairo, 1974.

Girga. The Ottomans, who arrived in 1517, recognized and confirmed the status of the Banū ‘Umar and integrated the Bedouin *amīrs* of this clan into the new administration.⁴² During the process of the Ottoman takeover, Amir al-Hawwāra ‘Alī b. ‘Umar denied a request for help by Tumānbāy, the last Mamluk sultan, and declared his loyalty to the new suzerain the Ottoman sultan Selim. As a reward, the Ottomans recognized his rule in Upper Egypt. Ibn Iyās described ‘Umar as “the administrator of Upper Egypt regions” (*mutawallī jihāt al-Ṣa‘īd*).⁴³ Under his rule, Girga became the capital of Upper Egypt and evolved into a new Muslim urban center that displacing Qūs. The *amīrs* of Banū ‘Umar continued to rule until 1607, after which the Ottomans succeeded in appointing an *amīr* of their own in 1608.⁴⁴ The Bedouin Hawwāra clan of the Awlād Humām then gained power, prompting the *ketkhudā* (deputy commander) of the grand vizier to note that when he had been the *agha* (commander) in Upper Egypt, the Bedouin undermined the position of the *sanjaq*, owned Mamluk fighters and slaves, had representatives who purchased concubines in Cairo for them and were *multazims* (tax farmers).⁴⁵

In the province of Buḥayra, the Bedouin amirs Aḥmad al-‘Adilī and his brother Mūsa were recognized *kāshifs* in 1596, responsible for security, for which they were paid.⁴⁶ In the Sharqiyya, the Bedouin amir Aḥmad b. Baqar retained his position under the Ottomans.⁴⁷

The Bedouin shaykhs had been granted the title *Shaykh al-‘Arab* during the Mamluk Sultanate and were granted estates (*iqṭā‘āt*) as a return for services rendered to the authorities, such as guarding the roads and tracking down robbers. This system continued until 1525 when Grand Vizier Ibrāhīm Pasha introduced the *Qānūn-nāme-i Miṣr*.⁴⁸ marking an entrenchment and reinforcement of the role of the *shaykh*

⁴² Ibn Iyās used the title *amīr al-Ṣa‘īd* for amir al-Hawwāra Dāwūd. See I, 290. See also J.-C. Garcin, *Un centre musulman de la Haute-Égypte: Qūs*, Cairo: Institut Français D’archéologie Orientale, 1976, 498.

⁴³ Ibn Iyās, III, 130, 159.

⁴⁴ See *Emīrs Hawwāras* and *Qūs*, 516, n. 1; 517, n. 2.

⁴⁵ *Kitāb al-asār*, 17.

⁴⁶ Stanford J. Shaw, *The Budget of Ottoman Egypt 1005–76/1596–7*, The Hague: Mouton, 1968, 92.

⁴⁷ Ibn Zunbul, 145, 146.

⁴⁸ The edict codifying the administrative practice of the province. See M. Winter, *Egyptian Society Under Ottoman Rule 1517–1798*, London: Routledge, 1992, 16.

al-ʿArab in the administration of the countryside (*al-rīf*).⁴⁹ At the same time the Ottomans evicted the shaykhs from the *iqṭāʿāt* and appointed them tax farmers tasked with collecting the *kharāj* (land tax) from tenant farmers and tribute payments from “despised” and protegee tribes.⁵⁰ The tax farmers were required to set aside the government share—the *mūrī*—and submit an annual report to the pasha.

The imperial decrees of the sixteenth century are an important source of information about the position of the Bedouin shaykhs in the Ottoman administration. Michael Winter made extensive use of this resource regarding the offices of the *Shaykh al-ʿArab*, the amir and the *kāshif*. The decrees confirmed the strong position of the Bedouin shaykhs in certain provinces where their dominance was undisputed. He found that the decrees refer to the shaykhs as rulers of a region and not merely as tribal leaders. In acquiring the status the *Qānūn-nāme*, the Bedouin shaykhs were given the same functions and authority as *kāshif*. Moreover, Winter argued the offices of *shaykh al-ʿArab* and *kāshif* were virtually synonymous in the imperial decrees.⁵¹ The *kāshifs* and the shaykhs were responsible for agriculture, public works and public order. Both constituted backbone of the tax collection system. The central government treated them identically and both were granted the same authority and functions. The only difference between them was that the *kāshifs* were army officers with the title of amirs, while the shaykhs were not members of the military elite.

Still, some noted Bedouin shaykhs were integrated in the military establishment and became commanders over Mamluk amirs. This occurred in the provincial areas, which in any case were under the control of the Bedouin shaykhs. Winter concluded that this demonstrated the vitality of the Bedouin as well as the greater flexibility (or even weakness) of the military class.⁵² Yet the point should be made that not only were the Bedouin the only population group readily available, they were structurally suitable and qualified to play a major role in the government administration and become

⁴⁹ See G.W.F. Stirling, *The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs, 1511–1574*, Urbana Ill: The University of Illinois Press, 1942, 73–74.

⁵⁰ Tribes, which were ascribed to inferior pedigree, i.e. the *Ḥatīm* in the Sinai and the “protected” *Murābiṭīn* tribes of the *Awlād ʿAlī* Bedouin in the Western Desert.

⁵¹ *Egyptian Society*, 90–102.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 95.

integrated into the Mamluk-based military and fiscal system. Both the Bedouin and the mamluks spent much of their time in warfare. Furthermore, the Bedouin were not committed to a sedentary life, they were knowledgeable about the social and economic conditions in the countryside, and maintained reasonably good relations with the local Mamluk officials. The central Ottoman government could not fail to take note of the similarities between the Bedouin and the mamluks and to perceive the potential for cooperation between the two groups.

The Bedouin gradually entered the ranks of the regiments of the Ottoman garrisons, the *ojāqs*. Aḥmad Shalabī referring to this issue, claimed that the Hawwāra Bedouin were *‘azab* or *mustahfizān* (Janissaries) and that they exploited this status in refusing to pay the *māl* and *ghilāl* (grain) tax on land they were granted. The governor of Girga, ‘Abd al-Raḥman Bey, complained about this in 1698, and the pasha promised to issue a *hujja* (legal title) annulling Bedouin membership in the military class (*‘askariyya*). Shalabī pointed out that a few years earlier, residents of Cairo alleged claims that Bedouin nevertheless serve in the *ojāqs* and indeed they were dismissed in 1657–8 following an imperial decree (*firmān*).⁵³ The Hawwāra’s entitlement to serve in the *ojāqs*, however, was retained in the law, and they were registered as *inkishāriyya* (Janissaries) and *‘azab* in Ibrāhīm Pasha’s registers (*daftars*) already in the first half of the sixteenth century. In 1723 Muḥammad Pasha, the Ottoman viceroy of Egypt, made an effort to remove them from the *ojāqs* but withdrew this initiative when he realized that their status was officially entrenched.⁵⁴

Winter cites several examples of Bedouin chiefs who attained senior military ranks in the Ottoman/Mamluk *‘askariyya* under Ottoman rule and who were regarded as military commanders or governors of regions, based on the *Mūhimme Desteri* documents. Aḥmad b. Baqar, the shaykh of the Bani Wā’il Bedouin, was appointed amir of forty elite *amir ṭablkhāneh* (commander of orchestra) at the end of the Mamluk Sultanate. Hammād b. Khabīr, (1571), who had been given the district of Jabal al-Akhdar in Cyrenaica as an *iltizām* (tax farm) was granted the military rank of amir (*sanjaq bey*), *Shaykh al-‘Arab* ‘Umrān’s predecessors of the Banu ‘Umar clan in Upper Egypt (1573)

⁵³ Aḥmad Shalabī, 156, 202–203.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 442.

had 50–60 Janissaries from Cairo at their disposal, Shaykh ‘Arab al-Ghazāla ‘Umrān⁵⁵ al-Khabīrī (1713–4), bore the rank of amir in the *nāḥiya* (district) of Umm Ḥanān in the province of Gīza. Powerful Bedouin shaykhs also served in the position of commander of the annual pilgrimage caravan (*amīr al-ḥājj*), considered one of the most prestigious offices in Egypt.⁵⁶ One of the prominent of them was ‘Īsa b. Ismā‘īl b. ‘Āmir, the *amīr* of the Banī ‘Awna Bedouin in the Buḥayra in 1555–6 and during 1562/3–1564/5. His son ‘Umar succeeded him in 1590/1, 1591/2, 1593/4 and 1594/5.⁵⁷ ‘Īsā was the *wāli* (governor) of Buḥayra province until 1561/2 and was succeeded in this post, too, by his son ‘Umar. Both these shaykhs had mamluks under their command as well.⁵⁸ According to al-Jazarī, the reason for ‘Īsa’s promotion in the Ottoman military hierarchy was solely attributable to the gifts he brought during his annual visits to the court of the sultan in Istanbul.⁵⁹

Allies in the struggle for rule over Egypt

The end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries witnessed a continuous state of war between the Ottomans and the various Mamluk factions, with French and British forces periodically fighting alongside one or another of the parties. Bedouin tribal groups played a key role in these confrontations, fighting in the service of all the parties. During the French occupation, tribesmen served in the ranks of the Mamluk *beys* as well as in the struggle against the French. This was the last period the Bedouin could exploit their advantages to assist rival Mamluk factions in their battles against each other and to reinforce the Mamluk ranks against the Ottomans, the British and the French. Notably, just as the Mamluk struggle for rule in Egypt after the French withdrawal was

⁵⁵ In the manuscript titled *Asyār al-muṣāna* that I used, his name is ‘Umar al-Khabīrī. See 61. Also see *Kitāb al-durra al-muṣāna*, 185a.

⁵⁶ On the office of *amīr al-ḥājj*, see Jacques Jomier, *Le Mahmal et la caravane Égyptienne des pèlerins de la Mecque (XIII–XX siècles)*, Cairo: Institute français d’archéologie orientale, 1953, by index; and al-Jazarī.

⁵⁷ In 999, 1000, 1002, 1003 *hijra*. See Al-Jazarī, 947, 1076, and by index.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 1032, 1054. See also *Egyptian Society*, 96.

⁵⁹ Al-Jazarī, 947.

not national character, but economic and territorial, the Bedouin too, sought only to preserve their economic and territorial interests. They favored Mamluk control of Egypt so as to exploit of the rivalry between the Mamluk factions for their own purposes.

An important source of information about the last stage in Bedouin-Mamluk coexistence is the chronicle by ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Jabartī.⁶⁰ It shed light on the political role of the Bedouin in the Mamluk’s final struggle for the rule of Egypt after the French withdrawal, a struggle that ended with the victory of Muḥammad ‘Ali. With the Mamluk *amīrs* constituting the main political actors in the chronicle, most of the information about the Bedouin deals with their relationship with the Mamluk *beys* and the *amīrs*. The chronicle reveals that in many cases the Bedouin pinned their hopes on the leaders of the major Mamluk factions, perceiving them as a source of stability. While al-Jabartī illuminate the background descriptions to the treaties and the rivalries between the Bedouin and the mamluks, his attitude toward the Bedouin is revealed as mostly hostile. Because of his social background as a man of urban middle class family, he was not familiar with the Bedouin lifestyle and was prejudiced against them. In this case, he sided with the French, who claimed that the mamluks and the Bedouins aimed to plunder the country and destroy Egypt.⁶¹

Following the French evacuation from Cairo in July 1801 and two months later from Egyptian territory entirely, several Bedouin tribal groups joined the Mamluk *beys* and amirs in making a stand against the Ottoman attempts to re-establish their sovereignty over Egypt. With this, the Bedouin enjoyed unprecedented freedom of action then because Ottoman rule was impotent and political chaos reigned. Even so, there is no indication that Bedouin groupings formed any kind of independent chiefdom in one of the regions or even had exclusive control over any part of Egypt.⁶²

⁶⁰ Al-Jabartī is a valuable source for descriptions of the relationships between mamluks and Bedouin in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, although there are gaps in his coverage and he constitutes a secondary source regarding such chronicles as *Awḍah al-ishārāt* covering Jabartī’s early period. However, al-Jabartī was an eyewitness to the events between the years 1776/7–1820/1.

⁶¹ *‘Ajā’ib*, III, 76.

⁶² The single exception is the case of the Ma‘āza tribes, which attained a territorial identity during Muḥammad ‘Ali’s regime. See J. Hobbs, *Bedouin life in the Egyptian Wilderness*, Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1990, 74–81.

After the death of Murād Bey (1801), two factions vied for Mamluk leadership. One, led by Muḥammad Bey al-Alfī al-Kabīr, consisted of supporters of the late Murād and favored a treaty with the British. The other, led by ʿUthmān Bey al-Bardīsī and Ibrāhīm Bey, sought affiliation with the Ottomans. The major Bedouin tribal groups assisted both parties. Bedouin from Upper Egypt secured the superiority of the al-Alfī faction and went so far as to attack Ottoman posts in September 1802.⁶³ Following a failed attempt by al-Bardīsī in 1802 to eliminate al-Alfī, the Ḥuwayṭāt and Maʿāza Bedouin helped al-Alfī escape and the Maʿāza Bedouin gave him asylum. It was Muḥammad ʿAlī, however, who was the most serious contender for rule over Egypt. According to the picture sketched by al-Jabartī, most of the Bedouin tribes joined one or the other of the Mamluk factions and in addition to fighting as part of Muḥammad ʿAli Pasha's troops, exploited the prevailing political disorder to steal and plunder. One of the major battles that the pasha led took place in April 1804 near Imbābā in Gīza province. Al-Jabartī reported that the Egyptian (Mamluk) *amīrs* (*al-umārāʾ al-misrīyya*)⁶⁴ and the Bedouin deployed in the Gīza region until they reached Imbābā, which they attacked and pillaged while the inhabitants escaped.⁶⁵ A description of events following a battle near Bāb al-Naṣr in Cairo a month later again emphasizes the Bedouin's role in acts of plunder while fighting in the Mamluk ranks and further illuminates the convoluted relationship and cooperation between mamluks and Bedouin. At the end of the battle the *amīrs* and the Bedouin retreated and dispersed through the provinces of Sharqīyya and Qalyūbiyya, wreaking havoc along the way. They destroyed grain harvests in the fields and seized what had been threshed. Afterwards, they released their mounts to graze on whatever was still growing in the fields and set fire to what had not been threshed. They also pillaged the livestock, slaughtering it and eating the meat. One of the Bedouin fighting unit took the *kāshif* of Sharqīyya prisoner at Billbays for two days while they pillaged the town, killing some two hundred people. The shaykh of the ʿĀ'id Bedouin, Abū Ṭawīla, came to the *amīrs* and rebuked them for the pillaging, saying: "These crops belong mostly to the

⁶³ *ʿAjāʾib*, III, 227–31.

⁶⁴ The Mamluk leaders were referred to thus in the chronicle.

⁶⁵ *ʿAjāʾib*, III, 292.

Bedouin, but your allies, the dregs of the Bedouin, have no part in it.” When the Hanādī Bedouin shaykhs and other allied Bedouin who were fighting on their side heard the word “dregs”,⁶⁶ they were enraged and came close to killing Abu Tawīla, and fights broke out between the various Bedouin groups. The *amīrs* also besieged the *kāshif* of Qalyūbiyya, summoning the shaykhs of the Zawāmil and ‘Ā’id Bedouin in the area and ordering them to carry out forced-labor projects (*kulaf*).⁶⁷ They also levied heavy taxes on the villages, appointing Bedouin allies as collectors and paying them unusually high commissions.⁶⁸

Al-Alfī was Muḥammad ‘Alī’s most dangerous Mamluk adversary once the French withdrew from Egypt in 1801.⁶⁹ Al-Alfī sought the support of prominent Bedouin shaykhs such as Ibn Shadīd, shaykh of the Ḥuwaytāt, shaykhs of the ‘Ā’id in the Sharqiyya, and the shaykh of the Bedouin of the Jazira area, to help him become the new ruler of Egypt. Muḥammad ‘Alī, meanwhile, had the support of the Ḥuwaytāt and Niṣf Ḥarām Bedouin and of Shaykh Ibn Shā’ir, leader of one of the tribal groups in the Buḥayra province. The reconfirmation by the Sublime Porte of Muḥammad ‘Alī’s appointment as pasha of Egypt in July 1805 marked al-Alfī’s failure in his quest.⁷⁰ He understood this once and for all while waiting in the Buḥayra province for three months for British help that had been promised to him but was late. The time was the height of summer, when there were no crops or pasture. The Bedouin in his service demanded to be allowed to go to Upper Egypt in search for food and pasture. Al-Alfī had no choice but to submit to the demand and to depart to the Ṣa’īd with his force, which included 6,000 Bedouin fighters, among them the Awlād ‘Alī and Hanādī tribes as well as Bedouin from the Sharqiyya, the core of his army.⁷¹ He

⁶⁶ Al-Jabartī uses the term *hubūd al-‘Arab*. See *‘Ajā’ib*, III, 294.

⁶⁷ *Corvée*, (in Arabic, *kulfa*), or forced labor, was a practice imposed by the Ottoman authorities.

⁶⁸ *‘Ajā’ib*, III, 295.

⁶⁹ See ‘Abd al-Raḥman al-Rāfi‘ī, *‘Asr Muḥammad ‘Alī*, Cairo, 1951, 25. Muḥammad ‘Alī struggled against several Mamluk rivals for two years after he seized the government of Egypt. Each had mounted Bedouin fighters in their employ. See below 21–22. See George Douin (ed.), *L’Égypte de 1802 à 1804—correspondance des Consuls de France en Égypte*, Cairo, 1935, 218.

⁷⁰ Al-Rāfi‘ī, 11–15.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 43.

arrived with his troops at Kafr Ḥakīm on January 27, 1807, dismounted on a hill near Cairo, and while delivering a speech, suddenly fell ill. He managed to appoint Shāhīn Bey as his successor and died that night. The Bedouin tribes that had rallied around him promptly went their separate ways, returning to their lands tend their animals and fields. Some sent requests to the pasha for an amnesty, realizing that he would succeed in stabilizing his rule.⁷²

Months of continual warfare and sieges of this kind between the two sides—Muḥammad ‘Alī and the *amīrs*—thus came temporarily to an end, although law and order were not soon restored. Land and sea routes were disrupted, local Bedouin shaykhs imposed arbitrary control in the wake of ineffective governments, and the *fellahin* (the rural peasant population) mounted unsuccessful efforts at resisting the Bedouin. The mamluks, for their part, were uncoordinated and focused on internecine struggles for control, with each of the rival amirs engaging Bedouin to assist him in his fight.

Muḥammad Bey al-Alfī, the “Bedouin” mamluk

Al-Alfī’s special ties with the Bedouin propelled to the head of the anti-pasha Mamluk camp and positioned him as having the best chance to get the upper hand in the Mamluk struggle for power. The amirs who preceded him in this struggle, late in the eighteenth century, such as Ibrāhīm Jawīsh, Muḥammad Bey al-Ṣa‘īdī, Ṣāliḥ Bey al-Qāsimī and Ḥusayn Kashkash had gained only limited support from the Bedouin tribes and only of small tribal groups, mainly from their own provinces. The pasha often said: “As long as this al-Alfī lives, my life will not be comfortable.” Informed of al-Alfī’s death, he obscured: “He and I are like two acrobats walking a tightrope, except that he has wooden shoes on his feet.”⁷³

Al-Jabartī is including detailed biography of al-Alfī in his chronicle, provided rare insights into the Mamluk attitude to the Bedouin and the relationship between the two groups:

Al-Alfī was an important and dignified amir. . . . A noteworthy accomplishment of his—one unique to him—was that all the Bedouin tribes

⁷² *‘Ajā’ib*, IV, 37–38.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 38.

in Egypt were subservient to him, carried out his orders, and never disobeyed him. He had an uncanny ability to manage them and such deep knowledge of their character and circumstances that he might have been one of them or raised among them. They would stand or sit at his command, in spite of the fact that he exacted money, camels, and livestock from them, imprisoned them or released them and killed some of them. Despite this they never turned away from him. He frequently married Bedouin women; those he liked, he would keep as long as it suited his purpose; those who did not suit his temperament would be sent back to live with their families. Only one of them continued in his household, one who had pleased him, and whom he left at his death. When the Bedouin learned of his death, their women gathered to mourn him with remarkable dirges that have since been sung again and again by singers to the accompaniment of musical instruments.

How strange it was! When he came into the area formerly under the sway of the Bedouin, making his yearly stay east of Bilbays, he would enforce his control over the Bedouin, punishing them with arrests and imprisonment, cooperating with one faction against another, taking money, horses, camels, sheep and goats from them, taxing them heavily, and preventing them from exercising their power over the peasants. Yet, when he returned from England, and al-Bardīsī with his army had ganged up against him and beset him on every side, he went into hiding among the Bedouin and fled to al-Wādī and the home of ‘Ushayba the Bedouin, who gave him refuge, hid him, and kept the matter secret. . . . This was unprecedented; some even said he was using magic on them or had some secret means of reducing them to obedience. When he died, their unity broke up and they no longer gathered around a single man after him. Each tribe went to its own area; some sought amnesty from the Pasha.⁷⁴

Continuing al-Jabartī records a typical monologue that testifies once again to the Bedouin’s fickleness even toward al-Alfī, who had built up an exceptional relationship with them. In a moment of frankness the Mamluk leader addressed one of his companions and articulated what he probably really thought about the Bedouin:

It is no easy matter for me [to live] now that I have become one man among thousands of enemies. Here are my own kin and companions who abandoned me and attacked me for no fault of mine. . . . Then there are these Bedouin gathered around me, whom I must cajole and lead, now with conciliation, now with threats, and likewise my horsemen and mamluks. Each of them ask me for a position of influence

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 39.

or a command, thinking in his heedlessness that the country is under my control and believing that I am curtailing his rights. Sometimes I treat them with gentleness; sometimes I rebuke them with severity. In the midst of all these groups, I am like a hunted animal, and those around me are like hungry dogs trying to tear me to pieces and devour me. Not having at my disposal the treasures of Qārūn to support these throngs of people, I am forced to commit unjust actions against God-fearing men, seizing their money and eating up their crops and livestock. If God grants me victory, I will compensate them for it and treat them kindly. . . .⁷⁵

Twilight of the Mamluk beys' rule: The loss of allies

Al-Alfī's death paved the way for Muḥammad 'Alī to try to impose control over all the Bedouin tribes, attempting to capitalize on the wide connections that al-Alfī had with the Bedouin. However, the strong Awlād 'Alī, al-Hanādī and al-Hawwāra tribal federations, which had been allies of the Mamluk amirs Mūrād Bey, Muḥammad Bey al-Alfī and al-Bardīsī, resisted his efforts. Still, to the pasha's good fortune, the hatred between the Hanādī and Awlād 'Alī groupings was so strong that a united Bedouin front against him did not emerge. So long as the mamluks remained active, Muḥammad 'Alī encountered difficulties, as the Bedouin maintained their practice dating back to the Ottoman conquest, of forming alliances with rival Mamluk factions. Only in 1811, after massacring all the Mamluk chiefs, could the pasha begin to try to implement his ideas concerning the Bedouin and the desirable policy toward them.

Significantly, al-Jabartī observed that with al-Alfī's death, there was no Mamluk *amīr* who could rally the Bedouin around himself. Indeed the *amīr* Yāsīn Bey still managed gathering Bedouin in order to fight Sulaymān Bey al-Alfī, but was defeated in June 1808 despite the fact that Sulaymān Bey was killed in an ambush. The *amīr* Shāhīn Bey al-Alfī also had good relationship with the Bedouin. He was the intermediary in settlement of a conflict between the Awlād 'Alī Bedouin and two other Bedouin tribes—the Hanādī and the Jahna in the Buḥayra province—in October-November 1808 and managed by that to drive out the Awlād 'Alī from the province.⁷⁶

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, *ibid.*

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 75, 78.

However, they were of the last Mamluk leaders to have significant relations with Bedouin.

The year 1810 was critical for the Bedouin. Muḥammad ‘Alī and the mamluks held discussions about the future governing of Egypt. Shāhīn Bey, the central personality in the Mamluk camp, crossed over to the pasha’s side but after a serious falling out returned to the Mamluk *beys* as one of their chief leaders. It seems that the Bedouin perceived that the mamluks’ role would end during Muḥammad ‘Alī’s rule, and that it was only a matter of time before the pasha would finally subdue them. Late in 1809, the *amīrs* Shāhīn Bey al-Alfī, Muḥammad Bey al-Ibrāhīmī and Muḥammad Bey al-Manfūkh al-Murādī had led a revolt against the pasha. This revolt reached a turning-point in May-June 1810, when large numbers of Bedouin fighters were massed in a Mamluk camp erected outside Gīza under the command of ‘Uthmān Bey Ḥasan. They awaited the firing of the pasha’s canons, which would augur his arrival to sign a peace agreement, but the pasha chose not to appear, leaving the Mamluk camp humiliated. This act marked the beginning of the final deterioration of the mamluks’ relationship with the pasha. Shortly thereafter, Ibrāhīm Bey, one of the amirs who attended in the camp, was given an ultimatum by the pasha under which Ibrāhīm would submit to his authority and would then be appointed to any position he desired, on the condition that he pay all the levies assessed in his districts, including the *mīrī*, grain and *kharāj*, and the customary retainer fees to the Bedouin. That same night, most of the Mamluk *amīrs* abandoned Cairo, took their horses, camels and chattel, and crossed the Nile toward Gīza. There they all gathered together and split up into three camps: the Murādīs, led by Shāhīn Bey; the Muḥammadīs, led by ‘Alī Bey Ayyūb and the Ibrāhīmīs, led by ‘Uthmān Bey Ḥasan. The first step they took was to write letters to the Bedouin shaykhs with the intent of ensuring the Bedouin’s support. At that very time, however, the shaykhs of the Awlād ‘Alī were making their way to the pasha who granted them robes of honor, cashmere shawls and 150 purses.⁷⁷

Following the failure of the negotiations with the pasha, Shāhīn Bey took the Mamluk initiative and led a series of battles against Muḥammad ‘Alī over a six-month period, which was to constitute

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 113, 114.

the final stage of the pasha's-mamluks struggle. Bedouin horsemen took part in all the campaigns as an act of support and identification despite their perception that the mamluks' effort was doomed. The three amirs of the Alfi wing had abandoned the Mamluk camp, prompting Shāhīn Bey reorganize the mamluks' war effort and appoint the amirs Na'mān Bey, Amīn Bey and Yaḥya Bey as commanders. Once the news of the split among the *amīrs* spread through Upper and Lower Egypt, however, the Hanādī Bedouin and their shaykhs, who were on their way to join them decided instead to head for the pasha declared their loyalty to him and asked for safe conduct. The pasha heaped cloth and other gifts on them.

Following several defeats and attempts at mediation, Shāhīn Bey returned to Cairo in December 1810 and contracted an alliance with Muḥammad 'Alī Pasha. This, however, did not enable him to survive the massacre of the Mamluk *amīrs* in the citadel of Cairo three and a half months later, at the pasha's orders. His Bedouin allies had proven to be unstable. As ever, the Bedouin, foreseeing the future, had deserted after each defeat. Some of them found their way into the pasha's camp. Indeed, the Bedouin were no longer valuable partners to any of the amirs, in their ongoing resistance to the pasha. Some of Bedouin began searching for ways to cooperate with Muḥammad 'Alī, who was gradually entrenching his position as the ruler of Egypt, others withdrew to their desert territories and ceased being involved in warfare and politics.

On March 1, 1811, Muḥammad 'Alī invited the *amīrs* and their Mamluk retainers and soldiers to the citadel to greet him and then killed them all, thereby removing the most serious threat to his rule on Egypt.⁷⁸ Until their elimination, the mamluks were the Bedouin's main allies and chief partners in intrigues, revolts and takeover of various regions in Egypt. Once the mamluks left the stage, the Bedouin lost their constant ally. They were now entirely in the hands of the regime that the pasha had fashioned and were forced to choose between maintaining a relationship of alienation and suspicion toward the government or submitting to the pasha's authority. In the event, they chose submission while keeping some degree of alienation.

⁷⁸ For details about the massacre, see *ibid.*, 126–29.

Conclusion

The intimate relations between mamluks and Bedouin in Ottoman Egypt were the result of a similarity of attitudes, values and social norms. The elite of both groups developed a similar social and political structure based on the household (*bayt*). However, the Mamluk-Bedouin relationship was a reluctant one: it would not have evolved if the Bedouin had not been the population in the countryside (*al-rīf*) available to render services to the ruling mamluks and back it in warfare. The Bedouin were better acquainted with the social and economic system in the Egyptian *rīf* and were rooted in its agricultural and cattle-based economy. The central authorities were compelled to grant them a major role in the local administration, where they developed a symbiotic relationship with the local Mamluk officeholders. These Mamluk *amīrs* were so preoccupied by inter-factional rivalries, that they required qualified, reliable and available allies. The Bedouin were there at the right time and the right place.

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
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Fig. 1: Safed, The Red Mosque. General view from the north, 1940s. Courtesy of Israel Antiquities Authority.



The ground plan

(according to Mayer, Pinkerfeld and Hirschberg)

Fig. 2: Safed, The Red Mosque. Ground plan. After Mayer, Pinkerfeld and Hirschberg.




Fig. 3: Safed, The Red Mosque. *Muqarnas* portal. General view.



Fig. 4: Safed, The Red Mosque. The open courtyard. General view.



Fig. 5: Safed, The Red Mosque. Interior of the prayer hall.



A suggested ground plan
(according to the author, H.T.)

Fig. 6: Safed, The Red Mosque, Baybar's era. A suggested plan of the mosque.




Fig. 7: Safed, The red Mosque. *Qibla* wall, Ottoman period. After Mayer, Pinkerfeld and Hirschberg.



Fig. 8: Samed, The Red Mosque. Details of the portal.




Fig. 9: Damascus, The portal of al-Salihiya al-Sahiba *madrasa* (1233-1245/630-643), after Herzfeld.



Fig. 10: Safed. The Red Mosque, details of the portal.



Fig. 11: Safed. The Red Mosque, details of the Portal.



Fig. 12: Damascus. Al-Zāhiriyya *madrasa* (1277-81/676-680). The Portal, courtesy of Hans-Ulrich Kuhn, Tübingen.