EDUCATION IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION

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The titles published in this series are listed at the end of this volume.

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KLAS ROTH AND ILAN GUR-ZE'EV (EDS.)

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Name	Address
Klas Roth	Stockholm Institute of Education Department of Social and Cultural Studies in Education klas.roth@lhs.se
Ilan Gur-Ze'ev	University of Haifa Faculty of Education ilangz@construct.haifa.ac.il
Nicholas Burbules	University of Illinois Department of Educational Policy Studies burbules@uiuc.edu
Pradeep Dhillon	University of Illinois Department of Educational Policy Studies dhillon@uiuc.edu
Walter Feinberg	University of Illinois Department of Educational Policy Studies wfeinber@uiuc.edu
Elizabeth Heilman	Michigan State University College of Education eheilman@msu.edu
Mark Halstead	University of Huddersfield Department of Community and International Education j.m.halstead@hud.ac.uk
Richard Kahn	University of North Dakota Educational Foundation & Research richard.kahn@und.nodak.edu
Lars Løvlie	University of Oslo Faculty of Education Lars.Lovlie@ped.uio.no

Olli-Pekka Moisio	University of Jyväskylä Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy Olmoisio@yfi.jyu.fi
Birgit Nordtug	Sogn og Fjordane University College Faculty of Social Sciences birgit.nordtug@hisf.no
Paul Standish	University of London Institute of Education Educational Foundation and Policy Studies Philosophy Section p.standish@ioe.ac.uk
Juha Suoranta	University of Tampere Department of Education juha.suoranta@uta.fi
Sharon Todd	Stockholm Institute of Education Department of Social and Cultural Studies in Education sharon.todd@lhs.se

INTRODUCTION: EDUCATION IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZING CAPITALISM

Ilan Gur-Ze'ev and Klas Roth

The new, dramatic imposition, so it seems, is no longer stoppable. It is an embarrassing growth that shatters, deconstructs and transforms modern and pre-modern dimensions and levels of our lives; challenging dreams, concepts, practices and the fruits of the Enlightenment and humanist education, in all its forms and dimensions. As such, it should be a starting point for a worthy effort to clarify and deepen our understanding of and responsibility for education in the era of globalization – not to retreat to sentimental, naive or nihilist alternatives. Or, in the words of Bauman: 'Retreat from the globalization of the human dependency, from the global reach of human technology and economic activities is, in all probability, no longer on the cards. Answers like "stand the wagons in a circle" or "back to the tribal (national, communal) tents" won't do. The question is not how to reverse the river of history, but how to fight the pollution of its waters by human misery and how to channel its flow towards a more equitable distribution of the benefits it carries . . . An effective response to globalization can only be global'(Bauman, 2003, p. 19).

For better or for worse, modern history or our lives as we were educated to articulate them, to reflect on them, to challenge or edify them – cannot necessarily continue linearly in the light of binary logic, social security and dialogically reached consensus and collective action, regulated and edified in a liberal democracy; our lives cannot continue unchanged either in their present forms or in their current directions, as if nothing had happened in the past generation.

Some would claim that modern life and its prospects have no future at all in the face of post-Fordist production, distribution, representation and consumption (Amin, 2000, pp. 1–40) within the framework of globalizing capitalism. They see globalization as a menace we should prepare ourselves to challenge; some would say to struggle against at all costs, because it can terrorize what is dear to us, even the very existence of the earth (Amin, 2004, pp. 438–448).

There are also people who would argue that globalizing capitalism or, in other words, the Americanization of It should be: the planet (Sen, 2002, pp. 1–14) is the genuine world terror (West, 1993, p. 394) and is responsible for the reaction from, in particular, Islam and the fundamentalists (Gray, 1998, p. 7) and that it is not, in fact, the fanatic killers of Al-Qaida, Hamas, Hezbollah or the Islamic Jihad.[1] And so, Peter McLaren argues, it is the mission of post-colonialist education as part of the world's progressive forces to address the colonialist nature of globalizing capitalism in theory as well as in revolutionary practice (McLaren, 1997). Others, such as Salman Rushdie, will disagree and insist, 'Yes, this is about Islam' (Rushdie, 2004, pp. 357–358). Still

[1] See also Giovanna Borradori (2003) and Michael A. Peters (2005) for elaborated discussions on the issue of terrorism in an age of globalization.

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others, among them moderate social democrats, committed democrats (Sacks, 2004, pp. 210–231. See also Giddens, 2002, p. XXIX) and wise critical thinkers, tell us that globalization opens for us new ways for mutual responsibility and leads us towards potential new forms of solidarity (Bauman, 2003, pp. 16–17). Less critical thinkers celebrate the disputable fact that globalization makes 'us' It should be: richer (Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 2000, p. 332) and could be restrained and re-educated (Behrman, 2002, p. 109), even ethically (Kuening, 1998, p. 92), and argue that it opens the gates for economically rationalized pro-transparency and anti-dictatorial attitudes, for local autonomy and individual creativity, resistance to closure and for a new, edified, global human existence that will be richer, more democratic and moral; globalization will realize the vision of self-rule in oneself as an autonomous, creative, normal and free human being (Novak, 2002, p. 260). According to this vision, globalization offers us new horizons for rewording, uncensored creativity (Dunning, 2002, p. 24), liberation from territoriality and its ethnocentricity while transcending the limits, hierarchies, oppressive values, ideals and practices of modernity and anti-modernization alike.

Either way, we cannot avoid addressing the new existential, philosophical, economic, cultural and political conditions, as educators, as theorists of education, as objects of subjectification and as – directly and indirectly – subjects of dynamic disciplining symbolic bombardment. The changes and transformations inflicted/opened by globalization might be justifiably called 'revolution', 'transformation of human conditions' or 'a new era'.

So, how should we understand the new actuality and what should we do? Is this the first step on the way towards the world of the cyborg: a civilization beyond the dichotomies between nature and culture, humans and machines, reality and fantasy, the moment and eternity? Or is it a gateway for the new, most advanced, self-inflicted barbarization of humanity? Is it the beginning of a culture-clash that will bring the end of liberal democracies and eventually human life on this planet? Or is it a new beginning, a dangerous inauguration of a human rebirth, even if only for the few selected ones – an open possibility that is so complex and anarchist that we cannot yet foresee its future fortunes while we must already now position and educate ourselves for addressing its risks, possibilities and ambivalences? And if so, should we offer new ways of understanding and practising education that will prepare individuals to live in a godless, multi-oriented, kaleidoscopic, risky, free, creative, ecstatic world? Or, maybe we, as humanist educators, should react like the Roman soldier excavated in Pompeii who faced the magma of Vesuvius by remaining at his post. Should we recycle archaic and outmoded humanist ambitions, values, ideals and concepts to hold on to what is still left to us: heroic tragedy?

Nothing prepared us for a worthy addressing of this historical shift, certainly not modern humanist education. Humanist education, as well as its various current critiques, rivals and alternatives (such as critical pedagogy, ecological education, postcolonial education and radical feminist education) are not only disoriented. They are exhausted. Beside the alternative of Jihad, all other alternatives are too weak to enforce a coherent

exclusive, stable, enduring set of master signifiers and strong endeavour. They compete with each other and with infinite other quests, fashions and developments, too weak to change the world according to an exclusive vision as an alternative to the humanist education that has become obsolete. Even more, they became part and parcel of the open, rich, contingent, conflicting totality of global cultural products that function in line with the rules imposed by the globalization that they are committed to destroying or overcoming (Gur-Ze'ev, 2007)! As an example, today's world political leader of anti-colonialism and anti-globalization, the Venezuelan President Hugo Chaves, who supports in the Venezuelan educational system Peter McLaren's version of revolutionary pedagogies against globalization and colonializm, is at the same time a major player in the global oil trade, while knowing all too well that the rich in the West will not suffer very much from another rise in the price of gasoline for their cars, whereas the billions in Third World countries will be pushed closer to starvation. At the same time, as a consistent anti-Western, anti-racist and anti-'whiteness' revolutionary, Chaves presents his post-colonialism and violent rhetoric along with his closest ally and personal friend, Ahmadinejad, the Iranian fundamentalist president. He shares Ahmadinejad's explicit anti-Semitism and anti-colonialism, while devotedly working politically and economically in the global market according to the principle of the maximization of profits, undistinguishably from Nike, McDonalds and the other representatives of Western colonialism. A central difference between international corporations such as Microsoft and the explicit 'anti-colonialist and anti-globalization' forces such as revolutionary Venezuela, fundamentalist Iran, Syria and Hezbollah is that these revolutionary forces are not subject to any systematic evaluation and regulation by any democratic institution or procedure; they are practising or supporting direct and explicit violence against innocent citizens around the world under the flag of anti-globalization and anti-colonialism.

What is significant, however, is that the critical pedagogy of McLaren, and even Ahmadinejad's critique of the West, have a point. It is erroneous to dismiss this critique as the irrelevant, vulgar rhetoric of the lunatic representatives of 'the axis of evil'. The big challenges, however, are to not side with any of the good guys and challenge all forms of globalization, colonialism, post-colonialist dogmatic violent critique of globalization and colonialism. The challenge is to approach a critique of their intimate collaboration, similarities and differences and elaborate on the difference that makes a difference; towards new ways of understanding education in the era of globalization that will not only challenge these various manifestations of the essence of colonialism itself but will further invite and cultivate alternative, flourishing, moral, life-loving, creative, solidarian modes of existence within the present system against its own logic and imperatives.

All the rival critiques of modern humanist education are trying to react to globalization, but they are all united in their impotence: impotence to offer a coherent educational alternative that will present understanding explanatory prognosis for change and actual bettering of the world. The world of Jihad (Barber, 1996) is seemingly and currently the only educational agenda offering a vivid emotional, spiritual, ethical, aesthetic, political and educational alternative worth approaching and addressing, but we will not go into

this issue in this collection. Instead, we will go into Globalization itself as a creative break with modernity and its educational utopias; we will critically present various critiques of, inter alia, globalizing capitalism and offer a reflection on their presumptions, limitations and the new possibilities they offer us.

The apparent weakness of some of the present critiques and educational alternatives to globalization and its fruits is partially due to the human condition that is turning into something totally foreign, young and strange to us. We do not know yet what it will give birth to, yet it is already creating new human preconditions, pressing challenges in actual powerful circumstances, and vivid, creative new ideals that we do not have the tools to decipher or the mechanisms to stop, transform or edify. This newborn shift is not yet here in its full richness, yet the world as modernists knew it is rapidly dissolving, is being deconstructed, ridiculed or transformed in front of our eyes. Maybe we should not expect a clear and distinctive birth of a new historical moment like the change from eating raw food to eating cooked food or from nomadism to agricultural and urban life. This is more in the nature of a new system that changes from linear, binary, hierarchical structures and dynamics into a rich, centerless, ecstatic, hybrid organization of reality, best symbolized by cyberspace and the logic of connectionism. This is one of the main reasons that the new threats, limits and possibilities embrace not only the various trends in humanist education but also its various post-modern and modern alternatives. In the meantime, educational theory and practice, formal and especially informal, in New York, Tokyo, London, Tel Aviv, Caracas, Sydney, Stockholm and Cairo, are already facing dramatic restructuring, changes and new possibilities that call for worthy educational attention.

Globalization is already manifest at many levels and dimensions of public and individual life. It already threatens existing preconditions, values, conceptual apparatus, habits and normalized expectations. It confronts the structures that made liberal democracy, humanist education and the welfare state possible. It confronts and deconstructs effectively any kind of relative economic independence and stability as well as ecological equilibrium and security in the self-justification of true knowledge, the autonomy of the subject and dialogical, democratic, intersubjectivity that the Enlightenment taught us to appreciate and struggle for. It deconstructs the preconditions for longing and struggling for non-violent consensus and true understanding; it deconstructs peace and worthy civic life in the nation state that accepts and enhances modernization, liberal democracy, civic society and so much more. All that is gone at present and now we are caught between that which has become obsolete and that which has not yet arrived.

Central modern concepts, ideals and master signifiers are being swiftly transformed and deconstructed or are becoming irrelevant, reflecting the advancement of new technologies, economic developments, cultural shifts/clashes, migration, ecological threats and the very fundamental dynamics of the 'risk society' (Beck, 1992). This concerns concepts such as 'love', 'subject', 'freedom', 'dialogue' or 'deliberation', 'understanding', 'truth', 'interpretation', 'legitimisation', 'justice', 'security', 'danger', 'responsibility' and 'creativity' as well as 'education' in times of transition.

For example, young people today enter a reality where it is no longer rational for them to expect that they can rely on or hope for a consensual understanding of any of these concepts; nor is it possible for them to maintain confidence in an undisputable meta-theory that will justify 'their' values, theory, ideals or hopes. At the same time, it is already common knowledge that people cannot rely on the future of their workplace, social security, ecological balance or the outcomes of the next terror attack or of the global financial markets. The concepts of 'security', 'confidence' and 'risk' are being transformed existentially, philosophically and politically in such a way that 'confidence' is no longer externally, logically or religiously founded, formal, fixed and stable but is fundamentally rooted in the essence of the nomadic eternal improviser (Gur-Ze'ev, 2005) who creatively insists on transcending the given, the consensual, the self- evident and the unbridgeable, changing notion of reality and himself or herself in an instant of the infinity of the moment. New ways of understanding and practising education might offer transcendence and a rearticulated autonomy within the totality of globalization. Within a globalized world and not in an imaginable utopia:

> openness, danger, and eros must have the last word. It is always put to the test in relation to the connection of human life to the moment, to history, and to eternity . . . Politics, or the world of contingent power-relations and violent symbolic and direct dynamics, here becomes a very relevant factor, yet never has the upper hand. The Diasporic eternal-improviser, when true to himself or herself, is never a totally controlled citizen of the earthly city; he or she resists becoming-swallowed-by-the-system, the historical facts, or the social horizons. He or she crosses from the infinity of each moment to eternity, or from eternity to the historical sphere and to the infinity of the fleeting moment. Parallel to the asymmetry and the absence of hierarchy and determined order between the moment, history, and eternity is the absence of hierarchy and determinism between reality, and its hermeneutical depths. It parallels also the 'cosmic music' of that which is symbolized by 'reality' and its representations, its courageous-edifying critique and its creative-transformative interpretations (Gur-Ze'ev, 2005, p. 32).

Here, responsibility too is transformed – not abandoned – in face of the new horizons opened up by globalizing capitalism. In the face of structurally – rationally – justified, growing gaps between the haves and the marginalized, the transformation of old institutions such as the family and democracy, (Gray, 1998, pp. 1–7), the threats to the environment and the culture clash, humanist educators should ask themselves new questions and open themselves to the task of rearticulating the fundamental values, concepts and predictions of current formal education. More than ever effective education takes place less in the family, the community and the schooling system. The very concept and potentials of education are being transformed, and this is being realized more than ever in chaotic, ambivalent, informal arenas such as cyberspace, and commercial centres, in the face of MTV and in the rapidly changing marketplace governed by international conglomerates such as McDonalds or Microsoft. It is not only a challenge for citizenship education, democratic education or education for sustainability and responsibility.[2] It is also a far greater challenge for restructuring ethics.

[2] See Roth (2000) for a discussion on the transformation of education for democratic citizens, and Roth and Burbules (2007) for a discussion of changing notions of citizenship education in an age of globalization.

New ways of understanding and practising education today should relate to the effective, rapid deconstruction of what we know as ethics, canon, social, economic and ecological equilibrium and the already present presence of the future in the form of cyborgs, identity politics and the coalition between the McWorld, the world of Jihad and the post-colonialist alternatives which, on the remnants of the centralized sovereignty of: the nation-state (Bauman, 1998, p. 65), are mistakably conceived as arch rivals. We assert that they are inseparable from the challenge of globalization and should be addressed as part of a coherent theoretical, political and educational re-articulation.

Today, we humanist educators in search of new ways of understanding and practising education have the responsibility to decipher and address what is actually happening around us. And what should we educators do when faced by these rapid, ecstatic, omnipotent changes while the new language for understanding and change is still beyond our comprehension? Yet, the interdependence and mutual responsibility are present and are pressing and urgent more than ever before. So, universalism does not fade away with the old foundations, hierarchies, security and telos. It is not necessarily correct, however, to recycle 'critical education' in the face of globalization that confronts difference, hybridity, parallel and conflicting cultural legacies and moral yardsticks and in the face of new technologies and economic de-territorializations that push away any centre, linearity, historical telos and non-violent consensus at a time when they are most needed. Ethical ambivalence, dynamic identity formations, and rapidly deformed re-organized understandings, consensus and mutual action might lead us towards new ways of understanding and practising education. An understanding and practising of education that offer new, edified forms of togetherness, love, creativity and responsibility while acknowledging ambivalence, multi-layered, Net-oriented realities, polyphonic dialogues and improvisation in a rich, dynamic, non-linear, speedy space-time relations are yet to come. Such education should address the existential and ethical need for responsibility and improvisation in the face of the various manifestations of globalization. As humans, as mothers and fathers, as friends, as free thinkers, as creators and as educators, we cannot content ourselves with maintaining our hopes and continuing what we have been doing up to now; not even 'reforms' or merely adopting intellectual, educational or other fashions will do. The river of change and global risks of unprecedented magnitude, if nothing else, call for such a new education and will not take 'later on' as an answer! A far-reaching sweeping change in educational theory and practice is needed; and there are very few who are willing and ready to rethink educational, political, philosophical and ethical traditions that have become so comfortable for them, to tackle the challenge we are facing globally today. This invitation, the first step towards the richness and the dangers of the unknown, is our endeavour in this collection.

Overview of the book

The book opens with an interview of Nicholas Burbules by Klas Roth that sets the frame for the discussion and arguments to come. It continues with various theoretical and elaborated inquiries of critical issues in times of transition and ends with a discussion of the issue of hope: human beings' endless struggle to better the conditions for human development. The authors show how various changes in the era of globalization influence discussions on education today, but also how altered conditions transform education and our thinking about it. In particular, they draw upon and sometimes move between different theoretical perspectives on education such as postmodern thinking, continental philosophy, analytical philosophy, critical theory, pragmatism, counter-education and post-structuralist thinking, but also on recent developments in political theory on deliberative democracy. They critically inquire into the notions of freedom, human rights and human rights education, cosmopolitanism and hospitality, the development of various valuable capabilities in our modern complex world such as imaginative, ethical, critical and deliberative capacities, and a reasonable notion of subjectivity that takes the body into account. Issues of responsibility, democratic deliberation, multiculturalism and racism as well as sports education and globalizing capitalism are also raised and critically discussed. The book ends with a discussion of hope and education, a discussion also raised by Burbules in the interview. The authors exemplify, in different ways through their writing, their own relation to and perspective on education, and particularly how their philosophical viewpoints reflect their way of understanding and discussing some of the more influential trends, perspectives and critical issues in education today. Several authors point to the value of reflection, critical inquiry, dialogue or deliberation for children and young people in education as well as for teachers, principals and educational policymakers and to the need for research on education in times when global transitions in social, political, religious and economic terms affect us all and in different ways. It is our hope that the discussions in this book will give the reader impulses, insights and issues to deliberate and critically inquire into further; they are raised by some of the leading philosophers of education and editors of influential journals on philosophical questions and educational problems.

In the opening chapter – a dialogue on educational issues – *Klas Roth* interviews *Nicholas Burbules* about different trends in the philosophy of education, about the value of those trends for education in general and for teachers in particular and about the barriers to philosophical reflection in schools. Professor Burbules also talks about the normalizing function of education, issues of diversity and difference, globalisation and dialogue in times of transition and globalization and especially about his own writing and thinking on these issues. In particular, he puts forward his ideas on the tragic sense of education, which he says is probably the most important perspective for him in his work on education in times of transition and related issues.

Paul Standish takes up the Enlightenment notion of freedom and the challenges it faces in our global world. He puts forward an alternative, richer notion of freedom,

particularly in relation to curricula. He draws on examples from the United Kingdom (UK) when he talks about the development of the idea of freedom in our modern world, the progressive movements in the UK and especially the idea of liberal education. At the end of his chapter, he addresses the problems and difficulties of liberal education and in particular the idea of rational autonomy, which he argues is narrow, elitist and does not pay attention to a more fully-fledged view of morality. He concludes by putting forward his alternative notion of freedom in terms of knowledge by direct acquaintance.

Pradeep A. Dhillon argues for human rights and human rights education in terms of Kantian ethics. She argues against narrow political and legal views and points out that we cannot do without philosophical and metaphysical claims. She brings the significance of Immanuel Kant's universalism and cosmopolitanism to our attention, stressing that a Kantian notion made human rights and human rights education globally significant. She argues that a Kantian notion of human rights discourse can take into account criticism from those who talk about the significance of cultural differences and that such discourse enriches human-rights education in the era of globalization.

Sharon Todd also discusses Kant's ideas, especially his notion of cosmopolitanism and hospitality. She particularly focuses on the ambiguities of cosmopolitanism, arguing that it defends universal moral standards on the one hand and recognizes local systems of meaning on the other. She explores the effects of universal rights on the concrete case of the French law prohibiting religious symbols in schools. Todd argues that Kant's notion of hospitality requires attentiveness to the needs of others and, if coupled with Levinas' notion of the Other, leads to a commitment to valuing difference and a framework for considering the effects of rights upon those whose needs do not seem to be recognized. With such a framework she believes we could be more attentive to and learn from those whose needs are misrecognized because of universal rights.

Elizabeth E. Heilman explores ideas for global education or cosmopolitan education and argues that it has various intentions: imaginative, ethical and pragmatic ones. The first is a type of psychological education, the second is a kind of moral education, and the third is a kind of technical education. She claims that these intentions of global or cosmopolitan education develop students' abilities to think differently, inspire emotional responses and a willingness to act responsibly towards the other and promote understanding as well as knowledge of global and environmental problems, political and economic systems and changing technologies. She concludes by arguing that the imaginative and ethical intentions are more fundamental than the technical ones.

Klas Roth discusses various notions of education for responsibility: an epistemological one, an ethical one and a deliberative interpretation. He argues that the conditions for successful education in epistemological and ethical terms are problematic and that we do not need to draw a sharp distinction between the epistemological and the ethical dimensions of education for responsibility. He suggests that the distinction between knowledge and ethics is not a distinction in kind but a difference in degree.

In his opinion, a deliberative notion shows that we are both accountable to and responsible for each other when entering into a deliberative communicative relation with one another. A fully-fledged notion of deliberation, he argues, gives those concerned the possibility to critically investigate, to come to understand and legitimate whatever concerns them, and to develop their communicative capacities in cognitive, ethical and critical terms.

Lars Løvlie also considers the notion of deliberation. He discusses the educational point of view as a pro-critical education for children and young people, and questions whether education for deliberative democracy can consist of such an education. He distinguishes between a strict and a moderate version of deliberation and argues that ethical phenomena – existential topoi – such as friendship, love, mourning and death bridge the gap between a strict version and a moderate. The strict version focuses basically on reason and the moderate one on virtues, while the existential topoi or topics do not submit to formal views of deliberation either on personal virtues or on local values. Lovlie argues that existential phenomena are radical experiences that instead raise new questions and insights without being categorical or determined by the values within specific communities or personal interests.

Mark Halstead inquires critically into multicultural metaphors used in the various discourses on multiculturalism. He particularly focuses on those who aim at stimulating imaginative capacities and evoking emotions and argues that it is not enough to stimulate children's and young people's imaginative capacities or evoke their emotional responses; children and young people need to develop their critical skills as well. Halstead shows how multicultural metaphors, whether they concern the insider/outsider, threat or menace or a mixture of different kinds, structure our thinking. He argues that learning about multiculturalism cannot do without metaphors of various kinds, or be avoided; and that the only way to protect children and young people from being influenced negatively by multicultural metaphors is to develop their skills of critical thinking.

Walter Feinberg explores the relation between racism and capitalism, showing that racism is not only an attitude but is also built on power relations and supported by institutions and practices of various kinds. He argues that narratives of class and mobility, as well as those of marginalization and race, are structured differently and that the educator's task is to disengage these narratives from each other and enquire into the different normative standpoint they entail. He shows how the effects of various different narratives work in communication, or rather miscommunication, between people and points out the importance of the teacher helping students to understand the dynamics and interplay of such narratives in communication in education.

Birgit Nordtug enquires into the notion of subjectivity and the relation between knowledge and subjectivity, a much-discussed topic today. She distinguishes between three post-structuralist notions: Giddens's reflexive approach, Bauman's moral approach and Kristeva's linguistic approach to subjectivity. Nordtug argues that Gidden's notion of reflexive modernity provides concepts and perspectives that

constitute the notion of subjectivity within the frameworks produced by the experts and functions as a resource for reflexivity. She points out that Bauman views subjectivity differently. He claims, according to her, that real subjectivity is free from knowledge and is instead experienced through taking responsibility for the Other. Nordtug is critical of both of these views and argues for a notion of subjectivity that is more closely affiliated with Kristeva's linguistic approach, which takes knowledge construction and especially the symbolic and semiotic dimension into account. She claims that such a notion of subjectivity is valuable for an understanding and critical analysis of knowledge production in educational practices.

Ilan Gur-Zeév explores the historical roots of sports education and its changes throughout time. He begins in Ancient Greece and continues through the Middle Ages and Modernity, ending up in our time, a time of globalizing capitalism. He traces its religious, ideological and philosophical roots and develops a philosophy of sports counter-education. He argues that such an education challenges the instrumentalization and reification of sports and sports education today and in particular the hegemonic sports industry. He also argues that sports counter-education offers a dialectic view, which transcends the impact of global capitalism on sports and opens up the critical potential of sports education as well as its humanistic roots, the impetus of Love of Life.

Richard Kahn enquires critically into the concept of paideia and explores in particular its changes throughout time. He begins in Ancient Greece and traces its changes from the Athenian paideia and its Hellenistic transformation to the period from Alexander through the Roman Empire, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance and the Enlightenment to our modern globalized world. He argues that the educational and political notion of paideia, with its focus on class distinctions, domination and oppression by elites over the people, has outlived its transformations from its birth to our time. He finally raises the question of an ecological paideia as a possibility for future education, functioning as an inclusive radical democratic concept and a critical education for democratic life.

Olli-Pekka Moisto and *Juha Suoranta* explore, in the final chapter, the notion of hope in relation to education and argue that we need to change ourselves if we want to change the world. They enquire into different notions of hope and argue that an individual's lonely act in silence and isolation can have social effects. They argue that it is especially important that education should encompass a comprehensive notion of hope in our modern world that does not lead to or include despair, pessimism, cynicism or passive waiting but a critical, dynamic hope. They particularly draw on Erich Fromm's discussion of hope when they put forward their dynamic notion of hope, which includes faith and fortitude and the realization of autonomous activity in interaction with the environment and other people. They conclude by suggesting principles for teaching and planning the curricula, which, in their opinion, can be seen as cornerstones of hopeful education in the era of globalization.

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CHAPTER 1

DIALOGUE, DIFFERENCE AND GLOBALISATION: AN INTERVIEW WITH NICHOLAS C. BURBULES

Klas Roth

Klas: Philosophy of education is, I think, a specific reflective and critical mode of thinking about education and other related issues and has always been characterised by different intellectual trends. Many philosophers of education have also been engaged in changing education in relation to changes in society. Today, for example, we live in times of global transformations, changed conditions for an understanding of our work, families, education and learning. What do you think of the role or meaning of philosophy of education today?

Nicholas: If you look at the history of philosophy of education, at least in Western countries or English-speaking countries, I think you see three very broad trends or characterizations of the field. All three approaches have coexisted at different times, but some have been more dominant during certain periods than others.

Very briefly, I would describe one approach as the prescriptive approach, that is, the view that philosophy of education is dedicated to the recommendation and justification of aims and activities or methods of education. On this view, one comes to the philosophy of education to find out what we should be teaching or what we should be learning and how best to pursue or achieve that. In some ways, this is the more classic view of philosophy of education, where philosophers provide to educators a big picture view of what its aims and purposes, on the one hand, and its activities and methods, on the other hand, ought to be. This prescriptive model has been a dominant approach to philosophy of education at various times in the past. I think it is not the dominant approach today.

The second approach I would broadly call an analytical approach. I do not mean this only in the technical sense of philosophical analysis, but as a general approach that says that the role of philosophy is to provide broad standards of clarity of thought, rigour of argumentation and respect for the principles of rationality. Beyond these sorts of commitments, many of these philosophers are suspicious of ambitious prescriptions of what education should be. They often say things like: 'Philosophers are like referees in a game who explain and adjudicate the rules of the activity, but do not participate in the actual game themselves'. They often, for example, are interested in the philosophy of science as a way of thinking about the broad aims and methods of how to go about educational research; but they would generally eschew having anything to say on empirical matters themselves.

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This is also a view shared by many liberal theorists who are more interested in defining and defending just procedures and principles, rather than prescribing specific educational ends. For them, philosophers should not make specific prescriptions about whether students, for example, should be required to learn a foreign language or not. That is not something philosophers can decide. It is a decision for society to make, and as long as it is made in accordance within these broad conditions of justice and respect for rights, there is nothing more for the philosopher, *qua* philosopher, to say about it. Philosophy itself cannot resolve such questions. This liberal strand leaves the ends of society, the substantive conceptions of what is good for society, as much as possible to the decisions of citizens of those societies. I think that even Habermas can be seen in this broad tradition, where he is talking about the procedures of deliberation, the norms of communication, without prejudging exactly what those deliberative processes might yield substantively.

A third approach, and again I do not mean this only in a narrow or technical sense, might be called a more critical approach. Unlike the prescriptive model, it is not usually trying to spell out in a positive or utopian sense exactly what society should be pursuing educationally. But unlike what I call the analytical approach, it is not simply a neutral arbitrator of rationality, just procedures or deliberative processes. I think a critical approach, as it usually appears in philosophy of education, has a commitment to equality and a vision of substantive justice and so would identify distortions to the process of educational activities – distortions of power, distortions of hegemonic political ideologies, distortions of bias or discrimination – that subvert human freedom and diversity. They say that the work of philosophy of education ought to be more of an advocacy process, arguing against inequities of power or, to use a term from Henry Giroux, promoting ‘counterhegemonic’ ways of thinking, because critical philosophy is not just a question of clearing out the garden of weeds. If there are active impediments to productive educational reflection and activities, philosophy has to criticise and challenge these restraints, to change them. Beyond this, some would say that critical philosophy also has to serve a positive function in encouraging the possibility of thinking differently, to propose alternative models of what education could be.

These broad approaches (the prescriptive, the analytical and the critical) have always coexisted at different times. I think that they coexist even within particular philosophical movements. Feminism, liberalism or even analytical philosophy in the technical sense, for example, has sometimes had elements of all three: they are sometimes analytical, sometimes critical and sometimes prescriptive. Even individual philosophers, such as Habermas, have elements of all three in different mixtures. So I do not mean these as absolute categories or camps, and they do not coincide with particular philosophical movements. In terms of contemporary philosophy of education, I think, I would say that in general the critical approach is a dominant trend now. But what interests me most is work that plays across these different tendencies.

Klas: In what sense would you say that these approaches to education and educational practices are valuable for teachers and students in school?

Nicholas: I think that these three approaches would give different answers to that question. In the United States, for many years, when courses in philosophy of education were required for teachers, the goal was spelled out in a very prescriptive way – that the teacher would finish the course 'having a philosophy of education', that is, they would finish the course with a specific set of commitments and beliefs about what and why and how they should teach, what their views of classroom discipline and curriculum would be and so on. Philosophy of education was meant to develop more or less systematic accounts that would help to inspire and help direct their activities. Once one saw one's personal commitment to teaching in terms of these larger accounts of meaning and value, it would help to motivate teachers, especially beginning teachers, to have some sense of why they are teaching. This prescriptive and inspirational quality was seen as a central justification for why beginning teachers should take these courses in the first place (in the United States, for many years, such courses were a required part of the curriculum and still are in many programs around the country).

I think that the second approach, the one I call the analytical approach, would say: 'What we want to give educators is a set of *tools*, tools of clear thinking, tools of rigorous argumentation, tools of detecting fallacies in their own thinking or in their students' thinking. These tools can be applied to a whole range of educational situations, problems, and subject matters.' Similarly, in at least some varieties of the liberal view, the constraints of social and political principle *exclude* certain options as unjust or as contrary to human rights and freedoms, but if one avoids these negative boundaries, this still provides a very broad scope for legitimate alternative choices (e.g. any of several alternative methods of assessing student learning – philosophy per se would not necessarily be useful in choosing between them). On this view, philosophy of education does not dictate what positive answers teachers are going to come up with, individually or collectively, for what to teach or how to teach. But it does seek to promote some of the broad principles of liberal society and to inculcate the capacities and dispositions necessary to participate in and sustain such a society (reasonableness, a commitment to justice, tolerance, public deliberation and so on).

The third view, which I am calling the more critical view, would talk about a different set of values. It would talk about the value of reflectivity among teachers, a sensitivity to issues of power, imbalances in power or issues of inequality. I think that it would recommend not only a more self-critical approach for teachers in thinking about what and how they teach but also a view that is more critical or suspicious of the institutional settings in which teachers actually practice: questioning issues of power, questioning issues of bureaucracy, questioning issues of inequality or discrimination, questioning issues of technocratic approaches to teaching and assessment and so on. In a more positive sense, this approach seeks a greater openness or receptivity to issues of difference, that is, to see not only that there are different learners in the classroom, or just that students come from different backgrounds and different cultures or that they have different learning styles and different needs. All that is a part of it. But a person could think that and still believe

that all students need to learn X; learn this kind of mathematics or learn this view of history or this view of language. A ‘multicultural’ educator might be sensitive to diversity but still believe in a common curriculum. Here I think a more critical view would be suspicious even of the idea of a common curriculum. It would say that the differences among students generally need to be actively *preserved*. In the United States, a common metaphor has been to see schools as a ‘melting pot’ that brings people together from different nations or backgrounds to become parts of a common culture and society, under a common sense of citizenship. More recently, however, I think critical educators want to see differences of culture, class, sexual orientation and so on, as things to be valued and sustained for their own sake, not blurred into some common muddle. Critical philosophers of education see the fundamental threat to diversity posed by the conventions of a standard curriculum, prescribed testing regimes, ‘normalising’ teaching methods and the cultural norms of ‘proper behaviour’ in school and in society.

Klas: You have talked about the role or meaning of philosophy of education and why philosophy of education could be important for teachers. What would you say about the question of how schools and teachers can or perhaps should recognise these philosophical approaches in their classroom?

Nicholas: Well, the first thing someone with a more critical approach (like myself) would say is that we have to begin by recognising the *barriers* to philosophical reflection in many classrooms in schools as we have created them. I think that the major barrier is a certain kind of instrumental thinking that predominates in schools and classrooms in this society and from what you have told me is increasingly true in Sweden as well. Certainly, it is true in other countries. This is a trend people often describe in terms of the rise of ‘neoliberalism’ and, to use Lyotard’s term, ‘performativity’.

What they mean by this is a model of instrumental thinking or a very narrow means/ends orientation to education. This would include a strong vocational orientation: the idea that the main purpose of schooling, all the way up to higher education, is to prepare people for a lifetime of work. In that sense, the demands of the workplace and the economy fundamentally shape the aims and purposes of education.

Another kind of instrumentalism is the preoccupation with performance measured in terms of test scores. There is an expression in the United States called ‘teaching to the test’, which especially in elementary and secondary schools occupies a growing percentage of the classroom day and the school year. Teachers know that, at the end of the year, their students are going to take a test that may partly determine school funding; it could even dictate their own evaluations and job security as teachers. It will almost certainly dictate their students’ future opportunities, especially for higher education. We call this system ‘high stakes testing’ – high stakes for several of the actors in the educational setting. Of course, some kind of testing for the sake of evaluating what students know, and how well we are succeeding at what we are trying to teach, has a place in education. But *high stakes* testing means test results

that have very large, disproportionate consequences for the future opportunities and well-being of students, of teachers, for school funding and in extreme cases even for shutting down a school entirely. In these high stakes situations, getting higher test scores becomes an end in itself, not as an evaluative tool, not as a mark of better teaching, but as an instrumental goal. Hence, many teachers are understandably desperate to make sure that they cover the material in their classes that will help their students do as well as possible on these examinations, whether it is *educationally* important or relevant information or not. They sincerely believe that this will be in their student's best interests and in their own, even when they do not believe in the tests themselves. From any sensible standpoint, this is a direct inversion of what we want the relationship to be between testing and teaching. Testing may be valuable as a way of evaluating how well we are teaching or how well we are accomplishing our goals. But now what happens is that doing well on the test *becomes* the goal.

To return to your question then, I would say that, before we can make progress in bringing the ideas from philosophy of education effectively into schools, we have to think about the impediments to doing so, and the primary impediment – in this society at least – is that so many educators are preoccupied with these instrumental goals. They have no time, they have very little energy, and they have very little incentive for thinking reflectively or philosophically because they have so much to worry about, to get through from day to day, in terms of the very specific goals that are defined for them, not defined by themselves. I think that they are also very isolated from each other, in the U.S. context at least, and so rarely have a chance to deliberate or reflect together seriously about these concerns; this sort of isolation is also an impediment to philosophical thought. But beyond all this, there is a certain paradox because for them to think really seriously about certain philosophical and ethical problems would probably make them feel even more disaffected by their circumstances, even more disillusioned about their inability to educate many of their kids in accord with their highest values and aspirations. The irony of many prescriptive approaches, which are meant to be inspiring and motivating for teachers, is that they often have exactly the opposite effect – they frustrate and discourage teachers because they see them as impossible in the present system; they seem to many teachers a luxury they cannot afford in simply trying to get through each day. It is not just that they are impractical or unrealistic under the present circumstances; it is that they would actively interfere with teachers' ability to respond to the current demands put upon them by the system. I think this represents a serious paradox, a challenge to philosophy of education as we might wish to practice it.

Klas: You have put forward the issue of difference. I would like to relate this issue to the fact that educational policies and educational practices in any nation have been developed and justified in relation to the majority culture within the nation and to the fact that education has been used to further a common identity. Is this view of education and educational policies not problematic in relation to the fact that nations are compounds of minorities and individuals with different ways of thinking and living their lives? How do you think that education can and perhaps should deal with the fact that people are different?

Nicholas: Good question. To use a term from Foucault, normalisation is always going to be a part of any system of education, especially education in a formal or institutionalised sense. There is always going to be an element of erasing difference because the very activity of bringing people together as students in a classroom or in a discussion already initiates a process where their differences are going to be engaging each other. In fact, even the very attempt to say, come here and sit together, read the same books and have a discussion about these questions, all these attempts are in one sense going to be normalising, even when the students' reactions or comments in the discussion may appear to be quite different. Something else is being established that is profoundly the same. It does not matter how much your aim may be to include differences or to preserve them; such differences are put into jeopardy as soon as you say, 'Here is something that I think is very important for you all to read, or for you all to think about, even though you may have different views about it'. If you are teaching a subject matter in which you think there are right answers (or even better and worse answers) or in which there is a particular way you want your students to think about a topic – even if you think this is a 'critical' way – you are embarked on a process of normalization. This dilemma runs deep, especially for teachers who think their classes are about resisting or questioning normalization; in some sense, they are caught in a performative contradiction.

I would actually call this a *fundamental* tension between education and the respect for difference. No *system* of education can be entirely tolerant of difference. Whether it is a matter of, 'Here is something we are going to learn' or 'We are going to use the same language', or 'We are all going to be governed by certain conversational rules in order for this discussion to go forward', any of these elements are going to be viewed as strange or unfamiliar or even wrong and harmful, by some participants. Yet, if they are going to participate in the activity at all, they are going to have to accommodate themselves to these elements of commonality, however foreign or objectionable they may seem to them. That is on the one side of the relationship.

On the other side of the relationship is, I think, a crucial set of decisions in terms of how the notion of diversity or difference is going to be thought about. Here I have been very much influenced by work, such as Homi Bhabha's, that differentiates the terms *diversity* and *difference* as reflecting different ways of thinking about how cultural pluralism actually works. I think that diversity regards the different characteristics of people as *resources* that can be drawn upon in ways that fit into and benefit the educational process; so, for example, what I am calling a diversity view would certainly cover most common approaches of what is called multicultural education, where cultural differences are acknowledged and even celebrated, but only insofar as they can inform and support the educational mission. Students come in and talk about their families and the countries their grandparents came from, they talk about their different cultures, different holidays, their different foods, maybe they talk about some of their differences in languages. But the idea here is that these cultural elements fit into a common purpose of cultural tolerance and reciprocal interest and respect; it provides more grist for the mill, more perspectives, more richness to the

study of history or social studies or art and literature. There is nothing wrong with this, but it is like the pleasure of going to different ethnic restaurants in a city. Diversity is good, it is interesting and pleasurable, and we can learn from it. But it does not threaten anything, it does not pose any challenges to us. Diverse ideas and values engage one another, under broad liberal principles such as tolerance and mutual respect – but this very dynamic means that they will become inevitably changed as a result of that engagement. Over time, I believe, they tend to become more differences of emphasis in style, rather than deep cultural differences; there are many different ethnic restaurants, but we all go out to sample them in the same way. Mexicans may like Italian food; Indians may enjoy sushi. (Religion, especially fundamentalist religion, seems to be an exception to this pattern; here, contact sometimes creates even stronger delineations of difference – but partly for these reasons, this is a topic almost entirely avoided by schools in the United States. Fundamentalist religion is seen as a threat to the purportedly common liberal values of reasonableness, tolerance and respect.)

In U.S. schools, students come from many, very different cultural backgrounds. But as soon as they come into schools, as soon as they come into classrooms, they start to lose touch with them to some degree. Many people talk about the difficulty of maintaining two (or more) distinct languages and cultural identities. We may think it is a good thing that people become more bicultural or pluralistic in their orientation, but I think that different people actually have different feelings about whether it is a good thing for them or not. They report that something is *lost*, not gained – that it becomes more difficult or even impossible for them to go back and simply inhabit their familial or traditional culture, because they now see it not only from the inside but also from the outside. They see what might be parochial or restrictive about it. Once you have seen a traditional culture from the outside, it becomes impossible to ever go back and inhabit it completely on the inside in quite the same way again. And of course, this is not a symmetrical relationship – some traditions, some cultures, are much more at risk in this dynamic than others. This diversity view, then, as I am calling it, looks at cultural differences as a resource, but it is a *depletable* resource; it works upon education and is worked upon by education over time, until it changes gradually and turns into something else or disappears.

What I am calling *difference* here, as opposed to diversity, is a very different notion, where the difference becomes the framework or affordance for *resisting* some of the normalising characteristics of education. Difference is not interested in being understood, explained, or justified *in other people's terms*. It is not interested in compromise or accommodation. It is not a part of the 'melting pot', and does not want to be. Difference as an educational standpoint represents a more active process of resistance to shared norms or purportedly universal values, to a particular way of talking or holding a conversation, to a way of being in the world or being with others. It may even take the form of a refusal to participate in such activities or to participate in them in ways that are seen as disruptive or subversive. Difference in this sense is a much more radical conception of cultural difference than the idea of diversity – and for obvious reasons, it is a very threatening thing for schools to acknowledge and deal with.

Klas: When you talk about difference and diversity, you touch upon the notion of deliberation or dialogue, which is a theme that you have been writing and thinking a lot about. I am puzzled by the fact that the character of a dialogue between teacher and students often takes the form of instruction irrespective of the culture or nation where the teaching takes part. Why do you think it is so difficult for teachers to recognise other forms of dialogue that, for example, recognise reflection or deliberation?

Nicholas: Well, one reason is the issue that I mentioned earlier: the problem of an instrumental orientation that constrains many teachers, even ones who do not believe in it, to overemphasize the coverage of content and to adopt more straightforward modes of instruction. So even when they think they are teaching with dialogue, this attempt becomes distorted by the instrumental mode. In the United States, one of the main expressions for this approach is a pattern of communication between teacher and students that is often called IRE, that is, Initiation, Response and Evaluation – a pattern that looks like this: the teacher says something or asks a question (initiates), the student says something in reply (response) and then the teacher says something such as 'right', 'wrong', or 'good answer' (evaluates). The teacher may say: 'Why does the giraffe have a long neck?' and the student says: 'Because it helps them eat the leaves on the top of the tree'. Then the teacher says: 'Very good, Suzie!' That would be a complete IRE cycle. Well, one might call this a certain kind of dialogue, but it is certainly a very impoverished notion of dialogue: It is not open ended. It does not really suggest an ongoing conversation. It aims towards a very specific 'correct' answer. It has a predetermined beginning, middle and an end, and presumably once the teacher evaluates what the student says, the cycle is over; the pattern always ends when the teacher says it does, with the teacher evaluating what the students have said. Students may become socialised into expecting and waiting for the evaluation from the teacher. Many teachers seem to think that when they are doing this they are having a 'dialogue' with students, that this is some version of the Socratic method – but it is all still directed and controlled by the teacher. The teacher decides when a satisfactory answer has been arrived at, and when to move on to a new topic.

There is a very funny example that comes from Donna Alvermann's research, where a teacher is talking with the students about the play of Antigone and asks whether the play is a feminist play or an anti-feminist play. The teacher clearly believes that the play is a feminist play. The students say: 'Anti-feminist!' The teacher says: 'Huh?' The students go: 'Anti-feminist!' The teacher says: 'What?' The students go: 'Anti-feminist!' Now, the teacher was not prepared for a real dialogue about the play. The teacher clearly had an expected answer in mind. The teacher wanted them to say: 'This is a feminist play' and the teacher could say: 'Yes, right!' and then go on to something else. Instead of seeing this unexpected response as something interesting and something to be explored, the teacher's first response was to be thrown off balance, to think that it was a mistake of some sort. This shows the implicit force of the IRE method, its habitual nature, and how it chokes off open-ended educational possibilities. I think it shows how hard it is to get real dialogues going in classrooms and

how difficult it is to get teachers to think outside of this model. And it is not just teachers – student expectations and responses often drive these exchanges into certain familiar, standardised pathways as well.

This example also shows something else interesting about the notion of dialogue. Paulo Freire stresses the distinction of dialogue and monologue, dialogue and lecture – Freire describes the latter as the 'banking model of education'. But I think that in the example I just mentioned we see that the dichotomy between dialogue and lecture is much too simple. Just because a mode of teaching seems to be a two-way exchange does not really tell you whether it is a true dialogue. It does not tell you whether it is still authoritarian, manipulative and controlling. A teacher that is only asking questions with the idea of getting specific answers is still stuck in a monological mode, even though it looks like a question and response exchange. A student in that teacher's class might say 'Don't insult us by asking us a question you really don't want to hear our answer to – just give us a lecture and tell us what you think. If you think it is a feminist play, tell us why you think it is a feminist play. That would be more honest and *less* authoritarian'.

So, just because something looks like a dialogue, it can still be very much in spirit monological. Conversely, I have heard lectures – and I am sure that you have as well – where only one person is speaking, but the lecture or speech is continuously inviting reflection and thought and participation from the audience to be actively working with the speaker to think through where the investigation might be going. Perhaps the lecturer is modelling a particular mode of inquiry or argument: perhaps there are many open-ended questions posed within the lecture that invite the audience to participate in the creative process through their own thoughtful contributions. So even though it is a lecture, it is much more dialogical in spirit than the other example I just gave. I think that what this shows is that in fact you can have very monological dialogues, if you will, and very dialogical lectures, depending on how the teachers actually are inviting participation from their students. This complicates the picture quite a bit from any simple dichotomy or dualism between monologue and dialogue. It is not just a matter of looking at whether one person is talking or whether two people are talking.

Klas: You have written extensively about dialogue and communicative virtues. In the book *Dialogue in Teaching: Theory and Practice*, for example, you put forward the idea of different kinds of dialogue as well as the importance of training the ability to move in between these kinds of dialogue. And, in later writings, you have put forward the idea of communicative virtues. Why do you think it is important to recognise different kinds of dialogue and the ability to move in between them as well as the development of communicative virtues in teaching?

Nicholas: Those are two different kinds of topics. Let us talk first about different kinds of dialogue. There are many things in that book I would write differently now, but one thing that I still think has merit is the section that differentiates at least four kinds of dialogue. I think that was one of the most important points in the book, and it has influenced the work of other people, including some empirical studies of

dialogues among teachers and students. There may be more than those four kinds, but at least these four are clear to me. One is dialogue in the *instructional* sense, that is, in the literal sense of the Socratic dialogues where we see a pattern of question and answer for the sake of teaching, for the sake of bringing students to a particular understanding they did not have before (the IRE pattern, described before, is a kind of distortion or oversimplification of this Socratic method).

The second kind of dialogue I called *inquiry*, where there is no pre-existing notion of what the final or correct answer might be, but where through the process of dialogue all the participants are exploring a question together with no clear sense about where the discussion is going to lead. In the inquiry mode of dialogue you are engaged in an active collaborative process of investigation, problem-solving, or seeking a common understanding over some issue at dispute.

A more informal kind of dialogue I called dialogue as *conversation*, where the emphasis is not necessarily on answering particular questions or pursuing a line of inquiry but something more about interpersonal understanding and connection. The notion of conversation is more concerned with exploring how you look at the world and how I look at the world. We are not necessarily trying to reconcile those views or settle the question. It is more about pursuing interpersonal understanding and knowledge about one another as an educational goal itself.

A fourth view I called dialogue as *debate*, which is also not seeking a particular answer, but in a more agonistic or combative fashion than conversation. It is concerned with the vigorous exchange and co-challenging of views, not necessarily for the sake of agreeing or reconciling them but for comparing their relative strengths and weaknesses. Agreement is not a goal: debate may even divide these respective points of view further from each other. After a debate you and I may be even further apart from agreement than we were before, but by vigorously arguing our respective views back and fourth, we each have been able to strengthen or clarify our own view partly by responding to the challenge of the opposing view.

Now, what is important to differentiate between these four kinds of dialogue, and possibly others as well, is that they work in very different ways. The communicative patterns, the kinds of things that people say in response to each other, may look very different. The kinds of questions they ask each other may look very different. Their affective or emotional quality will almost certainly be very different. Conversation has a different feel to it than debate, obviously. Different people may feel comfortable with different kinds of interactions. Some people are not comfortable in a debate. So, if we are speaking educationally if you try to build your classroom only around dialogue as debate, there will be some students who may simply be closed out and silenced. They are not going to participate in that vigorous aggressive mode. Other students may feel entirely comfortable with that, but get impatient with other modes.

Moreover, the four types of dialogue aim towards very different kinds of purposes. In some dialogue contexts, agreement is a goal; in other contexts, people may end up even further apart or with a sharpened sense of their differences than they did before. Either outcome may be educationally valuable. So, it is not the case that dialogue will

always end up with us agreeing or feeling empathy or understanding for each other. It may not turn out that way. Yet, a dialogue may still have been educationally beneficial. So in evaluating whether it has been beneficial or not, I think it is important that we be more clear about what these different notions of dialogue are; because what counts as 'success' for some forms would not be for others.

I also think it is important to see that these different approaches can coexist in a teaching situation. It is not as if one is better than the others. There are many reasons why one may prefer or choose one approach as opposed to the others in a particular situation. It may work better for certain students. It may work better for certain subject matters. It may depend on your own mood and energy that day as a teacher. Imre Lakatos has a book about several people working their way through a mathematical proof. It is portrayed as a dialogue, but it is very rough and tumble, with a lot of sarcastic criticism of one another's ideas. Maybe you have to have a thicker skin to be a mathematician. But because they are all working on the same proof, there is a clear sense that for these participants the criticism and argument is part of what makes the investigation pleasurable and playful for them – it is part of the motivation that keeps the dialogue moving forward. Some people would not feel comfortable with that, and in other contexts or with different people, it could be a disaster as an approach to teaching. If you are trying to explore a very painful personal situation with someone that sort of critical and argumentative approach would probably be very counterproductive. So we need to know the subject matter we are talking about, and we need to know the people with whom we are interacting. We need to know ourselves as teachers, as educators, and what approaches work for us. Someone may be very effective in using an aggressive debate style, but other teachers using the same approach will alienate their students. There are a lot of particular decisions that have to be made here. There is no one 'best' form of dialogue and no one way to teach dialogically.

When I have spoken on this subject in the past, some people have said that they think inquiry and conversation are the 'nice' modes of dialogue but that something bothers them about instructional dialogue or debate. I think that is another of those overdrawn dichotomies such as monologue versus dialogue. There can be educationally useful debates, and there can be pointless conversations. There are also writers such as Deborah Tannen who want to argue that some approaches are more 'masculine' and others more 'feminine'. There is something to that, you can see, but it is also overly stereotyped and dualistic. I know lots of women who are very good at debate, and many men who are good, patient, thoughtful listeners. My point is that all these approaches can work together; they do not need to be ranked in some order of value. A skilful teacher in a seminar, for example, might in fact use all four of these in different ways at different times with different students and may skilfully phase an ongoing dialogue into and out of these different modes at different times. It does not have to be one or the other, and simplistic moral judgements or dichotomies do not help much.

This pluralism of method is very much at the heart of my notion of dialogue. But I have to say that I have some doubts now about how central we have tried to make

dialogue to our thinking about pedagogy (whether Socratic, or Freirean, or some other views of dialogue). And I have been part of that tendency to treat dialogue as central to pedagogy. My current thinking is that we have to be very suspicious of viewing dialogue as some kind of educational panacea.

The second topic you asked about is the idea of communicative virtues. Although I have been thinking about this for a long time, my thinking is still very incomplete. The basic question for me is, 'Looking across these different notions of dialogue, and different kinds of dialogue, are there general things that can be said communicatively about why some dialogues succeed and others fail? Can we say things generally about what makes educationally worthwhile dialogue possible?' What I am interested in theorising here are the *conditions of possibility* of dialogue. Some of these conditions have to do with the institutional settings or other circumstances under which people are trying to carry out the dialogue. The other set of conditions are the personal attitudes, values and dispositions of the participants. This is where the notion of communicative virtues comes in, which I have been working on with Suzanne Rice.

In trying to say something generally valid about this subject, one needs to avoid the trap of generalizing too much from the norms of a particular cultural conception of 'good communication', and neglecting in the process what is distinctive and worthwhile about different cultural styles. To take an example: certainly, many cultures have some notion of politeness, what counts as polite speaking, that is specific to that culture. They may consider those qualities of politeness to be a communicative virtue, but those forms of behaviour and expression are bound up with other features of that particular culture, and people with other cultural backgrounds may not speak in that way – even if they are considered to be 'polite' in their own cultural context. Their way of speaking may seem very impolite to people from another culture. Yet, it also a problem to say: 'You must speak the way we speak, because your way of speaking is very rude'. It may only be rude from the cultural norms of that culture. Nor is it clear that one must be 'polite' to communicate effectively with another; in some cases (a political protest, for example), 'politeness' would not be appropriate or productive at all. So there is a problem with developing a cross-cultural theoretical account here.

Nevertheless I do think that there are general characteristics of speakers and listeners that make successful communication possible and that to an extent these conditions of possibility are not culturally specific or particularistic in the way that politeness is. That is what we are working on now. I think that there are some general things that can be said about, for example, listening. You cannot have communication at all unless the participants are able to not only express their own views but also hear and pay attention to and be thoughtfully receptive to the things that other people are saying. That does not mean agreeing with them. It does not mean giving up one's own views or one's own perspectives. But it does mean that the capacity to listen is a ground level condition of communication. I think that would be one example of what Suzanne and I would call a communicative virtue. Of course, having said that, there is much more to be said about what good listening looks like, the many ways it might

be practiced (under different circumstances or within different cultural settings) and how we learn or foster the learning of good listening as a communicative virtue.

I think that there are a number of other communicative virtues that we want to build into this model. But let me just say one other thing about this theory. At one time, we thought that these communicative virtues could be listed as a set or a list of communicative virtues. In our earlier writings, we wrote about them in that way. What is clear to us now is that these virtues do not exist in isolation from each other. The capacity and disposition to listen is wrapped up with a number of other virtues (a certain kind of patience, for example). They cannot be conceptualized apart from each other, and even more to the point, they cannot be developed or fostered in people apart from each other.

So now we talk about communicative virtue more as a constellation of interrelated characteristics and not a discrete list of virtues. When you look at the way character or virtue is often taught in the United States, you see the 'virtue of the week' approach: 'We will spend a week on teaching responsibility, a week on honesty, a week on courage, a week on friendship' and then down the checklist until you have covered them all. I think that is a weak philosophical conception of what the virtues are, but also pedagogically a very superficial way of thinking about what it means to teach them.

This 'constellation' approach shows how complicated the virtues actually are. Of course we say, in a simple way, 'This person is a good listener'. But real listening is not just passive reception. It is not just hearing. It is thinking. It is caring about what the person is saying. A part of being a good listener may be asking good questions. It may include a capacity for empathy. I mentioned patience. There are a lot of things to go into it. Suzanne and I believe that conceptualising the virtues in this more internally complex and interrelated way is not only more philosophically subtle and interesting but also pedagogically more fruitful in thinking about what it means to help people to become like this. It does not mean to go through a checklist and say: 'You spend a week learning this, then you learn this and then you learn that'. Our ideas are not going to fit easily into the instrumental model of teaching that seems to be predominant in most schools.

Klas: How then do you think that schools and teachers can and perhaps should support dialogue and the development of communicative virtues?

Nicholas: The first thing I would say is to repeat what I just said. The way we actually set up schools has made it very difficult for teachers to do this. It may even be that the main places to be thinking about developing these communicative virtues are outside of schools entirely. In my book, I wrote about the 'anti-dialogical features of many schools' – I think you can say the same sorts of things about societies generally.

I believe in a model of ethical teaching that is built on the ideas of modelling and emulation; so the first thing teachers ought to think about is whether they express or manifest these communicative virtues themselves. I believe that much of what we learn, especially when we are very young, is not a result of direct instruction or didactic rules but rather imitating and acting like the people who we grow up with: we act

towards others in the ways others have acted towards us. I think this is especially true of communication. Communication is a complex human practice that we learn through participation, through interacting as novices among more experienced participants. We are *drawn into* certain activities and in the process develop certain capacities and dispositions through our ongoing participation in those practical activities. We improve our communicative practices by practicing them – whether in school contexts or elsewhere.

I will give an example from my colleague David Hansen, who wrote a very nice article several years ago about a secondary school teacher who during class discussions would suddenly ask, say, student B: 'Will you please repeat and describe how you understand what student A just said' Think of it, how rarely we ever see things in school like that. It not only makes sure that the students are paying attention to each other and not simply to what their teacher is saying; but even more than this, that they are actively thinking about what each other is saying. By asking such questions, in this particular example, the teacher is making it clear that listening to one another is a respected and valued part of the classroom activity. We have all been in discussions, especially academic discussions, where we know that while someone else is talking, we are already thinking about what we want to say next. Maybe we try to connect what we plan to say with what that person said, in some token way, maybe we do not. David's example shows what it might mean to bring a concern with emulating, modelling and practicing the communicative virtues into a normal classroom; but it also shows, I think, how rare this is. As I said earlier, this sort of teaching about the communicative virtues may not happen primarily in schools. It may happen more in other settings, in families, in friendships, in clubs, in other public spaces, in church discussions, on the Internet or through other media.

Klas: Do you think that the educational policy system should facilitate dialogue and the development of communicative virtues, and if so how?

Nicholas: Why should educational policy make these communicative aims a higher educational goal? Well, let us take the idea of lifelong learning. Schools are more and more aware of the fact that you cannot possibly educate somebody in 12 or 16 years for everything they are going to need to know for their work life, for their lives as citizens or as parents or as participants in a community. In terms of their work life, given the changing nature of work and the changing nature of scientific and technical knowledge, more and more people are changing their jobs multiple times in the course of their careers. Hence, particular things you may have learned at one period of your life may not help you later on. This suggests that the important job skills are things such as communicative skills, because those will be relevant wherever your work is, and because they will help you continually build upon your knowledge and acquire new knowledge. I would suggest that the communicative virtues and deliberation are essential to lifelong learning in this sense, not only where work and employment are concerned but also in the other contexts I described (citizenship, parenting etc.).

These would not be the main philosophical justifications I would give for the communicative virtues or dialogue, but if we are going to be talking with policymakers and trying to convince them that they are important in our system of education, we will probably have to adopt arguments like this.

Klas: In the book *Teaching and its Predicaments*, which you edited together with David Hansen, you put forward the idea of the tragic sense of education. What do you mean by this? Why and how should schools and teachers acknowledge this way of viewing education?

Nicholas: This is something I have written about over a period of years. Personally, it is probably the most important work to me. It is probably the work that comes closest to my own existential questions and doubts, and when I am writing these pieces, I am writing in my own voice. What do I mean by this tragic sense of education, and how does it relate to what we have been talking about today? First of all, my perspective is not a prescriptive one. It is not saying: ‘Here is the way you should look at the world’. It is not saying it is the best way to look at the world or the truest way to look at the world. It would seem strange to me even to suggest such an idea. *It is how I look at the world.* When I am writing in this mode, I am representing or expressing what the world looks like from my vantage point. Some people find it meaningful and resonant for them; other people find it very strange or depressing. I do not think it is a depressing view, because to me the tragic view is not pessimistic. It is not saying everything is bad or everything fails or everything is a disaster. Often people use the word ‘tragic’ to describe any bad thing; they call a car accident or a plane accident a tragedy. That is not what I mean by the tragic view. Bad things happen in life – that does not make them tragic. Tragedy in the classic Greek sense of tragedy is a matter of seeing that bad things happen, but also seeing that, given even slightly changed circumstances, they might not have happened. (Think of Oedipus, for example.) The events of 9–11 were tragic, not because they were awful, or because people died, but because we have become increasingly aware of how they might have been avoided or at least minimized. It is this duality of perspective – both of the inevitability of what happened as it did and of the possibility of its not happening – and keeping them in mind both at the same time that is the tragic view. If one simply accepts the inevitability of bad things happening, that is not tragedy, but pessimism or fatalism. That is not my view. On the contrary, if one continuously thinks that we can always make things better and solve all our problems, then I think that we give up the other end of the tension, and we are simply naively hoping for the best even while facing of reality of failure. To me the tragic perspective is what maintains both points of view at once.

What interests me is what it means to think about education through this lens. It is a corrective to utopianism. I am very strongly anti-utopian. Somebody who has a tragic sense of education cannot believe in utopias, because one sees in any utopia what is repressive, destructive or harmful; what is not a part of the utopia, *who* is not a part of the utopia and how many people might have to die or suffer to create such a utopia (think of the history of communism, for example). Many utopias are described

as if, if you could simply take a blank generation and imprint them with what you wanted them to think and believe, then you could give human history a fresh start – take Plato's Republic, for example. But of course it never works that way.

Second is the recognition that we cannot pursue all goods at the same time. We cannot achieve all of our aims and purposes simultaneously; we inevitability pursue some at the cost of others. We have to face these difficult choices about which aims and values to pursue and which ones we have to leave behind. In education, we sometimes talk as if, in the English expression, the rising tide will lift all boats. Unfortunately, I think, as soon as we start making progress in achieving some of our goals, for some students, we also understand that this necessarily has meant sacrificing others. Even for a given learner, this tradeoff among ends is inevitable: a student may learn more about science, but lose their religious faith as a result; or they may develop a more cosmopolitan outlook, but at the expense of their strong feeling of kinship with their local community or culture. To think about these sorts of dilemmas and tensions is very uncomfortable for people in education. People in education by nature want to be forward looking and optimistic. We are all progressives, in the wide sense of that term. We believe that education is always possible, that every child can learn, that various social problems (teenage pregnancy, for instance) might have an educational solution. But what does it mean to look seriously and immediately at the prospect that what we seem to be achieving with one hand we are sacrificing with the other – that accomplishing some goals necessarily means sacrificing others?

The third element of this view is to see that gains and loses always come together. That educational aims and educational losses always come together. I mentioned a minute ago: We may help a student from a particular narrow background to appreciate and respect other cultures, to learn more about the world and to become less constrained by the particular values and beliefs of their own particular culture or community. But as soon as they do that – and it may be a good thing – they begin to lose a particular set of connections that were once important to them. They may be more unhappy; they may feel that something has been gained, but also that something is lost. You succeeded educationally in broadening their horizons, but only at the cost of something that is unrecoverable for them, because they can never go back any more to looking at their old way of looking at the world in quite the same way again. What this suggests is not even the question of balancing gains and losses, pluses and minuses. It is to see that the very notion of a 'gain' can also be seen from a certain perspective as a 'loss'. Every single one of our educational goals, I believe, can be looked at both ways. The kind of communicative goals that I described earlier can be questioned and challenged in this way: perhaps I have become more articulate and able to express my views and feelings and appreciate those of others. But each of the virtues (this is part of the Greek view, I'd say) can also become excessive, and by that become vices of a sort: I may become too clever in framing my ideas in words; or I may become too much of a 'listener', too patient, and so lose a capacity to act decisively.

I am not saying that the tragic outlook should be everyone else's perspective. To the extent that I might say something about this in relation to teacher education, it would be that I think that we sometimes do young teachers, novice teachers, a disservice by making them too idealistic and naïve. When they arrive in schools, which may be troubled schools or dysfunctional ones – when they meet colleagues who may be less than competent and/or demoralized – they are not prepared for it, and in the United States, at least, often respond by swinging to the other extreme and quitting the profession before their careers have even begun. Perhaps by being exposed a bit more to the 'tragic perspective', they may be better able to grapple with the predicaments and dilemmas they encounter in their own teaching.

But here again, I have to say that I am not tying to *convince* anyone about this. When I write about it, it is a personal struggle to make sense of things that I am troubled by: tragedy, doubt, uncertainty, the ambivalence of 'success' in life. It is, I suppose, a variety of existentialism. Existentialism was not, in my view, about convincing people through a philosophical argument, but about describing the way the world is or feels to the writer. It is as much an act of literature as of philosophy. Camus, Sartre, Nietzsche or Kierkegaard were not saying, 'I am going to make you think like me'. They would find that a very amusing notion. They were only trying to write about how the world appeared to them, and often, this was a very dark view of the world or of human existence. So it expresses a view of philosophy, to go back to the very first topic we talked about, which is not prescriptive, not analytical. It is a kind of critical approach, which encourages questioning, reflection and doubt, but a way of thinking about the 'critical' in a way that is very different from how some others use it. Most people write about 'critique' as a way of attacking and challenging other views that they find objectionable. But here critique is something directed first and foremost towards one's self, to the dilemmas and paradoxes within one's own beliefs, values and practices.

Klas: In the book *Globalization and Education – Critical perspectives*, which you edited together with Carlos Alberto Torres, you view education in relation to the global context and global transformations. These changes have tremendous impact on us, our societies and our educational policies and practices. How do you think that schools and teachers should relate to global transformations in education?

Nicholas: Let me touch on two aspects of the problem. The first is that globalisation offers a fine example of talking about social change from within this tragic perspective. I think there are wonderful things about globalisation and terrible things about globalisation, and if you look at the literature on this topic, it is generally divided in terms of the question, is globalization a good thing or a bad thing? So you have people saying: 'Globalisation is great; we have open markets and free trade, sharing these great new technologies, increased opportunities for travel, etc'. Other people would say: 'Globalisation is terrible. It is the domination of third-world countries by Europe and the U.S.. It is the spread of a rational, capitalist mode of thinking across the different parts of the world'. I think globalisation is both of these things, and I think it

has to be understood as *both* – not just in the sense of some good things and some bad things, but again in that the very same changes can be seen as beneficial or harmful. They certainly may be beneficial to some people and harmful to other people. But even to the same people, the changes may be beneficial in some respects and harmful in other respects. Bringing improved nutrition and health care to some poor country may make people's lives much better, but it may also result in overpopulation which gives rise to new problems of its own. Access to trade may create new industries, new jobs and new markets for export, but at the expense of traditional activities or products that may no longer be a part of the society. One of the traps of a non-tragic perspective is to say, 'Well, can't we have all the good things, but avoid the bad things', and of course, in some specific instances, that may be true. But in general that is not the way life works; the good things and the bad things are inseparable from each other, and once you accept some part of it, you are accepting the whole thing. In many contexts, I believe, this is how to think about what globalisation is doing.

The other thing I would say is that globalisation is central to thinking about education, because education today is both a cause and an effect of globalisation. Our schools, especially higher education, are profoundly affected by globalisation and a host of other changes that go along with globalization: new media, information and communication technologies and global networks, increased travel and mobility, more movement across national borders, more immigration and hence also more contact with people who might be very different from you. All of these trends are transforming the challenges of education, and so education can be seen as one of the primary sites where globalisation is actually happening, with all of the things that one might see as good or as bad about it. Whether we think of possible economic benefits of education or access to wider cultures and views of the world or whether we are thinking about notions of global citizenship, in all of these cases, we see paradoxes and tensions. What does it mean to think about global citizenship or cosmopolitanism, for example? In nearly all countries we say, 'We want schools to prepare young people for citizenship'. But citizens of where – their particular country or citizens in some larger context? Or both at once? Are these dual perspectives compatible? What does it mean to think about ecological responsibilities on a world scale? What does it mean to think about issues of terrorism, injustice and human rights on a global scale? How do these broader issues relate to those we teach in schools now? Does fostering these wider senses of responsibility and affiliation strengthen or weaken one's sense of civic identity or duty to a local neighbourhood, community, tribe or region? Is globalization creating a certain kind of homogenization among young people around the world, and how can this be seen as both a good and a bad thing? Whether it is through the Internet or popular culture or through advertising in the media, young people are being more and more exposed to a common culture of Nikes, blue jeans, Coca-cola, cell phones and Harry Potter. We know where these products come from and who profits from them. Nevertheless, they are a part of a global culture that is shaping the attitudes and values of young people in ways that those young people often find quite pleasurable and rewarding. What does this mean for education? What does it mean for a system

of education that may have been built around the priorities of local and traditional culture? Is it even possible any more to block such globalizing influences or define them simply in negative terms (as 'Westernization' or 'Coca-colonization')? As you know, I am especially interested in the Internet and the role it plays educationally and culturally in accelerating this global dynamic. In China or Malaysia or in certain Middle Eastern countries, there has been an attempt to keep out those influences, to censor or block online content, to preserve traditional values, traditional religions or national loyalty and identity, which these countries see – rightly – as threatened by this larger common global culture people are accessing through the Internet. But it does not work, and I think it cannot possibly work in the long run.

What are the long-term trends here? Are we destined to have an increasingly homogenised global culture? Does the global interact with the local in ways that produces new hybrids and may even multiply differences? Do some regions develop even stronger fundamentalisms to resist and counteract the influence of the global? Or are these merely defensive responses that are destined to weaken in the face of the positive appeals of globalisation in the long run? What role is education playing in producing and accelerating globalisation, on the one hand, and what role can it play in resisting it or developing a more critical understanding of it? Education is, I think, both part of the problem and a potential corrective, because clearly education is one of the few areas in which people can explicitly raise and explore these kinds of questions about dominant cultural values, identities, diversity and difference.

Klas: I think you have given very interesting answers to my questions and a lot of things for me to think about. I am glad that you took some of your time to answer my questions. Thank you very much for the stimulating and interesting interview.

Nicholas: Thank you. It is a great opportunity, and it has been a pleasure for me.

CHAPTER 2

MORAL EDUCATION, LIBERAL EDUCATION AND THE VOICE OF THE INDIVIDUAL

Paul Standish

'I want to break free.' – Freddie Mercury

The words above, from Freddie Mercury's hit song, *Free*, have, so it seems, a guaranteed appeal to young (and older) people today. In fact, there are many songs in which one finds expressions of, or cries of, or demands for freedom. We live in a world that, in so many respects, offers freedom to people as never before. But the word seems to have an unstoppable emotive force. Don't we all at times utter it or think it – whether we are thinking 'Now at last I feel free', or 'If only I could be free', or 'Once I get away from here I shall be free'? Where does the emotive power of the idea of freedom come from and why does it seem so important to us?

For all the apparent impetus towards new possibilities of life, however, there is in some of these expressions more than a suggestion of the *ressentiment* that Nietzsche saw as a manifestation of nihilism. Nihilism of such kinds involves a negativity towards the way things are, in a never-ending, perhaps compulsive longing for some other world. If only things could be different, these thoughts seem to say; they are the opposite of the yea-saying, the intense absorption in experience, that might otherwise be associated with freedom. But, this is an essay about neither Nietzsche nor nihilism. What I propose to do is to consider the ways in which concerns with freedom have been played out in the philosophy of the curriculum. I shall do this by tracing a story that leads from the rise of progressivism to the reactions against it.

Although there is, in a sense, something timeless about questions concerning freedom, they acquire new dimensions in circumstances of globalization. Whereas one might, on a standard analysis, ask questions about what it can mean for the individual to be free when he or she is at the same time conditioned by social, cultural, political and religious circumstances within the nation-state, the very terms of this question are now challenged by globalization. It is not just that the nation-state finds itself compromised by the power of multinationals or by the invasive forms of new communications or by larger political forms of organization; it is that the very space of the political, the terms of the public and the private, is reconfigured in new and sometimes frenetic, sometimes tranquilized forms. Education systems now routinely acknowledge questions of globalization, but these rarely go beyond gestures towards the knowledge economy or the somewhat haphazard adoption of web-based learning. From country to country, however, the picture varies. A dimension of the demise of

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the nation-state for many citizens in European countries, for example, is precisely that they now think of themselves as citizens of Europe. The ways in which individual identities are developed, and hence that the possibilities of freedom are conceived, are deeply conditioned by these changing political terms. In countries, such as the UK or Japan, however a relative isolation is maintained, with correspondingly more introspective conceptions of citizenship and its education. There are obvious debates to be had about how far public education should foster loyalty to the nation-state and how far cosmopolitan values, and about how far these are incompatible. In other political regimes, to be sure – say, in theocracies, in countries devastated by poverty or in newly formed democracies – the stakes of freedom are plainly very different.

When one looks across this range of difference, and against the in some respects common background of global change, what is clear is that Enlightenment ideals of freedom are themselves challenged. While I do not propose to foreground the Nietzschean themes alluded to here, it is in the restoring of such an inflection at the end of the chapter that an alternative, richer conception of freedom in relation to the curriculum is sought.

It is in this context that concerns about freedom and schooling have developed in various ways and in diverse circumstances. In Japan, there is concern about drop-out rates from education, about the rebellious behaviour of young people, about classroom disruption, and lack of respect for tradition, about hair dyed blond . . . And, in this context, some argue that what is needed is education of the heart (*kokoro no kyoiku*). In the UK within recent decades, debates about moral education and citizenship have gained a new prominence. What is needed, the argument has been, is to get 'back to basics'. What we need to do is to teach children the difference between right and wrong. In these and other countries, it has become a common wisdom that it is progressive (or child-centred) ideas and methods, that have given children too much freedom and so deprived them of the standards of behaviour and the discipline that is necessary in their upbringing. John Major went so far, in the early 1990s, as to say: 'The progressives have had their say and they have had their day'. In fact, in the UK, during the past 20 years, no leading politician (of any of the parties) has been willing to speak in favour of progressivism because in the eyes of the public it has become so much associated with the image of self-indulgent teachers, who want to be 'friends' with the children rather than to teach them, to let children do whatever they want, and because the one thing that the general public wants from education is for it to make sure that their children come out of school with the necessary skills to find decent jobs.

I want shortly to give a brief account of that development in the UK and of reactions against it. But, first, it is appropriate to say more about the value of freedom that is so close to its heart. For brevity, I shall not say anything here about the prominence of the idea in the world of Ancient Greece but shall confine myself to some remarks about the rise of the idea of freedom, principally in Europe, over the past 300 or so years. What does a consideration of that period show?

The development of the idea of freedom in the modern Western world

When people speak in history or philosophy of 'the modern world', they typically have in mind a period of time extending back to René Descartes and the individualism of disengaged rationality and to the political individualism of John Locke. But probably the most striking changes come with the political upheavals of the late 18th century and, in the UK especially, the massive social change brought about by the Industrial Revolution. Perhaps equally important during these centuries is the rise of science, which came with a new confidence in man's reasoning and a faith in progress. (It was indeed thought of as 'man's' reasoning at the time!) Words such as 'progress' and 'development' have now become so commonplace in our thinking that we suppose them to be perfectly natural, almost as if progress were built into the universe, but really this is very much the result of these massive changes in thought. With this new confidence in human abilities, there was an unprecedented questioning of established religious and moral horizons, and also the growing belief that, just as science had brought about spectacular changes in technology, so too rationality could be applied to the organization of society.

The gradual move from a conception of the universe as God's creation towards a placing of man at the centre of things (that is, the rise of humanism) gave new prominence to the idea of freedom. Immanuel Kant advanced the key principle that, because human beings were capable of free will, they should always be treated as ends, never simply as means. (In other words, they should never be treated simply as slaves, but should be recognized as beings with interests of their own, and with the capacity rationally to reflect on those interests.) This has become a guiding principle for the modern world. Perhaps the most important figure in the change we are considering, however, is Jean-Jacques Rousseau. His radical ideas pointed to the ways in which the contemporary world caused people to lead lives that were shaped by mere convention and that were unnatural. One can perhaps picture the extraordinary costumes that were worn by the aristocracy of that time – the long wigs, the make-up, the brightly coloured fancy clothing for women and men! – and think of these as symbols of the falseness of people's values and behaviour. In fact, however, the very ideas of what is *natural* and of *falseness* here are themselves familiar to us very much because of Rousseau's own work. For, in his rejection of the values of convention, he argued that human beings had lost touch with nature and with their true selves. The way that today we cherish the natural world – our delight in a beautiful mountain range as well as our current environmentalism – would probably have made little sense in the Western world before Rousseau's time. And, when today we read in a popular magazine such as *Cosmopolitan* of the need to get in touch with your 'real self' (Are you in touch with the real you?), this idea, which apparently comes so naturally to us, is surely partly attributable to Rousseau. The idea of what is real or true to ourselves, which connects with our notions of honesty, sincerity, integrity and being 'together' as a person, is sometimes spoken of as authenticity. In his book *The Ethics of Authenticity*

(1991), Charles Taylor speaks of the massive inward turn that is brought about by Rousseau's thinking: Rousseau gives us a sense of ourselves as beings with inner depths, for whom the morally good life must be one where we feel in tune with our own deepest commitments and feelings (as opposed to one where we simply follow what our religious or political leaders, or our parents, say). The source of morality is a voice within.

What Rousseau also offers, of course, in his conception of nature is a new idea of childhood – hence his enormous influence on thinking about education. Against the Christian idea that human beings are born in a state of 'original sin', he enables us to think of children as innocent (and pure and good, perhaps) because they are closer to nature. In contrast to the idea that the role of education was to mould children into a shape that would fit society, Rousseau's view was that the perverted forms that society had come to assume must themselves change in accordance with what was natural. His description of Emile's upbringing does indeed have an important bearing on education, but the book needs to be seen as part of his larger political philosophy: his vision of the good society and of citizenship. In the light of *Emile* (Rousseau, 1911, originally published 1762) and his other more obviously political writings, there is a clear connection between his thought and an event that was profoundly to shape the history of modern Europe and its understanding of itself – the French Revolution (1789). Its slogan of 'liberty, equality, fraternity' underlines the point.

In the 19th century, the thinker who stands out for his importance in the political thinking of the English-speaking world is, of course, John Stuart Mill. In Mill's *On Liberty*, originally published in 1859, he advances what has become taken by people in general to be a fundamental principle. He writes:

> The object of this essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant (Mill, 1978, p. 9).

In other words, you should not prevent someone from doing what they want to do unless they are harming someone else. You should not interfere with them because they are harming themselves or because you think you know what is best for them. This principle encounters many problem cases, some of which Mill and his critics have addressed, but it remains an immensely powerful guiding principle and a natural reference point.

Although the ways of thinking sketched here have become naturalized in the Western world, they have undoubtedly brought problems, problems that could not easily have been anticipated. When the individual becomes the ultimate reference point, there is a loss of horizons of meaning that in the past had given sense to much of what he did; community ties are weakened, and the individual feels rootless and purposeless; there is a kind of 'disenchantment' of the world. Within the democracies that have

developed, especially where the masses are not well educated, there is some tendency for values and policies to be determined by the 'lowest common denominator', so that societies are flattened and narrowed. And in these circumstances morality can degenerate into crude utilitarianism, governed by a technical rationality.

Of course, the history of the 20th century is marked by two world wars. Amongst the social consequences of these in the UK were a weakening of the British class system, which had been such a pronounced feature of the period of the Empire, and a change in the role of women (as they too became directly involved in the war effort or took over civilian jobs normally held by men). In the 15 or so years immediately following the Second World War, the UK faced a period of austerity and at the same time saw the closing decades of its empire, as colonized countries moved towards independence. But, in the 1960s, there was a new period of economic prosperity and suddenly the feeling that things could change. New universities were built to meet the needs of the children of the post-war baby boom who were now passing through adolescence, sex scandals in the government changed people's attitudes towards those in power and authority, the Beatles made their first records and 'flower-power' (the hippies) arrived! This was a new sense that one could question the way things had been done in the past, that one could, and one should, live one's life as one chose. One must above all be authentic. It was in this context that progressivism came to be introduced in schools.

Progressive schooling and its introduction in the UK

While the advent of progressivism in state education in the UK was later than it had been in Germany and Scandinavia, for example, or for that matter in the United States, its development was perhaps more dramatic.[1] The *Primary Memorandum* in Scotland (1965) and the *Plowden Report* (1967), two major government reports, advocated a radical change in the education of children in elementary school. The following paragraph from the *Primary Memorandum* is indicative:

> It is now generally accepted that the primary school is much more than a preparation for secondary school: it is a stage of development in its own right . . . [Schooling must] meet the child's needs and interests . . . [The teacher must] provide the environment, experiences and guidance which will stimulate growth along natural lines . . . [The child is] not an adult in miniature . . . [N]atural endowment of children is not uniform . . . [G]rowth and development . . . are continuous . . . The artificial nature of school organisation [needs to be compensated for] (SED, 1965, pp. 3–4).

To anyone familiar with the texts of progressive educators, these ideas will be familiar enough. It would be easy to match the phrases here to ideas of John Dewey, especially in *Democracy and Education* (Dewey, 1925, originally published in 1916). It is undoubtedly the case that the ideas that were promoted in the teacher education

[1] There had been a number of influential experiments in private education before this time. For a full discussion of the development of progressivism, see Darling and Nordenbo (2003).

colleges at this time were a watered-down, if not a distorted, version of the thinking of the philosophers whom they quoted (Rousseau and Dewey above all). And even if the new approaches that they advocated did not affect all schools, there was nevertheless a sudden wave of interest in these innovations. Visitors came from many countries to see the new 'Plowden schools'.

It is worth pausing for a moment to think what one might have seen in a visit to a progressive elementary school classroom in England at that time. In contrast to the plain, rather forbidding room with high windows (so that the children would look up towards God) and straight rows of desks (so that would work silently and attend only to the teacher) that had been the experience of the previous generation, the new classroom would be a colourful and comfortable place: there would be large windows, letting the light in and encouraging children to look out at the garden outside; tables would be arranged in 'family' groups, encouraging children to work with one another; the walls would be decorated with the brightly coloured art work of the children; there would be a 'quiet corner' with a carpet and cushions, and picture-books for children to browse; there would be pet animals (such as guinea pigs) for the children to care for, and plants for them to tend; and there would be a variety of activity, with children writing, drawing, making things, playing, talking and laughing excitedly; the teacher would not generally have spoken to the class as a whole, but would move around the room, attending to one child then another as the need arose. The children would up to a point be free to pursue the activities in whatever order they chose – in other words, to follow their interests. The principles and values governing this scene can be summed up in the following set of precepts:

- children learn best through doing, through experience;
- learning takes place in a process of discovery;
- creativity should be developed;
- imagination should be developed;
- children learn through play;
- they learn best when they are happy;
- learning should begin with the interests of the child;
- children must not become bored;
- children must learn things in meaningful contexts (not just isolated facts or mindless drills);
- learning should be organized on the basis of themes or topics, not according to abstract academic subjects;
- education is a process of growth from within;
- the role of the teacher is to provide conditions that will assist that growth;
- all children are different and they have their individual needs and rates of growth;
- the teacher must respond to the child's needs, not present them with what she wants to teach;
- the emphasis should be on encouragement and praise, not punishment;
- the teacher should not be an authoritarian figure but more like a friend to the children.

These then were the values promoted by many of those training teachers at the time and to some extent they became a kind of ideology. It is not the case that all schools adopted them entirely, but the general climate in the primary school undoubtedly went through a period of major change.

Economic change and conservative reactions

In the 1970s, however, events outside the school came to have an important bearing on the country's development and on how education and teachers were seen. In 1972, a world crisis was occasioned when some of the main oil-producing countries in the Middle East made the decision to act collectively to raise prices. In the UK, one effect was a doubling in the cost of petrol overnight. Inevitably, this put severe pressure on the economy. This occurred following a time of prosperity when the major trade unions had succeeded, through collective bargaining, in gaining wage increases for their members. Now, with higher prices in the shops, they understandably pressed for more. Through the 1970s, there was a series of strikes against a background of rising inflation (to over 20%). Social problems appeared to be on the increase, with crime rising, and there was a general air of unrest. In 1979, Margaret Thatcher came to power, with a radical agenda for reform, one that involved high levels of unemployment, new kinds of poverty and a squeeze on the funding of public services, welfare and education. Inevitably, progressive education was blamed for much that was wrong in society. Her first Minister of Education, Keith Joseph, even went so far as to say that it was teacher educators who were to blame because they had introduced teachers to Dewey!

In or around the 1970s, a number of publications had been produced under the ominous title of 'Black Papers in Education'[2] (see Boyson, 1975; Cox, 1992; Cox and Boyson, 1975, 1977; Cox and Dyson, 1969). At the time these reactionary texts struck many teachers as the ranting of conservative extremists, and they were assumed simply to be wildly out of touch. It was striking, however, that a decade later, with the reforms that Margaret Thatcher was to introduce, they had come closer to the mainstream. What Thatcher picked up on and skilfully exploited was suspicions amongst ordinary people that all was not well with education. For many people, the challenge to conventional notions of discipline and authority that had come with progressivism had seemed threatening, and the emphasis on creativity, play, and happiness in the elementary classroom appeared to involve a neglect of the knowledge and values that children needed. Not surprisingly, this laid the way for the idea that we needed to 'get back to basics' and that children must learn the difference between right and wrong.

[2] The term 'Black Paper' borrows from the normal use of the phrase 'White Paper' for a government policy document.

This widespread reaction to progressivism may have been justified in some ways, but it was generally based on very crude and limited ideas about education. It needs to be contrasted with the serious and careful work of a number of critics who, from the 1960s onwards, raised questions of a predominantly philosophical kind about some of the assumptions of progressivism. These criticisms were advanced in the name of liberal education, and it is to this that I now turn.

The idea of a liberal education

The views in Question are particularly interesting because, unlike those of the reactionary critics above, they also were committed to the idea that education was fundamentally connected with freedom. But they disagreed about what this freedom consisted in. The leading figure in this in the UK was R. S. Peters, although in many respects his work related to ideas being developed around the same time by Israel Scheffler in the United States. In collaboration with his colleagues, Paul Hirst and Robert Dearden, Peters attempted to restate *the idea of a liberal education*. The importance of this idea and its influence on Anglophone philosophy of education can scarcely be questioned. It is a conception of education with ancient roots that presents us with cogent criticisms of progressivism.

Criticism of progressivism from liberal education

Like the reactionary critics mentioned above, these thinkers were concerned about various aspects of the wave of progressivism that was changing education. Within the child-centred preoccupations with play, happiness, creativity, learning by discovery (or experiential learning) and growth, they detected a somewhat sentimental view of the child. They identified also a failure to think through what these terms really implied. To take an example, progressive educators tended to think that children must above all be happy and that only the happy child would learn well, and this came to mean that a classroom in which children were smiling and laughing was a good classroom. But, as Dearden in particular pointed out, happiness is a much more elusive notion than this suggests. Sometimes we can be laughing but not be happy or only happy in a superficial way. Sometimes a greater degree of happiness comes because of struggling and then feeling that one has really achieved something. Some kinds of happiness bring satisfactions that are more profound. If smiling and laughing were the ultimate satisfaction, we should put scientists to work on a drug that would produce this state reliably and without difficulty. But surely we want more from our lives than this. At least, surely we should!

This connects very much with what is perhaps the most pervasive criticism of progressive education that these philosophers made. This was, in R. S. Peters' words, that child-centred education was concerned too much with the *manner* and insufficiently with the *matter* of education. In other words, it was too concerned with questions about the methods of learning and insufficiently concerned with what was learned. From the point of view of liberal education, the question of what is to be learned is the fundamental question of education. Let us consider how they set about answering that question.

What is worthwhile?

There are obviously some things that we learn to do that we need more or less for our survival and some that are really a matter of training for the jobs that we take up in society. For example, in the comparatively recent past, many young women were trained in typing skills. With the development of voice-recognition, these skills will perhaps eventually become obsolete, and it is not obvious why anyone would then what to acquire them. So they are useful skills but nothing more. On the contrary, there are some things we learn that are not obsolescent in this way. It is noticeable that these are things that, unlike typing, have often been pursued by people who have not had to find jobs to support themselves (the aristocracy, for example). They seem to be things that, whether or not they are useful, are *intrinsically worthwhile*. The idea of what is worthwhile in itself is at the heart of this account of education. So we must ask what it is that people find worthwhile. What do they find most satisfaction in?

In addressing this question in his book *Ethics and Education*, Peters considers the things that people enjoy in a series of ascending stages. In the first place, they enjoy physical pleasures such as eating and drinking, sex, and lying in the sun. These are genuine sources of satisfaction for human beings, and they are activities that allow scope for care, refinement and sophistication. (Think for a moment of the remarkable difference between the way in which even the higher animals eat and a simple meal shared amongst friends or family.) But these activities also have their limitations. They depend on cyclical appetites – for example, there is only so much that one can eat at one time. And each time you eat, even where this is a gourmet meal, you do, as it were, start again from the beginning.

The second kind of enjoyment that Peters considers includes games and sports. People take great satisfaction in these. The advantage they have over the pleasures of the senses above is that they offer extraordinary possibilities for the development of ability or skill. If you play chess or tennis and you practise regularly, you may be able to press your achievement to higher and higher levels. Activities of this kind do not depend on cyclical appetites, and indeed, they may strengthen your capacity the more you do them. When you resume such activities, you do not have to start from the beginning, as it were, but build on the skill level that you have reached. They offer the possibility for extending human capacities in remarkable ways. But these activities also have limitations. Sports and games tend to be limited parts of our lives. Taking part in such activities does not, in general, cast light on the world as a whole or help you in other aspects of your life.

The third type of activity that Peters considers is what he calls 'theoretical activities'. He has in mind such academic pursuits as the study of history or mathematics or literature. Unlike the pleasures of eating and drinking, these do not depend on cyclical appetites but, on the contrary, are intensified the more you do them. Of course, you have to take a break for a rest sometimes! But the chances are that the more you know about, say, history, the more satisfying further study will be. They do not depend upon competition over resources that are scarce, because in intellectual activities the

possibilities extend the more they are pursued, nor do they depend upon competition, where, as in sports and games, the winner takes the prize, because these activities depend upon and are enhanced by the shared pursuit of their goals. Moreover, they are not confined in terms of their influence on our lives. The way we live in the world is transformed and improved if we know something about how it has developed (in terms of social and political history, geography, geology and so on) and something about the science and technology upon which it depends. More strongly, this knowledge, and perhaps the understanding of human nature that we can gain from such disciplines as history and literature, makes us better able to address the practical problems that we will face, in all their ethical diversity. Furthermore, in view of the fact that reason is the most obvious feature that distinguishes us from other forms of life and that these activities are supreme developments of human reason, it is this that we should develop. In sum, theoretical activities offer unparalleled opportunities for satisfaction.

Cultural initiation and the development of mind

If we think a little about reason and the nature of mind, we should come to realize that the development of the mind is quite unlike the development of, say, a muscle in the body. Of course, there are physical parts of the body upon which the mind depends, but the mind is not an *organ* of the body; the brain is not the mind. To recognize this is to realize the immense importance that initiation into a culture has for the mind's development. To speak of initiation into a culture here is not to refer to something highbrow but rather to think of the range of complex practices that make up any society and into which children are gradually introduced. Coming to participate in these practices *is* the development of mind. This may seem a surprising statement, but it can be supported by reference to the well-known case of the so-called wild child of Aveyron.

In France in the 18th Century, a child was discovered in the forest. The child was probably about 10 years old but was behaving like no ordinary child. He moved about on his hands and feet, and, obviously terrified of people, made animal-like noises when he was approached. Eventually, he was surrounded and caught, and then taken to an asylum in Paris. Asylums in Europe at that time, quite unlike modern hospitals, were places where mentally ill or abnormal people were confined. The public could pay an entrance fee to come and look (and probably laugh) at the people inside. An enlightened doctor heard about the child and became interested. The evidence was that this was a child who had been abandoned at birth and who had been left in the woods to die. The amazing thing was that it seemed that he had been found by wolves and protected by them, and so had spent several years amongst them. The doctor was interested to see how far this child had become different from a normal child because of being so dramatically cut off from society, and also whether he could be civilized. The doctor took the child into his home and cared for him, and tried to do just this.

What is immediately striking about this story is that, although the child is not radically different physiologically from other children (his brain has developed

organically, just as his muscles have), his mental state is barely recognizable as that of a human being at all. This should draw our attention to what it is we mean when we speak of the mind of a human being. In short, the mind is nothing without the cultural practices into which the child is introduced. Most important among those practices is language itself, as virtually all distinctively human activity seems to follow in some way from this. This child has been cutoff from language users, and so, the limited and strange ways of thinking that he has developed are scarcely recognizable to us. Indeed, it relates more to a wolf's behaviour than to anything we could call mind.

If this is right, it seems to follow that a child's upbringing cannot simply be a natural process of growth, or of unfolding from within, or even of unaided discovery learning. In any culture, the child must be introduced into the practices of that culture. Thinking of the way we treat infants and very young children – over such practices as sitting, walking, eating, talking, dressing, laughing – can help to show that this is the case.

A further comparison with animals helps to make this point. The societies that we live in are extremely complex, and our practices are the result of thousands of years of development. To see quite how far this is true, it is worth thinking for a moment of animals living in a natural environment – say, lions living in the African savannah. It is probably the case that the way that lions live today – their patterns of hunting, eating and mating – are no different from the way they were 5000 years ago. If we think, on the contrary, of the way in which people live in any ordinary city today in contrast to the lives of people there 5000 years ago, the difference is truly remarkable. It should leave us with no doubt, first, of the importance of educational practices through which these ways of thinking and understanding are passed on and advanced from one generation to the next, and, second, of the dependence of what we mean by 'mind' upon these practices.

It seems to follow from the above that education ought to initiate people into the forms of knowledge and understanding that have come down to us. For, if education is to be more than mere training for a job, it should *free* the mind to function in as rich a way as is possible; it is in this sense particularly that it is liberal. Not to introduce learners to the ways of understanding that have come down to us would amount to leaving them confined within limited ways of thinking – ones that they had acquired perhaps only from their immediate community or perhaps from a diet of cartoon programmes on television.

The 'conversation of mankind'

One of the most influential articles by Paul Hirst concludes with words from an essay by Michael Oakeshott entitled 'The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind' (in Oakeshott, 1962):

> As civilised human beings, we are the inheritors, neither of an inquiry about ourselves and the world, nor of an accumulating body of information, but of a conversation, begun in the primeval forests and extended and made more articulate in the course of centuries. It is a conversation which goes on both in public and within each of ourselves. Of course there

> is argument and enquiry and information, but wherever these are profitable they are to be recognized as passages in this conversation, and perhaps they are not the most captivating of the passages . . . Conversation is not an enterprise designed to yield an extrinsic profit, a contest where a winner gets a prize, nor is it an activity of exegesis; it is an unrehearsed intellectual adventure . . . Education, properly speaking, is an initiation into the skill and partnership of this conversation in which we learn to recognize the voices, to distinguish the proper occasions of utterance, and in which we acquire the intellectual and moral habits appropriate to conversation. And it is this conversation which, in the end, gives place and character to every human utterance (Hirst, 1965, pp. 52–53).

Oakeshott's moving words here underline the connection between the ways in which an education of this kind is properly described as liberal. It is liberal in the same sense of the term as is used in the liberal arts colleges of the United States. The initiation into the 'conversation of mankind' then involves something like an initiation into 'the best that has been thought and said', in Matthew Arnold's famous (if contentious) phrase. And, in this respect, these words not only value the past but connect with values that shaped the thinking of the world of Ancient Greece. The past is not valuable because it is the past. It is valuable because it offers us the developing history of attempts to get at the truth of things and to understand what matters in human lives.

In the *Republic*, Plato gives us a wonderful image of education with the myth of the Cave. He describes the human condition as being like that of people living in the darkness of a cave and watching the flickering images projected onto the back of the cave by the light from its mouth. What they see is not real but the distorted images (the shadows) of real objects at the mouth of the cave, objects illuminated by the bright light of the sun. (The relevance of the fact that the idea of reality that many people have today is given by the distorted images of the world on television scarcely needs spelling out.) Education involves the process of helping these people to turn their heads away from these images in order that they should come to see the *real objects* at the mouth of the cave and eventually look at the sun itself, the source of *truth* and *goodness*. But, just as we find it difficult to look at bright lights when we have been in the dark and are inclined to be dazzled and to turn back to the darkness, so too people would prefer to look at these images (and to remain in ignorance) rather than to face up to the truth. Crucial to Plato's account then is coming to see things truly (the contemplation of truth and goodness); it is *freeing the mind from illusion*.

Rational autonomy and political liberalism

A commitment to truth is close to the heart of the idea of a liberal education that is developed by Peters and his colleagues. But their position is also complicated by a further dimension of freedom, and this connects with the modern political liberalism associated especially with J. S. Mill. Here, the emphasis is not so much on freedom from illusion as on *freedom to choose what to do*: in the absence of any indisputable substantive conception of the good, the individual should decide for herself how she is going to live her life. Far from being a licence for irresponsibility, however, this was developed in terms of what came to be called 'rational autonomy'. Although there is now a huge literature on autonomy, especially in relation to education but also more

generally in political philosophy, perhaps the most succinct expression of rational autonomy is to be found in Dearden's essay 'Autonomy and Education'. As Dearden explains: 'A man is autonomous, on Kant's view, if in his actions he has bound himself by moral laws legislated by his own reason, as opposed to being governed by his own inclinations' (Dearden, 1972, p. 58). What should be noticed here is the emphasis on reasoning through one's principles for oneself. On this view, you should not do something simply because the priest or the government or your parents or the media tell you to, or because you do not have the strength of character to do anything different, or because you are under the influence of drugs or obsessions or neurotic fears, and so on. You should reflect on your desires and reason through what to do. Of course, the principles you adopt, the reasons for your actions, may be ones that are likely to be current in your culture in one way or another, but what is crucial is that you decide to adopt these as your own.

In the decades since this restatement of the idea of a liberal education was made, there has been a tendency for the connection with political liberalism (and hence with autonomy) to come to the fore, to the growing neglect of the more classical connection with the contemplation of truth. The term 'liberal education' is sometimes now used solely with such political principles in mind, in such a way that the robust account of the curriculum that was produced has been largely lost. In my own view this is very much to be regretted. Questions about what is to be learned and why should be recognized as unavoidable by any policy maker or practising teacher, and philosophy of education must find ways of addressing them.

In what follows, and to confront such questions myself, I shall say something about problems with the vision of a liberal education that I have sketched and shall point to ways in which its limitations may be overcome. I shall also attempt to show how what I have to say connects with the account of contemporary individualism with which the present discussion began.

Addressing the difficulties with the idea of a liberal education

Peters and his colleagues had great influence throughout the English-speaking world. But the idea of a liberal education that they advanced was not without its critics. A common response was that it provided nothing new: it was simply a rationalization for what was in fact going on at the time in grammar schools, with children at other schools – that is, the majority – given a watered-down version, and thus, it shored up the power relationships and class distinctions that were responsible for some of the injustice in society. Its conception of the curriculum itself was dull and outmoded – a matter of passing on the knowledge that happened to be preferred by a section of society rather than anything that was likely to be truly meaningful to the lives of people in general. That knowledge was highbrow and academic, the critics said, and so, not surprisingly, many children were alienated and did badly at school. Not only did it reflect the interests of particular social classes; it was also inherently sexist, being

based on the work or the deeds of 'dead white males'. And, far from developing critical thinking, it encouraged the repetition of received ideas. Moreover, because of its emphasis on this outmoded content, it failed to appreciate the importance of the insights of progressivism – in particular, the need for education to acknowledge the differences between people and to develop from the individual herself.

If liberal education is practised in the way described in the preceding paragraph, it should indeed be criticised. Many students, including some of the most intelligent, are not moved by 'the best that has been thought and said'. Such an education will, moreover, be a limitation of the individual rather than something that might engage her more deeply and foster her development. And it must be admitted that over-attention to the subject matter can inhibit opportunities for students to respond authentically and to find their own voices.

To be fair to Peters and his colleagues, however, it was never their intention that the curriculum should be a mere passing on of received ideas: they advocated curriculum content that incorporated traditions of criticism, and they saw the initiation of the learner into such forms of knowledge as a means of her engagement. The criticism of their views considered here then depends upon a distortion of the ideas that they advanced. I do, nevertheless, want to draw attention to two main concerns.

In the first place, the emphasis on rational autonomy as a central aim of education is based on a narrow view of human life and morality. It encourages us to think of the good life as one that is carefully planned out in (perhaps) most respects. In consequence, it loses sight of the value of spontaneity. This might be found, for example, in acts of unreflective generosity or courage and in the everyday kindness that good people show to others. Indeed, sometimes to reflect before you act – say, when an accident occurs – could be a sign of moral failing. Spontaneity is also apparent in a kind of *joie de vivre*, a delight in living or even just a sense of fun, as it is in a certain receptiveness to others. The emphasis on rational autonomy makes it sound also as though being morally good is likely to coincide with being intelligent and so hides the goodness that can exist in simple unreflective lives. As such, it may suppress the variety of human life and thereby have a limiting effect on the kinds of community that we can develop. To exaggerate (just a little unfairly!), it sometimes seems that the ideal rationally autonomous person would be someone like Mr Spock on the Starship Enterprise, someone who always meticulously plans everything he does and for whom a spontaneous emotion is something to be quickly mastered and overcome.

A second criticism concerns its emphasis on intellectual pursuits and the elitist connotations this has. While there is a good case for saying that everyone should be given the chance to pursue such activities, it is likely that these will appeal most to more intelligent people, and perhaps, as has been noted, not to all of them: many will find that an academic curriculum of this kind does not speak to them and stifles their voices. The point of studying history or physics may be lost on many people, especially while they are children. The fact that people who write theoretical articles about education almost by definition enjoy such things makes them bad at seeing how this may not be so for everyone!

Three questions arise from this. First, what response should there be to the problem of the demanding and potentially alienating nature of intellectual pursuits? Second, does this justify different curricula for those who do not progress well with such activities? And third, is there anything in the account of the value of theoretical activities – anything liberal, that is – that can be extended to other less intellectual pursuits?

Intellectual activities are demanding, and their appeal is often difficult to understand from the outside. It is usually the case that, before one can participate in them with any great satisfaction, one has to undergo periods of hard work and perhaps boredom: one has to acquire the 'vocabulary' to take part in the conversation, as it were – whether this is in literary criticism, physics or history, or in more creative activities such as music and art. Hence, the teacher must tread a careful path that enables the child to acquire the vocabulary appropriate to the subject – the skills, knowledge and understanding – while avoiding the alienating effects that the demands of the subject may have. It must be her aim in the course of this for the subject to speak to the child in such a manner that the child can come to find her voice in it: that she sees how it may (come to) matter to her. And this does not mean that she finds that it may match something that already exists in herself, but rather that it offers a new possibility for the development of her voice – that is, for the expansion of herself. Without this, the subject is in danger of going dead on the child, and schooling is likely to be an alienating experience, even if it equips the child with high grades. Bearing these factors in mind, then, it does seem that a degree of coercion is justified in taking the child through those difficult stages of learning that lead to this more rewarding understanding.

My own view regarding the second question is that the demands of a liberal education, thus conceived, are likely to be too great for some children and so that it is appropriate to provide different curricula, probably at some stage during high school. Of course, this need not be done on an all-or-nothing basis. And there should be opportunities for children to move from one route to another.

A further factor is important here – in terms of social justice but also for purely educational reasons. It is sometimes said that education is wasted on the young. Certainly there is evidence that mature students make much better use of educational opportunities. Hence, there is every reason to encourage people to take up such study throughout their lives, and so this is a powerful argument for meaningful lifelong learning. I do not necessarily suggest that full-time education should be available to adults at public expense because the costs of this may well be prohibitive. But there is a strong case for state subsidy of part-time education for adults. Even part-time study in evening classes can transform people's lives, and sometimes the combination of study and working can be peculiarly enriching.

With regard to the third question, it should be recognized that there are aspects of a liberal education that cannot easily be extended or replicated. The ideal product of such an education is someone who has a breadth of understanding across the different forms of knowledge that are our inheritance, in sciences, the humanities and the arts. But such a person will also have a deep love for at least one of these pursuits, such that it is an absorbing interest that brings to her life the sense of participating in an

'unrehearsed intellectual adventure', in Oakeshott's words, an adventure that becomes all the more intense and absorbing the more it is pursued. And, surprising though this may at first seem, it is in the idea of intense absorption that a Nietzschean inflection is found once again. It is perhaps this more dynamic aspect that we should look to if we hope to extend something of this experience to those who are not intellectually up to the full demands of a liberal education.

I suggest that there are other less intellectual activities that can offer such kinds of intense absorption. For examples, we should perhaps turn attention in the direction of craft activities. Of course, we can think of the kinds of satisfactions that people gain from activities such as carpentry or pottery, but there is obviously a danger of anachronism or nostalgia here. These things play a less prominent part in people's lives, whether at work or in their leisure time, than they used to. So, we need to be prepared to consider activities of quite different and perhaps surprising kinds. I am struck by the kind of enthusiasm and delight that people can take in practical work with things – in making them and shaping them – in more contemporary, everyday circumstances. I am thinking of the pride of the engineer in the smooth-running machine, of the hairdresser in cutting and styling, or of the bricklayer in the clean lines of a wall, or of the chef in preparing fine food. Take car mechanics as an example. Such activity does indeed offer scope for further understanding and enquiry, and for the refinement of skill with the accumulation of experience. Those involved in it often seem to take a delight in the work that incorporates aesthetic and ethical values – say, in the good timing of the engine, the pleasure to be found in its efficiently moving parts, its functional capability and improvement, and so on. This is a very ordinary example but one worthy of attention. When people take pleasure in their work in this way, this can spill over into other areas of life, generating a kind of curiosity about things and bringing them into intense involvement with others. Such involvement is often not confined to the activities concerned but becomes a broader social commitment and identification.

The idea of a liberal education has tended to reinforce certain dichotomies in our thinking – between theory and practice, between the academic and the vocational, between the mind and the body – in each case favouring the former term. It has also, and perhaps in consequence of these dichotomies, been excessively preoccupied with propositional knowledge. Of course, it would be absurd to deny the massive importance of propositional knowledge – not as the expression of inert facts but as the substance and vocabulary of the forms of knowledge of which Peters and Hirst speak. The alternative advocated here is not the skill-based curriculum that has become fashionable, important though skills obviously also are. What is missing from the picture, and what the craft examples above may suggest, is the importance of knowledge by direct acquaintance. Amongst more intellectual pursuits, art appreciation plainly involves an acquaintance with particular works of art, where one's encounter with them exceeds anything that could be rendered in propositional terms, however rich propositional language may be as an approach to these works. This kind of acquaintance is also, I suggest, to be found somewhere in the mechanic's relation to the engine or the hairstylist's relation to hair – including their relation to the kinds of resistance that the

materials they work with present. It is there too, I also want to say, in the historian's familiarity with a particular period, or in the physicist's or the philosopher's familiarity with particular sets of problems, and the characteristic kinds of resistance that *they* present. Indeed, this familiarity is very much a part of knowing one's way around a subject and the satisfactions that this offers.

Finally, it is important to draw attention to the fact that there is a kind of moral education that is inherent in the demands that learning can make on us, but these are demands that sometimes elude progressive education. These include, first, the intellectual virtues celebrated in the academic life, but the thought here is that what is most important extends across more practical domains. Without the understanding developed through knowledge by acquaintance, through patient attention to the way things are, these intellectual virtues may cut loose from the substance that gives them their sense. These are moral matters also in the way that such forms of learning draw the learner into practices that are sustained by communities. Although this may not be explicit, such communities uphold standards to which the learner must constantly aspire to be worthy – whether this is to the standards of truth and critical argument found in an academic discipline or to those inherent in the creation and maintenance of the fabric of the world we live in. When one applies oneself to such activities, there is a real sense in which one's attention is turned beyond oneself. What is learned – whether this is the functioning of the machine, the stresses that metal will take, and the explosiveness of a gas in an engine, or the substance of an academic subject – can lead to a kind of attention-to-the-way-things-are that has its intrinsic virtues but that also can disturb us from the self-preoccupied tendencies to which we can otherwise succumb. Far from a direct concentration on the development of the self, it is in such endeavours that the individual can flourish most, and through this engagement that she may find not only her own voice but that she has something meaningful to say.[3]

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[3] An earlier version of this chapter was presented as the Ogata Lecture at the University of Tohoku, Japan. I am grateful to those present on that occasion, and to Morinichi Kato and Naoko Saito especially, for their comments and response.

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CHAPTER 3

A KANTIAN CONCEPTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION

Pradeep A. Dhillon

> One should never do that to another which one regards as injurious to one's own self. This, in brief, is the rule of *dharma.*

In the introduction to a volume of essays devoted to human rights, Edward Kolodziej calls the human rights movement – 'a *force profonde,* working through time and space, shaping and shoving human societies'(Kolodziej, 2003, p. 1). Awareness of the complexity of the concept of human rights and the intractability of coming to global agreement on its meaning, content, and exercise leads Kolodziej to comment on the difficulties of developing a theory of human rights. Nevertheless, he rightly points to the need for such a theory to guide public policy. In this essay, I want to argue for the centrality of Kantian ethics to human rights discourse generally, and human rights education in particular. I will stress that we need to make philosophical and metaphysical claims on behalf of these rights. That is, even I suggest we not limit ourselves to claims for them afforded by political or legal arguments alone as often suggested by leading political theorists such as Michael Ignatieff (2001).

These theorists want to avoid taking a philosophical and metaphysical view of human rights because they correctly worry that the promotion of these rights will be perceived as an instance of Western cultural hegemony and the celebration of Western values. Therefore, Ignatieff suggests,

> A prudential—and historical—justification need not make appeal to any particular idea of human nature. Nor should it seek its validation in a particular idea of the human good . . . In other words, a universal regime of human rights protection ought to be compatible with moral pluralism (Ignatieff, 2001, p. 56).

Significantly, Ignatieff's concerns presuppose ethical commitments to individuals and groups. It is the respect he wishes to grant the values that guide various groups and their members that turns him towards moral pluralism and away from universalizing notions of human nature and human good that rise from within a particular, Western, context. Similarly, we could show that much of Edward Said's work, as also that of Gayatri Spivak and others, serves as a reminder of the moral lapses that prefigure and shape Orientalist discourse. Despite their emphasis on particularity, however, these theorists remain committed to considering human worth as a regulative ideal. Thus, it is demonstrable that when our focus is on issues of human dignity and protection, either through direct or representational intervention, we are already committed to a set of

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values regarding the moral treatment of persons, groups and cultures historically placed in positions of asymmetrical power with regard to other groups, cultures and persons. In other words, universal-democratic moral commitments continue to guide the cultural criticisms and philosophical worries regarding the universalization of values that have come to dominate ethico-political discourse both locally and globally. Thus, it is valuable to turn to Kant's moral theory.

In her introduction to *Creating the Kingdom of Ends,* Carolyn Korsgaard provides us with an excellent overview of Kantian thought:

> In the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant shows that theoretical reason is unable to answer the questions of speculative metaphysics: whether God exists, the soul is immortal, and the will is free. But this conclusion prepares the way for an extension in the power of practical reason. **Practical reason directs that every human being as a free and autonomous being must be regarded as unconditionally valuable** (emphasis added) (Korsgaard, 1996, p. 1).

The implication of Kant's practical reason for human rights discourse is clear. Kant declares that all humans be valued regardless of the conditions and circumstances under which they live. Furthermore, on the Kantian view, moral education is at the heart of the pursuit of human rights because, as Korsgaard notes, 'Bringing reason to the world becomes the enterprise of morality rather than metaphysics, and the work as well as the hope of humanity' (Korsgaard, 1996, p. 1). Finally, by declaring all humans autonomous, Kant paves the way for offering a rebuttal to the criticisms from culture that have presented such a challenge to the United Nations Human Rights Declaration in recent years. In the rest of this chapter, I examine these ideas and the relations between them in some detail.

Jürgen Habermas (1997) examines the Kantian concept of cosmopolitanism over the past 200 years with the benefit of hindsight. Through a focus on contemporary issues such as human rights, international law, and global order, Habermas comes out in defense of the Kantian ideal. He comes to this position by taking seriously the force of relativist challenges, such as a turn to Asian values, presented to human rights discourse. In other words, Habermas wants to present a non-Eurocentric Kantian global ethico-political discourse that remains committed to the notion of human rights but is keenly aware of the fundamentalism that an uncritical use of the discourse permits.

Habermas's argument for the non-Eurocentrism of Kant, however, remains inadequate on two counts. First, his attempt to bring the social into Kantian thought through discourse ethics rests on a post-Hegelian misunderstanding of Kant. Recent Kantian scholarship both in Europe and in the United States seeks to redress the incorrect understanding of Kant as abstract and distanced from direct experience.[1] Second, despite his nuanced and complex argument for human rights, one that sternly refuses their unreflective universalization, Habermas is still not able to respond adequately to the challenge Asian values are said to present to human rights discourse. Specifically,

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[1] See for example Herman (1996). More directly see Kant (1991 [1970]).

his claim is weakened by his insistence on maintaining a distinction between the moral and legal aspects of human rights, and privileging the latter over the former, as demanded by modernity.

By following Kant more fully, without apologies, and refusing the distinction and privileging of the moral over the legal, I will show, not only enriches human rights discourse, it also enfolds education. More importantly, it suggests the resonance that exists between non-Western and Kantian thought which takes us some ways towards resolving the worry that particular cultural values raise for the universalization of human rights and its significance for human rights education. Thus, I seek to recognize the legitimacy of the claims of particularity while retaining the robustness of a universal concern for human rights in our ongoing – albeit uneven and dialectical – attempts towards realizing Kant's cosmopolitan dream of perpetual peace.

Kant's notion of perpetual peace turns on a cosmopolitan notion of order, one that relies on the legal articulation of nation states. This must be read as an argument for particularity under contemporary global discourse. Under these conditions all states are sovereign. That is, they are not answerable to any supreme authority; pursuing self-interest in an enlightened rather than Hobbseian manner.[2] Such enlightenment would entail an understanding that individual states are only legitimate and prosperous when pursuing their own goals; not over against those of others but rather in a mutually beneficial relation both internally and externally. In other, words, it entails the practice of freedom in a manner that ensures not only the well-being of particular nation states but does so by placing limits on itself with a view to being mindful of the rights of others to the same claims. Although history, Habermas argues, has proven Kant wrong on some of the key precepts of his theory of a cosmopolitan perpetual peace, there is one area about which he was remarkably correct: his anticipation of a global public sphere. In Kant's words:

> The process by which all the peoples of the earth have entered into a universal community has come to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere; this means that the idea of cosmopolitan law is no longer a fantastical or overly exaggerated idea. It is a necessary complement to civil and international law, transforming it into public law of humanity (or human rights [*Menschenrechte*]); only under this condition namely, the existence of a functioning global public sphere can we flatter ourselves that we are continually advancing toward a perpetual peace (Cited in Habermas, 1997, p. 124).

In his concluding remarks to 'The Doctrine of Rights', in *The Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant anticipates a criticism from experience towards what some would call his idealism. He responds to such a criticism by making a distinction between pragmatic and moral ends. Pragmatic ends are those that are merely technical; moral-practical ends those we adopt as a matter of duty. This is a duty we assume even though there might be not the slightest theoretical possibility of its being realized. What this entails for Kant is that

[2] Kant is generally accepted as the 'father' of liberal peace in the international relations literature. See, for example Beiner and Booth (1993).

> Now morally practical reason pronounces in us its irresistible veto: *there is to be no war, neither* war between you and me in the state of nature nor war between us as states, which, although they are internally in a lawful condition, are still externally (in relation to one another) in a lawless condition; for war is not the way in which everyone should seek his rights . . . . And even if the complete realization of this objective always remains a pious wish, still we are certainly not deceiving ourselves in adopting the maxim of working incessantly towards it (McGregor, 1996 [1797], p. 123).

Kant's doctrine of rights and his injunctions against war are the structuring normative intuition for Habermas's attempts at arriving at a non-Eurocentric discourse of human rights. Following Hegelian criticisms of Kant's concern for humanity, Habermas focuses on Carl Schmitt's slogan 'Humanity, Bestiality'. Schmitt argues that terms such as 'humanity', 'cosmopolitanism' and 'peace', are often used to justify what have come to be called just wars. What is at stake here is the universalization of a value not simply because it is an inherent good; rather, it is chosen to be promoted because it provides a cover for the legitimation of the violent treatment of the territories and peoples of those who are not of our mind. Because different and not like us, such peoples are justifiably subject to treatment that we would ourselves find intolerable. Thus, during World War II, certain civilians were killed indiscriminately and put in mass concentration camps because they not were not considered 'human'.

These issues are at the heart of what has come to be called 'the Asian Challenge' to human rights (see for example Bauer and Bell, 1999). Although scholars from both Western and East Asian nation-states struggle to develop arguments that would facilitate the acceptance and spread of human rights discourse and education, it is not often noted that at least four quite distinct concepts are embedded in these challenges. The first of these has to do with the use of normative terms to cover a practical project that might even be at odds with the value being promoted, namely human rights. It is, however, to recognize, that the problem does not lie with the inherent good of the value itself, but rather with the use to which it is being put. The second is the worry that comes from a too determined implementation of what is taken to be an irrefutable good. This is the worry that derives from a strenuous commitment to the spreading – the universalizaton – of democratic values and human rights across cultures. This is what Habermas calls human rights fundamentalism. The third concerns itself with the experiential and the particular and indicates that values are tied to local beliefs and cultures. Hence, the global promotion of a certain set of values would put local values and the rights of groups and individuals to hold them at risk. This is what is at stake when we refer critically to 'universalistic' and 'relativistic' claims in human rights discourse. The fourth, acknowledging the previous three concerns, rests on the observation that power ascribes the terms 'universal' and 'relativist' to the values of cultures that are at the core and to those that lie at the periphery, respectively. There is no push, for example, to universalize values that favor arranged marriages over those resting on individual choice. Even though such was, and some might say continues to be, the practice not only in many parts of the non-

Western world but also in the middle to upper classes in the West – as exemplified in the struggle of Jane Austen's character Elizabeth Bennet and the person of Lady Diana Spencer – where proprieties of property or a duty towards maintaining cultural integrity and not compatibility of temperament are at stake in domestic arrangements. In other words, in this view, human rights discourse is Western and the insistence on a global human rights regime is nothing but another example of supremacist attitudes expressed largely. Mainly, the Asian challenge in its various articulations and its responses enfold and speak to these four concerns.

There have been several attempts at addressing these concerns. The first of these, as proposed by Jack Donnelly among others, claims that although human rights are inherently Western, they do not necessarily violate the values of non-Western societies and traditions (Donnelly, 2003). Let us first consider the two-part claim that human rights are inherently Western but do not necessarily violate non-Western societies and traditions. Habermas argues that human rights can be traced back to 'the Virginia Bill of Rights and to the 1776 American Declaration of Independence, as well as to the 1789 Declaration des droits de l'homme et du cityoen' (Habermas, 1997, p. 137). These declarations were inspired by the writings of John Locke and Jacques Rousseau. Furthermore, as Habermas (1997) argues, the privileging of rights over duties resulted from the conceptual modern move towards coercive law first articulated by Thomas Hobbes. Similarly, Jack Donnelly points out that the conception of human rights arose in the West in conjunction with the rise and spread of Protestant values and its attendant capitalist market and democratic political structures.[3] Importantly, then, human rights is not a formulation of what is a universal norm. Rather, as both Habermas and Donnelly argue, it is a value that arose in response to a particular complex of historical conditions within the West.

Donnelly defines human rights as the rights that one has simply by virtue of being human (Bauer and Bell, 1999, pp. 60–87). This seemingly simple definition is fraught with philosophical and political difficulties. The definition reflects two dimensions of human rights – the legal and the moral. The first has to do with the legal validity these rights enjoy as constitutional norms – a positive validity. The second deals with the validity they enjoy as rights attributed to each person. This is philosophically difficult for reasons already stated but especially so when considering universality. There are those who argue that the legal dimension merely reflects a natural right. If this be the case then the universality of human rights is a given and what we need to do is to set up legal procedures within different cultural contexts that will provide positive validity to these natural values. This runs contrary to the historical particularity that both Habermas and Donnelly give the idea of human rights. This is of particular importance to Donnelly, who must see human rights discourse as being Western and modern, as he

[3] It is important to note that there have been similar "protestant" movements in the non-Western world, such as Buddhism and Sikhism in India that entailed individualist-communitarian, democratic, but not necessarily capitalist features, that they did not come to shape human rights discourse had much to do with the distribution of knowledge within the nexus of technology, and local and global differentia of power.

wants to make the case that because of the processes of global communication, travel and education, we live in a time and increasingly in cultures where not only are we able to claim human rights but actually must be able to make these claims. It is this historical particularity tied to legal-political validity that gives Donnelly's argument its force. Habermas, displaying greater sensitivity to non-Western concerns, wishes to distinguish between innate and instituted law. Firmly, he reminds us:

> The conception of human rights does not have its origins in morality; rather, it bears the imprint of the modern concept of individual liberties and is therefore distinctly juridical in character (Habermas, 1997, p. 137).

The very concept of rights demands a legal forum for realization whether this be regional, national or international. Moreover, human rights are basic because, unlike other rights, moral arguments alone suffice to justify them. Nevertheless, Habermas stresses the significance of the legal in effecting the moral. It is for this reason that he finds the distinction between the moral and the legal useful. If Habermas had taken a more robust Kantian position, he would not be limited to the juridical arena as the only place for realizing the morality enfolded in the idea of human rights. Kant's idea of moral perfectionism would have led him to consider the significance of education in achieving perpetual peace through aspiring towards a moral international order. As Korsgaard in her comments on Kant's essay 'Universal Law and Humanity', reminds us:

> We ought to realize our humanity by developing our talents and powers, our rational capacities. We ought to acknowledge that others are sources of value by treating their chosen ends as good, and pursuing their happiness as they see it (Korsgaard, 1996, p. 18).

Thus, through educating ourselves we are able to live to our fullest. But, we do not achieve this through adhering to an anemic individualism. Rather, we achieve it by acknowledging the value of others as they go about living their lives to the fullest. Thus are individuals and societies, at local, national and international levels, linked as history moves us, through education, closer to the cosmopolitan ideal and perpetual peace. Furthermore, treating others as equals and acknowledging them as sources of value leads to the development of 'moral personality . . . a good will and moral character'.

For Kant, as John Rawls points out, 'that although as purely natural beings endowed with the powers of the rational but not the reasonable, we cannot oppose the love of life, nevertheless we can do so as natural beings endowed with *humanity,* that is, the powers of the reasonable in union with moral sensibility'(Rawls, 1999, p. 527). The role that humanity, which is natural, has to play is to act by bringing together the reasonable with moral sensibility and has to be educated and refined. Such education entails the performance of duty in accordance with the Categorical Imperative till the individual becomes aware of the moral sensibility – of humanity's rational nature – which one shares with all other human beings. Thus, we come to the educated realization – the enlightenment – that the freedom of humans as a species comes from the shared knowledge that we can act from a moral law of pure reason. The categorical imperative is the principle of autonomy. Thus, morality as autonomous use of reason provides the foundation of Kant's political thought, as Beiner and Booth point out,

> Standing at the center of Kant's political thought is the notion that persons are free in what he terms the 'positive' sense, free because they are or are capable of being the legislators of the maxims of their own conduct. The fact of autonomy is the foundation upon which Kant then erects a theory of politics. Autonomy serves simultaneously as the purpose or ultimate end of the political community, as the basis for an array of hedges restricting the behaviors of both rulers and citizens with respect to their treatment of one another, and as the cornerstone of a theory of relations between states (Beiner and Booth, 1993, p. 2).

It is through education that individuals not only come to recognize their humanity, but can then begin to act autonomously such that they build a society and a community of societies where relations are based on valuing each other as ends in themselves and not instrumentally. This is the Kantian legacy for human rights and human rights education.

Habermas has a deeper reason, however, for maintaining the distinction between natural and instituted law and the moral and the juridical. His first worry is that if such a distinction is not made and maintained the 'natural' nature of morality might be used to cover-up interventions that are really better seen as police actions.

> The politics of human rights undertaken by a world organization turns into a fundamentalism of human rights only when it undertakes an intervention that is really nothing more than the struggle of one party against the other and thus uses a moral legitimation as a cover for a false juridical justification. Second, he wishes to maintain the rights are no longer condemned and fought for from a moral point of view, but are rather persecuted as criminal actions within the framework of a state organized legal order according to institutionalized legal procedures (Habermas, 1997, p. 147).

This argument not only seeks to benefit victims but also to provide legal recourse to those accused of war crimes and crimes of humanity. Thus, Habermas seeks to satisfy the universalization condition of human rights discourse.

We can see that Habermas is not unmindful of the moral dimension that is constitutive of any definition of human rights. Rather, it is his attempt to block the possibility of using the rhetoric of morality to cover-up wars of expansionism, his desire to have crimes against humanity punished and not merely condemned, as well as to extend human rights to all by providing legal protection to the perpetrators of crimes against humanity, that motivates this distinction. These are the reasons why he declares at the beginning of his essay that he has based much of his discussion on Kant's doctrine of rights while remaining silent on the doctrine of virtue. This, I suggest, is a flaw in an otherwise powerful argument for human rights from a Kantian perspective.

In his discussion of liberalism and human rights, on the contrary, Donnelly rightly points out that rights are never raised without simultaneously raising the concept of duties. That is, rights and duties are inextricably linked one to the other. To invoke a right is to remind someone of their duty to respond to the call for help. However, he wishes to privilege the discourse of rights as opposed to that of duties for two reasons. The first, one that he shares with Habermas, derives from the historical rise of human rights. The claim to human rights was not present in premodern Western cultural contexts, he argues, and is absent in many non-Western discussions of concerns for the well-being of persons. That is, the claim to rights is tied to one's humanity is a modern, and Western, phenomenon.

The debate about Western and non-Western concepts of human rights turns on this distinction between rights and duties operating separately with the former trumping the latter and the two being deeply intertwined, with duties taken to be more significant than rights. It is pointed out by Asian scholars, such as Arvind Sharma, that Asians do not deny the moral power of human rights (Sharma, 2004). They point to the duties that are constitutive of social roles in traditional societies. These duties guide one's behavior not only towards those who are in authority over us but also those more vulnerable than us that we are obliged to honor. In this view, for philosophers such as Jürgen Habermas and Jack Donnelly to claim human rights as a concept that is uniquely Western is disrespectful towards non-Western societies and cultures.

Donnelly accepts these points but wishes to maintain the significance of rights over duties. What is unique to the West, he argues, is that subjects have rights they can claim independently of, or before, the social positions they occupy. Furthermore, Donnelly points out traditional societies, such as those obtained in Asia are not as 'traditional' as they were. This is also noted by Asian scholars such as Inoue Tatsuo, a law professor at Tokyo University, who notes that both Western and Asian publics are in the grip of Orientalism. Thus, we see that Asians, who challenge human rights discourse as an imposition of Western values, ironically have to rely on essentialist and West-centric constructions of Asian societies (Tatsuo, 1999, pp. 27–59). Clearly, we need deeper international education if we are to avoid reproducing distinctions that are no longer necessary and divisions which do not serve the global good. Furthermore, economic globalization has made individuals vulnerable to the vagaries of a capitalist market and so need human rights and human rights education. For leaders to get caught up in where an idea arose is to refuse mechanisms that are vital for the well being of their own people and to be rendered suspect of a peculiar sort of elitism.

There are two additional moves that I make to lay out my suggestions for finding our way towards a rapprochement between the incommensurable positions, 'Western' and 'Asian', that have come to plague contemporary human rights discourse. The first is to look to the Western tradition itself and make two further moves that lead us to the significance of speaking of human obligations in rights discourse. The second is to show the resonance between Western and Asian values such a move permits.

In her provocative comments on human rights, Mary Midgeley notes that moral-political frameworks have often had to be reworked when certain ways of organizing political life were no longer valid. 'Our world (speaking here for the West) has changed', she says, 'in ways that we cannot even begin to comprehend and it demands some kind of adaptation from us, adaptation of a morality which we built for a quite different, much more manageable kind of world. We cannot go on acting as if we were still in that simpler world. On that path, we will find no way through' (Midgeley, 1999, p. 161). This, of course, is not the first time that we, in the West, have faced such a 'radical conceptual emergency' (Midgeley, 1999, p. 161). She goes on to remind us that the decline of the Roman Empire led to the loss of a framework that gave meaning to an entire civilization. Furthermore, when the Goths took Rome, St. Augustine

offered Christians the idea of the City of God. Thus, she notes, other empires and cities have fallen since and people have had to reshape their moral horizons.

There are two ways we could respond to such an epistemological and moral crisis: the first is to widen the scope of morality as St. Augustine did or human rights discourse demands of us, or to narrow it. Since the Renaissance, Midgeley argues, we have tended to narrow the scope of our ethical concerns which is an understandable response to changes in a world that seems socially unbounded – and calls on people to respond to very wide demands. Given the complexity of the world, it seems perfectly reasonable to limit the social domain and retreat into a kind of 'moral minimalism.'

This reasonable response had some unintended consequences as she points out:

> It was meant to debunk supposed duties towards the supernatural because these duties had been used to justify fearful religious wars and oppressions. The real target of contract thinking was a distorted notion of duties towards God, and towards earthly rulers who claimed to be God's regents. But this move had an unintended side-effect. It makes it quite hard for us now to make sense of our responsibility towards humans outside our own society, and almost impossible to explain our responsibilities towards non-human nature (Midgeley, 1999, p. 162).

Thus, modern moral and political theorists till most recently have followed the path of contracted moral and political considerations. Often, these theorists, she argues, have followed the path of Kant who was taken to be largely responsible for the narrowing of the scope of morality till the point where all relations between individuals are seen as being contractual – individualistic and legalistic. This is the Kant invoked by Jürgen Habermas in his discussion of human rights as we have already seen. But Kant, Midegely notes, operated within a dialectic of both a narrowing and widening of our moral horizons. He combined both strands in his thinking and therefore continues to be a significant and fertile ancestor. It was first in the eighteenth century, the time that Kant was writing, that we see both in the formation of the United States and the French Republic – humanitarian movements – that celebrated a widening of the scope of moral and ethical considerations through the Declaration of Independence and the Rights of Man. Kant, privy to both, envisages a super-city inhabited by all humans, who simply because they are humans must be viewed as ends in themselves and not as means to the ends of others. The contemporary criticisms of the Enlightenment, speak to only one end of Kant's dialectic – the narrowing of considerations. The other end, the widening of the scope of our ethical and political concerns to embrace all humans has remained largely neglected until very recently as in the work of John Rawls, Carolyn Korsgaard, and Barbara Herman among others. The broadening pole of the Kantian dialectic encourages us to continue with the project of Enlightenment rather than abandon it.

It is easy and important to point to the manner in which postmodern theory has recognized the narrowness of the moral claims of modernity as also to show its error in taking this to be the whole of Western thought on these issues. Thus, it has served to usher in what we may take to be the despair of much of contemporary moral discourse.

It has served us well also by reviving our interest in Wittgensteinian concerns regarding representation and reality. In this view, as we can know and express the worlds we inhabit only through our representations – usually linguistic – then it matters much what kinds of language we are able to use. It is quite possible that the language required for full and complete participation within a legal system is one that you as immigrant, woman, child or cultural Other may not have access to. Hence, you can never be plaintiff in any legal interaction (Dhillon, 2000, pp. 197–198).

In sum, I take arguments from cultural particularity to be right to worry about the significance of context when thinking about the human rights as universal educational discourse. However, I suggest that calling for particularity and a referral to context is inadequate in itself. We must decide what a relevant context might be. Thus, for example, when I consider the Nazi persecution of European Jews, if I confine the relevant context to the sphere of Europe, I can identify the perpetrators of injustice, their victims and the moral liberators. However, if I expand the context to include Asia and Africa, then the 1940s in Europe present a more complex moral picture. The period of Nazi expansionism and social policies of ethnic purity was also a time when much of Asia and Africa was under colonial rule by the very European powers that were fighting the moral war against Nazi Germany. To define a context we need to recognize, and make explicit, what Wittgenstein would call its grammar. These rule-governed linguistic practices are already abstracted from the sensuous substrate where some may be more relevant than others when evaluating an action. Thus, we presuppose a responsibility to humanity which informs the determination of relevance of a particular context to a particular discussion of human rights.

According to Robert Brandom, while thinking about the conceptual and nonconceptual elements of thought, Kant contrasts concepts with intuitions. He does this first as form to matter, second as general to particular and third as products of spontaneity or intellectual activity, as opposed to products of receptivity (Brandom, 1994, p. 617). The argument for concepts in use turns on recognition of the Kantian distinction between concepts and intuitions while refusing to let the distinction slide into a dualism. This non-dualistic taking up of Kant's distinction rests on the recognition that Kant theory of judgment, which includes a classificatory discussion of concepts, rests on the attempt to link the intellectual and the sensible faculties in his description of the activity of judging. Talk of concepts in themselves leads us down the two positions often ascribed to, and criticized in Kant, that in turn lead to a dualistic view of the world and our knowledge of it. The first of these places concepts, and hence reason, over against, the material multiplicity and particularity of the world as it represented and taken up by us. Second, concepts emerge as epistemological intermediaries that mediate between our minds and the world, thus making it impossible for us to know the world as it is. By linking the conceptual, the general, to the particularity of intuition, and linking what is in us to what is out there, reason and feeling, the general and the particular are brought together in uneasy harmony. Hence, we hold out the possibility of knowing the world we inhabit and act within while refusing the dualism between ourselves, and those with whom we share it.

Specifically, Robert Brandom draws our attention to deictic expressions, such as 'this' and 'that', where the particular is linked to the general because something is indicated without being characterized. Brandom here strongly notes the erroneous thinking the dualism between conceptual neutrality and empirical content leads us to. 'In grasping this connection it is helpful to focus on the use of deictic expressions, for it is in such reports that the world most directly imposes itself on suitably trained concept-mongers, who find themselves possibly acknowledging empirically contentful commitments' (Brandom, 1994, p. 630).

Following Brandom's contemporary reading of Kant into linguistic usage, the sort of receptivity he sees as being fundamentally tied to unrepeatable tokens such as 'this' and 'that' is essential to our empirical knowledge. Furthermore, it ought to be distinguished from other, more spontaneous applications of concepts, for instance in purely inferential theorizing. Yet, according to the inferentialist conception the use of unrepeatable deictic tokenings – for instance, particular uses of 'this' – are fully conceptually articulated. Indeed, were they not, they could serve no cognitive purpose (ibid., p. 630). On this view, then, in reading Kant, we would not find ourselves in the company of 'the holy man who lives atop a mountain and refuses all human intercourse', rather by making judgments the fundamental form of our awareness and hence placing concepts in use we would find ourselves in a relation that reaches out to others and grows in response to the other.

Contrary to her own view, Kant would be in full agreement with the moral educator of particularity, Nel Noddings, when she says 'we depend upon each other even for our own goodness' (Noddings, 1984, p. 102). From the standpoint of the ethics of care, she finds herself agreeing with Kant's reservation with regard to our ability to define another's perfection 'for we cannot define the principles by which he should live, nor can we prescribe the particular acts he should perform to meet that perfection' (ibid., p. 102). We are, however, to remain, 'exquisitely sensitive to the ideal of perfection and in the absence of repugnance overwhelming to one-caring, we must as ones caring act to promote that ideal. As parents and educators, we have perhaps no single greater or higher duty than this' (ibid., p. 102). It is worth underscoring the significance of this passage in rethinking the relationship between a Kantian conception of human rights education and moral education based on ethics of care. At the first instance, we can note the role that the regulative ideal plays in shaping particular moral action. Furthermore, in valuing mutual moral perfectibility, Noddings is echoing, not refuting as she often claims, the fundamental concern that drives Kant's cognitive and moral investigations.

The difference between Noddings's position, however, and that of Kant is closely tied to the issue of moral perfectibility. Kant does not set apart our dutiful participation in moral interaction along lines of like and dislike. For Kant, this is a duty we bear universally – hence the significance of Kant in human rights discourse. Noddings adds the condition of 'absence of repugnance' in the performance of our part in moral perfectibility based on a concern with recognizing our duty to respect not only others but also ourselves. The ethic of caring is not an ethic of self-sacrifice

as suggested by Martha Nussbaum. It is the absence of a conditional in Kant's understanding of our dutiful participation in moral perfectibility, in fact the binding force of our bearing such a duty towards all which leads us to Kant's door when thinking about human rights education. As made explicit in several places but most accessibly in his essays 'What is Enlightenment?' 'The Idea of a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View' and 'The Doctrine of Virtue', in *The Metaphysics of Morals*, this radical turn to duty does not stem either from a self-sacrificial motive or from a hermitlike refusal of the social. Rather, it is in the performance of such duty in universal manner – in extending ourselves to become as inclusive as we can – that we display our deepest regard for ourselves. For, in such dutiful performance, we embrace our responsibility for the perfectibility of our species and create the conditions of our freedom. Thus, for Stuart Hampshire, are we are saved by Kant from becoming a mechanical tool for action that a faithful adherence to empiricism might demand as also from becoming being 'ghost, in the form of rational will' (Hampshire, 1989, p. 156). For Hampshire, it is through the double nature of our knowing – an awareness of our own inner feelings, with their own often indeterminate goals and rhythms, and the external observation of the body as a mechanical system – that we create the possibility of universal communication and the possibility of linking the particular with humanity as a whole. Hampshire's position, however, along with that of Kant, Noddings and Brandom remains species-specific or anthropomorphic, and a full account of human rights would be needed to attend to animal rights. Roughly, we would be needed to argue that not to pay attention to the environment and other creatures would be tantamount to limiting our humanity.

To quote Hannah Arendt, 'It seems that a man who is nothing but a man has lost the very qualities which make it possible for others to treat him like a man' (Cited in Lyotard, 1993a, p. 136). Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that someone who is under conditions so abject that he or she has to appeal to their very humanness to ward off the treatment they are being accorded are quite possibly not in a position to claim their human rights (Dhillon, 2001). Hence, the implementation of human rights becomes the obligation – the responsibility – of other members of society. Thus, for example, the Indian social anthropologist, Veena Das, gives us a description of the human suffering that followed in the wake of the disastrous Union Carbide leak in Bhopal. The case, against the Indian state and Union Carbide, for the basic rights of those who suffered the most had to be taken up by human rights and civil liberties groups both national and international (Das, 1996, pp. 137–174). Das argues that while justice in the narrow sense was done – that is all legal procedures were followed and some compensation offered the 30,000 affected because of faulty and irregular safety procedures – justice in a larger sense remained elusive, for no one was held responsible for this unfortunate accident. Moreover, in the course of the judgment 'it was evident that there was no lack of concern for the impact of a hazardous industry on *society in general,* it was only the interests of these particular victims that could not be fully protected' (Das, 1996, p. 163). In sum, even though the victims of the Bhopal tragedy were offered some money to ameliorate their condition, their human rights were not honored in the fullest sense.

What is important to the discussion at hand is that those who suffered most during this industrial mishap were among the poorest of Indian society. Because of their extreme vulnerability they were unable to make legal claims on their own behalf, and these claims had to be made by local, national and international humanitarian organizations. It is this inability that marks victimhood – to follow Jean-Francois Lyotard on this – the inability to represent one's suffering:

> It is in the nature of a victim not to be able to prove that one has been done a wrong. A plaintiff is someone who has incurred damages and who disposes of the means to prove it. One becomes a victim if one loses these means (Lyotard, 1993b, p. 9).

Hence, for Lyotard, proper moral action in human rights issues is to respond unconditionally to the representations of the call of the 'other' (Lyotard, 1993a, pp. 135–149). Thus, we make the turn from the discourse of human rights to that of human obligation and from Kant's doctrine of rights to the doctrine of virtue. In this way, we make the whole of the *The Metaphysics of Morals* relevant to a global discussion of human rights education.

The turn to Kant's doctrine of virtue and his discussion of obligation is motivated by these two considerations: a desire to widen the scope of moral and political discourse and a worry about the relation between the idea of human rights and the phenomenology of juridical practice. In 'The Doctrine of Virtue', Kant argues that 'ethical duties are of wide obligation, and duties of right are of narrow obligation' (Kant, 1996, p. 153). The narrow duties of right carry the two meanings, 'rectitude' and 'entitlement' that Donnelly notes:

> In the most general sense of rectitude, we speak of something *being* 'the right thing to do', indicating conformity with a standard of action. Entitlement is a narrower sense of 'right.' When one *has* a right, she is entitled to something and therefore armed with claims that have a special force (Donnelly, 1999).

Donnelly's notion of rights is tied to the individual, and this is what Kant refers to as duties of right tied to narrow obligation. Keeping in mind the dialectic of Kant's thought, we could say that Donnelly speaks to the strand of contraction even though he would have these narrow, Western, duties instituted around the world. The expansive pole of Kantian dialectics leads us to note that wider duties are those whose field of action is broadened – as for example displayed in maxims such as 'love your neighbor'. Such duties are much harder to realize in action. However, as a person is able to 'bring them closer to *narrow* duty (the duty of right), the maxim of complying with wide duty (in his disposition), so much the more perfect in his virtuous action (Kant, 1996, p. 153). Through attention on, and action directed towards, the realization of these wide duties one makes the right of humanity, or also the right of human beings, one's *end*, and in so doing widens our concept of human rights beyond an attention to what is legally due to us. Our continuing moral education, as well practice such that others can pursue theirs, towards the happiness and welfare of humanity, is, on the Kantian view, an obligation.

In this essay, I have argued for the significance of universalism in human rights without relinquishing the legitimacy of the critique from cultural difference. Furthermore, as in the Bhopal case, I have shown that such concerns are no longer

unique to the West. In other words, through a robust turn to Kant which encompasses the entire *The Metaphysics of Morals* (both the Doctrine of Rights and the Doctrine of Virtue), I have suggested ways in which the universalization of Western values has already taken place and made human rights discourse globally relevant. Second, I have also pointed to the nodes of attunement between Western and Asian values so that we can start to educate towards a legitimately universal non-hegemonic regime of human rights – one that is acceptable to all.

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CHAPTER 4

AMBIGUITIES OF COSMOPOLITANISM: DIFFERENCE, GENDER AND THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION

Sharon Todd

> The peoples of the earth have thus entered in varying degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in *one* part of the world is felt *everywhere*. The idea of a cosmopolitan right is therefore not fantastic and overstrained; it is a necessary complement to the unwritten code of political and international right, transforming it into a universal right of humanity.
>
> Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace*

Kant's 200-year-old plea for a universal right of humanity now seems almost prophetic in light of the contemporary culture of human rights around the globe. As an idea that entertains the possibility of universal right as a unifying force across various nations, cultures and societies, Kant's cosmopolitanism foreshadows, to a degree, current responses to the complexities of living in and with the effects of that hotly contested term 'globalization', which is marked by, for example, rampant capitalism, vast international migration, ecological fragility, technological inter-connectivity, cultural hybridity and reconfiguration of political power.[1] Indeed all these themes are present, to greater and lesser degrees, in the recent turn to the discourse of cosmopolitanism, particularly within political philosophy, social theory and ethics.[2] Reflective of a struggle to articulate norms and standards through which it might be possible to secure peace, security and human dignity, discussions of cosmopolitanism

[1] Social theorist Zygmunt Bauman has suggested that globalization 'means, among other things a separation of power from politics'. Capital, he claims, is 'no longer bound by the limitations of space and distance, while politics stays as before local and territorial. The flow is increasingly beyond the reach of political institutions' (Bauman, 1999, p. 120). Thus, one of the issues that Bauman identifies is how local political agency might be remobilized as a response to global forms of power. Cosmopolitanism, in general, attempts to rethink this issue through appeals to cosmopolitan citizenship and a notion of responsibility beyond community.

[2] Cosmopolitanism has been the theme of a number of edited collections. For example, Vertovec and Cohen (2002) critically focus on the theory and practice of cosmopolitanism; the essays in Breckenridge et al. (2002) take up the specific questions of culture; Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann's (1997) volume centres on the bicentennial anniversary of the publication of Kant's essay, *Perpetual Peace*. See also the special double issue of *Theory, Culture and Society*, vol. 19: 1–2 (2002), whose essays cut across a wide range of issues in social and political theory.

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have surfaced at a time when debate over citizenship, sexual equality within various cultural practices and the changing face of politics seems to be occurring at a fevered pitch.

The appearance of cosmopolitanism, particularly on the European scene, has been seen in conjunction with contemporary concerns over what kinds of rights and responsibilities nation states and citizens ought to have within a large European federation and how these might be simultaneously responsive to a global context. Robert Fine writes that cosmopolitan thinking within sociology, for example,

> maintains that the old national framework is no longer capable of addressing global risks that have no respect for national boundaries or power structures outside national frameworks of democratic accountability. It maintains that the internal heterogeneity and hybridity of populations within nation states are driving them inexorably beyond the framework of *national* societies (Fine, 2003, p. 454).

In this sense, cosmopolitanism is an attempt to rethink society from two directions. It can be seen as an expansive movement from the inside out, that is, it involves thinking about how the state and its citizens not only have obligations and responsibilities in terms of national contexts but in trans-national and international ones as well. Yet, the turn to cosmopolitanism has also been taken up in a time of global migration, leading to the increasing pluralism within nation states – what one might think of as the global presence within the borders of the state, or a movement from the outside in. In this view, questions are raised with respect to what obligations and responsibilities states and citizens have to cultural differences within national contexts. This has posed a number of challenges for certain European states, largely because of their self-identification in terms of unified culture or 'people' – a narrative of a 'modern social imaginary', to put it in Charles Taylor's (2004) words – which makes any thinking of the nation outside the terms of unity a difficult task to undertake.

However, within the growing pluralism of European societies, education is not simply challenged in terms of redefining its aims along cosmopolitan lines (as important as this is). It is having also to face the ambiguities of the cosmopolitan ideal within society itself, that is, how universal principles actually work *within* nation states reveals profoundly difficult dilemmas for education around questions of pluralism. I am not convinced, as some are, that the universalism of rights, particularly as applied uncritically to education, can offer some kind of redemptive unity to questions of diversity (Gundara, 2000, p. 57–60) on the grounds that rights are universal by virtue of their being unquestionable reflections of an essence of human dignity and worth (Perry, 1997). Moreover, as rights are themselves conflictual (Ignatieff, 2000, p. 9), granting them universal status along the lines of a moral principle seems inappropriate. Neither am I convinced, though, that paying sole attention to culture with a total disregard for rights is helpful either. Cultural practices can be just as diminishing to human flourishing as a violation of rights can be. And, this, as I see it, lies at the ambiguous core of cosmopolitanism: the defence of and obligation to universal moral standards *and* to local, particular systems of meaning. Instead, what I am proposing here as a way of working through ambiguities of cosmopolitanism is a critical

evaluation of how rights actually participate in concrete practices of intercultural relations.

A prime example of how rights and intercultural relations prove difficult to settle within a simplified call for the universalism of rights currently can be found in the excessive worrying over what Muslim girls and women wear to school. For instance, through appeals to the right of a nation to self-determination, Western nations are pursuing an increasingly aggressive campaign to delimit certain civil freedoms, particularly with regard to the right to education. Nowhere is this perhaps most clearly evident than in the recent rash of regulations and legislation compelling girls and women to refrain from wearing headscarves in educational settings, acts which disregard any particularity as to religious and/or cultural practices and to how gender is signified through those practices. In Sweden, schools are now given the right to expel girls who wear the *burqa*. In Belgium, there has been long-standing debate on whether to prohibit Muslim dress outright. In Germany, it has been questioned whether teachers can wear a headscarf to their places of employment. In France, it is now illegal for both students and teachers to wear a headscarf (or *hijab*) or other 'conspicuous' religious symbols in schools.

What is on the table here is, in my view, expressive of the inherent ambiguities of the cosmopolitan ideal as at once embracing both a universal discourse and a particular concern for cultural pluralism. This chapter examines the challenges to education posed through an exploration of this aspect of cosmopolitanism. I investigate here how we might think of cosmopolitan obligation and responsibility in ways that work through the tensions between universalism and particularism, sexual difference and cultural difference. In particular, I focus on the concrete case of the French law prohibiting religious symbols in schools and link this to feminist critiques of both rights and cultural particularity. In what follows, then, I argue that the spirit of cosmopolitanism always entails a moral obligation to defend the right of others to exist, an obligation that can be found emanating, in part, from Kant's notion of hospitality.

Cosmopolitanism and ambiguity

Before beginning with a brief exploration of Kant's contribution to cosmopolitan thought, it is important to mention the criticisms that have been brought to bear on conceiving cosmopolitanism solely as an achievement of European Enlightenment. Indeed, Sami Zubaida (2002) identifies cosmopolitan attitudes as emerging from the Middle East, whereas Peter Van der Veer (2002) claims it is a trope of colonial modernity, and Martha Nussbaum (1997), among others, has traced its beginnings back to the Roman Stoics. Thus, to begin with Kant is not to lay claim to some originary point from which an ethos of cosmopolitanism emerges, rather it is to understand the point of departure from which much of the current European literature on cosmopolitanism draws its meaning.

Like the term globalization, cosmopolitanism is difficult to pin down. It has been described variously as 'a) a socio-cultural condition; b) a kind of philosophy or

world-view; c) a political project towards building transnational institutions; d) a political project for recognizing multiple identities; e) an attitudinal or dispositional orientation; and/or f) a mode of practice or competence' (Vertovec and Cohen, 2002, p. 9). For the purposes of this chapter, the view of cosmopolitanism which I take up here might be seen as existing somewhere between a world-view, a socio-cultural condition of global migration and a project of recognizing diversity. Yet, the political and moral questions that cosmopolitanism raises both for education and society at large cannot be neatly contained within any one heuristic category. Indeed, I suggest that the ambiguities to be found in contemporary accounts of cosmopolitanism, as well as those of Kant, are ones that haunt the full range of its usage.

Written at a time of the burgeoning development of nation states in Europe and on the heels of the Treaty of Basel that brokered a *suspension* of all hostilities between revolutionary France and Prussia, Kant's 1795 essay proffers three definitive articles of *perpetual* peace, which he distinguishes from the mere laying down of arms (Kant, 1991, p. 93). The first of these articles defines the kind of state needed for peace to be attained. Here, he outlines the need for each state to develop a republican civil constitution that is founded on three principles: the freedom of all in society 'as men'; the dependence of all upon a unified body of law 'as subjects'; and legal equality for all 'as citizens' (ibid., p. 99). The second article involves the establishment of a 'pacific federation' between states, in accordance with 'international right [law]' (ibid., p. 104).[3] States must 'adapt themselves to public coercive laws, and thus form an *international* state (*civitas gentium*)' (ibid., p. 105). The third article is devoted to what Kant refers to as 'cosmopolitan right' as limited to the 'conditions of universal hospitality' (ibid., p. 105). Here, Kant formulates the basic 'right of humanity' as 'the right of the stranger not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else's territory' (ibid., p. 105). Hospitality is hence 'concerned not with philanthropy, but with *right*' (ibid., p. 105). What is important to note in Kant's formulation is that this cosmopolitan right is not a right to citizenship or membership in a state. But it is, in the spirit of Derrida's (1999) reading, a right of welcome. Kant writes

> If it can be done without destroying him, he can be turned away; but, as long as he behaves peaceably he cannot be treated as an enemy. He may request the *right* to be a *permanent visitor* (which would require a special, charitable agreement to make him a fellow inhabitant for a certain period), but the *right to visit*, to associate, belongs to all men by virtue of their common ownership of the earth's surface; for since the earth is a globe, they cannot scatter themselves infinitely, but must, finally, tolerate living in close proximity, because originally no one had a greater right to any region of the earth than anyone else. (Kant, 2003, p. 16)[4]

Indeed, hospitality is not 'a virtue of sociability, as the kindness and generosity one may show to strangers' (Benhabib, 2004, p. 26), but a right which requires a

[3] There is some discussion over how to translate the German *recht*, which refers both to law and to right. In this context, it is clear that to our modern English ears, law seems more appropriate here.

[4] Note here that this passage is quoted from Ted Humphrey's translation of Kant's essay, which offers a much smoother text in this instance compared with Reiss's. See Kant (2003) and Seyla Benhabib's (2004) own translations.

moral obligation on the part of the state (and its individual members) to receive all others, independent of cultural, national or social membership. Hospitality becomes the condition upon which discussions of a world federation or republic may be entertained:

> But this natural right of hospitality, i.e. the right of strangers, does not extend beyond those conditions which make it possible for them to *attempt* to enter into relations with the native inhabitants. In this way, continents distant from each other can enter into peaceful mutual relations which may eventually be regulated by public laws, thus bringing the human race nearer and nearer to a cosmopolitan constitution. (Kant, 1991, p. 106)

Although the second article has been taken up in discussions of the possibilities of world government and international law, the first and third articles particularly interest me here in thinking through the ambiguities of cosmopolitanism and how they play out for Muslim girls under the new French law. For Kant develops a cosmopolitan world-view that is conditional upon equal treatment under the law based on the universal freedom accorded to all members of society (at least all male members) while being also contingent upon the upholding the universal right to hospitality. It is no small thing, then, that the state can place limits on accepting members fully into their fold while also being obligated to grant temporary sojourn to outsiders. Thus, what we have here is a cosmopolitanism that recognizes the state's legitimate right to declare itself as a self-determining, at the same time as it has a universal moral duty to be hospitable. Two universal conditions, then, exist for states (and members of those states), and as we will see below, they do not necessarily complement each other when confronted with actual encounters across cultures.

Granting hospitality to the foreigner, the stranger, the outsider, means that states have a responsibility to engage with others who do not possibly share the same histories, language and world-view; in short, hospitality is about welcoming cultural differences. Anderson-Gold makes the simple observation that 'cultural pluralism is a precondition of cosmopolitanism since a cosmopolitan condition is one in which all of the peoples of the world participate' (Anderson-Gold, 2001, p. 8). But, even more importantly, one cannot think the terms of stranger, foreigner and other, and the demands this makes on the behaviour of states and its citizens, without having some idea of plurality and diversity in social life. Kant's continual allusions to peoples outside European territory give some indication of the fundamental scope of his vision.[5] Not a depiction of how members within states should treat one another, 'this 'right' regulates the interactions of individuals who belong to different civic entities yet who encounter one another at the margins of bounded communities' (Benhabib, 2004, p. 27).

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[5] As Fine and Cohen discuss, it is important to see Kant's cosmopolitanism in the light of his work on geography, where far from embracing what we would now see as an 'enlightened view' of others, 'Kant's views on race would not discomfort the average Nazi' (Fine and Cohen, 2002, p. 145). Here, they draw on David Harvey's discussion of Kant's lectures on geography and cite numerous examples of racial denigration. This stands in stark contrast to the tone of the examples of colonialism and brutality which pepper 'Perpetual Peace'.

So, if hospitality is about welcoming non-members into one's community and into the community based on a 'cosmopolitan constitution', then how do states deal with the demands of particularism in terms of the universal hospitality that is accorded to all others by right? Coupled with the state's right to self-determination to secure for itself its own membership and define for itself the conditions of freedom for its citizens, the obligation required to meet the right of hospitality can often lead to a tension between what it means on the part of strangers to feel welcomed and what the state is prepared to offer. For surely what it means to welcome is to welcome the other as stranger, as someone who exists in her own right, as someone who is independent of any attributes the state may place on her. To be hospitable, to welcome the other into one's home necessarily requires an attentiveness to accommodation that suits the other's particular needs. Otherwise, hospitality would indeed be an empty gesture, one to satisfy personal gain, and would contribute to Kant's worries about a state simply exerting its dominance instead of fulfilling its cosmopolitan responsibilities.

This, I want to suggest, is where the ambiguities of cosmopolitanism lie, and they are ambiguities that continue to haunt contemporary discourses on cosmopolitanism. Indeed, viewing Kant's internationalism and right of humanity as a prefiguring of the UN Declaration of Human Rights has lead many to the idea that human rights are the universal principles that need to inform relations between states as well as between states and individuals. The language of rights has thus been taken up as an expression of cosmopolitanism, as offering international moral standards which apply equally to all everywhere. The problem, however, is how to adjudicate between competing or conflicting rights (e.g., the right of the state to self-determination and the right to hospitality). Anderson-Gold, for example, sees Kant's formulation of cosmopolitanism as the groundwork for an international human rights agenda. It provides 'moral solidarity and a sense of world citizenship' (Anderson-Gold, 2001, p. 19). It is not that cultural difference is entirely ignored, but what sometimes gets left out of the picture is the messiness of cross-cultural dynamics within and between states, which also needs to be accounted for, it seems to me, in appeals to cosmopolitanism. But this is no easy task.

For example, Anthony Woodiwiss (2002) claims that human rights themselves have been not only based on capitalist interests but also has produced silences around social differences. Advocating for a more 'cosmopolitan' approach, Woodiwiss falls on the other side of the divide, so to speak. Rather than privileging rights as minimal universalist standards (which can form the basis of a universal ethic), Woodiwiss, in contrast to Anderson-Gold (2001) and many others, claims it is in the best interest of global peace to recognize cultural differences as integral to the implementation of human rights around the world.

Thus, the challenge cosmopolitanism poses to education is also reflective, to some degree of this tension between, on the one hand, world citizenship and universality of rights as a framework for education and, on the other, the centrality of cultural pluralism. Educational initiatives that are more reflective of the former move may be seen in the calls for teaching for human rights, global awareness (Noddings, 2005) and cosmopolitan citizenship (Nussbaum, 1997; Osler and Starkey, 2003). This type of educational

response sees the importance of expanding the horizons of students to take on global responsibilities. Educational response to the latter has largely been characterized through the appeal to interculturalism and, once again, to human rights. Indeed, for a number of authors, education's responsibility is to educate students for cultural diversity as a feature of developing local and not only global sensibilities. Here, interculturalism cannot be seen as separate from the pursuit of human rights within the education system (Batelaan and Cooman, 1995; Best, 1990; Gundara, 2000; Lahdenperä, 1995). There are generally two reasons given for this. First, intercultural understanding is itself a human right. That is, in order for each individual to be treated with respect for human dignity, education must value cultural diversity. Second, human rights actually promote social cohesiveness across cultural borders. That is, this line of argument focuses on the importance of developing a minimal set of values with the aim of creating unity within and across particular nations. The idea is that through accepting the universal application of human rights, states can begin the work of re-building a nation through its educational institutions – one that is both respectful of cultural diversity and yet binds members together through a shared commitment to universal rights.[6]

Yet, there is a lack of acknowledgement as to the limits of rights in responding to educational issues in practice. That is, appealing to changes in curricula or orientations to teaching, while extremely important, nonetheless fails to take up questions of how states actually promote conditions for cosmopolitanism through their educational policies. For instance, as I discuss below in relation to the French law, how are the rights of the state and the rights of the individual being adjudicated? Whose rights and whose culture are being privileged? How is girls' education being read against the backdrop of state obligation and responsibility in the light of universal appeals?

Thus, for the remainder of this chapter, I wish to keep in focus what is at stake in these cosmopolitan ambiguities – between cultural pluralism and universal right, as well as between competing rights. In particular, I turn now to what I see as a largely gender blind discourse with respect to rights and culture to set the stage for my discussion of how these cosmopolitan ambiguities factor specifically into the education of certain Muslim girls.

Culture and rights for whom?

Challenges to the globalizing tendencies of human rights have opened up considerable debate around the universalism of those very rights. Bryan S. Turner (2002, p. 46–47) notes three main criticisms: (1) that rights are saturated in Western values of liberal

[6] It is important to note here that not all those who advocate for multicultural or intercultural education wish to promote the upholding of universal principles of rights. Indeed, critical of some aspects of rights discourse, Bhikhu Parekh in his influential book, *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory*, writes: 'Furthermore, universal values and human rights need to be interpreted, adjusted to the unique circumstances and cultural traditions of each society, and prioritized in case of conflict. Since disagreements on these and related issues cannot be resolved by appealing to the values themselves, moral universalism is of limited value' (Parekh, 2000, p. 266).

individualism and are incompatible with non-Western societies; (2) that they are not enforceable, particularly those rights that have a cultural component; and (3) that rights imply obligations which have not been fully given adequate attention. The first, 'culturalist' argument, carries perhaps the most weight in terms of levying critique against the way rights discourse appears to turn a deaf ear to cultural difference. More particularly, principles of freedom, equality and justice, which ground rights, are often seen to be in tension with the particularities of linguistic, social and cultural contexts. The charge is that universalism pays inadequate attention to the local complexity of how freedom, equality and justice are understood and practised.

What is notably absent from Turner's list is the feminist critiques that have also highlighted the ways in which rights fail to protect the interests of girls and women around the globe. They also claim that rights which actually apply most directly to women (social, economic and cultural rights as opposed to political and civil ones) are not adequately enforced by local governments. The upshot is that for some feminists, rights are universal neither in principle nor in practice. Yet, rights discourse does not wish to abandon itself to a relativistic framework; the fear is that without universal principles the world would be left without a moral anchoring point.

The culturalist position has often laid claim to the fact that rights are merely representative of Western imperialism and that under the rubric of universalism they, in effect, mark 'otherness' as that which lies outside Enlightenment views of freedom, equality and dignity. They assert that otherness is sustained by the refusal of rights discourse to recognize their cultural legitimacy to define freedom, equality and dignity on their own terms. Basically, whichever culture lies outside the West becomes an unrecognized other. Now, one could easily make the claim, as some feminists have, that women are precisely othered in this way. Not necessarily in terms of Western prejudice, but in terms of patriarchal privilege. Feminist analyses of human rights treaties and practices have paved the way for understanding how documents such as the UN Declaration as well as national and international enforcement policies both create and sustain the systemic exclusion of women. There are two reasons generally given for this exclusion based on two distinct feminist critiques, what I call the access and specificity critiques.[7]

The first focuses on the lack of women's equal access to rights protections, that is this view asserts that women face enormous difficulties in accessing and achieving the same rights protection afforded to men, through legal procedures and institutional support. This view is largely entrenched in a liberal feminist position. The second charges that women's specificity is absent from rights, that is how the actual concerns of women, based on their particular lived experiences, have failed to be reflected in various rights declarations and treaties. As the argument goes, women's specificity is not fully recognized in rights documents, which thereby render all women other to masculinist notions of freedom and equality. And this is

[7] See Brems (1997) for an extensive discussion of the many faces of feminist and cultural critiques.

particularly the case with so-called first generation rights that protect civil and political freedoms. What is particularly masculinist has also to do with, on the one hand, the privileging of freedom in civil and political rights in the public sphere, which leaves patriarchal dominance largely in tact and, on the other, the paucity of attention given to second generation rights, that is economic, social and cultural rights which are largely reflective of the private sphere (Gallagher, 1997; O'Hare, 1999). This view tends to enjoy more favour among what might be loosely called cultural feminists.

As one of the main critics of how social, economic and cultural rights have failed to be enforced, feminists have been instrumental in championing them as crucial to the empowerment and advancement of women across national and cultural boundaries. The International Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993 was seen to represent a major victory for bringing these issues to the table. Both the access and the specificity arguments were used to convince conference members that the universality of second-generation rights, and not only civil and political rights, needed to be upheld (Binion, 1995; Brems, 1997). Indeed, the Vienna Conference resulted in a unanimous commitment to the universality of both first- and second-generation rights. But this meeting was also important in other ways. Both the focus on women's specificity and on issues of access came together to promote the idea that rights are indeed both a source of protection and an empowerment for women. Yet, in achieving a renewed commitment to universality, it also served to silence the cultural position, which claimed that the universalism of human rights served to deny the right of collectives to live according to their own cultural precepts. Some feminist responses to the cultural 'group rights' argument hinge on the fact that 'culture' has often been used as the rationale to sustain oppression and abuse of women within various communities, and the examples most prominently given are the practices of sati, purdah, female genital mutilation and forced marriage.[8] That is, women and girls have been denied basic freedoms on the basis of cultural definitions of gendered roles in society (Brems, 1997). Yet, other feminist responses recognize that culture cannot be separated entirely from questions of sexual difference.

As Ann-Belinda Preis writes, 'A more dynamic approach to culture is needed in order to capture the various ways in which human rights give meaning to, and are attributed with meaning in, the on-going life experiences of men and women' (Preis, 1996, p. 290). While feminists should indeed be wary of cultural arguments that are used to justify women's oppression, we should not fail to take notice of how cultural practices themselves shape an individual woman's self-understanding and give meaning to her

[8] See Susan Moller Okin's (1999) provocative essay, 'Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?' Here, Okin outlines how 'group rights' have been promoted in ways that fail to recognize how women are subject to patriarchal cultural practices within those groups. Critics have charged her with an oversimplification of the notion of 'culture', one that does not acknowledge pluralism even within self-identified groups. The point, however, is that she raises very similar concerns with respect to multiculturalism as some feminists have raised with respect to the cultural critique of human rights.

lived reality. The need to feel that one belongs, the risk of ostracism, and feelings of self-worth must necessarily feature into any attempt to apply universal standards to individual situations.[9] So, although the goal of universality in terms of gender equality and freedom is not in question, in practice the response to local context is nonetheless an important feature; it means that gender equality might look differently not simply according to one's culture, as if culture could ever be so monolithic, but according to the cultural practices that women and men engage in. Preis notes that human rights conventions might set a goal, but 'they are only intelligible in situated contexts' (Preis, 1996, p. 311). The result is that any discussion of the universalism of human rights has to contend with the ways in which gender is situated in relation to it.

What is at issue in these feminist arguments are the tensions that women as a *collective* face in terms of various expressions of patriarchal power and that *each* woman faces in terms of her self-worth and self-understanding within a specific set of cultural dynamics. Keeping alive this doubleness I think is important for thinking through the kind of obligations that a cosmopolitan commitment to rights necessarily entails. Indeed, attending to the complexity of gender is of utmost significance in analysing how sexual difference intersects with interculturalism and rights, and what consequence this has for education. Aside from the critiques of access and specificity, outlined above, it is important to keep in mind that gender is a primary effect of cultural practices (Butler, 1990) and making divisions along the lines of sexual difference is the central focus of most cultures (Okin, 1999). Thus, any claim for intercultural understanding would need to take into account the specific workings of gender. Discussions, then, about the effects of cultural differences in society cannot ignore the centrality given to gender roles, to expressions of masculinity and femininity or to how the private–public distinction is defined in relation to sexual difference. In this sense, cosmopolitanism would need to acknowledge the ways in which culture creates gendered conditions for human rights, including the right to education. Moreover, the singling out of Muslim girls in the European educational context indicates the way gender is located differently in concerns about cultural diversity in Western democracies. 'How can we account for the preponderance of cultural practices concerning the status of women, girls, marriage, and sexuality that lead to intercultural conflict?' (Benhabib, 2002, p. 84). Thus, discussions of rights and citizenship within the context of cosmopolitan values need to confront head-on the implicit and explicit ways gender factors into the tensions between the nation-state and its diverse populations.

Yet, rather than despair over the sheer complexity of taking gender and sexual difference into account in an already ambiguous and messy 'tension between universal human rights claims, and particularistic cultural and national identities' (Benhabib, 2004, p. 44), we might actually instead view these as part of an inevitable obligation

[9] This is one of the key points that Michael Ignatieff (2001) raises with respect to the problems that plague advocacy efforts on the part of the human rights' organizations. Although arguing from a liberal voluntaristic position, in which women need to decide for themselves how to 'make the adjudication between tribal and Western wisdom' – which begs the question how free any such 'choice' can be – Ignatieff nonetheless makes evident the social costs for some women in exercising their rights (2001, p. 72).

of cosmopolitanism and a 'constitutive feature of democratic legitimacy' (Benhabib, 2004, p. 44). The point is not to do away with such tensions but to find ways of learning to live better within them. Thus, to view the French *hijab* ban from a feminist perspective of specificity and culture requires seeing the inherent ambiguities of cosmopolitanism as integral to the very processes of the multicultural nation. The question is how are such ambiguities revealed in specific instances, such as the French law, and how might an appreciation of sexual difference help us acknowledge these dilemmas more fully?

The '*Hijab* Ban'

Having its roots in the '*l'affaire du foulard*' (the headscarf affair) of 1989, the French law on Secularity and Conspicuous Religious Symbols in Schools was voted in overwhelming by the legislature on February 10, 2004 (494 for, 36 against, 31 abstentions) and signed by the president on March 15 of that same year.[10] Coming into effect on September 2, 2004, the law has created a lively and divisive debate around the nature of the right of the state to uphold its constitutional commitment to *laïcité* (secularity) and the right of individuals to freedom of religious expression.

The headscarf affair began with the expulsion of three girls from their school in Creil for having their heads covered. It galvanized focus on the republic's educational system and the constitutional principle of *laïcité*. As Benhabib notes, *laïcité*

> can be understood as the public and manifest neutrality of the state toward all kinds of religious practice, institututionalized through the vigilant removal of sectarian religious symbols, signs, icons, and items of clothing from official public spheres. Yet within the French republic the balance between respecting the individual's right to freedom of conscience and religion, on the one hand, and maintaining a public sphere devoid of all religious symbolisms, on the other, was so fragile that it only took a handful of teenagers to expose this fragility. The ensuing debate went far beyond the original dispute and touched upon the self-understanding of French republicanism for the left as well as the right, on the meaning of social and sexual equality, and liberalism vs republicanism vs multiculturalism in French life (Benhabib, 2004, p. 186)[11]

Benhabib's observations centre on those elements in the debate which have served as a powerful precursor to the existing French law. Although in France, the law that requires all students from wearing 'conspicuous' (*ostensiblement*) religious symbols in schools affects Jewish and Sikh boys (as well as anyone wearing a large cross), it is not difficult to see in demographic terms the overwhelming affect this law has on a substantial portion of Muslim girls. Indeed, taken within the context of the debates around

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[10] The official name of the law is '*loi encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, colléges et lycées publics*'. Although the term conspicuous (*ostensiblement*) is not used in the title of the law, it appears in its first article. See Assemblée Nationale (2004).

[11] See also the Stasi Commission's Report (2003) for a brief history of the incorporation of *laïcité* into the French Constitution.

the headscarf that had raged in France for 15 years, and in the aftermath of September 11, the French law was indeed drafted against a background of fear of Muslim militantism. The original lawmakers admitted, for instance, that they failed to consider the implications of the law for the 5000 members of the Sikh community in France.

Elsewhere, I have argued that this obsession with headcovering reveals much about the views of how a society seeks to define itself as an 'us' against a 'them' and very little about what the actual wearing of the headscarf actually means to those who wear it (Todd, 1998). Although my focus was an incident of school expulsion in Montréal, Québec, the internal debate which ensued (which in that case divided opinion along cultural-linguistic lines) is to some degree echoed in the current questions being asked of the nature of French society. In defining who ought not to belong in certain segments of the public sphere, who ought, that is, not to participate in institutional life, the state recentres an idea of citizenship that is firmly rooted in an idea of unity and sameness. It is, we might say, a 'negative' citizenship, for the prohibition of certain articles of clothing from public institutions such as schools does not offer a productive view of belonging in civil society; it merely confirms who does not belong. It also raises the question as to how hospitality might be rethought in terms of relations between states and its own citizens, given that some citizens are deemed to be outsiders to the perceived unity of the state. What is so compelling about the French case is that unity is thus not simply accomplished through the sharing of a common cosmopolitan value (the principle of *laïcité*, for example) but is demanding a public identity based on what not to be. The failure to comply with this outward identity carries with it serious consequences in terms of the protection of one's individual rights.

Of course, this question of citizenship raises the issue of the nature of freedom of religious expression and the degree to which states can impinge upon that right with democratic legitimacy. The Stasi Commission, set up by the French government to report on application of the principle of *laïcité* within the Republic and to make recommendations of future actions to be taken, acknowledged the importance of upholding freedom of religious expression. However, in citing various cases presided over by the European Court in Strasbourg, the Commission dismissed any foreseeable problems with placing restrictions on, for example, religious dress in schools; indeed, it saw any intervention on the part of the European Court as remote. According to the report, the European Court 'protects *laïcité* when it is a fundamental value of the State. It allows limits to the freedom of expression in public services, especially when it is a matter of protecting minors against external pressures' (Stasi, 2003, p. 59, my translation).[12] But what concerns me in this chapter is how education is treated here. Surely not a public

[12] The original paragraph reads: '*L'obstacle juridique de l'incompatibilité d'une loi avec la Convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales, qui était fréquemment avancé peut, à l'issue des travaux de la commission, être écarté. La Cour européenne de Strasbourg protége la laïcité quand elle est une valeur fondamentale de l'Etat. Elle admet que soient apportées des limites à la liberté d'expression dans les services publics, surtout lorsqu'il s'agit de protéger des mineurs contre des pressions extérieures*' (Stasi, 2003, p. 59).

service, access to education enjoys protection under the European Convention as well as the UN Declaration. The French law makes access to education, which citizens are supposed to enjoy as a right irrespective of religious or cultural practices, conditional upon the forfeiture, to some degree, of yet another right. Moreover, its target is primarily, although not exclusively, Muslim girls. (For instance, with respect to Sikh boys, some French schools have ruled that the Sikh turban and *kirpan* are expressions of culture and not religion, which raises questions about how the practice of veiling is solely seen in terms of religion, not culture[13]). But, of course, this is not merely an issue of access. It is in failing to address the specificity of some women and girls from Muslim backgrounds that the right to education is so seriously put into question. This law is very much about circumscribing freedoms that fundamentally cut across the cultural meanings of sexual difference and gendered experiences of culture.

For example, one of the main rallying cries in promoting the law was that French society stood for sexual equality and that *hijab* was seen to be a serious obstacle to women's full empowerment. Thus, the logic of the argument implies that if everyone refrains from 'conspicuous' religious symbols, the furthering of gender equity will be served. The point is that this connection between lack of equality and the wearing of religious symbols is only ever made in the light of Muslim practices. The argument is never marshalled to defend Jewish or Sikh boys' equality. This is not to say that enforcement of Muslim dress by fundamentalist groups is not an issue of equity, it is merely that this argument lacks proper nuance with respect to the conditions under which *hijab* is worn when it is not required by the laws of the land. Benhabib notes a paradox in relation to *l'affaire du foulard*, which is pertinent to the contemporary issues resulting from the French law:

> We seem to have a paradoxical situation here, in which the French state intervenes *to dictate* more autonomy and egalitarianism in the public sphere than the girls themselves wearing headscarves seem to wish for . . . . although there was genuine public discourse in the French public sphere and a soul-searching on the questions of democracy and difference in a multicultural society . . . the girls' own perspectives were hardly listened to (Benhabib, 2004, pp. 190–119).

Although I question Benhabib's assertion that the French state wants more autonomy and equality than 'the girls themselves seem to wish for' (this seems to be only possible if we think that those girls' decision to choose to wear *hijab* are not an aspect of their autonomy), the point I wish to make here is how difference based on sex is produced through such Western fixations with the headscarf to the exclusion of hearing the voices of those who are most affected by the debate. To consider that one can

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[13] See Leila Ahmed's (1992, p.14–15) thoughtful comments on the cultural practices of veiling that predated Islam, noting that both before and after Islam, veiling was associated with class and sexuality. She also writes scathingly of the attention it has received in terms of women's equality: 'As item of clothing, however, the veil itself and whether it is worn are about as relevant to substantive matters of women's rights as the social prescription of one or another item of clothing is to Western women's struggles over substantive issues . . . . That so much energy has been expended by Muslim men and then Muslim women to remove the veil and by others to affirm or restore it is frustrating and ludicrous' (Ahmed, 1992, pp. 166–167).

speak in the name of a universal principle of equality on behalf of others who are quite capable of speaking for themselves means that the state does not simply deny the wearing of headscarves but is defining the public sphere without the express involvement of all of its members, namely its sexual and cultural others. For, to my mind, it is not only a question of religion that is at stake here but a question of how women and girls may be systemically excluded from participating freely in the public sphere to the point of risking their right to education. Moreover, there is an odd tension promoted between the public and the private spheres that, I think, exacerbates this risk. Freedom of religious expression is fundamentally not a private matter, particularly for those religions whose very practices are about public modesty. The very idea of head covering arises precisely in the context of public sphere. Thus, to claim that students and teachers can practice whichever religion they wish after school hours makes little sense in the context of these practices. In putting the schooling of girls at stake by prohibiting religious expression in public fora, we must ask ourselves is this risk really worthy of a liberal-democratic state – and is it truly defensible?

It seems to me, then, that one of the issues for cosmopolitanism is how to evaluate and prioritise competing rights, particularly as those rights are poised between universalism and the particularities of cultural and sexual difference. No one wants to claim that states should not have the right to uphold their constitutional provisions through legitimate democratic procedures. But at what cost? What kind of obligation to cultural and sexual differences do nations have with respect to their right for self-determination? For what the hijab ban has shown, beyond all arguments for or against, is that difference is not perceived to be as equally important to protect as is the right to define a nation in unifying terms. By way of conclusion, I turn briefly to an examination of how obligation to others needs to be part of moral discourse of cosmopolitanism, one that takes into account the very differences that make living in a pluralistic society so worthwhile.

Cosmopolitanism and the obligation of hospitality

> Culture matters; cultural evaluations are deeply bound up with the interpretations of our needs, our visions of the good life, and our dreams of the future. Since these evaluations run so deep, as citizens of liberal-democratic polities . . . we have to learn to live with the otherness of others whose ways of being may be deeply threatening to our own. How else can moral and political learning take place, except through such encounters in civil society? (Benhabib, 2004, p. 196)

Learning to live with the otherness of others requires some radical rethinking in terms of the cosmopolitan ideal, for it implies that all citizens must share a commitment to valuing difference even when that difference disturbs. Indeed, the otherness of others cannot help but disrupt the unity of self and of nation, however imaginary that unity might be. Thus, part of what I am arguing for here is an understanding of cosmopolitanism that can learn to respond to disruption in ways that do not simply result in defensive gestures seeking to protect a unity that is, perhaps, no longer tenable (if it ever was). Indeed, I see this disruption as not only central to the struggles inherent to

democracies but also precisely to what is necessary for thinking ethically about those struggles.

I want to return here to Kant's notion of hospitality. For, although Kant is adamant that this obligation be extended only to strangers within one's borders and not to citizens, who come under the full protection of the laws of the state, we can see from the French example that even citizens' rights cannot be secured by the republican state. Is there a way to extend Kantian hospitality as *the* law: The law that is not contingent upon the particular form that a state takes? I think both Levinas and Derrida are helpful here. Levinas, like Kant, sees hospitality as necessary for peace. Unlike Kant, hospitality is not conditional upon states taking a certain political form, namely republican. Indeed, for Levinas, hospitality is an unconditional law. Levinas – and Derrida after him – puts forth a view of hospitality as a welcoming of difference, as a receiving of the other 'beyond the capacity of the I' (Levinas, 1969, p. 51). The Other's otherness is precisely that which exceeds my comprehension and is beyond interpretation. It is unknowability and uncertainty that mark a hospitable relation to the other. To put it in other words, I do not welcome you because I know you; I welcome you because I cannot. With this move, Levinas inscribes hospitality within the language of the ethical encounter. Thus, hospitality, taken beyond Kant, is not simply based on a political model for relations between states and individuals, or citizens and strangers. Instead, it is the very condition of sociality between self and other that knows no limits. As Derrida has put it, 'hospitality is infinite or it is not at all' (Derrida, 1999, p. 48).

Although Levinas is clearly not speaking of states, laws, citizens and rights, the ethical relation to the Other provides us with a language that raises questions about the degree to which states' and citizens' obligations are bound up with alteration and disruption. An ethic of hospitality, then, is a gift of welcoming otherness and confronting disruption without violence. Indeed, for Derrida, hospitality and ethics are one and the same:

> 'To cultivate an ethic of hospitality' – is such an expression not tautologous? Despite all the tensions or contradictions which distinguish it, and despite all the perversions that can befall it, one cannot speak of cultivating an ethic of hospitality. Hospitality is culture itself and not simply one ethic among others. Insofar as it has to do with the *ethos*, that is, the residence, one's home, the familiar place of dwelling, inasmuch as it is a manner of being there, the manner in which we relate to ourselves and to others, to others as our own or as foreigners, *ethics* is *hospitality*; ethics is so thoroughly coextensive with the experience of hospitality (Derrida, 2001, pp. 16–17).

The Levinasian description of a relation with absolute difference helps us, in my view, to rethink what our obligations might be in relation to cultural and sexual difference within pluralistic societies. The Other, Levinas claims, is an absolute stranger who challenges my sense of being, simply by being in a relation of exteriority to me. Thus, seeing the state's right to self-determination begs the question of who this 'self' is, and how the self – this unified polity – is a living entity that can be transformed through the encounter with cultural practices that are not part of its acknowledged history or imaginary community. Offering hospitality to the stranger, then, would apply not only to the visitor but to immigrants, refugees, the stateless and, yes, even citizens.

Although hospitality cannot give a direct answer to the problem of how to adjudicate between competing or conflicting rights, it can give us a framework for considering the effects of those rights upon those whose voices do not seem to be heard. If we shift our understanding from rights as entitlement to rights as a defence of the other's right to exist (Levinas, 1987, p. 124), then how we approach the question of education in cosmopolitan societies would necessarily demand of us something more than assuming that state policies can merely uphold universal principles (such as *laïcité*), which, in turn, merely serve to reinforce, as oppose to open, the borders of membership in civil society.

Moreover, seeing hospitality as an ethical attention to difference and singularity means that laws need to account for the ways others understand themselves beyond our own understandings of them. Being hospitable to the other does not mean an uncritical acceptance of whatever that person says or does, but is an assurance that the other has the right to be. Of course, struggles over what that being consists in and of cannot, nor should not, be denied; rather, what is evident through prohibitive laws concerning gendered expressions of cultural and religious practices is the lack of complexity and the cementing of boundaries of belonging that merely exacerbate intercultural conflict. One of the challenges for education, as I see it, is how to live in the spirit of both rights and hospitality in such a way that allows for a continual renewal of itself as the patterns of complexity change.

Hospitality offers us a way of thinking about how we need to learn from others we share a nation with and how a nation needs to rethink its 'self' as both its members and guests alter both the real and the imaginary grounds on which it is founded. For, what is important here is that learning to live with others demands that we be open to learning from them.[14] And this openness is precisely part of an ethical discourse that is so needed in cosmopolitan struggles for rights within the plurality that is our social life. Learning to live with the ambiguities of cosmopolitanism means welcoming the specificity of women's lives and providing space and time for Muslim girls and women not to be just heard, but indeed listened to – and learned from.

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[14] For a more fulsome discussion of the term 'learning from the other' see Todd (2003).

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CHAPTER 5

(DIS)LOCATING IMAGINATIVE AND ETHICAL AIMS OF GLOBAL EDUCATION

Elizabeth E. Heilman

The global contexts in which we all live and interact seem to demand that we think about providing a global education for our students. We live in a world in which our geopolitical, environmental and economic fates are increasingly interconnected. New developments in technology, communications and global economics are forging changes that make a distinctive new world. We live within an increasingly integrated world-wide economic system accompanied by profound and deepening inequality; we wrestle with increasing concerns about environmental degradation and sustainability. We confront a situation where individuals coexist with increasingly powerful aggregations of global media conglomerates and businesses. Of the world's 100 largest economic entities, 51 are now corporations and 49 are countries.[1] We try to make sense of the complex and varied effects of innovations in technology, media and communications that compress time and space and intermix groups and cultures. In this speeded up and intermingled world, we also develop increasingly flexible, transnational identities and ideas of citizenship and, at the same time, we face rising tensions among cultural diversity, tradition and cosmopolitan culture. All of this seems to require thoughtful attention in education.

Ideas about the nature of the global connections we experience, and our understandings of the most compelling challenges in a new global world and who has power to influence the world are shaped by myriad forces. Young people learn about global issues primarily from television, movies, newspapers and magazines, from social and religious groups, friends and family, and from their work environments and schools. Ideally, formal education should provide an intellectual foundation of information and critical perspectives that will guide students to embrace active and constructive citizenship in a changing world. Yet, just as there are many definitions of the global, there are many lists of what global education should entail and many definitions of what education for cosmopolitanism might be. Identifying themes in global education theory turns out to be tricky, as the related but distinct fields of social studies education, science education, environmental education, multicultural education, critical theory, peace education, education for human rights and development education all include theorists who call for

[1] S. Anderson & J. Cavenaugh, *of the World's 100 Largest Economic Entities, 51 Are Now Corporations and 49 Are Countries*, Institute for Policy Studies (Retrieved 26 December 2004 from http://www.corporations.org/system/top100.html).

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globally focused curricula, and they come from a wide range of philosophical and curricular positions. Thus, they present a range of approaches and theoretical understandings of the political, educational, moral and economic issues at stake (see, for example, Calder 2000; Calder and Smith 1996; Case 1993; Cogan, Grossman and Liu 2000; Giroux 1997; Gur-Ze'ev 2001; Kirkwood 2001; Lister 1987; McLaren 1997, 1998; Tye and Kniep 1991; Werner 1996).

As I have stated elsewhere, (Heilman, 2005) global education theory tends to be under-theorized. That is, theorists assert what global educations should consist of, but they do not tend to locate and argue for their claims within particular philosophical and epistemological traditions. As a result, global education is sometimes conceptually murky and contradictory, sometimes shallow sets of assertions that are backed up by little and rooted in little. It tends then to be thin and airy, not well developed or coherently based. I think as well that some writers who are dismissive or dubious about the potentials for global and cosmopolitan education are simply mixing up these distinctive intentions.

This chapter begins from the premise that global education, or cosmopolitan education, has *distinctive* intentions: it has imaginative intentions and thus is a type of psychological education: it also has ethical intentions and thus is a type of moral education; and, finally, it has pragmatic intentions and thus is a type of technical education. Taken seriously, this claim compels us to recast debates about both the rationale and the forms of global education and to disentangle these intentions and their distinctive challenges. I also argue that the imaginative and ethical intentions are the foundations upon which the technical rely.

The nature of imaginative intentions of global education

The first intention of global education is to develop *imaginative* capacities among students. Curriculum is meant to help students experience or imagine other human circumstances, encouraging them to see what is happening around them differently and learn about others with different ways of being in the world. Students are meant to explore diverse realities in local communities, the nation, and across nations and imagine situations such as: What does it mean to grow up in Baghdad, in Mexico City or on the south side of Chicago? In a different place, culture or status situation? In its imaginative dimension, global education asks students to envision what it would be like to experience the world as a Muslim fundamentalist or a Bolivian coffee plantation laborer. What does it mean to be a woman or a child in sub-Saharan Africa? What would go into perceiving and seeing if you were the 'other?' How do such others understand? And, if you were them, how would you understand?

Across a range of definitions, global education, then asks students to imagine others' views and experiences. Hanvey, for example, asks for *Perspective Consciousness*. 'One's individual view of the world is not universally shared . . . others have views of the world that are profoundly different from one's own'(Hanvey, 1976, p. 38).

Through global education, students are invited to imagine lives and perspectives other than their own. The (U.S. based) Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development (ASCD) offers an online tutorial in global education, and while no single definition or goal is offered, the organization states, 'Whatever way you decide to conceptualize global education in your classroom, remember that global education is grounded in the identification and exploration of multiple perspectives'.[2] This is a key intention of global education, and I believe that this sort of educational intention is sometimes misunderstood. Why? There are many difficulties with this intention. It relates to an act that is imaginative and psychological, and it requires a certain degree of psychological openness and sense of comfort and well being. Knowing the other is not technical, but personal and potentially entails self-transformation. At the same time, understanding the 'other' is necessarily partial and the boundaries of the known and unknown are hard to place. Also, the terms and contexts of knowing others are power laden and related to the availability of material and cultural resources, and thus are always political as well as personal and interpersonal. Finally, all sorts of knowing is difficult both because the global includes much that is difficult and even horrible or traumatic, and because global experience includes all sorts of irreconcilably different perspectives.

Advocating for mere 'appreciation' for multiple perspectives denies, however, the transformative nature of really entering into and *seeing* from another point of view to the extent that one understands. Accepting difference and exploring cultures are difficult because they require not just a nod to the others' diversity, but, much more powerfully, they may implicate one's deepest self and create one's self anew. In this chapter, I am electing to use the term 'global education' rather than cosmopolitan education but I would like to discuss what the term cosmopolitan means and what it suggests for the imaginative intentions of global education. In a strict sense, to be cosmopolitan means to be worldly, 'having constituent elements from all over the world or from many different parts of the world' or 'having worldwide rather than limited or provincial scope or bearing'. What does this mean exactly and what does it have to do with imagination?

As I see it, to be cosmopolitan is to have a multiplicity of peoples' experiences *inside* of us, to understand from multiple perspectives. What enables a person to become cosmopolitan? A cosmopolitizing encounter changes my sight of a person and/or place and my vision about how some aspect of the world works. I think of times when I was confronted with a human reality that was unknown to me before. The experiences changed how I saw myself, and they changed how I saw others, not one specific other, but human others, who could teach me a lesson beyond one. These were sometimes difficult lessons in which I had to learn something to be able to get out of it. It may be an encounter with just one, but it has implications beyond one. Such an encounter may disrupt and rearrange my categories for seeing and being; it

[2] From http://pdonline.ascd.org/pd_demo/lesson.cfm?SID=36

adds a new view that changes my thinking and my identity. My range of responses is enhanced. It is more and more possible for me to imagine things beyond myself. I become more complex. My inner gyroscope has more colors and angles.

To better explain the nature of this imaginative dimension of global education, I will give a few examples from my own life experiences that led me to become more and more cosmopolitan. In the first experience, I am fourteen and in a dark isolated stairwell in my middle school in Newport News, Virginia. This is my third week of school, and I have just moved from the northeast to this Southern, coastal industrial town. In general, I have been in shock. I now live in a very ugly neighborhood with an odd smell because it was built on swampy ground, and I go to an old school downtown near the docks and the massive ship yard. I cannot make sense out of the black/white dichotomy here because I am from a place in New Jersey that is fairly well integrated with a mixed student population of Blacks, Jews, Italians, Poles, Irish, Chinese, Japanese, Catholics, Protestants and a smattering of others. There were no 'white' students in my town in New Jersey but, instead, there were Jews, Italians, Poles, Irish and Protestants. In my old town, many of the Catholics, including me, are what I come to understand later as ethnics. In this Southern town, though, there seem to be only blacks and whites, and this is disorienting.

On this day, in the stairwell, there are about eight black girls and they start to push me into the wall and call out 'hey little white girl . . . where are you going white girl?' First, I am fully terrified, then I am confused and then I am furious. I remember the feeling of desperately searching for understanding, meaning and connection, like a drowning person trying to get air or at least get hold of something. When some understanding clicks in, I shout, 'I'm not *white.* I'm from *New Jersey*'. This is ridiculous. But I am trying to express that somehow I am not part of this cultural context, I hate this too. I am trying to figure out what they see in me to hurt. Then I see Benita from my health class and understanding clicks in again and I say, 'God damn it, Benita. If you want to beat up a white girl, beat up Paula. Beat up Paula Farrah Fawcett. Go beat up somebody with lip gloss . . . I hate this school'. Benita and two of the girls start to laugh. Benita comes to me and pinches my cheeks with the fingers of each of her hands as though I am a young child and slowly says 'New Jersey' and laughs. They then leave me, walking up the stairs, one girl sharply kicking my shin first.

All school year Benita and Yvonne call me 'New Jersey', and they call out 'Get you some lip gloss, girl.' After a few weeks I call back, 'Where is your mascara, Yvonne?' I buy a very white cover stick and pass it to Benita saying 'This is going to solve all of your problems'. Later when I am on the track team, I run with the black girls. We are not friends, but there is an understanding. Through a leap of imagination, I have understood that in this place my identity has changed, and I often have little control over how I am seen. I understand in new ways what it feels like for these black girls to have little control over how they, in turn, are seen. They have understood that white girls can be outsiders too. I think they have some sense of how my New Jerseyness makes me an outsider, and we have shared our sense of how we are all

outsiders to a certain kind of hegemonic female beauty that our classmate sweet, busty, southern Paula, tall blonde Paula with the Farrah hair, instantiates. Seeing from each others' perspectives on this day changed us.

This was not my first lesson in being cosmopolitan. The second experience in which my imagination was stretched that I will share was inspired by reading a text. I had been profoundly changed at about the same age when I read a description of a particular incident of murder during the Nazi Holocaust. I do not recall the text today, but the image lives vividly in my imagination. There were about twenty men, women and children on a rise at the end of a field. Many of the men had caps on. A mother in a kerchief was holding two young children close to her; one man was clenching and unclenching his hands. All capacity for parental and familial protection was lost. They were all shot. Reading about this event changed my life forever. I never had entertained the possibility of such an act before and knowledge of it meant for me that I must always work in my life in defense of humanity against real evil.

The third experience occurred in the mid 1980s when I lived for a couple of years in central Asia, in Xinjiang, the far northwestern province of China. I traveled for 4 days on a train from Beijing to get there, the last day through the rocky moonscape of the Gobi dessert. My first view of Urumqi from the window of the train revealed dusty clusters of low mud stucco buildings and the occasional six- or eight-storey building in grim Soviet style concrete, all set in a stark, dry, sandy landscape, with a far horizon. The place was without grass. From the train window, there appeared to be nothing alive at all, no plants, birds or children. It was so far away, so desolate, and so different. This sense of differentness never left me; it took on new dimensions and expressions, it often became something interesting and beautiful instead of daunting, and it entered my experience and identity. Difference was not just how things looked, but how people created lives, established relationships and value, and how the horizons of time and intention could be placed.

In this place, I am an education development advisor and I am a teacher. On the day I tell you about, I am with college students, many of them future teachers. We are in a cavernous, dingy, concrete classroom, and we all wear layers of long underwear, several pants and sweaters, and our coats, because the heat seems to be on more in theory than in practice. Later, when the winter finally breaks, and the layers come off, I am shocked by the students' skeletal thinness. Most do not have enough money to eat enough. Today, the students are learning about ways to teach language and about adjectives and descriptive words. I had asked them 'Bring an object that is important to you and tell the class about it using adjectives' and our show and tell begins. Fatima brings 'soft, helpful, useful, green, deafening' ear plugs. Her dorm room holds ten girls on narrow bunks, in a very narrow, grey, concrete room with a long, narrow plank bench table down the middle. Her eyes tear as she explains, 'I have nothings because I have no space'. Weidong (her name means protect Dong – as in Mao ZeDong) has brought a small, white, plastic rabbit, the kind that has something sort of fuzzy sprayed on it so that the texture is vaguely fur-like instead of smooth, the kind sold for 99 cents at Easter. As a 10-year-old, she explains, she had tamed a few rabbits and one in particular was her dear friend. But her father killed them. The family ate them. She was in the middle, two siblings older

and two younger, one dead sibling had been older and one dead sibling had been younger. Her father was a farmer working to reclaim productive soil out of the desert. They were often hungry. That was why he killed the rabbits. She weeps as she talks. Two years later he presented this special gift to her. In the eyes of this rabbit, she explains, she could see her dead brother, her dead sister and her 'dead, soft, brown, warm, bright, generous' rabbit. Also, the glassy eyes of the plastic rabbit were like the 'hot, wet, shinning, weeping' eyes of her mother when she made a coat lining from the rabbit fur for Wei Dong's small sister, a cold girl who got warmer and who did not die.

Nazgul has a small plastic globe with water in it and a tiny ship. She is a Kazak, who was illiterate before aged 10 years and was raised as a nomad in the middle of the Eurasian land mass. When she saw this little globe in a bazaar, the ocean – 'open, free, magical' – was explained to her and ever since she has been trying to get there. It is that little ship that has brought her to me, she explains matter-of-factly. Wang Li talks about a single bead on a silk cord around his neck. The rest of the 'ancient, valuable, traditional' beads, carried from the coastal city from which his family was banished because of their interest in Western poetry and music, were sold to pay for his education. This reminds me of a Chinese friend my age, a physicist, who wears an old coin with a hole in the middle on a string around his neck. When he was 6 years old, his parents brought him to the market each day to sell him. He has been given this coin and he rubbed it as he stood waiting to be bought. They were all starving. But nobody bought him.

In my middle school, reading library books, and traveling and teaching in Central Asia, I encountered life in different ways and had to grow to adjust to. To understand in each instance required that I draw upon my imagination, and in some way, it required too a lessening of my old self to expand myself to find new understanding. To comprehend the actions by Nazis during the Holocaust or the lives that these central Asian young people lived required that I imagine these experiences and then let go of the way I used to see the world. It required that I add new frames to my vision. It required that I imagine evil in a world of good and that I imagine a level of poverty and degree of isolation unknown to me before. I had to imagine a scale of tragic circumstances and also the sheer incidence of tragic circumstances across a sweeping population in a sweeping landscape.

Challenges of the imaginative intentions of global education

Each of these experiences challenged and changed me. When I think about the psychological aspects of such a change, it occurs to me that being aware of how you yourself are already more than one person helps. What do I mean by this? The sort of global education that I am talking about requires a person to become a different person. This is actually a normal aspect of growth. The view from a different place becomes part of one's experience and identity. In traditional social studies and global education, the 'other' is often described as external, as the people 'out there'. Students study other people and other cultures with a technical intention. They accrue or collect different perspectives, such as trading cards. Yet, we are all composed of others;

we all are made up of others from the inside out. Encountering others involves changes in aspects of the self.

Through the stages and phases of our lives, one identity is replaced by another. As teachers wish to facilitate imaginative encounters that result in conceptual change, their work can be aided when they help students understand their own past transformations. This means that teachers must attend to students' life histories as an aspect of global education. Also, developing capacity to deeply engage very different people, circumstances and cultures is a capacity that increases with experience, and is a cognitive and emotional capacity that is best developed early on. It is like learning languages. A 20-year-old who has learned three languages during childhood can much more easily learn one more language than a person who only speaks one language. Similarly, a person who, as a child, has developed relationships with people of diverse experiences and cultures tends to be more open to learning from others and exploring difference as an adult. This means that like foreign language learning, global education functions best when the requisite imaginative and emotional facility is established early on.

Imagination and the challenge of emotional and psychological capacity

Even if a student does not become fully like another, to have really understood another point of view or cultural way of being changes a person in ways that are typically uncomfortable – at least at first. The capacity to be open to others requires imaginative capacity and also emotional and psychological capacity. It is very much connected to feelings of safety and to personal identity. Being able to imagine others' views and experiences is not merely or even primarily a cognitive enterprise. Students need not only cognitive capacity, but, more centrally, they need emotional capacity. Prejudice and ethnocentrism appear to be strongest in children who are not bonded to parents by unconditional acceptance and love. Children who grow up emotionally insecure and with low self-esteem can be attracted to racism which gives them social standing above others, and can also be attracted to the simplicity of making judgments about others according to a blunt rubric of categories that does not require them to experience the emotional vulnerability of getting to know people in a more authentic manner. Ethnocentrism, which is 'an exaggerated preference for one's own group and a concomitant dislike of other groups' (Aboud, 1988, p. 47), also arises out of an emotional need to enhance self-esteem by projecting one's negative qualities onto others, and these emotional dynamics obviously interfere with cross-cultural understanding. Teaching students facts about equality has little influence on emotional orientations. As Moreland explains, 'we need to realize that, although sound knowledge is necessary to combat false information, it is not sufficient to change attitude. Facts do not speak for themselves; rather they are interpreted through the experiences and biases of those hearing them' (Moreland, cited in Pate, 1988, p. 288).

In my own experience, through the cumulative process of imaginative and transformative encounters across difference, I have become less myself and less the composite being of the community of my earliest upbringing and immediate family and more and more the product of the world and some of this change is disturbing and unsettling. Global education entails not merely a happy multiculturalism but also encounters with difficult, tragic and sometimes frightening knowledge and the resulting psychological challenges of imagining what is not just different, but also catastrophic and threatening. As Felman (1992) explains, such education is personal and psychological, and thus cannot be understood merely as the transmission of passive knowledge.

In the era of the Holocaust, of Hiroshima, of Vietnam – in the age of testimony – teaching, I would venture to suggest, must in turn testify, make something happen, and not just transmit passive knowledge, pass on information that is preconceived, substantified, believed to be known in advance, misguidedly believed, that is, to be (exclusively) as given. There is a parallel between this kind of teaching (in its reliance on the testimonial process) and psychoanalysis (in its reliance on the psychoanalytic process) insofar as both this teaching and the psychoanalysis have, in fact, to *live through a crisis*. Both are called upon to be *performative*, and not just *cognitive*, insofar as both strive to produce, and to enable, *change*.

Gleaning some knowledge of the other, as in the example from studying the Holocaust, is tied to a willingness and capacity to weep in despair. It involves encounters with the tragic and not merely with good news and happy endings. At the same time, this sorrow is connected in important ways to its other side, to an affirmation of human goodness. The Nazi Holocaust is a social laboratory for extremes of human behavior, including evil, but also good. In my experience, up against despair, when I confront the pain and horror some aspects global experience has to offer, it is lived worlds that I know that help me see evil without becoming sick forever. It is not a belief in better things, or a belief in a utopic place, or even in a disembodied idea of justice or the good that reassures me. Instead, my own experiences of the kindness of strangers, my own experiences with generosity and sweetness and beauty all allow me to imagine atrocity. There are days when my readings and even my immediate experiences lead me to see most humans as fundamentally evil or depraved. This feeling can be assuaged when I come home feeling cold and dispirited and am held by and hold my family members and we create heat and close community. This is one of the simplest, closest expressions of a shared culture. We are not the same alone and together we are a society, a politics, an eutopia, good and sometimes glorious. It is from my ethics and politics of family and community experience, from democracies of five and fifteen people; from making peace with a co-worker and finding the place of cooperation with a really mean dude on my street that I glean the most capacity to engage with difference and to have a hope for a better world. Yet, not everyone has the comfort of eutopia, of a good tangible place and community from which to recover a faith in goodness and possibility for betterness, and nobody has it all of the time. This is a real challenge for thinking about global education.

Curriculum theorist David Purpel (1989) believes social pathologies and ideological sources of human suffering including war, terrorism and abuse of human rights, totalitarianism and racism, gross inequality and injustice, poverty and famine, as well as ecological devastation and existential alienation reflect a cultural, political and moral crisis of historic dimensions. He argues that the extraordinary chasm, between this profound global crisis and the technical and managerial issues that dominate educational discourse amounts to a 'trivialization' of education. Curriculum is currently rationalized primarily as vehicle for transmitting non-controversial knowledge and information. Engaging difficult, tragic and frightening knowledge requires the repositioning of both the psychological and the political foundation or stance of education because so much of global experience and history is inherently disturbing and controversial, and because so much of it makes ethical and political demands upon us.

The above discussion of emotional balance and psychology highlights the fact that we can distinguish a cosmopolitanizing global encounter not so much based on *what it is that* is encountered or the object of the encounter, i.e. who or what is encountered, but instead by considering *how* it is encountered and what is made of the encounter. This means that teachers need to consider educative material based on its capacity to inspire emotional and imaginative responses to others. These responses are most powerful when they are in a real context. Many students have experiences like I had in middle school that involve very real conflicts around issues of identity, gender, race, class and power, and yet, these are not often mined and mediated as starting points for multicultural and global curriculum. Such points of tension are actually rich starting point for curriculum that encourages students to really confront the idea of multiple and different perspectives. Teachers can help students think about experiences in which understanding across difference *matters.* In instances of interpersonal conflict, there is often a tension between how a person or a group understands why it is doing what it is doing and what meaning others attach to the person's behavior. The will to understand comes from a real need or desire to have an impact on another, to speak and be heard, and to make a difference to the other. A careful consideration of the experiences and patterns of power and oppression among students within school seems to offer more potential for cosmopolitanizing experience than reading about other people and ethnic tensions far away. Using our lives as texts acknowledges that this educational intention has personal, interpersonal, imaginative, psychological and transformative dimensions.

Imagination and the challenge of text and context

A cosmopolitanizing global encounter not so much based on *what it is that* is encountered as *how* it is encountered. Still, *what* is encountered matters too and presents challenges that are both related and distinct. The nature of educative global texts and contexts is important. As Allport (1954) and others have observed, prejudice-reducing

contact between groups is most effective when there is a context of equal status among participants, support from institutional norms and authorities, and shared goals or objectives. Yet, these optimal contexts are impossible and interactive experiences involve also inevitable expressions of power and positionality.

Cultures are expressed and interpreted by people in particular mediated contexts, including immediate face-to-face dialogue, written texts and through a vast array of electronic texts. Books and journals as well as electronic media of computers, television, movies and songs allow for global encounters that do not require students to participate directly with people who inhabit the same physical spaces. Global media often carry what appear to be such cultural exchanges, yet the available texts and contexts for cross-cultural communications are not unproblematic; these communications need to be understood as positioned within particular discursive and ideological contexts and as selective and mediated. They do not themselves lead to clearer understanding. And they may be powerfully misleading. Instead, all communicative contexts position and place concepts, people and experiences in particular relations of power with particular values attached. Common venues for cross cultural experience tend to place Western, American and European culture and the Western student in privileged spaces, and each has limits that need to be carefully and critically explored.

For example, media can both open and close perspectives. I argue that media often makes it hard for people to access and imagine the ‘real’. Global mass media, movies and television do not presume to represent the world and its people in a realistic way, but consumers still learn from media important perspectives on what life is like. National geographic, popular films, news, talk shows and more all help construct ideas such as ‘Muslim’ or ‘China’ or ‘poverty’. But, consider how limited and distorted these images are. Baudrillard asserts that we live in a world dominated by the hyperreality and simulations of mass media, images, and signs, where truth no longer exists (Baudrillard, 1993, pp. 194–199). The created and non-real, such as TV, becomes more real than the real. Borders between the real and the created, between entertainment and information, and between the private and the public become confused. There seems to be more and more information, less-valuable information, and less and less meaning. Global media are also dominated by five transnational corporations: AOL-Time Warner, Viacom, Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation, Bertelsmann and Disney. Programming – or journalism, the business argument goes, should support, not dilute, those messages that are paid for. As a result, non-corporate ideas and alternative visions are simply not available. Political and cultural diversity and global responses to deepening inequality, oppression or environmental degradation are often invisible in media or are portrayed through a Western-centric view. Non-dominant peoples and cultures lack equal access to marketing power and global media, so the lives, voices and experiences of most people on the planet are absent from the mix. Their ideas for solutions to global problems are missing as well. Equitable access to cultural expression through travel or through technology does not exist nor does any sort of global community for communication. There is no global

'we' and place or venue for global communication. Globalization and its venues for communication seem to increase connections among the like minded who have power and access to communications, but deeply segregates as well.

There *are* limited and specific transboundaried global cultural networks that allow people from different cultures, spaces and places to talk to each other. Transboundary global cultural networks include various diasporas, the women's movement, the peace movement, the environmental movement, communities such as scientists working in different specialized fields, people with special hobbies such as collecting Barbie dolls, artists or historians working in similar fields, and specialists of all sorts (Held et. al., 1999, pp. 371–372). However, each of these is a *specialized* and *narrow* community and also a relatively *privileged* community. Oppressed, marginal people with shared interests lack access to technology and often to a literacy and a common language necessary for extensive global communication across cultures and regions. Many of the world's people have limited literacy skills and 21% are illiterate. They are also hungry. Of the world's 6.2 billion people, 2.8 billion live on less than $2 a day, 1.2 billion live on under $1 a day. Many lack access to communications and education to have a global understanding of their economic situation. Most lack access to a global discourse community.

Even the 'text' provided by in-person cross-cultural experiences needs to be critically examined with attention to power and positioning. However much I seemed to have learned form the teachers and students I worked with in Xinjiang, I was certainly still experiencing them through a distorted and limited ethnocentric lens. How could I really have access to their experiences? On the contrary, however different we were, we were still a specialized discourse community of teachers and learners. However skinny they were, however tragic many of their lives had been, they were still *privileged* or I would not have encountered them in my education development work. My intention in doing this work was not to gain cross-cultural knowledge, but many study abroad and service experiences are designed with the deliberate purpose of exposing students to difference, and this context can be especially problematic. As Linhart observed in a study of such a trip:

> The curriculum of the short-term cross-cultural service project functioned like a transaction in that students went on the trip and viewed each experience as part of a 'package' through which they were to get something in return. There was a purchase . . . and for some students that placed an expectation that the experience would be 'worth the money' (Linhart, 2003, pp. 207–208).

In Linhart's study, adolescents expected to purchase an ethically and spiritually enriching cross-cultural experience. The artificiality and power-laden nature of cross-cultural experiences can perhaps be best illustrated by a counter example. Imagine a group of teens who are illiterate, Bolivian coffee plantation workers returning from a cross-cultural experience and reflecting: *Having smelled the smells and eaten the food of their suburban world, I now have a new enriched appreciation for American life. My global understanding has expanded.* What is implied for global education when global understanding is a commodity that WE can and do purchase, but THEY cannot? Is it global understanding if it only goes one way? As Tye's research on more

than 50 countries revealed, global education is a phenomenon that occurs primarily in the 'rich world' (Tye and Kniep, 1991, p. 47-49).

All curriculum models, texts, media, discourses, cultures and identities involve the exercise of power. When we recognize it, this transforms the goal of 'global cultural understanding' from a presumably innocent, neutral, intellectual and imaginative activity into a much more political one with inevitable contestations for voice, power and meaning. Once we move from the facade of the 'givenness' and 'learnability' of cultural identities to consider the historical, economic and cultural processes that produced them, we begin to shift the focus of education from fixed reified notions of culture as an external 'things, people and places' to a consideration of dynamic processes of production, naturalization and normalization. The educational question moves from what is your culture to how is your culture? Whom does it serve? Who defines and expresses it? Who interprets it and for what reasons?

The ethical intentions of global education

These questions raise issues that are ethical as well as imaginative. The imaginative intention of global education opens up spaces for both reflection and action, helping us to bridge the gap between what is and what may be. After one engages with the 'other' person or situation, there should be some sort of judgment about what they think, value, have and deserve, and a feeling of connection and even caring. This brings me to the next distinctive intention of global education, which is *ethical.* This intention of global education is to foster a willingness to take action regarding the other. This intention encourages questions like: Why should I care about people in Baghdad and Chicago? Who are they to me and who am I to them? What is the universe of my human obligation? How can I improve the situation? What are the ethical limits of tolerating difference? In its ethical dimension, global education asks students to explore questions about the ethical nature of human beings and human groups, the obligations and responsibilities that global citizens owe to one another and the implications and tensions of various and sometimes competing relationships among cultures, religions and states, and the nature and justification of political and cultural authority in global contexts.

The imaginative intentions of global education are rarely articulated as having importance for its own sake, or rather, for the sake of solely individual transformation. Global education clearly aims some kind of positive social outcome. It is progressive in the old-fashioned sense of the word, meaning an approach to education that leads to progress and a better world. Some type of global education figures in a wide range of educational contexts and professions and global education can be defended alternatively as a vehicle for global social justice, for enrichment and for the smooth functioning of transnational capitalism, among other things, as these four quotes below suggest.

'Global Education in Finland: Global education aims at raising a sense of global responsibility in people of all ages. It includes human rights education, equality education, cultural education, development education, environmental education, media education, peace education and security education . . . . Global education is a legally defined educational principle in Finnish schools.'[3]

'In an interrelated world wherein our survival and well-being is intimately related to our capacity to understand and deal responsibly and effectively with other peoples and nations and with a host of international issues, global studies can be viewed as basic education' (Becker, 1978, p. 229).

'Global education is the wave of the future. One out of every four new jobs created in the U.S. is tied to international business . . . Rewarding career opportunities await those students who acquire a solid business education with a global perspective on economics, finance, marketing, and management; who achieve fluency in foreign languages; and who can claim first-hand living and working experiences in foreign countries.'[4]

'Global Education is a process which enables people to understand the links between their own lives and those of people throughout the world. It aims to develop skills, attitudes and values to bring about a more just and sustainable world. Global Education aims to develop an understanding of the factors and underlying causes that surround poverty, injustice, conflict, health and environmental degradation both in New Zealand and internationally. This, in the medium to long term, raises awareness, enabling people to act more compassionately in their daily lives in their community.' The Global Education Centre[5]

The reasons motivating the teaching of global education are sometimes themselves meant to be taught; in other words, a particular ethical perspective might not be held by the student and transmitting it is both an overt educational intention and also is a perspective that structures other aspects of content and pedagogy. Yet, the ethical justifications are sometimes implied rather than explicit in curriculum, the justifications sometimes mix multiple ethical and social arguments, and sometimes include ethical and social visions that can be contradictory. Global education is also sometimes presented as merely pragmatically and practically useful in a move that seems to side step ethics, but, in fact, does not. When global education aims to develop or transmit an ethical sensibility, this is a distinctive educational intension that needs to be understood. I think these justifications should be made more explicit, and should be debated, and that the idea that global education is an inevitably and profoundly moral and ethical enterprise itself is an important topic for both global curriculum theory and for curriculum.

This effort can be challenging, however, because in various iterations, global education is justified or condemned on at least seven very different grounds. These statements below reflect a range of justification for global education, including teleological theories in which the ethical standard is determined by its consequences and deontological theories in which the ethical standard is determined by right motives, not consequences.

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[3] From http://www.kansainvalisyyskasvatus.net/raportti/summary

[4] From http://www.bus.ucf.edu/ib/content/careers.htm

[5] From http://www.globaled.org.nz/

Challenges of the ethical intentions of global education

I suspect that global education needs (almost) all of the justification it can find. Many of the criticisms we encounter about global education can be responded to constructively by rethinking and clarifying the nature of the claims that justify it and often by pointing to different and multiple ways to think about the rationale (Table 5.1). To begin clarifying the nature of the ethical rationales, lets look at the use of 'connection' as a theme in three of these rationales. Some obligations stem from our actual material connections. Things we do and decide actually affect others; their lives and their decisions affect our lives; webs of interconnections and mutuality bind us all, although we may live separately behind national boundaries. A weakness of this rationale is that the nature of these connections is diverse and often tenuous, and many people rightly feel that they are not personally implicated in the global to a degree that any real responsibility or duty is suggested. Some iterations of global education move to redress this problem by enhancing the imaginative dimensions or 'raising awareness' of global issues and peoples and encouraging the capacity to *feel* connected. Another argument for global education based on connection is to start with political citizenship and extend it arguing that because nations are connected, the nations' peoples are connected. As status citizens in the more powerful countries in the world, where Western strategic power and hegemony shapes much that goes, Westerners are, by the nature of those relations, morally implicated in policies and practices that shape the lives of others. By virtue of political and material involvement, we have a duty to explore the impacts of our actions on others, for good and for ill.

These three different, but related, arguments for global education that rely on connection have received a lot of justified criticism, but I also think that each is a misguided or at least incomplete rationale for global citizenship, as I will explain. A very common critique is that people are not able to feel connected to and thus care about the whole world. In somewhat different ways, Gertrude Himmelfarb, Sissela Bok, Katherine Betts and Michael Walzer all make this sort of critique.[6] Katherine Betts explains, 'With national citizenship, people often want to contribute to the wellbeing of their fellow citizens because they feel that they are part of the one people, and for those who lack this feeling, there are laws which insist that they contribute. The global cosmopolitan approach cannot explain why individuals, except for an altruistic few, should want to observe the duties necessary to underpin the rights of strangers on the other side of the globe. And if they do not want to there is no institution to make them do so'.[7] Bok argues that people are not capable of extending their circles of attachment to the entire world because 'our allegiances depend on our situation in life and cannot be overridden by obligations to humanity at large' (Bok, 1996, p. 39).

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[6] See their articles in Cohen (1996).

[7] K. Betts, *Cosmopolitanism and Global Citizenship.*
From http://www.abc.net.au/global/citizenship/citizen_betts.htm

Table 5.1 Ethical Rationales for Global Education

Rationale	Theory Suggested
Global education is important since we are all connected and it is moral to have knowledge of and act responsibly towards those whose actions we affect.	Duty Ethics
Global education is important since we are all equal global citizens with equal human rights who deserve nutrition, health, shelter, security, or more broadly happiness, autonomy and cultural freedom.	Natural Rights Theory
Global education is important since it will help you survive, be successful, and even lead a good life	Ethical Egoism
Global education is important since it will raise awareness, enabling people to act more compassionately.	Feminist Ethics/Care Ethics
Global education is important since it will help us develop a more just and sustainable world.	Theories of Justice
Global education is important because education for political citizenship is necessary for everyone, and nations and their citizens now must deliberate on global as well as domestic issues.	Liberalism and Political Citizenship
Global education is important since it will help both individuals and groups with the functioning of transnational capitalism.	Neoliberalism

It is, however, a mistake to envision connections concentrically and geographically as though people have the most allegiances to their town and the least to those far away. This is a ridiculous and erroneous criticism of cosmopolitanism, given that the local and the global are now inextricably connected, and it is increasingly difficult to give an easy answer to what being in or from a place might mean. As a professor of education in a college of education in a global university, I am tied more closely with similar professors of education in other nations than I am with local citizens who may live down the street in my town. The Mexican-American family who lives behind me, recently arrived from Guadalajara, may be more closely tied with its village of origin than with the local citizens down the street as well. Also, identity is constructed along all sort of axes and place – although important to some – is not important to all. Spatiality theories of critical geography[8] refuse to accept the naturalness of physical space as simply a neutral artifact of progress or matter-of- fact products of human creation or influence. Instead, these theories explore how constructions of space shape the social, cultural and political practices and, thus, also the formation of identity and meaning. These theories help us

[8] See, for example, D. Harvey, (2001). Also see Soja (1997).

see that the structuring and experience of people in particular spaces and places are deeply global as well as local and national.

Culture is now often separated from place and nation. There are global cultures of soccer players, of Barbie doll collectors and of flamenco dancers. There are Japanese flamenco dancers just as there are Japanese Black Gospel music aficionados. We are the products of multiple belongings, and in some of our identities and belongings, we are attuned *more* to the global than the local. Diasporic, aboriginal, regional, sexual, and even professional identities and cultures exist somewhat independently of state boundaries and shape many human lives. The conflation of the nation state with culture and caring in the writings of theorists such as Bok and Betts reifies a uniformity that historically was often forcibly created in the modern world – a national culture coexisted with regional and ethnic and tribal subcultures. Modern states were formed with the willful creation of national, cultural identities by leading national elites, reinforced by the sanction of official national languages and religions. The modern state's cultural-educational project sought:

> . . . the establishment of an anonymous, impersonal society, with mutually substitutable atomized individuals, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind, in place of a previous complex structure of local groups, sustained by folk cultures reproduced locally and idiosyncratically by the micro-groups themselves (Gellner, 1983, p. 57).

National identity has thus always been a murky concept and a constructed reality – not a natural occurrence. Moreover, idiosyncratic identities, allegiances and micro-groups have always co-existed with the nation. Allegiance and caring actually occur along myriad paths, and thus, the possibilities for developing a sympathetic imagination that allows for connection with others across the globe can also occur along myriad paths. Nationhood is one constructed identity concept but it coexists with many, many other ways to think of identity and of connection and disconnection. For example, 'I am an American' and 'I am a Bolivian' seem to be understood mutually exclusive categories beyond ken, kin or caring to some critics of cosmopolitanism. But, any one American and any one Bolivian has multiple constructions of identity beyond nationality that allow for many kinds of creative connection. It is easy to imagine that two students from different disconnected places and cultures can have a great deal of connection.

> I am an American and an oldest child and daughter, a daddy's girls, a soccer player, a girl who likes to make scrap books. I work in a coffee shop and I think I should get paid more. There's a guy there who flirts with me too much and makes me uncomfortable. I really love to dance. I like to make ginger bread houses, small beautiful replicas of different kinds of buildings. I hope to have a career as a nurse or maybe even a doctor.
>
> I am a Columbian and a daughter, soccer player, thinker, a girl who likes to make scrap books, a girl who works in a coffee packing plant and thinks I should get paid more. There's a guy there who flirts with me too much and makes me uncomfortable. I really love to dance. I like to make 'balcones' or 'casitas' small beautiful replicas of the front parts of houses in different parts of Colombia. I hope to have a career as a nurse or maybe even a doctor.

Relying on felt connection for ethical compunction is a highly uncertain enterprise as all we can ever know is a selected aspect of a person or a situation, and this knowing is an *imaginative* challenge even in local and immediate contexts. Formulations

asking for feeling seem to be rooted in something like feminist ethics or new world ethics that first requires felt connection and immediate context to stimulate ethical action, and second, it therefore requires that the ethical intention of global education is dependent on the imaginative intensions of global education. Noddings (1984), for example, argues that the (feminine) virtue of caring for others in specific situations is the basis upon which all ethical thinking is grounded, whereas Gilligan (1982) argues that morality is not about abstract principles, rights or impartial (typically male) theories of *justice*, but about caring for persons and maintaining relationships. Thus, as one cannot care about everyone in an immediate and personal sense, global education is not really possible. However, this is a very distinct view of what it means to have an ethical compunction, and there are other ways to think about it that may be better.

Global education that relies on allegiance is different. It is just as possible or impossible to have a sense of allegiance to all of the world population as it is to have a sense of allegiance to 300 million, if you are American or 1.3 billion if you are Chinese. The notion of allegiance to global humanity is rooted in Natural Rights Theory, which does not require one to imagine the others' humanity – it takes it as a given. Allegiance to global humanity is *not* to be supported from the ethics of caring or felt connection. Although a felt connection is still important and may be crucial for any one persons' ethical action, it is not necessary or even useful as a rationale for an entire global education program.

Another related confusion seems to lie in the difference between the nature and obligations of political citizenship as a status, and the nature and obligations of citizenship as a duty. Michael Walzer makes this mistake. He writes, 'I am not a citizen of the world as she (Nussbaum) would like me to be. I am not even aware that there is a world such that one could be a citizen of'(Walzer, 1996, p. 125). What Walzer is misunderstanding is that the argument for a global education rooted in a world citizenship is not at all related to the idea of normal status citizenship. Citizenship has historically referred to legal civic, political and social rights and had relatively little to do with substantive issues of ethics and relationships with others, which are what is important in education. An often-cited definition of citizenship comes from T. H. Marshall who considered citizenship as 'a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who posses the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed'(Marshall, 1950, p. 28). As this is a status one either has or does not, this conception of citizenship has limited implications for education. A more active and expansive conception of citizenship that entails optional duties, however, introduces an important ethical dimension and highlights the need to make judgments that affect others and to listen to others across difference. These intellectual and ethical capacities are not particularly natural, and this situation requires thoughtful education if they are to be successfully realized.

Duties of citizenship can include something relatively passive as obeying laws, serving on a jury and voting, but they also refer to more engaged duties of social action that require critically examining one's communities and working for change when needed. Citizens do not merely follow rules; we have a broader responsibility to change rules when they are in conflict with values we think to be important.

This more active idea of citizenship conceived in terms of its political and ethical obligations follows the civic republican tradition whereas a rights – based view is associated with liberalism. Oldfield (1990) distinguishes these types as citizenship as a status versus citizenship as a practice. Status citizenship has been politically, historically and geographically specific and in different contexts has come to have very different understandings and be supported by very different legal structures. Status citizenship is inclusive but also exclusionary, in the sense that some people have different rights than others. In contrast the moral justification for democratic citizenship as duty and practice makes reference to human rights and capacities, thus being inherently *fully* inclusive. There are two important inclusive conceptions of humanity that underlie the duties of democratic citizenship. One is that all people are equal. From this point of view, whatever the important elements of human well-being are (and there may be some disagreement about what these are), these elements belong to all human beings, e.g. nutrition, health, shelter, security, or more broadly happiness, autonomy and cultural freedom. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights established in 1948 expresses this value on a global scale.[9] Global citizenship accepts that, in this ultimate sense, one's loyalty is to all humans. Another conception of humanity that underlies the duties of democratic citizenship is the idea that all people are capable of enough reason and decency to justify government of, by and for the people. Citizens have the capacity, right and duty to examine the appropriateness of all public policies, and they have the capacity, right and duty to engage in dialogue, resist egocentric thinking, take into account multiple and opposing viewpoints, and aided by institutions, to arrive at suitable compromises, and to do practical work with others to create a more just society.

Philosophically, it is very difficult to argue that this conception of humanity is exclusive to those who hold the other kind of citizenship, status citizenship. Nor are these or should these be thought to be qualities of Americans alone. The rationale for national democratic citizenship of human equality, human reason and faith in democratic dialogue and decision making has no place for exclusion. At its most inclusive, global education relies on an idea of citizenship that is fully participatory and asserts human reason, faith in democratic dialogue and decision making, and human equality. Even more broadly, it sometimes asserts responsibility for all species and for the environment as well. But at the same time, global education *of course* has no legal or procedural basis for inclusion. Most people on the planet do not live in open societies or democracies in which rights are respected and democratic capacity is affirmed.

Although there is not yet any global status citizenship, there are nonetheless increasing venues for global rights and cooperation, such as the United Nations and its Commission on Human Rights, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Universal

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[9] Refer http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html

Postal Union (UPU), the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) among many others. Students should be educated to understand the difference between the sort of philosophical toleration underlying global human rights and the sort of practical, legally negotiated tolerance that is often limited and compromised, given the exigencies of actual global conflicts. Yet, philosophical recognition of global human rights leads to increasing incidences of practical, legally negotiated tolerance. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is widely endorsed, as there are international standards for the rights of individuals, the treatment of prisoners of war, international agreements about biological diversity, endangered species and sustainability. There are also increasing agreements about global standards in trade, communication, transportation and environmental safety. Although agreements are unevenly negotiated and enforced, they are enforced nonetheless and global principles as norms are important. Agreement among diverse nations is a real global accomplishment, considering they did not exist at all a 100 years ago. Such capacity to state principles and make actual choices across what sometimes seems to be intractable difference is crucial in the global area marked by differences and also political, economic and cultural contestation.

One worry is that progressives endorse a concept of post-national (global) citizenship and seek to shift authority from the national community to an institutional network of international organizations and sub-national political actors not bound within any clear democratic, constitutional framework. But this makes no sense. The sort of either/or thinking does not and cannot occur. Cosmopolitanism, as a mode of thought, and claims about global citizenship do not suggest that one does not have a nation or that one leaves one's national belonging out of the picture. It suggests instead that one should have critical distance from the actual *practices* of the nation that can be explored through the *ideals* of the nation and the ideals of all humankind. Democratic citizenship requires uncertainly towards authority, including the authority of one's own nation. The practice of examining the global context through ideals explains two of the other justifications for global education. One assumes that a person has judged the context and found it unjust, and the other that a person has found that global capitalism is just and should be furthered. These rationales focus more on the outcome of ethical judgment than the practice itself.

In my own experience, I have made use of multiple ethical frames both to develop and to teach global perspectives. It was my commitment to principles of equal humanity that allowed me to narratively imagine and care about others' experience, and those experiences recursively reinforced my commitment to principles of justice. Getting a sense of the experience of American black girls in a racist school culture and Jewish victims of the Nazi Holocaust in a genocidical political context are essential to my identity and functioning as both a national citizen and a global citizen. It is important to understand the distinctive nature of these theoretical perspectives, but it is important as well to make use of these different justifications collectively in educating.

Teaching beyond the technical intentions of global education

I argue that it is important to understand the ethical and political claims of global education, as they have great bearing on how curriculum is justified and approached; yet, there is a marked desire among global education theorists, for practical, political or other reasons, to seek to finesse these differences and locate commonalities across theories. For example, Case argued, 'We should not automatically assume that greater clarity about the goals of global education is necessary. Loosely defined coalitions . . . often permit otherwise disparate factions to ally in pursuit of common, or at least compatible goals' (Case, 1993, p. 319). I think this attitude is a mistake. Global education presents distinctive philosophical and conceptual challenges that are best understood and justified within distinct educational and philosophical traditions.

The third intention of global education is to develop pragmatic and technical capacity. This means that people need to understand all the technical aspects of solving global problems including knowing about things as diverse as how political and economic systems work and knowing about the environment and changing technologies. In this dimension, global education focuses on increasing relevant knowledge, capacities and skills to respond to an increasingly interconnected world and its complex interrelations, issues and problems. In its technical dimension, global education asks student to understand things, such as World Bank policies, and explore the history and culture that lies beneath the facts and figures of development and underdevelopment in various parts of the world. They would consider what exactly is global warming and what are the political and scientific intentions and realities of its resolution. A question such as 'In the global economy how do individuals and systems choose what will be produced, distributed, and consumed, by what methods, using what resources, and for whom?' is technical.

However, a questions such as 'why do we care?' and 'How are inevitable inequalities rationalized?' are ethical, whereas a question such as 'What is it like to be garment worker without a living wage?' has an imaginative intention. I think that the technical intentions of global education are better understood, whereas the ethical and imaginative intentions, which are personal, psychological and political, are less well understood, but, in my eyes, these are more foundational. They are more foundational, because you cannot solve a problem you do not feel responsible for and you don't take action on something you cannot imagine. We make the mistake sometimes of starting with our vision of the ends – we think and teach about mega society. We do not so often start with the lives, values and imaginations of children in our classrooms and the exigencies of their human experiences and moral deliberation that can help us to arrive at a better global future. When the focus of an educational endeavour becomes as large as the entire planet and all of the issues globalization confronts us with, it is easy to lose sight of the local, the personal and of questions of value. I think global education must first be something that happens to people who live in particular places. It must first be understood as lived, personal, psychological before it can be understood more abstractly as ethical and before it can be understood pragmatically as a context that presents technical and geopolitical challenges.

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CHAPTER 6

EDUCATION FOR RESPONSIBILITY: KNOWLEDGE, ETHICS AND DELIBERATION

Klas Roth

That education for responsibility can be interpreted in different ways follows from the simple fact that we humans can 'combine a limited repertoire of concepts in a potentially infinite number of ways' (Davidson, 2004, p. 13). In this chapter, I discuss an epistemological, ethical and deliberative interpretation of the question of how it is possible to educate people so that they become responsible citizens. My overall purpose is to argue for a *deliberative* interpretation. Responsibility, in the epistemological interpretation, means learning more about the other and the world and us, being loyal to members of the nation-state and developing the capacity to be critical. Hence, the success of education for responsibility is evaluated against how far children and young people learn knowledge, are loyal to other citizens of the nation-state and develop their critical capacity.

An *ethical* interpretation of responsibility suggests something different. It suggests a call upon the primacy of our ethical relation to the other as Other, which goes beyond our understanding and knowledge of the other. It proposes a radical openness to the Other as an absolute difference and a necessary asymmetry between others as Others. To be responsible for the other means that you are actively responsible for your responsibility for the other as an absolute, infinite and unknowable Other; a responsibility that precedes our knowledge and understanding of the other. This suggests, for advocates of postmodern ethics, that we give up the idea that we should learn more about the other as a correct ethical response to the Other. The success of education for responsibility then becomes a matter of whether teachers and students take their responsibility for their responsibility for the other as Other instead of just learning *about* others.

In the *deliberative* interpretation, responsibility means that you are both *accountable to* and *responsible for* the other when rationalising actions. 'Accountable to' means that you have an obligation to explain your reason(s) for your action and to support your claims about the validity of your descriptions of the situation, the world, people and yourself and the validity of your explanations and reasons given. 'Responsible for' involves your obligation to ask the other for his/her reason(s) for his/her action(s) as well. The success of education for responsibility is then evaluated against how far children and young people are accountable to and responsible for each other and critically investigate the sincerity, righteousness and truthfulness of actions.[1]

[1] See also Roth (2000, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2007) for a discussion on this issue.

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I begin by arguing that conditions for creating responsible citizens through public education articulated in the epistemological interpretation are problematic. They do not take satisfactorily into account young people's possibilities and rights to deliberate. I also argue both here and in part two of this chapter that the relation between at least two people does not necessarily have to be understood as asymmetrical; it can in principle he symmetrical. In the second part of this chapter, I also argue that the ethical interpretation cannot explain when in our ethical relations *to* the other we are held responsible *for* the other in specific situations. Finally, I remark on the value of deliberation in public education and propose the idea that we are both accountable to and responsible for the other simultaneously when we enter into a deliberative communicative relation. This suggests a difference in degree rather than a distinction in kind between knowledge and ethics.

An epistemological interpretation

Traditionally, it has been believed – and is still believed by many people in many countries, especially in liberal democratic societies – that public education ought to create an educated citizenry (Callan, 1997) that is, a reflective, knowledgeable and responsible public and that the education of such a citizenry would be accomplished when all had the same rights to education and to coming to know the other, the world and us. This suggests that the education of members (children and young people) of a nation-state as future citizens of a democratic society would be successful if it fulfilled certain conditions by (1) imparting knowledge to children and young people, initiating them to publicly reproduced knowledge, (2) furthering a common identity among its children and young people and instilling in them the values of a specific society or culture, and (3) developing students' critical capacity.

Imparting knowledge

In liberal democratic societies, having the same rights to education is equated with the idea that public education ought to be equal for all and that it ought to educate students as citizens of the nation-state.[2] No one ought to be excluded or left behind because of their family, culture, religion or economy. It is also asserted that the young ought to be given the same opportunities to be taught or learn the same or at last similar basic concepts and sentences within publicly recognised and produced forms of knowledge (see Goodlad and McMannon, 1997, p. 6; Hirst, 1961). This is a supposedly clearly defined set of concepts and sentences verified or at least not falsified by science. This can be seen as a principle of equal minimum; all should be enabled to learn the knowledge that is offered or dictated by the national curriculum, syllabi, text books and teachers. Both the Nazi regime during the Second World War and the communist regime in, for example, China, during the Cultural Revolution tried to mould their

[2] See Feinberg (1998) for a discussion on this issue.

citizens to embrace the same or similar beliefs and values through a common curriculum, common text books and syllabi.

It is believed even in liberal democratic societies that imparting knowledge is 'the main educational duty' (McMannon, 1997, p. 6; See also Siegal, 1998, p. 20). and that schools, of necessity, must prepare children and young people to become citizens of the nation-state. However, text books, syllabi or national curricula are not the same in each country, culture or era. Nor do teachers teach the same knowledge in every subject to each student; nor do children and young people learn the same knowledge. It is also obvious that it is not possible to boil down a recipe for what the curriculum, text books or syllabi should contain for each individual in every nation-state. It is not even possible to teach the same or similar knowledge to every student through compulsory education, although many nations attempt this through curriculum standards and testing (those who query the diversity of educational experience could ask whether you could communicate utterances that would mean same for all and have the same or similar effect for the development of an individual's capacities as outlined above). Hence, an education which focuses mainly on the reproduction of publicly produced knowledge and the standardised testing of how far students have acquired this knowledge potentially *limits* children's and young people's possibilities to 'combine a limited repertoire of concepts' in new ways and to reflect and deliberate upon ordinary and new combinations and uses and their effects.

Public education within a specific nation-state with its language(s), traditions and practices *cannot* recognise its own majority culture through, for example, the national curricula and syllabi and at the same time reflect knowledge of all other cultures within its own territory or all other nation-states: a choice always has to be made. Because one's tradition may be more represented in the curriculum or less, even when 'equal knowledge' is intended, the knowledge is always inequitable, more representative of some than of others. Public education cannot, then, be equal for all individuals within a nation-state in the sense described above. Hence, the principle of an equal minimum is fallible.

Furthering a common identity and instilling specific values

Children and young people are believed to become responsible through being socialised to have the same identity as, or at least one similar to, the majority of citizens and through embracing specific values furthered by its majority culture (McMannon, 1997, p. 6). One problem with the idea of furthering a common identity through public education is that a person's primary reason (Davidson, 2001d, p. 13), reflecting his or her pro attitude and beliefs, is not necessarily congruent with the values or norms expressed by any other citizen or with citizens of different nation-states even after finishing compulsory public education. People from different educational systems and nation-states commonly express conflicting and sometimes even contradictory values and norms.

Moreover, there is a problem of normativity of language, especially concerning the furthering of a common national identity through public education. The normativity of the usage of utterances reflecting values and norms expressed by people within different nation-states – especially patriots and nationalists who do not necessarily take responsibility for other people in other nation-states – is causally affected by other people's usage. However, this does not imply that application of an utterance is correct if and only if it accords with others' usage in *relevantly similar situations*. Successful communication requires that the interpreter assign the meaning of an utterance to the speaker's intention: that is, 'we understand a speaker best when we interpret him as he intended to be interpreted' (Davidson, 2001b, p. 199). Hence we also have to come to understand each others' beliefs rather than merely using the same or similar concepts in relevantly similar situations.

Other aspects of normativity are whether any external authority imposes standards for correct usage and whether the content of a person's thought is determined by the linguistic practices of their specific community. Michael Dummett says: 'The paradoxical character of language lies in the fact that while its practice must be subject to standards of correctness, there is no ultimate authority to impose these standards from without' (Dummett, 1991, p. 85). This seems to suggest that our beliefs and pro-attitudes are causally affected by our linguistic practices and that there is no ultimate authority on which we can rely for correct usage. If this is true, we seem to be caught in the paradoxical situation that nationalism and patriotism, creating feelings and beliefs of commonality, are prescriptive and perhaps even unavoidable within nation-states; but that their prescriptive force has no ultimate legitimising authority. And even though other people's use of a specific utterance in relevantly similar situations may affect a person's thought, the utterance does not necessarily determine any specific content of a person's thought. A customer and a clerk in a bank may say 'There are small Bills' to each other; the clerk is thinking about small requests for money, the customer of his short friend Bill.

Moreover, we should not confuse the empirical question of whether people's usage accords with others' in relevantly similar situations with the philosophical question of 'whether conventions are necessary for communication by language.' (Glüer, 2001, p. 55). Glüer says:

> From a Davidsonian point of view, it clearly is not necessary for communication that there are *shared* conventions governing the assignment of meanings to words (and sentences). That is, for two speakers communicating with each other, it is not necessary that there is a convention assigning the *same* meaning to an expression regardless of which of the speakers utters it. It is not necessary that there is a convention to this effect since it is not necessary that the same meaning is assigned to an expression across speakers at all, no matter what the nature of assignment is. All that matters for successful communication is that, regarding the specific utterance, the hearer assigns the meaning that the speaker intended.
>
> Neither is it necessary that there is a convention to assign the same meaning to an expression whenever a particular speaker utters it. What the speaker intends the hearer to interpret him as meaning with a particular expression does not have to be the same whenever he utters it (Glüer, 2001, p. 55).

This suggests that patriotism or nationalism understood as common and consistent conventions is *not* necessary for communication between at least two language users. These conventions need not then have a strong prescriptive force for legitimate usage of utterances and for regulating relations among humans. It seems then that the young do not necessarily become responsible for the other within their own nation-state or within other nation-states by being similarly nationalistic or patriotic or by being socialised as citizens through their acquired use of concepts such as the ones discussed above. On the contrary, it seems that supporters of patriotism and nationalism are not *necessarily* or to any large extent responsible for the other anywhere and that patriotism and nationalism, rather, further strategic relationships, sometimes even hate and violence, within and between nation-states.

The furthering of nationalism and patriotism, especially within liberal democratic societies – through public education – is being discussed and criticised today perhaps more than ever (see for example Banks, 2004; Cohen, 1996; Feinberg, 1998; Fullinwider; 1996; McDonough and Feinberg, 2003; Nussbaum, 1997; Waldron, 2003; Roth, 2007). A concurrent discussion on the relevance and importance of increased recognition of difference within nation-states in political theory (see Benhabib, 2002; Kymlicka, 2002, Chapter 7 and 8) and national educational systems in educational theory (see Banks, 2004; Feinberg, 1998; McDonough and Feinberg, 2003; Roth, 2007). is challenging the idea of using national public education to further a common identity, nationalism or patriotism. Advocates of multiculturalism, for example, assert that we ought to take difference into account in education and learn about the other to increase our understanding of the other and become responsible for the other. However, such increased understanding need not imply that we come to believe or act as if we should care *only* for members of the same nation-state and not for the other or others in other societies, nation-states or cultures. Cosmopolitanists argue, for example, that it is not enough to focus on increased tolerance of the other within a nation-state; they also assert that we need to recognise cosmopolitan values and cosmopolitan learning in a time of global transition and increased challenge of the whole idea of the nation-state and national education (Roth, 2007).

Criticality and communication

The third condition for the success of educating responsible citizens within liberal democratic societies is the value of criticality. Criticality has been a valued goal in most educational systems either rhetorically or substantially. It has been favoured by proponents of critical thinking and critical pedagogy, who believe that the young ought to be enabled, throughout their compulsory schooling, to critically examine basic concepts and sentences as well as unjust asymmetric relations of gender, ethnicity or class. They do, however, disagree about what criticality means, how to achieve or further it and the conditions for it (see Burbules and Berk, 1999; Roth, 2006). Proponents of critical thinking and of critical pedagogy believe that people should not embrace knowledge and values without critically examining them. People

from both camps believe too that people ought to transcend false beliefs and gain power through becoming aware of false beliefs or beliefs unsupported by legitimate reasons and that by achieving true beliefs about others, ourselves and the outer physical world, we can gain better understanding. Moreover, they also believe that could we but formulate methods or perhaps even *the* method for transcending false beliefs, then we would be able to examine critically and perhaps also to legitimise our beliefs or understanding of our concerns.

A common belief among many advocates of criticality is that, by gaining true beliefs and a better understanding of whatever concerns us, we can liberate ourselves, change conditions that enslave us, free our minds and transcend grave misunderstandings, prejudices and false beliefs; as well as adjusting asymmetrical relations between people. This is not necessarily true for Foucault-inspired analysts, who seem to believe that any new knowledge only reflects new power relations, from which we never can free ourselves totally; or even for proponents of postmodern ethics (as we shall see later). Foucault-inspired analysts seem to assert that any knowledge regulates relations between people and that such relations are always asymmetrical (see Popkewitz, 1999, pp. 5–6). This suggests that new knowledge only furthers new asymmetrical relations. However, communicating assertions as a kind of knowledge need not necessarily be social, and we do not necessarily need to construe relations as asymmetrical (see below). If this is correct, then assertions as a kind of knowledge need not necessarily regulate relations, although such assertions may affect people and their relations causally.

Habermas argues that the validity claims of utterances need not necessarily be reduced functionalistically to the effects of power: we cannot conclude from facts or what is or *seems* to be the case, what *ought* to be the case (Habermas, 1987, p. 276). This suggests that, by studying effects of power, we would be asserting that the meaning of utterances is equated with their effects, which is obviously false. If I assert 'The chair is blue', it could have the effect on the other person that he would not like to sit on it, but it need not necessarily have such an effect; he could very well sit on it. Whether he sits or not does not explain the meaning of the utterance; it only shows the effect the utterance may have or the effect that *I* uttered it has on *him*. He could decide to sit or not to sit because I uttered the sentence, and his reason could be that he likes me or does not like me and that anything I say to him will affect him either way. Thus, if he likes me, he sits on the chair and if he does not, he does not sit on the chair. However, he would then already know the meaning of the *utterance* 'The chair is blue' even though the utterance or the fact that I uttered was what caused him to sit or not.

The effects of an utterance – an assertion – need not be entailed in communication of it. When I say 'Klas and Lilian's children are named Paula, Cicilia and Isak' to my friend, the effects of the assertion on her are not contained in what is communicated. Pagin says:

> Not only is what is communicated in an assertion different from its social significance, but it is also *independent*. That is, a statement of the intended (or real) social effect of an assertion does not entail what is asserted, nor does what is asserted entail the statement of

> effect. Because of this, the significance of an assertion isn't exhausted by its *social* significance. Any description of the social significance will leave out the core of assertion, that it articulates a judgment about the world. It will always be possible to satisfy the description without expressing the judgment, i.e. without making an assertion. Because of this, no characterization of the social significance of assertion, however correct and complete, can adequately define what assertion is (Pagin, 2004, p. 836).

The effects of the utterance are, then, not necessarily identical with its meaning and do not explain its meaning. An utterance could have a strong effect on the other, who could claim that only her-and-her husband's children have the right to the names mentioned. But this would not say anything about the meaning of the utterance or about my intentions in uttering it.

According to Davidson, communication in general necessarily entails an interconnected triangle between at least two interlocutors and an environment: 'we have two interacting people, their interaction mediated by the external objects, situations, and events they mutually observe' (Davidson, 2001a, p. 11). This 'triangulation' constitutes the necessary condition for language and thereby our thoughts and conceptualisations. He also asserts that the interaction between at least two people supporting thought has to include linguistic communication:

> For unless the creatures can communicate, unless they can engage in the exchange of propositional contents, there is no way they can take cognitive advantage of their ability to triangulate their shared world. They must, in other words, recognize each other as embodied minds with a location in a common space and time . . . the social element that is essential to language is also essential to thought itself (Davidson, 2001a, p. 13).

Meaningful communication then seems to necessitate at least two people capable of defining or explaining their utterances or the use thereof in relevantly similar ways in relevantly similar situations. This suggests that two interlocutors have to be able to say when they have made an error and that they are accountable to the other for undertaking the act of justifying utterances linguistically. One interlocutor is in this respect in a symmetrical relation to the other.

If this is true, we do not have to construe relations between people as necessarily asymmetrical. The foregoing also suggests that criticality can be understood in terms of (a) how far at least two people *understand* and *legitimise* their utterances using other utterances, and (b) how far they are able to *investigate* and *reflect* upon the validity of their utterances in relation to each other. The responsibility for the other is then reflected in the intersubjective relation in terms of whether the validity claims are justified argumentatively among those concerned; and how far the other is enabled to reflect upon and criticise the assertability conditions of your utterances.

These views (a and b) can provide 'standards' for a critical evaluation of systematic deformations of and distortions in communication between people. We can depart from them when investigating how administrative, bureaucratic, economic, political or other systems affect and regulate relations between people and possibly also enable them to critically investigate validity claims. We can also use these standards when we investigate who participates and in what discussion and who is disallowed or otherwise disabled from participating. We can also investigate 'who can initiate topics, who can bring the

discussion to a close, who can contribute and in which order, how the topics are ordered and how the scope of the discussion is determined etc' (Cooke, 1994, p. 149). It seems, then, that we can critically investigate whether utterances are understood and legitimised, who is given the right and possibility to participate and who is not, and whether those involved or concerned are enabled to evaluate critically whatever concerns them.

It seems too that the critical power resides in the actual communication between participants and is partly reflected in their willingness to reach understanding and enable each other to criticise validity claims made. The lack of openness or willingness to participate in communication and the unwillingness to give reasons, listen to the other's view or consider new perspectives *reflects*, most likely, a strategic attitude and relation towards the other. On the contrary, participants who consider the descriptions and explanations as well as the arguments of most people concerned in communication about anything of interest are more deliberatively oriented towards each other. This suggests that all concerned ought theoretically to be equally entitled to participate and take responsibility for the other when deliberating knowledge, values and norms of action. The relation between people can then be understood as symmetrical in principle though not in every situation. The young are, however, not always or even mostly given the possibility or right to deliberate knowledge, values and norms of action in public education (see Roth, 2003). A symmetrical relation suggests that participants treat each other respectfully and fairly and listen to each other's views and arguments and that they ought to be *sensitive* to how far they are imposing on the other their own ways of understanding, interests and arguments and the supposedly validity of the latter.

An ethical interpretation

An ethical or moral interpretation of education is not new. It has been discussed in philosophy at least since Plato and is still being discussed today. Advocates of utilitarianism, for example, articulate conditions for evaluating the consequences of actions.[3] Advocates of deontology formulate conditions in terms of principles for duties regardless of the consequences of action.[4] Proponents of care ethics formulate conditions in terms of principles for our emotions and virtues, which are supposedly morally and ethically relevant.[5] Discourse ethics formulates conditions for evaluating the legitimacy of norms in terms of 'a formal-pragmatic analysis of communicative action . . .' (Habermas, 1990, p. 44). The latter is, however, not a strong normative approach to moral or ethical issues, because such an approach presupposes certainty in terms of knowledge or understanding or a set or ethical or moral principles which ought to

[3] See Bentham (1988), Hume (1998) and Mill (1998) for classical statements of utilitarianism.

[4] See Kant (1997) for a classical statement of deontology.

[5] See Noddings (2002) for a discussion on caring as an alternative view of ethics to utilitarianism and deontology.

guide us in ethical or moral reasoning. It affords a philosophical view of ethics that takes 'the form of a special theory of argumentation' (Habermas, 1990, p. 44). Even though there are differences among these lines of thought, all seem to reflect the idea that we need to formulate conditions for evaluating the success of ethical or moral action to know how to act in ethically complex situations and relations.

One reason why ethics and morality are today perhaps even more topical is that many philosophers and others do not believe knowledge to be certain. Other reasons are that there is an increased recognition of difference – especially in terms of the other – within liberal democratic societies (see McDonough and Feinberg, 2003) and that the state should *not* instil in the young an unquestionable idea of the common good[6] and further a common identity among all members in a strong sense. Eamonn Callan, for example, asserts that education ought to create the conditions for free and equal citizenship (Callan, 1997, and Feinberg, 1998), which suggests greater possibilities for choice and for members to further their own conceptions of the good life in liberal democratic societies. Private and independent schools are nowadays increasing in number in many liberal democratic nation-states and challenging the notion that the state alone ought to govern education. Voucher and charter schools have, however, been criticised for characterising the relation between students and education as a kind of consumer relationship, neglecting the political and ethical dimensions of education.[7] Public education, too, has been criticised for not giving children and young people the right to deliberate knowledge, values and norms in school (Roth, 2000, 2003).

It has also become fashionable to question the whole enterprise of reasoning philosophically on moral or ethical issues in terms of knowledge and to turn the relation between knowledge and ethics the other way around, that is, to speak of the primacy of ethics over knowledge or even the philosophical justification of moral reasoning. Some proponents of postmodern ethics are calling upon the primacy of our absolute responsibility to the Other or for the otherness of the Other, a responsibility claimed to precede our knowledge, principled reasoning, freedom, rights and equality.[8] It is said that responsibility breeds freedom, not the other way around. This primacy of our responsibility assertedly reflects an asymmetrical relation among others as Others, which is claimed to be ontologically different. The other as Other, it is maintained, is unknowable and infinite and is conceived as preceding our finite knowledge and understanding. Only the self or the person who is the other can know or come to comprehend through experience and reason. This comprehension of the person or the self is, however, asserted to be incomplete and uncertain, because our knowledge about anything cannot be certain and is believed to be without foundation.

Proponents of postmodern ethics argue that we ought to abandon the metaphysics that has imprisoned us since Plato, which is conceived to be a call upon the logic of

[6] See Cuban and Shipps (2000) for a discussion on the reconstruction of the common good in education.

[7] See for example Biesta (2004), Reid (2002) for a discussion on this topic.

[8] See for example Bauman (1993, 1995) Biesta (2004) and Todd (2003). See also Alan Badiou (2002) for a critical discussion of postmodern ethics.

the Same, that is, an acclaimed despotism of identifying subjects or objects as belonging to the same, which have had and have terrible and horrifying effects for humans especially in the realm of politics. They suggest instead that we have an absolute responsibility for the Other's interiority because we cannot have certain knowledge of the other as Other. In addition, they claim that the Other is infinite and goes beyond anything we can ever comprehend with certainty. These postmodernists call upon a radical and primary opening to the radical difference of the Other and the absolute responsibility for the face of the Other. Biesta says:

> responsibility is both possible and necessary under the postmodern "condition." It is possible because postmodernity abandons the belief in the possibility of a universal moral code and, more specifically, the codified rational ethics of modernity. It is for this very reason, however, that responsibility becomes necessary. . . . the most convincing argument [for the primacy of responsibility] may well be [Bauman's] contention that following the rules, however scrupulously, does not and will never save us from responsibility (Biesta, 2004, p. 244, p. 243).

Todd says:

> Turning our attention to the conditions for ethical possibility means giving up on the idea that learning about others is an appropriate ethical response to difference (Todd, 2003, p.9).

Advocates of postmodern ethics also argue that, were we to act upon our knowledge or understanding of the other as Other, we would inevitably act violently and not responsibly. They claim that increased comprehension of the other as Other only reduces difference to sameness, whether in terms of ethnicity, language, culture, politics, genetics or whatever, and forces the other into becoming the same. If correct, it seems that we are being invited to give up the idea of public education as creating an educated and responsible citizenry through developing their understanding and knowledge of others, together with the idea that we can rationally understand and organise our world, ourselves and our minds.

These ideas of the primacy of ethics, responsibility before epistemology and the problems of reducing difference to sameness seem appealing, especially in the light of pandemic violence. We are witnessing racism, terrorism, anti-Semitism and acts of violence towards and suppression of minorities, as well as children and females who are not given comparable opportunities. It seems, too, that increased comprehension of the other and increased recognition of the other do not necessarily solve conflicts. However, proponents of postmodern ethics misconstrue the relation between ethics and understanding, or so I will argue.

The priority of responsibility over understanding

Advocates of postmodern ethics assert that we would not be free and hence responsible if we had a totalising view of ourselves, others or society. Their reason for this is that a totalising view does not entail choice. However, such advocates also assert that we cannot in principle articulate such a view or even aspire to doing so and that efforts to achieve it have or can have effects that are inevitably violent and have had horrifying effects on the other. The criticism is evidently directed mainly

towards the said efforts and towards the belief that we could theoretically have such totalising comprehension. No such sustainable and coherent epistemological theory has, however, ever been formulated, and efforts to find foundations for our knowledge have been criticized not only by postmodernists but other philosophers as well.

Proponents of postmodern ethics do assert that we have choices, but not because we are free. Our responsibility for the other as Other precedes our freedom: we are free because of our responsibility for the other as Other, not the other way around. Hence, according to them, we do not have to understand or learn more about the other or even deliberate our understanding of the other to become responsible for the other as Other. The 'postmodernists' assert that we only have to take our responsibility for our responsibility to be responsible for the other as Other.

However, how can or should we understand the utterance that 'we have a responsibility for the Other', without taking the other's beliefs into account and the causal effect the environment has on us? Is there a rule that tells us how to act? Does the utterance above express a rule or is it identical with the rule for the possibility of responsibility? Such a rule seems mysterious, and the notion of the Other seems to be a postulated metaphysical subject for which we have no further argument but are just assumed to accept. But why should we accept it? Moreover, how can one meaningfully claim that the Other is elusive, infinite, absolute and different while at the same time asserting that the Other is unknowable?

Let's say that the utterance 'We have a responsibility for the Other' expresses a rule that shows how the relation between persons *really* is. Then, we can ask whether it is the rule itself or the rule as expressed in the utterance that gives us an adequate account of our relation to each other. If the former, then we can ask how we can comprehend such a rule without language, and whether a private rule prescribes future uses. However, such a rule faces Wittgenstein's problem of whether private rules can prescribe future uses of linguistic utterances (Wittgenstein, 1978, VII-39). If, on the contrary, it is claimed that the rule is expressed in language, then we can ask ourselves whether the words and sentences cannot be interpreted differently and whether there is a semantically correct use of the utterance that prescribes future uses. This can be questioned because such a determination or prescription of correct usage would only be empirical and contingent upon its correspondence with others' usage in relevantly similar situations.

While speaking accords with socially accepted norms, such norms or conventions are irrelevant to understanding, according to Davidson (2001c). He argues that a speaker have to be able to interpret the expressions of the other in order to understand them that is, decide whether the other's usage accords with his or her intention and whether they react to the objects and the environment in relevantly similar ways (Davidson, 2001b, pp. 212–213):

> We have no grounds for crediting a creature with the distinction between what is thought to be the case and what is the case unless the creature has the standard provided by a shared language; and without this distinction there is nothing that can clearly be called thought . . . In communication, what a speaker and the speaker's interpreter must share is an understanding of what the speaker means by what he says (Davidson, 2001b, p. 210).

Without such sharing or deliberation of thought and intention, we would not comprehend when any interpretation would be wrong, which would suggest that *any* interpretation is in accordance with the rule. And if the necessary conditions for understanding are that we cannot meaningfully assign meanings to an utterance without knowing what the utterance means and without knowing what the speaker believes, then we cannot establish whether a speaker is acting responsibly. If we do not know nor ever can know the speaker's intention or beliefs on the one hand and the meaning of the utterance on the other, then the utterance cannot be understood as meaningful. However, if we assume the speaker's beliefs are largely in agreement with ours, then we can use our own beliefs to explain our understanding of the speaker's, provided also that the speaker has the same or similar beliefs and uses utterances in the same or a similar way in relevantly similar situations as we would do. This reflects the principle of charity (Davidson, 2001b, p. 211). We can find out when the other has gone wrong by checking whether his usage accords with his intention and beliefs and whether his intention, beliefs and usage accord with ours. Such a check recognises the interconnection between the speaker's intentions on the one hand and the causal effect of the environment of the speaker's intentions on the other.

Advocates of postmodern ethics do not, however, attribute the necessity of the speaker's intention and beliefs and their interconnectedness to others' beliefs and intentions nor the causal relation to the environment or the objects in it. They do not then seem to take into account the necessary conditions for understanding, namely our beliefs and intentions and the effects the environment has on us. They seem to believe that it is possible to go beyond the necessary conditions for understanding. However, if Davidson is right, then we cannot meaningfully understand the utterance that we have a responsibility for the Other without also being able to differentiate between thinking we have the responsibility and really *having* the responsibility. It seems then that we cannot abandon beliefs and intentions altogether, or the causal effect objects and the environment have on us, when we communicate with each other.

The lack of explanation

If we cannot explain what reading of our responsibility for the other actually reflects our responsibility for the other, then we cannot know whether we have acted as responsible for the other. If we cannot comprehend which of our actions towards the other reflect our understanding of taking responsibility for our responsibility for the other, then we cannot know when we have taken our responsibility for the other. And if we cannot communicate our differentiation between *thinking* we have a responsibility for the other and *having* a responsibility for the other, then everything seems to be in accord with being responsible for the other. As proponents of postmodern ethics articulate no conditions, that would help us or them to understand when we have made an error, it seems that we cannot comprehend when we have erred or acted irresponsibly vis-à-vis the other. Hence, two persons who communicate their understanding of their responsibility for the other but who cannot differentiate between thinking they

are responsible and being responsible would be blind: could not know when they would be responsible for the other.

If, then, advocates of postmodern ethics cannot articulate the difference between *thinking* and *being* responsible, then we can question the relevancy and radicalism of postmodern ethics and its meaningfulness for ethical and moral problems. Moreover, if we cannot make citizens responsible, but have to assume ontologically that an individual as the Other is responsible from the outset, then we could ask when an individual as an Other *is* responsible: from birth? – at a certain age? If the latter, how do we know that the individual of the right age *is* responsible and that those below are not? How do we recognise that each individual at that specific age also is responsible and how do we know that responsibility begins at that specific age and not at any other? How do we know that infants are responsible from the moment of birth? Why not before birth? If before birth, then when do the unborn become responsible? It seems counterintuitive to believe that infants or the unborn are responsible in the same sense as mature people. Few would hold an infant responsible for coming into the world or for the actions of others.

The value of deliberation in public education

It is a truism that our comprehension of the other is incomplete. This follows from the simple fact that we can formulate an infinite number of meaningful sentences from a limited number of concepts, as noted earlier. We *can* communicate with each other even though we do not know much about the other. I may just have met the person and have no prior knowledge of her but still be able to understand what she says. It is, however, impossible to communicate with each other if we do not use meaningful utterances. We cannot have knowledge of the meaning of utterances unless we can explain when we err in our communication with each other, which requires deliberation.

The epistemological interpretation discussed earlier does not give children and young people satisfactory opportunities or rights to develop their deliberative capacity in public education and does not satisfactorily take account of cosmopolitan aspects of citizenship. Advocates of postmodern ethics on the contrary seem to be in trouble because they do not show or even explain when we have made a mistake or when we are held responsible, when it is 'appropriate to hold the individual accountable for the action under at least that description' (Baynes, 2001, p. 64) and the reason given for it. If the postmodern position is that the only activity we can participate in is deconstruction to show when we have gone wrong, then we seem to be caught up in an iconoclastic deconstructivism, defeatism and negativism, which leave us bereft of explanations of what prompted our behaviour and perhaps even legitimised it. Their general outline seems to be that we are responsible ontologically for the other as Other and that we can only deconstruct those beliefs, values, norms, knowledge, wishes, interests, preferences and so on that distort our responsibility for our responsibility.

It is not enough, however, to say that various specific ways of understanding the other as Other cannot be final and complete in principle – whether in terms of

ethnicity, culture, language, religion, gender – to remind us of our limited comprehension of the Other *and* to assert that we have a prior responsibility for the Other. We also have to articulate our intuitive knowledge of when a person *thinks* he is acting responsibly and when he *is* acting responsibly. Such an articulation inherits descriptions of what the person desired, the action she performed, her pro-attitude, beliefs about the outcome of her action and the consequences of her action, as well as a causal relation between these descriptions. The reason a person has for acting would then be an explanation and possibly a legitimate reason for why she acted the way she did.

It is a striking feature of linguistic communication that, when at least two people enter into it, they establish relations between themselves, to themselves and to the outer physical world. When they communicate, they generally regulate their relation righteously, express themselves sincerely and speak about the world truthfully. However, we lack good reasons to believe that people actually speak truthfully, act righteously and are sincere in every single case. Another striking feature is that people can reach understanding, and participation requires that they simultaneously communicate with each other about whether they are acting righteously, are sincere and are speaking truthfully about the world. This in turn requires that they are willing to be *accountable to* and *responsible for* the other and that they are morally committed to each other in these ways. It also requires that they are institutionally entitled to investigate and question the descriptions, explanations and reasons that are given. This right is important because if they for some reason are not morally committed to each other, or are prevented from deliberating democratically upon knowledge, values and norms of action, then their possibility to deliberate on whatever concerns them can be strengthened through democratic deliberation in, for example, education – which is their right.

Deliberation then seems valuable and necessary, for it gives participants both the possibility and the opportunity to investigate, question and come to agreement on given descriptions and explanations. It also enables those participating in deliberative communication to understand what possibly caused, perhaps also legitimised, one person to do this or that and the degree to which she can be held accountable to and responsible for the other. It seems then that, when entering into a deliberative communicative relation, we act on our beliefs and are motivated by our reasons. This suggests that we are capable of giving reasons and also morally committed to justifying our action to the other when required. Our responsibility for the other is then not mysterious but comprehensible, and we are in principle always accountable to and responsible for each other whenever we enter into a communicative relation. This suggests that we are never free from this accountability and responsibility. We are also able to distinguish between thinking we are responsible and being responsible for the other by evaluating, inter alia, whether the intended meaning is understood by the interpreter. A deliberative approach to ethical issues and questions ties our attitudes and beliefs to our actions and make them understandable; that is, interpretable by the other. In holding each other accountable and responsible for our (linguistic) actions and reasons, we would have to 'discover a degree of logical consistency in the thought of the speaker' (Davidson, 2001b, p. 211) and 'take the

speaker to be responding to the same features of the world that he (the interpreter) would be responding to under similar circumstances' (Davidson, 2001b, p. 211). When holding the other accountable for his action, we would have to take him to be reasonable and capable of articulating both descriptions of and reasons for his action as well as participating in *deliberation* on both of them and whether the given reason prompted and perhaps also legitimised his action. Such a rationalisation of actions could be deliberated in public education, and children and young people could be given both the opportunity and the right to deliberate whatever concerns them to develop their deliberative capacity and become responsible deliberating citizens (Roth, 2004). But then, we would have to consider conditions for the success of education for responsibility in terms of understanding and deliberation and not discard these concepts altogether. We would also have to shift our attention away from the acquisition of cultural contents through public education as a means for becoming responsible, focusing instead on the development of deliberative democratic competence. Such competence requires a general, open attitude towards the other and oneself, attention to how we come to relate to each other and ourselves when entering into a communicative relation, a willingness to be accountable to and responsible for the other as well as to pursue deliberation about knowledge, values and norms of action. Our capacity to combine and reflect on a limited set of meaningful utterances, to understand alternative interpretations of and give reasons for our action, which perhaps also legitimise our action, suggests that deliberation is both valuable and necessary for at least two language users coming to understand when they are, or can be held, accountable to and responsible for each other.

Thus, I reconfigure the concept of responsibility in deliberative terms. This requires a readiness to pursue deliberation in communication and a deliberative spirit in our communicative relations with each other. Where these requirements are fulfilled, the young are able to develop their communicative capacity, especially their deliberative democratic capacity, in public education. Hence, they would be educated as responsible, deliberative and cosmopolitan citizens without having their loyalty directed only to members of their own nation-state. This shift in loyalty from an abstract political unit – the nation-state – to a cosmopolitan one is also accompanied by a shift in children's and young people's right to deliberative education; a shift embracing the right to democratic deliberation; a shift from the moral commitment to learn about the other, the world and ourself to a willingness to participate in and to pursue democratic deliberation in education. This in turn suggests a stronger focus on education for responsibility in deliberative democratic terms in post-national education.

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CHAPTER 7

EDUCATION FOR DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

Lars Løvlie

Since the 1990s, the soul and future of Western liberal society has increasingly been discussed under the label of deliberative democracy. I shall relate only indirectly to that discussion and propose three components of an education for deliberative democracy: rational discourse, the virtues and the analysis of existential *topoi*. I shall not have much to say about the question of virtues apart from noting its obvious place in the triangle of virtues, norms and *topoi*. What I propose is a rather wide version of deliberative democracy and for some too loose to be of much interest. But the idea of an education for deliberative democracy must relate to more extensive and practical settings than the concept of deliberation itself allows for. The first part of the essay distinguishes between deliberation in the strict sense of a rational justification of norms and in the moderate sense of judgment and discretion, and points to the complex learning processes that are inherent in deliberative practices. The second part goes transcendental and starts with a thought figure sifted from G. W. F. Hegel's *Logic*, the finite–infinite relation presented in the first book of that work under the heading of the Doctrine of Being. I shall argue that Hegel's dialectic configures recent transcendental thinking and unites philosophers such as Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida in their common pursuit of liberal democracy. There are, of course, the differences. Habermas works out the suppositions of rational discourse, Derrida prefers to analyse human phenomena or *topoi* like friendship and hospitality.

The term deliberative harks back to the European Enlightenment, to Immanuel Kant's idea of 'publicity', to Edmund Burke's idea of the parliament as a 'deliberative assembly' and later to John Stuart Mill's idea of a 'government by discussion' (Elster, 1999). The modern idea of deliberation relates to a critical scientific spirit, to a constitution and to the institutions that assure the principles of freedom and justice in the Western democratic state. The salient features of today's democracy are often caught in the distinction between representative, participatory and deliberative practices, that is, voting, cooperation and rational discussion. The first refers to individuals in elections, the second to collective problem solving and the third to the justification of moral and political claims in argumentation. Over the past century, the links between participatory democracy and political education have been forged. For many educationists, it is the century of John Dewey and his ideas in *The Public and Its Problems* of 1927, which describes the state as a 'political public' created by 'associated activity' and 'articulated' by its political representatives (Dewey, 1927, p.67). The shift from Dewey's wide-ranging logic of inquiry to Habermas'

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justification by procedural reasoning is largely a shift from a participatory to a strict deliberative thinking. Rather than working out the implications of Dewey's republican ideas, Habermas' discourse theory works out the implications of deliberation related to norms and their justification.

Democracy is a mix of problem-solving practices including discussion, negotiation, bargaining and voting. Many everyday conflicts are, as we all know, solved by discussions that have elements of negotiation in them and may reach a final decision only by flipping a coin or by casting a vote. What, then, about teaching democracy, how do makers of a curriculum for political education go about their task? Some prefer to teach by the textbook about the founding fathers and the democratic institutions they helped to create, and to initiate discussions on the nation's proud political heritage among the students. Others are keen to invite the students to take part in quasi-democratic practices, such as representing one's fellow students on the local student or school board or acting as an 'ombudsman' for students who have complaints to make against education authorities. Such practices are indispensable for developing civic virtues and deliberative skills. Yet, they may fall short of the specific aim of deliberative education, which is the justification of moral and political claims. The answer to the question: 'Do we need all this fuss about truth and justice and fairness?' is a 'Yes', provided that the link to the liberal political tradition is not severed and that we judge the outcome of discursive practices in their wider educative settings.

Deliberation and the educational point of view

What is the educational point of view? Some would say that as long as there is learning and as long as interaction leads to changes of mind and habit, we are generally within the ken of the educational. This cannot, however, mean that any kind of process that makes a change in someone's cognitive repertoire or social habits is educational. I may certainly learn something from stumbling in the stairs or getting stuck in the rush traffic or being interrogated by the police, but that does not necessarily make my learning educational. Better candidates are the intentional learning of complex skills such as reading and writing; adding and multiplying; and mastering the Internet. In addition to teaching skills and imparting competences, the main task of education is to create those lasting imprints of tradition that make young people grow up acting and thinking like us. Traditionalists see education as initiation into the bourgeois mores – as getting the barbarians inside the citadel of civilisation, as R. S. Peters once had it.[1] Others take a clear stand for teaching ways of thinking that foster autonomy and critique. They want to impart political insight and reflection, to make students aware of the subtle – and not so subtle – power

[1] Peters, 1973. By this metaphor, Peters deconstructs his own idea of a rational liberal education. Children do not, of course, start off as barbarians, and Peters' metaphor is thus rather uncivilised.

mechanisms of democratic society and to support their political judgment and participation. They sustain the principle of the liberals from the 18th century, Kant and Hegel, that citizens should be able to recognise their best moral intentions in the social institutions they create and transform.

The border between initiation and critique is difficult to negotiate. Richard Rorty wants to end the conflict by one stroke, and he does so by giving them different time slots, as it were, in the educational enterprise. In the article 'Education as Socialization and as Individualization', originally published in 1989, he proposes that education up to the age of 18 or 19 years should be mostly a matter of socialisation or of inculcating the values of tradition – ' . . . of getting the students to take over the moral and political common sense of society as it is' (Rorty, 1999b, p.116). After the students have left high school for the colleges and universities, it is time for their 'revolt' against inculcation and for individual self-creation. This view stumbles on two points, one psychological and the other logical. First of all, it is impossible to prevent young people from being critical of society from an early age, without and within the school gates. The child that utters her first passionate 'No!' to a felt injustice attests to that. As there is no socialisation without individualisation, there is no way we can postpone children's and young people's critical voices, although there exist a number of ways in which we can curb or stifle them. Second, it seems logically impossible to defend the abrupt transition from inculcation to criticism at the age of 18 years, because we cannot be critical without an acquired repertoire to sustain it – we cannot criticise without knowing how. A critical repertoire is obtained through periods of learning the facts, acquiring the dispositions and practising the discretion that go with critical deliberation. These observations, obvious as they may seem to educationists, serve to show that we – parents and teachers – have to take the responsibility for a pro-critical education from the early years of childhood. We have to pursue democratic ideals in the making of our curricula and in the ongoing interaction between teachers and students from the very first school years. Mature responsibility – the *Mündigkeit* that Kant used to speak of – cannot be kept in stock till a definite age but is nurtured over years of careful practice. This is the educational point of view and the starting point for a full discussion of deliberative democracy as an educational enterprise.

Three aspects of deliberation: strict, moderate, and the *topoi*.

Kant thought that I owe to myself to stand by duty and to others the freedom to pursue happiness. The point is that if everyone puts reasonable constraints on his or her actions, happiness will take care of itself. Hegel wanted to explain duty and happiness, intellectual pursuit and aesthetic joy, productive work and social action by mutual recognition, an interactive concept through and through. The difference between the two views is repeated in the distinction between a strict and a moderate version of deliberation. Deliberation in the strict sense is committed to reason, to the courage to use one's own understanding without the direction from another, as Kant

intoned in his famous answer to the question: 'What Is Enlightenment?', and to participation in reasonable argumentation.[2] The moderate version, on the contrary, tempers the strong cognitive approach of the Kantians and tends toward the Aristotelian idea of deliberation as the ability to judge well in matters of the *polis*. Aristotelian *phronesis* chimes with Hegel's insistence that rationality is enmeshed in and actualised in social institutions. An analysis of reasonable interaction goes, *ipso facto*, with a reconstruction of historical institutions: the family, the school and the workplace. Both Kant and Hegel worked out the question of universality in terms of the dialectic between individual autonomy and political action. For Kant, the person who makes use of her moral reason is a member of a universal society of likeminded people: the person who is thinking according to the universalisation principle is implicitly taking part in the perspective of all affected. Hegel stated the same point in his circular way: education – *Bildung* – is to think of the individual in the form of the universal (Hegel, 1970, §209), that is, the individual realises her freedom in the inter-subjective relation of mutual recognition – within the boundaries of existing social institutions.

The teacher who tries to follow these complex paths seeks a resolution to the common dilemma between egotism and altruism: 'Should I act for my own good or for the benefit of others'? An answer to the question is given by two kinds of solidarity: consensus, if you see yourself as a Kantian, and reconciliation, if you opt for Hegel. Consensus is the agreement on what makes norms and actions legitimate, reconciliation is the harmony in feelings and ethos. This is a crude rendering of the difference between Kant and Hegel, but it points to different configurations of rationality, a difference that has made its way into the discussion between liberals and communitarians over the past decades. This rendering puts Hegel in the communitarian camp, which should not make us miss the fact that it is Hegel who informs Habermas' transcendental pragmatics. The traditional distinction between reason and virtues, what we do as autonomous agents and what we do as embedded in the mores of our forebears, makes us pass by a roster of ethical phenomena, those I shall call existential *topoi* of, for example, love and friendship, death and mourning. These *topoi* or topics open on to dialogues on the human condition by authors such as Hannah Arendt, Martha Nussbaum or Jacques Derrida. Consider love. Love is neither a procedure for problem solving, like inquiries, negotiations or argumentation, nor a personal virtue like courage, compassion or humility, important as these are in themselves. Existential topics neither submit to the formal moral point of view of the Kantian nor to the analysis of personal virtues or local values of the Aristotelian. They range freely across genre boundaries, and they are indeed often better described in novels and poems than in philosophical tracts. *Topoi* describe the 'places' where persons meet and events happen, the emotions they stir, the actions they instigate and the stories they engender. The rendering of topics in this wide sense contributes to answering the

[2] A strict version is discussed in Rahbek Schou (2004).

question of what I owe to myself and what I owe to others. They are made for reflection rather than for decision.

The place of dialogue

The linguistic turn of the last century and the idea of mutuality as both resting in and disclosed in language, makes a shift from the so-called philosophy of consciousness to the idea of intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity means that we are always already embedded in language and in the first-person perspective of taking the point of view of the other. The concept of intersubjectivity offers a clue as to how a modern, highly differentiated individuality can also be a responsible social person. The implications for education are manifold. When intersubjectivity takes pride of place in educational theory, dialogue tempers inculcation and tradition is made transparent. When the teacher is not assigned an unquestioned authority, she is free to fashion authority in her work with the students. When the curriculum is not determined by the received canon of texts, she and her colleagues may discuss the paradox 'There is no canon, thus we need one!' and thus question the established *doxa*. When the school stops controlling by a system of rules and regulations, teachers and students are free to discipline themselves in inquiry and cooperation. When individuality is seen in its double description as definable and ineffable, stable and restless, the teacher may start to appreciate the fine balance between giving her verdict and withholding it, between establishing an adequate rhetoric of cooperation and accepting a common fallible future.

On the intersubjective view, individual autonomy and authenticity is not a private whim but a public act articulated, as Wilhelm von Humboldt suggested, in the *dualis*, that is, in the first-person singular and plural, in which the one who addresses the other is always already speaking from inside a relation: 'The language is definitely not only a tool for mutual understanding, but an imprint of the spirit and the worldview of the speaker. The social life is the indispensable tool in assisting their unfolding'. Interaction in the first person singular ' . . . has its final point in the singular individual', he goes on to say, only 'in so far as that individual can be set apart from humanity' (Humboldt, (1827/1963), p. 135). Granted that Hegel liked to speak of a historical reason and Dewey relied on a theory of action rather than of language, both added significantly to the theory of intersubjectivity. The intersubjectivity of speaker and addressee is, of course, indispensable for a theory of deliberative education: here, individuality joins the social as the fundamental theme of education. Reflections such as these have not made much of a dent in the current debate on education. The effect of globalisation and the worldwide competitive agenda inaugurated by the OECD/PISA-evaluation tests in 2000 and 2003, and the thrust towards knowledge and elementary skills as the sovereign aims of teaching now characterises the discussions both within and without the academy. Politicians are pursuing their goals along the dated opposition between the dialogical, child centred, pedagogy and the teacher-directed

knowledge and skills pedagogy. In this topsy-turvy world, progressive pedagogy is outdated and outdated pedagogy is progressive, with deliberation rather low on the practical agenda.

Deliberation – the strict version

Deliberation in the strict sense takes place within the formal constraints of a rational argumentation or discourse. What are the consequences for education? Jürgen Habermas' discourse ethics suggests an answer. The theory introduces universality in ethics reminiscent of Kant and rational procedures for solving ethical quandaries reminiscent of Dewey. What do we learn from entering into a discourse? What have the participants learnt at the end of the day apart from playing by the rules? Do procedural constraints determine the validity of claims only or do they leave an educative residue in the individual's dispositions and attitudes? Does discourse ever form a moral personality and realise common values? The aim of strict discourse is to establish the validity of normative statements and to settle conflicts by argumentation only (see Rahbek Schou, 2004, p. 148ff). In other words, it is firmly placed within the ambit of moral rational thinking. There is, of course, the background culture to take into consideration. In the exchange of views on what is true and just parties relate to a common repertoire of understanding within a horizon of interpretations. A common horizon offers us the concepts, metaphors and rhetorical devices that make individual expression and mutual interpretation possible in the first place. In everyday life, we confront situations of doubt and disagreement, strife and struggle, and we seek resolutions beyond those of coercion or seduction, violence and repression. Argumentation points itself out as a civilising means in a highly differentiated society dependent on reaching a consensus on political matters. Argumentation is the prime rational tool because it is based, not on local habits and traditions for problem solving, but on taking the perspective of the other according to the principle of universalisation. The abstraction from both personal prejudice and public opinion makes way for the point of view of all possible participants in discourse. This is a valid ideal even if the participation of all in rational argumentation is factually limited by class, talent and luck. We shall see below that the opposition between ideal and real is in fact a vital dynamic relation. As a case of the Hegelian finite-infinite thought figure, the relation defends rather than defeats discourse. The first question now is whether the principle of universality or impartiality has educative implications beyond the thin air of the universalised norms themselves.

The answer to that question takes us some way towards assessing an education for deliberative democracy both in the strict sense of deliberation as argumentation and in the moderate sense of deliberative cooperation. Let us first take a look at the strict version, which seems to leak, almost by osmosis, into the moderate version. In two articles written in the early Eighties, Jürgen Habermas presented two related principles of procedural rationality. The first applies to norms and says that impartial judgments

depend on an intellectual principle that forces those who are affected by a norm's general observance to think from the perspective of everyone else. It is the universalisation principle that harks back to Kant and gets its naturalistic formulation in G. H. Mead's 'ideal role taking' (Habermas, 1983, p. 75f). The principle contains two premises for making a norm good: first, that we know the future consequences of following the norm; second, that we know what everyone's interest really is. Both premises are counterfactual, in the sense that we can neither know the future consequences of our actions nor play God the omniscient.

David Hume's impartial judge, revitalised in John Rawls' 'original position', gets closer to everyday life. Here, the judge is quasi-real in the sense of being situated in the ambit of an existing democratic tradition that makes political judgment possible in the first place. For the teenager whom we try to nudge into democratic thinking, this abstractness is still a tall order, because she is wont to relate socially and emotionally to others. It seems of little avail to imagine her in the position of an unencumbered judge wielding general principles. For her, the emotional openness towards the other's predicament prepares the road to sympathy and moral understanding. It seems the only thing a wise teacher could reasonably ask the student is to forgo her own inclinations, interests and prejudices for the moment, and identify herself with refugees, homosexuals and single mothers. Let us, however, pursue the impartial point of view a bit further. In discourse ethics, a norm's validity ideally depends on the agreement of all parties in moral discourse (Habermas, 1983, p. 132). Let us now turn from universal ideals to the methods of discourse ethics. Discourse considers a norm's validation rather than its validity: discourse is the practice of making normative claims good. Discourse proper is, admittedly, a rather sober activity: there are ideally no pains and passions in it, only validity claims and the mental tools for reaching a rational agreement. Yet, discourse is acting rather than cerebration; it is the interaction between real persons in real situations – the Hegelian influence in Habermas' largely Kantian scheme.

According to Habermas, moral problem solving should satisfy at least two of Lawrence Kohlberg's criteria for a post-conventional morality: reversibility in points of view and reciprocal recognition of every participant's right to have the ear of everyone else (ibid., p. 133). Reversibility means the exchange of roles in situations of mutual cognitive transparency. It means openness and honesty in dealing with the other; it is trying to see the reasons and the arguments from within the other's mind – a higher order cognitive skill. Recognition, on the contrary, is the claim or prerequisite – *Anspruch* – that everyone should have a voice in moral discourse. This presupposition is set against the fact that most people do not have the knowledge, skill and tact to satisfy such an ideal discourse. We note, too, that the German *Anspruch* is a juridical rather than a moral term; to have an *Anspruch* is to be entitled to or have a right to something, for example to be heard in court or to medical care or to social security. The overall ideal approach of discourse ethics points to its limits. Yet, the opposition between real and ideal does not, as we shall see, scorn real discourse but rather belongs to it as a motivating force. Just to take an example, although class, family and access to education systematically exclude many people

from taking part in political discourse, we may include them in principle – the ideal of inclusion has, after all, been a main political motive in the effort to spread democracy to the poor and underprivileged in Western social democracies in the 20th century.

Impartiality means that we are asked, in particular situations, to take a universal perspective. But the inclusion of all affected need not mean the inclusion of every thinkable person *tout court*. As Richard Hare reminds us, the universalisation principle can in fact be of unlimited specificity. His examples 'Never kill people' and 'Never kill people except in self-defence' both refer to a universal norm but differ in specificity (Hare, 1981, p. 41). Specificity occurs when people take a stand in the current quarrel over the question of equal rights for lesbians and gays; or to the question whether parents, regardless of wealth or income, should receive equal tax exemptions for raising children. Any claim raised in the family, the schoolroom or in political disputes, can be tested for its local validity in argumentation. There are also features of utility involved in discourse ethics, because the discussants have to take the possible future consequences of their adjudications into consideration. Yet, some aspects of life are beyond the pale of rational argumentation: human emotions and passions in everyday interaction. Their neglect makes reasonableness stumble in its path. What works in the seminar discussions does not always work in family quarrels, and what is decided in court does not solve family conflicts, as persons who take custody quarrels to court often realise. Bullying in schools are obvious cases for normative argumentation, for example according to The Convention on the Rights of the Child, when it speaks against 'attacks' on the other person's 'honour and reputation'. But impartial judgment is, as teachers know, often not enough. If we want to get things right, moral argumentation has to be tempered by intuition, tact and emotional support from teachers and peers.

Deliberation – the moderate version

The idea of recognition applies to persons and feelings rather than to principles. To respect the other as a rational person is to regard the other's claim as worthy of respect, even when she insists that the threatening antics of her German shepherd dog are protected by animal rights. In general, we tend to respect the person who holds back her particular inclinations and tries to judge impartially. We react with anger against speeding drivers and with indignation against civil servants who take kickbacks. We respect fairness in the distribution of social goods and willingness to resolve conflicts by talking rather than fighting. We accept laws that put constraints on our own freedom in the name of solidarity. Recognition is defined by the mutual obligations accepted by the parties in rational argumentation and the mutual respect that grows out of it. To put it this way: the rule of law works as a conduit of personal bonding. We respect persons because they think according to the law, and we respect

colleagues and friends all the more because they act as law-abiding citizens. Discussing norms according to rational principles engenders, in the best of cases, trust in the other. The social outcome of such learning processes goes beyond strict deliberation issuing in true and fair conclusions. And they are, of course, indispensable for stable political interaction and for a deliberative education. If we follow this path, it is possible to describe not only the educative effect of strict discourse but also the porous boundaries between discourse ethics and virtues.

It is difficult to establish a formal criterion of demarcation between morality and ethical life, like the one Karl R. Popper wanted to establish between what is and what is not scientific. It might, of course, be said that the muddle ethical theory gets into by throwing everything into the same moral basket, confirms the importance of keeping moral hunches and moral testing apart. But too often what we gain in logical stringency we stand to lose in moral adequacy. Discourse ethics has its preferred domains. Its principles seem perfectly appropriate when we discuss human rights in general, or argue for free speech, religious freedom and the right to fair trial on the national level. They also work on the institutional level, as when university professors defend their right to free research or when upper secondary school students protest against national test results made public on the Internet. But discourse involves, as we have just seen, more than playing by the rules. Rational argumentation seems to succeed only in concert with dispositions and habits and trust in the other. The ordinary school practices should negotiate the boundaries between the rights type and the value type of moral quandaries. If you ask people how they go about solving moral quandaries in real life situations, they will probably tell you that they have been helped by proverbs, stories and moral examples rather than reasons, or they will insist that sometimes they work by intuition rather than by rules. Recent research in child development has confirmed the view that infant behaviour is guided by the joint effects of imitation and, in Daniel N. Stern's (1985) words, 'affect attunement' and not by explicit rules. These affective schemas or habits of learning generate and become an integral part of later adult strategies for moral problem-solving. They are bodily affective dispositions rather than rules, coming into play when situation and context make their demands upon the individual. Ronald de Sousa prefers the name 'paradigm scenarios' for a readiness to act that is guided by moral impressions picked from coffee house discussions, films and journals, books and cartoons.

What about the place of the emotions in ethics? Cool impartiality does not sit well with emotions and passions seem inappropriate in discourse. The emotional deficit in strict cognitivism is modified in the moderate version. The question is: Can emotions be rational? De Sousa suggests that three considerations link emotions to rationality: they are ' . . . our confidence in judgments of *reasonableness*, the use of emotions as *excuses and justifications*, and the *thought-dependency* of most emotions' (De Sousa, 1987, p. 5). He has a point. We are wont to think of emotions as irrational, but when they occur in context they may turn out to be adequate both to the situation at hand and in argumentation. We put trust in persons that use discretion and have a sense of the apt judgment. Appropriateness often depends on a feel for what is suitable in a

situation, and tact requires some degree of emotional involvement in other people's situation: who has not told a white lie in his life and has been all the better for it? Even if rationality matters, a theory of deliberative education must consider the heuristic role of emotions and enquire into the sense of the intuitive and ineffable.

Participants in argumentation acquire a plethora of skills, the skills that we appreciate or even admire in people who are good at discussions, whether they take place in the schoolroom, on radio or on television, as long as strictures of fair discussion are obeyed. Let us close this section with short look at possible educative effects of a strict deliberative practice. Students learn to interact in the inquiring attitude, to treat claims as hypotheses to be put to the test and to see the results of argumentation as preliminary and open to further discussion. Discourse requires skills such as expressing a problem, picking out its salient features, laying out its scope, formulating one's claim, arguing one's case, respecting the other's right to disagree, working towards a possible agreement and accepting the final verdict even if it goes counter to one's own cherished beliefs. These are skills in handling complex intellectual and social situations. If their use leaves a moral sediment of dispositions in the student, the habit to act within the boundaries of reciprocity and fair discussion, we enjoy virtues such as caring for truth and truthfulness, honouring fairness and tolerating others. These are the virtues that would make up what Habermas calls democratic meaning – and will-formation – in the best of worlds.

The transcendental point of view

So far deliberative education has been modelled around rational procedures for resolving moral conflicts as an alternative to teaching by inculcation or seduction. I have suggested how a strict and, even more, a moderate version of deliberation allows for a porous relation to an education of the virtues. In the section above, I exemplified a basic feature of discourse ethics by the fact that even if people are materially and socially excluded from taking part in political discourse, we may still ideally hold on to the principle of inclusion of everyone in matters political. This suspended relation between real and ideal defines the transcendental. What has to be shown is how this relation itself is real in the sense that it affects and effects moral and political action. To some philosophers, such as Richard Rorty and Robert Brandom, it seems utterly irrelevant for pragmatists to go transcendental. They do not see what difference a transcendental backing of truth or justice makes for our efforts to educate reasonable citizens in a democratic society.[3] They have a point. Transcendental presuppositions that put formal strictures on rational action get in the way of situated inquiry and argumentation. If, on the contrary, we opt for a historicist Hegelian version of the transcendental theme, another vista opens itself, not wholly out of tune with Rorty's

[3] In philosophy, the transcendental question is hotly debated, as in Brandom, 2000.

own point of view. The salient point in Habermas' discourse ethics is the premise that non-factual, but still practically relevant, presuppositions are at play in rational discourse.

Non-factual presuppositions do not force our moral hand. They apply to discourse in general, yet do their work 'inside' each singular discourse. Ideals is not free-floating mind stuff but constrained by time and place, by the rational resources of the actual cases. The force of the argument rather depends on the dialectical relation between what I say and the anticipations that plays into the case. Force belongs to language and to the argumentation that brings the real–ideal relation to life in a singular case. Both Habermas and Derrida refer to real–ideal dialectics in their thinking, even if they come to quite different conclusions as to its import and consequences. For Habermas the transcendental feature of language, as expressed in 'the ideal speech situation', is a pragmatic premise that makes the wheels of argumentation turn smoothly on their ball bearings. For Derrida the transcendental feature contributes to the paradoxes of speech and action that leads to aporias and to a certain kind of aporetic reflection (see especially Derrida, 1993). Discourse ethics relies on the hypothetical attitude, a more or less formal rule following and an appetite for consensus. Deconstructive ethics comes through as the aporetic restlessness that resides in the text as a promise or an expectation of things to come – a messianism without Messiah, to speak in Derrida's own vocabulary. To make out the differences, I shall recover what I take to be their common Hegelian background.

The Enlightenment tradition has been running along a fault line of opposites: those of subject-object, true-false, just-unjust, private-public, etc. Hegel was the first philosopher who, around 1800, quit the habit of seeing the two sides of this opposition as mutually exclusive: the inside, subjective, autonomous and private part, as cut off from the outside, objective and public part. John Dewey made another stab at dualist thinking by insisting that education does not start either in the child or in the curriculum, to recall the title of his famous essay of 1902, but in the 'completest and freest interaction' between the two.[4] The dialectical view was further transformed when, in Rorty's terms, Dewey's 'naturalist' pragmatism was turned into the 'linguistic' neo-pragmatism of today. Language became the common medium of dialogue and action. In that context, the point of oppositions is not their fixedness but rather their insubstantiality and instability, the relation between individuality and solidarity being one of open-ended quest rather than epistemic closure.

The turn to language offers an alternative to fixedness in thinking. The alternative had an early spokesman in von Humboldt, but it is Hegel who configures my discussion in his description of the finite–infinite relation. With an explicit reference to and criticism of Kant's view of the 'ought' – *das Sollen* – of duty, Hegel argues in his *Logic* that the ought, by implying a future ideal, implicates a limit (*Grenze*) or limitation (*Schranke*)

[4] See Dewey, 1902/1974, p 4. Von Humboldt wrote a 100 years before that education is a matter of ' . . . linking of the self to the world to achieve the most general, most animated, and most unrestrained interplay [*freiesten Wechselwirkung*]. See Humboldt, 2000, p. 58.

between ideal and real. A current example: the promise you make here and now points, at the same time, beyond that situation, to its possible fulfilment or disappointment. The promise, then, sets the limit between the present and the future, between the expressed pledge and its fulfilment or not. In the ought of the promise the present and the future are thus already internally related, as is the case with marriage wows and business contracts. If you ask 'Where is the future fulfilment?', one answer is 'The future is here!' with all its existential certainties and uncertainties. That is to say, you cope with the promise as an existential *topos*. On the contrary, when the ought is withdrawn, the future withdraws, too, the same way contracts that are cashed in are no longer contracts. Instead of making the ought into a Kantian regulative idea, something apart and beyond, Hegel situates it in the present, as a dilemma or rather contradiction that exists in the present situation. The limit, then, is a limitation that affects us existentially as the oscillation or alternation between the present and the future in the here and now. Hegel thus transforms Kant's regulative idea into the transcendence of the concrete other: the promise is the limit rather than the solid ground, the restless relation between an honest pledge and the fact that the honesty may not be redeemed. The simple question 'What ought I to do?' invokes the infinite as internally related to the finite, as the flip sides of the same coin, the infinite as real as the finite in each singular case. The ought has, says Hegel, ' . . . its place and its validity in the sphere of finitude . . . the ought is only the standpoint that clings to finitude and thus to contradiction' (Hegel, 1976, pp. 135–136). The satisfactions of the ought are never fully enjoyed, it is a suspended satisfaction and thus aporetic. With Hegel's figure of thought, philosophy made a significant step toward a post-metaphysical and neo-pragmatic stand that is still nourished by the transcendental. Hegel configures the present discussion whether you invoke Habermas' ideal speech situation or Derrida's *différance*.

Skills, virtues – or *topoi*?

Discourse ethics makes the significant move away from a philosophy of consciousness in which maxims are justified by a reference to the Categorical Imperative and everyone's rational faculty in a moral monologue. In discourse ethics, the maxims are transformed into hypotheses to be tested in actual discourse. According to Habermas the moral grammar is not inscribed into the brain but into language, and discourse is constrained by the 'unforced force' of the ideal speech situation and the better argument. The hidden imprint of this grammar guides the discourse of individual speakers. Habermas has been criticised for his idea of the ideal speech situation and has, over the years, highlighted its mundane pragmatic features. In an interview conducted with Torben Hviid Nielsen in 1990, he distances himself a bit from his earlier use of the term. He stresses the fact that we orient ourselves by this idea when we want to give all voices in a discourse a hearing and when we hold that the best arguments available should be brought to bear. The ideals do not, then, work as regulative ideas in the Kantian sense – there are no stars that may stir the imagination and lead our efforts. As

Habermas puts it: 'The point is, rather, that if we want to enter into argumentation, we must make these presuppositions of argumentation *as a matter of fact*, despite the fact that they have an ideal content to which we can only approximate in reality' (Habermas, 1993, p. 164). The point is that the presupposition that validity claims can be made good, the 'as if' of the redemption of those claims, exists as a fact within the very discourse we carry out. Within language, then, the presupposition of an open-ended dialogue runs parallel with the constraints of a rational discussion. This, then, is the relevant transcendental point of view: when we speak we are always already invoking the difference between the ideal and the real, the factual and the possible, in actual discourse. Or as Hegel put it above: 'the ought has its place and validity in the sphere of finitude'.

Philosophers of education have noted that the procedural-deliberative model of democracy tends to exclude those features of modern society that go beyond rational discourse (see for example Bauer, 2000, p. 237). In his book *Back to the Rough Ground*, Joseph Dunne, after having documented Habermas' appreciation of the non-formal features of the lifeworld, asks whether Habermas has really ' . . . extricated himself from Kant's incorrigible formalism', and suggests that he still defends a certain 'technicism' (Dunne, 1993, pp. 218 and 225). Technicism refers here to the procedures for testing validity claims and to modelling moral discourse on the theoretical discourse of the natural sciences. In the middle of the transcendental problematic Dunne forces us to ask ourselves: Is there a thicker idea of practice than the one suggested by a strict and even moderate idea of deliberation? His deconstruction of Aristotle leads him to the idea of a ' 'phronetic' *techne*, i.e., one whose responsiveness to the situation is not fully specifiable in advance and which is experiential, charged with perceptiveness and rooted in the sensory and emotional life' (ibid., p. 355). Dunne's question brings us beyond the quarrel between liberals and communitarians, between those who want to foster rational rule-directed practices and those who want to teach the virtues. It leads me to the simple question: Are there phenomena in life that can be taught even if they are neither skills nor virtues? The answer is, I have already suggested, found in the existential *topoi*. Among those are trust, care and tolerance – and love, joy and happiness. They make up our everyday life but are not methods or procedures. Neither are they personal dispositions or virtues such as friendliness or fidelity or patience. That means they do not fit easily into the rule-governed activities of teaching and learning.

Sometimes these phenomena may, of course, be tilted towards descriptions of personal qualities and habits, as in the virtues of a loving, friendly or caring person. But *topoi* have a much broader descriptive scope, they are more akin to Karl Jaspers' 'limit situations' (suffering, struggle, and death), Martin Heidegger's 'existentials' (making room, concern, and attunement) and the Danish philosopher Knud E. Løgstrup's 'spontaneous life expressions' (speech, trust and care). They take on the character of existential phenomena that are intimate parts of ordinary people's life but not necessarily of their character. For the philosophers just mentioned existential situations have an ontological status: they belong to human existence despite the variety of their cultural

expressions. In C. S. Lewis's (1960) account of the four loves of affection, friendship, eros and charity in his book *The Four Loves*, they are woven into our everyday conversation, yet nobody would mistake them for personal virtues.[5] *Topoi* are not privileged but range from the commonplaces in the weekly *Cosmopolitan* to the conversations between teachers and students and on to textual and cultural analyses. They are unavoidable and recurrent life themes or topics that we keep on talking about in private and public, in a way that take us beyond the particular relation between speaker and hearer to a wider variety of common concerns. *Topoi* can even have non-linguistic features. As embedded in the material situations that determine the choreography of our thoughts and actions and as embodied in the pains and passions we express they colour our relations with others.

The relevance of the *topoi*

In the discussion about the sources of social interaction, Kantian morality has traditionally been pitted against Aristotelian ethics; on the one hand, the idea of autonomous persons thinking in the universal attitude and, on the other, that of people acting within the ethos of a particular culture. Now the point is that the *topoi* mentioned straddle the liberal–communitarian divide. Axel Honneth has suggested a quasi-independent status for the Hegelian concept of mutual recognition that implies a realisation of self separated from particular instrumentalities like justifying truth claims or initiating people into local forms of life (Honneth, 1994, p. 276). In *The Struggle for Recognition*, mutual recognition is introduced as a key concept of political theory in contrast to the individualism proposed by Thomas Hobbes and later libertarian thinkers. As Honneth tells it, the idea of mutual recognition as worked out by Hegel in his Jena period of 1801–1807, and coming to the fore again in the political setting of *The Philosophy of Right* of 1820, is a master *topos* that includes those of love and friendship. Their analysis can be made part of the 'normative reconstruction' of the conditions for a realisation of the freedom of all members of society (Honneth, 2001, p. 91). The main question then is: What consequences can such topological analyses have for deliberative thinking in general and for education in particular? The immediate answer seems to be: no consequences at all! For both politics and education typically make use of social mechanisms and techniques for their implementation. Outside the means-ends scheme of technicism, there seem to be nothing but the good-natured ramblings of wide-eyed idealists. The practical consequence for education is that there is no ready-made connection between an analysis of these phenomena and their place in education. As *topoi* do not suggest any principles for resolving conflicts of interest or opinion; and as they do not tell teachers how to make the young like us, it seems they should be left to the winds.

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[5] I am grateful to Maria G. Amilburu for commending Lewis' book to me.

So why insist on putting such flimsy things back into a theory of deliberative education? We do because democracy needs to reflect on human needs for freedom, self-realisation and community that go beyond technicisms and readymade conclusions. I shall leave Habermas here, and turn to Derrida for counsel on the matter, although Richard Rorty made short shrift of him with the following characteristic: a 'private' thinker given to self-indulgent fantasising, adding that 'There is no moral to these fantasies, nor any public (pedagogic or political) use to be made of them . . . ' (Rorty, 1989, p. 125) At the same time, Christopher Norris went to the other extreme by proposing that Derrida's deconstruction is 'a Kantian enterprise' because he makes 'writing' – a technical term in Derridas's vocabulary – into the condition of possibility of knowledge (Norris, 1987, pp. 94 and 183). He at least saves Derrida's credibility as a serious 'public' philosopher – if the man ever needed to be saved from his critics! I shall pursue a course similar to Norris' but follow a different path that shows how Derrida receives and transforms Hegel's logic of the finite–infinite as the aporetic moment embedded in the conversations of *topoi*. Aporetics draws on the Hegelian dialectic in its paradoxical features. But what can an aporetics – raising questions without providing neat answers – ever do for education?

Readers of Hegel's *The Phenomenology of Spirit* often overlook the human drama in Hegel's concept of experience, the fact that the ' . . . road [to knowledge] can . . . be regarded as the pathway of *doubt*, or more precisely as the way of despair'.[6] Experience appears as both a gift and a curse, the *pharmakon* that Derrida used to speak of. Learning becomes a loss of truth and self as much as an assurance of self and identity. The idea of *Bildung* as a contradictory process, the very instability at the heart of education, runs as an undercurrent through Hegel's authorship, in the name of a dialectic that defies closure – unless you believe in the end of history. It inspires the famous struggle to the death description of the master–slave relation in the *Phenomenology*. Chastised by the utmost fear of annihilation at the hands of the master, the slave resumes his life as a servant, artisan and worker for the master. Disciplined by his submission to the nitty-gritty demands of the world, he is finally coming to his own as the independent author of his life. The description brings to view that mutual recognition, self-realisation in the eyes of the other, is achieved by dramatic transformations, personal, social and political. These struggles bear witness to a life of restlessness and despair, as well as of promise and hope. In this context authenticity (Rousseau) and autonomy (Kant) as the 'right' that modernity has bestowed on its citizens, become fragile political goods that are historically transformed and never finalised. Yet, in the face of disappointments and defeat, we never stop presenting self-realisation and freedom as hopes and aims for education. We cope with this fate because the alternative to doubt and despair is stasis and stagnation and the repetition of the same. We cope because of the paradoxical freedom inherent in aims that cannot and should not materialise. We cope because perfect knowledge means the death of

[6] See Hegel, 1807/1977, p. 49 §78. In German, there is a significant wordplay here between *Zweifel and Verzweiflung,* the first referring to the cognitive dissonance, the second to existential despair. Hegel does not accept the gap between thinking and feeling.

wisdom, perfect self-realisation the death of self and perfect education the death of education. So our most cherished aims better remain, in Derrida's words, parts of 'impure' processes that are never finalised and thus leave us free to explore our finitude. In this sense, Derrida can say that 'The self, the *autos* of legitimating and legitimated self-foundation, *is still to come*, not as a *future* reality but as that which will always retain the essential structure of promise and as that which can only arrive as such, as *to come*' (Derrida, 2002a, p. 22). This is, I think, the gist of deconstruction in the context of education.

Deconstruction in context

Geoffrey Bennington has emphasised the deceptively simple argument Derrida is pressing in political thinking, namely the paradox that theorising and interpretation are interminable and cannot prepare for the irruptive moments of decision and action (Bennington, 2000, p. 25). In education, democracy is traditionally treated in the stories handed over from historians and political scientists. Some programmes of civic education seem on the whole happy to teach its institutions and explain its workings according to the textbook. Others, aware of the motivational and educative force of practical participation in democratic processes, engage the students in project work and in internal decision-making. The recent neo-liberal thinking fails here, partly because of its idea of freedom as freedom of choice, but more significantly because of its reliance on systems integration. It configures the school as a system of pressure and control, the curricula as goal-related rather than aim-related, and teaching as coaching for efficiency. Its freedom of choice is a freedom of closure. What, then, to expect from the radical 'perhaps' of deconstruction? The preliminary answer is that the analysis of the radical 'perhaps' reminds us that education for democracy is no algorithm, that democracy is not a given fixture and that political education must go beyond mere instruction and initiation – that is, if we want to defend and teach a viable democracy in our educational institutions.

We are not completely determined by the institutions and situations we are part of. An example may illustrate the point in its practical significance. In January of 2005, the Norwegian Student's Organisation staged a boycott of the national tests introduced a few years earlier and conducted on four different age levels; among them the first year of higher secondary education (ages 16–19). The NSO's main grievance was the decision by the Ministry of Education to publish the school leagues on the Internet. This was taken as a breach of privacy as the public results could be traced back both to the particular school and to the individual student. Another, implicit, theme was that the students willy-nilly had to participate in the global competitive schemes pursued by politicians and established by the Ministry in conformity with the international OECD-PISA studies of 2000 and 2003. The students wanted their legitimate interests as individuals and students to be respected and recognised. The boycott is interesting on several counts. The most obvious is that the 16-year olds who participated literally

walked out of their role as clients in the machinery of teaching and evaluation. The NSO worked as a Trojan horse, so to speak, within the established system of administration, which baffled the authorities. The immediate reaction of the Minister of Education was to threaten with low marks, a punishment directed at their character and comportment as well as their academic performance. The fact was that no public laws or regulations had actually been violated, which made state sanctions illegitimate and local education authority action ineffective (only 2% of Norwegian schools are private). The Minister admitted later, on a TV talk show, that the woman president of the NSO was a quick and clever person – an oblique recognition of her and the boycott action. The response was one of civil wisdom, because the students had, arguably, acted according to the aims of a democratic education, as put down in §1 of the Norwegian Education Act of 1999. They acted like responsible students in a field traditionally defined as administrative and non-political.

As a legitimate NGO action the boycott challenged traditional systems of legitimation, pitting civil society against the power of the state education authorities. The action temporarily opened the doors for a discourse in which validity questions could be raised, for example the question of the right of state schools to impose competition on international and national school systems, down to local schools, teachers and students. The action also moved the conflict from the level of systems integration to that of moral integration, that is, from the steering mechanisms of competition and control to discourse and justification. To stage the discussion the students took to strategic action, which shows how political conflicts are characteristically muddled: public discourse opened up by strategic and tactical action. The struggle posed a challenge to those who reflect on deliberative democratic education: How can political protest and deliberation be a legitimate part of secondary education; is it legitimate to see 16-year olds as sovereign citizens? Whatever answer that is given, the boycott demonstrates a more adult role for teenagers in contemporary digital society. It shows how the range for active participation by students in political life is different from the late Eighties, when Rorty wrote his wrongheaded article on socialisation.

The politics of deconstruction

Over the last two decades, Jacques Derrida has increasingly been engaged in debates on the teaching of philosophy and the reform of the European university system. He has taken an interest in political concepts, especially justice, and has been lambasted for corrupting political theory by the 'the Heideggerian messianism' offered in his 'dark and forbidding works' (Lilla, 1998). Let us not pass judgment on the matter until we see what he is up to. In an interview with Giovanna Borradori on the political aftermath of September 11, 2001, he gives a pragmatic analysis of a democracy in crisis. This is a topsy-turvy version of the finite–infinite figure – a reversal from promise and hope to perversion and self-destruction in democracy. Admitting to the relative inadequacy of a conceptual and discursive analysis of what is now referred to as 9/11, he

says that ' . . . what remains 'infinite' in this wound, is that we do not know what it is and so do not know how to describe, identify or even name it' (Borradori, 2003, p. 94). On the face of it, this utterance seems rather dodgy, as the world still reels under the footage and comments and analyses of the wars that followed upon the catastrophe. Derrida's point lies elsewhere, in the impossibility of a final description, understanding or closure of what took place in New York on that September morning. He goes on to describe this infinite experience as 'anything but abstract and idealist' and works it out in three moments of 'autoimmunity', that is, self-destructive or 'quasi-suicidal' reactions.

The first reflection is that the attack came from within USA itself, brought about by the technological potential of that country itself (the use American airline planes) and by helping the brain behind the attack, bin Laden, to become a terrorist (CIA covert actions backed the Taliban insurgents fighting the Soviet forces in Afghanistan in the 1980s). The second reflection is the traumatism that is produced by the future, by the 'to come' of possible deadly nuclear or bacteriological attacks by 'rogue states' or terrorist groups, a threat that is repeatedly making the news. The third moment is the self-defeating autoimmunitary response of violating human and civic rights and the basic democratic ideals (the American Patriot Act, the flouting of the Geneva conventions and American law at Guantànamo Bay, political surveillance and the American 'extra-ordinary rendition' of terrorist suspects in other countries). In Derrida's analysis, the finite– infinite relation now takes on the red hue of politics – the bad infinite of evil replaces the good infinite of the ought.[7] We are wont to hear from politicians that the threat to democracy comes from without: Ronald Reagan's 1980-style 'evil empire' and George W. Bush's 'axis of evil' rhetoric belong to that image. Derrida presents his take on the finite–infinite dialectic by describing these moments as cases of repression and suppression in their psychoanalytical and political senses. The threat is now coming from within, as the self-inflicted wounds of democracy itself.

In more general terms, the infinite insinuates itself in Derrida's rendering of the attack on the Twin Towers and its aftermath as an avenging angel, as the never-ending plot against our democratic institutions. All measures are then taken to prevent the radical unpredictability of future attacks. And every measure against the enemy reiterates and heightens the fear, nurtured by tales of sinister plots, reported arrests and the elusive bin Laden, hiding somewhere along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border. I have commented upon Derrida's analyses in order to show how politically real the evil infinite is as the expectation of a future threat, with its concomitant repression of civic rights. As an introjection of forgotten origin the infinite is taking on mythical proportions. As far as I can see, these are not dark and forbidding thoughts but can be discussed in the common academic vernacular. I believe that a responsible political education should reflect upon the

[7] Hegel used to speak of 'the bad infinite', not as evil, but as the free floating ought of the Kantian regulative ideas. I treat the bad or evil infinite as the dark and perverse side of the traditional transcendental finite-infinite relation.

double nature of democracy: its openness to the future of justice and its exposure to injustice from within its own institutions. Globalisation has thrust this task upon education, and education can choose either to take it upon itself or to remain oblivious or indifferent to it. In the last case, it forfeits its right to call itself an education for deliberative democracy.

So where do we set our course? Political injustice can, according to Habermas, be explained by distorted communication, that is, by ' . . . misunderstanding and incomprehension, from insincerity and deception' (Borradori, 2003, p. 35). Derrida's analysis takes up the slack of that approach by showing how repression has its hidden ways with us. He reminds us that injustice can be, and actually is, carried out in the name of justice. In the Habermasian thinking, the flouting of international conventions is interpreted as a case of illegitimate politics, to be set right by appeal to human rights, rational argumentation and action. Derrida's analysis points to a political pathology, a recurrent theme and a repetitive dialectic that plays itself out in the darker corners of justice. His analysis is, more characteristically, part of an aporetic: the sense for what calls for a reflection that widens the field of political insights. The aporetic is not conjured up by political defeatist but, in this case, offers a diagnosis open to discussion and to political action. The aporetic attitude is, I think, the reason why some readers get impatient or even reject Derrida's analyses instead of seeing them, in their preliminary, diagnostic and heuristic mode, as part of a deliberative education.

Derrida's answer to repressive actions within constitutional democracy is a politics that ' . . . leaves a perspective open to perfectibility in the name of the 'political', democracy, international law, international institutions, and so on' (ibid., p. 114). Deconstructive thinking should, he says, 'question and refound' axioms and principles of law, ' . . . without becoming discouraged by the aporias such work must necessarily encounter' (ibid., p. 114). He expresses a responsible, action-oriented political attitude, starting in existing states of affairs. But he eschews the tools and technicisms for improving them, and introduces the infinite as the 'impossible', that is, the simple thought of 'pure' democracy. This aporetic may carry the label utopian or messianic, but there is not a whiff of the Heideggerian in it. It is, if anything, rather Kierkegaardian in its existential inspiration. Our hopes for democracy is, as Derrida has it, ' . . . faith in the possibility of this impossibility and, in truth, undecidable thing from the point of view of knowledge, science, and conscience that must govern all our decisions' (ibid., p. 115). We cannot fully or totally implement democracy (total control as totalitarian democracy, a contradiction in terms), so we have to rest content with the 'democracy to come'. Political science cannot fully catch social reality in its conceptual schemes and rational procedures often do not touch the underlying problems of democracy. That leaves us democracy as 'undecidable' and in need of 'faith', a word that has a religious ring to it and refers to a complex of thought and feeling. This is the place where Derrida clearly distances himself from the proceduralism of discourse ethics. Democratic responsibility is not, he says, exhausted in ' . . . following, applying or realizing a norm or rule' that leads to 'a calculable consequence' (ibid., p. 134). Those who think or act according to

political algorithms are, in a certain sense, irresponsible because the manual or recipe has it all laid out for them. In a world of the recipes there is no fear or trembling and, thus, only the responsibility of making things to order. At a deeper level, following the rules is irresponsible because the sense of the world is laid to rest. Derrida's critique of rule-following can be read as a criticism of purposeful and strategic action on par with Habermas' critique of instrumentalist action. But, it can also be read as a critique of the hypothetical attitude of discourse ethics, and the formalism that runs through Habermas' pragmatics. But, be not deceived by the differences between Derrida and Habermas! On the eve of Bush's and Tony Blair's war against Iraq in early March 2003, the two of them together wrote an article in the newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung denouncing the occupation as unfounded and illegitimate.

Deconstructing tolerance

In her book, Borradori also conducts an interview with Habermas on the topic of September 11, and she asks both philosophers, Habermas and Derrida, about their view on tolerance. Both remark on the conditionality of tolerance: that it depends on one person's or group's sovereignty over another, that tolerance is given and withheld, a favour withdrawn at will. For Derrida the concept of tolerance even nourishes intolerance, as witnessed by the exclusion of those who do not conform to the conditions of tolerance, another take on the idea of repressive tolerance. Tolerance is defective because it does not satisfy the finite–infinite relation – there is no 'pure' tolerance and therefore no dialectic involved. Habermas characteristically resolves the problem of intolerance within the ambit of the constitutional state and the rights conferred on its subjects by the constitution. Universalism plays a role here, but the most important feature is, according to him, ' . . . the peculiar character of reflexivity that constitutional principles enjoy' (Borradori, 2003, p. 41). Applied to my example, the educational authorities had to tolerate 'civil disobedience' on the part of the students because the constitution covers such acts on the condition that the ' . . . rule-breaking resistance be plausibly justified in the spirit and wording of the constitution and conducted by symbolic means that lend the fight the character of a non-violent appeal to the majority to once again reflect on their decisions' (ibid., p. 42). This norm applies to the student boycott in the sense that they too appealed to reasonable rights informing the regulations sanctioned by the Parliament and expressed in the National Education Act. Here was a case of two political circles overlapping: the local interpretation of regulations within the school system, and the wider public discussion in society at large. It reminds us that an education for deliberative democracy is also responsible for letting events within a particular institution issue in public discourse, as part of an ongoing public deliberation.

Habermas, then, perceives tolerance as a lopsided relationship that only the common standards of constitutional thinking and action can put right. Derrida follows another path. On the question whether tolerance can be the condition of hospitality, he answers flatly that it is the opposite of hospitality: 'Tolerance is a conditional,

circumspect, careful hospitality. Or at least its limit', he insists (Borradori, 2003, p. 129).. His analysis of hospitality is reminiscent of Kant but set in the Hegelian dialectic. The person who invites someone into her home shows hospitality on the condition that the guest behaves according to the local, unspoken, rules of decorum. Inadequate behaviour exposes the limit and crisis of hospitality. The stranger drives hospitality to the limit where it threatens to turn into hostility (see de Caputo, 1997, p. 109ff). Derrida plays on the double description *hospes-hostis* (hospitality-hostility) as the etymological root of hospitality and thus to the roots of the basic inclusion–exclusion practices in modern democracy. The relevance of this analysis for our understanding of attitudes towards immigrants and refugees, the outsiders and the bullied is obvious – with the stranger as the limit case *par excellence*. Now practised hospitality is opposed to 'pure' hospitality. Pure hospitality, Derrida says, is 'practically impossible to live' (I would leave out 'practically' here). It cannot be defined or organised, it has no legal or political status, and thus seems to be beyond our powers and of no practical significance. Yet, he continues, ' . . . without this pure and unconditional hospitality . . . we would have no concept of hospitality in general'. That is to say, without it we cannot practise hospitality; we do not have a form of life according to an ethical point of view (Borradori, 2003, p. 129). The concept of pure hospitality makes it possible to demand a redress of the violated right to hospitality, it works as criterion of hospitality proper. What is lost with the loss of pure hospitality? Derrida provides an answer by relating that he learnt from philosophy ' . . . the necessity of posing transcendental questions in order not to be held within the fragility of an incompetent empiricist discourse, and thus it is in order to avoid empiricism, positivism and psychologism that it is endlessly necessary to renew transcendental questioning' (Mouffe, 1996, p. 81f). The right method often promises the adequate resolution. Derrida's purport is negative: to stop impatient measures in their track and keep the avenues of discourse open in a world of hasty resolutions. Hospitality in this sense gives us pause for reflection and thus avoids its own death at the hands of premature closure.

Again, how can 'pure' concepts such as hospitality, justice, friendship, care, trust and love still remain part of the everyday world? Again, a key to the answer lies in Hegel's thought figure. Real hospitality survives because we cannot act towards the other without implying pure hospitality, that is, a pragmatics of hospitality. As human beings situated, so to speak, in the *topoi* just mentioned we are bound to 're-inscribe' the pure into everyday life. Derrida prefers to speak here of 'transactions' that realise ethical responsibilities, and these transactions are as real as you can get them. The finite–infinite relation appears in practice as the limit situations of hospitality or care or love even when they are not felicitous, when they fail and collapse. Likewise, we hold on to the promise of democracy in the face of its crises – with hope as the integral part of democracy in transaction. Derrida's promise of the 'democracy to come' is the infinite reflected back upon the present life, the expectation of a renewed democracy, the sensitivity for what is in the coming, reminiscent of Hannah Arendt's concept of natality. The sense of coming into being implies a history that does not repeat itself and the accidental that cannot be predicted. 9/11 belongs to the history of terrorism, but it

is a different story from earlier state – or anarchist – terrorism, and it could not be predicted any more than the disintegration of the Soviet empire after 1989 – the first revolution without a shot fired. These are main stream reflections that get their ‘forbidding’, and among many academics forbidden, expression in Derrida’s work. At the same time, every finite–infinite transaction has its place in situations of finitude and singularity. The unique cannot be universalised, and in this respect, deconstruction stands at the far end of discourse ethics. But *techne* cannot be avoided. As Derrida has it in an interview, this time about respect for the other: ‘Deconstruction must not impose itself. But at the same time, obviously, this respect is a calculation; it is contaminated by calculation’ (Derrida, 2002b, p. 15). Derrida is always ready to detect the impurities of a life that is tainted by double descriptions of the calculable and the not calculable. We tend to accept such descriptions in novels and short stories, where they make for irony and drama, crisis and suspense. But they are, understandably, not happily admitted into the life of the scientist or teacher who is routinely working under the dictates of procedure and control.

The freedom to teach is contaminated by calculation: to make freedom part of democratic thinking and action. To make something is to draw the blood of freedom for the benefit of practical needs, which, in the context of the citation above, is the teaching of philosophy. Teaching needs methods. But at the same time, deconstruction ‘must not impose itself’; it cannot take the form of an algorithm, however lax it is. The crux of an education for deliberative democracy, then, is that responsible teaching may just take the responsibility out of teaching. When the ends and means are set, our responsibilities are accordingly set and circumscribed. The procedures for making validity claim good; the technicisms of legitimate action both extend and curb our democratic responsibilities. The same paradox befalls teaching when democratic virtues harden into set habits. It may seem that deconstruction, essentially occupied with *topoi* rather than rules or virtues, may free us from this paradox. It does not. If anything it sharpens the pain of the paradox. *Topoi* do not imply the technicisms of argumentation or inculcation, they are part of the self-examined life that has to be endured. On the one hand the *topoi* mentioned – and the list is easily prolonged – describe everyday situations within given cultural contexts. They are the ‘places’ where thinking dwells, in Heidegger’s parlance. They recur as topics in education when teachers and students reflect on friendship, justice and the care for the other. On the other hand, *topoi* are in a sense outside the ken of the educational: they exist independently of teaching the virtues and the rules we play by in our pursuit of a democratic form of life.

Do *topoi*, then, belong to a third category – a pre-ethical one, grounding or overriding rules and virtues? I think not. *Topoi* are unavoidable parts of the human condition, presented in scriptures, philosophies and novels. But they are not categorical, they cannot be appropriated by dogma, culled by scientific theories or configured into social mores and they cannot be made into a canon for an education for democracy. They cannot, because they are radical experiences that raise new and different questions and answers. I have presented those experiences as the relation between the finite and the infinite, as a mental restlessness, as living on the edge, and therefore as the fate of vulnerable minds. It may, after all, be a bearable life, a life of educative experiences, as we find

it in Derrida's descriptions of friendship and hospitality and of 'democracy to come', buoyed as they are by promise and hope. It is a bearable life even when we introduce the evil infinite, the threats we nurture in the dark recesses of the psyche and re-enact in self-destructive politics. In any case, I do not think we can talk about education for a deliberative democracy without taking this critique upon us as thinkers and teachers, and as responsible citizens of an open society. By the way, have you noticed that the sceptic Richard Rorty published a book in 1999, with the title *Philosophy and Social Hope*?

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CHAPTER 8

MULTICULTURAL METAPHORS

J. Mark Halstead

The various discourses of multiculturalism are simply overflowing with metaphors. Racists may talk of 'mongrel' cultures and warn of the dangers of 'contagion', 'seepage', 'contamination' and 'violation'. The supporters of multiculturalism, on the contrary, see it as culturally 'enriching', a 'patchwork quilt', a colourful 'tapestry', a 'harmonising blend' of diverse cultures and traditions. The relationship between the different cultures that make up a single society is variously described as a 'melting pot', a 'tossed salad', a 'mosaic' or a 'kaleidoscope'. Some of the most revealing metaphors have dropped unrehearsed from the lips of politicians, such as Margaret Thatcher's fear that her country might be 'swamped' by immigrants or George W. Bush's 'crusade' against terrorism. Asians in Britain have been described as 'leading unhappy double lives' (Akhtar, 1993, p. 3) or as 'walking on a tight-rope by being half Westernised and half Easternised' (Raza, 1991, p. 80). The school may be a 'bridge' between the culture of the home and the culture of the broader society, although it is often assumed that there is only one-way traffic across the bridge and that minorities should leave their 'cultural baggage' behind before embarking on the crossing. Monocultural education may be dismissed as 'narrow' and 'impoverished', or 'fertile ground' for the development of cultural arrogance and insensitivity (Parekh, 2000), but multicultural education equally has been criticised as an indigestible 'hotchpotch' put together out of incompatible ingredients.

What is going on in this kind of language use? Traditional explanations of metaphor seem inadequate: multiculturalism is not particularly a topic that is crying out for decorative or ornamental language, nor is it one that is totally dependent on an imaginative response; nor indeed are there clear truths that lie behind the metaphors, as Aristotle would have us believe, if only we can interpret them correctly. It is surprising that philosophers have paid so little attention to the *language* of multiculturalism. A fruitful starting point might be the research on metaphor that has been carried out over the last 20 years or so within the fields of linguistics and cognitive science. A body of theoreticians from these fields (let us call them 'experientialists') has argued that metaphor is the normal (almost automatic) way of understanding abstractions and complex phenomena. We make use of our imagination to explore complex ideas and develop our understanding in terms of more readily understood social and physical experiences, and conceptual systems are built up on these metaphorical foundations. Metaphor thus becomes a 'conceptual and experiential process that structures our world' (Johnson, 1995, p. 157), and

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this process is not an arbitrary one but is 'grounded in our most basic embodied experience' (Winter, 1995, p. 237). Imagination operates on our shared experience in a systematic, structured way, which experientialists such as Lakoff (1987, 1993) have analysed closely, and through this process we construct the meaning we give to things.

Taking this theoretical position as their starting point, experientialists have engaged in a series of mapping exercises setting out the use of metaphor in many areas of human thought, including science (Kuhn, 1993), law (Winter, 1995), social policy (Schon, 1993), morality (Rethorst, 1997), education (Taylor, 1984) and spirituality (Halstead, 1993, 1995), and have shown how metaphors are used to construct meaning in these areas. In other areas of life, however, including illness and AIDS (Sontag, 1991) and warfare (Lakoff, 1991), metaphors are more centrally concerned with attitudes and values (and often prejudices). Multicultural metaphors tend to follow this pattern, and their aim, rather than to 'construct meaning', is to evoke particular emotional responses from the audience or reader, perhaps in the same way that the language of music (if it is a language) can evoke profound responses. Sometimes, it is true, multicultural metaphors are a way of exploring and trying to make sense of one's own beliefs and experiences. At other times, however, they may be part of the rhetoric of politicians and others seeking to influence and persuade people to their point of view. At other times again, the influence may be less conscious and intentional, and indeed, the metaphors may take on a life of their own, insinuating themselves into our patterns of thinking and leading us in unanticipated directions. Whatever their origin, however, it is clear that we need to approach such metaphors with caution.

The present chapter falls into three sections. The first explores in more detail the recent theoretical work on metaphors in the fields of cognitive science and linguistics, and shows how central metaphors are to the development of conceptual thinking. The second considers how far these principles apply to multicultural metaphors; the aim of this section is to highlight both the strengths and the limitations of the theory, and at the same time to demonstrate the persuasive force of the metaphor in discussions about emotive concepts such as multiculturalism. The final section shifts the focus to multicultural education and argues that children need to develop skills of critical understanding, especially of the way that language works and metaphors make meaning and reinforce attitudes. Without such critical skills, children are unlikely to be free to construct their own values or to escape from the subtle influence of bias and prejudice.

How metaphors structure our thinking

According to recent research in linguistics and the philosophy of language (see, for example, Barcelona, 2000; Gibbs and Steen, 1999; Johnson, 1987, 1993, 1995; Kovecses, 2002; Lakoff, 1987, 1993; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff and Turner, 1989; Leddy, 1995; Ortony, 1993; Sweetser, 1990; Turner, 1987, 1991; Winter, 1995), a metaphor is much more than a simile with the term of comparison ('like' or 'as')

removed. The simile may simply draw attention to a point of comparison between two different objects, for the sake of clarification, conciseness of expression or facilitating an emotional response; thus, 'her eyes were like diamonds' is a pointed way of saying that they shone very brightly, although it may also imply that the observer places a high value on them, wants to possess them, and so on. The metaphor, on the contrary, can do much more than offer a new way of expressing a literal statement. As already noted, it can provide an effective way of exploring complex ideas, explaining abstractions, enriching and extending our understanding, and building up new conceptual systems. The metaphor does this by using the imagination to describe one concept (often a complex or abstract phenomenon) in terms of another (often a shared social or embodied experience). The outcome is to facilitate thought and communication and to explore abstract ideas. According to this theory, there are thus three key elements in the process we call metaphor: the exercise of the imagination; the grounding in social or physical experience and the exploration of complex or abstract ideas. Each of these elements will now be examined more closely.

The first element, the exercise of the imagination, is crucial. Recent work in the fields of morality, philosophy, therapy and other disciplines (cf. Burke, 1999; Johnson, 1993; Novitz, 1987; Warnock, 1994) suggests that human thought (unlike artificial intelligence) is essentially imaginative. However, the imagination does not operate as 'a kind of cognitive wild card' (Winter, 1995, p. 227) but rather in a regular, structured fashion which is open to investigation and analysis (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987). Our everyday use of metaphor (which may be original or clichéd, explicit or implicit, dead or full of vitality) draws on a more general framework of correspondences or core metaphors, which Lakoff (1993) calls 'cross-domain mappings', Johnson (1995) 'deep conceptual metaphors' and Goatly (1997) 'root analogies'. Whatever their name, they take the form *x* is *y*, where *x* is a conceptual domain in need of description or clarification, and *y* is the conceptual domain which conveys the description or clarification. Thus, we say that a man who cheats on his wife is a rat or that sexual desire is a magnetic force. The imagination elaborates on this basic stock of root analogies and constructs new ways of thinking and understanding complex ideas out of them. For example, the root analogy 'ideas are commodities that we buy and sell' may give rise to a whole cluster of metaphors: 'I won't buy that idea'; 'it's not worth the paper it's written on'; 'the marketplace of ideas'; 'with the right packaging we might just be able to sell that idea' and so on. In the next section, it is noted that the 'threat' of immigration may be described through a set of variations on the core metaphor 'immigration is a flood'.

The second element is the use of social or embodied experience as the raw material on which the imagination works in the construction of metaphors (Winter, 1995, pp. 237–8). Johnson points to a growing body of empirical research showing how core analogies 'typically come from basic-level experiences that are shared by human beings because of their shared bodily and cognitive make-up and because of the common features of the environments with which people interact' (ibid., p. 159). Hunger and its satisfaction, for example, play a significant role in many core

metaphors. Sex is food ('I'm hungry for your love'; 'what a hunk!' 'sexual appetite'), but so are ideas ('I'll chew it over;' 'he won't swallow that lie'), and fire is a hungry animal ('the fire devoured everything in its path'; 'the flames were licking at the door'). Reference will be made later to the way that metaphors of food, infection and rape are used in reference to multicultural issues. The experience of colour-blindness is a more complex example that has been used to convey different metaphorical messages about race. On the one hand, it implies that one ignores (or is blind to) a person's colour, and so 'colour-blindness' becomes a metaphor for the equal treatment for all irrespective of race, but, on the other, it represents a failure to distinguish different colours and therefore becomes a metaphor for the failure to recognise the different experiences and different needs of black people (cf. Halstead, 1988, pp.153–5). These are just a few examples of metaphors that both originate from and are constrained by common patterns of bodily experience and experience of the social and natural environment.

Thirdly, what emerge from the fusion of the imagination and embodied experience are new ways of structuring our experiences and understanding complex or abstract ideas. This claim about the meaning-making possibilities of metaphor is not a wholly new idea. Writing in 1821, Shelley (2002) argues in his *Defence of Poetry* that the language of poets 'is vitally metaphorical; that is, it marks the before unapprehended relations of things'. In other words, metaphor is used by poets as a means to transform the way we perceive the world. But what the experientialists have done is to extend this claim from poetic metaphor to conceptual metaphor. They argue that there is an extensive system of metaphor used by everyone, not just poets, to understand complexities and abstractions. Indeed, the use of such metaphors is so widespread that it often occurs unreflectively. Leddy argues that the only difference between literal statements and metaphorical statements is that in the former we understand one thing in terms of something else of the same kind, whereas in the latter we understand it in terms of a different kind (1995, p. 207).

Experientialism thus hovers in the middle ground between objectivism and radical relativism. It is clearly opposed to the literalism and absolutism of objectivist theories of knowledge and meaning, and is incompatible with Hobbes' and Locke's dismissal of metaphor as an unhelpful distraction in philosophical debate. On the contrary, there is something systematic and structured about the way the imagination interacts with shared human experience, even though the metaphors are sometimes open to different interpretations or convey multiple meanings and even though the insights they offer may be unexpected. This has already been noted with regard to the metaphorical use of the term 'colour blind'. Tensions within the metaphor may occur, as Ricoeur points out (1977, p. 224), when a phrase carries equal significance both literally and metaphorically, or when it carries two or more different (sometimes even contradictory) meanings at the same time. MacCormac (1975) goes so far as to say that it is the nature of all metaphors to be irreducible but argues that 'the fact that a metaphor cannot be reduced to ordinary sensible discourse does not of necessity justify its condemnation as meaningless' (ibid., p. 402). What we should be aiming for, he suggests, is not to reduce a metaphor to a literal equivalent, but to understand its

connotations. It was the connotations of the 'rivers of blood' speech by the English politician Enoch Powell in the 1960s which gave it its powerful (and many would say, its unforgivable) symbolic impact. Connotations are central to the understanding of most multicultural metaphors.

Finally, in this section, it is important to say something about the experientialists' claim that metaphors are involved in the 'construction of meaning'. It is clear on reflection that the comparison implicit in many metaphors (and therefore the learning that takes place through the metaphors) is a matter of attitude, not of content. Gualtieri (1966, pp. 153–4, drawing on Evans, 1963) defines religious metaphor (though I think the definition has a broader application) as 'metaphysical parabolic onlook'. 'Onlook' is a coined word used here to express the adoption of an attitude to something. Thus, the phrase 'God is our father' is best understood as 'We look on God as we would look on a father'. To interpret it as a statement about God himself (God is like a father) is problematic, for the resemblances between God and a human father may be elusive and indefinable, but as an expression of one's attitude to God, the metaphor can be said to have meaning. The central claim of the Gaia hypothesis, that the earth is a single living organism, provides an effective non-religious example of the same point. To take the metaphor as a claim about a state of affairs in the world raises all sorts of problems, such as whether it has a brain, or any kind of moral dimension, or whether it is a god (Allaby, 1989; Lovelock, 1995, 2000). But to take it to mean 'We look on the earth as a single living organism' opens up all kinds of positive responses based on human responsibility, spiritual awareness, the interconnectedness of all life and the need to rethink our understanding of the natural environment. It is very hard to assess the 'truth' of this kind of metaphor, but as an expression of an attitude it can influence our actions in many ways. This understanding of metaphor as expressing the way we look at something, rather than the way it 'is', is of paramount importance when we turn to the topic of multicultural metaphors.

The nature of multicultural metaphors

If it is true that metaphors structure our thinking and help us to understand complex and abstract ideas by linking them imaginatively to more accessible physical and social experiences, then it is not surprising that metaphors are commonplace in our thinking about such issues as national identity, culture and 'otherness'. Let us consider an early example. This is a speech by John of Gaunt in Shakespeare's play *Richard II,* when he is close to death. He criticises the King's irresponsible conduct and compares England's glorious past with its present shameful condition:

> This royal throne of kings, this scepter'd isle,
> This earth of majesty, this seat of Mars,
> This other Eden, demi-paradise,
> This fortress built by Nature for herself
> Against infection and the hand of war,
> This happy breed of men, this little world,

> This precious stone set in the silver sea,
> Which serves it in the office of a wall,
> Or as a moat defensive to a house,
> Against the envy of less happier lands;
> This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England,
> This nurse, this teeming womb of royal kings,
> Fear'd by their breed, and famous by their birth,
> Renowned for their deeds as far from home,
> For Christian service and true chivalry,
> As is the sepulchre in stubborn Jewry
> Of the world's ransom, blessed Mary's son;
> This land of such dear souls, this dear, dear land,
> Dear for her reputation through the world,
> Is now leas'd out . . .
>
> [Act 2, scene 1, lines 40–59]

This famous and much anthologised speech illustrates all the features of the experientialist analysis of metaphor outlined in the previous section. First, it consists of a string of highly imaginative metaphors, all contributing like pieces in a jigsaw to Gaunt's panegyric of his mother country: England is a throne for kings, the dwelling place of Mars himself, a garden worthy of comparison with the Garden of Eden, a jewel, guarded by the sea from other nations which cannot help being envious of it. Secondly, many of the metaphors make use of social or embodied experience as the raw material for comparisons that develop our understanding of patriotism. There are images of disease (England needs to be protected 'against infection' from other lands), of birth (England is a 'teeming womb' of royalty, a 'nurse' to a 'happy breed of men'), of warfare (England is a natural 'fortress', with the sea as a 'moat' that protects it from attack) and of religion (English princes engage in 'Christian service', in contrast to 'stubborn Jewry'). Thirdly, the imagination constructs metaphors like these out of common physical or social experiences to facilitate new ways of thinking and to develop abstract ideas such as national identity and national pride. Gaunt's speech is clearly an exposition of contemporary patriotism and an attempt to persuade his compatriots to accept his own vision of England's greatness.

However, a fuller analysis of the metaphors in the speech must pay attention not only to the root analogies used in the speech and to the way they are used imaginatively and structurally to achieve the speaker's purposes (whether explanation, understanding, analysis or persuasion) but also to the underlying attitudes they imply, the emotions they invoke and the way they may influence our thinking. Metaphors may frighten us into acquiescence, seduce us by their originality, construct appealing imaginative worlds for us or lull us into unthinking agreement by their very mundaneness. As far as Gaunt's speech is concerned, if we feel uncomfortable with it, it is because the patriotism which the metaphors delineate involves a framework of values some of us do not share (such as the need to engage in a crusade in a distant land against people of a different faith) and comes at the expense of other nations and ethnic groups ('less happier lands', who are described as envious, diseased and stubborn). In brief, we may consider it an example of prejudice and xenophobia. The ethnocentric worldview of the Elizabethans that underpins the speech may be represented by a series of

concentric circles with the English as the bull's eye, the Scots and Welsh in the next circle, then Western Europeans, then Christendom generally and perhaps the Jews after that. The outermost circle is made up of an undifferentiated mass of heathen, Turks, Ethiopes, infidels, Moors and savages, who are depicted in the writings of the time (in varying combinations) as ignorant, lecherous, ugly, defective in religion, immoral, animal-like, belligerent, ill-disciplined and given to extremities of passion. Perhaps this worldview lingers on in some quarters to the present day. The final section of this chapter stresses the need to be wary of the unreflective teaching of the metaphors in literary texts in terms of their imaginative and poetic effects without also paying attention to the underlying attitudes they imply and the emotions they evoke, because this may unintentionally reinforce the attitudes embedded there, such as prejudice and ethnocentrism in young and impressionable readers.

An examination of present-day multicultural metaphors shows that exactly the same root analogies are still in use. A brief mapping exercise of current metaphors about cultural diversity, migration and otherness suggests that they fall into three major categories: metaphors of the insider/outsider; metaphors of threat and menace; and metaphors of mixture. Each will now be examined in more detail. With regard to insider/outsider metaphors, Gaunt compares England to a fortress and says that the sea serves as a wall, presumably to keep outsiders out. A virtually identical image is used in the title of Alvin J. Schmidt's book *The Menace of Multiculturalism: Trojan horse in America* (1997), which implies that the ideology of multiculturalism has been smuggled into the fortress of America illicitly, by a trick, to achieve its downfall. An article in *Die Zeit* (10 January 1992) describes the European Union as a block of flats occupied by German and other European residents who treat outsiders with arrogance and disdain:

> At the moment, the German occupiers of the first floor apartment in the 'European house' seem to think that foreigners from outside the continent should be content with living in the rubbish bin. (quoted in Musolff, 2000)

El Refaie (2001, p. 353) argues that a similar symbolism is used in many countries to underpin anti-immigration discourse, often involving 'spatial opposites such as "internal" versus "external" and "up" versus "down" ' (cf. Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). Of course, the binary oppositions used here are part of a much larger tendency to drive a wedge between 'us' and 'them', between 'black' and 'white' and between 'the West' and 'the rest'. Insider/outsider metaphors are almost wholly negative. Hans Ingvar Roth has made a conscious attempt to develop a more inclusive root analogy – a park which different people visit regularly for different leisure activities – to represent a multicultural society (1999, especially chapter 2), but this has not had a significant impact so far. Perhaps the metaphor of the secure fortress providing its inhabitants with safety and security from invasion from outside is a Jungian-style archetype which appeals to something deep in the human psyche – but in terms of working to create a harmonious multicultural community it is very unhelpful.

The second category of metaphors, those of threat and menace, is based on the following root analogy: the Other (i.e. foreigners, immigrants, refugees) is a source of fear (i.e. a natural disaster, disease, invasion, fire, explosion, flood, conflict, war, fierce animal or threat of violation). Gaunt's speech, as we have seen, makes use of metaphors of 'infection' and 'the hand of war' to describe the threat to England from other nations ('less happier lands'). In her review of metaphors about asylum seekers in Austrian newspaper articles, El Refaie (2001, pp. 358–69) reports that they are usually portrayed either as a threatening category of human beings (such as criminals or an invading army) or as a catastrophe such as a flood or an explosion. In a notable mixed metaphor (presumably resulting from the desire to cram in as much of a sense of threat as possible into a single phrase), the British newspaper *Daily Star* combines metaphors of explosion and flood: 'Schools chief David Bell warned last night that the boom in Muslim-only schools could spark a wave of racial conflict' (18 January 2005, p. 7). The danger of sparking a wave (or rather, an explosion) is presumably a reference to the 'backlash' that might occur if too many concessions are made to minority groups or if they are perceived to be gaining advantage at the expense of the indigenous population. But sometimes the perceived threat is simply the numbers of immigrants arriving: what starts as a 'seepage' quickly becomes a 'flood', with the result that the country is in danger of being 'swamped' or 'deluged' by a 'rising tide' of 'outsiders', and we need to 'seal' our borders to make them 'watertight' (cf. Kovekses, 2002, p. 66). The dominant metaphors of menace and threat may differ from country to country: Santa Ana (1999) finds a dominance of animal metaphors in California, whereas images of immigrants 'violating the body' of the nation are more common in France (Chilton, 1994). The root analogy is not used simply in reference to the 'influx' of immigrants into Western countries: however, it may equally be used to refer to multicultural teaching in schools. For example, in the CBN report 'The Islamic Invasion of California's Schools' (Connor, 2002), the term 'invasion' does not refer to a growing number of Muslim pupils or teachers but to the decision to include teaching about Islam in the curriculum. It is worth noting that metaphors of threat are not limited to the media: phrases such as the 'clash of civilisations' (Huntington, 1996), 'culture wars' (Bolton, 1992; Gitlin, 1995; Hunter, 1991) and 'clash of fundamentalisms' (Ali, 2002) carry the same root analogy into the world of academic debate. As with insider/outsider metaphors, metaphors of threat are by definition wholly negative in their response to multiculturalism.

The third category, metaphors of mixture, is more ambivalent in its connotations, although there is still much negativity. Both a multicultural society (i.e. one that is made up of different ethnic groups) and a multicultural curriculum (i.e. one that includes topics from different cultures) may be represented by metaphors such as 'mongrel' or 'hotch-potch'. The dominant metaphor in an extended debate in the House of Lords a few years ago about the use of a world religions approach to Religious Education in schools was 'mish-mash' (Hull, 1990, 1991), with its implication that the mixture of diverse ingredients would confuse children and corrupt the purity of faith. Allan Bloom (1988) uses many metaphors from eating in his

analysis of what is wrong with America; in particular, black students have proved 'indigestible' because they insist increasingly on maintaining a separate identity rather than 'melting' like other groups. In the same way, Hirsch (1988) fears that America is becoming a 'tower of Babel' with a multiplicity of incompatible cultures (a metaphor drawn from the story in the Book of Genesis, chapter 11, in which a diversity of languages led to disunity and division). He argues that America needs a more homogeneous culture and that this can only be achieved by bringing a greater conformity to the cultural basis of the school curriculum.

Nevertheless, some metaphors of mixture carry more positive connotations, and indeed, the history of multiculturalism can be traced through the metaphors used by its proponents (Entwistle, 1999). The metaphor of the 'melting pot' has been used so widely that its metaphorical reference to American society is more readily understood than its literal meaning as a pot in which different metals are melted together. The sense is that all immigrant groups lose their distinctive identity in the American melting pot and that even the dominant culture is not left unchanged. What emerges is a strong alloy to which all have contributed. A similar notion is conveyed more prosaically in the words of the *Swann Report* (DES, 1985, p. 5):

> The ethnic minority communities cannot in practice preserve all elements of their cultures and lifestyles unchanged and in their entirety – indeed if they were to wish to do so it would in many cases be impossible for them to take on the shared values of the wider pluralist society.

A rather more positive view of the enrichment and benefit that each culture offers the others within a multicultural society is contained in the metaphor of a salad tossed in oil, in which 'each ingredient remains recognisable within the salad, but each very subtly contributes its own flavour to the overall ambience: the dominant flavours are muted, but no flavours are lost' (Saunders, 1982, p. 13). Metaphors such as the mosaic and the patchwork (in which the relationship between each culture is fixed but each contributes to the overall picture) and the kaleidoscope (in which the relationship between the different cultures is constantly changing) move a bit further towards recognition of minority identity. The individual components of society do not take on the flavour of the majority but retain their original colour and appearance – although each also contributes to the overall plan, shape and design of the broader society. Nevertheless, pots have to be broken to make a mosaic and material cut up to make a patchwork. The freedom of minority groups to retain their original form intact in a multicultural society is always in some sense denied. The metaphor of the 'mainstream' culture is also widely used, with its implication that there are many small streams or tributaries as well as the main river; but again, the implicit message is that when the tributary comes into contact with the mainstream culture, it is submerged and its distinctive identity lost.

What makes many of these metaphors so worrying, as with Gaunt's speech, is the underlying attitudes they imply, the emotions they invoke and the insidious way they may influence people's thinking by acting as a shroud for prejudice. It seems so much easier to find and use multicultural metaphors with negative than positive

connotations. The former seem at once more reasonable and more powerfully persuasive. Taken together, the metaphors in book titles such as

America Balkanized (Nelson, 1994)
The Disuniting of America (Schlesinger, 1991)
Telling the Truth: why our culture and our country stopped making sense (Cheney, 1995)
The Path to National Suicide (Auster, 1990)
Dictatorship of Virtue (Bernstein, 1994)
Battle of the Books (Atlas, 1990)
The Menace of Multiculturalism (Schmidt, 1997)

contribute to a general impression that it is both natural and reasonable to reject policies of multiculturalism. It is as if a new Barthes-style mythology is being created, designed to support a particular worldview and evoke a particular pre-determined emotional response in the reader. Three principles seem to underpin this process. First, the same metaphors are used repeatedly, within conventional grammatical structures and socially accepted ways of talking about ordinary experiences, with the result that readers are encouraged to accept them without reflection. Secondly, the metaphors are presented in such a way that the distinction between metaphorical and literal meanings may be blurred; thus, the metaphorical 'invasion' of a country by immigrants may be met with a literally 'violent' response, and a newspaper report about Muslims which claims that 'Britain's race relations are on a knife-edge' (*Daily Star*, 18 January 2005) may leave some readers associating Muslims and the danger of a knife attack. Thirdly, the metaphors operate at more than just the personal level, reflecting back as in a mirror the writer's own personal prejudices and biases; they exist in a social and political context and often reflect socio-political commitments which contribute to the way they are understood (cf. Chilton and Ilyin, 1993; Semino and Masci, 1996). As El Refaie concludes, 'The use of metaphors cannot be seen in isolation from the interests and motivations of the main . . . participants [in the discourse]' (2001, p. 368).

These dominant patterns of multicultural metaphor represent a real problem for those of us who believe that national policies towards refugees and immigrants should be based on justice and a sense of common humanity, that society's dealings with minority groups and their diverse cultural traditions should be marked out by tolerance and respect, and that including a multicultural dimension to the curriculum, far from confusing children's developing sense of personal identity, actually enriches their understanding, frees them from inherited bias and prejudice and develops sensitivity to others, intellectual humility, independence of judgment and the capacity for reflection (cf. Dhillon and Halstead, 2003). So how should the supporters of multiculturalism respond to the dominant pattern of multicultural metaphors that has been identified in this chapter? And what should we teach our children? The final section of the chapter looks briefly at some of these issues.

Multicultural metaphors and educational strategies

It is tempting to assume, especially under the influence of Wittgenstein (1967), that if mathematics education involves initiation into the distinctive language of mathematics (square, multiply, quadratic equation . . .) and moral education involves initiation into the distinct language of ethics (ought, virtue, deontology . . .), multicultural education must in some way involve initiation into the distinctive language of multiculturalism. In other words, if it is skill in language that empowers children to engage in thought, learning and communication, then children need to extend their understanding of the language of multiculturalism if they are to become full citizens of a multicultural society. However, this is not true in any straightforward way. For, there is no distinctive 'language of multiculturalism' in the sense of a specialist language which must be mastered before one can enter into any of the discourses of multiculturalism. The language of multiculturalism is largely the language of morality, using terms such as justice, respect, rights, equality and tolerance – and their opposites. Nonetheless, it has become clear that if children are to be empowered to think for themselves and construct their own multicultural values, they need to know how language can be used in multicultural contexts to influence and persuade. They need to develop skills that will help them to resist the seductive and perhaps unconscious influence of many of the negative multicultural metaphors that have been discussed in this chapter. Three strategies for such resistance are mentioned here.

First, children need to be encouraged to resist acceptance of anything without reflection. We have seen that negative multicultural metaphors are most likely to be accepted unquestioningly if they are presented as part of a natural, reasonable discourse that is repeated frequently and if the metaphors themselves are based on ordinary social or bodily experience. They are also more likely to be accepted if they are not the main focus of attention: ethnocentric attitudes in some of the literature studied at school may pass unnoticed (and may thus be passively accepted) if the focus of attention is exclusively the poetic effects or literary techniques of the writing, and the racist attitudes in some articles in the popular press may be absorbed more readily if the reader pays them only casual attention, perhaps having bought the newspaper for quite different reasons. Children can overcome the dangers of unreflective acceptance only if they are habituated into the practice of questioning everything and subjecting everything they are told, whether by teachers, parents, peers or media, to a process of critical reflection.

Secondly, it must be recognised that children cannot be taught about multiculturalism (or indeed about anything else) in a way that avoids metaphors, for metaphors inevitably permeate all forms of communication, including teaching. The only way to protect children from the insidious influence of negative metaphors is to teach them, as part of developing the skills of critical thinking, how metaphors work, both in the sense of how they are structured and in the sense of how they create meaning. Perhaps the best way to learn how metaphors work is to use them, and so, children need to be encouraged to practise the skilful use of metaphors

themselves, while learning to deconstruct examples from their own speech and from the speech of significant others, including their teachers, community leaders and politicians. In other words, children need to learn about some of the processes that have been discussed in this chapter. In this way, they will gradually come to understand how metaphors can influence attitudes and insinuate themselves into people's thinking. Only with this critical understanding will they be able to raise to consciousness the messages embedded within the metaphors they read or hear, so that they can judge, for example, whether the metaphors used in their textbooks or in the media reflect a worldview that is unjust and oppressive or one that is just and fair, free from racist and sexist bias, and respectful of cultural and other forms of diversity.

Thirdly, children need to be aware that core analogies conveying these kinds of positive messages *are* possible in discussions of such issues as national identity, cultural diversity, migration and otherness. Instead of images that drive a wedge between 'us' and 'them', core analogies based on social cohesion, harmony and inclusion can reinforce ideas of different communities co-operating and working together to produce things that could not be achieved alone. Images of the fortress under threat of attack by invading armies may be replaced by images of the fortress as a cultural prison from which one wants to break out: Bailey (1984) has emphasised the idea that education can free people from cultural encapsulation and from the limitations of their present and particular circumstances. This idea may open up the possibility of metaphors drawn from open borders, interaction with others, hospitality and conversation (cf. Bennett, 2001). The case of Roth's metaphor of the 'multicultural park' discussed above (Roth, 1999) alerts us to the difficulty of developing effective alternative core analogies if these have little currency in the media and in the world outside the school. But, they are likely to have more effect if children have 'invented' the metaphors themselves. The increased emphasis on familiarity with metaphors that is now part of the English curriculum in British schools means that children are in any case familiar with exercises involving the production of original metaphors: what is needed now is to ensure that in this process they are encouraged among other things to reflect critically on fundamental values such as tolerance, justice and diversity. The content as well as the technique of metaphor writing is an important topic for children to study.

Multicultural metaphors, like multicultural education itself, are ultimately not about transmitting information but about cultivating particular values and particular attitudes to life. These attitudes and values can be either positive or negative, although the negative ones currently seem to be predominant as many writers use metaphors as emotive rhetoric to mask their own prejudice and ethnocentrism. Unless children develop the capacity for critical discernment, particularly relating to the way that metaphors can be used to influence and persuade people to adopt attitudes that would be rejected if expressed directly, they will remain vulnerable to manipulation and may not learn to celebrate the diversity that is a key feature of contemporary Western societies.

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CHAPTER 9

RACISM: THE BIRTH OF A CONCEPT[1]

Walter Feinberg

Racism is a term that is sometimes confused with prejudice, or an internal and irrational attitude against a particular group. In this sense, the only difference between prejudice and racism is that one identifies the nature of the object of this attitude – a certain race whereas the other leaves the object open. But racism has a larger meaning than prejudice and dislike. It is a concept that has built into it differential power relations. Thus, for example, although it is easy to think of black people who would be prejudiced against white people, it is harder to think of situations in which black people can be accurately accused of racism. Blacks may certainly have an irrational dislike of all whites, but this alone does not make them racists. Racism entails more than an attitude. It requires objective institutions and practices that, together with subjective attitudes, define the parameters of thought, meanings and relations.

More than biological determinism makes a racist. The phenomena of racism, the practice where people are ranked according to certain biological classifications, measured along a predefined scale of progress, locked into social positions according to an assigned collective place on that scale, educated to think of that social position as natural, re-defined as out of one's place, should ambition and ability suggest otherwise, propelled into an arena of education and employment where one's collective assignment is coded through physical characteristics, and where evidence of any other classification is filtered, dismissed or reconstructed, these phenomena require something else before it can become a primary ingredient in the stew called racism. It requires a set of basic understandings that, should the facts be really otherwise, all of these arrangements are a terrible moral wrong. And, it also carries with it an implicit understanding that these are matters of fact, not matters of divine decree. As obvious as it may be, it is important to remember that the charge of racism assigns a moral judgment to certain purported facts. This is one reason, for example, that Franz Boas' criticism of racist anthropology was so effective. He took the racist science of measuring the skulls of people from different 'racial' groups and showed that these scientists had systematically mismeasured these skulls (Roth Pierport, 2004, pp. 48–64).

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Racism and capitalism

Prejudice can occur under any regime. It is simply an attitude built on irrational or faulty evidence. Modern racism occurs under scientific capitalism and the guise of meritocracy. Where talent and motivation are advanced as the currency of exchange, where mobility, status and power are the prize where the market is the arena for engagement, and where science is the means for keeping score and for explaining why some are not allowed to play. Racism occurs in a context where all of the rules of fair engagement laid down by capitalism are assumed to be at play but where exceptions require an explanation. The phenomenon of racism employs the language of essentialism, and determinism within a context of market exchange. Because it employs this language it includes the anti-Semite, but not necessarily the anti-Jew. It also occurs in a climate of fear and intimidation that leads to both exclusion and self-exclusion.

Because the practice of racism takes place within the arena of markets and exchange where the language of merit and motivation are taken for granted, it is not fully present in the regime of slavery that preceded it. It may sound odd to say that racism did not exist within the world of slavery, but this is odd only because two ingredients of racism – intimidation and the assumption of an essential inferiority – are identified with the whole. Yet, a simple thought experiment will show that there was more involved here than the assumption of an essential inferiority. If the problem was that slaves were simply inferior to whites, there should never have laws against teaching slaves to read. Even if the private life of the slave was not of any concern to the political authorities, this was a remarkable intrusion not just on the slave but on the private life of the slave owner as well. If slaves were just intellectually inferior to whites, that should still allow slave owners to reap maximum value from the slaves he owned and clearly, a slave who could read would be able to do more things for the slave owner than the slave who remained illiterate. Rather, they were forbidden because in the eyes of the white Southern slave owner, they did not have the moral capacity to assimilate ideas properly or without guidance.

In other words, the debate over slavery was first not about ability, merit or desert, it was about God and salvation, and it took place in theological terms. It was about whether a certain human being is to be counted as a person, and about whether certain human beings have fully developed souls like the rest of us, and it was about just who is God's child and whether one of God's children has any authority to own another one of God's children. It was not about ability. This was to come later as an afterthought, once the Civil War had settled the theological question.

To summarize the argument up to this point: the practice of racism emerges in a society where mobility is an expressed norm, and where some external characteristic serves as a marker explaining why some people are assigned slots outside the accepted channels of mobility and where intimidation leads to both exclusion and self exclusion.

The recognition of racism and the dynamics of race and class

The birth of the concept of racism is slow and agonizing, and Capitalism is well under way before the 1930s and the 1940s when the concept of racism begins to emerge in dictionaries (1930s) and encyclopedias (1970s). And biological determinists, cultural anthropologists and Marxist fight an undeclared war on the pages of the 1949 edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica as they struggle to assert biological determinism, cultural relativism or economic exploitation as the primary category for depicting race (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1949, Vol. 16. pp. 103 and 195). This struggle anticipated the struggle that was to occur later on the streets and in the Courts to determine whether racism was but a form of prejudice – prejudice directed against people of color. For many it continues to be difficult to separate racism, which includes a continuing history of intimidation, differential power, exclusion and self-exclusion, from the more psychologically rooted concept of prejudice, and this difficulty accounts in part for many of the issues that educators continue to confront. The most obvious is the continuing resistance to affirmative action, but there are others as well. To understand the source of some of this resistance may provide pedagogical strategies to address it.

Racism is easily distinguished from simple prejudice after the fact and across generations. I know that my family has been mobile by looking at the relative positions across generations. It is easier to see whether a group is mobile after a few generations have passed than it is from the standpoint of the first generation attempting to gain a toehold. The idea of mobility creates an expectation that one's children have an opportunity to live richer, healthier and longer lives. When these expectations are unclear because of class exploitation, race may go under-perceived as a factor of injustice. If we are all in the same sinking boat, the difference in our height will not be noticed until we realize that the taller among us can still stand on the bottom of the lake. Capitalism requires the expectation of intergenerational mobility. As long as the condition of the industrial worker remained arguably no better than that of a plantation slave, intergenerational mobility remains something to be worked out in the future and race is a muted element in discrimination.

As McGreevy shows, criticism of slavery did not materialize in the United States among Northern Catholics nearly to the extent that it did among Northern Protestants, and the reasons for this were partly religious and partly economic. On the religious side, conservative Catholics tended to buy into the Southern argument that hierarchical relations were divinely sanctioned and saw the institution of slavery as little more than another form of hierarchy, much like the Church (McGreevy, 2003, p. 53). On the economic side, Northern Catholics, especially Irish, were caught up in a system of class exploitation and oppression that was, in Marx's terms, little more than wage slavery wage slavery (ibid., p. 51). The free Northern black was essentially a competitor for the low-wage jobs that might otherwise go to the Irish.

Given their own position in the emerging class structure, the practice of slavery refracted in a different way for the Northern Catholic industrial worker than it did for the more established class of Northern Protestant abolitionists, and as capitalism

matures, this refraction continues to influence the perception of discrimination throughout the twentieth century where white people, perhaps successful children of working class parents, see racism as simply a manifestation of the same form of discrimination that their parents had to endure. Remnants of these differential refractions persist today in cases where the history of race discrimination is equated with the history of ethnic and class discrimination alone. When the two histories are equated in this way, the norms once established for addressing class and ethnic discrimination are seen as sufficient and the idea of special considerations for race are rejected as changing the rules of the game. An argument along these lines has been made by one of the more conservative members of the United States Supreme Court, Scalia, in his argument against affirmative action for blacks. He writes

> My father came to this country when he was a teenager. Not only had he never profited from the sweat of any Black man's brow, I don't think he had ever seen a Black man. There are, of course, many white ethnic groups that came to this country in great numbers relatively late in its history–Italians, Jews, Poles–who not only took no part in, and derived no profit from, the major historical suppression of the currently acknowledged minority groups, but were, in fact, themselves the object of discrimination by the dominant Anglo-Saxon majority (Quoted in Feinberg, 1998, p. 57).

The educator's task

Narratives of class and mobility are structured differently than are narratives of race and marginalization with each reflecting, in a simplified form, different historical experiences. The fact that these experiences intersect at a certain point in time means that the one will tend to be read in terms of the other. In this case, the task of the teacher is to disengage these two narratives and show how they entail different normative standpoints. Once the narratives are unpacked and their normative standpoints exposed, students can analyze the friction that develops when the two narratives compete for the same explanatory space, and they can also expose some of the common interests that are hidden behind the competing narratives. Let me address the two separately.

The narrative of class and mobility is shaped from the standpoint of a guest who, in accepting an invitation to participate in a game, has also accepted the rules by which it is played. This basic narrative frame sets the stage for understanding the etiquette of struggle. We came with nothing, accepted the rules and worked hard and now can enjoy the fruits of our own labor. It also explains the sense of resentment that arises when it is thought that some other groups are receiving the rewards while playing by a different set of rules.

The counter narrative begins not from the standpoint of the voluntary guest but from the standpoint of the involuntary servant, from the prisoner, whose work is always illegitimate because forced and expended for the gain of other. The involuntary servant may be the African American robbed of roots and labor, the Native American robbed of land and culture or the Hispanic American, robbed of country and of language, but each questions the right of the guest in the earlier narrative to receive

the largess of the host because they challenge the legitimacy of the benefactor to host the event in the first place. From the standpoint of the narrative of class, the narrative of race looks like a ready excuse for opportunities not seized and as a demand for special consideration. From the standpoint of the narrative of race the narrative of class looks like an anthem to privilege and a license to continue to exploit.

Educators who work with these students have an opportunity to open up these narratives allowing mutual interests to considered, as students reflect upon the possibilities that might emerge as each narrative is considered in terms of its interaction with the other. And this may require that educators help students see 'their' stories in terms of their interaction with the stories of others and that they judge them in terms of the interests that this interaction conceals, as well as those that each story, taken individually, is allowed to express. Let me illustrate what I mean when I suggest shifting the narrative focus with an example from family therapy in which each member has their own story to tell but where the interaction of these stories as revealed through the dynamics of the relation between members produces the effect that is most productive to examine.

Imagine, if you will, a family dynamic as it might involve a child with attention deficit problems – where the rhythm of the child's responses is delayed by a beat or two. This may be due to neurons firing a bit slower than normal or it may be due to an active but roaming mind, or perhaps to both. In any event, the family dynamics goes something like this.

Child: (in the other room) Dad
Father: What?
Child: (silence)
Father: What?
Child: (silence as she picks up a piece of paper on the floor that she has just noticed).
Dad: WHAT!!
Child: WHY DO YOU ALWAYS YELL AT ME?
Father: WHOSE YELLING!!
Child: (whimpering) You are.
Father: I AM NOT!
Mother: Why are you yelling at her?
Father: WHY DO YOU ALWAYS TAKE HER SIDE?

The miscommunications here arise from multiple factors, each one of which feeds the other and none of which could create the situation by itself. Understanding the dynamics of this family may involve multiple layers of analysis from tracking neurological activity, to plotting the specific rhythm of interaction against expectations developed from more common patterns, to a very specific analysis of the relations within this family. The cause of the problem resides in the dynamics of the family, although strategically it may be useful to focus on one or two elements at a time – the patriarchy of the father, the neurological lapses of the child, the mother's failure to

understand the situation and to leap to a conclusion, the father's tendency to interpret the situation as a contest, etc. In any case, each side can feel the discomfort of the situation but is also blind to the way they contribute to it, and this blindness is itself a contributing factor. And, of course, the element of power must become part of the analysis before the family can understand the different tonal elements that different members contribute to the cacophony.

The example is useful because beneath the cacophony there is shared interest as members of the same family and part of the definition of successful intervention is to find ways to insert this interest into the distinctive narratives.

I mentioned earlier that racism entails both exclusion and self-exclusion, and these are reflected in the individual narratives of class and race. Class operates as a narrative of exclusion when it refuses to acknowledge the special history of race. And race can operate as a narrative of harmful self-exclusion to the extent that it prematurely closes off opportunities to explore issues of mutual interests such as adequate health care, a clean environment, sufficient jobs, good transportation, educational opportunities and a host of other areas in which interests are shared and where an emphasis on the truth or falsity of a single narrative alone diminishes opportunities for progress. The effective educator cannot deny that the interests of race and class do not always coincide, but effective education will provide students with open scripts where there is room for them to add 'their own' voices and to appropriate history in new and unpredictable ways.

Racism in a global context

Granted, the metaphor of the dysfunctional family would be limited if it were used to suggest that the issue of racism can be dealt with as a psychological and human relations concern alone and did not enable students to probe the economic and political factors that contribute to the practices of racism. If the stories of race and class are to be politically productive, they must enable students to probe their initial frameworks in the context of the larger political, and economic factors that continue to make them relevant. In other words, the students' initial narratives of race and class are best viewed as open to revisions in light of new information that teachers and texts will need to make available.

The issues raised by the pressures brought about through globalization provide significant opportunities to add new chapters to the narratives and to complicate its underlying structure. The rapid flow of capital from one part of the world to another and the vulnerability that this creates for both local communities and for labor does not always fit either the narratives of guest or the narrative of the involuntary servant both of which depend upon the idea of a clearly identifiable space – an inside and an outside – and a clear sense of belonging or not belonging to this place.

The phenomenon of globalization means that capital has no set home and can 'travel' wherever opportunities arise, and this means that all of us are vulnerable in its

wake. Migrant farm workers chase jobs across the Mexican/US borders. American automobile workers lose jobs to Japanese automobile workers who in turn lose them to Korean and then to Chinese workers. American academic workers live continents apart from their partners and children.

Race and class are still major components of these changes determining in part the level of vulnerability of different segments of populations and contributing to the recent genocides in places such as Cambodia and Somalia. The political structures needed to protect populations from the impact of these changes is only just beginning to take shape, and it will only be completed if students become aware of the disjunction between capital and labor. Thus, while capital is increasingly mobile and global, labor and politics remain largely local and rooted in place. The pedagogy of race and class requires that students understand the economic and political factors that are contributing to this shared vulnerability and the implications of this new form of vulnerability to the older idea of national sovereignty, and that they consider whether new global structures will be required to contain the negative impact of capitalism.

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CHAPTER 10

EDUCATION AS SUBJECTIVITY: THREE PERSPECTIVES ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF SUBJECTIVITY AND THE POSITION OF KNOWLEDGE[1]

Birgit Nordtug

'We have to understand education as more than the simple acquisition of knowledge and skills'; this is a much-repeated message in the context of pedagogical research today. Some researchers point out that the German word Bildung is more appropriate to communicate this point of view than the English word education, arguing that the former concept has a broader frame of reference than the latter. They maintain that Bildung indicates *becoming and being somebody*; in short, it indicates the construction of subjectivity (Biesta, 2002, p. 343; Rudberg, 2003, p. 116). In this article, I will use the English word education, whilst giving it the same broad meaning as Bildung connotes.

Some worry that questions on the acquisition of knowledge are left out when subjectivity becomes the focal point in discussions on education. Others claim that the relation between the process of becoming somebody – the construction of subjectivity – and the acquisition of knowledge is given too little attention in such discussions (Rahbek Schou, 2003, p. 322).

If we take the stance of the post-structuralists on subjectivity, then both these views represent wrong assessments of the discussions on education today. The post-structuralist will emphasise that language is an essential constituent of our subjectivity. Since language is related to knowledge-producing practices, the post-structuralist will claim that questions on the acquisition of knowledge are integrally present in discussions on subjectivity (for example when focusing on the kind of concepts and perspectives, i.e. knowledge, individuals make use of in expressions of themselves).

In this article I will examine three post-structuralist approaches to subjectivity in relation to the position of knowledge. These perspectives give similar diagnoses of contemporary times, agreeing that subjectivity is no longer rooted in traditionally defined points of reference and religious and ideological meta-narratives. Instead, subjectivity is shown to be related to practices of knowledge that continuously change in the light of new knowledge.

[1] The concept of knowledge is seen in association with Anthony Giddens' present-day-related view, which connects knowledge to concepts and perspectives of modern expert systems (such as research and science).

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At the same time, these three perspectives differ on the role knowledge plays in the construction of subjectivity. I have connected the perspectives to the work of three researchers: Anthony Giddens, Zigmund Bauman and Julia Kristeva. I think, however, that these perspectives can be seen as general positions within today's post-structuralist's social scientific research on subjectivity.

The relevance of contemporary research into subjectivity and knowledge is reflected in several ongoing global discussions. One of these, in which the World Health Organization (WHO) is an active discussant, raises questions on body composition and nutrition-related diseases, such as obesity and eating disorders, and the role that knowledge can play in reducing these problems – an approach that WHO in various documents has seen in association with education (see for example WHO, 1999, p. 12). This theme indisputably represents a challenge to education in the world today. I will use eating disorders as an illustration in my discussion, because many researchers (including Giddens) relate these sufferings to the construction of subjectivity (see Malson, 1998 and Hepworth, 1999 for an overview on research taking this point of view). Initially, eating disorders were thought to be unique to white Western cultures, but today these disorders are increasingly becoming a global phenomenon. Whilst there are variabilities between the findings of different studies, all of them point to the emergence of eating disorders in societies worldwide (WHO, 2005, p. 2).[2] WHO has therefore given eating disorders the status of priority disorders with regard to 'Caring for children and adolescents with mental disorders' (WHO, 2003, p. 7), which is of relevance for the pedagogical area.

Three post-structuralist perspectives on subjectivity – A brief presentation

Anthony Giddens analyses the relation between subjectivity and knowledge in the trilogy *The Consequences of Modernity* (1990), *Modernity and Self-Identity* (1991) and *The Transformation of Intimacy* (1992). These books mark a shift in Giddens' authorship towards a post-structuralist and subjectivity-oriented direction (Alexander, 1996, p. 135). One central premise in Giddens' analyses is that production of meaning in our time acquires a particularly modern form, which he calls *the reflexivity of modernity* and which is constitutive in relation to subjectivity. Giddens underlines that modern expert systems, such as research, science and different consultation establishments, acquire a privileged position in the reflexivity of modernity by being suppliers of concepts and perspectives. Since the knowledge of expert systems is continuously being revised due to new information, subjectivity cannot be a given entity, but something that is created and re-created within the contexts of altering knowledge.

[2] The validity of the criteria used by WHO is, however, arguable. The universal criteria on eating disorders do not take into account cultural-specific views and individual-specific experiences of body composition and health.

Giddens (1991, pp. 99–108, 1992, pp. 31–32) claims that this point of view is illustrated in eating disorders, pointing out that people who suffer from eating disorders are constantly revising their subjectivity due to new knowledge of food, training, health and, in many cases, knowledge of how to recover from such disorders.

Zygmunt Bauman (1998a, 2000, 2001) agrees with Giddens that, in our times, subjectivity is no longer rooted in given points of reference but is related to practices of knowledge that continuously change in the light of new knowledge. But he disagrees on what position knowledge has in the subjectivity of modern individuals. While Giddens regards research-related terminology as a reflexive resource, Bauman points out that expert knowledge is not a resource for the construction of subjectivity, but is a source of fragmentation and alienation. Bauman claims that our real subjectivity is experienced only through *responsibility for the Other*, which is free from knowledge. According to Bauman (1993, p. 61), 'When concepts, standards and rules enter the stage, moral impulse makes an exit.'

In Bauman's writings the Other is seen in relation to Emmanual Levinas' ideas. The Other connotes the other person in his very alterity. The capital O marks the focus on the Other's alterity, which refers to the absolutely Other that is *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, as one of Levinas' (1997) books is titled. Since responsibility is a relationship with the other person in his very alterity, the relationship with the alterity as such is constitutive of subjectivity. The dimension which is constitutive of subjectivity is therefore *otherwise than being* and beyond the realm of knowledge. So Bauman can claim that it is in relationships of responsibility, which are free from knowledge that our real subjectivity is constituted.

In contrast to Giddens and Bauman, Julia Kristeva (1999a, 1999b) distinguishes between two dimensions in the construction of subjectivity: the semiotic and the symbolic. While the semiotic is connected to the subject's bodily dispositions (for example, rhythmic and tonal variations in language), the symbolic represents the universal terms and rules that enable us to express ourselves in language. These bodily dispositions create a breach in the universal terms and rules that we use in our constructions of subjectivity. This makes a process of *subjectivisation* possible, in which our expressions of ourselves in language can be experienced as our own.

Whilst Giddens and Bauman separate the bodily subject from the construction of subjectivity, concentrating on the universal terms and rules of language and that which is otherwise than being (in which the latter refers only to Bauman), Kristeva shows that the bodily subject gives life to the universal terms and rules of language. She describes subjectivity as an *inner dialectic* between bodily dispositions and the concepts and rules of language. When she focuses on each individual's experiences of the relation between the bodily and the universal dimension in the construction of subjectivity, Kristeva – in contrast to Giddens and Bauman – opens for a myriad of subjectivities, in which knowledge can have numerous positions.

Subjectivity in reflexive modernity – Giddens' approach

In *The Consequences of Modernity*, Giddens (1990) maintains that we are today on our way towards a new era, which is taking us beyond modernity itself. The new era does not represent dissolution of the modern, but will be an era in which the consequences of modernity become more radical and universal than earlier. Giddens uses different types of terminology to describe and diagnose the transition, depending on the focus of his analysis. When he uses the term reflexive modernity, the focus is on how our times are marked by a singularly modern production of meaning: *the reflexivity of modernity*.[3]

An important point in Gidden's analysis of the new era, which takes us beyond modernity itself, is that the production of meaning is no longer rooted in traditionally defined points of reference and religious and ideological meta-narratives. The reflexivity of modernity consists of a kind of self-referential self-reflection shaped by contemporary ideas and perceptions – ideas and perceptions that are constantly revised in the light of new knowledge. The reflexivity of modernity take place not only on institutional level but also in relation to each individual's subjectivity. We live in a post-traditional society without given points of reference for identity, claims Giddens (1991, p. 105). It is therefore the individual's need and responsibility to shape and retain a self-identity. This happens reflexively as we constantly rework the narrative about ourselves in the light of new knowledge.

In the post-traditional order of modernity, and against the backdrop of new forms of mediated experiences, self-identity becomes a reflexively organised endeavour. The reflexive project of the self, which consists in the sustaining of coherent, yet continuously revised, biographical narratives, takes place in the context of multiple choices as filtered through abstract systems (Giddens, 1991, p. 5).

In the absence of tangible points of reference in the production of meaning, Giddens gives expert-based knowledge on the status of a reflexive resource, which constitutes modern individuals' experiences of themselves. Giddens strongly criticizes the idea of core identity. According to him, subjectivity is formed within practices of knowledge that continuously change in the light of new knowledge and therefore cannot be a given entity.

Giddens' understanding that subjectivity acquires a dynamic character is in good post-structuralist spirit, as is his argument that subjectivity is a linguistic entity formed within the contexts of knowledge. However, Giddens' positive perception of knowledge in the construction of subjectivity differs from the usual stance of the dominating wing of post-structuralism, i.e. the critical tradition, and he underlines this point himself.

[3] Giddens has taken the concept *reflexivity of modernity* from Ulrich Beck, in which Beck (1997, p. 52) refers to the anthology 'Reflexive Modernization'. Giddens applies Beck's analysis, but his approach to the reflexivity of modernity differs from Beck's risk-oriented approach. See the mentioned anthology for a discussion about this.

Giddens clearly distinguishes between his own reflexive approach to subjectivity and the critical tradition. This tradition understands the relation between subjectivity and knowledge as a one-way intrusion of power knowledge, claims Giddens (1992, p. 28–32) with clear address to the post-structuralist analyses of subjectivity inspired by Michel Foucault's thinking. In contrast to the power perspective of critical tradition, Giddens regards subjectivity as a textual tissue free from ideology and power, in which the knowledge of expert systems is woven into the ongoing project: the construction of subjectivity.

It is fitting here to explore the critical perspective, not in the light of Foucault's thinking, but based on Zygmunt Bauman's critique of Giddens' reflexive approach towards subjectivity. In line with the usual stance of critical tradition, Bauman doubts that expert-based knowledge can contribute with something positive in relation to the modern individuals' subjectivity.

Bauman's critique of Giddens – subjectivity as responsibility for the other

Like Giddens, Bauman maintains that our modern life, which he describes partly as post-modernity and partly as liquid modernity, has changed the possibilities of choice for subjectivity. Bauman is, however, far more worried than Giddens about the individual's ability to handle the new situation. In an interview in the journal 'Telos' in 1992, cited in *The Bauman Reader*, he expresses his concern in the following manner:

> Freedom offers many wonderful things, but it does not offer one thing crucial to individual well-being, certainty – being sure that what you are doing is right, that what you have decided to do was not a mistake. To attain this certainty you need reassurance from an authority stronger than your self-confidence. Seeking such certainty leads people to sink ever deeper into dependency (Bauman, 2001, p. 26).

Uncertainty is an effect not only of the fact that we live in a fluid modernity without clear points of reference, but also of the flowing character of language, as Bauman (1998a) points out in *Modernity and Ambivalence*. In line with the semiotic angle within post-structuralist tradition, Bauman addresses Saussure's point that the relation between the expression and the content of the signs of language is arbitrary or random. Therefore, language does not have a given meaning but acquires its meaning in relation to other signs, in a system of distinctions.[4] Consequently, one can never be completely certain about any subject matter – or about oneself.

Bauman does not share Giddens' belief that expert-based knowledge is a positive resource for modern individuals' subjectivity. This disagreement becomes explicit in

[4] Referring to Ferdinand dé Sausurre's course of lectures on linguistics, held at the Sorbonne in 1907–1911, which some of his students wrote down and published in 'Course in General Linguistics'.

the 1992 interview with the following question put to Bauman: 'Could one not see the use of expertise as a kind of personal empowerment as Giddens (1991) does?' Bauman answers by saying:

> Most recipients of the services of experts do not learn the skills. Instead, they define increasingly larger parts of their life as legitimate objects for experts. Look at the development of psychiatry. It consisted in defining more and more aspects of ordinary life as psychiatric cases until virtually everyone had become a potential object of psychiatric treatment (Bauman, 2001, p. 27).

In *Liquid Modernity* Bauman (2000) compares what he describes as our dependence on expert advice to addiction.

Looking for examples, counsel and guidance is an addiction: the more you do it, the more you need to do it and the unhappier you feel when deprived of fresh supplies of the sought-after drugs. As a means of quenching thirst, all addictions are self-destructive; they destroy the possibility of being ever satisfied (Bauman, 2000, p. 72).

In *Postmodern Ethics*, however, Bauman (1993) expresses hope for improvement for the suffering modern individual. This hope is related to what he calls the moral primal scene. Modern human beings have lost their responsibility for the Other, Bauman claims. It is only through responsibility for the Other that we are able to experience ourselves. Or as he says with reference to Emmanuel Levinas: 'the humanity of man, subjectivity, is a responsibility for the Other' (op.cit. p. 85).

Through responsibility for the other, uncertainty – which is a result of the liquid modern life and the arbitrary character of language – becomes a positive resource in the construction of subjectivity. The uncertainty makes it impossible for us to be certain about whether we are moral enough. Since we can never be sure whether we are moral enough, responsibility (and hence subjectivity) becomes an endless project, according to Bauman (1998b, p. 124).

Subjectivity without body

Both Giddens and Bauman relate their analyses of expert-based knowledge to the subjectivity of a modern individual struggling with various symptoms and seeking expert help. However, they leave the symptomatic context out in their analyses. In spite of their repeated assertions that we live in a time of change, they do not say anything about how bodily changes affect modern individuals' subjectivity. While Giddens relates the dynamic character of subjectivity to the changeability of knowledge, Bauman relates it to our moral responsibility and the infinite character of language. Thus they can claim that expert-based knowledge has the same position in everyone's subjectivity and at all times, regardless of the health or well-being of the individual. Since Giddens and Bauman exclude the bodily subject from their analyses, they also exclude the sexual subject. Julia Kristeva's perspective differs in this respect: she includes the bodily, and thus the sexual, subject in the analysis of subjectivity.

A bodily subjectivity – Kristeva's approach

The semiotic and the symbolic

Kristeva shares Giddens' and Bauman's understanding that we live in times in which subjectivity, unlike earlier periods, is not subject to traditionally defined norms, ideals and religious and ideological meta-narratives. This has created changes in the psychopathological picture that can be related to changes in the possibilities of subjectivity, Kristeva (1995) points out in *New Maladies of the Soul*. Freud's compulsive neurotic patients who were repressed by the pressure of social norms, in the sense that their superego was dominant in the construction of subjectivity, are today, in some cases, replaced by patients who lack normative points of reference in their experience of themselves.

These new patients are suffering less from repression or inhibiting prohibitions than from the lack of reference points, such that their psychic apparatus has not really established itself: they are having difficulty in representing their internal and external conflicts (Kristeva, 2002, p. 32).

But for Kristeva, it is not the only conditions set by modern times that affect the construction of subjectivity. Kristeva believes that the subject, through its physicality, can create a breach in the contextual conditions of modernity, and thus construct a multitude of subjectivities. She describes a subject-in-process (*sujet en procés*) that does not necessarily take over and reproduce the dominating ideas and norms, but that has the potential to create new meanings in the universal conditions.

Kristeva's approach towards subjectivity owes much to her analysis of how meaning is created in the dialectic between That which is represented in the construction of terminology itself, and *That* which cannot be captured by terminology. In her PhD thesis *Revolution in Poetic Language* (1974/1999a), she calls the two dimensions the symbolic and the semiotic. The symbolic represents the social structuring of the production of meaning through universal terms and rules of language. The semiotic precedes naming, having its roots in chora – an expression Kristeva has taken from Plato's 'Timaios' and which represents a container that is unnameable. The semiotic is manifested in the production of meaning as a trace of the unnameable. Kristeva describes the trace of the unnameable as the dynamic disposition, which gives language movement and rhythm.

The two dimensions in the production of meaning are related to a perspective of development. The semiotic is related to the pre-lingual phases and the pre-Oedipal mother–child symbiosis, in which the child orientates itself in relation to the mother concerning drives and bodily energies (Kristeva, 1999a, p. 95). The symbolic is related to linguistic socialization and the child's adoption of terms and language codes that limit and separate. This enables the child to limit herself in relation to her surroundings by means of language, in which the pre-Oedipal symbiosis with the mother-object ends, and where subjectivity is related to the language community's systems of distinctions. But the pre-Oedipal symbiosis is not lost forever. It leaves behind a trace

in the production of meaning, which relates to meaning either as negation or as surplus (Kristeva, 1998, p. 266–267).

The semiotic always exists in relation to the symbolic dimension. 'Because the subject is always both semiotic and symbolic, no signifying system she produces can be either 'exclusively' semiotic or 'exclusively' symbolic, and instead necessarily marked by an indebtedness to both' (Kristeva, 1999a, p. 93). The relation between the semiotic and the symbolic is expressed in different ways in the form of various signifying practices or discourses.

Gender differences

In an essay about the Otherness of the Phallus, Kristeva (1996) puts the description of the semiotic and the symbolic in a gender perspective. In line with classical psychoanalytic thinking, she maintains that the Oedipal phase, which enables the child to limit herself in relation to others by means of language, is different for boys and girls. She points out that for boys the Oedipal phase is about *identification with the Same*. It is about adhering to the laws of the Father who sets the rules in relation to the Other (the Mother). For girls, the Oedipal phase is about *adhering to the Other* (the Father) who sets the rules in relation to the Same. Identification with the Same is, for girls, connected to the pre-Oedipal relation to the Mother.

Since gender identification in women is linked to the pre-Oedipal relation to the Mother, the semiotic disposition is less repressed in women's subjectivity. It can have different manifestations in their subjectivity, such as a fundamental discord between the semiotic and the symbolic. It affects the hysteric's subjectivity, where the experience of alienation can be a central theme. It can also appear as problems with limiting oneself in relation to others; near relationships will then be experienced as threatening to one's subjectivity. Both themes can be related to eating disorders.

The trace of the pre-Oedipal symbiosis can, however, also be a source of closeness and sensuality in interaction with others, and of creativity in the production of knowledge. Kristeva believes that the semiotic consists of a creative element when it is in an inner dialectic relation to the symbolic. Therefore, she not only challenges women, but also men to 'a reconciliation with the not-representable pre-phallic that is associated with the pre-Oedipal Motherly and with the pre-lingual' (Kristeva, 1996, p. 18).

Genotext and phenotext

Kristeva gives a text-theoretical expression to the semiotic and the symbolic through the concepts of genotext and phenotext. The phenotext is the verbal phenomenon as seen in a concrete statement's structure, which is regulated by grammar and communication rules. Analyses that consider only the phonology, structure and semantics of statements and that do not question the subject of enunciation are directed towards the phenotext. Kristeva's supervisor, Roland Barthes (1998, p. 77), calls such analyses as

structure analyses. The genotext is not language-related, in structural linguistic terms; it is manifested in the phenotext as a semiotic disposition (Kristeva, 1999b, p. 28).

The phenotext is constantly split up and divided, and is irreducible to the semiotic process that works through the genotext. The genotext, on the other hand, is a process; it moves through zones that have relative and transitory borders and constitutes a path that is not restricted to the two poles of univocal information between two fully fledged subjects (Kristeva, 1999a, p. 121).

The genotext is *more* than the concrete statements in the text – it is this *more* that gives the text life and is a proof that the text is not only a historical, socio-cultural and institutional foundation, but is also based on pulsating human subjects. The genotext is the area in which the signs are invaded by urge, lust and hunger for life and meaning. While the phenotext gives the text a universal expression, communicating semantic meaning, the genotext represents the life-giving communication – the procedural within the language structure.

In the light of one of Barthes' (1998, p. 85) many text metaphors, the relation between the two dimensions can be described as the relation between a tree trunk and its branches. The genotext is the trunk of the tree. It is the subject that holds the life-giving and the procedural in the signifying practices – that which moves and creates a breach and new meanings. The phenotext is the branches of the text tree. The branches are grafted into the text tree as inter-texts, forming the text's terminological frame of reference. This frame of reference, however, will appear merely as a static and lifeless linguistic expression if the text branches are not connected to the life-giving signifying practices that the subject holds.

Subjectivity in different signifying practices – challenges to education

According to Kristeva, the dialectic between the semiotic and the symbolic denotes different signifying practices, or what she also classifies as discourses. To examine this she uses Jacques Lacan's four basic types of signifying practices. In the seminar 'On Feminine Sexuality – The Limits of Love and Knowledge', Lacan (1999, p. 16–17) distinguishes between four types of discourse in our society: *the Master's discourse*, *the Hysteric's discourse*, *the University discourse* and *the Analyst's discourse*. Kristeva (1999a, p. 123) emphasises that the four discourses 'interest us primarily as a didactic implement – one that will allow us to specify some of the modalities of signifying dispositions.' In the following, the types of discourse are applied to highlight the difference between Giddens', Bauman's and Kristeva's approaches towards subjectivity.

Subjectivity as an academic project

Giddens describes a signifying practice that has close links with the University discourse. The University discourse is enunciated from the position of systematic knowledge, which is the agent of the discourse. Regarding Giddens' analysis, his arguments on

subjectivity come from the position of a mixed bag of social–scientific knowledge (compare to Mestrovic, 1998, p. 38, which calls Giddens' analyses 'a theoretical omelette'). This knowledge addresses how we experience our subjectivity. Giddens claims that our subjectivity is a self-narrative, woven by scientific texts.

There is a paradox in Giddens' analyses, which, in the light of the vocabulary of critical tradition, can be related to a hidden truth. Although Giddens underlines the fact that the modern individual's subjectivity is not based upon given points of reference, he gives subjectivity a definite foundation in his analysis: a basis in expert (and especially scientific) knowledge. So, Giddens' post-structuralist approach towards subjectivity seems to be in the spirit of the modern enlightenment project, in which one way of thinking (based on tradition and religion) is substituted with another (based on scientific knowledge) (see Mestrovic, 1998, for a deepening discussion of this point).

Gur-Ze'ev, Masschelein and Blake (2001) criticize the reflexive approach held by Giddens and others. Even though their critique is not explicitly related to Giddens, it hits the mark of Giddens' rationalistic approach when focusing on subjectivity as something *more* than the tapestry of rational text-tissue that Giddens describes. Gur-Ze'ev, Masschelein and Blake contrast the reflexive approach towards an understanding of education, which is connected to a new concept of reflection. In good post-structuralist spirit, they argue that language is the home for both reflexivity, or reflectivity as they prefer, and reflection. But whilst reflexivity is leaving out the *more* (than a rational text-tissue represents), reflection insists on this *more*. Unlike Kristeva, they do not relate the *more* to the subject's physicality. Inspired by Levinas' thinking, they understand subjectivity as the responsibility for the Other. The *more* is related to the otherness of the Other, which is 'otherwise than being or beyond essence'.

According to Gur-Ze'ev, Masschelein and Blake (2001, p. 93), reflexivity leads to a normalizing education, which 're-presents the hegemonic realm of self-evidence and the productive violence of social and cultural order'. Leaving out the *more*, reflexivity reproduces the dominant ideas and values of subjectivity. Reflection, by contrast, aims at challenging the supposedly self-evident and presenting order of things. 'Reflection aims at transcendence and represents a moral commitment in respect of the otherness of the Other, which power relations in every realm of self-evidence oblige us to neglect, to destroy or consume' (op.cit.). While reflexivity contributes to normalize education, the normal is challenged by reflection. Reflection makes possible an educational practice characterised by its refusal of the given: a counter-education. Even though Gur-Ze'ev, Masschelein and Blake insist on the *more* that relates our subjectivity to the totally Other, they do not leave out knowledge from the act of responsibility as Bauman does. Their concept of counter-education seems to build on a similar logic to Kristeva's, i.e. an inner dialectic between two dimensions in the language. 'In contrast to Levinas (. . .) we think there is a distinction between these two levels but that they are always closely related', they underline (op.cit. p. 101).

Subjectivity in the manner of the Hysteric

Bauman's description of the suffering, modern individual wandering from one expert to the other without any apparent cure, is reminiscent of the hysteric's discourse. It is a discourse that represents a kind of open ignorance, in which the subject is in search of someone who can reveal the truth about herself. By constantly questioning the given answers, the other is pressured to a point where his lack of knowledge is exposed. This is not a conscious exposure strategy on the part of the hysteric. It is, rather, the subject who does not know herself, continuing to ask in search of 'the definitive truth'.

Since we are subjects-in-process, as Kristeva formulates it, there are no given truths about who we are. The hysteric's project is therefore an impossible project. And as Bauman points out, the impossibility of the project can result in an eternal wandering from one expert to another. But this wandering is not necessarily merely the negative experience that Bauman claims it is. He ignores the hidden surplus value that can be found in the desire to yearn for something, which cannot be fulfilled. The pleasure of yearning compels the hysteric to continue wandering, even though she will never find fulfilment.

Lacan applauds the Hysteric's discourse and maintains that the hysteric contributes to the production of new knowledge through her doubt about any given answer. He describes the Hysteric's discourse as a truth-seeking discourse, but Kristeva does not share this glorification. According to Kristeva, the Hysteric's discourse is built upon a fundamental discord between the semiotic and the symbolic. This discord creates a constant doubt about the ability of the universal terms of language to represent anything at all – including the hysteric's subjectivity. Kristeva questions whether there can be any innovation where the representational function of the universal terms of language is so constantly in doubt.

Will the eternal frustration of the hysteric in relation to discourse oblige the latter to reconstruct itself? Will it give rise to unrest in everybody, male or female? Or will it remain a cry outside time, like the mass movements that break up the old system, but have no problem in submitting to the demands of order, as long as it is a new order? (Kristeva, referred in Moi, 1999, p. 10).

For Kristeva, the hysteric rebels against the universal terminology of language but does not add anything new to the production of knowledge. I think that both Lacan's and Kristeva's assertions on the Hysteric's discourse are relevant assessments, but in relation to uneven analytic levels. Whilst Lacan's assertion on the fruitfulness of the hysteric's constant questioning of the given answers is relevant to the level of scientific community[5], Kristeva's assertion that this discourse is, in fact, fruitless is relevant to the level of the hysteric's subjectivity and her experiences of alienation in relation to her subjectivity.

[5] Irene Matthis (1997) discusses this theme with regard to psychoanalytic theory and the dialectic between Freud's research and his hysterical patients.

As mentioned, eating disorders can in some cases be related to the hysteric's discord between the semiotic and the symbolic. This discord is in such cases at the root of the symptomatic context, which perpetuates the eating disorder. One step towards overcoming the disorder can be the creation of a bridge between the semiotic and the symbolic, allowing the bodily dimension to give life to concepts and perspectives, which the suffering subject uses in the symbolizing of her symptoms. Kristeva believes that love can create such a bridge. 'If the analyst doesn't love his patients he ought to give up trying to cure them', she claims (referred in Moi, 1999, p. 19). But in contrast to Bauman's (2003, p. 7) description of love in 'Liquid Love', she does not leave knowledge out from the love-related relation between an analyst and a patient. In the case of an analyst listening to the discourse proffered by a patient, there is no escaping a theoretical frame of sorts. Without some frame one hears nothing or simply falls back on the readymade frame provided by pop psychology. But in contrast to Giddens (1991, p. 18), who claims that 'knowledge has validity independent of the practitioners and clients who make use of it', Kristeva insists that the theoretical frame has to be applied in a relationship between an analyst and a patient, in which love is included.

When Giddens points out that eating disorders can illustrate that subjectivity is a reflexive project woven by scientific texts, he does not see that the discord between the bodily dimension and the universal concepts of language can be a part of the symptomatic context in eating disorders. He therefore believes that expert knowledge alone can cure eating disorders. For him psychotherapy is only about the acquisition of expert knowledge. In relation to psychoanalysis, Giddens (1992, p. 31) claims that 'its specific significance is that it provides a setting, and a rich fund of theoretical and conceptual resources, for creation of a reflexively ordered narrative self.'

Regarding Bauman's analyses on subjectivity, it would be valid to point at a paradox. When it comes to hope for the suffering, modern individual, which Bauman connects to responsibility for the Other, it is not the Hysteric subject we meet. It is, rather, the subject who knows himself, i.e. the subject of the Master's discourse. It is the Master who is confronted with the otherness of the Other. When he faces this otherness in unlimited responsibility for the Other, something happens to the Master: he no longer knows himself. He becomes a doubter like the Hysteric – a doubter who is never sure whether he is moral enough. Some post-structuralist feminists will surely describe this discursive change as a sex reversal from man to woman (see, for example, E. Wright's, 2000, reading of Lacan).[6] The Other, however, does not undergo this change, continuing (as in the Hysteric's discourse) to be constantly questioned for responsibility.[7]

[6] See Juliet Mitchell (2000) and Toril Moi (2004) for a critique of poststructuralist feminists who place the Hysteric's discourse together with the concept of femininity.

[7] Followers of Levinas will possibly reject my interpretation. Gert Biesta (2003) suggests another interpretation, which leaves out the first position (the Master's position) claiming that the Levinasian subject is a 'being-in-question' (op.cit. p. 63).

The paradox becomes explicit in cases of eating disorders in persons who lack the ability to limit themselves in close relationships to others. In these cases, Bauman's reversal from Master to Hysteric will not come to pass because the Master's position does not exist in relation to the Other. Levinas (1997, p. 74) seems to hint at this point himself when he writes that 'only a subject that eats can be for-the-other.' In cases of eating disorders concerning a lack of ability to limit oneself in relation to others, the absolute demand for unlimited responsibility for the Other can make the sufferings worse. The same can happen if such persons feel overburdened with unconditional love from a helper. Since these sufferers lack the ability to mark a limit to the other through verbal remarks, limitless love can be experienced as an invasion and as a feeling of being stifled. The sufferers will then try to stop the invasion through well-known coping strategies: refusal of food or over-eating, leading to further sufferings.

From a gender perspective Bauman's paradox becomes more explicit in the context of eating disorders because these sufferings are far more widespread amongst women than men. Women are in some cases seen to be in a position of subjection, in which the Master's position is absent in the construction of subjectivity. Levinas' suggestions that 'the Other is higher than I' (1999, p. 72) and that 'subjectivity means to be subject to every being; it is to be responsible for everyone' (1996, p. 90) seem to support the conventional view of subjection in relation to women's subjectivity. It would be valid to claim that women with eating disorders, who suffer from a lack of autonomy, point to a gender-related hidden truth about Levinas' ideas. Jacques Derrida (1978, pp. 320–321) may be referring to this hidden truth when he writes in a note in 'Writing and Difference' that Levinas 'pushes the respect for dissymmetry so far that it seems to us impossible, essentially impossible, that it could have been written by a woman. Its philosophical subject is man (vir).'

In 'Culture and Weight Consciousness', Mervat Nasser (1997) relates this revival of Levinasian ideas of responsibility and subjection to eating disorders. Her research on eating disorders and subjectivity involves Arab girls and women, but she refers to other studies that support her findings (for example in the USA). Nasser claims that there is a clear relationship between eating disorders and the conflict, on the one hand, between desire for autonomy and individual achievement and, on the other hand, values on women's subjectivity, which are coming back into society with the revival of Islamic fundamentalism and fundamentalist Christian belief.

The ethical turn and counter-education

Nasser's findings are interesting in relation to the ethical turn in education today, which is inspired by Levinas' ideas on subjection to and responsibility for the Other. Within the frame of Gur-Ze'ev's, Masschelein's and Blake's counter-education, the ethical turn represents a counter to the hegemonic realm of self-evidence. The hegemonic realm that they describe shows similarities to Bauman's (1993) contemporary picture in *Postmodern Ethics*, in which human beings have lost their responsibility for the Other. Bauman operates, however, with several different descriptions of our

time. In other writings, he (1998a, 2000, 2001) supports Giddens' and Kristeva's contemporary picture that depicts a multitude of realms without one specific point of reference for everyone's experiences of the realm of self-evidence.

If we make allowance for the latter picture, there will be different experiences of the hegemonic realm of self-evidence. Some girls (and also some boys) have grown up in a religious context in which the idea of subjection to and responsibility for the Other is a hegemonic value. For these children and adolescents, the ethical turn in education does not represent a new direction, but represents the hegemonic realm of self-evidence. Education that counters will, in these cases, mean signifying practices, including something that these children and adolescents are not allowed to express in the ethical context, but which comes to a manifestation through their desire. For some children and adolescents, this can be a desire for autonomy and individual achievement.

Although Gur-Ze'ev, Masschelein and Blake (2001) promote a position of constant revolt, they give counter-education a foundation in the ethical message on subjection to and responsibility for the Other. A challenge for education today is to allow signifying practices that give room for different kinds of revolt. Counter-education can make such signifying practices possible, but then the counter has to be differentiated in a manner that serves each subject's desire.

Concluding remark on the three approaches to subjectivity and knowledge acquisition

In my view, Giddens separates the bodily subject from the construction of subjectivity. In his writings subjectivity is described as an inter-textual tissue wherein *That*, which represents something other than the universal terms of language, is excluded. Giddens (1991) claims that subjectivity is a project of management. However, many of us do not experience ourselves in such a rationalistic manner. Like Giddens' and Bauman's modern individuals, we are struggling with various symptoms. But unlike Giddens' reflexive individuals, we experience that we cannot just administer the symptoms away.

Bauman relates subjectivity to *That* which in the production of meaning represents something other than the universal terms of language, i.e. our responsibility for the Other. For Baumann, this responsibility is free from knowledge. But, when Baumann leaves out the dimension of knowledge, subjectivity becomes naïve. When the relationship to the Other lacks the rationale and insight of knowledge, it can become very problematic, especially when the Other is a hysteric, which Bauman's postmodern individuals seem to be. But it can also be problematic when the Other experiences close relationships as threatening to her subjectivity, as in some cases of eating disorders.

Kristeva describes subjectivity as the inner dialectic between That which is represented in the construction of terms of language and *That* which cannot be encapsulated by the terms, and thereby gives life to the terms. Thus, she opens for numerous positions

which knowledge can have in the modern individual's experience of herself. Like Kristeva, I believe in signifying practices, which allow the inclusion of both the semiotic and the symbolic and, therefore, the construction of new meanings in the contextual framework that our time sets in relation to each individual's subjectivity. Expert-based knowledge can thus be a part of a symbolizing work for the subject, where recognition, acknowledgement and new knowledge are created. For the sufferer of an eating disorder, this can make a breach possible in a subjectivity, which has been frozen in one view, opening the door for new and various experiences of the self.

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CHAPTER 11

SPORTS EDUCATION FACING GLOBALIZING CAPITALISM

Ilan Gur-Ze'ev

The present historical shift and the social and cultural changes that are carving out their way to the future do not today enhance theological tension, intellectual vitality or revolutionary consciousness, nor practices of resistance of the kind that characterized the class struggle of the 19th and the first half of the 20th century. The constitution of the MacWorld that is the arena of 'the risk society' (Beck, 1999) is taking place in face of its victims, who are at the same time also its strongest and most devoted agents. The change in the function, representation and consumption of sport, sports education and physical education faces little, if any, resistance. This should not be understood as a failure of physical educators or of the active and passive participants in sports in the present globalizing process. Consumers and producers alike, whether armchair TV supporters of Real Madrid football club, media 'experts' or interviewers, do not as a rule resist or offer any critical alternative. By and large they enthusiastically support, cooperate with and even idolize this development. What we face here is the instrumentalization of sports education and the reification of sport as part of human life deteriorating into its natural, mythical and objective dimensions; human life becomes part of a mechanical–'natural' continuum. A moment of the Same. The human subject betrays its otherness and is about to be swallowed by thingness. This historical triumphant cannibalism of the object consuming the subject is paralleled and enhanced by rapid erosion in the Western master signifiers and ideals of control and order, of certainty and security, which were so central to modernity. A new world order, a new economy and a new kind of capitalism are being formed (ibid., p. 2), and the apparatuses of representation and cultural production are, accordingly, offering a new kind of sport and a new kind of sports education.

According to the supporters of globalizing capitalism, these developments open new horizons for creativity, multiculturalism and tolerance (ibid., p. 3). The present function of sport and sports education within this framework is assumed to be part of the opening of new possibilities for creative life for the individual and part of supplying more pleasure to the public through free, individual choice. This reality is presented as part of a development of which another dimension is the demolition of traditional hierarchies, objectivist yardsticks, authorities, exclusivity in representation of 'the truth' and of education in line of the hegemonic class, ideology, ruler or tradition.

According to the supporters of the ideology of globalizing capitalism these new developments represent the establishment of a new world order. This new world order

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offers us a new kind of cosmopolitanism, a new international morality (Beck, 2003, p. 86), a new kind of world memory (Levy and Szneider, 2004, pp. 143–157), of post-national communitarianism that is founded on global risk (Beck, 2003, pp. 16–17) and global pleasures in the form of activities and symbolic participation that enhance consumption of cultural products and competitive, healthy self-realization. In a way, life becomes a totalistic realization of 'sport'; sport, in this particular realization, becomes a symbolic manifestation of the truth of the present historical moment.

More than offering a new agenda, I try to locate the horizons of the present perversion of sport. This text is not neutral. It does not make do with critical reconstruction. It explicitly strives to identify potential possibilities for transcending the present borders of the cultural politics of 'sport'. In this sense, it is of vital importance for us to differentiate between the mission of sport – and that which is referred to by this telos, and the reality of 'sport', its practices, production, representation and consumption in present-day globalizing capitalism. Globalizing capitalism and its culture industry are the actual arena where both theories and practices of 'physical education' take place, parallel to the education for and consumption of competitive sport, as well as the philosophical frameworks that make possible the conceptual field for these theories and practices.

In this sense, philosophy of sports education will be presented here in its historical–social–cultural contexts to enable us to reach the gates of the fundamental problematic of the philosophy of sports education in its wider sense. If we follow this road, we may perhaps come closer to the possibility of challenging philosophy of sports education's abandonment of its mission. Such an Odyssey cannot avoid storming the closed gate on which these questions are inscribed: What is the mission of sport, if at all it has such an aim? What are the manipulations for ensuring the forgetfulness of the essence of the mission of sports education? What are the practices which ensure the trivialization, banalization and ridiculousness of these questions? And what are the powers, interests, dynamics and ontological signs which they serve, hide and unveil?

Even when trying harder and harder, philosophy of sport will not succeed in totally disconnecting the ties between its response to the call of the question of the mission of sports education and the enigma of the aim of human Life in a post-modern era. But does the human have any 'aim' at all? And even if human Life has a purpose and meaning – is there any open way to reach it, and even to explicitly articulate it in a public sphere? Is it perhaps the essence of human Life that its mission not be given, nor offer itself articulated, nor be theoretically accessible? Is it possible that when true to itself it will offer mere silence or its negation? As self-negation and absence, could the meaning of Life also be revealed as an anchor of freedom, calling humans to face bravely indeterminacy, endless openness and alienation? Is it possible that at the same time it is also an abyss between the regimes of production and consumption of representations of the given facts – and worthy life? From the viewpoint of Diasporic philosophy (Gur-Ze'ev, 2007) we can ask: is it possible that a Messianic moment will appear, in which, or, from which, the question of the aim of Life will burst in, or at least the presence of the closing

horizons and the forgetfulness of the question of Life's aim and meaning will rise, again, in the form of a young, vital readiness for a call to be ecstatically responded to? Is it possible that at a certain historical moment a renewed human vitality will become a reality in face of questions such as, 'Do humans still have a mission, yardsticks, and meaningful imperatives? Is it possible that within a Diasporic perspective the closure of the truths of globalizing capitalism, as manifested in reified sport, will be challenged?' And more specifically: 'Is it possible that instead of struggling to reclaim its former place as an important moment in preparing the human's readiness to face the question of her destiny, sport will contribute to a nomadic, Diasporic, existence, that will enhance a more mature humanity?' This question is not disconnected from the possibilities of overcoming normalizing education and opening the gate for counter-education. Here, I will try to probe the possibility that it is imperative that the philosophy of sports counter-education become part of this Diasporic transcendence. Modest as our aim in this elaboration might be, it still represents a commitment to worthy life, love, creativity and solidarity. But in face of globalizing capitalism and its culture industry we should explicitly ask this: Is there still openness and meaning in post-modern conditions for genuine Diasporic life, for counter-education and for Love of Life?

Responding to these challenges precedes, yet does not cancel, the questions which attract sports theoreticians who are so busy today meeting the demands of globalizing capitalism and ask – mostly within an instrumentalist orientation, 'What are the best ways for improving physical fitness of young and older producers-consumers in technologically highly advanced Western societies?' Sometimes, they are attracted even to philosophical questions whose instrumental orientation is less evident. Here they ask: 'Why is it important to raise the standards of fitness?' or 'Where should Western society concentrate its care and efforts and in light of what principles?' 'What is the proper education needed for advancing the decision makers in the field of sport?' or even 'What kind of education is needed to produce a more just and/or rational distribution of efforts and funds in sports, which today confronts the imperatives of globalizing capitalism and the truths of the symbols and passions of the post-modern 'spirit'?' Another important set of questions is of the kind of legitimacy of approval/disapproval of drug-use in sports or in diverting efforts and capital in favor of sports activities which, while less popular or commercially successful, contain unique manifestations of the sporting spirit. From time to time even fundamental questions for the philosophy of sport, such as 'What is fairness in a post-modern era?' or even 'Is there today a sports 'achievement' that is justifiable in itself and for itself, regardless of its rating or of the bottom line in the bank account?' Still, even on the rare occasions when such questions are raised they are disconnected from the eternal questions of the philosophy, meaning and aim of Life, as well as from actual social realities.

To my mind, it is of vital importance to address these challenges in the most concrete manner, but without disconnecting them from the possibilities/limitations of the utopian quest and mission of sports counter-education.

The ridiculing, banalizing, perverting or abandoning of the central questions of sports education – as is so common in today's philosophy of sport – is not a mere

coincidence. It has an economic value and makes an important contribution to collectivism and other forms of de-humanization. This is the synthesis between the central drives of the world of Jihad and the MacWorld (Zizek, 2002, p. 158 (in Hebrew)). Counter-philosophy of sport should offer not a gate to joining this coalition but a gate to Diasporic life in face of its apparent triumph. This Diasporic alternative does not necessarily search for a theoretical 'home-coming', for the constitution of a social earthly Garden of Eden or for the pleasurable quasi-creative deconstruction of solidarities, values and calls for edifying self-constitution. As a Diasporic human existential, philosophical and political alternative, it does not necessarily retreat into relativism, cynicism or anti-solidarian de-teritorialization of the self. As suggested by the example of sports counter-education, it can also offer new kinds of solidarity, intersubjectivity, responsibility to the body and to the cosmos, and new possibilities for the spirit.

Today, it is impossible to seriously challenge the post-modern globalizing condition, unless as part of a general struggle for change in existential, cultural and political realities. Such a struggle is a utopia. As a utopia it opposes present realms of self-evidence, which form the current existential, conceptual, political and aesthetic horizons. But, who is the one who is today mighty enough to dispute present rational manifestations of globalizing capitalism or fight the imperatives of post-modern technological advancement? Nevertheless, I claim, even in the era of 'the end of philosophy', and even if deconstructed or transformed, these questions are not completely castrated by the system. The struggle for transcendence, I insist, is still possible, even if only in a negative, nomadic manner – and this should be the great mission of diasporic-oriented sports counter-education in the post-modern era.

Sports counter-education has today a special challenge, in face of the culture clash between Western and non-Western civilizations, embedded with the divisions imposed by capitalistic globalization (which do not fit the above dichotomy). Capitalistic globalization itself is woven and differentiated by local processes, and their contingent, hybrid and temporary collective and individual realities.

At the same time, for the MacWorld, for the Jihad world, as well as for their coalitions, most of the veiled violences that facilitate and reproduce the post-industrial order of things remain unproblematized. This is so even when it is woven, like in the 2001 UN conference in Durban (South Africa), with religious violence, ethnocentric policies, racial, cultural and other discriminations and counter-discriminations. These form the 'I' and on a certain level the conditions, representations and threats of 'nature' of which the human soul and body are parts. They constitute the human body as a political site, and capitalize the powers of the spirit and the body for further mystification of Life, while hiding ecological threats to the earth, health risks for the human body, and reified human relations as precondition for today's self-perception and re-positioning of men and women who compete for 'success', power, pleasure and recognition. The counter-violence of the Third World's victims, when articulated in queer, feminist, anti-globalizing, post-colonialist, Islamic fundamentalist and other rhetoric, challenge this order, while being part and parcel of the post-modern condition. Paradoxically, they contribute to the

strengthening of unrestrained market-oriented policies on the one hand and empower the invisibility of normalizing violences on the other. The sublimation and de-sublimation of the MacWorld and the Jihad world parallels (as Adorno already understood) a perverse pact between the superego and the id at the expense of the reflective 'I'. The fruits of these violences produce and reproduce the unreflective representations of human 'fitness' and adaptability, within the de-humanized consciousness and body. As such they present the true nature of normalizing education and serve ecological, moral and other threats to the very existence of the human world in a global scale.

In globalizing capitalism, these violences ensure the construction of the human as a successful producer/consumer; even as a post-colonialist anti-globalizing, feminist or 'green' activist. It prepares humanity for its supreme sporting realization: 'successful' adaptation and eating the fruits of 'fitness' in the market as a perfect producer-consumer (Gur-Ze'ev, 2003a, p. 143). It prepares, represents, justifies and offers an ornamentalization of a totalistic arena, which inherits past religious ecstatic experiences and promises quasi-transcendence and a deceiving telos. Fundamentalist religious alternatives will challenge this direction and offer an alternative totalistic 'spiritual' dehumanization. Central to the framework of this alternative is overcoming or destroying the body of one's self. Sometimes, as in the case of Iranian Khomeinism, it will accept and integrate the world's sports industry. In other cases, such as the Jewish ultra-orthodox community, any compromise with the secular world is flatly refused. Yet, disciplining the body and mind in accordance with the imperatives of normalizing education will always unite the various conflicting fundamentalist alternatives. In Western and non-Western societies, which were completely overwhelmed by the logic of the capitalist production and consumption, traditional sports activity and its symbols were overtaken by this logic: a process of incorporation, which includes physical education and education for competitive sport, and its rational consumption. The relevant theories concerning today's sport are recruited to veil the transformation of sport as sacred work into 'sport' and to ensure the furthering reification and virtualization of Love of Life and its immanent freedom. By functioning efficiently on this level, they contribute in a most sophisticated manner to the transformation of 'sport' into an unproblematic, reified, part of current capitalist culture industry, within which body, nature and creativity become mere instrument, function or commodity. The human body and spirit abandon their connections to nature on the one hand and to the telos of spiritual edification on the other. The virtual reality of the advanced capitalist human conditions offers a victory of the abstract, dehumanized, 'home-returning' project over the Diasporic alternative, while presenting a quasi-nomadic 'alternative' in which post-modern Life, in all its spheres, becomes a totalistic realization of the idea of sport.

The Olympic Games, which, according to tradition, began in 776 BC, testifies to the presence in the classical Greek world of the essence of the ideal of sport. It is a religious essence in a pre-institutionalized sense. The religious essence of the sports ideal and its transcendental mission were realized also in a formed, symbolic manner, as a formal declaration of the Olympic Games as a practice in honor of the Olympic

Zeus. The first of the 5 days of the Olympic games, as organized in 472 BC, was wholly devoted to sacrificing and other sacred practices. The competitions were meant to call the spirit. They were intended to manifest the human spirit in its directedness to the excellent, to the superb, to the holy. Sport was, for the Greeks, a sacred practice. This is why only after the competitors took their vow and pledged allegiance to the supreme ideals of this human-Olympic event could they participate in the various competitions, which officially began on the second day. The last of the Olympic days was again devoted to sacrifices, to declaring the winners and crowning them with garlands of olive branches. In the Platonic state, gymnastics and life in the light of the ideal of sport are preconditions for the edification of the philosopher-king and for the constitution of the ideal state.

In other words, the essence of sport, before to its transformation into a commodity, is transcendental. When true to itself, the transcendental dimension of sport is individualistic-oriented while reuniting the human with other humans and with the cosmos in all its richness, diversity and infinite openness. It can, of course, betray its telos and abandon both its individualistic and cosmic dimensions, while offering a deceiving individualistic agenda (in the form of sports 'stars' as a commodity where the 'stars' themselves act in their personal life as a fabrication of their public representation). It can, in parallel, also offer a deceiving cosmopolitan ideal in the form of a symbol, a representation, which is a mere sign in the commodity market that has lost its relation to nature and to genuine human interests, potential and glory.

When true to its essence and telos, sport represents the impetus of Love of Life. As Love of Life, it raises the human from lower levels of existence to her supreme goal within the forms of constant self-elevation. This kind of self-elevation is actualized as a self-overcoming that is also a form of self-constitution. Self-overcoming, we should bear in mind, for the Greeks was unimaginable to actualize within the closedness of one's self; it was conceived as determined by responding to a heavenly call. This call was conceived as differing substantially from the drives, calls and reactions of the self: it is a transcendental call to which the proper response is the human's worthiest practice in a cosmos in which he or she becomes a citizen in his or her home. But, although it was institutionalized and conceived as potentially important for civil life within the framework of the hegemonic order, sport, like philosophy, carried also a Diasporic potential. It was a potential estrangement from the world of facts. It contained the potential for a refusal to see contingent order and the limits of the body and spirits as having the last word: it incubated the imperative of overcoming the governing facts and the limits of the body and spirits in the name of a transcendental call, a potential which contained an immanent Utopian massage and an alternative to the telos set by hegemonic normalized education.

Facing this ultimate, potentially Diasporic and autonomous essence of sport, Christianity, which conquered Latin Europe during the early middle ages, had to overcome, restrain or transform the Love of Life, non-religious happiness, and the practice and ideal of sport. Naturally, therefore, Emperor Theodosius I cancelled the Olympic Games in AD 393.

Imitatio Christi and the ideal of being a genuine diviner were supposed to dictate the only legitimate Diasporic way to worthy life and transcendence. It refused to tolerate any educational competition. However, all the prohibitions, restrictions and control did not succeed in completely blocking the manifestations of the essence of the ideal of sport, even if only in restricted, partial or sublimated ways: it survived even when the human body and earthly life in general were conceived as a jail for the God-loving spirit or as an invitation to hubris, or to devoting oneself to the lower manifestations of life in this world.

The practices realized in the courts of earls, dukes and kings, however, opened new gates to aesthetization of knightly ideals and to both physical and sports education, which became legitimate as it was integrated into the Christian tradition. Religious myths and well-institutionalized traditions brought it to the level of a convincing illusion of an ethical ideal, a synthesis which in the renaissance reached its peak. For example, Juan Louis Vivas, a Spanish scholar who was a distinguished teacher in many of Western cultural centers in the 16th century, understood that his quest for a Christian peace and for spiritual elevation must find a proper legitimate space for sport too. It was not to be solely preparatory practice for military achievements but an important stage in the spiritual elevation of the human. He even constructed a philosophical-ethical framework for private practice (Vives, 1979, p. 21). It is important, however, not to confuse the Church's willingness to accept some sports practices, as part of a process of their being swallowed by Christian-oriented politics, with its principal rejection of the essence of the ideal of sport. The Church was not mistaken in identifying a dangerous competition here for the soul and telos of the spirit of the human being.

According to Saint Augustine, one should sharply distinguish between the human body, which has not only a living soul but also 'a life-giving spirit', and the 'animal bodies', which 'are not souls' (St. Augustine, 1984, p. 356). The human being, according to this conception, is essentially a heavenly creature, not because of but in spite of his earth-made body. According to this doctrine 'the first man, was 'of the earth, earthly', and he was made as a 'living soul', not a 'life-living spirit'; that condition was reversed for him after he had merited it by obedience' (ibid., pp. 536–537). After the Fall, the life-giving spirit which raised Christ from the dead ensures also that it ' 'will bring to life your mortal bodies also, through the indwelling of his Spirit in you.' The body will thus be related to the life-giving spirit as it is now to the living soul' (ibid., p. 537). The very possibility of this appearance, living in the light of the possibility of resurrection, opens the gate to happiness and joy within the horizons of spiritual life, true religious life, which separate humans from other creatures. It is the mission of the Church to guide humans to this dimension of human life and to overcome earthly joy and happiness, pleasure and bodily strivings, which turn the human body and soul to be drawn into the vanity of daily life and its infinite meaninglessnes. This is why it was so important for this striving in Christianity to overcome what it conceived as quasi-love and quasi-spirituality, which were considered especially dangerous enemies.

Modernity positioned human subjectivity and the ideal of being a citizen of this world in the center – in secular philosophical and political terms. Accordingly, treatment of the ideal of the sport again changed dramatically. In modernity, sport as an experience of the body, the soul and the spirit was conceived as containing potential joy, solidarity and 'healthy' love. As such it reflected and contributed to the historical loss of ground by the Church in terms of its spiritual capital and its relevance to daily life, compared with its former hegemony over the interpretation and realization of the worthy way of life towards true love, happiness and transcendence.

Modernity, however, initiated a dynamic that ultimately challenged its own foundations and telos. On many fronts of the innovations, such as capitalism, in individualistic-oriented humanistic education, criticism and sports, it deconstructed not only the dogmatic institutionalization of spirit but exiled Spirit itself. It dissolved not only the possibilities of the kind of transcendence it wanted to overcome: it eliminated the very quest for transcendence and the possibilities for overcoming mere thingness and pleasurable meaninglessness as a human 'home'. This fate did not spare the transcendental dimension of sport itself; a dimension which was part and parcel of the ideal of sport in the classical era, during the middle ages, and in the renaissance, preceding its transformation into 'sport' and before its gaining popular fame; before arresting the creative and solidarian potentials of sport as Love of Life and as a unification of improvisation and training, self-constitution and attunement to the richness of the cosmos, of the body and spirit, of the unification of aesthetic form, the roots of natural life strivings, moral imperatives and cultural standards. But even if the birth of 'sport' signifies the exile of the edifying idea of sport, its end does not end its existence and does not terminate its immanent self-negation.

The ideal of sport, which is centered in modern sport as an important human involvement, values highly its psychic and even spiritual aspects, and certainly is not content with its physical manifestations. As such it still realizes a quest for transcendence. But in modernity the soul, the *anima*, inherits the former preeminence of the Spirit. The telos of progress which is cherished by modernity is no longer conditioned or sanctioned in or by obedience to the gods or love of God, but rather in seriousness towards the ideal of healthy humanity and the love of human life and its telos in this world. The glory of humanity in this world as its 'home' is conceived here as a value and humanity as a reality in the light of which sports education in its broader sense is undecided between emphasizing physical fitness in its popular contexts and the devotion to education towards success in competitive sports and its consumption, which fertilizes 'stars' as a commodity, displayed by sportsmen, media heroes, businessmen and politicians.

Modernity spreads the ideal of sport with great generosity across all fields of the public arena as a relevant guide for a model-behavior, and its educational functioning is similar to that of the knight and the monk in the middle ages. It was accepted in many abundant ways in modern realities of public life as a relevant manifestation of the good conduct, or *arete*. An expression such as in this manner be a sport, still contains the commitment to overcome instrumentalism or egoism and mere purposeness. And as such it retains a relation to high-flying or self-overcoming, which a modern human

should realize. 'Be a gentleman!' or 'Be a sport!' further develops and cherishes its roots in the classic ideal of human elevation as manifested in the Socratic concept of *arete* or Machiavelli's concept of *virtu*. It departs from the Christian ideal of *imitatio Christi* and the chivalrous ideal of total commitment to honor and justice by emphasizing, instead, human solidarity and love of life as a realization of absolute love overcoming the displays of the Pleasure Principle. This historical shift reflects the modern centrality of the anti-Diasporic humanistic-oriented ideal of universal emancipation. This project is anchored in the concept of 'the human spirit', as manifested in the Olympic Games. Here, people from as many as possible different countries, classes, races, sexes and cultures ideally (and at times actually) overcome that which divides them and is unique to them, and reestablish, together, the world as an earthly Garden of Eden. This anti-Diasporic concept of human life, creativity and solidarian self-constitution is realized also in the charter of the Olympic Movement.

The first article in this charter states: 'Olympism is a philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a balanced whole the qualities of body, will and mind. Blending sport with culture and education, Olympism seeks to create a way of life based on the joy of the effort, the educational value of good example and respect for universal fundamental ethical principles'.[1] The second article states: 'The goal of Olympism is to place sport at the service of the harmonious development of man, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity'.[2]

The common essence as exemplified in the modernistic orientation of sport education stems from the notion that humanity has a 'spirit' or manifests a unique 'spirit' or 'essence'. One of its better manifestations is the ideal of sport, along with other displays such as art and science, and sacred rights such as freedom. As one can clearly see in the charter of the Olympic Movement, the philosophical foundation of modern sports education in its broader sense represents the anti-Diasporic nature of Enlightenment. It represents identification with the pre-assumptions of modern science and with a positive Utopia that frames Enlightenment's social philosophy: homocentric-rationalized, Life might and should become a worthy 'home' for the humans. It might and it should realize this telos while overcoming the horizons set by tradition and the abyss, dangers and myths imposed by religious redemptive-Diasporic calls for transcending this world and its pleasures/temptations/pain. Overcoming the monotheistic 'home-returning' project was here of vital importance philosophically. This was so in the sense of establishing universal human reason as an alternative to the omnipotence and infinite goodness and wisdom of God; in the sense of constituting an existential alternative to the love of God as a guiding telos for the human in its way of transcending his or her bodily and earthly needs, aspirations and limitations; and in the sense of overcoming the monotheistic promise of a redemptive relation between the human's exile in this world of flesh, meaninglessness, loneliness, violence, and suffering, and total, universal, as well as individual salvation. This monotheistic

[1,2] 'The Olympic Charter', http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en_report_122.pdf (3.11.2004, p. 10).

tradition offered a Diasporic perspective that made possible education for a redemptive existence within the framework of the 'home-returning' project. By offering the homocentric project Enlightenment was anti-Diasporic and critical in its essence. As such, it offered an alternative, earthly, positive alternative by educating for the humanization of the world and its constitution as a worthy, stable, secured, beautiful, rational, just 'home'. It never challenged the philosophical, existential and political assumptions of 'home', truth or the quest for truth and worthy, aesthetic, life.

The anti-Diasporic philosophical assumptions of modern sport as represented by the Olympic Charter represent its Enlightened commitment to the religion of humanity, as manifested in the positivistic religion of the kind of Saint-Simon or Auguste Comte, Karl Marx and V. I. Lenin, a religion which secularizes and further develops traditional religious myths that Christianity reproduced so successfully until modernity.

As an ideal, sport worked its way even in medieval times. It was accepted after being domesticated and instrumentalized by Christian communities and theologies – as well as other, non-Christian ones. Still, the main trend insisted on emphasizing the dangers immanent in sports education. They did all in their power to expose it as an agent of the body and of the natural life forces, endangering the 'home-returning' project that promised salvation through transcendence by overcoming the natural dimensions of Life and Love of Life. Love of God and edification promised an alternative 'home' to that promised by the ideal of sport, of science and of rationalized, worldly pleasures. The religious relations between being exiled in this world and redemption allowed meaningful Life and love that offered happiness and meaning even in face of pain, aporia and solitude. The monotheistic 'home-returning' project was committed to suppress and overcome these anti-Diasporic dimensions of Life, such as those propagated by the sports ideal: human self-love and earthly ideals, such as freedom, creativity, joyous effort and fairness. Secular ideals, including the ideal of the essence of sport, were rightly conceived by the guardians of Christian dogma or Jewish tradition as a challenge to traditional Godly supremacy and a threat to the 'home-returning' project. Philosophy of sport, from this point of view, constitutes a special kind of negation of the quest for truth and surrendering to true love; and as such, sport is a hindrance to true happiness in humans' realization of their spiritual dimension as it is a specially dangerous form of humans' self-love and domestication in a sinful, spiritless, world.

The sports experience and the earthly joy it offers attain the summit of the human's self-idolization instead of surrendering to the true God. In many respects they are worse even than adultery. The main challenge to the modern ideal of sport, however, did not come from a religious revival. It came from a very different source, and its influence was internalized and realized within sports activity itself. It represented a different source of energy: the quest for domestication of the earth, the body and soul, and even mystery, danger, beauty and the quest for truth. Establishing home-centric Life as a secularized, earthly, Garden of Eden is very different from the 'home-returning' project, which

insisted on transcending the body and mind in the light of love of God and his imperatives. It is, however, closer to this project than to the negative utopia or the anti-monotheistic, 'Gnostic', Diasporic philosophy that overcomes all promises of truth, valid values, moral education, positive creativity and peaceful, comforting, guiding, consensus.

Modern nationalism found rich and diverse ways to secure the surrendering of not only sports activity but even of sports ideals themselves. Here I do not refer mainly to 'political influences on the sportive activity and the Olympic movement', as some do (Winnifrith, 1989, pp. 149–150). I shall bypass central issues such as the politics of sport – for all their importance – and I restrict myself to the representation of the essence of the ideals of sport as part of the modernization process; I shall refer, if only briefly, to nation building, to the culmination of ethnocentric creativity and to the culmination of national militarism. At times as a rival, but normally as a partner to the same process, the logic of capitalism co-opted (NICHES) sports activity. The army, industry, school and the media integrated the sports ideal and activity to ensure that they be incorporated in the national project. Sport became of special importance for strengthening the system and for veiling and internalizing its violences in ever more sophisticated ways, along with chauvinism, local folklore and pride/frustration within the various developments of capitalist glocalization. How does sport function today, as a part of globalizing capitalism?

According to Ulrich Beck,

> the peculiarity of the present, and future, globalization process lies in the empirically ascertainable scale, destiny and stability of regional-global relationship networks and their self-definition through the mass media, as well as of social spaces and the image-flows at a cultural, political, economic and military level . . .What is new is not only the everyday life and interaction across national frontiers, in dense networks with a high degree of mutual dependence and obligation. New too, is the self-perception of this transnationality (in the mass media, consumption or tourism); new is the 'placeless' of community, labor and capital; new are the awareness of global economic dangers and the corresponding areas of action (Beck, 2003, p. 12).

Glocalization is another part of the same development, in which the local identities, folklore, ethnocentrism, traditions, and modes of creativity and self-definition are integrated into the same process. Glocalization manifests more clearly also the loss, the 'must' and the inequalities that are rationalized and imposed by globalization as an unavoidable worldwide restratification. Within this development, sport is presented globally and it is celebrated by universal rules, standards, strivings, and ways of consumption.

At the same time, however, sport as a global commodity is manufactured and consumed locally, serving and representing both ethnocentrism and false universalism in the form of globalization. It is of vital importance for sport's success as a worldwide commodity to function in the service of local passions and as a manifestation of the negation of the otherness of the Other. Without local rivalries, hate and chauvinism, the worldwide reception and production of sport would not have been so successful. The glocalization of the production and consumption of sport makes possible the hidden educational agenda that sport serves so well, namely the successful activating and

veiling of the violences of normalization; of controlling the hegemonic representation and consumption apparatuses, interests, powers and philosophical pre-assumptions of advancing capitalism. As such it strengthens the relevance and the vitality of self-inflicted dehumanization processes, while uniting the powers of the deepest instincts and strivings of the individual with the collective consciousness and standardized behavior: the human becomes part of the local crowed, the lonely consumer with his TV set that is connected to the universal 'we' and to the forgetfulness of his responsibility to constitute his own aims, standards and creativity. He becomes a mere producer-consumer in a world where deconstruction, irrelevance or exile is the faith of modern master signifiers and ideals, on the one hand, and authentic solidarity, creativity and love become coopted and transformed by the system, on the other.

The betrayal of its own Enlightened ideals is not new to sports education. From its very beginning sports activity became – already within the framework of the modern nation-building project, establishing national ethos and constituting effective colonization of the Other – a central element of the effort of the modern system to create, represent and consume the modern body and soul and to create the healthy conquering national 'we'. The development of eugenics, and the wide-scale jailing, castrating, and killing of mentally ill, handicapped and 'just' poor all over the West, not solely in Nazi Germany, at the end of the 19th and in the first half of the 20th century, were part and parcel of the process that facilitated the centrality of domesticated sport in current culture industry. However, sports ideals such as readiness for and joy in prolonged effort, self-overcoming and the quest for a 'record' were not solely important in dramatic collective and sometimes militaristic contexts. They were even more important in forming the capitalistic normality – in its democratic and totalitarian contexts alike.

Within this process, ideals such as fairness, joy and happiness, which are bounded to the modern concept of sporting solidarity, are limited to the borders of the collective. Its vitality is directed to the Other as chauvinism, and to the frustrated, unfulfilled, standardized and normalized self as self-hate and hero worship, being content in drawing one's self in the 'fan', celebrating one's *pater familias*, or 'stars'. Note, however, that these practices dialectically clash with other, humanist-oriented practices that are realized in modern sport. This dialectical praxis reflects the philosophical origins of port.

Modern sports education is founded on a philosophical ground that has been destructed in the post-modern era, by developments that globalizing capitalism and today's sports education manifest in such a dramatic manner. The modern era made possible the relevance of universalist-oriented non-instrumental philosophical categories that were supposed to be realized by sports education, enhancing free play, peaceful competition, equality, fairness and Love of Life, serving no higher values and no ultra-human telos. Even if within the horizons of the politics of sports, this philosophy actually was used as a cover for legitimizing violence and colonization.

At the same time, it is true that sports education in its wider sense actually opened the gates to solidarity among individuals from diverse economic, social, religious and racial backgrounds. Within the framework of modern sport and its educational ideals,

from time to time, men and women devoted to running away from themselves by realizing the modern ideal of sport actually in a mechanical, abstract manner mete as equals. They do so regardless of, and at times in conscious opposition to 'their' asymmetrical backgrounds in terms of ethnicity, nationality, culture, religion, race and gender. This is part of modern Western reality in different respects and levels, both as athletes and as 'fans'.

Nevertheless, in both cases this happened as a fragile, temporary, threatened, manipulated, exceptional moment, only to serve, ultimately, the interests of big business, militarism and the self-disciplined human; the kind of human that will become the agent and the victim of global capitalism which is the supreme articulation of the purpose principle, that can flourish solely on the fertile ground of the human's self-forgetfulness and in her being swallowed by disciplinary powers of activization that pre-set the human's telos in the service of the totality of the aimless immanence. Normally, this quasi-realization of the sports ideal served the competition drive and the violent manifestations of the purpose-principle, namely the negation of the pleasure principle. In the service of this sublimation of the inner violence in the service of greater exterior instrumentalization of life, under the umbrella of modern sports education men and women were driven to ever greater identification with 'their' heroes and ethnocentric-oriented collectives, while being part of a reification process that further de-humanized and strengthened the achievements of other normalizing educational apparatuses. One of them is the promise of empowering marginalized collectives and individuals who have not many other sources for pride, hope, visibility, acknowledgement and empowerment. But at the same time, popular physical education also contributes to modern democratization of the society and has functioned as an important element in the transformation of modern societies and cultures. We may ask, however, what is the role of sport in this process, and where does it lead modern societies before their entrance into the era of globalizing capitalism?

The process of sports serving for the standardization and productivization of modern societies was part of a more general effort of forming the modern human and her strengthening not against but rather for the empowering of manipulating social behaviour in accordance with the needs of instrumental reason, the industrial revolution and the nation state. It made a special contribution to changing military requirements, which emphasised the need for ever more individual innovation, improvisation, enterprise, cooperation and total devotion to 'the aim' pre-set by 'the rules of the game' in all spheres of life. This is because the advancement of modern military techniques could no longer be accomplished by past blind, sheer obedience.

In its explicit and implicit versions, modern sports education was central to both the advancement of industry and the sophistication of national ethnocentrist violences. It was instrumental for developing and empowering character, and skills such as punctuality, productivity, endurance and self-commitment (Horkheimer, 1985, p. 222). It promoted treating not only the natural world and the social sphere but even the inner nature and the otherness of Being as an object of manipulation. Every manifestation of Life, and even the body itself, was consumed in the service of the advancement of

the rationalization and instrumentalization of the world. Vividness itself was called to realise itself in a reductionist manner that demolished its uniqueness and its otherness. Everything was supposed to be reduced to a mere function. Sport was no exception.

At the same time, however, central ideals and values of modern philosophy of sports education, such as freedom and self-edification, were dialectically, even if only potentially, also subversive and oppositional. This is due to their erotic dimension, a potential transcendence and universalism, which being unavoidable was oppositional to the world of facts and the specific manipulations in the historical settings where they were realized.

Even in face of manipulative modern national standardization, and in face of the near omnipotence of the capitalist logic realized in all levels and dimensions of life (and sometime a bitter strife enhances the two), modern philosophy of sports education still maintained its relation with the humanist tradition and the mission of edifying humanity in a solidarian, universalistic manner that dialectically was still connected to the Love of Life, erotic play of the self with nature and with the not-yet-oppressed human potentials; edification of the deepest strivings in their infinite connections to the richness of nature in an ethical yet ecstatic relation to the moment and to the infinity of the Other. In this sense, modern philosophy of sport offers transcendence in – not from – the immanence of Being. It negates in the most concrete manner the pre-assumptions and the ideals of the redemptive Diasporic religious project of 'home-returning' by overcoming nature, body, earthly love and sublunary creative pleasure of the kind offered by modern philosophy of sport.

This is what grounds modern solidarity among people sharing a common sports activity. Their solidarity, ultimately, symbolizes total commitment to this world as a worthy, pleasurable 'home', where play, competition and togetherness de-territorialize human existence into a renewed intimacy with worldly Life, the collective and the consensual dogmas and standards. The walls of this 'home' are ideally not made of bricks, which were made of a violent molding that prevents transcending critique and subversion. The powers of this 'home' ensure the protection and reproduction of the self-evidence as well as the impotence of criticizing the representation apparatuses and the other violences that make possible the borders between 'we' and 'they', good and bad, relevant and irrelevant, true and false (Gur-Ze'ev, 2003a, p. 16). Only after the constitution and the securing of these walls is it possible for these violences to establish the self-evidence and the promise of a humanist-oriented pleasurable, playful and harmonious coexistence of the body and soul in their balanced relations with themselves, with the Other and with the world. This is the modern ideal gate to equality, freedom and solidarity among all humanity. As such, modern sport becomes an important philosophical and existential element for any peace education that takes its mission seriously (Gur-Ze'ev, 2001, pp. 315–336).

Such a practice has specific and concrete existential, philosophical and political manifestations, as one could see in 1936 Berlin Olympic Games on the eve of the Second World War. A humanist philosophy of sports education, with a strong commitment to world peace and anti-ethnocentrism, could not at the same time also work for anti-dogmatism and for subverting human self-forgetfulness. Such an orientation

is a constant threat and a serious challenge both to ethnocentric trends and to the capitalist logic that made modern sport possible from the very beginning. Historically, it turned out that both ethnocentrism and advanced capitalism managed successfully to swallow and control both the subversive potentials and the genuine humanizing aspirations of modern sport.

Historically, it turned out that modern philosophy of sports education found itself powerless or irrelevant in its engagement with these challenges. How are we to explain this impotency in the best case and joining its rival in the worst? Before we try to offer an answer maybe we should ask: Why is it that modern sport did not even come close to the achievements of traditional religion or modern art in terms of resisting the modern world of facts and passions of which it is at the same time a part? Why did sport, along with music, become a modern religion of the masses, a 'home' that offers standardization, domestication and human self-forgetfulness in the level of passions, morality, consciousness, aesthetic, politics and economics in their deepest forms of realization?

Modern philosophy of sports education did not come to grips with the role of sport in modern capitalistic and totalitarian realities. It did not problematize its essence. It did not study the relations between sport and time. It did not question the relation between sport and imagination on the one hand and sport and internalized violence on the other. And it certainly did not search for the critical, subvertive and anti-hegemonic transcending dimensions of a sports counter-education or for an alternative to what the West called for so many centuries 'sport'.

Modern sports education forgot its mission to transcend itself and to overcome the world of facts, fears and consensus, and it betrayed the dialectics of its own existence: it did not try to understand that its mission is to offer a kind of sports education that will challenge normalizing physical education on the one hand and education for competitive (individual and collective) sport and its representation, distribution and consumption on the other. It did not meet the historic expectation/possibility of modernity: to offer humanity a kind of education that will contain more than sports ideals and practices in the limited sense, but also conceptions and practices of reflection, resistance, creative improvisation and self-discipline, as well as challenging the existing social-cultural context within which sports activity is situated. It did not critically reconstruct the relation between sports activity, the politics of the representation apparatuses and the general historical-social-cultural context. In short, it did not offer sports counter-education.

The political dimension of sport within the framework of a genuine counter-education, however, requires consciousness and praxis which will challenge the hegemonic politics of representation and the power structure that it serves and reflects. What we are faced with here is the need for resistance to sports activity and theorizing sport as an object for manipulation in the service of abandoning eros, creativity and genuine relation to the human depths and the 'exterior' nature and making mere life the aim of Life.

In other words, it means nothing less than a challenge to the abyss that Western thought since Plato, and surely since Descartes, constituted between the human subject and the world of objects, between the body and the mind, between the intellect and the passions, between voice and movement, between praxis and imagination, between the moment and the eternity. Re-establishing a non-naive intimacy to the body and to the cosmos, without being swallowed by it or sinking into nirvana, calls for a Diasporic alternative not solely towards one's self-consciousness and its theories, symbols and forms but towards one's abysses and bodily pre-formulated forms of existence.

Actually, it means a non-instrumental, playful philosophy of holistic life that reconnects humanity to the truths of the Gnosis; an erotic seriousness and creative bodily poiesis turned into intersubjectivity which is in a sense Diasporic in this world: which is in the deepest sense a representation of *the totally other*. And as such, it challenges not only the quest for truth and the values of traditional societies and normalizing education. It also overcomes, in a playful, creative, loving, manner, the modern process of instrumentalization of the relation towards the Other, treating her as something and not as someone.

As such, sports education is so much connected through play and creativity to Love of Life. It is a concrete negative Utopia. Against all the facts of modern reality and the techno-scientific world, in opposition to the self-evidence of reified life and instrumentalized eros, it is committed to offer not only a bodily poetic negation of these facts but also a concrete alternative to the modern transformation of love, imagination, time and pleasure.

As a negative Utopia, it is Messianism without a Messiah. Yet historically, modern sport did not realize its potentials as a negative Utopia and became part and parcel of a modern positive Utopia. It did not respond to the challenge of dialectically realizing a possible erotic, Dionysian, Diasporic, stand towards life as an abyss, as a danger, as a nomadic endless deterritorialization and transformation. The Diasporic philosophy has many negative aspects and realizations, but as a dialectical theory and human existence, it has also 'positive' aspects of which sport, when true to itself, is one of its supreme manifestations. It offers playful, anti-violent competitive edification of body–spirit relations. It signifies refusal to be swallowed by the call for nirvana on the one hand and for the victory of the Same of the given facts, consensus and violent 'victories' of the self-satisfied conqueror on the other. Modern sports education, however, did not insist on its otherness in face of the new forms of standardization and 'spiritualization' which this abandonment facilitated in terms of mythical-rational-fashioned consumption of pleasures in a process within which human relations themselves, not only the cultural representations, are being totally reified. It is a development within which the instrumentalization of knowledge, the reification of human relations and the new forms of consumption of cultural products become essential parts of a process of standardization of life and their return to the continuum of the thingness, of the Same. Why did modern philosophy of sports education fail to be true to its Diasporic mission?

It failed because it cannot be true to itself (regardless of its 'success') unless it becomes philosophically independent and politically antagonistic to its context – alienation that it feared to develop. Surely, it did not develop alienation into a negative Utopia within the framework of counter-education that will offer Diasporic sports counter-education. Its becoming sports counter-education, and developing its moral and political implications, would transform sport on the spot.

Still today, the moment sports education neglects its oppositional politics, it becomes instantly and everywhere overwhelmed by totalitarianism, capitalism and ethnocentric national ideologies. It becomes their loyal servant, even when maintaining a deceitful mirage of political neutrality or internationalism.

Critical thinkers such as Max Horkheimer already noticed the actual role of sports in the middle of the twentieth century (Horkheimer, 1985, pp. 221–234). Its social function is to enhance the de-politicization of the individual in the public sphere; to contribute to the exile of spirit and the possibilities for transcendence; to improve the function of those involved in the production and consumption and to enhance the efficiency, of promised and realized pleasure as a dormitory drug for the populous. A special contribution is here reserved to the media.

The media represent and distribute 'sport' and the promised pleasure arising from this ecstatic orgy. In a certain sense, it is the media that produce or make possible 'sport' as part of the same process that produces the customers and the fashions of the consumption of sport. The media are a vital part of a culture industry that domesticates-infantilizes-amuses its customers/producers and ensures a productive anti-eroticism. This anti-eroticism, which is made possible by the pleasure machine of which modern sport is part, allows a transformation into the essence of Love of Life and into real possibilities for solidarity, joy and a happy attitude to the body, to nature and to creative togetherness that will overcome 'sport'.

It is especially clear in competitive sport and in the education for the unreflective popular consumption of the ideal of mere (pleasurable) life as the aim of life where being drawn in the empty 'I' is enabled. It ensures disregard of the otherness of the Other (Levinas, 1996, p. 9) and blindness to the totally otherness of Life as danger and as a challenge. It enhances the constitution of a post-modern human who is completely drawn into the subjective pleasure of humans deprived of their individuality, which celebrates a false ecstatic catharsis. It sinks into the abstract 'I' that functions as an agent of the 'we'. After being emptied of messianic rhythm, and fully committed to disregard transcendence, the quasi-erotic or fully standardized human is swallowed by the Same; it becomes part of a meaningless continuum. Within this surrender to immanence and abandonment of the transcending utopian axis of Love of Life, the human crumbles into thingness (Levinas, 1987, p. 51). It retreats to become part of the immanence as if the world has became its 'home', not as a retreat to a pre-cultural unity with the cosmos. It is much more a flight into the heart of the 'progress' of the techno-scientific world; a retreat into the psychological, philosophical, cultural and social 'home' that instrumental reason establishes as a sophistication of the anti-human progress of the anti-Diasporic project of

establishing a earthly Garden of Eden. Globalism today is further developing and glorifying this historical project.

In this anti-transcendentalism, sport becomes a form of mere satisfaction of pre-socially organized drives, which are in opposition to the quest for happiness, which traditionally within the framework of Diasporic philosophy were called upon in the light of the absence of truth: an invitation to Love of Life. The logic of capitalism in the age of globalism is committed to anti-Diasporic normalizing education. It realizes its anti-Diasporic commitment in glorifying and enriching the quasi-ecstatic immanence and deconstructing or ridiculing transcendence. And so it works efficiently for the standardization of each and every sports 'experience' as a poiesis – and its function is mere comodified 'experience', favouring 'diversity' and catharsis while exiling the otherness of individuals, things and the not-yet instrumentalized erotic and poetic manifestations of Being.

The sports 'experience' in the form of physical education and as education for the consumption of competitive sport transforms happiness into 'pleasure'. It connects the id with the normalized dimensions of the super-ego. Happiness, play, creativity, improvisation and love are stripped of their otherness, of their subversive, Diasporic, horizons, which allow the call for transcendence; they are repositioned as a recycled part of the immanence of globalizing capitalism and its logic. Eros is repositioned in all its glory in this historical moment – after its domestication, in the service of Thanatus.

Under the rule of the logic of capitalism and the philosophical and existential horizons of the immanence it enforces, Love is replaced by wonder and astonishment; and it is the astonished 'I', not solely her admired 'star', who becomes an object, a mere thing, a sign that functions with no telos, will, or truth in the immanence of the system. As a particle of the abstracted humans who become 'fans' or as a market-made/represented athlete, the 'I' functions as a mere symbol. A symbol, which has been totally comodified. The otherness of the 'I' is forgotten, abandoned or ridiculed in a manner that ensures its insignificance exactly at the moment when it works as a false signifier. The 'I' is constituted and initiated by the representation apparatuses and functions as a reaction. Even in the most intimate experiences she imitates her celebrated public representations. In the absence of the ideal of the autonomous subject, grand individuals are celebrated, however, actualizing the absence of a genuine public sphere is ensured, and anti-Diasporic self-evidence gains the upper hand. How ironic it is that this reality is so close to the Utopia of Gilles Deleuze, who, in the name of nomadism and rhizomatic existence, offers us the telos of an all-becoming. An all-becoming is synonymous with a cosmic perception or with the total disappearance of the subject. Following Mainlaender and the other most radical figures of philosophical pessimism, for him, this is the ultimate aim of all becoming.

The insistence on 'flexibility', 'hybridists', 'nomadism' and endless identities to be purchased, consumed, replaced and recycled celebrates 'the individual free choice' on the ruins of genuine freedom and of the true autonomous human subject. There is no freedom in the immanence or gates to transcendence. Only as such can globalizing

capitalism give life the possibilities of 'authentic experience' for the football fans of Real Madrid; not before extracting each of the individuals from her individuality, from her otherness, from her Diasporic orientation. Today, here, and only here, within this process, there is a kind of nomadism that makes possible hope and emotional compensation for otherwise insignificant, standardized, de-humanized consumers of the sports industry; reified humans who are led to find in their consumption of 'sport' the only or one of the only routs for their true self. This is how normalizing education works. Of special importance here is the process of subjectification (Deleuze, 1995, p. 113). Modern sports industry acts as an apparatus of normalizing education in the sense that it produces the self-evidence as poiesis and facilitates the productivization and standardization of the energies of a false individuality; as part of a development which creates, preserves and enhances collective celebrated self-forgetfulness. Fashions, standards, commodities, producers and consumers are fabricated within the same process and are all levelled down to mere manifestations of the Same.

A vital element of the immanence of the present historical moment is the need for a false, deceiving, impression of a Dionysian outburst, ecstatic creativity and cathartic consumption of cultural products as a purifying excitement. Here, sport plays a special role in the production of this illusion of dynamism within the framework of a totalistic immanence. The sports industry as a vital part of present-day normalizing education contributes to ensuring the success of the present unchallenged negation of Life, the exile of creativity and the subversion of Love. This, in settling for the present order, identifies with the governing facts. In the form of sports fans, humans are willingly being swallowed by the system – taking up a predetermined position in a dynamic, complex field of power relations within which the possibilities of function, reaction, learning and change are pre-set and impose temptations, rewards and sanctions. Within the horizons of global capitalism, it means that the process of subjectification of the subject is actualized by the subject's own becoming a devoted consumer of sports, even if only in a fragmented islet of freedom and joy in front of her TV set, throwing herself into self-forgetfulness; becoming a total consumer, while enjoying freedom of choice, and actualizing herself in realizing her identification with the 'stars' or the 'achievement', or 'beautiful play', even if only for a fraction of a second; imposing a halt on the continuum of routine, oppression and meaninglessness; yet never unconditionally: only as a devoted agent of the same system and as its self-negating, entertained, victim (Postman, 1987).

In advanced capitalist societies, sports education (in its broader sense) offers a seemingly 'different', 'individual' and 'free' attention, listening and gaze; a playful, pleasurable celebration of creativity, pleasure and togetherness are being celebrated. This illusion of the 'free', 'different', 'individual' gaze and listening is also connected to another important illusion: the illusion of a different sphere of events, a freer existence within the present order of things. This illusion, which sport helps to enhance, plays a central role and makes a special contribution to the negation of Love of Life while ensuring the pleasurable, quasi-transcending, forgetfulness of this negation. Here, sport takes part in a comprehensive effort to eradicate and abandon the memory

of Love of Life by enhancing of the devotion to the logic of the present order and empowering the efficiency of the apparatuses which are structurally committed to veil the violences of the hegemonic system. It is done by advancing new forms of collectivism, further developing the subjectification processes and cultivating the pleasures which it offers its victims in ever more direct, sublimated and 'democratic' forms of satisfaction.

Modern sport, at the same time, is obliged to hide its true mission: it hides its role in the modern transformation of Love of Life and exchange of the erotic or religious quest for happiness for the drive for ever more pleasurable standardized satisfaction in the form of a quasi-ecstatic sports violence. Self-forgetfulness plays the part of individual erotic transcendence or of collective catharsis. In other words, its quasi-transcendental and false-edifying dimensions serve to hide its role in deconstructing genuine transcendence and Diasporic religiosity. But what is it that makes sports education (in its broadest sense) philosophically, existentially and politically so relevant and effective? The resemblance to Love of Life. The resemblance of reified joy to happiness. It is exactly the physicality, the immediacy and the 'authenticity' of the enthusiastic sporting experience in all its forms that makes sport so suitable and effective in ensuring the invisibility of the violences of the normality of the present order of things. The quasi-Dionysian energies enhanced by 'sport' and 'the sporting experience' make a most valuable contribution to the forgetting of the exile of Spirit and the invisibility of its forgetting. Each new 'authentic' burst of hysteria contributes substantially to this capitalist-organized perverted catharsis.

As part of modern culture industry, sports education in its broader sense is not centered on schools or sport organizations; nor is it activated by the sportsmen, experts, media stars and so forth. Far more, it is made possible by the cultural logic of capitalism, which makes possible, constitutes and manipulates these 'stars', 'events' and 'experiences' by its control of reality and its representation apparatuses. The logic of present-day capitalism constitutes an implicit, informal, philosophy of sports education, which is in direct conflict with the formal, acknowledged and hallowed ideals and values of modern philosophy of education, as articulated in texts such as the constitutive charter of the Olympic Movement.

Today, it is wrong to separate this informal philosophy of sports education – which is extremely relevant and effective – from the education propagated in the other channels of normalizing education such as MTV, McDonalds, CNN and the Internet.

And yet, within and against these borders, a subversive critical potential is still preserved in the explicit philosophy of sports education. The locus of this subversive and critical potential is the current reality of modern sports organizations. Note that this critical potential of modern philosophy of sports education is immanent in the essence of sport. This is precisely because sport, in its essence, contains self-negation: while part of the given physical, social and cultural reality, it also represents a concrete actualized relation to the promise of emancipation from the given facts; a promise of love of bodily, natural connections to not-yet controlled and manipulated human experiences; a promise of Life as overcoming the present horizons; a promise for joy and

happiness that is simultaneously connected to the spontaneous, improvised and physical – and to the disciplined will, responsibility and creativity. It is so close to the poetic attitude to Life. The human potential for solidarity is here realized within the framework of self-constitution and elevation which unites the body and the soul, the human and the cosmic, the cultural and the natural, the spontaneous and the disciplined self, in a creative synthesis that offers transcendence. This kind of promise for transcendence is modern, enlightened and anti-Diasporic too, in the sense that it offers humanistic horizons within which it is possible to struggle for the constitution of social and cultural life as an earthly Garden of Eden. Here, ultimately, systematic efforts of individuals and collectives are to establish non-mechanistic and non-purely intellectual creation, self-constitution, joy and peaceful intersubjectivity. It is important, however, to note that already here, in this refusal of the 'home-returning' projects, the concept of 'home' and its philosophical pre-assumptions are preserved. For all the importance of critique and social transformation, this project is still connected to the promise of a positive Utopia of peace education, humanist-oriented civil and democratic education and the quest for an alternative to God or universal reason that was deconstructed by late modernity and globalizing capitalism.

In the field of sports, counter-education in the age of global capitalism should proceed from the tradition of critical theory and humanist-oriented sport and peace-education potentials towards Diasporic philosophy as a worthy tradition for today's counter-education. If true to itself, this project cannot but be part of a more general project that challenges the essence and various aspects of normalizing education; an effort that is not to be separated from a concrete action: existential, philosophical and political involvement to change reality. It is a struggle. A struggle that cannot be reduced to challenging the productivity of present representation and reproduction apparatuses.

A Diasporic-oriented counter-education in the field of sports will treat seriously the humanistic transition and the critical potentials of sports education. Special attention will be given here to the edifying elements of critique of the hegemonic sports industry. At the same time, however, the alternative of solidarity, joy and non-instrumental efforts of the body and soul, of the individual and the partners, actualizes the utopian struggle as an opposition to hegemonic standards, ideals and practices. And yet, Diasporic-oriented counter-education in the field of sports cannot be content with such aims and achievements. If true to itself, it should struggle to overcome this positive Utopia of a humanist alternative and offer a serious response to the possibility of a negative Utopia. The Diasporic negative Utopia of sports counter-education has also 'positive' dimensions and it shares humanist-oriented critical sports education. At the same time, however, it negates the optimistic vision of a humanizing sports education within the framework of a positive Utopia of enforcing a worthier sports education.

The Diasporic refusal to see the historical moment and its hegemonic power relations and factual tendencies as a 'home' to be domesticated, or as a deterritorialized 'home' to be inhabited in the light of a worthier positive Utopia, differs substantially from the alternative view of sports education that critical pedagogy might offer us in its best moments. Counter-education, when true to itself, must be Diasporic. This is

because if true to itself, counter-education must challenge any theoretical, ideological, or political 'home', any master signifier, dogma, or ethnocentrism as manifestations of the Same, of the thingness of Being, which human beings are called to guard and transcend (Heidegger, 1962, p. 234). 'Counter-education, in this sense, must be at once Messianic and negative at any cost. This means that it cannot satisfy itself even with identification with the negation of self-evident, with the resistance to the ethnocentrism of the oppressed, and it cannot identify itself with the 'worthier' violences they actualize against their own 'internal' and 'external' Others' (Gur-Ze'ev, 2003b, p. 34).

Diasporic philosophy offers present-day counter-education a radical alternative to hegemonic concepts of Life, transcendence, subjectivity, inter-subjectivity and agency and to praxis. It also offers an alternative view of the relations between nature and culture, mind and body, the individual and the society.

Sports counter-education here should simultaneously offer a dialectical view of transcending the present horizons that are imposed by global capitalism; dialectics here should present radical negation that is not abstract; a negative Utopia that does not abandon Love. As such it is a sign for the possibility of a radical change in relation to the cosmos, to the body and to consciousness as a normalizing 'home'.

The move from abstract, mechanistic and dogmatic 'critique' into Diasporic existence and Diasporic-oriented sports counter-education might become a manifestation of Love of Life; a celebration of the body, of play, of improvisation and a togetherness with the otherness of the Other, while edifying the nomadic way of existence.

Global capitalism is not a mere closure. It does not exhaust itself in fabricating false images of universalism, individualism, improvisation and free choice: it also opens new possibilities for a Diasporic existence that need not become a mere intellectual message. In the form of counter-education, the relevance of today's Diasporic philosophy calls for concrete and specific fields of becoming, of self-constitution, of transcendence and of Love of Life and togetherness. As such, it challenges the traditional, philosophical and existential dichotomy between the subject and the object, the body and the mind, exile and redemption; it challenges also the post-modern 'solution' as manifested in current global capitalism. Sports counter-education might become one of the fields of manifesting Diasporic existence in the most concrete manner. It might offer a creation that is not merely an intellectual project. Nor is it mere bodily experience. It is a creation that does not satisfy itself in an individualized, de-politicized self-edification. A creation that unites body and soul, the individual, the community and the cosmos, the passions and the conscious and that transcends the abyss of subject–object dichotomies without abandoning dialectical thought, imagination and creation. Sports counter-education might signify a possibility for a creation that transcends 'critique' into a rich, nomadic, Diasporic existence. Diasporic existence is not of the kind of the 'home-returning' projects within the monotheistic religions (and secularized political theologies) that promised solutions and salvation. Counter-education here offers an alternative Diasporic philosophy, which opens the gate to a possible alternative existence: Diasporic existence while insisting on utopian negation also rearticulates intimacy between aesthetic, ethic, intellectual and political dimensions of life as a

manifestation of creative Love. Diasporic Love is of the kind Plato refers to in the Symposium:

> On the birthday of Aphrodite there was a feast of the gods . . .When the feast was over, Penia or Poverty, as the manner is on such occasions, came about the doors to beg. Now Plenty, who was the worse for nectar . . . went into the garden of Zeus and fell into a heavy sleep; and Poverty considering her own straitened circumstances, plotted to have a child by him, and accordingly they lay down at his side and conceived love . . . And as his parentage is, so also are his fortunes. In the first place he is always poor, and anything but tender and fair, as the many imagine him; and he is rough and squalid, and has no shoes, nor a house to dwell in; on the bare earth exposed he lies under the open heaven, in the streets, or at the doors of houses, taking his rest; and like his mother he is always in distress. Like his father . . .he is always plotting against the fair and good; he is bold, enterprising, strong, a mighty hunter, always weaving some intrigue or other, keen in the pursuit of wisdom, fertile in resources; a philosopher at all times . . . He is by nature neither mortal nor immortal, but alive and flourishing at one moment when he is in plenty, and dead at another moment, and again alive by reason of his father's nature (Plato, 1927, p. 162).

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CHAPTER 12

TOWARD A CRITIQUE OF PAIDEIA AND HUMANITAS: (MIS)EDUCATION AND THE GLOBAL ECOLOGICAL CRISIS

Richard Kahn

> *Homo sapiens* has been variously described as a symbol-making animal, a tool-making animal, a social animal, a political animal, a rational animal, and a spiritual animal. Each of these characteristics has been identified as the basic element which distinguishes *Homo* from the rest of animal nature and gives him his distinctively human characteristics. It may now be that *Homo* should not only be described biologically as *Homo sapiens* but socially and culturally as *Homo educans*. It may well be that the most apt way to describe the process of man's becoming human is to say that he became a *teaching and learning* animal. – R. Freeman Butts (1973, p. 21)

Can *paideia* further the aims of a radically democratic social project?

This chapter examines the historical relationship between *paideia* as practiced by the ancient Athenians, its extension as Hellenistic *humanitas*, and our current crises of globalization and planetary extinction. The idea that *paideia* is involved in a Western project of 'human' literacy is proposed; and while the idea that it may serve as the foundation for a progressive pedagogy for civil democracy is explored, the development of *paideia* itself is revealed to be problematically complicit with a Western legacy of domination based upon race, class, gender and species. The chapter ends by rejecting naïve proposals of *paideia* that would fail to apprehend the problematic character of *humanitas*, but the idea of an 'ecological paideia' is raised as a question and possibility for future exploration.

It is not unexpected that as people come to imagine a better and more just future, their thoughts tend to turn to the education of the young. For the children, while representing the continuance of the past, also represent the possibility that tradition is not merely static and draconian upon the present, but rather it is dynamic, democratically accessible and interpretable. Therefore, the education of youth often comes to embody the social hope that even the most undeniable of outcomes can be trained for, grasped, re-directed and transformed into something different. It is in this sense, I believe, that the critical educator Paulo Freire spoke of learning as being a process of both *historicity* and *humanization*.

The educational/political concept of *paideia* has played a robust role in the development of Western society, from its birth in Ancient Greece to its most recent invocations

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by American conservatives; and in the sense put forth above, *paideia* can be thought of as the West's ongoing attempt to articulate what it means to be 'civilized' and 'human' (Butts, 1973, p. 86). Emerging at the dawn of democracy in Athens two and a half millennia ago, *paideia* moved education beyond simple military preparation and the construction of an aristocratic class consciousness into its becoming the institution by which a complex of cultural skills and literacies could be learned by the young, in the name of initiating them into that overarching literacy known as 'Western civilization' (ibid., pp. 85–88).

The question is extended, then, as to whether or not radical educators and socio-political theorists can now draw upon the historical underpinnings of *paideia* to provide support for their own future-oriented democratic projects, or if the history of *paideia*, wholly consonant with the history of Western inequality and social domination, is better evoked as a *via negativa* to be criticized and overcome. In other words, now, after three decades of attack into the hegemony that is the theoretical bulwark represented by the phrase 'Western civilization', attacks spearheaded by waves of feminists, post-structuralists, postmodernists and multiculturalists, to name a few, can *paideia* serve any greater purpose than to be the victim of a radical critique and dialectical sublation? One senses that the answer to this question ultimately hinges upon whether or not the assumption is granted that the historical process that has advanced Western civilization – and its educational vehicle: the human subject – from Athens to the present day is evolving due more to a steady stream of slow reform and gradual development or rather is the result of periodic revolutionary disjunctures.

In this chapter, I intend to analyze the problem of *paideia* for a radical democratic future by means of a theoretical lens that conceives of the historical process of civilized human subjectivity as evolving dialectically and as a continuity. By considering *paideia* to be more or less equivalent to the historical process that is Western civilization's attempt to build a literacy of (and for) the 'human', I hope to underscore the productive nature of *paideia* and so, ultimately, define *paideia* as the West's attempt to produce a world that is the proper *oikos* for its vision of the 'human' – that is that it involves the formation of a particular human ecology. Unlike Marx, however, and countering Marxist orthodoxy, I do not assume that human history promises a beneficent end. Therefore, in concluding this chapter, I leave open the possibility that dialectical reform will not be adequate to the task now demanded by radical democratic theory and that the conceptual language of *paideia* – from the concept of the 'human' to 'civil democracy' itself – should be discarded. Of course, the canny reader will recognize that it is the very open-endedness of my analysis (*aporia*) that is perhaps most typical of Socratic thought as presented by Plato. Thus, in as much as this form of thinking is also often hailed within Western civilization as the very height of *paideia*, I aim to position my analysis dialectically between any simple act of affirmation and negation and thereby hope to problematize radical democracy rather than promote any particular prognosis for the same.

The situation at hand: the only way forward is through the past

> Here is a society that manifests the most extraordinary contradictions: a mastery over the forces of nature, surpassing the wildest dreams of antiquity, is accompanied by extreme material insecurity; dire poverty walks hand in hand with the most extravagant living the world has ever known; an abundance of goods of all kinds is coupled with privation, misery, and even starvation; an excess of production is seriously offered as the underlying cause of severe physical suffering . . . great captains of industry close factories without warning and dismiss the workmen by whose labors they have amassed huge fortunes through the years . . . racketeers and gangsters with the connivance of public officials fasten themselves on the channels of trade and exact toll at the end of a gun . . . consumption is subordinated to production and a philosophy of deliberate waste is widely proclaimed as the highest economic wisdom; the science of psychology is employed to fan the flames of desire so that men may be enslaved by their wants and bound to the wheel of production. – George S. Counts (1932, p. 10)

Although it may not appear so from the seats of political, economic and cultural privilege (i.e. the vantage points of the G8 nations and their most-favored allies), the inhabitants of the Earth stand positioned within another great wave of social crisis. As the most powerful countries, under the leadership of the U.S. push for world hegemony, have used the last few decades to penetrate and establish the neo-liberal marketplace of socio-political controls throughout the former Soviet-bloc of nations, Central and South America, and the ever-colonized Africa, unprecedented disparities in wealth and power have been created throughout the world (Kovel, 2002). While the neo-liberal capitalists have benefited greatly from the boom-time policies of such organizations as the World Trade Organization, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, their claims that the culture of 'freedom and democracy' (and the multi-billion dollar loans that insure these values) have enriched the lives of the poorest peoples of the un- and underdeveloped nations has so far amounted to little more than propaganda for a global version of class warfare. In fact, the disparities of wealth (and the cultural fallout from the same) that have been created by the explosive re-organizing of global capital have done much to harm outright the lives that the G8 have claimed to help. What makes this capital disparity a criminal act, beyond its moral failings, is that it has been the direct or indirect catalyst for an untold number of wars amidst programmatically de-stabilized regions, a wealth of global health and environmental catastrophes, as well as a causal agent for mass-induced starvation and its correlate of unimaginable poverty.[1]

Of course, unmentioned in all this is a proper accounting of exactly why the desire exists to have an unimpeded extension of neo-liberal economics into the Third and Fourth Worlds at all, a political reality in which 'friction-free' Bill Gates rubs up against 'the wretched of the Earth'. Again, usually the reasons expressed are altruistic and noble, with the 'higher standard of living' argument, in all its variants, trumpeted by the media and (more so) the politicians. But the hard facts tend

[1] For a short but detailed account of 'globalization' as it is offered here, and its resulting consequences, see Robinson (1996, pp. 13–31).

to tell another tale.[2] In truth, our current Age of Globalization can be seen as the unfolding political extension of capitalism's present imperial strategy of frontier economics, that is, the attempt by powerful elites to exponentially establish ever larger holdings of colonies filled with a bevy of exploitable natural resources, cheap labor and the space with which to house the large amounts of highly problematic industrial waste and related market bi-products that arise out of the process of modern empire (McGinn, 2002, pp. 75–100; Renner, 2002, pp. 149–173). Thus, behind the gracious offer of 'democracy' today often stands little more than the attempt to fleece entire nations of their heritage in the name of staggering profits and a more well-positioned global vantage point for controlling imperially directed colonial activities. For the great majority, then, of those now being welcomed with open arms into their historic destiny of free, democratic capitalism, this is a moment of profound crisis.

But there is reason to believe that the system itself that develops this crisis may also be in grave jeopardy. After a decade of inspired business development, the personnel 'cut backs' reminiscent of the massive 'downsizing' policies of the early and late 1980s have again become the norm. Stock markets are deep in recession and President George W. Bush himself, for months preaching of the economy's 'basic soundness', has recently confirmed that after a host of corporate scandals (e.g. Enron, WorldCom, Arthur-Andersen) and bankruptcies (e.g. U.S. Airways) that the economy 'faces challenges' 'faces challenges' (Holland, 2002). More serious still, it appears that the same practices of resource extraction, mass production and consumption beyond scale, those practices that have led to the bloated excesses typified by the U.S. corporate lifestyle, have managed to begin to extinguish the stocks of natural resources by which the system must run. Additionally, it appears that these resources have been extracted such that their sustainable re-growth has been limited and thus has a situation been created in which transnational capitalism now grows in direct proportion to the amount of future environmental (and hence social) catastrophe it helps to produce (Kovel, 2002, pp. 38–39; The Union of Concerned Scientists 1996, pp. 242-250; Wilson, 2002, pp. 43–78; Raven, 2001, pp. 58–62).

Our time, then, is a period when it is a regular event that concerned governments, NGOs and individuals from nations all over the world gather in cities such as Johannesburg, South Africa to hold World Summits in the attempt to address the global problems and injustices that unfold because of capitalism's pathological relationship to the environment and itself. But as these conventions of experts and leaders convene, so too do the leading business nations of the world continue to congress and plan countervailing agendas accordingly in secret meetings of their own; and while reform-minded observers might point to recent measures passed by the Green-integrated European Union that appear to take seriously otherwise co-opted buzzwords like 'sustainability', sadly, the United States appears set on instituting a rogue economic agenda that balks at

[2] For the calculation that nearly half of the globe (3 billion people) exists on $2/day or less, see World Bank, *World Development Report 1998*, at http://www.worldbank.org/.

any attempt to limit its own 'sustained' growth. So, with the unparalleled leader in capital expenditures refusing production and consumption reforms (regardless of their actual value), a dangerous message is issued throughout the Great-Chain-of-Being-Greedy that the U.S. is bent on interpreting other nation's attempts at sustainable reform as merely a sign of weakness demanding of predation.

I have taken the time to construct and properly contextualize the current global moment as dominated by endless bureaucracies and hierarchies of profit motive because, as we come to consider if there are real alternatives to this system of pathological greed and violence, we must be secure in saying that the present involves just that: *a pathological system that needs replacement in order to ensure planetary survival and flourishing*.[3] With this acknowledged, I would argue, we are then driven towards the necessity of accepting the following three postulates:

1. That the apparent chaos of institutional, neo-liberal globalization practices, much to the contrary, is instead girded by a structural logic that has historically developed capital towards its own reasonable ends
2. That this structure can be (and has been) articulated conceptually as a corresponding ideological framework for present capitalist development and so
3. That if we are to radically challenge the structure and offer a future that is anything more than a potential born of the system's own phantasy, then we must first critically illuminate the theoretical foundations that serve as the conceptual engine for the present capitalist crisis in the world

Now, 90 years have elapsed since George S. Counts critically seized upon an extraordinary set of social problems at work in America's Depression Era, the very same sort of problems that threaten the newly globalized world of today.[4] In his polemic against what he perceived to be the watered-down progressivism of a 'touchy-feely', child-centered psychologism, he asked of his colleagues, dare they offer such pedagogy in response to the social ills brought about by capitalism's own failure to humanely and equitably organize the sustained production of society's basic needs? Sensing that the most well-meaning of progressive educators had fallen victim to promoting an ideology that was ultimately wholly complicit with the sort of monopolistic capitalist life practices evidenced by the 'roaring twenties', Counts forcefully insisted that most educational reformers were better conceived of as reproduction agents for the preservation of status-quo oppression.

Against this, Counts argued, the schools *could play a role* in aspiring towards and helping to produce a just, equitable society – education could help to reformulate a new American *paideia* – if teachers would only grasp social power and then use their new influence to indoctrinate the youth under their command into believing in, 'the

[3] See Douglas Kellner, 'Marcuse, Liberation, and Radical Ecology' available online at http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/essays/marcuseliberationradicalecology.pdf.

[4] Counts is infamous in Education circles as the Progressive-era, Teachers College colleague of John Dewey. For a biographical sketch, see http://www.selu.edu/Academics/Faculty/nadams/educ692/Counts.html.

most humane, the most beautiful, the most majestic civilization ever fashioned by any people' (Counts, 1932, p. 35). Counts's answer, then, to the widespread evils wrought by the capitalism of his day was to mix Karl Marx with Plato and Horace Mann with John Dewey and thereby demand that American educators organize and revolt in the name of the people, become benevolent, socialist-minded philosopher kings and queens and then focus the training of the youth upon the re-invigoration of democratic ideals.

Counts's *Dare the Schools Build a New Social Order?* is a stirring document and it instantly electrified the educational and political debate of its day. Far from ephemeral, it remains a classic text of Educational Foundations courses, and even powerful new politically oriented movements within education, such as Critical Pedagogy, can be seen as the heirs of Counts's radicalism.[5] Yet, it is clear that the problems Counts hoped to combat through the construction of a radical *paideia* have increased exponentially and gone global, whereas radical educators have only lost power in a system in which schooling has become standardized, nationalized and corporatized. As we consider the possibilities of a re-invoking *paideia* for our own radical projects, then, we ought to remember George S. Counts's own words when asked in the 1950s if he might not have written his pamphlet differently. 'I might have placed it more in the context of history', he reflected (Cremin, 1988, p. 189).

A tale of two city-states: Athens and its Hellenistic re-invention, from the cultivation of democratic *paideia* to the *paideia* cult of *humanitas*

> The greatest work of art they [the Greeks] had to create was Man. They were the first to recognize that education means deliberately moulding human character in accordance with an ideal. – Werner Jaeger (1945, pp. xxii)

Although it is unclear whether the concept of *paideia* is useful for revolutionary democratic organization, it cannot be denied that the history of democracy is intimately twined to that of *paideia*. Athens in the fifth century B.C.E. experienced what the historian of education R. Freeman Butts has called a 'fluorescence'. The inheritor of a political situation in which its two chief competitors, Persia and Sparta, respectively, were beaten in war and undermined by slave rebellions, Athens began the steady consolidation of its surrounding territories and so inherited not only a wealth of new economic surplus but also a broad-base of new citizens. Additionally, the anti-oligarchic reforms first undertaken by Solon almost a century earlier, culminating in Cleisthenes's rupturing of the ancient kinship clans through the establishment of territorially based suffrage in 502 B.C.E., combined to define

[5] For a meaningful, recent instance of Countsian language, see Barton (2001, pp. 847–859).

the period of Athenian fluorescence by the energized institutions associated with direct democracy.[6]

It was in this period that Athens, which already had a long history of aristocratic education based in the Homeric courtly ideals of 'the heroic', began to transform education into a form of democratic *paideia*. Cultural influences rained into the newly opened Athenian *polis*, and Athenian society became marked by a period of rapid urbanization and social differentiation. This, combined with the revolutionary new literacies involved in reading and writing arts, meant that Athens in its golden age must have experienced the sort of social upheaval and cultural transition that we today know all too well.[7] To their credit, Athenian citizens recognized the potentials for social transformation wrought by the new literacies, and so, they conceived of a novel vision for education in which students could acquire the skills, values and traits associated with the extension of democracy. Thus, whereas education had been the privilege of a particular class and a training into a specialized culture of militarism and aristocracy, the birth of Athenian *paideia* meant that education became 'broadly civil' – or better 'civilizing' – in the sense that it attempted to form the citizen for a life of full participation in the wide range of activities worthy of the city (Butts, 1973, p. 86).

The result was the mass re-organization of educational activities, their institutionalization, popularization and conscious association with the ideals of democratic culture. Beyond the simple training of the youth into pre-formulated expectations, Athenian *paideia* attempted to integrate Athenian children into the broad ideals held by Athens concerning the harmony of body, mind, spirit and *polis*. The education of the Athenians involved physical, intellectual, aesthetic and military exercises in the hope that when the initiation into these various cultural domains was complete, the Athenians' investment in the education of their youth would be honored by the living example of Athens' democratic legacy at work in a crop of new citizens.

Thus, the florescent period of Athens was a time of great cultural creativity, and this is directly relatable to the rather liberal education of Athens' citizenry into the ideals of Athenian culture. This was, as Werner Jaeger alludes in connecting Athenian *paideia* to the German *Bildung*, a sort of ancient 'cultural studies'. More than a mere training, Athenian *paideia* was a cultivation – an attempt to conflate the philosophy of agriculture that was the genesis of Western civilization proper with a revolutionary social system and to bring it to bear upon itself in the hopes that proper child care would lead, not just to fruit but to cultural flourishing.

In this sense, Athenian *paideia* must be interpreted as not merely the process by which the young were educated but also as the result of that process. It was the Athenian attempt at constructing direct, active political responsibility in the popular

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[6] For a summary of Athenian politics and the difference between political and economic democracy, see Fotopolous (1995).

[7] For the relationship between technology, new forms of literacy and the development of civilization from Ancient Greece onwards, see Havelock (1986); Ong (1982). For the relationship to the current cultural moment, see Kahn and Kellner (2006).

assembly as much as it was the creation of the great works of Greek literature and philosophy. The training provided by the *paedotribes, citharists, grammatists* and civic-minded Sophists each enabled *paideia*, but the result was something synergistic and more than the sum workings of the various educational parts. Just what this 'more' was had to do with the relationship that the Athenians ultimately had to their own freedom and how this freedom itself related back to the system that made it possible. Thus, as represented by Pericles' *Funeral Oration, paideia* was most Athenian when its students culturally expressed the dialectical tension between valuing democratic society, on the one hand, and the goal of that society – the liberal individual – on the other. Democracy, then, was not conceived of as an ideal for which to aspire, but the Athenians could say to one another that political freedom:

> extends also to our ordinary life. There, far from exercising a jealous surveillance over each other, we do not feel called upon to be angry with our neighbour for doing what he likes, or even indulge in those injurious looks which cannot fail to be offensive, although they inflict no positive penalty. But all this ease in our private relations does not make us lawless as citizens (As quoted in Bookchin, 1982, p. 130).

Their *paideia* was democratic in principle, meant to represent neither the community of Athens as a whole, nor its most celebrated individual inhabitants only. Rather, it was always in the relation between the two (i.e. individual–community) that *paideia* could be found – the democratic city-state and the individual bred under the ideal of *autarkeia*, 'individual self-sufficiency graced by an all-roundedness of selfhood . . .' (ibid., p. 131).

However, *paideia* in the manner just put forth lasted little more than a century. Even if, in the attempt to honor the endeavors towards democratic practice that took place during the Athenian fluorescence, we could overlook the wide disparities in economic wealth and human rights that also typified the education of Pericles' Athens (e.g. Athenian philosophy was built on top of a foundation of material slavery and coercion), still, Athenian *paideia* would appear to be little more than the ancient world's version of utopia – ideally beautiful, yet short-lived and programmatically failed.[8]

For as Athenian society achieved ever greater cultural and political success, it turned increasingly mercenary and imperial, social hierarchies re-emerged as predominant and tyrannical power re-consolidated itself. As Athenian *paideia* waned, economic gaps widened between the various social classes and the loose federation of Greek city-states became fractured. The result was that democratic politics became increasingly corrupt and oppressive within Athens proper (Butts, 1973, p. 90). Finally, as the fifth century B.C.E. closed, democracy itself was temporarily overthrown, and although it was then once more to resume for a short time, it never again gathered the public enthusiasm that attended it upon its first germination.

In a sense, Athenian *paideia* can be seen as failing to meet the pressures imposed upon it by its own form of globalization crisis – what is known as the 'Hellenistic dispersal'. As democracy had previously come to replace local oligarchic and monarchic

[8] For an example of overlooking Athenian oppression, see the aristocratic and quasi-fascist celebration given by Werner Jaeger, op. cit., and shamelessly proclaimed on the book's very first pages.

rule, it now found its dialectical continuation in the imperialistic monarchies of Philip of Macedon and his son, Alexander the Great, whose own empire finally stretched from Egypt as far as Asia Minor. Conceptually, this same process was concretized in the philosophy of Aristotle, Plato's student and Alexander's tutor, whose mixture of aristocratic politics, scientific hierarchy, conceptual categorization and encyclopedic breadth mirrored well the turn away from the self-sustained, local *polis* towards the expansive control of a colonizing world empire.

'Hellenizing' the Western world, Alexander brought along with his troops the very Aristotelianism that would promote *paideia* as 'advanced culture', although he failed to correspondingly propagate the previous Athenian emphasis upon democratic process that had given rise to such cultural aspirations. The end result of Alexander's march was a sort of 'cultural revolution' throughout the ancient world, with Greek armies involved in the colonizing and civilizing of barbarous regions – first by arrow or sword, then via *paideia*:

> The most significant characteristic of the Greeks is that no group of them settled anywhere without at once establishing a school, and organized education was the most important single factor in the process of hellenization and also in the resistance to that process (Hadas, 1959, p. 59).

Rather quickly, in response to such policies and practices, the Hellenistic world began to form a far-reaching, civilized network of Greek-speaking, culturally oriented communities. However, the lived ideal of democratic *paideia* was also steadily replaced as a goal during this time. Instead, Alexandrian elites placed an emphasis upon the high-minded imitation of what was taken to be *paideia's* most noble accomplishments: the culture of metaphysical abstraction and the products fashioned by an intellectual and literary sensibility (Butts, 1973, p. 107). Interested far more in achieving the clothing of high-culture, as represented by the classical literature of the past, than in educating citizens for the ethical and moral dynamics of free civic life, the Hellenistic world re-constructed *paideia* so as to meet its own needs – anti-democratic needs that were spiritually transcendent and esthetically focused whereas the Athenian's had been overtly political and community oriented.

A sort of bastardization of Athenian *paideia*, the Hellenistic age went on preserving and stylizing what it took to be the best representations of the past for nearly half of a millennia and there can be little argument that we today continue to live in the Hellenistic image and feel its affects. Again, the immediate effect of the Hellenistic emphasis upon life lived as 'literal homage' was that the Hellenistic world became broadly civilized in Athenian culture, with education centering upon the book learning and print literacy necessary to imbibe classic texts, as elites dominated the new state-controlled institutions of elementary and secondary education. Furthermore, the Hellenistic age also erected vast systems of higher education for the specialized, aristocratic classes – from the plethora of philosophical and rhetorical research centers to the vast libraries and museums of its monarchical cities. But, lost in this immense maze of learned research, educational bureaucracy and institutionalization of the past was the aim of knowledge for any civic or communal

purpose aimed directly at serving the present. Instead, having become an end in itself, the Hellenistic representations of knowledge based upon classical forms played back to a re-formed, powerful aristocratic class its most deeply felt hopes and fears about its own historical worthiness, even as it legitimated the aristocracy's political and economical right to rule (Butts, 1973, p. 113).

We might pause to wonder about the relationship between Athenian *paideia* and its Hellenistic transformation. I am arguing here that while the two educational projects had different cultural means and ends, with the former tending towards democratic civil service and the latter towards imperialism and cosmopolitan culture, they are directly relatable and that Hellenistic tendencies were already at work within Athens. For instance, as we have seen, even as a radical experiment in democratic *paideia* Athens never achieved a truly inclusive democracy, as it rested upon certain foundational oppressions based on slavery, race, class, gender and species. This unresolved hierarchy meant that a tension existed at the very heart of the Athenian attempt at inclusivity; and as a result, a key Athenian theme became *agonism*, with social life characterized by the constants of challenge and contest, symbolizing the very violence at the root of so many Athenians' cultural freedom.

Plato himself penultimately represents the Athenian contradiction that would carry on through his teachings to reproduce itself as the transformed *paideia* of the Hellenistic age. On the one hand, the novelties represented by the Platonic philosophy's universal and normative emphasis could only have arisen with the Athenian golden age. Yet, on the other hand, these same aspects cannot be divorced from the dominant Platonic goal of transcendence over reality (mind over spirit and body), aspects which Friedrich Nietzsche correctly analyzed as a form of will-to-power that sought mastery over that which lay beyond its influence and which nihilistically de-valued that upon which it could legislate. Here then is the very essence of the Hellenistic age at work in the height of Athenian culture; and while Plato's work must certainly be seen as the product of the forces of Athenian democratic education and in a constant tension with the same, Plato also represents Athenian *paideia* seeking to overcome itself, to extend its territory and to abstract from its production certain essences that it could then substantiate as ruling principles (or individuals). There can be no mistake, then, that Athens in its glory was a radical cultural experiment and that, as such, it became the capital of the Ancient world. However, it was from this very process that a philosophy was formed that valued the 'head' (i.e. *caput*) over the body (i.e. *demos*), with important historical consequences.

During the period of the Hellenistic dispersal following the fall of Athenian *paideia*, the period from Alexander through the Roman empire, the civilization's capitals multiplied, cosmological vision transformed and the responsibilities demanded by citizens of themselves towards any notion of set community or democratic practice more or less disintegrated. The ironic result, then, was that as Hellenistic education came to define itself wholly around the intellectual culture of Athens, it mistook the part for the whole and so reproduced a simulated spectacle based upon Classical *paideia* literature wherever it laid claim to being the true heir of the Athenian legacy (Marrou, 1964, pp. 224–225).

This translation of *paideia* into *humanitas*, primarily effected by Cicero during the heights of Roman Hellenism, was initially achieved without losing much of either the spirit of civil-democratic action or the formation of noble character that had been the basis of previous Athenian *paideia*. For in his *De Oratore*, Cicero provided a re-invented version of Athenian progressive education by stressing not only the training of the young in the *artes liberales* but also by urging their immersion into the wide-ranging, humanistic studies (*politor humanitas)* that he deemed necessary for the construction of 'the good life' *and* its cultivated man of public action. *Paideia* as *humanitas*, then, underscored for Cicero that human excellence, as the bearer of the meaning inherent in Western civilization, could only come into being as its students were initiated into the broad learning of the great sciences of the past *and* cultured to apply that learning towards the great problems of the present (Gwynn, 1966, p. 101). Therefore, Cicero articulated for the Hellenistic age both that *paideia* was a sort of literacy into 'becoming human' and that humanity itself was as intimately tied to the heights of learned individualism as it was to the practiced preservation of social harmony and justice.

However, this Ciceronian sense of *humanitas* as construction of the *politicos philosophos* (i.e. philosophic statesman), while representing the possibility of a progressive, utopian *paideia* legacy, was not widely held during Cicero's own time. In fact, Hellenistic *humanitas* became instead a regressive reaction to both the successes and the failings of the Athenian democratic project and, as it proliferated, ironically *humanitas* educated for an entrenched mass-obedience to class notions of philosophic statesmanship more than it promoted this goal as the moral end due every citizen.

Hellenistic *humanitas* came to be a sort of 'cult of politeness' in which one's status, power, and – importantly – humanity were displayed symbolically as one's wit, knowledge and sophisticated manners. Gone was the Ciceronian notion of 'the human' as the bearer of the 'humane' as well as was the dream of civilization as the unfolding of a 'civil' society. In their stead, culture and political life regressed, so that a 'civilized man was one who was conversant with the knowledge of past civilizations, not educated to cope with the deepest crises of his own' (Butts, 1973, pp. 125–126) This occurred even as the idea of what it meant to be human was taken up directly and advanced, with the civilization that was the direct result of this new literacy reproducing itself rapidly throughout the ancient Western world.

Paideia was recently invoked in an American context when the philosopher Mortimer Adler defined it as follows:

> PAIDEIA (py-dee-a) from the Greek *pais, paidos:* the upbringing of the child. (Related to pedagogy and pediatrics.) In an extended sense, the equivalent of the Latin *humanitas* (from which 'the humanities'), signifying the general learning that should be the possession of all human beings (Adler, 1982).[9]

[9] Adler and his group exerted a tremendous influence on American education throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

In the end, we can agree with Adler's insight that connected the Greek practice up with the Latin, although the assertion of equivalence must be denied. He was correct in identifying that both *paideia* and *humanitas* involved liberal forms of knowledge and that this knowledge was directly related to notions of being human – both were interested in establishing a form of human ecology. What Adler crucially failed to realize, and what skewed his own *Paideia Proposal* in unfortunate directions, was that it is not clear that the Athenians and Romans ever meant to confer the status of 'being human' as liberally as their own educational practices demanded. Adler celebrates a vision of universal *humanitas* that is not born out by history. Athenian *paideia*, progressive by comparison, was still in principle an attempt at the liberation of culture from nature, to take that which was deemed best in the world, re-fashion it and inscribe it within the limits of the *demos*. All else was either excluded or made to serve the needs of the democracy. *Humanitas*, as the attempt to fashion yet a second human nature – one that is also identified with deeply problematical images of Classical representation – lost all connections with relevant notions of democracy and became instead a technology of elitism and social exclusion. Therefore, I think we have reason to fear any attempt to transform current educational practices for democracy through the institutionalization of *paideia* as *humanitas*. For it remains to be seen how such a project of 'human civilization' can signify a form of radical inclusivity that could go beyond the historical exclusivity demonstrated by its *paideia* lineage.

A *paideia* for humanity: the history of Western culture as evolved liberation or entrenched oppression?

> As the worldwide ruling class, the transnational bourgeoisie has thrust humanity into a crisis of civilization. Social life under global capitalism is increasingly dehumanizing and devoid of any ethical content. But our crisis is deeper: we face a *species crisis*. Well-known structural contradictions analysed a century ago by Marx, such as over-accumulation, under-consumption, and the tendency towards stagnation, are exacerbated by globalization, as many analysts have pointed out. However, while these 'classic' contradictions cause social crisis and cultural decadence, new contradictions associated with late twentieth century capitalism – namely, the incompatibility of the reproduction of both capital *and* of nature – is leading to an ecological holocaust that threatens the survival of our species and of life itself on our planet. – William I. Robinson (1996)

Edmund O'Sullivan, the former Director of the Transformative Learning Center for the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education at the University of Toronto, has theorized that 'The basic resistance to the negative fall-out of transnational globalization comes from a highly empowered civic culture that operates at the global level' (O'Sullivan, 1999, p. 256). O'Sullivan, as a promoter of what he (following the ecologist/theologian Thomas Berry) calls an 'Ecozoic vision', also believes that

> A major shift took place between the 'pre-modern' and 'modern world' cosmologies that has had profound consequences for our thinking and actions regarding the natural world. I have indicated that the modern scientific tradition depicted nature as a non-living entity to be manipulated, controlled and exploited (ibid., p. 105).

Following David Orr's thoughts about the importance of 'ecological literacy', O'Sullivan conceives of the possibility of a newly re-invigorated ecological *paideia* that is involved in critically educating people for democratic life towards what he postulates will have to be something akin to a planetary Deep Ecology experience of active caring and communion (Orr, 1994).

The vision of an ecological *paideia* is compelling. But, again, in using the language of *paideia*, we must demand that any scheme first demonstrate an understanding of the vast conceptual structure that underlies the dominant cultural history of the present and its relationship to what *paideia* actually has been and now means. For the 'civilization-process', the long history that has led to an extinction crisis through the human domination of the Earth is exactly the process that was first begun in the West as the ancient world's *paideia* and then evolved upon up through the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment and Modern periods as *humanitas*.[10] As nothing less than the history of the formation and representation of the *human species* back unto itself as educative process, any contemporary invocation of *paideia* makes the moral demand of us that we cast our vision back towards the dawn of Western civilization in the genealogical attempt to properly contextualize both the term and the current human dilemma of which it is a part.

I will not explore all of the numerous complexities involved in the assertions that I am making here but my claim is that if we are to properly evaluate and re-fashion an image of humanity that is capable of combating and surviving the global crisis of the present moment, we must understand it as a question that emerges within the ecology that is the domain of 'the human subject'. Furthermore, this subject, I want to say, can be seen as evolving dialectically as the history of the human subject and that a foundational element in this history, as R. Freeman Butts's put it, was when *Homo Sapiens* became *Homo Educans*. This is not to say, a la Marx, that *Homo Oeconomicus*, or any of the other numerous classifications that we can confer upon humanity through the analysis of human history, are merely secondary descriptions and that we can (or should) reduce Western civilization to the primary principle of human education. Rather, following the Frankfurt School (i.e. Adorno and Horkheimer's *Dialectic of Enlightenment* and Marcuse's *One Dimensional Man*) I am suggesting that the various histories of the West's political, economic, intellectual and spiritual development – the story of the development of Western culture conceived broadly – should be thought of as comprising a single, complex human ecology that, in modern times, has been marked by the idea and territory of 'the subject' and the domination of nature proper.

As *paideia* is involved in the process by which 'the subject' has been both formed and evolved, we should be able to connect the findings concerning *paideia* made here to the conclusions drawn by the litany of scholars who have made intensive investigations into and critiques of human subjectivity in the last

[10] For an interesting account of how our 'new globalization process' should better be conceived of as the long, historical civilization process that is bound up with the history of 'white privilege', see Allen (2001, pp. 467–86)

few decades. It is in this sense, then, that I would assert that we can come to a deeper understanding of *paideia's* role in the larger history of oppression – qua human subject – when we recognize that it was constructed (in both its progressive and regressive forms) as a dialectical process that envisioned the human as the opposite of nature. For while Athenian *paideia* progressively inscribed itself within the cultural community that it hoped to serve, it failed to further embed that community within the natural world as a whole. This dualism then became heightened during the Hellenistic age, and it is fair to assert that it has been the dominant socio-political narrative since that sees human history as the emergence of a class of people, previously deemed 'inhuman', who then become conferred as human and so deserving of rights only in so much as there remains a class by which to juxtapose their emancipation.

To reiterate, then, the so-called Eurocentric history of Humanism, the legacy left to us by the Hellenistic interpretations of *paideia* and the institution of *humanitas*, is coincident with the histories of speciesism, classism, sexism and all the other histories of oppression that have led to the current entrenchment of what Riane Eisler has called 'Dominator Hierarchies' (Eisler, 2000, p. 4). Again, this larger history is progressive in as much as it can be seen as forming an ever-larger class of 'subjects' who are granted human rights in return for their obedience to power, but it is always oppressive in as much as it is fueled by the imposition of an under-class that is defined by its continued denial of such rights and by its pronounced exploitation by 'humanity' and 'civilization'.

It is interesting that the concept of *paideia* emerges from an ideology of agriculture, with early meanings of education and cultivation being used equally with regard to the upbringing of plants and animals and to the rearing of human children.[11] Unsurprisingly, then, we can look to these agricultural beginnings for the roots of the human subject as well. Doing so, we find that at the dawn of Western civilization, 'humanity' became envisioned as a sort of transitional being – partaking as much of the earthly nature of the mortal animal as that of the divine nature of the sky. This, then, is the origin for the hierarchy that posits culture over nature, and we can perceive here how a dominant tradition within Western civilization drew upon this hierarchy as it began to construct a human identity around it. Hence, in early agricultural mythic tales and cosmological narratives, like the Sumerian *Epic of Gilgamesh* or the Hebrew *Book of Genesis*, images of the human as that which is divorced from and (at least partly) transcendent to nature, involved in urbanization processes and semi-divine are readily apparent and central to the texts (Mason, 1998, pp. 165–172). Furthermore, as has been widely pointed out in recent years, these tales also foster the initial codifications for the establishment of the patriarchy that would come to pervade Western social life (O'Sullivan, 1999, pp. 134–137). The overall vision of the human handed

[11] See 'paideia' in Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1940) at http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0057%3Aentry% 3D%2376571.

down from the cradle of civilization to the Greeks, then, was that of a dichotomous being, growing ever more uneasy with its own relationship to nature, as it came equally to identify with being molded in the shape of a higher power articulated as culture.

By the time of Athenian *paideia*, the texts of Plato and Aristotle come to represent not only the heights of ancient Greek democratic education processes but also the articulation of important ideological advancements upon the pre-Greek notion of humanity. Plato, as Jaeger notes, directly returned to the idea of 'the divine molding' of persons out of clay when he came to theorize about the proper education of Athenian citizens (Jaeger, 1945, p. xxii). But Plato also went much further, and although Amelie Oksenberg Rorty is correct in pointing out that Plato's conception of *paideia* is ultimately highly complex and evident only throughout the whole of his work, a single instance is enough to allow us to recognize the language of the human subject as Plato came to identify it with a higher power (i.e. Reason) whose nature was to supersede and subdue animal nature (i.e. the desires of the body):

> [The desires] are awakened in sleep when the rest of the soul, the rational, gentle and dominant part, slumbers, but the beastly and savage part, replete with food and wine, gambols and, repelling sleep, endeavors to sally forth and satisfy its own instincts. You are aware that in such case there is nothing it will not venture to undertake as being released from all sense of shame and all reason. It does not shrink from attempting to lie with a mother in fancy or with anyone else, man, god, or brute. It is ready for any foul deed of blood; it abstains from no food, and, in a word, falls short of no extreme of folly and shamelessness (Plato, 1961, Book IX, 571c).[12]

Thus, it was Plato's great invention to take the essence of the ancient cosmological sense of humanity's place in the world as both a demi-god and the fallen steward of that which dies, interiorize it so as to reveal a hierarchy of particular human faculties and then to exteriorize this same hierarchy as a socio-political system. In Plato, then, the dichotomy between human and animal took on a revealing form. For he conscribed early civilization's tripartite division of god/human/animal unto humanity as the hierarchical faculties of intelligence/spirit/passion. Thereby, Plato also made humanity stand in a dialectical relationship to the world in which it was both master and slave and the many are ultimately one.

Aristotle, for his part, underscored the naturalization of the Platonic hierarchy of god/human/animal and used that to articulate a political vision in which the free man, under God, was handed dominion of women, children, slaves, animals and the rest of the natural world (Fouts, 1997, p. 49). Sadly, the naturalized politics of Aristotle has been used repeatedly over the ages to legitimate gender, race, class and species domination because of its evocative reasoning. Based upon either the presence or the lack of what Aristotle found to be the more narrowly conceived cognitive faculties that define humanity, Aristotle delimited a strict dichotomy between master and slave, with highly unfortunate historical consequences for those beings deemed masterable.

[12] On Plato's dialogues and *paideia*, see Oksenberg Rorty (1998, p. 32)

Tellingly, at one point, he equated women with being 'unfinished' men and with being like the soil, a mere body whose purpose is to be the begetter of the creative seed man sows within her. Furthermore, his justification of slavery and of the subjection of animals and other natural resources to the whims of those who rule was based upon a similar logic that perceived all non-human things as partaking of a similar class:

> And it is clear that the rule of the soul over the body, and of the mind and the rational element over the passionate, is natural and expedient; whereas the equality of the two or the rule of the inferior is always hurtful. The same holds good of animals in relation to men; for tame animals have a better nature than wild, and all tame animals are better off when they are ruled by man; for then they are preserved. Again, the male is by nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled; this principle, of necessity, extends to all mankind.
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> Where then there is such a difference as that between soul and body, or between men and animals (as in the case of those whose business is to use their body, and who can do nothing better), the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors that they should be under the rule of a master.[13]

If the natural continuum that made up Aristotle's chain of being were to be conceived of as a sort of graphical plot for the history of human rights, with privileged males to the one side, the natural kingdom to the other, and with the large grey area in between comprises beings ambiguously related to both ruling man and servant animal, we would have a fair estimation of the structural limitations through which the history of progressive Western civilization has unfolded. Ruling men, created in god's image and endowed with reason, come to represent that which is 'human', but they do so only in as much as they are further dis-embedded from their animal nature. Women, slaves, those of other races, all come to spend the next two millennia fighting for the rights due their 'humanity' and for an equal voice in civil society with their fellow male elites. But these various histories – the histories of the struggles of race, class and gender – have achieved liberation only at the expense of the under-class(es) that continue to represent that which distinguishes the non-human from the human. Therefore, while even Aristotle still conceived of the human as both natural and animal, the dichotomy between the human and the non-human has been strengthened and furthered considerably since. Hence, the fundamental hierarchy that defines the historicity of the human subject, already latent in the works of Plato and Aristotle, was voiced and used as a political tool to both oppress and emancipate peoples in the time thereafter.

Again, as this chapter demonstrated earlier, high-minded cultural works such as those of Plato and Aristotle were the epitome of Athenian *paideia*. But it was not until *paideia* became translated into Hellenistic *humanitas* that it came to exert a major force upon the historical development of the West, with the works of both philosophers having a profound impact upon the worldviews of the succeeding ages. Thus, do we have the Hellenistic conceptual influence upon Christianity and

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[13] Aristotle (1943) *Politics*, Book I, Chapter V, trans. Benjamin Jowett. Online at http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.1.one.html.

the Church, with Augustine propounding a typically Platonic/Aristotelian view of divine human nature and of the corrupt nature of the world in which it finds itself chained. This conception would remain the official Church view throughout the Middle Ages, a time when the 'ape' was defined as a failed and degraded human being, with ritual executions of these and other animals occurring alongside the hangings of criminals, Jews and other forces of inhumanity (Morris and Morris, 1966, p. 31).

Finally, in the Age of Renaissance Humanism and its consequent Enlightenment Age of modern reason, while forces began to emerge within Western society that allowed for more people than ever before to rise up and out of the animal world of menial labor and poverty into the civility of membership within the various courts and administrations of the modern state, the dichotomy underlying the 'human subject' between its cultural transcendence and nature only widened. Coeval with the tremendous technological advances and insights that were made during this time, ideologues such as Francis Bacon articulated the binding of nature into humanity's service by placing 'her upon the rack' of learned scientific investigation and making of nature a slave (Spretnak, 1999, p. 54). This, when combined with the philosophical and educational approaches developed by the Hellenistically minded Humanists of the period, helped to give statements such as Alberti's, '*Natura sine disciplina caeca*' (Nature without discipline is blind) a wealth of hidden meaning. Suddenly, the development of individualistic character traits through an educational system based upon the Classical disciplines of knowledge, the resurrection of a cultural movement in which elite learning conveyed important messages about social status, and the inscription of nature within the cult of human achievement (rather than the opposite) all emerged together as a complex nexus of values hailed as an inheritance from the ancient world (Bantock, 1980, pp. 17–47).

Perhaps most exemplary of the Early Modern spirit is the figure of René Descartes, the thinker who not only helped to establish the mathematics behind the new mechanistic worldview that came to be called the Newtonian-Cartesian paradigm, but whose *Cogito ergo sum* became the slogan by which a long *humanitas*-oriented history of the centrality of human knowledge found its apotheosis. For Descartes took the implicit dualism that had haunted the history of the human subject since its first beginnings and made it powerfully explicit. Post-Descartes, humanity, which had always previously existed in a tenuous relationship to the natural world that it inhabited but felt little kinship with, stood wholly separate and demonstrated its liberation from nature through its unending control of the same. Very much true to the roots of Hellenistic *humanitas* established over one-and-a-half millennia earlier, Descartes identified human beings with the thinking world of subjects, superior to and unconcerned with the world inhabited by brute material bodies. Thus, with humans and animals now clearly delineated, and with the split between intelligence (*res cogitans*) and mechanism (*res extensa*) also established, it was simply a matter of logical calculation for Descartes to conclude that animals were unconscious automata and that he could perform vivisections upon them without the use of anesthetic because he could 'Kick

a dog, or vivisect a dog, and it yelped not out of pain but like the spring in a clock being struck' (Fouts, 1997, p. 49).

This period of civilization was also the time in which the West witnessed the rise of a large and powerful middle-class under the unfolding logic of capitalism in what amounted to a second great 'globalization' of colonization and mercantilism throughout the expanding Western world. Interestingly, *paideia* itself was once again invoked as the means by which people might better their station in life, make a 'second nature' of words, image and culture, and refine not only matter but manner (Bantock, 1980, p. 17 and p. 47ff). As such, large systems of higher education and research were established, text production boomed because of the printing press, and the growing largess of newfound wealth because of the exploitation of new lands and an endless series of wars allowed for the construction of a new urban, secular cultural personage, one that was elite and globally sophisticated and yet almost wholly removed from the natural world that remained its ultimate foundation. This, then, was the legacy of the modern extension of *paideia* as *humanitas* as the educational production of the human subject.

Conclusion: American *paideia* as *E Pluribus Unum*, will it be gaia or maya?

Truly, if *humanitas* had been a sort of problematic move away from Athenian *paideia* through its very imitation of the same, a study of the rise of modernity within the West might give cause to believe that a re-assertion of *paideia* in the direction of its origins took place within the American project. Tracing the lines of *humanitas*, the politicos of European nations and their subsequent colonies came ultimately to decide that a democratic revolution in political affairs would need to be accomplished if humanity were ever truly to live up to its conceptual heritage. Thus was Athenian *paideia* again resurrected in eighteenth and nineteenth century America, when statesmen such as Thomas Jefferson and Horace Mann demonstrated that only a state-funded, liberal education, held in common by all, and one in which the virtues and ideals of the new democratic republic could be in-formed and nourished, might possibly allow the American experiment in democracy to outlast the lives of its founders (Cremin, 1980, pp. 136–139).

Yet, with America, the story of *paideia* had come full circle and not necessarily with happy results. For the story of American *paideia*, while celebrated the world over as the establishment of a system of free, democratic public education by which the lower classes of subjection could move freely up the social ladder towards the full rights demanded them as meritorious human subjects, has been revealed to be largely a propaganda line and a structure used to instantiate class distinctions that were favorable to state and economic power.[14] Now, America has become the

[14] Tyack (2000). From http://www.aera.net/pubs/er/arts/29 08/tyack01.htm.

dominant world power, a vanguard of popular and high cultural forms and the self-proclaimed bastion of democratic, human civilization; but America is also the world's foremost polluter, unsustainable producer and consumer of market goods, and the imperial force behind the threat of the complete instrumentalization and extinction of the natural world.

In what sense, then, are we to analyze and make conclusions concerning the potentials left within *paideia*, when it has been the vehicle by which billions of people have become (relative to history) highly literate and immersed in the spoils of human culture, even as it has continued to leave billions beyond the realization of the same?[15] Even if we accept the neo-liberal leadership of the Bush administration at its word and believe that the full extension of American-led, corporate business and education into the 'less cultured' regions of the globe represents a sort of final Alexandrian attempt at mass civilization, how are we to judge the results of this project if it comes at the cost of the irrational devastation of the natural planet?

In his essay 'The Individual and the Great Society', Herbert Marcuse presents a surprising anticipation of the new vision of ecological paideia. Seeking to prevent what he perceived to be an oppressively militaristic mindset behind modern science and technology from dominating contemporary attempts at creating a free, beautiful and humane society, Marcuse's own critical pedagogy called for the re-integration of science with *humanitas* (Marcuse, 2001, pp. 74–76). He hoped thereby to invigorate the humanities with the real world questions that might confront an engaged and widely informed public sphere and to inject the realm of human ethics back into the hegemony represented by the sciences.

Clearly, when we ourselves now ponder the question of *paideia* in the face of our current global military/industrial crisis, Marcuse's thinking must be worthy of re-evaluation and further consideration. However, as I believe that this chapter has shown, Marcuse's own reliance upon *paideia* as *humanitas* is in some respects simplistic and unfortunate. That Marcuse's deep-seated and radical critique is forced, in some sense, to articulate itself around *paideia* and *humanitas* only goes to highlight how difficult it may be to escape the constraints of the past. Like Marcuse, we seek to push beyond the control of the educational forms of empire, but the field is already so well-delineated that even the periphery becomes centrally defined.

The challenge facing the emergence of a free society today is not just how to re-inscribe any multiplicity of (often competing) individual choices within a radically inclusive human ecology of common culture nor is it the challenge of how to equitably confederalize these myriad communities of subcultures into an effective democratic network at the level of a global human emergence. It must be both these things, I believe, but if it is not also (and most importantly) the re-inscription of human culture and community, whether at the level of the individual or the planet, within the larger *oikos* of nature and the cosmos as a whole – if the dichotomy between the human and natural

[15] For an excellent discussion of American *paideia* as it relates to ideas about contemporary multiculturalism and citizenship, see Davis (1998).

kingdom is not overcome – then the great heroic narrative that is the long emergence of a global civilization can be expected to conclude soon under the final trope of tragedy.[16]

In thinking about the rise of human civilization as the development of culture out of nature, and so into something un-natural, Max Weber offered this stark oracle about what he took to be the jailhouse of a world dominated by bureaucratic power structures and the total disenchantment with life they breed:

> No one knows who will live in this cage in the future, or whether at the end of this present development entirely new prophets will arise, or there will be a great rebirth of old ideas and ideals, or if neither, mechanized petrification embellished with a sort of self importance. For the last stage of cultural development, it might well be truly said: Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved (Weber, 1958, p. 182).

As I write this today, highly critical of the de-politicization of culture and the heights of power obtained by those immersed in the full glories of transnational capitalism, I must admit that it is hard for me not to imagine that Weber's prophecy has come true and that we have handed the Garden of Eden over to a nullity.

But I am reminded also of the counsel of Plato, that sage voice that encapsulates certain origins of our problem and whose work, Alfred North Whitehead once remarked, made all of subsequent Western thought into but a series of footnotes. In Plato's Allegory of the Cave, Socrates tells a tale of an underground cavern in which humanity lives in chains, alone, confused, each person endlessly facing a wall upon which images are cast from the light filtering in from behind them. No one so chained has ever been outside, and no one realizes that that which they take for meaningful and real is but merely the play of shadows. Thus, Socrates wonders: What if one person broke free and was led by the light of day out of the cave and into the world? What would this person do upon seeing, not a shadow, but the Sun? What if this person then returned to the cave so as to educate his fellow prisoners, could their reaction be anything more than derisive laughter and scorn? (Plato, Book VII, p. 514, pp. 747–751)

It might be argued that Plato's allegory is none other than a master's vision of *paideia* itself – one embodying the problematic tension involved in maintaining a commitment to the development and liberation of one's peers as one also moves idealistically beyond those peers and is liberated from them in a moment of transcendence. Yet, what is most striking to me about Plato's allegory is not this evocation of the problems of humanization. Rather, it is the manner in which Plato connects the social emancipation from humanity's troubled condition, not with a revolutionary seizure of power and dominion but with the simple ascent into the light of day as brought about by a return into the natural world proper.

Could it be that the long and winding road of Western civilization has been little more than the story of phantoms and chains and that our true revelation lies in a direction wholly other than we have been looking at until now? Those living in the new global cities, the megalopoli that are supposed to represent humanity's crowning

[16] This is the *Epilogue* argument put forth by Tarnas (1991, pp. 415–41)

achievements, can hardly even see the firmament at night anymore. What would the contemporary citizens of these cities think of the madman who returned to tell them not only that he had seen the stars but that he had come from them too? Could this be the moment that serves as the educational foundation for life in a world that includes not only ecological awareness but social justice too? If so, *paideia* may illuminate a future for us yet – a time in which the idea of *cosmos* is returned to the Cosmos, a manner of being in the world such that *being* is not reduced to a cult of manners, and a place in which the great scholars study the giant sequoias as least as much as they pulp them for paper.[17]

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[17] On the movement for ecopedagogy, see Kahn (2004).

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CHAPTER 13

HOPE AND EDUCATION IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION

Olli-Pekka Moisio and Juha Suoranta

> The chance is that, in this period, the historical extremes may meet again: the most advanced consciousness of humanity and its most exploited force. It is nothing but a chance – Herbert Marcuse (2002, p. 257)

In 1954, the magazine *Vogue* published French novelist Jean Giono's short story entitled *The Man Who Planted Hope and Grew Happiness* (Giono, 1993). It was a story about the most unforgettable person Giono could imagine. In our view, this wonderful little *novella,* more than anything, is a story about hope, faith and fortitude and how these are connected to individual human actions that can enter life in the most concrete ways.

The main character of the fictional story, which is also known as *The Man Who Planted Trees,* is a shepherd named Elzéard Bouffier. Bouffier devoted his long life to planting trees in the most remote and poorest part of Provénce in France. The story can be read as a description of both the individual and the social outcomes of learning. It demonstrates how purely individual deeds can have great social consequences. Bouffier's lonely work in planting trees spanned over three decades, and in that time, his fortitude, faith and love made Provénce once again a place worth living in. Thousands of people moved into the region because of Bouffier's unselfish and generous labour. He left his marks on the earth in thousands of trees, which grew to become forests. Without any thought of reward, he brought – quite literally – life back to the previously deserted region.

Furthermore, the story reminds us that learning has always its individual side, too. From his long day's work, Bouffier learned the individual wisdom of silence. In the first years, he occasionally chatted with strangers, but, eventually, as the years went by, he learned the secret of silence. Words lost their meaning for him. They did not capture the essential. They were useless and less important than the remorse earth he was trying to make fertile through his hard labour. Giono's story finishes with the following words:

> When I consider that a single man, relying only on his own simple physical and moral resources, was able to transform a desert into this land of Canaan, I am convinced that despite everything, the human condition is truly admirable. But when I take into account the constancy, the greatness of soul, and the selfless dedication that was needed to bring

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> about this transformation, I am filled with an immense respect for this old, uncultured peasant who knew how to bring about a work worthy of God.

The philosopher Franz Rosenzweig has articulated this active and admirable side of silence. In his words, silence is 'unlike the muteness [*Stummheit*] of the protocosmos [*Vorwelt*], which had no words yet' (Rosenzweig, 1985, p. 295). It is 'a silence which no longer has any need of the word' (ibid., p. 295). This kind of silence is the silence of the complete understanding, the situation where only one glance says everything. The dignity of silence has been also the interest of Martin Heidegger (1962, p. 318), when he writes that 'the tendency of the call [. . .] calls Dasein forth (and forward) into its own most possibilities [. . .] The call dispenses with any kind of utterance. It does not put itself into words at all; yet it remains nothing less than obscure and indefinite'. In a sense, this road from words to the glance is not some substitute for the linguistic communication but says something more than words could ever say. With the blink of an eye, the glance surpasses language, and yet at the same time, it is 'the other which constitutes language because comprehension depends on the sharing of language' (Düttman, 2000, p. 25).

In Giono's story, this glance was articulated in the scene where Bouffier and Giono were walking in the young forest that Bouffier had planted. The sight of one person's work struck Giono

> speechless and, as he didn't speak himself, we passed the whole day in silence, walking through his forest. It was in three sections, eleven kilometers long overall and, at its widest point, three kilometers wide. When I considered that this had all sprung from the hands and from the soul of this one man – without technical aids – it struck me that men could be as effective as God in domains other than destruction.

The character that Giono created shows that the possibility of hope and education can be connected not only to the virtue of silence but also to the actions and thoughts of one individual. One lonely act carried out in silence and isolation can in some paradoxical sense become universal. But the ever-enduring problem will be how we can reach each other. What are the limits of each individual and their lives? Are words enough, or do we also need small acts of silence? In this way, if we want to change the world, we first need to change ourselves, and then perhaps the people, through their own actions, can make the change. In this regard, Karl Marx's words from his 'Ad Feuerbach' are worth quoting:

> The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of changed circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that the educator must himself be educated. Hence this doctrine is bound to divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society. The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change [*Selbstveränderung*] can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice (Marx, 1845, p. 4).

But at the same time, this intertwining of hope and an individual's lonely actions signals the hidden pessimistic conclusion. As individuals are always and already socialized by the given era, and the prospects for fundamental changes in the 'social mentality' are always slow to catch on, the question we wish to address in the present

article is whether hope is possible in the desperate era of globalization. In making our response, first we give an overall view of various definitions of 'globalization' and then investigate the conditions of the present times and the paradoxes of learning by using Erich Fromm's concept of hope.

But we would also have to ask whether this hope is more often connected to impatience and a wish for the quick improvement of the situation than to any sober critical attitude towards the world as it is given to us. In raising this question, however, we do not want to imply that this impatience is not justified, especially if we think, for instance, of all the hardships that teachers face when working with children and adults alike. What we want to argue is simply this: although hope is an active state of doing things, it is not merely a matter of wanting this or that at a given moment. Instead, it is connected to the theoretically articulated diagnosis of the time we are living in, and in this sense, it is part of the virtues of patience and tolerance (see Moisio and Suoranta, 2006).

What is globalization?

The era of globalization has meant dramatic cultural, economic, social and educational changes and distinctions. The effect of these on people has depended largely on where in the world a person is located. We cannot sufficiently stress the fact that people are growing up in economically, culturally and socially different and differently timed worlds.

As Douglas Kellner (2000, p. 305) states, before the era of globalization, culture was a 'particularizing, localizing force that distinguished societies and people from each other. Culture provided forms of local identities, practices, and modes of everyday life that could serve as a bulwark against the invasion of ideas, identities, and forms of life extraneous to the specific local region in question'. Nowadays, however, the status and meaning of culture has changed: it 'is an especially complex and contested terrain today as global cultures permeate local ones and new configurations emerge that synthesize both poles, providing contradictory forces of colonization *and* resistance, global homogenization *and* new local hybrid forms and identities' (italics in original, ibid., p. 305).

But what is actually meant by globalization? The concept itself should be questioned and deconstructed because it is much too easy to claim that, in contrast to this immense variety of living environments, there would exist a grand narrative of globalization: an unprecedented and unifying educational power, which challenges and surpasses such traditional forms of socialization as the family and the school. Is there such a dramatic phenomenon? Or is it, as Kellner (ibid., p. 301) has observed, that the concept of globalization is often used 'as a cover concept for a heterogeneity of processes that need to be spelled out and articulated. The term is neither innocent nor neutral in many of its uses, and often serves to replace older critical discourses like "imperialism".' In the same tone, Peter McLaren and Ramin Farahmandpur (2005, p. 39) have stated that 'the concept of globalization has effectively replaced the

term "imperialism" in the lexicon of privileged class for the purpose of exaggerating the global character of capitalism – as an all-encompassing and indefatigable power that apparently no nation-state has the means to resists or oppose'. Instead of globalization as a sort of totalizing concept, in their lexicon of critical revolutionary pedagogy, McLaren and Farahmandpur prefer to use such terms as 'capitalist globalization' or 'globalization of capital'.

Various different names has been given to this new and unprecedented complex cultural–political situation, where people are forced to struggle for their lives, their living conditions and their identities. Some have called it the information or informational age, others have termed it techno-culture (Robins and Webster, 1999), techno-capitalism or global media culture, referring to the dialectic process in which the global and the local exist as 'combined and mutually implicating principles' (Beck, 2002, p. 17). A number of other labels, such as post-industrial, virtual or cybersociety, are also in use (see Hand and Sandywell, 2002), but the notion behind these descriptions is that across the globe media, information and communication technologies (ICTs) and capital economic relations form a 'captive triangle' that plays a central role in people's lives, as well as in society at large.

The first assumption behind these terms is that the 'captive triangle' is causing a rapid transformation in all aspects of life. The second is that the triangle functions to unify and standardize culture. Manuel Castells has analysed some of the demands that have characterized the transformation from the industrial to the informational era:

> The needs of the economy for management flexibility and for the globalization of capital, production, and trade; the demands of society in which the values of individual freedom and open communication became paramount; and the extraordinary advances in computing and telecommunications made possible by the micro-electronics revolution (Castells, 2001, p. 2).

What is noteworthy is that the grand narrative of globalization is rarely told from the standpoint of ordinary people. The processes behind globalization and the functions and effects of the captive triangle would deserve a more thorough analysis from the point of the view of people's life-world in different parts of the world, because the critique of the totalizing aspect of globalization must include the fact that the whole discourse of globalization is largely affected by Western values.

Typically, the debate about the meaning of globalization moves between two polarities: utopias and dystopias. Pessimists and cynics, who believe that the core meaning of globalization is one of cultural barbarism, challenge economic determinists and technology enthusiasts, who believe that ICTs will revolutionize every aspect of the world. Somewhere in-between these two polarities are those who collect statistics about the diverse aspects of 'globalization', with little emphasis on ethical or normative matters. Thus, they often forget the fact that the very act of statistical calculation is value-laden in itself. Furthermore, the media is keen to inform ztion. Those more or less autonomous researchers who are doing their best to gain a better understanding of the current situation provide another vantage point. Unfortunately, critical and analytical thinkers with the capacity and willingness to put forward ideas that go beyond technological determinism remain few.

Economic and technological determinism foster assumptions about globalization and free trade having the power to overcome the current maladies of the world, including poverty, hunger and deprivation, and the conflicts arising from them. Our own stance in these issues could be described as a critical yet cautiously hopeful and optimistic one. From the people's point of view, the main question is, what are the terms on which global hope can be sustained in the age of technological cynicism and capitalist barbarism? Our approach here emphasizes the dialectical relationship between material reality and cultural terrain. It is at the crossroads of the tangible concreteness of the world and the various cultural discourses, where different meanings of globalization continue to be built and re-built, contested and struggled over within the sphere of a negative dialectic which also contains a glimpse of hope.

Wide ranges of definitions and characterizations have sprung up around global media and information culture. Generally, the concept 'media culture' refers to the socio-cultural condition where most of people's daily perceptions and experiences are indirect and transmitted through various ICTs, whether more traditional (radio, television and newspaper) or relatively new (mobile phone, computer). Some of the definitions emphasize the significance of information and information technology that have emerged around it. Manuel Castells' three-volume *opus magnum, The Information Age* (Castells, 1996–1998), is a paramount example of this emphasis. Castells' account of the network society, the economic and social dynamics of the new informational age, is strongly reminiscent of the analysis once conducted by Marx on the industrial society. The most fundamental difference between the two is that where Marx emphasized industrial labour as the basis for all productivity, Castells stresses the meaning of information and information flows:

> In the industrial mode of development, the main source of productivity lies in the introduction of new energy sources, and in the ability to decentralize the use of energy throughout the production and circulation processes. In the new, informational mode of development the source of productivity lies in the technology of knowledge generation, information processing, and symbol communication (Castells, 1996, p. 17).

In the footsteps of Marshall McLuhan, Castells (2001) has further argued that the Internet is the *message* of our times; that is, the *medium* that forms the fabric of our very lives. For Castells, the network represents the leading idea of our era and functions as a metaphor, extending its influence to various aspects of human activity: 'Core economic, social, political, and cultural activities throughout the planet are being structured by and around the Internet, and other computer networks', he contends (ibid., p. 3) and continues: 'exclusion from these networks is one of the most damaging forms of exclusion in our economy and in our society'. He goes on to compare the meaning of information technology to that of electricity in the industrial era, likening the Internet to the electrical grid or the electric engine: the Internet can distribute the power of information throughout the entire realm of human activity. The central position of information also dictates the type of competencies required from the labour force in the future. Perhaps the most central capabilities are those of learning and re-learning and managing information. Yet, Castells' accounts of the matter are not one dimensional, but do justice to the versatile

and contradictory character of the global media and information culture. For instance, he is well aware of the fact that ICTs can be used both as the accelerator of immaterial flows of value, such as money and free trade, and as the information channel for various social movements and anti-corporate activism.

The crux of Castells' analysis, as well as his conception of the essence of the information society, rests on economic activity. In fact, the term 'information economy' is highly appropriate for the model of society constructed in Castells' theories. More than technological determinism, Castells' thinking seems to be guided and motivated by the ICT imperative. The following quote from Hand and Sandywell illustrates well this type of thinking:

> Where information technologies have been singled out as key causes of progressive change and democratic enlightenment, we not only have an instance of ideological simplification but also an advanced form of technological *fetishism* (Hand and Sandywell, 2002, p. 198).

Where Castells emphasizes access to information as a factor to global and macro-economic success, others (e.g. Kellner, 1995; Webster, 2000; Norris, 2001; May, 2002) highlight the importance of surrounding cultural, political and social factors in the construction of the global media and information culture. In these critical texts, global media culture has often been associated with the substitution of the national by the global: 'The logic of manufacturing is displaced by the logic of information; and the logic of the social is displaced by that of the cultural' (Lash, 2002, p. 26). The sovereignty of nation states – economic, political and cultural relationships between independent states – is being replaced by global flows such as finance, technology, information, communication, images, ideas or people. The logic of manufacturing is giving way to the logic of information. This means that a vast array of products is becoming more informationalized: for instance, toys and mechanical devices such as cameras – not to mention money and 'policing society' – are becoming increasingly digitalized. Moreover, work and production processes are no longer labour intensive, but information, knowledge and design intensive. Furthermore, the social is being displaced by the cultural: where the social constituted action tied to place and tradition, in the world of wired connections, the cultural flows freely as money, ideas and popular images (ibid., p. 26).

In his largely skeptical take on the information society, Christopher May (2002, pp. 12–17) has located four central, yet problematic, claims about current media culture. The first claim is that, above all, the meaning of media culture is that of a social revolution induced by the manifestations of information technology, such as computers, mobile phones and the Internet. As observed by May, such a claim represents technological determinism and forgets that the meaning of technology is not to be found in technology itself but arises from its usage and the cultural–political context. May (2002, p. 14) goes on to contend: 'Once we recognize that there has been a long gestation of the relevant technologies and of their interaction with societies across the globe, then the claims for revolution start to look a little strained'. The second claim foresees a replacement of the rigid social, political and judicial institutions by a new ICT-based economy and 'Californian' ideology. The global development of

'Californization' is about autonomous individuals who communicate with other autonomous individuals with the primary aim of finding new ways to make money. The new economy offers no hope for longstanding or permanent jobs that would create stability and social security in people's lives. In the weightless economy of the future, people in the North work primarily in flexible, part-time, low-pay service-sector jobs, whereas the youth of the South work long hours, with minimal wages and no job security in back-street sweatshops or in fenced-off industrial zones where the workers' performance is strictly monitored by the overseers and where the workers are housed in cramped on-site dormitories.

The third claim suggests that in the pre-Internet world, many writers stressed the significance of expert power afforded by the management, control, ownership and distribution of information. The age of the Internet has witnessed the spread of what one might call a do-it-yourself ideology. Its central assumption is that people automatically mobilize into small and efficient interest groups and social movements and no longer require traditional political parties or social institutions to forward their aims. The final claim argues that nation states are slowly disappearing from the political scene. According to this view, 'The information revolution has undermined the state's ability to control information for its own ends, with fatal consequences for its overall authority' (May, 2002, p. 16). Of course, such a claim is exaggerated, for in many senses, the nation state remains a powerful category in the scene of global politics and there are no signs of its disappearance.

In global-mediated culture, it can be difficult for people to know whose representations are closest to the truth, which representations to believe and whose images matter. This is partly because the emergence of digitalized communication, and the commoditization of culture have significantly altered the conditions of experiencing life and culture. Many people perhaps still feel attached to the romantic image of the old organic communities, where people would converse with each other face-to-face and live in a close-knit local environment. Digital communication, however, is gradually wiping out the romantic image:

> Most of the ways in which we make meanings, most of our communications to other people, are not directly human and expressive, but interactions in one way or another worked through commodities and commodity relations: TV, radio, film, magazines, music, commercial dance, style, fashion, commercial leisure venues. These are major realignments. (Willis, 2000, p. 48.)

The object character of global media culture is visible in many ways. Media culture is produced and reproduced by diverse ICTs. Thus, it would be imperative to update the teaching and training of knowledge and skills central to the agrarian and industrial societies with an education in digital literacy. A similar point is made by Kellner (1998, p. 122), who contends that, in a media culture, it is important to learn multiple ways of interacting with social reality. People must be provided with opportunities to develop skills in multiple literacies, in order for them to be able to better work on their identities, social relationships and communities, and most importantly maintain hope in their lives.

Hope and education

Erich Fromm, famous psychoanalyst and culture critic, made a thorough analysis of the notion of hope. His conception of hope referred to a concrete emotional response that is a fundamental and active dimension of the human way of being in the world. In his book *You Shall be as Gods* (1966), he studied the notion of hope by making what he called 'radical interpretations' of the Old Testament and its traditions, and in his book *Revolution of Hope* (1968), he returned to the analysis of hope from a more radical viewpoint.

Hope is the most fundamental dimension of any human activity – especially education – that is connected to change (see Fromm, 1968), and it almost always has two sides to it: the individual and the social. Individual and social changes are the heart of education, or at least the hope for change. Although education is one of the main vehicles in the socialization [*Vergesellschaftlichung*] process, and it is always connected in some way or other to the maintenance of an established system of prefashioned ways of being and acting in the world, we can still see glimmers of hope for change in the actual educational situation.

Human beings have always longed for something 'totally other', as for instance Max Horkheimer (1970) has shown in his late work. In Fromm's analysis, the Old Testament is one of the major works that is shot through by this longing, but he also sees in the New Testament the same dynamics of longing. Sometimes this longing for change has promoted impatience and wishful thinking, as the hopes were connected to some person or idea, as in the case of false Messiahs (e.g. Sabbatai Zevi). Fromm (1966, pp. 138–146) shows how the Jewish community has never lost its hope for the coming of the Messiah, even though the long list of false messiahs, from the destruction of the Temple to the eighteenth century, shattered their hope and left them in a state of shock and despair. But this shock and despair, he argues, is in fact an integral part of hope.

Fromm (1966, p. 153) argues that rabbinical literature warns again and again 'against trying to "force the Messiah".' Against this kind of attitude, Fromm places a different attitude that is neither impatience nor passive waiting. He called this attitude "dynamic hope". Dynamic hope longs for the salvation to happen right at this very moment and yet is 'ready to accept the fact that salvation may not come in one's own lifetime' (Fromm, 1966, p. 154). Fromm sees a certain danger in this. Hope can deteriorate into passive waiting when the desired goal is moved into the distant future. Hope can lose its force when it is seen not as a tension waiting to be released but as a passive hope, in the sense of infantile waiting for coming improvements. This is why Fromm (1966, p. 154) writes 'when hope loses its immediacy, it tends to become alienated. The future is transformed into a goddess whom I worship, and to whom I submit'.

This paradoxical nature of hope is the reason why we need faith. Faith, in the sense of certainty, is 'based on the inner experience of the goal, even though it has not yet been reached, and no proof exists that it ever will be' Fromm (1966, p. 157). Teachers, educators or persons living in the age of globalization wanting to retain a critical attitude

must have faith and fortitude. They must with all their energy be prepared for the goal of improvement, even though it is only a potentiality. For such a person, 'defeat is no proof invalidating his faith, while victory will always be looked upon with suspicion, since it might turn out to be the mask for defeat' Fromm (1966, p. 157).

Giono's character did not lose his faith, although war, hate, and destruction were raging around him. He worked towards his goal, even though the world was against him and made his life miserable. After Bouffier's death, Giono visited the place and saw the following:

> [Everything] had changed, even the air itself. In place of the dry, brutal gusts that had greeted me long ago, a gentle breeze whispered to me, bearing sweet odors. A sound like that of running water came from the heights above: it was the sound of the wind in the trees. And most astonishing of all, I heard the sound of real water running into a pool. I saw that they had built a fountain, that it was full of water, and what touched me most, that next to it they had planted a lime-tree that must be at least four years old, already grown thick, an incontestable symbol of resurrection.

Although Fromm argued about the dynamic concept of hope, Ernst Bloch wrote of hope in terms of the concept of 'radical optimism'. Hope is for Bloch a subjective–objective feeling that he divides into filled and expectant emotions. He writes in his *Das Prinzip Hoffnung* about 'filled emotions' (such as envy, greed and admiration), which 'are those whose drive-intention is short-term, whose drive-object lies ready, if not in respective individual attainability, then in the already available world' (Bloch, 1995, p. 74). This is in a sense impatient hope, hope that is connected to the given state of affairs. But the critical concept of hope is open to the horizon of time; it has a real living future as the Not-yet. Subjective hope, the hope that is hoping, presupposes an objective correlate that Bloch terms objective hope, that is a hope that is hoped for. This objective hope needs to be found and worked on, so that the true liberation of human beings could materialize. In this sense, hope is a cognitive act that shows the way to 'where' we should go – where something is intended and should be experienced.

Bloch stressed that hope is not a certainty. There is nothing in the world that would guarantee hope. This is why he sees that hope can only be based on a militant optimism, which recognizes the prospect of success but also the prospect of destruction. Moreover, the existence of objective hope does not even guarantee that the real opportunities would ever materialize. Hope is never satisfied when it is in motion towards whatever is hoped for. Hopelessness is written inside the concept of hope, in the fact that what is hoped for is never reached as it is hoped for – it is always in some way or another incomplete. But for Bloch, this is adequate because hope unfolds in the Now, the trend that could lead to the improvement of the conditions of humanity. Hope is all that we are left with. As he writes at the end of the first volume of *Das Prinzip Hoffnung*, 'Mankind and the world carry enough good future; no plan is itself good without this fundamental belief within it' (Bloch, 1995, p. 447).

Hope summons us to our 'own most potentiality-for-Being'. It is a call that touches the limit of language and at the same time has to be articulated in the manner that it is understood. Sometimes, only the gesture is needed, as Rosenzweig believes, but

sometimes it is not enough. In a sense, educational situations are quite literally the places where much of what happens, happens behind the backs of conscious actors. In these situations, one gesture says more than a thousand words could ever articulate. This rational non-rational dimension of education opens up the ideological function of education and also articulates the limits of hope in the concrete educational practices (Moisio, 2005).

Pedagogical Paradox and Hope

Education does not produce solely individuals with certain skills and knowledge but also political subjects. In this way, education is always an ethical activity involving the questions of justice and human rights at both the local and the global levels. Even though it is true that culture arises from the complex interactions of individual human actions, it is very rare for these individual human beings to reach the freedom of action and thought on their own. To be able to be conscious of their activity, the human being needs someone else, the significant Other, who can activate and emancipate them.

Immanuel Kant (1803, pp. 697–699) highlights this idea in his 'Über Pedägogik':

> Man is the only being who needs education. For by education we must understand nurture (the tending and feeding of the child), discipline [*Zucht*], and teaching, together with culture. (. . .) Man can only become man by education. He is merely what education makes of him.[1]

Kant (1803, p. 699) also states that: 'It is noticeable that man is only educated by man – that is, by men who have themselves been educated'. For Kant education is a tool which can be used to realize the potentiality for freedom and the autonomous use of reason in every human being. But because of this, education also includes inevitably compulsion. Kant writes in his 'Über Pädagogik' about discipline, coercion and cultivation. He thinks that these educational tools turn an animal into a man. What he means by this is that a human being does not have instincts that steer the actions of animals, and this is why he needs a faculty for the autonomous use of reason. A human being is not immediately able to use her reason in an autonomous way, and this is why human interaction in a symbolist level should be arranged in such a way that this autonomy could be reached. The pedagogical paradox is thus that we need to be coerced to be free. These ideas also pose a serious and ever-enduring problem for education, which Kant sees but never articulates as a negative effect.

There have been many attempts to try to avoid the pedagogical paradox fundamentally connected to the emergence of self-conscious action. Giroux (1997) sees that one way of arranging the educational situation for the purpose of creating autonomous individuals is to understand educators not as people who discipline children but as 'border intellectuals'. These intellectuals, who resemble Antonio Gramsci's organic and

[1] Translation taken from Kant, 1960, pp. 1–3.

engaged intellectuals, tear down the curtains for new ideas, lifestyles, thoughts and actions to appear. The human capacity for venturing beyond the immediate is highlighted in this idea about border intellectuals. Giroux sees – like, for example, Herbert Marcuse in his more utopian moments – that the realization of autonomous activity is able to free human beings from the tutelage of coercive power structures and thought patterns. But what is particularly interesting here is that this hope for the realization of autonomous activity is in fact internally linked to the pedagogical paradox.

What we have been arguing so far can also be articulated in the language of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic theory is especially helpful in trying to understand the complex development of individual autonomy in the changing contexts of actual educational practices. According to psychoanalytic theory, to become self-conscious and autonomous, an individual needs a community of primary socialization. This community contains a set of shared values that are essential for the development of a self-conscious person. In this respect, we do not find or select values as much as they find us.

Furthermore, when seen from the viewpoint of education, there are three dimensions to autonomy. The first is an organic dimension, which is connected to the developing individual and her internal drive to autonomy. This drive to autonomy can be seen in a compulsive need to produce and, moreover, to solidify the ego. In its early stages, the ego is through mental imagery connected to the maintenance of internal impulses, such as needs and tensions. These images, in turn, are connected to the earlier experiences in which some object or event has relieved the tension. In this vein, Freud (1964, p. 193) once wrote that 'If one has lost a love object, the most obvious reaction is to identify oneself with it, to replace it from within, as it were, by identification'. Freud thus defines identification as the first emotional tie to the object before he finalized its place as a precipitate of abandoned object cathexes (Freud, 1963). The main point in identification is that it is a relationship between a subject and a object, and not a purely internal process, as in introjections. The continuing relationship to the object is thus the distinctive feature of identification. We also need to assume the existence of a rudimentary form of self for the identification to take place.

The second dimension of autonomy is the social context of the developing ego, for it is already in multiple interactions with the surrounding community and its members. Interactions take place in a world full of diverse meanings produced in the sociocultural process of 'structuration' (Giddens, 1984). Structuration is a distinctive form of socialization, which refers to the both learning of rules and norms and structures of behavior and communication (Giddens, 1984, pp. 203–204). In this sense, structuration is an integral and necessary part of becoming an autonomous human being. In the view of Berger and Luckmann (1966), individuals try to be competent members of a given community with the implicit goal of being identified as individuals. This reflects a paradoxical process: to be an autonomous person means internalizing the socio-historic rule structures and through this internalization to be an authentic member of a community. And what is even more striking is that individuals interpret their feelings in a manner prestructured by the community.

Giono's character Bouffier worked and hoped on a local plane. His was the concrete hope, and the fruits of his work were at hand for him. But today, when we are living in a globalized world and the consciousness of our actions should be in a sense global, we are forced to wonder how this locality and globality of hope can be reconciled. Following on from what we have been arguing so far, one may ask: What happens to the idea of individual actions in a world where morality equals individuality? This is a crucial question in a world where individuality is defined by the globalized commodity markets. But can we still hope for the change that is promoted by genuine autonomy? Giono offers an answer, for his story is a marvelous example of the virtues needed in the time of globalization. Bouffier's deeds are an example of a genuine universal act and demonstrate what it means to be a human and to act as human. His lonely, silent work carries in it also a paradox: being universal, the planting of trees can only be exercised in isolation, and from a partisan position. The planting of trees is a universal act in the same sense that various 'globalization discourses' and endless postmodern points of view are particular and often mere nonsense. One could think of, for instance, international summits and meetings on various issues such as globalization and the environment: they are perfect examples of super-sized particular acts with minor effects. In a few words, the planting of trees is a metaphor for educational ethics in the era of globalization.

What can be hoped for in the era of globalization?

Let us conclude by stating a few hopeful yet – as we see them – necessary principles that should be taken into account when planning curricula and teaching in the era of globalization. All the following ideas share the ideas of wholeness and critical reflection as cornerstones of hopeful education in the global world. In connection with these sketch-like proposals, or directions, we need to keep in mind some serious reservations connected to the formation of personality as a constant interaction of society and individual (cf. Moisio, 2004, 2005).

Human beings, especially teacher educators and students, need to recognize their conditioning and their own situatedness in the world. If the world is in constant change, as it is argued to be, it is imperative to begin to know yourself and your neighbors. This strengthening of consciousness is connected to the individual's overall ability for critical reflection. This is what is meant by such concepts as self-reflection and 'autodidaktik'. But as we have seen, self-reflection, 'autodidaktik', critical reflection and so on are part and parcel of the world we are living in, and its system of self-preservation. So, at the same time as we emphasize the idea of critical self-reflection, we have to ask seriously whether it is at all possible to develop as an autonomous person in the conditions of 'liquid modernity', although this would be the most fundamental dimension of critical education.

If we still want to promote critical reflection in a concrete educational world we have to understand that human beings – parents, workers, cultural workers, students,

adult educators and teacher educators – need more time and 'thinking-space'. This clearing of spaces for serious reading and dialog should be done not only inside academia, or unofficially and informally among 'the bright ones', but also in people's life-world, as part of their everyday life. This process might eventually and hopefully promote the development of critical understanding.

If we are to take a further step and try to understand the concrete ways to open up these 'thinking-spaces' as places of hope, we need to understand how professional identities are formed. Students and their teachers need adequate possibilities to choose their own readings and to make their own paths towards becoming critical and engaged intellectuals, as well as professionals with high ethical standards. Educators of all sorts need to have more freedom to teach in accordance with their own interests and to maintain their autonomy to study. This means, for example, that we should get rid of the closed and didactic-oriented (read: cook book-like) teacher education systems, which have traditionally been isolated into separate Faculties of Education. This is often a very concrete problem, which effectively prevents serious co-operation and multi-disciplinary approaches with other fields such as cultural studies, sociology, political sciences and media studies.

Even though it is obvious that this choosing of your own substance is very limited if we look at the curricula issues and the legally sanctioned dimensions of the teaching of professionals (i.e. teachers, doctors, etc.), we think that the broadening of the view of how and what it means to be a professional is something that needs serious discussion. A way to do this is to give students more possibilities to participate in the planning processes of teacher education programs. They also need spaces other than lecture halls and classrooms to practice and use their own distinct voice. This informal learning includes student associations, newspapers, radio stations and various forms of independent media, as well as possibilities for voluntary work. It is obvious that students need a chance to 'go public' to grow up as public and transformative intellectuals with critical and hopeful minds.

Students also need opportunities to be able to call for co-operation and to share their study interests with fellow students and teacher educators. They should be allowed to learn from each other. This requires two things. First, teaching should not be based only on traditional methods, where the teacher teaches and the students are supposed to learn, but rather on dialogue and collaborative learning projects where everyone is allowed to have a word if not an argument. This does not mean that traditional methods should be demolished but simply that within the traditional way of teaching some opportunities for dialog and independent thought should be opened. In addition, we should remember that there are always some issues that touch the borders of the possibility of dialogue. Second, it would be better if the present mosaic structure of the teacher education program (where different subjects, such as math, geography, literature, etc., are taught separately) were changed into broader themes, or at least connected to these themes. This allows – or even forces – teacher educators to co-operate, to think, and to decide what they are doing both individually and together.

And last but not least, we should keep reminding ourselves that education is a deeply political endeavor. Thus, we need to deny capitalist-driven globalization and profit-driven competition as the only options for the world and humanity. Instead, we ought to focus on the needs of the world's population.

> These needs include ensuring that the majority have access to the benefits currently only available to the few; ensuring survival of the planet, ecosystems and humanity; the creation of a society based on co-operation, satisfying need and not profit; the substantial reduction of working hours; overcoming the alienation of people from their work, what is produced, and society as a whole; employing an abundance of products to alleviate poverty and need world-wide; allowing people to fulfill their potential and aspirations; and making health and well-being the single dominant social objective for the global population (Suoranta et al. 2004, pp. 257–258).

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