ETHICS AND EDUCATIONAL POLICY

Edited by
KENNETH A. STRIKE AND KIERAN EGAN

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General editor's note

There is a growing interest in philosophy of education amongst students of philosophy as well as amongst those who are more specifically and practically concerned with educational problems. Philosophers, of course, from the time of Plato onwards, have taken an interest in education and have dealt with education in the context of wider concerns about knowledge and the good life. But it is only quite recently in this country that philosophy of education has come to be conceived of as a specific branch of philosophy like the philosophy of science or political philosophy.

To call philosophy of education a specific branch of philosophy is not, however, to suggest that it is a distinct branch in the sense that it could exist apart from established branches of philosophy such as epistemology, ethics, and philosophy of mind. It would be more appropriate to conceive of it as drawing on established branches of philosophy and bringing them together in ways which are relevant to educational issues. In this respect the analogy with political philosophy would be a good one. Thus, use can often be made of work that already exists in philosophy. In tackling, for instance, issues such as the rights of parents and children, punishment in schools, and the authority of the teacher, it is possible to draw on and develop work already done by philosophers on 'rights', 'punishment', and 'authority'. In other cases, however, no systematic work" exists in the relevant branches of philosophy—e.g. on concepts such as 'education', 'teaching', 'learning', 'indoctrination'. So philosophers of education have had to break new ground—in these cases in the philosophy of mind. Work on educational issues can also bring to life and throw new light on long-standing problems in philosophy. Concentration, for instance, on the particular predicament of children can throw new light on problems of punishment and responsibility. G.E.Moore's old worries about what sorts of things are good in themselves can be brought to life by urgent questions about the justification of the curriculum in schools.

There is a danger in philosophy of education, as in any other applied field, of polarization to one of two extremes. The work could be practically relevant but philosophically feeble; or it could be philosophically sophisticated but remote from practical problems. The aim of the new International Library of the Philosophy of Education is to build up a body of fundamental work in this area which is both practically relevant and philosophically competent. For unless it achieves both types of objective it will fail to satisfy those for whom it is intended and fall short of the conception of philosophy of education which the International Library is meant to embody.

This collection of papers on 'Ethics and Educational Policy' continues the policy of the International Library. It concentrates mainly on topical problems such as liberal education under current conditions, students' rights and compulsory education, autonoray as an educational aim and the 'freedom of free schools', cultural diversity and equality of educational opportunity, and the connection between technology and education values. These are dealt with mainly by well-known figures in American philosophy of education. But the problems are not local ones, which should make the collection of interest to readers on both sides of the Atlantic. It should also contribute to answering the criticism that philosophers of education, because of their interest in concepts, ignore or take for granted major issues of policy.

Introduction

The papers in this book aim to contribute to that still slight body of literature which uses appropriate philosophical skills towards the clarification and resolution of practical educational problems. Such an aim has long been explicit in educational philosophy, but its achievement has been quite rare. The proper balance of focusing on practical educational issues and effectively using philosophical skills has been more difficult to achieve than it seems intuitively it ought. Too frequently either the educational issue has been clear but philosophical tools have been employed inappropriately or incompetently, or methods derived from academic philosophy have so dominated that the educationally crucial, but philosophically inconvenient, core of the issue has been left untouched. If our Scylla is philosophical incompetence, our Charybdis is to be so sucked into philosophical discourse that we lose our educational goal.

Attempts to apply philosophy to educational problems in this century may be described as involving two fairly distinct phases. The distinction is now commonly made between that style which saw philosophy of education as developing a systematic and coherent world-view and deriving from it appropriate recommendations for educational practice, and the more recent application of the tools of modern philosophical analysis to educational concepts.

In the former phase debate occurred between advocates of comprehensive positions wearing labels such as pragmatism, essentialism, transactionalism, idealism, etc. The training of novices involved laying out the constituents and implications of each, especially the educational implications, and leaving the novice more or less free to adhere to the -ism with which he or she had most sympathy. This conception of philosophy of education was susceptible to breaking up on the Scylla of inappropriate or incompetent philosophizing. It involved the largely abandoned conception of philosophy as a kind of superscience, incorporating and integrating all human knowledge. Such philosophers of education aimed to produce, or espouse, a philosophy which provided a grand perspective on education together with an implementing set of prescriptions. Only the very greatest minds could be expected to do this with any measure of coherence and success. For the rest, the gulf between academic philosophy and philosophy of education left them without the intellectual support of a philosophical training and led increasingly to philosophical vacuousness.

While perhaps philosophically weak, this older phase of philosophy of education was in some ways more substantial than what replaced it. It pronounced on problems which people who never darkened the door of a philosophy classroom regarded as problems. It was a respected component of educational policy debates, and as its practitioners were sometimes opinion leaders, it sometimes produced consequences in educational practice. Its major practitioners were occasionally people of some cultural weight, and even if their philosophies and recommendations seem to reduce to something like the assertion: 'Make people like me (without the warts)!', it was worth educators listening because the production of such educated people was clearly a sensible goal.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s the second phase became prominent. This conception of philosophy of education saw its purpose as nearly as possible to that which had come to prevail in academic philosophy—most commonly associated with the emphasis on 'analysis.' Its aim was clarity, its utility was to be precision of discourse, and its focus was on the language of education. Philosophers of education thus began analysing concepts such as knowing, teaching, learning, etc.

This new emphasis seems to have succeeded in improving the quality of scholarship in educational philosophy, but at a price, for it has also reduced its relevance to educational issues of concern to most educators. Clarity is after all a limited virtue. It might be vital to phrasing questions in a manner such that they can be informatively answered, but clarity does not answer substantive questions. Nothing, prescriptively or factually, follows from the meaning of a term. Anyone who derives a fact or norm from the analysis of a concept has made a mistake. Philosophy in this conception is a second order discipline.

The problem with a second order discipline is that for it to influence the world of decision-making, it needs consumers among those who actually make the decisions. One of the results of being sucked into the Charybdis of philosophical analysis has been the steady loss of such consumers for the work of most educational philosophers. Many educational decision-makers simply lacked the skills and concepts to be able to deal with philosophical literature of an analytic kind, and the products of it that they could make sense of did not convince them it was worth their while developing such skills.

This disenchantment has been further exacerbated by the unwillingness of many modern philosophers of education, following academic philosophy, to engage norms or facts. For example, philosophy of this kind might analyse ethical discourse but it cannot tell one how to live. Thus ethics was replaced by meta-ethics and serious political and social philosophy were almost extinguished. Analysis of concepts meant attending to the way a term was employed by the appropriate community. Ordinary usage thus came to dominate the concern of analysts of educational discourse. One result of this has been the avoidance of potentially more fruitful attempts to formulate functional concepts, in favor of examining, criticizing, and censoring those in current use. Ordinary language philosophy can be quite as effective in frustrating the development of a potentially useful technical vocabulary as well as in clarifying language. For example, educators may sensibly be no more concerned with the ordinary use of 'learning' than physicists should be concerned with the ordinary use of 'force.' The dominance of concerns drawn from academic philosophy has generally tended towards educational vacuousness.

We have dwelt on the weaknesses rather than the strengths of these modes of educational philosophy because the weaknesses have combined over the years to deprive educational thinking and decision-making of what should have been its most disciplined and trained contribution. The vacuum has been filled with a slew of mindless faddism. A more effective role for philosophers of education may likely come, not as a result of some new conception of their task, but rather from a synthesis of the strengths of these past modes, and a conscious avoidance of the tendencies that have made them less beneficially effective than they should have been.

These strengths seem to us, in short, a clear focusing on educational issues, an ability to deal with them in a way that makes sense to non-philosophers, and philosophical competence. Other books in this series have contributed towards a synthesis of these

strengths. This collection began very deliberately with the aim to organize a set of philosophically competent papers about significant and practical educational issues. Such an aim is perhaps to be encouraged in the philosophy of education as academic philosophy too seems to be moving towards a conception of itself which is less afraid of norms and facts, and is more willing to investigate and even construct conceptual systems for use in solving problems which go beyond philosophy.

In addition to providing a useful contribution to educators generally, we hope this book will serve to encourage educational philosophers, who are increasingly being trained to philosophical competence, to get their hands dirty with the messy problems that are raised by trying to educate children better. We hope that, increasingly, respectability will be looked for not in aping academic philosophy but by engaging the attention of and influencing educational administrators, teachers, etc. Education is a practical activity and the success of any aspect of the educational enterprise must ultimately be measured in terms of its effect on practice.

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part I
Liberality and the university

1

Ambiguities in liberal education and the problem of its content

R.S.Peters

INTRODUCTION

If one was mounting a defence of certain distinctive values in education nowadays, I doubt whether one would run up the flag of 'liberal education' in order to mark what one stood for. The term itself suggests the sweetness and light of the nineteenth century rather than the 'relevance' and 'validity' of the twentieth. Liberal policies, too, notoriously lack the positive cutting edge of the radical and the defensive solidarity of the conservative. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that the term itself is not particularly in vogue, the ideas behind it are; for contemporary complaint is against constraints of any sort, and the unifying idea behind liberal education is that of the unimpeded and unconstrained development of the mind. The concept, therefore, is of considerable contemporary relevance whatever one says about the phrase.

A more fundamental difficulty about the phrase is its endemic ambiguity. It is endemic because, as I have argued before, (1) 'liberal' functions like 'free' in that it suggests the removal of constraints, and there are different types of constraint. There is also the necessity, if clear communication is thought desirable, of stating precisely what it is of value that is being constrained. There are therefore bound to be ambiguities inherent in demands for liberal education. In a similar way, when people make demands for 'free schools', further questions must be asked about what they think schools are for and whether it is the curriculum, teaching methods, the organization of the school or external pressures on it, which are constraining.

Common to all interpretations of liberal education, however, is the value placed upon knowledge and under-standing. The various constraints are seen as impeding the mind in its quest for it. But it is at this point that ambiguities are most marked; for there is too little clairty about the type of knowledge that is to be sought. Indeed, as I shall argue, this question has been obscured by the tendency to assimilate the position of those acquiring knowledge in schools to that of those advancing knowledge in universities.

1 THREE INTERPRETATIONS OF LIBERAL EDUCATION

The ambiguities of what is meant by a liberal education are embodied in academic folklore by the story of the Oxford scholarship entrant who was asked by a tutor why he wished to come up to Oxford. 'To benefit from a liberal education, sir', he replied. 'And what, pray, is that?' asked the tutor. 'That is what I hope to discover by coming here', replied the aspiring

scholar. If he had obtained a scholarship and had studied the Classics he would soon have gleaned that the notion of a liberal education was introduced by the Greeks. Education was conceived of as a process in which the mind's development towards knowledge and understanding was not to be inhibited by being harnessed to vocational or utilitarian ends. Knowledge must be pursued 'for its own sake', not viewed as instrumental to some other end. This is the first interpretation of liberal education. It was strongly supported by nineteenth century thinkers such as Matthew Arnold and Cardinal Newman in a context of the rapid development of technical training and technology. It is still very influential as a characterization of university education.

The second interpretation of liberal education is a plea against the mind being confined to one discipline or form of understanding. Newman's conception of all-round development was, to a large extent, a reaction against the growing specialization and compartmentalization of knowledge in the nineteenth century. Nowadays, at any rate at the school level, liberal education is more or less identified with this demand for a general education as distinct from a specialized training. This demand is well exemplified in Paul Hirst's conception of a liberal education, which involves initiation into all the distinct forms of knowledge. (2)

A third interpretation of liberal education relates to constrictions on the mind imposed by dogmatic methods of teaching. An obvious example of this is indoctrination, in which a fixed body of beliefs is implanted in a manner which discourages criticism or an exploration of the grounds on which beliefs are based. Authoritarianism is another example; for the reasoning capacity of the individual is stunted by arbitrariness and by appeals to or demonstrations of the status of the teacher.

These three types of demand do not necessarily coincide. Mary Warnock, for instance, is a passionate advocate of studying things for their own sake, which she sees as one of the hallmarks of quality in education. But she is against general education which she regards as counter-productive in the attempt to achieve quality. (3) Catholic educators, following Newman, often favour the all-round development of the mind; but they are not notorious for condemning authoritarian methods of instruction. Some advocates of progressive methods, on the other hand, such as Dewey, do not espouse the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake; rather they see it as subservient to practical problem-solving. It is, of course, merely competing for an honorific title to ask which of these interpretations of liberal education is the real one.

Having distinguished these three interpretations of 'liberal education', I now propose to examine each in turn in more detail in order to make explicit the positive values in each which are thought to be subject to some kind of constraint, and to ask questions about the type of knowledge which the mind should be free to pursue.

2 LIBERAL EDUCATION AS KNOWLEDGE FOR ITS OWN SAKE

The constraints objected to in the first interpretation are those of utility and vocational relevance. Geometry, for instance, was found to be of great use in the development of plans for irrigation; but it was also studied without such constrictions imposed by practical ends. Indeed, on Plato's view, an understanding of its principles was essential for the mind's development, and hence a crucial element in education. The positive idea underlying this classical conception of liberal education was that the highest form of its exercise is in theoretical pursuits. Education was viewed by him as a process which equips and encourages a man to develop into being fully a man by using his reason to the utmost.

In derivations of this conception of liberal education the 'natural' development of mind is contrasted with the pursuit of knowledge for utilitarian or vocational ends by saying that knowledge is pursued 'for its own sake'. This suggests that the reasons for study are immanent in the study itself as distinct from benefits which might accrue from it. These might be stated in a mundane way by saying that the person did it out of curiosity or out of interest, or in a more Platonic way by saying that the person was led by a passion for grasping principles, for finding the forms in the facts. Alternatively a more normative note might be struck by mention of the demand to eliminate error and find out what is true. Finally such study might be represented as a form of mastery, as an enjoyable and challenging type of adventure. All such reasons for pursuing knowledge have the common feature that they are intrinsic to the pursuit of it and hence definitive of the mind's untrammelled development. They are to be contrasted with practical ends which are thought to act as constraints or limitations on the mind's development.

In Greek thought this ideal of pursuing knowledge for its own sake was extolled because practical knowledge was thought to involve mingling with the materials of the earth and thus to debase a man's soul, rendering him 'banautikos'. The type of practical knowledge which was displayed in morals and politics was not debasing in the same way, but it lacked the pure unimpeded features of theoretical knowledge and was thus not so valuable. The 'making' which characterized the fine arts was thought to be inferior for rather different reasons connected with the metaphysical status of its products. The net result was that there has been a continuing and influential tradition which has upheld the training of people in theoretical pursuits as the paradigm of liberal education, with a consequent down-grading of the practical. In universities, for instance, the faculties of medicine, engineering and education, are not held in such esteem as the faculties of arts and science. The reasons for this are complex, but one reason is still that they are closely connected with mundane practical problems.

It is not my intention in this paper to extol the virtues of either theoretical or practical knowledge, still less to discuss the Greek arguments about man's function or essence from which this emphasis on the theoretical stems. Concern with practical ends, however, need not be particularly limiting. Freud's basic concern was to cure his patients, but his speculations about their minds were pretty far-ranging. The solution of educational problems requires excursions into psychology, philosophy and the social sciences in a way which it is very difficult to delimit. Enquiries spring from problems. Some types of practical problems require far-ranging enquiries. Others do not. The same can be said of theoretical problems.

The important difference, I suppose, is that in practical enquiries knowledge is not pursued 'for its own sake'. Interest or curiosity is less likely to draw the medical student to the study of physiology than his consciousness that this type of knowledge is necessary for curing people. It is difficult to see, however, why this makes such enquiries less valuable in the absence of a special ethical theory such as the Greek doctrine of function. For practical ends such as the elimination of suffering and the maintenance of security are surely valuable. Also the obligatory types of value present in theoretical enquiries, the demand that error must be avoided and virtues such as those of consistency, coherence, and clarity which surround this demand, are present in practical enquiries as well. Indeed they have additional point if practical consequences depend in part upon the truth of the

supporting beliefs. Incorrect diagnosis may suggest treatment which leads to the death of a human being. I am not arguing, of course, that the justification of such virtues surrounding the attempt to discover what is true is to be sought in such consequences, only that such consequences give additional point to them. And it is not obvious why this sobering aspect under which such enquiries can be viewed makes them any less valuable than if they are conducted purely out of interest or curiosity.

However, I must stick to my resolution not to enter into the debate about the value of liberal education and to the task of trying to delimit what is included or excluded by this interpretation of it. This is difficult to decide; for the dichotomy between 'knowledge for its own sake' and 'knowledge for practical ends' is too coarse to throw light on the attitude of the learner towards knowledge. Indeed, as I shall argue later, it is really a distinction developed within the context of the advancement of knowledge, which is often transferred to the situation of the learner.

The first difficulty is with 'knowledge for practical ends'. For this description conceals a distinction that it is very important to make when considering the motivational structure of learning in institutions such as schools and universities. A typical example would be a boy at school practising on a lathe or a miller because he wanted to be a toolmaker or a medical student learning anatomy because he wanted to cure people. In both cases the knowledge and skill attained is indispensable to the practical activity, and there might be no further end for the sake of which the activity was practised. The boy might just want to make tools; the student might just be very concerned to relieve suffering. They might be oblivious to any thoughts of pay-off in terms of financial reward, approval, status, etc. On the other hand these further ends might exert a strong appeal and infect their learning and general conduct in their practical activities. They might equally well infect the activity of a scientist engaged on pure research; for he might become 'double-minded' in valuing his reputation as much as or more than the pursuit of truth, and be driven by this narcissistic ambition in his studies.

In learning at school these further ends are extremely important; for the learning situation is very often geared to obtaining rewards, doing better than others, avoiding punishment, winning status and approval, and passing examinations which are often seen as prerequisites to wealth and status. There are two features of such further ends which provide a contrast to the case of the toolmaker interested just in making tools or the medical student with a concern about human suffering. The first is that motives such as greed, envy, fear of disapproval and ambition, supply ends which exert a variable, extrinsic influence on learning activities. A student may cheat to do better than a rival; he may learn just enough to get by if he wishes to avoid the disapproval of the teacher. His care and effort is not determined by the intrinsic nature of the learning task. By contrast, the medical student with a concern about relieving distress, works at tasks which are all determined by their relevance to this end. Ideally he takes care because he cares about the suffering of the patient. In a similar way the toolmaker may be moved by his love of precision, accuracy and neatness which are values instantiated in what he is learning. Thus the motivation to learn is not so dependent on external and variable interpersonal and institutional factors. Second, the knowledge attained in the service of these extrinsic ends is not indispensable to their attainment or in any way constitutive of them. A student can learn geometry to outshine a rival or to please a teacher. But there are other ways of achieving such ends and

his knowledge of geometry is not central to the satisfaction obtained. The marks or the smiles are what matter to him, not the knowledge of Euclid. In the other cases, however, the ends cannot be achieved at all without this knowledge or skill. No one can enjoy making tools unless he has mastered a lathe and miller. Also the exercise of the knowledge or skill concerned is central to the satisfaction obtained. For 'ends' like curing a patient or perfecting a tool are unintelligible without reference to the relevant knowledge and skill.

The distinction between 'knowledge for its own sake' and 'knowledge for practical ends' is too coarse to mark these different ways in which practical ends can be pursued. It is also inadequate; for both theoretical and practical activities can be pursued 'for their own sakes' or they can be infected by the pull of all-pervasive motives such as ambition, envy, and greed. Now many argue that the most corrupting influence in life generally, as well as in learning, is the influence of these very motives. As they are very influential in our school system it could be argued that the dichotomy between 'learning for its own sake' and 'learning for practical ends', which is provided by this interpretation of 'liberal education', is a very unhelpful one because it is too coarse to make this crucial distinction. Indeed, because the further ends that go with ambition, greed, envy, etc., can be thought of as 'practical' in contrast to ends provided in theoretical activities by curiosity, concern for truth, etc., it could be argued that the dichotomy is positively misleading, for it tends to confuse the practical with the purely instrumental.

There is also the point that such 'ends' are often represented in too rationalistic a way. Much learning takes place in situations in which there is an implicit expectation of or association with something that is desired, but in which the learning is not viewed consciously as a means to attaining it. When children copy their elders or pick up their opinions or attitudes, they are not consciously seeking approval or reward. They may admire the person concerned; there may be warmth in the situation which favours attention; they may be afraid of missing something, or of being out of line. But they are not explicitly learning for the sake of such 'practical ends'.

There are inadequacies, then, in one alternative offered by the dichotomy of 'knowledge for its own sake' and 'knowledge for practical ends' when it is applied to the situation of the learner; for 'knowledge for practical ends' has been shown to gloss over crucial distinctions. But there are also inadequacies in the alternative of 'knowledge for its own sake'. This may rule out various motivations to learn; but what does it rule in? Obviously learning from sheer curiosity or learning because of the interest, novelty, or puzzling features of the subject-matter. But are these the only alternatives to learning for the sake of practical ends?

Suppose a man is exercised about why his friend is rude to him, worried about his own prejudices and uncharitable feelings, or concerned about whether he should be patriotic or feel awe for the sea or at the sight of death. Suppose that he is led by such uneasiness into studies in psychology, ethics, politics, and religion. Is he in such cases pursuing knowledge for its own sake? Notions like 'knowledge for its own sake', and curiosity suggest a stance that is too detached and disinterested to do justice to his concern about such questions. On the other hand answering them is not obviously connected with any particular course of action or further end to be achieved. For they are applications of the general beliefs and attitudes which are constitutive of his level of understanding and sensitivity as a human being. What is he to make of objects in the natural world and of phenomena such as the

dark, thunder, the tides, time, and the changes of the seasons? What is he to make of other people and of their reactions to him and to each other? What is he to think about himself and about questions of ownership? What attitude is he to take towards the cycle of birth, marriage and death? In what way is he to react to authority, suffering, and violence? These are questions arising from the general conditions of human life. Answers to them provide a general framework of beliefs and attitudes within which particular ends are sought and particular puzzles arise. Such practical and theoretical pursuits often bring about a transformation within the general framework. But the framework itself cannot be regarded purely as a deposit left by the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake or for the sake of some practical or extrinsic end.

These categories are probably very much the reflection of the situation in civilized societies when special institutions will either be doing this for its own sake or to prepare people for professions or to contribute to the solution of practical problems in the community. They will, therefore, tend to view the situation of people acquiring knowledge when they are being educated as capable of being categorized in the same way as that of those like themselves who are advancing knowledge. They will, therefore, debate about whether students should be encouraged to learn because of the intrinsic interest of the subject, because it will prepare them for a job, or because it will have some other practical use in life. And they will pass on these ways of viewing the acquisition of knowledge to their students from whom teachers are recruited. What will tend to be overlooked is the need to develop beliefs and attitudes which will help a person to make sense of and take up some stance towards the various situations and predicaments that he will inevitably encounter as a human being.

When talking about the educational value of a subject, university teachers such as Mary Warnock (4) stress the enjoyment of working at something for its own sake and the wish to go on with it on one's own. But this, surely, is a delight that can be experienced in a vast range of activities such as cooking, gardening, and carpentry. It is not peculiar to working at subjects such as history or geography. Nor is it possible, as she so rightly points out, for anyone to work in many fields of study in this way which is typical of a person who may go on to discover things for himself. Given, then, that subjects such as these provide all sorts of answers to questions which a man may ask about the world, and human life, how is he to be introduced to this human heritage? Mary Warnock views subjects rather from the point of view of potential research workers; but an equally important educational question is to ask how the products of such work can become significant to the majority of people who are never going to transform such products by their own activity. A person without a consciousness of the historical dimension of current social problems is poorly educated; but does he have to work systematically as a historian to develop such a consciousness? The sort of knowledge that enables a man to understand better the layout of a town, in which he is spending a holiday, to appreciate features of the rocks and rivers, or to speculate about the customs of the local inhabitants, is not the product necessarily of any specialized study on his part in history, geography, or anthropology. But it is very much the hallmark of an educated person. Did he acquire such knowledge for its own sake? Or to accomplish any practical purpose? Parts of it perhaps. But it is just as likely that he picked it up because of his concern to assess the significance of the context in which he has to live his life. Or perhaps he just picked it up from a talkative friend over a pint of beer.

In brief my argument is that there is a body of knowledge, entertained with varying degrees of understanding, that is extremely significant or 'relevant' to a person in so far as it determines his general beliefs, attitudes, and reactions to the general conditions of human life. This is not necessarily acquired for its own sake, as is a field that a person studies in depth out of interest or pure curiosity, or acquired because of its usefulness to particular ends. Liberal education, in the first interpretation, is too often equated with the stance of a scholar pursuing a subject that he loves. There is great value in this type of activity; for it involves not only the joys of mastery and the adventures of discovery, but also intellectual virtues such as clarity, humility, and impartiality of mind. But not all our beliefs are acquired by this sort of activity and many people are not at all drawn to it. They therefore often complain of the irrelevance of learning and are only disposed to apply themselves if they can see the pay-off. Yet if this knowledge and understanding could be presented to them more imaginatively in ways which take much more account of their concerns as human beings, their attitude towards learning might be different.

There is too much of a tendency to regard motivation just as a bundle of interests or needs that the individual brings with him ready made to a learning situation. In truth it is just as much a product of the situation in which he finds himself as something which he brings to it. If an institution is geared towards providing people with levels of qualifications to determine their point of entry to the occupational structure, this is the motivational message which its students will ingest, however hard its teachers work to present learning in a different light. Of course gifted teachers may arouse different attitudes in a few. In others, the desire to pass the required examinations may be reinforced by interests aroused by the subject-matter itself once they start to work. But the majority are likely to remain strangers to such noninstrumental attitudes to learning. They learn, if they do, in the way in which the logic of their institutional situation requires them to learn.

There is a question, though, whether people who talk about 'liberal education' in this first interpretation are primarily concerned with the motivation for learning characterizing the 'process' of education. They might be more concerned with the state of mind of the 'product'. A person, for instance, might have learnt mathematics because he saw it as being of practical use, but might gradually have become 'hooked' on it, to use a colloquialism. He might end up by being fascinated by it 'for its own sake'. Alternatively he might have worked at it just because he enjoyed solving these sorts of abstract problems. But later on he might come to appreciate its practical use. Indeed the concern with motivation might be only indirect. When, for instance, Whitehead fulminated against 'inert ideas' he was not directly making a motivational point. He was lamenting the lack of application to people's experience of so much that was learnt at school—mere book-learning that did little to transform a person's understanding of situations which he was likely to encounter. He then jumped to the other extreme and argued that knowledge should be 'useful'. Indeed he claimed that education is the art of the 'utilization' of knowledge. (5) But is this really what he meant? Did he not really mean that the knowledge and understanding of an educated person should have application in his life, should give him concepts and generalizations for understanding better situations in which he was likely to be placed? Did he mean 'useful' in the strict sense of instrumental to the realization of some practical end?

This dichotomy between 'inert' and 'useful', made in the context of characterizing the type of knowledge that it is important for an educated person to possess, tends to reinforce

the dichotomy in motivation between 'for its own sake' and 'for the sake of some practical end'. It encourages the neglect of that same body of knowledge, entertained with varying degrees of understanding, that is extremely significant or 'relevant' to a person in so far as it determines his general beliefs, attitudes, and reactions to the universal conditions of human life. This is neither 'inert' nor 'useful' in any ordinary sense.

I said that Whitehead, in making this distinction, was only indirectly concerned with motivation. By that I mean that he was concerned with knowledge which seems of obvious 'relevance' to a person's situation. Presumably he assumed, like most people, that learning will be improved as well because it will be seen to be relevant by the learner. But this is not necessarily the case, and the same point needs to be made about the kind of knowledge concerned with the human condition which I have assumed to be of some kind of emotional significance to anyone. For even though everyone is likely to be confronted at some time by emotional problems to do with death, personal relationships, authority, violence, etc., these may not seem to be of any particular significance to him while he is at school. That is why, in talking about liberal education, it is important to distinguish the motivational thesis from the sort of thesis developed by Whitehead about the features of the knowledge or understanding that anyone should be encouraged to develop.

My own view is that the content of education should not be determined by what, at any particular moment, the learner finds interesting or important/though obviously this is something of which any good teacher should be mindful. The teacher's task is as much to arouse interest as it is to build on existing interest. The same applies to concern about predicaments like those of death, suffering, and sexual infatuation to which it would be somewhat inappropriate to apply terms such as 'interest' and 'curiosity'. These are likely to compel the attention of students because of the universal emotions which are aroused by such predicaments. But even if they do not immediately do so, something should be done about the development of beliefs and attitudes in this area because of the predictable significance of these predicaments in anyone's life at some time. With the declining influence of the church, which traditionally dealt with issues in this area, so many people encounter such situations with so little preparation for them. I am not saying, of course, that the content of education should be centred entirely in this area. Only that it is an important area that tends to be neglected. This neglect is encouraged by the demand that knowledge should be either for its own sake or for its practical use.

3 LIBERAL EDUCATION AS GENERAL EDUCATION

This sphere of knowledge which seems essential to an educated person, but which proved, in the preceding section, to be very difficult to fit into the categories of acquired for its own sake or for the sake of some further end, seems extremely relevant to the second interpretation of liberal education, as general education. It is relevant because there are three types of problem which any advocate of general education has to face and some kind of answer to them is provided within this sphere of knowledge. There is first of all the problem of avoiding an assemblage of disjointed information; there is second, Herbert Spencer's question 'What knowledge is of most worth?'; third, there is the demand for 'integration' that lurks behind talk of developing 'the whole man'. I will, therefore, on occasions, make reference to this sphere of knowledge which is relevant to any person, in dealing with these three types of problem in relation to which ambiguities arise in the second interpretation of 'liberal education'.

(i) The demand that people should be allowed to develop in many directions rather than be confined to some particular specialized way of thinking is straightforward in a negative sense, though the constraining enemy appears in many guises ranging from the academic pedant to the demands of government or industry for specialized manpower. But the positive implications are obscure. It is clear that a man should not be, for instance, just a narrowly trained scientist, but should he be philosophically sophisticated as well as aesthetically sensitive and well versed in history? How coarsely or finely are such divisions to be made if illiberal specialization is to be avoided? Does it matter, for instance, if a scientist supplements his outlook by a developed appreciation of music, but misses out on literature? Or what if the literary man understands the Second Law of Thermo-dynamics but misses out on Mendel, Freud, and Durkheim?

To answer this kind of question it must surely be insisted that this conception of liberal education suggests only a continuum at one end of which is narrow specialization. It would be impossible to locate any particular point on the move away from this towards the other end of breadth of understanding and sensitivity, at which a person could be called 'educated'. Also some view would have to be taken, such as that of Hirst, about the arbitrariness or non-arbitrariness of divisions within knowledge. In the history of philosophy there has been a gradual differentiation. Empirical science was shown not to be just a branch of mathematics because of the difference in its criterion of truth and testing procedures. For similar reasons moral experience was shown to be unassimilable to either mathematics or science, to have a degree of autonomy. Questions then arose about the status of religion and about the possibility of regarding human studies such as psychology and history as similar to or distinct from the natural sciences. And both aesthetic appreciation and philosophical understanding seemed also to have sui generis characteristics.

If such non-arbitrary distinctions could be made in terms of truth-criteria, testing-procedures and distinctive conceptual schemes, some beginning could be made to answering questions about the ideal implicit in the continuum. It would be absurd to expect, for instance, that in all these various disciplines a person should be able to operate the testing-procedures in the way in which a trained specialist, who helps to develop understanding, must operate them. On the other hand it would not seem desirable for a person to amass a store of disjointed infonnation from a variety of disciplines. What would seem desirable and practicable over a long period of time would be that a person should acquire essential elements of the different conceptual schemes by means of which various items of information are given a place and organized. He should also learn to apply this scheme critically, which implies understanding of the different criteria of truth. Understanding of principles would be attempted which would increasingly structure a person's outlook and help him to organize experience in a variety of ways, and to think critically and imaginatively.

(ii) With the vast development of knowledge in all these different disciplines questions would obviously arise, about which branches to single out for study within them. Within natural science, for instance, should chemistry be studied rather than astronomy? In other words the question of what knowledge is of most worth would have to be faced. If there is any substance in the points made before about the sort of knowledge which is relevant to anyone who has to face the general conditions of human life, some kind of answer could be sketched. In this sense within philosophy, for instance, ethics would obviously be more relevant than symbolic logic; within history social history would be more relevant than diplomatic history; and so on.

This, of course, is not the only criterion for including studies in a curriculum. There are many others. I am merely drawing attention to an important criterion of the 'worth' of knowledge that is too often overlooked by teachers who see subjects merely as first stages in specialized study. At universities, too, an important consideration for any teacher is what there is in his subject for the majority who have neither the aptitude nor the inclination to develop it as a research worker like himself. The neglect, however, of this criterion both in schools and universities underlies much of the complaint by students of the lack of 'relevance' in their studies.

(iii) The third type of problem implicit in general education is that of how all-round understanding is to be conceived. One facet of this ideal is the capacity of a person to view what he is doing or what is going on under different aspects. A scientist, for instance, should not be oblivious to the moral dimension of his work; an engineer should be sensitive to the aesthetic aspect of his constructions. But more than this is often implied; for the different ways of organizing experience should not be compartmentalized and insulated from each other. There should be some kind of 'integration' between them. This is not the place to explore the different things which might be meant by 'integration' in this context, but one very pertinent meaning is the way in which different types of understanding interpenetrate in the spheres of knowledge which are relevant to anyone facing the general conditions of human life. In dealing with death, for instance, there is empirical knowledge about man's mortality, but this is inescapably tinged with philosophical assumptions about the relationship between consciousness and its bodily conditions. There are also inescapable ethico-religious questions about what is to be made of this universal predicament. The same sorts of considerations apply to confrontations with human violence or deceit. There are first of all straightforward factual questions about the actions. But these quickly shade into further questions about the motives of the person or persons concerned. And it is significant that motives such as envy, jealousy, and greed do not just explain; they are also the names of widespread vices. Moral judgment and interpersonal understanding are inextricably interwoven. And both types of knowledge are exercised within a context of beliefs of varying levels of sophistication about how society works.

My point is not just that in this sphere problems seldom turn up that can be neatly labelled 'empirical' or 'ethical' or 'requiring understanding of persons'. It is also that there is a widespread interpenetration between the forms of understanding that we employ to sort out the specific aspects of problems. There are links, though tenuous ones, between pure mathematics and moral understanding. But pure mathematics has little purchase in this realm. There are, however, countless links between moral knowledge and interpersonal understanding, both of which have ubiquitous application to it. So the sphere in which it is easy to make some sense of the notion of the integration of forms of knowledge is the sphere in which it is possible to give at least one type of answer to the question 'Which knowledge is of most worth?'.

4 LIBERAL EDUCATION AS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FREE MAN

In the classical view of liberal education the assumption was that movement towards the natural end of rationality was self-originated, the development of a potentiality immanent in any individual. Processes of education provided support and encouragement. The 'free man', on the Platonic view at any rate, was the man whose reason was properly in control,

who was not constrained by unruly passions. Modern variants of this ideal stress different aspects of it without its underlying doctrine of function which assigned a universal end to human development. They are more individualistic in that they envisage different ends for different men. But they share the belief that it is of crucial importance that the individual should choose what he is to become.

Extreme versions of modern individualism stress the importance of everyone doing his own thing, of being 'true to himself'. Self-origination is interpreted in terms of authenticity, of not copying others or conforming to social roles, whether of being a woman or being a waiter. Thus any processes of education which involve being told things by others, being initiated into public traditions, or being influenced by example, are thought of as constricting on the individual's development. He must find his own way by his own experience and discoveries and eventually learn to be himself, do his own thing, even, in some versions of this doctrine, construct his own reality.

Less extreme and more intelligible versions of individualism, which are usually put forward by people who would not mind calling themselves liberals, combine this stress on individual choice with an equal stress on the role of reason in informing such choices. The emphasis is on autonomy as well as on authenticity. In other words the importance of first-hand experience, of beliefs which are not second-hand, and codes of conduct that are not accepted just on authority, is granted. But stress is placed on the role of reason in achieving such independence of mind. On this view the development of the free man (6) is not necessarily impeded by instruction from others. Indeed it would be argued that the development of mind is inexplicable without reference to such social transactions which the extreme liberal regards as restrictions. What is crucial is the encouragement of criticism in the individual so that he can eventually accept or reject what he hears, sees, or is told, on the basis of reasons. What is inimical to such development is any process, such as indoctrination or conditioning, which inhibits or undermines the capacity to reason.

This third interpretation of liberal education brings to the fore again the question about the type of knowledge which is of most worth which was raised in relation to the two other interpretations; for, if autonomy is to be anything more than a pious hope, the individual must be possessed of relevant information to make realistic choices and have his imagination stimulated so that he can envisage all sorts of possibilities. In addition to specialized knowledge necessary for the pursuit of a particular occupation, the individual will need various types of general knowledge which are relevant to his choices as a citizen and as a human being. In such general education too little attention is given to political education and what any individual should know who is to make informed choices as a citizen in a democracy. Too little attention, also, is given to that body of knowledge that bears directly on the general conditions of human life which has been referred to previously in this article. The Schools Council Humanities project is one of the few attempts to connect the development of understanding in crucial areas such as those of violence, law and order, sex and personal relationships, with the development of autonomy. Many may have doubts about its emphasis on the 'neutrality' of the teacher, though this has to be understood against the tendency for teachers to indoctrinate their pupils on such controversial issues. But this emphasis of the project on a particular sort of teaching procedure must be separated from its emphasis on the importance of understanding in certain areas to the development of autonomy.

There may seem to be some inconsistency between this ideal of autonomy and what was said about the unrealistic tendency to think of pupils as potential research workers in the context of the first and second interpretations of liberal education. This is a vast topic about which it is possible, in the space available, to make only a few brief points. The first is that autonomy is very much a matter of degree; it indicates an attitude of mind rather than an achieved state. Knowledge has developed to such an extent in so many specialized branches, many of which impinge on our daily lives, that we have little alternative but to take a great deal of it on trust. Also, even in a sphere such as the moral one, the lives of reasonably autonomous people are governed by all sorts of rules on which they have reflected little. How many English people, for instance, have pondered deeply on the ethics of 'first come, first served' in queues? Most people are brought up in some established way of behaving and reflect on various elements of it in the light of their developing experience. The liberal ideal of autonomy is to be understood in contrast to unthinking conformity and rigid adherence to dogma. It does not demand making explicit everything which has been picked up from various sources and subjecting it all to constant criticism. What it does require is a willingness to learn and to revise opinions and assumptions when confronted with situations that challenge them. Logically speaking, too, criticism must take certain presuppositions for granted. Not everything can be questioned at once.

Second, it is important to distinguish approaching what one is told critically and attempting to organize and synthesize what one hears or reads in one's own way from either slavishly reproducing the views of some authority on the one hand or developing a highly original thesis on the other. Autonomy is most frequently associated with the moral sphere; but few people who attain a fair degree of autonomy in their moral life are moral innovators. This introduces the third point which is that there are great differences in respect of being able to manage without authorities in the various ways of thinking that are relevant to the sphere of knowledge which is of central importance to any human being. In the natural sciences, in so far as they impinge on everyday life, most people perforce rely on authorities. They may get as far as understanding some of the underlying theory; they realize that it is subject to error; but very few have the necessary training to locate possible sources of error. Morals are very different; for its underlying principles are not particularly recondite and a highly specialized training is not necessary to be sensitive to them. What is needed is the judgment and imagination to apply them in varying circumstances. There is also the problem of the degree of weight attached to different principles, which is one of the most potent sources of moral controversy. In between fall the various branches of human studies in which the 'common-sense' understanding of others and of ourselves is illuminated by theories supplied by specialized disciplines such as psychology, economics, and sociology. In assessing such theories, or the interpretations of actions and policies which they provide, the knowledge of particular men acting and suffering in particular circumstances is of crucial importance. We all possess such knowledge in various degrees; so we have a shared basis for criticism, judgment and making our own syntheses of what we glean from various 'authorities'. We have, of course, to be sufficiently 'on the inside' of such disciplines to understand the structure of their principles and how to apply them. But we do not have to be specialists in them in order to form some view of our own.

What emerges from this sketchy piece of probing is the need for more careful attention to a group of qualities associated with autonomy such as being critical, being independent,

having judgment, being authentic, being imaginative and so on. The application of these in spheres such as those of morals and politics, understanding on the one hand and more exalted qualities such as being original, creative, and inventive on the other. In so far as liberal education is concerned with autonomy it obviously aims at getting people beyond the level of just understanding and being well informed. But it does not demand the other extreme of originality and creativeness. Such qualities are extremely important for university teachers who are training specialists likely to advance knowledge, but they are an extra bonus for liberal educators concerned with the development of autonomy.

CONCLUSION

This paper really has no conclusions. This is partly because its intention was not to reach any but to explore some of the ambiguities inherent in liberal education. But it is also because, as the exploration proceeded, I began to feel an increasing dissatisfaction with the dichotomies in terms of which liberal education is usually interpreted. In particular I found difficulty with the dichotomy between 'for its own sake' and for the sake of some practical end which seems to me to have application to the advancement of knowledge but to fit very loosely over its acquisition. It seems to apply hardly at all to a sphere of knowledge, sometimes referred to loosely as 'the humanities', which is of central importance in any attempt to determine the type of knowledge which should form the content of liberal education. Having come to the end of this paper, therefore, I really feel that I should now get down to the very difficult task of trying to delimit this type of knowledge more precisely, examine its relationship to traditional disciplines, to vocational studies, and so on. But this might mean that the paper would become only marginally concerned with 'liberal education' as it is normally understood, even though it might be 'liberal' in exemplifying the untrammelled pursuit of knowledge; and it would certainly become too 'liberal' in its length.

NOTES

1 See R.S.Peters, 'Ethics and Education' (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), pp. 43–5.
2 See P.H.Hirst, Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge, most easily available as reprinted in R.S.Peters (ed.), 'The Philosophy of Education' (Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 87–111.
3 See M.Warnock, Towards a Definition of Quality in Education, in R.S.Peters (ed.), 'The Philosophy of Education' (Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 112–22.
4 See ibid.
5 See A.N.Whitehead, 'The Aims of Education' (New York: Mentor Books, 1949) p. 16.
6 For detailed development of such a view see R.S. Peters, Freedom and the Development of the Free-Man, in J.Doyle, 'Educational Judgments' (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973).

2
Liberality, neutrality and the modern university

Kenneth A.Strike

Universities in the Western world are generally held to ascribe to certain liberal ideals. They conceive of their basic ends as the pursuit and dissemination of truth, and they maintain that these ends require a climate of liberty and tolerance if they are to be successfully pursued. This commitment to liberality and tolerance has been held to imply an additional commitment to neutrality. A university, so the argument goes, cannot maintain an atmosphere of free and open discussion of significant issues while at the same time taking an official stand on such issues. Thus, the liberal university must be neutral.

This position concerning neutrality has been under strong attack in recent years. Three distinct sets of issues should be considered.

First, neutrality is sometimes objected to on the grounds that those who pay for a university have a right to determine its commitments. One author, for example, writes:

> To begin with, no institution, based upon the philosophical presuppositions of its founders and directors, can achieve total neutrality. But not only is total neutrality unachievable, it is also undesirable, especially if the university in question is taxsupported. When citizens of the United States have a portion of their income confiscated for purposes of educating other citizens of the United States, they should at least be offered the minimal assurance that their tax dollars will be used to train loyal citizens and not revolutionaries. (1)

This line of argument, of course, poses the issue in its traditional form. The university's liberal position is intended to ward off exactly this sort of encroachment on its intellectual liberty. This line of objection to neutrality requires the university to defend its liberal conceptions against the more conservative notion that the university exists to serve some set of vested social interests or to defend some particular social ideology.

A second line of objection to neutrality has been expressed by a more radical group. The claims are typically two. First, it is held that the doctrine of neutrality typically functions to cloak the fact that the university is in actuality a vassal of societies' dominant interests. Second, it is held that the ideal of neutrality is not just objectionable, it is impossible. A university cannot be neutral with respect to dominant social interests or issues. Its only serious choice is to opt for the right sort of social perspective. Robert Paul Wolff provides a quotable version of this orientation:

> As a prescription for institutional behavior, the doctrine of value neutrality suffers from the worst disability which can afflict a norm: what it prescribes is not wrong; it is impossible. A large university in contemporary America simply cannot adopt a valueneutral stance, either externally

or internally, no matter how hard it tries…. One of the first truths enunciated in introductory ethics courses is that the failure to do something is as much an act as the doing of it. It is perfectly reasonable to hold a man responsible for not paying his taxes, for not exercising due care and caution in driving, for not helping a fellow man in need. In public life, when a man who has power refrains from using it, we all agree that he has acted politically…acquiescence in governmental acts, under the guise of impartiality, actually strengthens the established forces and makes successful opposition all the harder. (2)

In this paper I shall deal with the second and the third sets of issues. I will assume for the duration that the battle between liberals and conservatives has been fought and won by the liberals. No doubt there are still occasionally successful purges against ideologically unpopular professors, but the prevailing orientation on campus is liberal and liberals have achieved acquiescence if not enthusiasm from society at large concerning such liberal institutions as academic freedom and tenure.

The second and third sets of issues are, however, newer and as yet not adequately explored. Thus, I shall focus on them. I shall begin with the question of the possibility of neutrality since this will enable me to develop some of the conceptual apparatus necessary to understand the policy questions involved. Initially, therefore, it will be useful to distinguish two types of possibility and three types of neutrality.

A state of affairs may be either logically or factually possible. To say that something is logically possible is to say that its conception is consistent. To say that something is factually possible is to say both that its conception is consistent and that there are no facts which preclude it. For example, a round square is logically impossible in that it must both have and not have corners. It is only factually impossible, however, to cool a substance to absolute zero. The conception of absolute zero is quite consistent, however; what physics we know, indicates that the state is unattainable.

Now those who have argued that neutrality is impossible have argued both claims. Often political and economic pressure or hidden bias are the sorts of facts appealed to to show that neutrality is factually impossible. It has also been claimed that neutrality is logically impossible. Wolff, for example, appears to have this in mind. To try to be neutral, Wolff claims, is to try to do neither A, or not-A. Thus, on Wolff's view, the advocate of university neutrality is not bucking the facts, he is bucking the Law of Excluded Middle. Neutrality is not just unattainable, it is inconceivable.

This distinction is of interest, because different conclusions follow depending on what sort of possibility one has in mind. What is important is that a situation which is factually impossible can be approximated whereas that is not the case for a situation which is logically impossible. It follows from this that the factual impossibility of a goal is not a fatal objection to the desirability of attempting to achieve it, whereas the logical impossibility of a goal is fatal.

Perhaps we cannot achieve absolute zero, but we can get close. And there may be benefits in trying. Thus, if neutrality is factually impossible it may nevertheless be desirable to be as neutral as possible. Therefore, it seems to me that claims as to the factual impossibility of neutrality are not especially interesting in this context since nothing much follows concerning whether we should try to be neutral.

On the other hand, an argument to show that neutrality is logically impossible would be most interesting. Since a situation is logically impossible in that it both must have and not

have some property a logically impossible state of affairs cannot be approximated. Thus, if a goal can be shown to be logically impossible, this is fatal to its desirability and to any policy meant to implement it.

Given the above analysis in what follows, I shall be largely interested in deciding if neutrality is logically impossible. Consider, then, that there are at least three sorts of neutrality.

First, it is necessary to distinguish neutrality of opinion from neutrality of consequence. In one sense of neutral, to be neutral is to not take a stand on an issue or to not have a position about an issue. In a second sense, to be neutral is to act (or not act) such that one's actions do not have consequences for an issue.

These two types of neutrality are logically distinct and may be factually independent. It is quite possible for a person or an institution to have no stand or opinion on an issue, but yet to act so as to effect the issue. Likewise a person or institution can have an opinion on an issue but act in a way which has no effect on the issue.

This distinction is important for understanding the character of certain debates concerning university policy. Let us suppose, for example, that the investment policy of a university is under attack. The university (let's say) has invested its endowment in a given oil company which, it turns out, has substantial interests in South Africa and which contributes substantially to South Africa's economy. This leads to the charge that the university is investing its funds in a way such as to indirectly support South Africa's racial policies and to demands that the university either liquidate its interests in the oil company or use its interests to pressure the oil company concerning its policy toward South Africa.

The university may respond to such charges by maintaining that its investment policy is neutral with respect to such questions. It is neutral in the sense that only financial considerations are considered in determining the investment policy. The university takes no position on other matters. It may perhaps add to this that its liberal ideals preclude it from taking a stand on such issues and require it to develop its investment policy without considering them.

Here the university defends itself against the charge that it is not neutral concerning some issue by claiming that it is in fact neutral. But, of course, the charge and the denial are not a charge and denial of the same thing, nor are the charge and the denial incompatible. The charge is that the university's actions are not neutral in that they have some effect on a given issue. The response is that the university is neutral in that it has not taken a stand on the issue. There are two sorts of neutrality at issue, and there is no logical reason why both the charge and the response cannot be true.

Two conclusions can be drawn. First, it is dangerous to talk about neutrality as though it were a single thing. There are different types of neutrality and one can be neutral concerning some issue in one sense of neutral and not another. Failure to recognize this is apt to introduce substantial confusion into debate. Second, we have to ask exactly what sort of neutrality is required by our liberal ideals. Is the liberal university required not to take stands on issues or is it required not to have an effect on issues. Or is there some third, still to be discovered, sense of neutral in which a liberal university should be neutral?

I shall develop a third sense of neutrality and try to sort out the requirements of a liberal ideology vis-à-vis these three concepts of neutrality shortly. At this point, we need to turn to the question of whether there is any logical problem in supposing that an institution can be neutral in either of the first two senses of neutral.

This question can be addressed by asking if the argument suggested by Wolff succeeds. Wolff's claim is essentially this. In any case where a university wishes to be neutral, it will find that it must either do some action, A, or not. (It is, of course, logically true that A and not-A exhaust the possibilities.) Moreover, the university will find that neither A, nor not-A, are neutral.

I shall attack this argument by claiming that the options available to an institution are typically not plausibly expressed as a choice between A and not-A. Consider, first, neutrality of opinion. What would have to be shown in order to show that a person could not be neutral concerning some opinion, O? Presumably it would have to be shown that it is necessarily the case that one must either believe O or believe not-O. But, of course, it is not necessarily the case that one must either believe O, or believe not-O. What is necessarily the case is that one must either believe O, or not believe O. The point here can be put in two ways. First, it seems clear that when we formulate the issue properly, that is, when we understand neutrality of opinion as a matter of neither believing O to be true or believing O to be false, it turns out that there is a third option. One may not have an opinion on the matter. Second, if one insists on forcing the options into Wolff's A, or not-A, schema, then the options we get concerning O are that one must either believe O, or not believe O. And, while it is indeed the case that one must either believe O, or not believe O, it is also the case that it cannot be inferred from the fact that one does not believe O that he believes not-O. Thus, in either case it is clearly possible for a person to have no opinion about an issue and, thus, to be neutral about it. And, assuming that we could attach some meaning to the idea of an institution rather than a person not having an opinion, it seems clear that neutrality of opinion is possible for a university.

Much the same point can be made concerning neutrality of consequences. Is it the case that one must do A, or not do A? Surely. But again it has to be pointed out that under many conditions A, or not-A, misrepresents the actual character of the choices available. To be neutral in some dispute is to act in such a way as to not have a material effect on the outcome of the dispute. It is to act in such a way that one's actions do not help or harm the cause of any of the disputants, and it is often the case that one does have such a course of action available.

That one does often have such an option can be shown by examining what I shall call the zealot's ploy. The zealot's ploy consists in treating any act other than one which aids his cause as one which harms his cause or helps the cause of his opponents. Such slogans as 'He that is not for me is against me,' or 'If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the problem' indicate common instances of the zealot's ploy.

Now at best, the zealot's ploy will make the claim that one is not neutral about a given dispute trivially true. It will trivialize the claim in that it will be capable of showing that acts intended to avoid involvement in a dispute even when apparently successful in fact fail to achieve neutrality. But the problem is even worse, because the zealot's ploy is capable of showing that one is simultaneously opposing both sides in a dispute of which he is not aware and which may be far removed from him. Suppose, for example, that there is a war taking place between groups A and B on the third planet circling Alpha Centauri. Well, on the argument of the zealot's ploy you and I have been actively opposing both sides. That our failure to remain neutral in the dispute consists in not doing anything to aid either side is not mitigating to someone armed with the zealot's ploy. But clearly this is a reductio ad

absurdum and something has gone wrong. What is wrong is forcing the options into the A, or not-A, model, but to admit this is also to admit the possibility of neutrality.

It is important to note here, however, that the fact that A, or not-A, is often not a rational way to represent available options does not show that it is not sometimes a rational way to represent available options. Often a university may find itself related to an issue in such a way that the possibility of a neutral course of action is effectively foreclosed. A useful example here is the plight of many American universities during the early days of the Vietnam War. Universities had for years provided the academic records of their male students to the Selective Service who used the information to determine draft eligibility. When the war began to be an object of intense criticism on campuses, the policy of providing this information became suspect in the eyes of many. Was the university not implicated in the war by helping the military select its manpower? Could it justify continuing to assist a process which sent its students off to fight in a war which many of them regarded as immoral? On the other hand, a refusal by a university to provide such information to the Selective Service seems a clear act of resistance.

The upshod is that the university seems effectively precluded from adopting a stance of neutrality. Why? Essentially, because two sets of conditions are fulfilled. First, it seems plausible to construe the university's options as A, or not-A. Either the university continues to provide information to the Selective Service or it does not. Second, both options require taking a stand on and having an effect on some issue. Given the circumstances continued cooperation with the Selective Service can only be construed as a pro-war stand and lack of cooperation as an anti-war stand.

What these arguments show is that the claim that a university cannot be neutral is wrong only if it is understood as showing that it is a priori impossible for a university to achieve neutrality on any issue. But there are cases where the argument works, namely cases where the options are plausibly construed as contradictories rather than contraries and where the options affect the matter at issue. Such cases often arise concerning the relations between the university community and society. Typical cases involve the management of endowments, the performance of military research, the treatment of minorities, and the effects of the university as a consumer in labor disputes as in the California grape boycott. In areas such as these it is easy for an institution to become involved in a dispute in such a way that neutrality is not an alternative.

We are now in a position to try to develop a concept of neutrality which relfects the requirements of a liberal ideology. The question may be approached by asking whether either neutrality of opinion or neutrality of consequences provides a suitable concept. It should be clear immediately that neutrality of consequences is not what we are looking for. Neutrality of consequences concerns the domain of action, but the sort of neutrality demanded by a liberal ideology is one which pertains primarily to ideas or opinions. The primary function of liberal neutrality is, as has been suggested, to promote tolerance of dissent and diversity.

Perhaps, then, neutrality of opinion is what we are looking for. At first glance this would require a university to take no stand or adopt no official policy concerning any idea or opinion in order to give free play to inquiry and discovery among the members of the university community. This seems close to what is required.

But it is not quite right. It is not quite right because the university does intervene in intellectual disputes in certain ways. In essence the university intervenes by certifying the competence of the participants in its intellectual life. Typically, this function is performed by granting the faculty control over areas such as the selection of its members and over the academic life of students on the assumption that the faculty is the repository of those skills required in order to judge competence.

When this type of judgment is exercised concerning the university's intellectual life, it will effectively exclude some points of view. Astronomy departments will not hire astrologers or disciples of Ptolemy, and chemistry departments will not hire alchemists. A university may tolerate such persons on the periphery of its intellectual life, but they will be denied access to the center.

Is this role a violation of neutrality? I suspect not, but it requires a new conception of neutrality. Here the sort of neutrality appropriate is analogous to the role of a referee or umpire in a game. The ideal is to be an impartial enforcer of the rules of the game. Let us call this sort of neutrality impartial neutrality. Impartial neutrality like neutrality of opinion requires the university not to opt for one party or another in a given intellectual dispute, but unlike neutrality of opinion, impartial neutrality assigns to the university (or to other university-based communities of scholars) the active role of enforcing the intellectual standards of the debate.

This role of referee of the intellectual life of the community is exercised in a variety of ways. I have already mentioned the selection and retention of faculty. But editors of refereed journals (note the word 'referee') and an extensive, if sometimes subtle, system of rewards and punishments also function (sometimes) to maintain standards of competence in intellectual life.

Thus, it seems to me that the main difference between the liberal's conception of a free and open marketplace of ideas as it applies to a university as opposed to society generally is that the university's marketplace is refereed, its ideological venders are policed, so to speak, but for competence not orthodoxy.

Is this kind of neutrality possible? There are at least three assumptions required. First, this concept of neutrality assumes that there is a recognizable difference between a discipline's content and its standards of judgment. Impartial neutrality requires that rewards and sanctions be applied solely on grounds of competence and never on grounds of opinions held. That assumes a systematic ability to distinguish the quality of an argument in a discipline, but not simply because one disagrees with the conclusions reached. It is my impression that in most disciplines this distinction is well understood and applied. It does, of course, become problematic to the degree that a discipline's standards of judgment are themselves at issue among the discipline's competent practitioners.

Second, this concept of neutrality assumes that the standards of judgment in a discipline are reasonably objective. The decisions as to who is intellectually competent can only be as objective as a discipline's methods. Thus, the 'softer' a discipline, the harder it is to identify rationally its competent practitioners.

These two conditions are logical ones. The third is a psychological one. If impartial neutrality is to be possible, human beings must be capable of applying appropriate standards of judgment in a reasonably fair and objective way. This requires both that they understand these standards and that they be capable of overcoming bias and prejudice.

Concerning the two logical conditions, I shall assume that in most academic endeavors they are adequately met. The third condition is, perhaps, most problematic. Here it will be useful to note that even if bias and prejudice are inevitable to some degree, they can be lessened. This suggests that even if impartial neutrality is unlikely to be completely attained, it can nevertheless be coherently aimed at. Thus, at this point, two conclusions are warranted concerning impartial neutrality. First, impartial neutrality is the sort of neutrality which is required by a liberal conception of the university. Second, impartial neutrality is possible and is, thus, coherently aimed at.

At this point, I shall discuss some different problem areas concerning university neutrality, and we shall see if the distinctions I have developed are capable of shedding any light on questions of policy.

Initially, there are areas in which the requirements of impartial neutrality are obvious. Impartial neutrality precludes the university from linking rewards or sanctions to a person's opinions or from making access to facilities contingent on any orthodoxy. But this is clear enough. We need, I think, to focus on some of the more interesting grey areas. The most fruitful area for inquiry here is the ways in which the university relates to the larger society. For purposes of convenience I shall divide the university's external relations into two classes. First, there are those activities of a university which are unrelated to its central functions. Universities spend and invest money, consume resources, hire employees, and even affect traffic patterns. All of these activities have effects on the lives of those outside of the university community. Second, there are those activities of a university which involve its central purposes, but which direct them at an audience external to the university. Modern universities generate knowledge for business or industrial consumers and train manpower for various job markets. Thus, they provide educational services for an external clientele.

Concerning the first group, there is that interesting class of events where the university is involved in such a way as to render neutrality of consequence impossible. What are the university's obligations here? I wish to argue that other things being equal the university has an obligation to take sides in any such dispute. The university may truthfully claim to be neutral in such cases in that it has no official policy concerning such a dispute and that what effects its actions have on the dispute are accidental consequences of its policies concerning other matters. But such a response merely shows that in such cases neutrality of opinion is possible. It does not show it to be desirable. And it is difficult to see what merit there is in refusing to take a stand on an issue on which one's actions are bound to have an effect. Such a ploy seems to amount to nothing more than a refusal to consider and take responsibility for the consequences of one's acts. Insofar as an appeal to neutrality merely serves to enable an institution to ignore some of the consequences of its actions in its deliberation concerning its external affairs, it is objectionable.

Nor is impartial neutrality really at issue in such cases. This is the case because when issues concern those external relations accidental to the university's purposes, the university can usually take a stand without being required to enforce sanctions against students and faculty who wish to dissent and without restricting the free flow of information and ideas. Thus, it seems both that the university has a moral obligation to take a stand in cases where its actions inevitably produce consequences and that taking such a stand need not be in violation of the requirements of its liberal ideas.

The most troublesome cases concern those contacts between the university and society which can be seen as extensions of the university's purposes. We need to note initially that the modern university has undergone considerable evolution concerning the conception of its central functions. The ideal university to which liberal conceptions of tolerance and neutrality linked has as its central values the pursuit and dissemination of truth or less archaicly research and teaching. The goals of the modern university have evolved into the triumvirate of teaching, research and service.

This evolution has not, however, amounted to simply the addition of a third function. It has altered the conception of the first two as well. In the liberal conception of the university the pursuit and dissemination of truth are treated as intrinsic goods and do not require justification in terms of some social agenda. The university is held to be a socially useful institution, but in a rather indirect way. Knowledge produced for its own sake nevertheless may have social utility. Educated men, while not trained for a specific job, nevertheless, prove adaptable, capable and do their jobs well. Social utility was something that the liberal university accomplished, but did not aim at.

In the modern university, however, much research and teaching is targeted to specific needs external to the university. Research is supposed to generate solutions to particular antecedently identified problems, and teaching is supposed to train people to perform specific tasks. Thus, the service ideal of the university infects its other goals as well.

How does this newer conception of the university affect the nature and application of the university's liberal ideals and its view of neutrality? First, it seems obvious that if the university is to provide direct solutions to social problems, it must take a stand on these problems and try to have consequences for them. Any attempt to serve society assumes some views about what is good for society. Thus, for example, if a university develops a program in criminology and fails to make its expertise similarly available to the Mafia it is not being neutral. It seems both to be taking a stand and trying to have consequences.

Perhaps, however, the university can enter into such commitments without sacrificing impartial neutrality. It is plausible to maintain, for example, that such commitments to serving society need not be translated into rewards or sanctions in such a way as to restrict free inquiry or establish any official ideology. The members of the university community will retain their freedom to dissent to their hearts' content. Thus, impartial neutrality is not violated.

This argument seems naive, however, for at least three reasons. First, commitments to provide research or teaching services to society will obviously translate themselves into demands for staffing in such a way that agreement with the particular commitment to service will turn out to be a condition of employment. Second, even for those whose jobs are secure a commitment to the prevailing social service agenda is often required in order to secure institutional rewards and avoid sanction. Thus, a faculty member who dissents on a program to which his colleagues have made a commitment will find himself isolated and his position and salary affected. Institutional incentives thus get linked to a point of view. Finally, a university geared to providing social services will find that the nature of its commitments will be significantly influenced by a kind of service market. The university after all can be expected to provide services to clients who are capable of expressing and funding their needs. This means that universities will not serve any needs, but only those needs which have some access to wealth or power. In short, the conceptions of society

which the university will serve will be those held by industry or government. Socially disenfranchised groups are unlikely to find a champion in the modern university until they first can express their needs through political power.

The conclusion here is that the social service university is likely to create mechanisms whereby its systems of incentives become linked to points of view held by external agencies and that this would seem a clear violation of impartial neutrality. It is also worth mentioning here that the consequences of this trend are likely to be a subtle and gradual erosion of the university's tolerance and neutrality. And since this process will manifest itself more via incentives rather than coercion, it is apt to be fairly inconspicuous and not energetically protested. Dissenters will not be coerced. They will be coopted or isolated.

This institutional erosion of impartial neutrality is I suspect merely the embodiment of a kind of conceptual displacement of the ideal of impartial neutrality. I have suggested that the shift from a liberal to a social service conception of the university can be conceptualized in part as a change in the conceptual status of the goals of teaching and research. In the liberal university, teaching and research are intrinsic goods, whereas in the social service university they are instrumental goods. Two things follow concerning liberal ideals such as impartial neutrality. First, it follows that insofar as research and teaching continue to be central activities of the university/ liberal ideals will continue to have a place in the university. Second, it follows that these ideals will be evaluated and understood in a different framework.

This second point can be explicated by the following model. Let us imagine a situation where a university's programs are geared to some social goal, SG. Teaching and research will be instrumental to SG and liberal ideals will be likewise instrumental to SG. Now what follows is that criticism, debate and tolerance will be valued so long as they are perceived as part of the process whereby SG is developed and implemented, but not when they begin to be perceived as in opposition to SG. Thus, in the social service university liberal ideals like impartial neutrality will be valued, but they will lead a more circumscribed existence and may be rejected when they seem to conflict with service goals.

These conceptual points suggest part of the explanation of the increasing resistance to liberal institutions such as academic freedom and tenure, institutions designed to implement impartial neutrality in that they prevent linking rewards or punishment to opinions. Such institutions are perceived from a liberal point of view as essential features of an institution whose purposes are the pursuit and dissemination of truth. But in the social service university they are easily perceived as obstacles to achieving service objectives. Individuals who have substantial freedom are not easily gotten to harness themselves to legislative directives or administrative programs. Thus, it seems inevitable that legislators and administrators who feel an obligation to harness the university to public service will come to perceive liberal institutions as hinderances to the flexibility and responsiveness of the university to social goals. Indeed, they are quite right. Liberal institutions which guarantee substantial independence to their individual members will be less responsive than they might to social goals. It is, thus, reasonable to suppose that as modern universities move from a liberal toward a social service conception that liberal institutions such as academic freedom and tenure will undergo substantial erosion or modification.

What follows from this analysis is that since the modern university is conceptually eclectic combining both liberal and social service perspectives in the same institution

coherent solutions concerning neutrality and liberality are not going to be forthcoming. Consistent policies are not likely to be derived from conflicting values. While this state of affairs offends my philosophical sensitivities considerably, I am not convinced that such eclectic institutions are objectionable. Indeed, there are substantial benefits to be derived from the juxtaposition of liberal and social service conceptions. Such institutions may be an effective way to render knowledge useful while avoiding the trap of uncritical subservience to socially dominant interests. My basic recommendation here is for a policy which permits incentives, but not sanctions to be linked to opinion. Such a policy provides leverage by means of which resources can be harnessed to service objectives while at the same time minimizing the penalties to a dedicated critic.

Perhaps two general conclusions can be drawn from this paper. First, neutrality is not easily generalized about. My argument should at least suggest that issues concerning neutrality need to be handled by means of close analysis of particular contexts rather than by means of conceptual broadsides. Second, the analysis indicates that the most interesting problems concerning neutrality and other liberal ideals arise from basic changes in institutional values. This is the area in which further inquiry would be most useful.

NOTES

1   Douglas Peterson, The American Cause and the American University, reprinted in Immanuel Wallerstein and Paul Slar, 'The University Crisis Reader' (New York: Random House, 1971), vol. 1, pp. 72–3.
2   Robert Paul Wolff, 'The Ideal of the University' (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), pp. 70–1.

3
Student academic freedom and the changing student/university relationships

Romulo F.Magsino

I INTRODUCTION

Somewhere in his 'Adventure of Ideas,' Alfred North Whitehead observes that 'Great ideas often enter reality in strange guises and with disgusting alliances.' This observation might be made, perhaps without much hesitation, by one who has studied the contemporary development of the idea of student academic freedom. If one grants that this idea—at least in the field of education—approximates the significance of the essential equality of men which Whitehead was alluding to, student academic freedom might indeed be shown to have entered the world of the university in 'strange guises and with disgusting alliances.' It came with ragged clothes and long hair, rough manners and coarse language, open six, and defiance of authority. But further, it came initially not as a moral cause under which student rebels rallied. Rather, it appeared, in the words of Sidney Hook, 'adventitiously in the wake of other student demands that required an ex post facto rationale.' (1)

The active, sometimes violent, energy that forced the idea of student academic freedom into our consciousness seems to have petered out. If recent accounts of student mood on campuses are not mistaken, we have now the 'selfcentered generation' concerned mainly with preparing themselves for lucrative and satisfying jobs and divorced from the political activism and revolutionary fervor of the not too distant past. (2)

Nevertheless, student academic freedom has arrived. As is true of powerful ideas, it will very likely continue to influence developments in the university. In England, the Commission on Academic Freedom and the Law, formed by the National Union of Students and the National Council for Civil Liberties (NUS-NCCL) and charged with considering all aspects of academic freedom and the law as they affect students, has suggested radical changes in the student-university relationships. (3) In Canada, the report of the Commission on the Government of the University of Toronto came out as an affirmation of the principles called for by the current conceptions of student academic freedom. Thus the report, entitled 'Toward Community in University Government,' endorses the principle of staff-student parity at all levels of university government and the principle of student participation in matters of faculty appointment, promotion, tenure, dismissal and in matters of research policy. The idea of student academic freedom seems to require all these, as former University of Toronto President Claude Bissell himself professes:

Increasingly freedom for the student…means his power to make decisions about his environment and to be protected against institutional coercion and injustice. He repudiates the in loco parentis theory of the function of the institution. In disciplinary matters he is concerned about proper legal

procedures, and about drawing a distinction between offenses as a citizen and as a student. All this is defensive. But the committed student seeks to give a more positive content to freedom. Freedom is the right and power to make decisions that shape one's environment. (4)

Unfortunately, the students' claim to academic freedom sounds perplexing, if not disturbing. Nowhere in federal or state constitutions, statutes or legal cases do we find provisions for student academic freedom. University bylaws or charters, if they say anything at all, confirm the broad powers of the institution over students. (5) Educational tradition in most countries, moreover, does not indicate any student entitlement to academic freedom. Thus, in the USA, for example, it is only during the 1960s that educators seriously considered extending academic freedom to students. (6) The historical fact seems to be that in the latter part of the nineteenth century, American educators trained in Germany brought with them to North America a rich German concept of student academic freedom. This concept embraced specific freedoms relating to students' determination of the course of their study and of their personal and social lives within the university. Unfortunately these educators failed to transform the concept into reality. (7) Consequently, a student claiming academic freedom in the present time cannot assert that there is a presumption in favor of his enjoying this freedom—a presumption which, incidentally, his faculty counterpart seems to enjoy despite recent blows on the idea of tenure in the university. (8)

That in most places today we do not find educational tradition granting students academic freedom that could protect them from arbitrary university action is indeed to be regretted. However, from another perspective—that of the university educators—it is also a matter of serious concern that the claim to an amorphous, vaguelydefined principle is presented to justify a reversal of roles within the university community, specifically those of the student. Naturally we can listen with empathic, understanding to insistent student demands. Wisdom, not only prudence, would enjoin us to consider such demands, a typical example of which runs as follows:

> Contemporary issues have come to define student academic freedom as student freedom in the academic community—not just freedom to explore ideas and express them within that academic community….
>
> [Student academic freedom] entails real responsibility in students—participation, not just consultation; functionally, not just formally.
>
> Genuine responsibility…must include a decisionary voice in all elements having an effect on students, including academics. (9)

Carried out consistently, such demands could result in profound changes within the university, particularly in relation to the roles of the students and the faculty. As Dewey pointed out about thirty years ago, liberty or freedom is power—effective power to do specific things. Now the possession of such power is always a matter of the distribution of power that exists at the time. Demand for increased power at one point means demands for change in the distribution of powers, that is for less power somewhere else. (10) Thus to grant students the academic freedom they demand is to diminish the university (faculty and administrative) power to determine much of what is being done in the institution, including, of course, the conduct of academic affairs. Surely, such a serious complication as this requires our close scrutiny. We would need to ask the question: Does student academic freedom justify the wide-ranging, specific freedoms demanded by students?

This paper is an attempt to take the initial steps that might lead to a suitable answer to our question. However, before we undertake these steps, two points need to be emphasized. First, there is, at present, no one formulation that every advocate of student academic freedom agrees on. Several competing formulations have been presented, (11) and this makes it difficult for us to say that their formulators are referring to the same thing or idea. The lack of established linguistic usage and educational arrangements embodying the idea of student academic freedom renders it nothing less than an elusive concept. However, we cannot afford to have it elude us here, otherwise we cannot determine whether it does or does not allow the specific freedoms claimed by students under the rubric of student academic freedom. Thus one of the central tasks in this paper is to indicate at least its basic nature.

Second, while formulations differ, nevertheless it is clear that their formulators aim at convincing us to accept their formulations by presenting their justifications for them. Hence, when a formulator explicates his formulation in terms of specific freedoms that make up student academic freedom (this freedom being taken to be nothing much more or much less than its constituent specific freedoms)*,* the specific freedoms are seen to follow from some considered justification. Thus the formulation—and necessarily the idea of student academic freedom it incorpoates—becomes acceptable only to the degree that the justification offered is itself acceptable.

In this paper, I shall elaborate on and assess the justifications offered for student academic freedom. It will be noted that these justifications have not given rise to viable formulations that reflect the true nature of student academic freedom. Having done this, I shall try to make explicit what I take to be its true nature. Finally, I shall indicate, at least tentatively, the specific freedoms that may be justifiably claimed as constituent elements of the student academic freedom being advocated here.

II THE JUSTIFICATION OF STUDENT ACADEMIC FREEDOM

Student academic freedom, in whatever form it has been presented, is generally not thought of as an end in itself. Rather, just like the faculty academic freedom, (12) it is understood to be a means to certain ends. The opening sentences of the 1967 Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students, by the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), typify the conception of student academic freedom as means:

> Academic institutions exist for the transmission of knowledge, the pursuit of truth, the development of students, and the general well-being of society. Free inquiry and free expression are indispensable to the attainment of these goals.
>
>   Minimal standards of academic freedom of students…essential to any community of scholars. (13)

If, indeed, student academic freedom is a means, it would seem that its justification would involve its meeting at least two requirements: (a) Insofar as a means arises in relation to an end, the acceptance of a means would require the prior acceptance of its end; and (b) insofar as a means is resorted to in order to achieve an end, this means must be the sort of thing that could achieve the end, and further, achieve it in the most effective manner consistent with the nature of an end. (14)

Now those who have espoused the idea of student academic freedom see good reason for advocating that students should enjoy it within the university. They believe that its desirability can be amply justified, and accordingly, they have offered justifications. These justifications fall roughly under two categories. (15) One category, which we might refer to as 'legal justification,' takes the students' claim to student freedom as being justified by their membership in a democratic society that ensures certain rights and freedoms for its members. Thus student academic freedom is viewed as a sub-species of an individual's political, legal, and egalitarian freedoms. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), John Searle, William Van Alstyne, and William Birenbaum, among others, have adopted this standpoint. (16) The other justification appeals to the nature of the university as a unique, specialized institution charged with some particular task. The pursuit of this task is seen to require certain freedoms not only for the faculty but also for students. This 'institutional justification' has been advocated by, among others, the AAUP, R.M.MacIver, Philip Monypenny, and E.G.Williamson. (17)

(Parenthetically, it must be noted that in the final analysis, both justifications are anchored on the ideal of liberal democracy which stresses knowledge and rationality in human institutions and arrangements. Thus the two categories of justification for student academic freedom differ not so much in regard to its ultimate end as in regard to the manner by which the ultimate end is to be achieved. One emphasizes the need to establish uniform standards or modes of relationships for all social institutions in order to attain the ideal; the other insists on maintaining unique standards or modes of relationships within each social institution. (18))

(a) The legal justification

In a recent definitive statement, the ACLU declares as follows:

> Academic freedom is analogous to civil liberties in the community at large, including not only the right to free inquiry, expression and dissent, but the right to due process and equal treatment, assuring for teachers and students the full enjoyment of their constitutional liberties. (19)

As civil liberties, they override educational considerations. Thus, Birenbaum states:

> Educational policy…is not the only nor the controlling factor in determining what recommendations should be made with regard to freedom of expression, assembly, press, and association. Ultimately, these are questions of constitutional law. We must look to Supreme Court decisions for the only reliable guidance on these points. (20)

The implications of the acceptance of this position are fairly discernible. Given that university students are mostly of the majority age, and given the present concern for guaranteeing civil liberties in the USA, the traditional university/student relationship faces upheaval. Not only are the theories (21) supporting university authority over students being laid down in the final resting place, also, as court decisions affecting students are spelled out, and as legislatures consider enactments guaranteeing student freedoms, (22) student freedom gains more and more content. In the USA, court activism in the 1960s produced a plethora of decisions negating the doctrines of in loco parentis and the waiver of student rights in

a contractual relationship. The consequence is that the university/student relationship has irreversibly changed. Not only that; more disturbingly, the longstanding, sacred university autonomy has been effectively challenged by the judiciary. University presidents or their representatives have had, on occasion, to encounter the courts' summons servers. This has led a victim of student unrest, former President Perkins of Cornell University to express this fear:

> We do view with alarm the specter that seems to be rising out of its ashes and taking the form of a rash of court cases challenging decisions in areas that were once considered the educational world's peculiar province. The filing of these cases seems to suggest that judicial processes can be substituted for academic processes. (23)

The alarm is understandable. However, if it is granted that broad university power over students is founded on doctrines that are morally and legally suspect; if it is agreed that it is about time students are given more protection by courts and legislatures from the arbitrary exercise of university authority, (24) then alarm must give way to a realistic assessment of the situation. The view taken by Professor Sibley of the University of Manitoba seems to be a sensible one. Though addressed to the matter of university autonomy in Canada, his comment could easily apply to the American or the British situation

> I am willing to postulate that if we do commit ourselves to resolute action, we shall eventually be met half-way by society and government. The present surge of hostility toward the university may be checked, and sensible accommodations arrived at. Much of our former autonomy will vanish: our decision boundaries are going to be severely constricted. Of this development I think there can be no doubt. In the fact of these changes our task is to define and to preserve at all cost our inner core of values while surrendering much that is peripheral and accidental. (25)

Whether we like it or not, it seems that specific freedoms will accrue to students through judicial and legislative action. The question that concerns us, however, is this: Could we take the accumulation of these specific freedoms as student academic freedom?

In response to this question, at least two points can be raised. First, it must be admitted that the legal justification could sufficiently demolish the theories underlying the overarching authority the university possesses vis-à-vis students. Also, it must be conceded that this justification can serve as a principle which can determine the contents of student freedom in the university. Nevertheless, this is not to say that the freedoms attributed to students who are also citizens comprise student academic freedom. What we have here, simply and more accurately, is a set of civil freedoms enjoyed by any other member of society, whether a doctor, a salesman, or a garbage collector. We surely sacrifice clarity—we can even mislead—if we call these freedoms 'student academic freedom' merely because they are exercised by students within the confines of an academic institution.

Second, it is rather obvious that if student academic freedom is made to represent those specific freedoms accruing to students from legal considerations, we would in effect eliminate from the conception those freedoms for students that arise in the course of the university's pursuit of its unique task. These, unfortunately, are the freedoms we cannot afford to set aside from our conception if only because they are the ones that appear particularly associated with the operation of the university as an educational or academic

institution. Take, for example, the freedom a professor gives his students to devise, by themselves, the contents of his course, subject to his supervision. Here we have a freedom that may be educationally desirable but which cannot be regarded legal or civil in origin by any stretch of imagination. The same may be said about student freedom to choose elective courses, to select their professors or course sections, and to go about researching on an assigned topic the way they think fit, subject to professorial supervision. These freedoms do not seem legally justifiable at all, yet these are precisely the kind of freedoms we would think students could be given in the academic enterprise.

These points are related to the ambivalence with which formulators of legally based conceptions of student academic freedom view it. On the one hand they begrudge the university for its arbitrary and authoritarian treatment of students, and accordingly aim at establishing student academic freedom so that students could enjoy liberties available to every member of society. But to approach student academic freedom in this manner is to assert in fact that this freedom is a means not so much to the attainment of the university's ends as to the achievement of a desired social arrangement. To say, for example, that as part of their academic freedom, students are entitled to demonstrate or picket against the university is to take the university as nothing different from any other institution of society that can be subjected to these activities. It is to say, further, that this has to be so, because the social good demands arrangements whereby every social group, whether minority or majority, can express its interests. Surely there is nothing wrong about students being able to do so, except that the university is supposed to be doing certain things that do not lend to a compromise of clashing interests. If we may use Green's metaphor, the university can be viewed as a 'market' where relationships result from the test of strength and desire. In the market model, what is tested is not reason: 'It is power and wants; not the common good good, but my good. The mechanisms of the market provide not a test of thinking but a test of bargaining power….' (26) The present-day university is so complex—with its dormitories, cafeterias, and contractual relationships with students—that a substantial portion of its relationships can be resolved based on the market model.

But, to use Green's metaphor once more, the university also operates under the 'tribunal' model because of its organic link with knowledge. It is, so to say, a deliberating tribunal, employing the light of reason, which determines what is reasonable to believe and do. (27) If students are to develop competencies in activities distinctive in the 'tribunal' model, and if freedoms are instrumental in the development of these competencies, then it is hardly appropriate to give them freedoms the exercise of which trains them for the 'market' activities. What we need to provide them, needless to say, are those freedoms that contribute to student competencies fitted for the 'tribunal' activities. To do otherwise—to conceive of student academic freedom as if it were made up of specific freedoms relevant to the 'market' activities—is to go counter to the very end for which the idea of academic freedom as means was conceived.

On the other hand, formulators of legally based student academic freedom might take cognizance of the academic activities of the university. They might then suggest that there is every possibility of incorporating into the formulation distinctively academic freedoms. It would be fascinating, although perhaps alarming, to hear the strategy by which this is to be done. At the moment, the odds are that it won't be done. The United States courts, notable (or notorious!) for their intervention in university affairs, have by and large refrained from

making pronouncements on matters that are primarily academic. (28) Of course, they can define, by the process of inclusion, student academic freedom if they wished to do so. It would certainly be effectively binding on the university. (29) (And, surely, courts have conjured up stranger things before.) The question really is: Ought the courts to do so?

No doubt, this question is quite involved, and no answer will be attempted in this article. (30) Nevertheless, for the courts to do so is to upset radically the traditionally respected (by courts and legislatures) autonomy of the university on academic matters. Obviously, the burden of proof lies with the judiciary to show that stripping the university of this autonomy is necessary. It has to answer satisfactorily, among others, the following questions:

1   Has the university failed in the discharge of its responsibilities in connection with its academic relationships with students?
2   Is the court competent in dealing with academic matters?
3   How will judicial intervention on academic matters affect the attainment of the university's ends?
4   What effects will judicial intervention in one social institution produce in relation to society as a whole as well as its other institutions?

If no acceptable response to these questions is forthcoming, then the judicial formulation of student academic freedom will have to wait. Meanwhile, it is about time that we examined the alternative justification.

(b) The institutional justification

Many educators sympathetic to the student claim attempt to justify wide-ranging freedoms for students in terms of the function or nature of the university as a unique societal institution. The real issue, one vocal educator puts it, is the educational one: 'It is on educational, not political, grounds that a valid case can be made for permitting recognized student organizations to invite speakers of their choice to the campus to discuss any topic, no matter how controversial.' (31) The same could be said, presumably, for the freedom of expression: "On educational grounds, students should be encouraged to publish their own newspapers, periodicals and pamphlets, exchanging ideas, commenting on great issues, testing and challenging their teachers' views.' (32)

In contrast to the legal justification, the institutional justification adopts a clear-cut position with reference to the status of student academic freedom as means to an end—the end being the achievement of the particular task of the university. Nevertheless, this justification does not seem to have given rise to an acceptable formulation of student academic freedom. Two reasons may account for this.

The first is that we are not exactly sure where the institutional uniqueness of the university lies. No doubt the public on the one hand and educators on the other have viewed the institutions of higher learning from different perspectives. They have been seen, using Robert Paul Wolff's metaphors, as a sanctuary of scholarship, as a training camp for the profession, as a social service station, and as an assembly line for establishment man. (33) At the height of student unrest, the university was also called upon to provide the testing ground for the critical citizen. (34) The problem here is that unless we agree on

the precise end student academic freedom is to serve, we cannot assess the efficacy of proposed component freedoms of the institutionally justified formulations.

We shall suggest later that the matter is not so much a dead end as we might be led to think. But for now let us make believe that we agreed on the unique end for the university. How would the formulation based on this end look? An answer to this would suggest the second reason.

What is rather unexpected about the formulations justified institutionally (e.g. by the AAUP, Williamson, and Miller and Pilkey) is that they include some specific freedoms that are also found in the legally justified formulations (e.g. by the ACLU and Birenbaum). And just like the latter, they appear only a little less extensive. Could the institutional justification actually justify the inclusion of all these specific freedoms? Take, for instance, some of the freedoms enumerated by Miller and Pilkey:

1. Students should be free to organize and associate to promote their common interests, whether it be to establish a student government to regulate campus activities or to promote common educational, social, or political goals—even though some of these goals may be of a controversial nature;
2. Freedom of expression on the part of students individually or collectively; and
3. They should be free to participate in off-campus activities, as others do, without institutional restrictions. (35)

These freedoms, according to Miller and Pilkey, are intended to ensure an objective search for knowledge and truth—a function which uniquely characterizes the university. Yet freedom 1 would sanction the promotion of groups that would actively seek the attainment of social and political goals. Assuredly, however, there is a distinction between an open-minded search for the truth on the one hand, and the persistent attempt to secure by pressure or lobby a group's interests on the other hand. One is a scholarly, dispassionate endeavor, the other is a socio-political action, less concerned with the truth than with the acceptance of a group's point of view. A similar comment may be made about freedom 2, frequently extended (by Williamson, for example) to include the freedom to demonstrate, picket, petition, or sit-in. Such processes are, familiarly enough, power tactics designed to force one's viewpoint on another without the benefit of rational inquiry. In principle, they are opposed to the objective search for truth. Finally, freedom 3 is obviously redundant in the formulation because institutions of higher learning have no business meddling with the activities of students outside of the university.

However, the search for truth may be denied as the only function of the university. It can be argued that other functions could justify the formulation of extensive freedoms for students. Recently, the role of the university in the development of critical citizens has been strongly suggested. As Broek et al. put it, 'it is no less true of freedom in the academy than of freedom in society that it requires regular and vigorous exercise if it is to survive and serve its ends.' (36) If students are to grow as responsible, critical citizens would they need extensive freedoms? In answer to this, two considerations may be taken up.

First, it is not obvious at all that social criticism or moral citizenship requires involvement on the part of students in interest groups or in demonstrations, picketing, and the like. Those who advocate the development of critical citizens do not envision anarchists. Rather, they

envision individuals capable of engaging in serious moral discourse and moral action. Now engaging in moral discourse and action requires at least two things. For one, it demands the participant's possession of knowledge relevant to the particular problem or issue at hand, or if he does not have the relevant knowledge on the matter, the skill needed in seeking out such knowledge. For another, it demands the participant's understanding of and adherence to certain principles or values that underlie moral discourse, such as consideration of the viewpoint of others, respect for persons, impartiality, honesty, and the like. There is no reason to believe that the two things we have cited are promoted when students lobby, demonstrate, picket or sit-in.

Second, even if it is granted that to become critical citizens, students need to experience such activities as demonstrating or whatever, nevertheless university consent and supervision on these activities are in order. If responsibility is placed in the university to develop the desired citizens, it stands to reason that it should have the corresponding authority to determine the activities students should engage in. Otherwise, there is no reason why the university should accept the responsibility. Thus, if the freedoms to demonstrate and the like are thought to be necessary for critical citizenship, granting these freedoms to students would still be contingent on the judgment and supervision of the university or its faculty. As such, these freedoms can not be equated with students' legal freedoms, the exercise of which entirely depends on themselves.

The point in all this is that at present, those who have attempted to specify the constituent elements of student academic freedom by appealing to the educational nature of the university have not been able to present any convincing formulation. This failure is unfortunate because, as I shall suggest later, the educational nature of the university indeed points to the appropriate formulation of student academic freedom.

In retrospect, we can observe that the claim to student academic freedom has not been presented with either clarity, consistency or adequacy. On the one hand, advocates of the legal justification arrive at justifications that are decidedly legal or civil, not academic. Granted that students in the university are entitled to civil freedoms, the justification still has to account for some other freedoms students claim not so much as citizens but as students. Otherwise, it cannot give rise to a comprehensive student academic freedom which it is intended to do. Yet the legal justification would seem unable to do so. Even if it is able to do so, it would draw the objection from educators who believe, very reasonably, that in the university they should have a determining voice in deciding on matters that affect the conduct of the educational enterprise. The objection, assuredly, is in order. For to subsume all student freedoms under the civil entitlements of students is in effect to destroy university autonomy in the academic area.

On the other hand, advocates of the institutional justification frequently formulate conceptions that are considerably broader than the justification allows. The net consequence of this state of affairs is that student claim to freedoms within the university becomes enfeebled. This is most unfortunate because arguably, a case for it may be a meritorious one.

This much, however, is clear from the preceding discussion. Students in the university may stake claims to at least two kinds of freedom, and it would not do students any good to subsume their claimed freedoms simply under the rubric of student academic freedom. Their case may be more intelligently and effectively pursued if it is waged along two fronts: the legal and the academic. Advocates on either front will have to argue for the

relevant freedoms that their ends require. We shall, necessarily, leave it to others to argue on the legal front. In the succeeding section, we shall attempt to deal with the initial stage in pressing the case for student freedoms on the academic front by suggesting a tentative but perhaps a more viable conception of student academic freedom.

III TOWARD AN ACCEPTABLE CONCEPTION

Clearly, the first step involves the need to pin down the end for which student academic freedom acts as means. The difficulty in making this first step is that we are here faced with questions about value—questions which do not frequently lend to easy resolution, as the history of moral philosophy attests to. Frequently, such questions are settled by force, or, if not settled, are allowed to remain unresolved and sacrosanct under the democratic ideal of social pluralism.

Nevertheless, whatever is the case, there is no reason to believe that the university cannot meet these values simultaneously. The faculties in a university are varied, and their activities diversified. It is not altogether implausible to suggest that in the modern university, one can pursue his own end, be it preparation for the profession, for social service, for the industry, or for critical citizenship. But what is crucial in this respect is that the university can make provision for all of these only because it has established bodies of knowledge which it makes available for varied purposes. Further, it is also crucial that we can hope to facilitate better the attainment of our purposes only because the university is able to pursue further knowledge. Thus, whatever task we attribute to the university, we find a common denominator, and that is the university's concern for knowledge. Whatever else the university is thought to be or do, its unique role in the search for and transmission of knowledge is undeniable.

Some features related to the university's concern for knowledge should now be stated. First, where the concern is knowledge, the position of the faculty is crucial. It is not inappropriate to say that knowledge does not exist independently of the community of scholars who must constantly work to refine and expand it. Since they are immediately and directly involved in the search for and transmission of knowledge, the faculty are in the best position to determine the knowledge activities in the university.

Second, if the preceding point is valid, then the university (the faculty, with the assistance of the administrative staff who facilitate the knowledge activities therein, vis-à-vis the courts, the legislatures, and the general society. Of course, this is not to say that the independence of the university is complete. As Crittenden has noted, academic freedom is a special freedom that depends on 'whether the members of the society were convinced that the advancement of knowledge, at least in some fields, was crucial for the attainment of other ends that they valued highly.' (37) Nevertheless, given the pervasive social valuation of knowledge and the competence of scholars engaged in it, the case for their academic autonomy is manifest.

Third, the special position of the faculty in relation to the knowledge enterprise makes it apparent that in determining activities by which students are initiated into and guided through knowledge, the latter take a subordinate status. This does not imply that thereby,

students' views should not be considered at all. A perfectly good case can be made for having these views presented and represented in deciding on knowledge activities affecting students. However, clearly the final word must lie with the faculty.

What, then, might be the activities the performance of which must involve autonomy on the part of the university? Tentatively, a list of such activities might include the following:

1 Determining the conduct of teaching, learning, and research;
2 Specifying the academic qualifications of those who will engage in the teaching-learning and research process processes;
3 Fixing the criteria for the award of prizes, degrees, grades, scholarships, and the like;
4 Setting down the minimum academic standards to be met for continuation of one's participation in the university community;
5 Determining the university calendar as well as the course offerings;
6 Formulating the rules and procedures for undertaking any of the above activities, and the sanctions on the violation of the rules and procedures so formulated.

It is in connection with these activities that the university should be fully autonomous without having to fear the creeping legalism that characterizes the contemporary social life. At the same time, it is also in relation to these activities that the university, particularly the faculty, should feel competent in determining what freedoms may be given to students in their pursuit of knowledge. And the principle they might employ in determining such freedoms might be stated as follows: Will this particular freedom promote the students' search for and understanding of knowledge or truth? Using this principle, what specific freedoms will our conception of student academic freedom consist of?

To answer this question satisfactorily, we need to examine rather closely the processes directly related to transmitting and searching knowledge in the university, and then determine whether student freedom in such processes is desirable. Needless to say, this is a difficult task, beyond the intention of this paper. Nevertheless, we can envision what, roughly, such freedoms might be like. They might very well fall under either of two categories: (a) freedoms that are academic because of their intent and the academic nature of their content; and (b) freedoms that are academic largely because of the intent of the activities involved.

(a) Such freedoms as the freedom to choose courses, to select one's professors, to determine the content of one's courses, and the like, can be seen as academic because of their intent and nature. When these freedoms are given to students, the hope is that such freedoms will encourage students to seek actively the knowledge they are interested in, and thus contribute to the universities' task of promoting knowledge. At the same time, these freedoms are of such nature that they can only be found in academic institutions.

(b) On the other hand, students may be given freedoms in engaging in certain activities that might also be found in the wider society. When a student questions and objects to the claims being made by his professor, the latter lets him do so because it furthers the student's knowledge about the subject matter the professor is presenting to him. Note, however, that questioning and objecting are common occurrences in ordinary discourse outside of the university, and are fully protected by law. The difference lies in the intent of

the participants in the university enterprise of questioning and objectingan intent inherent in their roles as scholars and students in search of knowledge. But the tempting question to ask then is: What difference does it make to have freedoms under this category set off as part of student academic freedom? The answer, hopefully, is that it should make a difference.

Thus, for an example, we may conceive of some professors, teaching a course on pornography and its effects on individuals and society, who allow their students to scrutinize and pass around among students of the course what could concededly be classified as pornographic materials. Surely, passing around and scrutinizing such materials are not uncommon in many communities, and are frequently subject to legal penalties. Yet done in the university for the express purpose of furthering our understanding of a pesky social problem, such activities may well be beyond the power of the courts to proscribe.

There might be other protected freedoms in the uni-versity that students may participate in. For example, professors and students alike might engage in a frank, full exploration of the advocacy of rebellion or revolution against the government. Conceivably such an activity in the wider society could be construed as an incitement to rebellion, and courts could possibly declare it illegal and punishable under the law. Yet we would think that such an activity, carried on in the university, should not carry any penalty. Similarly, students of a given course on modern ideologies might invite a known anarchist who never fails to harangue his hearers and enjoin them to a revolution. There is reason to believe that in such a case, both the speaker and the students could be exempt from legal prosecution. Thus, just like the legally justified freedoms, student academic freedom could provide students some measure of protection.

Protection for students, however, is not the only or even the main rationale for student academic freedom. Ultimately, this freedom arises from the need to have the students meet the twofold task of understanding the heritage of human ingenuity, and at least for some of them, of extending further the frontiers of human knowledge. In the words of Michael Oakeshott,

> 'Academic freedom' has become a cant phrase in the mouths of well-meaning but muddled advocates. But, in fact, it can sustain only one meaning: the freedom to be academic, the freedom of a university to pursue its explorations of the enterprises of human understanding and to initiate successive generations of students into this intellectual inheritance. (38)

Analogously, we might say that student academic freedom can sustain only one meaning: the freedom to be a participant in an academic endeavor, to partake of the freedom of the university in the pursuit of human understandings. Students are entitled to some other freedoms, namely the legal ones, and we are bound to observe them in the university. But as initiators of the successive generations of students into the human intellectual inheritance, the faculty has one pressing concern: to extend to students whatever freedom can contribute to their greatest achievement in the knowledge enterprise.

NOTES

1   Sidney Hook, 'Academic Freedom and Academic Anarchy' (New York: Dell, 1969), p. 35.
2   See, for example, Now, the Self-Centered Generation, 'Time' (Canada), September 23, 1974, pp. 8–9.

3   The National Union of Students and the National Council for Civil Liberties, 'Academic Freedom and the Law' (London: Goodwin Press, 1970).

4   Claude Bissell, The Student Version, in 'Student Power and the Canadian Campus,' ed. Tim Reid and Julyan Reid (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, 1969), p. 128.

5   The bill passed by the provincial legislature of Newfoundland, Canada, called The Memorial University (Amendment) Act 1974, is as explicit as any act relating to the power of the university in disciplining and penalizing students. It gives the university Board of Regents the full disciplinary jurisdiction over students, and provides nothing whatsoever about appeal or conviction procedures, leaving the university the chance to suit itself.

6   The American Association of University Professors, for example, came out for student academic freedom only in 1964 when it formed its Committee S on Faculty Responsibility for Academic Freedom of Students. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has of course called for it as early as 1925, but the Union worked largely outside the university and was not listened to favorably until lately.

7   Attempts to make the conception a reality in the American colleges and universities were, however, made. See Romulo F.Magsino, 'The Courts, the University, and the Determination of Student Academic Freedom, Ph.D. dissertation, University of WisconsinMadison, 1973, ch. II, pp. 9–47.

8   The reasons for this have not been thoroughly ascertained. For brief but suggestive comments on the matter, see Walter P.Metzger, Essay II, in 'Freedom and Order in the University,' ed. Samuel Gorovitx (Ohio: The Press of Western Reserve University, 1967), pp. 63–8.

9   Greg Lipscomb, A Student Looks at Academic Freedom, in 'The College and the Student,' ed. Lawrence E.Dennis and Joseph F.Kauffman (Washington, DC: American Council on Education, 1966), pp. 289–90.

10 John Dewey, 'Problems of Men' (New York: Greenwood Press, 1946, 1968), p. 112.

11 Among the formulations available are the following: American Association of University Professors, 1967 Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students, in 'Academic Freedom and Tenure,' ed. Louis Joughin (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), pp. 66–74; American Civil Liberties Union, Academic Freedom and Academic Responsibility, 'AAUP Bulletin' 42 (1956), pp. 517–23; American Civil Liberties Union, 'Academic Freedom and Civil Liberties of Students in Colleges and Universities' (New York: ACLU, 1970); William Birenbaum, in 'The Campus Crisis: Legal problems of University Discipline, Administration and Expansion' ed. Barbara Flicker (New York: Practising Law Institute, 1969), pp. 19–51; Rubin Gotesky, Charter of Academic Rights and Governance, 'Educational Forum,' 32 (November 1967), pp. 9–18; Robert M.Maclver, 'Academic Freedom in Our Time' (New York: University of Columbia Press, 1955), pp. 205–22; Theodore K.Miller and George P.Pilkey, College Student Personnel and Academic Freedom for Students, 'Personnel and Guidance Journal,' 46 (June 1968), pp. 954–60; Student Bill of Rights of the United States National Student Organization, 'School and Society,' 68 (August 1948), pp. 97–101; E.G. Williamson, Students' Academic Freedom, 'Educational Record,' 44 (July 1963), pp. 214–22; and Do Students have Academic Freedom? 'College and University,' 39 (Summer 1964) pp. 466–87.

12 This point is clear in the documents of the American Association of University Professors. The following statement is representative of the AAUP position since its inception:

> It is clear…that the university cannot perform its threefold function without accepting and enforcing to the fullest extent the principle of academic freedom. The responsibility of the university as a whole is to the community at large, and any restriction upon the freedom of the instructor is bound to react injuriously upon the efficiency and the morale of the institution, and therefore ultimately upon the interests of the community.

See the American Association of University Professors, The 1915 Declaration of Principles, in 'Academic Freedom and Tenure,' ed. Louis Joughin (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), p. 165. Also, see Brian Crittenden, 'Education and Social Ideals' (Don Mills, Ontario: Longman Canada, 1973), pp. 62–6.

13 American Association of University Professors, 1967 Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students, in 'Academic Freedom and Tenure,' ed. Louis Joughin (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), p. 66.

14 In relation to the two requirements, two points may be mentioned. First, these requirements, it will turn out, suggest the principle we are looking for. Second, by 'consistent with the nature of an end,' I mean simply that if we are concerned with a moral end (as is true of the end we are concerned with here) and if we are engaged in a moral discourse in search for means to our end, only moral means deserve consideration or qualify.

15 I am using 'categories' advisedly to indicate that each of the two justifications may be subdivided further. Thus, the legal justification may be either one that emphasizes the principle of due process, or one that stresses substantive freedoms. The same may be said of the institutional justification. For an extended discussion of these further justifications, see Magsino, op.cit., chs III, IV, and V.

16 American Civil Liberties Union, 'Academic Freedom and Civil Liberties of Students in Colleges and Universities,' (New York: ACLU, 1970); John Searle, 'The Campus War' (New York: The World Publishing Co., 1971), pp. 184–97; William Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the Rule-Making Power of Public Universities: Some Constitutional Consideration, 'Law in Transition Quarterly, 2 (1965), pp. 1–34; William Birenbaum, in Flicker (ed.), op.cit.

17 American Association of Universi ty Professors, 'Academic Freedom and Tenure;' MacIver, op.cit.; Philip Monypenny, Toward a Standard for Student Academic Freedom, in 'Academic Freedom: The Scholar's Place in Modern Society,' ed. Hans W.Baade (New York: Oceana Publications, 1964); E.G.Williamson, Do Students Have Academic Freedom?, 'College and University,' 37 (Summer 1964), pp. 466–87.

18 Surely one objection to judicial activism, by which courts impose uniform standards (for example, of procedural due process) on social institutions is that it endangers the nature and contributions of such institutions. See Lon Fuller, Two Principles of Human Association, in 'Voluntary Association,' Nomos XI, ed. J.Roland Pennock and John W.Chapman (New York: Atherton Press, 1969), pp. 3–21.

19 American Civil Liberties Union, 'Academic Freedom and Civil Liberties of Students in Colleges and Universities' (New York: ACLU, 1970), p. 4. This is no different from Searle's statement:

> The basic principle is that professors and students have the same rights of free expression, freedom of inquiry, freedom of association and freedom of publication in their roles as professors and students that they have as citizens in a free society, except insofar as the mode of exercise of these freedoms needs to be restricted to preserve the academic and subsidiary functions of the university.

See Searle, op.cit., p. 191. Searle's formulation is more sophisticated than the ACLU's, though no less questionable as student academic freedom.

20 Birenbaum, op.cit., p. 31. The supremacy of the Supreme Court in this statement reflects the American tradition in which the power of judicial review by the courts is amply recognized, especially concerning the interpretation and implementation of the Bill of Rights.

21 The theories or doctrines are 1 in loco parentis, 2 university attendance as privilege, and 3 the waiver of student rights in a contractual relationship. For a brief evaluation of each of these doctrines, see Developments in the Law—Academic Freedom, in 81 'Harvard Law Review', 1144 (1968).

22 As of winter 1973, the Wisconsin (US) legislature was, for example, conducting hearings in connection with a proposed Student Bill of Rights.

23 James A.Perkins, The University and Due Process, in 'American Library Association Bulletin'(September 1968), pp. 977.

24 These points are, I take it, undebatable. See Roy Lucas, Student Rights within the Institutional Framework, in Flicker (ed.), op.cit., pp. 30–86. For a more extensive treatment, see 45 'Denver Law Journal,' 502–678 (1968).

25 William M.Sibley, Accountability and the University: Is Whirl to be King?, in Proceedings of the Third Annual Meeting (1972) of the Canadian Society for the Study of Higher Education, no paging.

26 Thomas F.Green, 'The Activities of Teaching' (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971),p. 223.

27 Ibid.

28 For instance, in Mustell v. Rose, 211 So. 2d. 489 (1968), the court refused to interfere with the suspension of a medical student based on assigned grades which the student challenged. See D.Parker Young, 'The Legal Aspects of Student Dissent and Discipline in Higher Education' (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1970).

29 The law is, presumably, what the courts say it is. In the language of Mr Justice Holmes, 'The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.' Quoted by Clark Byse, Procedure in Student Dismissal Proceedings: Law and Policy, in 'Student Rights and Responsibilities,' ed. J.W.Blair (Ohio: S.Rosenthal, 1969), p. 135.

30 The question of judicial intervention in university affairs is evaluated in Magsino, op.cit., ch. V, pp. 173–214, and ch. VI, pp. 215–29.

31 Sidney Hook, Freedom to Learn but not to Riot, 'New York Times,' 3 January 1965, p. 16. Later in his 'Academic Freedom and Academic Anarchy' (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1969) he uses 'freedom to learn' interchangeably with 'academic freedom far students.'

32 Hook, Freedom to Learn but not to Riot, p. 18

33 Robert Paul Wolff, 'The Ideal of the University' (Boston: Lincoln Press, 1969), pp. 1–57.

34 See, for example, Richard Lichtman, The University: Mask for Privilege? in 'The University Crisis Reader,' 2 vols, ed. Immanuel Wallerstein and Paul Starr (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), vol. 1, pp. 101–20; and Theodore Roszak, On Academic Delinquency, in 'The Dissenting Academy,' ed. Theodore Roszak (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), po. 3–42.

35 Theodore K.Miller and George P.Pilkey. College Student Personnel and Academic Freedom for Students, in 'Personnel and Guidance Journal', 46 (June 1968),pp. 956–8.

36 Jacobus Ten Broek, Norman Jacobson and Sheldon Wolin, Academic Freedom and Student Polit-
    ical Activity, in 'The Berkeley Student Revolt,' ed. Seymour Martin Lipset and Sheldon Wolin
    (New York: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1965), p. 447.
37 Crittenden, op.cit., p. 64.
38 Michael J.Oakeshott, The Definition of a University, 'The Journal of Educational Thought,'
    1 (December 1967), p. 142.

part II
Students' rights

4

From childhood to adulthood: assigning rights and responsibilities

Francis Schrag

In 1965 three students were suspended from the Des Moines, Iowa public schools (two were in high school, one in junior high) for wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War. When their parents challenged the legality of the suspension they posed a question the courts had not heretofore confronted: does the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech apply to students in school? (1) This is but one facet of a larger issue, the legal status of young people, particularly adolescents, an issue which has been the source of continuing dispute both in and out of court since the mid-1960s. (2) As one commentator notes, referring to recent Supreme Court decisions, 'the Court has continued to hear children's rights cases with mixed and at times incongruous results.' (3)

The question to be discussed here is when does a child become adult or more precisely, how shall we determine when a child should be accorded adult status? Such a question presupposes that the distinction between adult and child is legitimate, that children should not be accorded the same rights and responsibilities as adults. It is precisely this presupposition that has recently been challenged by various self-styled child advocates, and before proceeding to the main discussion it is crucial to confront their point of view. The popular author, John Holt, for example, in his book 'Escape From Childhood' takes the following position:

> By now I have come to feel that the fact of being a 'child', of being wholly subservient and dependent, of being seen by older people as a mixture of expensive nuisance, slave, and super-pet, does most young people more harm than good. I propose instead that the rights, privileges, duties, responsibilities of adult citizens be made available to any young person, of whatever age, who wants to make use of them. (4)

John Holt is correct in claiming that children do not enjoy equality before the law with adults. They are not permitted to work or marry. They may neither make a binding contract nor purchase liquor or cigarettes. They may not participate in public affairs by voting, holding public office or sitting on a jury. Finally, children are required to live with their parents, receive medical treatment when sick, and attend school for at least ten years of their lives. Is Holt also correct in contending that such unequal status does them more harm than good? I shall briefly argue that the unequal status accorded children is desirable and indeed protects their best interests. In order to make this point as clearly as possible the following argument is meant to apply only to the very young, let us say, for convenience, children below age four.

THE STATUS OF THE VERY YOUNG

Even those of Holt's persuasion must admit that very young children lack the capacity to understand the consequences of their own actions and failures to act. It is sometimes said of the immature that they are not fully aware of the consequences of their actions, that they act imprudently or improvidently. (5) This is too mild a way of putting it and understates the nature of young children's disabilities. There is no easy way to draw a line between the meaning or nature of an action and its consequences. It is not as if young children were simply shortsighted. In failing to comprehend the consequences of activity, they remain unaware of the significance of activity in a fundamental way. The very young cannot realize that in pushing a button, or touching a wire, or in refusing to go to the doctor when it hurts, they are risking their very lives. Nor can they realize that in sticking a diaper pin into a sibling's tummy or in dropping a screaming bundle onto the floor they may be seriously injuring a human being. Nor can they realize that by pronouncing certain words or scratching their names to a piece of paper they thereby commit themselves to obligations extending over months and years. The very young, lacking a developed awareness of time and cause and effect, that is of the reality beyond themselves, literally do not know what they do. Being thus incapacitated they require not freedom from adult interference but adult care and protection. They need to be protected both from others who would exploit them and from the consequences of their own behavior. The restraint the law imposes on them therefore does them no injury in depriving them of their freedom. On the contrary, it protects their own interests. (6)

Such reasoning is indeed abhorrent when applied to any class of adults save perhaps the retarded and the insane. But we err as much in refusing to make necessary distinctions as in making artificial ones to suit our (adult) interests. The young child's capacities are dramatically different from the adult's, so his rights and responsibilities also should differ from ours. As Aristotle remarked we do as much injustice in treating unequals equally as in treating equals unequally. (7)

The interests of the young child then require that children not be accorded the same rights as adults. A second line of reasoning supports this conclusion as well. Our fundamental notions of fairness demand a balance between rights and responsibilities. If children were granted the right to make contracts we would rightly insist that they had a duty to keep them. If they had a right to serve on juries sitting in judgment on others, we would demand that they themselves be liable to criminal prosecution for violations of the law. Children's inability to understand and control their own actions is the source of our refusal to accord them either adult rights or adult responsibilities. If we granted them the former we would need to grant them the latter as well. This notion of fairness extends to the relationship between them and their guardians as well. Thus parents have the right to impose their will on their own children, to make decisions on their behalf. This 'benefit' is offset by parents' obligation to support their children financially and psychologically.

The position I am taking here seems to deny children basic human rights. Are children not to be treated as human beings then? Have they no rights? What is a right? Without going too far afield into the rich philosophical literature on rights, let us borrow a definition from the British philosopher, John Plamenatz: 'A man (or an animal) has a right whenever other men ought not to prevent him from doing what he wants or refuse him some service

he asks for or needs.' (8) When all rights are identified with protected freedom of action, then indeed children have very restricted rights. All human beings regardless of age require food, protection from the elements, human contact, relief from suffering. We may say that any human has a right to these. (9) Children do have rights qua children as well, to the care and nurture without which normal growth and development will not occur. The duty correlative with this right of providing such care normally falls on the parent, but it would be impossible for them to carry out this duty if they were forbidden from ever interfering with their offsprings' freedom. Freedom of action is an unmitigated good for any being which is able to understand the significance and assess the consequences of alternative courses of action. Freedom of action is a good for almost all adults (excluding the severely retarded). But if the freedom of action of the very young were protected by law, if adults were liable to arrest for ever forcing children to do anything against their will, few children would survive infancy.

This much has so far been shown: the rights and responsibilities accorded very younq children ouqht to be different from those accorded adults. In particular the denial to children of adult rights and responsibilities usually serves the child's own interests. It hardly follows from this, however, that minority should continue to age eighteen. Why should chronological age be the criterion? Should there be only two statuses, child and adult? And should acquisition of the right to vote be connected in any way with acquisition of the right to marry? These are the questions which will occupy us in the remainder of this paper.

THE CONCEPT OF MATURITY

We should begin by pointing to two central facts of human development: 1, Children do not grow by sudden, dramatic leaps or transformations but develop gradually over many years, and 2, Children do not develop at the same rate. No matter what dimension of growth one selects, children of the same chronological age will be found at different points along that dimension. Yet society through its legal system must fix some point in the life of every individual at which it publicly announces: now you may vote, now you may marry, etc. On what basis is such recognition to be made? One plausible answer is: whenever that person reaches maturity. The intention here is to take cognizance of fact 2 in such a way that the transition to legal majority is made to depend on individual attainment rather than on chronological age, which is a very inexact gauge of development at best. As the noted psychologist Gordon Allport remarked, 'A wellbalanced lad of eleven, "wise beyond his years," may have more signs of maturity than many self-centered and and neurotic adults.' (10) We must recognize that what motivates an objection to the age-criterion is a concern for justice. When basic rights are withheld from a population capable of exercising them, a grave injustice is done. The arbitrary fixing of eighteen or twenty-one as the age of majority deprives thousands, perhaps millions of mature younger people of the rights to which they seem morally entitled.

It is unfortunately far from clear how one would determine whether an individual had or had not attained maturity. What is meant in the first place by 'maturity'? We must first of all distinguish between physical and personal maturity. Almost everyone who lives long enough becomes physically mature but not everyone who is physically mature is also personally mature. Moreover, personal maturity is to some extent an achievement

whereas physical maturity is not. That is, a person has control or at least is perceived as having control over whether he will act in a mature way but no control over whether he will grow taller or develop secondary sex characteristics. Thus to say of someone that he is 'mature' or 'immature' is to either compliment or voice disapproval of his mode of behaving. Personal maturity, furthermore, varies from culture to culture in a way that physical maturity does not. The traits valued in an adult Hopi are not necessarily the same as those valued in an adult Chinese or American.

What though do we mean when we speak of a person as being mature? Adults frequently speak of children bteing 'mature' meaning that they are physically or psychologically developed beyond most children of the same age. This is clearly not the sense of 'mature' relevant to determining the transition to adulthood. We also characterize adults as 'mature' but we seem to refer to different aspects of personality depending on the characteristics and attitudes we most value. A person showing great fortitude, even resignation, in the face of misfortune may seem particularly mature to someone while another will characterize him as defeatist or unfeeling. Someone who takes the ups and downs of life with a good deal of humor and levity may be considered mature by one person and frivolous by another. Similarly a person who tenaciously strives for his chosen goals could be considered mature or pigheaded depending on one's point of view. Allport reports an experiment in which two groups of people independently rated university graduate students on the 'balance and degree of maturity which the individual shows in his relations with other people.' The correlation between the two sets of ratings was O.41. (11) There is, to be sure, a vague, general understanding that the mature individual has a greater sense of responsibility and a greater autonomy than the immature. But can we reach consensus on precisely what conduct is to count as mature? Unless such consensus can be found the criterion of maturity is likely in practice to be equivalent to 'those who share the particular values and attitudes of those in authority,' a most dangerous basis for extending or denying individual basic rights.

Let us view the problem of formulating a conception of maturity from the perspective of society rather than that of the individual. We can then reformulate our question. Instead of asking What is a mature individual?, we could ask, What are the minimum requirements for assuming the rights and responsibilities of a full member of society? (12) This question could in turn be broken down into several component questions such as, What minimum capacities and inclinations should a person exhibit before society accords him the rights and responsibilities of voting, marrying, or making contracts, etc. This approach to determining when people are eligible for full membership in society promises to be less subject to diverse value biases and more suited to determining a basis for awarding majority status than an approach which depends on a subjective assessment of maturity. Consider the problem of establishing minimal criteria for voting or getting married.

What must a person be able to do before he or she is entitled to marry? Let us assume that the right to marry includes the right to procreate. Does this mean that if a person is biologically able to bear or father children, he (she) thereby has the right to marry and become a parent? Few would agree, for they would point out that bringing up and caring for children, not bearing them, is what society is concerned about. But on what basis do we determine whether a person is capable of rearing children? Here we come against the same difficulties we encountered earlier. We do not share the same views about what matters in

child rearing. Must a person have an understanding of children and child development? Some would answer in the affirmative; others, not. Must a prospective parent have an ability to love his (her) child? Of course. But what does this mean? Does it mean that a parent must place the child's interest first? Always? Does it mean that a parent would refuse to leave the child in someone else's care for most of the day? Does it mean that the parent would cuddle the child and hold it a great deal? Pick the baby up when it cries? Put money away for its education? Or consider the requirement that a prospective parent be able to support his (her) child. What does 'support' mean? Does it mean meeting the child's minimum nutritional requirements? Does it mean earning enough so one parent can stay home with the child? Does it mean that the child must be able to have its own room? Does it include the ability to provide baby sitters? Children's books? Vacations? Or consider simply the requisite maturity for making a marriage contract without regard to becoming a parent. Must a person be able to form and maintain an exclusive attachment to a person of the opposite sex? Must he or she contemplate a lifetime commitment? Must he or she be capable of deep emotional attachment? The answers depend on one's conception of the nature of marriage which in turn depends on one's personal and social ideals.

The point I am trying to bring out here is not merely that as a practical matter it would be almost impossible to determine whether a given individual would make a competent parent or spouse, which it would be, but that in trying to define the criteria of minimal competence we run into the very problems of value diversity which we were hoping to avoid.

To take another case, consider the problem of defining minimal qualifications for voting. That task presupposes an understanding of the task of the voter. But what is this task? Is it to push down buttons and move a lever? Surely not. The voter must make an intelligent choice. But what is it that he is to choose? Is his task that of selecting among alternative policies or alternative political parties? Does the voter select men to represent his own interests or the public interest? Different answers to such questions have dramatically different implications for determining criteria of minimal competence for voting. For example less understanding is required for a voter to decide between the Republican and Democratic parties than for him to decide between two policies for controlling inflation. It is likewise easier for a voter to predict which of two candidates will serve his own interest than which will serve the public interest. Once again without achieving consensus on the nature of the voter's task we cannot arrive at minimal criteria for voting. Such consensus is unobtainable, however, because of the diverse conceptions of the role of the citizen in a democracy, conceptions that derive from conflicting ideals concerning the good life and the good society. (13)

I have been arguing that the notion of identifying minimum qualifications for becoming husband, parent or voter is value laden, in a sense in which setting qualifications for becoming driver or infantry soldier or bricklayer is not, for we can obtain consensus on the functions or tasks of the latter which we cannot on the former. This absence of consensus, I maintain, results not because some people are right while others are in error but because of commitment to diverse but equally legitimate personal and social ideals. A pluralist society has no right, I would further argue, to enforce one particular conception of marriage or parenthood or citizenship at the expense of others. The concept of maturity, no matter how it is formulated, is therefore incapable of serving as a direct basis for according majority status unless we are willing to sacrifice our commitment to diverse personal and social

ideals. Yet the conventional use of chronological age as a criterion is, perhaps, unjust as pointed out earlier. Two additional arguments favoring the traditional criterion, however, must also be considered.

1 It does not work to either the advantage or the disadvantage of any self-conscious or recognizable groups or special interests. Any other criterion based on individual maturity is likely to benefit some partisan or class interest. The use of some sort of 'maturity scale,' like the use of intelligence tests, is: likely to favor the educated, which is to say the more affluent classes. The age-criterion is non-partisan, however, in that the children of Republicans or the affluent or whites and the children of Democrats, the poor or blacks, are a all equally excluded. 2 One of the defects of any criterion based on individual attainment is that it leaves the question of who shall and who shall not enjoy majority status within the realm of human control. It is true that any minimal age requirement illegitimately deprives a segment of the population of its rights. But every such person may look forward to his eventual enfranchisement. There is very little any person or group could do short of mass murder to prevent millions of people from reaching the age of majority. Where majority status depends on some demonstration of maturity by the candidate, however, the possibility and hence the risk exists of a deliberate effort being made by one section of the population to prevent particular individuals or groups from ever being accorded majority status. Nineteenth- and twentiethcentury efforts to prevent blacks from voting in the South attest to the fact that the possibility of abuse is perhaps more accurately labeled a likelihood. It is exceedingly dangerous from the point of view of justice to make the possession of basic rights dependent on the probity, good will and impartiality of any man or group of men.

Despite its attendant injustices, therefore, I believe that the relatively equitable distribution of injustice among all social groupings and the certainty of everyone's attaining adult status are persuasive enough reasons to maintain the traditional criterion.

SETTING THE AGE OF MAJORITY

What, however, ought the age of majority to be? Does not setting a particular age indirectly invoke conceptions of maturity? Before answering these questions we need to consider whether there ought to be a single age for attaining majority status or rather different ages for acquiring different rights and responsibilities. (14) The law does already to some extent recognize different ages in different spheres of endeavor. For example, fifteen and sixteen are the minimum ages for obtaining a driver's license in some states, and the age required for marrying without parental consent especially for women is often two or three years below the age required for voting. It does seem as if a lower level of maturity were needed to drive a car than to vote although it is not clear what kind of evidence could substantiate this. One could as well argue that an immature driver poses a greater risk than an immature voter. Even if there were general agreement on these matters, however, there is a persuasive rationale for retaining the overall status of major and minor. This rationale invokes the idea of fairness mentioned earlier. It is unfair, we noted, to assign responsibilities without

corresponding rights and vice versa. The advocates of the recent constitutional amendment lowering the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen relied heavily and justifiably on the argument that a person liable to conscription and possible loss of life ought to have a voice in selecting those representatives whose decisions will determine whether there shall be war or peace. This notion of fairness can be applied throughout. A person permitted to marry and bring up children into the world ought to assume the responsibility of sustaining a family and vice versa. For why should grandparents be responsible for the care of children when they were excluded from the decision which brought these children into the world. A person liable to adult criminal proceedings and the verdict of adult juries ought to be permitted to vote for the judges who might sit in judgment over him, and to sit on juries and grand juries in judgment on others. A person permitted to make and be bound by contracts offering payment for goods or services ought not to be legally dependent on another for his support. Or to put it from the parents' point of view, if they are legally required to support their child because he (she) is not yet capable of self-support, then they ought to be protected from the financial obligations he (she) may unvittingly or foolishly incur. Again, when children legally acquire independence from parents to act as they wish without parental consent, then they ought also to bear the responsibility for their own support. I need not continue. The same points have been made, convincingly I think, with respect to the status of women. The notion of a fair balance of rights and responsibilities applies in both contexts.

The problem of setting the age of the transition to majority status still remains. A consensus could probably be reached that this age should be set somewhere between fourteen and twenty-five. Most are agreed that children prior to the relatively dramatic changes, both physical and psychological, that occur during puberty are unfit for adult status. Twenty-one has been the traditional age of majority in the Anglo-American world for centuries and not many would favor raising it by more than a couple of years. The selection of this age range rather than another certainly involves a conception of human development and maturity. How can we select a specific age from within this range? Are eighteen-year-olds sufficiently mature to marry, or should the age be raised (or lowered)? Are eighteen-year-olds today more (or less) mature than eighteen-year-olds of ten years ago? If my analysis of 'maturity' is correct, no amount of empirical data will determine answers to such questions. Take the case of marriage. There is statistical evidence to show that marriages of those under twenty-one are more likely to end in divorce than marriages of those above twenty-one. But what does this prove? That the younger group is less mature? Not at all. That conclusion only follows if we assume that it is a sign of maturity for a couple to sustain an intimate relationship which is unsatisfying or burdensome to one or both spouses. Why make such an assumption? Could one not as well say that those unwilling to divorce even though their relationship has become sterile and destructive are the immature ones? And why should the ability to make long-term commitments be equated with maturity in the first place? Possibly the younger generation's expectations and aspirations concerning marriage exceed those of the older generations. Seeking more, they are more often disappointed. Does that make them less mature? Is being satisfied with little a necessary indication of maturity?

How then should the age be fixed if not on the basis of evidence concerning the maturity of the young? What is important, I would argue, is whether the age that is set is perceived

to be reasonable by both majors and minors. If the age is perceived to be too high by the young, they will feel justified in disregarding or violating the decisions of those set in authority over them. If the age is perceived to be too low, the older public is going to have less confidence in and feel less bound by the decisions of the electorate, verdicts of juries, etc., in which younger people have participated. What is at stake here is public confidence in public processes and decisions. The young need to feel that as many as possible of those able to make their own choices and participate in public decisions are eligible to do so. The older citizens need to feel that public decisions which affect them are not made by those too immature to make them. Parents and children need to feel that legal rights and responsibilities towards each other are not terminated too late or too early. What counts, in short, is congruent perceptions of maturity. These perceptions are likely to differ among members within each group and between the two groups. Here compromise is necessary and appropriate. A compromise must be reached which will leave neither group with a sense of outrage or indignation. The age of eighteen may be a satisfactory compromise in our time, but since people's perceptions change, I would expect the age of majority to fluctuate from time to time and place to place.

TOWARDS DEFINING A NEW STATUS

We have seen that the very young should not be accorded the rights and the responsibilities of adulthood. Further I have maintained that the legal transition to adulthood should continue to be chronological age and that there should not be different ages for the assumption of different rights and responsibilities. Nothing in my argument so far, however, accounts for or defends the present arrangement whereby a person is and continues to be a legal minor from birth to his eighteenth birthday. It seems odd, to say the least, that the law does not recognize any significant development in the first eighteen years of life, that the sixteen-year-old possesses virtually the same rights and responsibilities as the sixteen-month-old. In the final section of this paper, I would therefore like to argue in favor of creating a new legal status between minority and majority. (15)

I begin once again with a fact: there is an increasing recognition by people of all ages that our society is failing to provide the conditions which encourage young people to grow into responsible adulthood. A panel on youth, appointed by the President's Science Advisory Committee, headed by the eminent sociologist James S.Coleman states the situation concisely: 'In our view the institutional framework for maturation in the United States is now in need of serious examination.' (16) Neither the topic nor the analysis and recommendations of the panel are new. Much the same point of view was expressed eloquently for well over a decade by the late Paul Goodman (whose name and works are ironically omitted from the numerous sources cited by the panel). Indeed the thrust of the panel's recommendations can be summarized in one of Goodman's exhortations: 'Our aim should be to multiply the paths of growing up, instead of narrowing the one existing school path.' (17) The problem which Goodman, the panel and many other scholars and social critics recognize is that the institutional and legal structures created to protect the development of youth 'have uncritically been extended to the point where they deprive youth of experience important to their growth and development.' (18) These institutional structures, the school in particular, which segregate youth from the adult coinmunity deny

to them both the rights and the obligations which would encourage them to develop in the directions of enhanced independence and responsibility. I will not enumerate all the recommendations of the panel. It is sufficient to say that they are designed to facilitate the independence of youth (through, for example, work in production, in public service and participation in youth communities). (19) The report does not propose the abolition of formal secondary schooling but does recommend that the school exercise far less of a monopoly over the adolescent's time. One section of recommendations deals with the legal status of youth. Here the panel recommends nothing more than the establishment of a separate minimum wage for youth and the revision of child labor standards in 'the interest of flexibility, individualization, and the opening of wider opportunities for work experience and employment.' (20)

It is clear that the authors of the report are conscious of the deleterious constraints which minority status places upon youth though they are justifiably unwilling to accord adolescents full adult status. The idea of a legally defined status between the two has perhaps not occurred to them. I believe that the establishment of such a status would both facilitate and legitimize the creation of the kinds of alternative institutions and environments for youth envisioned by reformers. What will be needed is recognition by all age groups, children, adolescents and adults, that those between say ages fifteen and eighteen are no longer children nor yet adults. Those within this age group would not bear all the burdens nor enjoy all the benefits of majority status. On the other hand they would not be bound by the very severe constraints placed on children or be freed of all responsibilities for their own lives and those of others.

At this level of abstraction such a proposal may sound attractive but what specific rights and responsibilities would holders of the new status possess? These rights and responsibilities fall into three categories: economics, family life and political participation. To require youth to be economically self-sufficient would not be feasible in a society with millions of unemployed adults. Moreover, it is contrary to young people's interests in discovering their talents, finding meaningful work and fashioning their own identity. The burden of responsibility for their own support would foreclose many opportunities for people of this age group. Yet the sixteen- to eighteen-year-old group needs work and needs partial independence. The recommendations of the President's panel include a direct government subsidy to youth in the form of educational vouchers and a vast expansion of opportunities for public service work such as is provided on a small scale by VISTA. (21) These two recommendations could be tied together in such a way that all youth would receive vouchers but would in turn have the responsibility of devoting a certain minimum number of hours a week or a month to such public service work. A balance between benefits and burdens would then be obtained. A young person could choose from among the many service oriented sectors where the demand for personnel far exceeds the supply, in nursing homes and homes for the aged, orphanages, hospitals, day-care centers, etc. They would gain independence by not being beholden to their parents for funds to pursue their own educational interests. Vouchers could be used for a variety of kinds of training in and out of schools and perhaps for such activities as travel as well. The decisions and the consequences would be the young people's, not their parents'.

Adults are reluctant to sanction marriage among members of this age group because the marriage license is also the license for parenthood and there is widespread feeling that

those in the sixteen to eighteen range haven't had sufficient life experience to take on the responsibilities of parenthood. Almost ten years ago Margaret Mead offered an intriguing suggestion that two distinct kinds of marriage be established: (22) 'individual marriage,' an intimate relation in which each partner has responsibilities to the other alone, and 'parental marriage,' which would be 'explicitly directed toward the founding of a family.' (23) The aim of and requirements for entering into each of the two forms would differ. I would suggest that holders of the new youth status be eligible to enter into such individual marriage, the purpose of which would be to 'give two very young people a chance to know each other with a kind of intimacy that does not usually enter into a brief love affair, and so it would help them to grow into each other's life—and allow them to part without the burden of misunderstood intentions, bitter recriminations and self-destructive guilt.' (24)

As Mead sees it the obligations of the parties would be ethical. No economic commitments would be involved: 'If the marriage broke up, there would be no alimony or support.' (25) Such relationships recognized by law, are, I believe, ideally suited to the transitional period between childhood and adulthood. They offer prerogatives and responsibilities to youth which present challenges to growth without imposing staggering burdens or excessive risks to the future of the young people.

In the civic sphere the transition to majority status is abrupt and unsatisfying in several respects. Participation as measured by voting is 'low among the newly enfranchised. Lowering the voting age to eighteen did not alter this phenomenon. Moreover, having little experience in civic life, youth often harbor attitudes of indifference or cynicism towards politics and the polity. Participation in school politics is often seen as a sham since students have little voice in determining the basic structure and operation of the institution. I propose that youth in the fifteen- to eighteen-year-old status be accorded the right to participate in public life in the following ways: 1, that they be eligible to vote for those elected officials whose decisions have the greatest impact on their own lives; these would include members of local boards of education, state superintendents of public instruction, justices of the juvenile court, and of course those officials whose task it would be to administer the new institutions relating to youth; 2, that they be eligible to serve on boards of education or their analogues at every level of government; 3, that holders of the new status be elected or appointed to serve as advisors and consultants to the juvenile court and all other institutions dealing with juvenile problems. The purpose of such augmented rights and responsibilities would once again be to facilitate the transition to majority status in a gradual way which would encourage participation without jeopardizing the survival of the polity.

The particular rights and responsibilities of the youth status which I have sketched out are intended primarily to enable the reader to visualize the kind of thing I have in mind. The spelling out of specifics will require a great deal of social experimentation and analysis of the kind projected in the report on youth. I do not believe that the establishment of such a new legal status can precede the development of new institutions and environments for youth. If such new institutions can be founded, however, I think the creation of a youth status would protect and strengthen them and bring to all age groups a sense of rationality and coherence in the socialization process which would otherwise be lacking.

I would like briefly to consider two objections which I anticipate being raised to my proposal. I think it will be argued that the creation of a new status will foster the sense of separateness which adolescents already feel, will actually intensify the feelings of alienation

and hostility towards adults which members of this age group already harbor. I cannot agree. The adolescents' sense of apartness is the result of the conflicting messages they receive from the adult society. On the one hand they are exhorted to 'grow up' and to act as 'mature and responsible people.' On the other hand, they are denied any real independence or responsibility. Informally they are urged to act as adults while their legal status reflects the fact that society does not distinguish them from infants. My proposal would foster in the fifteen- to eighteen-year-olds the sense of having achieved a status beyond childhood, of beginning to take part in the real world of the workplace and the voting booth, of having the opportunity to make decisions about things that matter to others and to themselves. Moreover, my proposal would require youth to work closely with adults in projects that matter to the entire community. The current pattern whereby members of one age group fraternize with each other almost exclusively would be disrupted.

A second concern is likely to be voiced by those who see the proposal as threatening to the integrity of the family and the beneficial influence which parents can have over their adolescent children. Will not the proposal allow or even encourage the boy or girl of sixteen to leave home in order to marry against parental wishes, to squander his or her vouchers of worthless experiences instead of embarking on a serious education? There is some risk to be sure and one can do little more than speculate about probable responses. But three things need to be kept in mind. First, the period in which the parents exert the greatest influence over their children, shaping their basic values and attitudes, is probably long over by the time they turn sixteen. Second, it is doubtful that parental coercion and blackmail are ever very successful where more benign forms of persuasion have failed. It is doubtful, for example, that parents are able to compel their children to benefit from the educational opportunities available in college even when they are able to compel attendance by threatening withdrawal of financial support. In fact the source of much of the adolescent's rebelliousness is to be found, I would argue, in the resentment engendered by his dependent status. Third, parents would retain considerable leverage over their adolescent children inasmuch as the latter, though not barred from employment, would not usually be economically self-sufficient.

One of the fruits of modern life and thought is the pervasive awareness that the patterns and categories of social life are human constructs rather than part of the natural or divine order. This awareness has caused some to assume that all existing institutions are barriers to human liberation. Others have taken this awareness as a spur to their efforts to shore up the established order through exhortation if possible, by force if necessary. Amid such opposing tendencies there is a need for sober, reflective analysis whose purpose is to discern which traditional patterns are worthy of preservation, which, of dissolution. Such an analysis in the limited area of the rights and responsibilities of children and youth is what I have tried to provide in this paper.

NOTES

1   'Tinker v. Des Moines School District,' 393 US 503, 515 (1969).

2   Two other often cited, landmark cases in the area are 'In re Gault,' 387 US 1 (1967), and 'Wisconsin v. Yoder,' 406 US 205 (1972).

3   Hillary Rodham, Children under the Law, 'Harvard Educational Review,' XLIII (1973), p. 499.

4   John Holt, 'Escape from Childhood: The Needs and Rights of Youth' (New York: Dutton, 1974), p. 18. See also, for example, Shulamith Firestone, 'The Dialectic of Sex' (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), ch. IV.

5   See B.C.Gavit (ed.), 'Blackstone's Commentaries on the Law' (Washington, DC: Washington Law Book Co., 1941), p. 204.

6   Ibid.

7   Aristotle, 'Nicomachean Ethics,' 5.2, 1131a, 23–5.

8   John Plamenatz, Rights, 'Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume' 24 (1950), p. 75. This formulation is somewhat too broad and fails to distinguish between different degrees of 'ought.' See Joel Feinberg, Duties, Rights, and Claims, 'American Philosophical Quarterly,' III (1966), 137–44.

9   These rights are presumptive; that is, they may be overridden under certain circumstances.

10 Gordon W.Allport, 'Pattern and Growth in Personality' (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965), p. 277.

11 Allport, op.cit., p. 282.

12 See Alex Inkeles, Society, Social Structure, and Child Socialization, in John A.Clausen (ed.), 'Socialization and Society' (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), pp. 73–129.

13 See P.F.Strawson, Social Morality and Individual Ideal, 'Philosophy,' XXXVI (1961), pp. 1–17. For more on the problem of setting qualifications for political participation, see my The Child's Status in the Democratic State, 'Political Theory,' 111, 4 (November 1975), pp. 441–57.

14 This suggestion is made by Rodham, op.cit., pp. 507–9.

15 This is not a new idea. Indeed, human development has long been accorded recognition by the Canon Law which identifies three distinct statuses between birth and age twenty-one. See John A.Abbo and Jerome D.Hannan (eds), 'The Sacred Cannons: A Concise Presentation of the Current Disciplinary Norms of the Church,' vol. I (St Louis, Missouri: Herder Book Co., 1952), pp. 123–30.

16 James S.Coleman (ed.), 'Youth: Transition to Adulthood: Report of the Panel on Youth of the President's Science Advisory Committee' (University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 1.

17 Paul Goodman, 'New Reformation: Notes of a Neolithic Conservative' (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), p. 87.

18 Coleman, op.cit., p. 130.

19 Ibid., pp. 145–75.

20 Ibid., p. 167.

21 Ibid., pp. 169–73.

22 Margaret Mead, Marriage in Two Steps, 'Redbook' (July 1966)*,* pp. 48–9, 84–5.

23 Ibid., p. 84.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

5
Compulsory education: a moral critique

Leonard I.Krimerman

1 AN INTRODUCTORY ANALOGY

In Clark Stewart's virtually unknown novella, 'Auriana,' everyone upon reaching 50 is forced to spend much of every day (except Monday) in recreational games and contests chosen and organized for them by younger folk. (1) They are picked up in the morning, taken to playing fields or gymnasiums, given equipment and instruction, and brought home by late afternoon. This regimen continues for ten years, after which there is an option to remain in the program on a voluntary basis. Jake Justin, the central character of 'Auriana,' comes to resent and then to rebel against this system of 'compulsory recreation' (CR). Jake constantly finds himself at odds with his wellintentioned 'recreators': when they tell him it is time for karate, he feels like swimming or reading; he gets enthusiastic about cross-country running, but it turns out to be the tri-mester for competitive team sports. 'Reading and cross-country track,' he is told by a District Recreation Supervisor, 'are strictly extracurricular.' Eventually, Jake sees himself as 'a parttime slave,' drafted each morning into athletic training, compelled by law 'to participate in a ten-year long circus.' He asks the Supervisor, 'How is this different from punishing people who haven't committed any crime?'

The ironies of Jake's position are endless. His keepers are neither cruel nor despotic: they rarely punish his rebellions, and attempt to understand them as symptoms of 'senility' or of 'a disturbed marriage.' He winds up repelled by sports such as volleyball and tennis that, prior to CR, were sources of spontaneous pleasure. His 'game-mates' are not concerned by the loss of a decade of free time. They are puzzled by Jake's opposition to what they regard as no less natural than 'heat in the summer, ice in the winter.' They expect to be stronger and healthier at the end of their induction into CR than when they turned 50. Jake's conviction that they are all slaves, strikes everyone else as unintelligible: 'How can CR be slavery if we all are required to spend the same amount and period of our lives in it?' 'What promotes such goods as physical vitality and longer life cannot be slavery!'

'Auriana,' though a fantasy, strikes very close to home. It raises fundamental questions as to the legitimacy of CE, which most contemporary societies have come to treat as a natural and useful custom, very distant from 'part-time slavery.' For though there is vagueness in what counts as 'compulsory education,' the central cases of this notion involve the use of force and the threat of legal sanctions to ensure attendance and participation for several years in a prescribed and standardized curriculum. Thus, CE does involve a loss of liberty throughout a substantial period of one's life, it forces learners to submit to the prejudices and routines of others, it refuses to honor the learning objectives of those compelled to participate. Thus, if we agree with Jake Justin about CR, must we not also view CE as a form of slavery, or at least of intolerable injustice?

One way to defend CE against this condemnation by analogy would be to locate a relevant contrast between the two practices, one that could establish that the moral objections to CR are without weight against CE. Thus, CR is a fictional notion, whereas CE has real instances. But this disanalogy, though clear, cannot show CE to be any more defensible than CR. The major differences between these two compulsory practices are easy to spot; they concern who and what is compelled. Thus, Section 2 discusses defenses of CE based on the alleged deficiencies of children: there I argue that we have reason to doubt whether children are more defective than adults (at least those in 'Auriana'), and that, even if they are, this neither justifies CE nor establishes any moral contrast between it and CR. Section 3, on the other hand, focuses on the *what* of CE and CR, and specifically on the claim that education can be distinguished from recreation by virtue of its greater contributions to 'society's interests,' e.g. to a democratic polity, to the development of productive and medical technology, etc. In view of these contributions, the argument runs, education is justifiably made compulsory. My response is that the supposed contributions are conjectural and in any case are no less likely under voluntarized arrangements than under CE.

Finally, in Section 4, I consider and rebut two common practical objections to the idea of discarding CE; first, that without this practice, unjust and pernicious conditions, such as racism and inequitable distributions of wealth and opportunities, would be strengthened; and second, that CE is not eliminable, at least not from any industrialized society.

In brief, my aim in what follows is to develop and lend support to Auriana's implicit renunciation of CE by showing that presumed contrasts between CR and CE either do not obtain, rest on ungrounded conjecture, or fail to show any respect in which the two practices are morally distinguishable, and by countering practical objections often raised against the goal of voluntarizing education. The case against CE, I shall argue, is no less strong than that against CR.

2 THE DEFICIENCIES OF CHILDREN

2.1 Children, we may think, are under-developed and immature; they lack foresight, experience, information, and responsibility. In this light, the requirement of compulsory schooling may seem to make sense, for it is designed to offset those deficiencies, and thus in the long run to benefit both the child and the rest of society.

2.11 One difficulty with this defense of CE is immediately apparent, for the fifth-decade citizens of Auriana also have diminished capacities. Their powers of coordination, endurance, physical strength and the like have begun to fade; the aim of CR is to contain or reverse this process, to revitalize abilities and energies. Nonetheless, this appeal to deficiencies and their reduction does not prompt us to alter our attitude towards CR; it remains an unjustifiable invasion of personal freedom. Consider also the case of health services. These are seldom furnished on an involuntary basis, even when it is certain that a person is ailing, that their ailment (e.g. alcoholism or VD) is curable, and that it is causing distress, or even spreading, to others. In short, knowledge of a person's deficiencies and of a remedy for curtailing them and their consequences does not invariably license interference with that person or the coercive imposition of that remedy. Thus, even if we assume that children are under-developed as persons and further assume that CE is a remedy for their defects, this alone cannot justify that practice or distinguish it from CR.

2.2 Here it may be countered that children are incapacitated in a different and more severe way than the adults in Auriana. The latter have begun to lose their physical powers, but the former lack something which is more fundamental: the capacity to make decisions based on past experience. They lack familiarity with their own enduring interests, they are ignorant about the consequences of varying options. It is because the 'rational powers' of 50 year old Aurians are undiminished, because they can all judge what is optimum recreation for themselves, that CR is antithetical to our moral intuitions. More precisely, it runs contrary to our notion that, on this matter—choosing the best form of recreation for oneself—each of these adults is on the whole the best possible judge.

CE, on the other hand, does not encounter any such difficulty. For (it is alleged) children do not know what is educationally best for themselves. Their powers of discrimination, prediction, self-awareness, etc., are embryonic and operate only intermittently. They are inept at choice-making, they have little or ho experience assessing ranges of options, they are not the best possible—or even competent—judges when it comes to deciding what sort of education they should have. When seen in this light, so the argument goes, CE can be distinguished morally from CR. CE makes choices for those unable to make them on their own, whereas CR makes choices for persons who, though physically on the wane, are otherwise intact and more capable than anyone else of making those choices. What we see as intolerable about CR, therefore, is absent from, and cannot mar the legitimacy of, CE.

2.21 This line of defense will not salvage CE. It is far from true, to begin with, that all children are deficient at choice-making. The choices of most 10 and 12 year olds, not to mention teenagers, might well compare favorably with those of most adults, regardless of one's standard for 'rational,' 'sensible,' or 'wise' choices. Like adults, children are a heterogeneous lot; why should all of them suffer for the defects of some (or even most)? Suppose, though, that we concede the problematic assumption that children, by and large, are less capable of decision-making than adults. This would certainly supply a contrast between CR and CE, but from it we need not conclude that CE is justifiable. We could instead infer that everyone should be exempt from educational impositions, unless and until they had been shown to be severely deficient in rationality, or to be substantially below most adults in this respect. Our working principle would then be 'rationally competent unless proven otherwise'; the clear burden of evidence would rest with those alleging severe deficiency. Given this principle, which is fully compatible with children being comparatively under-developed, our educational arrangements would operate much as do hospitals today. People would be committed into them temporarily, under extraordinary circumstances, and for the most part voluntarily. Those arrangements would aim at eliminating the insufficiences or incapacities which originally justified their intervention. Where an educational system did not regard itself as in this sense self-eliminating, it would forfeit any rights over the time and energy of children, even those admittedly deficient. Just as juvenile and mental institutions have recently been put on judicial notice to 'treat or release,' so such failing educational institutions would be required to either 'develop rational powers or release.'

The point which emerges here is this: even if it is granted that children on the whole are less decisionally competent than adults, that some are severely defective as decision-makers, and that in some cases severe deficiences in rationality can warrant educational intervention, this intervention need not take the form of CE. Hospitals to which people are sent for diagnosis and treatment, in some cases against their consent, do not by themselves

add up to a system of 'compulsory health care.' Where people (including children) are ordinarily allowed to educate themselves as they prefer, with exceptions only in extreme circumstances, what obtains may be 'sporadic educational intervention,' but it is too occasional and peripheral to be CE.

2.22 That one can grant the sub-rationality of children without embracing CE can be shown in another way: by examining the general relationship between rights and 'degree of development.' For under-developed capacities, taken alone, do not provide a reason for reducing someone's rights. In certain cases, differences in capacity, even when extensive, are morally besides the point: everyone from the severely retarded to the genius is thought to have an equal right to vote, ride public transportation, use public parks. Moreover, inferior abilities sometimes warrant the provision of a greater share of responsibilities: other people may not need the experience as much, and more growth may be expected from this type of allocation than from any other. Thus, in pedagogical contexts, the least advanced may have the greatest need, and right, to present their thoughts for criticism, to use the dark room, etc. ('Let Jerry stretch the canvas; you already know how to do it.')

If defective powers by themselves do not justify a contraction of rights or responsibilities, then the greenness of children as choice-makers cannot warrant the reduction of their rights under CE. On the contrary, those deficiencies might either (i) be irrelevant to whether children should enjoy educational liberty (as the failings of mentally retarded persons are irrelevant to their right to vote) or (ii) provide grounds for extending full educational choice to children so that they can begin to grow more directly and completely into competent choice-makers (as the under-development of the least capable learner is grounds for ensuring him/her greater access to resources and responsibilities).

Or consider the 'mentally ill.' A person may suffer from phobias or paranoid delusions that make him behave irrationally or, like Mary Barnes, may become totally absorbed back into his own infancy. (2) We have begun to see that involuntary institutionalization is rarely a satisfactory way to cope with such departures from rationality. A close and voluntary association with people living ordinary lives, who are caring without being controlling or invasive, may be more desirable in two ways: in terms of (a) such short-run considerations as how a person feels about their experience and their relations with others and (b) their long-range struggle for fuller health and development. The same might hold for children. They might learn and grow more completely, in addition to having a more satisfying or enjoyable educational experience, where their learning choices were unrestricted, where adults had no official or coercive authority and functioned as co-learners, advisors, resource coordinators, etc. The benefits for children of promoting education through voluntarized and noninstitutionalized approaches might far exceed those achieved through CE.

This was William Godwin's contention, two centuries before 'Compulsory Mis-Education,' 'Deschooling Society,' 'School is Dead,' etc. In Of the Communication of Knowledge, Godwin maintained that where the learner is guided by 'a perception of the value of the thing learned,' rather than by 'constraint and fear' or 'by accidental attractions' appended by a teacher, we have 'the most desirable mode of education.' For to study because one desires to, to 'proceed upon a plan of one's own invention' is:

> the pure and genuine condition of a rational being. By exercise it strengthens the judgment. It elevates us with a sense of independence. It causes a man (sic) to stand alone and is the only

method by which he can be rendered truly an individual, the creature not of implicit faith but of his own understanding. (3)

Given a position like Godwin's, the deficiencies of childhood rationality, even where severe, cannot establish a case for CE. For according to his position, CE is not the only or the best way to reduce those deficiencies. It seemed plausible to Godwin, and remains plausible, that independent rational judgment is not strengthened by a routine of restriction and obedience, but by the exercise of such judgment even in its earliest stages of maturation. (Just as children learn to speak their native language without formal or compulsory instruction, but by actively exchanging and experimenting with sounds.) If this is so, then the routine of compulsory schooling would tend to stunt development by giving learners no incentive to acquire the ability (or integrity) to think problems through on their own, to reach or even conceive of conclusions beyond those expected, rewarded or required.

Recently, Godwin's philosophical reflections have been confirmed by empirical studies which indicate that using rewards to 'motivate' learning can backfire. Two psychologists, David Greene and Mark R.Lepper, begin where Godwin did: by distinguishing between intrinsically motivated learning (a child who reads unassigned books for enjoyment) and learning done for ulterior or extrinsic motives (a child who reads because books have been assigned or to do well on tests). On their view, there is a

> Danger that extrinsic rewards may undermine intrinsic motivation…. If we induce a child to engage in an interesting activity by offering a reward, the child may come to perceive that activity and his engagement in it differently. Rather than being an end in itself, the activity may become a means to an end. Because of the reward, the child has a different, ulterior motive for engaging in the activity. At any other time, when the reward is no longer available, the child may be less likely to engage in the activity on his own. (4)

From these considerations, Greene and Lepper formulated their 'overjustification' hypothesis; i.e. that inducing people to engage in an activity to achieve extrinsic goals (avoid punishment, win prizes) may neutralize their intrinsic interest in that activity. They then constructed an experiment with pre-schoolers and magic markers. The authors' hypothesis predicted:

> that children who had expected and received an award for their drawing would subsequently play less with markers, in the absence of further rewards, than children who received an award unexpectedly or not at all. The data confirmed our hypothesis. (5)

How does this research bear on CE? Ultimately, CE demands that children learn what they learn not because they want to or find it intrinsically interesting, but because they are told to. The threat of force may be naked or veiled, but it is always present. In this sort of context, the overjustification hypothesis predicts that intrinsic learning will be discouraged. Participants in CE will tend to regard the whole of education much as the rewarded pre-schoolers reacted to drawing with magic markers: in the absence of continual extrinsic incentives, they will turn away from it. If our aim is to expand learning and development, reliance on CE would appear self-defeating.

It would seem then that CE cannot be justified by appealing to substantial deficiencies in childhood rationality, For even if these are conceded and with them a contrast between CR and CE, there are other, less restrictive ways to develop rationality; moreover, there is some empirical evidence for thinking that CE compares unfavorably with educational arrangements which provide learners with access to resources but do not dictate how or when or where to use them. Perhaps the most that can be said for CE is that there are unsettled empirical issues here: To what extent, if any, does CE contribute to/work against the development of rational abilities? Would a voluntarized approach (e.g. Illich's 'learning networks' or the 'sporadic educational intervention' model referred to previously) facilitate more or less rational competence than CE? (6) But if these issues are unsettled, then the defects of children, no matter how severe, offer no warrant whatever for CE in preference to more voluntarized alternatives.

2.23 Up to this point, the argument has been restricted to showing that appeals to the choice-making deficiencies of children are inconclusive as far as morally distinguishing CE from CR and establishing the former's moral defensibility. But it is possible to go further than this: there is a serious moral objection to be raised against CE's treatment of those it regards as defective in rationality. Thus, not only does this treatment fail to gain support from the under-development of children; in addition, it violates a basic moral imperative, and thus further strengthens the analogy between CE and CR.

Once again, Godwin's position will be "found instructive. That position should not be reduced to the empirical hypothesis that self-originated learning will give rise to critical and independent intelligence more effectively and fully than systems involving CE. In Godwin's account of the 'most desirable mode of education,' there is also included a normative principle, i.e. that self-deter-mination has intrinsic moral value even for those who are substantially lacking in rationality. In the passage quoted above, both empirical and normative contentions are advanced. Proceeding upon desires andpplans of one's own devising, he claims, 'Strengthens the judgment' and 'is the only method by which [a person] can be rendered truly an individual.' But beyond this it constitutes 'the pure and genuine condition of a rational being,' a condition which 'elevates us with a sense of independence.' In the latter of these assertions, Godwin is not purporting to describe the long-range consequences of allowing children to choose what they will learn. On the contrary, he is contending that whenever we deny them this sort of choice, we deny them—at that time—access to a fundamental good or right.

In Kantian language, we fail to treat them as end-inthemselves. For treating people as intrinsically desirable involves honoring (taking as decisive) their own rankings of their own present and future interests. To do otherwise, is to regard them as subordinates required to submit to one's own rankings or priorities. Thus, if Mary wants to roller skate or share fantasies with friends, but is compelled to study geography or mathematics, a rationale might be constructed in terms of her long-range interests. But what if Mary agrees that storysharing will not advance her future interests as rauch as geography, while adamantly preferring the former? 'I know that geography will be more useful for me, but I don't care, I'd rather make up stories.' Here there is no (empirical) dispute over what will in fact lead to maximum development or future well being, etc. The dispute is entirely normative: should Mary's projected concerns outweigh her present desires?

Now if we accept the rationale mentioned as justifying compulsion, we are thereby enforcing what we think is more important as between two of the child's own interests over what that child thinks. We have made her comply with our standards for evaluating desires as more and less desirable, rather than respecting Mary's autonomy in regards to her own goals. We have treated her as a means, rather than an end. Furthermore, under CE the situation is not reciprocal: Mary has no right to use her notion of what makes goals worth seeking to prevent her teachers or administrators from pursuing present rather than future satisfactions.

The point is not that treating children as ends requires that they never be interfered with to advance their own long-range interests. This is not true of adults, and we should not expect it to be true of children. The point, rather, is that there is a prima facie obligation to respect the goals of children and how they rank those goals, an obligation which is systematically violated by CE. Conceivably, there might be grounds for overriding this obligation, just as there might be grounds for public officials misleading their constituencies as to military spending or aid to foreign dictatorship, etc. But the moral burden must be assumed by those who would defend CE, not those who would argue for its elimination. In sum, the issues surrounding CE should not be thought of as wholly or even primarily empirical—a matter of contrasting the consequences for rational development of CE and voluntarized alternatives. CE, in its treatment of children as subordinates whose private goal-rankings have no intrinsic priority, mistreats them and hence should be discarded unless powerful considerations can be adduced in its favor.

These considerations would have to establish that there are no alternatives to CE, that this practice furnished the only—or at least the most effective—remedy for overcoming the defects of childhood. But as mentioned earlier contentions such as these are speculative at best. There are no empirical studies comparing CE with Illich's deschooled learning networks or Goodman's 'incidental education' in regards to facilitating given educational objectives. Does CE promote self-originated learning and independence of mind more than a scheme in which learners receive life-long subsidies to purchase resources (tools, instruction, space, etc.) of the sorts they desire, and in which support services such as advisors, information clearing houses, evaluators, etc., are also provided? At this point in the social science of education, we simply do not know, though the Greene and Lepper studies are strongly suggestive of a negative response.

The conclusion to be drawn then is this: since CE's accomplishments in reducing childhood deficiencies in rationality are uncharted and problematic, the empirical data necessary to defend it, to distinguish it from CR, and to override its morally abusive treatment of children are simply not available. CE's failure to treat children as ends is evident and inescapable; the claim that it alone or best can develop rational decision-makers is at most uncertain. In brief, there would appear to be no reason for preserving the practice, and a clear (and hence decisive) one for eliminating it.

Let us return to CR and imagine a slight deviation from Stewart's original text. We shall suppose, that is, that CR is applied not to all Auriana adults who reach 50, but only to those judged to be 'diminished in rationality.' Normal adults are left alone to find their own favored forms of recreation, while the others, e.g. those showing early signs of senility, are legally required for ten years to join the games and enter the contests constructed for them. This modified system can be labeled 'CRD,' for Compulsory Recreation imposed on the rationally Defective. Would CRD be a morally acceptable practice?

To answer in the affirmative would imply that the liberty of those approaching senility can be set aside as of no consequence. But if normal adults have a right not to be burdened by CR, why should this right be denied to those who have fallen below normality? If older adults should not be subordinated to younger ones, why should those with failing mental capacities be subordinated to those whose ability to make choices is intact? The Kantian imperative cited earlier would have all persons (and not just 'normal' ones) treated as ends: it exhorts us to honor the choices, the consent, the faltering (or budding) powers of self-regulation of all individuals. Kant's imperative, that is, gives no sanction or support to a tyranny of normality.

Furthermore, the case for non-intervention gains additional strength if there is uncertainty about CRD's effects on senility or whether there are other equally effective and less invasive policies for containing the deterioration of rationality.

The relation of these remarks to CE is straightforward. If the embryonic senility of those placed forcibly in CRD does not decrease the moral illegitimacy of that practice, then the rational deficiencies of children cannot offset the case against CE. Once again, we are led to conclude that the invasion and abridgment of children's liberty represented by CE cannot be justified by their underdevelopment. For the connection between CE and the development of rationality is at best speculative. More important, as the case of CRD indicates, why should those with substantial defects in rationality have lesser claims to liberty than those of normal competence? A tyranny of normality is as little justified for children as it is for sub-normal adults.

2.3 'But you cannot deny that, because of their deficiencies, we must sometimes protect children against themselves, for their own good.' With this contention, we reach the issue of 'paternalism': the deficiencies of children, coupled with our obligation to guard them against self-damage, require (supposedly) the imposition of CE.

2.31 It is important to note, however, that in reject-ing CE, no stand has been taken on the need or justification for paternalization of children by adults. In particular, I have not maintained either (a) that children should never be interfered with for their own good (never 'paternalized') or (b) that children should be paternalized no more than adults. Both of these seem to me false, though strong reasons could certainly be given for (b). In any case, neither is implied by what has been argued against CE.

Thus, to consider some specific cases, nothing has been said which denies or weakens our obligation to prevent children of 3 or 4 from playing in busy city streets or with chancy electrical appliances; allowing 10 year olds to sky dive or experiment with heroin injections is not an implication of rejecting CE's legitimacy. To generalize, paternalizing children can be acceptable when a child's health or life would otherwise be put in jeopardy. If CE were abolished, as we have been recommending, there would still be ample opportunity for adults to interfere with children bent on risking injury or death. The absence of that practice would in no way preclude such paternalization: children released from compulsory schooling could be supervised by adults authorized to protect them from self-damage but not to determine what, when, or how they should learn.

As for (b), nothing in the case against CE rests on viewing the capacities of children as equal to those of adults. At many points, the substantial defects of child rationality have been conceded, in order to argue that these defects fail to make CE defensible. On the other hand, the deficiencies of childhood might well make other types of paternalizing—those protecting health and life—both necessary for children and more frequent than with adults.

Our attack on CE does of course affirm that children can do without it. But this in no way implies that they can dispense with all forms of adult regulation and intervention. After all, adults can be justifiably paternalized even though they fall outside the scope of CE. Moreover, if children do not need CE, it does not follow that they require less protective interference than most ordinary adults. Elderly adults may need paternalization more than those of middle age, but this does not establish any obligation for the former to submit to CE.

Further, it would be a mistake to equate the view I am defending with the doctrine (c) that paternalism is morally unacceptable in educational contexts, i.e. that though children can be justifiably paternalized, this sort of interference can never be defended on exclusively educational grounds. Doctrine (c) seems to be a plausible enough doctrine, but it has not been defended or presupposed here. For CE is one, but not the only, form of educational paternalism. Consider a society which did not require the learning of any specific subject or skill, but which prohibited educational experiences thought to be (not dangerous or unhealthy but) time-wasting or intellectually discreditable. It might subsidize learners, telling them to use their subsidies as they desired, except for certain restrictions: e.g. not more than 5 per cent could be spent learning any given sport, interpretative and folk dancing were acceptable but contemporary dances such as the rhumba, twist, bump, etc., were not. Perhaps this sort of educational policy can be described as 'negative educational paternalism'; as opposed to CE, it makes no curriculum or learning environment obligatory, but it does constrict the boundaries within which educational choices are permitted (or will be supported). Now while what has been argued above is certainly incompatible with the positive sort of educational paternalism essential to CE, it raises no objection to the negative variety and hence contrasts sharply with (c).

2.4 What has been argued in responding to defenses of CE premised on the deficiencies of children can be reconstructed as follows. Three such defenses have been examined, each somewhat more complex than the preceding. The first claimed simply that children are defective or under-developed (Section 2.1). We conceded this claim, while pointing out that though the adults in 'Auriana' had deteriorated in several respects, this supplied no justification for CR: in short, inferior development, by itself, cannot warrant interference with personal liberty (2.11). The second defense appealed to the 'more fundamental' failings of children, those which adversely affect their capacity to make sound decisions (2.2). These defects, we maintained, also fail to provide a case for CE: other less restrictive policies could be introduced to remedy them and facilitate the growth of rational competency (2.21, 2.22); moreover, while CE's tendency to foster human learning is speculative and problemridden, its treatment of children as means rather than ends involves unmistakable moral abuse (2.23). Finally, we considered the view that the sub-rationality of children requires paternalistic intervention of various sorts by adults (2.3). Here it was argued that such paternalization, e.g. protecting children against self-destruction or serious self-injury, does not imply CE: one can endorse the former while finding the latter morally unacceptable (2.31).

In sum, neither the simplest nor the two progressively more complex and sophisticated appeals to children's deficiencies can provide a genuine moral contrast between CE and CR; moreover, given 2.23's results, the two practices are linked by a common thread of injustice. To find such a contrast, if this is at all possible, it appears that we must look beyond the supposed incompetencies of childhood.

3 THE SOCIAL INDISPENSABILITY OF EDUCATION

3.1 The second major contrast between CE and CR concerns not who but rather what is compelled by each. Using this contrast, it might be argued that, since the contributions of education to human welfare far exceed those of recreation, there is a morally significant difference between the two, and one that yields a justification for CE. The appeal, then, is not to purported deficiencies in those required to participate, nor even to their longterm development or well-being. On the contrary, this defense of CE is based on the (alleged) tendency of education to promote certain of 'society's interests,' i.e. certain morally important goals, a tendency not shared, supposedly, by recreational activities.

What are the social interests or moral goods which education secures or helps to secure? A full list, responsive to everyone's notion of education, would be indefinitely long, but it would certainly have to include the following:

(A) The skills and attitudes necessary for an informed and critical electorate and hence for a democratic polity.

(B) Scientific, medical, and technological development and the freedom from illness and impoverishment which they enable.

(C) The exposure to diverse beliefs and values—alternatives to those dominant within a child's familyessential for a pluralistic and tolerant society.

(D) The provision of educational resources, accredited learning, and career training to vulnerable and disadvantaged groups (e.g. minorities, women, poor people), and hence a minimal level of distributive justice.

3.11 Though a detailed response to each of these points is not possible here, there are certain considerations which have force against them all. For one thing, do we know that education does in fact help secure these admitted social goals? Suppose a non-interventionist policy was initiated, whereby no educational venture or association was to receive public support and none was to be forbidden, except those in clear violation of people's rights. Is it certain, or only speculative, that goals A-D would be placed in jeopardy?

Prior to the seventeenth century, it was generally thought that in the absence of publicly enforced and supported religion, civilized values would swiftly succumb to barbarian ones. Only a few decades ago, almost everyone held similar beliefs about the nuclear family. Today these convictions strike us as little more than amusing relics of historical gullibility. But is the contemporary notion of education's social import any less amusing or better grounded? It is highly doubtful, for example, whether many entire public school careers have access to as much diversity as the print, electronic, and film media present within a single year.

3.12 Second, we should note that recreation, along with art and medicine, also helps secure important social goods. This, however, does not persuade us to define publicly the games which all citizens must play, the forms of art they should cultivate, or the kind of medical care they must pursue. In general, no legal sanctions are imposed on those who avoid altogether any or all of these three worthy activities. Instead, people are often provided with publicly funded resources (parks, museums) or services (clinics) as incentives to engage in them. Why should education be different? Instead of compelling participation in schools and curricula, why not distribute resources and offer support services to make (or keep) learning attractive and accessible?

In brief, the social benefits of recreation do not justify CR, nor do those of art and health care justify coercive, rather than voluntary, measures to promote those activities. Hence, even if we concede that education does help realize important social interests, this would not show that it should be made compulsory.

3.13 This conclusion can be strengthened by considering a design for facilitating, rather than compelling, education. In this plan, public revenues would in general be allocated directly to individual learners, rather than to school distrcits, or to any other administrative unit or 'authority.' Moreover, our subsidized learners would have their choice as to what educational resources to purchase, as well as from whom and at what periods of their lives to make such purchases. Some might elect to save up most of their educational subsidies until they had reached 40 or 50, and were ready to begin a new career or explore their full potential more deeply. Nothing would prohibit the continuation of schools similar to those we presently see all around us, but no one would be subject to truant officers or legal penalties for keeping clear of them.

For the most part, the special occupation of 'Teacher' would disappear. Learning would in the main proceed through apprenticeships with those engaged in some craft or productive activity. We would not require learners to study under a separate group of 'professionals' who did nothing other than teach, and who by law pre-empted others with greater experience or capacity (but fewer teacher preparation credits) from receiving public educational funds. Thus, farmers could be hired to instruct city folk in how to produce subsistence on vacant lots or in city parks; poets, auto mechanics, lawyers, carpenters, musicians, etc., would all become available as educational resources. No requirements of age, prior schooling, degrees, etc., could prevent learners from contracting for the instructional services of anyone they wished to work or study with. In addition, as Illich points out, some learners would not want or need instruction, but access to equipment or materials (hand-tools, clay, telescopes) or to certain kinds of space or environments (an empty garage, open fields, a lake). The subsidies they receive Could also be used to purchase or lease these, as well as the expertise and assistance of people with skills to impart.

To help make all this work, learners could be furnished with various types of support, for example:

(A) Information centers which publish and distribute material indicating what resources are available; when, where, from whom, and under what conditions they can be obtained, etc.

(B) Clearing houses which match would-be learners with needed human or material resources.

(C) The acquisition, maintenance, and distribution (by loan or lease) of educational equipment and materials. (This can be seen as an extension of the public library idea.)

(D) Advisors to work individually with learners, offering encouragement and criticism, pointing out unrecognized options, identifying and helping to overcome weaknesses and obstacles. (Advisors might set tests for their advisees, but the results would be privileged information.)

(E) Remedial programs for those having difficulty acquiring basic skills or with severe emotional or physical handicaps.

(F) Increased subsidies for those from low-income households.

Despite its brevity, this account of 'voluntarized education' (VE) may suffice to indicate that there are ways for education to promote socially beneficial goals that do not depend on compulsion. (Much as medicine, art, and recreation rely on voluntary sources of participation.) Earlier it was stated that claims concerning CE's exclusive or preferred role in repairing childhood deficiencies can only be speculation; the same would now seem to hold with respect to Section 3.1's social goods. In both cases, the comparisons between CE and VE have not been studied: the empirical issues remain entirely open.

3.2 So much then for defenses of CE which rest on what education is thought to contribute to the interests of society. Against these defenses it has been contended, first, that those contributions may involve more speculation than certainty; second, that even if they are conceded, this would not establish a need or justification for educational compulsion; and last, that for all we currently know, voluntarized forms of education could promote society's interests as well as, or better than, CE. In light of these contentions, however, the defenses of CE considered in this section, like those in the previous one, are either fallacious or heavily weighted down by conjecture. Hence, since CE's moral abuse of children is evident and not speculative, the case against it, once again, would seem conclusive.

4 TWO PRACTICAL OBJECTIONS TO VE

Nonetheless, the grip of a long-standing custom, as Jake Justin discovered, is not easily relaxed. Some residual loyalty to CE, or antipathy towards its abolition, will doubtless remain despite the preceding arguments. In an effort to break through some of this resistance, I shall discuss two practical objections to the notion that education should be voluntarized. The first maintains that eliminating CE, given present social conditions, would have disastrous consequences, especially for groups already suffering under inequitable treatment; the second that CE is not abolishable anyhow, at least not from any current or foreseeable industrialized society.

4.1 The first of these practical objections is willing to concede that, in theory, we should voluntarize education, i.e. that the ideal form of VE is to be preferred over any form of CE But in practice—in any concrete situation—the elimination of compulsory attendance laws may not give rise to this ideal; instead, it may feed the development of damaging and unjust institutions. Thus, when the state of Mississippi discarded CE, the prime victims were its poor and black children: they are now even further removed from basic learning skills, credentials, and access to decent jobs and lifeopportunities.

4.11 This objection is not lacking in force. But we must be wary of inferring too much from it. What follows here is not that CE is justifiable, but that, in certain circumstances, we may have to tolerate it in order to avoid even greater evils. Accordingly, as in other 'lesser of evils' cases, the present argument cannot establish any obligation to support or to preserve CE. On the contrary, our responsibility is to either eliminate the conditions forcing the dilemma upon us or extract ourselves from those conditions: that is, to avoid both lesser and greater evils altogether. Specifically, we should work toward establishing in Mississippi some variant of the VE design described in Section 3.13 above or find ways to provide its blacks and poor people with access to educational/life options external to that state.

The issues here are reminiscent of those arising from the punishment of innocent persons. We may know, to take the usual example, that a person charged with rape did not actually commit the crime; if released from jail, however, (s)he could not escape the town's desire for revenge. Does this justify punishing the innocent as a general practice? Clearly not: our obligation is to keep the accused away from the lynch mob, not to deprive him/her of liberty. If and as soon as possible, we should contrive an escape both from jail and from the local vigilantes.

In the same way, the intolerable consequences of alternatives cannot justify the imposition of compulsory schooling. We remain obliged to protect children (those innocent of crime) both from CE (punishment) and from other injurious conditions. This duty of protection, moreover, requires that we liberate children as soon as and to the greatest extent possible. Our innocent victim should be regulated and interfered with as little as possible while in jail. Likewise, we should reshape CE toward increasingly voluntary arrangements, e.g. by ensuring public funds for experimental and communitycontrolled schools, and by developing what might be called a 'compulsory competence' system (CC). Here learners, though entitled to conventional schooling, can gain exemptions from it by demonstrating mastery of curriculum objectives, say, by passing the same tests given to regular students. When students earn exemptions, they or their parents receive subsidies towards the cost of educational resources of their own choosing. In short, under CC only the 'what' and not the 'how' of education would be compelled: in comparison with CE, infringements on the liberty of children would be substantially diminished.

Now this obligation to initiate something akin to CC confirms once again what has just been argued about CE: even where the wholesale abandonment of compulsory schooling would have consequences of hardship and inequity, our obligation is not to retain CE but to eliminate as much of it as we can without generating those consequences.

To sum up: this first practical objection fails to distinguish CE from such clear moral abuses as punishing the innocent (or CR). Quite the contrary, it leaves intact our obligations (a) progressively to restrict the scope of CE and of its interference with children and (b) to create conditions in which any onerous consequences of eliminating CE can be avoided and which enable us, therefore, to develop VE as our primary form of education.

4.2 The second practical objection contends that there is no escape from CE and hence that it is pointless to discuss its moral acceptability or recommend its abolition. Furthermore, since there would appear to be no difficulty avoiding CR, we have here, supposedly, a sharp contrast between the two practices.

Authors who disagree more than they agree reach consensus on this criticism of the aim of voluntarizing education. Thus, Herbert Gintis, a radical economist, appeals to an analysis of capitalism as sacrificing 'the healthy development of community, work, environment, education, and social equality to the accumulation of capital' to argue that 'In the final analysis "deschooling" is irrelevant because we cannot "de-factory," "de-office," or 'de-family," save perhaps at the still unenvisioned end of a long process of social reconstruc-ion tion.' (7) Alternatively, on behalf of the 'clods, the piecemeal reformers, the people without a grand vision, those who are simply trying to improve the quality of the experience that real children have in schools,' educator Neil Postman avows that 'American society is not going to be deschooled! Not in the near future anywayand for the very reason Illich sees so clearly: the schools function to perpetuate the established order.' (8)

4.21 A full reply to this objection would require detailed treatment of such perennial philosophical issues as the scope of prediction in human affairs, the role of (autonomous) desires, beliefs, and decisions in shaping social reality, the degree to which any one segment of society (educational activities) is independent or the product of another (productive forces and relations). This is not the place to reiterate my discussions of these issues, nor the arguments I have urged in support of a libertarian conception of causality and explanation in human life, one which rejects models of determinism and prediction imported from natural science and which is capable of recognizing and facilitating autonomous activity. (9) Here, three more particularized remarks will have to suffice.

In the first place, this objection appears to be a product of conjecture: it lacks roots in any sustained investigation of efforts to disestablish compulsory schooling. In 1975, the task of abolishing CE may be comparable to that of establishing representative democracy in 1750, or creating the right of labor to organize in 1870, or 'de-asylumizing' mental health care in 1950. That is, it is not as though people had been trying and failing for decades: agitation against CE has just barely begun. What evidence is there that CE is a fixed part of the institutional environment, as opposed to having reached a terminal phase of development—a phase which in fifteen years will relinquish almost all involuntary claims on those of high school age and permit exemptions on an individualized' basis to children under 12? (10)

I suggest (a) that whatever we see happening today is no more compatible with the permanence of CE than it is with the equally hypothetical view that voluntarized ways of educating the young have begun to make their entrance and will occupy primacy of place within industrialized countries by the end of the 1980s, and (b) that the dispute here involves, like so much else in social science, a doctrine that is self-fulfilling: if people ceased to believe in the intransigence of CE, they'd look more readily and more successfully for ways to avoid and replace it. But if (a) and (b) are true, the issue raised by this practical objection is an open one; it can only be resolved by examining what actually results from concerted and tenacious efforts to introduce VE. Hence, the objection cannot show that such efforts will be futile, nor can it reduce our obligation to work towards the voluntarization of education.

Second, to avoid the charge that CE's purported intransigence is a flight of untestable conjecture, this objection is sometimes restated as the contention that VE cannot be fully realized without the aid of fundamental social changes of a non-educational sort, e.g. redistributions of power and resources, dispersion of child-rearing responsibilities to persons outside the nuclear family. Put in this way, the objection seems hardly disputable. The trouble now is that, in this new form, it is innocuous, entirely compatible with our position that CE can and should be discarded.

Consider: it is probably true that the aspirations of women and of racial minorities can be fully realized only where no individual or group (regardless of sex or race) can amass a disproportionate concentration of economic or political power, i.e. where there are social limits placed on the private ownership of land, capital and other resources. But this does not imply that, in the absence of such limits, racial and sexual equality are irrelevant or merely academic goals, nor that we can legitimately set them aside until those more

general principles of distributive justice have already been achieved. The same holds for VE. Conceding that it can flourish only where child-rearing, ownership, and production have been substantially altered does not imply that, before those changes have been accomplished, we cannot or should not begin to substitute voluntarized for compulsory aspects of education. On the contrary, it suggests an hypothesis as to how those efforts can be most effective, i.e. by combining them with strategies designed to combat injustices other than those unique to education. Thus, on this hypothesis educational subsidies should be advocated not merely for minors but for adults as well. For this would not only curtail CE's present infringements on the liberty and development of children, but make further voluntarization more accessible by showing that it can work towards fulfilling demands made by working-class and low-income adults for a fairer share of resources and opportunities. But if this educational subsidy policy is supported by or compatible with the current formulation or our second practical objection, how can that formulation be used to contest either the feasibility or desirability of VE?

Last, there is a strange kind of callousness, one might even say 'age-ism,' in this objection's certainty concerning the perpetuation of CE and in the ease with which it sets aside the rights of children to be free of imposed confinement and of adult indoctrination. Sexism, racism, prisons, colonies, etc., like schools, all function to 'perpetuate the established order,' but we are not told to forgo support for anti-imperialist freedom fighters or for the 27th amendment on the ground that the system will remain what it is for the foreseeable future. Nor would most radical economists maintain that we must first 'de-factory' before struggling against the abuses of racism or to decrease the types of crime punishable by incarceration. Perhaps it has somewhere been discovered that only those features of contemporary industrialized societies which affect children are beyond fundamental change, or can only be altered after every other important institutional change has been implemented? If not, children can be excused for thinking that once again they have been put last, that their rights to self-determination have been set aside on no defensible basis, and that this objection manifests the very sort of arbitrary domination exhibited by CE. ('Wait until you grow up, then we will take the abuses you suffer seriously.') (11)

5 SUMMING UP THE CASE AGAINST CE

If the arguments advanced in the preceding sections are sound, CE has nothing more to be said for it than CR; any objection we may have to the latter applies with equal force to the former. For both of the principal contrasts alleged to distinguish these two practices—the lesser competency of those compelled to participate in CE and the greater contributions of education to major social interests—have been found to be largely conjectural (2.11, 3.11). Moreover, even if we concede that these contrasts do obtain, they fail to provide either (a) any moral justification for compulsory rather than voluntarized educational arrangements (2.21, 2.22, 3.12, 3.13), or (b) any evidence which denies or diminishes the morally abusive treatment of children by CE or our consequent obligation to discard that practice (2.23, 3.12, 3.13).

Nor were the two practical objections considered in Section 4 any more successful in regards to (a) or (b). As for the first, it was contended that injuries to minorities and/or the poor (like those to an innocent person) supposedly generated by voluntarizing education (by

imposing legal penalties upon him/her) may warrant temporary tolerance of CE (punishment of the innocent) but cannot reduce our general obligation to work toward VE (to punish only the guilty) or to bring about conditions in which those injurious consequences are minimized (4.11). The objection that CE is not eliminable from industrialized societies was countered by the argument that, taken literally, it seems to rest solely on unfounded (and age-discriminatory) speculation, while if restated to affirm that implementing VE will require other far-reaching changes in the distribution of power and resources, the objection becomes true at the cost of losing all of its bite: it no longer conflicts with the advocacy of VE.

Much more, of course, remains to be said on all of these points. In particular, a complete account should be furnished, first, of the many varieties of VE and, second, of plausible strategies for diminishing the scope of CE and for replacing it by voluntary activities sensitive to the claims of distributive and compensatory justice. (12) But enough, perhaps, has been presented to indicate that the claims of CE on the lives and liberty of children are very far from indisputable, and to shift the burden of justification to those who would retain CE at the cost of failing to promote voluntarized alternatives.

NOTES

Many of the ideas and arguments in this paper have been formulated or refined in the course of discussions with my friends and colleagues, Phillip D.Jacklin, Jeffrey Walter, and Phillip R.Wheeler. Others should have the benefit of such painstaking and perceptive critics.

1   C.Stewart, 'Auriana' (New Orleans, Louisiana: Gumbo Publications, 1965).
2   J.Berke and Mary Barnes, 'Mary Barnes: Two Accounts of a Journey Through Madness' (New York: Ballantine Books, 1971).
3   W.Godwin, Of the Communication of Knowledge, reprinted in L.Krimerman and L.Perry (eds), 'Patterns of Anarchy' (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1966), p. 421.
4   D.Greene and M.R.Lepper, Intrinsic Motivation—How to Turn Play into Work, 'Psychology Today,' vol. 8, no. 4 (September 1974), p. 50.
5   Ibid., pp. 51–2.
6   See here ch. 6 of Ivan Illich's 'Deschooling Society' (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).
7   H.Gintis, Toward a Political Economy of Education: A Radical Critique of Ivan Illich's 'Deschooling Society,' reprinted in A.Gartner et al. (eds), 'After Deschooling, What?' (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), p. 32.
8   N.Postman, My Ivan Illich Problem, reprinted in Gartner et al., op.cit., p. 145.
9   These arguments appear in the introductions to section sections IV–VIII of my 'Nature and Scope of Social Science' (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), and in my article, Autonomy: A New Paradigm for Research, published as ch. XIII of the '71st Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education' (University of Chicago Press, 1972).
10   For a suggestive view on this point, see James Coleman's article, The Children Have Outgrown the Schools, reprinted in L.Bowman et al. (eds), 'Of Education and Community' (Lincoln, Nebraska: Nebraska Curriculum Development Center, 1972), pp. 69–75.

11 Ch. 5 of Allen Graubard's penetrating book, 'Free the Children' (New York: Vintage, 1974), deals in much greater detail with the issues raised by both of the two practical objections examined in this section.

12 These two accounts are outlined in a position paper, Should Education Be Compulsory?, by L.Krimerman and J.Walter, available from the authors, c/o Childhood and Government Project, Boalt School of Law, University of California, Berkeley, 94720.

part III
Autonomy, freedom and schooling

6
Autonomy as an aim of education

Brian Crittenden

INTRODUCTION

Individual autonomy is widely regarded as a fundamental value in educational theory and practice. Supporters of a systematic approach to knowledge in teaching and learning often claim that one of the main outcomes, if not the most important, of the educational process is its contribution to the making of an autonomous person. In the tradition of liberal education, the forms of human thought and knowledge are to be studied for their own sake, for the distinctive values they can bring to a person's life, and not simply for the sake of an extrinsic end they may happen to serve. It is not surprising that the qualities of mind promoted through such disinterested studies should be described in terms of personal freedom and autonomy. Among the so-called radicals in education, autonomy is not simply an achievement to promoted, but a condition to be respected even in children and thus a basic criterion of the kind of educational procedures that may legitimately be employed. Whatever other defense may be offered for such practices as the open classroom, participatory democracy in decisions of schooling, selfdirected and individualised learning, the stress on creativity and learning by discovery, they are often thought to be justified in the name of autonomy.

That such otherwise divergent theorists can so happily appeal to autonomy suggests that the notion and its relationship to education deserve to be examined more closely. In the following discussion, I shall attempt to pursue some aspects of this task. I shall be concerned, for the roost part, with the practice of education in so far as it involves a systematic introduction to the main symbolic forms of culture. In this practice, the enterprise of teaching and learning is not determined primarily by the immediate interests of the child or the society, but by the most significant human achievements of knowing, interpreting, evaluating, expressing—what we classify loosely as the sciences, the humanities, and the arts. I take it that this view of teaching and learning clearly belongs within the tradition of liberal education. For the sake of brevity I shall therefore refer to it by this title. There are of course other variations on the theme of liberal education. In the interpretation I have briefly sketched, the development of reasoned thought and judgment is not restricted to exclusively intellectual activities but extends to the moral and aesthetic domains as well.

Among my reasons for focusing on liberal education is that its relationship to personal autonomy seems to be a complex and ambivalent one. If we believe that children are already autonomous (in a sense that demands moral respect) and that their exercise of autonomy determines what counts as education, it is obvious that the question of the relationship between education and autonomy has been drastically simplified. In this scheme, education is to be defined as any activity that expresses a person's autonomous

choice and, presumably, increases his capacity and opportunity for such choices. On the other hand, if we believe quite strictly in the primacy of the socialising role of education, it seems that personal autonomy can hardly be a serious candidate as an aim of education. In the case of liberal education, the process is not determined as a function of autonomy, but by the public symbolic structures that make up a culture. At the same time, proponents of liberal education would claim that personal autonomy of any significance is achieved only through initiation into these symbolic structures. While this process of initiation, unlike socialisation, is not crudely at odds with autonomy, there seems to be something paradoxical about the claim that we achieve personal autonomy through being encultured in such ways.

PERSONAL AUTONOMY AS AN 'IDEAL' TYPE

In order to give a positive sketch of autonomy as an 'ideal' type, I think it is useful, if not necessary, to distinguish three overlapping basic aspects. These may loosely be called the intellectual, the moral, and the emotional. One may be autonomous in any of these aspects without necessarily being autonomous in the others. Under the intellectual I include the whole range of one's beliefs, whether they are about the nature of the world or the things that are thought to be worthwhile or the standards of conduct. At an extreme limit, intellectual autonomy would require, in the first place, that a person not accept any of his important beliefs primarily on the authority of others, but on his own experience, his own reflection on evidence and argument, his own sense of what is true and right. For complete intellectual autonomy it would also seem necessary that a person should determine for himself the second-order questions about what constitutes a true claim, adequate evidence, a justifiable moral principle, and the like. Even the crucial concepts in which he perceives and understands should be of his own design or, at least, accepted from others only because he is personally convinced that such concepts are satisfactory.

Moral autonomy, as I am using the expression, is intended to embrace all forms of practical judgment and action. Assuming that factual and normative beliefs are relevant to the decisions we make on how we should act, it is clear that moral autonomy depends in part on intellectual autonomy. Of course, in the Existentialist view, at least as Sartre has presented it, moral decisions in the concrete situations of life are pure acts of the will, choices in which belief and principle can play no part. If moral autonomy is understood quite literally, it will either include aspects of the extreme form of intellectual autonomy or appeal to an interpretation of moral choice in which such choice is the determining act of an isolated personal will that is the core of the self. As Iris Murdoch has shown, (1) this interpretation finds support in contemporary Anglo-Saxon philosophy as well as in Existentialism.

In addition to independence of thought in determining and applying criteria of moral judgment, moral autonomy also includes the executive capacities for carrying into practice what one decides should be done. The possession of these capacities is commonly described by such terms as tenacity, resoluteness, strength of will, self-mastery. Perhaps the last of these most appropriately designates this facet of personal autonomy.

In relation to the exercise of political and other authority, a morally autonomous person will not, in the extreme view, obey or even acknowledge a command. 'For the autonomous

man,' says R.P.Wolff, 'there is no such thing, strictly speaking, as a command.' (2) If such a person acts as commanded it is only because he is personally convinced about the merit of the action independently of the exercise of authority.

The third main aspect of autonomy, the emotional, is also to be interpreted fairly broadly. It may be treated as part of self-mastery in so far as the latter refers to the control of one's emotions, desires, and feelings. However, the point is not simply that a person would exercise self-mastery in the face of strong emotional involvement, but that he would remain emotionally detached in his relationships to other persons and things. This form of independence and self-sufficiency has a long history as an ideal. It was illustrated in the life of Socrates and cultivated as a central doctrine by the Cynics and the Stoics.

Given the aspects of autonomy that I have been describing, it should be emphasised that even though a person may reflectively accept the authority of others in determining certain of his beliefs or actions, it is nevertheless an abdication of his autonomy. This possibility illustrates the insufficiency of R.F.Dearden's criterion of autonomy, namely, that the explanation of what a person thinks and does in important matters requires 'reference to his own activity of mind.' (3) Obedience, even of a servile kind, is a human act and thus cannot be explained without reference to the agent's own activity of mind. Dearden's criterion may provide a sufficient condition for ascribing responsibility. But a person may be held responsible for what he does, without necessarily having acted autonomously.

INTELLECTUAL AUTONOMY AND SUBJECTIVE EPISTEMOLOGY

Of the three aspects of personal autonomy that I have just outlined, I shall give most attention to the intellectual as a possible aim of education. This aspect includes, of course, a significant part of what is often claimed on behalf of moral autonomy.

At the present time there are probably very few serious defenders of the complete subjectivism that intellectual autonomy in the strict sense entails. However, in a variety of recent relativist interpretations of knowledge, the conditions of subjectivism on which a thoroughgoing intellectual autonomy depends are substantially satisfied. The trend is clearly illustrated in Feyerabend's 'anarchistic epistemology': he evens draws a connection between his epistemological theory and the ideal of human freedom. (4) A similar interpretation is defended by Kuhn in his analysis of the changing models of epistemic procedure to which scientists adhere. (5) Basically, the same kind of relativism is also inherent in Wittgenstein's notions of a form of life and a system. What is being claimed in theories of this sort is that questions of objectivity, rationality and truth can only be raised in the context of a particular conceptual system. Different conceptual systems (whether, for example, the difference exists between cultures, or social classes, or interpretations of science, or science and religion) cannot be compared on criteria of objectivity, rationality and truth; they are strictly incommensurable. One's adherence to a particular conceptual system is treated as either an essentially arbitrary and non-rational decision to commit oneself or as the effect of a combination of psychological and social causal conditions. At least for those who make the issues of knowledge depend ultimately on a nonrational subjective commitment, a place for personal autonomy of a very significant kind in man's intellectual life is obviously secured.

A somewhat similar view of intellectual autonomy based on the relative nature of knowledge has recently been gaining favor in educational theory and practice. It is difficult

to say whether, or to what extent, the philosophical views just mentioned have had any direct influence. For the most part, the educationists have not developed the anarchistic epistemology that underlies their position. Kuhn's name is often quoted, but this may simply reflect a current fashion rather than a studied acceptance of his theory. In any case, the relativism of the educationists may have been fueled more by some recent popular social theorists than by the philosophers. Certainly, the vision of small local groups determining their own curriculum of learning and making their own knowledge can be nourished from the writings of a Theodore Roszak of a Peter Berger (although the latter eschews any epistemological stand). (6)

The trend in educational thought and practice to which I am referring incorporates much of what has now become the established doctrine of progressive education—in particular, the belief that each child's education should be determined primarily by his or her felt needs and interests. What has been added (or reiterated more forcefully, if we recall the Instrumentalist branch of earlier progressive education) are some elements of a theory of knowledge in which the claim to objectivity for any form of thought and inquiry is radically challenged. The favored alternative is either a version of subjectivism or, for those who find its individualist aspect repugnant, a relativism of small local groups made up of freely and fully participating members.

The flavor of this theory as it is proposed by educationists can be gained from the efforts of Charles H.Rathbone and Roland S.Barth to set out the interpretation of knowledge that they themselves support and that they believe is commonly assumed in the practices of open education. (7) Among their tenets are the following:

> Knowledge is idiosyncratically formed, individually conceived, fundamentally individualistic. Theoretically, no two people's knowledge can be the same, unless their experience is identical.
>
> Because knowledge is basically idiosyncratic, it is most difficult to judge whether one person's knowledge is 'better' than another's.
>
> Knowledge does not exist outside of individual knowers: it is not a thing apart. The data that goes into books and into the Library of Congress is not the same as the knowledge people know.
>
> Knowledge is not inherently ordered or structured nor does it automatically subdivide into academic 'disciplines'. These categories are man-made, not natural. (8)

In relation to these views on the nature of knowledge, it is useful to notice what Rathbone takes to be the underlying assumption or 'the basic idea' among supporters of the open classroom on how children learn:

> Open education views the child…as a self-activated maker of meaning…. Learning is seen as the result of his own self-initiated interaction with the world: the child's understanding grows during a constant interplay between something outside himself—the general environment, a pendulum, a person—and something inside himself—his concept-forming mechanism, his mind—
>
> …in a very fundamental way each child is his own agent—a self-reliant, independent, self-actualizing individual who is capable, on his own, of forming concepts and of learning. (9)

Of course, Rathbone also reaffirms the Rousseauist faith of progressive education generally in the natural goodness of the child. This attribute of the child together with his autonomy as a learner form the basis of his general autonomy as a moral agent. Each child 'has the

right to elect what he will do and what he shall be'; 'to pursue whatever question interests him'; 'what he does and who he becomes are his to decide.' In the theory of open education, as Rathbone interprets it, each child is thus already an autonomous agent, and this is a fundamental condition that any effort claiming the name of education should respect.

Given these beliefs about the nature of knowledge and the autonomy of the child as learner and moral agent, it is not surprising that the ideal teacher-student relationship bears no resemblance to that of master and apprentice. The key words in Rathbone's description of the teacher's role are 'assistant' and 'facilitator.' (10)

It is beyond the scope of this essay to provide an adequate critique of the varieties of relativist epistemology that underlie the assertion of an unqualified intellectual autonomy for the learner in the process of education. In relation to both the philosophical and the educational positions that have been mentioned I shall merely point to what I take to be their most serious shortcomings. No doubt, many of their supporters are reacting to the excesses of the mechanistic, positivist account of knowledge—in particular, to its notion of objectivity; (11) and many are probably motivated by a proper moral revulsion at the inhumane uses to which knowledge, especially science, is frequently put. However, in attacking these philosophical and moral defects, it is not necessary to promote the role of the individual human agent in knowing to such an extent that any notion whatever of objectivity is undermined. In fact, once this has been done, the philosophical and moral criticism simply collapses into an expression of one ultimately non-rational commitment against another. The critical notes I here wish to make on recent forms of relativism have for the most part been developed by Roger Trigg in 'Reason and Commitment.' (12)

1 When the standards of truth and reasonable belief that apply to any individual are those, and only those, that the individual decides to accept for himself, then it is not possible for him (provided he observes the standards to which he subscribes) to hold a false belief or to believe or act irrationally. In these circumstances, no distinction between knowledge and belief can be drawn, and there is no ground for claiming that anyone is fanatical or prejudiced. As Trigg observes, '"truth" becomes a consequence of belief and commitment and not a reason for it.' (13) In such a scheme, it is not simply that we can only speak of what is true or rational for this or that person, but we cannot intelligibly employ the concepts of true and rational at all. For where it is not possible to distinguish error or irrationality, neither is it possible to distinguish truth or rationality.

2 Human beings who hold radically different beliefs do communicate with one another through language, and translations are effectively made from one language or conceptual system into another. An essential condition for such communication and translation of beliefs, as well as for genuine argument, is that claims may be true or false, may constitute good or bad reasons, as such—and not simply from the point of view of the speaker. This, in turn, presupposes that there are not as many worlds as there are ways of talking, but various conceptual perspectives from which the same world may be described and interpreted in ways that may be true or false. Anyone who followed a relativism of conceptual systems or forms of life quite literally would be forced to restrict his assertions about what is the case to those

who share his form of life. Even his account of relativism could claim to be true (and intelligible?) only from the viewpoint of that group.

3   If the commitment to conceptual systems on which issues of truth and rationality depend is finally nonrational, it must be assumed that we cannot question whether the beliefs that characterise such a system may themselves be mistaken, or whether it may be more reasonable to accept one system rather than another. To support this assumption it would have to be further supposed that these conceptual systems (forms of life, etc.) exist as completely self-contained units and that there are no general or commonsense criteria for true or reasonable belief.

It also seems to be assumed that we may choose whether to be committed to the conditions of rationality or not. But these conditions apply to us regardless of our commitment. We may of course choose to reject them, but still we cannot escape acting irrationally.

The talk of ultimate non-rational commitments seems to reflect the image of man referred to earlier in which each individual is, at centre, an isolated will that is not constrained by reasons, but in a pure act of freedom determines what it shall find acceptable as reasons, not only in morality but in science as well. In this context I can only refer the reader again to Iris Murdoch's critical discussion of this view of man. In summary, the alternative she defends is expressed as follows:

> Man is not a combination of an impersonal rational thinker and a personal will. He is a unified being who sees, and who desires in accordance with what he sees, and who has some continual slight control over the direction and focus of his vision. (14)

4   Serious exponents of relativism are not able to maintain a strict and consistent relativist position. The general problem they face is that anyone who adopts a thoroughgoing relativism, who rejects the possibility of objective criteria of truth and rationality, cannot even consistently assume that he is correct. Even if he begins to argue seriously, he must assume inconsistently that the claims one makes may be true or false.

The problem is illustrated in Kuhn's interpretation of scientific knowledge. Although he asserts that different paradigms of scientific inquiry are incommensurable, he confidently undertakes a comparative and historical study that yields conclusions about what is presumed to be, in some sense, a common enterprise. He even suggests that scientists can go wrong in following a given paradigm, and detects a pattern of progress, not simply change, within science. Kuhn also accepts the truth of the psychological and sociological explanations as to why scientists at a given time support a particular paradigm. If he were consistent, he would have to treat such explanations as relative to the conceptual schemes within which their proponents work. In terms of his relativist assumptions, Kuhn's own conclusions cannot even make a claim to be true—except on those who find themselves committed to the paradigm of inquiry that he himself employs.

The relativists among the philosophically inclined sociologists of knowledge, such as Karl Mannheim, have also inconsistently supposed that they were giving a true account of the group-relative nature of belief (both as a matter of fact and as an epistemological

theory). In theories of this kind there is often an elite (e.g. Mannheim's 'socially unattached intelligentsia') that excapes the conceptual boundaries of this or that social group, and to which their authors belong. Despite the inconsistency with relativism, it is argued that the conceptual perspective of the elite is preferable to that of any other group.

Anything like an adequate critical comment on the beliefs about knowledge and learning that, in Rathbone's view, are presupposed in the practice of open education would take us far beyond the limits of this paper. Yet, as we saw earlier, these beliefs offer a rationale for treating what approaches the limit of unqualified intellectual autonomy as a basic normative factor in the conduct of education. I should therefore at least refer briefly to some respects in which I believe the theory is mistaken.

1   Perhaps the most serious weakness is the theory's simplistic image of learning: each human organism independently interacting with its environment and deriving its own concepts out of this experience through the workings of its 'concept-forming mechanism' or mind. There is a substantial range of concepts for which this abstractionist view simply cannot account. (15) But, in any case, as human beings we are not isolated individuals constructing our private realm of concepts out of the data of our raw experience. We acquire concepts, and learn to apply them in interpreting and understanding our experience, through the social process of learning language as an integral part of various human practices. The theory's individualistic view of man ignores the fact that each human being develops as such in the context of a preexisting world of shared meanings, that mind is not simply a given, there to be flexed like a muscle, but an achievement that depends largely on our gaining access to the inheritance of shared meanings. (16)

2   There is an obvious sense in which all the ways of classifying knowledge are man-made. However, it does not follow from this, as Rathbone seems to suppose, that they must be entirely matters of convention, or if conventional, that they are necessarily arbitrary. One need not even argue, as Hirst has done, (17) that there are several logically distinct basic forms of knowledge. It is sufficient to point out that a particular method of inquiry, a group of closely related key concepts, a significant common human purpose may severally or together provide a non-arbitrary basis for the organisation of knowledge.

Apart from incurring the general criticisms against subjectivism, the emphasis that Rathbone places on the idiosyncratic character of knowledge seems to reflect a confusion between the sequence of psychological activities in which a person learns and the logical criteria that apply to the outcomes of his learning (that is, whether what he has learnt is knowledge or false belief, whether he has acquired a moral concept of honesty or a scientific concept of energy, and so on). In relation to the practice of education, the consequence of this confusion is that an account of how children learn is also thought to determine what they should learn.

A curious feature of the theory of open education as Rathbone presents it is that, despite the uncompromising rejection of objective forms of knowledge, it seems only to entail that 'in certain rather basic situations, traditional academic objectives are not considered to be the first order of priority.' (18) On the basis of the general

claims about the nature of knowledge, one would expect that such objectives could have no place in the order of priorities at all.

3   Rathbone's discussion of the theoretical assumptions of the open classroom also illustrates the general problem of inconsistency that relativists face. If the supporters of the open classroom consistently accept the anarchistic epistemology that Rathbone describes, they cannot argue that the assumptions of traditional schooling are mistaken or that their own style of education embodies correct principles and priorities. They can merely state that the position they take is true for them because they believe it to be so, and acknowledge that the same must be said for the supporters of any other view of education.

As we have seen, various forms of anarchistic epistemology (including the relativism of conceptual systems to which people ultimately adhere by virtue of a non-rational commitment) allow for, and in fact require, the exercise of 'pure' intellectual autonomy. I have suggested briefly why the price they exact for this autonomy is intolerably high. It can be bought only at the cost of eliminating in effect the distinction between knowledge and belief, between rational and irrational thought and action. Certainly, the kind of personal autonomy that makes these demands cannot be an aim of liberal education. For liberal education is primarily an induction into the standards of truth and rationality and other domains of value as they have been articulated in the ongoing public traditions of human understanding.

It is difficult to know what kind of education could be justified, given the assumptions of unqualified personal autonomy. If human beings are thought to be autonomous from birth, or, at least, if it is supposed that the potentiality unfolds spontaneously, there is clearly no need for an education that promotes autonomy. In so far as such autonomous beings can be said to be educated, the only appropriate method would seem to be that of personal discovery. But if this method were taken quite literally, its effectiveness for most individuals would be very limited, and it would make impossible the cumulative achievement of knowledge and skill from one generation to another. Nor would it be possible to apply any public criteria to the quality of what an individual discovered for himself. It could not be said, for example, that a conclusion he had reached was false, or insignificant, or biased. It is difficult to see how we can speak seriously at all of the education of human beings if they are interpreted as asocial and ahistorical atoms. Even the environment that A.S.Neill established at Summerhill was not entirely consistent with his beliefs about the complete autonomy of each child's wants, and the dire consequences of any kind of uninvited adult influence. He did not seem to notice, for example, that children at Summerhill were not necessarily free to do what they wanted when left alone; both the wants they had and the ways they satisfied them depended upon the options available at Summerhill.

The general objections that have been raised do not necessarily apply to emotional autonomy. It is an arguable moral ideal and can probably be promoted by some form of liberal education. At least, there does not seem to be any incongruity between the general characteristics of liberal education and this ideal. Given the role of the emotions in human action and the consequences of involvement and commitment, the question is whether there is more loss than gain in attempting to achieve emotional autonomy. Without arguing the case here, I believe that the loss does outweigh the gain. The detachment by which a

person refrains from egoistically consuming what he loves seems to me a more admirable ideal to develop than the egoistic detachment by which one carefully avoids loving, or loving too much.

KANT'S DEFENSE OF RATIONAL AUTONOMY

To come back to the question of intellectual and moral autonomy; although an anarchistic epistemology provides the basis for a substantial form of personal autonomy, I have argued that it cannot be justified and that autonomy of this kind cannot be an aim of liberal education. The question now is whether there can be a significant version of personal autonomy that is nevertheless hedged in by the conditions of rationality and morality in human thought and action. Whether such a concession seriously dilutes the claim about autonomy clearly depends, in part, on how the conditions for rational and moral behavior are interpreted. Historically, the main effort to defend autonomy in a strong sense, while still acknowledging the constraints of rational criteria, has been made in the moral sphere. Kant's defense of moral autonomy of this kind is, of course, the most distinguished and influential. It clearly reverberates in the contemporary theories of moral development proposed by Piaget and Kohlberg.

According to Kant, who in turn was influenced by Rousseau, each individual is autonomous in that he decides upon and legislates to himself those principles of action which he sees are fitting to his nature as a member of a community of free and equal rational beings. In the moral sphere each one of us is usbject only to his own will as a rational being. But, of course, the principles that we prescribe for ourselves in this way must also be willed as universal laws applying equally to all free and rational beings. For Kant, the basis of autonomy is 'the idea of the will of every rational being as a will which makes universal law.' (19)

The first difficulty with this doctrine is that an individual cannot seriously will a universal law without being prepared to challenge the autonomy of everyone else. (20) No conflict arises as long as every individual does in fact will the same law for himself and everyone else. But it is not the case that human beings always agree about universal laws of morality. And we cannot suppose that they must necessarily agree, without questioning the autonomy of their decision. Of course, Kant tried to ensure a consensus of sovereign wills by appealing to an obscure metaphysical entity, the rational self.

A second and more basic problem is that of making sense of individuals legislating universal laws to themselves. In Kant's theory the plausibility of the metaphor of selflegislation depends again on the metaphysical distinction he draws between the noumenal or rational self and the phenomenal self. But apart from the difficulty with this distinction, there is, as Kurt Baier has recently argued, a logical impossibility in claiming that each individual is subject only to laws of his own making: 'If no member of a society were subject to the will of any other, then there would simply be no law and so no legislation including self-legislation.' (21)

As Baier also points out, the metaphor of legislation is inappropriate to the activities of accepting, applying, criticising, or even reforming moral principles. To the extent that Kant's criterion of universalisation is useful, it is not a legislative mechanism, but a guide for judging the moral adequacy of a rule. While various aspects of Kant's moral theory may consistently be adopted in the practice of education, there is one decisive reason why his

ideal of the autonomous rational self-legislator cannot be an aim of education: it is simply that there cannot be such a person.

MORAL AUTONOMY AND OBJECTIVITY

In the contemporary view of moral autonomy, there seem to be elements of both the Kantian self-legislator and the older belief in the supremacy of individual conscience, shorn now of its religious affiliations. The latter holds that an individual must be completely free to follow his own moral beliefs" and that his own conscience (or what he judges he should do) is the final arbiter of morality in his case. Where this element dominates, autonomy slips from the hold of rationality that Kant attempted to place upon it. It is simply another way of talking about pure autonomy in the moral sphere, and is subject to the criticisms that have already been made. I wish to consider here more closely whether the not uncommon mixture of the self-legislator and personal conscience theories of autonomy can perhaps escape the charge of subjectivism.

H.D.Aiken illustrates the attempt to interpret moral autonomy in this fashion and yet to argue for a form of moral objectivity that is compatible with it. According to Aiken, objectivity in making a moral judgment amounts to an impartial consideration of all the moral values to which one is committed that are related to the decision. As he says, when there is question of the objectivity of a moral judgment we have made, 'our task is always and only to look beyond it to the other relevant commitments which we ourselves acknowledge.' (22) Aiken also seems to claim that a moral judgment is verified if it satisfies the conditions for objectivity. (23) While his interpretation places stress on internal consistency and authenticity, it is really only a demanding form of subjectivism rather than a version of objectivity. Perhaps it permits us to say that an individual is inconsistent with his own moral beliefs in reaching a certain decision or holding a particular principle. However, if a person sincerely claims that he is not being inconsistent, I am not sure that on Aiken's theory anyone else can justifiably challenge the claim. Certainly, the theory does not allow for the possibility that anyone could sincerely and consistently hold moral principles and make moral judgments that were nevertheless false or inadequate.

Aiken's own reference to moral communities within which argument is possible provides the context for a more satisfactory account of moral objectivity. But if we are talking about a genuine moral community of beliefs and practices, and not simply the fortuitous agreement of isolated individual wills, it then becomes necessary to modify the notion of moral autonomy from which Aiken starts. I would wish to go further still in drawing the boundaries of moral objectivity. No doubt serious moral argument is empirically very difficult among those who belong to different moral communities, and some agreement on moral beliefs and practices would seem to be a necessary condition for such argument. However, Aiken seems to suppose a series of discrete moral communities rather than a pattern of significant common and overlapping elements among all moral communities. Moreover, as he allows that the autonomous person is a rational self legislator, he can hardly reject the possibility of comparatively assessing the adequacy of different raoral practices and systems against criteria of rationality. It is outside the range of this paper to develop this point any further. A clear illustration of the kind of dimensions that may be applied is given in Morris Ginsberg's 'On the Diversity of Morals.' (24) As Ginsberg notes, the

relativists, whether individual or social, are in an awkward position in that their views are more likely to encourage the imposition of moral beliefs and practices rather than respect for those who differ, unless they inconsistently assert the universal validity of a principle of tolerance.

Whatever may distinguish personal autonomy in the moral domain once due regard is given to the criteria of rationality and the communal character of moral practices, I think it is clear that objectivity, to the fullest extent that it can be achieved, is an essential characteristic of moral maturity. We should not confuse, as Aiken seems to, the questions of objectivity and truth. Although the two are closely related, objectivity is predicated of attitudes and procedures, while truth is predicated of statements. The development of objectivity in a moral agent—e.g. critically reflecting on one's own assumptions, being aware of the conditions that shape one's values, understanding other points of view, submitting one's principles and judgments to the criticism of others—is an outcome to which liberal education is immediately and evidently directed. Whether autonomy is also an aim depends on the extent to which it can be reconciled with the practices required for objectivity.

AUTONOMY AS AN AIM OF LIBERAL EDUCATION

If there is question of trying to achieve personal autonomy in anything like the strict sense, then it is clearly paradoxical to suggest that this can be done through induction into the main public traditions of rational thought and expression. Of course, from the point of view of classical rationalism, these traditions and the nature of personal autonomy are interpreted in such a way that the paradox is avoided. The condition that autonomy should be rational is not regarded as a restriction on personal self-determination. In the classical rationalist interpretation (of which Kant's self-legislator is one version) personal autonomy consists in willing what one knows to be rationally necessary. Thus initiation into the forms of understanding is not only compatible with personal autonomy but a necessary condition for its attainment. (25) I shall not comment on the adequacy of this concept of autonomy or the distinctive beliefs of classical rationalism that underlie it. Assuming that the defense of objectivity and rationality against the claims of anarchistic epistemology does not depend on these beliefs, what I wish to ask is whether there is a sense in which 'autonomy' can appropriately describe a fundamental aim of liberal education.

In relation to this question, I am assuming two general conditions that the practice of liberal education should satisfy. The first concerns the way in which the traditions of rational inquiry are interpreted. The crucial difference is whether they are seen as immutable and unquestionable moulds of human thought and action or as ceaseless efforts at understanding and achievement carried forward from one generation to another—in Eliot's phrase, 'the common pursuit of true judgment.' I am referring to the kind of liberal education that reflects the latter of these interpretations. The continual, critical reform of the traditions of rational inquiry is itself a tradition. However, it does not exist independently, but is a way of engaging in any of the particular traditions.

The second condition is that the dominant emphases in the procedures of liberal education should be upon the understanding of what is learned; the acceptance of methods and theories on the basis of the evidence that justifies them, not simply on the authority of the teacher or the experts; the development of the skills of inquiry in a way that depends

on reflection and imagination, a combination of what is fashionably called convergent and divergent thinking; the critical appreciation of the scope and limitations of each of the main forms of thought and expression and the relation in which they stand to one another.

Granted that liberal education in practice attempts to satisfy these two conditions as fully as possible, it is clear that it must be aiming at the development of some degree of intellectual autonomy. However, I am still not satisfied that we should describe the outcome in these terms. When the qualifications have been duly acknowledged, we can speak of autonomy only in an attenuated sense. Even those who have achieved the mastery of experts in any field might initiate a significant revision or breakthrough—particularly affecting its basic methods—is relatively restricted. And, of course, even in these cases, the judgment of significance has to be upheld by the community of experts. (26)

If these are the sorts of limitations on the autonomy of those who have achieved mastery, how much more so for those who have achieved the level of understanding and competence that may reasonably be expected through liberal education? For while liberal education may provide the basis for mastery in some aspect of science, or the humanities, or the arts, its direct purpose is to achieve an integrated induction into the broad range of these public symbolic structures. Even if liberal education were restricted to an intellectual elite, it would not aim at developing the level of mastery at which one might exercise some degree of significant autonomy. The language of autonomy seems even more unrealistic and misleading, if we are prepared to entertain the radical possibility of providing liberal education for the majority of people in our society; and, apart from any other reasons, as long as we are serious about having everyone participate intelligently in political democracy, I do not see that we have any alternative but to try.

Being reasonable does not depend on being autonomous, even when autonomy is interpreted as discovering for oneself the rules that apply rather than deciding on one's own rules. In fact, there would be little scope for reasonable thought and action if we did not, for much of the time, employ theories and rules that have been worked out and tested by others. Whether we consider, for example, learning and using language in everyday life, or examining the validity of an argument or the claims of a scientific experiment, or even making direct observations, we must inevitably rely to some extent on the authority of others.

As I have already suggested, a fundamental aim of liberal education is the development of the skills, attitudes and values that are bound up with objectivity. This aim cannot be adequately realised unless we also learn to reflect critically on the traditions of rational inquiry themselves. It might be said that here the objective of liberal education is to encourage personal autonomy. However, I would point out that the habit of critically assessing the 'conventional wisdom' is not promoted for the sake of personal autonomy as such, but as the best way of ensuirng that our beliefs and values will be as thoroughly justified as is possible. Independence of judgment, whether on moral or other issues, is a desirable characteristic only to the extent that a person is qualified to judge. An educator may not justifiably encourage critical inquiry except in the context of trying to develop skills and knowledge relevant to making judgments in a given area.

In relation to the other outcomes of liberal education that are loosely, if not misleadingly, described as personal autonomy, I think it preferable to speak of them in such terms as the following: to gain an understanding of the main methods of thought, conceptual schemes and

bodies of knowledge, together with a critical appreciation of their strengths and limitations both in themselves and in relation to one another. The level of understanding should be sufficient for intelligently interpreting one's own experience, for expressing oneself with clarity and precision, for making informed and responsible choices, for following intelligently the debate of experts—especially when their claims affect the general conduct of life, for critically assessing the programs of political leaders, for seeing through and resisting persuasive strategies of empty rhetoric and propaganda, for responding with discrimination to fashionable trends whether in art, life-styles, political theories, popular entertainment, or whatever. This list is not intended to be exhaustive. It mainly stresses aspects of a constructive or critical response, rather than a contribution, to the forms of culture. This emphasis reflects, I believe, the character and scope of liberal education. For while it is a desirable, if not necessary, basis for a constructive—perhaps even creative— contribution, it is not sufficient.

In regard to the process of liberal education, teachers who are committed to the kinds of outcomes I have listed must, if consistent, be prepared to observe the conditions of objectivity in their own teaching, and always to provide the most adequate reasons that are within the capacity of their students. While there are moral grounds for acting in this way, it is not necessary to appeal to the students' actual or potential autonomy. It is sufficient for the teacher to recognise them as persons in the process of developing their capacity to choose on the basis of reasons, and that reasons may be good or bad. 'It is precisely in reference to the criteria of objectivity and reasonable belief, which are such primary concerns of liberal education, that such questions as what conditions distinguish educating from indoctrinating, what kind of persuasion is rationally and morally defensible in teaching, when a teacher should and should not be neutral on an issue, are to be resolved.

I do not wish to imply of course that liberal education is not closely related to the achievement of human freedom. In gaining familiarity with the main symbolic forms of culture one also greatly enlarges the range of significant choices that one can make. The outcome also involves a change in the quality of choice, not simply in its scope. The fundamental objective of learning with understanding cannot be realised unless the learner comes to grasp principles for himself, and thus to achieve intellectual independence from the mere authority of teachers, text-books, experts and cult heroes. So if the engagement in liberal education is conducted properly, a person should reach the point at which the important choices he makes are his own in the sense that he applies for himself the relevant criteria of criticism and evaluation, and sees for himself why these criteria are the relevant ones to employ. Provided we recognise the public criteria of knowledge and the public standards of excellence within which an individual exercises such intellectual independence, we may metaphorically refer to him as autonomous in contrast to the person whose choices are in effect usually made for him by others.

However, to speak in terms of autonomy versus heteronomy is, I believe, to draw the line of distinction too sharply. The question is not whether we accept the public forms of reasoned inquiry, moral practice, artistic expression, or the authority and judgment of others, or deeply felt commitments, but how we accept them. The fundamental distinction is between a blind, unreflective, mechanical acceptance and one that is informed, critical, discriminatory, adaptive. If the latter (which includes the reasoned acceptance of the authority of others) is to be described as intellectual autonomy, there is no difficulty in

counting autonomy as an aim of liberal education. However, it must be recognised that this is a substantially different concept of autonomy from the one that is related to an anarchistic epistemology and widely invoked in contemporary educational theory. It is precisely because of this difference (and because educationists often leave the underlying epistemological issues unexamined) that the invocation of personal autonomy, whether as a criterion for the process or the outcome of education, tends to function as a slogan. In fact, it seems that personal autonomy has become one of those idols in whose name the effort to make liberal education available to as many people as possible is being betrayed.

NOTES

1   I.Murdoch, 'The Sovereignty of Good' (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970).

2   R.P.Wolff, 'In Defense of Anarchism' (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 15.

3   R.F.Dearden, Autonomy and Education, in 'Education and the Development of Reason,' ed. R.F.Dearden, P.H.Hirst and R.S.Peters (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), p. 453.

4   'Such an anarchistic epistemology—for this is what our theories of error now turn out to be—is not only a better means for improving knowledge, or of understanding history. It is also more appropriate for a free man to use than are its rigorous and "scientific" alternatives' (Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, in 'Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science,' vol. IV, ed. M.Rodner and S.Winokur (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1970), p. 21).

5   T.Kuhn, 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,' 2nd ed. (University of Chicago Press, 1970).

6   T.Roszak, 'The Making of a Counter Culture' (London: Faber & Faber, 1970), especially ch. VII; Science: A Technocratic Trap, 'Atlantic Monthly' (June 1972), pp. 56–61; P.L.Berger and T.Luckman, 'The Social Construction of Reality' (New York: Doubleday, 1966).

7   C.H.Rathbone (ed.), 'Open Education: The Informal Classroom' (New York: Citation Press, 1971); R.S. Barth, 'Open Education' (New York: Agathon Press, 1972).

8   C.H.Rathbone, The Implicit Rationale of the Open Education Classroom, in Rathbone (ed.), op.cit., p. 102.

9   Ibid., pp. 100, 104.

10 Ibid., pp. 106–8.

11 Some of the contemporary critics (E.G.Roszak) seem to have confused the general question of objectivity with the particular interpretation of it in the positivist tradition (the doctrine of objectivism). It is not uncommon for writers to refer to Michael Polanyi's 'Personal Knowledge' as a decisive refutation of scientific objectivity. What he attacks to good effect, however, is the doctrine of objectivism. What he tries to construct—whether successfully or not is another matter—is a theory of knowledge at once personal and objective. In supporting objectivity in knowledge, I am not assuming the rationalist view that, in our attempts to understand the physical world or the normative standards of human action, we must suppose a perfectly consistent system. But if the world (or human conduct) is such that it cannot be accounted for in strictly consistent theories, then this is itself a fact about the world and our efforts to know it.

12 R.Trigg, 'Reason and Commitment' (Cambridge University Press, 1973).

13 Trigg, op.cit., p. 23.

14 Murdoch, op.cit., p. 40.

15 Cf. P.Geach's criticism of abstractionism in 'Mental Acts' (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957). For a general critique of the theory of knowledge supported by Rathbone, see L.F.Claydon, Content and Process in Curriculum Construction, 'Educational Philosophy and Theory,' vol. 6, no. 2 (October 1974), pp. 43–53.

16 This view is developed by a number of recent philosophers of education. See, for example, R.S.Peters, Education as Initiation, in 'Philosophical Analysis and Education,' ed. R.D.Archambault (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965); I.Scheffler, Philosophical Models of Teaching, in 'The Concept of Education,' ed. R.S.Peters (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967); P.H.Hirst, Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge, in Archambault (ed.) op.cit.

17 Ibid.

18 Rathbone, op.cit., p. 105.

19 I.Kant, 'Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals,' translated and analysed by H.J.Paton (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 98.

20 As Berlin has pointed out, Kant's individualistic doctrine lends itself ironically to a totalitarian interpretation:

> If I am a legislator or a ruler, I must assume that if the law I impose is rational (and I can only consult my own reason) it will automatically' be approved by all the members of my society so far as they are rational beings. For if they disapprove, they must, pro tanto, be irrational; then they will need to be repressed by reason: whether their own or mine cannot matter, for the pronouncements of reason must be the same in all minds.

See 'Four Essays on Liberty' (Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 152–3.

21 K.Baier, 'Moral Autonomy as an Aim of Moral Education, in 'New Essays in the Philosophy of Education,' ed. G.Langford and D.J.O'Connor (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 102. On Kant's idea of legislating for oneself, G.E.M.Anscombe comments that it

> is as absurd as if in these days when majority votes command great respect, one were to call each reflective decision a man made a vote resulting in a majority which as a matter of proportion is overwhelming, for it is always 1–0. The concept of legislation requires superior power in the legislator.

See Modern Moral Philosophy, in 'Ethics,' ed. J.J. Thomson and G.Dworken (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 187–8.

22 H.D.Aiken, 'Reason and Conduct' (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), p. 162.

23 Ibid., p. 168.

24 M.Ginsberg, 'On the Diversity of Morals' (London: Mercury Books, 1956), title essay, especially pp. 121–6.

25 As Berlin notes in describing the rationalist view, 'Knowledge liberates not by offering us more open possibilities amongst which we can make our choice, but by preserving us from the frustration of attempting the impossible' (op.cit., p. 144).

26 The relationship between intersubjective agreement and the attainment of objectivity and truth is a complex one. Such agreement functions both as a criterion and a condition of objectivity. However, in neither case is objectivity just a matter of agreement. In relation to the former, a claim is not held objectively—much less is it true—simply because a large number of people agree about it. As Michael Scriven has pointed out, it is an error of positivist methodology to confuse

the qualitative and quantitative senses in which 'objective' and 'subjective' may be contrasted (Objectivity and Subjectivity in Educational Research, in 'Philosophical Redirection of Educational Research: The Seventy-First Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education,' ed. L.G.Thomas (University of Chicago Press, 1972), pp. 95–7). However, even when qualitative criteria are observed, agreement does not constitute objectivity or truth, although it provides a crucial test.

Some measure of agreement at the methodological level on the qualitative criteria of objectivity, as well as on the use of concepts, is a necessary condition for making and settling claims to objectivity in particular cases. However, this does not mean that the question of objectivity must in the end be just a matter of convention. For what may justifiably be agreed upon is constrained by characteristics of the world and of human beings that do not depend on convention. For a discussion of objectivity see D.W.Haralyn, Objectivity, in 'Education and the Development of Reason,' ed. R.F.Dearden, P.H.Hirst and R.S.Peters (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972). I am not convinced that Hamlyn gives a satisfactory account of the ultimately non-conventional nature of 'forms of life.'

7

Ambiguity and constraint in the 'freedom' of free schools

David Nyberg

'Lyberte or freedome is a moche swete thynge.' Freedom is an idea, like justice or education, that is used to defend and to embellish social policies and institutions of almost all persuasions. Freedom is one of the most important words in our language, not so much because it helps resolve disputes or solve intricate dilemmas, but because to consider it and its diversity of meanings is inevitably to learn something more about civilized human life and values. The word is important because it represents an idea that we cannot do without, and because it has survived the persistence of philosophers and poets and politicians to reduce it to a single operational definition. Some would argue that this characteristic ambiguity of the word is evidence that its worth in terms of human knowledge has been overestimated, and that it may even be an impediment to 'philosophically sound' cultural advancement, that is to say, meaningless. To conclude of freedom, on the grounds that its 'real meaning' eludes analysis, that the word must be meaningless, leads one to the same conclusion about the Tao, the Pentateuch, most of Plato, Shakespeare, Marx, and Freud, most music (excluding, perhaps, military marches and the mnemonic alphabet songs of childhood), and the Constitution of the USA, for example.

The silliness of such conclusions is less ambiguous, I think, than is the meaning of freedom. But this introduction to the difficulties of the idea of freedom should not be read as praise for ambiguity itself. Ambiguity is no more a 'good' than is precision; these are aspects of language, not virtues, notwithstanding Russell's remark that the demand for certainty is natural to man, 'but is nevertheless an intellectual vice'. Across the breech from the analytics' antipathy toward ambiguity, gloat the family of romantics whose devotion to the ambiguous in language, if not in ideas, is no more defensible for its fervor, than is the analytics' denial for its chill. It is not defensible for two reasons. First, some types of ambiguity serve the intention to deceive, either in disguising the fact that a speaker or author does not know what he would have the listener or reader believe he knows, or by creating an emotional response in connection with a slogan that is meant to carry conviction along with ignorance. (In fairness it must be said that sometimes the sloganeer is as ignorant as he must count on his audience being, and therefore we should not impute to him culpability for deception which is more inevitable than deliberate.) The second reason comes as a response to the romantic claims that since important words, like freedom, have several meanings, then it doesn't really matter which we choose, and it is pointless to debate justifications for our choices. This position rests on the common and mistaken belief that, lacking certainty, there are no standards by which choices and meanings can be assessed for their relative and potential worth, and that because there are alternatives

on a given issue, the alternatives are coequal. This simply is not the case. Aside from the obvious reminder that 'equal' is one of our most important words, too, and it has its own ambiguities which must be observed before it can be invoked to defend the subjective construct view of 'freedom' and of meaning in general, there is a more generic objection. The objection has two parts: 1, the value of a meaning of freedom cannot be justified without appeal to other values, and the meaning of these other values may or may not be consistent with a given meaning of freedom; 2, it is not possible to endorse all meanings of freedom, all freedoms, without contradiction.

The argument for the first part of the objection is roughly this: If A claims that freedom means 'whatever one can do and wants to do, one may do', and that this meaning of freedom is coequal with any other, then A must answer for B's challenge that for him (B) freedom means 'whatever one can do and wants to do, one may do, except if it causes pain to anyone else', and that what A proposes to do (e.g. burn B's manuscript to keep warm) will cause B pain, therefore, A is not free to do as he can and wishes to do. If these meanings of freedom are coequal and conflicting, we have a dilemma: both A and B are restricted by the other's view of freedom. A is prohibited by B from burning B's manuscript on the ground it would interfere with both A's and B's conception of freedom (B can and wants to protect his manuscript, so he may protect it; B also claims that if A exercises his freedom it would cause B pain). B is restricted in a slightly different way; he is forced to be vigilant of his manuscript so that A won't get a chance to burn it, and this robs his attention from other matters. The dilemma remains unresolved until an appeal is made to another value, which could be any one of several (respect for private property, compromise, friendship, the communal authority of civil law, etc.). In this example, B's meaning of freedom is more consistent with an appeal to another value, because of its conditional clause, and therefore might be considered a 'better' meaning so long as the resolution of conflicts over freedom is also held to be a value. It should be noted in conclusion that some other value must be held for freedom itself to be of any value. Calling the ideal of freedom 'good', or 'humane', or 'democratic' is only to put off the question 'For what?' And when that question is answered, the basis for assigning value to a meaning of freedom will have been laid, or mislaid, depending on whether the meanings are shown to be compatible. (If the answer to the question 'For what?' is 'Nothing', then what would be lost without freedom? If the answer to that question is also 'Nothing', freedom is neither gain nor loss; it has no apparent value.)

The argument for the second part of the objection to the romantics' view, namely, that one cannot endorse all meanings of freedom, all freedoms, without contradiction, can be elucidated in a single example. If all freedoms are allowed, A is free to arrogate B's freedoms, even to take B's life. If to give A all freedoms is to make a slave of B, and if slavery is taken to mean unfreedom, then to endorse all freedoms is to endorse unfreedom as well; both justified under the same principle. It takes considerable guile and dexterity even to a defense of such a position.

Freedom is a swete thynge, but it is a complex thing, too. Many persons have died for it, killed for it, some long for it while others fear it, some have got great government grants to figure out how to keep it for allies and take it away from enemies, who are often defined in terms of what meanings of freedom they hold and what they are willing to do to get it and keep it. It is important to continue trying to understand the idea of freedom, because

the idea is crucial in human life. No less important is the idea of education, and no less ambiguous, as one is bound to judge who is concerned with understanding the enchanting controversy over the reappearance of 'free schools'.

'A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do….' Emerson goes on in this most celebrated of his essays, Self-Reliance, to pick at the intellectual glue of the arguments just presented, namely that thinking of freedom in relation to other values is worthy and best done with respect both for the systematic and productive ambiguity of our most important ideas and words, and for consistency in reasoning. In his tribute to individualism and nonconformity, he foreshadows the spirit of the free schools that would follow him by more than a century:

> Society everywhere is in conspiracy against the manhood of every one of its members…
>
> Whoso would be a man, must be a nonconformist…. Nothing is at last sacred but the integrity of your own mind…. No law can be sacred to me but that of my nature. Good and bad are but names very readily transferable to that or this; the only right is what is after my constitution, the only wrong what is against it….
>
> Life only avails, not the having lived. Power ceases in the instant of repose; it resides in the moment of transition from a past to a new state, in the shooting of the gulf, in the darting of an aim….

These snippets of Emerson are used as a beginning for a discussion of freedom and schooling, free schools in particular, because of their sententious economy not because of their chronological significance. In fact, Emerson's essay fits in between Fichte's considerations of freedom based on a sort of instinct of self-respect, and Tolstoy's concept of non-interference, all three of whom wrote later than Montaigne, Rousseau, and Pestalozzi. None of these others, though, seems to remain as contemporary with modern educational-freedom thinkers such as Kozol, Goodman, and Rogers, whose works are cited below as evidence that while the issues and convictions have not changed much, our progress toward their elucidation has been slow.

'Sir, We know our will is free, and there's an end on't.' In the 200 years since Johnson made this rather imperious remark to Boswell, we have not been able to produce the evidence for the great man's conviction. Professor Skinner has recently produced a volume, 'Beyond Freedom and Dignity', which manages only to claim that he knows our will is not free, and there's the real end on't, while at the same time managing to detract from the character of the debate. But to speak of Johnson and Skinner in the same context is to compare Sabatiers with screwdrivers.

Like the bullish and opposite beliefs contrasted above, we have, in deciding how to stand as educators these days, a rather mean pair of alternatives offered by the proponents of free schools.

One can either come out for 'love and freedom', and learn to believe that no learning can take place unless the pupil's environment is loving and free; or one feels pressure, failing this alternative, to say that something else is better for learning than 'love and freedom', and that learning most likely occurs when the pupil is not free, but rather is well disciplined and diligent, loved or not. The charge against this view is that 'fear and authoritarianism' are the other sides of 'love and freedom', and that no right thinking, warm blooded adult educator

could still make policy on 'fear and authoritarianism' grounds, when the disastrous results of such policy are so embarrassingly apparent in our massive cowering crowds of obedient consumers, our bourgeois bureaucracies, our bellicose nationalism, our chauvinistic social constructs, and our sundry asylums. It is not difficult to see that this bifarious scene would be much improved by an appreciation of at least some of the complex reasoning that sustains it, however much wanting it is for utility in generating premium policy.

A complex combination of appealing principles and of some stupefying practices has a confounding effect on the policy questions of free schools, and open education in general. One is as naturally drawn to most principles of freedom as one is drawn to uncontaminated air. One is 'for' them, but they are hardly thought of until they are taken away, or slip, during the night, out of our control. (But who ever worried about controlling fresh air until recently?) On the other hand, when certain principles of freedom are used in defining and endorsing educational policy in schools, especially free schools, awesome things occur. For example, in one free school I know of, en dome in Illinois, the cooperative board of directors voted to allow the pupils freedom in using any means they wished for settling disputes that arose during the course of a free school-day. The vote was not unanimous, but the policy was adopted. In a few weeks' time, the directors were troubled and rent as a policy-making body over the issue of violence among the pupils. Some of the disputes were being settled in brutish fashion, and in fact some disputes were being generated by the more pugnacious of the pupils so they could 'pick a resolution' with their meeker peers.

There were arguments for the cathartic benefits of expressed aggressions, which, it was assumed, would disappear as they were freely discharged. And there were arguments from the vanquished that such individual therapy came at too high a price, that it was not in the community's better interests, that the long term effects of such unruly and careless behavior would be destructive to the school's reputation and to the learned values of cooperation and compassion that had been assumed to underlie the whole notion of free schools. For bullies they had public schools.

This is a long hand way of illustrating Camus's remark on freedom, 'Your freedom ends where my nose begins.' But he was speaking of adults. When speaking of children, it is crucial to remember that important as the nose is, behind it lies a brain, and a bloodied brain is not so easy to spot and mend as a bloodied nose. What counts as behavioral freedom for one may indirectly, through fear and persuasion, wreck the psychological freedom of another.

In the next few pages, the words of three well known advocates of free schools will be used to expose three major theoretical claims about freedom, claims that are appealed to, mistakenly I think, in debates over free school policy. The first is Jonathan Kozol's view about the function of free schools in the realization of the end of liberation, of freedom.

Kozol, like many others, tries to define 'free school' contra traditional school, or public school, assuming that the latter already have an adequate definition, especially as the definition would concern freedom. This is an unsupportable assumption, surely, due to the difficulties we have seen in overcoming the ambiguities of freedom, and another of our most important words, education. What a traditional school 'is' depends so much on what the speaker means by 'education' and by 'freedom' that one would think a definition of the former would rely so heavily on the latter that, given the ambiguity of the latter, agreement on what a traditional school is would come hard, and seldom, if at all. However, the assumption apparently prevails that 'traditional' or 'public' school is a standard referent.

In 'Free Schools', Kozol reasons that 'Free School, as the opposite of public school, implies not one thing but ten million different possibilities.' However, this admission does not serve to caution its author from asserting with considerable certainty his own 'true' definition of 'free school': 'The true, moral, political and semantic derivation of "Free School" lies in "Freedom School". It is to the liberation, to the vision and to the potency of the oppressed that any Free School worth its derivation and its photographs of Neill, Tolstoy or Eldridge Cleaver must, in the long run, be accountable.' A free school, then, is an organization dedicated to the condition of liberation, i.e. freedom, of the oppressed, and further characterized by Kozol as being outside the public education system, inside cities, outside white man's 'counterculture', in direct contact with needs of the poor and dispossessed, as small as can be managed, and unpublicized.

Kozol's vision of the eventual condition of liberation as the organizing principle of free schools, contrasts with another common emphasis on what is 'free' about free schools, an emphasis that is, like Kozol's, primarily sociological. Paul Goodman believed that we can educate the young (1968, pp. 73–5):

> entirely in terms of their free choice, with no processing whatsoever…. It seems stupid to decide a priori what the young ought to know and then to try to motivate them instead of letting the initiative come from them and putting information and relevant equipment at their service. It is false to assert that this kind of freedom will not serve society's needs—at least those needs that should humanly be served; freedom is the only way toward authentic citizenship and real, rather than verbal, philosophy. Free choice is not random but responsive to real situations; both youth and adults live in a nature of things, a polity, an ongoing society, and it is these, in fact, that attract interest and channel need.

Continuing his policy of nonencroachment, he claims, a few pages later, that 'Voluntary adolescent choices are often random and foolish and usually transitory; but they are the likeliest ways of growing up reasonably. What is most essential is for the youth to see that he is taken seriously as a person rather than fitted into an institutional system,' Goodman clearly believes that being 'taken seriously as a person' means being given virtually unlimited free choice, at least in one's education. Goodman has switched the emphasis from the end of freedom, to the means of freedom employed for the ends of 'authentic citizenship and real, rather than verbal, philosophy', as well as due service to society's needs. Living with such faith must have been invigorating.

A third usage of 'freedom' in education, one that has some, yet little, in common with the other two, has been tirelessly written about by Carl Rogers. I quote from a section called The Meaning of Freedom of a chapter called Freedom and Commitment in his book called 'Freedom to Learn' (1969, pp. 268–9):

> the freedom that I am talking about is essentially an inner thing, something which exists in the living person quite aside from any of the outward choices of alternatives which we so often think of as constituting freedom…. It is the realization that 'I can live myself, here and now, by my own choice.' It is the quality of courage which enables a person to step into the uncertainty of the unknown as he chooses himself. It is the discovery of meaning from within oneself, meaning which comes from listening sensitively and openly to the complexities of what one is experiencing. It is the burden of being responsible for the self one chooses to be. It is the recognition of a person that he is an emerging process, not a static end product. The individual who is thus deeply and

courageously thinking his own thoughts, becoming his own uniqueness, responsibly choosing himself, may be fortunate in having hundreds of objective outer alternatives from which to choose, or he may be unfortunate in having none. But his freedom exists regardless.

And there's another end on't.

In the remainder of this paper I will deal with three issues raised by these excerpts: 1, freedom as a goal of schooling; 2, the implication that taking one seriously as a person means giving one unlimited choice in one's education; and 3, the reification of freedom.

'Oh, Lord, I want to be free, want to be free; Rainbow round my shoulder, wings on my feet.' The words of this old song capture in simple grace the sense of freedom as a goal. But freedom as a goal, like a rainbow, is an image that inspires pots of gold. The inspiration is of more substance than the pots.

Kozol has spoken for the ambition of producing a condition of liberation as a result of free school experience. The ambition is common among free school theorists, but not all limit the conditions of liberation quite as Kozol does. Nonetheless, Kozol's position can serve as an example of the faulty reasoning behind the ambition itself. Kozol argues that a free school is an organization dedicated to the condition of liberation, freedom, of the oppressed. But not all qualify as 'the oppressed'. In fact, Kozol accuses other free school people, e.g. those who retreat from urban terror and degradation to the country and the copse, the sylvan communities devoted to spontaneous behavior and simple values, of 'running away' to a 'moral vacuum', and thus contributing to the oppression of those left behind in the cities; never mind what reasons or conditions were responsible for these people's need to escape the clamps of urban life. Kozol uses an ugly simile to emphasize his view: 'In my belief, an isolated upper-class rural Free School for the children of the white and rich within a land like the United States and in a time of torment such as 1972, is a great deal too much like a sandbox for the children of the SS Guards at Auschwitz.'

We have here in Kozol's own position the grounds for questioning the reasoning behind freedom as a goal. If the condition of liberation, of freedom, is to be sought a as a good, as a goal, one would assume that as a good, freedom would be a legitimate goal for everyone. But this is not the case for Kozol, who claims that the freedom some seek is immoral (like the SS), or at least amoral (a vacuum). The problem comes of a difficulty in defining 'the oppressed' who need 'freedom'. Kozol rightly and passionately points out that economic and racial oppression should not be tolerated and that is what his notion of a free school is designed to fight. But what about the emotional retardate of any economic or racial group, the academic 'success' who is also helplessly hypochondriacal, the children of sadistic parents, the wives of wife-beaters? Are they, too, rightly considered in any sense oppressed, and in need of 'liberation' from their oppressive circumstances? It is not immediately clear why it is less moral, or even immoral, to attempt to free someone from neurotic constraints (e.g. authoritarian compulsions, xenophobia, excessive greed), than to attempt to liberate someone from economic or racial constraints. Regardless of whether it is clear or not, it does seem to be the case that for most of us, some groups deserve freedom more than others, some sandboxes become evil for us depending on who plays in them.

When we speak of freedom as a goal, we do not generally mean freedom as a universal goal. To be free to do as one likes is to be free to oppress, to murder, to degrade, to take freedom from others. This clearly is not what Kozol or any other free school theorist is

after, yet they go on speaking in a way that leaves them open to this sort of criticism. What seems to be the real intent is to remediate certain freedoms that a depressingly large number of politicians, landlords, money lenders and others of the lesser species exercise at the expense of those who are defenseless against them because they have not the power; power to fight other powers with in order to gain the opportunity to do something else. 'Liberating' might mean 'empowering', but this is not the same as 'being free'. One needs the power to choose of course, or one has no power at all. But what one does with this power, what one chooses, what turns out to be the something else that one does, is the nub of moral education, not merely the condition of being able to exercise the power of choice. As Arnold put it in 'Culture and Anarchy Anarchy' (1935, p. 74):

> What is freedom but machinery?… In our common notions and talk about freedom, we eminently show our idolatry of machinery. Our prevalent notion is…. that it is a most happy and important thing for a man merely to be able to do as he likes. On what he is to do when he is thus free to do as he likes, we do not lay so much stress.

But we have trouble thinking of freedom as machinery. There is a general presumption for defending the right of people to do what they want. We demand reasons for limiting this right, as if it were the sole means for happiness itself, and social well-being. But as Peters has pointed out recently, and as the literature of alienation in the 1950s has documented copiously, happiness does not necessarily follow freedom, for gains in freedom often cost the security of the familiar, and the contentment of reliable companionship. It is simply not realistic, given our experience with social groups, to expect that the inherent good will and decency, let alone the intelligence and imagination, of a given group will ensure the freedom to do as each one wants. The diversity of wants, and their equality under the goal of freedom, the condition of liberation, will not allow it. The condition where freedom is desired needs rules, consistent order, to protect against the inconsistency of men. In fact, the choice as we have it is not 'for' or 'against' freedom, but for and against certain restraints and not others. There is no concrete and general problem, or condition, of freedom. But there are concrete problems of what some people want to do and what it is that hinders or prevents them. The general aim or goal of 'freedom', then, does not make sense.

The development of civilization is possible not when individual freedom is supreme, but when the individual's power to satisfy instinctual needs, part of which are aggressive, is replaced with the community's power to ensure security from one's aggressive needs to satisfy at the expense of another. Although an argument can be raised that this plea of necessity as justification for limiting the freedom of some, is the plea of tyrants, this is not to argue that the necessity for order is wrong when compared to freedom. It is only to argue that tyrants misuse their freedom when not restrained from doing so by the power of the community.

The goal of freedom is a false goal for educators. The goal of acquiring due power for the disenfranchised to choose well and effectively for themselves is a legitimate goal, as is the goal of influencing any student's ability to discriminate for worth and fairness between possible wants. This position leads to the next issue raised by the free school literature, namely, that respect for another person means giving unlimited free choice in educational matters.

'…we should deal with children as God deals with us, for He makes us happiest when He lets us grope our way in a pleasant illusion.' Just about the time I let Goethe's words convince me, a little poem by J.P.Donleavy jangles in the back of my mind:

At the rate
The world
Is going
It will
Be
Poor old
Everybody

Does respect for students mean that we should let them grope away in their pleasant illusions; will this groping lead us to poor old everybody? This is a question of normative freedom, perhaps the central question of free school policy.

Goodman's belief that we can educate the young 'entirely in terms of their free choice, with no processing whatsoever' is a belief that either 1, students' reasoning is intrinsically as valid, useful, and moral as anyone else's, or that 2, students' reasoning is beside the point of educating. If one believes the former, then the next step is to believe that everyone's reasoning is just as valid, useful, and moral as anyone's reasoning. This amounts to a denial that there is any criterion at all that we can agree on for objective justification, even consistency. That being the case, then, if the next utterance by the believer of such a doctrine is a negation of the doctrine, it must be taken as equally valid as the original statement. We are asked to believe that A is both A and not-A, and not to fret over it, or fret over it; whatever we like. It is both easy and difficult to argue against this claim. It is easy because there is an abundance of examples that show the claim false (e.g. the proper, correct, change for 5 dollars on a 1 dollar purchase is 4 dollars; New York is larger than Rhode Island; as of the summer of 1974 Richard Nixon is the only president in USA history to resign his office; ½ means the same as 'one half', etc., in spite of anyone's opinion to the contrary). There are criteria for objective verification and justification that we can and do agree on, and consistency underlies them all. But it is also difficult to argue against the subjective view of knowledge, and the idiosyncratic view of reasoning because those who hold such views don't care about consistency in argument so much as they care about their rights to learn what and how they please, to grope their way in their own pleasant illusions, just as we others grope our way in the illusion of consistency and the possibilities of objective justification. John Gardner put it well in 'Grendel': 'All order, I've come to understand, is theoretical, unreal—a harmless, sensible, smiling mask men slide between the two great, dark realities, the self and the world—two snake pits.' But if Gardner succeeds in making us understand his meaning through our common use of language, he in some measure succeeds also in making an argument against himself, for surely there is order in the language itself, insofar as we use it with mutual understanding?

It is equally indefensible to claim that reasoning is beside the point of educating, especially in the common free school principle of educating the 'whole child', for reasoning is a part, a significant part, of a person's integrity as a 'whole' person. To ignore reasoning is to do mental mayhem, a character amputation. And Goodman himself aims for 'authentic citizenship' and 'real philosophy' through education, neither of which is conceivable without highly developed reasoning. In fact, connecting the accomplishment of any aim

at all with any preferred or necessary means is an act of reasoning in and of itself, so any policy for educating on purpose would rely on reasoning from the start.

The spirit of this normative freedom survives such analysis, however, even if its sense fades a bit. And this is because we do want students to make choices for themselves, and to be responsible for their educations to a large, and in the end, controlling degree. The problem is that we are reluctant to assume the authority in teaching them how to make choices when their own education is the subject, and a 'free school' is the object model. We have trouble holding in mind at the same time both the principle that freedom in choosing is a desirable end, and the principle that good choices do not happen spontaneously or by gift alone, but one must learn how to make good choices by learning how to reason and to perceive oneself accurately in many various circumstances. We make the mistake of believing that the best way to achieve an increase in some sort of freedom, e.g. in choosing well among alternatives, is by way of freedom itself, by way of noninterference on the adult's part, That freedom leads to freedom is a dubious formula, however.

And here is the question of the role of adults in free school education, a question still the subject of enormous debate. The alternatives that seem to exhaust the imaginations of the debaters are Abdication and Noninterference, Love and Be Loved, or mere Environmental Design. The first is weak because it is hypocritical, unreal; it denies participation in the natural and necessary relations between people who share the same space and so much time. The second is unclear because if 'love' is meant as caring and being cared for, we are left with no way of evaluating the many different ways one can 'care for' another; it does not take an unusual imagination to conceive of the circumstance in which caring, or loving, means taking away certain freedom. The third, Environmental Design, 'providing a rich environment', is insufficient because all hinges on what the designers consider 'rich', and it is distressingly similar to the behaviorist response to questions of education, namely, contingency management, which can be an insidious infringement on freedom through its indirect coercion and structured limitation of access.

I think this unsatisfactory situation can be improved significantly with regard to the role of adults in the development of a student's freedom, by using a conceptual scheme presented by Joel Feinberg (1973).

Since Mill's classic statement that the absence of coercion is the sufficient and necessary condition for freedom, the individualist/liberal view has been enlarged to include two amendments: 1, other than human coercion, there must be an absence of natural conditions that prevent the chosen activity, and 2, one must have the executive power to do that which one wishes. This view split of its own ripeness into two halves, a double concept: freedom from…, and freedom to…. At this point Feinberg offers a single concept analysis to replace, and simplify, the double concept analysis. He does this by defining 'constraint' as anything that prevents one from doing something, and then proposing that all constraints can be considered along two dimensions: the positive/negative dimension, and the internal/external dimension. Combining these dimensions yields four categories of constraint: 1 Internal Positive, such as headaches, obsessive thoughts, compulsive desires, etc.; 2 Internal Negative, such as ignorance, weakness, deficiencies in talent or skill; 3 External Positive, such as barred windows, locked doors, and pointed bayonets; 4 External Negative, such as poverty, lack of transportation, and the like. It might help to remember the categories if they are presented like this:

	CONSTRAINTS	
	Positive	Negative
Internal	(obsession)	(ignorance)
External	(guns, locks)	(poverty)

(By 'positive' he means 'the presence of", and by 'negative' he means 'the absence of' a thing or condition.)

Now if an adult wishes to expand a student's range of possible alternatives, to ensure against useless deliberations that are a nuisance or impossible or insignificant alternatives, then the adult can diagnose, with Feinberg's four categories, what the nature of the relevant constraint is for the accomplishment of the chosen objective. Teachers, naturally, will have more direct dealings with internal constraints, both positive and negative. In fact, a strong case can be made in the name of freedom for the direct, intentional interference on the teacher's part when the student finds himself in a condition of the internal negative constraint of ignorance. The internal positive constraints would be more to the taste of those who follow Rogers's therapeutic facilitation of learning, rather than, say, a Bereiter's unabashed skills teaching regimen.

A note on the notion of autonomy will conclude this section. Feinberg contrasts the condition of autonomy with that of anomie, a contrast that will be useful in resolving policy debates over the most effective and desirable, and consistent, means for generating free school curricula, and perhaps for training free school teachers.

Anomie, according to Durkheim, is a defective condition of persons who have no success at ordering within themselves their ideals, desires, intentions, and commitments into some sort of hierarchy. The lack of such ordering leaves the person subject to internal action jams and motivation jumbles. Free to do anything, one has difficulty deciding what to do; when there is no hierarchy of reasons or values for doing this rather than, or before, that, there is virtually no point in doing this or that. This condition is a sort of inhibiting disorientation, an internal constraint, that stands in the way of accomplishing objectives. Such absence of order, or rules, or structure is what people often call freedom; the existentialist might call it dreadful freedom. From outside, though, it looks very much as if the person thus free is not free to act in ways that he might wish, or even, finally, to wish at all. Instead of conduct regulated and assisted by a system of stop and go, yield and 'caution when wet', one is bashed and bandied about in the fashion of the amusement park ride called 'Bumpers Cars' (a large rink-like arena in which one drives an electric car, flat out and careening, trying to butt and bump others for the fun…Poor old/Everybody).

Autonomy, though, can mean quite another thing from 'being free to do anything'. It can mean self-governing. 'Autonomic' has the sense of self-regulation while still part of a large whole. The autonomic nervous system, for example, is concerned mainly with regulating the smooth muscles and glands, but it is not subject to strict voluntary control; nevertheless it is dependent on the brain and spinal cord. It is a system, with organization and uniformity, it is self-regulating but not free of the larger whole which sustains it. In the same way, one can speak of a person's behavior being probabalistically determined by the (social and physical) system which sustains him, but not wholly determined if at any time a mental state can influence the function and effect of that system, say, by acting morally without reward. Such a mental state which serves to regulate behavior in the absence of external conditioners, may be called autonomy.

'Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.' Reification means 'To convert mentally into a thing; to materialize' and it is about the same as 'to hypostatize' which means 'To make into or treat as a substance' ('Oxford English Dictionary'). Freedom has been reified into a 'thing' worth fighting for, as a condition which exists and deserves homage, as the 'substance' of various forms of government, as the idol of humanism. This is a similar birthing phenomenon as that undergone by Western religions. Feuerbach sums up his analysis of the mystery of religion in 'The Essence of Christianity' this way: 'Man—this is the mystery of religion—projects his nature into objectivity, and then makes himself an object of concern for this new "subject," for this projection of his nature.' In this sense, then, religion, is man's alienation from himself. One might replace 'religion' with 'freedom' in this though thought to get at the problem of the creed of freedom in much of the free school argument that we have considered here. Ollman (1971) suggests further that 'by attributing an independent life to the various forms of value, people succeed in transferring to them certain powers for regulating their own existence.' As these forms take on 'existence' they influence the way we see and how we judge what we see. An example of this might be the Constitution of the USA which manipulates the people (as in 'We the people…') who wrote it, and which in some cases inspires a sort of patriotism, a service to an abstraction, at some considerable expense to service to real living persons. The 'freedom' of such a patriot is illusory, as is the 'state' which he fervently serves.

This sort of reification of values is an attempt to rescue the chosen value from the influence of context, from the ambiguity of these values in the generation and refinement of civilization. But such influence cannot be avoided any more than being in a context can be avoided. Being in a context means being influenced. One cannot escape influence just as one cannot excape context.

If we are born into a community, we are not born free, Rousseau's exhortations to the contrary notwithstanding. Perhaps the most comprehensive and brief introduction to this condition of human life is Freud's 'Civilization and Its Discontents'. The principle thesis of this book is that civilization progresses as the individuals in a culture learn to trade their instinctual 'happiness' for the security they need to live among others, both within and without their given community. One aspect of the security thus gained is freedom from the potential oppression of others' instinctual needs. Freud's analysis of the 'happiness for security' bargain in civilization is useful in developing a perspective on the plural nature of freedoms, on the lost values of freedom-as-instinct-happiness v. freedom-as-security-from-alien-oppression. Following these points in social psychology made by both Feuerbach and Freud, one can dereify freedom and argue that education has a central role in developing freedoms. Education for freedoms is certainly conceivable as education for better trading, for self-governance, for the powers of discrimination among desired and desirable wants.

As we have seen throughout this paper, the generic terms of freedom are 'you' and 'me' and 'us'. Your freedom, my freedom, and our freedom may not be compatible: we cannot affirm them all without some appeal to another value that governs not freedom, but particular freedoms. Because freedoms entail more than one person and at least one context of their behavior, the issues raised in discussing freedoms are inevitably ethical

ones, involving the rights of each to be granted, taken, or denied. Adler sums up this point well in 'The Idea of Freedom' (1961, p. 617):

> If some tension between self and other is involved in any conception of freedom, then law plays one role when it represents a power alien to the self, and another when the self is able to make the law somehow its own or an expression of its power. In the first role, law is an obstacle to freedom; in the second, it is a source of freedom, or even part of its substance.

Again, there is no general issue of freedom, but issues of particular freedoms. Freedom can be defined in terms of independence, power, autonomy, choice, 'doing what one wants', and so on. None is sufficient for defining the magnificent singular Freedom, but each can be useful in defining the more diminutive freedoms. In education, these diminutive freedoms do not lead to an abdication of instructional responsibilities on the grounds that presenting alternatives is enough for a teacher to do. To know of alternatives is not the same as having a choice, any more than to know of theoretical justifications for freedom(s) is the same as being free. What one does with one's knowledge, subjective or objective as it may be, is the more important indication of one's degree of freedom(s), of one's education, and most important, of one's values for conduct. Freedom is machinery that makes various modes of conduct more or less possible, it is not an idol to which one appeals in a solemn invocation for happiness.

Care for the freedoms of others, in my view, is more clearly demonstrated when the people of an institution, such as a free school, or a public school, care for the cultivation of discrimination in judgment and in those other values that ultimately govern manifestations of freedom, than by their studied reluctance to instruct in methods of judging, observing, and valuing. I think, further, that instruction in Feinberg's four categories of constraint, and pursuant diagnosis of students' conditions of constraint, especially the internal negative constraints of ignorance, or lack of skills, would be an admirable and practicable initial move toward a policy of educational liberation, freeing schools from an unnecessarily constraining sense of freedom.

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part IV
Equality and pluralism

8
Cultural diversity and education

Richard Pratte

INTRODUCTION

The general purpose of this paper is to examine the phenomenon of cultural diversity with a view to drawing out the relevance and significance for educational policy and public education.

Today, as perhaps never before, there is an expanded interest in cultural diversity and ethnicity. This is true not only of the USA but of many developed and undeveloped countries of the world. Both have asserted themselves forcefully and demands related to them are among the most persistent and troublesome for educational policy-makers. Many ethnics are particularly sensitive to what they regard as their changing status resulting from recent social revolutions and the result has been a demand for greater expectations and outcomes to be had primarily through schooling. Educational authorities have been pressured on many fronts either to take greater account of cultural diversity or to suppress it altogether. In most cases, administrators, school board members, teachers, etc., have been ill-prepared to deal with such attacks and reluctant to institute changes because the content of their training has left them unprepared for an intelligent appraisal of the situation. The basic issues remain unarticulated, the forum of understanding not made ready. This paper, then is an attempt to contribute to the articulation and the making. And although its main focus is the USA, the issues and problems are applicable to other countries as well.

It is important, moreover, to note that this paper is neither an attempt to justify ethnicity nor an attempt to make capital of the problems of culturally diverse societies. Rather, it is an attempt to explore the fundamental question: What is called for regarding the making of educational policy and the functioning of public education in a culturally diverse society?

'CULTURAL DIVERSITY'

The initial question I wish to pose is: Just what is cultural diversity? 'Cultural diversity' is a much bandied-about term that bears examination, for it is central to many present-day discussions concerning the role and future of public education. What is less obvious, although closely related, is the term 'diversity' itself. In what situations, under what conditions, is the term 'diverse' or its cognate 'diversity' used? Oftentimes there is great variability rather than sameness exhibited in employing these terms.

To explain how different human groups were originally distinguished is beyond the scope of this work; such an undertaking would require an extensive historical/sociological/anthropological study. Suffice it to say that two facts do stand out. First, it is clear that

'human groups do not exist in nature, or rather, the part of difference that exists because of nature is unimportant.' (1) Whenever distinctions are made and groupings result, it is we who make them. Second, the distinctions that men make to create groups or factions may be drawn along regional, economic, ideological, political, occupational, etc., lines, and among the most persuasive distinctions that divide mankind are those which we designate as 'ethnic,' that is, those distinctions based on race, religion, or national origin. (2)

There seems to be no end to human ingenuity in thinking of characteristics that can set groups apart. Hence, we are all familiar with the realization that diversity may and does take different forms. But what is claimed here? what does it mean to say that some group is diverse? At rock-bottom we would say that the decision to regard any group as diverse signifies a decision on somebody's part to single out different factors in the group—such as skin color, beliefs, ancestral heritage, language—and establish these as criteria for the basis of the so-called diversity.

The point is, of course, that diversity of some sort exists everywhere and is visible everywhere. Every society is diverse in some respects, but this observation can only be made from a certain point of view. It could be made only by somebody who looks at a number of people and because of some reason or other finds it important to observe that some members are different. While seeing that every society is diverse in some respect, it should not go unrecognized that we make certain criteria count in establishing differences. To turn the coin over, when we say that a particular group is homogeneous, we mean simply that the ways in which the members differ are unimportant or irrelevant to any practical concerns. However, we do not suggest that there are no differences. When we say that a society is diverse, we are saying that from a particular vantage point we find something relevant, interesting, and for some reason important to mark off a group or groups as different. Thus, we may identify differences of exclusiveness along the lines of cultural difference, and group identity may be ordered along the lines of ritual, dietary habits, beliefs, folk tales, and language pattern. One or a combination of these aspects generally is regarded as necessary for identifying a group as culturally diverse.

But is this sufficient for establishing cultural diversity? No analysis of cultural diversity is complete without a recognition that the selection differences between groups must be viewed as fundamental enough to be capable of producing values and dispositions that contribute to significantly different outlooks on the world. The variety or variegation of unlikeness among groups must be capable of making a difference. The difference must have reality in the minds of men, not just in the eye of the beholder. The point to be observed is that cultural diversity within society must have a concrete social reality; it must be made incarnate within the behaviors of the people. It must be expressed in a concrete situation which bears on political, economic, and social policy. Hence, the second condition that must be met for a society to be culturally diverse is that diversity go beyond being merely visible; diversity must be exhibited in the social behavior of groups who wish to embody their views in choosing among the various social arrangements which determine the division of advantages for underwriting an agreement on the proper distribution of goods and services.

But even this is not sufficient: Diversity is not a matter of genetics; it is a matter of cultural transmission across generations. Hence, a third condition of cultural diversity would require that a sense of historical and participational identity and the peculiar traits

which mark the identity must be transmitted from generation to generation if the group is to continue to maintain its identity. It is doubtful that any group could long maintain its peculiar features if it did not jealously guard them and limit the member's sphere of relations, particularly in the decisive period of formation, namely childhood. (3)

With these three conditions in mind, we may further identify what 'cultural diversity' expresses. We can start with its descriptive use. As a descriptive term, at the very least 'cultural diversity' refers to the coexistence of unlike or variegated groups in a common social system. It makes no judgments about this situation, for it is employed simply to record the fact that different groups are able to live together in such a way that allows the society to accomplish the basic functions of producing and distributing goods, defining social arrangements and institutions which determine collective goals, and providing security.

But 'cultural diversity' may be also used normatively to express a social ideal. As a social value, the phrase goes beyond the descriptive sense to emphasize the value of freedom of association, the so-called 'democratic ideal.' That is, a culturally diverse society is commonly portrayed as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage-everyone profits from a plurality of groups expressing different values and interests. Thomas F.Green expressed this point most eloquently:

> The view is that any society is richer if it will allow a thousand flowers to blossom. The assumption is that no man's culture or way of life is so rich that it may not be further enriched by contact with other points of view. The conviction is that diversity is enriching because no man has a monopoly on the truth about the good life. There are many ways. Diversity is further valued because it provides any society with a richer pool of leadership from which to draw in times of crisis. (4)

Green develops this position by observing that the value of diversity entails two further assumptions.

> In the first place it means that there must be contact between the divergent groups in society. A household may be richer for including persons of different aspirations, values, dispositions, and points of view. But these differences will not be enriching to any particular individual unless he talks with, eats with, or in some way has an exchange of views with those who are different. The value of diversity implies contact between persons, and not simply incidental, temporary, and casual contacts. Secondly this fundamental value implies that the diversity which is enriching is not itself endangered by the contact which is valued. The diversity must be sustained through contact. (5)

If Green is right, and there is good reason for thinking he is, then it seems that cultural diversity as a social ideal wraps up certain fundamental values or beliefs. It demands that different groups coexist with one another, having more than mere fleeting or casual contact, and it presumes that such contact will not limit or endanger but will enrich the diversity.

Cultural diversity as a social ideal is immensely significant for public education. Our understanding of the ideal could influence the positions we take on the issue of informal or casual education versus formal education or schooling as well as determining the flexibility we allow to public education in accommodating religious and language differences. But if the ideal of cultural diversity is to have any influence in determining practical educational

issues, it will do so to the extent that the ideal is embodied in and expressed through the decision-making of men in voting their various agendas of politics. In other words, the ideal of cultural diversity will or will not be expressed in no other terms than in the reality of American social structure.

From the view of social structure, American society has had difficulty in accepting cultural diversity. There is strong evidence that cultural diversity has been viewed as potentially divisive. The point is that the USA has been seen as a congerie of culturally diverse (and potentially divisive) groups, most with distinctive social, economic, and political concerns, who prefer living with other members of their group and take pride in efforts to sustain and build up group self-confidence and self-assertiveness. The divisive tendencies of cultural diversity have been seen as promoting a view of politics which makes of local and state government a federation of groups, with protected and excluded turfs.

Reasons for the lack of congruence between cultural diversity as social ideal and as realized in social institutions are found in the hard core of the American experience. Since most Americans have no ethnic roots in past millenia, as do so many other peoples of the world, the Americanization process has taken on a central role in the formation of a national identity and self-concept. What is unique in the American experience is not the fact that the naturalization of immigrants has taken place, but rather that we have the example of a new nation starting from scratch, as it were. In fact, to question the wisdom of the necessity for engaging in the Americanization of immigrants has struck many as questioning the very possibility of America's continued national and cultural well-being. Both the explanation and the fact of Americanization have affected the nature and function of cultural diversity, and both have done so in a cumulative and accelerating fashion.

Nevertheless, a double anomaly is hidden in this phenomenon. The first anomaly is that so many could be de-ethnicized so easily. The second is that having apparently been de-ethnicized, they have not become more indistinguishable than they are.

TWO ANOMALIES

The first anomaly has received much attention. The Americanization of immigrants has been explained by scholars and laymen alike in terms of one or another combination of the following: the destruction of immigrant family patterns under the impact of rapid industrialization and urbanization; the American emphasis given to childhood and youth, and the outdating of adult values and patterns; the attractiveness of American culture coupled to an 'old world' weariness which immigrants wished to be rid of; the openness and ampleness of the American reward system gained primarily through public education- and, finally, American nationalism was non-ethnic from the very first, and to become the 'ideal' American, immigrants were encouraged to repudiate their older life-styles, customs, and language. (6)

The fact of the matter is that any immigrants who thought moving to the USA made them masters of their own fate—or of their economic well-being—were in for a rude shock. In the USA, as in Europe, power flowed from above. And power—the capacity to get other people to do what you want them to do—was found at the level of management and ownership of the industrial-corporate order orbbeing a politician on practically any level. Moreover, patterns of ethnic stereotypes dictated a clear pecking order for immigrants from eastern, central, and southern Europe. Many Americans thought that such immigrants

were plodding but industrious, and that, because they had brought little cash from the old country, they had to work or starve; particularly they would work in menial occupations which were spurned by non-immigrants. In short, the immigrants were considered mentally and socially inferior. They were seen as a group to be basically uneducated, ignorant, and easily misled by labor agitators and by politicians. Above all, immigrants were considered unfit for the industrial discipline needed in the factory or workshop. (7)

The net result was the de-ethnicization of the immigrant. Its story is largely a tale of transforming the immigrant and his children into a stable, quiescent labor force. The process, where effective, conceded very little to racial or national diversity. Many immigrants, almost as soon as they had established residence in America, took for their own the slogan, 'Americanize the immigrant.' The years from 1880 to 1923 witnessed a great deal of unanimity in the shaping of the American ideal of nationhood. First- and second-generation immigrants collaborated with the descendants of earlier, more respectable and more prosperous immigrants to define '100 per cent Americanism.'

Lest the reader be misled, it must be remembered that the immigrants had come to America to gain freedom and opportunity, and most were willing to sacrifice, to shift, to change, both personally and culturally, in order to acquire the benefits of being in America. America was regarded as a land of great opportunity, and the immigrant visualized his children becoming American. Hence, while the first generation themselves might be called Hungarians, for example, and their sons and daughters would be called Hungarian-Americans, they dreamed of the day when their children's children would be called American. Most immigrants appeared to be willing to cast their lot with a new land, a new culture, and a new image.

But it is significant that over fifty years after mass immigration from Europe to this country ended, the culturally diverse pattern is still so strong. Thus, we come to the second anomaly.

The second anomaly is indeed a curious one. Ethnic groups and ethnicity, language loyalty and language maintenance, abound on the present American scene. Many Americans of today, the progeny of the immigrant folk of decades ago, wear lapel buttons that say 'Irish Power,' 'Kiss me, I'm Italian,' 'Viva la Raza.' In addition, some Navajos these days drive cars with bumper stickers proclaiming 'Dine Bizell' ('Navajo Power'), and there are Sioux headbands and Afro hairdos. Comedians rejoice in the fact that ethnic jokes and dialects of yesteryear are no longer regarded as vices to be indulged in behind closed curtains in discretely defined neighborhoods. Even some Americans of northern and western European origin-German, French, Norwegian, Swede, etc.—recognize their ancestry and partially define themselves in accord with it. For reasons that seem to be little understood, many American groups have not lost themselves entirely within their American surroundings even after three, four, and more generations, although there have been coercion and opportunity enough to do so. Hence, cultural diversity is a constituent part of American life and politics.

Is it the case that industrialization and the much-touted economic and social mobility of America contains limits which non-Anglo-Saxon ethnics cannot transcend? Have recurring anti-foreigner sentiments elicited protective withdrawal and insularity in their threatened targets? Is the threat of de-ethnicization in America so conducive to anomie and alienation that the retention of cultural diversity of some kind is called for to perform a an orienting and stabilizing function?

These questions, according to Michael Novak (8)—a primordialist who celebrates ethnicity as a basic attribute of men which, when suppressed, will always rise again—have yet to be answered. His contention is that the resurgence of ethnicity today is a fact all too well ignored by most. American society, although paying lip-service to the ideal of the melting pot, maintains or permits ethnicity beyond the point of cultural assimilation. The surprise, according to Novak, is not that cultural diversity is still alive and kicking, but rather that all of a sudden a great many people are rediscovering this.

There is, however, a curious fact to observe about the phrase 'resurgent ethnicity.' Ethnicity, as a concept, suggests a movement of affection and identity, enriched perhaps by the subtle, provocative ways in which one differs from others, and reinforced by a strong attachment to family and relatives. 'Resurgent ethnicity' lends itself to an interpretation of ethnicity which suggests that the immigrants' experiences in America were those of continuous pressure to conform to an alien culture, but, paradoxically, the immigrant and his children's ways were never accepted. Despite enormous pressure to 'Americanize,' the Americanization process, although outwardly successful for a period of time, could not ultimately succeed due to some sort of ethnic 'unmeltableness.' This rather awkward term catches precisely Novak's claim that human nature demands ethnic identity and many Americans today are simply exhibiting the remarkable recuperative power of men, who in the face of serious social and psychological adversity, seek a return to their most basic and rewarding source of identity. According to Novak, 'The new ethnicity is a form of historical consciousness. Who are you? What history do you come from? And where next? These are its questions.' (9)

At the core of the slogan 'resurgent ethnicity' lies an extremely seductive line of thinking, particularly when the phrase is given Novak's metaphysical formulation. It is seductive insofar as its unquestioned acceptance points us to the conclusion that the immigrants' experiences in America were those of facing discrimination and privation, and ultimately the immigrants' children and their children could not repudiate their ancestral past, at least not without doing a disservice to their basic humanness.

Novak paints in broad outline the dimensions of resurgent ethnicity. He contends that ethnics have proved themselves to be a dynamic force in American politics and culture, and he claims that the 1970s is the 'decade of the ethnics.' But on the periphery of Novak's works lies a relatively unexamined assumption that a 'crisis of identity' exists in America today and this crisis is the cause of resurgent ethnicity. Novak claims that 'the new ethnicity—[is] a movement primarily of personal and social identity -….' (10)

How does this explanation compare with others? It seems that Novak's position is parallel to the view advanced by the historian Marcus Lee Hansen in his study 'The Problem of the Third Generation Immigrant.' In this work, Hansen suggested that 'What the son wishes to forget, the grandson wishes to remember.' (11) Hansen's Law stipulates that assimilation characterizes the second generation, but when the second generation throws off its immigrant skin, the third generation suffers an identity crisis. That is, Hansen's Law contends that changes in the attitudes of social groups correspond to generational changes. Put in other terms, in a truly diverse society it is not enough to be just an American. The question becomes 'What kind of American are you?' According to Hansen, the third generation falls back upon the social identity of its grandfathers.

Glazer and Moynihan, in a pioneering study of ethnicity and politics in New York City (1963), said, 'We have precious few studies of ethnic identity, despite the increasing prominence of its role in the mass media in recent years….' (12) They do, however, suggest the following reasons for the revival of ethnicity.

1. Ethnic identities have taken over some of the task of self-definition that occupational identities, particularly working-class occupational identities, have formerly given. The status of the worker is downgraded; as a result, apparently, the status of being an ethnic, a member of an ethnic group, has been upgraded.
2. International events have declined as a source of feeling of ethnic identity, except for Jews. Identification with homelands (involvement in and concern for) declines, and more and more the sources of ethnic identification are to be found in American experiences, on American soil.
3. Along with occupation and homeland, religion has declined as a focus of ethnic identification, particularly in the Catholic Church. For the first time, the Catholic Church does not complement the conservative tendencies of Catholic ethnic groups. (13)

Glazer and Moynihan offer some basic insights into the nature of the problem of cultural diversity. Their hypothesis is best stated in their own words:

> The assimilating power of American society and culture operated on immigrant groups in different ways, to make them, it is true, something they had not been, but still something distinct and identifiable…. The ethnic group in American society became not a survival from the age of mass immigration but a new social form. (14)

According to the authors, ethnic differences remain with us but they also assume new social meanings and functions. Such membership is a form of social identity, a way of knowing who you are, within the larger society. Moreover, each of the so-called hyphenated-American minorities (Irish-American, Italian-American, etc.) represents a political interest group. Each group, in New York City, has become politically organized in order to reap its share of the goals and services of society.

In short, it has been argued, both explicitly and implicitly, that a 'crisis of identity' is sufficient to account for resurgent ethnicity. Novak, Hansen, Glazer and Moynihan, and others are in agreement that resurgent ethnicity today is merely a response to an identity crisis. But to establish why this is, is perhaps to accept a too facile explanation. While it is not denied that identity is connected in some way to the phenomenon of resurgent ethnicity, it may be unwarranted to claim that a 'crisis of identity' is a sufficient condition (or even a necessary one?) for the phenomenon. It may be the case that a too ready acceptance of the identity factor as the only or even the most plausible explanation of resurgent ethnicity is unfounded.

For example, it may be granted that the identity factor is connected in some way to the phenomenon of resurgent ethnicity, but to what extent this needs to be connected to a historical identity (ethnicity) is a moot question. If we limit the sources of identity to those rooted in race, religion, or national state, have we in effect excluded a great many categories

of identity commonly known to operate in today's society? For example, the identification of someone with a 'reform' political candidate, some political action group, an Archibald Cox, a Henry Kissinger, Martin Luther King, Ralph Nader, The Beatles, or what have you? In short, it seems to be the case that the single path of personal identification with the traditional ethnic sources commits us to too narrow an explanation of resurgent ethnicity.

There is another possible explanation to be considered. Our first step is to ask a prior question, namely, 'Just what is resurgent ethnicity?' 'Resurgent ethnicity' may be explained in part by noting that the term 'ethnic' has been broadened to include 'life-style.' Mary Anne Raywid has pointed out that the phrase 'ethnic group' was 'previously restricted to national groups, often in religious combination (as, for example, in Irish Catholic)' but 'the term has recently come prominently to apply to blacks as well.' (15) She contends that:

> We've not given much attention to the considerable switch this represents in identifying cultural difference or ethnicity: from acquired or learned difference like nationality, to biological differences such as race. According to current usage, blacks are an ethnic group, and at least some women have acquired that particular consciousness of kind entitling them to ethnic group status too. And this, of course, represents an even further extension of ethnicity, from a racial to a sexual basis. (16)

I agree with Raywid that a broadening of ethnicity has occurred. Indeed it is a 'considerable switch…in identifying cultural difference or ethnicity…from acquired or learned difference like nationality, to biological differences such as race.' However, what is important in this shift is the fact that certain sub-cultural groups have 'asserted' their fundamental claim to ethnicity. What is indicated here is that blacks and women have asserted that they have a distinct sub-culture or life-style that is sufficiently different to warrant their having ethnic group status.

What can we say about such a shift? (17) If we recall the three criteria for cultural diversity established earlier—1, we make certain criteria count in establishing differences; 2, the selected differences between groups must be viewed as fundamental enough to produce values and dispositions of a significant sort; and 3, there must exist a sense of historical and participational identity capable of being transmitted across generations— then we see that the inclusion of blacks and other minority groups as well as women as 'new ethnics' is permitted.

But what needs clarifying here is that the locus of the first criterion has shifted. Previously in the Americanization movement culturally diverse groups were 'labeled' as such by the 'older' established Americans who claimed a cultural superiority. Immigrants were told explicitly and implicitly to become aware of how much they differed from the host or dominant culture. Such a labeling rarely accommodated ethnic identification and dignity marching hand in hand. Oh, dignity could be had from bearing insult and assault without rancor, but it was rarely granted the ethnic through a show of acceptance and kindness. The labeling process easily descended into a squalid form of cultural debasement and gross prejudice.

In this shift from a group being labeled ethnic to a group asserting its fundamental ethnicity is the fact that the new ethnics themselves elect to make certain criteria count in establishing differences; but today the criteria are not necessarily nationality, culture, language, and religion. Rather they are of the ascriptive sort, and should be recognized

as such. Ethnicity appeals to and is fast taking hold among many Americans who know that they cannot shake or be rid of certain identifying characteristics such as skin color or sex. Thus, the phenomenon of broadened ethnicity is indicative of more than resurgent ethnicity; something larger is taking place. It is caught, in part, by what Ralf Dahrendorf has referred to as the 'refeudalization' of society—the return to ascriptive rather than achieved characteristics as determinants of social stratification. (18) Moreover, as Daniel Bell put it, 'Ethnicity has become more salient (than class) because it can combine an interest with an affective tie….' (19) Apparently, the strategic efficacy of ethnicity is seen as a major focus for the mobilization of group interests. It is a strategy for asserting claims against the institutions of society, for any oppressed group has the best chance of changing the system if it raises the communal consciousness of its individual members.

It is important, therefore, to recognize that broadened ethnicity suggests the past experiences of oppressed minorities as merely the starting point of a strategy calculated to cash in on today's rapidly changing political situation. The common elements fashioning broadened ethnicity are the crucial considerations of deprivation, powerlessness, alienation, frustration, and the like. In the not too distant past, such conditions were viewed largely in terms of individual-personal discontent, and help was sought from relatives and friends. But today individual-personal discontent has been replaced with collective-political discontent and the new organizations of broadened ethnicity seek significant power to harness the sources of discontent and to establish a political and a moral base under the emotive slogan of cultural pluralism. (Curiously, the political interest-defined group is now behaving as an ethnic group, whereas in the past the ethnic group behaved as a political interest-defined group.)

The second factor challenging the thesis that 'resurgent ethnicity is caused by a crisis of identity' has to do with the fact that many of America's ethnic whites belong to America's working class. In the mid-1960s, the working class discovered that the old rules of the game through which they would supposedly share in the bounty of America were suddenly changed. Welfare, for some, had become an acceptable way of life; police officers were called 'pigs' and those who flaunted the law were not punished; and flag burning and draft evasion were condoned by some. By the late 1960s rampant inflation caused an economic squeeze and many family breadwinners were hard put to meet the family budget. Inflation made it next to impossible for the average family to save and it appeared that only the children of the very rich or the very poor (scholarship grants and aid) were able to meet the problem of spiraling costs of a college education. Labeled or characterized as racist pigs, honkies, bigots, the Silent Majority, and hardhats, many white ethnics felt that there was little hope that any foreseeable change in American life would likely benefit them. To them, the social revolution of the 1960s had changed the 'rules of the game' and the change was largely made at their expense.

Hence, today's white working-class ethnic wants it known that his ancestors' early experiences were not easy ones; that they had to work tremendously hard to 'make it' in America, that they were oppressed and exploited; and in addition, they, too, were the targets of pseudoscientific racial theories. It is apparent that the message of the third- and fourth-generation offspring is this: Whatever progress or success they have achieved, it was due to hard work, struggle, and self-sacrifice, and no one gave their forebears and themselves anything 'on a silver platter.'

Finally, the 'crisis of identity' cause of resurgent ethnicity can be challenged in terms of yet another phenomenon, namely, the collapse of accommodative or 'machine' politics. The rather sudden collapse of accommodative politics—that curious blend of ethnic groups and local and state-elected officials—has changed significantly the political and social mobility of white ethnic groups, such as the Irish, Jewish, and Italian. The long-term contribution of accommodative politics was its providing of political stability facilitating the mobility of white ethnic groups within a permissive political environment. For example, accommodative politics is reflected in the Irish-Catholic transition from a despised and feared outgroup to one for whom the traditional American holders of institutional power had to make room or 'accommodate.' Indeed in Boston they became a despised and feared ingroup—The Irish Mafial The primary political benefactors of accommodative politics shaped public policy in the Democratic party coalition and, to a lesser extent, through the labor unions and fraternal associations of America.

Accommodative politics was largely ethnic, with political candidates showing up at, say, a local picnic, attempting to enjoy an athletic feat or perhaps a polka, and attempting to say a few words in another tongue. But this was changed in the 1960s. The 'new politics,' made up of groups representing the 'new' minorities (ethnics?)—women, blacks, Chicanos, native Americans, Puerto Ricans, etc.—displaced the white ethnic coalitions and claimed for themselves the political rewards of exercising power.

My major point is that Novak and others, who stress the importance and significance of a resurgent ethnicity, also justify it in terms of its being caused by a 'mass society' type of social order inimical to identity stability. Now it is true that ethnicity and its accounterments are 'in the air' at present, but it is not necessarily true that the phenomenon is caused by a 'crisis of identity'; other factors also appear as possible causes. A minor point, but an important, one, is 'What counts as resurgent ethnicity.' This is not just a nit-picking question, but one which is crucial if we are to make judgments about cultural diversity, particularly in the schools. The question is not whether cultural diversity in the form of multi-ethnicity is undesirable. It is rather that since many, perhaps most, Americans desire some sort of£ sub-cultural identity or life-style, we should not necessarily connect this phenomenon to the historic past of racial, religious, and national groups. My concern here is that we ought not be too quick to join those who insist that no separation of the older and traditional view of ethnicity and today's so-called 'resurgent ethnicity' is necessary.

EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY

To see public policy as a product that authorizes the distribution of benefits and prerogatives in society, and educational policy as performing the function of ensuring the acceptance and maintenance of such policy is to appreciate the instrumental function of public education in providing stability to a society. Thus, to consider public education apart from policy-making is to run the risk of confusing the cart with the horse. This is the reality: Public education is, and always has been, inseparable from broader social, political, and economic goals.

We must now consider some points which, if recognized, might have the positive effect of creating public education within the parameters of a democratically conceived culturally diverse society.

First, the bulk of the evidence is in and it indicates that most Americans desire some sort of group affiliation tie or ties. If my analysis is correct, we are in the presence of more than simply a renascent ethnicity. The pattern of cultural diversity emergent in our society is both broader and deeper. It encompasses sex, occupation, race, age, etc. People are rejecting the goal of a monolithic American culture and are discovering themselves to be members of groups distinguished by interest-defined concerns. Since the goal of a monolithic American culture is no longer acceptable to the many self-identified subgroups or to the dominant core culture itself, public education should attempt to secure some workable expression of cultural diversity, although not necessarily as a response to Novak's (et al.) claim that it is a 'resurgent ethnicity.'

My objection is not to the notion that an ethnic factor remains with us, although colored by assimilation, for Glazer and Moynihan's observation that ethnic groups assimilate but remain distinct is a most important one for us to remember. But in discussions concerning the role of public education in a culturally diverse society we should note the brute fact that for some Americans today acceptance of the notion of a 'resurgent ethnicity' requires no more than the politicalization of passions along black-white lines to fan the flames of a latent racism. In a word, the need is for stability, particularly in the area of race relations, because for some ethnics, white and black, the resurgence of ethnicity is simply a cover for racism.

My point is a simple one: the need for stability in a society dominated by a broadened ethnicity may turn into a mockery of a great society. We may note a pragmatic folly in easy accommodation to the 'new ethnic consciousness' celebrated by Michael Novak. For the poor and the victimized it could be nothing more than a cruel hoax, since it could be made to exploit the reactionary potential of the not so recent American past. Stability, at any cost, however, might lend support to the glorification of racial and religious peculiarities offering as a viable alternative a federation of races—each with its own territory or elected representative. Such a proposal would assure freedom for the group, but not for the individual. The individual's fate would be predetermined on the basis of his cultural identity.

A system of public education sympathetic to a legitimate cultural diversity demands standards drawn from more than one culture. In this context, the curriculum requires that due recognition be given to all who contributed to our national heritage. The tokenism of 'Black America Week,' 'Columbus Day,' or male heroes only, simply will not suffice. Public education must deny the position that has consistently refused to recognize that a legitimate cultural diversity exists, or even that it should exist. Implied here is the notion that schooling that dicounts cultural diversity by ascribing to cultural differences all kind of demeaning terms—culturally deficient, culturally disadvantaged, culturally deprived (culturally depraved?)—is no longer acceptable—it simply cannot be tolerated any longer. But neither can it substitute a new kind of advocacy which emphasizes the racist and ethnocentric aspects of American life.

The revival of ethnicity is growing and will continue for some time to come. The new-found pride and economic power of native Americans, blacks, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, women, and others will result in a growing assertiveness aimed at reshaping occupational, housing, and educational patterns. In particular, the positive aspects of ethnicity will call into question the failure of the neighborhood school to prepare adequately children

for successful roles in adult life. Hopefully, the realization of the inadequacy of the old accommodation model of politics to deal meaningfully with this problem should be seen as the starting point of most discussions on educational policy. But the search for something more adequate in shaping public education based on the recognition of cultural diversity should not encourage exclusivist tendencies. Divisive groups who wish to achieve separation should be recognized but not encouraged.

My contention is that the ethnic factor remains with us, although colored by cultural assimilation and the 'broadening effect.' And if ethnicity is honest and is viewed as a source of cultural strength rather than of personal deprivation, then public education may help develop a cultural stability rooted in youths who are open to change, who are flexible, adaptive, and receptive. This means introducing the student to many life-styles, not superficially, but in depth. Students should study the variety and richness of America's multicultural history. Hopefully, such an education would defuse a latent racism and provide a solid, stronger type of social stability.

The problem of resurgent ethnicity, minority group assertiveness, and the need for stability is directly related to two further consequences for public education. We can see this as follows: For one thing, the problem may produce a willingness to compromise on vital matters. This practice was defended in the 'accommodation model' as not only a necessity of politics and white ethnicity, but also as the supreme virtue. As previously mentioned, the long-term contribution of the model was that it provided stability facilitating the mobility of white ethnic groups within a somewhat adaptive political environment. But it is entirely conceivable that the very broadening of passions and cultural issues in current 'ethnic politics' makes such facile pragmatic accommodation, even if one is willing, all but impossible to achieve. That is to say, the policy at present is too broad, too involved in scope to make possible easy accommodation of all interests involved. As John Dewey foresaw in the late 1920s, the sentiments and symbols of shared cultural attachments are themselves too varied, disparate and incomplete. He said 'The social situation has been so changed—that traditional general principles have little practical meaning.' (20) Further on he commented, 'Symbols control thought, and the new age has no symbols consonant with its activities.' (21) And 'Our Babel is not one of tongues but one of signs and symbols without which shared experience is impossible.' (22)

The essential point here is that the newer collective strategies and methods—such as the use of skyjacking commercial aircraft, political assassination and kidnapping, economic sanctions against supermarkets, etc.—have outrun mere mediation and negotiation efforts aimed at a compromise. This points toward major reconsiderations which involve educational policy conceived primarily as a function of informative criticism, inquiry, and publicity. The need, in other words, is the improvement of the methods and conditions of discussion and debate. There being no universal arbiter who decides which ethnic demands are just and which are not, relevant data must penetrate the whole system of decision-making and policies must be developed that reflect the bearing of knowledge supplied by the various groups.

Second, the implementation of cultural diversity studies as part of the curriculum of public education would involve, minimally, a school setting in which programs are designed to help students learn about and possibly appreciate the many diverse American life-styles as well as learning to interact productively with people from different backgrounds. The

teacher would teach students not to stereotype others and how to prevent alienation in social intercourse.

Hopefully, teachers would engage students in a number of learning activities designed to accomplish inter-group understanding. The curriculum would in part be derived from the many cultures and problems of a culturally diverse society and would be related to academic subjects of study such as language arts, social studies, and the physical sciences. Projects involving in- and out-of-school activities would be utilized to help students better understand the roots of prejudice, the consequences of ethnocentrism, the strengths and weaknesses of local ethnic groups, the search for individual identity within a multi-culture, and how to become facile in the dominant culture as well as in the sub-culture.

There is, however, a need for a cautionary note. I am not advocating a multi-cultural education per se. Rather, I wish to suggest that schools can be utilized as vehicles for fostering tolerance and understanding among culturally diverse groups. But if this is to be accomplished, teachers must conduct a careful assessment of the impact of their work and their knowledge of the political as well as the self-serving purpose of schooling. The rhetoric, promises, trappings and symbols of, say, a 'problems of democracy' course for students simply will not suffice. Tolerance and understanding will not be fostered in the area of forced consensus nor by adherence to an ideology of social reconstructionism. What seems to be indicated instead are discussions and situations focusing on primary associations wherein students interact more fully as people who learn about and share a number of common interests and concerns. Schooling would thus provide an opportunity for the gathering of heterogeneous or homogeneous groups to examine and discuss issues of mutual concern. The major thrust of schooling would be reflection and deliberation, clarity before commitment, and above all, coimmitment.

There is no good reason why schools cannot foster the kind of learning suggested above by pursuing a great number of dialects, values, languages, historical accounts, interpretations of events, etc. In a society such as ours, in which many culture groups exist, massive areas of disagreement about public education will abound, but we should not overlook the agreement, the shared or common concerns. Both disagreement and common concerns are possible because of the acceptance of the fundamental principle of equal citizenship which grants a prima facie right to all individuals, even the right to disagree. Our ability to construct a viable system of public education that recognizes bases of agreement may well provide the acid test of the old 'melting pot' ideal.

NOTES

1   Nathan Glazer and Daniel P.Moynihan, 'Beyond the Melting Pot,' 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1970), p. xiv.

2   Perhaps the most common use of the term 'ethnic' connotes a group or person. Historically, this use was restricted to nationalities (French, Greek, Poles, Germans, Irish, etc.) and then it was broadened to include religious affiliation as well—as, for example, German-Lutheran, Irish-Catholic, etc. Recently, however, the term has been applied much more broadly and includes Latin Americans, blacks, and so on as ethnic groups. This is an important, but often unnoticed observation that I owe to Mary Anne Raywid, Pluralism as a Basis for Educational Policy: Some

Second Thoughts, presented to the Lyndon B.Johnson Memorial Symposium on Education Policy, Glassboro, N.J., May 25, 1973.

3   It would be wrong to assume that explicit sanctions would be needed to enforce expression of cultural diversity. Nothing more than a carefully nurtured sense of historical identity and well-defined and available satisfying participational roles within the group and the large society are needed.

4   Thomas F.Green, Education and Pluralism: Ideal and Reality (Twenty-Sixth Annual J.Richard Street Lecture, Syracuse University School of Education, 1966), p. 10.

5   Ibid., p. 11.

6   For early documents on the immigrant problem and a workable bibliography of this aspect of the Americanization movement, see Edith Abbott (ed.) 'Historical Aspects of the Immigrant Problem: Select Documents' (University of Chicago Press, 1926). See also Andrew M.Greeley, 'Why Can't They Be Like Us?' (New York: Dutton, 1971); Marcus Lee Hansen, 'The Atlantic Migration, 1607–1860' (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,1940); Edward Hartmann, 'The Movement to Americanize the Immigrant' (New York: University of Columbia Press, 1948); John Higham, 'Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925' (New York: Random House, 1970); Dwight Macdonald, 'Against the American Grain' (New York: Random House, 1962); Roger Portal, 'The Slavs' (New York: Harper & Row, 1969); Richard Scammon and Ben J.Wattenberg, 'The Real Majority' (New York: Coward-McCann, 1970); George M.Stephenson, 'A History of American Immigration, 1920–1924' (New York: Russell & Russell, 1964); Rudolph S.Veceli, European Americans: From Immigrants to Ethnics, in 'Reinterpretation of American History and Culture,' ed. William H.Cartwright and Richard L.Watson (Washington DC: National Council for the Social Studies, 1973).

7   Gerd Korman, 'Industrialization, Immigrants, and Americanizers' (Madison, Wisconsin: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1967).

8   See Michael Novak, One Species, Many Cultures, 'The American Scholar,' Winter, 1973–4; The New Ethnicity, "The Humanist,' May/June 1973; 'The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics' (New York: Macmillan, 1971). For a variation on this theme, see Peter Schrag, 'The Decline of the WASP' (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1970).

9   Novak, 'The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics,' pp. xviii.

10 Ibid. p. xxiv.

11 Marcus L.Hansen, 'The Problem of the Third Generation Immigrant' (Rock Island, Illinois: The Augustana Historical Society, 1937), p. 15.

12 Glazer and Moynihan, op.cit., p. xxxiv,

13 Ibid.*,* pp. xxiv, xxv, xxvi.

14 Ibid., pp. 13–14, 16.

15 Raywid, op.cit., p. 6.

16 Ibid.

17 Although the precise import of the shift is notoriously difficult to characterize, it is caught in part in the following:

> Nowadays, it appears a cultural demand can no longer be weighed on the scales of seriousness and depth. Eventually all demands are to be taken seriously. Indeed, the point about ethnicity and ethnic consciousness is that no group submits to the judgment of others. By their very nature ethnic claims do not allow of a universal scale against which they can be measured.

See Norman Glazer, Ethnicity and the Schools, 'Commentary,' vol. 58 (September, 1974), p. 58.

18 See Nathan Glazer and Daniel P.Moynihan, Why Ethnicity, 'Commentary,' vol. 58 (October, 1974), p. 36.

19 Ibid., p. 37

20 John Dewey, 'The Public and Its Problems' (Chicago: The Swallow Press, 1927), p. 133.

21 Ibid., p. 142.

22 Ibid.

9
Equality of educational opportunity

Robert H.Ennis

In which of the following cases do we find the educational opportunity of one member of the pair equal to that of the other?

(A) Edward Tudor and Tom Canty, born on the same day, were raised respectively in the Palace of Westminster and Offal Court. Edward had a series of private tutors who gave him a strong academic education. Tom Canty learned by experience in the streets of London. The Earl of Hertford deemed the education of each to be fitting (characters from Mark Twain's 'The Prince and the Pauper').

(B) Jill and Jack, born on the same day in a small rural Illinois town to lower class and upper/middle-class parents respectively, went to the same tax-supported Illinois schools through age seventeen. Their inherited mental ability was about the same. In their early teens both entertained the idea of becoming electrical engineers. Jill was discouraged by her gasoline-delivery-truck-driving father, who scoffed at her 'uppity' thoughts, and who himself did not go beyond the eighth grade. Very few magazines and books were to be found in her home, which contained two bedrooms and hou3ed six people. Jack had a private bedroom; and his physician father encouraged his engineer aspirations and subscribed to 'Scientific American.' Right after high school, Jack went on to engineering school, and Jill married locally, becoming a housewife with children.

(C) Fraternal twins, Bonnie and Clyde, came out differently in what John Rawls (1971) called the 'natural lottery.' At age six Bonnie's and Clyde's scores on the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children are about 130 and 70 respectively, and the disparity in scores is consistent with their parents' and teachers' appraisals of their conceptual development and ability to learn. Clyde can look forward to special classes for the 'educable mentally handicapped' in tax-supported schools through age eighteen. Bonnie can expect to progress through the tax-supported schools and, with some financial help from their middle-class parents, the state university.

(D) White identical twins, Alpha and Beta, who are children of school teachers, came out the same in the natural lottery of mental ability, but throughout school, Beta was not interested in acquiring an academic education. Rather he wanted to hunt, fish and tend horses. Alpha sought an academic education. In elementary school Beta was pressured to learn to read and work with numbers sufficiently to cause him to keep up with Alpha in elementary school, but by the time they completed secondary school, Beta's academic achievement level was well below that of Alpha. The school system offered no courses in hunting, fishing and horsemanship, and their parents tried to discourage Beta's interests therein.

(E) Another of Alpha's classmates is Running Deer, a full-blooded American Indian coming from a tribe that values prowess in hunting, fishing, and horsemanship, but does

not value academic accomplishments. Running Deer and Alpha are born with similar capacities, but are brought up differently. At the end of their compulsory education Alpha scores higher on academic tests than does Running Deer.

People with whom I have discussed these cases generally agree that Edward and Tom, the prince and the pauper, did not have equal educational opportunity, and I agree, though I shall contend that the case is not conceptually inconsistent with this ideal. But people vigorously disagree about the other four cases. These disagreements are indicative of some deep-seated policy issues that trouble us these days.

Why is it that even though there is so much agreement on equality of educational opportunity as an ideal, there is so much disagreement about its application? A first approximation sometimes offered as an answer is that different people have different definitions of equality of educational opportunity. For those who view definitions as simply arbitrary rules for the use of terms, this first approximation results in the disagreement's being simply an arbitrary matter to be settled by the flipping of a coin, or some such maneuver. Clearly the disputes are not such as can reasonably be settled that way.

For those who view such definitions as things that need more justification than is provided by flipping a coin, the first approximation provides some insight, albeit oversimplified. The problem with this oversimplified answer is that it leaves confusion about how to proceed in trying to settle the disagreements. This is because there are different sorts of definition, requiring different sorts of justification. When I have encountered this first approximation, it has generally not been accompanied by an understanding of these different sorts of non-arbitrary definition.

Embodied in this paper is an attempt to make more clear the nature of equality-of-educational-opportunity disputes, especially those that develop even when people appear to be looking at the same set of facts. Greater understanding of disputes about cases like the five I offered is the modest first goal.

The disputes involved, I shall claim, are often about the value judgments required for the application of the concept equality of educational opportunity. If I am right, there is some advance over the first approximation. Although settling value issues is often a very difficult matter, there is an advance in knowing that this has to be done, as opposed to mucking about in the typical confused argument over, or 'search for,' a definition. (1)

In order to achieve this first goal of understanding, I shall offer an analysis of the concept of equality of educational opportunity, an analysis that ultimately focuses on our ideas of education and of having an opportunity as the sources of controversy. I believe that this analysis does justice to the concept that is employed by intelligent, sensitive educational policy makers. Its elaboration and defense is a second goal of the paper. The defense depends on the ability of the analysis to explain the way we think and argue about cases like the five given earlier.

EQUALITY, A DYADIC RELATIONSHIP

Equality is a relationship between two things, a dyadic relationship. To say that something is equal, without specifying something else (or in the often trivial case, itself) to which it is claimed to be equal, does not make any sense. To say that Jack has equality of educational opportunity all by himself does not make sense. There must be someone who is claimed to be equal to Jack in amount of educational opportunity for the claim to get off the ground.

In discussions of equality of educational opportunity we are often interested in relationships between groups, so one might wonder how such a dyadic relationship fits groups, since it is individuals, not groups, that have educational opportunity. One way to express this interest is to look at average or representative individuals for each group, and see whether their educational opportunities are equal. I am not meaning here to suggest a mathematically precise way of reducing the problem about groups to one about individuals; I am only indicating a general approach. As a first approximation, one might say that two groups have equal educational opportunity just in case a pair of average members, one from each group, have equal educational opportunity. Alternatively one might pair comparable children of various sorts and see whether the educational opportunities of the pairs are equal.

Statisticians, methodologists, and philosophers have work to do here prior to the execution of studies. I am only suggesting that they build their methods on the concept of the comparison of a pair. Discussions of equality of educational opportunity have not and need not wait for the methodological refinements, however. Once we make decisions about pairs (the hardest part of the conceptual problem, I believe), we can make rough, intuitive estimates for groups that can be useful in policy discussions. First things first.

THE ANALYSIS

Because equality of educational opportunity is a dyadic relationship, I shall take as the object of my analysis an expression that clearly indicates this dyadic relationship and that facilitates thinking about what must be equal to what. This form is called 'contextual definition' by Hempel (1952, p. 4) and others. I think a more informative name is 'equivalent-expression definition' (Ennis, 1969, pp. 217–21). The expression on which I shall focus then is the following:

1   x and y have equality of educational opportunity This expression, which is in the
     form of a sentence, exhibits the fact that equality is a dyadic relationship. As an
     analysis I suggest that expression 1 is equivalent in meaning to the following:
2   x and y have the same amount of opportunity for an education

This proposed analysis is not immediately startling, but there are advantages.

CONCEPTS AND CONCEPTIONS

In terms of the concept-conception distinction used by John Rawls (1971), the offered analysis outlines the concept of equality of educational opportunity; to specify in addition what constitutes education and having an opportunity would be to offer a conception of equality of educational opportunity. Rawls in talking about justice explains the concept-conception distinction as follows (1971, pp. 5–6):

> It seems natural to think of the concept of justice as distinct from the various conceptions of justice and as being specified by the role which…different conceptions have in common. Those who hold different conceptions of justice can, then, still agree that institutions are just when no arbitrary distinctions are made between persons in the assigning of basic rights and duties and when the rules determine a proper balance between competing claims to the advantages of

social life. Men can agree to this description of just institutions since the notions of an arbitrary distinction and of a proper balance, which are included in the concept of justice, are left open for each to interpret according to the principles of justice that he accepts. These principles single out which similarities and differences among persons are relevant in determining rights and duties and they specify which division of advantages is appropriate.

Using this language, I have offered a concept of equality of educational opportunity, feeling that people can agree to it, but have not set forth any conceptions of equality of educational opportunity, nor any principles embodied by any conceptions. The notion having an opportunity and the notion education are 'left open for each to interpret according to the principles' that she or he accepts.

Furthermore, the analysis enables one to make the important point that application of the concept equality of educational opportunity requires value judgments in addition to that required for the endorsement of the concept as a guide to life. This point has been made before in the philosophy of education literature, by Myron Lieberman (1961), B.Paul Komisar and Jerrold Coombs (1964), R.S.Peters (1966) and Thomas Green (1971). The point should be made, but prior work does not adequately explain why the point is a correct one. Nor does the prior work indicate focal points for deciding whether there is equality of educational opportunity. I shall attempt both.

The point that additional value judgments are required enables us to explain why there is so much agreement that equality of educational opportunity is a good thing and so much disagreement about what to do in specific cases. We are generally agreed that the concept should be implemented, but we are often not agreed upon any particular conception of equality of educational opportunity. More specifically we are often in disagreement about what is to count as education and what is to count as having an opportunity. To decide these matters requires one or more value judgments. To show that value judgment is generally required for the specification of what is to count as required for education is relatively easy. To show that value judgment is required for application of the concept having an opportunity is more difficult, but I shall attempt to formulate a defense. Defense of both points will be aided by an examination of the previously described cases.

EDUCATION

In Case A, most people would agree that Edward Tudor and Tom Canty did not have equality of educational opportunity. On most views of education and of having an opportunity, Edward and Tom had different amounts of opportunity for an education. Education, most would think, was brought to Edward on a silver platter but was systematically denied to Tom. Tom had less opportunity, I suppose most people would say. (2)

However, one who thinks that Tom's education in the streets is every bit as good an education as Edward's (not merely good for Tom, given his destiny), and thinks that Tom had just as much opportunity as Edward (which he presumably did) for his good education, then that person should judge them to have equality of educational opportunity. Furthermore, if one judges Tom's prospective education in the streets to be appropriate education for everyone, in contrast to what some might call an 'empty, bookish, academic' education, then, since Edward had less opportunity for the street kind of education, the conclusion should be that Edward had less educational opportunity than Tom.

This all goes to show that one's judgment about whether there is equality of educational opportunity depends at least in part upon one's judgments about what constitutes an education. In most equal-opportunity contexts this determination requires value judgment.

One's judgments about education also play a significant role in Case D, in which identical twins, Alpha and Beta, have different interests. If one judges an academic education to be proper, as contrasted to an education in hunting, fishing, and horsemanship (or alternatively, if one makes the value judgment that mastery of hunting, fishing, and horsemanship does not constitute an educa-tion, whereas academic mastery does constitute an education), then presumably one would judge Alpha and Beta to have equality of educational opportunity. One would presumably also say that Beta just did not take advantage of his opportunity.

Suppose that one instead judges an education to be proper to the extent that it is in accord with a student's interests, but that their school provides only an academic education. Then presumably one would judge their educational opportunities to be unequal, since Alpha's academic interests were better provided for by the system than Beta's outdoor interests.

A parallel problem arises in making judgments about equality of educational opportunity for people whose background is other than the dominant culture in a school. Let us assume that to be academic, white, and middle class, for the sake of discussion, in comparing Alpha with his classmate, Running Deer (Case E). Running Deer's culture encourages hunting, fishing and horsemanship, but Running Deer's days in the compulsory school are spent in attempts to develop him academically.

Granting these typical conditions we can see that the issue of whether or not they have equal educational opportunity depends in part on one's value judgments about what constitutes an education. If one judges that a genuine education is primarily concerned with introduction to and absorption of one's culture, then Running Deer and Alpha do not have equality of educational opportunity. Running Deer's culture is not promoted by the compulsory school.

If, however, one judges academics to be the core of an education, then the decision problem (comparing Running Deer and Alpha) becomes somewhat like that of Case B, in which Jill and Jack, coming from different backgrounds, go to the same school with a common goal assumed. These two cases bring out a type of controversial issue often embedded in comparing amounts of opportunity, when agreement on the goals (or nature) of education is assumed. Settling this sort of issue, I shall urge, requires one or more other value judgments.

In previously discussed cases I bypassed this type of problem, assuming that all of us would line up on one side of the question about opportunity, enabling me to focus on the controversial goals (or nature) of education. For example, in Case A concerning Tom Canty and Edward Tudor, assuming that an academic education of the sort given to Edward Tudor was the right kind of education for both, I suggested that all would agree that Tom had less educational opportunity than Edward; and assuming that a street-type education was the right type for both, that Tom had more opportunity than Edward.

HAVING AN OPPORTUNITY

In Cases B and E, however, assuming academic educational goals and the same inherent ability, the environmental differences are such that people with different value orientations can understandably still come up with different equality-of-opportunity judgments when

looking at the same situation. I shall at first focus on these cases involving environmental differences. Later on I shall examine Case C as a representative of situations involving people with natural differences,

In Case B some would say that Jill had less educational opportunity than Jack, because Jill's background was not academically stimulating, because her father scoffed at her academic ideas, because of the lack of quiet privacy for study, because of 'hidden tuition' costs, etc., items for which the schools did not deliberately attempt to compensate through such things as Head-Start programs. Let us call this the 'Liberal Position.'

Others would say that the educational opportunity was the same, since the schools were there to serve both Jill and Jack, giving them equal attention, and the factors mentioned were merely conditions of the situation. What really matters, so the position goes, is the fact that there was nothing restraining Jill from going on to engineering school and absorbing what it had to offer. It was up to her to take advantage of what was there. If she failed to do so, the responsibility is hers. She just was not sufficiently motivated. Let us call this the 'Conservative Position.'

One interesting feature of the Liberal-Conservative dispute is that opposing parties have difficulty seeing the rationality of the other position. The Liberal tends to think that the Conservative has simply failed to take account of some obvious basic facts, while the Conservative tends to think that the Liberal has introduced irrelevancies. Each has trouble seeing how the other could think the way she or he does, and suspects that ulterior motives must be operating. My proposed explanation of the situation is that the controversy is often not about a matter of fact, as many think, nor about a concept, as some think, but rather about the buried value judgment(s) that one makes in applying the concept, 'to have an opportunity.' This explanation is fairly complicated with some gaps in detail. But on the whole it appears to be a likely candidate because it explains how we handle difficult issues, and it makes understandable the feelings that some have that their opponents are irrational.

POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF HAVING AN OPPORTUNITY

Roughly speaking, x's having an opportunity to do z consists of the presence of positive factors combined with the absence or insufficiency of negative factors. The positive factors are environmental facilitators; that is, environmental features that could enable (or help) x to do z. Examples are the presence of an engineering school and Jack's father's help, which facilitated Jack's learning engineering.

Negative factors, the insufficiency of which is the other constituent of x's having an opportunity to do z, are environmental factors that could deter (or are deterring) x from doing z. An example of an environmental deterrent (at least from the point of view of Tom Canty) is the fence that kept him out of Westminster.

THE PERSONAL-ENVIRONMENTAL DISTINCTION

Only environmental, as contrasted with personal, factors are constitutive of having an opportunity. (3) Personal factors include motivation, traits, abilities, decisions, ideas, beliefs, and goals of the person involved. That Jill did not in the end decide (a decision is a personal factor) to learn engineering does not by itself count against her having had

the opportunity to learn engineering. That people do not choose to take advantage of their opportunities does not automatically show that they do not have the opportunities.

Some might point to her lack of motivation as evidence of environmental factors that would count directly against the presence of opportunity. For example, the Liberal might claim her lack of motivation to be evidence of the existence of deterrents, such as lack of privacy, lack of encouragement, scoffing, etc., perhaps grouped together as family background. One sort of evidence of the efficacy of something is the identification of the chain of events through which it operated. Lack of motivation could be one element in the chain. But being evidence for a state, s, does not make something constitutive of s.

Although traits and abilities are not constitutive of having or having an opportunity, the absence of some ability might make it pointless to talk about a person's opportunities. For example, it would be pointless, perhaps a cruel joke, to say of Clyde (IQ 70) that he has an opportunity to learn engineering.

The distinction between environmental and personal factors is very important in discussions of equality of educational opportunity. In Jill's case the deterrent alleged by the Conservative (lack of motivation) is a personal factor; personal factors are not constitutive of having (or not having) an opportunity. Those alleged by the Liberal are environmental factors; environmental factors are constitutive of having (or not having) an opportunity. More generally when there is an issue, the issue is usually one of determining the environmental facilitators of and deterrents to x's doing z. Roughly speaking the presence of an environmental facilitator augments and the presence of an environmental deterrent diminishes, the amount of opportunity that x has to do z. How then do we determine what are (or were) the facilitators and deterrents to someone's doing z?

For the sake of brevity I shall look in some detail at the determination of deterrents only. In our current milieu, there is considerable expressed interest in deterrents, so I pick them. However, the upcoming discussion could be extended in parallel ways to facilitators.

PRESENCE AND ABSENCE

Conceptually, deterrents can be either the presence of something or the absence of something. The fence was a presence-type deterrent. Lack of money and lack of private study space, if they were deterrents, consisted of the absence of something. Although Liberals and Conservatives will disagree about whether those two absence factors were deterrents to Jill's learning engineering, presumably everyone would agree that there can be absences that are deterrents. For example, the absence of food can be a deterrent to someone's learning engineering. A mother's lack of sympathy can be a deterrent to a child's emotional development. And many would hold that the absence of a public school system in Prince Edward County, Virginia, in the early 1960s, was a deterrent to the education of many children. The absence of a facilitator that should exist is a deterrent.

Descriptions of presences and absences can be at least roughly converted into opposite-type descriptions though the conversion is often awkward. 'Lack of food' can be roughly converted into 'presence of food deprivation,' 'lack of sympathy' into 'presence of non-sympathy,' and 'presence of a fence' into 'lack of unblocked space.' For our purposes it does not especially matter whether presence or absence formulations for deterrents are used. It is largely a matter of convenience and linguistic habits. The main point is that a factor should not be ruled out as a deterrent simply because its formulation is of one sort or another.

DETERRENTS, CAUSES, MAKING A DIFFERENCE, RESPONSIBILITY

Since a deterrent is one kind of cause—the kind that holds back or prevents something—I shall apply with appropriate modifications an analysis of specific causal statements for which I have elsewhere argued (Ennis, 1973). Following this analysis (4) there are two decisions to make in determining that a factor is a deterrent: 1, Determining that the elimination of the factor, other things remaining the same, would have made x's doing z more likely. (It could not be a deterrent unless it made a difference. (5)) There are many factors that can satisfy this criterion. When we look at any occurrence or state of affairs, we can see that a very large number of things could have made a difference. For example, if Jill had been offered 50,000 dollars per year plus free tuition, room and board to learn engineering, she probably would have done so. Hence the absence of such an offer satisfies the first criterion. (The elimination of the absence would have made her learning engineering more likely.) It gives a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for something being a deterrent. A second decision, involving a responsibility judgment, is needed: 2, Selecting from those factors that satisfy Criterion 1 the one (or ones) to deem responsible (or in part responsible) for the lessened likelihood of x's doing z.

Most of us would not want to deem the absence of the annual-payment-plus-tuition-room-and-board responsible for Jill's not learning engineering. That explains why we would not judge the absence to be a deterrent to her going to engineering school. But other candidates are more controversial.

Suppose the Liberal and Conservative to be in agreement on the empirical point that if Jill had decided to try to learn engineering, it would have been likely that she would have done so. For them, then, Criterion 1 would have been satisfied for establishing absence-of-a-decision-to-try as a deterrent. Suppose them also to be in agreement that having given Jack's family background to Jill (instead of hers) would also have made it likely that who would have gone on to engineering school and learned engineering. So for them Criterion 1 would have been satisfied for another factor, Jill's family background.

But they part company on Criterion 2. The Conservative might deem the lack of motivation responsible, and thus conclude that it was the deterrent to her learning engineering. Since this alleged deterrent would be a personal factor, its existence would not count as diminishing the amount of opportunity that Jill had.

The Liberal, on the other hand, does not deem the lack of motivation responsible, and thus for the Liberal this lack was not the (or a) deterrent. The Liberal deems her family background responsible, which for the Liberal then satisfies Criterion 2, and was the deterrent. Since family background is an environmental factor, its being a deterrent would count as a reduction of Jill's opportunity. Now we are beginning to see how the Liberal and Conservative can disagree, even when given the same empirical facts. In principle at least, disputes about the satisfaction of Criterion 1 can be settled by scientific investigation. But how are disputes about Criterion 2, the responsibility criterion, to be settled? There are empirical and value elements.

The empirical element is the determination of the other consequences of a change in any factor that satisfies Criterion 1. For example, what would be the other consequences of intervention focused on Jill's family background? We need to know these consequences in order to evaluate the intervention. We need this evaluation (which introduces the value element) in order to determine responsibility. That is, we deem responsible the thing (or event, or state of affairs) that we think should have been the focus of change, if the result

in question were to have been avoided. And we decide what should have been the focus of change on the basis of costs and benefits, using empirical and value beliefs and assumptions to decide what are costs and benefits, and to what extent they are so. Thus values play a significant role in deciding what was a deterrent.

The Liberal picks family background as the (or a) deterrent to Jill's learning engineering, because the Liberal feels that the best way to have avoided Jill's non-learning (or a good way to have helped avoid it) was by altering the functioning of her family background. The costs of so doing (greater taxes, interference with the family, etc.) are acceptable to the Liberal, who thus has picked an environmental factor, one that would count against Jill's having had full opportunity.

The Conservative picks Jill's lack of motivation as the deterrent, feeling that a change in her motivation was the best way to have avoided her non-learning of engineering. And that was up to her, this Conservative thinks, though we might have given her some help by pointing out the (alleged) advantages of going on to college. The frequently presented chart depicting expected life-time earnings for people of different levels of education is what the Conservative might offer, plus a good commencement address and other exhortation. But to reach into her background would involve costs unacceptable to the Conservative (greater taxes, interference with the family, etc.); her background would thus not be an appropriate focus of change, would not be responsible, would not be a deterrent, and thus for the Conservative would not be relevant to opportunity judgments.

I do not propose here to suggest how to settle the empirical and value questions raised in deciding whether someone has an opportunity. Presumably we each already have ways of settling such empirical and value questions (though many, including me, are not completely happy with our methods). The contribution I am trying here to make is to show how to locate and separate these issues.

THE GENERAL APPROACH

The location and separation of the issues in the Jill and Jack case is fairly typical. Assuming some set of goals of education for a pair of people, we decide that the two have equal educational opportunity just in case the environmental facilitators minus deterrents for one balance the environmental facilitators minus deterrents for the other.

The balancing of factors is not a matter for which we have precise techniques, though we do generally manage with our imprecise methods. Perhaps it would be desirable to develop precise techniques, perhaps not. Current cost-benefit analysis strategies leave me pessimistic.

The approach is the same in the Alpha and Running Deer case. In contrasting minority groups and the majority group, in addition to the controversy over aims of education that can result in disagreements about the presence of equality of educational opportunity, there is the controversy about the value judgments used in judging the best way to have avoided (if we had wanted to) what would otherwise occur (or has occurred), a controversy that must be faced in making judgments about opportunity. Assuming an academic goal, settling this case requires (in addition to the empirical judgments) value judgments which are no doubt embedded in broad value positions dealing with the desirability of paying more tax money for the education of lower-class children and of minority children than for white middle-class children, etc. I have illustrated this general picture with an example of an American Indian, but the picture fits representatives of any minority group.

DIFFERENCES IN GENETICALLY DETERMIMED NATURAL ABILITY

The approach for Case C, in which fraternal twins, Bonnie and Clyde, differ in their mental endowment, also follows the guidelines suggested. We consider what would constitute an appropriate education for each. If an academic education is deemed appropriate for Bonnie, while training in basic unskilled job-holding skills together with aesthetic and social development is deemed appropriate for Clyde, then their not ending up with comparable academic competence would be irrelevant to a judgment about equality of educational opportunity. What would be relevant would be the balance of the environmental facilitators and deterrents to their achieving the appropriate goals. They are balanced just in case Bonnie's environmental facilitators minus deterrents equal Clyde's environmental facilitators minus deterrents. If there is an unbalance, then the opportunity judger should deem the opportunities to be unequal.

To be more specific, with me serving as the opportunity judger for the real case I know (there are significant differences from one real case to the next), I judge them to have equality of educational opportunity for the following reasons:

1   I believe academic education to be appropriate for Bonnie and rudimentary vocational training plus aesthetic and social cultivation for Clyde. Hence inequality of academic results is irrelevant.

2   Special classes are provided for Clyde. The intervention I recommend is thus occurring in a chain of events that would otherwise have led to his failure to achieve his goals. The facilitator is there, and I believe the only significant deterrent to be junk television programs. But these are not a strong-enough deterrent for me to judge that Clyde does not have an opportunity to achieve the specified goals.

3   Similarly, an academic curriculum for Bonnie is provided and it is adequate. Thus a facilitator is there and the same deterrent, junk television, is also present. I judge that Bonnie does have an opportunity to achieve academic goals.

4   Now why are their educational opportunities equal? It is impossible for me (or anyone) to describe the rich complexity of the situation in sufficient detail to provide full justification. But it does seem that overall the environmental factors that facilitate and deter do balance out.

So far in the Bonnie and Clyde case I have assumed different educational goals for each. Suppose on the other hand that we judge that an (appropriate) education for each would be an academic education. On that assumption (one that I would not make), if the only thing I judge to be deterring Clyde (in addition to the things deterring Bonnie) is his low mental ability, then (since that is personal) I judge them to have equal opportunity. What I would be doing in making such a judgment is saying that his mental prowess is the appropriate focus of interference, if we could and if we wanted to so interfere.

If, in addition, I judged lack of additional compensatory facilities for Clyde to be a deterrent, then I would judge Bonnie to have greater educational opportunity. This judgment incorporates the judgment that an appropriate focus of change in the chain of events is in the lack of compensatory facilities and that the costs of such change are acceptable. Actually I do not make such a judgment, because I think additional compensatory facilities would make no difference, an empirical judgment.

My consideration of this and previous cases is oversimplified, because we do in fact take more factors into account than I have indicated. Even with the oversimplification the account may at first appear complicated, but the proposed depiction of our conceptual structure does account for what we do, it accounts for our occasionally believing other people to be irrational for not agreeing with us, and it accounts for the disagreements that so trouble us beneath the veneer of agreement.

PROSPECTIVE RETROSPECTION

So far my emphasis has been on judgments about whether there is equality of educational opportunity between two people at some particular point in time. This is the basic conceptual case from which results can be extended to questions of greater political interest. Earlier I mentioned extension to groups. Another useful extension is to a total period of development from birth to maturity or beyond. Our interest in justice warrants concern about whether there was equal educational opportunity over the growth periods of the parties concerned. We are not merely interested in whether, given the parties' motivation, knowledge, and ability at some advanced point in their development, they have equal opportunity for an education.

This long-range interest for mature parties is retrospective: Did they have equal educational opportunity? For unborn and immature parties it is prospectively retrospective: Will they, when mature (or beyond), have had equal educational opportunity? Answers to this question follow the general outline developed earlier: a decision about what constitutes a good education is required; and the environmental facilitators and deterrents over the years must be balanced. Part of the determination of the facilitators and the deterrents over the years is empirical; the other part is evaluative, involving value judgments. Given that the empirical question (about what will and would have made a difference over the years and at what consequence) has been answered, the ascription of responsibility to certain of these factors (and thus their selection as facilitators and deterrents) requires value judgments. The value judgments are involved in deciding what costs and benefits are acceptable, the costs and benefits being those involved in changing the functioning of factors that over the years will and, would have made a difference. Environmental deterrents and external facilitators thus selected are then balanced off to make equality-of-opportunity judgments.

GOING ALL THE WAY

Some writers (e.g. Myron Lieberman, 1961, p. 142; R.S. Peters, 1966, p. 140; James Coleman, 1968, pp. 21–2; and Thomas Green, 1971, p. 137) have avoided endorsement of full equality of educational opportunity, because they apparently believed that this ideal implies control of too many things, including 'early upbringing, size of families, and breeding,' as Peters put it. They need not have felt so restrained. One can consistently endorse full equality of educational opportunity without being committed to control of such things, for there are other possibilities.

1   One is to pick motivation as the responsible factor when people with backgrounds that make a difference do not generally achieve up to the level of people with other backgrounds. This is a Conservative response. All they (the lesser achievers) had to do was make up their minds and be steadfast. The Conservative much prefers this cost to

the individual over the cost in terms of freedom, family, taxes, and bureaucratic frustration, which results from interference with early upbringing, size of families, and breeding. This response in terms of value judgments does assume that people have some freedom of choice, even given their early upbringing, the size of their families, the breeding they do have, etc. This response is not open to someone who denies the existence of free choice, but I have found very few people who consistently do that.

2   A second alternative is to locate other environmental factors that also would make a difference. For example some kind of compensatory education including very small classes, special attention, and scholarships might well also make a difference—just as much difference as early upbringing and family size (breeding makes a special problem here that I shall look at soon)*,* and that is an empirical question which certianly has not yet been conclusively resolved. The value question is whether we should tax heavily enough to make such things available to the poor—perhaps leaving as is the treatment of folks who are better off. One could well decide that the costs of this kind of intervention (taxes, challenges of unfairness to the better-off, etc.) are far more bearable than the costs of interference with early upbringing and family size. If one so decided, then one might conclude that full equality of opportunity would be achieved by introducing those changes, because they would bring about a balance of environmental facilitators and deterrents for the parties of concern. The intervention would provide greater opportunity to the recipients, bringing them up to equality without 'going all the way,' given the above empirical and value assumptions, assumptions that many reasonable people are willing to make.

With respect to the 'breeding' suggestion presumably this means that various selective genetic practices would be needed in order to achieve full equality of educational opportunity. An initial problem with this suggestion is that people who otherwise would not have had equal opportunity are simply avoided. They do not come into existence. Who then benefits from this equalizing? But leaving that aside, selective genetic practices, because of their costs in human intimacy, dignity and freedom, might be judged to be completely unacceptable; thus the absence of genetic practices, since there is an alternative candidate for responsibility, could reasonably be deemed not responsible and they would thus not be judged a deterrent. The selected deterrent might instead be mental incapacity, which being personal, does not count against the existence of opportunity. This could be selected even though we know of no way to get rid of it (other than breeding). In selecting mental incapacity as the deterrent to success of some person, we have picked a focus for interference if it were possible. It need not be possible, given our technology. (6)

Thus one is not committed to the endorsement of extreme measures by a full endorsement of equality of educational opportunity. The nature of the commitment varies in accord with the conception of education being assumed, the empirical relationship that obtains, and the assumed value judgments about human dignity, the good life, freedom, etc., on one level, and taxes, bureaucracy, daily toil, economic wealth, ecological wealth, etc., on another level.

COLEMAN'S PROBLEM

In response to a request from the Congress of the United States, James Coleman organized and supervised a study that was published under the title, 'Equality of Educational

Opportunity' (Coleman et al., 1966). This study has received wide notice and its data and conclusions have since been subjected to much scrutiny. In requesting the study, Congress asked 'the Commissioner of Education to assess the "lack of equality of educational opportunity" among racial and other groups in the United States' (Coleman, 1968, p. 16). The problem Coleman faced, as the person appointed by the Commissioner to perform the study, was that he was given a concept, but virtually no conception.

From the many views about the aims of education, and a variety of values impinging on judgments, Coleman was in effect asked to pick a set and report about the degree of satisfaction of the resulting conception. Thus, Congress gave Coleman an insufficiently specified task. At the commencement of his study, he responded by coming up with a list of five at-least-partial operationalized conceptions of equality of educational opportunity, one of which he appears to have favored: equality of results, given the same background and ability (Coleman, 1968, p. 17). In selecting which results to examine he had to bring to bear a conception of education. He picked an academic conception and argued for it (Coleman et al., 1966, p. 218): 'The facts of life in modern society are that the intellectual skills, which involve reading, writing, calculation, analysis of information, are becoming basic requirements for independence, for productive work, for political participation, for wise consumption.' I am not meaning to quarrel with Coleman's argument, though many people would do so—especially since Coleman operationalized intellectual skills with 'a vocabulary test…[as] the criterion of achievement used throughout most of the examination of school effects' (p.292). Rather I offer it as evidence that Coleman had to make value judgments concerning a conception of education (which he sought to defend) in order to conduct his scientific study. That he felt obligated to defend his value judgment suggests that Coleman was aware that he was making one. And the United States Congress did not tell this scientist which value judgment to assume.

In seeking factors that were relevant to opportunity, Coleman received one piece of value guidance in that one factor seemed to be suggested to him by the law (Section 402 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), Commissioner Howe's letter of transmittal (Coleman et al., 1966, p. iii), and the tenor of the times: racial isolation. The implicit judgment was that this factor, if it turned out to make a difference, was to be deemed responsible—an appropriate focus of change.

So far as I can see, little or no other guidance was provided for this scientist. What he apparently did was to select factors for study, changes in which he thought 1, would not violate some set of values (at least mostly his), and 2, might make a difference, or be thought by someone to make a difference. He then did an empirical study of these factors in an attempt to see which ones did make a difference.

To the extent that Coleman operated in accord with the operationalized conception, equality of results given the same background and ability, he was resolved in advance to ignore (as constitutive of opportunity) facilitators and deterrents from a person's background (ability being already ruled out by the concept, opportunity). To ignore background factors is a conservative stance. Roughly speaking, it is in effect to say that the background factors are not recommended intervention points. Perhaps Coleman would not really care to endorse this conception, given his other views.

To attempt, from the point of view I have developed, a detailed discussion here of Coleman's operationalized conceptions of opportunity, and the details of his pursuit of the problem would make this paper too long. So I shall leave this tempting enterprise

to another time and place, and invite others to join in, for there is much to be learned—positively and negatively—from Coleman's work. The point that I do want to make here is that, as a scientist, Coleman was put in a difficult position, having been given a concept without, save one part, a conception.

SUMMARY

Although most people I know are in favor of equality of educational opportunity, there is much disagreement among them about how to implement this goal. To explain this phenomenon I have offered an analysis of the concept 'equality of educational opportunity' which locates the problem not in our concept of equality, but rather in our conceptions of education and of having an opportunity. Determination of these two conceptions requires the making of value judgments; that this is generally so for a conception of education is fairly obvious, but that it is so for a conception of having an opportunity is not so easy to see. Judgments about opportunity, I suggested, are in part responsibility judgments, which are dependent on empirical-fact judgments about what environmental changes would have made a difference and what the consequences of such changes would have been, and on judgments about the appropriate focus for change. The latter judgments, since they are about appropriateness, incorporate value judgments.

If the approach is correct, then we know better where to focus our attention in the disputes about whether equality of educational opportunity exists: on the determination of a conception of education, on the empirical determination of what would have made a difference and the consequences thereof, and on the determination of appropriate foci of change. All these judgments are very difficult to make and justify, but at least we can know what we are about—and we can abandon fumbling efforts to arrive at a definition of equality of educational opportunity, efforts that in my experience have often led to confusion and people's talking past one another.

Second if the approach is correct, then endorsers of equality of educational opportunity need not feel guilty about not going all the way—for example, about not endorsing interference with 'early upbringing, size of families, and breeding.' They might instead judge these factors to be inappropriate change areas, and thus not to be deterrents to opportunity.

Last, a legislative body (like the Congress of the United States) that seeks from a scientist (like James Coleman) a study of the extent of equality of educational opportunity within its domain owes that scientist some guidance, if the scientist is not to assume a legislative function. It owes an indication of aims (or sets of aims) of education, the opportunity to achieve which it is interested in; and it owes an indication of criteria for judging possible avenues of change. To the extent that these are not supplied, a legislative body turns over its legislative functions to the scientist.

For this paper I have tried to paint a broad picture of equality of educational opportunity, and have left many topics and problems unexamined or only mentioned. It is the beginning rather than the end of a series of related investigations. I invite others to join in the effort.

NOTES

Haynes, Robert Holmes, Michael Johnson, Adele Laslie, Robert Nomk, Ralph Page, Hugh Petrie, Susan Purcell, Martin Schiralli, Kenneth Strike, Ronald Szoke, and Donald Tunnell.

1   In my 'Logic in Teaching' (1969) I have considered the problems involved in trying to settle disputes about definition (though in a teaching context). I think that the approach of the current paper constitutes a further development of the programmatic definition theory offered there, which had its roots in Scheffler's 'The Language of Education' (1960, pp. 22–7) and Stevenson's 'Ethics and Language' (1944, pp. 206–26).

2   Incidentally this case shows the incorrectness of the Komisar's and Coombs's (1964) view that in educational opportunity contexts 'equality' means fitting. The Earl of Hertford might consistently judge there to be a fitting inequality between Tom and Edward. C.J.B. Macmillan (1964–5) has discussed this problem.

3   The Biological Science Curriculum Study (BSCS) has captured the personal-environmental distinction in the title of a curriculum it has developed: Me and My Environment. Ralph Page has called my attention to the fact that this distinction is employed by, among others, Joel Feinberg (1973) and David A.J. Richards (1973). As I did in early drafts of the present paper, they use the language, 'internalexternal' instead of 'personal-environmental.' I abandoned the 'internal-external' language only because so many people found it confusing; I think that either pair of terms is acceptable.

   Richards employs the distinction in the opportunity context as I have, claiming that 'it is not normally proper to speak of the internal capacities of A that enable him to do x as being opportunities to do x' (p. 41).

4   Slightly refined since then: to say that a caused b is to say that 1, given the other conditions, a was sufficient for b, and 2, that a was responsible for b; this second condition implies that the best place (or if b was overdetermined one of the best places) to have interfered with the production of b, if one had wanted to and been able to, was in the functioning of a (that is, either with a or the chain between a and b). This is not a reductive analysis, but I feel it is enlightening.

5   Unless the non-doing of z was overdetermined. In this paper I shall consider only results that are not overdetermined. Adjustments could be made to allow for overdetermined results, but for the sake of simplicity of presentation of a matter that is complicated anyway, I shall not make these adjustments here.

6   The recommendation implied in a responsibility ascription, as indicated in note 5, is a qualified one. It might simply indicate the least offensive focus of change, and it does not guarantee that we have the technology or resources available.

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part V
Technology and work

10
Technology and educational values

H.S.Broudy

It is almost a cliché that modern technology is a plethora of mechanical gadgets that serve as mindless, value-free instruments for whatever ends their owners prescribe. Yet when so regarded, the relation of technology to value is highly and perhaps mischievously oversimplified.

For one thing, one can speak meaningfully of better and worse technology, apart from its instrumentality. Ingenuity, sophistication, and even a certain aesthetic elegance can be attributed to technology. Furthermore, the degree to which a technology is science-based, genuinely a logos of technique, also serves an intrinsic criterion, e.g. witch doctors use a less rationalized technology than does modern medicine.

In the second place, technology is more than a means to value attainment. Obviously, it can enlarge whatever values are incidental to the production of goods and services. What is not so obvious but nonetheless the case is that technology can affect the domains of intellectual, aesthetic, and moral values as well. New technology—in microscopy, holography, carbon dating, to name a very few—has certainly enlarged the compass of scholarship. New technologies of photography, plastics, lighting, and construction have expanded aesthetic possibility. Least obvious is the change in the moral domain that technology has or could bring about.

Insofar as technology increases control over experience it transforms the human condition morally, for with increase of control arises the possibility of moral obligation to exercise or to refrain from exercising that control. Moses or Socrates could deplore disease and poverty, but morally about all they could do was to behave so as not to deserve either. Technology has deprived us of the luxury of moral indifference to these evils. Even the common man can, and therefore perhaps should, do something about them.

The relation of technology to educational values is likewise complex and often ambiguous. Question of fact are intermingled with problems of value; of efficiency with those of propriety; of principle with issues of practicability. Sorting out the various components of these relationships does not of itself solve the problems of relating the school to them. Nevertheless, educators cannot evade the pressure to technologize instruction nor postpone taking a stance toward it, and for them clarification of the issues could be useful.

The relation of technology to education is not exhausted by these issues. There is also the impact on education of the effects of technology on the ethos of a society and on the consciousness of its members. This latter factor raises questions that are only indirectly related to the methodology of teaching or theories about the teaching-learning transaction. What, for example, is the individual to study if he is to live in a society in which making up one's own mind, earning one's own living, developing one's own personality are made almost impossible by the complex net of interdependence? What would one have to know

in order to exercise democratic citizenship in such a society? What does moral integrity mean in a society in which it is virtually impossible to fix the responsibility for anything on an individual agent? Technology, insofar as it imposes large-scale mass production methods on every walk of life, depersonalizes and demoralizes them. Is there any sense in which it also repersonalizes and remoralizes life? What is the face of the human condition in a modern technological culture? By what images is it perceived and by what categories is it to be interpreted?

The discussion of technology and educational values, therefore, can be directed toward the challenges to schools and schooling and/or toward the broader impact of a technological way of life on the tasks of education. To a considerable extent they are separable issues, but one is reluctant to leave out either for two reasons: first, the methodological issue is immediate and pressing, and no less so is the passionate resentment of many articulate citizens against the effects of technology on the quality of life. Second, the two areas of concern with technology are linked by a metaphysical—or at least a philosophical— question: Is man no more than a machine? Is he, for that matter, a machine at all? This paper, however, will be devoted to the impact of a technological society on the humanistic consciousness and an education consonant with it.

THE CHALLENGE OF TECHNOLOGY TO HUMANISM

Much could be said about the accomplishments, prospects, and danger of technology. Research, one hopes, will give definitive answers to some of the questions about effectiveness. Economic developments, the stance of teacher organizations, changes in the tax structure, shifts in patterns of occupational mobility, and the increase of dual-salary households are other factors that will determine the role of technology in instruction and the organization of the school system. (1)

Important as these questions are, even definitive answers to them do not settle the more fundamental questions that a highly developed technological society poses to its institutions and individual citizens. Can men live in a technological society without becoming mechanized, manipulated by mechanisms, thingified, and robotized? Can the aspirational, aesthetic, and moral dimensions of experience survive under the demands for efficient and profitable mass production? Can the belief that these aspects of life are real be maintained? Is education in nurturing these aspects of experience as if they were real perpetuating a myth?

Or to put the questions differently: Do the techniques of mass production make it necessary to redefine virtue, freedom, individuality, personhood, responsibility, duty, and the other categories thought to be relevant to moral experience? Or are the meanings these notions acquired in a pretechnological society still valid? What, for example, is moral responsibility to mean if interdependence makes it almost impossible to assign responsibility for anything to anybody? What is freedom to mean, if, as B.F.Skinner argues, we ought to get 'Beyond Freedom and Dignity'?

There is a rich literature, including that of the counter-culturists of recent times, that seems to argue that technology must be limited, controlled, and perhaps even abandoned if the human or humanistic consciousness is to survive. (2)

Much of this literature stresses the need to preserve the natural environment against the depredations of industrial pollution associated with technology. Some of it centers upon

the problem of remaining sane in what seems to be an insane world; some, like R.D.Laing, argue that sanity is itself a conventional attitude fostered by those in power that defines socially sanctioned behavior. (3)

I shall not recount this literature, nor will I try to show that for every cloud technology emits, it also fashions a silver lining. The crucial point for the relation of technology to the human enterprise is whether it permits us to take the moral point of view at all, and if it does, whether it entails a wholly new morality or new view of human nature or the same morality and the same human nature expressed in new behavioral forms.

To a participant in a modern technologically mature society/culture, two of its salient effects on consciousness are anonymity and impotence. The first is so familiar that only a few examples need be cited. Products one buys are not traceable to any particular workman. The processes are too intricate and complex, for one thing, and the workers are interchangeable, for another. Some items are identified by brand names, but it is no easier to trace a particular General Motors automobile to a particular worker than it is to trace an unmarked box of soap powder. As a consumer and citizen, one receives anonymous products from the factory, the press, the legislatures, and inscrutable economic forces. Workers see their contributions disappear in collective products and processes. (4) Intricacy and interchangeability—the outstanding characteristics of mass production— yield deperso-nalization as their sum. To treat these and kindred phenomena in personal terms is regarded as immature—an exercise in outmoded animism,

With anonymity comes a sense of impotence. Whatever the enterprise, individuals feel powerless to affect or evade the result. The collective is too massive for the individual to attack, and individuals on whom an attack might be effective cannot be identified. Impotence yields a fear of dependence on others; one feels that nobody can or will help anybody. The response to this may be despair, resignation, or a defiant determination 'to care' anyhow— witness the ideology of love in the communes of the late 1960s and early 1970s. One cannot laugh at such defiance, but what attitude toward it is proper is hard to say.

The frustrations imposed by dependence lead to attempts to achieve self-sufficiency by a reduction of need. But reduction of need can also be a reduction of life. Security is purchased at the cost of richness. When selfsufficiency, and fullness of life are sought by erecting wealth and status as defenses against the vagaries of fortune and the indifference of men, one discovers that the potentialities of misfortune and misadventure are beyond calculation. A technological society expands the volume of contingencies exponentially, and thus randomizes the incidence of both good and evil.

The fear of dependence plus the randomizing of evil (and good) induces a hostile, suspicious wariness of life. It becomes imperative to protect oneself against want, sickness, fire, flood, wind, earthquake; against vandals, thieves, muggers; against crooks, swindlers, manipulators—and the very bureaucracy established to defend us. More and more insurance policies are bought to protect oneself from the consequences of evil as its incidence becomes more and more unpredictable.

Impotence plus depersonalization leads to demoralization or the renunciation of responsibility as relevant to life, since only efficacious agents (persons) are morally responsible. This melancholy conclusion is traumatic to those who are steeped in the ideology of the workindividual agency-responsibility ethic and who persist in interpreting their world in these terms. For succeeding generations, we are warned toy George Orwell

and others, the trauma will be replaced by a robotized, collectivized, rationalized, and hedonized harmony with the world of technology.

Is this the inevitable consequence of technology for human consciousness? I shall argue that it is not, first by trying to show that consciousness oscillates around certain modes or within parameters that remain constant: the characteristic virtues, the dramatic tensions of personality, and the integrity of the self. In the second place, it will be argued that these characteristics of the humanistic consciousness can be achieved, albeit only under certain conditions, in a technological society.

RESPONSIBILITY AND CAUSAL EFFICACY

The search for responsible agents in a technological society is frustrated by disclaimers of responsibility on the grounds that the cause of the action lies outside of the agent. Colloquially, this is known as passing the buck, which more often than not ends by blaming the system as a whole, thus exculpating any agent within it. If, on the other hand, we refuse to accept the disclaimers and insist that a given event was caused by a particular agent who is to be held responsible for it, then it is important that the parties agree on the boundaries of the causal sequence to be judged. Thus during the student riots in the late 1960s, the answer to the question Who started it? depended on where the starting point was to be fixed. The 'event' could have begun when the first stone was heaved through a window in the administration building or at the moment the police arrived or when bombs fell on Vietnam.

The difference in temporal segments chosen for judgment is especially prominent in controversies about the responsibility for wars, economic depressions, ecological disasters. Each party insists that, if only the segment were broadened or narrowed, the responsibility would fall elsewhere, i.e. the cause would be located outside of himself or his agency, his nation. (5)

Another aspect of the problem is illustrated by the attempt to allot responsibility to various social institutions or professions for certain functions. For example, if an engineer or the engineering profession argues that engineers are responsible only for that segment of the action that has to do with finding a suitable technology to achieve an end assigned to it, then it can refuse to take responsibility for any social damage the technology may entrain. Lawyers, physicians, architects, and all manner of businessmen and bureaucrats can and do insist that theirs is a specialized activity with responsibility limited to approved procedure, legal rules, etc. On these grounds the responsibility for the total act cannot be fixed; the individual segmental responsibilities never quite add up to it. The only recourse is to allot total responsibility to government, a responsibility that is accepted more in form than in substance.

Thus when ecological concerns were pressed upon engineers, they disclaimed responsibility for them, as did industry, contending that only the government or the people could make policy decisions that would take in all facets of the common welfare. For its part, the government, claiming the right to legislate for the common good, assumed the responsibility formally. Substantively, legislators pleaded that their decisions were determined by their particular constituencies, and these spoke with many voices. They could only weigh the relative strengths of their constituencies and arrive at some kind of tolerable compromise between the automobile culture and pollution; between energy needs

and the preservation of the environment, the need to stop inflation and the need to maintain a high level of employment.

So in the last analysis it would seem as if responsibility ultimately has to be placed on the voters who make up the majority on a given issue. But in what sense can the conglomerate of judgments of thousands of voters be regarded as a moral agent? Some of them are only partially informed of the issues; some are motivated by interests other than those of the common good, and some are voting the party line without thinking about the issues at all. This hardly conforms to the image of the individual agent taking the moral point of view and making a commitment after moral reflection.

Yet the pressures of events and of new political constituencies (environmental, consumer, minority) are stretching the boundaries of responsibility that social institutions and the professions have drawn for themselves. Engineers are expected to calculate the environmental impact of projects, and lawyers will be forced to take into account the social justice of legal rules when minorities are strong enough to challenge them. But inasmuch as a technological society lives by the division of highly specialized labor, the expansion of responsibility will be slow. The pace will be slowed even further by the fact that it takes a new generation of practitioners within a guild (lawyers, doctors, etc.) to acquiesce in such expansion. This is understandable because the more fuzzy the outlines of the guild function become, the more difficult it is to define the rules of entry into and exclusion from the guild, and the control of these rules is important to the guild. (6)

The slowness with which agreement on the limits of social and moral responsibility is achieved in a technological society points to a hard alternative, viz. that each individual citizen must be ready to act in a double role: as a specialist vocationally, and a generalist civically. This means shifting judgments between small segments of the causal stream of events and larger segments (and perhaps very large ones, e.g. the future of the nation or the human race). Broadly speaking, the school does try to prepare the individual for this dual role through general and vocational education, although elementary and secondary schooling are largely generalist in emphasis. Post-secondary schooling, on the contrary, is under ever-increasing pressure to become explicitly vocational, even in colleges of liberal arts and sciences. The centrality of occupation in a technological society makes the generalist role seem secondary, postponable, and even irrelevant.

About the only help technology can give to the generalist as a citizen is the computer. The computer makes it possible to analyze complex social problems by sorting out and calculating the effects of many variables combined in various patterns. For example, one can formulate alternative strategies for war on the basis of the ways in which the enemy might react to a variety of circumstances. Or one might use it to estimate the effects of different policies for meeting the energy crisis or spending large sums of money on the relief of the poor. So, in a way, technology provides one of the means to cope with the very complexity it causes or, more accurately, to understand more clearly the alternatives among which we are called upon to choose. In this sense it enables the individual to choose more responsibly.

A somewhat different approach to defining the locus of moral responsibility abandons the attempt to apportion praise or blame by identifying who did what, to whom, when. It contends that, regardless of the segment of the causal flow used to define the boundaries of the action to be judged, it will contain events not caused or intended by the agent and

perhaps by any agent. These elements contribute to every moral situation undetermined amounts of undeserved good and evil to be accepted with humility, a moral virtue that modulates and moderates our moral judgments. (7) While humility can be and often is construed in religious terms, it need not be. Justice, the virtue that seems to be outraged by undeserved good and evil, can be appeased by the probability that each of us produces about as much undeserved good and evil as he receives.

If the quest for causes of the present situation is tempered with humility, the significant moral situation begins with the now. The question What is my duty now? thus becomes partly disengaged from the question Who was the cause of the present situation? but not from the consideration of the consequences my decision may have, although humility should also govern how far into the future our responsibility will extend.

Thus the student gunman should have refrained from shooting the policeman even though, strictly speaking, he was not responsible for the events that led up to the shooting, for he is causing a death, which is wrong legally and which may be the morally wrong thing to have done even though the action was provoked by others. Similarly, the engineer can be expected to act in a morally justifiable way about a possible ecological disaster, even though he did not cause the events leading up to it and his professional guild has absolved him from their consequences. Regardless of our responsibility for the past, responsibility for the future and consonance with moral principles are always relevant issues. (8)

PARAMETERS OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS

The flow of human thought and feeling can follow many paths; its flexibility is almost limitless. Nevertheless, human consciousness generates some constraints on itself, and these constraints correspond in one way or another to the demands of selfhood or personhood.

It is interesting to note how one kind of thinking will be stopped by another. The kind of thinking I have in mind consists of imagining or expecting a certain trend or process to continue indefinitely. For example, the search for causes can go on indefinitely and can only be halted by saying there must be a beginning to the series of causes, i.e. a First Cause, or it can be halted by fatigue. Or one can think of dividing a line into parts and these parts into parts, ad infinitum. The same sort of iteration is exhibited when one thinks of interdependence leading to more interdependence, and this in turn to even more. Or we imagine that depersonalization will produce further depersonalization until presumably there are no persons left, or one tires of trying to imagine smaller and smaller bits of personality.

However, the human mind can interrupt this iterative process so that it produces not more of the same but a trend in the opposite direction. At some point in the growth of interdependence the demand for independence is created or augmented; after depersonalization has been carried to a certain point, the restoration of personhood becomes imperative. (9)

Virtues as limits

At what points does consciousness begin to resist trends in given directions and set countervailing trends in motion? One such set of limits or parameters are the virtues, especially the moral virtues. Courage, temperance, wisdom, justice, honesty, truthfulness,

generosity, loyalty—there is no fixed list—in any culture denote dispositions to act so that the action meets certain formal requirements. Courage, for example, to qualify as such must be a fairly reliable willingness to face danger when it is judged reasonable to do so. Aristotle thought that a proper estimate as to what ought to be feared enters into the courageous act, and that for a given person at a given time the act will be a mean between cowardice and rashness. Temperance is the disposition to modulate the passions, but especially the appetites by rational considerations—a mean between unbridled indulgence and indiscriminate self-denial. These and other moral virtues define zones of humanness. Action or ideas that fall outside the zones set up resistances to counteract them.

It is not being argued here that these dispositions are deposited in the genes. Nor is it necessary to suppose that Aristotle or anyone else discovered and named the one set of virtues once and for all. I would want to claim only that being human carries with it dispositions to act in accordance with the moral point of view (the moral virtues), and that these dispositions seem to transcend differences in cultures. It may be that these virtues serve as definitional limits of what is human, and indirectly as survival values, so that in time they become species characteristics. For example, if we ever encounter Martians, the crucial test of their humanness may not be intelligence or even physiological sensitivity, but rather an awareness of norms of conduct and an obligation to conform to them. If they acknowledge norms, albeit transgressing them from time to time, we shall call these Martians human. If they have renounced their obligation to these norms we would call them inhuman; if they had neither norms nor a sense of obligation, we would call them nonhuman.

Such a definitional gyroscope might serve the same stabilizing function as heredity, for presumably the definition would be used to impose sanctions against inhuman and the nonhuman behavior. If this conjecture is at all plausible, then despite the impacts of a technological society, human consciousness will demand that the virtuous life be possible and will strive to find ways to express it. If, for example, a society decreases the opportunity for the exercise of courage, men will find or imagine forms of behavior that will conform to the requirements of that virtue, and similarly for behavior that conforms to the formal demands of temperance, wisdom, justice, truthfulness, honesty, loyalty, etc. (10)

The technological society, for example, does not provide many opportunities for expressing courage in the forms familiar to the Spartan warrior or the Christian martyr. But we do have wars and even the possibility of a final war. How is courage to be expressed in modern wars? Was the evasion of the draft during the Vietnamese War cowardice or virtue? And what is the proper mean between cowardice and rashness with respect to the countless terrors of crime, violence, accident, and divers natural catastrophes? I suggest that the question is not whether courage is good, but rather whether a given act is really courageous. To ascertain a reasoned answer is the task of moral reflection.

The dramatic imperative

A second set of limits on the tolerance of human consciousness are the requirements of dramatic tension. To be endurable, life must be interesting; suspense, surprise, anticipation are necessary for interest. When human events exhibit conflict, climax, and resolution, we call them dramatic; lack of these results in boredom, a sense of drift, and a loss of tension. When life is not sufficiently dramatic, the temptation is strong to make it more so

by dressing up the facts. A story is made interesting by enhancing the danger, drawing out the suspense, sharpening the denouement. The enemy of the interesting and the dramatic is the routine, the uniform, the easily predictable. Soren Kierkegaard remarked that nothing is more lacking in aesthetic potentiality than eternal blessedness. Equally lacking in drama are the uniformity, routine, and predictability characteristic of technology. Indeed, a technological system is made interesting by its imperfections; by the fortuitousness of errors—human errors—and the concatenation of unforeseen circumstances.

For example, air travel is still an interesting venture because nobody has as yet been able to foresee all that can befall a journey on these technological marvels. Every air traveler has his own store of marvelous stories of how the unexpected happened, and many such a traveler, despite hundreds of trips, can hardly believe that his flight is somewhere on time, that it has made connections with another flight, and that he is landing without the captain clearing his throat and announcing that weather, mechanical trouble, traffic, a strike, or some other event that had no business happening had in fact happened. But the fortuitousness of the errors in a technological system provides better material for farce than for genuine drama. The latter requires that human striving that makes sense be blocked by other strivings that make sense, and that the conflict be resolved in a way that also makes sense, although it may not always make the kind of sense one would like. This structure makes life significant.

A moral life is the natural scenario for the drama that makes life interesting and compelling. The hero and the villain (moral agents) locked in conflict, the uncertainty of the outcome, despite the inevitability of the hero's triumph (real or symbolic), are the standard materials of drama. If, however, a technological society makes the very notions of the responsible moral agent and the conflict between good and evil or between inclination and duty or between conflicting duties nonsensical, whence is the dramatic tension of life to come?

Of conflict there is plenty. War, battles between corporations, struggles between political parties and between generations have not been eliminated by technology. The mass media do their best to present endless opportun-ities to take part vicariously in the drama or the melodrama of life. Yet sooner or later each individual must have some dramatic tension in his own life. The dedramatization of life can go only so far before a reaction sets in.

So powerful is the need for dramatic validity that the assassination of an important figure such as the late President Kennedy continues to spawn conspiracy theories despite the weight of empirical evidence to the contrary. Dramatically the facts in the Kennedy slaying were simply all 'wrong'; it would make no sense on the stage to have such an event attributed to fortuitous or trivial causes. Hence the effort to find a plot that would give the event dramatic sense.

The search for dramatic tension takes a multitude of forms. Some fortunately find it in their daily lives. For those who do not, climbing mountains, self-imposed tests of survival in the wilderness, risk-taking, all create suspense and tension. Other forms are developed in fantasy: the heroic exploits of Thurber's Walter Mitty, identification with characters in the movies or in fiction, and the like. The human imagination's fecundity in producing dramatic potentialities is prodigious. Needless to say, not all of these ploys are equally successful. Sometimes the drama ends in farce with fruitless rounds of frustration taking the place of conflict. The amount of illusion, sublimation, and fantasy the health of the individual

can stand is not unlimited. The virtues are the correctives to responses to the dramatic imperative because they are dispositions to use reason and therewith the reality principle. The virtues, however, are dispositions of a self and, one might add, of the healthy self.

The imperative of selfhood

There is also a limit to the amount of fragmentation, anonymity, and impotence the human consciousness can live with, although it can take a great deal. There is no need to recite the innumerable ways that the self is asserted when it is threatened. Psychiatry is kept busy straightening out the circuitous ploys for self-assertion that men invent. Sooner or later the self has to be a genuine center of meaning and be strong enough to sustain its integrity in the face of the impotence and anonymity that threaten individuality in a technological society,

What are the criteria of selfhood? At the risk of repeating some of the points already noted and some to be discussed below, we can think of three: self-determination, self-realization, and self-integration. Self-determination clearly entails some degree of genuine freedom to initiate action and sufficient power to implement some of these choices. The problematic component of freedom is power, since the desire to be free from restraint and the desire to fulfill one's wishes can be taken for granted. In a technological society the individual's power is a minuscule fraction of the total; how then does one achieve enough power to make the claim to freedom plausible?

By self-realization is meant the process of developing one's potentialities for value realization. This is abstract, to be sure, but the failure to realize potentiality is familiar enough. The person with high scholastic potentiality who cannot go to the university; the person who could do neurosurgery who spends his life sweeping hospital corridors; the list is endless. The importance of self-realization is expressed in the belief that the self is defined by its potentialities; that the true self is what one could be as much, if not more, than what one happens to be. For selfhood, accordingly, some evidence that these potentialities are being actualized is indispensable. This is the sense, perhaps, in which the existentialists have defined the self as 'my project.'

Finally, to be a self is to be a center of meaning. This centrality calls for a unification of diverse forces, impulses, and activities. Self-determination and selfrealization can result in action so fragmented, so centrifugal that one effort cancels another. The actions of such a self can become so unpredictable that it is called a self only by courtesy.

HUMANISTIC POTENTTALITTES OF TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY

Where in a technological society can the individual—the run of the mill individual—find the power, the freedom, the individuality to render him a morally responsible, socially significant, and aesthetically interesting individual or self?

Impotence, I would conclude, is not a necessary or inevitable consequence of a technological society, provided one realizes that to be effective in many areas of life one must collectivize the efforts of many to move the system.

The knowledge of the workings of a technological system in its industrial, commercial, and political phases constitutes one of the high priorities of schooling. Any curriculum that does not provide for such knowledge and the rudiments of the skills of participating

in collectivized power takes the palm for irrelevance. That all people should have this knowledge, skill, or the disposition to use them seems to me to be obvious.

The problems of anonymity, facelessness, flatness, can all be considered as problems of demoralization and depersonalization. Can one remoralize and repersonalize experience in the face of the pressures to the contrary? Reference has already been made to the fact that for many generations, even the moral heroes of those generations, poverty, slavery, disease had no moral import because the ability to make significant choices with respect to them were absent.

Technology changes that, but what can an individual do about cancer, about war, about poverty and other social evils? Again, one answer is collectivization of effort. Research costs lots of money; only large numbers of contributors make a significant difference in the research effort, and so large numbers must be organized, and each individual has a choice as to whether to join or not. And if this is not a grand moral drama watched by a great crowd, it is perhaps not unheroic for all that. The decision to contribute a few dollars to a cause, if made intelligently and with moral reflection, has the same moral quality as a president making a choice that affects millions. Indeed, the very absence of public plaudits may purify the moral quality of the private decision. Humility suffered anonymously differs from humility celebrated by a mass media magazine.

As to individuality, selfhood, and dramatic tension, these too are possible, but perhaps not in their conventional or traditional forms. If by individuality is meant fame or a marked deviation from the average, then indeed individuality is out of the reach of most people. For most persons, the job is hardly conducive to individuality in the light of what has been said about anonymity, impotence, etc., and yet to be a distinctive individual requires no more than to develop one's powers into a pattern that is authentically chosen by the self. And in a complex technological society the potential patterns are virtually limitless in number and variety.

The potentialities of the mature technological society for a high material standard of living release for even the assembly-line worker time and resources for nonvocational pursuits. They also proliferate the opportunities for experience and cultivation in every field of value: the aesthetic, social, intellectual, recreational, civic, moral, and religious. Can a life of self-cultivation pursued without fanfare have the dramatic tension needed for the good life—the life interesting to live and perhaps to behold? Here a metaphor may have to do for an answer. A work of art is interesting by virtue of its form, i.e. by the way it gives a unified feeling or flavor to a complex of elements. It too sets up conflicts and resolutions that capture the aesthetic interest. There is a sense in which the individual by taking advantage of the potentialities of a technological society can to a considerable extent fashion an interesting instantiation of the characteristics of a work of art.

But the individual needs two ingredients to activate the actualization of these opportunities. One is the educational resources for self-cultivation and the other is the will to undertake such cultivation.

As to education, despite great inequalities, there is far more opportunity than most young or older persons seize. The extraordinary importance attached to motivation at every level of schooling in this country—yes, even at the collegiate level—indicates how far even the existing opportunities for learning are being evaded. And the learnings that are being rejected are precisely the intellectual disciplines that traditionally have been used for the cultivation of the individual.

It is argued by educationists that these disciplines are abstract, artificial, academic, and remote from the natural concerns of the young, and the young agree. They are right, of course, but they miss the essential point, viz. that cultivation of the human potentialities of men has to be an intervention by disciplined thought and feeling into the flow of untutored thought and feeling. Commonsense science, commonsense morality, commonsense art need no explicit, deliberate cultivation; if one lives in a culture, he is encultured by its informal educative inducements. And it should be obvious that a technological society does provide an extraordinarily rich ambience for informal education through the opportunities it provides in travel, the mass media, museums, the films, recordings.

But if individuality is the goal, then clearly massproduced ideas, like mass-produced clothes, are not the means for achieving it. Distinctive individuality requires the cultivation of a peculiar combination of talent by the best that has been thought and said and wrought—by disciplined science, humanities, and the arts. (11) A life so cultivated will be individualized and distinctive, but it will also be highly personalized, moralized, and above all interesting to live and to behold. The sensitive individual in a technological culture is subjected to the highest tension once he becomes aware of the possibilities of self-cultivation and enters into the dialectic of cultivation in such a culture.

The dialectic is set up by the fact that selfcultivation is not mandatory for any individual and failure to undertake it is not attended by drastic sanctions. On the contrary, if the Devil is still about today, he is painting a vivid and persuasive picture of the ease with which one can enjoy a pleasurable life without self-cultivation. This is the great boon of technology—that it builds rationality into a system of mass-production, but it does not require a high order of rationality to consume it. The good automobile technologically is precisely the one that the operator needs to know very little about—it is driver proof. So it is also with mass-produced ideas and opinions—they are manufactured by persons with great talent, but they minimize the talent and knowledge needed to use them—they are thinker proof.

And so to be or not to be cultivated is itself a decision of the deepest and gravest consequence; having this choice remoralizes life and to that extent dramatizes it. Technology is not simply and finally destructive of the humanistic values; but one cannot be a Pollyanna about outwitting the facelessness, the anonymity, the depersonalization that are inherent in it. About the best that can be promised is that freedom, individuality, and a truly human life can be wrested from it.

NOTES

1   The literature on this aspect of the topic is extensive. For example, see 'Planning for Effective Utilization of Technology in Education', ed. L.Morphet and D.Jesser (New York: Citation, 1968) as well as many articles in 'Educational Technology.'
2   To mention a few: Kurt Baier and Nicholas Rescher (eds), 'Values and the Future: The Impact of Technological Change on American Values' (New York: Free Press, 1969); Jacques Ellul, 'The Technological Society' (New York: Knopf, 1967); Lewis Mumford, 'Technics and Civilization' (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1963); Theodore Roszak, 'Where The Waste Land Ends' Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1969).
3   R.D.Laing, 'The Politics of Experience' (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967).
4   Industry, notably in Sweden, is trying to mitigate these effects. Kockum's shipyard in Malmo is offering 'work enrichment' by putting some variety and responsibility

into tedious production jobs. The Volvo plant at Kalmar has replaced the conventional assembly line by groups of workers who assemble a whole auto rather than repeat a single operation as an auto moves along the production line. See Bowen Northrup, 'The Wall Street Journal,' October 25, 1974.

5   Obviously, if a number of simultaneous causal chains are involved, and if some items or their effects interact, the search for responsible agents becomes even more difficult, because we are now involved with coincidences and unintended effects.

6   An excellent discussion of this topic is found in Abraham Edel, Knowledge and Responsibility, a paper presented at the Conference on The Uses of Knowledge, Urbana, Illinois, 1974.

7   Cf. Peter A.Bertocci and Richard M.Millard, 'Personality and the Good' (New York: David McKay, 1963).

8   Judging each act separately can serve to trivialize responsibility to the point of farce. For example, a traveler who has been bumped from a flight on which he had confirmed reservations rages at the ticket counter that his mother will die before he can reach her bedside or that he will lose an important contract. Whereupon he is arrested for disorderly conduct.

9   This tendency to reverse itself has been called dialectical thinking or thinking by opposites, and it is featured in Hegel's dialectic and its economic derivative in Karl Marx. For Hegel, thought necessarily moves from thesis to antithesis, from self to other; for Marx, economic activity necessarily creates conflict between the classes, so that each form of production (slavery, capitalism, etc.) in time produces its own enemy and the seed of its own destruction. Whether these theories are true I cannot say, but thought does change its focus and direction for many reasons. One is that an idea is not limited to a particular frame of meaning, and once imagination starts running with an idea such as blood, there is no telling where it will go. Life, war, death, fire all have aesthetic meanings for blood. Another is that the demands of selfhood impose limits to what thought it will tolerate, so that, for example, we allow ourselves to be manipulated so long as we don't know that we are being manipulated, and then resentment against being manipulated sets in.

10   One can imagine cultures that place differential premiums on the several virtues. Seafaring cultures, for example, place great value on courage. A tropical paradise places less emphasis on temperance and the duties of work. But if one could imagine a 'society' in which all the virtues were irrelevant, the inhabitants would, because they were human, create discrepancies between inclination and duty (as did Adam and Eve) or they would experience no such discrepancy and therefore be reckoned among animals or the angels.

11   The standard liberal studies are disciplines in this sense, but there may be other ways of inducting a generation into the best that has been thought, said, and wrought.

11
Career education and the pathologies of work

Thomas F.Green

I SOME USEFUL DISTINCTIONS

Pathology is the science of disease. It is concerned with the causes of disorders and their effects. The concept of pathology has no meaning except in relation to some understanding of healthfulness, wholesomeness, and normality. To speak of the pathologies of work is, therefore, to speak of the diseases, the disorders, or the unhealthy conditions to which work itself is subject. And that, in turn, presupposes that there is such a thing as the healthiness, wholesomeness, and normality of work.

The idea that there are pathologies of work is also a normative idea. It does not simply describe a state of affairs. Rather, it describes someone's idea of a good state of affairs. When we say that a certain condition of the liver is pathological, we imply that we know that that state is not normal, healthy, or wholesome. It is not good. And that implies that we have some idea of what is good, normal, healthy. Thus, anything described as a pathology of work will have, on its other side, someone's notion of what is healthy, normal, wholesome about work, or what is healthy, normal, and wholesome about the role of work in a given society.

We are unlikely to get much detailed agreement on what constitutes a good society, nor are we likely to get much agreement on what constitutes career education. It may seem impossible then to develop any persuasive view of the relation between career education and the pathologies of work, and still less possible to explore what curative effects we may reasonably expect from career education.

The prospect is not hopeless, however. We can take a different approach altogether. Whenever we speak of pathology, we must always be prepared to speak of the pathology of something or other. And we must always be able to answer what that something or other is. And so no matter what we may identify in detail as the pathologies of work, we must be prepared to explain whether we are referring to a pathology of jobs, of the employment system, of the separation in some society of work from the rest of life, and innumerable other things. It is worth noting that there may be some things that could be described as pathological that arise from the very nature of the human condition itself. That is to say, there may be some hopes, aspirations, expectations that men seek to attain through work which by their very nature will remain unsatisfied. In that case, it would make sense to suggest that some of the pathologies of work are in fact pathologies of man himself. If there are such pathologies, it is unlikely that career education, or for that matter any kind of education, will do much to change them. I do not suggest this possibility because I believe it is true, but only to point out that in order to examine the relation between career

education and the pathologies of work, and in order to speak realistically of what we may expect from career education, some elementary distinctions will be useful.

But what kinds of distinctions? There are important differences to be understood between (i) work and labor, and (ii) between work, job, vocations and careers. The mere making of these distinctions will help to separate an and arrange a great many issues that arise from career education and the pathologies of work.

Work and labor

The term 'work' is ambiguous in a way that the term 'labor' is not. By 'work' we may refer either to an activity itself or to the finished 'thing' that results from that activity. The word is either a verb or a noun. We refer either to 'work' or to 'a work.' Indeed, what is essential to the concept of work itself is the connection between these two elements—the activity, and the product or result of that activity. Indeed, if you try to imagine a world totally without work, what you will have to imagine is a world without one or the other or both of these two elements—the activity and some durable result of that activity. You would have to imagine either (a) a world in which there is an expenditure of energy but no resulting works, or (b) a world in which all the works of men are present, but without any expenditure of energy, i.e. without them being the works of men.

There is no need to elaborate extensively on these suppositions. But there are some important points in them that need to be made explicit. The second supposition is really the idea of an immensely benign form of nature. We are asked to imagine a world in which the paintings, houses, tools, and utensils that are the works of men are present, but not as a result of any human effort. They are simply there, just as the plains, mountains, and streams are there. Food is prepared and the table is set, but nobody prepares it or sets it. Indeed, nobody makes the table. Under these conditions it is doubtful that the very idea of civilization itself would remain unchanged, for the very idea of civilization requires not simply that there be artifacts, but that those artifacts be the consequence of human effort. The concept of work itself, like the concept of civilization, requires that there be effort and that there be some durable result that is the consequence and end of that effort.

If the second supposition is really the conception of a benign form of nature, then the first supposition is the conception of a particularly self-defeating form of nature; for in the first supposition we are asked to imagine a world in which there is the expenditure of human energy to produce some works, but the failure to do so. The house dissolves, perhaps, as fast as it is constructed. No work can endure long enough to be completed. That is a world in which man is impotent, a world in which his energy is expended in futility.

This idea that human energy might be spent without any result in some durable work is the idea that defines the concept of labor. Labor is that kind of activity that never ends because it cannot result in any durable work itself. There are lots of activities like that. The table is set only in order to be undone. The ancients accepted slavery not because they disliked work, but because they recognized that there are certain activities that answer to the fact that man is an animal rather than to the fact that he might be human. Those were the activities of labor. They were activities essentially slavish, in the sense that they were endless, futile, and yet necessary. They corresponded not to the fact that man is a social, political, religious, or artistic creature, but to the fact that he is a biological creature. Thus, to be freed to do works, one must be freed from labor.

There is no need to accept the distinction as I have drawn it, but there is every need to understand the difference that the distinction is intended to illuminate. It is the difference between human potency and human futility. We all recognize the pathos of the life spent in accomplishing some great work only to see it vanish in an hour of disaster. And that pathos is easily translated into moral offense when we see people who, through no fault of their own, are rendered impotent. Work, it can be said, is man's refusal to acknowledge that his life is futile, pointless, and without effect, that one's energies have been expended without avail…. That is a condition against which men have always shouted in defiance. It may almost be taken as the definition of man that he is, among all creatures, the one who demands most to escape from labor into work.

The first and most serious pathologies of work, therefore, are all those that stem from the tendency to transform work into labor. There are many of them. I shall discuss some in more detail later. But the principle can be seen in the following points. When it happens that things that were made to be used are now made only to be used up, then it also happens that, in some degree, energy that was expended to produce a work is now expended without that result. That is the transformation of work into labor. The object of the work is converted from a use object to a consumer object with all the transitoriness and tentativeness that that implies. The result phenomenologically can be the difference between work and labor. Or again, it sometimes happens in the excessive rationalization of work-tasks that the expenditure of energy in the task is so far removed from any resultant object that it can be understood only as an act of labor. We often overlook this fact because when we describe a work-task, we usually make the connection between the effort and its object. Instead of describing the task as 'Plugging this thing into this device and reading the dial,' we describe the task as 'testing circuit components.' Or instead of saying, 'I want you to push pieces of paper like this into this slot,' we say, 'I would like you to sort the mail to each of the different departments.' But clearly the principle involved in this kind of description of worktasks is our acknowledgment that in many contexts the tasks to be performed have no clear or visible relation to their purpose or aim in some stable or durable result. That is to say, the tasks resemble labor more than they do work. We find it necessary to give the activity some connection to its object in order to describe it as work. Without that connection many activities required in the job structure of the society would be recognized for what they are, namely absurd activities for anyone to perform when considered simply by themselves. Finally, we might observe that work gets transformed into labor when the specific tasks required in a particular work position do not require the exercise of any human capacities such as intelligence, judgment, or a sense of craft.

Work, job, vocation and career

There are two fundamentally contrasting ways to understand the idea of a career; and there is an enormous difference between them. But no matter which view you wish to take, these days, the idea that everyone, or even most people, should have a career, is likely to strike many people as an excessively grandiose, and unnecessarily serious and heroic, view of life. But in order to understand such a point of view, it is useful to have some appreciation as to how the ideas of jobs, careers, and vocations have developed historically.

A detailed exposition of the tortuous change of these ideas is unnecessary. Essentially, what happened was something like this. Originally—that is to say, before the Protestant

Reformation—the idea of vocation meant simply 'calling.' And there was essentially only one kind of calling, the religious calling of the clergy and especially the regular clergy. There was no question of one being 'called' to be a shoemaker, a tavern-keeper, or even to the lofty post of jurist. The ordinary jobs of the 'common life' or even the lofty positions of leadership could not be described as 'callings' or 'vocations.' They were simply jobs. They were the ways—and there were many ways—that people tried to make a living.

Luther, however, began to bring these ideas together, in a way that wrought a social revolution. We are still living with the consequences of that revolution. Our conceptions of career education are strongly shaped by it. What Luther did was to extend the idea of 'calling' or 'vocation' to include the ordinary jobs or roles that ordinary people filled in the fabric of society. Thus, it became possible to speak of the roles of tavern-keeper, maid, housewife, teacher, lawyer, and so forth, as vocations. That is to say, they became callings. The idea was still that the central vocation of every Christian was to be the 'bearer of love and of service to neighbor.' But the way in which one was to do that was through his particular job or position. One was not to discharge his vocation as a Christian by escaping from the world in monastic retreat, nor by long pilgrimages, but in the particular station where he found himself.

The Christian should 'carry out his "calling" within the "calling" wherein he was "called."' That is a fair rendering of what St Paul wrote, The word he used was klēsis, which is the Greek term for God's calling of men to fellowship with him and to love and service of neighbor. It had nothing to do with jobs or with the way people make their living. But I imagine that when Luther read St Paul and came to the second rendering of the word 'calling,' in this passage, he probably read the word that means religious calling, thought the Latin word 'status' and wrote the German word 'Stand.' Thus, he came to the idea that, 'The Christian should carry out his calling within the job (or position or role) within which he received his calling.' From the idea that one's job is the place where one carries out his calling, it is only a small step to the view that carrying out one's job is his calling. Thus, the idea of a job came to be transformed from merely a way of making a living and came to be infused with all the power of a religious duty. It came to have almost cosmic significance. In fact, it came to be the way that a person identifies who he is.

So jobs got transformed from the idea of a mere economic role into the context for the performance of some useful religious service to neighbor, and they came to bear the heavy psychological freight of having to be the expression of one's self-identity. The usual account of Luther's contribution to our ideas on work and vocation is to say that he transformed the status of an ordinary job by infusing it with the religious idea of vocation. That is correct. But the more important part of his thought was that, for the first time, Luther tended to identify the idea of a man's work with his job. He transformed the idea of making a living into a religious work.

This identification of work and job has been enormously powerful and beneficial in many societies. The association of jobs with the performance of a religious duty has done much to raise the standards of craftsmanship and to increase the social expectation that jobs performed will be performed well. But this association of work and job has also been the source of a great deal of intellectual and practical mischief. Indeed, it is from the association of these two ideas that the second great class of pathologies can be seen to flow.

I shall mention only three of them by way of illustration. It is often suggested that by extending the idea of 'vocation' to the 'callings of the common life,' work received a kind

of dignity that it had never had before, and that is an important asset in the development of modern industrial societies. But with that asset comes a liability. The fact is that it is never work itself that has dignity. It is always the worker. To confuse the two is what makes it possible for a society to insist that however demeaning a man's job may be, nonetheless, he should somehow manage to find great dignity in its performance. And that result leads immediately to a second kind of pathology.

The idea that there is dignity in work itself, together with the idea that a man should find his work in his job, leads inevitably to the notion that the worker should find his dignity in his job. It leads to the notion that somehow one's own self-identity is to be displayed, discovered, and made public to others in the performance of his job. This is the association of ideas and dispositions that leads us to identify who a person is with what kind of job he holds. For example, in the contemporary practices of education we ask a youngster, in effect, 'What do you intend to be when you grow up?' rather than 'How do you expect to make your living?' This educational approach is not only dysfunctional but positively cruel in a society where many jobs that need doing cannot possibly provide a sense of self-identity or a central life interest. There is abundant evidence that in the USA today many jobs—perhaps most jobs, including even some professional positions—do not provide people either with an adequate sense of self-identity or any satisfactory central life interest. The result is often described as a kind of 'alienation from work.' It would be more adequately described as alienation from jobs or from the institutions of employment. What is clearly happening is that people are finding it increasingly necessary to separate their job life from the rest of their lives. They are tending to find their work—if they have one—but certainly their life interests and their sense of self-identity in some arena of activity away from their place of employment or their jobs.

The psychological and moral 'fall-out' from this historic association of work and job has also lead to some distressing educational conceptions and practices. In a world where a man's job is the vehicle for self-identity and self-expression, it follows that jobs will have to receive some social and moral justification. That is to say, we shall have to find a way—to take an extreme example—of demonstrating that the real justification for the job of installing telephones is that it is an important way of 'connecting people.' It is not enough merely to say that it is a decent way to make a living. One has to say that it is a socially and morally needed activity. If the personal justification of the man is to be found in the justification of the job, then that job must be justifiable by its social and moral significance and not merely as a way of earning a living. It becomes unacceptable for a person to justify taking a certain job simply on the grounds that he is good at it and that it returns enough income to do other things away from the job. Instead, he has to find some rationalization for taking the job on the grounds that it is good in itself. Under these conditions, part of the educational task necessarily is to teach people how to give acceptable moral and social justifications for pursuing quite self-seeking ends.

What may well be needed in the modern world of work, and therefore in modern education, is the observance in thought and practice of a clear distinction between work and job. It is true that in the modern world increasing numbers of people are not able to find any kind of central life interest or life work in their jobs. But if we begin to recognize this fact, and to observe it in educational practice, we will also begin to see the difference between asking a child 'What do you expect to be your life work?' and 'How do you expect

to earn a living?' The first question is really the basic issue in education for work. The second is the fundamental question in education for entry into the employment system. They are not the same questions. They do not require the same educational strategies or the same educational programs. Their differences are reflected in the contrast between the questions 'What are you going to be?' and 'What are you going to do for income?'

This last point leads immediately to a third distinction, the contrast not between vocations and jobs or between work and jobs, but between careers and jobs. We must recognize that having a life work is a very different thing from having a particular job. There is an enormous difference between the man who sees his life in prospect as involved in the accomplishment of some work, and the man who sees his life in retrospect as a mere succession of jobs that he has held. Only the first, in the strict sense, has what can be called a career. The difference is between the man who sees his career defined by the jobs he has held, as opposed to the man who engages in a succession of jobs because they contribute to his career. having a career is a very different thing from having employment, even steady employment, or even steady employment over a lifetime. Indeed, there is no necessary reason why anyone should find his career in or through his mode of employment at all. Career education should never be confused with vocational education insofar as that kind of education is directed toward training for jobs or for employment. Careers, most certainly, will not develop without employment; but neither should education for careers ever be confused with education for employment. They are, therefore, two educational tasks that need to be distinguished—education for work or careers, and education for jobs or employment.

II CAREER EDUCATION AND THE PATHOLOGIES OF WORK

The pathologies identified so far are not, in fact, pathologies of work. Nor are they pathologies of career education. They are the pathologies that are likely to arise in a changing society in which the place or worklife is no longer clear, and the traditional ideologies used to explain the place of jobs and employment no longer command belief. These are the pathologies of the employment structure and of the institutions of employment in modern societies. If we ask to what extent the development of career education can reasonably be expected to change the conditions that lead to such pathological states, the answer must be that we cannot expect very much.

The reasons for this judgment can be enumerated simply. In the first place, education has never proved to be a very useful policy instrument for the transformation of basic social institutions. One reason is that its effects are too indirect and too long in appearing for it to be a very effective force in changing basic institutions over the short- and middle-range periods within which educational policy is likely to be framed and sustained. Second, that the structure of the employment system will influence the ways that work and jobs are presented in the process of education, is always more likely than that the educational system will influence the behavior of the employment system. Thus, if the significant pathologies of work have their roots in the employment system itself, we ought not to expect renewed focus on career education to make very significant differences in the basic employment.

There is a final precaution. Much of the current literature on career education appears to stress the need to combat widespread alienation from work. I suspect that this emphasis is fundamentally misplaced. As far as I know, there is little evidence of any basic alienation

from work in American society. On the other hand, as I tried to explain earlier in this paper there is strong evidence of growth in alienation from the institutions of work, or from the ways that jobs are structured and organized. There is alienation from the employment system. Furthermore, I have tried to explain why that alienation is often justified and why it is not likely to be reduced, let alone reversed, by anything that the educational system does in the way of career education.

My own judgment is that the movement of career education is an important one. It is potentially of enormous benefit both to American education and its capacity to equip people to lead wholesome and happy lives, if not actually useful lives. But unless those engaged in the enterprise learn to make some distinctions of the kinds that I have tried to outline, they will promise too much. But more importantly, unless they learn to do so, the literature on the subject as well as the practice, I fear, will continue to sound like a pleading to make the educational system a special department of the United States Chamber of Commerce. (See, for example, Hoyt, Evans, Mackin and Mangin, 'Career Education: What It Is and How To Do It', Olympus Publishing, 1972.) That is a movement which, besides being unlikely, is undesirable.

The point can be pressed. One of the developments in contemporary education is the expansion of what has been called 'mastery learning.' Mastery learning is based upon the assumption that anyone can learn what anybody else can learn, only it may take some a longer time to do it. Thus, what should become the variable in instruction is not the level of mastery attained by anyone, but the amount of time it takes to reach a satisfactory level of mastery. All programmed learning and all forms of individualization of instruction are based upon the principles of mastery learning. It is easy to see also that nearly all employment settings involve the same principles. But imagine what it would be like to work in a situation in which one has mastered the lesson to be learned and the lesson leads to no subsequent lesson. One is simply asked to learn the same thing over and over and over. The result would have to be a sustained, seething, feirce, anger. Yet, the fact is that an enormous number of blue-collar positions, and even positions within the service occupations, are of precisely that sort. They lead to no subsequent lesson. They are dead-end jobs. Under such circumstances, the alienation from work is really alienation from the job, and it is justified.

There are only two possible answers to such a problem. On the one hand, one might quit trying to overcome the alienation from such jobs, and quit trying to give them some moral and social justification, and begin trying to assemble the social resources to help people find creative ways (which usually means inefficient ways) of using their abilities away from the job. The other way is to attend to the hidden curriculum of the job structure itself in an effort to see that there are no jobs that have the character of a total mastery setting leading to no subsequent lesson. This would mean, of course, that the structure of employment institutions would then have to be examined in the light of their educational potential as a setting for human learning and development.

Neither of these attacks on the pathologies of work is likely to be carried out by the schools. The latter especially means that the greatest arena for career education is not in the schools but in the employment offices and executive planning offices of major employer institutions. There are some recent developments that point in the direction of both tactics at once. In Germany, and more recently in the USA, employers have been experimenting with

different versions of the work calendar. In Germany especially, one of the more interesting developments is the re-introduction of the time clock for all classes of employees, asking only that they complete a total of forty hours of work in a week in any sequence they wish between seven in the morning and seven at night provided that they are all present during the 'core hours' of ten in the morning to two in the afternoon. The experiment has been remarkably successful. The amount of sick leave has dropped, productivity and job satisfaction have increased. People can now arrange their time as they wish, and they have learned to do so. They can work early in the morning or late at night, which permits them to arrange the employment of their creative powers in other ways away from the job. Job alienation thus has decreased because it does not need to take the 'prime' hours of the day, and the sense of dignity is enhanced because it encourages the use of human capacities for judgment and decision. Some real pathologies of work are being confronted in this experiment.

Many observers have attributed the so-called Japanese 'economic miracle' to the intense (almost familial) corporate loyalty that the major employers have instilled. The result is that transfer between companies in the past was regarded as a signal sign of disloyalty and a definite bar to promotion. Moreover, the amount of overtime in Japanese concerns has been among the highest in the world. Both of these features are now changing dramatically. The number of transfers between companies is increasing so rapidly that it is no longer seen as a bar to promotion, but as an instrument of education. Thus, the hierarchical structure of the employment system is being severely tested. Second, it is increasingly the case that when Japanese workers are confronted with the choice of more overtime or more time away from the job to 'do their own thing,' they choose the latter. They now choose it so often, in fact, that some companies have had to place limits on the amount of overtime that any employee can accumulate.

These are evidences that in perhaps the two most 'workoriented' societies of the world many of the pathologies of work are being met in ways compatible with the set of distinctions outlined in the beginning of this paper. They constitute new approaches to defining the place of work in modem life, and in significant aspects they constitute a departure from the 'work ethic' that has produced those pathologies of work. In neither case, however, are these attempts to deal with the pathologies of work carried on in, by, or through the system of education. In each case, they implicitly acknowledge, however, the educational components that are discoverable within the ways that the employment system is structured. They constitute the most direct and effective attack on the pathologies of work that I know of.

No scheme for education in any society can be regarded as successful if it fails to prepare the young to take authentic and responsible roles within adult society. It might be argued then that preparation for work must receive central attention in any satisfactory arrangements for education in any society. Thus, in a society in which work is a predominant aspect of most adult roles, it follows that the process of education must pay serious attention to preparation for work. Indeed, it would seem a shaky conclusion to suggest that that essential educational task should not be carried out in some central way by the system of schools itself. But how should this be done to pay some serious attention to the pathologies of work?

The Yugoslavian experience suggests that the central issue is how to organize the schools themselves so that no matter what content they convey they do it through a process and a system of social organization that simulates the ways that work roles are organized. That should be an old idea to Americans whose schools have been modeled, timed, evaluated, and manned in the way that we man the industrial enterprise. But for career education in the new day, it means a vastly more flexible schedule of school operation, the teaching of management skills in reaching educational objectives, a stress of cooperative rather than competitive activities, the presentation of a greater variety of occupational roles for emulation, and a quicker and easier access to enter employment and return to the educational system. These it seems to me are the essential demands that career education places on the organization and conduct of schools. But I see very little of them being expressed either in the plans, policies, or programs of the movement.

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