

KEMAL H. KARPAT

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# **Studies on Turkish Politics and Society**

*Selected Articles and Essays*

BRILL

STUDIES ON TURKISH POLITICS AND SOCIETY

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*Selected Articles and Essays*

BY

KEMAL H. KARPAT



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## INTRODUCTION

This book consists of a series of research articles and some essays on Republican Turkey published in the past decades. The articles were written mostly as independent studies, as communications to be presented at various scholarly meetings or as chapters for edited volumes. Their common subject is the internal transformation that took place in Turkey from the beginning of the Republic in 1923 but especially after World War II. Some of the material in these articles is derived from extensive research for a book intended to cover the events after 1960, where *Turkey's Politics* (1959) ended its analysis.\*

My search for the historical roots of the early Republic began in reaction to the distorted view of the Ottoman past, Islam and social change that had been put out for half a century by the Turkish media, educational system and ruling elites. Resulting in a book,<sup>1</sup> a great number of articles,<sup>2</sup> and additional books (some edited) on Ottoman history,<sup>3</sup> my work established that, except for the political regime and inevitable socio-economic evolution, the Republic and its Ottoman predecessor formed much more of a continuum than did, for example, imperial Russia and the Soviet Union.<sup>4</sup> But all this research, however deeply satisfying and rewarding, left little time to put together the information on events in Turkey after 1960.

While engaged in research on Ottoman Islam and the Empire's

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\* I take a special pleasure in thanking Robert Zens for all his help in preparing this article and the book as a whole for publication. Without his able assistance the publication would have been long delayed. KHK.

<sup>1</sup> Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Ottoman State* (Oxford, 2001).

<sup>2</sup> Kemal H. Karpat, *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History* (Leiden, 2002), henceforth *Studies*. The book of about 850 pages includes thirty-one articles besides the introduction.

<sup>3</sup> Kemal H. Karpat, ed. *The Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey* (Leiden, 2000).

<sup>4</sup> It is this basic point that Donald Quataert failed to understand in criticizing *The Politicization of Islam* for "ruminations" about Ottoman history and for dealing with current events in Turkey. History—even Quataert's type of social-economic history—becomes relevant if linked to contemporary life and the cultural roots of the living society. For his review, see *American Historical Review* 107:4 (2002): 1327–8.

last decades, I continued to follow systematically events in Turkey, including the rise of the Justice and Development Party and its victory in the elections of 3 November 2002. At this early point, one may only venture to say that these elections represented a momentous reconciliation between Turkish modernism and Islam based on the interaction between faith and rationality—or *iman ve akıl*. In fact, many current developments in Turkey cannot be understood without relating them to their historical and cultural roots, and this is particularly true regarding Islam, which has evolved, sometimes in opposition, but mostly in tandem with social change and its underlying ideas.

A good number of the articles in this collection were prepared for the volume on events in Turkey after 1960, but, as noted above, historical migration, nationalism, and other forces in Ottoman history are intimately related to events in the Republic. Consequently earlier works about such forces provide the necessary context for these articles, which can be organized under five categories: (1) Identity, Republicanism, and Turkishness; (2) Migration and cultural-political homogenization; (3) Literature and the national-modernist acculturation; (4) International Alignments; (5) Politics, Democracy and Islam.

### *Identity, Republicanism and Turkishness*

In both the Ottoman state and the Republic the ruling regimes defined the Turks' ethnic, cultural and political identities according to their own political interests and the prevailing cultural assumptions. The Muslim segment of the population was identified with the state and the faith, which were the political and cultural facets of the same entity—the Muslim community. The *şariat*, or religious legal system, enforced by a state-appointed judicial body—the *kadı*, and the Ottoman political culture produced a fairly high degree of cultural and legal homogeneity among Muslims.

Islam, or the various faiths of the non-Muslims, defined the basic identity of all Ottoman subjects. Each subject viewed the state from the perspective of his/her status either as a Muslim living under Muslim authority or as a *zimmi* (*dhimmi*)—that is a non-Muslim member of *ahl al-kitab* (people of the Book)—governed by an Islamic ruler. As the dynasty-sultan provided the personal linkage between the sub-

ject and the state, the Slavs often referred to the sultan as “tsar” and İstanbul as Tsarigrad. For Muslims, ethnic identities were of secondary importance until the state devised Ottomanism and granted equal citizenship to subjects regardless of faith, ethnicity or language. This secular political identity then made everyone citizens of the state rather than subjects of the sultan.

Ottomanism, instead of bringing unity, divided the population into Muslims and non-Muslims. While the former identified with the state, the latter turned their newly reinforced religious identities into nationalities and identified with historical territories that predated the Ottomans. The modernist Muslim intelligentsia associated with the state, in turn, began to search for the ethnic roots of the founders of the Ottoman state and eventually concluded that they were Turks. That Turkish was the language of the state and a large section of population also helped make Turkishness into a political category. Although by the end of the nineteenth century a large proportion of the elites identified themselves as Turks, their “Turkishness” derived neither from a racial identity nor even from an old political sense of group identity. Rather, it was an amalgam of shared historical experience, faith and, especially, identification with the state devoid of any clear sense of territoriality. It could be assumed by any Ottoman Muslim (as in the Balkans, where the term Turk is still the equivalent of Muslim) as long as politically motivated ethnicity was not invoked.

The Young Turks (1908–18) remained officially committed to Ottomanism and Islamism in order to preserve the heterogeneous Ottoman state yet were inclined to consider themselves “Turks.” A series of associations, such as *Türk Yurdu* (Turkish homeland) and ideologues, such as Ziya Gökalp (d. 1924) and Yusuf Akçura (d. 1935), openly espoused the cause of an ethnic Turkishness, often defined by *soy* (lineage) and race, although culture and modernity remained the chief marks of political identity.

Ziya Gökalp, in particular, viewed the Turks as a well-established millenary nation with a specific national culture. For him, the Turks constituted the basis of the Ottoman-Muslim comity despite having been enslaved and used for imperial purposes by the “socially alien” Ottoman ruling class. The sharp line Gökalp drew between the Ottomans and the oppressed and exploited masses of Turks who had preserved their ethnic purity and unique national culture gave rise to populism, one of the six principles of Kemalism. In addition

to the dismay of Muslim conservatives, Gökâlp believed a secularized and Turkified Islam attuned to modern civilization to be part of the Turkish culture. The Young Turks' discussions, revolving around the history, cultural characteristics and future of the Turkish nation,<sup>5</sup> lacked the vital dimension of territory, or fatherland. Previous efforts to define a fatherland—e.g., Namık Kemal (d. 1888) as the Ottoman territory south of the Danube and by other as the *Turan*, or all the land inhabited by Turks—had been undercut by the changing and shrinking of Ottoman boundaries.

The composite issue of Turkishness, fatherland and nation was settled in a precise and categorical fashion by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) in the period from 1919 to 1923. The *Misak-ı Milli* (National Pact) issued during the Erzurum Conference of July–August 1919 defined the Turks' fatherland as today's Turkey (plus Mosul). Then, the 1919–1922 War of Liberation ended with the expulsion of the Greeks from Anatolia and the retreat of the British, French and Italians from Turkey, attesting to the concrete fact that the Turks had liberated their homeland. For these reasons, reinforced by the government's calculated discouragement of irredentism, most Turks do not regard the former Ottoman territories as "theirs." During the discussions on the establishment of the Republic in 1923, Mustafa Kemal declared that for the first time in history the Turks had decided to establish a state bearing their ethnic name, Turkey, although Arabs and Europeans already had referred to the Ottoman lands as *Turkiyya* and Turkey respectively.

The definition of the nation (*millet*) inhabiting the newly established fatherland was rather vague. The National Pact had not used race or ethnicity as a criterion of Turkishness but had adopted the prevailing definition that the nation was the community of all the Ottoman Muslims living in the territory of the new Turkey.

The abolition of the sultanate in 1922 and of the Caliphate in 1924 abruptly liquidated the two pillars of cultural identity and solidarity among the Ottoman Muslims who were the main body of Republican Turks. Secularization measures, such as closing the religious schools and the *tarikats* (popular religious orders) in 1924 and

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<sup>5</sup> Two main books on the subject are Taha Parla, *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp, 1876–1924* (Leiden, 1985) and François Georgeon, *Aux origines du nationalisme turc: Yusuf Akçura, 1870–1935* (Paris, 1980).

adopting the Swiss Civil Code in 1926, undermined the influence of the religious establishment (*ilmiye*) and left the government free to create loyalty to the national territorial state along with a corresponding political identification.

The vast and unique People's Houses experiment, which still awaits a full study, was undertaken to upgrade and generalize the true culture of the Turkish nation as practiced by the villagers and common folk while imbuing them with the virtues of modern civilization and republicanism. Established in 1932, the Houses replaced the *Türk Ocakları* and their concept of *hars*, meaning the traditional culture based on faith, lineage, history and folk spirit,<sup>6</sup> with a new culture based on the songs, tales and proverbs of the grassroots people. Despite the stress on village ways, however, the religious exhortations and superstitions of the *imams*, *hocas* and other old-time village leaders were superseded along with the traditional culture's basis in faith.

The activities of the People's Houses including dramatic performances, handicrafts, publications and festivals meant to bring both modernity and republican Turkishness to the masses. Embodying the principle of populism they were active mainly in cities and towns in contrast to their more modest rural counterpart, the *Köy Odaları*. All were closed in 1951 by the Democratic Party as elitist organizations promoting one-party rule, alien to the needs of the people, and they remained rather passive and obscure when reopened by the military governments after 1960. Nevertheless, there is no question that the People's Houses represent a significant event in the development of Turkish nationalism, modern identity, elite-imposed populism and tenacious tradition.<sup>7</sup>

### *Migration and Political-Cultural Homogenization*

Migration was a major force in the social and cultural reconstruction of the Ottoman state in the nineteenth century. While some seven to nine million, mostly Muslim, refugees from lost territories in the Caucasus, Crimea, Balkans and Mediterranean islands migrated

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<sup>6</sup> Füsün Üstel, *İmparatorluktan Ulus-Devlete Türk Milliyetçiliği: Türk Ocakları, 1912-1931* (İstanbul: 1997).

<sup>7</sup> The two articles in the collection are the chapters from a lengthy manuscript which still awaits publication.

to Anatolia and Eastern Thrace, during the last quarter of the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth centuries, about two million Arabs, Armenians and Greeks emigrated from Ottoman lands to the United States, Russia and Greece.<sup>8</sup> The far-reaching effects of this immigration-emigration made Anatolia, and so today's Turkey, a predominantly Muslim-inhabited land. It also accelerated the privatization of state lands and the introduction of a capitalist economy and increased the size of the middle classes.

Migrations continued during the Republic through either forced population exchange with Greece or agreements with Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. After 1950, though the latter two countries forcefully began to oust their Muslim-Turkish citizens.<sup>9</sup> In this period of the Republic about 1,500,000 people entered Turkey.

Meanwhile, after 1950 Turkey faced an unprecedented, growing tide of internal migration from village to city. Unlike the international migrations before 1950, which were due primarily to political, religious and ethnic reasons, these internal migrations were motivated by economic and demographic reasons. In 1950, about 81 percent of Turkey's 20,947,000 people lived in rural areas. Then insufficient and unproductive lands or even a lack of arable land along with slow but steady growth of the rural population had resulted in very low living standards; general yearly per capita income in 1950 was \$166, and probably only \$50 in villages.<sup>10</sup>

The Democratic Party came to power in 1950 on the strength of rural votes as well as support from the middle classes dissatisfied with the government's statist policy. The ensuing political and economic liberalization led to private and some foreign investment and then to industrialization, mostly in the cities, creating an acute need for manpower. Consequently, beginning in the mid-fifties and accelerating constantly afterward, large numbers of impoverished villagers began to move to the cities. They were followed by relatives as well as by not-so-needy villagers as the urban wages, which were quite

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<sup>8</sup> For the studies on this issue see Karpat, *Studies*, 689–800; Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821–1922* (Princeton, 1995).

<sup>9</sup> Soner Çağaptay, "Population Resettlement and Immigration Policies of Interwar Turkey: A Study of Turkish Nationalism," *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 25–26 (2001–2002): 1–24.

<sup>10</sup> The figures, if not specified otherwise, are taken from Emre Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye 2000'li Yıllarda Türkiye'nin Toplumsal Yapısı*, 13th ed. (İstanbul, 1998).



modest by Western standards, far exceeded the meager agricultural incomes.<sup>11</sup> Between 1950 and 1997, the total population more than tripled, growing from roughly twenty to sixty-three million, while the per capita gross income rose from \$166 to \$2,916 in the same period.<sup>12</sup> The proportion of urban population, which was roughly 20 percent in 1950, reached 65 percent in 1997.<sup>13</sup>

The village-to-city migration profoundly affected every facet of Turkish life, beginning with the size and configuration of the cities. It suddenly created on the outskirts of the major Turkish cities a series of shantytown or *gecekondu* (landed overnight) causing İstanbul to grow from about one to ten million and Ankara from 300,000 to 3.5 million between 1950 and 2000. The *gecekondu*, usually established on usurped land, violated ever planning regulation, property right and rule of public hygiene. When given property rights over the land, however, the *gecekondu* were transformed almost just as suddenly into sites of livable, modern three-to-six story buildings and the owners became members of the propertied urban middle class with enduring ties to their original villages.

The social, cultural and political impact of the village-to-town migration was profound and lasting. It increased dramatically the migrants' literacy and living standards and opened for them new vistas for the future. For the first time the old cultural, social and political chasm between village and city narrowed, producing throughout the entire country a new multi-faceted national Turkish culture. Based on its Ottoman-Islamic multicultural communal forerunner, this new national culture incorporated the modernist, secularist, republicanist and westernist features of its own era. It was, in fact, fairly homogeneous, being grounded in the common characteristics of the population, but also because the scope of the new Turkish identity varied with the ethnic composition of regions, it was more widely adopted among urbanites than in rural areas.

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<sup>11</sup> I studied in depth village-to-city migration assisted by a team of sixteen assistants from Middle East Technical University, see Kemal H. Karpat, *The Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanization in Turkey* (Cambridge, 1976).

<sup>12</sup> Kongar, 402–3.

<sup>13</sup> The term “urban” is rather arbitrary. Officially Turkey considered any settlement of 5,000 people “urban” even though these urban sites were merely overgrown villages. However, by 1990 some 67.4 percent of the urban population lived in cities with over 100,000 inhabitants and only 8 percent in cities with 10–20,000 people. *Ibid.*, 550.

At the same time, the emerging culture and the democratic regime brought into the open a variety of ethnic differences, especially among nationalist Kurds who were sons or grandsons of village migrants. Partly a reaction to the ethno-nationalist policies of the previous government, this ethnic consciousness also arose sporadically among other Muslim ethnic groups, such as the Circassians and Lazzes, but it remained a comparatively insignificant trend. Far more numerous were assimilated and became part of the new Turkish society and national culture shaped by the post-1950 migrations, industrialization and the spread of literacy, which by 1990 had reached a rate of 80 to 85 percent.

Yet another major impact of the rural-to-urban migration was profound change in the leadership, organization and voting base of political parties. After the mid-1960s, the parties relied on voters in cities and towns rather than in villages, but while the main parties retained their moderate ideologies, a series of ideologically polarized Marxist, Islamist and nationalist parties arose often among the offspring of the rural migrants. Migration from village to city thus had a profound impact on national Turkish politics over and above its contribution to the rise of regional urban, industrial and commercial centers, such as Bursa, Kayseri, Denizli and Adana, that challenged the authority of the center.

### *Literature and the National-Modernist Acculturation*

Literature in Republican Turkey has played a seminal role in defining and popularizing awareness of the social, political and cultural problems arising from change. In the same way, it had served as a forum in the Ottoman era for discussing the status of women, Ottoman and Islamic identities and the usage of colloquial Turkish, as well as for defining abstract concepts of nationhood and fatherland, often before they became subjects of political debate.

Shortly after İbrahim Şinasi (d. 1871) became the first author to plead the cause of a Turkish language and culture in the 1860s, Namık Kemal formulated the idea of an Ottoman fatherland in his play *Vatan* in 1873. Subsequently, throughout the last quarter of the nineteenth century the novels, short stories and travel diaries of Ahmet Mithat efendi, Ahmet Rasim and other writers and poets formed the basis of modern Turkish literature and the language

spoken in Turkey today. Their works covered problems ranging from the peaceful coexistence among Ottoman ethnic groups to the virtues and faults of European society and the need to embrace contemporary civilization. Ömer Seyfeddin's (d. 1920) short stories reflected the nationalist teachings of Ziya Gökalp as well as his own acute observations on the behavior and thinking of his contemporaries.

Although neither the Ottoman nor the Republican government tried to use literature to disseminate its political creed or made more than sporadic efforts to ban "subversive" works, individual writers were a different case entirely. Many did attempt to use literature to express their own political opinions or to defend or condemn a particular ruler, regime or practice. For instance, the Ottoman writer Recaizade Ekrem (d. 1914) wrote the novel *Araba Sevdası* in order to condemn the life imposed on harem women.

During the first decades of the new regime, some Republican authors actually vied with each other in condemning the injustice and economic exploitation caused by foreign interests as did the *Çıkkırlar Durunca* by Sadri Ertem (d. 1943) while still upholding the virtues of modernity. Either writers bitterly criticized the *ayan* and *eşraf*, that is, the communal leaders, for oppressing and exploiting their townsmen, the novel *Küyucaklı Yusuf* of Sabahattin Ali (d. 1948) being one example of this sort of literary social criticism. Their "village" was fictitious for it was invented to serve ideology.

The "real" Turkish village and its problems were discovered in the 1950s. Works by graduates of the Village Institutes such as Mahmut Makal and Fakir Baykurt, promoted understanding for the poor villagers flocking into the cities. This brand of realistic village literature shattered two old contradictory views of the village either as a bucolic site inhabited by innocents or as the home of degenerate semi-animals portrayed in Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu's novel *Yaban* (Stranger). By contrast, the new grassroots social literature was enriched and broadened by the writings of Yaşar Kemal, Aziz Nesin, Kemal Tahir and many others who placed the problems of the rural population in their historical, social and national contexts. This "realist" literature was accompanied by a series of traditionalist, history-oriented works, represented by those of Tark Buğra.

After the decade of the 1960s, modern Turkish literature broadened its scope to the individual and to the social and psychological impacts of urban life and national problems, but by 1980 it had discovered the Ottoman past to a rather unexpected extent. In one

survey during 2002, eight books out of fifteen best sellers dealt with Ottoman subjects. The list of writers who use the Ottoman background to air their views includes the well-known Adalet Ağaoğlu and Orhan Pamuk as well as the newcomers, Ayşe Kulın and Hıfzı Topuz. In sum, the contemporary Turkish literature represents the most authentic mirror of Turkish society and all its complexities, and the pieces on Turkish literature in both this volume and the volume on Ottoman history illustrate its social and political functions.

### *Foreign Relations*

Foreign policy has had a major impact on Turkey's political, cultural and economic life. Relatively friendly relations with the Soviet Union in the early 1920s turned into neutrality until 1939, when Turkey signed a treaty of alliance with France and the United Kingdom and, in the process, acquired Alexandretta (Hatay), causing permanent tension with Syria. Despite the alliance, Turkey remained neutral during World War II and so incurred the wrath of its allies, especially the United Kingdom. The resulting temporary isolation of Turkey in 1944 and 1945 inspired Soviet demands for territory in the northeast and bases on the Straits. Along with civil war in Greece between the communist-led insurgents and the government, these demands were among the primary factors that unleashed the Cold War.

The Truman Doctrine of 1947, which promised American help to countries threatened by communism, combined with the Korean War to give Turkish foreign policy a new twist. Turkey loosened its rather cumbersome ties to the United Kingdom in favor of closer relations with the United States and contributed about 5,000 soldiers to the Korean conflict, which facilitated the country's admission to NATO in 1952. The Turks, led by Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü, viewed the alliance with the NATO as their admission into the Western comity of nations and as a promise on the Turks' part to abide by its standards and rules. Already the introduction of the multiparty system in 1945/6, under pressure from the United States Congress, had signaled Turkey's intentions to achieve modernization and Westernization not only in form, but also in essence. The NATO alliance, strengthened by Turkey's admission into various international organizations, for half a century provided Turkey a solid military

shield and security as well as a variety of economic benefits. As a result, Turkey was able to devote its energies to internal development.

The early reforms carried out from 1922 to 1938 had replaced the Ottoman imperial system with new institutions and a Western legal system, all intended to consolidate the republican, secular regime. Many of the reforms, however, did not strike deep roots and some even engendered conflicts and contradictions. Most of the changes ignored basic economic and social needs, and many were out of harmony with Turkey's own history, identity, culture and traditions of change. The bulk of the opposition in Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s was not directed against the regime or against Mustafa Kemal Atatürk personally, despite his dictatorial powers. Instead, it focused on the haphazard and often artificial way modernization was implemented by an elite increasingly alienated from the citizenry, especially after Atatürk's death in November 1938. Since 1947, with the security provided by the Western alliance and constructive criticism from a variety of quarters in the West, Turkey has been able to repair gradually and peacefully what may be called the "excesses of the reforms."

Although the crisis with Greece in 1959 escalated from Cyprus to the exploitation of Aegean oil and the delimitation of air and maritime space, it has been contained since then because both parties belong to the same Western economic and military system. In truth, the European (Community) Union's rather partisan support of Greece has been balanced partly by American understanding for the Turkish position.<sup>14</sup>

Turkish relations with the Muslim world have remained generally correct. The Arab revolutionary regimes, however, treated Turkey coldly, if not with hostility, after Turkey recognized Israel in 1949 and joined the Baghdad Pact in 1955. At first reluctant, Turkey ultimately joined the Organization of Islamic Conference but remained a rather passive member despite the respect accorded to its Ottoman past.

Turkey's alliance with the West produced a major economic and cultural dividend in the money and experience gained by Turkish workers in Europe. Germany began to hire Turkish workers in the

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<sup>14</sup> For an annotated chronology of foreign events involving Turkey, see İsmail Soysal, *Soğuk Savaş Dönemi ve Türkiye: Olaylar Kronolojisi (1945-1975)* (İstanbul, 1997).

early 1960s, and France, Austria, and the Netherlands followed later. Approximately 3.5 million Turkish workers have found legal (and some illegal) work abroad. While about 200,000 are in Saudi Arabia, most of the Turkish workers abroad live in Germany, where they have established their own communities and ghettos, have acquired citizenship and in some cases even have been elected to parliamentary positions.

The financial, economic and cultural impact on Turkey of its workers abroad has not been properly assessed, but their annual remittances to the homeland are estimated at four billion dollars or about 15 percent of the value of exports.<sup>15</sup> In addition, a fairly large number of returned workers have invested in small enterprises or in houses in their native towns and cities, and many draw retirement benefits from the countries in which they worked. As for the cultural impact of the foreign work experience, suffice it to say that the travels of the workers themselves and their numerous visiting relatives have placed millions of Turks in direct contact with the West and its cosmopolitan life. Before the 1960s only a handful of Turkish diplomats, businessmen, rich intellectuals and students, probably numbering not more than one hundred thousand a year, ever traveled abroad. Today Turkish society as a whole reflects widespread contact with the West.

Turkish foreign policy remained relatively calm and steady from 1952 until confronted with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in 1991–2 and the civil war in the latter. Turkey's cultural, historical and religious ties with the Turkic republics in Central Asia and with Azerbaijan in the Caucasus had been dormant throughout the Soviet era, but one of the first countries to recognize the independence of the Turkic republics, Turkey played an active role in helping integrate them into the international political and economic system. The expected intensive political and economic interaction between the republics and Turkey failed to materialize, however, except in the case of Azerbaijan. Turkey proved unable to provide massive economic assistance to Central Asia, where there also was some suspicion about Ankara's hegemonic intentions.<sup>16</sup> A

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<sup>15</sup> Kongar, 502. The Turkish workers abroad have fueled a construction boom in Turkey. It is estimated that at least two million apartments in Turkey are owned by people who work or have worked abroad.

<sup>16</sup> For a comprehensive analytical treatment of Turkish foreign policy and its

fair number of Turkish private enterprises did manage to invest in the Turkic republics; private organizations opened a number of schools there, and the government signed some agreements to train the military and administrative personnel of the republics. In the end, though, the most concrete result of Turkey's efforts was an agreement to build an oil pipeline from Azerbaijan through Georgia to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, which was supported by the United States mainly as an alternative to a pipeline through Iran.

Paradoxically economic relations between Turkey and the Russian Federation grew as many Turkish building companies, retail stores, etc., received lucrative contracts and Moscow became Turkey's major supplier of natural gas through a pipeline crossing the Black Sea. As a result, although Turkey is supportive of the Chechen struggle for independence, it has muzzled many domestic organizations, especially those for offspring of the Caucasian refugees of 1862–1918, which provided volunteers and material aid to the Chechen rebels. Turkish relations with the Russian Federation, however, are subject to change, depending on Turkey's relations with the United States and the European Union and on the evolution of Russia's domestic regime and foreign policy.

Occurring in the heart of the Ottoman presence in the Balkans from 1389 to 1878, the disintegration and civil war in Yugoslavia forced Turkey to face its Ottoman legacy in both strategic and cultural terms. Probably 30 to 35 percent of the present Turkish population consists of refugees and immigrants from the Balkans, especially Macedonia (including the Greek segment) but also Bosnia, Albania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania and Greece.<sup>17</sup> Consequently, many Turks, including some distinguished names, have relatives, associations and business interest in the Balkans.

In contrast to the remote historical and cultural ties with the Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union, the Turks' relationship to the Balkans is direct, personal and contemporary to a degree not

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relation to internal affairs, see William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774–2000* (London, 2000). In spite of its title, most of the book (pp. 79–338) deals with the Republic. For my review of this book, see *International History Review* 24:2 (2002): 58–61.

<sup>17</sup> For an up-to-date comprehensive source on Ottoman Balkans, see Fikret Adanur and Suraiya Faroqhi, *The Ottomans and the Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography* (Leiden, 2002); L. Carl Brown, ed., *Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East* (New York, 1995).

suspected by the casual observer. Moreover, events in the Balkans indicated that Islam played a major part in connecting the Balkan Muslims to their brethren in Turkey and in defining the policies of even the avowedly secularist Balkan governments towards their Muslim and non-Muslim citizens.<sup>18</sup> Yet, contrary to the expectations raised by its deep Balkan roots, Turkey strongly supported the status quo. It was one of the last countries to sever its relations with the Milošević government in Yugoslavia and the first to resume them. It also maintained good relations with Croatia and rapidly changed unfriendly relations with Bulgaria to cooperation in all fields, including the military. Turkey organized most of the Balkan and Black Sea powers into the Black Sea Economic Cooperation after the lessening of the Soviet threat led to Turkey's marginalization in NATO, but the organization remained passive because Turkey lacked the economic, political and military prowess to lead it.

Relations with Europe remained fairly stable, despite Western criticism of Ankara's human rights record and handling of Kurdish problems, until the European Union refused to take in Turkey as a member. At its Copenhagen meeting in 2002 the European Union accepted Turkey only as a candidate for membership although Turkey already had amended a variety of laws in order to meet the Union's democratic standards. A large segment of the Turkish population, therefore, concluded that Europe would never accept Turkey's membership because of its Islamic faith and culture, a position articulated by France's ex-president, Giscard d'Estaing, a short time before the Copenhagen meeting.

Two groups of Turks remain opposed to seeking membership in the EU, one for purely ideological Islamist reasons and the other because it does not want the country to become a pawn in the EU's competition with the United States. This latter group favors a closer partnership with the United States, in view of its global might and relative freedom from Europe's historic anti-Turkish prejudices. Turkey's ambiguous answer to American demands during the war with Iraq in 2003, however, alienated the formerly supportive United States and also strengthened the European Union's misgivings about the country. As a result, the effects of the war may extend well

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<sup>18</sup> For an excellent up-to-date appraisal of Balkan Islam's political role and relations to Turkey, see Xavier Bougarel and Nathalie Clayer, eds., *Le Nouvel Islam balkanique: Les Musulmans, acteurs du post-communisme, 1990–2000* (Paris, 2001).



beyond Baghdad or even the creation of a *de facto* Kurdish state in northern Iraq to the future of the Turkish Parliament.

*Politics, Democracy and Islam*

The bulk of the articles in the book deal with the domestic politics of Turkey, especially with the development of democracy and the role of political parties and the military in achieving or delaying it. This vast subject, covering fifty years, will be treated in a general manner from the perspective of social change, the conflict of the elites and popular participation in politics.

The attitude of the early Republican regime towards participatory democracy was truly ambivalent. As did the regime of the Young Turks (1908–1918) it accepted in principle parliamentary democracy as the institutional manifestation of its basic principle of populism (*halkçılık*). But in practice it implemented authoritarian one-party rule. Legitimizing the measures as necessary to defend the regime against reactionary forces, in 1925 it closed the Progressive Party, established by Kazım Karabekir and Rauf Orbay who were instrumental in winning the War of Independence of 1919–22, and in 1930 it shut down the Liberal Party founded by Fethi Okyar at Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's urging. The conflict between the regime's professed liberal ideals and dictatorial practices was solved in favor of the former by Turkey's association with the Western alliance against the Soviet Union and the resulting need to conform to the alliance's political standards.

A genuine opposition Democratic Party (DP) was established by dissidents from the ruling Republican People's Party (RPP) in 1946, and in the free elections held in 1950, the RPP was ousted in a true social and political revolution. The DP represented the provincial landowners, merchants and semi-aristocratic families of the countryside as well as disgruntled intellectuals, minorities and the lower urban classes, all of whom as in Ottoman times, resented the intrusive policies of the central government. In the Republic, the political authority of the center had gained additional weight through the adoption of statism—a form of state capitalism—another of the six principles of Kemalism. After crippling the already fragile private sector, statism had posed a direct threat to landowners with the “Land Reform Law,” passed in 1945 but not enforced.

The Greeks, Armenians and other minorities supported the opposition parties under the Young Turks but were reduced to numerical and political insignificance through migration and population exchange. The so-called Muslim minorities, such as the Kurds, were silenced by fiat, and their well-to-do provincial leaders were coopted into the upper ranks of the RPP and DP. Until the 1980s, Turkish politics, thus freed of “nationality” issues, dedicated itself to social and economic problems. The Kurdish issue surfaced after 1980 among a relatively small group of intellectuals, militants and emigrants in Europe, but the bulk of the Kurdish leaders in the country proper remained fairly well integrated in the system as lawmakers (numbering 20 percent of the deputies), businessmen, government and army officials. In any event the right to publish and teach in their native language was granted formally to the Kurds of Turkey in 2001–2.

After the DP came to power in 1950, its policies were in part determined by its electoral strength. Its count of deputies went up from 408 in 1950 to 490 in 1954 while that of the RPP declined from 69 to 30. In terms of popular vote the RPP total stagnated at roughly 3.1 million but that of the DP grew from 4.2 to 5.1 million, and eligible voters increased from 8.9 to 10.2 million.<sup>19</sup> The consistent vote for the RPP, however, indicates that it retained a substantial backing among certain urban, bureaucratic and intellectual segments of the population.

The DP governments under the Premiership of Adnan Menderes followed three main goals. These governments wanted to weaken the RPP by undermining the influence of its supporters in the bureaucracy, educational system and the army. They also tried to dismantle the statist economic infrastructure in favor of private enterprise and investment. Finally, they hoped to increase the size of the entrepreneurial middle classes wherever they existed.

The DP policy towards secularism followed in the footsteps of the liberalization of religious education and practices began by the RPP in 1947. It allowed the reading of the *ezan* (call to prayer) in Arabic and took other steps to show respect for the “Islamic” culture and identity of the citizens. At the same time, it suppressed harshly any

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<sup>19</sup> The figures are from an official publication, *Results of the General Elections of Representatives, 1950–1977–1983–1995* (Ankara, 1997), 213.

attempt to politicize the faith as indicated by the closure of the *Millet* Party.

After 1954 the DP abandoned its initial liberal policies. It then sought to identify the bureaucracy with the party and to use economic statism to secure party support while eliminating from power the Kemalists and weakening their backers. The now authoritarian Prime Minister Menderes appeared determined to liquidate the RPP by every possible means. His government closed the People's Houses as the propaganda outlets of the RPP, ostentatiously asserted civilian control of the military and, aided by inflation, reduced an army career from the prestigious position sought by the lower and middle classes to the least desirable profession.

The elections of 1957 were won by the DP with 800,000 fewer votes than in 1954, while the number of RPP deputies went up nearly six fold, fueling the fierce struggle between the DP and RPP. Former president İsmet İnönü, the head of the RPP who had prevented a military coup designed to keep the DP out of power in 1950, was physically threatened. Meanwhile, the DP set up an inquiry to find the RPP guilty of "subversive" activities and close it.

The military take over of 27 May 1960 occurred after İnönü, a former general, implied in a public statement that the army ought to fulfill its obligation to the nation. The military intervention was backed by the old ruling elites for the intelligentsia, army officers and urban and rural upper classes deeply resented the rise of a new middle class and the assertiveness the power of the ballot had given to the lower classes. At the same time, the coup was an action against the anti-democratic policies of the DP leaders and the prime minister's misuse of the extensive power of the executive branch under the one-party Constitution of 1924, which remained in force until 1961. The domestic and foreign press stressed this reaction against the anti-democratic actions of the Menderes government as the primary reason for the "revolution" of 1960, but in reality the military coup was just as much a reaction of the Turkish elites against the populist challenge from below.

The Turkish elitist system, like its Ottoman predecessor was not based on a social class but on the state and was fed by a statist culture and philosophy of its own. While in opposition, one could criticize the system and blame some leader or event for society's woes, but upon gaining power, such an opponent would be assimilated into the statist system, often to become worse than the deposed

tyrant. After the demise of the Ottoman state in 1918 this centuries-old system was modernized, nationalized (Turkified) and territorialized by the Republic and although some of its foundations were weakened, it thus preserved its essence.<sup>20</sup>

When Adnan Menderes took office in 1950, he sought to undermine the statist culture-philosophy by attacking its institutional and human pillars. He invoked the national will enshrined in the Constitution to claim that his electoral victory gave him the absolute authority to act as he pleased. Authoritarian democracy was his credo.

Menderes lacked the intellectual ability to formulate a philosophy that could liberate the individual from the Leviathan and soon was assimilated into the very statist culture he was fighting. Before giving up the fight, he had managed only to make a dent in that culture, but the tool used to dent it, democracy, gained ground and deepened its hold over the Turkish society in the next decades. The debate in Turkey today about the *derin devlet* (deep state or deep throat), that is about the real masters of the state, began in the era of Menderes.

In May 1960 Menderes was arrested along with about 415 DP deputies, roughly two-thirds of the National Assembly. Tried and found guilty of violating the constitution, he was hanged along with the Finance and Foreign Ministers. Some of the positive aspects of Menderes' legacy survived him, however, embodied in the Justice Party (JP), successor to the DP.

The *Milli Birlik Komitesi* (National Unity Committee), the military junta, soon reverted to an established Ottoman and Republican tradition of military interventions by turning power over to civilians. Informally receiving that power—with the DP abolished—the RPP convened a Constituent Assembly composed of its members and sympathizers. But the new constitution drafted by the Assembly barely received the majority necessary to adopt it.

The split of Turkish society into two basic constituencies was a fact. The statist group was comprised of intellectuals, military officers, many traditional rich landlords, including Kurdish chieftains, and some businessmen who had benefited from the statist system. Gathered

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<sup>20</sup> A first attempt to look historically at the Turkish statist culture is by M. Naim Turfan, *Rise of the Young Turks: Politics, the Military and Ottoman Collapse* (London, 2000). See also my review in *Journal of Military History* 65 (2001): 771–775.

around the RPP, they sought to revive the social and political status quo prevailing before 1950. The opposition to the statist consisted of liberal elements of the urban and rural middle classes, modernist-minded Islamists, younger professionals, a large peasantry and lower urban groups that had gained a high degree of political consciousness.

The military and RPP sought to portray the opposition as reactionary, anti-republican Islamists. Actually from the day of the military takeover to after the elections in 1961, there was no open religious reaction. What did galvanize the opposition was fear that the coalition of forces behind the real “state,” which had ruled society for centuries, would reclaim power and liquidate the democratic gains made in the past decade.<sup>21</sup> The peasants, in particular, believed that although the RPP and its supporters spoke of “us,” they, in fact, were disrespectful of the people’s dignity, interest, rights and aspirations. The “people,” in this context, referred to the community whose state was not working and living in consensus with it.

It is easy to assume that the Turkish peasantry used “people” to refer to a community of faith. Indeed, the traditional Ottoman concept of *din-ü devlet* (faith-state) had made Islam the bond between the community and the state, helping create the mystical supremacy of the state. Secularism, however, had deprived not the faith but the state of its aura of spiritual sanctity and revealed it for what it really was, the instrument of power and domination of society. Although, in part for cultural self-defense, society had become more attached to its Islamic culture as the distinguishing mark of its identity, it did so in a non-political fashion.

By abolishing the Caliphate, closing the religious schools and weakening the power of the religious establishment, secularism in Turkey had deprived the state of the institutions and people who had helped it in the past maintain its hold on society. From 1950 onwards, the government was regarded as a worldly tool of the powerful which could be bridled and tamed by worldly means including democracy. The relative lasting success of democracy in Turkey was made possible not by any profound belief in its virtues but because it was the

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<sup>21</sup> During a good part of 1960 to 1962 I conducted research in Turkey and traveled extensively interviewing party leaders and ordinary citizens in dozens of Turkish towns and villages. My information derives from actual field observations of which only some are reflected in the published articles.

best means to liberate the individual from the shackles of state. But soon democracy acquired a life and permanency of its own.

The return to civilian life was effected by enactment of a liberal constitution in 1961. The freedom to establish political parties came about under high, though invisible, popular pressure and the efforts of a segment of the liberal intelligentsia opposed to military and one-party rule. The division of Turkey into cultural statist and anti-statist reemerged in the form of two political blocs, the first consisting of the old RPP and the second of the DP's successors, the Justice (JP) and New Turkey parties (NTP). In the elections of 1961 the RPP received only 3.7 million votes, almost the same as in 1957, but the combined vote of the JP and NTP was about 5.1 million. The novelty of the election was the rise of a new party, the Republican Peasants Nation Party (RPNP), using nation in the sense of *milli* rather than of a geographical nation. The nationalist, populist RPNP received 1.4 million votes and eventually metamorphosed into the nationalist *Milliyetçi Hareket* (Nationalist Action Party). Although the combined number of deputies of the DP's heirs amounted to 223 versus 65 for the new RPNP and 173 for the RPP, the task of forming a government was given to İnönü, the head of the RPP.

In the very agitated period between the elections of 1961 and those of 1965, those of the RPP tried unsuccessfully to consolidate its hold on the government, and the JP attempted to unite the anti-statist front. In the meantime, the statist proposed rapid and extensive economic development through state action in a manifesto signed by over five hundred intellectuals and published in the leftist ideological journal *Yön* (Direction). Many of the same intellectuals also were involved in establishing the State Planning Organization but failed in their efforts to place it above the elected National Assembly. Eventually the JP emerged as the voice of the opposition under Demirel, an engineer who had spent time in the United States, and advocated democracy, economic development and no grudges for past conflicts. Winning the elections of 1965 and 1969 by a comfortable majority, the JP embarked on a series of economic development projects.

The Constitution of 1961 had created a bi-cameral legislature to restrict the power of the executive and had greatly enlarged political freedoms and rights. It thus unleashed the pent up ideological tendencies and a proliferation of Marxist, Maoist and Islamist associations. The military coup of 1971 against the elected JP govern-

ment supposedly was meant to protect the constitution from anti-secularist Islamic threats but actually was designed to prevent a leftist group of military and civilian Marxists from seizing power. Years later some of the coup's plotters confessed how they had misrepresented the danger of Islamic reaction.<sup>22</sup>

By 1965, the RPP was under the leadership of the young, fiery but impractical utopian Bülent Ecevit. He had decided to "democratize" the party by dropping its six arrows, which corresponded to the republican, populist, nationalist, reformist, statist and secularist principles of Kemalism. Also dropped, in favor of a social-democratic stand was the RPP's "secularist" rhetoric, which had won it few votes. The changes cost the military a major social and political bastion, and the aftermath of the coup of 1971 reflected the military's lack of support from an established body such as the RPP.

The decade from 1971 to 1980 brought relative economic development, but in Turkish political life, extremely agitated ideological debates among and within the ranks of Marxists, Islamists, liberals and nationalists by 1975 were about to escalate into violence. All the while, industrialization, migration from villages to cities, urbanization, a rapid increase in literacy and a much delayed opening to the outside world affected the quality of Turkish politics as well as the general outlook of individuals.

The major issues that had animated Turkish political life from 1960 to 1975 became obsolete. Fear of a military intervention to restore the statist order underwent a subtle change. Increasingly strong voices demanded that the state become a functional service-oriented apparatus. This new program was particularly attractive to the new urban migrants from the villages. The replacement of İsmet İnönü by Bülent Ecevit as party chairman enhanced the party's popular appeal. It was able to form a coalition government with the National Salvation Party and gain great prestige by the successful landing in Cyprus in 1974 but the coalition was torn by internal dissension. In the elections of 1977 the RPP received 6.1 million votes versus 5.4 million for the JP despite the competition from the new Republican Reliance, Nation, and Labor (Marxist) parties and 1.2 million votes for the Islamist National Salvation.

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<sup>22</sup> The story of this so-called secondary military coup has been told in dozens of publications. See Hasan Cemal, *Kimse Kızmasın Kendimi Yazdım* (Istanbul, 1999); Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-75* (London, 1977).

After 1977 RPP tenure was marked by its failure to achieve any meaningful social and economic development or to quell the battles between left and right. Although Ecevit lost the local elections and was replaced by a coalition government headed by Süleyman Demirel, the period from 1978 to 1980 was dominated by a virtual civil war. The causes, motives, nature, characteristics and achievements of the ensuing military intervention of September 1980 have long been debated, but generally its military regime has been characterized as a blow to democracy because it questioned and punished practically every party and group involved in politics.

Each of the three military interventions in Turkey was unique and cannot be viewed as part of a sequence of regular military interferences in political life. The first one in 1960 was an attempt to restore the elitist socio-political order prevailing before 1950, and the RPP was its half-hearted accomplice.<sup>23</sup> The second one in 1971 resulted from ideological differences among officers and from civilian intrigues and was anomalous from the start. The cabinet resigned but the legislature was retained in the hope that the military would dictate but not enforce government policies. Its failure wounded the military's prestige. The intervention of 1980, on the other hand, aimed to save the state and the Republic and to reform the political system by making the army its guardian, through the National Security Council formally headed by the President and enshrined in the Constitution of 1982.

Between 1980 and 1983, the military arrested and tried all leftist, Islamist and rightist groups and politicians including the leaders of the Nationalist Action Party, which had acted until then as a kind of government partner in defending the regime against the onslaught of the extreme left. This "impartial" action against ideologically oriented parties had the sobering effect of convincing all of them that a true democratic regime was the best guarantee for their survival. The military, however, invited Necmettin Erbakan, the former leader of the abolished Islamist National Salvation Party, to return from exile in Switzerland and establish a new party to preempt the appeal of leftist parties. This *Refah* (Welfare) Party was thus established and proceeded to fulfill the founders' original ideology of *Milli Görüş*

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<sup>23</sup> See William Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military* (London, 1994).



(National View). It was a mixture of Islamic-Turkish nationalism which apparently appealed to the Turkish workers in Europe more than the domestic audiences.

The military did not associate with any of the political organizations and abolished all parties. It sought instead to create its own popular constituency and the election of General Kenan Evren as President was submitted to a public referendum, which he won overwhelmingly.<sup>24</sup> The formation of the Nationalist Democracy Party by General Turgut Sunalp indicated that the military sought to perpetuate its control of the political system in civilian guise. Nevertheless, it is a paradox of the Turkish public that it regards the military as the most trustworthy institution—as 86 percent did in a 1998 poll—but refuses to vote the military into government. Consequently, in the elections of 1983, Sunalp's party received just about 4 million votes and elected 71 deputies while the newly formed *Anavatan* (Motherland) party (MP) of Turgut Özal, who had been denounced by President Evren, received 7.8 million votes and elected 211 of the 450 deputies in the Assembly, the Senate having been abolished by the Constitution of 1982. The RPP, which had reorganized itself as *Halkçı* (Populist) Party, received 5.2 million votes and elected 117 deputies. Some 92.3 percent of the electorate, or 19.7 million voters, participated in these elections.

The ideologically ecumenical MP received, in addition to the votes of the JP, that is the old Democrat Party, support from nationalists, Islamists and liberal leftists. Özal formed the government and liberalized the economy and the political system, in an unprecedented manner. Originally from the city of Malatya, Özal had worked for the World Bank in Washington, D.C. before becoming head of the State Planning Organization under the military. He was the first unfettered prime minister who was as much a liberal as a traditionalist. Although he declared openly that economic motives had priority in life, also he was an openly practicing Muslim Naqşbandi (the dominant moderate revivalist Sufi order in Turkey) and half Kurd by ethnic origin.

The economic boom during Özal's premiership and his efforts to identify Turkey's regime with the West, as by enlisting Turkey in the Gulf War of 1991 contrasted sharply with the half-hearted

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<sup>24</sup> In his multi-volume memoirs Kenan Evren stated that he undertook the takeover in 1980 with great reluctance. *Kenan Evren, Amları* (İstanbul, 1990).

modernization of previous decades.<sup>25</sup> Suffice it to say here that Özal's name is next to those of Atatürk and Menderes as the architects of modern Turkey although he was responsible for a degree of corruption and neglect of the positive traditions of statehood.

Özal handily won the elections of 1987 with 8.7 million votes and 292 deputies, despite the competition of the True Path Party (4.5 million votes and 59 deputies) of Süleyman Demirel, who claimed to represent the DP legacy. The old RPP—the Populist party of 1980s—had split into the Democratic Left Party of Bülent Ecevit (2 million votes) and the Social Democratic Populist Party (5.9 million votes) of İsmet İnönü's son Erdal İnönü. These elections of 1987 also marked the rise of the Islamist *Refah* (Welfare) Party (1.7 million votes, no deputies) of Necmettin Erbakan, who had strived unsuccessfully to rise in the JP but was rebuked for his insatiable lust for power and opportunistic Islamism.

After 1987 the competition between the Motherland and True Path (TPP) Parties split the middle-of-the-road voters and allowed the *Refah* Party to gain strength as it embraced economic and social issues from the platforms of the other parties. The same shift to the center was adopted by the Nationalist Action Party of Alparslan Türkeş, one of the leaders of the 1960 coup. That party even gave Islamic themes some place in its program, claiming they were part of the national secular culture. In the 1995 election, it received 2.3 million votes but did not elect any deputies by failing to attain the required 10 percent of votes cast.

Turkish political life in the 1990s was dominated by interparty conflicts, Turgut Özal left the premiership and the leadership of the Motherland Party to become president in 1989 to the utter dismay of his mentor Süleyman Demirel, who believed he was entitled to the position himself. The inability of any party to achieve an electoral majority led to weak coalition governments, opportunistic compromises and ideological chaos. Participation in elections fell from about 93 percent in 1987 to 83 percent in the 1991 elections.

Turgut Özal died of a heart attack in 1993 and Demirel was elected to his post. Left rudderless as a result were the two middle-

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<sup>25</sup> He wrote—actually commissioned the writing of—a book that expressed his modernist, Westernist views. Turgut Özal, *Turkey in Europe, and Europe in Turkey* (Nicosia, 1991).

of-the-road parties, Motherland and True Path, both heirs to the DP and mainstays of the liberal, traditionalist, moderate regimes that had assured the survival of democracy in Turkey since 1960. Demirel's place as head of the TPP was taken by Tansu Çiller whose leadership proved disappointing in every way. Rumors of corruption surrounding the leaders of both parties (MP and TPP), along with their quarrel and pettiness led Erbakan's Islamist Welfare Party (WP) to win 6 million votes in 1995 versus just 4.1 million in 1991. Meanwhile, over the same period, the vote totals of the MP and TPP both declined, and the left was split by reestablishment of the RPP.<sup>26</sup>

After the MP and TPP coalition fell apart, the TPP joined a coalition under the premiership of Erbakan, which exposed the weakness of the Turkish system. The leaders of practically all the political parties, lacking the necessary intellectual weight to cope with Turkey's many problems, covered their incompetence by personally dominating the party and firing their critics. The democracy of Turkey thus was left to political parties under dictatorial control.

Soon after becoming premier, Erbakan installed his men in key positions and took trips to the major Islamic countries. His intent was to create an Islamic axis of power and eventually to desert the Western alliance. Ambitious for wealth as well as power and a very loyal friend of Saudi Arabia, Erbakan not only used Islam however he could,<sup>27</sup> but also instituted economic policies that had populist appeal.

Eventually the National Security Council, dominated by the military, requested Erbakan to adopt measures designed to undermine his Islamist policies. Instead, Erbakan resigned in February 1997 and was replaced by another coalition government that soon went to new elections in 1999. In those elections, the Turks expressed their frustration with a "democracy" that had degenerated into a game of musical chairs by casting a respective 24 and 22.5 percent of the vote for the most unlikely and ideologically opposite Democratic Left and Nationalist Action Parties. The ensuing coalitions, headed by the Democratic Left's Bülent Ecevit and also including the MP, was troubled from the beginning by disagreements over domestic policy

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<sup>26</sup> The elections of 1991 and 1995 deserve in-depth study, which cannot be provided in this survey.

<sup>27</sup> See Gencer Özcan, *Onbir Aylık Saltanat Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Dış Politikada Refah Yol Dönemi* (İstanbul, 1998).

and the distribution of government jobs, membership in the European Union, the freedom to wear the Muslim headscarf and Ecevit's periodic illnesses. While some of the elites, especially in business circles supported membership in the EU, conservatives, Islamists and the military opposed it as dangerous both to national sovereignty and to Turkey's relations with the United States. Although the coalition government amended a series of laws in order to meet the membership conditions posed by the European Union, their liberalizing Turkey's political system, allowing Kurdish to be taught in schools, etc., did not produce the expected membership but only the promise of candidacy at the Copenhagen meeting in November 2002. Beset by a variety of conflicts as well as by Premier Ecevit's illness, which confined him to bed for weeks, the coalition resigned.

The unexpected results of the new elections of 3 November 2002 completely shattered the old Turkish political system. The new *Adalet ve Kalkınma* or Justice and Development Party (JDP), of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan won 34.5 percent of the vote and the RPP under Deniz Baykal won 19 percent. All the other political parties and their leaders fell short of the 10 percent threshold required to enter Parliament. A dozen or so veteran politicians, including Süleyman Demirel, who had directed the Turkish political life for the last forty years were eliminated. Ecevit's party received just 2 percent of the votes, Erbakan's newly renamed *Saadet* (Felicity) Party received about 2.5 percent.

The victorious JDP really is a new party not just another version of the Islamist Felicity Party. Its electoral victory, therefore, could be another turning point in Turkey's domestic and foreign policies. It was established in 2001 by a group of dissidents, headed by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the former mayor of İstanbul. Erdoğan long had been critical of Necmettin Erbakan who had been banned from politics for five years but operated through a proxy Recai Kutan. Erdoğan's JDP adopted secularism, Atatürkism, republicanism and all its reforms as well as the alliance with the West as basic principles. While regarding espousal of Islam and its rituals as a matter of individual choice, the JDP considered Islam part of the society's culture. The party advocated economic and social development and implementation of a democratic program to replace the elitist, statist system that had survived every election and change of government.

Erdoğan himself had not been able to enter the elections of 3 November 2002 because of a jail sentence, but thanks to a timely constitutional amendment, he won the by-election of 9 March 2003

in Siirt, the town where he had made the speech that landed him in jail. As expected, he replaced Abdullah Gül as premier although, already acting as *de facto* premier, he had unsuccessfully lobbied the European capitals for EU membership.

The expectation that the JDP's overwhelming 367-seat majority in Parliament would finally bring Turkey political stability was undermined by the Iraqi crisis. Contrary to all expectations, the Parliament voted, by just a three-vote margin, against allowing the passage of American troops through southeastern Turkey. Subsequently it voted to allow the flight of American planes and passage of some vehicles, but that vote proved rather useless to either side. Instead, the Turkish insistence on entering northern Iraq to prevent the establishment of an independent Kurdish state there met stiff opposition from both the United States and the European Union. The Gulf War of 1991 caused huge economic losses to Turkey. Now the war in 2003 appears to threaten Turkey's close relations with the United States, the cornerstone of its foreign policy since 1952, and thus to present the Erdoğan government with an insoluble crisis.

### *Conclusions: 1960–2003*

The information presented in the preceding pages has been meant as a general survey of Turkish political life over four decades rather than an in-depth analysis. Nonetheless, it lends itself to a few conclusions.

1. The democratic process in Turkey has proved to be a slow and uneven, yet eventually effective, process for eliminating the old elitist system and its ideological bases, including the use of secularism and Kemalism to justify suppressing opposition. The voting appeal of various Islamist, Marxist and ultranationalist groups trying to use the democratic system in order to destroy it has remained small. Indeed Turkey has now a score of communist, Kurdish, liberal, nationalist and Islamist parties that have been unable to send deputies to the Parliament. For example, the so-called Kurdish party, the People's Democratic Party (now DEHAP), received 1.1 million votes in 1995, and some 6 percent of the total in 2002, mostly in the few Kurdish strongholds in the southeast. The main demand of the electorate in the so-called Kurdish areas (only in one province, Diyarbakır, out of eight "Kurdish" provinces did DEHAP receive 52 percent of

the vote in 2002) is for economic development and social justice.

2. The Parliament, political parties and court system have only partially fulfilled their functions of leadership. In response, the public has repeatedly shown its impatience with the system by voting for “new” parties, hoping that they will conform to the basic standards of democracy and bring economic development. Parties established by idealistic, well-meaning intellectuals, however, have failed to attract popular support because of their utopianism. The country’s need for parties and leaders capable of channeling their people’s virtues towards constructive goals could make the victory of the JDP in 2002 a real turning point in Turkey’s politics, the inexperience of its leaders notwithstanding.

3. As one of the sure indications that a “true” democracy is developing in Turkey, a number of “forbidden” subjects are now freely discussed. Approaches to history that ignore the Ottoman past, idealize the early years of the Republic, defame Islam or disparage the minorities all are being reevaluated.<sup>28</sup>

4. The place and role of the army in Turkish life remain one of the most crucial issues. Throughout most of its existence, the Ottoman state was governed by the military although many of the military leaders readily became civilians and did not have a militarist philosophy. Moreover, practically all reforms were associated with, or at least condoned by, the military. The public holds the army in great esteem as the backbone of the state but criticizes its meddling in daily politics.

After undertaking a variety of anti-democratic actions over the years, Turkish military officers always have returned power to civilian bodies and, unwittingly perhaps, strengthened the democratic system. To a large extent, the military’s political role has been determined by the inability of the elected political leaders, including the presidents, to provide enlightened national leadership. Indeed, the leaders often have appeared to act under the assumption that the military establishment always can come to their rescue. Early in 2002, for example, the head of a powerful business organization called upon

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<sup>28</sup> The Tarih Vakfı (History Foundation) of İstanbul has dealt with many of these issues. See the proceedings of the conference held in İstanbul in June 1995. *Tarihte Eğitim ve Tarihte “Öteki” Sorunu* (The Problem of Education of “Them” in History) (İstanbul, 1998); Etienne Copeaux, *Espaces et Temps de la nation turque* (Paris, 1997), translated into Turkish as *Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-İslam Sentezine* (İstanbul, 1998).

the army to take over the government and pull the economy out of one of its perennial crises.

5. In sum, many of Turkey's problems derive from its imperfect political culture, but salvation still lies in the political system itself. That system can be greatly updated and enhanced by improving the quality of the people serving it after first upgrading the quality of Turkish democracy.

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PART ONE

POLITICS

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## POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN TURKEY, 1950–70<sup>1</sup>

### *Introduction*

The elections of May 14, 1950, which brought the Democratic Party (*Demokrat Parti*) of Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes, President and Premier in 1950–60 respectively, to power and sent the Republican Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*) of İsmet İnönü into opposition (it is still there) was the turning point in Turkish political and social life. It set into motion a new process of leadership selection, social mobilization and broader popular participation. Now, twenty years after this memorable political event, one may rightly ask whether the Turkish efforts to adopt first the classical mechanism of European parliamentarianism and then the ideas of social democracy were successful at all. The answer is positive, despite the brief interlude of a military takeover in 1960–61. Instead of restoring a strong régime under one party government, as demanded by some intellectual and bureaucratic groups, the military ended their rule formally in 1961, by adopting a broadly based social and political order and a new constitution.

The success of the Turkish experiment in parliamentary democracy stands in sharp contrast not only to the political régimes in the neighbouring countries but also to most of the Third World. It is true that the present régime in Turkey has been challenged by a variety of leftist and rightist groups, either because it supposedly retards modernization and does not achieve social justice, or because the economic development and the social change it promotes undermine the basic values and the established order in the society. But the régime seems to maintain its vitality.

The purpose of this article is not to provide broad generalizations about Turkish politics but a general and factual analysis of some of the major internal and international developments occurring between

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<sup>1</sup> Several articles by this writer dealing in detail with some of the issues treated in this general analytical survey have appeared elsewhere. See 'Political Developments in Turkey and Their Social Background', *International Affairs*, June 1962; 'Society, Economics and Politics in Contemporary Turkey', *World Politics*, October 1964, etc.

1950 and 1970. Nevertheless, in order to place these developments in proper perspective it is necessary to point out some basic historical and social factors which conditioned, at least in part, the emergence of the current parliamentary régime.

The first factor is a historical one. The Turkish Republic inherited from the Ottoman Empire not only a strong bureaucratic organization but also a sophisticated political understanding of conflicts and experience in solving them. One may say that throughout the nineteenth century the Ottoman bureaucracy, despite its internal weaknesses, sought to reconcile the social and ethnic conflicts rising from the encounter with, as well as the pressure of Europe, its own traditions of authority and social organization. This tradition was based on the principle that the role of the government was to achieve balance among various forces and interests within the framework of a political system. The social and cultural system on one hand, and the political system on the other, were manipulated in practice as separate entities subject to their own exigencies. The ability of the Ottoman bureaucracy to separate in practice—the theory was rather ambiguous—the functional and technical aspects of its responsibilities from its cultural allegiances was one of its chief characteristics.

The Ottoman Empire failed to find lasting solutions to its problems in the nineteenth century chiefly because it avoided social ideological solutions which could have tied together separate ethnic, religious and social groups, and could have integrated them into one uniform political system by eradicating, or at least minimizing, their differences. (The Ottoman nationalism of 1839–76 was essentially Islamic, and Turkish nationalism which borrowed elements from the former through a process of desacralization was called—wrongly—secularism. These were ideological solutions which appealed only to small groups and were developed by intellectuals outside the stream of general society.)

The ideological shortcomings of the Ottoman bureaucracy may have prevented it from discerning the economic and social roots of the political and religious conflicts it had to cope with but did not prevent it from seeking some solutions to these conflicts. This experience enabled the bureaucracy to develop new insights into and approaches to the solution of conflicts, notably in learning how to respond realistically to the pressures arising from the social body.

The republican bureaucracy inherited the political experience of its predecessor and applied it successfully when the occasion arose.

The adoption and the maintenance of the parliamentary democracy in 1945-50 was one of these major occasions. It developed not so much as the result of a commitment to lofty political principles but mainly as the outcome of a calculated decision to find a practical political solution likely to soothe and eventually to quell the rising social, economic and cultural discontent. It might have been intended as a 'safety valve', as Professor Bernard Lewis put it aptly, but when it worked out it was wholly adopted. Thus, the realistic and practical ability to manipulate power toward objectively defined and achievable goals stands as one of the chief characteristics of the Turkish leaders. Indeed, the political experience of the bureaucracy has been gradually emulated by leaders coming from the society at large. (If the concept of 'national character' were not so badly discredited one may be tempted to say that political and military ability has been a distinct characteristic of Turks as a group in the tribal age in Central Asia as well as in the contemporary period of nationhood.) It must be noted that as early as 1876, the Ottoman leaders viewed the idea of representation as a crucial political device likely to bring problems into the open and provide some clues to their solution through the co-operation of the interested parties. Indeed, the constitution and the parliament of 1876-78, appear to have been rationally conceived political instruments which could provide legal, recognized and formal outlets for articulating social and economic demands, and for solving conflicts. Ironically enough it was the European powers which dismissed this genuine Ottoman political experiment in parliamentarianism, at best, as a 'trick' intended to delay the reforms, and at worst, as a futile imitative effort to borrow a uniquely Western institution doomed to fail in the hands of the Asiatics,<sup>2</sup> though Turks had been on European soil for over five hundred years.

The second factor possibly responsible for the advent and preservation of the democratic system in Turkey is to be found in the emergence of the new middle class groups in the professional, entrepreneurial and service sectors of the economy and in their political outlook. It is true that social mobility and stratification intensified increasingly throughout the Republic especially after 1931. But the top political leadership remained largely in the hands of the same

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<sup>2</sup> See Robert Devereux, *The First Ottoman Constitutional Period*, Baltimore, 1963.

groups which had been associated in one way or other with the ruling Republican Party and its modernist principles. Thus the conflicts within the Republican Party resulting often in dissent and splinter groups (the Democratic Party formed in 1946 was one of them) did not stem from some fundamental disagreement over the principles of the Republic but rather in group disagreements. It is in this framework of formal and often imposed allegiance to Republicanism and all that it entailed, that new cadres of leaders were formed among the agrarian, professional, entrepreneurial and labour groups with middle-class values. Eventually, with the establishment of opposition parties in 1945–46, these acquired the power positions in various political parties or organized themselves as pressure groups but without having sufficient numerical strength or ideological arguments to demand exclusive control of the system as a whole. Having developed vested interests in the existing political system which provided them with status and benefits, these new groups strove to preserve it against any challenge.

The economic development and the uneven distribution of income, as well as a series of cultural and social developments occurring after 1946, dislocated the bureaucratic and intellectual groups from power positions and, at the same time, provided them with new arguments, such as the need for rapid modernization, the establishment of an egalitarian scientifically-minded society, to justify their claim for power. Such ideas and claims were both a challenge and inspiration for the new middle-class groups, for it enabled them not only to assess more realistically their positions in society but also to borrow and implement some of the social ideas advocated by their opponents. The years between 1946 and 1959 may be regarded as the period in which the new groups emerged fully and acquired political supremacy, while the period between 1959 and 1965 may be regarded as the period of internal change in the leadership of the political parties and the acquisition of a new welfare philosophy by the same.

The third factor responsible for the durability of the Turkish democratic system is the self-generating intellectual activity created and maintained by political freedom. Even the most radical intellectuals, though opposed to the formal representative institutions and political parties, regarded the freedom of expression and debate as an inherent part of modern existence, and seemed determined to preserve it. Nurturing this attitude from underneath there is a process of intellectual, social and psychological revitalization far too complex

and subjective to be treated with any justice in a few introductory sentences. Such a treatment would involve, first, an accurate, unbiased evaluation of what religion, that is Islam, was for the government on one hand and the ordinary Turk on the other, and what it has become today for both of them. It would call also for a lucid appraisal of the secularist reforms in Turkey and their actual impact on the Turks' inner life.

This writer finds himself at odds with most of the views expressed on Islamic reformation in Turkey, chiefly because he views religion not only as an historical fact, a body of laws, a dogma, a philosophy of life, a theological commitment, but chiefly as the spiritual evaluation of social situations which determine at some psychological level man's view of himself, of others, and of society in which he lives. It is this latter aspect which concerns us here. The religious reforms in Turkey did not change Islam for they were not intended to do so, but aimed at preparing the foundations for a new form of existence. Obviously these generated a series of inner conflicts between faith and reason, the self and the society.

The secularist reforms and the crisis they created did not compel the Turk to seek salvation in another religion but forced him to reassess his entire individual and collective existence on several levels of experience. It produced on one hand alienation and on the other a frantic search for a new definition of his identity *vis-à-vis* his own past as a Turk and a Muslim but also as a member of a universal society which was the new dimension of his identity. All this resulted in inner conflicts and tensions hardly detectable on the Turks' grave and composed face and studied reserve. The freedoms achieved in democracy gave these inner tensions vitality and dynamism through unbridled expression which is the essence of freedom if not of humanity itself. The health of the soul, as Voltaire expressed it, is the freedom to think and write. It is in this atmosphere of freedom that the inner crises and conflicts, the clash between allegiance to one's historical identity and that nebulous yearning for being modern, did not become self destructive but found channels for creative expression. On the surface every principle, every tradition and norm was challenged and criticized including secularism, reformation, westernization, nationalism and religion. But from somewhere deep within there emerged a new modern Turk endowed with a new vision of himself and the world. If democracy has created nothing but this type of man in Turkey, then it was worth the effort.

*The Rule of the Democratic Party*

The events which generated the transformation described above could be traced to the early days of the Republic or to the formal acceptance of opposition parties in 1945–46. But it was during the Democratic Party's rule in 1950–60 that their impact was fully felt. The party acquired government power through elections in 1950, as mentioned without any difficulty, though some four generals loyal to İsmet İnönü, President in 1938–50, offered their unsolicited assistance to retain him in power if he so desired. İnönü turned down the offer, possibly aware of the fact that some other lower-ranking officers, such as Fahri Belen and Seyfi Kurtbek, dissatisfied with the one-party rule had pledged, on behalf of their own secret organization, support to Celal Bayar.

The Democrats' rule began with promises of constitutional amendments and institutional innovations necessary to consolidate democracy. They promised to uphold all the reforms of Atatürk and to refrain from resuscitating any controversy over past events. However, they abandoned soon their promises and began to criticize the Republicans' policies since such criticism seemed to create, at the beginning at least, some sympathetic reaction among the public. The Democrats soon became concerned with their own power and attempted to consolidate it by depriving the Republicans of some privileges obtained during the latter's unopposed rule from 1923 to 1950. The buildings of the People's Houses, which were still registered as Republican Party property, despite a proposal to transform the Houses into a cultural foundation, were confiscated on behalf of the treasury.<sup>3</sup> A few of these were handed to the *Türk Ocakları*, (Turkish Hearths) the old nationalist organization which had been re-established in 1949. The virtual abolition of the People's Houses was regarded by the reformists as an attack on Atatürk's reforms, despite the fact that the Houses had accomplished their initial goal of disseminating the Republic's nationalist secularist principles, chiefly

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<sup>3</sup> By 1950 a total number of 478 People's Houses and 4.322 People's Rooms (founded in villages after 1940) were established throughout Turkey. The Houses had the following branches of activity: language and literature, fine arts, drama, sports, social assistance, adult education, library and publications, village welfare, museum and cultural exhibits. Kemal H. Karpat, 'The People's Houses of Turkey', *Middle East Journal*, Winter-Spring, 1963, pp. 31–44.



among the urban intelligentsia. The religious liberalization which began (actually it started under the Republicans in 1947) with the permission to read the *ezan* (call to prayer) in Arabic was followed by additional educational measures intended to teach Islam and to train a modern clergy.<sup>4</sup> All this was accompanied by an upsurge of the Islamic sects and of religious practices in the countryside, which occasionally took reactionary forms and led even to attacks on Atatürk's statues.<sup>5</sup> The religious revival, which showed some vehemence at the beginning, exhausted its momentum by 1954, but without inflicting lasting damage on the basic republican modern character of the state. After 1954, the discussions on Islam, despite sporadic ominous reactionary undertones, seemed to concern themselves chiefly with the role and place of religion in the individual's life and the freedom of worship in a democratic régime rather than with the contradictions likely to arise between Islam and a secularist political régime. Religion certainly had a part, though a diminishing one, in party politics. The Republicans had their share of responsibility in it, for their local organizations were occasionally as responsive as the Democrats' to the people's wish for religious freedom.

The real meaningful issues debated during the Democrats' rule stemmed from their economic policy. The military aid from the United States, which began in 1947, was coupled with economic assistance after Turkey was admitted to the Marshall Plan in 1948.<sup>6</sup> By 1950 the initial allocation of 100 million dollars to Turkey was increased to 233 million dollars, especially after Turkey joined the United Nations forces in Korea with a brigade of about 5,000 men who, notwithstanding heavy casualties, achieved a brilliant record on the battlefield. Eventually the assistance from the United States, as well as aid from the consortium of European Powers, reached a total of about five billion dollars by 1968, a third of which was economic and the rest military aid. The change of government certainly had helped trigger the generosity of the United States which hoped to

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<sup>4</sup> Howard A. Reed, 'Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey', *Middle East Journal*, VIII (1954), pp. 267-82; 'The Faculty of Divinity at Ankara', *The Muslim World*, October 1956, pp. 295-312, January 1957, pp. 22-35; 'Turkey's new Imam Hatip Schools', *Die Welt des Islams* IV (1955), pp. 150-63.

<sup>5</sup> G. Jäschke, 'Die Heutige Des Islams in der Türkei', *Die Welt des Islams*, Vol. VI, 3, 4, 1961, pp. 185-202.

<sup>6</sup> Richard D. Robinson, *The First Turkish Republic*, Cambridge, Mass., 1963, pp. 138 ff., 180, 209.

make Turkey, planted on the southern flank of the Soviets, a model of democracy and free enterprise.

The identification of Turkey with the Western political and economic philosophy and policies was further enhanced after the country joined NATO in 1952, and was thus formally insured against outside aggression.<sup>7</sup> It was due partly to this assurance against foreign pressure that the Democratic Party government could concentrate all its efforts on internal domestic political development. The Democrats' liberal economic policy, implemented for about two years after 1950, gradually reverted to statism. However, in contrast to the one enforced in 1931–45, this statism had different economic-political goals, for the state assumed a major role in developing the entrepreneurial middle classes, though outwardly economic development regardless of the cost or method seemed to be Menderes' chief goal. The state invested heavily in cement, sugar, power plants and construction industries while trying to promote private investment through generous credits to the farmers, tax exemptions and special treatment accorded to foreign capital.

The total investment in 1950 stood at 1 million liras or 9.63 per cent of the gross national product. The investment in 1953 went up to 2,087 million liras and 12.41 per cent, and in 1960 it reached 7,779 million liras or 15.89 per cent. The gross national product which stood at 28,491 million liras in 1950 (at 1961 factor prices) went up to 49,941 million in 1966, and 49,213 million in 1967, while *per capita* income increased from 1,181 liras in 1950 to 1,469 liras in 1961.<sup>8</sup> (The exchange rate for the dollar went up from 2.80 to 9 liras in 1958.) But the price index, which was 100 in 1950, reached 263 in 1960. The population, on the other hand, went up from 13,648,270 in 1927, to 18,790,174 in 1945, and then to 27,754,820 in 1960, and to 31,391,207 in 1965.<sup>9</sup>

Meanwhile the percentage of the rural population decreased from 78.3 in 1950 to 71.2 per cent in 1960, while the share of agriculture in the national income went down to 42 per cent in 1961;

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<sup>7</sup> Nuri Eren, *Turkey Today and Tomorrow*, New York, 1963, pp. 236 ff.

<sup>8</sup> *The First Five-Year Development Plan*, Ankara, 1963, pp. 14–15.

<sup>9</sup> Orhan Türkay, *Türkiye'de Nüfus Artışı ve İktisadi Gelişme*, Ankara, 1962, p. 8; also *Economic Developments in the Middle East* (United Nations Report) New York 1955–62; *İstatistik Yıllığı 1963*, Ankara, 1963, p. 42; *1965 Genel Nüfus Sayımı*, Ankara, 1965, p. 3.

industry's share climbed up from 16 to 23 per cent. But the yearly foreign trade deficit, which was 22 million dollars in 1950, went up to 162.8 million dollars in 1961. Recent studies indicate that the real national income of Turkey, after approximately a 6 per cent increase in 1950-53, slowed down to about 3 per cent annually until 1961, and resumed growth afterwards. The government provided ample credits, machinery and subsidy prices to farmers; actually the real benefit went to a small group.<sup>10</sup> Nevertheless, the economic activity in the rural areas, spurred by intensified communication through an excellent road programme, water projects and a variety of other works, and further enhanced through the abolition of controls and intense political activity left their impact on the peasantry. The Turkish villager began to change rapidly his living habits and thoughts as he gained confidence in his own value and asked for opportunities to better his life not as a favour of the rulers but as his birthright.<sup>11</sup> Many of them migrated to the cities in search for better fortune and caused there a wide range of social and political problems.

The economic development which had started under rather auspicious conditions created a measure of welfare which was reflected in the national elections of 1954. The Democrats won 504 seats, the Republicans a bare 31 places and the small Nation Party just 5 seats.<sup>12</sup> The electoral victory induced the Democrats to accelerate further the economic development through inflationary policies. The growing budget deficits, inflation, and the depreciation of the currency, all of which were already visible in 1953, took their toll. The inflation hurt the salaried groups by lowering their living standards. The price mechanism was disrupted and the markets lost their normal exchange functions. The price of imported goods soared. All this brought in turn unproductive government controls and red tape which stifled the economy and caused a misallocation of resources resulting in a general deterioration of the economy.

There emerged in Turkey in 1950-59, from the lower urban

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<sup>10</sup> William H. Nichols, 'Investment in Agriculture in Underdeveloped Countries', *American Economic Review*, May 1955, p. 64.

<sup>11</sup> For change in the economic life and the political outlook of peasantry, see John F. Kolars, *Tradition, Season and Change in Turkish Village*, Chicago, 1963, p. 108 ff.; Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*, 1958.

<sup>12</sup> K.H. Karpat, 'The Turkish Elections of 1957', *Western Political Quarterly*, June 1961, p. 459.

groups and semi-rural towns, a small group of capital owners along with a larger group of aggressive entrepreneurs with a rather superficial liberal view of economics. Many of these became associated with the ruling Democratic Party, often as chairmen or members of its local executive boards. This was, in fact, the new middle class of Turkey which together with their families formed about 10–15 per cent of the total population in 1960, and about 25 per cent in 1970. Political power gradually passed into their hands. Meanwhile the upper economic and landed families, which had joined the Republican Party during its one-party rule and benefited from its statist policies, began to accuse the rising groups of corruption, political opportunism and, naturally, religious reaction. The younger members of this group and the sons of the bureaucrats eventually formed the intellectual nucleus which produced the organized opposition to the Democrats after 1954.

Economic policy became subject to political controversy. The Democratic Party government, criticized for its unplanned economic policy, reacted by imposing restrictions on the press and the opposition.<sup>13</sup> The attempt by some Democratic Party deputies, led by Fevzi L. Karaosmanoğlu to oppose the dictatorial tendencies of Celâl Bayar and Adnan Menderes at the party convention in 1955, were of no avail, as was the revolt within the Democratic Parliamentary Group. Shaken briefly, Menderes regained control of the party and liquidated his opponents. Meanwhile the dissidents formed the *Hürriyet Partisi* (Freedom Party) in 1955, under Karaosmanoğlu's leadership, but had limited success for they failed to establish branches in the countryside and develop a popular philosophy.

The conflicts among politicians were in fact the symptoms of much deeper social unrest, as indicated by the riots of September 1955, in İstanbul. The gathering which started as a demonstration to protest against the Greek designs on Cyprus soon turned into a devastating show of social animosity. Hundreds of shops mostly belonging to Greeks, but also property, especially luxury goods, owned by Turks,

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<sup>13</sup> The election law was amended several times in order to limit the election chances of the opposition. The province of Kırşehir was 'punished' by being reduced to a district seat, for it supported the Nation Party. The press restrictions were so heavy that by 1954 the International Press Institute in Vienna cited Turkey as a country infringing upon the freedom of communication. Later the government passed a law to retire judges at an early age.

were destroyed while the police watched helplessly. The government apparently had planned the demonstration for political reasons but without realizing that it could serve as an outlet for releasing the accumulated social tension. The opposition asked unsuccessfully for an investigation. However, later in 1961, at the Yassıada trials the Democrats had to account for these destructive riots.

The Democrats began to show clear evidence that they distrusted the intelligentsia, the military and the bureaucracy as the supporters of the Republican Party, and did not hesitate to condemn system, organization and intellect as their means of power. The most formidable opponent of the government was the press. It emerged as a dedicated supporter of democracy and played a major role in spreading political information. The total number of newspapers increased from 131 in 1950 to 506 in 1960, and the total circulation went up from about 300,000 in 1945, to over 1.4 million in 1960.<sup>14</sup> The number of published books which stood at an annual average of about 2,600 in 1936-50, went up to over 4,100 in 1960.

A truly modern Turkish literature was born after 1950, in the atmosphere created by social tensions, political debate and relative freedom of expression. The literature, written mostly in colloquial Turkish, was social in character and represented the views of the lower-class intellectuals and reflected the infinite problems and aspirations of all other groups, including the peasantry.<sup>15</sup> All these combined to teach the population the benefits of a true democracy while the new rulers, like their old predecessors, continued to regard the citizens as ready to acquiesce to their orders simply because they, the rulers, represented the *devlet*, that is, the state, and considered it to be the sum of all human virtues.

The tension between the ruling Democrats and the Republicans increased after the elections of 1957. The Republicans had elected 178 deputies as against 31 in 1954, while the Democrats lost seats and votes; their total popular vote was in fact below the combined vote of the opposition. Although the Democrats won the elections largely because of the majority system, they had lost considerable

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<sup>14</sup> K.H. Karpat, 'Mass Media', *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (R. Ward and D. Rustow, eds.), Princeton, 1964, pp. 255-82.

<sup>15</sup> For a literary sample, see *Literary Review*, June 1960, and *Middle East Journal*, Winter-Spring 1960.

popular support.<sup>16</sup> Actually considerable support for the opposition came from those Democrats who opposed the growing dictatorial tendencies of their party leaders. These were the new middle-class groups who regarded the maintenance of a free and democratic system as the guarantee of their own power and safety.

Finally, the government, seeking to recapture its popularity and with considerable prodding from creditor countries, accepted to stabilize the economy, after receiving a new foreign loan of about 300 million dollars. The ensuing relative economic stability, however, had no effect on the political struggle. The opposition regarded the loan as having given the Democratic Party government a new lease of life and consequently began to accuse the West of indirect interference in Turkey's domestic affairs. Eventually, the criticism acquired ideological dimensions as the leftists described the entrepreneurial and business groups as the agents of the Western economic interests and as promoters of capitalism, and of subservience to imperialism. Meanwhile the Republican Party, encouraged by its success in the elections, absorbed the Freedom Party,<sup>17</sup> and then tried to form a united opposition front. The Democrats launched in turn a new organization, the *Vatan Cephesi* (Patriotic Front) in order to attract the uncommitted voters. The relations between the two parties worsened to the point of physical clash in the Assembly and in the country, especially after the Republicans defied the ban and held mass meetings. The confrontations reached a climax when the Democrats tried to use the military to stop İnönü, a venerated figure among the military, from entering the town of Kayseri. This was a political blunder since the military flouted the order and thus dealt a demoralizing blow to the government's authority. Undaunted by this ominous rebuff, the Democrats finally established, in April 1960, an Inquiry Committee with absolute powers to investigate the 'seditious' activities of the opposition in order to prevent it from involving the army in politics and eventually to reassert the supremacy of law and order.<sup>18</sup> The major goal seemed to be the muzzling of the opposition

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<sup>16</sup> İnönü described these elections as the 'proof of the country's progress and of the salvation hopes in the future. The people have asserted consciously that the régime is theirs. The people are acting as an umpire with common sense over political disputes and violent debates', *Muhalefette İsmet İnönü* (S. Erdemir, ed.), İstanbul, 1959, p. 2.

<sup>17</sup> *1958 de İnönü* (C.H.P. Publication), Ankara, 1959.

<sup>18</sup> *Resmî Gazete*, #10484, April 19, 1960.

and the press. İnönü, protesting against these measures, declared that 'when conditions are complete, revolution becomes a legitimate right for the nation, for the citizen begins to think that no other institution or way exists to defend his rights'. He pointed out that Turkey had had to fight for a long time to transform the revolutionary Republican régime into a democratic system, and warned the Democrats that their attempts to establish a repressive régime would unavoidably lead to a revolution. 'We cannot be involved in the revolution', he declared; 'such a revolution will be carried out by outsiders who have no relation to us.'<sup>19</sup> İnönü's speeches were banned but the underground printing shops formed overnight circulated them widely. Leftist and other radical groups which had been neutralized either by police controls or the unwillingness of the opposition to collaborate with them joined the underground movement. They provided some leadership and especially the ideological guidance, the effects of which became clearly evident in the debates after the revolution.

Meanwhile the government's efforts to quell the student demonstrations failed, for the army refused to fire on or even arrest the demonstrators. The universities were closed and martial law was imposed, only to be followed by the War College cadets' silent march in Ankara; the army was clearly on the side of the demonstrators. Already the retiring Commander of the Ground Forces, General Cemal Gürsel, had advised the Minister of Defence to take a series of political measures designed to restore calm and order. Instead Menderes, with his characteristic flamboyance, made new speeches threatening to crush whatever opposition was left.<sup>20</sup> The tight curfew imposed on the large cities, the martial law, the police controls had created a common front against the government mainly in the major cities. The atmosphere for a violent change was thus prepared; the question was its timing.

### *The Military in Politics*

The military took over the government in a few hours early on May 27, 1960.<sup>21</sup> The War College cadets in Ankara and a few units in

<sup>19</sup> *Milli Birliđe Dođru* (S. Erdemir, ed.), Ankara, 1961, p. 151. The book is an anthology of documents and speeches; see also *Ulus*, April 19, 1960.

<sup>20</sup> *Milli Birliđe*, pp. 101-38.

<sup>21</sup> See the military's statement in *Ulus*, May 28, 1960. Two days later the mili-

İstanbul constituted the core of the *vurucu kuvvet*, the *force de frappe* of the revolutionary organization. Power was in the hands of the *Milli Birlik Komitesi*, the Committee for National Unity headed by General Cemal Gürsel. The military in a communiqué explained the takeover as an action aimed not at any special group but at preventing internal dissension. They promised to hold elections soon to choose a new government and pledged to respect Turkey's foreign policy commitments.

A group of professors summoned to Ankara to provide advice on the future policy and on the drafting of a new Constitution, issued a declaration justifying the revolution.

It would be wrong [they stated] to view the situation [military take over] . . . as an ordinary political coup. . . . The political power that should have been the guardian of civil rights, and that should have symbolized the principles of state, law, justice, ethics, public interest, and public service had . . . become instead a materialistic force representative of personal influence and ambition and class privileges. . . . The state was transformed into a means of achieving personal influence and ambition . . . [and, therefore,] the political power ended up by losing all spiritual bonds with the true sources of state power, which reside in the army, its courts of justice and bar associations, its civil servants desirous of demonstrating attachment to their duties, and in its universities . . . it descended into a position of virtual enmity toward the basic and essential institutions of a true state and also toward Atatürk's reforms. . . . The situation was the same from the viewpoint of legitimacy. The legitimacy of a government is . . . [derived from] its ability to exist as a rule of law. Instead the government and political power had kept formulating new laws totally contrary to the constitution, and then had proceeded to utilize these laws to violate the constitution. It had also engaged in activities without the benefit of any law. . . . We look upon the action of the Committee of National Unity in arranging for the administration to be taken over by state forces and institutions as a measure dictated by the imperative need to re-establish a legitimate rule so as to redress a situation in which social institutions had been rendered virtually inoperative, in which the people were led to anarchy . . . and in which there was being exerted a conscious effort to destroy all the ethical and moral foundations required to support such institutions.<sup>22</sup>

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tary expanded further on the basic ideas in the communiqué. *Vatan*, May 29, 1960. See also Walter F. Weiker, *The Turkish Revolution 1960-61; Aspects of Military Politics*, Washington, D.C., 1963.

<sup>22</sup> Turkish text in *Milli Birliğe*, pp. 319-20; English text in *News From Turkey*, May



The professors' statement resembled the old *fetva* through which the Şeyhülislam had given religious sanction to government acts, including the change of power. It symbolized in a way the changes in philosophy and group alignment in Turkey. The university, more in form than essence, appeared as the epitome of science and progress, and the professors as the high priests of modernity and democracy, whose pronouncements could turn might into right and revolutionary deeds into legal acts. The university and the intelligentsia had replaced the *meşihat* (Şeyhülislam's office) and the *ulema* respectively, and performed now their functions in the investiture and legitimization of authority. But developments in the next decade were to blow apart these vestiges and postures of the past.

The professors justified the revolution by emphasizing the destruction of the state order at the hands of an interest group, that is the new middle class. This view contrasted sharply with the military's assertion that the revolution did not aim at any social group. The revolution was actually a social upheaval of utmost importance. It represented the natural reaction of the traditional ruling groups around the state to the emergence of a diversified type of civilian order in which group interests dominated. It is symbolic that the opposition to the Democrats began first in 1953, at *Mülkiye* (School of Political Science) known now as *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi*, and that the revolution was carried out by the *Harbiye* (War College). These two institutions represented the main locus of early modernization in Turkey, and were the channels through which the power élites were recruited in the early days of the Republic. (The same had been true in the nineteenth century.) The Democrats, the first truly civilian administration in the history of Turkey, chosen by the people, had failed to find the proper balance and relationship between the old and new groups and thus doomed themselves to failure. But now the modernist élites had become the 'old', and the entrepreneurial middle class groups the 'new' élites of Turkey.

The background of the revolutionary organization proves the point that the revolution was caused in good part by group conflicts.<sup>23</sup> The first secret military organization established in 1954-55 came out as

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30, 1960, pp. 6-9; and Kemal H. Karpat, *Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East*, New York, 1968, pp. 307-9.

<sup>23</sup> See *Milliyet*, May 27-July 14, 1962. Abdi İpekçi-Ömer Sami Coşar, *İhtilâlin İcyüzü*, İstanbul, 1965.

a means to safeguard the military's social and economic status and to protest against the ascendancy of business groups and countryside politicians. Waiting for a long time, the revolutionaries were seeking a propitious time for action, which finally materialized in 1960, through the Democrats' repressive measures. The initiative in establishing the secret organization and in carrying out the revolution fell on colonels and majors, whereas the generals who assumed leadership afterwards played limited roles. The members of the secret association, except for a vague agreement to hold an early election, could not decide on a common ideology, or on the policy to be followed after assuming power.

The military administration went rapidly into action. The Committee for National Unity, composed of 38 officers, abolished the Constitution of 1924, and assumed 'legal' powers under a self-drafted Provisional Law of June 12, 1960.<sup>24</sup> It liberated the political prisoners and re-established freedom of press and assembly. Executive power was left to the Council of Ministers which, though composed mostly of civilians, followed the instructions of C.N.U. The military arrested the Democratic Party ministers and deputies and banned all political activity. They detained in a camp the landlords associated with the Democrats, established committees to investigate the source of wealth of the newly enriched families, and dissolved the executive committees of the Chambers of Trade and Industry, the pressure institutions of the business groups.

The revolution's social motives became more evident when General Gürsel, the President of the Republic and head of C.N.U. declared that Turkey needed social reforms and that 'socialism' could be regarded as a possible avenue for development. Gradually the military began to propose long-range plans for economic and social development. Some intellectuals and the press advanced first cautiously the view that parliamentary democracy based on political parties and dominated by various interest groups was a slow process which could achieve neither rapid progress nor social justice.<sup>25</sup> The attacks on the parliamentary régime were supported by two groups in C.N.U.; the nationalists headed by Colonel Alparslan Türkeş and

<sup>24</sup> *İnkılâp Kanunları*, Vols. 1-2, Istanbul, 1961, pp. 17-21.

<sup>25</sup> Menderes' statement in 1957 that each city district had 15 millionaires was repeatedly cited as an outrage to social justice and as an indication of Democrats' corruption.

the social-minded following Orhan Kabibay and Orhan Erkanlı. The attacks eased when İnönü stated emphatically on behalf of the Republican Party, which was inactive but potentially the only organization capable of assuming power, that the military rule would be temporary and that the return to the parliamentary order through election was an irreversible process.

The struggle within C.N.U. was fought between those who wanted social reforms under prolonged strong rule and those who defended an early return to a civilian democratic order. The conflict was solved when the fourteen most outspoken advocates of reforms and strong government were ousted on November 13, 1960, and assigned to overseas posts. The action paved the way for return to a civilian rule but did not solve the problem of social reforms.

The military had already undertaken a series of measures, and passed altogether 125 laws supposedly to correct the Democrats' errors and speed the society's modern progress. Among these measures the most important ones were the literacy programme, the establishment of a State Planning Organization, the founding of Turkish Cultural Societies (this was a new name for the People's Houses, which was used until 1963), the university reform which led to the summary dismissal of 147 university professors, the programme to rejuvenate the army according to which about 7,000 officers were retired, and finally the revamping of the High Court of Justice in order to try the ousted Democrats.<sup>26</sup>

The above measures, passed hurriedly and without much preparation, expressed on one hand a yearning for social reform and on the other reflected nationalist ideas. The spirit and manner of execution of some of these measures, besides contradicting the military's professed allegiance to democracy, affected also directly the interests and views of various intellectual and entrepreneurial groups. All this finally combined to undermine the enthusiasm for prolonged military rule and strong government. Indeed, such a rule appeared as a strong possibility after a group of about 67 senior field officers formed their own council to speak for the armed forces. It was this group which spoke on behalf of the military and imposed itself on the C.N.U.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>26</sup> *İnkılâp Kanunları*, pp. 367, 382.

<sup>27</sup> In fact some claim that the rivalry among the C.N.U. and the council of

Meanwhile the economy, subjected to rigorous controls and beset by incertitude, came to a standstill. The entrepreneurial groups after a brief hesitation began to exercise growing pressure on the government by sending missions to Ankara, by using the press to air their discontent and opposition, and especially by refraining from investment. On the other hand, the workers, now over a million strong, while in favour of welfare measures, showed little interest in a strong rule by the military or the intellectuals. The peasantry and the lower-middle classes, passive at the beginning, started to display signs of unrest at the danger of prolonged strong rule. Faced with this opposition the military had to pass laws in order 'to protect the reforms of May 27', and to reaffirm their promise of re-establishing civilian rule.<sup>28</sup> It was evident that the social structure of Turkey had become so diversified and interests and attitudes so complex as to make impossible the return to the élitist-monolithic order of the past.

### *The Establishment of the Second Republic*

The military revolution of 1960, although not intending to do so, destroyed the vestiges of the old order and permitted the new middle class to gain additional political and social power through a new constitutional order. It also liberated the social forces from the hold of surviving traditionalism and gave them the freedom to act according to their power and interests. Constitutionalism, parliamentarianism and liberalism, that is the traditional values of the middle class, became the political credo of the new order.

The return to a civilian order began with the convening of a Constituent Assembly on January 6, 1961, to draft a constitution.<sup>29</sup> The 292 members of the Assembly, the majority of whom belonged to the Republican Party or were its sympathizers, were chosen by political parties (the Democrats were expressly left out), universities, bar associations, trade unions, etc. The Constituent Assembly worked on two constitutional drafts: one prepared by an İstanbul commit-

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officers secured the return to a civilian order. The members of C.N.U. had resigned from the army and lost effective control of troops.

<sup>28</sup> Law number 6 of June 30, 1960, *Resmi Gazete* #10539.

<sup>29</sup> See *Kurucu Meclis Kanunu* #158 of December 13, 1960; also *Encyclopedia of Islam*, under *Düstur-Turkey*, p. 644 (new edition).

tee, the other by *Mülkiye* or the School of Political Science in Ankara and came out with a compromise text. The debates in the Assembly revolved basically around the proposals of a younger group to give a predominantly social and statist orientation to the new régime, and the demands for a liberal parliamentary régime and economic freedom defended by the large majority consisting of the established interests.

The final constitutional text which was approved in the referendum on July 9, 1961, began with a preamble expressing faith in national independence and progress as inspired by Turkish nationalism, in the rule of law and social justice, and ended by entrusting the constitution to the citizens' custody.<sup>30</sup> Article 2 of the Constitution defined the Turkish Republic as being a democratic, secular, social state based on the recognition of human rights. It defined the legislature, that is the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, as consisting of a Senate with 150 members elected for six years and 15 appointed by the President, and a National Assembly composed of 450 members elected for four years. The joint houses choose the President for a seven-year term. The Executive, which could include ministers outside the Parliament, was made subject to legislative controls. The judiciary was granted full independence and immunity. A High Court of Judges decided on all matters connected with the personal status of the magistrates while the newly established Constitutional Court judged the constitutionality of all statutes. Individual rights and freedoms were guaranteed by easy access to courts, checks on the Executive, and recourse to the Constitutional Court.<sup>31</sup>

The Constitution called on the government to achieve social justice and rapid economic development while recognizing extensive liberties for the individual, and granting freedom for private enterprise, and security for property. Thus, it strove to define future goals and set up political standards for achieving continuous political development rather than placing in a legal strait-jacket the existing Turkish structure.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>30</sup> The texts are in Rona Aybay, *Karşılaştırmalı 1961 Anayasası*, İstanbul, 1964.

<sup>31</sup> In the constitutional referendum of the 12,749,901 eligible voters, 10,321,111 cast their ballots: 6,348,191 were in favour, 3,934,370 against the Constitution. For various interpretations, see İsmet Giritli, 'Some Aspects of the New Turkish Constitution', *Middle East Journal*, Winter 1962, pp. 1-17; also Nuri Eren, 'Turkey: Problems, Politics, Parties', *Foreign Affairs*, October 1961, pp. 95 ff.

<sup>32</sup> A questionnaire, *Anayasa Komisyonu Anketi*, İstanbul, 1960, according to reliable information was hardly used. The Constitution has a series of serious weaknesses,

The constitution-making process was accompanied by the gradual association of the Republican Party with the military government. The military expected the Republicans to win the forthcoming elections, and by assuming government responsibility to pursue its own policies. All this prompted the former supporters of the Democratic Party to rally against the Republicans, and implicitly against the military. Thus, when the ban on political activity was lifted early in 1961, the opposition was there all but in name. The *Yeni Türkiye* (New Turkey) party of Ekrem Alican, an economist, and later the *Adalet* (Justice) Party of the late Rağıp Gümüşpala, a retired general, were supported mainly by former Democrats, often the brothers and relatives of those being tried at Yassıada for the violation of the Constitution.<sup>33</sup> The trials ended on September 15, 1961; fifteen people were condemned to death and the remaining to various jail sentences ranging from a few months to life terms. Of those condemned to death only Adnan Menderes, Hasan Polatkan, the former Minister of Finance, and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, the former Foreign Minister, were hanged, despite insistent internal and external pleas for clemency. Adnan Menderes had been a hero, now he was made a martyr; to assure the victory of any party opposing his accusers was a duty incumbent on his followers. Nevertheless, the trials did provide a practical lesson to future politicians, for it brought a government before the public to account for its deeds; an event without precedent in Turkish history. But it also opened a profound political wound.

The parliamentary elections held on October 15, 1961 in complete freedom reflected all these influences. Despite the military's moral support and the fact that it was opposed by newly-formed parties, the Republican Party could not win the necessary electoral majority to form an independent government. It had a plurality in the Assembly while in the Senate the Justice Party had a majority. The election for the Assembly used proportional representation, while a majority system was used to elect the senators. Consequently three

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such as accepting the former members of Committee for National Unity as lifetime senators in a system based on popular vote. For critical views on Constitution, see Ali Fuad Başgöl, *İlmin Işığında Günün Meseleleri*, İstanbul, 1960, pp. 86–131.

<sup>33</sup> The accused included 17 ministers and the President, and about 379 deputies. See Hasan Halis Sungur, *Anayasayı İhlâl Suçları ve T.C.K. 146ci Maddesi Hükmüleri*, İstanbul, 1961, pp. 7 ff., 318–23, also *Yassıada Broşürü*, İstanbul, 1960, pp. 22 ff.

successive coalition governments were formed in 1961-64, all under the premiership of İnönü.<sup>34</sup> The military, after an initial attempt to nullify the election agreed to a civilian government under İnönü, provided that the laws passed by the revolutionary officers would not be annulled and that no vindictive action would be undertaken against them. General Cemal Gürsel was elected President, while Ali F. Başgil, the candidate favoured by the Justice Party, withdrew under pressure.

The first coalition formed in collaboration with the Justice Party, despite great differences of opinion and personalities, represented a political compromise overshadowed by mutual fears of military intervention. Nevertheless, this was a civilian government. Soon, however, the economic liberalism and the proposal to liberate the jailed Democrats as put forth by the Justice Party conflicted with the Republicans' statist views and irritated the military who were too sensitive to any action likely to impair the legitimacy of the revolution. The government and the Parliament became impotently deadlocked only a short time after the intensive reformist activities and the ideological discussions in 1960-61 had opened new intellectual, social and economic vistas requiring swift action.

The intelligentsia, disappointed by the failure of the political parties to endorse the social and economic reforms proposed in 1960-61, turned against the parliamentary régime and condemned it as unsuitable to Turkey's need for rapid progress. In the Parliament itself the opposition accused the Republican Party of using the military to maintain their own power and of conveying the impression that it was the army that delayed the full establishment of a civilian rule. The Justice and New Turkey parties insisted on the supremacy of the national will, the Parliament, the Constitution, and the freedom of political parties. These discussions, widely reported by the press, stimulated further the ideological currents in society already in the making since the revolution.

The Marxist current, represented by the *İşçi Partisi* (Labour Party) to fall one year later after its establishment in 1961, under the leadership of Mehmet Ali Aybar, a former university professor, and a variety of other less socialistic organizations were countered by nationalist

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<sup>34</sup> See Kemal H. Karpat, 'Political Developments in Turkey', also René Giraud, 'La Vie Politique en Turquie apres Le 27 May 1960', *Orient* 21, 1962, pp. 21 ff.

groups and associations. The ideological disputes were basically confined to the intelligentsia and did not exercise much influence among workers, peasants or business groups. Formally all groups accepted Atatürk as the founder of modern Turkey and vowed allegiance to his reforms. In practice, however, Atatürk's ideas were interpreted and often distorted according to one's particular viewpoint. To the modernist, secularist school of thought *Atatürkçülük* (Ataturkism or Kemalism) meant a mixture of ideas related to future reforms and a rejection of policies not approved of.<sup>35</sup> To the socialist, Kemalism meant a strong statist-collectivist régime, while for the few intellectuals siding with the new middle classes it was liberalism and freedom of enterprise. The confused ideological atmosphere, indeed proved suitable to extremist actions as indicated by the abortive coups of Colonel Talat Aydemir in 1962 and 1963, which intended to bring about a strong, supposedly reformist, régime but which in reality was a rightist dictatorship. The coups were unsuccessful, first because the commanding echelons among the military remained loyal to İnönü, and second because the army as a whole wanted to stay out of politics, especially since its interests were safeguarded by a series of laws and measures enacted in 1960. Aydemir's trial and execution, in 1964, produced no reaction.<sup>36</sup>

Actually, by 1964, the chances of democracy in Turkey appeared brighter than the above analysis may indicate. Most of the jailed Democrats, including many of those condemned to life terms, were quietly released, largely through the President's clemency powers. The economic plans for development undertaken with the advice of the State Planning Organization, established in 1960, seemed geared to produce, if stability were restored, an annual economic growth rate of more than 6 per cent. The Planning Organization, after an initial effort to acquire extra-parliamentary powers, submitted to political controls and began to promote the idea of a mixed economy through its publications and was instrumental in establishing the idea of a rational planned economy.<sup>37</sup> The five-year plans (the first was

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<sup>35</sup> *Atatürkçülük Nedir?* (Yaşar Nabi, ed.), İstanbul, 1963; also *Çeşitli Cepheleriyle Atatürk* (Conferences delivered at Robert College), İstanbul, 1964.

<sup>36</sup> Frank Tachau and Haluk Ülman, 'Dilemmas of Turkish Politics', *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations 1962*, Ankara, 1964, pp. 21 ff.

<sup>37</sup> See *Planning in Turkey*, Ankara, 1964; *Capital Formation and Investment in Industry*, İstanbul, 1963, pp. 150 ff.



adopted in 1963), although encountering difficulties because of shortage of foreign currency, were nevertheless successfully implemented. In fact, experts conceded that the Turkish economy had some basic strength, that private capital was accumulated, that managerial skill had developed but it had been handicapped by adverse psychological and political conditions. But the intelligentsia still affected by its élitist view on authority could not accept and learn to live with a new middle class which controlled the party organizations and much of the economy. In fact, some did not hesitate to indicate the Ba'ath Party of Syria as the model to be followed. The new middle class in turn, accustomed to associate the military and the intelligentsia with absolute government, could not fully accept that these groups too had their special social and cultural roles. Nevertheless, the uncompromising attitude shown by the two groups against each other in 1961-64, became somewhat more flexible after both had undergone some change. The intelligentsia gradually discredited itself, as did the academics, through their utopian schemes of development, the defence of strong government, the meaningless rhetoric and especially the embarrassing lack of practical understanding of society and the human being.<sup>38</sup> In the Justice Party itself the extremist nationalist group was defeated by the moderate majority which was willing to accept the political realities of Turkey and learn to live with them. The debate taking place within the Justice Party was concluded in the party convention of December 1964. The anti-militarist extremist group headed by the incumbent chairman, *Sadettin Bilgiç*, a doctor from Isparta province, was defeated by an almost two-thirds majority by those supporting Süleyman Demirel, a former high government official born in a village in the same province as his opponent. Demirel slowly distinguished himself as one of the most capable men to appear on the Turkish political scene for a long time. Under his direction the Justice Party and eventually the government achieved a *modus vivendi* with the military and broadened further the sphere of political and economic activity as indicated further.

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<sup>38</sup> *Öncü*, April 20, 1962.

*The Coalition Governments and the Justice Party Rule*

The first coalition government under İnönü's leadership was formed, as mentioned, between the Republican and Justice parties in 1961. It dissolved in June 1962, largely because the partnership seemed to erode the latter's popular support. The assumption proved to be right. İnönü formed his second coalition in association with the New Turkey Party and the Republican National Peasant Party. However, in the municipal elections of November 17, 1963, N.T.P. lost almost half of its votes, mostly to the Justice Party, and hurriedly abandoned the coalition in a futile attempt to regain its popularity. A third coalition formed by İnönü with the other minor parties in January 1964, lacked vitality. The economy, though somewhat improved in comparison with the situation in 1960-61, still stagnated. Consequently, even its most rabid opponents appeared resigned to a government by the Justice Party which behind the scene exerted profound influence on the public. Meanwhile the public image of the Justice Party improved considerably through the election of Süleyman Demirel as chairman in the party convention held beginning November 30, 1964. Demirel was brought to the chairmanship of the party primarily because of his proven administrative capability and political moderation, and because he symbolized by background and achievement both modernity and national authenticity; he came from a Turkish village and achieved technological reputation as an engineer of water-works. Under his chairmanship, the professionals, technicians, and the moderate elements interested in political stability and economic development gradually acquired the upper hand in the party organization by replacing the agrarians and some of the diehard former Democrats. The military and sections of the intelligentsia, though still suspicious of the Justice Party, welcomed the change in the leadership as a repudiation of the anti-militarist extremist and reactionary views, and as a step closer to their own modernist—secularist stand.

Demirel faced a series of conflicting demands. He had to devise a policy within his own party which would satisfy the entrepreneurial, business and professional groups' demands for political security and stability necessary for investment and economic development but without alienating the right wing, as well as those desiring to rehabilitate the condemned Democrats. Moreover, he had to placate the military as well as a variety of intellectuals, all too prone to read

reactionary or vindictive motives in Justice Party decisions. Demirel had also to preserve the loyalty of the rank-and-file, notably the peasantry, who out of interest or conviction or sheer sentimental attachment expected the Justice Party to follow the Democratic Party's policies and rehabilitate its leaders. But most important of all he had to achieve control of the government and acquire some charisma. He achieved both by toppling the İnönü cabinet through the rejection of the budget law. İnönü resigned early in 1965, and a new coalition government was formed under the premiership of Suat Hayri Ürgüplü, elected as an independent. The new coalition was based on the Justice Party (Demirel was Deputy Premier) and the New Turkey Party and two other minor parties.

The campaign for the forthcoming elections, to be held in the autumn of 1965, appeared as a struggle chiefly between the Republican and Justice parties. The Republican Party, various supporters of the revolution of 1960, including the intelligentsia, seemed to have united merely with the purpose of preventing the Justice Party from securing an electoral majority sufficient to form a cabinet by itself. While heading the coalition government, the Republican Party had allowed considerable freedom to the Labour Party and various leftist organizations, partly because of constitutional obligations, but chiefly with the hope that the leftists would take away the Justice Party's rural support; in the process the Republicans lost their own best young leaders to the Labour Party. An amendment to the election law introduced a cumulative system supposedly to help strengthen the minor parties but actually to weaken further the Justice Party's electoral chances.

The effect of all this was just the opposite; the Justice Party appeared as the victim of the old ruling groups while the intelligentsia and even the Republican Party appeared unwilling to abide by popular will. The Justice Party capitalized on these issues and in the elections held October 10, 1965, it won a comfortable majority in the Senate and the Assembly and formed an independent government under Demirel's premiership. The party received its support mostly from villages, labour and the lower urban groups, while the Republicans were supported by upper urban groups, the intelligentsia, bureaucracy, and scattered regions in the East and Southeast, and Central Anatolia.

It is interesting to note that prior to these elections the Republican Party revised its programme in order to give broader representation

to social ideas and make it a party 'left of the centre', *ortanın solu*. This shift to the left, which was fully exploited by the Justice Party, cost the Republicans considerable votes. It also exacerbated the differences in the Republican Party between an ideologically oriented small group in the national party organization and two other groups: the moderate statist, some of whom were influential in the central bodies, and the larger groups in the country branches favouring a somewhat more liberal economic policy. The conflict in the Republican Party eventually came into the open, and the moderate statist under the leadership of Turhan Feyzioğlu, a former professor, seceded and formed the *Güven* (Trust) Party in May 1967. The actual control in the Republican Party remained in the hands of İsmet İnönü, the chairman, and his Secretary General Bülent Ecevit, a former newspaperman.

The Justice Party policy in 1965–69 was conditioned on one hand by the need to promote economic development and achieve social justice and on the other to do away with the lingering effects of the revolution of 1960, that is, to pardon and rehabilitate the condemned Democrats. The economic development, which resulted in a mean annual growth of about 7 per cent, was criticized by socialists as favouring the businessmen and entrepreneurs whom they labelled as 'the stooges of Western capitalism and imperialism', as well as by the liberals who found it laden with cumbersome government controls. Actually the economic policy followed generally the constitutional principle of a mixed economy, that is, the joint use of the economic means in the hands of the government and individuals to promote general welfare and social justice. The leftist organizations which arose mostly among university students, teachers and some professionals, subjected the government to vehement attacks by claiming that its economic and social policies were complete failures. The fact is, however, that the steady increase of production and employment, and a visible qualitative change in the life of town and many village dwellers, made these attacks ineffective as far as the bulk of the population was concerned. But some of the student boycotts and demonstrations, as well as the clashes between leftists and rightists, which tended to go beyond the university campuses, and initially were intended to create difficulties for the Justice Party achieved their goal. The party vacillated between a firm conviction that in a liberal democratic régime all liberties should be freely exercised and the fear that certain groups may abuse this freedom to promote their

own anti-democratic ends. The ultimate hope seems to rest in a self-binding sense of civic responsibility.

The relations of the Justice Party's government with the military after 1965 were far smoother than expected. The election of General Cevdet Sunay as President upon the incapacitation and death of Cemal Gürsel in 1966, was considered by the military as an act of good faith. Sunay, as Chief of Staff, played an important role in saving the parliamentary régime in 1961, and was instrumental in securing better conditions for the military. The government improved further the material conditions of the officers and refrained from interference in strictly military matters while displaying the traditional reverence for the army. Yet for a long time it was not able to solve the main problem on which the military and the Justice party seemed diametrically opposed: the complete amnesty of the Democrats. These, including former President Celal Bayar, had been released from jail but were deprived, under a constitutional clause, of their political rights. It seemed that a group in the Justice Party, mostly the politically rightist and economically liberal group formed around the former chairman Saadeddin Bilgiç, wanted to make the full rehabilitation of the Democrats the issue for capturing the party chairmanship. Moreover, the former Democrats, notably the octogenarian Celal Bayar and his ageing disciples, seemed more than interested in acquiring some position in the Justice Party which they regarded as their own usurped inheritance. İnönü and his Republican Party capitalized on this situation by introducing, just before the elections of 1969, a proposal to amend the Constitution and rehabilitate the Democrats. The amendment was accepted in the Assembly but was stopped in the Senate by the Justice Party largely because of the military's opposition. The amendment was duly passed after the elections without causing any reaction from the military.

It must be mentioned that the debates revolving around the use of religion for political purposes, which seemed to have been a major difference between the Republican and Justice Party in 1961-64, gradually lost their importance. Except for a handful of old-time secularists, very few people seem to be interested in indulging in such polemics. Finally, prior to the elections of 1969, the Republican Party decided not to invoke the issue in its election campaign since it apparently did not affect the electorate one way or other. Instead, it stressed the need for social and economic reforms through statism,

which in the context of Turkish historical experience implied strong government controls, and the supremacy of an intellectual bureaucratic élite. At the end the Republicans grudgingly acknowledged the existence of a new entrepreneurial middle class and adopted some measures specifically designed to attract them. It is important to note that despite some social measures such as the right to strike and collective bargaining favourable to labour enacted by the Republican government in 1963, the workers still backed the Justice Party. Apparently they preferred political freedom to statism, though the latter was potentially more favourable to them.

The economic development in 1960–69, and the social and cultural transformation which accompanied it, have changed considerably the nature of the political issues as well as the voters' attitudes in Turkey. Accounting for this change are material and cultural factors, such as the increase in the rate of urbanization, which reached more than 25 per cent in 1960 and 31 per cent in 1965, the literacy rate which went up to 48 per cent (actually the enrolment of school-age children is over 90 per cent), the intensive communication, the exposure of workers in Europe—most of whom come from villages and lower urban groups—to new ideas and modes of life, and the rise of new professional and service groups. (See appendix.) Meanwhile the rate of employment in industry and the income derived from industrial and service occupations have increased much faster than those in agriculture.

These basic changes do not seem to have impressed sufficiently the existing political parties since most of these appear to be more concerned with maintaining the *status quo* rather than adjusting to change. In fact, the surge of various leftist currents, first among the well-to-do intellectuals and lately among some labour and other urban groups, can be attributed to the inability of the major political parties to evaluate these changes and give them an intellectual and practical expression in their own programmes and attitudes. The Republican Party, as mentioned before, revised its programme, supposedly with the purpose of making it more responsive to the new conditions. Actually the revisions did not stem from a realistic appraisal of the Turkish economic and social realities but from tactical considerations designed to capitalize on the social ferment and win votes. The party speakers, headed by the Secretary-General, used the slogans of class warfare, notably in the campaign for the municipal election of June 1968, with the ardour of professional revolutionaries. This approach

attracted some of the Labour Party followers but did not secure the Republicans substantial popular support. The Republicans were instrumental in the beginning in stirring up and supporting the student demonstrations in the hope of paralysing the government. They also obstructed much of the legislative programme of the government party. But these unorthodox tactics caused considerable friction in the party, while the Marxists attacked the Republicans for degrading socialism and for utilizing the radical tactics of the left for their own conservative ends. Finally, many leftists turned against the party as being ideologically unsuitable for creating the 'new society'. All this had a moderating effect on the party's policies and forced it to scale down its attacks on the régime; the Secretary-General had proclaimed that *bu düzen değişmelidir* (this order must change). At the same time the Labour Party, the chief exponent of Marxism, all too prone to produce ready-made slogans to explain the society's transformation, gradually alienated itself from the mainstream of thought. After considerable activity it was torn apart by internal struggles among its own groups; the intellectuals, the trade unionists and the 'authentic' revolutionaries, that is, those who claimed seniority in starting the leftist movement in 1946. The latest conflict broke out after the party chairman criticized the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

The Justice Party's understanding of the changes in the country which it promoted and generalized was rather superficial and ambiguous. Like its predecessors, the Democratic Party, it accepted material change as an inherent part of modernization but refused to acknowledge the social and cultural adjustments necessitated by the same change. It clung stubbornly to the notion that the peasants and the lower urban groups have a permanent fear of the urban, intellectual and bureaucratic élites and that this fear would make them vote for the Justice Party as long as the Republican Party lasted. The party alienated a large part of the intelligentsia by its condemnation of the ideologically formulated social ideas as being leftist or quasi-subversive, and by its lukewarm attitude towards the rightists. Moreover, it tended to overemphasize the danger of military takeover and to keep alive the resentment caused by the revolution of 1960, which was latent among some of its followers. Most important, however, is the fact that the party failed to keep up with the intellectual development, the aspirations and the broader political philosophy of its main leadership group: the élites of the new middle classes. The *yeminliler* (sworn) group in the Parliament, made up of

the younger members of the party, usually from the larger urban centres, advocate a social and economic policy based on broader popular participation, while the rightists and the conservatives prefer a very liberal economic policy, strict control of the ideological parties and the maintenance of the grass-root character of the party. Süleyman Demirel, often siding with one or other group, contained the struggle until the last elections held on October 12, 1969. These elections were won by the Justice Party due to an amendment of the electoral law which abolished the cumulative vote. The party won 256 seats for the Assembly (out of a total of 450), but its popular vote fell from 52.9 per cent to 46.60 per cent. The Republican Party also increased its seats, while the extreme left and right were practically liquidated as far as their parliamentary representation was concerned. Of the six minor parties only the Trust Party won enough votes to form a parliamentary group. For all practical purposes Turkey returned to the two-party system as the two major parties, the Justice and Republican, accounted for 74 per cent of the popular vote and 88.7 per cent of the parliamentary seats. (See appendix.) Even in the past, despite the special provisions favouring the small parties, the pattern did not vary greatly. Probably the most important trend revealed by the elections was the gain made by the Republican Party in the traditional strongholds of the Justice Party in the South-west, that is the main centres of the new middle-class groups. It seems that this group has begun to look upon the programme and the overall intellectual level of the Republican Party as being more congenial to its own level of development and expectations, especially after the party rid itself of its borrowed radicalism and extreme leftist postures. The new cabinet formed by Süleyman Demirel did not include those ministers (*Sadettin Bilgiç*, Mehmet Turgut, Faruk Sükan, Cihat Bilgehan and Hasan Dinçer), in the former cabinet considered to belong to the right-conservative wing of the Justice Party.

#### *Foreign Relations: 1954–70*

The foreign relations of Turkey reflected the internal developments and were affected by the same.<sup>39</sup> After a rapid and total involve-

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<sup>39</sup> On foreign policy of Turkey, see Hikmet Bayur, *Türkiye Devletinin Dış Siyaseti*,



ment in the Western policies in the Middle East in 1947-60, Turkey gradually tried to disengage partially in order to consolidate her regional relations and to adjust to the conditions likely to be created by the East-West *détente*. Moreover, as her economy developed, Turkey attempted to improve her economic relations with the Balkan countries, and later, after the June war of 1967, with the Arab countries by supplying the latter with some commodities and household goods. Though Turkish foreign policy remained basically pro-Western, nevertheless it acquired increasingly independent postures, especially after the Cyprus dispute, renewed in 1963, brought about a critical confrontation between what the country considered to be her national interest and her commitment to international alliance.

We have mentioned above foreign relations in 1947-52. It remains to survey those in 1953-69. The Balkan alliance with Greece and Yugoslavia signed in August 1954, following a friendship treaty enacted one year earlier, aimed chiefly at strengthening the position of Tito after his break with the Kremlin in 1948. Though it opened at the beginning tantalizing possibilities, it was not pursued to its logical conclusion. The Geneva talks between the United States and the Soviets in 1955, having produced a reduction of tensions, and the Russians and the Yugoslavs having achieved an understanding, the tripartite Balkan pact lost its meaning. The relations of Turkey with the Arab world worsened after 1952, because of Turkish total commitment to Western foreign policy. The still unhealed wounds caused by the annexation of Hatay in 1939 were reopened when Turkey recognized Israel in 1949, and then out of deference to her Western allies refused to support some Arab causes. A brief attempt at rapprochement with the Arabs in 1955 failed when its real motive, that is the involvement of the Arabs in the Western defence system, became evident. The Baghdad Pact of mutual assistance, concluded on February 24, 1955, between Turkey and Iraq, and joined later by Great Britain, Iran and Pakistan, was the principal factor which spoiled the relations between Turkey and the Arab nationalist régimes.

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İstanbul, 1938. L.V. Thomas and R.N. Frye, *The United States and Turkey and Iran*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1951. D.A. Rustow, 'Foreign Policy of the Turkish Republic', *Foreign Policy in World Politics* (Roy C. Macridis, ed.) Englewood, N.J., 1958, pp. 295-322; Richard Robinson, *The First Turkish Republic*, Cambridge, 1963, pp. 162-89; Mehmet Gönlübol and Cem Sar, *Atatürk ve Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası, 1919-1938*, Ankara, 1963; *The Problem of the Turkish Straits* (U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., 1947). See also *Turkish Foreign Policy* (K.H. Karpat, ed.) forthcoming.

Though the pact members mediated successfully in the Suez Canal dispute of 1956, this did not improve Turkey's standing among the Arab bloc headed by Egypt. On the other hand, Turkey maintained friendly relations with the monarchies of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iraq. However, the destruction of the monarchy in Iraq in 1958, led to the expected withdrawal of this country from the Baghdad Pact. The latter was renamed Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and turned gradually from a military and political alliance into a regional organization for economic co-operation between Iran, Pakistan and Turkey.

The real test of Turkey's foreign relations and dependence on the West came through the Cyprus dispute. It began in 1954/55, in the form of Greek Cypriot demands for independence and *enosis*, unity with Greece. Turkey claimed that any final settlement on Cyprus should consider the fact that the island lay only 43 miles from her coast, and that over 100,000 Turks lived on it. The dispute was eventually settled in 1959/60, but not until the relations between Turkey and Greece, both members of NATO, reached breaking point. The agreements of London and Zürich, concluded first between Turkey and Greece and joined later by the United Kingdom and Archbishop Makarios in 1959/60, led to the independence of Cyprus under a special Constitutional arrangement based on the communal organization of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish community was granted the vice-presidency and 30 per cent of the seats in the Parliament and civil service. Internally each community decided its own affairs. In December 1963, Makarios proposed a series of constitutional amendments which, if accepted, would have deprived the Turkish self-governing community of its political rights and transformed it into a minority. The proposals were rejected and Makarios' irregulars attacked the Turkish Cypriot communities in order to force upon them the rule of the Greeks who now viewed themselves as a majority. Turkey reacted by threatening to intervene as she was entitled by a special Treaty of Guarantee signed in 1960. Greece also declared her readiness to oppose the military actions of Turkey and claimed that prior treaty agreements had lost their validity. The Greeks seemed to have accepted the settlements of 1960 as the first step leading to the incorporation of Cyprus into Greece. The archaic idea of Greater Greece which had marred relations between the two countries for a century and a half was thus revived along with all the medieval religious prejudices and abusive propaganda which the

Greeks had used against Turkey in the past. The Cyprus issue came before the United Nations which sent a peace-keeping force to the island in March 1964, but without being able to restore peace or safeguard fully the safety and properties of the Cypriot Turks. The United States, while opposing several times Turkey's decision to land troops to protect the Cypriot Turks, claimed to maintain a neutral policy even though this 'neutral' attitude favoured the Greeks who, assured that the Turks would be prevented from landing, proceeded to annihilate the Turkish Cypriot enclaves. Meanwhile Makarios had already entered into negotiations with Egypt to secure arms, and in September 1964 received a promise of aid from the Soviet Union. Turkey found herself with no support from her Balkan or Middle East neighbours or the new nations of Africa and Asia. The West seemed to have failed Turkey in an issue which had a profound symbolic and historical significance for her. Moreover, subtle pressures, including withholding of economic aid to force Turkey into compromise, increased the antagonism to the United States. Finally, in 1964, President Johnson wrote a rather ill-considered letter to İnönü, who was still the Premier, which, when made public, turned popular opinion against the U.S.A. Consequently the neutralist feeling and the reaction against total commitment to Western foreign policy which was already evident after the revolution of 1960 gained ground rapidly. The reaction was nurtured further by the intelligentsia's social resentment, since economic aid from abroad seemed to have strengthened the new middle class in economic occupations and helped the Democrats and the Justice Party maintain themselves in power. Yet, when Turkey joined the European Common Market in 1963 as an associate member, an event of profound long-range consequences, there was little opposition to it except from the radical left.

Meanwhile, feeling isolated and relatively insecure as a consequence of the Cyprus dispute, Turkey began to move towards some sort of accommodation with the Soviets after she had rejected for a decade promises of help and renewed friendship. The claims on the Straits had been renounced by the Soviets long ago as being a Stalinist aberration. In November 1964, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Cemal Erkin, visited Moscow, the first man of his rank to do so in 25 years. Later, Parliamentary groups, prime ministers and the heads of state exchanged visits, and several trade and technical assistance agreements were signed. The Soviet-Turkish thaw enhanced also the position of the leftists at home who became an important factor in

Turkish domestic politics despite their division into Maoist, Soviet, Turkish revolutionist and anarchist groupings.

The Arab-Israeli War of 1967 provided Turkey with a chance to better her relations with the Arabs by supporting various U.N. resolutions. Though relations with Israel have cooled considerably, Turkey has refused to become involved in the dispute. Relations with the United States seem to be relatively stable now after some adjustments in Turkish-American treaties have been made. The government and the major opposition parties endorse generally the pro-Western alliance including membership of NATO. Nevertheless the press and the students persist in their anti-American campaign.

Turkey has over 400,000 workers in European countries, who provide a substantial portion of her foreign currency, and is a member of several economic and political organizations. She has become an integral part of the European system, though some say more as a tolerated poor client than an equal ally. One cannot envisage at this time any drastic changes in Turkish foreign policy so long as the domestic régime lasts. It is, however, natural and expected that in the near future Turkey would play some important part in the Middle East as well as in Soviet-Chinese relations. Her geographical position, historical ties and military power makes her a natural candidate for such a role.

## APPENDIX

MAJORS INDICATORS OF DEVELOPMENT\*  
(Thousands)

<i>Indicators</i>	<i>Years</i>	<i>1927</i>	<i>1935</i>	<i>1940</i>	<i>1945</i>	<i>1950</i>	<i>1955</i>	<i>1960</i>	<i>1965</i>
Population (000)		13,648	16,158	17,821	18,790	20,947	24,065	27,754	31,391
Net national income (Factor cost, 1948, million TL)		4,449	6,111	7,690	5,942	9,098	12,334	16,677	20,926
<i>Per capita</i> income (Factor cost, 1948, TL)		328	378	431	316	434	512	601	667
Urban population (000) (Centres over 10,000)		2,236	2,684	3,203	3,442	3,872	5,324	6,999	—
Urban population (per cent of total)		16.4	16.6	18.0	18.3	18.5	20.9	25.2	—
Radios (000)		—	29	78	176	321	999	1,341	2,443
Newspapers, Magazines		—	149	338	336	647	—	1,658	1,722
Highways (km)		22,053	39,583	41,582	43,511	47,080	55,008	61,542	—
Railroads (km)		4,637	6,639	7,381	7,515	7,671	7,802	7,895	9,301
Literacy (as % of total population)		10.7	19.6	22.4	29.2	33.5	40.7	43.7	48.0

\* The sources for these statistics are the Yearbooks and the relevant publications of the Turkish Institute of Statistics, Ankara, issued in 1927-65. For reasons of space they have not been included here.

CHAIN INDEX NUMBERS OF MAJOR INDICATORS OF DEVELOPMENT

	1927	1935	1940	1945	1950	1955	1960	1965
Population	100.0	118.4	112.9	105.6	111.5	114.9	115.3	113.1
Net National Income	100.0	137.4	125.8	77.3	153.3	135.6	135.2	128.8
<i>Per capita</i> Income	100.0	116.0	114.1	73.3	137.4	120.3	117.2	110.9
Urban population	100.0	120.0	119.3	107.5	112.5	137.5	131.5	
<i>Communications and Mass Media</i>								
Radios	—	100.0	269.8	225.3	186.2	311.2	134.3	182.1 (1963)
Newspapers and Magazines	—	100.0	226.8	99.4	195.2		256.3	103.9
<i>Transportation</i>								
Highways	100.0	179.5	105.0	104.9	108.2	116.8	111.9	
Railroads	100.0	143.2	111.2	101.8	102.1	101.7	101.2	117.8
<i>Literacy</i>								
As % of total population	100.0	183.2	114.3	130.4	114.7	121.2	107.6	109.8
Literate population	100.0	216.7	126.0	137.4 (1946)	109.7 (1950)	162.4 (1954)	124.1 (1957/60/1961/65)	124.2
Political participation		insignificant		100.0	119.1	99.2	86.7/105.7/100.5/87.6	

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTIONS

	1950	1954	1957	1961*	1961	1965	1969†
Eligible votes	8,905,743	10,262,063	12,078,623	12,747,901	12,925,395	13,679,753	14,692,581
No. of votes cast	7,953,085	9,095,617	9,250,949	10,321,111	10,522,716	9,748,678	9,380,860
% of participation	89.3	88.6	76.6	81.0	81.4	71.3	63.8
Trust Party							577,026 (6.42)
Democratic Party	4,241,393 (53.3)	5,151,550 (56.6)	4,372,621 (47.3)				
Freedom Party			346,881 (4.0)				
Nation Party	250,414 (3.1)					582,704 (6.3)	294,655 (3.3)
National Movement P.							278,220 (3.1)
Justice Party					3,527,435 (34.8)	4,921,235 (52.9)	4,184,814 (46.6)
New Turkey Party					1,391,934 (13.7)	346,514 (3.7)	202,042 (2.7)
Peasant's Party		57,011 (0.6)	350,597 (3.8)				
Republican National P.		434,085 (4.8)	652,064 (7.0)				
Republican Peasant's National P.					1,415,390 (14.0)	208,696 (2.2)	
Republican Peoples P.	3,176,561 (39.9)	3,161,696 (34.8)	3,753,136 (40.6)		3,724,752 (36.7)	2,675,785 (28.7)	2,465,554 (27.5)
Turkish Labour P.						276,101 (3.0)	238,741 (2.7)

POST REVOLUTION = (NEW CONSTITUTION,  
BROADER REPRESENTATION)

Table (cont.)

	1950	1954	1957	1961*	1961	1965	1969†
Union P.							228,586 (2.54)
Independents	383,282 (4.8)	137,318 (1.5)	4,994 (0.1)		81,732 (0.8)	296,528 (3.2)	508,733 (5.7)

\* Constitutional Referendum.

† Unofficial results excluding Hakkari province.

Sources: 1950–65 *Milletvekili ve 1961, 1964 Cumhuriyet Senatosu Üye Seçimleri Sonuçları* (the Results of 1950–65 Deputy Elections and the Senate Elections of 1961, 1964), State Institute of Statistics, Ankara, 1966. *Cumhuriyet*, Oct. 15, 1969 (İstanbul).



## THE TURKISH ELECTIONS OF 1957

### I

The last national elections held on October 27, 1957, mark an important stage in the history of political parties and democracy in Turkey. These elections, the fourth since the country's transition to a multi-party system, provide an excellent opportunity to study various issues shaping politics in Turkey and which will ultimately determine the future of her democracy.

The Turkish multi-party system has been functioning on a continuous basis since 1945–46. Whatever its shortcomings this is the longest lasting experiment in parliamentarianism in Turkish history. The first experiment began in 1877 and 1878, and lasted several months; the second, undertaken by Young Turks, began in 1908 and ended in 1911 in the domination of the Union and Progress party; the third, initiated by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) in 1930, led to the establishment of the *Serbest Furka* (Liberal party) of Fethi Bey (later Okyar) but was suppressed a few months later and the People's Republican party alone ruled the country until 1945.<sup>1</sup>

The last experiment in parliamentarianism was initiated by the Republican party itself in 1945 through an unusual decision to allow the establishment of opposition parties. The reasons for this decision may be sought in a variety of sources; first in the political, economic,

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\* This article was completed just before the military coup of May 27, 1960, which ousted the Democratic party government of Menderes. We have kept the article intact since the information supplied here presents the background of the revolution. The developments in Turkey since May 1960 have proved the conclusions drawn here to be right, point by point. For information on recent events see Kemal H. Karpat, "Young Turks Again," *Challenge*, March 1961.

<sup>1</sup> The evolution of Turkey's political regime, its transition to a multi-party system and various causes which conditioned it have been discussed by this author. See Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics, the Transition to a Multi-party System* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959). For the history of political parties, see Tarık Z. Tunaya, *Türkiyede Siyasi Partiler* (Political Parties in Turkey) (İstanbul, 1952). Also Cevat Naki Akkerman, *Türkiyede Siyasi Partiler Hakkında Kısa Notlar* (Brief Notes on Political Parties in Turkey) (Ankara, 1950). For a chronology of political developments in Turkey in 1942–51, see Gotthard Jäschke, *Die Türkei in den Jahren 1942–51* (Wiesbaden, 1955).

and social transformation of the country, which necessitated a political reorganization, or at least a change which had become imperative at the end of World War II.<sup>2</sup> (Turkey did not become directly involved in the war. She severed her relations with the Axis Powers in 1944, and later declared war on them on February 23, 1945, in order to qualify for membership in the United Nations. She kept her army in battle readiness throughout the strife by imposing heavy economic burdens on the population.) The second reason for democratization may lie in the United Nations Charter, the acceptance of which was considered a moral pledge on the part of the government to democratize the political system; besides, it was hoped that such a measure could improve Turkey's standing among her Western allies. The increasing reliance of Turkey on the West and in particular on the United States for military and economic aid made her very sensitive to the opinion of her Western allies. Consequently, President İsmet İnönü promised political freedom, and the Parliamentary Group of the ruling Republican party took liberalization measures in 1945. Soon four Republican deputies separated from the party—three were expelled and one resigned—and established the *Demokrat parti* on January 7, 1946.<sup>3</sup> Celal Bayar, an ex-premier, Refik Koraltan, Adnan Menderes, and Fuat Köprülü, the dissident deputies, drafted the new party's program, completed the necessary formalities and became the *kurucular*, founders of the party, a title which secured them special prestige and leadership therein. The Democratic party, encouraged by overwhelming popular support, as well as by the benevolent attitude of the government, quickly consolidated its position. Its existence, as well as that of other political parties, was finally guaranteed in İnönü's declaration of July 12, 1947, which could be considered as the document laying the foundations of the multi-party system in Turkey.<sup>4</sup> In 1948, a group of dissidents broke away in protest against the domination of Democratic leaders and formed the *Millet Partisi* (National party). This party was

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<sup>2</sup> See Bernard Lewis, "Recent Developments in Turkey," *International Affairs* (July 1951), p. 323

<sup>3</sup> During the summer of 1945 the late Nuri Demirağ, a rich industrialist from İstanbul, had already formed the *Milli Kalkınma Partisi*, National Resurgence party, which proved that the government was indeed ready to accept an opposition.

<sup>4</sup> For text see *Ulus* (Nation), July 12, 1947, also *Ayn Tarihi* (Monthly History) (July 1947), pp. 15 ff. Karpat, *op. cit.*, pp. 191-93.

abolished by the government in 1953 because of clericalists who had gained control of it, and clearly plotted to destroy secularism which is the foundation of the Turkish Republic. The party, however, was re-established immediately afterwards under the name of the Republican National party and since then has increasingly consolidated its position as Turkey's third-largest political party. The National party absorbed the Turkish Peasant party, a minor organization, and changed its name to *Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi* (Republican Peasant National party).

The Grand National Assembly, in which the Republicans held overwhelming majority, approved in 1950 a liberal election law in which the judiciary supervised the entire election procedure, so different from the past when elections were controlled by the executive branch of the government. The subsequent elections held on May 14, 1950, expressing accumulated resentment to the twenty-seven years' rule of the Republicans, resulted in a decisive Democratic victory.<sup>5</sup>

The Democrats' first term of office in 1950–54 was marked by the relative expansion of the freedoms of assembly, press, travel abroad, and individual rights, all of which had been liberalized in varying degrees by the Republicans in 1946–50. The greatest achievement of the Democratic party while in power was its economic policy which, subsidized with generous assistance and loans from abroad, had brought about an unprecedented rate of development. Economic welfare and freedom were the two fundamental issues with which the Democrats entered the elections of 1954 and won a smashing victory. But by 1955 the economic policy backfired. The difference between the high rate of industrial investment and low production led to inflation and consequently to a high cost of living, while the intense farm mechanization in 1949–54 deprived tenants and sharecroppers of their living and forced them to migrate into cities.

On one hand the necessity of maintaining a high rate of industrialization to provide employment for the newcomers into the city, and on the other hand the need to sustain farm mechanization and increase production in agriculture to pay for industrialization, produced a vicious circle which, because of lack of capital and foreign currency, resulted in some deterioration of living standards and caused

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<sup>5</sup> For a comparison of votes see the following sections and appendix.

dissatisfaction with the government. The opposition assisted by an increasingly friendly press seized upon this opportunity, as well as upon some cases of corruption among the members of the ruling party, and launched into increasingly vehement criticism of the government policies. The Democratic party deemed this criticism unjustified, and on the whole utterly harmful to the country's economic and social development, which it considered a national mission placed above all party considerations. It also opposed the *ispat hakkı*, the newspapermen's right to produce evidence against the government officials accused of mishandling funds, as a device concocted by the opposition to harm government personnel's prestige. Convinced that the opposition was plotting to "sabotage" the "country's bright future," the government passed a series of laws curbing the freedom of the press and assembly, and at the same time silenced criticism within the party itself. The liberal wing of the Democratic party finally rebelled under the leadership of Fevzi L. Karaosmanoğlu and early in 1956 formed the *Hürriyet Partisi* (Freedom party) which became Turkey's fourth-largest party.<sup>6</sup> It finally merged with the Republican party in November 1958.

The effects of the various social, economic, and political developments described above intensified in 1954–57; the government tried to carry out its policy amidst all kinds of difficulties while the opposition, encouraged by the turn in public opinion, stiffened its criticism. The Democratic party leaders finally became convinced that the tide was turning against them. With no visible relief in sight for several years until the economic development program was supposed to reach full fruition, these leaders decided to hold elections on October 27, 1957, instead of in the summer of 1958 as originally scheduled.

The National Assembly dissolved itself on September 11, 1957, but not before revising the Election Law, the third revision since 1950, with the purpose of preventing the opposition from presenting a united coalition slate against the government, or even from

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<sup>6</sup> Some considered the *Köylü Partisi* (Peasant Party) a major political party. Its membership, influence, and ideas would not place it among the "big" four. Its only visible success was in the municipal elections of 1955 when it won 262 municipal seats out of 11,807 contested, just because the major opposition party, the Republicans, did not participate in the elections. In 1954 it received 39,473 votes. In 1957 it did not participate in the elections and one year later it merged with the National party.

fusing in the form of a new political party.<sup>7</sup> It also passed a law declaring a ten-year moratorium on all the farmers' debts to the Agricultural Bank. This and other material benefits, coupled with the special political and social status given to the villagers for the first time, swung the rural vote to the Democrats.<sup>8</sup> As a result of the law, the opposition's tentative coalition collapsed and each party entered the election on its own.<sup>9</sup>

## II

The election campaign and the election itself took place under the supervision of the Boards of Election. These Boards are headed at the district and provincial level by the highest ranking local judge. They are responsible to the Central Supreme Board of Election located in Ankara, which is also the highest body of appeal on election matters. The ultimate purpose was to elect 610 deputies (one deputy per 40,000 people) to the one-chamber Grand National Assembly, the supreme and ultimate authority in legislative, executive, judicial matters.<sup>10</sup>

The major contenders in the election were the four major political parties: Republican, Democratic, National, and Freedom. The

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<sup>7</sup> The election law also barred the candidacy of anyone who had resigned from his party two months prior to the election. This clause was aimed in particular at Fuat Köprülü, one of the founders of the Democratic party, who had resigned from his party a few days before the law was passed. See *New York Times*, September 12, 1957.

<sup>8</sup> A peasant in Kırşehir expressed in a succinct way a general feeling among villagers: "*Bize refah ve hürriyet getirenin gökte yeri var*" (One bringing us freedom and welfare has a place in the Heaven). Freedom in this case meant chiefly freedom from the pressure of police and from forced delivery of crops. Another villager expressed the general feeling in a more concrete way. "The Government gives us wheat for seeding, the *Jandarma* (village police) does not beat us any longer." *Cumhuriyet* (Republic), September 26, 29, 1957.

<sup>9</sup> According to Fuad Arna of the National party, an agreement actually had been signed between the leaders of the opposition parties, giving the Republicans 47.5 per cent, the Freedom party 27.7 per cent, and the National party 24.8 per cent of the seats to be won in the election. According to Arna, the deal fell through just because İnönü did not want openly to defy the law. See Arna's speech in *Zafer* [Victory], October 22, 1957.

<sup>10</sup> See *Seçim Neticeleri* (Election Results) (Ankara, 1959, a publication of the research office of the Republican party). Also see Orhan Aldıkaçtı, "Les Elections Legislatives Turques ou 27 Octobre 1957," *Annales de la Faculté de Droit d'Istanbul*, No. 8 (1958), pp. 128-37.

minor political parties played an insignificant part—the only one of some significance, the Peasant party, having decided not to participate in the elections. The *Vatan* (Homeland) party established shortly before the elections under the leadership of Hikmet Kıvılcımlı participated in the contest in İstanbul and İzmir. Its candidates were predominantly workers and professionals. This party was abolished by the government, and twenty-five of its members were arrested in January 1958 for having promoted communist ideas.<sup>11</sup> Most of its arrested members had been in jail at one time or another for communist propaganda. Recently, in 1960, the members of this party were acquitted by the court. At about election time, steps had been taken to establish a Women's party, as a protest against the fact that only 10 per cent of the major political parties' candidates were women, but it did not materialize.

The Republican party entered the election with the growing conviction that its chances for victory were brighter than ever and that a faithful observance of İsmet İnönü's directive, its leader whose prestige increased greatly since 1954, would lead it to power.<sup>12</sup> The close dependence of the Republicans on İnönü, however, deprived them of mobility and decreased the efficiency of local organizations.<sup>13</sup> They committed a further error by asking their candidates to pledge in writing that they would solve economic problems and run in new elections, based on proportional representation, not later than May 1958.<sup>14</sup> This pledge was depicted and exploited by the Democrats as expressing the Republicans' lack of confidence in their own candidates.

The Republican election platform stressed heavily the failure of the government to consolidate democracy and criticized the restric-

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<sup>11</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, October 8, 1957; *Şafer*, January 26, 1958.

<sup>12</sup> During the elections of 1954, İnönü was threatened with bodily harm in some localities, notably in Mersin where he had to make his escape over a wall. In 1957, however, İnönü was met by large cheering crowds wherever he went and since then his appearance has been an occasion for popular gatherings.

<sup>13</sup> The Republican Party Council delegated its powers to İnönü who nominated the candidates in İstanbul. These candidates, many of whom were changed later, were relatively "weaker" than those of the Democratic party in İstanbul such as Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes. The Democrats carried the city with almost 26,000 votes margin over the combined opposition. The Republican's defeat in İstanbul might have been caused by the fact that their general election platform failed to answer the diversified needs and interests of various occupational groups. *Cumhuriyet*, September 27, 1957.

<sup>14</sup> For the pledge, see *Ulus*, October 8, 1957.

tions imposed on the freedoms of press, association, and election.<sup>15</sup> The platform included promises to adopt proportional representation (which the Republicans had opposed while in power as leading to class differences), to subject the acts of the executive to judiciary review, and to establish an upper legislative house and a constitutional court. It promised reinstatement and consolidation of all the basic freedoms, including autonomy of universities, the freedom of trade-unions, and the right to strike.<sup>16</sup> The platform also promised to harmonize economic development with the country's needs and resources, to end inflation, to reorganize imports and exports, to offer equal treatment to private and state enterprises, to help the peasants pay their debts, and to adopt a series of social measures.<sup>17</sup>

The National party entered the campaign, while its resourceful and popular leader, Osman Bölükbaşı, was in jail awaiting trial. (He was a deputy elected from Kırşehir and was deprived of his parliamentary immunity because of attacks on the government.) The National party capitalized on Bölükbaşı's "martyrdom" to prove that the real opposition to the government came from its own ranks. This party, indeed, had maintained a rather uncompromising attitude towards the Republican and Democratic leaders whom it accused of having similar undemocratic attitudes developed during the one-party rule when they were all in the ruling group.

The National party's election campaign, marred by occasional accusations of religious propaganda,<sup>18</sup> consisted chiefly of bitter criticism

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<sup>15</sup> *Ulus*, the Republican party newspaper, wrote that the party's national duty was to save the democracy which they, the Republicans, had established. *Ulus*, October 17, 1957. The newspaper *Sabah* (Morning) which supported the Republicans, printed in large captions: "Atatürk's order in respect of İsmet İnönü is: in case of difficulty always appeal to İsmet Pasha not to others, for he knows and can solve all problems." *Sabah*, October 16, 1957. Ahmet E. Yalman, the publisher of *Vatan*, who had been a staunch supporter of the Democrats in 1946-55, finally turned against them, and described the forthcoming elections as a national struggle for freedom and modernization whose significance equaled that of the struggle at Gallipoli in 1915 and the War of Liberation in 1919-22. *Vatan*, October 16, 1957. Yalman has been condemned to jail for criticism of the government in 1960.

<sup>16</sup> *Ulus*, October 10, 22, 1957. The Republicans also criticized the government because of the riots of September 6/7, 1955, which resulted in damage to property belonging to minorities as well as some ethnic Turks and lowered the country's prestige abroad. *Ulus*, October 22, 1957.

<sup>17</sup> For the platform, see *Ulus, Cumhuriyet*, October 11, 1957.

<sup>18</sup> It was reported that Şeyh Said Kürdi, known as the founder and leader of *Nurcu* (Lightspreaders) sect was campaigning for the National party in the villages of Kütahya province. *Zafer*, October 9, 1957. Later in 1959 it was again reported

of the government policies in the political and economic fields and of promises to cure all these evils through a liberal policy. It also defended the idea of retroactive responsibility in order to punish government officials who had committed crimes at any time in their careers.<sup>19</sup>

The Freedom party entered the election campaign with an exaggerated belief in its own strength and importance. It claimed that it provided a new slate of candidates who had never been associated with the one-party regime, proposed a new eclectic economic policy, and described itself as the only party capable of solving Turkey's problems.<sup>20</sup> The Freedom party received strong support from Fuat Köprülü who had resigned from the Democratic party. Köprülü criticized the leaders of his former party as bent on establishing a dictatorial government and asked the populace to vote for the Freedom party which, according to him, was the best qualified to defend and establish democracy in Turkey.<sup>21</sup> But the elections proved to be a disaster for this party which elected only four deputies.

The Democrats, the government party, entered the election campaign based on a strong and efficient local organization which almost from its inception had been known for its dynamism, flexibility, and its remarkable ability to understand popular sentiment and mold it in such a way as to further its own interests. This special quality of the Democratic party organization stems from the fact that its local leaders represent a special group of individuals interested in practical policies. They are chiefly landlords, professionals, and artisans in small towns who know local conditions. Their pragmatic and realistic approach to problems, often akin to expediency, has been the

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that he spoke in favor of the Democratic party. Kürdi died in 1960 ending a very controversial career.

<sup>19</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, October 20, 1957.

<sup>20</sup> The party's newspaper *Yeni Gün* (New Day) dwelt upon this theme overlooking the fact that its leader, Fevzi Karaosmanoğlu, was the head of the Democratic Disciplinary Committee in 1948, which expelled its own unorthodox members, and then the deputies who disagreed with the party leadership.

<sup>21</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, September 29, October 23, 1957. *Şafer*, the Democratic newspaper, wrote in anger over Fuat Köprülü's resignation from the Democratic party and his criticism of the government: "What was Köprülü's position in our democracy anyway? He managed somehow to join the founders of the Party (Democratic) and they had to carry him along as a useless burden in the party organization and government. His departure from the government was not noticed and his resignation from the party cannot be considered a loss." *Şafer*, October 8, 1957.



chief characteristic of the Democratic party; a characteristic which it injected into the political life of Turkey, and which may have beneficial effects in the long run. Bent on efficiency, the Democrats did not hesitate to exclude from their lists of candidates about 124 deputies who seemingly were passive or in disagreement with party policy, and to replace them with new candidates, thus giving a chance for recognition of other party workers.

The government party claimed that economic development had improved living standards by opening new outlets for employment and had created an economic and social revolution in the villages. In order to prove this assertion, and desirous of creating a bandwagon movement, the Democrats plunged into a series of spectacular dedication ceremonies on the eve of election by opening new factories, roads, housing projects, etc., all of which were greatly publicized.<sup>22</sup> The Democrats claimed that economic prosperity was more important to the general public than the political freedom demanded by but a small group of intellectuals. Despite partisan opposition, the Democrats were firmly decided not to let the "country's economy linger in a primitive condition in this atomic age." Consequently, they urged the electorate to give the government the necessary endorsement by returning to the Assembly as few opposition members as possible; a request which the voters ignored by electing three times as many opposition deputies than in the previous elections. Rejecting proportional representation, the Democrats claimed that the majority system was best suited to the country not only because of its political merits, but also because it conformed to the character of the Turkish people, who, like the English-speaking people, preferred to make a choice between only two parties.<sup>23</sup>

The Democratic party, on the other hand, asserted that it recognized the existing political parties and their right to live even in opposition to the government: it promised to preserve an impartial election system and declared that it would give up power if the people decided that they did not want the Democrats to stay in office.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Some of these projects included the cement plant at Niğde, the textile factory at Nevşehir, the jute factory at Mudanya, the housing project in Ankara; altogether thirty new industrial projects in three months. *Zafer*, August 12, 1957.

<sup>23</sup> On Democrats' campaign, see *Zafer*, October 14, 19, 20, 21, 1957.

<sup>24</sup> The opposition claimed, with some distortion, that Refik Koraltan, one of the founders, had declared that the Democrats intended to give the opposition no chance of victory. *Ulus*, October 17, 1957.

## III

Election campaigns in Turkey are opened by party leaders who state the party view on national issues and set the tone for the campaign. The real, intense campaign does not start until the nomination of candidates is concluded, usually two or three weeks before the election. Primaries do not exist in Turkey. Nominations are strictly intra-party affairs, controlled by the party's central organization which usually appoints 30 per cent of the candidates and has veto power over the nominations from local organizations, although this procedure varies somewhat in each party. A late nomination prevents the disappointed office-seekers from changing parties or entering the election on an independent ticket and thus weakening their respective parties. But once the nominations are final and public, the campaign is taken over by the nominees who have to deal with specific issues according to the need and understanding of the local audiences. Thus the campaign becomes concrete and meaningful and reflects the main problems of the country.

The campaign of 1957 followed the same procedure: first the nominations, and then the real battle. The candidates nominated on the lists of all the major parties had, with slight variations, some common characteristics: similar educational and social background such as a university or high school education; better than average income. The urban middle class, especially lawyers and doctors and other professionals, provided the largest percentage of candidates. The Republican candidates' list included 221 lawyers, 59 doctors, 36 industrial engineers, 58 businessmen, 57 farmers, 20 industrialists, 30 newspapermen, 18 educators, 12 economists, 9 agricultural engineers, 21 administrators, 10 bankers and 9 workers. The Freedom party list included 137 lawyers, 71 professors, 92 businessmen, 80 agriculturists and foresters, 43 doctors, 32 journalists, 8 retired generals, 15 workers and drivers. Among the 610 people elected to the National Assembly, there were 172 lawyers, 84 merchants and businessmen, 75 land-owners, 62 doctors, and the rest were other professionals.<sup>25</sup>

Several specific issues were debated in this campaign and probably the most frequently recurring theme was the question of religion

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<sup>25</sup> See *Ulus*, October 6, 1957; *Cumhuriyet*, October 8, 1957; *News from Turkey*, March 19, 1958.

and secularism. One of the chief criticisms leveled at the Republican party administration was the imposition of secularism during 1930–45 in such a way as to turn the country from Islam and thus lower the society's moral standards. The attitude of political parties on secularism and religious freedom is determined by their assumption that since the general public in Turkey is religious, promises of additional liberalization of religion, that is, restrictions on secularism, will bring them more votes.<sup>26</sup> Secularism being one of the six fundamental principles of the Turkish Constitution (republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, and reformism are the others) no political party has openly rejected it; but in private, in the heat of a campaign, all of them have indulged in far-reaching promises on religion.

The Democrats claimed that their administration built 15,000 mosques in seven years and promised to build better schools for the clergy, and to make İstanbul a second Kaaba, that is, a second place for Muslim pilgrimage. They also promised that "next to the factory chimney there would be a mosque minaret." Some Democratic speakers even recited passages from the Koran in Arabic and generally warned the public not to vote for the "irreligious" Republicans if they wanted to preserve their religious freedoms.<sup>27</sup>

On a popular level the religious propaganda, despite warnings from intellectuals, took a variety of forms depending on the imagination of the speaker or the audience's level of education, including ostentatious participation in public prayers in the mosque, which were promptly labeled by the imaginative public as *seçim namazı* (election prayer).<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> For Islam and politics in Turkey, see Gotthard Jäschke, "Der Islam in der Neuen Türkei," *Die Welt des Islams*, I (1951), 1–174, and II (1953), 278–87. Also Dankwart A. Rustow, "Politics and Islam in Turkey 1920–1955," *Islam and the West*, ed. Richard N. Frye (Hague, 1957), pp. 69–107. For bibliography see Karpat, *op. cit.*, pp. 44–45, 271–92.

<sup>27</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, October 20, 1957. *Zafer*, October 23, 1957 (Menderes in Adana and Konya).

<sup>28</sup> The use of religion for political purposes appeared in various forms. Some clergymen who supported the government spread the rumor that Muhammed, the Prophet, appeared in the Premier's dream and gave him the state seal, that is, saw him fit to rule the country. Other clergymen, criticizing the family name law, claimed that the Republicans had profaned God's name by changing it from *Allah* to *Tanrı*. Others accused some ministers of being Freemasons. Mustafa Runyun, a graduate from Al Ahzar in Cairo and member of the advisory board of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, was a Democratic candidate from his native Konya. He preached for two hours in the mosque, making in effect a campaign speech, which violates

The Republicans defended themselves by reminding the people that it was their own party which undertook the first measures to liberalize religion in 1947–49. Şemseddin Günaltay, Republican Premier in 1949, pointed out that he opened the first religious schools in Republican Turkey, while other speakers depicted their party as friendly to Islam and to piety in general.<sup>29</sup>

The most outstanding feature of religious propaganda lies in the fact that it had no visible effects on election results. Certain areas, known as being strongly religious, such as Konya and the eastern part of the country were subject to extensive promises of religious freedom on the part of the government. And yet, the heaviest defeat of the Democrats took place in the East. In Adana, where the Premier devoted forty minutes of his two-hour speech to religious promises, the Democrats lost the election with a total margin of more than 33,000 votes. Konya (old Iconium), a city known to be very conservative (it also is the center of the Mevlevi order of Dervishes), had been subjected to religious propaganda for years by the Democrats; they succeeded in winning the elections only because the opposition split their votes. Their votes in Konya actually decreased by about 26,000 when compared with the election results in 1954, and were about 35,000 behind the combined votes of the opposition. Similar examples could be multiplied to cover many other regions of the country.<sup>30</sup>

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the law. *Zafer*, October 19, 1957 (Koraltan in Kocaeli); *Cumhuriyet*, October 8, 9, 10, 19, 21, 30, 1957; *Ulus*, October 10, 17, 1957; *Dünya*, October 5, 1957.

<sup>29</sup> Kasım Gülek, then the secretary general of the party, declared in Adana that the Republicans put an end to the “ringing of church bells in Turkey” and as a whole gave the country a real Muslim orientation. *Cumhuriyet*, October 12, 1957. İnönü, the Republican leader, was vehemently denounced as irreligious. So his advisers told him to repeat God’s name as often as possible in his speeches. He contented himself by ending his speeches with “May God help us.” *Cumhuriyet*, October 15, 1957. His son-in-law, Metin Toker, publisher of the weekly *Akis* (Echo) found it advisable to state that the Koran was read daily in İnönü’s home. Other party members gave details of İnönü’s home life—kissing his mother’s hand and getting her blessing on each trip—to prove that he was a tradition-observing man. *Cumhuriyet*, October 12, 1957.

<sup>30</sup> In Elazığ the Democrats were supported by a powerful religious leader, Şeyh Kazım. The Republican candidate was handicapped also by the fact that he had published an article in the past requesting that the *ezan* (call to prayer) should be read in the native language rather than Arabic. (The *ezan* was read in Turkish until 1950, when under pressure from conservatives, the Democrats returned to the old Arabic reading.) This issue was repeatedly brought out during the campaign against the Republicans to prove their anti-religious attitude. Yet, the Republicans carried

The conclusion is that the average voter in Turkey is affected less by religious propaganda than in the past, and that he casts his vote according to other more vital considerations. One may assume also that religious propaganda has lost its significance just because the differences of view among the existing parties on religious issues have dwindled to a minimum, and the voter feels that the policy on religion will not be profoundly altered whichever party comes into power.

The deciding issue was economic development with all the social and political implications it entailed. The opposition favored industrialization, but sought its adjustment to local needs and possibilities with due regard to planning and availability of local capital instead of depending on assistance from abroad which would tie the country to outside interests for years to come. It claimed that economic development lowered the living standards of the small income groups and benefitted only a rich social group. The middle class was annihilated the gap between the rich and poor classes was deepened.<sup>31</sup> Referring to the situation in agriculture, the opposition claimed that farm mechanization had dislocated masses of people in agriculture who sought employment in the cities and lived there in dire conditions, and that large numbers of tractors imported at great expense were idle because of lack of spare parts.<sup>32</sup>

The government answered these charges by describing its economic policy as strengthening agriculture, and claimed that industrialization

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Elaziğ with a margin of over 2,300 votes. The Democrats' votes decreased here about 15,000, most of which went to the Freedom party. *Cumhuriyet*, October 2, 1957; *Zafer*, February 8, 1958 (Yaşar Kemal reporting).

<sup>31</sup> See speeches by İnönü and Günaltay in Bursa, Samsun, İzmir and Balıkesir. *Ulus*, October 15, 17, 20, 22, 1957; *Cumhuriyet*, October 23, 1957. The statement about the annihilation of the middle classes was in answer to the Premier's claim that there were in each city district, fifteen millionaires, and that bank deposits increased to ₺T6 billion from less than 1 billion in 1948. The Premier was actually trying to point out the increase in the volume of national income. He utterly rejected the opposition's claims that the Democratic party was the party of the rich and insisted that the rich were in the Republican party. *Cumhuriyet*, October 23; *Zafer*, October 20, 21, 22, 1957. (Menderes in Elaziğ, İstanbul and İzmir. Two points must be clarified. A middle class—but a new one whose power rests on wealth instead of government position—is expanding fast. Personal investigations conducted by this author indicated indeed that there are large numbers of well-to-do people in the Republican party.)

<sup>32</sup> The government answered this criticism by stressing that out of a total of 41,865 tractors in Turkey in 1956, 37,441 were being used, while the remaining tractors were in disrepair or in need of spare parts. *Zafer*, October 20, 1957 (Declaration by the Minister of Agriculture).

was carried out with a view to complementing and modernizing the former. Since reliance on credits and imports from abroad was an inherent feature of the Turkish economy, industrialization and modernization of agriculture could not be carried on without foreign capital.<sup>33</sup>

Neither the opposition nor the government parties had much to say about state intervention in the economy since all of them seemed to agree that such intervention was necessary to the extent that it did not compete with or restrict the freedom of the private sector, that is, individual enterprise.<sup>34</sup>

The opposition and the government parties clashed on the question of workers' living standards and their freedom to organize and the right to strike. The Republicans, departing from their former conservatism, claimed that the Democrats were mindful of workers' welfare only to the extent it suited their partisan purposes, but failed to acknowledge their political maturity by giving them freedom of organization, and the right to strike. (Strikes and lock-outs are illegal in Turkey.) The Democratic speakers claimed that the workers' living standards were approaching those in the West (wages in 1957 averaged ₺T6–7 a day), since their educational level was still low they could not properly use the right to strike; such a right would eventually be granted.<sup>35</sup>

There was limited disagreement on current foreign policy which all parties accepted as being pro-Western. This was caused at that time partially by persistent Soviet press attacks on Turkish "designs" to attack Syria, supposedly at the instigation of her Western allies.

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<sup>33</sup> *Zafer*, October 10, 1957 (Bayar in Konya); also October 21, 1957 (Ağaoğlu in İstanbul). According to the official figures given by Celal Bayar, the amount of foreign capital which entered Turkey since the law on investments from abroad was passed totaled ₺T220 million. It operated in partnership with local capital amounting to ₺T291 million (\$1 = ₺T9.00 official rate). *Zafer*, October 10, 1957.

<sup>34</sup> This problem of state intervention in the economy was discussed in 1946–50 when Democrats advocated a liberal statism. On statism in Turkey, see Max V. Thornburg, G. Spry, and G. Soule, *Turkey: An Economic Appraisal* (New York: Allen & Unwin, 1949); also Celal Ö. Sarç, "Economic Policy of the New Turkey," *The Middle East Journal* (October 1948), pp. 430–46; also the *Türkiye İktisat Mecmuası* (Turkish Economic Review), September–December 1947; Karpas, *op. cit.*, pp. 84–93, 293–307.

<sup>35</sup> *Ulus*, October 22, 1957, *Cumhuriyet*, October 20, 1957, November 5, 1957. For Trade-Unionism in Turkey, see Kemal Sülker, *Türkiyede Sendikacılık* (Trade Unionism in Turkey) (İstanbul, 1955); Karpas, *op. cit.*, pp. 108–11, 308–23. For Democrats' past views on trade-unionism, see *Kudret*, September 30, November 29, 1947; *Vatan, Cumhuriyet*, August 17, 18, 19, 1947. For their present views, see *Forum*, (Turkish), March 15, 1957, p. 8.

So, as usual, all political parties overlooked their differences and presented a united front in foreign affairs. The government spokesmen accepted the view that the world was divided into two blocs with the neutralists, some of them "honest," in the middle. Turkey, according to them, could not remain neutral because of her geographical position and had to join the West.<sup>36</sup> As a consequence of this decision, she entered into a series of alliances (NATO, CENTO) for the purpose of safeguarding and strengthening her independence. Due credit was given to the Republicans for their acceptance of the Truman Doctrine in 1947.

Some significant points regarding views on foreign policy in the past were brought to light. The Republicans, answering a charge made by Premier Menderes to the effect that İnönü sought an alliance with the Soviets in 1946, claimed that during the war years Celal Bayar had urged a friendly policy towards the Soviet Union. İnönü declared that Bayar was following the advice of Tefvik Rüştü Aras, during whose term as foreign minister in Atatürk's time Turkish-Soviet friendship had developed.<sup>37</sup> İnönü, furthermore, claimed that he had decided in 1946 to reject all Soviet demands for revising the Montreux Convention of 1936, and in doing so he had rejected even the advice of Western statesmen, including President Roosevelt, who had urged him in 1943 to seek agreement with the Soviets. İnönü declared in a press conference that President Roosevelt told him in Cairo in 1943: "we (Americans) are 3000 miles away. Come to some

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<sup>36</sup> About three months after the election the Republican Parliamentary Group issued a declaration in which it criticized the secrecy in which the government conducted foreign policy and accused it of creating unnecessary disputes with neighboring countries and with partners in alliances. For text see *Ulus*, February 2, 1958. Recently İnönü issued a statement warning the US to be respectful of Turkey's rights and national feelings; *Cumhuriyet*, February 26, 1960.

<sup>37</sup> Tefvik Rüştü Aras, according to İnönü, had informed the government, while Ambassador of Turkey in London in 1944, that the Soviets were insisting on having friendly governments in neighboring countries. This view was communicated by the Soviets to the British, and Aras, who had advance information, conveyed it to his government without waiting for the British Ambassador to do so. This attitude on the part of Aras was implicitly described by İnönü as a support of the Soviet views. Aras answered İnönü's charges by declaring that his purpose was merely to communicate to his government the happenings abroad. For Aras' letter, see *Cumhuriyet*, October 23, 1957. For Aras' views urging cooperation with the Soviets, see *New York Times*, June 27, 1944; also *Tan*, June 28, 1944. A broader view on Aras' opinions can be found in his memoirs now in preparation. See also *Görüşlerim* (my views) (İstanbul, 1945). See also İnönü's press conference in Istanbul. *Ulus*, *Cumhuriyet*, October 21, 1957.

agreement with the Russians.” Averell Harriman, Ambassador of the United States to Moscow in 1946, once told İnönü that when he heard of the Soviet demands on Turkish Straits he thought that another country was about to go behind the Iron Curtain. But on hearing the Turkish rejection of the Soviet demand, he, Harriman, became convinced that there were other ways of dealing with the Soviets.<sup>38</sup>

The Cyprus problem inevitably came up for discussion during the campaign: the government declared that thanks to its wise policy the island had not been ceded to Greece. There was a definite agreement between the government and opposition parties to demand partition of Cyprus, and at worst not to let it go to Greece under any circumstances.<sup>39</sup> (An agreement reached by England, Greece and Turkey in 1959 would make Cyprus independent to be ruled by a government composed of native Greeks and Turks. Final ratification is being awaited.)

As the election campaign neared its end, speeches, heated charges and counter charges became more partisan and personality attacks intensified, but not to the point of “mud slinging.” Campaign techniques were adjusted to local needs and utilized all available means; loud speakers, posters, vehicles of all kinds.<sup>40</sup> Candidates toured vil-

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<sup>38</sup> On Turkish foreign policy during this period, see İnönü’s press conference, *Cumhuriyet*, October 21, 1957; also Cemil Bilsel “The Turkish Straits in the Light of Recent Turkish-Soviet Russian Correspondence,” *American Journal of International Law* (October 1947), pp. 727 ff. Necmeddin Sadak, “Turkey Faces the Soviets,” *Foreign Affairs* (April 1949), pp. 449–61; also *Nazi-Soviet Relations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of State, 1949), pp. 233, 245–47.

<sup>39</sup> For Turkish views on Cyprus see *Turkey and Cyprus* (London: Turkish Embassy, 1956); also *Turkish Views on Cyprus* (New York: Turkish Information Office, 1956). For legal views see Savas Loizides, *The Cyprus Question and the Law of the United Nations* (Nicosia, 1954). For debates on Cyprus in the United Nations see *Department of State Bulletin*, February 14, 1956, p. 261.

<sup>40</sup> Some party posters read as follows:

*Republican Party*: “End the partisan administration.” “There are schools but no teachers.” “We shall preserve the opposition.” “There is no medicine.” “The six arrows (the party flag symbolizing the constitutional principles) were left by Atatürk to the custody of CHP.” “A worker’s wage is just enough to pay for a broom; this is how the government cares for him.”

*Freedom Party*: “Those who destroyed freedom of the press shall expiate their sins in the ballot box.” “We shall go into villages not for votes but people themselves.” “Democrats under the banner of despotism fear truth and will be rewarded by the people with a slap.” (The poster rhymed.)

*National Party*: Taking a paragraph from a speech by Celal Bayar in 1948 in which he told people that they would perform a national duty if they dismissed a government failing to fulfill its promises, the National party added, “Citizens fulfill your national duty.”



lage after village and advanced promises of all kinds, sometimes to the point of absurdity.<sup>41</sup> Peaceful rallies were often held in large towns and cities, especially if the speaker was an important party leader. Audiences would be composed of loyal party members, but also opposition members gathered out of curiosity to hear a good speaker or see a famous personality, but not necessarily to vote for him.<sup>42</sup> The public attending the rallies would listen respectfully to the speaker, would ask pointed questions and would not fail to heckle if the speaker became overly partisan, exceeded certain limits of propriety, or was a deputy who appeared in the village only at election time. Thus, election campaigns in Turkey have acquired a significant educational role in acquainting people with issues and ideas. They have also a social function of bringing people into organizations, teaching them teamwork.

Expenditures in the election campaign were borne chiefly by deputy candidates, each individual contributing an initial sum. The Republicans reportedly spent £T2 million in the election; the Freedom and National parties each spent £T1 million. The Democrats' expenditure which definitely exceeded by far that of the opposition, is unknown. On the other hand, expenses for election registration, balloting and official notices were met from public funds.

The campaign ended on October 23 at midnight, three days before the voting date, in an atmosphere of calm and security despite the opposition's claims that there had been pressure on the part of the government and that it had used the state radio for its own purposes.

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*Democratic Party:* "Since you can vote for whom you want in a democracy then vote for the Democrats." "Water, roads, schools to every village." In Mudanya, while receiving Premier Menderes: "Menderes you have saved Mudanya forever we are proud of you." Democratic newspapers carried huge captions attacking İnönü: "God protect us from his grudge and anger," or "He has left the nation in ruins," or "İnönü is disseminating poisonous gossip." *Zafer*, October 17, 29, 20, 1957; *Yeni Sabah*, October 19, 1957.

<sup>41</sup> One candidate promised shiny boots, like the ones he wore, for all who voted for him. Another one, carried away by campaign "affection," treated all the villagers he met to malaria shots for he wanted "his" villagers to be healthy. *Cumhuriyet*, October 12, 1957.

<sup>42</sup> One speaker with considerable influence on audiences was Premier Menderes, whose fluent and captivating speeches have helped many a hesitant constituency to go over to the Democrats. Bayar's dignified and factual speeches have more effect when complemented by Menderes. İnönü's brief, concise and articulate—but not emotional—speeches appeal more to intellectuals.

## IV

Thus far, the Turkish election campaign of 1957 has been studied by taking into consideration the activities of the participating political parties and their platforms. It would be appropriate, before studying the election results, to deal with certain social groups and economic factors which might have had an impact upon the election, as well as the behavior of the general public.

Turkey could be broadly divided for the purpose of this study in two sections, the eastern and southeastern part, and the western part, with the demarcation line running diagonally about 200–300 miles east of the Adana-Ankara-Sinop line. The western part, with exception of Central Anatolia, has soil of better quality, and small individual land holdings predominate, although occasional large estates are to be found. Settlement is denser and the population is relatively more advanced both economically and culturally.

In the east and southeast, the land is mountainous and arid, with a hot climate in summer. Large land ownership is prevalent here. The rural population, especially the Kurds who live in this part, is somewhat closely knit in family groups, *aşirets*, headed by a *şeyh*. Culturally and economically, this area is less developed than the western part, for it had been subject to a feudalistic land organization in the past, from which it was barely, and not entirely, delivered by the Republic. Landlords and religious leaders, *şeyhs*, had been among the bitterest opponents of the Republican regime. Several revolts were instigated by them in this region (Şeyh Sait's revolt in 1925 and the Kurdish revolt of 1937), supposedly to oppose modernization and secularism and establish an independent Kurdish state, but also to preserve their personal authority which was threatened by the new regime.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> For a first-hand report on the struggle of *şeyhs* against the Republican regime, see memoirs of a province governor, Cemal Bardakçı, *Bizde Siyasi Partiler* (Political Parties in Our Country) (Istanbul, 1946); also Naşit Hakkı Bey, *Derebeyi ve Dersim* (Feudal Lords and Dersim) (Ankara, 1932). Some of the kinship groups and some of their leaders are the following: In the provinces of Mardin and Maraş the Ademi and Mahmudi groups and the powerful Kadıoğulları. The last supported first the Republicans and then the Democrats. In Maraş there are also the Kureysan and in Tunceli (predominantly Kurdish) the Orelli groups. In Hakkâri, Bingöl and Muş, the groups of Şeyh Kâzım Ağa, Şeyh Selim Seven, and in Hatay the Çilli family are active in politics. In Muş, a villager defined the election as: "The time to put the Şeyh's paper into the box." For various field reports see *Cumhuriyet, Vatan*,

The *şeyhs* in the east, especially in the southeast, still command allegiance among their *aşiret* (group) not only because of their religious authority but also because they own land on which many a villager makes a living. With the advent of political parties the *şeyhs* have become increasingly involved in politics and it is no secret that victory in some provinces in the east and southeast may depend on the ability of the political parties to win them over.

The *şeyhs* do not have a single party which they all support in common, nor do they have a united view on politics, their attitude being determined chiefly by personal gains, offered by one or another party. Such a political party must be socially conservative and culturally "safe"; requirements which now all major political parties of Turkey meet with minor variations. But now several factors are undermining fast the *şeyhs'* power. There is the peasant who had been exposed to strong political and economic influences from outside, especially since the inception of the multi-party system, and consequently seeks betterment and a new type of independent relation with his *şeyh*. Several hundred field reports indicate that many peasants in eastern and southeastern Turkey were determined to cast their votes according to their own understanding of politics rather than following the *şeyh's* directives.<sup>44</sup> A strong challenge to the *şeyh* came first from small landowners whose land the *şeyhs* had wanted to usurp in the past, and second, from the modern-minded large estate owners who want to mechanize their farms and operate them for market purposes and thus oppose traditional land relationships. A final challenge to the *şeyh* comes from modernist intellectuals such as school teachers, who want to establish relations in the society on a more individualistic basis. Thus, the multi-party system in Turkey has become a means for a profound struggle between conservatism and traditionalism on the one hand, and modernization and democracy on the other.

Political allegiance on the basis of group attachment was also noticeable during the campaign among immigrants from abroad,

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September 23 to October 16, 1957. The number of these groups is larger. See *International Social Science Journal*, XI, 4 (1959), 525-31.

<sup>44</sup> For a change of mentality among peasants see Howard A. Reed. "A New Force at Work in Democratic Turkey," *Middle East Journal*, VII (1953), 33-44; Karpat, *op. cit.*, pp. 342-45; also "Social Effects of Farm Mechanization in Turkish Villages," *Social Research* (Spring, 1960), pp. 83-104. For reports see *Cumhuriyet, Vatan, Dünya, Ulus*, September 16 to October 23, 1957, *passim*.

approximating with their descendants about 5 million people in a population of 25 million. The overwhelming majority of these are of Turkish descent and culture. There is also an indeterminable number of people subject to internal migration.<sup>45</sup> Differences of origin have had no lasting effects in Turkey, nor did they prevent the assimilation of immigrant groups. During the election of 1957, however, group loyalty based on common origin was occasionally exploited and played some part in determining the fate of a few candidates, but had, on the whole, little effect on deciding the final result on a country-wide basis. For instance, in Eskişehir the differences of *Yabancı* (outsider) and *Yerli* (indigenous) were exploited by some candidates. Elsewhere, in Mersin, three districts inhabited by settlers from Urfa supported the Republicans because the local leader was one of theirs while an opponent, a Democrat, had the support of the Arab-speaking group. In Adapazarı, a predominantly immigrant community, the Democrats won easily for the immigrants felt that the government had taken good care of them. In Muş, on the other hand, the native population complained because immigrants were given land which was insufficient for their own needs.<sup>46</sup>

Turning to the economic factors affecting the election of 1957, one may say that the election results reflect the manner in which economic development affected various parts of the country. The western part, which had received economic aid and utilized it by diffusing it to large numbers of people, tended to support the government. The eastern part, which had not received substantial economic assistance, or was unable because of its economic structure to spread whatever assistance it received to larger numbers of people, voted for the opposition.

Thus, the rural areas southwest of Ankara, which have received considerable economic assistance from the government and diffused it to large numbers of individual landowners—the predominantly individual landownership and the diversified type of agriculture in this region being suitable for such diffusion—voted in general for

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<sup>45</sup> For immigration in Turkey see *Türkiye Yılığ 1953* (Turkish Yearbook 1953) (Ankara, 1953), p. 82; also *Toprak-İskân Çalışmaları* (Land-Settlement Work) (Ankara: Settlement Directorate, 1955), p. 57. Also Stephan P. Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities* (New York: Macmillan, 1932), pp. 335–584. Also Hue L. Kostanick, “Turkish Resettlement of Minorities from Bulgaria 1950–1953, *Middle East Journal* (Winter, 1955), pp. 41 ff. Karpat, *op. cit.*, pp. 94–97.

<sup>46</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, September 29, October 13, 1957, February 8, 1958.

the Democrats. The Republicans won only in a single province west of Ankara, namely in Uşak, chiefly because of feuds within the local Democratic organizations. The Republican victories came practically all from the provinces east of Ankara, including the capital itself. Yet, this part of the country is less developed and supposedly antagonistic to the reforms introduced by the Republican party. Even in Tunceli, a predominantly Kurdish province from which the Republicans forcefully moved entire villages to the West in 1937, to prevent rebellion against the regime, it was the Republicans who won.

The explanation may lie in the fact that economic development affected beneficially fewer people in the East than the West, for mechanization here concentrated in the large farms and deprived agricultural workers and tenants of steady employment. Moreover, the growing cities had absorbed many of the goods produced in the East, such as meat, cheese, and butter, and had created shortages of such goods in local markets.<sup>47</sup> Finally, there are in the East large groups of Shiis (*Alevîs*) against whom there have been some attacks on the part of orthodox Sunnis, who are in an overwhelming majority in the rest of the country. The Shiis fear that the freedom of religious activities promised by the Democrats will result in the Sunnis' oppression of the Shiis—as was in the case in the Ottoman Empire—and consequently they vote for the Republicans who are the strongest defenders of secularism. The preceding is a probable cause for Republican victory in the East, but should not be overestimated.

Of the other social groups, the industrial workers supported in general the Democratic party. Many of them, although dissatisfied with the high cost of living and the Democrats' refusal to give them freedom of organization and the right to strike, still voted for the government. This may be explained by the fact that the Democratic administration has expanded the workers' benefits; but above all, it has maintained a day-to-day contact with trade-unions by receiving their delegations and by talking directly to them, and thus has given them a sense of power and status.

Craftsmen, artisans, and shopkeepers in towns have generally backed the Democratic party but some shifted to the opposition,

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<sup>47</sup> Intermediaries bought local produce to sell it at exorbitant prices in the city. Although the individual producer received higher prices for his goods, the inflation and the high price of imported goods deprived him of any real gain. For complaints of peasants against middlemen, see *Cumhuriyet*, October 10, 11, 1957.

especially to the National and Freedom parties.<sup>48</sup> These groups, who used to form the backbone of the Turkish middle class, are generally conservative, religious, and opposed to largescale modernization. Economic development and expanded communications which tend to integrate large areas around a few commercial centers have started to affect this middle-class group, too, and have caused it to lose the high social position it held in relation to the villagers. It continues, nevertheless, to be the vital link between village and town, for the peasant's contact in town is the craftsman, and especially the shopkeeper. They supply him with manufactured items on credit or cash, and in many cases, operate also an enterprise which buys his produce. Many such shopkeepers become landowners by buying the land of the indebted peasant, but this is less so now with the increase of credit facilities. There is also a social relation between the shopkeeper and the peasant. The latter may ask the shopkeeper, whom he considers more "illuminated," for opinions on current problems. While it is true that the fast expansion of radios and newspapers has diminished the peasants' reliance for information on their town relationships, such contacts still play a part in the opinion-making process in Turkey. The intellectuals and the younger generation, especially the university students, have usually supported the Republican party chiefly because they believed that the Democrats had compromised on the reforms of Atatürk. They also reject the pragmatic and expedient approach adopted by the Democrats in state affairs and its restriction of freedoms. The Republican and Freedom party youth organizations issued a joint declaration condemning the Democrats for failure to carry out democratic promises, for deviation from Atatürk's modernist principles, and for depriving the young people of a truly scientific, modern education. The Youth Organization for the Protection of Atatürk's Reforms issued a declaration indicting all political parties for compromising on reform for the sake of votes.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> In Konya, for instance, the Democratic district convention was dominated by shoemakers; 211 were shoemakers out of a total of 386 delegates. About 1,000 shoemakers of Konya, out of a total of 1500, occupied various administrative functions in the local organizations of the Democratic party. Hacı Süleyman, the head of the shoemakers' association of Konya firmly believed that life in Turkey should be based on morality and religion. *Cumhuriyet*, September 29, 1957; also October 13, 1957.

<sup>49</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, October 12, 1957; *Şafer*, November 2, 1957; *Ulus*, November 5, 1957.

## V

The election was held on Sunday, October 27, 1957. The polls opened at 8 A.M., and voting began according to instructions issued earlier by the Election Boards. An elector voted in his own precinct in which he had registered earlier; villages generally formed one single polling precinct, while in towns and cities the neighborhood, or the *mahalle*, which included several streets, formed one polling precinct. Absentee voting was not accepted. A voter could not carry any sign identifying him with a certain political party. On arriving at the polling station, the voter would identify himself to the polling officers—representatives of the major political parties—and sign his name on the voting register. He would then enter alone a specially designed voting booth, stuff the ballot in an envelope taken from the election officer and cast it into the ballot box. He could pick one of the available party lists as a ballot, or draft a list of his own. Security and military forces could not vote. Sale of intoxicating beverages and carrying of firearms were forbidden during election day. Any attempt to interfere with the voting or modify the election results was subject to penalty.

Voting took place in an orderly manner. The opposition complained of a number of irregularities such as pressure on the part of the government, disappearance of ballot boxes, and mishandling of voting registers.<sup>50</sup> Yet there is no definite evidence that such irregularities were planned on a large scale or that they altered substantially the final election result on a country-wide basis. Such irregularities, however, might have affected the election result in those provinces in which the opposition and the government parties showed equal strength, where the election results depended on only a few hundred votes.

Popular participation in these elections and the final results show distinct differences from the pattern developed in the past. First, there was a relatively low turn-out of voters. Of the total eligible

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<sup>50</sup> Complaints coming from İstanbul, İzmir, Giresun, Gaziantep, Konya, Artvin, Trabzon, Ağrı, Antalya, contended that pro-Democratic individuals were allowed to vote during election day, while citizens known to be favoring the opposition were refused registration (according to the law, registrations are allowed even during the election day, provided that certain conditions are met). Occasionally votes were counted in secret and representatives of opposition parties were not permitted to participate in the counting. *Forum* (Turkish), November 1, 1957, p. 4.

12.1 million voters, only 9.344 million, or 77.15 per cent voted, as compared with 88.75 per cent in 1954 and 89.06 per cent in 1950. The official results showed that the Democrats had trailed the combined opposition by about 380,000 votes.<sup>51</sup>

The Democrats won a clear majority in forty-five provinces, and partial victory in three other provinces on a mixed slate, winning altogether 424 seats. Republicans won a total of 178 seats clearly in eighteen provinces and partially in another three. The National and Freedom parties each won four seats, in Kırşehir and Burdur respectively. (Seven seats remained vacant to be filled through by-elections at a later date. Later many more seats were vacated because of death. Similarly, several deputies have changed parties.)

An analysis of participation in the election and of the results leads to interesting conclusions. The relatively low popular participation, whatever the effect of tampering with the polls, may be chiefly attributed to the fact that many citizens foresaw no substantial change of basic policy, whatever the outcome.

The Republicans, who had antagonized many voters by their authoritarian rule in the past, had not acquired a new viewpoint and a new philosophy in the light of the country's development and needs. On the other hand, the National and Freedom parties—the former because of its parochialism and lack of systematic program and the latter because of a lack of organization, drive, and concreteness—could not provide a real alternative. Therefore the resigned voter stayed at home.

Close scrutiny of the election results indicates that in several provinces won by either the Democrats or the Republicans, the margin was extremely narrow; only a few hundred or a few thousand votes. This may indicate that the elections occurred at a time when the popular vote was shifting fast in favor opposition.

The National and Freedom parties invariably split the opposition vote and helped assure victory for the government party. The Democrats secured a clearcut majority in only twenty-four out of a

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<sup>51</sup> The sources on election results, including the government declarations, show variation. We have used the results contained in *Seçim Neticeleri Üzerinde Bir İnceleme* (A Research on Election Results) (Ankara, 1959). It was published by the Republican party's Research Bureau and it is sufficiently objective and comprehensive to be accepted as reliable. For other sources, see Karpat, *op. cit.*, p. 241; *Forum* (Turkish), November 1, 1957; Jäschke, *Die Türkei 1942-1951*, p. 121; İstatistik Yıllığı (Annual Statistics) (Ankara, 1953), p. 177.



total sixty-eight provinces,<sup>52</sup> which elected 250 deputies, or about 56 seats short of a majority in the Assembly. There is no certainty, however, that had these two parties not participated in the elections, their members necessarily would have voted for the Republicans. The average member of the National party probably would have abstained due to long-standing opposition to the Democrats and Republicans alike, while some of the Freedom party members might even have voted for the Democrats.

The Republican party's voting record, compared with the elections in 1954, showed an increase of about 548,000 votes, while the Democrats lost about 756,000. The number of eligible voters increased by over 1,860,000 since 1954. The Republican gain probably came mostly from the younger voters who identify the Republicans with Atatürk's reforms.

The incumbent Democrats registered increases in comparison with the 1954 results in only four provinces, Aydın, Hakkâri, Muş, and Sinop. Even these increases have to be qualified: Aydın is the Premier's constituency; in Muş the Republicans had elected one deputy; in Sinop the difference between Democrats and Republicans consisted of about 600 votes, while Hakkâri province elects only one deputy. The Freedom party suffered a crushing and demoralizing defeat. It won only four seats as compared with over thirty held in the pre-election Assembly. All in all, it received half a million votes less than its registered membership. The apologists for this party explained their defeat by the fact that their supporters voted for the "strongest opposition party" in order to defeat the incumbent Democrats and were aware that a new election was to be held shortly afterwards. Actually the defeat was due to the failure of the Freedom party to communicate with the masses at large, to its inability to tackle squarely the existing difficulties through a concrete policy rather than a confused liberalism, and to lack of an effective, driving organization capable of reaching the voters—although it had some skeleton organizations in fifty-six provinces. Finally, the argument that some members of the Freedom party feared the Republicans more than the Democratic party to which most of them had belonged in the past and therefore voted for Democrats, must not be totally rejected.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> The provinces are the following: İstanbul, Balıkesir, Ağrı, Antalya, Aydın, Bitlis, Bolu, Bursa, Manisa, Muğla, Rize, Sakarya, Tekirdağ, Zonguldak.

<sup>53</sup> *Forum* (Turkish), November 1, 1957, p. 5; *Cumhuriyet*, October 29, 1957. After

As for the National party, its relative success in popular votes can be attributed to its vigorous campaign, the lack of a strong party to defend a third and new alternative policy, and partly to its consistency in opposing both the Republicans and the Democrats. It is doubtful, however, whether the National party will ever expand to the point of becoming a serious candidate for government power since its ideology, conglomerate membership and regionalism deprive it of a universal character likely to appeal to large masses of voters.

## VI

The announcement of election results caused a flood of complaints from the opposition. The Republicans contested elections in sixty provinces by accusing the government of mishandling the voters' registers, allowing its own party members to vote several times, placing pressure on the opposition, "buying" votes, etc. The Supreme Board of Elections, however, rejected all requests to invalidate the elections, even in those provinces in which the evidence was overwhelmingly in favor of such invalidation, presumably on the ground that certain minor violations of the election procedure would not affect the final result.

After the election results were announced a series of riots broke out chiefly between Republicans and Democrats in several provinces; those in Gaziantep (where Democrats won ten seats with only a small margin) and Mersin were graver and took several lives. Disturbances in the provinces of Kastamonu, Kayseri, Çanakkale, Samsun, and Giresun forced the government to hold an extraordinary Cabinet session under the chairmanship of President Bayar and to take a series of drastic measures, including the use of armed forces, to forestall further violent outbreaks. Even Ankara, the capital, in which the National Assembly met a few days after the election, was placed under military guard, although in this city and province which the Republicans won, there was relative calm. These disturbances, according to the opposition, were spontaneous reactions by citizens outraged to see their votes grossly falsified by the government.<sup>54</sup> But the Demo-

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the merger of the Freedom party with the Republicans some of its members returned to the Democratic party.

<sup>54</sup> *Ulus, Cumhuriyet*, October 30, November 1-4, 1957; *Zafer*, October 30, 1957 (Declaration by Menderes).

crats claimed that the disturbances were instigated by the opposition, chiefly Republicans, to avenge their frustration at losing the elections. Actually, each riot must be judged separately, for in most part they were the result of local rivalries rendered intense by party fights, and of tensions which had been building up for months.<sup>55</sup> Yet these riots, despite their local causes and temporary nature, can be considered a striking evidence of a tendency among the masses to resort to violent means whenever there is any interference in elections, or whenever there is a suspicion that the election results do not represent the popular vote. The aftermath of the elections was marked by considerable political tension, caused chiefly by the fact that the Democratic party won a very high number of seats in the Assembly, while its total popular vote fell short of the combined strength of the opposition. The Republicans did not hesitate to describe the Democrats as "ruling the country without the consent of the majority of people." Actually, the discrepancy between popular votes and parliamentary seats won by the government party is natural in a democracy based on a majority system. The government defined such utterances as a challenge to its legitimacy and threatened to undertake retaliatory measures in order to forestall the "instigations to revolt and disorder" of the opposition.

The paramount conclusion is that the division of the opposition into several individual parties helped maintain the Democrats' supremacy. Consequently, after the election a unification drive started among opposition parties. The Freedom party merged with the Republican party; this fusion was baptised *Güçbirliği* (Power Union). The National party absorbed the smaller Peasant party and may be expected to combine, or at least form a coalition with the Republican party in the near future. The National party leader, Osman Bölükbaşı, had already conducted several talks with İnönü on the question of

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<sup>55</sup> The "face saving" question manifested in the form of unwillingness to accept defeat, plays a considerable part in shaping relations among local leaders of various political parties. Each leader, regardless of whether he belongs to the opposition or to the party in power, seems to feel a psychological urge to convince himself that his views conform to and are the views of the majority of the people. He must have the psychological assurance that he is right by being with the majority. The idea that one can be right, even being in a minority has not found wide acceptance among politicians. This mental attitude obviously is the transposition of the *Idjma* into modern politics. *Idjma* means searching for the agreement of the society on any matter of faith, which eventually expanded to include all social matters in Muslim communities.

unity, but with no definite results. At a National party convention held in the spring of 1959, a proposal was submitted to change this party into a socialist one to meet country's social needs and oppose communism. The proposal was rejected and its proponent, Alaeddin Tiridoğlu—the ex-inspector of the Republican party and a strong defender of the Land Reform Laws of 1945—resigned and formed a socialist party in 1960. In January 1960, Peasant party leaders left the National party, accusing it of violating the merger agreement; but they have not yet reestablished their old party.

The Democratic party countered the opposition's activities by launching a membership drive called *Vatan Cephesi* (Homeland Front) and by inviting the opposition members to join it. This Front was described as a patriotic movement aimed at supporting the Democrats in the fulfillment of their ambitious program for economic development. The success of this drive was widely advertised through the official state radio and party newspapers, while the opposition did its best to discredit it. The *Vatan Cephesi* drive had eased off somewhat later, since there were indications that this new version of the Democratic party was creating friction with the older organization while vying for power. It may be worth mentioning that the Democratic party appears still to hold the rural groups on its side and works steadily to win over new members. The Democrats' ability to deal with tangible issues, such as road building, water supply, employment, crop prices, etc., draws considerable support. Its local organizations, situated primarily in small towns—politically the most vital position—are dynamic and flexible enough as to adjust its strategy to local conditions and needs. The Democrats' task of maintaining their popularity was facilitated by the economic stabilization program, which has been under way since August 1958. New foreign loans totaling about \$359 million are being utilized to stabilize the economy which had reached its worst point in 1957–58, and this policy has met with considerable success. But the Democratic party failed to win over the urban areas, the intellectuals, and especially the press, which have grown excessively critical of the restrictions imposed on the freedom of criticism and inquiry. The growing reliance of the Democrats on conservatives and their disinterest in large-scale educational and cultural projects have compelled the intellectuals to turn to the Republican party in the hope that it would carry on the modernization started by Atatürk, its founder. The press and the intellectuals, the two forces capable of providing leadership and of

molding public opinion, have sided with the opposition. The intellectuals demand a leadership capable of directing the country towards the social and cultural goals as initially established by the Republic, and expanded later to include democracy and the freedoms. Instead, they find a policy of compromise ready to sacrifice principles for expediency; they see reliance on foreign aid, rather than on the native creative forces, as likely to undermine the vitality and sovereignty of the country. Pro-Western policy remains the cornerstone of the opposition's program on foreign affairs, but it demands that this policy be conducted in a spirit of mutual respect of national interests and prestige.

The government party, whose attachment to power has grown in equal proportion to its dislike of criticism and legislative controls, instead of answering these charges, chose to silence them by imposing additional restrictions on the press, and by utilizing the state radio to defame the opposition and publicize its own achievements. Furthermore, a certain deterioration in the impartiality of the administrative services created in the society an atmosphere of fear and distrust which gave a distorted picture of the country's problems and even obscured many of the Democratic party's achievements. The Republican party itself, which has intensified the attacks on the government and many times did not hesitate to exploit small incidents to its own advantage, has been subject to heavy restrictions including its right to hold meetings and publicize all the debates in the Assembly. Some incidents in which İnönü's person was subject to attacks, have further embittered the relations between the Democrats and Republicans and pushed both of them to extremes. The recent, and as usual unsuccessful, attempt to prevent İnönü from visiting the town of Kayseri, and the use of the army for the first time by the government for political purposes has triggered a series of events. The government accused the opposition of inciting disobedience and violence and finally established a committee composed of Democrats and endowed with extensive powers to investigate the opposition's actions. The Republicans considered this to be the first step to end the opposition and a series of student riots followed. Martial law was imposed for three months and scores of students were arrested. Actually, the Democrats discussed for a long time the establishment of an investigation committee and its present timing is due partly to the forthcoming elections. The Democrats wanted to produce evidence of the opposition's disruptive tactics to discredit them in the voters'

eyes. According to some Republicans, the Democrats intend to use the evidence as pretext to prevent the opposition from getting into power if favored in the elections. The students' riots and the resignation of several army officers protesting the use of the military for political purposes are definite warnings to the Democrats that they are about to reach the limit of public endurance.

It may be advisable to point out that despite extreme partisanship and unfortunate events, many of the democratic gains of the past two decades such as the party system and election mechanism are preserved, and few leaders can afford to defy for long the democratic yearnings of the Turkish people. For the first time in Turkish history the country now possesses a strong and relatively organized public opinion which demands that its political ideals of freedom and democracy be respected and implemented. Governments and political leaders who traditionally have been accustomed to rule without paying attention to public opinion find it hard to adjust to this new political force, but eventually yield to its pressure. It was this pressure which forced the Republicans to accept democratic elections in 1950, and many times it compelled the Democrats to adopt a new course of action. For instance, very recently the Premier announced that new elections will be held, when disturbances and riots end, to determine whether or not people wanted a change of government and, in case they voted for the Democrats, to prove that the riots were engineered by a small group.

The outcome of this imminent election can only be conjectured at this time. It is certain however, that any interference in the elections will cause grave reactions which may rock the country from its foundations. The intellectuals, community leaders, and other social groups, will not tolerate for long a government that stays in power through force, or a political party which tries to reach power by unorthodox means. This is a crucial factor which tempers the opposition and government parties, for both are backed by large groups of dedicated followers who would violently oppose the deviations from the accepted methods of government and power.

Thus, the party struggle in Turkey appears now as a fight for democracy and freedom. It has become a fervent idealized pursuit impregnated with martyrdom complexes which obscure real issues, as well as the reasons underlying the struggle. These reasons lay in the economic and political developments of the past fifteen years which have necessitated a social reorganization in conformance with

the modern and complex needs of an advanced Turkish society. This need in turn places emphasis on intellect and on the thinking individual, capable of long-range planning. The establishment of a new socialist party—socialism in Turkey should be understood as meaning the most liberal democracy—in addition to the existing several other insignificant socialist parties, is a symptom of the need for a new socio-intellectual orientation of Turkish politics. These are the unspoken needs of Turkey, and their settlement will determine the course of politics in the country.

## VII

A few general conclusions may be drawn from the preceding discussions: (a) Turkish society is undergoing a profound social, economic, and cultural transformation which has affected large sections and compelled them to take an active interest in politics. Politics is no longer the preoccupation of a few selected groups as it was during the first three decades of the Republican regime, but has become a means of betterment and of change for all people. An unparalleled social dynamism, an awakening to life and activity, is to be witnessed throughout Turkish society.

(b) The issues and ideas which seem to animate the people appear now to be of a social and economic nature. The original Turkish revolution which was chiefly political in character, has now evolved socially and economically to the point of calling for a new orientation and philosophy in the light of the modern understanding of democracy. As a corollary to this idea, the cultural reforms introduced by the Republican regime seem now, after certain compromises and adjustments in 1947–54, to be generally accepted and propaganda based on them alone does not suffice to secure victory for one party. Even secularism and religious liberalization has lost a great part of the dynamic impact it had on politics in 1946–50. The question of Westernization or modernization, which had been the starting point in the Turkish history of reform, still remains the foundation of Turkish life. It has, however, transcended now its narrow cultural and political meaning and has acquired social and economic features. These give Turkey greater similarity to the West, but also make her face a series of new problems arising from the country's own special structure and economic conditions. Finally, since real

issues seem to become the major opinion-forming factor in Turkey, personality prestige or family names seems to be losing their importance. One may expect that in the near future, real issues and not names will decide the fate of an election, as this trend was clearly discernible in the election of 1957.

(c) The political democracy needs to be complemented with social and economic measures which would consolidate and perpetuate it. The present-day Turkish political parties seem unprepared from an ideological viewpoint to present the ideas and solutions to bring about Turkey's deep-felt need of new social and political democracy. These political parties attempt to face problems from the viewpoint of a narrow conservatism, and at best, utilize the slogans of nineteenth-century Western political liberalism. This ideological inadequacy has created a strong tendency to search for a new political party. Furthermore, most political parties do not take their philosophy and program from Turkish life and realities, but strive to imitate foreign models.

(d) The multi-party life of Turkey, despite its shortcomings, has put down roots in the country and has created new habits and views, a political education for the people. It has placed them in a position of judging issues and acting on them. The election returns, while showing dissatisfaction with the government, can be interpreted also as public appreciation of the need for a strong opposition to control the government. The popular demand for maintaining an impartial election system and securing fair election results may be interpreted as additional evidence of the Turkish people's political maturity.

(e) Turkey's political regime, based on the unity of power doctrine, was initiated in 1921-24 (and maintained since then) with a view to meeting emergency situations and carrying out a series of reforms. Since both these objectives have been attained to some extent, it appears necessary to deliver the regime from the control of an overwhelmingly powerful executive, and to institute guarantees for the full enjoyment of individual freedoms and rights granted by the constitution.

(f) Finally, Turkey proves once more to be the most important contemporary social laboratory in which a vital experiment is taking place. This experiment may prove whether or not an integral Western system of politics and conceptions can be instituted in countries with different cultures, history, and economic and social structures.



## APPENDIX I

<i>Election Years</i>	<i>Eligible Voters</i>	<i>Votes Cast</i>	<i>Participation Percentage</i>			
1950 .....	8,908,824	7,934,449	89.06			
1954 .....	10,250,338	9,097,451	88.75			
1957 .....	12,111,183	9,334,246	77.15			
	VOTES RECEIVED BY PARTIES			DEPUTIES ELECTED*		
Parties	1950	1954	1957	1950	1954	1957
Republican .....	3,195,618	3,214,895	3,763,866	67	31	178
Democratic .....	4,274,933	5,150,924	4,394,893	416	504	424
National .....	265,980	425,386	659,970	1	5	4
Freedom .....	—	—	346,881	—	—	4
Peasant .....	—	39,473	—	—	—	—
Independents ....	258,698	266,791	39,867	3	1	—
			Total .....	487	541	610

\* One deputy for 40,000 people. Number of seats per province decided according to population increase.

Different sources vary as to the election statistics, but the variation does not affect the over-all result. A discrepancy exists in the number of deputies elected and the number of seats in the Assembly since there are constant vacancies due to natural causes. The number of deputies belonging to each party also varies since many deputies change parties. For comparative figures see *Seçim Neticeleri*, App. II, III (accepted as basis for our statistics except for Independents). *Istatistik Yılığın 1953* (Ankara, 1953), p. 177, also Jäschke, *op. cit.*, p. 121, also *Contemporary Review* (August 1954), p. 81; also *Forum* (Turkish) June 1954, p. 5, November 1, 1957, p. 3; *Ulus*, *Şafer*, February 8, 1958, *New York Times*, February 9, 1958.

## DOMESTIC POLITICS

### I. *Introduction: Concepts and Methodology*

The modern Turkish political system is the product of the interaction between a continuously changing socio-economic structure and static constitutional models borrowed from outside. The periodic rehauling of the constitution, especially in the period 1960–82, has been caused not only by the rapid transformation of the social structure but also by a basic disharmony between this structure and the domestic politics. Certain features of the politics, such as republicanism and national statehood, have exhibited strength, consistency and continuity; but the status of various proclaimed freedoms and rights and, especially, of the regulatory institutions, has oscillated constantly as they have been misused and abused by governments, by groups and by individuals. There is no question that the instability of the Turkish domestic politics must be attributed first to the breakdown and the discontinuity of the old traditions of conflict management and adaptation to socio-political change. However, in order to understand the continuous crisis in Turkish domestic politics, it is necessary to analyze its evolution into a broad conceptual framework by taking into account the interaction between social groups, the government elites, and certain international events that were a part of the process of structural differentiation. In historical retrospect the Turkish constitutions appear not as the expressions of society's basic culture, philosophy, and aspirations but as tools designed to reshape society and legitimize control of government power. Both constitutions and ideology must be viewed as the instruments through which particular social groups have tried to establish a new regime and to implement a predetermined policy.

### II. *Pluralization and Democratization, 1945–1950*

On May 19, 1945, İsmet İnönü, the President of the Republic and Chairman of the CHP, declared that “as the conditions imposed by war disappear, democratic principles shall acquire gradually a larger

place in the political and cultural life of the country . . . The government (has) constantly developed the country towards democracy".<sup>1</sup> This was, in fact, the much awaited signal that the one-party rule and the dictatorship of the bureaucracy was about to end, or at least to ease. Once more the initiative for political change had come from the top. The event is indeed outstanding in every way. The CHP was firmly entrenched in power and faced no organized opposition. Yet, it voluntarily decided to give up its monopoly of power, or at least to allow it to be challenged in the political arena.

The move was an expedient one, but the reasons behind it were complex. It became apparent that the inclusion of Turkey into the United Nations and her growing friendship with the West,<sup>2</sup> caused largely by the Soviet demands for territory and military bases, also necessitated psychological-political accommodation. The internal pressures were equally strong. The monolithic political system stood atop a pluralist social structure which continued to diversify and create conflicts, both between various social groups and between the society and the government. The government itself had contributed to this social diversity. The statist policies of the government and industrialization, coupled with the flourishing of the private sector during war years when desired imports were in short supply, had created a new class of industrial workers as well as a variety of business groups involved in the finishing and marketing of goods produced in state enterprises or in the manufacture of products formerly imported. In addition, the commercialization of agriculture also stimulated the rise of a variety of groups influential in the rural towns. The CHP, which claimed to represent the nation as a whole, tried to include within its ranks formal representation of all these social groups, but without lasting success. Eventually the social unity, enforced from the top in the name of the *classless society*, broke down during debate on the Land Reform Law.<sup>3</sup> A group of deputies representing

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<sup>1</sup> *Ayn Tarihi* (Monthly History), May 1945, pp. 52–3.

<sup>2</sup> The criticism of the Turkish political regime in the US Congress was reported in the press, and since USA emerged as a superpower its views have carried considerable weight. See Karpat, K.H.: *Turkey's Politics. The Transition to a Multi-Party System*. Princeton 1959, p. 140 ff. (Cit. as: Karpat, *Politics*).

<sup>3</sup> The law (number 4753, published: *Resmî Gazete*, number 6032 of June 15, 1945) was submitted by the government of Şükrü Saraçoğlu, the son of a saddle maker from the town of Ödemiş. He was a typical representative of the statist minded anti-capitalist, nationalist and reformist breed that ruled Turkey in 1938–45. He

agricultural interests not only objected to the excessively expropriatory features of the law but also accused the government, and especially the CHP, of ignoring the will of the nation and of violating the UN charter which the government had just signed.<sup>4</sup> On June 7, 1945, four people—Celâl Bayar, a former Premier and associate of Atatürk; the historian Fuat Köprülü; Adnan Menderes, a landowner and former inspector of the CHP; and Refik Koraltan, a former governor—submitted to the CHP parliamentary group a proposal that, since the war was over, democratic freedoms should be restored and the National Assembly be allowed to exercise its constitutional prerogatives over the Executive. They also demanded that the necessary conditions be established so that opposition parties might be properly established.<sup>5</sup> Eventually the four, all members of good standing, resigned from the CHP and taking courage from the fact that Nuri Demirağ, a rich industrialist, was allowed to establish the MKP on July 18, 1945, officially established their own party on January 7, 1946.<sup>6</sup>

The DP found little immediate support, as people feared that it would be closed. However, after the government amended the Association Law, which had forbidden the establishment of political parties, and indicated its willingness to allow the opposition to continue, the ranks of the DP swelled. Overnight it became a mass movement. Dissatisfied individuals from every walk of life, regardless of class affiliation, seemed to regard the DP as the panacea for all their ills. Meanwhile in a party convention held on May 10, 1946, the CHP decided to democratize itself also by abolishing the position of “permanent chairman,” held by İnönü, eliminating the *Müstakil* (independent) group designated to play the role of a loyal opposition, and holding new elections based on the direct vote.<sup>7</sup> The press law was

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was the author of the Capital Tax Law imposed on minorities. Those who were unable to pay were placed in concentration camps. See Karpas, *Politics*, pp. 115–120.

<sup>4</sup> These debates in the *Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi* (Records of the Grand National Assembly), session 7, vol. 19, p. 170 ff.

<sup>5</sup> The text of this important proposal (*dörtlülük takrir/proposal of the four*) which can be considered as the first foundation of the multi-party democracy in Turkey is in Akkerman, N.C.: *Demokrasi ve Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler* (Democracy and Political Parties in Turkey). Ankara 1950.

<sup>6</sup> The chronology of these events is in Jäschke, G.: *Die Türkei in den Jahren 1942–1951*. Wiesbaden 1955. A comprehensive analysis is in Karpas, *Politics*, p. 150 ff.

<sup>7</sup> The text of these decisions may be found in the CHP-newspaper *Ulus*, 11–14 May 1946.

also amended to remove various restrictions imposed on the formalities necessary to establish a newspaper or periodical. Thus, in a matter of less than one year, the Turkish political system underwent a profound liberalization. However, in the new elections held on July 21, 1946, with 85% of the electorate participating, the CHP won a decisive victory, thanks to its manipulation of the ballots. Celâl Bayar publicly accused the CHP of having falsified the election results, while large crowds in Ankara demonstrated against the government (but did not succeed in changing the outcome). The elections gave 64 seats to the DP, which had won many votes in İstanbul, and 6 to the independents, but the CHP held the remaining 395 seats. The election result had proved that the DP was there to stay, but the party was cautious enough not to carry its opposition beyond a certain limit, lest it stir up an untoward reaction among the militants in its own ranks. One such group, led by Kenan Öner, a lawyer from İstanbul, accused Bayar, who was DP chairman, of having concluded a secret agreement to cooperate with İnönü and urged the party deputies to boycott the Assembly and continue the struggle in the countryside. Eventually these extremist populists left the DP and formed their own party, the MP, in order to fight the "continuation of old habits in a new house," an allusion to the former affiliation of the DP leaders with the CHP.

The rise of the MP was actually a reaction against the efforts of the DP to channel, contain, and institutionalize the popular movement which, stirred by the opposition, continued to gain strength. By the end of 1946 the DP had come to represent a mass rising against the elitist structure and its policies of cultural and social alienation, undertaken in the name of modernization. However, the DP leaders chose not to exploit this popular dissatisfaction for immediate political gain but instead gradually curbed its tendencies toward religious and social extremism, channelling it ultimately towards more realistic goals. The DP was supported at this stage by an amalgam of social groups, although its leadership was drawn chiefly from among professionals, upper class farmers, entrepreneurs, and retired government officials. Under the DP the profile of the Assembly became a professional one. In 1946, 36% (it was 48% in 1935) of the membership of the legislative body was former bureaucrats, with 35% professionals and 24% persons from agriculture, commerce and industry. In 1950, when the DP won the election, the percentages became: bureaucrats, 22%; professionals, 45%; the other groups, 29%.

Furthermore, the average age in the Assembly, which was 52.8 years in 1946, fell to 47.8 years in 1950.<sup>8</sup> The DP represented the upper strata of the countryside groups, who had deep historical, social, and cultural roots in their local societies and thus were capable of mobilizing support in these areas. The CHP, on the other hand, relied on the intelligentsia of the large cities, the younger professionals, and also the business group created in the Republic. On balance, the strength of the CHP seemed concentrated in large, well-defined areas, whereas the DP had a following throughout the countryside.

The opposition concentrated its campaign mainly on the government's undemocratic policies of the past. More specifically, the government was castigated for its economic policy based on state control. Similarly, secularism was bitterly criticized as having deprived the citizens of their religious freedoms and as having pushed the country into irreligiousness and open refutation of Islam. Thus, the issues discussed in the National Assembly in 1920–22 became at once the dominant topics for the party struggle, which began to unravel after 1946. Faith and bread became the two major topics of discussion. The debates stirred enormous popular interest and compelled the government to undertake major changes in its secularist policy. Indeed, after the elections of 1946, and especially after Recep Peker, the Prime Minister, who favored strict adherence to the old policy, was forced to resign in 1947, the CHP gradually began to rescind its secularist measures in order to attract popular following. A variety of religious schools, notably those training the Muslim clergy (*imam* and *hatip*), were opened by the government.<sup>9</sup> However, the call to

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<sup>8</sup> See Frey F.W.: *The Turkish Political Elite*, Cambridge (MIT) 1965, pp. 170–181; and Tachau, “Turkish Provincial Party Politics,” in: Karpat, K.H.: *Social Change and Politics in Turkey*. Leiden 1973, pp. 282–317.

<sup>9</sup> The liberalization of religious freedoms took place gradually over a period of three years. They are described as a “revival” of Islam in Turkey, although in reality such “revival” was nothing else but the restoration of religious freedoms. See Reed, H.A.: “Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey,” in: *Islam and the West*, pp. 108–148. Thomas, L.V.: “Recent Developments in Turkish Islam,” in: *Muslim World*, 44, 1954, pp. 181–85; Lewis, B.: “Islamic Revival in Turkey,” in: *International Affairs*, 28, 1952, pp. 38–48; Heyd, U.: “Islam in Modern Turkey,” in: *Royal Central Asian Journal*, 34, 1947, pp. 299–308; Smith, W.C.: “Modern Turkey: Islamic Reformation?,” in: *Islamic Culture*, 15, 16. Parts I and II January 1951, 1952; Smith, W.C.: *Islam in Modern History*. Princeton 1957; Birge, J.K.: “Islam in Modern Turkey,” in: *Islam in the Modern World*. Washington 1951, pp. 41–6; Birge, J.K.: “Secularism in Turkey and its Meaning,” in: *International Review of Missions*. October 1944, pp. 426–32. For the Turkish bibliography, see Başgil, A.F.: *Din ve Lâiklik* (Religion and Laicism).

restore the *şeriat* (religious) courts and bring back the Caliph was ignored. It must be mentioned that the DP remained content to ask for religious freedoms, refusing to associate itself with any action that would reverse the basically secular nature of the regime. On this issue Celâl Bayar, the chairman of the DP, was in full agreement with İnönü.

The multiparty regime was further developed after Recep Peker resigned—a step not taken before he had threatened to force the opposition to “abide by the law”, and his Minister of the Interior had accused the Democrats of associating themselves with communists. At this point İnönü manipulated the resignation of Peker and promised the opposition full protection and freedom under the laws of the country.<sup>10</sup> The truth is that the DP had secured its existence through a massive campaign in the countryside which mobilized additional support and persuaded the government that any attempt to liquidate the opposition might cause violent popular reaction. Organizational ability and strength came to play a crucial role in the continuously unfolding political struggle; consequently, both parties attempted to streamline their organizational structure. Although the CHP possessed a well established countryside network, it could not match the popularly supported DP in this regard. The CHP remained a highly centralized party whose decisions were made at the top, whereas the DP made decisions only after democratic consultations, relying on the participation of the local branches at the bottom of the organization. From 1948 to 1950 the DP concentrated its efforts on consolidating its party organisations, mobilizing support, and pressing the government to amend the electoral law in such a way as to insure secure and impartial elections. This policy paid off. The elections held on May 14, 1950 proceeded in an orderly fashion and representation was based on a majority system, the election district being the *vilayet* (province). The DP won a brilliant victory, taking most (408) of the seats in the Assembly. The CHP won only 69 out of the total of 487 seats, while 9 seats went to the independents, the MP won only

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Istanbul 1977; Daver, B. *Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Lâiklik* (Laicism in the Republic of Turkey). Ankara 1955: *Lâiklik-Türk Devrim Ocakları* (Laicism—The Focus of Reforms in Turkey). İstanbul 1954 includes 19 articles on the subject.

<sup>10</sup> İnönü issued the statement known as the *12 Temmuz Çok Partili Beyanname* (The Multi-party statement of July 12). This is the document which guaranteed the survival of the Turkish opposition. The text is in *Aym Tarihi* (Monthly History), July 1947, pp. 15–16.

one seat. Of the total votes cast, the CHP still received approximately 39.9%, an indication that the party's efforts at democratization had won it remarkable support.

The transfer of power occurred in a quiet manner. Celâl Bayar was elected President, while Adnan Menderes became the Prime Minister. İsmet İnönü, the heir to Atatürk and one of the great personalities of the Turkish Republic, humbly accepted the role of leader of the opposition. In the hour of his defeat İnönü achieved his greatest moral victory. He turned down offers by four army generals to close the DP and keep him in power. In terms of the Turkish political culture, an extraordinary revolution had peacefully taken place.

The elections of 1950 were an extraordinary political event, however looked at. Firstly, the ordinary people were made the referees of power as the Constitution demanded. Secondly, an elitist order based on a coalition of bureaucrats and professionals and supported by the military was peacefully replaced by a purely civilian administration, the first of its kind since the inception of the Ottoman state and the Republic. The DP victory at the polls was the culmination of a process of democratization and civilian ascendancy which had begun with Mithat Paşa's Constitution of 1876. This process came to full fruition in 1950, although only for a short time.

### III. *The Democratic Party Rule, 1950–1960, and the Military Coup*

The rule of the DP is as important in the history of Modern Turkey as the first decade of the Republic, for it added social and economic content to the political shell previously established. This was a truly revolutionary period, for the course of Turkish politics was directed towards fuller popular participation and towards a government policy dedicated primarily to economic development and service rather than mainly to political-institutional reform and administration. The political life of Turkey in the period 1950–60 was governed by the same Constitution of 1924 that had been in use during the one-party regime. The strong executive powers given by the Constitution to the Prime Minister and the President served well the purposes of the new government in implementing its own policies. From the very start the DP government concentrated its efforts on agriculture, instituting a policy of easy credit and in selected areas, massive mechanization. Over the ten years of DP rule, agricultural production



increased at an average of 5.4% annually, while industrial growth averaged 8.3% and service industry grew by 6.7% annually.<sup>11</sup> The population increased from 20.9 million in 1950 to 27.5 million in 1960, rising by an average of 2.8% annually. GNP per capita went from 1,842 TL to 2,577 TL in the same period. The economic gains were attributable in great part to the dynamism of the economy and the new entrepreneurial spirit, although some of the growth was also due to inflationary policies and occasionally to artificial stimulation.

The economic policies of Adnan Menderes (1899–1961) have been studied and praised or criticized according to the writer's political and social approach. One fact is certain: for the most part his policies produced widespread and irreversible social and political effects, regardless of whether Menderes intentionally pursued such goals. It has often been said that Menderes deliberately adopted inflationary tactics in order to weaken the bureaucracy and other salaried groups supportive of the CHP<sup>12</sup> and that he purposely engaged in a massive effort to enlarge the size and bolster the economic power of the entrepreneurial and commercial groups. There is some truth in the view that the early years of Menderes' rule were marred by his rather ill-disguised antimilitarist attitude and his measures designed to reduce the army's influence and prestige. Upon taking power, the DP replaced the Chief of Staff and other army officers but ignored advice concerning the reforms of the military. During this period there was a significant drop in the prestige of government occupations, while interest in, as well as respect for, money-making occupations increased greatly. The social composition and occupational structure of the cities began to change rapidly, as thousands of peasants, uprooted from the land by mechanization, came to the cities to seek employment in the booming construction industry.

The relations between the newly empowered DP and the CHP assumed from the start a peculiar form, which was conditioned by

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<sup>11</sup> Hale, W.: *The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey*. London 1981, p. 109; and Singer, M.: *The Economic Advance of Turkey, 1938–1960*. Ankara 1977.

<sup>12</sup> There is a rather rich literature on Adnan Menderes, although as usual, much of it is rather one sided. See Aydemir, Ş.S.: *Menderes'in Dramı* (The Drama of Menderes). İstanbul 1969; Fersoy, O.C.: *Bir Devre Adını Veren Başbakan Adnan Menderes* (Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. Who Gave His Name to an Epoch) İstanbul 1971. On the ideology of the DP see Eroğul, C.: *Demokrat Parti Tarihi ve İdeolojisi* (The Democratic Party: History and Ideology). Ankara 1970.

a series of factors specific to Turkish political history. The CHP, taking advantage of its historical association with the Republic, portrayed itself as the defender of reforms and of Atatürk's legacy, despite the fact that it had governed the country without a true popular mandate. Republicanism and national statehood were no longer popular subjects of discussion, so the Republicans made secularism their ideological banner. Henceforth, the CHP publically judged almost all the activities of the Government party by the partisan (and rather subjective) criterion of whether they adhered to secular principles, despite the fact that the Republicans had themselves drastically altered their secularist policies while still in power. Although demands for the restoration of the fez and the veil were put forth in some DP conventions, the party leadership rejected these demands. Basically the Democrats remained faithful to Atatürk's legacy.<sup>13</sup> For its part the DP attacked the Republicans for past acts of corruption, accusing them of having acquired during their 27 years reign property and money belonging properly to the government and of having used the People's Houses as CHP cultural branches, despite the fact that the Houses were financed with public funds. In the end the Assembly passed a law which in effect closed the People's Houses and gave the Treasury much of the CHP property secured with public funds.<sup>14</sup> From the start the CHP, like the DP in opposition, acted in accordance with the dictum that the *duty of the opposition is opposition*, and the government party in turn, like all previous holders of power, began immediately to accuse the opposition of being deliberately malicious and intent on destroying it.

The continuous preoccupation of the government party with the opposition, and its use of every conceivable means to silence it, stemmed from historical and political precedent and also from the fear that the CHP might be particularly effective as it enjoyed the support of the best organized and most articulate groups in the country: the bureaucracy, the intelligentsia, and the military. (The DP was able simply to shut down the MP, citing its anti-secularist policies.) However, although the CHP continued to accuse the government itself of anti-secularist actions, public opinion was not swayed

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<sup>13</sup> The government party passed in 1951 a law designated to protect the legacy of Atatürk including his statutes, some of which had been demolished in Anatolia.

<sup>14</sup> Karpat, K.H.: "The People's Houses of Turkey: Establishment and Growth," in: *Middle East Journal* 17, 1, 1967, pp. 55-67. (Cit. as: MEJ).

away from its approval of DP policies. The economic development initiated by the DP government, the relative increase in employment opportunities, and the growing stature of Turkey in international affairs (in 1952 she became a member of NATO), coupled with a general atmosphere of liberalization in the country (despite a new press law aimed at the opposition), enabled the DP to secure a major victory in the elections of 1954. The opposition won barely 30 seats as against 490 seats won by the DP.

The electoral victory of 1954 gave Menderes unlimited confidence. The cabinet which was formed after the elections included many personal friends of Premier Menderes, who felt that the party's overwhelming victory was actually a vote of confidence given to him personally. His overbearing attitude soon gave rise to a reaction within his own party, however, the electoral law was amended in such a way as to prevent defections from the party, denying dissatisfied DP deputies the opportunity to seek seats as independents. The state radio, which originally had been used both by opposition and government parties on an equal time basis, was reserved for government use only. Menderes's autocratic attitude, plus the riots of 1955 in İstanbul, which destroyed Greeks' property, alienated the intelligentsia and undermined further his position. Faced with sharp criticism within the party, the cabinet resigned but in a bizarre act, Menderes personally received a vote of confidence. (It was under these circumstances that the dissidents formed the liberal *Hürriyet Partisi* (Freedom Party) in December 1955, but the activities of this party remained rather insignificant).<sup>15</sup> The independence shown by the DP deputies towards the Prime Minister vanished as soon as Menderes gained the upper hand again. Meanwhile Menderes co-opted the army generals into the system through a variety of incentives but alienated the young officers, especially by ignoring Seyfi Kurtbek, a retired general and Minister of Defense, who put forth plans for reforming and rejuvenating the officer's corps. This was an error for which Menderes paid dearly at the end.

New elections were held in 1957 and were won again by the DP but with a diminished margin of victory. Voter participation dropped

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<sup>15</sup> Considerable information on these developments may be found in Toker, M.: *İsmet Paşayla 10 Yıl 1954-1964* (Ten Years with İsmet Paşa, 1954-1964), 4 vols. Ankara 1965-69.

sharply for the first time, and the CHP won 178 seats. The DP had 419 seats. (The total number of seats increased in proportion to the population growth; one deputy for 40,000 inhabitants.) The setback, although minor, indicated that the Turkish political scene was undergoing a rather important transformation. The economic policies of Menderes, successful in the 1950–56 period, appeared now to have lost their dynamism not only because of bad agricultural harvests in 1954 and 1955 but also because of the unbalanced distribution of income. There was growing dissatisfaction among salaried groups because of inflation, and a certain malaise had developed among the low income urban groups settled in the shanty towns that had mushroomed around the cities.<sup>16</sup> The destructive riots of 1955, in which these shanty town dwellers had played an important role, were an indication that new forces and new motives were beginning to determine the course of Turkish politics. The social unrest, although only in its infancy, encouraged the CHP, always in search of new social bases and political issues, to shift slightly to the left and to take a new interest in social matters. It discovered to its satisfaction that the old populist ideas, which it had ignored during its term in power, could now be revived in a secular context and used to party advantage. The research bureau of the party was manned by a group of leftist intellectuals, some of whom were associated with the liberal review *Forum*, the periodical that became the defender of new social and democratic ideals. The bureau began to issue studies of economic and social issues.

It was quite obvious that the political atmosphere of Turkey was undergoing a rapid transformation. The events of 1957–60 which resulted from this transformation, although important, cannot be studied in detail here.<sup>17</sup> It is sufficient to say that dissension within the DP ranks increased as a number of prominent members (e.g., Sıtkı Yırcalı, Semih Ergin) tried to break the supremacy of the four founders and particularly of Menderes, while the opposition sought to exploit the growing popular dissatisfaction with the government to its own advantage. The CHP issued a Statement of Purposes proposing to amend the Constitution, to balance the power of the

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<sup>16</sup> The shanty towns have been studied in great detail. See Karpat, K.H.: *The Gecekondu. Rural Migration and Urbanization in Turkey*. New York 1976.

<sup>17</sup> See Ahmad, F.: *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950–1975*. Boulder, Colorado 1977. (Cit. as: Ahmad, Experiment).

Executive, to provide safeguards for the Judiciary, and to make the entire political system compatible with the principles of democracy. The feud between the DP government and the opposition reached new heights. The government tried to silence the opposition by creating an inquiry committee, while the CHP organized mammoth demonstrations to protest authoritarian policies; then the DP tried to use the military to stamp out the demonstrations. This was a fatal step, for it put an end to the army's neutrality. It was taken for granted, although no one ever proved it, that the DP was getting ready to close the CHP, whose chairman, İnönü, now began to issue veiled calls for assistance from the military and the intellectuals. It was in this atmosphere that the military coup of May 27, 1960 occurred. The military had kept out of politics for forty years in accordance with one of Atatürk's key principles; however, in 1960 it stepped once more onto the scene to turn a new page in Turkish politics.<sup>18</sup> A secret military organization of junior army officers in power installed a junta headed by General Cemal Gürsel. The military's supremacy over the civilian society was thereby reaffirmed and the elitist order revived: developments that proved totally incompatible with the emerging pluralistic political order. The DP era had been brought to a close but not before it had set the society on a new and irreversible course of evaluation shaped by the interaction of various internal groups and forces rather than by government decisions alone.

The period 1950–1960 had been dominated by Adnan Menderes, his personality and his policies. He was dedicated to material progress and had a good intuitive understanding of the Turkish peasantry and their cultural and economic aspirations. He directed his policies essentially toward the satisfaction (and the exploitation for his own advantage) of the desires of villagers and the lower classes for both material progress and spiritual nourishment in the form of religion. He was, like most Turkish leaders, authoritarian by nature, and having been brought up under the one-party regime, he regarded democracy not as a goal in itself but only as a means by which he might acquire power and use it for his own designs. He regarded the

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<sup>18</sup> On the military see Karpas, K.H.: "The Military and Politics in Turkey 1960–64," in: *American Historical Review*, 75,6, 1970, pp. 1654–83; Özbudun, E.: *The Role of the Military in Recent Turkish Politics*. Cambridge, Mass. 1966. See also chapter Weiher, G.: "Die innenpolitische Rolle des Militärs."

bureaucratic-military apparatus as the main enemy of the civilian order he tried to establish and consequently used every means to dominate, subdue, and eventually use it. His violent enmity towards İsmet İnönü stemmed from his paranoid fear that in a showdown of power, the military-bureaucratic intelligentsia group would support İnönü. At the end the multi-party democracy became almost a personal political struggle between Menderes and İnönü. The differences between the CHP and DP, epitomized in the elitism versus mass participation duality, a duality which has been the mark of Turkish politics since the inception of the modernist era, persisted and developed new dimensions. İnönü won the first battle in 1960 (but at the end, in 1972, he lost the struggle to the statist-elitists, who dubbed themselves socialists, in his own party). The military intervention of 1960 ended a promising era in Turkish democracy and in turn became like many similar interventions in recent Turkish history: the harbinger of a new socio-political era.

#### IV. *The Pluralist Constitutional Order under Military Tutelage*

The military group, which took the power on May, 27, 1960, organized itself rapidly into the MBK. It consisted of 38 officers, headed by General Cemal Gürsel, who had joined the secret revolutionary group shortly before the takeover. On June 12, 1960, the Committee adopted a self-devised Provisional Constitution, which gave it all the powers held by the old elected Assembly until a new constitution could be adopted. The Cabinet was composed of former CHP members and people known for their Republican sympathies and functioned under the MBK, but gradually it assumed considerable independence. The MBK made its decisions by a four-fifths majority, which assured the young officers of a dominant position until the radical group known as the "fourteen" was ousted.<sup>19</sup> The military, supported by the intelligentsia, the bureaucracy, a substantial part of academia, and the press, justified their intervention as a step

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<sup>19</sup> The literature on the May 27, 1960 event is too extensive to be cited here in any detail. For bibliography, see works cited in note 18. See also Weiker, W.F.: *The Turkish Revolution, 1960-61*. Washington, D.C. 1963. The legislative activity of the NUC is found in a collection of laws: *İnkılâp Kanunları (Laws of Revolution)*. 2 vols. İstanbul 1961.

necessary to save democracy and Atatürk's reforms (that is, mainly secularism) and promised a quick return to civilian order.

However, from the start the intervention created a series of political and legal anomalies totally in contradiction to the most elementary rules of democracy, the most obvious being the claim that the military had intervened to "save the constitution and democracy" by busting a popularly elected government. True, the Menderes government had greatly restricted the freedom of the opposition, which increased the political tensions to near the breaking point, but there was no conclusive proof that he indeed planned to close the CHP. Neither was there ground to believe that the military intervention was mounted to save the CHP from extinction, as some of the officers, notably the "fourteen," were as critical of the CHP as of the DP. In fact, some secret military organizations had been established as early as 1954, and there was a plan to take over power in 1957. The takeover had been basically the class reaction of the old bureaucratic-intellectual-military elites to the rise of a new civilian order with its own social, political, and cultural values rooted in the traditional society and in the contemporary capitalist economic system. The military in power displayed from the beginning to the end of their rule an almost paranoid hatred of the DP and a partisan preference for the CHP. All the DP-deputies were arrested and accused of violating the Constitution. They were tried *en masse* at the Yassıada prison under a new law defining their crimes and setting the legal procedures, written by the MBK itself. The court decisions came out in the fall of 1961 in an atmosphere of heightened tension. At the end, Adnan Menderes and the former Finance and Foreign ministers, Hasan Polatkan and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu were executed, despite stiff internal and external opposition. Celâl Bayar's death sentence was commuted to life in prison because of his old age. Later, when the civilian order was re-established, he and other DP-deputies were amnestied.

The social dimensions of the military involvement became more obvious after General Gürsel, the head of MBK, declared that Turkey needed social reforms and that "socialism," which had been a taboo concept for thirty years, could be employed to achieve economic development. Meanwhile 240 landlords in eastern Anatolia were arrested, and an inquiry committee was established to investigate how the *nouveaux riches* gained their wealth. The junta dismissed 147 university professors for rather obscure reasons, thus causing the

alienation of some of the intelligentsia. The People's Houses were revived under the title of Turkish Cultural Associations but without lasting success. The army reform, which had been contemplated as early as 1952 by the DP, was finally carried out under a *rejuvenation* program. It resulted in the dismissal of 7,000 officers, who formed the EMINSU (Retired Officers Association), and this organization in turn became a powerful interest group.

One of the most important achievements of the MBK was the establishment of the SPO (State Planning Organization). By 1961, a powerful socialist-statist-intellectual group, encouraged by the leftist leanings of the military and guided by the ideological review *Yön* (*Direction*), began to agitate for far flung social reforms. At this stage, the amorphous association of socialists, Fabianists, Marxists, social democrats, and secularists that formed the Turkish left, laid priority on economic development as the chief condition necessary to strengthen the national economy and to achieve social justice. Consequently, a group of statist-socialists influential within the CHP tried to place the SPO above the government and the Parliament but were finally thwarted in 1963, after İnönü was compelled to establish a coalition with the YTP and accepted a liberal economic policy. Nonetheless, the SPO played a vital role after 1963, when, placed under parliamentary control, it provided a systematic and realistic plan for investments and development with beneficial effects for the economy.

However, the MBK was beset by ideological differences and individual power ambitions. A small group headed by Alparslan Türkeş had nationalist-socialist tendencies and wanted to retain power as long as possible in order to carry out reforms. The majority of the MBK, working closely with the CHP, wanted a quick restoration of parliamentary rule. The dissension came to a climax on the question of the *Kurucu Meclis* (Constituent Assembly) to be charged with the drafting of a new Constitution. The group headed by Türkeş opposed the early establishment of the Assembly as well as the end of the military rule, expected soon thereafter. The "fourteen," and notably Türkeş, were open critics of İnönü. After they were ousted the MBK came to rely almost entirely on the CHP for support and guidance. In fact, six months after the coup the CHP was strong enough to set up the mechanism for return to a civilian order, but in accordance with its own views. Meanwhile the army officers on active duty formed the Union of Armed Forces (UAF), both in order to supervise the young officers, many of whom seemed intent on



becoming involved in politics, and to act as a pressure group against the MBK.<sup>20</sup> The general tendency in the UAF was to favor the return to civilian democratic rule. With both the CHP and the UAF in favor, the MBK decided to establish the Constitutional Assembly on December 16, 1960. The law establishing the Assembly forbade all former members of the DP (which meanwhile had been definitively closed) to become members of the new body, which thus came to be dominated overwhelmingly by the CHP and a group of leftist liberal intellectuals. A Constitution was gradually drafted by the Constituent Assembly and subjected to a popular referendum on July 9, 1961. Of the 10,322,169 votes cast 10,282,561 were considered valid and 39,608 void. A total of 6,348,191 votes approved the Constitution, while 3,934,370 rejected it.<sup>21</sup> It should be noted that the negative votes constituted an unusually high percentage, indicating the existence of widespread popular opposition to the Constitution.

The provisions of the Constitution reflected not the realities of Turkey but the emotional reaction to the excessive power entrusted to the Executive, which had permitted abuses of authority under the DP. The new Constitution was an excessively liberal document that introduced extensive checks over the Executive and scattered authority among a variety of legislative and judiciary bodies, so as to make the exercise of government authority extremely difficult. It espoused at the same time liberal economic and social goals far beyond Turkey's economic and intellectual means. The Constitution, in fact, expressed a utopian dream, if not sheer fantasist liberalism, and a perfunctory imitation of the West. One of the members of the Constituent Assembly claimed that that body had read the texts of all the major constitutions in the world and chose what seemed to be the best provisions.<sup>22</sup> The Constitution of 1961 created new institutions and a new relationship between the three branches of government and consequently, must be analyzed in some detail.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Ahmad, *Experiment*, p. 168.

<sup>21</sup> This is the statement of the High Council of Election, number 106 of July 19, 1961.

<sup>22</sup> Giritli, İ.: "Some Aspects of the New Turkish Constitution," in: *MEJ*, 16, 1962, p. 2 ff.

<sup>23</sup> There are a variety of official and non-official texts of the Constitution of 1961 in foreign languages. For a bibliography of the Turkish Constitution see *Anayasa Bibliyografyası*. Published by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. Ankara 1981. See also Aldıkaçtı, O.: *Anayasa Hukukumuzun Gelişmesi ve 1961 Anayasası* (The Evolution of Our Constitution and the Constitution of 1961). 3rd edition. İstanbul 1978.

The preamble, after paying tribute to Turkish nationalism as the source of the drive for equality and the recognition accorded to Turkey in the world, pledged allegiance to Atatürk's reforms. It defined the Constitution as the instrument for achieving human rights and freedoms, national solidarity, social justice, peace, and progress. The operative articles defined Turkey as a Republic (Art. 1) and as a national, democratic, secular and social state bound by the rule of law (Art. 2). The new Constitution preserved secularism but replaced populism, statism, and reformism by new principles, such as democratic and *social* statehood. The *social* feature attributed to the state appeared to be a rather confused, paternalistic yearning for social progress and welfare and political liberalism, all to be achieved simultaneously through strong state intervention and regulation. The second section of the Constitution (Arts. 10–63) defined individual rights, freedoms, and securities—e.g., the inviolability of domicile, freedom of press and communication, fair trial—in the most liberal terms. Land reform was promised, in a rather oblique fashion (Art. 30), and expropriation permitted, with generous provisions for indemnity. The family was defined as being the society's foundation. The right to work or to engage in private enterprise was expressly granted, while the state was charged with providing “a living standard in accordance with human dignity through the regulation of economic and social life and in accordance with justice and full employment” (Art. 41). The right to form trade unions and to strike was accorded fully to the workers; the employers also could form unions. The right to establish political parties without prior government permission was granted in a very liberal fashion, provided that such parties respected the integrity of the state and the Constitution. In fact, political parties were defined to be the necessary foundation for the existence of a democratic political life (Art. 56).

The formal political structure designed to enforce and protect the new rights was very elaborate. The bicameral Parliament was divided into the Assembly, consisting of 450 members (minimum age, thirty years) and elected for four years through direct secret vote, and the Senate, consisting of 150 elected members, former members of the MBK (who were declared lifetime senators) and other Senators were

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(Aldıkaçtı was the chairman of the committee which drafted the Constitution of 1982). An English translation of the 1961 Constitution may be found in the *Oriente Moderno*. 43. 1–2. 1961, pp. 1–27.

appointed by the President. Senators were elected for six years with one-third up for reelection every two years. Senatorial candidates had to be a minimum of forty years of age and university educated. The legislative powers of the Senate remained limited and subordinate to the Assembly.

The Constitution opened the way for the introduction of Proportional Representation (PR), which was later restricted somewhat but was maintained until the end of the "second republic", as the new order was called. PR allowed a variety of small and sometimes radically oriented parties to send members to the parliament and in effect, to become the power brokers of Turkish politics.

The Republic's President had to be, like the Senators, at least forty years old and university educated. He was elected for a term of seven years by a two-thirds majority in a joint session of the Senate and Assembly. The President was required to sever relations with any party and thus became above party politics. The powers of the President were limited largely to ceremonial functions. Although he could preside over Cabinet meetings, he had no authority to dissolve Parliament, except by an extremely cumbersome procedure not likely to be possible to comply with.

The Judiciary under the Constitution was given almost total independence, so as to allow the judges to be immune to political pressure and influence. In fact, the High Committee of Judges (Art. 143) was the sole organ empowered to deal with the personnel affairs of the Judges. The regular system, consisting of peace (*sulh*) courts and courts of upper instance (*asliye*), were headed, as in the past, by a Supreme Court which was basically a court of appeal. The army had their own court system that dealt only with issues involving military affairs. The old Council of State (*Şûrayı Devlet* or *Danıştay*) was retained and charged with the adjudication of cases arising from administrative decisions outside the jurisdiction of regular courts (Art. 140). Also, for the first time the Constitution introduced a Constitutional Court (*Anayasa Mahkemesi*), consisting of fifteen active and five deputy members (Arts 145–153), to handle cases involving the constitutionality of laws.

It is not possible here to provide complete details of the Constitution of 1961, but the main thrust of its provisions is clearly indicated in the brief discussion above. It was, given the condition of the country and its institutions at that time, a truly extremist liberal document. The country was, indeed, in dire need of administrative, social, and

economic reorganization and regulation. By 1960, Turkey had undergone rapid urbanization and industrialization, accompanied by massive rural-to-town migration, that had begun to erode the traditional patterns of the society. What the country needed after 1960 was a degree of liberalization to permit the gradual emergence of a pluralistic political and social order that could create new rules and customs suitable to the modern nation. Instead it got an imitation western constitution that proved a disaster.

The small, ultra-liberal group that was mainly responsible for the provisions of the Constitution of 1961 was out of touch with the Turkish society and culture. Some of its members were more at home in New York, Paris, and Frankfurt than in the Turkish towns. Moreover, the reality of the country's economic underdevelopment was completely ignored by these sophisticated, well-educated elites, as they sought to collect ideas and organizational schemes from Western countries to be embodied in the new constitution and imposed on their own society in the name of progress. The new Constitution promised every conceivable right and freedom, without regard to the country's limited resources and its lack of the intermediate economic, social, cultural, and civic organizations that existed in the West to supervise the exercise of those freedoms and rights at the grassroots level. Furthermore, although it was to the state that the populace was to look for fulfillment of these generous constitutional promises, the reduction of the Executive to a powerless symbol, paralyzed by numerous checks and balances to fulfill any role in the administration of the new system, eliminated any possibility of success.

The independent Judiciary also proved to be more of an impediment than an aid to the operation of the new constitutional system. Freed of any sort of legislative oversight, the Judiciary became so bogged down that there were enormous delays in disposing of ordinary cases. A few judges, although ostensibly freed from the necessity of taking into account public pressures and popular ideologies, gave more weight to these external political manifestations than to the law itself. The new Constitutional Court, in particular, was often used by various interest groups to promote their own views.

Thus, the permissiveness of the new "democracy" promoted an anarchy that ended by destroying that democracy. The new political system that developed in the absence of restrictions, but without benefit of established democratic traditions, evolved not on the basis

of tested principles but as a process of action and reaction in which expediency and personal interest were primary.

V. *Party Politics in the Pluralistic Order, 1961–1971*

The military rule ended on October 15, 1961, when free elections were held. It had been assumed all along that the DP was so discredited that its successor parties—the YTP, under Ekrem Alican and the AP, under a former general, Ragıp Gümüşpala—had no chance of winning the elections. Indeed, the liberal provisions for political parties were adopted in the belief, shared both by the military and by the framers of the Constitution, that the CHP would win the elections. Actually, sympathy for the CHP, which had swept the country on the eve of the army coup, had been replaced by deep resentment because of that party's association with the military and its restrictive economic policies. The antagonism to the military rule in 1960–61 had been demonstrated in a series of non-violent but determined popular reactions in the countryside, such as refusal to deliver goods to markets, constant complaints, and failure to show the traditional respect for authority.<sup>24</sup> The election results of 1961 proved that indeed, the electorate's view of the situation was quite different from that of the people in power. The AP and the YTP took 34.8 and 13.7% of the votes, respectively, while the CHP received only 36.7%. The CKMP, a successor to the MP, closed in 1953 for anti-secularist reasons, and to the small Peasants Party,<sup>25</sup> received 14% of the votes. The rest of the votes went to the independents. İnönü was given the task of forming the government, and after long bargaining and upon much pressure from the military, the AP and CHP agreed to form a coalition cabinet.

The coalition was short lived. The AP was interested principally in measures that would get its deputies released from jail rather than in acts favored by the military. İnönü's own party, on the other hand, wanted rapid enforcement of the Constitution's promises. Despite

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<sup>24</sup> The writer spent the campaign and election time in the provinces and villages of Turkey. The opinions expressed here are based on direct personal observations in the field.

<sup>25</sup> A list of the small parties until 1952 in Karpat, *Politics*, pp. 440–41.

İnönü's personal goodwill and willingness to compromise, the coalition collapsed and the cabinet resigned. During this period İnönü also had to cope with two putsch attempts by Talat Aydemir, a disgruntled officer who had been a member of the secret military association but had missed his opportunity to participate in the takeover of 1960 because he was out of the country. His first attempt was aborted, but he later tried again. For this act he was condemned to death and executed.

The first unsuccessful coalition was followed by others formed with the YTP, the CKMP, and in 1963, with the independents. Defying the radical wing of his own party, İnönü had made several concessions in favor of private enterprise and agreed to trim the powers of the SPO. By 1963 the rightists and moderates appeared to be in control within both the CHP and the coalition government, thus thwarting the power ambitions of the leftists. Fethi Çelikbaş, a statistician turned liberal, occupied the key economic post in two of İnönü's cabinets. Finally, however, the İnönü coalition was ousted on a vote of no confidence engineered by Süleyman Demirel over a budget matter. Demirel, an engineer and former head of the Water Resources Department, had won the confidence of the army by wresting the chairmanship of the AP from the more extreme leadership exemplified by Sadettin Bilgiç, who took over after the party's first chairman, Gümüşpala, died in early 1964. After İnönü's defeat, Demirel formed the cabinet that went into the elections of 1965.

The elections exacerbated an already tense situation. The AP, having absorbed most of the YTP members, won a 52.9% majority of the vote, while the CHP received only 28.7%. A new Marxist Labor Party, the TİP, that had been quietly established in 1961, won 3% of the vote and sent fourteen members to the Assembly.<sup>26</sup> The TİP had undergone rapid growth during 1962 after Mehmet Ali Aybar, a Socialist, was elected its chairman. It gained popularity among the intellectuals and attracted a segment of the trade unionists, who formed their own organization (DİSK—the Turkish acronym for Revolutionary Workers' Trade Union Confederation) to support the TİP.

The CHP became convinced that its poor showing in the 1965 elections was due to its abandonment under İnönü's leadership of

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<sup>26</sup> See Karpat, K.H.: "Socialism and the Labor Party of Turkey," in: *MEJ* 21, 2, 1967, p. 158 ff.

the social programs that its radical wing had long insisted were envisioned by the Constitution of 1961.<sup>27</sup> In two post-election party conventions the CHP reached decisions that radically changed its direction. At the 1966 convention it elected Bülent Ecevit, the leader of its statist-socialist wing, as Secretary General. Ecevit was a journalist of high oratorical skill. His persuasive eloquence, which bordered on demagogery, had a greater impact on the party. At the extraordinary gathering of 1967 the party defined and adopted a policy it termed "left of center". From then on the CHP moved slowly but inexorably leftward. First, it adopted social democratic principles, gradually abandoning nationalism and Kemalism. It remained secularist, but because its new populist philosophy called for rapprochement with the ordinary people and respect for their views and culture, it became less strident in its secularism. Now that it had a real ideology (or so it thought) the party no longer needed the artificial ideology of secularism, on which it had depended for so long. Throughout the period 1946 to 1965, the CHP had constantly accused the DP, AP, and the YTP of being reactionary and disrespectful of Atatürk's reforms. From 1965 on, the secularist rhetoric was abandoned, and nobody, except for a handful of diehards, missed it. It was obvious that if the CHP wanted to become truly a populist, mass party, it would have to conform to the people's wishes and attitudes. It should perhaps be mentioned that the leftward drift in Turkey received a push from foreign events, such as President Johnson's anti-Turkish letter of 1964, in which he criticized Turkey's efforts to defend its rights in Cyprus, and the ensuing Soviet-Turkish detente and cultural exchange.

After the party convention of 1967 formally adopted the "left of the center" program, those who were opposed to this leftward turn broke from the CHP and formed their own party, the CGP, formed under the chairmanship of Turhan Feyzioglu; However,<sup>28</sup> this splinter party remained rather small and ineffective. Premier Demirel faced opposition from the liberals, nationalists, and Islamists within his own party; however, he was able to consolidate his position, although he remained rather vulnerable to both the extremist nationalist-Islamists

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<sup>27</sup> The participation in results of these elections are analyzed in Özbudun, E.: *Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey*. Princeton 1976.

<sup>28</sup> The developments within the CHP are described in Kili, S.: *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinde Gelişmeler* (Developments in the CHP). İstanbul 1976.

and the military, who were opposed to the full rehabilitation of DP leaders. Eventually Demirel was able to face up to the opposition within the party, thanks to support from old veterans of the DP, including the former President, Celâl Bayar. In 1968 the AP faced major problems. Demirel's desire to amend the tax laws and initiate new measures designated to achieve a better distribution of income and more rapid economic growth was at issue. His opponents claimed that this would undermine the party's liberal philosophy and open the way to a new type of statism. At the party convention of 1968 Demirel's supporters won a narrow victory, but in 1969 his party won the elections with only 46.5% of the vote as opposed to its 52.9% total in 1965. The 1969 decline in AP popularity was accompanied by another political event that was to prove of major importance. In that year the MHP representing the fusion of two smaller CKMP and MP parties, was born under the leadership of Alparslan Türkeş, the officer who had been exiled in 1960 for his defense of a strong regime.

The MHP was ultranationalist, opposed to both capitalism and socialism as well as to liberal democracy. The program of the party, represented in nine principles spelled by Türkeş, put stress on Turkism but also on development, technology, and industrialization.<sup>29</sup> The rise of the MHP was an indication of an ideological polarization in the country. The leftist movement, which had followed a very democratic course throughout the 1960–65 period, had begun to gather strength by 1967 and fell rapidly under the influence of the militant Marxist leaders. Although the bulk of the rank and file leftists were divided into numerous groups that did not share the ultraradical views of the leaders, they eventually fell into line. The early debates about how to achieve economic development and social justice and a variety of similar goals by democratic means gave place to schemes proposing total social and economic revolution through violent means. Militant leftist organizations, infiltrated in part by agents and proxies of various foreign powers, began to court minority groups, such as the Kurds and the Shiites, in the hope of using them against the establishment. The radical left made important gains in the univer-

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<sup>29</sup> Succinct information on the MHP and on its leader can be found in Karpat, K.H.: *Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East*. New York 1982, section on Turkey.



sities, the press, and the bureaucracy. It was this noticeable success of the leftist groups that moved the frustrated CHP in 1967 to adopt its quasi-socialist policy, in the hope of gaining for its own ranks some of the newly left-leaning voters and at the same time of preventing the desertion to the TİP of its young, militant cadres.

Meanwhile the nationalists and other rightists that remained disorganized in the early 1960s began to establish their own groups. By 1970 the main rightist organizations, such as the *Ülkü Ocakları Birliği* (Union of Idealist Hearths) and the *Türkiye Milliyetçiler Birliği* (Union of Nationalists of Turkey), were firmly established and had formed a relationship with the MHP. They then began to oppose the leftists, often through their own commando groups; the best known of which was the *Bozkurtlar* (Grey Wolves).<sup>30</sup> Thus, the political polarization began to manifest itself in acts of violence.

The CHP itself, in an effort to establish its bonafides as a truly leftist party, engaged also in a series of militant tactics against the elected government, which it denounced as “capitalist bourgeois” and other similar epithets. The irony of the matter was that these epithets were more applicable to the CHP itself than to the AP which, though headed by professionals and business groups, continued to rely on sound popular support. The CHP was trying desperately to become a class party by adopting first, a class ideology and then, looking for a social constituency. To this end, it began to try to enlist the support of the workers, although in 1961, Ecevit had strongly opposed the involvement of workers in politics. The CHP began also to make use of its sympathizers in the government and the court system, using every available channel to delay and frustrate the implementation of laws passed by the Parliament. As the acts of terrorism, which were unknown in Turkey until 1969, began to reach threatening proportions, incidents of political murder and kidnapping became frequent; the CHP moved even further to the left. Bülent Ecevit, with the help of small militant groups, eliminated the conservatives from his party and consolidated his power through a party convention in March 1970.

Ecevit remained Secretary General and İsmet İnönü, although highly dissatisfied with actions of the party, continued as its chairman.

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<sup>30</sup> For a full study of these organizations see Landau, J.M.: *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*. Leiden 1974. See also *Milliyet* and *Cumhuriyet*, March 12–20, 1971.

Bent on acquiring power at all costs, Ecevit embarked upon a war with the government in power, using what later proved to be his preferred tactics: passionate denunciations and appeals to class hatred and sweeping promises elaborated by sentimental visions of social justice and freedom. Political crimes and manifestations of unrest, including mammoth demonstrations against the government, organized by the left, became daily occurrences.

During this period Demirel, the Premier, was at a great psychological disadvantage because of corruption charges brought against him, although in the end none of these charges proved to be well founded (some members of his family were implicated, however). Demirel's authority was further eroded by criticism and opposition arising from within his own party—ostensibly directed toward his alleged condoning of corruption, but actually because of his fiscal and economic reforms. The dissidents, altogether forty-one leading members of the AP representing its liberal wing, resigned and formed the DemP, an obvious effort to identify themselves with the old DP of Adnan Menderes.

On March 12, 1971, the military, headed by Memduh Tağmaç, Faruk Gürler, Muhsin Batur (all Chiefs of Staff) and others, submitted a memorandum accusing the Parliament and the Government of having driven the country into anarchy and fratricidal struggle, of having delayed the implementation of the reforms decreed by the Constitution, and naturally, of having violated Atatürk's principles. The memorandum demanded that a government be constituted to enforce the reforms and threatened an army takeover if this was not achieved quickly. Demirel resigned, and his place was taken by Nihat Erim, who resigned from the CHP in order to assume the premiership. He formed a Cabinet consisting of some veteran and conservative members of the CHP but mostly of independents, as the AP refused to join the cabinet.<sup>31</sup> Another era of military rule was about to begin.

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<sup>31</sup> Unfortunately, the only available book-length study of the period from 1971–76 studies all these events in a highly subjective manner by adopting a very partisan, laudatory view of the CHP and of Ecevit. Ahmad, *Experiment*, pp. 288–320.

VI. *The Agony of Coalitions, 1971–1980*

The military intervention of 1971, which put a temporary end to democracy in Turkey, also distorted and damaged the political process almost beyond repair. It produced artificial and utterly illogical political arrangements which emphasized the existing constitutional weaknesses and prevented the formation of any government capable of managing the country. The President at this time was General Cevdet Sunay, who had replaced President Cemal Gürsel in 1966 when the latter became incapacitated by illness and relinquished his position (dying shortly thereafter). Sunay delegated to Nihat Erim the task of forming a government that did not represent any specific political party but paradoxically was to work with a Parliament made up of political parties bitterly opposed to each other. The military, organized into a National Security Council (NSC), used their power and influence to sustain the Erim government. Meanwhile special military organizations, assisted by the imposition of martial law, assumed the responsibility of restoring law and order. They acted with the agreement of the government but also outside the normal channels. The military representative in the cabinet, Sadi Koçuş, often had the last word. Nevertheless, the terrorist activities intensified. Several American enlisted men and the Israeli consul in İstanbul were abducted. The killing of the latter two months after the military takeover (the Americans were freed by the police) demonstrated that the military's vows to establish law and order under the existing system could not be fulfilled. Martial law was further expanded and tightened, and a large number of leftists were arrested and their organizations closed. There were discussions about amending the Constitution in order to strengthen the Executive, but no real amendment materialized. Still, the government simply could not function in the existing constitutional framework, and it was rendered even more inoperative by the imposition of military rule.

The reforms demanded by the military consisted of vast plans for industrialization, economic development, land reform, educational expansion, etc., which a simple caretaker government without strong popular support could not possibly implement. In the economic field the old statist policies of government control and discouragement of private enterprise were revived. A bureaucratic-minded economist, Atilla Karaosmanođlu, was back in charge of economic planning and promptly denounced foreign investment, profits, devaluations, and

the like which the World Bank approved. (This economist paradoxically, had served the World Bank in Washington, D.C.) Karaosmanoglu's attacks against the previous policies of the Demirel government were of the standard ideological vintage of the CHP and the so-called socialists. Thus, the basic disagreement concerning Turkey's economic policies, which was at the bottom of many of the country's political differences, burst into the open again. The military, the CHP-leadership, and a substantial part of the press demanded *statist* policies, often labeled *socialism* whereas the AP and the new DP espoused a degree of economic *liberalism*.

It should be pointed out here that the ideological positions of the opposing parties on the Turkish political scene are not really accurately described by the terms *statism*, *socialism*, and *liberalism* as these are defined in the West, although the terms are those generally used. *Statism* encompassed not merely the overt policies of the group espousing it but also the attitudes of intellectual superiority, erudition, and elitist leadership that had been the mark of the ruling group in the past. Thus, the statistes looked upon economic planning and state intervention as essentially a mechanism of control and supervision that derived from the supremacy of the state with its inherent right to arrange and utilize the economic and human resources of the country as it wished. Naturally, this group considered itself to be the one rightfully in charge of the arranging and utilizing. The *liberals*, on the other hand, looked upon economic planning as simply a matter of economic organization and systematization to be geared to the production of the highest quantity of goods. They considered that controls inhibited production, while the desire for personal economic achievement and the rewards of such achievement were the most efficient stimuli of economic activity. It was their view that the state ought not to be a coercive organ with the right to force society into a predetermined course but rather a body that expressed the community's history, cultural attachments, and interests and followed a course dictated by the will and wishes of the people.

*Statism* was defined also in terms of its opposition to the new order based on economic power and achievement and especially to the spirit of pragmatic realism (materialism) of the worker and the entrepreneur that was the hallmark of *liberalism*. The opposition claimed that the *statists* sought national and collective benefit while workers, entrepreneurs, and peasants were animated solely by personal material motives. *Statism* became equated with *socialism* and the rhetoric

of class struggle was adopted as part of the *statist-socialist* vocabulary. Despite allusions of members of this group to the suffering of the destitute masses, their political energies remained directed toward the old elitist goals, which is not surprising considering that the background of these *socialist* leaders was mainly the well-to-do urban intellectual or landlord upper class or mid-level bureaucrat class. Their virulent dislike of the opposition stemmed from resentment and fear of the policies that proposed to give more power and scope to the entrepreneurial and commercial classes and the peasants, at the expense, of course, of their own traditional powers. Thus, the animosity between statist and non-statists assumed many of the characteristics of a class struggle, but the fact was that both groups lived off the surplus of the real producers.

It is interesting to note that during the 1960s, despite changes of government and the adoption of the new constitution, a twenty-six year old bureaucrat or a well-to-do upper class young man would still address a fifty year old peasant as *oğlum* (my son), thus showing the true state of the power alignment in the society. However, the continuing ideological debates between the AP and the CHP were beginning to have the sort of effect on this grassroots situation that no upper level reform had been able to engender. The military intervention put a temporary stop to these vigorous debates without being able to repair or bridge the tremendous rift that had developed between the statist *socialist left* and the *liberal right*.

The *reforms* proposed by the Erim government at the behest of the military would have revived to a considerable extent the old statist order. The AP pulled its members out of the cabinet, thus bringing about the collapse of the Erim government, which the CHP eventually helped restore. Meanwhile the CHP entered into a course of activity that in the long run proved fatal to itself and the country. Chairman İnönü had supported, very reluctantly and cautiously, the military intervention in 1971, while Bülent Ecevit, the General Secretary, had opposed it. Each had his own supporters in the party. Ecevit's younger supporters had captured the leadership of most of the party organizations in the countryside, while İnönü relied on the old party stalwarts. The inevitable struggle between Ecevit and İnönü, who had raised the former to notoriety, ended in Ecevit's victory. After a prolonged fight within the CHP, Ecevit became Party Chairman after İnönü resigned in protest over the election of Ecevit as Secretary General instead of his own candidate. From then (May, 1972) on

Ecevit had to prove to his leftist and Marxist supporters and to himself that, indeed, his ideas were right while those of the moderate nationalists, secularists, and Kemalists were wrong. İnönü's supporters in the CHP who sought to preserve the residue of Kemalism, followed Kemal Satır, their leader, in resigning. They eventually joined the CGP of Turhan Feyzioğlu, the loser to Ecevit in the ideological struggle of 1967.

Meanwhile the Erim government was replaced by Ferit Melen, after S.H. Ürgüplü had failed to form a cabinet. Both of these men were long-standing members of the CHP. The elimination of the moderate old Kemalist group, which could have counter-balanced the statist-Marxist militant group in the CHP, was matched by a considerable loss of power for Demirel and his group within the AP after a struggle for control of that party. His friend and classmate Necmettin Erbakan, who had aspirations towards the leadership of the AP, had resigned from the party in 1969 and in 1970 formed a conservative religious party, the MNP. This party had been closed by the Constitutional Court in May, 1971, shortly after the military intervention, as being anti-secularist. It reemerged 15 months later under the name of MSP. It appealed to the conservative and religious sentiments of the population, including many youths anxious to find historical and cultural roots in their own society rather than adopting the fleeting ideologies imported from abroad. The MSP attracted a large following from among the ranks of the AP; namely, religious conservatives, small town craftsmen and entrepreneurs, as well as well-educated intellectuals demanding a change in Turkey's culture and foreign policies.

The elections of 1973 brought these developments to a head. The military decided to restore full power to the civilians after it was faced with opposition in the Parliament: General Faruk Gürler, the master of the 1971 coup, was not elected President, despite a show of force; rather Fahri Korutürk was the choice. The results of the national election gave the CHP the front position among the parties for the first time since 1946. It won 33.3% of the vote, against 29.8% for the AP. This was not sufficient, however, for it to form a government by itself. The MSP won 11.8% of the votes (48 deputies) and became the true power broker in the Parliament.

The relative electoral success of the CHP persuaded Ecevit that his policies were right and that he should pursue them. In fact, the results of the elections had a very different meaning. The popula-

tion seemed to have favored the CHP because it enjoyed the confidence of the military and the bureaucracy and consequently could use the state authority with considerable freedom to maintain law and order. The populist image of the party conveyed by its leaders also persuaded millions of new immigrants into cities that the new CHP was Turkey's hope for the future (a belief also held by many intellectuals at the time). It is interesting to note that the Marxist TİP elected no one while the *Birlik Partisi* (Unity Party), representing a more traditionalist leftist view, elected only one deputy. The fate of the TİP, torn by dissension after its leader M. Ali Aybar denounced the USSR intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, should have been a warning to Ecevit, for, although critical of Communism, he continued to adopt increasingly militant leftist tactics and slogans.

Ecevit was charged by the President, Fahri Korutürk, a retired admiral, with forming the cabinet after a sort of non-party government headed by Naim Talu who resigned in 1974. He was unable to do so at the first try, but at his second attempt (after Demirel had tried and failed) he finally managed (in January, 1974) to form a coalition with a most unlikely partner: the MSP.<sup>32</sup>

The MSP stood for just the opposite of everything the old CHP and Kemalism had espoused. It is wrong, however, to look upon the MSP as solely a reactionary Islamist party. It had, in fact, a program of social and economic development and industrialization alongside a program of cultural and social reorientation and rehabilitation based on Islam and history. Many of the MSP leaders were technocrats with a university education; Erbakan, who became Deputy Premier, was a professor of engineering who had worked in a German university. The view that the MSP represented mainly the small countryside merchants and craftsmen opposed to big capital, supposedly represented by the AP, was actually only a very small part of the picture. The appeal of the party lay in the coincidence of its doctrines with many Turks' search for an identity based on historical and cultural continuity as well as a new foreign policy that would bring Turkey closer to the Arab nations. This was a minority position that had been accommodated within the AP as long as it followed a middle-of-the-road policy. When it adopted a policy of social and fiscal reform in 1969, this minority group was alienated. By

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<sup>32</sup> *Yanka*, July–Sept. 1974; *Milliyet*, September 15, 1974.

1977, however, the AP had become again the major representative of the peasants and the others in the lower echelons of the society. The MSP vote then fell to a mere 8.6% and it elected only 24 deputies, half the number elected in 1973.

The CHP-MSP coalition of 1974 was based on a number of agreements, including one that all persons accused of political crimes should be pardoned. Thousands of militants and terrorists of both left and right were freed, but this was the only major provision carried out. The plan to conduct a somewhat independent foreign policy and to implement a variety of social and economic measures never came to fruition. In July, 1974, Turkey landed troops on Cyprus in order to maintain the constitutional arrangement which had been violated by the ousting of Makarios (engineered by the junta ruling Greece at the time). This event gave an enormous boost to the rapidly diminishing popularity of Ecevit. Encouraged by this new popularity, which he enhanced through partisan appointments to state radio and television, Ecevit decided to disband his coalition, which was beset by disagreements. He resigned as Premier in the hope that the resulting crisis would lead to new elections; however, new elections were not scheduled, and after a prolonged ministerial crisis Sadi Irmak, another old time member of the CHP, formed an interim government. This was followed five months later by a Demirel coalition government of the AP, MHP, MSP, and CGP. The new coalition was called the National Front and was promptly denounced by Ecevit as a rightist plot.

The CHP, frustrated by the fact that it had been reduced to political impotence despite its large bloc of deputies in the Parliament, carried its struggle against the government to the press and streets. The polarization and degeneration of Turkish politics proceeded rapidly as the left and the right disrupted opposition party meetings and engaged in street fighting and assassinations: both Demirel and Ecevit were targets of such attacks which undermined further the country's stability. Hope was rested on the forthcoming elections. However, the elections of 1977 failed to give a clear majority to any party. Thus, the political situation that had produced the weak coalitions and the instability of 1973-77 was preserved. The CHP share of the vote rose to 41.4 (from 33.3% in 1973) giving it 213 deputies. The AP vote also went up, from 29.8 to 36.9%, and the number of its deputies increased from 149 to 189; however, this was regarded as a setback, for the AP had expected a higher vote after its excel-



lent showing in the partial elections of 1975, when its vote percentage was 48.6 against 38% for the CHP.

The 1977 elections should have been taken as a signal for the two parties to come together. Indeed, in 1977 the AP and CHP, the two major parties of the center, took roughly 78% of the total vote, as against 63% in 1973, despite the fact that the MHP's vote also showed an almost threefold increase and the number of its deputies jumped from 3 to 16. It seemed that the nationalist groups of all tendencies, especially the religious-minded ones, had shifted their support from MSP to the MHP.<sup>33</sup> Yet, both Ecevit and Demirel refused to cooperate in a coalition government as the former was still determined to transform his party into a truly socialist one, and the latter was afraid that any partnership with the CHP would cause the drift of many of its members to the radical rightists, as had happened to the MSP because of its alliance with Ecevit in 1974. Thus, the political situation in the period 1977–80 was a repetition of the previous session. After an attempt by Ecevit which did not succeed, a rightist coalition government, in which the MHP had a great share, was established under Demirel but was weakened by internal dissension and the beginning of stagnation in the economy. Foreign loan money was used unwisely in an effort to stimulate economic growth which failed to materialize, due in large part to the prevailing political insecurity. Also, the Demirel government proved ineffective with the growing anarchy. In the end the CHP and Ecevit personally were able to persuade (actually buy) enough dissatisfied deputies from AP to acquire a very slim CHP majority in the Parliament. The renegade AP deputies were given ministerial positions, regardless of the fact that few of them had the qualifications for high position. Ecevit formed his cabinet in January, 1978. Although he lacked an electoral majority, he engaged in a far reaching nationalization program, which greatly handicapped the economy and alienated the foreign banks. The program was, in fact, the old stereotypical state capitalism, dubbed "socialism".

The result of Ecevit's policy was a fuel shortage in the severe winter of 1978–79. Schools were closed, hospitals went unheated and

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<sup>33</sup> The gross number of votes for the MSP actually showed a minor increase, but the number of its deputies went down from 48 to 24. The growth of eligible voters from roughly 16.7 million in 1973 to 21.2 million in 1977 favored the big parties. See also Weiker, W.F.: *Modernization of Turkey*. New York 1981.

the economy as a whole deteriorated rapidly. Meanwhile the unending workers' strikes and the generous settlements supported by the government doubled and tripled the inflation rate, the political assassinations and bank robberies increased, and rampant terrorism made Turkey a land of insecurity. The government declared martial law but failed in its promises to stamp out the terrorism. The Cabinet was administratively incompetent. Its mismanagement of the economy and the structure of the society had produced a decay and permissiveness that had turned life in Turkey into a nightmare. The government existed in name only. In the midst of this chaos Ecevit continued to deliver his fierce attacks on the opposition, which responded in kind.<sup>34</sup> The polarization intensified. Teachers and other professionals, and even the police, became divided along ideological lines. The government appointed more and more leftists and Marxists to high positions in its attempt to prove the authenticity of its *socialism*.

The depth and extent of the public dissatisfaction with this state of affairs apparently went unheeded by the government and the CHP until brought home by the results of the partial elections in the fall of 1979. The CHP proved to have fallen into disfavor, even in areas such as Edirne where it felt it had a commanding position. Of the total votes cast in five provinces, the AP received 54% and won all the five contested seats, while the ruling CHP's vote fell to 29.3%: an extremely poor showing for a party in power. Ecevit resigned, and in November of 1979 Demirel formed a minority government. The new government acted forcibly in an effort to control anarchy and terrorism but without success. It did, however, implement a major plan for economic stabilization, adopting measures known as the *January, 1980 measures*. For the first time in Turkish history, emphasis was placed on private initiative, production for export, sav-

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<sup>34</sup> A visitor in a talk with Ecevit early in 1978, told him that a CHP-AP coalition was the only possible way out of the impasse in which Turkey found herself. The public opinion also demanded such a coalition. Ecevit said that his government was already a coalition, since it included former AP deputies and there was no need for another coalition. In general, he showed an extraordinary lack of political maturity and responsibility. He was informed that moderate nationalist and leftist groups wanted to come together and attempt a reconciliation. The two groups desired to see Ecevit take the initiative to bring them together and act as the moderator. He called the moderate nationalists "fascists" and declared that he would have nothing to do with them.

ings, and similar programs that are the norm in healthy economic systems. These were, in fact, common sense developments, but they appeared extraordinarily original when compared to the contrived mass of bureaucratic provisions and controls instituted in the past in the name of statism. The program put in place by the Demirel government was in line with the advice of the international banking institutions. It was entrusted for implementation to Turgut Özal, who was elevated to a high position. The program was accepted by the Parliament, despite the fact that the AP government did not command a parliamentary majority, because nobody wanted to take the blame for opposing the economic rehabilitation. The beneficial effects of these measures went unnoticed at first, partly because these could not be fully implemented at once, but mainly because the terrorism and anarchy had reached uncontrollable proportions. Internal and external forces seemed to unite to sabotage the economic recovery plan and destabilize the country as a whole. In the summer of 1980 Turkey became an inferno, as the rate of political assassinations kept mounting (it had reached 20 to 25 a day), and various ethnic and religious groups began to fight each other.<sup>35</sup> The continuing confrontations between the CHP and the AP and the ensuing inability of the Parliament to elect a new President when the term of Fahri Korutürk had come to an end, further aggravated the disarray. The population at large, which had consistently supported a civilian democratic order, longed for peace and security. It put the blame for the chaos on the political parties and the permissiveness of the regime. The cries for some sort of intervention, divine or otherwise, grew louder and louder. The last straw was a series of MSP-organized demonstrations demanding establishment of an Islamic order. On September 12, 1980 the military once more took over the government.<sup>36</sup>

Thus, an era of democracy that opened under such auspicious conditions in the period 1945–50 came to a sad end as party politics and all associated with party politics was profoundly discredited.

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<sup>35</sup> For an account of terrorism and its external connections, see Mumcu, U.: *Silah Kaçaklığı ve Terör* (Arms Smuggling and Terrorism). İstanbul 1982; see also the official government publication: *September 12, in Turkey, Before and After*. Ankara 1982.

<sup>36</sup> Karpat, K.H.: "Democracy at Impasse in Turkey: Political Instability, Terrorism, and Third Military Intervention," in: *International Journal of Turkish Studies*. Vol. 2/1. 1981, pp. 1–45.

However, despite the turmoil and the unregulated rise of partisan politics of the most vicious type, the period 1960–1980 was not totally without its redeeming features. There was rapid economic growth and increased industrialization, especially from 1963 to 1976, due to an odd combination of private enterprise and investment, a policy that came to be known as *karma ekonomi* (mixed economy). A free press also developed rapidly after 1963, and there developed an active intellectual life along with the proliferation of a great variety of associations and interest groups. These favorable developments came about despite the new Constitution, because some of the old leaders of the CHP and AP were still influential and despite their differences, still shared some common ideals and could act in concert for the nation's good. When the old leaders lost power and the barriers were entirely broken down after 1976, Turkey fell prey to anarchy and terror.

#### VII. *The Military Rule and Domestic Politics, 1980–1984*

The army takeover in 1980 was different in all respects from the coups of 1960 and 1971. It received wide, popular acceptance, because it was seen as a last resort for establishing order and security. The first two interventions had been motivated by social and reformist ideological considerations, whereas the intervention of 1980 sought national unity and the preservation of the existing institutions and the social order. The military sought to rebuild national unity around the legacy of Atatürk, taking advantage of his birth centennial to reemphasize his ideals. Although adamantly secularist, the military refrained from attacking Islam or from imposing restrictions on the freedom of religion as had been done in 1960 and 1971. On the other hand, there were mass arrests and trials of terrorists and Necmettin Erbakan, the MSP leader, and Alparslan Türkeş, the head of the MHP, were jailed. In fact, these two rightist leaders were treated much more harshly than expected. Ecevit and Demirel were arrested, or put in house detention, for short periods of time; Ecevit because he tried to keep his name in the limelight through the publication of journals and political statements in open defiance of a ban, and Demirel because he became involved in party activity.

The government organization put in place by the military was also different. The National Security Council (NSC), headed by

General Kenan Evren, was comprised of the heads of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Gendarmerie and a Secretary, General Haydar Saltık, later replaced. The Cabinet, consisting mainly of civilians without party affiliations, was headed by Premier Bülend Ulusu, a former admiral and ambassador to Rome. The old Parliament was dissolved. Thus, the military established full control of the government instead of relying on cooperation with the political parties of the Parliament. The military rulers reduced civilian participation, influence, and contacts to a minimum, lest the non-partisan, national character of the government be compromised. It promised to return the government to civilian control and to restore the parliamentary democracy as soon as conditions permitted. Later, General Kenan Evren provided a time-table according to which the return to democracy would be completed by the fall of 1983 or the spring of 1984.

The military government centered its efforts, first, on stamping out terrorism and anarchy. Leftists and rightist militants, altogether some 43,000 people, involved in actual murders were arrested and brought to trial. In a relatively short time peace and tranquility was restored, although sporadic acts of violence still occurred. The military government has been accused, notably by European liberal and leftist circles, of having engaged in arbitrary arrests and torture of the detainees. It is true that a few cases of torture and death (and many more borderline cases) seem to have occurred, apparently without the knowledge of the government and due in large measure to overzealous officials. The military did strive to abide by the letter of the law, although in a number of cases the interpretation of the law was too strict and disciplinarian in spirit.

The economic stabilization program initiated by the Demirel government was continued. Turgut Özal, one of the few people associated with previous governments to be entrusted with a position in the military regime, was included in the Cabinet in the position of Deputy Prime Minister. The efficacy of the previously enacted economic measures was reflected in a drop in the inflation rate from 130% in 1980 to 35% in 1983, in the rise of exports, and in the general growth of the economy. The success enhanced the prestige of the military and its policy of discipline and authority, at least at the beginning.<sup>37</sup> However, the attitude of the military towards the

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<sup>37</sup> The legislative activities of the National Security Council are found in: *Milli*

political parties gradually stiffened after officers favoring a stricter and somewhat more nationalist policy became influential in 1981. General Saltık, whose ambiguous (but impartial) attitude towards the left and the right caused considerable concern among both the military and the business community, was replaced as secretary of the NSC by General Necdet Ürüğ. Efforts thereafter by old party leaders to revive party apparatus and influence brought on the formal abolition of all political parties and the confiscation of their properties: an act not envisioned by the military at the beginning. Thus, legally speaking, the two major parties of Turkey, the AP and the CHP, came to an end, creating immediately the new major problem of who was to inherit their followers. It may be noted that the closure of the CHP marked the formal end of the long period of institutional and ideological evolution that had begun with the Union and Progress society of Salonica in 1908 and continued in Defense of Rights Associations in 1918 and in the Republic under the doctrine of Kemalism. However, as discussed in preceding sections, the party had already divorced itself from its past and from Kemalism through the adoption of its *left-of-center* policy (1967), its open espousal of social democracy (1973), and finally, its turn to socialism (1977). The end came before the small group in the party, which had used Ecevit as its stalking horse, could complete its transformation to a fully statist-Marxist organization. I do not say *Marxist-socialist* because the CHP could never have become a truly socialist party. Although it was ready to use socialism, with a Marxist façade, as a route to power, its ability to enforce a truly socialist program was limited. (As was revealed as soon as the elections of 1983 were concluded, which shall be discussed later.)

The closure of the CHP removed a strong and deeply rooted organization from the arena of Turkish politics, thus weakening the center, even though the party did not plan to remain in the center. However, the eradication of the CHP may prove beneficial in the long run by having liberated the intelligentsia from bondage to the past and opened the way to genuinely new ideas. The closure of the AP did not have the same significance, for being a broadly-based pop-

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*Güvenlik Konseyince Kabul Edilen Kanunlar, Yayınlanan Bildiri ve Kararlar ile Önemli Mevzuat* (Laws, Decrees and Communications and Important Legislation passed by the NSC). 3 vols. Ankara 1981.

ular party it could be reconstituted at any time under a different name, as indeed it was.

In 1981 the military took the first step towards establishment of a civilian order. The NSC established a Consultative Assembly (CA: *Danışma Meclisi*), selecting its members from a large number of applicants. The assembly's main purpose was to draft a new Constitution and to advise the NSC. Throughout its duration the CA acted as a subsidiary organ of the NSC, which had concentrated in its hands all legislative and executive powers. The CA finally submitted a draft Constitution, which after some minor amendments was presented to the populace in a referendum on November 7, 1982. Out of a total of 20,690,914 registered voters, 18,884,488 people, or 91.27%, cast their votes. Of these, 17,215,559, or 91.37%, cast votes in favor of the Constitution, while only 1,626,431, or 8.31%, rejected it. Thus, General Evren, who assumed the title of President of the Republic upon the acceptance of the Constitution, had apparently received an overwhelming vote of approval, giving him the feeling that he enjoyed the absolute support of the population.

The new governmental and political system established by the Constitution (which has a total of 177 articles, plus 16 provisional articles) differs markedly from the previous liberal one.<sup>38</sup> In general, it is a very detailed and somewhat cumbersome instrument, which in reaction to the bitter 1961–1980 political experience of Turkey, tries to provide a variety of checks on future violators of the public order. The lesson learned in that period of chaos led to a drastic shift from legislative supremacy to a rather excessive executive authority. Yet, the concept of a strong executive is in line with the Turkish past and its political culture and represents a return to the situation prevailing in the early days of the Republic. It remains to be seen whether this can be maintained and reconciled with parliamentary democracy.

The Constitution reaffirms and sanctions the patrimonial-patriarchal supremacy of the state in practically all fields. In practice, this means that the bureaucracy, which in the ultimate analysis has been the major obstacle to the establishment of a truly civilian and

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<sup>38</sup> The text of the Constitution was published in the *Resmî Gazete*, Number 17874 of November 20, 1982. The Directorate General of Press and Information issued translations in Western languages. See also Kramer, H.: *Das neue politische System der Türkei*. Ebenhausen 1983.

free society in Turkey, has gained the upper hand. In the false belief that tight controls and imposed discipline are the only way to achieve progress and modernity, the Constitution shows an excessive tendency towards the establishment of hierarchical, centralized systems in every field of activity. For instance, the High Council of Education (YÖK) delivered a grave blow to the Turkish university system by forcing numerous qualified instructors to leave the universities, thus stifling creative work and free thought. On the other hand, the Constitution does provide for popular control of the system through free elections and political parties, and consequently, the excesses of authority and the unnecessary controls may be eliminated in due time. On balance, the Constitution of 1982, despite its shortcomings, is more liberal than was originally expected and may in fact prove to be the right instrument to encourage the rooting of democracy and freedom in Turkish soil.

The overwhelming popular approval of the Constitution in the referendum of November 7, 1982 had at least three consequences: it silenced the critics who claimed that the regime in Turkey had no popular support; it also encouraged the military, including General Kenan Evren, to think that the population would back any of their decisions; and finally, it gave confidence to the population that the return to a civilian order was assured. It was under these circumstances that the date for elections was set as Sunday, November 6, 1983. The freedom to establish political parties as a preparation for the elections was granted in the summer of 1983. The rush by former politicians and ideological groups, as well as citizens desiring social eminence and prestigious jobs (being good politicians, all claimed that they wanted to serve the country), was extraordinary. By the middle of July, 1983 at least 14 political parties were duly established or were striving to meet the conditions stipulated by electoral law. Before election day, however, the NSC intervened to put an end to the scramble by closing some of the new parties or vetoing the deputy candidates. The election law itself sets a number of technical conditions, such as a certain number of county branches and percentage of votes in an election, that make it difficult for small parties to survive. In the end only three parties gained the right to mount candidates for election: the MDP under General Turgut Sunalp, a long time friend of President Evren; the HP of Necdet Calp, a former governor who was acceptable to the military; and the ANAP headed



by Turgut Özal, the former Deputy Premier and the man responsible for Turkey's economic recovery.

The platforms of the three parties did not, at first sight, seem very different from each other. The MDP was essentially a moderately right-of-center, business oriented organization, and it was supported by the military. It emphasized law and order, as epitomized in its slogan "Nationalist state", and strong government. Eventually it drifted to the right, strongly denouncing communism and attracting considerable support from the extremist nationalists and from a variety of older voters favoring a traditional militaristic government.<sup>39</sup> Finally, the MDP came to feel that, despite its strong backing from the military government and President Evren's friendship with Sunalp, it was less favored than the ANAP; thus it began to attack Özal in the hope of discrediting him, despite a general pledge to abide by high campaign standards.

The HP of Necdet Calp adopted a mildly social democratic platform intended to appeal to the former members of the CHP as well as to a variety of moderate leftists and trade union members.

Özal's ANAP campaigned essentially on an economic platform, promising employment and welfare. Özal promised also to pursue and expand the policies initiated in January, 1980 by supporting a free economy based on internal and external competition, lifting the bureaucratic restrictions, and reducing the number of ministries. He promised also to eliminate the SEE to the extent possible. As to foreign policy, Özal promised closer relations with the Arab world as well as with the West. He had moderate Islamic sympathies: he had run from İzmir on the ticket of the MSP in 1977; his brother, Korkut Özal, was a leading official of that party and was arrested briefly in 1980. Özal's main appeal was to the former members and supporters of the AP.

As the election campaign approached its end, and especially after the leaders of the three parties appeared on the state TV, it became obvious that Turgut Özal was the most popular leader. The possibility that Özal's party might win the elections upset the military, which had supported Sunalp in the hope that his victory would result in a friendly and cooperative government that would continue the

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<sup>39</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, October 20-31, 1983.

policies implemented during the 1980–83 military rule. Consequently, two days before the elections General Evren, notwithstanding his own advice to politicians to refrain from personal fights and in violation of his political neutrality as President, attacked Özal (without mentioning his name) for not telling the truth and for making exaggerated promises.<sup>40</sup> This open interference in the elections appears to have influenced approximately 8 to 10% of the would-be supporters of Özal to switch their votes to other parties, but this was not enough to secure Sunalp's victory.

The elections were held in total security and peace on November 6, 1983, with 92.27% of the electorate participating—the highest turnout since the multiparty system was introduced in 1946. The high participation was due, at least in part, to the compulsory vote; a fine of 2,500 TL was levied on non-voters.

A brief analysis of the election results<sup>41</sup> shows that the basic political alignments in Turkey remained stable. The right and centrist views commanded at least 90% of the votes cast, as much of the vote received by the HP belonged to the center. Possibly only 10% of the total vote belonged to the extreme left and right. The decisive issue in the election was the same one that had determined the outcome of all Turkish elections since 1946—namely, the establishment of a populist democracy and the achievement of economic development. There is no question that both Turgut Özal and his party fit the populist-democratic image, not only in their words, behavior, social origins, and past associations but also by being able to link themselves psychologically to the nation and the community. The promises of economic betterment certainly buttressed this image but also presented a key problem for Özal. As mentioned before, Özal promised to introduce a free-market economy based on private initiative, competition, and remuneration based on productivity. Yet, all similar populist promises made by Menderes and Demirel in the past, despite these leaders' strong commitment to economic liberalism and private initiative, were carried out on the foundations of government support. Thus, in the end both the DP and AP were instrumental in increasing the size of the bureaucracy and in strengthening statism, despite their wishes to do the contrary, as political

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<sup>40</sup> *Hürriyet*, November 5, 1983; *Christian Science Monitor*, September 6, 1983.

<sup>41</sup> See chapter Özbudun, E.: "Election results," table 10.

interests centered on vote-getting proved to be, in the long run, stronger than principles. Özal was able to enforce an austerity program in 1980–82, thanks to the backing of the strong military government free of parliamentary restrictions. It remains to be seen whether he can show the same skill and political acumen in a parliamentary democracy; however, he is generally a man of principles and is dedicated to efficiency and accomplishments and may succeed.

Özal's decisive electoral victory and the certitude that he would be able to establish a government by himself persuaded the military to abide by the popular verdict. President Evren had a cordial meeting with Özal, designated him as Premier, and asked him to form the Cabinet. Nevertheless, the NSC, which dissolved itself only after the Cabinet was duly accepted by the Assembly, continued to legislate and rule even after the elections. Three days after the elections it decided to continue martial law for another four months, passed a press law, and recognized the independence of the Turkish section of Cyprus.

It is too early to predict what will be the future outcome of Turkish politics. It appears that the current political setup may undergo some rapid changes. The MDP of Sunalp has already started to disintegrate, and many of its members may join Özal's party. A dilemma is presented by the HP, which seems to have captured the votes of the CHP but also a variety of groups which had supported radical leftist policies in the past. The radicals fear that if Necdet Calp is indeed capable of controlling, consolidating, and retaining these groups in his own party, he will deprive them, that is the radical leaders, of a substantial part of their following. Calp is presently being attacked as not being a genuine social democrat, least of all a socialist capable of and willing to challenge the capitalists. Already, Halil Tunç, a former president of *Türk-İş* and a strong supporter of Ecevit, has declared his intention to establish a "genuine" social democratic party. The actual SODEP, which could not enter the elections because of a variety of technical deficiencies (a large number of its founders were vetoed by the military), is also ready to contest the HP. Similarly other parties, such as DYP, backed by Demirel, *Bayrak* (Flag), *Yeni Doğuş* (New Birth), and RP, which were legally established but could not participate in the elections of 1983, are planning to test their popularity in the coming elections.

The electoral victory of Turgut Özal's ANAP party, endorsed by the results of the municipal election held on March 25, 1984, was

in a way an implicit endorsement of the economic policy Özal supervised as Deputy Premier during the military rule. Consequently, he reiterated his decision to enforce a *liberal* economic policy by increasing the exports, keeping the Lira in line with the world's strong currencies, by seeking to cut down the inflation rate to about 25% (from 55% late in 1983), and by seeking a way to dispose of the İDT, etc. In foreign affairs he continued the old pro-western and pro-NATO policy but sought a much closer relationship with the Arab and Muslim countries.

The chief problems faced by the Özal government are internal. His cabinet, the first one in Turkish history to make pragmatism, practicality and public service a cardinal principle, is composed in good measure by technocrats and specialists with little experience in party politics or in dealings with the party branches or small-town politicians. Consequently, the Cabinet has been subject to bitter criticism on the part of the ANAP deputies because of the Ministers' unwillingness or unavailability to discuss patronage demands (for government positions, credits, special favors, etc.) coming from the interest groups in the country. Moreover, nationalist- and religious-minded groups that support the ANAP demand a firmer commitment on the part of the government to their own specific ideology. The liberals and intellectuals have also demanded the abolition, or at least the limitation of some of measures taken by the military government, including a revision of the authority of the omnipotent YÖK. The fact that the Constitution has created a series of institutions and procedures related directly to the preservation of state security above the government provides it with a certain protective shield against the more extreme movements or excessive liberalization.

In the middle of 1984 the political ties of Turkey, both internal and international, appear to be remarkably stable and promising, provided that the high expectations of the economy materialize by the end of 1984; otherwise it will be difficult to prevent the salary and wage earners (who are now bearing the weight of the economic stabilization program) from further demanding sharp wage increases. The second half of 1984 and especially 1985 can be a crucial test for Özal's government as well as for Turkey's democracy and economic development.

On balance, however, it seems that short of some unforeseen developments the proponents of free enterprise, the centrists, and the right-of-center parties will have the upper hand for the next four

years. If they prove that private enterprise can indeed achieve economic development and welfare, then they will have the chance to dominate Turkey's politics, at least until the end of the century. By the same token, if their promises remain unfulfilled, then the chance that a social democratic, or even socialist, government will emerge from the next general elections increases greatly. All of those who consider the success of the private enterprise a threat to their own ideology and political fortune will certainly do their best to sabotage the free economy, as in the past. In a way, the socio-economic forces and ideological positions underlying the Turkish political system are the same as before 1980. There is, however, a difference. The streamlined Executive and Judiciary, not to speak of a variety of other institutions, can prevent, if they so wish, the abuse of freedom and democracy by an influential, intellectual minority and allow Turkey to follow the wishes of the overwhelming majority.

## RECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN TURKEY AND THEIR SOCIAL BACKGROUND<sup>1</sup>

The military *coup* which took place in Turkey on 27 May 1960 ousted the Democratic Party Government, the first civilian government ever directly elected by the Turkish people, and a National Unity Committee, composed of the military, ruled the country until November 1961 when power was surrendered to a civilian Government. This involvement in politics ended the political neutrality of the Armed Forces, which had been accepted as a basic principle in the early days of the Republic, and departed from an ancient tradition established in the Ottoman Empire, when the janissaries had confined themselves merely to pressing for a change in the ruling group rather than taking over the administration. These are significant breaks with tradition and precedents which may have long-lasting effects.

The *coup* was justified as the only course left to the Armed Forces, the one group preserving intact its moral integrity in an effort to save democracy. The Democratic Party had established a one-party Parliamentary Committee to investigate the administration's critics, had imposed martial law, and seemed determined to suppress the Opposition and the press which censured their authoritarian measures, their corruption, and their lack of economic planning. The *coup* was furthermore justified as a necessary step to save the reforms of Kemal Atatürk and restore the dignity and prestige of the State.

It received enthusiastic support in the urban areas where the population had grown weary of the rigorous controls of the Democrat administration. The intelligentsia in general welcomed it as a victory both for democracy and for a policy of modernization, regardless of the conflicting interpretations attached to each of these terms. Democracy was interpreted as political liberalism, while modernization implied rapid social and economic progress through drastic reforms which could hardly be reconciled with liberal ideas.

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Immediately after the *coup* the military set about restoring democracy; they re-established freedom of the press, liberated the political prisoners incarcerated by the Democrat regime, and commissioned a body of university professors to draft a new Constitution, with the proper institutions and checks to ensure the survival of Turkey's young democracy. As time went by, however, they blundered in the administration of a civilian society which had grown immensely complex during the previous few decades and increasingly independent of the traditional forms of authority. Consequently the glow of heroism began to fade, together with the belief in the magic ability of the military to cure Turkey's ailments with a few laws and some well-chosen speeches. The view began to be cautiously put forward that the *coup* represented in fact the intelligentsia's reaction against democracy and particularly against its egalitarian effects, and that it aimed at forestalling the rise to power of the peasantry and the crumbling of the traditional social order, based on the supremacy of the urban classes and particularly of the intelligentsia.

In a way, this was only natural and to be expected in the light of Turkey's far-reaching experiment in democracy. The multi-party system and the universal suffrage introduced in 1945-6 enabled the common man to give political expression to his social and cultural aspirations. The economic development which accompanied and conditioned multi-party life gave the masses a new vitality and mobility and undermined in a few short years the existing social order and its system of values. Two social orders, belonging to different eras and acting under different cultural stimulants, had now come into conflict.

The elections of 1950, which ousted the Republican Party and brought the Democrats to power, were the tangible proof that power resided with the people. This was the greatest revolution ever to occur in the mind of the average Turk; and one may add that the Turkish people take democracy far more seriously than they are given credit for in the West. The subsequent economic development brought a measure of relief to the impoverished masses of Anatolia, and, since this came mainly after 1950, it was considered to be a natural by-product of democracy. This economic development initiated by the Democrats may be criticized when judged in the light of inflation and limited production. For the millions of unemployed or under-employed Turks, however, economic development and inflation opened outlets for employment, added a few calories to

their meagre diet, and left a few liras in their pockets. As a beginning this was all they wanted.

All these blessings contrasted so violently with the restrictions imposed during the Republican Party's rule that the mass of the population seemed committed permanently to support the Democrats, the authors of this miracle. The economic developments naturally produced a new materialist, hedonistic, anti-intellectual outlook. Large-scale social mobility, resulting from mechanization, industrialization, and migration to the cities, further undermined the old social order which had been sustained by a static philosophy and a social hierarchy dominated by the intelligentsia at the top. The State and its institutions, which assured the supremacy of the intelligentsia-bureaucracy—for they are the two faces of the one dominating social group—received a deadly blow, the first of its kind in the Middle East. The Government was forced to change from being an omnipotent institution, personifying and protecting all human virtues, into a functional agency looking after the citizen's welfare. The bureaucracy had to cease being the people's master and become their servant both in theory and practice. The peasant, who had for centuries been called the country's master by those who oppressed and exploited him, became a master indeed and seemed to enjoy his new station. To be able to order the bureaucracy around and make it fulfil some useful function—this was a dream come true.

Together with all this came reaction to Atatürk's reforms, especially in those areas in which they had helped the intelligentsia to achieve social supremacy or had cut off the masses from the fountainhead of Islam. This reaction was to be expected and after a few years its pressure gradually eased. What was unexpected was the Democrats' sponsorship and incitement of such reaction during their last few years in office, with the purpose of helping the public to forget its growing preoccupation with social and economic matters, for which, paradoxically enough, the Democrats were chiefly responsible.

At the same time the Democrats began to tamper with public institutions. Their partisan feeling led them to believe that the reforms necessary in the functions of the Government amounted to a rejection of the impartiality of authority necessary to discharge public responsibilities. Political feudalism and nepotism grew and began to undermine the very basis of the modern State. In other words, the Democrats, who were animated at the beginning by a desire to change the function of the State and adjust it to practical needs,



ended by undermining the form and structure of the Government. Their greatest fault lay in their inability to provide an intellectual leadership capable of restraining the masses and bringing about a reconciliation of modern reforms with democracy and progress. They failed to provide adequate leadership for the masses and eventually, in their anxiety to obey the public whim, they let themselves be carried by it to their own doom.

Seen in retrospect, the Democratic Party leaders appear as part of the general intelligentsia brought up under the Republic. In background, education, and mentality they were no different from those who joined other political parties. The only difference was that they were in power and wanted to stay there. In a way, the Democrats' failure is an indictment of the Republican regime's inability to imbue its generation with a comprehensive intellectual power and a new philosophy, which would enable it to lead society towards higher forms of organization. The destruction of freedom of thought after Atatürk's death, the condemnation of free discussion, and the promotion of servile obedience to power as the highest human virtue could only produce intellectuals avid of power and self-glorification. This was a bitter lesson taught by the recent past; its beneficial effects are now becoming visible, as objectivity and intellectual honesty are gradually being recognized as the truest foundations of a modern society.

But to look at political developments from a more factual and basic angle, the immediate causes of the military *coup* were, as was mentioned earlier, the various restrictions imposed by the Democrats, which mainly affected the urban population and the intelligentsia. These restrictions had been imposed with the purpose of curbing the criticisms voiced by the Republican Party, and which had inhibited the Democrats from achieving the full 'economic development' which they supposed the mass of the population desired. Thus the reasons for military intervention must be sought in the bitter and uncompromising rivalry between these two political parties. A more basic investigation of the social and economic structure of these political parties helps to explain not only the *coup* of 27 May but also the political developments which have followed it. A field investigation conducted by the writer in some twenty provinces of Anatolia has revealed that the party struggle in Turkey was basically a conflict caused by social growth and restratification. It was this change in the social structure, expressed in the form of the political parties,

which made the military give way and eventually reinstate a civilian Government.

### *The Social Background*

A brief survey of the social background is essential to an understanding of contemporary political problems. At the time when the Republic came into force, three types of family, residing primarily in the towns, seemed to have established a *de facto* supremacy in the social hierarchy. First there were the *Ulema* families, who controlled cultural life from the basis of their traditional religious primacy. Secondly, there were the families who had acquired social stature and economic power through association with the Government and administration. Finally, there were well-to-do families whose properties consisted mainly of large landed estates, inherited from their feudal ancestors, who in turn had acquired them from the Government either as a reward or bribe or had usurped them by sheer force; the tribal chiefs of the past were naturally included in this group. All these three family types had been in conflict with each other at one time or another. They gained additional economic power at the end of the nineteenth century when the *Miri* or State land organization finally broke down and private ownership of land increased. It is probably accurate to say that it was in the nineteenth century that the town achieved absolute economic control over the village and thus completed its overall supremacy over the rural areas.

These dominating urban families, although divided among themselves, were eventually united against the central Government and particularly against the modernist bureaucracy-intelligentsia, whom they regarded as an economic burden and a menace to the established order and traditions of society. The central Government was in process of organization and growth and was developing an anti-religious positivistic philosophy, all of which indirectly assisted the town *Eyraf* (notables) to consolidate their moral and material supremacy over the rural masses. On the other hand, the State apparatus gradually became a tool in the hands of the bureaucracy-intelligentsia, who had developed into a fully distinct and self-conscious social group. In the Union and Progress era the intelligentsia used the State machine to promote their own status, while reforming it and making it a national force, by cloaking it under the high-sounding

phraseology of modernism and nationalism. Between these two groups there were the peasants and other low-income groups, whom both the intelligentsia and the urban *Eşraf* were trying to control and dominate, the first by means of power and promises of progress, the second by tradition and community feeling.

The social restratification intensified and changed its nature after the establishment of the Republic in 1923. The properties, both urban and rural, of the departing Christian minorities—numbering over two million, chiefly Greeks and Armenians—who formed the middle class in the Ottoman Empire became State property and were distributed to the incoming Turkish immigrants from the Balkans and Greek islands. Much of this property was misappropriated at various dates by local notables and by some active participants in the War of Liberation; this was done in a variety of ways, including the abuse of a deficient land registration system. The situation was rendered worse by the introduction of the Swiss Civil Code in 1926, since this depended on special land surveys, which were non-existent in Turkey. Thus a new group of families achieved economic prominence through the changes brought about by the Republic and, understandably enough, they became ardent nationalists and Republicans. A national middle class came into being, not only through the acquisition of such property but also through the economic and commercial opportunities left open to them by the departing minorities.

The People's Republican Party was established in 1922 in place of the *Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyetleri*, which had been instrumental in organizing resistance to foreign invasion. The party had to rely, in the countryside especially, on those elements who had influence among the population and who sided with the new regime either from self-interest or from conviction. With the introduction and intensification of an *étatiste* economic policy the interplay of economics and politics became more evident. Concessions for the distribution of monopolies and a variety of rare items and for the sale of goods produced in State enterprises were granted to members or supporters of the party, or to those who seemed sympathetic to its activities. Membership in various bank councils and legal adviserships for other public bodies were used in the same way. A new social stratum, whose economic power derived from industrial or semi-industrial activities supported by the State, came into existence in the towns. It grew rapidly in size and began to acquire power in the countryside

by taking advantage of high interest rates to buy land; in time it established common interests with other landed groups to become a land-owning merchant class. To this group must be added also members of the professional classes who, for lack of other outlets, invested their savings in land and became partners in share-cropping. These new families were in general dedicated to the Republic's modernist goals of secularism and cultural progress; but they were at the same time socially ultra-conservative, and this attitude in turn undermined their attempts towards cultural progress. In more than one instance they felt that the peasants were awakening in the wrong direction, and were beginning to realize that economic relations which tied them to the urban groups would be to their detriment.

These new social groups were economically dominating, however, and sufficiently enlightened to realize their superiority. They had a captive market and abundant manpower at their disposal, sound connections in the party and the Government, and they were not dependent on the public. These conditions bred in them a disdainful contempt for the common man and gradually produced an arrogant patriarchal attitude, a reliance on authority that set them apart as a distinct group. Though they preached the theories of populism, equality, and brotherhood, in reality things worked out quite differently. By buying agricultural produce at low prices and selling State products to the peasants at exorbitant rates, since such prices were generally determined by the Government, this State-supported bourgeoisie earned the permanent animosity of the peasantry and small craftsmen. The rapid acquisition of the peasants' land, especially in areas producing crops used for industry or export and therefore requiring special credits, naturally added to this animosity. This class of businessmen-politicians eventually dedicated more time to business than to politics. But their influence continued to be felt in party and government circles, for their unquestionable patriotism was further enhanced and sanctified by their economic power. They stood as the pillars of the new regime, condemning opponents either as reactionaries if they came from the uneducated lower social strata or as subversive elements if they came from the intelligentsia.

On the other hand, the majority of the intelligentsia, indoctrinated chiefly with nationalist secularist ideas, remained in the few big cities, dependent on government jobs and ignorant of the nature of happenings in the countryside. They approved the reforms needed to bring about modernization and, at the same time, ignored their eco-

conomic and social aspects. Through lack of contacts, they came to view the peasants as inherently opposed to change and reform, regardless of the fact that in reality the villagers were carrying the economic burden of these reforms without enjoying or understanding their practical benefits. For the peasants, reform came to mean additional power for the dominant groups and also an interference in their own way of life. The gulf between town and country became ever wider.

Thus the Republican Party appeared to be dominated at the top by intellectuals, who were committed to a policy of reform and modernization but were hardly aware of the social and economic impact of this policy, while at its base, that is at provincial and district level, the Party was in the hands of an *étatiste* bourgeoisie. The two groups had come together, the one to maintain its political supremacy and to carry out a policy of cultural modernization, the other to preserve its economic privileges and social status. They both supported the Republic and, further, were united in opposing for specific reasons of their own the upward move of the lower strata. The peasants' grievances, caused by economic and social conditions affecting their daily lives, were interpreted as reactionary tendencies, directed against the regime, and this interpretation was intensified by the pious terminology used by the peasants to describe their plight. By a long-established tradition in the Middle East the lower strata of society phrase their economic and social problems in religious terms and express them as God's doing, although they well realize that God's wrath or blessing often varies according to His creatures' whims and interest.

Finally, mention must be made of the urban strata and the landowners who were a relic from the Ottoman days. Although they were socially and culturally pushed into the background, they nevertheless maintained their economic influence, except in the east where the Kurdish landlords became involved in revolts and were deprived of power. Some of these Ottoman families became involved, in one way or another, in the commercial, economic, and political life of the Republic; but others restricted their activity to the ownership of land and suffered the consequences of *étatisme* and industrialization, which developed at the expense of agriculture. A certain community of feeling was established between this group and the peasants, brought about by the same forces which caused their material distress, and the maintenance of traditional religious and social

attachments consolidated this sympathy. Often it was these landlords who helped, protected, and advised the peasants, and in the midst of a drive for modernization, which treated the peasants as potential reactionaries, the landlords appeared as their friends and co-sufferers.

### *Effects of the Democrat Take-Over*

This whole socio-political set-up was shaken to its foundations in 1950 by the establishment of the multi-party system and by the initiation by the Democrats of a policy of economic development. The nature of this economic development determined the structure and attitude of the new social groups it created or resuscitated. The policy initiated by the Democrats after 1950, with ample material assistance and advice from the United States, aimed at promoting economic development based on private enterprise and competition. Underlying this policy there was also a more general idea of consolidating the middle classes to make them the basis of democracy. Easy credit terms and investment privileges certainly stimulated the rise of a new group of entrepreneurs drawn from the lower middle classes and the upper ranks of the working classes. These people had previously enjoyed the fringe benefits of *étatisme* but had also been brought to economic consciousness by its waste, inefficiency, and bureaucratic red tape. As a result of social and economic conditions peculiar to Turkey, and helped by the effects of inflation, they soon achieved an economic status based on their own competitive ability, productivity, and ingenuity, all of which produced a measure of well-being during the first few years of Democrat rule. Moreover, to these were added the new landowning groups, who acquired power as a result of subsidy prices for crops, cheap machinery, and the abolition of taxes on agriculture. The bulk of the peasantry also benefited during the early years of the Democrat administration from the rise in agricultural prices, new opportunities for employment, and the abolition of controls and pressure from the higher authorities. The new entrepreneurial groups carried on most of their trade in towns and villages, and this increased economic activity in the countryside was beneficial both to the peasants and to the business men. The new economic groups were thus oriented towards the mass of the people both by interest and by occupation. The State incidentally became an instrument of this liberal policy and therefore the liberal *étatisme*

of the Democrats was quite different, at least during the first five years, from the *étatisme* practised under the Republican Party.

The new businessmen-landlord groups were ambitious self-made men who had risen from the masses, understood their psychology, had no superior attitudes, and furthermore could endear themselves to the people by providing employment. Many of the landed families, too, moved into the towns and cities and went into business while at the same time preserving their old ties with the peasantry. The urban professional classes naturally followed these developments and often sided with these groups as a means of increasing their *clientèle*.

These business groups and landlords became the provincial and district leaders of the Democrat Party or supported its representatives. Thanks to their knowledge of the masses and the countryside and to their practical ability, they organized a formidably flexible and efficient party apparatus which, as long as it kept going, could defeat any other similar body, particularly the rigidly organized Republican Party.

These new groups, which we shall call for convenience the new bourgeoisie, became engaged in a struggle for power with the older *étatiste* bourgeoisie which, with more capital at its disposal, could dominate the market but found its economic supremacy threatened by these new groups, whom it treated with the same disdain and mistrust as it accorded to the common men. The new bourgeoisie, on the other hand, mistrusted the intelligentsia and the bureaucracy who had used Government power to consolidate their own political and social status. The closure of the People's Houses and later of the Village Institutes, apart from its anti-secularist significance, was also motivated by such social considerations. Inflation, coupled with a tax system which put the burden of public services on to the salaried class, lowered the living standards of Government employees and of the intelligentsia and down-graded their social status. The Armed Forces, which in Turkey are considered to be part of the intelligentsia and a progressive reforming force, suffered most. Their high status under the old set-up fell to the bottom of the new social stratification determined by economic power.

*Later Years of the Democratic Administration*

The social situation during the later years of the Democrat administration, from 1956 to 1960, was far more complicated than the schematic picture presented above. Within the Party itself there had arisen factions who used their political influence to amass large fortunes and then turned to suppress their critics within the Party. They supported private enterprise and individual freedom but reacted violently against any suggestion of social legislation or economic planning. It was about this time, roughly in 1956-7, that the peasantry, politically awakened by all these developments and at the same time aware of the temporary nature of their prosperity, began to turn away from the Democrats and to look more sympathetically towards the Republicans.

Indeed the years in opposition had brought to power the younger more socially-minded wing of the Republican Party who received their political and social education in the multi-party struggle. These men put forward proposals for a planned economy and a new type of welfare State in which the cultural doctrinaire approach of the past was to be replaced by ideas of political liberalism and social justice. The need became acute for an impartial State apparatus, reformed to suit the practical needs of society, and the mass of the people seemed to have confidence in the Republicans' ability to achieve it.

The peasantry, on the other hand, had acquired a sense of power and dignity and consequently felt confident that their status and freedom would be respected, regardless of which party was in power. They believed in their own power and in the system that had achieved it, and their allegiance to the Democratic Party consequently began to lose its personal character. It was this change in the attitude of the peasantry which led many politicians in Turkey, including high-placed Republicans, to affirm that with proper leadership the peasantry was one of the major forces capable of establishing democracy on a permanent basis. Moreover, the spectacular growth of a working-class from less than half a million to a million and a half in a decade, coupled with their support of liberal ideas, seemed to have aligned the lower strata of society in favour of democracy.

The intelligentsia had been only partly influenced by these developments. The Turkish educational system, with its dry scholasticism and flowery subjectivism, had continued to imbue the youth of the



country with an egocentric belief in their capacity for leadership and self-sacrifice from which they believed there would emerge a happy nation singing their praises. Nevertheless, the addition of intellectuals arising from the lower classes had added a new social dimension to intellectual thought, a dimension which unfortunately has recently lost its liberal nature and become arid and doctrinaire. In many ways this was a natural reaction to the Democrats' condemnation of intellectualism and their corruption of intellectuals for their own purposes. Hence the intelligentsia gradually began to look upon democracy as a device by which the economically powerful groups could deceive the peasantry and consolidate their own power at the cost of modernization and also of democracy itself. In their view the peasant was an ignorant and conservative creature, concerned only with his narrow existence and ready to sacrifice all great ideals for a piece of bread and an hour of worship in the mosque.

Thus on the eve of 27 May 1960 there seemed to be the old traditional gulf fixed between the masses and the intelligentsia, but now the peasant was the potentially powerful force and the intelligentsia felt downtrodden. Actually, however, the root causes of this separation contained at the same time the possibility of real incentives to bring them together in a harmonious social whole. The country had reached the threshold of real reforms, and the intelligentsia and the bureaucracy had to separate their role of public servant from that of thinker and of maker and enforcer of policy. The State needed to become an impartial agency for public service and to cease being a tool in the hands of those who controlled it and who used it to fulfil their own ambitions.

In any case, Turkey's chief political difficulty arises from the lack of a proper definition of the Government's position *vis-à-vis* the individual and society at large; and to this is also tied the definition of the role of the intelligentsia and bureaucracy in the social body and of their rights and obligations towards it. This is the crucial problem, of which the intelligentsia in Turkey is gradually becoming conscious; certain large sections still think of dominating the entire social and political body, while others seek for enlightened measures to integrate them into the rest of society.

*Measures Following the Military Coup*

These were the crucial problems which the Armed Forces had to solve when they came to power. As expected, their first measures were a reaction to the policy of the Democratic Party. The various proclamations issued after the *coup* stressed two themes: the needs to up-grade the intelligentsia and to bring about social justice. To justify the cry for social justice the villagers' lack of education was highly dramatized; landlords and sheiks were held responsible and more than two hundred who had supported the Democrats were held in custody in Sivas. The peasant was described as economically and culturally enslaved by these reactionary forces and compelled to vote for whoever they chose. Economic development was dismissed altogether as being artificial and dependent on foreign help, which enriched a minority at the expense of the wealth and sovereignty of the nation as a whole. This feeling of commiseration for the peasant did not last long, however, and he was soon taken to task for his share in the sins of the Democrats. Some intellectuals demanded a restriction of universal suffrage in order to balance the votes of the peasantry, while others denounced the multi-party system altogether and demanded a strong Government composed of intellectuals and responsible to none. Yet the new Constitution, which in its original draft had included these restrictions, in its final form retained universal suffrage; this was largely due to pressure from the lower strata of society as well as from the Republican Party itself, which believed in its electoral chances. Social welfare was incorporated in the Constitution as a basic principle and the State was defined as a social entity.

Measures taken by the military Government to stabilize the economy ended differently, however. The closing of various construction projects, the restriction of credits, the ban on the free exploitation of forests, and anti-property measures, such as the establishment of committees to inquire into private wealth and the increases in government salaries, cut down economic activity and caused widespread unemployment. The dignity of the State was reinforced by prohibiting the ordinary citizen from bothering the bureaucracy with his trivial demands, and this meant to him a return to the bureaucratic supremacy of the days of one-party rule. Moreover, the summary dismissal of all Democratic Party village eldersmen, who in most cases were elected on their merit, was received by the villager as a direct interference

in his direction of community affairs, a prerogative which he cherishes as symbolic of his freedom. On the intellectual level, the retirement of about 7,000 Army officers, to provide mobility among the lesser ranks, created some apprehension, which was rendered worse by the summary dismissal of 147 university professors, supposedly for professional incapacity but actually in most cases for nationalist and racial reasons. The intelligentsia began to turn away from the Armed Forces and to desire a return to civilian government, where such measures could be criticised more freely. Even those who had wished for a permanent strong Government began to have second thoughts. The other social groups, such as the business men and landlords, pointed with alarm to the consequences of economic stagnation and demanded the return of a civilian administration. Sporadic arrests throughout the country of various factions, supposedly set up to overthrow the new administration, indicated grave social ferment. All these, coupled with the Armed Forces' initial promise, often repeated, to restore civilian administration, gradually paved the way for a return to a free political life and eventually for elections. It may be safely stated that the hopes for a return to a civilian administration, which were kept alive throughout the military's rule, contributed immensely to the maintenance of calm and order. Moreover, it is in the character of the Turkish people to observe the utmost patience and orderliness and to bring indirect pressure to bear to achieve the desired result rather than to embark on hasty actions that may jeopardize their basic goal.

The chief difficulty of the military Government resulted from its search for legal arguments to prove the legitimacy of the action of 27 May. Some lawyers and professors put forward the argument, based on various constitutional texts, that the action was rendered legitimate by the Democrats' violation of the Constitution. But this was an ordinary legal argument which could hardly prove the legitimacy of an action which by its very nature fell outside the sphere of ordinary law. Subsequent legal actions therefore suffered because of this contradiction between formal legality and reality. The High Justice Council was established to try the Democratic deputies on the basis of ordinary civilian procedure. The Council's basic purpose was to bring out the Democrats' guilt and thus legitimize the action of the Armed Forces. All the Democratic Party's deputies were brought to trial at Yassıada. The Party itself was closed down at the end of a trivial action started by an obscure member and all

those registered as supporters of the Democrats were exposed to moral condemnation and forced to seek some new organization to represent them. The insulting name of *Kıyruk* (a tail separated from its body), attached to all Democrats, divided the citizens into two blocs. Even those who had parted company with the Democrats in the past or who wished to do so now found themselves forced back into moral expiation of their sins along with their leaders at Yassıada. The prolonged trials permitted the Democrats to defend their past policies; in view of the growing unemployment these began to appear in a favourable light, and this led many ex-Democrats to believe that their original choice had been correct.

### *Return to Political Activity*

One year after the *coup* the country was back in its original position. The Democratic Party, formally closed, was essentially intact and waiting for new leaders. Consequently, when freedom of political activity was restored, the Justice Party and the New Turkey Party were quickly formed and, despite various pressures, consolidated their organization overnight. The head of the Justice Party, General Ragıp Gümüşpala, contrary to ill-intentioned reports, proved to be an able organizer, balanced in his views, and quite courageous in his defiance of both the military and the extreme reactionary wing in his party. Ekrem Alican, of the New Turkey Party, although an able economist and respected intellectual, failed to gain much power for his party, primarily through tactical and strategic errors, and lost a considerable number of his potential supporters to the Justice Party. These two parties rely essentially on the Democratic Party membership and their leaders at local level are mainly ex-Democrats. At national level, however, the leaders are new people, and this is a reassuring fact. After the elections the joke circulated that the Democrats' team No. 1 went to jail and team No. 2 took over the command.

The final sentences at the Yassıada trials, which everyone had expected to be much milder, added new fuel to the Democrats' bitterness and antagonised the moderates; and, although this was not mentioned publicly, they had a deep effect on the elections of 15 October 1960.

The Republican Party suffered the consequences of all these hap-

penings. It appeared to be identified with the military regime, for it supplied the majority of members to the Constituent Assembly and thus sanctioned several of the laws, even though in fact this Assembly checked and balanced the power of the Armed Forces. The Republicans failed to oppose publicly some of the military's measures, for fear of antagonizing them and driving them to close down all the political parties and establish themselves permanently in power, since many people held the Republicans responsible equally with the Democrats for the political *débâcle*.

The Republicans committed some additional errors. In the countryside some partisan Republicans denounced their Democratic rivals, who had persecuted them in the past, and had them arrested; the military Government eventually refused to engage in mass trials and released the lesser Democrats. But the worst was yet to come. In the local branches many Republicans, who had achieved economic supremacy during the one-party regime, regained control of the party organization and pushed into opposition the local younger progressive members whose influence had grown during the previous decade. These authoritarian local leaders frequently claimed that they were actually in power and would stay there regardless of the people's choice, since they enjoyed the military's confidence. Economic *étatisme*, as it was practised in the old days, became their favorite theme, and, as the new economic measures designed to stabilize the economy redounded to their advantage, it seemed that the Republican Party had revived to occupy its former position in the days of one-party rule. When the younger Republicans discovered belatedly during the election campaign the unpopularity of some of their local leaders they tried to disassociate themselves from them by refusing to stay in their homes overnight and even begged them not to take part in the campaign.

At national level, however, the Republican Party's progressive wing won power after a bitter fight with those supporters of Kasım Gülek who advocated a brand of 'go to the people and be like them' democracy. This victory attracted the intelligentsia and the urban population whose hopes of social reform had been unfulfilled by the military Government and who now pinned them on the Republicans. In a way, the intelligentsia sought to save the action of 27 May, which it considered its own victory, by bringing the Republicans into power and engaging them in a series of social reforms. Many people were also of the opinion, and rightly, that the military Government,

despite all promises, would in fact relinquish its power only to the Republicans, who alone were able to prevent a wave of reaction, safeguard the interest and prestige of the Armed Forces, and consolidate the reforms of Atatürk. It should be stressed that the Republican Party's existence as a well-organized political body acted as a deterrent to extremists inside and outside the Armed Forces and as a guarantee of order and stability, and all these considerations played an essential part in bringing about a return to civilian rule. At one time İsmet İnönü himself opposed the military who wanted to close down the Justice Party because of its openly pro-Democratic stand.

This did not, however, endear the Republicans to the peasants and lower classes, who saw these inter-party shuffles resulting in the re-establishment of the old *étatiste* system dominated by the intelligentsia and bureaucracy at the top and by its economically powerful representatives in the countryside. All the other parties in opposition to the Republicans now appeared to be more attractive, not because of any intrinsic value of their own, but as a means of preventing the re-establishment of *étatisme* and its social hierarchy. On the eve of the elections the situation resembled to quite a considerable extent the social alignment of 1945–6, except that the lower strata were now better organized, politically educated, and socially conscious. The Republicans, basing their hopes on the results of the 1957 elections and on their supposed popularity, felt quite confident of securing an easy victory. As the election results became known some of the Republican leaders, who had honestly fought for democracy, were bewildered at the people's negative vote. They had been misled by the results of the constitutional referendum held in July 1961. They interpreted the positive vote they then attained, of 6,348,191, as representing their own strength since they had been instrumental in drafting and passing the new Constitution in the Constituent Assembly. By the same token, they took the minority vote of 3,934,370 as representing the strength of the opposition. In actual fact, the majority vote expressed a desire for an early return to civilian life, and it frequently emanated from the Democrats. The minority negative vote and the surprisingly high number of abstentions resulted from a variety of causes too numerous to analyse here. Their significance lay in the fact that so large a number of people should have dared to vote 'No' in such a tense situation, and this alone is ample evidence of the independence of the Turkish electorate.

*The Results of the Election*

The elections were finally held on 15 October 1961 with a poll of over eighty per cent, almost ten per cent higher than that for the referendum. They were free from any pressure and the Armed Forces preserved an absolute impartiality. The Republicans won the highest number of popular votes as compared with any other party but fell short of achieving an absolute majority in either House of Parliament. In fact their comparative strength reached its lowest ebb since the elections of 1950. The Justice Party won a resounding victory in the west among the strongholds of the Democrats, while the New Turkey Party won in the east as the result of a tacit agreement. These two parties seldom competed; where one was weak the other was strong and *vice versa*. The Republican National Peasant Party led by Osman Bölükbaşı secured about a million and a half votes and about fifty seats, primarily because of its leader's unabashed violation of inter-party agreements not to exploit recent events, including the Yassıada trials, for partisan purposes. Two-thirds of the seats in the two-Chamber Parliament were divided between the Republicans and the Justice Party and one-third between the National and New Turkey Parties.

It may be that the Justice and New Turkey Parties will unite in some way in the future, at least so far as their ex-Democrat members are concerned, while the National Party may dwindle to its normal size and regional character. During the election campaign the Republicans made promises of social and economic reforms, whereas the opposition referred constantly to the Republican Party's record during the one-party regime and often cited incidents which had actually occurred under military rule. The opposition parties promised if elected to liberate the jailed Democrats, but this promise had only a limited appeal. It is true that people were upset because of the jailed Democrats, not that they questioned their guilt but primarily because they felt outraged to see their elected representatives condemned by ordinary legal procedure. Nevertheless, the electorate seemed primarily interested in a return to active economic life rather than in events which could create fresh trouble.

It was paradoxical that the Republicans, who proposed economic development, should not have gained more support from an electorate, of which the majority desired such development. The explanation

lies in the distrust of the Republicans developed during the previous year and a half and in the popular fear of a revival of *étatisme* as practised in the past. Moreover, the Republicans have never been able to descend to the popular level, to get really into touch with the mass of the people and make them feel part of one social whole as the opposition was able to do.

The election results shattered the intelligentsia's last remnants of faith in democracy. They considered the victory of the opposition parties, established on the foundations of the 'discredited' Democrats, as final proof of the people's 'inherent antagonism to progress and modernization' and hence to Atatürk's reforms. Some writers openly demanded the establishment of an intellectual dictatorship under the protection of the Armed Forces, rather than the restoration of power to the Democrats disguised in the form of new parties. The results were also discomfoting to the Armed Forces, who wanted to resume their role of political neutrality without incurring the danger of persecution on the part of revengeful Democrats or of seeing their status and interests down-graded again. The Army's invisible Council, which had been influential behind the scenes during the previous months, now made its presence felt and became for a time the actual ruling group with the backing of military force. The members of the National Unity Committee, who were absorbed into the Senate as *ex officio* members and who wanted to abide by the election results, found themselves isolated from the rest of the Armed Forces. After considerable manoeuvring and pressure behind the scenes Parliament elected General Cemal Gürsel as President, while his potential rival Professor A.F. Başgil retired from politics altogether.

The subsequent formation of the unusual coalition of Republicans and Justice Party under İsmet İnönü's Premiership appeared to be the only way to produce a civilian Government, the one objective on which all parties were agreed and ready to reconcile their differences. In a way, the formation of this coalition was a credit to Turkish statesmanship. Difficulties naturally began to arise as soon as the Government was formed. Some deputies in the Justice and New Turkey Parties demanded an amnesty for the jailed Democrats as a means of suppressing one of the main causes of friction and establishing mutual confidence. The Republicans, who were not averse to an eventual amnesty, felt that an immediate pardon was likely to create reaction and dissension and ultimately invite a fresh military intervention. Some strong statements made by ex-members of the



junta and at meetings of students protesting against the proposed amnesty strengthened the feeling that things might get out of hand again. An amnesty would indeed be likely to be taken as an outright condemnation of the *coup* and of those who engineered and supported it.

Faced with this opposition, the supporters of an amnesty have complained in public that a threat of military intervention, whether imaginary or real, impaired legislative freedom, violated the people's mandate and sovereignty, and undermined the confidence of the electorate in the Armed Forces. They naturally held the Republicans responsible for all this, for in their opinion, though the Armed Forces had resumed their political neutrality, the Republicans kept the threat of imminent intervention alive in order to perpetuate the coalition. Many rank and file deputies felt that the coalition gave the Republicans an excellent opportunity to prove their faith in democracy, to win popular confidence, and thus to secure an easy victory in the next elections. Consequently the anti-Republicans wanted to speed up the transition to civilian rule, form a steady coalition of the three anti-Republican parties, and then hold fresh elections to consolidate their own power.

Meanwhile the coalition has worked with a remarkable degree of success. Mr. İnönü has shown a willingness to compromise on difficult issues, while General Gümüşpala, though he remained outside the Government, has worked steadily among his deputies and party organization in support of the coalition. The predominantly Kurdish landlords, exiled to the western part of the country, have been allowed to return to their towns, martial law has been lifted, and freedom of the press once more restored. A law has been passed to reinstate the university professors, measures to increase investment and ease credit terms are being initiated, and the establishment of a constitutional court is under consideration.

### *The Present Situation*

Yet the democratic structure is far from consolidated. The intelligentsia continues to distrust democratic institutions and does not fail to discredit them, as is shown by a countrywide campaign to gather alms for the deputies who have complained about their low honorarium. In the opinion of the intelligentsia, speedy economic development,

cultural progress, and social justice can be achieved only by a strong Government headed by enlightened intellectuals. Parliament, in their preconceived view, is in the hands of landlords and reactionaries who exploit the peasants for their own purposes. The intelligentsia has developed a social consciousness to an unprecedented extent, as is indicated by its interest in writings of a socio-political character. It demands social justice, which at the present time appears primarily as a reaction against the richer groups, or, to be more precise, against their wealth. The intelligentsia feels, on the other hand, that the administration of the military group was quite unsatisfactory, that it created confusion and popular distrust, and proved that the Armed Forces were not prepared ideologically or practically to establish a truly social regime. Few retain any faith in the fourteen exiled members of the junta, who appeared at one time to be veering towards a policy of drastic social reform. The information available indicates that the fourteen had no common philosophy; they produced a disjointed collection of social statements, which the intelligentsia, in search of leadership, had once imagined was representative of its own wishes. A comeback on the part of the fourteen would depend upon organized support for them in the Army, where they enjoy some popularity among the lower ranks, and on the formulation of a concise and logical political philosophy to win over the intelligentsia.

The unsuccessful military *putsch* of 22–3 February 1962 to abolish the present regime came about as a result of all the above considerations. In a way it may be regarded as the rejection of a civilian administration which fell short of fulfilling the progressive hopes embodied in the action of 27 May. Basically, however, the attempt represented the refusal of a group in the Army to relinquish the power it had exercised behind the scenes throughout the previous year; it expressed a persistent dissatisfaction with their general situation among the lower ranks of the Army; and, finally, it was symbolic of a somewhat adventurous spirit among the younger officers and intelligentsia who believed that a civilian government could be brought down in a few hours through a show of force, as had happened with the Menderes Government in 1960. The attempt failed, for conditions were hardly favourable for a new strong regime; the bulk of the Armed Forces and intelligentsia, however dissatisfied they might be with the present set-up, chose to support it rather than to branch out into a new venture. The *putsch* was quite untimely and

gave the Government an opportunity to reduce the military's influence; it consolidated the coalition by indicating the only alternative should it fail; and, finally, it gave an excuse to the party leaders to purge those members who through their speeches and reactionary leanings appeared to be a constant provocation to the military and the intelligentsia.

The intelligentsia has always been committed to maintain the reforms of Atatürk, but the principle of nationalism has lost much of its former virulence, while secularism is now envisaged as being determined by changes in the social structure. It is now held that no reform can be firmly rooted and no true modernization achieved until there is a drastic change in the social structure. It is premature to attempt to guess the final outcome of these ideas, but it may be wise to state that they contain the embryos of future constitutions.

This modernist, social-minded intelligentsia is opposed by a right wing which defends the present democratic structure since it gives them security and freedom. Within this right wing there are racialists, Islamists, and reactionaries who publish several newspapers and reviews. They make a formal claim to be dedicated to Atatürk and have attacked the social-minded group as communists or fascists without any of the apparent success which would have been attained ten years ago. This right wing forms a small minority and does not enjoy the confidence of the Armed Forces.

Labour stands as one of the strongest pillars of democracy. It supports the multi-party system in the hope of consolidating its own organization and securing material gains. It has organized silent marches to support its demands for the right to strike and for collective bargaining. It has refused to identify itself with any political party or doctrine and has thus been able to secure recognition and respect. So far nobody has attacked labour openly, for there is a tacit consensus of opinion that the working classes have been the least privileged group in the country and that the continuation of this situation may produce explosive results. Labour was relatively neutral towards the military administration, even though the latter allowed it to organize and lifted several restrictions, such as the ban on joining international bodies, and also the police controls imposed on the unions since their inception in 1947. Needless to say, the peasantry supports the multi-party system and democracy. Many Turks feel, rightly, that any attempt to deprive the peasant of his hard-won freedoms will be met with open resistance and even revolt.

From all this emerges a clear picture of a balance between the various social forces, and this in itself is a great step forward.

Foreign policy has not been affected by these developments. Turkey continues to be firmly aligned with the West, even though after 27 May there was some talk about a policy of neutrality to give her a freer hand in international dealings. Yet the future course of Turkey's international policy calls for close scrutiny in the light of her internal developments. Among the intelligentsia there is a fear that heavy military expenditure may constitute a big handicap to economic development and give the military too much influence, and that it produces a certain intellectual paralysis. To the masses at large, international questions remain remote apart from the paramount principle of the preservation of national independence. Turkey is so much preoccupied with her own problems that inside the country itself the cold war and the arms race seem the concern of people in another planet.

To sum up, Turkey appears to have begun to tackle the problems of adjusting the political structure established by Atatürk to more practical social needs. The many discussions about social justice, changes in the social structure, free democracy versus guided democracy, etc. are the natural consequence of what Atatürk pioneered forty years ago in pursuit of progress and modernization. At the basis of all this there is the ordinary Turkish citizen. All theories, speculations, and hypotheses are ultimately subordinated to the will of the ordinary man, matured in suffering, conscious of his existence, and resolute to achieve a higher status as a human being and as a citizen. There is such a deep-rooted inner strength, a civilized instinct for orderly society, and a spirit of forgiveness in this humble man that one comes to respect him. The future of Turkey lies in his hands.

We may conclude by stressing the change in the country's political life. Public opinion and social groupings have emerged as the strongest forces in shaping political life. It is the balance of power between these groups which now determines internal stability. Moreover it would seem that Turkish society is now capable of ruling itself by general consent rather than by force or coercion. An absolute reliance on will-power and intellectual concepts to reform human nature, often according to Western ideas which have been only partly understood, has created a reaction which may in fact bring about a com-

promise between will-power and human nature, and this ultimately will mean a truly Westernized Turkey.

The action of 27 May has played a crucial part in destroying some obsolete attitudes and patriarchal views and has thus permitted new social groups and fresh opinions to reach the political arena. There is a new constructive dynamism in Turkey, and this ultimately means progress. Many important developments are in the making, some in the immediate future, others in a decade or so. Some people expect a fascist or semi-fascist government to take over if the present coalition fails. Others fear that a victory of the opposition in the next elections may bring about fresh reactions on the part of the military and the intellectuals. Others again fear a sort of leftist-nationalist orientation. All these hopes and fears are only too natural in a society which is in the process of rapid change. The ultimate result will be a new Turkish citizen with his rights to a free life, full human dignity, and progress fully restored.

## REFLECTIONS ON THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF THE TURKISH REVOLUTION OF 1960<sup>1</sup>

The political evolution of Turkey during these last years is a reflection of the changes that took place in the social structure of the country and the new relations of power between social groups forming it. The revolution of May 27, 1960 aimed to restore the democratic liberties violated by the government of Democrat Party under Adnan Menderes. However, from the very early phase on, the military government took a series of measures, which surpassed largely the initial aim. In time, the military abandoned a number of reforms and transferred the power, at least formally, to a civilian government.

The political regime established after the revolution was a multi-party democracy and in spite of a stubborn opposition that made its weight felt in every way, it was successful in maintaining itself. Turkey is therefore one of the rare nations that kept a sufficiently liberal parliamentary regime, despite the pressure of economic and social problems. A correct evaluation of political incidents in Turkey requires a sound understanding of the social forces lying beneath them. Such an understanding demands an objective appreciation of each present force, by abstracting all ideological, sociological or nationalist prejudices, although it is inevitable to ignore the impact of these conceptions.

Consequently, the military action should be considered as an outcome of particular internal social forces that differ in genre and significance from the forces, which affect the evolution of neighboring Arab countries. Also, the future evolution of Turkey should be seen as shaped by internal economic and authentic cultural factors. This new appreciation is of vital importance, because Turkey is at the threshold of a new political era full of promises but also dangers. Thus, one should evaluate the political evolution of this country by

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<sup>1</sup> A shorter version of this article was presented earlier in a conference at the Middle East Institute, in Washington D.C. Translated from its French original by Kaan Durukan, with the help of Akile Zorlu-Durukan in typing and editing: "Réflexions sur l'Arrière-Plan Social de la Révolution Turque de 1960", *Orient*, 37, 1966.

taking into account the social structures; not solely in the forms they appear today, but also in the way these were molded in the past by various forces. Inevitably one should look for the clues in history and in the first place to the Ottoman history before the Republic. The political history of the empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries seems to be fundamentally dominated by the same problems that the history of the Republic dealt with in terms of social structures. The problem was social at its base and political at its summit.

*Land Property and Social Groups in a Historical Perspective*

The Ottoman Empire and its complex organization were based on a land system, which determined the internal organization of the function of each social group as well as its relation with the government. The disintegration of the land system in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries modified the function of each group and was at the origin of a series of new events, which were intrinsically similar to some structural changes that took place in Europe during the transitory period between feudalism and State. In terms of structures, it is appropriate to first carefully examine the problem of *ayans*, *esrafs* (notables) and *derebeys*, who rose in the European and Asiatic territories of the empire.

Contrary to certain classic opinions, the social structures of the empire did not consist of a monolithic unity in form. There was a great variety of cultural groups, Muslim and non-Muslim, sustained by a corresponding social organization and attached to the state by a community of interests and convictions. These interests were assured by state authorization, from which a considerable number of small lords of Anatolia and particularly the Balkans benefited by exercising actual power on their respective domains. The religious divisions had respective benefits: the non-Muslims enjoyed a cultural and religious autonomy, whereas the Muslims were in the service of the state and had the possibility to reach high governmental positions. Additionally, in the eyes of the Muslims the government symbolized their ideal regarding their faith. The central government was represented by a series of institutions, which perfectly counterbalanced the power of provincial administration. The *timar* (fief) system enabled the central government to exercise its authority on the administration

of the land regime, which was established in order to favor the military interests of the state. The internal organization and administration of *timars* or the provincial administration is not the subject of this article. The essential idea is that the administrative edifice and land system of the empire were organized in such a way that the provinces could oppose the central power if the latter lost its effective control. The conflict between the central authority and the provincial administrators was one of the principal causes in the origin of the fall of many Muslim states in the past. The Turks avoided the administrative mistakes of their Muslim predecessors. Throughout many centuries, they kept the integrity of the empire with the help of an efficient new organization and a new type of Muslim ideology. Nevertheless, in the end the empire was weakened and dissolved, due to a great extent, to the lack of control over the provinces. The loss of this rôle had, in its origin, material factors inherent within the structures of the empire. These causes continued to engender an evolutionary scheme, the effects of which are still felt today.

The *timar* organization lost its importance after the foot soldiers and the new-type armies proved their superiority over the cavalry, which constituted the basis of feudal timariot troops. At the end of the eighteenth century, it became evident that a new army necessitated a central organization, a central training system, and especially financial resources, which had to be collected and used by the organs of the central government. Thus, the *timar* system lost its original function as well as its source of supply and potential for troop recruits, and was partly transformed into a source of revenues in order to finance the new army. Indeed, Selim III (1789–1808) confiscated a certain number of *timars*, the holders of which were in an irregular situation and devoted their revenues to his army (*Nizam-ı Cedid*). He also tried to establish a sort of general conscription. It is true that he ordered the provincial administrators to enlist and train units similar to those of his, but he was unsuccessful. In this manner the central administration of territories, the centralized system of taxes and the army were parts of an inevitable evolution in the modernization efforts of the Sultan. The idea to establish a new economic and financial organization came from the West. The reports from diverse imperial envoys in Europe, all critical of the morality of the West, nonetheless praised its financial and administrative systems and especially the economic rôle given to individuals by the state. There is no doubt that liberalism was the doctrine that influenced Ottoman



thinking the most. In fact, liberalism was not considered in ideological terms; it was particularly an impression derived from the observation of the position of the individual vis-à-vis the state and his relations with it. The envoys of the Sultan were assigned to seek the sources of Western power and they discovered that the individual was at the center of activity, which they saw as the secret of European success. The Sultan and his ministers were interested in a way of life, which would in the end permit the human machine named individual to freely accomplish certain modern physical tasks, while the spirit and the heart of this individual would belong eternally to the state. Partially as a response to the opposition manifested in the provinces, the centralization efforts were presented as alluring, since a number of *timars* had become a kind of private property in the hands of old administrators. Some *timars* were attributed as sources of revenues to the holders of official posts. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the *timars* lost a major part of their original function and became, like other types of domains, a source of power for the local persons. The rise of a provincial elite, sprung from elements inherited from the pre-Ottoman period and the beginnings of the Ottoman era, was stimulated by economic and social changes. Originally the *ayans* were the leaders of *ahis*, fraternities who lost ground after the Ottoman central state became powerful, and at the same time the *eşrafs* (rich persons of modest origin), who acquired a certain power due to their essential rôle in establishing and collecting head taxes and by renting state territories. (Theoretically, the state kept its property rights over *miri* territories.) Their power increased because they were controlling local judges and appeared frequently as the protectors of the local subjects against the demands of the central government for supplementary resources in order to finance the new military contingents.

The provincial elites had in their own regions a basis, both economic and social. They could oppose the government either by plotting with the functionaries of the Sultan or more frequently by supporting the rising leaders. Selim III had to struggle continuously against various provincial lords. His second successor Mahmud II (1808–1839) was forced to sign a pact, which gave special privileges to *ayans*, some of who had managed to march to İstanbul with their own armies. Later Mahmud formed a strong central army and got rid of rebellious *ayans*, but without destroying their families and all of their wealth. The *eşrafs* seemed to be less affected because they

accepted the power of the central government and kept their economic might. Thus, the government destroyed the rising feudalism, but maintained its foundations formed particularly by rich families.

The central authority imposing its political control and supremacy with the help of a new army, a new administration and new institutions was victorious. In these new structures the society continued its evolution subject to pressures coming from within and reacting against the policies of the government. Developing economic relations with the West, the capitulations and diverse cultural influences gave increasingly an economic meaning to the old idea of activism. For instance, the idea to facilitate the transfer of state territories to increase the value of real estate (and to assure supplementary resources) was officially implemented.

The development of internal and external commerce in the nineteenth century was an important factor, which gave a new stimulus and a new direction to the social changes taking place in the structures of the empire. In the first place, commercial centers were established especially in the Balkans, in coastal areas and regions closer to Europe. Moreover, there were the beginnings of an economic integration and orientation towards a market economy. The social impact of these developments was the rise of a bourgeoisie divided into two major groups. The bourgeoisie consisting of non-Muslims was modern and strong and the basis of its power was particularly commerce. The so-called Muslim bourgeoisie (we think mainly of Rumeli and Anatolia) depended especially on land property and agricultural production and its cadres were still the descendants of old *ayans*, *eşrafs* and some old aristocratic families, who had their economic power rooted in land property.

We ignore the precise phases of transformations, which took place among Muslim land owning families, the merchants and the artisans of Anatolia and Rumeli. Commerce oriented the economic life. The dominant economic influence of the West refrained the Turkish government from comprehending the capacities of this Muslim group in productive activities and creating a really modern bourgeoisie. This situation had important repercussions, because later this group formed in good measure the economic foundation of Ottoman and Turkish nationalism.

The historical experience led the government to distrust the upper strata of land owning Muslim groups. However, the transfer of state territories to individuals continued rapidly. The government tried to

interfere and keep the property right on territories in its possession (*miri*) by adopting the famous Land Code of 1858. But only ten years later, their status was liberalized and the transfer of these territories to individuals was largely facilitated. Numerous amendments, especially during the period of Young Turks, liberalized the law even more, to a degree that the use and the transfer of state territories became only slightly different from private lands (*mülk*). These new land owning groups were conferred a legal status by the law of *vilayets* in 1864, in which the local notables took positions in the powerful executive councils.

Economic and political considerations made these changes in the status of state territories inevitable. It is true that the state kept its ultimate right over territories, as a result of which the birth of a huge territorial aristocracy was prevented, but not the rise of a land owning class who struggled to install a regime friendly to land property. Moreover, this land owning class gave rise to numerous political leaders, merchants and industrialists whose influence was felt throughout the twentieth century. This was a new force that had its operation bases in the rural areas and regarded the expansion of central government's power as a threat to its economic and social foundations. Decentralization and an autonomous local government became the political and administrative demands of these rural elites. Therefore, it is understandable that the national independence movements and nationalism itself, especially among the Arabs, was in origin a reaction against centralization. The statement of Sati' al-Husri on the origins of Arab nationalism shows that during the Young Turk era many deputies, mostly members of rural families, depicted decentralization as a precondition of their membership in the Ottoman Empire.

### *Society and Government*

The historical framework presented above, though sketchy and general, will help to understand the conditions, which were at the origin of the permanent conflict between the society in general, and the government.

The "society-state" dichotomy began with the attempts of the Ottoman government to shape and transform the society according to its militarist conceptions, instead of following the transformations

occurring within the society itself and adapting the state to these transformations. Therefore, the society and the government began to separate from each other progressively since the early nineteenth century, and each followed a different course, subject to different conditions and forces deriving from their own proper structures and philosophy of life. This conflict undermined the energy and creative capacity of the society and limited the scope of the reforms. The conservatives, being the actors of this conflict and deprived of enlightened intellectual leadership, opposed all novelties, whereas the modernists rejected the old norms completely. Thus, situated in two extreme poles, they perceived each other with an increasing animosity.

The conflict was expressed constantly in cultural terms and masked the real power struggle that brought the central authority and local groups into a confrontation. A careful observer can immediately realize that the so-called "cultural struggle" between the "modernists" and the so-called "reactionaries" was hardly related to the present day meanings of these words.

The modernist ideas represented by the new administrative intelligentsia had their roots in the statist, and later nationalist philosophy, whereas the "conservatives" defended liberal ideas, including religious freedom, as channels of opposition to the central power. The real religious reactionaries were generally outside of these two groups, although they could easily unite with the conservatives, particularly when they were opposing the centralized government. The situation became more complicated by the fact that certain members of lower rank *ulema* and especially old clerical groups lost their functions in society. They tried to justify their existence by referring to the last symbols of a glorious past. All these groups were generally linked to the so-called "conservatives", although the latter ones sometimes asked for reforms at the expense of *ilmiye (ulema)*. On the other hand, many *ulema* were enlightened intellectuals, who did favor a change. All of these groups emerging from the traditionalist period became the allies of the rising bourgeoisie. Their common ground was their opposition to the central power, although their motivations and aims were fundamentally different. The rising bourgeoisie had economic targets, but the others saw only the cultural aspects of the struggle.

The literature and writings of the second half of the nineteenth century express basically two modes of thought, two manners of

perceiving the world. One belongs to the intellectuals in the state, supportive of it: in appearance idealistic, but unrelated to reality. It was full of political rhetoric and ultimately regarded state authority as the society's sole medium of salvation. The other produced by the rising Muslim bourgeoisie was positive, simple, but logical, not creative but full of common sense: it put accent on practical issues and rejected authority. If one compares the writings of Namik Kemal to the novels and articles by Ahmed Mithat, one is immediately struck by the fierce nationalist thought, requiring sacrifice of the first and the realism of the second. Namik Kemal demanded limits to the power of the Sultan; but at the same time advocated that individuals show absolute obedience and sacrifices to the state and its territory, which was called *vatan*, the land of ancestors or fatherland. Ahmed Mithat, on the other hand, saw progress as an endeavor to transform the individual of the old society into a creative, self-conscious independent person guided by moral principals rooted in the Islamic faith. Today Namik Kemal is eulogized as a great idealist, whereas Ahmed Mithat is rejected as a petit bourgeois preoccupied solely with practical subjects. The reason of this attitude does not lie in the real value of their ideas but in the nature of the group, which finally became predominant. The conflict of mentalities and intentions between the administrative intelligentsia and the rising Muslim bourgeoisie representing urban lower classes and rural sectors was evident at the political level.

The newspapers of the nineteenth century and in particular the records of the first Ottoman Parliament (1876) give a striking image of conflicts engendered by the economic and social transformations on the one hand, and of a government was left behind society's evolution on the other. The deputies coming from the provinces criticized the new administration and corrupt *ulema* (*ilmkiye*) severely and wanted these two groups to conform themselves to the real needs of the society by reforming their organization, mentality and function. In glancing at these records, one is impressed by the profound common sense of the civilians and dismayed by the ignorance of the administration concerning material conditions of the country. In fact, the problems before the administration needed a new objective attitude and a realist apprehension of the relations between individuals, the government and the society. Even a quick glance at the records of these debates reveals an abundance of conflicts and problems deriving from changes in the nature of labor relations and property

transactions. (A number of these conflicts affected the policies of the government.) In fact, the reign of Abdülhamid II (1876–1909) and especially the period of Union and Progress (1908–1918) were marked by a series of social and economic problems (land property, taxes, control over state officials) rooted in the changes, which took place between 1800 and 1876. Abdülhamid II adopted the viewpoint of conservatives, doubling the opposition of the modernist intelligentsia. Ironically, this opposition increased rapidly within the very schools opened and maintained by the Sultan himself. During the Young Turk period the accent was put on the nationalist policies of the new group in power, represented by the Committee of Union and Progress. Small independent bourgeois groups were increasingly neglected, although they were one of the principal forces that had supported the military coup of Unionist officers in 1908. Instead the government attempted to create a nationalist state bound group of its own.

The relations between these two groups became more tense when the intellectual, generally cut off culturally from his society, began to consider himself and his refinement as the final objective of the society and assumed that the other classes should support him.

The rising nationalism in its search for an authentic Turkish culture gave a new interpretation to the changes of structure and adapted them to align with its modernist, worldly and populist ideals. It enlarged the cultural gap even more, which separated the official intelligentsia from the society in general. But, nationalism expressed also the resentment of lower Muslim groups against the Christian commercial bourgeoisie, which had expanded and strengthened under the protection of Western powers. Nationalists were in favor of a national economy controlled by ethnic Turks (for the traditional society, Turk was the synonym of Muslim) and they tried to create it. But, while these structures existed, the conflict between the government and the society persisted. Temporary unity between the elites in power and the Muslim bourgeoisie against the non-Muslim commercial class was interrupted by the increasingly secular politics of the government, necessitated by its nationalist aims and the fact that non-Muslims were ousted from Turkey.

*Social Evolution under the Republic*

The War of Liberation was in its origin a reaction against foreign invasion and conducted in the name of traditional institutions, including the salvation of the Caliphate. The power of local elites manifested itself in the creation of *Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyetleri* (Associations for the Defense of Rights). Local *ulema*, merchants, *eşrafs* (*ayans* did not exist anymore), teachers and demobilized officials were the leaders of these associations and contributed to mobilize the population against foreign invaders. Mustafa Kemal became the elected head of the association, which assured considerable mass support. He was the representative of modern, nationalist and secular concepts, but did not express them before getting complete control of power.

The alliance of young officers and the intellectuals with the elites of the countryside in 1919–1922 was largely facilitated by the fact that the Sultan-Caliph in İstanbul had signed the Sèvres Treaty in 1920, accepting to quit national territory and leave its Muslim-Turkish population under the rule of foreign powers. In this way, he violated one of his fundamental obligations: to defend the community against the foreigners.

The basic importance of the War of Liberation lies in the fact that it became also a popular movement training Anatolian masses in the struggle. The minutes of the First National Assembly and the literature of the period between 1920–1922 display the concern that the leaders had for the social and economic demands of the people. The first program submitted to the Assembly by the government in 1920 was entitled *halk programı* (people's program) and the debates following the proposal clearly show the principal orientations of the deputies. A group of representatives talked about social reforms, borrowing repeatedly the terminology of Russian revolutionaries, who had established friendly relations with Mustafa Kemal's government. Another group severely criticized the bureaucracy, its obsession with control, surveillance, and its corruption. They also harshly blamed the intelligentsia for having lost ties with the population at large and for failing to produce competent leaders. The third group, which took the upper hand, stated that the future depended, in the first place, on a new ensemble of modern political institutions suitable to support the rising republican nationalist regime. Seemingly their preoccupation was to take sufficient social and economic measures, which would be necessary to guarantee the survival of the new regime.

The abolition of the Sultanate in 1922, the establishment of the Republic in 1923, the introduction of secularism and abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 respectively were to a great extent accelerated by the power struggle in the Assembly and international developments, and gave the evolution of the following decades its tone. A modernist, secular intelligentsia was in power and implemented policies stamped by an extreme progressivism in the cultural domain and an equally extreme conservatism concerning social problems.

The republican leaders accepted a necessary compromise in their need to assure the survival of the Republic. They approved and respected the socio-economic status of the local leaders in exchange for the recognition of their political power. Each group continued to develop independently, but their divergences in mentality and interests were kept and canalized into the new political structures, namely the nation-state. Absolute obedience to the throne and Islam under the Ottoman rule could not stop the decisive effects of the struggle between the central authority and local groups. But, the nation-state might overcome it by forcing upper and lower groups to work together, according to a new philosophy and new interests engendered in a different spirit. A new collective political identity was connecting the administration and the countryside.

Economic evolution contributed considerably to the strengthening of the national entity and to the acceleration of social change. Economic policies followed by the government until 1930s aimed to strengthen the private sector and the social structures supporting it. This was also the case in the legal/judicial domain. For instance, the introduction of the Swiss Civil Code in 1926 sealed a definitive transition to a modern regime of private property, which had begun a century ago. In fact, this was a victory for the middle classes, because from then on property rights would be regulated with the help of a Code, which had the Roman-Napoleonic-European notion of private property, which was the expression of a bourgeois economic philosophy. The Civil Code also abolished agricultural regulations, originating from the Ottoman times and replaced the old Code (*Mecelle*), which was not much in use anyway. Therefore, the last obstacles to the free circulation of land property were abolished and land could be accumulated or disposed of according to market conditions. Although small land estates dominated the agricultural sector, large estates could be found in the East and South-East often as the domain of Kurdish tribal chiefs. In 1945 the government



introduced a Land Reform bill intended to bring "justice" to the peasants. But a landowning group in the National Assembly led by Adnan Menderes opposed the government and founded the Democrat Party to claim power. A part of the "rural" aristocracy behind Menderes had old family roots, but a considerable number of them rose during the Republic due to the liberal property regime instituted by the Swiss Civil Code. This regime was strengthened further by a new system of land registration and surveys. The Civil Code, and especially the clauses regarding private property, inheritance and contracts regulated the new commercial relations and gave a new impetus to a new type of social stratification and capital accumulation, which had begun many decades before with the introduction of European commercial codes.

On the other hand, the abolition of the *Mecelle* was justified, among other factors, by the fact that it was incapable to respond to a particular type of economic contracts, engendered by the new national structures. Commissions established in 1920, 1921 and 1923 respectively to adapt the *Mecelle* according to modern conditions failed, not solely because of the radical Westernization adopted by the Republic, but also due to a new socio-economic system, which required corresponding judicial regime. Productive social groups gained a victory, but still they needed a guarantee preventing the possible intervention of the omnipotent state, if the latter felt its interests and authority threatened. The social structures, despite their backward aspects, were elaborated upon by the forces of the Western capitalist economy. They began to resemble their Western counterparts or, at least were oriented to develop according to this scheme.

Population exchange with Greece in 1926—a very important economic event—established a certain cultural homogeneity, as ethnic Turks became the dominant group in social and economic activities, and it eliminated also the danger of conflict between minority-majority or Muslim-non-Muslim groups, which had obscured the effects of social stratification and uneven income distribution among Turks. The abolition of the Capitulations intensified socio-economic activity and gave it a purely national character.

*The Effects of Etatism on the Social Structures*

The most significant factor, which affected the evolution of the social structure under the Republic, was economic *étatisme* or statism. In the first place, it stimulated a rapid and different type of social stratification. Secondly, it created new national economic structures that were subordinated to political designs. The development of economic *étatisme* or State capitalism was conditioned by the scarcity of domestic capital, the big demand for goods and the availability of resources and manpower. The government used its power of taxation to accumulate the capital and exploited local markets in order to operate with profit. Initially, this economic policy was initiated by the state in the hope of establishing an industrial foundation for the development of private entrepreneurship. But the state economic structures, which developed rapidly after 1930s, opposed private entrepreneurship instead of supporting it and caused unfair competition. Nevertheless, although the interpretation of *étatisme* varied from one Ministry to another and state enterprises continued to grow, private enterprise also expanded, because *étatisme* did not become an exclusive ideology and was not fortified by convincingly strong social arguments or political measures.

Monolithic perception of the society, officially sanctioned by the government refused to recognize social classes and their distinct interests; also, it prevented free expression of the conflicts engendered by the economic evolution. In the end, the perception favored the rising bourgeoisie, because it stopped the claims of the lower groups, employed by private and national enterprises. Diverse social groups reaching a certain economic power found it advantageous to accentuate traditional forms of loyalty to the state, in order to eliminate criticisms of the lower groups about the unbalance that existed in the distribution of the national income.

All changes regarding the relations between social groups were seen as likely to undermine the subordinated position of social groups versus the government, and this was unacceptable. Diverse evidence, varying from declarations in the Assembly to literary works, displays an increasing unrest on the part of the peasants who carried the burden of this economic *étatisme*, which benefited only its own institutions and economic groups of the bourgeoisie.

The economic development triggered by the state (particularly, industrialization) in fact accelerated indirectly the accumulation of

capital in private hands, causing the rise of new social groups. First of all, it stimulated considerably the cultivation of certain crops (beets, cotton, raisin), providing raw materials for the national enterprises. By supplying raw material to the industry landowning people, rich planters and middlemen had an excellent opportunity to augment their revenues and their status. At the marketing level, a group of retailers distributed commercial items manufactured in state enterprises or used half-finished products in their own shops, by transforming them into consumer commodities. Thus, a native merchant group was formed and added new strength to the middle classes.

In the private sector, the domestic trade as well as the exchange of agricultural products were free until 1941–1942. At this point, the Office of Agricultural Produce, created originally to help the peasantry with a price support policy, expanded its duties and began to supply agricultural products to the army; as necessitated by war circumstances, prices were fixed and the delivery of crops to the government was made mandatory. Most of the farmers' resentment against the ruling Republican People's Party originated in these forced delivery of crops even if the actual production of crops fell below the fixed quotas.

The war also necessitated a limitation of imports. Consequently, small enterprises, intended to substitute for import items, developed in the cities. It used local raw materials to manufacture goods, in order to replace imported ones or to satisfy the increasing market demand. Many of these industries, especially in textile, used the products of state enterprises, but also contacted directly the private businesses. Demands for agricultural products from foreign countries increased considerably during the war and stimulated not only the growth of firms involved in export, but also the big agricultural firms.

The relations between this rising bourgeoisie rooted in economic occupations and the government began to deteriorate not only because the private sector had expanded considerably beyond the expected limits, but also because this class began to protest the state, which had extended to favor its own enterprises and limited the scope of private trade. The state enterprises were attacked as obstacles to free enterprises. Tax on capital in 1942, supposedly instituted in order to meet wartime's needs and the land reform law of 1945 brought the struggle between the state and newly rising groups to a breaking point. A group of bureaucrats with national social tendencies desired to reassert the state's traditional supremacy.

A new political situation was developing for the first time in Turkish history. A variety of social groups, originating in the relatively shapeless traditional social structures confronted the state with demands for freedom. A group of landowners owning medium sized estates emerged as the spokesmen for the new social groups. Its influence in the agricultural regions, due to the specific conditions of Turkish agriculture, was much more significant in relation to its actual size. Next to them, there were the commercial groups, importers, exporters, small merchants and artisans, who together with their families, numbered about 1.5 million in 1945 and 4 million in 1964. At the top of all these groups, stood the industrialists and manufacturers, who mustered important economic power and had political aspirations. A class of industrial workers and a service sector came into existence, too. Their numbers, just around 300,000 in 1923, reached more than 2 millions in 1964. For example, the Association of Drivers had more than 260,000 members at the end of 1964. The state itself and especially the state enterprises, in addition to their administrative personnel, hired a great number of workers and economic administrators, whose affiliation with the State created a number of difficulties. The right to strike for the workers was rejected until 1963, under the pretext that workers employed by the government could not go on strike against the state, since the state aim was to bring welfare to the entire society rather than a specific group. These structural changes followed a dialectical course, which isolated the intelligentsia and isolated it from the main course of life. The intellectuals, being a social group, enjoyed a certain prestige, position and had a secure future. They were the symbol of modernism and privileged spokesmen of the regime. The state gave them the mission to lead the society towards some targets designated in advance, without taking into account the real desire of the society or the connections of the intellectuals with the social body. For centuries, the intelligentsia had been on top of the society, earlier in the name of Islam as *ulema* and now, officially as symbols and agents of modernization. Considering authority as the only medium for a rapid modernization and elevating nationalism to the level of absolute ideal, the intellectual was seeing himself as the sole agent of progress. One should remark that the question of social justice, which became a major theme in Turkey after 1960, was hardly included in the initial conception of modernization. Social justice became the new and strong theme for a big section of the intelligentsia after 1960 as well as a new justification

to obtain power and position by making it an indispensable part of democracy.

The intellectuals represent one of the most powerful leading groups in Turkey, including the military. Their relations with other social groups and their political attitudes would determine the future of Turkish political life.

### *Evolution of Structures during the Republic*

One can summarize the evolution of the social structures during the Republic until 1945–1946 by saying that the principal characteristics of the Turkish reformist movement, namely the development of the state and the administrative intelligentsia developed at one level and the society at another, much more so than in the Ottoman past. The participation of everyday citizen to the decision-making process remained limited.

The official culture, modeled by the state according to nationalist and secular ideology had the aura of absolute superiority. The majority of the people living in the cities as well as in the countryside were still subject to communal traditional culture, but also to the combined effects of economic and social forces. Theory and political power geared to national ideas guided the leading group, whereas the reality and interpersonal relations determined the lives of lower strata. The latter, residing in the villages and poor urban areas, seemed to have conserved most of their traditional attitudes towards the state and the authority. However, facing the changes caused by industrialization and relatively intense economic activity, their reaction was less conservative and adaptation to the new material conditions was rather quick and natural. For example, villages exposed to intensive innovations and material changes seemed to have adapted themselves with relative ease to the new conditions created by the change, especially if it increased their living standards.

Material improvements also produced chain reactions leading frequently to changes in mentality and habits, which did not follow precise schemas, but varied according to the incentives and sources of resistance in each community and region.

An excellent example of adaptation to the modern technology, Western society—and its life style—was provided by some 100,000 Turkish workers, employed in diverse industries of Western Europe,

especially in Germany. These workers came from rural and lower urban classes and in relatively short time their employers came to appreciate highly their efficient work, which appeared to be higher than the workers migrating from Southern Europe and Mediterranean Basin.

In political and social terms, Turkish villages have certain characteristics, which helped them to adopt a flexible attitude towards government and democracy.

Despite the existence of some large land estates, small-scale land property remained dominant in Anatolia. The family worked as a unit on their properties, instead of being part of an amorphous group headed by a chief or a lord, although such a type of organization exists in the South-East. The village as a whole appeared as an autonomous unit, with an administration elected by the community. The village administration, represented by the *muhtar* (chief) and the board of elders, decided on administrative problems while religious questions are left to the *imam*, who is also an organic component of the community. The central government encroached upon the authority of the *muhtar* and sought to make him its agent, but without really undermining his independence. The village traditional government, emerged as a response to the need for maintaining order and regulating relations in the community, based on consensus something the central government, despite its efforts in this direction, could not achieve. The agricultural organization of the past as well as the specific conditions of land tenure in Turkey contributed considerably to the creation of this village type. The government, notwithstanding its reformist zeal, respected the traditional rural organization, although the *muhtar* was put under the authority of the central government as per the Village Law of 1926. Finally, we should restate that, with the exception of a few rare important domains, individual small property is still dominant in Turkey, forming proportionally 80 to 85 per cent of total land property. In terms of land property, social and administrative organization and adaptation capacity to material innovations, the Turkish village resembles more the Balkan rather than the Middle Eastern village.

Many conclusions can be drawn from the general analysis, presented in the preceding pages. Historical evolution of the social structures took place at two levels simultaneously. The appearance of a strong central government led to the formation of a relatively dominant intelligentsia, which included also civilian and military administrations.

The old central government of the Ottoman Empire, facing the opposition of local lords and *ayans*, suppressed them and unconsciously forced the socio-economic evolution to take a favorable course towards the birth of a new kind of middle class, especially in the countryside. The *étatisme* of the Republic, created principally for the sake industrialization, enlarged considerably the size of the urban elements of the middle class and led indirectly to the integration of the rural middle class into national economy and sharpened its group and interest consciousness. The rise of this middle class in rural and urban regions based on private property was facilitated and sanctioned by a modern judicial system borrowed from the West. This middle class was founded upon a rural basis, composed by a huge number of villages, in which small land property dominated and the villages were administrated by locally elected bodies. Even the administration of pasturelands, owned by the community was under the responsibility of these bodies. The bourgeoisie and the peasantry were standing on practically similar economic foundations, the private property, and their activities evolved in the same economic direction. Their social and economic differences, if viewed in their Islamic cultural context, were differences of degree, not genre.

The initial conflicts between the actual government and local communities still persisted. But, the aim and orientation of the conflict had changed. Under the Ottoman Empire, the provinces desired a large political and administrative autonomy, whereas under the Republic, they were asking for a certain degree of local autonomy and consideration of their local needs. Demands for political autonomy, with the exception of some Kurdish revolutionaries' nationalist claims, were practically non-existent. The cultural differences between the intelligentsia and the rural middle classes, particularly regarding their different conceptions of "secularism", were not that sharp and irreconcilable, as foreign observers sometimes tend to think. In reality, the heart of the controversy was the intelligentsia's anti-clerical philosophy and the issue was rather a power struggle between the two groups, than a real discussion on religion. In Turkey, there was never the idea or attempt to reject Islam as a belief or to reform it from within. The governing circles and the intellectuals understood intuitively that Islam had impregnated the essence of the society's culture and was still a necessary force to maintain internal cohesion. The "modern" groups in power used secularism as a necessary condition for modernization, which in turn legitimized their

hold of state power. Paradoxically, the government had used orthodox Islam in the past to assure the Muslims' loyalty to the government to legitimize its supremacy and the so-called discussions on religion and Islam expressed in fact social and political conflicts between the groups in power and the society in general. In the preceding 20 years, there had been no serious opposition against secular institutions, the Republic or the regime. Socio-economic forces, not the religious ones, formed the center of gravity of political process. One can say that active groups in society, developing with the help of relatively free interaction of economic and social forces, were dominated by a political elitist order, anchored in its own dogmatic and selective conception of society, authority and government.

### *Effects of Liberalism after 1945*

The decision to accept a multi-party system was made under these circumstances in 1945–1946. The adoption of the system was dictated by a series of internal and external causes and among them, the pressure coming from the structures, severe restrictions during the war and the success of democracies in World War II played a dominant rôle. The decision to abandon the single-party system was very important and should be considered a turning point in Turkish political history. Whether İsmet İnönü, President at that time, did fully realize the remarkable significance of this decision does not concern us. Indeed, the most important thing was the decision he made. In its essence, the decision signifies that hereafter the power of the government should be acquired and exercised according to popular will and, groups and individuals can compete to gain this power to use it for their own ideas and interests. It shook all preceding conceptions and practices long associated with the government. No doubt, governmental positions and intellectual supremacy still retained prestige in this setting, even though a completely new power relationship between the governing bodies and the masses was in the making.

The opposition Democrat Party, founded in 1946, was the most serious candidate for power and became the spokesman of all social groups, which had old and new grievances against the government. Democrats did not have a long-term program, but with the help of their deeply rooted and spontaneously created organizations, they managed to express the views of the masses, who voted for them



and acted accordingly. Menderes supported agricultural credits, the abolition for governmental interference in agriculture and the reduction of bureaucrats' power. He applied this economic policy after his coming to power in 1950, largely with the help of loans from the United States. The mechanization of agriculture, the abolition of agricultural taxes, industrial development, expansion of commerce and good harvests engendered the economic "boom" of 1950–1953. The results were so encouraging that the Democrats vowed to reach the standard of American life: cars, refrigerators, etc., invaded the market whereas in the countryside, approximately one million small farmers were living in poverty and moved to the cities in search of a job.

The group of landowners possessing large estates increased their wealth and power, by acquiring new lands and new machinery, whereas poorer villagers satisfied themselves by crop subsidies and temporary tax exemptions.

In the commercial sector, the groups of importers and industrialists could accumulate wealth, partially placing it in foreign banks. Menderes, electrified by this development, boasted during the electoral campaign of 1957—he had won sweepingly the one in 1954—that his economic policies were so successful as to produce fifteen millionaires in each urban district. A new type of high bourgeoisie or capitalism was born. Many included in this group made their fortunes often by using governmental channels, without creating permanent productive mechanisms. *Etatisme* was not abandoned, but used, especially after 1953, to increase the power of a new class of entrepreneurs and landowners.

Nevertheless, the economy was considerably stimulated and new social groups rose on the basis of an economic development, in which foreign loans played an essential rôle. The lack of proper information on the Turkish social fabric led to distorted policies, which forced society to evolve unilaterally often in the wrong direction. Upper classes, anxious to promote their economic interests influenced the policies of the Democrat Party government, without giving lower classes, i.e. workers, the permission to organize themselves. (A list of collaborators of Democrat Party, published after the 1960 revolution includes a certain number of well-known firms and banks, which had close relations with the government). The financial burden of government's services fell on wage earners. 70 per cent of government's revenues came from the workers and salaried functionaries,

whereas a farmer earning millions of Turkish *liras* paid only insignificant taxes. The salaries of workers and civil servants remained unbelievably low, while salaries in the private enterprises doubled. Statistics show that 61 per cent of workers in public service were paid 131 TL, an equivalent of \$15 per month (salary doubling hardly in 20 years), whereas wholesale prices of merchandises increased 11 times during the same period. The salaries of functionaries increased only fourfold.

Intensive economic activity in the private sector went parallel with a similar activity of the government, whose program of road construction and industrial development demanded technicians and specialized planners. The people working in these sectors were paid big salaries, hardly comparable to that of the civil servants' or academia. For example, an engineer earned between \$280–500 per month, whereas a university professor with 28 years experience made just about \$80 per month. The technician became naturally the ideal type, and a scholar in humanities looked like a fool who failed to grasp the realities of daily life. The emphasis placed on professional training forced the many intellectuals who had politics their main preoccupation to undertake specialization and professionalization in practical fields. A new bond between the intelligentsia, especially the professionals and economic interest groups was thus created. This led to a proliferation of engineers, doctors, economists, etc.

Thus, although professionals and specialized technicians acquired high positions and income, civil servants in the administration and the staff of the army were neglected. Democrats tried to increase the efficiency of the administration by abolishing certain red tape formalities. But, these efforts were soon abandoned, when the old bureaucratic mentality took the upper hand. Indeed, instead of installing a large-scale institutional and functional reform in the government, Democrats tended to return easily to the routine. Without the philosophical and intellectual bases necessary to define a long-term policy of socio-political adaptation to rapid economic development, the Democrats adopted expedient short-term solutions to new problems, only when they appeared. Principles and plans were abandoned and activism, without a system and clear aims, became policy. Intellectual idealism and cultural concerns, dominating between the years 1923 and 1946 disappeared and were replaced by a vulgar empiricism. The economic power, without taking into consideration its origin, became the principal criterion to define social position.

It is not surprising therefore, that all intellectual groups fell almost

to the lowest strata of the social echelon, while the Democrat government's disdain of reason, thought and intellectual curiosity reached alarming levels. Mandarins were replaced by Philistines.

The reaction against this evolution materialized progressively in the form of an opposition against Democrat Party's government. A part of the press, tripling its daily circulation between 1946 and 1960, vigorously opposed the government and disseminated information regarding the unbalanced economic development and its socially unjust consequences. The center of gravity of the Turkish politics shifted profoundly towards social and economic problems after the 1954 elections and affected the results of the 1957 elections. During these elections, the opposition Republican People's Party increased its seats in the Parliament (from 30 in 1954 to 173 seats), defying the demand of the Democrats that the electorate eliminate totally the opposition from the Parliament.

Therefore, Republican People's Party became the catalyst for all unsatisfied groups, led by the intelligentsia. The power of the opposition increased while economic crises of all sorts increased the discontent among the population. The new foreign loan of 300 million Dollars in 1958 brought some relief, but did not remove completely the opposition against the Democrats. The old members of the Democrat Party, who had founded the first provincial organizations, also left the Party largely as a reaction to the dictatorial policies of the leadership and of the politicized professionals, who had assumed control of Party's central organs.

Many of the political and social problems, which rose in 1957–1960, had their origins in the events between 1920 and 1945 and the following years, but cannot be studied here. Suffice to note that the causes of the opposition were social and economic, and affected adversely the living standards and position of the intelligentsia and the old leading cadres. The opposition increased its size and intensity and questioned openly the intention of the government since the latter tried to use investigation committees to liquidate the opposition. The mistreatment of a former President, a general and war hero shocked and antagonized the army. The idea that revolution was a fundamental right of the society to defend itself against the oppression became a familiar theme in the periodicals and newspapers of the opposition, while the Democrats seemed incapable to overcome this wave of criticism. The desire to protect democracy was general, yet for some groups, democracy was a pretext to gain

power, whereas for others, this was a fundamental conviction. In the end, it became clear that the multi-party regime, despite its imperfections, was the best political solution for Turkey, not solely for philosophical reasons, but also as a practical way to reconcile all interests and groups and permitting them to co-exist in peace.

### *Military Intervention and its Repercussions*

The military coup of May 27 1960, that overthrew the Democrat Party government, was the normal and predictable result of the events described above. Contrary to many exaggerated accounts, Menderes' popularity was in decline on the eve of May 27. His efforts to suppress the opposition, followed by a brutal repression of university students' demonstrations and severe martial laws turned a large part of the public against him and led to an alliance between the army and the intelligentsia. Fear of an authoritarian regime aiming to disguise social injustice and corruption scared ordinary people. The Republicans were not popular, but now they appeared as the champions of liberty and people supported them as they had supported other opposition groups reacting against the authoritarian measures of the government in the past. It is almost a rule in the Middle East: each opposition fighting against a strong government soon finds popular support.

The army's coup occurred in this favorable atmosphere, although the idea for such an intervention had been put forth five years earlier in 1954–1955, when the first secret military organizations were formed. In fact, there is a close relationship between the growth of economic activities, the rise of wealthy groups and the rise of revolutionary action in the army.

The military overthrew the government in three hours, without any resistance, since the Menderes regime had lost much of its popular support. Changing conditions in society permitted the government to acquire power with large margin of votes and lose it completely when it failed to live up to the public's expectations. If the Democrats abided by the will of the electorate and accepted the parliamentary control of their actions, the risk for such a coup would be considerably lower. They realized rather late that a revolution was in the making and failed to create a militia for their own security as some had advocated.

The military justified the overthrowing of the government by force as a necessary step to save the democracy; they promised elections, which would bring to power a civilian government, elected democratically.

But a series of events after the revolution expressed the real nature of the action. University professors issued a declaration legitimizing the revolution and denounced the anti-intellectualism and social injustice of the Democrats. An identical conception was expressed by army officers and other intellectuals, whose life standards, prestige and status had deteriorated under the Democrats. Later General Cemal Gürsel, the leader of the military, declared that a socialist party—a taboo for many decades—could solve certain problems of Turkey. The press unanimously denounced landowners, religious conservatives and opportunistic businessmen, who became rich at the expense of the society. Workers on their part asked for the right to strike and more freedom of self-organization. In Eastern Anatolia, more than 200 landowners associated with Democrat Party were put in a camp in Sivas (most of them were released later; only 52 Kurdish landowners were kept much longer). Intellectuals published manifestos, stating that the illiterate, i.e. peasants, should not be allowed to vote. An agrarian reform and an educational campaign aiming to eliminate illiteracy were also proposed.

During these days, most of the measures taken by Democrat Party, which supposedly undermined Atatürk reforms were cancelled; secularism and nationalism gained their previous importance. Many economic projects implemented by Democrats were abandoned. Even in foreign policy, most of the economic difficulties were attributed to the implication of military pacts with the West and to the economic support given to Menderes by Western powers.

Shortly after assuming power, the military government engaged in a series of reforms, far exceeding its initial aim, namely to re-establish democracy and leave the power to a civilian government. The provisional government tended to be permanent, because a group within the junta, apparently the real organizers of the coup, began to denounce political parties and proposed extensive governmental action, led by a strong regime, designated to eliminate underdevelopment. Political discourse acquired a virulent nationalist color, reminiscent of racism and xenophobia, which replaced the talks about social justice.

The military encountered practically no resistance in the first four

months, due solely to the provisional character of the revolutionary regime. People agreed that a new Constitution and a certain number of measures were necessary in order to establish a stable democratic system, with a regime sensible to the general welfare and impartial to all social groups, instead of a party government. To materialize all these intentions, the military was in need of time and the people accepted reluctantly the prolongation of the military rule for one more year. But when the military regime tended to be permanent, the public reacted. Dismissal of 147 university members for so-called "professional" reasons provoked a wave of criticism among the intelligentsia and they began to oppose the military government. The military government had already retired 7000 officers without any public reaction. However, the case with the university was different. This institution was enjoying a certain administrative autonomy; it had opposed and criticized the dictatorial policies of the Democrats. Thus, it appeared as the defender of democracy and liberty, and people were against all actions, which could jeopardize this function. The military tolerated this criticism with similar others, and with the exception of a few warnings appearing in the press and advising some parties not to surpass some limits, they did not use repressive methods. Military government showed a remarkable respect for liberties, permitting more freedom of expression. Even under these circumstances, it became clear that the public did not want a permanent military government in power that could threaten democratic and moral principles of freedom. People seemed to prefer a multi-party regime with all its inconveniences, to any idealistic, moralist system formulated according to abstract concepts. When radical officers began to argue in favor of the extension of the strong regime, the middle class and the peasantry began to react slowly by insisting on the restoration of democracy under a civilian regime.

Business circles criticized the blocking of banking operations, opposed the efforts to investigate financial operations of commercial firms and demanded the government to put an end to the insecurity on private property, which affected negatively the economic life. Numerous meetings with the government gave these groups the chance to ask for certain measures in order to assure security for their operations and reduce the inflation and regulate the credits, imports, bureaucratic formalities, etc. Economic activities showed also a deep slackening, especially in the business sectors, due to the political insecurity. Finally, in July 1960, the government issued a

declaration, praising the activities and defining the profits of businesses as essential to economic activity. It announced that no firm would be checked and investigation committees in the provinces would be dissolved. Behind this declaration, there was the slowdown in investments, increasing unemployment, drop in production, etc., due to the restrictive decisions taken by the government, and particularly the reaction of business circles against these measures.

In the provinces, peasants reacted by keeping themselves in a sulkily silence; occasionally, they reacted against young people, who came to explain them the meaning of the revolution. A certain number of secret societies, organized obviously by religious reactionaries against the government, were discovered and some people were arrested in the cities and the villages. Private reports indicate that the peasantry was fully aware of the developments at the governmental level and was ready to follow any leader opposing dictatorial regimes. The negative state of mind of the peasantry and the workers in general does not necessarily mean that they were pro-Democrats or opponents of the military regime. They were active groups opposing any kind of totalitarian regime, which could restrict their economic activities and perhaps use them for their own intentions, as was the case in the past. The same hate against a dictatorial government manifested itself among the intellectuals, although the reasons of their attitude were completely different from those of the middle classes or peasants. The intellectuals generally supported the action against the Democrats, but refused to identify themselves with the new regime, lest it could help make it permanent. Therefore, as one of the leading figures of the junta declared, the military government did not have a basis in any social group. It remained in power under the tacit approval of the people, until the transition process to a democratic civilian regime could be completed without any trouble.

Economic opinions expressed by diverse interest groups forced the government to modify its initial projects and adopt a more liberal policy. Authority and the government had to give in to the hard realities of life, instead of rejecting them as vulgar subjects that conflicted with the great moral precepts incarnated in the authority of the state. True, the remarkable democratic attitude of some officers was instrumental in this realistic decision, but the real pressure coming from social groups should not be minimized. In the previous thirty years, such a pressure could not have prevented the government from enforcing such authoritarian measures. But, now social

groups were stronger and their activities could not be ignored without causing profound troubles. The decision in favor of returning to a democratic regime was taken not solely on the basis of conviction, but also as the consequence of the balance of power involved in the struggle for democracy. Thus, the return to a civilian government and some kind of democratic order seems to be a compromise, in fact the only path, which could satisfy all groups, at least to a certain degree.

However, one should underline the fact that one of the most important forces, preventing the establishment of a totalitarian regime was the Republican People's Party, which had its powerful organization intact in the countryside. A word from İnönü was sufficient to activate it. He had defied audaciously the extremists of the junta in September 1960, reminding them that their aim was to found a democratic apparatus and then leave the power to the civilians. İnönü's declaration, forcing the junta to define its position and the situation of various social groups before the military, had an important effect. He had already asked for the creation of a Constituent Assembly, composed of civilians sharing the power with the military and guaranteeing the democratic promises of the army. The brewing conflict between the extremists and the moderates within the junta was resolved by the elimination of the extremist fourteen members of the junta and their assignments to missions abroad.

The eviction of the *Fourteen* was a victory for the moderates in the army. It also marked the beginning of a progressive evolution towards a return to normal civilian government. A Constituent Assembly was formed in 1961 and prepared a Constitution, which was approved publicly by a referendum on July 9, 1961. The Constitution established a Parliament with two Chambers (Assembly and Senate), a Constitutional Court, immunity was given to magistracy and recognized political parties as essential components of the democratic regime, and finally gave recognition to a secular pluralist social and economic order. The elections of October 15, 1961 gave rise to a series of weak coalition governments, which, despite their serious handicaps, managed to resist two unsuccessful military coups and various pressures.

Post-revolutionary period of 1960–1965 represents a new phase, more advanced in terms of social and ideological development, which was in harmony with the basic principles inseparable from the Turkish



republican regime. For all social groups, the freedom to express their views and defend their interests was recognized. The real victor was the new bourgeoisie, which supported by peasantry, paradoxical as it may sound, re-established its power over political parties and the Parliament, despite the organized resistance and the pressures coming from the intelligentsia and the army.

A series of publications and professional organizations defended the sacred character of constitutionalism and parliamentary institutions, the virtues of economic liberalism and opposed *étatisme*. The spokesmen for this view came mainly from the Justice Party and New Turkey Party (these two parties were supported by ex-members of the Democrat Party), which advocated even physical resistance by the people, against forceful takeover of power. On the other hand, the intelligentsia, well aware of its numerical weakness turned gradually to socialism as the sole solution to challenge the strength of property groups and reach social justice, as well as rapid economic growth. Various publications and organizations, for example Turkish Workers' Party, defended "socialist" doctrines. These doctrines were limited to the intelligentsia and had a minimal impact among workers, peasants and lower strata. In the municipal elections of 1963, the Workers' Party gained with difficulty a total of 37,000 votes, coming especially from the wealthy districts of the urban regions. These so-called socialist doctrines may have a certain influence, but could not expect an immediate success. They did not have organic connections with the real problems of Turkey and the country's historical evolution. These doctrines were, in essence, arguments used to serve the political claims of a traditional elite, who had lost its political and social supremacy. The intelligentsia (comprising the administration) lost largely its power, because they were not able to define a new rôle for themselves, by adapting to the new structure and pragmatic philosophy, dominant in society. In fact, by losing its superior power position, the future of the intelligentsia depended on its capacity to develop new concepts and new rôles for itself: the co-existence and power sharing with the new bourgeoisie appeared to be the most plausible solution.

The 1960 revolution temporarily brought the intelligentsia to power, serving only to demonstrate its intellectual and professional incapacity to handle the complexities of modern Turkey. The historical evolution of structural changes, stimulated originally by the government

and frequently canalized by it, reached a point where all social groups had to re-evaluate and accept their positions and their mutual functions, then create the corresponding political structures.

The bourgeoisie shows a voracious appetite for wealth, which it embodied in the slogans of liberalism and constitutionalism, whereas numerous intellectuals used the platitudes of the nineteenth century socialism and materialism to build a "new" society in the twentieth century. Political and social changes in today's Turkey developed rapidly in a relative atmosphere of liberty and free speech. Ideas are judged not for their rhetorical power, but their practical value with regard to life and society. The power of each social group and its capacity to use this power determine the physiognomy of Turkish politics. The government and authority are no longer considered serving uniquely the ideals of morality and virtue as in the traditional period, but rather as power instruments used by human beings for their own intentions. The age of power politics began in Turkey, in the form of new economic, social and political relations. Nowadays, ideologies such as liberalism for bourgeoisie and socialism for the intelligentsia, lacking most of the time their meanings in the West, are used to justify the power claims of each group.

Considered in the light of the cultural background of Turkey and the Muslim world in general, this development should appear as a real revolution deeply affecting the philosophy and all aspects of social life at every possible level. The seeds of a real change are embedded in the new power relations and socio-economic foundations supporting them. A new phase of Turkish modernization will originate from these new relations. They began with the 1960 revolution and this trend will continue probably with more serious revolutions.

These views were expressed some thirty-five years ago and with minor changes have proved to be correct. K.H.K.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE TURKISH POLITICAL  
SYSTEM AND THE CHANGING MEANING OF  
MODERNITY, SECULARISM AND ISLAM (1876–1945)

*Introduction: Concepts and Methodology*

The modern Turkish political system is the product of the interaction between a continuously changing socio-economic structure and static constitutional models borrowed from outside. The periodic rehauling of the constitution—especially in the period 1960–82—has been caused not only by the rapid transformation of the social structure but also by a basic disharmony between this structure and the political system. Certain features of the system, such as republicanism and national statehood, have exhibited strength, consistency and continuity; but the status of various proclaimed freedoms and rights and, especially, of the regulatory institutions has oscillated constantly as these have been misused and abused by governments, by groups and by individuals. There is no question that the instability of the Turkish political system must be attributed first to the breakdown and the discontinuity of the old traditions of conflict management and adaption to socio-political change. However, in order to understand the continuous crisis of the Turkish political system it is necessary to analyse its evolution in a broad conceptual framework by taking into account the interaction between social groups, the government elites, and certain international events that were a part of the process of structural differentiation. In historical retrospect, as this study will show, the Turkish constitutions appear not as the expressions of society's basic culture, philosophy, and aspirations but as tools designed to reshape society and legitimize control of government power. Both constitutions and ideologies must be viewed as the instruments through which particular social groups have tried to establish a new regime and to implement a predetermined policy.

*The Search for Reconciliation of European Modernity and Ottoman Political Tradition: The Constitution of 1876*

The Constitution of 1876 has been regarded as the formal beginning of the Turkish modern political system.<sup>1</sup> Modelled in part after the Belgian Constitution, it was proclaimed in December 1876 with the clear intention of undermining the Constantinople Conference of the European powers—a gathering ostensibly convened to devise “reforms” but actually aimed at strengthening further the European hold on the Ottoman economy and government. Yet, the timing of the issuance of the Constitution had little to do with its essence. It had been prepared by Mithat Paşa and a handful of his supporters in response to basic changes in the Ottoman society. First, it offered protection to the new Ottoman bureaucracy by limiting the powers of the Sultan’s autocracy and, at the same time, was an expression of the desire of the new middle classes to transform the government into a functional bureaucracy. Second, the Constitution tried to regulate the fundamental structural changes which had occurred since 1800. The gradual liberalization of trade, and the spread of private land ownership among small and medium sized farmers (also among large estate holders in selected regions), coupled with the influx of more than three million immigrants and the settlement of approximately two million nomadic tribesmen in the second half of the 19th century, had produced drastic changes in the traditional Ottoman structure.

By 1860 the Ottoman Empire already was well on its way to adopting a capitalist system, although both its new economy and the groups promoting it were subordinate to and dependent upon the European economic-social system. The Constitution of 1876 reflected this dependency but, nevertheless, sought to remain faithful to Ottoman traditions and to preserve the old political culture and institutions while introducing new regulations and institutions based on the European model. The traditional Ottoman system did not have a written constitution, but it was governed by a series of basic laws (*kanun-name*) that in effect provided a rather broad and flexible “constitutional” system organized around the Sultan, who wielded the ultimate

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<sup>1</sup> The only major study of the Constitution of 1876 in Western languages is by Robert Devereux, *The First Ottoman Constitutional Period* (Baltimore, 1963).

power. The Constitution of 1876, while preserving the Sultan's central position in the system, nevertheless emphasized participation and consensus in decision making. The traditional concepts of *meşveret* (consultation) and *şura* (council) were consolidated in the House of Deputies, which consisted not only of religious leaders and the confidants of the Sultan but also of representatives of the people to be chosen by indirect elections. Thus the two elections held in 1876 and 1878 created a parliamentary body composed of communal leaders, provincial notables, landowners, merchants and 'Ulamā'. However, these deputies voiced such strong criticism of the ineptitude, corruption, and arrogance of the bureaucracy that Sultan, outraged by their irreverence, prorogued the Parliament and suspended the Constitution.<sup>2</sup> Its author, Mithat Paşa, was first banished, ultimately imprisoned and then murdered (1884).

The initial constitutional experiment failed principally because the ruling political elite, headed at that time by the Sultan, were unwilling to share power with the representatives of the society at large. This pattern was repeated over and over again for the next century, although different actors and rationales were involved: whatever the group, monarchical or republican, in power, it considered its own government almost infallible and regarded opposition and criticism as ill intentioned if not actually treasonable. In 1876 Mithat Paşa and his followers did not have a political party behind them and had not formulated an ideology capable of mobilizing popular support; and while there were within the Ottoman government various groups competing for power, none of them had a broad social base or ideology in harmony with the infrastructure of the society. So Sultan 'Abd al-Ḥamīd II (1876–1909) went on ruling without a constitution; however, he reformed the bureaucracy, expanded education, updated the agricultural system, modernized transportation, and generally spurred the economy as a whole. Agricultural production tripled during his reign, and some beginning was made in industrialization.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> The detailed records of these debates were destroyed in a fire during the Young Turks government. The records of some of the debates were saved and have been published. See Hakkı Tarık Us, *Meclisi Mebusan 1293: 1877 Zabit Ceridesi* [Records of the House of Deputies, 1877], 2 vols. (İstanbul, 1940, 1954). For an analysis of these debates see Kemal H. Karpat, "The Ottoman Parliament of 1877 and Its Social Significance" *Proceedings of the International Association of South-East European Studies* (Sofia, 1963), pp. 247–55.

<sup>3</sup> See Charles Issawi, *The Economic History of the Middle East 1800–1914* (Chicago,

Thus ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd established the educational basis and strengthened greatly the socio-economic infrastructure necessary for the establishment of a modern political system. In fact, without these improvements the political developments of the Young Turks era and the Republic would have been rather unthinkable.

The Young Turks era (1908–1918) is of fundamental importance because the political organizations and the ideology which animated both the elites and the masses in the War of Liberation and the Republic had their genesis in this period. The Young Turks “revolution” of 1908—which became a revolution only well after the “revolutionaries” had assumed power—consisted of a few acts of terrorism and insubordination engineered by army officers and some educated youngsters with the aim of forcing the Sultan to reinstate the Constitution of 1876.<sup>4</sup> The “revolutionaries” belonged to a secret organization which had been established independently in Salonica in 1906, but eventually became linked with and adopted the name of the *İttihad ve Terakki* (Union and Progress) Society established in France. On 23 July 1908, the Sultan agreed to reestablish the Constitution of 1876, and the Committee of the Union and Progress (CUP) sent several of its members to İstanbul to supervise the reinstatement of the second constitutional period, known as *İkinci Meşrutiyet*.

The Young Turks leaders came from outside the imperial establishment; they were young members of the new middle classes and had studied in the modern professional schools. It is true that they shared some of the dominant family and social values of the Muslim majority, but were also to some extent free of the reverential feelings held by their elders for the Caliph, the Sultan, and the imperial bureaucracy. The Union and Progress Committee had its power base in the House of Deputies, which it came to control, winning elections held in 1908, 1911, 1912, and thereafter.<sup>5</sup> Although it was part of the cabinet most of the time, the CUP did not assume full control of the Executive until 1913. This anomalous situation was due partly to the fact that the Sultan was an inherent part of the

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1966, p. 65, and Roger Owen, *The Middle East in the World Economy* (London, 1981), pp. 189 ff.

<sup>4</sup> For the background of the secret organization, see Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda İnkılap Hareketleri ve Millî Mücadele* [Reform Movements in the Ottoman Empire and the National Struggle] (İstanbul, 1959).

<sup>5</sup> Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859–1952* [Political Parties in Turkey] (İstanbul, 1952), p. 188.

Executive, and thus difficult to replace at once, but mostly to the fact that the CUP was not yet a full-fledged political party with fully formed political ideology applicable to the multi-ethnic, multi-religious Ottoman State. However, the CUP transformed itself gradually from a small and secret group into a regular political party and devised an ideology while retaining in its hand the government power for most of the period (1908–18).

It is essential to analyze in some detail the main features of this process of political transformation in order to place the Republican political system in its proper historical perspective. I shall discuss very briefly the constitutional process, the evolution of the Union and Progress into a political party, and the ideological movements of 1908–1918. The Constitution of 1876 remained in force throughout the CUP period, but its 119 articles were amended several times. The Parliament (the Senate was deprived of its prerogative in favour of the House of Deputies) assumed sweeping control, replacing both the Palace (Sultan) and the Porte (Grand Vizir) as the chief source of power.<sup>6</sup> The Executive (Cabinet) too, though still powerful, became subject to the control of the legislature. After the ousting of ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd II (under the pretext that he organized the counter revolution in 1909)<sup>7</sup> the power and the prestige of the monarchy fell to such a low point as few people knew or cared to know who the Sultan was. In a matter of a few years the six-centuries old House of Osman had lost most of its power and glamour, although it still retained its importance as the repository of the Caliphate. Meanwhile, the CUP broadened its social bases by establishing first a series of political clubs throughout the country. In 1913 these clubs became party branches after the governing committee abandoned its secrecy and openly declared itself to be a regular political party. The elevation

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<sup>6</sup> Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks, The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics* (Oxford, 1969), pp. 57–64. Also E.E. Ramsaur, *The Young Turks, Prelude to the Revolution of 1908* (Princeton, 1957).

<sup>7</sup> It is certain now that the so-called reactionary counter-revolution of 1909 was not organized by ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd II. The action was a predominantly social movement that has been exploited in the Republic as a religious reaction because of the role played by the *İttihādī Muhammed Fırkası* [Party of Muslim Unity] and its leader, Dervish Vahdeti, in organizing the initial demonstrations. The real power behind the action was the soldiers stationed in the capital. The literature on this topic is abundant, although one-sided and partisan. See İsmail H. Danişmend, *31 Mart Vakası* [The March 31st Event] (İstanbul, 1961).

of the secret association to the status of political party was accomplished through successive yearly conventions (congresses) during which a programme and an ideology gradually were devised. A total of nine congresses were held; the last (in 1918) decided to dissolve the party.

The Union and Progress party faced the stiff opposition of a dozen other parties ranging from socialist to religious. Among these the *Ahrar* (Peoples') and *Hürriyet ve İtilaf* (Freedom and Alliance) parties, the latter a coalition of the main opposition parties, deserve special mention.<sup>8</sup> The opposition parties were concentrated mainly in the capital and a few major cities and hence had limited popular support. Their chief argument in favour of their own accession to power was the dictatorial stance of the ruling group. The turbulent and often violent relations between the ruling party and the opposition reflected, in fact, the ethnic, religious, and social conflicts besetting the Empire. The national and social groups demanding recognition and representation in the parliamentary democracy, instituted after 1908 and forming the backbone of the opposition, had in the past been accommodated in the traditional religious *millet* system. The *millets* had been destroyed before a new type of secular-political system was developed. Yet, beneath the turbulent political surface of the nation a certain consensus about the future seemed to emerge among the various elites who sought to identify with one or more ethnic-religious groups. Although the ruling party outwardly accepted Ottomanism, that is, the idea of equal citizenship accorded to all Ottomans regardless of race, religion, or ethnic origin, as its official ideology, in reality it was reshaping another and more authentic creed. This creed was nationalism, and it consisted of an amalgam of political anti-imperialism, economic statism, and Turkism.

The element of Turkism became part of the new nationalism through three channels. Literary-linguistic Turkism defended the use of a simplified language close to the vernacular.<sup>9</sup> It became the avenue for the expression of populism which eventually became (for a short time) a major component of nationalism. The statist, or instrumental, nationalism as expounded by Yusuf Akçura, who was

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<sup>8</sup> Tunaya, p. 189.

<sup>9</sup> Ercüment Kuran, "The Impact of Nationalism on the Turkish Elite in the Nineteenth Century," in W.R. Polk and R.L. Chambers (eds.), *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East* (Chicago, 1968), pp. 109–119.



aware that Ottomanism and Islamism were failing as political ideologies, sought the eventual dominance of Turkism and the transformation of the Ottoman State into a Turkish homeland.<sup>10</sup> The third school, represented by Ziya Gökalp, stood for an evolutionist and assimilationist Turkism whereby history, religion, and the Ottoman past, instead of being rejected, would be internalized and adapted to modern conditions so as to form the foundation of the national culture of the modern Turks.<sup>11</sup> Actually, all these three forms of Turkish nationalism had their roots in the Islamic fundamentalist-anti-imperialist movements which began to emerge after the middle of the 19th century. Sultan ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd II had used these incipient populist—fundamentalist—anti—imperialist feelings to build an internal social cohesion among his Muslim subjects whereby Islamic, Ottoman and Turkish identity became synonymous, but only among Muslims. However, the psychological fabric of Turkish nationalism was the Muslim-Ottoman identity, which reached to the depths of the history and personality of the Turks. The Young Turks faced the task of adapting this cultural-historical nationalism to the requirements of a territorial national State. The effort to consolidate the three currents of Turkish nationalism into a single ideology, begun by the Young Turks, reached fruition in the Republic, though in a rather arbitrary fashion.

The secular dimension of the emerging Turkish nationalism was evident during the Young Turks period, not in the form of any assault on the spiritual and legal foundations of Islam but as an effort to divest the religious establishment of various administrative and judiciary functions in favour of the State.<sup>12</sup> The nationalism of the Young Turks had also an anti-imperialistic economic dimension: they sought to abolish the capitulations (which granted extra-territorial rights to the European powers after the Ottoman State had entered World War I on the side of Germany) and to establish a national economy. The pan-Turkic (pan-Turanic) views of the Young Turks,

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<sup>10</sup> François Georgeon, *Aux Origines du Nationalisme Turc, Yusuf Akcura, 1876–1935* (Institut d’Etudes Anatoliennes, Paris, 1980).

<sup>11</sup> On Gökalp, among other works, see Niyazi Berkes, *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization, Selected Essays on Ziya Gökalp* (London, 1959). For the genesis of Turkish nationalism, see David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism* (London, 1977).

<sup>12</sup> S.J. Shaw and E. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. ii (Cambridge, 1977).

which are considered to be a by-product of this nationalism were adopted as a useful foreign policy device intended to weaken Russia and had little in common with Turkish nationalism proper. (Pan-Turkism had developed independently among the Muslims of Russia as a defensive ideology intended to oppose Russification and czarist oppression.)

The final point to be discussed in this historical-ideological survey of Turkey's political system concerns the social origin of the political elites. It is significant that the Young Turks revolt started not in the capital, as had most of the previous uprisings, but in the countryside. A closer look at the family and geographical origins of some of the main Young Turks leaders reveals that they or their parents were immigrants or were from among the old Ottoman provincial elites who had been uprooted from their original homes and positions. They represented a marginal group outside the mainstream of the Empire's political life and imperial traditions. (Kamil Paşa, one of the main representatives of the old order, reportedly said that the unionists should return to Salonica where they came from rather than stay in İstanbul.)<sup>13</sup>

As a ruling group the CUP sought to maintain itself in power, first, by gaining the support of the military and by trying to control it. After achieving a certain compromise with the army, which had become preoccupied with the War, the Unionists sought organizational support from the lower and mid level intellectuals, lower ranking bureaucrats, some army officers, and a variety of aspiring economic groups in the countryside, such as small merchants and petty landowners. The party thus established itself as the chief channel for upward mobility among the lower middle class and groups that originated during transformation occurring in the 1856–1908 period.

It is quite evident that its organizational and ideological framework and its social base cut off the Union and Progress Party from the old order, represented by the monarchy and its entourage, by a deep social, psychological and cultural gulf. It was, therefore, relatively easy for the new leadership cadres to dispose of the imperial structure—with which they had little in common—despite the marriage of Enver Paşa into the Sultan's family. They had risen to power by their own “revolutionary” efforts rather than through manipulation

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<sup>13</sup> Ali Fuad Türkgeledi, *Görüp İşittiklerim* [What I Saw and Heard] (Ankara, 1949).

of the ruling power structure as had in the past been the route to the top. This was, in fact, the first instance in Ottoman history when a social group outside the imperial establishment had gained control via an ideology and arguments opposed to the very essence of monarchy. (The Young Turks preserved the monarchy out of practical considerations, but not conviction.)

However, the new order bore within it the seeds of its own subsequent weakness and downfall. Having acquired power not through alliance with the masses (popular meetings such as the one in Firzovik in July 1908 are special cases) but through the manipulation of power within the army and the government bureaucracy, their revolution did not represent the victory of the economic bourgeoisie but of the lower ranks of the bureaucratic and intellectual order created by the government through the so-called modern school system.<sup>14</sup> The changes which had created the new order altered also the entire route to individual position, power, and prestige. Whereas in the earlier times, including 'Abd al-Ḥamīd's reign, one could achieve personal distinction and social position through achievement in the religious or artistic fields, now one could climb the social ladder only through association with the party and government. The political system had monopolized all avenues leading to higher status. The modern educational system became in turn the most important channel of upward mobility through qualification for government position, despite the fact that the broadening of economic opportunities had increased the possibilities for accumulating wealth. In sum, a society divided into a handful of educated (*münever*) and a mass of uneducated (*avam*) people, became the basis of the new elitist order created by the Young Turks revolution.

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<sup>14</sup> One of the main spokesmen and apologists for the Union and Progress was the well known journalist and writer, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın (1875–1957), the editor of the party's newspaper *Tanin*. Yalçın continued to defend the Unionists during the Republic. He was Vice-President and the President of the Chamber of Deputies in 1914–18. See his memoirs "Meşrutiyet Hatıraları" [Memoirs from the Constitutional Period], *Fikir Hareketleri*, [Intellectual Movements], Number 71 ff., February 1935. See also a more balanced view—Y.H. Bayur, "İkinci Meşrutiyet Devri Üzerinde Bazı Düşünceler" [Some Thoughts on the Second Constitutional Period], *Belleten*, XXIII/90 (1959), pp. 267–85. A rather general and impressionistic but comprehensive account is given in Hasan Amca, *Doğmayan Hürriyet* [The Unborn Freedom] (İstanbul, 1948), and Mustafa Ragıp, *İttihat ve Terakki Tarihinde Esrar Perdesi* [The Curtain of Mystery in the History of Union and Progress] (İstanbul, 1934).

The Union and Progress Party left the government and dissolved itself in the fall of 1918 when it became apparent that the Empire had lost the war. In the period 1918–1922 there was a proliferation of political parties (some thirty parties arose) as the *Hürriyet ve İtilaf* (Freedom and Alliance) Party formed various ineffective governments under Damad Ferid Paşa and collaborated with the allied powers in the partition of Turkey. This downgraded further the prestige of the opposition parties, and indirectly rehabilitated the ideas of progress, nationalism, and independence propounded by the Union and Progress.<sup>15</sup> Thus, the CUP left behind it not only a legacy of ideas but also a political organization that relied on a large number of well trained cadres that controlled a substantial part of the human, economic, intellectual, and cultural resources of the country. The movement of National Liberation and the Republic led by Mustafa Kemal was based on the socio-political foundation prepared in the Young Turks era.

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<sup>15</sup> The conventions of these local branches of the Defense of Rights Associations are exceptionally important in understanding the spirit of the Turkish War of Liberation and the ideology of the social groups involved in it. There are a number of books and brochures published in provinces which describe the genesis of the local organization but to the best of my knowledge there is not yet a single work of synthesis analyzing the social structure and ideological content of these organizations. See Sabahattin Selek, *Anadolu İhtilali* [The Anatolian Revolution] (İstanbul, 1973). See also Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Milli Kurtuluş Tarihi* [The History of National Liberation] (İstanbul, 1974). On specific history of the various local organizations, see Cevat Dursunoğlu, *Milli Mücadelede Erzurum* [Erzurum During the National Struggle] (Ankara, 1946); A.A. Tütenk, *Milli Mücadelede Denizli* [Denizli During the National Struggle] (İzmir, 1944); Kenan Özer, *Kurtuluş Savaşında Gönen* [Gönen in the War of Liberation] (Balıkesir, 1964); Sami Önal, *Milli Mücadelede Oltu* [Oltu in National Struggle] (Ankara, 1968); Kasım Ener, *Çukurovanın İşgali ve Kurtuluş Savaşı* [The Occupation of Cukurova and the War of Liberation] (İstanbul, 1963); Hacım Muhittin Çarıkılı, *Balıkesir ve Alaşehir Kongreleri* (Memoirs) [The Congresses of Balıkesir and Alaşehir] (published by the Turkish Historical Society, Ankara, 1967). This is an important source containing a series of documents describing how the resistance movement began in these two localities. During the past ten years there has been also a considerable effort to find in the national liberation a variety of radical trends. See e.g. Dogu Ergil, *Social History of the Turkish National Struggle, 1919–22* (Lahore, Pakistan, n.d.). Actually the effort to put non-existent ingredients in the events of 1919–22 reflects the radical ideological mood which betook Turkey in 1970–80. See also Kurt Steinhaus, *Soziologie der Turkishen Revolution* (Frankfurt, 1969).

*The War of Liberation and the Foundation of the Modern Political System*

The Turkish political system, which began to acquire its contemporary shape in 1918–1922 period, appears to have drawn its essence from three different historical periods, each one with its specific characteristics: the first was the Ottoman past with its political culture stretching back to the 15th century; the second was the period encompassing the socio-economic changes which culminated in the Young Turks era—an era that was in fact, a transitional period marking the end of the traditional politics and the broadening of the social bases of the political system; the third period, from which the modern system acquired characteristics, was the Republican era that began with the War of Liberation. It was a period distinctly different from the previous two in origins and goals.

Throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, reforms and changes had been initiated by a handful of people associated directly with the government or the second or third echelon of government personnel such as the bureaucracy and the army. The Republican era began as a grass root movement of popular resistance and defense to foreign occupation that grew into the War of Liberation.

The organizational basis of the War of Liberation is to be found in a variety of groups known under various names, such as the *Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyetleri* (Associations for the Defense of Rights) and the *Redd-i İlhak Cemiyeti* (Rejection of Annexation Society) in the countryside and the *Karakol Cemiyeti* (Sentinel Association) in İstanbul.<sup>16</sup> The catalyst of the war was the Greek landing in İzmir on 15 May 1919. Supported by the Allies, the Greeks soon occupied a substantial part of Anatolia, which they intended to annex. It was mainly in reaction to the Greek invasion that the resistance associations mushroomed in Anatolia and Thrace. The leaders of these associations belonged to the upper and middle classes in Anatolia and Thrace and consisted of landlords, local merchants and craftsmen,

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<sup>16</sup> Ethem was the son of a landlord of Bandırma and like his two other brothers was instrumental in quelling several anti-nationalist revolts instigated by the Sultan against the nationalists. He fell at odds with Mustafa Kemal partly for personal reasons and partly as reaction to the authoritarian tendencies manifest in the group supporting Kemal. The best account of Ethem's views which provides valuable insights into the early phases of the War of Liberation are his memoirs, *Çerkes Ethem'in Hatıraları* [The Memoirs of Ethem the Circassian] (İstanbul, 1962).

'*Ulamā*', school teachers, demobilized reserve officers, and lower ranking government officials. The abundant material on the War of Liberation indicates that many of the resistance leaders had been members of the Union and Progress party. Immigrants from the Balkans and the Caucasus and their descendents provided strong support to the resistance movement (although later an important guerrilla leader, named Çerkes Ethem, joined the Greeks),<sup>17</sup> as did some rich landowners and high ranking officials who represented the Sultan's views. Thus the first major participants in the War of Liberation were these countryside groups, many of whom found themselves from the start at odds with the Sultan. The day to day journal of Hacim Muhittin, the organizer of one of the most important resistance organizations in Balıkesir and Akşehir, indicates not only that the liberation movement had broad popular support but also that the movement had pitted the middle class leaders in the countryside against the Sultan's court.<sup>18</sup>

The group responsible for organizing the Defense of Rights Associations into a national movement and in defining its goals and giving it direction consisted of army officers and some nationalist intellectuals. Mustafa Kemal, the hero of the Dardanelles, left İstanbul almost immediately when the Greek forces, under the protection of British, French, and Italian warships, landed in İzmir. (Only after 1934 did Mustafa Kemal become known by the surname Atatürk, given him by the Assembly.)

He became the spokesman for the group and sought to establish contact with various army officers opposed to occupation and to organize the scattered resistance associations into a single body. On 21 June 1919 the Amasya Protocol was signed by Mustafa Kemal, Ali Fuat Cebesoy (army commander at Ankara), Refet Bele (commander at Samsun), and Rauf Orbay (former navy minister); it was

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<sup>17</sup> See Zuhdül Güven, *Anzavur İsyamı* [Revolt of Anzavur] (İstanbul, 1948); Hacim Muhittin, pp. 32–33, also n. 15.

<sup>18</sup> There is a rich bibliography on this phase of the war. See Tefvik Bıyıkhoğlu, *Trakya'da Milli Mücadele* [The National Struggle in the Thrace], 2 vols. (Ankara, 1955–56); Mahmüt Goloğlu, *Milli Mücadele Tarihi* [History of the National Struggle], 5 vols. (Ankara, 1968–71). This work covers in detail the period between 1919 and 1923 and each volume has a separate subtitle indicating the period covered. Another basic work on the National Liberation war is *Türk İstiklal Harbi* [The Turkish War of Independence], published by the Turkish General Staff, War History Department, 6 vols. (Ankara, 1962–68).

later accepted also by Kazım Karabekir, the commander of the relatively intact third army at Erzurum. The Protocol was the first major document spelling out the purposes of the movement and defining the future steps necessary to mobilize the population for resistance. The congresses of Erzurum (23 July–7 August 1919) and Sivas (4–11 September 1919), held with the participation of most of the Associations for the Defense of Rights, unified all of them in a single body and produced the *Milli Misak*, or the National Pact.<sup>19</sup> The Pact affirmed the territorial integrity and the national independence of an area encompassing more or less present day Turkey. It proclaimed that the resistance movement was aimed at defending not only the national territory but also the Sultan-Caliph, who was portrayed as being the Allied forces' prisoner in İstanbul. The Pact also expressed a truly revolutionary principle: it reminded the central government that, in an age in which nations determined their own destinies, the Sultan and his government should obey the national will and not act as though they were above the nation. Moreover, it stated that if the central government was unable to fulfil the nation's wishes by convening a national assembly, the nation would take in hand its own destiny. The Pact described the Defense of Rights Associations as a Union representing the nation and mirroring its sufferings and desperation and proclaimed that a representative committee (*Heyet-i Temsiliye*) would establish national unity at all levels.<sup>20</sup>

The truly revolutionary character of these provisions of the National Pact become evident when they are studied in the context of Turkish political history. They made a sharp break with the imperial past and instituted a new political system based on ideas drawn from the European political philosophy. The first, and the paramount, idea contained in the Pact was the concept of a national State based on territorial sovereignty; two years later the identity of this national

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<sup>19</sup> The text of the *Milli Misak* (or National Pact) may be found in Biyıkhoğlu. On the Sivas Convention see Ulug İğdemir, *Sivas Kongresi Tutanakları* [Records of the Sivas Convention] (Ankara, 1969). A considerable literature, often repetitive may be found in the immense literature dedicated to the life and achievements of Atatürk. See Lord Kinross, *Atatürk: The Birth of a Nation* (New York, 1965); Ş.S. Aydemir, *Tek Adam* [Unique Man], 3 vols. (İstanbul, 1969); *Atatürk* [published by UNESCO] (Paris, 1963); Johannes Glasnek, *Atatürk und Die Moderne Türkei* (Berlin, 1971). Vamık D. Volkan and Norman Itzkowitz, *The Immortal Atatürk, A Psycho-biography* (Chicago, 1984).

<sup>20</sup> Shaw, vol. ii, p. 348.

State was defined as Turkish. The second basic principle clearly defined the national will, that is, the collective will of the people, as the source of all authority, superseding the Sultan-Caliph's powers in all matters concerning the national survival and progress.

The third major principle concerned the manner in which the national will would be expressed and its mandates carried out. However, the Pact left the method of selection and composition of the representative committee—*Heyet-i Temsiliye*—rather obscure, as the newly emerging regime chose to be somewhat non-committal as to the exact form and extent of popular participation. The question of representation was solved in an odd way by the elections of 1919 ordered by the Sultan's government in İstanbul. The Deputies were elected mostly from territories controlled by the nationalists, so they were in general sympathetic to the national cause. Mustafa Kemal, elected Deputy from Ankara, was proposed as the President of the House of Deputies in İstanbul. The Deputies promptly passed a resolution by accepting the National Pact, defining it as the expression of the Turkish people's decision to achieve independence and to assure national and territorial integrity.<sup>21</sup> The English were dissatisfied with this action of the House of Deputies and induced the İstanbul government to condemn and arrest the leading nationalists and to instigate against them various local rebellions in west and central Anatolia. Mustafa Kemal was declared infidel by the highest Islamic authority and condemned to death by a military tribunal. These actions brought an open break between İstanbul and Ankara and force the nationalists to seek wider support among the population at large. Henceforth the spontaneous resistance movement took on distinctly anti-imperialist, anti-monarchical, national, and populist features. The possibility of cooperation between the Sultan and the nationalists vanished as the latter now had to fight not only the foreign invaders but also a variety of local forces sympathetic to the Sultan. The fact that the anti-nationalist forces received support from the upper echelons of the religious establishment strengthened the position of the anti-clerical elements in the nationalist movement and bolstered their "secularist" tendencies.

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<sup>21</sup> The text of the Constitution of 1921 may be found in Kemal Arıburnu, *Milli Mücadele ve İnkılaplarla İlgili Kanunlar* [Laws Related to the National Struggle and Reforms] (Ankara, 1957), pp. 11–12 (7 February 1921). See also, Şeref Gözübüyük and S. Kili, *Türk Anayasa Metinleri* [Texts of Turkish Constitutions] (Ankara, 1947).



The Parliament in İstanbul was dissolved in March 1920, and some of its members reconvened in Ankara together with a number of newly elected members by the Defense of Rights Associations and established the *Büyük Millet Meclisi* (Grand National Assembly) on 23 April 1920. (The day was eventually declared a holiday—the Day of National Sovereignty—which had the distinction of being the first secular holiday in Turkish history.) The one chamber Grand National Assembly became at once the repository of the national will and the only body concentrating in its hands all legislative and executive powers. Mustafa Kemal was elected president of the Assembly. Thus, by April 1920, that is, in less than one year after the beginning of organized resistance to foreign invasion, the Turkish political system had acquired its distinctive nationalist and populist features. Finally, the Constitutional Act of 1921 (*Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanunu*) gave a full legal expression to these developments.<sup>22</sup>

It is obvious that the Constitutional Act of 1921, unlike preceding and succeeding acts, was not the copy of some foreign model but developed from authentic sources representing the conditions of the time and the true aspiration of the Turkish people. The new Constitution dealt with the essentials of the regime. It declared that sovereignty belonged unconditionally to the nation, that the National Assembly was the sole representative of the national will, and that it held all legislative and executive powers in its hands—including the right to declare war and make peace and enact treaties.<sup>23</sup> The Assembly unified all the national resistance forces into an army. It decreed that elections should be held every two years. The Assembly exercised full powers as the rightful representative of the Turkish people and declared null and void the acts of the government in İstanbul. Areas not covered by the new Constitution were subject to the provisions of the Constitution of 1876 as amended in the period 1908–18.

These institutional developments were accompanied, and determined in part, by ideological developments that gave the emerging

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<sup>22</sup> Article 3 of the Constitutional Act of 1921 in its original form read as follows: “The People’s Government of Turkey is governed by the Grand National Assembly and bears the name of the ‘Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.’” In the version passed by the Assembly the term *halk* [people’s] was replaced by the term “state.” Arburnu, p. 28.

<sup>23</sup> Arburnu, p. 13.

modern Turkish political system considerable depth and scope. Nationalism dominated the thought of the revolutionary leaders. This nationalism was rooted psychologically and socially in Islam. In fact, one can state rather firmly that the predominant feature of the Turkish nationalism during 1919–1923 was its religious character. The term *millet* (nation) and *milli* (national) so frequently used then referred essentially to a national community, bound together by religious ties, living in a defined territory and owing allegiance not to Sultan but to its own elected body, the National Assembly. It was obvious that this “nation,” as it emerged from the War of Liberation, was neither the classical Islamic *millet* nor the conventional European model. Outwardly, it resembled the nations of the West, but its inner core retained its own authentic cultural and historical essence and identity. The religious-cultural dimensions of this nationalism was visible specially when the new regime defined the status of the non-Muslims: both the National Pact and subsequent pronouncements promised the non-Muslims full civil rights and protection not as members of autonomous religious communities, but as minorities different in culture and outlook from the majority. The fact that the Armenians had sought to establish a separate State and the Anatolian Greeks, had cooperated with the Greek army mistreat the Turkish population had already created a deep gulf between the Muslims and non-Muslims.

Populism emerged early in 1920 as the most powerful ideological feature of the liberation movement. After the final rupture with the İstanbul government in the spring of 1920, the nationalist leaders began to rely much more on the masses, and their attitudes and speeches acquired distinct populist-egalitarian overtones. The fact that the nationalists established relations with and accepted material and moral support from the Bolshevik government strengthened the populist and anti-imperialist features of the Turkish revolution, but without turning it into an ideology of class struggle. (However, this populist trend was relatively short-lived, the regime reverting after 1925 to an elitist policy, to be discussed later.)

Another ideological feature of the emerging Turkish political system was the belief in material progress to be achieved through the development of the country’s natural and human resources. This principle had been expressed in the Convention of Erzurum and in the National Pact and acquired added force as demands for economic progress were put forth by people in various meetings.

Thus, by the fall of 1920 nationalism, populism, and material progress appeared to be inseparable from each other. The momentum gained by the War of Liberation may be attributed to this amalgam of ideologies so well expressed in the government's programme of 13 September 1920, aptly named a *halkçı program* (populist programme).<sup>24</sup> Article 2 of the programme declared that the "sole purpose of the government of the Grand National Assembly is to liberate the people from the oppression and tyranny of imperialism and capitalism and to make it the real master of its sovereignty and administration." Article 4 stated that the primary obligation of the Grand National Assembly was to "put an end to the misery in which people lived and to procure the means for achieving happiness and well being by bringing about the necessary innovation and development in the areas of real popular needs . . . [such as] agricultural, educational, judiciary, fiscal, economical and all social fields."<sup>25</sup> The same article emphasized the need for national unity and solidarity and significantly stressed the fact that "the Grand National Assembly attaches utmost importance to taking its political and social principles from the nation's soul [in accordance with the national spirit] and to enforcing these principles in accordance with the nation's tendencies and real needs."<sup>26</sup>

Yet, views of the true meaning of nationalism and populism as well as the economic policy necessary to develop the country, showed striking differences. The National Assembly was already divided into two camps.<sup>27</sup> The first, composed of the military and other bureaucratic elites who had been associated with the government, believed that all change must be imposed from the top and should be directed towards altering the traditional institutions, organizations, and, especially, culture, as these were regarded as the chief hinderance to progress. The second group, which included most of the countryside leaders, believed that society should maintain its traditions, while the

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<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>26</sup> Some information on the composition of these two groups may be found in Tunaya, pp. 333-40.

<sup>27</sup> The radical and moderate leftist movements including the activities of various Turkish communist parties are studied in Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye'de Sol Akımlar 1908-1925* [Leftist Currents in Turkey] (Ankara, 1967), and George S. Harris, *Origins of Communism in Turkey* (Stanford, Calif., 1967).

government use its authority to remove the obstacles to economic activity, thus affording the individual full opportunity to develop his potential and fulfil his aspirations. The first group was culturally progressive, although imitative, but socially and economically conservative—even reactionary. The second group defended innovation and freedom in the economic field but was culturally conservative, for it sought to preserve and perpetuate the society's beliefs and values. The first group, imbued with European ideas and concepts, looked upon their society as merely an amorphous body of people waiting to be “liberated” from Greeks and English and be unshackled from their own traditionalist culture. The second group demanded, first, material progress rather than a cultural transformation that might jeopardize its identity and historical continuity. Yet, both groups co-existed democratically in the National Assembly which directed the destiny of the country. A variety of radical ideological groups inside and outside the Assembly—such as the Communist Party, the Turkish Socialist Party, and the Green Army—, although important movements, had limited impact on the ultimate outcome of the Turkish revolution.<sup>28</sup> The basic issue was decided in the struggle between the first and second groups after the main goal of liberation was attained. The French evacuated southern Anatolia in 1921 and the Greek army, defeated badly in 1922, left the country taking along a large number of local Greeks who had committed atrocities and destroyed thousands of Turkish homes.

For Turks, the War of Liberation was both a deadly struggle for survival and a process of radical political transformation. While fighting the War they were establishing also the foundations of the modern national Turkish State. Thus are nations often born through violence and strife that separate them from the past and bring them into the world as new entities with new identities and new aspirations.

### *The Republic, 1923–45*

The Republic regime has generally been treated as the era of reform in Turkey. In fact, the reforms were carried out over three distinct periods of time, the first of which was the 1919–1923 period dis-

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<sup>28</sup> Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics* (Princeton, 1959), p. 40.

cussed in the preceding section. It will have become evident to the reader that the basic decisions (e.g. the abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of the RPP and the Republic) that determined the course of the modern regime were taken during the Republican years. However, it was during the years 1923–1930 that the major operating reforms of a secularist-nationalist character were put in place. These included the replacement of the Şeriat (*Shari‘at*) law by a civil code on the Swiss model, adoption of a Latin alphabet to replace the Arabic script, the change to the Western calendar, and even dress codes. The third reform period, also during the Republican era, encompassed the years from 1930 to 1945 when a number of relatively minor changes intended mainly to consolidate and bolster previous reform—especially secularization—and, at the same time, to enhance the political power of the new elites, were enacted. Some of these, notably the creation of the Historical Society, the Society for Language Studies, and the People’s Houses, were part of an effort to create a national Turkish culture to replace the Islamic culture which the reformers sought to sweep away. However, as we shall see, it was during the final era of Republican reformism that the foundations for Turkey’s post-World War II problems also were laid.

The War of Liberation had brought forth in an unmistakable fashion the populist-republican and national character of the emerging political system. Already the first National Assembly had used freely the terms *Türkiye* (Turkey) and *Türk milleti* (Turkish nation), and these incipient political tendencies took the form of concrete decisions after the military victory over the Greeks in August–September 1922. On 1 November 1922 the Grand National Assembly in Ankara formally abolished the Sultanate—the six-hundred-year-old institution which had become synonymous with the State—although the abolition had already occurred *de facto* in 1920 when the Assembly first convened. The official abolition of the Sultanate was precipitated by the need to end the confusion about who would represent Turkey at the peace conference scheduled to open in Lausanne on 22 November 1922.<sup>29</sup> The Lausanne Treaty, signed on 24 July 1923 by the representatives of the Ankara government and the Allies, was the international

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<sup>29</sup> Some of these crucial developments were reported faithfully by the *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (National Sovereignty) which was the main newspaper of the new regime.

instrument which recognized the new regime and its tenets and accepted the boundaries of modern Turkey as defined in the National Pact (minus Hatay and Musul).<sup>30</sup>

The easing of international tensions revealed the ideological and philosophical differences which separated Westernist-modernist group headed by Mustafa Kemal from the populist-traditionalist group (which was split into several subgroups including Muslim revolutionaries, leading intellectuals and army officers). The Westernist-modernist group regarded cultural and religious reforms as the chief avenue of modernization and progress. The traditionalists, many of whom were in favour of social and economic reforms, were not upset by the abolition of the Sultanate, for the Sultan had fatally compromised himself by cooperating with the occupation forces. However, few traditionalists were prepared to abolish the Caliphate which they regarded as the symbol of the Turk's cultural identity and their link to the rest of the Muslim world. It was under these circumstances that the Westernist-modernists decided to assume the control of the Assembly by eliminating the traditionalists and to enforce their own reform programme.

The methods used to seize control were classical. The Grand National Assembly dissolved itself in April of 1923. The Westernist-modernists won the subsequent elections and shortly afterwards (September 1923), in fulfilment of a promise of their election platform, they transformed the Defense of Rights Association into a political party bearing the name of *Halk Fırkası* (People's Party). The official establishment of the new party came on 23 October 1923.<sup>31</sup> (Although the newly established party claimed that it had nothing in common with the defunct Union and Progress Party, the truth is that many members of the People's Party had been associated also with the Union and Progress Party.) The Westernist-modernist group

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<sup>30</sup> Mustafa Kemal's speeches on this issue are very clear. In accepting the Presidency he declared that "our nation shall show better the civilized world its qualities and capabilities under the new name." The Turkish Republic will show with deeds that it occupies "high position in the world." In other speeches he declared, "The Grand National Assembly accepted in accordance with the true tendencies of the Turkish nation the authentic form of government which is the Republic." *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri* [The Speeches and Statements of Atatürk], vol. i (published by the Turkish Institute of Reform History, Ankara, 1945), pp. 313-14.

<sup>31</sup> *Atatürk'ün Başlıca Nutukları 1920-1938* [The Main Speeches of Atatürk], ed. by Herbert Melzig (Istanbul, 1942), pp. 84-85. In his speech Atatürk used it in the sense of progress.

used the new party to formulate the reformist policies it favoured and to secure unity and mass support for these policies, which were then implemented by a series of decisive acts of the Assembly. The new Assembly, which convened on 11 August 1923, appointed Fethi (Okyar) in the place of Rauf Orbay as Prime Minister. On 12 October 1923 a law officially announced Ankara as the capital of the country. Then, at the end of an artificially created crisis which supposedly had resulted from the ill arrangement of the relations between the three government branches, Turkey was declared a Republic (29 October 1923) and Mustafa Kemal was elected its first president. The President, the first official of his kind in the Muslim world, made it clear that for the first time in their long history the Turks had decided to establish a State, bearing their own ethnic name, that was to be a unitary national State with a strong central government, not only in order to thwart various autonomist tendencies (several districts including Balıkesir and Adapazarı claimed administrative autonomy) but also to mould the new identity of the Turks in accordance with the requirements of national and Westernist-modernist concepts of reforms.<sup>32</sup> Secularism gradually emerged as a leading principle.

Nationalist and secularist tendencies, now defined as progress, became more evident and more clearly defined after 1923, as indicated by the following statement of Mustafa Kemal:

Those people who governed Turkey for centuries might have given thought to many things except Turkey. The Turkish homeland and Turkish nation have incurred, because of this neglect, losses which can be remedied only in one way, namely by thinking about nothing else but Turkey. We can reach targets of happiness and security only if we act with this mentality . . . the purpose of our nation, our national ideal is to become a truly advanced (*medenî*) social body. Do you know that the existence, the value, the rights to independence and freedom of a nation in a world is proportionate to its acts of progress . . . ? It is an absolute condition to follow the road to progress and become successful. On marching along this road those who are ignorant and look backward rather than forward are condemned to be crushed under the wave of progress.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> The literature on this topic is too abundant to be cited in any detail. See Karpas, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 44, n. 37. See also Gotthard Jäschke, "Der Islam in der neue Türkei," *Die Welt des Islams*, vol. i, 1951. Also A.J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs 1925* (London, 1927).

<sup>33</sup> See *supra* note 31.

The Caliphate became the target of critical questioning and censure of its suitability to the national goals of Turkey in the light of modern conditions. Finally, on 3 March 1924, the Caliphate was abolished and the Caliph expelled from Turkey. During the same session the National Assembly decided to unify the educational system, ending the division into modern and religious schools. It also downgraded the old Ministry of Religious Affairs and *Vakıfs* to a Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet*); and a few weeks later the religious courts were abolished.<sup>34</sup>

The abolition of Caliphate and *Şeriat* courts and the closing of the religious schools were carried out on behalf of a policy to be later named (or, rather, misnamed) *laiklik*, or secularism. This was a principle hardly mentioned during the War of Liberation, much less regarded as one of its goals. It was a latter day decision—imposed from the top by a handful of people—that secularization was a necessary condition for achieving progress and civilization.

The ideals of the Republican regime were embodied in a new constitution that, in fact, came to represent the victory of the Westernist-modernist elite over their traditionalist adversaries. The first Ottoman Constitution of 1876, which had remained in force for almost half a century, had attempted to reconcile the basic elements of Ottoman political culture and tradition with the European principles of constitutional monarchy. It was, thus, to a good extent in harmony with the social and cultural traditions as well as with the modernist political aspirations of the Ottoman community of the time. The Constitutional Act of 1921 was conceived in the war conditions and expressed a generally shared desire for freedom and independence and for a government of the people. It, like the Constitution of 1876, drew some of its strength from its roots in the national culture as well as from the prevailing conditions in the country. In contrast, the Constitution of 1924 (20 April 1924) was designed as an instrument of change, geared to the future as envisioned and interpreted by the elites in power. The eight “basic provisions” defined the Turkish State as a Republic whose religion was Islam and language Turkish. (But on 10 April 1928, the second article was amended, deleting the reference “the religion of the Turkish state is Islam.”)<sup>35</sup> Ankara was the named

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<sup>34</sup> See *supra* note 32.

<sup>35</sup> The English text of the Constitution of 1924, together with the amendment



capital of the State. The constitution stressed the fact that sovereignty belonged unconditionally to the nation and that the National Assembly was the sole representative of the nation and exercised sovereignty on its behalf. The Assembly concentrated in its hands all legislative and executive powers—a doctrine that came to be known as unity of power (*kuvvetler birliği*). The Assembly exercised its executive powers through the President of the Republic, whom it elected, and through a Cabinet appointed by him. The judicial power was exercised on behalf of the Assembly by independent tribunals.

The National Assembly was formed by members elected every four years in conformity with the electoral law, under which the system of indirect elections was maintained as during the Young Turks' regime. The voting age was set originally at 18 but was raised to 21. Women were granted full suffrage (articles 9–11). Eligibility for election as a Deputy began at the age of 30. The Deputies took an oath swearing "before God" to have no other aim but the happiness and safety of the fatherland. (The oath "before God" was replaced on 10 April 1928 with the expression "I swear on my honour.")

A variety of other articles (17–30) dealt with the immunities, rights, and privileges of the Assembly and its Deputies and with the rules for electing officers and conducting debates. A Deputy could lose his seat if he absented himself from sessions for two months without an acceptable reason.

The President of the Republic, though elected by the Assembly and responsible to it, actually concentrated the major executive powers in his hands. He was the head of the State and presided over the Assembly, if necessary, and over the Cabinet, but he was barred from taking part in the deliberations of the Assembly or from voting in it. The President promulgated the laws passed by the Assembly and could veto them in ten days after submission, except for the budgetary laws (article 35). However, the Assembly could override the President's veto with a simple majority. The President appointed representatives abroad and received foreign dignitaries. He acted on behalf of the Assembly as the Supreme Commander of the Army. Moreover, the President had the power to issue decrees which had the force of law. He also had the power of pardon and amnesty. The Prime Minister

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brought to it during the next years, appears in Donald Everett Webster. *The Turkey of Atatürk: Social Process in the Turkish Reformation* (Philadelphia, 1939), pp. 297–306.

was chosen by the President. (In 1937 a series of amendments extended the President's right to the choice of deputy ministers.) However, the President had no right to dissolve the Assembly, this prerogative being left to the legislature itself.

The Judiciary was independent in the conduct of trials and in the rendering of judgments and was protected against outside pressures. The Assembly and the Cabinet were expressly forbidden from changing a court decision.

The fifth section of the Constitution (articles 68–88) dealt with the rights and freedoms of the Turks. It declared that “every Turk is born free and lives free, the only limitation to his freedom being the rights and liberties of others.” Equality before law, inviolability of person and domicile, freedom of thought, travel, work, assembly, association, etc., were all duly enumerated. Torture and corporal punishments (e.g. public flogging) were prohibited. The press was declared cautiously to be “free within the limits of the law” and not subject to censorship before publication. A variety of other provisions on taxation and communication embodied the highest principles of democracy. The Constitution of 1924 annulled the two previous Constitutions of 1876 and 1921. It could be amended by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly.

The Constitution of 1924 tried to reconcile the two conflicting tendencies that had affected all Turkish constitutional endeavours since the era of political modernization started. It generously promised all those freedoms and rights created by the Western political and industrial democracies over a period of two centuries, despite the fact that such freedoms were alien, in their Western guise, to the Turkish society. At the same time, it established a strong semi-presidential system sustained by an omnipotent National Assembly and, in effect, a single party system. Indeed, after the unsuccessful efforts of some of Mustafa Kemal's war-time associates, such as Kazım Karabekir and Rauf Orbay, to establish an opposition party (the Progressive Nationalist Party of 1924–25), the People's Party became the only political force in Turkey. Meanwhile the party changed its name two times, in 1935 becoming the *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (Republican People's Party—RPP).

One major event in the economic field shaped the philosophy and organization both of the RPP and of the regime as a whole; it was a development related also to the class organization and the economic development of Turkey. In 1923 there was an economic congress at

İzmir aimed at devising development policy.<sup>36</sup> (The capitulations, which were considered the main hindrance to economic development, were abolished in that year.) The meeting also sought to reassure the Allies that Turkey, despite her good relations with the Soviet Union, was not planning to nationalize her economy. Mustafa Kemal talked about the virtues of a pluralist system and the cooperation of all the social classes—the principal goal of the country being not class struggle but national development. Shortly before the İzmir meeting Mustafa Kemal had expounded the optimistic doctrine of *sınıfsız cemiyet* (classless society), a doctrine that became the predominant feature of Turkey's political thought and has remained so until the present time. Mustafa Kemal rejected the idea that political parties were established in order to pursue economic aims and denounced all the evils caused by such parties.<sup>37</sup> It appeared that the regime expected economic development to occur naturally through the free initiative and cooperation of various social classes. However, this expectation was not realized; first, because the country's human and financial resources had been destroyed by incessant wars; and, second, because the RPP leaders in the countryside used the political power at their disposal for individual economic advantage. The old story of domestic economic exploitation repeated itself. The Ottoman State elites had used the government power at their disposal to appropriate the surplus from agriculture and to raise their income far above that of the producers, including the merchants and the farmers. The RPP leaders did the same. However, their numbers were far greater than those of the Ottoman bureaucracy; and, moreover, they had the powerful organization of the party and its ideology at their disposal to ensure and legitimize their control of economic resources. Leaving aside a few administrative measures dubbed as "economic reforms," such as the abolition of the tithe (which, in fact, was a more equitable system than cash taxation), the economic situation of the people of Turkey actually worsened after 1925.

The lack of economic development and the increased fiscal burden imposed by the regime upon the peasantry and the merchants in order to finance a few "window dressing" modernizations led to

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<sup>36</sup> The congress has been subject to considerable controversy since the issues debated there lend themselves to a great deal of interpretations and speculations. See Gündüz Ökçün, *İzmir Kongresi* [Congress of İzmir] (Ankara, 1972).

<sup>37</sup> The important speeches may be found in Melzig, pp. 67–70.

the second event, namely, the establishment of an opposition party. The Liberal (or Free) Party was established in 1930 by Fethi Okyar at the urging of Mustafa Kemal,<sup>38</sup> who wanted a loyal opposition not only in order to satisfy his yearning for a democratic regime, which he shared with many of his colleagues, but also to use it as a vehicle for criticizing and checking the abuses of the RPP. However, the party was soon abolished because it attracted a greater than anticipated popular following and provided too good a podium for criticizing the government. The anti-government feeling was so deep and widespread that Mustafa Kemal found it advisable to take a long trip throughout the country to discover the sources of this profound popular resentment that had risen only seven years after the Republic was established.

These events, plus the world economic crisis of 1929–30, which was partly responsible for the economic woes of Turkey, compelled Mustafa Kemal and the RPP to seek new ways to achieve economic development lest popular dissatisfaction reach dangerous levels. Thus, the statist economic policy emerged in the 1930s in the form of a modest industrialization programme, and the relatively free atmosphere that had prevailed until then was replaced by a new, authoritarian outlook. This new ideology found its expression in the review *Kadro* (Şevket S. Aydemir, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu and Burhan Belge were among its publishers). The principle underlying the philosophy espoused by *Kadro* was that in order to achieve full independence it was necessary to achieve economic development, at any cost, through active State intervention. Actually, “development” was envisaged as “industrialization”—which was viewed also as an instrument of social change. *Kadro* took an anti-traditionalist, materialistic, secularist view and aired a rather confused theory of social classes. However, this statist economic theory acquired the force of a constitutional principle and eventually was incorporated in the programme of the RPP and in the Constitution itself.

The Party convention of 1931 spelled out the statist ideology. At a later convention, in May 1935 (the Fourth Congress), a complete ideology, “Kemalism,” was outlined.<sup>39</sup> The Party defined the nation

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<sup>38</sup> For the history of the Serbest Firka [Liberal Party], see Walter F. Weiker, *Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey: The Free Party and Its Aftermath* (Leiden, 1973).

<sup>39</sup> The English translation of the programme of the RPP is in Webster, pp. 307–18.

as a "political unit composed of citizens bound together with the bonds of language, culture and ideal" (Article 2). The Party regarded itself as the educator of the population and defined the regime as a sort of political tutelage designated to educate the masses in the rudiments of modern politics. It also defined Turkey as a "nationalist, populist, statist, secular, and revolutionary-reformist Republic"—a description that was incorporated into the Constitution on 5 February 1937. The "populism" envisaged by this official description, it must be stressed, had little in common with the grass-roots democratic populism that had flourished in the period 1919–22. It amounted merely to lip service paid to an idea superseded by the elitism which had emerged after 1923. At most, populism in its new form meant equality before the law, regardless of the citizen's origin, and the abolition of aristocratic titles, and the like. However, there was not any planned effort to legalize and perpetuate the bureaucratic elitism. On the contrary, Mustafa Kemal personally remained faithful to the principle of "popular sovereignty" despite the fact that it was in practice mainly ignored—and in all his speeches he always described the nation as being the source of all power and himself as a servant of the national will. These sincere utterings were addressed at least in part to the RPP itself, for the truth was that by 1930 the Party had already achieved full control of the National Assembly and the government, and at times could defy even Mustafa Kemal. For instance, the Party was successful in getting him to renounce his neutrality and, eventually, to order the closure of the Liberal Party (1930). The extremist secularist-nationalist wing sought to portray the Party as the supreme defender of the revolution and considered even Atatürk subject to its principles and discipline.<sup>40</sup> Recep Peker, who became Party Secretary, formulated his own doctrine of revolutionary change, namely the violent destruction of all that was old and traditional and its replacement by everything that was new and modern, regardless of its value or usefulness. He attempted to concentrate power in his own hands but was eventually ousted. Meanwhile

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<sup>40</sup> Art. 5, paragraph f. of the Party programme adopted in 1935 proclaimed openly that the Party was not "bound by progressive and evolutionary principles in finding measures in State administration . . . [it remains] faithful to the principles born out of the revolution which our nation has made with great sacrifice and is committed to defend these principles which have since been elaborated." Webster, p. 309.

the Labour Law of 1936 made strikes illegal, and a 1938 law restricted greatly the freedoms of press and association. Thus the populism of the Turkish revolution, which had proved a useful device for mobilizing the masses during the War of Liberation, became a dead letter issue once victory was achieved.

“Secularism” is probably the oddest of the principles inserted in the Constitution. It was defined generally as the separation of religion from politics, although, as everyone now realizes, such principle cannot completely apply in a Muslim society (there is no question that Turkey remained fervently Muslim, except for a handful of intellectuals and bureaucrats). The original move toward secularism had been a reaction to the “Muslim-nationalism” policy of the beset Sultan ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd II. Before the last days of the Empire, over which that monarch presided, the Ottoman government in practice functioned as a secular institution, although its authority was legitimized by Islam.<sup>41</sup> However, ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd II sought to achieve internal solidarity by promoting a nationalistic sort of Islamism. In this effort he used the ‘*Ulamā*’, Sufi orders, and other religious bodies, hence increasing their visibility and influence both in the government and society. The Young Turks reacted to this policy by eliminating the clerics from the government and ridding education and the judiciary of clerical control. However, they did not attempt to tamper with or eliminate Islam as a fundamental part of the society and culture.

The doctrine of secularism changed character under the Republic largely because it came to be considered an absolute condition for modernization. A good part of the bureaucratic elite that gained the upper hand after 1923 looked upon “modernization” and “progress” as consisting mainly of cultural change rather than as economic, social, and political progress. They believed that civilizations were created first and foremost by ideas and, consequently, that one had to search for the right idea in order to attain the desired level of contemporary civilization. These elites considered European-style civilization to be the pinnacle of progress, and they hurried to adopt the symbols of the European civilization. In the end they came to adopt an idea long preached by European missionaries and orien-

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<sup>41</sup> Unfortunately, the only major work in Western languages provides a rather biased interpretation. See Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal, 1964).

talist scholars, namely, that Islam was inherently opposed to material progress in general and to European civilization in particular. Thus, under the Republican regime, secularism became a positivist ideology designed to liberate the 'Turks' minds from the hold of Islam so as to allow them to acquire those rudiments of contemporary civilization considered to be desirable.<sup>42</sup> In other words, the attainment of modern European civilization became a new faith, the realization of which was considered possible only through intellectual conversion. The idea was to use nationalism to give Turks a new political identity while secularism undermined the attachments to the old traditions. Europe, almost without exception, hailed secularism as the greatest achievement of the Turkish revolution, while most of the Muslim world condemned it. As implemented in the period 1930–45, secularism did not promote atheism or prohibit worship or other religious manifestations. Nevertheless, religious education was greatly restricted, dervish orders were disbanded, a general atmosphere of hostility towards Islam in particular and religion in general developed, especially among the educated, and a form of vulgar materialism and hedonism that ignored spiritual values was promoted. Aimed at achieving intellectual liberation, secularism ended by creating spiritual confusion and became one of the main sources of ideological schism and extremist divisions. The rise of secularism and the dismissal of the original populism were intimately related. Secularism was an important ideology of the new elitist order established after the 1930s. It was evident that the acquisition of the "superior" European civilization was possible only for an elite individual having the type of intellectual training and psychological make-up that alienated him from his own traditional culture. The overwhelming part of the population, made up of simple people attached to their traditional culture, could not be associated in decision making. Populism came to be expressed as a government for the people instead of the people and their culture.

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<sup>42</sup> The fact that the Caliph, the chief office of Islam, collaborated with the European Allies against the nationalists dealt a heavy blow to his prestige and indirectly to Islam. One must remember that during the First World War the Young Turks asked the Sultan-Caliph to issue a call to *Jihād* [holy war] despite the fact that he supported Germany and the War itself took place essentially between the European powers. For the relation between the Sultan and the Ankara nationalists, see Dankwart A. Rustow, "Politics and Islam in Turkey, 1920–1955" in *Islam and the West*, ed. Richard N. Frye (The Hague, 1957), pp. 69–107.

“Statism,” or to put it more accurately, State capitalism, was another policy which produced rampant consequences. In essence, statism sanctioned the intervention of the government in the economy as investor, supervisor, and regulator. However, the State industrial enterprises created after 1930, although producing much needed goods, incurred also great losses that were financed from the general budget. Nevertheless, the government expanded the scope of the State enterprises, limiting the freedom of private enterprise. This expansion was accompanied by efforts to expand the bureaucracy’s authority in all fields of activity, including agriculture.

It is understandable, therefore, that the success of the new regime in establishing a modern political structure was not matched by a similar achievement in the economic field. The opposite was true. Burdened by heavy expenditure, the economy became stagnated. In 1937 already, alarmed by the economic situation, Atatürk had replaced his old friend and colleague, the statist-minded İsmet İnönü, with Celal Bayar, known for favouring somewhat free enterprise, signalling thus a possible major change in the government’s economic policy. However, the death of Atatürk on 10 November 1938 put an end to this attempt at internal change. İsmet İnönü became President of the Republic and the doctrinaire bureaucratic wing of the RPP gained once more the upper hand. During the Second World War Turkey remained neutral while continuing to follow more or less the policies set in the 1930s. However, the popular dissatisfaction caused by heavy economic burdens and the inefficient State controls, as well as the increasingly anti-religious secularist policies of the government, was coming near the explosion point. The situation was further aggravated by shortages of consumer items caused by war conditions. By the end of the War in 1945 Turkey was, in fact, a country almost as demoralized and destitute as if it had been through the ravages of war. Yet few questioned the Republican regime or national statehood. Rather, it was asked why material betterment and progress, as well as freedom in the broadest sense of the word, promised during the War of Liberation, remained unfulfilled. Soon the controversy was to rage anew, testing the strength of the political system and its supporting social and intellectual bases. The pressures for change were mounting in an alarming fashion. İnönü himself proved to be democratically minded. By 1943 he had begun to ease some of the political restrictions imposed during the previous decade; and a new era was in the making.



It was thanks to the gradual institution of democratic freedoms that people, that is, the ordinary folks, and their leaders representing the grass-root culture of the masses, became free to express their true feelings and were endowed with the necessary means, that is, free elections, to turn their true feelings and aspirations into government policies. The political struggle which began in Turkey after 1945 as a struggle for democracy was in fact the struggle for cultural and spiritual freedom as people understood them. It was a struggle for historical and cultural continuity which expressed itself in a variety of forms. But this is a new subject which transcends the boundaries of this article.

## THE MILITARY AND POLITICS IN TURKEY, 1960–64: A SOCIO-CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF A REVOLUTION

The role of the military in the political history of the Middle East has been the subject of intensive study. Some scholars have regarded the advent of the military to power in a number of these countries as a return to traditional historical patterns of authoritarian rule after several decades of deceptive experiments in democracy and parliamentarianism. Some have stressed the part of the military in the creation of modern political structures, in the mobilization of society, and in the involvement of the masses in political life through social and cultural reforms, economic development, and mass organizations. Others have defined the military in the Middle East as the “new middle class,” which, as it controlled the chief means of physical force, was the only organized group capable of coping with corrupt and inefficient civilian governments and of setting society on a new course of development.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Related views dealing with general events in Turkey may be found in my article “Recent Political Developments in Turkey and Their Social Background,” *International Affairs*, XXXVIII (1962), 304–23. On the military in the Middle East and Turkey, see J.C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension* (New York, 1969); John C. Campbell, “The Role of the Military in the Middle East: Past Patterns and New Directions,” in *The Military in the Middle East*, ed. Sydney N. Fisher (Columbus, 1963), 106–07; Morroe Berger, “Les régimes militaires du Moyen Orient,” *Orient*, XV (1960), 21–68, and Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton, 1965), Chap. IV. See also P.J. Vatikiotis, *The Egyptian Army in Politics* (Bloomington, 1961); and Majid Khadduri, “The Role of the Military in Middle East Politics,” *American Political Science Review*, XLVIII (1953), 511–24. For related studies see Lucian W. Pye, “Armies in the Process of Political Modernization,” *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, ed. John J. Johnson (Princeton, 1962), 75; William Gutteridge, *Armed Forces in New States*

The role of the Turkish army in the history of modernization, and especially in the Revolution of 1960, has also been given fairly extensive treatment.<sup>2</sup> The present study, while relying somewhat on secondary material, also includes interviews with revolutionary officers and considerations of writings by military men. Above all it aims at presenting an interpretation of the Revolution of 1960 within the historical framework of modernization, cultural change, and the overall position of the military in the social-political structure. Consequently, both the officers involved in the Revolution of 1960 and the Revolution itself will be treated in the light of four ideas that can place the developments under study here in a new historical, conceptual perspective.

The first idea concerns the place of the army in the social and political history of Turkey. The military in the Ottoman Empire and later in the Republic, at least at the beginning, was the basic foundation on which the social and political organization stood. Consequently, a change in the traditional elite position of the military in the social and political arrangement was bound to produce profound repercussions in the entire society.

The second idea underlying this study is a corollary of the first. It concerns the self-image of the officer, or the role and place of the military in society as conceived by the officers themselves. The officers' self-image has been regarded as having a normative function in the planning and justification of political actions. "Image" has been defined as the totality of the attributes, real or imaginary, that an individual perceives in an object and/or in a situation, attributes perceived in himself or in his nation. Images are formed, first, according to the norms and stereotypes borrowed from family and society; second, according to secondary or acquired experience, through books, mass media, education in school, discussion, and so on; and

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(London, 1962); and Morris Janowitz. *The Military in the Political Development of New States* (Chicago, 1964).

<sup>2</sup> Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Army and Founding of the Turkish Republic," *World Politics*, XI (1959), 513-52; Daniel Lerner and Richard D. Robinson, "Swords and Ploughshares," *World Politics*, XIII (1960), 19-44; Frederick W. Frey, "Arms and the Man in Turkish Politics," *Land Reborn*, XI (1960), 3-14; Walter F. Weiker, *The Turkish Revolution, 1960-1961, Aspects of Military Politics* (Washington, 1963); Ergun Özbudun, *The Role of the Military in Recent Turkish Politics* (Cambridge, Mass., 1966); George S. Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics," *Middle East Journal*, XIX (1965), 54-66, 169-76. Turkish sources will be cited later.

third, according to personal knowledge and experience.<sup>3</sup> We may add a fourth, namely, the image derived from identification with a social or professional group and its ethics. This is particularly significant in the case of Turkey. The identification of the Turkish revolutionary officers with the traditions and values of the military establishment as shaped by the history and the social-political mores of the army, as well as their views on social ranking, duty toward the nation and the state, reform and modernity, had profound effects upon their political attitudes and actions.

The third idea through which the Revolution of 1960 is analyzed concerns the changes or the mobility of the Turkish political elites. It is assumed that multi-party life and economic development after 1945–46 greatly intensified social mobility and changed the criteria for selection of the elites. The rise of the new elites, on the basis of economic power and through party channels, from the agrarian, entrepreneurial, and professional groups, changed not only the hierarchical order of the elites, but also the system of political values. In other words, the rise of civilian elite groups and their clash with the statist-bureaucratic elites, including the military, was a crucial landmark in the history of Turkey, not only in precipitating the Revolution of 1960, but also in bringing about a new political structure.

The fourth idea concerns the consequences of the Revolution. Starting from a structural and functional interpretation of the political phenomena, I have regarded the constitutional order and the parliamentary democracy that emerged after the Revolution as a compromise arrived at by the elite groups in order to select the consensual system of decision making best suited to their interests. In other words, the resulting parliamentary system, which provided for new social and economic goals and broader participation, became the channel of political conciliation among social groups, including the army. In this process, the elites became aware of their relative strength and position in society and adjusted their self-image accordingly. Thus, a broader analysis of the Revolution of 1960 would go

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<sup>3</sup> On the question of image, see William A. Scott, "Psychological and Social Correlates of International Images," in *International Behavior*, ed. Herbert C. Kelman (New York, 1965), 72; and Ole R. Osti, "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VI (1962), 244. See also Andrew M. Scott, *The Functioning of the International Political System* (New York, 1967).

a long way in explaining the political transformation of Turkey during the decade just past and possibly for a long time to come.

Historically, the army is the oldest social institution in Turkey, and, in fact, it is the only organization surviving from the traditionalist era. It draws its spirit and traditions from the Turkish heritage in Central Asia, from Islam, and from the experiences of the Ottoman Empire (1299-1918) and the Republic. It occupied the highest place in the traditional social organization consisting of the *erkan-ı erbaa*, the four pillars or estates: the military, the learned, the merchants, and the peasants. In fact, in the Ottoman Empire society came to be regarded as divided into two sections: the first, the *askeri* (military), comprising the army and the bureaucracy, that is, the ruling elite; and the second, the *raya*, which included all villagers whatever their religion,<sup>4</sup> although in the nineteenth century the name *raya* came to be applied only to Christian subjects. This order was defined as "the state" (*devlet*), and the population was indoctrinated to regard the survival of the state as identical with the survival of Islam. One of the essential goals of the state was to preserve existing arrangements and to create happiness through the craft of government. The Janissary establishment played a crucial role in maintaining this structure. Known as *devşirme*, that is, "collected" for the purpose of state service, the Janissaries joined the large group of *Kapıkulu* (servants—not slaves—of the Porte) on which the throne and entire bureaucratic edifice stood. The Janissary establishment represented the central authority in its endeavor to rule the heterogeneous ethnic and social population and to subdue local groups. Thus, the *devşirme* became the representative of a somewhat oppressive central authority, but in religious and ethnic terms appeared to be a suspicious group. Because the *devşirme* were new converts to Islam and without known affiliation to the early *Gazi* (warriors of Islam) who established the

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<sup>4</sup> A.K.S. Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant in Persia* (London, 1953), xviii-xli; E.I.J. Rosenthal, *Political Thought in Medieval Islam* (Cambridge, 1962); *Law in the Middle East*, ed. Majid Khadduri and Herbert J. Liebensny (Washington, 1955), 3-27; Halil İnalcık, "The Nature of Traditional Society," in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, ed. Robert Ward and D.A. Rustow (Princeton, 1964), 42-45. Jalaluddin Dawanni, the author of *Ahlâq-ı Jelâlî*, a book that reappraises the social estates, was congratulated by Sultan Bayazed II (1481-1512), and the Ottoman jurist Abdul Rahman Çelebi studied under him for seven years. For the early Ottoman ideology of the *Gazis* see Paul Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1938), 7-14.

Ottoman state, their religious and social loyalties remained suspect, even though by the end of the sixteenth century those born Muslim could freely join the Janissaries. Conversions and subsequent appointments to high government positions continued even into the nineteenth century. Eventually the Janissary establishment associated itself with the *ulema* (learned religious men), through which, with the population at large, the Janissaries became a bulwark against the power of the court and defenders of traditional ways of life and the social order. Thus, they played important social and political roles, often to the total disregard of their military functions. In fact, by the end of the eighteenth century, the Janissary *ocak* (unit) had become a sort of fraternity that often included the entire Muslim male population of a town.<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, the suspicion that the descendants of the *devşirme* continued to occupy high state positions without inner commitment to the actual values of society survived, as will be indicated later.

A modern army, drawing its members primarily from ethnic Turks, was organized at the end of the eighteenth and chiefly in the nineteenth centuries.<sup>6</sup> This army was used to strengthen the power of the new centralized government, to defend Ottoman territory, and eventually to destroy the power of the local gentry, the *ayans*. The modern army annihilated the Janissaries in 1826 and improved itself by borrowing Western techniques and ideas and by acquiring certain professional characteristics that distinguished it further from the civilian bureaucracy. High positions were still reserved for the Ottoman aristocracy, that is, the royal bureaucracy. Lacking a new basic philosophical or social orientation, the Ottoman rulers in the nineteenth century drew heavily on traditional values by allowing for change only to the extent that it was necessary to preserve harmony among ruling groups. They could not tamper with the loyalties and value systems of the masses, particularly with those relating to the army. Religion, holy war, martyrdom, and the struggle against the infidel had created a set of values among the population that, if preserved

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<sup>5</sup> H.A.R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West* (London, 1951), I, pt. I, 26–38.

<sup>6</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London, 1961), 7–14; Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1876* (Princeton, 1963), and bibliography therein. See also Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought* (Princeton, 1962), 185.

intact, secured efficient military performance on the battlefield and guaranteed the survival of the state. A practical problem of loyalty and service to the state emerged in 1855 when general conscription was introduced, and, for lack of suitable emotional foundations that could assure the loyalty of Christian subjects to the Empire, military service was limited to Muslims and chiefly to Turks.<sup>7</sup> The Ottoman rulers were compelled to rely basically on the Muslims' values and loyalties stemming from Islam and the *Gazi* mystique of warfare, even though these had been rendered quite anachronistic by change in the balance of world power and social developments within the Empire. "Modernist" intellectuals like Namık Kemal (1840-88), bent on developing a new concept of fatherland, symbols, and images of loyalty to the state, drew the essence of their views from the *Gazi* traditions. Namık Kemal was not concerned with the masses but with the intelligentsia, who seemed to depart from the traditions of heroism and sacrifice that had been, according to his ideological-nationalist interpretation of history, the chief characteristics of the traditional Ottoman political-culture. His play *Vatan Yahut Silistre* (Fatherland or Silistre), which has a direct relevance to my topic, played an important part in the ideological indoctrination of Ottoman and Turkish officers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.<sup>8</sup> This

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<sup>7</sup> Lewis quotes Cevdet Pasha on this vital issue, in *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 332.

<sup>8</sup> Of this play and particularly of a poem that epitomizes its philosophy, Mehmet Kaplan, a Turkish scholar wrote: "This poem is one of the rare works that has gone beyond literary limits and has imbued future generations with love of country. . . . This poem is the first and most powerful model of a social poem and of social mysticism. . . . It is at the basis of all social poems written in modern Turkish literature." *Şiir Tahlilleri* [Poem Analyses] (İstanbul, 1958), 33. Another famous Islamist, Mehmet Murat, who was known as Mizancı, wrote that this play was a unique work that expressed the cultural characteristics of the Turks as shaped by history and traditions. *Mizan*, Jan. 19, 1888. There is a striking similarity in tone and expression between the political terminology developed in literature in the nineteenth century and the expressions used in the declaration of the Saviour Officers' Group, a terrorist military organization established in 1912 to oppose the dictatorial and inefficient policies of the Union and Progress government: "The fatherland expects sacrifice of us. . . . The Ottoman officers [should] save our honored nation, which has raised and fed us, from domination and disappearance." See the complete text in Tarkan Z. Tunaya, *Türkiyede Siyasi Partiler* [Political Parties in Turkey] (İstanbul, 1952), 353. Namık Kemal's *Vatan* caused popular demonstrations. Audiences acclaimed the author with grateful cries that the Ottomans had finally found their identity and mission. Eventually the author was exiled for creating unrest, but the play continued to be read extensively. Namık Kemal ultimately became a vener-

indoctrination aimed at creating loyalty and dedication to the modern state, even though the cultural and psychological roots of this loyalty lay in traditional values. The military, who subscribed to the traditions and values of the past and at the same time sought modernity, appears to have been ideally suited to achieve the transition to a new level of political life. On the one hand it had the physical capabilities, the organization, and the ideas necessary to reorganize the political system, while on the other it represented the symbols of state power and political culture as understood by the masses.

The ideas that the military represented the highest virtues of the state and that the state was synonymous with society and its cultural-religious identity played important unifying roles. All these cultural factors further consolidated the elite position of the military, although the bonds between the elite and the masses were bound eventually to lose their traditionalist content. In any case, viewed in retrospect, it appears that both during the ascendancy of the Young Turks (1908–18) and early in the Republic (1923) the basic loyalties to the state, and particularly the popular concepts about the army and military service, changed little.<sup>9</sup> Reforms in the Republic, thus, were carried out with relative ease by the government, since Atatürk, the president after 1923, was also a venerated military commander with the title of *Gazi*, a man who stood as the guarantor of ancient bonds tying the masses to the leader. It is true that at no time in the Republic did active army personnel occupy positions in the administration, except for a short period in the 1920's when the

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ated national poet primarily because of this play. For the symbolic appeal of political images, see Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David Apter (New York, 1964), 58.

<sup>9</sup> Bitter criticism was directed by conservatives against the Freemasons with whom the Young Turks and army officers had close relations in Salonica prior to the Revolution of 1908. It seems that the conservatives were afraid that the anti-militaristic, humanistic views promoted by the Freemasons would weaken the army's fighting zeal. Later in the Republic, the Freemasons were described as cosmopolitans and promoters of capitalism and were condemned in behalf of nationalism and etatism. Actually the traditional concept of leadership was not viewed as requiring an absolute obedience imposed by force but as a voluntary participation in actions necessary for reaching common goals. There was between the ordinary soldier and his officer a certain *esprit de corps*, which has survived until the present day. I know several cases in which generals, sometimes appointed to ambassadorial positions, corresponded with their former subordinates, some of whom were simple *çavuş* (squad leaders) living in Anatolian villages. This kind of paternal relationship has declined.



chief of staff was a member of the cabinet and army commanders of the border areas were also governors of those provinces. Atatürk, who as early as 1909 opposed interference by the military in politics as a matter of principle, turned this principle into law in 1924, and from then until 1960 officers were barred from politics.<sup>10</sup> The highest government leaders still had military backgrounds, but while holding civilian jobs they resigned their commissions. Indeed, every cabinet from 1920 to 1948 included some ministers who had been military officers. From 1950 to 1960 the cabinets consisted mainly but not exclusively of civilians. The main question, however, was not the army's direct participation in government but the overall relation of the military to the regime and the state. In this respect, continuity rather than change prevailed. The army's constant association with political change and reform was the result of its historical position in the structure of the state and in the traditional ruling order based on it.

The multi-party experiment beginning in 1945-46 brought about a new relationship between the masses and the elites. In essence, this experiment, appearing as a struggle between the ruling Republican party and the opposition Democratic party, was, in fact, in its early years, a mobilization of the masses against the ruling groups. The direct vote without property or literacy qualifications, the impartial election system adopted in 1950, and especially the establishment of a countrywide network of political organizations in towns and villages (*ocaks* and *bucaks*) headed by local leaders, provided the means for political organization and participation at the grass-roots level.<sup>11</sup>

The government controlled by the Republican party was criticized as having erred in its basic duty to achieve the "good life," and was thought instead to have imposed "tyranny" on the people, since its rational, secular authority was not rooted in the traditional system

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<sup>10</sup> The fact that between 1920 and 1960 Turkish politics remained relatively immune to military interference had much to do with the nature of the new state, its elite philosophy, and the influence of the "civilianized" military in government. The best study of the ruling groups in this period is by Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965). See also my study on the elite philosophy and ideological developments in the 1930's, "Die Geschichte der ideologischen Strömungen seit der Begründung der Türkischen Republik: Der Populismus und seine Vertreter," *Bustan*, I-II (1962), 17-26.

<sup>11</sup> See my *Turkey's Politics, The Transition to a Multi-Party System* (Princeton, 1959).

of beliefs.<sup>12</sup> Consequently, when the opposition parties began to demand individual freedom and political rights, the masses interpreted this as a call to reject a power group that had lost its moral justification. But in actual practice the opposition's demands, based in the complexities of traditional concepts of power and authority, emerged in the guise of democracy and political liberalism. In popularly appealing forms and in a traditionalist spirit, the Democrats criticized the bureaucracy as the "permanent power group oppressing the people"; thus its leaders appeared as true saviors, similar to the ancient heroes of Islam. But the expectation from *hürriyet* (freedom), which became a magic word for arousing instant mass enthusiasm, consisted of a deliverance not only from "the oppression"—all rule without valid justification is tyranny—of "Godless rulers," but also from economic and social inequality, for the elites had indeed monopolized the scarce resources of the country.

The Democratic party's electoral victory of 1950 and its assumption of governmental power came as a surprise to everyone, not because the Democrats won but chiefly because the Republicans were willing to accede to the electorate. The victory was a political miracle hailed as a "White Revolution—achieved by the people" in some books and pamphlets published in the countryside.<sup>13</sup> During 1946–54 conservative landlords and ancient *ulema* families led the masses, but later the intensification of communication through a good network of roads, the emergence of mass-circulation newspapers, the extensive use of radios, and an increase in economic activity accelerated social mobility and changed the nature of popular demands. Professionals, small businessmen, and entrepreneurs of all kinds acquired economic power and social standing. The demands for more economic development and for social justice came not only from

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<sup>12</sup> Villagers often applauded Celal Bayar, the head of the opposition Democratic party, with cries "*yaşa, paşam*" (long live my general), even though Bayar had no military rank. The peasants explained that according to their traditional belief only generals dared to oppose the government. Since Bayar criticized the government, they deduced that he was a *paşa*.

<sup>13</sup> Some of these books expressed the viewpoint of the local family dynasties. See Cavit Ersen, *Beyaz İhtilal* [White Revolt] (Adana, 1953). This book, along with others that supposedly glorified the Democratic victory of 1950, was suppressed by the military in 1960. Notice the title of a similar work: Acer Tuncer, *Beyaz İhtilalin Üç Büyük Lideri, Bayar, Menderes, Koraltan* [The Three Leaders of the White Revolution] (İzmir, 1959).

lower-class urban groups and the intelligentsia, but also from the peasants who saw at long last hope for a real economic and political emancipation.<sup>14</sup>

Thus a new social group with pragmatic leanings and accumulated resentment against the old statist elite had come to power. It did not miss any chance to use the bureaucracy and military for its own ends while undermining their social prestige. It also regarded religious freedom as a basic right of the individual.<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, inflation after 1953 undermined the living standards of the salaried groups and made them look with envy and resentment at the uncouth leaders from the countryside who amassed wealth and decided the destiny of Turkey.

The multi-party experiment of 1945-60 naturally affected the military. At the beginning the officers had hoped that the forthcoming parliamentary regime might provide some solution to the army's long-standing internal problems, such as promotions, better pay, and adequate quarters.<sup>16</sup> Like all other social groups, they regarded the solution of social and economic problems as dependent solely on political change. Fearful that the Republicans would not yield power, as their misconduct in the elections of 1946 seemed to forecast, a group of officers organized in 1948 a secret association to prevent future election frauds. Its leaders included General Fahri Belen, Col-

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<sup>14</sup> It is reliably reported that during a discussion on the education of the peasants Atatürk was told by one of the participants: "My general, do not educate them, for the first thing they would do once they are enlightened would be to murder us." Atatürk replied: "*Nerede o günler*" (literally, "where are those days?") meaning that he would be happy to see the peasant reach such a level of emancipation as to assert his independence and question his leaders.

<sup>15</sup> The late Ali Fuad Başgil, a former professor of constitutional law at the University of İstanbul and a presidential candidate in 1961 on the Justice party ticket, defended religious freedom as part of individual rights and freedoms. According to Başgil, the basic need of a human being is to illuminate his mind through knowledge and to "submit his will, after a moral education, to the service of his mind, and to strive to achieve the ideal chosen by his conscience." The goal of the state, "as a human environment and organization . . . is to enable the individual to live his [chosen] life. It is obvious that the state is not an environment like a sheep corral, which is established to satisfy material and animal needs, such as feeding, defense, and love-making." *Yeni Sabah*, July 18, 1960. Başgil's articles have been assembled in *İlmin Işığında Günün Meseleleri* [Today's Problems in the Light of Science] (İstanbul, 1960). For Başgil's version of the Revolution, see his *La Révolution Militaire de 1960 en Turquie* (Geneva, 1963).

<sup>16</sup> Many units were quartered in mosques, for some of the best barracks were in the Balkan territories ceded by the Ottoman Empire in 1913-18.

onels Şeref Konuralp, Seyfi Kurtbek, Major Cemal Yıldırım, and several other officers in İstanbul and Ankara. Some of the officers personally assured the Democrats that the army was supporting them. This assurance quelled the Democrats' fears, which had been aroused by some older generals who wanted to prevent a change of government, and by implication it served notice to the Republicans that the entire army did not support them. Nevertheless, at least four generals did approach İsmet İnönü, the president in 1950, and assured him of support if he wanted to stay in power.<sup>17</sup> İnönü refused, and the Democrats took over the government in 1950 with a certain uneasy feeling about the future attitudes of the military. Grateful for the moral assistance rendered behind the scene, the Democrats gave ministerial positions to Fahri Belen and Seyfi Kurtbek, the leaders of the secret organization, which shortly thereafter began to disperse. The relative proportion of military men in the assembly and in high governmental jobs also diminished considerably. Yet the Democrats' victory of 1950 brought little relief to the military as a whole, although some high-ranking commanders were given special privileges and jobs in an effort to win them over. In public pronouncements the Democrats and their supporters vowed unlimited respect for the army and claimed that they were all soldiers and held the army in the greatest esteem according to national tradition. But privately they did not hesitate to insinuate that Turkey's stagnation was caused by a surviving militarist mentality that had deprived society of creativeness, initiative, and normal life.<sup>18</sup> Behind this attitude there was the apprehension that as a body the Democratic party, unlike the Republican, had had no direct share in the War of Liberation of 1919–22 or in the establishment of the Republic and could not, therefore, hope for military support in a showdown with the statist groups. The apprehension was proven valid by the events of 1950–60.<sup>19</sup>

The Democrats acted with a certain caution and impartiality until

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<sup>17</sup> *Milliyet*, May 27, 1962; Abdi İpekçi and Ömer Sami Coşar, *İhtilâlin İç Yüzü* [The Inside of Revolution] (İstanbul, 1965), 15; Harris, "Role of the Military," 65.

<sup>18</sup> Premier Menderes' uncourteous criticism of some generals for their failure to curb the ruinous anti-Greek riots in İstanbul of September 1955 further turned the army against the Democrats. Menderes reportedly had stated that he would, if necessary, run the military establishment with reserve officers. This was certainly an insult to the standing army.

<sup>19</sup> The Republican party was based on the *Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyetleri* (Defense of Rights Association), which played a crucial role in the War of Liberation (1919–22).

the elections of 1954. The overwhelming popular support they received at that time led them to believe that intensified economic development and material inducements to the peasantry offered the best chance to maintain their widespread popularity, which in turn would discourage any group, including the military, from seizing power. Meanwhile, aid derived from the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and association with NATO after 1952 resulted in a dramatic modernization of weapons, training, and organization, and in more democratic relations the military establishment. Some technical branches of the services, such as the air force, armored units, engineers, ordnance, and sections of the navy, acquired high prestige. These were specialized sections, which had more contact with the West. In fact, a number of officers were trained in the United States and Germany, and some of them were able to save enough to buy cars and other consumer goods and thus formed a privileged group among the military. Therefore, the rate of modernization, measured in terms of technological skills, appears to have been much higher among the military than among civilians 1946-60. Meanwhile, some important defense matters, including the prestigious NATO affairs, were taken over by the minister of foreign affairs, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, a descendant of a Polish political refugee converted after 1848. Zorlu's pedantic manner did not help him make many friends among the military. The *Erkâm Harbiye*, chiefs of staff who had a certain autonomy and had represented the viewpoint of the military, was placed under the ministry of defense.<sup>20</sup> The minister, following a practice initiated by the Republicans prior to 1950, was usually a civilian. In the government itself the influence of the officers who had sided with the Democrats vanished. Highly respected people, such as General Fahri Belen, were pushed into the background. Meanwhile the cost of living in 1960 was about eleven times what it had been in 1950-53, while salaries had barely doubled, causing hardship for those in the military and assigning to them, as individuals, the responsibility for all the shortcomings of Turkey. On the other hand, the newly rich politicians, landlords, and entrepreneurs placed emphasis on wealth, luxury, and material pursuits, all of which contrasted sharply with

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<sup>20</sup> Fahri Belen, *Demokrasiden Diktatörlüğe* [From Democracy to Dictatorship] (İstanbul, 1960), 35-37. See also Ahmet Hamdi Başar, *Yaşadığımız Devrin İçyüzü* [The Inside of Our Time] (İstanbul, 1960), 90-97.

the ascetic idealism preached in the army. The social standing of the military deteriorated, while the values cherished in the past disintegrated under the assault of the materialism supposedly promoted by the new power groups.

Many of the officers I interviewed after the Revolution complained that in the 1950's some landlords would not even bother to show them houses for rent, for "they could not afford it"; some store owners looked annoyed at the prospect of showing expensive items to this impoverished group; waiters with an eye on tips preferred to serve richer customers; and even mothers, who had once been highly honored to have officers as sons-in-law, often advised their daughters not to marry men with "shiny uniforms but empty pockets." Some officers, hard-pressed to support big families, took up such menial jobs as bus driving. Others resigned from the army altogether, since interest in this previously highly-honored career was well on the decline. A communiqué by the ministry of defense in 1960, intended to justify the high pensions and bonuses offered to the retired officers, describes well the economic plight of the military during the rule of the Democrats:

Respect for the past is one of the [conditions] for looking with confidence into the future and for surviving as a nation. Our recent history is a treasury, which no other nation possesses, worthy of respect. In this history, the army . . . represents our sacred existence. It was proudly affirmed [by Premier Menderes] in recent years that a millionaire rose in each city district. Meanwhile army generals, seventy-five years of age, who had retired with TL 250 [twenty-seven dollars] a month, had to do translations to earn a living. Retired colonels had to feed themselves with tea and bread. Finally, we paid close to half of our salary for rent. Certainly we set no good example for the defense of the motherland and for the younger generations.<sup>21</sup>

All these indignities were part of a general trend toward materialism and the downgrading of the army, which began, according to Alparslan Türkeş, who was a leading revolutionary and is presently the chairman of the *Milliyetçi Hareket partisi* (National Action party), during the war years when the military career turned into a "condemned profession of destitution . . . and the officers became despised because of war riches."<sup>22</sup> The morale of the army was already very

<sup>21</sup> Quoted in *Cumhuriyet*, Aug. 7, 1960.

<sup>22</sup> See the memoirs of Alparslan Türkeş in *Yeni İstanbul*, Feb. 15, 1962. Türkeş

low. The Democrats, according to the military, rendered it worse by their selfish materialism, which was communicated to the masses together with a sense of power and self-importance that destroyed the "moral foundation" of society. "The Democrats had begun their work by distrusting the army," declared an officer. "They did not love the army and did not understand that it was a part of the nation. They insulted the army in their conventions, they generalized individual incidents in such a manner as to hurt the army's self-respect."<sup>23</sup> Others claimed that from the first day of their rule the Democrats began to consider the army and its officers "worthless and despicable." "They made those wearing the uniform—the noblest heritage of our history—feel ashamed." Consequently, as one officer put it, he "took off [his] beloved uniform and began to wear civilian clothes." In addition the Democrats "took all kinds of measures to undermine the position of the military in the national culture. They destroyed the old belief that going into the army made one a man."<sup>24</sup> Even the police force on which the Democrats relied for power began to act discourteously toward officers, molesting and arresting them.<sup>25</sup> One revolutionary officer described the psychological impact of these developments to me in the following terms:

You must understand the special psychology of the military if you want to grasp the real causes of the Revolution. We, the military, are brought up with a keen sense of honor and an absolute faith in our code of ethics and our superiority. For you civilians a general is a top officer; for us he is a kind of demi-god, the symbol of our values, an ideal rank toward which all the younger officers strive. What would hap-

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wrote that during the war years, a new class of entrepreneurs had emerged who were influential in bringing the Democrats to power. Türkeş attacked the entire party system, the Republicans, and especially İnönü. It was this attack that secured him, temporarily, considerable popularity in the Justice party among a small but vociferous group of racialists and arch-nationalists to whom his nationalist views held considerable appeal. Eventually Türkeş became the head of the Peasant National Republican party, which later changed its name to the National Action party.

<sup>23</sup> Muzaffer Özdağ, quoted in *Cumhuriyet*, July 2, 1960. *Cumhuriyet* published a series of personal interviews with the revolutionary officers.

<sup>24</sup> Rifat Baykal, quoted in *Cumhuriyet*, Aug. 11, 1960; Orhan Erkanlı, quoted in *Cumhuriyet*, July 20, 24, 1960; see also *Milliyet*, May 28, 1962.

<sup>25</sup> War College cadets, who had been outraged at the way the police mistreated some arrested officers, demonstrated against the government in May 1960. They wanted to get hold of some policemen to "teach them a lesson." After the Revolution, the police were disarmed for some time.

pen to this value system if younger officers should see their general open the door and bow to a civilian minister?<sup>26</sup>

A major who commanded a War College battalion during the Revolution described the Revolution as resulting from the officers' determination to preserve the national heritage:

The Democrats tried to eradicate from school the [nationalist-idealist] faith and manner of upbringing. . . . They strove to destroy national feelings, national emotions, and the notions of morality, honor, and dignity. They caused one group to live in misery next to [another's] limitless ambition for money, amusement, luxury, and squandering. Materialism became the master of everything. Moral feelings and thoughts disappeared. The deposed [government] tried to put this nation to sleep with such [materialist] morphine. . . . All these means are used by an enemy to destroy a country from inside. . . . [The Democratic government's] activities in this field alone suffice to stigmatize them as traitors to the fatherland and to make them punishable by death.<sup>27</sup>

The rebellious response of the military to these conditions was natural and expected. Consequently the nucleus of the first secret military organization was established in November 1954, after the Democrats won a smashing electoral victory and seemed determined to pursue on a larger scale their previous "liberal" economic policies. Among the founders of the organization were most of the people who had carried out the successful coup d'état in 1960—Orhan Kabibay and Dündar Seyhan, who were captains at the time, Sadi Kocaş and Major Faruk Güventürk, who later became a general. In 1956 the organization took a more definite shape with the addition of Majors Sezai Okan, Osman Köksal, Orhan Erkanlı, Talat Aydemir, and Adnan Çelikbaş; Alparslan Türkeş and Sami Küçük joined in 1958–59.<sup>28</sup> The first organization was established in İstanbul at the

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<sup>26</sup> Another officer, Turan Yavsin, in answering those who criticized the army's salary increase, stated: "Today officers who have reached the highest level of education are in great need. An officer who does not see himself on a superior level in society cannot be expected to act that way in front of an enemy." Quoted in *Cumhuriyet*, Aug. 8, 1960.

<sup>27</sup> Avni Erevli, *Hürriyet İçin* [For Freedom] (Ankara, 1960), 155. Cahit Tanyol, a professor, in turn welcomed the Revolution as a "true moral revolution, a downgrading of money and position. The Revolution brought back to us the values, we missed and considered lost." Tanyol, in *Seçkin Devrim* [Select Revolution], ed. Yalçın Günel (Ankara, 1960), 32.

<sup>28</sup> For the history of the secret organization printed in a series of articles in



War Academy, a second one in Ankara, and the two eventually agreed to cooperate. Significantly enough, one of the founders of the first organization told me that his intention was to name it *İade-i İtibar Cemiyeti* (Society for the Restoration of Respect). I asked him to explain the first and most basic inner motivation that had led him to think about a revolutionary organization, and he answered:

The prestige of the army was declining. Money seemed to have become everything. An officer no longer had status in society. It hurt me to see officers forced to take jobs of all kinds and wear civilian clothes and feel proud in them. . . . I was on leave in İzmir with a friend at a restaurant filled with well-heeled politicians and businessmen who received adulation and respect while we were ignored. I looked at my friend and told him that things could not go on like this. Corruption and materialism seemed to dominate everything. It was not that we needed money, for officers had always been ill-paid. But we had had honor and respect in the past. Now these were gone. I asked my friend what we were waiting for and he nodded significantly. I soon discovered that most of my colleagues shared my feelings. From there on the question was one of organization, planning, and waiting for the right moment to act since the Democrats had already prepared the groundwork of the Revolution.

A detailed history of the secret organization provides interesting material for evaluating the officers' organizational skill, their intimate knowledge of government, the psychology of their own colleagues and of the bureaucracy, and the loyalty among the military men. The organization was composed exclusively of military men and at no time did it establish direct contact with civilians despite some vague attempts to sound out some politicians, including İnönü, who turned down the suggestion of a revolution.<sup>29</sup> On the other hand, the military never achieved agreement on a common ideology or on the policies to be followed after the Revolution. One or two attempts to decide the length of military rule after revolution ended in violent

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*Milliyet*, May 7-July 13, 1962, see İpekçi and Coşar, *İhtilalin İç Yüzü*. See also Öncü, Feb. 19-Apr. 22, 1962; *Yeni İstanbul*, Feb. 15-17, 1962; *Zafer Milletindir* [Victory Belongs to the Nation], Dec. 1, 1961; and *Büyük Zafer* [Great Victory], Jan. 19-Mar. 1, 1962.

<sup>29</sup> The revolutionaries approached İnönü to head their organization, but he categorically refused. In another instance one of the members panicked and denounced some of its chief leaders to the government, but he failed to expose the organization because of loyalty among the suspected officers and assistance from military investigators.

disagreement. A minority headed by Türkeş defended a prolonged stay in power, whereas the majority favored the return to a parliamentary regime in about three months. The only decision agreed upon was to establish the Committee of National Unity (CNU) to supervise the transition to civilian rule. Beneath this failure to reach agreement there lay personality conflicts and ideological differences ranging from sheer reactionism to social radicalism, all of which came out after the Revolution.<sup>30</sup>

The background of the thirty-eight officers who formed the Committee of National Unity after 1960 is revealing. They ranked as follows: five generals, seven colonels, five lieutenant-colonels, thirteen majors, and eight captains.<sup>31</sup> The actual role of the generals in organizing the initial secret association and in carrying out the Revolution was minimal, yet their presence was of vital importance. Many officers, deeply attached to the traditions of military hierarchy, wanted to see in the organization a “chain of command” culminating with generals at the top. For months, indeed, the lower ranking officers who organized the secret association looked for a suitable general to head it. Eventually General Cemal Gürsel, president of Turkey in 1960–66, was won over, and he was instrumental, while commander of the ground forces, in appointing revolutionary officers to key positions in the defense ministry. Some generals joined the revolutionary association shortly after the coup and were assigned immediately to high positions.<sup>32</sup> During the Revolution the military units were commanded only by majors and colonels (except for the War College cadets officered by Brigadier Sıtkı Ulay), and consequently several military units in Ankara, although agreeing to support the

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<sup>30</sup> On the currents of thought in the junta, see *Milliyet*, June 17–July 13, 1962; *Le Monde*, Jan. 30, 1962; F.W. Fernau, “Courants sociaux dans la deuxième république turque,” *Orient*, XXIII (1962), 17–42; and *idem*, “Le retour des ‘quatorze’ en Turquie,” *Orient*, XXV (1963), 17–24.

<sup>31</sup> Biographies of the officers appeared in *Cumhuriyet*, July 15–Aug. 11, 1960. See also a brief official list in *Cumhuriyet*, June 16, 1960; Özbudun, *The Role of the Military*, 19; Weiker, *The Turkish Revolution*; and the *New York Times*, June 13, 1961.

<sup>32</sup> The revolutionary officers I interviewed were not pleased with the reliance on generals, but had to follow the generals’ advice in order to secure a following among rank-and-file officers. In private they were highly satirical in describing the hesitancy of some generals to join the Revolution and the manner in which their adherence was secured. See *Öncü*, Mar. 6–Apr. 22, 1962, for the memoirs of Müşerref Hekimoğlu, a close associate of some CNU members. The memoirs provide illuminating information on the background of the Revolution.

action, remained inactive for lack of orders from the proper command channels.

The overwhelming majority of CNU members were between thirty-five and forty-six years of age.<sup>33</sup> This indicates that the beginning of the military careers of these officers and their difficult junior years coincided with the period of multi-party life and the downgrading of the old ruling elites. The majority of officers came from the lower middle classes. About twenty belonged to families of government officials and officers, three were related to high Ottoman families, and only three were sons of true peasants, while five claiming rural origin were actually sons of officials or intellectuals, who had drifted into villages but were not identified with village life and values. The remainder belonged to families in various small businesses. Four officers had been born abroad (one in Cyprus and three in Thrace) and two of these—Alparslan Türkeş, a nationalist, and Sami Küçük, a social democrat—had an important impact on the ideological disputes in the Committee. At least fifteen CNU members belonged to families that had changed place and occupation, usually for the worse. Eight officers were born in large urban centers—İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir—and the rest in smaller towns, usually other than province capitals. Possibly the most important aspect of this geographical background is that the officers' early youth and the period of their elementary education was spent in small towns dominated culturally and economically by a few well-to-do conservative families.

As a whole, however, social background seemed to have had less impact than education on the officers' attitudes. Their reading habits indicate that they preferred biographies of great men and novels with social content written in a romantic vein. Namık Kemal's very important play *Vatan*, which was previously mentioned as a source of nationalist feeling, was preferred reading. But it was a book about Finland, published initially in 1928 and reprinted eight times between 1930 and 1960, that had an overwhelming influence.<sup>34</sup> This book,

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<sup>33</sup> The age breakdown was as follows: two between 62 and 65, three between 52 and 53 (all generals), twelve between 40 and 46, fifteen between 35 and 39, five between 31 and 34, and one was 27. See *Cumhuriyet*, June 16, 1960; *Büyük Kurtuluş* [Great Salvation] (Istanbul, 1960), 99; and Özbudun, *The Role of the Military*, 29.

<sup>34</sup> See Ali Haydar Taner, *Beyaz Zambaklar Ülkesinde* (Istanbul, 1960), 39-56. The author, Grigory Spiridonovich Petrov (1868-1925), was educated in a theological seminary in Russia. He was both a priest (he later renounced his vows) and a teacher who sought to enlighten the masses through a liberal and democratic edu-

Grigory Spiridonovich Petrov's *In the Country of the White Lilies*, was written in an absorbing style. It followed Thomas Carlyle and Leo Tolstoy in glorifying the hero and presented a romantic picture of the army as a brotherhood in which people trained not only for war but also for peacetime duties, "a school for people" where useful skills were taught.

Their reading of *Vatan*, along with similar works of literature, indicates that many revolutionary officers drew inspiration from ideas and values of indigenous origin that were eventually incorporated in populist and nationalist ideology.<sup>35</sup> This is no mere coincidence. Much of Turkish political thought and the attitudes and value system of the intelligentsia have been determined largely by native conditions and cultural traditions that assimilated many outside influences, including those from the West, into their own images of life and society.<sup>36</sup>

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caution. A fervent disciple of Tolstoy and a political activist (he was a member of the second Duma), Petrov published the *Ruskaya Slovo* [Russian Voice], which was widely read. During the Russian Revolution he escaped to Turkey and then settled in Yugoslavia, where he became a professor. The manuscript of the book under discussion was sent along with other manuscripts to Bulgaria. It was translated into Bulgarian by Dimitri Bojkov and published for an educational-cultural group in 1925. It had seven known editions in Bulgarian. Taner translated the book into Turkish by using the Bulgarian version, but omitted the five chapters that discussed the relations between religion and the priesthood on the one hand and the masses on the other. The Turkish translation, repeatedly reprinted, was recommended strongly by the ministries of defense and education to teachers and officers. The book was hailed in Turkey as describing a model for a democratic nation; it suggested the proper methods for development, preserving freedom, establishing healthy relations between the intellectuals and the masses, and adopting constructive ways useful to the nation; and it provided an example of real patriotism and of the dedication of the learned to the welfare and advancement of the masses. The Turkish version was used for the Arabic translation, which was published in Baghdad by Aziz Sami as *Fi Bilad iz Zambakat*. For the final and complete Turkish translation see Türker Acaroğlu, *Ak Zambaklar Ülkesinde* (Istanbul, 1968).

<sup>35</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, July 2–24, 1960, mentions the following as literary works that inspired the revolutionary officers: Reşat Nuri's novel *Çalkıuşu* [Golden Crested Wren] (Istanbul, 1928), describing the life of a woman teacher; Yaşar Kemal's novel *İnce Memed* (Istanbul, 1958), translated into English as *Memed My Hawk* (London, 1961), dramatizing in a romantic vein the exploits of a Turkish Robin Hood whose target was landlords; Atatürk's speeches, Nietzsche's *Also Sprach Zarathustra*, and Lincoln's biography and speeches were also mentioned.

<sup>36</sup> I refer to various expressions, images, thoughts, and attitudes rooted in the native culture. These cannot be analyzed without an extensive study of each word, each expression, and its relation to the system of values. It is not uncommon for a sober politician making a serious speech on some current issue to end by stating, "We are the sons of a people who has fought by sword its way to the gates of Vienna" (the siege of 1683). Another popular romantic expression inherited from

Deeply engraved in the minds of many individuals were the inherited symbols and the mental yearnings for the "good life," a still undefined ideal form of existence.

Practically all thirty-eight officers spoke or read one or two foreign languages (a few subscribed to Western newspapers) and at least thirty-six had been abroad on visits or tours of duty. The exposure to outside influences resulted in a sharper awareness of Turkey's material backwardness and a desire to reflect abroad a better image of the country as a democratic, modernized republic. As individuals, the officers cherished moral virtues and the ideals of glory and sacrifice, honor, prestige, and loyalty to the fatherland, family, profession, and friends. All of this was balanced by self-control and poise and a determination to preserve their professional reputation.<sup>37</sup>

Thirty-two members of the CNU were staff officers, the elite of the armed forces. In fact the revolutionary organization was conceived and directed by them. Staff rank is a qualification for becoming *paşa* (general) and is won through a rigorous competition that involves studies at *Harbiye* (War College), satisfactory field service, and successful completion of courses at the War Academy. Far better trained than the civil servants, competent in technology and matters of organization, the staff officers are deemed to possess outstanding planning abilities and moral and intellectual qualities that confer upon them, *ipso facto*, leadership positions in the army and the nation. Indeed the struggle for modernization in this century was led largely by staff officers, the famous *Erkam Harb*.<sup>38</sup>

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Namık Kemal's interpretation of history is "the Byzantine Empire with its gigantic fortresses and strong armies and famous scholars disintegrated before a handful of Turkish tribesmen who had established a state in a small town around Bursa." *Cumhuriyet*, May 18, 1963.

<sup>37</sup> One member of the CNU, now a lifetime senator, asked the government to intervene to delete from the film *Lawrence of Arabia*, when shown in the United States, those sections casting an unfavorable light upon Turkish officers. *Milliyet*, Jan. 23, 1963.

<sup>38</sup> A writer, discussing the reforms planned by the CNU in 1960, found that "the staff officers' ability in planning is being used in civilian matters, in the five-year development plans, and in efforts to raise the people's living standards." *Forum*, Nov. I, 1960, p. 14. A comparative study of commissioned officers and non-staff officers may throw significant light upon the sources of tensions in the army. The non-commissioned officers, who cannot advance beyond a rather low rank, are reportedly to be among the most dissatisfied and revolutionary-minded group in the army. In 1970, some non-commissioned officers' wives defied a ban and organized several marches in various towns to protest a personnel draft law that left the non-commissioned officers underpaid. Reportedly the generals were so alarmed by this

I asked one of the key CNU members whether they, as military men, were professionally qualified to rule a civilian society beset by conflicts and not used to rigid discipline. In his view, the main problem was to create the ideal leadership cadres at the top, capable of conceiving reforms, drawing up plans, and supervising the civilian technicians and economists who would execute the blueprints.<sup>39</sup>

The officers' claim to leadership stemmed directly from their association with the state. The state, in their view, represented the essence of Turkish society and was the source of all virtues, moral standards, and the vehicle for bringing the entire society into the modern age.<sup>40</sup>

The officers regarded the army as the basis of the Republic and considered themselves guardians of the state and of Atatürk reforms. In fact, Article 34 of the old military code charged the military with the duty of defending the state. One of the CNU members expressed the idea in the following manner:

If the administration in the country fails to provide leadership, if there is not a constitutional court, a senate, who is going to defend the Republic? Naturally the army. Those who established the first Republic thought of the army as its sole guarantor, and expressed this idea in Article 34 of the military internal organizational code. In this sense the Revolution is not only legal but also lawful.<sup>41</sup>

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unprecedented break of discipline that they sought to impose drastic restrictions on the country as a whole.

<sup>39</sup> On August 26, 1960, ten ministers were summarily dismissed for conflict of views and failure to follow the directives from the top. *Ulus*, May 28–30, 1960. Orhan Erkanlı commented on the military-civilian duality as follows: "The government [cabinet] did not and could not follow in the [revolutionary] footsteps of the [CNU]. It did not and could not show the desired activity; it did not and could not use the authority and opportunities at its disposal. The arrangement was faulty at its foundations. It was established in a distorted way and functioned accordingly and produced unavoidably [ill] consequences." *Milliyet*, Mar. 26, 1963.

<sup>40</sup> Pertev Demirhan, one of the oldest living generals, wrote in the introduction to a small booklet on the history of the War College that the "basic power of this [Turkish] nation, in addition to real unity, rests in moral powers such as faith, virtue, and morality." Muharrem Giray, *Şanlı Harbiyenin Tarihi* [The History of the Glorious War College] (İstanbul, 1961), 2.

<sup>41</sup> Özdağ, quoted in *Cumhuriyet*, July 24, 1960. Mehmet Karan, another member of the CNU, expressed the same idea: "Those who betray Atatürk's reforms are doomed to meet the same fate [as the Democrats]. The youth and the army shall always, like Democles' sword, hang over the head of such miserable people." Quoted in *Cumhuriyet*, Aug. 5, 1960. The new Law #211 of January 4, 1961, Article 35, defined the duty of the military as follows: "to protect and look after [*kollamak ve korumak*] the Turkish homeland and the Republic as defined by the Constitution." Article 39 of the same law defined the soldier as "loyal to the Republic, having love of country and high morality, showing obedience to superiors, perseverance in

Article 34, formally incorporated into the Provisional Constitution of June 12, 1960, was invoked to legitimize the Revolution as a sacred legal duty against the old government, which had endangered the Turkish homeland and national existence by inciting citizens to fight each other.<sup>42</sup> Actually, the article was borrowed from the Prussian military code at the turn of the century when German military missions trained the army.<sup>43</sup>

The conception of state and authority in general held by the military was intimately connected with nationalism,<sup>44</sup> which in turn was fostered by the memory of past glories in the Ottoman Empire that had been achieved by the military, all of which provided an ideological basis for interpreting current social and political events.<sup>45</sup> While all the glories of the Ottoman Empire were attributed to Turks, the decay and backwardness were placed squarely on foreign elements—the converted—who usurped control of the state and continued to preserve themselves by adjusting opportunistically to changing circumstances. A lengthy quotation from a book by General Fahri Belen, who was the head of a secret military organization in 1948 and a minister for a short time under the Democrats, links history with contemporary politics. Commenting on the fierce party struggle in 1958-59, he stated:

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the discharge of duty, courage, aggressiveness, disregard for life if necessary, the ability to get along with his fellows, mutual assistance, orderliness, abstinence from prohibited things, concern for health, and the ability to keep secrets.”

<sup>42</sup> The words of Article 34 were repeated once more when the GNU took an oath to return power to a parliamentary regime on June 24, 1960. See the text in *Ulus*, June 25, 1960.

<sup>43</sup> One officer declared: “The staff officers are generally under the influence of the philosophy of the German military that the officer is charged with the protection of the . . . state.” *Milliyet*, May 29, 1962.

<sup>44</sup> A report submitted to the government in 1963 pointed out that the confused politics of a “civilian coalition government had prepared the ground for the emergence of fascism, under the mask of Kemalism and of religious reaction,” all of which “threatened together or separately the authority of the state and the national integrity.” *Cumhuriyet*, Apr. 22, 1963. The result was a crackdown of Kurdish nationalists and leftists. *New York Times*, Aug. 20, 1963.

<sup>45</sup> Orhan Erkanlı describes in his memoirs that on the night of the Revolution, while on his way to take command of a tank unit stationed at the Davut Paşa barrack, he recalled the past glories of this establishment: “This barrack was built by Davut Paşa, one of Fatih’s [Mehmed the Conqueror commanders. For five hundred years . . . it was a shrine full of honor and glory. . . . for our history. . . . The army marching to campaign in Rumelia [the Balkans] made its last stop at Davut Pasha. The war council was held here. . . . The army that besieged Vienna [1683] spent its last night here.” *Milliyet*, July 4, 1962.

The country cannot possibly rid itself of parties, groups, and partisan efforts. This partisan mentality results from the traditions left by a small minority that ruled the state for three hundred years. After the abolition of these *Kapıkulu*,<sup>46</sup> their place was taken by their gangs and associates. Neither the *Meşrutiyet* [constitutional reforms of 1876 and 1908] nor the Republic could liquidate them entirely. The *Kül* gang usurped all the brilliant parts of our reforms like [parasite] insects. At the beginning they were passive spectators to our national war [1919–22] and to reforms, but later they became fly wheels to the rulers. These were the residue of the Ottoman dynasty. Their origin went back to the *devşirme* and even to the [subversive movements] of other climates. They spread the opinion that the Turk can be governed only by pressure, and they became supporters of absolutism. . . . They substituted for the welfare of the fatherland their own personal happiness and achieved fortunes without effort. . . . We have defined these people as derived from the *devşirme*. . . . Could the Turks who established this state and spread Islam have thought that one day the Christian children collected from the battlefields of Europe would take the administration in their hands, and with the fervor of oppressive bigotry turn upside down every stone in Anatolia saying that it was atheistic, unlawful, and rebellious . . .?<sup>47</sup> Our reform movements did not stem from people or scientists but from authority. The Sultans and statesmen, however well intentioned, were not the true representatives of the people or of the currents of thought. . . . The *Meşrutiyet* and the Republic, although appearing to be national movements, have not entirely escaped being imposed from the top. The fact that people were not prepared [for change] was one of the causes of imposition [from the top] but the great error was not, in half a century, to prepare people for change.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> The reference is to the *devşirme*, including the Janissaries and other latter-day converts to Islam during the Ottoman Empire. These were accused, as previously mentioned, of not having participated in the initial establishment of the Ottoman Empire. Gibb and Bowen refer to *Kül*, or the *devşirme* as “slaves” of the Porte, “nearly all [of whom] adopted Islam, indeed, not because they were forced to do so, but because they could not otherwise obtain any influential position.” Gibb and Bowen *Islamic Society and the West*, 44. Actually, the name “slave” is misleading, since the *devşirme* enjoyed much higher prestige than the free-born Muslims. For the classical theory supporting the view that the *devşirme* army defended the state against the subversive revolts in Anatolia, see Reşat Ekrem Koçu, *Dağ Padişahları* [Mountain Lords] (Istanbul, 1962).

<sup>47</sup> General Belen refers here to social and religious upheavals, or the *Celali* revolts in Anatolia in 1596–1603, some of which were considered heretical movements directed against orthodoxy, and thus crushed mercilessly. Concerning the Christian children in the army, he qualifies his statement by saying: “The *devşirme* were the children of civilized people, but they received the education of slave. They came out not from the discipline of science, but from that of obedience.” *Demokrasimiz Nereye Gidiyor* [Where is Our Democracy Going] (Istanbul, 1959), 87.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 6–9 *passim*.



This theory of social history, however erroneous, was broad and confused enough to appeal to socialists, racialists, and nationalists alike, depending upon whether they defined the dominating group as "an exploiting class" or "renegades."<sup>49</sup> Consequently the military reinterpreted populism, another principle at the foundation of the Turkish Republic, as a call to the true sons of the people to deliver the masses from the oppression of powerful groups and to reshape the state organization according to the national characteristics of the majority.<sup>50</sup> Populism also acquired new social and economic dimensions that came to be expressed in the form of demands for social justice. The personal acquaintance of the officers with the grim poverty of the villagers during their duties in the countryside, and with the luxury and arrogance of the newly rich groups in the city, had much to do with their views on social justice.<sup>51</sup>

An examination of the ideological background of the officers would not be complete without defining their views on Islam and secularism. They supported all of Atatürk's secular reforms, and eventually defined the Revolution of 1960 as a continuation and reassertion of secularism. They condemned the use of religion for political purposes, censured obscurantism and superstition, and opposed any action likely to undermine the national character of the state or to promote Pan-Islamism.<sup>52</sup> Yet the military did not view secularism and the entire issue of Islam as the main problem of Turkish modernization as did some old-time secularists. Religion was considered

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<sup>49</sup> Kemal Tahir, the socialist writer, has adopted this theory as the basis of many of his novels. See his article, "Anadolu Türkçülüğü Açısından Atatürkçülük" [Kemalism From the Viewpoint of Anatolian Turkism], *Yön*, Nov. 7, 1962, p. 17. See also Cahit Tanyol, "İki Kadro" [Two Cadres], *Cumhuriyet*, Apr. 19, 1963.

<sup>50</sup> Republicanism, nationalism, secularism, statism, and reformism were the other principles incorporated in 1937 into the Constitution. Article 2 of the Constitution of 1961 defined the state as being national, secular, democratic, and social.

<sup>51</sup> One officer stated: "I have had occasion to visit the poor villages of Çankırı. Many of these people had never seen footwear. I visited the villages of Antep one by one. In Karaköse I stayed with people who were living underground like moles." *Cumhuriyet*, July 26, 1960. See similar statements in *Cumhuriyet*, July 25, Aug. 1, 13, 1960. For the background of these social views, see my article, "The Turkish Elections of 1957," *Western Political Quarterly*, XIV (1961), 436-59.

<sup>52</sup> Alparslan Türkeş, echoing Ziya Gökalp, declared that "in the Turkish mosque the Koran is read in Turkish, not Arabic." *Cumhuriyet*, July 17, 1960. Another officer suggested that courses in modern sciences be introduced for the clergy, as in fact they later were, and that modernist propaganda should be carried out in the mosque itself to educate the "man of religion to work in laboratories like the priests in the West." *Cumhuriyet*, July 24, 1960; *Milliyet*, Mar. 26, 1963.

a matter of secondary importance because, as some officers told me, aside from some sporadic activity, there was no large-scale attempt to revive traditional Islam. Some older officers regarded religion, when separated from politics, as an essential element in the life of an individual, a basic necessity for the "religious nature of the Anatolian peasant."<sup>53</sup> Immediate practical considerations might have motivated this attitude. Young conscripts from the villages, brought up in a traditional understanding of authority, considered military service a sort of religious duty. Their discipline and loyalty derived considerable strength from this belief rather than from strictly modern nationalist indoctrination as might have been the case with the intelligentsia.<sup>54</sup> In one instance it was reported that several cadets in the War College were *Nurcus*, that is, followers of the banned fundamentalist Islamic sect of Said-i Nursi. Special courses on Kemalism were proposed not only to prevent the spread of such influences in the War College, but also to infiltrate this key institution with revolutionary officers.<sup>55</sup>

The attitude of the officers toward religion was also affected by historical considerations. Many were aware that the glories of the military in the Ottoman Empire were intimately connected with Islam and that much of the army's spirit, shaped in the light of this faith, survived well into the Republic. Fevzi Çakmak, the pious, conservative marshal who was chief of staff until 1944, certainly did his best to preserve the army's ancient traditions and spirit. Falih Rıfkı Atay, a leading associate of Atatürk and an extreme secularist, described the marshal as "an Ottoman soldier who loved his country and was ready to die for it any time. . . . From the viewpoint of his ideas and convictions he was a conservative attached to the Sultan

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<sup>53</sup> Sıtkı Ulay, quoted in *Cumhuriyet*, July 21, 1960. See also F.W. Fernau, "Le néo-kémalisme du comité d'Union nationale," *Orient*, XVI (1960), 51-68.

<sup>54</sup> I was informed that there had been discussion among some military men after 1960 about offering religious courses to the new recruits along with courses in fundamental education. Some older officers even insisted that the recruits, when conscripted, take a religious oath along with the one legally prescribed. These suggestions were not accepted. Religious attitudes appeared in other declarations. Ali İhsan Kalmaz, a cadet who was killed during the Revolution, wrote in his diary a few hours before his death: "If fate is favorable tomorrow, May 27, 1960, the sacred Friday prayer shall be offered with peace in hearts and faith in souls." *Milliyet*, July 13, 1962.

<sup>55</sup> The *Nurcu* affiliation was denied at first, but the commander of the War College later acknowledged it. *Milliyet*, June 27, July 2, 1962; *Öncü*, Mar. 15, 1962.

and Caliph. . . . He did not favor any of the reforms. Until he retired from his position of chief of staff, he used the old [Arabic] script." In referring to the marshal's friendship with the head of the religious affairs bureau, Atay continued, "One was the head of the mosque . . . the other the head of the army," and he concluded, "The regime kept Fevzi Çakmak at the head of the army much longer than necessary. The progressive officers and generals were always complaining that the army was very retarded because of its attachment to old ideas."<sup>56</sup>

The background of the revolutionary officers analyzed in the preceding pages, while useful in explaining the political attitudes of the military, would not suffice to ignite a revolution without a special political stimulus. Actually, had it not been for the extremely favorable atmosphere prepared by the government itself in 1959-60, the coup probably would not have taken place at all. Even if it had, its chances of success would have been very limited.

The efforts of the Democrats to curtail freedom of the press and assembly in 1959-60, coupled with an oppressive martial law and an inquiry committee established to investigate the opposition, turned urban public opinion against this party. The *Vatan Cephesi* (Fatherland Front), established by the Democrats supposedly to counteract the coalition of the opposition, also aimed at "protecting democracy" as the Democratic Party interpreted it. One branch leader of the *Vatan Cephesi* told me, amid vows of respect for the army, that his group's main purpose was to prevent the Republicans and their leader İsmet İnönü from using the army to advance their own power.

The Democrats' own attempts to use the army in order to prevent İnönü from entering some towns and addressing the meetings sponsored by the Republican party backfired. Officers and soldiers put down their weapons and warmly acclaimed the old soldier İnönü, who had retained the loyalty and affection of much of the army. Finally the brutal handling by the police of university students in April 1960, and the army's reluctance to fire on or arrest the demonstrators, further undermined the government's authority. An informal coalition of *zinde kuvvetler* (active forces), such as the army, the intelligentsia, and the press had emerged.

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<sup>56</sup> Falih Rifki Atay, *Çankaya* (İstanbul [n.d.]), I, 105-10, *passim*. For the marshal's political career, see my *Turkey's Politics*, 169-70, 283-85.

The coup itself was carried out in three hours in İstanbul and Ankara on May 27, 1960. The armed forces in the rest of the country soon acceded to this *fait accompli*, although some generals, such as Ragıp Gümüşpala, the commander of the third army in the east, gave their blessing after some hesitation.

The Committee of National Unity, headed by General Cemal Gürsel, was formed about two weeks after the Revolution and comprised thirty-eight officers, including the key members of the secret revolutionary association. Colonels Talat Aydemir and Dündar Seyhan, assigned to duties abroad in 1960, were not included in the CNU. Several other officers who had either secondary roles or no part whatsoever in the secret organization were added in order to represent all the branches of the armed forces.<sup>57</sup> But the representation remained uneven, since the army held thirty-two seats, the air force three, the navy two, and the Gendarmerie, or the military units charged with police functions, only one.

The CNU attempted to identify itself from the beginning with all the armed forces but did not quite succeed. The *Silahlı Kuvvetler Birliği* (Union of Armed Forces), although not formally acknowledged, was probably more instrumental than the CNU in shaping Turkey's political fate. Established originally by lower ranking officers in order to express the army's viewpoint, it grew in size and eventually included the highest ranking officers. The generals, including the chief of staff, thus acquired control of this Union and brought it into the open, but also prevented it from carrying out its political purposes, notably the annulment of the elections of 1961. The Union wanted to unite all the armed forces and restore professional discipline, to prevent the CNU from using the military for its own purposes, to "direct it on the right path," and to oppose those politicians seeking to involve the army in their games. This last point, revealed during the trial of Aydemir, was a criticism of the Republican party. The junior officers believed that İnönü had persuaded the generals to back his own party. Others thought that the Republicans indoctrinated the army with their own party ideology and used it against the Justice party, which was established in 1961 with the support of former Democrats. In any case, the generals' control of the Union ended

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<sup>57</sup> See the views of Talat Aydemir and Osman Deniz in Cankaya İsen, *Geliyorum Diyen İhtilal* [The Arriving Revolution] (İstanbul, 1964), 208, 265–67, 282–89.

all hope for a new military revolution and turned it into a pressure group that worked incessantly to better the economic status of the officers.

The policy of the military after the take-over was conditioned by its own traditional and professional background and by its monolithic, elite conception of society and government. But these views were gradually amended according to the needs of a society divided and subdivided into interest groups whose perspectives on life and authority were quite individualized. The first military announcement stated that the Revolution was not "directed against any special group" but against a mentality and the party struggle that had undermined democracy and national unity. Subsequent developments, however, clearly indicated that the Revolution was in fact directed at certain special groups and particularly against those who benefitted economically and socially from association with the Democrats. Shortly after the Revolution the military arrested large numbers of leading Democrats, including all the deputies, partly to thwart reactionary attempts and partly at the instigation of some revenge-seeking Republicans. But the arrest of about 240 landlords in Eastern Anatolia, their internment at Sivas, and the establishment of inquiry committees to investigate the mode in which the *nouveaux riches* had accumulated their fortunes thoroughly undermined the idea that the Revolution had no social motives. Most of these measures were later rescinded, after the army's social resentment somewhat exhausted itself and was replaced by the more enduring idea of nationalism. The landlords were released, except for fifty-five men of Kurdish origin who were settled elsewhere in the country, even though few of them, according to some reports, owned any sizable amount of land.

General Gürsel, meanwhile, declared at a news conference that the country needed a new social outlook and that socialism should not be viewed as totally harmful. The heavy taxation imposed on agriculture and real estate and the establishment of a state planning organization in 1960 were born of these social considerations. Taxes were later decreased because the levies appeared too high. The state planning organization, after some unsuccessful attempts to acquire supreme executive powers, was reduced to the role of economic adviser to the government.<sup>58</sup> On the other hand, the efforts made

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<sup>58</sup> Originally, the state planning organization was under the direction of a small

to enact a land reform law produced no immediate results. The trade unions were recognized as having a certain freedom of organization and were liberated from police supervision, but were not included in any major policy-making decisions. There were, for example, only six representatives from trade unions in the 270-member Constituent Assembly.<sup>59</sup> Actually, many of these social measures were proposed by small groups of civilian intellectuals, some of whom had volunteered to "guide" the military in carrying out the reforms. Not having long-range plans, the military used whatever advice the intellectuals could give, but did not associate them directly with power.

Motivated by professional considerations, the CNU took a number of other steps that created disunity within the military. The congestion of generals at the top, mostly officers who had rendered service in the War of Liberation, delayed the promotion of lower ranks. Consequently 235 generals and seven thousand lower ranking officers were retired in order to "rejuvenate the army." This internal army reform had a deep political effect for it made available to political parties a large number of former officers.<sup>60</sup> The retired officers eventually established the *Emekli İnkılap Subayları* or EMİNSU (Retired Revolutionary Officers), an organization that became one of the most powerful pressure groups. Even though retired, many officers preserved some influence in the army through loyal friends and relatives and were often instrumental in converting these friends and relatives to the civilian point of view they had come to espouse. The retired officers received high pensions (seventy-five per cent of their salary) and a bonus equivalent to two years' salary, while the active officers were given generous housing credits and salary raises, almost

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group of intellectuals who had been catapulted to this position by the Revolution. They tried to establish the supremacy of the organization over the legislature and, together with it, to consolidate their own position. Unsuccessful in their attempt, they eventually established a socialist club. The state planning organization finally acquired some popular support after its social and economic goals were given priority over its political claims.

<sup>59</sup> On some general aspects of the constitution, see İsmet Giritli, "Some Aspects of the New Turkish Constitution," *Middle East Journal*, XVI (1962), 1-17.

<sup>60</sup> Among the top officers who became politicians one may mention Colonel Adil Türkoğlu, who became a senator. He supposedly had arrested Faruk Güventürk, one of the secret organization leaders, in connection with information conveyed to the government in 1957. Yusuf Demirdağ, elected senator from Samsun, had supposedly tried to prevent the cadets' demonstration prior to the Revolution in 1960. General Ragıp Gümüşpala, who was made chief of staff after the Revolution and then retired, became the chairman of the Justice party.

twice as much as their equals in the civil service, plus an orderly or 200 TL a month. This measure was later amended. The sympathizers of the banned Democratic party were quick to contrast the interest of the military in raising its living standards with the accusation of materialism leveled at the ousted government.

In order to soothe their anger and to provide the state with personnel "representing the moral and idealistic virtues of Turkish society," the CNU placed many of the retired officers in government positions, including the security organizations. The appointments were in fact part of a broader scheme of some of the officers in the junta to assume absolute power by placing reliable individuals in key government positions. "The salvation of Turkey," stated the CNU in explaining this measure:

and the onward surge of the Turkish state depends upon liberating the state administration and public institutions from partisan, immoral, lazy hands. We have decided to strengthen these institutions [by appointing] retired generals and officers who have spent a lifetime in honor and dignity. A new spirit, a new credo, will come into the state organizations and thus the purposes of the May 27 action will shortly be materialized. This measure shall never be [directed] against other professions. . . . The Turkish nation needs the services of the retired generals and officers. . . . The reform in administration is the desire of the nation and the absolute necessity of our Revolution. The future of the state can be assured only by a good administration. A good administration can be established [only] by qualified, moral, and idealistic personnel.<sup>61</sup>

The military government also established the *Türk Kültür Dernekleri* (Turkish Cultural Associations) in 1960, ostensibly with the purpose of replacing the People's Houses closed by the Democrats in 1951, but actually for eventual use as the nucleus for a political party.<sup>62</sup> The *Derneks* abandoned the populist and democratic features of the Houses and emphasized nationalism and the supremacy of the state in order to unite the nation around a common culture and ideal. Similarly, the plans to revive the Village Institutes, which had been

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<sup>61</sup> *Ulus*, Aug. 12, 1960. In fact, by November 1960, 2,200 officers had been placed in a variety of jobs, chiefly in security and civil defense. After 1961 there was objection to the fact that relieved military men occupied jobs usually reserved to civilian bureaucrats. For the job classification, see *Ulus*, Nov. 27, 1960; *Milliyet*, Mar. 23, 1963.

<sup>62</sup> The Houses resumed their old name in 1963. See my "The People's Houses in Turkey," *Middle East Journal*, XVII (1963), 55-67.

created in the early forties for the purpose of eradicating illiteracy in villages but transformed into teacher training schools by the Democrats, were rejected. Instead, the cadet reserve officers spent their term of active duty as teachers in villages.<sup>63</sup> Furthermore, a *Ülkü ve Kültür Birliği* (Union of Culture and Ideal) was proposed to replace the ministry of education. It was to be an autonomous body that would instill a new sense of purpose and unity in Turks living at home and abroad.<sup>64</sup>

The military distrusted the political parties from the very start. Soon after the Revolution, political activity was prohibited, and later the Democratic party was banned by court decision. The group headed by Türkeş and backed by civilian supporters attacked the Republican party as being as responsible as the ousted Democrats for bringing Turkey to the threshold of political disaster, although the Republicans had fought to preserve democracy. All the *ocaks* and *bucaks* of the political parties, including those belonging to the Republican party, were abolished with the justification that they had become centers of friction and conflict among the rural population, a view enthusiastically shared by the intelligentsia.<sup>65</sup> İnönü and several other politicians insisted that the party precincts had performed outstanding educational functions and that their constructive role outweighed their defects.<sup>66</sup> But these arguments could not convince the military or the intelligentsia; both, for their own satisfaction, had to cling to the idea that the commoner was unable to govern himself and needed the permanent guidance of the “enlightened.” The party precincts have not yet been reestablished and all party decisions were as of 1970 still made by central and provincial organizations dominated in towns and cities exclusively by professionals. Inadvertently, the military helped to consolidate the political power of the new middle class.

A group in the CNU backed by the upper echelons of the army

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<sup>63</sup> The military government’s attempt to eradicate illiteracy, though motivated by good intentions, produced limited results, for the “teachers” lacked professional training, school buildings, and teaching materials. Nevertheless, the project helped urban intellectuals to become acquainted with rural conditions.

<sup>64</sup> It was reported that the late Mümtaz Turhan, a professor of psychology and a champion of an elitist system of education, was considered for the ministry of education.

<sup>65</sup> See Law #8 of July 4, 1960.

<sup>66</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, July 8, 9, 1960; *Sır*, Oct. I, 1960.



proposed to hold elections as soon as feasible in the belief that the Republican party, favored by the military, would win. The civilian rule envisaged at this stage was supposed to preserve all measures enacted by the military and to establish a secular and social-minded regime based on the rule of a "middle class." This concept of a "middle class" was the same idea that had prevailed in the thirties, namely, the establishment of a regime dominated by the bureaucracy and intelligentsia at the top and sustained economically by the entrepreneurs and business groups at the bottom. This structure, civilian at the base and military at the top, was to adopt statism as a philosophy and to achieve progress along with internal and external economic independence. A similar scheme adopted in the early days of the Republic had failed supposedly because the guiding bureaucratic middle class was destroyed by the rising "statist capitalists" and further weakened in the 1950s by the new entrepreneurial class and the landlords friendly to the West and its capitalist system.<sup>67</sup> A group in the Republican party accepted this view and it has now become, after further embellishment by additional slogans borrowed from the socialist vocabulary, the party's basic social philosophy.

The major question facing the military in 1960 concerned the group that would both carry out the scheme of social reorganization and respect the measures enacted by the junta. A small group in the junta, composed of nationalists and socialists, although in disagreement over philosophy, were united in supporting the extension of a strong military role in the form of a new political organization. Another larger group, which trusted the Republican party and its philosophy and was sure that it would win the forthcoming elections, opposed continued military rule. Inevitably the officers in the CNU divided into two groups, one advocating the return to a civilian regime, the other insisting on remaining in power, despite a public oath to hold elections as soon as feasible. Each group became convinced that it would not persuade the other. Consequently General Cemal Gürsel—supported by other generals and officers in the junta willing to surrender power, on their own terms, to a civilian government—ousted "the fourteen," that is, the advocates of strong rule, on November 13, 1960, and assigned them to jobs overseas. Actually

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<sup>67</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, July 23, 1960; *Söz*, Aug. 11, 1960; Tekin Alp, *Kemalizm* (İstanbul, 1936), 260 ff.; *Forum*, Nov. 1, 1960, p. 13.

the total number of supporters of continued military rule in the CNU was about twenty, or the majority of the thirty-eight-member junta. Subsequently, a Constituent Assembly was convened, a Constitution was enacted and approved by referendum in July 1961, and elections were held in October 1961. But the elections produced totally unexpected results since they were influenced by forces ignored by the military. A group in the Republican party, aware of Turkey's problems, tried to combine the ideas of social reform and democracy under the slogan *hürriyet içinde kalkınma* (development within freedom). The Justice party also began to adopt the idea of social reform through consensus, although leadership in this party was at the beginning in the hands of conservatives from the countryside. The officers, however, seemed to ignore the fact that the major parties of Turkey were undergoing a profound ideological transformation that oriented them toward a new interpretation of modernization and reformism. In the view of the military, economic reform and true democracy could be achieved only by imposition from the top, a procedure they described as a return to and reformulation of Kemalism. In short, this view seemed irreconcilable with the party democracy and the level of political socialization prevailing in Turkey.

The results of the election in 1961 seemed to support these assumptions. The Justice party won 77 seats in the senate, the New Turkey party 9, and the Republican party only 44; the remaining 55 seats were divided among other parties, the president's 15 appointees, and the lifetime senators or the ex-members of the junta. In the assembly, where the real legislative power lies, the Justice party won 168 seats, the New Turkey party 29, and the Republican party 187 of a total of 450, the rest being distributed among the minor parties.<sup>68</sup> Thus the Republican party favored by the military was in the minority, while groups thought to be loyal or sympathetic to the ousted Democrats and antagonistic to the Revolution had a majority in both houses. Consequently, on October 21, 1961, a group of officers belonging to the Union and advised by some university professors reached agreement to intervene on behalf of the armed forces before the legislature met, in order to turn over the "revolution to the nation's true and competent representatives," to ban political parties,

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<sup>68</sup> *TBMM Albümü* [Album of the Turkish Grand National Assembly] (Ankara, 1964), 170, 190. The seats held by each party varied in the following years.

to dismiss the CNU, and to nullify the "elections."<sup>69</sup> Another group of officers in Ankara approved the agreement. It must be noted that this agreement came immediately after free, honest elections were held under the guarantee of the military and its express declaration to accept the people's verdict. The agreement was a flagrant violation of the constitution committed in a most haphazard manner, but it was not implemented in large part because of the opposition of General Cevdet Sunay, chief of staff at the time. Sunay argued that a new military intervention would create turmoil, that anti-military reprisals would not be allowed, that the measures introduced after the Revolution would be safeguarded, that Cemal Gürsel would be brought to the presidency and İsmet İnönü to the premiership to head a coalition government. Consequently, a civilian government was formed under İnönü, himself a venerated soldier, and the CNU members became lifetime senators. Thus the military coup of October 21, 1961, attempted through hierarchic channels, had failed, but it did not subdue dissatisfaction among the young officers. Eventually these men began to form secret organizations only to be exposed by military intelligence, and their leaders retired before engaging in action.

The return to a civil government brought to the fore once more the conflicts created by the Revolution. The Justice party, and to a lesser extent the New Turkey party, supported basically by the members of the defunct Democratic party, soon began indirectly to denounce the Revolution, to demand amnesty for Democratic party leaders, and deviously to attack the senators who were ex-members of the CNU. It seemed that the social and political groups that had dominated Turkish politics prior to 1960 had regained the upper hand in the legislature, and gradually they began to undo what the military had tried to achieve during their brief stay in power. Some of the ex-members of the CNU openly attributed these attempts to their own failure to create an ideology, to organize a party, and to become identified with a social group. One socialist officer said retrospectively:

For the Revolution to become social and economic and achieve success it needed to destroy down to its foundation the previous political [and social] order. To change positively the social and economic order

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<sup>69</sup> İsen, *Geliyorum Diyen İhtilal*, 18-20. See also the memoirs of Metin Toker, İnönü's son-in-law and trusted aid, which appeared in *Milliyet* during February 1969.

and bring the social forces to a new balance [was a necessity]. If the social and economic order of the past were to continue, then the political order would have survived, too. If the new social forces were not organized and if at least some structural changes were not achieved . . . the alternative would be a counter-revolution [by former Democrats].<sup>70</sup>

In reality, however, the situation in the society at large was different. The Revolution belonged to the government elite who ignored the views and reactions of the population, since it was taken for granted that the people would acquiesce in elitist decisions as had been the case in the past. True, there was no popular reaction to the overthrow of Adnan Menderes' government, since on the eve of the Revolution the Democrats' dictatorial policies had made them unpopular. But some popular reaction began to manifest itself toward the middle of 1961 in the form of a readiness to support any party professing opposition to an elitist regime, whatever its form. The peasantry began to think of itself, now, as a distinct social group with special interests of its own and to act as though fully conscious of its power. The large number of negative votes (3,934,370), as against 6,348,191 positive votes cast in the constitutional referendum of July 9, 1961, clearly expressed the situation. This occurred several months before the trial in September of the Democratic party deputies and leaders was concluded. Menderes and his ministers Fatih Rüştu Zorlu and Hasan Polatkan were hanged.

The opposition centered around the Justice party capitalized on the danger of dictatorship coming from the old ruling circles, particularly from the Republican party, and accused it of courting the military. The opposition leaders claimed that national sovereignty was embodied in the legislature and that the decisions of elected legislators should prevail. In fact some went so far as to say that the military was opposed to civilian supremacy in politics, thus losing the people's confidence and weakening traditional respect for the army. The issue was fully dramatized when the assembly refused to lift the legislative immunity of a deputy who had accused the military of being power-hungry and had urged the population to resist forcibly any take-over by the army.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> *Öncü*, Apr. 22, 1962. Memoirs of Müşerref Hekimoğlu, reproducing verbatim the letter of a revolutionary, possibly Orhan Erkanlı. See also my "Society, Economics, and Politics in Contemporary Turkey," *World Politics*, XVII (1964), 50-74.

<sup>71</sup> The deputy was Reşat Özarda of the Justice party. During the legislative pro-

The reaction to these developments among some officers materialized in the abortive coup of Colonel Talat Aydemir on February 22, 1962. The attempt was put down quickly by the government, aided by the air force, but the plotters were pardoned despite some opposition in the legislature. Later a group of air force officers known as the "eleven" were retired before carrying out their planned coup.<sup>72</sup> Talat Aydemir meanwhile tried to unite all the revolutionary groups but failed because each group wanted to assume leadership for itself. The available data indicates that Aydemir, aside from some vague reformist schemes and nationalist ideas borrowed from Türkiyeş that he tried to formulate as Neo-Kemalism, seemed interested mainly in power. Aydemir's second attempt on May 21, 1963, failed again because the bulk of the army supported the government. Aydemir and his deputy were tried, sentenced to death, and executed. It is interesting to note that Aydemir established relations with at least four senators, ex-members of the CNU, with several Republican party members in the legislature, and even with a few intellectuals.<sup>73</sup> Yet Aydemir's abortive coups did not suffice to convince the extremists in the Justice party that their indiscriminate attacks on the military would incite new coups and eventually bring the army back to

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ceedings to deprive him of immunity, several officers, retired in 1960, testified in his favor, indicating thus a divergence of opinion among officers. Immediately after the vote, İnönü stated that the situation had become very dangerous. The politicians claimed that this was another "trick" of İnönü, but Talat Aydemir's putsch five days later proved him right. (See *Ulus*, May 15-23, 1963. The following quotations support my ideas about the dangerous civilian-military rift at that time. Recai İskenderoğlu, New Turkey deputy from Diyarbakır, wrote: "The temporary military rule has brought, by necessity, economic difficulties. These were exploited by certain political circles and created [antagonism] between the citizens and their uniformed sons and unnecessarily distorted ideas [concerning each other's intentions]." After accusing certain political circles of aggressive intentions, he continued, "That is why there is among the people the idea that some military circles have not withdrawn from politics." "Bugünkü Siyasi Ortamda Türk Politikacısı" [Turkish Politician in Today's Political Environment], *Cumhuriyet*, May 18, 1963; see also comments by D.H. Baki, elected from Afyon as an independent: "Son Krizin Nedenleri" [The Causes of Last Crisis], *Cumhuriyet*, May 20, 1963.

<sup>72</sup> The military groups contending for power in 1961-63 were the following: (a) the "fourteen" divided into two groups; one nationalist, headed by Alparslan Türkiyeş, and the other socialistic, headed by Orhan Kabibay; (b) the "Febrists," or the first group of Aydemir; and (c) the "eleven" previously mentioned. Many of the plotters were officers retired in 1960.

<sup>73</sup> The best account of Aydemir's coup is İsen, *Geliyorum Diyen İhtilal*. See also the communiqué of the Ankara martial law commander in *Anadolu Ajansı*, July 24, 1963; *Cumhuriyet*, July 5, 1963; Özbudun, *The Role of the Military*, 34-37.

power. They intensified the campaign for amnesty for the Democrats. Finally, Cevdet Sunay had to write a letter on November 12, 1964, to the president, the premier, the party leaders, and the chairman of the legislature. He mentioned the army's loyalty to the constitution and declared that a press campaign:

has chosen the army as its target, and by its nature it is likely to hurt the commanders and the officers who in silence and dedication try to carry out the high duty of protecting the country. . . . Some party members are attempting to incite the innocent citizens against the government, the army, and their own adversaries, and aim especially at the commanding officers. They thus incite an armed revolution. Their declarations aim at destroying the harmony between the commanders and their subordinates, and create mischief for the country. . . .<sup>74</sup>

The letter had its effect. The Justice party convention, which met at the end of November 1964, ignored the extremists who sought to rehabilitate the ousted Democrats and elected as chairman, with a two-thirds majority, Süleyman Demirel, who represented the moderate wing in the party.

From the end of 1964 the military's relations with the Justice party improved considerably as the uproar caused by the Revolution subsided. The election of Cevdet Sunay to the presidency after Gürsel who suffered a stroke and died in 1966 consolidated civilian rule and helped to establish "correct" relations between the military and the Justice party. A difficult phase had been concluded and parliamentary democracy received a new chance to prove itself capable of solving the social and economic problems of Turkey.

The military Revolution of 1960 in Turkey began as a reaction of the traditional power elite to the challenge of new social groups. It ended not by reestablishing the old order but with a new, modern constitutional regime based on a social and political balance between all major groups. It thus established, unwittingly perhaps, the legal and political bases of a participatory democratic society. Indeed, a new constitution, a two-house legislature, a constitutional court, and judicial immunity were accepted, and, formally at least, power was transferred to a civilian government. The Revolution was successfully contained within the framework of a national state and

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<sup>74</sup> Quoted in F. Hüsrev Tökin, *Türk Tarihinde Siyasi Partiler* [Political Parties in Turkish History] (Istanbul, 1965), 124–25.

channeled to establish a pluralist social-political order in which all major social groups were to be represented.

The initial revolutionary association of the military in 1954-55 was a measure of self-defense and a reaction caused by the deterioration of the army's social status; it expressed an implicit desire to reinstate the army in its traditionally powerful position in the government. The revolutionaries declared that the power was taken over by the *silahl kuvvetler* (armed forces) on their own behalf instead of by an organization representing broader sections of the population. The seizure and exercise of power on behalf of armed forces was in fact the first incident in Turkish history when the army acquired power directly on its own behalf. Throughout the Ottoman Empire and the Republic the military has been behind the government; it has changed sultans and ministers but it has always preserved formal allegiance to the ruling authority. The military interventions of the past were legitimized in accordance with the Islamic-imperial traditions of government and authority, even though the actual reasons for intervention might have derived from practical considerations. Atatürk turned against the throne only after he was securely entrenched in power. Still he described the nation and the legislature as the sources of all authority and argued at great length to prove how the nation had replaced the throne in this role.

The military revolution of 1960 was a clear break with the past, despite the persisting influences of social and political traditions. This was evident in the attempt to legitimize the Revolution in the light of modern political and social ideas. Such a break with the past was unavoidable because the groups competing for power had new social and economic motives and a new political outlook. Social differentiation had created a new social identity and a new sense of economic interest.

The revolution also undermined the elite philosophy and brought into the open the ideological differences caused by changes of occupation and mentality among the intelligentsia. Two decades earlier the bulk of the intelligentsia depended on the government for employment. Now the majority had become independent professionals, or well-paid employees of private enterprises, and were identified in outlook and interest with their occupations. The intelligentsia was no longer an independent social class but had been divided and subdivided into professional groups that affiliated themselves with labor, business, the peasantry, and a variety of other occupational groups.

Consequently, after the Revolution many intellectuals voiced the view of the groups to which they were attached rather than that of the state, as they had done in the past. But, theoretically, the intellectuals still regarded themselves as an independent group dedicated solely to progress and modernization, although even these concepts were reinterpreted according to professional and group affiliations. The military as a group became the object of public debate and painfully realized that its traditional high prestige did not grant it immunity to criticism or assure military men positions above others. The laws and measures providing economic benefits to the military indicated that the officers' concern with their own welfare was similar to that of ordinary citizens. The magic—in fact, the political charisma—of the old elite groups was broken forever. A new sense of value and faith in men as rational beings capable of selecting their own political destiny by themselves had emerged. A revolutionary officer wrote:

Today, all institutions—the army, the university, the press—have lost much of the moral power they held prior to May 27 [1960]. Two years of unproductive revolutionary activities have tarnished these institutions in the people's eyes. [Discredited are the] intellectuals . . . who considered themselves an independent class apart from the people, entitled to social privileges because they had first priority to rule the nation. They had an absolute belief that if these privileges were not granted to them the society would never come into the [modern] age. It seemed as though the salvation of Turkey depended on the establishment of an intellectual oligarchy, . . . an idea forced upon society since Plato.<sup>75</sup>

The military revolution of May liberated the social groups from the hold of traditionalism. It destroyed, perhaps unwittingly, many of the ancient concepts of power and authority. It indicated that the traditional power elites could no longer maintain their political supremacy in a socially diversified national state without a change of philosophy and without identifying themselves with the cause of some social groups. It helped lay emphasis on economic activity as the means for material welfare and on social progress, balance, and stability.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> *Öncü*, Apr. 22, 1960, and Apr. 20, 1962.

<sup>76</sup> The minister of finance, Şefik İnan, declared in 1962 that “economic matters had become the main and key problem of Turkey. . . . To view any other problem as paramount and impress it as such on the public mind would endanger the resolution of basic economic and financial problems.” *Bayram*, Mar. 16, 1962.



The idea of political modernization was thus broadened. All this occurred, not through following a formal plan but largely as a result of mutual pressures and the interaction among social groups. The military yielded to pressure and demands arising from the social body. This is a definite credit to the army. Yet one must recognize the essential fact that the acceptance by the military of a civilian democratic order did not stem from its own convictions but from the very ability of the civilian sectors to assert their claim to political leadership. In this way, the agelong process for the establishment of a truly civilian society, which had begun under the Ottoman Empire, entered its last and decisive phase.

## TURKISH DEMOCRACY AT IMPASSE: IDEOLOGY, PARTY POLITICS AND THE THIRD MILITARY INTERVENTION

### 1. *The Immediate Causes of the Military Intervention*

The military takeover of the government on September 12, 1980, marks a definite turning point in the history both of the Republic and of democracy in Turkey. The crises which precipitated the intervention are so deep and so complex as to preclude any hasty judgment of the action taken or of its future consequences.<sup>1</sup> Pressed by newsmen, as well as by European governments, General Kenan Evren has declared that a Constitutional Assembly will convene in October, 1981, but he has refused to say when power will actually be relinquished. The demands for a “timetable” for a quick return to civilian rule, and the military’s own honest efforts to produce quickly such a “timetable” do not appear to be based on a realistic understanding of the backlog of accumulated problems which produced the intervention in the first place.

The intervention was caused by the failure of Süleyman Demirel’s *Adalet Partisi* (Justice Party—JP) government to halt the terrorism which had escalated into a mini-civil war between the leftists (including the Kurdish separatists) and the rightists, to break the legislative logjam (only a handful of laws were enacted in 1980), or to lower the rate of inflation which had gone to over 100 percent. Demirel’s predecessor, Bülent Ecevit and his *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (Republican People’s Party—RRP), of which there will be further discussion, had failed also to accomplish these goals, and for the same reasons. Efforts to form a coalition between the two parties produced no result, despite the military’s urgings.

The chief event that apparently compelled the reluctant military to step in was the ominous political rally of the *Milli Selamet Partisi* (National Salvation Party—NSP) in Konya shortly before the coup.

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<sup>1</sup> For details, see *Milliyet*, September 13–16, 1980, and *New York Times*, September 14–17, 1980.

It was the culmination of a series of similar meetings held by the party in various Turkish provinces. It appeared that the NSP was determined to return to its original Islamic principles. Established in 1973 (its predecessor, the *Milli Nizam Partisi*—Party of the National Order, was closed in 1971), the NSP began to voice fundamentalist Islamic aspirations, advocating the reassertion of national identity and promising social justice, equality, and development. In 1973 the party won instant success when, barely established, it entered the elections and received an impressive 11.8 percent of the total votes cast. It formed a strong parliamentary group, consisting at that time of 48 deputies; however, it lost considerable ground in the election of 1977, the electoral setback being the consequence of the inability of Necmettin Erbakan, the party leader, to understand the true nature of the religious forces that catapulted him to overnight political success and of his opportunism in sacrificing principles for position. Erbakan flirted with the RPP, joining Bülent Ecevit's coalition government in 1974; eight months later he was jolted out of this alliance and became a supporter of, as well as as for a while a partner in, the coalitions headed by the JP from 1975 to 1978. The by-elections of 1979 permitted the NSP to recoup some of its losses; it won 9.7 percent of the votes cast for the senate, but its percentage for the five contested assembly seats dropped to 7.4. The vote for the JP soared from the 35.5 percent obtained in 1977 to 54 percent, giving it all the five seats contested in the National Assembly. The Republican Party's vote share shrank from over 41 percent in 1977 to 29.3 percent in 1979. (See appendices for details.)

Erbakan's relative popularity in 1979 can be attributed to his growing identification with the Muslim causes in the Middle East (he gave enthusiastic support to the Islamic revolution in Iran, and to the anti-Israeli policy of the Arab states) and to his opposition to some of Demirel's economic and educational policies as well as to his aloofness from the old partner, the RPP. Erbakan and his close advisers were convinced by the apparent success of these tactics that the party's success lay in a return to its original fundamentalist principles, including more dedicated support of Islam and stiffer opposition to the ideas of big enterprise and liberal capitalism associated with Demirel's government and the West. The new political strategy developed by Erbakan aimed at appealing to a broad spectrum of voters. The pro-Islamic policy allowed the NSP to disassociate itself from the RPP and to repair its tainted image among the

hard core Islamists who had resented Erbakan's association with the party that had fathered Turkey's secularism in the 1920s. On the other hand, the denunciation of big capital and the West served as a refutation of Demirel's party and had a direct appeal to nationalists and leftists.

Erbakan felt that the main obstacle to his success was Demirel; therefore, he teamed up once more with Bülent Ecevit (who had resigned as Prime Minister and grudgingly allowed Demirel to form a minority government after the election of 1980), and forced the dismissal of the Foreign Minister through censure motions based on flimsy reasons. It was his growing feeling of power, augmented by press adulation and a certain popularity among some leftist groups—some of which reportedly had begun to infiltrate some branches of the NSP—that gave Erbakan the audacity to turn down an invitation issued by the military chiefs to discuss Turkey's political situation. The snub to the honor conscious military was aggravated by incidents at the previously mentioned party rally in Konya: a huge group, estimated at over one hundred thousand people, some of whom had come from neighboring areas, joined the meeting; banners in Arabic were displayed and the re-introduction of the Shariah (Islamic law) was demanded, while the youth organization of the party, the *Akıncılar* (or Raiders), marching in perfect order, carried posters that glorified Islam and hailed Erbakan as the future savior of Turkey. (One of the posters read something like this: "leader, order, and we shall die for the cause".)<sup>2</sup>

The terroristic attacks, the rapid collapse of government authority, the high rate of inflation, and the deadlock over the election of the President seemed to have limited the possibilities for solution of Turkey's multi-sided crisis to two. The first alternative required that a political organization capable of appealing to the citizens' basic loyalties come forth and mobilize the masses around common symbols and feelings. Erbakan's party was situated best, both culturally and politically, to appeal to the basic Islamic loyalties of the population and create a common front for action to save the nation. Although essentially a radical rightist association, the NSP had managed to remain outside the violence which had overtaken the other radical parties: the youth groups of the NSP, for example, were not

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<sup>2</sup> See *Milliyet* and *Cumhuriyet*, September 2–8, 1980.

involved in terrorist attacks. Moreover, the party's program appealed in matters of economic policy and social justice to the left, while through its views on history, culture, national identity, and self assertion it held an appeal for the right also.

The second alternative for overcoming Turkey's crisis was a military takeover. This would neutralize Erbakan's appeal, reaffirm the Republic's fundamental principles, and possibly preserve the necessary foundations for the restoration of a civilian democratic order. There is no question that the military, although not anxious to assume political power, had made the necessary preparations to act. The population, deeply disappointed by the paralysis of the political system and disappearance of security for life, was not only fully prepared to accept the military intervention but actually sought it.<sup>3</sup> The military's reluctance to intervene was regarded as a weakness by terrorists, especially of the radical left, who became audacious enough to claim that this was "the first and the last state established by the Turks bearing their own ethnic name" (this was a sarcastic allusion to Atatürk's declaration announcing the establishment of the first Turkish national state in 1923).<sup>4</sup> As the military intervention expected in the summer failed to materialize, certain sections of the population began to express the view that they would accept *any* regime which could restore order and guarantee one's life. Meanwhile the political leaders in Parliament, as though totally unaware of the situation in the country, continued to tear each other down on behalf of the "democracy" they had managed to turn into a meaningless, if not despised, idea.

One did not have to read the classics of Rome, Greece, or even the history of the Byzantium to learn about the destruction of a civilization brought about by human passion and frivolity. It sufficed merely to open any Turkish newspaper or watch the news on the state-run TV, where the spectacle of otherwise urbane party leaders

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<sup>3</sup> The writer spent several months in Turkey in 1980 and was told this by several persons in private conversations.

<sup>4</sup> On terrorism, see Osman Güvenir, "Türkiye'de Terör ve Güvenlik Kuvvetlerinin Durumu" in *Türkiye'de Terör* (İstanbul, 1980), pp. 82–96. This book consists of a variety of communications, mostly theoretical and legalistic, submitted to a seminar organized by the Newsmen's Association of İstanbul in memory of Abdi İpekçi, the noted newsman assassinated in 1979; the question and answer section is more interesting. See also Metin Toker, *Solda ve Sağda Vuruşanlar* (Ankara, 1971) and Section 5 of this paper.

accusing each other of incompetence, moral failure, subversion, and the like was displayed for public view. Inevitably, one was led to ask how long such a nation—one with an illustrious history showing its excellence in capable administration and enlightened leadership—could watch the sad scene staged by these epigones brought to national prominence through the political game of democracy so well expressed in the expression *biz sandıktan çıktık* (we came out of the ballot box).<sup>5</sup> Atatürk's name, although perfunctorily mentioned, seemed to belong to a remote past, especially in his own party.

## 2. *The Intervention and Its Aftermath*

The military takeover was carried out without incident on September 12, 1980, by the armed forces under the command of the incumbent Chiefs of Staff. The National Security Council (*Milli Güvenlik Konseyi*) assumed all legislative and executive powers. This body consisted of General Kenan Evren, the Chief of Staff who became the head of the state; General Nurettin Ersin, the commander of ground forces; General Tahsin Şahinkaya, chief of the air force; Admiral Nejat Tümer; Sedat Celasun, the general commander of the gendarmes; and General Haydar Saltık, considered to be the brain behind the plan, who became the secretary general of the Council. Saltık had been the secretary of the old National Security Council established by the Constitution to oversee the nation's security. In fact, it may be claimed that the military takeover amounted simply to the assumption of power by an already established constitutional body—the National Security Council—although its composition was drastically changed and its powers vastly expanded shortly after the takeover through the addition of several committees on the economy, intelligence, and so on, so that it became in effect a super government. Admiral Bülend Ulusu, Turkish ambassador in Rome, was appointed Premier and formed a cabinet consisting chiefly of civilians.

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<sup>5</sup> The expression, used mostly by the Justice Party and its predecessor, the Democratic Party, implied originally that someone, however obscure in origin, if elected to the Parliament acquired prominence because he was the people's choice. However, the expression later came to imply that the mere act of election overshadowed any other considerations such as the education, capability, achievement, etc., of the elected.

The population in general greeted with jubilation the announcement of the takeover. Significantly, *Bizim Radyo*, the clandestine radio station of the Turkish Communist Party in Berlin, called upon the masses and, particularly, the National Salvation Party followers to resist the takeover.

The first announcement by the military was consonant more or less with the conditions and expectations which precipitated the takeover. General Evren declared that the military leaders, who had maintained a strict neutrality since 1973, had appealed repeatedly to the politicians to patch up their differences and unite in adopting the necessary policies. The army was eventually forced to intervene because:

the Turkish republic given in trust to us as a national and territorial entity is faced with treacherous ideologies and physical attacks instigated by external and internal enemies who aim at its existence, at its political system and independence. The government and its principal organs have been rendered inoperative, the constitutional institutions have turned contradictory or silent . . . the political parties have failed to secure unity and togetherness while reactionary and other deviationist ideologies flourished in the place of Atatürkism.<sup>6</sup>

The armed forces, according to Evren, had to fulfill their duty as ordered by the military's internal administration or service—*İç hizmet kanunu*. Consequently, the military assumed power:

to preserve the country's integrity and achieve national unity and togetherness, to prevent a possible civil war, and a war among brothers, to restore the authority of the government and to assure the existence of the state and eliminate the obstacles which prevented the democratic system from proper functioning.<sup>7</sup>

General Evren declared emphatically that the military's ultimate purpose was to restore the democratic order in the shortest possible time by fighting divisive ideologies and rebuilding national solidarity, on the basis of the spirit displayed in the War of National Liberation and around Atatürk's principles and reforms. The old pro-Western foreign policy was to be pursued.

The military intervention was viewed with satisfaction abroad as Turkey's situation seemed hopeless whichever way one looked at it.

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<sup>6</sup> See *Milliyet*, September 13 and 14, 1980.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

The U.S. declared that the takeover did not infringe human rights, as did other coups in Latin America, and it moved to continue aid to Turkey.

Following the takeover all political activity in the country was suspended. Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit and about sixty deputies were taken into custody but were released after a relatively short time. Necmettin Erbakan, on the other hand, originally held in custody at a military base and then released, was rearrested two days later and brought to trial for violating various laws. Several of his close followers were arrested also.<sup>8</sup> Alparslan Türkeş, the leader of the *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* (Nationalist Action Party—NAP), remained in hiding for a few days; but he eventually surrendered, was subsequently arraigned, and has thus far been tried for at least five violations of the law. Türkeş, a former army colonel and a leading member of the military junta which assumed power in 1960, was suspected of maintaining relations with right wing officers with the idea of a possible takeover: in fact, a leftist turncoat who joined Türkeş's party accused him of plotting a rightist putsch. So far no concrete evidence has been supplied.

The military began a massive hunt for both rightist and leftist terrorists and subversives and was able to round up several thousand in a matter of a few days. Most of the members of those rightist organizations suspected of terrorist activities—consisting chiefly of three or four major groups—have been arrested. Leftist organizations, usually of smaller size than the rightist groups, seemed to have broken up into a great variety of outlaw secret bands with various Marxist political labels; many members of these groups were arrested also. Terrorist attacks now have been reduced substantially and, what is more important, public confidence in government authority has been restored. It appears that terrorism was principally a lucrative business for a number of youth gangs operating under flamboyant political labels, as well as for some businessmen who shipped arms to these bands through Bulgaria. Many youths, on the other hand,

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<sup>8</sup> The arrest and trial of Erbakan has been protested by several Muslim leaders abroad, including Salem Azzam, the Secretary General of the Islamic Council of Europe, who asked that the human rights of the "movements of Islamic resurgence in Turkey" be protected along with the Turks' right to order their socio-economic life in accordance with their faith and ideological values; see *Impact International* (20 September–9 October, 1980): 4.



came from culturally and socially alienated groups and employed ideology and terrorism in a fight against the system's injustices, real or perceived. The years of unhindered activity and easy access to financial resources enabled some of these groups to organize countrywide, to develop well-entrenched systems, and to acquire a missionary-like sense of "righteousness" that enhanced their resourcefulness, resilience, and durability.

The economic policy since the military takeover has remained what it was under Süleyman Demirel. It is worth mentioning that Demirel's minority government had adopted early in 1980 a series of economic measures long advocated by the International Monetary Fund and made preconditions for the granting to Turkey of much needed hard currency credits. The slowing of the economic growth rate; the reorganization of money losing, tax supported state enterprises; the devaluation of the currency to stimulate exports; the development of a better foreign investment policy—these were some of the chief measures taken by Demirel. They were in fact revolutionary measures, if seen in the light of Turkey's economic history; they aroused the bitter opposition of the left, which feared that success would place Turkey definitely in the camp of the free enterprise capitalism, while the statist minded groups and the entrepreneurs, who had thrived under state protectionism, regarded with misgivings the adoption of programs promoting true creative entrepreneurship.

DİSK (*Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu*—the Revolutionary Workers Trade Union Confederation) was one of the organizations which started an open campaign of strikes intended to destabilize the economy and sabotage Demirel's new measures. DİSK had Soviet backing (it was accused of being a branch of the outlawed TKP—the Turkish Communist Party), had supported radical leftist elements, and had played a significant part in getting the wages of its followers raised to keep up with the inflation. The wage raises were far greater than the economy's potential, however; for instance, some refinery workers received wages three times greater than that of the highest paid government employee. (Actually DİSK, with about 400,000 members, was seeking to win the workers away from the Türk-İş, the chief and oldest trade union confederation, which had about 2 million members.) The military government suspended the activities of DİSK and arrested more than 350 of its leaders; but many have since been released. It closed also the nationalist trade union (MİSK).

The military allowed the Türk-İş to continue to function freely,

and the Secretary General of the Türk-İş, Sadık Şide, was made Minister of Labor. However, some collective contracts negotiated by Türk-İş before the coup have not been fully enforced, a variety of other more pressing economic matters, such as the much needed tax reform, being under consideration at the time of this writing. Turgut Özal, the head of the State Planning Organization under Demirel, was retained and elevated to the position of Minister of State, indicating that the military will continue the economic policy initiated by the outgoing government. There have been a series of veiled attacks on Turgut Özal by the press, as well as complaints that the military seem to favor economic conservatism and businessmen. These attacks and complains are as yet without visible results.

### 3. *Authority, Elitism and the Democratic Order*

The dismal failure of democracy in Turkey, which made inevitable the military intervention of 1980, as it had twice before, should be a matter of deep concern not only to Turks but to the entire third world and the West. This is not the failure of a few practical measures but the crumbling of an entire system of Western values, structures, and institutions. It is especially disturbing that the foundations of democracy in Turkey were undermined not because of popular rejection of democratic principles but through cynical manipulation and exploitation by radical elements of the intelligentsia of the freedoms granted under democracy. Various extremist ideological groups proposed to substitute for democracy nationalistic, socialistic, or communistic totalitarian systems, giving priority not to democratic freedoms and rights but to a variety of economic and social objectives that they considered to take precedence over any spiritual or moral consideration rooted in political democracy. There is no question that democracy in Turkey provided the necessary political conditions to articulate social and economic needs; however, the demand that these needs be met appeared to acquire priority over the principle which allowed their expression. Radicals of the left deemed democracy incapable of fulfilling the demands, although the material and social progress achieved by Turkey under democracy in the period from 1946 until 1980 exceeded by far the economic and social growth achieved under the one-party system from 1923 until 1946. Paradoxically, the "slow" rate of economic development under democ-

racy was cited as a handicap to social and economic modernization, and thus political democracy was made to appear incompatible with social and economic democracy.

One is forced to ask whether political democracy, as the product of Western culture and history, can be successfully adopted in countries like Turkey which have quite different historical traditions of government and social organization. Is political democracy simply a device used by the West and the dominant groups in Turkey to perpetuate their supremacy and advance their interests, as is claimed both by rightist and leftist extremists? As mentioned above, the overwhelming majority of the Turks not only defend the principles of democracy but demand that it be protected and fully implemented. Thus it would seem that the spirit of democracy may be preserved in Turkey if its implementation and administration are made compatible with the country's traditions of government and political culture. This implies that democracy in Turkey may have to be implemented by means other than those known in the West, and this immediately raises the problem of whether a "democracy" can be deprived of its procedures. The paradox of the situation in Turkey lies in the fact that the military have emerged as the defenders of the political democracy (whatever its scope and meaning) against the continual failure of the civilian governments to implement or protect it. In other words, the Turkish situation contradicts the common view, accepted by Western students of politics, that democracy is the product of compromises and agreement among civilian groups and is somehow an antidote for militarism. In Turkey democracy has undergone three grave crises since its inception some thirty-five years ago. All three crises resulted solely from the failure of the civilians to compromise or learn to live with each other, whether in power or in opposition. Three times the military has had to intervene to save democracy (a feat accomplished in 1960 only through the drastic purge of officers who did not want to restore it).

Turkey has lived under a democratic system since 1945-46, despite short interludes of restricted freedom. A generation and half (comprising some 40 percent of Turkey's population) has grown up under a democratic system and has absorbed its values. There is thus a contradiction between the apparent incompatibility of western democracy with the values of the non-western, Turkish culture and the evident ability of democracy to survive for thirty-five years in Turkey. In fact, the apparent contradiction has so far been—and must continue

to be, if Turkish democracy is to survive for more generations—nullified by the adaption and accommodation of the political democracy to the demands of Turkey's traditional political culture. Democracy has been successful in Turkey to the extent that the government-state has been able to enforce the basic laws and regulations designed to assure the citizens' security and freedom to exercise their political rights without intimidation. Needless to say, law and the existence of a government capable of enforcing it is a prerequisite for civilized society anywhere. In Turkey, this prerequisite acquires an added importance.

Turks have inherited from the highly bureaucratic Ottoman state both a tendency to overregulate and a predisposition to accord respect to laws and regulations—as long as there is a government deemed capable of enforcing them. Thus, some parties, usually the totalitarians and those urging rapid progress by means of government intervention, have claimed that historically Turks are attuned to perform best under an authoritarian government. This raises the classical question of the difference between authority and authoritarianism and plain dictatorship. I believe that historically Ottoman and Turkish governments have been *authoritarian* only when their authority to maintain the law was challenged. Totalitarianism, as understood in the West and in East Europe, has been conspicuously absent in Turkey, even under the most restrictive governments. Democracy in Turkey began to be undermined when the traditional understandings of government and authority and their implicit supremacy began to be replaced, via rationalist ideologies, by an individualistic and interest-oriented understanding of government and authority. Indeed, democracy was successfully established and has survived in Turkey (with some lapses, to be sure) not only because of the temporary coincidence of interests and opinions among the Turkish elites but, rather, because of the coincidence of traditional beliefs and values and forms of collective action with certain procedures of democracy, such as action through communal consensus, representation, and voting.

On balance, however, it appears that it was not popular disillusionment but, rather, the failure of the intellectual elites to develop among themselves a consensus on issues of social justice, economic development, and the place of history, culture, and religion in society that undermined democracy. Radical leftists claimed that parliamentary democracy in Turkey was a device to perpetuate social injustice and backwardness and to allow the upper classes to enrich

themselves by maintaining semi-feudal relations in the society. The rightists, on the other hand, believed that democracy had destroyed the traditional social order and its values and had given to a variety of leftist groups the freedom to subvert and undermine the national integrity and character. Radicals from both sides shared a deeply entrenched belief that democracy had permitted the "ignorant masses," alleged to be mainly preoccupied with petty material interests, to make decisions concerning society's welfare and future, and, worse, had allowed the moneyed interests and a variety of established groups to manipulate the "ignorant" electorate according to their own wishes.

The new elite group, which emerged chiefly after 1965, was substantially different from the old. The old, traditional political elites claimed status because of their association with the Republic and the government or their degree of formal higher education, family background, wealth, etc.—not necessarily in this order listed. The new elitism placed emphasis on leadership ability and the capability of defining the problems affecting the entire nation-society, identifying with those problems, and devising solutions accordingly. There is no question but that the new elites advocated and exemplified most of the leadership qualifications sought by advocates of modernization. Yet this new elitism—justified by its support of populism, socialism, and development—was not really amenable to the ideas of classical western democracy (as was well demonstrated by the ideological adventures of the RPP, to be dealt with in the last section of this article). The population that continued to live in areas in which traditional tribal or religious ties had been broken seemed to have developed an independent and relatively consistent political attitude favorable to democracy. On the other hand, the new elites—that is, the educated groups originating from these same areas—appeared to have been affected by the breakdown of the traditional society in quite the opposite manner: these rejected democracy as a system unsuitable to Turkey and called for its replacement by a totalitarian regime, it being a matter of accident or circumstance whether the viewpoint adopted was leftist or rightist.

The deadlock between political elites gathered around political parties polarized at the two ideological extremes paralyzed the political system and necessitated the intervention of the army as an "honest broker" striving to maintain the integrity of the Republic. The role and function of the military in this process was determined by its historic association with the state, its own view that it was situated

at the apex of the elite hierarchy (this judgment was based on a definition of "elitism" different from that of the civilians), and the army leaders' view that democracy was the only regime accepted voluntarily by the largest number of Turks, regardless of their motives. An understanding of the role of the military in the Turkish political system is essential for the understanding of the development of Turkish-style democracy and for the prediction of its probable future course.

#### 4. *The Military's Historical Position and Interest*

The army is the only institution in Turkey to have maintained an uninterrupted existence throughout the 600 year history of the Ottoman state and the life of the Republic.<sup>9</sup> The military has been intimately associated with the state since its inception; one cannot think of the state without the army or vice versa. The head of the state throughout the Ottoman history and in the Republic, with the exception of the fateful period between 1950 and 1960, has always been a military man. A quick glance at the history of the political transformation shows that the military have been the developers and the implementers of the reforms in the Ottoman state and Republic. The military was itself the first institution to undergo drastic reform in the eighteenth century; it seems to have been the only institution able to absorb innovation without suffering a crisis of identity (as happened to other segments of the society) and without being affected in its sense of its own historical continuity. The military establishment has managed to maintain its distinct historical identity by harmonizing it with new values and conditions; for example, the army accepted and used the most advanced technology without discarding its own established traditions and values.

Despite the fact that the Ottoman government was essentially in the hands of the military even when performing civilian functions (the top ranking administrators all being from the army), the society did not become militarized; in fact, the opposite was true. The mil-

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<sup>9</sup> There is a rather rich bibliography on the military in Turkey; see e.g. Kemal H. Karpat, "The Military and Politics in Turkey—A Socio-Cultural Analysis of a Revolution," *American Historical Review* (October 1970), and E. Özbudun, *The Role of the Military in Recent Turkish Politics*, (Cambridge Mass., 1966).

itary's association with and control of the government was preserved even after the introduction of a general conscription system in 1855, and service in the army after that date had a certain equalizing effect, as all recruits were treated equally regardless of their social origin or status. In the Republic the educated were trained as reserve officers, but their treatment within their own quarters was egalitarian.

The Turkish officers were (and are) recruited from the middle and the lower classes and, occasionally, the peasantry, but are not identified ideologically with any of these classes or with any oligarchy or aristocracy (which do not anyway exist in Turkey). Thus, the Turkish military is different from the military in Latin America or in neighboring Greece (or the other prewar Balkan states) in that it is not identified politically with a specific social class but with the state only. It remains also, as far as individual members are concerned, an integral part of everyday society. When the military have stepped in to exercise government power they have done so not for their own sake or on behalf of a particular social group but for the purpose of maintaining the integrity of the state, which in turn guarantees their role and position. This identification with the state makes the military relatively immune to the daily political infighting. The identification also gives the military rather unlimited freedom to intervene on the excuse of defending the state. Obviously, it may be questioned whether this type of state is the ideal one, but the examination of that issue is beyond the scope of this study.

The identification of the military with the state, reform, and the society at large was reinforced during the War of Liberation (1920–22) which led eventually to the establishment of the Republic. Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk), who rose from the military ranks and played a crucial role in these events, became the symbol of the new state, the maintenance of which became the military's chief responsibility. The military regarded the new state and the modernist reforms as Atatürk's legacy. Yet military men were forbidden to enter politics so long as they maintained their army commissions. Atatürk became involved in nationalist politics in 1919 only after he resigned from the army. There have been always some officers who have disagreed individually with this position of the army establishment, but these have been in a minority and have been easily neutralized.

The formal decision to adopt democracy with its principles of opposition parties and freedom of assembly and expression was taken in 1945–46 by President İsmet İnönü, a former general—but not

before he had consulted the military chiefs and secured their approval; İnönü won the military's support after assuring the army commanders (as he told this writer in an interview) that the political parties would not be allowed to violate Atatürk's reforms. İnönü told the army chiefs that they had a duty to preserve the democratic order. In other words, the military, besides retaining their positions as custodians of the state, were entrusted additionally with the task of guarding the state's newly established democratic order, although direct involvement in politics was still strictly forbidden as part of Atatürk's legacy. Thus the Turkish democracy came into existence with the express consent and backing of the military.<sup>10</sup>

There is no question but that the development of a pluralistic order in Turkey and of civilian structures and processes outside the control of the military at times conflicted with and challenged the army's traditional position and values; but the tensions born out of this conflict have always been kept under control. In the long run, the transition of Turkey's social and political system to an entirely civilian order is inevitable. In fact, one may claim that many of the political crises faced by Turkey since 1950 stem from the process of this transition. The question that arises is whether the transition finally will be achieved through violence and the total destruction of the old order or will take place gradually, with the old order being quietly replaced by the new. The experience so far shows that democracy was the most suitable vehicle for effecting a gradual and relatively smooth change. The military itself has played a key role in the transition which, if finally achieved successfully, will put an end to its traditional political role in Turkey. The military interventions in Turkish government seem to have expedited the gradual transition, first, by defining the army's role in the democratic order and, second, by consolidating the democratic processes through various constitutional and legal devices. The interventions all were triggered by destructive conflicts between the political parties and the threat to the Republic's integrity.

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<sup>10</sup> I have analyzed these events in a variety of publications, see *Turkey's Politics* (Princeton, 1959) and "Society, Economics and Politics in Contemporary Turkey," *World Politics* (October, 1964): 50-74.



### 5. *The Sequence of Military Interventions*

The military takeover of May 27, 1960, was essentially a reaction of the intelligentsia, the bureaucracy, and the military to the rise of a civilian order, to the free enterprise system, and to the disintegration of the traditional elite order brought about by the policies of the Democratic Party (DP) government of Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayar. The takeover was preceded by student demonstrations and a massive underground activity chiefly led by the younger members of the Republican Party. The event which triggered the takeover was the attempt of Menderes to use the army to quell the opposition. The RPP and its leader, İsmet İnönü, felt that the Democrats, and especially Prime Minister Menderes, were bent on liquidating the opposition and thus ending democracy.

The 1960 takeover was engineered by a secret organization consisting chiefly of majors, captains, and one or two colonels; the generals were drafted into the secret organization only shortly before and during the early hours of the takeover. The ideological leanings of the thirty-eight officers who ruled Turkey after the takeover ranged from social conservatism (among the elders, particularly the generals) to social nationalism (among a few) to a vague yearning for social democracy (among the rest). With the ousting of the nationalists—that is, the “fourteen” headed by Col. Alparslan Türkeş who advocated a strong government—the social democrats remained in majority. The military dealt the democratic order a debilitating blow by arresting all the Democratic Party deputies and bringing them before a special court at Yassıada to stand trial for violating the Constitution. The Democrats were condemned to various terms in jail, and prohibited from engaging in politics; the leaders were condemned to death, but only Adnan Menderes and the former Foreign Minister, Fatih Rüştü Zorlu, and the Finance Minister, Hasan Polatkan, were hanged. Thus the military coup appeared to have been directed exclusively against the Democratic Party, which was closed down and its members and sympathizers—representing four million voters—insulted with various derogatory names.

The military who forced the change of government appeared to be in control, but the real power was in the hands of the RPP, especially after the ousting of the “fourteen” who were as critical of the RPP as of the Democratic Party. The Constituent Assembly which drafted the Constitution of 1961 consisted almost exclusively of

members or sympathizers of the RPP. The views of the RPP on the future regime of Turkey had already been expressed in various publications issued by its Research and Publication Office.<sup>11</sup> This office was dominated by young members, some of whom later became identified with radical leftist movements and the publication of *Yön* (*Direction*), the review which played such a significant part in shaping the thought of Turkey's leftist element. The RPP had offered liberals, social democrats, and some Marxists an excellent shelter from the Menderes government, which seemed ready to prosecute as "subversive" or "communist" any individual who dared criticize the imbalanced income distribution or any other social shortcoming. Indeed, social concerns were on the rise because of social dislocation and inflation, as had been indicated by the relatively poor showing of the DP in the elections of 1957. The RPP seized upon the public's growing concern with economic and social problems and, in its convention of January 14, 1959, issued a "Declaration on First Targets" which reflected also the views of the Freedom Party (formed by dissidents from the Democratic Party). These were in essence politically liberal and socially egalitarian views which were later incorporated, to an excessive extent, into the Constitution of 1961 (as shall be discussed below).

In sum, the military takeover of 1960, described euphemistically as the work of the *Çinde kuvvetler* ("vigorous young forces") established the view that the Democratic Party and its members were anti-democratic, reactionary, conservative, and anti-secularist, and thus unfit to govern the country. Consequently, the successors of the DP were likely to be opposed and challenged any time by the Republican Party and all other "progressive" groups on the basis of the principles enunciated by the Constitution, and the tacit assumption was that the army would step in to defend them against a government run by the "conservatives-reactionaries." (This assumption has been dominant in the two decades of political activity in Turkey since 1961; the feeling has been that a group—usually the intelligentsia and the RPP—that could prove that it "conformed" to the constitution, however flimsy the proof might be, could not be touched by any government or law administered by the Justice Party.)

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<sup>11</sup> The *CHP Araştırma ve Yayın Bürosu* (RPP Office for Research and Publication) published until the middle of 1961 some twenty-four brochures on development, agriculture, rural problems, etc.

It was assumed that the military intervention of 1960, the bad press, and the formal closure of the Democratic Party had so drastically undermined that group's popular appeal that the Republican Party would easily receive a comfortable majority in the elections and be able to form the government by itself. These calculations proved to be totally wrong. First, the new Constitution received only 66 percent of the votes cast in the referendum held in July, 1961; and probably it would have been rejected if the opposition leaders had not urged their followers to cast a positive vote in order to hasten the return to a normal civilian regime. Then the parliamentary elections failed to produce a majority for the RPP. Its rivals, the *Adalet* and *Yeni Türkiye* (the Justice and New Turkey parties), both of which relied on the support of the Democratic Party members and voters, won 158 and 65 seats respectively in the 450-seat National Assembly. Normally, these two parties should have formed the government, but the military opposed this as being counterrevolutionary. The Republican Party, which won only 173 seats, was entrusted to form the government. İnönü formed a coalition government composed of the JP and the RPP that lasted barely seven months, despite the Premier's frantic efforts to make it work. İnönü next formed a coalition with NTP and RPNP. A third coalition formed with independents lasted until 1965.

It is wrong to say that the government weakness that is the root cause of political troubles in Turkey resulted chiefly from the failure of any political party to win a majority. As pointed out, in 1961 the JP and NTP had between them a near majority, while in both 1965 and 1969 the JP alone won a comfortable majority (see appendices). However, there was a matter of psychology involved: it appeared utterly illogical to entrust the government and the enforcement of the new Constitution to a party against whose predecessor a revolution had been carried out only one and one-half years previously. The argument against JP was that it represented conservative ideas, that it was *çağdışı* ("out of this century"), despite the voters' preference for the party. Thus the majority party was considered to be somehow unqualified to govern. A detailed, objective study would show that that image of the JP was created by its opponents. (The Western press, ready to accept any criticism as valid as long as it was directed against Islam and cultural conservatism, generalized the view of JP's opponents.) The JP also suffered because its concept of "modernity" and "progress" was framed in empirical and economic

terms, while its opponents had an ideological-cultural concept of “modernity.”<sup>12</sup>

The entire decade of 1961–1971 was lost to ideological debate among the parties. Forces operating inside and outside Parliament were able to frustrate the work of a duly elected government if they could successfully claim that the government was not performing in accordance with the dictates of the Constitution. Such groups claimed—with the backing of the press and the universities—that the Constitution gave precedence to social and economic goals over formal political democracy. The Justice Party, on the other hand, felt that its constituency was unjustly maligned and deprived of Constitutional rights. It was therefore uncooperative.

The military intervention of 12 March 1971 must be considered the logical consequence of the situation described above. Unlike the 1960 intervention, this was led by the Chiefs of Staff, headed by Faruk Gürler, on behalf of democratic nationalist officers who feared a leftist takeover by a group headed possibly by General Cemal Madanoğlu (who supposedly had been receiving the advice of some radical intellectuals). The ostensible purpose of this second takeover was to enforce the social and economic reforms decreed by the Constitution of 1961; actually it was intended to prevent the leftists from taking over the government. Indeed, there had been a leftist upsurge after 1965, and this allowed liberal leftist groups to gain control of the universities and some labor unions and to increase their influence in the press, education, and in the lower ranks of the bureaucracy. This happened during Süleyman Demirel’s Premiership. His party won a majority of the votes in the elections of 1965 and 1969 and secured a comfortable margin of seats in the parliament, but its government proved both unwilling and unable to cope successfully with a variety of illegal acts, including the occupation and boycott of universities as well as the acts of violence that accompanied the leftist upsurge.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> This issue has been debated publicly at great length between Süleyman Demirel and Abdi İpekçi, the late editor of *Milliyet*; see their exchange of letters in the issue of 14–28 February 1978. Demirel complained that the press had presented a biased and distorted view of his party and his modernist orientation.

<sup>13</sup> In a personal interview in 1970 I asked Demirel why he did not use his authority to oppose the illegal seizures of universities and the intimidation of students and professors by political thugs who not only violated the law but threatened democracy. Demirel answered that the demonstrators would realize that the public did

The military, along with many intellectuals, believed that much of the dissent and dissatisfaction in the universities and the press stemmed from the failure of the government to introduce social and economic reforms, among which land reform occupied a symbolic place. Consequently, the military first attempted to reestablish government authority, arresting thousands of leftist and religious activists and closing down political parties, including the *Millî Nizam Partisi* (Party of National Order) of Erbakan and the TİP (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*—Labor Party of Turkey) which were considered to represent the extreme religious and extreme left, respectively. (Both parties reappeared soon, one with changed name.) The military proposed also a series of reforms. They did not, as in 1960, associate themselves formally with any political party; the new Prime Minister designate, Nihat Erim, had been a member of the RPP but resigned from the party before assuming the office. The civilian parliament was allowed to function, and there were no mass arrests or trials of politicians. Some analysts were thus led to describe it as the “civilized revolution.”<sup>14</sup>

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not agree with them and, having exhausted their arguments, would quiet down. The first violations of some most elementary notions of basic democracy were initiated by the leftists in some universities in 1967 and 1968 after students began to demand social reforms. They prevented their adversaries from expressing their views or even attending school. Meetings were often used to radicalize and indoctrinate the student body, often with the assistance of a few professors in utter defiance of the university administration. The universities were autonomous, and the police would not enter until specifically asked by the President, who often would not dare to incur the wrath of the radicals. (Anyway, the courts were always ready to issue a restraining order against restrictions on meetings.) In passing judgment on this problem of violence on the university campuses I rely greatly on my personal observation of the student activities at Middle East Technical University in Ankara in 1968–70. Soon after these events I met in New York with Orhan Eyüboğlu, a prominent member and Secretary General of the Republican Party who had also served the chief of the İstanbul police. In his view it was proper that police should not enter and stay on the university grounds without the express demand of its President, regardless of the gravity of the situation. He opposed the army's entry into the campus. (He was very surprised when I told him that in 1968 the National Guard of Wisconsin with rifles in hand and lined along building corridors had assured the access of students to classrooms against those who wanted to deprive them of their right to learn.) One can say with hindsight that much of the political turmoil in Turkey, which began first in the universities and then spilled over into society in general, could have been avoided if the university administrations and the government had the legal power and the determination to uphold the rules of a true democracy.

<sup>14</sup> See for instance *Barış Dünyası*, No. 107 (April, 1971); this review was published by the late Ahmet Hamdi Başar, one of the few writers who attempted to maintain a certain political neutrality.

In fact, the military made it clear that they still regarded Demirel's party and government as the culprit. The communique announcing the takeover accused Demirel's government of having:

pushed the country into anarchy, fratricidal struggle and social and economic unrest through its [wrong] views, attitude and politics. It lost in the eyes of the public any hope of achieving the level of civilization targeted by Atatürk, it failed to enforce the reforms mentioned by the Constitution and placed the future of the Turkish Republic in grave danger.<sup>15</sup>

The military promised to hold free elections "once the anarchy had been totally eradicated and order and security has been fully established."<sup>16</sup>

The political parties opposed the takeover. The RPP in particular, unlike its stance in 1960, came out openly against the intervention. The party now was under the leadership of its Secretary General, Bülent Ecevit, who denounced the military intervention in rather strong terms. Ecevit was engaged in promoting a "left of the center" ideology for his party and believed that the intervention had thwarted his ideological pursuits and damaged the party's election chances. Interest in rapid economic development and social change (to be discussed later) seemed to have enhanced RPP's political fortune. Much of the Demirel's inability to cope with the rising unrest and to enforce his program, which made him appear as a weak and vacillating leader, had been in fact the result of the delaying tactics employed by his opponents in the parliament and in the courts. Eventually the elections of 1973 gave the RPP 33.3 percent and the JP 29.8 percent of the vote. The proportional representation system enabled the Democratic Party, formed by a dissenting group, to take away a substantial number of the JP votes; the dissenters, advocating a truly liberal economic policy, reacted to a tax reform introduced by Demirel in order to equalize income distribution. However the RPP was unable to form a government by itself and, as previously mentioned, turned to the NSP of Erbakan for support.

The military intervention of 1971 produced no lasting effect chiefly because it failed to secure the support of a major social group or a political party. In fact, one may say that the intervention of 1971 was "an incomplete revolution" (as some called it) which gave an

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<sup>15</sup> See *Milliyet*, March 13 and 14, 1971.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

inadvertent support to the ideological struggle by legitimizing the ousting of a duly elected government for failure to enforce the reforms.<sup>17</sup>

The recent military intervention of September 12, 1980, on the other hand, was prompted by the deadlock among political parties, the unchecked terrorism that deprived citizens of the security of life, the disintegration of the government authority, and the religious, ethnic, and social rivalries instigated by small parties in search of a support basis: even the leader of the RPP adopted a pose as the defender of the "oppressed" *Alevis* (Shiites). The intervention was not aimed directly against the Justice Party (Demirel was again the Prime Minister in a minority government) or the Republican Party, although the latter was blamed for leftist ideological deviations and political opportunism. So far the military have again rejected any affiliation with a political or social group and have claimed identification only with the state, law, and order through appeal to the basic principles of the Republic and Kemalism. The 1980 intervention was similar to the intervention of 1971 in that the military acted under the direction of the chiefs of the armed forces not in order to forestall a takeover by an ideologically oriented group (rumors that Türkesh nationalist followers were preparing a coup cannot yet be verified) but in order to save the regime and reassert Kemalist principles. Consequently they have placed a special emphasis on secularism as one of the chief, if not the main, principle of Atatürkism. The reassertion of secularism on its old terms runs against the new concepts of religious freedom in the RPP and JP and other parties, as well as against the NSP, which defends a revival of fundamentalist Islam. As mentioned elsewhere, the dispute over the maintenance of secularism in its original form—one of the main differences between the RPP and JP—had ended gradually after 1965 as the Republicans moved ideologically to the left.

Unlike their actions in 1971, the military have dissolved the parliament, but so far only a handful of deputies have been arrested for violating common law. All executive and legislative power has been

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<sup>17</sup> The chief measures undertaken by the military governments are enumerated in *12 Mart Sonrası Hükümet Faaliyetleri 12 Mart 1971–12 Mart 1973* (Published by the Premier's office: Ankara, 1973). For additional literature, see Abdullah Uraz, *1970 Siyasi Buhran ve İğyüzü* (İstanbul, 1970); Süleyman Genç, *12 Mart'a nasıl gelindi* (Ankara, 1971); Ali Gevgilili, *Türkiye'de 1971 Rejimi* (İstanbul, 1973); Ergin Eroğlu, *Sınıflar açısından 12 Mart; 12 Mart Devam Ediyor mu* (İstanbul, 1974); and Mehmet Kemal, *12 Mart Öfkeli Generaller ve İşkençe* (İstanbul, 1974).

concentrated in the hands of the National Security Council, while the actual implementation has been left to a largely civilian cabinet. In 1980 the military have defined the distribution of power and responsibilities in a more precise and clear fashion and have assumed an almost completely free hand to do whatever they deem necessary to restore law and security and the state's prestige and authority, with the ultimate purpose of creating the necessary conditions for the reestablishment of a civilian democratic order.

### 6. *Economic Change, Social Dislocation, and Terrorism*

Much of the political and ideological ferment in Turkey was generated by the breakdown of the traditional social and economic order and the ensuing social alienation which exacerbated the feelings of insecurity already aroused by the existing cultural alienation. The search for a sense of security by way of the reassessment of religious and national identity encouraged the rise of rightist sentiments; the economic changes and social dislocation created new problems of adjustment and income distribution that stimulated the rise of leftist, notably Marxist, ideologies. Rightist and leftist ideologies alike strove to provide an explanation for the social phenomena and a vision for the future, with the choice of the actual ideology being often a matter of accident, circumstance, and exposure. Economic development and internal migration were among the chief causes of the social change. Development in Turkey, if measured in terms of per capita and gross income, communications, literacy, associations, etc., would show an impressive growth during the period from 1950 to 1977, despite short periods of stagnation. The rate of real economic growth, especially in the years from 1965 to 1977, oscillated between 4 and 9 percent annually. Turkey was one of the few developing countries to show a steady rate of real growth. Statistical evidence fully supports the above contention and need not be reproduced here.<sup>18</sup> Suffice it to mention that per capita income had reached about \$1,200 in 1979 (some using different methods of calculation claim that it was \$1,600), or about twelve times the per capita income

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<sup>18</sup> For figures see Kemal H. Karpat, *Social Change and Politics in Turkey* (Leiden, 1973).



in 1946. By 1979 literacy had reached nearly 85 percent among those in the 10 to 25 year age range. Empirical observation alone would show massive betterment of living conditions in West, Southwest and North Turkey, while the Southeast remained relatively undeveloped, as indicated by statistics and even by voting behavior.<sup>19</sup> However, economic development took place in an atmosphere of tension and controversy between aggressive and able but socially unsensitized entrepreneurial groups and a state sector protected by law, financed from public taxes, and administered by a bureaucracy which increasingly adopted ideological postures.<sup>20</sup> The Turkish economic system itself, defined as “mixed”—that is, consisting of private and state sectors and with a State Planning Organization whose political orientation changed according to the ideology of the government party—was partly responsible for the political tension in Turkey.

In large measure the controversy between the defenders of free enterprise and the statist only reflected the deep changes brought by economic development to the country's traditional economic and social structure. Industrialization, mechanization of agriculture, and the adoption of a market economy, whether stimulated by private or state enterprise, altered in various ways and degrees the methods of production and the relations between producer and consumer, employer and employee. The rise of a labor movement, which counted trade union membership of about 2.5 millions in 1979 but was divided into the middle-of-the-road *Türk-İş*, the Marxist *DİSK*, the nationalist *MİSK*, and an incipient religious group, illustrates both the power of the economic and social change and its divisiveness. For this researcher, the importance of the economic development, including the unbalanced distribution of income (the gravity of which has been emphasized or minimized according to researchers' ideological

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<sup>19</sup> See William Hale, “Particularism and Universalism in Turkish Politics,” in *Aspects of Modern Turkey*, W.M. Hale, ed. (London, 1976), pp. 39–58, and Paul J. Magnarella, “Regional Voting in Turkey,” *Muslim World* (July–October, 1967): 224–36, 277–87.

<sup>20</sup> Turkish economic thought, aside from a number of books by economists representing various political tendencies, probably is best expressed in a series of the publications of the Economic and Social Studies Conference Board of İstanbul; see e.g. *Capital Formation and Investment in Turkey* (First Conference; İstanbul, 1968), *Planning and Growth Under a Mixed Economy* (İstanbul, 1965), and *State Economic Enterprises* (İstanbul, 1968). See also the publications of İstanbul University, especially *Problems of Turkey's Economic Development*, Vol. I (İstanbul, 1972), and Edwin J. Cohn, *Turkish Economic, Social and Political Change* (New York, 1970).

preferences),<sup>21</sup> lies in its effect of upsetting and altering traditional structures and old systems of values and beliefs.

Rural migration was the source of the most traumatic social and cultural change both in villages and in the cities. This movement was the consequence of economic development, chiefly of the building industry, that depended on large numbers of workers from the countryside. No other factor contributed as much to social and political change and, indirectly, to political unrest in Turkey as the agglomeration of rural migrant settlements around all the major cities of Turkey.<sup>22</sup> The population of the major cities of Turkey increased greatly in the period from 1950 to 1980. Some large cities, such as Ankara, İstanbul, and Adana, more than tripled their population. Most of this growth resulted from the country-to-city migration. This migration, it should be strongly emphasized, produced more than mere geographic and occupational change: For the rural migrant and his family, life in a *gecekondu* (shantytown) meant a drastic change in living habits, including not only the new type of work on construction sites or in industry but also, for example, regular hours of work, new types of associations, and even new kinds of nutrition. Yet until about 1975 life in the *gecekondu* was well organized, cohesive, and rather stable, because the traditional family ties, the village organization, and the leadership pattern (with the elders and the peers in commanding positions) were preserved and adapted to urban conditions. But as a social group the *gecekondu* dwellers remained relatively outcast in the eyes of the old city dwellers and the urban establishment.

The young people presented the chief problem in the *gecekondu*. Deprived of their natural village environment and culture, unable to integrate into urban life and share fully its amenities or, because of low income, educational insufficiency, etc., to achieve upward mobility, many of the young became alienated from the socio-political system and its culture. By 1973 the vote of the *gecekondu*, because of its size, had become crucial in determining the outcome of the municipal and even national elections. Because of its political importance,

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<sup>21</sup> See Tuncer Bulutay, "Türk Toplumsal Hayatında İktisadi ve Siyasi Gelişmeler," *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* (September, 1970): 79–119; Serim Timur and Hasan Ersel, *Türkiyede Gelir Dağılımı: 1968* (Ankara, 1970); and Korkut Boratav, *Gerlir Dağılımı, Kapitalist Sistemde, Türkiye'de Sosyalist, Sistemde* (İstanbul, 1963).

<sup>22</sup> Kemal H. Karpat, *The Gecekondu, Rural Migration and Urbanization in Turkey* (New York, London, Melbourne, 1976).

the *gecekondu* secured a certain *de facto* autonomy in administration. In fact, in many districts the *gecekondu* dwellers achieved numerical superiority over the established population and often succeeded in electing their own candidate as *muhtar* (headman) of the precinct. At first this seemed to be a positive development which could have led the *gecekondu* to integrate fully into the urban environment. However, a shift in political leanings changed the situation. The majority in the *gecekondu*—which had voted usually for the conservative Justice Party—began in 1973, for a variety of transitional reasons, to vote for the Republican Party. This shift to the left enabled the younger members of the *gecekondu* to replace the old, traditional leaders. A variety of militant student and radical party groups seeking a social base had already established close relations with the dissatisfied youth of the *gecekondu*. My own study has showed that by 1975 the Marxist Labor Party had secured a 10 percent following in the *gecekondu*, while its vote in the entire country never exceeded 3 percent.

The disintegration of the government authority, and the reluctance of the Ecevit government in 1978–79 to resort to coercion, lest it alienate its newly found backers in the *gecekondu*, permitted the new leaders to turn many migrant settlements into hot beds of radicalism, mostly leftist, although the rightists also controlled some of these settlements. Intimidation by a variety of strong means forced even the most independent-minded and, for the most part, law-abiding members of the settlements to follow the directives of the new leaders. Ethnic and religious differences between Kurds and non-Kurds, between *Alevîs* (Turkish Shiites) and Sunnis were politicized and used by both leftists and rightists to set one group against another. The grave incidents in Kahramanmaraş on 26 December 1978, and in Çorum, where dozens of people were killed, provide the best examples of the results of these political incitements which began mostly in the *gecekondu*.

Although the majority of the *gecekondu* seemed to have managed to maintain their independence, a good many fell under the domination of militant radicals. Alienated youth in the *gecekondu* and elsewhere in the cities provided a large recruitment pool for every militant, radical, and terrorist group. A study conducted among a group of rightists and leftists condemned to jail for various crimes shows that they differed little in terms of age, education, income, etc.; the only difference was that the leftists relied on their comrades for advice and help, while rightists relied on their elders. (The rightists' attitude

is not attributable to traditionalist inclination but, rather, to better discipline and a stronger hierarchy.) The same study supported the view that militancy and radicalism were, in part at least, the consequence of alienation more than of ideological commitment. It showed that 39.2 percent and 34.0 percent, respectively, of the jailed leftists and rightists were born in villages; 60 percent of the leftists and 63 percent of the rightists had, however, spent most of their lives in big cities, usually under unfavorable conditions; most were dropouts from schools.<sup>23</sup>

The relative ease with which the military liquidated most of these groups and arrested their leaders after the takeover in 1980 indicates that they did not have depth, cohesion, and popular support. In fact, many were arrested as a result of information supplied by citizens who had in the past been too afraid to inform the government.<sup>24</sup> The daily total of half a dozen or more murders (about 3,000 assassinations in the last two years) had been reduced to one or two per day by January, 1981, thanks in part to the public's growing confidence in the efficacy of the law enforcement agencies.

Terrorism was able to inflict a heavy blow on the idea of democracy because it was at times associated with the legally organized political groups and benefited from their tacit support. It appears that the Nationalist Action Party, especially its youth groups and *Ülkü Ocakları*, had connections (although it never acknowledged them)

<sup>23</sup> Doğu Ergil, *Türkiye'de Terör ve Şiddet, Yapısal ve Kültürel Kaynaklar* (Ankara, 1980), pp. 105–167. See also bibliography, n. 34. A condensed table of figures given in Ergil shows the following similarity between leftists and rightists (in percentages):

	<i>Leftists</i>	<i>Rightists</i>
<i>Ages 16–24</i>	80.8	76.5
<i>Education</i>		
Midlevel completed	17.6	14.8
Midlevel uncompleted	22.4	27.8
University completed	3.2	4.3
University uncompleted	26.4	28.4

<sup>24</sup> The disorder had assumed such proportion and intensity that even the declaration of martial law could not control violence. Actually the distorted application of “democracy” tended to undermine the military's authority and prestige. Martial law is ordinarily implemented by the military in rather stern fashion. However, Ecevit, searching for what he called “benevolent martial law,” introduced the idea of “*eşgüdüm*,” a sort of cooperative administration of martial law whereby the military were to inform the government about and obtain its approval for their actions. It undermined the military's claim to be able to control violence because martial law, though extended to twenty provinces of Turkey by 1980, could not control terrorism.

with various rightist terrorist groups, as indicated by arrests made since the military takeover. However, many more rightist groups seem to have organized and been active outside the control of the party. The National Salvation Party and its growth groups, the *Akıncular*, seemed to have managed to remain outside the terrorist battlefield.

The connection of the legally organized leftist parties with terrorist groups is rather complex. There were six organized leftist parties in 1980—the *Türkiye İşçi Partisi* (TİP), *Türkiye Sosyalist İşçi Partisi* (TSİP), *Türkiye İşçi ve Köylü Partisi* (TİKP), *Devrimci Sosyalist Partisi* (DSP), *Türkiye Emekçiler Partisi* (TEP), and the *Birlik Partisi* (BP).<sup>25</sup> So far it appears that none of these had direct connection with terrorist organizations. In fact, the pro-Chinese TİKP, through its daily *Aydınlık*, accused the USSR of being the source of terrorism in Turkey and repeatedly condemned all violence. It should be stressed that some of the leftist terrorist groups were organized originally as harmless political and intellectual organizations. For instance, the origins of the *Dev-Sol* (*Devrimci Sol* or Revolutionary Left) can be traced to the *Dev-Genç* and the *Fikir Kulüpleri*; the first was a radical but non-terrorist student group while the latter was organized initially as a discussion group. The truth is that the leftist terrorist groups adopted the political doctrines of the radical leftist parties, which rejected the existing socio-economic system, advocated its replacement by socialism or communism—through revolution if necessary—and labeled any opposition to their views as fascism.<sup>26</sup> Marxism-Leninism was

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<sup>25</sup> The most comprehensive, albeit somewhat dated, study of these groups is Jacob Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey* (Leiden, 1974). A very comprehensive report of rightist activities and their relation to the Nationalist Action Party was prepared by the General Directorate of Security in 1970. This report shows that the *Ülkü Ocakları*, the chief nationalist youth group, was established at the Universities of İstanbul and Ankara in 1968 and became a countrywide organization in 1969. The stated purpose of that organization was to train youth in a patriotic and nationalist spirit and to fight against divisive and subversive (Communist) movements. Another rightist organization, *Hür Düşünce Kulüpleri Federasyonu* (Federation of Free Thought Clubs), was established in 1967 in order to assure the progress of the fatherland according to the principles of Atatürk and nationalism. *Genç Ülkücüler Birliği* (Union of Young Nationalists) and *Millî Türk Talebe Birliği* (National Turkish Student Union) were other nationalist organizations. These groups organized various commando training camps. See the excerpts of the General Directorate's report in *Milliyet*, 6 November 1978. These organizations should not be confused with the *Milliyetçiler Demeği* and *Aydınlar Ocağı* representing the conservative nationalist intellectuals, mostly university professors and professionals.

<sup>26</sup> For example, the TİİKP (Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Party of

their common ideological basis and ultimate goal; the existing democracy supplied them with the right and freedom to organize and to publicize their view that the system should eventually be replaced by a “real” democracy. Many of the leftist parties, while publicly condemning terrorism, insisted that it was perpetrated only by the rightists and that the leftists merely reacted in self-defense.

In the ultimate analysis, the difference between the legally organized extreme left and the terrorist leftist groups appears to have been one of method rather than of basic ideology, as indicated in the intensive discussions that took place in various leftist organizations preceding the terrorist outburst. The beginning of terrorism lay in those groups that opted for *eylem*, that is, revolutionary action, instead of settling for protracted political education within the framework of the existing systems.<sup>27</sup> Some of the militants, including members of the organized parties, received training in the use of arms and explosives in the military camps of the Palestine Liberation Army and fought in its ranks.

There was a real leftist force in Turkey—the underground, Soviet-supported TKP (the Communist Party of Turkey)—which seems to have infiltrated many of the legally-established trade unions and left-

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Turkey), in a book protesting various legal actions brought against it, has the following to say about courts and jails:

The ruling classes are using, in addition to terror and pressure, jail sentences to intimidate and prevent the revolutionaries from participating in the struggle for the people’s cause. . . . Wherever they are, all revolutionaries without exception have the duty to struggle against fascism. To defend resolutely the people’s cause in the courts and to oppose collectively the pressure and tyranny in jails is part of the people’s struggle against fascism.

Referring to a petition by a recanted revolutionary, the leader of the party told the court that “this petition was written by MİT [the government security organization], which is the secret organization of the monied gentry and landlords”, see *Devrimciler Faşizmi Yarguluyor* (Istanbul 1975), pp. 7, 44. TİİKP split eventually into two groups. The moderates, under Doğu Perinçek, on January 31, 1978 formed the TİKP (*Türkiye İşçi ve Köylü Partisi*—Workers and Villagers Party of Turkey). The court records of the trial of TİİKP shows that some of its members were trained by PLA in guerilla warfare and maintained relations with the *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık Hareketi* (Proletarian Revolutionary Enlightened Movement); see *Türkiye İhtilalci İşçi—Köylü Partisi Dosyası* (Istanbul, 1973).

<sup>27</sup> The literature on the subject is too rich and repetitive to be analyzed in detail in this general article. Reviews such as *Eylem, Devrimci Yol, Kurtuluş*, to name just a few, contain much information on the importance attached to action over theory. For a comprehensive analysis of the left, see Aydın Yalçın, “New Trends in Communism in Europe, The Case of Turkey,” *Dış Politika*, 7, nos. 1–2 (1978): 28–50, and *Türk Komünizmi Üzerinde Bazı Gözlemler* (Ankara, 1976).

ist organizations as well as underground groups. There were also leftist professional organizations such as TÖB-DER and POL-DER, comprised respectively of the school teachers and the policemen, which provided excellent recruiting grounds for the radical political parties and had enough of their partisan members in the government to paralyze its authority. All of these organizations have been closed down and their leaders arrested (POL-DER was earlier forced to change by its by-laws) since the military takeover.

The rightist terrorists took their ideological nourishment from ethnic nationalism and fought (according to their own statements) to defend and preserve the "sacred values and existence of the nation." Democracy provided, according to the rightists, safeguards for the "leftist subversives" and enabled them to undermine and destroy the nation and its culture. (Interesting for sociologists is the fact that many customs, mores, and values embodied in the traditional culture were politicized and put to the service of violent action: for example, the ideals of personal honor and bravery and loyalty to friends, and the family vendetta from the countryside were converted to ideals of political loyalty and violent action. This approach suited the village-town code of behavior and values and made possible the recruitment of youth groups from the countryside.)<sup>28</sup>

### *7. Redefining National Identity: Islam, Nationalism, and Westernism*

The preceding sections have dealt in a general fashion with the economic and social forces that contributed to the undermining of democracy. Diverse and often opportunistic attitudes of social groups and classes toward democracy, and the conflicting and often disproportionate demand for social, cultural, and economic rights also had a debilitating effect upon the political system. Actually, many of these demands, whatever their articulated objectives, reflected also the accumulated resentment at the continuous, and at times vertiginous, cultural change that had bewildered Turkish society for fifty years. The profound socio-economic changes, coupled with the freedoms

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<sup>28</sup> The blood relationship which accounted for solidarity among kinship groups in the village was replaced by reliance on ideology as the tie binding together members of various ideological groups. Moreover, old traditional justifications for leadership conformed now to new conditions.

brought by democracy since 1945, have created a new and somewhat different vantage point from which the changes brought about by Atatürk's reforms in the early days of the Republic may be viewed and evaluated.

The early reforms were essentially cultural and political, aimed at a set of ancient values and beliefs. They exacted a heavy toll from society, creating not only alienation, unrest, and suffering but also new aspirations. Unavoidably, therefore, democracy came to be regarded not merely as a narrow technical device for changing governments but, rather, as a means through which society's grievances might be aired and new goals formulated. Under these circumstances it would have been unrealistic to expect complete detachment and objectivity, even from politically experienced and honest persons. In order to facilitate the understanding of the dynamics of Turkish politics in the past twenty years, I shall discuss briefly the background of the rise of nationalism and the religious revival.

It has become common both in Turkey and in the West to regard Atatürk's reforms as immutable—much like the sultans' views of their own regimes. In fact, democracy produced a variety of changes and a political climate in which the discussion of some of Atatürk's reforms became inevitable. The republican regime, the legal system, the calendar, the dress, women's emancipation, and a variety of other lesser reforms were hardly challenged except by small extremist religious groups. (Some institutions, such as the People's Houses, Village Institutes, and the like, were challenged, abolished, or changed in the period from 1950 to 1960 largely because these seemed to be identified with the Republican party.) The chief issue that seemed to underlie all discussions after 1945 was secularism.

A few students have studied the question of secularism in a rather superficial fashion and strictly in conformation with the traditional Western bias towards Islam. They have applauded any effort to eliminate or neutralize religion in Turkey, dismissing or condemning as "reactionary" attempts to define Islam's true place in Turkey's deeply religious society. The attitude of many educated Turks toward religion also was not very different from the traditional Western view. In fact, one can say that many of the views on Islam put forth by the so-called secularists in Turkey were very similar to those expressed by English and French statesmen and missionaries in the nineteenth century.

Atatürk's secularism aimed above all to curtail the power of the



clergy, to eliminate the influence of the Caliph or his supporters in the government, and to make causal reasoning the philosophical principle of modernity. There are today many students who claim, often quoting Atatürk, that he was actually the greatest Muslim reformer, having allowed Islam to regain its original rationalist spirit and served as a model to other Muslim leaders seeking to revitalize the society and preserve its identity through a variety of institutional changes; other students have stressed the fact that Turkey became more deeply Islamized and increasingly orthodox (Sunni) under the policy of secularism.<sup>29</sup>

Today two aspects of secularism are of particular interest: first, the relation of religion to the conduct of governmental affairs, and second, the place of religion in defining national identity. Few Turks, except for some religious extremists, would question the government's primacy in the conduct of day-to-day administrative affairs. On the other hand, both the pious and the non-pious have shown deep concern with the impact of secularism and Islam on the Turkish sense of national identity and the idea of historical continuity. Islam as a culture could not easily be differentiated from the folk culture that was to be the basis of the Turkish national culture. A variety of restrictive measures, imposed on the freedom of worship and religious education and on traditional customs and mores for the purpose of advancing secularism, were antagonistic to the society's sense of cultural and historical identity. The feeling of cultural alienation, the psychological malaise from which Turks began to suffer, was attributable to the rejection of the society's traditional historical memories and cultural attachments. Some westernist elites sought to isolate themselves by retreating into the domain of western art, philosophy, and literature; others espoused another form of westernism—that is, Marxism—and found some sort of explanation and salvation in materialistic philosophy. But the overwhelming majority found their salvation by turning to history or religion. The materialist group was called leftist, while the group turning to religion and history was labeled as rightist; but the reason for their alienation was the same. The populist-socialist orientation of RPP after 1965, coupled with the existence of widespread public sympathy for the independence struggle in the Islamic countries, gradually led the Republicans to

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<sup>29</sup> Detler H. Khalid, "The Kemalist Attitude Towards Muslim Unity," *Islam and the Modern Age*, 11 (1975): 23-40.

abandon their old concept of secularism. (It did not secure them many votes, however.) Once the formal constraints imposed on Islam were abolished or loosened, the deep-lying unrest created by the misapplication of secularism surfaced, not as an open demand for an Islamic order but as a search for the means to restore the society's real sense of identity and historical continuity. True, religious persons considered strict adherence to Islam and, hence, rejection of Atatürk's secularist reforms as the essential elements for restoring the society's cultural integrity. For the overwhelming majority, however, the question was to find a way to define their Turkish identity so as to encompass historical and cultural traditions and, at the same time, accommodate their status as modern citizens of a national state. Interest in religion seemed to derive not so much from piety as from practical considerations: it was obvious that the social and cultural cement which held the society together derived from the mores and customs of Islam. Democracy, modernization, or westernization (as different from westernism) was not generally seen as implying the rejection and disregard of these basic elements of social cohesion but, rather, as requiring their recognition as part of a Turk's cultural and historical legacy. In fact, many argued that full modernization, democracy, and scientific and material progress could be facilitated and would be better balanced through the existence also of religious-spiritual values.

Views of history followed the same path. Originally Atatürk and his followers dis-associated the Republic from its Ottoman past in order to bring up a generation of Turks without historical inhibitions. However, as literacy increased from about 35 percent at the beginning of democratic regimes to 75 percent overall at the present time (the illiterate persons are mostly the aged), and as higher institutions of learning expanded their historical research, the interest and sophistication in history increased. It became clear that much of the Republic's official view of the Ottoman period was distorted or outright false. Documentary research on the socio-religious origins of the national struggle in 1919–22, published in several widely-read books, showed that this was in fact a social and international event of far more significance than that accorded it by the early historians of the Republic.<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, research on the Young Turks

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<sup>30</sup> The works of Sabahaddin Selek, Doğan Avcıoğlu, Mahmut Goloğlu, etc., are just a few of the studies on the subject.

era has showed that many of the ideas put forth under the Republic actually were formulated in 1908. Abdulhamid II's reign, notwithstanding that sultan's ill repute, appeared as a period of development that actually laid the socio-economic, demographic, and ethnical foundations of the Republic. The Marxists, who acquired widespread following, delved into the Ottoman past also, in order to substantiate their own ideas on historical materialism. Thus a substantial number of the educated Turks, regardless of whether they called themselves socialists or nationalists, came to accept the idea of historical continuity and considered themselves to be linked with the Ottoman past—a feeling intuitively held by the population at large for centuries. These trends converged towards some sort of cultural and social integration, an accommodation between the past and present, between change and continuity.

Discussions of Islamism brought out the latent historical and cultural attachments, raising them from the subconscious to the conscious level, rearticulating and expressing them within the framework of changed economic, social, and political conditions. The breakdown of the old forms of social organization made it absolutely necessary to create new forms of association, which in their turn engendered their own hierarchies and value systems that eventually found expression in the programs of the political parties. The main factor that turned these otherwise creative discussions about identity and history into sharp ideological disputes was the adoption of religion and nationalism as the theoretical bases of the National Salvation and Nationalist Action parties.

The political developments in Turkey were affected profoundly by the country's relations with the West and the breakdown of the idealized image of the West and the traditional concepts of westernization and westernism. The basic goal of Kemalism was spiritual and material modernity, or "progress," within the framework of a national state. The concept of modernity—progress—was embodied in the term *medeniyet-uygarlık* (the last term is a recent linguistic innovation) or "civilization," and the West came to be regarded as its source. Consequently, Turkey emulated and imitated the West in a variety of ways. Modernization through westernization, often equated with Kemalism, became a basic principle of state policy which could not easily be challenged, despite the existence of grave private misgivings about its direction and long range impact. The image of the West as the chief source of modernity/civilization was preserved until

the late 1950s despite the upsurge of a variety of leftist, Islamic, and conservative nationalistic movements which challenged this notion. "Civilization," it must be remembered, was defined by Ziya Gökalp, the sociologist of Turkish nationalism, in terms of science, technology, and information—not as a culture which could be subject to religious influences in a way likely to result in conflict.<sup>31</sup>

The idealized image of the West remained intact and the drive towards modernization on the western model kept its momentum largely because Turkey encountered no major conflicts with the West or with any of her neighboring countries until the 1960s. The association with the West, which continued despite short periods of coolness and isolation in 1945–46, enabled Turkey to weather successfully and the Soviet demands for territory in the northern part of the country and bases on the Straits.<sup>32</sup> The entry of Turkey into the NATO in 1952, and into some European economic and political associations, reinforced further Turkey's pro-western orientation. The Cyprus dispute changed all this.

The Cyprus conflict, settled in 1959–60 without much harm to Turkey's relations with the West, had been abruptly rekindled in December of 1963 by the late Archbishop Makarios, who unilaterally amended the Constitution, depriving the Cypriot Turkish community of certain constitutional rights. In 1974 the Greek officers ousted Makarios and prepared to declare the unity of Cyprus with Greece. The Turkish military intervened, and in 1975 the United States Congress, spurred mainly by the exhortations of the Greek lobby in

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<sup>31</sup> The interest in these issues is clearly demonstrated by repeated publications of Gökalp's writings as well as of studies about his life and teachings; for a bibliography of Gökalp's efforts at redefinition, see Sabri Akural, *Ziya Gökalp: The Influence of His Thought on Kemalist Reforms* (Ph.D. dissertation: Indiana University, 1978). As Gökalp's writings can be employed—with certain distortion and manipulation—to support the nationalist theses, his writings have been published chiefly by groups identified with nationalism and have been ignored totally by the leftists; see e.g. his *Türk Medeniyeti Tarihi, Türkcülüğün Esasları* and other works published by Turkish Culture Publications (Türk Kültür Yayını: İstanbul, 1974–75). Actually Gökalp was a serious thinker, aware of the effect of socio-political change on the cultural identity of Turks. Unfortunately he has been made the subject of polemics by politicians who have not read him.

<sup>32</sup> The literature on Turkish foreign policy is too rich to be listed here. For bibliographical references see Kemal H. Karpat, ed., *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition* (Leiden, 1974). See also *Foreign Policy*, the periodical published by the Turkish Foreign Policy Association of Ankara.

Washington, imposed a military embargo on Turkey. Greece, openly and covertly, exploited the historical sympathy of the West and roused old anti-Turkish prejudices in the Balkans and in the Middle East with the purpose of forcing Turkey out of Cyprus. (Greek restaurants in the USA even provided their customers with anti-Turkish petitions to the Congress.) Those supporting a Greek Cyprus acted with the conviction that they would find acceptance and support in a Christian West attuned by centuries of conflict to regard Muslim Turkey as an outsider.

The fact that the West did side with Greece in various ways, and that the USA imposed an arms embargo which reduced substantially Turkey's military capabilities and threatened ultimately her integrity and independence, produced negative effects almost beyond description. The West began to be judged not in idealized terms but in terms of its past colonial exploitation, imperialist expansion, and cultural hegemony over Turkey. The old image of an omnipotent, civilized, humanist West was further undermined by the final disintegration of British and French colonial empires, by the rise of the third world countries, and the Vietnam war. Isolated and economically dependent on the outside world, Turkey searched for allies and support among the long-ignored Middle Eastern Arab Muslims, the socialist bloc, and the African nations.

Turkey remained a member of the NATO and of a variety of Western organizations, and her economic dependence on the West increased—as illustrated by the presence in West Europe of 1.2 million Turkish workers who supply a substantial part of Turkey's hard currency needs. Yet Turkey's relations with the socialist bloc, the Muslims, and the Arab countries intensified, to the detriment of the West. In addition, the growing military power of the USSR, her successful penetration in Africa and elsewhere, contrasted sharply with Western policy of seeming appeasement and the West's indecision, its inability to check inflation and terrorism, and, especially, its self-doubt. There is no question that Turkey's identification with the West received a crippling blow in the 1970s and probably will never regain its former strength.

The deterioration of relations with the West and the rejection of the West as an absolute model of modernity/civilization stimulated ideological developments of all kinds in Turkey. Liberated from the self-imposed constraints of following a Western model, Turkey looked to her own past to find a new path. The rise of Islamism and nationalism

provided the psychological and cultural foundation on which the National Salvation and Nationalist Action parties built.

I shall end this section by quoting in support of the views expressed above the opinion of a German scholar, who wrote:

It has become obvious that extremist ideologies on the left, i.e., the various groups of Marxists, and on the religious right, mainly represented by the National Salvation Party, have put into question Turkey's orientation towards the West. They argue that the dependence of Turkey on NATO and Western Europe is no longer in the interest of the country and detrimental to its future economic and social development.<sup>33</sup>

The truth is that while Turkey's formal imitation of the West decreased, her commitment to modernization increased. This modernization still followed the western model.

#### *8. The Constitution System: Authority versus Authoritarianism*

I have pointed out that the failure of democracy in Turkey was precipitated by the disintegration of government authority, resulting from its loss of control over the means of coercion, and the ensuing disintegration of the traditional respect for law and state government. The Constitution of 1961 inadvertently facilitated and speeded up this process of political disintegration. It became the ideology of RPP, as shall be indicated later. The problem can be outlined in a few sentences.

The traditional Turkish socio-political system and its culture, as in most of the Middle Eastern Islamic countries, was constructed on the twin concepts of hierarchy and law and embodied in political and social institutions. Authority was the extension of law and supplemented it. The authority of the institution was embodied in a person who headed and represented the institution and exercised authority on its behalf, the person and the institution often being inseparable. This personalized type of institutional authority was accepted and obeyed prescriptively by individuals or groups identified

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<sup>33</sup> Udo Steinbach, "Between Marxism and Islamic Fundamentalism Towards an End of Westernization" (in German), paper presented to the Conference on Crisis in Turkey, Brussels, September 24-26, 1980.

with the system. While social institutions, such as the family, clan, and tribe, had their own moral, psychological, and social means of maintaining their integrity and enforcing their authority, the state government, which underwrote the survival of the social institutions, possessed the sovereign capability and the coercive means of safeguarding and enforcing its authority. The ultimate legitimization of state authority lay in the religious law, although in the course of time references to religion became a perfunctory ritual.

Centuries of life under these conditions transformed the social respect of law and authority into a deeply rooted political culture. Throughout the long life of the Ottoman state, and during four decades of the Republic, the public at large bowed voluntarily to government authority, attributing to it a certain inherent sanctity. The widespread popular saying *devletin eli uzundur* (The state has a long arm, i.e., to reach and punish offenders) was evidence of the belief in the omnipotent power of the state. In the old days, traditional government authority was embodied in the person of the sultan and was exercised by him on behalf of a divinely ordered arrangement. Unquestionably, such personalized authority could lead, depending on the incumbent's personality, to abuse, laxity, or true excellence.

The history of freedom and constitutionalism, both in the Ottoman state and in the Republic, is seen to revolve essentially around a search for a means of depersonalizing authority and subjecting its acquisition, use, and transfer to impersonal rules—all borrowed from the West. It is easy to understand why the "constitutionalism" promoted by the elites was equated with liberalism and meant, above all, liberation from the personal authority of the ruler—the sultan or whoever else happened to possess authority. (Old Islamic injunctions against tyranny supplied a certain subconscious bias against autocracy.) "Freedom," because of the personalized nature of authority, came to imply first and above everything else freedom from coercion, chiefly physical coercion. However, as coercion, actual or potential, was a corollary of authority, freedom from coercion meant liberation from authority of any sort. Less government implied less use of authority, including the authority to enforce law and order.

The relations between institutions, persons, law, and authority, were the legacy of the past and could not be changed overnight. Thus practically all the true Ottoman reformers, such as Sultans Mahmud II and Abdulhamid II, and the heads of the government in modern times as well—Atatürk, İnönü, Bayar, Menderes—maintained the old

traditional authoritarian concepts of government and statehood, libertarian utterances notwithstanding. This centuries-old, popularly accepted tradition of authority was maintained in modern times through a strong executive. The Turkish constitution of 1921 and 1924 and the subsequent amendments of 1937 remained faithful to this principle by maintaining executive supremacy under the concept of *kuvvetler birliđi*, or unity of powers. The Democratic Party, which took over the government in 1950, did not amend the constitution, despite promises to do so made during its opposition years.

The rise of a variety of new social groups with their specific views and interests, the beginning of industrialization, the increase in literacy, the rapid urbanization, and a variety of other related developments in the years between 1923 and 1960 brought insistent demands for recognition of the changed nature of society and for the devising of a constitutional system capable of limiting the powers of the executive. (The last demand was in part a reaction to Premier Menderes's broad use of executive power, often in a personal and arbitrary manner during the Democratic Party rule of 1950–60.) The military takeover in 1960 permitted the Republican Party and its sympathizers to assume control of the Constitutional Assembly and to draft the Constitution of 1961, which embodied liberal political aspirations and social yearnings and limited to the greatest extent possible the power of the executive.<sup>34</sup>

The new constitution provided for a variety of groups to be represented in the Parliament as a necessary condition for democracy, but it failed to include safeguards to defend the system against those who rejected its essence. It defined a series of social goals and described them as part of the citizens' rights, although the fulfillment of these goals depended to some extent on the existence of a strong executive. Indeed, a substantial part of the constitution (arts. 10–62) was dedicated to the enumeration of personal, social, and political rights and safeguards not encountered even in the most developed countries. The constitution adopted as a basic principle the idea of the separation of powers—an abrupt and radical departure from both the traditional concept of authority and the earlier practices prevailing in the Republic. The President was reduced more or less

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<sup>34</sup> For a view on the constitution, see Mümtaz Soysal, *Anayasaya Giriş* (Ankara, 1969) and Orhan Aldıkaçtı, *Anayasa Hukukumuzun Gelişmesi ve 1961 Anayasası*, 2 vols. (İstanbul, 1964).



to a figurehead with no real power to affect the work of the Parliament or the Cabinet. (He could order new elections only in some exceptional and unlikely circumstances, such as the resignation of the Cabinet twice in eighteen months plus a vote of non-confidence.)

Political parties were regarded as the indispensable bodies of a democratic system. Proportional representation was adopted in order to give parliamentary representation and expression to minority views and interests, a provision that facilitated the formation of ideologically-oriented parties. Communist parties remained outlawed by articles 141 and 142 of the penal code, which prohibited the formation of organizations advocating the supremacy of one social class over another; but in practice ultra radical leftist and rightist parties could be formed simply by avoiding the term "communist" and a few key technical words referring to class struggle. Political parties could not be closed down except by the Constitutional Court after due process.

The constitution also adopted a rigid system of judicial immunity and created the Constitutional Court to judge the constitutionality of laws. The Council of State or *Danıştay* (the old *Devlet Şurası*—an institution originally borrowed from France in the nineteenth century and used as an administrative court) was empowered to judge all administrative decisions. It was turned into a sort of supreme judiciary body that could enjoin appointments and dismissals of officials, etc.; for example, it could declare to be successful a professional candidate who had been failed by an academic board.

The Constitutional Court, consisting as it did of judges without sufficient understanding of the true nature of constitutionalism, used narrow judiciary methods in trying cases brought before it and became in fact a judiciary forum of last resort to which ordinary legal cases were routinely referred. On the other hand, the Court frequently ruled on the constitutionality of the laws passed by the Parliament and often nullified provisions or an entire act for ordinary legal or political reasons, thus rendering rather meaningless the election process.<sup>35</sup> The shortcomings of this ultra liberal and somewhat utopian constitution soon became apparent and were subjected to criticism—especially by the Justice Party—but without result because of the difficulty of the procedure for constitutional amendment. A recent

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<sup>35</sup> For the decisions of the Constitutional Court, see B. Tanör and Taner Beygo, *Türk Anayasaları ve Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararları* (İstanbul, 1966).

amendment proposal based on a serious and comprehensive study of constitutional shortcomings was turned down by the RPP.<sup>36</sup>

Obviously, one cannot put the entire blame for the shortcomings of Turkish democracy on the constitution or the Constitutional Court. Yet one cannot overlook the fact that the protests against the established order were based on the social rights recognized by the constitution but unenforceable except by a strong executive dedicated to social reform. Yet the constitution, having enumerated these rights without regard for the country's economic ability to materialize them, did not permit the establishment of a strong executive.

I have said that the failure of democracy in Turkey cannot be blamed entirely on the constitution or the Constitutional Court. Rather, the malfunctioning of the constitution was a consequence of the breakdown of the consensus between the two major political parties, the RPP and JP, about the nature of Turkey's political regime. One must remember that the multi-party democracy was established and functioned until 1960 on the basis of the constitution of 1924 which had been also the constitution basis for the single party system. The democratic regime was successfully established and functioned as the result of the consensus reached by the dominant political elites organized around the Republican and Democratic parties. The crises of democracy in Turkey—in 1947, when the opposition sought and received safeguards against government control, and in 1958–60, when the first military intervention occurred—were caused by power quarrels among the dominant elites. But at these times the fate of the basic regime was not at stake. The issue was the enlargement and the consolidation of the democratic regime and the change of its social and economic foundation.

The Constitution of 1961 was accepted and functioned fairly well for a few years, despite its ultra liberal features, because the dominant political elites were in consensus as to both the potential of and the limitations on—given the existing socio-economic and political system—the implementation of the enumerated the constitutional rights and freedoms. İnönü, the old statesman trusted by the army, was at the helm of power most of the time from 1961 to 1965. The balance between the political elites was gradually undermined by the

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<sup>36</sup> See *Rejîm ve Anayasamızda Reform Önerisi*, special section of *Yeni Forum*, May 15, 1980.

“left of center” policy adopted by the RPP after 1965. Initially, this policy aimed at promoting a more rapid enforcement of the social and economic democracy embodied in the constitution. However, by 1967 the demands for social and economic democracy had exceeded the ability of the system to materialize them. Full implementation of the constitutional rights logically called for a radical socialist rehaul of the entire socio-economic system; and the RPP’s desire to enforce these social and economic rights inevitably led it to conflict with the Justice Party, whose view was more conservative.

It must be emphasized that the demands for social and political democracy on the part of the RPP could have been formulated in a more realistic way if the organization and the opinion-formulating processes within the party had been truly democratic. The advocates of the “left of center” under Ecevit relied on the power of the central organization and on its *Gençlik Kolları* (youth branches) to dominate and control the party conventions at both local and national levels. With control thus assured, they changed the “left of center” from a policy into an ideology, despite the fact that the “left of center” lacked any historical basis, doctrine, or even any elementary theoretical foundation. The RPP gradually discarded Kemalist views and borrowed heavily from the terminology and, ultimately, the tactics (demonstrations, marches) of the radical left, which had originally relied on university students.

The “left of center” was essentially a sentimental yearning for social justice, freedom, and equality rather than a well-reasoned plan or program for action, and its doctrinal and theoretical weaknesses soon became evident. Consequently, Ecevit began to promote the liberal social and political rights embodied in the constitution as the ideology and *raison d’être* of the party, without even being aware that this ideological shift affected the fate of the entire constitutional system. Eventually Ecevit, carried away by his own rhetoric, put forth an ultimate demand: *bu düzen değişmelidir* (this regime, or order, must be changed). The other parties to the informal constitutional entente, chiefly the Justice Party, reacted to this challenge and were accused of reactionism. Ecevit used the Constitutional Court and other devices against the Demirel government, supposedly in order to force him to conform to the constitution. (Ecevit’s demands were so abnormal that the court actually rejected many of his challenges to the JP government.)

İnönü finally became aware of the ultimate danger of the “left of center” to the regime, and he tried to take control of the party,

using as a pretext a conflict with Ecevit over the party's attitude towards the military intervention of 1971. But it was already too late (see next section for details). İnönü died a short time later, and Ecevit and his group moved even further to the left, changing the label of their ideology from "left of center" to "democratic left" and, ultimately, to "socialism." The brief government tenure of the RPP in 1974 and its longer one in 1978–79 showed fully the superficiality of its ideology. However, the constitution and the democratic regime had been undermined beyond the power of Demirel's party—which was put on the defensive—to repair. Despite its frequent appeals to the "will of the people," the JP failed to produce a real challenge to Ecevit, even when it won decisive victories at polls in 1965 and 1969. It was clear that the course of democracy in Turkey was determined not only by the voters but also—and perhaps to a greater extent—by other forces.

### 9. *The Political Parties as the Ideological Catalysts of Socio-Cultural Change*

The social and structural changes caused by economic development, rural migration, urbanization, the liberalism brought by the constitution and the ideologies that developed after its introduction were reflected in the philosophy and attitudes of the political parties. The result was ideological polarization and political fragmentation; this created a deep gulf between the two major political parties which had assured the survival of Turkish democracy and, ultimately, undermined the regime. These developments will be discussed briefly in this section.<sup>37</sup>

The main political party which conditioned Turkey's politics since the establishment of the Republic and continued to do so during the multi-party era was the Republican People's Party. Although it was ousted from power in 1950, the RPP continued to act as though it were the actual government. Initially the party was ideologically identified with Atatürk, its original founder and chairman; and until

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<sup>37</sup> The ideological developments in Turkey are discussed at length and excerpts are reproduced in my *Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East* (new edition forthcoming).

1965 it acted as the “defender” of Atatürk’s reforms (although its opponents never challenged these reforms, at least not openly). The RPP’s image of itself as the defender of the reforms and the only party capable of achieving real change and progress persisted in the minds of its leaders regardless of facts. At first the party’s leadership at the province level consisted mainly of a conglomeration of professionals, statist businessmen, former bureaucrats, and army officers, but also included some conservative landlords, tribal chiefs, and similar persons. The inherent structural-social contradictions were minimized by the hierarchical organization of the party, which gave the top echelon, that is, the Chairman, the Secretary General, and the Party Council, extensive decision making powers. These positions remained until the early 1960s in the hands of the bureaucrats, intellectuals, and other groups identified closely with the ideas of Kemalism such as republicanism, modernization, and secularism. The party held the belief that its ideas were inherently superior to those of its opponents and that ultimately it would be voted to power once the citizens became “enlightened” enough to perceive the truth. Some leaders, including İnönü, regarded the RPP as the political educator of the masses, first in modernism and later in representative government. Armed with this elitist philosophy and confident that in a showdown they could rely on the support of the army (as they did in 1959–60), the RPP leaders treated rivals either with condescension (when RPP was in power) or as usurpers (when RPP was out of power). Thus the Democratic Party was treated in a patronizing, half-disdainful fashion throughout its existence.<sup>38</sup>

In reality the RPP and the DP were similar in structure and basic political philosophy, but they differed in their approach to economic policy, their view of the limits of religious freedom, and the like. The Democratic Party, established by dissidents from the RPP in 1945, represented essentially the petty middle classes and the agrarian groups dissatisfied with the government’s statist policy. It is important to remember that both the similarities and differences between the RPP and DP were born out of the historical conditions which governed the birth and evolution of the Republic. Together the two

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<sup>38</sup> For instance, during the agitations of 1958–60, when the Democrats took measures to stifle the opposition, İsmet İnönü haughtily told Adnan Menderes that his policies would lead him to disaster and that “even I [İnönü] will not be able to save you.” (Incidentally, the prognosis proved to be true, for Menderes was hanged.)

parties, aided by a majority election system, controlled most of the seats in the Assembly and managed, notwithstanding their differences, to preserve intact much of the original regime and the institutions established in the early days of the Republic. The situation changed drastically after 1961.

The military takeover and the liberal constitution adopted in 1961 slowly but inevitably led to political fragmentation. The position of the DP, closed down by the military in 1960, was filled by the New Turkey and the Justice parties in 1961. (The latter eventually absorbed the former, although the formal merger did not occur until almost a decade later.) The JP's main goal after 1961 was to rehabilitate the DP deputies condemned to various sentences by a court set up by the military. This policy, defined as "revengist," was promoted by the leaders of JP under the chairmanship of Sadettin Bilgiç and seemed destined to lead the party to a direct confrontation with the military. This was avoided at the party convention held in November of 1964, when the representatives of the moderate group elected Süleyman Demirel, an engineer by profession and a former head of the Water Resources Directorate, to the chairmanship of the party.

National elections held in 1961 had given the RPP not a majority as expected but, rather, only a slight edge over JP, and these two, together with other parties, formed a coalition government under İnönü's premiership. It lasted only seven months. The coalition proved unworkable because, among other things, the RPP, relying on the military's support, paid little attention to the views of its partners, especially the desire of the JP to pardon the Democratic Party deputies imprisoned for allegedly violating the constitution. Although it did not have the necessary power, not being in a majority position, the RPP headed the government chiefly in order to implement the new constitution. Once more the party could claim—rightly—that it was the main power which decided the basic form of Turkey's political regime, as all constitutions (1921, 1924, and 1961) bore its own stamp.<sup>39</sup> The voters seemed to disagree with the party's self image. The elections of 1965 gave the RPP a mere 28.7 percent of the total votes cast, versus 52.9 percent for the JP, its opponent.

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<sup>39</sup> It should be noted that, in contrast to the scarcity of writings on the DP and the JP, there is an abundant, and for the most part sympathetic, literature on the RPP; see the bibliography in Suna Kili, *1960–1975 Döneminde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinde Gelişmeler* (İstanbul, 1976).

The elections of 1965 reflected also the dissension within the RPP. The leaders at the center, that is, the bureaucrats and the intellectuals, sought to identify themselves with the principles of economic development and the social aspirations expressed in the constitution. (A declaration of some 500 intellectuals in *Yön*, the review which articulated the bases for the development of socialism in Turkey, aimed at producing an ideology for this development.) The professionals, landlords, and local notables who formed the backbone of the RPP's branches in the countryside did not like the policy preached by younger members and the newcomers—a number of military officers, retired from the armed forces after 1960, who had joined the RPP. (Later additional officers retired because of leftist leanings entered the RPP and played a major role in its leftist orientation, e.g., Süleyman Genç, Mustafa Ok.). However, as long as İnönü remained at the head of the party, many of the old members remained personally loyal to him regardless of the ideological direction taken by the party. Party loyalty has always been far stronger in the RPP than in the other parties.

The RPP faced also a political challenge from the left. The elections gave the Labor Party of Turkey (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*) about 3 percent of the total vote. This party, established in 1961 and reorganized in 1962, relied on a Marxist philosophy; it gathered considerable following among students, intellectuals, and some trade unions, and aroused interest even among the population at large through its attacks on the West, NATO, and vested interests and its demands for rapid development and social justice. The Cyprus crisis that erupted in December of 1963 allowed the LP to appeal to the patriotic-nationalistic feelings which, combined with the social discontent, gave the youth of Turkey a solid ideological platform from which to condemn both the West and the domestic regime that emulated it.

The power behind the organizational strength and the country-wide activities of the LP were the young cadres of the RPP. Dissatisfied with the conservatism of the leaders and the contradictory politics of the party, the younger members, notably university students who had played a decisive role in the struggle against the DP in 1958–60, began to abandon the RPP and to join the LP. It was therefore clear that if the RPP wanted to retain the loyalty of its young sympathizers and perpetuate its image as a progressive, dynamic organization attuned to Turkey's future goals, it had to pay closer attention to the social and economic concerns of the young as well as to the

principles embodied in the constitution. Already aware of this situation, the party had proclaimed in the elections of 1965 the previously discussed “*ortanın solu*” or “left of the center” policy, but without much success; the opposition promptly labeled RPP a leftist-Marxist party. The promoters of the new ideology succeeded, with İnönü’s backing, in electing their leader, Bülent Ecevit, as the Secretary General of the party. Eventually the new ideology was enshrined in the party’s official program. Nevertheless the party claimed, in order to soothe Turhan Feyzioğlu and his group, who opposed the switch to the left, that the “RPP is not a socialist party and will never be one.”<sup>40</sup>

The situation created by these developments was riddled by dangerous contradictions. The “left of center” idea, which evolved eventually to social-democracy and then to democratic leftism and beyond, represented the views of a small group of intellectuals and bureaucrats with little relation to the mass of the party members. Their slogan articulated not the aspirations of a bonafide social class but, rather, their own narrow views, which encompassed bureaucratic disdain for, and animosity toward, the entrepreneurial classes along with a certain intellectual and sentimental interest in ideas of social justice, development, and progress—ideas acquired mostly through reading. These elements of the party relied chiefly on the state, toward which they had a proprietary attitude, and on the constitution for the fulfillment of their goals. The party was compelled to move continuously to the left in order to maintain the allegiance of its own radicals and attract new members and thus prevent the formation of a competitive, strong leftist party. Moreover, the ongoing preoccupation with its leftist image forced the party leadership to give considerable influence to its small but very effective radical wing (accused by some of being a Marxist group striving to take over the party from the inside), thus alienating its moderate and conservative members. Meanwhile the RPP sought to build for itself a broad social base among the workers and, possibly, the peasantry. Doing an about face from its previous position, RPP began advocating the workers’ involvement in politics. It tried to politicize even the Türk-

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<sup>40</sup> See Kili, *op cit.*, pp. 317–350 *passim*. The Soviets were quick to note and assess the far-reaching effects of the RPP’s switch to the left; see V. Danilov, “The New Course of the Republican People’s Party of Turkey,” *Narody Asii i Afriki*, No. 4 (1979); 30–42 (in Russian).



İş (Confederation of Trade Unions), causing considerable dissension among workers. At the same time the RPP continuously emphasized its historical and cultural affiliation with the state, which it still regarded as the vehicle through which its aspirations would be realized.

The constitution was suitable for the promotion of the statist social and economic views of the RPP, and a sympathetic bureaucracy and a variety of radical and militant student and other youth groups stood ready to lend their support against the “capitalist bourgeois” order represented by the Justice Party and its allies. Thus, as expected, the RPP was successful after 1965 in thwarting some important legislation introduced by the Demirel government, despite the fact that Demirel’s party had 240 deputies to only 134 for RPP in the 450 member National Assembly.

Meanwhile, the JP, which had successfully avoided a confrontation with the army and had negotiated amnesty for the jailed Democrats, remained tied to its parochial view of the economy and politics. It failed to take into consideration that social justice and development needed a certain planning and initiative from above and that the aspirations of the emerging working classes needed to be taken into account. Lacking a proper intellectual understanding of Turkey’s development, and unprepared to incorporate into its ranks new segments of the socially minded intelligentsia, the JP government decided, chiefly in 1967–68, to fight the left and, indirectly, the RPP by encouraging the formation of nationalist youth groups and associations. It did not make use of the legal means at its disposal to quell the repeated leftist challenges to the authority and the integrity of the government and the state for fear that the RPP would exploit such use of government authority, calling it an unconstitutional act directed against youth and thus giving the military a pretext to intervene. However, after 1968–69 the Justice Party began to develop a new view of social justice, and it initiated a variety of social programs as indicated by its important amendments to the tax laws. This led the diehards in the party to dissent and form their own party, called once more the Democratic Party. (Actually in Turkish the old party was called *Demokrat* and the new, *Demokratik*.)

The political fragmentation continued. Turhan Feyzioğlu and seven friends who claimed that the new Secretary General of the RPP, Bülent Ecevit, and his friends, despite their assurances to the contrary, aimed to transform the RPP into a “socialist” party, were outmaneuvered in several tumultuous conventions, and they resigned in

the spring of 1967 to form their own Republican Reliance Party. However, a very large group which had sided with Feyzioğlu in the conventions did not follow him, as historical loyalty and their regard for İnönü proved stronger than their own ideological apprehensions.

The elections of 1969 inflicted on the RPP another crushing defeat; it obtained only 27.4 percent of the total votes cast, its lowest percentage since 1950. It was a turning point. The radical wing under Ecevit claimed that success lay in the full adopting of a social program, if not outright socialism. About this time the RPP began its slow dissociation from Atatürkism and began to court the sympathies of minorities, chiefly the *Alevis*. At a meeting in 1969 Ecevit criticized Atatürk, and gradually he ceased using the term *Türk milleti*—"Turkish nation"—and instead adopted the term *Türkiye halkı*—"the people of Turkey" (the Marxists used the term *Türkiye halkları*—"peoples of Turkey"). The shift in terminology was symbolic of great changes taking place within the RPP, for it must be realized that the idea of national statehood embodied in the term *Türk milleti* used by Atatürk was the linchpin of republicanism and of Atatürkism.

A major challenge of Ecevit by the old Kemalists was defeated in 1970, again with İnönü's aid. By this time the party had renounced its old claim to be a mass party. It claimed instead to be a political organization which sided with "the workers, the poor, the oppressed and those who could not claim their rights" and fought a vanguard battle to materialize their aspirations.<sup>41</sup> The other leftist parties, including the LP, which had lost much of its early following, accused the RPP of being essentially a "bourgeois" party attempting to forestall the development of true leftist parties by using their terminology and ideas to deceive the workers and the peasants.

The military intervention of March 12, 1971, which put an end to leftist activities, appeared to have dealt a grave blow to Ecevit's efforts to disseminate the ideas of the "left of center." Consequently, Ecevit denounced the takeover as an undemocratic act, while İnönü accepted the intervention as a *fait accompli*. Basically İnönü did not favor the intervention but, aware of the need to preserve the army's prestige and integrity, he refused to take an open position against the military.<sup>41</sup> Nevertheless, he did ask for early elections and a return

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<sup>41</sup> The events of 1971–73 are too complex to be dealt with in detail here. Briefly it may be mentioned that the military accused the RPP of supporting radical left-

to civilian rule. İnönü, in fact upset by the radical orientation of the party, tried to use the dispute to rid the party of the leftists and of Ecevit. It proved to be too late. Following these developments, Ecevit resigned his powerful position as Secretary General, and he refused to support the government formed by Nihat Erim, a long time member of the party who had resigned to become Premier. The conflict between Ecevit and İnönü over the military takeover came into the open at a party convention held in January of 1972, during which İnönü accused Ecevit and his followers of "unlawful" activities and "radicalism." He said that Ecevit was not a "Communist" but accused him of following a "policy with an obscure [outcome] for the party and for the country." Meanwhile Ecevit, who had attended practically all the regional party conventions and secured the election of his own sympathizers to the general party convention, had gained control of the powerful Party Council.

In an extraordinary party convention held in May, 1972, İnönü, after failing to eliminate Ecevit as a potential Secretary General, resigned as Chairman of the party—but not before threatening in vain to disperse the council and other bodies. This was the sign of monumental change: İnönü, close associate of Atatürk, the architect of democracy, and an important figure in the history of the Republic, had been faced by opposition from his own disciples and had to resign as Chairman of the party. The RPP had had only two chairmen, Atatürk and then İnönü, since its establishment in 1922–23. These two illustrious military men were followed by Ecevit, a newsman whose chief quality was eloquence. The dramatic change in the leadership of the RPP symbolized the changes which had taken place in Turkey itself. İnönü believed that personal loyalty would suffice to control the party. However, Kamil Kırkoğlu, the leader of the group which supported Ecevit and assured his victory, declared the "İsmet Pasha is not a *padishah* [sultan-ruler] with divine will to force us to acquiesce always to his wish. Certainly we know something too"; İnönü believed that a group in the party council who had succeeded in acquiring control "wanted to change the RPP into an organization different from what it is and what is ought to be."<sup>42</sup>

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ist organizations such as the *Türkiye Öğretmenler Sendikası* (TÖS—Trade Union of Teachers of Turkey), *Dev-Genç* (Revolutionary Youth), etc. İnönü, who was in the middle of his unsuccessful struggle against Ecevit, had to defend the party.

<sup>42</sup> See Kili, *op. cit.*, pp. 317, 319.

The new leaders of the RPP believed that, in order to carry out necessary reforms in Turkey, they had to overhaul and rejuvenate the party.

It was during these days that the first major terrorist attacks were staged; the commander of the gendarmes was attacked, three British citizens were kidnapped and murdered (their abductors were also killed), planes were hijacked, and the like.

By the end of 1972 the military, faced by the opposition from both the RPP and the JP, decided to speed up plans for an election and a return to civilian rule, partly in the belief that the developing unrest was a protest against military rule. The two major political parties, united momentarily by their interest in establishing a civilian government, later opposed the election of General Faruk Gürler to the Presidency; this candidate had led the intervention in 1971.

The elections of 1973 showed an increase of about 6 percent (from 27.4 percent to 33.3 percent) in the votes received by RPP, while the JP, weakened by the departure of the liberals who bolted to form the DP, received 29.8 percent of the vote (the DP obtained only 11.9 percent but this was enough to deny JP a majority). A close look at the professional background of the elected deputies shows that most of them had similar—and mostly bureaucratic—backgrounds, despite the “socialist” utterances of the RPP.<sup>43</sup>

The RPP leaders interpreted the relative success of their party as a positive popular response to their leftist policies. After the election, Naim Talu formed a non-party government but soon had to resign. Subsequently, Bülent Ecevit was asked to form the government. He did succeed in putting together a coalition government with what

<sup>43</sup> The professional background of the deputies elected to the National Assembly in 1973 (in percentages) is shown in the following table, the source of which is *Resmî Gazete*, October 31, 1973, No. 14698.

Parties	Govt. Officials	Professionals	Workers	Farmers	Businessmen	Craftsmen	Industrial Class	Religious Men	Others	Total
RPP	32.3	54.1	2.2	6.0	2.8	1.1	—	—	1.5	100
JP	42.4	30.6	0.7	9.9	8.3	1.5	2.3	2.6	1.7	100
NSP	47.9	27.1	—	2.0	10.4	—	—	12.6	—	100
DP	30.6	41.3	—	16.4	7.1	—	—	4.6	—	100
RRP	38.4	53.8	—	7.8	—	—	—	—	—	100

See also a study which claims that the bureaucracy dominates the National Assembly: *Emin Çölaşan, (et al.) 1973 Seçimleri* (İstanbul, 1975). For a different perspective, see İhsan Tekli and Raşit Gökçeli, *1973 ve 1975 Seçimleri* (İstanbul, 1977).

appeared to be a most unlikely partner—the National Salvation Party of Necmeddin Erbakan, who became deputy premier. The coalition, if studied more closely in the light of the ideological transformation of the RPP, is not as strange as it may appear at the first sight. The two parties held compatible views on social and economic matters, although with different reasons; both were against capitalism and for social justice; both opposed westernism but defended modernization; and both favored national independence and friendly relations with the third world, including the Arab countries. Both also defended unlimited freedom of thought—which to Erbakan meant unlimited religious freedom and to Ecevit meant total freedom for leftist ideologies. Moreover, Ecevit and Erbakan had a certain personal regard for each other. Erbakan defended Ecevit against accusations that the latter was a Communist.

As Premier, Ecevit ordered the landing of the Turkish troops in Cyprus in July, 1974. He became overnight a folk hero and, needless to say, won the army's good will. His political skirmishes with the military in 1971 seemed forgotten. Meanwhile, an amnesty law (which was part of the coalition agreement between RPP and NSP) pardoned all those condemned for acts of "conscience," including violent acts committed for ideological reasons. Thousands of leftists and religious leaders, including many terrorists condemned to jail terms by the courts during the military rule in 1973–73, were freed.

Confident that he could force the Parliament to go to new elections in which he could gain a comfortable majority, Ecevit broke up the coalition in November of 1974, and thus vindicated those who claimed that the differences between the two partners were stronger than their similarities. However, Ecevit's expectations did not materialize. Parliament refused to go to new elections. Erbakan, enraged by the humiliating treatment accorded to him during the months of political partnership, made common cause with the conservative parties, the JP and the Nationalist Action Party of Alparslan Türkeş. A short-lived, non-party cabinet formed under Sadi İrmak was followed by a right wing coalition government composed of the JP, NSP, NAP and RRP, formed under Süleyman Demirel and lasting from March, 1975 to June, 1977 (for cabinet changes see Appendix I). It was during this time that the rightist groups proliferated, for both the NSP and, especially, the NAP began to infiltrate various government offices with their own members as a precaution against a leftist takeover. This marked the beginning of a general

trend for parties in power to subvert and use the government offices for their own ideological purposes.

The elections of 1977 finally gave the RPP 41.4 percent of the vote, the highest since 1950. The JP made a comeback in this election, obtaining 36.9 percent of the vote after having lured back members from the dissident DP. The elections of 1977 reversed a trend of declining popular participation and demonstrated a certain tendency to support the big parties to the detriment of the smaller ones; the two major parties, JP and RPP, polled together about 78 percent of the total vote, as compared with their combined total of only 64 percent in 1973 and 74 percent in 1969. The popularity shown by the Nationalist Action Party was the most dramatic event of the elections of 1977: its vote rose from 3.4 percent in 1973 to 6.4 percent in 1977, while the number of its deputies soared from 3 to 16. Meanwhile, the NSP's vote percentage dropped from 11.8 to 8.6 percent, and the number of its deputies went down from 48 to 24. (Election results are shown in Appendices II and III.)

The election results reflected the voters' disillusionment, caused by Erbakan's political opportunism and wavering, and the success of the NAP in shedding its narrow nationalist ideology and adopting a new and broad view, combining nationality with religion with the purpose of redefining the Turks' national identity. The NAP was originally a minor rightist radical party with power bases in Central Anatolia. Initially called the Republic Peasant National Party, it was the result of a merger between the Nation and Peasant parties. It was taken over by Alparslan Türkeş and his associates in 1965 and transformed into a highly disciplined, hierarchial, nationalist group. The Türkeş philosophy, encompassed in his nine principles (*Dokuz Işık*—nine rays or lights), rejected socialism and capitalism and remained closely attached to secularism. However, after 1973 Türkeş' nationalist philosophy acquired increasingly Islamic overtones, although, rejecting accusations of nazism and fascism, he claimed that he was following a Kemalist line and democracy. By 1973 the party had developed into a countryside organization with strong representation in all the major cities, including some following among segments of the lower middle classes. The NAP was on the move.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> There have been some ingenious theories claiming that the NAP secured its

Meanwhile the cleavage between the RPP and the conservative parties deepened, especially after the death of İnönü in 1973. The rightists believed that Ecevit was under the influence of a crypto-communist group in his own party and, blinded by his ambition for power and irrational leftist sentimentalism, was bent on destroying their own parties; so they used their votes in the Parliament to prevent Ecevit from assuming power.

The electoral results in 1977 permitted NAP, together with NSP, to give Demirel the margin of votes (229) necessary to form a coalition government called *Millî Cephe* (National Front) after Ecevit, despite his large bloc of deputies (213 in all), had failed to gain a vote of confidence. (Some of the JP members complained that their party was being radicalized by its association with the nationalist-religious parties of Türkeş and Erbakan, but they could not prevent the drift to the right.) However, because it had a large number of deputies in the Assembly as well as sympathy among the intellectuals and bureaucrats, the RPP successfully blocked many programs undertaken by the rightist coalition.

Meanwhile, both inflation and terrorism, originally unrelated to each other, intensified beyond control. The inflation was the result of the mounting foreign debt stemming from Demirel's ambitious plans, which called for economic development based on a large volume of imported goods to be paid for by short term foreign loans at high interest rates, and, especially, from the skyrocketing of oil prices. By 1978, Turkey's exports barely sufficed to pay for her oil.

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victory by taking away the votes from the NSP. There was indeed a shift of votes from the NSP to other parties, especially in the provinces such as Elazığ, Erzincan, Çorum, Yozgat, Sivas, Tokat and Çankırı which had large *Alevi* (Shiite) populations. One explanation is that in 1973 the Sunnis of these provinces had voted for the NSP in reaction to the Shiites but then, in 1977, shifted their vote to the NAP because they found its nationalist-religious appeal suitable to their own philosophy and interests. Actually, the principal explanation is found in the growth of the total number of voters, an important 6 percent rise in popular participation, and, especially, in the polarization of votes. If sectarian allegiances were to play such an important role, then the *Birlik Partisi* (Union Party), a small leftist group established specifically with the purpose of attracting the Shiite (*Alevi*) votes, should have gained popularity among these people, who form 20 to 30 percent of the population in Eastern Anatolia; but the vote received by TSP was barely 1 or 2 percent of the total cast. For a more detailed view of the impact of ideologies in Turkey, see my *Political and Social Thought* (revised edition forthcoming).

One can state relatively safely that the voters in 1977 favored the establishment of a government by the RPP for several reasons. It seemed that the RPP was best suited to use strong means to crack down on the mounting violence and to contain the absurd effort of a handful of leftist activists to oust the regime by violent means without antagonizing the military and the bureaucracy which had remained cool to Demirel. (The paradox of the situation was that it was the RPP which defended the right of these radicals freely to express their views and opposed any strong action against them.) Moreover, there was in the urban areas, notably among the shanty-town dwellers, a temporary tendency toward accepting the social democratic policy as preached by RPP. At any rate, the success registered by the RPP at the polls in 1977 vindicated Ecevit's view that the party could come to power only by adopting a genuine leftist policy. Consequently, he moved further to the left and became utterly merciless in attacking his political enemies. He established also his firm control over the party by defeating easily the challenges to his chairmanship.

Meanwhile, accusations of incompetence due to its inability to check terrorism and inflation, the growing dissatisfaction of many members of the JP with the rightist radicalization of their party, and a variety of legal and parliamentary obstructions undermined drastically the efficiency of Demirel's coalition government. A number of deputies, chiefly from the JP, were induced to resign with promises of ministerial positions. These, together with a few deputies from the RPP, DP, and independents, all anxious to end the dangerous slide to the extreme right, combined in a coalition government under Ecevit's premiership.<sup>45</sup> The new coalition government stayed in power from January 1978 to November 1979, but contrary to Ecevit's limitless promises, it was not able to check either terrorism or inflation. In fact, both worsened beyond description, while both the rightists and the leftists tried to prove the inability of *any* government to control these evils. The rate of the spiraling rise in wages accelerated, thanks in part to the government's open support of the workers' demands. The business establishment, eager to avoid confrontation

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<sup>45</sup> The information on these developments and subsequent events has been gathered from the daily press and periodicals too numerous to be cited. The chief publications used were *Milliyet*, *Cumhuriyet*, *Hürriyet*, and *Aydınlık* for the leftist and middle of the road views and *Tercüman* and *Milli Gazete* for the rightist views.



with government-backed labor, accepted the wage increases, only to pass them on immediately to the consumers. Meanwhile Ecevit tried to develop closer relations with socialist and third world countries, although Turkey remained formally in the NATO. Like his predecessors, he staffed the government offices with his own supporters and sympathizers, including many Marxists, deepening further the ideological gulf that divided government officials—especially the police, educators, and administrators—into rival groups. Soon the coalition began to lose the support of its partners.

After the elections of 1977 the country saw a rapid and profound deterioration of its economy, civil service, and practically all fields of activity caused by the increasing strife among the political parties. Public pessimism mounted, as the confidence of the public in the government and in its own ability to change the course of events vanished. Doomsday, brought about by political parties in the name of democracy, did not seem far away. The failure of the government in almost every field and the administrative incompetence of the Premier seemed even worse when contrasted with the generous promises made with such eloquence by Ecevit during his long years in opposition.

The public discontent with the Ecevit government was shown in the by-elections of October 1979; the five Assembly seats contested were all won by Demirel's party. (In this study the election for the Senate, which is relatively powerless, is not discussed.) The RPP vote fell to about 29 percent, while the JP's vote rose to 54 percent; the votes received by the NSP and NAP showed smaller decreases. The popular consensus seemed to have swung strongly to the support of the moderate right wing parties, which received 68 percent of the total vote. The four extreme leftist parties that participated in the elections obtained less than 1 percent of the vote.

Ecevit resigned, and Demirel formed a minority government. Stung by accusations of rightist deviation and by the deterioration of his party's public image because of its association with NSP and NAP, Demirel reverted to the party's original middle of the road—i.e., socially conservative but economically liberal—policies and attempted to revive the authority of the government by taking stern measures against both the leftists and the rightists. He initiated also the far-reaching economic reforms demanded by the International Monetary Fund before Turkey would be granted foreign loans. It was too late. The inflation rate remained the same, and terrorism continued

unabated, while Erbakan, having been left out of the government (NAP supported Demirel), once more combined forces with Ecevit in an all out effort to bring down Demirel's government through a series of votes of nonconfidence.

The days of Demirel's government seemed numbered. Repeated suggestions that JP and RPP form a coalition government or hold new elections had fallen on deaf ears, as the two had grown ideologically too far apart from each other. The alternative, until the general elections due in 1981, seem to be another string of weak coalition governments and continuous anarchy and terror. Thus the military decided to intervene on September 12, 1980, to put an end to the chaos brought by the misunderstanding of democracy and incompetent political leadership. A new era in Turkish politics was about to begin.

### 10. *Conclusions*

The analysis of political events in Turkey lends itself to a number of conclusions concerning the future of the regime as a whole.

The failure of democracy in Turkey was essentially a failure in leadership. The leaders of the political parties viewed Turkey's multifaceted problems as either day-to-day issues which could be settled with a few practical and expedient decisions or as suitable conditions for introducing leftist or rightist elitist ideologies purporting to provide total solutions. Ideologies were chosen and promoted without much regard for the country's readiness to accept them and without consideration for the political, social, and cultural institutions, values, and aspirations developed in the Republic or inherited from the Ottoman past.

The lack of cooperation, collaboration, and compromise among political leaders led to the destruction of the political balance (between the two major political parties—the JP and the RPP) which had guaranteed the survival of democracy and of the regime in the past. This was probably the greatest loss to the political system and the source of the other troubles that shook the system to its foundations. The growing imbalance between production and consumption, between actual economic development and the ambitious social programs and expectations stimulated by politically motivated promises weakened

further the stability of the political system. Yet, one should not ignore the fact that the political chaos, the breakdown of law and order, the fights between ideologically motivated groups, and the sense of pessimism and dejection that for a while betook the country were also the symptoms of a qualitative change long in the making. The qualitative change can be summarized in a few words: during the last twenty-five years Turkey has moved from a predominantly traditionalist, agricultural, semi-literate society to a modernist, semi-industrial, literate society. Various modernistic values, attitudes, and aspirations in the past associated with the minority are now shared, or on the way to being shared, by a majority.

The critical need for Turkey in devising her future constitutional system is to take account both of the lessons of the past and also of the critical developmental stage reached at the present. At the present stage it would be relatively easy either to push the country back into its old mold or to launch it into the future along ill advised paths. The point to remember is that many of the foundations which guaranteed the stability of the regime in the past do not exist any longer. There is no dominant political elite united on essential points; the old traditional urban and rural structures have disappeared to a large extent; there are no charismatic leaders; and, worst of all, some of the values and symbols of the Republic that provided a degree of unity have been obscured by a variety of rightist and leftist ideological tendencies. Yet, paradoxical as it may sound, the rank and file population seems to be far more strongly attached to the Republic and the national ideals and democracy than some of the elites, and much more so than it was a generation ago. The communication process had its share in generalizing and transmitting to the masses the symbols and values of Turkishness, Republicanism, and democracy. It is difficult to ascertain at this stage the features of the democratic regime being discussed and defined in Turkey among the military and various intellectual groups. One fact is certain: the future of Turkey's democracy is vitally dependent on the wisdom of the constitutional decisions being made. The pressure put on the military rulers of Turkey to "restore democracy as soon as possible" originates not only from among well-intentioned people but also from among astute extremists who are afraid that a well thought out and balanced democratic system will dash forever their political ambitions.

The current proposals concerning the future democratic system of

Turkey seem to attach exaggerated importance to strengthening the executive. True, a strong executive would conform to Turkish traditions of government and to her current needs. However, the chief guarantee of a democratic order is the acceptance of the system by the population at large. This can best be achieved through popular participation, and the best means for achieving such participation is via the political parties. Yet, so far the views put forth with regard to the role of the political parties, the selection of leaders, the achievement of interparty democracy, etc., seem to attach far more importance to schematic and narrow legalistic views of democratic procedures than to the interplay of basic social, economic, and cultural forces involved in the political process of democracy. At this stage one can only wish for the best.

APPENDIX I: *Turkish Governments (Premiers), 1970–1980*

1. Süleyman Demirel, 6 March 1970–12 March 1971
2. Nihat Erim, 26 March 1971–3 December 1971
3. Suat Hayri Ürgüplü, 14 May 1972 (Received no votes)
4. Ferit Melen, 22 May 1972–10 April 1973
5. Naim Talu, 15 April 1973–25 January 1974
6. Bülent Ecevit, 25 January 1974–7 November 1974
7. Sadi Irmak, 13 November 1974–30 March 1975
8. Süleyman Demirel, 31 March 1975–21 June 1977
9. Bülent Ecevit, 21 June 1977–21 July 1977
10. Süleyman Demirel, 21 July 1977–5 January 1978
11. Bülent Ecevit, 5 January 1978–12 November 1979
12. Süleyman Demirel, 12 November 1979–12 September 1980

APPENDIX II: *National Assembly Election Results, 1950–1979\**

Year	Total No. of Voters	Total Votes Cast	Voting %	Total Valid Votes	Vote by Parties														
					JP			RPP			RRP			RPNP			RNP		
					No. of Votes	% of Votes	Deputies Elected	No. of Votes	% of Votes	Deputies Elected	No. of Votes	% of Votes	Deputies Elected	No. of Votes	% of Votes	Deputies Elected	No. of Votes	% of Votes	Deputies Elected
1950	8,905,743	7,953,055	89.3		–	–	–	3,176,561	39.9	69	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1951	3,168,423	1,778,853	54.1		–	–	–	687,668	38.7	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1954	10,262,063	9,095,617	88.6		–	–	–	3,161,696	34.8	30	–	–	–	–	–	–	434,085	4.8	–
1957	12,078,623	9,250,949	76.6		–	–	–	3,753,136	40.6	173	–	–	–	–	–	–	652,064	7.0	4
1961	12,925,395	10,522,716	81.0	10,138,035	3,527,435	34.8	158	3,724,752	36.7	173	–	–	–	1,415,390	14.0	54	–	–	–
1965	13,679,753	9,748,678	71.3	9,307,563	4,921,235	52.9	240	2,675,785	28.7	134	–	–	–	208,696	2.2	11	–	–	–
1969	14,788,522	9,516,035	64.3	9,086,296	4,229,712	46.5	256	2,487,006	27.4	143	597,818	6.6	15	–	–	–	–	–	–
1973	16,798,164	11,223,843	66.8	10,723,658	3,197,897	29.8	149	3,570,583	33.3	185	564,343	5.3	13	–	–	–	–	–	–
1975	1,743,152	1,120,415	64.3	1,077,821	524,001	48.6	5	409,387	38.0	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1977	21,207,303	15,358,210	72.4	14,827,172	5,468,202	36.9	189	6,136,171	41.4	213	277,713	1.9	3	–	–	–	–	–	–
1979	1,727,069	1,289,141	74.6	1,252,427	676,900	54.0	5	367,317	29.3	–	21,593	1.7	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

\* Extracted from official election figures issued by the Prime Minister's Statistical Office (1980), pp. 586–87. Results in 1951, 1975, and 1979 are for by-elections in only a few provinces.

\*\* The initials stand for the following parties: JP| Justice Party; RPP | Republican People's Party; RRP | Republican Reliance Party; RPNP | Republican People's National Party; RNP | Republican National Party; DP | Democrat Party (Old); Democratic Party (New); FP | Freedom Party; NP | Nation's Party, NAP | Nationalist Action Party; NSP | National Salvation Party; SDP | Social Democratic Party; TUP | Turkish Union Party; LP | Labor Party, SAPT | Socialist Action Party of Turkey; NTP | New Turkey Party.

Year	Total No. of Voters	Total Votes Cast	Voting %	Total Valid Votes	Vote by Parties																				
					DP (Democrat)			DP (Democrat)			FP			NP			NAP			NSP					
					No. of Votes	% of Votes	Deputies Elected	No. of Votes	% of Votes	Deputies Elected	No. of Votes	% of Votes	Deputies Elected	No. of Votes	% of Votes	Deputies Elected	No. of Votes	% of Votes	Deputies Elected	No. of Votes	% of Votes	Deputies Elected			
1950	8,905,743	7,953,055	89.3		4,241,393	53.3	408	-	-	-	-	-	-	250,414	3.1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
1951	3,168,423	1,778,853	54.1		937,288	52.7	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	142,359	8.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
1954	10,262,063	9,095,617	88.6		5,151,550	56.6	490	-	-	-	57,011	0.6	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
1957	12,078,623	9,250,949	76.6		4,372,621	47.3	419	-	-	-	350,597	3.8	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
1961	12,925,395	10,522,716	81.0	10,138,035	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
1965	13,679,753	9,748,678	71.3	9,307,563	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	582,704	6.3	31	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1969	14,788,522	9,516,035	64.3	9,086,296	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	292,961	3.2	6	275,091	3.0	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
1973	16,798,164	11,223,843	66.8	10,723,658	-	-	-	1,275,502	11.9	45	-	-	-	62,377	0.6	-	362,208	3.4	3	1,265,771	11.8	48	-	-	-
1975	1,743,152	1,120,415	64.3	1,077,821	-	-	-	30,654	2.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24,848	2.3	-	84,706	7.9	-	-	-	-
1977	21,207,303	15,358,210	72.4	14,827,172	-	-	-	274,484	1.9	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	951,544	6.4	16	1,269,918	8.6	24	-	-	-
1979	1,727,069	1,289,141	74.6	1,252,427	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	67,154	5.4	-	92,932	7.4	-	-	-	-

Year	Total No. of Voters	Total Votes Cast	Voting %	Total Valid Votes	Vote by Parties																
					SDP			TUP			LP		SAPT		NTP		Independents				
					No. of Votes	% of Votes	Deputies Elected	No. of Votes	% of Votes	Deputies Elected	No. of Votes	% of Votes	Deputies Elected	No. of Votes	% of Votes	Deputies Elected	No. of Votes	% of Votes	Deputies Elected		
1950	8,905,743	7,953,055	89.3		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	383,282	4.8	9	
1951	3,168,423	1,778,853	54.1		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10,323	0.6	-	
1954	10,262,063	9,095,617	88.6		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	137,318	1.5	10	
1957	12,078,623	9,250,949	76.6		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,994	0.1	2	
1961	12,925,395	10,522,716	81.0	10,138,035	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,391,934	13.7	65	81,732	0.8	-
1965	13,679,753	9,748,678	71.3	9,307,563	-	-	-	-	-	276,101	3.0	14	-	-	-	346,514	3.7	19	296,520	3.2	1
1969	14,788,522	9,516,035	64.3	9,086,296	-	-	-	254,695	2.8	8	243,631	2.7	2	-	-	197,929	2.2	6	511,023	5.6	13
1973	16,798,164	11,223,843	66.8	10,723,658	-	-	-	121,759	1.1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	303,218	2.8	6	
1975	1,743,152	1,120,415	64.3	1,077,821	-	-	-	3,014	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,211	0.1	-	
1977	21,207,303	15,358,210	72.4	14,827,172	-	-	-	58,540	0.4	-	20,565	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	370,035	2.5	4	
1979	1,727,069	1,289,141	74.6	1,252,427	7,677	0.6	-	4,290	0.3	-	7,315	0.6	-	6,735	0.5	-	-	297	0.3	-	

APPENDIX III: *Senate Election Results, 1961–1979\**

Year	Total No. of Voters	Total Votes Cast	Voting %	Total Valid Votes	Vote by Parties**														
					JP			RPP			RRP			RPNP			DP (Democratic)		
					No. of Votes	% of Votes	Deputies Elected	No. of Votes	% of Votes	Deputies Elected	No. of Votes	% of Votes	Deputies Elected	No. of Votes	% of Votes	Deputies Elected	No. of Votes	% of Votes	Deputies Elected
1961	12,926,837	10,519,659	81.0	10,032,530	3,560,675	34.5	71	3,734,285	36.1	36	–	–	–	1,350,892	12.5	16	–	–	–
1964	4,668,865	2,808,592	60.2	2,756,275	1,385,655	50.3	31	1,125,783	40.8	19	–	–	–	83,400	3.0	–	–	–	–
1965	5,466,284	3,072,393	56.2	2,967,331	1,688,316	56.9	35	877,066	29.6	13	–	–	–	57,367	1.9	1	–	–	–
1968	5,420,255	3,595,976	66.3	3,322,710	1,656,802	49.9	38	899,444	27.1	13	284,234	8.6	1	66,232	2.0	–	–	–	–
1973	6,761,157	4,412,727	65.3	4,201,557	1,300,801	31.0	22	1,412,051	33.6	25	246,888	5.9	1	–	–	–	438,276	10.4	–
1975	9,295,019	5,430,184	58.4	5,260,888	2,147,026	40.8	27	2,281,740	43.4	25	–	–	–	–	–	–	165,170	3.1	–
1977	6,800,746	5,019,677	73.8	4,812,326	1,842,396	38.3	21	2,037,875	42.8	28	89,484	1.9	–	–	–	–	107,278	2.2	–
1979	6,868,533	4,847,156	70.5	4,730,571	2,215,053	46.8	33	1,378,224	29.1	12	117,749	2.5	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

\* Source: Official figures of the Prime Minister's Statistical Office (1980), pp. 2–3.

\*\* See Appendix II for party names.



Year	Total No. of Voters	Total Votes Cast	Voting %	Total Valid Votes	Vote by Parties**														
					NP			NAP			NSP			SDP			TUP		
					No. of Votes	% of Votes	Deputies Elected	No. of Votes	% of Votes	Deputies Elected	No. of Votes	% of Votes	Deputies Elected	No. of Votes	% of Votes	Deputies Elected	No. of Votes	% of Votes	Deputies Elected
1961	12,926,837	10,519,659	81.0	10,032,530	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
1964	4,668,865	2,808,592	60.2	2,756,275	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
1965	5,466,284	3,072,393	56.2	2,967,331	157,115	5.3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
1968	5,420,255	3,595,976	66.3	3,322,710	200,737	6.0	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
1973	6,761,157	4,412,727	65.3	4,201,557	-	-	-	114,662	2.7	-	516,822	12.3	3	-	-	-	89,824	2.1	-
1975	9,295,019	5,430,184	58.4	5,260,888	-	-	-	170,357	3.2	-	465,731	8.9	2	-	-	-	28,283	0.5	-
1977	6,800,746	5,019,677	73.8	4,812,326	-	-	-	326,967	6.8	-	402,702	8.4	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
1979	6,868,533	4,847,156	70.5	4,730,571	-	-	-	312,241	6.6	1	459,040	9.7	4	33,548	0.7	-	55,774	1.2	-

Year	Total No. of Voters	Total Votes Cast	Voting %	Total Valid Votes	Vote by Parties**											
					LP			SAPT			NTP			Independents		
					No. of Votes	% of Votes	Deputies Elected	No. of Votes	% of Votes	Deputies Elected	No. of Votes	% of Votes	Deputies Elected	No. of Votes	% of Votes	Deputies Elected
1961	12,926,837	10,519,659	81.0	10,032,530	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,401,637	13.0	27	39,558	3.9	-
1964	4,668,865	2,808,592	60.2	2,756,275	-	-	-	-	-	-	96,427	3.5	-	64,498	2.3	1
1965	5,466,284	3,072,393	56.2	2,967,331	116,375	3.9	1	-	-	-	70,043	2.4	1	980	0.0	-
1968	5,420,255	3,595,976	66.3	3,322,710	157,062	4.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	58,317	1.7	-
1973	6,761,157	4,412,727	65.3	4,201,557	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	82,233	2.0	1
1975	9,295,019	5,430,184	58.4	5,260,888	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,851	0.1	-
1977	6,800,746	5,019,677	73.8	4,812,326	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,624	0.1	-
1979	6,868,533	4,847,156	70.5	4,730,571	33,720	0.7	-	62,105	1.3	-	-	-	-	63,093	1.3	-

## THE TURKISH LEFT

The rise of a modern secular left-wing movement in Turkey, aimed at establishing a new social and political system, depended first and above all on the elimination of the traditional concepts of authority and social organization. Leftist ideas of government rest on a materialist concept of power and assume an economic explanation of social organization which is irreconcilable with the traditionalist moral understanding of government and authority. It was natural, then, that the disintegration of traditionalism and the rise of leftist thought should begin only slowly in the Ottoman Empire and become increasingly rapid in Republican Turkey. The reforms in government prepared the ground not only for modernization of the country in the general sense, but also for the development of leftist movements.

The first of these (clubs, political parties) were established during the Young Turks era (1908–18), after the power of the traditionalist dynasty had been irrevocably undermined by nationalism and secularism. The process had in fact begun much earlier, as a result of the social changes occurring after *Tanzimat* (1839), and especially after the Crimean War in 1853. The Young Ottomans (1865–76), especially Ali Suavi, Ziya Paşa, and Namık Kemal, held views which might have evolved into a movement of social protest, but they were stifled and diverted into the demand for a constitutional parliamentary regime after Abdulhamid II, in 1877, prorogued Parliament indefinitely and maintained the sanctity of traditional institutions. Thereafter social ideas found an outlet in literature which bore little relation to political thought. Between the years 1880 and 1908 the reformist intelligentsia, forced to flee abroad, borrowed Western political ideas without much concern for their economic and social relevance.<sup>1</sup> The resulting social vacuum in the thought of the Young Turks reflected their aloofness from the country's realities and the inability of modern social ideas to make their way against the institutions and the philosophy of the traditional social organization.

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri* (Ankara, 1964), and Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics* (Princeton, 1959), Chapters 1–3.

A drastic change in these traditional political institutions therefore appeared as the primary condition for the rise of modern social thought, including its left-wing varieties. Consequently the abolition by Mustafa Kemal of the Sultanate in 1922 and the Caliphate in 1924, and of their sustaining cultural and educational bases (these had already been undermined by the secularist-nationalist policies of the Young Turks), prepared the ground for the establishment (1923) and consolidation of a Republican regime, and also removed the obstacles hampering the rise of a secular left. The Republican government, bent on preserving the unity necessary for building a national state, found it expedient to make extensive use of the traditional concepts of government and authority, but these could not be maintained indefinitely, while the social structure became diversified and evolved often in contradiction with the political ideas surviving from earlier times. The inability to harmonize the philosophy of the political system with its developing social and economic content, and to provide satisfactory intellectual explanations, caused profound tensions throughout the Republic. Fresh social ideas, being ignored or misunderstood, took the form of political hostility to a government which failed to grasp their vital meaning. Whenever conditions made it possible, as during periods of rapprochement with the Soviet Union, or when genuine attempts to introduce democratic processes were made, as in 1930 and after 1946, left-wing currents burst violently into the open.

The forms they took varied according to the degree of liberalization and the stage of social development reached. In 1930 the interval of liberalization was so short that they scarcely had time to assert themselves, and became confused with the popular protest against the ruling Republican Party. They emerged more clearly after 1946, but were soon forced underground by the government's repressive action.

A second source of leftism in Turkey must be sought in the social and cultural dislocation caused by modernization. The complex social and psychological readjustments it implied provided leftism with the opportunity to present itself as a creed offering salvation in the form of dedication to a modern form of life. Modernization, indeed, gradually undermined the traditional social and cultural framework within which the individual had found security and meaning in life. Change in a society which preserves its basic religious, cultural, and philosophical framework does not totally undermine its value system; but in

Turkey the economic and social transformation, especially after 1930, profoundly affected existing values. The situation was further aggravated by the government's opposition to open debate and discussion. Given this freedom, the intellectuals would have been able to explain and justify the changes and thus adapt themselves mentally to new forms of social and political organization. Without it, they were unable to carry out their unique mission of formulating a system of ideas and thus facilitating the adjustment to the changed forms of life.

Actually it was the intellectual who became the first victim of the clash of values. The common people were still relatively secure within their traditional family relations and communal ties, which were hostile to but still protected them against outside influences.<sup>2</sup> But the intellectual, borrowing the outlook and values of the West, was exposed to inner conflict from the very beginning. His ideas of 'good', 'right', and 'just' differed substantially from those accepted in his immediate environment. It was usually the more sensitive and serious type of intellectual who reacted most violently to society's unwillingness to accept his own borrowed standards of 'good' and 'just', standards nourished by a kind of secular humanism which made his dissatisfaction with the traditionalist order even greater and left him mentally isolated in his own society. He turned avidly to a search for arguments and ideas to support his stand and to condemn his opponents and society at large as sinners against modernism.

Western literature offered him an easy escape into an ideal world where he shared ideas and lived among men whose way of life he wanted to make his own.<sup>3</sup> Later the intellectual moved from literature to social doctrine and finally began to search for political means to fulfil his social dream. The rise of leftism in Turkey was intimately associated with literature; the country's leading leftists are usually thoroughly versed in Western literature, and literary works

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<sup>2</sup> The large group of Turkish workers (over 150,000) employed in Western Europe seemed to have taken the new conditions in their stride just because their values were already formed and their intellectual unpreparedness left them immune to outside influences. See Nermin Abadan, *Batı Almanya'daki Türk İşçileri ve Sorunları* (Ankara, 1964), p. 191 ff.

<sup>3</sup> A leftist escapee to the West wrote: 'I am in Europe and free. I have no hatred, only pity towards my society which tortured me and my friends and condemned us materially and morally. That society pushed aside the truly progressive citizens . . . It lives on their blood and tears . . . we have seen much and our friends have suffered much. What was our guilt? Nothing, believe me, nothing. Only our thoughts, which did not suit their minds and made them suspicious.' *Akşam*, 13 August 1960.

were often used to convey political ideas to adherents and to propose practical methods of political action. The police would ascertain the political tendency of suspected leftists by raiding their libraries; Ignazio Silone, John Steinbeck, and most Russian writers were usually considered incriminating.

It was thus the intrusion of Western values upon a traditionalist system, rather than a conflict arising from the clash of economic interests, which turned intellectuals to the left, although economic arguments were later invoked as justification for a new political regime. This situation, coupled with the ruling elite's denial of freedom, and especially its dismal failure to replace fading social values with new ones genuinely in accord with new conditions, facilitated the spread of leftist ideas.

A former member of the underground communist party of Turkey (now an actor), gives an excellent insight into his conversion to Marxism. He was brought up in a lower-class urban environment amidst poverty, ignorance, and bloody feuds arising from personal conflicts, while the upper class remained utterly unconcerned with the fate of the underdog. Eventually a friend, who had associated with communists, gave him Stefan Zweig's book *Mercy*, describing Zweig as a humanist. Later the reading list included Nazım Hikmet's poems and other works by left-wing Turkish writers, to be followed by occasional socialist writings. Finally the 'bourgeois' became the hated enemy opposing the establishment of the 'right' social order, and the man found himself in the left-wing underground in 1946.<sup>4</sup> 'I ask myself,' he writes, 'whether I would have joined the communist party . . . if I had found a little interest, affection, and understanding? . . . I ask the question in order to determine my own responsibility. I am the child of a society whose values were destroyed and its foundations shaken by the downfall of the Empire . . . I accept my share of responsibility without going into unnecessary explanations. But those ruling society in those days must accept theirs too. It is easy to accuse and even punish a man and make him a social outcast because his values differ from society's. But this means to view lightly the problems of our country and those of the world . . .

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<sup>4</sup> Aclan Sayılğan, *İnkâr Fırtınası* (Ankara, 1962), pp. 15–27. The author entered the party in 1945 and was arrested in 1952 along with the most of the underground organization.

I have no doubt that my generation, born with the Republic, was the victim of treachery. We saw that everything was valued politically. The politicians wrote history and made us read it the way they pleased. They defined democracy as they pleased and wanted the masses to swallow it like a pill. They praised not the power of the intellect, of creativity and culture, but that of brute force, and wanted us to become its slaves. They sacrificed what was lofty to the clamorous flatten<sup>7</sup> of the masses . . . A generation which was neglected and whose existence was ignored, was bound to realize that it had been deceived. It would then reject everything and would strive to find new values to replace those destroyed.<sup>7</sup>

Often left-wing ideas were taken up as a comprehensive answer to the needs of modernization. A well-integrated socio-political system, such as that of the traditionalist Islamic order, could be replaced only by a system which was equally comprehensive. This substitution of one system for another is feasible at the intellectual level if other social and political developments within the social body do not thwart or reshape the intellectuals' political ideals. The social transformation in Turkey, while offering suitable conditions for the development of a radical left, also created new interests and orientations which were in opposition to it. In this context leftism in Turkey, especially after 1940, became also part of a complex endeavour to preserve the intelligentsia's high status against the rising entrepreneurial middle class. Modernization in the Ottoman Empire and Republican Turkey aimed primarily at reforming the government institutions. The subsequent expansion of the administration necessitated a large bureaucracy, whose official role of implementing state authority was coupled with the unofficial function of providing intellectual leadership for the modernization movement. The content of this function was determined largely by the bureaucratic intelligentsia's association with and dependence on government.

The entrepreneurial groups, on the other hand, functioned initially as a subordinate economic auxiliary to the ruling bureaucratic order. But the growth in their size, power, and function within the national economy made them potential candidates for political power. Eventually, after the introduction of a multi-party system in 1945-6, they assumed their own political role and achieved power under the Democratic Party in 1950. This was followed by a marked diminution in the power of the bureaucrats who had ruled the country since the nineteenth century, while important sections of the intelli-

gentsia were attracted to the side of the rising bourgeoisie. Furthermore, the rise of new social groups to economic and political power challenged and undermined the values and standards of the upper classes, the old Ottoman families who had led the Republican revolution, and those who grew rich in 1915–22, in the economic scramble which followed the decline of the non-Moslem middle classes. The growing importance of economic factors played a decisive part in giving a more concrete form to leftist ideology and in relating it to various social groups.

The agitated years of the War of Liberation (1919–23) saw the rise of a series of leftist groups. Of these only the young Spartacist-Marxists, trained in Germany, notably Şefik Hüsnü (Değmer) played a part in later movements. The Islamic-minded socialists took no part in the elections of 1923, while the secularist, moderate leftists were absorbed into the ruling Republican Party. After 1925 the Law on Public Order was used to liquidate all extremist movements.

The official acceptance of economic statism in 1931, and the renewal of the treaty of friendship with the USSR, enabled social questions to be discussed more freely. It was obvious that the social transformations under way needed an explanation and justification, not only to placate the intellectuals but also to influence their thinking. The review *Kadro* (1932–4) presented an amalgam of radical concepts, left and right, aiming at creating a national ideology, and possibly preventing the expansion of the radical left. But Marxist political literature,<sup>5</sup> apart from a few translations, remained confined to a few insignificant tracts, brochures, and periodicals. Underground political activities were also of limited consequence.

The really significant leftist activity after 1925 was to be found in literature. Nazım Hikmet Ran (1902–63), using also the pen name of Orhan Selim, Sabahaddin Ali (1907–48), and several other lesser names, portrayed in realistic terms the plight of the lower classes, using literature for political purposes. In an interview in 1958, Nazım Hikmet declared that ‘a writer could not be politically neutral. It would be difficult to point even to a single great writer throughout history who remained perfectly neutral and passive about the problems

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<sup>5</sup> See Kerim Sadi (Nevzat Gurken) *Felsefenin Sefaleti* (İstanbul, 1934); *Bir Şakirdin Hatıraları* (İstanbul, 1934); and several other works appearing in the *İnsaniyet* (Humanity) collection. See also the review *Projectör*. On the *Kadro* see *Türkiye’de Kapitalizm* (Tarihsel Maddecilik Yayınları), vol. i (İstanbul, 1965), p. 154 ff.



of his time . . . I believe that writers, communist writers in particular, must create a literature which will become one of the sources of knowledge of real life . . . I would like to write poems, novels, plays which had this virtue for my people and for other peoples'.<sup>6</sup>

Orhan Kemal, one of the best contemporary Turkish novelists, tells how he was converted to such views by association with Nazım Hikmet in jail.<sup>7</sup> His writings also make it clear that personal friendships and family attachments often determined a writer's political and ideological orientation, and incidentally provide interesting information about the lower strata of Turkish society. Nazım Hikmet's celebrated poems *Memleketimden İnsan Manzaraları* (Human views of my country), a description of various social types, are based on observation and interviews with men he met in jail. Kemal Tahir, another well-known living novelist befriended by Nazım Hikmet, told this writer in 1962 that most of his heroes were men he met in jail, while serving a sentence for his association with Hikmet. Similarly Şevket Süreyya, the leader of the *Kadro*, was awakened to the realities of Turkish life, according to his memoirs, by men he met in jail. All this suggests that the early socialist writers had only a limited knowledge of life in Anatolia, and may legitimately provoke the question whether men condemned for ordinary crimes accurately reflect Turkey's social problems.

During the war years 1939–45 conditions favoured the development of left currents; the rise of wealthy groups living in luxury gave a sharper outline to social injustice and illiteracy. At Ankara University a team of sociologists began to study social change in Turkey in a systematic, scientific manner, publishing their results in the reviews *Yurt ve Dünya* and *Adımlar*, and took an active part in the development of Village Institutes, the educational institutions set up in the countryside.

The fruit of these preparations was evident in the outburst of left-wing activities following the political liberalization of 1945–6.<sup>8</sup> Several newspapers and reviews gave space to socialist ideas of various kinds,

<sup>6</sup> Nazım Hikmet, *Anthologie Poétique* (Paris, 1964), pp. 357–8.

<sup>7</sup> Orhan Kemal, *Nazım Hikmet'le Uç Buçuk Yıl* (Istanbul, 1965).

<sup>8</sup> The Democratic Party, established in January 1946, was supported by many socially-minded and leftist intellectuals desiring social progress. Some of them became fully identified with this party and put to good use the propaganda and organizational skills developed during their marriage with leftism.

while the amendment of the Law on Associations in 1946, enabled left groups to organize themselves. Of about six self-styled socialist parties established at that time, only two were of any political consequence: the Socialist Party of Esat Adil Müstecaplıoğlu, with a broad leftist orientation, and the Marxist Workers and Peasants Socialist Party of Şefik Hüsnü Değmer. Of about one hundred trade unions established in 1946, at least a dozen were dominated by the left. Eventually the two parties, most of the publications, and the unions were closed in December 1946, and their leaders charged with subversive activities.

The left was once more declared illegal and identified with extremism, although a large number of so-called leftists were doing no more than seeking development and progress through ideas other than the official platitudes. This indiscriminate condemnation made it impossible to separate communists from socialists, and in fact secured for the former a dominating position. It remains true, however, that the leftists in 1946 may in a way be said to have doomed themselves from the outset by giving priority to foreign policy. They aroused hostility by their pro-Soviet attitude at a time when Stalin was exerting pressure on Turkey to obtain territory in the North and military bases on the Straits.

After 1946 left-wing activities were carried on by members of Değmer's party who escaped arrest in 1946. The underground organization under Zeki Baştımar was uncovered and its members arrested in 1952, and sentenced to various terms in jail. Their activities at home and abroad, their tactics, and especially the use they made of 'fronts' and of sympathizers (often without their knowledge), have been described by former members.<sup>9</sup> Open activities, such as opposition to the Korean War, sporadic publications, and the *Vatan Partisi* established by Hikmet Kıvılcımlı in 1957, were quickly liquidated by the Menderes government.<sup>10</sup> Left-wing activities after the second world war were initiated by urban intellectuals, many of them from the upper classes. They attracted a number of university students (the universities remained the main centres of leftism) but were unsuccessful in gaining the support of the working class. Although using

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<sup>9</sup> Sayılğan, *op. cit.*, p. 128 ff.

<sup>10</sup> One of the first acts of Menderes was to stiffen the legal provisions outlawing communist activities. For legal aspects of leftist trials see Remzi Balkanlı, *Mukayeseli Basın ve Propaganda* (Ankara, 1961), p. 445 ff.

Marxist slogans, they seemed to criticize chiefly conservatism and traditionalism rather than any specific social class. In fact the 'bourgeoisie' seemed to be the conservative religious small shopkeeper and the self-employed businessman relying on his own efforts for a living, rather than the banker or capitalist.

The number of convinced leftists in Turkey in the nineteen-forties probably never exceeded a thousand. Isolated from society, they appeared unable to affect the course of events. But a new generation of intellectuals was being educated in the West. Some of them, already committed to socialism or communism, assembled in Paris and organized the Progressive Young Turks, which served as a communication centre with Marxist groups in Turkey; but the majority of socially-minded students in the West preferred not to compromise themselves by overt adherence to a leftist ideology and awaited a suitable chance upon their return home.

The chance came as the liberal economic policy of the Democratic Party promoted the development of entrepreneurial activities of all kinds.<sup>11</sup> In 1950 the industrial middle class (including their families), probably accounted for about five per cent of the total population. By 1965 the figure had risen to over twenty per cent, and exerted a powerful influence on the government. The number of wage earners meanwhile rose from fewer than 400,000 in 1950 to close on two millions in 1965. At the same time improvements in agricultural methods and an extended road programme increased social mobility and helped to spread social awareness. The political consciousness of the masses developed steadily as they found their place in the various occupations. The dominant motive in all these activities was economic; among the working classes it naturally expressed itself in a desire for material advancement and welfare.

This process of growth from below, initiated by the government with immediate practical motives of its own, fundamentally changed the country's social organization and the power relations within it. The bureaucracy, already affected by inflation, surrendered its political and social power to a new economic elite drawn from landed and business groups and their associates. Moreover, the intelligentsia,

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<sup>11</sup> Alec P. Alexander, 'Industrial Entrepreneurship in Turkey', *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, July 1960; Arif Payashoğlu, *Türkiye'de Özel Sanayi Alanındaki Müteşebbisler ve Tesebbüsler* (Ankara, 1961). There is a comprehensive symposium in *Social Aspects of Economic Development* (Istanbul, 1963).

in the past strongly represented in the bureaucracy, saw the rise from its own ranks of professional groups either associated with the entrepreneurs as engineers and technicians, or finding lucrative employment in the service of private commercial and business enterprises. Earlier social values, based on education and dedication to state ideals, were undermined by an order based essentially on economic power. Socially and psychologically this was a far-reaching revolution. Materially and morally, it affected every section of the traditional ruling groups; the civil bureaucracy, the military, and all their affiliates. This social change occurred without benefit of intellectual justification or systematization. The automatic condemnation of all critical social ideas in the past as being conducive to socialism and communism greatly hindered the development of an adequate school of social thinking.

The intellectuals' reaction to these changes once more manifested itself in literature. The vast output of stories and novels with 'social content' after 1950, best reflects the trends of thought which eventually became the foundation of a new leftism. Writers such as Mahmut Makal, Yaşar Kemal, Orhan Kemal, Aziz Nesin, Kemal Tahir, Fakir Baykurt, Kemal Bilbaşar, Atilla İlhan, Necati Cumalı, to mention only a few, came mainly from the villages and the lower ranks of the urban intelligentsia.<sup>12</sup> They brought to public attention the unknown dimensions of Turkey's acute social problems, the widespread poverty, distress, and injustice. Gradually this type of writing found its way into the daily press. Correspondents roamed the far reaches of Anatolia and corroborated the writers with their well-documented findings. The increase in the daily circulation of newspapers (many published social novels in serial instalments) from about half a million in 1950 to a million in 1956, a million and a half in 1960, and finally to over two millions in 1965, attests to the importance acquired by the written word. Gradually the press attracted some of the left-wing *litterateurs* and became one of the strongholds of socialism after the revolution of 1960.

There were also a number of periodicals devoted largely to the discussion of social ideas, several of them published by Village Institute graduates. The review *Forum*, appearing bi-monthly in Ankara after 1954, provided probably the best systematic analysis of Turkey's

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<sup>12</sup> Cf. Kemal H. Karpat, 'Social Themes in Contemporary Turkish Literature', *Middle East Journal*, Winter-Spring 1960.

problems. It often published articles by leftists but generally occupied a moderate middle-of-the-road position. This was a sensible thing to do, since it permitted the discussion of social problems without incurring the danger of being indicted for leftist propaganda.

Support and approval came from those in the bureaucracy and the intelligentsia who did not benefit directly from the Democrats' economic policy. The idea that social justice was lacking in Turkey appealed to them and they sought allies among other social groups. They hoped to win over the impoverished peasants and workers and together with them establish a new, just, and prosperous regime; but they found little response in those quarters.

The large-scale conversion of the bureaucracy and the intelligentsia to the left occurred gradually after 1954. In that year the Democrats won a great victory at the elections, and decided to speed up their development drive, based chiefly on an inflationary unplanned economic policy. Capital accumulation in private hands increased and inflation mounted, while salaries remained relatively stagnant. The dissatisfaction aroused provided the foundations of a new leftist movement not associated directly with Marxism, as was the case for most earlier leftist endeavours. Furthermore, the new leftism was a response to domestic conditions, not a replica of a foreign ideology. As such it held the promise of taking shape in economic and social policies designed to broaden and modernize the Republic from within. Kemalism had built the political framework of modernism but neglected its social and economic content. The rising social currents eventually sought legitimation in the unfulfilled social promises of Kemalism, through an expanded interpretation of its populist, statist, and reformist principles.

The organized propagation of social ideas began timidly first in the *Devrim Ocakları* (Reform Hearths) established early in the 1950s to defend the secular reforms against religious reaction.<sup>13</sup> The *Ocaks* attracted mostly the university students, and were in sympathy with the Republican Party. Discussions usually began with a defence of Kemalism, and after 1954 moved on to debate contemporary social and economic problems. For the most part, however, the young generation of intellectuals got their training in the youth branches of

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<sup>13</sup> In 1963 the *Ocaks* had fourteen branches in ten cities with a total membership of 2,000. *Cumhuriyet*, 12 April 1963.

the Republican Party which, at its eleventh convention in 1954, adopted a programme which seemed to answer the intelligentsia's social yearnings. Article 36 of the programme reads:

The main source of value which must be protected and made the foundation of national existence is the citizens' effort (work). It is the duty of the state to take the necessary measures to provide employment opportunity for the citizen according to his intellectual and civil capacities, to provide jobs for the unemployed and protect labour from exploitation with due regard for the employers' rights. Our party considers the job security of every citizen an inviolable right . . .<sup>14</sup>

At its fourteenth convention in 1957 the Republican Party decided to expand the activities of its youth branches, since these seemed to respond best to new social ideas. They were involved in the students' demonstrations before the revolution of 1960, and played a leading part in organizing resistance to the Democrats' drive to silence the opposition. Their underground activities in April–May 1960 were inspired by a revolutionary clan which has been maintained to the present day. Until the revolution of 1960, there were about 295 Republican youth branches in the country; the number went up to about 530 in 1961, comprising roughly 25,000 energetic young members. With İnönü's support, the Republican Party committed itself to the solution of social and economic problems and especially to social justice. Unplanned economic development, it was argued, had lowered the living standards of the salaried groups, large sections of the urban population were destitute, while small groups became rich. In the elections of 1957 the Republicans increased their vote by 15 per cent, gaining 178 seats as against 31 in 1954. These results encouraged them to enlarge their social programme and bring to the fore the leftist members. The party's Research Bureau began to issue studies on a variety of social problems.<sup>15</sup> Finally, beginning in 1958–9, some party leaders openly defended socialism as the short road to development and welfare. The psychological and organizational ground for a new leftism was thus prepared. It needed only the opportunity to emerge, and this was supplied by the military revolt of 1960.

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<sup>14</sup> CHP Programı (Ankara, 1954). For comparative table, see Kemal H. Karpat, 'Turkish Elections of 1957', *Western Political Quarterly*, June 1961.

<sup>15</sup> By 1961 the Research Bureau had published 24 studies covering major social issues, and reproducing speeches by its members on urgent social problems.

The social motivations of the military revolution were evident in its organizational structure, its policies, and especially in its attitude to social questions. The revolution was carried out by officers, mostly men in their thirties, raised in the same atmosphere and with the same aspirations as the new intelligentsia supporting them. The military government showed little favour to the groups which had grown rich under the Democrats; it stressed the importance of economic development and social justice, and its leading members, including President Cemal Gürsel, openly declared that socialism might be beneficial to Turkey. Police controls over labour were lifted, and some cases of communist propaganda pending in the courts were brought quickly to an end.<sup>16</sup>

The period from 27 May 1960 to the elections of 15 October 1961, can be described as an intensive search for a social and economic policy capable of bringing Turkey fully into the modern age. Social evils were brought into the open and dramatized as proof of Turkey's backwardness. Newspaper reporters searched the countryside to discover villages owned by *ağas* (landowners, tribal chiefs) who were described as plotting with religious leaders to keep the peasants in ignorance and to exploit them. The heartless capitalists were accused of depriving the workers of their due wages, and endless testimony was offered to show the unjust accumulation of wealth under the Democrats.

What was required to remedy these ills, it was said, was a strong regime led by a socially-minded elite. A professor summed up the situation. 'We have,' he declared, 'a unique chance in the fact that those (military) holding the destiny of the State in their hands . . . are an impartial body concerned only with the country's welfare. Should we miss this opportunity?'<sup>17</sup> The essay competition opened by the newspaper *Cumhuriyet* about expectations from the revolution showed that the intelligentsia demanded land reform, eradication of illiteracy, better pay for all workers, an end to exploitation, economic development, etc., all to be achieved overnight.<sup>18</sup> However, the

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<sup>16</sup> See e.g. *Akşam*, 10 August 1960, *Cumhuriyet*, 5 July 1960. The case against 13 people arrested in 1958 for exploding bombs near the American Embassy while Dulles was in Ankara, was dismissed.

<sup>17</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 8 July 1960.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 7 August 1960. (The essays were published intermittently for about three months.) It was also reliably reported that the leftists began to publish after the revolution a review which was never distributed. It contained articles on Marxism,

attempts by a few officers in the junta to capitalize on these demands and establish a strong rule was opposed by the Republican Party and the leftists at large. Both groups hoped to achieve power and use the social discontent for their own benefit.

Meanwhile several organizations known to have opposed the Democrats in the past opened their membership to socialists. The *Ankara Devrim Ocağı* gained several members who represented the socialist wing among teachers, journalists, and academics. A spokesman for the *Ocak*, accused of collaborating with leftists, answered his nationalist opponents: 'Yes, I no longer work alone in the *Ankara Devrim Ocağı*. A group of thirty people who have social training and know how to work as a team are steadily at work.'<sup>19</sup> A similar socialist orientation was evident in the powerful National Federation of Turkish Teachers Associations, as shown by its later activities and its support of left-wing parties.<sup>20</sup>

The establishment of a State Planning Organization in 1960 added a new dimension and a scientific justification for this new leftism or socialism, as it was now openly called. The rational use of national resources to promote rapid development, social justice, literacy, etc., could, it was said, be achieved through overall planning by the state. The idea of state planning injected a potent political ingredient into social thinking which was bound to affect the course of events.

The social ideas developed in 1954–60 and during the revolution were eventually incorporated in the Constitution of 1961. Defining Turkey as a national, secular, and social state, it recognized extensive individual rights and freedoms, and spelled out a broad social programme to be carried out by the state.<sup>21</sup> Thus, while providing a legal basis for social reforms, it also ensured safety for individuals to engage in political activity in order to achieve these goals. The Republican Party and some socialists dominated the Constituent Assembly which drafted the Constitution. It was assumed that this

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Leninism, and Stalinism. The review was suppressed by the police and its publishers brought into court.

<sup>19</sup> Letter in *Yeni İstanbul*, 3 February 1963. This organization also fought to eliminate the legal provisions outlawing communism. The Chairman, Tark Z. Tunaya, was probably referring to this leftist infiltration when he declared: 'we are decided to fight to the end those circles who use Kemalism as a cover without being Kemalists, and who conceal their secret intentions.' *Cumhuriyet*, 12 April 1963.

<sup>20</sup> See letter addressed to İnönü, *Yön*, 25 July 1962.

<sup>21</sup> *Constitution of the Turkish Republic*, Ankara 1961, also *Middle East Journal*, Winter 1962.



party would come to power in the forthcoming elections and carry out a social programme through state planning, but there was among the population at large a deep aversion to any scheme likely to restore the power of the intelligentsia and bureaucracy. Entrepreneurs, businessmen, and landlords, aware that the proposed planning was aimed chiefly at their economic power, used their professional organizations and publications to fight the swing to the left. When the ban on political activities was lifted, the Justice and New Turkey parties established in 1961 came to represent their interests.

The elections of 15 October 1961 gave the Republicans the largest number of seats in the National Assembly, but not an absolute majority,<sup>22</sup> while the Senate was under the control of the Justice Party. With the military's support, the Republicans nevertheless formed a Cabinet under İsmet İnönü's Premiership in coalition with their chief opponent, the Justice Party. The coalition lasted about six months, breaking up chiefly because of sharp conflict over economic policy (state versus free enterprise), although outwardly it appeared as disagreement on the amnesty of jailed Democrats.<sup>23</sup> The subsequent government, formed in coalition with the minor parties in June 1962, again under İnönü's Premiership, was formed only after the Republicans reluctantly agreed to compromise on their social programme and to accept private enterprise as an equal. The chairman of the New Turkey Party, an ardent defender of private enterprise, was made Deputy Premier in charge of economic affairs, including the State Planning Organization. These developments opened a new and important phase in the intelligentsia, using the Kemalist idea of a classless society (he meant a society without class conflicts) interpreted it literally. The rich were condemned as the cause of social conflict and as enemies of progress.

Turkish socialism, as it developed after the revolution of 1960, seems to have been at first an effort to harmonize the relations between individual and society in a new social order, and to generate a sense of social responsibility. Its ideological sources can be traced to the Fabian school, classical Western socialism, and also to Marxist ideas revised in the light of new theories of economic development and planning as formulated in Western Europe after the

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<sup>22</sup> The percentage of seats was as follows: RPP, 36.7; Justice, 34.8; New Turkey, 13.7; and National, 14 per cent.

<sup>23</sup> See İnönü's letter of resignation, *Yeni Sabah*, 1 June 1962.

war, including the views of the Dutch economist Jan Tinbergen who was adviser to the State Planning Organization. The response of rank-and-file intellectuals was generally favourable. State planning was advanced as the primary condition for achieving economic development and social welfare, and it was largely on this question that the division between socialists and their opponents turned. Consequently the need to define the nature and function of the state in socialism became imperative. Most socialists argued that the state had the prime function of establishing social justice. Subsequently, despite various traditional forces affecting its philosophy, the state would be transformed into an agency of modernization under the influence of the new intellectual elite in power. The idea of workers and peasants taking an active part in this socialist state was dealt with only later, after the need for popular support became evident. Thus the idea of *Yön* and the Socialist Society took shape as a new elitist doctrine of power justified in terms of economic development.

## MILITARY INTERVENTIONS: ARMY-CIVILIAN RELATIONS IN TURKEY BEFORE AND AFTER 1980

### 1. *Introduction*

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the process that brought a gradual disintegration of the Turkish ruling coalition. In fact, the military interventions mark the progressive breakdown of the grand socio-political coalition that had ruled Turkey since 1923. The 1980 takeover was, in fact, the final phase of the dissolution of the alliance between the military and the various civilian groups and the beginning of a new period of modernization with a new "division of labor."

### 2. *The Background of the First Military Intervention*

The military takeover of 1960 was a turning point in the relationship between civilian and military elites that had governed the country since 1923. Justified as a step necessary for the preservation of democracy, the action appeared to be chiefly designed to answer a threat (if there actually was one) to the Republican People's Party (RPP), which had governed Turkey from 1923 to 1950.

Strains within the civilian-military coalition had begun to develop as early as 1946, with the establishment of the opposition Democrat Party (DP). During a talk with the late İsmet İnönü some years ago, I asked whether he had any conditions for allowing the establishment of opposition parties in 1945–1946. In response, İnönü said that he had told Celâl Bayar, the leader of the proposed new party, that this group would be free to debate and challenge any of the principles of the ruling party except the Kemalist tenets of republicanism and secularism.

The DP sought electoral support among the masses by offering economic incentives, such as credit, subsidies, road building programs, etc. The Democrats' interjection of economic issues into party politics was accompanied by an open display of animosity toward the military's informal linkage with the RPP, particularly on the part

of Adnan Menderes, who had been a member of the RPP himself.

In fact, Menderes' attitude toward the military was rather ambiguous. He was aware and appreciative of the military's historical role as the defender of the state; he, nevertheless, also thought that the military had become mainly a guarantor of the highly centralized, statist-elitist system since the founding of the Republic and that it was unfriendly to landed notables and other groups favoring a degree of administrative decentralization. Moreover, he felt that the military was a non-productive group that demanded a larger-than-legitimate share of the national income. For example, he was cognizant of the fact that wartime budgets, which were always increased, continued to be presented to the legislature by the military even after 1945 and were usually approved.

Menderes appeared to reflect the chief interests and fears of the leading social groups in small towns and among rural farmers. In contrast to the urban bureaucratic stratum, which had undergone an ideological and cultural transformation while it sought modernization through imitating the West, the non-urban elites had maintained their cultural and religious roots and felt a strong sense of continuity with their past. They were dismayed by the secularist-statist turn taken by the government between 1938 and 1945. The DP emerged as a coalition of these groups.

In the summer and fall of 1946, it became obvious that within the ranks of the DP there was considerable difference of opinion regarding how to proceed. After a period of ideological ferment and argument (called the "*46 ruhu*," "the spirit of 1946"), the party leaders ousted a group of Islamist-populist militants who were advocating open warfare against the military-civilian bureaucratic coalition and against the secularist-elitist ideology. The ousted members accused Bayar and Menderes of being basically the same in spirit and mentality as the group they appeared to be fighting against.

This accusation of the bureaucratic coalition by the DP radicals had much truth in it. Despite promises made during his years in opposition, Menderes did not try to amend the Constitution of 1924 when the DP came to power in 1950, for he did not really disapprove of its provisions. In fact, he made use of the Constitution to concentrate power in his own hands. He did try to downgrade the role of the military and the bureaucracy while he worked diligently to increase the power and influence of the nascent entrepreneurial

groups, businessmen, and the special class of countryside merchant-landowners. This policy led to the rapid growth in size of the new economic middle class and to an inflation that not only reduced the purchasing power but also diminished the prestige and influence of the military-civilian bureaucracy. The DP's actions vis-à-vis the military during its ten years in power, however, were not sufficient in themselves to have provoked the 1960 intervention. In fact, the DP tried to respond to the military's important basic demands by rejuvenating the upper echelons of the army and modernizing its weapons and training systems, especially after Turkey entered the NATO alliance. Thus, the professionally rooted complaints of the military against the DP would not seem to be strong enough to engender a rebellion.

Rather it seems that party politics, which perhaps inevitably began to reflect changes brought about by the DP's policies, were the crucial ingredient in precipitating the army's action. The RPP did not take kindly to being out of power. It saw a fairly large number among the members of groups formerly dominant in the ruling coalition (such as former civil servants and retired army officers) defect to the ranks of the DP. This defection was often a purely expedient, and perhaps temporary, change in party alignment, as these "converts" to the Democrats' side retained their basic political philosophy even after they had switched parties. Nevertheless, some of the more orthodox statist-elitists among the Republicans considered such defections as betrayal.

Until the elections of 1954, the RPP maintained its old posture as the party that "represented the entire nation" and was the guardian of Atatürk's legacy and reforms. It should be remembered that the six basic principles of Kemalism (republicanism, nationalism, secularism, populism, reformism-revolutionarism, and *étatisme*) had been incorporated into the RPP's own official ideology. Although the RPP continued to hold the same positions after 1954, in practice it identified itself increasingly with the new generation of intellectuals and their ideology, which began to acquire social-economic overtones that manifested themselves in a more radical definition of economic statism leading some intellectuals to socialism.

The relative success of the RPP in the elections of 1957 (when its parliamentary representation soared from 31 to 173 seats, while that of the DP decreased from 490 to 419 despite an increase in

the total votes cast) convinced the RPP leaders that the taking of a strong Kemalist-secularist ideological line with the incorporation of new socio-economic ideas held the promise of future success and reinstatement of their party in power. The ideas in question were put forth by social-democrats, pseudo-socialists, and orthodox Marxists, all of whom were also “secularists” except that they regarded religion as subject to market forces: thus their brand of “secularism” was actually materialism.

Meanwhile, the DP was losing membership and Menderes was losing his prestige and influence within the party. Dissension was ripe. Some of the dissidents broke away to form the Freedom Party, after which there was a vote of no confidence in the Parliament (although, on demand, the Prime Minister was personally exonerated). Menderes was particularly vexed by the fact that so substantial a number of young professionals of the new generation, many of whom owed their new status to education in DP-established schools, opposed his party. But the problem was that since the DP did not have a cadre of intellectuals working on party ideology, it was unable to come up with new principles or new theoretical bases to replace the old ones and thus it could not have any appeal to the new educated elites. However, Menderes failed to see this and attributed the DP’s misfortunes to the machinations of the RPP and, especially of İnönü, whose influence with the army and among the intelligentsia he feared greatly.

Menderes had expected the RPP to accept the new leadership developing in the ruling coalition in the same way that the entrepreneurs, agrarian groups, conservatives, Muslim fundamentalists, etc. had accepted the leadership of the secularists, Kemalists, statistes, and the military in the past, although they had held their own views. To Menderes, this was the meaning of democracy. The Democrats had not, since coming to power, disturbed the foundations of the republican form of government or sought to destroy the legacy of Atatürk (except for a few institutions, such as the People’s Houses and Village Institutes that were holdovers from the single-party days and seemed ideologically suspect). Menderes was not prepared for militant opposition from the Republicans.

However, to the new generation of RPP members, the DP ideology and policies were unacceptable; and, in its new posture as the party representing the aspirations of this rising intelligentsia, the RPP

challenged the Democrats forcefully with mass demonstrations as well as political speeches. Menderes responded with harsh measures to quell the opposition and threats to close down the RPP. His fatal mistake was to use the army against some demonstrations (partly just to show the Republicans, and İnönü especially, that the military was controlled by the government). At this point İnönü decided, or was persuaded, to issue his famous statement calling vaguely for the intervention of the army to “save democracy” (that is, the RPP) from the wrath of the DP leadership. The inside story of this phase is still to be told. These events occurred shortly after Sygman Rhee, the strongman of South Korea, was ousted by the military, and what İnönü in effect said publicly was that when necessary the Turkish army would act no less patriotically than had the South Korean army.

Now with the hindsight gained through twenty-five years of study of the documents related to these events and discussion with civilian and military leaders in Turkey, I have come to the conclusion that Menderes and Bayar and İnönü were issuing threats in pure bluff. The evidence in the records of the courts that tried the DP leaders and deputies in 1960–1961 indicates that Menderes and Bayar did not truly intend to close down the RPP in 1959–1960 but hoped that by suggesting closing as a possible measure they could compel the party to forego mass demonstrations. İnönü’s declaration in turn was intended to remind the DP that if it actually went so far as to close the RPP, the army, the cutting edge of the statist-Kemalist-secularist forces, would not permit it. Neither party appeared to believe that the army could or would act.

In the first place, as previously pointed out, it did not appear that the DP’s relations with the military were so antagonistic as to engender support for a takeover. A variety of small, so-called secret, associations had existed within the military since 1954, but these were basically social organizations that were promoted as “revolutionary societies” after 1950, when anti-DP activities acquired an aura of heroism and patriotism. Furthermore, in view of the army’s old tradition of political neutrality, which had been reinforced by Atatürk’s firm opposition to military involvement in politics, it seemed unlikely that the army would choose to intervene.

However, in 1960 accompanied by hosannahs from the statist intelligentsia a handful of officers did decide to act, proclaiming (not

entirely truthfully) that the takeover represented the desire of the entire military establishment and that they were safeguarding democracy and the state, and protecting the legacy of Atatürk.

### 3. *Aftermath of the 1960 Intervention*

Following the intervention except for the relatively short period until the ousting of the “radical fourteen,” there was no real military junta installed in power. In fact, by the fall of 1960 the government was virtually in the hands of the RPP once more, although there were military personnel in a number of important positions. The chief effect of the intervention was to raise some members of the radical statist-secularist wing of the RPP (including the pseudo-socialists) to posts of influence in the government.

The arrest and trial of the Democrat Party deputies, the detention of landlords in special camps, the establishment of a committee (soon deactivated) to inquire into the source of the wealth of DP members and of its sympathizers, and a variety of other measures with such an ideological-political bent as to remind one almost of class warfare were put into effect by the radical wing of the military and their civilian advisors. Once again it should be emphasized that the military rule of 1960, unlike the intervention of 1980, was wide open from the beginning to cooperation and intercourse with civilians, and these civilians belonged overwhelmingly to the RPP.

Having precipitated the takeover, the top leadership in the Republican People's Party, headed by İnönü and his associates of the time, now tried to defuse the charged atmosphere and to extricate the military from politics altogether. The ousting in the summer of 1960 of the fourteen officers supposedly of radical bent (with the exception of one who seemed to have some peculiar relations abroad, none was a true socialist or Marxist; rather they were secularist-nationalist-statists) prevented the further radicalization of the military rule, and eliminated the officers opposed to RPP. It also had the effect of keeping the ideologically oriented young radicals in the party from gaining direct access to government power.

The majority of the radicals in the RPP (whose views came to be expressed in *Yön*) were strongly statist; that is, they wanted expanded control of the economy by the state, but also sought rapid economic development through accelerated investments and the rationalization



of the economy. They were also nationalists, in the sense that they wanted a more independent foreign policy, and, naturally, secularists, although their attachment to the principles of secularism was generally limited by the extent to which this secured party and army support for their goals. In the last analysis ideology of the radical wing in the RPP amounted principally to a typical bureaucratic-intellectual reaction to the rise of the entrepreneurial business-oriented class and to the threat of erosion of the traditional statist-elitist values.

The Constituent Assembly was convened late in 1960. All former members of, and even voters for, the defunct DP were excluded by law from becoming members of the Constituent Assembly. The Constitution of 1961 was almost exclusively the work of the RPP. The main debate in the Assembly was between the statist-radicals (who were in the minority but, because of their superior education and their knowledge of tactics, exerted great influence) and the majority group of conservative, old-time Kemalists-secularists. İnönü, as usual, played the role of powerbroker, although on balance he appeared to have sided more with the radicals than the conservatives.

Unlike the Constitution of 1924, which accepted pluralism but failed to provide the mechanism for achieving it, the Constitution of 1961 did openly recognize the existence of some social groups, such as labor, and acknowledged workers' right to organize themselves politically on the basis of occupation and interest.

The 1961 Constitution represented, in fact, a compromise between the radical-statists and the socially conservative but economically somewhat liberal leadership of the RPP by recognizing the aspirations of both groups. In effect, it promised a wide range of economic and social programs, which could be carried out only by a strongly socialist state, and at the same time, espoused free enterprise and extensive political freedom, which called for far less governmental intervention in the affairs of society. The two sides agreed on a weak executive, not only because it would prevent the emergence of a "strongman," but also because each group felt that it would be more able to promote its own views and enhance its position without interference from above.

The new regime, with its legal paraphernalia in question, was expected to endure for a long time. The old ruling coalition was restored to power and the expectation was that it would soon acquire the *de jure* right to rule the country. The only task remaining was

the legitimization and perpetuation of the revived elitist apparatus through the ritual of the elections demanded by the Constitution. The trouble, of course, was that the millions of ordinary Turks saw all the machinations that preceded the creation of the new Constitution and government not as matters of intellectual interest only but as the manipulation of their own lives and traditions.

The elections of 1961 held with the expectation that they were to give the RPP a comfortable majority, that is, a form of popular mandate to enforce the new Constitution, did not go as planned. The Justice Party (JP) and the New Turkey Party (NTP), both of which were successors to the Democrat Party, together won 238 seats representing a majority in the 450 member Assembly. In effect, the voters returned to power the party ousted by the military only the previous year. Nevertheless, the RPP was entrusted with the task of forming the cabinet under İnönü's leadership.

In connection with Turkish election results since 1961, it has been said that the period until 1980 has been the era of coalitions. The statement is true only for the period after 1973 when the electorate became highly fragmented and political parties proliferated. During the period 1961–1973, the JP won the majority in all the elections, either by itself or with the NTP. However, the Justice Party was prevented from forming a government until 1965. Instead İnönü formed a series of weak coalitions, ostensibly in order to ensure the implementation of the socio-economic provisions of the Constitution so as to achieve rapid economic development and an egalitarian distribution of income, although the GNP of Turkey would be adequate support for only a fraction of the benefits which the Constitution promised to the citizens.

Furthermore, even though the Justice Party won the majority of votes itself and formed its own independent governments in 1965 and 1969, it was effectively prevented from exercising full authority by a series of well-planned strategies of the radical wing of the RPP. In fact, the study of these tactics provides an illuminating view of the mentality of statist-radical intelligentsia and a primer on how to prevent an elected government from exercising its mandate. First, there were delaying tactics in the Parliament, ranging from the introduction of endless amendments to bills to debates amounting to a sort of filibuster. Second, there were constant challenges to the constitutionality of laws, and often the Constitutional Court, would oblige by striking down JP legislation, since a good part of its personnel

sympathised with the RPP and its radical social views. Third, through the Council of State the bureaucracy, although officially neutral, could in subtle ways block the administrative decisions of the JP government. The JP could only respond by complaining meekly that it was being prevented from carrying out the mandate given to it by the national will (*milli irade*).

The internal politics in Turkey, now more than ever, was being decided essentially through the struggle of the same two groups as before (despite some overlapping): the statist-elitist intelligentsia and bureaucracy, on the one hand, and the entrepreneurial, free-economy-oriented group, the power of which had begun to reach into the larger towns and cities, on the other. After 1961, however, the strategies and goals of each side changed markedly. The social-democratic (statist-socialist) groups in the RPP had acquired considerable influence and were no longer interested in rebuilding the old ruling coalition on behalf of the ideas of Kemalism and secularism, but wished instead to achieve the political and ideological supremacy of its own cadres in order to carry out schemes for economic development and social welfare.

The secularist-republicanist-Kemalists within the RPP, bound to the party by personal loyalty and family traditions, initially went along with their more radical colleagues, often on İnönü's advice. The military stood by as the silent guardian of the Constitution and the faithful supporter of the RPP, which was still regarded as the sole party that understood and could implement the Constitution of 1961 and maintain the principles of Kemalism.

The Justice Party was preoccupied chiefly with obtaining amnesty for the imprisoned Democrat Party leaders and deputies rather than with basic issues facing the regime. On the one hand, it claimed, in order to soothe the military, that it was a new party and not the continuation of the Democrat Party and that it sought no revenge on behalf of the DP, on the other hand, in private it extolled the memory of Menderes and the socio-economic legacy of the DP.

In 1963, İnönü made a decision on an issue that both sides saw as the key to greater state control desired by the radicals. In question was the scope of the responsibility and authority of the State Planning Organization (SPO). The Constitution provided for a "mixed economy" (*karma ekonomî*) that accorded more or less equal recognition to private and state enterprises (although in practice the state enterprises were favored by both special legislation and by the continuous

infusion of capital from the national budget). Many of the authors of the law which established the State Planning Organization were social-democrat-statists who were openly critical of capitalism and private enterprise. They sought to place the SPO above the Parliament by making its decisions immune to parliamentary amendment, approval, or rejection. İnönü accepted the supremacy of the SPO in principle; however, hard pressed to form a coalition government that would keep the RPP in power, he finally agreed, after considerable bargaining, to limit the SPO's autonomy by placing it under the authority of the government as an advisory body on economic matters, as demanded by Ekrem Alican, the leader of the New Turkey Party and the RPP's new coalition partner. Thus a vital issue was settled in favor of private enterprise. The decision marked İnönü's first major break with the statist and young militants in his own party.

The next major development, one that proved fatal to the regime, came after the elections of 1965, with the spillover of the intergroup ideological-political struggle (which had therefore been confined largely to the Parliament) to the society at large. The catalyst for this new development was the JP victory in an election from which the Labor Party (LP) emerged as the true spokesman for the leftists. The LP, an avowedly Marxist conglomeration of workers, intellectuals, and a variety of marginal groups that held no seats in the Assembly in 1961, won 15 seats in 1965, although its vote was a mere 3 per cent of the total cast. Meanwhile the number of seats held by the RPP, despite the military's silent support—or in part because of it—and despite its leftist posturings, fell from 173 to 134. The radicals within the RPP blamed the party's electoral failure on a half-hearted commitment to social democracy, while the conservative wing blamed it on the party's alliance with the left. The issue of the direction the RPP was to take was settled in favor of the left wing, headed by Bülent Ecevit, who became Secretary General. A new principle of the left of center (*ortanın solu*) was adopted and the party platform redrafted. Thereupon the liberal and middle-of-the-road group, headed by Turhan Feyzioğlu, resigned and formed its own Reliance Party (RP) in 1967.

The repercussions were extreme and far-reaching. Now dominated by the statist social democrats, the RPP sought to attract all sorts of leftist voters by becoming gradually the champion of all leftist

causes, especially on economic issues. It claimed at times to have undermined even the communists' appeal, including that of the Labor Party. It sought to bring in groups outside the parliament, even the trade unions, which previously it had regarded as solely professional associations. However, even as the RPP sought to establish itself solidly among the working class, Ecevit was forced to acknowledge that it was basically a petty bourgeois party.

Leftist currents of all shades experienced an enormous upsurge between 1961 and 1965, but, in general, the groups were not openly militant in character. After 1967, and especially after 1968, the left became very militant, and the LP split up into a variety of radical organizations under the leadership of new, hard-driving, and seemingly professionally-trained leaders, many with connections abroad. The LP was fragmented by differing views of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. The Kurdish issue became a central theme of leftist propaganda, as many of the new leaders of these new militant groups promoted the Kurdish separatist claims.

The so-called right-wing groups—that is, the ethnic nationalists and Islamists who had lent support to the DP and JP in the past—finally responded to the upsurge of the left by forming their own organizations such as the Grey Wolves, and eventually their own parties, although the Islamists had a much earlier start in 1961. This development among the rightists, occurring primarily after 1968, was fully tolerated, if not encouraged by the JP government, which sought support outside the Parliament in order to counteract the RPP and the more militant leftists, whose activities were carried out in towns and villages.

Thus, the spread of Marxism to some university circles, trade unions, the press, and professional associations was accompanied and counteracted by even a more vigorous resurgence of active nationalist-Islamic-Ottoman feeling, which had long been quiescent under official disapproval but had not been stamped out. This development has been called a Turkish identity crisis, the elements of which were the continuing historical ties to the Ottoman political and cultural past (which during the decades of official non-recognition seemed to have become even stronger and acquired wider public acceptance) and the newly reaffirmed religious identity of the Turks as Muslims. According to the more moderate religious groups, this revived Islam was impregnated with a heavy dose of Turkishness and modernism.

The two political parties of the right, the Nationalist Action Party (NAP) and the National Salvation Party (NSP) were not responsible for the national-Islamic-Ottoman resurgence but were to some extent its beneficiaries. They sought rather unsuccessfully to channel and use these popular currents of feeling to attain their own political ends. Toward the end of the 1960s, however, the JP was able to undermine the appeal of the two rightist parties and attract many of their followers. The NAP in turn attempted widening its popular appeal by accepting Islam as a basic part of the Turkish legacy while amending its by-laws to allow for rapid modernization, and the militant activities increased. The NSP, unlike the NAP, did not involve itself in violence.

In conclusion, one may state rather categorically that the grand ruling coalition which had in one form or another governed Turkey since 1923 had vanished, to a large extent because it could no longer accommodate all the conflicting new ideologies and the new social groups. What was needed was a coalition put together with some degree of selectivity but broad enough to encompass all the new forces and ideas, and able to bind these together through some sort of supra-parliamentary mechanism. Indeed, the political history of Turkey after 1971 is the history of the final collapse of the old coalition with the military emerging as the supreme arbiter above political parties and social groups.

#### 4. *Interlude: The Takeover of 1971*

The takeover of March, 1971 drew its impetus from the old tradition of the army's association with the statist-elitists and the RPP, although it was a rather premature, only half-thought out action. Once more its ostensible aim was the preservation of secularism and the legacy of Atatürk; in addition it was supposed to speed up the implementation of the social economic reforms decreed by the Constitution. It produced no lasting results.

The military, as usual, tried to rule through a National Security Council that was superior to the civilian parliament and a cabinet headed by a "neutral" figure, who, in this case, was Nihat Erim, a liberal-minded old-timer among RPP leaders. Once more the RPP was given preference in the army's arrangement for governing the country as shown by the recent memoirs of General Muhsin Batur,

a member of the ruling junta who subsequently joined the RPP.<sup>1</sup>

For the second time a properly elected JP was ousted and its premier, Süleyman Demirel deposed. This time the move was welcome to some people, who were glad to see the military come to grips with the spreading violence and anarchy. İnönü reluctantly gave his public endorsement to the intervention, while Bülent Ecevit denounced it as a blow to the RPP effort to transform itself into a mass social-democratic party. The eventual outcome of this dispute between the RPP leaders was the victory of Ecevit-backed candidates over those put forward by İnönü for the party elections. Ecevit himself was elected Secretary General and, subsequently, İnönü resigned as party chairman. Ecevit was elevated to the chairmanship in 1972.

After the natural death of İnönü in 1973, the RPP gradually discarded Kemalism as an ideology and took a position opposed totally to the basic tenets of the republican regime: it tended to reject the concept of nation (*millet*) and the idea that Turkey was a *national* state. It sought for a solid social foundation on the basis of which it could call itself a true socialist mass party. This search for a cause led Ecevit to describe the *Alevîs* as an "oppressed" minority and to enlist their support. Ecevit's position was not representative of that of the entire RPP but only of the two groups that had captured the leadership of the Party Council. The first group consisted of the secularist-elitist-statist followers of Ecevit (who called themselves social-democrats and many of whom were culturally alienated from society), and a variety of intellectuals, academics, former bureaucrats, etc.; the second one consisted of a smaller number of Marxists and radical statistes opposed to the capitalist system and this group included such persons as Süleyman Genç and Mustafa Ok (both of whom were former army officers). The third group, although far larger than the other two and representative of the views of the bulk of the RPP members, was inarticulate and incapable of effectively opposing the top leaders. In most cases this group silently deferred to the decisions of the party secretary and council, as had been the case during the days of the single-party rule. The acceptance of decisions from above remained a characteristic of the RPP membership until its end.

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<sup>1</sup> *Anılar ve Görüşler: Üç Dönemin Perde Arkası* (İstanbul, Milliyet Yayınları, 1985).

It is clear that the deviation of the RPP to the left, its rejection of the Kemalist principles, and its espousal of a hodgepodge of minority and potentially explosive causes (for example, Kurdish nationalists found favor with the party) alienated the military from the RPP in general and from Ecevit in particular. The economic stagnation that set in after 1976, the rampant anarchy and disorder with armed battles between the leftists and rightists, and finally, Ecevit's disastrous coalition government (formed with the help of often deputies claimed to be "bought" from the JP) of 1978–1979, which followed on the heels of the ineffective but equally ideological coalition of the rightist parties in 1975–1977, removed the possibility of reconciliation among Turkey's political parties. In the autumn of 1979, the RPP suffered a total defeat in the partial elections when it lost five seats contested in the National Assembly. Demirel then established a minority government which, in January of 1980, introduced the economic stabilization program recommended for years by Turkey's foreign creditors. He could not, however, initiate successful measures to curb the anarchy. The entire political edifice erected by the Constitution of 1961 had deteriorated beyond repair.

##### 5. *Final Intervention: Characteristics of the 1980 Takeover*

In the preceding analysis of the events following 1960 I have sought to focus attention on the profound changes which took place in the structure of the ruling coalition of Turkey and to emphasize a crucial development, namely, the gradual alienation of the military from the RPP. While the military intervention of 1960 brought about a *de facto* identification of the military with the RPP via the reforms and the Constitution, that of 1971 not only failed to arrest but actually accelerated the process of alienation primarily because it brought into the open the divergence of opinion between the party and the military on social classes, Atatürk, nationalism, secularism, and reformism, which had hitherto been glossed over. The breach between the military and the RPP was detrimental to the development of democracy in Turkey, and for that breach, Bülent Ecevit himself was mainly responsible. On the eve of the 1980 takeover, Kemalism as a state philosophy had no longer a formal, organized representation.

The first outstanding feature of the intervention of 1980 that sets it decisively apart from the 1960 action was that it had been planned



well ahead of time by the General Staff in consultation with the field commanders. In a recent work, Mehmet Ali Birand has pointed out that there had actually been a sort of planning staff that not only worked toward achieving the consent and cooperation of all the leading military field commanders but also designated individual officers to perform specific tasks during the takeover and after.<sup>2</sup> Also quite unlike its predecessors, the military seem to have determined in detail the basic constitutional principles that would be enacted, the type of institutions that would be established, the division of labor between the “state” and the government, and the sort of mechanisms that would be needed to ensure smooth functioning after the return to civilian rule.<sup>3</sup> General Kenan Evren declared that the takeover had been carried out in accordance with Article 34 of the military by-law, which charged the military with the defence of the Turkish republic and that it was an act taken on behalf of the entire nation, a claim given substance by later acts.

It appears certain that, in common with the previous takeovers, this one was not envisaged as a permanent military regime but aimed toward the eventual re-establishment of civilian parliamentary rule once the army had put the government house in order. Süleyman Demirel and other politicians claim, however, that had the military adequately used its martial law authority to put down the anarchy prior to 1980, the government could have managed to put its own house in order. Demirel’s view (which he reiterated at our meeting in June 1985 in Ankara) is that the military deliberately failed to use its power to stabilize the situation in order to discredit the civilian government and bring the populace to such a point of desperation that the intervention would be welcomed and the orders of the military regime followed without dissent.

It is true that under the martial law the military has great discretionary authority to quell disturbances; and it is also true that the military has an extensive intelligence network superior to any such civilian apparatus. However, the full co-operation and participation of the police and other civilian bodies would have been necessary. But Premier Ecevit had invoked a new principle—*eşgüdüm* (coordination)—whereby the martial law authority’s decisions had to be

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<sup>2</sup> *12 Eylül: Saat 04:00* (İstanbul, Karacan Yayınları, 1984).

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, passim.

approved also by the government. Meanwhile, the police, infiltrated by rightist and leftist “moles,” had been divided along ideological lines and become totally ineffective.

It is essential to remember that the military’s plans for the takeover, and for the civilian regime that would emerge afterwards, did take into consideration public opinion. Indeed, unlike the military chiefs of 1960 and 1971, the leaders of 1980, showed their concern for the public. Evren succeeded in becoming very influential, not only because of his rather effective speaking ability but also because he conformed to the average Turk’s image of a leader, seeming to combine both traditional and modern characteristics. First, he attempted to speak on behalf of the nation as a whole, without attacking by name the old leaders or the political parties but merely condemning the politicians’ ineptitude and their disregard for the national interest. He was also able to convey to the public his feelings of trust, respect, and consideration for them by keeping them informed about the important developments concerning the nation as a whole, giving them, for example, the news about his trips abroad. In sum, Evren’s reserved and dignified manners, his caring attitude toward the public, his ability to rise above political parties and individual concerns in the name of the nation cast him in the image of a charismatic father figure.

The wide approval of the military by the people was particularly necessary in 1980 because, unlike the interventions of 1960 and 1971, this one did not have the organized support of a political party or a social group. The most significant aspect of the takeover was the lack of identification with any specific civilian or bureaucratic group. Under the military’s plan for governing the country, basic decisions were made by the National Security Council (NSC), which included the Chief of the General Staff, Commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Force, and Secretary General of the Council—altogether some six people—whereas the junta of 1960 consisted of 38 officers, to which were added a series of other formal and informal military bodies. The arrangement of 1971 was similar to that of 1960.

In 1980, the participation of the military establishment in the government was limited greatly. The views of the military commanders were passed on directly to the Council without being reviewed by any intermediaries. There were, of course, occasions when the officers expressed dissatisfaction with the actions or attitudes of the NSC. One major objection expressed by a large group of officers was to

the relatively lenient policy toward the leftists. Eventually this resulted in a shift of the right followed by a correspondingly ambiguous change of personnel in the NSC, which will be taken up below. In another instance, officers outside the NSC forced the partial abandonment of liberal economic measures and were instrumental in obtaining an increase in the benefits of the public servants. However, the NSC's position toward Necmettin Erbakan and especially, Alparslan Türkeş, the leaders of the NSP and NAP, respectively, remained uncompromising, despite considerable sympathy for the latter among some officers.

The best yardstick for measuring the seriousness of a conflict between the NSC and the rank-and-file officers was the frequency of General Evren's visits to troops to try to persuade them to support the NSC's action. This system was designed to keep decision-making hierarchical, to prevent decisions from being made on the spot by any officer desiring to exercise power, and it was, in great measure, successful. Although there were military officers occupying a variety of positions in the government bureaucracy, their access to and participation in the decision-making process at the top was so limited as to be almost non-existent. Recommendations from the army were normally passed up through hierarchical channels, leaving the ultimate decision to the discretion of the top leaders. This procedure seemed to have been planned well in advance in order to prevent the rank-and-file from becoming directly involved in politics. Its ultimate purpose was to prepare the ground for the permanent extrication of the military from the political arena, a goal repeatedly emphasized by the leaders themselves.

The NSC initially did not abolish the two major political parties (RPP and JP) or arrest deputies, although a few party leaders were detained temporarily and some deputies associated with radical groups and Kurdish separatists were taken into custody. The initial plan was to have a cabinet composed entirely of civilians. However, Turhan Feyzioğlu, the leader of the Reliance Party, was replaced at the very last minute, as prime minister designate, by retired Admiral Bülend Ulusu, ambassador to Rome, because some officers objected to giving the premiership to another politician. The NSC did its best to insulate itself from direct civilian influence and from personal prejudice within the army. Oddly, the isolation from outside influence seems to have increased the popular respect for the military. One can assume that the few army commanders in whose hands the

power was concentrated with no intermediaries between them and the populace, were seen as incorruptible and dedicated to the national good.

It may be argued that the administrative apparatus set up in 1980 was not different in essence from that employed in 1960 and 1971. While such an argument is essentially not incorrect, the concentration of power in the NSC, the level of centralization as well as the separation of the decision-makers from the population in 1980 was greater than in the previous military government. It was the type of government that conformed to both the traditional Ottoman pattern and Atatürk's philosophy of government, despite the difference in the goals pursued by the Sultanate and the Republic. It may be added that there is a close resemblance between the methods used by Evren and Atatürk in dealing with the public. The dominant philosophy in both eras was that governmental authority should be exercised strictly in conformity with the political requirements of rulership, eschewing social, economic, or ideological considerations. The ruling of society, according to this philosophy, was a political art. Power and authority were to be reposed in a supreme and wise authority, which might be even a single person so long as that person exercised this authority faithfully for the welfare of the nation and the community.

Atatürk, it should be remembered, saw himself as the total embodiment of the nation and, as such, acted to secure the nation's welfare. The sultan also had been the ultimate repository of state authority. This resembled the Western idea of absolutist but enlightened government, although in the Ottoman-Turkish case, there was an intricate mechanism that defined the limits of authority and the nature of the relations between the ruler and the ruled: it was a popularly supported absolutism that relied upon the populace for legitimacy rather than upon "divine right" or naked power. With such as background in mind, it was obvious that the new regime would incorporate a dominant executive, as had always been the case in Turkish history except in the 1960–1980 period.

The military's view of the civilian sector as an undifferentiated nation-mass and the categorical segregation of the ruler from the ruled, at least in the initial phase of the takeover, determined its actions with regard to the political parties. A substantial number of the army officers as well as the extreme rightists and leftists, viewed the political parties as either hotbeds of strife and dissension or simply

as convenient means of achieving power. In 1980 the prestige of the parties was at an all time low due to their pitiful performance in the years from 1960 to 1980. In general, the military considered that political parties should be instruments of national unity, order, and stability rather than vehicles for the expression of special interests of social or economic groups or particular regions of the country.

Yet, the military did not immediately abolish the middle-of-the-road parties. However, when Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit, despite restrictions imposed on political activities, appeared determined to hold on to the leadership of their parties and perhaps use them to carve roles for themselves in the new government, both the JP and the RPP were summarily abolished.

The closure of these two established political parties, needless to say, was of overwhelming importance for the political life of Turkey. The decision was made after the nationalist wing among officers favoring stronger military rule gained the upper hand. General Necdet Üruğ became the Secretary and Co-ordinator of the NSC, while General Haydar Saltık, rumoured to have demanded lenient treatment for leftists not involved in violence, was sent to complete his field duty as commander of the First Army in control of İstanbul, the Straits, and Thrace.

One of the first acts of the military rulers was to revive the doctrine of Atatürkism, which had always been the salient ideology of the military, and make it the basis of the regime. To put it in the simplest terms, Atatürkism rests on the ideal that Turkey is a nation-state and that its form of government is republican. These were the fundamental principles enunciated by the Constitutions of 1924 and 1961 and reiterated in the Constitution of 1982. Secularism in its old form was to the military also an inseparable aspect of Atatürkism, while among the traditional Kemalists and some Islamic-nationalist groups, Atatürk's co-operation with the religious elites during the 1919–1922 period is emphasized. (One of these Islamists, of a group still in the minority, said to me in a discussion concerning this question: "We want to show that Atatürk's greatness stems first from his faith, Islam, which he saved and helped to gain a new vigor and vitality.") The issue of definition of "secularism" has since become moot, the meaning of the term having undergone considerable adjustment. However, there is no question but that Atatürkism is a strictly state ideology with no claim to reflect the social, cultural, or economic ideologies of society at large.

To promote the goal of a return to Atatürkism and, as well, to foster national unity, to revitalize the memory of the War of Independence and the establishment of the Republic, the military made much of the Atatürk centennial in 1981. The various national institutions, such as the Historical Society, the Language Society, and assorted Atatürk institutes, were consolidated in one central Supreme Atatürk Society. In June, 1985, I was told that its chief purpose was to train an elite body of intellectuals to be the vanguard of Atatürkism who would disseminate it throughout the country. The textbooks on the history of the Republic were revised in accordance with this new-and-old doctrine.

Meanwhile, as tranquility and public order were restored and the economy began to revive, the military's popularity reached a new peak. In 1981 a timetable for the return to civilian rule was announced. The decision at this point to settle upon a timetable was no doubt hastened by the relentless pressure from Turkey's western allies.

In the same year, a Consultative Assembly was convened, charged with drafting a new constitution. The Assembly members were carefully selected from among thousands of applicants. The constitution drafted by the Assembly, which was, in turn, put into final form by the NSC, established a two-tiered regime. The state (*devlet*) is represented by the President, who has the authority necessary to maintain the territorial integrity and security of the state and the modernist features of the regime and to exercise a mild form of tutelage over the Parliament. The second tier of the regime consists of the Parliament, the Cabinet, the bureaucratic apparatus, and several other institutions and it is designed to carry out the day-to-day functions of the government within the framework set by the state.

The new constitutional system is basically democratic, having preserved intact the general suffrage in free and regular elections, leading to the establishment of government by the winning party, and the whole spectrum of individual freedoms and rights despite some limitations. The Constitution turned out to be fully satisfactory to the average voter in Turkey, as demonstrated by the overwhelming acceptance of it in the popular referendum held on November 6, 1982, and by the endorsement of Kenan Evren as President. Voter participation was 91.27 per cent; 91.37 per cent of the votes were affirmative, while only 8.63 per cent were negative. I believe that the average Turkish citizen accepts as natural the state-government duality and the extensive state powers granted to the President because

these conform to the traditional Turkish patterns of government, and are to a large extent outside the citizen's immediate concern.

The Constitution defines political parties as the "indispensable elements of the democratic political system" (Article 68) but prohibits the formation of class-based parties and the establishment of youth branches and the like. As already noted, the political parties are not regarded as channels of popular participation in the decision-making process, but chiefly, as vehicles necessary for the achievement of popular consensus and acquiescence to the regime. However, political parties, have their own dynamics and their own laws, and are difficult to confine within preordained bounds. Thus, the first and the gravest crisis encountered by the military was caused by the emergence of new parties, which also marked the first encounter between the military and freely established civilian political organizations since the takeover.

It appears that the overwhelming approval of the Constitution and the endorsement of Kenan Evren as President led him to assume that he enjoyed unqualified popular support even in *political* matters per se. What Evren failed to realize was that the citizens were predisposed to support a constitution which endowed the state with strong authority for looking after the "high interests of the nation" but not an authoritarian regime which would dictate the day-to-day activities of the citizens.

The issues was dramatized by the events that followed the granting of freedom to form political parties. The NSC, which ruled the country until a duly elected government took the power, used a variety of measures to prevent the establishment of political parties or the election to the Assembly of individuals who were unwilling to agree with the military and carry out its mandate. At the end, only the Nationalist Democracy Party of General Turgut Sunalp, who had been picked by the NSC for the job, the Populist Party of Necdet Calp, a former provincial governor trusted by the military, and the Motherland Party of Turgut Özal, the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs between 1980 and 1982, were allowed to participate in the elections. Of these three, only Özal's party appeared to be a genuine political organization, relatively free of subservience to the military. Consequently, despite a variety of difficulties, it rapidly won wide popular support to the detriment of the two other parties. President Evren made a last minute effort to help Sunalp win the elections by launching a personal (and unconstitutional) attack

on Özal. Yet, all this interference did not prevent Özal from securing a solid victory in the elections of October 1983, winning 211 seats in the 400-member Assembly, which enabled him to form a majority government.

The elections were a turning point in civilian-military relations, creating a new and unanticipated situation that necessitated the establishment of a new type of dialogue between the state and the government. President Evren accepted the popular verdict and, perhaps, unwillingly entrusted the leadership of the almost completely new ruling coalition to the popularly chosen Motherland Party and its chairman Turgut Özal.

### 6. *Conclusions: Outlook for the Future*

The military rule ended by creating a new ruling coalition in which a conglomeration of social groups from the middle classes, ranging from small entrepreneurs to capitalists and from moderate traditionalists to activist nationalists and Islamists finally gained the upper hand. This was the process begun in 1950 but interrupted, thwarted, and forced into ideologically chosen directions by the RPP in alliance with the military in 1960 and, partly, in 1971. As already noted, the fact is that the traditionalist but economically liberal middle class parties consistently had the majority of votes in the elections from 1961 on, although the winning parties were kept from exercising the mandate except when the JP won an absolute majority. The 1980 military intervenors finally created, unwittingly, the constitutional mechanism necessary to permit the political victory of the middle classes in a division of labor that suits both sides. At the upper level, the state interests are embodied in the presidency and are safeguarded by the extensive state powers given to the President.

The Presidency is the symbol and repository of the ideals and ideologies of the state and of the regime as a whole as these are understood by the military (e.g., nationhood, Atatürkism, secularism, and modernism) despite the rather distinct difference between the popular-traditionalist and the elitist interpretation of these terms. However, the difference in interpretation between the military and the civilians narrowed considerably in the last year or so. The key ideological change has occurred in the meaning attached to "modernism." Today, the cultural and political emulation of the West is no longer



the axis of modernism. It is, rather, economic development, technological advancement, and material progress in all its forms. The reconciliation with the Ottoman past and the reshaping of the national identity in the light of the Turks' own national cultural and religious ethos have broadened the scope of modernization in such a way as to relegate the West, without abandoning it, to a secondary position, while giving priority to a new historically rooted socio-cultural Turkish identity. In large measure this has been achieved by reinterpreting "secularism" in such a way as to permit the reconciliation between the past and present without damaging the foundation of the Republic.

The conservative, middle class groups, needless to say, have won the final victory through the democratic processes after a thirty-year tenacious struggle against the elitist bureaucratic early reformists who had separated themselves from society. The military appears reconciled to accept these changes as long as they do not pose a threat to the republican regime or to Atatürkism. In fact, many military men appear to welcome the conservative traditionalist trends and regard them as bolstering national unity and building social solidarity, all of which are essential to assure the nation's survival and society.

There are, of course, various groups, which include even some of the middle-aged and older officers, that favor a much stricter policy of Atatürkism and secularism. This view is supported by the old guard of the RPP, a variety of leftist groups, and large numbers of westernized intellectuals, but as a whole, these constitute a small (though influential) minority. There are of course extreme rightist and religious groups within the ruling Motherland Party that are clamoring for a distinct nationalist-Islamist policy. In fact, at a recent private meeting held in İstanbul (June 1985), a nationalist group asked Prime Minister Özal to adopt a more genuine Islamist-nationalist policy even though this may disturb the military.

The key factor in the social realignment of the political system and the ruling coalition of Turkey has been the ideological transformation of the RPP, beginning with its deviation to the left, İnönü's loss of power and death, and the demise of the power of the Kemalists within the party. The transformation of the party to a so-called leftist organization also alienated most of its socially conservative but loyal members who had played important mediating roles in the past in achieving a degree of accommodation with the Justice Party and other middle-of-the-road parties on various economic and social issues.

In 1978–1979 the party also lost a major part of its popular support because of the economic debacle and the anarchy that came to be associated with the government headed by Ecevit. The closure of the RPP by the NSC after 1980 was the final act that sealed the fate of this party which had played a significant role in the history of the Republic. Unlike the DP and the JP, and the Motherland Party as well, which could easily be revived due to their continuous strong popular support, the RPP could not be reconstituted on account of a lack of popular basis. The RPP's strength derived from its association with the early history of the Republic and Kemalism, and its main support came from the civil bureaucracy and the intelligentsia, groups that had power far in excess of what was warranted by their numbers because of their control of government, the communications media, and the educational system.

The closure of the RPP ended the phase of modernization that had begun with the founding of the Union and Progress Party during the Young Turk era. The victory of the Motherland Party in the elections of 1983 and the acceptance by the military of the election results began a new phase. The overwhelming popular approval of the Constitution and the electoral majority gained by the government fully legitimized the constitutional system and the government as a democratically approved body. The fact that there was guidance from the top early in the process does not appear to vitiate the result, despite some minority opinion to the contrary. The current challenge to the system appeared to stem from a rather unexpected quarter, namely the True Path (*Doğru Yol*) Party headed until 1987 by Hüsamettin Cindoruk but in reality representing the views of the old leadership of the Justice Party, notably of Süleyman Demirel. The key contention of this party is that the military still exerts considerable influence in and out of the government so that the regime is not fully civilian and that economic development has been too slow. In the 1987 general elections the True Path Party could become only the third party, for Demirel's popular support was and is limited. Most of the lower-ranking and truly influential communal and political leaders of the old JP appear to support fully Özal's party. In a private conversation with me, Demirel claimed that the ideas of the Motherland Party are "our ideas" and that Özal and his associates are "our boys."

Actually this rift within the ruling coalition can be easily repaired, and the accusations of military influence in government can be swiftly

answered through the full "civilianization" of the system. This could be achieved by electing Suleyman Demirel to the Presidency, provided that the military do not insist on keeping their hold on that office. Yet, as the President is elected by the Assembly, it is obvious that the political parties are legally entitled to elect whom so ever they choose. As far as the other political parties are concerned, the Populist Party has quickly lost ground. In August 1985 the party merged with the Social Democrat Party, leading to the creation of the Social Democrat Populist Party (SDPP). The Nationalist Democracy Party, too, rapidly lost what little attraction it had in the eyes of the electorate. The SDPP appears intent on capitalizing on the early political traditions of Turkey so as to attract the old RPP followers. In the 1987 general elections the SDPP was placed second and I believe that its chances for success are little unless it judges correctly and realistically the present social and political conditions in the country. The old RPP had resulted from unique political and historical conditions and cannot be revived.

In sum, the present political system in Turkey appears to conform to the Turkish traditions regarding power and authority and to represent the synthesis of various socio-economic forces, and, thus, it enjoys overwhelming popular support. For the first time in its history, Turkey appears to be on the verge of taking upon itself the true essence of democracy. The distribution of power between the state (President) and government (Premier) can assure the co-existence of modernism and "traditionalism" and guarantee the maintenance of order and security.

## SOCIALISM AND THE LABOR PARTY OF TURKEY

Socialism in Turkey appeared after the revolution of 1960, both as an ideology and a technique of action designated to achieve rapid modernization through the rational organization of economic life. Some of the urban intelligentsia, notably university professors, teachers, writers, journalists and old time Marxists, became spokesmen of socialism.

The expansion of production, increased popular participation in economic and political life, respect for work, and especially social justice—all to be achieved through state planning—were the chief goals of this socialism.

The social awakening which swept Turkey after the revolution of 1960 was the outcome of structural differentiation, change of rôles and statuses among social groups, and the increase of political activity which occurred in the decades preceding the revolution. The downfall of the intellectual bureaucratic order which ruled the country until the end of the 1940's, and the subsequent rise to power of agrarian-entrepreneurial groups, appeared as the initial phases of a process of change leading to mass participation in political and economic decision making. The function of socialism, as viewed initially by its proponents, was to formulate scientifically the rising demands and expectations among various social groups and incorporate these demands into the political system. Consequently, large segments of the intelligentsia and bureaucracy, as well as labor leaders, and professional organizations sharing in various degrees the demands for social justice, economic development and the establishment of a political system with broad social bases, supported this socialism. Even the influential newspapers *Cumhuriyet*, *Milliyet*, and, later, *Akşam*, owned by upper class families, as well as the central bodies of the Republican Party backed by its youth branches, became advocates of social reforms included in the aims of socialism. The term "socialism" used publicly by President Cemal Gürsel was quickly adopted by all those

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desiring rapid progress. The emphasis at this stage was on "social" rather than "ism."

The Constitution of 1961, which defined Turkey as a secular, national, social and democratic republic, expressed rather well the general state of mind prevailing in 1960–61.

The second stage in the evolution of Turkish socialism, which marked its shift towards formal doctrine, occurred through the declaration of 500 intellectuals published in the review *Yön*.<sup>1</sup> The latter became the mouthpiece of the intellectual groups such as teachers, some professionals and left wing members of the Republican Party desiring to establish a socialism based on supremacy of the intellectual. The declaration included the social aims mentioned above and made a special point of describing the ruling circles as deprived of a "development philosophy," and hence incapable of bringing Turkey into the modern age. The socialism envisaged by *Yön*, other publications and organizations, including the Socialist Cultural Society established in 1963, despite opposition to free enterprise, parliamentary democracy and to the West, appeared likely to improve, consolidate and preserve rather than drastically to change the basic structure of the social system. Indeed, without the support of an organization and of a social group, the socialism of *Yön* was destined to remain a current of thought which would compel the existing political parties to consider the causes of the increasing social unrest and take measures accordingly. It thus seemed fairly certain that the socialists would turn, sooner or later, to enlist the support of the laboring class.

The possibility of facing labor opposition compelled the government and practically all political parties to adopt a conciliatory attitude towards labor unions and meet their economic demands. This attitude of compromise was at least partially instrumental in consolidating further the labor leaders' decision not to become involved in politics, though individual workers were free to join any political

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<sup>1</sup> We have discussed the birth of socialism and related ideological developments in a series of articles. See Kemal H. Karpat, "The Turkish Left," *Journal of Contemporary History*, No. 2, 1966, pp. 169–186, and "Ideological Developments in Turkey After the Revolution of 1960," to appear in a forthcoming publication edited by Malcolm Kerr. For the declaration, see *Yön*, December 20, 1961, pp. 12–13. An English translation by Frank Tachau appeared in *Middle Eastern Affairs*, March 1963, pp. 75–78.

group. Acting as a pressure group, the Confederation of Labor (Türk İş) secured important concessions from Parliament, notably the right to collective bargaining and to strike, granted in 1963, owing in large measure to the efforts of Bülent Ecevit, the Republican Minister of Labor. Short of a new social and political drive, the workers appeared oriented towards a policy of material betterment within the existing political system and through its methods.

Thus, in its initial phase, socialism seemed to have helped broaden the social and economic scope of modernization and appeared destined to lose its intensity and drive after diffusing its ideas in the society at large.

Consequently, the doctrinaire minded socialists, including the small but active group of Marxist intellectuals, had either to acquiesce to "socialization" according to liberal democratic ideas and accept the existing social structure, or attempt to remold the social thought and direct it according to their own ideology. Already some Marxists, while supporting all social movements in the hope of preparing the ground for their own ideology, made it clear that they were interested in political action rather than social reform. Samim Kocagöz, paradoxically enough a rich landowner and now member of the Labor Party, signing the socialist declaration of *Yön*, expressed his hope that:

... all intellectuals who signed the declaration should shape these ideas into a party program. They should give the proper name to statism, to a progressive statism, according to the conditions and ideas in the country and come out with a party capable of undertaking profound reforms and solving the country's main problems. In my view this party should be established with a socialist orientation and give a direction to the statism mentioned in the declaration. The party should gather all workers from the intellectual to agricultural workers, from agricultural workers to industrial workers; shortly it should become a workers' party as dictated by country's conditions. In order to protect this party against the charlatans... it is necessary to amend first the so-called anti-democratic laws, and above all articles 141 and 142.\*<sup>2</sup>

*Türkiye İşçi Partisi* (TİP) (Labor Party of Turkey) must be viewed therefore as an attempt to capture the leadership of the socialist movement and to organize and use it for its own ideological purposes.

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\* These articles in the criminal code outlaw communism.

<sup>2</sup> *Yön*, January 3, 1962, p. 11.

The party was originally established by a small group of trade unionists on February 13, 1961, with the idea of sending workers' representatives to Parliament. The party met with some negative reaction from the main body of trade unions but was soon ignored, since it seemed as innocuous as many other similar organizations,<sup>3</sup> despite the fact that it had opened branches in several provinces by May of 1961.

A drastic change occurred in 1962, when the party leadership was assumed by Mehmet Ali Aybar and a few associates known as Marxists.<sup>4</sup> There are a few indications showing that the first founders, some without knowing it, were a front for the Marxist socialists. It is reliably reported that Aybar is basically speaking on behalf of a policy-making group which would rule the central bodies. The party was established on the same day the Ministry of Interior lifted the ban on political activities. The "offer of party leadership" to Aybar came only a few weeks after *Yön* issued its "socialist" declaration and seemed to have taken the lead in developing socialism. Some of the founders of *Yön* had held talks with trade union leaders at the end of 1961, hoping to establish a socialist party of their own. The proposal for a *Çalışanlar Partisi* (Workingmen's Party) was defeated in a trade union convention largely through the efforts of Labor Party members from the provinces. Another attempt to establish a *Sosyal Güvenlik Partisi* (Social Security Party), by 293 trade unions with approximately 300,000 members, was not carried out, lest it destroy the economic orientation of labor. These attempts to establish labor parties were described by Behice Boran, a former sociology professor and leader of the Labor Party, as a "capitalist plot" engineered to oppose and defeat the real workers' parties.<sup>5</sup> *Yön* itself was looked

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<sup>3</sup> A "socialist" party was established in January 1960, by Atif Akgüç and Alaettin Tiridođlu, reviving a similar party established by the latter in 1959. It intended to oppose the spread of communism. The party had no consequence. *Cumhuriyet*, January 20, September 9, 1960. Later this party merged with a Labor Party on March 3, 1961.

<sup>4</sup> Aybar (b. 1910), a relative of Nazım Hikmet and member of an aristocratic family, was educated in French schools and took a law degree in İstanbul. His academic career was interrupted in 1946 due to his leftist tendencies. He published *Hür* (Free) and *Zincirli Hürriyet* (Enchained Freedom), opposed Turkish participation in the Korean War and associated himself with various leftist activities. He is known as having an authoritarian disposition but courage as well. His Marxist ideas, like those of many other Turkish Marxists, came from French sources. See *Akis*, August 28, 1965, pp. 8-12.

<sup>5</sup> *Akis*, August 28, 1965, p. 9.

upon with suspicion by Labor Party leaders and minimized as a pseudosocialist organ, though their differences were not publicly aired.

Immediately after taking over the party leadership Aybar engaged in strenuous activity to establish branches in the countryside and publicize the party's views. He had little success at the beginning.<sup>6</sup> Meanwhile, a bitter struggle developing between right and left wing intellectuals ended with the apparent victory of the latter.<sup>7</sup> The labor strike, workers' demonstrations for employment in the summer of 1962, and the passiveness of Parliament further prepared a suitable atmosphere for the activities of the Labor Party. In August 1962 Aybar was formally approved as chairman, along with Rüştü Güneri as Secretary General, and Orhan Arsal, İbrahim Denizcier, İsmail Topkar, Rıza Kuas, Cemil Hakkı Selek and Kemal Türkler as members of the Central Executive Committee.

In November 1962 the party engaged in a campaign to delete articles 141 and 142 from the criminal code, hoping thus to be free to propagate the concepts of class struggle forbidden by these articles. The campaign was well organized and supported by all leftist publications, including the *Bizim Radyo* (Our Radio), the clandestine broadcasting station located in one of the Eastern European countries. However, it began to backfire when nationalists broke up the protest meeting. Several members of the Labor Party resigned, protesting the forceful manner in which the leaders had been chosen.<sup>8</sup> The *Türk İş* (Labor Confederation) itself organized counter demonstrations condemning communism, in an oblique warning to the Labor Party to limit its propaganda. Harassed by these attacks, a Laborite delegation visited Premier İnönü and secured from him a promise that the constitutional rights granting freedom of thought would be extended to their party.<sup>9</sup> Subsequently the Laborites, supported by the Socialist Society and several new members, including Niyazi Ağırnash, a senator from Ankara, resumed their activities, chiefly in

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<sup>6</sup> *Türkiye Bülteni*, May 5, 1962 (Kemal Sülker).

<sup>7</sup> See discussions in the press during April 1962 about the novel (later made into a play), *Yılanların Öcü* (The Revenge of Serpents), by Fakir Baykurt, dealing with class conflicts in villages.

<sup>8</sup> Ahmet Muşlu, a member of the Central Disciplinary Board, resigned after accusing the leaders of accepting people with communist background and of being attacked personally as "bought" by *Bizim Radyo*. Declaration in *Yeni İstanbul*, November 16, 1962, also November 13, December 23, 1962.

<sup>9</sup> *Milliyet*, December 23, 1962.



the form of press conferences and panel discussions. They criticized the five years economic plan as being inadequate, and opposed Turkey's entry into the Common Market as infringing upon national independence and "consolidating the country's economic and social structure responsible for the society's backwardness."<sup>10</sup> The party concentrated its efforts on gaining a favorable public image. It rejected implicitly any association with communism in order to attract the workers and the uncommitted, social minded intellectuals.<sup>11</sup>

Despite these efforts the membership remained confined largely to urban intellectuals, while workers seemed weary of its growing dogmatism. Indeed, by September 1963 the party had established organizations only in seven provinces and twelve towns, whereas the next smallest party had about 150 branches.<sup>12</sup> It also adopted a rather friendly attitude towards Kurdish communists and socialists, many of whom were striving to acquire national rights for their own group.<sup>13</sup>

The campaign for municipal elections, held on November 17, 1963, gave the Labor Party an excellent chance for propaganda on state radio during its legally allotted time. It vehemently attacked capitalists, landowners and the unjust distribution of national income.<sup>14</sup> These had some effect on the public, but the party won only 34,301 votes or 0.36 per cent of all ballots cast. Almost half of the votes (14,451) came from İstanbul, notably from the well-to-do sections of the city. It was certain that rigid dogmatism, predilections for theoretical debate and appeal to marginal groups caused popular and official resentment. As early as March 1962, Sadun Aren, a professor at the School of Political Science in Ankara who eventually became the head of the Ankara branch and deputy in 1965, had warned against excessive theorizing.

Aren claimed that the ideological struggle between capitalism and

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<sup>10</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, September 15, 1963.

<sup>11</sup> For instance, one of the nationalist revolutionary officers, Mucip Ataklı, attacked the party as engaging in communist propaganda while another one, Sami Küçük, defended it. Both officers are lifetime senators. *Milliyet*, January 23, 1963. *Yeni İstanbul*, February 11, 1963.

<sup>12</sup> See report in *Cumhuriyet*, September 10, 1963.

<sup>13</sup> The Minister of Interior declared that, of 12 Kurdish propagandists arrested and condemned, six were known as communists, *Cumhuriyet*, *Yeni İstanbul*, June 29, 1963.

<sup>14</sup> See Aybar's speech in *Yurt Sorunları ve Çözüm Yolu* (published by Research Bureau), Ankara, 1964, pp. 8-9. The speeches were described as being communist propaganda shaped along Leninist ideas. *Yarn*, November 13, 1963.

socialism had lost its violent character because of a change in economic conditions, and that polemical discussions were useless. True, social conditions in Turkey were not yet stabilized and they provided ground for bitter ideological struggle.

But the capitalist sector is so new, young and ambitious as to claim that it was offered no chance and that with such chances it would solve the country's problems . . . still it would be an error to engage in an ideological struggle reminiscent of the 19th century type . . . a rigid doctrinaire struggle will create an artificial situation not corresponding to historical evolution and daily conditions, and will not involve and interest the large mass.

Aren also warned against the danger of ignoring doctrine since:

Any domestic problem, any social problems cannot be solved without being based and directed by a world view . . . A practical approach (*Yön's*) . . . may lead to finding a new development theory for Turkey, that is to say a new socialism. But this idea is unfounded and misleading. Socialism, as is known, is a system of values behind which there is a known method which analyzes and explains social change . . . the value system consists of preventing the exploitation of man by man, of providing equal opportunities to everyone, ending contradictions of interests, so as to provide equality of opportunity and mutual assistance . . . There is just one socialism if understood as a system and a model. To talk about a different socialism for Turkey means to accept the fact that the Turkish man and society is subject to development laws and values different from other men and societies. It is true that in order to achieve the socialist model each country may take a different road in the solution of various concrete problems . . . but all these solution methods must work for the same purpose and be consistent with the [ultimate] goal . . . I want to repeat once more that our development can be achieved only by following a socialist model centered on a constructive popular statism.<sup>15</sup>

Aren proposed to use statism as an ideology for mobilizing the masses, and through it, make "factories and establishment centers of civilization and culture, in fact, true schools." The emphasis on statism was legally concordant with the Constitution, which had accepted the principle of a mixed economy granting equal place to private and state enterprises.

The impact of these ideas was evident in the Labor Party's first national convention held in İzmir on February 9–10, 1964. The

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<sup>15</sup> Sadun Aren, "Nasıl Bir Sosyalizm," *Yön*, March 21, 1963, p. 12.

delegates were selectively chosen so as to allow those with “political consciousness” to exercise leadership instead of having a “large group without [political] consciousness who would give place to wavering.”<sup>16</sup> The delegates (By-laws, Art. 10) included all members of the Central and Disciplinary Committees, the members of the provincial executive and disciplinary committees, and only one provincial delegate for each 1,000 members with paid dues. The latter’s number would never exceed the number of deputy seats legally allotted to that province. The clause gave overwhelming power to the central bodies, that is, to those men deciding the party policy. This article, though criticized as undemocratic, was not amended. (The party opposed also the law on political parties as unconstitutional since this act was aimed, among other things, to prevent small groups from controlling the organization.)<sup>17</sup>

The convention amended the by-laws to strengthen the power of central bodies and define members’ duties. The member (Art. 7) was to follow faithfully the program and by-laws, obey the decisions and directives of competent party organization, and fulfill thoroughly the responsibilities assigned to him. He was to vote for party candidates and use every opportunity to enlist new members and disseminate information about the party’s program and goals. He was to obey all decisions even if he personally disagreed with them.<sup>18</sup>

A new, voluminous party program was presented to the convention by Yahya Kanbolat, Sadun Aren, İsmet Sungurbey, Fethi Naci and Behice Boran—none of whom was a worker and at least three were known as dedicated Marxists. The program begins by reproducing a declaration by the First Turkish National Assembly of October 21, 1920, condemning capitalism and imperialism.<sup>19</sup> It defined the party as being:

the political organization, marching to power through legal means and based on history and science, of the Turkish working class and of the groups which arrived consciously at the happy conclusion of seeing unity of fate with it (the working class), and followed its democratic leadership, such as socialist intellectuals, agricultural workers, landlords

<sup>16</sup> *Eylem* (1) 1964, p. 50 (Aybar’s statement).

<sup>17</sup> *Siyasi Partiler Kanunu ile Anayasa Hakları Nasıl Kısıtlanıyor* (Party Publication). İstanbul, 1964.

<sup>18</sup> The general communiqué of the party No. 78 of March 2, 1965.

<sup>19</sup> *Türkiye İşçi Partisi Programı*, İstanbul, 1964, p. 9.

and insufficiently landed peasants, craftsmen, small businessmen, and salary and wage earners, low income professionals, in a word all citizens leading a life based on their own effort.<sup>20</sup>

The program stressed the party's desire to follow democratic ways and to respect the Constitution. It gave an extensive analysis of Turkey's social structure in order to dramatize the country's backwardness, and the existence of an overwhelming number of workmen, thus justifying the need for radical social reforms. The program also presented a doctrinaire interpretation of Turkish history and arrived at the conclusion that once workers became organized and "acquired class consciousness nobody could oppose them for very long in carrying out their historical mission in achieving social progress and democracy."<sup>21</sup>

The Labor Party was the living symbol of the fact that workers were becoming politically conscious and were bound to mobilize all toilers despite a regressive trade unionist leadership serving the ruling classes. The party was the political means for achieving a workers' democracy, while statism represented its social and economic dimensions. The main solution to Turkey's problems, according to the program, lay in the political field, namely, in bringing workmen to power through political education by the party, under the protection of rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. The key production and exchange means were to be nationalized. The program rejected Western methods of development as being inapplicable to Turkey and advocated "a planned economy siding with labor and being implemented and controlled through workers' participation."<sup>22</sup> Private enterprise was to be an auxiliary of the state economy in this planned framework and gradually limited, as its functions were taken over by government enterprises.

The state was to establish basic industry and operate it as state property, distribute land to peasants, and adopt a program of land cultivation through a system combining state, cooperative and private farms. Economic education was to be implemented according to the principle "income according to effort" culminating eventually

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<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14. This is a more doctrinaire version of the same definition put forth in 1962 in Art. 2 of its first program. See first version, *Türkiye İşçi Partisi Kimlerin Partisidir?* İstanbul, 1962.

<sup>21</sup> *Program*, p. 49.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 64.

in the abolition of a system based on the exploitation of man by man. The program claimed that the party believed in the existence of social laws similar to physical laws above man's will power, but that this would not prevent outside intervention in order to achieve rapid harmony between historical conditions and social evolution. Science was the only road to follow; the party policy was to be defined according to scientific realities. The program defined in detail the question of education and culture and reinterpreted the principles of the Turkish Republic—nationalism being defined as opposition to foreign domination. It expressed the deepest respect for religious and philosophical beliefs and especially stressed the fact that “the party's struggle against backwardness should never be understood as struggle against religion,” although its commitment to keep religion out of politics was firm. The party recognized private property and the right to inheritance, subject to legal limitation only when necessitated by public interest.

The program in general was consistent with the party's outward idea of establishing a system based on the leadership of the working class.<sup>23</sup> The doctrinaire, deterministic view of society and history was accompanied by various side interpretations and formal concessions to prevailing ideas in society, and formal respect for the Constitution in order to enjoy its protection. Basically the program sought several practical aims: first, to present a broad and cohesive interpretation of socialism, in order to attract all intellectual groups and prevent the rise of another form of socialism; second, to acquire a large popular following in order to assert its place among the other parties and forestall any effort to outlaw it; third, to claim intellectual superiority by presenting a total interpretation of society and make this interpretation a standard idea for upcoming generations and, fourth, to emphasize its preoccupation with national problems and thus avoid being discredited as a tool of a foreign power as has happened to other leftist parties in the past.

The party convention accepted the program unanimously and elected a new Central Committee (41 members) and an Executive Committee; the latter—the most powerful body—consisted of Behice Boran, Cemal Hakkı Selek, Adnan Cemgil (replacing İsmet Sungurbey),

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<sup>23</sup> The Turkish expression *Emekten Yana* (those siding with work or labor) is far more comprehensive than its English translation, “Siding with Labor,” may indicate. The slogan was coined by the Labor Party.

Nihat Sargin, Şinasi Yeldan, Cenani Gündoğlu, Rıza Kuas, Kemal Nebioğlu, Mecit Çıkar (replacing Doğan Özgüven), Kemal Sülker, Salih Özkarabey and Sina Pamukçu. The party claimed as usual that it was led by workers but almost two-thirds of the membership in the Central Committee consisted of intellectuals, mostly writers or university teachers known as leftists. The by-laws stipulated that 21 members of the Central Committee should be workers. Thus the intelligentsia assumed a leading rôle in this workers' party and perpetuated the traditional élitist organization despite the party's express intention of eradicating the intellectual-labor dichotomy.

The convention displayed outward unity but internally was torn by a series of problems and divisionary activities. These consisted largely of different interpretations of social classes and of leadership.<sup>24</sup> It was obvious that various groups of workers, some still in traditional forms of occupation and often related to their employees by non-economic ties, could not be lumped together with those supposed to lead the fight for a workers' democracy. Since the workers' élite was in trade unions and apathetic to organized politics, the party had to devise a comprehensive sociological—rather than professional—definition of “workingmen.”<sup>25</sup> Finally, several party members, following Bin Ballâ's ideas, proposed to make the peasants the leaders of the social movement.

After the convention a few members resigned from the Central Committee. Esat Çağa, appointed to the Senate by the President, denounced the dogmatic imitation of foreign models adopted without regard for their compatibility with Turkey's realities and continuous change of social conditions. The extreme Marxists, usually urbanite intellectuals, also denounced the party's opportunism and compromise in favor of popular support. Some of the critics were soon expelled from the party as voicing the “ruling circles' views.” Aybar's group took firm control. The efforts of others to gather a new convention failed.

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<sup>24</sup> For a good article on the different criteria for class definitions, see Muvaffak Şeref, “Toplumcu Hareketlerimizde İşçi Sınıfı, Yoksul Köylüler ve Toplumcu Aydınlar,” *Eylem*, July 1964, pp. 22–32.

<sup>25</sup> One leftist writer claimed that the Labor Party's definition of workers did not differ from the official one and that of the trade unions. He insisted that the “socialist movement would achieve its historical mission and would bring the working people or the majority of the nation to power as long as it relied on all classes and groups united and led them without recognizing special privileges.” *Eylem*, May 6, 1964, p. 8.

The new program, the party's formal effort to uphold the Constitution, and its outward moderation produced excellent results as the bulk of uncommitted, social-minded intellectuals began to side with it. Meanwhile, the Cyprus dispute enabled the party to inject a much needed nationalist ingredient into its propaganda and thus expand its own influence. This dispute, causing growing deterioration in Turkey's relations with the West, led to a *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union.<sup>26</sup>

Consequently, the controls over leftist activities lessened and the Soviets took full advantage of this in inviting neutral and socialist writers to Moscow; the latter dutifully publicized the Soviet achievements under socialism. The Moscow visits of Turkey's Foreign Minister—and afterwards Premier—Suat Hayri Ürgüplü, returning the visits to Ankara of Andrei Gromyko and a Soviet Parliamentary delegation, played their part in melting away suspicion towards the Soviets, especially after the latter came fairly close to supporting the Turkish view on Cyprus. (The signing of a protocol on November 12, 1965, according to which the Soviets were to open a credit for 200 million dollars, seemed to consolidate this friendship.) Subsequently the Labor Party turned its wrath on the West as the source of all evils fallen on Turkey. The West had supplied the economic aid which benefited the rising aggressive entrepreneurial groups and offered different ideas on social organization and economic development as alternatives to the Soviet blueprints. If Turkey ended her reliance on the West, then she would turn for aid, and possibly for political inspiration, to the Soviet Union. All this would greatly strengthen the position of the Labor Party.

The Republican Party, which headed three coalition governments until 1965, viewed sympathetically the Laborites' efforts to attract the peasants and workers. It hoped that this would weaken the popular support of its main opponent, the Justice Party. Indeed, the accusations of communism, and after that physical attacks on the Labor Party by rightist groups, caused negative reactions among the pub-

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<sup>26</sup> Originally the Labor Party leader, in a speech in Bursa, claimed that, according to Atatürk's foreign policy, Turkey should keep out of the Cyprus dispute. This speech led to resignations from the party but the leader soon declared that he had been misquoted and had to issue a corrected pamphlet backing Turkey's position in the dispute. *Kıbrıs, Genel Başkan Mehmet Ali Aybar'ın 10 Mayıs 1964 Tarihli Bursa Konuşması*, İzmir 1964.

lic after these outbursts of violence were described as the Justice Party's desperate efforts to preserve its control over the lower classes. Consequently, the Labor Party intensified further its activities. It published a variety of newspapers: *Toplum* (Society) in Gaziantep, *Çağrı* (Call) in Samsun, *Emekçi* (Laborer) in İstanbul, and later *Rençper* (Farmer) in Ankara, *Uyanan İşçi* (Awakened Worker) in Ankara, along with the doctrinaire reviews *Eylem* (1964) (Action) and *Sosyal Adalet* (Social Justice) in İstanbul.<sup>27</sup> It also issued regularly a *Haberler Bülteni* (News Bulletin).

Following the above developments a large number of intellectuals, some senators, former officers, many of whom had only a normal yearning for social progress, joined the party. Yet, despite a drive to expand its organization, the party failed to establish enough provincial branches and thus qualify legally to enter the senatorial elections held on June 7, 1964. But it intensified its efforts and qualified for participation in the national elections held on October 10, 1965. In this last election the party tried to assure itself of representation in the Parliament.<sup>28</sup> It avidly sought publicity and complained that the press ignored it, though in reality it received far more coverage than its due.<sup>29</sup> The party aimed at securing the highest possible number of ballots in order to divide the popular vote and bring about a coalition government since weak governments ruling in Turkey in 1961–1965 had helped its own rise. Moreover, if it received five per cent of the votes cast the party would have qualified for financial assistance from the national budget. The leaders, moreover, viewed the elections of 1965 as preparing, legally and politically, the ground for taking power in the elections of 1969, and thus, as the chairman put it, “to bring, through vote, the working

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<sup>27</sup> It must be stated, however, that the review *Eylem* represents a group of ideological minded intellectuals, either in the party or sympathizing with it, who differ from the official line. They would give the leadership to the industrial workers class, and would not “accept passively forces above human will,” and thus assert the determining power of human will. These appear more militant in their revolutionary tactics but also demand freedom of thought and dissension, and oppose personal rule—that is to say the authoritarian attitude of the chairman.

<sup>28</sup> The expectations for the future are well illustrated in İffet Aslan, *İktidar Adayları*, Ankara, September 1965, pp. 107 ff.

<sup>29</sup> Çetin Altan, a writer first for *Milliyet* and then *Akşam*, one of the most dedicated and influential advocates of the LP, complained about neglect. He was elected deputy of İstanbul for the party. See his article reproduced in *Emekçi*, June 27, 1964.



popular masses to power. This would have a world wide importance, for such an experiment occurred nowhere.”<sup>30</sup> Indeed, there is not yet any Marxist régime which has reached power by popular vote.

The party entered the elections in 51 provinces out of a total of 67. Its 382 candidates, according to the party’s own classification, were grouped as follows: 101 workers, farmers and agricultural employees, 27 trade unionists, 27 craftsmen, 23 small businessmen, five drivers, four women, 20 journalists, three artists, 18 teachers, ten retired teachers, 14 officials, 21 technicians, four professors, 15 retired officers, 11 engineers, 36 lawyers, 22 liberal professions, ten businessmen and contractors. The top places on the provincial electoral lists, however, were usually given to intellectuals and spokesmen for the party’s central bodies in order to assure their election to the Parliament.<sup>31</sup>

The chairman, Mehmet Ali Aybar, opened the campaign in İstanbul with a strong denunciation of the United States for its bases in Turkey, its “imperialistic policy” and its opposition to the Turkish cause in Cyprus. “Americans have seized all our national resources,” he declared; “oil companies dare to send insolent cables to our government and threaten the State. In these circumstances, brother workers, citizens, your first duty is to deliver the country from foreign occupation. Forty-three years after winning the War of Liberation, all, we citizens from seven to 70 years of age, shall again mobilize. Turkey cannot become the satellite of any state. Americans shall be thrown out . . . we shall abolish all agreements giving privileges to America and shall establish anew our independence and autonomy. . . . As long as we are not free we cannot have land reform, industry, employment and social justice because America relies in our country on landlords, speculators.”<sup>32</sup>

The foreign policy of Turkey, coupled with attacks on oil companies (the latter topic was used also by Republicans), became a chief issue and helped crystallize the Labor Party’s ideological stand. The party welcomed the efforts to improve relations with the Soviets, the Balkan countries and all neighbors, and proposed to follow a

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<sup>30</sup> Aslan, p. 111.

<sup>31</sup> See official listing in *Resmî Gazete*, 12099 of September 13, 1965, and *Sosyal Adalet*, September 1965, p. 42.

<sup>32</sup> See the election platform, *Türkiye İşçi Partisi Seçim Bildirisi*, İstanbul, 1965. For Aybar’s identical ideas in 1947, see reproduction of statement in *Kurtuluş*, September 17, 1965.

policy likely to prevent a Third World War. Internal development was to be achieved rapidly through state intervention. All major private enterprises, including trade banking and insurance and all foreign firms, were to be nationalized. The law on foreign investment was to be abolished and Turkey was to resign from the Common Market. Land reform was to be carried out, workers were to be granted full rights, and the lockout abolished. Education was to be reformed and universalized according to a new economic and social philosophy. The Village Institutes were to be reopened and any youth group, which was anti-imperialistic and populist, reorganized accordingly. Human effort, being the creator of all value, was to be appraised and rewarded, and made the foundation of the new system. The platform reiterated the party's views on science, populism, religion, property and family (the basic institution of society) as expressed in the program. Democracy, being the government by the people and for the people, necessitated the eradication of all economic, social and political obstacles preventing working people from leading a humane, democratic life. This was to be achieved by sending people's representatives to the National Assembly.

The platform, after supporting the Republican Party's leftist orientation, especially its foreign policy toward the Soviets, still dismissed it along with all other parties as defending the interests of landlords and other upper groups.

The ideas in the platform, repeated by party candidates over the radio and in the press, as well as at rallies, tended to awaken some interest and led the optimists to believe that the party would receive a great number of votes and become Turkey's third major party (after the Republican and Justice parties) and even join the coalition government.<sup>33</sup>

The opposition parties, especially the right wing groups, responded to this campaign by publicizing the name of Labor Party candidates who had been prosecuted or condemned for communist activities and went to great efforts to identify the party's tactics with those of communists.<sup>34</sup> Some ill-timed actions by some Laborite candidates,

<sup>33</sup> See *Milliyet* (column "Durum" by Abdi İpekçi) September 27–October 7, 1965.

<sup>34</sup> See Kenan Öztürkmen (former National Security Inspector), "Türkiye İşçi Partisinin İç Yüzü," *Son Havadis*, September 27–October 6, 1965. During the campaign a former head of the Labor Party from Eskişehir (his wife was running in the election) was condemned for communist propaganda. A case involving Kurdish

such as the claim of Çetin Altan, the popular columnist of *Akşam* and then deputy from İstanbul, that Atatürk's written condemnation of communism was a forgery, reinforced the anti-leftist position. The leader of the National Party, Osman Bölükbaşı, produced an instruction allegedly issued to an international writers' conference held in Moscow in 1955. The eighteen articles of the declaration supposedly coincided with the tactics used by the Labor Party.<sup>35</sup> Alparslan Türkeş, a former member of the military junta, and by then the leader of the rightist Republican Peasant National Party, accused some Labor Party candidates of being "sold lackeys trying to divide, in fact put an end to, an independent Turkey. It is now very easy," he declared, "to recognize these people with sick mind, souls and character by their mustache, special words and broken dialects which bear no resemblance to Turkish. These have never in their lives handled a shovel. Their monthly income does not fall below 15–20,000 liras. They live in comfortable quarters in Ankara and İstanbul and never go to and could never stand to see the poor districts inhabited by the Turkish worker and peasant. These pasha [noble] offspring shall not deceive the people. Be they masked or unmasked, we shall always oppose the communists and destroy their insidious plot."<sup>36</sup> Türkeş represented the rightist school of thought which regarded as potentially subversive any proposals for social progress.

The Labor Party tried to counteract these accusations by rejecting communism and subservience to the Russians. It upheld religious freedom (at one point there was a question of prosecuting it for using religion for political purposes) in a desperate effort to maintain its self-created image as genuine spokesman for the commoner.<sup>37</sup> Neutral intellectuals, asked to analyze the platforms of all political parties, found that the Labor Party's views on economic and social policy and foreign affairs contradicted present conditions and democratic principles.<sup>38</sup>

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agitation was concluded after six years and two of those sentenced were Laborite candidates, along with two independent candidates. *Milliyet*, September 28, 1965.

<sup>35</sup> Text in *Son Havadis*, October 10, 1965; see answer by Çetin Altan, *Akşam*, September 25, 1965; for Altan's remarks about Atatürk's declaration on communism, see *Cumhuriyet*, September 8, 1965.

<sup>36</sup> *Milliyet*, September 30, 1965.

<sup>37</sup> *Türkiye İşçi Partisini Tanyalım* (pamphlet issued in 1965).

<sup>38</sup> See articles by Cahit Talas, Besim Üstünel and Mehmet Gönlübol in *Milliyet*, September 28 to October 6, 1965.

The elections were held on October 10, 1965. The Labor Party won 276,101 votes and elected two deputies directly. Owing to the cumulative vote system it was awarded 13 more seats in the Parliament.<sup>39</sup> Almost half of its votes came from the three big cities: İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir. Most of its deputies were known leftists—intellectuals rather than workers (just two could qualify as such). The party, despite its expectations, gathered only three per cent of the total vote and disqualified itself for financial assistance from the budget. It ran behind the National Party (31 seats) and New Turkey (19 seats), but ahead of Türkiyeş' Party (11 seats). However, the Laborites' chief target—the Justice Party and its leader Süleyman Demirel, accused of being a stooge of the West—won 239 seats. This was enough to form an independent government. The Republican Party which had campaigned on a “left of center” platform suffered its worst defeat in receiving only 134 seats, or 28.75 per cent (36.7 per cent in 1961) of the total valid votes.\*

These results, despite reassuring comments, constituted a reversal for the Labor Party. It had the best organizers and speakers, an enthusiastic, dedicated organization and the sympathy of some of the most influential newspapers. Moreover, it enjoyed the tacit support of the Republican Party and a general sympathy among the social minded who hoped to see a socialist group in Parliament.

The party, in addition to a shortage of funds, indiscriminate accusations and some social pressure, was handicapped by its own inner shortcomings. First, its program, drawn along orthodox Marxist ideas, conflicted with its opportunistic policies aimed at securing votes at all costs. Second, it had the most heterogeneous social structure of all Turkish parties and had but little relation to working classes. Its rallies were often attended by well dressed intellectuals, ladies in furs and men using private cars, while the Justice Party rallies appeared as truly popular gatherings. Third, the party assembled individuals with political grievances against other parties, even the Republican régime and the trade union movement. Fourth, the party leadership was in the hands of extreme leftist intellectuals with élite attitudes, whose interest in labor was motivated by opportunistic, political

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<sup>39</sup> Mehmet Ali Aybar, Çetin Altan, Rıza Kuas, Cemal Hakkı Selek, Tarık Ziya Ekinci, Adil Kartal, Yunus Koçak, Yahya Kanpolat, Ali Karıcı, Yusuf Ziya Bahadırılı, Sadun Aren, Behice Boran, Kemal Nebioğlu. The names of two deputies are missing.

\* Cf. “The Turkish Elections: 1965” in *MEJ*, Autumn 1966, pp. 473–94.

reasons. Fifth, the party used foreign policy as a main issue and thus consolidated the strong suspicions about its Soviet orientation. Sixth, it made a capital error in minimizing the dynamic and highly capable leadership of the middle classes and their influential working relations with other social groups. The party's advocacy of tactics based on history and science proved to be a lifeless political dogma.

It may be said further that much of the Labor Party's dynamism was provided by the able, young, social minded members of the Republican Party. These, encouraged by their own party's lukewarm attitude towards the left and its ambiguous idea of statism, went fully to the support of the Labor Party. But these intellectuals, who were effective as long as they spoke moderately for their own party, lost their popular following in siding with an abstract extreme left.

Yet, the establishment of the Labor Party and its activities must be viewed as an important milestone in Turkish politics. For the first time in history socialist ideas found formal representation in the Parliament. One may question the Laborites' social origin and occupation, but the fact remains that they spoke on behalf of groups hitherto deprived of formal representation in the legislature. This in turn forced the other political parties to reshape their views on economic development and social justice according to the specific needs of various social groups, as is now evident in their programs.

Socialism, as indicated in this study, appeared as a program of social and economic reform. It began as a general current of thought among intellectuals and was shaped gradually into a social ideology. A few groups among the intelligentsia, especially those in universities and the press, used socialist ideology both as a program for radical structural changes and as a technique to acquire power. The bulk of the intellectuals of the bureaucracy, the trade unions and professionals, however, remained sympathetic more to a democratic, flexible program of social and economic action, rather than political dogma.<sup>40</sup> An organization likely to answer the social yearnings of these groups has not been established. A newly formed Social Democratic Party under Senator Sitki Ulay, a former general, does not seem to have the organizational and ideological capacity necessary

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<sup>40</sup> It is important to note that a group usually known as socialist has not identified itself with the Labor Party but issued a declaration on behalf of "neutrals" urging the population not to vote for the Justice Party in the 1965 elections.

to embody the intelligentsia's wish. The chances are that the People's Republican Party of İsmet İnönü, moving ideologically to the left under prodding from its own socialist wing, may subdue its arch-conservatives and become a truly socialist party. If this occurs, then several groups, such as those around *Yön* and the universities, and even the rank and file members of the Labor Party, would join it and make the Republican Party a truly social-minded democratic party. If this does not materialize, the Republican socialist group may resign and form their own independent body. They would probably secure considerable backing from labor. The Labor Party, in this case, probably will move further to the left and—leaving aside its revisionist views—become a truly orthodox Marxist party, especially if the formal ban on communist parties is lifted.

Thus, the next decade in Turkey may witness further the rise and political reorganization of the intelligentsia on behalf of socialist ideologies ranging from Fabianism to extreme Marxism. The intelligentsia, which was both the product and then the agent of modernization, uses socialism not only for opening new horizons for social and economic modernization but also for justifying its own bid for power. The social groups attacked as being opposed to this modernization are the entrepreneurial, nationalist, state capitalist groups which established power and status in the past as the supporters and representatives of the emerging Republican order.<sup>41</sup> The socialist position is strengthened by the fact that the increase of importance attached to economic occupations, coupled with intensive social mobility, integration into and participation in political and economic life, has rendered narrow and restrictive the sphere of modernization outlined in the first decades of the Republic. This situation provides ample conditions for ideological debate, especially since social stratification facilitates the application of Marxist concepts concerning the social classes. Yet, viewed in its entirety and with due regard to the objective situation of all social groups, the over-all process of change in Turkey cannot be understood and appraised in ideological terms, but rather in the broad perspectives opened by modern social sciences. In the second phase of modernization in Turkey the intelligentsia's rôle and function in society are

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<sup>41</sup> This view is in line with David Apter's observations concerning the rise of socialism in developing countries. See David Apter, *Ideology and Discontent*, New York, 1964, pp. 23 ff.

markedly different from the first phase. It is not a leader at the head of all other social groups but a rationalizing agent bent on discovering the objective roots of thought and of the very process of transformation.

The Labor Party adopted ideology as its tool for enlarging the scope of modernization. It consequently was forced to negate the objective conditions which facilitated its rise by stressing the subjective effects of change. This contradicts both the prevailing conditions in Turkey and the intelligentsia's vital new rôle of achieving integration and participation through science and consensus.

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PART TWO  
LITERATURE

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## THE IMPACT OF THE PEOPLE'S HOUSES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNICATION IN TURKEY (1931-1951)

The People's Houses, *Halk Evleri*, were established in 1931/32, as cultural and political centers designated to indoctrinate the masses with the nationalist, secularist and populist ideas of the Republican regime. Specifically, the Houses were charged with the duty to establish a national culture based on Turkish folklore, teach the masses the Republican principles, eradicate illiteracy, and devise the means to raise the people's living standards. The purpose of the People's Houses, thus, can be assembled in two categories, one cultural and the other political. The cultural goal, that is, the establishment of a national culture based on folklore and on an authentic Turkish life style, called for extensive sociological and folkloristic research in the villages, and even among the tribal groups where the ethnic Turkish culture had been preserved supposedly unspoiled.<sup>1</sup> The duty of the Houses was to discover the authentic Turkish culture, to collect tales, poems and stories, to register songs, and after refining their quality through advanced technique, share them ultimately with the entire country.

The political goal of the Houses was to persuade as many people as possible in the countryside that Turkish nationalism was their new religion and Republicanism their modern political identity. The survival of Turkey as a nation depended on the mass acceptance of these political principles which came to be considered synonymous with modernization itself. Thus, it was evident that in order to fulfill its main goals the Houses needed to develop, first, the media which would enable them to reach and indoctrinate the largest number of people, and second, to devise the methodology and technique for collecting the folkloristic data necessary to build a national culture and then, to refine that raw material and make it acceptable to a more sophisticated audience.

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<sup>1</sup> For additional bibliographical information see (G. Jäschke, "Die türk. Dorfinstitute", in *Bustan* 4 (1964), pp. 10-14.

Consequently the People's Houses were faced from the very beginning with the need to develop a system of communication capable of serving their goals. Indeed, the Houses devised such a system but without being conscious that the communication system thus developed was a modernization effort in itself (see appendix). Actually the media, the establishments, the professions and the habits created by the communication system survived and became part of everyday life in Turkey long after the Houses were closed in 1951.

The three major media of communication as well as the educational sources developed by the Houses consisted of the publication of reviews and books, the establishment of libraries, and the delivery of talks, or *konferans* to towns and city audiences. One may state in general that the publication of reviews and books stimulated greatly interest in writing, journalism and reporting. It encouraged also the development of libraries and provided economic incentives to book publishers and printers throughout Turkey. Private firms undertook the printing of reviews and books since the People's Houses were forbidden to establish their own printing facilities.<sup>2</sup> This measure, enforced also with respect to all other government and party sponsored publications, except official acts, increased the demand for paper, stimulated the development of new printing establishments and helped create a group of professional printers. The printing presses used Roman letters throughout Turkey and, thus, were instrumental in generalizing the use of the Latin alphabet which had been adopted in 1928. Indeed, as a consequence of these measures the number of locally published reviews, newspapers and books increased steadily in the countryside. The local press in turn was instrumental in crystallizing the public opinion at town level and helped the upper social groups and intellectuals who were the supporters of the Republican regime to leave their ideological mark on the younger generation. The local press established in the 1930's was very effective later in the 1940's, after the multiparty regime was introduced, in helping the newly rising leaders to mobilize the public for political action in the countryside.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Article 1 of by-laws of 1940.

<sup>3</sup> For instance the newspapers in İzmir, Adana, Eskişehir, and other places affected significantly the course of politics in Turkey. Each province and district, city and town, has often several small local newspapers.

The Houses published a great number of reviews (see appendix II and III). Each House located in a provincial capital was entitled to publish its own review which acted as the spokesman for all other Houses established in that province. The language and literature branch of each House was charged with the responsibility of publishing the review once a month by paying utmost attention to its quality.<sup>4</sup> The reviews were financed with funds from the national budget allocated to the People's Houses in each province. Except for copies exchanged with other Houses, the reviews were sold to the public in order to secure revenue.<sup>5</sup> All other publications printed by the People's Houses were distributed free of charge.

The chief review was the *Ülkü* (Ideal) published by the People's House of Ankara beginning in 1932/3. This latter House was placed under the general supervision of the General Secretariat of the Republican People's Party. Consequently, the *Ülkü* defined the general policy of the Houses according to the prevailing views in the ruling Republican Party. However, in practice the policy of the *Ülkü* and its approach to problems varied in accordance with its editor's views and background. Recep Peker, the Secretary General of the Republican Party was the editor of the *Ülkü* until 1936, and consequently the review expressed his radical belief in promoting rapid modernization through forceful change with little regard for tradition and feeling.<sup>6</sup> Fuat Köprülü, the noted historian, directed the *Ülkü* from 1936 to 1941, and subsequently the review acquired a didactic, historical approach. Köprülü emphasized the importance of sound scholarship but paid scant attention to the readers' tastes and aspirations or to increasing the review's circulation. Finally, after 1941, under Ahmet Kutsi Tecer, a writer and artist, the *Ülkü* broadened its coverage to include subjects from the main fields of art, literature and practical professions.

The publication of the *Ülkü* was properly advertised. In a circular letter, the General Secretariat of the Republican Party informed all the party branches and all the People's Houses that the forthcoming

<sup>4</sup> Articles 12-15, the by-laws of 1940.

<sup>5</sup> The *Ülkü* was started in February 1933, and ceased publication in August 1950. In order to emphasize its educational purposes it imitated the cover of the *Adult Education* published in the U.S.A.

<sup>6</sup> Recep Peker's views were expressed in his university lectures published as *İnkılâp Dersleri*, Ankara 1935, and 1936.

publication “would be the most scientific, the most valuable and the most populist review of Turkey”, and asked them to support it by every possible means.<sup>7</sup> The basic duty of the *Ülkü*, according to the letter, was to express the principles and ideas of the Republic in a scientific and persuasive manner. The letter advised the House leaders to hire the most capable writers who would inform the public about the cultural aims of the Republic and would strive to raise the intellectual standard of the Turkish youth in accordance with the national culture and the spirit of scientific developments in the world at large.<sup>8</sup> In order to avoid any misrepresentation of the Republic’s principles, the Party advised all the Houses which published reviews to take their ideas from the *Ülkü* and the *Yeni Türk* (New Turk).<sup>9</sup> The latter, published on behalf of the People’s Houses of Istanbul, featured in addition to political writings a variety of literary and philosophical themes. The Party advised all the editors of the People’s Houses reviews to identify themselves with their social environment, to capture the villager’s interest and to root the cultural reforms among the masses. It also instructed the House leaders to urge the local youth to write stories and essays by taking their inspiration from local events, from village and town life, and to describe the natural beauties of their lands.<sup>10</sup>

Following these instructions several Houses throughout the country began publishing their own reviews. Some of the reviews had been founded before the Houses were even established. Some of these reviews agreed to become the publicity organs of the Houses by changing their names and appearance in order to conform to the Party directives.<sup>11</sup> Other reviews stopped publication altogether in order to protest the press control imposed by the Republican Party. Some other reviews were of such low quality that they were rejected

<sup>7</sup> *Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası Katibi Umumlüğünün Fırka Teşkilatına Umumi Tebligatı*. Vols 1–20 (Ankara, 1933–1940). Referred henceforth as *Tebligat*, vol. I, p. 194, communication 123, of November 17, 1932.

<sup>8</sup> *Tebligat*, vol. II, p. 59, communication #41, 42, 61, of March 9, 1933.

<sup>9</sup> *Tebligat*, vol. I, p. 106, communication #129, of November 11, 1932.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 107.

<sup>11</sup> Some of these reviews were the following: *Memleket*, The Country (Adana) *Duygu ve Düşünce*, Feeling and Thought (Sivas) *Dilek*, Request (Samsun) *Yeni Fikir*, New Idea (Konya), *Duygu*, Feeling (Çankırı) *Ahali*, People (Samsun) *Halk*, People (Muğla), *Türk Dili*, Turkish Language (Balıkesir) *Kırşehir*, *Bartın* (locality names) *Gediz* (Manisa), the last changed its old name *Bozkurt* (Greywolf) on April 24, 1937.

by the Houses themselves. This regimentation of the press raised the printing quality of some reviews, but restricted also the freedom of their writers by demanding conformity to official views and by imposing control over their opinion.

I have been able to locate so far fifty-four reviews published by the People's Houses in 1933-1950.<sup>12</sup> But only fifteen reviews followed a more or less regular publication schedule, especially those reviews which belonged to the People's Houses established in some larger cities, such as Istanbul, Konya, Ankara, Sivas, Balıkesir. Some of the reviews published by these Houses formed voluminous collections over the years. On the other hand, some of the reviews published in the smaller towns often indulged themselves in eulogizing profusely the high government officials and local dignitaries, and, naturally, the leaders of their own People's Houses. The local leaders often used the reviews to publicize their own achievements and thus consolidate their own position in the party.

There are no available statistics to indicate the total circulation of the People's Houses reviews.<sup>13</sup> One may be certain that most of them did not publish more than a few thousand copies. The quality of the print as well as the content of the reviews, left much to be desired. Moreover, the strict conformity to party directives, the officious language and the inability to express the people's real thoughts and feelings were the chief weaknesses of these reviews. Meanwhile in the country at large the total number of reviews expressing various non-official political and literary tendencies published in 1926-1936, rose from 130 to 330, reflecting thus a certain intellectual restlessness, and the fact that the reviews of the People's Houses failed to express properly all the prevailing thoughts.<sup>14</sup> Faced with a great number of inferior reviews, which drained the Party funds, the General Secretariat of the Republican Party had to issue an order in 1942 restricting the publication of reviews only to the Houses located in provincial capitals as originally intended.<sup>15</sup> (By this time even the small Houses located in district, *kaza*, capitals, were

<sup>12</sup> This number may be even higher as we have discovered new reviews not mentioned in any source. See appendix 2-4.

<sup>13</sup> The *Ülkü* had a circulation of 20,000 in 1933, which is rather high.

<sup>14</sup> See Behçet Kemal Çağlar "Yeter Bu Mecmua Dampingi, Arkadaşlar Birleşelim", *Ülkü*, June 1940, pp. 289-290.

<sup>15</sup> *Tebliğat*, vol. 20, pp. 164-169, communication No. 5/2319 of June 10, 1942.

striving to publish their own reviews). Consequently, the number of reviews published by the People's Houses was reduced to about twenty, and gradually after 1945/46, that is, after the emergence of the opposition parties and relative freedom, most of them disappeared, leaving their place to free and independent publications. It must be mentioned that throughout the period from 1933–1946, a large number of literary and political reviews were published independently by private individuals, and these portrayed probably adequately the real trends in Turkish thought. Yet, the importance of the People's Houses reviews should not be minimized. Despite their uneven quality, these reviews published a considerable amount of original material in the field of anthropology, folklore, sociology, literature and education, and provided useful information on various social groups, and on village and town life.<sup>16</sup> This material is of such great variety and originality that folklorists, sociologists, and anthropologists can not ignore it. The mere fact that the People's Houses reviews were published in small localities by editors who were in close contact with ordinary people and were aware about living conditions in their villages and towns, endowed them with a fresh view of life and a sense of actuality and practicality which could not be found in the general press.

The reviews of the People's Houses encouraged their writers to use simple language and direct expression. This was in fact a turning point in Turkish intellectual life; it marked the reorientation towards concrete images connected with life and reality. Thus, thoughts and feelings were expressed in a natural way without being forced into predetermined forms or images as was the case in the past. True, the reviews followed closely the instructions of the Republican Party in matters of politics and ideology,<sup>17</sup> but in literary and descriptive writings, they enjoyed a freedom of expression which enabled them to break away from the dry formalism of the old *divan* literature. The reviews published folklore and expressed a variety of opinions about life among the lower urban and village groups, and

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<sup>16</sup> Nihat Sami Banarlı, "Halk Evleri Dergilerinde Halk Edebiyatı Araştırmaları", *Türkiyat Mecmuası*, vol. V, İstanbul, 1936, pp. 371–380.

<sup>17</sup> The attitudes of the People's Houses reviews differed substantially from some extremist nationalist and socialist publications with respect to the totalitarian regimes in Europe. Notwithstanding their own nationalist orientation they often criticized Mussolini and Hitler.



intellectuals, and thus served as channels of communication between them.

The model for a factual approach to writing and for direct expression adopted by many of the young people writing for the House reviews was provided by the *Halk Bilgisi Haberleri* (News of Folk Culture) a folklore review published in 1929.<sup>18</sup> The review belonged to the *Halk Bilgisi Demeği* (Association of Folk Culture) established in Ankara in 1927, with the purpose of gathering folklore material and for using it to build a national culture.<sup>19</sup> Fuat Köprülü directed first this review. But it was a well-trained folklorist, Pertev Naili Boratav who gave the review not only intellectual weight but also a social mindedness which became later the dominant mark practically of all folklore research in Turkey. The methods of folklore research developed by the review were approved by the Ministry of Education and recommended for use to all the People's Houses. Subsequently a special folklore research manual approved by the government was printed and distributed.<sup>20</sup> The *Halk Bilgisi Haberleri* published studies on social groups, craftsmen, religious sects, nomadic tribes and their customs, agricultural methods, local art, and dealt extensively with rural problems in a solution-oriented and practical manner. The other reviews emulating the *Halk Bilgisi* published, in turn folklore material and strived also to conduct historical and social studies connected with their respective locality. The quality of some of these studies is questionable, but still some of the published research contains valuable information on social conditions in villages and towns. Some writers used historical documents found in local libraries, and published interviews with the native people.<sup>21</sup> Moreover, the reviews spread

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<sup>18</sup> The review ceased publication in 1931, and reappeared in April 1933, as the organ of the People's Houses in İstanbul. It stopped publication in 1943, and reappeared in 1947 as a nationalist review, and criticized the past folklore research as being oriented to the left. This happened after leftist professors were dismissed from the University.

<sup>19</sup> This folklore was to form the basis of a Turkish national culture and thus eliminate the Arabic and Persian influences.

<sup>20</sup> *Halk Bilgisi Haberleri*, September 1939, pp. 225-233.

<sup>21</sup> See, for instance, *Ün, Fame* (Isparta) September 1937, *Antalya* (Antalya) August 1937, *Altın Yaprak*, Golden Leaf (Bafra) January 1937, which published documents concerning the War of Liberation of 1918-22. I have studied many collections of these reviews in order to collect material for my own research. I wish to draw the attention of scholars interested in Turkey's social and intellectual life not to neglect these rich sources, even though the research may be tedious and not always rewarding.

practical information, ranging from the description of the most frequent diseases encountered in their respective locality and the means to combat them, to the introduction of new methods for land cultivation. All this publishing activity developed in the youth a taste for writing and was instrumental in helping a considerable number of intellectuals to begin their literary careers. Many of the contemporary Turkish writers and poets in their forties and fifties began writing first in some of these reviews. Suffice to mention for instance, that Yaşar Kemal, the noted Turkish novelist, began his career as a folklorist working for the People's House of Adana. Furthermore, by introducing the printed word among the masses, the reviews helped develop an interest in the printed word and this helped in turn raise the circulation of national newspapers and eventually speeded up political education in the countryside. Finally, these reviews served also as apprentice shops for some of the politicians and newspaper publishers who became famous after 1945/1946.<sup>22</sup> They developed their writing skills here and learned to evaluate the people's potential reactions to the written word.

The second major impact of media communication developed by the People's Houses consisted of the publication of books and pamphlets. These publications printed research findings on linguistics, folklore and history, and disseminated information on practical matters of all kinds. Book publishing was part of the responsibility of the publication branch of each House. This branch was charged with the duty of spreading among the population the results of intellectual and creative work.<sup>23</sup> The same section was also in charge of establishing and administering libraries. The manuscripts submitted for publication to the Houses had to be approved by the House Executive Board and then be sent to the printer. Once the book was printed, copies were sent to the Republican Party Secretariat, to all the People's Houses and People's Rooms (the latter were established in villages) and to the reviews published by the Houses. The distribution of books was a requirement imposed by the House bylaws. Consequently, each book or pamphlet had to be printed in at least four to five thousand copies corresponding to the total number of

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<sup>22</sup> For instance Hulusi Köymen who became one of the leaders in the Democratic Party after 1946, was an active writer for the *Uludağ* (see for instance No. 10, October 1938) the review of Bursa. Also Sıtkı Yırcahı was active in Balıkesir.

<sup>23</sup> Articles 101–103 of the by-laws of 1940.

People's Houses and Rooms, and reviews.<sup>24</sup> All books were printed, as mentioned before, in privately owned establishments and distributed free of charge, since the printing costs were met from the general budget of the House.

The publishing activities undertaken by the People's Houses resulted in a great variety of books and pamphlets dealing with social and practical matters. By 1944, eighty-three out of the existing four hundred five Houses had published a total of 492 books and pamphlets.<sup>25</sup> Actually this number may be higher. In addition to these books, the Republican Party's Bureau supervising the People's Houses published during the same period 246 works of various kinds. The total number of these publications may appear limited at first sight, but their significance lies in the fact that these books contained, like the material in the reviews, empirical observations and opinions related to everyday life in Turkish society.<sup>26</sup> An exhaustive bibliography containing all the People's Houses publications is not available yet. The existing bibliographies cover in the main the works published until 1944, thus leaving out the remaining six and one-half years of publishing activity.

The books and pamphlets published by the People's Houses may be divided roughly into four categories. The first category consists of books and pamphlets designated to disseminate the political ideology of the Republican People's Party. These include often speeches, accounts of anniversary celebrations and other political activities.<sup>27</sup> A second category of publications includes the reports of the People's Houses describing their own activities. These reports were usually consolidated—not always in a very objective manner—in one general report issued by the Party's central bureau in Ankara.<sup>28</sup> The

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<sup>24</sup> A total number of 407 People's Houses and 4322 Rooms were established by 1950.

<sup>25</sup> Hasan Taner, *Halkevleri Bibliyografyası*, Ankara, 1944, p. 3.

<sup>26</sup> See Avni Candar, *Bibliyografya, Halk Evleri Neşriyatı*, vol. I, Ankara, 1939, vol. II, Ankara, 1941. The Houses' own report mentions that until 1944, 84 Houses published 508 books. *Halkevleri ve Halköğütleri 944*, Ankara, 1945, pp. 9-10.

<sup>27</sup> Kerim İncedayı, *İnkılâp ve İstikâl*, Zonguldak, 1936, *Cumhuriyetin Onuncu Yıl Dönümü*, Ankara, 1933, *Türkiye Cumhuriyetimizin Yıl Dönümü Münasebetiyle Samsun Halkevi*, Samsun, 1934, *Cumhuriyetin 15 inci Yılında Aydın*, Aydın, 1938. Publications bearing similar titles were issued in Bolu, 1938, Çankırı, 1938, Diyarbakır, 1938, Manisa, (n.d.) Mardin, 1938, Tekirdağ, 1938.

<sup>28</sup> See Taner, p. 9, and especially pp. 31-33. Many of these reports have been used throughout this study.

third category of books consists of literary works, monographs on local poets and writers and collections of local folklore or music.<sup>29</sup> The fourth group includes studies on the history and structure of the local communities. Some of these are of excellent quality and cannot be ignored even by the most discriminating students of Turkish society. Among these studies there are several village monographs based on empirical observations in rural areas.<sup>30</sup> However rudimentary, these works contain nevertheless valuable sociological information and provide excellent insights into social mobility among the lower strata and the emergence of new social groups in Turkey.<sup>31</sup> Among the studies dedicated to rural problems, there are several reports written by qualified administrators proposing various development projects for the Turkish villages.<sup>32</sup> These reports represent grass roots thinking and offer better practical advice for development than the reports of some would-be rural sociologists in Turkey who had never visited a village. Finally, included in the social studies published by the People's Houses, there are a few excellent works on social history. Many of these used documents found in the local archives and eventually became major sources for studying Turkish social history.<sup>33</sup> The unique feature of these studies dealing with social

<sup>29</sup> A. Kemal Akça, *Sillenin Halk Şairleri*, Konya 1940, K. Özyalçın Kemal Gürpınar, *Sarıkaşlılı Serdari*, Sivas, 1938, Fehim Çaylı, *İlgün Folkloru*, Konya, 1945, M. Ferruh Arsunar, *Tunceli Dersim Halk Türküleri ve Pentatonic*, İstanbul, 1937.

<sup>30</sup> Among the monographs see those published by People's House of Bergama for the villages of Eğriğöl, Dörtköy, Turmanlar, Bölcek by Ali Rıza Başsorgun in 1944–1945. See also a separate study, *Bergamada Köyler; Pınarköy, Narlıca, Tepeköy, Yalnızev*, Bergama, 1944. See also the monographs published by Kayseri People's Houses for the villages of *Tavsalun, Cermik, Mimarşinan* prepared by Kazım Özdoğan in 1936–1937. The Kırşehir People's Houses also prepared in 1940–41, a series of monographs on the villages of Ortaköy, Ömerhacılköy, Genezin, Göynü, Boztepe, Karacaviran.

Antalya P.H. published in 1938, a monograph on Korkudeli and Yavuzköy.

<sup>31</sup> See from "rags to riches" story, *Köylerde Eskicilikten Sonra Çiftlik Sahibi Mehmet Zirhlı* (Mehmet Zirhlı village cobbler [who became] estate lord), İzmir 1937.

<sup>32</sup> Among these studies several may be cited: Saim Gündoğan, *Köycülik ve Köy Davası Hakkında Bir Etüd*, Aydın, 1944, (the author was the governor of Aydın). Sabri Sözer, *Köy İdaresi ve Köycülik Meseleleri*, Gaziantep, 1947 (the author of this book was also a governor). See also *Köy İşleri, Beş Çalışma Programı*, Balıkesir, 1930.

<sup>33</sup> See the excellent studies of M. Çağatay Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda Saruhanda Eşkıyalık ve Halk Hareketleri*, İstanbul, 1944. See also the second volume, *18 ve 19. Yüzyıllarda Saruhan'da Eşkıyalık ve Halk Hareketleri*, İstanbul, 1955, also *Saruhan Oğulları ve Eserlerine Dair Vesikalar*, İstanbul, 1940, also *Manisada Ziraat, Ticaret ve Esnaf Teşkilâtı*, İstanbul, 1942. Kamil Su, *XVII ve XVIII inci Yüzyıllarda Balıkesir Şehir Hayatı*, İstanbul, 1937, see also by the same author *Balıkesir ve Civarında Yürük ve Türkmenler* (this is a study based

structure and popular movements lay in their emphasis placed on the local history and the social organization of towns and cities of Anatolia, which had been practically ignored until that time. A final group of publications, mostly pamphlets, dealt with practical matters, such as human and animal sanitation, the teaching of new legal procedures and of a variety of skills.<sup>34</sup>

The third media of communication extensively used by the People's Houses, consisted of public lectures on a variety of subjects delivered by university teachers, professionals, writers and other prominent intellectuals. The lecturers traveled from one town to the other according to the demand put forth by the respective House or the schedule arranged by the Secretary General of the Republican Party. In view of the speaker's relatively good educational background and the requirement of the bylaws that lectures be submitted in writing to the House Chairman in advance, the quality of the talks was usually high.<sup>35</sup> For instance, the lectures delivered in one remote People's House (Elazığ) during one year—each House was bound by statute to have at least two talks a month—dealt quite well with topics connected with political and legal reforms, hygiene, land cultivation, education, crop raising and animal breeding, administrative organization and national defense.<sup>36</sup> According to the *Ülkü*, the central review of the Houses, in 1940 alone, a total of 4533 lectures were delivered to a total of 1,282,824 listeners.<sup>37</sup> By 1943 the total number

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on *kadı* registers and other official documents), İstanbul 1938. Also İbrahim Gökçen, *Manisa'da XVI ve XVII Yüzyılda Deri Sanatları Tarihi*, İstanbul, 1945, also *Saruhan'da Yörük ve Türkmenler*, İstanbul 1946. For related studies see Mahmut Akok-Ahmet Gököğlü, *Eski Ankara Evi*, Ankara, 1946, Muhtar Yahya Dağlı, *İstanbul Mahalle Bekçilerinin Destan ve Mani Katarları*, İstanbul, 1948. Nurettin Yatman, *Türk Kumaşları*, Ankara, 1945.

<sup>34</sup> Necmettin Üstüntürk, *Bulaşık Hastalıklardan Korunma Öğütleri*, Mersin, 1936 *Hayvanlarda Kılkuş Hastalığı*, Mersin, 1939, M. Aşır Aksu, *Hukuk ve Ceza Davaları Nasıl Açılır*, İstanbul, 1937. Naimi Erdem, *Halkımıza Miras İşlerini Öğretir*, İstanbul, 1937 (both published by Elazığ P.H.). *Köylüler Kendi Yakacakları ve Satacakları Odunu Nasıl Alabileceklerdir*, Ankara, 1937.

<sup>35</sup> These lectures have been published in a series of twenty-four volumes. *CHP Konferansları*, vols. 1-24, Ankara, 1939-1940, also *Söylevler*, Ankara, 1942, which includes some of the lectures delivered in 1932-1942. Several lectures were published independently by individual People's Houses.

<sup>36</sup> *Halkevi 1940*, Ankara (n.d.), also *Ankara Halkevi 1939 Çalışmaları*, Ankara, 1939, p. 4, which lists 57 talks in one year.

<sup>37</sup> *Ülkü*, March 1941, p. 69. The claim is supported by *Halkevi 1940* (n.d.) p. 19, which lists 2835 talks in two six month periods in a total of 509 Houses.

of talks rose to 25,000.<sup>38</sup> The popular interest in these lectures varied. In larger towns there seemed to be a lively interest, whereas in the smaller areas there was a certain apathy, caused probably by the speakers' academic approach and the theoretical and specialized nature of the subjects discussed.<sup>39</sup> In 1939/40, some of these shortcomings were overcome to some extent as the language was simplified and emphasis was placed on practical matters, and consequently popular interest in these public lectures increased.

The cultural activities undertaken by the People's Houses depended on the existence of libraries and reading rooms. The bylaws imposed upon a People's House the obligation to establish a library, or at least a reading room, inside or even outside its own building in collaboration with the existing libraries in the locality. This was in fact a basic condition accompanying the establishment of a House. The bylaws imposed on each House the obligation to open reading rooms in the villages in their vicinity, and even to use the rural coffee houses, if necessary, as lecture rooms while lecturing teams visited a village.<sup>40</sup> Some of the Houses even established mobile libraries which provided reading opportunities for the residents in the rural areas.

The bylaws regulated very rigorously the type of books to be acquired by the House libraries. All religious publications, books opposed to the ideology of Turkish reform and those describing foreign regimes and ideologies or those disseminating views opposed to the Turkish national interest and to science were excluded from the library. Similarly, the libraries were prohibited from acquiring publications which displayed backward and reactionary tendencies, or were pessimistic in spirit or described crimes and suicides, or glamorized passion or taught the youth bad habits.<sup>41</sup>

The People's Houses acquired books from several sources:<sup>42</sup> government offices, the Language and History Societies, the General Secretariat of the Republican Party.<sup>43</sup> From private citizens and

<sup>38</sup> *Ülkü*, March 1, 1944, p. 16.

<sup>39</sup> İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, *Halkın Evi*, Ankara, 1950, pp. 122–124.

<sup>40</sup> Articles 89, 99, by-laws of 1940.

<sup>41</sup> Article 90, by-laws of 1940.

<sup>42</sup> Article 91, by-laws of 1940.

<sup>43</sup> The Secretariat sent to the People's Houses 55,147 copies of 230 different works in 1943, 87,500 books in 1944, with 450 different titles and 86,000 books with 62 different titles in 1945. *Halkevleri ve Halkodaları 1944*, Ankara, 1945, pp. 9–10.

through their own purchases. The publications coming from the latter two sources were to be examined by the House leaders in order to determine whether they met the basic criteria mentioned above. Those books which failed to meet the above conditions were sent to the Secretary General of the People's Republican Party. All publications coming from abroad, including pictures and advertisements, were to be sent immediately to the same Secretariat.<sup>44</sup> This proved to be a difficult policy to enforce. The publications issued outside the People's Houses increased in number and quality and variety and attracted a large number of people who had remained apathetic to the People's Houses publications. Many People's Houses' libraries acquired books which might have not been approved by the Party. The General Secretariat itself was not too careful with the books it sent to the House libraries. For instance, a circular letter of the Secretariat acknowledged that it mailed by error to the People's Rooms a number of books printed in Arabic script and urged the responsible officers to destroy all such publications.<sup>45</sup> The Secretary General, and even the General Directorate of the Press which gradually became one of the chief agents of thought control, issued periodical lists of books and plays to be excluded from the House libraries because of their moral, political and social deficiencies.<sup>46</sup> Actually, this trend, noticeable in 1933-36, when several books, plays, and poems were officially banned,<sup>47</sup> developed parallel to the strengthening of one-party rule and the rise of power of a new elitist bureaucracy highly suspicious of all populist and democratic movements. Nevertheless, the number of libraries opened by the People's Houses, the books accumulated there as well as the number of readers increased continuously. In 1940 the People's Houses administered 366 libraries with a total of 462,817 books. Two years later 267 libraries reported that a total of 612,766 readers attended their reading rooms. The

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<sup>44</sup> Article 93 of the by-laws. *Tebliğat*, vol. 15, 1940, pp. 41, 139-140, circulars No. 1206 of June 25, 1938, No. 1623 of December 12, 1939.

<sup>45</sup> *Tebliğat*, vol. 16, p. 142. Communication No. 1358 of April 26, 1940.

<sup>46</sup> See the communication of the Press Directorate *Yeni Türk Mecmuası*, 287, April 1935, pp. 1995-2000.

<sup>47</sup> See *Ulus* March 4, 1935 (Aka Gündüz). The author agreed to see his own play banned, because, according to him, times had changed and it was necessary now to produce works conforming to the new spirit. He called upon the Press Directorate to fulfill its duty, and described such activity not censure but a control on behalf of morality, reform and republicanism.

readers' interests ranged in percentage as follows: 31 general books, 27.64 literature, 12.86 history and geography, 6.37 social sciences, 5.51 positive sciences and the rest miscellaneous. An inventory of an individual library (The People's House of Tire, a small town in Western Turkey) conducted in 1948, revealed that the library possessed a total of 2578 books and three dailies; one national and two local. A total of 139 books had not been returned by readers.<sup>48</sup> Of 500 books on the shelf, almost half consisted of literary works and the rest were mixed; 77 books were of translations.<sup>49</sup> In summary one may say that the educational value of this intellectual activity is too obvious to need further comment. Reviews, books and libraries, however simple and rigorously controlled, broke virgin ground, and stimulated immense intellectual activity after the seeds sown by the People's Houses blossomed under the warmth of freedom and democracy.

#### APPENDIX 1

##### *Sample of People's House Activity—Eminönü (Istanbul), and Elazığ (Eastern Turkey)*

*Eminönü in 1938–1940 (9021 members—993 women, 8028 men)*

<i>Activity</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Attendance</i>
Conference	79	9,037
Concerts	28	4,620
Plays	160	37,375
Ortaoyun (traditional play)	5	28,000
Wrestling	2	4,000
National holidays and celebrations	24	34,442
Soccer matches	51	16,000
Family gathering	4	420
Film	1	300
Commemoration	1	1,000

<sup>48</sup> *Fikirler*, December 1948, pp. 34–36.

<sup>49</sup> The complete breakdown of 500 books shows that 213 (47.6 %) dealt with literature, 55 (11 %) with History and Geography, 22 (4.4 %) with positive science, 15 (3 %) and the rest with arts and linguistics. *Ibid.*



Appendix 1 (*cont.*)

<i>Activity</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Attendance</i>
Organizational meetings	102	11,376
Congresses	8	252
Section meetings	10	864
Classroom courses	—	1,129
Library attendance	—	113,941
Total	475	162,756

*Elazığ in 1931-1936 (1711 members—57 women, 1654 men)*

<i>Activity</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Attendance</i>
Plays	12	4,800
Concerts	96	21,000
Films	53	7,950
Conferences	51	15,000
Exhibits	7	7,000
Social Gatherings	22	2,980
Sports	161	17,158
Other activities	277	54,105
Total	679	129,993

## APPENDIX 2

*Major Reviews Published by the People's Houses with Relative Continuity  
During 1933-1946 in Province Capitals*

<i>Name of Review</i>	<i>Locality</i>	<i>Beginning Year</i>
1. Başpınar	Gaziantep	1939
2. Çorumlu	Çorum	1938
3. Erciyes	Kayseri	1938
4. Fikirler	İzmir	1927
5. Gediz	Manisa	1933
6. Görüşler	Adana	1937
7. Halk Bilgisi Haberleri	İstanbul	1929
8. Halkevi	Eskişehir	1932
9. Hatay	Antakya	1944
10. İnanç	Denizli	1937

Appendix 2 (*cont.*)

<i>Name of Review</i>	<i>Locality</i>	<i>Beginning Year</i>
11. İnan	Trabzon	1942
12. Karacadağ	Diyarbakır	1938
13. Karaelmas	Zonguldak	1938
14. Kaynak	Bahkesir	1933
15. Konya	Konya	1936
16. On Dokuz Mayıs	Samsun	1935
17. Ordu	Ordu	1944
18. Taşpınar	Afyon	1942
19. Türk Akdeniz	Antalya	1937
20. Ülkü	Ankara (chief review)	1932/3
21. Ün	Isparta	1934
22. Uludağ	Bursa	1935
23. Yeni Türk	İstanbul (Eminönü)	

Sources—*Tebliğat*, vol. 29, 1942, pp. 164–169 communication No. 5/2319 of June 10, 1942. Taner, *op. cit.* *Ülkü*, June 1940, p. 371. Some of the reviews had changed names. Some ceased publication in 1947–47 and in 1951. Some, like *Fikirler*, published independently thereafter.

## APPENDIX 3

*Minor Reviews Published Sporadically in 1933–43*  
*Mostly in Small Localities*

<i>Name</i>	<i>Locality</i>	<i>Beginning</i>	<i>Ending</i>
1. Akpınar	Niğde	1934	1940
2. Aksu	Giresun	1933	1942
3. Altan	Elâzığ	1935	1939
4. Altınyaprak	Bafra		
5. Altok	Edirne		
6. Anafarta	Çanakkale	1934	1940
7. Atayolu	Erzurum		
8. Batıyolu	Kırklareli		
9. Bozok	Yozgat	1938	1941
10. Burdur	Burdur	1939	1941
11. Çoruh	Artvin		
12. Derme	Malatya		
13. Devrimin Sesi	Bilecik	1936	1936
14. Dıranaz	Sinop	1936	1941
15. Doğuş	Kars	1933	1941
16. Dört Eylül	Sivas	1936	1942

Appendix 3 (*cont.*)

<i>Name</i>	<i>Locality</i>	<i>Beginning</i>	<i>Ending</i>
17. Duygular	Bolu	1941	1942
18. Edirne	Edirne	1933	1936
19. Erzurum	Erzurum		
20. İçel	Mersin	1938	1942
21. Ilgaz	Kastamonu	1936	1936
22. Küçük Menderes	Tire	1941	1942
23. Muğla	Muğla	1937	1939
24. Notlar	Yozgat	1941	1942
25. Ocak	Urla	1939	1939
26. Orta yayla	Sivas	1936	1938
27. Sakarya	Adapazarı	1943	1943
28. Taşan	Merzifon	—	—
29. Türkün	Bursa	—	—
30. Ülker	Nikhisar	1936	1937
31. Yeni Doğuş	Manisa	—	—
32. Yeni Milas	Milas	1936	1037
33. Yeşilirmak	Amasya	1938	1939
34. Yeni Tokat	Tokat	1934	—

For sources see Appendix 2.

## ÖMER SEYFEDDİN AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF TURKISH THOUGHT

### 1

The emergence of the modern Turkish thought in the second half of the nineteenth century is a unique process of intellectual transformation. It is unique because of the rapidity with which traditionalist and religiously oriented modes of thought and oral communication gave way to rationalism, naturalism and realism, and to new written forms of expression, such as the novel, drama, the short story, and to the use of literature as a means of education and political indoctrination.

This process, which began in the nineteenth century, consisted of the adaptation of imperial traditions of thought, shaped according to the conditions prevailing in the Ottoman multinational state, to the requirements of the emerging Turkish unitary state in which a national culture and all that it implies, prevailed.

This intellectual transformation was the product and symbolized in essence, a vast social, economic, and political change which affected not only the existing social arrangement, but the view of each social group about its status and role in society and the world at large.

The traditional Ottoman society had rapidly crumbled at the end of the eighteenth century. The ruling elites represented by the throne, the *ulema* and much less by the *tarikats* leaders, and the military bureaucracy, faced in the nineteenth century the inside and outside challenge of at least three major forces.

The first was the overwhelming technological, military, and economic power of the West, which aided by the continuous expansion of czarist Russia forced the Ottoman state to yield grudgingly to and then enter fully into the sphere of Western economic and cultural influence. The second challenge came from the interior from a rapidly expanding middle class, which was aided by the adoption of a Western concept of private property and by the immense possibilities of profit offered by the expansion of trade. The third challenge was the combined product of the internal and external factors. It came out as a demand for change by the middle class in the existing socio-political

order and was addressed to the ruling elites. Those assembled around the throne were willing to adopt changes in the government structure and operations only to the extent necessary to face the internal and external challenge, but without sharing power with the elites of the rising middle class or the masses. Later in the twentieth century, in the Union and Progress era, 1908–1918, after the structure of the elites underwent considerable change, the new leaders searched for ways and means to develop a suitable ideology and ally themselves with the masses.

The change in the structure and ideological orientation of the elites in the Ottoman state was reflected in the rise of the national idea and nationalism and search for independence, first among the various ethnic-linguistic groups in the Balkans. It was followed by a cultural and national awakening among the Muslim element and their own search for a new political, ideological and cultural identity, as well as social and national goals as necessitated by the complexity of these conditions.

The early modern thought in the Ottoman state which began largely under the leadership of İbrahim Şinasi 1826–71, Ziya Pasha, 1825–80, and especially Namık Kemal 1840–1888, aimed at finding a solution to the ideological cultural problems created by the new conditions within the framework of the elitist Ottoman philosophy of government, the religious traditions of the Muslim population, and the ideas and technical forms of expression borrowed from the West. All three were poets, journalists, novelists, historians, etc., but also government officials at the same time. Their idea, too complex to be dealt with in detail here, formed the foundation which nurtured the Ottoman-Turkish intelligentsia for generations to come.<sup>1</sup>

It is interesting to note that another school of thought developed parallel to the elitist-bureaucratic school represented by the above trio. This was represented chiefly by Ahmed Mithat 1844–1912, and several other writers who belonged to the rising economic middle class. The fundamental role played by Ahmet Mithat and his followers in the formation of the modern Turkish thought has not been properly assessed yet, despite the fact that their newspapers, reviews,

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<sup>1</sup> See my article “The Transformation of the Ottoman State”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 3, 1972, pp. 243–281; See also my *Türk Edebiyatında Sosyal Konular* (İstanbul, 1962).

short stories were the principal source of learning for the vast majority of the Turkish readers in 1876–1908.

A very brief comparison between Namık Kemal and Ahmet Mithat can show the differences between the two schools. The first was a liberal in his political and economic thought and a utopian in his historical outlook. He placed the utmost value on abnegation, sacrifice, attachment to culture and religion, group solidarity and leadership abilities as the chief forces of collective human achievement. But he was also a defender of freedom—his “Ode to Freedom” is still widely read—and an enemy of monarchical absolutism. These qualities earned him a permanent place in Turkish intellectual history. Ahmet Mithat formally appeared attached to the Sultan and religion primarily because he considered them elements of stability and order in society. He was opposed to the powerful bureaucrats whom he accused of distorting the language and the culture of the masses by creating an elite Ottoman culture of their own. Ahmet Mithat had a pragmatic, utilitarian view of society and a natural understanding of man and his needs. While Namık Kemal thought about the human being as created by destiny as a kind of live brick to be used in building glorious edifices, Ahmet Mithat looked upon man as a unique but malleable substance whose quality could be raised through education. Hence education, including the education of women, played a central part in Ahmed Mithat’s thinking. However, both thinkers, utopian and pragmatic as they were, remained within the compass of Ottoman universalist, that is, multinational Muslim traditions of thought. They were Turkish mostly because they used the Turkish language as a linguistic means of expression. They were not aware that language established bonds of solidarity in a group, that it served to express the esthetic feelings of that group, and if shared in common, it could establish meaningful communication between the elites and masses, the leaders and the led. Moreover, Ahmet Mithat and Namık Kemal lacked the perceptive understanding of human motives, the natural aspects of human existence, and of humanity as a whole. These shortcomings derived to some extent from the fact that neither of them had developed a true social and political philosophy, and a realistic understanding of the forces of change in society. However, in their own way, they had established certain intellectual foundations which helped the Turkish intelligentsia chart a new course of thought.

A new period of national reconstruction, of cultural revival and a

new understanding of the social forces shaping man's destiny, developed in the Republic.

There is between the Young Turks (Union and Progress) revolution of 1908 and Mustafa Kemal's (Atatürk) proclamation of the Republic in 1923, a period of transition. This period includes some vitally important events which have conditioned the socio-political and intellectual life in Republican Turkey. The coming to power of a nationalist military elite, the national movements in the Balkans, the loss of territory in this area as a consequence of the war of 1913, the defeat in the First World War, the occupation of Turkey by Greece, France, and England, the successful war of Liberation, 1919–1922, the abolition of the Sultanate and the Caliphate are some of the events which accompanied the rise of modern Turkey. Parallel to these events, there was also a sharp change of thought, language, and literature from Muslim universalism toward a particularist national Turkish pattern.

## 2

It is in this context that Ömer Seyfeddin acquires a towering position as the writer who expressed best the problems encountered in the transitional period. He was helpful in preparing the ground for other, more mature, literary and philosophical schools of thought in the Republic. One may well say that Ömer Seyfeddin provided a link between the Ottoman modernizing thought of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the Republic. He symbolized not only the drama of the individual in a rapidly changing society, but also the functions expected from the writer in particular, and the intelligentsia in general, in preparing the ground for social adaptation.

In Seyfeddin's lifetime, social dislocation and the ensuing accelerated mobility dealt a deadly blow to the idea of social immutability, to this fundamental principle which had determined the philosophy of fatalism for centuries. The dislocation exposed the writer to new conditions of life. It dramatized the idea that social values were relative, and brought forth the need to provide an explanation for all these changes which had turned the old order upside down. The explanation was possible only through a rational, cause-effect relationship in which the emerging secular and positivist view of the world conflicted with the ancient concept that man's fate, and the

order in his society were divinely preordained. The adjustment to a new mode of life was above all an intellectual and psychological problem demanding a broad range of emotional capabilities, a high level of perception and introspection which few ordinary people possessed.

Ömer Seyfeddin, as a writer, played a vital role, not only in providing explanation and justification for the social change, but also in establishing the criteria and the standards for the acceptance of innovation and change. Moreover, he had to use a language and dialect easily understood by the majority of people and express his ideas through familiar images and expressions. In addition, his work had to meet basic artistic standards while providing at the same time a synthesis between the writer as an individual with his own personal needs and aspirations and the society's problems, feelings, and goals. The new social problems encountered gave his thought a new humanist, emotional dimension, while art gave him independence of thought, standards and perspective.

Thus, an analysis of some of Ömer Seyfeddin's short stories provides a unique insight into the socio-cultural problems of Turkey in 1908–1920, and indirectly into the intellectual foundations of the emerging Republic. The unique value of Ömer Seyfeddin's stories stem from their documentary value as far as the social scientist and the historian are concerned. His stories relate to a very large degree to events, individuals and currents of thought as well as to the social and political environment prevailing in 1908–1920. Thus he is both a chronicler and a social critic. One must insist upon the fact that much of Seyfeddin's political ideas on nationhood evolved continuously from a romantic dream of Pan-Turanism to a more rational understanding of a Turkish nation striving to advance within its own national boundaries. This realistic reorientation was the result of historical experience as the Pan-Turanist plans of the Union and Progress government ended in failure in the First World War, and a new understanding of nationhood in the form of patriotism began to take its place after 1918. This was a major phase in the development of modern Turkish thought. It was, in fact, the chief intellectual foundation which nurtured the arts, philosophy, literature, political ideology and all other related fields. Consequently, while analyzing Ömer Seyfeddin's ideas, we shall deal mostly with his views on nation, country, patriotism, and education, since, these, as mentioned



before, mark, in the context of Turkish historical experience, a crucial phase of intellectual development.

## 3

Ömer Seyfeddin was born in 1884, in Gönen, a small, peaceful town in Western Anatolia.<sup>2</sup> His father, a Turk originally from the Caucasus region, was an officer in the army and rose to his rank of major, not through school, but through a commission in the army. Seyfeddin's references to his father are rare and not complimentary since he was a cold and authoritarian man with a dogmatic view of family and education, which he tried to imprint on Seyfeddin.

The mother belonged to a relatively well-to-do intellectual family from İstanbul. "Intellectual" at this time meant pious, well-versed in the Islamic religious teachings and practices. In his autobiographical stories *Kaşığı, İlk Namaz, Ant, İlk Cinayet* (Curry comb—First Prayer—Pledge—First Crime) Ömer Seyfeddin refers to his mother repeatedly with a tenderness akin to religiosity. Much later, Ömer Seyfeddin described best the impact of his mother upon his career and his view of his social role as an artist. In one of his most famous short stories, *Fon Sadriştaynın Oğlu* (The Son of Von Sadrstein), he speaks through the mouth of his hero, a poet:

Everything I learned comes from my mother. She raised me in a spirit of religious exaltation. The source of lyricism that you feel running through my poems is derived from the [tenderness] of feeling she gave me. My poems, stories, tragedies were in her fairy tales. Her soul that

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<sup>2</sup> The main study of Ömer Seyfeddin's life is by Tahir Alangu, *Ömer Seyfeddin, Ülkücü Bir Yazarın Romani* (İstanbul, 1968). The intimate and basic information about the writer is provided by his friend and supporter, the publisher of the *Genç Kalemler*, the nationalist revue of Salonica, Ali Canip (*Yöntem*), *Ömer Seyfeddin, Hayatı ve Eserleri*, İstanbul, 1935. A new, enlarged version was published in İstanbul in 1947. Other useful works are by Hilmi Yücebaş, *Ömer Seyfeddin, Hayatı, Hatıraları, Şiirleri* (İstanbul, 1960), Hikmet Dizdaroğlu, *Ömer Seyfeddin* (Ankara, 1964), Yaşar Nabi (Nayır), *Ömer Seyfeddin* (İstanbul, 1961). A good survey is in Otto Spies, *Die türkische Prosaliteratur der Gegenwart* (Leipzig, 1943), pp. 16–26. There are also a series of useful dissertations prepared by the Turkish Literature School of İstanbul University. The best bibliography was prepared by the National Library, *Ölümünün 50 Yıldönümü Münasebetiyle Ömer Seyfeddin Bibliyografyası* (Ankara, 1970).

came from the people [*halk*] has grafted the love of people in my own soul. Because of this, the people's expressions is my rhyme and the harmony in the people's language is my music.

Ömer Seyfeddin spent his childhood mostly in Gönen where he attended elementary school. His warm feeling for nature, the joy of living, his ability to establish intimate rapport with his subjects, as well as his realism, may be attributed in part to his early childhood spent in the intimacy of the uninhibited natural environment of this town. The description of his schoolhours (ca. 1890) and of the teacher in Gönen in *Falaka* (Swingle tree) is probably one of the best portraits of the educational system in the Ottoman state. Moreover, the origin of the legends, fairy tales which appeared in various forms in his writing may be easily traced to the folklore of his native region. Seyfeddin moved eventually to İstanbul and finished a military school, there. After graduation, he taught in a military school in Izmir, where he became acquainted with a small circle of men interested in literature, and he learned French, lest his literary tastes remain at the level of the *harabat* poets, the pessimistic bohemian group of the nineteenth century. Later he translated the *Iliad* of Homer and *Kalevala*, both of which seemed to have contributed to his understanding of the epic. In İzmir, Ömer Seyfeddin seemed to have been influenced by Baha Tevfik, a rationalist-materialist modernist and an apologist for the use of simplified or vernacular Turkish, and Hüseyin Hilmi, known as "the socialist", who had published briefly the *Serbest İzmir* (Free İzmir), a literary review.

Later, in 1909–1911, Ömer Seyfeddin served for two years in the Balkans, in the Monastır area with a unit fighting the guerillas of the area. It is here that he acquired a first-hand knowledge about the Christian minorities and their national aspirations. The national idea of Ömer Seyfeddin, as well as of the entire revolutionary group in Salonica, which played a vital role in redefining the content of emerging Turkish nationalism, can be properly understood only in the light of their direct contact with an exposure to the Balkan national ideas of the period.

Ömer Seyfeddin eventually resigned from the army to become a contributor to the *Genç Kalemler* (Young Pens), the major Turkish nationalist review defending the language reform, published in Salonica. He became acquainted there also with Ziya Gökalp, the social-political thinker who had an overwhelming influence on his political ideas. Salonica, it must be noted, was the seat of the Union and Progress

Committee, which organized the revolution of 1908, and unleashed a chain of events leading to the establishment of the Republic.

During the Balkan War of 1912–13, Seyfeddin was taken prisoner and spent about one year in a Greek jail. After the war, he returned to İstanbul. He died of an unknown illness in 1920, at the age of 36, just about the time he had reached intellectual and artistic maturity. Ömer Seyfeddin wrote a total of 135 short stories as found so far, mostly after 1917. His writings consisted mostly of short stories. He also wrote seven stories which revolve around the same topic and have one common hero. These were assembled and published as a novel.<sup>3</sup> Ömer Seyfeddin wrote hurriedly some of his short stories after writing became his main source of living. Thus, some of his stories appeared as diary notes and still others lacked organization or even a plot and contained profane expressions designed to interest the reader. Yet, each story has a literary quality, a power of suggestion, an idea to communicate, an apparent simplicity of feeling that leaves a lasting impression on the reader. The artist always prevails, regardless of whether he discussed politics or a man's plight. Ömer Seyfeddin is, in a way, the Anton Chekov of Turkey. He lived in a period of national anxiety by witnessing the occupation of Turkey and died without seeing the day of liberation. Yet, he was able to maintain an artistic quality by using humor and satire to deal lightly with the most controversial problems of his day.

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<sup>3</sup> Ömer Seyfeddin's complete literary works were published first in a series of nine volumes by Muallim Ahmet Halit Yaşaroğlu, a publishing house in İstanbul beginning in 1938: 1. *İlk Düşen Ak*, 2. *Yüksek Ökçeler*, 3. *Bomba*, 4. *Gizli Mabeyt*, 5. *Asilzadeler*, 6. *Bahar ve Kelebekler*, 7. *Beyaz Lâle*, 8. *Mahçupluk İmtihanı*, 9. *Tarih Ezeli Bir Tekerrürdür*. These were reprinted, under the direction of Şerif Hulusi after 1958, with annotations and reorganization and additions, by the same house. In fact the edition of 1958, was the 6th printing but had an additional volume titled *Nokta*, which constituted the tenth volume. The final editing, including some newly discovered stories, was undertaken by Tahir Alangu. The new set was published by Rafet Zaimler printing house in İstanbul beginning in 1962. This last series is the most comprehensive, though not the best organized one. It bears the following titles: 1. *Bomba* (bomb), 2. *Beyaz Lâle* (white tulip), 3. *İlk Düşen Ak* (the first gray), 4. *Yüksek Ökçeler* (high heels), 5. *Eski Kahramanlar* (ancient heroes) 6. *Gizli Mabeyt* (secret temple), 7. *Bahar ve Kelebekler* (spring and butterflies), 8. *Efruz bey* (Mr. Efruz), 9. *Falaka* (Swingle tree), 10. *Mahçupluk İmtihanı* (trial of shyness), 11. *Aşk Dalgası* (love wave).

In addition Seyfeddin has a social-political story written originally in 1913, *Ashabi Kehfimiz* (nobles) (1918), which is often described as a novel, and also a Turanist pamphlet *Yarınki Turan Devleti* (Tomorrow's State of Turan) (1914), reprinted by N. Sencer in 1958, and a series of unfinished works: See Alangu, *op. cit.*, pp. 535–544, and Dizdaroğlu, *op. cit.*, pp. 32–36.

The language used by Ömer Seyfeddin in his stories was his greatest contribution to modern Turkish literature. It was a simple, but expressive language used in everyday life. Yet, it proved to be a powerful instrument of communication, which conveyed in crisp expressions the natural thoughts and feelings shared by the overwhelming mass of people. He had achieved, through the use of the vernacular, a true “revolution in language and literature”, as he had proposed to do while joining the staff of the *Genç Kalemler*.

Ömer Seyfeddin is generally considered a “nationalist” writer, although this term had a special meaning for him. Nationalism appears essentially as a search for national consciousness through the adoption of the vernacular, the identification of the elite with the culture of the masses and achievement of progress within a national state. Nationalism was synonymous with patriotism, that is, attachment to the land, the people, and the native culture as an indispensable condition for unity and political-social integration.

Ömer Seyfeddin’s early idea on nationalism and patriotism seemed to have been in the form of a natural attachment to one’s place and traditions. But this apolitical attachment to the land began to change at the end of 1908, when he was transferred to a unit located in a village in the Monastr area of the Balkans. There, he met the Bulgarian intellectuals, all nationalists, who claimed that Turks could not have political ideas, and could not become true nationalists because of their universalist religious concept of state and society, which denied ethnic and national allegiance. The Bulgarians saw the Ottoman Empire, not as a multinational state, but as a mere political order, ruled by Turks who had no sense of national consciousness. He discovered that the Balkan nationalists were firmly attached to their ideal of national liberation and expressed pride in their political aspirations.<sup>4</sup>

According to Seyfeddin, the nationalists in the Balkans won their national struggle often taking advantage of the Ottoman’s goodwill and forced the Turks living in those areas to abandon their homes

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<sup>4</sup> The episode is in *Nakarat* (Refrain). This story had a subtitle: “From the Diary of an Old Officer Who Spent His Youth in Macedonia”. Another famous story dealing with the Bulgarian guerillas and their fighting methods is *Bomba* (bomb).

and lands.<sup>5</sup> But Seyfeddin drew the proper lesson. He believed that all this had happened because the Turk's level of education was so low and he was so deeply immersed in his religious fatalistic concept of life as to accept everything as preordained. Seyfeddin placed the blame on the intellectuals who sought positions of power and prestige and who wanted to live an easy life in İstanbul and looked upon the West as a model of progress which was synonymous with material comfort. He saw, therefore, the modern writer and poet performing a vital task in creative unity between the masses and the leaders around a national goal and culture:

The poets and the learned [in the past] insulted their own kin as being of low class (*avam*) and never shared their own feelings with them . . . but, he [the poet] never looked upon his nation as divided into two groups as *avam* and *havas*,<sup>6</sup> but instead [tried to unite] them together under a national ideal . . . he generalized the usage of the İstanbul dialect<sup>7</sup> . . . which became the language of an entire nation . . . he did not seek inspiration in the French or Persian [literature], or in the singing of dervishes<sup>8</sup> or folk poets<sup>9</sup> but turned to his own soul. Thus, he understood the Turkish feeling. He found his topics, stories, language, and courage in the Turkish soul.

This description, in fact, suits perfectly Ömer Seyfeddin's own literary-political accomplishments. Seyfeddin had developed grave doubts

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<sup>5</sup> This idea is defended in the short story *Tuhaf bir Zülim* (A strange oppression) in which Ömer Seyfeddin defended the Turks against harsh criticism.

<sup>6</sup> This expression is important in understanding the criterium for social differentiation in the Ottoman society. It can be translated as mass and elite. Actually the true meaning of *havas* was "those who possess sublime feelings and ideas and live in such a world" and of *avam*, "those who live in the low world of sensations."

<sup>7</sup> The idea of using a Turkish dialect, namely the dialect spoken in İstanbul, was put forth by Ziya Gökalp, the nationalist ideologue of the period. The purpose was to achieve national unity, and a common language was considered an essential condition. The language used by Ömer Seyfeddin is not the high class but the vernacular of the common city dweller.

<sup>8</sup> The reference is to a group of poets in the nineteenth century, who, inspired by the school of the mystical poet, Şeyh Galip, strove to maintain the religious-sufi type of poetry. In the 18th and 19th centuries, this poetry was often recited in the *tekke* or living quarters of the mystic *dervishes*. These latter day hedonist mystics, however, had little relation to the old mystics who were true believers.

<sup>9</sup> *Saz Şairleri* or folk poets became important as the representatives of the folklore during the rise of Turkish nationalism after 1908. In reality these were poets in their own right, often dealing with local themes but using the vernacular. Some writers, in part inspired by Fuat Köprülü, the historian, who studied the folk poets, began to imitate their style. Seyfeddin was against the imitation of the simplistic themes and the slang used by folk poets.

about the humanitarian ideal, the brotherhood and equality of men, of freedom and independence which the European nations preached freely but did not apply to the people of Asia and Africa. He saw the big powers of Europe as imperialistic minded, bent on dominating and exploiting the weak ones.<sup>10</sup> But despite all this new insight Seyfeddin's view of nationhood and patriotism still lacked a dynamic, optimistic quality and thus he was unable to overcome the gloom of predestined defeat and even extinction, which was generated by the Austrian annexation of Bosnia in 1908, the Italian War in 1911, and the disastrous Balkan War of 1913. This feeling was increased by a pathological complex of inferiority towards Europe. A degree of self confidence was restored only by the Turkish heroic resistance which forced the British to abandon their beachhead at the Dardanelles in 1915. This was in fact the starting point in the political transformation of the Ottomans into Turks. Indeed, the incredible had happened: "The English and the French battleships could not cross the Dardanelles . . . despair gradually disappeared and [the Turk] realized that he was part of a nation which achieved self-realization, had an ideal and was alive."<sup>11</sup>

The reaction to and rejection of the West prompted Ömer Seyfeddin to idealize his own Turkish culture and language, while using his biting satire to ridicule those who denigrated their own country, culture and national responsibility by imitating blindly the foreign models.<sup>12</sup> However, all the hopes which Ömer Seyfeddin had placed

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<sup>10</sup> Thus, as a reaction to the West's betrayal of its own principles, Kenan bey, the hero in *Primo-Türk Çocuğu* (Primo-Turkish Son) who had married an Italian wife and had become thoroughly cosmopolitan by rejecting his own culture and identity chose to return to his Turkishness. This occurred in 1911, after the Italians, while speaking about peace all the time, occupied Libya.

<sup>11</sup> This appears in the story *Çanakkaleden sonra* (after the Dardanelles). In the war years 1914–18, Ömer Seyfeddin wrote a series of stories based on the Turkish history with the purpose of exalting patriotic feelings. "If the artist cannot find the [necessary] exaltation in the contemporary ideal," wrote Seyfeddin, "he should turn to the romantic past, for in the past thousands of heroes live in legends." See *Kaç Yerinden* (Many Places). It was evident that if the nation became aware of its past achievements and glories, its will to fight would be enhanced. Discipline, loyalty, and obedience to the commander *Ferman* (Decree), wit to outdo the enemy *Kütük* (Log), *Vire* (Surrender), belief in a predestined glory *Kızılalma Neresi* (The Site of Red Apple) and an unshaken belief in the ultimate victory were the characteristics of the victorious ancestors. These were to be brought to public attention.

<sup>12</sup> The story *Fon Sadristaynın Karısı* (The Wife of Von Sadristein) is the best example of his criticism of alienation. Sadrettin, who went to visit Germany, was so overwhelmed by the modern domestic qualities of the German women that he divorced

in romantic nationalism, constitutionalism and many other ideas proved unable to save the country or bring rapid progress. The dream world of the intellectuals and the wretched situation of the ignorant peasant in the countryside stood in sharp contrast to each other. As the First World War neared its end, the defeat of Ottoman armies appeared inevitable, as was the doom of the Union and Progress Party and its policies. Ömer Seyfeddin had supported the Union and Progress chiefly because he believed that its policies would rejuvenate and modernize the country. Disillusioned he wrote:

When the constitution was reinstated [in 1908] we used to dream that all our [intellectual] resources would stream forward like hidden springs and we would reach the level of Europe in ten or fifteen years. We returned to our birthplaces, to our farms and occupations. We believed in everything written in the İstanbul newspapers . . . but here [in Anatolia] there is just one idea: reaction.<sup>13</sup>

He now returned more firmly towards an idea he had expressed as early as 1911, namely the idea of progress through science and technology, and unity with the commoners under proper leadership. As early as 1911, Ömer Seyfeddin had published an article, "New Language" in *Genç Kalemler*. Here he called on the youth to save the nation through "strong and serious progress. Progress is possible," he wrote, "through the development of science, technology and literature among us. In order to publicize [generalize] these, we need a common national language . . . without a natural and national language, science, technology and literature will remain for us what they are today, an enigma. Let's abandon the language of the yesterdays. Let's write the spoken Turkish as it lives with all its rules and principles."<sup>14</sup> By 1919 the country was occupied by Greeks, English and French. Salvation for Ömer Seyfeddin lay now in the

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his Turkish wife in order to marry a German girl. He even adopted a new name, von Sadristein. His new wife was orderly, hard-working, economical and so efficient that after delivering lunch to her husband, she gave birth to her child all by herself. Yet, she was back on her feet to prepare his dinner. "Indeed," declared von Sadristein, "the entire wealth of Germany, the strength of her armies are the product of German womanhood . . . the German woman who raised the population of Germany to sixty- or seventy million people in a century was able to lift my own weight from 125 to 200 pounds." However, later in life, when his son abandons him to go to America to seek adventure, and his wife remains senseless to the country's spirit, von Sadristein realized how lonely he was.

<sup>13</sup> These views appear in his story *Memlekete Mektup* (letter home).

<sup>14</sup> Reproduced in Alangu, *op. cit.*, p. 170, Dizdaroğlu, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-50.

leadership of great men with exceptional qualities and total dedication to government service and the country, who could express all the aspiration for freedom, liberation and progress. The struggle for liberation was to begin in the Anatolian homeland among the masses with the firm conviction that Turks would always survive. Ömer Seyfeddin spoke through the mouth of his hero:

We Turks went through many disasters in history. Our state was left without a government and without a ruler. Brothers became each others' enemies. But at the end we still managed to come together. We didn't perish . . . I shall not stay here [in İstanbul]. At the first occasion I shall start on my journey . . . İstanbul needs guidance from the countryside. From now onwards we must listen to the heart-beat of our beloved nation wherever we are; in our homes, up in the high mountains, in our mud-covered, white-walled hamlets by the foaming wells . . . Yes, we have endless problems and unbearable misery. But we have a soul which death cannot even [dare] to approach. Even when this soul is deemed to have died, it is not dead. At the most unexpected time, suddenly it revives.<sup>15</sup>

Indeed, while Ömer Seyfeddin was writing these lines the struggle for liberation, when leaders and masses united in a common spirit had already begun in Anatolia, under a true leader, Mustafa Kemal. But Seyfeddin passed away on March 6, 1920, without seeing the fulfillment of his national dream. Step by step he had lived through the disintegration of the multi-national empire and the failure of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanism. He did not see the full rise of the Turkish national state, but witnessed only its beginnings; the burgeoning idea of a people united by a common language, and aware of its political existence. His literary writings had contributed greatly towards achieving this vital step in the process of nation formation.

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We have dealt in the preceding pages only with Ömer Seyfeddin's ideas related to the transformation of Turkey from a multi-national imperial structure to a nation in the modern sense of the word. His writing, however, covered a great variety of other subjects in which irony and compassion, the comedy of man and the tragedy of society,

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<sup>15</sup> In *Memlekete Mektup*.



failure and achievement were depicted in simple but sharp lines. For instance a series of stories, such as *Yuf Borusu Seni Bekliyor* (Damnation Waits You), describing the passing of an old time aristocrat, others, such as *Niçin Zengin Olamamış* (Why Did Not He Become Rich?) deal with the black market profiteers, *Türkçe Reçete* (Turkish Prescription), *Yemin* (Oath), *Namus* (Honor), *Kesik Byık* (Cut Moustache), provide insights into the social conflicts and the clash of values. Four stories known as the Cabi Efendi series *Mermer Tezgâh* (Marble Bench), *Dama Taşları* (Draught Pawns), *Makul Bir Dönüş* (Reasonable Return), and *Acaba Ne İdi?* (What Was It?), analyze the gradual adaptation of a fatalist, traditional-minded man to the economic-minded new society and the rise of a new type of bourgeoisie. The stories dealing with nationalist themes, though important for the study of ideology, are often rhetorical, didactic and repetitious. But the stories related to social change, and notably those dealing with the intelligentsia are outstanding in every respect. The writer becomes personally and directly involved in them for the story he tells is often that of the intelligentsia of which he was a part. The best example for this type of story involving the intelligentsia is the cycle known as Efruz bey.<sup>16</sup> The hero in all these seven stories making up the novel is one and the same Efruz bey, despite the fact that one man cannot have so many different roles and fulfill so many different functions requiring prolonged specialization. But this was possible in the early days of the Young Turks Revolution of 1908. The old standards had broken down. The new regime created a series of political positions in order to consolidate its own power, but had yet no objective criteria to distinguish the opportunist from the honest, the skilled from the ignorant.

Every story criticizes some shortcoming of the contemporary intellectuals; their lack of political education and failure to understand modern national ideals; their reaction to social mobility; their historical romanticism and ignorance of the country's true situation; their abuse of power and their frivolities justified on behalf of nationalism, modernity and language reform; and finally, their search for superficial amusement and their uselessness to the society. In many ways the political satire of Ömer Seyfeddin resembles the stories and plays of the Romanian writer I.L. Caragiale who ridiculed the middle class of his day. An analysis of two stories in the Efruz bey cycle may prove the above point.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>16</sup> We have used for this study the series edited by Hulusi Şerif, *Asilzadeler, Efruz*

Ahmet bey, a petty government official, succeeded during the absolutist regime of Abdulhamit II (1876–1909) to give to everybody the impression that he was on the Sultan's side. And of course, like all the position seekers, he had to be *comme il faut*, and *distingué*, so he implied that he studied at Galatasaray, the French middle school, where one became “modern” and “Europeanized.” Ahmet was quick to notice one morning in the newspaper a small official note to the effect that the Constitution was reinstated.<sup>17</sup> He made his way into the Foreign Ministry where everybody strove snobbishly to speak French and shouted “long live freedom.” There he engaged in an abusive criticism of Abdulhamit II, and described how, he, Ahmet bey, had forced single handedly the Sultan at pistol point to reinstate the constitution. Recounting in public his fantastic exploits as an underground activist, Ahmet bey soon became a freedom hero. Since secrecy was the virtue of all revolutionaries (Union and Progress was a secret organization and remained as such several years after it assumed power) Ahmet claimed that he had kept his real name so secret that even his own mother did not know it. Then he concocted his “real name,” *Efruz* (the illuminator). The credulous mob carrying him on its shoulders, quickly converted the name to *Afaro*z (the excommunicated). Efruz bey then provided a definition of freedom: “It means the Constitution. The Constitution means no difference of sex and sect . . . which means there is no sex and sect . . . a free man becomes equal, and equality means brotherhood, and thus there

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*bey* (The Nobles-Efruz bey), İstanbul, (Ahmet Halit Yaşaroglu), 2 vols., 1956, 1957. Pertev N. Boratav was the first to call the attention to the continuity that existed in the six stories forming the original Efruz bey cycle, though the author himself in his original announcement mentioned only five stories. P.N. Boratav, *Ömer Seyfeddin*, “Folklor ve Edebiyat” (Ankara, 1945), vol. II, pp. 171–181. See also *Yurt ve Dünya*, March–April, 1942, pp. 68–75. The first story appeared in the newspaper “Vakit” in 1919, and the rest in 1926, well after the writer's death. The seventh story *Sivrisinek* was added by the last editor, Alangu. It contains the author's final judgment of Efruz bey. This opinion is, however, implicitly evident in the previous six stories, and consequently *Sivrisinek* (The Mosquito) has less value than the other six stories.

<sup>17</sup> This is exactly how the Sultan announced the reinstatement of the constitution of 1876 which he had suspended in 1878. He reinstated the constitution by accepting the demands of the officers and intellectuals, who had rebelled in Salonica in the summer of 1908.

remains no differences of religion and nationality.”<sup>18</sup> Soon, however, Efruz bey is unmasked by the real revolutionaries, the Union and Progress Society, but still, undaunted, he engages in other pursuits. And opportunities are plentiful.

The breakdown of the old order had enabled men who felt that they were socially superior to others, in particular the intellectuals, to seek avidly arguments to create for themselves superior positions in society. They were the new class, the nobles of the new order who had replaced the Sultan and his aristocratic bureaucracy. In order to prove their nobility, they refused to deal in “unbecoming” occupations or take regular work. In order to prove their own “noble” origin they turned to race and ancient history. Efruz bey and his friends, all graduates of the Galatasaray lyceum were convinced that “without nobility this country would sink.” Consequently, they reinterpreted history to prove their noble origin; they preferred to find the source of their nobility somewhere outside Turkey. One claimed that he was the descendent of Lord Johnson Sgovat, who came as a British ambassador (sic) to Sultan Orhan (1326–1359). The other claimed that he was the Eternal Prince of Kara Tanburin and proved that his family had a divine origin.<sup>19</sup> The third one, Kaysussujufuzrtaf, traced his origin to the romantic era of desert life where his ancestors carried out the Ghazwa, that is bedouin warfare, and had their name mentioned in the Muallaqa poems, that is the best pre-Islamic Arab poems chosen at literary contests. Efruz bey, himself “felt” in the depth of his heart the entire history of his noble family as clearly indicated by his father’s journey to Kastamonu, the land of Kızıl Ahmet. So he became *Prince Efruz of Kızıl*. Soon the “nobles” held a meeting in order to establish an organization dedicated to locating other “nobles” and to fight to gain their titles as well as rights. The meeting was broken up by the police, since the gathering place was a gambling joint. But, Efruz bey, sensing that the police razzia was a commoners’ plot against nobility, accepted in a gesture à la Don Quixote, the gambling charge and went serenely to jail convinced

<sup>18</sup> *Hürriyete Laik bir Kahraman* (A hero fit for freedom).

<sup>19</sup> Many heroes in these stories are easily identifiable as Ömer Seyfeddin’s contemporaries. Eternal Prince, for instance, was the nationalist thinker Yusuf Akçora (later Akçoraoğlu), born in the Kazan region of Russia. He did in fact claim that his family tree could be traced some fifteen hundred years back in history. In fact, Akçora was the representative of the “pure Turkish” school.

that he had succeeded in hiding the purpose of the nobles' meeting. The satire in these stories, although demanding some knowledge of Turkish history, is nevertheless clear enough as not to require further elaboration.

The other stories in the Efruz bey series, whose full analysis falls outside the scope of this study, contain a biting satire of the Pan-Turanism, and the intellectuals' superficial views of science and education. Those are parodies of the debates and intellectual currents which prevailed in 1912–1920. It is interesting to note that Ömer Seyfeddin wrote these stories after many of his early romantic ideas shared by his contemporaries proved to be unattainable. The Union and Progress era coming on the heels of the monarchical rule proved unable to meet the country's expectations. But a new generation with a keen understanding of the problems of Turkey, and firmly decided to solve them through science and technology, and association with the people was rising in the small towns and villages of Anatolia. Ömer Seyfeddin wrote for them by pointing out to the shortcomings of their predecessors and indirectly advising them not to commit the same errors. His time was a period of change and transition. Seyfeddin performed his task not only by introducing successfully the vernacular in literature and newspapers but also by using the same language to put before the growing mass of readers the difficulties involved in creating a new society out of the heritage of the past and the need of progress and modern existence.

# A LANGUAGE IN SEARCH OF A NATION: TURKISH IN THE NATION-STATE

## 1. *Introduction*

The title of this paper is not chosen fastidiously. It epitomizes the long history of Turkish, one of the world's oldest languages which evolved for millennia subject to various socio-cultural forces, but acquired distinctly political dimensions only in the twentieth century after it became the chief mark of identity for the Turkish Republic. Historically speaking the evolution of Turkish was conditioned by a set of unique socio-cultural forces which also charted the gradual evolution of the Turks into a nation-state. It is in the Republic that after thousands of years the Turks' political identity was expressed linguistically in the form of a national language.

The study of the complex socio-cultural and historical forces which conditioned the evolution of Turkish is in its infancy. I shall not here discuss at length the misconceptions that have clouded many of the studies dealing with Turks and Turkish. Suffice it to say that the nationalism of the peoples who had been part of the Ottoman commonwealth in the past—this nationalism often developed after independence and statehood—has distorted and prejudiced their views of their own Ottoman past and has helped perpetuate the misconceptions. This paper is not a linguistic study of Turkish but, rather, an analysis of the cultural and political forces that have conditioned the historical evolution of the language—forces that were the product of Turkey's very complex, imperial, religious and ethnic-historical legacy.

## 2. *Linguistic Divisions and Historical Background*

Turkish belongs to a group of languages known as Altaic, the two others in the group being Mongolian and Tungusic. The Uralic or Finno-Ugric languages (Finnish, Estonian, Lapp, Hungarian) are deemed to be close to Turkish, and recent research seems to indicate that Japanese and Korean also are related to Turkish. The exact

nature of the relationship between Mongolian and Turkish has been vigorously argued;<sup>1</sup> however, the languages appear to have borrowed from each other and to be traceable to an ancient common language known as proto- Altaic.

Today Turkish-Turkic is by far the most widely spoken Altaic-Uralic language; about 130 million people, spread from the Adriatic to the Pacific Ocean, speak it. The geographical areas in which some variety of the Turkish language is spoken are roughly the following:

- a. In Anatolia, southern Europe and small areas of Syria and Iraq some 45 million people speak Ottoman Turkish (with some minor local and regional dialect variations). Today, this language is referred to as Turkish while the others mentioned below are defined generally as Turkic.
- b. In Central Asia, the Turkmen, Uzbeks, Kirgiz, Uigurs, Khazaks and the Kara Kalpak, altogether some 25–30 million people who live in their own recognized administrative units, form one of the largest Turkic groups.
- c. In the Caucasus region, some 15 million people, such as the Azeris, the Karachai, Balkars, Kumyk and Nogai speak their own Turkic dialects, as the Kashgai and Turkmen in Central and Eastern Iran.
- d. In European Russia, the Kazan Tartars, the Crimeans (although nearly all of these were deported to Central Asia in 1944), the Chuvash, Bashkir and the Gagauz in Bessarabia numbering probably 8 to 10 million people, speak their own form of Turkish. Crimean and especially Gagauz are close to Ottoman Turkish.
- e. In northern and eastern Siberia, the Khakass, Tuvinians, and the Yakuts as well as the Uigurs of western China (SinKiang), probably about 13 million in number, form another Turkic group.

These Turkish-Turkic groups often live mixed together. The languages of most of them are mutually intelligible, as the basic syntax, vocabulary, and other linguistic characteristics are the same. (A Turk from Turkey who visited Yakutsia recently claimed that he conversed with the Yakuts, each one in his own language.) The Turkic languages uniformly lack any forms for expressing gender, make use of numerous cumulative suffixes (glutination), and have vowel harmony, that is, all vowels in a given word belong to the same class: i.e., *ata* (sing.), *atar* (pl.) = grandparents; *tepe* (sing.), *tepeler* (pl.) = hills. Speakers of one of the languages rapidly acquire the dialects of the other groups amidst whom they happen to live, as

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<sup>1</sup> Sir Gerard Clauson, *Turkish and Mongolian Studies* (London, 1962).

seen for instance in the Central Asian cities of Tashkent and Bukhara. Practically all of these peoples, with the exception of the Yakuts, the Chuvash, the Gagauz, and a couple of other very small groups, are Muslims; only the Azeris and the Kashgai are Shiites, the rest being Sunnites. Relatively large groups of Shiites live also in Eastern Turkey.

Basically, the Turkic languages mentioned above fall into two groups: the larger, standard group in which the «s» and the «z» are basic sounds, and the smaller «l/r group» in which the «s» and «z» do not exist as basic sounds but are represented by «l» and «r». It is apparent that these two language groups were part of one single language (Altaic) spoken probably at least as far back as one millennium B.C.

Turkish has drawn the attention and admiration of linguists on account of its precise linguistic rules. The renowned philologist Max Mueller said of it that it seemed to have been created by a committee of linguists. In terms of current linguistic typology Turkish is classified as a language with a highly consistent SOV order (subject object, verb). Nouns and verbs follow uniform and precise patterns, with suffixes added for cases and tenses. Nevertheless its system is flexible enough to tolerate variation and wide-scale borrowing from other languages.<sup>2</sup>

Customarily it is claimed that the first direct mention of Turks (Tuk-ui) appears in Chinese documents of the sixth century A.D., although there are Chinese and Greek documents of various earlier dates referring to peoples who were known to have been the ancestors of the Turks or to translations from Turkish as early as the thirteenth century B.C. The first known monuments with Turkish inscriptions tying them to the political history of the Turks were erected in the sixth century A.D. in the honor of rulers Kül-Tegin (Gültekin in today's Turkish) and Bilge-han; these monuments were found by Russian scholars late in the nineteenth century in the valley of the Orkhon River in Mongolia. Other inscriptions of the same

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<sup>2</sup> For the history of Turkish see A. Caferoğlu, *Türk Dili Tarihi* [History of the Turkish Language], 2 vols. (İstanbul, 1964); see also *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, s.v. "Turk," and Vasili V. Barthold, *Histoire des Turcs d'Asie Centrale* (Paris, 1945; reprt. Philadelphia, 1945). See also a special issue dedicated to Turkish in *Review of National Literatures*, IV/1 (Spring 1973). On the linguistic discovery and early classification of Turkish in the West see Aldo Scaglione, *The Classical Theory of Composition* (Chapel Hill, 1972), p. 343, and Scaglione, ed., Henri Weil, *The Order of Words* [1844] (Amsterdam, 1978).

kind were found at other places and times. The Orkhon inscriptions, in addition to describing the Turks' encounter with the Chinese and their subjugation by, and liberation from the latter, express a surprisingly keen ethnic and political consciousness.

The script employed by these Turks is known as the Uighur (Uygur) alphabet. Some claim (probably erroneously) that the K k-T rk also had their own alphabet. The Uighurs, who built a large empire—actually a confederation—in central and north-east Asia, made wide use of their alphabet, especially in the eighth and ninth centuries, and they spread it among the other Turkic peoples living under their rule. The Uighur alphabet was derived from the Aramaic through the intermediary of the Soghdian; it had basically 17 characters, with some special signs, including the umlaut, adapted to the specific phonetics of Turkish. Thus, by the eighth century the Uighur Turks had developed a language of their own along with a special alphabet. The Uighur alphabet was used in the imperial court of the Golden Horde and by the Timurids for the writing of Kipchak and Chagatay Turkish as late as the thirteenth through the fifteenth centuries. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, that is, well after the Ottoman state was established, there were still experts in Istanbul who knew how to write Uighur. In fact, the non-Muslim Turks of China used the Uighur alphabet as late as the eighteenth century and, according to some witnesses, even into the twentieth. Thus the Uighur language and alphabet could well have developed into a national Turkish language if the Uighur state and culture had been maintained. The Uighur state was undermined through the rise of the Kirghiz, another Turkish group. Yet, the Uighur script survived for many years as the Timurids—the descendants of Tamerlane—continued to use it to symbolize their ethnicity and linguistic purity.

The bulk of the Turkish-speaking peoples under the ruler Satuk Bughra Khan of the Karahanid or Ilkehanid dynasty accepted Islam around the middle of the tenth century, casting aside, along with their Shamanism and Buddhism, their Uighur alphabet, which was replaced by Arabic. However, smaller groups of Turkish tribes that had migrated south into the domains of the Abbasid Caliph, e.g., the Tulunid dynasty of Egypt (868–946), accepted Islam at an earlier date. The major conversion occurred, as mentioned under the Karahanid, or Ilkehanid, dynasty, which was descended from the Karluk Turks—one of the major groups in the Uighur confederation—and ruled the Turkish-speaking areas of Central Asia during



the tenth through the twelfth centuries. The Uighurs also played an important part in the establishment of the Karahanid state along with the Oguz and Kipchak; the latter would play decisive roles in the history of the Turks after the eleventh century. The Ilkhanids had long been in contact with their neighbors, the Samanids, an Islamized Persian dynasty which ruled Transoxiana and had their capital in Bukhara. Eventually the Ilkhanids expanded, occupying the Samanid territory until the armies of Cengiz Han (Genghis Khan or Jinghis) put an end to their independence in the thirteenth century. It should be noted that the descendants of Cengiz Han in West Asia were rapidly Islamized and Turkified, so that soon afterwards they appear as Turkish-speaking Muslim rulers.

The conversion to Islam and the adoption of the Arabic alphabet produced far-reaching changes in the history, language, and political destiny of the Turks. They became part of the universal Muslim community and had to adapt to its requirements. Now Islam does not attach any political significance to the ethnic, linguistic, national, or racial factors and, consequently, none of these factors can be accepted as a legitimate basis for the building of a social, economic, or political organization. On the other hand, Islam accepts the division of people into national and tribal groups—*shu'ub* and *kabyla* as the Koran defines them—with their own languages, provided that such division does not impede fraternization among them and is not used to promote the ethnic supremacy of one group over the others. This is a koranic commandment (49; 13) which cannot be debated or changed. The claim that Arabic gained supremacy over other Islamic languages because it was the language of the Prophet and of the Koran is without merit. The language of the Koran has little in common with the Arabic spoken in seventh-century Arabia or today; rather, it is Arabic so unique in its syntax and vocabulary as to appear as a language specific to the Koran (thus it was called God's chosen language by Muhammad and is accepted as such by the faithful). Yet, the advent of Islam did necessitate a certain rearrangement of languages which was determined by objective factors, such as geography, rate of literacy, frequency of usage, and practical usefulness. Arabic became important as the language needed for the study of the Koran and Sunna, for practically all the early basic commentaries on these two fundamental sources of Islamic law were written in Arabic. Also, the language spoken and used in correspondence by the early Muslim Caliphs and their administrators

was Arabic. Pious Muslims recognize the supremacy of and accord respect to the language of the Koran, but not necessarily to Arabic for its own sake.

The supremacy of Arabic was challenged shortly after 750 A.D. The Abbasids, in reaction to the Umayyads, whom they ousted and castigated for, among other things, having borrowed Roman institutions and non-Islamic practices, began to adopt the administrative and political institutions as well as the language of their fellow Muslims, the Persians, although many of these Persian institutions had been created originally by the non-Muslim Sassanids. By the end of the eighth century the Persian language had nearly replaced Arabic at the court of the Caliphs in Baghdad. Thus al-Jahiz (d. 869) and Ibn Qutaiba (b. 889) had to wage a valiant battle to “modernize” Arabic (i.e., adopt poetical forms from Persian which did not exist in early Arabic) and thus enable it to maintain its importance. What made Persian such a formidable alternative to Arabic, besides its practical usefulness in providing the Caliphs with a rich administrative vocabulary, was the fact that the Persian nobility managed to develop it into a subtle language of poetry and art through which, although probably not by any conscious design, they were able to maintain their aristocratic positions and perpetuate their national identity. As mentioned, Islam did not prohibit the maintenance or development of a group identity and language as long as this held no political meaning.

### 3. *The Fate of the Turkish Language after the Acceptance of Islam*

The position of the Turkish language within an Islamic framework was determined by historical and practical considerations. The Karahanids who accepted Islam abandoned the Uighur alphabet and changed many of their original Turkish names to Muslim-Arabic names; for example, Satuk Bughra Khan (d. 955), the head of the Western Khanate of the Ilkhanids, became Abd al-Karim. Yet, while their old ethnic identity was diluted in the sea of Islam, the Turks still managed to develop a new linguistic and ethnic identity and consciousness that was far more acute than in the past, although apolitical. Linguistically, Turkish came under the influence of Arabic and Persian. Meanwhile, Turks were compelled to reconcile and balance their ethnic, tribal, and linguistic identity with the universalis-

tic values of Islam. While the move of a human group from a narrow cultural framework based on language and ethnicity into a broader one with universal horizons produces a certain realignment of priorities, loyalties, and attachments that in some circumstances may lead to the extinction of that group's language and identity, in other cases the change may result in revitalization and expansion. The early Bulgars, for example, lost completely their original Turkic language and their ethnic identity after they accepted Christianity, and eventually they were Slavized. The Turks themselves seemed to emerge as a new and vigorous group after accepting Islam.

It was during this period of assimilation into Islam and under strong Arabic and Persian influences that the Muslim Turks created their first truly national linguistic works in the city of Kashgar (now in China). These two works, accepted today by almost all Turks as their common linguistic heritage, are the *Divan-ü Lügat-it-Türk* (1072–74) of Mahmud al-Kashgari (Kashgarlı), which is a dictionary but also a catalogue of the main Turkish groups and dialects of the eleventh century, and the *Kutadgu-Bilik* (the science for giving happiness) of Yusuf Khas Hacib. Kashgarlı argued that the name “Turk” was given by God and that it was a religious duty to learn Turkish, which was in his view as good if not a better language than Arabic and Persian; he mentioned *hadises* (later proved not authentic) in which the Prophet and the Caliph Umar (634–644) were made to praise the Turks. The work of Hacib, completed in 1069–70 and submitted to the Karahanid ruler, is a didactic poem of over 6,000 couplets which seems to have enjoyed great popularity in its time. These works, along with others of lesser impact, express a profound attachment to the Turkish language and were intended to make the Turks known to the Arabs but also to preserve and propagate their language as the vehicle for the Turks' ethnic-linguistic identity within the framework of Islam. Both works can be read today by someone possessing the old vocabulary and a good knowledge of phonetic changes.

The two works were written during the period of zealous acculturation following the conversion to Islam. One may argue that the *Divan-ü Lügat-it Türk* and *Kutadgu-Bilik* were created, as some Turkish secularist-nationalists claim, in order to defend the Turkish language against the Arab rulers who used Islam as a vehicle for the assimilation of other peoples. Actually the reverse was the case. These works reflect the fact that Turkish flourished under Islam. The religion

accommodated without strain languages other than Arabic as long as the groups speaking them were members of the Muslim *umma* (community) and accepted its political supremacy over ethnic and national loyalties. For a Muslim, membership in the *umma* superseded, without undermining or destroying, membership in a linguistic ethnic group, as the loyalties required for the two memberships were not in conflict—at least not until the introduction of Western type nationalism which gave priority to ethnicity and language and made them the basis of political organization. It is interesting to note that the Kashgar dialect became in this period the basis of the language known as *Hakaniye* or Eastern Turkish. One must mention also that by the eleventh century Khwarizm, the flourishing Persian state in West Central Asia, started to be Turkified and eventually played a major role in the assimilation of the Mongols. Turkish flourished here too.

Turkish did not become widespread among non-Turkish Muslims in the tenth through thirteenth centuries chiefly because the language had been deprived by Islam of formal political significance and was not in continuous usage in a political entity dominated by Turkish-speaking rulers (except in the Seljuki state in Anatolia). Moreover, as a latecomer into the fold of Islam, Turkish had neither the religious-didactic importance of Arabic nor the literary quality of Persian. However, unlike literary Persian, which remained the monopoly of small aristocratic groups in possession of wealth and power and seldom acquired numerous adherents, the Turkish language was spoken by masses—a fact of great political importance. The two previously described eleventh-century works in Turkish relied on the vernacular and sought to perpetuate it rather than to create a language for the ruling classes (although such a language would no doubt have emerged if the Ilkhanid political structure had not been destroyed by Cengiz Han's armies in the thirteenth century).

The linguistic divisions of the Turks followed their religious affiliation. By the end of the eleventh century the Western Turks, that is, the bulk of the Turkish speaking peoples inhabiting Asia, divided linguistically—and politically—into two groups. The first, that is, the northern group whose western boundary reached the Dnieper and Volga rivers and included the area known as *Desht-i Kipchak*, became under the Mongols the backbone of a large state known as *Cuji Ulus* or the *Altun Orda*, i.e., Golden Horde. Linguistically they were referred to as the Kipchak (who formed the dominant group and are known

as Cumans in Europe), from which most of the Turkish dialects of northern Asia and Russia were derived. The second, southern group came to be known as the Oguz, or Turkmen, or Turcoman, a name used as early as the tenth century. The language of the Oguz, who consisted of twenty-four large groups, was the linguistic parent of the Turkish spoken in Azerbaijan, Iraq, Turkey, and the Balkans. The Oguz fought the Kipchak and were driven south into Iran and Iraq, where they subsequently became soldiers and generals and, eventually, *de facto* rulers in their own state and in various Arabic-speaking lands under the jurisdiction of the Caliph in Baghdad. The founders of the Seljuk dynasties of Iran and Anatolia were from this southern Turkish group.

The invasion of the Mongols under Cengiz Han (1155–1227) and especially his followers shattered the stability of the Turkish-speaking lands. The political state of the Ilkhanids, already hard-pressed by the Kipchak (who, according to some sources, were serving in large numbers in the Mongol army also), was destroyed. This was followed, in 1258, by the destruction of the Caliphate when Baghdad was demolished and its population decimated. Consequently, many Oguz Turks were forced to migrate further west into Anatolia, where they had secured a strong foothold as early as 1071 through the victory of Malazgirt (Manzikert) against the Byzantine ruler. Eventually the Turkish-speaking lands in the south were incorporated into the Mongol empire extending from Central Asia to western Anatolia, but Cengiz Han (his real name was Timuchin) ordered the continued use of the Uighur alphabet.

It was in the western lands of the Mongol empire ruled by the descendants of Cengiz Han that the Mongol masters were Islamized and Turkified and participated, along with the Kipchak who had been subject to Orthodox and Catholic proselytizing but eventually accepted Islam, in a new revival of Turkish. The Mongol courts, besides maintaining to some extent the Uighur alphabet, encouraged also the revival of the old Oguz epics and their traditions and, ultimately, achieved the development of a new language and literature known as Chagatay.<sup>3</sup> The name derives from Chagatay, the second

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<sup>3</sup> The Studies of Chagatay in Western languages are unsatisfactory. Even the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (old ed.) has scanty and incomplete information under "Turks"; a richer source of information is in the new Turkish edition under "Çağatay." See also Caferoğlu, *op. cit.*

son of Cengiz Han, who received from his father all the lands of the Uighur territory in West Asia in which many of the local Turkish princes continued to rule under the new lords. (There were also tribes which had the same name.) Chagatay was not friendly to Islam although he seemed to support the Uighur Turks. The Chagatay state was actually founded by his grandson and heir, Kara-Hulegu, and consolidated by the latter's descendants. The son of Kara-Hulegu was proclaimed Shah in 1266 and then became a Muslim, assuming the name of Mubark Shah. However, many Mongols sought to remain faithful to their old religion and, especially, to the nomadic way of life and traditions which conflicted with the settled ways of the conquered and soon ruined their extensive civilization and the flourishing urban network that had developed under Uighurs and Karahanids. Those Mongols who abandoned their old ways and settled in the valleys soon became assimilated into Islam and Turkified, although they tried to maintain their own identity.

It was in the kingdom of Chagatay that an eastern Turkish language known as Chagatay Turkish arose. It represented a certain continuity but also an amalgam of the language and traditions of the pre-Islamic Uighur and the Muslim Ilkhanids with the literary traditions of Kashgar and Khwarizm, where Turkish and Islam were flourishing, as well as the dialects of many Turkish groups living within these boundaries. It was formed out of the dialects spoken in various parts of the Chagatay realm. Here there was a revival of the Uighur alphabet. The works produced in Chagatay Turkish, beginning with those of Djamal al-Kurashi and the "Sheik", Husam al-Din (ca. 1274–77), and later comprising the works by the sons and grandsons (the learned astronomer Ulubeğ was one of these) of Timur (Tamerlane), reached a zenith with the *Divan* of Mir Ali Shir Nevai (1441–1501). Nevai is still cherished, both as a poet and as a defender of the language, in Central Asia and the Caucasus—where his name adorns buildings and squares. In one of his last works (*Muhakamat al-Lugatain*, 1499), he claimed that the language and literature of the Turks were comparable to those of the Persians. The influence of Nevai and of the poet of the masses, Ahmed Yesevi (patron of a large mystic order that was widespread among Turkish-speaking Muslims), survives today among Turkish-speaking peoples. Chagatay Turkish was a literary court language of the eastern Turks which was gradually replaced by various local dialects, notably Uzbek,

for it did not have a truly popular basis. What survived of Chagatai was the language used by Nevai, a fact which confirms once again the enormous importance of the writer and of the work of art in assuring the survival of a language.

The literature and language of the Oguz followed their own course. The Seljukis of Iran, who belonged to the Kınık tribe, established a large empire (1083–1157) which comprised today's Anatolia, Iran, Afghanistan, Central Asia and Iraq. For a considerable period of time they spoke their Oguz Turkish language, but eventually they were linguistically assimilated by the Persians. However, a scion of the main Seljuki dynasty, which secured a foothold in Anatolia in the eleventh century, held fast to its Turkish dialect, and this remained the dominant language until and after the state was overrun by the Mongols in the second half of the thirteenth century. The Seljuki cities of Sivas and Konya, the latter being their last capital, are full of monuments from this period.

The early literary legacy of the Oguz is the epic *Book of Dede Korkut*, written probably in the eleventh century in the vernacular of the time. It is interesting to note that one version of the same epic was recorded in Central Asia and another one in Anatolia and Azerbaijan.<sup>4</sup> The Turkic peoples living in these areas, including the Kirgiz, consider the *Dede Korkut* their own national heritage and opposed strongly the Soviet efforts to forbid its reading as being a legacy of the feudal age.

#### 4. *The Ottoman Turkish*

Chagatay Turkish, although a well-developed literary language spoken in the courts of the rulers, did not spread sufficiently to the masses to become their permanent communication medium. It was replaced eventually by various local dialects, most of which were Turkish and mutually intelligible. Once more, the lack of political continuity and

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<sup>4</sup> F.E. Sümer, A.E. Uysal, and W.S. Waler, trans., *The Book of Dede Korkut, A Turkish Epic* (Austin and London, 1972); see also the extensive commentaries in the Turkish versions published by Muharrem Ergin, *Dede Korkut Kitabı* (İstanbul, 1955–69). There are also other versions published in Baku, Azerbaijan (USSR). This work should not be confused with several other epics known as the *Oğuzname* (The Book of the Oguz).

stability, as well as failure of the state successor to the Chagatay empire to identify politically with the language, were the chief causes for its demise. The Seljukis and especially the Ottomans were successful in maintaining the continuous use of Turkish not only because of adherence to the vernacular but chiefly because a large group of people identified with the state and its culture spoke it.

The history of Ottoman Turkish is long and complex; we only have time to touch upon its most salient episodes. The language which began to emerge as early as the tenth century as the dialect of the Oguz (Turkmen), that is, the language of the southern Turks, became the full-fledged language of the Anatolian Turks first in the Seljuki state in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries and then in the Ottoman and various Turkmen states, such as the Ak Koyunlu, Kara Koyunlu, etc. The Ottoman state was established in Western Anatolia in the vicinity of the Roman province of Bythinia at the end of the thirteenth century under Osman (1286–1326). It soon became a haven for the Turkish *ulema* and other families fleeing the Mongols who had overrun the Seljuki state and its capital, Konya. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Ottoman state absorbed various Anatolian Turkish principalities, such as Karesi, Germiyan, etc., in which the dialect showed only insignificant variation from Ottoman (i.e., Anatolian Seljuki) Turkish. The process of consolidation and growth of the Ottoman state was greatly strengthened by the linguistic affinity between it and the population of the annexed territories in Anatolia. The Ottoman state soon expanded into the Balkans, where there were to be found Turkish-speaking groups such as the descendants of the Uz (Oguz), Pechenegs, Cumans, Karakalpaks, and the Gagauzes (the Muslim Seljuki population who escaped the Mongol invasions of 1261–80 by fleeing to Byzantium, where a large number subsequently accepted Christianity), as well as remnants of earlier Turkic groups, who had migrated westward through the Russian steppes in the fifth and sixth centuries and whose ultimate fate has not yet been fully ascertained. There was a massive Turkish colonization and some conversion in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in the Balkans, notably in Macedonia, Thrace, and the Bulgaria of today; thus there came to exist there a large Turkish population that spoke its own dialect, but one scarcely different from the Turkish spoken in Anatolia. It appears from the Ottoman documents of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries that Turkish, despite some



intrusion of Persian and Arabic, remained rather close to the vernacular. Today an educated Turk can easily understand the Ottoman language as spoken and used by the bureaucracy of that period. The social origins of the dynasty had something to do with the similarity between the vernacular and the court language since the Ottoman dynasty, contrary to its claims of noble ancestry, appears to have originated among the petty chiefs engaged in frontier warfare against the Byzantine state.

The Ottoman state's first massive encounter with the Arab world occurred at the beginning of the sixteenth century. The incorporation of the Arab Near East, that is, Syria and Egypt, and then Hejaz with the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, into the Ottoman realm in the period from 1516–1525 was bound to increase the influence of Islam and of the Arabic language. However, the strength of this influence has been unduly exaggerated by latter-day Arab and Western writers eager to downgrade the importance of Turkish. The fact is that this Turkish language reached its zenith after it established a close contact with the Muslim world. During the sixteenth century the Ottoman state and society reached a very high level of artistic and literary sophistication unknown in the past, in large measure because of its closer contact with Arabic and Persian. The linguistic character of Turkish offers no opposition to the adoption of large numbers of foreign words which are easily adapted to the Turkish syntax and phonetics and made, in fact, Turkish. (One may compose an entire sentence with Turkified Arabic words of which an Arab will not be able to understand the meaning.) In tandem with the broadening of its civilization, and in accordance with its needs, the Ottomans borrowed from other languages as well; for instance, the marine vocabulary of Turkish is largely Italian.

The language of the Ottoman administration continued to be Turkish, although in the provinces, notably in the Arabic-speaking areas, the local dialects were also used in varying degrees. Today, for example, the archives of Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and all other Arab countries contain large numbers of documents pertaining to their local affairs, all written in Turkish. (After the 1920s, historical studies in the countries were forced to concentrate on the pre-Ottoman and post-Ottoman period. Today, however, as the early nationalism has lost its vehemence, many Arab, as well as Balkan scholars have become interested in a more realistic interpretation of

their own past. So, teachers of Turkish are actively sought by Arab universities to help them read the massive files of Turkish documents accumulated in their archives.)

A separation of the court and especially literary language from the vernacular began and was accelerated during the sixteenth century, in part due to the sophistication of the Ottoman cultural, social, and artistic life. The social division between the vast ruling order composed of bureaucrats, poets, the religious establishment, merchants, and other community leaders on the one hand, and the masses on the other, deepened so that two worlds were created, each one having its own Turkish language, the one sophisticated and complex, the other homely and simple. The lack of an educational system prevented the dissemination of high class Turkish among the masses. The emerging court literature adopted not only Arabic and Persian words but also a large variety of ingenious though often artificial constructions. For example, the language of Baki (Mahmud Abdülbaki, 1526–1600), one of the greatest Ottoman poets of the period, who used his poetry not only to express his own feelings but also as a tool to court the powerful of the period and to reach high position, is full of such constructions. The way to demonstrate erudition and sophistication was to use as many Arabic or Persian words as possible to express the simplest thought. Meanwhile, vernacular Turkish remained pithy and economical, the same language as that shown to such advantage in the religious mystical poems of Yunus Emre (ca. 1251–1321), which circulated widely among the peasants and town dwellers. Known as the “poet of the people,” Yunus Emre lived in a period of Turkish mobilization against the Mongol rule in Anatolia. It was during this period that Mehmet Bey of the Karamanoğulları, a dynasty ruling a section of central Anatolia, ordered that no other language but Turkish should be used in state offices, gatherings, etc. Emre’s fourteenth century Turkish is the same as the vernacular spoken today in Anatolia and Rumelia, and his poems are still recited by villagers. Sultan Mehmet I (1413–21) demanded the use of Turkish in court correspondence.

During the Ottoman rule, Turkish was adopted by many converted Muslims who lived among the Turkish-speaking people, except in those areas that were densely populated by such groups, e.g., Bosnia, Albania, and Crete. The adoption of Turkish was evident even among Christians. The Karamanlis of the Orthodox church (who, according to some sources, were originally Turks who had converted to

Christianity) and a large number of Armenians in Anatolia adopted Turkish as their first languages. The Christian Gagauzes, who lived in the Balkans, continued to speak their native Turkish. Although use of Turkish became widespread during the Ottoman rule, the state did not regard Turkish as an *official* language and did not actively support its teaching or encourage its usage through a policy of repression of other languages. Each major group was absolutely free to develop its language as it saw fit. Consequently, the Greek and Armenian languages continued to develop, being taught in the patriarchates, churches, and religious community schools. Nevertheless, Turkish became the preferred language for everyday communication, particularly in cities and towns and mixed villages, because it was the language of the ruler and of the administration. It was also the source of the titles of respect and the polite expressions of social etiquette that went along with power and wealth and percolated down in various forms to the masses. Moreover, a large number of Turkish words usually associated with trade, professions, and public office, entered into the vocabulary of Serbian, Bulgarian, Greek, Albanian, and Rumanian, as the perusal of a dictionary of any of these languages will show.

The Ottoman Turkish of the upper classes reached its peak early in the eighteenth century. By this time thousands of *Divans* (collections of poems) and an endless variety of ethical, religious, and scientific books, as well as travel accounts and other genres were written in Ottoman Turkish. At no period did Turkish reach such an extraordinary development as during the Ottoman era. To illustrate this point, it may be mentioned that the Süleymaniye Library in İstanbul alone contains over 115,000 manuscripts of all kinds—most of them still to be investigated—in Turkish, Persian, and Arabic. Similar manuscript troves are to be found in the Topkapı and other libraries. The three-volume catalogue of Ottoman authors compiled by Bursaî Mehmed Tahir Efendi, *Osmanlı Müellifleri* (1915), contains 1,600 names, a list far from complete as it includes only a few categories of authors.

Meanwhile, the cleavage between the language of the upper classes and the vernacular became even more pronounced as the members of the society's elite—bureaucrats, scribes (eighteenth-century İstanbul had 20,000 scribes), religious men, merchants, craftsmen, and sophisticated city dwellers—increased. The basic educational system—the *medreses*—placed the emphasis on religious learning, which required

a knowledge of Arabic, while it was *de rigueur* for any self-respecting poet and intellectual to know Persian as well. The social dichotomy between the ruling order and the masses and the lack of a political ideology based on linguistic unity prevented the emergence of an educational system designed to disseminate the rulers' language, thus delaying the emergence of a uniform Turkish national language.

In fact, the fate of Turkish in the Ottoman state was probably the inadvertent result of the basic philosophy of government. The early Ottoman state (roughly between 1286 and 1421) was distinctly Turkish in leadership and culture, and could well have become a Turkish nation-state under different circumstances. However, as innumerable ethnic and religious groups came under its authority, the Ottoman state attempted to accommodate them ethnically, religiously, and culturally on an equal basis by stretching to the maximum the religious tolerance and permissiveness of Islam. The *millet* system, which emerged formally after 1454, allowed each non-Muslim group total religious, cultural (including education), and (in personal and family matters) legal autonomy. By the same token, the Muslim was left free to follow, and to borrow at will from, the religious and the literary treasures of all other Muslims. One is forced to take cognizance of a paradox. The early states of Uighur and of Chagatay, each of which lasted about two centuries, perished as political entities at the hands of nomadic conquering groups. Yet these states displayed a keen linguistic consciousness and tried to retain their Turkish language. The Ottoman state, far richer and more sophisticated than its predecessors, achieved both stability and continuity, lasting from 1286 to 1918, but it gradually lost its ethnic-national character and its linguistic consciousness until the revival in the second half of the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, the Turkish language survived and developed, chiefly as the consequence of the historical accident of its being the language of the administration rather than as the result of a consciously devised state policy or the political consciousness of the population. There was no forum or association charged with the study and diffusion of Turkish.

The profound change in the social organization, occupations, and administration in the Ottoman state not only intensified internal conflicts and contradictions but brought about the need for an even more complex vocabulary for the expression of new thoughts and feelings. Thus the vernacular and the language of the upper classes diverged still more sharply, until the words "Turk" and "Turkish"

came to refer exclusively to the coarse, primitive, rural folk of Anatolia and Rumelia, and the society was clearly divided into the elites (*has*) and the commoners (*am* or *havas*, the latter meaning one who lives with the five senses). Beginning late in the eighteenth century, there was a forewarning of the split in Turkish society in the form of great social unrest among the lower classes. The literary-linguistic manifestation of this unrest appeared in the rise of a group of unorthodox Alawite minstrels and bards of peasant origin who used the vernacular in poems expressing the social discontent and cultural malaise that resulted from the disintegration of the traditional social order. The themes and language of this new folk literature began to achieve recognition even among learned circles.<sup>5</sup> In due course of time, what appeared to be simply a social issue acquired national overtones (indeed, all the national issues in the Ottoman state began initially as social issues), and the folk poets were subsequently hailed in the Republic as the forerunners of the move toward a national consciousness and identity.

The evolution of the Turkish language in the nineteenth century was conditioned by a least three new major forces. The first was the introduction of a series of reforms, largely under the political and economic impact of the West. The need for new words to articulate and describe complex needs, social relations, and aspirations gave impetus to the borrowing of foreign words on an unprecedented scale. The complexity of social and cultural life created profound and new psychological and personal crises and needs, with which the Ottoman Turkish used by the elites, despite its verbal refinement, could not contend. For example, when the French Larousse was translated late in the nineteenth century, the translators had to use several Turkish words to describe concepts and feelings expressed by a single word in French; under the letter "A" alone there were 300 such words. The poverty of the language reflected the society's economic and social underdevelopment.

The second factor affecting the evolution of Turkish was the emergence of Ottomanism as the denominator for a common national identity. Until the nineteenth century the empire's uniting link was allegiance to the sultan rather than a sense of communality arising from shared political ideals or national identity. Certainly there was

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<sup>5</sup> The best work is still Fuat Köprülü, *Türk Edebiyat Tarihi* (İstanbul, 1920).

an Ottoman way of life with its own customs and mores, but there was no common Ottoman political identity expressed through a single language and capable of integrating the diverse ethnic and religious groups into a single cohesive political unit. During the second half of the nineteenth century the government attempted to develop a sense of Ottoman nationhood through the policy known as Ottomanism that began with the adoption of a common citizenship in the 1860s.

The third major factor affecting linguistic change was the introduction of a government-supported European type of educational system designed chiefly to train personnel for government services. Education increased general literacy just by a few percentage points, yet enough to create a new class of intellectuals whose main trade was the creation and debate of ideas and who had to rely on the language for the dissemination of their ideas to a broader audience. Communication became, for the intelligentsia, both a channel for the dispersion of ideas and a vehicle for achieving power. The political struggle for supremacy between the monarch and his bureaucracy and the search for supporters among suitable social groups made the intelligentsia a potential power broker and enhanced further the political value of communication.

The linguistic impact of these factors was immediate and profound. First, the search for new words led to heavy borrowing from Arabic and Persian, and culminated in the creation of a "modern" literature which expressed many new ideas in a language that became totally incomprehensible to the uneducated. The same was true for the language of the administration. Later in the century after admiration for the West had overcome attachment to native values, French words replaced, or were used together with their Arabic or Persian equivalents, i.e., *doctor*, *tabib*, *hekim*. The most powerful single force, the one that finally caused the linguistic revolution, was the newspaper in its role as an educational medium for the imparting of general information and the conveying of political ideas. The press and literature became inseparable, as many novels and short stories were by preference published first in newspapers. By the logic of practical necessity, the language of the newspapers had to be made intelligible, for they sought to reach a large segment of the society. The literary and linguistic debate in the second half of the nineteenth century centered on one fundamental issue: the simplification of language, or "sadeleşme." In essence, this was the beginning of a populist movement which found its first expression in language and literature.

The change brought about by the introduction of newspapers as the chief means of written mass communication was truly revolutionary. The widespread dissemination of prose writing of various sorts was in itself somewhat of a revolution, as poetry had been the standard channel of literary expression at the upper levels. Yet, prose was the form most used by the story tellers (*meddah*) at the level of the common people, and the switch to mass prose communication caused changes in philosophical as well as linguistic outlook.

Simplification of the language would require the adoption of an idiom closer to that of vernacular Turkish—a form that, although it employed a number of Arabic and Persian words, was completely Turkish in syntax and phonetics, unlike the rather artificial language of the upper classes. Many of the prose writers and poets who debated the “simplification” question came from these lower urban classes. They were the owners or employees of newspapers, and they used the press to disseminate their modernist ideas. Thus Ali Suavi, İbrahim Şinasi, Namık Kemal, Ahmet Mithat, and Ziya Pasha, to mention only a few, were poets, and journalists who advocated simplification of the language. The same men were also, in varying degrees, the spokesmen for reform and change, and some, like Namık Kemal, were the advocates of liberalism and constitutionalism and the creators of a literature that was the forerunner of contemporary Turkish literature.<sup>6</sup>

It is evident that the language debates were in fact related to political, social, and cultural issues that transcended the intellectuals’ narrow linguistic preoccupations. Politics and literature had become intimately interwoven. Although the debates on the “simplification” of the “Lisan-i Osmani” or Ottoman language were ostensibly without ethnic or nationalistic connotations, the very idea of simplifying the official language by bringing it closer to the “language of the people” necessarily implied giving it a more ethnic and national character, as the “language of the people” was actually a pure Turkish. Already a number of people, such as the revolutionary-minded Ali Suavi, were pointing out that, in fact, the so-called “Ottoman language” was basically Turkish, despite its permeation by Arabic and

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<sup>6</sup> A comprehensive study of these debates, with extensive quotations from the original articles and extensive bibliography, is Ağâh Sırrı Levend, *Türk Dilinde Gelişme ve Sadeleşme Evreleri* (The Phases of Development and Simplification of the Turkish Language), 2nd ed. (Ankara, 1960).

Persian words. Yet, paradoxically, the school system was at that time placing an even stronger emphasis on Arabic, and Arabic grammar was introduced into the curricula for the teaching of Ottoman.

The increased attention to Arabic studies in the government-controlled educational system, a policy apparently quite out of step with other developments, was in line with efforts of Sultan Abdül Hamid II (1876–1909) to strengthen the bonds of Islamic unity within the remaining portion of the empire. As a whole, however, the government's Muslim-Ottoman policy (Ottomanism) contributed greatly to the dissemination of Turkish. The flourishing newspapers, so extensively read in the urban centers, spread the use of Turkish among upperclass Arabs in Syria and Iraq, while the attempt to centralize the administration of the realm spread Turkish-speaking bureaucrats throughout the provinces. Eventually the non-Turkish groups, Muslim and non-Muslim, began publishing their own newspapers, often giving considerable space to articles in Turkish (as some still do; e.g., *Şalom*, the newspaper of the Jewish community in İstanbul, to this day prints material in Ladino—sixteenth-century Spanish—and Turkish). The use of Turkish in the nineteenth century had become widespread as never before, as can be illustrated by a few statistics. According to a reliable study, a total of 730 newspapers were published in the Ottoman Empire in 1909.<sup>7</sup> The breakdown of the main languages used by these newspapers was as follows:

Turkish	308	Turkish/Greek	16
Turkish/Arabic	41	Greek	109
Arabic	67	Turkish/Armenian	5
Persian/Turkish	3	Armenian	43
Persian/Arabic	1	Turkish/French	24
Jewish (Ladino)	20	French	36
Italian	2	(Other mixed-language newspapers)	36

(A number of other languages are excluded from the above list.)

By the end of the nineteenth century the campaign to simplify the language had made the written language of communication accessible to the masses, although there was still a divergence—admit-

<sup>7</sup> Orhan Koloğlu, "Turkish-Arab Relation as Reflected in the Arabic Press," *Türk-Arap İlişkileri* (Ankara, 1979), p. 100.



tedly a greatly narrowed one—between the vernacular and upper-class “literary” language. Meanwhile, during the latter part of the century the Turkish idiom then emerging in Istanbul in the columns of the newspapers as the national language of the Turks was being adopted by the reformists-nationalists of Russia, such as İsmail Gaspiralı (Crimea) and Mirza Fath Ali (Azerbaijan), as the inspiration and model for their own search for linguistic identity, modernity, and nationhood. During this period also the first major and modern Turkish dictionary, the *Kamusül Türki*, was produced by Şemseddin Sami, known as an apologist for purified Turkish in Turkey and as the precursor of Albanian nationalism in his own native land.

The linguistic debates in the Ottoman Empire during the Union and Progress (Young Turks) era of 1908–18 acquired overtly national overtones, as nationalism then appeared as the only ideology capable of inducing the society to rejuvenate itself with in-depth reforms and a new social and political identity. The discussions clearly articulated the need for the development and adoption of a national language to be called by its proper name, that is, plainly Turkish. The process of “simplification” inevitably had led to the nationalization of the language. The reviews *Türk Yurdu* (*Turkish Homeland*) and *Genç Kalemler* (*Young Pens*) became the chief advocates of a Turkish national language, and the government itself was controlled by a military-civilian elite which supported the drive for a national language (although not openly, lest it undermine whatever was left of the Ottoman-Muslim unity). Ziya Gökalp, the leading nationalist ideologist of the time, proposed to make the Turkish spoken in İstanbul the prototype national language of the Turks. This is what happened in practice. The Turkish spoken in İstanbul was the most developed idiom; its syntax was pure Turkish, but it also included a large number of Arabic and Persian words which had become fully adapted to Turkish phonetics. Opposing the nationalists were conservative and classicist groups which defended through their own publications—which often used the vernacular Turkish developed by the press—the virtues of the Arabic-Persian-Islamic heritage.

The failure of the Arabic alphabet to convey Turkish sounds was addressed in the debates; the solutions proposed ranged from the adoption of special characters to be added to the Arabic alphabet to the total replacement of the Arabic alphabet with a Latin one—paradoxically enough referred to as the “Turkish alphabet.”

### 5. *The Language Problem in the Republic (1923)*

The establishment of the *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti* (Republic of Turkey) was a momentous decision. It was a decision, to paraphrase Atatürk, on the part of the Turkish people to establish a state answering to its own ethnic name and reflecting its own cultural and historical characteristics. At long last the Turks' political identity came to coincide with their linguistic and ethnic identity, thanks to the idea of nation-state borrowed from the West. The national consciousness thus gained soon led, as one may expect, to a national view of the past, and to the subsequent reassessment of the Turks' role and place in world history in general and of Islam in particular. Turks claimed now that they had made major contributions to world civilization and played a dominant role in the history and civilization of Islam. But the Turks' achievements had been ignored and their misdeeds exaggerated for they had no national political elite with its own tongue to express the nation's viewpoint. Now with the proclamation of the national statehood all this was bound to change drastically.

Consequently, history became of immediate and vital importance as the chief repository of information about the nation's roots, while language became the identifying mark of Turkishness. History acquired priority over language because the tongue was a living reality while history had to be reinterpreted in a national framework and the place and role of the language defined accordingly. It is interesting to note that at the beginning Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk) seemed interested only in basic political reforms, not in language change, as indicated by the lack of debate on the subject in the 1920s. Atatürk's own language was the "simplified" Turkish developed in the Young Turks era. Eventually the alphabet reform of 1928 opened up discussion on the language.<sup>8</sup> The Arabic alphabet, which had been adopted in the tenth century when Turks converted to Islam, was replaced by the Latin alphabet. This decision, which cut off the Turks from their Ottoman-Islamic past, was promoted by practical and symbolic considerations. The promotion of greater literacy appears to have been Atatürk's aim in adopting the Roman characters. Arabic

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<sup>8</sup> Atatürk's very short, rather obscure, and apparently only discussion of the alphabet reform has been reproduced in many publications; see *Atatürk'ün Maarifî Ait Direktifleri* [Atatürk's Instructions Concerning Education] (Istanbul, 1939), pp. 26–28.

was considered unsuitable to Turkish phonetics: for example, the Arabic “v” (wau) was used to express five different sounds in Turkish, two of which have the umlaut. Furthermore, the joint and shortened spelling of Arabic made reading difficult, which contributed to the high illiteracy rate. The symbolic meaning of the alphabet reform, as expressed by Atatürk, was that the Turkish nation wanted to “show with its script and mentality that it is on the side of world civilization.”<sup>9</sup> This symbolized the move of the Turks from the sphere of oriental civilization to that of the West, as Ziya Gökalp had defined it.

Interest in language reform—as opposed to alphabet reform—revived in 1929, because of the need to produce a national history (or, rather, to interpret history in a national framework) and the spread of secularism, which made language the keystone of national loyalty and allegiance. Consequently the pre-Islamic history of the Turks, in which the new regime showed special interest so as to put distance between itself and the Ottoman-Islamic past, gained in importance. The only tangible means for identifying the secular Republican Turkey with its remote, pre-Islamic past, long defunct in public memory, was the language. Hence linguistic studies gained new impetus in the drive to create a “national” past; language being its only tangible legacy. Still, the new administration was not interested in wide-scale adoption of new words but chiefly in a scientific study of Turkish grammar and vocabulary which could be properly used to create a national literature based on the vernacular, the feelings and the literary taste of the Turkish masses. A Language Convention (*Dil Kurultayı*) was convened finally on September 26, 1932. It had been preceded by a Historical Convention indicating once more the subordination of language to history. During the debates at the Language Convention, the veteran journalist Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, a former advocate of simpler language, claimed that the Turkish language had achieved a remarkable clarity and efficiency in the past half century and should be left to its own natural evolution. He was soundly criticized by the new school of language purists whose enthusiasm for change was matched only by their ignorance of linguistics and history. A *Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti* (Society for the Study of the Turkish Language) was established at the end of the Convention. This organization, to which Atatürk bequeathed

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<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

a part of his estate, later renamed itself *Türk Dil Kurumu* (Turkish Language Association) and assumed a series of responsibilities including the purging of foreign words and the creation of new terms. Differently from other institutions established during Atatürk's lifetime, the Language Society, as it is called in English, was not a public but, rather, a private organization—a clear indication of its relatively low status.

The subservience of language to history and the joint use of both by the Republican regime to foster a sense of Turkish national identity and consciousness were clearly demonstrated by the emergence of the Sun-Language theory.<sup>10</sup> According to this fictional theory, the source of languages was onomatopoeia. The sun was the chief source of terms and gave birth to the first language, which arose in Central Asia and was therefore Turkish. The first name given to the sun derived from “ağ,” which in Turkish is a basic syllable. It was also claimed that the Doric civilization was Turkish. (*Dor-tor* was the name of a Turkish tribe and “doruk” in Turkish means summit.) The purpose of this theory was to bolster the national ego of the Turks by depicting them as major contributors to world civilization and thus to persuade them to create a national language by borrowing words from their pre-Islamic languages (Kök-Türk, Uighur, etc.), of which Turks had limited knowledge.

The government's views on language reform were affected by at least two political-ideological considerations. The first was secularism which, by the late 1930s, and especially after Atatürk's death in 1938, acquired irreligious tendencies and indirectly strengthened the position of some advocates of language reform—notably a group in the Ministry of Education—who regarded language and culture as the exclusive product of material forces. The second idea was one of *total* national independence, which implied that linguistically as well as politically the Turks had to rid themselves of dependence on everything foreign, including Arabic and Persian terms. This was a xenophobic and isolationist view which stemmed partly from the materialistic nationalism adopted by the leaders of the bureaucratic-intellectual elite that assumed power in the late 1930s. The one-party system placed all the government power at its disposal and

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<sup>10</sup> See Abdulkadir İnan, *Güneş-Dil Teorisi Üzerine Ders Notları* [Class Notes on the Sun-language Theory] (İstanbul, 1936).

allowed it often to justify the excesses of totalitarianism with claims of reformism. These same people who purged Arabic and Persian words on behalf of Turkish nationalism did not hesitate to borrow heavily from French. The ruling elite proclaimed itself to be *halkçı* (populists), but did not hesitate to undermine the very language of the people.

Immediately after World War II, the government launched a massive campaign for language reform, a campaign already heralded at a convention in 1941 by İsmet İnönü, the new president and a partisan of language purity. Well-established and fully assimilated Arabic and Persian words were purged wholesale and replaced with terms taken, by preference, from the pre-Islamic Turkish or simply invented, at times without much regard for Turkish word roots. The best example is to be seen in the recording of the Constitution in 1945; the Arabic term *Teşkilati Esasiye* (or, in its Turkified form, *Esas Teşkilat Kanunu*), which can be literally translated as the Law of Basic Organization, was changed to *Anayasa*, that is Mother Law.<sup>11</sup> The term *yasa* (law) had been used both by Turks and Mongols in the eighth century when the concept of a constitution did not exist at all. Arabic terms had been used for all the constitutions issued or amended from 1876 to 1937. The new drive for language reform assumed the title and goal of “Turkification” or “purification” of the language, whereas in the past the aim was merely *sadeleşme*—simplification. For the purpose of this “purification” even international scientific terms, such as oxygen, were officially (but unsuccessfully) rejected in favor of purely Turkish words. The entire operation stemmed from the government, whereas in the past during the entire period from 1870 to 1918 the discussions were carried out in full freedom, without government interference.

The pre-1918 debates on language reform had succeeded in coming up with a workable language understood both by the lower urban classes and the elites. The effort had been truly populist in nature and designed to close the gap between the masses and the upper class. The language reforms after 1940 actually created a new and sharper cleavage between the languages of the two groups, the effect being partially mitigated by failure of the communications media to accept fully and use all of the artificial terms. Once again, however,

<sup>11</sup> See Uriel Heyd, *Language Reform in Modern Turkey* (Jerusalem, 1954), pp. 38–60.

the language dichotomy that had been characteristic throughout the Uighur, Chagatay, and most of the Ottoman eras reappeared, this time having been justified through nationalism and reformism. Somehow the political elites had to separate themselves from the people, to gain respectability through a claim of erudition bolstered by their command of the new and 'magical' language, and thus to secure obedience to their decrees.

In fact, the language reform beginning in the mid-1930s heralded the emergence of a ruling elite that held the government power in its hand and wanted to legitimize its authority as the promoter of modernity and reform. Yet, the language spread, thanks to an expanding educational system under government control, and gained additional strength due to the gradual rise in literacy. Meanwhile the Language Society published a massive *Türkçe Sözlük*, or *Turkish Dictionary*, which in a way bolstered and crowned the language reform. A great variety of other dictionaries bearing such odd titles as *Osmanlıca-Türkçe Lügat*, or *Sözlük*, that is, *Ottoman-Turkish Dictionary*, were published and had to be used to read not only the writings of the nineteenth century but also the very language used by the Republican leaders of the 1920s. Established writers and novelists such as Reşat Nuri Güntekin, whose works were considered classics, had to rewrite in the new language their old novels published in the 1920s, so that the new generations could read them.

Opposition to the Language Society and its reforms burst vehemently into the open as soon as the political regime was liberalized and opposition parties formed. In 1946, the *Muallimler Birliği* (Teachers Union), representing national-Islamic views, and the *Hür Fikirleri Yayma Cemiyeti* (Society for the Propagation of Free Thought), a politically liberal but culturally conservative organization, held their own language convention and denounced the excesses and artificiality of the purification drive of the 1940s. The vigorous and heated campaign, a campaign somewhat tainted by political motives, between the defenders of the language reform and their opponents was reported in newspapers, journals, and books. Hasan Reşit Tankut, a defender of the discarded Sun-Language theory and the former general secretary of the Language Society, claimed that in order to become accustomed to the newly introduced words "one has to believe first in innovation and progress and undertake the sacrifice necessary to [adapt] to the new," and that "the discussion about language reform

is a shield behind which political issues are being formulated and propagated.”<sup>12</sup>

Moderation in language reform began with the coming to power of the Democratic Party in 1950 and continued well into the early 1960s, despite the fact that the Language Society refused to settle down to the role of a scientific organization dedicated solely to the study of the language. It insisted on, and was more or less successful in, remaining a forum for making policy and an enforcing agency, chiefly because of its indirect influence on the nationalist secularists and, later, on both the leftist radicals and on the Republican People's Party (RPP) governments that assumed power from 1960 to 1980. Nevertheless, the terminology used in translating the Constitution into “Turkish” in 1945 was replaced by the old words, although a number of the new terms remained in use.

The language debate was rekindled again after 1965, when the RPP, the flag bearer of the elitist order from 1923 to 1950, shifted towards socialism and attacked its chief opponent, the Justice Party, as capitalistic and conservative (it had attacked the predecessor of the Justice Party, the Democrat Party, as pro-Islamist and reactionary). By 1965 the RPP had abandoned its extremist, secularist platform in favor of a political ideology dubbed “left of center”; apparently the party wanted to maintain its self-promoted image as the party of change and reform. An overwhelming majority of about 900 members of the Language Society were members or supporters of the RPP. Thus, the intellectuals' position on language reform had followed party lines since the issue had become a predominantly political one.

The late 1960s version of language reform was rebaptized as a campaign to achieve purity and clarity in the language, that is, to create an *Öz Türkçe*, or a pure or basic Turkish language. Critics accused the Language Society of having ignored Atatürk's goal of purging Arabic and Persian words only from the legal and administrative vocabulary and of dedicating the Society's chief resources to an objective study of the language. They argued that the Language Society sought to introduce artificial words totally unsuitable to the

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<sup>12</sup> H.R. Tankut, *Türk Dili Üzerine Söylevleri, Demeçleri ve Yazıları* [Speeches, statements and writings on the Turkish Language] (Ankara, 1949), p. 33.

phonetics of Turkish and to effect syntactic changes, thus alienating the language from its own 900-year-old roots and ultimately making the Turks of Turkey unable to understand the language of other Turks. The neo-reformists were accused, furthermore, of seeking to cut the Turks off from their own culture and history by eliminating well-established words with deep symbolic and psychological appeal, such as *hürriyet* (freedom) and *millet* (nation), and replacing them with meaningless terms, such as *özgürlük* and *ulus*; the first being a totally artificial creation, and the latter, an old Mongolic-Turkish word.<sup>13</sup> Some members of the Society, among them well-known linguists and literary critics, resigned or were expelled from the organization because they criticized its extremist-purist views on language. In fact, the Society was accused of having fallen under the influence of ultra-leftists, some of whom were suspected of ill intentions in seeking to undermine Turkey's national unity and destroy forever any links between the Turks of Turkey and other Turkic peoples. The more moderate critics of the Language Society accepted the idea of language reform but felt that this had already been achieved and that the language, therefore, should now be left free of interference.

The reformists expressed their views in *Türk Dili*, the old journal of the well-heeled Language Society. They charged that the attacks came from anti-reform, anti-revolutionary conservatives and reactionaries who opposed all change and innovation, and from linguists rigidly bound to formal rules and thus unable to accept words and expressions created with the purpose of defining new and unfamiliar concepts. There was a need, they claimed, for an authentic Turkish language, the present phase being just a link in the long chain of evolution that would terminate when Turkish became self-sufficient and rich enough to express every object, concept, and feeling. Finally, the apologists of language reform averred that they were true patriots who fought to create a national language, while their opponents, lacking a real love of Turkish, spurned all innovation. They claimed that barely 3,000 new words had been introduced—1,200 in the ordinary vocabulary—since the beginning of language reform.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>13</sup> The views of this group were expressed in reviews such as *Hisar*, *Meydan*, *Türk Yurdu*, etc. See also Necmettin Hacı Eminoglu, *Türkçenin Karanlık Günleri* [The Dark Days of Turkish] (İstanbul, 1975), and Adnan Ötügen. *TRT İçin Türkçe Dersleri* (Turkish lessons for TRT—the official radio and TV).

<sup>14</sup> See, for example, Emin Özdemir, *Öz Türkçe Üzerine* [On pure Turkish] (Ankara,



With the coming to power of the Republican People's Party in 1978, when Bülent Ecevit, a fierce advocate of "pure" Turkish, became Premier, the state-owned and operated TV and radio began to use this "purified" Turkish. This created a furor which abated only after the old spoken language was restored—notably after Ecevit resigned from the Premiership late in 1979 and was replaced by Süleyman Demirel. The language situation remained stable after the military took over the government in September, 1980. According to unverified reports, the military plans to place the Language Society, along with other organizations of the same kind, into a Turkish Academy of Sciences that is to be established soon. This may in fact mark the end of state-supported language reform.

### 6. *Conclusions*

It is quite obvious that the debates on language reform in Turkey have acquired definite political and ideological overtones that transcend the boundary of linguistics. Some of the participants in these debates lack sufficient linguistic training to speak with authority and their arguments are often ingenious fabrications. The fact is that the radical leftists strive to use "pure" Turkish almost to the point of becoming unintelligible and ludicrous, while the ultra-rightists make a special effort to use Turkified Arabic terms, and a new breed of Ottomanists cling to nineteenth-century usages. The ordinary citizen does not use or even understand any of the idioms of the apologists for one or the other variety of Turkish as they are born, on the one hand, from utopian yearnings for a total revolutionary change, and on the other, from romantic longings for a "golden" past. The overwhelming majority of the Turks take the middle road, using a language in which the vernacular mixes freely with newly coined words, and with Arabic, Persian, English, and French, which are often used interchangeably: for example, the word "interesting" appears as *enteresan* (French), *alâkâ çekici* (half of which is Arabic), and *ilginç* (new Turkish). Words defining automobile parts are predominantly French while terms for soccer, a national sport, are English. Almost every

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1969), and Cevdet Kudret, *Dilleri Var Bizim Dile Benzemez* [They have language not resembling ours] (Ankara, 1966).

word in common use can be expressed by three or four terms having exactly the same meaning. In some cases, new words supposedly created to express a new concept are used together with their older equivalents in order to express specific nuances: for instance, *durum* and *vaziyet*, meaning “situation,” are occasionally used together as *durum vaziyeti*—“the situation of the situation”—a seemingly redundant expression that actually refers to a situation both general and particular.

Moderate and truly objective and well-trained linguists, as well as large numbers of impartial foreign scholars, agree that language reform in Turkey was necessary and that a degree of interference was unavoidable, but they feel that such efforts should not be undertaken by the government or by ideologically motivated groups.<sup>15</sup> They point out that this way of manipulating the language conspicuously contradicts previous movements toward language reform and that the invention of new words often violated the linguistic rules and the Turkish language’s own way of word formation. It is an irony of history that Atatürk’s own speeches were “translated” into current Turkish (the caption under the title of the book referring to the “translator” reads *bugünkü dile aktaran*—literally: “he who transferred it to today’s language,” as the term “translated” would have sounded outrageous only 30 to 40 years after original delivery).<sup>16</sup> The complaints that parents do not understand the language of their children, that a scholar wishing to study the history and society of Turkey from 1923 to 1980 has to learn three languages and that a generation which introduced one form of language reform is followed by another generation which develops its own language and does not understand the idiom of its predecessors, may be exaggerated, but certainly not totally unfounded. The generation gap in Turkey has plainly been widened by the linguistic differences and also by the alienation and the crisis of identity that beset Turkey in the 1970s, both of which were partly the consequence of the language reform and were expressed through it.

Yet, when one looks back at what has been accomplished, one’s

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<sup>15</sup> For a learned view, see Zeynep Korkmaz, *Türk Dilinin Tarihi Akısı İçinde Atatürk ve Dil Devrimi* [Atatürk and language reform within the historical evolution of the Turkish language] (Ankara, 1963).

<sup>16</sup> *Bugünün Diliyle Atatürk’ün Söyleleri* [The speeches of Atatürk on today’s language] (Ankara: Language Society, 1968).

misgivings tend to diminish. There is today a common Turkish language spoken by the overwhelming majority of the Turkish people as well as by the intelligentsia, except of course the extremists. The newspapers are read now all over Turkey by a population which is 70 percent literate (90 percent literate between the ages of 8 and 35). The language of the newspapers is everyday Turkish read by villagers and townsmen alike. A rich and beautiful modern literature, which is translated into foreign languages, has come into being, and prose writing has attained a high level of clarity and sharpness. Literary Turkish, except for that of the extremists who excel in archaisms or neologisms, is free of verbosity and the cumbersome stylistic ornaments of the past. In fact, it has reached the point where it conveys thoughts and feelings with a precision and economy of words that would have been unthinkable some decades ago. Grammar books, dictionaries of all kinds, and linguistic studies on syntax and morphology are abundant. One may sum up by saying that, in effect, what has resulted is a true national Turkish language. Turkish is a language with extraordinary capacity for growth and development. In this paper I have tried to show that the language has exhibited extraordinary resilience and has survived through extremely difficult trials. It is hoped that it can survive once again the barbarous onslaught launched by politically motivated zealots just at the time when it has come into its own.

SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND LITERATURE:  
THE REFLECTION OF THE YOUNG TURK ERA  
(1908–1918) IN THE LITERARY WORK OF  
ÖMER SEYFEDDİN (1884–1920)

I. *Introduction*

Modern social literature of the Middle East, namely the short story, the novel, poetry, and, lately, the drama, is a rather faithful mirror of social and political transformations occurring in the society at large. Unlike other modes of intellectual expression, literature presents an internalized, psychological, and individualized interpretation of change and its effects. It appears, first, as a qualitative critique of transformation. Second, while remaining involved in the realm of values, it strives to justify the need for additional transformation. In some cases, it may well oppose and criticize certain moral and intellectual aspects of change.

The writer's personality and background often determine his views regarding the process of social change. The family is the basic institution in which the writer's early values are formed. In fact, it is the mother who may have the overwhelming formative impact upon the writer's personality and his basic viewpoint toward change. Consequently, some knowledge about the mother's background, experience, and personality would be valuable in understanding the Middle Eastern writer. (We are not referring here to the mother's natural impact upon the child's personality, but to a series of special feminine qualities which might determine the writer's formation as an artist. Emotion, lyricism, tenderness, perception, empathy—that is, some of the basic qualities of an artist—may be attributed to the mother; whereas the model for courage, manliness, family responsibility, social position, etc., is provided by the father.)

We may divide (arbitrarily, merely for the sake of clarity) the system of values in a traditional society into two categories: personal and societal. Thus, one may say that the impact of the mother's personality and values is evident in an individual's intimate personal life, while fatherly values are dominant at a more general and impersonal societal level.

Modernization, notably the adoption of a written medium of communication and the translation of Western works (this a major source of intellectual influence hardly studied), coupled with a new social mobility, provided both the model and the avenue for gradually blending the more intimate and personal type of values rooted in the mother's psychology and personality into the generally manly societal system of values.

Education is another major variable in determining the writer's personality. This education received in schools must always be viewed in relation to the artist's family background, since such instruction, especially the value-oriented instruction, was molded, interpreted, and internalized through interaction with the basic family education. The education received from the modern types of schools had more often than not an ideological-political orientation. It strove to create idealized images of modern societies and states. Thus, the writer's view of modernization, as well as his opinion about his own role in this process was often shaped by the official view of what an ideal modern society ought to be. However, the writer's own personality, in which the motherly influence must be given due recognition, together with continuous exposure to ideas and certain standards of intellectual ethics, enabled the writer to adopt critical views, often in contradiction to the official dogma.

The third factor affecting the writer's personality and determining the tendencies of his literary work may be found in changes which occurred in his and his family's social status. Modernization in the Middle East disturbed, and continues to disturb, ancient social arrangements. Social dislocation and the ensuing accelerated mobility dealt a deadly blow to the idea of social immutability, a fundamental principle which had determined Middle Eastern philosophies and attitudes throughout centuries. Dislocation exposed the writer to new conditions of life. It dramatized the idea that values were relative, and brought the need for an explanation of all changes in order to facilitate social adjustment. Adjustment was possible only through a rational, cause-and-effect explanation based on the emerging secular and relativist view of the world, a view which conflicted with the ancient view that man's fate and the order in his society were preordained. Adjustment to a new mode of life through the acceptance of change was, above all, an intellectual and psychological problem demanding a broad range of emotional capabilities and a high level of perception and introspection, qualities which few

ordinary people possessed. The writer thus played a vital role, not only in providing explanation and justification for social change, but also in establishing the criteria and standards for the acceptance of innovation and change. Moreover, the writer had to use a language or dialect easily understood by the majority of people, and had to express his ideas through familiar images and expressions.

The variables that are paramount, however, in ultimately determining the writer's role as an agent of change and the force of his impact on society are talent, artistic sensibility, empathy (which need not be discussed), and commitment. Talent we may define as the inborn ability to turn a felicitous phrase, to express ideas or describe people, places, and events in such a way as to catch the attention of the reader despite his lack of prior interest in the topic. At this point, the degree of the author's own commitment, both to his art and to his cause, is crucial, for the reader's attention must be held and his mind engaged if the writer's words are to have a social impact. The work must, first, meet artistic criteria, and be writing of high literary quality. Then it must represent a synthesis between the writer as an individual, with his own needs and aspirations, and the society with its universal problems, feelings, and goals. Social problems give art a humanist, emotional dimension, while art offers society standards and perspective. A writer's commitment to a cause gives his work a sense of purpose and dynamism, but a prior commitment to literature—to the mastery of technique and to the spirit of art—is required. It is this kind of commitment which separates the artist from the politician, and gives force to his social comment.

Modern social writings in the Middle East (notably those in the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey, which we have studied extensively) appear in many instances as records of social events, of ideologies, of the clash of personalities, and the like. Events are often distorted; some individuals are ridiculed, others glorified, depending upon the writer's opinion. Thus, these works cannot be taken at face value as authentic documents. Yet, if social literature is read with a new understanding of its specific function and role in the process of modernization, these literary writings may provide new insights into and a new understanding of the entire history, and the social and political transformation, of the modern Middle East.

Current studies of so-called developing societies cover the factual, objective aspects of social transformation, but in most cases they fail to envisage the process in its human and psychological dimensions.

We feel that a more complete understanding may be achieved through the acceptance and study of literature as a major source for historical, social, and political studies. In the Middle East, in particular, a series of additional reasons, such as changes in family structure, the expanded use of the vernacular, the passage from the old ideal of a universal community to the national state, and increased social differentiation augment the value of literature as a source for social research.

We shall attempt in the present paper to support the above hypotheses by analyzing some of the relevant short stories of Ömer Seyfeddin. We shall limit our treatment to three topics: (a) Ömer Seyfeddin's family background and formation as an artist; (b) the development of the idea of nationalism; and (c) the rise of intellectuals as a social group. The quotations in the text are taken almost exclusively from his short stories. The story titles are italicized. The footnotes provide, in addition to standard documentation, additional factual evidence supporting some of the points raised in the short stories. The reader is advised to pay special attention to the endnotes, which have been used extensively to identify the heroes in the stories with living personalities.

## II. *Ömer Seyfeddin's Background*<sup>1</sup>

Ömer Seyfeddin was born in 1884 in Gönen, a small peaceful town in western Anatolia. His father, a Turk originally from the Caucasus region, was an officer in the army who rose to his rank of major not through school, but through a field commission in the army.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The best study of Ömer Seyfeddin's life and of contemporary events is by Tahir Alangu, *Ömer Seyfeddin Ülkücü Bir Yazarın Romani* [The Novel of a Patriot Writer] (İstanbul, 1968). Intimate and basic information about the writer is provided by his friend and supporter, the publisher of *Genç Kalemler*, the nationalist review of Salonica, Ali Canip (*Yöntem*), in *Ömer Seyfeddin, Hayatı ve Eserleri* (İstanbul, 1935); a new, enlarged version of this work was published in İstanbul in 1947. Other useful works are Hilmi Yücebaş, *Ömer Seyfeddin, Hayatı, Hatıraları, Şiirleri* (İstanbul, 1960); Hikmet Dizdaroğlu, *Ömer Seyfeddin* (Ankara, 1964); Yaşar Nabi, *Ömer Seyfeddin* (İstanbul, 1961). A good survey is in Otto Spies's *Die türkische Prosaliteratur der Gegenwart* (Leipzig, 1943), pp. 16–26. There is also a useful series of dissertations prepared by the Turkish Literature School of İstanbul University. A short analysis is in H.B. Paksoy, "Nationality and Religion: Three Observations from Ömer Seyfeddin," *Central Asia Survey* III, iii (1984), pp. 109–15. Other sources are indicated below.

<sup>2</sup> The *alaylı zabıt* and *mektepli zabıt* were two categories of officers. The first rose from the rank and file, and represented the unbending, loyal, military spirit of the

Seyfeddin's references to his father in his works are rare and not complimentary. The father appears as a cold, authoritarian man, determined to give a stern, traditional education to his children. The father's attitudes brought the child closer to his mother. Yet, the father's dogmatic attachment to his own view of family and education, coupled with his military profession, had a profound impact on Ömer. Throughout his life, Ömer had a powerful sense of ethics, loyalty, and attachment to country, as well as to other values he considered to be good.

The mother belonged to a relatively well-to-do intellectual family from İstanbul. "Intellectual" at this time meant pious and well-versed in Islamic religious teachings and practices. In his autobiographical stories *Kasağı*, *İlk Namaz*, *Ant*, *İlk Cinayet* (Curry Comb, First Prayer, Pledge, First Crime), Ömer Seyfeddin repeatedly refers to his mother with a tenderness akin to religiosity. She was the most beloved person, whom he saw "surrounded by angels while she read the Koran" (*Kasağı*). Even if he went to Hell in the next world, the writer felt that the fire would not burn the corner of his face where she used to kiss him. Every morning as a child he "invented dreams in which a big bear carried him into the inn up in the forests," and she interpreted the dream for him to mean that he would become a great man, "a famous general whom nobody could hurt" (*Ant*). Much later, after he became a well-known writer, Ömer described most fully the impact of his mother on his career, as well as upon his role as an artist. In one of his most famous short stories, *Fon Sadriştaynın Oğlu* (The Son of Von Sadristein), he speaks through the mouth of his hero, a poet:

Everything I learned comes from my mother. She raised me in a spirit of religious exaltation. The source of lyricism that you feel running through my poems is derived from the religious feeling [teaching] she gave me. My poems, stories, and tragedies were in her fairy tales. Her soul, which came from the people (*halk*), has grafted the love of the people onto my own soul. Because of this, the people's expressions are my rhyme, and the harmony of the people's language is my music.

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old army. The troops were greatly attached to these officers. Their modest origin and constant service in the army brought them close to their men. These officers could not advance beyond a given rank. The *mektepli*, or "schooled" officers, represented the elite who could reach the highest positions in the army. The level of schooling was the social and professional barrier which divided the two groups. After the revolution of 1908, the *alaylı* officers were retired; this was one of the factors contributing to the army's support of "reactionary" upheaval during that year.



The poet in Ömer Seyfeddin's story sets forth in a nutshell the basic literary-social problem of his time, namely, the need for a national language to bring together the masses and the elites.

Before him [the poet], the poets and the learned insulted their own kin as being of low class [*avam*], and never shared their own feelings with them . . . but he [the poet] never looked upon his nation as divided into two groups, as *avam* and *havas*,<sup>3</sup> but instead [tried to unite] them together under a national ideal. . . . He generalized the usage of the İstanbul dialect<sup>4</sup> . . . which became the language of an entire nation. . . . He did not seek inspiration in French or Persian [literature], nor in the singing of dervishes<sup>5</sup> or folk poets,<sup>6</sup> but turned to his own soul. Thus he understood the Turkish feeling. He found his topics, stories, language, and bravery in the Turkish soul.

This description, in fact, fits perfectly Ömer's own literary-political accomplishments.

Ömer Seyfeddin spent his childhood mostly in Gönen, where he attended elementary school. His warm feeling for nature, his joy in living, his ability to establish intimate rapport with his subjects, as well as his realism, may be attributed in part to this early childhood spent in intimacy with the uninhibited natural environment of this town. The description in *Falaka* (Swingle Tree) of his schoolhouse (ca. 1890) and of the teacher in Gönen is probably one of the best portraits of the educational system in the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the origins of the legends and fairy tales which appear in various forms in his writing may easily be traced to the folklore of his native region.

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<sup>3</sup> This expression is important in understanding criteria of social differentiation in Ottoman society. It can be translated as "mass" and "elite." Actually, the true meaning of *havas* was "those who possess high feelings and ideas, and live in such a world," and of *avam*, "those who live in the low world of sensations."

<sup>4</sup> The idea of using a Turkish dialect, namely the dialect spoken in İstanbul, was put forth by Ziya Gökalp, the nationalist ideologue of the period. The purpose was to achieve national unity, and a common language was considered an essential condition for this.

<sup>5</sup> The reference is to a group of poets in the nineteenth century who, inspired by the school of the mystical poet Şeyh Galip, strove to maintain the religious (*Sûfî*) type of poetry. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, this poetry was often recited in the *tekke*, or living quarters, of the mystical dervishes. These latter-day hedonist mystics, however, had little relation to the old mystics.

<sup>6</sup> *Saz Şairleri*, or folk poets, became important as the representatives of folklore during the rise of Turkish nationalism after 1908. In reality, these were poets in their own right, often dealing with local themes, but using the vernacular. Some writers, in part inspired by Fuat Köprülü, the historian who studied the folk poets, began to imitate their style.

Ömer eventually moved to İstanbul and enrolled in a military school, but seemed very happy to move later to a similar institution in Edirne, where class distinctions were less evident. Then he went back to İstanbul, where he finished his military education. Commissioned to teach in a military school in İzmir, he became acquainted with a small circle of men interested in literature. In İzmir he learned French, lest his literary tastes remain at the level of the *harabat* poets.<sup>7</sup> Later he translated *Ilyada* (The *Iliad* of Homer, published in 1927) and *Kalavela*, both of which seem to have contributed to his understanding of the epic form. In İzmir he seems to have been influenced by Baha Tevfik, a rationalist-materialist Westernist and an apologist for the use of a simplified or vernacular Turkish, and Hüseyin Hilmi (known as “the socialist”), who had published briefly the *Serbest İzmir* (Free İzmir), a literary review.

Later, from 1909 to 1911, Ömer served in the Balkans in the Monastır area with a unit fighting the nationalist guerilla bands. It is here that he acquired a first-hand knowledge of the Christian minorities, and especially of their nationalist aspirations. Indeed, Ömer’s own nationalist ideas, as well as those of the entire revolutionary group in Salonica, which played a vital role in redefining the content of emerging Turkish nationalism in 1908–18, can properly be understood only in the light of their exposure to the ideas of the Balkan nationalists. Niyazi Bey, one of the leaders of the revolt in 1908, openly acknowledged that his nationalism was inspired by the Macedonian revolt of 1903.

Ömer eventually resigned from the army to become a contributor to *Genç Kalemler* (Young Pens), the major Turkish nationalist review defending the language reform. In Salonica he became acquainted with Ziya Gökalp, who had an overwhelming influence on his political ideas. Salonica, it must be noted, was the seat of the Union and Progress Committee, which organized the revolution of 1908, thus starting the chain of events which led to the establishment of the Republic. In fact, Salonica, a busy port with direct connections to the West, was for a while the *de facto* capital of the Ottoman Empire, as the seat of the ruling Union and Progress Committee.

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<sup>7</sup> This was a group of bohemian poets of the nineteenth century, whose social pessimism and escapism was reflected in their poems exalting the material pleasure derived from wine drinking.

During the Balkan war of 1912–13, Seyfeddin fought on the Greek front, and eventually, after defending his area almost to the last man, he was taken prisoner and spent about a year in a Greek prison. After the war he returned to İstanbul. He died of an unknown illness on March 6, 1920, at the age of thirty-six, just about the time he had reached intellectual and artistic maturity. That he planned to write a series of novels and plays is indicated by his unfinished works.

The literary career of Ömer Seyfeddin seems to have been intimately involved with the idea of using the vernacular as the language of Turkish literature. This idea was one of several that were basic to the projected language reform. Though language reform was one of the main principles of Ömer's own nationalist philosophy, he regarded the use of a simplified language not as an ideological weapon, but as an essential condition for mass communication and national education. In his letter offering to write for the review *Genç Kalemler*, he spoke about the adoption of the vernacular as a true "revolution in literature and language." Ömer's work consisted mostly of short stories. He wrote a total of 135 stories (found so far), most of which date from after 1917. Some of these deal with the same topic and have a common hero, and were therefore published together as a novel.

Some of Ömer's short stories were written very hurriedly, as publishing became his main source of livelihood.<sup>8</sup> Some stories appear

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<sup>8</sup> Ömer Seyfeddin's complete literary works were first published, beginning in 1938, by Muallim Ahmet Halit Yaşaroğlu, a publishing house in İstanbul, in nine volumes: i. *İlk Düşen Ak*. ii. *Yüksek Ökçeler*. iii. *Bomba*. iv. *Gizli Mabeyn*. v. *Asilzadeler*. vi. *Bahar ve Kelebekler*. vii. *Beyaz Lale*. viii. *Mahçupluk İmtihani*. ix. *Tarih Ezeli Bir Tekerrürdür*. These were reprinted, in a revised, annotated edition, by the same house under the direction of Şerif Hulusi after 1958. In fact, the edition of 1958 was the sixth printing, but with the addition of a tenth volume, entitled *Nokta*. The best edition, including some newly discovered stories, is that undertaken by Tahir Alangu; the new set was published by the Rafet Zaimler publishing house in İstanbul, beginning in 1962. This last series is the most comprehensive one, though not the best organized. It bears the following titles: i. *Bomba* [Bomb]. ii. *Beyaz Lale* [White Tulip]. iii. *İlk Düşen Ak* [The First Gray Hair]. iv. *Yüksek Ökçeler* [High Heels]. v. *Eski Kahramanlar* [Ancient Heroes]. vi. *Gizli Mabeyn* [Secret Temple]. vii. *Bahar ve Kelebekler* [Spring and Butterflies]. viii. *Efruz bey* [Mr. Efruz]. ix. *Falaka* [Swingle Tree]. x. *Mahçupluk İmtihani* [Trial of Shyness]; and xi. *Aşk Dalgası* [Love Wave].

In addition, Seyfeddin has a sociopolitical story, originally written in 1913, *Ashab-ı Kehfimiz* [Nobles] (1918), which is often described as a novel; a Turanist pamphlet *Yarınki Turan Devleti* [Tomorrow's State of Turan] (1914), reprinted by N. Sencer in 1958; and a series of unfinished works. See the Alangu edition of his works, pp. 535–44, and the Dizdaroğlu biography, pp. 32–36.

merely as diary notes. Other stories lack organization, or even a plot, and contain profane allusions designed to interest the reader. Yet, each story has a literary quality, a power of suggestion and of communication, and a simplicity of feeling which leaves a moving and lasting impression. The artist always prevails, whether he discusses politics or a man's plight.

Ömer Seyfeddin was the Anton Chekhov of Turkey. He lived in anxiety in a society overwhelmed by internal change and threatened with extinction by outside powers, and he well expressed his own and his contemporaries' feelings. He used satire and humor to criticize the shortcomings of contemporary society and of the people around him. In 1918–20 he witnessed the defeat and occupation of the Ottoman Empire by the Allies and died without seeing the day of liberation.

The language used by Ömer Seyfeddin in his stories was his greatest contribution to modern Turkish literature. It was a simple but expressive language, as used in everyday life. Yet, it proved to be a powerful instrument of communication, conveying in crisp but natural expressions the thoughts and feelings shared by the overwhelming majority of the people. Unity through communication was thus achieved.

### III. *From Ottomanism to Turkish Nationalism: The Making of an Ideology*

Turkish nationalism acquired its modern content during the Young Turk period. It developed together with the ideas of modernization, secularism, and reformism, to become the dominant ideology of the Turkish Republic after 1923. In Ömer Seyfeddin's writings, nationalism appears essentially as a search for a national consciousness through the adoption of the vernacular, the identification of the elite with the culture of the masses, and the achievement of progress within a national state. But Ömer also defended patriotism—that is, attachment to the land, to the people, and to the native culture—

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Seyfeddin continues to be widely read in Turkey. New editions of his works have been reprinted, but so far none has equaled Alangu's edition, which was reissued in 1982. The Bilgi publishing house published the same works in 1970.

as an indispensable condition for unity and political-social integration. He was driven to this point of view, which was conditioned by his own background, and by the exigencies of the political order of which he became a part.

Ömer Seyfeddin's early idea of nationalism and patriotism seems to have been in the form of a natural attachment to one's place. He had been brought up to regard loyalty to the throne, maintenance of the status quo, and preservation of ancient values as part of a permanent social arrangement. But his apolitical attachment to the land began to change at the end of 1908, when he was transferred to a unit located around the village of Yakorit in the Monastir area of the Balkans. There he met Bulgarian intellectuals, all nationalists, who claimed that Turks could not have political ideas, and consequently could not become nationalistic, because of their religious concept of state and society. The Bulgarians saw the Ottoman Empire not as a multinational state, but as a mere political order ruled by Turks who had no sense of national consciousness (see *Nakarât; The Refrain*).<sup>9</sup> He discovered that the Balkan nationalists were firmly attached to their ideal of national liberation, and delighted in telling their national legends and in expressing their political ambitions. Even the young Bulgarian girl enamored of the Turkish officer sang "Nash, nash, Tzarigrad, nash." The officer thought that she sang love songs, only to be awakened to reality when an old man told him what the words meant: "Ours, ours, İstanbul is ours." The Balkan nationalists regarded the *Ilinden* (the revolt in Macedonia in 1903, which was rapidly quelled) as a symbol for the continuing struggle for independence, and as a reminder that sooner or later revenge had to be taken. (This, in fact, occurred later in the war of 1912–13, when most of the Ottoman possessions in the Balkans were lost to Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia. The Bulgarian communist government completed this revenge by changing Turkish names to Christian ones in 1984–85, in effect achieving a forced conversion.)

The Balkan guerrillas recruited men both by force and by persuasion. Some inhabitants wanted to emigrate to America and to lead their lives in this peaceful land, but could not get away. They

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<sup>9</sup> This story has a subtitle: "From the Diary of an Old Officer Who Spent His Youth in Macedonia."

had to stay and fight for the liberation of their native land. The heroine of one story, *Bomba* (Bomb), is a young woman, Magda, who is anxiously waiting for her husband to return home so that they can prepare to leave for America the next day. Instead, there comes the chief of the guerillas, to leave “a bomb” in the house. This turns out to be the head of Magda’s husband. He had dared to defy the guerillas, and to try to avoid his “national responsibilities.”

The nationalists in the Balkans won their struggle, often taking advantage of the Ottomans’ goodwill, and forcing the Turks living in those areas to abandon their homes and lands (*Tuhaf bir Zulum*; A Strange Oppression). All this happened because the Turks’ level of education was so low, and they were so deeply immersed in their religious, fatalistic concept of life, that they accepted everything as preordained. But the Ottoman intellectuals were not much better. Many joined the army merely to become staff officers in order to rise to positions of power and prestige, to live an easy life in İstanbul, and to go to the West as military *attachés* in order to enjoy life there (*Nakarât*).

Meanwhile, the nationalists among the Christian groups in the Balkans found support and understanding among their own kin. They had been molded together into a nation, helped by similarities of language and by the idea that they all had a common past. They spoke a simple, common language, in which class differences were not yet evident. Their songs and tales reflected so much of their daily life, their joys, and their aspirations, that they formed an integral part of their world and of themselves. Indeed, their lives had been remade and galvanized by a political ideal: nationalism.

The Young Turks’ political impotence continued to manifest itself in military defeats and territorial losses, as indicated by the occupation of Tripolitania by the Italians in 1911. This occupation was labeled by Ömer Seyfeddin as a betrayal of the humanitarian ideals of brotherhood and the equality of men, and of the doctrines of freedom and independence which European nations preached to non-Europeans. The Italians, in the note addressed to the Ottoman government, claimed that Tripolitania was the only area left out of the European “civilizing” mission. Expressing Ömer’s reaction to the West’s betrayal of its own principles, Kenan bey, the hero of *Primo-Türk Çocuğu* (Number One Turkish Son), who had married an Italian girl and had become thoroughly Westernized, rejecting his own cul-

ture and identity, chose to return to his original cultural allegiance. His son, Primo, followed him.<sup>10</sup>

These developments could not fail to affect the old type of passive Turkish nationalism, which was oriented toward resistance and the preservation of the status quo. The Turkish intellectuals in Salonica experienced a growing desire to broaden the scope of their own nationalism in such a way as to achieve total national salvation, by creating the *Yeni Hayat* (New Life). This became, in fact, the ideal of the new generation. Ömer Seyfeddin moved with the new, active phase of nationalism, by defining the role of language and literature in the formation of national consciousness. In one story, *İlk Düşen Ak* (The First Gray Hair), he declared through the mouth of his hero that people with a common religion and language should be considered as part of the same nation.<sup>11</sup>

Turkish nationalism, however, still lacked a dynamic, optimistic quality, and was thus unable to dispel the gloom generated by what was considered inevitable defeat (and even extinction) with the loss of Bosnia in 1908, the Italian War in 1911, and the disastrous Balkan War of 1913. This feeling was increased by a pathological inferiority complex toward Europe. Dr. A. Cevdet recommended a full imitation of everything European. A degree of self-confidence was restored only by the heroic resistance of the Turkish soldiers to the British invasion at the Dardanelles in 1915, known as the battle of Gallipoli in the Western literature. This was, in fact, the starting point of the political transformation of the Turkish Ottomans into Turks.<sup>12</sup> Indeed,

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<sup>10</sup> Another story, *Piç* [Bastard], describes a Turk who is happy to discover that he was illicitly conceived by a Frenchman and his adulterous Turkish mother.

<sup>11</sup> There is no precise information about the date of publication of this biographical story. Many of the ideas expressed in it may be found in Ziya Gökalp's nationalist writings. It must be noted that Ömer Seyfeddin's early ideas on nationalism were influenced by Turanism, and by the idea that kinship and blood relations are unity-forming bonds. After 1914, these views were gradually discarded. As early as 1911, Seyfeddin published an article on the "New Language" in *Genç Kalemler*. Here he called on young people to save the nation through "strong and serious progress." "Progress is possible," he wrote, "through the development of science, technology, and literature among us. In order to publicize [generalize] these, we need a common national language . . . without a natural and national language, science, technology, and literature will remain as they are today, an enigma. Let us abandon the language of the yesterdays. Let us write spoken Turkish, as it lives with all its rules and principles" (reproduced in the Alangu edition, p. 170, and in Dizdaroğlu, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-50).

<sup>12</sup> In 1915, Ömer Seyfeddin, together with a group of other writers, visited the

the hero in *Çanakkaleden Sonra* (After Gallipoli) used to believe fatalistically that his nation was doomed to perish, and that its people would become the slaves of the Russians, French, and English. But the incredible had happened: "The English and French battleships could not cross the Dardanelles . . . [consequently] his despair gradually disappeared, and he realized that he was part of a nation which had achieved self-realization, which had an ideal, and was alive."

Thus, the original literary nationalism/patriotism acquired distinctive activist political features. Gradually, this broader politically-oriented nationalism began to provide the basic viewpoint for judging people and events in society, including the national image of Turks. "The Turks were also a nation. But having lived in the *umma* (Muslim community), they ignored their own nationality and origin. One must modernize in order to become a nation, but many Turks started imitating the French, and therefore could not progress. In fact the Turks, similar to other nations, have a national personality of their own. They can advance if they can define their own nationality" (*Çanakkaleden Sonra*).<sup>13</sup>

Soon afterward, Seyfeddin began to treat the idea of nation and national personality as a focus of individual loyalty and cultural allegiance. This was evident in his bitter criticism of cultural alienation. He used with utmost mastery the genre of satire to ridicule those who denigrated their own country, culture, background, and national responsibility, seeking salvation in the blind acceptance and imitation of foreign models.<sup>14</sup>

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Gallipoli battlefield. For the Gallipoli campaign, Alan Moorehead's *Gallipoli* (New York, 1956) is still the best-known popular account, although other, more recent works give far better insights. See Robert R. James, *Gallipoli* (New York, 1965).

<sup>13</sup> The ideas expressed in this story also appear elsewhere. "The nation has essentially one single language. The *umma* has one common religion but different languages, such as the language of the Turkish and Arab nations, which form the Muslim *umma*. The language of one is Arabic, of the other Turkish. Ottomanism is a state and not a nationality (nation). Since Ottomanism is not nationalism, there cannot be a language called Ottoman" (see Yöntem, 1947 ed., p. 138).

<sup>14</sup> This theme is repeated in various forms in the stories of Ömer Seyfeddin. It comes out usually as a contrast between the modes of life, of *alafrañga*, "à la française," versus *alaturca*, "à la turque," or "modern" versus "traditional." Ömer Seyfeddin envisaged this conflict as disruptive to family harmony, and as creating unhappiness (see *Nadan*). One personal reason for this extreme attitude toward cultural alienation may have been caused by Ömer Seyfeddin's divorce. His wife seems to have had an excessive liking for modern forms of life, while Ömer was interested in its essence. *Nadan* is an excellent story, portraying conflicts between husband and wife caused by differing concepts of modernity.



The story *Fon Sadriştaynın Karısı* (The Wife of Von Sadristein) is the best example of his criticism of cultural alienation. Sadrettin, who went to visit Germany, was so overwhelmed by the domestic qualities of modern German women that he divorced his Turkish wife in order to marry a German girl. He even adopted a new name, von Sadristein. His new wife was orderly, hard-working, economical, and so efficient that she gave birth to her child all by herself after delivering lunch to her husband, then returning to her feet to prepare his dinner. "Indeed," declared von Sadristein, "the entire wealth of Germany, the strength of her armies are the product of German womanhood . . . the German woman, who raised the population of Germany to sixty or seventy million people in a century, was able to lift my own weight from 125 to 200 pounds." However, later in life, when his son abandons him to go to America to seek adventure, and his wife remains insensitive to the country's spirit, von Sadristein realizes how lonely he is.

Criticism was also directed against the Ottomanists and Islamists who ignored nationalism. The former, many of whom became members of the opposition parties, regarded nationalism and Turkism as regressive currents opposed to the scientific humanitarian views of the West, and did not hesitate to cooperate with the occupying powers in İstanbul in 1918 (*Gayet Büyük Bir Adam*; A Very Great Man).<sup>15</sup> The Islamists accused the nationalists of having destroyed Islamic unity, and thus inviting foreign occupation.

The war years (1914–18) brought about the addition of a new historical dimension to Seyfeddin's concept of Turkish nationalism. "If the artist cannot find the [necessary] exaltation in a contemporary ideal, he should turn to the romantic past, for in the past thousands of heroes live in legends" (*Kaç Yerinden*; "Many Places"). It was evident that if the nation could become aware of its past achievements and glories, its will to fight would be enhanced.<sup>16</sup> Discipline,

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<sup>15</sup> The hero in this story is easily identified as Rıza Tevfik, known also as "the philosopher." He was one of the chief opponents of the Union and Progress Party, and then opposed the nationalists during the struggle for national liberation. He was eventually exiled, but returned to Turkey toward the end of his life. See his memoirs, *Serabi Ömürüm* [My Illusory Life] (İstanbul, 1949).

<sup>16</sup> Actually, in 1915, and then again in 1917, the ruling Union and Progress Party found it necessary to resuscitate the patriotic zeal of officers and soldiers through literary epic writings. The progovernment newspaper, *Tanin*, pointed out that the French and the Germans were making extensive use of literature to stim-

loyalty, and obedience to the commander (*Ferman*; “Decree”), the wit to outdo the enemy (*Kütük*; “Log” and *Vire*; “Surrender”), a belief in predestined glory (*Kızulelma Neresi*; “The Site of Red Apple”), and an unshaken belief in ultimate victory were characteristics of the victorious ancestors of the Turks, according to Ömer, and he brought these characteristics to public attention in his stories.

The First World War was nearing its end; the defeat of Ottoman armies seemed inevitable, as did the doom of the Union and Progress Party and its policies. Ömer Seyfeddin had supported the Union and Progress chiefly because he believed that its policies would rejuvenate and modernize the country. In a short story he wrote:

When the constitution was reinstated [in 1908] we used to dream that all our [intellectual] resources would stream forward like hidden springs, and we would reach the level of Europe in ten or fifteen years. We returned to our birthplaces, to our farms and occupations. We believed in everything written in the İstanbul newspapers . . . but here [in Anatolia] there is just one idea: reaction. Indeed, this is a most persistent ideal. (*Memlekete Mektup*; “Letter Home”)

Eventually, his disillusion with the party grew, and his contributions to the *Yeni Mecmua* (New Review), in which he published many of his stories, became rare. Like many other nationalists, Ömer began to be preoccupied with the policy to be followed in case of foreign occupation.<sup>17</sup> He voiced the general idea that the salvation of the country lay in the leadership of great men with exceptional qualities,

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ulate their citizens’ bravery and sacrifice. The Turkish writers, *Tanin* complained, were not sufficiently nationalistic to produce a similar literature. See the article, reproduced in the Alangu edition, pp. 350–51. Ömer Seyfeddin answered the call by writing more than twenty stories whose subjects were taken from Ottoman history. He used as sources for some of his stories the *Chronicle of Naima* (1655–1718), and especially, the *Chronicle of İbrahim Peçevi* (1574–1651), whose ideological views of Ottoman history suited his views. In fact, one story, *Baş Vermeyen Şehit* [The Martyr Who Wouldn’t Give His Head], is taken almost intact from *Peçevi’s Chronicle* (İstanbul, 1847), 1, 356–67, 358–63. This chronicle, which describes events of the sixteenth century, includes a series of legends. Ömer’s stories with historical subjects are usually collected in a volume entitled *Eski Kahramanlar* [Ancient Heroes].

<sup>17</sup> In 1917 several intellectuals, including Yusuf Akçura, were already holding meetings at the headquarters of the *Türk Yurdu* [Turkish Homeland], the principal nationalist ideological review, in an attempt to define the essential characteristics of Turkish nationalism. The idea was to stress those features, language and religion, which had wide popular appeal, in order to mobilize the population for resistance if the country should be occupied by the Allies. Halide Edip Adıvar, *Mor Salkamlı Ev* (İstanbul, 1936), pp. 189 f.

who had total dedication to government service and the country, as in the glory days of the Ottoman Empire (*Köse Vezir*; “Beardless Vizier”). The desire for a charismatic leader had become a practical necessity, but this was not enough: the struggle for liberation was to begin in the Anatolian homeland among the masses, with the firm conviction that the Turks would always survive. The hero of this story writes to his friend:

We Turks went through many disasters in history. Our state was left without a government and without a ruler. Brothers became each others' enemies. But at the end we still managed to get together. We didn't perish. . . . I shall not stay here [in İstanbul]. At the first occasion, I shall start on my journey. . . . İstanbul needs guidance from the countryside. From now onward we must listen to the heartbeat of our beloved nation, wherever we are; in our homes, up in the high mountains, in our mud-covered, white-walled hamlets by the foaming wells. . . . Yes, we have endless problems and unbearable misery. But we have a soul which death cannot ever [dare] to approach. Even when this soul is deemed to have died, it is not dead. At the most unexpected time, it suddenly revives. (*Memlekete Mektup*)

Indeed, even as Ömer Seyfeddin was writing these lines, the struggle for liberation, and the painful process of national formation, had already begun in Anatolia and was ready for its leader, Mustafa Kemal.<sup>18</sup>

Seyfeddin passed away on March 6, 1920, without having seen the fulfillment of his national dream. He had lived step by step through the disintegration of the multinational empire and the failure of Pan-Turkism. He did not see the rise of the Turkish national state, but he did witness its beginnings: the burgeoning idea of a nation united by a common language, and aware of its political existence. His literary writings had contributed greatly toward the achievement of this vital step in the process of nation formation.

#### IV. *The Intellectual: Social Status and Political Role*

The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 aimed at reinstating the constitutional régime of 1876, which had been abrogated by Sultan

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<sup>18</sup> The movement of national resistance began in the latter part of 1918. The story itself was published in *Büyük Mecmua* on March 13, 1919.

Abdülhamid II (1876–1909). In practice, however, this political revolution proved merely the starting point of a series of profound social and cultural changes. The rise of intellectuals to positions of power in the government, press, and education, and the rapid politicization of all major spheres of public life, were the most significant outcomes of change. The schools established after 1869 and the economic activity, stimulated chiefly by trade, of the second half of the nineteenth century had given the process of change a content and direction different from that of the *Tanzimat* era.

The Union and Progress era (1908–18) may be considered a transitional phase, in which the old bureaucratic aristocracy and the religious elites, as well as the upper-class groups created in the nineteenth century, were replaced by a small property-owning, and an especially large intellectual class which used the expanded power of the central government to establish its own social and political hegemony, to become in fact a ruling class. The rise of this class to political power and social preeminence created a series of conflicts: first, it challenged the older bureaucrats, who strove to preserve their positions at all cost; second, it found itself at odds with the entrepreneurial groups that were expanding rapidly due to the government's economic policy of "division of labor." The aim of this policy was to create a national economy based on a native Turkish middle class of entrepreneurs and property owners. (The war years greatly stimulated the growth of this class.) The intellectuals' rise to power also raised other problems. First, there was a need to define the function of the intellectual within the framework of an emerging national state and its goal of modernization. Second, there was the problem of adapting society to the new pattern of social stratification, and of defining the new social strata as well as the criteria for status assignment. Third, there was the question of creating the symbols, the images, and the attitudes necessary for recognition, acceptance, and respect for the intelligentsia in society.

These problems were far more complicated than they appeared at first sight. In both theory and practice, Ottoman society was pervaded by a strong system of social ranking and class function that was rooted in centuries-old tradition. Moreover, the intelligentsia, as a new social and political group, was called upon to undertake political functions (political socialization, indoctrination, integration, creation of a national identity) for which it could find only limited precedent in its own culture. In addition, it was expected to perform differentiated,

specialized technical tasks for which it had only limited professional preparation. Thus, the intellectuals' rise to power was a multidimensional process of social differentiation and adaptation.

The problems outlined above manifested themselves in everyday life in the form of personal failure, frustration, or achievement. Irony and drama, the comedy of man and the tragedy of society, were blended together in concrete human situations. Only an artist with deep sensitivity, but also with a sense of humor, could have grasped the infinite aspects of these events. Ömer Seyfeddin's stature as a writer derives essentially from his ability to grasp and to describe the most intimate effects of change, as reflected in individuals' attitudes. The stories dealing with nationalist themes, though important for the study of ideology, are often rhetorical, didactic, and repetitious. But the stories relating to social change, and notably those dealing with the intelligentsia, are outstanding in every respect. The writer becomes personally and directly involved, for the story he tells is often that of a group to which he himself belonged.<sup>19</sup>

A series of stories, such as *Yuf Borusu Seni Bekliyor* (Damnation Awaits You), describe the passing of the old-time aristocracy; others, such as *Niçin Zengin Olmaması* (Why Did Not He Become Rich?), dealing with the black market profiteers, *Türkçe Reçete* (Turkish Prescription), *Yemin* (Oath), *Namus* (Honor), *Kesik Byık* (Cut Mustache), provide insights into social conflicts and the clash of values. Four stories, known as the Cabi Efendi series, *Mermer Tezgah* (Marble Bench), *Dama Taşları* (Draughts Pawns), *Makul Bir Dönüş* (Reasonable Return), and *Acaba Ne İdi?* (What Was It?), analyze the gradual adaptation of a fatalistic, traditional-minded man to the economic-minded new society, and the rise of a new type of bourgeoisie. We shall not analyze the aforementioned stories, but concentrate instead on the novel known as *Asilzadeler* (Nobles), or *Efruz bey*.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>19</sup> In fact, in the introduction to the novel *Efruz bey*, the author apologizes to his hero for exposing him, by saying: "My dear Efruz, everybody knows you as much as he knows himself. Today nobody is a stranger to you, for even if you are not 'all' of us, you are a part of us."

<sup>20</sup> We have used for this study the series edited by Şerif Hulusi, *Asilzadeler Efruz bey* [The Nobles-Efruz bey] (İstanbul, 1956-57). Pertev N. Boratav was the first to call attention to the continuity existing in the six stories which form the Efruz bey cycle. The author himself, in his original announcement, mentioned only five stories. See P.N. Boratav, *Ömer Seyfeddin, Folklor ve Edebiyat* (Ankara, 1945), II, 171-81. See also *Yurt ve Dünya* (March-April 1942), pp. 68-75. The first story appeared in the newspaper *Vakit* in 1919 and the rest in 1926, well after the writer's death.

The hero in all of the seven stories making up the novel is one and the same Efruz bey.<sup>21</sup> It would seem impossible one man could have so many different roles and carry out so many different functions which would normally require prolonged specialization, but this was possible in the early days of the Young Turk Revolution. The old standards had broken down. The new regime created a number of new political positions in order to consolidate its own power, but it still had no objective criteria to distinguish the opportunist from the honest man, the skilled person from the ignoramus. Each story criticizes some shortcoming of contemporary intellectuals: their lack of political education and failure to understand modern national ideals; their reaction to social mobility; their historical romanticism and ignorance of the country's true situation; their abuse of power and their frivolousness, which they justified in terms of nationalism, modernity, and language reform; and finally, their search for superficial amusement, and their uselessness to society. As a symbol of this rootlessness, Seyfeddin chooses one single hero, Efruz bey, who plays several often contradictory roles.

The career of Efruz bey begins amid the following circumstances. Ahmet bey, a petty official, had succeeded during the regime of Abdülhamid II in giving everybody the impression that he was on the sultan's side. And, of course, like all status seekers, he had to be *comme il faut* and *distingué*, so he falsely implied that he had studied at Galatasaray, the French *lycée*, where one became "modern" and "Europeanized." One morning, Ahmet was quick to notice a small official note in the newspaper, to the effect that the constitution had been reinstated.<sup>22</sup> He made his way to the Foreign Ministry, where everybody strove to speak French, and shouted "Long live freedom!" There he engaged in an abusive criticism of Abdülhamid, and described how he, Ahmet bey, had single-handedly forced the sultan at pistol point to reinstate freedom. Recounting in public his fantastic exploits as an underground activist, Ahmet bey soon became

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<sup>21</sup> The seventh story, *Sivrisinek* [The Mosquito], was added by the last editor, Alangu. It contains the author's final explicit judgment of Efruz bey. His opinion is, however, implicitly evident in the previous six stories, and consequently *Sivrisinek*, being more didactic, has less value than the others.

<sup>22</sup> This is exactly how the sultan announced the reinstatement of the constitution of 1876, thus accepting the demands of the officers and intellectuals, who had rebelled in Salonica in the summer of 1908.

a freedom hero. Since secrecy was the virtue of all revolutionaries (Union and Progress was a secret organization, and remained one even years after it had assumed power), Ahmet claimed that he had kept his real name so secret that even his own mother did not know it. Then he invented a “real name,” *Efruz* (the illuminator). The credulous mob, carrying him on its shoulders, quickly converted the name to *Afaroz* (the excommunicated). Efruz bey then provided a definition of freedom: “It means the Constitution. The Constitution means without difference of sex and sect . . . which means there is no sex and sect . . . a free man becomes equal, and equality means brotherhood, and thus there remain no differences of religion and nationality” (*Hürriyete Laik Bir Kahraman; A Hero Deserving Freedom*).<sup>23</sup>

Soon, however, Efruz bey is unmasked by the real revolutionaries, the Union and Progress Society; but, still undaunted, he seizes other opportunities, which are plentiful. The breakdown of the old order had enabled commoners to break the social mold, and to attempt to lead an upper-class life. Men who felt that they were socially superior to others, in particular the intellectuals, sought avidly for arguments to create superior positions and status for themselves. They were the new class, the nobles of the new order, and they especially sought to prove their nobility by not dealing in “unbecoming” occupations, such as regular work and politics. And since achievement had not yet become the criterion for status assignment, they sought stature in prescriptive claims. Their affiliation with the Ottoman bureaucratic aristocracy, temporarily downgraded by the revolution, being of no use, they turned to race and ancient history. Efruz bey and his friends, who were all supposedly graduates of the Galatasaray, became convinced that “without nobility this country would sink” (*Asiller Klübü; The Nobles’ Club*). They reinterpreted history to prove their own noble origin, which they preferred to find somewhere outside Turkey. Ömer Seyfeddin satirized their alienation and ignorance. One claimed that he was the descendant of Lord Johnson Sgovat, who came as British ambassador to Sultan Orhan (1326–59). The sultan married him to his “stepsister” (*siit kız kardeş* in the text, that is, “nurtured by the same nurse”), and kept him in

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<sup>23</sup> The eyewitnesses to the revolution agree that “freedom” meant whatever one wanted it to be: a white-clad nun, the right to do whatever one wished to do, the members of the Union and Progress Central Committee, etc.

the Empire. Another claimed that he was the Eternal Prince of Kara Tanburin, and proved that his family was of divine origin.<sup>24</sup> The third, Kaysussujufuzrtaf, traced his origin to the romantic era of desert life, when his ancestors carried out the *ghazwa* and had their name mentioned in the *Mu'allaqāt*. Efruz bey himself “felt” the entire history of his noble family in the depths of his heart, as clearly indicated by his father’s journey to Kastamonu, the land of Kızıl Ahmet. He therefore became “Prince Efruz of Kızıl.” Soon these “nobles” met to establish an organization for the purpose of locating other nobles, of giving them back their “proper” titles, and of fighting for their rights. The meeting was broken up by the police, since the meeting place was an illegal gambling house. But Efruz bey, sensing that the police *razzia* was a commoners’ plot against the nobility, confessed to the gambling charge in a Don Quixote-style gesture, and went serenely to jail, convinced that the “nobles” had succeeded in keeping their worthy endeavor a secret.

Efruz bey eventually became convinced that one had to cultivate oneself in order to become useful to the nation. His basic motives were, however, still personal: namely, to build a reputation as a learned man. In fact, he had actually become, in a very short time, an expert in every branch of learning, including national history.<sup>25</sup> Like many of his intellectual friends, he believed that the villager remained uncorrupted by the cosmopolitan, materialistic life dominant in the cities. The villager, in his view, was the “true” Turk, who had preserved all the virtues of the Turkish soul, such as friendliness and honesty, in their primitive beauty. But on a visit to rural areas, Efruz bey and his friends are treated rudely by the villagers, who even charge him five times the normal price for food. He is disappointed, but still hopeful that his image of the Turkish peasant was correct. Indeed, one boy in the village had shown them utmost

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<sup>24</sup> Many heroes in these stories are easily identifiable as Ömer Seyfeddin’s contemporaries. Eternal Prince, for instance, was the nationalist thinker Yusuf Akçora (later Akçoraoğlu), born in the Kazan region of Russia, who did, in fact, claim that his family tree could be historically traced for some fifteen hundred years. Akçora was the representative of the “pure Turkish” school. This school was accused of implying that the Ottoman Turks had become mixed with other races, whereas the nordic Turks, or Tatars, had preserved their racial purity. In the Republic, Yusuf Akçora was one of the guiding forces during the first historical and linguistic conventions which established Government policy in these fields.

<sup>25</sup> The hero in this story, according to Ali Canip Yöntem, the closest friend of Ömer Seyfeddin, was Haşim Nahit (“Erbil”); see Hulusi (ed.), *Asilzadele*, II, 147.



friendliness and even refused to take the money offered for his services; so Efruz bey pointed out the boy to the villagers as the model of the rural Turkish peasant. But the peasants laughingly tell him: "He is not a villager . . . but a gypsy" (*Tam Bir Görüş*; A Complete View).

Soon afterward, like many intellectuals interested in nationalism, Efruz bey became a prodigious lecturer on the subject. He delivered his lectures to audiences gathered in various branches of the *Türk Ocakları*.<sup>26</sup> In each lecture, he managed to mention as many as twenty book titles, although he had not read the books. In one lecture he claimed that knowledge was to be sought everywhere, "from the time of the cradle to the grave," and that one had to go even "to China in order to get it."<sup>27</sup> With quick and formal logic, Efruz bey demolished all other theories, all accepted ideas, and established his own views. The chairman of the *Türk Ocağı*, jealous of Efruz bey's success, dared to challenge his statements on "scientific" grounds. Indeed, in repeating the *hadith* about knowledge in Arabic, Efruz bey had mistakenly said from the "grave to the cradle," and thus had violated the foundations of scientific causality. However, the audience, composed mostly of Turks from Russia, was very friendly to Efruz bey. They called him "our Tolstoi," for he had told them, "You are the real Turks. The Turks of Turkey are not Turks. They are degenerates. We shall get civilization from you, and we all shall become Tatars" (*Bilgi Bucağında*; In the Land of Knowledge).<sup>28</sup> In his talks, Efruz bey covered every branch of knowledge, for instance: "The science of social events is called sociology and is part of the natural sciences, because it uses induction [*sic*], that is to say, it starts from a conclusion and goes to the premise." Actually, when he said "from the grave to the cradle," Efruz claimed that he had conformed to this basic method of reasoning.

Efruz bey's views on the question of language reform, a most vital topic during the Young Turk era, outdid all the proposals put forth by the apologists for a purified Turkish. The existing grammar rules

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<sup>26</sup> *Türk Ocakları* ("Turkish Hearths") were cultural organizations established in 1911. These became centers of nationalist education and indoctrination, as well as stepping stones for intellectuals seeking power and status.

<sup>27</sup> These are two well-known *hadiths* which emphasize the value of science and learning. The fact that *hadith* could be made the object of satire is an indication of the level of irreligiosity reached during the Young Turk era.

<sup>28</sup> See n. 24.

are to be reversed, and all “Arabic, Persian, and French words in the language, including the spoken language, are to be left out. Words without a Turkish counterpart are to be taken from Tatar and Mongolian, with Turkish suffixes added.”<sup>29</sup> Some of his followers pointed out the practical difficulties involved in so drastic a language reform, but Efruz bey had the solution: faith. (In fact, the language thus invented became in the Republic the distinguishing mark of a small ruling minority of intellectuals, and thus separated them from the masses.)

This linguistic interest led Efruz bey to another major problem which indeed preoccupied the nationalists at that time, namely, the historical origin and the achievements of Turks. Efruz bey’s most original finding, rivaling that of the greatest minds of his time, was that Americans were Turks. He also became involved in discussions concerning alphabet reform, and voiced immediate support for the alphabet proposed by Dr. İsmail Hakkı of Milas.<sup>30</sup> Finally, the serious-minded leaders of the nationalist movement asked Efruz bey to submit his talks in writing before delivery. Unable to do so, Efruz decided, under the pretext that morality was corrupted, to retire and live in the geographic fountainhead of Turkish nationalism, that is, in Turan.

Efruz bey soon reappeared in the role of an educator. But this time, he decided to seek the advice of another well-known educator, Mufat bey.<sup>31</sup> The latter did not believe in a Turkish national educational system, but rather in a practical one oriented toward the individual and his needs. Claiming that he had studied pedagogy in Europe, Efruz bey attacked his mentor, Mufat bey. He became

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<sup>29</sup> It is extremely difficult to translate this wordplay ridiculing various linguistic theories discussed by intellectuals of the Young Turk era. These discussions continued in the Republic, and are still as void of essence as they were during Ömer Seyfeddin’s time. The writer mentions the actual names of many intellectuals involved in these discussions, and ridicules many poets whose art had hitherto been considered unassailable: “Hamid [Abdülhak] is considered a genius because nobody knows his works.” Hamid was the idol of the romantics at the turn of the century.

<sup>30</sup> This was a proposal for language reform. It envisaged the use of Arabic letters separated from each other as in the Latin printed alphabet. Apparently, it was briefly used in 1911. See Hulusi (ed.), *Asilzadeler*, II, 149, n. 17.

<sup>31</sup> Mufat bey was the well-known Arab nationalist writer Sâî’ al-Ḥuşri, who was in İstanbul as an official in the Ministry of Education, and became involved in the educational polemics of the period. İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, the well-known Turkish educator, is also mentioned in the story. See Hulusi (ed.), *Asilzadeler*, II, 150.

an ardent supporter of "natural" education, going to the extreme to defend the state of nature. Efruz agreed with those educators who considered even school furniture a luxury, for luxury incited the poor against the rich. This was, in fact, proof that he was not a theorist. In order to realize his ideas on education, he decided to establish an open-air school at Hayırsızada (Useless Island, located in the Sea of Marmara); hence the title of the story *Açık Hava Mektebi*. This school was eventually to become self-supporting, like the Anglo-Saxon schools.<sup>32</sup> It was to be a school without books, paper, or pencils, and to involve no homework. He put his ideas before the schoolchildren, who agreed enthusiastically to all his proposals, including the idea of addressing their principal by his first name—which, being too long, was shortened to *Mistik*, a derogatory nickname.<sup>33</sup> But instead of reaching the island, the place where he intended to establish his school, Efruz ended up in Yalova, a resort town. Finally, at the peak of his intellectual prowess, Efruz bey, convinced that he was "an oral writer," "a famous poet without poems," and "a genius without any works," criticized everything and everyone, including the writer, and established his own literary school (*İnat*, "Stubbornness").<sup>34</sup> Surrounded by his disciples, he had the last word on any intellectual, philosophical, or literary problem. Even when proved wrong, he would not change his opinion or position. He thought that he was at the pinnacle of intellectual achievement. Closed in his own shell, he had become a self-satisfied, escapist egomaniac.

#### V. Conclusion

The short stories of Ömer Seyfeddin appear to reflect the social and political events of his time. It is rather easy to draw a parallel between them and actual events, ideas, and personalities which shaped the Young Turk era. Whatever their shortcomings, these short stories

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<sup>32</sup> This is probably an allusion to Robert College in İstanbul, which was seeking ways to become self-supporting, and which until recently had operated a pig farm.

<sup>33</sup> The humor of these speeches can be grasped only when viewed in the light of Turkish fondness for titles and the traditional respect for old age and rank.

<sup>34</sup> In *İnat* [Stubbornness], Efruz bey personifies the poet Yahya Kemal Beyatlı, and also answers one critic who had chided him on the awkward use of a verb tense.

do enable the reader to look at the process of modernization from inside, and thus to gain a new insight into the individual's adjustment to social change. This is vital, because in the ultimate analysis, it is the individual who bears the impact of change. Thus, a more complete and refined evaluation of the function played by literature, as well as the transformation of the literature itself within the framework of the general process of change, should greatly broaden our understanding of change. Moreover, such a retrospective approach would add a much-needed historical perspective to studies on modernization.

## CONTEMPORARY TURKISH LITERATURE\*

The emergence in the twenties of a modern literature marks a major transition in Turkey's cultural history. Today this literature exerts a profound influence on intellectuals in all walks of life. It constitutes the main source of their philosophical inspiration. It provides an escape from the whims of daily politics and an excessive social conservatism, and it offers a haven where unorthodox ideas can be dressed in an ordinarily acceptable form and expressed without too much fear of retaliation. Creating new social, political and intellectual currents, Turkey's contemporary literature is one of the most effective forces in her cultural advance.

The history of the Turkish Republic and the history of contemporary Turkish literature are closely interwoven; indeed, when the Republic undertook to remold Turkish culture, it chose literature as a major vehicle for shaping individual and social thinking in the pattern of its ideals. The reforms instituted between 1923–1945 sought to provide the new society with solid foundations along Western lines. Islamic traditionalism was rejected, the Sultanate and the Caliphate—strongholds of political and theocratic absolutism—were swept away and Western science and positivist philosophy were elevated to supreme goals. A vast government-sponsored program of translations from Western literary masterpieces was designed to inculcate youth with fresh ideas as well as new methods of literary expression. The abolition of the Arabic alphabet and the substitution of the vernacular for the language of the upper classes, which was filled with Arabic and Persian words, helped greatly to reconcile the written and the spoken language, and reading became accessible for the first time to the large mass of people. In still another major effort to implement its goals, the Republic established in 1930–31 almost five hundred People's Houses in cities and towns and over four thousand People's Rooms in villages, whose purpose was to stimulate intellectual and creative interests in several fields, but with emphasis

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on theater, writing and publication and the development and use of libraries.

The Republic prescribed certain conditions under which creative work would be protected: it must condemn the old regime, glorify nationalism and modernism, promote patriotism, inculcate the ideal of personal sacrifice for the common good . . . Since the People's Houses reached even remote segments of society, the government program dealt a severe blow to the old order, but the new conformity lent some encouragement to a new dogmatism by providing chauvinists with the opportunity to taboo, in the name of nationalism, any ideas that did not please them. Government sponsorship of art, particularly of literature, however, was never wholly monopolistic. Outside the official program, a much larger number of writers published articles and books and edited magazines according to their own tastes and interests. Thus, in spite of certain limitations, the Republic's policy produced three major beneficial effects: first, it encouraged the acceptance of the West as the source of the new order's inspiration; second, by discrediting the Ottoman past, it stimulated new currents of thought which were free of overt opposition from reactionaries; and third, through the People's Houses, it provided writing and publishing experience useful to authors and editors in the later development of their own ideas through private publication.

Although the old *Divan* and *Tekke* (palace and religious) literature by 1935 had been thoroughly undermined by the new nationalist literature, which drew on the country and the people as the source of its inspiration, the life depicted by the committed nationalist poets—Faruk Nafiz Çamlıbel, Yusuf Ziya Ortaç, Orhan Seyfi Orhon—was over-idealized. Their work lacked the originality, freedom and personality found in the independent modern poetry of, for example, Yahya Kemal Beyatlı and Ahmet Haşım, the former excelling in the use of traditional meter, the latter in symbolism, and both, antedating the nationalist poets, exerted a profound artistic influence on Turkish poetry. Nazım Hikmet Ran, another pioneering poet of considerable distinction at this time, moved to the extreme left to depict the social conflicts of the industrial age. In fiction a number of independent writers, to be discussed later, likewise stimulated a keen public awareness of critical social problems.

Thus a new Turkish literature came into its own, yet much of it remained impersonal and static. It described national aspirations and

exposed social conditions, but it did not reveal inner feelings and states of mind and it lacked the drive that comes from contact with living reality and intellectual and artistic diversity. Its language was intelligible to the masses, but it was still cliché-ridden. Actually, it failed to achieve an intrinsic national spirit—the unique-universal quality that would reveal the basic inner attitude of Turks as individuals and as a culture toward life and its problems. Without such a quality, Turkish literature could not hope to attain stature among the world's great literatures.

The one current which led to a dynamic contemporary Turkish literature stressed from its earliest beginnings personal expression free from rigidly prescribed forms. The *Yedi Meşaleciler* (Seven Torch Bearers), among whom Yaşar Nabi Nayır, Ziya Osman Saba and Cevdet Kudret Solok deserve mention, spearheaded the modern movement which defended sincerity, vitality and experimentation. The review *Meşale* (Torch), which appeared briefly in 1928, and *Varlık* (Existence), which has been published regularly by Yaşar Nabi since 1933—a real publishing record for Turkey—strengthened the new current by publishing the modern works of young writers and poets. In recent years other publications—*Yeditepe* (Seven Hills), *Yeni Ufuklar* (New Horizons), *Dost* (Friend)—have vigorously aligned themselves with the movement. A number of smaller reviews—*Yaprak* (Leaf), *Yeni Fikirler* (New Ideas), *İstanbul*—have likewise promoted at various times the modernist cause.

On this substantial groundwork, a major new effort was built with the publication in 1941 of a collection of poems in a modest volume entitled *Garip* (Strange). *Garip* contained the work of three poets: Orhan Veli [Kank], Oktay Rifat [Horozcu], and Melih Cevdet [Anday]. The first of the three, generally known as Orhan Veli, conceived the project, selected the poems, and wrote the introduction which proposed the poetics of the group as fruitful goals for Turkish poets generally. The original edition of *Garip* has long been out of print and Orhan Veli has now been dead for ten years, but the movement he founded continues to dominate Turkish lyrical poetry.

The introduction to *Garip* sparked a revolution in contemporary Turkish poetry:

The understanding on which the new poetry is based does not belong to a minority class. The majority of people earn their living in this world by an endless striving. Poetry, like everything else, is their due and must appeal to them. [We] are not attempting to [satisfy] the

demand of these people through the old literature. This is not a defense of the class interests . . . but a search for its artistic tastes in order to make it the master of art. One can reach a new understanding . . . only by using the new means and new ways.

There is no artistry and no new effort in attempting to squeeze some theories into known forms. The entire structure must be altered from its foundations. For years we have guided our taste and will power and tried to deliver ourselves from the influence of literatures that formed [our tastes]. In order to escape their suffocating influence we were forced to reject all that those literatures taught us. We wish it were possible to reject even the language that restricts our creative endeavors by expecting particular words in writing poetry.

The two salient features of the bold new program—a socio-democratic spirit centered in the lives of people and freedom to experiment—provoked, as expected, a storm among the older writers and in universities long accustomed to scholastic works and oriented to the past. Many of the young writers creating in the new style were accused of leftist deviations and of tendentious writing which allegedly debased cultural values and traditions.

Specifically, the three poets of *Gariş* and their numerous followers—among them Asaf Halet Çelebi, Orhon M. Arıburnu, and many younger writers—stand for “clarity” and “spontaneity” as opposed to the “contrived” and “stereotyped” nature of traditional Turkish poetry.

It is understandable and perhaps inevitable but still curious that contemporary Turkish poetry should be so eager to break with all the traditions of its classical past when the great poets of Western Europe—from Goethe in his *Westöstlicher Divan* and August Graf von Platen in his *Ghazellen* to St.-John Perse—have again and again sought to enrich European poetry by seeking inspiration from the type of classical Islamic poetry popularly associated with the name of Omar Khayyam. The *Gariş* group turns its back on all this “classical” art of the *Divans* to seek new forms in the country’s own popular poetry or in the contemporary French poetry of Guillaume Apollinaire and Paul Eluard, the Russian poetry of Vladimir Mayakovsky, or the lyrical epigrams of Japan.

Much of contemporary Turkish lyrical poetry—and most contemporary Turkish poetry is lyrical—thus tends to be a poetry of immediate perception and feeling rather than of synthesis, recollection or reflection. Such lyrical poetry can express admirably and often concisely the “spleen” that assails a sensitive and witty poet in a frustratingly complex urban civilization.



Any account of recent Turkish poetry must devote considerable space to Orhan Veli, who set its course and pace. Experimenting with modern forms as early as 1937, at the age of twenty-three, he had advanced sufficiently far to undertake with his friends the publication of *Garip*. Orhan believed that the writing of poetry is, above all, devoted labor, consisting of constant experimentation in order to find the precise word with the proper intonation that would awaken a desired effect in the reader. His poems, many of which are read almost at a glance and appear to be rather artless, are in fact the product of dedicated craftsmanship. Influenced by French surrealism, he believed that poetry is the art of conveying impressions and images with an economy of words and free of descriptive elaboration. It is the effect that matters. Poetry cannot be matter-of-fact, but it must be clear enough in its evocations to be intelligible. This requires, in turn, mastery of the language and its nuances. Consequently poetry is untranslatable. A poem must be considered in its entirety, not approached piecemeal as verse or rhyme—the poet therefore must be skilled in fitting the parts into the organic whole. These general precepts are not rigid rules and regulations. Each poet must experiment for himself with new forms and images, keeping his mind alive to fresh ideas, for a poet “believing that there is nothing to believe beyond his own credo is a bigot.”

Orhan Veli's source of inspiration was the human being, individually and collectively, as he appeared in daily life. His admiration, like Sait Faik's, centered on the “little man,” both the manual and intellectual worker. (The preoccupation with the “little man” in contemporary literature is the result concurrently of the new democratic currents and the reaction against upper class Ottoman absolutism.) During the last year of his life, Orhan published a two-page newspaper, *Yaprak* (The Leaf), devoted exclusively to letters. In *Yaprak* he and his friends fought outworn ideas and customs, but social concern in Orhan's poetry is always subordinate to art. His poem, “For This Country” (p. 231), which appears at first glance satirically humorous, in reality not only expresses compassion for the millions who died for Empire and ruling class at the mere sign from a leader, but also attacks current politicians who invoke the sacrifices of the past to justify their own ambitions. A more powerful impact could hardly be made in volumes of prose. Orhan Veli's art and attitude, a continuing inspiration for some younger poets, have achieved a permanent place in Turkish literature and may well entitle him to recognition in world literature.

Oktaý Rifat was originally a symbolist. Lately he has been experimenting with so-called "obscure" poetry. Arguing that poetry is the art of images and that useful images cannot be limited to those that are actually definable, Oktaý holds that poetry should not always be expected to express obvious meanings. But as he departs more and more from commonly understood reality, his work becomes increasingly singular and difficult to understand.

Melih Cevdet Anday, the third of the *Gariþ* triumvirate, is inclined to concentrate on social matters to such an extent that his later poems, clear and powerful as they are, frequently subordinate artistic quality to current events.

Although the more sophisticated and impressionistic urban poets of İstanbul associated with the *Gariþ* movement still attract more attention with the public—perhaps because they edit some of Turkey's literary periodicals or are closely associated with them—their more "popular" colleagues who are writing in and about Anatolian villages or small towns may yet make more original and permanent contributions, for they are less influenced by the literary fads that spread to İstanbul from Paris, Moscow and other foreign centers.

Poets such as Cahit Külebi and Mehmet Başaran, attracted by the genuine character of the peasant and his rich folklore, deal extensively with village life. No one, except Ceyhun Atuf Kansu, has succeeded so well as the former in expressing the feelings of the Anatolian in authentic lyrical forms. Külebi's moods are mellow rather than indignant. His language is natural yet powerful as he describes the people, roads and towns of central Anatolia, from where he himself comes. His sensitivity is most deeply touched by the fate of peasant women who, in the struggle for bread, lose "the color of their cheeks before their chastity."

The same compassion is shown to the city worker, himself usually a late arrival from the village, by Rifat Ilgaz, Metin Elođlu, Arif Damar, A. Kadir and others. Thus social ideas, not as political ideology, but as a new literary dimension come into Turkey's contemporary poetry. The individual in all walks of life is a matter of direct concern, and his material welfare is as important as his spiritual well-being.

Another group of poets—İlhan Berk, Cahit Irgat, Salâh Birsell, Sabahattin Kudret Aksal, Turgut Uyar, Edip Cansever, Ece Ayhan, Cemal Süreyya, Can Yücel and others—deserve special mention: some for their continuous experimentation, some for their subject matter,

and some for promoting a "second modernist movement" which claims to go far beyond the school of Orhan Veli. The result has been the emergence of the so-called "obscure-difficult" type of poetry in which the poet considers himself free from an obligation to provide obvious meaning. One of his concerns is the organization of syllables to produce pleasant sounds.

It is doubtful, however, that obscure poetry as a movement will survive in Turkey. The position of modern literature is not sufficiently secure and the old school of poetry and thought is too stoutly resistant for poets, at this stage, to sacrifice their real mission for eccentricity. There is extra-poetic justification for obscure poetry—political controls, social pressures . . .—and some obscure poetry is beautiful, worthy of more attention than can be devoted to it in this paper, but Turkish literature today cannot remove itself from its social context or alienate its larger audience. It still plays a key role as a reform force—its loss as such would weaken the modernization effort and could conceivably lessen the social consciousness of the reading public. Perhaps other societies which have achieved intellectual maturity and material security can afford those extreme forms of artistic individualism that appeal to the initiated few, but Turkey cannot. One of the weaknesses of *divan* literature in the imperial days lay in its neglect of society. Obscure poetry is a "modern" way of reactivating the old. Happily, the trend of obscure poetry may soon be turned to constructive ends, for common sense, self-criticism and the desire for full self-realization are still very much alive and these are the guarantees for the future of Turkish poetry.

Since some of Turkey's most mature poets subscribe to no school, the contemporary scene enjoys considerable richness and variety. Cahit Sıtkı Tarancı, who died four years ago, appeals to conservatives and modernists alike. While accepting the forms of the new poetry, he writes with sentiment on traditional *carpe diem* themes and is affected by the folk and mystic writers with their simple pantheism and lilting rhythms. Although he is not too concerned with social problems, some ideological strains are discernible. He has been described as "the most protean of all contemporary Turkish poets and one of the most lovable."

Bedri Rahmi Eyüboğlu has also been influenced by folklore. His thorough, first-hand knowledge of the country and its people, and his documentary style combine to provide a balanced and diversified picture of modern Turkey. Fazıl Hüsnü Dağlarca's poetry, dealing

with the War of Liberation and other themes ranging from village problems to deeply personal moods, is sometimes clear, sometimes obscure and difficult of translation. Behçet Necatigil is one of the few contemporary poets preoccupied with urban middle class life, and Necati Cumalı presents the optimistic point of view in lyrics concerned with both rural and urban society.

Prose, particularly the novel, was for centuries the neglected stepchild of Turkish literature. In an age when poets had already produced masterpieces that can be compared with the great lyrics of other literatures of the West and East, such early Turkish epic tales as those of the *Book of Dede Korkut* strike us as surprisingly primitive when we compare them with Arabic fiction—the stories, for example, of the *Thousand and One Nights*. Until the nineteenth century most Turkish writers remained content to emulate—and rather poorly—Arabic and Persian fiction.

In the nineteenth century, Turkish writers were inspired to a great extent by Western models, above all by such French masters as Victor Hugo, Flaubert and Maupassant, Paul Bourget and Pierre Loti. Some Turkish writers even preferred to write their novels and stories about Ottoman life in French. Few of these authors, whether they expressed themselves in French or Turkish, are read today. Their insistence on a kind of local color that has become obsolete, their faith in panaceas now outmoded, the very derivative quality of their inspiration and their old-fashioned diction and style—all these characteristics condemn their works to the kind of oblivion from which they can scarcely be rescued even by scholarly research. Their value lies in the bridge they provide between the old and the new.

The real classics of Turkish fiction at all widely read in Turkey today have been written for the most part in the past fifty years. They include a number of excellent collections of traditional legends and fairy tales, popular anecdotes and other kinds of fiction that earlier scholars had often ignored as unworthy of their attention. Professor Pertev Boratav, now on the staff of the Paris Musée des Arts et Traditions Populaires, has proved in this field to be both a great scholar and a great editor. His collections of Turkish fairy tales deserve attention as world-wide as those of the Brothers Grimm or of Hans Christian Andersen. Folk literature as a whole deserves special attention—much more than we can give it here—for it provides a rich source of human experience, authentically Turkish, for masterpieces.

Turkey's development as a modern nation has been more drastic since 1920 than that of many another nation. In attempting to bridge within a few decades the enormous gap between medieval Islam, still dominating most of the life of Anatolia, and a modern economy now found in İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir, Adana and a half dozen other Turkish centers, the habits of men and their thoughts and speech alter rapidly and radically. Most serious Turkish writers of the last few decades have been concerned above all with studying and explaining this critical problem of transition. Thus Turkish prose has strong social undertones.

Modern Turkish fiction thus came into being with the works of a few pioneer spirits who distinguished themselves during the régime of the late Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Reşat Nuri Güntekin and Halide Edip Adivar, the last a leader in the emancipation of women, deserve attention. Though their individual works may today have less significance, as a group these writers played an important role in their nation's cultural life as educators and literary innovators, particularly in arousing a keen public awareness of social problems.

Among the other important early social writers—one who today is an established elder of Turkish prose—is Halikarnas Balıkcısı. An ardent, independent nationalist, he later spent some time in exile. The story of his available for this Turkish number of *The Literary Review* reveals his satirical talent, but his major contributions are his stories and novels depicting the life of fishermen. His *Legends of Anatolia* is a remarkable study of old customs and folklore in which he seeks to prove that many of the ancient Greek gods were borrowed from Anatolian mythology and that some of this mythology persists today.

The most authentic social writer of this period was Sabahattin Âli, whose *Anatolian Tales*, defining the dangers to over-rapid modernization, anticipated the coming of age of a whole generation of writers who now concern themselves with the problems of Anatolian villagers as they face the disruption of their ages-old agricultural economy and the shock of their first contacts with modern industry. Sabahattin Âli was a Communist. Since his mysterious death, his works are no longer reprinted in Turkey, but they have been translated with success abroad.

Yet Sabahattin Âli's example as a social realist is followed by a whole school of younger fiction writers, among whom Orhan Kemal is undoubtedly the greatest. Less political than Sabahattin Âli, Orhan

Kemal and his group—Samim Kocagöz, Yaşar Kemal, Mahmut Makal, Kemal Tahir and others—are not easy writers to translate: the conditions they describe are often alien to the experience of Western readers and require editorial explanation. Though realists in much the same sense as some Italians, notably Giovanni Verga and Ignazio Silone, they are also more stark, more reticent and, with the exception of Yaşar Kemal, less lyrical.

Nonetheless, the introduction of social themes into literature gave additional impetus to the development of the modern novel, which, as has been noted, lagged far behind poetry and the short story. Few Turkish writers were accustomed to handling the more intricate plots and even fewer had developed the ability to encompass time and space in a broad organic structure. But the peasant's fate—from his struggle for land to his migration into cities—fascinated the writers who followed his fate, and they brought his odyssey to life in novels which for the first time in Turkish literary history gave stature and a new dimension to this field of writing.

As the leader and teacher of this school of social realists dedicated to the study of Turkey's greatest human problems, Orhan Kemal deserves all our respect and admiration. His novels and short stories about the village-born workers in new urban industrial centers, the underprivileged little man of İstanbul, or the Anatolian migrants driven into industrialized agriculture present a deeply moving and wonderfully exact picture of the social evolution of the masses in today's Turkey. An admirer of Erskine Caldwell, Orhan Kemal writes in a forthright, documentary fashion without much lyricism, and the son of a lawyer-politician who went into exile, he himself at times strikes political tones, especially when defending the rights of the proletariat. The influence of his work on others, especially on the younger writers, has been considerable.

The village and the villager, who forms close to eighty per cent of Turkey's population, have thus acquired an increasing significance in the country's contemporary literature. The writer, profoundly influenced by the modern humanitarian spirit, cannot remain passive before the plight of people too long left to the mercy of nature. Moreover, the Village Institutes themselves, established primarily to train local young men for elementary school teaching, have provided some 20,000 of them with modern concepts with which to judge the condition of their communities. These youngsters early began to write about village life with a realism and intensity not known before.

With Mahmut Makal, the school teacher who wrote stories of village life, the Turkish peasant won a permanent place in his country's literature.

There are definite limitations imposed on literature by the kind of romantic realism that now leads so many Turkish writers to concern themselves almost exclusively with village life, peasant psychology, agrarian reform, folkloristic poetry and peasant arts and crafts. But the Anatolian peasant remains in Turkish life the great human problem that obsesses all serious politicians, educators, thinkers and artists. It is hardly reasonable to expect Turkish writers to write psychological works about a middle class such as the one that inspires French writers who belong to it and cannot escape from it.

Two major writers remain both within and without this general realistic trend: Sait Faik [Abasıyanık] and Yaşar Kemal. It is not given to many writers in any literature to have the lyrical tenderness of the first or the epic vision and swing of the latter.

A specialist in those moods of "spleen" that once inspired such nineteenth century masters as Baudelaire, Gogol, Stephen Crane or Arthur Schnitzler, Sait Faik—departing from the formalistic, tortuous, over-idealized writing of the past—has left us some wonderfully tender and dreamlike vignettes that reveal odd aspects, sections and characters of İstanbul, a city that deserves as great writers to unravel its complex mysteries as Paris or old St. Petersburg, Vienna or New York. The undisputed master of Turkish prose, Sait Faik's work reveals few traceable literary influences. He studied in Grenoble, France, yet none of his works bears any resemblance to any French writer.

Born to a relatively well-to-do family, he steadily professed his "goal of becoming nothing in life" and he certainly attained it, for he is known to have had no profession. (Once when he requested a passport the officer validating the document indicated his profession with a word meaning "vagabond".) He rebelled against society by defying its conventions. He broke loose from its petty mentality which sought to pigeon-hole everybody in a definable profession. His aim was to enjoy life uninhibitedly, with no strings attached. Love was his guide and inspiration throughout his disoriented life. He loved the birds in the sky as much as the giggling Greek girls of İstanbul, the waiters and the peddlers as much as the waters and the winds of the Bosphorus. His short stories find lovable aspects in every incident and every human being, however insignificant. "If men are not to love each other, why do they build such crowded

cities?" he said—an expression which epitomizes his philosophy. Sait Faik chose all his subjects from the lower classes of the İstanbul scene—peddlers, fishermen, small merchants, petty white collar workers—and he presented them without idealization or even dramatization, yet his short stories, when taken together, are the drama of the little man who tries to earn a living and lives from day to day with his dreams and worries. Sait Faik does not pity him because he is insignificant, rather he admires him, for his unimportance neither crushes nor prevents his being happy and having his own personality and his own, to him, important pursuits. This precisely is what endears all his heroes to the reader. Sait Faik's style and insight have left a deep impact upon the younger generation. In this respect, without intending it, he has been a school of his own.

Yaşar Kemal appears today, at the age of thirty-eight, as one of the most promising novelists of Turkey. Having written two successful novels and a number of short stories in the form of field reports, he has established himself as a first-hand observer of village life and an expert on folklore. He writes from personal experience, with intimate knowledge of his material and compassion for his subjects—the peasant left to the mercy of landlords, petty officials and money lenders. He demands a better life for these people, condemns injustice and the system that permits it. His open and lyrical style, strongly influenced by folklore, gives to his work the atmosphere of a fairy tale. Although his heroes come from the Adana region where he was born, his newspaper work has taken him all over the country and his articles, in a refreshing new style, masterfully combine art and reality with a rare understanding of the social problems of Turks throughout the land. Last spring the French newspaper *Combat* reported that Yaşar Kemal will be proposed for the Nobel prize for his novel *İnce Memed*. Modestly, the author dismissed the news with the words, "The time for it has not come yet"—undoubtedly a statement with underlying meaning.

Some other fiction writers deserve special note. Aziz Nesin, a prolific and gifted writer of humorous stories with a sharp eye on human frailties, ridicules the incompetent bureaucrat, the pompous politician, and the superficial intellectual, as well as social injustice in all its manifestations. Sometimes more journalistic than poetic, he is a kind of Damon Runyan of Turkish literature. Samim Kocagöz, a well-to-do landowner, is chiefly concerned with the special social and intellectual problems arising from modernization. Among other



able young writers whose work has not yet taken a definable course are Oktay Akbal, prize-winning fiction writer and newspaper columnist; Vüs'at O. Bener, popular short story writer; Tahsin Yücel, whose short stories have considerable originality and artistic potentiality; and Orhan Hançerlioğlu who, adding to his observations in Anatolia his own thoughts and feelings, gives his stories originality and sensitivity as well as an urbane atmosphere.

Drama is omitted from this survey. Except for some worthwhile plays by Vedat Nedim Tör, Reşat Nuri Güntekin, Cevat Fehmi Başkut, Salâhattin Batu and several others, the Turkish theater still lags far behind the country's achievements in other literary fields.

Literary criticism likewise has yet to attain eminence. Except for the late Nurullah Ataç, it has produced no critic with an indisputable reputation for his understanding and vision of literature's larger goals. Fortunately, there exists a group of promising younger critics able to discern and judge the major trends and levels of literary achievement. Among these critics Adnan Benk, Memet Fuat, Sabahattin Eyüboğlu and İlhan Berk deserve attention.

Contemporary Turkish literature has certain shortcomings which it is seeking to overcome: insufficient self-analysis and self-confidence, inadequate learning, lack of sustained effort, over-sentimentality, limited understanding of the larger meaning of art and letters. Nonetheless, certain positive generalizations, by way of summary, may be assayed:

Most writers are versatile, producing poetry, short stories and novels concurrently, albeit they generally begin with poetry. They rely on personal experience and direct observation for authenticity. Their language is simple, natural, frequently colloquial and sometimes even folksy. They are experimentalists and non-conformists, but they hold to artistic standards. In subject-matter and style they have achieved considerable breadth and some depth.

Their writing possesses a special character and intensity, the result largely of the unique cultural conflict created by historical circumstances. For most writers, childhood was conditioned by traditional Caliphate-Sultanate values, but the modern world led them to agnosticism and positivism. The struggle between the subconscious forces pulling them back and the reason driving them ahead remains acute. Those who seek serenity in the old cultural order, who succumb to the fatalism that still lurks in every corner of Turkish life, speculate about death, not as the contrast of a dynamic, potentially rich and satisfying life, but as the awe-filling fate which haunts all human

beings through a few ephemeral, illusory years. The younger writers, although they understand the "regressive" and "reactionary" attitude of their elders, persist with their modern view, since any relapse would vitiate the vitality of their work. At some later stage, they believe, when the modern foundations are sufficiently secure, the problems of life and death can be approached in creative works with balance and perspective.

Contemporary Turkish writers, with some notable exceptions, come from the lower middle class, which, it must be understood, is intellectually the best-prepared and most progressive level in the country. They are the children of government officials, army officers or small businessmen. Some were born in İstanbul, but the majority come from the towns and villages of the southeast, Western Anatolia, the Black Sea . . . Their lower middle class and widely-distributed origins provide an unusual insight into the over-all conditions of the country.

For most writers, literature is an avocation rather than a profession. The majority hold university degrees, but few of those degrees are in literature, most are in law, political science, education, even medicine, with the result that writers earn their living as lawyers, officials, teachers or journalists. Practically no writer derives sufficient income to enable him to dedicate himself wholly to creative work. The relatively limited circulation of literary works (average 5,000–10,000 copies) and the low price of books (mainly paper backs, which cost between twenty cents and a dollar), both caused by the low level of literacy (35 per cent in 1957), undoubtedly accounts for the absence of material incentive. Moreover, there are few awards or prizes for literary achievement. The only direct support comes from the government-sponsored translation program which provides some writers additional income but which is insufficient for living. Many writers oppose government aid—their independence explains in part the growing dignity of the writing profession. Moreover, the varied professional pursuits of writers enable them to come in contact with the whole range of society and the individuals who compose it, an experience which, reflected in their writing, provides color and a sense of reality.

Contemporary Turkish writing is more and more developing its own truly national character. It is often claimed that Turkish writing developed under the direct impact of the West, that individual writers have been influenced by some Western source, especially

French. The modern literary transformation undoubtedly began, as this paper makes clear, under such foreign influence. Most Turkish writers speak one or two Western languages and are familiar with scores of Western writers, whose works they have translated, but it now seems that the impact of the West may have been unduly stressed, for the West has become less and less a source of direct inspiration and more and more a means of comparison and perspective. French realists, symbolists, surrealists, American writers, Italian playwrights—all have affected Turkish writing, but this writing, having lived through its infancy, has now acquired sufficient stamina to stand on its own. The very originality of contemporary Turkish literature was achieved when it leaned less on the West and learned to rely on its own rich resources. The most successful writers have been those who have developed their own style in presenting material from purely Turkish sources. Even when some Western literary current or model appeals as a source of inspiration, the tendency today is to modify it—to adapt it to the local milieu. This kind of cultural exchange is encountered everywhere in the world and in no way detracts from the originality of a work of art.

The major consideration, the ultimate satisfaction, is that anyone reading through the contemporary literature of Turkey acquires a feeling for a country and a people that is at once unique and yet an intrinsic part of the total involvement of human civilization.

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PART THREE  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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## TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY: SOME INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Since the establishment of the Republic in 1923, the foreign policy of Turkey has revolved around two main axes: 1) the maintenance of the nation's independence and the achievement of security in the face of Soviet ideological and territorial expansionism, and 2) the preservation of the country's modernist, secularist, national regime. This foreign policy, to which the utmost importance is attached by the Turkish leadership, evolved from a combination of standard practical and strategic considerations and, as well, historical factors unique to the country.

Despite the republican leaders' contention that Turkey was a "new" country that had nothing to do with the Ottoman Empire and its history, the truth is that the Republic is heir to Ottoman cultural, strategic, historical, and religious legacies, both negative and positive, and these have haunted the country's culture, its policies, and its people to a much greater degree than its leaders' prescription for the Republic Today, however, Turkey's foreign policy is being shaped by new factors: i.e., the many results of the abrupt ending of the Cold War between the West and the former USSR.

Since 1947 the existence of the Cold War has been a prominent factor in Turkey's foreign relations. It led not only to Turkey's incorporation into the NATO bloc but also resulted in the assumption of a more definitively western orientation in Turkey's culture and the political regime. Indeed, as Turkey entered increasingly into the western sphere after the end of World War II, it began to distance itself more and more from its Muslim neighbors—except in those cases when its NATO membership dictated that greater contact be maintained (e.g., the CENTO alliance with Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan). Meanwhile, the country underwent major modernization/westernization and won greater security from the USSR. That these developments served to advance both mutually complementary aims of Turkish foreign policy—namely, security from the Soviets and modernization of the culture, economy, and political system—ensured the internal peace and harmony of the country and a stable and consistent foreign policy that was scarcely affected by the occasional

political upheavals (in 1960, 1971, and 1980), by Marxist efforts (in the late 1970s) to push Turkey out of NATO and into the Soviet orbit, or by the conservatives' sporadic campaigning for friendlier relations with the Arabs. The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 dealt a severe blow to the monopriniple—namely, the establishment of binding ties to the West—that had become the foundation of Turkish foreign policy and affected relations not only with the former Soviets but also with the West and the Middle East.

In the last four years, Turkey has been forced to confront its Ottoman legacy, to consider the need for ethno-national affiliations, to rethink its strategic position, and to contemplate a possible future without a NATO shield. The discarded relics of the past have suddenly become forces shaping Turkey's relations with all of her neighbors. The Soviet collapse resulted not only in the diminution of Turkey's strategic and military appeal to the West but also in the explosion of the Europeans' long-suppressed, atavistic anti-Turkish prejudices. Europe, especially France, has already espoused the Kurdish cause as a weapon for keeping Turkey in check and thwarting any ambition the country might have to begin playing a major regional role. Both France and Britain have historically regarded a strong Turkey (or, in the past, a strong Ottoman Empire) as harmful to their interests in the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. (In her memoirs dealing with her years in the White House, Barbara Bush recounts how Danielle Mitterand, on a state visit to the U.S., never neglected an opportunity, even while in state cars riding from one function to another, to press Mrs. Bush on the issue of the adoption by the U.S. of a friendlier attitude toward the Kurds—presumably expecting that she would exert influence on her husband.)

However, while the disappearance of the Cold War has forced Turkey out of her settled foreign policy and caused some anxiety in official circles, it has provided also an unprecedented opportunity for the country to use its cultural and historical assets to expand its influence in the Caucasus, Balkans, and Central Asia, even as it has opened up a minefield of historical grudges and destroyed previous alliances and friendships. Turkey has become potentially the main player in the foreign relations game in this most volatile area of the world, already separated into hostile camps by the Armenian—Azeri and Palestine—Israeli conflicts and now plunged into the maelstrom of the Yugoslavian disintegration. The latter event has compounded



the problems faced by Turkish foreign policy-makers seeking to adapt to the new realities, for it has revived the memory of Turkey's cultural and historical ties with the Muslims of Bosnia, Albania, and various areas of Serbia (Kosovo, the *sancak* of Novipazar, etc.), and put new strain on the already tense Turkish—Greek relations.

In the following portion of this general introduction I shall outline Turkish foreign policy as it has evolved toward four important areas—namely, the West, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia—mainly since 1991. These are the areas that are covered, in varying degrees of scope and depth, by the contributions in this volume.

### *Europe and the United States*

Turkey remains a member of NATO, but her application to join the European Union (the old European Community) has been turned down—even though such membership appeared rather certain ten years ago. The proposed Turkish membership in the European Customs Union, approved in committee, has been accepted also by the full chamber. Much of the so-called liberal European press has given wide coverage to the “Kurdish problem” in Turkey, ignoring the key fact that the “problem” derives basically from the bloody terrorist campaign of the Marxist PKK, directed from Syria and Iraq, and the government's defensive reaction to this. Unfortunately, the battle against the PKK has so far prevented the launching in Turkey of a full and objective investigation into other questions involving policy toward the Kurds of Turkey, and a growing number of Turkish citizens see the Europeans' campaign for Kurdish “national rights” as no more than a modern version of the British and French pressure for “Christian rights” in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. As a result of that historical campaign, the Christians under the protection of Europe eventually became freer and more prosperous than the Turks and other Muslims; yet the English and the French continued to give wide coverage to isolated incidents of hostility toward Christians within the Empire, which they took as proof of continued Turkish oppression, and thus legitimized the separatist claims that gradually stripped away the Empire's territory and power. These European advocates of Christian “rights” then labeled the Ottoman Empire as “the sick man of Europe” and proceeded to partition it between various groups. At present, the

growing western pressure urging “human rights” on Turkey is becoming counterproductive, for it is creating a powerful nationalist backlash. Even President Süleyman Demirel declared, after a meeting with Alain Juppe, then the French foreign minister, that Europe appears bent on reviving the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, which had created a series of national enclaves in what was left of the Empire.

Many Turks think that, while the current European campaign to publicize and emphasize Turkey’s “Kurdish problem” may differ in intent from the nineteenth-century pro-Christian campaign against the Ottomans, in spirit it is much the same. The aim is to depict the Turks—despite all concrete evidence to the contrary—as a people incapable of absorbing the basic democratic and humanist values of the West. Thus the refusal to admit Turkey to the European Union may appear legitimate and, even worse, so may the possible eviction from European countries of the approximately 2.5 million Turks working there (and of other Muslims as well). Thus the Kurds, who are Muslim, have become the new political darlings of the West and the unwitting tool of its anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim drive.

What is, or will be, the effect on Turkey if this campaign against the Turks and the Muslims continues unabated? Certainly the elites in Turkish government and business truly aspire to have the country accepted into the EU and to become part of Europe; and, indeed, the policy of the Republic has aimed toward this goal for the past seventy years. The Turkish political regime, culture, economy, and society have been Europeanized with this goal in mind, even though the people have remained adamantly Muslim and Turkish. (I have explored this topic in detail in a paper, “Turkey in Europe from the Perspective of 1994,” to appear in a book to be published soon by the Johns Hopkins University-Bologna Center, Italy.)

However, Europe may, in fact, succeed in alienating Turkey from the West, although some European intellectuals and, so far, the United States are striving to prevent this. There is little doubt that a rupture from the West brought about as a result of the current European anti-Turkish campaign will be followed by a major anti-western and anti-secularist backlash in Turkey, which would end, most likely, in the establishment of an authoritarian, secularist military regime. In such a case, it seems likely that the military regime would soon be overthrown by a Muslim-leftist coalition already in the making. The war against Iraq, which cost Turkey billions of dollars in revenues from trade and pipeline fees and destroyed the tra-

ditionally friendly relations between Turks and Iraqis, has already caused a great deal of popular resentment against the West. All of this is further nurturing Islamic fundamentalist sentiments, and, although the current spokesman for Islam in Turkey—the *Refah* (Welfare) party—does not pursue fundamentalist aims. A Muslim fundamentalism capable of overthrowing the regime could easily emerge if Turkey is cut off from the West and its seventy-year old westernization policy is abandoned in favor of “Islamic modernism” (whatever that may be taken to mean).

As for United States-Turkish relations, these are presently on hold, due as much to the uncertainty of future developments in Eurasia and the Eastern Mediterranean as to the lack of clearly defined principles and goals. It seems quite clear that, should the United States decide somehow to divorce itself from European interests and prejudices, its own national interest would compel it to befriend Turkey and to use its influence to prevent a total rupture with Europe. The U.S. has been a major force in promoting the modernization of Turkey, in forcing its acceptance into NATO, and in protecting it against undue European hostility, pressure, and discrimination. This policy has served American interests in the Middle East and the Caucasus, as well as in Turkey itself, and there seems to be no logical reason why the U.S. attitude should change. In fact, it seems that the American role in Turkey’s foreign policy has become stronger and gained new dimensions since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Russian policy in the Caucasus and, to some extent, in Central Asia, as well as the direction taken by the democratization process in Russia itself, obviously will affect the course of Turkish-U.S. relations.

### *The Balkans*

The reader should be reminded that the bulk of the early Ottoman state was established in the Balkans in the fourteenth century and, until its drive into the Middle East, the Ottoman state was a predominantly Balkan power and remained as such until the twentieth century. The Ottoman-Turkish legacy in the Balkans is represented not only by the 11 million Muslims spread unevenly through all the Balkan countries but also by the very Ottoman social and communal organization and identity patterns seen in the whole area—most

notably in Bulgaria, Albania, the former Yugoslavia, and northern Greece. The Turkishness of the Balkans had long ceased to be a desirable subject of discussion in the peninsula or in Turkey itself, as each side has been interested in promoting its own pure national culture and identity and has avoided any consideration of the common imperial past, which was seen by all sides as having been an impediment to ethno-national development. Even the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the greatest beneficiaries of Ottoman rule, distanced themselves from the Turks until recent events pushed them into remembering the past and seeking Turkish support. The disintegration of Yugoslavia, and the Serbian massacres of innocent Bosnian children, women, and men, has turned upside down the existing foreign relations of the area and has revived old memories and associations.

The demographic-ethnic situation in the Balkans is as follows: There are roughly 35 million people throughout the area; this population is comprised of approximately 9 million Serbs, 8 million Greeks, 6 million Bulgarians, 1.5 million Macedonians, 5 million Albanians, 4 million Croats, and various others ethnic religious groups. Turkey, with a population of some 63 million and a geographical position on the Anatolian as well as the Balkan peninsula, has a definite military—and even economic—advantage over all her Balkan neighbors. Although initially unwilling to become involved, Turkey has been forced since the disintegration of Yugoslavia to become interested in the affairs and politics of the Balkans. Before 1991, scant attention was paid to the politics, economy, or society of this area, as indicated by the fact that only one very small private foundation made any study of the Balkans. (This organization, the Near Eastern and Balkan Research Foundation, has had only one main publication: *Balkanlar*, the proceedings of a conference held in İstanbul in 1990.)

Good Turkish-Greek relations, which traditionally had a stabilizing role in the Balkans, have been strained by Turkey's recognition of and diplomatic, political, and economic support given to Macedonia and Albania, aggravating the dispute over Cyprus and the use of Aegean Sea airspace. At the same time, Turkish support for Macedonia has resulted in an improvement in the formerly very tense diplomatic and military relations with Bulgaria—to the point that the Bulgarian campaign to denationalize the 2.5 million Muslims (mostly

Turks) that made up more than a quarter (27 percent) of that country's population in the period 1984–1989 seems to have been forgotten. In addition, relations with Albania, to which Turkey has given both economic and military aid (the latter mainly in the form of training), have improved almost to the point of full-fledged alliance, which probably has been the main deterrent to Greek action against the weak Albania.

As for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Turkey immediately recognized its independence and has supported its beleaguered government in every way possible in the United Nations and European fora. It has provided Bosnia with military, economic, and medical aid, although refraining from direct military involvement and, instead, backing UN peace efforts. The Turkish government has prodded the Croatian government toward the adoption of a more cooperative policy towards Bosnia and has done its best to encourage the consolidation of the Croatia-Bosnia federation (this despite rebuffs by Croatia's president, whose Turcophobia seems to border on paranoia). Turkey has also managed to maintain a sort of stable relation with Serbia, believing that, however difficult it may be, some such liaison will help prevent the strengthening of the Serbian-Greek axis.

Turkey has as its goal for the Balkans the restoration of peace and the establishment of a climate of mutual recognition of and respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty and religious, national, and ethnic rights. As a defender of the *status quo*, Turkey may, of course, be seen to be on the side of the Muslims. However, as Turkey has no territorial ambitions in the Balkans and has no strong military ties to any country in the region, it does have a degree of flexibility and freedom of action (although, diplomatically-speaking. Big Power involvement in the dispute has overshadowed the Turkish role and reduced it to a minimum). Still, any escalation of the conflict in the Balkans may draw Turkey into it.

### *The Caucasus*

The Caucasus, like the Balkans, has now become an area of opportunity for Turkey—but one of danger also. The jubilation over the retreat of the Russian borders to the north Caucasus in 1991 has been replaced by a growing anxiety caused by Russia's steady effort

to regain her influence and establish military bases in Georgia and Azerbaijan and to use Armenia, as in the past, to promote her Caucasian ambitions.

Turkish relations with Georgia have been relatively good and stable, as Turkey did not lend support to the Adjar (Acar) irredentists (the Muslim Adjars live on both sides of the Georgian-Turkish border) and remained neutral in the Abkhazian Georgian war, despite the presence of a large number of Abkhazians in Turkey, some of whom actually went to fight alongside their brethren. A small trade between the Turks and Georgians (about 1 million people enter Turkey from Georgia) has had a beneficial effect on Georgia's economy. As with other Caucasian areas, discussed below, the real worry is Russia, and the question of what pressures it will bring to bear is the burning one.

Azerbaijan and Armenia are intertwined in Turkish foreign relations. The ties between the Turks of Turkey and the Azerbaijanis are unique and close, as the influences operating to give shape to the drive for modernity and national-ethnic identity were the same in both countries. The Azeris are very close to the Turks in language, customs and culture, and even physical appearance—especially to those living in Eastern Turkey, which may be said to be basically a cultural-linguistic extension of Azerbaijan (or vice versa). The first concrete ideas about the Turkish ethnic identity and modernization (or “Europeanization,” as it was termed) were expounded by Ali Hüseyinzade, a leading Azeri intellectual and the nationalist mentor of Ziya Gökalp (who became known as the ideologue of Turkish nationalism and modernism). Turkey recognized Azerbaijani independence as soon as it was declared, entering immediately into bilateral relations, exchanging visits and personnel, and supporting the Popular Front and its leader, Ebulfaz Elçibey—a nationalist admirer of Atatürk—against his pan-Russian opponents.

Turkey also gave its immediate recognition to Armenia, but the Turks' relations with the Armenians are conditioned by a variety of historical disputes, many of which created permanent negative images on both sides. Massive popular pressure dictated that the Turkish government come down firmly on the side of Azerbaijan in the territorial disputes with Armenia, thus recognition was not followed by the exchange of diplomatic missions, and Turkish hopes of acting as umpire between Armenia and Azerbaijan came to nothing.

For a short period Turkey's relations with Azerbaijan became

strained due to the inability of Turkey to stop the Armenian forces, which, in the war over Karabakh, achieved military success, thanks to the support of the Russians. On this account, Turkey lost prestige and influence in Azerbaijan and, ultimately, Elçibey was ousted as president. Turkey did close down Armenia's communication routes, land and sea, over its territory, but this did not prevent the Armenians from occupying one-fifth of Azerbaijan's territory and dislocating 1 million (or about one-eighth) of its people. Furthermore, Turkey has been excluded from participation on the many fact-finding and mediation committees established to help find a solution to the Azeri-Armenian conflict. Iran and Russia have proved to be the main players in that conflict, although in the end Iran was neutralized also. Beginning in the latter part of 1994, Turkish-Azeri relations improved once more. President Haidar Aliev (who replaced Elçibey) refused to allow Russian troops to be stationed in his country and also promised to give Turkey a small percentage of the oil to be extracted by an international petroleum consortium formed to exploit the oil resources of Azerbaijan. (In any event, the relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan are too special to be ignored for long by either party.) Recently Turkey was pressured by the U.S. Congress to open up its airspace to Armenian transports. Turkey would do this, provided Armenia pulls out of Azerbaijani territory.

Obviously, Russia is still the commanding force in the Caucasus, and it would like to be able to station large military forces in the area in order to retain supremacy and forestall the spread of Turkish influence. In fact, a large part of Russia's reason for launching the attack on Chechnya was its desire to ensure free access to Azerbaijan, which is important for the achievement of both aims. Turkey's Caucasian legacy from the Ottomans includes a large measure of good will; its relations with the Azeris are, as has been shown, special; and, furthermore, a large number of Chechens, Daghestanis, and other Caucasian Muslims living in Turkey have reestablished contact with their kin since the breakup of the Soviet Union and on such a scale that both the Russians and the Iranians have become alarmed. In the long run, however, Russia does not have the necessary support in Azerbaijan and Georgia to maintain its supremacy unless the West agrees to name Russia the "peacekeeper" for the area. There are indications that Russia, under the present leadership, may (after the military fiasco in Chechnya) be ready to accept the independence of the Caucasian republic and to regard Turkey

as a partner rather than a competitor—provided that the West does not decide to allow Russia reestablish its military hegemony there. (For more information on the situation in the Caucasus, see Marie Broxup, ed., *North Caucasus Barrier: The Russian Advance Toward the Muslim World*, [London, 1992]).

### *Central Asia*

Turkey had no relations with the Central Asian republics prior to 1989, despite common cultural, linguistic, and religious ties to the people of the area; but relations with the new republics of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and—to a lesser extent—Tajikistan developed at a feverish pace after 1991. The Turkish government was one of the first, if not the very first, to recognize the independence of these states and impart great momentum to the informal, private relations that had developed between the citizens of all of the republics and Turkey in the form of exchange visits and even a small “suitcase” trade during the last two years of *perestroika*. Turkey established diplomatic missions in the Central Asian capitals immediately after formal recognition, and in Ankara buildings were set aside to be used for the embassies from each. At the same time, Turkey initiated the necessary formalities for membership of the new nations in the UN and various European organizations, hoping that their quick entry into the international arena would bolster their newly-won independence against Russian efforts to reoccupy them.

The heads of the Central Asian republics and of Turkey promptly exchanged visits and concluded numerous agreements covering diverse subjects, ranging from the training of diplomatic personnel to economic investment. Actually, the most intense Turkish involvement in Central Asia came after President George Bush stated, in February of 1992, that the U.S. supported the activities of Turkey as the country best positioned culturally and economically (with some financial support from the U.S.) to aid the development of the Central Asian republics and (although this was not mentioned publicly) to keep Iranian fundamentalism at bay. It appeared at this stage that Turkey was an ideal model of development for the Central Asian republics (and also Azerbaijan), as it is a modernist, secularist, and economically relatively prosperous western-oriented, free-market democracy.



Even Russia accepted, for a time, Turkey's primacy in Central Asia—again, with the hope of keeping Iranian fundamentalism from gaining a foothold there. Russia, having been badly defeated by the Muslim *mujahidīn* in Afghanistan had, at this stage, an exaggerated fear of anything Islamic.

However, the high hopes pinned on Turkey began to fade in 1992: despite spending over one billion dollars out of her meager resources, Turkey proved unable to meet the burgeoning need of the Central Asian economies or to provide immediately the qualified personnel required to help modernize the native industries and administrative apparati. Meanwhile, in their euphoria the nationalists on all sides espoused the view that Turkey, as the most successful Turkic-Muslim nation in its modernization, should be considered the “big brother,” but this view was openly denounced by the former Soviet Turks. Meanwhile western business interests, realizing that the Central Asian republics possess huge reserves of oil, gas, coal, and minerals as well as being good sources of agricultural commodities, began to invest heavily in the area. Turkey was economically marginalized, although it is involved in numerous mid- and small-scale enterprises. The establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the adherence of most of the Central Asian states to that organization and to military pacts with Russia has shown that all of them will follow policies guided by particular national interest and security needs, despite their close cultural and religious ties with Turkey. Consequently, today Turkey conducts relations with Central Asia not as a bloc but with each individual country according to its views and interests. These relations vary in quality and intensity from country to country. For instance, the closest friend of Turkey at the present time is Turkmenistan, followed by Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan, while Uzbekistan currently has reduced its relations with Turkey to a minimum, in good measure because of the reaction of its leader, Karimov, to Turkey's granting of asylum to Uzbek opposition leaders. Lately, in 1995, Uzbek-Turkish relations have improved.

However, despite a decrease from the intensive relations prevailing in the 1991–1993 period, Turkey is probably the only country to have relations with Central Asia at all levels of activity, including trade, cultural, press, broadcasting, educational exchanges (some 8,000 Central Asian students are presently studying in Turkey), joint economic enterprises, etc. All this activity has increased Russia's suspicion and prompted it to accuse Turkey of pursuing pan-Turkist

aims, although Moscow has produced no concrete evidence to support this allegation. Meanwhile, Turkey has assumed leadership in the establishment of regional economic organizations such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation group, with the purpose of creating for itself a position of leadership in the Black Sea basin—which, in addition to the littoral states, takes in Azerbaijan and Greece. The already-established economic cooperation arrangement with Iran and Pakistan has been expanded to include the Central Asian states (although many of its proposed joint projects have not yet been implemented). (For more extensive information on Turkey's relations with Central Asia, see my article, "The Sociopolitical Environment Conditioning the Foreign Policy of Central Asian States," in Aaded Dawisha and Karen Dawisha, eds., *The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, International Politics of Eurasia Series vol. 4, K. Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds. [New York 1995]: 177–214).

Turkey's political relations with Russia are presently correct only, although there are indications that both sides are seriously considering expanding them. Already Russia is one of the largest trading partners of Turkey. Informed sources estimate that small traders from Russia spend over 8 billion dollars annually on merchandise from Turkey, although other statistics put the value of trade between the two countries at merely 2 billion dollars per year. Moreover, a large number of Turkish construction companies have obtained building contracts all over the Russian Federation. (The Turkish construction firm ENKA has reportedly won the largest contract among all firms working in Russia in 1995.) In addition, an increasing number of Russians are vacationing in Turkey. It is not yet clear whether intensive economic relations will be matched by political ties between Russia and Turkey. However, as Russia gains strength economically and reasserts the authority of the central government and the army, it is bound to be less inclined to regard Turkey as a partner in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In fact, the opposite seems to be the case, as Russia has come to regard an economically prosperous and democratic Turkey as a threat to its interests.

In conclusion one may say that Turkish foreign policy, after having charted a steady and relatively predictable course between 1950 and 1991, has entered a new phase since the demise of the USSR. In this new phase, the historical and cultural legacies of the Turks as an ethnic cultural group have been revived and given a new vital-

ity and meaning as factors that could have impact on the direction of Turkey's foreign policy. It should be noted that from 1923 to 1991 the Turkish state officially disregarded its historical, cultural, religious, and ethnic linkages with other Turkic groups. The rise of the independent Turkic states in Central Asia and the Caucasus and of states such as Bosnia that have historical links with Turkey has, however, changed the entire picture.

The Turks of Turkey (I here refer to the political nation that was forged beginning at the end of the nineteenth century) today find themselves at a crossroads. They can maintain the old policy of absolute neutrality and disinterest in their kin abroad, or they can seek to maximize their economic and political opportunities in Central Asia and the Caucasus. There is no question that historical, cultural, and political forces have pushed Turkey out of its shell, but the country does not at the present time have the means to exploit to the full the opportunities in its own "near abroad." Thus Turkey is bound to seek the slow consolidation of its influence in the Black Sea region, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, all the while strengthening, if possible, its ties to the West—or at least maintaining the *status quo*. A Turkey without western connections cannot exert much influence in its area unless it becomes economically and militarily powerful enough to impose its will—a state at which it is unlikely to arrive in the near future.

The leadership in Turkey has, wisely, been categorical in its rejection of pan-Turkism and pan-Turanism; but ties of common interest and common culture, faith, language, and history exist between Turkey and all of the newly-emerging states (except for Croatia and Slovenia) in Southern Europe and Eurasia, and the recognition of the strategic position of the country may lure many political leaders, eager to achieve popularity, into making dangerous decisions. Turkey's greatest shortcoming today lies in its lack of profound, visionary, and broadly cultivated leaders; its corrupting political patronage system and concentration of power at the top has prevented (with a few rare exceptions) the rise of much needed great leaders. Some of this leadership weakness results also from the fact that most of Turkey's governments over the past 35 years have been coalitions composed of parties that have been ideologically opposed to each other. Even though Turkey's foreign policy generally enjoys bipartisan support, the ideological cleavages increasingly threaten this bipartisanship. The saving grace in this rather unpromising situation has

so far been that the foreign ministry has been able to conduct foreign policy more or less independently of the political parties and their conflicting ideologies. Although basically conservative in outlook and reluctant to change, the foreign ministry maintains a high professional standard, and its officials, unlike the ordinary politicians, are capable of understanding world realities and, thus, of undertaking actions that serve the national interest.

## THE MUSLIM MINORITY IN THE BALKANS

### *Number and Geographical Distribution*

The total number of Muslims in the Balkans is about 10 to 11 million, or about 18 percent of the total population. They are concentrated in Albania, where they constitute about 70 percent of a population of 3.6 million. I do not include the Albanian Muslims in this study, for since the establishment of that country as an independent state in 1912 the Muslims have always been in the majority. (Although in 1967 Enver Hoxha declared Albania to be officially an atheistic state and banned religious practice—Muslim and Christian alike—the cultural Muslims still predominate.)<sup>1</sup>

The largest minority concentration of Muslims, about 4.5 million, is in Yugoslavia. In Bosnia-Herzegovina the Muslims constitute 44 percent of a population of some 1.8 million, while in the Kosovo province they number 1.7 million and form 89 percent of the total population. Muslim enclaves are found also in Macedonia (where the ethnic Turkish population has dwindled to only about 100,000 from the majority status it held until as late as 1913); in addition, small Muslim enclaves are found also in Montenegro and Croatia (mostly small businessmen and immigrants from Bosnia and Macedonia). The total in these areas comes to slightly over one million. The Balkan country with the second largest Muslim population is Bulgaria. The Muslim element is placed at from 1.4 to 3 million. The official Bulgarian statistics have used language, not religion, as a classification criterion, largely in order to minimize the minority issue. These statistics listed only the Turks as an ethnic-religious minority and gave their number as about 650,000. The government figures, in addition to grossly understating the number of Turks, have ignored the Pomaks (Slavic-speaking Muslims) and the Gypsies. A

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<sup>1</sup> For a general background see: P. Ramet (ed.): *Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and Easy European Politics*, London 1989. The historical background and an extensive bibliography is in A. Popovic: *L'Islam Balkanique, Les Musulmans du Sud-est Européen dans la période post-Ottoman*, Berlin, 1986. R.V. Weeks, *Muslim Peoples, A World Ethnographic Survey*, Westport, 1978.

Bulgarian official recently stated that the total number of Muslims in the country is 1.3 million, that is, almost double the previously given number. Some scholars well acquainted with the Bulgarian demography place the number of Muslims at around 2.3 million, or nearly 30 percent of the population. In any case, one fact is certain: the Muslim populations of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria amount to from 15 to 28 percent of the total in each of these countries.

Two other Balkan states, namely Greece and Romania, have Muslim populations that are very small relative to the total: in Romania (population 23 million) the total number of Muslims, according to official statistics, is 65,000 (but some native intellectuals estimate the Muslim population to be between 90,000 and 100,000); in Greece the total Muslim population is about 120,000. The Muslims of Romania are concentrated in Dobruca, while in Greece they live in Western Thrace, where they were the majority until very recently.

In Bulgaria, they are concentrated near the Greek-Turkish border in the Kircali area of the Rodop mountains, where they constitute the overwhelming majority, and in the northeast, in Razgrad, Shumen, Silistra, and Tutrakan districts, where they are probably close to, if not actually, a majority. The overwhelming majority of Balkan Muslims are orthodox, or Sunni, with a few scattered *Alevi* (Shiite) groups in the Deliorman area of Bulgaria.

The concentration of the Muslims in a few areas—some of strategic value—has had a definite impact on the policies of the ruling Balkan governments. They tend to regard their Muslim subjects as potential sources of trouble, although there is no evidence to justify this kind of suspicion. Thus the Serbian government has accused the Kosovo Albanians of plotting to annex Kosovo to Albania, while the Greek and Bulgarian governments have accused their Muslim Turks of wishing to engage in seditious activities, thus provoking retaliation and giving Turkey a pretext for intervention.

*The Genesis of Balkan Islam and Community Organization  
Under the Ottomans*

Islam came to the Balkans mainly, but not exclusively, through migration and conversion beginning in the thirteenth century. The overwhelming majority of the Muslim immigrants who came into the Balkans were Turks. Some Turkish groups came from north of the

Black Sea as early as the eleventh century, if not earlier (for example, the Huns); but most were immigrants from Anatolia who came mainly in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and settled south of the Danube on the territory of today's Bulgaria, Thrace, and Macedonia. Consequently, most of the Muslims of Bulgaria, Greece, and Romania are ethnically Turks and speak the language of Turkey, except for minor regional variations in phonetics and terminology. After the Ottoman-Turkish conquest of the territory over the fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries a series of internal migrations altered the religious-ethnic composition of the Balkans, but not in any large measure, except possibly in the Kosovo area.<sup>2</sup>

Conversion was the major channel for the Islamization of the Balkans. Conversion to Islam occurred mainly in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, not as the result of force or pressure but chiefly because Islam appeared to provide the chance for certain groups to maintain their ethnic identity and cultural peculiarities, as was the case with the Bogomils—the ancestors of the Bosnian Muslims—who accepted Islam in order to avoid the rigid orthodoxy of Rome or Constantinople. Conversion also allowed some of the dominant classes to maintain their social privileges. The lower classes also had some inducement for conversion to the new faith. Islam recognized the supremacy of the *devlet* (the state), which in practice gave to public law a certain primacy and thus, in effect, protected the peasant from the predatory practices of Latin and Byzantine feudal lords, who were still holding considerable power in the Balkans at the time of Turkish conquest. The Turkish feudal lords were subservient to the center and could not develop the personal autonomy of their Christian predecessor. Thus, the Bosnians and Albanians converted to Islam in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, as did smaller groups of Vlachs, Macedonians, and Bulgarians at various times in history.

Ethnically speaking, therefore, today the bulk of the Balkan Muslims—that is, about 70 percent—consist of Albanians and Slavs (mainly Serbo-Croatian-speaking Bosnians, Herzegovinians, and Montenegrins) and a few other groups, all of whom were the original inhabitants of the area. The ethnic Turks constitute about 20 percent of most of the total Muslim population. This demographic

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<sup>2</sup> W.C. Lochwood: *European Moslems, Economy and Ethnicity in Western Bosnia*, New York, 1975.

fact negates the claim of Balkan nationalists that their Muslim citizens were “interlopers” who were settled by force among the autochthonous Slavic and Greek population. The truth is that the Albanians, who constitute the largest Muslim bloc in the Balkans (over 5 million people), are the oldest inhabitants of the area and predate the Greeks and Slavs by millennia.

The Ottoman state adopted a partially corporate system of organization as far as the non-Muslims were concerned. Practically all the Christians in the Balkans were Orthodox and consequently were placed under the authority of the Orthodox patriarch in İstanbul. They were recognized as forming one *millet*, or religious-national community. The patriarch and his synod had absolute jurisdiction over all educational, religious, and cultural affairs of the larger Orthodox community, which was sub-divided into smaller segments, each with its own church, that corresponded roughly to the ethno-linguistic divisions among the Orthodox. The Jews also had their own *millet*.<sup>3</sup>

The authority of the Ottoman government extended mainly to matters of law and order, taxation, and defense. The rights of the Christians and Jews to practice their faith and to establish the necessary cultural and religious institutions was viewed as a kind of natural right with divine roots.<sup>4</sup> The Ottoman government adhered scrupulously to the Islamic view that both the Jews and the Christians were “People of the Book” (*Ahl al-Kītab*)—that is, they were governed by laws (Torah, Bible) revealed by God; and, therefore, no worldly government or laws enacted by manmade bodies, including the Ottoman government, could infringe upon the rights stemming from their faith. Jewish and Christian religious leaders, on the other hand, did not view the Koran as being of divine origin. Consequently, Jewish and Christian governments did not consider themselves bound to accord Muslims the same religious and cultural freedom accorded to Jews and Christians under Muslim rule. The principle of religious and cultural freedom and autonomy for minority groups was a late-

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<sup>3</sup> B. Lewis and B. Braude (eds.): *Christians and Muslims in the Ottoman Empire*, New York 1982; P. Sugar: *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354–1804*, Seattle and London, 1977.

<sup>4</sup> K.H. Karpat: “The Ottoman Ethnic and Confessional Legacy in the Middle East,” in M.J. Esman and I. Rabinowich (eds.): *Ethnicity, Pluralism and the State in the Middle East*, Ithaca, New York, 1988, pp. 35–54.



developing one that followed upon the secularization of Christian governments.

During the period of Ottoman rule the Muslims were not officially designated a *millet*, but in practice they also came to constitute a *millet*, but a purely religious one. The ethnic, linguistic, and racial identities of the Muslims were superseded by the common Islamic identity, although each ethnic group continued to speak its own language and practiced its own *adat* (custom). Many Balkan Muslims belonged to one of the numerous religious brotherhoods (Halveti, Kadiri, Mevlevi, etc.) that had proliferated in the area. Like their Christian counterparts the Balkan Muslims were fully aware of their various ethnic identities, but neither ethnicity nor language was the basis of the group identity to claim superiority over the rest of the population. The Bosnians spoke Serbo-Croatian but identified themselves with the Muslims rather than with the Serbians or the Croats. The language of the Ottoman administration was Turkish, but Turks never claimed to be above other non-Turkish Muslim groups.

The Muslims did not regard themselves as a “majority” and consequently did not view the Christians as a “minority”. These concepts were totally alien to the Ottoman state, whose corporate organization rested on the equality of the religious communities and not upon an ethnic hierarchy. The Muslims identified themselves with the authority of the state but not with its territory. As Muslims, they were bound to obey a Muslim ruler, and if the ruler lost his authority over a territory, the Muslims traditionally would migrate to live in an area still under the rule of an Islamic government. This traditional obligation of migration originated in the flight of the Prophet in A.D. 622 from Mecca, where he was persecuted, to Medina, where he practiced and preached his faith freely.<sup>5</sup>

Eventually the concept of nationalism—the ideas of territorial-national statehood and citizenship and a form of secularism—gained favor among the Balkan Christians. Most Balkan scholars would claim that all of these concepts were borrowed from the West. The truth is that their names and the forms came indeed from the West, but their content and essence was eastern, reflecting the historical and institutional background of the area. Needless to say they were

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<sup>5</sup> See D. Eickelman and J. Piscatori (eds.): *Muslim Travellers Pilgrimage. Migration and the Religious Imagination*, London 1990.

ultimately instrumental in determining the present day status and treatment of the Balkan Muslims. The concept of nationhood in the Balkans was rooted in the religious community, not, as is officially claimed, in the ethno-linguistic group. This is why the rise of modern states in the area was preceded, or accompanied, by the establishment of national churches. Thus, Balkan nationalism led first to the dismemberment of the Universal Orthodox Patriarchate. Even Greece produced its own national church, despite its effort to identify also with the İstanbul patriarchate.<sup>6</sup>

The transformation of the religious Orthodox identity into a political one, and its further evolution into a form of national consciousness among the Balkan Christians, resulted from an ideological process initiated by czarist Russia towards the end of the eighteenth century. The liberation of the "oppressed Orthodox Christians from the tyranny of the infidel Turk" became the slogan of Russian foreign policy in the Balkans and was disseminated by Russian agents and native teachers educated in Russia long before large numbers of Balkan intellectuals became acquainted with the West and its ideas. Pan Slavism added a new strength to the religious identity by injecting into it the ethnic-linguistic ingredient, which made it correspond outwardly to the western criterion for nationhood. The fact that the Ottoman government did not interfere in the educational activities of the Orthodox Christians, at least until the 1880s, allowed Russia free rein to exert its own influence on the school curricula, notably in Bulgaria and Serbia. This process gained additional momentum after the sultan's government adopted the Reform Edict in 1856. This edict provided "equality," as defined by the West, to non-Muslims; that is, it created a series of new laws that abetted the transformation of the Orthodox Christian communities into political nations. It did this mainly by reducing the power of the religious leaders over these communities.

### *The Transformation of Muslims into Minorities*

The Berlin Treaty of 1878 completed the ideological and cultural process that turned the Muslims into minorities by permitting each

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<sup>6</sup> K.H. Karpat: *An Inquiry into the Social Foundation of Nationalism in the Ottoman State*, Princeton 1973.

major Orthodox Christian group to establish its own independent national-territorial state.<sup>7</sup> Thus, almost overnight, Serbia, Romania, Montenegro, and Bulgaria (which remained formally under the sultan's suzerainty until before World War I) became independent states bearing ethno-historical names. Greece had already become independent (in 1830). In 1878, Austria occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina, in part to thwart the Serbian ambition to gain access to the Adriatic. Finally, in 1913, the last major Ottoman possessions in the Balkans—namely, Macedonia and Thrace—were occupied and divided among Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria. Every one of these new nations included large populations of Muslims or other peoples who had little in common with the ruling group that became the master. This was particularly the case after the 1913 annexations. In the sections of Macedonia occupied by Serbia, for example, the Serbians were a tiny minority as were the Bulgarians and Greeks in much of the territory these countries took over.

The occupying powers attempted to achieve demographic balance in their favor by forcing the Muslims to emigrate, regardless of their ethnic or linguistic affiliations.<sup>8</sup> In the Balkans “Turk” was synonymous with “Muslim”. The fact that the majority of the Balkan Muslims were not ethnically or linguistically Turkish was of no consequence to the rulers of the new “national” states, since religion was (and to a very large extent continues to be) the major badge of national identification in the Balkans. It is interesting that the same criterion was applied in the Ottoman state—and later in modern Turkey—which accepted the Bosnian Slavs, the Illyrian Albanians, and the Greeks as “Turks” provided they were Muslims. The net result of the border changes and the migrations, voluntary and forced, was that Muslims became minorities in all of the Balkan states created in the nineteenth century, with the exception of Albania. The Albanians avoided becoming a minority in their own state by declaring independence in 1912.

The area of the Balkans was, in fact, hardly suited to the formal concept of the nation-state introduced by the Treaty of Berlin. Not a single country there had a population that was religiously, linguistically

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<sup>7</sup> W.N. Medlicott: *The Congress of Berlin and After*, London 1938; R. Millman: *Britain and the Eastern Question, 1875–1878*, London 1979.

<sup>8</sup> On migration and population figures see K.H. Karpat: *The Ottoman Population, 1830–1914*, Madison 1985.

and ethnically homogeneous enough to be called a true nation—except perhaps for Wallachia and Moldavia which united in 1858 to form Romania. Groups speaking the same language were divided by religious differences (e.g., the Orthodox Serbians and Catholic Croats) and, to a lesser extent, by regional diversity (such as the Bulgarians and the Shops of the west) or by different historical experience. Consequently, each new state, using the government means at its disposal, attempted to create a “nation” by declaring one idiom the national language and by using the educational system to disseminate a standard version of its “history”, a “national” literature, and a particular view of future aspirations which often included territorial expansion.

The Balkan states believed, and continue to hold the view, that cultural and religious homogeneity is the best guarantee of the survival of the state. In other words, the “nation” is deemed to have priority over the “state”, and any act designed to strengthen national cohesion and solidarity is considered a legitimate and desirable act, regardless of minority rights. The communist regimes in the Balkans, in particular, after 1947, adopted assimilationist policies against their minorities all the while preaching the brotherhood of people and condemned and punished harshly “bourgeois nationalism” that is, the efforts of the minorities to defend their cultural heritage. Even an ignoramus and megalomaniac of the worst type—namely, Ceausescu—found wide support at the beginning of his dictatorship largely because he exploited ethnic pride and encouraged xenophobia in the name of patriotism and nationalism. He, like Zhivkov of Bulgaria, wanted to go down into history as the architect of a homogeneous, monolithic national state. In the eyes of the Balkan governments, the Muslims represented the greatest obstacle to the effort to create a homogeneous united nation, thus securing the safety of the state for they refused to be assimilated. Consequently the Muslims were regarded as an alien element that could not be trusted, despite the fact that the Balkan Muslims have been loyal to their states and have performed faithfully all their citizenship duties, including the army service.

The Berlin Treaty abolished the concept of equality and autonomy of the religious communities that had been the keystone of the Ottoman system. It legitimized the concept of the unitary national state, in which the majority group became the ruler, while other groups, regardless of their size or history, became subject to the will

of the rulers. Having created legal “minorities”, the framers of the Berlin Treaty adopted two provisions especially designed to protect the rights of religious minorities—mainly Muslims.

It should be emphasized here that the participants in the Congress of Berlin, which drafted the treaty of 1878, despite their adherence to the secular concept of the nation-state, nonetheless still viewed the Balkan minorities in terms of religion. The treaty thus ignored all of the ethnic minority groups, condemning them to be ruled by governments that espoused different ethnic identities—for example, Greeks left in Bulgaria and Vlachs put under Serbian and Greek control—without any regard for their “national” rights. However, the treaty did strive to ensure religious freedom and equality, stating: “differences of faith and confession cannot be used against anyone as a reason for exclusion or incapacitation in the exercise of civil and political rights, in the admission to public employment, functions, and honors, or in the exercise of various professions and occupations in any locality.” It also declared that “the freedom to believe, and to practice openly, all religions belong to the inhabitants of [the country name] as well as to foreigners, and no impediment can be placed either to the hierarchical organizations of various communities or to their relations with their spiritual leaders.” This article appeared, in identical form, in the sections concerning Bulgaria (art. 5), Montenegro (art. 27), Serbia (art. 35) and Romania (art. 44).

The rights of the minorities in a national state can be envisaged in at least three categories. The first category of such rights would aim at protecting the minorities against discrimination by the government of the ruling majority. In other words, the protective measures would aim at securing the minorities the same civil, political, educational and religious cultural rights enjoyed by the majority. The second category of rights aim at giving a degree of autonomy and at creating a special status for the minorities, including the right to represent themselves as a national entity in the existing political bodies. The granting of such rights could certainly assure the survival of a minority as a distinct ethnic religious or cultural group but would also segregate and set it apart from the rest of the population. The Ottoman state adopted this policy towards its religious minorities which segregated all the religious communities and eventually made impossible their assimilation into a national-unitary state. It should be remembered that the effort of the Ottoman government to fuse the religious groups into one homogeneous political

community by giving them some sort of political representation in the parliament of 1876–8 failed, both for it threatened the authority of the sultan and for receiving the cold shoulder of Russia and Europe. The third category of minority rights is to treat a minority as a son of endangered species and to try to resurrect it and pull it up to the economic and intellectual level of the majority through a variety of “affirmative” measures.

It is obvious that the Berlin Treaty adopted the first approach which aimed at preventing the newly independent Balkan governments from discriminating against their Muslim subjects. In effect, the struggle of the Balkan Muslims since the adoption of the Berlin Treaty has aimed at ending the general discrimination inflicted on them by the governing majorities in violation of their treaty obligations.

### *The Treatment of the Muslims in the National States*

The newly independent Balkan states initially abided by the provisions of the Berlin Treaty, although the new governments did not hesitate to encourage the emigration of their Muslim subjects through a variety of administrative and economic pressures.<sup>9</sup> A number of Muslims also emigrated voluntarily because they found it difficult to adapt to their new status as minorities or because they preferred to live under the authority of the sultan-caliph. However, the relative freedom accorded the Muslim minorities immediately after 1878 was gradually restricted or abolished altogether, as each Balkan state became increasingly nationalistic and reinterpreted its history in a revanchist spirit. These governments attributed their relative economic underdevelopment to the Ottoman-Turkish rule—five hundred years of Turkish oppression, as they called it—and began to label their Muslim subjects as supporters of the return of the old regime. They used this pretext to justify the increasingly discriminatory treatment of their Muslim citizens. The Turkish-speaking Muslims in particular bore the brunt of this discrimination, as they were viewed as having been the chief instruments of Ottoman rule in the past and, worse, as the potential supporters of Turkey. Bulgaria

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<sup>9</sup> C. and B. Jelavich: *The Establishment of the Balkan National States 1804–1920*, Seattle-London, 1977.

openly adopted a discriminatory policy against its Turks after a group of nationalist officers ousted the elected government in the early 1930s and established an authoritarian fascist government.<sup>10</sup> Turkish schools and newspapers were closed, and Bulgarian children were taught in school to hate the Turks. This hatred of Turks became a permanent feature of Bulgarian culture.<sup>11</sup>

The treatment of the Balkan Turks tended to vary in accordance with each Balkan country's relations with Turkey. After World War II, Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia, which adopted Marxism and, except for Belgrade, joined the Warsaw Pact, viewed Turkey, a member of NATO, as their worst enemy and treated their Turkish citizens as a potential fifth column. Greece on the other hand, which was also a member of NATO, adopted a more liberal attitude towards its Turkish-speaking Muslims until the Cyprus conflict soured its relations with Turkey. The Muslims in the Balkans suffered the worst persecution under the Marxist regimes, except that in Yugoslavia, the federal system and Tito's foreign policy provided them with a modicum of protection, despite the efforts of the Serbians to perpetuate their discriminatory policy that had prevailed from 1918 to 1941, when they controlled the Yugoslav unitary state.<sup>12</sup>

The persecution of the Muslims took place despite the existence of various treaties signed by the Ottoman state and later by Turkey with various Balkan governments. For instance, the Muslims of Bulgaria have been subject to several treaties between Turkey and Bulgaria. The İstanbul Protocol of 1909 restated the provisions of art. 5 of the Berlin Treaty, reiterating that ethnic Turks were considered equal to Bulgarians. The treaties of 1913, 1919 (Neuilly), and, especially, the treaty of friendship of 1925, reaffirmed the Turks' civil and religious rights and guaranteed their right of emigration.<sup>13</sup> These rights (violated) in 1951–52 Bulgaria, on the advice of Stalin, expelled 152,000 of its citizens of Turkish origin. The purpose was to wreck the economy of Turkey by making it absorb the refugees

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<sup>10</sup> On Bulgaria see: R.J. Crampton: *Bulgaria, 1878–1918, A History*, New York, 1983.

<sup>11</sup> K.H. Karpat: *The Turks of Bulgaria, the History, Culture and Political Fate of a Minority*, İstanbul, 1990.

<sup>12</sup> Ramet: *op. cit.*

<sup>13</sup> A. Mete Tunçoku: "The Rights of Minorities in International Law and Treaties: The Case of the Turkish Minority in the People's Republic of Bulgaria," in K.H. Karpat: *Turks of Bulgaria . . .*, pp. 241–257.

because that country had joined the NATO.<sup>14</sup> A new Turkish-Bulgarian agreement in 1968, was designated to reunite families divided by the expulsion of 1951–52. It was only partially implemented, for Bulgaria forbade the Turks' emigration. Indeed, Bulgaria, faced with a shortage of labor, began to regard its Turkish minority as an essential pool of labor for building roads and urban dwellings and developing agriculture. The wages of the Turks remained exceptionally low, especially in agriculture, while the ethnic Bulgarians moved to higher-paying jobs. Meanwhile, the birth rate among Muslims increased to over 3 percent (for a variety of demographic, cultural, and political reasons, including the Turks' subconscious effort to survive as an ethnic group by increasing their reproduction rate). The ethnic Bulgarians' birth rate dropped from about 1.5 percent in 1950 to 0.2 in 1980. Consequently, in December of 1984 the ruler of Bulgaria, at that time Todor Zhivkov, with the approval of his cabinet decided to solve once and for all the bothersome Turkish-Muslim problem. Already he had declared that the Macedonians (numbering about 168,000) were really ethnic Bulgarians. He did the same to the Romanians inhabiting the Timoc valley, the Greeks, and to other ethnics. In defiance of all the bilateral treaties and international agreements signed since 1878, the Bulgarian government declared that the Turks of Bulgaria were actually "converted Bulgarians" and that they had decided to return to the "national fold" by assuming Christian (Bulgarized) names and customs. The Turkish schools were closed, the mosques in most of the country confiscated (the mosque in Sofia was allowed to function in order to delude the Arab diplomats), Muslim cemeteries destroyed, and the speaking of Turkish prohibited. Protests by the Turks led to riots, which resulted in several hundred killed and more than one thousand interned on Belene Island.<sup>15</sup>

The world condemnation of Bulgaria, the criticism by Amnesty International and Muslim international organizations, such as the Muslim World League, produced no result whatsoever. The Soviet Union, despite pleas from various quarters, refused to intervene, calling the naked violation of the most elementary human rights in

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<sup>14</sup> H.L. Kostanick: *Turkish Resettlement of Bulgarian Turks 1950–1953*, Berkeley, 1957.

<sup>15</sup> See report by Amnesty International, *Bulgaria: Imprisonment of Ethnic Turks*, London, 1987, "Radio Liberty Bulletin 2," No. 1 of January 1986.



Bulgaria “a matter of internal affairs.” In the spring of 1989, the Turks staged a big demonstration in Shumen to protest their forced Bulgarization. The demonstration was put down with great difficulty—only after Turks had destroyed with their bare hands several Bulgarian tanks—and had the effect of showing up the ruling communist group as weak and afraid. Subsequent Turkish demonstrations encouraged democratic-minded ethnic Bulgarians to use and eventually bring down the Zhivkov dictatorship. It is interesting to note that two oppressed minorities—the Turks of Bulgaria and the Hungarians of Romania in Timisoara—brought to the edge of desperation rose to protest the treatment inflicted on them by the ruling governments and helped ignite the spark that brought down two of the worst dictators of Eastern Europe. However, the Bulgarian overthrow occurred only after Zhivkov had managed to expel 350,000 Bulgarian citizens of Turkish descent under the pretext of giving them “freedom to travel”: that is, he issued them passports valid only for three months for Turkey. After the overthrow of Zhivkov, some 100,000 Bulgarian Turks returned home and, together with those still in Bulgaria, managed to form a political party (Movement for Rights and Freedoms) headed by Ahmed Doğan and elect twenty-two deputies to the National Assembly. However, the Bulgarian public, taught to hate the Turks, has steadily opposed the equality granted to them. The threat to their rights, remains, therefore, despite the good intentions of the current democratic minded president of Bulgaria. It should perhaps be noted in passing that the Pomaks—that is the Slavic-speaking Muslims of Bulgaria—have continued to identify with Islam and the Turks, despite a variety of government pressures and inducements intended to persuade them that they are “Bulgarians”. Thus, the religion has proved to be a stronger source of identity than ethnicity or language, so perhaps the framers of the Berlin Treaty were not so wrong in regarding the protection of minority religious freedom as of prime importance.

The Muslims of Greece underwent similar treatment under somewhat different circumstances, thus indicating that the Balkan governments ultimately tend to adopt the same nationalist policy, regardless of the political regime in power. The status of the Muslims of Greece, most of whom are ethnic Turks, was regulated by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), which is also the international foundation stone of contemporary Turkey, and by other agreements, including the protocol for the exchange of population between Turkey and Greece.

According to these agreements, the Turks of Western Thrace were to be permitted to remain in their original homes (Komotini, Xanthi, etc.), the Greeks of İstanbul were to remain in that city. The rights of the two groups were spelled out in the most liberal terms and were generally implemented in relatively good faith by both sides. However, after Turkey landed troops in Cyprus in 1974 (to protect the constitutional order on the island as stipulated by the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 signed by the UK, Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus), the policy of each country towards its minority changed abruptly. Greece, in particular, began to limit the rights of its Turkish minority in defiance of the Lausanne Treaty, citing, among other things, the concern that the Turks of Western Thrace would provide a pretext for Turkey to invade. The Greek government raised a series of obstacles to the education of Turks in their mother tongue: it prohibited the import of textbooks from Turkey, refused to recognize diplomas given by institutions of higher learning in Turkey, etc. The government also confiscated, on various pretexts, the Turks' land, colonized large numbers of so-called Pontic Greeks from the USSR in the areas inhabited by Turks, imposed heavy and successive fines on Turkish properties, and even went as far as to confiscate the passports and deprive of citizenship those Turks who traveled abroad.<sup>16</sup> Even Amnesty International—which certainly has not been known as a friend of the Turks—could not close its eyes to such injustice, and early in 1991 issued a report that sharply criticized the Greek government's violation of Turks rights. One of the Athens government's more criticized acts was against Sadık Ahmet, a deputy in the Greek Parliament; it deprived him of his immunity and arrested him. Mr. Ahmet was eventually released due to the international pressures and was subsequently elected as an independent deputy from the district of Komotini.

Meanwhile, the small minority of about 20,000 Pomaks in Greece (they had been under Bulgarian rule from 1912 until 1919, when their area was attached to Greece) declared themselves to be Turks, in open defiance of a government-sponsored campaign to label them as originally Greeks who converted to Islam. Following the Bulgarian

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<sup>16</sup> J. Dalegre: "La minorité Musulmane Turcophone de Thrace Occidentale: Système d'enseignement et identité culturelle," *La Transmission du savoir dans le monde Musulman périphérique*, March 1991, pp. 51–63. See also *Bati Trakyanın Sesi* (Voice of West Thrace, a periodical published in Turkey by Turkish refugees from Greece.)

model, the Greek government gave the Pomaks a variety of desirable positions (teaching in Turkish areas, e.g.) and privileges with the intention of bringing them back to the Greek fold.<sup>17</sup>

The situation and treatment of the Muslims of Yugoslavia has varied from one republic to another, depending on the size and position of the Muslim population as well as on the overall foreign policy of Yugoslavia. Each one of the three major Muslim groups in Yugoslavia has its own special ethno-political characteristics. The Boshnaks, as the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina call themselves, are in a rather unique position. They form a plurality of 44 percent in that republic and speak the same language as the neighboring people of Croatia and Serbia. From 1878 to 1918 the Bosnians were under the rule of the Habsburgs, who treated them rather well, even allowing them to engage in political activity.<sup>18</sup> In fact, the Austrians established the office of *Reis-ül ulema* (the chief of religious scholars) and dealt with it as the true representative institution of the Muslims. After World War II Bosnia and Herzegovina became part of the newly-constituted state of Yugoslavia, or, to put it more accurately, they were incorporated into greater Serbia, which acted as the spokesman for the Southern Slavs. The Yugoslav state was founded on the idea that ethnic and linguistic affinity among the Slavs was the dominant feature of the population and was strong enough to bind them together; but soon the Serbians discovered that religious differences were stronger than the idealized ethnic ties. The Slovenes, Croats, and Muslims refused to be assimilated into the new political entity, which, contrary to its ethno-secularist pretensions, culturally speaking followed a Serbian Orthodox policy and was closely affiliated with the Serbian Church. Today, in Kosovo it is the church that disseminates the strongest anti-Albanian propaganda.

The Boshnaks were subjected to various pressures designed to alienate them from their faith and induce them to declare themselves "Serbians". The Muslims of Bosnia reacted by lending their

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<sup>17</sup> This is proven by the flood of publications defending the view that the Pomaks are Greeks. P. Mylonas: *The Pomaks of Thrace*, Athens 1990; P. Hidiroglu: *The Greek Pomaks and Their Relations with Turkey*, Athens 1990; Y. Magriotis: *The Pomaks of Rodope*, Athens 1990.

<sup>18</sup> The best and most extensive treatment of the Habsburg rule over the Bosnians is by R.J. Donia: *Islam Under the Double Eagle. The Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1878-1914*, Boulder, Co. 1981.

support to the Croatian political parties, largely as a measure of self-defense against Serbian chauvinism, and were then subjected to even greater Serbian nationalist pressure. Although strongly resisted by the Bosnian Muslims, the nationalism campaign of the Serbians did have its effect; it weakened the Boshnaks' memories of their historical ties with the Ottoman state and resulted in the creation of a new Boshnak identity—a national-political identity with a secular dimension that was nevertheless rooted in the old Muslim religious identity. Thus, it had a character of its own that was neither Serbian nor Croatian and became the foundation stone of a new national entity—the federated republic that was created after World War the Second.

Although Bosnia continued to be dominated by Belgrade, after Marshal Tito became an important figure in the Third World, especially after the Bandung Conference in 1955, and sought to establish better relations with the nationalist-socialist regimes in the Arab world and Asia, notably with Sukarno's Indonesia and Nasser's Egypt, the situation of the Yugoslav Muslims, especially that of the Bosnians improved considerably.<sup>19</sup> Sarajevo and Mostar, and their Muslim monuments built during the Ottoman rule became show sites for the Yugoslav government to demonstrate to the visiting Islamic missions from the Third World how well it treated its Muslim citizens. Secularist, rational ideas had increased the Boshnaks' ethnic and linguistic consciousness and their desire to be recognized as a distinct national group. They still refused to identify with the Serbians or the Croatians despite the latter's eagerness to welcome them on the basis of common ethnic and linguistic ties. The Boshnak intellectuals, many of whom were members of the ruling party (the Communist League), claimed to be a distinct nationality that, in ultimate analysis, stemmed from their religion, their secularist, atheistic philosophy notwithstanding. Consequently in 1971, the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Muslims were officially recognized as being of "Muslim nationality," while other Muslims of Yugoslavia were described in ethnic terms, such as "Turk," "Albanian," etc.

After being officially labeled a "nationality" the Boshnaks naturally began to increase their demands for national rights. They demanded freedom of press, association, education, etc., the right to

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<sup>19</sup> A. Popovic: *Les Musulmans Yugoslaves 1945-1989*, Paris, 1991.

study and interpret history in their own terms, and greater administrative autonomy as well. Faced with this ever increasing Bosnian Muslim nationalism, Belgrade finally decided to act to denying the Muslims the rights that were implicitly recognized when they were declared a "Muslim nationality." Using the pretext of a discovery of a "fundamentalist Muslim conspiracy" to overthrow the central government, Belgrade ordered the arrest of eleven Muslims in 1983. The government also used the "conspiracy" pretext to close several Boshnak publications and to appoint a non-Boshnak as *Reis-ül İslam* (formerly *Reis-ül ulema*). This office was occupied always by a Boshnak until 1983-84, indicating thus that the Slavic-speaking Muslims, rather than the Turks, were to represent Islam in Yugoslavia. However, those arrested were liberated late in 1989 after the beginning of political liberalization, and the Yugoslav government finally admitted that the Muslim "fundamentalist conspiracy to establish a government based on the shariat" had been fabricated by its secret service, which was dominated by Serbians.

In the Kosovo area, which is populated by Albanians, national agitation for autonomy has been going on for over a decade. This is basically a political movement aimed at securing for the Muslim majority administrative, cultural, and economic rights. It may be stated positively that the movement has had little, if any, religious undertone (despite a variety of contrary opinions on this question). The reaction of the Serbian government to the legitimate demands of the Kosovo Albanians was to abolish the autonomy of the region and to incorporate it into Serbia and impose drastic limitations on the civil and human rights of the Muslims. In fact, the Serbian government has even denied permission to international agencies and visitors to enter the Kosovo area.

The situation in the third Muslim area of Yugoslavia, namely Macedonia, is strikingly different from the rest. Here the Yugoslav government has adopted a liberal religious and cultural policy towards Muslims, the majority of whom are of Albanian origin. In order to diffuse the strong Albanian nationalist feelings among the Macedonians, the Belgrade government has tried to increase the appeal of Islam. It has built a *medrese* (school to train religious leaders) in Skoplje and has permitted the publication of religious literature, while allowing the Muslim *tarikats* (religious confreries) freedom of activity. At the same time, in order to help counter the Albanian nationalist groups, Belgrade has given the Turks of Macedonia (about 100,000

remain after some 200,000 to 300,000 were forced to leave in 1951) extensive rights and encouraged them to assert their national rights in every possible form. In sum, then the Muslims of Yugoslavia continue to be part of the internal and international policies of the Belgrade government. Their minority rights and freedoms are enlarged or restricted depending on the circumstances. The fact that Yugoslavia was and still is dominated by the Serbians with their brand of expansionist-nationalism has rendered meaningless the concept of inalienable human rights and freedom.

The Muslims of Romania fared rather well until the advent of the communist regime, when, encouraged by Moscow, the Romanian government began to restrict the freedoms of the Muslims. Indeed, from 1878 to 1947, the Romanian government allowed the Muslims—practically all of them of Turkic origin—to maintain their cultural and religious institutions. This benevolent attitude was dictated in good part by practical reasons. First, the attaching of Dobrudja to Romania in 1878, in a sort of exchange for southern Bessarabia taken by Russia, was simply a windfall—post-acquisition claims to historical ownership notwithstanding. Second, the Muslims were in a majority while the Romanian population constituted a small group of only 20 percent in 1878. Consequently, Romania needed a certain period of time to colonize Dobrudja with ethnic Romanians while at the same time forcing the Muslims to emigrate to Turkey. Once the ethnic Romanians were in the majority (this occurred in the 1940s after the Bulgarian inhabitants of north Dobrudja had been exchanged for the Romanian colonists from the south), its policy towards Muslims changed. Early in the 1950s the property of the Muslim upper class was expropriated, along with that of other propertied groups, and its leading representatives were interned at Bicaz. Then the Tatars were encouraged to declare themselves a nationality different in language and customs from the Turks, although the two groups had in the past considered themselves to be one community, as indicated by intermarriages, common schools, etc. All the Turkish and Tatar schools, including the teacher (imam)—training, mid-level seminary at Medjidia were closed. Then the Romanian government launched a rather bold project—namely, to assimilate all its remaining minorities, Jews and Germans were allowed to emigrate after payment of substantial amounts of money (ostensibly, in order to compensate the government for “expenses” incurred in “educating” the departing minorities). The Muslims, being a small, defense-

less minority without capable leaders, became an immediate target to assimilation. The *Securitate* branch at Constanta, the main city of Dobrudja, was staffed with native informers and administrators. The government used both the carrot (permission to enroll in high-ranking schools which produced a professional group that was prone to intermarriage with Romanians) and the stick (harsh penalties for any Muslim effort to maintain their culture and language) to promote assimilation. It did not formally close the mosques, but it did its best to discourage attendance and to deprive the Muslims of leaders by paying the imams just one-third of the average salary it paid to other government employees. Consequently the number of imams catering to the religious needs of the Muslims had dwindled to only about 20 in 1990. The situation has improved only slightly since then.

After the so-called revolution that ousted the Ceausescus in December of 1989, the Muslims began to organize with the purpose of securing their national rights. They asked for permission to open schools and train their clergy. During the euphoria which followed the "revolution," the Muslims were allowed to elect one representative to the Parliament, and Tahsin Cemil, a historian, was nominated by the Muslim community as its parliamentary representative. However, the *Securitate* (now bearing a different name) considered the rebirth of the Muslim community as a threat to its assimilationist policy, which remained in effect. Consequently it decided to split up the Muslims once more, using its agents, which have infiltrated the Muslim community, to launch a campaign to claim the "rights of the Turks." A small group of Turks occupied the offices of the *Muftiat* (the religious-cultural spokesman of the Muslims), and accused the Tatars of usurping all the offices available to the Muslims. The leader of the Turkish group, a driver by profession, who was seldom employed, visited President Ion Iliescu, in a hastily arranged appointment and was immediately named "deputy of the Turks." The split of the Muslim community into Turks and Tatars was thus formalized and perpetuated. The resulting intergroup quarrels leave little room for any constructive activity.

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The information presented above is only an outline designated to highlight the civil rights situation of the Muslims of the Balkans. The record, even if considered in the most liberal terms, has been dismal,

to say the least. The main reasons for the ill treatment of the Muslims are the following:

a. The “nation,” which became the foundation of the state in the Balkans, was viewed basically as a confessional and religious community and only secondarily as a secular, ethno-linguistic entity despite lip service paid to the latter concept.

b. The Balkan governments have used the political power at their disposal to make the majority ethnic group linguistically, culturally, and religiously an absolute dominant group and sought to create a monolithic nation that leaves little room for the existence of ethnic and religious minorities.

c. In the eyes of each Balkan nation-state the Muslims have appeared to be almost totally alien to their “nation”, primarily because of religious differences and, in the case of the Turks, because of their distinct language and their historical ties with Turkey.

d. The West has tended to ignore the treatment of the Balkan Muslims, despite the often repeated vows of respect for human rights regardless of faith and language, and this indifference has made worthless the international and bilateral treaties and charters designed to protect the civil and human rights of the Muslims in the Balkans.

The Muslims in the Balkans have remained loyal to the state in which they have lived throughout the past century. This obedience stems in good part because the Balkan Muslims are Sunnis who throughout the Ottoman centuries have developed the tradition of obeying the government, any government as it turned out. Yet, such obedience has not improved their situation. The solution to the plight of the Muslims and other minorities in the Balkans must be a redefining of the concept of a “minority” and its rights versus the majority and the government. (Query: is the “majority” to be defined in ethnic-cultural terms or otherwise?) The very concept of “state” also needs redefinition. Does the state belong to the dominant religious-ethnic majority or to all the citizens living within its territorial boundaries?

The creation and acceptance of an international charter granting rights to the Balkan minorities and the establishment of an international office with the authority and capability to monitor compliance with the charter, coupled with a change in the western attitude of indifference toward the violation of Muslim rights, is in my opinion, an absolute necessity if minority rights are to be secured in the Balkan states.



# THE ROLE OF TURKEY AND IRAN IN INCORPORATING THE FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS INTO THE WORLD SYSTEM

## *Introduction*

The disintegration of the Soviet Union unleashed overnight two mutually complementary processes of reintegration of the new independent states of Central Asia and the Caucasus into region blocs which emerged as a consequence of the disintegration and the world international and economic system. Turkey and Iran, located at the southern flank of the former Soviet Union and linked to Central Asia and the Caucasus by historical, cultural, and ethnic ties, were drawn almost immediately into this process of reintegration and assumed a variety of roles, based not upon any predetermined plan but according to the dialectic of international forces and the new states' search for support to consolidate their independence and statehood.

The policies of Turkey and Iran towards the new states were conditioned partly by their own national interests and historical and ethnocultural perceptions of the area, but mostly by their position, ties, and ideological relations to at least three geographic-cultural and economic blocs. The first and dominant international bloc is the Western one, led by the United States and Western Europe, which may be joined at times, paradoxical as it may sound, by Russia, if the latter deems that certain foreign relations of Central Asia and the Caucasus serve its own interests. The second bloc is regional, is led by Turkey and Iran, and is supported by other regional states such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India, although India more often than not follows its own independent policy. The third bloc may be called Islamic, for it includes in addition to the countries in the second bloc Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf states, and, to a lesser extent, Malaysia and Indonesia. This third bloc, although relatively large in size, does not have a formal structure or extensive influence; nevertheless, it provides a useful outlet for both Turkey and Iran to court the support of the Muslim countries in order to advance their own agendas in the area while permitting other Islamic states to seek Central Asian and Caucasian support for

their own security and interests—for example, Saudi Arabia versus Iran. Despite the growing appeal of Malaysia and Indonesia as relatively successful economic models and pluralist, pragmatic modern Islamic societies for Central Asia, they will not be studied here. Instead, this study will focus mainly on the relationship of Turkey and Iran with some of the former Soviet republics, and their role in opening up the former Soviet southern republics to the world. These are the Central Asian (except for Tajikistan), Caucasian, and Black Sea republics. Russia's policies in Central Asia and the Caucasus are seminal but will be studied in relation to those of Iran and Turkey rather than separately. It must be emphasized, however, that the relations between Russia on one hand and Turkey and Iran, respectively, on the other gained both momentum and diversity after 1991, as conditioned by their changed positions toward each other and Central Asia and the Caucasus. Prior to 1991 Turkey and Iran conducted limited bilateral relations with the USSR, as both countries feared communism as well as its territorial expansionism and sought Western help. Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952 and faithfully followed its policies, while Iran, along with Turkey and Pakistan, became part of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), until Ayatollah Khomeini's revolution of 1979 rendered that organization meaningless. The inevitable political and ideological estrangement of Iran from the United States after 1980 and the hostage trauma led the Iranians to seek some sort of accommodation with the USSR, while Turkey enjoyed renewed interest and backing as a Muslim antidote to Iran's perceived Islamic militancy. The end of the war in Afghanistan removed a major obstacle to Iranian-Soviet/Russian rapprochement, which the disintegration of 1991 accelerated and reconditioned. Meanwhile Turkey, after undergoing a rather rude awakening to the fact that the diminished role of NATO made precarious her presence in the Western alliance, regained a new stature as a stable Western ally in a region divided into new blocs and subject to the uncertain future of the Russian Federation and the Muslim fundamentalist movements.

It must be noted from the very start that the terms "Islam," "Muslim," or "Islamic" used in this study describe only the culture and faith of the individuals and not their countries' foreign policy, although common faith, language, culture, and history seem to have facilitated relations between Turkey and Iran and the new neighbor

states. Indeed, Turkey and Iran historically have had unique and close ties with Central Asia and the Caucasus—and Ukraine, in the case of Turkey—and have relied strongly on them to renew their relations with and even influence the area's economic and political life. The specific nature of these historical relations and their compatibility with future aspirations have, in fact, facilitated to some extent the success of Turco-Iranian relations with the contemporary new states, but did not determine them. The ultimate outcome of these relations was determined by the new perception of the world and one's own group position in it as part of a territorial national state and the subsequent sense of "national interest." These are old truths for the West but are new for the Islamic world, forced to divide itself into a series of ethnoterritorial states.<sup>1</sup> Persia dominated for centuries parts of Central Asia and the eastern Caucasus, that after the sixteenth century its promotion of Shiism as a political ideology of expansion alienated it from the bulk of the Muslims, even in areas such as Azerbaijan, where it was able to convert a substantial part of the population to Shiism. Shiism turned Iran into a political enemy of the Central Asian khanates, and the Safavids defeated the newly emerging Uzbek state only to be crushed by the Ottoman sultan Selim I (1512–20) at the battle of Chaldiran; the victory permitted the revival of the Uzbek state and the establishment of a long alliance.

Politics and religion not only distanced Central Asia further from Persia but to pushed it closer to the Ottomans by adding a new political weight to their common linguistic and cultural ties. These are key background issues which cannot be ignored by any student of the contemporary affairs of the area. Persia eventually transformed itself into Iran in order to camouflage the rule of the Persian minority over a variety of Turkic, Arabic, and Kurdish groups, and its version of Shiism along with the Persian language to assimilate its minorities. In sum, the concept of Iran was basically a modernist scheme designed to transform the multiethnic Persian empire into a Farsi nation-state; in a similar way the Young Turks used Ottomanism-Islamism to Turkify the multiethnic Ottoman state. Moreover, his-

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<sup>1</sup> This key issue, aside from some sources mentioned below, has received scant attention. See James P. Piscatori, *Islam in a World of Nation-States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Adeed Dawisha, ed. *Islam in Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

torically speaking, Persia was not a land of destination, but in transit, for the Muslims of Central Asia and the Caucasus to reach the shores of the Mediterranean, Marmara, and Black Seas, which were the terminals of the Silk Road.

The conversion of the bulk of Central Asian Turks to Islam in the tenth century further increased the attraction and influence of the western Islamic lands because of the obligation of *hajj* (pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in a lifetime) and the influence of the travel infrastructure necessary to support the pilgrimage. The communications of Central Asia, the Volga region, and Siberia with western Asia increased, as did the number of lodges along the pilgrimage land, which served not only as sanctuaries and work colonies for the pilgrims' support but also as outposts to disseminate the faith. Eventually, pilgrims avoided crossing Persia and preferred to use the Ottoman-held land. In the process İstanbul became such a semisacred place that Central Asians considered a pilgrimage to Mecca incomplete without a stop in İstanbul. İstanbul became the heart of the caliphate in 1517, and the fact that the sultan-caliph, the spokesman of the Orthodox Sunni Islam, appeared to be the only Muslim ruler who could do something for the Muslims of Russia after the period 1552–1783 increased the influence of İstanbul without giving rise to fears that the sultan-caliph may ask to substitute his rule for the tsar's as Persia's rulers had attempted to do many times. The Ottoman sultans never ruled Central Asia and the eastern Caucasus but instead appeared as disinterested defenders of the Central Asians' religious freedoms. Moreover, İstanbul was also a center of Islamic culture and learning, and after the 1850s it appeared increasingly as the source of reform, revival, and religious-national rejuvenation. It attracted hundreds of modernist (*jadidist*) intellectuals from Russia proper, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, including the famous Bukharan poet-modernist, Abdurrauf Fitrat, who wrote (ca. 1911) his seminal *munazara* (a dialogue about modernity) in İstanbul.

The disintegration of the USSR found Turkey and Iran in a markedly different situation from that prevailing in 1917, when the Bolshevik regime completely cut off all the Muslims under its rule from communicating with the rest of the world. Turkey had abolished (in 1922 and 1924, respectively) the sultanate and caliphate, whose incumbents personified the faith that was the main bond between eastern and western Turks. Turkey had become a territorial national state guided by national interest and a political identity

derived chiefly from ethnolinguistic roots; without a written rule, Islam in Turkey gradually would become one of the sources of national culture, personal ethics, and morality. Meanwhile Iran, after an intensive campaign of Persianization under the Pahlavi dynasty, abolished the monarchy in the revolution of 1979, whose leaders defined themselves as the revolutionary promoters of the return of all the faithful to the fundamental grassroots of Islam. Shiism was ignored outwardly but was in essence the driving force behind Iran's new Muslim internationalism. Thus, following different ideological and philosophical paths, Turkey and Iran had become republics, as would all the new states of the former USSR.

On balance, the Muslims of Central Asia and the Caucasus appeared closer to the Turks of Turkey. They shared not only common linguistic and cultural-historical ties but also the secular pragmatic outlook of their elites and citizenship in territorial ethnolinguistic states, however arbitrary their boundaries and limited their experience in independent national statehood. Even the Sunni Tajiks, despite their Persian language, are closer to the rest of Central Asia than to Iran, as their leaders have repeatedly indicated. In sum, the relations between the Central Asians/Caucasians and Turkey and Iran were facilitated by their historic cultural ties, but conditioned and determined largely by their respective political and ethnolinguistic transformations in the period 1917–91. In more than one way, all sides had changed, although many preserved the memory of the Soviet days.

The collapse of the Soviet Union put an end to seventy years of complete segregation of Central Asia and the Caucasus from Iran and Turkey and seemed to have revived overnight the old ties, but the reality was different from the image. In a visit to the grave (mosque) of Aslan Bab(a) (the mentor of Ahmed Yesevi) near the town of Otrar in Kazakstan in 1989, I was astonished to hear the old worshipers at the mosque greet visitors from abroad with the cry *jetpis jylın bitti* ("a seventy year wait has ended"), while both younger Kazaks and the visitors looked puzzled by this outburst of sentimentality. Indeed, the dominant theme at these reunions, which I witnessed repeatedly, was not the joy of finding long-lost brothers but the anxious search for friends and allies, regardless of nationality or faith, who could help the Central Asians overcome as soon as possible the ravages of political oppression and economic backwardness. The oft-expressed view of scholars accustomed to echoing the Soviet line, that the Central Asians regretted the end of communist

rule, did not appear to be correct except maybe at the beginning and in isolated cases, at least as witnessed by this writer.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, the Central Asians did not soon turn against each other (an excuse used by Russia to justify interventionism) and proved to be able to govern themselves and to learn to run their industries without Russian leadership. True, the collapse of the USSR and sudden independence initially had caused a high degree of perplexity, for the Soviets and Russians had taught the natives that their presence in the area was permanent and that the natives (often called in private “black donkeys”) had no capacity to govern themselves without Russian directives. These artificial perceptions began to disintegrate rapidly after 1993, however, as the new states realized that Russia was too weak economically, and too concerned politically about the possible reaction of the European community of civilized nations, which it wanted to join, to attempt to revive the defunct USSR.

The international and interregional relations of the new states intensified and subtle changes were made. For instance, the Central Asian states abandoned the old formula, “Kazakstan and Central Asia,” for the shorter “Central Asia,” making Kazakstan an organic part of this cultural-political bloc. The move further enhanced Kazakstan’s chance to become the leader of the area and pushed aside the old concept of “Turkestan” (southern Central Asia) put forth by Uzbekistan in order to promote its own regional leadership. The relative eclipse of Uzbekistan as a regional leader was also due to Uzbekistan’s view of China as a model of development and its late acceptance of economic reforms as well as to President Islam Karimov’s autocratic rule. By contrast, Kazakstan’s signing of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1993 and its prompt sale and delivery to the United States of about 600 kilograms of uranium from Ust’-Kamenogorsk in 1994—the material was flown immediately to the Dover air-base in Delaware, then trucked to Oak Ridge, Tennessee—encouraged the United States to support Nursultan Nazarbaev as the preferred leader of Central Asia. There is no question that Nazarbaev proved to be an exceptionally capable and foresighted leader as much as an adept manipulator of Russia’s fears and ambitions. However, there is no clear indication that the Western, and especially the United States’, interest in the Caucasus and Central

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<sup>2</sup> The nostalgia for Soviet rule was described in Martha B. Olcott, “Central Asia’s Post-Empire Politics,” *Orbis* 36, no. 2 (Spring 1992): pp. 253 ff.

Asia is deep and lasting. Kazakstan enjoyed a high degree of popularity in the United States as long as it harbored nuclear weapons and displayed an economic attraction. But the historical, cultural, and even strategic center of gravity in Central Asia is Uzbekistan, and sooner or later it will gain its due recognition, as indicated by the warming relations between Washington and Tashkent and the recent visit of Karimov to the United States. The situation may change, and the Western interest in Central Asia may increase drastically, if China's dormant ambitions in Central Asia are revived and Russia remains militarily and economically too weak to stem Chinese expansion, however improbable it may appear now. The desirability of a Central Asian self-defensive and self-supporting bloc against Chinese expansion westward—or against a revived Russia's move southward—may in the long run determine the Western policy in this area. For the time being the Western interest, even if formal, is vital in consolidating the area's independence and statehood. However, up to now the Western interest in the area, if measured in financial terms, has been minimal—except in Armenia, which has received enough help to rank it as one of the top five countries receiving U.S. aid. The U.S. Congress has prevented Azerbaijan from receiving aid on one of the clumsiest and most unjust of pretexts, while Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan received no help. In the latter case the lack of projects, the initial Uzbek orientation toward China as an economic model, and Turkmenistan's economic closeness to Iran, as well as apparent unfamiliarity with aid procedures, played some role in obstructing Western economic aid.

### *The Phases of Integration into the World*

The integration of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union into the global diplomatic and economic web can be divided into two distinct phases. The first phase lasted from independence until the end of 1993 and the start of 1994, and the second began thereafter. During the first period the West—notably, the United States—was caught unprepared by the sudden collapse of the USSR; lacking even elementary information about the area, Western nations showed considerable reluctance to become involved in its affairs for fear of being pulled into ethnic warfare and civil disorders, epitomized by the war in Tajikistan. It is now well known that the Russians

were at least partly responsible for the Tajik war and that the attacks on Mesketians (Turks of Ahiska in Georgia deported to Central Asia in 1944) in Uzbekistan were staged by the KGB in order to impress upon the world the need for a Russian presence in the area. In a similar way Russian and Soviet foreign policy makers portrayed the bogey of Islamic fundamentalism as directed against Western civilization and Christianity, thereby justifying their violent suppression.<sup>3</sup> As late as 1989, for example, on a visit to Tashkent, Mikhail Gorbachev lambasted Islam as a reactionary and oppressive faith, and this charge was followed up with attacks in the Soviet press and from its local pundits.

During the first period Turkey was designated, as clearly indicated by U.S. president George Bush's statement during a visit to that country in 1992, a model of development and a cultural antidote to Iran's fundamentalist Islam. Turkey accepted its role enthusiastically because of its long-standing ties with the Muslims of Russia and its desire to reinforce its NATO membership, which the collapse of the USSR had made even more tenuous. Meanwhile Iran, relatively isolated by U.S. policy and still recuperating from the war with Iraq, remained relatively passive and undecided as to what policy to pursue. Iran's posture was essentially defensive, for the rise of independent ethnic nation-states on its borders, notably in the Caucasus, posed grave dangers to its territorial integrity, as shall be indicated.

The second phase in the process of incorporating the former Soviet states into the world political economic system took place after 1994, when the United States and Europe became actively involved in the lives of those nations. At least two key issues prompted the Western involvement—namely, the realization that the Muslim states of the

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<sup>3</sup> There is a striking similarity in the attitudes of the tsarist administrators and Soviet satraps towards Islam. Both claimed that it was a reactionary and destructive force, ignoring the most elementary fact that the first truly enlightened modernists of the nineteenth century, such as Shiabeddin Marjani and Ismail Gaspirali, just to name two, came from among Russia's Muslims and influenced profoundly and positively Ottoman and Russian Islamic modernism. The fundamentalist movements in Russia, such as the Caucasian Muridism of Sheyh Shamil, were essentially political movements of liberation which are still continuing, as indicated by the Chechen revolt. It is interesting to note also that even sophisticated Russian scholars claiming detachment and objectivity have described the natives' deep attachment to their ways of life as a regressive consequence of their Islamic faith rather than a cultural self-defense against Russian-Soviet assimilationist campaigns. See, for instance, Sergei P. Poliakov, *Everyday Islam: Religion and Tradition in Rural Central Asia* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1991).



former USSR possessed rich deposits of oil, gas, coal, gold, and other minerals,<sup>4</sup> and the Russian policy of keeping only a military and economic foothold in the area without contributing much to the new states' development and welfare. During this second phase Turkey turned from an independent actor enjoying freedom of political and economic initiative to a partner of Western interests. At the same time, Iran, deprived of allies, achieved a rather close rapprochement to Russia in order to, among other things, prevent the ethnic nationalist policy of Azerbaijan from creating separatist movements among the Azeri population in Iran and use economic incentives to counter Turkey's cultural penetration of Central Asia. Russian backing and Iran's own economic muscle enhanced its unique advantage of providing direct land access to the Indian Ocean for the Central Asian and Caucasian states once their need to export gas and oil abroad became evident. Even so, Iran appeared to be a land of transit, as in the past, while Turkey emerged as the terminal gate for loading and shipping the oil and gas to the Western world, a position Turkey probably will retain until Russia can provide a safe alternative passage to Western markets, which is unlikely to happen soon.

The second phase of incorporation was also characterized by several internal developments: the intensification of regional interstate relations, the absence of ethnic strife, and especially the adaptation of both the natives and the Russians to the new circumstances. The emigration of many Russians, including qualified personnel who could not accept their minority status or were unwilling to learn the native language, had a rather important political and demographic impact. By raising the numerical proportions of the natives, it enhanced their claim that they were the permanent masters of their lands. After *Nezavisimaia gazeta* reported that some 400,000 people migrated to Russia from Kazakstan in 1994 alone, the newspaper stressed once again the demographic fact now facing the Russian Federation, that the "situation is not as bad for Muslims in Russia. . . . [Their] birth rate is significantly higher than [their] death rate, and [their] population density is increasing, as is the percentage of Muslims in their

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<sup>4</sup> It is a strange coincidence that the oil reserves in the republics of the former USSR are concentrated in the Muslim republics, such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Even in the Russian Federation the two Muslim autonomous republics, Tatarstan and Bashkirstan, have rich oil deposits. "Europe makes good cars and we give them good oil to run them, so this is a good partnership, if we get our share of the deal," an Azeri told this writer.

traditional areas. . . . Muslim families are bigger, stronger, and healthier than Russian families.”<sup>5</sup> Today the percentage of ethnic Kazaks might have reached 51 to 52 percent, while that of ethnic Russians likely has fallen to 30 to 33 percent. The Russians in Kazakstan appear to have accepted their new situation.

A study conducted by the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies indicated that only one out of ten Russians living in Kazakstan’s cities felt that Russia was his or her homeland but that one of two indicated that the former Soviet Union was his or her homeland (a rather interesting political nostalgia); meanwhile, 83.4 percent of Kazaks said Kazakstan was their homeland.<sup>6</sup> According to the same survey, 28.2 percent of Kazaks placed priority on independent statehood; 21.8 percent wanted to be part of the Eurasian nation proposed by President Nazarbaev, and only 14.7 percent preferred the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Meanwhile, 24.4 percent of the ethnic Russians wanted to see Kazakstan as part of a revived USSR, 21.5 percent as part of the CIS, 20.6 percent as a former union republic, and 15.1 percent as part of Eurasia; 32 percent of Kazaks and 11 percent of Russians agreed to transferring the nation’s capital from Almaty to Akmola.<sup>7</sup> In both cases there were undecided respondents. In a rather interesting and meaningful act of ethnic reconciliation in Kazakstan, only a small percentage of Russians and Kazaks recognized the right to territorial autonomy for Russians, and only 7.4 percent of the Kazaks wanted to see the Russians leave the country. In other words, the results of that survey imply that many ethnic Russians would live as a minority with assured rights and freedoms in a potentially prosperous Kazakstan rather than immigrate to a Russia with an uncertain future and a bleak economy.

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<sup>5</sup> *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* (hereafter *CD*) 47, no. 4 (1995): pp. 20–21; *CD* 47, no. 10 (1995): p. 15. The Voronezh province was so alarmed by the number of newcomers that it sought to limit the immigrants’ number. It should be noted that some publications continue to reproduce the Soviet demographic data which places the Kazaks at 42 percent and Russians at 37 percent of the population while indicating that the Russian population had decreased by 500,000 or about 9 percent in 1989–1995. *Monitor* (Open Society Institute) 10 March, 1996.

<sup>6</sup> *CD* 47–48 (1995): pp. 16 ff. For a behavioral study of Central Asian attitudes towards democracy, identity, ethnicity, and so on, see Nancy Lubin, *Central Asians Take Stock* (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute for Peace, 1995).

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

*The Role of Turkey and Iran in World Economic Integration*

During the period 1991–93 Turkey played a key role in bringing the Central Asian and Caucasian states into the international diplomatic circuit, while Iran sought to revive these states' traditional cultural and religious identities by appeals to Islam and past association to Persian culture. On balance, Iran's initial messianic efforts to portray itself as the "center and aspiration and the Mecca" of all Muslims, to quote a recent article, seemed to have been less successful than the Turkish and Saudi efforts to promote Islam as the faith and culture of the citizens of the new states.<sup>8</sup> However, during the past three years Iran has successfully used its relations with Turkmenistan not only to expand its economic ties with this country, with which it shares a long border, but also to prove to the rest of Central Asia that it is interested primarily in mutually beneficial economic relations rather than ideological conquest. The recently completed railway connection has brought Iran economically closer to Central Asia and has given a new impetus to its bilateral relations with the countries in the region. The growing *de facto* entente between Russia and Iran has helped consolidate Tehran's position in the area but without undermining—at least for the time being—Turkey's position. The combined effect of the appeals by all these Muslim states, plus Pakistan, each one playing the Islamic card to promote its own national interest in the area, was to rehabilitate the Muslim identity and cultural self-respect of the ex-Soviet Muslims and to bring them into the mainstream of world relations. It was clear from the very beginning that the Central Asians displayed secular attitudes and were interested in the material welfare and progress that their co-religionists from abroad could bring them. Even the Sunni Tajiks, despite their Farsi language, appeared to prefer the Turkish model of statehood and economic development to Iranian proselytizing.

The politics of oil and gas in Central Asia and the Caspian provided an excellent avenue for the incorporation of the ex-Soviet republics into the world economic-political system. It proved the primacy of economics in defining international relations, and the value of independent territorial statehood in enabling a nation to monopolize

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<sup>8</sup> Hanna Yousif Freij, "State Interests versus the Umma: Iranian Policy in Central Asia," *Middle East Journal* 5, no. 1 (Winter 1996): p. 81.

the use of its natural resources. It also highlighted the crucial role Turkey and Iran could play in assuring the political and economic future—and possibly the survival—of the Muslim-Turkic states of the former Soviet Union, and demonstrated as well that neither Iran nor Turkey possessed the political, military, and economic capability to determine by itself the economic and political course of the former republics. The crucial fact, to repeat, is that practically all the Muslim republics of the former USSR (and of the Russian federation) are landlocked; their exit is commanded first by Iran and second by Turkey, though Turkey is not contiguous with any of these areas, except for Nakhichevan (cut off from its mother country, Azerbaijan, by the Armenian corridor), but has a crucial position on the Mediterranean and Black Seas.

Contrary to some opinions, Turkey was reluctant to establish relations with the Turkic lands of the USSR during the periods of *glasnost* and *perestroika*. In fact, then premier Turgut Özal declared undiplomatically during a visit to New York that Turkey had little affinity for predominantly Shiite Azerbaijan. (He barely survived the outcry caused by his remarks, which demonstrated his lack of historical knowledge.) With the independence of the new states a *fait accompli* by 1991, however, Turkey drastically changed its position and was instrumental in promoting the new states' admission to the United Nations, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other international bodies. Among the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with the new states, Turkey facilitated their doing the same with the rest of the world.<sup>9</sup> It donated a building in Ankara to house the diplomatic missions of the cash-strapped new states and engaged in a massive program to train their diplomatic and civil service personnel.

The Turkish penetration of Central Asia and Azerbaijan during the period 1991–93 was rapid, multisided, and profound, for both the West and Russia—which came to believe its own anti-Islamic propaganda—regarded Turkey as the only suitable Islamic model of

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<sup>9</sup> Kemal H. Karpat, "The Foreign Policy of the Central Asian States, Turkey, and Iran," in *Turkish Foreign Policy: Recent Developments*, ed. Kemal H. Karpat (Madison, WI: 1996), pp. 101 ff.; Kemal H. Karpat, "The Socio-Political Environment Conditioning the Foreign Policy of the Central Asian States," in *The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995).

development and secular statehood for them.<sup>10</sup> The position of the West and Russia towards the involvement of Turkey and Iran in the life of the new Muslim states determined the scope and impact of each country's involvement. Turkey was by far the chief beneficiary of the great powers' support and attempted to draw the utmost benefit from it.

Turkey lent strong support to President Abulfaz Elchibey, the pan-Turkic leader of the Popular Front in Azerbaijan, who was elected to the presidency in 1992. However, Elchibey was ousted for giving anti-Russian and anti-Iranian policies—including a prediction that Iran would disintegrate and the Azeris of Iran would be freed—and was replaced in 1993 by Haidar Aliiev, the former Communist master of Azerbaijan. Elchibey's removal was engineered by Russia with the tacit support of Iran; and it dealt a devastating blow to Turkish influence in Azerbaijan, which already was rapidly declining because of Turkey's inability to stop the Armenian advance into Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, Azeri-Turkish relations resumed shortly thereafter because of public pressure in both countries and because Azerbaijan realized Turkey was indispensable to its survival as an ethnic national state and member of the international community. For instance, Turkish support has allowed Azerbaijan to resist Russian demands for military bases on its soil.

The oil question proved to be the axis around which revolved the complex relationship between national interest, the new state's incorporation into the world economic system, and the roles of Turkey and Iran. It also produced a Byzantine labyrinth of maneuvers and showed Russian contempt for established contracts, and displays of arrogance, all in the name of national interests and power politics. Soon after the disintegration of the USSR, the Ministry of Petroleum in Moscow divided into five lots the Caspian Sea shelf, which hitherto had been explored entirely by Azeri oil men, now giving one lot each to Turkmenistan, Kazakstan, and Russia. Azerbaijan's share included the Guneshli, Chirag, Azeri, and Neftyanie Kammi fields,

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<sup>10</sup> Ian O. Lesser, *Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993); Graham E. Fuller, *Central Asia: The New Geopolitics* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1992); Hafeez Malik, ed., *Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994). For a short but informed report on Turkish activities in Central Asia, see Lowell Bezanis, "Turkey Runs Up the Flag," *Transition* 1, no. 24 (29 December 1995).

and the newly discovered one of Kaypaz, all about twenty to thirty-five miles from the Apsheron Peninsula coast, on which Baku is located. The issue remained dormant until 20 September 1994, when an international consortium headed by British Petroleum and Amoco, in which Russia's Lukoil (80 percent of whose capital belongs to the state) and Turkey had shares, signed an exploration contract with the government of Azerbaijan.<sup>11</sup> Meanwhile, President Aliev had traveled to London, where he was promised generous economic assistance and support, encouraging him to resist more resolutely Russian calls for closer cooperation. The news about the consortium produced a very negative reaction from the Russian Foreign Ministry, which invoked the Iran-USSR treaties of 1921 and 1940 on fishing and navigation to claim that the Caspian Sea was a closed sea and any decision to explore and exploit its riches should rest on the unanimous agreement of all five littoral states.<sup>12</sup> The idea of a Caspian Sea organization had been put forth first by Iran's president Hashemi Rafsanjani during his visit to Moscow in 1992 but was ignored at the time, as Russia was overly confident that its long-entrenched position on the Caspian was more or less permanent. Now the Organization for Regional Cooperation of Caspian Countries was formed through the efforts of the Russian Foreign and Defense Ministries, the KGB, and Iran, to keep the West, especially Turkey, from establishing a strong economic foothold in the Caspian.

Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, speaking on behalf of the Russian industrialists and satisfied with the 10 percent given to Lukoil (they were afraid of being left out altogether), assured Aliev that Russia had no intention of opposing the implementation of the consortium oil agreement. However, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, supported by foreign intelligence chief Evgenii Primakov, condemned the agreement as illegal, accused the Russian industrialists of greed and lack of patriotism, and persuaded President Boris Yeltsin to issue a secret directive—which Chernomyrdin refused to sign—to protect the Russian interests in the Caspian and the “provisions of international law.”<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> *CD* 46, no. 39 (1994) and *CD* 46, no. 41 (1994).

<sup>12</sup> *CD* 46, no. 39 (1994) and *CD* 47, no. 45 (1995).

<sup>13</sup> *CD* 46, no. 27 (1994) and *CD* 46, no. 41 (1994). An appraisal of the contract appeared in *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 27 October 1994, and is reproduced in part in *CD* 46, no. 43 (1994).

After Russia sent a strong memo to the British government criticizing the consortium and threatening to undertake a variety of unspecified measures, the West finally allowed Turkey to play its Black Sea card. Turkey announced to the world that it was taking the necessary measures to defend the environment and the safety of its citizens by subjecting the passage of oil tankers and other ships through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to new regulations. The Montreux Convention of 1926 had left the defense of the two straits to Turkey, but gave users unlimited freedom of passage. The only requirement for passage was notification. In 1994, however, Turkey declared that it had the right to authorize passage, imposed a twenty-four hour notification, demanded the stationing of a pilot on the passing ships, and implied that it might even levy a fee to clean and protect the environment. If one considers that the number of vessels using the Straits had increased to 16,000 by 1993, from about half that number just ten years earlier, that all the beaches of İstanbul are polluted by tar, and that incidents of collision are frequent, a rationale for the measures is self-evident. Nevertheless, by backing Turkey, the West acquired a rather effective but potentially dangerous means to force Russia, half of whose maritime trade passes through the Straits, to respect the rights of the new states.

In 1994, Azerbaijan successfully took the initiative to secure the acquiescence of Iran and Turkey to the consortium. On a four-day visit to Iran in July 1994, President Aliiev signed a declaration to deepen bilateral relations with Iran in the political, economic, and cultural fields and then eight other agreements to build a railroad from Orduabad to Menjan and to lay a gas pipeline from Khvoy to Orduabad. Iran promised to support Azerbaijan in its Nagomo-Karabagh dispute with Armenia but refused to discuss any question related to southern Azerbaijan, even rejecting Aliiev's demand to visit Tabriz, its capital, and refused to give any assurances that Iran will not build a gas pipeline to Armenia.<sup>14</sup> Soon afterwards, Saudi Arabia entered the picture by promising to finance twenty-four programs in Azerbaijan worth \$15 billion, hoping to entangle Iran more deeply in the politics and economics of Central Asia and the Caucasus and lessen its grip on the Gulf area, or at least to secure a bargaining chip.<sup>15</sup> The Iranians and Azeris agreed to set up a commission to

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<sup>14</sup> CD 47, no. 45 (1995).

<sup>15</sup> CD 46, no. 33 (1994). Under Saudi pressure, the Islamic Charity Fund of the

supervise the implementation of their agreements, including those signed by President Rafsanjani in 1993 but never enforced.

Earlier in 1994 Aliev had made his first official visit to Turkey. As a gesture of reconciliation, he assured the Turks that they would receive a share in the consortium—the share went up, according to unconfirmed reports, from 3 to 5 percent—provided that Turkey accept as “natural and inevitable” Azeri membership in the CIS, claiming it would be difficult to sever two-hundred-year-old ties to Russia. In exchange, Aliev received from Turkey \$250 million of credit for long-term exports and a promise for an additional \$600 million, plus a gift of 100,000 tons of grain and more on loan, to be turned into grants if necessary. Moreover, Azerbaijan and Turkey signed sixteen agreements, including one on Development of Friendship and Multifaced Cooperation, Article 5 of which stated that if one of the parties became subject to aggression, the other would take necessary “effective” measures and provide assistance to the other in conformity with the UN Charter. Turkey had every interest in preserving its self-styled image as a caring brother to the Azeris.

The “contract of the century,” as the Azeri oil consortium was dubbed, continued to involve the West in the Caucasus and bring the new states further into the limelight of world politics. On 10 November 1995, Azerbaijan signed a second oil consortium agreement, which included Pennzoil (USA), Agip (Italy), and Lukoil (Russia), to operate the Karabagh field (estimated to have from 80 to 120 million metric tons of oil), fanning further the discord between the Russian Foreign Ministry, which insisted that the riches of the former USSR belong to Russia, and the fuel and energy chiefs, supported by Chernomyrdin, who were more than happy with Lukoil’s huge (35 percent) share in the second consortium and the right to operate the field.<sup>16</sup>

The geographical layout of the oil pipelines was potentially the

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League of Islamic States provided care to thirteen thousand refugees and promised to finance a large clinic and to build fifteen hundred apartment buildings in Baku.

<sup>16</sup> The Azeris told this writer in Baku that the amount of oil reserves is several billion metric tons. When asked, the late rector of Azerbaijan Petroleum University, Tawfik Aliev, did not support the above figure but insisted that Azerbaijan had the know-how and manufactured the equipment for the entire oil industry of the former USSR. In any case, the oil deal deserves far greater attention and study than we were able to devote to it. For further information see *CD* 46, nos. 38, 40, 46, and 47, and *CD* 47, nos. 21, 34, *passim*.



most important phase of the oil deal, for the control of the pipelines has infinite economic, military, and political implications. The oil reserves in the fields assigned to the first consortium are estimated modestly to be 500 million metric tons, and because the extraction is truly cost effective, for each \$1 billion invested, the return is roughly \$10 to \$15 billion.<sup>17</sup> Consequently, the owners of the pipeline can impose rather high fees on the oil flowing through their territory. Russia, which controls the existing pipeline to the Black Sea port of Novorossiisk through Dagestan and Chechnya that will also transport the oil from Chevron's fields in Tengiz in Kazakhstan, naturally insisted that all new pipelines follow the same route. Azerbaijan and Turkey, on the other hand, advocated that the Baku-Supsa (Georgia) route be lengthened to Ceyhan (on Turkey's Mediterranean coast), and even though the United States opposed the Baku-Iran-Turkey pipeline, presidents Süleyman Demirel and Haidar Aliiev both declared in 1994 that Turkey had an indisputable right to lay a pipeline through its territory.

The long dispute was finally resolved in October 1995. The Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC) determined that the first oil—95,000 barrels a day—will start flowing late in 1996 and will be exported through Russia and Georgia, the line eventually to be extended to Ceyhan. The repercussions of the oil and pipeline deals created price wars between Russia and Georgia, affected the war in Chechnya, had something to do with the attempt on Eduard Shevardnadze's life, and prompted a phone call from President Clinton to Aliiev, advising him to accept both the Russian and Georgian pipelines. The pipeline and oil deals are far from being settled definitively. The Russian press has blamed the United States for being behind this "intrigue, which they are cleverly calling . . . a compromise . . . although in reality Russia is the loser."<sup>18</sup> Indeed, Russia was made to pay for its manipulation of the Sadaval, the organization that Russia backed in 1992–93 to unite the Azeri Lezgians with their "brothers" in Dagestan in the Russian Federation and thus destabilize Azerbaijan and weaken Elchibey. In 1994 Aliiev claimed that the pipeline to Novorossiisk was unsafe because it passed through two hundred miles of hostile Lezgian-Dagestani territory,

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<sup>17</sup> *Pravda*, 10 October 1995.

<sup>18</sup> *RFE/RL Daily Report*, 2 January 1996; *Pravda*, 10 October 1995.

and consequently Azerbaijan preferred the southern route through Georgia and Turkey.

The battle over the oil consortiums and the pipelines in Azerbaijan awakened Chevron to the importance of the pipelines (the company had plunged into the operation of the Tengiz fields without paying much attention to transportation issues), and it also introduced Mobil into the oil business of Kazakstan. Chevron is exporting barely 20,000 barrels of oil from its Tengiz fields, but reportedly it is planning to lay a pipeline across the Caspian and through Azerbaijan to Georgia and Turkey. Meanwhile, because Georgia expects to earn several times more money from the oil flow than from its tax revenues of just \$250 million annually, it has sought to improve relations with Turkey, which is already supplying Georgia with a substantial amount of hard currency thanks to business tourism.

Oil politics brought Azerbaijan into world politics—it recently joined the Partnership for Peace—and highlighted the crucial position and role of Turkey in the area, forcing Iran to side with Russia. In the short run the oil deals allowed Azerbaijan to somewhat isolate Armenia, as Russia and Iran, the main supporters of Yerevan, had to distance themselves somehow from their protégé (actually an unloved pawn) in order to safeguard their economic interests in Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, their long-range interests call for maintaining a strong foothold in Armenia so that Russia can use Armenia to put military pressure on Azerbaijan, despite the Minsk group and European peace efforts, and Iran can use Armenia to quell any Azeri separatist initiative among its own Turks. Armenia, in turn, looks upon the Russian military bases on its territory (and in Georgia) as a possible springboard for a Russian advance into the Middle East, which would allow Armenia to occupy eastern Anatolia.<sup>19</sup> This polit-

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<sup>19</sup> The Armenian diaspora is doing its best to provoke Turkey. In a meeting in Istanbul in 1994, the then foreign minister of Armenia, Raffi Hovannisian, representing the most extremist irredentist U.S. group, launched an incredibly insulting attack on Turkey. This episode was one of the reasons Ter Petrosian, the president of Armenia, ousted his foreign minister and tried to forge a new foreign policy for Armenia in accord with the prevailing political and economic realities of the area rather than the bellicose dreams of the diaspora. Petrosian has refused to grant dual citizenship to diaspora Armenians and in 1995 outlawed the Dashnak party, the standard bearer of Armenian irredentism. Meanwhile, budget revenues in Armenia fell to \$21.6 million (it was \$44 million in 1993) and nominal wages per month dropped to \$15.60; in addition, the country forfeited any share of oil pipeline revenues. But Armenia receives generous aid from the United States.

ical fantasy, nourished by the Armenian diaspora in United States and France, along with pressure from Azerbaijan, has compelled Turkey to cut off Armenia's land communication (limited air communication has been restored) with the rest of the world.

Exclusion from the oil deals and from trade with Turkey has ravaged Armenia's economy and prompted an exodus of its people to Russia, Europe, and the United States, slowly turning the Armenian military "victory" in Karabagh into a political and economic defeat. Although Armenia massacred thousands of innocent civilians and occupied one-fifth of Azeri territory, from which it ousted one million Muslims, it could escape isolation and improve its world standing by coming to terms with Azerbaijan. Following the 1994 meeting of the Council of Foreign Affairs of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Budapest, the representatives of Azerbaijan and Armenia met in Amsterdam. Armenian President Ter Petrosian declared that the Armenians of Karabagh were prepared to make concessions (but not on the status of the province or the Azeri corridor of Lachin, which links Armenia to Karabagh) by taking the Dayton agreements as a model.

Meanwhile, Iran's claim to be a disinterested advocate of all Muslim causes has been buffeted by its policy of friendship with Armenia, which is dictated by its own national interest but in the end negatively affects Azerbaijan. Iran was able to hide its pro-Armenian policies until the 1994 downing of an Iranian C-130 transport plane by Armenians (who mistook it for an Azeri plane) not only caused public revulsion against Armenia in Iran but also reinforced claims that Iran was providing secret military help to Yerevan despite assuring the Muslim world of the contrary. Although Iran continues to be troubled by the growing ethnic consciousness among its Turkic groups (Azeris, Turkmens, etc.), awakened by the rise of national territorial states north of the Iranian border, President Aliiev assured Iran that Azerbaijan considers "sacred" any territory under Iranian jurisdiction. In addition, relations between Georgia and Turkey have continued to expand. In January 1994 Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze and President Aslan Abashidze of the autonomous Republic of Adzaria, a Muslim enclave on the border with Turkey, visited Ankara to sign a declaration of solidarity and cooperation. Shevardnadze lauded Turkey's efforts to stabilize the situation in Georgia and received a \$50 million loan, promises of electricity, and other assistance. (President Abashidze offered to go to Abkhazia to

mediate that enclave's conflict with Georgia but was turned down by Tbilisi, probably out of fear that the "mediation" might turn into collaboration between the two Muslim enclaves of Georgia.)

An abundance of resources has played a crucial role in integrating other states into the world political system, sometimes through Iran and Turkey. Kazakstan, the recipient of by far the largest amount of foreign aid from the United States and investment from abroad, has played an astute diplomatic game. President Nazarbaev has sought to accommodate Russia militarily, economically, and politically—even taking a position against Turkey when he supported passage of the pipeline through Russia—at the same time he has worked for the rapid economic development and nationalization of Kazakstan. Nazarbaev has rejected all efforts to impose the economic sanctions on Iran advocated by the United States, while striving to build regional interstate organizations, as will be discussed later. Nazarbaev signed an agreement with an international consortium comprised of Mobil, Shell, Total Agip, British Gas, and British Petroleum/Statoil to conduct exploratory surveys in the northern Caspian Sea, and in 1994 Nazarbaev signed another contract with British Gas and Agip for the exploration-exploitation of the Karachaganak field, which has at least 650 million tons of gas condensate and 200 million tons of oil, in the northwest part of the country. Still, Kazakstan has insisted that these two Western companies come to terms with Russia's Gazprom to secure the transportation of gas and oil. To supplement the Central Asian Economic Council that regulates trade between the five member states, Nazarbaev has proposed a Eurasian Union, partly to overcome the numerous shortcomings of the CIS and possibly to downgrade Russia's domination of the latter. In a conference on "Eurasian Space: Using Integration Potential" held on 20 September 1994, Nazarbaev insisted integration not be limited to trade and economics. (It should be noted that in the Eurasian Union Kazakstan favors, all states would maintain their territorial integrity, but Islam Karimov's proposed Turkestan would consist of a territorial union similar to the one created by Russia in the 1860s.)

It was, however, Turkmenistan that signed first the truly major Central Asian contract with Iran. President Saparmurad Niyazov (known now as Turkmenbashi—the head of the Turkmen) visited Tehran in the fall of 1994 and signed a contract to build a four-thousand-kilometer pipeline to carry gas to Turkey and Europe via

Iran.<sup>20</sup> The pipeline will take years to build and will cost \$7 billion. Although the United States opposes it, Turkey will accept it—not only for financial reasons but also in order to decrease its own dependency on Russia, whose gas pipelines to Turkey have been periodically pirated by Ukraine, causing costly shortages in Ankara and Istanbul, which prefer to use gas instead of pollution-causing cheap Arab oil. Turkmenistan shares a six-hundred-mile border with Iran, with which it has had long trade relations, and more recently has improved its land communication. The Ashkhabad-Mashhad-Tehran highway was opened in 1991, and the three-hundred-mile Tajan-Sarkhs-Mashhad railway is expected to be completed in 1996, giving Turkmenistan access to the Indian Ocean. Uzbekistan and Kazakstan hope to use this transportation system to ship their goods overseas, as indicated by a series of agreements.<sup>21</sup> Meanwhile, the Caspian Sea Shipping Company, established in 1992, is linking the ports of the five littoral countries to each other and to the Indian Ocean.<sup>22</sup>

Although Iranian trade with Central Asia has been rather limited, it is expected to increase rapidly as Turkmenistan begins to earn hard currency. Indeed, partly to counteract the growing economic presence of Iran, President Turkmenbashi has invited businessmen from Germany and Great Britain to Turkmenistan. A British delegation from twenty firms, headed by Minister of Energy Timothy Egger, visited Ashkhabad in mid-1995 and promised Turkmenistan liberal credits to build gas pipelines and railways and conveyed, on behalf of British Prime Minister John Major, “feelings of eternal friendship and brotherhood,” mentioning Iran’s failure to build even a single structure in the country.<sup>23</sup> Obviously, British participation in the economic “great game” now unfolding is intended to prevent Iran from taking the lead in building the pipeline, but the British also have concluded a series of agreements on education, science, and culture and signed memoranda of cooperation in exploring sources of gas and oil energy. The truth is that Iran, besides being immersed in dire economic problems of its own, does not have the

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<sup>20</sup> *CD* 46, no. 34 (1994); see also *CD* 47, nos. 34, 40.

<sup>21</sup> Freij, “State Interests,” pp. 78–79.

<sup>22</sup> *CD* 46, no. 2 (1994); see also *CD*. 46, nos. 38, 39, and 40 (1994).

<sup>23</sup> *CD* 47, no. 7 (1995): p. 25. See also *US-Kazakstan Monitor*, vol. 1, no. 5 (October–November 1994).

capital, organization, and know-how to plan major economic or political role in the new states of the former Soviet Union.

As this survey of economic activities in the southern republics and their underlying political, social, and cultural implications clearly has demonstrated the new Muslim states of Central Asia and the Caucasus have linked themselves to the outside world through lucrative relations and powerful partners, such as the United States, Britain, Germany, and France. (France has actually established a sort of economic-diplomatic monopoly over Uzbekistan.) There are also lesser partners such as Israel, which has been visited by several Central Asian heads of state, including Kazakstan's Nazarbaev, who balanced his trip there with a visit to Yasir Arafat. In addition, Japan, China, and India are preparing their own separate plans to carry Central Asian oil to the Pacific and build refineries in Kazakstan, but all these Asian countries are bound to play secondary roles because of their limited influence in the area, in contrast to Russia, apparently still the main political actor. The incorporation of the Central Asian and Azeri states into the world cultural, economic, and political system was backed and generalized by scores of exchange programs with Europe and the United States; the Fulbright and International Research & Exchanges Board programs alone brought over one thousand scholars and officials to the West between 1991 and 1995, and the Turkish exchange program will be mentioned later.

The opening of the Central Asian and Caucasian republics, especially the southern ones, to the world was evaluated by a group of experts at the Social Science Institute, the think tank established by Mikhail Gorbachev at Moscow State University. Citing the Baku oil deal and the *de facto* change in the status of the Turk Straits, those experts claimed that the Western countries had used the oil companies to influence the new states to "fling their doors open to the West and open windows to the Mediterranean," ominously adding that political unrest was the only means to stop or slow down Western investment there.<sup>24</sup> The experts named Turkey the "new regional leader," and because Turkey controls the Russian exit to the Mediterranean they called upon Russia to balance it by establishing a strong

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<sup>24</sup> CD 46, no. 43 (1994): pp. 10–11. The *Economist* reported (2 December 1995) that Iran is planning to establish several free trade zones along its northern border, including one at Sarakhs.

foothold in Armenia building military bases there.<sup>25</sup> Finally, they likened the impact on Russia of the new routes out of Central Asia to the way the discovery of routes to India around Africa ultimately pushed the Italian city-states to the periphery of European politics. Russian political elites seem to have a permanent great power psychosis that leads them to rely on power to solve any problem involving the Muslims (while taking advantage of their wealth), probably including a military showdown when they are ready for it.

It would be wrong to portray Turkey and Iran as permanent rivals and competitors who can be played against each other at will. The two countries know full well that a strong Russia is a threat to their existence, as made clear by Vladimir Zhirinovsky's speeches, and that, as proven by history, Armenia has always been a pawn in Russia's southern politics to the detriment of both Iran and Turkey. Consequently, in response to the rising Russian nationalist tide, their presidents held a series of meetings in 1993 and 1994 in order to settle Iranian-Turkish differences and coordinate policies in Central Asia and the Caucasus.<sup>26</sup> It was under these conditions that in 1994 Haidar Aliev was able to renew, improve, and place Azerbaijan's relations with Iran and Turkey on equal terms rather than openly favor Turkey, as his predecessor, President Elchibey, had done.

### *International and Regional Organizations*

The relatively small, ethnically divided populations of the new states of Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as their landlocked position,

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<sup>25</sup> These views were expressed at a conference organized by the Foreign Policy Institute of the Russian Foreign Ministry and its Turkish counterpart titled, significantly, "Russia and Turkey: Rivals or Partners." The conference, closed to the public, was held in Ankara in May 1995, and there Russian participants accused Turkey of "Pan-Turkist" aims and of being the tool of the "corrupting, decadent" West which had destroyed Russia. The Turks responded in kind. The second part of the conference, held in Istanbul, dealt with economic issues and was open to the public.

<sup>26</sup> Late in 1993, as Russian near abroad policy threatened to become aggressive and politicians talked about expanding Russian borders to the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean, Ankara and Tehran came together to patch up their differences. Both countries appeared to agree that the PKK (the Kurdish Workers Party ruled by the Kurdish Marxist guerrillas) was a threat to their stability and that Russia successfully had manipulated to keep both Turkey and Iran from mediating in the Karabagh conflict. Both countries have established visa requirements for Azeri citizens and vice versa.

economic weakness, and domineering national bureaucracies, expose them to internal and external pressures. As a result, these states have regarded membership in international bodies and the establishment of regional organizations as the prime means for offsetting potential foreign threats, or courting support, as the case may be, from their big neighbors—Russia and China (and Iran)—for which they are no military match, individually or collectively. The total populations of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan consist of roughly 65 million people, more or less equal to the populations of Turkey and Iran and far below those of Russia and China.

Because the independent existence of the Central Asian and Caucasian republics offers Turkey and Iran a safety zone against Russia and China, however, both Turkey and Iran, whatever their differences, have done their best to consolidate the independent statehood of their northern brethren. The dormant Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), which originally included Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, was expanded to include the Central Asian states and Azerbaijan.<sup>27</sup> ECO membership opened the way for the new states to reincorporate themselves into the Islamic Middle Eastern world to which they had belonged for millennia.<sup>28</sup> This symbolic reincorporation facilitated for the Central Asians the pilgrimage to Mecca, instruction in religion, student exchanges, and the like,<sup>29</sup> but the ECO's grandiose plans to expand communication and transportation, lower tariffs among member nations, and establish banking facilities have materialized only in part and primarily as the consequence of lateral agreements rather than regional pacts. Iran, which stands to benefit most from it, has been the most dedicated advocate of the ECO.

Personal relations, not well-planned projects, accounted for much

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<sup>27</sup> CD 45, nos. 43, 51 (1993).

<sup>28</sup> Iran formally recognized the seven states on 25 December 1991, well after they declared their independence, lest demands for border changes and a disorderly breakup of the USSR create turmoil and demands for ethnic reunification in the north of Iranian Azerbaijan, which shares the same language and ethnicity as the former Soviet Azerbaijan, and actual border changes. A. Ehteshami, "New Frontiers: Iran, the GCC, and the CCARs," in *From the Gulf to Central Asia*, ed. Anoushiravan Ehteshami (Exeter: Exeter University Press, 1994): p. 94.

<sup>29</sup> For the ideological battle between various varieties of Islamic fundamentalism and the Central Asian response, see Ahmed Rashid, *The Resurgence of Central Asia—Islam or Nationalism?* (London: 1994).



of the interaction between Turkey and Iran and the new states. The president of Turkey visited the area in 1991, followed by Iran's Rafsanjani in 1992, and a summit meeting held in Ashkabad led to other meetings that spelled out the policies of the new states toward Turkey and Iran. By 1992 it became clear that the Turkic states chose to follow Turkey's secular, ethnonational, pro-European path of development while maintaining close relations with Iran. The choice of Turkey as a model stimulated cooperation among the Turkic states, creating a *de facto* economic and cultural Turkic bloc, but there was no open or covert commitment to Pan-Turkism, which conflicts with the idea of ethnonational statehood. The rise of the ethnic and linguistic factors as the principal link between the new states of Central Asia in 1991–92 and the subordination of Islam to them as a cultural ingredient left Iran no other alternative but to play its own Islamic card, minimizing the Shiite differences while upholding the virtues of the Persian language and culture, especially in dealing with the Tajiks. Perhaps inadvertently, Iran helped raise the importance of ethnicity and language as the prime sources of identity. The revolutionary fundamentalism of Iran, the conservative revivalist Wahhabism of Saudi Arabia, and the orthodoxy of Pakistan, all alien to the Central Asian understanding of Islam, neutralized each other (or at best limited each to isolated footholds) and prevented the formation of an Islamic international political organization, however remote the possibility.

In January 1992 Turkey established the Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TICA). Its purpose is to develop a "legal framework for liberalization . . . democratization . . . [and] management cadres . . . necessary to help the new republics adjust to the outside world not only politically and economically but also socially and culturally," and, of course, to consolidate Turkey's position in the Turkic states.<sup>30</sup> Meanwhile the Exim (export-import) Bank, with a revolving credit of \$1.2 billion, encouraged investment in gas and oil exploration, transportation, telecommunications, and a variety of smaller consumer-goods industries such as clothing, shoes, and supermarkets. In mid-1992 alone, 220 firms received financing, while by 1995 the

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<sup>30</sup> Umut Arık, "The New Independent States and Turkish Foreign Policy," in Karpat, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, p. 38. Arık, a former ambassador to Tokyo, was the head of TICA until his appointment as ambassador to Italy late in 1996. See also CD 45, no. 23 (1993).

figure had increased to 350, according to a conference report. In 1993, bilateral trade between Kazakstan and Turkey increased by 300 percent over 1992, amounting to \$112 million, and the total cost of projects assumed by Turkey was over \$1 billion. Turkey also concluded economic and cultural agreements with all the other republics; consequently, beginning in 1992, some 10,000 exchange students were enrolled in Turkey's fifty-three universities. (Students who failed the courses were trained and given capital to open small businesses in their country of origin, preferably in association with a financing firm in Turkey.) Meanwhile, trade between Turkey and Russia reached \$2 billion, according to official figures; unregistered private trading probably was three times that amount.

The Central Asians became more interested in establishing regional organizations after 1992–93 as they became more confident that “a return to the empire,” as Nazarbaev put it, would not occur. As mentioned, they established the Economic Union, which did not seem to yield much result. Then, however, the Central Asian states were forced out of the ruble zone in 1993, and each country had to issue its own separate currency. Russia provoked this monetary crisis to benefit itself in economic relations with the former Soviet republics without realizing that the move would consolidate their economic and political independence and stimulate the drive to establish regional associations.

When President Nazarbaev paid an official visit to Turkey in October 1994, he signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. He further stated publicly that the time had arrived to create an organization that would include Turkey and the Turkic-speaking states of Central Asia and work for peace without being directed against anyone. As if to stress his Turkic affiliation, Nazarbaev prolonged his visit in Turkey through the Turkic summit held on 18–19 October 1994. There, the heads of the six states (Azerbaijan included) proclaimed in their declaration that their relations had developed significantly since the first summit held in Ankara in 1992 and needed to progress further.<sup>31</sup> They reaffirmed their common historical, cultural, and linguistic ties and stated that their views on solving regional problems were in harmony and that they would act in accord with the charter of the United Nations and other international bodies.

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<sup>31</sup> *Sabah*, 20 October 1994; *CD* 46, no. 42.

They also condemned Armenia for its acts in Azerbaijan and called for an early solution of the United Nations Cyprian and Bosnian conflicts.<sup>32</sup> The heads of state symbolically described their interstate cooperation as reestablishing the Silk Road—that is, a sure way to produce prosperity and stability for the region. Moscow expressed its fears that such meetings incited Pan-Turkic sentiments, only to be told by President Demirel of Turkey that such accusations were unfounded, but that Turkey would come to the aid of Azerbaijan if, as threatened, Moscow imposed sanctions on Baku.

The Turkic summit meeting, held at the request of Turkey just on the eve of the CIS summit, was designed to demonstrate to Russia that Turkey exerted a special influence over the region. At the CIS meeting following the Turkic summit, Nazarbaev proposed the establishment of the aforementioned Eurasian Union, and Russia complained about the growing segregation of the Turkic countries along national and ethnic lines. In order to remind Turkey of the danger of ethnic politics, Russia subsequently convened a conference on the situation of the Kurds in Russia (a bare one hundred thousand people, many of whom had been deported to Central Asia in 1944) and abroad. Formally, the conference was organized by the Association of Kurds in the CIS, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), and the Institute of Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, but in reality it was supported by Russia.<sup>33</sup> Turkey lodged a strong protest against Russia's use of the Kurds to pressure Turkey and then embarked even more assiduously on preparations for the next summit meeting of Turkic states, to be held in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, in August 1995.

Probably as a reaction to these inter-Turkic developments and as a warning to Turkey not to go too far, Russia and Armenia held their own military exercises, allegedly in response to Turkish military exercises conducted on the frontier of Armenia in the winter of 1995. Although Russian defense minister Pavel Grachev paid an official visit to Armenia, he was not able to intimidate Turkey, as Marshal Shaposhnikov had in 1993. Then, Shaposhnikov's warnings that Armenia was part of the CIS defense system had quelled Turkey's posturing about taking action against Armenian attacks on Azerbaijan.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> *CD* 46, no. 9.

<sup>33</sup> *CD* 47, no. 3 (1994).

<sup>34</sup> Karpát, "The Foreign Policy of the Central Asian States, Turkey, and Iran," pp. 101 ff.

In fact, Russia was concerned about a whole chain of military relations Turkey had established with the new states, including Uzbekistan and Kazakstan.

In August 1994 the Kazak and Turkish ministers of defense concluded a preliminary military cooperation agreement, which Nazarbaev described as not conflicting or interfering with Russia and other countries.<sup>35</sup> Later in 1995, following his well-established method of involving Kazakstan in as many international agreements as possible without alienating Russia, Nazarbaev agreed to join the Russian-Belarusian customs union, described Russia as his country's strategic partner, and supported the passage of the oil pipeline from Kazakstan to the Black Sea through Russia's territory. At the same time, he announced that his administration will move to Akmola, the new capital favored by Kazak nationalists, in 1997.<sup>36</sup> Remaining close to Russia both in appearance and essence, Nazarbaev still has managed to expand his country's relations not only with its neighbors but also with the West, which has far surpassed Turkey as a source of investment and trade. Indeed, Kazakstan has appointed an ambassador to the European Union in Brussels. The EU accounts for 28.5 percent of Kazakstan's foreign trade, and the Netherlands ranks second only to Russia as the recipient of Kazak exports.

After the CIS summit meeting of 10 February 1995 adjourned and Russia's President Yeltsin departed, the presidents of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan met and laid the groundwork for what could be the first truly meaningful regional bloc. They created an Interstate Council composed of the three presidents, a Council of Foreign Ministers, and a Central Asian Bank of Cooperation with a capital of \$10 million. The three countries, searching for ways to economic integration, held another meeting at Tashauz, Turkmenistan, which Turkmenistan attended despite declaring its "permanent neutrality," and the three agreed to follow different ways of development, respect each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, and consolidate their participation in the Interstate Council on the Aral Sea.<sup>37</sup> In short, the regional policy of the Central Asian States was

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<sup>35</sup> *CD* 46, no. 32 (1994).

<sup>36</sup> *Daily Report*, 16 January 1996. Practically all the Russian names of streets and villages in Kazakstan have been changed to Kazak, including that of Yermak. (Yermak Timofeyevich was the conqueror of Siberia.)

<sup>37</sup> *CD* 47, no. 10 (1995).

following, more or less, the pattern proposed by Nazarbaev after the 8 December 1991 meeting of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus in Minsk. When the Central Asian heads of states met at Ashkhabad and asked to join the CIS, because they could not face the insurmountable difficulties of being suddenly severed from the long-dominant Slavic bloc, Nazarbaev proposed the creation of a transnational union to coordinate regional cooperation and balance the Slavic group. The policies, meetings, and organizations subsequently established by the Central Asians all seem to have conformed to Nazarbaev's strategy of appearing to draw close to Russia while in fact balancing it.

It is too early to assess the impact of Turkmenistan's decree of permanent neutrality in its constitution, which the United Nations, in an unprecedented act, ratified. Lately, Turkmenistan has taken an active part in bringing together the warring parties in Tajikistan. It also has changed the name of the country's chief Russian-language newspaper from *Turkmenskaia Iskra* (Spark) to *Nitralny Turkmenistan* (Neutral Turkmenistan) and adopted the motto "Follow me, my united people," coined by its leader. Is Turkmenistan becoming a political and economic dissident from the rest of Central Asia in order to reserve for itself the economic benefits of following Iranian and Russian suggestions? It is too early to volunteer a guess. Information about the latest Uzbek-Kazak-Kyrgyz summit, held at Djambul on 15 December 1995, is too scanty for an in-depth analysis. Nazarbaev's warning to Yeltsin that the re-creation of the defunct USSR will be a tragedy for everybody, however, indicates that the Central Asian states view themselves no longer as docile satellites of Russia but as independent members of the international comity of nations.

### *The Black Sea Basin Organization*

The politics of the Black Sea countries has not received the international attention it deserves despite the area's crucial importance to the defense of West Europe and the future of the former Soviet republics. Until 1989–91 the Black Sea littoral was divided almost in half between Turkey (ca. 1200 kilometers) and the Soviet bloc. After 1991 the old Soviet portion was subdivided between Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Romania. Turkey became the main riparian state, consolidating further the position it enjoyed through control

of the Straits; the *de facto* amendment of the Montreux Convention in 1994 has been mentioned. Until the peace of *Küçük Kaynarca* in 1774 which sealed the Russian conquest of the northern Black Sea littoral from the Ottoman Empire, of course, the Black Sea had been a Turkish *mare nostrum* and the Ottoman government had been able to establish ethnic, religious, and political outposts—and centers of influence—along the littoral in the Caucasus, Crimea, and Moldova. After 1774, although many potential sources of Turkish influence in the Caucasus and Crimea were gradually liquidated or neutralized, population movements brought in others, such as the Gagauz of Moldova.

The Gagauz are the descendants of the Seljukian Turks from Anatolia, who, fleeing the Mongols, settled (ca. 1263–65) on the western shores of the Black Sea. During the Byzantine reconquest of the Balkans from the remnants of the Fourth Crusade (ca. 1261–70), many of these Seljukian Turks converted to Orthodox Christianity. Now known as the Gagauz, they became part of the Ottoman Empire (ca. 1390–92) and remained so until the nineteenth century. When the Turks lost Bessarabia (the historical name of southeastern Moldova) to Russia through the peace of Bucharest in 1812, according to the treaty terms, the predominantly Muslim population of the south (mostly Nogai remnants of the Cumans and Golden Horde) were resettled in the north Caucasus and mainly in Dobruja, south of the Danube, which was still part of the Ottoman state.<sup>38</sup> Russia, in turn, settled Gagauz and Bulgarian immigrants in the place of departing Muslims in what amounted to an informal exchange of Muslim and Christian populations, most of whom were ethnically Turks. The Turkish dialect still spoken by the Gagauz is the closest to the language spoken in Turkey, as are their customs and attitudes. In fact, Turkey opened schools in the Gagauz areas of Bessarabia while the province was part of Romania from 1918 to 1944. Afterward, however, Turkey was cut off entirely from the area until 1989, for during Soviet rule the southern part of Bessarabia was made part of Ukraine's Odessa oblast. That move deprived Moldova of access to the Black Sea and split the historic *Gagauz yeri* (homeland of the Gagauz, as they call it) in two: about 160,000 live in Moldova in

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<sup>38</sup> On the history of the Gagauz, see Kemal H. Karpat, "The Seljukid Origin of the Gagauzes," *Etnograficheskoe obozrenie* 4 (July–August 1994): pp. 36–43.

about twenty-five villages and towns, while 60,000 are left in Ukraine.

The disintegration of the USSR in 1991 added new dimensions to the Turkish initiative to establish the Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC).<sup>39</sup> Turkey had taken the initiative in 1990 in order to increase its regional influence and thus counteract its expected marginalization in NATO with the end of the Cold War. Following an official invitation by Turkey, representatives of the USSR, Bulgaria, and Romania joined their Turkish counterparts in Ankara on 19 December 1990 and agreed on a basic constitutive act. After the disintegration of the USSR one year later, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova joined, as did Greece and Yugoslavia. Thus BSEC became a kind of vehicle for incorporating the new states of the Black Sea into the world economic and political system,<sup>40</sup> and its final constitutive act was signed on 25 June 1992 by all the heads of state. The organization's primary aims were to achieve multilateral cooperation in the region based on market economy principles, and to strengthen the signatories' connection with Europe in accord with the Helsinki Act, Charter of Paris for a New Europe, the CSCE, and so on, but without competing with the European Community (now Union).<sup>41</sup> Turkey is not yet a member of the EU but was admitted to the Customs Union in March 1996. The signatories stressed again and again the fact that the organization was European and a part of the emerging European structures, and that it would uphold democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, and that it would resort only to peaceful means to solve the many conflicts in the area.<sup>42</sup>

Although the success of the Black Sea organization was limited by the delaying tactics of Greece and Russia, both of which feared Turkish ascendancy to the rank of regional power, it nonetheless played a crucial role in helping Turkey develop bilateral relations with Ukraine and Moldova and thus helped solve the simmering Gagauz conflict. Ukraine was reluctant to establish close relations with Turkey for historical reasons (Ottoman rule and the situation of southern Moldova in addition to the status of the Gagauz). Moldova,

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<sup>39</sup> Oral Sander, "Turkey and the Organization for Black Sea Cooperation," in Karpat, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, pp. 61 ff.

<sup>40</sup> Oktay Ozuye, "Black Sea Economic Cooperation," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 3, no. 3 (1992): pp. 50 ff.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>42</sup> Sander, "Turkey and the Organization for Black Sea Cooperation," p. 71.

on the other hand, needed regional support because ethnic Russians in its Tiraspol region, backed by the Fourteenth Russian Army of General Aleksandr Lebed, had declared independence. Consequently, Moldova used the friendship of Turkey to counterbalance pressure from the Russian military and the hawks who desired the establishment of permanent military bases in this westernmost outpost of the former Soviet Union. Although Moldova has been Slavicized to some extent, it definitely is not a Slavic country, as anyone who has visited the area would know. In fact, 65 percent of Moldova's population speaks Romanian and has a Latin culture. Turkey is aware that Ukraine and Moldova are of crucial importance to its own security and trade and that their independence is the best guarantee against the revival of the Russian Empire, so Turkey has done its best to strengthen their independent statehood. Besides establishing diplomatic relations at all levels, Turkey has opened its frontiers to visitors from the area, provided economic assistance to their governments, established flights to Kiev and Kishinev (Chishinau), and encouraged cultural exchanges.

The Gagauz separatist endeavors created a difficult problem for Moldova. The Gagauz *nomenklatura*, backed by Russia and, to some extent, Ukraine (a large Russian force was stationed in Bolgrad just south of the Moldovan-Gagauz-Ukrainian border), had declared their territory a republic as early as 1989–90.<sup>43</sup> The subsequent effort by the Moldovan army to liquidate the Gagauz “republic” was stopped short by Russian troops, turning the Gagauz rebels into Russia's and Ukraine's military stooges. The Moldovan government found itself squeezed from the east and southwest by two separatist forces, the ethnic Russians of Tiraspol and the Gagauz, both backed by Russia. Turkey played a decisive role by using persuasion and economic incentives to convince the Gagauz leaders and the Moldovan authorities to solve their conflicts peacefully. The continual visits by Turkish businessmen and intellectuals to the Gagauz and vice versa, the exchange of students, and common linguistic ties, despite differences of religion, helped the Gagauz overcome their feeling of isolation and give up their reliance on Russia. When the Gagauz-Moldovan conflict finally was resolved in 1995, the Gagauz (who constitute

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<sup>43</sup> For these recent developments, see Kemal H. Karpat, “Gagauzlar,” *İslam Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul, The Diyanet Foundation: 1996).



about 42 percent of the population in the district assigned to them) agreed to recognize Moldovan authority in exchange for extensive cultural and administrative autonomy and the right to secede if Moldova unites with Romania. (The reconciliation was greatly facilitated by the decision of Moldovan president Mircea Snegur's party to renounce unification with Romania and his subsequent electoral victory, which put to rest Gagauz fears of Romanian chauvinism.)<sup>44</sup> Western diplomatic fora responded to Moldova's application to join the Council of Europe—it was the first of the former Soviet republics to apply, in July 1995—by making good treatment of the minorities a preliminary condition and supporting an “independent and united Moldova.” The United States made clear that it had an interest in the early withdrawal of the Fourteenth Russian Army from Moldovan territory, but the rebel Trans-Dniester Republic of Tiraspol held elections and referenda to legalize its independent status and opposed a Yeltsin-Snegur agreement to withdraw the army. As late as January 1996 some members of the Russian Duma visited the area and voiced support for the separatists.<sup>45</sup> Moldova, meanwhile, tried to soothe Russian fears by declaring that it would not join NATO. For its part, Ukraine, which holds territory in northern Bukovina and southern Moldova that was recognized as part of Romania from 1918 to 1944 (except for a short interlude from 1940 to 1941), has since kept aloof from the strife. Should Romania eventually claim this territory Ukraine will need Russia's support, and it also faces in Crimea the separatist claims of ethnic Russians.

The Turkish role in the Ukrainian opening and integration into the rest of the world has been dependent on the policies of Europe, for Turkey does not have the economic, cultural, and historical resources to affect such matters on its own. The West took a rather late interest in consolidating Ukrainian independence and helping its economic development, and Ukraine proved hesitant in defining its

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<sup>44</sup> Information collected by this writer during visits to Moldova in 1992 and 1994.

<sup>45</sup> The Moldovan parliament renounced unity with Romania late in December 1994 under the pressure of President Mircea Snegur, who had won the national elections with an independence platform opposing the nationalist party's demands for reunification with Romania. The Gagauz, in turn, held a local referendum and an election, which ended in the ousting of Stefan Topal and his group, the leaders of the separatist drive. The Gagauz will have three languages—Gagauz, Romanian, and Russian—and their own flag and anthem. See *CD* 47, nos. 8, 10, and 13 (1995).

relations with Russia, its own identity, and its economic policies. Unlike Moldova and the Central Asian and Caucasian nations, the Ukrainians do not differ much from the Russians in language, history, and/or religion except in the predominantly Catholic western part of the land. Nevertheless, President Leonid Kuchma, contrary to all expectations, began to move away from Moscow, changing his country from a fraternal nation to a good neighbor to just a neighbor.<sup>46</sup>

Ukrainian trade with Russia has been halved; gas imports will be reduced from 56 billion cubic meters in 1994 to 50 billion in 1996; and Ukraine has been admitted to the Council of Europe. In December 1995 Kuchma traveled to Latin America and then to Britain. British Prime Minister John Major welcomed Ukraine's expanding relations with the United Kingdom, Europe, and the European Union, and promised to visit Ukraine, as did U.S. Vice President Al Gore. President Kuchma also held important talks with President Chirac of France, Prime Minister Helmut Kohl of Germany, and many other dignitaries during the funeral of French President François Mitterrand.<sup>47</sup> Moreover, the chairman of People's Rukh party, Viacheslav Chornovil, declared at the sixth party convention that Ukrainization must be forged to create a true Ukrainian nation even though dire economic conditions seem to have made many Ukrainians lose interest in independence. Still, Ukraine decided to stay out of the CIS customs union.

The Tatars of Crimea are both a link as well as a source of possible discord between Turkey and Ukraine. Crimea was part of the Ottoman state from 1475 to 1774, and the descendants of Crimean immigrants in Turkey are estimated accurately to number around three to five million. (Some estimates are exaggerated to the point of leaving no Turks in Turkey.) Meanwhile, about three hundred thousand Crimean Muslims out of a total of about one million living in Central Asia, where they were expelled by Stalin in 1944, have returned to their homeland and created tensions among the Russian-dominated Crimean legislature, the Ukrainian government, and the Muslim Crimeans. The returnees' grievances include their legal status, their dire economic situation, and the fact that their properties have not been returned, as well as their lack of full equality with the rest of the Crimeans. The well-organized Crimean lobby

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<sup>46</sup> *CD* 47, no. 46 (1995).

<sup>47</sup> *FBIS*, 28 December 1995 and 16 January 1996.

in Turkey has exerted considerable pressure on the Turkish government to secure from the Ukrainian authorities favorable terms for their kin in Crimea. Nevertheless, the Muslim *mejlis* (council) in Crimea decided to side with the Ukrainians, thus bolstering the strength of the non-Russian population from 25 to 35 percent but without any obvious benefit for the Crimeans, at least for the time being. As this example once again indicates, Turkey's position of leadership in the BSEC has not received wide enough acceptance to make the organization a truly effective interregional body, mainly because Russia fears marginalization in an area it regards as vital to its status as a super- or global power.

(The record of freedom for the press and opposition parties, fair elections, and human rights leaves much to be desired throughout the new republics, but did not prevent their admission into European bodies. The subject, interesting as it may be, was left out of this paper because, despite formal conditions to abide by the rules of democracy, none of the governments [except to some extent for Moldova] paid attention to it. The violation of democratic pledges seems to have neither speeded up nor delayed the integration of the new states into the European system, for as usual, *realpolitik* has prevailed over democratic idealism.)

### *Conclusions*

Turkey, and to a much lesser extent Iran, played key roles in paving the way for incorporating the new states of the former Soviet Union into the world political and economic system. In the process both countries had a chance to enhance, in proportion to their influence, their own regional stature and interests. Religious, ethnic, and historical ties between the new republics and Turkey and Iran facilitated their contacts but had little impact in determining the ultimate success of Turkish or Iranian efforts. The key factor that determined the level of their success was their affiliation—or alienation—from the West. That affiliation was measured, as in the case of Turkey, by the degree of commitment to secularism, democracy, and economic and political-cultural modernization, as well as to upholding sincerely the national ethnic identity and sovereignty of the new states. Turkey represented a Westernized model of modernization which proved to have a definitive appeal over the Iranian-traditionalist-imperial-Islamic

model. The symbol of this preference was the acceptance of the Latin alphabet by all the Turkic-speaking republics, including the Gagauz Republic and Uzbekistan, the latter hesitantly agreeing to adopt it by the end of the century. In effect, the major Turkic groups in the world are committed to using the Latin script. Contrary to a variety of dire predictions, Islam proved to be a potent force only if associated with and supplementing national identity and culture. In other words, Islam in the former Soviet Union, to the dismay of Iran and Saudi Arabia, has ceased to be an independent constant factor of politics—at least for the time being.

The Islamophobia, which had such a distorting effect on Western policies towards the Muslim countries, was shared fully and to an even worse degree by the Russians.<sup>48</sup> Recently and belatedly, however, the Russians have come to view Islam in the former Soviet Union as a moderate, pluralist, and regionalist form of faith rather than a monolithic extension of Middle Eastern Islam or, most improbably, of Iranian fundamentalism.<sup>49</sup> This simple discovery, echoed in several conferences on Islam in Russia, may have revolutionary implications for Russia's future policies. With at least 20 million Muslim citizens of its own living in the Caucasus, Tatarstan, Bashkirdistan, Siberia, and so on, and surrounded by several Muslim states to the south, Russia has come to the realization that it has more to win than lose by acting as the Muslims' friend, and many communist candidates—including the presidential aspirant Gennadi Zyuganov—advocated that approach during the 1995 election campaign.

Turkey was able to act as intermediary in the incorporation of the Muslim-Turkic republics of the former USSR into the world system because the Western powers strongly encouraged Turkey to do so and Russia acquiesced to their will. The Russians saw Turkey's role as an alternative to Iran's fundamentalism and realized it was too late to do anything about it anyhow. Without question the deci-

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<sup>48</sup> For the enduring strength of some of the old cliches about the power of Islam, see Raphael Israeli, "Return to Source: The Republics of Central Asia and the Middle East," *Central Asian Survey* 13, no. 1 (1994): pp. 19 ff. See also, for a different perspective, Lowell Bezanis, "Exploiting the Fear of Militant Islam," *Transition* 1, no. 24 (29 December 1994): pp. 6–8.

<sup>49</sup> Russia has realized belatedly that Turkish Islam, promoted extensively as a supplement of ethnic national identity, is far more politically potent than pure religion. The old Pan-Slavists of Russia effectively proved a similar point with their use of Orthodox Christianity in the nineteenth-century Balkans.

sion of Gorbachev, and to some extent of Yeltsin and Andrei Kozyrev, to become part of the Western world also had much to do with Russia's willingness to let Turkey pull Central Asia and the Caucasus into the political and economic fold of Europe. Andranik Migranian, an influential member of Russia's Presidential Council, attributed the "unilateral" concessions made by Russia to the West during Gorbachev and Yeltsin's first years to the hope of receiving aid, achieving a basic unity of goals with United States and Europe, and becoming part of the civilized world. In the process, Migranian claimed, administrative borders became political ones, and Russia turned inward, hoping to stay away from the problems and conflicts of the former republics.

Migranian blamed the Foreign Ministry and especially Foreign Minister Kozyrev for pursuing a defeatist policy that prevented the USSR and then Russia from making its military might into tangible economic and political assets in Europe and elsewhere.<sup>50</sup> He seemed to think that the foreign policy of Russia in the former republics and members of the Warsaw Pact should aim at reversing the incorporation of the former republics into the world economy and society. As indicated throughout this study, relations between Russia and Turkey, except for their excellent trade relationship, are being made increasingly tense by the complex affairs of the former Soviet republics. Although it may be too late to do so, Russia actually is attempting to recoup many of the "losses" incurred during its own efforts to become part of the Western world and is trying to pull the new states along as it inches out of the system it once idealized. Just as Turkey helped the West to bring the new states into the world system, Iran may now help Russia to pull them out. If Russia decides to abandon the democratization program and revive the defunct empire, Iran may be compelled to review its ties to Russia and realign its policies with Turkey in accordance with their historical experience. The vicious circle of Iranian, Russian, and Turkish politics may be thus closed once more.

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<sup>50</sup> *Nezavisimaa gazeta*, 24 January 1994; CD 46, no. 6 (1994).

## THE ROOTS OF KAZAKH NATIONALISM: ETHNICITY, ISLAM OR LAND?

### 1. *Introduction*

Empirical observation based on talks with Kazakh intellectuals and visits to various cities and towns of Kazakhstan reveals the presence of a powerful nationalism, which appears to be somewhat different in nature and intensity from the nationalism prevailing in other Muslim republics of the ex-USSR. This is a predominantly secular and political nationalism rooted in the social organization and ethnic characteristics of the people and in the peculiar historical circumstances that attended the emergence of the Kazakh nation as a new socio-political entity in the nineteenth, and especially the twentieth centuries. The process of nation formation in Kazakhstan is now in full swing as intellectuals, writers, and even party officials feverishly discover and add new historical and cultural elements to their ethnos and national consciousness. There are obviously ideological differences between Kazakh intellectuals, ranging from disputes about the national credentials of the official *nomenklatura* to those raised by the Islamists in the Alash, who defend the idea of a united Muslim Turkestan. However, in cases of conflict with outsiders, all these differences are put aside in the name of Kazakh national interest. (It should be noted that even the use of the term Kazakh only became generalized in the twentieth century, replacing the older name of Kirghiz—the Kirghiz of today being known as Kara Kirghiz—at the same time as the rise of national sentiment.)

It is true that the nationality problems and the national characteristics of each major Muslim group in the Soviet Union have their own special features and therefore it is difficult if not impossible to devise a single, all-inclusive theory of nationalism for all the Muslims of the USSR, despite the existence of a variety of common cultural and historical similarities. The basis of Kazakh nationalism is a relatively homogeneous Kazakh population located in a well-defined territory and having a distinct history of its own. For the Kazakh intellectual, the nation is Kazakh because of its ethnicity, language, culture, and special history. Islam may be cited first or last, depend-

ing whether one is talking to the traditionalists or the secular intellectuals. (In Uzbekistan on the other hand, probably a native would say that the foundations of his nation are, first, Islam and then the rest. Divided into a variety of linguistic groups, each with its own history, the Uzbeks are bound together by only one major cultural link—namely Islam.)

The views expressed above with regard to Kazakh nationalism apply mainly to the intelligentsia, as the *auls*, or villages, are at a different stage of development. However, since the Kazakh intelligentsia (those with mid-and-upper level education) ranked third or fourth in size (percentage) in the ex-USSR, and is heavily concentrated in cities and towns, its impact is great and its viewpoint will prevail.

The Kazakh attitude towards Russians and the Russian language is also rather ambiguous. It seems that Kazakh intellectuals use Russian to converse among themselves far more often than the Uzbeks or Azeris. In fact, some educated Kazakhs prefer to speak Russian to prove their intellectual superiority and achievement. The number of educated Kazakhs (except for the Tatars in Moscow) who do not know their mother tongue is probably the largest among Soviet Muslims; but they continue to call themselves Kazakhs and are fiercely nationalistic. The moderate Kazakh intellectuals confess that Russia contributed to their modernization (a few told us, that “alcohol drinking was one good thing the Russians taught us”) but then accuse the Russians of every conceivable misdeed.

With this background in mind, I define the purpose of this communication as to be an inquiry into the historical, cultural, sociological, and political factors that charted the formation of today's Kazakh nationality and nationalism. At the conclusion, I will offer some thoughts as to the final outcome of Kazakh national problem. I shall begin with Islam because of its special function in the rise of Kazakh national identity and consciousness.

## 2. *The Islamic bases of nationalism among the Kazakhs*

It is generally assumed that the influence of Islam among Kazakhs was limited because they were converted late, and thus Islamic ways of life had little time to permeate the customs and mores of the nomadic tribes. The mass Islamization of the Kazakhs is attributed mainly to the Tatar and Nogay *mollas*. It is said to have taken place

with the encouragement of the government and is considered to have occurred sometime in the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century. This view is incorrect and does not explain properly the Kazakh relationship with Islam. Even today the vast majority of Muslims in Africa and Asia, especially those living in villages, but even those in the towns, remains only superficially acquainted with the doctrine of Islam. However, these villagers and nomads call themselves Muslims and practice the basic Islamic rituals at birth (name taking), circumcision, marriage, and death. (*Janaza* or burial according to the Islamic customs, is well portrayed by Aytmatov in his novel, *A Day Lasts More Than a Hundred Years*.) They are also generally committed to the faith, or *iman*, and show some solidarity with Muslims living elsewhere. Total conversion takes centuries to accomplish. For instance some of the Turkic and Mongol tribes preserved their shamanistic religion for a very long time even after they had settled in the Middle East and lived among Muslims.<sup>1</sup>

In order to properly evaluate the impact of Islam among the Kazakhs, a certain typology is required. I shall first discuss “folk Islam” which I shall divide into two categories. The first type of folk Islam, encountered frequently among the villagers and nomads of the Middle East, derives its dogma from the religious establishments located in towns and cities. The other, and relatively rarer, variety of folk Islam is found predominantly among nomads, whose contact with the established Islamic centers was superficial: here the dogmas of the faith were therefore known to only a very few select members of the group. This latter type of folk Islam incorporates much from the old religious belief, predating Islam, and is manifested in a variety of apocryphal stories, mythological tales, and legends—all of which are viewed as being “Islamic”—dealing with the life and experiences of the group. The Kazakhs, who never possessed well-established, permanent political or administrative institutions, belong to the group professing this type of folk Islam, as do some other groups in Central and Inner Asia.

The conversion to Islam among such nomadic groups, including the Kazakhs, may occur sporadically or *en masse*, depending on the circumstances. The principal agents of conversion, in addition to the

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<sup>1</sup> For general background on contemporary Islam see Yaacov Ro'i “The Islamic influence or nationalism in Soviet Central Asia”, *Problems of Communism*, July–August, 1990.



missionaries, appear to be individuals who personified the old religion or were representatives of the literary folk traditions. The old religion of the Turks of the Asian steppes was shamanism, and its personification and representative was the shaman. If the shaman accepted Islam, he could propagate the new faith under the cloak of shamanism without making a sudden break with past practices and even without his audience realizing that its faith was being gradually changed. The fact that the oral literature was almost the exclusive form of communication in the old nomad society certainly increased the influence of the shaman, who now might have turned into a Muslim *pir* (head, master), *dervish* or *ishan* (this name was given also to the graduates of the *medrese*, or religious schools).

It should be remembered that shamanism consisted of practices; it did not have a formal body of beliefs or a clerical hierarchy. Islam, on the other hand, had a written history, a political structure, and a well-defined system of beliefs, which greatly facilitated people's identification with it. Thus the Kazakh nomad who became a Muslim was very attached to his new faith, first, because it gave him a concrete identity as the follower of a spiritual God superior to his mundane shaman and, second, because it raised his consciousness of being a member of a new community of believers and mostly for the tribal rituals and customs were preserved, either intact or with a change of name or details. Thus, the new faith was rapidly interiorized and regarded as synonymous with the native culture. Moreover, shamanism can be practiced along with Islam in a manner hard to separate one from another.<sup>2</sup> This explanation may solve the dilemma of E. Schyuler, who in his visit to Central Asia noted that the nomads were ignorant of the teachings of Islam and yet claimed that they were very good Muslims.

The Kazakh pastoral nomads developed their own folk Islam as early as the tenth century, thanks to their own native preachers and semi-saints, who masterfully blended the basic tenets of Islam with their own native lore. The resulting folk religion was comprised of the major tenets of Islam expressed in the native language and with motifs derived from the native culture and forms of expression. Thus

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<sup>2</sup> For concrete examples of shamanist practices in contemporary Central Asia see M.M. Blazer (ed.), *Shamanism: Soviet Studies of Traditional Religion in Siberia and Central Asia*, Armonk, NY, 1990, pp. 39–46.

the oral literature of the Kazakhs, one of the richest and most colorful in the world, became impregnated with Islamic themes. This special religious culture became self-perpetuating, even when the groups remained isolated from the main body of Muslims. The itinerant bards of the steppes, the *aqyn* (*ashuk* among the Azeris and Anatolian Turks), the *dzyrshy* (an *aqyn* who performed epic songs) and the *baqsy* (a sort of literary shaman) disseminated the native culture and kept the faith alive as oral literature came to fulfill both spiritual and literary needs.<sup>3</sup> It should be remembered that these bards traveled from one tribe to another, borrowing new elements from the local story-tellers and thus creating a body of songs and epics (the latter revolving around a *batyr*, i.e. hero) that came to be familiar to most nomadic Kazakhs and helped create a sense of shared values and tastes. (Some of the bardic stories derived from Arabic, Indian or other Asian literatures, and from Islamic history as well.)

The development of Islam among the Kazakhs followed a unique course. It was disseminated by sufi teachers, some of whom are ranked in the Turkish world as among the giants of the faith. Islam was introduced into south Kazakh cities in the eighth century, and mass conversion in the steppes began to occur in the tenth century, due to, among other things, the preaching of native sufis (to be touched upon later).<sup>4</sup> The real founders of the Kazakh state—that is, the Jochid princes—were Muslims. (The faith of Alash, the legendary founder, is unknown.) The Kazakh rulers were aided by trained secretaries and religious advisors, who taught the children of their masters and kept them in touch with the rest of the Muslim world. All these Kazakh khans who had dealings with the Russians—e.g., Sultan Oraz Muhammad, who went on a mission to Moscow in ca. 1588 and, later, Abul Khair—were Muslims, as indicated by their names.<sup>5</sup> The idea, however, that “real” Islam was accepted only by Kazakh rulers and city dwellers while the masses were only

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<sup>3</sup> Thomas G. Winner, *The Oral Art and Literature of the Kazakhs of Russian Central Asia*, Durham, NC, 1958, p. 19.

<sup>4</sup> V.V. Barthold, probably the most authoritative source on Central Asia, gives ample information on these issues. See *Four Studies on the History of Central Asia*, vol. 3 (Leiden, 1962). See also Köprülüzade Mehmed Fuat (M.F. Köprülü), “Influence du Chamanisme Turco-Mongol sur les Ordres Mystiques Musulmans.” İstanbul, 1929. (Memoirs of the Institute of Turkology in İstanbul).

<sup>5</sup> Martha B. Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, Stanford, 1987, p. 19.

“nominally” Muslims—an idea promoted by Soviet (Russian) scholars and westerners—is one-sided and basically incorrect.<sup>6</sup> The implication is that somehow the pastoral nomads of the steppe were outside Islam and did not share the same values and views with the rest of the Islamic world.

The Syr Darya basin was one of the largest and earliest areas of Kazakh concentration and was subjected to the Islamization efforts of the sufi mystics beginning in the tenth century. In the vicinity of the ancient fortress of Otrar (close to the town of Shauldar) there is the tomb of Aslan Baba (Bab), which still attracts thousands of pilgrims from the whole of Central Asia. Aslan Baba lived mainly in the eleventh century and preached among the Kazakh nomads. His most famous disciple, Ahmet Yesevi (d. 1166), after studying in Bukhara settled in Yesi (today Turkestan) and, after a life full of Islamic teaching, died and was entombed in Yesi. On his grave, Tamerlane erected a gigantic mausoleum, which is still standing and is considered one of the structural masterpieces of Central Asia. Aslan Baba and Yesevi are known to have been instrumental in spreading Islam far to the north and east.

The Yasaviya order, or brotherhood, was apparently established in the twelfth century and attracted millions of followers in today's Kazakhstan and Kashgaria (and Anatolia) but had little impact on the settled areas of Bukhara and Khorezm. Yesevi was supremely successful because his version of Islam was especially adapted to the life-style and beliefs of the nomads roaming the steppes. Yesevi borrowed numerous elements from shamanism and even animism and presented them in the monotheistic spirit of Islam, for Yesevi was a dedicated orthodox Sunni.<sup>7</sup> Yesevi preached in the native tongue, and his teachings were eventually gathered together, probably by his disciples, in one book, the *Divan-ı Hikmet*. Practically all of the sources on Yesevi relate that *dzikir* (chanting in a group) occupied a basic

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<sup>6</sup> Olcott, after defending the Russian-Soviet view that Islam was practically non-existent even among Kazakh rulers, a few pages later speaks of poets who were closely associated with the “Kazakh aristocracy” and remarks that “their poetry reflects a closer association with Islamic and practically sufi thought . . .” (*ibid.*, pp. 19, 21, 31–33).

<sup>7</sup> On this see M.F. Köprülü, *Türk Edebiyatında İlk Mutasavvıflar* [The first mystics in Turkish literature] İstanbul, 1976. (This is a reprint of the 1919 original.) See also “Ahmet Yesevi” in the *Enc. of Islam* (Turkish Edition) and my piece in *ACA-SIA*, vol. 5.

place in his preaching, and that his talks were attended by both unveiled women and men. All this was contrary to established Islam, and is strongly reminiscent of shamanist practices. Thus a popular mystical form of Islam reached the steppe nomads in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and it has retained its vigor until today, as indicated by the continued survival of the Yasaviya order particularly in the countryside. The language of the *Divan-ı Hikmet* is among the earliest examples of literary Turkish and is credited with having affirmed the independence of Turkish against Arabic and Persian, then in vogue in Bukhara. It became a key source of inspiration for Kazakh oral literature, especially that disseminated by the *baqsy*.

Today, the Kazakhs consider the teachings of Aslan Baba and Ahmet Yesevi as part of their national heritage and a source of their identity. It is for this reason that in October 1990 the Kazakh Writers Union organized an international conference, supported by the government, for the purpose of reviving knowledge of the legacy of Yesevi and enshrining him as the fountainhead of Kazakh identity.

It is quite clear then that a popular mystical form of Islam prevailed among the Kazakhs (then known as Kırğız) of the Syr Darya basin as early as the tenth century and spread north and west from there; but there is no doubt also that a number of Kazakh tribes, notably in the north east, remained pagan or were only superficially affected by Islam. It was this minority, along with the practitioners of folk Islam, who became subject to Islamic indoctrination in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These should not be taken as representative of all of the Kazakhs. (This "Islamization" undertaken, in part under orders from the Empress Catherine, was actually designed to tame the Kazakh nomads in order to facilitate the task of the Russian administration.)

The key point which concerns us here is that Islam among the Kazakhs was of the popular, mystical type and retained its folk religion characteristics until our time; and it is this folk characteristic that separated the Islam of the Kazakhs from that of the settled Muslims in Kokand, Bukhara, etc. Since the expression of folk, or popular, Islam is different from institutionalized, or state Islam and constitutes one key element of the Kazakh national identity, I will further discuss this issue.

The state, or *devlet-dawla*, in Islamic societies has a meaning and function totally different from the term "state" in the West. State in Islam means first and above everything else authority to rule the

society and to protect the Islamic institutions (*vakiys*, mosques, *imarets* etc.) necessary to create an Islamic way of life. The ruler, or *malik* (that is, the temporal holder of authority), and the *mülk* (that which is subject to the authority, such as land and other property) are the elements that turn the Islamic authority into concrete reality.<sup>8</sup> Needless to say, Islam views God as the ultimate possessor of authority, and whoever exercises it from day to day should know, that he/she holds authority only in trust. It is quite clear that the chief purpose of the Islamic state—in fact, its basic “raison d’être”—was the maintenance and propagation of the faith. In practice, the *devlet* consisted of a political system represented by the ruler (*sultan*, *padishah*, *khan*, etc.), his military and civilian bureaucracy, the court system (which applied Islamic law and theoretically was outside the jurisdiction of temporal authority), and a number of socio-economic institutions.

A truly orthodox Muslim state can exist only in a settled society which possesses the basic economic and social infrastructure to support the ruling institutions which, in turn, transform that society into an Islamic entity. Land, or territory, had a very limited importance (if any) in the Islamic theory of government, at least until the nineteenth century. The city was the ideal unit of Islam, the best locus for the cultivation of Muslim virtue.

All the Muslims living in Russia, with the exception of the Kazakhs of the steppe, had their own well-formed classical types of Muslim states. Thus Kazan, Crimea, Astrakhan, Azerbaijan, and Central Asia proper (Bukhara, Samarkand, etc.) were ruled by authentic Islamic governments and institutions that helped impart a deep sense of Islamic identity. The Kazakhs (and the Turkmen to some extent) were the only major Muslim groups that retained and practiced their popular (folk) Islam. It is true that the khans of the three major Kazakh hordes had their own administrative structure that adhered to the precepts of Islam to the extent that this was possible. However, the government of the Kazakh hordes was designed to meet the special needs of a nomadic society rather than the exigencies of Islam. In effect, the ruling institutions of the Kazakhs remained tribal and secular.

A fully-fledged Islamic state is usually dynastic and is easily dis-

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<sup>8</sup> The term *mülk* also expresses the title to private property, *arazi-i mülk*, or privately owned land, and should not be confused with the administrative “*mülk*.”

tinguished by its name. These states usually bear the name of the founder: Abbasid, Shaibanid, Timurid, Osmanli, etc. The Kazakh "states," that is, the khanates, did not have a dynastic name, for they were in fact large tribal federations representing an *ulus*, that is, a nation. (The claim to Jengizid affiliation had some importance but probably was not a true replacement for dynastic affiliation.)

It is true that in the second half of the nineteenth century the classical Muslim institutions spread rapidly and were gladly accepted by both settled and nomadic Kazakhs (the latter diminishing rapidly in number at that time). In fact, the rapid spread and interiorization of classical Islam in the nineteenth century went hand in hand with the rise of national consciousness among Kazakhs, and was part of the same process, namely, the defense against Russification and colonization. It is also interesting to note that with the advent of modernity, many Kazakh intellectuals showed a marked readiness to adopt Russian institutions and concepts of organization in order better to fight assimilation, but they showed no inclination to accept the Orthodox faith. The relative interest of the Kazakh intellectuals in pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism (the two were more or less the same for practically all Russian Muslims at least until the beginning of the twentieth century) stemmed primarily from national rather than religious considerations.<sup>9</sup>

An understanding of the consequences of the dominant position of folk religion, with its heterogeneous components, is seminal in understanding the rise of Kazakh nationalism and national identity. The folk religion contained the basic native ethnic (tribal) customs and beliefs, which became the foundation of the national culture and way of life in the age of national statehood. In Muslim societies ruled by Muslim governments, these ethnic, linguistic, and tribal identities and customs were superseded or blended into the new culture and ways of life of the establishment supported by the Islamic governments and institutions. The ethnic culture survived at the grass roots level. It is interesting to note that, after the formation of the Muslim territorial-national states in the twentieth century, many governments searched for their authentic "national roots" in the folklore of their villages and tribes. The Arab nationalists glorified the tribes as the

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<sup>9</sup> See Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "Islam and Nationalism", *Central Asian Survey*, 2, no. 2 (September, 1982): pp. 7-87.

repository of an authentic Arab culture, while Turkey, having established the People's Houses in 1932, changed these institutions to build a "Turkish national culture" by collecting songs, epics, customs, etc. from villages and tribal areas which had supposedly maintained their original (Turkish) national culture. This movement in Turkey was seen as the absolute consequence of secularism and nationalism.<sup>10</sup>

In sum, therefore, folk Islam preserved the Kazakh native tribal traditions, customs, ways of life and culture, in one word their ethnicity. At the same time, it also promoted the development in them of a certain secular form of Islamic identity which reinforced their national identity. (The fact that the Russian government considered the Kazakhs *inorodtsy*—i.e. foreign—and did not give them citizenship and open the way to Russification certainly also helped them preserve their ethno-cultural identity.)

The relations between nationalism and Islam in the Soviet era have been explored at length and need not be addressed here. Suffice it to mention that the Soviet regime abolished the formal Islamic institutions, many of which were established in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It did not, and could not, touch the folk Islam that had existed for centuries as the living culture of the Kazakh nomads and villages. The remark made by one of two Kazakhs in Mecca for the pilgrimage is significant: "We have no mosques, no institutions or official clergy, so the Russians cannot destroy us." In sum, the major source of Kazakh nationalism is ethnicity, which in turn is embodied in, and is inseparable from, folk Islam.

### 3. *Nationhood and Community*

The Turkish sociologist Ziya Gökalp, in one of his seminal essays discussing the sequence of organizational transformation in Turkish society, noted that this went from *aşiret* (tribe) to *ümmet* (Muslim universal community) and then to *millet* (nation).<sup>11</sup> Gökalp had in mind

<sup>10</sup> See my "The People's Houses of Turkey," *Middle East Journal*, Winter-Spring 1963.

<sup>11</sup> Gökalp is identified as the "father of Turkish nationalism" and dismissed as a sort of pan-Turanist. He lived during the rise of Turkish nationalism—which after 1908 was influenced profoundly by the ideas of Russian Muslim-Turkic national-

the Ottoman Turks, but his typology is applicable to other Turkic groups too. The key idea I wish to discuss briefly here is that the Kazakhs went directly from tribe to nationhood, thus largely skipping the full cultural metamorphosis in the *ümmet* phase.<sup>12</sup> The ideal *ümmet* (*ummah* in Arabic) is well-known as the universal, God-guided community to which all Muslims belong. But this ideal *ümmet* existed only for a short time during the life of the Prophet and of his four Caliphs, when there was one single Muslim society governed by one ruler. From then on, the Muslims have lived in a variety of splinter and often feuding states.

Sociologically speaking, the *ümmet* represents a communal-associational concept. The organizational model for the *ümmet* was the tribe, with the capital exception that Prophet Muhammad gave the tribe a universal dimension and a Muslim identity that superseded the divisions and strife that had beset the Jahiliya Arabs. All the members of the community are considered to be brothers and sisters, and are equal as believers: their first allegiance and loyalty is to the community. The relative legal uniformity in the community is achieved through the application of the shariat, which produced a pattern of similar institutions (family, property relations, etc.). The Muslim governments that set up and maintained the necessary Muslim institutions, system of courts, etc., obeyed the same shariat throughout the world, and the major struggle of these governments throughout the centuries was to achieve application of this religious law. The legitimacy of one ruler over other rulers often derived from the level of this dedication and service to the faith.

The different Muslim societies all over the world obviously varied greatly in tribal origin, language, local customs (*adat*), etc., and

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ists. Some of his writings are subjective and political. However, most of his work is sound and objective, based on a thorough sociological and historical understanding of the Anatolian tribes. It should be noted that Yesevi's teachings disseminated by a large group of disciples, played a key role in the Islamization of the Turkish tribes of Anatolia. See Ziya Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, several editions have appeared (first in İstanbul, in 1923, later in the Latin alphabet in 1939), the latest İstanbul, 1982. *The Principles of Turkism* (R. Devereux tr.), Leiden, 1968. The book was banned temporarily in 1944 when the government arrested the so called Turanists. Bibliography and analysis are in Taha Parla, *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp 1876-1924* (Leiden, 1985). See also *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization*, (tr. N. Berkes) (New York, 1959).

<sup>12</sup> For a different argument, see Ch. Lemercier-Quelquejey "From Tribe to Umma", *Central Asian Survey*, 3, no. 3, 1984: pp. 15-26.



this variation was accepted in the Koran, giving the *ümmet* a pluralist social structure. The Koran (sura 49) accepted as legitimate the division of the *ümmet* into tribes (*kabail*) and nations as long as one did not dominate the other, and as long as their first allegiance and loyalty belonged to the *ümmet*.<sup>13</sup> Thus theoretically the Muslims first allegiance was to the *ümmet*, which was not only an ideal community but also a political one, because the membership in it was based on the faith and excluded non-Muslims. The tribal or rural community, on the other hand, was based on blood and kinship, common culture, and, lastly, on common interests and shared experience. While the Koran sanctioned officially the tribe and the “*millet*”, but the *adat* or *örf*—that is, the customary law—regulated most of the relations in villages and where mystic folk Islam dominated. Thus in the period of nation formation the Muslims had two organizational models to follow: the *ümmet* and the tribal-village community. (There was a third but foreign model, that is the Western type of nation-state whose imperial prototype among Russian Muslims was represented by the Czarist regime.)

The *ümmet* was the national model used most frequently by Muslims in the twentieth century. The nation appeared as a political community whose cohesion rested on Islam rather than the secular nationalist ideology preached by some leaders. When successful, this nationalism more often than not derived its strength from the faith. The idea of creating a nation based solely on the model of the tribe found no followers, although many cultural features of the tribe became part of the cultural profile of the new nation, especially if the regime accepted some secular features. The Western type of nation-state favored by Muslim intellectuals, proved acceptable if some of its elements, such as language, and history, were grafted onto the *ümmet*. The Muslims of Russia first took the *ümmet* as a model and added to it new cultural features, such as history, language and art, all this being called “national” or *milli*. Initially the term “*milli*” was inseparable from Islam, but later, in the Soviet period, this culture became “secularized”—that is its visible Islamic features were eliminated but its roots, notably the folk religion, remained untouched.

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<sup>13</sup> See N. Shahranti's comments on the dynamics of identity among Central Asian Muslims where he discusses cultural and social pluralism in Islam: *Ibid.*, pp. 27–38.

The term *millet* (nation) actually came to describe a new type of community, a political one, comprised of, simultaneously and in a concentric fashion, the local (tribal) and regional communities and the universal *ümmet*. Thus the Uzbek nationalist poet and political leader, Abdurauf Fitrat (1866–1938), writing in Persian, referred to Bukhara as his *vatan* (fatherland) and to its people as his *millet* (nation), although Bukhara consisted of a variety of different ethnic and linguistic groups. Thus Fitrat's *millet* included all the Muslims of Bukhara, regardless of ethnicity, even though he was pleading the cause of the Uzbeks and the concept he used to supersede ethnic differences was nationalism.<sup>14</sup>

The Kazakhs followed a somewhat different history of national development. The Kazakh tribes associated with each other for practical reasons at least as early as the fourteenth century. A common culture, due to similarity of language and religion, appears to have emerged in the fifteenth century. The language and culture facilitated communication between tribes, but their most enduring bond was their common interest in having free access to grazing lands. The struggle to assure grazing land, winter and summer, for the herds that were the economic backbone of the tribal society had been a constant element of the history of the Kazakhs since the founding of their first state. Tribes would unite in federations and confederations for the purposes of self-defense, administration, and attack against, and plunder of, their enemies. Common suffering, more than any other experience, is the ingredient that gives a nation the power and will to exist and assert itself. The encounters with the Junqars and the dislocation and suffering caused by Russian settlers added a "they" dimension to Kazakh national identity. These historical experiences were enshrined in songs, epics, and histories which are part of the national Kazakh literature and Kazakh personality. The hauntingly beautiful song "Elim Oi" (My People) describing the uprooting caused by the Kalmuk invasion is in fact the unofficial Kazakh national anthem.

The Russian conquest of Kazakh lands (Kazakh historians today challenge most of the established accounts that their khans voluntarily accepted the Czar's rule) was another source of suffering in

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<sup>14</sup> See Edward Allworth ed., *The Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia* (New York, 1967), *passim*.

the nineteenth century, and especially in 1916. Finally, in the 1930s, probably more than half of the Kazakhs were killed or perished of famine, dislocation, and disease. Without those deaths the numbers of Kazakhs today would probably be as high as 25 million.

A sense of common interest was another major factor contributing to Kazakh national consciousness. The fact that the overwhelming majority of them were pastoral nomads made their culture and interests alike. These concrete elements helped produce a high degree of cultural integration and ethnic consciousness. Obviously the size of the nomadic tribal society in comparison with the settled areas is important in determining the form, culture and language of the emerging nations. In the Ottoman state, for example, the nomadic tribes in Western Anatolia constituted a small minority and their cultural role was minimal whereas the Kazakh pastoral nomads were in the overwhelming majority and occupied vast tracts of land without a major city or administrative center. Once more Ziya Gökalp's ideas are useful in defining the national characteristics of the Kazakhs. Gökalp insisted that "nations" are different from race-based ethnic communities, and from *ümmet* and *halk* (people). The essence of a nation resides in its culture. He points out that the nation-states in Europe emerged out of the matrix of the defunct Roman and German empires, as Turkey was emerging in similar fashion from the ashes of the Ottoman state. But he appears to have also accepted the possibility that a nation could emerge from the evolution of a tribal ethnic entity without passing through the *ümmet* phase when he says that a Turkish *kavim* (nation) existed before Islam.

Historically speaking, the Kazakhs seemed preeminently endowed to make a successful transition from tribe to nation. As explained, they were Muslims but until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when institutional Islam began to penetrate the steppes, the Kazakhs' faith was predominantly a folk Islam that incorporated most of the tribal culture and was expressed mostly orally. The sense of cultural unity and common interest seems to have been present in one form or the other among the Kazakh tribal elites as early as the fourteenth century. This sense of unity was expressed repeatedly in various forms when Khan Janibek (d. 1480), aided by the poet Hassan Kangi (d. 1465), sought to bring the Kazakhs together formally, presumably in some sort of political unit. A unified Kazakh state was successfully established early in the sixteenth century by Kasim Khan. Some scholars regard these endeavors as the beginning

of Kazakh nationhood.<sup>15</sup> In fact, the union of various Kazakh clans into one political group was a sort of primitive nation with enough consciousness of its own identity to see itself as different from the Uzbeks.

The disintegration of Janibek and Kasım's state late in the seventeenth century resulted in the emergence of the three khanates: the Great (*Ulu*), the Middle (*Orta*) and the Little (*K̄ichi*) *cuз*. The names imply that these three khanates considered themselves part of one large unit and therefore the designation "horde" is wrong.<sup>16</sup> The three khanates were Muslim but were not fully institutionalized or dynastic, as was the case with the regular Islamic states. Despite the division between them, each of the three khanates maintained a powerful sense of Kazakhness that was as much ethnic and linguistic as it was cultural and rooted in folk Islam, with its unique tribal features.

In the nineteenth century an intellectual dimension was introduced into the nationalism of the Kazakhs when some of their intelligentsia—for example, Chokan Valikhanov—came into indirect contact with some of the most liberal and humanistic Western ideas via the Russian intellectuals and revolutionaries (Dostoevskii, Shevchenko, Potanin, etc.) who lived as exiles in the Kazakh lands. These exiles showed understanding and sympathy for the suffering of the Kazakhs who were deprived of their lands by Russian settlers, and on more than one occasion they came to the defense of the victims of such colonization. Many of these Russian intellectuals espoused freedom in the Western sense (although Dostoevskii later became an extreme Russian conservative nationalist), meaning that they favored national

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<sup>15</sup> Kazakh history and the topic of Kazakh evolution to nationhood have been subject to various interpretations in Russia, especially during the Soviet period. Initially, the Soviet regime regarded the Kazakh struggle to oppose Czarist expansion and colonization sympathetically. Thus Kasımov Kenesary, one of the leading rebels in the nineteenth century, was originally viewed favorably, but was denounced after 1946 as a "feudal lord" and his biographers as "bourgeois nationalists." T.R. Ryskulov, A. Pankratova, and M. Abdulkhalikov who wrote a series of standard textbooks favoring the anticolonialist theme, later were bitterly criticized. See Lowell Tillet, *The Great Friendship*, Chapel Hill, NC, 1969.

<sup>16</sup> The Kazakhs use exclusively the term *cuз*, not horde (*orda*) used by Russians and Westerners in referring to the Great, Middle and Little Khanates. The term *cuз* can be literally translated into English as "part", "particle" or "ingredient" implying that the three khanates considered themselves a part of a larger whole and referring probably to the state of Khans Janibek and Kasım in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

rights and self determination. By the end of the nineteenth century the sense of national identity and consciousness had emerged fully.<sup>17</sup>

As early as 1913, the Kazakh nationalist writer Baitursunov could write in the *Kazak* (the newspaper of the modernist nationalists) that “the Kazakh nation for a long time has inhabited a definite territory and lived a particular way of life”; and, speaking of the coexistence with Russian settlers and the necessity that the Kazakhs modernize in order to survive, he wrote, “then they [Kazakhs and Russians] will mature on the same level, then they will be able to develop independently, and they will exist in their own right, preserving their own national fate.”<sup>18</sup>

Today a modern Kazakh intellectual identifies himself, first, as a Kazakh; then he may mention the *cuз* to which his ancestors belonged and then, perhaps, the tribe. Many Kazakhs also emphasize that they are Muslims, although, with the exception of a small radical group (the *Alash*, who were temporarily united around the review *Turkestan*), few would agree that Islam is the basic font of their nationhood.<sup>19</sup>

In sum, then, it may be said that today a distinct nation, with identity and political consciousness derived from concrete elements such as culture, social organization, and historical memories, is in existence. This sense of identity is essentially secular but is supplemented and bolstered by Islam, which in turn has been imbued with all the elements of the Kazakh folk culture. In my estimation, only the Turkmen resemble the Kazakhs in the nature of their sense of nationhood (but among the Turkmen, tribal identities and loyalties take priority over national consciousness and identity).

There is one further element that enters strongly into the Kazakh sense of nationhood (it is prominent in the quotation from the writer Baitursunov cited above): territory. In the next section I address myself to the issue of territorial nationhood as it applies to the Kazakhs.

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<sup>17</sup> For a masterly summary, see A. Bennigsen and L. Lemerrier-Quelquejay. *Islam in the Soviet Union*, New York, 1967.

<sup>18</sup> Quoted by Winner, *Oral Art*, p. 139.

<sup>19</sup> Some information on this group is in Martha B. Olcott, “Perestroika in Kazakhstan”, *Problems of Communism*, July–August 1990, pp. 65–77.

4. *Territory, State, and Nationhood*

The classical Muslim political literature attaches little, if any, importance to territory as the basis for either a state or a nation. It is true that the delimitation of boundaries between the Dar-ül Harb and Dar-ül İslam and the various treaties involved the issue of territory; but this was a topic not discussed by Muslim writers.<sup>20</sup> Theoretically, the Muslim owed his full allegiance to God, and therefore any other loyalty likely to dilute this primary one was frowned upon. Moreover, a profound attachment to land—that is, to a material object—was equated with the worship of things, and was thus defined as idolatry, totally in contravention of the doctrine of Islam. Thus the rise of the idea of *vatan*, of a physical homeland commanding loyalty and allegiance akin to that accorded to the faith, was a new phenomenon as in the nineteenth century the Muslim world underwent a metamorphosis which transformed one's natural feeling of attachment to the birthplace, the *patria*, into a political principle.

Villagers, farmers, and nomads, who lived close to and depended directly on the product of the land for survival inevitably developed a deep attachment to the native soil. This natural human feeling was expressed in various ways in the folk literature. The notion of *jer ana* (mother earth), which appeared in the pre-Islamic Turkish literature in various forms, has been retained in folk beliefs up to the present day. The pastoral nomadic Kazakhs were dependent upon their livestock (*mal*), which had first priority in their lives. The size of the livestock herd was the yardstick of wealth, and much Kazakh custom and tradition revolved around the *mal* and the *aul* (village or clan) until the nineteenth century, when territory began to acquire political significance among the Kazakhs, as among the rest of Russian Muslims, primarily as the result of the drive for national survival. Although in the course of time, the natural bonds between the human being and his/her territorial environment became a recognized and basic element in the emerging nationalism of most Muslims, the idea of *vatan*—fatherland—seems to have found its earliest articulation and concrete expression among the Muslims of Russia. (The idea was addressed in various forms by other Muslim intellectuals, such

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<sup>20</sup> The Kasrshirin treaty of 1639 between Persia and the Ottoman state, in which boundaries are clearly defined with reference to territory, is a prime example.

as Tahtawi of Egypt and Namık Kemal of Turkey. However, Namık Kemal defined *vatan* in terms of *duty*, whereas the Muslims of Russia defined it as the basis of their national existence).<sup>21</sup>

The idea of *vatan*, which became central to the thought of Russian Muslim intellectuals arose primarily in the nineteenth century. It was a reaction to the emigration or expulsion, as the case might be, of their kinsmen from their native lands and their replacement by Russian and other non-Muslim colonists. It is important to remember that, until about the 1860s, when the Muslims of Russia, notably those who had previously lived under Ottoman rule, emigrated, they headed for the Sultan's lands chiefly because they wished to live under the authority of a Muslim ruler. *Hijra*, or migration is a basic tradition in Islam and is rooted directly in the precedent established by the Prophet and his companions, who fled Mecca to Medina in 622 A.D. to escape the oppression of the infidel Kureish. This migration was so important as to mark the start of the Muslim calendar, and it was later emulated by Muslims living in a territory occupied or ruled by non-Muslims: they would migrate to territories under the authority of a Muslim ruler (probably with the expectation of eventually returning to reconquer their native lands). Thus the Ottoman empire became the destination of choice for millions of Russian Muslims. The first to emigrate were the Crimeans, who came to the Ottoman Empire after the peninsula was annexed by Russia in 1783 (a migration that actually continued until 1917). The Caucasians who supported Sheyh Shamil were driven out by the Russians after Shamil's defeat in 1859, but then the Caucasians began to emigrate on their own initiative as the first departures created momentum. Small groups of Azeris, Central Asians, Kazakhs, and Kazan Tatars also came sporadically into the Empire up until our own day, and all these groups are found in today's Turkey.

Since the middle of the nineteenth century, emigration of Muslims from Russia has been under duress. The rise of national consciousness among Muslim intellectuals led to a reversal of the old Islamic practice of emigration to a Muslim land, since it decreased the numerical strength of the natives. İsmail Gaspıralı (Gaspirinsky: 1857–1914)

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<sup>21</sup> I deal with this issue extensively in a forthcoming work, and I shall not elaborate on it further here. See also James Crichtlow, "Vatan and the Concept of 'Homeland' in the Muslim Soviet Republics", *Turco-Tatar Past, Soviet Present*, Ch. Lemerrier-Quelquejay, et al., eds., Paris 1986, pp. 481–88.

openly advised his Crimean co-nationalists not to migrate but to stay in, and revive, their native land. Eventually love of motherland became a basic theme among the Young Crimeans and other Muslims of Russia who also found a rather controversial *hadis* (hadith) to back their views: *hubb-ül vatan min-el iman*.<sup>22</sup>

The rise of the concept of *vatan* among the Kazakhs followed a course of its own. The seminal importance of land for these pastoralist nomads is obvious and does not need elaboration. After all, the entire history of the Kazakhs revolved around the search for pasture and water for livestock. The land issue acquired a new and politically explosive dimension after the Russian government began to give the better lands, which were also excellent pastures, to Russian colonists, especially in the nineteenth century. Laws of 1867 and 1886 dealing with the administration of Turkestan, and particularly the Steppe Statute of 1891, made special provisions for the government to take over the “excess” land of the Kazakhs and eventually to give it to Russian and Ukrainian colonists. These laws were followed by other legislation that in the end left the Kazakhs with the least suitable terrain. The land policy deprived a vast number of Kazakhs of their ancestral pasture lands and forced many of them to engage in some sort of marginal agriculture—for which most were ill-prepared. The better lands were now occupied by an alien population supported by Russian military might. After several unsuccessful revolts and attempts to resist this settlement policy, some of the Kazakh pastoralists decided to try to cope with the situation as best they could. A good number settled down to cultivate the land left to them or still raised animals on small parcels, while the Russian colonists produced market crops. Thus the vast majority of the Kazakhs were transformed by force from free pastoralist nomads into settled poor farmers and second class citizens in their own country. (The beneficial effects of this development which would turn the Kazakhs into a settled national society, became evident only a century later.)

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<sup>22</sup> “Love of fatherland is part of the faith.” This hadith was frequently used by the Muslims of Russia in the nineteenth century in order to discourage the emigration of Muslims out of their native lands. For instance, the mufti of the Caucasus addressed a letter to the *imams* (heads of congregation) ca. 1887 advising them to prevent the exodus of their congregation to the Ottoman state since this was contrary to Islam. The motto of the *Hadim-i Vatan* (Servants of the Fatherland), the newspaper of the Young Tatars of Crimea (ca. 1905) was also *Hubb-ül vatan min-el iman*. These matters are discussed in my work in preparation.



The land tenure history of Kazakhstan is complex and falls outside the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that the land issue in Kazakhstan was unique, although in other Muslim areas of Russia there were somewhat similar problems (in Crimea and Turkmenistan, for example), and it gave the Kazakh nationality problem its special features.

The lands which were the focus of stories and legends, and the site of the graves of the Kazakh ancestors were often inaccessible and often defiled by colonists. The experience with the Russians in the nineteenth century turned out to be far worse, and of more lasting impact, than the destruction by the Jungars. The “we/they” dichotomy, which is considered to be the basis for the emergence of nationalism, inevitably grew out of the Kazakhs’ confrontation with the colonizers. The Russian system of administration imposed upon the area did not permit the Kazakhs simply to make do with their decreased acreage, ignore the presence of the colonists and continue to live their lives as nearly as possible to that of the past. At first, the lands were administered by their sultans (who had served as governors for the khans), subject to Russian authority. But in 1868, the position of sultan was abolished and the Kazakh lands were divided into four oblasts: Turgai, Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, and Semirechie. These were placed under the rule of a Russian military governor and subdivided into smaller units. In 1869, the Temporary Statute put an end to the tribal organizations and reduced the jurisdiction of the *bi* (a basic tribal court) to minor cases.

These administrative measures had a profound impact on the rise of the Kazakh sense of nationhood. The destruction of tribal institutions, and the weakening of tribal identities and loyalties in which individual consciousness and other identities had previously been submerged, resulted in the emergence of a new sense of ethnicity and individuality among the Kazakhs, and this began to be articulated in a new, political manner. The stolen territories on which they had formerly pastured their huge herds, and over which they had walked yearly for distances of 1,000 to 1,500 kilometers (i.e., from one end of Kazakhstan to the other) were the lost paradise; they assumed a new and different importance and were named *ata meken*—“fatherland” in Kazakh.<sup>23</sup> Thus, land, history, culture became an integral part of Kazakh national identity.

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<sup>23</sup> On nomadism with special reference to Kazakhs see A.M. Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World*, Cambridge, UK, 1983.

It should be emphasized that the importance of the land as “our domain” was felt personally and acutely by the Kazakh masses before the intellectuals gave form to these feelings by naming it “fatherland”. However, thus expressed, the concept found wide acceptance among the masses as well as among the intelligentsia. In fact, one may say that love of the land—that is, of the fatherland in its elemental form—is probably far more pronounced among the Kazakhs than among any other Soviet Muslim group.

It was at this time that the Kazakhs began to turn *en masse* towards the institutions and practices of established Islam. Indeed, there is a direct correlation between Kazakh resentment against Russian land and administrative policies and closer realignment with traditional state Islam. It was for the purpose of defending their fatherland that the Kazakh intellectuals sought to ally themselves with other Muslims of Russia. Thus the “Islamization” of the Kazakhs in the late nineteenth century had its roots in the land and administrative policies of the Russians. True to the secular nature of their nationalism, however, the Kazakhs remained interested more in pan-Turkism than pan-Islamism.<sup>24</sup>

Under the Soviets, land policy was different, but the immediate results were even worse. The forced collectivization of Kazakh farmers (most still raised animals) in the 1930s caused widespread famine and millions of deaths, and mass migration from Kazakhstan to China, and further increased the native resentment against the Russians. Khrushchev’s drive to open the virgin lands to agriculture destroyed what was left of the traditional way of life and caused another rise in anger. However, after relative stability had been established, the orderly life on the farms proved to be more beneficial than the nomadic life. Literacy increased, and life became stable and economically secure as Kazakhs became part of the national Soviet economy. A class of native agricultural engineers, administrators, and marketers arose.

The fact that the *sovkhoz* rather than the *kolhoz* seems to have been the dominant collective agricultural enterprise in Kazakhstan has been to the benefit of the native culture. The *kolhoz* is the oppressive, degrading form of economic association that was instrumental

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<sup>24</sup> For these issues see A. Bennigsen and C. Lemerrier-Quelquejey, *Islam in the Soviet Union*, New York, 1967.

in destroying the traditional village and its culture in Eastern Europe and the USSR. The *sovkhos*, on the other hand, with its relatively well-organized structure employing thousands of people at a certain salary is, in fact, a relatively modern agro-business, the members of which work mostly as salaried employees. It is also a center of communication and culture, and a gathering place where ideas are exchanged, issues are debated and national songs and literature sung and read. The employees not living in the central site of the *sovkhos* usually reside in their native *auls* and towns that have preserved much of their traditional Kazakh outlook. (Some Kazakh intellectuals complain now that the traditional *aul* is an impediment to nationalism and rapid modernization.) The fact that a part of the *sovkhos* production is sold in the nearby towns has strengthened the linkage between village and town.<sup>25</sup> In addition local TV and radio broadcasts using the Kazakh language are now available. Furthermore, the relative industrialization of Kazakhstan (Chimkent, for example, has about half a million people and is a major industrial city) has increased the rate of urbanization, which in turn has created a new Kazakh middle class as well as a large group of industrial workers. Thus the benefits that have resulted from the transformation of Kazakh society are evident.

Another effect is a steady migration from villages to cities. It should be remembered that a good part of the contemporary Kazakh intelligentsia and industrial workers are of rural origin and keenly aware of the land policies of the Russian and Soviet governments.

The major contribution of the Soviet regime to Kazakh nationhood was the recognition of Kazakhstan as an independent administrative unit in the 1920s and then as a Union republic in 1936. Thus the idea of a Kazakh nation expressed by Baitursunov in 1913, the idea that the Kazakhs inhabit a well-defined territory and have their own way of life, was reinforced by the emergence of the Kazakhstan as a republic in the Soviet Union. The language and nationality policies of the central government may have succeeded in weakening the Kazakh sense of unity with other Turkic groups, but these have greatly reinforced the Kazakhs' own ethnic and territorial nationalism. One can safely state that there is today a relatively

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<sup>25</sup> Some of this information derives from field observation in the Seyran and Turkistan during the month of October, 1990.

homogeneous Kazakh nation living on its own historical territory. However, the situation is complicated by the uneven distribution of the ethnic population. According to the 1989 census, ethnic Kazakhs account for 42 percent, Russians for 36 percent and Ukrainians for 5.4 percent of the population. The rest is made up of other ethnic groups. Actually, Muslims may be in the majority; but the census is based on language and ethnicity, and the Kazakhs refuse to count also the Uzbeks, Tatars, and Azeris, who number about a million. The Muslim majority is thus not established for the time being. (Some Kazakhs, however, have defended the idea that some small Muslim groups at least should be arbitrarily classified as Kazakhs.)

The Kazakh government has quietly embarked upon a project to bring the Kazakhs of the diaspora back to their native land. Thus those in China, who fled there in the 1930s, and those who live in other republics, are being lured back. Some Karakalpaks from the Aral region, close kins of the Kazakhs, have already settled in Kazakhstan, many on the lands of departing Russians and Germans.

The importance attached by Kazakhs to territory as a vital element of their nationhood was clearly evident in the torrent of articles, speeches, and radio broadcasts that stiffly criticized Solzhenitsyn's view that the lands of northern Kazakhstan, inhabited by a Russian majority, should be part of the future Russian-Slavic state he advocated. The Kazakh writers asserted that all the lands included in the Republic of Kazakhstan are an inalienable part of the historical home of the Kazakhs and that the Russians achieved their current superior position in the north by driving out the original settlers. They complained that anyway some Kazakh lands have already been gobbled up by the Russian republic. Furthermore, as early as 1988 the Kazakhs founded an organization—called, significantly, *Atameken*—to promote the national culture and language and lure back the Kazakhs of the diaspora. To the best of my knowledge, of all the Soviet Muslims, only the Kazakhs have exhibited their strong sense of nationalism in this way.

##### 5. *Modernity and Nationalism*

Folk Islam, ethnicity, language and territory would not have come together and produced the Kazakh nationality and nationalism without the impact of modernism. Nationalism and modernity are inseparable.

arable in contemporary Islamic societies. The former cannot exist without the latter. Modernity penetrated the thinking of Muslim intellectuals chiefly in the nineteenth century in the form of a heightened self consciousness or awareness about their economic, cultural, social, and political situation. This heightened consciousness was essentially their individual response to basic changes in their social and political status—a change brought about by the European occupation of Muslim lands in Asia and Africa and the introduction of a capitalist economic system, which forced a fundamental change in the traditional system of production, distribution, and marketing, and tied these societies into a dependent relationship to a center. This change in Central Asia was imposed by the military and enforced by an administrative apparatus organized by, and directed from, the center, that is, Moscow. This phenomenon of intellectual awakening is called in Arabic *tajaddud*, (renewal): in Turkey the word used is *islahat* (reform), and in Russia, *jadidjilik* (innovation). Jadidism among Russian Muslims arose first in Kazan, Azerbaijan, and Crimea, and finally spread to Central Asia proper. In Kazakhstan, its development followed a special course.

This modernist educational system introduced by Europeans in conquered Muslim lands was designed to serve both ideological and practical ends. Through education, the natives were to be indoctrinated with the idea of the superiority of the culture of the conqueror, and, at the same time, they were to be trained to take over administrative responsibilities in the governing apparatus imposed by the conqueror.

Although Russian policy in the occupation and administration of the Muslim lands varied considerably from the European model, it still corresponded in general to the model. The Russians themselves were still undergoing their own modernization; and although they regarded Western Europe as the model (without openly admitting this), they were quite capable of using, against the conquered Muslims, when circumstances seemed to demand it, the harsh methods which had been utilized by the Czars since the conquest of Kazan. New methods borrowed from the West were adopted also, notably in education. The introduction of Western-type schools, using the native languages and directed by the missionary Ilminskii, produced such good initial results among the Tatars that the system was extended to the Kazakhs.<sup>26</sup> Initially Christian proselyting in Central Asia was

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<sup>26</sup> See an excellent discussion about Ilminskii's unsuccessful effort to indoctrinate

forbidden, lest this antagonize the natives and awaken them to vigorous resistance. However in Kazakhstan extensive Russian religious missionary activity was allowed including an education policy aimed at Russifying the natives as soon as possible. The results were not as planned.

The Kazakh intellectuals who played a role in the awakening of their societies were educated predominantly either in the Russo-Muslim or purely Russian schools, although a few studied also in the traditional *medrese*. (The *medrese*, and the Muslim establishment in general, opposed the reforms and therefore the Russians.) These Kazakhs educated in the modern schools became promoters almost simultaneously of modern reforms and of Kazakh national revival. Most of them saw modernization in all spheres of life as the form of national awakening that would bring progress and ultimately protect the native society against Russification.

The revival of Islam in the Muslim areas of Russia was basically a part of this drive toward self-defensive nationalism, for it sought to awaken the national consciousness of the Muslims by reminding them of their past and emphasizing that their ancestors had raised a glorious civilization, full of intellectual and artistic achievement, centuries before Russia had come with its military might to conquer their lands. Muslim nationalism in Russia was not an expansionist ideology, contrary to most nineteenth-century European nationalisms, including the Russian version. Nor was it (despite some ugly features) the fanatical, regressive, anti-modern movement that it is so often portrayed to be in Western and Russian literature. It was, rather, a new and powerful force for cultural revival and national liberation, and for modernization as well; as stated above, it was recognized that a national revival had to go hand in hand with modernity. So powerful, in fact, were the modernists among the Russian Jadidists that socialism, and even Marxism, were regarded as likely roads to rapid progress.

Jadidism as an ideology of modernism-nationalism followed a somewhat different course of development in each major Muslim group in Russia, and once more, due in part to the special circumstances

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an early, Kazakh leader. Isabelle Kreindler, "Ibrahim Altynsaryn, Nikolai Ilminskii and the Kazakh National Awakening." *Central Asian Survey*, vol. 2 no. 3, November 1983, pp. 99-116.

of Kazakh history, culture, etc., the ideology was given a special twist in Kazakhstan. Almost from the start, the Kazakh modernists appeared to be preoccupied mostly with their own ethnicity, language, literature and territory rather than with global Muslim problems as was, for example, the famous pan-Islamist A. İbragimov. There was in them a degree of Kazakh ethno-national centrism that had few parallels in the other Russian Muslim groups. Kazakh intellectuals used this special background to create from the start, a nationalism that was an amalgam of folk Islam, tribal-ethnic identity, and the sense of community which with great rapidity became a national Kazakh synthesis. The remarkableness of the development becomes clear when one takes into consideration the fact that the Kazakhs did not have their own bourgeoisie or the benefit of a legacy of old political institutions (as was the case with the Tatars and Azeris).

The Kazakh modernists demanded education, the reorganization of Kazakh tribal society, an end to nomadism, and overall, emancipation (including the emancipation of women). The first Kazakh modernists, such as Chokan Valikhanov (1835–1865) came from among the feudal nobility, and initially they regarded modernism as a form of intellectual and social emancipation. They also looked upon Russia as a guide and as a model of modernity.<sup>27</sup> İbrahim Altynsaryn (1841–1889) was the founder of the Kazakh modern school system that produced the generation of Kazakh nationalist intellectuals. Altynsaryn's original supporter was Ilminsky, who wanted to use him and the modern school system to convert the Kazakhs. (Ilminsky was very upset when Altynsaryn presented him with a book designed to teach Islam in a new spirit to Kazakh children. For months he did not respond to Altynsaryn's letters.)<sup>28</sup>

The early precursors of Kazakh modernism were opposed to pan-Islamism and in general were strongly influenced by Russian culture, including the concepts of *rodina*, fatherland, emancipation, and the like. Russian literature, first translated by Abai Kunanbaev, was among the initial sources of modernist ideas. Kunanbaev (1845–1904), the poet, writer, and philosopher, created almost singlehandedly the

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<sup>27</sup> For short biographies see Serge A., Zenkovskii, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), pp. 61 ff. Valikhanov's idea that Russia was an enlightened guide vanished rapidly after he witnessed the destruction caused by Russian occupation.

<sup>28</sup> Kreindler, "İbrahim," pp. 109 ff.

modern Kazakh literary language, based on the vernacular and by eliminating Arabic and Persian words.<sup>29</sup> The next generation of Kazakh intellectuals, however, such as Ali Khan Bukeikhanov (1869–1932), Ahmet Baytursun (1873–1937), Mir Yakup Dulatov and many others, were true Kazakh nationalists and critics of the Russian administration. They also discovered Europe and saw how Russia had distorted its liberal and humanist spirit.

Eventually the Kazakhs allied themselves with the rest of the Muslims. They sent representatives to the First Muslim Congress held in January 1905 and became members of the *İttifak al-Muslimin* (Muslim Union), which emerged from this first meeting as the organization which would represent all Muslims, and which later became a political party. The Kazakhs did not participate in the Second Muslim Congress but held their own meeting and eventually rallied around the newspaper *Qazaq*, aiming to map out a special national path for themselves. *Qazaq* was actually one of many such newspapers; for by the end of the nineteenth century, various Kazakh periodicals had appeared and were espousing a variety of national and modernist themes; those in the south were more nationalist, traditionalist and anti-Russian, while those in the north and the west placed more emphasis on development, emancipation, and friendship with the Russians. The modernist, nationalist group finally established the *Alash Orda* association, which became a political party in 1917. The *Uc Cuz* (Three Hordes), formed in Tashkent in 1914, stressed unity. As is well known, *Alash Orda* succeeded in establishing an autonomous Kazakhstan which functioned until April 1920.<sup>30</sup> It was the only independent Muslim government to last so long and to function relatively well. (Azerbaijan falls in a different category.) It also created the only major native army (of about 25,000 men), which played a major role in securing the Bolshevik victory in Asia.

The *Alash Orda* represented the triumph of the idea that Kazakh nationalism should be based on, and give priority to, modernism and independence. It remained quiescent in the face of the savage repression of the 1916 revolt because it saw the rebellion as a kind of reaction against, and resistance to, modernism, rather than as the expression of accumulated resentment against the Russians.

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<sup>29</sup> Zenkovskii, *Pan-Turkism, op. cit.*, p. 64.

<sup>30</sup> See Hasan Oraltay, "The Alash Movement in Turkestan", *Central Asian Survey*, 4, no. 2, 1985, pp. 41–50.



The acceptance of socialist and Marxist ideas by some Kazakhs after 1905 partially undermined the power of the pan-Islamists and pan-Turkists but added new strength to the Kazakh opposition to the Czarist government and to nationalism. The Czarist administration was now seen not only as a national oppressor but also as a capitalist exploiter. Kazakh nationalism thus gained a new socio-economic dimension that transformed the ideology of modernism into one promoting total social and economic restructuring. Eventually, after 1920, *Alash Orda* was accused of defending "bourgeois" nationalism, and most of its leading members were liquidated.

After 1930 the Soviet regime in Kazakhstan adopted the old Czarist goals. It attempted to destroy the traditional sources of Kazakh culture and identity. It closed the mosques and religious schools, and prohibited the practice of a variety of customs and traditions, including the folk religion. The Kazakh family was subjected to far more severe repressive measures than that of other Muslims. The new regime tried to undermine the attachment to the past, tradition, and national history while promoting a secular attachment to the regime, that is, to the Soviet fatherland. It glorified the Russian contribution to Kazakh modernism. The school system became the vehicle for indoctrinating the Kazakhs in the new creed. Literacy and urbanization increased as did communication between the city and the countryside, and the percentage of Russian-speaking Kazakhs went up sharply; but knowledge of the regime's language did not dilute commitment to everything Kazakh.

The general effect of Soviet policy in Kazakhstan was to increase the appeal of the secular components of nationalism, such as language, literature, and national history. A large modern intelligentsia, which eventually took control of the party cadres at practically all levels, and a variety of professional groups were created during the Soviet regime. The creation of these native cadres was made possible mainly because of the ingenuity of the local party leaders, not through the express wish of Moscow; for while these local cadres spoke Russian they remained as a whole committed to their Kazakhness (even though some would have preferred to be Russians).

The role of Dinmukhamed Kunaev, who served for 25 years as First Secretary of Kazakhstan, in charting the emergence of a modern Kazakh intelligentsia with strong dedication to national causes is worthy of further investigation. The real reason for his ousting by Gorbachev in 1986 was not corruption but his untiring and astute

promotion of Kazakh interests and national development. Today he is viewed as a national hero in Kazakhstan, and any attempt to arrest him would cause probably far more unrest than the student riots of 1986. We should know more about the politics of Kazakhstan once Kunaev's memoirs, which he is reportedly writing, are published. (In a recent interview—December 1992—Kunaev told this writer that he resigned because of disagreement with Gorbachev over nationality issues. Asked whether he considered himself first a communist or Kazakh he responded that he was both, and believed in God.)

### *Conclusions*

While each major Muslim group in the USSR has its unique history, their cultures and languages show marked similarities; but Kazakh history and its brand of nationalism remains unique. The roots of Kazakh nationalism appear, upon close examination, to be, first and foremost, ethnicity. The ethnicity which is the source of Kazakh national identity and personality is a blend of tribal identity and folk religion—shamanism first and then Islam—that is the essence of the basic Kazakh culture. Among the nomadic Kazakhs Islam itself consisted until the nineteenth century predominantly of a special variety of folk religion which had absorbed many features of shamanism. Then the influence of established Islam, which had flourished among the Kazan Tatars (who used it to assimilate the Kazakhs) and in the settled areas along the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers, became predominant.

Territory historically important to the Kazakhs appears to be another pillar source of their nationalism. The colonization by Russian settlers, which deprived the Kazakhs of their ancestral grazing land, along with the administrative measures that undermined the tribal institutions and organizations, were the major stimuli of national awakening. This was both a social and national awakening because it was a reaction to the destruction of the economic bases of Kazakh traditional culture and tribal institutions. Although the boundaries of their ancestral territory had not been firmly drawn on maps, they were nevertheless clear and well-defined: the Kazakh land consisted of the steppe, and it was bound on the south, the east, and the west by settled areas and on the north by forested lands. This was the territory of which the Kazakhs for centuries had had almost exclu-

sive use for the grazing of their herds; in the era of nationalism it became for the Kazakh people the fatherland—*vatan*, *rodina*, or *atameken*.<sup>31</sup> The Kazakhs' culture, way of life, and history is intimately associated with this territory, and they are to a large extent the product of this association.

Language does not appear to have had a major impact on the rise of Kazakh nationalism until well into the second half of the nineteenth century, when the literary Kazakh language was created. Language separated the Kazakhs not only from the Russians but also from the Tatars. They shared religion with the latter, but the two groups were socially and politically antagonistic to each other. This was important in the twentieth century in conditioning the Kazakh intellectuals' negative attitude towards pan-Islamism. Modernism, or *Ĵadidism*, was the intellectual force that sharpened the Kazakhs' self awareness and produced what was the equivalent of a national awakening.

*Glasnost* and *perestroika* eliminated some of the oppressive control by the center, and, consequently, most Kazakh intellectuals have come forward to express themselves forcefully and defend their rights. Aesopian language, "reading between lines," and the other tricks used to deceive the communist censors are being swept away, despite the continued presence in Kazakhstan of the sophisticated control mechanism of the center. The most recent catalyst for the Kazakh nationalist movement were the riots of 1986, which marked a turning point in the Kazakh path toward national realization. The Soviet government's response to what was a relatively normal student demonstration was excessively brutal, for it was intended to intimidate the

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<sup>31</sup> The view that the Kazakhs voluntarily accepted Russian rule—in 1982 the Soviet press gave wide publicity to the 250th anniversary of the alleged Kazakh "voluntary" incorporation to Russia—has not gone unchallenged. The review in *Qazaq Adebiety* (Kazakh Literature) no. 30, 1982, as though in refutation of this "voluntary annexation," published a long article on the K l Tegin (G ltekin) monuments to celebrate the 1,250 anniversary of their erection. These monuments, known also as the Orhon (Orkhon) inscriptions, are considered to be the first clear expression of Turkish national identity. The inscriptions dealt at length with the Chinese threat to the Turks' independence and survival. See Charles F. Carlson and Hasan Oralatay, "K l Tegin. Advice for the Future?" *Central Asian Survey*, 2 no. 2, (1983), pp. 121–38. The supposedly "voluntary" annexation stemmed from only one khan who sought Russian help against the Mongol invaders. Prof. Baymirza Hayit has demonstrated how untenable this theory of voluntary incorporation into Russia is; see his "Some Reflections on the Subject of Annexation of Turkestan Kazakhstan by Russia," *Central Asian Survey*, 3, no. 4, (1984), pp. 61–74.

Kazakhs into retreating again into the customary model of obedience that had been the norm in Kazakh-Russian relations.<sup>32</sup>

There seems today to be a complete unity of view among Kazakh intellectuals concerning the existence of a Kazakh nation and its inalienable right to its historic territory, culture, and freedom. The presence of a very large Russian minority concentrated in the north, and their clear defiance of Kazakh nationalism and national claims, poses a deadly threat to Kazakh aspirations, however, and the ethnic Russians in the north are already well organized and could secede any time to join the Russian Republic. This situation, in turn, is a powerful stimulus to unity among the Kazakh nationalist groups, of which the main ones are four in number. I discuss each of these briefly below.

The Kazakh Communist Party, which represents the Kazakh establishment and seems to advocate a slow and steady progression towards autonomy, while still collaborating with Moscow, supported Gorbachev until recently, when Nazarbaev, the First Secretary, shifted his support to Yeltsin. The most nationalist-minded element among the communists are the lower cadres. It seems that the major objective of the party is to gain time. It appears to believe that if the current policy can be maintained for another ten or fifteen years this would permit the Kazakh ethnic population to reach majority status (some 52–55 percent in 1995/6). The extensive program aimed at bringing back the Kazakhs in diaspora, the settlement of Karakalpaks on the lands of departing Germans and Russians, and a variety of other measures, appear to ensure a rapid increase of the native population. (A very reliable source reported that a group of educated but unmarried Kazakh women petitioned the government to allow them to become second wives to married men in order to bear children.) The Kazakh establishment appears willing to cooperate with the central government and with ethnic Russians in order to raise the rural standard of life, to provide for a more balanced development, to secure control of natural resources and to exploit these resources in a profitable way, if necessary with foreign capital investment. The primary spokesman for this policy is the First Secretary Nursultan Nazarbaev who hopes to gain popular support by increasing the

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<sup>32</sup> See Taras Kuzio, "Nationalist Riots in Kazakhstan" *Central Asian Survey*, 7 no. 4, (1988), 79–100; and Olcott, "Perestroika".

Kazakhs' living standards, but who is apparently under some pressure for not having opposed D. Kunaev's dismissal in 1986 (the entire, debateless session in which this was accomplished lasted only 19 minutes). The Communist Party of Kazakhstan adopts the most bourgeois, conservative stand on practically all matters, although individual members when questioned appear to take a more radical nationalist stand. In general, they prefer to retain the existing unionist structure.

*Azat* (Freedom) is the "popular front" of Kazakhstan with some 45,000 or so members and some 40 branches. It is headed by Prof. Sabitazi Agataev. It is strong in towns and cities and claims to be a successor to *Alash Orda*. It advocates full independence. In a lengthy interview with the review *Forum*, appearing in Ankara, Agataev rejected the use of violence and instead advocated passive resistance and dialogue with the Russians in order to persuade them to leave the country.<sup>33</sup>

The Jeltoksan National Democratic Party, established by a lawyer, Amancol Nalibaev, is more traditionalist and appears to be strong in some rural areas.

*Alash* is the party of the ultra religious, who advocate total rejection of communist rule, disassociation from the union, and close relations with Muslim countries.

A variety of other groups, such as "*Sanirag*", "*Azamat*", "*Kazak*", and "*Adilet*" represent various other views, some addressing mainly local problems. These groups do not play a major role.

So despite the existence of a variety of minority views, the overwhelming majority of Kazakh intellectuals seem united around a common, well-formed sense of Kazakh secular national identity. The Kazakh nation appears prepared to play its historical role; but Kazakhstan is isolated from the rest of the world. It borders China but does not like and trust that country. Thus the Kazakhs are bound to seek alliance with their neighboring republics and to stay on good terms with the center, at least for the time being. (Since the writing of this communication early in 1991, a variety of major developments in Kazakhstan, including national independence have strengthened many of the points and ideas expressed).

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<sup>33</sup> "Tam Bağımsız Kazakistan: Azat Partisinin Lideri Akatayev'le Mülakat" (Fully Independent Kazakhstan. Interview with Agataev, the leader of the Azat Party) *Forum*, (Ankara), January 1991, pp. 43-49.

## THE TURKS IN AMERICA<sup>1</sup>

### *Historical Background: From Ottoman to Turkish Immigration*

The Ottoman state and modern Turkey have been regarded in general as immigrant-receiving countries. Indeed, some five to seven million people from the Crimea, Caucasus, the Balkans, Crete and the Aegean islands came into the Ottoman lands in the period from 1783 to 1914.<sup>2</sup> The influx continued during the Balkan War of 1912–13<sup>3</sup> and World War I and then accelerated in the 1930s as another two million Muslims and Turks from the Balkans, Syria, and especially northern Iraq (Kirkuk, Mosul and Suleymaniye) settled in Republican Turkey. New waves of Turks and Muslims expelled from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia between 1951 and 1953 were followed to Turkey by another exodus from Bulgaria in 1983–89, bringing the cumulative total of immigrants to nearly ten million people.<sup>4</sup> The impact of these population movements on the Ottoman social and

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<sup>1</sup> There is hardly any literature on the Turks in America. With the exception of Frank Ahmed's book, consisting of recollections and general information, an article in the Harvard Encyclopedia, and a few casual references to be noted in due place, there is hardly any research article or book, my own article on Ottoman migration, published in *IJMES* in 1985, notwithstanding. Although I was informed that there are some dissertations prepared on Turkish immigration to Canada and the United States, I was not able to locate any. Consequently, in writing this article on Turkish migration to America, I had to rely on a variety of general sources and interviews with the heads of various Turkish organizations. I would like to convey my thanks to Drs. Özer Aksoy and Demir Delen of the Federation of Canadian Turkish Associations, Dr. Şevket Karaduman of the Federation of Turkish American Associations, Inc., and other groups and individuals for their assistance.

<sup>2</sup> For a general background, see Kemal H. Karpat, *Ottoman Population 1830–1914, Demographic and Social Characteristics* (Madison, WI 1985). There are a series of new publications on these historical migrations; see Bedri Habiçoğlu, *Kafkasyadan Anadoluya Göçler* (İstanbul 1993). For a trilogy of Caucasian migrations see M.I. Quandour, *Kavkas* (Moscow 1994). This book, written originally as a series of screenplays for the culture fund of the Republic of Kabardina Balkaria, was published with the assistance of Frances Kennett in English in Jersey (Channel Islands) in 1994.

<sup>3</sup> Ahmet Halaçoğlu, *Balkan Harbi Sırasında Rumeli'den Türk Göçleri* (Ankara 1994).

<sup>4</sup> For the latter period see Cevat Geray, *Türkiye'den ve Türkiye'ye Göçler ve Göçmenlerin Gelişmesi (1923–1961)* (Ankara 1962). For the most comprehensive demographic bibliography see Daniel Panzac, *La Population de l'Empire Ottoman, Cinquante ans (1941–1990) de publications et de recherches* (Aix-en-Provence 1993).

ethnic structure was profound. It accelerated the socio-economic and cultural reconstruction of the old Ottoman society and prepared the basic ground for the emergence of modern Turkey.<sup>5</sup>

It is generally little known that the Ottoman state also exported a large number of emigrants to Russia and North and South America. Considerable numbers of Armenians and Greeks emigrated to Russia, most of them after 1878 mainly for economic considerations, that is, because of the financial attraction offered by the development of state-supported Russian capitalism; the emigration to Russia was stimulated by political factors between 1916 and 1918 but diminished afterward.<sup>6</sup>

The bulk of the Ottoman migration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however, flowed towards North and South America. This vast Ottoman emigration to America, despite its extraordinary importance, has been largely ignored for a variety of reasons. Suffice it to say that each emigrant group, once in America, identified itself not as "Ottoman", but rather according to its ethnic and/or religious identity and so rendered meaningless the "country of origin". Officially, the U.S. or Latin American censuses called them "Turks" or identified them as being "from Turkey." In fact, existing U.S. statistics classify most Ottoman emigrants as being from either "Turkey in Europe" or "Turkey in Asia" or from "European Turkey" or "Asian Turkey,"<sup>7</sup> but the U.S. authorities listed the Armenians, most of whom emigrated from the Ottoman empire, according to their ethnic origin. Those authorities also listed other immigrants as being from Arabia and Egypt, two emigrant-sending areas that were part of the Ottoman state or "Turkey in Asia."

The existing statistics on Ottoman emigration to America fail to

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<sup>5</sup> These issues are discussed at length in this writer's published works, and forthcoming ones.

<sup>6</sup> Kemal H. Karpat, "The Ottoman Emigration to America", *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 17 (1985): 175–209. The other account of this migration is a short account by Phillip K. Hitti in the E.I. (Eng.). It appears under "Djāliya" from the Arabic *djāla*, to migrate. My own updated piece on the same subject appears in the new *İslam Ansiklopedisi* published by the *Diyanet Vakfı* (Religious Foundation) under the title "Caliye". I was informed by Ignatio Klich of Argentina that he was working on Ottoman immigration to Argentina from 1910 to 1915, but I am not aware that the work has been published.

<sup>7</sup> U.S. Department of Commerce, Division of Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970* (Washington, D.C. 1975); also Imre Ferenczi and W.F. Willcox, *International Migrations*, vol. 1 (New York 1929).

provide concrete figures about the exact number of ethnic Turks from Anatolia and the Balkans who migrated and settled in North America prior to World War I. Actually the statistics do not mention any Muslim immigrants as having come to the United States, because officials generally were not interested in listing the immigrants' religion. Most Muslims, including the Turks, feared that they would not be accepted in a Christian country because of their religion and often adopted and registered under a Christian name at the port of entry, if not while boarding a foreign ship at some Mediterranean port. The prevailing opinion until recent times was that most, if not all, of the immigrants from the Ottoman lands were Christians and (some) Jews, and that few Muslims and Turks ever came to the shores of North America.<sup>8</sup> The U.S. statistics indicate that in the period from 1869 to 1915, a total of 178,712 people came to the United States from Asian Turkey. In the period from 1895 to 1924 a total of 140,833 people came from "Turkey in Europe" and 178,112 "from Turkey in Asia."<sup>9</sup> In addition, 65,756 Armenians and 18,848 "Turks" were listed as having immigrated during the same period. While Ottoman emigration to the United States rose after 1895, U.S. immigration officials then began to compile data according to both the country of origin and ethnic origin. The figures given are rather confusing. A similar confusion concerning the immigrants' ethnic origin existed in South America; all the Ottoman immigrants were called "Syrians" in Argentina, and "Arabs" and "Turks" in Brazil.

Ottoman statistics, on the other hand, indicate that a total about 80,000 people emigrated in the 1885–1912 period; the actual number is much higher. The Ottoman government, which faced a population shortage at the end of the nineteenth century, forbade the emigration to America and was disinclined to admit openly that its ban on emigration was ignored. In any case, from the 1820s until 1920 over 1,2 million people from the Ottoman lands crossed the ocean to the New World, most of them going to North America. There is no question that approximately fifteen percent of these immigrants—roughly 200,000 people—were Muslims, including about 50,000 ethnic Turks. We know for certain that many ethnic Turks from Harput, Elazığ, Akçadağ, Antep and Macedonia embarked for

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<sup>8</sup> Karpat, "Ottoman Emigration", p. 201.

<sup>9</sup> U.S. Department of Commerce, *Historical Statistics*, *passim*.



the Americas from Beirut, Mersin, İzmir, Trabzon and Salonica but declared themselves as “Syrians” or even “Armenians” in order to avoid discrimination and gain easy access at the port of entry.<sup>10</sup>

The largest number of ethnic Turks appear to have entered the United States prior to World War I, roughly between 1900 and 1914 when American immigration policies were quite liberal. The Ottoman entry into World War I on the side of Germany put a virtual end to the Ottoman emigration to the United States. However, a fairly large number of ethnic Turks and Muslims from the Balkan provinces of Albania, Kosovo, Western Thrace, and Bulgaria, which were lost between 1908 and 1913, emigrated and settled in the United States. They were listed as “Albanians”, “Bulgarians” and “Serbians” according to their country of origin, even though many of them were ethnically Turks and identified themselves as such. It is painful to record that many immigrant families classified as ethnically Bulgarian, Serbian, Greek, etc., from Macedonia, Greece, Albania and Thrace included children of Turkish origin whose parents had been “cleansed” after Macedonia was partitioned between Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece following the Balkan War of 1912–13. These Turkish children had been “sheltered”, baptized and adopted, and then used as field laborers. When the adopting families had to emigrate to America, they listed these children as family members, but most of these Turkish children still remembered their origin.<sup>11</sup> With the end of World War I the immigration of Turks to the United States resumed for a relatively short time. It appears that American middlemen came to Turkey in 1920 and recruited some 10,000 workers of various ethnic origins from the provinces of Elazığ and Harput. The missionary American college at Harput was a major center of information, and although its primary purpose was to help the Christians in the region, Turks also benefitted from its activities.

The number of Turkish returnees from the United States, as shall

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<sup>10</sup> For these Muslim migrations to the United States see Kathleen M. Moore, *Al-Mughtaribun, American Law and the Transformation of Muslim Life in the United States* (Albany, N.Y. 1995).

<sup>11</sup> The issue of converted Turkish children brought by Bulgarians and Macedonians to the United States has never been studied. This writer met several people in the 1960s and 1970s in various localities in Wisconsin, even a priest in Platteville, who claimed that they were the descendants of Turkish children brought by Balkan immigrants.

be discussed later, was very high. Some returned home a few months after their arrival, others after a few years. In any event, by 1920 a total number of about 12,000 ethnic Turks still lived in the United States. They were concentrated in the urban areas of New York, Massachusetts (Peabody, Salem, Lynn), Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Detroit and Chicago. Sabiha Sertel, who studied sociology at Columbia University from 1919 to 1923 and dealt with migrant workers living in New York, conducted some research among Turkish workers in New York, Detroit and Massachusetts.<sup>12</sup> She placed the total number of Turkish workers in the United States at 9,000, and she pointed out that a large number of “Turks” had come to the United States in 1920 from Cyprus, Macedonia and Bulgaria to escape the pressure of the Bulgarians, Greeks and Serbians and that these “Turks” included Tatars, Kurds, Albanians, etc. According to Sertel, known in Turkey as a socialist who lived for many years in the USSR, the Turks in America consisted of unskilled workers willing to labor long hours in the most trying and high-paying jobs in iron works, leather tanneries, automobile plants, soap factories (one in Worcester was owned by a Turkish *imam*), and small businesses.<sup>13</sup> These early Turkish immigrants had established under the leadership of a few professionals (an engineer, a movie operator and a doctor) the *Türk Teavün Cemiyeti* (Turkish Aid Society) with branches in New York and Detroit. The Kurds, who lived together with Turks, had their own *Hilal-i Ahmer* (Red Crescent). These two associations managed to collect and send to Turkey one million dollars to support the nationalist cause.<sup>14</sup> Many of the Turks returned home on the vessel *Gülcemal*, the legendary boat that made the first trip to the United States in 1923 on behalf of the new Republic. Because the trip was one of the first concrete efforts of the Kemalist government in Ankara to establish good relations with the United States, the event deserves closer study.<sup>15</sup> Sertel reported that the *Türk Teavün Cemiyeti* was still active when she returned for a visit to New York in 1937 and that the association was manned by a new generation of youngsters, some of whom had become politically radical and even joined the Lincoln Brigade in the Spanish Civil War.

<sup>12</sup> Sabiha Sertel, *Roman Gibi 1919–1950* (İstanbul 1969), pp. 42–66.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 53.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 53–60.

<sup>15</sup> Sabiha Sertel described the arrival of the ship as a national event, for Turks from all over the United States flocked to New York to welcome her.

The two sources on the life of the early Turkish immigrants to the United States (Sertel and Frank Ahmed) agree that most of them were rural, illiterate and poor but showed a remarkable degree of ethnic solidarity and sought to preserve their traditions.<sup>16</sup> To be sure, most of the Ottoman migrants to North America belonged to low income groups. Their main goal was to work for a number of years in any job, without becoming a part of the country, and to save enough money to buy land and houses upon returning to their homeland. The rate of returnees among Ottoman immigrants was very high; about one third of the Christians and probably more than half of the Muslims returned to live the rest of their lives in relative abundance in their native lands, despite the difficulty of readjustment to their old culture.

One factor compelling Muslims and ethnic Turks to return home was the lack of suitable Muslim women for them to marry in the United States. The great majority of Turkish immigrants at the time were men; only very few brought their wives and families. Because bachelors who married non-Muslim women abroad and the immigrants who had left their wives in their native villages but married American women while supporting their old family at home usually were assimilated, one is bound to deduce that the number who survived culturally as Turks in America was very low.<sup>17</sup> Those who maintained a degree of their ethnic identity did so either because they had formed their own small communities, or were gathered around a makeshift mosque, or had enough of an education and strength of personality and willpower to preserve their identity as Turks. There is, however, no credible evidence in hand to suggest that this early immigration to the United States and Canada established any permanent cultural or organizational foundations to help future Turkish immigrants build upon and enlarge their ethnic presence in America and gain group recognition: the local press in

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<sup>16</sup> The best, and probably the only, personal account of a Turk's life in the United States is by Frank Ahmed, *Turks in America, The Ottoman Turks' Immigrant Experience* (Washington 1993). I am grateful to the author for making available to me a copy of this unique book. Frank Ahmed's grandfather returned to Turkey, but his father married an Irish American and stayed in Massachusetts where he engaged eventually in the real estate business.

<sup>17</sup> I would place the total number of Turks who married and settled in the United States between 1910 and 1930 at about 300, which is close to Ahmed's estimate of 200 families.

Peabody (Mass.), according to Frank Ahmed, referred to Turks as “Ali Hassans” and “Abdulhamids.”<sup>18</sup>

The failure of the early Turkish immigrants to make permanent their ethnic foundations in the United States stands in sharp contrast to the successful adjustment and the subsequent growth of the Armenian, Greek and Slavic (Macedonian) communities, most of whose members came from Ottoman lands. The most fundamental cause of the Turkish failure to establish a durable ethnic group was the lack of a sense of community and cultural affinity with the United States. The Greeks and Armenians as well as the Christian Arabs recreated their home communities around their respective churches. Most Muslims, including the Turks, looked upon America as a culturally alien land where they had been driven by sheer necessity and where they wanted to stay as little time as possible. Consequently they refused to strike permanent roots, build mosques, and establish their own communities as Muslims. The truth is that they would not know how to do it. At the start of the First World War the Turks’ ethnic identity was just beginning to differentiate itself from their basic Islamic identity and they, therefore, found it difficult to understand how one could be a Turk and a Muslim and live in a predominantly Christian country.

In contrast to the Turks, the Greeks, Armenians and Slavs, who had lived in the Ottoman Empire as ethno-religious communities clustered around their own churches, had no difficulty in recreating their native communal structure around their transplanted religion. The history of the Orthodox churches in the United States, most of which are also “national” institutions, goes hand in hand with the history of the ethnic groups they serve. The relative power and influence of the Greeks in America is due to the crucial role played by the Greek Archdiocese of America, a powerful cultural-political institution and the chief tool and symbol of Hellenism and Greek nationalism. The Greek Orthodox Church also acts as a true American institution and is part of the Council of Churches of the United States. The fact that the United States Constitution allowed all religious groups freedom to practice their faith apparently was never explained to the Turks.

Indeed, the Turks lacked an enlightened leadership who under-

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<sup>18</sup> Ahmed, *Immigrant Experience*, p. 33.

stood the spiritual and cultural needs of their people and could explain to the immigrants the laws of the country in which they lived. The mass-elite division of the Turks was their worst enemy, for the elite looked down upon their own lower classes as ignorant beasts of exploitation rather than as kin to be helped. Members of the Ottoman intelligentsia, like many modernist Turks, were trained to serve not their people and society but the state and thus were unable to establish their own viable, independent ethnic community. Lacking a communal foundation to provide continuity, each wave of immigrants had to start anew the process of adjustment to the unfamiliar environment but ultimately abandoned its efforts, either by returning home or by disappearing within American society. The Turks did not even have their own cemetery in Peabody; they were buried in a special spot in the Cedar Grove cemetery beginning in 1917, when fifty-one Turks, most of whom died of tuberculosis, were buried there.<sup>19</sup>

### *Turkish Immigration After World War I*

The immigration from Turkey to the United States and Canada after World War I was the product of two conflicting trends. First, Turkey developed as a national state after 1923; consequently emigration to and from Turkey was defined in ethnic terms rather than by imperial labels. In fact, during the first three decades after independence, Turkey sought to attract immigrants who identified themselves with the Turks' Ottoman-Muslim past. Because Turkishness thus was an identity defined by history and culture, not race,<sup>20</sup> most of the Muslim Bosnians, Albanians, Pomaks, Vlachs, etc. who had suffered discrimination in the Balkans moved to and settled in Turkey.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 83.

<sup>20</sup> As mentioned previously, the Turkish government encouraged the immigration of the Balkan Turks, i.e. Muslims, in order to increase the size of its population. The almost continuous wars with Italy (1911–12) and with the Balkan states (1912), the First World War (1914–18) and the War of Liberation (1919–22) had reduced the population of the country to a bare 11 million. See Gülten Kazgan, "Migration Movements in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic . . .", Commission internationale d'histoire des mouvements sociaux et des structures sociales, *Les Migrations Internationales de la fin du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle à nos jours* (Paris 1980), pp. 616–641; and *fit.* 4.

The few who emigrated to America existed as small, isolated enclaves and eventually melted into other groups, primarily because there was not an established American Turkish community to offer them guidance and perpetuate their ethno-cultural existence.

Second, the non-Muslims remaining in Turkey were deprived of the privileged protection of the Western powers and subjected to the strict jurisdiction of the Republican government according to the terms of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. As a result, many Armenians and Greeks, including Greek inhabitants of İstanbul exempted from the population exchange of 1926, who did not like the equality of the treaty emigrated to America (The emigration of the Jews is different from that of the Armenians and Greeks. The bulk of the *Sephardim* from Edirne and Tekirdağ emigrated earlier to the United States; those from İstanbul followed them later).<sup>21</sup> Because new U.S. immigration laws and the quota system introduced in 1924–26 classified Turkey as an Asian country, it was allotted just about one hundred immigrants per year, a quota filled by non-Turks (Greeks, Armenians, Assyrians, etc.) several years in advance. Moreover, the quota system regarded the country of one's birth rather than the country of residence as the qualification for emigration, so many Greek exchangees and Armenians born in Anatolia, even if residing in Greece or elsewhere, registered as "Turks."<sup>22</sup> In the end, the number of ethnic Turks who benefitted from the quota available to Turkey from 1924 to 1965 was extremely limited.

The real, meaningful Turkish immigration to the United States and, much later, to Canada began after World War II in an unplanned, accidental fashion. The American educational system had been viewed in Turkey as pragmatic and practically oriented, in part because John Dewey had helped reform the Turkish educational system in the 1920s. The political rapprochement between Turkey and the United States that started with the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and the country's inclusion in NATO in 1952 gave a new momentum to the Turks' search for professional specialization in the United

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<sup>21</sup> For some scattered information on Jewish emigration from Turkey to the United States, see Walter F. Weiker, *Ottomans, Turks and the Jewish Polity* (New York 1992), pp. 263 ff. According to Weiker some 7,000 Jews from Turkey emigrated to American between 1920 and 1924.

<sup>22</sup> Stephen P. Ladas, *The Exchanges of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey* (New York 1932); Dimitri Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and Its Impact upon Greece* (Paris-The Hague 1962).

States. Thousands of Turkish doctors, engineers, and other technicians came to America for training, and a number of them stayed on, becoming immigrants. The estimates of this "brain drain" for the years 1948-80 range between ten and twenty-five thousand people. Although a large number of professionals returned to Turkey, a significant number took advantage of the quota system, which gave priority to professionals whose skills were needed in the United States. The same was true for a large number of capable Turkish students who took advanced degrees (M.A.s, Ph.Ds) in various branches of learning and were offered attractive positions in U.S. or Canadian academia, industry, and business management. The number of Turkish students in the United States varied between 800 and 2,000 per year, in Canada between 100 and 300 per year. One may assume that about ten to fifteen percent of the Turkish students obtaining postgraduate degrees stayed permanently in the United States and received the famous "green card"; five years later they could receive U.S. citizenship. Eventually Turkey accepted dual citizenship and revised its old rigid laws concerning compulsory military service. Many of the Turks who had become U.S. citizens and cut off their ties to Turkey then renewed their interest in their old society.

The nucleus of the Turkish diaspora in America and Canada after 1950 was formed by the professional groups of doctors, engineers, and other highly trained individuals. The qualitative difference between these post-World War II immigrants and their Ottoman predecessors was evident in key areas, such as the definition of identity, level of education and income, and social position. The new wave of immigrants not only identified themselves from the beginning as Turks but also defended and promoted the cultural and political aspects of their Turkishness in an open and direct fashion, either individually or as organized groups. Their education and income placed these early professionals turned immigrants at a social level far above both the destitute, largely uneducated and ignored Ottoman immigrants and the average American.

If one takes into consideration the extraordinary stature of the physician in American society, especially in small towns, the socially strategic position of the immigrant Turkish doctor is easily understood, but other individuals succeeded in becoming true civic leaders with lesser professional assets. The history of those who distinguished themselves in their social milieu, relying not on other Turks but on their own ability, is not yet written. A good example, however, is Mr.

Orhan Yirmibeş, whose career this writer has studied. Yirmibeş was born in Bartın, a town in northwest Anatolia, and came to study economics at the University of Wisconsin-Madison in the late forties. He married his schoolmate, a Wisconsin woman, and started a small business renting machinery to American farmers in southeast Wisconsin. Yirmibeş's business prospered where other similar enterprises collapsed, thanks to his managerial skills, engaging manner and friendly personality. He eventually entered and won the mayoral election in Delavan, the prosperous small town where he had his business. There were no other Turks in his town.

Yirmibeş financially helped almost every Turkish cause in the United States and played some role in the election of several congressmen. He took special interest in several Turkish doctors working nearby but was not able to persuade all of them to take a more active part in the public life of either their local communities or a broader Turkish American one. A pathetic example was Dr. A.B., who worked in a small Wisconsin town. He married a local woman and had three daughters. They formed a nice small-town American family, but the doctor never took them to visit Turkey, nor did he teach them Turkish, and so the family developed no interest in the husband's culture. The doctor himself spoke a simple, coarse English and was hardly known in the community, for he never joined or attended meetings of the local Rotary or Lions clubs, and he was critical of everything American. Instead, he listened every night to Turkish news on his shortwave radio and dashed off occasional letters to Turkish newspapers passing judgements on Turkey's problems. One of his letters sent to the president of Turkey even was reprinted in a major daily of İstanbul.

### *The New Turks in America*

Turkish immigration to the United States and Canada underwent another qualitative transformation beginning in the mid-1970s as the result of various unrelated factors, such as the gradual opening of Turkey to the outside world, the rising interest in business, the lack of employment opportunities at home, the proliferation of well-trained professionals (thanks to the growing number of universities), and political-ideological conflicts. During this period the number of legal and, especially, illegal immigrants from Turkey to both the United States



and Canada began to increase steadily. So too did the number of ethnic Turks, born in the USSR and Balkan countries, who took advantage of the protection offered by the United States to people escaping from behind the Iron Curtain. The first large group of such Turks consisted of Crimeans, most of whom settled first in Turkey and Germany; they were followed after 1979 by Uzbeks and some Turkmens from Afghanistan as well as by Turks escaping from Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia. However, the overwhelming majority of Turks who came to America after 1970 still had been born and educated in Turkey and shared the common political culture of the Republic, its values and its identity.

The Turkish immigrants arriving after the mid-seventies consisted mostly of professionals, including engineers, economists, and teachers, whose numbers tended to increase while the number of incoming doctors was decreased by a series of new qualifications requested by American medical authorities. The new Turkish immigrants also included many small businessmen, artisans and skilled workers, as well as unskilled laborers who found employment in a variety of occupations such as construction and building maintenance. A number of these latter immigrants, following the American interest in ethnic cuisines, opened restaurants serving Turkish food. They and the Albanians from the Balkans challenged the Greek monopoly on this type of business although Greeks continued to dominate the market for family restaurants. Madison, a university city with a metropolitan population of about 300,000, has five Greek, six Albanian and four Turkish restaurants, and competition among them has acquired cultural and linguistic overtones; e.g. the Turks changed the Greek "gyro" back to its original name of "döner kebab". The newcomers also have engaged in the import-export business, and in some towns in New Jersey and on Long Island (New York) they control the gas (*benzin*) stations and food markets set up on the premises.

### *The Legal Determinants of Turkish Migration to America*

The Turkish immigration to the United States after World War II was conditioned by American immigration policies, the growing surplus of labor in Turkey, and the vicissitudes of the European labor market. The United States had been a country of free immigration

until Congress passed the Quota Act (1921) and the National Origins Act (1924). The laws allowed Western Europe 82 percent and Southern and Eastern Europe 16 percent of all immigrants permitted to enter the United States in one year, leaving just 2 percent for the rest of the world, for a total of 154,000 immigrants per year. The quota system was maintained in the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (known as the McCarran-Walter Act) and still is the main basis of immigration legislation, although it has been heavily amended since.<sup>23</sup> In 1965, following the civil rights movement and the protests against racism, supposedly embedded in the immigration policies, the Act of 1952 underwent drastic amendments that increased the flow of immigrants from non-European countries. The new act greatly favored the “Asians” but left out the Turks, despite the fact that the new immigration laws classified them as Asian. Meanwhile illegal entries through “ship jumping” by sailors, “frontier crossing without visas,” tourists “overstaying” after visa expiration, etc. also increased.

The relative liberalization of immigration policies was prompted mainly by economic factors. In 1964, America entered a period of massive economic growth which, though interrupted by the Vietnam War and a severe recession in the late seventies, resumed and still continues through 1995. This economic growth, in turn, has revived the tradition that the United States always has been a country of immigration: the total number of people who have immigrated to the United States is estimated to be around 53 million.<sup>24</sup> Nevertheless, the increase in immigration after 1965 caused considerable anxiety in labor circles and among the political right. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, passed in part as a response to these apprehensions, sought to stop and control illegal immigration. It imposed for the first time financial penalties on the employment of illegal aliens but also allowed illegal aliens who had been living and working in the United States since January 1982 to regularize their status and become permanent citizens. The numbers of legal and illegal immigrants from Turkey in the period between 1960 and 1985 was greater than in the period between 1924 and 1950 yet far below the totals of other ethnic groups. (In 1986 alone Mexico sent

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<sup>23</sup> United States immigration history cannot be covered properly in this article. See Charles B. Keely, *U.S. Immigration: A Policy Analysis* (New York 1979).

<sup>24</sup> Leon F. Bouvier and Robert W. Gardner, “Immigration to the U.S.: The Unfinished Story”, *Population Bulletin* 4, n° 4 (November 1986).

67,000 illegal immigrants to the United States; China sent 25,000 and Korea 36,000.)

The Immigration Act of 1990 made the most significant revision of the original immigration acts of 1924 and 1952 and opened the door for higher immigration from Turkey. Passed under pressure from the Irish Immigration Reform Movement and Irish immigrants who had arrived in the United States after 1980, the act was intended both to repair the injustice done to countries that had been disadvantaged by the quota system and the Act of 1965 and to make immigration more responsive to the U.S. need for skilled laborers and farmers.<sup>25</sup> The law maintained the primacy of family unification but cut it down in favor of labor-oriented preferences. It also created a special category of 55,000 "independent" immigrants to be admitted on "points" counted according to education, skills necessary in the United States, age, experience, and ability to speak English; most of this liberalization favored the Irish and the Europeans. The act increased the quota ceiling to 20,000–25,000 per country, but countries such as Turkey were subject to a variety of limitations. One of the most important features of the Act of 1990 was the preference given to employment-based immigration, which benefitted businessmen as well as professionals and others possessing highly technical skills. In addition to establishing several preference categories, the law eliminated some of the old requirements, such as producing evidence of permanent employment and its certification by the U.S. Labor Department that there are no Americans to fill the job offered to the foreigner.<sup>26</sup> Although, under this law, the number of new immigrant physicians is likely to decrease significantly, as American medical schools now seem to be training enough doctors,<sup>27</sup> in 1993 there were 149,525 foreign-born, foreign-trained doctors practicing medicine in the United States; probably about 1,000 to 1,200 of them were Turks.

Turkish migration policy since 1960 has developed in response to

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<sup>25</sup> David M. Reimer, *Still the Golden Door, The Third World Comes to America* (New York 1992).

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 252–263.

<sup>27</sup> New Jersey (which has a large number of Turkish doctors), North Dakota, New York, and Nevada have the largest number of foreign-born and foreign-trained doctors in the United States: 52,9 percent, 41,7 percent, 35,7 percent, and 32,5 percent, respectively, of all doctors working in those states. The *New York Times*, 7 November 1995.

short-range opportunities rather than being based on solid demographic study or cultural and political considerations. In fact, as far as this writer is aware, there is no evidence the Turkish government follows U.S. migration policy or has any experts on it.<sup>28</sup> The first organized emigration from Turkey occurred primarily as a response to European labor-market demands. The first laborers left Turkey in the early 1960s; by 1963 there were only 22,000 Turkish workers in Germany. At the same time, the annual population growth in Turkey reached 2,85 percent, raising for the first time the question of overpopulation. Subsequent five-year development plans (the second and third, 1968 to 1975) began to look upon emigration as a supplement to economic development. After the emigration to Germany proved to be financially and demographically beneficial, the government considered emigration not only as a good measure for coping with surplus labor but also as a source of hard currency.<sup>29</sup> Turkey sent 203,576 workers to Europe in the period 1961–67 and 569,306 in 1967–73; but after the European labor market became saturated, the number of workers going to Europe dropped to only 32,461 between 1973 and 1986. During this latter period Turkey sent 355,019 workers to Arab countries and 21,966 to other countries.<sup>30</sup> For the entire period 1961–86, the total for other countries, presumably including the United States, was a mere 33,277 people out of 1,204,931, most of whom went to Europe.

The developments mentioned in the previous paragraphs played a crucial role in conditioning the Turkish migration to the United States after 1970. First, there was the constantly growing Turkish population throughout the 1960–90 period, when it reached about

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<sup>28</sup> The only piece on U.S. immigration matters that may be of some interest to Turks appeared in *MIM Bulletin* (Fall 1995): 8, 23–24; this publication is the periodical of the Society of Turkish American Architects, Engineers and Scientists, Inc. The writer of the piece, Çiğdem A. Acar, presumably a lawyer, was flooded with calls from Turks wanting to regularize their status.

<sup>29</sup> On the emigration of the Turks to Europe see N. Abadan Unat, *Turkish Workers in Europe, 1960–75* (Leiden 1976); Thomas J. Archdeacon, “Reflections on Immigration to Europe in Light of U.S. Immigration History”, *International Migration Review* 26, n° 2 (Summer 1992), pp. 525–548. I am pleased to convey my thanks to my colleague Professor Archdeacon, who teaches historical demography at the University of Wisconsin, for his help in locating the necessary data.

<sup>30</sup> William J. Serow et al. (eds.), *Handbook on International Migration* (New York-London 1990); see the excellent section on Turkey by A. Barışık, A. Eraydın and A. Gedik, pp. 301–23.

60 million, compared with a mere 20 million in 1945. Second, there was the lack of employment at home. Third, and most important, was the saturation of the European labor markets, manifested in the precipitous drop in the number of Turkish workers going to Europe between 1973 and 1986. One can add to all these push-pull forces a variety of other subjective factors, such as interest in higher standards of living and the social prestige of consumerism, the high inflation rate and the skyrocketing cost of living. All of them put great financial pressure on wage earners and salaried personnel, who became candidates for emigration. As the European labor markets proved unable to absorb the Turkish labor surplus, mainly after 1990, the United States became the chief target for legal and, especially, illegal emigration. Would-be Turkish emigrants are not only peasants but upper, middle and lower class urbanites seeking high economic rewards according to their skills.

*The Number of Turks in the United States and Canada*

A variety of private sources puts the total number of ethnic Turks in the United States and in Canada at between 250 and 300 thousand and between 20 and 40 thousand, respectively, but the numbers given by the statistics of the United States government are substantially lower. These government immigration figures, however, are not fully reliable because they do not list the immigrant's ethnic origin or religion but only the country of birth. A considerable number of Turks were born in foreign countries, in the Balkans and USSR, and so are listed under a rubric different from Turkey, though they consider themselves ethnically Turks. There also are non-Muslims born in Turkey who are listed as "Turks", though in America, they have little to do with ethnic Turks. The measurement of immigration, itself based on registration at the point of entry, is subject to doubt for a variety of technical reasons, among which are the criteria for judging ethnic origin and the lack of universally accepted norms.<sup>31</sup> In addition, arrivals from Turkey include a great number

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<sup>31</sup> Ellen Percy Kraly, "Long Term Immigration to the United States: New Approaches to Measurement", *International Migration Review* 25 (Spring 1991); and "Estimates of Long term Immigration to the United States: Moving U.S. Statistics Toward United Nations Concepts", *Demography* 29 (November 1992): 613-26.

of visitors who are not listed as “immigrants” but who choose to stay permanently in the United States. Nevertheless, the U.S. censuses and statistics indicate that the number of non-permanent visitors (some were students) from Turkey who exceeded their visa terms was extremely low in comparison with those from Eastern Europe, Asia and Latin America: the percentage for non-returning Turkish visitors was a mere 2,4 percent, while it reached 48 percent for Bulgarians, 35 percent for Russians, and equally high rates for those from other countries, especially in Latin America.<sup>32</sup> The official statistics provided by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the main government agency screening the arrival and departure of people to and from the United States, thus present a rather mixed and incomplete numerical picture of Turkish immigration. Generally speaking, the number of Turks emigrating to America in the period 1931–70 was very low because of the low quota for Turkey (100) and Turkey’s own need for people, but emigration increased after the quota system was altered in 1965 and 1990.

*Emigrants Admitted to the United States by Region and Country of Birth:  
Turkey*<sup>33</sup>

1. Ottoman and Turkish Immigrants for the years 1820–1931	415,793
2. Turkish Immigrants for the years 1931–1970	15,524
3. Turkish Immigrants for the years 1971–1980	13,399

Years of Increased Turkish Immigration,  
1981–1993 (Total = 28.061)

Years	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Immigrants	2,766	2,864	2,263	1,793	1,691	1,753	1,596	1,642	2,007	2,468	2,526	2,488	2,204

<sup>32</sup> See ftns. 25 and 30.

<sup>33</sup> This data has been collected from a series of annual reports issued by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service for the years 1950–1994, and from U.S. census documents too numerous to be reproduced in detail here. These are basic reference sources found in any major library.

The total in Line 1 includes Ottoman territories in the Balkans and Middle East and obviously does not provide an accurate estimate for ethnic Turks.

The total Turkish immigration to the United States from 1931 to 1980, that is, for a period of fifty years, was 28,923, an exceptionally low number in comparison to the total number of almost one million legal immigrants who enter the United States annually. Turkey, although considered to be a part of Asia, did not participate in the visibly increased tide of Asian immigrants. The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service's *Statistical Yearbook* for 1984 shows that immigrants from all of Europe for the period 1941–70 accounted for between 33,7 and 60 percent of the total number of immigrants to the United States in any one year; the immigrants from Asia accounted for between 3,1 and 12,9 percent during the same period. But in the years from 1971 to 1985 the European percentage fell to between 11,1 and 17,8 percent of the total, while the Asian percentage rose from 35,3 in 1971–80 to 47,8 in 1980–85, with Korea, the Philippines and Vietnam accounting for 20 percent of this; Asian immigration fell off after 1986. It should be noted that during the same period of about 45 years a total of around 15 million immigrants entered the United States, an increasing number of them, 2,610,707 in all, after the Second World War were refugees and those seeking asylum in the United States. At the same time, the number of those coming from Turkey was low: 752 people in 1982, 42 in 1986, 175 in 1989, 276 in 1990 and 100 in 1991, a total of 6,717 people during the period 1946–81. Moreover, a surprising number of the Turks are accounted for by just one settlement. In 1969, an initial group of 13 Turkish tailors were brought over by the Bond clothing company, whose sources of labor in Europe had dried out. Later this number increased to 300 and, with the addition of their families, they formed a group of about 2,000 people residing in Rochester, New York. There they built a school and a mosque, to establish the first Turkish community in the United States.<sup>34</sup>

In 1991, some 489 Turks went through what is called “conditional status removal” under the marriage fraud amendment of 1986. Put in simple terms, this shows that a large number of illegal immigrants enacted marriages with U.S. citizens in order to obtain permanent resident status on the basis of the preference given to family members. The relatively high number of Turks undergoing “conditional

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<sup>34</sup> Information supplied by Mr. Nureddin Sabuncu, a successful businessman and leader of the community.

status removal” further suggests that the number of illegal immigrants in the Turkish group is very high, as only a few “illegals” ever get caught.

The number of illegal Turkish immigrants to the United States was relatively small between 1960 and 1980 but, as mentioned, has tended to increase steadily since then. Illegal Turkish immigrants to the United States consist of a mixed bag of unskilled laborers and relatively skilled and educated people who seem to be driven by the desire for high income and social position more than by sheer poverty. A random survey by this writer of ten illegal Turkish immigrants living in a small community in New York State indicated that all were literate; six had finished high school (one studied for a year at the university); six had held respectable professional jobs in Turkey and all were working at steady or part-time jobs as salesmen or house painters. Two spoke English relatively well, another four haltingly, and the rest knew only a few words. Four of them had married American women.

The United States Census of 1990, the most comprehensive social survey ever carried out by the U.S. government, places the total number of Turks in the United States at 83,850 people, classified as such according their “ancestry”.<sup>35</sup> (The same census places the number of Greeks at 1,110,373 and Armenians at 308,096.) Obviously the census figure for the Turks is extremely low, primarily because the census was flawed by undercount, cumbersome questionnaires and lack of controls. The census does not cover the years 1990–95, during which more than 35 thousand Turks entered the United States legally or illegally. It should be noted that the number of immigrant Turks returning to their native country, usually after retirement, was relatively high between 1950 and 1980 but seems to have slowed down considerably during in the last five years. It probably has declined from around 15–20 percent of the total of annual entries to just 5–10 percent, for a variety of reasons, including a substantial rise in the number of Turkish and Muslim immigrants to the United States, which had a culturally reassuring impact on Turks. Although some Middle East immigrants from Iran, Iraq and Syria actually are ethnic Turks—Azeri and Turkmen—they are classified

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<sup>35</sup> The census data is stored in a multitude of volumes available in all major U.S. libraries.



as Iranians. As a result, the total gross number of Iranians in the United States in 1980 was 106,389 but increased to over 210,000, thanks to about 104,000 "Iranians" who entered the United States from 1981 to 1987; a considerable number of these "Iranians," probably 20,000, were ethnically Azeri. The overall Muslim immigration to the United States, which was barely 4 percent of the total in 1968, grew to 10.5 percent in 1986,<sup>36</sup> and the total number of Muslims in America is estimated at 3–5 million. In sum, if one takes into consideration legal immigrants from Turkey, the Turkic groups from other countries, illegal immigrants, overstaying visitors, etc., one can place the total number of ethnic Turks in the United States at 185–210 thousand people.

### *Turkish Immigration to Canada*

From 1945 to 1993, more than five million people entered Canada, but because the Canadian and U.S. economies and immigration and emigration between them are tightly interlocked, most Canadian immigrants and emigrants come from or go to the United States. There also are certain differences. For example, immigration in the United States is administered entirely by the federal government, while in Canada it is shared by the federal and provincial governments, notably in Quebec, which has its own policy. Still Canada, like the United States, has been a country of immigration. The Legislative Act of 1976, which provides the basis for regulating immigration,<sup>37</sup> established ten criteria for immigration, such as the needs of labor markets, family reunification, asylum for refugees, distribution of population, etc.<sup>38</sup> Subsequently refugees have become a major source of immigration to Canada; for example, the number of refugees

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<sup>36</sup> Carol L. Stone, "Estimate of Muslims Living in America", in Yvonne Y. Haddad (ed.) *The Muslims of America* (New York 1991), pp. 30–32. The growth of the Muslim communities in the United States has been met occasionally with violent reaction, such as the burning of mosques. The oldest and largest mosque in New England, located in Quincy, Mass., was burned on the first day of Ramadan in 1990.

<sup>37</sup> On Canadian immigration see W.O. Boxhill, *A User's Guide to 1981 Census Data on Place of Birth, Citizenship and Immigration* (Ottawa 1986); H. Howith, *Immigration Levels Planning—The First Decade* (Ottawa 1988); and C. Taylor, *Demography and Immigration in Canada: Challenge and Opportunity* (Ottawa 1987).

<sup>38</sup> Serow, et al., *Handbook*, section on Canada.

seeking immigrant status in 1986 was about 60,000.<sup>39</sup> The flocking of asylum seekers to Canada is due not only to the relatively benevolent Canadian attitude towards refugees, but also to the lengthy procedures—sometimes taking several years—necessary to process the refugee's status. This procedural procrastination has attracted an odd variety of illegal immigrants; in 1986 and 1987 only about 25,000 individuals were cleared for permanent residence although a bill enacted in 1989 speeded up the refugee claims process. As a consequence of all these changes, the flow of immigrants to Canada from regions other than the United States, United Kingdom and Europe during 1987 increased from roughly 5 percent to 25 percent, and this change in favor of the non-Europeans benefitted the Turks, who tend to concentrate as other immigrants do in the provinces of Quebec, Ontario and British Columbia, particularly in the cities of Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver.

The Turkish immigrants to Canada came mainly after the 1970s, either as *bona fide* professionals or as refugees claiming political asylum. Among the latter were Cypriot Turks, who, as members of the Commonwealth, had a slight advantage, Turks who came from Bulgaria after 1984–85, some who claimed to be “Kurds,” and others who invoked political persecution without regard for truth. For instance, at one time an entire village of about 2,000 Turks from western Anatolia landed in Montreal and claimed political asylum; half were sent back after long being cared for by the Canadian government. In additions, a relatively large number of Turks (Turkmen) from Iraq and Azeris from Iran entered Canada after 1990. All these Turks from Bulgaria, Iraq, Iran, and Cyprus, have established their own associations (there are two Turkish Cypriot associations). Including the Turkish Culture and Folklore Society (est. 1976), the oldest Turkish association in Canada, and other bodies, there are altogether fourteen associations that cooperate under the umbrella of the Federation of Canadian Turkish Associations, established in November 1985 and headquartered in Toronto, Ontario. In addition to these civic-cultural associations, the Canadian Turks possess two Turkish mosques, one of which is affiliated with the Islamic “Union” of the

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<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 39. For the purposes of comparison see Rinus Penninx, “A Critical Review of Theory and Practice: The Case of Turkey”, *International Migration Review* 16, n° 4 (Winter 1982): 781–819. For the status of immigrant women see Tahire Koçtürk, *A Matter of Honor—Experiences of Turkish Women Immigrants* (London 1992).

United States, to be mentioned later. Although the total number Turks in Canada is only between 20,000 and 40,000 people, the Turks have been unusually active in the civic and cultural life of Canada as well as in dealing with the media, both to correct misconceptions about Turks and to project accurately Turkey's stand on national and international issues. The social, economic and cultural status of the Canadian Turks is similar to, if not better than, that of Turks living in the United States and will not be studied further.

*The Social, Economic and Cultural Characteristics of the Turks in America*

The Turks in America, according to the U.S. census of 1990, total 83,850 people, but that figure clearly is too low. In any case, most live in urban areas, 34,458 in central cities and 37,737 in urban fringe areas. New York, California, Michigan, New Jersey, Florida, Illinois and Texas account for about 70 percent of the Turks covered by the census of 1990, but Turks are spread among all fifty states of the Union, even Montana and Wyoming, with fifty-two and twenty-eight Turks, respectively. Some 36,964 Turks out of a total sample of 62,012, i.e., roughly fifty-five percent, did not speak English, which is rather high; 55,087 out of a sample of 66,492 spoke their native Turkish, indicating that they are recent arrivals.

The division of the Turks in America into two segments is obvious from their labor composition. On the one hand is a highly educated elite composed of doctors (about 1,000–1,200), engineers (2,000), professors of all kinds (350), and other professionals, and on the other is a group of middle and lower class professionals and workers. Unlike their Ottoman predecessors and the Turkish immigrants in Europe, the majority of Turks now in America belong to the upper and middle classes, although the size of the lower class seems to be growing lately. The 1990 census indicates that out of a sample of 54,087 people, 36,038 were part of the labor force: 7,993 or roughly 18–20 percent were in the professional specialty occupations; 13,508 in managerial and professional jobs; 3,565 in education; 8,571 in sales; 2,700 in health services; and only 161 were in farming and fishing. A total of 553 Turks possessed a doctorate; 1,860 had an M.A.; 3,509 held a B.A.; and 621 had other professional degrees.

The educational and occupational structure of the Turks in the United States places them among the relatively high income groups.

Again according to the U.S. census of 1990, 22,000 Turkish households out of 26,458 were earning between \$15,000 and \$99,999 a year; 1,112 Turks were making over \$100,000. Actually, in view of the Turks' well-known penchant for financial secrecy, the number of those earning over \$100,000 is probably between 3,000 and 5,000. The census placed the median and mean income of the Turks at \$37,095 and \$51,712, respectively, while only 329 families or 5.1 percent earned incomes below the poverty line. A more detailed inquiry among Turks and interviews with representatives of the several major Turkish banks that have opened branches in the United States would yield additional information about the financial situation of the Turks in America, which is better than it appears, especially among the top echelons. For instance, the daily flight of Turkish Airlines (*Türk Hava Yolları*) from New York to İstanbul appears to be always full; THY alone carries an estimated 200,000 people per year to and from the United States, and numerous passengers use other airlines. Moreover, there are several dozen enterprises worth millions of dollars that are owned and managed by Turks as are relatively major corporations such as Aydın Electronics, the missile-making corporation of A. Kafadar, an engineer originally from Gaziantep, A. Erteğün's Atlantic Corporation, and many other lesser enterprises, including computer and software sellers. The same applies to the Canadian Turks, whose overall income level was rather high until the arrival of less-skilled immigrants brought it down.

The organizational structure of the Turks in America is represented by at least three umbrella bodies. (The Turkish-American Society of New York is a semi-official social and civic group; it usually includes representatives from Turkey and acts independently of other associations.) The Assembly of Turkish American Associations located in Washington, D.C., administered by professionals active in various local or regional Turkish associations, is a single, compact organization rather than a true federation. Its main function is to lobby for causes important to the Turks and to conduct studies and surveys associated with their life and culture. It is difficult to appraise its impact, for it operates in a fairly closed circle. The Federation of Turkish-American Associations, located in New York City, is by far the largest umbrella organization and claims to be the Turks' most representative association. It consists of thirty-nine associations, of which five (Turkistan, Crimean, Azerbaijan, Karachai and Cypriot) represent the ethnic Turk or Turkic peoples who immigrated to

America, in most cases after World War II. (The Kazan Tatar Association, although Turkic, has not joined the Federation.) The rest of the associations in the Federation consist of professional and civic groups, such as the Society of Turkish-American Architects, Engineers and Scientists; Turkish Children Foster Care; the Turkish-American Physicians Association; the Turkish Women's League of America, and regional organizations such as the Turkish Society of Rochester, the Turkish-American Cultural Associations of Chicago and Florida, and many others. All areas with major Turkish concentrations, such as California, Michigan, Texas, Pennsylvania, etc., have their own regional associations, some of which are not members of the Federation. The total number of Turkish associations in the United States, including the members of the Federation, is around seventy to eighty. These associations generally publish newsletters, organize social activities, and function as centers of Turkish culture and language and occasionally lobby for Turkish causes.

The third, and in some ways most popular and powerful organization, is the United American Muslims Association or the *Amerikan Müslümanlar Birliği*, which consists of about twelve mosques. This "Union" of the twelve mosques is headed by the central mosque in Brooklyn, which has a school, a library and its own stores and has become a center of Turkish life in New York. The mosques (including one Bosnian mosque) in New York, New Jersey and Canada are considered "Turkish". Eight of the mosques are basically independent; that is, they are administered by the progressive Nakshibandi Süleymancı. The four other mosques are "official," administered by *imams* appointed and paid by the *Diyanet* (Religious Affairs Directorate) in Ankara, a government institution. All the mosques have a substantial membership and following—far greater than the associations'—and could become the nuclei of real American Turkish communities if they adapted themselves fully to the American way of life. Compared to hundreds of other mosques and *mesjids* that have proliferated in America in the last twenty years, the Turkish mosques appear to be modern-minded, socially conscious and active, and to a large extent apolitical. The Union and its mosques are pro-Turkish but cooperate with non-Turkish mosques and support Muslim causes; they are visited occasionally by Muslim dignitaries and Turkish politicians but are systematically shunned by the Turkish diplomatic corps. The Union is a member of the Federation. A recently established fourth organization, the World Turkish Council (*Dünya*

*Türkleri Konseyi*) is a supranational association, but its activities remain undefined.

In addition to these main organizations identified directly with the life and affairs of Turks living in America, there are scores of other groups, including student associations which have limited contact with the former. There are also some academic organizations. For example, the Turkish Studies Association, with about 220 members, is an independent academic organization unrelated to other Turkish associations, and the Institute of Turkish Studies was established as a foundation, with funds donated by the Turkish government, in order to promote the development of Turkish studies in the United States. Now affiliated with Georgetown University, the institute's activities have been greatly impaired for lack of funds; the amount generated by the \$ 3 million endowment for distribution to support Turkish studies in 1995 was approximately \$ 80,000, just enough to pay the annual salary of one professor. Attempts were made in the past to publish Turkish periodicals in the United States—*Yankı* (Echo), *Anavatan* (Fatherland), *Türk Dünyası* (Turkish World)—but the initiatives failed. More recently, two large dailies in Turkey, *Milliyet* and *Türkiye*, have started to publish special editions in the United States, and *Sesimiz* (Our Voice) and *Haber Bülteni* (News Bulletin) are published bi-monthly in Toronto, as is *Bizim Anadolu* (Our Anatolia) in Montreal.

The relative failure of the Turks to develop a truly active intellectual and artistic Turkish life in America, with their own social centers and journals, stems from a variety of causes. First is the relatively low numbers of Turks in America and their failure to concentrate in any meaningful manner in one area. There is hardly a town, village or even neighborhood in America that is predominantly Turkish, except perhaps for that in Rochester. Second is the inability or unwillingness of some Turkish groups to buy a building or buildings on behalf of their respective associations. The Crimean Turks, who bought a building in Brooklyn soon after arriving in the United States and used it as a cultural, educational and civic center and mosque, and the Rochester group, which owns its own premises, are the most active and well-established associations. Finally, there is the constant and pervasive cultural and political dependence on Turkey and everything Turkish—ranging from food, which is natural, to values—that prevents the full adjustment to the United States. Many Turks seem incapable of being bi-cultural or culturally pluralist. Instead they have developed an almost stubborn defiance that

condemns American attitudes, values, and ways of life without bothering to understand what they mean. Many first-generation Turks remain alien to America while becoming de-Turkified culturally and linguistically; the Turkish identity of the second and third generation thus remains a formal label void of national substance. The children born to such immigrant parents often grow up without feeling much affinity for, or even interest in, the culture of their parents, largely because the parents, their flag-waving notwithstanding, lack the very Turkish culture they seek to transmit to their children. In the Turks' case, parents and children are separated not only by a generation gap but also by a true failure of communication. Parents force themselves to retain their "national culture" without explaining and making it relevant and meaningful to children exposed to American life.

In sum, Turks in America have failed to create a truly living, authentic American Turkish community. A large part of the cultural and linguistic discontinuity between parents and children and the lack of a truly Turkish socio-cultural core, which could act as the center of Turkish life in the United States, are due to the lack of a true community of American Turks. In other words, there is no community in which Turkish and American cultures and identities coexist with and supplement each other.

Most of the early Ottoman Muslim-Turkish immigrants regarded America as a "foreign" land because of its predominant Christian faith. They, therefore, regarded their stay in the United States as temporary, just long enough to accumulate some money and then return home to preserve intact their original Turkish (Islamic) identity, culture and personality. That mentality has survived to this day, except that the "religious" entity it wanted to preserve has become "national" without much change of its essence. Today it is quite obvious that a large number of Turkey living in the United States and Canada will never return permanently to Turkey yet they adamantly refuse to adapt fully to the new continent's ways of life. Rather, the conservative families fear that their daughters will become the victims of the "immorality" and sexual permissiveness they see on television. Basically modern Turkish culture, despite the extraordinary impact of western influences, is defensive in nature; it accepts the material culture of the West but rejects its multisided spiritual-cultural aspects in order to oppose "assimilation", which is seen as a form of religious conversion. Turkishness in America thus is reduced to an ethnic and political label without any cultural, spiritual and

ethical content. The overwhelming majority of Turks are congenial, friendly, and warm individuals, but they remain incapable of turning their personal geniality, inherited from an era in which Turks lived a balanced material and spiritual existence, into a living communal asset. A misunderstood "secularism" has emptied many Turks of the spiritual dimension of human existence.

Another key factor that has impeded the emergence of a true Turkish American community is the paternalistic role played by the Turkish government in the United States. It exerts a high degree of influence over the American Turks and, perhaps unwittingly, becomes involved in their affairs. Nevertheless, the government has provided the minimum necessary means to create and maintain some form of Turkish communal activity, for the *Türk Evi* (House of the Turks) in New York, owned by the Turkish government, is the center of key Turkish activities in the United States. In the end, a Turk either accepts to work within the existing organizational framework and obey its unwritten rules or is bound to remain outside the establishment, partly at least, ostracized, ignored, and alienated from the rest.

This survey, the first of its kind, has outlined some of the major aspects of Turkish life in the United States and Canada and should be followed by other more comprehensive works. What are needed are courageous, honest, profound and forward-looking studies of the Turks' American diaspora.



## THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF THE MUSLIMS OF THE BALKANS\*

### *Historical Background*<sup>1</sup>

Muslims of the Balkans are among the first and may even be the only Islamic group that has formally acquired the status of a minority through international treaties and has lived as such under non-Islamic authority. Their change in status—from that of group formerly associated with the ruling authority to that of a minority—was enshrined in the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. The Balkan Muslims were not the only ones to be ruled by non-Muslims. The Crimea and the Bucak (Budjak) fell to Russia in 1783 and 1812, respectively. Muslims from these regions were neither recognized as minorities nor endowed with rights as such. Actually, the Nogais and Turks of the Bucak were ousted in 1812 while the Crimeans were exiled to Central Asia in 1944 (the latter are currently trying to return to their homeland). Whereas the history and status of the Crimea and the Bucak had their distinct peculiarities, the Balkans evolved in intimate association with the Ottoman state and later with the Turkish republic. In fact, Turkey played, and continues to play, a major identity-giving role in the life of the Balkan Muslims. This state of affairs, which has few parallels in history, produced a number of political consequences.

None of the great Muslim states or their successors played a role similar to Turkey's in protecting its former subjects more than a century after their legal and political bonds had been severed. Yet, despite this protection, the Muslims in the Balkans, culturally, politically

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\* This article was written before the outbreak of the war in Bosnia.

<sup>1</sup> For the historical background and an extensive bibliography see Alexandre Popovic, *L'Islam Balkanique, Les Musulmans du Sud-est Européen dans la Période post-Ottoman*, Berlin 1986; Richard V. Weeks, *Muslim Peoples, A World Ethnographic Survey*, Westport, CT 1978; William G. Lockwood, *European Moslems, Economy and Ethnicity in Western Bosnia*, New York 1975; Bernard Lewis and B. Braude (eds.), *Christians and Muslims in the Ottoman Empire*, 2 vols., New York 1982; Peter Sugar, *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354–1804*, Seattle-London 1977; Pedro Ramet (ed.), *Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics*, London 1989.

and economically faced a far worse situation than the Muslims under English and French rule, or under the rule of a nation with a European orientation. All the Muslims in the Balkans and those who lived north of the Danube in Hungary, Wallachia, and Moldavia until the nineteenth century, considered themselves Ottoman subjects regardless of their ethnic and linguistic origin. Indeed, although the Balkan Muslims belonged to three major and several minor linguistic and ethnic groups, politically they regarded themselves as belonging to a single Muslim nation.<sup>2</sup> After the middle of the nineteenth century the Ottoman government began to classify the Balkan Christians according to their ethnic and linguistic origin, but as far as Muslims were concerned it continued to view them as a monolithic cultural group.<sup>3</sup> This principle was preserved in the twentieth century both by the Young Turks and Republican Turkey, despite the national Turkish character assumed by the state.

There was an obvious paradox in this situation. The early republican governments in Turkey proclaimed themselves secular and national and gave preference to everything Turkish. Yet, they did not hesitate at all to admit into Turkey a variety of Muslims from the Balkans who had a different ethnic origin and language and did not even speak Turkish. The explanation of this paradox did not lie in Turkey's need of additional population as had been the case in the 1920s and 1930s after some 40 percent of the Anatolian male population between the ages 18–40 had perished in 1911–1922 either on various war fronts or in the civil strife of East Anatolia. Rather, the explanation lay in the fact that notwithstanding the leaders' denunciation of the Turkish sultans and the Ottoman past, Turkey had to submit to historical and cultural forces beyond its control and act as the sole true heir of the Ottoman state, despite the leaders' decision to ignore the Ottoman past.

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<sup>2</sup> Kemal H. Karpat, 'The Ottoman Ethnic and Confessional Legacy in the Middle East,' in M.J. Esman and I. Rabinovich (eds.), *Ethnicity, Pluralism and the State in the Middle East*, Ithaca, NY 1988, pp. 35–54.

<sup>3</sup> The Balkan Muslims appear simultaneously both as a national and as a religious minority which is unique to them and to the Jews. In fact, in the Balkans it is impossible to define the nationality of a person without indicating his/her faith as a Muslim. The term Bosnian Muslim today defines both a nationality and a religious affiliation. The term Croatian Muslim or Serbian Muslim given by the Croats and Serbs to the Bosnian Muslims has no significance whatsoever for the latter, as they do not accept such a term, except for reasons of expediency.

The republican governments in Turkey regarded the former Ottoman-Muslim subjects and their descendants in the Balkans as fully entitled to settle in Turkey and enjoy the rights of native Turks. The Balkan Muslim immigrants were occasionally discriminated against either by the fascists, who questioned their Turkish racial purity, whatever that meant, or by the religious conservatives who often regarded their lack of bigotry and the freedom enjoyed by Balkan Muslim women as deviations from the faith. This behavior was the exception rather than the rule.

The Turkish government's liberal immigration policy towards the Balkan Muslims sometimes encouraged many nationalist governments in the peninsula to use subtle means but mostly force to root out their Muslim citizens. The Balkan states seemed to fear a Turkish political resurgence despite Turkey's reassuring policies. The fact is that until recently Turkey failed to defend the Balkan Muslims' basic rights and freedoms, lest it be accused of irredentism and 'neo-Ottomanism' (the word was coined by the Greeks after Turkey landed troops in Cyprus in 1974). This passive attitude encouraged many Balkan governments to mistreat their Muslims, especially the ethnic Turks even though the rights of the victims were enshrined in various international treaties.

History shows that Turks were intimately associated with the fate of Islam and Muslims in the Balkans. Although after the Second World War some non-Turkish peoples, notably the Arabs, showed a sudden interest in the Balkan Muslims, still their fate seem to revolve mainly around Turkey and Turks.

The first Muslim settlers in the Balkans were overwhelmingly of Turkish origin. The first significant group arrived in the Balkans in the thirteenth century, even though a few might have come as early as the tenth and eleventh. The thirteenth-century settlers were the followers of Izzedin Keykaus and of Saltuk Baba, his supporter. After Keykaus rebelled unsuccessfully ca. 1261–62 against the Mongols, he and the Turkmen headed by Saltuk took refuge in the Byzantine Empire and were settled along the Black Sea coast in an area extending roughly from Varna to Babadağ in Dobruca.<sup>4</sup> Some of Keykaus's

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<sup>4</sup> On these issues see Kemal Karpat, 'Gagauzların Tarihi Menşei Üzerine ve Folklorundan Parçalar' in *First International Congress of Folklore*, Ankara 1975, pp. 163 ff. (Turkish).

people (according to some chronicles Saltuk tribesmen had 12,000 *çadır* or tents) went to Crimea but ca. 1280, they returned to Dobruca (Dobrudja). A few years later, those settled around Varna became Christians but preserved their pure Anatolian Oguz dialect.

Those in northeast Bulgaria and northern Dobruca remained Muslim. Saltuk Baba's tomb in the town of Babadağ was for centuries a place of worship for Muslims and was visited by the Ottoman sultans on their way to and return from campaigns in the Bucak, Moldavia and Poland.

The largest and most lasting Muslim settlement in the Balkans took place beginning in the second half of the fourteenth century almost immediately after the conquest of the three Bulgarian principalities whose native population had declined to insignificance due to internecine dynastic struggles. Present-day Bulgaria became the major area of Turkish settlement, followed by Thrace and Macedonia. The record of these Ottoman Turkish Muslim settlements is preserved in the minutest detail.<sup>5</sup> It is known that some of these settlements were originally a place of exile for the unruly tribes, but most were the result of inducements offered to would-be settlers by religious institutions such as *vakıfs*, *zaviyes tekkes*, and *imarets*.<sup>6</sup> The mystic Sufi leaders (colonizing dervishes) also played a leading role in the settlement.

There is absolutely no doubt about the Turkish origin or Muslim faith of these early settlers. Some were also Crimeans: the Akta group

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<sup>5</sup> İlhan Şahin et al., 'Turkish Settlements in Rumelia (Bulgaria) in the 15th and 16th Centuries: Town and Village Population,' in Kemal H. Karpat (ed.), *The Turks of Bulgaria*, İstanbul 1990, pp. 22 ff.

<sup>6</sup> The first mass settlement took place in 1357 and was followed by others. The Yörüks (nomadic tribes who upon settlement became known as Turkmen) of Menemen were deported to Filibe (Philippopolis, today's Plovdiv) as were the İsfendiarioğlu (of Kastamonu and Sinop). The *defters* show that by the beginning of the sixteenth century the Muslim population in Sofia, Filibe, Eski Zağra, etc. was 80–90 percent Muslim. By 1570, the Muslim population in the Şumnu-Silistre-Razgrad region increased by 300 percent, much of which was due to migration. A substantial number of the migrants appear to have been town dwellers in Anatolia and practiced a variety of crafts and trades. According to the Ottoman population survey the countryside of Silistre was inhabited by 12,000 Muslims along with 5,000 Yörüks and 3–4,000 non-Muslims. The names of the village and even town settlements were either of Anatolian origin or more likely the name of the dervish (Umar Faki, Hacı Salı, etc.) who led the community. A similar pattern of Muslim settlement took place along the Aegean coast and Macedonia. Settlement was rather scanty north of the Sava River and south of Janina in Greece.

was settled around Filibe (Plovdiv) ca. 1398, after it lost the struggle for power in the peninsula.

The second largest group of Muslims in the Balkans consisted of converts, mostly Bosnians and Albanians. They converted voluntarily *en masse* in the fifteenth century after Mehmet II (1451–81) firmly established Ottoman rule in Bosnia and Albania and offered the leaders certain inducements, such as the preservation of their estates. The Albanian conversion was protracted and checkered after İskender (Alexander Castriotis) beg recanted and with Papal help fought the Ottomans until his death in 1467. The Bosnian conversion occurred ca. 1463 after Mehmet defeated the last native king. The other smaller groups that converted to Islam included Greeks from Morea (Peloponnešus), Crete and Thessaly, small groups of Vlachs, Serbians and Bulgarians (Pomaks) and Gypsies.

The overwhelming majority of the converts preserved their native languages, especially in villages and small towns. Linguistic Turkification occurred only among the educated, that is, among those who joined the Ottoman bureaucracy and the religious establishment or settled in towns and villages with an overwhelmingly Turkish-speaking population. The Balkan Muslims occupied important positions in the Ottoman bureaucracy and institutions, probably far more than their number would warrant. For instance, two of the most prominent *vezirs* in Ottoman history, such Mehmet Sokollu and Mehmet Köprülü were of Serbian and Albanian stock, respectively. Ethnic awareness as well as knowledge of the native language was common among the non-Turks who fought in the Ottoman army or worked in İstanbul. The leader of the first Ottoman urban revolt of 1730, Patrona Halil, was a Bosnian who received wide support from his countrymen working in İstanbul. After the revolt, many of his followers fled back to Bosnia and were captured only after considerable difficulty.

Islam found relatively wide acceptance in the Balkans not only because it was the religion of the rulers, but also for ideological and social reasons. The competition between the Roman Catholic church and Orthodox Byzantium for domination of the Balkans left no alternative for some ethno-religious groups, such as the Bogomils, but to seek security in Islam which permitted them to maintain their cultural identity. The Sufi orders became widespread in the Balkans because their broad humanistic and liberal religious attitudes allowed the new converts to practice their old rites and rituals. The Halveti,

Naqshbandi, Kadiri, Bektashi (to which the janissaries belonged), Bedreddini, Mevlevi orders, just to mention a few, included almost the entire Balkan rural and urban Muslim population.

The intimate association of the Balkan Muslims with the Ottoman government and state was due first to the unique Ottoman political culture which emerged first in the Balkans and shaped the Muslims' personality and identity. This culture was an amalgam of religious and political beliefs and practices which accommodated themselves to the believers' underlying tribal and ethnic structure while superseding them. It is unnecessary to dwell on the fact that the Ottoman state was first established in the western extremity of Anatolia, but grew and became a world power in the Balkans in the late fourteenth century before it began to expand into eastern Anatolia, and the Middle East early in the sixteenth century. Thus, it was quite natural for the Balkan Muslims to consider the Ottoman state as 'their own' rather than as an alien invader as some Christians did. Thus, by the middle of the nineteenth century the terms 'Turk' and 'Muslim' in the Balkans had become synonymous. It was not unusual for a Serbian or a Croatian Christian to call a Bosnian Muslim a Turk, although the latter shared the same ethnic origin, language and literature as the Christian. This apparent confusion was not a confusion at all, because in the relations between the Christians and Muslims, religion had become synonymous with nationality. But among Christians, ethnicity and religion were already becoming differentiated.

In sum, the Muslims of the Balkans considered themselves an organic part of the Ottoman state. The term *Rumelili* (Rumelian Turk) had only a geographical connotation until the Balkan war of 1912, when it began to acquire a certain cultural and political significance. Thus, the Balkan Muslims, whether Turks or converts, had become an integral part of the Ottoman Muslim *millet* or nation even though it did not exist formally.

### *The Acquisition of Minority Status*

The change in the legal and political status of the Balkan Muslims was a direct consequence of the military and political shifts in central and southeast Europe. This change was associated directly, first, with the loss of Ottoman territory to the Hapsburg Empire (less so

to Russia) and the rise of Balkan national states throughout the nineteenth century. There are two distinct phases in the status change of the Balkan Muslims. The first phase began after the Ottoman defeat at Vienna in 1693 and lasted with ups and downs until 1877. The second phase began with the Ottoman-Russian war of 1877–1878 and the San Stefano and Berlin Treaties of 1878. The Balkan wars of 1912–1913 completed the process which began in 1877 by eliminating the Ottoman military and political hold on most of the Balkan peninsula, and by transforming the Muslims from a dominant group associated with the ruling authority into a minority ruled by the sultan's former Christian subjects. The architect of the new Balkan political constellation was Russia, whose major objective was to eliminate the Ottoman presence in the area and substitute it with proxies of its own. It wanted first to create a satellite state, that is, Bulgaria, which would be used to advance Russian interests in the region. It also desired to weaken the Ottoman military and economic power and thus undermine potential Ottoman support for the Muslims of Crimea, the Caucasus and the newly-conquered areas in Central Asia. The history of the Balkan Muslims as a group dominated by an alien non-Muslim powers (which claimed to have historical rights over the land) began after 1877–78.

After 1878, most of the Balkan provinces of the Ottoman state became independent states.<sup>7</sup> (Greece had gained independence in 1830, its northern boundary at that time was a short distance from Athens. In 1881 it added Thessaly to its territory.) Serbia, which had been autonomous since 1815, gained full independence as did Romania and Montenegro. Bulgaria, too, gained full autonomy and in 1885 annexed Eastern Rumelia, which was under Ottoman rule. (Bulgaria later occupied nine Ottoman districts in the Rhodope area where Muslims were a majority of ca. 92 percent,<sup>8</sup> thus, further increasing the number of Muslims in Bulgaria). Bosnia and Herzegovina were occupied by Austria. The Ottoman state retained Macedonia and Thrace where Muslims had a slight majority. A final

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<sup>7</sup> W.N. Medlicott, *The Congress of Berlin and After*, London 1938; Richard Millman (ed.), *Britain and the Eastern Question 1875–1878*, London 1979. For a study of Balkan nationalism from an Ottoman-Turkish perspective, see Kemal H. Karpat, 'The Balkan National States and Nationalism: Image and Reality,' *Quaderni Storici* 84 (December 1993): 679–718 (Italian).

<sup>8</sup> Bilal N. Şimşir, 'Turkish Minority in Bulgaria,' in Karpat (ed.), *Turks of Bulgaria*, p. 161.

division of these Muslim-inhabited territories including Kosovo occurred in the war of 1912–1913; Macedonia and Thrace were divided among Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece; Montenegro expanded to border Serbia, while Romania occupied southern Dobruca where the Muslims were a majority. Throughout the period from 1877 to 1914 large sections of the Muslim population were uprooted and forced to migrate to Turkey. Although on a reduced scale, this process continues until today.

The change in the Muslims' status from a majority in the heartland of the Balkans into a minority ruled by the newly constituted states did not occur without resistance. The study of these resistance movements would reveal a little known fact of Balkan history, namely that in 1878–79 there was an insurrection in the Rhodoppe mountains which was quelled only after the sultan personally asked the rebels to lay down their arms. A Muslim independence movement in Thrace which started ca. 1911 established its authority and maintained it on sizeable territory until the early 1920s. The popular resistance movement in Bosnia led by religious leaders delayed the Austrian occupation of the area for three months.<sup>9</sup> The resistance movement in Albania (connected with the Bosnian uprising) known as the League of Prizren ultimately succeeded in creating an independent Albania in 1912, in large measure to prevent Belgrade from occupying these lands where the number of Serbians was less than 10 percent. (The Kosovo region occupied by Serbia despite every effort by Belgrade still had an Albanian Muslim majority of 90 percent in mid-1991.)

The rights and freedoms of the Muslims ruled by the new Balkan governments were defined in the Treaty of Berlin (1878) in exact terms each time before or after the boundaries of every new Balkan state were delineated. The relevant passage (taken from the section dealing with Bulgaria) states:

The difference of faith and confessions cannot be used against anybody as a reason of exclusion or incapacitation in the exercise of civil and political rights, in the admission to public employment, functions

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<sup>9</sup> Kemal H. Karpat, 'Ottoman Attitudes Towards the Resistance of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austrian Occupation in 1878,' in *Posebus Izdona*, Sarajevo 1979, pp. 147–73; and Abdürrahim Dede, *Balkanlarda Türk İstiklal Hareketleri*, Istanbul 1978 (Turkish).



and honors or in the exercise of various professions and occupations in any locality. The freedom to believe, and to practice openly all religions belong to the inhabitants of Bulgaria as well as to foreigners and no impediment can be placed either to the hierarchical organization of various communities or to their relations with their spiritual leaders (Art. 5).

Art. 27 applies to Montenegro, Art. 35 to Serbia and Art. 44 to Romania. However, there were no provisions concerning the religious rights of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina occupied by Austria, although details were discussed later with the Porte. The Muslims in these provinces enjoyed extensive religious freedoms, in sharp contrast with the restrictions imposed by Serbians and Bulgarians.<sup>10</sup>

Neither did the treaty include any provision concerning the rights of the Muslims in the provinces of Kars, Ardahan and Batum which were ceded to Russia. Art. 12, dealing with Bulgaria, ordered the establishment of a Turkish-Bulgarian commission 'to regulate in two years all the issues concerning the mode of transfer, exploitation and use for the Porte's account the properties of the State, the pious foundation (*vacoufs*) as well as questions related to the interests of the private individuals involved.' This provision, which dealt basically with the economic foundations of the Muslim culture, was of fundamental historical importance. The reports of Nihat Paşa, who was appointed Ottoman representative on the property settlement commission, pointed out that the Bulgarians, similar to the Serbians and Montenegrans, paid little attention to their treaty obligations. The Muslims in these three countries were subjected to discrimination and oppression that forced a large number to immigrate to Turkey.<sup>11</sup>

The only relative exception was Romania which entered the war of 1877 under Russian pressure, but lost the provinces in southern Bessarabia and proposed an anti-Russian alliance to the Porte. In exchange for southern Bessarabia, Romania received a large section of Dobruca where the Romanians remained a minority well into the 1920s. (Romania had never claimed Dobruca and never planned to get it, but took it as compensation for the loss of Bessarabia which

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<sup>10</sup> See Robert J. Donia, *Islam Under the Double Eagle. The Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1878-1914*, Boulder, CO 1981.

<sup>11</sup> On migration and population figures see Kemal H. Karpat, *The Ottoman Population, 1830-1914*, vol. 1, Madison, WI 1985.

the Romanians considered an integral part of their land.)<sup>12</sup> Significantly, the Romanian king, Carol I of Hohenzollern, addressed the inhabitants of Dobruca as follows: 'The great European powers through the Treaty of Berlin have united your country with Romania. We are not entering your country whose frontiers have been fixed by Europe as conquerors.' He went on to say that this was a kind of reward for Romania's having liberated the Danube's right bank. He then promised the Muslims full respect for their faith and family similar to the rights accorded to the Christians, and vowed to give the *müfti* full authority to deal with Muslim religious and cultural affairs. Indeed, eventually *müftis* and *kadis* were appointed to look after Muslim affairs and a *medrese* opened in Babadağ to train Muslim teachers and *imams*. To an extent, Romania kept its promise and abided by the provisions of the Berlin treaty, but Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and Greece consistently violated the treaty provisions concerning Muslim rights and freedoms. The status of the Muslims in Bulgaria became subject to several treaties between the Turkish and Bulgarian governments: the term 'Muslim' was replaced by that of 'Turk.'<sup>13</sup> A convention and protocol signed by the Ottoman and Bulgarian governments in 1909 promised to give the Turks all the civil and religious rights enjoyed by other ethnic groups and by Bulgarians. Another treaty signed in September 1913 reiterated the rights of the Muslims and the responsibilities and duties of the *müfti*. The Neuilly Treaty (to which Turkey was not a signatory) included a series of provisions concerning the rights of the minorities. A far more extensive and basic agreement was signed in 1925 which is still in force. It redefined all the rights and freedoms granted by the previous agreements and added new ones. Finally in 1968, a new treaty regulated the emigration of the Muslims from Bulgaria to Turkey. Similar agreements were signed with Romania and Yugoslavia. The effect of these treaties on safeguarding the Muslims' rights was limited.

The fiercely militant nationalistic Balkan elites who compared their low standard of living with that in Western Europe blamed their

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<sup>12</sup> Charles and Barbara Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States 1804–1920*, Seattle-London 1977.

<sup>13</sup> On Bulgaria, see Richard J. Crampton, *Bulgaria, 1878–1918, A History*, New York 1983, and Kemal H. Karpat (ed.), *The Turks of Bulgaria, the History, Culture and Political Fate of a Minority*, İstanbul 1990.

backwardness on the 'Turks' and their '500 years of oppression.' They now viewed the multiethnic and multireligious Ottoman state as a 'national Turkish state' and made it the scapegoat for all their national frustrations and disillusionment. Religious differences became the basis of Balkan nationalism. Whereas in the past the Christians had viewed the sultan as a merciful, just and impartial master, now their new leaders portrayed him as a corrupt, intolerant, oppressive and cruel Muslim despot who had used his coreligionists to oppress the Christians. Nobody asked how all the Balkan ethnic and linguistic groups had survived and thrived for 500 years under such an intolerant ruler. In the eyes of the Bulgarians, Serbs and Greeks (Romania, which owed its national existence to Ottoman protection against Poland and Russia, was less strident) the Balkan Muslims became the accomplices of Turkish 'tyranny' and 'injustice.' It was common for the new rulers of Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece to call the Turks 'interlopers,' 'foreign invaders' and a variety of other names in order to justify their own mistreatment of their Muslim minorities, whom they now considered to have been the tool of the Turks.

The Balkan Muslims responded to the change in their status and the oppressive psychological atmosphere either by immigrating to Turkey or by adjusting to the new conditions. The official Ottoman statistics indicate that a large number of Muslims from Bulgaria, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Greece and Serbia (in the latter, the Muslim community was small because of earlier departures) emigrated and settled in the Ottoman state. A total of 1.5 million emigrants left the Balkans in 1878–1918, according to official Ottoman statistics which did not include a large number of people who had successfully infiltrated through the Ottoman and Turkish borders.<sup>14</sup>

#### *The Number and Geographical Distribution of Balkan Muslims*

As of June 1991, there were about 10–11 million Muslims in the Balkans, or about 18 percent of the total population. They were concentrated in Albania, where they constituted about 70 percent of a population of 3.6 million. Albanian Muslims are not included in this study, because since the establishment of Albania as an independent

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<sup>14</sup> Karpat, *The Ottoman Population*, ch. 4.

state in 1912 the Muslims have always been in the majority. Although in 1967 Enver Hoxha declared Albania to be an atheistic state and banned Muslim and Christian religious practice, the main part of the population remains culturally Muslims.

The largest concentration of Muslims, ca. 4.5 million, was in Yugoslavia. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Muslims constituted 44 percent or ca. 1.8 million of the population, while in the Kosovo province they numbered 1.7 million (89 percent of the total population). Muslim groups were also found in Macedonia, where the ethnic Turkish population dwindled to only ca. 100,000 from the majority status it held as late as 1913, and in the Sanjak, where they numbered ca. 250,000 souls. In addition, small Muslim enclaves were also found in Montenegro and Croatia, most of them small businessmen and immigrants from Bosnia and Macedonia. The total in these latter areas including Macedonia was slightly over one million.

The Balkan country with the second largest Muslim population was Bulgaria: from 1.4–3 million. The official Bulgarian statistics after the Second World War have used language, not religion, as a classification criterion, largely in order to minimize the minority issue, whereby the Turks appear as an ethnic minority of ca. 650,000 people. In addition to grossly understating the number of Turks, the official statistics ignored the Pomaks (Slavic-speaking Muslims) and the Gypsies. But after the change of regime a Bulgarian official stated that there were 1.3 million Muslims, which is nearly double the number previously given. Some scholars have placed the number of Muslims in Bulgaria at around 2–3 million, or nearly 30 percent of the population, which may be an exaggeration. In any case, one fact is certain: the Muslims in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria formed between 15 till 28 percent of the total population.

Two other Balkan states, i.e., Greece and Romania, had relatively small Muslim populations: in Romania 65,000 (according to official statistics) out of a population of 23 million, but some native intellectuals put the figure at 90,000–100,000; in Greece about 120,000. The Romanian Muslims were concentrated in Dobruca; in Greece, in western Thrace, where they were the majority until very recently.

In Bulgaria, Muslims were concentrated near the Greek-Turkish border in the Kırçali area of the Rodop mountains, where they were the overwhelming majority, and in the northeast, in Razgrad, Shumen, Silistra, and Tutrakan districts, where they were probably close to, if not actually, a majority.

The overwhelming majority of Balkan Muslims were orthodox, or Sunni, with a few scattered Kızılbaş, *Alevi* or Shiite groups in the Deliorman region.<sup>15</sup>

The concentration of the Muslims in a few areas—some of strategic value—affected the attitude of the Balkan governments. They tended to regard the Muslims as potential sources of trouble, although there was no evidence to justify this suspicion. Thus, the Serbian government accused the Kosovo Albanians of plotting to annex Kosovo to Albania, while the Greek and Bulgarian governments accused their Muslim Turks of wishing to engage in seditious activities, which would provoke retaliation and give Turkey a pretext for intervention as happened in Cyprus.

### *The Balkan Muslims after 1944*

The newly independent Balkan states initially abided by the provisions of the Berlin treaty, although the new governments did not hesitate to encourage the emigration of Muslims through a variety of administrative and economic pressures. Some Muslims emigrated voluntarily, because they found it difficult to adapt to their new status as minorities or because they preferred to live under the authority of the sultan-caliph. Bulgaria openly adopted a discriminatory policy against its Turks after a group of nationalist officers ousted the elected government in the early 1930s and established an authoritarian fascist government. Turkish schools and newspapers were closed and Bulgarian school children were taught to hate the Turks. This hatred became a permanent feature of Bulgarian governments policy toward their Turkish minority.

Actually, the treatment of the Balkan Turks tended to vary in accordance with each Balkan country's relations with Turkey. After the Second World War, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia, which, except for the latter were part of the Soviet bloc and joined the Warsaw Pact, viewed Turkey, a member of NATO, as their worst enemy and treated their Turkish citizens as a potential fifth column. Greece, on the other hand, which was also a member of NATO, adopted a more liberal attitude towards its Turkish-speaking Muslims

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<sup>15</sup> Weeks (under 'Bosnian,' 'Pomaks,' etc.).

until the Cyprus conflict soured its relations with Turkey. The Balkan Muslims suffered the worst persecution under the Marxist regimes, except for those in Yugoslavia, where the federal system and Tito's foreign policy, based as it was on friendship with the Arab countries, provided them with a modicum of protection, despite the efforts of the Serbians to perpetuate their discriminatory policy from 1918–1941 when they controlled the Yugoslav unitary state.<sup>16</sup>

Muslims were persecuted despite the various treaties signed by the Ottoman state and later by Turkey with various Balkan governments. For example, the Bulgarian Muslims were the subject of several treaties between Turkey and Bulgaria, as already pointed out. In 1951–52 Bulgaria, on the advice of Stalin, expelled 152,000 of its citizens of Turkish origin. The purpose was to force Turkey to absorb these refugees and thereby wreck the Turkish economy, because that country was a member of NATO. A Turkish-Bulgarian agreement in 1968 provided for the reunion of families divided by the expulsion of 1951–52.<sup>17</sup> It was only partially implemented, because, paradoxically, Bulgaria forbade the Turks from leaving. Faced with a labor shortage, Bulgaria had started regarding the Turkish minority as an essential pool of labor for building roads and urban dwellings and for developing agriculture. The wages of the Turks remained exceptionally low, especially in agriculture, while the ethnic Bulgarians moved to better paying jobs. Meanwhile, the Muslim birth rate increased to over 3 percent (for a variety of demographic, cultural and political reasons, including the Turks' subconscious effort to survive as an ethnic group). The ethnic Bulgarians' birth rate dropped from about 1.5 percent in 1950 to 0.2 percent in 1980. Consequently in December 1984 Tudor Zivkhov's government decided to solve once and for all the bothersome Turkish-Muslim problem. The regime had already declared that the Macedonians (ca. 168,000) and the Romanians in Timoc valley, the Greeks and other ethnic groups were really ethnic Bulgarians. In defiance of the treaties and international agreements signed since 1878, the Bulgarian government declared that the Bulgarian Turks were actually 'converted Bulgarians' and that they had decided to return to the 'national fold' by adopt-

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<sup>16</sup> Kemal H. Karpat, *An Inquiry into the Social Foundation of Nationalism in the Ottoman State*, Princeton 1973; D. Eickelman and J. Piscatori (eds.), *Muslim Travellers Pilgrimage, Migration and the Religious Imagination*, London 1990.

<sup>17</sup> H.L. Kostanick, *Turkish Resettlement of Bulgarian Turks 1950–1953*, Berkeley 1957.

ing Christian (Bulgarized) names and customs. The Turkish schools were closed, the mosques in most of the country were taken over (the mosque in Sofia was allowed to function in order to delude the Arab diplomats), Muslim cemeteries were destroyed, and the speaking of Turkish prohibited. Protests by the Turks led to riots, which resulted in several hundred fatalities and more than 1,000 persons being interned on Belene Island.<sup>18</sup>

Worldwide condemnation of Bulgaria, the criticism by Amnesty International and Muslim international organizations, such as the Muslim World League, were fruitless. The Soviet Union, despite pleas from various quarters, refused to intervene, on the grounds that what had happened was 'a matter of internal affairs.' In the spring of 1989, the Turks staged a big demonstration in Shumen to protest their forced Bulgarization. The demonstration was put down with great difficulty only after Turks had destroyed several Bulgarian tanks, thus exposing how weak and frightened the ruling Communists were. Subsequent Turkish demonstrations encouraged democratic-minded ethnic Bulgarians to rise and eventually bring down the Zhikov dictatorship. It is interesting to note that two oppressed minorities—the Turks of Bulgaria and the Hungarians of Romania in Timisoara—helped ignite the spark that eventually toppled two of Eastern Europe's worst dictators. However, the Bulgarian overthrow occurred only after Zhikov expelled 350,000 Bulgarians of Turkish descent under the pretext of giving them 'freedom to travel': they were issued passports valid for three months for travel to Turkey. After the collapse of Zivkhov's regime ca. 100,000 Bulgarian Turks returned home and with others there established a political party, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms headed by Ahmed Doğan. The party sent 22 deputies to the National Assembly in 1990 and then 24 in 1991. However, the Bulgarian public, taught to hate the Turks, steadily opposed the equality granted to them. The threat to their rights remained despite the good intentions of the democratic-minded president of Bulgaria, Zhelyu Zhelev. It should be noted that the Pomaks—the Slavic-speaking Muslims—continued to identify with

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<sup>18</sup> See report by Amnesty International, *Bulgaria: Imprisonment of Ethnic Turks*, London 1987; Radio Liberty Bulletin 2, n. 1, January 1986. See also A. Mete Tunçoku, 'The Rights of Minorities in International Law and Treaties: The Case of Turkish Minority in the People's Republic of Bulgaria,' in idem (ed.), *Turks of Bulgaria*, pp. 241–257.

Islam and the Turks, despite government pressures and inducements to declare themselves 'Bulgarians.' Thus, religion proved to be a stronger source of identity than ethnicity or language, indicating that perhaps the framers of the Berlin Treaty were not so wrong in regarding the protection of minority religious freedom as of prime importance.

The Greek Muslims received similar treatment under somewhat different circumstances, which indicated that the Balkan governments tended to adopt the same nationalist policy regardless of the regime in power. The status of the Greek Muslims, most of whom are ethnic Turks, was regulated by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), which is also the international foundation stone of contemporary Turkey, and by other agreements, including the protocol for the exchange of population between Turkey and Greece. According to these agreements, the Turks of western Thrace were to be permitted to remain in their original homes (Komotini, Xanti, etc.) and the Greeks of İstanbul were to remain in that city. The rights of the two groups were spelled out in the most liberal terms and were generally implemented in relatively good faith by both sides. However, after Turkey landed troops in Cyprus in 1974 (to protect the constitutional order on the island as stipulated by the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 signed by Great Britain, Turkey, Greece and Cyprus), the policy of each country toward its minority changed abruptly. Greece, in particular, began to limit the rights of its Turkish minority in defiance of the Lausanne treaty on the grounds, among others, that the Turks of western Thrace would provide a pretext for Turkey to invade. The Greek government raised a series of obstacles to the education of Turks in their mother tongue. Among others, it prohibited the import of textbooks from Turkey and refused to recognize diplomas given by Turkish institutions of higher learning.<sup>19</sup> The government also confiscated Turkish-owned land, resettled large numbers of 'Pontic Greeks' from the USSR in areas inhabited by Turks, imposed heavy and successive fines on Turkish property, and confiscated the passports of Turks who traveled abroad and deprived them of citizenship. Even Amnesty International, which had been critical of Turkey,

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<sup>19</sup> Joell Dalegre, 'La minorité musulmane turcophone de Thrace Occidentale: Système d'enseignement et identité culturelle,' *La Transmission du savoir dans le monde Musulman périphérique*, March 1991, pp. 51–63. See also *Bati Trakyanın Sesi* (Voice of West Thrace, a periodical published in Turkey by Turkish refugees from Greece).



issued a report early in 1991 that sharply criticized Greek violations of Turkish rights. The report criticized the government's lifting of the parliamentary immunity of Sadık Ahmet and his arrest. Dr. Ahmet was eventually released due to the international pressure and was subsequently reelected as an independent deputy. Eventually, reshuffling of election districts deprived the Turks of electoral representation. Meanwhile the Greek-speaking population of İstanbul dwindled from a high 60,000 souls in 1965 to a mere 6,000 in 1993.

Meanwhile, the ca. 20,000 Pomaks in Greece, who had been under Bulgarian rule from 1912–1919 when their area was attached to Greece, declared themselves Turks in open defiance of a government-sponsored campaign to label them as 'Greeks who had converted to Islam.' Following the Bulgarian model, the Greek government gave Pomaks a variety of desirable positions, such as teaching in Turkish areas, and privileges in order to bring them back to the Greek 'fold.' Large numbers of Pomaks emigrated to Turkey.<sup>20</sup>

The situation and treatment of Yugoslav Muslims varied from republic to republic, depending on the size and position of the Muslim population as well as on Yugoslavia's foreign policy. Each of Yugoslavia's three major Muslim groups had its own ethno-political characteristics. The Boshnaks, as the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina called themselves, were in a rather unique position: they formed a plurality of 44 percent in that republic and spoke the same language as the neighboring people of Croatia and Serbia. From 1878–1918, the Bosnians were under the rule of the Hapsburgs, who treated them rather well, even allowing them to engage in political activity.<sup>21</sup> In fact, the Austrians established the office of *reis-ül ulema* (the chief of religious scholars) and considered it the representative of the Muslims. After the First World War Bosnia and Herzegovina became part of the newly constituted state of Yugoslavia, or, to put it more accurately, they were incorporated into what was intended to be greater Serbia, which acted as the spokesman of the southern Slavs. The Yugoslav state was founded on the assumption that ethnic and linguistic affinity among the Slavs was their dominant feature

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<sup>20</sup> This is proven by the flood of publications defending the view that the Pomaks are Greeks. For example, Polys Mylonas, *The Pomaks of Thrace*, Athens 1990; Yannis Magriotis, *The Pomaks of Rodope*, Athens 1990.

<sup>21</sup> The best and most extensive treatment of the Hapsburg rule over the Bosnians is by Robert J. Donia (n. 10).

and was strong enough to bind them together. But the Serbians soon discovered that religious differences were stronger than the idealized ethnic ties. The Slovenes, Croats and Muslims refused to be assimilated into the new political entity, which, contrary to its ethno-secularist pretensions, culturally speaking followed a Serbian Orthodox policy and was closely affiliated with the Serbian Church. In Kosovo, it was the church that disseminated the strongest anti-Albanian propaganda.

The Boshnaks were subjected to various pressures designed to alienate them from their faith and induce them to declare themselves 'Serbians.' The Bosnian Muslims reacted by lending their support to the Croatian political parties, largely as a measure of self-defense against Serbian chauvinism, but they were then subjected to even greater Serbian nationalistic pressure. Although this pressure was strongly resisted by the Bosnian Muslims, it had its effect: it weakened the Boshnaks' memories of their historic ties with the Ottoman state and resulted in the creation of a new Boshnak identity—a national-political identity with a secular dimension that was, nevertheless, rooted in the old Muslim religious identity. Thus, it was neither Serbian nor Croatian but Boshnak, a new national entity which became part of the federal republic of Yugoslavia created after the Second World War.

Although Bosnia continued to be dominated by Belgrade after Marshal Tito became an important figure in the Third World, especially after the Bandung Conference in 1955, and sought to establish better relations with the nationalist-socialist regimes in the Arab world and Asia, the situation of the Yugoslav Muslims, especially those in Bosnia, improved considerably. Sarajevo and Mostar, and their Muslim monuments built during the Ottoman rule became show places which the Yugoslav government used to demonstrate to Islamic missions from the Third World how well it treated its Muslim citizens. Meanwhile, secularist, national ideas increased the Boshnaks' ethnic and linguistic consciousness and their desire to be recognized as a distinct national group, as well as their refusal to identify with the Serbians or the Croats, despite the latter's eagerness to welcome them on the basis of common ethnic and linguistic ties. The Boshnak intellectuals, many of whom were members of the ruling Communist League, claimed that the Boshnaks were a distinct nationality based on religion, their secularist, atheistic philosophy notwithstanding. Consequently in 1971, the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Muslims were officially recognized as being of 'Muslim nationality.'

while other Yugoslav Muslims were described in ethnic terms, such as 'Turk,' 'Albanian,' etc.

After being officially declared a 'nationality' the Boshnaks began to increase their demands for national rights. They demanded freedom of the press, association and education; the right to study and interpret history in their own terms, and greater administrative autonomy. Faced with this burgeoning Bosnian Muslim nationalism, Belgrade decided to deny the Muslims the rights that were implicitly recognized when they were declared a 'Muslim nationality.' Saying that it had uncovered a 'fundamentalist Muslim conspiracy' to overthrow the central government, Belgrade ordered the arrest of 11 Muslims in 1983, closed down several Boshnak publications and appointed a non-Boshnak as *reis-ül İslâm* (formerly *reis-ül ulema*). Until 1983/84 the incumbent had always been a Boshnak. The change showed that the Slavic-speaking Muslims, rather than the Turks, were to represent Islam in Yugoslavia. Those arrested, supposedly headed by Alija İzetbegović who was to become the president of the independent state of Bosnia, were freed in late 1989 after the beginning of political liberalization. The government finally admitted that the Muslim 'fundamentalist conspiracy to establish a government based on the *shariat*' had been a fabrication of the secret service, which was dominated by Serbians.

In the Kosovo region, which was populated by Albanians, national agitation for autonomy had been going on for over a decade. This was basically a political movement aimed at securing administrative, cultural and economic rights for the Muslim majority. The movement had little, if any, religious undertone (despite contrary opinions on this question). The Serbian government reacted by abolishing the region's autonomy, by incorporating it into Serbia, and imposing drastic limitations on the Muslims' civil and human rights. The Serbian government even denied permission to international agencies and visitors to enter the Kosovo region.<sup>22</sup>

The situation in Yugoslavia's third Muslim area, namely Macedonia, was strikingly different from the others because the government adopted a liberal religious and cultural policy toward Muslims, the majority of whom were of Albanian origin. In order to defuse the

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<sup>22</sup> A. Popovic, *Les Musulmans Yugoslaves 1945-1989*, Paris 1991.

Macedonians' strong Albanian nationalist feelings, the Belgrade government tried to increase the appeal of Islam. It built a *medrese* (school to train religious leaders) in Skoplje and permitted the publication of religious literature, while allowing the Muslim *tarikats* (religious confraternities) freedom of activity. At the same time, in order to help counter the Albanian nationalist groups, Belgrade gave the Macedonian Turks (ca. 100,000 remained after ca. 200,000–300,000 were forced to leave in 1951) extensive rights and encouraged them to assert their national rights in every possible form. In sum, therefore, the Muslims of Yugoslavia continued to be pawns of the government's domestic and foreign policies. Their minority rights and freedoms were expanded or restricted depending on the circumstances. The fact that Yugoslavia was dominated by the Serbians with their brand of expansionist-nationalism rendered meaningless the concept of inalienable human rights and freedom.

The Romanian Muslims fared rather well until the advent of the communist regime when, encouraged by Moscow, the government began to restrict Muslim freedoms. From 1878–1947 the Romanian government allowed the Muslims—most of them of Turkish origin—to maintain their cultural and religious institutions. This benevolent attitude was dictated in good part by practical considerations. First, the incorporation of Dobruca into Romania in 1878, in an exchange for southern Bessarabia which was taken by Russia, was a windfall, later claims to historical ownership notwithstanding. Second, the Muslims were in a majority while the Romanian population constituted only 20 percent in 1878. Consequently, Romania needed time to settle ethnic Romanians in Dobruca, while simultaneously forcing the Muslims to immigrate to Turkey. Once the ethnic Romanians became a majority in the 1940s after the Bulgarian inhabitants of north Dobruca were exchanged for Romanian settlers from the south, the policy toward the Muslims changed. Early in the 1950s, the communist regime expropriated the property of the Muslim upper class along with that of other groups, and its leading representatives were interned at Bicaz. The Tatars were then encouraged to declare themselves a nationality, different in language and customs from the Turks, although the two groups had in the past considered themselves to be one community, as indicated by intermarriage, common schools, etc. All the Turkish and Tatar schools, including the teacher (*imam*) training, mid-level seminary at Medjidia were closed. The Romanian government then decided to assimilate all its remaining minorities,

except for the Jews and Germans, who were allowed to emigrate after payment of substantial sums of money, ostensibly to compensate the government for 'expenses' incurred in 'educating' the emigrants. The Muslims, being a small, defenseless minority without capable leaders, became an immediate target of assimilation. The *Securitate* branch in Constanta, Dobruca's main city, was staffed with native informers and administrators. The government used both the carrot—permission to enroll in high-ranking schools (which produced a professional group likely to intermarry with Romanians)—and the stick—harsh penalties for any Muslim effort to maintain their culture and language (to promote assimilation). The government did not close the mosques, but it discouraged attendance and deprived Muslims of leaders by paying the *imams* one-third of the average salary paid to other government employees. Consequently, the number of *imams* had dwindled to only about 20 in 1990. The situation improved only slightly after that.

After the ouster of Nicolae Ceaușescu from power in December 1989, the Muslims began to organize to secure their national rights. They asked for permission to open schools and train their clergy. During the post-December 1989 euphoria, the Muslims were allowed to elect a representative to the parliament and nominated Tahsin Cemil, a historian. However, the *Securitate* (now under a different name) considered the revival of the Muslim community a threat to its assimilationist policy, which remained in effect. Consequently, it decided to split up the Muslims once more, using agents who infiltrated the Muslim community, to launch a campaign to claim the 'rights of the Turks.' A small group of Turks occupied the offices of the *Muftiat* (the religious-cultural spokesman of the Muslims), and accused the Tatars of usurping the offices available to all the Muslims. The leader of the Turkish group, a driver by profession, visited President Ion Iliescu in a hastily arranged appointment and was immediately named 'deputy of the Turks,' thus formally splitting the Muslim community into Turks and Tatars, which left little room for constructive activity.

### *Conclusions*

This paper has highlighted the problem of the civil rights of the Balkan Muslims. The record has been dismal, to say the least. The main reasons were:

- (a) The 'nation,' which became the foundation of the Balkan states, was viewed basically as a confessional and religious community and only secondarily as a secular, ethno-linguistic entity despite lip service paid to the latter concept.
- (b) The Balkan governments sought to create a monolithic nation that left little room for the existence of ethnic linguistic and religious minorities.
- (c) The Muslims were almost totally alien primarily because of religious differences and, in the case of the Turks, because of language and historical ties with Turkey.
- (d) The West tended to ignore the treatment of the Balkan Muslims, despite the oft-repeated pledges of respect for human rights regardless of faith and language, thereby making worthless the international and bilateral treaties and charters designed to protect the Balkan Muslims' civil and human rights.

The Balkan Muslims were loyal to the state in which they lived throughout the past century, in good part because they were Sunnī, who throughout the Ottoman centuries, developed the tradition of obeying the government. Yet, such obedience did not improve their situation.

The solution to the plight of the Muslims and other minorities in the Balkans must be a redefinition of the concept of 'minority' and its rights. Is 'majority' to be defined in ethnic-cultural terms? The concept of 'state' also needs redefinition. Does the state belong to the dominant religious-ethnic majority or to all its citizens?

An international charter granting rights to the Balkan minorities and the establishment of an international body with the authority and power to monitor compliance with the charter, coupled with a change in Western indifference toward the violation of Muslim rights is, in my opinion, an absolute necessity if minority rights are to be secured in the Balkan states.

# THE TURKS OF BULGARIA: THE STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL-RELIGIOUS SURVIVAL OF A MUSLIM MINORITY

## *Introduction*

In May 1989, two series of demonstrations in Turkish villages of northeast Bulgaria was followed by a massive gathering of more than 50,000 Muslim Turks in the town of Shumnu in the same area. The Turks had converged to Shumnu from the surrounding villages and smaller towns in order to protest the forced changes of names and the Bulgarization imposed by the government of Todor Zhivkov, then undisputed ruler of Bulgaria. The demonstration was put down in the usual brutal Bulgarian way; some twenty to thirty-five demonstrators were killed and hundreds were injured. However, the Turks had made their point; they were not going to give up, however fierce the official terror, their Islamic identity and culture.

The world failed to appreciate the significance of the Turks' demonstration in Bulgaria organized in order to preserve their rights guaranteed by the United Nations charter, the Helsinki agreement and the Bulgarian Constitution itself. The demonstrations were the first of its kind in Bulgaria and defied openly the policies of the regime. In this context it is essential to note that the Turks were the first citizens of Bulgaria who dared to challenge the ruling feudal-communist regime. The Turks died fighting for their rights while the ethnic Bulgarians bowed as usual to whomever controlled the government. Faced with the unexpected opposition, Todor Zhivkov and his *Politburo* decided to quell permanently the Turkish resistance before the idea of opposing the regime generated by the Turks' sacrifice spread to the ethnic Bulgarians. The rulers of Bulgaria decided to expel the Turks under the flimsy explanation that the move was voluntary. (The change of name has also been described as being "voluntary.") This decision further undermined Zhivkov and ultimately brought about his fall of November 1989, leading to his replacement by the hand-picked successor, Peter Mladenov, long time Bulgaria's Foreign Minister. The Turks of Bulgaria inadvertently perhaps helped bring about a change of government in Bulgaria, although few ethnic

Bulgarians would ever admit it. (Political change in Bulgaria followed its course as shall be explained later.) In the wake of the decision to expel the Turks some 340,000 people left the country from mid-June to 20 August 1989, when the Turkish government decided to close the border in an effort to force the Bulgarian government to negotiate an agreement permitting the orderly emigration of Turks to save some of their assets.

The emigrating Turks had left behind homes, land, moveable property, bank accounts, and even family members. According to the accounts given by thousands of these refugees, Bulgarian police and military units summoned them to various government stations, handed them passports prepared in advance, and told them to leave the country immediately. The Bulgarian government claimed that this exodus was “voluntary,” that the Turks had taken advantage of “freedom of travel” and could return to their homes in Bulgaria if they wished. The so-called “freedom to travel abroad,” however, applied only to Turks—not to ethnic Bulgarians or to other minorities. Furthermore, the right to return home was hedged with financial penalties. Turks who did not return within three months would have to pay heavy fines, while a six-months stay abroad (that is, in Turkey) led to an automatic loss of pension and other rights.

The Bulgarian government, with its usual shortsightedness, calculated that the ousting of the Turks would benefit it either way. If those exiled stayed in Turkey, it meant that their number in Bulgaria would diminish, their assets, etc., would become the property of the government, and the accumulated pension benefits would not have to be paid; if some returned to Bulgaria, they could be used as propaganda vehicles to expedite the Bulgarization of the remaining Turks with descriptions of bad living conditions in Turkey and discrimination by native Turks against immigrants. A number of exiles have returned to Bulgaria and have been promptly brought before TV cameras and radios and asked to defame Turkey: some of these are considered to have been agents of the Bulgarian government.

The exile of these Turks was an admission by the Bulgarian government that ethnic Turks do exist in Bulgaria and gives the lie to its four-year-old contention that “there are no Turks in Bulgaria.” Bulgaria’s decision to expel its citizens of Turkish origin amounts also to a confession that its brutal policy of Bulgarizing the Muslim minority has met with dismal failure. Despite the killing and jailing of thousands of Turks, resistance increased steadily and eventually



culminated in open defiance of the military and police units charged with carrying out the Bulgarization policy. In the mammoth demonstration by some 50,000 Turks in Shumnu the desperate Turks disarmed several dozen soldiers sent to arrest them.

The demonstrators were objecting to the forced change of their Turkish Muslim names to Slavic-Christian ones and the prohibitions imposed on the practice of their faith and customs. They did not ask for an autonomous Turkish region or for territorial separation from Bulgaria but only for respect for their rights. The protest of these Turks was an entirely legitimate and natural reaction to the oppressive policy of the Bulgarian government which, at Helsinki among other places, had agreed to protect the precise freedom and rights it was wantonly violating. Many Bulgarians uncritically supported the actions of their government. They stoned cars, buses, and trains carrying the refugees, robbed thousands of them, and committed rape against women and even young girls of 8 or 10 years of age.

This inhuman behavior on the part of the Bulgarians paid indirect compliment to the tenacity and temerity of the Turks, who preferred death or exile rather than the abandonment of their Turkish names and Islamic faith. The warm reception accorded to the refugees by even the most extreme leftist elements in Turkey contributed further to undermining the myth of "socialist brotherhood" and "humanism" expounded for decades by East European governments.

The reasons for the latest actions of the Bulgarian government are numerous. The villages of the Turks who were forced to emigrate to Turkey are strategically located in eastern Bulgaria and the Kircali mountains close to Turkey. After forcing out the native Turks, the government hoped to settle some Bulgarians there brought from other regions, as well as to install military units, as the number of ethnic Bulgarians is too small to replace all the departing Turks with civilians. Thus, by expelling the Turks the government aims to establish firmer control of the areas around the Kustendil, Razgrad, Shumnu, Silistre, and Varna districts, where the Turkish villages are contiguous and where the government's policy of forced Bulgarization appears to have no impact.

The reports indicate that Bulgaria has started importing workers from Soviet Moldavia, which is inhabited, among other nationalities, by some 260,000 Bulgarians. These were settled in Moldavia (the former Romanian province of Bessarabia) in the nineteenth century, and their current return to Bulgaria is a form of repatriation. However,

since the USSR faces a shortage of manpower in its western republics and the Bulgarians of Moldavia usually support the Russian causes, Moscow is not likely to permit their migration to their ancient homeland. The Russian ambassador in Ankara offered to mediate the conflict between Turkey and Bulgaria, but his offer appears designed to derail the Turkish government's efforts to bring the matter before international forums. (There has even been talk of bringing Vietnamese to work the Bulgarian fields, but this news is regarded as a smoke screen to mask the settlement of the Soviet Bulgarians in the villages of the expelled Turks.)

The closing of the border may have thwarted the Bulgarian government's plans. It is estimated that Bulgaria is trying to rid itself of a total of 500,000 to 600,000 Turks. Then, citing its own false statistics, it can declare once more that "all Turks have left Bulgaria," and proceed with even more stringent measures to Bulgarize its remaining Muslim citizens (whose number is still close to two million). Bulgarians believe that the Turks are the most politically conscious group and enjoy the sympathy of Turkey, and that their removal, therefore, will eliminate the most resistant and vociferous Muslim voice opposed to the policy of Bulgarization.

### *The Campaign to Bulgarize the Muslims*

The recent events described in the introduction were preceded by a long Bulgarization campaign towards the Turks. Late in December 1984 the Bulgarian government started a well-planned program to force the Turkish population of the country to abandon their Islamic names and adopt Christian Slavic names. The Bulgarian government has claimed that the Muslim population changed names voluntarily, but there is not a single report in any Western newspaper, journal, or book to support this claim. Even the Soviet press has kept silent on this issue, while Russian statesmen, when questioned, have evaded, saying that this is a "matter between Turkey and Bulgaria." The forced change of name—a type of forced "baptism" in the eyes of Islam—is fully attested to by the reports of Amnesty International, the Bulletins of the Helsinki Watch Committee, and the records of the United States Congress.<sup>1</sup> The change of names has been accom-

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<sup>1</sup> See *Hearing Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe*, 99th Congress,

panied by the closure and destruction of mosques and the prohibition of Islamic rites, such as fasting, circumcision, and even burial of the dead in Muslim cemeteries.

According to Western estimates, over 1,000 persons who resisted changing names have been killed, and several thousand have been arrested and many interned to Belene island. Resistance was actually far more widespread than officially reported. Many villages dug trenches and held off for days the attack of government troops riding in tanks and armed with the latest Soviet weapons. Today, visiting those villages is prohibited even for Bulgarian citizens. In some areas the resistance is continuing. There have been sporadic reports about the bombing of buildings, acts of sabotage, and hostage-taking on the part of the Muslim resistance fighters within Bulgaria. Visitors who have spoken with these oppressed Muslims believe that they will rise *en masse* at the first opportune moment. Other reports state that the Muslims are now making a special effort to speak only Turkish among themselves, leaving out all Bulgarian words or expressions that had infiltrated the vocabulary in the past. The Pomaks also are trying to learn Turkish and thus avoid speaking in Bulgarian—their native tongue. In fact, a number of Western observers who have spent time in Bulgaria claim that national sentiment among the Turks has risen to an exceptionally high level.

Meanwhile, in Turkey, the immigrants from Bulgaria or their descendants—amounting to some ten million people—and also the rest of the country's population have been emotionally mobilized against Bulgaria. A side effect of the Bulgarian government's action has been to defeat the claim of the Turkish communists that a communist regime is the only one capable of achieving brotherhood and equality among different national and ethnic groups, regardless of which group holds power. The results of the elections of 1987 showed that leftists in Turkey have been weakened greatly. The reports briefly summarized above prove beyond any doubt that the Muslims' name change in Bulgaria was an act of coercion.

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Washington, DC, 25 June 1985, pp. 182–183; Amnesty International, *Bulgaria: Imprisonment of Ethnic Turks* (London, 1986) (also the larger updated version, 1987); and Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 1986. Reports appearing in the West European press have been gathered in several volumes by the Turkish General Directorate of Information: see Basın Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü, *Turkish Minority in Bulgaria*, 6 vols. (Ankara, 1985–1987).

*Bulgaria's Methods of Nation Formation*

The modern Turks of Bulgaria are the descendants of people of genuine Turkish stock. Some of their ancestors had settled in the area before the Bulgars arrived, while the majority were immigrants from the Anatolian peninsula during the Ottoman era. Under the Ottomans the Turkish communities developed their own Muslim culture that was different from that of the Bulgars. Eventually, the Bulgar communities came together as a sort of national political group that succeeded in gaining first autonomy (1878), and then independence (1908).<sup>2</sup>

Bulgaria was not a nation in the modern cultural, ethnic, or political sense of the word at the time the Russian army made the newly created principality autonomous in 1878. The fledgling state felt the urgent need to immediately develop a national-historical *raison d'être* and thus adopted the idea of an absolute ethno-national homogeneity as its principle for nation formation. Thereafter, the government worked to either assimilate or liquidate all of its national minorities. The device employed to give credence to its actions was that of declaring a particular area and the people inhabiting it as having been "Bulgarian" at some point in history, however spurious the supporting evidence might be. Among the territories alleged to have been "originally Bulgarian" are lands today held by Bulgaria's neighbors: Thrace (Greece), Macedonia (Yugoslavia), Eastern Thrace (Turkey), and Dobruca (Romania). In 1885, in open defiance of the Berlin Treaty of 1878, and despite the fact that the area was culturally, economically, demographically, strategically, and historically

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<sup>2</sup> There are a number of good scholarly works on the history of Bulgaria. The best, despite pro-Bulgarian bias, are by Konstantin Jirecek, *Geschichte der Bulgaren* (Prague, 1876) and *Das Fürstentum Bulgarien* (Vienna, 1891). See also Nikolai Botev Staneff, *Geschichte der Bulgaren* (Leipzig, 1918); and Nikolai Botev Staneff, *Geschichte der Bulgaren* (Leipzig, 1918). For a recent work, see Richard J. Crampton, *Bulgaria, 1878-1918: A History* (New York, 1983). One may form an opinion about the quality and spirit of the contemporary Bulgarian writers merely by reading Bistra Cvetkova, *The Heroical Resistance of the Bulgarians against the Turkish Invasion* (Sofia, 1960); D. Kossev and H. Hristov, *Bulgaria, 1300 Years* (Sofia, 1980). The Turks who emigrated from Bulgaria have established several associations and published periodicals and books containing excellent firsthand information on the situation of their kin left in Bulgaria; see the views of one of the leaders, himself a recent refugee from Bulgaria, Mehmet Çavuş, *Bulgaristanda Soykırımı* ("Genocide in Bulgaria") (Istanbul, 1984).

an organic part of Turkey, Bulgaria successfully annexed Eastern Rumelia (the area south of the Balkan mountains). However, being unable unilaterally to fulfill her territorial ambition, Bulgaria allied herself with larger powers: Germany in the First and Second World Wars and the USSR after 1944. During the Second World War Bulgaria, as an ally of Hitler, occupied the long-coveted territories of Macedonia in Yugoslavia and northern Greece, and promptly sought to Bulgarize them. However, when Hitler eventually lost his global war, Bulgaria had to give up these spoils. Macedonia is now one of Yugoslavia's six republics and enjoys recognition as a distinct ethnic-national entity despite the mixed religious composition of its inhabitants. Other areas were not so fortunate.

The large and flourishing Greek community centered in the Philippopolis area (the Bulgarians changed the name to Plovdiv) and the ancient Greek towns on the Black Sea disappeared, through either emigration or assimilation. The Gagauzes, Turkish Muslims who settled on the shores of the Black Sea around Varna and became Christians at the end of the thirteenth century but retained their languages and traditions, were long ago declared "Bulgarian."<sup>3</sup> The same happened to the Romanians who lived along the southern shores of the Danube and to the Vlachs (descendants of the Romans) living in the Pirin and Rhodope mountains. The small but influential group of Bulgarian Catholics—some 50,000 of them—who strove to abide, partially at least, by the political standards of the West were subjected to extraordinary pressure and persecution (spared sporadically when the government of Bulgaria needed Western sympathy and finance).

As the above brief summary of the Bulgarian government's policy towards its nationalities makes clear, the current treatment of the Turks and other Muslims falls into a well-defined historical pattern, although Muslims in general (the Pomaks were less fortunate), and

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<sup>3</sup> This group, consisting of some 20,000 people, still speaks its own Turkish language, even though its intellectuals have been among the vanguard in the Bulgarization campaign. (Dr. Emil Boyeff, a teacher of Turkish at Sofia University, is one of the most outstanding examples of the Bulgarized Gagauz.) The contemporary existence of the Gagauz has been fully ascertained by some Bulgarian authors; one of the best known is A.I. Manov, an army officer who collected his material while serving in the Gagauz districts. See *Potekloto na Gagauzitei tehните obicai i nravi v dve casti* (Varna, 1938). (A Turkish translation, *Gagauzlar*, was published by Varlık Publishing House, İstanbul, 1940.)

the Turks in particular, were spared the traditional assimilation pressures until well into the second half of the twentieth century, presumably due to the sheer size of this population—a good 30% of the total—as well as to the wide gulf of difference in religion, language, and culture separating the Turkish Muslim population from Christian-Orthodox Bulgarians. The existence of Turkey as a neighbor also was a deterrent until Bulgaria agreed, under Breznev's urging, to assume her traditional role as testing-ground for Soviet policy in the Balkans.

Scholars well acquainted with the demographic history of the Balkans know that the large Turkish population has always posed a thorny problem for the nationalist-minded rulers of Bulgaria. Historically, Bulgaria was part of the heartland of the Ottoman state and was as Turkish in character—as was the population, despite the many changes brought about by the assimilation policies of the government. Ottoman mosques, *vakıfs* (pious foundations), *hans* (inns), and *imarets* (business and social establishments) dot the entire country as can be seen in hundreds of surviving works.<sup>4</sup> The Bulgarian government tried to eliminate these Ottoman monuments as soon as it took power.<sup>5</sup> Meanwhile it pressured the Turkish population to emigrate. From 1878 to the present a stream of “surplus” Bulgarian Turks has flowed steadily into Turkey (but the community in Bulgaria has still maintained its fair size, as shall be discussed later). In 1950–1952 Bulgaria expelled 152,000–156,000 Turks on Stalin's order, in the hope of undermining the Turkish economy as punishment for the country's participation in the Korean War and its joining NATO.<sup>6</sup> However, the intractability of what it saw as the problem of the large Muslim population seems finally to have moved the Bulgarian rulers to resort to drastic means. In 1956—and subse-

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<sup>4</sup> One of the best-documented works on the Turkish monuments is Machiel Kiel, *Art and Society of Bulgaria in the Turkish Period* (Asen/Maastricht, 1985). For a more complete bibliography, see Turkish Historical Society, *The Turkish Presence in Bulgaria* (Ankara, 1986).

<sup>5</sup> On the destruction of the Turkish monuments, see Bernard Lory, *Le Sort de L'Heritage Ottoman en Bulgarie, L'Exemple des Villes Bulgares, 1878–1900* (Istanbul, 1985). There are also Bulgarian works which justify this destruction as the liquidation of feudalism and capitalism; see Georgi Georgiev, *The Liberation and the Ethnocultural Development of the Bulgarian People, 1878–1900* (Sofia, 1979), in Bulgarian.

<sup>6</sup> See H.L. Kostanick, *Turkish Resettlement of Bulgarian Turks, 1950–1953* (Berkeley, 1957).

quently in 1964, 1969, 1970, and 1984—the Communist Party's Central Committee adopted measures designed to achieve *priobshtavane* (homogeneity, or “becoming a whole”) so as to establish *edinna Bulgarska natsiya* (one compact Bulgarian nation). Initially the “unification,” that is, assimilation, measures were directed against smaller groups, such as Macedonians, Vlachs, and Gypsies. Eventually, in the 1960s, Pomaks (Bulgarian-speaking Muslims) became the target. The government launched a campaign, supported by a fictitious “history” of the group, to convince them that their religion—that is, Islam—had been imposed on them by force, after which some of them somehow became Turkish-speakers. By the end of the 1970s of the seventeen major national groups listed in the census of 1956 only Bulgarians and Turks were still on the list.

The traditional Bulgarian historiography accepted the view that some Christians converted to Islam during two short periods in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and that these conversions were voluntary. By the late 1960s, as the Pomaks became the target for assimilation, Bulgarian historiography had adopted the extremist view that all conversions to Islam had been mandatory. The “nationalist” wing of the historians, represented by a young, extremist generation that sought the patronage of the late Liudmila Zhivkova, the daughter of Chairman Todor Zhivkov, launched an attack on the older generation of historians, especially against those who had somehow begun to accept the positive aspects of the Ottoman rule. Veselin Traykov, Petur Popov, Bistra Cvetkova, Hristo Hristov, etc., headed the anti-Ottoman attack aimed at, among others, Nicolai Todorov, a highly intelligent historian of Greek and Gagauz ancestry, educated in Moscow and befriended in the West, who had offered a more moderate and accurate interpretation of Turkish rule in Bulgaria. Todorov survived the attacks.<sup>7</sup> (He was a recent candidate for the top position at UNESCO. For a few years he was out of circulation as Bulgaria's ambassador to Greece, while the nationalists had the field to themselves.)

The new breed of nationalist historians produced “documentary studies” designed to prove the government's point.<sup>8</sup> A quick glance

<sup>7</sup> See numbers 3 and 5 for bibliography.

<sup>8</sup> See P. Petrov, ed., *The Assimilatory Policy of the Turkish Conquerors. Collection of Documents with Regard to Islam and Conversion to Islam. 15th–19th Centuries* (in Bulgarian) (Sofia, 1962). Petrov has several other works of the same genre, none supported by any basic source, including K. Jirecek's classical works.

at these documents show that the authors relied on false evidence, that they did not use the basic Turkish documents, and that where they did use Turkish sources they were so unaware of the ethnic, confessional, and social organization of the Ottoman state as to be unable to understand the meaning of what they read.<sup>9</sup> The chief source used by all Bulgarian studies to document the “forced conversion” to Islam is a note of several pages supposedly written by Methodii Draginov, a Bulgarian priest, on the final page of a liturgical manuscript dated *c.* 1666.<sup>10</sup> This note, in its published version, states that Pehlivan Mehmed Pasha, on his march towards Morea in 1666, went through the Rhodope mountains. Gavril, the Greek bishop, informed Mehmed Pasha that the peasants had failed to pay their taxes to the (Greek-Christian) Plovdiv Metropolitanate and were, therefore, rebels. Mehmed Pasha would have executed the Christian notables and the local priest for this offense, except for the intervention of a Muslim *imam*—Hasan Hoca—who suggested that the tax delinquents be spared their lives if they converted to Islam. Altogether it seems that the inhabitants of seven Chapni villages were converted. Those who did not convert fled into the mountains as their houses in the villages were allegedly destroyed. Dennis P. Hupchick, who has studied this “conversion” in Bulgarian sources claims that its roots were both social and legal. According to him, Chapni villages in the Rhodopes were given autonomy from the Greek patriarchate in İstanbul at the time of the conquest in the fourteenth century in exchange for some military service. Then Süleyman the Lawgiver (1520–1566) declared the area a *wakif*, and this freed the villagers from other taxes and services. The Chapni Bulgarians “whether due to an outside threat to that religious autonomy—e.g., the Plovdiv Greek Orthodox Metropolitanate—or the existence of Ottoman laws applying to wakif lands which permitted wakif inhabitants to convert *en masse*, may quite possibly have decided that conversion to Islam was the only alternative open to them in

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<sup>9</sup> See the “Documents” section of the *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, Vol. 4/2, (1988) for a series of misinterpreted Ottoman sources.

<sup>10</sup> The original, in Bulgarian, was published in the *Geographical-Historical Statistical Description of the Tatar Bazarçik* (Vienna, 1870). The original document disappeared immediately after publication and has never been seen. The language used in the document differs substantially from the language spoken in seventeenth-century Bulgaria.



order to maintain their privileged status under an increasingly fanatical Muslim regime.”<sup>11</sup> No reliable scholar has ever studied the original document, and, in fact, scholars well acquainted with Ottoman history and Bulgarian affairs are in agreement that it must have been a forgery. Dr. Machiel Kiel, a Dutch scholar who has spent considerable time working in Bulgaria, states that some leading Bulgarian historians informed him in private that the document was not authentic.<sup>12</sup> There is a great deal of evidence—both internal and external—pointing to its spuriousness. It is well known that there were in the Balkans voluntary conversions to Islam of large groups of Bogomils. The Bogomils were Slavic Christians, adherents of the Manichaeian doctrine and thus, according to the tenets of the Catholic and Orthodox churches, were heretics. Consequently, they were vigorously persecuted by their Christian brethren.

When the Ottomans conquered the territory they put a stop to the persecution of the Bogomils, giving them reason to welcome the new administration. Furthermore, as their reasons for clinging to Bogomilism had almost as much to do with protecting their ethnic identity in the face of a monolithic Byzantine orthodoxy as it did with firm religious conviction, they were quick to see the advantage of becoming, by the simple expedient of accepting Islam, members of the ruling religious group that recognized and tolerated ethnic differences and was not organized to persecute “heresy.” Thus, the conversion of several villages need not necessarily have been forced. The fact that the above-mentioned document holds both the Greek Church and the Turkish administration responsible for the conversion indicates that it was forged: one of the contentions of the Bulgarian nationalists is that the Turks and the Greeks were accomplices in the stifling of the Bulgarian national spirit. Finally, the fact that the area allegedly involved was Chapni gives lie to the story: the name derives from the Chapni, a branch of Kızıldaş as (*Alevi*s) who reside in the Sivas area in Eastern Anatolia. Obviously some of these Turkish peoples were long settled in that area of Bulgaria, so the villagers could already have been Muslim.

The Bulgarian government went so far as to ask an upcoming

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<sup>11</sup> Dennis R. Hupchick, “Seventeenth-Century Bulgarian Pomaks: Forced or Voluntary Converts to Islam,” in *Society in Change: Studies in Honor of Bela K. Kiraly*, ed. Steven Bela Vardy (Boulder, CO, 1983), p. 311.

<sup>12</sup> Kiel, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

party member with literary ambitions, Anton Donchev, to write a novel to back the historians' contention that the Pomaks were forcibly Islamized. Donchev wrote the novel, *Vreme Razdelno*, ("Time of Parting"), in just 144 days after he had supposedly spent two years living among the Pomaks. He was awarded the Dimitrov Prize in literature, given only to "remarkable creative work," and his novel was translated into Western European languages.<sup>13</sup> The story revolves around a Turkish military unit commanded by Kara İbrahim (Abraham the Black), a Janissary chief, who was sent by the Porte in around 1668 to convert the Bulgarians of the Elindenya valley in the Rhodope mountains. The other characters in the novel include Muslim religious men, Sheik Shaban and Molla Zülfikar Softa (the author's unfamiliarity with Muslim names and ranks is immediately apparent), and Hassan Hoca (a Pomak). Kara İbrahim's military force is confronted by Manol, the fearless Bulgarian shepherd leader, with his sons and various other types chosen to represent the Bulgarians. The story, which is based on the spurious Methodii Draginov document discussed above, ends, as one might expect from such pre-ordered novels, with the Janissaries engaging in rape and massacres and the execution of those who say, "My head I'll give—my faith I will never give." Thus historians and novelists at the beck and call of the Bulgarian government sought to provide "moral-historical" justification for the policy of "Bulgarization" of the Pomaks.

This policy was brutally enforced in the 1960s without causing any unfavorable world comment, although the "justification" advanced was totally baseless. The Pomaks—inhabiting the southwest part of Bulgaria—are probably the descendants of the Cumans, the Turkic-speaking group that settled in the area in the eleventh and twelfth centuries and later adopted the Slavic language. Some embraced Christianity in its Bulgarian form and then accepted Islam. Apart from those Cumans who migrated and settled in eastern Hungary and eventually adopted Calvinism (probably to distinguish themselves from other Hungarians who were Catholics), the Pomaks are staunch Muslims and consider themselves Turks (as shown by their mass migration and settlement in Turkey) despite the fact that they speak a Bulgarian dialect.

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<sup>13</sup> The Bulgarian edition appeared in 1964; the English version, translated by Marguerite Alexieva, was published in Great Britain in 1967, and in the USA by William Morrow and Company, New York, 1968.

The party cadres engaged in the 1960s campaign sought not only to persuade the Pomaks that they had been forcibly Islamized but also to prepare themselves and the cadres for bigger tasks in the future. Several groups in Turkey criticized the forced change of names among the Pomaks but without any visible success.<sup>14</sup> The Turkish government saw it as an isolated incident which did not impinge upon the religious and cultural freedom of the rest of the Muslims and, as usual, adopted an extremely conciliatory attitude towards Bulgaria. At that time it was preoccupied with internal terrorism (the arms for which were supplied by Bulgaria); in addition, it did not want to damage relations with their eastern neighbor whose highways were used by millions of Turkish workers travelling to and from, Western Europe. Contrary to foreign press reports, the Turkish governments in general have refrained, under prodding by the Foreign Ministry, from defending the cause of Turks living outside Turkey until forced by public opinion to do so, as happened in the case of Cyprus in 1963–1967 and Bulgaria in 1985.

### *The Turks of Bulgaria and Their Treatment*

The Turks of Bulgaria have been under continuous pressure and suffered the denial of their political rights almost ever since the country gained its autonomy in 1878, despite the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin, which accorded them national and religious rights, and of several other treaties negotiated between Ottoman and later Republican governments and Bulgaria. However, immediately after 1944, when the Soviet troops occupied Bulgaria and installed a socialist regime, the Turks' position improved considerably. The number of Turkish schools increased dramatically, while periodicals and newspapers were published in all the main cities inhabited by Turks. Local Turkish literature began to emerge, along with a variety of studies dealing with the language and culture of the Turks in Bulgaria.<sup>15</sup> As late as

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<sup>14</sup> See, for instance, *Rodop-Bulgaristan Türkleri Tarihten Siliniyor mu?* ("Are the Rodop Turks of Bulgaria Eliminated from History?") published by the Association for Culture and Solidarity of the Rhodope-Danube Turks (Istanbul, 1976).

<sup>15</sup> According to available information, the Turkish authors published in 1960–1968 a total of 34 novels, 36 collections of short stories and 17 volumes of poems; see Bilal N. Şimşir, *Bulgaristan Türkleri* (Istanbul, 1986), pp. 303–306. A comprehensive bibliography on the study of Turkish spoken in Bulgaria was compiled by

1975, several Bulgarian leaders praised the development of the Turkish language and literature in Bulgaria and promised help to aid its future expansion. However, by 1976 the Turkish schools, newspapers, periodicals, etc.—except for a few left to be shown to the visiting foreigners—were suddenly closed. By 1984 the entire panoply of historical works were revised, and all mention of Turks was taken out of books and articles. In fact, many distinguished Bulgarian scholars were forced to rewrite their books and articles to eliminate any reference to Turks, except as Ottomans.<sup>16</sup> It seemed that the Bulgarian government had decided to eliminate absolutely everything in the country that could remind the Turks of their ethnic identity, as though they could wipe out by decree the entire past.

The reasons for the Bulgarian government's abrupt change of policy towards the Turks stemmed, first, from the Bulgarians' deep historical inferiority complex that has infected every ideological, tactical, or even occasionally *bona fide* effort by the Bulgarian regimes to adopt the standards of the civilized world. Bulgaria has always remained outside the moral confines of Europe. The Bulgarian peasant is a hardworking, honest, reliable individual, but the intellectual appears to be in the grip of a continuous crisis of identity, of feelings of insecurity and inferiority that he tries to overcome by engaging in endless—and for the most part false—diatribes about the glorious past of Bulgaria, “the five hundred years of Turkish oppression” (a

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a member of the Turkish Institute of Bibliography—see Türker Acaroğlu, “Rumeli Türk Ağızları Üzerine Türkçe ve Yabancı Dillerdeki Başlıca Araştırmaların Açıklamalı Kaynakçası 1904–1981” (the annotated sources of the main researches in Turkish and foreign languages on the Turkish dialects of Rumelia 1904–1981 [Balkans]), *Halk Kültürü* 4, 1984, pp. 13–40. One should mention also the linguistic studies undertaken by two well-trained linguists, Rıza and Mefkure Molla (Mollow); see e.g., “Traits de fusion dans le dialect turc du Rhodope de l’Est,” *Balkanski Ezikoznanie* 14, 1970, pp. 57–81 (in his Turkish name). Scholars of Bulgarian origin, such as Peter Miyatev and Stefan Mladenov, have also produced works on the Turkish language of Bulgaria.

<sup>16</sup> For example, one writer of Muslim origin, Mustafa Muslimoğlu, in 1967 described the Turks as the largest minority in Bulgaria. In a recent rewriting of the same work he declared that there are no Turks in Bulgaria (meanwhile, his name became Peter Letrov). In the meantime, another Bulgarianized Turkish intellectual paraded by the Bulgarian government in the West wrote a pamphlet upholding the government's views. See Olin Zagarof, *The Truth. Only the Truth* (Sofia, 1985). The original Turkish name of Zagarof is Mehmet Tahiroğlu. In a private conversation with this writer in Pec (Hungary) in 1986, Tahiroğlu claimed that he was Turkish. While in public, when Bulgarians were present, he claimed that he became voluntarily Bulgarian.

view not supported by history) and finally about the unjust treatment it has received from its neighbors, from Western Europe, etc.

The Bulgarian intellectuals are always trying to justify their regime's futile efforts to stand against the tide of history and civilization. Thus they have become accomplices when Bulgarian governments, driven by ambition, have sacrificed the dignity and moral integrity of their people for petty territorial gains and have oppressed the country's minority citizens. They helped the government to undermine the Bulgarian church, which was older and stronger than any other institution in the country and was the real source of Bulgarian identity and culture. The fascist nationalist regime that ruled Bulgaria from 1933 to 1944 used the church for its own political purposes and, in the process, substituted a materialist nationalist ideal for the spiritual vision of the church. The materialism subsequently preached by the communist regime further undermined the church.<sup>17</sup> Even worse, after 1944 the Bulgarian people were almost forced by their leaders to adulate and imitate the Soviet Union and thus deny their own culture and identity. It is well-known that Zhivkov actually asked the Soviet Union to accept the country as another Soviet Republic and thus put an end to its independent national existence. In a relatively recent article, David Binder, who was a *New York Times* correspondent in East Europe in the 1960s, told how Zhivkov paid his public dues to the USSR with remarks like, "The Soviet Union and Bulgaria breathe with the same lungs and the same blood flows in our veins," and took part in antidemocratic actions such as participation in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.<sup>18</sup>

The reaction of the average Bulgarians to the servility of their leaders towards the Soviets since 1944 (and towards Germany in the First and Second World Wars) has led to frustrated ultra-nationalistic outbursts in which the Turks became the scapegoats. In the 1970s the nationalist banner was unfurled by Todor Zhivkov's own daughter, Liudmila Zhivkova.<sup>19</sup> Zhivkova appealed to Bulgarian national

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<sup>17</sup> Yet the atheist government of Bulgaria did not hesitate to exploit for propaganda purposes the church whose values it has undermined; see the brochure, *Religious Denominations in Bulgaria*, issued by the Press Agency (Sofia, 1987). In the demonstrations which took place in Sofia on 8 December 1989, the demonstrators asked that the religious holidays be restored. It seems that, finally, the ethnic Bulgarians decided to follow the Turks in asking for their religious freedoms.

<sup>18</sup> *The New York Times Magazine*, 8 December 1985, p. 156.

<sup>19</sup> Zhivkova died of a mysterious illness in 1981. The former top-ranking Soviet

pride with words such as, "It is to our generation . . . that the historical responsibility and honor has fallen of standing at this vantage-point [the 1300th anniversary of the First Bulgarian State] from which past and future are to be considered."<sup>20</sup> Another example of the Bulgarian leaders' low prestige in the eyes of their own people is provided by Georgi Markov, the Bulgarian writer who was a confidant of Zhivkov until he fled to the West and broadcast bitter criticism of Bulgaria. As one might expect, he paid with his life for daring to criticize the rulers of Bulgaria. In his memoirs Markov describes an interesting scene which took place in Arkutino, the resort town of the Bulgarian technocratic élite. Vulko Chervenkov (died 1980) Bulgaria's "Little Stalin," came to spend New Year's night at Arkutino and entered the bar, which was full of young Bulgarian intellectuals. Upon seeing Chervenkov, the intellectuals began to sing *Shumi Maritza* (Maritza Flows), the old national anthem of pre-Communist Bulgaria. The forbidden anthem was sung in order to remind Chervenkov, and later the police who came to investigate the incident, that they were not true Bulgarians.<sup>21</sup> (In the 1970s during my visits to Bulgaria several intellectuals expressed their admiration towards the Turks, who despite mistreatment at the hands of the Bulgarians and Russians, had maintained their ethnic identity, while the Bulgarians vied with one another to emulate everything Russian. By eradicating the Turkish community in the name of a nationalist policy, Zhivkov may hope to eliminate such examples of ethnic pride.)

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aide at the United Nations, Shevchenko claimed in his memoirs that a KGB general expressed utter dissatisfaction with Liudmila's Bulgarian nationalism and vowed to liquidate her.

<sup>20</sup> Liudmila Zhivkova, "Unity Between Past, Present, and Future," *Palaeo Bulgarica*, III, 1979, p. 3. The extensive festivals in 1981 celebrated the establishment of the First Bulgarian State. There is little organic connection between the first, second, and finally the third (est. 1878) Bulgarian states except the name. It is interesting to note that the so-called "1300 years of existence" of the Bulgarian state consisted merely of four centuries of independence which was actually an independence that amounted to a continuous struggle for survival due to Bulgaria's inability to get along with its neighbors.

<sup>21</sup> Georgi Markov, *The Truth That Killed* (London, 1983); entitled "Nationalist Serenade for Vulko Cherenkov," pp. 99, 107. (Markov was stabbed in London with an umbrella which contained poisoned pellets and died four days later at the age of 49.) Vulko Cherenkov was educated in the USSR and took the place of Fimitrov, the veteran Bulgarian communist leader, after the latter died in 1949. Cherenkov was replaced by Zhivkov (b. 1911) who was Prime Minister in 1962–1971, then Chairman of the State Council, and *de facto* dictator of Bulgaria until November 1989.

The source of Bulgaria's historical animosity towards Turks and Turkey are well known. The early Bulgars, who came into the Balkans in the seventh century, abandoned their Turkish mother tongue and adopted the language of the Slavs, whom they ruled. Such events occurred many times in history as rulers became assimilated by the people they ruled. But the Bulgarian case was different because the rulers of Bulgaria always remained aloof from the masses and stayed in power, more often than not, by serving some larger power. The Ottoman rule in the Balkans was challenged repeatedly by Greeks, Serbians, Albanians, Montenegrans, and Romanians—but not by Bulgarians. History does not record a single instance of Bulgarian uprising until the nineteenth century, a fact that the adversaries of Bulgaria are prone to cite very often. Bulgaria emerged overnight as an autonomous national state in 1878 as a direct consequence of the Russian victory over the Ottoman army. Russia desired to create a large, strong, but also loyal proxy state that would promote her own interests in Southeast Europe, today, as it was during the Tsarist times. Bulgaria dutifully carries out in the Balkans all the roles assigned to her by her patron state and, in exchange, receives economic, military, and diplomatic support and, occasionally, territory. Some writers go as far as to say that the USSR uses Bulgaria to test a new policy before applying it to her own people. According to A. Bennigsen, the forced change of names imposed on the Turks of Bulgaria may be the experimental prelude to a similar policy contemplated by the USSR for the millions of Muslims living there.<sup>22</sup>

Nearly all of the Bulgarian historians blame the Ottoman Empire (that is, the Turks) for having prevented Bulgaria for five hundred years from achieving national fulfillment and cultural economic development. They also blame, even in stronger terms, the Greek patriarchate in Istanbul, which supposedly used religion and the universality of the Orthodox Church to wipe out the national culture of the Bulgarians and, thereby, Hellenize them. As mentioned, some support a theory of a Turco-Greek conspiracy: "The Turks oppressed and exploited us physically while the Greeks robbed us of our national identity and alienated our leaders." (Bulgarian notables often became Hellenized because they sent their children to Greek schools, the only ones available).

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<sup>22</sup> The late Alexander Bennigsen expressed this view several times to this writer in many personal talks in France and the United States in 1985–1988.

This article has dealt very generally with certain well known historical facts in order to demonstrate that the personality complex of the Bulgarian leaders developed as a result of historical experience and that these complexes colored their attitude toward Turkey and the Turks and have affected the formation of policy as much as ideological perception and the interpretation of past events in the light of contemporary problems. Deep in their subconscious, Bulgarian intellectuals and their leaders know that they have killed thousands of Turks and have forced as many out of the country, while destroying their monuments and civilization, even though the Turks of Bulgaria were a docile, law-abiding community (at least until the recent forced change of names challenged their self-respect and dignity).

Behind the senseless persecution of the Turks lies the perennial Bulgarian fear that Turkey may be tempted one day to use the Turks of Bulgaria for her own purposes. They know that they illegally hold East Rumelia. Thus, Turkey may wish someday to revise the status quo. Some Bulgarians even fear that Turkey may one day try to revive the Ottoman Empire (a thought that anyone with the slightest knowledge of Turkey would find ludicrous). The Bulgarians cite the landing of troops in Cyprus in 1974 as proof of Turkey's neo-Ottomanist designs (although this action was carried out according to treaties signed in 1959 and 1960, and Turkey has made no attempt to annex the Turkish part of Cyprus). In fretting about Turkish territorial ambitions they conveniently ignore the fact that in 1939-1944, when Turkey was allied with England and France, she could with impunity have attacked Bulgaria which was allied with Hitler. Indeed, Turkey refused to engage in war against the Axis powers despite the suggestion of Britain and France that she might expect to get back a large portion of the territory given to or seized by Bulgaria in previous years. Bulgaria worries particularly about the fact that the Muslims living there show a natural affinity towards Turkey and fears that they would not feel inhibited from throwing in their lot with her if the opportunity arose, if only to escape Bulgaria's oppression and inhumanity. Meanwhile the population of Turkey is constantly growing (it stands at approximately fifty-six million versus nine million in Bulgaria) and her economic development is relatively steady while Bulgaria's is teetering on the verge of bankruptcy. It is these fears that have moved the leaders of Bulgaria, with the encouragement of the USSR, to use every means to prevent the economic development of Turkey and to destabilize her regime by methods



such as supplying weapons to the anarchists and terrorists in 1975–1978 and to the Kurdish bands operating currently in southeastern Anatolia. (The Bulgarian involvement in widespread efforts to destabilize Turkey are multi-sided and well-documented but cannot be dealt with here in detail.)

In sum, Bulgaria's five hundred year submission to Ottoman power, coupled with the denationalization pressure of the Greek Patriarchate in the eighteenth century seems to have permeated and distorted the political thinking of Bulgarian leaders, pushing them to take the most drastic action against Turks living in Bulgaria. Obviously, leaders who do not have self-respect for their own national identity can hardly be expected to respect those of other peoples. In effect, the Bulgarian regime has tried to baptize as Christian the Turks living in Bulgaria (as explained, Muslims consider the adoption of Christian names a form of baptism) in order to create a cohesive nation that could withstand pressure from outside, including potential attacks from Turkey. That this reason is mere pretext is demonstrated by the fact that Bulgaria refused adamantly the proposal by Turkey that the Turks living in Bulgaria be permitted to emigrate and to settle in Turkey, as did thousands of their kin in the past. Obviously, the emigration of the Turks living in Bulgaria would eliminate the danger of a Turkish "fifth column" in case of conflict. However, the policy towards the Turks of Bulgaria and the refusal to permit their emigration is, in fact, a reaction to a series of basic demographic and economic forces, to be discussed in the next section.

*Demographic and Economic Factors Behind Bulgaria's Policy Toward its Turkish Population*

The rapid growth of the Turkish population in Bulgaria and the near stagnation of the demographic growth among ethnic Bulgarians since the mid 1950s are the key factors that have moved the government to adopt the Bulgarization policy towards the Turkish community. The size of the Muslim population of Bulgaria (including Dobruca and Eastern Rumelia) on the eve of Bulgaria's autonomy was about one and a half million while the non-Muslims were slightly less—most of them were Bulgarian-speaking.<sup>23</sup> During the war of

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<sup>23</sup> The figures used as the basis of this calculation are in Kemal H. Karpat,

1877–1878, approximately half of the Muslim population was forced to emigrate and some 300,000 were killed by Bulgarian bands and Russian troops. A number of Bulgarians also moved from the periphery to settle in the Bulgarian principality. A. Ubcini, a well-informed aide to the French Embassy in Istanbul who had access to official Ottoman statistics, estimated the population of the *sancaks* of Ruschuk, Varna, Vidin, and Tirnova and of Sofia at 1,914,638 in 1878–1879. In Ruschuk and Varna, Bulgarians constituted slightly over one-third of the population, the rest being mostly Muslims. Only in Vidin, Sofia, and Tirnova were Bulgarians in the majority.<sup>24</sup>

The government of the autonomous principality of Bulgaria conducted its first census in 1881 and a second census in 1888. The results of these censuses were published and are available. The British government, apparently dissatisfied with the available information, asked for and obtained from the Bulgarian government a copy of these census results.<sup>25</sup> The population figures for Bulgaria (excluding Eastern Rumelia) as supplied by the government to the British were the following:

	1881	1888
Bulgarians	1,345,507	1,570,599
Muslims	527,284	480,593
Greeks	11,444	10,975
Various	123,684	131,267
TOTALS	2,007,919	2,193,434

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*Ottoman Population 1830–1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics* (Madison, Wisconsin, 1985). The *Salname* of 1874, which was based on the census of 1866 conducted by Mithat Pasha (and was used extensively by Nicolai Todorov in his book on the Balkan town) gives the male population of the Tuna Province (including Dobruca, but omitting the area south of the Balkans) as 504,297 Muslims and 491,742 non-Muslims. The Muslims were concentrated in the east, around Ruschuk, Varna, Pazarcık, Shumlu, Razgrad, Silistre, and Hexergrad, and in the southwest in Kustendil, Orhaniye, etc. The census of 1877, which did not classify the population into religious groups, gave the male population of Bulgaria north of the Balkan range (including the districts of Niş) as 1,247,000. Calculated proportionately, the Muslims numbered about 680,000.

<sup>24</sup> A. Ubcini, “La Principauté de Bulgarie,” *Revue de Géographie*, July–December 1879, pp. 81–100.

<sup>25</sup> See *Public Record Office*, Foreign Office 78, Vol. 4032, *O’Connor to Salisbury*, 13 September 1887; also *ibid.*, Vol. 4230, “Memorandum on the Population of Bulgaria,” p. 120 ff.

To these figures one must add the Muslim population of Eastern Rumelia, annexed by Bulgaria in 1885. Figures appearing in the journal *Maritza* give the number of Muslims in 1880 as only 174,000, as against 573,231 Bulgarian.<sup>26</sup> Actually, we know from a variety of other sources that the number of Muslims, despite deportations, killings, and migrations, amounted after 1878 to over a million, or roughly 35% of the population in 1888. Even if one were to rely solely on Bulgarian figures, still the Muslim population of Bulgaria in 1880 constituted about 23% of the total.<sup>27</sup> In 1913 Bulgaria took over the nine districts in the eastern part of Macedonia, with its population roughly 160,000 of whom 92–95% were Muslim. In 1913 Bulgaria lost southern Dobruca to Romania (she regained it in 1940). The Bulgarian statistics of 1910 listed the Muslim population of south Dobruca at 117,622. After annexing the area, the Romanian government conducted a census in 1913, according to which the Muslims numbered 165,788.

The Bulgarian population growth, according to official Bulgarian statistics since 1900, has been as follows:<sup>28</sup>

*Patterns of Population Growth, 1900–1983*

	Birth rate (per 1m.)	Death rate (per 1m.)	Natural increase (per 1m.)	Total population (thousands)	Urban share (%)	Density (per km.)
1900	42.2	22.5	19.7	3,716	19.8	38.9
1920	39.9	21.4	18.5	4,825	19.9	47.0
1940	22.2	13.4	8.8	6,368	23.0	61.7
1950	25.2	10.2	15.0	7,273	27.5	65.7
1960	17.8	8.1	9.7	7,906	38.0	71.4
1970	16.3	9.1	7.2	8,515	53.0	76.8
1980	14.5	11.1	3.4	8,877	62.5	80.0
1983	13.6	11.4	2.2	8,939	65.0	80.7

<sup>26</sup> Copy of *Maritza* of 27 July 1880, reproduced in the Great Britain House of Commons, *Accounts and Papers*, Vol. 82, 1880, pp. 109–110.

<sup>27</sup> A variety of sources placed the population of Muslims in Bulgaria at 652,000. At the end of the nineteenth century they had 1,293 schools and 64,422 students; see Alexandre Popovic, *L'Islam Balkanique* (Berlin, 1986), p. 74.

<sup>28</sup> See *Statisticheski godishnik na NR Bulgaria, 1982* (Sofia, 1983), p. 29.

These figures are exceptionally revealing if properly interpreted. The figures show, first, that Bulgaria's population grew steadily in the period 1900–1940, with the main growth occurring between 1900 and 1924 (due in part to population exchanges). The increase in the birth rate from 22.2 to 25.2 over the 1940–1950 period was due to the re-acquisition of southern Dobruca in 1940 and the immigration of the large Bulgarian population from the north (exchanged for the Romanian colonists of Quadrilater). The Muslim population of the two districts known as Quadrilater in southern Dobruca—that is, the districts of Silistre and Pazarçık—totaled approximately 120,000. The Bulgarian statistics show that the national birth rate dropped steadily from 25.2 per thousand in 1950 to a mere 13.6 per thousand in 1983, when the total population of Bulgaria had reached 8,939 million. Meanwhile, the death rate of an ageing population increased from 8.1 per thousand in 1960 to 11.4 in 1983, when the total population of Bulgaria had reached 8,939 million. The rate of urbanization, on the other hand, rose from 19.8% in 1900 to 23% in 1940 and then more than doubled to 65% in 1983. Heavy capital investment, financed in part by the USSR, which wanted to have a strong ally to face two NATO members—Turkey and Greece—turned Bulgaria into an industrialized-urbanized nation almost overnight, however shaky the bases of that industrialization. According to Bulgarian sources, the national income, which rose steadily at a rate of 8.3% until 1975, had slipped to a 4.1% rate of increase by 1980; since then income has fallen much lower. It is interesting to note that the investment in agriculture was 22.9% in 1980, although the export of food and consumer manufacturers based mostly on agricultural production remained at a steady 26.6% of the total Bulgarian exports.<sup>29</sup>

The true political significance of the figures provided above can be understood properly only if the shifts in population growth and the urbanization of Bulgaria are interpreted in the context of the ethnic and religious composition of the population. The Bulgarian

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<sup>29</sup> Background information on Bulgaria's economy are in John R. Lampe, *The Bulgarian Economy in the Twentieth Century* (London, 1986) and John R. Lampe and Marvin R. Jakson, *Balkan Economic History, 1550–1950* (Bloomington, Indiana, 1982). A more recent figure indicates that Bulgaria's economic growth was as follows: 2.8% in 1971–1980, and only 0.8 in 1981–1985. *The New York Times* (Business Section), 11 November 1989.

statistics give the Turkish population in 1956 as 656,025.<sup>30</sup> This figure excludes the Pomaks, who number about 160,000 and consider themselves Turk, the government having abandoned the old religious classification and adopted instead an ethnic linguistic classification that allows the Bulgarian-speaking Muslim Pomaks to be classified as "Bulgarians." The last forced exodus of Turks from Bulgaria, involving some 152,000 people (some put the figure at 156,000) occurred in 1950–1952. From that date onwards Turkish emigration dwindled to insignificance because industrialization increased Bulgaria's need for manpower. Thus, one can say that the growth of the Turkish population in Bulgaria after 1960 was not reduced by emigrations, as was the case from 1878 to 1944 and 1951–1952. According to Bulgarian official statistics the total of Muslims (Turks, with Pomaks added in) in Bulgaria amounted roughly to 860,000 or 12% of the population in 1956. This total of 860,000 Muslims does not include the 197,000 Gypsies listed in the statistics of 1956, although most of them were Muslims. If the Gypsies are added to the total, then the Muslims in 1956 amounted to at least 14 to 15% of the population according to rounded Bulgarian official statistics. We know from a variety of sources that the Bulgarian government manipulated the census figures so as to show the number of Turks as lower than the true figure. The reclassification of the Pomaks is one such manipulation. Taking into account the various omissions from the official statistics, one may reasonably place the total of the Muslim population of Bulgaria in 1960 at some 20% of the entire population, or, roughly, 1,600,000. (I believe that even this figure is too low.)

The industrial development and urbanization after 1960 affected mainly the ethnic Bulgarian population. The occupation change from agriculture to industry and services resulted in the movement of a large number of ethnic Bulgarians from villages and town to cities. Meanwhile, the Turkish population in particular, and Muslims in general with the exception of those from a few areas around Plovdiv, Burgas, etc., stayed in their villages and remained primarily involved in agriculture. (Presently about 80% of the Muslims live in rural areas.) The Bulgarian government welcomed this development in the

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<sup>30</sup> See B. Kayser, *La Population et l'économie de la République Populaire Bulgare* (Paris, 1961).

1960s and 1970s because industrialization and urbanization resulted in an upgrading of the quality of life for ethnic Bulgarians. The government exploited the agricultural sector, in which the Muslim-Turkish population was concentrated, to finance its industrialization. It paid very low agricultural wages and, in the process, downgraded the living standards of the Turks. The share of the agricultural labor force, which stood at 82.1% of the total labor force in 1948, dropped to 23.8% in 1980. One may assume that about half of the agricultural force consisted of Muslims, since their rate of movement into industry (except for mining and similar hazardous occupations) was very low. The ethnic Bulgarian peasantry became a blue-collar working class overnight, while the Muslims stayed in agriculture.

The same condition prevailed in the army, which, like its counterpart in the USSR, used Muslims as work units. We do not have exact figures for the percentage of Muslims in the Bulgarian military forces; yet it is safe to assume that, in view of their high birth rate as contrasted with the low rate for the Bulgarians, the percentage of Turks and Muslims in general in the army amounted to some 30% in 1980. The Muslim units are not trained for battle; therefore, the fighting capability of the Bulgarian army, if measured in terms of the number of fighting men, has undergone a steady deterioration since the mid-1970s. The Bulgarian government, having oppressed its Turkish citizens since 1970, is fully aware that it cannot now count on their loyalty in case of war with Turkey.

The service and construction sectors, which together accounted for 32.8% of the labor force, were equally affected. The Muslims who lived in small towns or on the periphery of cities were used collectively to build roads, port installations, and a variety of other projects involving heavy labor.<sup>31</sup> Since agriculture relied on low paid manual labor supplied by Muslims, the government invested relatively little in heavy agricultural machinery. Thus, the drop of agricultural investment from 29.7% of the total in 1960 to 12.4% in 1980 (the actual gross did not change that much) can be explained by the fact that the government could exploit at will the working Muslim population. The results of this economic policy based on the

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<sup>31</sup> I have collected this information during my frequent trips through Bulgaria in the 1960s and 1970s. I have also interviewed hundreds of Turks from Bulgaria who emigrated to Turkey.

exploitation of the Turkish Muslim element were just the opposite from those expected.

In the late 1940s, and 1950s, in order to win the support of the population, the government introduced sanitary services, and opened schools, including professional schools. In the Turkish areas, the number of schools went up from 424 in 1943 to 1,199 in 1949–1950, and the number of teachers rose from 871 to 3,037 in the same period. Consequently, the literacy rate among Turks, which was around 20% in 1940, went up to 50 or 60% in 1970, while the health services helped increase the survival rate of the newborns. (Even before the new regime took power in 1944, the sanitary services, as well as the general standard of life in Bulgaria, were of a relatively higher quality than in all the other Balkan countries, including Turkey.) Moreover, the relatively low consumption of alcohol and the dietary habits of the Muslims permitted them to maintain a healthy life: their cuisine uses practically any ingredient grown in the backyard or on small pieces of land around the house. Thus, while the ethnic Bulgarian population in cities had to wait for hours in line to receive second-class foodstuffs, the Turks living in rural areas had plenty of homegrown food, however simple. Meanwhile, the Bulgarian ruling party opened branches in the villages and created a local bureaucratic structure manned by the new, politically-minded Muslim intellectual elite. This elite was under the direct supervision of the ethnic Bulgarian chiefs, but it could occasionally articulate demands and defend the interests of its own people. A few of the Muslim intellectuals made it to the top: that is, they were given seats in the Legislature.<sup>32</sup> Finally, one must mention the fact that in the late 1940s and 1950s, Bulgaria was used by the Soviet Union as a show-case to illustrate the superiority of the socialist regime in achieving rapid economic development, especially in comparison with Turkey whose economy was underdeveloped. (A substantial amount of literature depicting the “happy” life of the Turks in socialist Bulgaria was smuggled into Turkey in the 1950s and 1960s.)

The result of this policy was that by the mid-1950s the growth of the Muslim—and notably of the Turkish—population began to increase dramatically, while the rate of growth among the ethnic

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<sup>32</sup> Halil İbiş, a former Turkish member of the Bulgarian legislature, took refuge in Turkey and eventually testified before congressional committees in the USA.

Bulgarians dropped steadily. The death rate among the aged Bulgarians also increased, due to the shortage of food in cities, to excessive work, and a variety of other ills associated with rapid industrial development. One may safely assume that by 1960 the annual growth rate among the Muslims of Bulgaria had increased by at least 3%. There are no accurate statistics available on the Muslim population's growth rate. The Bulgarian government provided census figures which showed that the size of the Muslim—i.e., Turkish—population remained the same during a thirty-year period, although there was practically no emigration between 1952 and 1987. Yet we know for certain, from field observations and sporadic talks with local people in Bulgarian villages and towns, that the rate of growth of the Muslims population accelerated steadily after 1956. The number of children in an average rural Muslim family in Bulgaria in the period 1950–1985 increased from two to three (1940–1960) to five or six in 1980; the marriage age decreased from 20–22 to 18–20 in the 1960s, contributing greatly to the explosion of population among the Turks.<sup>33</sup> Meanwhile, the ethnic Bulgarian population was ageing and by 1980 could not even replace itself, a phenomenon common in all of Eastern Europe. On the basis of the various available figures, one may assume that the Muslim population of Bulgaria (excluding the Gypsies, whose number is now placed at 500,000) has been increasing at a rate of at least 3% yearly. If one takes as a basis of calculation the entire Muslim population as of 1960 as we have it from unofficial but reliable sources, then the size of the Muslim (mostly Turkish) component of the Bulgarian population may be given as follows:

1960	1,600,000
1970	2,080,000
1980	2,624,000
1985	3,017,000

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<sup>33</sup> I was told in 1978–1979, by several people intimately familiar with the life of the Turkish villages in the Deliorman (Silistre-Tutrakan) area, that young Muslim activities formed teams among themselves and went from one village to the next urging Turkish families to marry off their sons and daughters early and to have as many children as possible. This occurred after the Bulgarian government intensified its pressure and attempted to prevent the Turks from having many children by cutting down the child allowances.



A student of Bulgarian affairs, who was born and raised in the area and had access to unpublished data, gives the following figures for the Muslim population.<sup>34</sup>

1892	1,212,986
1900	1,182,956
1910	1,107,644
1926	1,430,329 (including western Macedonia, acquired in 1913)
1934	1,439,566
1941	1,471,000 (including Dobruca)
1956	1,075,000 (Pomaks not included)
1971	1,450,000 (Pomaks not included)

#### Muslim Emigration from Bulgaria

1935–1940	95,494
1941–1949	14,390
1950–1951	156,000

According to our calculations which we believe to be correct, the current proportion of the Muslim population of Bulgaria is as high as 28%, which is normal, given Bulgaria's special ethnic and economic situation as described above. One may go as far as to say that the drop in growth of the Bulgarian population (from 9.7 per thousand in 1960 to 2.2 per thousand in 1983) occurred mainly among ethnic Bulgarians. In fact, the national growth probably can be attributed mostly to the sharp rise of the birth rate among Muslims. (A similar demographic phenomenon occurred among the Muslims of Central Asia, as indicated by various Soviet censuses. The parallel growth of the Muslim population in the USSR and Bulgaria are not coincidental, since the history and treatment of the Muslims in both countries have been similar).<sup>35</sup>

The growth in size of the Muslim population, accompanied by

<sup>34</sup> See Halit Molla Hüseyin, "Muslims in Bulgaria: A Status Report," *Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 5, January 1984, pp. 136–144. For a comprehensive study of immigration from Bulgaria, see Cevat Geray, *Türkiyeden ve Türkiye's Göçler ve Göçmenlerin İskanı* ("Turkish Emigration and Immigration and Settlement") (Ankara, 1962).

<sup>35</sup> There is abundant literature on the birth rates among the Soviet Muslims; see, in particular, the work of Murray Feshbach, "The Soviet Union Population Trends and Dilemmas," *Population Bulletin* 37, No. 3 (1982), pp. 1–45.

the emergence of native élites, produced alarmed reactions from the Bulgarian government beginning in the mid-1970s, when it began to close Turkish schools, newspapers, etc. The Turks reacted to these measures by demanding explanations and by voicing criticism. Long dormant nationalist feelings were awakened among them; it was rumored, for example, that some Turkish leaders had asked for autonomy in the districts where they formed a majority as a means of defending their ethnic identity. The Bulgarian government responded by increasing the pressure, only to cause further resistance and open defiance, as shown by acts of sabotage, bombings, and the like. Yet the government would not expel the troublesome Turks or even allow them to emigrate because it had become vitally dependent on their cheap slave-like labor. Without Turks, the Bulgarian agriculture and even services sectors would collapse. The Turks had become indispensable to the Bulgarian economy, even though they were detested and feared. The Bulgarian government out of sheer greed and nationalist passion had pushed itself into an economic and political corner: it did not want the Turks in the country; yet, it could not do without them. This situation explains the Bulgarian government's new, negative attitude towards the emigration of their ethnic minorities. For instance, in 1920 the Greek populations of Messembria and Sozopolis, two Black Sea ports which had been Greek since the sixth century BC, were expelled without remorse. In 1913 the Bulgarians applied every possible pressure on the Turks of Quadrilater to get them to leave their lands, and in 1950–1952 it expelled 152,000 Turks, as already mentioned.<sup>36</sup> Yet, since 1960 Bulgaria refused adamantly to permit any Turk to emigrate, despite the oft-repeated offer of the Turkish government to accept all the Muslims of Bulgaria who wanted to settle in Turkey.

The Bulgarian government had no choice; if it let its Muslim citizens emigrate, its shaky economy would collapse overnight. If it kept the Muslims and they continued to multiply their numbers, then in a matter of twenty years ethnic Bulgarians would have become a minority. The government came inexorably to the conclusion, after

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<sup>36</sup> The best source on the history of the Turks in Bulgaria is by Bilal Şimşir, *Bulgaristan Türkleri*, ("The Turks of Bulgaria") (Istanbul, 1986). Şimşir attended elementary and high school in Bulgaria before emigrating to Turkey. He has an intimate knowledge of the Bulgarian government's policies as well as of the language and customs of the country.

trying unsuccessfully to stem the growth of the Turkish population, that it would have to Bulgarize them. Hence the policy of baptizing the Turks as Christians under the guise of merely changing their names.<sup>37</sup> Thus, an atheistic communist government was forced, in the end, to employ religion to advance its nationalist aims, and forced by grim economic, demographic and political reality to declare that "there are no Turks in Bulgaria."

Once more the Bulgarian leaders have misused the power in their hands and exposed their country and its people to endless peril. David Binder's insightful conclusion to his article on Bulgaria is worth citing at some length:

"The Bulgarians never liberated themselves" remarked a Macedonian from Yugoslavia, who is a keen observer of this country [Bulgaria], "and after the Russians liberated them [in 1878], they only won one war, a short one in 1885 [against Serbia]. Bulgaristan history is discontinuity" he said, adding that "they chose the wrong side in three wars," suffering defeat in the second Balkan War, and again in World War I and II, when Bulgaria sided with Germany. Having made wrong choices at three critical junctures in the space of less than three decades "there is no fixed reference point" observed the Macedonian. For Bulgarians, who is to say the choices they make now are not wrong?<sup>38</sup>

### *Epilogue*

The actions of the Bulgarian government went unnoticed to a large extent by the Western press, while it was totally ignored by the East European news media. However, Muslims in the Soviet Union repeatedly criticized in private the Bulgarian action and did not hesitate to show their disapproval. A Bulgarian dance group which came to Baku in Azerbaijan was booed and expelled without being able to

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<sup>37</sup> The actions of the Bulgarian government has caused consternation among some, but not all, Bulgaristans abroad. Some scholars of Bulgarian affairs in the USA have, in the presence of this writer, expressed their satisfaction with the policy, stating, "if the Bulgarian government can get away with the baptism of the Turks, then it will be thanked by the next generations." The Bulgaristan Studies Association in the USA has remained entirely silent on this issue. For a bold Bulgarian criticism on the treatment of the Turks, see S.T. Raikin, "Problems of Communism in Bulgaria. Liquidation of the Turkish Minority in Bulgaria," *Free Agrarian Banner*, No. 45/46 (1985), p. 113.

<sup>38</sup> *New York Times Magazine*, 8 December 1985, p. 162.

perform in public. The Crimean Tatars gave a strongly-worded protest to the Bulgarian ambassador in Moscow.

The issue was taken up finally by Muslim international forums, thanks in part to the selfless dedication of Dr. Abdellah Omar Nasseef, the heart of the RABITA, who chaired the last committee set up by the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers. Indeed, the sixteenth conference which met in Fez in 1986 established a three-member committee to investigate the issue—the official name of the committee being The Contact Group of the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

The Turkish government asked the Committee to investigate the latest developments, that is the expelling of the Turks. The Committee headed by Dr. Naseef visited the refugee camps from August 10 to 13, 1989, and issued its report soon afterwards. The lengthy report presents a realistic description of the plight of Bulgarian Muslims, and underscores the undemocratic and defiant attitude of the Bulgarian government. It concluded by urging the Muslim governments to “lodge protests in the strongest term through their respective mission in Sofia” and make it clear to the Bulgarian government “that economic relations with Sofia would be damaged” and a “review be undertaken of all existing bilateral, economic and commercial relations between all member countries of the OIC and Bulgaria.”<sup>39</sup>

Meanwhile, the European Parliament passed a resolution threatening to take economic action against Bulgaria if the government continued to mistreat its citizens of Turkish origin. Meanwhile, in the United States Congress, Senator Dennis Concini of Arizona, Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, introduced a resolution concurrent with the resolution introduced in the House by representative Steny H. Hoyer of Maryland and Steven Solarz of New York.<sup>40</sup> These resolutions detail the history of the campaign to Bulgarize the Turks, from the various discriminatory acts of the 1950s to the expulsions of 1989, and cite the various international agreements being violated by Bulgaria in this policy. They called upon the US administration to raise the issue “in all

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<sup>39</sup> Report of the Contact Group of the O.I.C. on its visit to Turkey from 10 to 13 August 1989, pp. 7–8.

<sup>40</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 135, No. 80, June 15, 1989.

appropriate international *fora*" (*Congressional Record*, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 1989, Vol. 135, No. 80). In August the US Ambassador to Bulgaria was recalled. The displeasure of the USA may be felt in other ways also. In an article in *The Christian Science Monitor* of 2 March 1988 (p. 19), Congressman Hoyer suggested that the more recent "openness" on the part of high-level Bulgarian officials, spurred in part by the desire to gain full membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and to enhance Bulgaria's access to Western markets and technology, can be met with a challenge [to the assimilation campaign].

Thus, if the USSR embarks on a full-fledged retrenchment on her commitment to East European satellites—as many feel she must and is even now beginning to do—Bulgaria's government may find that in ridding itself of the "Turkish problem," it has also destroyed all credibility with the rest of the international community toward which it will need to turn for trade and aid in lieu of the Soviets. Thus, it will have created for Bulgaria a larger problem: one of survival on its own in a world that, for the most part, finds its treatment of its Turkish minority abhorrent. In this context, the resignation of Todor Zhivkov from the premiership and then his ousting as head of state and replacement with a new slate of leaders in November of 1989, becomes more understandable. Bulgarian demonstrators in Sofia, however, rapidly silenced and admonished as "traitor" a speaker who called attention to the unjust treatment of the Turks. In effect, the Bulgarians showed as usual that their understanding of democracy and human rights does not include their own co-nationals of Turkish origin, even though the suffering, struggle, sacrifices and resistance of the Turks inflicted a devastating moral and physical blow to Zhivkov's dictatorship and hastened its demise. It provided a model of courage and integrity that finally ethnic Bulgarians decided to follow in order to achieve their own liberation. It is probably with these things on his mind that Premier Peter Mladenov on 12 December 1989, finally acknowledged that the Turks of Bulgaria had been subjected to unjust and cruel treatment in forcing them to change their names, and asked for forgiveness. It remains to be seen whether this act of recanting is sincere and leads to the redress of the wrongs done to the Turks or is just another subterfuge. (Mladenov used the Belgrade talks of 1986 for that purpose—to placate the Turks and world public opinion until the issue is forgotten.) The century-old

history of religious and national persecution is deeply imbedded in the Bulgarian mind and cannot be uprooted with mere verbal lip-service to the cause of justice and human rights. Bulgaria must prove with concrete deeds that it really believes in these principles of democracy and justice by restoring full rights to its Muslim citizens.

(February 1990)

## THE SOCIOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT CONDITIONING THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

### *Introduction: General Considerations*

The purpose of this study is to deal with the broad historical, political, cultural, territorial, and national factors that condition the foreign policy of the Turkic states of Azerbaijan and Central Asia. Tajikistan, due to its unsettled situation, will be given less attention, although much of what follows applies to that state, too. It should be noted from the beginning that independence came for all the ex-Soviet republics, and especially the Turkic states, suddenly and rather unexpectedly, without the usual period of preparation that permits the formation of proper public and national opinion, leadership cadres, communication networks, and so forth, free from the influence and mentality of the old dominating center. Thus, during the first two years of independence the Central Asian states formulated their foreign policies in close relation to internal developments in Russia, all the while attempting to gain recognition from as many foreign states as possible in order to distance themselves from Russia. Consequently, this study will devote considerable attention to those events in the Russian Federation that affected the course of political life in Central Asia. The foreign policy of the Turkic states is part and parcel of their emergence as national states, and the two are viewed as such in this study. In fact, the foreign policy of the new nations in Central Asia is part of the founding process, much the way the foreign policy of Atatürk in 1920–23 was part of the founding of the Republic of Turkey. The founders of the national states have considerable freedom to decide their future foreign policies, but also a high degree of limitation imposed by Russia, due to their past association with the Soviet Union, which continues in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the transformation of the union republics into independent territorial nation-states have raised a series of basic conceptual, philosophical, and practical issues, both for the Russian Federation and the new states.

The first and paramount issue was the redefinition of nationhood, national identity, territorial borders, and national interest according to the new realities. Paradoxical as it may appear, history places the Central Asian states in a better position than Russia as far as some of these points are concerned. Throughout the socialist period Moscow and the Russian Federation—although largely led by ethnic Russians—acted as the ideological and administrative seat of a supposedly classless society composed of a great variety of ethnic groups. These groups, of course, were denied the freedom to express their national political consciousness. The nationality policy applied to the Muslim republics aimed primarily at fragmenting the universal Islamic community, the *ummet*, an imaginary, ideal concept rather than a reality. The Soviet regime feared its neighbors, the old spokesmen for this *ummet*: primarily Iran, and, somewhat less, Turkey. The latter abolished the caliphate in 1924 and abandoned the pretension of commanding the Muslims' political allegiance. However, the abolition of the caliphate in Turkey did not eliminate overnight the Islamic traditions and cultural outlook of the Central Asians, acquired over centuries, or their habit of regarding İstanbul as their national Islamic center, second only to Mecca and Medina. For Central Asians and other Muslims of Russia, the hajj to Mecca without a stop in İstanbul was considered incomplete.<sup>1</sup> At various dates, mainly from 1924 to 1936, Central Asia was divided into a variety of administrative-territorial units in order to break down the *ummet's* territorial unity by identifying each ethnolinguistic group with a territory.

The Soviet nationality policy, as is well known, emphasized ethnicity as the foundation of political identity and made the vernacular the distinguishing element of nationality of the major ethnic groups. This policy was in essence an almost ideal blueprint for speeding up nation formation in Central Asia and Azerbaijan (the nationality policy there brought together the various old Azeri khanates, such as Shirvan, Kuba, and Shusha). Meanwhile, the supposedly supra-nationality policy of the Soviets greatly expanded the usage of the Russian language and generalized many elements of the Russian political-communist culture, while the leaders refused to call the

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<sup>1</sup> The issues are discussed in Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, eds., *Muslim Travellers: Pilgrimage, Migration and the Religious Imagination* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).



Soviet Union a Russian state. The Soviet policy resembled the Ottoman efforts in the nineteenth century to create an Ottoman nation out of diverse ethnic groups. This Ottoman policy strengthened the national identity of the members of various ethnic groups while holding back and neutralizing the national identity of the ethnic Turks. Hence Turkish nationalism did not acquire its distinct marks until the twentieth century, while Russian "nationalism" emerged in the nineteenth century as a means to assimilate the tsar's non-Russian subjects. One might further note numerous striking parallels in the nationality problems, changes in the political regimes, and economic policies of the Ottoman and Russian empires and the Republic of Turkey and the Soviet Union. (All this could be made the subject of an illuminating historical study.)

The basic problem for Russia today is to become a true nation with an identity and culture of its own. The Russian state must decide whether it wants to achieve economic, spiritual, and cultural self-fulfillment first for the Russians as a people, or continue to view its "Russian-ness" as intrinsically bound to the domination of other ethnic and national groups. This domination prevented the emergence of a Russian identity independent of the domination of others. The state became in fact the vehicle to indoctrinate the Russians with messianic dreams and use them as the docile tools of an expansionist state. If Russia desires honestly to become an authentic Russian nation-state without the psychological need to dominate other nations, this attitude can profoundly affect the internal and external policies of the Central Asian states. The issue deserves more scrutiny than we can give it here. Suffice it to say that the search by the Russians for "superpower" status implies the restoration of the old structure. The fall of many world empires—Ottoman, Habsburg, British, French—since 1918 has left lasting wounds, but nowhere do the imperial memories appear as deeply rooted in the popular psyche as in Russia.

The situation in the former Soviet Union must be placed in the proper perspective in order to better appraise the situation of the Central Asian states. The entire history of Russia has been made and unmade by the state, that is, a power group, not by the nation or society. The case is proven by events in 1991. The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 was preceded by the collapse of the center, that is, the Soviet state, which was embodied in the Communist Party and its numerous policy-making bodies, much in the way that

the end of the monarchical state had brought about the end of the tsarist regime in 1917. The collapse of the communist state compelled the Russians to realize overnight that they were an inchoate nation, an amorphous body of people without a distinct political identity deriving from a true national state of their own.<sup>2</sup> The absence of a true governing Russian nation in a multiethnic structure is typical of the traditional type of empires of which the Soviet Union was the last surviving prototype, despite claims to the contrary. Of course, the Soviet government further complicated the situation by actually adopting the European colonialist formula of the metropolis-colony dichotomy in its military and economic relations with the periphery, while striving to Russify and “denationalize” the Muslims through the policy of atheism, which could undermine Islam as a source of national identity more than the weakening of Orthodoxy undermined the Russians’ sense of national identity. While Russian colonists poured into every economically promising crevice of the vast Soviet territory, they remained distinguished from Central Asians and Muslims in general by their dominant political-economic status and their language and Orthodox faith. The Russians acted as the dominant social class, but also as the supporting human basis of the state rather than as the representatives of a Russian nation. The issue was aggravated further by the fact that the non-Russian Europeans were considered also “Russians,” although ethnically and linguistically they never considered themselves as such. Thus, in the ultimate analysis, “Russian-ness” in Central Asia was determined by one’s association with the “center-state,” which in turn conferred status. In practice, the real difference between the “outsiders” and the indigenous population was determined by religion. Indeed, no Muslim Tatar, Chechen, Turk, or Persian, for example, however high his education, achievement, or position, could ever qualify as a “Russian” or “European” unless he converted to Christianity and became fully Russified in manners and spirit. These are known issues, but they need to be reviewed to understand better the meaning of the political transformation of Central Asia and the current psychological-legal position of the Russians in the area. The Russians, in short, are viewed as the tools of an oppressive alien state rather than the

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<sup>2</sup> For a discussion of what is “Russian” and who are the “Russians,” see Paul Goble, “Russia and Its Neighbors,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 90 (Spring 1993), pp. 79–88.

*bona fide* members of a normal nation, and they are treated as such.

The disintegration of the Soviet center, that is, the party-state, left largely intact and capable of reorganizing and reactivating themselves the very institutions that helped the center govern the periphery. Among these institutions of the center, the armed forces, the Ministry of the Interior, and the KGB occupy the first rank. It is these bodies that are now striving to re-create the old center, both by using the CIS as their tool and by casting themselves as defenders of the "civil" rights of the Russians living in the old Soviet republics. These two issues increasingly occupy a central place in the foreign relations of the old republics with Russia.

The CIS, about which there will be further discussion, is the potential vehicle capable of transforming the old extensive imperial center-periphery relationship into a new selective, harmonious economic and military relationship between the Russian Federation and the old republics. But the CIS can also be easily used by Moscow to dominate the ex-republics by assuring for itself the utmost benefits and fewest liabilities. At the moment the power instruments of the old communist state, that is, the army and the KGB in Russia, are in the process of developing a new relationship with the old Central Asian and Caucasian periphery. It should not be forgotten that the ex-Soviet army, although reduced in size, remains a formidable force, and it, the KGB, and the relevant ministries are indoctrinated with a heavy dose of nationalism, which, for lack of a truly persuasive and binding Soviet nationalism, had to borrow its symbols, heroes, and spirit from the Russian messianic nationalism used by the tsarist regime throughout its expansionist existence. Nationalism in Russia today emanates from the military, the KGB, and various civilian groups. The current weakness of the "national" political institutions of the Russian Federation, such as the parliament and constitution, the slow progress of privatization and the market economy, and public apathy have induced the leaders, including Boris Yeltsin and his prime minister, to court the power instruments of the old Soviet state, especially the armed forces. In this context one can point out that Yeltsin's brutal elimination of the old parliament in October 1993—amidst applause from the West—and the election of a new one in which the conservative-nationalist forces have the numerical superiority have greatly increased the influence of the army and other irredentist forces. The outcome of this struggle cannot be predicted with accuracy, although one can venture some views. The USSR

was brought down primarily because of the economic weight and political oppression of the state organs, especially the army, operating through the Communist Party. A restoration of the old state by the instruments of the state can only bring to power and give additional privileges and authority to the military, the KGB, and other antidemocratic forces. The restoration of the old order can only hasten its fall in a much more dramatic and, socially speaking, costly manner than the fall of the USSR. The Soviet regime sought to save the tsarist empire with internal reforms. There is no other regime to save what is left of the communist empire but democracy, if it can be implemented at all.

### *The Vestiges of the Soviet Union*

The foreign policy of the Central Asian states is conditioned simultaneously by the challenges and developments taking place in the Russian Federation (including efforts to re-create the old union) and the ethnic, cultural, economic, and historical forces within their own territories unleashed by independence and national statehood. The CIS forms the main axis of the foreign policy of the Central Asian states. Consequently, Central Asian foreign relations are conditioned by a set of circumstances that have no parallel in world history, except probably to a limited measure in France's relations with its former colonies in Central and West Africa. The restoration of the Russian Foreign Ministry to its previous policy-making status is an omen of things to come. The Foreign Ministry in both the tsarist and Soviet eras has played a major and generally successful role in projecting abroad selected images about the intentions and policies of the state. Its leading personnel have always been selected from among the exceptionally well-educated and sophisticated Russians and Russified non-Slavs whose psychological understanding of the West, including the United States, was repeatedly proven by their adroit ability to manipulate the Western press and the public. No Russian foreign policy could be carried out without the input of the Foreign Ministry. Consequently, the Foreign Ministry has been called to carry out the new foreign policy of the Russian Federation, whose objectives were defined in part in circles of the armed forces. The former republics became the central target of the "near abroad" policy, indicating that they were still regarded as part of the "internal"

empire rather than truly independent nation-states. The rapid transformation of the Russian Foreign Ministry (including Andrei Kozyrev) from an institution promoting a Western-type democracy, respect for the independence of other nations, the market economy, and close relations with the West (it is the most Westernized segment of the Russian bureaucracy) into an advocate of a nationalist policy toward the near abroad, including Central Asia, is worthy of some discussion. As the USSR began to disintegrate, Yeltsin issued a decree on 18 December 1991 making the Soviet Foreign Ministry and all its assets an institution of the Russian Federation; one week later he placed Deputy Prime Minister Gennadii Burbulis in charge. Andrei Kozyrev, who had been in office since November 1990 and who was Yeltsin's protégé, kept his place, evincing a truly intriguing ability to survive, given the harsh criticism leveled at him.<sup>3</sup> At this early stage it seemed that Russia was ready to accept and conduct regular relations with the new nations, as indicated by the creation of a new department to oversee relations with the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (created late in 1991). Meanwhile, the Russian Foreign Ministry decided to upgrade its information services. This move was undertaken primarily to answer state critics who had severely censured Kozyrev and even asked for his resignation because they saw Russia's foreign policy as too accommodating to the West and ready to accept as a *fait accompli* the new political configuration of the former Soviet Union. In fact, early in 1992 Kozyrev made a tour of the CIS nations and established diplomatic relations with Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Moldova. Both Yeltsin and Kozyrev opposed the creation of a special ministry to deal with the CIS countries, as proposed by the state counselor Sergei Stankevich, an advocate of an active near abroad policy. The Security Council of the Russian Federation, headed by Iurii Skokov, also had endorsed the idea of a special ministry to deal with the near abroad (Skokov would be dismissed eventually). Skokov asked for Kozyrev's resignation, while the latter accused the proponents of an intensive near abroad policy of being "national patriots" and "neo-Bolsheviks"<sup>4</sup> and defended a good-neighbor policy with the former Soviet republics. The conduct

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<sup>3</sup> See Suzanne Crow, "Personnel Changes in the Russian Foreign Ministry," *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 1, no. 16 (17 April 1992).

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*; see also *idem*, "Russia Prepares to Take a Hard Line on the Near Abroad," *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 1, no. 32 (14 August 1992).

of relations with the near abroad was left ultimately to the Foreign Ministry. The decision represented a victory for Yeltsin and Kozyrev and was received with deep relief by all the ex-republics, for it neutralized the ultranationalists. Obviously Yeltsin and Kozyrev's initial accommodating attitude toward the former union republics came as much from domestic power considerations as from fear of alienating the West. However, ultimately late in 1993 the growing pressure of the nationalists and the army, coupled with a loss of popularity by Yeltsin, led him and Kozyrev closer to the position held by the advocates of a strong near abroad policy.

We have devoted considerable attention in the above pages to developments in Russia because they are part of the general process that seeks to define the content and scope of the postcommunist Russian nation and will in turn play a crucial part in the foreign policy of the Central Asian nations.

The Russian Federation is engaged in a search for a definition of the Russian nation, its territorial scope, cultural content, and relations with the state and a true perception of its own history, while seeking to introduce democracy and a market economy. In contrast, the Central Asian nations, unbelievable as it may seem at first sight, appear to be in a relatively better situation as far as formal territory and definition of nationality are concerned. The breakup of the Soviet Union left the Turkic states with a well-defined territory (however artificially drawn initially) and a national identity, which, although imposed from above, rested on concrete and genuine ethnolinguistic bases, and on a historical background suitable to the formulation of a national history.<sup>5</sup> Already several Kazakh, Uzbek, Azeri, and other "national" histories based on rather interesting cultural, anthropological, and economic data encompassing the old tribal federations, traditional khanates, and so forth, have appeared in print.<sup>6</sup> The first demand of scholars and visitors from the area to the West is for printed information on the history of their "national" states,

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<sup>5</sup> See Kemal H. Karpat, "Central Asia Between Old and New," *Central Asian Survey*, vol. 12, no. 4 (1993), pp. 415–25.

<sup>6</sup> For the new history textbooks, see Murakthan Kani, *Kazaktyn Köne Tarikhy* [The old history of the Kazakhs] (Almaty: Zhalyñ, 1993). This is a reprint of the original, which appeared in 1987 in Arabic script in Sinkiang in China; it is based on Arabic, Persian, and Chinese sources. See also Ermukhan Bekmukhanov, *Kazakhstan v 20–40 gody XIX veka* (Almaty: Qazaq universiteti, 1992). This book was initially published in 1947 and was banned by the Soviet authorities.

the naive assumption being that their "nation" had been in existence for centuries and that the statehood gained in 1991 was a belated recognition of a historical fact. This preoccupation with old history is essentially part of the comprehensive process of decolonization taking place in the political, cultural, and economic spheres of activity of the Central Asian states. The Soviet era is dismissed as an accidental phase of national life. The more positive aspects of the Soviet era, such as increased literacy, the rise of modernist elites, medical services, road and rail infrastructure, and communications are judged from a national perspective, as both the tsarist and communist regimes are viewed as colonial and imperial structures that delayed—rather than speeded up—the nation-formation process. Also, one cannot ignore the fact that half of the population of Central Asia, in fact over 50 percent in Tajikistan, deals in agriculture and has preserved its traditional culture and modes of life, as did most of the native lower-income urban groups. The issue has a basic relevance to the process of nation formation, as the indigenous culture of the lower classes may become the source of national culture. The situation appears to be rather confusing in Tajikistan, which lacked a true ethnic Persian foundation, since the accepted culture was the Islamic-urban culture centered in linguistically cosmopolitan cities, while in the countryside the tribal-ethnic culture of the Uzbeks dominated (it should not be forgotten that most of Tajikistan was administered from Bukhara until the Soviet era).

For the first time in their history the Central Asian states are in possession of a well-defined area and are identified with a modern type of political structure, namely, the territorial national state, in which, to repeat, the nation and the state formally coincide. The source of national identity is ethnicity based on language, and indeed ethnicity and language appear to define national territorial statehood. Other forms of identity appear to be secondary to ethnonational identity, at least for the time being, since ethnicity in Central Asia is open to wide interpretation. If ethnicity is defined not solely by language but as a mode of life comprising all the elements of material and spiritual culture, then a language-based view of ethnicity and nationality appears to be rather narrow. In any case, the old forms of identity emanating from clan, tribe, region, religion, and ethnicity appear to have realigned themselves, politically speaking, in a hierarchical order, topped by the territory-bound "national" ethnic identity, at least among the ruling elites. The conservative

modernists and *nomenklatura* elites seem to be united in accepting the primacy of the national-ethnic identity, primarily toward others. At the same time, the Central Asian governments strive to promote the idea that Central Asia is a cultural whole—that is, it shares a common culture, history, and religion—but is divided into a series of political-administrative units that give recognition to the prevailing linguistic, regional, and geographic differences. The desire to harmonize the particular with the general and universal is reflected in the foreign policy of the Central Asian states in the form of regional organizations, mainly economic, while the older generation often invokes the union of Turkestan.

It is in the context of the special circumstances that attended the process of nation formation in Central Asia and Azerbaijan that Islam acquires its true function, not solely as a source of spiritual nourishment for individuals but as the cultural foundation of the emerging national culture and language. A broad, almost universal concept of cultural ethnicity was based on Islam, while linguistic and tribal identity coexisted with it in a subordinate capacity. Today national identity based on language-rooted ethnicity is promoted by the government and has the upper hand over Islamic cultural ethnicity. In a speech dedicated to the “Strategy of the Formation and Development of Kazakhstan as a Sovereign State,” President Nazarbaev declared that a “nation cannot exist without a state system . . . in its turn the disappearance of a nation leads to a senseless existence of its state.” The progress of the state was bound to the “revitalization of the national culture and language and the restoration of the spiritual-cultural roots of Kazakhness . . . [and] on the creation of the necessary requisite conditions for the Kazakhs who were forced to leave their country to come back.” After defining Kazakhstan as an open, peace-loving, and democratic state, respectful of the sovereignty of other states and possessing a multistructured market economy, Nazarbaev touched upon the “complicated ethnopolitical and legal” nature of Kazakh society by defining it as a sovereign ethnic-national Kazakh entity with deep national roots and traditions and a multiethnic political community.<sup>7</sup> Obviously Nazarbaev strived to find a formula that would allow him to culturally transform the country into a Kazakh national state while recognizing the rights of other

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<sup>7</sup> *Kazakhstanskaia pravda*, 15 May 1992.



minorities, especially the Russians. So-called fundamentalist Islam, on the other hand, rejects the entire concept of territorial national statehood and language-based ethnicity and thus appears at odds with both the historical evolution of the Central Asian states and their current political-social situation and aspirations. The Central Asian states pursue a "secular" policy not so much because of the separation of politics and religion, which is a rather debatable concept, but because the very survival of each of the newly constituted independent states depends on the preservation of national-ethnic identity and territory. The rise of ethnicity as the mark of national identity raises a series of disturbing questions concerning the freedom of ethnic subgroups in each republic, since each possesses scores of other ethnic groups. Thus the Karakalpaks in Uzbekistan—about a million—consider themselves closer to the Kazakhs than Uzbeks and looked to Moscow in the past to balance the authority of Tashkent. There is of course the view that "cultural ethnicity" is different from "political ethnicity." In other words, the minor ethnic groups in Kazakhstan would accept the fact that the state is politically Kazakh and that all have citizenship, while the minority groups would enjoy full linguistic, religious, and cultural freedom, although this formula may not work well in a unitary centralized state.

### *The Foreign Policy of the Central Asian States*

The Central Asian republics moved swiftly to national independence in 1991 through a series of popular independence referendums, followed by presidential elections that gave the governments a legitimate foundation of power.<sup>8</sup> The Soviet Union, hitherto considered a superpower with immense military capabilities, disintegrated at a speed unknown in world annals because the state mechanism (the Communist Party) that had kept the union together was abolished and left its main organs—the army, the KGB, and so forth—without direction, although these bodies underwent some disintegration. Unlike other states that emerged with independence from the disintegration of the Ottoman, Habsburg, and West European empires,

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<sup>8</sup> See reports in *Presidential Elections and Independence Referendums in the Baltic States, the Soviet Union and Successor States* (Washington, DC: Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1992).

the Central Asian states gained their freedom and sovereignty without prolonged struggle or bloodshed. The demonstrations in Almaty (note the recent Kazakhization of the name from the Russian Alma-Ata) in 1986, the bloody occupation of Baku in 1989, and the subsequent gaining of new strength by the Azerbaijan Popular Front and its demonstrations indicated the presence of popular will to achieve some freedom from Moscow. These events played some part in conditioning the judgment of both the Russians and the Central Asians toward their own capabilities as well as the real strength of the union. The Central Asians believed, or were made to believe, that the might and durability of the union were so overwhelming that any open opposition to it would remain effectless. However, the defeat of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan and Moscow's inability to definitively curb the political ferment in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan produced doubts about the invincibility of the center. A psychological milestone was thus passed. But once independence was declared and Moscow acquiesced to it, Central Asian sovereign national statehood became a *fait accompli*. The Russians believe that they were unjustly deprived, by a combination of rapidly evolving circumstances, foreign pressure, and unpreparedness, of the fruits of five hundred years of national struggle and conquest. The perceptions of both sides about the circumstances leading to the disintegration of the Soviet Union had a profound impact on their foreign policies.

The Russians faced a certain psychological difficulty in treating the new states as truly independent and still regarded relations with them as a sort of internal question, while the Central Asians, after a short period of hesitation, came to regard the concept of near abroad as a device to be used by diehards to defend and restore the old union. Thus the first and primary foreign policy objective of the Central Asian states was to accept every possible means, including new organizational agreements such as the CIS, both to settle the common problems inherited from the old union and to thwart Russia's efforts to reestablish the old status quo. The Central Asian states used international recognition as a key device to consecrate their independence.

Turkey was among the first states to recognize first Azerbaijan and then the Central Asian states. The United States in turn extended quick recognition of and established diplomatic relations with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in January 1992 and with Turkmenistan,

Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan in February 1992, and set up embassies in each state shortly thereafter. Today Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have been recognized by some 130 states and have established diplomatic relations in some 70 countries, the remaining three states having won recognition from some 100 to 130 states and have established diplomatic relations with some 40 to 60 states. All the Central Asian states and Azerbaijan have become members of the United Nations and its affiliates, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and so forth.

It is essential to note that already by 1989 and 1990 practically all the Central Asian states, taking advantage of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, had held a variety of national congresses and conventions—described as “scientific conferences”—that dealt with the revival of the national culture and history. Already a variety of taboos dealing with national history had been pushed aside and national figures such as İsmail Gaspiralı of the Crimea and Abdurrauf Fitrat of Uzbekistan, long condemned as bourgeois nationalists, were rehabilitated. Many of the so-called scholarly conferences to which foreigners were invited sought to revise the Soviet views on some key “national” issues, such as the famines and the forced sedentarization of the tribes in Kazakhstan in the 1930s, the Russian occupation of Central Asia in the 1860s, and the place of the Jadidists (modernists) in national history. These feverish preindependence nationalist activities did not aim at independence or separatism but played a key role in preparing the national elites for seizing the opportunity of independence when it actually presented itself. However, the search for the roots of national history and national culture had been going on in a variety of forms since the early 1970s, and *glasnost* and *perestroika* merely helped intensify and generalize this search. In this context it is essential to note that the search for national historical roots was carried out not on behalf of a common homeland such as Turkestan, except for a few diehards, but on behalf of the specific republic with which the researcher identified himself/herself. The fact that one historical or literary figure was claimed simultaneously by several republics was either ignored or accepted as being valid during the old ages, “when we all lived together.” The process of rebuilding the national history turned the old religious figures into “national heroes who perpetuated our language and literature.” For instance, the first Ahmed Yesevi conference was held in 1990 in

Kentau, some fifteen miles from the town of Turkistan (the former Yesi), where the *pir* or *baba* lies in the mausoleum built by Tamerlane, and which is the site of a university bearing his name. He was described as a literary figure who established the basis of the Kazakh language and literature, although Yesevi was a Sufi and hardly aware of his nationality.<sup>9</sup> In sum, the Central Asians sought first to develop an authentic image of their national history and culture, which helped consolidate the national independence when it came. The search for the authenticity of the nation, culture, language, and faith in the years preceding independence should yield excellent clues in explaining how unexpected independence and national sovereignty were quickly internalized. The fact that the Russians were always regarded as undesirable aliens and rulers helped internalize independence not as a political value or principle but as a practical method to get rid of Moscow's presence. It should be noted that, notwithstanding the degree of Russification among elites, the rural, and grassroots lower urban classes in Central Asia preserved a high degree of cultural authenticity lacking in Turkey and even Iran.

National independence and sovereignty are the indispensable conditions to promote the interests of the territorial national state. Foreign policy is the means to defend and promote the national interest abroad and secure international support to perpetuate independence and sovereignty. It is carried out by an experienced staff and ministry organized for the purpose. The Central Asian people had practically no experience in foreign relations and hardly possessed the bureaucratic organization and professional staff capable of meeting

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<sup>9</sup> The conference was organized by the first secretary of the Kentau district but was presided over by the vice prime minister of the Kazakh republic. The forty-odd communications read at the conference dealt almost entirely with the literary aspects of *Divan-ı Hikmet*, the chief work of Yesevi (d. ca. 1166) compiled by his followers in the fifteenth century. The fact that Yesevi was basically a religious figure, and that he used the Turkish language of the time only as a medium to express his religious beliefs, though of basic importance, was conveniently ignored. This writer presented one of the two communications that dealt with Yesevi's religious ideas and his Sufi order. The communication was ignored. However, at a second Yesevi conference held in Ankara in 1992, much debate centered on his theological contributions, although the Central Asian participants still preferred to discuss Yesevi's literary work. I could not attend, though officially invited, the third Yesevi conference, held in Almaty in November 1993. Yesevi's busts have appeared in various Central Asian countries and his name has been given to streets and squares that formerly bore the name of Russian and Soviet heroes.

the challenge of foreign relations. In fact, the Central Asian states seemed to lack the very concept of foreign policy as a basic and indispensable instrument for promoting the national interest.<sup>10</sup> All the "foreign ministers and ministries" of the old union republics, notably those of the Central Asian states, had no visibility and least of all the necessary authority to engage in even the most innocuous foreign relations, while their "embassies" in Moscow often served as hostels for their natives visiting the center. The foreign policy experience of the Central Asian states prior to Russian occupation was negligible. It is true that many of the old petty Central Asian khanates had periodically dispatched emissaries to İstanbul to plead with the caliph, the head of the Muslim community, for some help or to secure the sanction to legitimize some usurped throne.<sup>11</sup> In fact, during the nineteenth century the Bukharan and Khivan *emirs* had what one may call permanent representatives in İstanbul whose residence or "embassy" was the famous Uzbek lodge (it was open to all the Central Asian Muslims), which is still standing in Üsküdar, on the Asiatic side of İstanbul. However, the *seyhs* of the lodge, acting as diplomatic envoys, together with numerous other religious and political delegations coming from Central Asia, were the personal representatives of the Khivan or Bukharan rulers and not the state itself. They, like other overseas Muslim dignitaries, were regarded as part of the religious establishment of İstanbul. These earlier Turkish relations with Central Asia, which broadened until 1917 to include a number of intellectuals, including many Jadidists who came to study in İstanbul, obviously cannot be ignored. However, these relations among ruling *emirs* and sultans can never be regarded as the equivalent of true interstate relations. Central Asia experienced true interstate relations only after 1991.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> The issue was debated in an international conference, "The Opening of the New Turkic Republics to the Outside World: Problems and Solutions." The conference was organized by the Turkish Institute on Foreign Relations with the assistance of TİKA (Turkish Agency for Cooperation and Development) and was held in Ankara on 11–12 December 1992.

<sup>11</sup> The correspondence between the Ottoman caliph and the Central Asian and Azerbaijani khanates from the sixteenth to the late nineteenth centuries is being published by the General Directorate of the Turkish Archives. See, for instance, *Osmanlı Devleti ile Azerbaycan Türk Hanlıkları Arasındaki Münasebetlere Dair Arşiv Belgeleri*, vol. 1, 1578–1914, and vol. 2, 1575–1918 (Ankara, 1992, 1993). The significance of this correspondence is in Kemal H. Karpat, *Islamism-Panislamism: The Remaking of State, Society and Religion in the Late Ottoman Empire* (forthcoming).

<sup>12</sup> One of the few attempts to study the foreign policies of Central Asian states

Central Asian states rapidly won international recognition and membership in international bodies and established embassies and consulates abroad, despite financial constraints. The diplomatic offensive was due, as implied, on the one hand to the need to strengthen their precarious independence and sovereignty, and on the other to use it to offset the concentration of the armed forces and economic power in Russia's hands. It is therefore quite understandable that the Central Asians focused their foreign relations, first, on securing international recognition, and second, on neutralizing (so far successfully) the threat posed by the power instruments, for example, the armed forces of the old union. It should be mentioned also that the establishment of widespread foreign relations sought by the Central Asian states, in addition to securing them the international protection that comes with diplomatic recognition, had the virtue of ending the political, cultural, and scientific isolation of this area by placing it in the stream of world communication. Most Central Asian intellectuals, similar to their modernist counterparts in other Islamic countries, see the West as the fountainhead of contemporary civilization—not Russia or the Russians, as they were compelled to believe during the Soviet regime. Consequently, the Central Asian states' rapid opening up to the West is motivated as much by the need to strengthen and safeguard their sovereignty as by a genuine yearning to establish direct and permanent communication with the authentic sources of today's dominant civilization and thus put a permanent end to their isolation.<sup>13</sup> The practical implications of this basic political-philosophical leaning toward the West are evident in some

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is by Martha Brill Olcott, "Nation Building and Ethnicity in the Foreign Policy of the New Central Asian States" in *National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. Roman Szporluk (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994).

<sup>13</sup> The ambassador of Turkmenistan in Ankara, who participated in the foreign relations conference of 1992 (see note 10), claimed that in one year his country was recognized by one hundred states and had established relations with sixty of them, and that his country had "firmly decided to utilize all the diplomatic means available" to break away from isolation. He claimed that the foreign policy principles of his country were the defense of the national interest, an open door neutrality, noninterference in the affairs of other states, and avoidance of ethnic strife. Relations with Russia were to be on a bilateral basis and no different from other nations. According to the ambassador, Turkmenistan viewed as natural the public's revived interest in Islam (the number of mosques went from 5 or 6 to 150) but wanted to avoid religious conflicts. The mullahs did not know Arabic and did not possess the proper knowledge of Islam, hence the need for an enlightened teaching of Islam and Islamic history.

key decisions. First, there is the decision of Azerbaijan and all the Central Asian states (except Tajikistan) to adopt the Latin alphabet as the chief means of written communication. Second, there is the relatively friendly treatment accorded to Western business corporations and investors, despite bureaucratic red tape of various types and interest-motivated personal manipulations. For instance, the Kazakh government accorded to the Chevron Corporation and its partners the concession to exploit the Tengiz oil field in a relatively short time, while prior to independence the Soviet officials procrastinated (by inflating their terms) for a long time. Today, some seventy American corporations, including such giants as Mobil Oil, General Motors, Boeing, and Philip Morris, just to mention the larger ones, are involved in Central Asia and are receiving from the governments almost "preferential" treatment, probably as a vehicle to greater U.S. interest and involvement.

*The Bureaucratic Background of the Central Asian Foreign Ministries*

Unlike Russia, which inherited the experienced and sophisticated Foreign Ministry of the former Soviet Union, the Central Asian states had to recruit anew their foreign ministry staffs from whatever source was available. By early 1994 the Foreign Ministry of Russia had stabilized (after a period of crisis, dismissals, and readmissions) at three thousand people, excepting the missions abroad, while the Central Asian foreign ministries typically include about fifty to eighty people each. The first obvious source of personnel recruitment for the Central Asian states was the indigenous people who served on the staff of the Russian Foreign Ministry, usually in minor jobs. The second and most widespread source for the Central Asian foreign ministries was the upper ranks of the native civil bureaucracy, usually the best educated and those who could converse in European languages. They included a number of indigenous young bureaucrats who had been sent after 1988 to study abroad, most to Europe and a few to the United States. Some of the graduates of the old party institutes designed to train the future party leaders also joined the foreign ministries (Nazarbaev is a graduate of such an institute in Almaty that has been transformed into an Institute of Management and Economics and was later attached to the president's office).

Turkey was one of the first countries that agreed to act as a proxy

and help train the foreign ministry personnel from the Central Asian states. For instance, a Protocol in Cooperation in the Diplomatic Field, signed in Tashkent by the foreign ministries of Turkey and Uzbekistan on 5 March 1992, that is, just a few months after Uzbekistan won independence, is typical of the “diplomatic” technical aid provided by Turkey to the Turkic states of Central Asia. The protocol was based on the Friendship and Cooperation Agreement signed by Turkey and Uzbekistan on 19 December 1991 in Ankara. Similar agreements were concluded with the other states. According to the protocol, the “Turkish embassies will represent Uzbekistan and protect the latter’s rights and interests in the accredited third countries, for a period of time to be mutually agreed” (Article 2). Turkey undertook to do the same in international organizations until the Central Asian states created their own foreign ministry personnel. Consequently, Article 4 of the protocol stated that “the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey will provide professional training to the Uzbek diplomats,” while Article 5 stipulated further that the “Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey will provide assistance and support to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan regarding diplomatic services.”<sup>14</sup> Moreover, Turkey invited several teams of Central Asian bureaucrats, notably economists, for training that included a series of seminars and actual desk work in the appropriate Turkish offices.

It is essential at this point to review briefly the national credentials and ideological background of the indigenous bureaucrats of Central Asia, including foreign ministry personnel. It goes without saying that most of the native bureaucrats serving in the upper ranks of their domestic government were members or candidates to membership of the Communist Party. But it is probably correct to say that few of them were truly convinced communist ideologists. The top echelons of the national bureaucracy, including the foreign ministries, were educated in party schools and were obviously members of the Communist Party. Thus, one may conclude that the bureaucracy in power consists mostly of the old communist-era civil ser-

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<sup>14</sup> The texts of numerous agreements concluded by Turkey have been distributed by the Turkish authorities to various institutions. The quotation was taken from a text distributed to the Central Asian Center of the Bilkent University. These and all other agreements have been published in the *TC Resmi Gazete*, the official legal review of the government. See *TC Resmi Gazete*, 13 and 17 July 1991; 25 November 1992; 23 January 1993; 24 January 1993; etc.



vice. This view would be correct if the growing size of the native bureaucracy and some of the qualitative changes that took place after independence were ignored. The old communist cadres were the only trained bureaucrats, usually in the technical professions, available to conduct the day-to-day business of the new governments, since there were no truly "national" cadres formed yet. Instead of waiting for the emergence of "national" cadres to replace them, the ruling communist bureaucracy tried to "nationalize" itself overnight, and became ardent Uzbek, Kazakh, or other patriots. This patriotism was genuine, at least up to a point, since the indigenous bureaucracy and the intelligentsia, although sharing by necessity the communist ideology with their Russian masters, were in fact separated from them by ethnicity and religion. This communist-era bureaucracy presently ruling the Central Asian states knows from inside how the Moscow system and the KGB work and think. They also know how to manipulate their former masters. There is sufficient grounds to claim that after World War II, members of the local Communist Party branches were affected as much by rising Uzbek, Kazakh, or other localism and ethnic awareness as by communism, not so much as an ideology but as a form of political association and social behavior. All this resulted in a rather curious interplay of patron-client relationships between Moscow and native party leaders, and especially between the latter and their cronies selected on the basis of tribal, clan, or regional ties but also in the search for popular support and a sheer interest in position and income. In other words, the communist experiment in Central Asia had a lasting behavioral impact, but the same experiment evolved in a specific manner as conditioned by the ethnocultural structure of the native society and its almost total domination by Moscow.

It appears that the old party bosses of Central Asia, represented by such prominent figures as Rashidov (d. 1983) of Uzbekistan and Kunaev of Kazakhstan (who was ousted by Gorbachev in 1986 and died in August 1993), came to rely on a fairly large local constituency and their own selected bureaucrats. These leaders co-opted the upper ranks of the native population and induced them to obey the system by providing nourishment to their cultural needs (sometimes they suppressed the manifestations of established Islam, the free ulema—learned religious scholars—but left free the popular *tārikāt*—popular religious brotherhoods—that did not challenge the political system) and by adroitly using the economic resources at their disposal to

distribute patronage to selected rural and urban areas. In retrospect it appears that these outwardly obedient “tools” of Moscow were instrumental in promoting the rise of a large local native intelligentsia—bureaucracy—from the lower ranks of the native society, including the traditionalist villages. They did so, partly at least, in order to dominate and govern more absolutely their own indigenous society while catering to its “national” cultural needs, which often consisted of secularized religious practices and beliefs. The center went along with manipulation of its representatives in the field, notably during the era of Brezhnev, who seemed to have viewed with some personal fondness the deference-prone Central Asians, since Moscow was interested more in acquiescence to its authority than how this acquiescence was secured. It is difficult to determine whether these native leaders were aware of the political implications of their policy of educating and creating a large native intelligentsia. (Of course, the decision taken by Khrushchev to give the natives greater access to higher education, though stemming from the need to upgrade the quality of the local workforce and industrialize Central Asia in order to defeat capitalism, had its impact in speeding up the creation of a native intelligentsia.) I asked Dinmukhamed Kunaev, a few months before his death in 1993, why some Kazakhs called him *Kazakhstan ’in atasi* (the father of Kazakhstan). In response he claimed that he tried to educate and modernize his Kazakh people, that he built Almaty into a modern city (though inhabited by a Russian majority) and tried to meet the needs of the countryside people without offending their traditions and customs. (Our conversation took place under the portrait of Kunaev’s grandfather, attired in the pilgrim hajj garb, taken after the latter’s return from Mecca. Kunaev said he was at once a communist, a Kazakh, and a Muslim, but believed in God). Pressed to say whether he intentionally sought to create a large body of native Kazakh intellectuals, he answered that his desire was to enlighten his entire nation. (In his memoirs, which were dictated in late 1990, Nursultan Nazarbaev is rather critical of Kunaev and his policies, but in a very measured fashion.)

The KGB appears to have become aware of the new patterns of social stratification in Central Asia. It advised Moscow to take the necessary measures to stop the ascendancy of the native intelligentsia-bureaucracy.<sup>15</sup> The effort to oust the entrenched local bosses started

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<sup>15</sup> Even after independence the KGB continued to monitor closely the cultural

during Andropov's tenure and reached its climax during Gorbachev, who dismissed Kunaev (among others) and replaced him with a Russian, Gennadii Kolbin. This caused the first nationalist riots in Almaty, the first spark of independence in Central Asia. Significantly enough, Kazakhstan adopted 17 December 1986, the date of the riots, as the day of independence, that is, the national holiday of the country.

The native *apparatchiks* were often accused of corruption and nepotism and of "favoring Islam, protecting Sufi brotherhoods, or siphoning funds to unofficial mosques." As Michael Rywkin points out, "Such allegations only increased popular sympathy for the purged officials," and needless to say cemented further the incipient solidarity between the native bureaucrats and the emerging national constituency. Consequently, it is quite easy to understand, as M. Nazif Shahrani put it, the "domestic acceptance and tolerance of the old political order," that is, the old *nomenklatura*, despite their Leninist ideology, a large part of these bureaucrats, notably at the middle and lower levels, are "nationalized" or at least willing to appear as such.<sup>16</sup> In the 1986–90 period, the upper ranks of the old *apparatchiks* were replaced by the second echelon of leaders, all of whom, with the exception of Askar Akaev of Kyrgyzstan, had been high-ranking members of the Communist Party and are now heading their respective states. But practically all of them came from the humble ranks of the traditional society, were educated in modern schools, and preserved an awareness of their ethnic identity. The better-educated and promising native intellectuals were often given jobs in Moscow and were viewed overnight as stalwarts of the center, and thus mistrusted. Those who served in the home republic gained the aura of the good native son.

The current heads of state in Central Asia turned nationalistic

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and political developments in Central Asia. The Yesevi conference mentioned in note 9 was directed by an academician who many said was part of the old Soviet secret service. A Turcology conference held in Kazan in 1992 was attended by the head of an institute of ethnography from Moscow who intended to study the "ethnic situation in Kazan," that is, the various non-Tatar groups who were opposed or could be made to oppose the incumbent government. He was described by other participants as being in the KGB.

<sup>16</sup> Michael Rywkin, "Post-USSR Political Developments in Former Soviet Central Asia," *Nationalities Papers* (fall 1992), p. 98; also M. Nazif Shahrani, "Islam and the Political Culture of 'Scientific Atheism' in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Future Predicaments," in *The Politics of Religion in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. Michael Bourdeaux (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995).

once they became sure that the demise of the USSR was real. Uzbek leaders were suspicious of Gorbachev's reforms and opposed liberalization but were among the first to declare independence as early as 31 August 1991. Even İslam Karimov, who had first supported the August 1991 coup in Moscow, decided after witnessing the coup's failure to ban the party from government and education and to confiscate its property. Eventually he transformed the party into the People's Democratic Party and used it as his own power base while formally taking his legitimacy from his people; he was popularly elected president with an 86 percent majority on 29 December 1991, but once in power he ignored the most elementary norms of democracy. In sum, I believe that the nationalism of the Central Asian leaders is genuine, but with many caveats. Consequently, it is correct to state that the current leaders of the Central Asian states are supporting the creation of a national culture in their respective states, since they have come to regard such a national culture as the irreplaceable basis for the independence and sovereignty of the state and for their own power. They are also trying to maintain most of the modernistic features of the old system, including education and women's rights. The roots of this nationalism, as mentioned, are in the leaders' traditionalist family background, their relative acquaintance with cultural authenticity, their aspirations for administrative autonomy, and the need for a supporting native constituency, not to speak of their exceptionally astute, opportunistic instinct for power.<sup>17</sup> At the same time most of the leaders continue to view Moscow in a rather friendly manner, not only because of their previous political-ideological affinity with the old center but also because of an entrenched belief that Moscow still possesses somehow the ability to decide the ultimate fate of their republic and themselves. The fall of Abulfaz Elchibey, who embraced an unequivocal Azeri nationalism directed against Moscow (and toward Iran), was a good lesson that cannot be ignored.

Independence, national statehood, and the expansion of the bureaucracy have opened great employment opportunities for the elites educated in the modern schools and have permitted, indirectly, the

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<sup>17</sup> It should be noted that the heads of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are married to Russian women and reportedly speak Russian at home, as do much of the ruling elite throughout Central Asia, without, however, identifying themselves with Russia or rejecting their own culture and identity.

“national” culture of the traditional masses from which this intelligentsia originated to percolate into the upper echelons of the government. The cultural closeness of the current rulers of the Central Asian states to the masses, despite their association with the old regime, has made them relatively popular and easily electable.<sup>18</sup> However, not far from the surface there lies a mass of accumulated grudges against all kinds of things, including the leaders’ past association with and servility to Moscow. Thus the top leadership of the Central Asian republics is caught between its desire—and that of large segments of the native population—to be free from political dependency on Moscow and its own past associations and personal-ideological ties with the Soviet center. The nationalists in the opposition parties throughout Central Asia mention continuously the leaders’ old links with Moscow, and simultaneously the rulers’ fear of a native nationalist backlash. This fear induces them to prove that they are genuine Uzbek, Turkmen, or other patriots while remaining in the good graces of Moscow, however contradictory it may appear. Actually the coming of independence and statehood and the shift of power and patronage away from Moscow to local cadres have split the educated elite groups in every Central Asian state into bureaucrats and intelligentsia. The former appears to be identified with the state, while the latter claims to speak on behalf of the nation and all it entails. The split is manifest in the political parties, but a study of the political parties, including the officially approved ones in the hands of the old native *nomenklatura* and the “unregistered” nationalist opposition parties, falls outside the scope of this chapter. Suffice it to say that the protagonists in the struggle for democracy in Central Asia presently consist of the bureaucracy and the intelligentsia, the latter hoping to attract the emerging civil groups. The bureaucracy relies on its control of the government apparatus to maintain its political supremacy, while the intelligentsia seeks the support of the indigenous masses by appealing to their traditional values and national culture. For instance, the Azat, Alash, and Zheltoksan parties (the

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<sup>18</sup> Rywkin wrote that successive purges affected three sets of officeholders, with the new appointees sharing the fate of their predecessors within a year or two of their initial appointment. The most important consequence of the purges was that local Muslim party officials, because of the “suffering” at Moscow’s hands, became “rehabilitated” in the eyes of their compatriots—a development that took on key significance at the moment of independence. Rywkin, “Post-USSR Political Developments,” p. 99.

last two unregistered) in Kazakhstan are doing exactly that, although in varying degrees of intensity and appeal to traditionalism and Kazakh ethnic nationalism. On the other hand, some leaders such as Nazarbaev have learned how to manipulate the opposition parties while successfully building their own party and bolstering their image as popular national leaders. Ultimately the question of legitimacy will decide the political fate of the new leaders and their regimes. The old communist legitimacy no longer has its old force, while the democratic legitimacy stemming from popular acceptance and the electoral system has struck no real roots, partly at least because the elections failed to improve the population's living standards.

*Islam, National Identity, and Foreign Relations*

Islam is one of the major sources of national identity and a factor facilitating the relations of Central Asia with other Islamic countries. It conditions also the formation of a national culture and affects the political behavior of the masses and their leaders. The issue is of capital importance, but we shall devote to it the minimum space necessary to illustrate the rather unique position of Islam in Central Asian society.

As a religious dogma, along with its institutional and legal framework, Islam has a certain uniformity and universality that provide a good common basis for understanding among Muslims. At the same time, Islam, having achieved the acceptance of the same *iman* (faith), leaves its followers totally free to adapt to and live in accordance with the social, geographic, and political environment. Islam is an individualistic religion without an organized clergy and thus allows each community to adopt the faith according to the sociogeographical situations. Consequently, Islam has adapted easily to every continent and circumstance and has become easily identified with the local culture and customs. In areas relatively remote or isolated from the orthodox centers of Islam, the identification of the faith with the local secular culture has been greater.

Russian-Soviet and Western scholars have measured the "secularization" of Muslims in accordance with their observance of the rituals of the faith, such as prayer, fasting, and abstinence from alcohol and pork. This naive understanding of Islam has led numerous scholars to claim that the hold of Islam on the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz was

weak because they converted late and failed to practice the rituals of the faith. This view is echoed also by many Central Asian *nomenklatura* who never had the curiosity to find out how their ordinary conationals think and feel about their faith. Besides, claiming that the Central Asians are not good Muslims is likely to win them points with the Russians and Westerners.

The study of Islam both in the West and the former Soviet Union has been caught in a vicious circle. Scholars have studied Arab Islam as the archetype of the faith and regarded its various ideological manifestations as likely to occur elsewhere, too. Thus Wahhabism, which appeared in the northeastern section of the Arabian Peninsula in the late eighteenth century, has been viewed mistakenly as the prototype of all Islamic fundamentalist and revivalist movements. Consequently, developments in Islam in Indonesia, Turkey, Iran, and other countries were regarded either as replicas of Arab Islam, or aberrations if they showed peculiarities of their own. The Soviet scholars in turn adopted wholesale the Western concepts concerning Islam—especially the negative judgments—and applied them to the study of their own brand of Islam. Thus, throughout the Soviet era the folk Islam, which will be dealt with briefly below, was condemned and violently repressed as superstition, obscurantism, and reactionism.<sup>19</sup> The same scholars viewed the urban and better-organized manifestations of nationalism under religious garb as Muslim fundamentalism and condemned it as such. For instance, in 1985 and several times afterward, Gorbachev, following his advisors' opinion,

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<sup>19</sup> Soviet scholars can sometimes provide exceptionally illuminating information on Islam in Central Asia and the Caucasus even though their purpose is to criticize and downgrade it. S.P. Poliakov, an anthropologist, regarded traditionalism, that is, the continuity of the local culture, even when fused with Soviet ingredients, as the chief characteristic of the rural mass culture. He regards Islam as the most powerful factor in the continuity of tradition, which in turn prevented the adoption of Soviet modes of life. In Poliakov's view, the mullahs (rural religious men) and folk Islam became the mainstay of religion after the Soviets destroyed the established Islam. Traditionalism even manifested itself in a petit bourgeois mode of production where buying and selling of land in villages followed the rule of *adat* (customary law) and the *shariat* (religious law). Poliakov feared that *perestroika* (he wrote the book in 1989) would undermine all the progress registered by Central Asia during the Soviet-imposed reform. A detailed critique of the book is necessary to demonstrate the false Soviet understanding of Islam as well as the author's Marxist dogmatism, which was in fact a convenient "scientific" cover for his Russian chauvinism. Sergei P. Poliakov, *Everyday Islam: Religion and Tradition in Rural Central Asia*, ed. M.B. Olcott (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992).

criticized and condemned Islam (once while in Tashkent) in the most intemperate manner as obscurantism, while Kozyrev repeatedly called the attention of the West to the danger of Muslim fundamentalism in order to justify the Russian intervention in Tajikistan. The rise of this nationalism rooted in folk Islam among the Central Asian lower and middle classes was evident in the 1970s as elementary- and mid-level native schoolteachers and their pupils began to visit and repair the graves of local saints, minstrels, and historical leaders. Eventually after independence the names of these personalities were given to parks, streets, and localities. Soviet scholars condemned all the natives' searches for the roots of their identity in their own culture, of which folk Islam was an inseparable part, as a sort of Muslim fundamentalism probably inspired by Iran or Egypt, although there was little connection among them. (The Russians came to see the Afghan resistance to their invasion as a form of religious opposition rather than a national one.) The Soviet scholars' views on Islam, though heavily influenced by Western writings, were in turn adopted by the Kremlinologists often acting as experts on Central Asia, and portrayed as original and honored as such.

The acceptance and practice of Islam among Central Asian elites vary greatly. Since the overwhelming majority of these elites received an atheist education and were heavily indoctrinated with anti-Islamic propaganda, they tend to be personally neutral—if not hostile—toward any religion, although often they are the first to acknowledge its practical importance. Nonetheless, as the process of national consolidation intensifies and the new regimes' need for popular support and cultural harmony with the ruled increases, Islam is bound to gain further importance. But the religious crises may remain under control as long as religion is considered an individual matter and the state leaders' secularist postures are maintained, and as long as the religious freedom of the Russians, notably in Kazakhstan, where church attendance has increased, is not hindered. The truth is that Islam in the lands that became Russia and the ex-Soviet Union developed almost from the beginning in close association with the local culture, and found in Ahmed Yesevi (d. ca. 1166) an ideal representative who disseminated Islam in the guise of local folk religions, including shamanism. The mystical Sufi Islam, as represented both by the eleventh-century Yesevia religious brotherhood and its urban offshoot of the fourteenth century, the Naqshbandiyah, are of Central Asian origin and were, and are, popular among Turks,



Persians, and Indians, but were shunned by orthodox, establishment Islam. The late president of Turkey, Turgut Özal, declared publicly that he was a Naqshbandi and did his best to honor the memory of Bahauddin Naqshbandi, the founder of the order, whose tomb near Bukhara was and is a popular shrine. The ultraorthodox Muslims reject the Yesevia and Naqshbandiyah. Even today the Saudi Arabian missionaries in Central Asia denounce unsuccessfully this local mystical understanding of Islam and the rites associated with it as being un-Islamic. From its early days to our time Islam in Central Asia and Russia as a whole was part of the daily life of its followers and entered into the fabric of various currents—Jadidism (modernism), nationalism, Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turkism—that affected the sociopolitical life of Russia's Muslims. It is only now that Russian scholars seem to have started to become aware of the unique characteristics of their Islam.<sup>20</sup>

Thus, if one accepts the fact that faith and local-tribal culture are intimately interwoven, notably in folk Islam (which existed as a parallel religion to that officially sanctioned by the old regime, represented by the four *mufiates* during the Soviet era), then it seems evident that Islam as the repository of the folk culture will become a major source of national culture. Indeed, the historical experience in nation formation during the last two hundred years indicates that the religious and nonreligious folk culture of the dominant ethnic-national group becomes the source of national culture and provides the symbols of national identity. As the case of Ahmed Yesevi illustrates, a religious mystic could be transposed into a "father" of the nation.

Today Islam in Central Asia is a source of national culture and an avenue for the political leaders to court popular support and identify themselves with the masses. It is Islam that permits a leader to tell the Muslim masses, "I am one of you." Tribal and clan affiliation can obviously buttress further the leader's identification with the masses but cannot achieve it fully without the religious ingredient. It would be impossible for a non-Muslim Kazakh or Uzbek to become a generally accepted leader. National identity and religious affiliation—even if one is not an observant Muslim—are becoming inseparable from each other. The opposition parties in Central Asia are aware

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<sup>20</sup> See A.V. Malashenko, "The Eighties, A New Political Start for Islam," *Russian Social Science Review*, vol. 32, no. 2 (March–April 1993), pp. 74–94.

of these practical realities and when convenient have accused their presidents of atheism. The presidents in turn, contrary to some misinformed claims, have strived to prove that they are good Muslims. Thus, Niyazov of Turkmenistan and Karimov of Uzbekistan visited Mecca (and Akaev promised to) not only to ingratiate themselves with the Saudis but also to prove to their countrymen that they are good Muslims. To be a Muslim in Central Asia is a necessary condition for being a good Uzbek, Turkmen, or Kazakh. Fundamentalism as perceived in the West, on the other hand, does not exist in Central Asia. The fact that it is often mentioned derives from Islam's bad name in the West and thus provides a convenient excuse both for Russia and the totalitarian regimes of the area to silence their opponents and critics, Karimov of Uzbekistan being a good example. It is true that the fertile Fergana Valley, unlike other areas, has been a traditional stronghold of orthodox Islam due to a variety of geographic, historical, and political factors. The inhabitants of these areas, including the Tajiks, have long-standing urban and sedentary traditions that favor close identification with tenets of orthodoxy. But orthodox Islam cannot be equated with fundamentalism, if that word implies the establishment of a government guided by the political principles of Islam.

The Saudi and Iranian missionaries chose the Fergana Valley to disseminate their own brand of Islam.<sup>21</sup> The first were branded Wahhabis and the second Humeinis and registered a degree of local success due mainly to the spiritual vacuum left by Soviet atheism, but there was not a true fundamentalist movement. It may be correct to state that fundamentalism in Central Asia has little chance of success because ideologically its universalism and denial of ethnicity and national statehood conflict and directly challenge the basic political trend in the area: national independence and sovereignty based on ethnonational culture and identity. Islam retains its appeal among the masses because it is part of their folk culture, and because of this, it is the source of their national-ethnic identity.

Islam as a factor of international relations provided the cultural bond that linked Central Asia to the Muslim countries in Asia and

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<sup>21</sup> Some of the most extensive information on Islam and fundamentalism in Central Asia can be found in the field reports of Ahmed Rashid, a Pakistani journalist. See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 19 November 1992; *Herald* (November 1992); and *Nation*, 13 November 1992.

Africa, particularly Turkey and Iran. The issue was best described by President Nazarbaev in his speech delivered on the eve of Kazakhstan's independence day. After stating that "Kazakhs, today, for the first time in their history have a chance to mold their statehood, [achieve] a comprehensive development of their language and culture," he declared that:

we have to keep in mind in our foreign policy the Islamic factor. We are realistic about it. We take into account the spiritual basis of Islamic culture and the importance of Islamic culture in modern life. The Islamic world has many potentials which we cannot ignore. But we also have no grounds for all kinds of talks [pleading] for strengthening or enhancing religious fundamentalism in our country.<sup>22</sup>

The foreign ministries of the Central Asian states are heirs to the bureaucratic cadres' cultural and ideological transformation, as mentioned before. They have to cope with, among other things, a domestic audience increasingly influenced by nationalist-populist Islam while at the same time maintaining a façade of neutrality toward Islam often disguised as "secularism" in order to soothe the apprehension of the Russians and Westerners, some of whom appear to regard any revival of Islam as a form of militant fundamentalism. Today the Central Asian states are trying to reduce the number of ethnic Russians in government service or to push them to second- or third-rate positions, although occasionally the Russians are ostentatiously awarded high ministerial positions, such as prime minister of Kazakhstan. The foreign ministries in particular seem to give priority to recruiting native intellectuals, but Russians often describe the preference given to the natives as a form of nationalistic and religious discrimination.

Today, the foreign policy of the Central Asian states is largely in the hands of the presidents of the countries, due, partly at least, to the need for a single consistent policy line. Practically all major decisions, from the appointing of senior officials and ambassadors to granting concessions to foreign companies and concluding treaties, are decided by the president. In some reported cases, the president decided who should be allowed to enter or leave the country. In a notorious case, Baymirza Hayit, a scholar of Uzbek origin living in

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<sup>22</sup> *Central Asian Desk*, compiled by Eric Rudenshold of the International Republican Institute-Almaty (5 January 1993), pp. 4-5.

Germany since 1944, was invited as a guest of honor by the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, but was asked by the president to leave the country in twelve hours. Apparently the KGB persuaded Karimov to oust the well-known anticommunist scholar. The foreign ministry and its resident staff, together with newly established offices or institutes of strategic studies or strategic planning, assist the president in the formulation of foreign policy and help him carry it out. The concentration of foreign policy prerogatives in the president's hands is normal and expected in a presidential form of government—and the *de facto* regimes that prevail in Central Asia are presidential. Central Asian foreign relations have acquired an escalating importance in tandem with the rising ominous nationalism of Moscow. In some cases even the parliaments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have become involved in foreign policy matters, although so far such involvement seems to be an exception rather than the rule. Nevertheless, the parliaments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have successfully blocked their presidents' agreements to send troops into Tajikistan to put down the civil war there. Meanwhile, the upgrading of the quality of foreign ministry personnel continues at a feverish pace. Uzbekistan has established in Tashkent under French auspices a Université de Diplomatie et Economie Mondiale dedicated to training future Uzbek diplomats. Incidentally, the rector (president) of the university is the Uzbek minister of foreign affairs. Meanwhile, the European Community—now the European Union—has already appointed representatives to Uzbekistan and plans to have two representatives in each country with the purpose of providing both advice and financial support for the development of the energy sector, human resources, food production and distribution, privatization, and communication. Also, many Central Asian professionals who have worked in Moscow with foreign enterprises have been given high positions in the foreign ministries or hired as foreign policy advisors to the presidents. The foreign ministry structure is in constant evolution, and no definitive assessment is possible until it takes a more definitive shape. One of the major handicaps to the development of a truly modern foreign service personnel is the lack of hard currency. Consequently, the Central Asians may be forced to use Moscow's old facilities for training their diplomats and expose them to undesirable indoctrination. Aware of this situation, the Central Asian states are looking for other training opportunities.

*The CIS, Central Asia, and the Armed Forces*

The armed forces are the indispensable attribute of national sovereignty. They express the national will to exist and provide the actual means to secure that existence. There cannot be an independent sovereign state without its own armed forces. The Central Asian republics did not have their own armies, except for some paramilitary units organized for various police functions. The creation of native armed forces is obviously one of the most complex and difficult problems faced by the new states. President Nazarbaev has described very well his republic's need for armed forces:

[Kazakhstan's] main goal is the defense of the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the country. As a sovereign state Kazakhstan considers the maintenance of its defense capacity to be one of the most important state functions and the common cause of all the people living in the republic. Consequently Kazakhstan will do whatever is necessary together with other states to build an all-around system of international security. [Consequently] the formation of our own armed forces, the army of the Republic of Kazakhstan, must be completed in a short time.<sup>23</sup>

In the following section we shall attempt to provide an overall assessment of the tug-of-war between Russia and the new states that ended in the formation of national armed forces in each of the CIS states. National independence for the new states meant escaping from the security arrangements made by Moscow and establishing their own security policies and national armies with or without Moscow's cooperation. The division of the Soviet armed forces could assure each state a number of military units; the troops on their soil would become a part of the national army. Yet the reality proved to be immeasurably more difficult than they thought.

The ties between the Central Asian states and Russia, developed over one hundred years, are deep and multifaceted. They cannot be severed or altered overnight, notably in matters of economy and defense. Consequently, in matters of defense the Central Asian states are bound to remain dependent on Russia for a number of years to come. So far none of the Central Asian states possess armed forces capable of fighting even a small-scale war. The Central Asians view

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<sup>23</sup> *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 15 May 1992.

China and its enormous population as a far greater threat to their existence as an ethnic group and a state than Russia. China, in turn, is keenly aware that the existence of a series of independent Turkic states at the border of East Turkestan can only stimulate the nationalist aspirations of the Uigurs. The Chinese conquered for the last time the land of the Uigurs in 1877, when they put an end to the independent state of Yakub Bey and renamed the country Sinkiang in 1884. The Uigurs vividly remember these events. China has refused to recognize twelve frontier points with Kyrgyzstan and reportedly claimed a part of eastern Kazakhstan. The potential territorial claims of China, however remote they may appear at this time, are a source of great anxiety throughout Central Asia and an unheralded but ever-present reason for the new republics to maintain friendly relations with Russia, the only power that can cope with the military might of China. It is probably for this reason that Kazakhstan has curtailed the entry of the Chinese into the country and scaled down their sizable investments.

Thus the Central Asian states are placed in the uneasy situation of fighting the Russian nationalist efforts to bring them under Moscow's authority while seeking Russia's economic support and military protection to assure the very national independence and sovereignty that Moscow appears to threaten. The CIS was the partial result of this situation. It was seen as an organization that could and needed to take care of the problems shared by the republics of the former Soviet Union, including the settling of conflicts. It was established in Minsk on 8 December 1991 by Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus and was soon joined by the Central Asian states.<sup>24</sup> The CIS developed several policy-making bodies, such as the Council of Presidents and the Council of Prime Ministers, with additional bodies created later, such as the Councils of Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Intelligence.<sup>25</sup> Its membership has oscillated; in October 1992 Azerbaijan dropped out (at the time the number of members was reduced to ten since the Baltic states and Moldova stayed out) but came back in 1993.

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<sup>24</sup> Ann Sheehy wrote that Ukraine saw the CIS as "a civilized means of divorce"; Ann Sheehy, "The CIS, A Shaky Edifice," *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 1 (1 January 1993), p. 37. Actually the CIS proved to be far more resourceful, thanks to Russia's efforts to make it the vehicle of restoration of a Russian empire.

<sup>25</sup> Jan S. Adams, "Will the Post-Soviet Commonwealth Survive?" Occasional Papers (Columbus: Mershon Center, Ohio State University, 1993).

The CIS command structure, if it can be called that at all, came out in May 1992. The Treaty on Collective Security was signed on 15 May 1992 in Tashkent and reaffirmed by a series of military agreements in the draft CIS Charter, signed on 22 January 1993, by only six member of the CIS: Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia. Turkmenistan stayed out but signed a series of bilateral military agreements with Russia, making it a *de facto* member. The number dropped to five and rose again in 1993 with the addition of Azerbaijan and Georgia. Ukraine, Moldova, and Azerbaijan did not sign the Treaty on Collective Security because they saw it as a re-creation of the old center.

The basic purpose of the CIS, according to Russia, was to maintain the unity of the strategic and general purpose forces of the Soviet Union and to preserve the ruble zone. It is true that after the coup of 1991, Yeltsin ordered a reorganization of the Soviet Defense Ministry and established a new command team under Marshal Evgenii Shaposhnikov that remained in place after the dissolution of the USSR. The well-established Russian tradition of maintaining the continuity of the military establishment was thus preserved. The armed forces of the former Soviet Union were formally placed under the command of the CIS Council of Heads of State, but in reality they remained an all-union institution and a supranational organization, being in fact, as Stephen Foye put it, an independent actor or a "twelfth CIS state."<sup>26</sup> The CIS members agreed to coordinate their foreign policies, open their frontiers to free movement of citizens, and cooperate on transportation, but soon all these agreements—notably the ones concerning the common economic space, foreign policy, and the armed forces—went awry. In May 1992, faced with opposition from Ukraine on a variety of military issues, Russia decided to establish its own armed forces, as did the other CIS members. Meanwhile, Russian cities decided to treat the citizens of the former USSR not residing permanently in Russia as foreigners and/or as stateless persons (Russia had passed a citizenship law on 1 September 1991 allowing any Soviet citizen to take Russian citizenship within three years if he/she had not taken another republic's citizenship). The constantly changing language and policies of the CIS reflected new views taking shape in Russia. The term "near abroad" began

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<sup>26</sup> Stephen Foye, "The CIS Armed Forces," *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 1 (1 January 1993), p. 42.

to be used increasingly in 1992 with regard to the Russian Federation's policy toward the former Soviet republics and the status of the ethnic Russians and those who identified ethnically and culturally with the Russians living on the territory of the former Soviet republics. The total number of people who fall into this category amounts to about 25 million, of whom close to 10 million live in Central Asia, mostly in Kazakhstan. The issue was first formulated by Iurii Skokov, the head of the Foreign Policy Commission of the Security Council of the Russian Federation.<sup>27</sup> Skokov argued not only about the rights of the Russians living in the near abroad but also about the need for Russia to counter the aspirations of the United States to be the only world leader. He was dismissed from his position, but on 1 December 1992 Kozyrev's Foreign Ministry issued a fifty-eight-page document outlining Russia's foreign policy and strived to clarify his own position toward the near abroad. He accepted the concept, while he avoided defining it as part of Russia's foreign relations. Arguing that the term referred to internal unity, he ominously avoided discussion of Russia's policies and intentions toward the Central Asian states. Actually the near abroad concept, which included the Russian state's obligation to defend the rights and interests of Russians—and those identified culturally with Russia—was a basic part of the Russian General Staff's military doctrine.<sup>28</sup> Russia's concern for the Russians living in the countries of the near abroad is to some extent natural, but the solutions proposed are hardly acceptable. The truth is that independence—at least in Central Asia—unleashed the unavoidable process of decolonization. It was not carried out based upon a well-designed plan, but resulted from processes of national independence and nation formation. The Russians in Central Asia have occupied, by force of their better education and control of political power, the best economic and administrative positions in the country. They have treated the native population in a contemptuous manner and seldom bothered to learn their language, culture, and traditions. Today, the ethnic Russians face the loss of these colonial privileges and have to bow before their former subordinates. Yet it is the nationalists in

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<sup>27</sup> John Lough, "The Place of the 'Near Abroad' in Russian Foreign Policy," *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 11 (12 March 1993), pp. 21–26.

<sup>28</sup> *Voennaia mysl'* (special edition), nos. 4–5 (1992), cited by Lough, "Place of the 'Near Abroad.'"



Russia proper who have championed the rights of the Russians living in the near abroad for their own expansionist goals rather than the colonists themselves, although the latter's complaints are growing. Actually the treatment of the Russians in the near abroad or Central Asia has been far more lenient and considerate than the treatment accorded to other peoples regarded rightly or wrongly as part of a formerly dominant ethnic group. For instance, the newly independent Balkan states, under the advice of Russia, forced out millions in 1877–78 and thereafter from their ancestral lands because supposedly they were “Turks” who had been associated with the previously ruling Ottoman government, a nonnational structure that was labeled “Turkish” for the sake of expediency. The “ethnic cleansing” by Serbs in Bosnia is the continuation of this old policy. So far in Central Asia there has not been any violence directed at Russians, or legislation aimed at depriving them of their property and civil rights. In fact, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have gone out of their way to urge the Russians to stay, and have assured their safety in every way. Kazakhstan has passed a law punishing ethnic-national discrimination, while Kyrgyzstan has established a special agency to deal with ethnic problems.

On the other hand, all the Central Asian states have raised their native tongues to the constitutional status of state languages and have refused to grant the Russian language an equal status, despite the fact that it is still the main medium of communication among the native elites. Only in Kazakhstan has the Russian language been upgraded to the rank of the language of interethnic communication. Moreover, all the Central Asian states have adamantly refused to grant ethnic Russians dual citizenship, despite Russia's repeated demands, the latest pressure coming from Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev during his recent trip through Central Asia. Only the president of Kyrgyzstan has promised to grant dual citizenship to ethnic Russians, but he may be overruled by his legislature. The loss of superior status, the need to learn the hitherto despised native languages, as well as the psychological malaise resulting from all this have compelled many Russians, Ukrainians, and Germans, notably the former command cadres, to move out of Central Asia, although Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan received in 1993 considerable numbers of Russians exiting from Tajikistan. Anyway, the Central Asians see in Russia's efforts to maintain the privileged status of its citizens the

proof of the Russians' perennial love for empire and fear it as such.<sup>29</sup> The bulk of the working Russian population is made up of blue- and white-collar workers, and they can be easily replaced by natives, thus indirectly helping lower the high unemployment rate among natives. But the Russians living in Central Asia include also highly qualified technicians and specialists who had run the industrial plants, and their departure, although not regretted, since there was little if any social intercourse between the indigenous population and the "Europeans," has created serious management problems—notably in Kyrgyzstan, where Akaev issued public pleas to the Russians to stay in the country.

It is not evident yet what measures would suffice to soothe the Russians and persuade them to abstain from separatist endeavors or seek the intervention of the Russian Federation.<sup>30</sup> Meanwhile, there has been a rather muted campaign to persuade the native intelligentsia—whose preferred medium of communication is Russian—to speak their native tongue, especially in Kazakhstan, where a sizable percentage of the urban population does not know their own mother tongue. The truth is that, aside from Uzbekistan's partial exemption, practically all the Central Asian states lack modern and up-to-date facilities to teach their own languages. There are relatively few people among the young generations, especially in the cities, who possess a full literary command of their native languages—which lack, among other things, scientific and technical terminology.

The discussions about the fate of the armed forces of the CIS progressed amidst the rising Russian outcry about the fate of the Russians abroad. As mentioned before, on 15 June 1993 the joint military command of the CIS was abolished due to Russia's failure

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<sup>29</sup> Aleksandr Prokhanov, known in the past as a liberal and a critic of the communist regime, declared late in 1992 in a speech given at Columbia University that if fascism was necessary to revive the empire he would vote for the fascists. *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (155/25) (1993), p. 1.

<sup>30</sup> I asked a Kazakh nationalist intellectual, the leader of a political party, to describe the political behavior of Russia. His description: (1) Russia has always been the judge of its own actions; (2) whatever Russia does or thinks, its actions and thoughts are always right and moral; (3) Russia always portrays itself as the party that makes a sacrifice (*zhertva*) of itself for others, and as the party that is taken advantage of; (4) any land that Russia sets its foot on becomes by almost a sort of divine order Russia's blessed soil and motherland; (5) the fault with everything that goes wrong in Russia belongs to others: Jews, Germans (fascism), Americans (imperialism and exploitation), ungrateful minorities, and so forth.

to use the CIS to control militarily and otherwise the territory of the former Soviet Union. Shaposhnikov, the commander of the joint armed forces of the CIS, was appointed secretary of the Russian Security Council to replace Iurii Skokov, the architect of the near abroad views and the proponent of a CIS ministry that would have downgraded the Foreign Ministry.<sup>31</sup> The Russians gave as a reason for their action the economic burden of supporting all the CIS forces. Actually, the CIS armed forces agreement had become redundant. Already Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Moldova had decided to create their own armed forces. In the spring of 1992 Kazakhstan assumed control of the military personnel, installations, and property of the CIS armed forces installed on its territory, and in August 1992 created its own border troops and planned to create its own navy. In March 1993, Nazarbaev concluded a wide-ranging defense agreement with Russia on military cooperation and the setting of joint defense zones extending to the territory of both countries. Incidentally, in June 1992 Kazakhstan passed a law on organs of national security to replace the old Soviet KGB—actually to create a Kazakh security organ having more or less the functions of the old, including extensive authority to “ensure state and public interests.” Uzbekistan adopted a law in the summer of 1992 to create an army of land and air units. The Uzbek army backed the communist side in the Tajik civil war, providing troops and supplies. At the same time, as though to assert its military power, it conducted military operations in the Osh districts of Kyrgyzstan, apparently without obtaining prior permission. This is, in fact, further evidence of Uzbekistan’s perennial effort to assert some sort of dominion over its smaller neighbor. The fact that the Uzbek government declared openly that Russia was Uzbekistan’s chief guarantor of security and stability invites suspicion that Uzbek bullying may have Russian support.<sup>32</sup> The Turkmen government signed in mid-June 1992 a document with Russia, in which Russia agreed to assist Turkmenistan in establishing a national army and to provide equipment, training, and funding. The army was to be under joint Turkmen-Russian command and would not engage in operations without joint consent. By April 1993 a total of

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<sup>31</sup> Foye, “CIS Armed Forces”; and *RFE/RL Research Report*, 2 July 1993.

<sup>32</sup> Bess Brown, “Central Asian States Seek Russian Help,” *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 25 (18 June 1993).

sixty thousand troops were stationed on Turkmen soil, fifteen thousand under direct Russian command.<sup>33</sup>

Kyrgyzstan claimed that it was a country without an army or military or defense personnel, despite the fact that 78 percent of the population, according to a survey, wanted to have an army. Yet in June 1992 President Akaev issued a decree assuming jurisdiction over all the troops found on the national soil, while the Kyrgyz vice president, Feliks Kulov, described Kyrgyzstan's military doctrine as "armed neutrality," and Russian troops assumed responsibility for guarding the Kyrgyz borders. Tajikistan's armed forces are to a very large extent Russian and remain under Russian command, despite the relative peace that has prevailed for the past year. The rather complex civil war in Tajikistan and the massive Russian involvement there render difficult an analysis of the country's future.<sup>34</sup>

In sum, the Central Asian states have managed to create the nucleus of national armed forces,<sup>35</sup> but whose command structure is still largely Russian and whose equipment, ammunition, and so forth are supplied or bought largely from Russia. The command structure of the old union army was 90 percent Slavic (80 percent Russian); the current command structure of the Central Asian states is probably still 60 percent Slavic, although the native percentage is increasing fast. A number of states have promoted the junior native officers to higher ranks and have given them command positions. A fairly large number of Central Asian officers—three hundred from Turkmenistan and probably as many as a total of fifteen hundred—are being trained in Turkey or by Turks; already a number of them have assumed command of their troops. The Pentagon has also concluded

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<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 86.

<sup>34</sup> A fairly comprehensive account of Tajikistan is in Olivier Roy, *The Civilian War in Tajikistan: Causes and Implications* (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1993).

<sup>35</sup> Except in Tajikistan, the chief commanders of the Central Asian armed forces are all natives, as follows: (1) Kazakhstan: Col. Gen. Sagadat Nurmagamatov (b. 1924), educated at Frunze Military Academy, active in the Soviet armed forces; (2) Kyrgyzstan: Major Gen. Dzhanibek (b. 1943), educated at Frunze Military Academy; (3) Turkmenistan: Lt. Gen. Dantar Kopekov (b. 1950), attended Turkmen KGB school; (4) Uzbekistan: Lt. Gen. Rustam Akhmedov (b. 1943); (5) Tajikistan: Major Gen. Aleksandr Shishlianikov (b. 1950) (from Brown, "Central Asian States"; Brown has compiled additional data on these commanders). During the fighting in the latter part of 1992, the Russian 201st Motor Rifle Division in the country was commanded by Tajik General M. Ashurov, who ordered his troops not to become involved in the fratricidal struggle.

agreements concerning the training of the Central Asian armies. The nationalization of the army in Azerbaijan occurred mainly after Elchibey won the presidential election of 7 June 1992 with a 60 percent majority (Haidar Aliev was barred from running for office because of age) and embarked on a major drive to Turkify the country by coming closer to Turkey while abandoning membership in the CIS. Azerbaijan, due to the Karabagh war, has built a rather sizable army, which, although still lacking fighting power, is bound to be the largest and most experienced armed force of all the Muslim states in the former Soviet Union. (We have not dealt with the disposal of strategic nuclear missiles, which gave Kazakhstan much-needed publicity and world attention, as seen in U.S. Vice President Al Gore's visit to the country in December 1993 and President Nazarbaev's very important visit to Washington in mid-February 1994. The issue is important but is a one-time event, unless Kazakhstan refused ultimately to dismantle its nuclear arsenal—as the Iranians claimed in late January 1994 in reports that were rebuffed by Kazakhstan. In any event, the Kazakh Supreme Soviet ratified the country's accession to the START I Treaty.)

### *The Economic Factor in Central Asian Foreign Relations*

The importance of the economic factor in determining Central Asian relations with Russia is too overwhelming and will not be dealt with here in any detail. Suffice it to say that the economic and fiscal ties of Central Asia to Russia developed over one hundred years and made the two sides dependent on each other, although as usual Russia had the upper hand.<sup>36</sup> All Central Asian countries were included in the ruble zone.

The privatization of the economy became linked from the very start to political issues that in turn were tied to the broader questions of national interest and identity. An outright privatization would have definitely enhanced the already superior economic position of the ethnic Russians by making them owners of the enterprises and land they operated as administrators. Moreover, liberalization and

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<sup>36</sup> See Boris Z. Rumer, *Soviet Central Asia: "A Tragic Experiment"* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989).

privatization could disturb the existing setup, lower living standards, and create social unrest. But economic liberalization and privatization also had the potential of creating a new national sphere of economic activity and propertied middle classes within each republic, which, if successful, could consolidate the national identity and sovereignty.

The economic policies of the Central Asian states are far from acquiring their final shape. They remain heavily controlled by the state, with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan having adopted some privatization. Inflation and scarcity of goods are rising, in part at least because Russia failed to meet its financial obligations, including the financing of the pension fund. In fact, Russia has complained that it is asked to bear the financial burden caused by the Central Asians' transition to independent statehood and a market economy. Meanwhile, the Central Asian states refused to accept the heavy conditions imposed by Russia in order to keep them in the ruble zone; they objected that these conditions would, among other things, impose limitations on their freedom and undermine their long-range economic potential. The long-brewing dispute reached the breaking point over Central Asian participation, against Russian objection, in a summit meeting of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), consisting of the five Central Asian states, Azerbaijan, and also Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan, the last three being the founding members. Russia saw the meeting, held in July 1993, as a major step toward the creation of a Muslim common market and warned the Central Asian states that they had to choose between the ECO and economic union within the CIS. Already Russia, although a member, was apparently unhappy with the Turkish-initiated Black Sea Economic Project, which included all the states bordering the Black Sea and also Azerbaijan and Greece. Meanwhile, after some hesitation Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan decided to speed up their transition to privatization and a market economy and opened up further their borders to foreign capital, although it is not quite clear how they intend to carry out their privatization by selling shares or vouchers. The issue is further complicated by the presence of the vast *kolkhozes* and *sovkhozes* in Kazakhstan that cannot be easily turned over to and operated by private individuals. A recent survey of the situation by the World Bank, when published, should give illuminating insights.

Kyrgyzstan, without major economic resources of its own, pins its hopes on tourism to turn the country into the Switzerland of Asia; it has received rather generous loans from international financial

organizations, due partly at least to its good democratic record. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan decided to adopt its own plan of development—some described it as following the Chinese or the Chilean (Pinochet) models—of keeping more or less intact the statist economic structure while permitting only a limited degree of privatization. President İslam Karimov paired his economic statist policy with a repressive stand toward the opposition parties, first *Birlık* and then *Erk* (the latter party seceded from *Birlık* because it believed in cooperation with the government). Resource-rich Turkmenistan has followed a somewhat different policy under the direction of President Saparmurad Niyazov. He became first secretary of the party in 1985 when the previous leader was ousted and then in 1991 renamed his old party the Democratic Party; after declaring independence on 27 October 1991, he was popularly elected president on 21 June 1992. Turkmenistan has agreed to open its gas and oil resources to foreign companies for exploitation, hoping to establish markets abroad.<sup>37</sup> It has recently agreed to an extensive economic-commercial exchange with Iran. All in all, despite variations in style and degree of commitment to a market economy, the Central Asian states, headed by Kazakhstan—except for impoverished Tajikistan—have sought to establish economic relations with a variety of foreign countries while maintaining their old ties with Russia and hoping to draw benefits by staying in the ruble zone. (The Russians did not hesitate to exploit when suitable the image of helpful “big brother” that the old communist regime had cultivated in Central Asia.)

Eventually all this maneuvering by Russia and Central Asia about securing for themselves the greatest benefit came to a sudden end in 1993, as all the Central Asian states—except Tajikistan—found themselves outside the ruble zone and had to issue their own currency. The Kyrgyz government, under the advice of the IMF, introduced its own currency, the *som*, and caused a sharp reaction from Uzbekistan, leading to a temporary border closure. Then other states introduced their own currencies (the *sum* in Uzbekistan, the *tenge* in Kazakhstan, and the *manat* in Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan; they all gave one name, *kyin*, to the fractions). The Central Asian states

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<sup>37</sup> Bess Brown, “Central Asia: The Economic Crisis Deepens,” *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 3, no. 1 (7 January 1994). Much of this information is also found in the *Kazakhstan Today Bulletin*, a monthly publication appearing in Almaty, and the *Central Asia Monitor* (January 1993).

cannot maintain their independence and sovereignty for long without an economic union of some kind. Historically, Central Asia existed as an economic whole even when divided into khanates and republics. The Russian administration wisely accepted this fact when it established in 1867 the Turkestan governate that comprised all of Central Asia (most of Kazakhstan was under another administrative division). The Stalinist policy of using each republic to specialize in a given product, for example, cotton in Uzbekistan, certainly undermined the possibility of forming an economic union in the region but did not entirely destroy it, or at least the concept of it. The need to establish economic unity in Central Asia was proposed by President Nazarbaev as early as 1990. Since then the heads of the Central Asian states have met at least eight times to discuss the establishment of a common market.

Expulsion from the ruble zone has forced the Central Asian states to seek their own remedy. Meetings between the leaders of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan have resulted in a formal agreement to establish a common market to support each others', currencies and oppose the growing Russian economic and strategic pressure.<sup>38</sup> Russia asked for equity holdings and a share in the output of natural resources—about 10 percent of the oil and gas pumped out of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan—and has delayed the payment for goods, including coal taken from the area. It seems that Turkmenistan and Tajikistan are drawing closer economically and militarily to Russia, although the final outcome of all this maneuvering is not clear yet. The Uzbek-Kazakh agreement was to become effective on 1 February 1994 and in the year 2000 turn into an economic union. It is interesting to note that Karimov issued a decree on 22 January 1994 that covered a wide range of industries subject to privatization as a means to expedite the union, this after he approached the IMF on 21 January 1994 for credits while opening the door to foreign investments. These measures were preceded by agreements of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to cut down their imports from Russia, while Karimov stated that the two countries had the capacity to satisfy each other's needs; the expectation was that Iran and Turkey would help fill the gap. Meanwhile, both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have made drastic changes in the administration of their fiscal and economic institutions.

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<sup>38</sup> Message from CENASIA Bitnet discussion group, 1 February 1994.



In effect, today all the Central Asian states aspire to establish their own armed forces and have their own national currencies (which have lost value, but so far less than the ruble), thus meeting some of the outward conditions of national independence. Meanwhile, Russia has used every possible orthodox and unorthodox means and has drawn the two ultranationalist countries of the Caucasus, Azerbaijan and Georgia, into its own military and economic orbit.<sup>39</sup> It is too early to judge whether the difference in attitudes taken by Russia toward these two areas actually heralds her future policy, namely, to establish a firm influence and presence in the Caucasus (President Yeltsin just signed an agreement that leaves three major military bases in Georgia in Russian hands) while maintaining a loose grip on Central Asia.

### *Conclusion*

The foreign policy of the Central Asian states is developing along with the efforts to build the basic institutions necessary for an independent state, such as a national army and bureaucracy. The creation of an authentic national culture and identity rooted in the national history, which is being slowly rewritten in light of the perception of the past and aspirations, is an inseparable part of state building. Consequently, the foreign policy of the Central Asian states reaches beyond the technical confines of normal relations among states and acquires a basic role in the construction of the national territorial state. In this context one can say that the current foreign policies of the Central Asian states may leave permanent marks upon the character, attitudes, and orientation of the emerging national structures. There are at least three major tasks related to foreign policy that may determine the evolution of the internal and external policies, as well as the character, of these states.

The first task is to overcome the past subordinate associations of Central Asia with tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union. There is no question that tsarist and communist Russia played a decisive part in undermining the traditional Central Asian society and forcing it

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<sup>39</sup> The Russian foreign minister, A. Kozyrev, has stated repeatedly that the Caucasus is essential to the security of Russia and that his country's position in that area has been assured during centuries of struggle.

socially, politically, and territorially to assume its current shape. The indigenous culture, including Islam, was thus forced to mold itself (without losing its authentic spirit, at least at the grassroots level) according to the sociopolitical conditions imposed on it from above. The Russians defined independently their own role in creating a modern political and institutional superstructure sustained by a very traditionalist infrastructure. Had the Russians started their “reformist” endeavors by tackling the traditional rural and tribal structure not with compulsory brutal sedentarization, collectivization, and frontal attacks on the traditional family, as done by Stalin in 1927, but by instituting better and more efficient market relations in villages, the results might have been different. The old traditional structures in villages and tribes were incorporated into a variety of Soviet agricultural production units and governed with an iron hand. Nazarbaev in his childhood recollections provides exceptionally insightful passages concerning the treatment of Kazakh villagers by the Russians and communists. In one passage he describes how his father Abish (according to the tribal tradition the eldest son took the father’s name, so Nazarbaev’s tribal name is Nursultan Abish) was forced to join the *kolkhoz* but managed to take care of his family by raising apples in his backyard, which he and his son marketed in Almaty. The Russians directing the *kolkhoz* soon asked Abish not to sell his apples on the market but to surrender the entire crop to the *kolkhoz*. In response Abish cut his beloved apple trees, and afterward the family lived on the edge of starvation. No leader who remembers so vividly his family’s sufferings can be expected to cherish the old system, even though it brought him to prominence.

The key question concerning the Central Asian republics’ relations with Russia is the extent to which Moscow is able to shed its imperialistic historical national identity and regard its former subordinates as equals. In other words, the question is whether Russia can redefine its national identity without making the subjugation and rule of other nations its essential psychological ingredient. By the same token one can pose the same question to the old native communist *nomenklatura* ruling the republics, who in the past accepted wholeheartedly Moscow’s supremacy and obediently fulfilled its instructions, in exchange obtaining position, income, and prestige. As mentioned in the text, some of the native leaders acted with a sense of national responsibility during the Soviet era, but others labored to please Moscow at any price so they could retire and live comfort-

ably there. It will be the task of Central Asian foreign policy makers to persuade the Russians to get rid of their self-devised historical image as the "big brother," as Stalin euphemistically expressed it. The same foreign policy makers will face the task of inculcating the natives with a sense of independence toward everything Russian and confidence in their own abilities to decide the course of their national future.

The second task of the foreign policy of the Central Asian countries concerns their own historical, linguistic, and religious "near abroad" and the possibility of becoming members of a large ethnic, cultural, or religious union. This "cultural near abroad" consists first of Turkey, which has an infinite number of historical, cultural, and religious ties with Central Asia, and second of Iran. Pan-Turkism and Pan-Turanism as policies for uniting all the Turkic peoples were never popular in Central Asia or even among ordinary citizens of Turkey. They were reserved in 1908-18 to a small group of Azeri, Tatar, and Turkish intellectuals. On the other hand, Pan-Islamism as a form of nationalist union with Pan-Turkist features was born in Russia in 1880-1920. It was envisaged as the only practical device to liberate Muslims from Russian rule. Iran subtly appeals to a form of Pan-Islamism but relies largely on its own self-made image as the fountainhead of a Persian culture, and occasionally language, which it describes as dominant throughout the area. Iran hopes that somehow, someday, the Central Asians will be lured back into this Persian world dominated by Shi'i fundamentalist Iran. Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Arab countries, in that order of importance, can appeal to the Central Asians mainly on the basis of shared Sunni Islamic ties. On balance, neither Pan-Turkism, nor the Persian historical culture, nor unity of faith can rival in attraction and loyalty or supersede national statehood and the identity that emanates from it. On the contrary, the attraction of nationhood will grow stronger. It will be the task of the Central Asian foreign policy makers to steer their countries away from regional or global associations based on historical, cultural, and linguistic ties, while using the same ties to consolidate their national independence and sovereignty. Regional associations for economic and self-defense purposes are always possible.

The third task of the foreign policy of Central Asia is the global one, or, to be more precise, the overall "civilizational" orientation of their states. The Russian and Soviet concepts of modernization, or "progress," as they usually defined it, took the West as a model,

the contrary views of the Slavophiles notwithstanding. The Russian modernists took the science and technology from the West but ignored its democratic humanitarian, political, and cultural aspects, notably its liberal political pluralism. The beginning of modernism among Russia's Muslims had a Western orientation more in terms of values and aspirations than institutions—as was the case among the Ottoman modernists. The Soviet regime tried to nip in the bud the Muslims' yearning for contact with the fountainhead of contemporary civilization by prohibiting contact with Europe and by telling the Central Asians that Russia was the true source of civilization and that their highest level of aspiration should be education in a Russian institution and the mastery of the Russian language. Today, most of the intellectuals in Central Asia would like to establish strong, permanent, and genuine ties with the West. The decision by all the Central Asian Turkic states to abandon the Cyrillic alphabet and accept the Latin alphabet by 1995 is the most convincing proof of their intention to join the civilization of the West. The main ideological difference between Turkey and Iran stems from this point. Turkey wants to cement its alliance with the Central Asian states by moving them fully into the sphere of Western civilization, while Iran wants to keep them in the oriental Islamic sphere of civilization, which it hopes to reshape according to its own Shi'i fundamentalist revolutionary image. This choice of civilization—which is really a political rather than a cultural choice—does not imply the abandonment of the Central Asians' religion, traditions, language, and customs, but the valuation and reconstruction of all these through a set of new values and philosophy within the confines of a national territorial state, which is, incidentally, a Western form of political organization.

It is difficult to determine at this stage whether the Central Asian foreign services possess the personnel with the necessary knowledge, sophistication, and skill to carry out the above tasks to a successful conclusion. At first glance the situation is not very encouraging. Foreign policy decisions, from the simple to the most important, are made by the presidents of the republics, while the foreign ministers act more as employees and delegates than executives with defined responsibilities of their own. The foreign ministries do not yet have established traditions of service or possess the proper strategic philosophy, although there is evidence that serious attempts are being

made to overcome these shortcomings either by establishing foreign service schools or by sending personnel for training abroad. The old dependency on Moscow for training and the view that the average citizen is ignorant of international relations, if preserved, may inhibit the development of an independent-thinking foreign policy staff. The recently elected parliaments, notably in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, do take from time to time an interest in foreign policy issues, especially in opposing attempts to maintain or increase the government's dependency on Moscow. The parliaments are bound to reflect more and more the opinion of the public, if the political parties become truly representative of the views and interests of various social groups. The nationalist intelligentsia is becoming increasingly interested in foreign issues, often in a rather extreme manner, but so far its impact on government decisions is barely felt. In the ultimate analysis the intelligentsia's input as well as the influence of the public on foreign policy matters is dependent on the democratization of the entire political system. It is premature, in fact impossible, to expect the Central Asian countries to produce overnight a full-fledged democratic system. However, a slow start must be initiated before the current authoritarian regimes become ossified and the leaders permanently entrenched in power. The Kazakh experiment, while far from being ideal, represents a good start, as does Kyrgyzstan. On the other hand, Elchibey's short-lived experiment in true democracy, although nipped in the bud, has set a precedent that may still bear fruit in the future.

The progress and the creative endeavors of a new nation are often stimulated by the memory of past achievements. Such memories nurture the national consciousness and the collective ego and become the incentives for future creative endeavors. Central Asia as a whole occupies a very distinguished place in the Muslim world as the citadel of intellectual achievement. Proportionate to its size, it has produced the largest number of theologians (Bukhari, Hamadani), philosophers (Farabi, Ibn Sina [Avicenna]), mathematicians (Kwarizmi, Ulugh Beg), poets (Navai), and hundreds of other scholars and writers. In the era of nationalism these Central Asian luminaries have been appropriated by Arabs and Persians. The Central Asian creativity in all intellectual and artistic fields lasted from the eighth to the seventeenth centuries. It was an unparalleled period of achievement, when Central Asia was at the crossroads of world cultures. National

independence and sovereignty should enable Central Asia to link itself again to the rest of the world, and thus end its isolation from the real sources of civilization and regain its past creative prowess. This is the unique and vital foreign policy mission facing the Central Asian states, the awareness of which may inspire them to rise to the challenge.

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