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Party Organization in Southern and East-Central Europe

Ingrid van Biezen



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

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To the memory of my grandfather – Voor opa

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INGRID VAN BIEZEN

List of Party Acronyms

Acronym	*Original name*	*English name*
Czech Republic		
ČSS	Československá Strana Socialistická	Czechoslovak Socialist Party
ČSSD	Československá Strana Socialní Demokracie/Česká Strana Socialně Demokratická	Czechoslovak/Czech Social Democratic Party
HSD-SMS	Hnutí za Samosprávnou Demokracii – Společnost pro Moravu a Slezsko	Movement for Self-Governing Democracy – Society for Moravia and Silesia
KDU-ČSL	Křest'ansko a Demokratická Unie – Československá Strana Lidová	Christian Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party
KSČ	Komunistická Strana Československá	Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
KSČM	Komunistická Strana Čech a Moravy	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia
LSU	Liberálně Socialní Unie	Liberal Social Union
ODA	Občanská Demokratická Aliance	Civic Democratic Alliance
ODS	Občanská Demokratická Strana	Civic Democratic Party
OF	Občanské Fórum	Civic Forum
OH	Občanské Hnutí	Civic Movement
SPR-RSČ	Sdružení Pro Republiku – Republikánská Strana Československá	Movement for the Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia
US	Unie Svobody	Freedom Union
Hungary		
FIDESZ-MPP	Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége – Magyar Polgári Párt	Alliance of Young Democrats – Hungarian Civic Party

FKGP	Független Kisgazda – Földmunkás- és Polgári Párt	Independent Smallholders Party
KDNP	Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt	Christian Democratic People's Party
MDF	Magyar Demokrata Fórum	Hungarian Democratic Forum
MDNP	Magyar Demokrata Néppárt	Hungarian Democratic People's Party
MIÉP	Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja	Hungarian Justice and Life Party
MSZMP	Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt	Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party
MSZP	Magyar Szocialista Párt	Hungarian Socialist Party
SZDSZ	Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége	Alliance of Free Democrats
Portugal		
AD	Aliança Democrática	Democratic Alliance
CDS-PP	Centro Democrático Social – Partido Popular	Democratic Social Centre – People's Party
CDU	Coligação Democrática Unitária	Unitary Democratic Coalition
PCP	Partido Comunista Português	Portuguese Communist Party
PEV	Partido Ecologista-Os Verdes	Green Party
PPD	Partido Popular Demócrata	Democratic People's Party
PRD	Partido Renovador Democrático	Democratic Reform Party
PS	Partido Socialista	Socialist Party
PSD	Partido Social Demócrata	Social Democratic Party
Spain		
AP	Alianza Popular	Popular Alliance
CDS	Centro Democático y Social	Social and Democratic Centre
CiU	Convergència i Unió	Convergence and Union
IU	Izquierda Unida	United Left
PCE	Partido Comunista de España	Spanish Communist Party

PNV	Partido Nacionalista Vasco	Basque Nationalist Party
PP	Partido Popular	People's Party
PSC	Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya	Catalan Socialist Party
PSOE	Partido Socialista Obrero Español	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party
PSUC	Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya	Catalan Communist Party
UCD	Unión de Centro Democrático	Union of the Democratic Centre

Introduction

In contemporary democracies, parties are usually regarded as vital political institutions. On this view, they are a *sine qua non* for the organization of the modern democratic polity as well as for the expression and manifestation of political pluralism. This point of view thus contrasts sharply with the opinions predominating in the era when parties first emerged, when they were primarily perceived as a potential threat to the general interest. While the constitutions of most of the established liberal democracies initially refrained from prescribing a role for political parties, their relevance today has become increasingly recognized also in constitutional terms. The Federal Republic of Germany and Italy were the first of the West European countries to dedicate a separate article in their constitutions to political parties, and this practice has since been followed in constitutional revisions in many other polities, including the European Union. It is in new democracies in particular, however, where the very establishment of democratic procedures was often identified with the establishment of free competition between parties, that parties were attributed a pivotal role and indeed privileged position as the key instruments for the expression of political pluralism and political participation. As Kopecký (1995: 516) has observed for the Czech Republic, 'a conception of democracy prevailing among the designers of the emerging democracies seems to be one in which political parties are the core foundation of the democratic political system.'

At the same time, however, as any reading of the current scholarly and popular debates will easily attest, parties are not without their critics. In fact, this anti-party critique is a long-established motif in writings on democratic theory (e.g. Daalder, 1992) and, as the works of Ostrogorksi (1902), Michels (1911) and Weber (1918) show, dates back to the very period in which parties were first emerging. However, it has recently

been renewed and revived in more contemporary clothing (e.g. Poguntke and Scarrow, 1996). Much of this recent wave of anti-party sentiment may be associated with what many regard as the personal and political failures of party leaderships and of the political class more generally. More specifically, it may also be associated with problems confronting the ways in which parties now organize, and especially with the perceived weakening of their linkages with society and with their inability to constitute adequate channels of representation. A growing disengagement from conventional politics seems further to accentuate the passing of a golden age of the mass party, which has always been seen to represent the norm in terms of both representation and legitimacy (Mair, 1995).

The relevance of political parties as the core institutions of modern democracy, on the one hand, and the importance of how these parties organize, on the other, together form the core object of this study. More specifically, the focus is on the development in recently democratized European polities, that is in those polities that constitute part of what Huntington (1991) has depicted as the 'third wave' of democratization. Indeed, in the relatively fragile and vulnerable new democracies established after decades of non-democratic rule, of whatever hue, the way parties organize can make a critical contribution to the stability and legitimacy of the new democratic system.

On political parties, transitions to democracy, and consolidation

Political parties can already make a critical impact during the transition to democracy, although their role in this process is hitherto relatively undertheorized. To put it most starkly, and echoing the distinction advanced by Linz (1978) on transitions through reform (*reforma*) or rupture (*ruptura*), there are two predominant perspectives on the role of political actors in democratic transitions. From an elitist or top-down perspective, political leaders – of either the non-democratic regime or the opposition, or both – dominate the transition, since they are the actors responsible for the final decisions. By and large following the framework first developed by O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), this has become the dominant approach in the contemporary transition literature. On this view, and in the words of Di Palma (1990: 8), democratization is 'ultimately a matter of political crafting', and the most crucial factor in determining the outcome of a transition, or the odds for a successful transition to democracy, is therefore elite behaviour (see also

Higley and Gunther, 1992). From this perspective, the mass public are largely exogenous to the transition and at best play an indirect role as reactive to elite decisions. Even if 'the people' are accredited with playing a decisive role in initiating the transition process, elite behaviour remains crucial since, as Linz (1990: 152) argues, a 'leaderless and disorganized people […] may be unable to negotiate a transfer or sharing of power.'

On the other hand, bottom-up perspectives approach transitions as potentially protracted processes of social and political struggle, in which the role of societal forces and their interaction with political elites is more pronounced. On this view, successful transitions often are as much a product of the behaviour of elites as of the pressures of the population or social movements. Ruth Collier (1999), for example, has recently criticized the bias entailed in the elitist perspective on democratic transitions by emphasizing the crucial role of the working class in democratization processes in Western Europe and South America. Rejecting the exclusive focus on individual elites, advocates of this approach seem to have taken their cue from Rustow (1970: 347), who already alerted more than thirty years ago that '[t]he "advent" of democracy must not, of course, be understood as occurring in a single year'. Rather than reducing the entire transition process to merely the 'decision phase', the contention is that the role of social forces in the potentially prolonged 'preparatory phase' should be more fully acknowledged.

What both the 'bottom-up' and 'top-down' perspectives have in common is that they represent a shift in focus towards behaviour and choice. In other words, and notwithstanding a few significant exceptions (e.g. Rueschemeyer et al., 1992), contemporary approaches stress the importance of agency rather than the structural conditions and socio-economic determinants of democracy, which characterized most of the democratization literature of the 1950s and 1960s (see Lipset, 1959; Moore, 1966). However, and perhaps most importantly, neither the top-down nor the bottom-up approach tends to accord a significant role to political parties. On the face of it, it seems crucial to build theories that would seek to integrate the actions and behaviour of masses *and* elites, in that both have played an important role in the process. It seems equally evident that it is precisely through the agency of party that both perspectives could be successfully combined. In practice, however, there is a tendency to treat elites and masses as *ex ante* distinct from one another. Most scholars seem to prefer to juxtapose each side against the other and to emphasize the importance of one to the other, thus potentially erasing any possible attention to parties.[1]

Advancing a theory on the role of political parties in transitions to democracy does not concern us here, but it is as well to recognize that the shift in focus towards the 'agents' of the transition has resulted in a primary emphasis on political elites, few if any of which are defined in terms of party. It is state actors and individual elites who count, or, at best, more or less formalized groups of leaders. Hence the commonly accepted notion that political parties do not play an important role in transition processes, even where they have already appeared on the stage. As a consequence of this bias towards the importance of leadership, however, the critical contribution of political parties to democratic transitions has been systematically underestimated.

The contrast between the Spanish and Portuguese transitions is a case in point. Spain is exemplary for an elite-negotiated and pacted transition, and indeed has become a paradigmatic case of a successful transition, in contrast with the revolution in neighbouring Portugal. While the Portuguese transition is notorious for its high levels of political turmoil and upheaval and the absence of successful leadership, which is seen to account for its lack of success, the transition in Spain is renowned for its consensual style and the 'quasi-consociational' practices adopted by the elites (Gunther et al., 1986: 114). However, in a critical evaluation of the Spanish transition, Bermeo (1997) shows that violence was in fact much more pervasive in Spain, and the number of strikes much higher. What the predominant focus on elite behaviour obscures is how, in contrast to their Portuguese counterparts, Spanish parties, and particularly those on the left, made a critical contribution to the moderation of the pervasive and potentially disruptive conflicts by controlling society through the channels of the party, i.e. their party organizations and affiliated trade unions.

While their role in democratic transitions has been relatively undervalued, the positive contribution of political parties to the consolidation of democracy is more generally acknowledged. In fact, parties are seen to make a relevant, if not crucial, contribution to the consolidation of a newly established democratic polity.[2] Political institutionalization is generally seen as the most important and urgent factor in the consolidation of democracy, even when other arenas, such as civil society or the rule of law, are also considered to be relevant. This is so because, as Diamond (1997: xxiii) contends, political parties are 'essential instruments for representing political constituencies and interests, aggregating demands and preferences, recruiting and socializing new candidates for office, organizing the electoral competition for power, crafting policy alternatives, setting the policy-making agenda, forming effective

governments, and integrating groups and individuals into the democratic process.' Essentially, then, the relevance of political parties applies to both the domains of society and the state, even though new democracies may 'have to survive with a lot less interest intermediation than in the past' (Schmitter, 1997: 27). On the one hand, they craft constitutions and major laws and procedures, manage the state apparatus and produce the overall framework for economic society and the establishment of the rule of law. On the other hand, they interact with civil society, whose values and interests are the major generators of political society, and they play an active role in linking civil society with the state (see Linz and Stepan, 1996). In this sense, parties are not only the driving force behind all other arenas, but they are also the crucial political linkage mechanism between civil society and the state.

The contribution of political parties to democratic consolidation, therefore, should be analysed primarily in two domains, i.e. the relationship between parties and society, on the one hand, and the relationship between parties and the state, on the other. The role of parties can be seen in two directions (Morlino, 1998: 26). In a 'bottom-up' direction from civil society to government, parties can be seen as having a legitimizing function, i.e. as actors who promote legitimacy for the new democratic system among their supporters and followers, who create support for governmental institutions and who, by enhancing system supportiveness, reduce the potential for anti-system actors. Seen in a 'top-down' direction, parties are not only crucial decision-makers but are also the institutions par excellence for the political channelling of society, and even of societal control. Whichever direction we deal with, however, it is clear that it is the mode of organization that will determine if and how effective parties can perform these roles. For this reason, it is important to study how political parties in new democracies organize. Put differently, and as Huntington (1968: 461) has famously concluded:

> Organization is the road to political power, but is also the foundation of political stability and thus the precondition of political liberty. The vacuum of power and authority which exists in so many modernizing countries may be filled temporarily by charismatic leadership or by military force. But it can be filled permanently only by political organization. Either the established elites compete among themselves to organize the masses through the existing political system or dissident elites organize them to overthrow that system. In the modernizing world, he controls the future who organizes its politics.

Avoiding the 'transformation bias'

While research on Western European party organizations has made significant progress both theoretically and empirically, advance has been much more limited regarding parties in new democracies. The state of analysis there echoes the vicious circle as expressed by Duverger (1954: xiii), i.e. the difficulty of constructing a general theory of parties with limited empirical knowledge and, conversely, the problems of data collection without the guidance of a suitable theory. Despite the continuing attention for party organizations in new democracies, only few analyses seem capable of escaping this impasse between theory and practice.

First of all, much of the literature on parties in new democracies emphasizes their organizational weaknesses, which is generally attributed to the low levels of party affiliation. However, little attention has been paid to the structure of the membership organizations as opposed to their size. Moreover, even if it were to be the case that parties in new democracies have developed relatively weak linkages with society, this does not necessarily presuppose an overall lack of organizational strength, nor does it imply that party organization *tout court* is any less important. As Katz and Mair (1995) have pointed out in the context of the established Western democracies, the perceived decline of parties has been manifested primarily or almost exclusively at the level of society and has in fact been counterbalanced by a greater access to and an increasing control of the state. This underlines that we should not think of party organizations as unitary actors but rather as being composed of different elements, or 'faces', which also allows us to realize that while one of these elements might be relatively poorly developed, this does not necessarily imply that the party as a whole is organizationally weak. Thus far, however, relatively little attention has been paid to the structural evolution of parties, as Lewis (1996: 1) observes for the post-communist democracies. In addition, and perhaps quite paradoxically, while it might be their relationship with the state rather than society that is of primary importance for parties in newly established democracies, the strength and nature of their linkage to the state constitutes a relatively underexplored area of research compared to a more persistent focus on the parties' weakly developed linkages with society.

Secondly, and primarily as a result of the lack of conceptual clarity or the absence of a single analytical framework, research on party organizations in new democracies has thus far led to contradictory conclusions, or is at best inconclusive on a number of accounts. This is true for

questions concerning the extent of variation between parties, the conception of organizational types or the patterns of development over time. Do we witness variation or similarity between parties of the left and right, between newly created and old parties, or between government and opposition parties? Is there one particular type of party emerging or rather several different types? Should parties in new democracies be seen as party organizations of a new type, or are they to be understood in terms of the existing models in the established Western European democracies? Are the patterns of organizational development to be seen in terms of convergence or divergence? In brief, current research does not permit any conclusive answers as to the impact of the historical or institutional context from which parties emerge, or to the question whether there is a 'generational' or a 'life-cycle' effect, i.e. whether it is a party's genetics that continue to be reflected throughout subsequent processes of structural adaptation and which will lead to different and coexisting types of party, or whether some sort of a period effect will lead the party organizations to converge (cf. Katz and Mair, 1990).

By applying the models of party organization that have been developed in the Western European context to the parties in the new Southern and Eastern European democracies, a relatively limited degree of understanding has been achieved. Nevertheless, these models are as yet the only theoretical constructs available for the analysis of party organization, and it would be undesirable to dismiss them entirely. However, although ideal types are generally difficult to investigate empirically, there is an additional and indeed more important disadvantage involved in applying the Western constructs to the context of the new democracies, in that these models involve what might be termed a 'transformation bias'. That is, rather than models of party organization per se, most of the existing party types in fact reflect models of party *change*. Kirchheimer's (1966) 'catch-all party', for example, clearly captures a process of party transformation with the classic mass party as explicit point of reference, while Panebianco's (1988) model of the 'electoral-professional party' summarizes the organizational changes relative to the traditional mass-bureaucratic party. In the same vein, Katz and Mair's (1995) more recent 'cartel party' also builds on previously existing types of party organization. As Katz and Mair (1995: 6) assert, 'the development of the parties in western democracies has been reflective of a dialectical process in which each party type generates a reaction which stimulates further development, thus leading to yet another type of party, and to another set of reactions and so on.' Logically, therefore,

the Western models of party organization that have been elaborated thus far reflect this process of party change, in which each type takes a previously existing type of organization as a point of departure.

Hence, most of the existing models of party organization concentrate on, and are thus primarily useful for, the analysis of the degree and direction of party organizational adaptation, change and transformation. What is lacking, however, is a theory of party *formation* that can also be applied to cases other than the Western European parties of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. LaPalombara and Weiner's (1966: 12) assertion made almost 40 years ago, namely that '[g]reater theorizing is needed […], because Duverger's attempts to trace the early development of parties to the emergence of parliaments and electoral systems [can] hardly be applied to most of the developing areas', is still valid for parties in democracies that have been recently established. Hence, for a theory of party formation and analysis of organizational development in such newly established democracies, it is imperative to avoid the bias of transformation that is almost inevitably associated with the existing Western European models of party organization. In this research, which is what Ragin has labelled case-oriented and thus primarily directed at uncovering 'patterns of invariance and constant association' (Ragin, 1987: 51) rather than discovering universal correlations and probabilistic relationships, the already existing models will serve as a heuristic tool. However, rather than applying these models as a whole on the reality in new democracies, they are broken down into their constituent elements in so far as these reflect organizational characteristics, while at the same time incorporating variables that are likely to be particularly relevant for the context and period of party formation in a new democracy.

The empirical side of this study focuses, most of all, on data gathered on the internal organization of the individual parties, i.e. the size and structure of the party organization, the degree of penetration into society and the state, the internal balance of power and the party's financial profile, as well as on the conceptions of party organization held by the parties themselves. In this, and for reasons of comparability, this research follows similar lines of inquiry as have been developed in a broader cross-national research project on party organizations in Western Europe (Katz and Mair, 1992, 1994), while it also draws in part on the framework developed by Janda (1980).

In Part I, which presents the framework for our analysis, Chapter 1 outlines three scenarios for the possible organizational development of parties in new democracies, identifying the newness of democracy, the

period of democratization or the unique conjuncture of institutional and contextual dynamics as potentially decisive determinants of the emerging mode of party organization. Chapter 2 then goes on to assess precisely why and how we can expect parties in the new democracies to be different from those in the advanced democracies in the West.

Chapters 3 to 6, which together constitute Part II of this study, will examine the practice of organizational development of the main parties in the individual countries. They will discuss the parties in Portugal, Spain, Hungary and the Czech Republic respectively, with a particular emphasis on the membership organization and the extra-parliamentary party structures. All country chapters are organized according to the same general structure. The first section provides a brief and general overview of the transition to democracy and its main actors, and a short history of the parties and the development of the party system. The analysis then focuses on the specific organizational characteristics, i.e. on membership organization, the official organizational structure and the internal balance of power, showing a detailed and thus relatively full story of organizational development.

Part III of this study passes from country-based analysis to a comparative perspective, analysing the relationship between the extra-parliamentary party and the party in public office in Chapter 7, and the rules and practice of party finance in Chapter 8. Chapter 9 finally summarizes the findings, providing a synthesis of the evidence from the individual country chapters of Part II and the comparative analyses of Part III. The picture we want to emphasize here is that the institutional context in which parties emerged has clearly enhanced electorally expansive rather than organizationally penetrative strategies, has encouraged the incorporation of parties within the state and has promoted the emergence of a dominant power coalition at a critical junction within the organization. While the prevailing interpretations in the contemporary literatures see parties in the new democracies primarily as having made a quick 'evolutionary leap' towards the already existing modes of party organization in the West, this study concludes by arguing that the path of party formation and development in new democracies is in fact best understood as a process *sui generis*, by which parties in new democracies generally start out as 'parties in the state' which subsequently expand their organizations beyond the confines of state institutions and reach out, albeit only minimally, towards society.

Before embarking on the analysis itself, however, it is useful at this point to address the importance of a cross-regional comparison of parties in Southern and East-Central Europe. The present analysis concentrates

on the experience of party organizations in four of these recently democratized polities: Portugal and Spain in Southern Europe, and Hungary and the Czech Republic in East-Central Europe. Hence, the focus rests on parties in two polities that emerged from authoritarian rule in the 1970s, at the beginning of Huntington's third wave, and in two polities that emerged from communist rule at the end of the 1980s, when the third wave was beginning to assume explosive dimensions. Despite the fact that much valuable work has been done on parties in each of these two regions, and that many other aspects have often been the focus of cross-regional comparisons, political parties in the two regions have been rarely compared systematically. Although cross-regional comparisons have been carried out with regard to a wide range of themes,[3] such as the nature of the transition or, more broadly, the prospects for democratic stability and consolidation, contemporary analyses of political parties in new European democracies have rarely adopted a comparative inter-regional perspective. Rather, they tend to limit the analyses exclusively to one particular region. Not surprisingly, the findings of such regional studies are often difficult to generalize beyond the idiosyncrasies of the post-authoritarian or post-communist environment, which impedes our understanding of the functioning of political parties and the ways in which they organize in the broader realm of new democracies.

It is the contention of the present study that there are no theoretically or methodologically sound reasons *a priori* to exclude comparisons of Eastern European parties with their Southern European counterparts. A comparative analysis of the differences and similarities between the processes of party formation in both regions will only facilitate the identification of the relevant factors that influence the process of party organizational development and advance a better and more comprehensive understanding of how these encourage parties to adopt a particular organizational format. In other words, a comparative analysis of the parties in both regions is imperative for arriving at a comprehensive understanding and conclusions with external validity on party organizations in new democracies in general. Hence, in contrast to the commonly adopted focus on the particularities of either post-authoritarian or post-communist politics, the present analysis transcends the traditional regional bias in contemporary comparative party research by taking the context of a newly emerging democracy itself as a point of departure. Applying a common framework to two regions which have been rarely subject to systematic comparative analyses of party organization enables the identification of relevant political, social and institutional factors

that influence the processes of party formation and organizational development in 'third wave' democracies.

Although the experiences in Southern and Eastern Europe form the core of the comparisons elucidated in this study, the comparative reference point is thus much wider than that, in that it also includes other parties in consolidated democracies in Europe that constitute part of the 'third wave', as well as the long-established Western European democracies. In fact, and underlying the whole basis of this research, the key point of comparison in both sets of countries is with the development of party organizations in the long-established democracies of Western Europe. There are two reasons for this. First, and inevitably so, the analytic tools and theories which can be applied to the experiences of the new democracies in Europe derive from an understanding of the Western European tradition. Whether focusing on cleavage formation and party–voter linkages, or models of party organization and the relationship between parties and society or parties and the state, it is simply impossible – and also undesirable – to seek to evade the paradigms which have emerged from the analyses of the Western European experience. It is from there that our language has been derived, as it were. Second, and for obvious heuristic reasons, the comparison between both Southern and Eastern Europe, on the one hand, and Western Europe, on the other, should enable us to appreciate precisely what is different about party organization and development in new democracies, and should, at the same time, reveal what has also been distinctive about the trajectories in Western Europe itself.

Part I
Framework

1
The Path towards Democracy: the Institutional Context of Party Formation

This chapter will pay particular attention to the institutional context in which parties in newly emerging democracies begin to operate, and the opportunities and constraints such an environment offers for strategies of political mobilization and organization. Thus, while parties may also be considered virtually independent institutional forces that act upon political, social and economic development or change, in the perspective adopted here they are regarded as in some way dependent and as responding to their environment. For this purpose, the present chapter identifies different paths towards democracy as well as the institutional context of party formation resulting from these paths, while in the following chapter prospects of political parties embarking on particular organizational strategies within such a context are analysed in more detail. The contention here is that a neo-institutionalist perspective, in which the existing structures make a difference for the choices that will be made, offers a much greater potential than more narrowly focused and almost voluntaristic perspectives concentrating primarily on the internal agents of party change, such as advanced by Harmel and Janda (1994). In their view, party change is 'normally the result of leadership change, a change of dominant faction within the party and/or an external stimulus for change' (Harmel and Janda, 1994: 262; see also Harmel et al. 1995). The broader contention here, however, is that the behaviour of party leaderships and party strategies cannot be seen to be independent from the structural context in which the party is embedded. This is not to argue that party change 'just happens' but that context and conduct are necessarily interrelated. The perspective adopted here, therefore, is one in which the basic assumption is that party strategies are shaped by both the institutional context and the historical setting in

which they operate (cf. Aldrich, 1995). It is the environment in which the party begins to operate that is primarily responsible for the type of organization that emerges, and the changing environment is often, as Katz and Mair (1990: 18) suggest, the ultimate source of party organizational change. Hence, the approach advanced here emphasizes that, while strategies of party formation and change might be contingent and subject to choice, contingency is also subject to structural constraints (see Karl, 1990). For this reason, no study of party formation and party organization can afford to ignore the wider context in which that party emerges and begins to operate.

Party formation and organizational development: three scenarios

Having established that the context in which parties first emerge is critical for the nature of those emerging political parties, the question remains which environment is to be held primarily responsible. If, as Panebianco (1988) has argued, a party's genetic structure is most decisive for its organizational development, we need to establish which of the conditions at the time of its birth really matter. There are at least three types of environment which are possibly relevant, and therefore three potential scenarios for the formation and organizational development of parties in new democracies. In the first, it is the sheer newness of a democracy that matters, regardless, that is, of the different trajectories that were followed in arriving at this stage and which are discussed at greater length below. In this scenario, parties in new democracies would follow a trajectory comparable to their early post-democratizing Western European counterparts. In an environment of profound social and political change characteristic of the early stages of democracy and in a context of 'consequent and strong pressures by new categories of interest to enter into the political system', mass integration parties would emerge, as Pizzorno (1981: 272) has put it, 'to strengthen and to control the access of the new masses into the political system' and become redundant once these objectives are achieved.

In established Western European democracies, the mass party appeared a transitory phenomenon in a continuing process of party adaptation and organizational change. Kirchheimer (1966) drew attention to the transformation of mass parties into catch-all parties, for which the functions of mobilization and integration were becoming increasingly irrelevant and which focused on more immediate electoral success instead.[1] In addition, Panebianco (1988) has highlighted the

increasing professionalization of the electorally oriented party organizations. These organizational changes reflect, as Katz and Mair (1995) have pointed out, a movement away from the traditionally strong linkages between parties and society towards an intensification of their relation with the state, culminating in what they suggest is the emergence of the cartel party, in which parties are seen to have become an almost integral part of the state.[2]

If parties in new democracies are driven by the same imperatives as those in early Western European democracies, this would allow us to identify parallels between the parties in the new democracies of the late twentieth century and those of the early twentieth century. If this were to be the case, it would be the 'newness' of a democracy that matters, and not the era in which it develops, for example, that largely determines how parties organize. Once cleavages are structured and the party systems are stabilized (see Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), parties might undergo a similar process of organizational transformation as their West European counterparts and evolve from mass parties into catch-all parties or other successor types of party.

The evidence suggests, however, that this is not the most likely scenario. In the second and more plausible scenario, parties in new democracies would resemble their counterparts in contemporary Western Europe rather than those in early democratizing Europe. Although Lipset and Rokkan may make a good starting point for the stabilization of cleavages in Western Europe at the turn of the century, and Duverger for the emergence of mass parties in that era (see also Neumann, 1956), the beginning of the twentieth century is clearly past and the Western European models of party formation and organizational transformation may therefore have become obsolete. Parties in newly established democracies are perhaps driven by more contingent imperatives, which also have exerted a considerable influence on Western European party organizations, such as changes in the character of society, the nature and strength of the cleavage structures, the availability of modern mass media, or the increasing importance of state subventions to political parties. If this were to be the case, it would allow us to identify parallels between parties in new democracies and those in the contemporary established democracies. In that case, parties in new democracies would make what Smith (1993: 9) has called an 'evolutionary leap'. They would miss out the mass party stage, and other stages for that matter, and it would be factors relevant to the era in which a new democracy develops rather than the sheer newness of democracy that has the most decisive influence on the emerging types of party organization.

A third possibility is that neither of these two scenarios applies and that we witness the emergence of entirely new types of party organization and paths of organizational development without clear precedents in Western Europe. The emergence of these types of party would be induced by the particular and indeed unprecedented combination of institutional, contextual and period-related variables that specifically accompany third-wave democratization processes and the course of party development in the more recently established democratic regimes. The remainder of this study will, after outlining the different available paths towards democracy, examine which of these three scenarios most accurately describes the process of party formation and party organizational development in newly established democracies.

The path towards democracy

In order to examine which of the three scenarios outlined above is most likely, it is essential first to analyse the institutional context of party formation in early democratizing Western Europe. There are two major reasons for first turning to the experience of the established liberal democracies. First, as discussed in the introduction, the theories available on the emergence of political parties are primarily limited to the early parliamentary systems of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Western Europe. A contribution to a greater theorizing on party formation should therefore involve an assessment of the validity of existing theories as well as their shortcomings for cases of contemporary party development. Secondly, and more specifically, given that one of the main purposes of this analysis is to appreciate the similarities and differences in party organization and development in new democracies vis-à-vis those already established, the first objective should be to assess the conditions under which party formation took place in early Western Europe and to evaluate the extent to which parties in newly emerging democratic polities found themselves in similar or different conditions.

To assess the impact of the institutional environment on party formation and organization in early democratizing Western Europe, the focus should be on the institutional context preceding the introduction of universal suffrage, since that is where the blueprints of early Western European models of party organization can be found. For the purpose of such an analysis, Robert Dahl's (1971) classic typology of regimes provides a useful heuristic tool. The typology also serves a purpose beyond its traditional use, which lies mainly in democratization studies or the classification of political regimes (e.g. O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986,

Karl and Schmitter, 1991; Vanhanen, 1997). Its main value for the present analysis is to highlight the institutional dimensions underlying patterns of regime change and the corresponding paths towards democracy. The broader contention here is that the path towards democracy and patterns of party formation are closely interrelated, in that the former has a critical impact on the available strategies of party organization.

According to Dahl (1971), two basic and independent dimensions underlying a political system can be distinguished. On the one hand, regimes vary according to the degree of public contestation, or political competition, i.e. the extent to which institutions are 'openly available […] and fully guaranteed to at least some members of the political system who wish to contest the conduct of government'. On the other hand, regimes vary regarding their inclusiveness or degree of participation, i.e. 'the proportion of the population entitled to participate in controlling and contesting the conduct of government'. The dimension of inclusiveness thus refers to those who are entitled to participate in the system of public competition (Dahl, 1971: 4).[3]

In Dahl's view, in order for a political system to be qualified as a democracy, both the dimensions of political competition and participation should be fully maximized. Hence, democracy is a political system with a maximum freedom to organize and to compete, in which the right of participation is granted to all (adult) citizens. Democracy is then located at the upper-right corner in Figure 1.1,[4] which presents a slightly adapted version of Dahl's typology of political regimes based upon these two dimensions.[5] If both political competition and participation are minimal, the regime is a 'closed hegemony', located in the lower-left corner. This is a regime that imposes the most severe restrictions on the expression, organization and representation of political preferences as



Figure 1.1 Typology of political regimes
Source: Adapted from Dahl (1971).

well as on the opportunities available to the opponents of the incumbent government. In these systems, participation is limited and the population is prohibited from expressing public opposition to the policies and ideology of the ruling leaders, as well as to the major social, economic and political structures as a whole. In a closed hegemony, organized dissent and opposition are prohibited in any form (Dahl, 1973: 3). The regime type located in the lower-right corner is the 'inclusive hegemony', which is a regime that provides extensive opportunities for participation, without, however, acknowledging opportunities for public contestation. Finally, located in the upper-left corner is the 'competitive oligarchy', which is a regime that provides extensive opportunities for public contestation, but restricts participation to only a small proportion of society.

From this typology, it follows that there are essentially three different paths towards democracy. These can be distinguished according to the particular sequence of 'liberalization' and 'popularization', i.e. the order in which political competition and participation are expanded.[6] A closed hegemony can be transformed into a competitive oligarchy through the liberalization of the regime, i.e. by increasing the possibilities for public contestation. Through the popularization of the regime, i.e. increasing the level of participation, this regime may subsequently develop towards democracy. Conversely, if popularization precedes liberalization, a closed hegemony first becomes inclusive by providing greater participation and is subsequently transformed into democracy by increasing the opportunities for public contestation. Finally, regimes can pursue a 'shortcut' from a closed hegemony to democracy, through a simultaneous expansion of suffrage and rights of public contestation (Dahl, 1971: 34).

The Western European path: from competitive oligarchy to democracy

In essence, the path followed by most of the now established liberal democracies in the West consisted of a transformation of competitive oligarchies into democracies (Dahl, 1971: 10; see also Daalder, 1966). By the end of the nineteenth century, most of these countries were characterized by low levels of inclusiveness: universal suffrage had been established in only four countries (see Rokkan, 1970: 84–5). At the same time, however, political competition had already reached relatively high levels. The introduction of universal male suffrage constituted the first considerable step in the direction of democracy, a process that was concluded

soon after the Second World War, when the restrictions on the suffrage for women were abolished everywhere.[7] In other words, the Western European democratization process essentially involved the expansion of the level of participation, or the increase of the regimes' inclusiveness, in already competitive systems.

Regarding the relationship between the path towards democracy and the emerging types of party organization, the most noteworthy aspect to underline is the sequence of events in which liberalization of the regimes preceded their popularization: political competition was established before full political participation. While in these regimes the restrictive suffrage excluded a large segment of society from the political system, a constitutional system with an elected parliament and political parties competing for power was already in existence. Politics in the period of limited suffrage was dominated by a relatively small political elite, which was closely connected to the powerful elites in society. Since these political elites could rely on status and connections in order to be elected, there was little need for well-structured intermediary political organizations. Under nineteenth-century restricted suffrage, Liberal and Conservative parties – which are generally the oldest parties in Western European political systems – were, as Duverger (1954: 20) contends, generally 'nothing but federations of caucuses' and can therefore be best described as 'cadre parties'. As Katz and Mair (1995: 9) suggest, they were basically committees of those who constituted the leadership in both the state and civil society.

In terms of the cleavage structure, the political system mirrored the class cleavage almost perfectly, in that it included the 'owners' and excluded 'workers' (and also women) from participation. As a product of nineteenth-century industrialization, a working class of considerable size had emerged before its members were granted the right to vote. As the urban and rural working classes increased in numbers and continued to be sharply separated from, and politically and economically subordinate to, the middle classes and aristocracy, they began to develop a political consciousness and increasingly felt the need to organize not only industrially but also politically. This encouraged the emergence of working-class parties and trade unions. Hence, European class-conscious socialism was partly fostered by the introduction of universal suffrage long after the establishment of competitive politics.[8] The institutional structure, excluding the underprivileged working classes from the political system, provided the basis for the organization of socialist working-class parties, which in most cases emerged and organized before the introduction of universal male suffrage.[9]

These parties were usually created externally, i.e. outside the legislature. In the case of internally created parties, or parties of parliamentary origin, the leaders held public office first and only afterwards established local electoral committees and a permanent party organization that connected the two. Conversely, working-class parties – and in some countries also religious parties – emerged as movements outside parliament and first created a coherent and centralized extra-parliamentary organization before they competed in elections and acquired parliamentary representation (see Duverger, 1954; LaPalombara and Weiner, 1966). In other words, organization was achieved before these parties engaged in mass electoral competition. In order to challenge the existing economic and political order successfully, working-class parties had to rely on the mobilization of large numbers of supporters and the organization of a large membership. In fact, organization was of fundamental importance: 'when new social claimants came to exert pressure for representation, organization outside parliament became not only profitable but essential for political survival' (Daalder, 1966: 51). Michels (1962 [1911]: 61–2) puts it as follows:

> It is easy to understand […] that organization has become a vital principle of the working classes, for in default of it their success is *a priori* impossible. […] It is only by combination to form a structural aggregate that the proletarians can acquire the faculty of political resistance and attain to a social dignity. The importance and influence of the working class are directly proportional to its numerical strength. […] [F]or the representation of that numerical strength organization and coordination are indispensable. The principle of organization is an absolutely essential condition for the political struggle of the masses.

In addition to the necessity to mobilize large numbers of members as a source of resistance, members were also needed in large numbers for financial reasons. Unlike parties representing the entrepreneurial classes, the working-class movement could not rely on financial contributions from wealthy individuals and had few other alternative resources to resort to than the dues paid by its members. Large numbers of members were therefore needed in order to compensate for the lack of alternative financial resources. Primarily for these two reasons, the creation of a mass party was, as Epstein (1980: 130) puts it, an 'organizational necessity'.

The concurrence of economic and political demands also made a significant contribution to a natural affinity between working-class parties

and trade unions, because of their common roots as the 'Siamese twins' of the labour movement (Padgett and Paterson, 1991: 177). In most countries some form of an interlocking cross-linkage between socialist parties and trade unions existed, which is, as Bartolini (1996: 8) points out, one 'characterised by a profound interpenetration of corporate and electoral organisations, reinforcing each other on the basis of leadership and membership overlap and interchange, support-base coincidence, and a wide arena of common collective activities'.

The class conflict amounted to a significant political crisis, which potentially endangered the persistence of parliamentary democracy. In most countries, the traditional elites reacted to this crisis by accommodating the emergent demands and gradually opening up the political system in order to incorporate the political newcomers (Dahl, 1966: 361). Ultimately, as Daalder (1966: 48) asserts, 'both pressures from competing elites downwards and concomitant pressures from sub-elites upward made for a competitive gradual extension of democratic rights.' It can thus be argued that the working classes played a decisive role in the final push for democracy in Western Europe, although, as Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) observe, their success depended on the collaboration of other classes. Already before the introduction of universal suffrage, the political representatives of these classes had built extensive organizational networks, and the parties themselves were sometimes also accepted as members of coalition governments. Externally created parties thus gradually and sequentially passed what Rokkan (1970: 79) has referred to as four critical thresholds: the threshold of *legitimation*, involving the right of criticism, petition and demonstration against the existing regime; *incorporation* into the political system through the enfranchisement of (part of) their electorate; the right to *representation* in the legislature; and *executive power*, by which they were given a direct influence on executive decision-making through government responsibility.

In conclusion, then, the emergence of democratic mass parties in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe appears fundamentally influenced by the particular institutional context on the eve of the final breakthrough to democracy and mass mobilization. While the context of a competitive oligarchy initially provided a suitable environment for the existence of cadre parties, it was the institutionalized division of the rights of political participation, including certain economically privileged sectors and at the same time excluding economically underprivileged segments, which subsequently encouraged the emergence of mass parties. Mass parties adopted their particular organizational structure

largely as an organizational necessity to challenge the political and economic order. In addition, the sequence of developments, in which democratization involved the extension of the rights to participate in systems that were already competitive, provided these mass parties with the opportunity to convert this necessity into practice and enabled the construction of nation-wide mass organizations before the introduction of universal suffrage.

The emergence of new democracies: divergent trajectories

The pre-democratic regimes of the European third-wave democracies can be divided into two sub (ideal) types: the authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe and the totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe. These regimes, as Juan Linz (1975) has emphasized, differ fundamentally from each other on four key dimensions: the degree of pluralism, the relevance of the regime's ideology, the degree of mobilization, and the position of the leadership. Authoritarian regimes are 'political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism; without elaborate and guiding ideology […]; without extensive political mobilization […]; and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones' (Linz, 1964: 297). Particularly the first and the third dimension, i.e. limited pluralism and the lack of mobilization, are relevant for a discussion of the path these regimes followed towards democracy.

In Southern Europe, the monopolistic position held by the ruling party impeded the existence and voluntary creation of competing political parties. Franco's aversion to parties and political pluralism, which he believed would lead to conflict and disintegration and would pose a threat to the national unity, led him to outlaw all political organizations other than the *Movimiento* (Linz, 1973: 171–2). Parties with their roots in the pre-authoritarian period, such as the Socialist Party (PSOE) and the Communist Party (PCE) were forced underground. General elections were never held and a large majority of the seats in parliament was occupied by ex officio members of the magistracy or educational institutions – such as university rectors – and appointees personally designated by Franco. In municipal elections, a few seats were allocated by the 'inorganic' vote, to which only the heads of families and married women were entitled.[10]

As in Spain, the authoritarian regime in Portugal never sought to institutionalize pluralist mediating structures between citizenry and government. While formally also a corporatist state, the formal organic

structures between society and the state were never fully developed and the idea of a corporatist state was thus hardly translated into political practice (Opello, 1985: 53–6). Although elections were held regularly in Salazar's *Estado Novo*, the regime showed little interest in mass mobilization. Illiterates were excluded from participation, as were women until 1968. Moreover, due to the government manipulation of the registration process, the actually registered electorate was considerably smaller than the population potentially eligible to vote, and amounted to only seven or eight per cent of the population (Schmitter, 1978: 146–7). Since the opponents of the regime were effectively not able to win any seats (Hermet, 1978: 6–7), elections were in fact a means of controlling the opposition rather than a way to contest the conduct of government (da Cruz, 1983: 238). Furthermore, little room was available for the organization of political opposition to the predominant *União Nacional*. The Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) was the only effective resistance movement under the authoritarian regime, but, like its Spanish counterpart, was forced to operate as a clandestine organization.

What authoritarian and totalitarian regimes have in common is a lack of legally recognized political pluralism. Totalitarian regimes, as Linz (1975: 191) defined them, are characterized by the existence of a monistic centre of power; an exclusive and more or less elaborate ideology which is used as a basis for policies or which is manipulated to legitimize the actions of the ruling group or the party; and extensive citizen participation in, and active mobilization for, political and collective social tasks, which are not only demanded but also encouraged and rewarded, and, moreover, channelled through a single party. Whereas in political systems with a high degree of public contestation the validity of organized dissent is recognized and opposition is institutionalized, the communist regimes typically denied the legitimacy of opposition movements contesting the policy or ideology of the ruling party or the regime itself. Hence, as the monopolistic position of the Communist Party impeded the existence and the voluntary creation of competing political organizations, in the Eastern European regimes political competition was effectively absent.

This is not to argue that the Communist Parties were monolithic entities (see Skilling, 1973). Nor is it to suggest that, notwithstanding the fact that they were one-party centred, communist political systems were always one-party regimes in the strict sense, since, to a varying degree, non-communist parties and associations did coexist with the ruling Communist Party. However, despite variations, all communist regimes were essentially non-competitive political systems, in which the

Communist Party determined the conditions and established the boundaries of political activity. Even in communist systems where elements of electoral choice had been introduced, the leading role of the Communist Party continued to be beyond electoral challenge at all times (see Pravda, 1978). Because of the monopolistic position of the ruling party, which possessed both a *de jure* and *de facto* hegemonic position in the political system, competition between political parties on an equal basis was impossible, and alternation in power inconceivable. In other words, real party competition or public contestation was absent. In contrast with authoritarian systems, for communist regimes the mobilization of the masses constituted an essential device for the legitimation of the political system. Despite the formal absence of compulsory voting, communist elections usually showed a remarkably high turnout. In other words, these regimes were highly inclusive.[11]

In sum, the Eastern European communist systems can be seen as approximating to the inclusive hegemonies in the typology presented in Figure 1.1 above. Due to the hegemony of the Communist Party, these regimes were characterized by an extremely low level of political competition and at the same time displayed a high degree of inclusiveness and participation. Conversely, the authoritarian regimes of Portugal and Spain can be best classified as closed hegemonies because of the limited possibilities to organize dissent and the restrictions on political competition, as well as the equally limited level of inclusion of the citizenry in the political system.

Whereas totalitarian regimes differ from democratic regimes on the dimensions of contestation but not participation, authoritarian regimes contrast with democracies on both dimensions (see also Dahl, 1984). In terms of the particular path towards democracy, therefore, the Southern European authoritarian regimes clearly pursued a 'shortcut', in that the democratization process consisted of a relatively sudden and virtually simultaneous increase of both the levels of political contestation and participation. The post-communist democracies emerged as the result of a process in which inclusiveness preceded liberalization and in which democratization involved a sudden increase of the permissible political pluralism in a system that was already participant. The Eastern European democratization process is thus one which more or less inverts the Western European experience, where the path towards democracy involved the extension of participation through the enlargement of suffrage in an already reasonably developed system of public contestation.

The reason why the classic cadre and mass parties are historically unique models of party organization in Western Europe is that party

formation first occurred in the context of a competitive oligarchy. Given their departure from hegemonic regimes, the Western European path towards democracy was not available to the Southern European authoritarian regimes or the Eastern European communist regimes. In fact, in contemporary political systems, a democratization process departing from a competitive oligarchy is unlikely to be repeated more generally. The institutional context of democratization for third-wave democracies could thus perhaps not be more different from the Western experience, and we may therefore anticipate that the same is also largely true for the process of party formation. Because parties in new democracies appeared in a different historical, social and cultural context, we should not expect them to be like in the old democracies (see Linz, 1997: 416–7). Precisely why and how we can expect parties in the new democracies to be different can be seen from the arguments outlined in more detail in Chapter 2.

2
Party Formation and Organizational Development: Opportunities and Constraints

The institutional context of recent democratization processes differs markedly from the earlier Western European experiences. To put it most starkly, while earlier transitions basically entailed already existent competitive systems opening up to mass participation, the democratization process in recently established democracies involved a wholesale restructuring of the political system and its institutions. Hence, in sharp contrast with the earlier Western transitions, the establishment of competitive democratic politics and the rearrangement of the political system in the third-wave democracies had to be achieved in a context of mass politics. As Dahl (1971: 38) points out, '[w]hen the suffrage is extended before the arts of competitive politics have been mastered and accepted as legitimate among the elites, the search for a system of mutual guarantees is likely to be complex and time consuming.' This conjuncture, in which a transition to democracy involves a process in which competition follows or concurs with mass inclusion, requires the creation of a new political system in a context where the rules of the game are still ambiguous and the legitimacy of competitive politics is still weak, and is therefore likely to pose a considerable challenge for the consolidation of democracy. In addition, a sequence in which political competition is established after or concurrently with mass suffrage is likely to have an impact on the party system and its underlying cleavage structure as well as on the nature of the emerging political parties.

Contemporary democratization processes can be considered *sui generis* and are perhaps not easily comparable with the mere extension of the level of participation in the already competitive oligarchies of Western Europe around the turn of the twentieth century. However, contrasting the emergence of the early Western European polities with the genesis of

the newly established ones in Southern and Eastern Europe provides us with a heuristic tool to identify the essential factors that influence the nature of political parties. In short, and for a variety of conjunctural reasons which will be discussed at greater length below, we may anticipate that party organizations in the new third-wave democracies will not have developed along the same lines as their counterparts in the newly democratized polities of Western Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century. The arguments involved here may be summarized as follows.

The sequence of organizational development

For the early Western European polities, the real impetus for the creation of some form of party organization is generally thought to be the extension of the suffrage (cf. LaPalombara and Weiner, 1966). Especially the classic mass party is traditionally associated with the establishment of mass democracy and with the need to mobilize and encapsulate the newly enfranchised electorate. As Weber (1948 [1918]: 102) has put it, these 'modern forms' of party organization 'are the children of democracy, of mass franchise, of the necessity to woo and organize the masses, and develop the utmost unity of direction and the strictest discipline.' However, the process of party formation and hence the outlines of the mass party structure date back to the era before the introduction of universal suffrage. As argued in the previous chapter, it was the particular institutional environment of the competitive oligarchy with its restrictions on the suffrage that helps to explain the necessity to create mass organizations for parties that found themselves outside the established order and strove to change it.

It is also worth underlining that the emergence of mass parties in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe was made possible because of the need to organize in a context in which parties also had the opportunity to pursue a strategy of mass mobilization. Because party formation in Western Europe took place in a context of relatively high levels of public contestation, the emergence of externally created parties and their efforts to build a powerful extra-parliamentary organization with an extensive membership did not meet with oppressive behaviour on the part of the established elites. Such behaviour here occurred to a far less significant extent than in the non-democratic regimes in Southern and Eastern Europe.[1] Hence, the traditional externally created parties usually emerged in a relatively favourable institutional context, which provided them with the opportunity to strengthen their extra-parliamentary organization and to mobilize their constituents before

the suffrage was expanded and their supporters were granted the right to vote. As a consequence, by the time of the final breakthrough to democracy, i.e. when the restrictions on the franchise were abolished and these parties engaged in mass electoral competition, organization building had already by and large been achieved.

Free political organization was prohibited under the authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, which lacked any legitimate opposition and in which political competition was effectively absent. Since these regimes were essentially incompatible with free party organization, the restrictions on dissident political behaviour generally made it impossible for political organizations other than the ruling party to develop or persist. Hegemonic rule outlawed most of the existing parties and impeded the emergence of new ones. While extra-parliamentary mobilization in the pre-democratic Western European polities was left relatively uninterrupted, party building in non-democratic Southern and Eastern Europe was well nigh impossible. As a consequence, party formation in newly established democracies generally followed a different trajectory, as parties engaged in mass electoral competition before developing their party organization.

While party building in the Western European experience of party formation had already been virtually accomplished by the time of the first fully democratic elections, in newly established democracies it was not until the first democratic elections that parties effectively had the opportunity to organize. Many parties contesting the first elections were thus newly created, founded only shortly before or during the transition, or sometimes only afterwards, emerging from the ranks of loosely organized movements or parties. Their organizational development thus followed a reverse trajectory compared to their West European counterparts. To evoke Rokkan's (1970) thresholds, while the working-class and religious parties that challenged the existing order of the Western European polities of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries gradually passed the stages of legitimation, incorporation, representation and executive power, third-wave parties did not overcome the first threshold until after the demise of the non-democratic regimes. And thus, while in the case of externally created parties in most Western European countries mass mobilization preceded the creation of national party organizations,[2] parties in the newly established democracies could only pursue the expansion of their organization after the creation of a national party organization. However, by the time parties were finally able to initiate any efforts to mobilize members and supporters, the necessity to build a strong extra-parliamentary organization with an

extensive membership organization had largely become redundant, especially because other tasks, such as the shaping of new democratic institutions, had acquired a higher priority.

In addition, it is worth underlining the sequence and the time span in which the thresholds of legitimation and incorporation, on the one hand, and those of representation and executive power, on the other, were surpassed. In the Western European experience, externally created parties generally emerged in an institutional context in which the right to demonstrate and participate provided them with the opportunity to construct a solid extra-parliamentary organization prior to acknowledging their right to representation and executive power. Hence, organization building outside parliament had been achieved before they made an appearance in the parliamentary and governmental arenas. Since the creation of a party structure outside the legislature preceded that of the party in public office, the latter generally acted as an agent of the earlier created extra-parliamentary structure or the party on the ground (Katz and Mair, 1995: 12).

For parties in new democracies, the institutional thresholds were not overcome consecutively or in such a relatively extended period. In fact, it could be argued that for many parties they were actually overcome more or less simultaneously. Parties acquired parliamentary representation almost immediately after their creation, and many of them also participated in the newly formed governments shortly after their foundation. In this sense, parties almost immediately exceeded the threshold of executive power, which for many parties in the early Western European democracies usually was the final step in a protracted process of organizational development.[3] For many of the parties in new democracies, the early timing of the first elections in the process of organization building meant that they acquired parliamentary representation at the very early stages of their organizational development. In this sense, many of the newly founded parties can be regarded as 'internally created'. They consisted primarily of a small group of prominent elites at the national level and, indeed, in many cases, appeared more or less confined to a parliamentary and sometimes also a governmental existence, and lacked an established organizational structure extending much beyond these offices.

Hence, from the outset, the party in public office occupies the leading position, if only by default, and the very first incentives for organization building often originate from the party in public office. Since the party in public office often emerges first, and since it is this face of the party that initiates and controls subsequent organizational development, it is

likely to maintain its ruling position and to continue to occupy a dominant position within the party organization as a whole. It is in this sense that the sequence of events in the democratization process matters, in that it affects the sequence of organization building and offers an important incentive for parties to focus on the public face of the party rather than on the expansion of the extra-parliamentary party and the structuring of the party on the ground. In addition, since parties acquired early parliamentary – and sometimes governmental – representation, they were compelled to divide their attention between extra-parliamentary and parliamentary matters. The significance of the latter, and particularly the importance of the restructuring of the new institutions of the regime, entailed a diminished concern for the party structures outside parliament and particularly the organization on the ground.

These incentives are only marginally different for parties which had an already established organization outside parliament before becoming parties competing for power, such as the clandestine socialist and communist parties in Southern Europe, which could not operate on the electoral and parliamentary arena because they were banned. While they resemble the traditional 'externally created' parties in early Western Europe, the incentives to develop a similar mass organizational structure have been much more attenuated, and the membership organization or the extra-parliamentary organization more generally has not acquired a similarly predominant position. At the onset of the transition, the structures of these parties with such a reasonably lengthy organizational history were in a relatively weak condition, primarily because the decades of having to work in secret during authoritarian rule – which not only did not tolerate dissident political organization but usually also pointedly harassed these parties – had seriously hindered their organizational development. Although their lengthier organizational history has made the older parties to some extent prone to organizational inertia, in that some of the basic outlines of their original organizational structure continue to persist, they have nevertheless shown themselves not to be invulnerable to the impact of the volatile environment of a newly democratizing polity with its high salience of institution building and the need for expansive electoral competition.

Hence, while parties in the old democracies generally started out as organizations of society demanding participation, parties in the new democracies are faced with the challenge of enticing citizens who already have rights of participation to actually exercise those rights. The sequence of organization building is of importance, because the emergence of the party in public office before or concurrent with the

opportunities for the development of the extra-parliamentary party diverts attention from the development of organizational linkages between parties and society. In addition, it enhances the position of public office holders within the party, although, as will be discussed in Chapter 7, not to the extent that the party in public office can be seen as the predominant face of the party organization.

Institutional origins and institutional orientations

The second important point to recognize here is that, in contrast to most of their Western European counterparts, many of the parties developing in these new democracies had an institutional rather than societal origin. In early Western Europe, the classic path of party formation was the representation of the interests of a particular segment of society that could be defined in social terms (see Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). The configuration of parties in these systems therefore somehow represented societal differentiation, although Panebianco (1988: 3) has correctly warned against what he calls the 'sociological prejudice', in that neither parties nor the party system should be understood as mere direct and unmediated reflections of social stratification.

In contrast to the established democracies, in the new Southern and Eastern European democracies the connection between social groups and parties is much less evident, since it is not necessarily social divisions that lie at the foundation of the newly emerging parties. In fact, in many cases, party formation did not take place on the basis of politicized social stratification. Rather, parties were often created on the basis of politicized attitudinal differences regarding institutional issues, namely the desirability, degree and direction of regime change. In Eastern Europe, the civic movements, which essentially embodied anti-regime sentiments and presented themselves as an alternative against a delegitimized state, clearly illustrate these institutional rather than societal origins. Even if the direction of the unfolding events was not at all clear at the outset of the transition, it was evident that the institutional environment was in flux and that the *status quo* would not be maintained. What all actors shared, regardless of their particular points of view, was a primary concern for the speed and extent of liberalization of the non-democratic regime and the institutional framework of the successor regime. Indeed, as Bozóki (1993) observes for the countries involved in the transition from communism, what constituted the core of the round table negotiations between incumbent and opposition parties were constitutional and institutional issues (see also Elster, 1996).

Similar preoccupations with institutional engineering transpired from the negotiated pacts in Spain, or from revolutionary Portugal, where the democratic parties tried to impose a counterweight against the radical aspirations of the communist forces. At least initially, therefore, the *raison d'être* of many parties, and especially the newly created ones, lay primarily in the expression and manifestation of attitudes towards the shape of the institutional framework, rather than in the representation of the interests of a particular segment of society. Since parties were often not created as the agents of certain groups in society, the social basis of party politics had to be created after the transition to democracy (cf. Stokes, 1997: ch. 9). As minister Syryjczyk of the Mazowiecki government in Poland answered when he was asked whom he represented: 'I represent subjects that do not yet exist' (quoted in Staniszkis, 1991: 184).

Institutional engineering continued to be high on the political agenda for quite a while, with continuing debates over constitutional revisions, the type of government system, the powers of the executive, adaptation of the electoral system, the reform of the judiciary, the submission of the military to civilian authority, questions of regional autonomy and so on. Although not all institutional issues were equally relevant to all newly established democratic polities, the organization of government and parliament, if not democracy as a whole, constituted a key priority. As Schöpflin (1993: 259) observes in the Eastern European context, '[a]t a deeper level, the post-communist contest was not so much about policies as about polities. The key issues centered on the nature of the constitutional order and the rules of the political game, rather than the allocation of resources that makes up the standard fare of politics in established democracies.'

Whereas the societal origins of parties in Western European polities provided them with a relatively stable basis in society, the institutional origins of parties in new democracies may equally frustrate the development of such linkages, with the high salience of institution building during and beyond the democratic transitions having potentially important consequences for the focus of the parties' activities. This is largely true also for parties which were not entirely new and which had no immediate institutional origin. In contrast with their newly established counterparts, the communist parties in Portugal and Spain and the Spanish Socialist party already had established some form of linkage with society and possessed some sort of organizational network entrenched in society. Even more notably, the former ruling Communist parties in Eastern Europe maintained an important organizational legacy, in the form of deep roots in both society and the state. The older

parties thus did not always have to build their party organization from scratch but could depart from an existent, albeit sometimes weakly developed, organizational structure. However, given the importance of organizing parliamentary and governmental life and the shaping of political institutions for all actors in a newly emerging democratic polity, the relevance of institution building enhances their orientation towards the state and the new democratic institutions that need to be established. Parties emerging in or developing from such a context devote most of their attention to activities in the parliamentary and governmental arena and primarily concentrate their activities around the party in public office at the expense of attention for the development of the extra-parliamentary organization. Time and energy concentrated on the activities in parliament and government is usually spent at the cost of neglecting the building and structuring of the party organization on the ground.

The weakness of cleavage structures and partisan identities

As Huntington (1968: 398) points out, the emergence of parties in a relatively late stage of the democratization process, i.e. after the introduction of both competition and participation, may have considerable destabilizing consequences: 'A society which develops reasonably well organized political parties while the level of political participation is still relatively low […] is likely to have a less destabilizing expansion of political participation than a society where parties are organized later in the process of modernization.' This instability is to be expected because the large majority of the electorates in newly democratizing countries had little or no sense of party attachment or partisan identity when the political system finally opened up after decades of non-democratic rule (see Schmitt and Holmberg, 1995; Rose and Mishler, 1998). Since it requires at least some time for stable psychological attachments to parties to take root, partisan identities are weak in a context in which most parties have only recently been created. In addition, the fact that many parties have only weak programmatic identities (Kitschelt, 1995) does not provide a facilitating condition for the development of clearly crystallized party profiles for the electorate to identify with.

Another reason why instability is to be expected is that the cleavage structures underpinning the party systems are weakly developed, and thus less likely to exhibit the same bias towards stabilization as in the established European democracies (Mair, 1997: ch. 8). Particularly in the post-communist countries, social stratification had been largely,

although not completely, levelled out as a result of an egalitarian ideology which had sought to transcend class, ethnic, linguistic, religious or other social divisions. This lack of social differentiation makes it difficult for a strong cleavage structure to emerge, since it limits the possibilities for parties to appeal to specific social groups and to create an 'electorate of belonging' by encouraging feelings of collective identity. The fact that the societal stratification in newly established democracies is not as marked complicates the parties' appeal to traditional classes or specific segments of society and thus causes difficulties for the creation of relatively closed partisan blocs.

To be sure, even post-communist societies cannot be seen as entirely homogeneous or as lacking social differentiation altogether. Indeed, at a particular point in time, social or attitudinal divisions connected to parties may be very well discernible (e.g. Kitschelt, 1992a; Tóka, 1996). Because of a lower degree of politicization and especially less interference in the socio-economic structure, a larger degree of social stratification endured in the authoritarian regimes of Southern Europe. While this might, in principle, have facilitated the emergence or persistence of strong cleavage structures, rapid social change (especially economic growth and secularization) ensured that the boundaries between social groups were becoming increasingly blurred. More importantly, as Lipset and Rokkan (1967) have suggested and has been re-emphasized by Bartolini and Mair (1990), the concept of cleavage does not refer to simply any social or attitudinal division in a society. As Schattschneider (1960: 69) reminds us, only some issues are organized into politics while others are not, because 'organization is the mobilization of bias'. Not all social divisions, therefore, automatically result in political conflict and a cleavage also denotes the mobilization of collective identities by political parties. In other words, an essential condition for the existence of a cleavage is the translation of social divisions into the political arena. In this sense, political parties are the intermediating device par excellence between society and politics, since it is primarily through their organizational behaviour that social divisions are translated into political cleavages. More than anyone else, Sartori (1968) has emphasized the importance of the intervening organizational capacities of intermediating structures such as parties in order to encourage collective political identities among those who belong to empirically identifiable social groups.[4]

At the onset of democratization in Southern and Eastern Europe, however, the organization of most parties was not developed enough to provide similar channels of mobilization as in the West. And thus, while

class-based inequalities and privileges, or social differentiation more generally, might well become the source of political conflict, the weakly institutionalized organizational intermediaries made it unlikely that these could eventually result in stable cleavages and frozen party systems. For post-communist Europe, as Słomczyński and Shabad (1997: 188–9) indeed observe, 'the channels through which [the] societal divisions are mobilized by political and organizational entrepreneurs are still not well institutionalized'. And as Mair argues, 'the fluidity of the social structure on the one hand, together with the relative lack of crystallization of identities on the other, suggests that such foundations are, as yet, unlikely to constitute a *stable* pattern of alignments' (Mair, 1997: 182; emphasis in original). Parties in new democracies lack the stable constituencies with relatively durable political identities that could enable them, like their Western European counterparts, to encapsulate the electorate and to narrow down the electoral market. While, as Sartori (1968) has emphasized, the mass party played a crucial role in the structural consolidation of the West European party systems, parties in new democracies lack the organizational capacities ultimately to stabilize the party system.

This is indeed suggested by the comparatively high indices of electoral volatility. In post-communist Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, volatility levels averaged almost 25 per cent in the first elections. This leads Tóka (1998: 591) to conclude that these countries are simply off the mark compared to the standards of the contemporary consolidated Western democracies, which recorded an average of 8.4 per cent for the postwar period (Bartolini and Mair, 1990).[5] While a tendency towards higher instability was also characteristic of most West European party systems in the wake of full enfranchisement in the early part of the century, volatility levels tended to be substantially lower than for the first post-communist elections, standing at an average of some 12 per cent for the period between 1918 and 1930 (Mair, 1997: 183). In Southern Europe, aggregate volatility for the post-authoritarian period averages approximately 12 per cent for Greece, some 14 per cent for Portugal and 14.6 per cent for Spain (Gunther and Montero, 2001). The electorates in Southern Europe thus seem less volatile than in Eastern Europe, although it should be noted that they rank highest among the most volatile postwar European elections, with the Spanish earthquake elections in 1982 placed at the top of the list with 42.3 per cent aggregate volatility.

The difficulty of creating a stable pattern of alignments is further enhanced by two particular 'legacies of the past'. The first is the generally

negative or even hostile attitude towards politics and parties that has been created by the decades of non-democratic rule (see, for example, Montero, 1981; Batt, 1991). In new democracies, political parties are the least trusted among the new democratic institutions (e.g. Rose, 1995), which discourages the creation of stable linkages between parties and society. Secondly, it is worth underlining that democratization occurred in the wake of a virtual absence of an effective civil society. This is especially true for Eastern Europe where, as a consequence of the totalitarian penetration of society, societal dissent had come to be seen as a movement of society against the state and, more often than not, dissident organizations described themselves as non-political and conducted opposition according to the general principle of the 'politics of anti-politics' (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 272–5). This anti-political nature considerably frustrated the later adaptation of political actors to the context of a democratic polity in the aftermath of the transition. The new East European democracies effectively emerged from communist rule with highly unstructured societies and relatively low levels of self-organization. Evans and Whitefield (1993), in this sense, speak of the 'missing middle' between society and the state, i.e. the absence of organized intermediating structures – referring not only to weakly organized political parties, but also to a lack of organized societal movements more generally. The impact of authoritarianism on the development of civil society, on the other hand, may not have been as devastating as under communist rule, and civil society was reasonably well developed and differentiated in comparison with post-communist societies.[6] However, although the damage to the development of civil society may vary with the type of non-democratic regime, both authoritarianism and totalitarianism are thwarting experiences for the structural consolidation of both political and civil society (see Di Palma, 1991).

Access to mass media and public funding

All of the arguments cited above – the sequence of organizational development, the institutional origins of parties, the lack of partisan identities in new electorates and the weakness of cleavage structures – suggest that new parties in new democracies are unlikely to have either the capacity or the resources to build up mass organizations. In this sense, these parties are also likely to differ markedly from those parties which first began to compete in the then newly democratized polities of early twentieth-century Europe. In addition, two other factors are also at play here which are likely to prove crucial to the development of party

organizational styles, and which in this case derive from the wider context within which party linkages can be facilitated: the possibilities for the public funding of parties on the one hand, and the availability of modern techniques of mass communication on the other. Both of these contextual factors are important because they may be seen to offer new parties opportunities to bypass the traditional mass party model, and in this sense they may serve further to reinforce the contrast between these parties and their predecessors from the early part of the century. Indeed, both of these factors have also been seen as playing a major role in the transformation of the organizational styles of the long-established parties in Western Europe, and we might anticipate that they will work to even greater effect on parties in new democracies.

The availability of public money

The introduction of state subventions to political parties has made parties financially increasingly dependent on resources provided by the state and has also served to encourage important changes in the mode of party organization. More specifically, Katz and Mair (1995) have argued that the changing patterns of party financing, and particularly the increasing availability of public funds, has served to strengthen their orientation towards the state while it has at the same time contributed to their shifting away from society. Even more so than in the established European democracies, public funding plays a pivotal role in the financing of political parties in newly emerging democracies. The Southern European countries were the first 'third-wave' democracies to experience the introduction of widespread public funding of parties, and the post-communist democracies duly followed suit. While in the older liberal democracies state funding of political parties was introduced only long after the institutionalization of the party system and the consolidation of the democratic regime, the transition to democracy in the third wave was generally accompanied by, and political parties emerged within, a context of extensive state funding. In new democracies, state subventions therefore have had an even larger impact on the development of party organizations than in the established democracies in the West.

There are many possible explanations for the introduction of state funding for political parties. New democracies may just have imitated the experiences of the established Western democracies, where public funding had become an increasingly common practice. Alternatively, the necessity of state money may have been perceived as high, especially since most parties, given the weak state of their organizations, effectively

lacked any alternative means to generate financial resources and to secure their own income. Since parties are seen as essential political institutions for contemporary democracy, the need to fund them publicly has seemed beyond dispute. Furthermore, public funds are relatively easily accessible and relatively easy to control, especially since parties themselves enjoy the privilege to decide on the amounts of state money and the rules to access. State funding thus provides parties with a relatively stable and secure source of income, which also implies that the availability of public funds removes one important incentive to raise funds elsewhere.

The consequences of public funding of political parties, however, often appear to have been ill-considered. In many cases, state funding was introduced without much debate on the role money from the public sector should play in the financing of political parties, as del Castillo (1989: 179) observes for the Spanish case. However, public funding makes parties heavily dependent on the state, and may therefore encourage their orientation towards the state. At the same time, the widespread availability of state money reduces the incentives to approach society for financial support. In addition, state subventions may enhance the parties' electoral orientation, because these subsidies are usually allocated on the basis of their levels of electoral support and parliamentary representation and thus electoral performance is translated directly into financial revenues. Parties can therefore simply not afford to neglect their potential electoral performance. Since in financial terms it is voters that are the most valuable, parties have an important incentive to confer to seek votes and to pursue an expansive electoral strategy. In this sense, public funding may strengthen the parties' orientation on more ad hoc and short-term linkages with the electorate rather than on the development of structural and more permanent relationships between party organization and society.

Furthermore, public funding has an important impact on the internal balance of party power in that it encourages the concentration of power within the party (cf. Nassmacher, 1989: 250–1). This is especially true if the bulk of the state subsidies are collected at the national level and the decision-making authority on the internal allocation of funds is located at the top echelons of the organization. As most of the money is transferred from the top to lower organizational levels, with the national organs deciding on which activities the money should be spent and how the financial resources are to be distributed downwards, a high dependence on state subsidies encourages a top-down model of organization and favours high levels of centralization.

All this has a particular relevance for newly established parties in the new democracies, since it is not only the sheer importance of state money per se but also the timing of its introduction that matters. Whereas public funding in Western Europe was introduced after parties had built up their organization, and then only gradually, new democracies suddenly introduced large amounts of state subventions when most party organizations were still in the very incipient stages of party formation. Although there does not appear to be a straightforward relationship between an increase in public funding and a decline of party membership in the established democracies (Hofnung, 1996; Katz and Mair, 1994), for parties in new democracies, at the very least, the introduction of public funding before efforts to expand the extra-parliamentary organization has removed one key incentive for anchoring the party in society. Consequently, while the introduction of public funding and the corresponding increasing dependency on the state for Western European parties revealed a shifting orientation from society to the state, the absence or relative weakness of linkages with society at the outset of democratization in Southern and Eastern Europe results in no such shift ever occurring, leaving parties largely dependent on and oriented towards the state from the very beginning.

The role of the mass media

A similar line of argument can be put forward for the impact of the high availability of mass means of communication on party organizations. For the parties in the established Western European democracies, the increased availability and reach of the mass media has significantly changed the relationship between parties and society, especially because of the reduced relevance of the party organization to communicate with society. Instead, they can now present themselves directly to the electorate and intermediate party organs have therefore become increasingly redundant for the purpose of communication (Katz and Mair, 1995).

The classic Western European mass party of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had to rely on an organizational network to be in contact with its constituency. A comprehensive organizational structure on the ground was needed essentially for reasons of communication and mobilization. Press organs controlled by the party played an important role in informing society about its programme and goals, while the circulation of party press largely depended on the active rank-and-file. In addition, a large membership was advantageous because of the so-called 'two step flow of communication and information'

(Lazarsfeld et al., 1944), which implies that every individual member can be regarded as an influential source of information and produces a 'snowball effect' in that the lines of communication expand exponentially with the number of supporters. A large membership thus increased the level of distribution and therefore the potential reach and influence of the information.

Political parties in the new Southern and Eastern European democracies, by contrast, emerged in an era characterized by highly developed and available modern mass media. Parties can now communicate their message directly to the electorate through newspapers, radio and particularly television, rather than having to recruit members for communication and mobilization. The creation of an extensive and densely organized network on the ground is thus no longer indispensable for the distribution of information from party to society, or for communication with society more generally. Access to the mass media is furthermore conducive to a personalization of politics. The role of party leaders is already likely to be particularly important in the context of a newly democratizing polity, and especially in a situation where many parties are new and underinstitutionalized, and their identity has not yet materialized to such an extent that it stands above its leader (cf. Sartori, 1968). Indeed, Pasquino (2001: 222) notes in the Southern European context that politics tends to be highly personalized, largely as a product of the combined impact of relatively weak party organizations and the great pervasiveness of television. Not only has the image of the party leader come to assume a prominent role in campaigning, parties have also tended to become more centralized and professionalized, as Farrell and Webb (2000: 123) observe for the advanced industrial democracies. As the use of modern campaign techniques progresses, parties are relying increasingly on highly skilled and specialized staff to control the media exposure of the party and its leaders and to communicate with society more generally. In this sense, access to modern means of communication (and the availability of modern technology in general) influences not only the size but also the nature of party organizations in that it encourages internal specialization and promotes professionalization of the party apparatus. In an era in which politics more broadly tends to become more professionalized, party structures tend to adapt accordingly.

While the access to and availability of modern means of communication and technology are important in their own right, they acquire an additional relevance in the context of parties in newly emerging democracies. Again, timing – or the sequence of developments – is a critical

factor here in that what matters most is the stage of organizational development in which parties acquired access to and could start to use the mass media for campaigning and other party activities. In the established democracies, the growth of the mass media may have pushed parties towards further centralization, higher levels of professionalization and a reduced relevance of the party activists, and may have contributed to an increasing predominance of the party in public office. Because parties in new democracies are founded in an environment in which mass media are widely available, they tend to gain access to the mass media at an early stage of party formation, i.e. prior to the development of their extra-parliamentary organization, while they are usually still largely confined to a parliamentary existence. The impact of the media on the shaping of party organizations, therefore, is even more pronounced, as access to the mass media largely supplants the need for an extensive extra-parliamentary structure and replaces the need for party activists in favour of a relatively professional party apparatus.

Strategies of mobilization: electorates versus partisans

Put most starkly, in creating a linkage with society parties face the choice between two different strategies. They can opt for electoral mobilization, trying to attract as many voters as possible and focusing on the direct relationship with the party in public office. Or they can follow a strategy of partisan mobilization, trying to create a structural and permanent anchoring of the party within society through an active recruitment of members and the expansion of the party organization on the ground.[7] The latter may be more favourable to a more durable linkage with society, may facilitate the integration of society into the new political system and may perhaps also encourage the party's stability. Pride (1970: 674), for instance, asserts that in a democratization process '[i]t is the political party that can help reorient these newly mobilized people. The party helps them to understand the nature of politics. It provides them with new and meaningful symbols and rhetoric. The political party translates their needs and aspirations into political demands. In a larger sense, the party absorbs these men into the political community.'

Despite its advantages, however, and although partisan mobilization is sometimes considered more desirable from a normative perspective, it is also a relatively time-consuming and labour-intensive strategy and thus not necessarily seen as the best alternative in the perception of the party leaderships. Partisan mobilization, especially in the form of the creation of mass organizations is, as Kalyvas (1998: 297) asserts, 'an

expensive, painstakingly slow, and arduous undertaking, usually chosen only when other options are unavailable.'[8] Electoral mobilization, therefore, although it may produce only a more temporal and thus potentially more feeble and unstable linkage, is a more feasible alternative because it is relatively quicker and easier to achieve. Indeed, electoral rather than partisan mobilization is also the strategy that began to be preferred increasingly in the West. As it was famously articulated by Kirchheimer (1966: 184), parties during the postwar years were '[a]bandoning attempts at the intellectual and moral *encadrement* of the masses [and] turning more fully to the electoral scene, trying to exchange effectiveness in depth for a wider audience and more immediate electoral success.'

For parties in a newly democratizing polity, the short interval between the beginning of the transition and the first elections provided them with relatively little time and few incentives to approach members and to expand the extra-parliamentary party organization. The lack of partisan identities or stable party preferences in the unaligned and therefore widely available electorates may have furthermore compelled them to make a strategic choice for expansive electoral mobilization. Especially parties that were created on the basis of institutional issues lacked a 'natural constituency' and would not function as the political representative of pre-defined segments of the electorate. Turning to the electorate at large, facilitated by the availability of modern mass media, and especially television, generally would be perceived as the most effective strategy for the creation of alignments with the electorate and as the most efficient strategy to enhance the chances for party survival.

Some parties already had something of an organization more or less entrenched in society and might therefore have been better organized than newly created parties. In addition, these parties could be expected to be more concerned with maintaining and expanding their linkages with society. At last relieved from the authoritarian oppression limiting the expansion of their party organizations, it could be argued, they could finally initiate efforts to mobilize substantial sectors of society and to recruit large numbers of supporters. However, although for historical reasons they may be more inclined to partisan mobilization than newly created parties, these older parties are likely to be susceptible to the benefits of electoral mobilization as well. They may be relatively advantaged over newly created parties because they already were equipped with an organization on the ground and a small core of loyal supporters. However, under the authoritarian regimes they had never been able to

mobilize and integrate or even encapsulate major components of society. At the outset of the transition they thus lacked the stable constituencies with durable political identities which had allowed Western European mass parties to narrow down the electoral market and ultimately to bring about the freezing of the cleavage structures and the stabilization of the party systems.

Moreover, by the time the authoritarian regime had collapsed, the need for mobilization had largely disappeared. In fact, after the demise of the authoritarian regimes, when the level of political competition was expanded and thus the impediments obstructing organizational development had become mostly irrelevant, large numbers of party members were no longer an organizational prerequisite. In such a context, it is voters, rather than members or even partisans, who constitute the inevitable target groups identified by the parties. Having only a very small nucleus of partisan adherents, these parties attempted to direct their greatest efforts to capturing the yet undecided and unaligned voters. An expansive electoral strategy therefore seemed the most effective way in an open electoral market to approach the new and highly available electorate in order to maximize the number of parliamentary seats. Voters were the first objective, while membership recruitment and the development of party structures had a much lower priority.

These are also the reasons why parties and trade unions in new democracies act more autonomously from one another. The absence of concurrent political and economic demands has made the establishment of strong links between parties and trade unions less necessary. Furthermore, although connections with organized interests may encourage the stabilization of a party's constituency, they also constitute a restraint, in that close relationships require too narrow commitments and put a constraint on electorally expansionist strategies, and may also be conducive to intra-party conflicts. Moreover, and especially in the post-communist countries, a particular legacy of the past is the reluctance of trade unions to engage in too close linkages with parties, preferring instead to approach the parties in parliament or government directly rather than through the channels of the party organization and thus maintaining a more autonomous relationship vis-à-vis parties.

To be sure, as Scarrow (1994) has also pointed out, party membership does not only bring about costs but may also provide important benefits to the party. In this sense, there may also be major benefits accruing from a strategy aimed at building a mass party. It is argued that members are a valuable asset from an electoral point of view, for example, because

they tend to be the most loyal voters for the party and because party members may multiply votes by everyday contacts. Secondly, members equip the party with various material, financial and human resources, i.e. they provide a relevant part of the party's income, as well as an indispensable network of volunteer workers inside the party. For these reasons, Scarrow (1994) argues, parties may actually not be unequivocally inclined to relinquish their membership organization (see also Scarrow, 1996).

It may of course be true that – notwithstanding the evidence of a significant and almost universal decline in party membership in Western European polities (Mair and van Biezen, 2001) – a decline in membership deprives parties with an already established membership organization of important assets that they may not always be willing to relinquish. This does not imply, however, that parties in new democracies lacking such an established membership organization will be driven by the same imperatives to create one. For these parties, the question of membership recruitment should be approached from an opposite angle. While parties with an established membership may be to a certain extent motivated, if only because of organizational inertia or nostalgia, to restrain the loss of members in order to maintain the existing membership organization, newly established parties are less likely to be sensitive to such considerations. For these parties, the question is whether there are any incentives to spend time, money and energy at recruiting and mobilizing members and establishing a membership organization in the first place.

In fact, this seems to leave only two reasons why parties may actually pursue the recruitment of members. First, it could be argued that members are potential candidates for public office and thus, since parties need to recruit candidates for these offices, it can be expected that they develop at least some structures on the ground (cf. Kopecký, 1995). However, it is doubtful whether this necessity encourages parties to establish large membership organizations. Even if there are a considerable number of public offices to be filled, if this is the only incentive for the recruitment of party members, it is unlikely that parties would expand their organization beyond the minimum needed for candidate recruitment. Moreover, parties in new democracies appear characterized by relatively low levels of 'inclusiveness', which indicates 'the height of barriers separating party members from other supporters. The level of these barriers is partly determined by the extent of duties and privileges attached to party membership [and] also reflects the ease of difficulty of enrolment' (Scarrow, 1996: 30). While running for public office is one of

the rights traditionally enjoyed by party members, for new democracies this privilege is much less conditional upon official enrolment in the party. The boundaries of the party organization (Lawson, 1994: 295–6) are relatively porous in new democracies, especially in Eastern Europe where, in comparison with the established democracies, formal party membership has a much lower relevance as a prerequisite for the position of public office holder.

The second incentive for the creation of a large membership may be as an asset in itself, solely so as to improve membership statistics (Scarrow, 1994: 46). Or, as Katz (1990: 152) puts it more substantively, because a large membership may be regarded 'as proof that the party has significant roots in society and therefore may serve as a source of legitimacy.' In other words, rather than for practical reasons or particular benefits, parties perhaps care for members with a view to democratic legitimacy. Parties in Western Europe which lack a mass base are sometimes perceived as elitist, or even as insufficiently legitimate, and hence become concerned once membership levels are in decline. This 'legitimacy myth' may be prevalent in Western Europe because these polities have experienced the heyday of the mass party and hence may be more susceptible to the normative legacy left behind by this type of party. However, it is not certain that there is a contagion effect of this conception of party organization to the newly established democracies. Indeed, the legacy of non-democratic rule appears to have fostered just the opposite attitude. In new democracies, and especially in post-communist polities, the tradition of mass mobilization by the ruling party has left behind a low level of legitimacy for political institutions which integrate society through the intermediary channels of the party.

Conclusion

For third-wave democracies, transition processes generally set out from the institutional environment of a hegemonic regime. This point of departure has a number of important implications for the process of party formation and organizational development, which essentially imply that such a context leaves few incentives to develop a type of party which would resemble the classic mass party. Due to their very nature, pre-democratic hegemonic regimes severely limit the opportunities to organize parties prior to the liberalization and popularization of the political system. Parties thus emerge from a previous environment of limited public contestation and enter the era of mass politics without or with only underdeveloped organizational structures. Because they

often have to be built virtually from scratch, the sequence of organizational development is of critical importance in the context of a new democracy.

The classic mass parties in the older democracies generally originated as organizations of an underprivileged segment of society demanding inclusion. This encouraged the creation of strong partisan linkages with society in the form of an extensive extra-parliamentary organization and a strong organization on the ground which served to represent and integrate society through the channels of the party. The institutional origins of parties in new democracies, by contrast, leave few incentives for such linkages to develop. Seeing that they are not organizations of society, these parties emerge within relatively weakly developed cleavage structures and face a relatively unaligned electorate with little sense of party attachment and weak partisan identities. Faced with the challenge of enticing citizen involvement in a context where mass participation is already established, parties are encouraged to pursue expansive electoral strategies to capture the still unaligned voters and to create a transient electoral relationship with society rather than durable partisan linkages. In addition, whereas the creation of parties with a large membership organization was, for a variety of reasons, an 'organizational necessity', few of these reasons can be seen to be of any significance in recently established democracies. The widespread availability of public funding has removed a key incentive for parties to establish linkages with society, while the immediate access to the mass media has replaced the party organization as a means for mobilizing support or as a channel for communication. More generally, the benefits or legitimacy traditionally associated with party membership may not outweigh the costs of the establishment of a large membership organization or the short-term advantages of a more electoralist linkage.

The expansion of public contestation in a context of mass participation generally leaves parties with little time to prepare organizationally. Furthermore, their rapid access to representation and executive power encourages a particular sequence of organization building, in which the party in public office emerges first and controls subsequent organizational development. This sequence not only enhances the position of public office holders within the party, but also induces a top-down development of the party, with resultant high levels of centralization. Contingent factors such as the pervasiveness of television and the availability of public funding reinforce these patterns, giving a special importance to the image of the party leader and encouraging the internal concentration of power while at the same time further reducing the

relevance of a permanent mobilization of society. The significance of the role of parties in reshaping the very institutional framework of the new democracy serves further to divert their orientation away from society and to strengthen their orientation towards the state.

For all these reasons, it is unlikely that the process of party formation and organizational development resembles that of the parties in the early Western European democracies. In other words, in terms of the three scenarios outlined in the previous chapter, there seem to be few reasons to expect that it is the 'newness' of democracy that matters most for the types of party organization that emerge. It is thus likely to be either the second or the third scenario that is most relevant for party formation and organizational development in the new democracies. However, the question remains whether the party models in new democracies resemble those of their contemporary counterparts in the West, or whether the particular combination of institutional and contextual factors has encouraged the emergence of new and unparalleled models of party.

Part II

Membership Organizations and Party Structures

3
Portugal

On 25 April 1974, the Movement of Armed Forces (*Movimento das Forças Armadas* – MFA) brought down the authoritarian regime in Portugal, which had lasted almost five decades under the rule of António Salazar (1926–68) and Marcelo Caetano (1968–74). The two years of the Portuguese Revolution that followed were characterized by a high level of political turmoil, a rapid succession of governments, attempted coups and countercoups, large-scale nationalizations and land expropriations. In contrast with its neighbouring country Spain, where the transition would follow the path of a negotiated reform, the Portuguese transition can be characterized as a complete and sudden rupture with the old regime, in which a high level of mass mobilization was involved. In the transition process, the Communist Party played a predominant role.

In the midst of this turbulence, on the first anniversary of the Revolution in 1975, general elections were held for the constituent assembly. For the first time in Portuguese history, elections were free from restrictions on the suffrage or the level of political competition. Although during the First Republic (1910–26) Portugal had some democratic experience, the suffrage in this period was restricted to literate males and the male heads of households (Mackie and Rose, 1991: 373). Elections under the authoritarian regime were barely competitive. The regime's principal purpose in inviting part of the opposition to participate in the elections was to divide them by marginalizing and repressing the communists and socialists and trying to gain the allegiance of the liberal and republican opposition (da Cruz, 1983: 238).

The new constitution, adopted on 2 April 1976, clearly revealed the legacy of the prevailing left-wing mood of the Revolution as well as the predominance of the armed forces. It enshrined the country's transition

to socialism in the constitution and institutionalized the military Revolutionary Council with important decision-making and legislative prerogatives (see Gallagher, 1979b). The constitutional revision of 1982 abolished the Revolutionary Council, placed political power entirely under civilian control and established the primacy of political parties in the new democratic system, thereby bringing the Portuguese transition to democracy to an end.

Parties and the party system

The parties on the left

Only one of the post-authoritarian political parties in Portugal, i.e. the Portuguese Communist Party (*Partido Comunista Português* – PCP), could count on a long-standing organizational history. The PCP was founded in 1921 by a group of anarcho-syndicalists and is one of the few European communist parties that did not emerge as a result of a schism within a socialist party. Under the authoritarian regime, the clandestine PCP was the only effective resistance movement with a disciplined and relatively solid party organization. The party allied with the armed forces during the revolution and together they tried to marginalize the political parties on their right. The PCP furthermore made an attempt to acquire a monopolistic position within the trade union movement and to dominate the state-controlled media and the local governments. Since the PCP was the only well-organized political force in the country at the time of the revolution, the communist strategy met with little resistance from other political groups (see Gallagher, 1979a).

Given its dominant role in the revolution, the fact that the PCP obtained only 13.5 per cent of the vote (30 out of 250 seats[1]) in the 1975 elections for the Constituent Assembly was an unanticipated disappointment. The party emerged as the third party in parliament, after the Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista* – PS) and the Democratic People's Party (*Partido Popular Democrático* – PPD), which won 40.7 per cent of the vote (116 seats) and 28.3 per cent of the vote (81 seats) respectively. The fourth party to obtain parliamentary representation was the right-wing conservative *Partido do Centro Democrático Social* (CDS), which obtained 8.2 per cent of the vote (16 seats). Since 1991, the PCP has contested the elections in a coalition with the Green Party (*Partido Ecologista-Os Verdes* – PEV), although the Communist Party has always constituted the dominant part of the electoral alliance. In electoral terms, the Communist Party and its allies have witnessed a steady decline, obtaining its worst electoral result in post-authoritarian Portugal in the 2002 elections with

7 per cent of the vote and 12 seats. The communist vote is concentrated around the industrialized regions and *latifundia* areas of the country, the cities and dormitory towns on the outskirts of Lisbon, as well as some industrial enclaves in the rural areas in the interior of the country (Pereira, 1988: 89). In particular the south of Portugal continues to be a Communist Party stronghold.

The PCP embarked on a gradual process of change in the late 1980s, which slowly transformed it from an ideological anti-system party into a more legitimate pro-regime actor, enabling it to participate in a coalition with the Socialist Party for the municipal elections in Lisbon, for example. However, the official ideology of the PCP continues to be based upon the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the party's organization on the basic assumptions of democratic centralism. As a result of the party's relative insignificance in electoral terms and, more importantly, its extreme ideological position, the Communist Party has always occupied a relatively marginal place in the Portuguese party system ever since the first constitutional government assumed office in 1976.

Of the three new parties, the Socialist Party was the only one to be created before the outset of the Revolution. With the support of the German SPD, the PS was founded in April 1973 in the Federal Republic of Germany by a group of prominent socialists in exile. Initially little more than an association of prime minister Soares' friends (Gallagher, 1979b: 201), the PS became the biggest party in both the 1975 and 1976 elections. This was an unprecedented outcome for a Portuguese Socialist Party, which had always been outflanked in earlier democratic periods by republicans on the right and anarcho-syndicalists on the left (Sablosky, 1997: 56). During the transition, the PS was a colourful collection of groups and movements for which the non-communist left essentially was the only acceptable alternative: '[t]he party embraced everything from the reasoned faith in a mixed economy […] to left-wing extremism' (Harvey, 1978: 40).

The PS has increasingly adopted a catch-all strategy, having progressively moved towards the centre of the political spectrum in ideological and programmatic terms (Sablosky, 1996: 1,018). The PS explicitly adopted a more moderate stance when it modified the party programme in 1986, abolishing all the references to Marxism as the guiding principle of the party's policy (Robinson, 1991/92: 17). In the 1995 elections, the PS explicitly went after the middle-class vote, a strategy that proved to be successful after almost ten years of PSD rule. With 43.8 per cent of the vote, the PS again became the largest party in parliament. With almost half of the parliamentary seats, the PS formed a minority government

under prime minister António Guterres, the party's secretary-general since 1992. The PS continued its winning strategy when its candidate Jorge Sampaio defeated Cavaco Silva of the PSD in the 1996 presidential elections and when it again emerged as the largest party in the 1999 legislative elections. However, it lost its parliamentary majority in the early 2002 elections.

In organizational terms, the PS is largely characterized by personalism and factionalism. At the outset of the transition, the party scarcely had an organizational structure. However, little attention was given to the expansion and structuring of the party, since prime minister Soares and his close associates from the very first elections onwards occupied pivotal governmental and parliamentary positions, leaving little time to devote to party management (Sablosky, 1997: 62). Moreover, internal disputes occasionally emerged within the party, primarily challenging the leadership of Soares. After a dispute over the control of the secretariat, Soares actually resigned in 1979, but regained leadership of the party in 1981 and solidified his position. The defeat of what would become known as the 'ex-secretariat', however, did not put an end to intra-party disagreements. Further disputes over the leadership of the party emerged when Soares resigned as secretary-general and was elected president of the republic in 1986 (see da Cruz, 1996). Also after the election of Guterres as the new secretary-general in 1992, factionalism has continued to put its mark on internal party affairs.

The parties on the right

The two parties on the right – the PSD and CDS – were created shortly after the start of the revolution. The PSD was founded in May 1974 as the Democratic People's Party (*Partido Popular Democrático* – PPD), emanating from the 'liberal wing' of the pre-democratic National Assembly. The prevailing left-wing mood of the revolution and its aftermath led the party to claim that it was pursuing a social democratic policy and to change its name to Social Democratic Party (*Partido Social Demócrata* – PSD) in 1976. After Francisco Sá Carneiro had solidified his position as party leader during the course of the revolution, the PSD increasingly moved towards the right of the political spectrum. The untimely death of Sá Carneiro in a plane accident on the eve of the 1980 elections, however, left the party without its charismatic leader.

Of all Portuguese parties, the PSD has suffered most from internal factionalism (see Stock, 1989a). Some observers, Bruneau and MacLeod (1986: 89) note, have characterized the PSD 'as a federation of parties or

as an association of barons'. The party's origins as an organization, founded on the existing patron–client relations in central and northern parts of the country, are reflected in the still persisting tendencies at the elite level (see Corkill, 1995). The PSD has always depended heavily on the charisma of the party leader to hold the various factions together (Lopes, 1989). Especially in its early years, internal disputes frequently led to schisms within the party. It was not until the arrival of the new party leader Aníbal Cavaco Silva in 1985 that the PSD again had a strong and charismatic leader who proved capable of reducing the tensions within the party (see Frain, 1996). Inspired by the style and political course of his predecessor Sá Carneiro, Cavaco Silva won the 1985 elections with a primarily anti-socialist campaign. The party obtained an absolute majority of the votes and parliamentary seats two years later, and repeated this result in 1991. Cavaco Silva's resignation in 1995, however, left the PSD once more without a strong party leader. In 1999, José Manuel Durão Barroso was elected as the party president, leading the party to an electoral victory in the 2002 elections.

The PSD has always adopted a programme sufficiently moderate to attract a large proportion of the electorate located on the right and the centre of the political spectrum. This vague ideological profile has been an indispensable asset for a party which integrates a large variety of factional tendencies. Its ideological position furthermore enabled the PSD to coalesce with either the Socialist Party on its left or the CDS on its right, and thus facilitated the party's predominance within the party system. Only in 1995 was the party voted out of office for the first time since 1979, losing its hegemonic position of 18 years to the Socialists.

Further to the right, the CDS was founded as the Party of the Social and Democratic Centre (*Partido do Centro Democrático Social*) in July 1974. The conservative image of the CDS, inspired by christian-democratic principles, placed the party in a difficult position in the left-wing climate of the revolution. The problems with consolidating its position on the right were furthermore exacerbated by the fact that its main competitor had been created three months earlier, which had given the PPD an important head start over the CDS. Over the years, the party frequently shifted its ideological position, oscillating between attempts to solidify its position on the right of the PSD and to occupy the centre of the political spectrum. These ideological and programmatic shifts were accompanied by a high level of internal problems between the different factions as well as strong personality clashes (Frain, 1997: 90), which led former party leader Basílio Horta to coin the CDS as 'a group of friends who cordially hate each other' (quoted by Robinson, 1996: 968).

In 1992, the leadership of the party was taken over by Manuel Monteiro, who initially seemed to succeed in overcoming the internal disputes. Under his rule, the party modified its name by adding the initials PP (*Partido Popular* – People's Party) to the original acronym. It also changed its programmatic strategy by pursuing a more right-wing populist approach and adopting a fierce anti-European position. The new strategy seemed to pay off when the CDS-PP more than doubled its share of the vote in the 1995 elections. However, the new party leader could not entirely silence the internal differences and prominent members of parliament increasingly began to question his strategy (Frain, 1997: 92). The poor result obtained during the local elections of December 1997 sparked off the latent internal differences and led Monteiro to resign. In March 1998, the congress elected Paulo Portas as the new president of the *Partido Popular*, which produced a comeback of the more centrist factions within the party and opened up the possibilities for a renewal of the electoral coalition *Aliança Democrática* with the PSD.

Electoral volatility and party system change

The four parties described above have dominated the Portuguese party system ever since the first democratic elections of 1975, giving the party system an image of relative stability in terms of its composition and configuration. This picture was suddenly disrupted in 1985, with the successful performance of the party of incumbent president Eanes, the Democratic Reform Party (*Partido Renovador Democrático* – PRD), which obtained 18.5 per cent of the vote. Although the PRD eventually proved to be only an ephemeral party, its sudden emergence revealed the relative ease with which an incumbent leader could capitalize on his popularity and thus distort the existing configuration of parties. The success of the PRD thus demonstrated the fluidity underlying a party system which, according to Aguiar (1985), had appeared to be 'ultra-stable'.

That this stability is largely illusory can also be illustrated by the relatively high levels of aggregate electoral volatility, averaging 13.9 per cent between 1975 and 1999. Inter-block volatility is also relatively high, contributing to an average of 37 per cent of the total volatility (Gunther and Montero, 2001; Morlino, 1995). In fact, Portugal has an extremely competitive party system, with a very weakly developed cleavage structure (see also Aguiar, 1994). Moreover, for more than a decade, Portugal was characterized by relatively frequent general elections because of its short-lived governments: until 1987, no government completed the full four-year term. Furthermore, the pattern of government formation was

relatively unpredictable, the only stable factor being the consistent exclusion of the Communist Party. From then on, however, the elections revealed a concentration of the votes around the PS and PSD, which tend to obtain about 75 per cent of the vote and some 85 per cent of the seats. As a consequence, the party system has increasingly begun to resemble a two-party system, in which the PSD and PS alternate in power, albeit in a context of 'bilateral oppositions', to adopt the terminology of Sartori (1976). Despite this stabilization on the systemic level, volatility continues to be high and, in this respect, the fluidity of the Portuguese party system has not diminished (see also Magone, 1998). This picture of electoral instability, which is symptomatic for parties in a newly democratized polity, can be partly attributed to the low partisan encapsulation of society.

The membership organization

The size of the membership organization

For almost two decades, the PCP recorded the largest membership organization in Portugal. Immediately after the fall of the authoritarian regime, the Communists followed a successful strategy of membership mobilization, which led to a rapid increase from almost 15,000 members in 1974 to 115,000 members two years later. Membership continued to grow in the following years and reached a level of over 200,000 in 1983. Until 1988 the level of affiliation remained more or less stable, after which it dropped to about 163,000 in 1992 and further decreased to approximately 130,000 in 2000 (see Table 3.1). The membership decline was accompanied by an even more substantial erosion of the party organizational structures on the ground, which decreased from 2,427 cells in 1988 to a combined number of cells and local branches of only 993 in 1992.

The party itself primarily attributed the fall in party membership to the implementation of the decisions taken by the 1988 party congress, by which members who ceased to participate actively would lose their membership, thus envisaging a closer correspondence between the registered and effective number of members. One of the more plausible explanations for the decline of membership, however, is the party's inability to attract new and young members, as a consequence of which PCP membership is ageing rapidly: the share of party members younger than 30 dropped from 41.3 per cent in 1976 to only 10.4 per cent in 1992, while the share of members older than 50 in that period increased from 9.2 to 39.1 per cent.

Table 3.1 Party membership in Portugal

	PCP	*PS*	*PSD*	*CDS-PP*
1974	14,593	35,971	10,474	
1975	100,000	81,654	19,775	
1976	115,000	91,562	24,247	
1977			25,964	
1978	142,000	96,563	27,907	
1979	164,713		31,688	
1980	187,018		38,128	6,732
1981			45,517	
1982			53,428	15,479
1983	200,753	119,000	58,619	
1984			65,169	20,789
1985			76,063	
1986		46,655	87,194	24,841
1987			98,434	
1988	199,275		106,496	25,696
1989		62,117	113,488	
1990			122,239	
1991		69,351	137,931	26,801
1992	163,506	70,000	152,393	27,092
1993			162,576	
1994			171,945	
1995			180,439	
1996	140,000	94,138	207,074	34,522
1997				
1998			57,811	32,183
1999				
2000	131,504	100,000	75,000	40,000

Sources: Frain (1997); Mair and van Biezen (2001); Morlino (1995); Sablosky (1997); official party data.

As is true more generally, membership figures should be interpreted with caution because of the tendency for parties to exaggerate their membership levels. In the case of the PCP, it is noteworthy to draw attention to the so-called *desligados* (those without ties), which involve members who are no longer formally affiliated to the party but continue to be considered as such. The proportion of *desligados* has increased rapidly, from 21.8 per cent in 1980 to approximately 50 per cent in 1992 (Bosco, 2000). Partly in order to counteract its loss of members, the PCP abolished the payment of the membership subscription as a requirement of party membership in 1992, so that it was able still to consider those who had failed to meet their financial duties as members of the party.

Table 3.2 Party membership in Portugal (% of electorate)

	1975	*1980*	*1986*	*1991*	*1996*	*2000*
PCP	1.62	2.70	2.62	2.10	1.57	1.52
PS	1.32	1.52	0.61	0.84	1.06	1.15
PSD	0.32	0.55	1.14	1.68	2.32	0.86
CDS-PP	n/a	0.10	0.33	0.33	0.39	0.46
Total	*3.26*	*4.87*	*4.70*	*4.95*	*5.34*	*3.99*

Note: For years in which the party membership is not available, the author's estimate based on linear extrapolation is taken as the size of the membership organization.

In the early 1990s, party membership in the Social Democratic Party first exceeded the level of the PCP (see Table 3.1). From the outset of the transition, the membership organization of the PSD had increased steadily from about 10,000 members in 1974 to more than 200,000 in September 1996. However, the case of the PSD further underlines that membership figures should be interpreted carefully. In an attempt to provide a more accurate account of the number of party members, the PSD centralized the membership registration in 1996, a responsibility previously allocated to the lower levels of the organization. This decision was primarily motivated by a desire to abolish the excessive overrepresentation of certain regions to the party congress and to curtail the clientelist-based power of the local barons. The loss proved to be more substantial than anticipated, however, leaving party membership at only about a quarter of its original size, amounting to 57,811 in October 1998.[2]

The smallest party in terms of membership has always been the CDS-PP. At its foundation, the CDS was basically a party of notables linked to the previous regime (Pinto, 1989: 204). The CDS began building a party structure on the foundations of the existing patterns of clientelism. The local organization of the CDS-PP is particularly strong in the rural north, where local bosses (or *caciques*) still maintain a dominant position. As in all other Portuguese parties, the role of personalities in internal party affairs of the CDS-PP has always been of crucial importance, dominating the party to such an extent that it can be considered primarily as a party of individuals and notables. Because of the lack of a developed party organization, it has also been referred to as 'a party with a head and no body' (Bruneau and MacLeod, 1986: 81). The levels of party affiliation have always been low, increasing somewhat only in the early 1980s. In early 2000, the party reported approximately 40,000 members, although the round figure raises suspicions about its accuracy. In the PS, there are

also reasons to doubt the official figures, as discrepancies between the registered membership and the number of dues-paying members have been recorded. When the party organized an internal referendum in 1983 on the question of joining the PSD in a governing coalition, for example, it was officially announced that only 34,109 letters were sent to the membership, while the party at that time claimed some 100,000 members (see Bruneau and MacLeod, 1986).

Between 1980 and 2000, aggregate party membership in Portugal increased in absolute numbers, although growth by some 9,000 members in twenty years is at best modest. Moreover, the growth in party membership has clearly failed to keep up with the expansion of the national electorate, as can be seen from Table 3.2, which presents the membership figures as a percentage of the electorate (M/E). The figures show that the relative levels of party membership have actually decreased. Whereas the four major parties taken together recorded an aggregate M/E ratio of 4.87 per cent in 1980, this had declined to 3.99 twenty years later. Hence, Portugal does not deviate substantially from the average of almost 5 per cent for contemporary European democracies (see Mair and van Biezen, 2001).[3] This suggests that Portugal, at least in terms of the size of party membership, more closely resembles the parties in contemporary rather than the early post-democratizing Western European democracies, where partisan density was higher in the wake of full enfranchisement in the early twentieth century and where membership would continue to expand considerably thereafter.[4] It furthermore suggests that, in terms of the three scenarios outlined in Chapter 1, it is not the newness of democracy per se that is the key determinant here.

The level of membership in relation to the number of votes for the party (M/V) provides us with an indication of the degree of organizational encapsulation of the parties' voters. This measurement should be interpreted with care, however, since it is evidently vulnerable to fluctuations

Table 3.3 Party membership in Portugal (% of votes)

	1975	*1980*	*1985*	*1991*	*1995*	*1999*
PCP	14.09	18.68	22.41	34.36	28.94	27.63
PS	3.81	4.46	4.28	4.18	3.43	4.18
PSD	1.32	2.18	4.45	4.82	9.06	3.83
CDS-PP	n/a	0.79	4.09	10.77	6.14	8.03

Sources: For membership figures see Table 3.1; election results from *Comissão Nacional de Eleições*.

in the electoral strength of the party (see Bartolini, 1983). Nevertheless, when comparing the M/V ratios of the four parties, as shown in Table 3.3, a clear contrast emerges between the relative weak organizational penetration of society of the three newly created parties, and the much stronger societal embedding of the PCP, which consistently shows much higher levels of organizational encapsulation of its electorate than any of the other Portuguese parties. In this sense, therefore, the Communist Party has been comparatively successful in terms of the organizational mobilization of its electoral support and has established a relatively strong organizational hold on society.

These figures not only point to a considerable difference in organizational encapsulation between old and new parties, but also appear relevant for the internal conceptions of the membership organization. The relatively low level of partisan mobilization of the PS, for example, encouraged a membership recruitment campaign in 1986 in order to improve the party's organizational implantation and thus to reduce the discrepancy between the much larger electoral constituency compared to the membership organization. This is an indication that even for a new party in a new democracy a high level of party affiliation can be seen as desirable, which can be interpreted as a sign that members continue to be of importance, even though the nature of the membership organization may have changed. It thus appears that it is not the model of the party as a membership organization per se that has lost its validity, but rather the classic mass party model, by which society is incorporated in a densely and actively organized membership organization and thus integrated into the political system through the channels of the party.

The conception of the membership organization

Unlike the PS, PSD and CDS-PP, the Communist Party demands a very strong commitment from its members, incorporating numerous provisions to this effect in the party statutes. Members have to participate actively within the party organization, attend party meetings on a regular basis, defend and promulgate the policy and ideology of the party by maintaining close links with the population in general and the working class in particular, recruit new members for the party, and contribute actively to the distribution of the party press. Obligations of PCP members are not restricted to these partisan activities but also affect their personal life, in that they have to show they are acquainted with the party's ideological orientation and increase their level of political and

ideological knowledge through a constant study of the party's ideological principles and its political performance. On this view, membership is not merely a formal act but should contribute to the general activities of the party. Although the membership organization of all four parties is based on formal membership registration, an organizational principle first introduced by the classic mass party (cf. Duverger, 1954), the PCP is the only party which shows a participatory conception of the membership organization and that aspires to a model of organization resembling the classic mass party (see van Biezen, 1998).

Even though the PS wishes to preserve the model of the party as a membership organization, for example, the traditional mode of integration associated with the mass party is considered obsolete and no longer appropriate for parties in a contemporary democracy. In his address to the 1990 party congress, secretary-general Sampaio therefore advocated the need for the party to adopt a new and more suitable mode of organization:

> [T]he model that has served as a matrix for the traditional organization of democratic socialist parties, social democratic and labour parties, has been outdated by modern society – open, atomized and communicational – by the increasing complexity of the political debate and by the alteration in the conditions and modes of political participation. In a modern political party, the essential function is no longer recruitment, mobilization or integration, but rather the collection and production of information and its communication.

This notion of the membership organization is in clear contrast with the view of the PCP, which continues to cling to the traditional mass party model and is particularly interested in creating an active cadre of party militants. More specifically, the Portuguese Communists are primarily concerned with the establishment of a participatory linkage through the encadrement of their rank-and-file, and the enhancement of the level of participation of their members within the party as well as on the shopfloor. This attitude towards the nature of the membership organization can also clearly be discerned from the continuation of the organic linkage between party and trade union (see below).

Changing roles of members and leaders: towards the catch-allization of the *Partido Popular*

Many parties have introduced organizational changes which suggest an increased influence of the party membership. The decision of the PSD in

1996 to have the district executive elected directly by the party members rather than indirectly by the corresponding assembly is an example in this respect. Similar changes towards a more direct involvement of the party members which, however, at the same time involved a higher degree of centralization and personalization were introduced in the CDS-PP in 1996.

The first change that is indicative of a changing view of the role of members within the party organization affected the criteria for the establishment of local organizational units. While local branches usually consist of an established minimum number of members, this fixed number (of 30 in the case of the CDS-PP) was replaced in 1996 by a number conditional upon the amount of registered voters in the municipality, thus divorcing organization building on the ground from the party's membership strength. In addition, the representation from lower to higher party echelons ceased to be contingent on the size of the membership organization and became dependent on the level of electoral support for the party instead. In other words, rather than being based exclusively on the size of the registered membership, parts of the organization of the CDS-PP came to be constituted on the strength of its electoral following, which is an attested method of reducing the power of unrepresentative local barons. More importantly, by fundamentally altering the basic principles on which the extra-parliamentary party is organized by entirely relinquishing the relevance of the membership organization, the CDS-PP shifted from a focus on the party membership towards the electorate as the key pillar of party organization.

The second modification concerned the method of election for the executive committees on the municipal and district levels. First, the local branch lost the prerogative to elect its executive committee, preserving only the right to elect its president. The president of the local branch, in turn, acquired the authority personally to appoint the members of the executive committee. Similarly, on the district level, the members of the executive committee came to be appointed by the president of the district. At the same time, the district president would be elected by a newly created district plenary, encompassing the entire membership rather than a district assembly composed of elected delegates. On the one hand, these changes thus implied a more direct involvement of the party membership in the election of the presidents of the executive committees by abolishing one of the intermediary party structures. On the other hand, however, they simultaneously involved a substantial concentration of power in the hands of these presidents and a parallel loss of influence of the party membership on the composition

of the executive committees themselves. In this sense, the CDS-PP provides an illuminating example of a type of organizational change which involves a downgrading of the role of the party members with a concomitant strengthening of the leadership, as entailed in the classic formulation of the catch-all party (Kirchheimer, 1966).

This marked organizational transformation can probably be best associated with the internal factional struggles and in particular with the leadership of Monteiro. With his election to the party presidency in 1992, the party shifted towards a more national-populist discourse, of which the name change to People's Party can be considered symptomatic. The party furthermore advocated institutional changes, such as a modification of the electoral law, for which it proposed a more candidate and less party oriented system. Overall, Monteiro favoured a more direct contact between politicians and society, making politicians more immediately visible to the voters and reducing the influence of the intermediary party cadres and structures. The increasing electoral orientation combined with more direct member participation, while at the same time centralizing power and personalizing party positions, appears to follow from this particular perspective on the appropriate way of linking politics to society. The abolition of some of these organizational changes in 1998 can be best understood from a similar perspective of party leadership change. After the resignation of Monteiro, president Paulo Portas tipped the internal balance of power towards a different faction and to a party leader who holds different views about the desirable style of party organization.

Parties and interest organizations

Although to a varying extent, all Portuguese parties have adopted some form of indirect model of organization in terms of their established relationships with ancillary or affiliated youth and women organizations. The youth organization of the PSD is an ancillary organization, while the youth organizations of the PCP, the PS and the CDS-PP are independent organizations affiliated to the party. In the mid-1980s, the youth organization of the Socialist Party registered about 23,000 members (da Cruz, 1990: 220). The youth organization of the CDS-PP reported approximately 18,000 members in the early 1990s (Robinson, 1996: 955). In the late 1990s, the youth organization of the PCP reported about 20,000 members.

Close linkages with organized interest associations, and particularly with trade unions, however, only exist in the case of the PCP, although

the union is formally not affiliated to the party. Ever since their joint mobilization efforts during the revolution, the Communist Party has been closely connected with the General Confederation of Portuguese Workers (*Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses* – CGTP)[5] (see de Lucena and Gaspar, 1991). Until 1978, the CGTP was the only official trade union confederation in Portugal. The Portuguese General Workers' Union (*União Geral dos Trabalhadores* – UGT) was founded that year by the PS in cooperation with the PSD, primarily to impose a counterweight to the monopoly of the communist-led CGTP.

On the one extreme, the PCP and the CGTP virtually approach the mass party ideal type of a solidary and organic linkage between party and trade union. The PCP enjoys a hegemonic position on all the echelons of the CGTP. In addition, the party and the union are entangled to such an extent that, on the shopfloor, it is virtually impossible to decide where the trade union branch ends and the party cell begins (Castanheira, 1985: 805–6). The PCP sees itself as a working-class party for which a strong trade union is an indispensable actor in the class struggle. Members of the PCP are therefore actively encouraged to participate within the union. Moreover, the party supports a unitary trade union movement with a predominant position for the CGTP. On this view, the creation of the UGT in 1978 and the demands for trade union pluralism imposed a threat to the unity of the working class. Consequently, these 'divisionist' strategies invoked the indignation of the communist forces.

Over the years, the party's demand for the unity of the trade union movement and the relatively hostile attitude towards the UGT have scarcely diminished. The CGTP continues to uphold similar perspectives (see Nataf, 1995). The fact that the CGTP, with the public consent of the PCP, decided to participate in the tri-partite Permanent Council for Social Concertation in 1987 was therefore a tactical manoeuvre induced by the predominant position of the PSD government, which compelled the confederation to institutional cooperation with the UGT, rather than an acceptance of any division in the labour movement. Consistent with its Marxist-Leninist ideology, the PCP urges continuation of the class struggle in order to accomplish a radical change of the economic and political structures. Hence, efforts to promote a close linkage with the working class, attempts to encourage its party members to affiliate to the trade union, active efforts to support and strengthen the CGTP, and support for the unity and a strong organic cohesion of the labour movement, all remain high on the PCP organizational agenda.

On the other hand, as is to be expected for newly created parties in the context of a new democracy, other parties lack such a close relationship

with a 'fraternal' trade union. The PSD and PS have been involved actively in the organizational affairs of the UGT only at the time when the union was founded and in the early years thereafter. The UGT has always occupied a relatively autonomous position vis-à-vis political parties, not only because it is linked to both the PS and PSD rather than to a single party, but also because the parties themselves have always preferred to see the UGT as an autonomous social and political actor (Nataf, 1995: 140–1). The different unions of the confederation that is the UGT are divided along party lines, as is the UGT's executive committee, in which the membership is more or less equally divided between both parties. This dual loyalty sometimes generates internal conflicts, especially since the collapse of the 'central bloc' government (1983–85) in which both the PS and the PSD participated. At the same time, it has encouraged the UGT to adopt a moderate posture and has prevented a close identification with either of the two parties (Stoleroff, 1992: 125).

The organizational structure

Sub-national organization

The organizational structure of the PCP is modelled according to the principles of a traditional communist party. While it is possible to organize local party branches, the party structure is essentially based on the organization of its members on the shopfloor, with the cell being the basic organizational unit. The party organizations of the CDS-PP and the PSD, on the other hand, are based entirely on a territorial structure, in which the local branch constitutes the basic organizational unit, although the PSD was formally organized according to a dual structure until 1984, allowing for organizational units based on the shopfloor or a particular profession. The PS is the only party that still maintains a formally dual structure, in that party organization on the ground is made up of local branches which integrate members of the party on a territorial basis, as well as sectoral branches which involve members on the basis of their workplace. However, the number of territorial branches substantially outweighs the workplace branches, such that, in practice, the party is primarily territorially structured. The territorial organization of the parties in general follows the administrative division of Portugal into parishes (so-called *freguesias*), municipalities (*conselhias*) and districts, with the latter corresponding to the constituencies for national elections. In the PCP, the aggregate of cells is organized territorially following the same administrative ordering as the other parties.

In a sense, and despite variations, all parties are organized according to straight mass party structures, according to a bottom-up principle by which the organization on the ground is represented directly on the national congress via the local assemblies, and the party congress is thus composed of delegates elected by, and representative of, the membership organization. In addition, decision-making and executive committees are elected by, and accountable to, the national congress, which is to be organized at least every two years (every four years in the PCP). Despite a formally bottom-up structure, however, the organizational structure of most parties is actually fairly centralized (see also Magone, 1997). This can be seen, for example, from the high degree of ex officio representation of national party officials and public office holders in the lower echelons of the organization. The extent of top-down representation is particularly high in the CDS-PP and the PS. By virtue of their office, all the members of the national commission of the PS, for example, are delegates to the assembly and the executive committee of the district where they reside. In both the CDS-PP and the PS, moreover, national MPs as well as ministers of the party (if the party is in government) are ex officio members of the executive committees and the assemblies of their districts.

National party organs

The highest decision-making body is the national party congress. In the PCP, delegates to the congress are elected in proportion to the number of members of the party, in a ratio of one delegate for every 100 members. Given the relatively high level of party membership, the PCP congress tends to consist of large numbers of delegates, with 2,090 delegates attending the congress at the party's membership peak in 1988. Because of the generally large number of delegates, and especially because the selection of delegates is controlled from above by the so-called *controleiros*, the PCP congress in practice acts like a rubber stamp for the approval of decisions of the party's executive organs or the election of the central committee.

One of the most salient characteristics is the large and increasing proportion of party officials and especially public office holders on the national party organs. Their share is most limited in the PCP, where elected delegates to the party congress account for a large majority of approximately 90 per cent of the total of congress delegates, against approximately three-quarters in the case of the PSD and the CDS-PP, and two-thirds in the PS. Public office holders with ex officio representation

in the PSD are the deputies to the national and European parliaments. In addition to their MPs and MEPs, the PS and CDS-PP also include government ministers as well as the deputies to the regional parliaments as congress delegates, while the CDS-PP furthermore includes the presidents of the municipal chambers and parliaments and its regional government ministers in the national party congress. In the CDS-PP, the number of ex officio members is restricted to a maximum of one-quarter of the total number of congress delegates.[6] In the PS the number of ex officio delegates was restricted to a quarter of the total of delegates until 1992, and was increased to a maximum of one-third in 1998.

In addition to their increasing presence at the national congress, public office holders also enjoy a privileged position on the national decision-making and executive committees, with the exception of the PCP. The representation of public office holders in the PSD includes the president of the republic, the president of the National Assembly and the prime minister, as well as the presidents of the regional governments of the Azores and Madeira. In the CDS-PP, representation to the national commission is granted to all the MPs and deputies to the regional and European parliaments, as well as the members of the national and regional governments. The PDS furthermore includes the leader of the parliamentary group in the permanent executive (see Table 3.4). The share of public office holders in particular, therefore, has assumed considerable proportions and has tended to increase over the years, which

Table 3.4 Composition of permanent executive in Portugal

	Size	*Members*	*Number*	*Electing body*
PCP	10	Secretary-general	1	Central committee
		Other members	9	Central committee
PSD	9	Party president	1	Party congress
		Vice-presidents	4–6	Party congress
		Secretary-general	1	Party congress
		Leader parliamentary group	1	Ex officio
CDS-PP	12	Party president	1	Party congress
		Vice-presidents	3–9	Executive committee
		Secretary-general	1	n/a
		Vice-presidents executive committee	n/a	Ex officio
PS	n/a	Secretary-general	1	Party membership
		Other members	n/a	Executive committee

Sources: Party statutes and party headquarters.

suggests their overall predominance within the party organization (see Chapter 7).

In addition, party structures are relatively hierarchical and centralized, in which the party president or secretary-general occupies a predominant position. Except in the PCP, the party leader is given a special status as a 'unipersonal' party organ, bestowed with important prerogatives such as a decisive vote in the meetings of the national executive, ex officio membership of all other national party organs, or the *de facto* authority to choose the members of the permanent executive, which is the organ including the most prominent party officials and is in charge of the daily management of the party.

In the Socialist Party, the permanent executive was given a formal status in the party constitution only in 1998. It is constituted by and from the members of the executive committee and coordinated by the secretary-general. In that same year, the frequency of meetings of the party's national decision-making organs was reduced considerably – from every three to every four months for the national commission and from every month to every two months for the political commission. In addition, while the party had traditionally maintained a relatively clear-cut separation of the memberships of its national bodies, the organizational structure was modified such that the members of the smaller and hierarchically superior organs came to be represented on the larger and subordinate ones. These changes suggest an increasingly hierarchical structure with a corresponding concentration of power allocated to the small nucleus located in the permanent executive.

A new mode of party organization: the Socialist intermezzo

In 1992, the PS drastically altered its basic organizational model, which made the party a striking anomaly to the classic organizational model of the mass party. While the pattern of change in the CDS-PP suggested the erosion of intermediary party structures and an increasing predominance of party leaderships, the PS likewise adopted a more direct model of linkages between party members and leaders. Here, we will concentrate on the national level, although similar changes were carried out at the lower echelons of the organization. First, the party congress of the PS was renamed the 'National Convention' and lost its status as the party's highest decision-making body. It also lost the authority to elect members of the various national party organs as well as its decision-making powers, and was to be primarily a deliberative organ. In addition, it ceased to be the representative organ of the membership organization and was composed entirely of ex officio members instead.

This is not to suggest, however, that a national membership body ceased to exist *tout court*, because the national commission replaced the party congress as the representative body of the membership organization. While the majority of the members of the national commission had traditionally been elected by the national congress, the larger part was now to be elected directly by the party membership in what proved a failed attempt to encourage internal membership participation and to increase internal party democracy. Most of the functions previously assigned to the party congress were transferred to this national commission, including the election of the secretary-general and the authority to modify the party statutes and party programme. The powers of the new national commission were even somewhat larger when compared to the pre-1992 congress. Hence, by directly electing a body with larger powers, the party members were given a more direct and more significant influence within the organization.

Within just six years, however, the PS annulled most of these organizational changes and reinstated the *status quo ante*. One of the reasons for this was the apparent lack of enthusiasm of the party membership to make use of their newly acquired rights of participation. In addition, the elimination of the party congress had seen the weight of the party barons decrease considerably as the organizational channels of the party apparatus they traditionally controlled were largely abolished. Deprived of their habitual bargaining arena, moreover, they also lost a large part of their influence on the composition of the party executive. The re-establishment of the old party congress can therefore in part be interpreted as a means of restoring the influence of the barons within the party organization.

Although the new organizational structure proved to be only short-lived, there are at least two conclusions that can be drawn from the Socialist experience. The first relates to the magnitude and speed of the organizational transformation, which suggests an overall lack of organizational institutionalization, which is indeed typical for new parties in a newly established democracy and is also illustrated by the case of the CDS-PP discussed above. The second conclusion relates to the notion of party membership and the relevance of party members for the party organization more generally. The organizational changes effectively implied that the Socialist Party adopted a more direct link between party leaders and members, which corresponds to its internal conception of the membership organization, thus disqualifying the traditional view of the political party as a vehicle for the mobilization and integration of society.

What remained in practice of this new conception of the role of the membership is the direct election of the secretary-general, who was previously elected by the party congress. As in many other Western European parties, by increasing the possibilities for direct participation of its members by means of membership ballots, the PS has ceded more decision-making powers to its members, whereby 'the process of intra-party democratization is being extended to the members as individuals rather than to what might be called the *organized* party on the ground' (Mair, 1994: 16; emphasis in original). In this sense, the PS provides a marked example of the persisting relevance attributed to party members, while contrasting sharply with the traditional organizational characteristics of the mass party such as still displayed by the PCP.

The internal distribution of power

The organizational structure of the PCP and the internal balance of power continues to be based on the principles of democratic centralism the party adopted in the 1940s. These principles entail that, in addition to the bottom-up election of the directing organs of the party and their accountability to the electing organ, the minority is subordinate to the majority, and that decisions of the executive organs are binding on all other organs at the lower levels of the party organization. Furthermore, there is a strong emphasis on collective decision-making, unity, cohesion and discipline as well as a ban on factional activities (see Waller, 1988).

Consequently, internal democracy in the PCP is virtually absent and dissident voices have always been successfully silenced by the dominant coalition (see Bosco, 2000). The major reason that the PCP clings to this traditional structure is the persistence of the old guard of orthodox party leaders within the organization, who have been able to control the party since the early 1940s. One such senior figure within the PCP is Álvaro Cunhal, the party's secretary-general for almost 30 years (1961–92). Although his position has weakened, and that of the revisionist wing has consequently strengthened since Carlos Carvalhas succeeded Cunhal as secretary-general in 1992, the old secretary-general continues to occupy an important position within the party. And '[w]hatever official or unofficial position Cunhal holds […] automatically becomes a dominant position within the party' (Cunha, 1997a: 33). Moreover, the lack of success in attracting new generations and the party's consequent organizational erosion has made the relative weight of Cunhal, and the old orthodox guard more generally, even more pronounced (see also Cunha, 1997b).

Although, in contrast with the highly centralized structure of the PCP, other parties formally accord a relatively large degree of autonomy to lower levels of the organization, all parties are in fact relatively centralized. The recent changes introduced by the PS and the CDS-PP, for example, clearly have implied a shift of power away from the organs representing the membership towards the executive committees and their presidents. Contrary to what the introduction of membership ballots might seem to suggest, the changes in the vertical balance of power have actually worked towards a higher degree of centralization. Despite some persisting levels of factional autonomy, power is effectively concentrated, and increasingly so, in the hands of the members of the permanent executive and the party leader, as can be illustrated by the candidate selection process and the internal financial management of the party.

Decisions on financial affairs generally follow a top-down chain, originating at the highest levels of the party. Despite the financial autonomy of the local branches, such as their own collection of membership subscriptions (see Stock, 1989b), the lower strata are constrained by the boundaries established at the national level. It is the secretary-general who is ultimately responsible for determining the membership subscriptions, for example, and for the party budget and the party's financial accounts. In addition, the responsibility for internal financial regulation of the distribution of money over the various organizational echelons and for the approval of the budgets and financial accounts of the lower levels normally rests with the national executives, all of which strongly reduces the freedom of manoeuvre of the lower organizational echelons. Moreover, especially since most parties tend to derive the largest part of their income from public funds collected at the national level, the freedom of manoeuvre of the lower strata of the party organization is confined to the relatively small margins established on the national level.

On the face of it, the selection of candidates for local office, that is for the assembly of the parish and the municipality, is a relatively decentralized process in which decisions are made on the local or district level and national party officials lack the formal authority to interfere. In practice, however, the proposals for the candidate lists tend to be discussed with the national executives, who frequently intervene and change the composition of the lists, in particular regarding the top positions. The selection of candidates for national public office is more centralized, following a bottom-up procedure from the local branch to the national level, by which the national executives ultimately decide on

the composition of the lists. Despite the formal bottom-up process of candidate selection, the national executives in fact have a large influence on the composition of the candidate lists, both by statute and in political practice. The executive committee of the Socialist Party, for example, has the authority to change up to almost one-third of the candidate lists proposed by the lower echelons, a percentage that is likely to underestimate its actual influence in practice. As with many parties in new democracies, the PS thus provides an illuminating example of the tendency toward the formal centralization of decision-making power on the selection of candidates for public office (cf. Kopecký, 1995).

Conclusion

In many respects, the Communist Party stands out in clear contrast to the other Portuguese parties and provides an anomaly from the prevailing model of party organization in new democracies. Although all Portuguese parties have adopted some elements of the classic mass party, such as the establishment of indirect channels of representation for youth and women organizations, for example, it is only in the PCP that these patterns are consistent across all dimensions of the party organization. The Portuguese Communist Party closely resembles the classic mass party in terms of the size and type of the membership organization, the attitude towards the role of party members within the organization, as well as the organizational structure of the extra-parliamentary party. Indeed, the PCP is one of the few remaining orthodox communist parties in Europe today, modelled on the principles of democratic centralism and characterized by a strong emphasis on internal cohesion and discipline, as well as low levels of internal party democracy (see also Bosco, 2000).

The Socialist Party, the Social Democratic Party and the People's Party, in contrast, are characterized by the lack of requirement for an active commitment of its membership towards the party, the relative insignificance of participatory duties for party members, as well as a rather loose formal organizational linkage with society more generally. This is apparent from the low levels of party membership, from the relatively low partisan encapsulation of the electorates of these parties, and from the absence of strong institutionalized linkages with organized interests. The trade union UGT occupies a relatively autonomous position vis-à-vis the PS and PSD, for example, and therefore provides a sharp contrast with the organic linkage between the communist CGTP and the PCP. In addition, several patterns of organizational transformation attest to the

reduced relevance of the organized membership and the increasing emphasis on a direct and unmediated linkage between voters, members and party leaderships.

This can be seen unmistakably from the experiences of the *Partido Popular* and the Socialist Party. Echoing the aspirations of the PS for a more contemporary and 'communicational' relationship with society, it has proceeded to create a more direct type of linkage with individual party members, which is exemplified by the direct election of the party secretary-general introduced in 1998. As the PS never adhered to a conception of democracy in which the political party serves as a vehicle for the mobilization and integration of society, the bypassing of the organized party on the ground corresponds accurately with the party's own views on the model of party organization it seeks to establish. What the organizational changes in the PS and the CDS-PP furthermore underline is that a more direct involvement of the party membership in internal elections tends to be accompanied by a substantial power concentration in the hands of the party leaderships. In addition to these patterns of organizational change by which parties become more centralized and personalized, it is noteworthy to emphasize that the comparatively high frequency and large scope of organizational transformations are indicative of a relative lack of institutionalization of organizational structures, which can be considered emblematic of many parties in newly established democracies.

4
Spain

The Spanish transition through peaceful elite-negotiation is generally regarded as the paradigmatic case of a successful democratic transition, followed by a relatively rapid consolidation of democracy. The transition, conventionally seen as starting with Franco's death on 20 November 1975, concluded with the first democratic elections in June 1977 and the subsequent approval of the new democratic constitution in 1978. One of the first significant moves in the democratization process was the approval by the Francoist *Cortes*, in October 1976, of the Law for Political Reform, which allowed for a democratically elected parliament. The Spanish transition owes much of its success to the competence of Adolfo Suárez, the former secretary-general of the Francoist *Movimiento*, who competently reconciled the antagonistic and almost diametrically opposed forces which favoured a gradual reform (*apertura*) of the system, and those who advocated a complete break (*ruptura*) with the past (see Preston, 1986). Additional steps in the reform process included the dissolution of the *Movimiento* and the transfer of its assets to the state, as well as the dismantling of the corporatist vertical syndicates.

While the voluntary elimination of the Francoist *Cortes* had paved the way for the first democratic elections, a major issue to be tackled by Suárez was the legalization of political parties. On the right, the *Alianza Popular* (AP, now *Partido Popular* – PP) had been created in October 1976. The parties on the left, however, were still deprived of a legal status. The legalization of the Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista Obrero Español* – PSOE) was achieved in February 1977, but the legalization of the Communist Party (*Partido Comunista de España* – PCE) constituted a much more controversial issue, which was heavily opposed by the armed forces and right-wing sectors formerly involved in the Franco regime. The PCE's

increasingly moderate and Eurocommunist political course as well as its pledged commitment to the monarchy, however, enabled Suárez to follow an inclusive strategy and to allow the Communist Party to participate in the democratic political process. The PCE was finally legalized in April 1977, two months before the elections.

Parties and the party system

As in many recently democratized countries, the Spanish constitution attributes a particularly pivotal role to political parties in the new democratic polity by stating that 'political parties express political pluralism, contribute to the formation and the manifestation of the popular will and are the fundamental instrument for political participation' (art. 6). It is also interesting to observe the effort to achieve a prominent role for parties through institutional engineering, and in particular via the introduction of closed and blocked lists in the electoral system.[1] As Montero (1997: 13) asserts, there was a certain consensus during the transition 'that this type of list was the most adequate for electors who lacked experience [and] for parties that counted on only a couple of months of trajectory'. The imminent process of constitution writing as well as the anticipated impact on governability were among the main considerations of the institution builders. Moreover, it was thought more generally that parties rather than personalities should be the protagonists in the political process (Montero and Gunther, 1994: 35). From the outset, however, the combined impact of the constitutional framework, the nature of the party system and electoral competition, and internal party dynamics has subjected the Spanish parliamentary system to 'presidentializing' pressures (see van Biezen and Hopkin, 2003).

Electoral volatility and party system change

Since the restoration of democracy, the vote share of the two biggest parties – the UCD and PSOE from 1977 to 1982, the PSOE and AP/PP after 1982 – has been oscillating between 63.7 per cent and 78.6 per cent of votes cast, and their share of parliamentary seats between 80.6 per cent and 88.3 per cent. The vote for the PCE/IU has varied between 4.0 per cent and 10.8 per cent and its parliamentary size between 4 and 23 seats. The greater part of the remaining votes and seats is divided between regionalist parties, of which the Basque PNV (*Partido Nacionalista Vasco*) and the Catalan CiU (*Convergència i Unió*) have been taking up the largest share since 1977. Despite a relatively high number of parties (on

average more than 12), parliamentary fractionalization has been comparatively low, largely because the smaller parties tend to be regionalist forces incapable of challenging the two main parties on a nationwide scale.

At more than 42 per cent, electoral volatility in 1982 reached a level almost unrivalled by any established Western democracy. However, the Spanish party system thereafter consistently featured relatively low levels of electoral change, aligned to a stable left–right cleavage and followed quite predictable patterns of competition (see Gunther and Montero, 2001). Despite a degree of ideological polarization between the two main competitors for office which is relatively high in comparison with other European countries, the system is characterized by a centripetal direction of competition, which is encouraged by the absence of a significant centre party (Montero, 1995). In systemic terms, and following the categorization of Sartori (1976), the 1982 elections produced a transformation of the system of moderate pluralism to a predominant party system. Despite the subsequently comparatively low levels of electoral change, the party system changed again in 1993, when the PSOE lost its parliamentary majority and was able to continue in office only with the extra-governmental support of the Catalans and Basques. These and subsequent elections, enhanced by the increasing vote share of the two big parties, increasingly made the Spanish party system in the early 1990s resemble what Galli (1984) has depicted as 'imperfect bipartism'.

Consolidation of the left

Although Linz (1980: 101–2) observes that few of the parties of the Second Republic could claim any heritage or organizational continuity, this observation is primarily valid for the parties of the right. The two statewide parties on the left, i.e. the Communist Party (PCE) and the Socialist Party (PSOE), both have historical roots dating back to the pre-authoritarian period. The PSOE was founded in 1879, and the PCE in 1920. Under Franco's rule, the leaderships of both parties went into exile. Efforts to maintain a party organization in Spain were complicated by the physical separation of the party leaderships from their constituencies and were frustrated by the repression of the authoritarian regime. The Communists proved to be better capable of functioning as an underground resistance movement than the Socialists, who gradually lost their hold on the working classes to the PCE and its allied trade union *Comisiones Obreras* (CCOO). At the time of Franco's death, the Communist Party enjoyed a more or less complete territorial organizational presence

and a much larger degree of organizational coherence than the Socialists (see Gunther et al., 1986).

The PSOE leadership that returned from exile after Franco's death in reality consisted of a new generation which had emerged from the party's youth organization. From the end of the 1960s onwards, the leadership in exile under Rodolfo Llopis had become increasingly challenged by the organization within Spain. Between 1972 and 1974, in fact, two opposing leadership groups coexisted. The battle culminated at the party congress in Suresnes (France) in 1974, where the old generation was replaced by a rival group concentrated around Felipe González and Alfonso Guerra, who were elected as secretary-general and deputy secretary-general.[2] González guided the PSOE through a process of ideological change, leading it to abandon its Marxist roots at the 1979 party congress, where he also consolidated his position as party leader (Gillespie, 1989: 337). Throughout the PSOE's post-Franco period, González maintained a firm control over the party, with the important backing of deputy secretary-general Alfonso Guerra, until he resigned – quite unexpectedly – from his post as secretary-general in 1997.

While the PCE had hoped that its organizational strength would yield substantial electoral profit, enabling a meaningful role in the post-Franco era, the party has always occupied a rather marginal position in the new democratic system, which already became manifest with its poor electoral performance in 1977. Partly nourished by its poor performance at the polls, the PCE went through a series of detrimental internal conflicts in the 1980s. The party's moderate attitude during the transition had strengthened the position of the Eurocommunist wing, which now increasingly opposed the rigid course of the hard-liner section and attacked the authoritarian leadership style of secretary-general Santiago Carrillo. The culmination of these internal tensions eventually led to the practical destruction of the party. Carrillo resigned after the disastrous 1982 elections, when the vote for the PCE plunged to 4 per cent and the number of seats fell to only four, and eventually abandoned the party altogether in 1985. Partly to save it from further electoral misfortune, secretary-general Gerardo Iglesias led the PCE into the newly established electoral coalition United Left in 1986 (*Izquierda Unida* – IU), of which it has always been the predominant component in terms of members, party officials and material resources (Gangas, 1995).

Under the leadership of Julio Anguita, who combined the positions of secretary-general of the PCE and party leader (*Coordinador General*) of *Izquierda Unida*, the electoral coalition was subsequently transformed into a unified 'social and political movement' in 1992. Prior to that,

however, it was already difficult to characterize IU as merely an electoral coalition of independent political parties. Since the first congress in 1989, the adoption of measures such as the establishment of party branches and the possibility of direct affiliation to IU already pointed towards the adaptation of the organizational structures towards those of a political party. At least until 1992, however, members of the parties that had originally formed the electoral coalition were also considered to be members of *Izquierda Unida*. Initially, therefore, *Izquierda Unida* was at least partially a party of indirect membership, the mediating organizations being the constituent political parties of the coalition. After unification, *Izquierda Unida* further moved towards a harmonization of its organizational structures. Indirect membership was abolished in favour of direct membership, quotas for the representation of the constituent parties on party organs and electoral lists were abolished, the collection and distribution of public subsidies was centralized, and the development of organizational structures with decision-making and executive organs at all levels was completed (see Ramiro, 2000). After launching *Izquierda Unida* as a unified movement in 1992, however, the constituent parties were not dissolved and to date they continue to coexist with IU.

Renewal of the right

The main political parties of the right are essentially newly created, lacking any organizational continuity with parties of the pre-Franco era. On the far right of the spectrum, the *Alianza Popular* (AP) emerged from an alliance of seven small parties of prominent politicians of the Franco regime headed by Manuel Fraga, a former Interior Minister under Franco. In its early years, the AP showed a decidedly pro-Francoist and anti-communist attitude, strongly objecting to the legalization of the Communist Party and showing its discontent with the new democratic constitution adopted in 1978 by abstaining or voting against the draft text. From 1979 onwards, the AP gradually attenuated its rhetoric and, encouraged by the internal disputes afflicting the UCD, reached out for the more moderate sectors located at its left. It considerably improved its electoral performance in 1982, increasing its share of the vote from 6.1 to 26.4 per cent and the number of seats from 10 to 107, becoming the second largest party in parliament after the Socialist Party. However, the leadership of Fraga as well as the inclusion of large numbers of prominent Francoist politicians on the party lists continued to be a major obstacle for further electoral improvement. Although voter studies

consistently show that the Spanish electorate is aligned to the centre-left (e.g. Montero, 1995), the party aspired to conquer what it saw as the 'natural majority' on the centre-right. The AP/PP failed to meet this objective until 1993, not succeeding in obtaining more than about a quarter of the total vote, which consequently came to be interpreted as the party's electoral ceiling.[3]

The resignation of Fraga as leader of the party in 1986 prompted a leadership vacuum and led to a turbulent three-year period fraught with internal tensions. Fraga had to return as president of the party in 1989 in order to settle the disputes and he consequently paved the way for an organizational reform, remodelling it according to a primarily presidential structure which still characterizes the party today. The federation was abolished and the constituent elements of the alliance fully integrated into a unified party structure, which was furnished with the new name *Partido Popular* (PP). However, it was only under the new party leader elected in 1990, José María Aznar, that the Francoist overtones which had discouraged the reluctant centrist voters from voting for the PP were effectively played down. For the first time in 1996, the party presented itself successfully as a legitimate alternative to the hitherto predominant PSOE.

As the dominant party on the centre-right, the UCD lasted only a few years. Rather than a party, the UCD was an ideologically quite heterogeneous electoral coalition led by prime minister Suárez. For the parties which formed the coalition, themselves lacking an established infrastructure, Suárez's popularity as well as his access to state resources and his close contacts within the network of the Spanish state television (RTVE), of which he was the former director general, constituted indispensable organizational assets at the outset of the transition. As a former UCD official recalled, these parties 'consisted of nothing more than prominent persons at the national level. […] They could not by any stretch of the imagination be called national parties. In most provinces, "branches" of these political parties consisted of little more than personal contacts with national leaders. There was virtually no core of militants within these parties' (quoted in Gunther et al., 1986: 96). The hasty constitution of the UCD shortly before the 1977 elections was primarily the result of the convergence of a series of short-term strategic interests of various political groups in a context dominated by the figure of the prime minister Suárez and his government (see Hopkin, 1999).

The diverse groups making up the UCD were initially able to work together because of their basic agreement over the nature of political reform. After the approval of the constitution in 1978, however, the

internal ideological differences within the UCD became exacerbated. The party's eventual demise was to a large extent due to a lack of institutionalization. UCD elites failed to develop a sense of loyalty to the party and instead viewed the party primarily as a vehicle to achieve short-term objectives (see Gunther and Hopkin, 2001). Unable to reconcile the incompatible pressures, Suárez eventually resigned and many of the major ideological factions were incorporated into PSOE and AP. Largely as a consequence of the discordant image the UCD presented to the electorate, support for the party in the 1982 elections plummeted from 34.8 to 6.8 per cent of the vote, and the party retained only 11 of its 168 seats. The UCD was dissolved one year later; the creation of the *Centro Democrático Social* (CDS) by Suárez proved an unsuccessful attempt to establish a party of the centre.

The membership organization

The size of the membership organization

Due to its virtual monopoly as a resistance movement under Franco, the PCE was the only party with a relatively well developed membership organization at the outset of the transition. The party's organizational strategy after the transition emphasized the further expansion of the membership, clearly adopting a strategy of mass mobilization and advancing the party's aspiration to build a party organization in accordance with the characteristics of a mass party. Party membership then grew rapidly. Between 1975 and late 1977, PCE membership increased from some 15,000 to more than 200,000 members (see Table 4.1). However, that figure seems to mark the peak of the mobilization capacity of the Communist Party and membership started to decline rapidly thereafter. The loss of members was especially dramatic during the early 1980s, when the PCE suffered from damaging internal conflicts: between 1981 and 1983, almost half of the members abandoned the party. The declining trend appeared to be irreversible, although continuing at a lower speed thereafter. By 1998, the level of party affiliation had decreased to about 26,000 members, a declining level of party membership that corresponds to a more general pattern of membership erosion in Western Europe. The creation of *Izquierda Unida* is unlikely to have made a significant impact on the further erosion of the communist membership organization, although it may have created a further impediment for the membership mobilization of both parties.[4]

Quite extraordinarily for parties in a newly established democracy, membership of the AP/PP and the PSOE has continuously increased

Table 4.1 Party membership in Spain[a]

	PCE	*IU*	*PSOE*	*AP/PP*
1975	15,000		4,000	
1976			8,000	
1977	201,740		51,552	
1978	168,175			27,225
1979			101,082	
1980				
1981	160,000		97,356	
1982			112,591	85,412
1983	84,652		145,471	144,960
1984			153,076	163,062
1985	70,000		165,413	202,777
1986			185,663	223,068
1987			209,388	240,235
1988	49,000		213,239	246,678
1989			242,661	262,755
1990			262,854	284,323
1991	44,775		309,026	300,988
1992		57,303	325,424	326,356
1993			347,759	375,232
1994		52,711	350,173	429,293
1995	34,704		362,662	490,223
1996		65,099	365,090	540,218
1997		71,578		570,879
1998	26,253		383,462	584,341
1999				586,000
2000		67,802	410,000	601,731

[a]National parties only. Party membership of the Catalan CDC increased from 8,870 in 1980 to approximately 30,000 at the beginning of 2000. In early 2000, the Basque PNV reported a membership of about 32,000 and the Catalan UDC reported 17,519 members.

Sources: Gangas (1995); García-Guereta (2001); Mair and van Biezen (2001); Montero (1981); Ramiro (2000); official party data.

since the outset of the transition. In its early years, the *Alianza Popular* scarcely paid any attention to the development of the extra-parliamentary organization and membership mobilization did not have a high priority. Until approximately 1982, the AP clearly ranked at the bottom of the list with approximately 85,000 members. Around that time, however, the party revised its organizational strategy and adopted a more positive, although arguably instrumental, view to its party membership. As Cotarelo and López Nieto (1988: 87) observe, the leadership saw the reinforcement of the party organization and its territorial expansion as

a vehicle for electoral growth.[5] Consequently, membership began to be significantly promoted. Two years later, AP membership had almost doubled and, standing at some 163,000 members, exceeded that of the Socialist Party. Membership levels continued to increase thereafter and, in mid-2002, the *Partido Popular* claimed almost 640,000 members.

In the early years of the transition, the PSOE followed a strategy of mobilization similar to that of its communist counterparts, aiming at a significant expansion of its membership organization. Between 1975 and 1977, affiliation to the party increased from about 4,000 to over 50,000 members. The party also intensified its territorial reach, increasing the number of local branches to an almost complete geographical coverage (Tezanos, 1989). With time, PSOE membership continued to increase, thereby gradually adding organizationally to its electoral consolidation as the predominant political force of the left. However, organization building could hardly keep pace with the party's increasing political relevance at the institutional level. In fact, throughout most of its post-Franco history, the PSOE has been concerned with the low levels of party affiliation and particularly with the low member/voter ratio (see Table 4.3). The party has repeatedly emphasized the need for a stronger organizational implantation in society and has underscored the high priority for 'corrective measures' to remedy this organizational 'deficit'.

On the whole, and taken in both absolute and relative terms, party membership in post-Franco Spain has been clearly increasing. Between 1980 and 2000, absolute membership has grown by more than 250 per cent, although it should be noted that it started from an exceptionally low base in the early 1980s. In relative terms, i.e. as a percentage of the electorate, and taking the national parties together, the mean level of party membership has increased from 1.81 per cent in 1980 to 3.21 in

Table 4.2 Party membership in Spain (% of electorate)

	1980	*1985*	*1990*	*1995*	*1998*
PCE	0.67	0.24	0.16	0.11	0.08
IU	–	–	–	0.16	0.22
PSOE	0.37	0.53	0.90	1.13	1.16
AP/PP	0.21	0.68	0.98	1.53	1.75
UCD	0.56	–	–	–	–
Total	*1.81*	*1.45*	*2.04*	*2.94*	*3.21*

Note: For years in which the party membership is not available, the author's estimate based on linear extrapolation is taken as the size of the membership organization.

Table 4.3 Party membership in Spain (% of votes)

	1979	*1982*	*1986*	*1989*	*1993*	*1996*	*2000*
PCE/IU[a]	9.69	14.45	6.73	2.56	2.44	2.48	7.25
PSOE	1.85	1.11	1.80	2.93	3.69	3.92	5.24
AP/PP	3.84	1.54	4.25	4.97	4.58	5.38	5.88

[a] For the period 1986–89, the IU vote and the PCE membership is taken as a basis for the M/V ratio; for 1993–2000, the figures are based on IU vote and membership.

Sources: For membership figures see Table 4.1; election results from Spanish Ministry of Interior.

1998 (see Table 4.2). This growth can be attributed almost exclusively to the two largest parties, which are responsible for an increasing share of the total membership. The increase itself is perhaps hardly surprising, since all parties had to build their organizations more or less from scratch. When compared to the other European polities, however, it appears that even with the growing levels of membership, Spain clearly falls below the 20-country mean of almost 5 per cent reported for European polities in the late 1990s (see Mair and van Biezen, 2001). In terms of party membership, therefore, Spanish parties today are closer to their contemporary counterparts in the long-established European democracies than to the parties during the heyday of political mass mobilization (cf. Katz, Mair, et al., 1992).

The conception of the membership organization

In terms of the role envisaged for party members, the basic dividing line in Spain is between the parties of the left, which maintain a more or less participatory conception of party organization, and the parties of the right, where such a conception is absent. For the AP/PP, membership participation has traditionally been conceived of as a right rather than a duty, whereas the PSOE, PCE and IU all demand a more or less active commitment to and engagement in party activities from their members.

The early Communist Party can be easily characterized as a typical mass party with a participatory model of party organization and a conception of party membership as personally and politically committed to the ideology and activities of the party. Furthermore, PCE members were obliged to accept party discipline and to abide by the fundamental principles democratic centralism, which ensured the effective predominance of the secretariat and the executive committee over the party congress, the central committee and the other organizational echelons (Hermet,

1974: 98). The PCE saw itself as a working-class mass party and placed a strong emphasis on its linkages with mass organizations and mass movements. In this respect, the Spanish Communist Party thus shared an important resemblance with its Portuguese counterpart (see Chapter 3). However, the lack of correspondence between the formal statutes and political practice was much higher than in the PCP, where democratic centralism was implemented more effectively. Even the Spanish Socialists could be seen as more successful in imposing a form of democratic centralism than the PCE (Heywood, 1987). The PCE continued to be modelled after an orthodox communist party structure until 1991, when the principle of democratic centralism was abolished, the membership acquired full freedom of expression and a system of proportional representation was introduced for internal elections (see Bosco, 2000). The references to its nature as a mass party then also disappeared from the party constitution and those to the requirements for ideological commitment of the members to the party likewise were abolished.

Izquierda Unida advocates citizen participation and collective action as its fundamental organizational principles. The party's working groups (*areas de elaboración colectiva*) are conceived of as the instrument to enhance membership participation and social mobilization and serve to strengthen its linkage with civil society and social movements. However, the efforts to adopt a genuine grass-roots democratic model have proved only partial and selective. Although *Izquierda Unida* has introduced rules of mandate rotation or gender parity, for example, it has not institutionalized a collective leadership and the functioning of its working groups remains the most problematic and least developed element of the organizational structure (see Ramiro, 2000).

Like the Communist Party, the PSOE in the early post-Franco years also embraced a notion of the party as a class-based mass organization, although it never demanded an equally strong ideological commitment from its members as the PCE. With the abolition of its Marxist principles in 1979 and particularly after acquiring government responsibility in 1982, the references to its mass character disappeared and the PSOE ceased to define itself as a class-based party. Nevertheless, the Socialist Party still continues to underline the importance of active membership participation, both within the party and within wider civil society. Even so, recent organizational changes unambiguously testify to the PSOE moving away from a classic mass party structure. The abolition of the statutory obligation of party members to affiliate to the trade union UGT and the introduction of party primaries indicate a move towards a direct rather than indirect model of party organization in which

membership participation is encouraged to bypass the traditional extra-parliamentary party channels.

The changing role of members: party primaries in the PSOE

The PSOE's almost consistently expressed concern with the low member/voter ratio, as well as the party's membership recruitment campaigns, indicate that a large membership organization continues to be valued positively and that even in a recently established democracy members continue to be seen to be of importance. Such views may be inspired by a prevailing participatory conception of democracy or the perceived legitimacy of the mass party structure (van Biezen, 1998; Méndez, 1998). Despite the continuing emphasis on the importance of an active membership, the PSOE provides an illustrative example of the changing role of party members for parties in contemporary democracies. For the PSOE, at least part of the interest in expanding the party organization on the ground seems to lie in the need to establish local branches in order to facilitate the recruitment of public office holders on the one hand, and to enhance the visibility of the party during elections on the other (Méndez, 1998: 161). From this perspective, therefore, the membership organization is primarily relevant as a resource for electoral mobilization and as a channel for the recruitment of politicians, rather than as a platform of membership participation or as a vehicle for political integration. This interpretation is further supported by the fact that the efforts of membership expansion clearly diminished after the PSOE acquired government office in 1982 (Méndez, 1998: 209). As illustrated by the UCD, which as the main protagonist of the Spanish transition gave little importance to the development of the extra-parliamentary organization (Gunther, 1986a), being a party of government further encouraged a focus on the activities of the party in public office at the expense of an orientation towards the extra-parliamentary organization. In addition, being a government party appears to have reduced the emphasis on the size of the membership as an indicator of organizational strength and therefore to have reduced the value of party members as a source of legitimacy. At the very least, the PSOE upholds an ambiguous attitude to its membership organization, and its interest in a committed and actively participating rank-and-file is at best questionable, which is perhaps hardly surprising for a party of which the deputy leader and main election strategist Guerra had gone on record stating that he preferred '10 minutes of television [broadcasting] to 10,000 militants' (quoted in Gillespie, 1989: 366).

The introduction of primary elections to choose the PSOE candidate for prime minister in the 2000 elections[6] clearly had a direct impact on the role of party members within the organization. Boix (1998: 35), in this context, speaks of 'mixed primaries', since they were open only to party members and gave a strong role to the party apparatus, and especially the executive committee, in the selection of the candidates. In the spring of 1998, the incumbent and rather lacklustre secretary-general and official party candidate for prime minister, Joaquín Almunia, lost the battle to his challenger Josep Borrell, with an unambiguous margin of 45 against 55 per cent. The outcome resulted in the separation of the positions of party leader and potential head of government, a situation with few precedents in Spain, and this clashing 'dual leadership' created serious internal tensions. While Borrell tried to extend his newly acquired authority, Almunia at the same time used his strength in the executive committee to prevent Borrell's emergence as *de facto* leader (Hopkin, 2001).[7]

The official motives for the introduction of party primaries for the future head of government were to increase internal democracy and to break with the iron oligarchic control of the party leadership over the selection of candidates for public office. However, party primaries play an ambiguous role as a means to increase influence from below and can also be seen to reinforce the control of the party apparatus at the expense of the party membership. Indeed, in subsequent primaries at the regional levels of the organization, the entrenched party elite generally managed to firmly secure their positions. Rather than a well-considered means to encourage internal accountability, the introduction of primaries appears to have been a short-term response of a party leadership troubled by the void left behind after the resignation of González, the low legitimacy of his successor Almunia, as well as the party's involvement in a series of corruption scandals.

However, even though the decision was rather ill-considered and the underlying motives were doubtful with a view to internal democratization, the introduction of party primaries has significantly affected the traditional mode of organization. Party primaries have subsequently been institutionalized at the lower levels of the party organization of the PSOE, and *Izquierda Unida* has introduced similar mechanisms of direct leadership selection. Consequently, these Spanish parties are increasingly approaching to a model of organization in which the organized party on the ground gradually loses its relevance in favour of the individual members (in some Spanish regions also sympathizers). As in many of its European counterparts, the internal party organization is

thus increasingly characterized by direct links between party leaders and individual members rather than the organized membership on the ground (cf. Mair, 1994).

Parties and interest organizations

Although most parties have established youth organizations, either as ancillary or affiliated organizations, the changing relationship between parties of the left and their historically affiliated trade unions clearly demonstrate the increasing relevance of direct linkages and the corresponding erosion of the indirect model of party organization. Historically, the PSOE has always been closely related to the General Workers' Union (*Unión General de Trabajadores* – UGT), which was originally founded by the party in 1888. The Spanish Communist Party intimately cooperated with the Workers' Commissions (*Comisiones Obreras* – CCOO) as an underground resistance movement under Franco. In post-Franco Spain, the only party that established a formalized relationship with a trade union was the PSOE, where members of the party were obliged by statute to affiliate to the UGT.[8] Although besides this requirement formal provisions referring to any institutional relationship between party and trade union were absent, it is important to underline that close linkages actually did exist in political practice, both in the Communist and in the Socialist camps.

While such close relationships with 'fraternal' trade unions and indirect and mass-like organizational linkages with affiliated organized interest associations can increasingly be seen as an anomaly across Western Europe, the lengthy existence of the Spanish parties of the left and the pressures of organizational inertia largely account for the continuation of these linkages in much of the post-Franco era. However, it should also be underlined that Spanish parties correspond to the tendency observed elsewhere, by which the relationships between parties and trade unions have become much looser with time. This became apparent first in the PSOE (see Gillespie, 1990). Initially, and especially when in opposition (1977–82), party and union were closely united and maintained an organic relationship as the political and economic exponents of the labour movement. Striving to achieve a hegemonic position for the UGT in the labour movement, both party and trade union ruled out cooperation with the communist CCOO. The PSOE depicted itself as a working-class party for which the mobilization of the workers, understood as their integration into the party and the trade union, was a

fundamental objective. On this view, the socialist struggle was not seen as merely electoral. Indeed, without the support of the UGT, the Socialist Party saw itself as being condemned to be an electoralist party without working-class basis. The party therefore offered active human and financial support to the trade union, provided education and formation for the UGT cadres and encouraged its members to fulfil their statutory obligation to join the union.

Once the PSOE assumed government office, and particularly after 1985, the relationship with the UGT deteriorated. The resignation of the UGT secretary-general Redondo as a socialist MP in 1987 and the subsequent general strike in December 1988 clearly marked a rupture in the socialist family. The UGT increasingly moved towards a more autonomous position vis-à-vis the party and at the same time softened its antagonistic attitude towards the CCOO. Several years of rivalry were ended when the secretary-general of the PCE Iglesias reached an agreement with the UGT on a programme of joint action directed against the government's policies. In 1989, the UGT for the first time openly refused to support the PSOE in the European elections and later that year in the national legislative elections. While the union increased its autonomy, the party at the same time distanced itself increasingly from the union by clearly condemning the critical position of the UGT towards PSOE policies and the union's attempts to undermine the legitimacy of the government with a strategy of permanent mobilization (Paramio, 1988).

In addition, the PSOE also began to recognize that its electoral support came from broader sectors in society than merely the working class. It therefore realized that it needed to open up the party organization to this socio-economically diverse electoral constituency, emphasizing that it should also associate with other organizations rather than considering its objectives as an exclusively socialist project. Gradually, the PSOE manifested itself as an open and heterogeneous party and shifted, at first hesitantly but later more evidently, towards expanding relationships with other sectors in society and towards social movements in particular. The 1990 statutes abolished the obligatory affiliation to the UGT and instead encouraged members of the party to engage in activities within wider civil society.[9] Since then, the trade unions are seen as merely one type among the large variety of interest organizations and social movements with which a dialogue needs to be maintained.

The PSOE started to see itself as a party with a broad electoral following, advancing the view that its political activities were to be directed towards a more plural and complex array of groups and collectives than

merely those which were the traditional supporters of democratic socialism. The party's observation that a more distant relationship with the UGT did not lead to significant electoral losses also facilitated an acceptance of the split with its traditional ally (Astudillo, 1998). The fact that the traditional mode of integration of the working classes, which characterized the party organization in its early years, has been replaced by a more open model of direct linkages with a variety of interest groups serves to indicate the increased 'catch-allness' of the PSOE. Even though linkages with social movements have been weakly developed in practice, partly because of the organizational weakness of these movements themselves but also in part due to a lack of initiative on behalf of the party actually to develop and reinforce these linkages, the change of focus clearly reveals a different conception of the desired nature of linkages between party and society. Consequently, the internal conception of party organization has clearly changed.

Primarily for strategic reasons, the PCE has always maintained a more distant position vis-à-vis the CCOO than the Socialists did towards the UGT. The CCOO has a more heterogeneous electoral constituency than the UGT. Whereas the large majority of UGT members voted for the PSOE in the legislative elections, the CCOO has a considerable amount of members not voting for the PCE (see Gunther, 1986b; Puhle, 1986). Hence, in order to avoid the alienation of the non-communist CCOO members and to discourage them from voting for the UGT in the elections to the workers' councils, both party and union had to be careful not to promote too close a public allegiance. In practice, however, the PCE and the CCOO were closely connected and the Communist Party enjoyed a predominant position within the trade union. As in the PSOE, the national and provincial executive committees resembled 'interlocking directorates' because of the large personnel overlap. Indeed, at the elite level, the degree of personnel overlap remained high until 1991, when the executive committee of the party suddenly no longer included any members of the CCOO executive. This was primarily the outcome of a strategic decision made by the trade union's secretary-general Gutiérrez, who believed that a greater autonomy from the PCE was essential to the future development of the union, especially if it was to move towards closer cooperation with the UGT (Gillespie, 1992: 170). Although the party preferred to cling to the preservation of the predominant position of the Communists within the ranks of the CCOO, the union had taken decisive steps in favour of greater autonomy, to the extent that the relationship between Communist Party and union progressively resembles the path followed by the PSOE and the UGT.

The organizational structure

Federalism and party structures

Within only a couple of decades, Spain has evolved from the unitary and highly centralized state it was under Franco towards an increasingly federal state structure. The 1978 constitution explicitly recognized the right of regional autonomy, which the Basques and Catalans were the first to exploit. Spanish parties have adapted their organizational structures to the federal structure of government to the extent that, on the face of it, they seem relatively decentralized. The parties of the left in particular grant a substantial degree of autonomy to their regional organizations, which sometimes can be seen as virtually independent from the national party, functioning under their own statutes and their own party label. This is most notably true for the Catalan branches of the PSOE and especially the PCE (and later IU) which, for historical reasons, have always occupied an exceptional status and maintain a singular relationship with the national party. The Catalan branch of the Communist Party (*Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya* – PSUC) was defined in the national party statutes as an independent and autonomous party 'fraternally united' to the PCE. The PSUC not only enjoyed a larger degree of formal autonomy, but also behaved more autonomously from the 'mother party' than the regional branches of the PCE in other Autonomous Communities (Hermet, 1974: 97). It sometimes deliberately opposed decisions of the national executive of the party or violated the principles of democratic centralism (see Mujal-Léon, 1983; Heywood, 1994). In parliament, however, the deputies of the PCE and the PSUC constituted a single parliamentary group.[10]

In 1976, the PSOE was the first Spanish party actually to define itself as an organization with a federal character. Consequently, party organs at the state level were given the label 'federal' (e.g. federal executive committee) while so-called 'national' or 'regional' parties or federations operated on the level of the Autonomous Communities. *Izquierda Unida* has taken the principle of federalism a step further and has adopted it as one of the key foundations of the party. In *Izquierda Unida*'s own view, federalism is not merely a structural device but also entails the recognition of the sovereignty of the integrated parties in the respective Autonomous Communities.[11] The Spanish right, on the other hand, has always been more suspicious of Basque and Catalan nationalisms, which are traditionally perceived as a threat to the unitary character of the Spanish state. The right, therefore, conventionally tends to be more centralist.

Despite these formally more or less federal structures, however, Spanish parties are highly centralized organizations which have always kept their party apparatus under tight control of the national leadership. They have concentrated power at the highest echelons of the party in the hands of a small elite and allow their party leaders to occupy a predominant position, such that they reveal strong oligarchic tendencies. As Gillespie (1989: 323–4) observes about the deputy secretary-general of the PSOE, a confidant of Felipe González and co-founder of the party, 'the power of the party apparatus headed by Alfonso Guerra was an effective check upon the genuine autonomy of the regional federations.' Similarly, the party apparatus of the PP is under firm control of the secretary-general, who occupies this position upon the proposal of the party president and is both *de jure* and *de facto* subordinate to the party president (Gangas, 1995). Indeed, nearly all Spanish parties stand out for their marked degree of power concentration and personalization. As will be argued in more detail below this is true for both the formal and centralized party structures and for the importance of personalities for internal party politics.

Local and provincial structures

Since the abolition of the cell structure of the Communist Party in 1978, all Spanish parties are characterized by a primarily territorial organization, generally accommodating to the administrative demarcations of the country. The local branch is the basic unit – although the PP is not formally made up of basic organizational units – and corresponds to the parish or municipality. A local branch can be established with any number of members. In the PCE, IU and PSOE, the organization is formally not made up exclusively of territorial branches, as the statutes also allow for the creation of branches based on workplace, profession or sector. In the case of the PSOE, a sectoral organization parallel to the territorial structure was introduced in 1994. However, the actual number of sectoral organizational units is so limited that a dual organizational structure is barely a political reality.

Until 1991, the PCE was organized according to a straight mass model, with a formally bottom-up but in practice highly hierarchical structure, in which the upper organs were elected by, and accountable to, the lower echelons and the executive organs on all levels derived their mandate from the corresponding assemblies, which were composed of delegates representing the membership organization. Furthermore, the membership organization constituted the cornerstone of the party

structure, in that its size was the basis for representation of the various branches on the higher party organs. This structure remained basically intact until 1991, after which, as a response to the unification of *Izquierda Unida*, the formal party structure has come to be defined only in rather loose terms. The PSOE shares many of its organizational characteristics with the early PCE, although its structure is more decentralized and the lower levels formally have a larger share in the election of hierarchically superior party organs.

The local and provincial structures of the AP/PP contrast with those of the PCE and PSOE in a number of fundamental respects. First of all, the structure of the lower organizational echelons were given a formal status at a relatively late stage. As might be expected for new parties in new democracies, and especially those which were internally created, the AP/PP in its early years did not pay much attention to the building of its extra-parliamentary organization, which is reflected in their absence in the party constitution (see López Nieto, 1988). Only at the 1984 party congress, when the statutes were entirely rewritten, did the party formalize its extra-parliamentary organization by introducing a thorough and detailed elaboration of the party structures on all echelons, amounting to a very centralized party structure. In contrast to the PSOE and the PCE the composition of the lower level echelons is dictated by statute. The PP further contrasts with the organizational characteristics of the PSOE and PCE in that it sets down the make-up of its party structure in much more detail and is more thorough in its prescription of the composition of the various party organs. Moreover, the PP stands out for being the only party to include local and regional public office holders as ex officio members in its decision-making and executive bodies of the subnational echelons. In addition, the level of ex officio top-down representation of public office holders is quite considerable. Regional and national MPs are members of their provincial council by virtue of their office, and the same is true for the membership of national MPs of their regional council. In fact, public office holders enjoy a salient position within the party structure more generally and thus occupy a potentially predominant position in the party as a whole (see also Chapter 7). Finally, it is worth emphasizing that for the PP the membership organization does not constitute the cornerstone of the party organization, since the allocation of delegates to the representative organs on higher organizational strata is based in part on the size of the party's electoral support, rather than exclusively on the number of party members (see also below).

National party structures

The national party congress is the highest decision-making authority of the party and its delegates are normally elected by the provincial and local assemblies. The PCE and the PSOE follow the structure of the classic mass party in establishing the number of congress delegates in relation to the size of the membership organization, while the PP and IU use a combination of membership size and level of electoral support, in a ratio of about 60 to 40 (in the PP) and two-thirds to one-third (in IU). This suggests that the membership organization in new parties is given a lower status compared to the older parties. Conversely, new parties appear more inclined to assign a higher priority to their electoral supporters, thus revealing a more electoralist rather than partisan orientation.[12]

National congresses are held about every three years. Over the years, all parties have reduced the frequency of party congresses in what is indeed a consistent and striking change which underscores the continuously reducing relevance of the membership organization. The Socialist Party decreased the interval between congresses from every two to every three years in 1981 and subsequently to every three to four years in 1990. The AP used to organize a national congress every year until 1982, after which the interval was diminished to every two years and further reduced to every three years in 1986. In the same vein, *Izquierda Unida* reduced the frequency of party congresses from every two to every three years in 1994.

Few parties establish the number of delegates to the national congress or the ratio between party members (or voters) and congress delegates by statute. Only the PSOE stipulates that the number of delegates should fall between 500 and 1,000. In practice, the congresses of the PCE, IU and PSOE are more or less similar in size. Since the PSOE congresses have varied little in size over the years while the membership has continued to expand, the ratio between delegates and party members has consequently dropped substantially. In contrast to the Communist and Socialist Parties, the congresses of the *Partido Popular* are relatively large and the number of delegates runs into thousands. The total number of delegates to the 1999 congress, for example, amounted to approximately 3,000, of which 2,496 delegates were elected by the lower echelons. The congress delegates furthermore included representatives of its youth organization (*Nuevas Generaciones* – NNGG), as well as the approximately 400 members of the national committee, who are all ex officio delegates. Although the PP restricts the percentage of ex officio members by stipulating that the number of elected members should be at least five times higher than the number of non-elected delegates, this

results in a relatively large number of congress delegates overall rather than having any limiting effect on the number of non-elected delegates.

The national congress usually elects (part of) the members of the national decision-making and executive committees. In comparison with the parties of the left, the selection procedures in the PP are relatively centralized and the party furthermore stands out for the relatively small proportion of elected members. While the PSOE and IU include a significant proportion of representatives elected by the regional branches in their national committees, their presence is relatively small in the PP and consists furthermore exclusively of ex officio public office holders, i.e. the heads of the regional and provincial governments. Overall, less than 10 per cent of the approximately 400 members of the national committee of the PP hold an elected position; the rest are filled by party officials and public office holders. National MPs especially, who are all ex officio members of the national committee, occupy a predominant position, accounting for about three-quarters of the total. In 1999, the PP further enlarged its national committee, adding also the mayors of the provincial capitals. The executive committee of the *Partido Popular* also stands out for the high share of non-elected members, which make up about half of the body. This evidently further increases the weight of non-elected party officials, and more specifically that of the public office holders, further underlining the high overall share and importance of ex officio representation and especially public office holders in the party.

Also noteworthy are the considerable prerogatives of the president of the *Partido Popular* in the formation of the executive committee: the party president has the authority to personally nominate the secretary-general, and to appoint the deputy secretaries, the area coordinators and executive secretaries, as well as five additional members. In practice, this allows the party president directly to decide on the membership of almost one-third of the executive committee. In addition, these members may – and in practice often are – selected externally, i.e. without mandate from the party congress, which further reduces the level of accountability to a direct personal loyalty to the party president. The subordination of the executive committee to the party president is furthermore explicitly recognized by authorizing him to discharge and replace its members.[13] The president's personal appointees together constitute the permanent executive (see Table 4.4), i.e. the committee in charge of the daily political and organizational management of the party, thus giving the president an exceptionally large control over the party. The party leader of *Izquierda Unida* enjoys a similarly large

Table 4.4 Composition of permanent executive in Spain

	Size	*Members*	*Number*	*Electing body*
PCE	11	Secretary-general	1	National committee
		Secretary national committee	1	National committee
		Other members	9	Executive committee
IU	17	General coordinator	1	National committee
		Other members	16	General coordinator
PSOE	13	Secretary-general	1	Party congress
		Party president	1	Party congress
		Area secretaries	11	Party congress
PP	13	Party president	1	Party congress
		Secretary-general	1	Party president
		Deputy secretaries	3	Party president
		Area coordinators and secretaries	8	Party president

Sources: Party statutes and party headquarters.

influence over the formation of the permanent executive, which comprises members selected by the party leader from the executive committee. The authority of these party presidents is illustrative of the highly centralized and presidentialized party structures. In particular in the case of the AP/PP, presidentialism has always been a salient characteristic of the party structure.

As Sartori (1976: 97) points out, the internal electoral system is a crucial variable in systems where political careers advance through the party. In most Spanish parties, the members of the executive committee are elected by the party congress through a closed (and blocked) list according to a simple majority system. In practice, this leaves the composition of the executive committee largely to the party leader. Typically, only one list for the future executive committee is submitted for ratification to the party congress, which effectively leaves abstention or a blank vote as the only alternative to a plebiscitary approval of the presidential list. In the *Partido Popular*, there is only one exception to the tradition of the single closed list. At the 1987 party congress, held in the middle of the bitter leadership contest that followed the resignation of Fraga, for the first (and only) time in the party's history two candidates stood for the presidency of the party. Equally, it was only between 1986 and 1989 that the election of the president and the remaining members of the executive committee of the PP were temporarily separated. The president's loss of power in that period, however, was counterbalanced by allowing him directly to appoint 17 of its 47 members. In 1989, the closed and blocked list was reintroduced.

In addition to its election through a closed list according to a simple majority, a noteworthy aspect of the electoral system for the executive committee of the PSOE should be underlined. Until 1994, it was elected by a so-called collective vote, which implied that, rather than the individual congress delegates, only the heads of the provincial delegations to the national party congress were entitled to cast a vote. In addition, the provincial votes could be, and often were, pooled together, such that provinces belonging to the same Autonomous Community could constitute a single delegation headed by one representative. At the extraordinary party congress in 1979, deputy secretary-general Guerra thus controlled the whole region of Andalusia, representing 25 per cent of the total congress, with one single vote (Preston, 1986: 157).[14] This particular voting method not only effectively filtered out the representation of critical minority elements and reduced the role of the congress delegates in favour of the party barons, it also highlights a concomitant process of formal centralization of the party organization and the increasing predominance of party leaders. The abolition of this method of election in 1994, when Guerra resigned as deputy secretary-general, in part reflected the outcome of a long-standing factional struggle between *guerristas* and *renovadores* in which the latter had increasingly gained the upper hand (see Méndez, 1998: 117). Indeed, the resignation of Guerra created an opportunity for the regional barons to enter the power centre at the national level, as is illustrated by their increasing presence on the executive committee. This reflected a process of change starting off in the early 1990s, in which the effective autonomy of the regional federations has grown and the power of the regional barons has increased at the expense of the centre.

The internal distribution of power

In spite of their seemingly federal structures, Spanish parties are actually highly centralized and can be seen to have concentrated crucial decision-making powers at the highest levels of the organization, usually in the hands of a close circle around the party leadership. This is so because the power of the federations is restricted by the explicit provision that their decisions are bound by the confines established by the national party. Moreover, the autonomy of the lower echelons is effectively negated by stipulating that some decisions, and particularly the politically most salient ones, need the approval of the national party. Although candidate selection for local office, for example, is a prerogative of the local organizations, the influence of the national party

increases with the importance of the office: in the PSOE, the electoral committee is entitled to modify the candidate lists for the regional parliaments, as well as those for municipalities larger than 50,000 inhabitants and the provincial capitals. In the PP, the electoral committee authorizes the candidate lists for the regional parliaments, the candidates for the presidency of the regional and provincial governments as well as the mayors of the provincial capitals.

From this perspective, it is not surprising that the selection process for national public office is even more centralized and is essentially the responsibility of the national leaderships. In a sense, parties have institutionalized the practice adopted in the transition years, when the weakly developed organizational structures enabled the leaderships of all parties to exert a strong influence on the elaboration of the candidate lists (e.g. de Esteban and López Guerra, 1985). To date, the ultimate authority is still reserved to the national leaderships. Even when the selection process is formally bottom-up, the selection of candidates and their rank order on the list is effectively decided at the centre with little influence from below. Illustrative of this is the process in the PSOE, which starts off at the local branch and concludes at the federal committee. The latter not only has formal veto powers over the proposals of the lower strata but may also add names to the lists. In reality, the preliminary lists emanating from the local branch have to pass so many stages that, as Méndez (1998: 195) observes, the final result can be entirely different from the initial proposals, while there is no room for disagreement or appeal.

On financial decisions also is the nominal autonomy of the local organizations, which entitles the branches to collect the membership fees and decide on their own spending, is severely curtailed by requiring them to forward part of the fees to the national party. By statute, *Izquirda Unida* has established that a quarter of the membership subscriptions are to be transferred to the national party. Similarly, the PSOE demands that part of the membership dues are handed over to the higher echelons and ultimately to the national party. Especially given the already low import of membership subscriptions as a whole and the concomitantly high relevance of state subventions available to the central office, such practices are to be interpreted as devices which further centralize the locus of decision-making. The national leadership elaborates the budget, establishes the membership contributions, decides on the salaries of party employees, administers party property, and decides on electoral expenditures as well as the distribution of money over the organizational echelons of the party. Ultimately, therefore, the national

leadership is responsible for the financial management of the party in general. These high levels of centralization and power concentration have resulted in a further strengthening of the party leaderships.

The party where the concurrent tendencies of centralization and personalization most strongly emanate from its formal structures is the *Partido Popular*. From the composition of its party organs it is obvious that the higher echelons have secured a strong grip on the lower echelons. In the case of the PP, this is ensured by the ex officio representation of public office holders on the lower strata of the organization, by which all national MPs also hold membership of the council of the province for which they were elected as well as the respective regional council. In the form of ex officio top-down representation, therefore, national party officials have secured a significant presence and hence a large influence on the lower levels of the party organization.

Moreover, the high degree of centralization around the party leadership is even more strongly suggested by the prominent position that the party leader enjoys by statute, to the extent that the PP is best characterized as a party with a presidential structure. Presidentialism was already an essential characteristic of the *Alianza Popular* (see Cotarelo and López Nieto, 1988). The predominance of the party leader was in part the result of the informal and highly personalized networks surrounding the party president. Clientelism and personal ties with the party president played an extremely important role in establishing the territorial structures of the party, and personalist features tended to dominate internal party conflicts. This, according to Montero (1989: 516), was translated into a deficient institutionalization of the party and an extreme dependence on its charismatic leader and founding father Fraga.

Presidentialism was reinforced with the party's 'refoundation' as *Partido Popular* in 1989 (see García-Guereta, 2001). To an important extent, presidentialism in the PP is codified in the formal personalization of the leadership and the authorities assigned to the party president by statute. This is manifest, for example, in the institutionalization of the party presidency as a 'unipersonal' party organ which occupies a privileged position within the party as a whole, especially as it is accompanied by the attribution of important prerogatives which, moreover, have tended to increase over time. In the PP, virtually all power is *de facto* concentrated in the hands of the party president, who is the highest representative of the party and who chairs all the national party organs, in which he has a decisive vote. In 1993, in addition, the party president acquired the ex officio leadership of the parliamentary groups in the lower and upper chambers as well as the European Parliament.

Among the most noteworthy powers of the party president of the PP is the prerogative to personally appoint additional members to the executive committee and the exclusive authority to choose the members for the permanent executive (see above).

While the PSOE has not institutionalized the party presidency and maintains a formally collegial executive, the Socialist party leader is both by statute and especially in political practice clearly more than a *primus inter pares*. Indeed, the PSOE is well known for the control of the leader over the party, in particular under the reign of Felipe González and Alfonso Guerra (see Maravall, 1999). González long enjoyed a strong and uncontested position, and the importance of his charisma for the unity and cohesion of the party was such that his unexpected resignation left the party in disarray and created a leadership vacuum that culminated in a clashing 'dual leadership' after the 1998 party primaries. Hence, although the PSOE has not institutionalized the party presidency as a 'unipersonal' party organ, the predominance of González in the PSOE in practice was equivalent to that of his counterparts in the *Partido Popular*, although it was owed as much to his personal charisma as to formal prerogatives assigned to the party leader.

Conclusion

Old and new parties in Spain differ markedly in terms of the relevance of the membership organization for the party. Whereas the Communist and Socialist Parties continue to organize their parties on the size of the membership, this aspect has lost much of its relevance for the *Partido Popular* and *Izquierda Unida*. Both newly established parties build their extra-parliamentary structures in part on their electoral support, a feature also exhibited by the no longer existing UCD, thus displaying a conception of party organization in which the party's voters have taken over part of the relevance formerly ascribed to the party membership. Furthermore, the PCE and PSOE continue to uphold a more participatory conception of party organization, while such a notion is largely absent in the *Partido Popular*. At the same time, however, the comparatively large membership of the PP suggests that even in new democracies members continue to be of importance, if only as a vehicle for electoral expansion. Whether from a substantive belief in democratic participation and legitimacy or from an instrumental vote-seeking perspective, however, Spanish parties have sought to preserve their membership organizations somehow or other. In this sense, therefore, they differ not so markedly from their older counterparts in the established democracies.

Nevertheless, and despite an almost uninterrupted increase, it should also be noted that Spanish parties continue to show strikingly low levels of party affiliation. In addition, in the parties of the left, the role of the party members is clearly changing and the traditional organizational models are gradually eroding. The organizational changes in the Socialist Party show that the value of the membership organization increasingly lies in its potential as a channel for the recruitment of public office holders and as a resource for electoral mobilization rather than as a platform for active membership participation or as a means for political integration. The recent introduction of party primaries also attests to the party's relinquishing of its past model of organization and underlines the diminishing relevance of the organized party on the ground. Further testifying to the reduced relevance of its old organizational model is the gradual disentangling of the historical linkage between the PSOE and the socialist trade union UGT, a pattern that has come to be repeated by the Communist CCOO and the PCE. Despite certain patterns of organizational inertia and persisting organizational legacies, therefore, the traditional linkages by which society is integrated within the party structures are difficult to preserve in the context of a contemporary democracy.

At the same time, Spanish parties exhibit strong 'presidential' tendencies. This is exemplified by highly centralized party organizations in which the party leadership is attributed a privileged position. This is most forcefully visible in the presidential party structure of the *Partido Popular*, in which the president – as a 'unipersonal' party organ – enjoys special privileges and extensive powers. This can be illustrated by the authority of the president of the PP personally to select the members of the permanent executive, by the explicit subordination of the members of the executive committee to the authority of the president, or by the president's strong control over the party apparatus through the secretary-general, who is nominated by the party president and is *de jure* and *de facto* his subordinate.

Izquierda Unida features similar tendencies towards presidentialization, despite formally voicing the objective for a grass-roots model of democratic party organization. In this sense, newly established parties seem to differ from the older ones, where the party structure with its collegiate decision-making organs continues to reflect their organizational legacy. In reality, however, personalization has also been thriving here. The PSOE especially is well known for the influential position of the party leader and the leadership's control over that party leader, in particular under the charismatic reign of Felipe González. Although the

extent of presidentialization is contingent upon parliamentary strength and internal party cohesion (van Biezen and Hopkin, 2003), presidential tendencies are further encouraged by the constitution, which enshrines executive dominance over parliament and the predominance of the prime minister within the executive (Heywood, 1991). In Spain, the constitutional framework thus serves to reinforce the salience of intra-party organizational dynamics typical for the context of a newly established democracy.

5
Hungary

As in Spain, the democratic system in Hungary emerged as the result of a 'negotiated transition'. The Round Table talks which started on 13 June 1989 included a representation of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (*Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt* – MSZMP) and its satellite organizations on the one hand, and representatives from various opposition movements that had emerged since the late 1980s on the other. Although most of the opposition parties had been either newly created or re-established only relatively shortly before the first democratic elections in 1990, all parties that acquired parliamentary representation in the first elections had already been formed prior to the Round Table discussions. One of the most distinctive features of the emergence of political society in Hungary is thus that, in contrast with many other Eastern European countries, it had already assumed much of its organizational structure before the outset of transition (see Bruszt and Stark, 1992).

Parties and the party system

The opposition parties emerging shortly before the Hungarian transition can be grouped into two categories: the so-called 'historical' or 'revival' parties on the one hand, which includes those that were re-established from the remnants of parties dating back to the pre-communist era, and newly created parties on the other, with no clear historical predecessor. Two of the parties that acquired parliamentary representation in the 1990 elections fall into the first category. The Independent Smallholders Party (*Független Kisgazda – Földmunkás- és Polgári Párt* – FKGP) was established out of the roots of the party originally created in 1930, which had played an important although brief role in the first postwar government after winning an absolute majority in the 1945 national parliamentary

elections (Márkus, 1999: 71). During the communist period, the party's organizational structure was dismantled and it was only re-established in September 1988. The FKGP, a single-issue or 'sectoral party' (Körösényi, 1999), was established with the primary goal of restoring land and property confiscated by the communists. The second example of a successfully re-established historical party is the Christian Democratic People's Party (*Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt* – KDNP). It was re-founded in the early spring of 1989 as the descendant of the short-lived experience of the Democratic People's Party, which had existed between 1946 and 1948. The KDNP was represented in the post-communist Hungarian parliament between 1990 and 1998.[1]

Of the newly created parties, the Hungarian Democratic Forum (*Magyar Demokrata Fórum* – MDF) had been the first to emerge. It was founded in 1987 by a group of about 180 people, mainly writers, historians and other intellectuals, of a populist-national signature. About a year later, a christian-democratic and a national-liberal wing joined the MDF, along with Jozsef Antall, who was elected chairman of the party in October 1989 and became Hungary's first post-communist prime minister. The Alliance of Young Democrats (*Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége* – FIDESZ) was created in March 1988 by a group of young students. The popularity of FIDESZ was especially enhanced by its involvement in political and environmental mass demonstrations prior to the regime change, such as the commemoration of former prime minister Imre Nagy on the anniversary of his execution, or the protests against the hydroelectric dam on the border with then Czechoslovakia. The Alliance of Free Democrats (*Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége* – SZDSZ) was founded six months later, in November 1988. It mainly gathered intellectuals who had started organizing against the communist regime during the late 1970s and who were important contributors to *samizdat* magazines such as the relatively well-known *Beszélö*. This circle of dissidents had always been confined to a small elite primarily located in Budapest. Although transformed from an informal and narrow intellectual circle into a formally organized national party (Balász and Enyedi, 1996: 53), its origins are still visible in that even today the country's capital continues to be the party's stronghold in both electoral and organizational terms. Representatives of the Budapest county are formally granted a privileged position within the organizational structure, which further underlines the party's origins as a dissident movement largely confined to the capital.

The sixth party to obtain parliamentary representation in the 1990 elections was the Hungarian Socialist Party (*Magyar Szocialista Párt* – MSZP),

the successor to the former ruling Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSZMP). A few months before the elections, in October 1989, the MSZMP split into two parties, formally separating the reformist wing from the hard-liner faction. The latter organized a new party under the name of the Hungarian Workers' Party, which failed to pass the electoral threshold in 1990. The reformist wing established the Hungarian Socialist Party, which abolished the principles of Marxism-Leninism, adopted a completely new programme and underwent a significant change in the organizational structure (Ágh, 1997). These important ideological and organizational changes contributed positively to the credibility and legitimacy of the Socialist Party in the post-communist party system, facilitating its return to power after the 1994 elections and enhancing its consolidation in the Hungarian party system. After a period in opposition from 1998, and despite becoming the second largest party after FIDESZ-MDF, the MSZP returned to government in a coalition with the Free Democrats in 2002.

Patterns of electoral volatility

In the 1990 elections, the Hungarian Democratic Forum emerged as a clear winner and obtained 165 of the 386 seats. It formed a coalition government with two smaller parties: the Smallholders Party and the Christian Democrats. With 94 seats, the Free Democrats became the second largest party and the biggest opposition party. The reformed Socialist Party obtained 33 seats, while FIDESZ became the smallest opposition party with 22 seats. The second elections were held four years later, in May 1994. With the completion of the full parliamentary cycle, the first post-communist parliament thus demonstrated an exceptional degree of stability. Many observers have also emphasized its stability in another respect, i.e. that of the partisan composition of parliament: none of the parties that entered the legislature in 1990 lost their parliamentary representation in 1994, and no newcomers achieved enough seats to establish a parliamentary group.[2] Underneath this ostensible stability of the parties and the party system, however, the tendencies towards instability are noteworthy and have become more noticeable in recent years.

First, not unlike its Eastern European counterparts, the Hungarian party system is characterized by a high level of electoral volatility. In the 1994 elections, the electoral support for the largest governing party (MDF) dropped from 24.7 per cent of the vote and 165 seats to only 11.7 per cent and 38 seats. This decline was counterbalanced by the

rise in electoral support for the MSZP, which obtained 33 per cent of the votes in 1994 compared to 10.9 per cent four years earlier. Consequently, the Socialists rose from a relatively small opposition party to the largest party in parliament, securing an absolute majority with over 54 per cent of the seats, and formed a government coalition with the Free Democrats. In 1998, the Hungarian Democratic Forum witnessed a further electoral decline and almost disappeared from the parliamentary scene. FIDESZ, on the other hand, which had been the smallest opposition party during the first two legislatures, saw its electoral support increase from 7.0 to 29.5 per cent and obtained 148 seats in the 1998 parliament, after which it formed a government coalition with the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Smallholders Party.

Between 1990 and 1994, the level of total electoral volatility was approximately 20.5 per cent. In this sense, therefore, Hungary does not show a significantly larger degree of stability than its East-Central European counterparts, where electoral volatility has been generally relatively high and averaged almost 25 per cent for the first post-communist elections (Mair, 1997: 183). By 1998, total volatility had increased to almost 28 per cent. Although the recorded level of volatility declined in 2002 to a level of some 21 per cent,[3] the Hungarian electorate and party system cannot be seen to have stabilized compared to the first elections. In addition, in terms of the partisan composition of parliament the first changes became discernible in 1998, when the Christian Democrats disappeared from the parliamentary scene and a newcomer – the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (*Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja* – MIÉP) – obtained parliamentary representation. The 2002 elections saw a more dramatic reshuffling of the Hungarian party system, reducing the number of parliamentary parties to only three: FIDESZ-MDF which presented a joint electoral list with 188 seats, the MSZP with 178 seats and the SZDSZ with only 20 seats.

Hence, if anything, the Hungarian party system has in fact become more unstable with time. This is also true if the party system is analysed from the patterns of inter-party relations, party competition and government formation. Whereas in the transition phase inter-party relations were best described as the radical opposition confronting the Communist Party, the post-communist party system thereafter was initially best characterized as consisting of three poles, including a populist-conservative bloc (with the MDF, KDNP and FKGP), a liberal bloc (with SZDSZ and FIDESZ) and a socialist bloc, consisting exclusively of the Socialist Party (see Bozóki, 1990; Körösényi, 1999). Especially because of the remarkable ideological transformation of FIDESZ away from the

liberal camp towards an increasingly conservative stand, the structure of the party system transformed radically, enabling this once radical youth opposition party in 1998 to enter a hitherto inconceivable coalition with two parties on the most conservative side of the political spectrum. After the 2002 elections, and partly because of the reduction of parliamentary fragmentation and the return of the tried and tested MSZP–SZDSZ coalition, patterns of party competition and government formation appear to have crystallized into a more clearly defined 'left–right' pattern.

Patterns of party instability

Patterns of instability are not only manifest on the party system level, but also inside political parties, with individual MPs often leaving their parliamentary groups and affiliating to another. During the four years of the first legislature, for example, almost 50 MPs out of 368 changed their party affiliation, while six of them did so more than once. The largest parliamentary party, the Hungarian Democratic Forum, suffered most in this respect: the parliamentary group of the MDF lost 31 of its 165 members and was thus reduced by more than one-fifth of its original size (Szarvas, 1995).

In addition to the exit-prone behaviour of individual MPs, the frequent break up of the parties themselves can be interpreted as a further and noticeable sign of party instability. One of the most notable examples includes the Hungarian Democratic Forum, in which intra-party conflicts led to the expulsion of the controversial István Csurka from the party in 1993 (Oltay, 1993). Together with 11 MDF deputies, Csurka established a new parliamentary group – the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP) – which entered parliament in 1998 with 14 seats and 5.5 per cent of the vote, although it failed to cross the 5 per cent threshold in 2002. The parliamentary group of the Smallholders Party also suffered from an internal split, after the relations between the parliamentary group and the party executive, and particularly the party's notorious chairman Torgyán, had become untenable. While the party executive had decided to withdraw its support from the Antall government, a number of insurgent deputies refused to obey this decision and were consequently expelled from the party (Pataki, 1992). In the following elections, only the Torgyán group succeeded in obtaining parliamentary representation.

The second legislature continued to reveal MPs switching parties: in just two years, more than 20 MPs changed party affiliation (see Ágh,

1999). In addition, parties and parliamentary groups continued to split. Again, the Hungarian Democratic Forum suffered heavily, when in 1996 a number of deputies opposing the newly elected right-wing leadership headed by Sándor Lezsák left the party and established a new parliamentary caucus (Hungarian Democratic People's Party – *Magyar Demokrata Néppárt* – MDNP) under the leadership of Ivan Szabó. Their departures left the rump MDF with only 19 deputies. Although the MDNP failed to obtain parliamentary representation in the 1998 elections, the split endangered the persistence of the MDF, which needed the support of FIDESZ to ensure its parliamentary persistence: only because of an electoral agreement with FIDESZ were enough MDF candidates elected in the single-member constituencies for the Hungarian Democratic Forum to establish a separate parliamentary group. Finally, the internal crises within the Christian Democratic Party, the subsequent disintegration of its parliamentary group and the party's eventual disappearance from parliament all add further evidence to the instability of political parties and the party system. The conflicts in the KDNP concentrated on disputes between the party executive and the parliamentary group, and between chairman György Giczy and group leader Tamás Isépy in particular. The parliamentary group fell apart when it expelled three of chairman Giczy's supporters from its ranks and decided to amend its charter and to free itself from the obligation to follow policies laid out by the national leadership, after which chairman Giczy and another nine deputies left the group. Of the remaining 13 MPs, eight ultimately joined the parliamentary group of FIDESZ in September 1997. Largely as a result of these internal conflicts, the KDNP lost its parliamentary representation after the 1998 elections.

Whether internal conflicts evolve around party personalities or programmatic issues, both phenomena are particularly characteristic for newly created parties operating in the volatile environment of a new democracy. This is not to suggest that intra-party conflict, whether concentrating on policies or personalities, are the exclusive preserve of emerging parties in a new democracy. Nevertheless, internal differences appear difficult to reconcile and often result in individual members leaving or entire factions seceding from the party, which demonstrates a weakness of existing loyalties towards the party organization, at least to the extent that the costs of 'exit' are often lower than those of 'voice' and 'loyalty' is virtually non-existent (Hirschman, 1970). It is in this sense that the picture of intra-party instability of Hungarian parties may be considered symptomatic for newly emerging parties in a newly democratized polity.[4]

The membership organization

The size of the membership organization

As with many parties in the new post-communist democracies, Hungarian political parties are characterized by relatively low levels of party membership. The smallest party in these terms is FIDESZ, which has never had more than approximately 12,000 to 15,000 members (see Table 5.1). The Smallholders Party, by contrast, claims to have between 50,000 and 60,000 members, although this figure is generally considered considerably exaggerated. Membership of the SZDSZ and MDF expanded relatively quickly during the years before the 1990 elections, while the development of the membership organization of the KDNP and FIDESZ set off relatively slowly and only gained some momentum after the first elections.

Despite not being a newly created party, the MSZP also has a rather small membership organization. The primary reason is that the Hungarian Socialist Party, in terms of its membership organization, cannot be seen as merely the successor of the old Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party. At the first MSZP party congress in October 1989, it was decided that members would have to re-register with the successor party. However, only an unexpectedly low 10,000 of the more than 800,000 party members joined the reformed party. Hence, and although the bulk of these members had belonged to the Communist Party, the MSZP clearly did not inherit a mass membership organization from its predecessor.

With a few exceptions, parties in Hungary developed their membership organization primarily during the transition and the level of party affiliation has stabilized at a stage when memberships are still relatively

Table 5.1 Party membership in Hungary

	1990	*1992*	*1994*	*1997*	*1999*
MSZP	59,000[a]	29,000	36,000	37,000	39,000
SZDSZ	24,000	32,258	35,018	32,300	16,000
MDF	33,800	27,300	27,000	21,100	23,000
KDNP	3,500	18,000	28,203	26,500	10,000
FKGP	40,000	60,000	64,378	n/a	60,000[b]
FIDESZ	5,000	13,252	15,000	12,000	15,600

[a] Figure for 1989.
[b] Figure for 1998.

Sources: Ágh (1995); Balász and Enyedi (1996); Körösényi (1999); Lomax (1996); Mair and van Biezen (2001); Tóka (1995); official party data.

Table 5.2 Party membership in Hungary (% of electorate and votes)

	M/E				*M/V*			
	1990	*1992*	*1994*	*1997*	*1990*	*1992*	*1994*	*1997*
MSZP	0.75	0.37	0.46	0.47	11.03	5.42	2.02	2.08
SZDSZ	0.31	0.41	0.44	0.41	2.28	3.07	3.29	3.03
MDF	0.43	0.35	0.34	0.27	2.78	2.25	4.26	3.33
KDNP	0.04	0.23	0.36	0.34	1.10	5.67	7.43	6.98
FKGP	0.51	0.77	0.82	0.76	6.94	10.41	13.52	12.60
FIDESZ	0.06	0.17	0.19	0.15	1.14	3.01	3.95	3.16
Total	*2.10*	*2.30*	*2.61*	*2.40*				

Notes: The M/E ratios for 1990 and 1992 are based on the size of the electorate in the first round and the M/V figures on the number of votes cast on the party lists in 1990; the 1994 and 1997 M/E ratios are based on the size of the electorate in the second round and M/V figures on the number of list votes in the 1994 elections.

Sources: For membership figures see Table 5.1; for election results see Ágh and Kurtán (1995); Ilonszki and Kurtán (1995); Körösényi (1999).

small. In Hungary, only about 2 per cent of the electorate is affiliated to a political party (see Table 5.2).[5] The degree of partisan mobilization in Hungary is therefore limited in comparison with contemporary Western European democracies, where membership levels themselves have fallen considerably in recent years (see Katz, Mair, et al., 1992; Mair and van Biezen, 2001). Parties in post-communist Hungary are therefore not developing along the same lines as their Western European counterparts but rather like those in other post-communist democracies, which all show markedly low levels of party membership.

Another observation that stands out from Table 5.2 is the relatively high degree of organizational encapsulation of voters by the FKGP and, although to a lesser extent, the KDNP. This is shown by the substantially higher level of party membership as a proportion of the votes (M/V), a contrast that became increasingly visible during the second half of the 1990s. By that time, especially the FKGP had created a relatively well-developed degree of organizational entrenchment in society, by which approximately one for every eight voters was also a member of the party. This relatively high degree of partisan embeddedness in society can be partly explained by the fact that both the KDNP and the FKGP are organized on the basis of a more clearly circumscribed social basis, defined in religious and socio-economic terms respectively. The KDNP is a denominational party, whose vote is largely concentrated in the Catholic regions. The Smallholders Party relies primarily on the vote of

the rural areas of the country (see Körösényi, 1991). The fact that their social constituency is more clearly defined in comparison to the more diverse electoral support of the other parties has facilitated the development of their organization on the ground and has encouraged the creation of stronger partisan linkages with society.

The conception of the membership organization

With regard to the official position of the members within the party organization, the first observation to be made is that all Hungarian parties have set up their party organization on the basis of formal membership registration. In that sense, they show a fundamental resemblance with established Western European models of party organization. However, in terms of the obligations of the members towards the party, Hungarian parties do not require a particularly active involvement and commitment, since the duties of party members generally do not extend much beyond rather ill-defined participatory requirements. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that all parties actually have introduced at least *some* participatory requirements, however general and imprecise, as is illustrated by the need for new members to the MDF and FIDESZ to have their application supported by existing party members, the restrictions on the eligibility as party officials for newly enrolled members in the MSZP, and the emphasis on a participatory attitude of individual members (KDNP) and an active role in the local organizations (SZDSZ and FKGP). This suggests that newly created parties in a post-communist democracy may be more approving of an active role for their members than is generally assumed, and thus, in this limited sense at least, they differ from what might have been anticipated for newly created parties in a post-communist democracy.

The low levels of party membership, however, may come to constitute difficulties for the recruitment of public office holders, which is one of the few reasons why parties may be expected to actually pursue the enrolment of members. That this is indeed the case is most clearly visible during local elections. With a generally limited number of local branches, parties are absent in most of the municipalities and thus lack the adequate organizational structures for the nomination of a party candidate in all constituencies. Secondly, the small membership organizations constitute a too limited reservoir for the recruitment of candidates to fill the numerous positions of local public office. As a consequence, local politics is dominated by independents, a pattern which is most evident in small villages and towns. In 1990, for example, of the directly

elected mayors in the almost 3,000 smaller municipalities, 83 per cent were independents, while 71 per cent of the elected members of the local assemblies were not affiliated to any political party (Kolosi, 1995: 127). In the 1994 local elections, in villages with less than 10,000 inhabitants, independent candidates won more than 80 per cent of the available seats (Ilonszki and Kurtán, 1995: 369). Although parties generally performed better as the size of the municipality increased, the recruitment problem was also manifest in larger cities (Oltay, 1995). Eight years after the transition, independents still dominated local elections: in the municipal elections of October 1998, almost half of the candidates had no party affiliation.[6]

While the low level of partyness is primarily visible in local elections, the recruitment problem was also manifest at the national level, primarily in the first elections. In 1990, most parties had substantial difficulties in presenting a candidate list for every county and with finding enough candidates to be fielded in every individual constituency. FIDESZ and the KDNP, for example, failed to present a candidate in about half of the single-member constituencies. Although four years later the recruitment capacity of most parties had improved, partly because of the increase in party membership, smaller parties such as the KDNP and FKGP still encountered difficulties in fielding enough candidates in the single-member constituencies (see Ágh and Kurtán, 1995).

On both the local and national level, all parties have compensated for the lack of members by incorporating substantial numbers of non-affiliated candidates on the party lists. The parliamentary group of the MSZP of the second legislature (1994–98), for example, included 24 non-partisan members among its 209 members, thus making up more than ten per cent of the Socialist parliamentary group. At this point it is important to underline that the use of independent candidates is not necessarily perceived as a second-best option prompted by the lack of party members as suitable candidates. Parties sometimes actually prefer to include independent candidates under the party label, with party members sometimes even losing out to non-party members in the selection process, especially in the single-member constituencies. One important reason for this is that the personal popularity of the candidate is often more important than party affiliation. This suggests not only a primary concern for electoral performance and hence a mainly electoral orientation, but is also indicative of a generally poorly developed sense of party.

The parties' focus on electoral mobilization is generally accompanied by a relative lack of attention to the development of the membership

organization. Most parties attribute the lack of large memberships to the legacy of the past, the contention usually being that four decades of communism have given the political party a negative image among the public at large, which is said to discourage people from affiliating to, let alone participating actively in, such a party. While this argument contains a lot of truth, it should also be noted that the parties themselves have adopted a somewhat acquiescent attitude towards this situation, at least to the extent that they do not aspire to a larger membership. None of them is known for having initiated mobilization campaigns in order to increase their organization on the ground, for example. The potentially positive contributions that the membership may make to the party organization do not appear to compensate for the costs that an active effort to enlarge the membership organization would entail.

Suggestive of the prevalent attitude towards the membership organization in post-communist democracies is an essay written in 1992 by Bálint Magyar, a former Minister of Culture and Education and since 1998 president of the Free Democrats, in which he argues that the ideal organizational structure of a political party should be designed to attract the largest number of voters. The classical mass party with its 'primitive technique' of increasing party membership is an old-fashioned phenomenon belonging to a different era (Magyar, 1992: 9). On this view, for a political party in a contemporary democracy the most important function is to govern. If party membership has any positive purpose at all, it thus primarily serves as a pool of potential public office holders. However, in a context in which public office holders are not exclusively recruited from within the party organization, the membership organization can be seen to have lost a large part of its relevance.

Parties and interest organizations

Despite the existence of ancillary or affiliated youth organizations, and sometimes women's organizations, most parties have adopted a model of direct rather than indirect organization, that is one in which parties maintain direct contacts with a variety of interest groups rather than a relationship of exclusive commitment by which a singular interest group is incorporated within the party structure. One noticeable exception, however, is the Christian Democratic Party, which perhaps provides the closest approximation of a party with strong, although informal linkages with like-minded – Catholic – interest organizations. The KDNP maintains close relations with the Hungarian Christian Social Trade Union, of which the leaders play an important role in the internal

life of the party. Another important ally of the Christian Democrats is the Catholic Church. In both cases, however, contacts with the party primarily exist on an informal rather than institutionalized level. Trade union leaders are not represented on the party executive or the parliamentary group, for example, and the Church officially does not support any political party. Nevertheless, the KDNP is so deeply embedded in the Catholic community that it can be classified it as a 'subcultural party', i.e. 'a party involved (directly or indirectly) in non-political (i.e. cultural, recreational, educational, religious, etc.) activities and surrounded by different, strongly interlinked social organizations that claim to represent the values of a culturally and ideologically well-defined group' (Enyedi, 1996: 379). Although the linkages are not formalized, the organizational style of the Christian Democratic Party is atypical for parties in a contemporary and newly established democracy.

While other parties also maintain close contacts with trade unions, they do not uphold such an exclusive approach to fraternal organized interest associations more typical for a classic mass party. The case of the Hungarian Socialist Party and the National Association of Hungarian Trade Unions (MSZOSZ) shows that, despite the sometimes close relationships with interest associations, parties and unions are autonomous from each other, and that the nature of the relationship tends to be pragmatic rather than ideological. The MSZOSZ is the successor to the former communist-dominated National Council of Trade Unions (SZOT) and is by far the largest union in Hungary (Tóth, 1997: 170). Although the union lost a significant part of its members after the transition, it succeeded in maintaining a relatively high degree of organizational encapsulation of the workforce. Furthermore, even though the MSZOSZ inherited only a fraction of the rank-and-file of the communist union's membership, it retained large parts of its property, organizational infrastructure and leadership, which gave it a considerable advantage over the newly emerging unions. The primary rationale of the Socialist Party to establish an alliance with the union was its organizational strength and electoral popularity: the MSZOSZ obtained over 70 per cent of the vote in the work council elections (Neumann, 1997: 187).

The first signs of cooperation between the MSZP and the MSZOSZ emerged with the signing of an electoral agreement prior to the 1994 elections, allowing union representatives to run on the Socialist Party's electoral list. The then chairman of the union, Sándor Nagy, was given the second position on the party's national list, after party president Gyula Horn and ahead of all other prominent party officials.[7] In addition to Nagy, five other MSZOSZ leaders were incorporated in the party's

national list (Oltay, 1994: 24). What distinguishes the Hungarian Socialist Party from a classic mass model in which the union is partially incorporated within the organizational structure and acts as a transmission belt of the party, however, is the pragmatic nature of the relationship between party and union and the fact that neither party nor union restricts relationships exclusively to one another. The MSZOSZ preferred not to distance itself from other parties and union chairman Nagy encouraged the leaders of the confederation to stand for office for parties other than the MSZP (Pataki, 1994: 3). In addition, along with other trade unions, the MSZOSZ can also be seen to articulate its demands directly to parliamentary committees, the executive or the bureaucracy, a practice which is further enhanced by the weak institutionalization of neocorporatist intermediation structures (see Montgomery, 1996; Reutter, 1996). At the same time, the Socialist Party also maintained contacts with other interest organizations, such as the business sector, encouraging leaders of business organizations to stand as candidates for the party (Ágh, 1995: 501). In this sense, and despite close contacts, the nature of the relationship between party and union is illustrative of the type of linkage that tends to prevail in contemporary and new democracies, which is one characterized by direct rather than indirect linkages between party and society, and by parties which maintain pragmatic relationships with a variety of interest groups rather than an ideologically motivated relationship with a single 'fraternal' trade union.

The organizational structure

Subnational organization

Since the communist party organization was expelled from the shopfloor in the autumn of 1989 (Tóth, 1993: 97), all post-communist Hungarian parties are organized on a territorial basis, generally following the lines of the administrative division of the country. Local branches coincide with the municipalities and the party structures on the regional level with the 20 counties that correspond to the electoral constituencies. The FKGP and the MDF have established an additional organizational echelon in their party structure which is intermediary between the local and county levels. In the Smallholders Party, this so-called 'regional' level corresponds to the historical districts in which pre-communist Hungary was divided before the socialist administrative reform. In the Hungarian Democratic Forum, on the other hand, the separate organizational layer corresponds to the electoral single-member constituencies and is designed to coordinate the party's electoral activities on that level.

While the Smallholders have thus apparently been guided by the historical roots of the party, organization building in the newly created MDF appears to have been driven by the need adequately to fit the party to the prevailing electoral demands of a contemporary democracy.

In general, the size of the membership organization is the cornerstone of the organizational structure, in that the allocation of delegates to the higher-level assemblies is generally in proportion to the number of members in the local branch. However, during the process of organizational transformation (see below), FIDESZ abandoned the size of the membership organization as the basis for the representation of the regions in its national board and took the number of electoral constituencies instead. An important consequence of this modification was that it effectively reduced the weight of the 'rebellious' Budapest section in the organization, which was heavily opposed to the intended organizational changes (Enyedi, 1994: 10).

The development of the number of local branches shows that FIDESZ has the least extensive party organization: by 1997 it had established 400 local branches, which amounts to a local branch in about 12 per cent of the approximately 3,200 municipalities (see Table 5.3). The number of local branches for the MDF, SZDSZ and KDNP is almost twice as high, although geographically still limited, extending to less than one-quarter of the country. The comparatively high number of local branches in the MSZP and FKGP shows that these two parties have developed the highest levels of organizational density. However, since these two parties allow for the existence of more than one organizational unit in a single municipality, the relatively high number of local branches does not necessarily imply a more extensive organizational network. In fact, the

Table 5.3 Local branches in Hungary

	1990	*1992*	*1994*	*1997*
MSZP	n/a	n/a	2,080	2,500[a]
SZDSZ	320	900	759	740
MDF	327	824	820	650
KDNP	n/a	700	885	750
FKGP	n/a	1,630	n/a	1,700
FIDESZ	150	468	363	400

[a] The MSZP had 418 municipal organizations in 1995 and 431 in 1997.

Sources: Ágh (1995, 1996); Lomax (1996); Körösényi (1999); party headquarters.

extensiveness of the MSZP is only marginally higher than for FIDESZ. The branches of the Smallholders Party are mainly concentrated in rural areas. Its relatively high organizational penetration indicates a high priority for maintaining a marked profile and visibility through the organizational presence of the party in its electoral strongholds.

On the formal structure of the subnational organization, the first observation to be made is that the MSZP is the only party where the structure of the organization on the subnational level is not regulated by the party rules. The local and regional organizations are described as independent organizational units for which no particular organizational format is prescribed. A second observation concerns the extent to which the various party organs of the lower echelons are composed of elected rather than ex officio members. Only the statutes of the KDNP and the MSZP do not include provisions for such ex officio representation. As a general rule, however, the formal assignment of ex officio membership of the subnational organs is quite considerable, and is clearly most pronounced in the FKGP. Some subnational organs of the Smallholders Party include only non-elected members, such as the regional leadership (which consists of the presidents of the local organizations and their personal appointees) or the county leadership (which is comprised of party officials as well as the party's national, regional and local deputies and government members). Large proportions of non-elected officials and a general lack of internal democracy also characterize the national structures of the Smallholders Party.

Finally, it should be noted that public office holders and particularly national MPs occupy an influential position, since they enjoy extensive ex officio membership privileges on the subnational organs and their presence can assume significant proportions. In FIDESZ, for example, by statute their share on the county assembly may attain half of the total number of delegates. This example shows that the official rules grant public office holders a relatively important position within the extra-parliamentary organization, and point towards their predominant position within the organization as a whole (see Chapter 7).

National party organs

On the national level, the national party congress represents the organization on the ground. The national congress is usually the highest decision-making body in the party, which, in most parties, adopts the basic party documents and elects the executive. The national organizational structure of all six parties encompasses an executive committee

Table 5.4 Composition of executive committee in Hungary

	Size	*Members*	*Number*	*Electing body*
KDNP	7	Party president	1	National committee
		Vice presidents	5	National committee
		Leader parliamentary group	1	Ex officio
FKGP	10	Party president	1	Party congress
		Vice presidents	5	Party congress
		Secretary-general	1	Party congress
		Deputy secretaries-general	2	Party congress
		General attorney	1	Ex officio
		Leader parliamentary group	1	Ex officio
FIDESZ	10	Party president	1	Party congress
		Vice presidents	8	Party congress
		Chair national board	1	Ex officio
		Leader parliamentary group	1	Ex officio
SZDSZ	11	Party president	1	Party congress
		Other members	10	Party congress
MSZP	15	Party president	1	Party congress
		Vice presidents	max. 4	Party congress
		Other members	n/a	Party congress
		Leader parliamentary group	1	Ex officio
MDF	17	Party president	1	Party congress
		Other members	8	Party congress
		Leader parliamentary group	1	Ex officio
		Prime minister	1	Ex officio
		County representatives	8	Party congress

Sources: Party statutes and party headquarters.

consisting of between 7 (KDNP) and 17 members (MDF), and a national board varying in size between 31 (KDNP) and 145 (MSZP) members, which is hierarchically inferior and generally possesses a combination of decision-making and executive powers. The executive committee usually includes the party president, the vice presidents and in some parties also a number of members at large. Except in the SZDSZ, the leader of the parliamentary group generally is an ex officio member in the executive committee (see Table 5.4). The MDF is the only party to include a member of government – the prime minister if he or she is a member of the party – as an ex officio member of the executive committee.

The KDNP and FKGP have established a third national party organ, the national committee. Although this body is officially called the 'party congress' in the FKGP, other than its name it bears few resemblances to a traditional party congress, both in terms of its functions and its composition. It is a very large non-elected body, consisting of approximately

1,500 members (Lomax, 1996: 32) and is composed entirely of party officials and public office holders, which further attests to the party's relatively undemocratic internal structure. It lacks the prerogative to elect any of the other national party organs, but has the authority to amend the basic party documents and the party statutes. Rather than the representative body of the membership organization, the FKGP denominates a body comprised of ex officio members as the party's 'superior entity'. Further attesting to a relative lack of internal democracy is the national board of the FKGP, which includes such a large proportion of ex officio members that only about 40 per cent of its members are elected. In addition, the renewal rate of party officials is much lower in the Smallholders Party. Whereas elected members in other parties usually have a mandate for two years, they serve a four-year term in the FKGP.

National party congresses are held with a minimum frequency of every one (SZDSZ, MDF and FIDESZ) to two years (MSZP), except for the Smallholders Party, where the minimum interval is established at only every four years. Whether elected directly by the local organizations or indirectly through the assemblies of an intermediate echelon, the national congress is at least partially based on the size of the membership organization, although the exact ratio between congress delegates and party members is rarely spelled out. The FKGP congress, which has virtually no effective decision-making powers, appears to be the smallest, comprising only about one hundred delegates (Lomax, 1996: 33). In other parties, the number of congress delegates varies from approximately 400 delegates to the FIDESZ congresses to some 800 delegates in the MDF and MSZP, and about 1,100 delegates in the KDNP (see Lomax, 1996; Ágh, 1997).

The MSZP is the only party to limit the number of ex officio delegates to the party congress to a maximum, in this case to one-third of the total number of delegates. In the KDNP, the party statutes allocate almost a quarter of the total number of congress delegates to ex officio party officials and public office holders, a proportion which moreover tends to be much higher in practice. In addition, the party congress of the Christian Democrats occupies a somewhat peculiar position in the party organization as a whole, in that it lacks any substantial prerogatives. It does not elect the members of the national party organs, nor does it have the authority to make any decisions or to amend the party statutes or programme. Indeed, it has no other function than to establish the long-term political course of the party and its role is effectively limited to that of a deliberative assembly. In addition, the Christian Democratic Party can be seen to have infringed the statutory norms with regard to the

minimum frequency of party congresses. The rules prescribe that a party congress should be held every two to four years, but at least one year before parliamentary elections. While in most parties the frequency of party congresses is often higher in practice than the minimum prescribed by statute, the KDNP congress has at times been kept inactive for periods longer than four years, as a result of which it clearly occupies a marginal if not redundant position within the party organization.

The internal distribution of power

The party structure of the MSZP is the least formalized and most decentralized. While all parties include some regional representation in the national board, for example the MSZP in this respect stands out for being the only party to include a large representation of the local branches, amounting to at least two-thirds of its total membership. In addition, and in contrast with other parties, the statutes of the Socialist Party do not contain any prescriptive regulations for the structure of the lower level organization, the selection procedures or composition of their decision-making or executive bodies, the frequency of meetings or their *modus operandi* more generally. While in most parties the local and regional organizations are officially granted a certain degree of independence vis-à-vis the superior bodies, their freedom of manoeuvre is often at the same time curtailed by statute. Local branches are constrained by formal rules established from above, such as on the minimum number of members needed to establish a new branch or on the size or method of selection of the local executives, by the obligation to report on their activities, membership size, financial state or property to some higher party organ, or by the requirement that their decisions need the approval of the higher echelons. Only the decentralized party structure of the MSZP provides a noticeable exception to this general pattern of centralization (see below).

In many respects, the party organizations tend to be relatively centralized. On financial decisions, for example, most parties have established a firm degree of control over the management of the local branches. This is so despite a certain degree of autonomy *de jure* assigned to the local organizations, by which they derive their own income from the locally collected membership dues and other contributions and are free to decide on the allocation of their own financial resources. Given the low importance of membership fees and the comparatively high dependence on public money which is allocated to the national party organizations, local organizations are in practice largely dependent on

the national level for their income (see also Chapter 8). Thus, notwithstanding their official financial autonomy, their freedom of manoeuvre is largely restricted to the confines established by the practice of state funding and the decisions on the allocation of resources made at the national level. From this perspective, the requirement that the local organizations of the SZDSZ relinquish 10 per cent of the membership fees to the party central office implies not only an even more reduced sphere of decision-making but also the strengthening of control from above.

A similar tendency towards centralization is discernible in the candidate selection process. Although the authority to decide on the candidates for local public office in principle rests with the local branches, in all parties except the MSZP and KDNP higher organs have the right to intervene in the selection process, such that the ultimate decision-making power in fact lies at the national level. The candidates for the 176 single-member districts in national parliamentary elections[8] are usually in the first instance selected by the local branch. However, it is only in the MSZP that their election is the exclusive preserve of the local organization. In all other parties, the national executives are by statute allowed to intervene in the process or to veto the candidates. In the MDF, the organizational layer at the constituency level plays an important role in the selection process, although the national executive retains the right to veto. Throughout the years, the MDF has further centralized the selection procedures almost continuously, revising the party statutes such that the right to veto candidates for the single-member districts has since 1997 been granted to the president of the party. Usually even more centralized is the selection of candidates for the national lists, which is effectively decided by the national executive and which normally includes the party leadership at the top of the list (Ilonszki, 1999: 99). In 1997, in the MDF, in parallel with the concentration of presidential powers over the candidates for single-member constituencies, the right to draw up the national list was handed over from the executive committee to the party president.

In fact, the formal and actual powers of the MDF president are so considerable that it can be best qualified as a 'president-oriented oligarchy' (Machos, 1999). More generally, in addition to the relatively high degree of centralization of Hungarian parties, it is important to underline that many parties ascribe a favourable position to the executive organs, and particularly to their presidents, and assign them a dominant role in party activities. The concentration of powers in the hands of the members of the executive committee and its presidents is most clearly visible in the FKGP, where it has assumed such proportions that Machos (1999)

asserts that the organizational structure of the Smallholders Party can be best characterized as 'presidential authoritarianism'. Among the president's many prerogatives is the authority to select the members of the executive committee, who are then *pro forma* ratified by the party congress (see Table 5.4), and also to dismiss and appoint new members of that committee.

Breaking with the past: the Hungarian Socialist Party

Because the Hungarian Socialist Party originally descended from the former Communist Party – the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (MSZMP) – it is arguably not a new party. Although the MSZP claims to be only the legal and not the ideological, political or organizational heir of the MSZMP, the large majority of the party elite and the rank-and-file proceed from the Communist Party (see Machos, 1997). Since it also inherited much of its financial assets and real estate from its predecessor, the Hungarian Socialist Party is characterized by a large degree of organizational continuity.

Nevertheless, ever since the rupture in the old Communist Party, the MSZP has aimed at a radical break with the past, abandoning many ideological and organizational legacies, and has aspired to create a relatively open party with an internally democratic structure. Illustrative of the distinct organizational styles of the MSZP and its predecessor are the abolition of the traditional organizational principle of democratic centralism from the party rules, the introduction of voting by secret ballots, and the decentralization of the selection mechanisms for the various party organs. Furthermore, the incorporation of independent candidates for public office under the party label should at least partially be understood as a result of the MSZP's ambition to underline its openness and to present the successor party as a clear contrast to the closed and rigid structures of the old Communist Party.

Another indication of the MSZP's quite open structure, its relatively low level of 'inclusiveness' (cf. Scarrow, 1996) and its effort to establish a closer contact with society are the different internal factions and platforms. To be sure, internal tendencies or platforms organized on the basis of common interests of professional experience are by no means exclusive to the MSZP. The early party statutes of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, for example, acknowledged the existence of the three original founding tendencies – the national-populists, the christian democrats and the national-liberals – as integral components of the party. In FIDESZ, internal party platforms used to constitute an essential

element of the party organization before the organizational restructuring terminated their existence. Nevertheless, and despite the fact that they continue to exist in the Christian Democratic Party or in FIDESZ, the Socialist Party is the only party to encourage actively the creation of such platforms and to pursue actively the engagement of non-members within their ranks. In the MSZP, they furthermore constitute an essential building block of the organization in that each of the platforms elects one delegate to the party's national board.

What should also be understood in line with the party's aspirations to bury the organizational model of the past is the fact that the MSZP is quite loosely organized and its organizational structure is scarcely formalized. The party furthermore has a very decentralized party structure in which the local organizations enjoy a large freedom of manoeuvre (see Ágh, 1995). A comparative analysis of the division of decision-making powers over the various levels of the organization suggests that it is in the MSZP that the local organizations enjoy the largest degree of autonomy and that the MSZP as a whole is the most decentralized of all Hungarian parliamentary parties (see also Machos, 1999). Local party organizations of the Socialist Party are independent units and are entitled to decide on their own internal organizational structure. In principle, they also decide on the candidates for local public office as well as on the candidates for the single-member constituencies in national elections. It is only in the MSZP that this authority officially rests exclusively with the local branches and higher organs have no right to interfere. Furthermore, the local branches decide on their own financial affairs and higher party organs lack the formal right to interfere in their decisions. This is true even for the membership fees. While in other parties the minimum membership subscription is usually an amount determined by the national executives and decision-making organs, for MSZP members the fee is not fixed or set at a minimum but consists of a donation of which the amount is decided by the members themselves.

In practice, the large degree of freedom of the local branches in determining their own organizational structure may not have produced an internal organizational structure that is substantially different from the other, more regulated and centralized parties. And despite the autonomy of the subnational party structures, the internal power balance in the Socialist Party also features tendencies that, in practice, are characteristic of all Hungarian parties, and parties in newly established democracies more generally. This includes the propensity to progressively strengthen the position of the party executive, to concentrate powers increasingly in the hands of a small elite and to be relatively dependent

on the party leader. In spite of the formal separation of powers between the national board and the executive committee, for example, it has been the latter that has generally benefited from any changes in the internal division of powers. While this format, by which the presidency of the executive committee is incompatible with that of the national board and the two bodies are formally parallel with virtually no membership overlap, was designed as a model of checks and balances, in practice it showed a particular vulnerability to intra-party tension. With time, the executive committee gradually increased its powers at the expense of the national board. In addition, in the Hungarian Socialist Party, and especially under the leadership of prime minister Gyula Horn, the party president also occupied a key position such that the party was heavily dependent on its leader.

From movement to party: the Alliance of Young Democrats

FIDESZ likewise underwent a process of fundamental organizational transformation, although in many respects in a direction opposite from the route followed by the Socialist Party. As with many other Hungarian parties, the Alliance of Young Democrats was also affected by the departure of some of its prominent figures in its early years, although this did not bring about as much electoral damage to FIDESZ. More than anything else, the departure of these leading FIDESZ politicians was caused by the dramatic transformation of the party in both ideological and organizational terms. To their discontent, the Young Democrats had slowly abandoned the original liberal ideology and had adopted an increasingly conservative political discourse. In addition, they opposed the changes in the organizational style of the party, which they believed did injustice to the original conception of grass-roots democracy on which FIDESZ had been founded (see Pataki, 1993). The radical changes were introduced at the party's Vth congress in 1993, as a result of which the Alliance of Young Democrats was transformed from an informally organized movement advocating a strong participatory conception of democracy into a highly centralized and professionalized party structure.

At its foundation in 1988, the party organization of the Young Democrats could best be characterized as loosely organized. While the institutionalization of party structures inevitably takes time to develop, for FIDESZ a loose and informal organizational structure was not so much a consequence of the newness of the party but rather a positively valued principle. Averse to the rigidity of the centralized and statist institutions of the communist era in which they had grown up, these young

students founded a movement based on the principles of grass-roots democracy and an informal organizational structure. The early party structures guaranteed basic organizational units and group building on virtually any basis (Machos, 1993: 14). These groups, moreover, enjoyed a relatively large degree of autonomy.

The conception of direct democracy played an important role and party members occupied a pivotal position within the early party structures. This is illustrated by the fact that the delegates to the national council were elected directly by the local groups and their votes were weighed in accordance with the number of members they represented. Furthermore, the mandates of the delegates were bound in that they were obliged to represent the opinion of the local group they represented (Enyedi, 1994). Also stemming from the original conception of grass-roots democracy was the fact that the Alliance initially had no formal leadership but was managed collectively. Only after the 1990 elections was the first official leadership position created, when Viktor Orbán was elected the leader of the parliamentary group. The extra-parliamentary party, however, continued to be managed by a collective leadership and remained without a single official leader until 1993, when Orbán was elected president of the party and László Kövér – one of the founders of the Alliance and a confidant of Orbán – replaced him as the leader of the parliamentary group.

The question of the most desirable organizational style had been on the agenda since the very foundation of the party. One of the recurring themes was the question of 'becoming a party or remaining a movement' (Machos, 1993). While internal factions such as the 'Direct Participation Faction' or the 'Movement Faction' constantly took action against the increasing concentration of powers, the advocates of internal democracy soon found themselves on the periphery (Balász and Enyedi, 1996). The membership increasingly lost its relevance within the organization, which was interpreted by the internal opposition as a betrayal of the activist origins of the movement. Although heavily contested by some of the early founders, at each party congress the decisions on the organizational structure took FIDESZ a step further in the direction of a highly centralized organization with a hierarchical structure.

Preparing the draft for the new party statutes to be submitted to the 1993 party congress, Kövér argued that the early organizational structure had been definitely exhausted. Because membership had ceased to increase while the party was gaining popularity at the polls, Kövér argued that an organizational transformation of FIDESZ was needed in order to exploit the party's vote-winning potential and to facilitate the

party taking on government responsibility. For that purpose, it was argued that the principle of collective decision-making had to be abolished, since it was thought to leave the locus of internal responsibility unclear and to reduce the party's chances in comparison to those successfully symbolized by a single person. The solution to these problems was seen to lie, most of all, in the introduction of the institution of a party presidency (Balász and Enyedi, 1996: 60).

The net results of the organizational transformation of FIDESZ, for which the 1993 party congress proved to be the definite turning point, first of all reflect a general deterioration of the position of the party membership and a corresponding erosion of the party congress as its representative organ. Thus, the principle of direct participation in the party congress, initially a highly valued good within the activist movement, was replaced by the principle of delegation. Furthermore, the principle of organization building based on autonomous groups was abandoned in favour of a territorially based party structure, allowing for only one local branch per municipality. Since organization building based on criteria other than territory was no longer to be permitted, this implied the effective silencing of internal dissident factions that advocated more direct democracy and internal participation (Balász and Enyedi, 1996: 60). The party congress furthermore lost important prerogatives, such as the decision-making authority over the annual budget and the party's financial policy, which were both put in the hands of the executive committee.

The reduced importance of the party membership was accompanied by an increase in the degree of formalization of the party structures and a higher level of centralization and concentration of powers within the executive committee, especially around the party president. Whereas the autonomy of the local groups had initially been a highly valued principle, the current organizational structure of FIDESZ is prescribed by statute up to the lowest level of the organization, and hierarchically superior organs can now make binding decisions for, or overrule decisions made by, the local branches. In addition, the party president acquired substantial prerogatives, such as the right to make appointments at the party central office or the supervision of the entire party apparatus and all its affiliated organizations. The president's vote is furthermore decisive. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the number of public office holders and party officials included in many of the party organs increased considerably. József Vas, a prominent member of the 'Movement Faction', asserted that all these changes were effectively reducing the degree of internal party democracy, taking FIDESZ in an

anti-democratic direction (Balász and Enyedi, 1996: 62). Finally, to complete the movement's transformation into a hierarchically organized electoral party and following the suggestions of a German consultancy hired to examine the efficiency of the party central office structure, the party made an attempt to professionalize its apparatus by separating the internal administrative and political functions (Enyedi, 1994).

As a result of these changes, according to some critics, the principles of grass-roots democracy have been entirely eroded and the original conception of civil society on which the party had been founded denied. In 1993, therefore, some of the leading figures in FIDESZ, including Gábor Fodor – one of its founding members – resigned from their positions and gave up their parliamentary seats. Fodor eventually joined the SZDSZ, where he claimed that the 'extra-parliamentary engagement', which initially had characterized both liberal parties, had been better preserved (Szabó, 1994a: 144).[9] To continue its transformation from a youth movement to an electorally oriented party, FIDESZ abolished the age limit of 35 for party members at its 1993 congress and thus renounced its identity as a 'generation party'. Orbán had never liked the idea of a 'generation party' anyway. In his view, the change of FIDESZ to a serious political party that was capable of acquiring government responsibility was necessary in order to save it from an existence as a social protest movement at the margins of the political system (Lomax, 1999: 113). The process of 'dejuvenation' was concluded in 1995, when the party altered its name by adding Hungarian Civic Party (*Magyar Polgári Párt* – MPP) to the original acronym. 'FIDESZ' now no longer denotes 'young democrats' but symbolizes a party that, regarding many aspects of its organizational structure, is little different from many other Hungarian parties. It is now an 'extremely oligarchic party' (Machos, 1999) with a high level of vertical articulation, a highly centralized decision-making structure and a dominant party president (see also Machos, 1998). Its organizational structure is primarily guided by the principles of efficiency and above all directed at electoral success. Grass-roots activism of the party membership has lost practically all importance.

Conclusion

Regardless of historical or ideological origins or organizational continuities, membership is low in all Hungarian parties, and, consequently, the aggregate level of partisan affiliation amounts to only 2 per cent of the electorate. In addition, the geographical extensiveness of the party organizations is relatively confined, which implies that the reach of

party organizations adds up to at most approximately a quarter of the country and that most parties therefore have not established a local branch in the large majority of municipalities. This combination of low party membership and a limited territorial reach of the party organizations results in a generally low level of partisan entrenchment in society.

The requirements imposed on party members or the existence of partisan ancillary and affiliated women's and youth organizations seem to suggest that Hungarian parties maintain a more participatory conception of organization than might have been anticipated in the context of a post-communist democracy. However, the scarcity of local organizational structures and the low levels of party affiliation substantiate the general observation that Hungarian political parties are weakly rooted in society. In addition, the dominant style of organization is one in which the membership organization as a linkage with society has practically lost all relevance. This is suggested by the absence of formal linkages with organized interest associations such as trade unions or by the incidence of the non-partisan candidates running as local or national public office holders for the parties, a pattern which further suggests that the boundaries of the party organization are in reality rather blurred and that the sense of party more generally is weakly developed.

The second important conclusion to be drawn is that party structures are very centralized and that many parties stand out for having concentrated the most important decision-making powers at the highest echelons of the party in the hands of a small elite. Moreover, party presidents clearly occupy a pivotal position, such that many parties reveal oligarchic tendencies (see Machos, 1999). This is manifest both by statute and in political practice. It should be noted, however, that the Socialist Party presents a significant exception to this general pattern. Despite the increasing powers of the party executive or a noticeable dependence on its leader, the MSZP is considerably less formalized and has a clearly decentralized party structure. Its organizational model can perhaps be most accurately characterized as approximating a model of stratarchy, in which 'there is great autonomy in operations at the lower "strata" or echelons of the hierarchy, and [...] control from the top is minimal' (Eldersveld, 1964: 99–100). Although it has been suggested that this mode of organization may also be increasingly acquiring relevance in the older Western democracies as well as the more recently established ones (see Katz and Mair, 1995; Kopecký, 1996), few parties appear to have created a stratarchic organizational model akin to the MSZP.

Indeed, the model of party organization of the Hungarian Socialists represents a deviant type from the prevailing model of party organization in

Hungary, which is hierarchical and top-down, with little room for a membership organization of any importance. The case of FIDESZ offers a noteworthy example in this respect, with its organizational history adequately capturing the essence of a typical post-communist party. The rapid transformation of the former Young Democrats from a grass-roots oriented movement towards a highly centralized electoral and professionalized party clearly reveals that pressures to increase the electoral orientation are difficult to withstand, and that a participatory orientation is sacrificed relatively easily when confronted by the need for organizational efficiency.

6
The Czech Republic

While Solidarity had already achieved an overwhelming victory in the first – partially free – democratic elections in Poland, and opposition parties in Hungary negotiated a regime change with the Communist Party in Round Table talks, the leadership in Czechoslovakia continued to resist demands for fundamental political and economic reforms. In comparison with its neighbouring countries, the transition in Czechoslovakia thus started relatively late. Nevertheless, on 17 November 1989, a student demonstration held to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the death of a student killed by the Nazis triggered off what became known as the Velvet Revolution. The communist regime quickly collapsed under the pressure of popular demands voiced in mass demonstrations and by the Civic Forum (*Občanské Fórum* – OF), a movement founded two days after the first demonstrations as a 'prelude to a dialogue with the Communist Party and the government' (Wheaton and Kavan, 1992: 56).

Within less than six weeks, the constitution was amended in order to abolish the leading role of the Communist Party, a number of the communist members of parliament were replaced by co-opted members of the opposition, and a coalition government was formed that consisted primarily of non-communists (see Elster, 1996). The opposition had ascended to the leading positions of the vital institutions, including the majority of the cabinet positions and almost half of the membership of the Federal Assembly. Finally, on 29 December, the partially renovated Federal Assembly elected Alexander Dubček, architect of the Prague Spring in 1968, as its chairman, while former dissident Václav Havel was elected president of the Czechoslovak Republic.

Parties and the party system

Civic Forum and its descendants

Civic Forum played a crucial role in channelling the demands of the public and in negotiating the resignation of the Communist Party from its hegemonic position. Civic Forum was a broad political movement, typical of the Eastern European transitions in particular (see Cotta, 1996). It unified a large variety of forces critical to the communist regime, with leading dissidents such as Havel at the forefront. Part of Civic Forum was the former dissident movement Charter 77, in which virtually the only significant form of opposition against the communist regime in Czechoslovakia had been crystallized. Charter 77, however, was not an organized political movement. It united a large variety of intellectual dissidents, who shared a common concern for the defence of human rights and for the autonomy of society from the totalitarian state (Rupnik, 1989: 218). Other participants in Civic Forum were the Czechoslovak People's Party (*Československá Strana Lidová* – ČSL) as well as several members of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party (*Československá Socialistická Strana* – ČSS), both of which had been incorporated in the National Front, the communist-dominated umbrella organization. Also some former members of the Communist Party had joined the Civic Forum. In addition, it included a host of other associations and 'democratically inclined citizens'.[1]

Civic Forum essentially consisted of a coordination centre situated in Prague and lacked any form of vertical organizational structure (Rupnik, 1990: 58). It primarily symbolized anti-regime sentiments, to which it owed a large degree of its attractiveness. The popularity of the Forum culminated in its overwhelming electoral victory in the first post-communist elections of June 1990, when it obtained a majority in both houses of the Federal Assembly as well as in the Czech National Council. After its successful electoral performance, however, differences within the movement over economic policies rapidly came into view. The free-market liberals close to Finance Minister Václav Klaus and Minister for Economic Affairs Vladimír Dlouhý on the one hand, and the social liberals around Foreign Minister Jiři Dienstbier on the other, adopted antagonistic programmatic positions. The movement soon broke up, with the conservatives splitting into the right-wing Civic Democratic Party (*Občanská Demokratická Strana* – ODS) headed by Klaus, and the centre-right Civic Democratic Alliance (*Občanská Demokratická*

Aliance – ODA) led by Dlouhý. The social liberals reorganized themselves as the Civic Movement (*Občanské Hnutí* – OH).

In addition to the clash of opinion about the speed and nature of the economic transformation, positions within Civic Forum were also polarized over the very nature of the movement itself. On the one hand, Klaus and his followers supported the objective of the movement's restructuring into a centralized and hierarchically organized political party. The advocates of this stance represented the dominant mood within the movement, which had shifted markedly towards accepting the necessity of tighter organizational structures after the 1990 elections (Batt, 1991: 63). On the other hand, a substantial number of the Forum's founding leaders distrusted partisan politics and preferred to preserve the original conception of a broad and non-partisan citizen movement. The end of Civic Forum was accelerated by the decision of the January 1991 congress to transform the Forum into a political party with regular dues-paying membership. The division was formalized one month later. The ODS became a formally organized political party with individual membership only, while the Civic Movement retained a much looser organizational structure and allowed for both individual and collective members (Wolchik, 1991: 82).

After the 1992 elections, the ODS became the dominant party in the Czech party system. Although in opposition since 1998, it has clearly been the most successful descendant of Civic Forum. It secured about 30 per cent of the vote in both the 1992 and 1996 elections and was the dominant party in a coalition government with the much smaller Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL) and the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) between 1992 and 1998. The Civic Democratic Alliance, on the other hand, remained an electorally small party and disappeared from the parliamentary scene as an independent political force in the 1998 elections. The social liberal descendant of Civic Forum (OH) never reached the threshold for parliamentary representation, despite the fact that party leader Dienstbier remained one of the most popular Czech politicians. The question of the most desirable form of political organization continued to crop up occasionally, most notably between prime minister and ODS leader Klaus and president Havel (see, for example, Havel, 1995; Havel and Klaus, 1996). The latter had initially been closely associated to the Civic Movement and continued to show himself a fervent advocate of a lively civil society and a well-developed associational life. Klaus, on the other hand, is known for his aversion to such a conception of democracy in which organized groups mediate between individuals and the state, as well as for his preference for elections as the

only means of identifying the interests and ideas of the public (Green and Skalnik Leff, 1997: 74). Hence the specific conception of party organization as advocated by the founders of the Civic Democratic Party is one in which there is a primary focus on a direct linkage between party leaders and the electorate, appearing to leave little room for a developed intermediate party organization. With the victorious electoral performance of the ODS and the concomitant poor result of the Civic Movement, this conception of party defeated the notion of the non-partisan movement as the most suitable form of organization.

The emergence of new parties and the survival of old ones

With the disintegration of Civic Forum and the creation of new parliamentary groups from its ranks, the first post-communist parliament had become an important site for the formation of new parties. Not only did the Civic Democratic parties emerge from the movement, but also, in part, the Social Democratic Party. In March 1990, shortly before the first post-communist elections, the founding congress of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party (*Československá Strana Socialní Demokraticie* – ČSSD)[2] decided to re-establish itself as the legitimate heir of the Social Democratic Party of the First Republic of Czechoslovakia (1918–38). Since the Communist Party had largely eradicated the Social Democratic Party of the interbellum after 1948, the ČSSD may be considered its successor in ideological if not in organizational terms. The post-communist Social Democrats initially showed a poor electoral performance. With only 4.1 per cent of the vote, the ČSSD failed to cross the electoral threshold in the 1990 elections. At the same time, the faction of social democrats within the ranks of Civic Forum found itself confined to a small parliamentary group without official affiliation to any party organization (see Vermeersch, 1994). The eventual merger of the social democrats in parliament with the ČSSD, shortly before the 1992 elections, considerably enhanced the visibility of the extra-parliamentary ČSSD and effectively guaranteed the continued existence of the Czech Social Democrats.

Ever since the first post-communist elections, the Czech parliament has included two 'old' parties, i.e. parties with some degree of organizational continuity: the Christian Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party (*Křest'ansko a Demokratická Unie – Československá Strana Lidová* – KDU-ČSL), which had been part of the National Front under the communist regime, and the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (*Komunistická Strana Čech a Moravy* – KSČM). Unlike many of its

counterparts, which embarked on a path of transformation towards a more social democratic profile after they were ousted as the ruling party, the Czech Communist Party has retained much of its orthodox profile in both ideological and organizational terms, with the hard-liners within the party successfully withstanding pressures for change (see Ishiyama, 1995). Party chairman Svoboda resigned at the 1993 party congress, after efforts of the reformist faction under his leadership failed to moderate the party's ideology, to change its name and to transform its organizational structure. With the new chairman Grebeníček, the factional confrontation was successfully brought to an end in favour of the hard-liners of the party. As a consequence of its reluctance to reform, the Czech Communist Party has always occupied a relatively marginal position in the Czech post-communist party system. Furthermore, the party's ability to attract large numbers of voters has been hindered by its extreme ideological position in a relatively pro-market oriented electorate (see Evans and Whitefield, 1995).

Patterns of electoral volatility and partisan instability

In the first post-communist elections in 1990, only four political organizations won parliamentary representation in the Czech National Council.[3] With 13.2 per cent of the vote, the Communist Party[4] came in second after Civic Forum, which obtained 49.5 per cent of votes cast. The Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL) gathered 10 per cent of the vote while a newly established and ephemeral regional party, i.e. the Movement for Self-Governing Democracy – Society for Moravia and Silesia (*Hnutí za Samosprávnou Demokracii – Společnost pro Moravu a Slezsko* – HSD-SMS) obtained 8.4 per cent of the vote.

As a result of the disintegration of Civic Forum, and the volatile environment characteristic of post-communist party systems more generally, the number of political formations that acquired parliamentary representation in the 1992 elections doubled from four to eight. Some of these would prove to be merely transient phenomena, such as the coalition Liberal Social Union (LSU), which was hastily put together shortly before the elections. At the extreme right, the Republican Party (*Sdružení Pro Republiku-Republikánská Strana Československá* – SPR-RSČ) entered parliament with 6 per cent of the votes. The SPR-RSČ improved this result to 8 per cent of the vote in 1996 but with 3.9 per cent it failed to cross the threshold for parliamentary representation in the 1998 elections.

In 1996, Social Democrats witnessed a noticeable increase in their electoral support, rising from 6.5 to 26.4 per cent of the votes. Thus,

while its electoral appeal in 1990 had been insufficient to obtain parliamentary representation, the ČSSD in 1996 became the second party in parliament after the ODS, and the largest opposition party. The increase of the electoral support for the Social Democrats was most likely due to the adaptive voting behaviour of the electorate, which at that time appeared less inclined to vote for smaller parties bordering the 5 per cent threshold (Brokl and Mansfeldová, 1999). Furthermore, the disappearance of several fragile electoral coalitions and the absence of new entrants in parliament considerably reduced parliamentary fragmentation.[5] The increase of electoral support for the ČSSD was also enhanced by the growing dissatisfaction with government policy and the mounting unpopularity of the dominant coalition party ODS. After the resignation of the ODS-led government, the Social Democrats improved their performance in the premature elections of 1998 and increased their electoral strength to over 32 per cent. Faced with a lack of feasible coalition partners, the ČSSD formed a minority government under Prime Minister Milos Zeman with the external support from the ODS.

Although it is probably too early to identify any unequivocal trends, the 1998 elections might be interpreted as a first move towards the stabilization and institutionalization of the Czech party system. First, they brought about a further reduction of the percentage of the 'wasted vote', as well as a decrease in the number of parliamentary parties from six to five. In addition, while the Czech Republic had recorded an increase in the level of electoral volatility from 22.0 to 31.4 per cent between 1992 and 1996 (Tóka, 1998: 591), the figure dropped to 17.5 per cent in 1998 and further declined to some 12 per cent in 2002.[6] The levels of electoral volatility in the Czech Republic, and new post-communist democracies in general, substantially exceed those of the established Western European democracies, as well as those of the newly established democracies in Southern Europe (see Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Gallagher et al., 2001; Gunther and Montero, 2001). However, the electorate in the Czech Republic is less volatile compared to other Eastern European democracies. The recent decline in electoral volatility may be an indication of the structural consolidation of the party system, although the high level of block volatility (accounting for more than 80 per cent of the aggregate volatility in 2002) suggests a particularly high salience of the left–right dimension of competition.

The individual parties also have undergone a process of gradual stabilization. Given the newness of the parties, as well as the ongoing process of party formation and the absence of party loyalties, the first Czechoslovak legislature was characterized by a high level of instability,

with many MPs changing affiliations between parliamentary groups. As Olson (1994: 42) observes, the boundaries between the incipient parliamentary formations were initially blurred and it was sometimes difficult to distinguish between government and opposition parties. The fluidity of the new democratic institutions diminished after the 1992 elections, when the institutions of parliament and government became more clearly separated and the boundaries between the parliamentary groups more crystallized.

In the second legislature (1992–96), parliamentary parties proved to be less fragile than before, with the incentive for MPs to 'exit' from their original parliamentary group becoming increasingly less attractive. A considerable level of instability did persist, however. By April 1995, more than 45 of the 200 deputies had changed their party affiliation since being elected and some had done so more than once (Kettle, 1995: 12). In general, the coalition parties (ODS, ODA and KDU-ČSL) were less vulnerable to this phenomenon than the opposition parties, where internal struggles and factional disputes continuously threatened party cohesion (Obrman, 1993). The constellation of parties at the right of the political spectrum remained relatively stable both in terms of electoral support and with regard to the size of the respective parliamentary groups.

By the end of 1997, however, conflicts within the ODS broke out over party president Klaus' alleged involvement in illicit party financing. This resulted in the departure of 31 MPs and the establishment of the Freedom Union (*Unie Svobody* – US) from within the ranks of the ODS. In 1998, the Freedom Union entered parliament with 8.6 per cent of the vote and 19 seats. Electorally, the core of the ODS was not significantly affected by the secession of the Freedom Union, losing only about 2 per cent of its vote in 1998. Nevertheless, the break-up of the party that had appeared one of the most stable constituents of the Czech party system may offer an indication that party structures are fragile and weakly institutionalized and remain vulnerable to sudden change.

The membership organization

The size of the membership organization

A clear contrast between old and new parties is reflected in the size of the membership organization and the parties' territorial entrenchment. On the eve of the transition, the Communist Party and the existing satellite parties incorporated in the National Front possessed an elaborate organizational structure well embedded in virtually all parts of society. Since the restrictions on dissident organization under communist

rule had effectively eradicated organized opposition movements, new parties only emerged during the transition. These parties initially basically consisted of the newly created parliamentary groups and lacked the organizational vertices on which the older parties could rely.

As a consequence of their different origins, the membership organizations of the old and new parties developed in opposite directions, moving slowly upward in the new parties and rapidly downward in the old ones. The membership of the Communist Party quickly eroded in the wake of the collapse of its power monopoly. By November 1990, almost one million of the over 1.7 million party members had abandoned the party and membership stood at 750,000 (Wolchik, 1991: 81). As the decline continued thereafter, the Communists gradually saw their membership base wither away until, in 1999, the party reported 136,516 members (see Table 6.1). The development of the membership organization of the Christian Democrats followed the same downward trend, from some 100,000 in 1993 to approximately 55,000 members in 2001.

The new parties, which were still in an embryonic stage of party formation at the outset of the transition, followed a reverse process. Since they were at the same time involved in dismantling the old state structures and preparations for the upcoming elections, that is, as Batt (1991: 62) puts it, heavily absorbed in 'high politics', organization building and membership recruitment was not their first priority. Indeed, the creation of their extra-parliamentary party structures was completed only shortly before the 1992 elections (Kopecký, 1996: 78). In addition, although they established something of a membership organization, the membership figures have remained relatively low. Furthermore, as in Hungary, their membership levels stabilized relatively early and consequently at

Table 6.1 Party membership in the Czech Republic

	1993	*1999*
ODS	22,000	19,000
ODA	n/a	2,800[b]
KDU-ČSL	100,000	62,000
ČSSD	13,000	18,000
KSČM	354,549[a]	136,516

[a] Figure for 1992.
[b] Figure for 1998.

Sources: Kopecký (1995); Mair and van Biezen (2001); official party data.

relatively low levels. As Table 6.1 reveals, none of the new parties succeeded in establishing a membership organization of any significance. While the ČSSD experienced some growth from 13,000 to 18,000 members between 1993 and 1999, membership hovered around 16,000 in 2001. The ODS has also registered a decline, from around 22,000 to some 19,000 between 1993 and 1999. Hence, with the levels of party membership in the old parties rapidly declining and even the newly established parties losing members, the organizational presence of parties on the ground is rapidly diminishing.

Despite the dramatic loss of members, most pronounced in the Communist Party, membership of the old parties still significantly outweighs the levels of affiliation in new parties. The same is true for their territorial implantation, which is substantially higher in the older parties than in the newly established ones. The estimates for the ODS, for example, amount to some 1,000 local organizations in 1998, while the ČSSD claimed to have about 1,500 local branches. The KDU-ČSL, on the other hand, reported 2,635 local branches while the KSČM claimed approximately 5,406 local units in 1999. The older parties thus have a considerably more intensively developed extra-parliamentary organization than new parties such as the ODS and the ČSSD, and in this respect they also clearly reveal their organizational legacy.

As in many other post-communist democracies, the level of party membership as a percentage of the electorate in the Czech Republic stands at a markedly low level. In 1993, the M/E ratio amounted to about 6.4 per cent, having fallen to 3.2 per cent by 1999 (see Table 6.2).[7] The relatively high level of party membership in the early 1990s can be largely attributed to the old parties, and particularly the Communist

Table 6.2 Party membership in the Czech Republic (% of electorate and votes)

	M/E		*M/V*	
	1993	*1999*	*1993*	*1999*
ODS	0.28	0.23	1.14	1.15
ODA	n/a	0.03	n/a	0.73
KDU-ČSL	1.29	0.76	24.61	11.55
ČSSD	0.17	0.22	3.08	0.93
KSČM	4.52	1.97	38.48	24.30
Total	*6.26*	*3.21*		

Sources: For party membership see Table 6.1; for election results see Rose, Munro and Mackie (1998).

Party, and their large memberships inherited from the communist era. Together, the two old parties initially accounted for approximately 90 per cent of the total membership. With their mass memberships crumbling, however, and the lack of any signs of substantial increase in the membership of new parties, the aggregate level of party affiliation has declined rapidly, being reduced by almost half within five years. The old parties are still responsible for the greater part of the party membership: the KSČM and the KDU-ČSL together account for more than 80 per cent of the 1999 figure.

The level of membership as a percentage of the number of votes for the party (M/V) reported in Table 6.2 reveals another unambiguous contrast between old and new parties. For new parties, the linkage with society primarily consists of an electoral relationship. The older parties, by contrast, continue to integrate a large share of their supporters within the party organization. Since the old parties are clearly losing their organizational hold on society, however, it is likely that this particular linkage with society will eventually lose much of its relevance. Hence, with low levels of party affiliation and a weak organizational hold of parties on their voters, partisan linkages with society are increasingly an anomaly rather than a common political practice in the Czech Republic. It thus appears that tendencies towards a declining importance of the partisan linkage observed in the established Western European democracies is also visible, and even more forcefully so, in the post-communist context of the Czech Republic, where the relationship between parties and society can increasingly be seen to consist almost exclusively of an electoral rather than partisan linkage.

The conception of the membership organization

In terms of the role of party members and the conception of the membership organization, the Communist Party and the Christian Democrats on the one hand, and both Civic Democratic parties (ODS and ODA) on the other, clearly represent contrasting points of view, which can be seen to reflect the differences in their organizational age. While all parties require that party members support the programme and goals of the party, accept the party statutes and pay the prescribed membership fees, the ODS and ODA effectively limit the duties of party members to these obligations. The older parties, in contrast, demand a larger degree of active involvement in party activities and commitment to the party. Both the KDU-ČSL and the KSČM formally require their members to participate actively in carrying out the party programme

and defending the party goals, for example, and both have assigned a special role for the local branch in encouraging the active political participation of its membership. Old and new parties thus reveal a different approach towards the required role of the party member within the party organization. The Social Democratic Party is situated somewhere between these extremes, espousing a more participatory view on party members than their passive acceptance of the official party programme.

Perhaps not surprisingly given its historical continuity and its persisting traditional model of organization, it is the Communist Party that most forcefully emphasizes the active commitment of its members to the party. The membership fees are higher than for other parties, for example (see below). The KSČM furthermore demands that its members do not limit their activities to internal party activities but also extend their activities externally, and publicly promulgate the party ideology and actively recruit new voters and members for the party. Membership of the Czech Communist Party, moreover, is not restricted to activities in the public realm but also extends to the private and requires a dedication to personal and political development. The KSČM thus closely resembles a traditional and orthodox Communist Party and, in this sense, clearly reflects its organizational legacy.

Remnants of its organizational legacy can also be discerned in the KDU-ČSL. The duties demanded from the party members shortly after having abandoned the wings of the National Front corresponded with those still persisting in the KSČM, such as active participation in internal activities and a responsibility to recruit new party members. In contrast with the KSČM, however, the Christian Democratic Party has evidently made substantial efforts to abandon parts of its inheritance. One of the elements that has changed in respect of its original mode of party organization concerns the position of the individual party member. With time, the KDU-ČSL has gradually discharged its membership from any significant engagement with the party and the position of the KDU-ČSL party member increasingly resembles that in newly created parties such as the ODS and ODA. Hence, although the statutes continue to reveal some remnants of the past, including some general and ill-defined participatory requirements, the Christian Democrats have progressively adapted their party organization to the exigencies of a contemporary democracy, in which the requirements of party membership normally do not demand a strong and active commitment to the party.

It is also worth pointing to a significant difference in the minimum frequency of the local assemblies as written down in the statutes. While local branches of the ODS meet only once a year, the branches of the

Social Democrats and the Communist Party are required to meet considerably more often, namely at least four times (ČSSD) and six times a year (KSČM). With only one meeting of the local branch per year, the ODS conveys an approach in which the main purpose of the local assembly is the election of the members of the corresponding executive bodies or the authorization of the activities of the executive council. Alternatively, the Social Democrats and the Communists assign a position to the local branch that extends beyond this minimal engagement, suggesting a higher priority for an active membership and a potentially more participatory notion of the organization on the ground. From this perspective, the fact that the KDU-ČSL in the post-communist era has reduced the minimum of local branch meetings from four times to twice a year corresponds with the party's strategy of discarding much of its organizational legacy as a membership organization and adopting an increasingly indifferent stance towards an actively committed organization on the ground.

As in Hungary, the lack of a sizeable rank-and-file primarily affects the selection capacity of candidates for public office, since membership organizations are too small to provide for a sufficient supply of potential public office holders. This is particularly true for newly created parties like the ODS, ODA and ČSSD. However, given the continuously falling membership levels in the older parties, in time it will also begin to become an issue for the Christian Democrats and the Communist Party. As a consequence of the low party membership, local elections tend to be dominated by candidates without party affiliation. In the 1994 municipal elections, for example, independents won more than half of the total number of seats (see Brokl and Mansfeldová, 1995). In the 1998 local elections, the political parties with parliamentary representation together fielded only 25.7 per cent of the candidates – of which the KSČM presented the largest share – and 68.5 per cent of the candidates had no political affiliation, while the number of mandates for candidates without party membership was as high as 76.9 per cent (Lacina and Vajdova, 2000: 266). Hence, as a consequence of their weak territorial implantation, political parties have a particularly low profile in local politics, although their weakness is more manifest in the smaller communities and tends to decrease in larger municipalities.

To compensate for the lack of potential public office holders within their own ranks, the ODS, ODA and ČSSD, like many of their Hungarian counterparts, often field candidates without party affiliation under the party label. At first glance, the inability to recruit candidates for public office from their own organizations might be seen as a sign of weakness

of the parties in that it emphasizes their inability to adequately perform one of the functions traditionally listed as the core, if not defining, characteristic of a political party. However, the importance of non-partisan candidates in the Czech Republic, or newly established post-communist democracies more generally, does not necessarily imply the parties' incapacity to perform the recruitment function. By recruiting candidates outside their own organizations, parties in newly established democratic polities can be seen to opt for alternative recruitment mechanisms than the traditional partisan channels, although from a practical perspective the lower propensity of independent candidates to party discipline might be problematic in terms of intra-party stability.

However, as long as their candidates, partisan or non-partisan, commit themselves to the party, parties have found themselves a means to guarantee their electoral visibility. From this perspective, party members as such are not seen as particularly advantageous and parties in the Czech Republic have therefore not been particularly enthusiastic about engaging in large-scale membership mobilization. If undertaken at all, recruitment efforts are seen to be more valuable if directed at well-known 'important personalities', from whom a larger electoral profit is to be expected, than to society at large, which underlines that the type of linkage sought between parties and society is conceived of as electoral rather than partisan. In addition, and in contrast to some of their Southern European counterparts for which membership expansion is still valued, if only inspired by motivations of electoral growth, the predominant linkage in post-communist countries is more temporary and confined to the act of voting rather than durable and enacted through permanent membership. In other respects also we see the contributions traditionally associated with party members and membership activity being substituted by novel and more contemporary structures. In the ODS and ČSSD, for example, the expert commissions that have been established to encourage programmatic renovation and ideational renewal offer a means of compensation for traditional membership activity.

All this suggests that for most parties in the Czech Republic a large membership organization does not constitute a political priority. Only the Communist Party appears slightly disquieted about their membership, although it is not so much the number of party members itself that gives reasons for concern, but rather the fact that the membership organization is rapidly ageing. However, the gradual erosion of the party on the ground and the lack of new and young members enrolling to the party has not encouraged the KSČM to make any substantial effort to

increase its membership. Because the party is still in a position to claim by far the largest membership of all Czech parties, its organization on the ground serves to furnish the party with a source of legitimacy it lacks in terms of political relevance.

Overall, Czech parties have adopted a quiescent or even complacent attitude towards their low membership levels and appear relatively indifferent towards the notion of party membership. For these parties, a large membership is not a prerequisite to guarantee its electoral, programmatic or organizational vitality. Parties do not perceive party members as vital assets or as essentially advantageous. Instead of focusing on the membership organization, Czech parties have opted instead for alternative organizational principles and alternative linkage mechanisms, in which the organized membership is largely left out of the equation. This can also be seen from their relationship with interest organizations.

Parties and interest organizations

The relations between the Communist Party and the communist dominated trade union structures were abolished immediately after the revolution. The communist trade unions were replaced by the Czech and Slovak Confederation of Trade Unions (*Česká a Slovenská Konfederace Odborových Svazů* – ČSKOS)[8], created in March 1990, although there was considerable continuity from the past in terms of property and personnel. The new confederation inherited up to 40 per cent of its representatives and about 60 per cent of its apparatus from its predecessor (Myant, 1993; Pollert, 1997). Unlike the reformed communist unions in Poland and Hungary, which are closely linked to the successors of the Communist Parties, the Czech trade unions are without party affiliation and have distanced themselves deliberately from political involvement since their inception. Indeed, the unions in Czechoslovakia were eager to break their links with the Communist Party because of the negative connotation associated with party–union relations under communist rule. The trade unions in Czechoslovakia, therefore, insisted that the unions must remain independent from political parties. Lacking any linkage with a corporate interest organization, the organizational legacy of the KSČM in this sense is much less evident than it is in terms of other aspects of its membership organization. The same is true concerning the communist ancillary organizations, which were all dissolved after 1989. Only ill-defined references to cooperation with like-minded associations persist in the party rules. However, as these organizations lack formal

rights of representation and do therefore not constitute part of the party structure, there are few signs of a persistence of any 'indirect' channels of party organization.

In the Czech Republic, members affiliate to a political party on a strictly individual basis. The example set by the Civic Movement, allowing also for collective membership, has not attracted any following among the present political parties. Moreover, virtually none of the parties has established any ancillary organization within its own ranks or maintains close formal ties with affiliated organizations. The Social Democratic Party presents the only exception to this general pattern. Following examples of both its historical predecessor of the First Republic and its foreign social democratic sister parties, the ČSSD has established an organizational structure that is to some extent reminiscent of the classic mass model of indirect representation, in that it has created partisan organizations for both youth and women which are represented on the party's executive and decision-making bodies. The social democratic women (*Sociálně Demokratické Ženy* – SDŽ) are organized in an ancillary organization while the Young Social Democrats (*Mladí Sociální Demokraté* – MSD) are an affiliated organization that closely cooperates with the party.

In sum, and with the partial exception of the Social Democratic Party, the mode of party organization in the Czech Republic is one characterized by the absence of indirect forms of representation through the partisan channels, either in the form of ancillary organizations inside the party or institutionalized linkages with affiliated or corporate organizations outside the party. What is important to underline here is that both newly established parties and those with a longer organizational legacy essentially conform to the same organizational principles. The Social Democratic Party, by contrast, in harking back to a more traditional model based on the example of its predecessor, represents a peculiarity in this regard and thus, in this sense, challenges the dominant mode of party organization in the post-communist Czech Republic.

The organizational structure

Subnational organization

Since the party cells of the Communist Party were abolished in 1990, forcing the KSČ to dismantle its organizational structures on the shopfloor, all parties in the Czech Republic are organized on a territorial basis, with the local branch as the smallest organizational unit. The organizational structures of Czech parties generally correspond to the

administrative and electoral divisions of the country. The local branch is organized in the municipality, which coincides with the local electoral constituency, the district organizations correspond to the boundaries of the state administration, and the regional organizations essentially reflect the electoral constituencies for the lower chamber. The organizational structure is modelled exclusively on the size of the membership organization. Local branches should consist of a minimum of five members, and the number of delegates to higher echelons of the party organization is contingent upon the number of party members.

Both the KDU-ČSL and ODS stand out compared to other Czech parties for the substantial numbers of ex officio representatives, and especially their public office holders, in the local and regional party structures, a practice they have also introduced at the national level. Deputies of the local and regional parliaments are represented in large numbers in the corresponding party assemblies and decision-making and executive committees. The ODS, in addition, is the only party in the Czech Republic to have institutionalized a form of top-down ex officio representation, in that national public office holders are granted membership rights to organs in the lower echelons of the party. More specifically, all the party's MPs and senators are ex officio delegates to the assemblies of the districts and regions in which they reside or for which they were elected. In addition, government members of the ODS officially enjoy the right to participate in the sessions of the regional assemblies, although without the right to vote. Moreover, the ODS has established extensive privileges for ex officio representation of national party officials in the organs of the lower echelons. Members of the national executive, for example, are by virtue of their office delegated to the assembly of the region in which they are registered. The institutionalization of such privileges reflects the predominant position that party officials and public office holders occupy in what can be best characterized as a highly centralized and top-down hierarchical party structure.

National party organs

In addition to the party congress, the national organizational echelons normally include the executive committee and the smaller and hierarchically superior permanent executive, which is in charge of the everyday management of the party. In addition to these two executive bodies, the KSČM, KDU-ČSL and ČSSD have established a relatively large party organ in the form of a national committee, which functions as the decision-making organ of the party between the sessions of the national

congress. The party congress is the representation of the membership organization, to which the delegates are elected by the district and regional assemblies. A national party congress is to be held every year (ODS and ODA) or every two years (ČSSD and KDU-CSL). Although the Communist Party constitution stipulates that a congress be held every four years, national congresses have been organized with a much higher frequency than that prescribed by the official rules. Between 1990 and 1995, for example, the KSČM organized four party congresses, thus easily exceeding the interval prescribed by the party constitution. This relatively high frequency reflects the fact that, even though the post-communist KSČM has maintained many of its pre-transitional characteristics and reveals very few signs of organizational adaptation or change, this outcome did not go unaccompanied by serious internal conflicts and failed attempts to transform the party into one with a post-communist or social-democratic signature (see Ishiyama, 1995).

The number of delegates to the national party congresses is relatively limited. In 1996–97, the size varied from about 200 delegates to the ODA congress and about 300 in the ODS, to approximately 400 in the ČSSD and KSČM. Members enjoy a relatively larger degree of representation in the party congresses of the newly established parties than in the older parties with their much larger membership organizations. At the 1997 congress of the ODA, for example, one elected congress delegate represented approximately 20 party members, and the ratio between elected delegates and party members approached one delegate for every 50 members at the 1997 congress of the ČSSD. At the 1999 party congress of the KSČM, by contrast, each of the 269 elected delegates represented approximately 500 party members. The formal ratio in the KDU-ČSL approaches the figure for the Communist Party: the 1990 statutes of the Christian Democrats assigned one congress delegate to every 350 party members.

The ex officio representation of especially public office holders on the party congress is extensive, both as enshrined in the party constitution and in political practice, even though some parties restrict their numbers to a maximum. In the ODA, for example, the number of elected delegates should amount to at least three-quarters of the total number of delegates, while in the ČSSD elected delegates should contribute to at least two-thirds of the total. Even these maximum thresholds, however, allow for substantial numbers of non-elected delegates. As a rule, all national public office holders, i.e. MPs, senators and government ministers, are delegates to the national party congress by virtue of their function, which in practice enhances their predominance within the party.

Table 6.3 Composition of permanent executive in the Czech Republic[a]

Size	*Members*	*Number*	*Electing body*
7–8	Party president	1	Party congress
	Vice presidents	all	Party congress[b]
	Leaders parliamentary groups	2	Ex officio
	Secretary-general[c]	1	Party president

[a] All parties excluding the KSČM.
[b] In the ODA, three vice presidents are elected by the party congress; the other two are elected by the executive committee.
[c] Only the KDU-ČSL.

Sources: Party statutes and party headquarters.

This tendency is also visible in national decision-making and executive committees, which in all parties include a significant share of public office holders. The Christian Democrats in particular stand out for the large number of public office holders, and, moreover, for their growing proportion over the years. As with most other parties, the leaders of the parliamentary groups of the lower and upper chambers are ex officio members of the permanent executive (see Table 6.3). In addition, while other parties do not tend to incorporate other ex officio public office holders in their national executives, in the KDU-ČSL all public office holders of the party are members of the national committee, and the party furthermore incorporates five members of parliament as well as all its government ministers in its executive committee.

The Christian Democrats also compare unfavourably with other Czech parties in terms of the centralization of the party structure. While the national committee of the Social Democratic and the Communist Parties are largely composed of representatives elected by the lower echelons of the organization, the national committee of the KDU-ČSL includes only a minor representation from the regions which consist, moreover, exclusively of ex officio party officials. The executive committees of the ODA, ODS and ČSSD likewise include a delegation from the regional echelons, whereas the Christian Democrats lack such a regional representation. Finally, and regarding the composition of the permanent executive of the KDU-ČSL, it is noteworthy to underline the presence of the secretary-general, i.e. a non-elected member appointed by the president of the party (see Table 6.3). From this, it can be inferred that, in addition to the apparent predominance of public office holders that characterizes the KDU-ČSL, a distinctive feature of the party is not

only a generally high level of centralization but also the influential position of the party leader.

The internal distribution of power

The highest decision-making body in all parties is the national party congress, which establishes the party's programme, defines its political orientation and is authorized to amend the party statutes and to rule on the party's dissolution or merger with other parties. Hence, the highest authority is assigned to the representative body of the membership organization and, in this sense, Czech parties do not differ much from one another. Nor do they differ much from the classic mass party in this regard. On the other hand, Czech parties differ markedly, both from one another and in many respects from the traditional mass party, in terms of the formal degree of centralization, and more importantly, the degree of power concentration in the hands of the party president.

In many parties, the party president *de jure* and *de facto* occupies a pivotal position, which further underlines the fact that the predominance of the party leader can be considered characteristic for all parties in new democracies. The president is especially privileged in the ODS and KDU-ČSL, where the party rules dedicate a special section to the party presidency and the powers and prerogatives associated with this position. Illustrative of the influential position of the party leader is the authority of the KDU-ČSL president to make 'any decision regarded as indispensable'. Although this prerogative is qualified by the provision that such decisions may not violate the official party rules, an exceptionally large freedom of manoeuvre is allocated to the party president.

Furthermore concentrated in the party presidency of the KDU-ČSL and the ODS is the management of the party apparatus. The president of the KDU-ČSL, for example, personally appoints the secretary-general, who is ex officio incorporated as a full member of the permanent executive (see Table 6.3). The ODS president likewise appoints the so-called general manager, who enjoys the right to participate (although not to vote) in the meetings of the executive committee and the permanent executive as well as in the decision-making and executive committees in the district and regional echelons. These functionaries effectively control the functioning of the entire party apparatus. They are responsible for the management of the party central office, the appointment of party employees on both national, regional and district level and the supervision of the regional secretaries and managers, as well as the functioning of the lower organizational echelons which are directly subordinate to

the central authority. Because the secretary-general and the general manager are *de jure* and *de facto* subordinate to the party president, the party leaderships have thus established a tight control over the entire party apparatus.

In practice, this also gives the party president a firm control over the party expenditures and a considerable leverage in the financial management of the party. In the ODS, the centralization of financial decision-making is enhanced by the prerogative of the president to appoint the party treasurer, who is responsible for the party's finances.[9] In the KDU-ČSL, the secretary-general is responsible for all activities related to the party's finances such as the elaboration of the annual budget and the financial accounts or the management of the party's property. In addition, it should be observed that, by statute, the executive committee is authorized to 'carry out any necessary budgetary measures it considers indispensable'. Although such decisions are subject to ratification *post hoc* by the national committee, these provisions give the executive a considerable leverage in financial decision-making.

The centralization of financial decision-making occurs in all parties, despite the formally autonomous position of the local branch vis-à-vis the national echelon. Although in principle they are free to decide on their own expenditures without intervention from higher party organs, in practice the financial freedom of manoeuvre of the local branch is curtailed and confined to the boundaries of the budgets established at the national level. In addition, local branches generally lack adequate means to generate their own financial resources. Their principal source of income consists of membership subscriptions. However, with the exception of the KSČM, where members with employment pay a minimum of 0.5 per cent of their yearly income, membership fees are usually low, ranging from only 100 to 500 Czech crowns (about $3.5 to $18) per year (Kopecký, 1995: 532, fn. 13). Local branches cannot exert any influence of the amount of the dues, which is established at the national level. Moreover, since the larger part of their income is derived from state subsidies allocated to the party central office, the distribution of money over the various echelons of the organization normally flows top-down (see also Chapter 8). The ultimate authority on financial decisions rests almost exclusively at the national level, including decisions on the internal distribution of money, the approval of the budgets, the authorization of the financial accounts or the amount and sources of expenditures. In practice, therefore, the lower echelons of the party organization are financially largely dependent on the national party.

This is not to argue that parties are extremely centralized in all respects. The selection of candidates for municipal elections, for example, appears to be relatively decentralized. Essentially, the nomination of candidates for local office is decided at the local level, without the formal right for the national party to intervene. Regarding the selection of national public office holders, i.e. the candidates for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, the official selection process is most decentralized in the ČSSD, where candidate lists are approved at the level of the electoral constituency.[10] However, and although the national leadership has no formal right to intervene in the process or to modify the candidate lists, it can and often does make informal suggestions on the inclusion of certain candidates or their position on the list. In the other parties, the authority of the national party has been more clearly formalized. Despite the formally bottom-up sequence of the selection procedure, it is the national executives which are entrusted with the ultimate decision-making authority on the composition and rank-order of the candidate lists.[11] The prerogative of the KDU-ČSL executive committee to modify the candidate lists, for example, is only limited by the provision that any alteration must be carried out in such a manner that at least two-thirds of the candidates reside in their election district. Since it previously was allowed to challenge only a maximum of one-third of the original nominations, the current stipulation has in fact implied a significant strengthening of the position of the party leadership and an increase of its influence on the candidate lists. This can be regarded as but one example of statutory provisions that indicate a tendency towards the formal centralization of decision-making power around the party leadership (Kopecký, 1995).

Conclusion

Regarding their formal organizational structure, parties in the Czech Republic have modelled their organizations to a certain extent according to the example of the traditional mass party. In the extra-parliamentary organization, the national party congress represents the membership organization as the highest decision-making body and elects the corresponding executive committees which it can hold formally accountable for their activities. Furthermore, all parties display a relatively high level of vertical articulation, in which the different organization echelons are connected with one another through the representation of the lower strata on the higher echelons or vice versa.

The low levels of partisan affiliation, however, indicate that the organizational linkage between parties and society is generally weak and

that the classic mass party is not the most adequate model to characterize the majority of Czech parties, although the membership organizations in various respects reveal a clear difference between old and new parties. The newly created ODS, ODA and ČSSD have few members, relatively few local branches and usually do not demand any active involvement of their members in party activities. The older KČSM and KDU-ČSL, by contrast, reveal a more participatory attitude towards their members, have relatively large memberships and are organizationally furthermore relatively well-entrenched in society. Due to their organizational legacy, the old parties thus possess a much stronger organizational linkage with society and continue to integrate large sectors of their supporters within the party organization. With time, however, the relevance of these organizational legacies is likely to diminish and the distinction between old and new is likely to become increasingly blurred. The older parties are likely to lose the particular characteristics of a strong membership organization and to become increasingly closer to their newly created counterparts.

Evidence in that direction is already available with regard to the linkage between parties and organized interests, with few signs of any structural relationships in new and in old parties having been established. Furthermore, both the Communist Party and the Christian Democrats are rapidly losing members and do not make any substantial efforts to counterbalance the erosion of the party organization on the ground in order to maintain a sizeable membership organization. The KDU-ČSL especially has shown itself willing to abandon certain aspects of its organizational legacy, in particular its partisan linkages with society. This also explains why the party organization of the Christian Democrats is seemingly contradictory on a number of accounts. While it still reveals remnants of a participatory conception of party organization in some respects, it has been adapting itself progressively to the context of a newly established democracy. The party has seen its membership organization decline, has gradually enlarged the presence of public office holders on the extra-parliamentary structures and has increasingly centralized and personalized internal decision-making procedures.

In these terms, therefore, the party organization of the KDU-ČSL may soon be on an equal level with the new and internally created parties. For these parties, the establishment of an extra-parliamentary organization followed their creation as parliamentary formations and initially their organization was almost exclusively restricted to parliament (and government). Their involvement in the 'high politics' of institution building left little time to devote to the structure and strength of the

extra-parliamentary structures. For the ODS in particular, its creation from above is reflected in a highly centralized and top-down hierarchical organizational structure, in which members of the higher-level party organs enjoy substantial ex officio membership rights on lower level bodies. The ODS is furthermore particularly noteworthy because of the party's preference for a direct linkage with the electorate and for the aversion of party leader Klaus in particular to partisan linkages with organized interests. In this sense, the Civic Democratic Party most markedly underlines the increasing relevance of direct and scarcely mediated linkages between party elites and voters typical for parties which first emerge in the context of a contemporary new democracy.

Part III
Cross-National Patterns

7

On the Internal Balance of Power: the Extra-Parliamentary Party vs the Party in Public Office

In many of the more recently established democracies in Europe, the linkage between parties and society is generally considered to be weak (e.g. Pridham, 1990; Rose and Mishler, 1998). As Morlino (1995) has demonstrated in the Southern European context, a weak organizational linkage with society does not imply that parties are irrelevant to new democratic polities, or that these parties are characterized by an overall lack of organizational consolidation. Indeed, Katz and Mair (1995) have pointed out in the context of the long-established Western democracies that the perceived decline of parties has been manifested primarily or almost exclusively at the level of society and that this has been counterbalanced by a greater access to and an increasing control of the state. In other words, with time, different aspects of the party may become more privileged, and particularly in recent years it has been argued that it is the party in public office that has gained most in importance. This chapter will discuss and investigate the proposition of public office predominance in a context of weak societal linkages, by focusing on the internal balance of power between the extra-parliamentary party, and the party executive in particular, and the party in public office.[1]

The predominance of the party in public office

In principle, in any given party, the relationship between the extra-parliamentary party and the party in public office may have one of the following forms: either (a) the party in public office dominates over the extra-parliamentary party; (b) there is a state of relative balance of forces between the party in public office and the extra-parliamentary party; or (c) the extra-parliamentary party dominates over the party in public

office (cf. Duverger, 1954: 182–202). It is the central hypothesis to be examined in this chapter that parties in new democracies will primarily reflect the first of these three forms. On the basis of the current approaches to party formation and organizational change, there are in fact at least three distinct reasons to suggest that, in new democracies in particular, the party in public office is likely to be particularly ascendant, especially given a context of organization building in which there were few real opportunities and little necessity to develop a strong organization on the ground. Although they have already been briefly touched upon (see Chapter 2), the anticipated features relating to the expected predominance of the party in public office are worth recapitulating more systematically.

First, most of the parties in these new democracies were newly created. They were founded often shortly before the first democratic elections, or only afterwards emerged from the ranks of movements or parties competing in these first elections. Consequently, they acquired parliamentary representation at a very early stage of their development. Indeed, in many cases these parties appeared more or less confined to a parliamentary – and sometimes also a governmental – existence, and lacked an established organizational structure extending much beyond these offices. Thus, from the outset, the party in public office occupied the leading position, if only by default, and the very first incentives for organization building originated from the party in public office. Put differently, many of the parties in these new democracies were 'internally created' (cf. Duverger, 1954). If this origin has a similar bearing on the relationship between the extra-parliamentary party and the party in public office as in the older Western European democracies, and if it is indeed a party's genetic origins that determine to a large extent its organizational structure (see Panebianco, 1988), we should expect the party in public office to maintain its ruling position and to continue to occupy a predominant position within the party organization, particularly since it is this face of the party that is likely to have initiated and controlled subsequent organizational development.

The second important point to recognize here is that, in contrast to most of their Western European counterparts, many parties developing in these new democracies had an institutional rather than societal origin. The classic path of party formation followed in Western Europe was the representation of the interests of a particular segment of society that could be defined in social terms (see Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). In the new Southern and Eastern European democracies, by contrast, it was rarely politicized social stratification that lay at the root of party

formation. Rather, parties were often created on the basis of politicized attitudinal differences with regard to institutional issues, and particularly the extent and direction of regime change. This particular origin has important consequences for the focus of the parties' activities. Especially given the importance of organizing parliamentary and governmental life and the shaping of political institutions for parties in a newly emerging democratic polity, parties in such circumstances devote most of their attention to the parliamentary and governmental arenas and thus concentrate their activities around the party in public office. As a result, this face of the party organization is likely to acquire an especially important position in the party organization as a whole (cf. Duverger, 1954: 197).

Thirdly, partly as a consequence of their 'institutional' origins and the sequence of party development, parties in these new democracies are likely to concentrate on the relatively easier and less time-consuming strategy of electoral mobilization rather than the laborious strategy of partisan mobilization. In other words, they are more likely to focus on establishing a direct linkage between the party in public office and the electorate rather than on channelling societal demands through the extra-parliamentary organization. Hence, parties are encouraged to concentrate on their activities around the public face of the party and to put the party in public office at the centre of attention. The fact that they are forced to do so in an early stage of their existence, i.e. because they engage in electoral competition before they fully develop their party organization, is likely to enhance this process. Indeed, the relative weight of the party in public office may be even more pronounced than in the older Western European democracies, where the increased prevalence of the party in public office at the expense of the extra-parliamentary organization has been attenuated by persisting organizational legacies and institutional inertia. Moreover, the focus on, and thus the visibility and relevance of, the party in public office will be further enhanced by the widespread availability of modern mass media which characterizes the era in which parties in these new democratic polities have first emerged.

Assessing public office predominance

In order to assess the validity of the propositions outlined above, the following analysis will concentrate on three particular aspects of the relationship between the extra-parliamentary party and the party in public office. The first part examines the internal conceptions of the balance

of power, i.e. how the parties themselves perceive and define the relationship between the extra-parliamentary party and the party in public office. This aspect is analysed through an inquiry into the official party rules, focusing in particular on the references in the party statutes to the position of the party in public office vis-à-vis the extra-parliamentary organs, a feature that has often been ignored in research on party organizations.[2] These references may include a variety of provisions, such as, for example, the norms of behaviour for the party's parliamentary representatives, the establishment of the internal rules of the parliamentary group, the selection of its leader(ship) or the formulation of public policy. For our purposes, the primary objective is to establish whether the party in public office enjoys an independent position or is to some extent subordinate to the extra-parliamentary party and depends on it for approval of its actions.

The second aspect taken into consideration is the degree of personnel overlap between the organs of the extra-parliamentary party and the party in public office. This feature entails an 'official' component, consisting of the extent to which public office holders and party leaders outside parliament enjoy ex officio representation on one another's institutional organs, as well as an analysis of the actual extent of personnel overlap between the permanent executives and the party in public office. Especially given the parliamentary origins of most parties and their relatively early acquisition of government responsibility, a significant representation of public office holders on the extra-parliamentary organs is most likely to be a sign of predominance of the party in public office, enabling this face to preserve its leading position within the party and to maintain control over the extra-parliamentary structures as the organization develops.

The final aspects concern the distribution of resources over the two faces of the party organization, which are divided into human and financial resources. The first concentrates on the party staff, and in particular on the ratio between the full-time staff employed by the party central office and those working for the parliamentary party. The second focuses on the rules and practice of party financing, concentrating in particular on the amounts of state subventions allocated to the extra-parliamentary organization and the parliamentary group. Money is obviously an important political resource – and state subsidies are generally the most important source of income for parties in new democracies (see Chapter 8) – and the method of allocation of funds to the different faces of the party organization, as well as their relative size, is an important indicator of the balance of power between the two.

Internal conceptions of the balance of power

In the light of the proposition formulated above, it is surprising to note that it is only in the rules of some Czech parties, i.e. the ODS and ODA, that the party in public office can be seen to emerge as a relatively independent body, that is if we consider the absence of statutory references to the status of the parliamentary group in relation to the extra-parliamentary organs as an indication of a relatively autonomous position of the former. In the ČSSD, the only reference to the parliamentary party in the statutes stipulates that it 'follows the strategies and the programme of the party'. The Christian Democratic party (KDU-ČSL) and, to a larger extent, the Communist Party (KSČM) in the Czech Republic sharply deviate from the expectations formulated above on the autonomy of the party in public office, since they contain provisions that can actually be interpreted as constraints on the autonomy of the parliamentary group. In both parties, it is the extra-parliamentary party that establishes the directives and coordinates the activities of the parliamentary groups, and in the KDU-ČSL this also extends to the government members of the party. The Communist Party, moreover, demands that its parliamentary representatives transfer part of their allowance to the party. This device, once also frequently used by Western European socialist and especially communist parties (Duverger, 1954: 198), increases the subservience of the parliamentary representatives vis-à-vis the extra-parliamentary party. The deviant status of the Czech Christian Democrats and particularly the Communist Party might be seen as an exception that confirms the rule, likely to be inspired by their long-standing organizational history and the prevailing traditional conception of party organization resembling the classic mass party.

Nevertheless, newly established parties in post-communist Europe do not necessarily lack strong formal ties between the party within and outside parliament. This is shown by the Hungarian parties, which, moreover, reveal that the power relation between the two is balanced in favour of the party executive. To be sure, the parliamentary group is officially an autonomous body and is entitled to establish its own internal rules or to elect its leadership, provided that it does not violate the programme and strategies of the party or its basic documents. At the same time, however, numerous provisions in the party rules curtail this formal autonomy and reveal that the parliamentary group is not completely independent from the extra-parliamentary party. The ambiguous status of the party deputies, who are perceived as both exponents of the extra-parliamentary party and as an autonomous representative group

of the party's electors, is aptly captured by the rules of the Smallholders Party which state that 'the members of the parliamentary group represent the electors *and* the party'.

More specifically, the party executive of both the SZDSZ and KDNP evaluates the functioning of the parliamentary group and is entitled to make recommendations on its performance; it has a say in the establishment of the internal rules of the parliamentary group and the selection of its leader(ship) in the case of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and FIDESZ; the president of the MDF has the authority to convene sessions of the parliamentary group; MPs of the Hungarian Socialist Party are restrained by the explicit rule that they cannot vote against the decisions of the party congress or the national board; and in both the MDF and MSZP the executive committee is entitled to make recommendations on parliamentary issues and voting decisions in important legislative matters or constitutional revision. Furthermore, the national executives also control the process of coalition formation in that they make the final decisions on the possible coalition partners and the contents of the coalition agreement. As a consequence of this tight control of the party executives, Bihari (1995: 41) concludes on the practice of the second legislature (1994–98) that the autonomy of the parliamentary groups of the government parties had largely vanished.

These findings indicate that, in Hungary, it is the extra-parliamentary party rather than the party in public office that occupies the predominant position within the party. This is confirmed by a survey of MPs, which indicates that 65 per cent of the Hungarian deputies of the first legislature (1990–94) stated that it is the national executive rather than the parliamentary party which has the largest say in party policy. Despite the relatively larger degree of autonomy appearing from the statutes of some Czech parties, the extra-parliamentary party plays a comparably large role here also, with 79 per cent of the deputies surveyed in 1993 asserting that the national executive is the most influential organ when it comes to determining the party's policy. Moreover, figures from the same survey reveal that about three-quarters of the Czech and Hungarian deputies claimed that the national executives, even if only occasionally, try to give instructions to the parliamentary group (see Kopecký, 2001; van der Meer Krok-Paszkowska and van den Muyzenberg, 1998).

An analysis of the statutes of the Southern European parties leads to findings similar to those in Hungary, i.e. of extra-parliamentary dominance over the party in public office. Moreover, they also reveal a tendency in a direction opposite to what would be expected in that they

point towards a strengthening of the position of the national executive over time rather than any increasing autonomy or importance of the party in public office. That both Communist Parties in Portugal and Spain (PCP and PCE) manifest a strong grip by the party executives on the parliamentary representatives is probably hardly surprising. The structure of these older parties descends from a typical communist model of party organization, where public office holders put themselves and their position completely at the disposal of the party, and their activities are directed by the extra-parliamentary party. It is evident also that in the Spanish *Izquierda Unida* (IU) the parliamentary group is placed under the control of the party executive. Even beyond the Communist Parties and their successors, however, the subordination of the party in public office to the party executive manifests itself in parties of both the left and the right, and in new as well as in old parties.

Illustrative in this regard are the provisions in the statutes of the Spanish *Partido Popular* (PP), which state that the activities of the parliamentary group are regulated by the so-called *criterio de dependencia*, implying that MPs are subject to the instructions of the party executive. A similar subordination to the directives of the party executive applies to the MPs and to government ministers of the Portuguese Social Democrats (PSD), and to the members of the parliamentary group of the CDS-PP. In addition, in the two Socialist Parties in Portugal and Spain (PS and PSOE), members of the parliamentary groups are explicitly subject to voting discipline. The federal committee of the PSOE can expel MPs from the parliamentary group who do not respect these rules. Furthermore, the PSOE statutes demand that members of the parliamentary group resign from their parliamentary seat if they leave the party for whatever reason. The Portuguese Socialists have established a similar requirement, the so-called *compromisso de honra* (honorary commitment).[3] In other words, it is the extra-parliamentary party that is assigned a dominant role in determining the conduct of the parliamentary representatives and which has the authority to sanction dissident behaviour.

In general, the official rules of all Southern European parties put the party in parliament under the strict control of the extra-parliamentary party and explicitly limit the autonomy of the group in establishing its own regulations, and making decisions on the distribution of its material and financial resources as well as the employment and dismissal of the parliamentary staff by stipulating that these require the approval of the party executive. In addition, public office holders have to yield a certain percentage of their salary to the party, which is a telling indicator of a deferential position of the parliamentary representatives vis-à-vis the

extra-parliamentary party. The most important political decisions are furthermore taken at the party headquarters and parliamentary representatives are constrained by a severe party discipline. Hence, where Liebert (1990: 253), on the basis of an analysis of the standing orders of Southern European parliaments, arrived at the conclusion that 'parliamentary groups and political parties are linked by iron institutionalized ties', our analysis of party statutes reveals that it is the extra-parliamentary party that wields the power in this relationship. Rather than an autonomous institution, the groups should be regarded as the parliamentary instrument of the extra-parliamentary party (see also da Cruz and Antunes, 1989; Sánchez de Dios, 1999).

In addition, and probably most strikingly, many changes in the party rules should actually be interpreted as a further constraint on the freedom of manoeuvre of the party in public office and as an attempt to strengthen the hold of the national executive rather than any increase in the autonomy of the parliamentary group. This can be inferred, for example, from the fact that the president of the Spanish PP has since 1993 been the ex officio leader of both the parliamentary groups in the lower and upper chamber as well as of the group in the European Parliament. More generally, in their formative years, parties concentrated their rules primarily on the structure of the extra-parliamentary organization and largely refrained from explicating the relationship with the party in public office. With time, however, the position of the party in public office vis-à-vis the extra-parliamentary party has become more minutely defined, to the advantage of the latter. In fact, it is only in the Portuguese PSD that the expected shift towards a more independent position for the parliamentary group can be discerned. This can be concluded from the abolition of certain rules formulated in the party's early years, such as the party leader's ex officio leadership of the parliamentary group, the right of the national council to elect the presidium of the group, or the penalty of expulsion from the party in case MPs did not comply with the political directives of the executive committee. On the other hand, as described above, even public office holders of the PSD continue to be constrained by their statutory subordination to the party executive.

In sum, therefore, and notwithstanding the absence of explicit references to the position of the party in public office in the statutes of some of the Czech parties and the tendency towards less central office predominance in the Portuguese PSD, the official rules of most parties indicate a relatively strong influence of the party executive over the parliamentary group, an influence which, moreover, diverges sharply

from the expectations that were formulated above. First of all, the position of the parliamentary party is described in detail in the statutes of most parties, some of which even include the party in parliament under the party's national organs. This differs sharply from the practice in the older Western European democracies, where party statutes are usually restricted to the structure of the party outside parliament and decision-making authority on the rules regarding the internal structure and functioning of the party in parliament rest almost exclusively with the latter.[4] Secondly, the balance of power between the extra-parliamentary party and the party in parliament clearly favours the former over the latter, rather than the other way around. Thirdly, the Southern European parties reveal that, where a change in the nature of the relationship can be discerned, it is generally the extra-parliamentary party that benefits from these changes and acquires a more influential position at the expense of the prerogatives and autonomy of the party in public office. Hence, on the basis of the official status of the parliamentary group vis-à-vis the party executive and against expectations, we would have to conclude that, with only a few exceptions, it is actually the extra-parliamentary party and particularly the party executive that is the predominant body within the party organizations.

Accumulation of mandates

While the anticipated predominance of the party in public office does not emerge from the official party rules, the privileged position of public office holders is, however, visible in terms of their strong presence on the extra-parliamentary organs. Their privileged position in this respect can be seen from both their ex officio rights of representation and the high proportion of public office holders on the party executives in practice. In most parties, the leader of the national parliamentary group is an ex officio member of the permanent executive, which is the extra-parliamentary organ that meets most frequently and directs the daily activities of the party. In the East-Central European countries considered here, this is true for all but one party, i.e. the SZDSZ. The ex officio representation of members of the parliamentary group on the hierarchically inferior decision-making or executive bodies is usually even more pronounced. The Christian Democratic KDU-ČSL in the Czech Republic and the Hungarian Christian Democrats (KDNP) and Independent Smallholders Party (FKGP), for instance, incorporate all their MPs in the national committee. Furthermore, a large number of parties (ODS, FIDESZ, SZDSZ, MDF, FKGP) grant their national parliamentary

representatives ex officio membership of decision-making organs at the lower echelons of the party organization. Finally, in a few cases, such as the Czech KDU-ČSL and the Hungarian MDF, even government members are entitled to representation on the national executive, and sometimes also on party organs at the lower levels.[5]

Whereas the Czech and Hungarian parties have introduced relatively similar regulations concerning the representation of public office holders on the organs of the extra-parliamentary party, in Southern Europe a significant contrast is discernible between two groups of parties. In parties of the right, the ex officio representation of public office holders within the extra-parliamentary party is much more pronounced than in parties of the left. The two Communist Parties and IU do not grant public office holders any statutory representation on the parties' executive organs. In the PSOE, only the leader of the parliamentary group is an ex officio member of the federal committee and is entitled to attend the sessions of the executive committee, although without the right to vote. The leader of the parliamentary group of the Portuguese Socialist Party is a member of the political commission, but public office holders are absent from the party's executive committee and permanent executive. Portuguese Socialist MPs as well as government members of the party can only participate in the meetings of the executive committee without the right to vote.

On the other hand, the Spanish PP as well as the Portuguese CDS/PP and PSD have always included numerous amounts of ex officio public office holders in the decision-making and executive committees at the national and the lower levels of the organization. In addition to the representation of the leaders of the parliamentary group on the party executive, for example, the PP and CDS-PP incorporate all their MPs in the national commission. Other examples include the extension of these rights to members of the European Parliament (PP), and the inclusion of members of the government (CDS-PP and PSD) or other public office holders, such as the president of the Republic (PSD). All Portuguese parties furthermore grant their national public office holders ex officio representation on lower-level party organs.

While the official rules of some parties already suggest a significant overlap between the party in public office and the extra-parliamentary party, in practice this overlap is considerably larger. Moreover, the lack or relative unimportance of ex officio representation of public office holders as displayed by the statutes of some parties does not necessarily mean that in practice the positions in the extra-parliamentary organs are separated from those in public office. First, in none of the parties but

the Spanish PSOE is the function of public office holder incompatible with party positions outside parliament.[6] Moreover, in none of the parties are examples of overlapping memberships difficult to find, since party leaders usually combine their mandate with membership of parliament and the prime minister is normally also the official party leader. As a rule, however, the party leader is usually not the leader of the parliamentary group (although especially in the early years of party development the two positions were sometimes combined), which might be indicative of a relatively clear-cut division of powers between the extra-parliamentary and the parliamentary organizations.

In practice, parties can scarcely be seen to limit the presence of public office holders solely to ex officio representation. The level of accumulation of mandates appears particularly high in East-Central Europe, where the overlap between the parliamentary group and the party executive is so considerable that it sometimes becomes difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between the different faces of the party organization. According to surveys conducted in the first parliaments, for example, a significant number of MPs from the legislatures in both the Czech Republic and Hungary indicated that they also held a position in the national executive, namely 36 and 48 per cent respectively (Kopecký, 2001; van der Meer Krok-Paszkowska and van den Muyzenberg, 1998).

This high level of personnel overlap is also revealed by the figures in Table 7.1, which display the actual share of public office holders in the permanent executives. The overall picture that emerges from this table is of national executives being strongly invaded by public office holders. With only a few exceptions, public office holders make up the majority of the party executives and in some cases, such as the Czech ODS and ODA, the permanent executive is entirely composed of public office holders.[7] Even where the share of public office holders is relatively low, as in the Hungarian MDF, it is important to note that the accumulation of mandates primarily involves the highest party officials, such as the president and vice presidents of the party. The low proportion of parliamentary representatives in the Executive Committee of the Hungarian Christian Democrats (KDNP) can be attributed to internal splits that emerged in the party in the course of 1997 which caused the departure of two vice presidents who were also MPs (see Chapter 5).

The figures on the Southern European parties also underline the pivotal position of public office holders, who comprise up to 85 per cent of the total membership of the permanent executive. Preliminary evidence suggests that the predominance of public office holders is not a new phenomenon but was already manifest in the early post-transitional

Table 7.1 Public office holders in permanent executives

		MPs		*Ministers*	
	Size	*No.*	*%*	*No.*[a]	*%*
Portugal					
PCP	10	1	10.0	–	–
PS	**28**	**7**	**25.0**	**5**	**17.9**
PSD	9	7	77.8	–	–
CDS-PP	12	8	66.7	–	–
Spain					
PCE	11	3	27.3	–	–
IU	17	3	17.6	–	–
PSOE	13	7	54.8	–	–
PP	**13**	**11**	**84.6**	**5**	**38.5**
Hungary					
KDNP	7	3	42.9	–	–
FIDESZ	11	9	81.8	–	–
FKGP	11	10	90.9	–	–
SZDSZ	**11**	**10**	**90.9**	**2**	**18.2**
MSZP	**15**	**14**	**93.3**	**3**	**20.0**
MDF	17	n/a	± 50	–	–
Czech Republic					
ODS	**7**	**7**	**100.0**	**5**	**71.4**
ODA	**7**	**7**	**100.0**	**3**	**42.9**
KDU-ČSL[b]	7	6	85.7	–	–
ČSSD	8	6	75.0	–	–
KSČM	n/a	n/a	n/a	–	–

Notes: Bold figures denote government parties.

[a] In Portugal the position of government minister is incompatible with membership of parliament, whereas in Spain, Hungary and the Czech Republic the two functions can, and in practice usually are, combined.

[b] Figure for 1999.

Sources: Party statutes and party headquarters, 1997–98.

period. The executive committee of the PSOE elected at its 1981 congress, for example, included 18 members of the lower chamber and one senator among its 25 members (see Huneeus, 1985: 301), with public office holders thus accounting for more than three-quarters of its total membership. The PP reveals similarly high percentages of public office holders on the party's executive: between 1982 and 1996, the proportion of MPs in the party's executive committee averaged over 60 per cent, occasionally reaching peaks of 86 and 75 per cent in 1990 and 1993 (see García-Guereta, 2001).[8]

In addition, many of the highest PP officials, including the president of the party, the secretary-general and the deputy secretaries-general, are also members of the government. Equally, government ministers could be found among the members of the executive committee of the PSOE. Although involving less ample numbers than MPs, the prime minister and the deputy prime minister were always included (see Méndez, 1998). The importance of the party in public office, and particularly the party in government, was most remarkable in the case of the no longer existing Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD) in Spain, where government ministers accounted for almost two-thirds of the total membership of the party's permanent commission. In addition, the executive committee elected at its first congress in 1981 included all the UCD ministers of the Suárez government. As a result, 19 out of the 36 members of the executive committee also held a government position, underscoring the prevalence of government ministers in the party executive and confirming that this body was little more than a representation of the Council of Ministers where the real decision-making took place. The UCD thus closely approximates the predominance of the party in public office which we would expect of a newly created party that immediately assumes government responsibility.

The weighty presence of parliamentary representatives and government members on the party executives thus largely confirms the expectations on the critical position of the party in public office within the extra-parliamentary organization, and seems to reflect their parliamentary origins and early ascendancy to government. Moreover, this confirmation is evident in both the official party statutes, with their emphasis on ex officio representation, and in political practice, with parliamentarians and government leaders occupying a high proportion of the seats of the party executive. The only party that offers a genuine exception to this general pattern is the Portuguese PCP, where the permanent executive includes only one MP, namely the party's secretary-general Carvalhas. Equally, although to a somewhat lesser extent, in the Spanish IU the parliamentary group does not occupy such a pivotal position in the permanent executive as in many of the other parties in these new democracies.

The exceptional position of the Portuguese PCP can largely be explained by the party's lengthy organizational history, which dates back to the pre-authoritarian period. The PCP thus entered the democratic era with an already reasonably developed organizational structure, which, in addition to its marginal position within the Portuguese party system, has facilitated the persistence of a past model of organization,

closely resembling the classic mass party (see van Biezen, 1998). To a lesser extent, this is also true for the Spanish IU. Although technically speaking a new party, the PCE constitutes a majority of its leadership and rank-and-file. Like their Portuguese counterparts, the Spanish Communists had a long-standing organizational tradition and, at the outset of the transition, possessed a relatively well-developed organization with strong mass party characteristics. The dominance of the PCE within IU can therefore account for the continuity of an organizational structure in which the extra-parliamentary party and the party in parliament are perceived as distinct bodies, with a clear predominance of the former.

In the East-Central European parties, the weight of public office holders is even more pronounced than in Southern Europe. This can be accounted for by the newness of the democratic system, which in most cases is enhanced by the newness of the parties themselves, as well as the almost instantaneous access to government responsibility. However, it is also important to emphasize that even older parties, such as the Hungarian Socialists (MSZP), have adapted themselves quickly to the new environment in which electoral competition and institution building demand a high priority for the party as a parliamentary or governmental actor.

The employment of party staff

Human resources, both volunteers and paid professionals, are of vital importance for the functioning of a party. For a discussion about the particular model of organization, it is the ratio between volunteers and paid staff that is particularly relevant. Reliable figures on the number of people working for the party are scarcely available, however. Only for the Hungarian and Spanish parties are our data adequate for a comparative examination of the relation between the extra-parliamentary party and the party in public office.

The figures in Tables 7.2 and 7.3 show the staff employed by the parliamentary group (PP) and the party central office (CO) in 1996–98, only including staff who are employed and paid on the national level.[9] A comparison of the figures in the two tables first of all reveals that the level of professionalization is much higher in post-communist Hungary than in contemporary Spain. This is true for both the professionalization of the extra-parliamentary organization, measured by the party staff at the party central office in relation to the number of members (M/CO), and of the parliamentary group, measured by the parliamentary staff in relation to the number of seats (S/PP). Hungarian parties

Table 7.2 Party staff in Hungary

	Central office	*Parliamentary party*	*M/CO*	*S/PP*	*CO/PP*
MSZP	60–65	50	592	4.2	1.3
SZDSZ	50	25–30	646	2.5	1.8
MDF	45	20	469	1.9	2.3
KDNP	25–30	n/a	964	n/a	n/a
FKGP	12–15	25	4,444	1.0	0.5
FIDESZ	10	13	1,200	1.5	0.8
Mean	*34.8*	*27.1*	*1,395*	*2.2*	*1.3*

Sources: Party headquarters.

Table 7.3 Party staff in Spain

	Central office	*Parliamentary party*	*M/CO*	*S/PP*	*CO/PP*
PCE	14	–	1,875	–	–
IU	30	20	2,386	1.1	1.5
PSOE	197	30	1,853	4.7	6.6
PP	140	38	4,174	4.1	3.7
Mean	*95.3*	*29.3*	*2,572*	*3.3*	*3.9*

Sources: Party headquarters.

have about twice as many employees working at the national headquarters than their Spanish counterparts, and have employed on average one staff member for every two MPs, against one for every three MPs in the Spanish case.

In fact, and although complete figures are not available, the level of professionalization of the extra-parliamentary party in the Czech Republic, at least as far as the new parties are concerned, is equivalent to most of the Hungarian ones. The number of paid extra-parliamentary party staff working for Czech parties appears relatively small, amounting to about 15 employees in the national headquarters of the ČSSD and ODA and approximately 25 in the ODS. However, in terms of the overall level of professionalization and, more specifically, the ratio between party staff employed at the central office and the number of party members (M/CO), these three new Czech parties together average one paid employee for every 753 members. It thus appears that the importance of paid professionals has assumed greater proportions in East-Central than in Southern Europe.

Of the Hungarian parties, it is especially the Smallholders Party which shows a comparably professionalized parliamentary group, in which the deputies are assisted by one employee each, while it has at the same time the least professionalized extra-parliamentary organization. Conversely, the Hungarian Socialist Party has a relatively unprofessionalized parliamentary group, with only one staff member for less than every four MPs, while its extra-parliamentary organization is the most professionalized of all Hungarian parties. The same is true for the PSOE, which shows the lowest level of professionalization of the parliamentary party of the three Spanish parties and the highest levels for the extra-parliamentary organization.

More particularly relevant for the context of this chapter are the conclusions that can be drawn from the ratio between central office staff to parliamentary party staff (CO/PP). In comparison with Hungary, the Spanish parties, and particularly the PP and PSOE, show a much more professionalized central office and a much less professionalized parliamentary group, and thus contrast most sharply with the anticipated relationship. Also, although in less significant proportions, in the cases of *Izquierda Unida* and the Hungarian MSZP, SZDSZ and MDF the party staff at the central office outnumbers the parliamentary party staff. In fact, it is only in two parties, i.e. the FKGP and FIDESZ, that a more favourable balance towards the parliamentary party can be found. In terms of staff employed, therefore, most parties show a more privileged position for the extra-parliamentary party rather than the party in public office, thus providing evidence to the contrary on the propositions formulated above.

In addition, it should be observed that the level of professionalization of the parliamentary groups in these new democracies – with almost one staff member for every two MPs – is actually much lower than in contemporary Western Europe, where on average almost every individual MP is assisted by a professional employee (Krouwel, 1999: 94). Hence, while in the established liberal democracies the increase in parliamentary staff has generally steadily exceeded the rate of professionalization of the central offices, in the new democracies it is only for the party central office but not for the parliamentary party that professionalization of the party organizations has reached comparatively high levels. These findings, therefore, suggest that the factors at work in contemporary Western European democracies do not apply to the newly established ones, and indicate a different balance of power between the extra-parliamentary party and the party in public office than initially anticipated (see also Chapter 9).

The allocation of state subventions

In the light of the balance of power between the extra-parliamentary party and the party in public office, it is furthermore interesting to distinguish between the extent to which the two faces are financially related to each other on the one hand, and their relative share in the total of state subventions on the other. Regarding the former, and despite the officially independent financial position of the parliamentary group vis-à-vis the extra-parliamentary party, it should be noted that the parliamentary groups usually receive financial support from the extra-parliamentary party and that financial remainders of the parliamentary groups are frequently transferred to the party central office. Furthermore, many parties receive financial contributions from their public office holders, thus in practice complying with their statutory obligation. In Spain, for example, the transfer of money from public office holders to the party central office is a widely practised habit (Álvarez, 1994: 32).[10] In addition, Spanish MPs do not receive their salary directly but through the party central office. The subordinate position of the public office holders that emanates from the official party rules is thus also discernible in financial terms. Even if office holders generally contribute only marginally to the parties' total income, it is not so much the relative weight of their contributions, but rather the dependent position of the parliamentary representatives vis-à-vis the extra-parliamentary party that is indicative of the balance of power between the two faces.

As far as state subventions are concerned, public funding in these four newly established democracies consists of three types of contribution. First, parties are entitled to an annual subvention in order to defray the cost of their so-called routine expenditures, which include the activities organized by the extra-parliamentary party, the payment of party employees and the maintenance of the party organization more generally. Second, the state provides an additional contribution in election years in order to cover the cost of election campaigns. Finally, the parliamentary groups receive an annual subvention, although in this case the amount of money is generally considerably lower than the sum designated to the extra-parliamentary party.

While the particular rules and practices of party financing will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter, it is important to underline here that the recipient for both the routine subventions and the subsidies for election expenditures is the extra-parliamentary party. Given that the subsidies for routine and electoral purposes significantly

outweigh those to the parliamentary groups, the predominance of the extra-parliamentary party is thus also confirmed when comparing the relative share of the two faces of party organization in the total of state subventions. Even if we concentrate solely on the subventions for routine expenditures versus those to the parliamentary groups, the predominance of the former is unequivocal.

In Portugal, for example, the amount of state subventions granted to the extra-parliamentary party for routine expenditures currently amounts to approximately four times the sum of state money allocated to the parliamentary groups.[11] In Spain, subventions for routine expenditures outweigh those to the parliamentary groups by almost five times.[12] Occasional evidence for Hungarian parties shows a similar financially privileged position for the extra-parliamentary party which receives an amount of money that is about six times higher than the parliamentary groups. These figures clearly underline the financially privileged position of the extra-parliamentary party vis-à-vis the party in public office. On the other hand, the Southern European countries suggest that changes over time in the financial balance between the two faces has favoured the parliamentary groups. In Spain, for example, state subventions for routine expenditures increased by almost 20 per cent (from 7402.4 million to 8744.3 million pesetas) between 1987 and 1997, while in that same period the total of subventions to the parliamentary groups in both chambers grew by almost 90 per cent (from 1005.8 million to 1889.4 million pesetas between 1988 and 1997). Consequently, the relative shares of public money to the extra-parliamentary party versus the parliamentary groups changed from a ratio of almost 15 : 2 to less than 9 : 2. In Portugal state subventions for routine activities increased more than tenfold (from 120.1 million to 1262.6 million escudos) between 1978 and 1995, while the subsidies to the parliamentary groups grew by almost 16 times (from approximately 20 million to 310 million escudos) between 1978 and 1993. Accordingly, the relative share of public money to the extra-parliamentary party has declined from about 6 : 1 to approximately 4 : 1. Hence, in both these cases the change has benefited the party in public office, although it is the extra-parliamentary party that continues to occupy the financially most advantageous position. The most striking financial predominance of the extra-parliamentary party can be found in the post-communist Czech Republic, where state subventions for routine expenditures in 1996 outweighed those allocated to the parliamentary groups that year by approximately 180 to 1.[13]

The predominant allocation of state money to the extra-parliamentary party unquestionably favours this part of the party organization over

the party in parliament. While the increasing dominance of the party in public office in Western Europe is visible also in financial terms (see Katz and Mair, 1993), such a trend is not unequivocally visible in the new democracies. While changes in the financial balance in Portugal and especially Spain have favoured the parliamentary party, it should be underlined that by far the largest part of the available public funds for political parties is allocated to the extra-parliamentary organization. The extra-parliamentary party is therefore in a financially much more beneficial position than the party in public office. In this sense, the evidence presented here contrasts markedly with the anticipated predominance of the party in public office which was expected to emerge also in financial terms. This suggests that, in new democracies, the balance of power between the extra-parliamentary party and the party in public office should not be understood in similar terms of increasing public office predominance as in the long-established Western European democracies.

Conclusion

This chapter started out with the premise that the party in public office would be the predominant face of political parties in newly democratizing systems. This would be suggested by the theories of party formation advanced for, and the patterns of organizational change observed in, the established democracies in Western Europe, as well as the particular context in which parties in new democracies emerged and the particular sequence of their organizational development. However, of the three dimensions considered here, it is actually only in the high level of accumulation of mandates that support can be found for the proposition of public office predominance. Public office holders indeed appear to enjoy considerable rights of ex officio representation on the organs of the extra-parliamentary party. Moreover, the actual composition of the national executives shows that they are primarily composed of parliamentary representatives and government members, all of which underlines the pivotal position of the party in public office within the party organization.

However, as far as the official status of the party in public office vis-à-vis the extra-parliamentary organization is concerned, the party rules show a remarkably powerful status for the extra-parliamentary party and a particularly strong position for the party executive. Rather than an autonomous body, the party in public office in fact appears to be largely subordinate to the extra-parliamentary party. In addition, in terms of human and financial resources it is the extra-parliamentary party rather

than the party in public office which emerges as occupying the most privileged position. These observations thus sharply contrast with the anticipated pattern, and suggest that the classic distinction of internal versus external creation does not have the same impact on the parties of newly established democracies. They furthermore suggest that the factors encouraging the increasing predominance of the party in public office apparently do not work with the same effect in the context of a newly established democracy. At the very least, the relationship between the extra-parliamentary party and the party in public office appears more complex than initially assumed. Alternative explanations than the ones valid for the long-established Western European democracies, therefore, need to be considered to account for the pattern in newly emerging democratic polities. These issues will be further explored in Chapter 9, where it will be suggested that the subordination of the party in public office can be best understood as a device to increase party cohesion and to reduce the potentially destabilizing consequences that emerge from the general context of weakly developed party loyalties and a general lack of party institutionalization (see also van Biezen, 2000b).

8
Financing Parties in New Democracies

Traditionally, political parties in Western Europe primarily have depended on private contributions for their financial resources. While the classic mass party secured a structural flow of income from the fees paid by its members and affiliated unions, the cadre party generally relied on donations from wealthy individuals or contributions from private business organizations. Government financing of the political process, if at all, occurred mainly indirectly and the introduction of direct state funding of parties has been a relatively recent phenomenon (Alexander, 1989). The introduction of public funding for political parties has clearly encouraged important changes in the way in which parties in modern democracies organize. The increasing dependence on the state as a principal financier of party activity, for example, seems to have resulted in a corresponding increase of power concentration within the party (cf. Panebianco, 1988). Moreover, for parties in the established Western democracies, it has been observed that the increasing availability of public funds has served to strengthen their orientation towards the state while it has at the same time contributed to their shifting away from society (Katz and Mair, 1995).

Public funding appears an even more widespread phenomenon in newly emerging democracies. It is therefore highly relevant for the organizational development of political parties and has a major impact on the strength and nature of their linkages with society and the state in particular. Because most parties started out with relatively weakly developed organizational structures which could be exploited as a financial resource, the state plays an even more predominant role than in their older Western European counterparts. This chapter analyses the patterns of party financing, with a particular emphasis on the relative importance of the state and society as financial contributors to party activity, and the consequences for the way parties organize.

The legal framework of public funding

Public financing of parties in all four countries is primarily party rather than candidate oriented, and, in this respect, resembles the general Western European tradition of public funding (see Nassmacher, 1993). The Spanish, Portuguese and Czech regulations on party financing are defined entirely in terms of party, while in Hungary state money for election expenses is in principle also available for individual candidates standing in single-member constituencies. Direct public funding of parties essentially rests on three pillars: annual subventions for routine activities, subsidies for electoral expenditures and subsidies to support the activities of the parliamentary groups. In addition, parties also receive various forms of in-kind subsidies and indirect funding, such as free radio and television broadcasting, a reduced postal rate or various types of tax exemptions.

The first type of subvention is the money parties receive from the state in order to cover their normal daily functioning. This money consists of an annual lump sum, is not earmarked for specific purposes and tends to be used for the maintenance of the party organization, the payment of the party employees and for extra-parliamentary activities with no direct electoral purpose more generally. This type of public money will be referred to henceforth as subventions for routine activities. It should be distinguished from a second type of public subsidy, namely the money parties receive for the reimbursement of their election campaigns. This is a one-off subsidy granted to every party participating in the elections providing it meets certain thresholds, and will be referred to as electoral subventions. Here, the focus will be on subventions for national legislative elections and to the national party central office only.

Public financial support was generally introduced at a very early phase of the democratization process. In Spain, the introduction of electoral subventions preceded that of any other type of public subsidy to political parties. Electoral state subventions have been awarded since the first democratic elections of 1977, while subventions for routine activities were established shortly afterwards, in 1978. In Hungary, subventions for routine and electoral activities were introduced more or less simultaneously. The legal foundations for the system of public funding of parties were already established in 1989, before the first democratic elections.[1] In order to compensate the anticipated cost of the 1990 elections, the amount of state support for the first post-communist elections was agreed upon in the Round Table negotiations (Szabó, 1994b: 272). In Portugal, state financing of parties was introduced in 1977, about

two years after the first democratic elections. This concerned only annual routine subventions; electoral state subsidies were introduced much later in 1993. In the Czech Republic (then Czechoslovakia), public financing of political parties was introduced prior to the 1990 elections in a law on political parties which entitled parties to an annual state subvention.

State subsidies for routine activities are usually distributed in proportion to the number of seats and/or votes. In Portugal and the Czech Republic, the amounts of state subventions are established by law. In Portugal, all state subsidies are related in a fixed proportion to the national minimum wage. The amount of money for routine activities is based on the number of votes in the national legislative elections, in a proportion of 1/225 of the monthly minimum wage for every vote obtained in the most recent elections.[2] Parties in the Czech Republic are entitled to subventions from the state according to a combination of the percentage of the vote in the national elections and the number of parliamentary deputies: for the first 3 per cent of the vote, parties receive 3 million Czech crowns. To this amount, an additional 100,000 crowns for every 0.1 per cent of the obtained votes is added up to 5 per cent of the vote. The maximum annual subvention allocated according to the percentage of the vote is thus 5 million Czech crowns. In addition, parties receive half a million crowns per year for each parliamentary seat.[3]

In contrast to Portugal and the Czech Republic, the amount of money for routine activities in Spain and in Hungary is not predetermined by law but decided anew annually and included in the national budget which is to be approved by parliament. The law only establishes the method of distribution. In Hungary, 25 per cent of the money for routine activities is distributed equally among all parties with at least one parliamentary seat, while the remaining 75 per cent is distributed in proportion to the vote obtained in the first round of the parliamentary elections. Public subsidies in Spain since 1987 have been distributed according to a combination of seats and votes in the preceding elections to the lower chamber, by which one-third of the total sum is allocated in proportion to the number of seats and two-thirds in proportion to the number of votes.[4] The fact that only the method of distribution but not the actual amount of money is established by law gives Spanish and Hungarian governments a potentially larger leverage to adjust public subsidies. Indeed, although the annual growth of routine subsidies in Spain generally does not exceed the increase of the consumer price index (del Castillo, 1989: 185), a noticeable exception was a 150 per cent rise in the 1987 budget. Among others, the costly NATO campaign of

the PSOE in 1986 and the *Flick* case[5] account for the Socialist government's decision to resort to a significant increase in the routine subvention to political parties that year (López Garrido, 1994).

Electoral subventions in the Czech Republic are based exclusively on the number of votes, whereas in Portugal and Spain they are based on a combination of votes and seats. Hungarian law establishes that financial support for electoral expenditure is related to the number of candidates presented, leaving the actual amount of money to be determined by parliament. The electoral subsidies that have been awarded in the Czech Republic since the 1996 elections entitle parties to 90 Czech crowns per vote, which represents a significant increase compared to previous elections (see note 3). As in the Czech Republic, the 1993 Portuguese law on the financing of political parties and election campaigns introduced electoral subsidies as a new and additional source of party funding. Despite disagreements between government and opposition parties on various parts of the new law – the integral text eventually only received the support from the governing PSD – all parties agreed on the desirability of introducing electoral subventions as a complement to the already existing system of public funding of routine activities (see Meirim, 1994). State subventions for election expenditure in Portugal are also related to the legal minimum wage, such that the total sum of state money for legislative elections amounts to 2,500 monthly minimum wages. Of this amount, 20 per cent is distributed equally over the participating parties, while the remaining 80 per cent is divided in proportion to the obtained electoral result.

The allocation of electoral subsidies in Spain is based on the percentage of votes and the number of deputies in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Between 1977 and 2000, these amounts have increased from one million to almost 2.7 million pesetas for every seat obtained in either one of the two chambers, from 45 to 101 pesetas for every vote obtained in the elections to the lower chamber and from 15 to 40 pesetas for every vote in the Senate elections.[6] In addition, the 1991 modification of the Spanish electoral law brought about an important change, introducing state support for the costs of direct election mailing which is unrelated to the parties' electoral or parliamentary strength. Provided they meet the threshold for establishing a parliamentary group,[7] Spanish parties are entitled to a sum of money per voter in every electoral district in which they present their candidates, which increased from 22 to 27 pesetas per voter between 1993 and 2000. Overall, these amounts of public money add up to quite considerable sums, with relatively elevated levels of state subvention as a consequence.

A noteworthy characteristic of the Spanish system of election financing is the significant bias in favour of the bigger parliamentary parties and, although to a lesser extent, parties with a regionally concentrated vote. This bias is especially noticeable with regard to the public subvention for election expenditure. In Spain, parties only qualify for reimbursement in constituencies where they meet the electoral threshold, which is set at 3 per cent at the constituency level. In practice, this has little relevance as a threshold for parliamentary representation, since the small district magnitude renders it almost inconceivable that a list with less than 3 per cent of the vote could win anything outside the two biggest districts of Madrid and Barcelona. However, the threshold does effectively imply a substantial punishment for the reimbursement of the campaign expenses of the smaller nationwide parties. Even if they obtain parliamentary representation, these parties do not qualify for financial compensation for the votes in those constituencies where they remain below the threshold. In essence, therefore, the method of allocation of electoral subventions significantly intensifies the already disproportional tendencies inherent in the electoral system. The two bigger parties – PSOE and PP – have collected between 82 and 89 per cent of the total of electoral subventions for the elections beween 1986 and 1996, while oscillating between 65 to 76 per cent of the vote (see van Biezen, 2000a). The main beneficiaries of the system of public funding in Spain are thus the major parties, a phenomenon that not only contrasts with the practice of party financing in the other three democracies discussed here, but also with those of the long-established democracies in Western Europe (see Gidlund, 1991; Nassmacher, 1993).

The skewed distribution of seats, and hence of state money, is even more pronounced for the Spanish Senate elections, due to its majoritarian system of seat allocation. In the 1996 elections, for instance, *Izquierda Unida* did not succeed in acquiring a seat in the Senate, despite being the third largest party in terms of the number of votes obtained at the national level. As a consequence, the party did not receive any financial compensation for its approximately 6.8 million votes. Much smaller regional parties such as the Catalan CiU and Basque PNV, by contrast, which obtained approximately 1.5 million and 0.6 million votes respectively, obtained representation in the upper chamber with eight and four senators, and thus secured electoral money from the state. The characteristics of the Spanish electoral system, with its relatively asymmetrical distribution of seats, thus have a clear impact on the allocation of state funds, which substantially benefit the bigger parliamentary parties over the smaller ones, as well as the parties with a regionally

clustered electorate. Only the recent introduction of state money for the costs of direct mailing, for which a much lower threshold applies and which is not related to parliamentary or electoral strength, has somewhat counterbalanced these tendencies towards disproportionality.

The third type of public money is the subvention to the parliamentary groups. These subventions are normally regulated by the parliamentary standing orders, which generally establish that the groups each receive an equal amount of money plus a fixed sum for every parliamentary seat. In Spain, the amounts of subsidies to the groups in the lower and upper chambers are established annually by the presidium of the respective chamber. The state subsidies for the parliamentary groups in Portugal's unicameral chamber consist of at least four times the annual minimum wage per group,[8] plus one-third of this amount – which was increased to half of this amount in 1993 – per deputy. The Hungarian parliamentary groups receive an amount of money equivalent to 20 times an MP's (basic) salary,[9] plus a sum per individual MP, which amounts to 25 per cent of the basic salary per MP for a government party and 50 per cent for opposition parties. The parliamentary fractions in the Czech lower chamber receive 20,000 crowns per month, plus 2,500 crowns per deputy (Kopecký, 2001).

Restrictions, disclosure and enforcement

After having outlined the official framework of party financing and before proceeding to analysis of the practice of party financing itself, it is useful at this point to discuss briefly the system of public control of political finance, including the limitations and prohibitions on donations and expenditures, as well as the system of disclosure and enforcement. In all countries, the legal framework includes a system of public control of the practice of party financing, including a series of regulations on limitations and restrictions on the amount and type of permissible contributions, mechanisms for disclosure and reporting of party income and expenditure, as well as legal methods of enforcement. At the same time, however, political parties are legally considered private associations and their internal functioning and organizational structure consequently largely remains outside the scope of the law. The sometimes detailed legal provisions on party financing, the requirements for disclosure or the limitations and bans on certain types of income and expenditure to a certain extent undermine their formally private and autonomous status. However, these conflicting public and private conceptions of the political party have produced a tension between legal

requirements and actual political practice, resulting in political finance regimes which offer a strict although often inconsequential regime of public control of party financing.

In order to monitor the undue influence of money on political finance, public control of party financing includes limitations and bans on certain types of donations and expenditures. In that sense, the newly established democracies have followed practices also widely adopted in many of the established liberal democracies (cf. Nassmacher, 2001). Contribution bans generally apply to donations from public or semi-public entities. In addition, until 1993, it was illegal for Portuguese parties to receive financial contributions from private corporations. However, this formal prohibition could not prevent the *de facto* financing of parties by private business, usually through individuals as intermediaries. The 1993 law opened up the possibilities for financing of parties by private business, although their donations are subject to a ceiling by which both the amount per contributor and the total amount of private donations may not exceed a maximum limit.[10] Spanish law, by contrast, has become stricter on the possibilities for private financing with time. While previously unregulated, private donations to election campaigns have since 1985 been subject to a limit of one million pesetas per contributor per year. The maximum contribution to a party's routine activities amounts to ten million pesetas per contributor per year. According to Spanish law, and in contrast to Portugal, the total amount of private donations is not legally limited. In Hungary, a complete ban exists on anonymous donations, while in Spain and Portugal anonymous donations are not prohibited but are subject to a legal maximum. In Portugal, the total of anonymous contributions per year may not exceed 400 monthly minimum wages. For Spanish parties, anonymous contributions may not exceed 5 per cent of the amount of state subvention for routine activities.

Further restrictions apply to foreign contributions, which are generally prohibited *tout court*, although it is almost a conventional wisdom that many parties have received financial support from abroad, especially in the early years of the transition. In Portugal, the PCP received money from the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, while the other parties were financed by West European and particularly West German parties and their associated research institutes (Bruneau, 1983; Eisfeld, 1985). The PS, for instance, benefited from the transfer of resources, including not only financial but also human and technical resources, from the Friedrich Ebert Foundation of the SPD, which had also supported the party at its foundation in West Germany in 1973

(see Mateus, 1996). Spanish parties also received ample financial support from abroad (del Castillo, 1989: 180). Foreign financial aid to Southern European parties significantly diminished after the demise of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and particularly the unification of Germany, after which German financial aid to political parties was mostly directed to the East. In general, many democratizing countries in Eastern Europe have relied heavily on financial support from Western Europe and the US (see also Glenn, 1999).

While in the two East-Central European countries no spending limit exists, both Spain and Portugal have established a ceiling on election expenditures. Such limitations have been in effect in Portugal since the approval of the 1993 law, which stated that for national legislative elections parties were allowed to spend a maximum of 50 monthly minimum wages for each candidate on the list. For the 1995 election, this entailed a maximum of 2.6 million escudos per candidate. In practice, the spending limit proved to be relatively generous. Whereas the Socialist Party spent 495.5 million escudos, for example, it could have spent the legal limit of 846.7 million.[11] For the 1999 elections, the maximum amount was lowered to 35 monthly minimum wages per candidate. In Spain, spending limits for election campaigns were first introduced in 1985. These involved a legal maximum of a fixed sum per electoral constituency (22 million pesetas) plus an additional sum for every inhabitant of the constituency in which a party stands for election (which increased from 44 pesetas in 1986 to 47 pesetas in 2000). The modification of the electoral law in 1994 abolished the fixed sums per constituency, resulting in a considerably lower legally permitted maximum amount to be spent. In relative terms, Spanish parties spend considerably more than their Portuguese counterparts. While the aggregate campaign expenses for the three nationwide Spanish parties amounted to some 6.5 billion pesetas – almost 200 pesetas (1.2€) per voter – in 2000, the four major Portuguese parties together spent over 7.1 million euros – equivalent to some 0.8€ per voter – in the 2002 elections.

Whether in old or new democracies, the financing of political parties as it occurs in practice is perhaps the least transparent aspect of party activity. In Spain, information on party financing was initially scarce and, particularly during the first years after the transition, party financing practically lacked legal control (del Castillo, 1989: 182). The situation was very similar in the early stages of post-communist democratization, where, as van Biezen and Kopecký (2001: 415) note, 'the lack of legal provisions on party finances was a deliberate choice of policy-makers in order to extricate newly emerged parties, often dependent on financial

aid from abroad, from disadvantages in competition with the materially secured Communist Party'. In Portugal, unlawful conduct was equally common to all parties in the first years of democratic transformation (see de Sousa, 1983). Despite the relatively stringent legal requirements for disclosure, parties have often proved reluctant to disclose their complete financial accounts. The audit courts in both Spain and Portugal still frequently rule that financial reports are incomplete and that parties can be shown to have breached the law. In 1996, for example, three of the four parliamentary parties in Portugal (the PS, PSD and CDS-PP) were penalised with a total fine of 2,784,000 escudos. Despite these penalties, however, there may be incentives for parties to prefer paying a relatively small fine rather than complying with the law.

Hence, although the prerogatives of the audit courts have increased in recent years, it is difficult to guarantee the reliability of the available data, particularly because the state auditors have little authority to investigate the party accounts beyond the information that parties themselves are willing to report. In sum, the data available have to be considered with care. Within the confines of the obvious limitations of these constraints, however, it is possible to tease out a number of crucial observations on the practice of party financing in these four newly established democracies, in particular concerning the dependence of parties on state funding, the relevance of society and the extent to which parties use their financial resources primarily for electoralist or rather for organizational purposes.

The relevance of public money

Given that state subventions were introduced when most parties were still in an initial stage of party formation and therefore usually lacked the organizational resources to generate their own income, public funding was always likely to play a critical role in the financing of parties in these new democracies. Although an attempt was made in Hungary to prevent the state from playing too big a role in party financing, by including a provision in the 1989 law limiting the share of state support to a party's total income, this clause proved untenable in the context of weakly institutionalized parties and was hastily repealed in 1991.

Indeed, the state is the predominant player in party financing in both post-communist Europe and their Southern European counterparts. For the two major Portuguese parties, the Socialist Party (PS) and the Social Democratic Party (PSD), for example, state subsidies are the single most important source of income, on average contributing to more than

80 per cent of the parties' annual income in the early 1990s. Only in the Communist Party (PCP) does the state play a minor role in financing the party. In the mid-1990s, the PCP reported that state subsidies made up only some 8 per cent of the party's annual income.

The state also plays a considerable role in the financing of Spanish parties, as can be seen from Table 8.1. The figures show the income of the three nationwide parties, with a particular emphasis on the relative share of state subventions (including subventions for routine activities

Table 8.1 Income of Spanish parties, 1988–97

	Million pesetas				*% of total income*			
	PSOE	*AP/PP*	*PCE/IU*	*Total*	*PSOE*	*AP/PP*	*PCE/IU*	*Mean*
1988								
State subventions[a]	**4,281.6**	1,685.1	246.2	*6,212.9*	**80.2**	92.5	57.3	*76.7*
Donations[b]	**691.3**	122.9	113.9	*928.1*	**12.9**	6.7	26.5	*15.4*
Other	**367.6**	14.5	69.6	*451.7*	**6.9**	0.8	16.2	*8.0*
Total income	***5,340.5***	*1,822.5*	*429.7*	*7,592.7*				
1990								
State subventions	**4,170.7**	2,666.1	729.0	*7,565.8*	**92.0**	89.1	85.3	*88.8*
Donations	**157.9**	248.0	100.5	*506.4*	**3.5**	8.3	11.8	*7.9*
Other	**206.1**	76.6	25.6	*308.3*	**4.5**	2.6	3.0	*3.4*
Total income	***4,534.7***	*2,990.7*	*855.1*	*8,380.5*				
1991								
State subventions	**4,492.3**	2,781.1	775.7	*8,049.1*	**76.1**	82.8	75.8	*78.2*
Donations	**885.1**	360.7	97.7	*1,343.5*	**15.0**	10.7	9.6	*11.8*
Other	**523.3**	215.1	149.5	*887.9*	**8.9**	6.4	14.6	*10.0*
Total income	***5,900.7***	*3,356.9*	*1,022.9*	*10,280.5*				
1992								
State subventions	**4,744.9**	2,975.4	805.7	*8,526.0*	**76.7**	80.6	75.5	*77.6*
Donations	**922.6**	321.3	109.7	*1,353.6*	**14.9**	8.7	10.3	*11.3*
Other	**514.8**	395.5	152.2	*1,062.5*	**8.3**	10.7	14.3	*11.1*
Total income	***6,182.3***	*3,692.2*	*1,067.6*	*10,942.1*				
1993								
State subventions	**4,534.2**	3,477.9	806.1	*8,818.2*	**74.6**	78.0	71.1	*74.6*
Donations	**1,031.7**	693.4	193.3	*1,918.4*	**17.0**	15.5	17.1	*16.5*
Other	**508.1**	290.0	133.6	*931.7*	**8.4**	6.5	11.8	*8.9*
Total income	***6,074.0***	*4,461.3*	*1133.0*	*11,668.3*				
1994								
State subventions	**4,444.9**	3,739.9	719.6	*8,904.4*	**72.1**	78.8	65.6	*72.2*
Donations	**1,141.8**	935.7	121.3	*2,198.8*	**18.5**	19.7	11.1	*16.4*
Other	**578.6**	68.1	256.6	*903.3*	**9.4**	1.4	23.4	*11.4*
Total income	***6,165.3***	*4,743.7*	*1,097.5*	*12,006.5*				

Table 8.1 continued

	Million pesetas				*% of total income*			
	PSOE	*AP/PP*	*PCE/IU*	*Total*	*PSOE*	*AP/PP*	*PCE/IU*	*Mean*
1995								
State subventions	**4,593.1**	4,063.1	748.2	*9,404.4*	**78.8**	79.4	67.5	*75.2*
Donations	**1,190.2**	993.7	104.9	*2,288.8*	**20.4**	19.4	9.5	*16.4*
Other	**44.5**	60.3	255.9	*360.7*	**0.8**	1.2	23.1	*8.4*
Total income	***5,827.8***	*5,117.1*	*1,109.0*	*12,053.9*				
1996								
State subventions	4,312.6	**4,287.5**	928.7	*9,528.8*	75.3	**75.9**	70.3	*73.8*
Donations	1,056.1	**1,303.2**	147.8	*2,507.1*	18.4	**23.1**	11.2	*17.6*
Other	361.5	**60.3**	244.2	*666.0*	6.3	**1.1**	18.5	*8.6*
Total income	*5,730.2*	***5,651.0***	*1,320.7*	*12,701.9*				
1997								
State subventions	4,111.8	**4,233.0**	904.6	*9,249.4*	67.6	**76.1**	68.5	*70.7*
Donations	1,062.0	**1,264.9**	179.6	*2,506.5*	17.5	**22.7**	13.6	*17.9*
Other	909.3	**67.3**	236.1	*1,212.7*	14.9	**1.2**	17.9	*11.3*
Total income	*6,083.1*	***5,565.2***	*1,320.3*	*12,968.6*				

Notes: Bold figures denote government party. Figures include the Catalan branches of the PSOE (PSC) and IU (IC). Bank loans are not included. $1 = 126.7 pesetas (mid-1987) and 147.5 pesetas (mid-1997).

[a] Includes subventions for routine activities and to parliamentary groups.
[b] Includes membership subscriptions, private donations and contributions from public office holders.

Source: *Boletín Oficial del Estado*.

and the subsidies to the parliamentary groups) and donations (including membership subscriptions, private donations and contributions from public office holders).[13] For all three parties, the state is not only clearly the single most important contributor to their income, the amounts of state subvention have also attained such an elevated level, averaging over 75 per cent, as to make parties virtually entirely dependent on public money.[14] Contributions from society, including membership fees and private donations, are relatively unimportant.

The state plays an equally significant role in the financing of Spanish elections, as can be seen from Table 8.2. This stands in contrast with most recently established democracies, including not only Portugal but also the post-communist Czech Republic, where the relevance of state contributions for campaign expenses is evident, but where private donations and fundraising activities also play a role (see below). With an average contribution of more than 85 per cent of the parties' total income,

Table 8.2 Financing Spanish elections, 1986–96

	Million pesetas				*% of total income*			
	PSOE	*AP/PP*	*PCE/IU*	*Total*	*PSOE*	*AP/PP*	*PCE/IU*	*Mean*
1986								
State subventions	**1,584.8**	734.0[a]	42.3	*2,361.1*	**86.0**	90.5	22.7	*66.4*
Contribution party	**256.0**	75.3	143.3	*474.6*	**3.9**	9.3	76.9	*33.4*
Donations	**2.4**	2.1	0.6	*5.1*	**0.1**	0.3	0.3	*0.2*
Other	–	–	0.1	*0.1*	–	–	0.1	*0.0*
Total income	***1,843.2***	*811.4*	*186.3*	*2,840.9*				
1989								
State subventions	**1,626.7**	929.6	134.4	*2,690.7*	**99.9**	100.0	96.1	*98.7*
Contribution party	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Donations	**0.2**	–	–	*0.2*	**0.0**	–	–	*0.0*
Other	**1.6**	–	5.5	*7.1*	**0.1**	–	3.9	*1.3*
Total income	***1,628.5***	*929.6*	*139.9*	*2,698.0*				
1993								
State subventions	**2,467.0**	2,272.9	752.8	*5,492.7*	**77.6**	87.1	88.1	*84.3*
Contribution party	**707.4**	227.2	97.8	*1,032.4*	**22.2**	8.7	11.4	*14.1*
Donations	**5.7**	104.8	4.1	*114.6*	**0.2**	4.0	0.5	*1.6*
Other	–	5.5	–	*5.5*	–	0.2	–	*0.1*
Total income	***3,180.1***	*2,610.4*	*854.7*	*6,645.2*				
1996								
State subventions	2,511.9	**2,495.0**	962.2	*5,969.1*	**91.6**	**95.5**	94.7	*93.9*
Contribution party	228.8	**112.2**	52.0	*393.0*	**8.3**	**4.3**	5.1	*5.9*
Donations	0.6	**1.8**	1.4	*3.8*	**0.0**	**0.1**	0.1	*0.1*
Other	–	**2.2**	–	*2.2*	–	**0.1**	–	*0.0*
Total income	*2,741.3*	***2,611.2***	*1,015.6*	*6,368.1*				

Notes: Bold figures denote government party. Figures include the Catalan branches of the PSOE (PSC) and IU (IC). Bank loans are not included. $1= 139.1 pesetas (mid-1986) and 128.2 pesetas (mid-1996).

[a] Total of subventions to the *Coalición Popular*.

Source: See Table 8.1.

the state seems virtually the only significant financial contributor to the cost of Spanish election campaigns, the low percentage of 22.7 for the PCE/IU in 1986 being the only exception to this pattern. The importance of society in this respect is even more marginal than for the financing of routine activities. In general, their heavy financial reliance on the state, and thus their dependence on a good electoral performance, makes parties vulnerable to changes in the behaviour of the electorate, which tend to be volatile in newly established democracies more generally. The example of the Spanish Communist Party is illustrative in this regard. The poor result in the 1982 elections, when the vote for the party

declined from almost 11 to only 4 per cent and the number of seats plummeted from 23 to 4, so drastically reduced state subsidies that the PCE was brought to the verge of bankruptcy and was forced to sell many of its assets and property, including its headquarters in Madrid. Hence, although the dependence on the state was generally substantially lower for the Communist Party than for any of the other Spanish parties, the PCE clearly exhibits the potentially catastrophic consequences of this vulnerability that results from a strong financial dependence on the state.

The financial profile of the parties in post-communist Hungary also shows strong patterns of state dependence. Table 8.3 represents the

Table 8.3 Income of Hungarian parties, 1990–96

Sources of income (million forint)	*MSZP*	*SZDSZ*	*MDF*	*KDNP*	*FKGP*	*FIDESZ*	*Total*
1990–94							
State subventions	698.0	996.5	**1,052.3**	**419.1**	**609.1**	505.8	*4,280.8*
Membership fees	104.3	36.4	**54.2**	**17.2**	**16.8**	2.8	*231.7*
Donations	72.3	288.7	**212.3**	**25.7**	**22.6**	20.4	*642.0*
Other	1,429.5	168.6	**1,777.9**	**103.9**	**33.5**	1,619.5	*5,132.9*
Total income	*2,304.1*	*1,490.2*	***3,096.7***	***565.9***	***682.0***	*2,148.5*	*10,287.4*
1995–96							
State subventions	**703.0**	**460.1**	313.6	227.4	260.0	227.1	*2,191.2*
Membership fees	**38.3**	**6.2**	17.8	11.3	12.2	1.5	*87.3*
Donations	**74.0**	**13.6**	19.7	13.4	12.5	1.3	*134.5*
Other	**649.5**	**34.5**	982.1	22.9	17.1	829.0	*2,535.1*
Total income	***1,464.8***	***514.4***	*1,333.2*	*275.0*	*301.8*	*1,058.9*	*4,948.1*
Sources of income (% of total income)	*MSZP*	*SZDSZ*	*MDF*	*KDNP*	*FKGP*	*FIDESZ*	*Mean*
1990–94							
State subventions	30.3	66.9	**34.0**	**74.1**	**89.3**	23.5	*53.0*
Membership fees	4.5	2.4	**1.8**	**3.0**	**2.5**	0.1	*2.4*
Donations	3.1	19.4	**6.9**	**4.5**	**3.3**	0.9	*6.4*
Other	62.0	11.3	**57.4**	**18.4**	**4.9**	75.4	*38.3*
Total	*99.9*	*100.0*	***100.1***	***100.0***	***100.0***	*99.9*	*100.1*
1995–96							
State subventions	**48.0**	**89.4**	23.5	82.7	86.1	21.4	*58.5*
Membership fees	**2.6**	**1.2**	1.3	4.1	4.0	0.1	*2.2*
Donations	**5.1**	**2.6**	1.6	4.9	4.1	0.1	*3.1*
Other	**44.3**	**6.7**	73.7	8.3	5.7	78.2	*36.1*
Total	***100.0***	***99.9***	*100.0*	*100.0*	*99.9*	*99.8*	*99.9*

Note: Bold figures denote government parties. $1 = 151 forint (August 1996).

Source: *Magyar Közlöny*.

sources of income of Hungarian parties for the period of the first legislatures (1990–94) and the first two years of the second legislature (1995–96). The role of the state stands out quite clearly as a crucial source of income. Also the irrelevance of other sources, and particularly the membership fees, is unmistakable, reaching a level of almost zero in the extreme case of FIDESZ. However, the large category of 'other' sources of income makes an analysis in more detail almost impossible. In some cases, the (partly illegal) sale of party property and real estate may account for part of these other sources of income. What caused a serious political scandal, for example, was the fact that in 1993 the Hungarian Democratic Forum and FIDESZ sold parts of their party headquarters which had been state property donated at the time of the transition.

While state funding is generally assumed to be of critical importance for parties in newly established democracies, the financial profile of parties in the Czech Republic reveals that this is not unequivocally so. The figures presented in Table 8.4 do not represent a clear-cut case of exclusive dependence on the state or irrelevance of society. Although financial assistance from the state is still considerable, the state does not appear to be the most important financial contributor. Society plays an equally important part, primarily in the form of donations from individuals and business organizations. Furthermore, there is substantial variation between parties, revealing a relatively higher importance of public money for newly established parties, such as the ODS and ODA, than for parties with some degree of organizational continuity, such as the Communist Party (KSČM) and the Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL). Perhaps not quite unexpectedly given its relatively large membership organization, the KSČM stands out because of its comparatively large share of membership contributions, which are in fact the most important source of income to finance the party's routine activities. State subsidies, by contrast, are relatively unimportant. The membership is clearly equally important for the KDU-ČSL (see also Kopecký, 2001). For newly created parties, by contrast, membership fees do not have a similar relevance. In all three of the newly established parties – ODS, ODA and ČSSD – the membership fees contribute to a below average share of the income.

The figures in Table 8.4 furthermore reveal that older parties are in a relatively advantageous position compared to the newly created ones because they can rely on various types of organizational resources. Not only may a large membership organization be financially beneficial, but also the maintenance of property clearly brings ensuing financial privileges, in that the sale of real estate and letting of buildings provides parties with an important additional source of income. This applies not

Table 8.4 Income of Czech parties, 1995–96

Sources of income (million crowns)	*ODS*	*ODA*	*KDU-ČSL*	*ČSSD*	*KSČM*	*Total*
1995						
Annual subventions	**36.8**	**12.5**	**12.5**	14.0	6.5	*82.3*
Membership fees	**8.0**	**0.3**	**6.3**	1.7	26.1	*42.4*
Donations	**24.9**	**7.9**	**1.3**	0.2	0.0	*34.3*
Property	**7.0**	**0.0**	**23.8**	41.1[a]	16.1	*88.0*
Other	**3.5**	**4.8**	**0.9**	4.7	13.1	*27.0*
Total income	***80.2***	***25.5***	***44.8***	*61.7*	*61.8*	*274.0*
1996						
Annual subventions	**39.5**	**12.0**		26.5	12.0	*90.0*
Electoral subventions	**161.5**	**34.7**	**57.4**[b]	144.2	56.4	*454.2*
Membership fees	**9.5**	**0.6**	**17.8**	2.2	34.3	*64.4*
Donations	**43.5**	**52.4**	**9.4**	0.7	0.0	*106.0*
Property	**18.2**	**0.0**	**14.3**	2.7	14.6	*49.8*
Other	**2.8**	**0.1**	**5.7**	6.4	14.2	*29.2*
Total income	***275.0***	***99.8***	***104.6***	*182.7*	*131.5*	*793.6*
Sources of income (% of total income)	*ODS*	*ODA*	*KDU-ČSL*	*ČSSD*	*KSČM*	*Mean*
1995						
Annual subventions	**45.9**	**49.0**	**27.9**	22.7	10.5	*31.2*
Membership fees	**10.0**	**1.2**	**14.1**	2.8	42.2	*14.1*
Donations	**31.0**	**31.0**	**2.9**	0.3	0.0	*13.0*
Property	**8.7**	**0.0**	**53.1**	66.6[a]	26.1	*30.9*
Other	**4.4**	**18.8**	**2.0**	7.6	21.2	*10.8*
Total	***100.0***	***100.0***	***100.0***	*100.0*	*100.0*	
1996						
Annual subventions	**14.4**	**12.0**		14.5	9.1	*12.5*
Electoral subventions	**58.7**	**34.8**	**54.9**[b]	78.9	42.9	*54.0*
Membership fees	**3.5**	**0.6**	**17.0**	1.2	26.1	*9.7*
Donations	**15.8**	**52.5**	**9.0**	0.4	0.0	*15.5*
Property	**6.6**	**0.0**	**13.7**	1.5	11.1	*6.6*
Other	**1.0**	**0.1**	**5.4**	3.5	10.8	*4.2*
Total	***100.0***	***100.0***	***100.0***	*100.0*	*100.0*	

Notes: Bold figures denote government parties. $1 = 26.9 crowns (July 1996).

[a] Sum of several years.
[b] Total of annual and electoral subventions.

Source: Parliament of the Czech Republic.

only to the Communist Party, but also to the Social Democrats (ČSSD), for which the ownership of its party headquarters stems from its pre-communist ancestor of the First Republic.[15] In addition, older parties also tend to conduct the least expensive electoral campaigns, primarily

because their large membership provides them with a potentially more stable electoral base which does not need to be mobilized through expensive electoral campaigns. The cost of the 1992 electoral campaign of the KDU-ČSL, for example, amounted to about 17 million crowns, while the campaign of ODA in that same year cost around 45 million crowns (Kopecký, 2001).

The ODS and ODA appear to have been capable of compensating for the lack of such profitable organizational legacies by collecting large sums of money from private contributions. In general, incumbent parties have been more attractive to private financing from the business sector than opposition parties, which mainly attract donations from individual supporters rather than private business. This distinction between government and opposition parties also seems to tap into a different mode of financing for parties such as the ODS and ODA on the one hand, and the ČSSD and KČSM on the other. The two Civic Democratic Parties represent a way of private financing close to the traditional cadre party, with a predominant dependence on relatively large sums of individual contributors. Instead of appealing to a few big private donors, the Social Democrats and the Communists, by contrast, spread the financial burden over the largest possible number of members and supporters, a device which is characteristic for the once predominant mode of private financing of the classic mass party (cf. Duverger, 1954).[16]

Although the dependence on public money may not be unequivocally high among all parties and we should keep the distinction between new parties and parties with strong organizational legacies in mind, state resources are the key factor in party financing. A comparison of the total amounts of state subventions furthermore shows that it is in the Czech Republic that a relatively high priority is accorded to the funding of political parties. The Czech Republic ranks second if the amounts of money in real terms are compared between countries, and occupies the first position if the relative amounts – i.e. the amounts per voter – are considered. In 1994–96, political parties in Spain received 164 million dollars from the state, as against 51 million dollars in the Czech Republic in 1996, 24 million dollars for Portugal in 1995 and 18 million dollars in Hungary in 1996[17] – although it should be noted that the figure for Hungary is less easily comparable with the others.[18] In relative terms, parties in the Czech Republic receive the highest amounts of state reimbursement, consisting of 6.42 dollars per voter. Spain ranks second, with a compensation of 5.04 dollars for every voter, followed at a distance by Portugal with 2.71 dollars and Hungary with 2.27 dollars per voter. The position of the Czech Republic ahead of the other countries is

a remarkable indication of the much higher importance of the state to the funding of political parties in this much newer democracy.

The role of society

The generally low levels of party affiliation obviously constitute a key element in party financing. In Spain and Portugal, only 3.4 and 4.0 per cent of the national electorates are affiliated to a political party, while the corresponding figures for the Czech Republic and Hungary are 3.9 and 2.2 per cent (Mair and van Biezen, 2001). These low levels of party membership imply that membership subscriptions constitute only a minor financial resource, on average amounting to less than 10 per cent of the total income. One important caveat is that the figures presented here may misrepresent the actual contribution of the membership to the overall party income, since they refer to the accounts of the national party organization and may not include parts of the membership fees collected by the local branches. However, it is unlikely that this distortion affects the validity of the general observations. In fact, since large parts of the available state subsidies – including subventions for presidential elections, supranational (i.e. European) and subnational elections, as well as subsidies to regional, provincial and municipal party headquarters and legislative representatives – have also been excluded, the relevance of public money is likely to be even more pronounced than it would appear from the evidence presented here.

In spite of a general tendency that underlines the relative unimportance of the membership organization for party financing in new democracies, there are a few parties for which party members continue to matter. Examples of such parties are primarily those with a long-standing organizational legacy, such as the Communist Party in Portugal (PCP) or the Czech Communist Party (KČSM). For these parties, the membership organization continues to be of importance in financial terms and can be seen to contribute from about a quarter up to almost half of the total income. More generally, these parties prove to be financially relatively self-sustaining, in that it is the membership organization rather than the state that constitutes the most important source of income. To a lesser extent, the same can be observed for the Spanish Communist Party and the Czech Christian Democrats, where the contribution of the membership organizations to the parties' income is higher than average.

For an assessment of the relative importance of the state vis-à-vis society, it should be emphasized that the role of society for the financing of

political parties is not exclusively confined to party members paying their fees. As has already been alluded to in the context of the Czech Republic, it may also include private donations. The relevance of societal funding is clearly visible in Portugal, at least as far as the financing of elections is concerned. The pattern that emerges from Table 8.5 is similar to that of the Czech parties, showing that, although public funding has become a critical source of income, this does not unequivocally rule out the relevance of society. Indeed, for the financing of the 1995 Portuguese elections, the state played only a minor role. If anything, it was financial contributions from society, primarily the party membership in the case of the Communist Party (listed as CDU in Table 8.5) and private contributors in the case of the PSD and PS, that provided the larger share of the parties' income. What is also worth underlining here is that the PS and PSD were the only two parties that received money from the business sector. This suggests that the prospect of incumbency is an attractive if not crucial factor for private financing, and thus confirms the observation made earlier in the context of the Czech Republic. In sum, while the state plays a noticeable role in the funding of the parties' routine activities, its importance is less evident in financing election campaigns, for which parties in some countries appear to be capable of generating resources other than state subsidies.

Other financial contributions emerging from society, such as those furnished by organized interests, are generally less important. Parallel to the reduced relevance of the membership organization in new democracies more generally, organized interest associations are usually not closely linked to political parties. To be sure, the balance sheets of the Communist Party and the Socialist Party in Spain reveal occasional financial transfers to and from the trade unions CCOO and UGT. This underlines the historically close ideological and organizational linkages between these parties and their affiliated trade unions, although it should be recalled that, with time, for both the PSOE and the PCE the relationship has lost much of its original strength (see Chapter 4).

The evidence, therefore, depicts quite a clear trend and shows that – at least formally – the state plays a predominant role in party financing, and particularly in the subsidizing of routine activities, while the contribution of society is only marginal, with the possible exception of private business financing the election campaigns of some Czech and Portuguese parties. However, although the state may often seem the single most important financier of party activity, in practice parties also receive considerable amounts from unlawful sources. From this perspective, membership subscriptions and private donations only constitute

Table 8.5 Financing Portuguese elections, 1995–2002

Income and expenditures	*CDU*	*PS*	*PSD*	*CDS-PP*	*Total*
1995 (million escudos)					
State subventions	13.3	**57.1**	46.3	13.3	*130.0*
Donations: companies	–	**59.5**	30.6	–	*90.1*
Donations: individuals	29.8	**374.2**	649.3	–	*1,053.3*
Fundraising campaigns	7.9	–	83.7	–	*91.6*
Contribution party	137.5	–	–	–	*137.5*
Other	–	–	22.9	70.8	*93.7*
Total income	*188.5*	***490.9***	*832.9*	*84.1*	*1,596.4*
Total expenditures	*188.5*	***495.5***	*832.1*	*116.9*	*1,633.0*
2002 (1000 euros)					
State subventions	284.5	1301.2	**1410.2**	**308.7**	3304.6
Donations: individuals	–	154.7	**366.2**	**408.9**	929.8
Fundraising campaigns	74.9	41.8	**385.4**	–	502.1
Contribution party	584.4	1134.5	**100.8**	–	1819.7
Other	10.8	–	–	–	10.8
Total income	*954.6*	*2,632.2*	***2,262.6***	***717.6***	*6,567.0*
Total expenditures	*642.7*	*2,631.6*	***3,081.2***	***777.2***	*7,132.7*
Income (% of total income)	*CDU*	*PS*	*PSD*	*CDS-PP*	*Mean*
1995					
State subventions	7.1	**11.6**	5.6	15.8	*10.0*
Donations: companies	–	**12.1**	3.7	–	*4.0*
Donations: individuals	15.8	**76.2**	78.0	–	*42.5*
Fundraising campaigns	4.2	–	10.0	–	*3.6*
Contribution party	72.9	–	–	–	*18.2*
Other	–	–	2.8	84.2	*21.8*
Total	*100.0*	***99.9***	*100.1*	*100.0*	*100.0*
2002					
State subventions	29.8	49.4	**62.3**	**43.0**	**46.1**
Donations: individuals	–	5.9	**16.2**	**57.0**	*19.8*
Fundraising campaigns	7.8	1.6	**17.0**	–	*6.6*
Contribution party	61.2	43.1	**4.5**	–	**27.2**
Other	1.1	–	–	–	*0.3*
Total	*99.9*	*100.0*	***100.0***	***100.0***	*100.0*

Notes: Bold figures denote government party. $1 = 145.7 escudos (mid-1995); 1€ = 200.482 escudos.

Source: *Comissão Nacional de Eleições*.

part of a broader category of societal funding. An exclusive focus on legitimate forms of party financing would exclude the potentially crucial role of these illicit contributions from society and thus potentially underestimate the importance of society for political finance. At the same time, it should also be noted that state resources themselves are not limited to the official subsidies, but also include numerous indirect subsidies and, perhaps most importantly for new democracies, party patronage. Hence an assessment of the relative importance of the state and society for party financing cannot afford to overlook the importance of practices of illicit financing from both society and the state which usually escape legal control (van Biezen and Kopecký, 2001).

For many countries there is ample evidence that considerable amounts of money have been obtained from corrupt sources and that parties have accessed big donors through kickbacks and tollgating. This type of financing seems to have assumed extensive proportions especially in Spain, where it was first uncovered through the 'Filesa affair' and other scandals have meanwhile followed suit (see del Castillo, 1994; Heywood, 1996). Although the extent of corruption is, due to its very nature, difficult to assess, the general supposition is that it is particularly pervasive in Spain. According to Heidenheimer's (1996) classification of 17 Western European countries, Spain ranks together with Italy, Greece and Turkey as 'quite corrupt', while Portugal is 'somewhat corrupt'. Indeed, media investigations of the early 1990s unveiled the involvement of, above all, the Spanish Socialist Party in a series of corruption scandals. The ensuing public disapproval and judicial prosecutions proved a major discrediting factor for the Socialist government and significantly contributed to the ascendancy to power of the *Partido Popular* in 1996.

However, the perception of the Spanish case as more corrupt may be partly biased. Not only are cases of illegal financing more frequently under scrutiny in the Spanish press, but the Spanish case also appears more frequently than Portugal, for example, in scholarly assessments of illicit financing in Western Europe (e.g. Mény and Rhodes, 1997) as well as in Southern European comparisons (e.g. Pujas and Rhodes, 1999).[19] Corrupt practices in other newly established democracies have only very recently begun to draw any attention, and these may be neither less infrequent nor less significant. For Portuguese parties, it has been argued that illicit party financing has also increasingly become a *modus vivendi* (de Sousa, 2001) and the same can be argued for Eastern Europe. In fact, illicit party financing was one of the major reasons for the resignation of Klaus' government in the Czech Republic in November 1997 and the subsequent split of the ODS. According to an external international audit,

the ODS had rigged its own accounts and failed to abide by donation disclosure laws, among others concealing donations from companies and individuals by using false names. Indeed, in the 2001 Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International, the post-communist countries are reported as significantly more corrupt than Southern Europe (and, incidentally, Spain as less corrupt than Portugal).[20]

The apparent pervasiveness of illicit party financing may explain the somewhat paradoxical situation that parties often seem to grapple with a lack of financial resources, having to resort to large bank loans and finishing up with massive debts, while they are unwilling to or incapable of generating external sources of income. One of the possible explanations for this discrepancy between the proclaimed insufficiency of the public subventions and the absence of substantial fundraising efforts is the inadequate and ineffective control of party financing, as a result of which unauthorized private financing frequently compensates for the officially declared lack of income. In addition, and despite strict regulations controlling income from private contributions in order to counteract improper sources of income, parties have resorted on a large scale to patronage and clientelism, extracting state resources through office holding positions (e.g. Cazorla, 1995; Lopes, 1997).

As Katz and Mair (1995) have pointed out, parties in contemporary democracies have come to dispose an ever increasing wealth of public resources, including official subventions, indirect funding and in-kind subsidies, and state-regulated media access. As a consequence of their strong linkage to the state, parties may also tend to turn to the state for resources in addition to these official subsidies, and may be inclined to make unauthorized use of public resources. Indeed, as Pasquino has also pointed out, a system of public funding may have a supplementary rather than substitutory effect on clientelistic forms of financing (quoted in Blanco, 1995: 165; see also Paltiel, 1979). The abundance of unauthorized uses of public resources and illegal party financing underscores the relevance of this observation in the context of both Southern Europe and post-communist East-Central Europe.

Party finance and party organization

The generally high dependence on public funding suggests that most parties have secured a financially robust linkage with the state virtually from the outset. The combination of a strong financial dependence on the state with pervasive patterns of patronage has encouraged parties to become so firmly entrenched in the state that they can be seen as

semi-state agencies (cf. Katz and Mair, 1995). In new democracies, moreover, the large part of state subsidies tends to be allocated to the national party. This has the effect of encouraging a top-down model of organization by concentrating financial decision-making in the hands of the party leadership and thus further centralizing the internal locus of power in already highly centralized parties. In addition, as will be discussed below, the relative importance of electoral versus routine subsidies indicates that parties are progressively focused on elections rather than organizational activities, which adds further evidence to the decreasing importance of the extra-parliamentary organization. However, it should be noted that an assessment of the patterns of party expenditures shows that this does not unequivocally rule out the relevance of the extra-parliamentary organization as such.

A comparison of the routine expenses with the expenditures on electoral activities reveals that, overall, Spanish parties spend considerably more money on routine organizational activities than on election campaigns. In the 1996 election campaign, the three nationwide parties (PSOE, AP/PP and IU/PCE) spent almost 6,300 million pesetas against some 16,500 million pesetas for routine purposes in 1997. A similar pattern of expenditure is discernible in Portugal, where the four major parties (PCP, PS, PSD and CDS-PP) together spent 1,633 million escudos for the 1995 election campaign, and even less (7.1 million euros or under 1,500 million escudos) in 2002, against 4,042 million escudos on routine activities in 1997. In addition, the evidence for Spain suggests that aggregate campaign expenses have increased at a much lower rate than those on organizational activities. Taken together, expenditures on routine activities for the three nationwide parties have more than doubled between 1988 and 1997, while the aggregate expenditures on election campaigns increased with a lower rate of just over 30 per cent between 1986 and 2000. Hence, the evidence here, albeit limited, reveals a primary focus on the routine activities of the extra-parliamentary party rather than any increasing electoralist orientation, although the analytical distinction between these two types of activities may be somewhat blurred in practice. The high levels of routine expenditures in Spain can be partly explained by the extensive and costly extra-parliamentary structures, since parties maintain local headquarters staffed by paid officials throughout the country (Heywood, 1996).

In addition to the pattern of expenditures, the relative importance of state subventions also reveals a balance in favour of routine as opposed to electoral activities. Comparing the relative weight of the different types of state subsidies shows that in both Spain and Portugal subventions for

routine activities are substantially higher than those for electoral purposes. Portugal shows a particularly uneven allocation of state subventions, by which subventions for routine activities are about ten times higher than election subsidies: in 1995, the state spent a total of 1262.6 million escudos on routine subsidies, against only 130 million escudos for campaign expenditures. However, it should also be observed that with time the balance has changed to the advantage of electoral subventions. While the modification of the system of party financing in Portugal in 1993 can in itself be seen as indicative of the growing importance given to the financing of electoral campaigns, in Spain it is the change in the relative weight of state subventions that underlines the increasingly higher priority accorded to the funding of campaign expenses. While the total of public subsidies for routine activities in Spain grew with almost 20 per cent (from some 7402 million to about 8744 million pesetas) between 1987 and 1997, the subsidies for national election campaigns more than doubled (from 3155 million to almost 6848 million pesetas) between 1986 and 1996. Consequently, the relative share of routine and electoral subsidies changed from a ratio of about 5 : 2 in the late 1980s to only 3 : 2 by 1996. The modification of the system of party financing in Portugal in 1993 also is indicative of an increasingly higher priority afforded to elections. Although the state subsidizes election expenditures by much smaller sums than routine activities, the introduction of state reimbursement for electoral costs as a new source of public funding is in itself a sign of the growing importance of electoral activities.

The prevalent focus on electoral activities applies to a much greater effect in the Czech Republic, where state subsidies for routine activities are not nearly as important as those for electoral purposes. Whereas the amount of routine subsidies clearly outweighs the electoral subventions in Portugal and Spain, in the Czech Republic the sum of state money for the costs of election campaigns is about five times higher than the state subsidies for routine purposes. This indicates a much higher orientation towards electoral rather than non-electoral activities. In this sense, it seems that the relevance of electoral linkages, electoral activities and electoral success for parties works with the greatest effect on the most recently established democracy.

Conclusion

In new democracies, public funds are not only a crucial financial resource, they have also been available from the very beginning. State

subsidies to parties were introduced at a relatively early stage of the democratization process in the post-communist democracies even prior to the first democratic elections. In a context in which extensive state funding is available when political parties are still only in a very early stage of party development, the close financial linkage with the state has discouraged parties from looking for additional sources of income (except for corrupt sources perhaps) and has removed a key incentive to establish a more structural relationship with civil society. Parties thus become part of the state apparatus rather than tools of civil society (Katz, 1996).

For many of the parties in the newly established democracies, the relevance of public money is indeed pronounced and, with state subsidies in a number of cases contributing to some 95 per cent of their income, the financial dependence on the state in some parties is virtually complete. The most significant exceptions to this pattern of financial state dependency are some of the older parties, most notably the Portuguese PCP and the Czech KSČM, for which the membership organization financially also continues to be of primary relevance. Given the low levels of party membership in new democracies, however, the financial contribution of the membership organization is on average virtually insignificant. The role of society more generally is relatively limited, with the possible exception of the financial contributions from private business to the campaign expenses of some Czech and Portuguese parties. For the financing of their routine activities, however, these parties also strongly depend on the state.

This high financial dependence on the state furthermore concurs with an increasing electoral orientation. To be sure, not all the evidence points unequivocally towards a reduced relevance of the extra-parliamentary organization. The Spanish parties in particular have been spending larger amounts on their party organizations than on their electoral activities. Nevertheless, in terms of the relative weight of state subventions for electoral purposes and routine organizational activities, there is a clear tendency towards an increasing importance of the former. This is indicated by the introduction of separate state subventions for election expenditures in both Portugal (in 1993) and the Czech Republic (in 1995), and by the much higher rate of increase of electoral subventions compared to subventions for routine activities in Spain. In addition, the Czech system of public funding in particular shows an unequivocal bias in favour of electoral activities and it is also the Czech state which distributes the highest amounts of money per voter. Hence, it seems that it is in one of the most recently established democracies that a relatively high priority is accorded to the funding of political parties and where an electoral orientation is also most clearly visible.

In terms of their strong linkage with the state, most parties in the new Southern and Eastern European democracies appear to reflect the tendency observed in Western Europe, by which state subventions become a principal financial resource for modern parties. Since state subventions are defined in terms of electoral success or parliamentary strength, they make it difficult for newcomers to enter the system. In this sense, public funding may act to freeze the *status quo* of the party system or encourage its cartellization (cf. Gillespie, 1998: 81–4). Illicit financing in the form of patronage and corruption may be seen further to strengthen the strong patterns of state dependence. If money accrued from corrupt sources would be particularly advantageous to governing parties, it may serve to reinforce rather than to counterbalance the overall dependence on the state (van Biezen and Kopecký, 2001: 424). Precisely why these new democracies should be more susceptible to illicit financing than (the majority of) Western European countries need not concern us at this point.[21] However, it is important to recognize here that the institutional framework of public funding has advanced a particular 'logic of appropriateness' (March and Olsen, 1984), encouraging a standard of behaviour that allows political actors to operate within a reasonably robust although relatively inconsequential legal system of public control over party financing.

9
Patterns of Party Organization in New Democracies

The main contention of the present analysis has been that political parties which emerge in a context in which democratization primarily entails the establishment of the principles of public contestation in a previously hegemonic regime will follow a different path of organizational development than parties emerging in a context whereby a competitive oligarchy develops into a full democracy. Whereas many of the now established Western European liberal democracies followed a path from competitive oligarchy to democracy, this path has generally not been available to countries that constituted part of the 'third wave', including the four Southern and East-Central European democracies analysed here. This institutional context, adopted from Dahl's influential typology of political regimes, is of fundamental importance for an understanding of party formation, for it conditions the opportunities and constraints for organization building.

More particularly, it was argued that the environment in which most parties in the newly established democracies emerged is likely to have favoured a certain sequence of organizational development in which the party in public office emerges and acquires relevance before the development of an extra-parliamentary organization, and that this, in turn, would then be reflected in the current organizational format in the predominance of the public face of the party in the organization as a whole. Furthermore, given that many parties in these new democracies had to build their organization from scratch and also given that the context in which they emerged would probably lead to a prioritizing of electoralist as opposed to organizationally penetrative strategies, the expectation was that partisan linkages with society would be weak, that the membership organization would have acquired little importance in the party

organization as a whole, and that extra-parliamentary activity would depend on professionals rather than on members working as volunteers. Given their institutional origins and the relevance of institution building, moreover, it was anticipated that their orientation to and their linkages with the state would be strongly developed, and that parties would be characterized by relatively high centralization around the party leadership. In addition to the institutional context, conjunctural factors related to the period in which these parties emerged, and particularly the access to public funding and the mass media, were expected to have served to enhance these particular organizational styles.

The first observation to be made, however, is that it appears quite difficult to establish general and unequivocal patterns of party organization, since, on the face of it, there seems to be a large extent of variation in organizational features. In this sense, therefore, the evidence indicates a striking level of dissimilarity rather than pointing towards any trend in patterns of party organization, let alone indicating the emergence of a particular type of party organization for the newly established democracies. This variation logically also implies that there are always cases that confound the expectations, and for which a definite explanatory factor cannot always be singled out. With few exceptions, moreover, these outliers do not add up to a consistent pattern of deviance. Thus, for example, while it is sometimes the distinction between 'old' and 'new' parties that accounts for diverging organizational patterns, variation in the degree of organizational continuity emerges only irregularly and inconsistently as significant, occasionally being relevant to some parties while not to others. The same is true for the distinction between government and opposition parties, or between parties of the left and right.

Nevertheless, this is not to argue that parties in new democracies have not developed their party organizations along some clearly discernible patterns, since variation does not imply that organizational features are simply randomly dispersed. Despite deviant cases, therefore, it is still possible to tease out some predominant patterns of party organization in new democracies. Moreover, in many respects, a clear contrast emerges between the Southern and Eastern European parties, suggesting that the contextual factors apply more forcefully to parties in the more newly established democracies and that factors related to the social and political environment in which parties emerge reinforce the patterns induced by their institutional environment.

On the relevance of members, professionals and party leaderships

Party members clearly play a reduced role compared to professionals and the party leaderships, although it should also be noted that, even in new democracies, the model of the party as a membership organization continues to matter. This can be seen from the particular structure that has generally been adopted for the extra-parliamentary organization. All parties analysed here are based on formal membership registration, thresholds for entry are normally low, and nearly all parties have adopted an organizational structure in which the local branch is the basic organizational unit. In this sense, therefore, these parties have modelled their organization according to the 'Socialist invention' of relatively open branches which contrasts with the model based on the closed and limited caucus, in which entrance tended to occur only through co-option or formal nomination (Duverger, 1954: 23). The introduction of these basic principles of organization by the early mass party on the eve of democratization in the late nineteenth century thus had a 'contagion effect' clearly extending beyond an immediate impact on the traditional cadre parties of that era, in that they also provide the leading examples for parties building their organizations in the recently established democracies today.

Parties in the new democracies further seem to have taken their cue from their older Western European counterparts in terms of a party structure in which local branches (and cells) are clearly only part of the whole. While, as Duverger (1954: 23) puts it, the traditional caucus 'evokes an autonomous reality, capable of living on its own', the separate existence of branches is inconceivable. Most parties in the newly established democracies also display a high level of vertical articulation, with a strong connection between the different organizational levels through the representation of lower strata in the higher echelons. Party organizations are generally built bottom up, having established congresses or assemblies at all levels of the organization which are usually composed primarily of delegates elected at the lower echelons and conceived as representative organs of the membership organization. Executive organs are normally elected by, and accountable to, these assemblies. Ultimately, it is the national party congress which is formally the highest decision-making authority within the party. This further underlines the importance accorded to the membership organization and demonstrates the impact of previously existing models of party organization in the West on the recently established democracies.

In this regard, it is also worth pointing out that, for most parties, the membership organization is the exclusive basis on which the entire extra-parliamentary organization is structured: that is, its size is decisive for the share of representation of the lower structures to the party congress or to other national organs, as well as the number of representatives to organs on the higher strata more generally. Only FIDESZ, *Izquierda Unida*, the PP and the CDS-PP are organized – although virtually none of them exclusively – on the basis of their levels of electoral support. These four parties thus clearly accord a lower relevance to the membership organization and, in this sense, reflect an organizational structure which shows a stronger orientation towards the party's electors rather than its members.

In addition, many parties continue to value the existence of a membership organization, and members therefore continue to matter, as can be illustrated by the membership recruitment campaigns carried out by the Spanish and Portuguese Socialist Parties, for example. Even in new democracies, therefore, electoral legitimacy derived from the mandate of the voters cannot supplant the perceived legitimacy derived from a large membership. These parties thus still cling to the predominant Western model of the party as a membership organization and thus, despite their relatively recent arrival on the stage and despite expectations, they do not differ so markedly from their older counterparts in the established democracies.

Having said that, however, various examples attest to the increasing relevance of direct member participation in the election of party organs and officials, and thus to a changing role for the party members in respect of the traditional membership organization. The changing role of the organized membership may also be seen from the marked and quite consistent pattern by which the frequency of party congresses tends to be reduced over time. Parties in new democracies thus tend to limit the opportunities for involvement and participation of the organized membership, and they do so even more effectively than their counterparts in the established Western democracies (see Krouwel, 1999: 110). These parties may therefore echo contemporary reforms in many of the long-established Western European parties, by which the organized membership tends to become less relevant (see Mair, 1994).

Furthermore, it can be argued that many of the organizational changes point towards the marginalization of the membership per se, and a loss of intra-party democracy more generally. From this perspective, the consistent cutback in the frequency of party congresses can be seen as just one example of the mechanisms by which the membership

increasingly loses its relevance and party organizations in new democracies tend to be progressively dominated by their national leaderships. The overall weakness of the structural linkage between parties and society in a sense has paved the way for a more influential role for the party elites. Certainly as far as the provisions in the party rules are concerned, but also in political practice, it is often the national executive which emerges as the organ ultimately controlling the functioning of the party apparatus, the financial decision making as well as the selection of candidates for public office. Although the lower strata of the organization may have some say in the selection process of public office holders, the national executive usually retains the right to final approval or veto. Even in parties where the membership participates directly in the selection of the party leader, as in the case of the PSOE for example, the strong role of the party leadership in the selection of candidates remains evident and the actual extent to which the primaries have increased the influence of the membership is questionable (Boix, 1998; Hopkin, 2001).

The high degree of centralization around the party leadership is even more strongly suggested by the prominent position of the party leader within the organization, who, not only in political practice but also by statute, enjoys a privileged position. Notwithstanding the preservation of a formally collegial leadership by some of the older parties, many parties show a marked inclination towards personalized leadership. In many parties, the composition of the permanent executive, the control over the party apparatus, the employment of party personnel, the financial management of the party, the selection of candidates for public office and the eventual control of the government may largely hinge upon the statutory and factual authority of the party leader. All this is perhaps best illustrated by the radical transformation from a collegial to a personal leadership with extensive prerogatives in FIDESZ (see Chapter 5), in a shift towards what represents the predominant leadership style in the new democracies.

Finally, it should be emphasized that party members are clearly less relevant than paid professionals for internal party activity. Here too, parties in new democracies mirror the tendencies observed for Western European parties, where the diminished importance of voluntary labour is clearly demonstrated by the substantial increase during the postwar period in the number of paid professionals at the party central office. Nevertheless, despite increasing professionalization, contemporary Western democracies recorded only 6.3 paid employees for every 10,000 party members in the late 1980s (Krouwel, 1999: 91). In the new democracies, by contrast,

the level of professionalization – amounting to an average of 12.9 professionals for every 10,000 party members – is more than twice as high. The importance of professionals has thus assumed an even greater weight than in contemporary Western Europe, although it appears to be the post-communist democracies that are primarily responsible for these marked levels of professionalization rather than the new democracies per se.[1] In this sense, therefore, the post-communist countries provide the sharpest contrast with both their Southern European counterparts and the long-established liberal democracies in Western Europe.

The East-Central European parties also tend to revolve to a larger extent around party officials as opposed to party members, as is attested by the much higher proportion of ex officio representation on their party organs than in the Southern European parties. More generally, the observation that the existence of a membership organization continues to be valued positively appears much less relevant in the post-communist context. For many of the parties in Hungary and the Czech Republic a favourable attitude towards members is largely absent, despite their formal organizational model as a membership organization. That party members in the post-communist countries generally do not seem to carry any additional advantage to the party is not only reflected in the somewhat acquiescent attitude towards the low membership levels and the absence of membership recruitment campaigns, but also, and more strikingly, in the relatively widespread practice of fielding independent candidates for public office under the party label. This appears to be a prevalent phenomenon in post-communist politics, partly induced by the negative connotation associated with the party as a political institution. In Russia, for example, some candidates even 'intentionally hid their ties to a party in fear that their party affiliation would alienate potential supporters' (Moser, 1999: 148).

By expanding their reach outside the channels of the party organization in performing their recruitment function, moreover, these parties reveal a generally poor sense of party as well as a primary concern for electoral performance, by which a model of the party as a membership organization is relegated to the status of an old-fashioned phenomenon. These parties thus provide a marked contrast with the continuing interest in many of the Western European parties in maintaining a membership organization (e.g. Scarrow, 1996; Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Whiteley et al., 1994). Hence, particularly in the post-communist democracies, the distinction between members and non-members has become almost decisively blurred and the notion of party membership clearly has lost practically all of its relevance. In that sense, the preservation of the party

as a membership organization has almost become a paper structure devoid of substance.

Parties and society: a tenuous relationship

Given this general attitude towards membership, it is therefore perhaps not surprising that membership levels are generally low, and that they tend to be even lower in East-Central Europe than in Southern Europe. In terms of the levels of party membership, parties in new democracies are indeed characterized by relatively weak partisan linkages with society. Taken as a percentage of the electorate, party membership today in the four countries analysed here averages just 3.2 per cent. Parties in newly established democracies, therefore, clearly do not engage citizens the way their counterparts in the longer established democracies once did, for which an average of almost 15 per cent was recorded at the beginning of the 1960s. They also fall below the mean recorded for contemporary European democracies, which stood at almost 5 per cent in the late 1990s and 2000 (see Katz, Mair, et al., 1992; Mair and van Biezen, 2001).

A diachronic analysis of the membership levels furthermore reveals that the membership organizations are unlikely to expand substantially beyond their presently limited size. Of the four countries analysed here, Spain is the only country where party membership in relation to the electorate has increased significantly over the past twenty years, while Portugal and Hungary have witnessed rather minor growth levels. The Czech Republic has actually recorded a substantial decline, which can be largely attributed to the massive and quite predictable decline in the membership of the former ruling Communist Party (KSČ, now KSČM) and, although to a lesser extent, to that of the Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL), a former satellite party. This suggests that the factors which have been responsible for the general decline in party membership and the erosion of the party organization on the ground in longer established democracies appear to work with an even greater effect on parties in newly democratizing polities. To be sure, old parties generally have a larger membership organization than their newer established counterparts. This is most notably true for the Czech Communist Party (KSČM) and the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), but also for the Czech Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL). However, despite their currently relatively high membership levels, these older parties have seen their organization on the ground sometimes rapidly whither away in what appears to be quite a consistent trend. For the Spanish Communist Party (PCE), this steady and continuous decline in membership levels had already

started shortly after the transition. The relatively large membership organizations of some of these older parties may therefore reflect a certain degree of organizational inertia, but the erosion of their membership organization suggests that many of them are gradually losing their hold on society. In the long run, therefore, this type of partisan linkage with society will tend to lose much of its relevance.

A number of newly created parties have established relatively large, or at least medium-sized membership organizations. This is especially true for the Spanish *Partido Popular*. While its membership organization did not receive any significant impulse until mid-1982, by the late 1990s the party ranked second after the Czech Communist Party. On the other hand, a newly established party such as the *Partido Popular* also shows that the membership organization, while perhaps comparably large on paper, may be of little relevance in the party organization as a whole. The obligations of the members of the *Partido Popular* are only minimal and the party does not demand any substantial participatory duties from its membership. More generally, it is worth recalling that it is only in newly established parties such as the Spanish PP or the Czech ODS and ODA that the obligations of party members are minimal and do not exceed the payment of the membership fees or vague requirements such as the acceptance of the party rules, programme and statutes. Older parties such as the Communist PCP and KSČM, by contrast, clearly reveal their organizational legacy by standing out for the high number of obligations and by demanding the strongest commitment from their members. And although the Spanish PCE and PSOE or the Czech KDU-ČSL started out as parties imposing considerable duties on their members and demanding a quite active level of participation, all three are now gradually abandoning this organizational inheritance. This can be interpreted as an adaptation of the party organization in which any substantial engagement of the membership in internal party activities is no longer desirable and in which an active party membership is seen to matter less.

Even here, however, the picture is not unequivocal, since many of the newly established parties appear to have imposed sometimes considerable obligations on their members. These requirements include the duty of active membership participation and the recruitment of new members to the party, or the prescription of a particularly active role to the local branch, for example. The fact that many parties have introduced at least some of these requirements suggests that parties in a newly established democracy have introduced more 'inclusive' organizations than anticipated, and also that they might be slightly more approving of an active membership than expected.

These unexpected findings notwithstanding, the formal organizational linkages between parties and society are generally weakly developed. This can also be seen from the low extensiveness of party organizations, i.e. their limited geographical coverage, which, again, is more relevant for the East-Central European context rather than the new democracies *tout court*. Parties in post-communist Hungary and the Czech Republic, and particularly the newly created ones, have established such a limited number of local branches that, on average, the reach of party organizations does not exceed 25 per cent of the territory.[2] One of the important consequences of the weak presence of party organizations on the ground is the low profile of parties in local politics, which tends to be dominated by candidates without party affiliation. In addition, the low territorial implantation of party organization in post-communist countries leaves parties in these polities remote from large sectors of society, and, consequently, renders partisan linkages more generally of little relevance as a channel to structure the relationship between parties and society.

Hence, with the levels of party affiliation relatively low, and, especially in post-communist polities, the territorial presence of the party organization relatively limited, party membership appears to be an exceptional rather than a common political practice. It thus appears that tendencies towards a declining importance of the partisan linkage found in the established Western European democracies, where 'parties are weakening as elite–mass linkages' (Andeweg, 1996: 158), are also visible, and even more forcefully so, in the context of the newly established democracies. This is also true if the conceptualization of linkage is stretched beyond a merely formal organizational relationship with society.[3] As is demonstrated by evidence suggesting low or negative party-identification (see Schmitt and Holmberg, 1995; Rose and Mishler, 1998), low trust in political parties and politicians (e.g. McDonough et al., 1994; Wyman et al., 1995), high levels of abstention and electoral volatility (see Gunther and Montero, 2001; Morlino, 1995; Tóka, 1998), or the heterogeneity of the parties' electoral constituencies (e.g. Linz and Montero, 1999; Szelényi et al., 1997), linkages between parties and citizens also tend to be weak in psychological, ideological or sociological terms. It thus appears to be the electoral rather than partisan linkages that almost exclusively shape the relationship between parties and society, while the role of parties in providing the linkage between society and the state might be increasingly diminishing (see also Katz, 1990).

In addition to the weakness of the partisan linkage per se, it is noteworthy to emphasize that the nature of the relationship between parties

and society tends to be shaped through direct rather than indirect linkages. Although our initial expectations have been challenged by the relatively large number of parties that have created separate youth – and sometimes also women's – associations, and thus have adopted a partially indirect structure of organization, this mode of organization is not extended to the inclusion of other organized interest associations within the ranks of the party organization. The large majority of parties report no formal linkages with trade unions, for example, or with organized interest associations more generally. In fact, the only party ever to possess an institutionalized relationship with a fraternal trade union was the Spanish PSOE, which maintained such a linkage until 1990 in the form of an obligation on the part of party members to affiliate to the UGT.

Despite the absence of formal linkages, close relationships do actually exist in political practice. The strongest linkage can be found between the Portuguese Communist Party and the CGTP, where it consists of a virtual complete entanglement of the party and union cells on the shopfloor, interlocking directorates at the level of party and union elites, as well as a strong emphasis on behalf of the party to strengthen the union and to promote the organic cohesion of the labour movement. The orientation of both party and union is furthermore exclusive, in that they reject any division in the labour movement and generally refuse cooperation with other, non-communist, organizations. The Hungarian KDNP resembles the PCP with their primarily exclusive focus on linkages with like-minded, in this case Catholic, organizations and therefore also provides an example of a party organization with a deep subcultural implantation (see Enyedi, 1996).

The PCP and KDNP are exceptions to a general organizational pattern, however, where, despite the sometimes close relationships with organized interest associations, such an exclusive approach to organized interests is normally absent or clearly diminishing. The PCE and PSOE, for example, both started out in the post-authoritarian era with an organizational model derived from their historical origins as early twentieth-century labour parties, which was characterized by a strong connection with an allied trade union. However, both parties have begun to recognize the need to open up the party organization to interest organizations other than the traditionally allied UGT and CCOO. With time, therefore, the relationship between parties and trade unions has become much looser and both the PCE and PSOE have gradually disentangled themselves from their historical linkages. In Eastern Europe, the former ruling Communist Parties and their allied trade unions have abandoned their organizational and programmatic commitment to one another

more decisively, as is illustrated by the relationship between the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and the trade union MSZOSZ, or the distant position that the Czech unions have always taken vis-à-vis political parties, and the Communist Party in particular. That an indirect model of integration is considered largely obsolete and inappropriate for parties in contemporary democracies can also be seen quite clearly from the stance of the Portuguese Socialist Party in defence of a direct linkage between party and society.

All of these parties thus show that the actual autonomous relation between parties and organized movements is not necessarily the result of a weak development of organizations in civil society, as Kopecký and Barnfield (1999) have argued in the context of post-communism, but is at least partially induced by the reluctance of parties to adopt the particular indirect model of organization. The context of contemporary democratizing regimes, therefore, in which parties are generally not born out of politicized societal interests and in which the sequence of organizational development is reversed, leaves few incentives for them to develop close and formalized linkages with organized interest movements (cf. Coppieters and Waller, 1994; Deschouwer and Coppieters, 1994). In fact, in many of the old parties the historical linkages with organized interests are now unravelling along a similar path to that taken by their counterparts in contemporary Western European democracies.

Encouraging *étatisation* through public funding

The availability of public funding can be seen to have a critical impact on party organization in new democracies in that it has decisively strengthened party–state relations and, at the same time, reinforced the organizational styles already encouraged by the particular context of a newly democratizing polity in which parties first developed. First, the early introduction of state subventions secured a strong financial link between parties and state from the outset. In fact, financial dependence on public subventions is such that the state is – at least formally – the single most important financier of party activity. Financially, parties in new democracies are even more firmly entrenched in the state than parties in the contemporary established democracies. While direct subventions on average contribute to about 65 per cent of the total income of the parties in the new democracies, the average share of public funds to the total income of Western European parties in the late 1980s was only some 35 per cent (Krouwel, 1999: 82). In terms of their strong linkage with the state, therefore, most parties in the newly established

democracies of Southern and East-Central Europe clearly reflect the tendency observed by Katz and Mair (1995) by which state subventions become a principal resource for modern parties in a contemporary democracy and by which parties increasingly become part of the state apparatus rather than part of civil society (see also Katz, 1996).

While the introduction of public funding in Western Europe contributed significantly to the parties' shifting orientation from society towards the state, in the new democracies the tie to the state came immediately in the wake of democratization. In addition, the parties' early financial dependence on the state also appears to have removed one key incentive to establish a more structural financial linkage with society. Notwithstanding the continuing importance of the membership organization for some of the older parties such as the Czech and Portuguese Communists, the membership organization has generally lost virtually all relevance in financial terms. On average, in the new democracies, the share of membership fees to the parties' total income amounts to just some 7 per cent. These figures again stand in marked contrast with the Western European parties, where, despite a distinctive decline from the beginning of the 1950s onwards, almost 30 per cent of the income still originates from membership fees (Krouwel, 1999: 76). Here too, therefore, these parties present unequivocal evidence of the pace by which trends observed for the long-established democracies tend to be reinforced in the context of a new contemporary democracy.

Moreover, public funding tends further to encourage the parties' electoral orientation, by tilting the balance increasingly in favour of subventions for electoral as opposed to routine organizational activities, which has also removed another incentive for the development of the extra-parliamentary organization. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, it underlines the higher priority that the parties deciding on such measures accord to electoral rather than organizational activities. In this sense, therefore, it reflects a notion of party by which a direct and temporary linkage with the electorate prevails in importance over a more structural and permanent relationship with the party rank-and-file.

Finally, the extensive availability of public funds has not only created strong party–state linkages, but also has further centralized the locus of power within the party. More specifically, the increasing dependence on the state as a single financier coupled with the centralized method of subsidy allocation has resulted in a corresponding increase in the concentration of power within the party (cf. Panebianco, 1988). In terms of the internal organizational dynamics, therefore, the extreme financial dependence on the state has further encouraged the oligarchization of

parties and, to recall Michels (1962 [1911]: 117), has 'enshackled the organization as with iron chains.' Parties in new democracies, therefore, are primarily elitist organizations and, as Mair (1997: 184–5) suggests, the absence of a successful challenge from alternative (mass) types of parties 'is likely to favour the continued maintenance of elitist party organizations'. Quite unexpectedly, however, parties in new democracies are ones in which the locus of power is to be found within the extra-parliamentary executive.

The predominance of the extra-parliamentary executive

It is this last observation which is perhaps the most intriguing. For although many of the arguments cited above may lend support to our initial expectations, parties in new democracies differ from what was anticipated, and from their Western European counterparts, in one important respect: in terms of the balance of power between the extra-parliamentary party and the party in public office, the evidence does not seem to support the anticipated predominance of the party in public office within the party organization. Of the various indicators considered in this analysis – the official position of the party in public office as written down in the party rules, the degree of personnel overlap between the organs of the extra-parliamentary organization and the party in public office, and the distribution of human and financial resources over the elements of the party organization – it is striking to note that only the high level of accumulation of functions seems to provide unambiguous support for the original hypothesis. That is, it is only in the accumulation of functions that we see a strong confirmation of a trend towards the predominance of the party in public office in newly emerging democracies.

What is therefore surprising, and thus also more interesting, is the evidence of the remarkably powerful status of the extra-parliamentary party and the particularly strong position of the party executive. Rather than acquiring the status of an independent body, let alone that of the predominant face, the official rules of these parties indicate that the party in parliament is essentially subordinate to the party executive. Also, in financial terms, it is the extra-parliamentary party that clearly occupies the most privileged position. In addition, the relatively low levels of professionalization of the parliamentary party suggest that the tendency towards increased public office predominance does not apply to the newly established parties. In fact, the gradual strengthening of the position of the extra-parliamentary party observed for some parties even

reveals a tendency opposite to the direction of organizational change recently observed for many Western European countries, where the party in public office has generally been the main beneficiary of the changing relationship between the different faces of the party organization.

These observations sharply contrast with the proposition formulated at the beginning of this analysis, where it was argued that, especially in the context of a newly emerging democracy and given the particular sequence of organization building, there are theoretically sound reasons to expect that the party in public office will be the predominant face of the party. But for parties in these new democracies, the classic dictum of either internal or external creation appears of little relevance in terms of the overall power balance between the extra-parliamentary party and the party in public office. Nor has their birth in an environment of generous public funding and widely available mass media tipped the scales in favour of the party in public office.

To be sure, the original proposition could still be maintained by pointing to the very high proportion of public office holders, both by statute and in practice, in the extra-parliamentary organs. This could suggest that, in the context of these newly established democracies, the analytical distinction between the two faces is meaningless in practice, and that the party executive is actually little more than a subsection of the party in public office. And thus, even if the rules would indicate a favourable position of the party executive, it could still be contended that, in effect, it is the party in public office that wields the power.[4] Yet, although the importance of the high levels of personnel overlap should not be underestimated, and although this logic cannot be dismissed entirely, it nevertheless fails to account for the provisions in the official party rules that explicitly put the party in public office under the strict supervision of the executive, let alone the tendency for the control of the national executive over the party in public office to increase with time. In addition, as the surveys of MPs in the Czech Republic and Hungary suggest, parliamentary deputies themselves are quite capable of distinguishing between the directives of the national executive and the decisions made by the parliamentary group, and this in itself would suggest that it is actually an oversimplification to treat the two bodies as if they were entirely indistinguishable.

Given the apparently limited value of established models of party formation and organizational change for parties in newly established democratic polities, it seems therefore that alternative explanatory factors have to be taken into consideration to account for the particular balance of power between these two faces of party organization. What

is interesting to observe in this respect are the opinions of the MPs themselves on their position vis-à-vis the executive. When asked in 1993 who should have the final say if the opinion of the parliamentary party differed from that of the national executive, 33 per cent of the Czech MPs and 45 per cent of the Hungarian MPs opted for the parliamentary party, as opposed to only 23 and 24 per cent respectively who chose the national executive (see Kopecký, 2001; van der Meer Krok-Paszkowska and van den Muyzenberg, 1998). At the very least, this indicates that parliamentary representatives are reluctant to yield their autonomy to the party executive. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, these perspectives reflect possible underlying tensions between the party in parliament and the extra-parliamentary party, and perhaps it is this tension that should lie at the core of any explanation of the tendency to strengthen the position of the party executive at the expense of the party in public office.

This is not to suggest that tensions between the extra-parliamentary party and the party in parliament, or intra-party conflict more generally, are the exclusive preserve of emerging parties in new democratic systems. What is true, however, is that newly created parties in particular are vulnerable to intra-party conflicts and, within the volatile environment of a newly democratizing regime, the initial consensus over the party's policy or goals may be rapidly undermined in the wake of the emergence of new issues or as a result of the need to adapt to other actors in the changing political arena. What may also be considered symptomatic for parties in new democracies is the obvious readiness of individual MPs or entire factions to split from the original party when internal disagreements prove difficult to reconcile, a readiness which clearly demonstrates the lack of party institutionalization and the weakness of existing loyalties towards the party.[5] This is certainly true to the extent that the costs involved in 'exit' are often lower than those of 'voice' (Hirschman, 1970). A high level of intra-party instability is therefore typical of newly emerging parties in a newly democratized polity, whereas the number of splits and mergers in parties in the established liberal democracies has generally proved quite limited (see Mair, 1990).

Since intra-party conflicts engender a potentially destabilizing effect in a context of weakly developed party loyalties and lack of party institutionalization, parties in newly democratizing polities may therefore consider it particularly urgent to build mechanisms that can maintain the unity of the party and thus discipline the party in public office. From this perspective, the incorporation of large numbers of MPs into the party executive and the simultaneously strong position of the party executive in the new democracies can perhaps be interpreted as

a disciplinary device intended to increase the cohesion of the party in public office.[6] In other words, by ensuring the supremacy of the rules and directives of the party over the autonomy of the parliamentary group and the MPs' constitutionally enshrined free mandate, parties may intend to counteract the potential lack of parliamentary unity and to establish a degree of cohesion that otherwise could not be easily achieved in a context of weakly developed party loyalties.

This cohesion-seeking strategy could provide a plausible alternative hypothesis that accounts for the particularly strong position of the extra-parliamentary party in these new democracies. Indeed, the relevance of this rationale underlying the constraints on the autonomy of the parliamentary party is endorsed by both party officials and parliamentary representatives (see Paniagua Soto, 1997). In addition, and perhaps more importantly, there are at least two fundamental contingencies worth addressing in this respect. First of all, it is important to underline that the preservation of a cohesive and disciplined parliamentary group is clearly an asset once the party assumes governmental responsibility; indeed, virtually all parties included in this analysis have already had government experience. Becoming a party of government inevitably makes the internal party structure and thus the relations between the different faces more complex, since it divides the public face of the party into a governmental and a parliamentary component. When parties acquire governmental status at an early stage of organizational development – which is generally the case for parties in new democracies – they are particularly vulnerable to the destabilizing consequences that the intricate relationship between the extra-parliamentary party, the party in government and the parliamentary party may produce. An amenable and subordinate parliamentary party may therefore help to diminish the tensions between the two public faces of the party and thus contribute to the freedom of manoeuvre of the party in government.

Secondly, and following from this perspective, it is probably not accidental that in virtually all parties the process of selection of candidates for public office is highly centralized and concentrated – either formally or informally – around the party leadership. As Gallagher points out, parliamentary indiscipline is likely to occur when neither the local party organizations nor the MPs selected for the party have developed a strong sense of built-in partisanship (Gallagher, 1988: 270). In this sense, as Bowler et al. (1999: 7) indicate, '[i]t is a very important component in recruiting members to the legislature that there be some preexisting loyalty to the party itself'. In the context of a newly established democracy, therefore, it may have been the general lack of such a strong sense of party attachment that has induced parties to seek for alternative mechanisms

that might reduce possible dissenting behaviour among their public office holders. Controlling the recruitment process of future public office holders from above may therefore be one of the means by which parties in newly developing democracies compensate for the weakness of reservoirs of party loyalty and try to ensure party cohesion through 'enforced discipline' (cf. Sartori, 1994: 191).[7]

Although public office holders thus clearly occupy a central position in parties in newly established democracies, our expectation that the party in public office will increasingly emerge as the predominant face of the party organization cannot be sustained. If anything, it is the extra-parliamentary party executive that emerges as the institutional actor. This also suggests that the relation between the party in public office and the extra-parliamentary party is actually more complex than is generally assumed. Certainly as far as the new democracies considered here are concerned, party organizations appear to have become increasingly controlled from a small centre of power located at the interstices of the extra-parliamentary party and the party in public office.

But why should this be the case? And why, contrary to our generally plausible expectations, should the party in public office not have achieved an unequivocal predominance? As has been suggested above, we can perhaps best interpret these counter-intuitive findings as reflecting a desire to increase party cohesion and so reduce the potentially destabilizing consequences of emerging intra-party conflicts, which themselves are an inevitable by-product of the context of weakly developed party loyalties and a generalized lack of party institutionalization. In addition, it may simply be that much easier for the party leadership to control many of the parties' essential activities, such as the allocation of financial resources or the process of candidate selection, if such control is exercised from within the party executive rather than from within the party in public office. In other words, consolidating its position within the party executive provides the party leadership with a relatively stable and predictable organizational foundation, which is a particularly valuable asset in a climate of frequent party ruptures.[8] In these cases, at least, it appears to be the party executive that constitutes the organizational base that can best withstand the consequences of the volatile environment of a newly emerging democracy.

Conclusion

It thus appears that, except for the balance of power between the extra-parliamentary organization and the party in public office, parties in the

new democracies have adopted an organizational style which largely resembles that of their contemporary counterparts in the older democracies. In fact, in many respects, these parties provide a model by which the organizational styles to which the parties in the West have been developing can be seen to prevail in an accentuated form. In other words, many of the organizational characteristics which are seen to predominate in parties in the long-established Western European democracies today are even more forcefully present in the newly established democracies. This is true for the weak partisan and strong electoral linkages, as well as the reduced relevance of party members, the predominance of professionals and party leaderships or the parties' assimilation into the state (cf. von Beyme, 1996; Katz and Mair, 1995).

This seems to suggest that parties in the new democracies have been quick to catch up with their counterparts in the West, and thus that their party organizations should be understood as having made an 'evolutionary leap'. In terms of the three scenarios outlined in Chapter 1, therefore, it might be argued that it is a combination of the institutional context and period in which parties develop, and not the sheer newness of democracy, that is most decisive for the type of party organization to emerge. We do not witness entirely new types of party, however, at least not to the extent that they are phenomena that should be perceived as being something completely different from previously existing types (cf. Sartori, 1984: 28–34). Any existing differences between types of party organization in old and new democracies, therefore, can best be understood as differences in degree rather than in kind.

However, at the same time, it should be emphasized that the path of party formation in new democracies is best understood as a process *sui generis*. That is, despite the many resemblances between parties in old and new democracies today, it should be underlined that they have arrived at this stage by setting off from two completely different points of departure. At the risk of oversimplification, the process for the old democracies might be summarized as 'a movement from society towards the state'. Parties in new democracies, by contrast, started out as 'parties in the state' which subsequently have expanded their organizations beyond the confines of state institutions and reached out, although often only minimally, towards society.

Underlining the distinction between these two patterns may contribute to a better understanding of processes of party formation and organizational development more generally. It certainly would help to avoid the teleological connotation which is inevitably inherent when interpreting party organizational development in new democracies in

terms of leaps towards the models established by the older democracies in the West. Although parties in old and new democracies may be seen to converge and together can be seen to represent a mode of party organization which is clearly different from early post-democratizing Western Europe, it might be the parties in the Western European polities that are developing towards the standard currently set by the new democracies rather than the other way around. In this sense, therefore, this perspective not only reveals what is different about party organizational development in new democracies, but also highlights what has been distinctive about the trajectories in Western Europe itself. That is, it underlines the uniqueness of the emergence of parties as strong movements of society, as opposed to agents of the state, a path which is unlikely to be repeated in a different institutional context of party formation and a different period. In fact, and beyond the context of the four new democracies elucidated in this study, in many of the other European polities that constitute part of the 'third wave', parties can also be seen to originate in state institutions, and can be interpreted as attempts to form parties of the state rather than society (cf. Oversloot and Verheul, 2000).

If, as Di Palma (1977: 222) asserts, 'parties are what shapes and sets the tone of political society' and 'are by and large what political society is all about', it appears evident that in newly established democracies, and to a progressively large extent also in the older ones, political society is more about the state than it is about society. Given the growing disengagement from conventional politics and the effective aloofness of political parties from society, political society in these new democratic polities is rendered short of the very substance on which it is to prosper. The absence of a successful challenge of alternative types of party, moreover, is only likely to enhance the continued prolongation of parties as statist institutions.

Notes

Introduction

1. Indeed, it is only in the last instance that Rueschemeyer et al. (1992: 287) conclude that their theoretical framework has undeservedly overlooked the crucial role of political parties in democratization processes. They apply this conclusion only to the Latin American and Caribbean context, however. 'It is somewhat unfortunate', as Kitschelt (1992b: 1031) has observed, 'that the systemic role played by parties is not emphasized also for Western democratization.'
2. Conceptual discussions on the term 'consolidation' have been abundantly explored elsewhere. See especially Schedler (1998) for an attempt to disentangle the existing 'collective ambiguity' (cf. Sartori, 1984: 35). At present, the most authoritative definition is probably the one advanced by Linz and Stepan (1996: ch.1), for whom the process of democratic consolidation includes a behavioural, an attitudinal and a constitutional dimension, and needs to take place in the five interacting arenas of civil society, political society, the rule of law, bureaucracy and economic society.
3. The discussion on the pros and cons of such comparisons is perhaps best epitomized by the debate between Schmitter and Karl (Schmitter and Karl, 1994; Karl and Schmitter, 1995) versus Bunce (1995a,b) in the *Slavic Review*.

1 The Path towards Democracy: the Institutional Context of Party Formation

1. See Mair (1989) for emphasizing the importance of organizational change inherent in the concept of the catch-all party. For a conceptual and empirical analysis of Kirchheimer's catch-all party, see Krouwel (1999), who has argued that 'catch-allism' should be treated as a three-dimensional phenomenon, which consists of an organizational, an electoral and an ideological component.
2. Recently, Bartolini (2000: ch. 10) has traced the development of socialist movements back to the particular 'macroconstellation' – consisting of processes of state formation and consolidation, economic transformation brought about by industrialization and capitalist development, cultural integration and standardization, and political democratization – at the time of their integration into national mass politics.
3. Following Dahl, the terms political or public contestation and competition will be used interchangeably. Equally, the degree of participation of a political system is used as an equivalent of its degree of inclusiveness.
4. To underline that democracy involves substantially more than merely these two dimensions, Dahl introduced the term 'polyarchy' for 'real-world systems' that are closest to the upper-right corner in the typology. Following the prevailing usage in the scholarly literature, however, 'democracy' rather than

'polyarchy' is used here for regimes that are, as Dahl (1971: 8) puts it, 'highly inclusive and extensively open to public contestation'.

5. In its original form (Dahl, 1971: 7), only the extreme corners of the figure of 'liberalization, inclusiveness, and democratization' are occupied and the space in the middle is not denominated or subdivided. This reflects his desire to preserve the labels only for the extreme types and to avoid redundant terminology for the regime types in the mid area. In addition, in this way he believed the figure facilitated a dynamic interpretation of regime change, since changes in one of the two dimensions may occur without this implying a wholesale shift from one type of regime to another. However, since our concern here is with the institutional dimensions of regime change rather than marginal within-regime changes or with the actual classification of regimes, the original figure has been adapted to represent a typology in a stricter sense, based on two dichotomous variables of participation and political competition.
6. These paths should thus be distinguished from the paths towards democracy such as the well-known alternatives advanced by Stepan (1986), for example. These are primarily classified on the basis of the type of actors involved, and are best treated as types of transition.
7. Except in Switzerland, where female suffrage in national elections was not introduced until 1971.
8. This sequence of events was reversed in the United States, where workers already had acquired the right to vote long before a proletariat of a significant size emerged. Since they did not find themselves outside the political system, 'workers were never alienated from the political system as a result of being excluded from it' (Dahl, 1966: 363). As a consequence, American workers did not develop such a strong class-consciousness, which, in combination with a strong system of patronage, may go some way to explain why a European-style working-class party never developed in the United States (see also Epstein, 1980: 104–11).
9. The exceptions are Germany, where party formation and male enfranchisement developed more or less concurrently, and Denmark, France and Switzerland, where universal male suffrage long predated the formation of socialist parties. For suffrage extensions and socialist party formation see Rokkan (1970: 84–5) and Bartolini (2000: 246–51) respectively.
10. Only in occasional national plebiscites, as for example in the case of the law of succession in 1947, was a larger majority of the citizens entitled to participate, although no precise information is available about the level of inclusiveness of these referendums (see Payne, 1987).
11. Later, in his work with Stepan, Linz distinguished 'post-totalitarianism' – a regime type that can encompass a continuum from 'early post-totalitarianism' to 'frozen post-totalitarianism' to 'mature post-totalitarianism' – from both totalitarianism and authoritarianism and argued that this type of regime should be treated as an ideal type in its own right (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 40–51). However, while a post-totalitarian regime may be characterized by a certain, although limited, degree of social, economic and institutional pluralism, which is absent in a 'pure' totalitarian regime, *political* pluralism is virtually absent in both. This is what these systems share with authoritarian

regimes and what at the same time distinguishes both of them from competitive pluralistic regimes. Furthermore, Linz and Stepan argue that mobilization in totalitarian systems is more intensive than in post-totalitarian systems. However, even if mobilization in post-totalitarian regimes is merely a matter of routine and produces careerist and opportunistic rather than ideologically committed cadres and militants, both systems are characterized by an extensive array of organizational vehicles that serve to integrate society within the political system, which distinguishes them from authoritarian systems where such mobilization is usually absent. In other words, the distinction between totalitarianism and post-totalitarianism basically entails a difference in degree rather than in kind, which is irrelevant for the discussion on the path towards democracy.

2 Party Formation and Organizational Development: Opportunities and Constraints

1. To be sure, political parties, and especially left-wing parties and/or trade unions, were sometimes severely harassed or temporarily banned. France and Germany, for example, had a long-standing tradition of working-class repression.
2. On left-wing parties, see Bartolini (2000), especially ch. 6; on religious parties, see Kalyvas (1996), especially ch. 4.
3. In fact, before the introduction of universal suffrage, social-democratic parties occasionally refused cabinet portfolios because they were not considered ready for government responsibility in a coalition with the 'bourgeois' parties. It is difficult to conceive of parties in new democracies rejecting government responsibility because of similar concerns.
4. Sartori (1968: 15) asserts that it is to a large extent 'the class that receives its identity from the party', or, in other words, it is the party that encourages class-consciousness of those belonging to an objective class, and thus creates the subjective class. Although reference is made to socio-economic divisions, 'class', in this sense, can also be understood more broadly as equivalent to religious, linguistic, ethnic or other social groups. For the relevance of Sartori's argument in the context of the formation of confessional parties in the early twentieth century, for example, see Kalyvas (1998: 295), who argues that '[t]he formation and action of the Catholic movement and confessional parties created a Catholic political identity, rather than the other way around'.
5. In the 1990s, the level of aggregate electoral volatility went up significantly to an average of some 12 per cent among the established European democracies (see Gallagher et al., 2001: 263–5).
6. On civil society in early democratic years in Spain, see Pérez Díaz (1987).
7. Cf. also Kitschelt (1989, ch. 2), who argues that parties can choose between different logics of party formation, i.e. between a logic of constituency representation or a logic of electoral competition.
8. Cf. also Shefter (1994: 6–7), who argues that 'parties will organize an extensive popular following only if they must overcome substantial opposition to gain or retain power and they lack other means of accomplishing their ends.'

3 Portugal

1. Between 1976 and 1979, the Portuguese parliament consisted of 263 seats, after which the number of seats was established at 250, to be reduced to 230 in 1991.
2. Rather than updated, the existing membership file was completely renewed, in that all party members were required to re-register, which is likely to have exhibited a significantly larger decline than a simple clean-up.
3. This figure refers to the average of 20 European countries, including both established Western European and new Southern and Eastern European democracies. Excluding the new democracies would increase the figure to 5.7 per cent.
4. On the levels of party membership for early democratizing Western Europe few systematic and reliable data are available which are suitable for cross-national analysis. Based on the evidence for parties of the left alone, partisan density averaged approximately 5 per cent of the electorate throughout 1900 to 1930 (see Bartolini, 2000: 300).
5. Also known as *Intersindical*, or as CGTP-IN.
6. Although the party statutes actually state it the other way round, i.e. that the number of ex officio public office holders should constitute at least three-quarters of the total number of delegates.

4 Spain

1. The Spanish electoral system is one of proportional representation, with a series of correctives to make the outcome as majoritarian as possible, including the d'Hondt method for seat allocation, a relatively small district magnitude and a 3 per cent threshold at the constituency level. The system not only benefits the bigger parties but also those with a regionally concentrated vote (see Montero et al., 1992).
2. After the legalization of the PSOE, some of the old leaders returned from exile as the PSOE-*Histórico*, but they never succeeded in acquiring any weight as a separate party.
3. Since it could to an important extent be attributed to party leader Fraga, who faced significant levels of hostility from the electorate (see Montero, 1986), it became popularly known as *el techo de Fraga* (Fraga's ceiling).
4. Since both *Izquierda Unida* and the PCE continue to have separate party organizations and affiliation can be sought to either one of the organizations or to both, there might be a considerable overlap between the two membership organizations.
5. In the same vein, the reason underlying the UCD's aspiration to increase its organizational implantation were primarily supposed electoral benefits (see Gangas, 1995).
6. In fact it was the Catalan branch of the party (*Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya* – PSC) which was the first to organize internal party primaries for the selection of the party leader.
7. This potentially disrupting conflict was resolved when Borrell stood down after it transpired that his subordinates had been involved in a corruption affair while he was Minister of Public Works and Transport.

8. Less than half of the party members fulfilled their duty, however. In 1980, 41 per cent of the PSOE members were also affiliated to the UGT. After rising to 48.5 per cent in 1983, the figure dropped to 46.4 per cent in 1986 and further declined to 38.6 per cent in 1989. See *Los Afiliados Socialistas en 1989: Informe de Resultados* (Madrid: Instituto INED).
9. Although, in the event they should seek affiliation to a trade union, a preference was stated for the UGT.
10. That is until the formation of *Izquierda Unida* in 1986, after which the Communist Party ceased to present itself independently at the elections.
11. In 1997, the relation between the *Izquierda Unida* and its Catalan branch *Iniciativa per Catalunya* (IC) reached an all-time low, and IU formally broke up with its Catalan counterpart.
12. The UCD adopted a similar method of electing congress delegates according to both party affiliation and electoral support (Gangas, 1995).
13. In this sense, the *Partido Popular* can be seen to resemble the former UCD, which equally was known as a party with a highly centralized and presidential party structure, in which Suárez and his close allies controlled virtually all facets of the party organization (see Hopkin, 1999; Huneeus, 1985).
14. Gillespie (1989: 350) furthermore observes that Guerra, whose influence in the party was unrivalled, always voted first (for Andalusia, as the vote took place in alphabetical order) and many other federations took their cue from the way he voted.

5 Hungary

1. A third example of a historical party was the Social Democratic Party of Hungary, which was revitalized in early 1989. The Social Democrats, however, did not manage to obtain any parliamentary seats.
2. In the first parliament, a minimum of 10 seats was required for a parliamentary group. For the second legislature, this number was increased to 15.
3. The aggregate volatility levels are based on the percentage of the vote obtained by all parties with more than 1 per cent of the vote. For the measure of the volatility index, see Pedersen (1983); Bartolini and Mair (1990).
4. For a more detailed discussion of the extent to which the tensions between the extra-parliamentary party and the parliamentary group constituted an important dimension in internal party conflicts, see Chapter 7.
5. These percentages are based on the membership figures of the six parties that gained parliamentary representation in the 1990 and 1994 elections. The MIÉP claimed about 10,000 members in 1999 (see Mair and van Biezen, 2001). Among the extra-parliamentary parties, membership in the Hungarian Workers' Party is probably the highest. Early estimates indicated that the membership base of this party amounted to approximately 30,000 (Ágh, 1995).
6. RFE/RL Newsline, October 1998.
7. Nagy has been vice president of the MSZP executive committee since 1998 and leader of the parliamentary group since 2001.
8. The electoral system for the unicameral legislature combines elements of both proportional representation with county and national lists, and majoritarianism

with single-member constituencies. For the origins and mechanics of the Hungarian mixed-member system, see Benoit (2001); Schiemann (2001).
9. Fodor ran for the SZDSZ in the 1994 elections, became Minister of Culture and Education in the first MSZP-SZDSZ coalition, and became a member of the executive committee of the Free Democrats in 1998.

6 The Czech Republic

1. Proclamation of the Founding of Civic Forum, reprinted in Wheaton and Kavan (1992).
2. Later renamed Czech Social Democratic Party (*Česká Strana Socialně Demokratická*).
3. After the break-up of Czechoslovakia in 1992, the Czech National Council continued as the legislative chamber of the Czech Republic and was renamed the Chamber of Deputies. Although still within the boundaries of Czechoslovakia, distinctive Czech and Slovak party systems emerged almost immediately after the demise of communist rule. Civic Forum was mainly a Czech movement, while its counterpart Public Against Violence (VPN) operated in the Slovak Republic. In fact, although not all parties saw themselves as exclusively Czech or Slovak, those with a nationwide appeal failed to obtain significant electoral success. Only the Communist Party succeeded in winning seats throughout the whole country in the 1990 elections. In the 1992 elections, no party won seats in both republics. By that time, the Communist Party had also split into separate Czech and Slovak organizations (see Wightman, 1995: 60–1).
4. Although the Slovak Communist Party had already seceded from the federal Czechoslovak Communist Party (*Komunistická Strana Československá* – KSČ), the Communist Party contested the elections under the KSČ label.
5. This led some observers to conclude that the party system was increasingly stabilizing, primarily as a result of the crystallization of socio-economic cleavage (e.g. Vlachová, 1997). However, although parties can be seen to be ordered along a particular left–right dimension (see Evans and Whitefield, 1998), voting preferences in the Czech Republic are distributed too randomly over the various socio-economic sectors to be able to speak of a clear class cleavage.
6. The calculation of the aggregate volatility levels is based on the percentage of the vote obtained by all parties with more than 1 per cent of the vote. For the measure of the volatility index, see Pedersen (1983); Bartolini and Mair (1990).
7. This figure excludes the SPR-RSČ, which had an estimated membership of 10,000 in 1995 (Kopecký and Mudde, 1995), and the US, which reported a membership of 3,000 in 1999 (Mair and van Biezen, 2001).
8. Renamed Czech Confederation of Trade Unions (ČMKOS) after the break-up of Czechoslovakia.
9. In the ODS, financial affairs are primarily the responsibility of the party treasurer. Since 1996, the treasurer is an appointed employee of the party rather than an elected party official. Bestowing a non-elected party employee rather than the political leadership with the responsibility of the party's finances may have been encouraged by the party's involvement in illicit party financing (RFE/RL Newsline, 14 May 1998).

10. The official regulations are imprecise enough to allow substantial differentiation in the selection procedure within the different constituencies. For the 1996 elections, for example, primaries were held in the district of Prague where every member could submit up to seven candidates, except for the first position on the list.
11. However, ODA candidates for the 1996 elections were selected through a system of primaries, a procedure lacking a basis in the party statutes, in which the entire membership was entitled to participate. The thus elaborated candidate lists were approved without modification at an extraordinary party congress prior to the elections.

7 On the Internal Balance of Power: the Extra-Parliamentary Party vs the Party in Public Office

1. Following the lines of earlier cross-national research on party organization in Western Europe (Katz and Mair, 1990, 1992), the party in public office is understood as the representatives of the party in parliament and/or government. Although an analytical distinction between 'the party in parliament' and 'the party in government' is in principle conceivable (e.g. Blondel and Cotta, 1996), the arguments suggesting the likelihood of public office predominance advanced here apply to both of these public faces versus the extra-parliamentary party. The party in public office therefore includes both the parliamentary representatives and the government members of the party.
2. For a recent exception, see Harmel and Gibson (1998); and Heidar and Koole (2000).
3. MPs of the PS sign an undated letter of resignation, which the party can use if the MP loses the party's support (Sablosky, 1997). In the PSD, public office holders sign a letter to the party president in which they declare that they comply with the provisions in the party statutes.
4. See the various contributions in Katz and Mair (1992).
5. In many parties, in addition, the level of accumulation of functions is also high at the lower echelons of the organization, and local and regional public office holders often enjoy ex officio representation on the extra-parliamentary organs of the corresponding organizational levels.
6. The 1984 revision of the PSOE statutes introduced the incompatibility between membership of the executive committee and the government, however, with the exception of the president of the party, the secretary-general and the deputy secretary-general. According to Méndez, these exemptions were to facilitate the coordination between the government and the party, but also to ensure that certain distinguishing figures would not be discharged from the top positions within the party executive (Méndez, 1998: 124).
7. Comparable data are not available for the Czech KSČM, although the executive committee of the Czech Communist Party also features a high proportion of MPs (see Kopecký, 2001).
8. These figures refer to the aggregate of public office holders for the PP, including members of the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate and the European Parliament. Including only the deputies of the lower chamber would reduce the average figure to approximately 53 per cent, and the peaks to 66 and 62 per cent respectively.

9. With the exception of the MDF, the party staff at the lower echelons of the organization are employed and paid directly at the corresponding organizational level. In addition to the 45 MDF employees working in the national headquarters reported in Table 7.2, the central office had contracted 40 employees (two for each county) for the county organizations.
10. For a discussion of this practice in Eastern Europe, see Lewis (1998).
11. Thus discarding the state reimbursement for election expenditures, which is also assigned to the extra-parliamentary party and the inclusion of which would thus mean even greater predominance for the extra-parliamentary party.
12. For more detailed figures and their sources, see Chapter 8.
13. Calculated from the figures provided by the Parliament of the Czech Republic and the legal provisions on state funding to the parliamentary groups.

8 Financing Parties in New Democracies

1. The 1989 law on the operation and financial functioning of political parties and the electoral law are reprinted in Tóka (1995: 135–82).
2. In 1996, the monthly minimum wage amounted to 54,600 escudos ($1= 156.8 escudos (mid-1996)).
3. The current Czech system of state funding has been in effect since the 1996 elections (the law was modified in 1995). Between 1992 and 1996, state funding of parties was based on the 1990 and 1991 regulations, which granted parties 10 and 15 Czechoslovak crowns (for the 1990 and 1992 elections respectively) per vote for each of the three federal chambers (see Kopecký, 2001).
4. Prior to the introduction of the 1987 law on the financing of political parties, parties received an annual subvention of a fixed amount per seat and per vote for both the lower and upper chamber. The 1987 law abolished these amounts related to electoral and parliamentary size in favour of a more freely adjustable amount, and furthermore rendered the seats and votes obtained in the Senate elections irrelevant for routine subsidies (see Alvarez, 1994; van Biezen, 2000a).
5. The *Flick* case involved illegal financial donations to the PSOE from the German SPD, transferred to the party by the Flick Corporation.
6. Unless otherwise indicated, the figures on party financing in Spain have been obtained from the reports of the *Tribunal de Cuentas* as published in the *Boletín Oficial del Estado* (various years).
7. In Spain, the minimum number of seats required to form a parliamentary group is 15 for the lower and 10 for the upper chamber. In the lower chamber, parties that have obtained at least five seats and at least 15 per cent of the vote in the constituencies where they have presented candidates, or at least 5 per cent of the vote at the national level, can also establish a separate parliamentary group. Parties that do not meet these requirements are incorporated in the so-called mixed group (*grupo mixto*).
8. Note that in Portugal no minimum number of deputies is required to form a parliamentary group.
9. In 1996, the basic salary amounted to approximately 90,000 forint (about $600). The basic salary excludes supplementary payments. Chairpersons of a parliamentary committee, for example, received about twice the basic salary.

10. For routine activities, the total amount of donations from private business may not exceed the sum of 1,500 monthly minimum wages per year, with a limit of 100 monthly minimum wages per individual contributor. Private donations from individuals are subject to a limit of 30 monthly minimum wages per contributor. Anonymous donations may not exceed one monthly minimum wage per contributor, while the total of anonymous donations per year may not exceed 400 monthly minimum wages. Contributions to election campaigns by either private business or individuals may not be higher than 100 monthly minimum wages per contributor and the total of corporate donations may not exceed one third of the legal limit of campaign expenses.
11. 'A Factura da Victoria', *Visão*, 9 May 1996.
12. The figures on state subsidies and election financing in Portugal have been provided by the *Direcção de Serviços Administrativos e Financeiros* of the *Assembleia da República* and the *Comissão Nacional de Eleições*.
13. Membership subscriptions, donations and contributions from public office holders have been grouped together primarily because they are usually merged in the accounts presented by the parties themselves, making an assessment of their relative importance virtually impossible.
14. Although *Izquierda Unida* is an autonomous political organization, it has been treated here as a coalition of parties with the PCE as the dominant component. For IU alone, state subventions would have been the only source of income between 1990 and 1993. By 1997, the proportion of state subsidies had declined from 100 to 92 per cent and the share of membership dues had attained 8 per cent (see Ramiro, 2000).
15. *Lidovy Dům* (House of the People) was the party headquarters of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party until it was confiscated by the Communist Party after its takeover in 1948. Because the ČSSD considers itself the legal successor of the First Republic Social Democrats, it also claimed to be the legitimate owner of *Lidovy Dům*. The building was returned to the ČSSD in the first months of the democratization process, but in 1993 the (ODS, ODA, KDU-ČSL) government decided to nullify this decision on procedural grounds. The party accounts were first partially and later completely frozen, causing serious financial problems (see Vermeersch, 1994).
16. By Czech law, 'large' and 'small' donations, i.e. below and above 100,000 crowns, have to be accounted for separately. Of the total of private donations to the ODS and ODA, between 85 and 95 per cent stemmed from 'large' donations. Virtually all the private donations to the ČSSD, by contrast, were 'small' donations. Moreover, 'small' donations to the ODS and ODA appear to be significantly higher than those to the ČSSD. The average private donation to the ČSSD in 1995–96 amounted to 5,575 crowns, as opposed to an average small donation of 15,716 crowns to the ODS and 23,009 to the ODA.
17. These figures include the aggregate sum of state subventions to all parties with parliamentary representation for both routine and electoral activities. Only for Spain are the figures restricted to the PSOE, PP, PCE/IU, CiU and PNV. For reasons of comparability, the PPP (purchasing power parities) rates of currency conversions, which equalize the purchasing power of different currencies by eliminating the differences in price levels between countries, rather than the simple currency exchange rates have been used.

18. From the Hungarian party accounts, it cannot be determined with certainty whether the state subventions only include those for routine activities or also for election campaigns.
19. For a recent exception, see van Biezen and Nassmacher (2001).
20. www.transparency.org. See also van Biezen and Kopecký (2001).
21. Although it is noteworthy to underline that sequence and timing are relevant in this respect too. Patronage, clientelism and corruption appear linked to modern democracies where political parties dependent on mass electorates were established while the central state was generally weak, as a result of which effective checks on executive power were lacking and mechanisms of bureaucratic accountability were poorly developed (cf. Heywood, 1996; Kitschelt, 2000; Shefter, 1977).

9 Patterns of Party Organization in New Democracies

1. The East European parties have employed on average 16.7 paid professionals at the central office for every 10,000 members, against 4.3 paid professionals for Southern Europe.
2. This figure excludes the Czech KSČM and KDU-ČSL, which have preserved a notable organizational heritage in the form of a relatively sizeable organization on the ground.
3. V. O. Key, for example, famously defined linkages as 'the interconnection between mass opinion and public decision' (Key, quoted in Lawson, 1988: 14).
4. Heidar and Koole (2000), in this context, speak of 'integrated parliamentary groups'.
5. The cases of party splits are too numerous to be all listed here. The most prominent example is probably the collapse of the UCD in Spain, only a few years after its creation. Other notable examples include the disintegration of the Civic Forum and the break up of the Left Bloc in the Czech Republic, or the several new parties that were established from ranks of the Hungarian Democratic Forum. More recently, the faction New Left was expelled from IU in Spain, and the Czech ODS suffered a split because of the establishment of the Freedom Union.
6. For a similar argument in the context of the more established Belgian parties, see Deschouwer (1994: 94).
7. That the financial subordination of parliamentarians serves such a disciplinary purpose is underlined by the case of the Spanish Socialist party, for which Share (1989: 125) observes that the leadership deducted fines from the pay cheques of MPs who missed parliamentary sessions in order to discourage abstention as a form of silent protest against the government.
8. That 'fission' is usually not an electorally successful strategy is illustrated by the fact that newly established dissident groups generally have more difficulties in obtaining parliamentary representation than the parties from which they seceded.

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