

The GeoJournal Library 104

Barney Warf *Editor*

Encounters and Engagements between Economic and Cultural Geography

 Springer

Encounters and Engagements between Economic and Cultural Geography

The GeoJournal Library

Volume 104

Managing Editor:

Daniel Z. Sui, College Station, USA

Founding Series Editor:

Wolf Tietze, Helmstedt, Germany

Editorial Board: Paul Claval, France

Yehuda Gradus, Israel

Sam Ock Park, South Korea

Herman van der Wusten, The Netherlands

For further volumes:

<http://www.springer.com/series/6007>

Barney Warf

Editor

Encounters and Engagements between Economic and Cultural Geography

 Springer

Editor
Barney Warf
Department of Geography
University of Kansas
Lawrence, KS
USA

ISSN 0924-5499
ISBN 978-94-007-2974-2 ISBN 978-94-007-2975-9 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-2975-9
Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg New York London

Library of Congress Control Number: 2012935893

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. Exempted from this legal reservation are brief excerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis or material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the Copyright Law of the Publisher's location, in its current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from Springer. Permissions for use may be obtained through RightsLink at the Copyright Clearance Center. Violations are liable to prosecution under the respective Copyright Law.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

While the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication, neither the authors nor the editors nor the publisher can accept any legal responsibility for any errors or omissions that may be made. The publisher makes no warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein.

Printed on acid-free paper

Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)

Contents

1 Introduction: Fusing Economic and Cultural Geography	1
Barney Warf	
2 A Short Cultural History of Anglo-American Economic Geography: Bodies, Books, Machines, and Places	19
Trevor J. Barnes	
3 The Cultural Turn in Geography: A New Link in the Commodity Chain	39
Elaine Hartwick	
4 Consumption Geographies: Turns or Intersections?	47
Juliana Mansvelt	
5 Gender, Commodity Chains and Everyday Life	65
Deborah Leslie	
6 Economic Rationality, Ethnic Identity, and the Geographies of Consumption	79
Lucia Lo and Lu Wang	
7 Trust and Distrust: Culture Finding Its Way into Economics or the Other Way Round?	103
Geir Inge Orderud	
8 Building the Beloved Community Through Techno Music Production in Detroit	123
Deborah Che	
9 Exploring the Role of Networks in the Creative Economy of North East England: Economic and Cultural Dynamics	143
Roberta Comunian	

10 The Relevance of Scale Economies in Economic and Social Relationships in the New Economic Geography 159
Luca Spinesi

11 Consuming the Spectacle: Tourism and Communication Technologies in Santiago de Compostela 167
Carlos Ferrás Sexto and Yolanda García Vázquez

Index..... 179

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1	Quantgeog airlines flight plan	34
Fig. 6.1	Study areas	86
Fig. 8.1	Visual land mines in Detroit.....	132
Fig. 8.2	For those in the know	133
Fig. 8.3	Counteracting negative images: UR's alternative tour of Detroit (Clockwise – The Heidelberg Project, The Motown Museum, Indian Village house).....	136
Fig. 11.1	Location of Santiago de Compostela, Galicia, Spain.....	172
Fig. 11.2	Idyllic image of Santiago de Compostela.....	175

List of Tables

Table 6.1	Results of the grocery model.....	93
Table 6.2	Results of the electronics model.....	93
Table 6.3	Results of the travel model.....	94
Table 8.1	Detroit’s population, 1940–2010.....	125

Chapter 1

Introduction: Fusing Economic and Cultural Geography

Barney Warf

In retrospect, the long-standing separation of economic and cultural geography seems ludicrous, even analytically disastrous. Two major parts of a discipline renowned for the diversity of its theoretical views and the heterogeneity of topics that it studies have suffered for decades in relative isolation, as if the economy and culture had little to do with one another. Fortunately, what have long been distinct sub-disciplines, each with its own body of theory, vocabulary, methodology, and topics of inquiry, recently have increasingly merged, an intersection fostered by their mutual interest in issues of social relations, power, and location.

Economic geography has typically taken the domain of production for its point of departure, focusing on the dynamics of capitalist development and underdevelopment over space and time, subsuming issues such as labor markets, technological change, transportation and communications, geographies of the firm, international trade, and regional restructuring. In part, economic geography's long-standing detachment from culture reflected its earlier infatuation with neoclassical economics, which views the economy as a black box utterly detached from the rest of society, as if it were devoid of social, political, economic (and spatial) origins and consequences. Thus Barnes (2005:68) notes that "Neoclassical economics is extreme in its aversion to culture." In this sterile reading, the only actor who matters is that desolate being, *homo economicus*, a purely self-interested creature lacking any consciousness but utility lines. Fortunately, most neoclassical nonsense has been purged from geography as it embraced various species of political economy and social theory, and more recently, come to acknowledge that the economy is deeply shaped by cultural norms and practices, that economy and culture are mutually constitutive.

For the last decade or more, economic geography has thus undergone a pronounced "cultural turn," a transformation that has met with a variety of reactions. For some, the cultural turn is mere passing intellectual fashion (Crang 1997; Barnett 1998). Many

B. Warf (✉)

Department of Geography, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, USA
e-mail: bwarf@ku.edu

view it as a chance to expand the definition of the economic (Martin and Sunley 2001). Thrift (2000a,b) welcomes it as a long overdue necessity. Others accept it but note the on-going tension between the two kingdoms that it is supposed to unite (McDowell 2000). Andrew Sayer (2001) cautions against invoking cultural analysis as a panacea for the oversights of Marxism by overstating its role in the “often brutal economically dominated world” (Sayer 1997:25). For yet others, it amounts to an attack on political economy, even a lethal assault on economic geography (Rodrigues-Pose 2001).

Cultural geography, in contrast, has traditionally centered on the domain of social reproduction, a suite of topics that includes cultural landscapes, ethnicity, representation, discourse, gender and sexuality, everyday life, and identity formation. As cultural geographers have grappled with the situated nature of culture and consciousness, its embodiment in living beings engaged in interaction with nonhuman actors, and the pervasive role of power in shaping ideology and everyday life, they have been drawn into issues such as the uneven topologies of capitalist landscapes and globalization, and regional restructuring. Unfortunately, unlike the cultural turn that has engulfed economic geography, cultural geographers have shown no obvious proclivity for a parallel “economic turn.” Perhaps this silence reflects culture’s fundamentally important influence on every other part of the discipline and the topics it studies (Cook et al. 2000). The story of the engagement between cultural and economic geography is thus almost entirely a one-way street. Nonetheless, as economic geographers have discovered the power and significance of culture, the boundaries between the two fields have blurred.

What do the intersections between these two hitherto separate subdisciplines imply for geographers? Do these realms retain any meaningful status independent of one another? Is the cultural-economic dichotomy simply another tired dualism of the type increasingly jettisoned by the discipline? Dualisms thwart the effective integration of concepts once held in mutual disregard, oversimplify and essentialize stances, and tend to privilege one side of the dichotomy over another. Barnes (2005) explicitly seeks to dissolve the boundaries between the cultural and the economic by replacing them with a hybrid, one that offers the possibility of escaping traditional dualisms. Thus, as he puts it (p. 73), “The task of a hybrid economic geography should not be simply to reverse the binary and make culture primary, and the economy secondary. Rather, it should be to dissolve the binary altogether.” In this spirit, this volume seeks to accelerate the fusion of economic and cultural geography by exploring the implications of their intersections. It hopes to shed light on how the boundaries between the economic and the cultural have become so hopelessly blurred that this distinction is no longer meaningful, if it ever was.

1.1 A Brief History of Convergence: Traditions Leading to the Fusion of the Economic and the Cultural

Although to many observers it may appear that economic and cultural analysis have shared little common ground in the past, a quick survey of intellectual history reveals otherwise. Indeed, there is a remarkably long and fecund history of thought in which

these two domains were viewed as inseparable. Karl Marx, for example, while often simplistically dismissed as an economic determinist (largely for distinguishing between the base and superstructure), exhibited a studied concern for how the production process, notably the extraction of surplus value, was hidden from workers and consumers alike. Marx famously viewed goods as more than just things but as embodiments of social processes, even as the social origins of products – the blood, sweat, and tears that went into their making – were obscured by commodity fetishism. For example, Marx (1976:73–75) argues that the social character of labor appears as objective, given nature of products:

The relations connecting the labour of one individual with that of the rest appear, not as direct social relations between individuals at work, but as what they really are, material relations between persons and social relations between things ... To [producers], their own social action takes the form of the action of objects, which rule the producers instead of being ruled by them.

Marx's analysis of commodity fetishism maintained that the opaqueness by which market relations obscure relations among producers is functional for capitalism. Commodity fetishism abstracts commodities from their social context and (re)presents them as purely market-based phenomena. So naturalized has the culture of commodities become in American culture (especially) that it is often difficult for students to think of the world in any other way. This tendency is amplified by conservative intellectuals; neoclassical economists, for example, often project the character of commodities onto everything: even children become consumer durables.

Marxism, despite the hegemony of production in the analysis of class, nonetheless also exhibited a sustained concern for cultural issues through the disparate intellectuals often lumped together under the umbrella term of Western Marxism. Some, such as Gramsci, were instrumental in opening up the realm of ideology to class analysis, often centering on the question as to why workers accepted their exploitation so unproblematically. Others, such as Walter Benjamin, initiated an insightful tradition concerned with the semiotics of the commodity and its potential to narcotize consumers (Buck-Morss 1993). Benjamin saw the world of the Paris arcades – of glitzy store windows, mirrors, boulevards, museums, art galleries, monuments, and showcases – seducing the modern consumer, fetishizing commodities, and tranquilizing the masses into a narcoleptic dream state. These new, highly commodified environments stripped goods of their once-sensuous qualities and engendering a new way of relating to objects through the bourgeois spectacle of the commodity (Benjamin 1969). Similarly, the Frankfurt School of critical theorists focused on how consumption legitimated or smoothed over the inequalities and contradictions of capitalism, integrating a working class into a society fundamentally structured against its best interests. Such lines of thought demonstrate the powerful ideological and cultural impacts of consumption, its relations to identity and status, which are far greater than simply the Marxist realization of use values or the simplistic neoclassical economic maximization of utility.

One of the most influential contributors to the realization that the economy could not be abstracted from cultural relations was Mark Granovetter (1985, 1991). As much as anyone, and more than most, Granovetter overcame the common view that the economy drives all else, offering instead a more nuanced vision in which

economic and cultural relations are reciprocal and simultaneously determinant. “Embedding” the economy within a cultural context, for example, entailed understanding culturally-specific definitions of “work,” including shared understandings, definitions, and expectations that varied widely among (and within) countries. In Japan, particularly under Fordism, for example, corporations prized loyalty and obedience in structures that resembled extended families. Different national legal traditions that shape the economy are also culturally embedded, including the definition of, and weight given to, property rights, reputation, and informal linkages. Labor relations and the politics among and within firms, too, were culturally embedded, including how gender and ethnicity were recognized and how disputes are negotiated and settled. Culture, in short, shapes how actors perceive and internalize rules, laws, and regulations, or, conversely, how they do not, and thus resist them. An economy without culture is, therefore, one populated by automatons and unthinking robots. Granovetter’s work opened the door for an understanding of economic activity free of the shackles of neoclassical economics, with its narrow-minded closure around the mythology of the “free market,” as well as a richer, historically-situated notion of the human subject.

Culture also rose in importance in geographical analyses of production in the 1990s. From the growth poles of the 1950s on, every generation of geographers seems to rediscover the importance of agglomeration in its own way. In the 1990s, economic geography’s obsession was the rise of flexible production and post-Fordist agglomerative complexes (Gertler 1992, 1995; Harrison 1992; Peck 1992; Amin 1995). This literature drew heavily on Alfred Marshall’s famous analysis of industrial districts in the late nineteenth century, which opened the door to the role of external economies of scale in the formation and sustenance of dense networks of small firms. Much of it was concerned with the question of vertical integration and subcontracting in the explication of local divisions of labor. A parallel, related line of work was concerned with the geography of innovations (Audretsch 1995; Antonelli 2000; Howells 2000), a topic approached empirically through the analysis of research and development (Audretsch and Feldman 1996) and patents (Feldman and Florida 1994). Yet another variant dwelled on “learning regions” and knowledge spillovers (Maskell and Malmberg 1999). The latest take on the role of agglomerative effects is clusters (Vorley 2008; Martin and Sunley 2003; Cumbers and MacKinnon 2004; Benneworth and Henry 2004). Drawing on Michael Porter’s theory of competitive advantage and Paul Krugman’s endogenous growth theory, economic geographers came to emphasize more qualitative, contextual approaches to competitiveness, including the seminal role played by knowledge spillovers and positive externalities in the formation of “learning regions.” The term and concept of clusters is rather elastic, but points to dense supply chains that are concentrated in urban areas, often largely local in nature but including linkages to transnational firms.

How firms and economic agents interacted in post-Fordist regions, centers of innovation and patent formation, clusters, or learning regions increasingly became a matter of considerable analytical and policy significance. This literature pointed to the powerful roles played in regional competitiveness by “non-economic” factors such as learning, reflexivity, convention, expectations, trust, uncertainty, and reputation in the

interactions of actors, many of which were advanced by Giddens's (1984) theory of structuration. Geographical theorizations of iconic regions such as Silicon Valley or Italy's Emilia-Romagna increasingly came to center on the pivotal roles assigned to trust, reputation, loyalty, face-to-face contact, and tacit knowledge in mediating successful and competitive regions (Ettlinger 2003; Gertler 2003), or what Storper (1997) calls "untraded dependencies," as well as "buzz," or knowledge that circulates through informal channels (Storper and Venables 2004). These issues sensitized economic geographers to the need to incorporate a more realistic and robust understanding of human consciousness into their portraits of what makes successful regions work (Thrift and Olds 1996; Schoenberger 1997). As a result, economic geographers came to emphasize culture as a complex set of relations every bit as important as putatively "economic" factors in the structuring of economic landscapes.

The understanding of how actors interact, innovate, and shape one another drew much from the work of Polanyi (1967), who offered a well-known and highly influential distinction between explicit (or standardized) and tacit knowledge. Explicit knowledge refers to standardized forms of information that are easily transmitted from one person to another, including quantitative data, publicly known rules and standards, and orderly records. Explicit knowledge is designed to be as free as possible from its context and easy to transmit over time and space, and involves operating rules to make it applicable to a wide array of environments, such as blueprints and operating manuals. As such, explicit knowledge is relatively easy to obtain and generates comparatively little in terms of value-added. Explicit knowledge thus forms the basis of many relatively capital-intensive services such as data entry, back offices, and call centers, for whom clustering is relatively insignificant.

Tacit knowledge, on the other hand, includes information that is unstandardized, changes rapidly, and is usually not written down. Polanyi's original definition utilized violin makers in Hungary, who acquired a deep and intimate knowledge of the wood necessary to construct their instruments; such knowledge, accumulated gradually over long periods of time, could not be easily communicated verbally, and was hence unspoken, or tacit. The term today, however, has gained a wider currency. Tacit knowledge is heavily context-dependent and subject to informal rules of organization that make it difficult to transmit from one situation to another, including gossip, oral histories, and invisible corporate cultures. It tends to circulate only within narrow social and geographical channels with a limited spatial range, and have a small degree of fungibility, i.e., substitutability in different contexts. Like Polanyi's violin makers, expertise of this type takes years to develop and involves the acquisition of highly specialized knowledge from diverse sources. Often such information is collected informally, over lunches, drinks and dinners, in the locker rooms of sports clubs, on golf courses, and through a variety of social and cultural events. Face-to-face contact is essential to the performance of actors in these networks. Despite the ability of telecommunications to transmit information instantaneously over vast distances, face-to-face contact remains the most efficient and effective means of obtaining and conveying irregular forms of information, particularly when it is highly sensitive (or even illegal, as repeated waves of corporate malfeasance and insider trading demonstrate). Thus, in the context of

face-to-face meetings, actors monitor one another's intentions and behavior through observations of body language, include handshakes and eye contact, which are essential to establishing relations of trust and mutual understanding.

In shifting their focus from abstract economic processes to the concrete interactions of human actors situated in local contexts, geographers irrevocably embodied social relations, suturing identity, the body, and place together. This change led to an appreciation of the role of the body in the reproduction of social relations over space and time. The body is the primary vehicle through which prevailing economic and political institutions inscribe the self, producing a bundle of signs that encodes, reproduces, and contests hegemonic notions of identity, order and discipline, morality and ethics, sensuality and sexuality. As McDowell and Court (1994a, b) showed, gender is fundamental to the performativity of actors engaged in the provision of financial services. McDowell and Court (1994a, b) illustrate, for example, how banking in London largely hinges on the networks of trust among white businessmen, a process in which the appearance and behavior of actors is critical to the reproduction both of global banking systems and the City's premier position within them. Gender roles thus cemented relations among male actors and worked to marginalize the attempts of women to "break into the club." Drawing on Judith Butler, whose work viewed gender as a continual bodily enactment, culturally-informed economic geography came to see all economic actions as performed (Thrift 2000a, b).

Viewing economic relations as contingent, historically produced, embodied, and culturally embedded allowed geographers to appreciate capitalism as contingent and subject to a myriad of potential trajectories, which, in turn, resulted in a multitude of national and local variations. Mitchell (1995) and Mitchell and Olds (2000), for example, demonstrated how capitalist relations in the Chinese context differed significantly from the North American model, relying heavily upon trust and family networks, indicating there is no single, "standard" model of capitalist relations, only a diversity of local models. Zhou (1996, 1998, 2000) examined the activities of Chinese producer service firms in Los Angeles and found that small, privately-owned and decentralized Chinese accountants, banks and computer companies located in Los Angeles play a key role in connecting immigrant economic activities with the international circulation of information, goods and capital and especially with their place of origin (cf. Li et al. 2002). Such firms facilitated the expansion of Chinese corporations into the U.S., a process expedited by the rapid growth of the Chinese immigrant population. The Chinese community in Los Angeles was thus poised at the threshold of the global and the local, coordinating interactions over long distances and serving as an intermediary between the American and Chinese business communities.

Contemporary capitalism has opened up culture to commodification to an unprecedented degree. Accordingly, the entwinement of culture and economy has become an increasingly urgent public policy matter as information-intensive industries have grown. Thus, what began as studies of the agglomeration of manufacturing or banking soon diversified into an array of culturally-saturated creative industries such as film (Storper and Christopherson 1987; Storper 1989; Coe 2000), design (Sunley et al. 2008), fashion (Currid 2007), video games (Johns 2006), and digital media (Neff 2004). Allen Scott's work is particularly important in this regard

(2000, 2002, 2005). In a series of influential works centered on the Los Angeles region, particularly Hollywood, Scott revealed how the broader dynamics of capital accumulation and the division of labor played out within the specific circumstances of Southern California. Moving beyond the earlier focus on vertical disintegration, which impels firms to cluster, Scott conceives of cultural districts within the context of value chains that expand and contract over time and space, thus constituting a variant of the broader process of capitalist production. Indeed, for Scott (2007), the cultural turn in many respects amounts to little more than the intellectual appreciation of the turgid growth of the “cognitive-cultural” economy, an epistemological acceptance of ontological reality.

In the analysis of culture and economics, few scholars have caused a greater sensation than Richard Florida (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005), whose thesis of the creative class initiated an enormous interdisciplinary uproar. In arguing that the contemporary economy requires more cultural inputs than ever, including education, innovation, and expertise in the face of accelerated product cycles, Florida focused on the large group of workers employed in “creative industries,” including most producer services. Creative class workers, whose personal and professional lives often overlap and intersect, were held to place a premium on flexibility of work times and informal labor conditions that were necessary to sustain continuous invention. The presence of such workers, he holds, is central to local and national competitiveness, and given their high degree of mobility, their lifestyle preferences are important to attracting and keeping them in specific locales. In particular, Florida maintains, cities that offer a rich array of amenities and entertainment possibilities, including the chance of serendipitous encounters, as well as ethnically diverse and politically tolerant environments, are likely to succeed at the expense of less diverse and less tolerant places. The creative class functions well in thick labor markets with many opportunities, developing large networks of weak ties that require little emotional investment. Boring and intolerant places, in short, were unlikely to be successful ones. Florida’s work met with a fair amount of criticism as well as celebration, particular from those who held that he seriously underplayed the role of the urban division of labor, the webs of interactions among firms clustered in cities, and external economies of scale vital to the process of agglomeration (Peck 2005; Storper and Scott 2009). These objections dismiss accounts of urban growth predicated on human choice and behavior in favor of explicitly structural arguments in which labor markets take center stage. Thus, “creative workers,” often tied to jobs in producer services, are unlikely to be able simply to move based on a preference for amenities alone. “Thus, while human capital and skills are most certainly indispensable to urban growth, they clearly cannot be taken as basic independent variables that precede economic development in either the order of analysis or the order of time” (Storper and Scott 2009:158).

Finally, yet another arena in which the inseparability of the economic and the cultural is made profoundly evident is within the broad domain of consumption studies. Volumes have been written about consumption, which is inescapably economic and cultural, social and individual, temporal and spatial, local and global, symbolic and material, political and environmental in nature. When rescued from neoclassical

economics, consumption offers an ideal opportunity to view the intersections of social relations, culture and ideology, and space. In an age of cheap mass-produced commodities, consumption for most people, particularly in economically developed countries, is the most important process in identity construction, forming their most sustained and intimate connection to the economy and, for some, public space in general. Indeed, consumerism as ideology and lifestyle far overshadows the politics of work and production. From histories of the rise of mass consumption to Marxist theories of underconsumption to Thorsten Veblen's conspicuous consumption to more recent accounts of niche consumption under globalized post-Fordism, analyses of consumption have adopted a rich array of conceptual perspectives. Not surprising, a fecund geographical literature on consumption and shopping has sprouted (e.g., Glennie and Thrift 1993; Gregson 1995; Miller et al. 1998; Jackson et al. 2000; William et al. 2001; Mansvelt 2005), much of it pointing to how it shapes consumers and spaces, including shopping malls (Hopkins 1990; Goss 1993, 1999) and retail outlets (Wrigley and Lowe 1996, 2002). Geographies of food consumption play an especially important role in this regard (Bell and Valentine 1997; Wrigley 2002). In particular when linked to commodity chains, consumption offers an ideal pedagogic vehicle for exploring the politics of everyday life, identity, and the body (Valentine 1999; Hartwick 2000). Not surprisingly, therefore, consumption is one of the primary arenas in which economic and cultural geography have enfolded one another. Indeed, consumption is one of the few "economic" domains into which cultural geographers have ventured fearlessly and productively.

By now cultural economics has become a well-established field (Throsby 2001; Cheng 2006). Rather than confine culture to the domain of the irrational, this approach takes seriously a variety of motivations that underpin behavior, including, for example, fear, loyalty, religion, tradition, and popular attitudes towards education, gender, ethnicity, age, property rights, and crime. Among other things, this line of thought has shown that markets are not simply sites of exchange, but also of power, cultural norms and values, and networks through which identities and social relations are produced, contested, and transformed. In short, markets are made, not given (Jessop and Oosterlynck 2008; Berndt and Boeckler 2009; Mackenzi 2009), that is, they are socially reproduced, even if unintentionally, by knowledgeable, embodied agents. This manoeuvre dethrones markets from the perch of perfect rationality upon which neoclassical economists have so emphatically placed it, and instead reveals markets as unstable, anarchical, frequently irrational, and self-destructive.

What does the merger of economic and cultural geography imply for the epistemological foundations of the discipline as a whole? While the repercussions of this process are likely to unfold over many years and cannot be anticipated with certainty, three possibilities are explored here: the embodiment of social actions; the rules of truth construction; and the shift to relational space. Several thoughtful essays on the reconstruction of economic geography (Thrift 2000a, b; Barnes 2001; Yeung 2003) have articulated the outlines of a post-positivist subdiscipline in which social relations, class, power, struggle, ideology, consciousness, and culture figure prominently. Rather than abstract processes, social relations are seen as embodied in individuals who, in turn, are always deeply embedded in networks, a line of thought made most

explicit by actor-network theory (Murdoch 1995; Bosco 2006; Latour 2007). Hence, the classical, Cartesian notion of the subject (what Barnes calls “minds in vats”), as a consistent, rational bundle of traits that transcends time and space has given way to views that focus on identity as a multiplicity of different, unstable, context-dependent traits that vary temporally and spatially. While bodies typically appear as “natural,” they are in fact social constructions deeply inscribed with multiple meanings, “embodiments” of class, gender, ethnic, and other relations. The body is the primary vehicle through which prevailing economic and political institutions inscribe the self, producing a bundle of signs that encodes, reproduces, and contests hegemonic notions of identity, order and discipline, morality and ethics, sensuality and sexuality. In taking up bodies in this way, cultural/economic geographers open new spaces of analysis of identity and representation (Gibson and Kong 2005).

Foregrounding the embodiment of subjects leads to a second analytical advance, the shift from mythological notions of objective “truth” to a view of knowledge as always partial, situated, and contingent. Barnes (2001) labels this a shift from epistemological to hermeneutic theorizing, noting (p. 551) that “hermeneutics conceives theorizing as a creative and open-ended process of interpretation that is circular, reflexive, indeterminate, and perspectival.” This argument acknowledges the deeply social origins, and consequences, of knowledge formation. In this transformation, the criteria of what is accepted as true themselves are open to question. Following Rorty (1981), theory is repositioned from being a map of reality, a view that assumes what Haraway (1991) famously labeled a “god trick,” to an argument, a narrative, or a form of persuasion. Language – the means by which we bring the world into consciousness – is given pride of place in this view, and discourse is upheld as the only viable means of knowing the world. Of necessity, this stance is doubly self-conscious: Both the situated knowledge of the observer and that of the subjects under consideration are taken into account. Contextualized epistemologies tend to jettison correspondence theories of truth for other forms, notably consensus theories (Miller et al. 2011), in which truth is held to be the outcome of informed debate free of restrictions, or what Habermas (1979) calls the ideal speech situation. In this conception, reason, truth, logic, and self-reflexivity are not located in some abstract transcendental realm but are grounded in praxis. The only criterion that remains for resolving contesting claims is their truth-value, which rests on the “force of a better argument,” leading to a consensus theory of truth that rejects absolute foundations for knowledge in favor of procedural ones. This philosophical stance no doubt informs much of the eclecticism, plurality, and diversity of outlooks that characterize contemporary economic geography (Amin and Thrift 2000; James 2006; Barnes and Sheppard 2010).

Finally, a conjoined economic/cultural geography is decisively relational in outlook (Ettlinger 2001; Bathelt and Glückler 2003; Yeung 2005; Sunley 2008), a notion that is integral to post-structural views of space (Murdoch 2006). As pioneered and articulated by Massey (2005), relational understandings of spatiality stress how geographies are constructed and reconstructed through ever-changing manifolds of power and interaction. Denis Cosgrove (2008:47) notes that “Places and landscapes are no longer thought of by geographers simply as bounded containers, but as

constellations of connections that form, reform and disperse in space and over time.” In a relational ontology of space, spatiality is defined not only through lines of power but also by feelings of belonging and responsibility, or what (Massey 1993) describes as a progressive sense of place in which identity is always comprehended in relation to other places. Mitchell (2000:272) holds that “A progressive sense of place and identity is predicated as seeing that identity and that place as part of a web of interconnections with other places and identities, a web defined not by exclusion or sameness, but by interdependence and difference” (emphasis in original). Thus, relational understandings of place and identity arose hand in hand.

1.2 A Preview of Things to Come

The ten chapters that follow offer a diverse array of theoretical and empirical insights into how economic and cultural geography are shot through with each other. Written by authors located in seven different countries, they come to terms with the mutual interpenetration, indeed symbiosis, of cultural and economic relations as they play out differentially across numerous local and regional contexts. Some chapters focus on commodity chains, others on consumption, and others on related topics like networks, trust, and the commodification of the urban. They share in common a concern with advancing the discipline of geography by conscientiously dissolving its stubborn subdisciplinary boundaries.

Trevor Barnes opens the chapters to come by noting that “Culture goes all the way down, seeping into economic geography’s very pores.” In tracing the historical geography of Anglophone economic geography as a subdiscipline, he shifts the origin of its changing ideas from “brains in vats” – the essence of the Cartesian subject – to a series of embodied social practices in which economic geographers worked within different cultures of knowledge, used and in turn were shaped (that is, enabled and constrained) by material objects such as books and computers, and were profoundly affected by the specific places within which they operated. When the evolution of economic geography is viewed in this way – as situated and reflective of changing social and political circumstances – then its traditional ideas, arguments, views, priorities and silences are revealed as profoundly gendered (i.e., masculinist) and racialized. The emergence of feminist economic geography began to undermine the hegemony of white males, of course, and set the stage for a series of productive engagements that would lead the field to view people and places in increasingly relational terms. Barnes shows that particular moments and locations arise in the discipline’s history as heterotopic, i.e., generating waves of change that reverberated throughout academic networks to remake the field. In short, Barnes recasts the temporal and spatial trajectory of economic geography in terms that resemble actor-network theory, in which the subdiscipline is portrayed not as manifolds of abstract ideas but as the contingent outcome of networks of people operating in interaction with objects in specific places.

Elaine Hartwick offers an expanded commodity chain analysis to unite production and consumption. Whereas earlier versions of this approach centered largely on

the material good, her version incorporates the representational and figurative dimensions of the commodity as part of a larger political project to penetrate the obstinate veil of commodity fetishism that permeates Western culture. By deconstructing how images are a vital part of the linkages that unite producers and consumers, she unveils a geography that unites the symbolic and the material into a seamlessly integrated whole. Under conditions of neoliberal, highly financialized, post-Fordist capitalism, in particular, in which stagnant incomes mean that consumption is fueled through household debt, financial speculation has wreaked havoc with the lives of countless millions. In this context, a commodity chain analysis sensitive to the deteriorating conditions of reproduction faced by workers and consumers becomes all the more imperative. She uses the simple example of a cup of coffee as a pedagogic device to illustrate how financialization has complicated commodity chains and hides the conditions of production from consumers. She concludes that “Doing cultural geography means practicing a critical politics of the economy.”

Perhaps nowhere are the deep ties between economic and cultural geography more evident than in the analysis of consumption. Accordingly, three chapters of this volume explore consumption in light of economic geography’s cultural turn. Juliana Mansvelt offers an insightful summary of how consumption has been repeatedly reconceptualized, ranging from the Frankfurt School to actor-network theory. Rescued from the abyss of neoclassical economics, consumption has been depicted, simultaneously, as an economic, cultural, psychological, political, and spatial process deeply tied to the formation of the consumer as subject. Under post-Fordist capitalism and its highly segmented markets, consumption has increasingly acquired a symbolic status in addition to being a material one, in which the sign of the commodity is often more significant than its use value. This shift has permeated the meaning of retail spaces such as shopping malls. She concludes by pointing to lines of work concerned with the renewed significance of the material object in consumption studies, the human/non-human interface, how consumption produces consumers as subjects, transnational actor-commodity networks, and the moral economies of consumption.

Like Hartwick, Deborah Leslie also uses commodity chains to unite the economic and the culture, extending this line of thought into a gendered understanding of the fashion industry. A feminist analysis of the fashion commodity chain conceptually unites the women who dominate it at every stage, from design to production (often under brutally Dickensian conditions) to consumption. Such a move is “sensitive to the mutually constitutive link between production and consumption, the material and the symbolic,” and injects a badly needed sense of class, politics, and difference into commodity chain analysis. Long associated with women and femininity, the fashion industry has been thoroughly restructured in the wake of on-going globalization, financialization, accelerated product cycles, and shifting demographic forces. Leslie’s analysis reveals how women across the chain are tied together in complex ways that shape their fortunes, outlooks, and everyday lives.

Lucia Lo and Lu Wang also take on the question of consumption, in which the fusion of the economic and the cultural is transparently obvious, despite neoclassical economists’ best attempts to divorce the two. Using the behavior of Chinese consumers in Toronto as their empirical analysis, they demonstrate how shopping

behavior is firmly embedded in wider understandings of ethnicity. The economically “rational” here is revealed to be not an inherent, universal attribute of *homo economicus*, but conditionally structured by, and manifested through, culturally-specific norms and practices. Consumption is inseparable from ideology and the identities that consumers construct, project, and reproduce in the act of purchasing. They integrate recent theorizations of ethnicity with commodity chain analysis, focus groups, and logistic regression to shed light on the spatiality of immigrant shoppers, concluding that for Chinese shoppers, “ethnicity is more important than price.” Thus, far from the aspatial, ahistorical, and asocial fantasies of utility maximization, shopping is saturated with deeply social and political meanings that are embodied in place.

Trust has long loomed large in the analysis of how economic relations are mediated among actors, particularly given the dense networks of ties that characterize post-Fordist agglomerations of production. Because it is socially created, reproduced, and annihilated within the context of culturally-specific parameters, trust is also a topic that unites economic and cultural geography. Geir Oderud explores the changing nature of trust and distrust in the context of economic restructuring and scalar change of neoliberal capitalism. Theorizations of trust inevitably have political consequences; for example, the assumption that ghetto residents suffer from widespread mutual mistrust has been invoked in “culture of poverty” explanations. He offers three case studies of the changing geographies of trust that point to the integration of cultural norms and economic practices: a cardboard packaging company undergoing a shift to internationalized administration, the restructuring of work in the Scandinavian public sector in light of the assaults on the welfare state, and the Norwegian home-building industry as it becomes ever more deeply entwined with banks and real estate developers.

For Deborah Che, the fusion of economic and cultural geography is evident in the techno music scene in Detroit. Situating techno in the city’s transition from the capital of Fordist production to post-industrial ghetto, abandoned by capital, young African Americans developed novel musical forms and a means of commodifying them. Detroit’s rebirth as a “creative city” in this context reflected a localized communal effort by people with few opportunities, not simply the individualistic ethos celebrated by both conservative advocates of entrepreneurship or those holding to Richard Florida’s theory of the creative class. The futuristic sounds of techno thus stood in sharp contrast to the city’s dismal economic status, offering the allure of escape and recovery, a means of rebuilding communities devastated by economic collapse. This story stands as hopeful reproach to the long series of dystopian works on Detroit that in the discipline of geography can be traced back to William Bunge’s works in the 1970s.

Networks have long occupied an important role in economic geography, ranging from the dense clusters of firms bound by agglomeration economies to long distance ties that facilitate “communities without propinquity.” Clustering, creativity, innovation, and networking, particularly in culturally-sensitive industries, have long been recognized as simultaneously determinant. For example, notions such as “institutional thickness” and “untraded dependencies” implicitly, if not explicitly, assume a unity of the economic and the cultural. Using a series of interviews, Roberta Comunian highlights how formal and informal local networks in northeastern

England and the local creative economy revolve around one another, how careers are made (or not) as actors draw upon the webs of contacts, resources, and meaning in which they are embedded to conduct business. In this light, the cultural turn has made everyday life an indispensable part of economic geography, not as a pale shadow of socioeconomic processes but as the medium through which they are negotiated, constituted, and transformed.

Luca Spinesi takes the cultural turn into the heart of location theory. Whereas conventional explanations of uneven development, inasmuch as economists bothered to consider the issue at all, assumed it away as a function of the distribution of exogenous factors such as natural resources, she invokes the Spatial Impossibility Theorem to demonstrate the logical implausibility of a spatial equilibrium among regions. In part, this results from externalities on both the supply and demand side, including locally-specific consumer preferences, which are culturally determined. Working at the interface of neoclassical economics and the new economic geography, she demonstrates the fundamental roles of imperfect competition, increasing internal returns to scale to firms, and circular causation. Drawing on the work of Paul Krugman and others, she sketches an approach to regional development that takes space, and culture, far more seriously than it has been appreciated hitherto. Thus, by using the tools of economists against themselves, regional development is recast as dynamic, unstable, and contingent.

Tourism, arguably the world's largest industry in terms of employment, is another avenue through which the unity of the economic and the cultural is apparent. Carlos Ferrás Sexto and Yolanda García Vázquez offer a case study of a fused economic and cultural geography in their analysis of Santiago de Compostela, Spain. The capital of Galicia, Santiago has played a role as a center of religious pilgrimage since the medieval era. Situating the city within the wider context of contemporary tourism, itself enabled by the information technologies of post-Fordist capitalism, they portray Santiago as a "city as spectacle," i.e., as a set of commodified images and representations. This strategy has served the city well, attracting ten million visitors annually. But, as they point out, tourism in Santiago has come at a cost, including enhanced inequality and the gradual erosion of Galician culture, as the city becomes a surreal plaything for visitors expecting to encounter the idealized version seen on the Web. In short, conventional distinctions between, say, the material and the symbolic or the market and culture, do such violence to a realistic understanding of Santiago that they are more misleading than revealing.

References

- Amin, A. (Ed.) (1995). *Post-fordism: A reader*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Amin, A., & N. Thrift. (2000). What kind of economic theory for what kind of economic geography? *Antipode*, 32, 4–9.
- Antonelli, C. (2000). Collective knowledge communication and innovation: The evidence of technological districts. *Regional Studies*, 34, 535–547.
- Audretsch, D. (1995). *Innovation and industry evolution*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

- Audretsch, D., & Feldman, M. (1996). R&D spillovers and the geography of innovation and production. *American Economic Review*, 86, 630–1640.
- Barnes, T. (2001). Rethorizing economic geography: From the quantitative revolution to the cultural turn. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 91, 546–565.
- Barnes, T. (2005). Culture: Economy. In P. Cloke & R. Johnston (Eds.), *Spaces of geographical thought: Deconstructing human geography's binaries* (pp. 61–80). London: Sage.
- Barnes, T., & Sheppard, E. (2010). 'Nothing includes everything': towards engaged pluralism in Anglophone economic geography. *Progress in Human Geography*, 34, 193–214.
- Barnett, C. (1998). The cultural turn: Fashion or progress in human geography? *Antipode*, 30(4):379–394.
- Bathelt, H., & Glückler, J. (2003). Toward a relational economic geography. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 3(2):117–144.
- Bell, D., & Valentine, G. (1997). *Consuming geographies: We are where we eat*. London: Routledge.
- Benjamin, W. (1969). *Illuminations*. New York: Schocken.
- Benneworth, P., & Henry, N. (2004). Where is the value added in the cluster approach? Hermeneutic theorising, economic geography and clusters as a multiperspectival approach. *Urban Studies*, 41, 1011–1023.
- Berndt, C., & Boeckler, M. (2009). Geographies of circulation and exchange: Constructions of markets. *Progress in Human Geography*, 33, 535–551.
- Bosco, F. (2006). Actor-network theory, networks, and relational approaches in human geography. In S. Aitken & G. Valentine (Eds.), *Approaches to human geography*. London: Sage.
- Buck-Morss, S. (1993). Dream world of mass culture: Walter Benjamin's theory of modernity and the dialectics of seeing. In D. Levin (Ed.), *Modernity and the hegemony of vision* (pp. 309–338). Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Cheng, S-W. (2006). Cultural goods creation, cultural capital formation, provision of cultural services and cultural atmosphere accumulation. *Journal of Cultural Economics*, 30, 263–286.
- Coe, N. (2000). The view from out west: Embeddedness, inter-personal relations and the development of an indigenous film industry in Vancouver. *Geoforum*, 31, 391–407.
- Cook, I., Crouch, D., Naylor, S., & Ryan, J. (Eds.) (2000). *Cultural turns/geographical turns: Perspectives on cultural geography*. Prentice Hall: Harlow.
- Cosgrove, D. (2008). *Geography and vision*. London/New York: I.B. Taurus.
- Crang, P. (1997). Cultural turns and the (re)constitution of economic geography. In R. Lee & J. Wills (Eds.), *Geographies of economies*. London: Edward Arnold.
- Cumbers, A. and MacKinnon, D. (2004). Clusters in urban and regional development. *Urban Studies*, 41, 959–969.
- Currid, E. (2007). *The warhol economy. How fashion, art and music drive New York city*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Ettlinger, N. (2001). A relational perspective in economic geography: Connecting competitiveness with diversity and difference. *Antipode*, 33, 216–227.
- Ettlinger, N. (2003). Cultural economic geography and a relational and microspace approach to trusts, rationalities, networks and change in collaborative workplaces. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 3, 145–171.
- Feldman, M., & Florida, R. (1994). The geographic sources of innovation: Technological infrastructure and product innovation in the United States. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 84, 210–229.
- Florida, R. (2002). The economic geography of talent. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 92, 743–755.
- Florida, R. (2003). *The rise of the creative class*. New York: Basic Books.
- Florida, R. (2004). *Cities and the creative class*. New York: Basic Books.
- Florida, R. (2005). *The flight of the creative class*. New York: Harper Collins.
- Gertler, M. (1992). Flexibility revisited: Districts, nation-states, and the forces of production. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 17, 259–278.
- Gertler, M. (1995). "Being there": Proximity, organisation, and culture in the development and adoption of advanced manufacturing technologies. *Economic Geography*, 71, 1–26.

- Gertler, M. (2003). Tacit knowledge and the economic geography of context, or the undefinable tacitness of being (there). *Journal of Economic Geography*, 3, 75–99.
- Gibson, C. and L. Kong. (2005). Cultural economy, a critical review. *Progress in Human Geography*, 29, 541–561.
- Giddens, A. (1984). *The constitution of society: Outline of the theory of structuration*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Glennie, P., & Thrift, N. (1993). Modern consumption: Theorising commodities and consumers. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 11(5):603–606.
- Goss, J. (1993). The “magic of the mall”: An analysis of form, function, and meaning in the contemporary retail built environment. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 83(1):18–47.
- Goss, J. (1999). Once-upon-a-time in the commodity world: An unofficial guide to the mall of America. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 89(1), 45–75.
- Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 91, 481–510.
- Granovetter, M. (1991). The social construction of economic institutions. In N. Nohria & R. Eccles (Eds.), *Networks and organisations: Form and action*. Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press.
- Gregson, N. (1995). And now it’s all consumption? *Progress in Human Geography*, 19(1): 135–141.
- Habermas, J., (1979). *Communication and the evolution of society*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Haraway, D. (1991). *Simians, cyborgs, and women: The reinvention of nature*. London: Routledge.
- Harrison, B. (1992). Industrial districts: Old wine in new bottles? *Regional Studies*, 26, 169–183.
- Hartwick, E. (2000). Towards a geographical politics of consumption. *Environment and Planning A*, 32, 1177–1192.
- Hopkins, J. (1990). West Edmonton Mall: Landscape of myths and elsewhere. *The Canadian Geographer*, 34(1):2–17.
- Howells, J. (2000). Knowledge, innovation and location. In J. Bryson, P. Daniles, N. Henry, & J. Pollard (Eds.), *Knowledge, space, economy*. London: Routledge.
- Jackson, P., Lowe, M., Miller, D., & Mort, F. (2000). *Commercial cultures: Economies, practices, spaces*. Oxford: Berg.
- Jackson, P. (2002). Commercial cultures: Transcending the cultural and the economic. *Progress in Human Geography*, 26, 3–18.
- James, A. (2006). Critical moments in the production of ‘rigorous’ and ‘relevant’ Cultural economic geographies. *Progress in Human Geography*, 30, 1–20.
- Jessop, B., & Oosterlynck, S. (2008). Cultural political economy: On making the cultural turn without falling into soft economic sociology. *Geoforum*, 39, 1155–1169.
- Johns, J. (2006). Video games production networks: Value capture, power relations and embeddedness. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 6, 151–180.
- Latour, B. (2007). *Reassembling the social: An introduction to actor-network theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Li, W., Dymski, G., Zhou, Y., Chee, M., & Aldana, C. (2002). Chinese-American banking and community development in Los Angeles County. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 92, 777–796.
- Mackenzi, D. (2009). *Material markets: How economic agents are constructed*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mansvelt, J. (2005). *Geographies of consumption*. London: Sage.
- Martin, R., & Sunley, P. (2001). Rethinking the “economic” in economic geography: Broadening our vision or losing our focus? *Antipode*, 33(2):148–161.
- Martin, R., & Sunley, P. (2003). Deconstructing clusters: Chaotic concept or policy panacea? *Journal of Economic Geography*, 3, 5–35.
- Maskell, P., & Malmberg, A. (1999). The competitiveness of firms and regions: Ubiquitification and the importance of localized learning.” *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 6(1):9–25.

- Massey, D. (1993). Power-geometry and a progressive sense of place. In J. Bird (Ed.), *Mapping the futures: Local cultures, global change* (pp. 59–69). New York: Routledge.
- Marx, K. (1976). *Capital: A critique of political economy* (Vol. 1). Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Massey, D. (2005). *For Space*. London: Sage.
- McDowell, L. (2000). Acts of memory and millennial hopes and anxieties: The awkward relationship between the economic and the cultural. *Social and Cultural Geography*, 1(1):15–24.
- McDowell, L., & Court, G. (1994a). Missing subjects: Gender, sexuality and power in merchant banks. *Economic Geography*, 70, 229–251.
- McDowell, L., & Court, G. (1994b). Performing work: Bodily representations in merchant banks. *Environment and Planning D*, 12, 747–750.
- Miller, D., Jackson, P., Thrift, N., Holbrook, B., & Rowlands, M. (Eds.) (1998). *Shopping, place and identity*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Miller, F., Vandome, A., & McBreweester, J. (2011). *Consensus theory of truth*. Mauritius: Alphascript Publishing.
- Mitchell, K. (1995). Flexible circulation in the Pacific Rim: Capitalisms in cultural context. *Economic Geography*, 71, 364–382.
- Mitchell, D. (2000). *Cultural geography: A critical introduction*. Malden: Blackwell.
- Mitchell, K., & Olds, K. (2000). Chinese business networks and the globalisation of property markets in the Pacific Rim. In H. Yeung, & K. Olds (Eds.), *Globalization of Chinese business in globalization of Chinese business firms* (pp. 195–219). London: Macmillan Press.
- Murdoch, J. (1995). Actor-networks and the evolution of economic forms: Combining description and explanation in theories of regulation, flexible specialization and networks. *Environment and Planning A*, 25, 731–757.
- Murdoch, J. (2006). *Post-structuralist geography: A guide to relational space*. London: Sage.
- Neff, G. (2004). The changing place of cultural production: The location of social networks in a digital media industry. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 597(1):134–152.
- Peck, J. (1992). Labor and agglomeration: Control and flexibility in local labor markets. *Economic Geography*, 68, 325–347.
- Peck, J. (2005). Struggling with the creative class. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 29, 740–70.
- Polanyi, M. (1967). *The tacit dimension*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Rodrigues-Pose, A. (2001). Killing economic geography with a “cultural turn” overdose. *Antipode*, 33(2):176–182.
- Rorty, R. (1981). *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Sayer, A. (1997). The dialectic of culture and economy. In R. Lee & J. Wills (Eds.), *Geographies of economies* (pp. 16–26). London: Arnold.
- Sayer, A. (2001). For a critical cultural political economy. *Antipode*, 33(4): 637–708.
- Schoenberger, E. (1997). *The cultural crisis of the firm*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Scott, A. (2000). *The cultural economy of cities*. London: Sage.
- Scott, A. (2002). A new map of Hollywood: The production and distribution of American motion pictures. *Regional Studies*, 36, 957–975.
- Scott, A. (2005). *On Hollywood: The place, the industry*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Scott, A. (2007). Capitalism and urbanization in a new key? The cognitive-cultural dimension. *Social Forces*, 85, 1465–1482.
- Storper, M. (1997). *The regional world: Territorial development in a global economy*. New York: Guildford.
- Storper, M. (1989). The transition to flexible specialisation in the US film industry: External economies, the division of labor, and the crossing of industrial divide. *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 13, 273–305.
- Storper, M., & Christopherson, S. (1987). Flexible specialization and regional industrial agglomerations: The case of the U.S. motion picture industry. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 77, 104–117.

- Storper, M., & Scott, A. (2009). Rethinking human capital, creativity, and urban growth. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 9, 147–267.
- Storper, M., & Venables, A. (2004). Buzz: Face to face contact and the urban economy. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 4, 351–371.
- Sunley, P. (2008). Relational economic geography: A partial understanding or a new paradigm? *Economic Geography*, 84, 1–26.
- Sunley, P., Pinch, S., Reimer, S., & MacMillen, J. (2008). Innovation in a creative production system: The case of design. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 8, 675–698.
- Thrift, N. 2000a. Pandora's box? Cultural geographies of economies. In G. Clark, M. Feldman, & M. Gertler (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of economic geography* (pp. 689–704). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Thrift, N. 2000b. Performing cultures in the new economy. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 90, 674–692.
- Thrift, N., & Olds, K. (1996). Reconfiguring the economic in economic geography. *Progress in Human Geography*, 20, 311–337.
- Throsby, D. (2001). *Economics and culture*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Valentine, G. (1999). A corporeal geography of consumption. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 17, 329–351.
- Vorley, T. (2008). The geographic cluster: A historical overview. *Geography Compass*, 2(3), 790–813.
- William, P., Hubbard, P., Clark, D., & Berkeley, N. (2001). Consumption, exclusion and emotion: The social geographies of shopping. *Social and Cultural Geography*, 2, 203–219.
- Wrigley, N. (2002). Food deserts in British cities: Policy context and research priorities. *Urban Studies*, 39, 2029–2040.
- Wrigley, N., & Lowe, M. (2002). *Reading retail*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Wrigley, N., & Lowe, M. (1996). *Retailing, consumption, and capital: Towards the new retail geography*. London: Longman.
- Yeung, H. W.-C. (2003b). Practicing new economic geographies: A methodological examination. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 93, 442–462.
- Yeung, H. W.-C. (2005). Rethinking relational economic geography. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 30(1):37–51.
- Zhou, Y. (1996). Inter-firm linkages, ethnic networks and territorial agglomeration: Chinese computer firms in Los Angeles. *Papers in Regional Science*, 75, 265–91.
- Zhou, Y. (1998). Beyond ethnic enclaves: Location strategies of Chinese producer service firms in Los Angeles. *Economic Geography*, 74(3), 228–251.

Chapter 2

A Short Cultural History of Anglo-American Economic Geography: Bodies, Books, Machines, and Places

Trevor J. Barnes

Economic geography as a discipline doesn't just do culture (and in the various forms illustrated by chapters in this collection). It is culture, produced by culture. Culture goes all the way down, seeping into economic geography's very pores. By culture I mean a set of shared values, judgments, institutional forms, artefacts and embodied practices that while changing over time possess sufficient stability and continuity to make that culture distinctive and capable of transmission.

While I use the singular form of the noun, culture in practice is plural. There are many *cultures* within economic geography. Certainly that is true historically as this chapter will document, but even within a given time period at least many diverse cultures of economic geographical inquiry proliferate. That is no more true than it is right now (Barnes and Sheppard 2010). The current constitution of economic geography is as pluralist as it ever has been, with difference, otherness, and fragmentation breaking out all over. Especially over the last three decades, economic geography has been pulled, twisted and contorted by a torrent of different approaches that just keep on coming (for a review see Scott 2000; Barnes and Sheppard 2010).

And that is only contemporary economic geography. Once one goes back beyond 30 years, many more disciplinary cultures emerge. In setting out a brief cultural history, I begin by elaborating the idea of culture, discussing its relation to the production of scientific knowledge and the shaping of academic disciplines. Here I draw upon science studies that more than any other body of work asserts that culture is woven into the very woof and weave of academic knowledge. Consequently, it is impossible to separate culture from disciplinary knowledge. By unpicking it, one would unravel the very object of investigation. To keep the discussion focussed, I highlight four elements that contribute to the cultural production of academic knowledge: bodies, books, machines and places. The remainder (and bulk) of the

T.J. Barnes (✉)

Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada
e-mail: tbarnes@geog.ubc.ca

chapter then uses these four elements as foci to organize selected vignettes of how culture plays out within economic geography's history.

That history, at least in its institutional form, begins in Western Europe in the late nineteenth century, and initially is hand-in-glove with various imperial projects. By the early twentieth century, while still fragile, the discipline begins to stand on its own, becoming increasingly robust and independent over the course of the next 100 years or so. It changes enormously over those 100 years, but constant is the importance of the cultural, and represented by the four elements identified above (Barnes 2000). Specifically, I argue that the blurring of the cultural with the discipline's scientific knowledge prevents clear-cut identification of progress within the history of economic geography. Progress is possible only if scientific knowledge is scraped clean of the cultural, allowing objective knowledge claims to be comparatively assessed, like with like. If cultural residue remains, however, no such comparison is possible, rendering assessments of disciplinary progress unachievable. This is the case in economic geography, I will suggest. The cultural is present throughout the entire corpus of economic geographical knowledge, and explaining, perhaps, why past disciplinary cultures never quite die out, but continue as existing traces. For this reason, economic geography maybe best conceived as a palimpsest (itself a cultural artefact), with partially erased, crossed-out, incomplete, and splintered-off versions of past cultures of inquiry persisting long after they once dominated. This makes the cultural history of economic geography messy and complex, sometimes indecipherable, but for all that no less compelling and powerful.

2.1 Cultures of Knowledge

2.1.1 *Kuhn and Science Studies*

The standard, rationalist account of the generation of scientific knowledge spurns talk of messy and complex cultures. Instead, it stresses the simple purity of rational thought lodged in a disembodied mind ("brains in vats" to use Putnam's (1981: 7) arresting image). Rationality's universality means that it matters neither where it is applied nor to what it is applied. What's important is only its inexorable pursuit, guaranteeing Progress with an upper-case P. For example, Newton famously could hold an analytical problem in his mind for days, turning it over, trying one logical line of attack, then another, until eventually it succumbed (Gleick 2003). Hence, he was able to invent calculus, or the wave theory of light, or the gravity equation. He did so through sweated brain power. By doggedly following rationality, and only rationality, truth was discovered (literally uncovered). It was as if truth were there all along, pre-existing, but hiding in the shadows, waiting for the searing light of rationality to be illuminated.

Criticisms of rationalism go back literally centuries, and take many forms. The critique I want to pursue is associated with a body of literature known as science

studies. The first canon shots over the bows of scientific rationalism came from Thomas Kuhn's [(1970 (1962))] paradigm-busting book on paradigms, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (reputedly the most academically cited book of the twentieth century). Roughly, a paradigm is the constellation of values, assumptions, techniques and concrete exemplars shared by a given scientific community, making it what it is, and passed down to future practitioners. A paradigm shapes what scientists think about something before they think it. The interpretation I want to draw from this description, and elaborated below, is that a paradigm is like culture. It is a set of institutionalised values and practices, some are formal, others tacit, but both learned and shared within a community, and passed on. In this sense, a Kuhnian paradigm is similar to culture. It is a culture for acquiring knowledge.

Kuhn argues that not only does the paradigm model provide a different account of science compared to rationalism, but provides a critique of it too. Culture makes a difference. Under rationalism, it is only the mental acuity of the individual scientist, his or her firing synapses, that determines whether truth is discovered. In the paradigm view, truth is not discovered but actively made from within a paradigm, shaped by the heterogeneous elements that constitute it. The scientist is not a brain in a vat, but is embodied, undertaking specific corporeal practices using various material objects, and is embedded within a larger cultural system of inquiry (the paradigm). Moreover, Kuhn claimed that the elements that constitute a paradigm are so heterogeneous that comparing one paradigm with another is impossible. They are like apples and oranges. This is a problem because rationality can operate only if the entities to which it is applied are commensurate, comparable. If they are not, the case with paradigms, rationality has no purchase. Choosing a paradigm, therefore, can never be an entirely rational process, but always open to non-rational factors. This view leads to a third point: under the paradigm model of scientific knowledge the assertion of Progress with an upper-case P is impossible. To demonstrate Progress one must be able to show that truths under the current paradigm are truer than truths under the prior paradigm. But if the paradigms generating those truths are incommensurable, no such demonstration can be made. Scientific knowledge, consequently, moves not as linear progress, but as non-comparable, discontinuous transformations.

Kuhn never used the term "culture," and later in his life when he became a professor at Harvard he denied the anti-rationalist implications of his earlier work (Fuller 2000). But those implications were taken up by others a decade or so later after his book was first published under the banner of science studies (for reviews of science studies in geography, see Barnes 2003 and Powell 2007). That literature is now vast, full of disagreement and competing perspectives, but it remains united in upholding Kuhn's anti-rationalism; denying big P scientific progress; conceiving science as a set of learned embodied practices involving a spectrum of material entities (from Bunsen burners to industrial-sized labs); and emphasizing that scientists are always part of a larger *cultural* matrix that doesn't exist only on the outside, stopping at the walls of their lab or at their office door, but seeping inside, getting into their very ideas, theories, objects of investigation, places of work, forms of communication, and the historical course of their disciplinary inquiry.

2.1.2 *Bodies, Books, Machines, and Places*

There are many elements that enter into the cultural production of disciplinary knowledge, but for this chapter, and following the literature of science studies, I focus on four: bodies, books, machines, and places.

Rationalist accounts deal with bodies by excluding them. They follow the seventeenth century French Enlightenment philosopher René Descartes in separating thinking, that is, rational thought, from the body in which it occurs. The body's gender or skin color or sexual orientation is irrelevant. What counts is not what I am, but what I think. In Descartes's famous aphorism, it is because I think that I am ("*cogito ergo sum*"). Thinking comes first, while bodies are secondary, and can be written out of the histories of knowledge. Or when they are included they are there to add mere background color and texture. Contemporary science studies, however, partly as a result of interacting with, and contributing to, cultural studies, feminism, post-colonialism and queer studies, argues that the body should never be in the background but in the foreground. Mind and body cannot be separated. Who I am affects what I think. Bodies are never innocent. There might be the pretence that the body performs as only a "modest witness," to use Donna Haraway's (1997) phrase, rationally and dispassionately recording only the observable facts. Haraway (1997) argues, though, that such modesty is no modesty at all. It is a front, a ruse, hiding and protecting what many of those bodies do. For Haraway, the front of modesty hides the interests of white, Western men. It is their bodies that most produce and benefit from scientific knowledge. "Modesty pays off ... in the coin of epistemological and social power" Haraway (1997: 23) writes. Denying the importance of bodies thus turns out to be a strategy to promulgate a particular kind of knowledge, and for Haraway marked often by masculinism, racism and heteronormativity. It is for this reason that we must be culturally attentive to the kinds of bodies involved in producing economic geography's knowledge. Knowledge is never disembodied, always incarnate.

Second, on the surface books appear as neutral media of knowledge transmission, simply the materialization of rational thought. But like bodies, books have a complex cultural history and role. To use the language of science studies, one purpose of a book is to be a "spokesperson" for a specific culture of inquiry. They sit on the library shelf waiting to be taken to an office or a home, to be opened and read, and to persuade readers of the knowledge between their covers. Bruno Latour (1987) labels books "immutable mobiles." They are mobile in that they easily travel, but are immutable in that the distance they travel does not physically corrupt the inscriptions they contain. They contribute to the cultural production of economic geography in at least four ways. First, because they are "immutable mobiles" they facilitate connections among geographically dispersed members of the same culture, cementing their relation, but also reaching out to non-members, bringing them into the fold, enlarging the community. Second, a book is a powerful artefact because it brings many varied aspects of the world together on a single page, enabling control, re-ordering, manipulation, and assertion of cultural authority. As Latour (1990: 45)

writes, once inscribed on a book's page, phenomena can be "dominated with the eyes and held by the hands, no matter when and where they come from or what their original size." Third, if they are successful, a book becomes an "obligatory passage point" (Latour 1987: 159), a mandatory cultural reference whether one agrees or disagrees with its position. If you want to do/undo economics then you must read Paul Samuelson's *Foundations of Economics*. If you want to do/undo sociology then you must read Talcott Parson's *Structure of Social Action*. Finally, a book's success derives from the quality of its rhetoric meaning an ability to draw together within its text different allies. Consequently, if you attack the book it means you also attack its allies, thus making the volume stronger, more secure and durable.

Third, it might seem odd to make machines one of the components of the cultural production of a discipline given that generally they are neither thought of possessing culture, nor thought capable of making knowledge (they are tools to produce knowledge, not knowledge producers). Again science studies, suggests a different view. For Latour (1993: 79–82) machines are not just "intermediaries," but "mediators," shaping, channelling, and entering into the form of knowledge that is produced. As Hetherington and Law (2000: 35) write: "Material trappings are not just trappings. They are not idle. They are also performative. That is they act. ... [They] participate in the generation of information, or power relations, of subjectivities and objectivities." For example, software used to run the hardware of geographical information systems brings with a systematic set of cultural biases, hidden assumptions, and *aporias*. The knowledge that is produced by such machines, and found in print-outs and screenshots, are not mirror copies of the world, "the gaze from nowhere" (Haraway 1991: 188), but the view from somewhere. Machines are not inert pieces of wire, plastic, metal, and glass, submissively responding to the beck and call of their operators. But they possess agency, and enter into the cultural production of knowledge. Peter Galison (1997) provides a brilliant illustration in his history of twentieth-century microphysical detectors used in scientific laboratories. His is not just a technical history – how material bits and pieces are physically joined (although it is that as well) – but it is also "part labor history, part sociology, part epistemology. It is a history inseparable from individuals' search for a way of working in laboratories sited squarely in a particular culture – here of Victorian Scotland, there of war-time Los Alamos. It is a history of twentieth century microphysics written from the machine outward" (Galison 1997: 5). Similarly we need a history of economic geography from its machines outward.

Finally, there is place, and increasingly important within science studies (Livingstone 2003; Powell 2007). Initially science studies focussed on the micro-spaces of just one kind of place, the laboratory (Latour 1988). But it was increasingly recognised that both substantively and theoretically place served more than only a site for the enactment of a specific form of science. How place was an active contributor to the production of knowledge was taken up by several researchers. Kevin Hetherington (1997), for example, argued that some places, which following Foucault (1986) he labelled heterotopias, held the potential to allow a different form of ordering to emerge compared to other places outside. To use my earlier vocabulary, heterotopias, because of their openness, were places of potential new paradigm

formation, sites that permitted disciplinary transformation. Gieryn (2002) suggested that some places through their cultural meaning and materiality became “truth spots;” that is, the knowledge claims made at those sites precisely because they were made at those sites legitimated them as necessarily truthful, “authentic all over” (Gieryn 2002: 118). If it came from Harvard it must be true. Or finally, for Bruno Latour (1987) places were central to the production of knowledge because they functioned as “centers of calculation.” That is, they were sites where knowledge from other places was gathered, accumulated, organized, and interpreted, before disseminated and producing “action at a distance” (Latour 1987). The important point for this chapter about these works is that whether as heterotopias, truth spots, or as centres of calculation, places are entwined with the cultural, permeating the resulting production of knowledge.

In sum, following the science studies literature I’ve argued that the production of knowledge is always infused with culture. It is present at every turn. Any history of economic geography therefore must also be a cultural history, and to which I now turn.

2.2 Cultures of Economic Geography

2.2.1 *Bodies*

Until even 25 years ago the vast majority of economic geographers were men, and men of Northern European heritage (like me). White men continue to predominate, but over the last quarter of century there has been at least incremental change, with women more numerous as well as non-Caucasians (especially those of Asian heritage). This shift has brought about a change in the intellectual agenda of the discipline, speaking directly to the entanglement of culture and knowledge.

Up until around 1980, economic geography was unabashedly masculinist. That was true first, in terms of the gender of those who practiced it, and second, in terms of the discipline’s substantive interest. Economic geography was primarily concerned with what men did at work, and often taken to be producing physical commodities using large machines with other men and frequently in heartland industrial regions in Western Europe and North America. And finally, in terms of its method, economic geography was about accumulating hard facts, often in numerical form, displaying them in tables and maps, and since the post-world war II period undertaking statistical analysis including occasionally formal mathematical modelling.

The form of the pre-1980 version of the discipline can be traced back to the very origins of the university-based economic geography that started in the late nineteenth century in Western Europe and the United States. The earliest Anglo-American professors of economic geography were white males like George Goudie Chisholm (1850–1930) at Edinburgh University (MacLean 1988), Lionel W. Lyde (1863–1947) at University College London (UCL) (Clout 2003), or J. Russell Smith (1874–1966) at the University of Pennsylvania (Rowley 1964). They wrote about

where and how commodities were produced, and about transportation simply as a means to move goods from where they were produced to where they were consumed. Their concern was purely the commodity, and as a corollary the brute facts of nature, the labor process (but rarely labor), physical infrastructure, and new technology. Theirs was a “God’s eye view,” to use Haraway’s term, providing knowledge of the whole world, with detailed empirical inventories of every continent to prove it. Those inventories took the form of maps, black and white photos, appendices stuffed with tables, and on almost every line of text a statistic. George Chisholm (1889: iv) says in the preface to his volume, *Handbook of Commercial Geography*, that his intention was *not* to “encumber the book with a multitude of minute facts.” But those minute facts litter every page.

While seemingly the “gaze from nowhere” (Haraway 1991: 188), early economic geography was of course the view from somewhere and from *somebody*. It was the view from the center. That is, from those countries that were industrialized, wealthy, anxious to pursue trade, and that most wanted to maintain or expand the colonies they controlled. The beginning of the “Scramble for Africa” coincided almost exactly with the date of the first formal rendering of economic geography as an academic discipline in 1882, defined by the German geographer Wilhelm Götze (Sapper 1931).

The whiteness of the bodies that did the gazing came out, at least in some of those bodies, as racist theories of development couched as environmental determinism. The early twentieth-century Yale-based geographer, Ellsworth Huntington, was perhaps the most notorious. His 1915 book, *Climate and Civilization*, included a chapter on “Work and Weather” (Huntington 1915). Huntington calculated that mental work efficiency was maximized if mean seasonal temperatures do not fall below 38°F, and physical work efficiency was maximized if mean seasonal temperatures do not exceed 65°F (Huntington 1915: 129). *Ipso facto*, mental and physical work occurred most efficiently in the world’s temperate regions, and, as it just happened, occupied by white populations (that is, if one forgets the original aboriginal inhabitants who usually had been decimated by European colonization). People in North or Central Africa or South or East Asia, or Central or South America had not “made it,” nor could they have ever made it, because the climate regime under which they labored made them labor so badly. The early American economic geographer J. Russell Smith fully approved, writing to Huntington to say that the latter’s “chart showing the relation of human output to temperature” was “real geography” (quoted in Livingstone 1994: 143). The British economic geographer Lionel Lyde was not much better. As reported in a 1911 *New York Times* article, “How Men Changed their Color,” Lyde suggested low amounts of light and significant rain made humans light skinned, and high amounts of light, and significant aridity made humans dark skinned.¹

¹ How men changed their color, *The New York Times*, August 6, 1911. Available on-line at: <http://query.nytimes.com/mem/aLawrchive-free/pdf?res=F60F15FE3D5813738DDDAF0894D0405B818DF1D3>

Economic geography continued as a man's discipline following its incarnation as regionalism during the inter-war period (regions as natural economic geographical units), and later as post-war spatial science that attempted to make economic geography a natural science (Barnes 2011a). The latter involved the systematic application of hard science forms of theorising and abstract modelling, and the use of rigorous statistical techniques of analysis and description (Barnes 2011b). Later critics interpreted the hyper rationalism of spatial science's epistemological form with its assertion of universality and certainty as classic tell-tale signs of phallocentrism, that is, a gendered, masculinist conception of knowledge (Doel 1999). Certainly, women rarely participated within spatial science. At an iconic conference where spatial science debuted on the world stage, the 1960 International Geographical Union meeting at Lund, Sweden, not one of the 63 paper presenters or discussants was a woman. The conference photographs show a sea of men's faces except for the tea room, where two well-dressed, smiling women fill a table full of cups from two large teapots.² Or another example: Patricia Burnett and Susan Hanson both faced considerable obstacles in participating in U.S. spatial science. Burnett in the end sued Northwestern University's Geography Department, where she was a professor, for its "climate of sex discrimination" (P. Burnett, Interview with the author, Cambridge, MA, May, 2002). While Hanson (Interview with the author, Worcester, MA, May, 2002), a graduate student at Northwestern during the 1960s, remembers that when the chair of the department, Ed Espenshade, "spoke, he only asked how the family were, but never asked about scholarly work. Realistically ... one did not expect anything different! We knew very well that we were entering male turf."

In that light, Doreen Massey's (1984) book *Spatial Divisions of Labour* was a watershed volume for economic geography in two senses. First, the book offered a very different agenda for economic geography. Production and the factory were still prominent, but it was not necessarily production by men. Moreover, to understand what went on inside the factory, Massey argued that it was necessary to refer to what went on outside, particularly in the home (the site of "domestic reproduction"). As a result, distinguishing different kinds of bodies and what they did at different sites was critical. The intellectual sensibility was different too emphasizing the cultural as much as the economic, interpretation as much as analysis, and deft prose as much as deft arithmetic. The second watershed, of course, was that the book's author was a woman. There had been women economic geographers before, but not many given the struggles they endured as the experiences of Burnett and Hanson illustrate. But there had never been a woman economic geographer who had built into her conceptualization of the disciplinary problematic the absence of bodies, and female bodies in particular, providing a larger theoretical framework to set and resolve that lack.

² Photographs of the conference were taken by the University of Chicago geographer Chauncy Harris, and can be found in his Papers lodged at the University of Chicago (Papers of Chauncy Harris, University of Chicago, Box 26, Folder 3). The conference organisers prepared a post-meeting souvenir brochure of the event using photographs by Harris, and containing pictures of the all-male line up, as well as the two tea ladies.

That was the genius of Massey's book, which divides the history of economic geography into before Massey and after.

After Massey came a different kind of economic geography that was less straight-laced and buttoned up, less about numbers, less about the economy, less about white men. Massey's work didn't so much determine how economic geography was conducted, but provided the disciplinary room for experimentation with other forms of inquiry and methods. More women came into the discipline, often bringing concerns about the body, and using those concerns to re-theorize the subject (both human and academic). J. K. Gibson-Graham (1996) and their book *The End of Capitalism (as We Knew it)* represented all of these things. They were two women (Kathy Gibson and Julie Graham), who drew on feminist theory, advocated and undertook novel methods (action research), and radically re-drew what counted as disciplinary knowledge and practice. They showed what was possible from a different cultural sensibility.

More recently, the "relational turn" that entered the discipline about 10 years ago can be interpreted as yet another expression of the desire to widen further the range of bodies that potentially contribute to economic geography's knowledge (Bathelt and Glückler 2003; Yeung 2005). The "relational turn" understands the relationship among different economic agents in terms of a network of close interconnections even when those connections in physical distance are not close at all. Actors across the world are tethered to one another by complex sets of relations. Everyone within the network is joined. This is a message, though, also for the discipline of economic geography. All economic geographers, even those physically distant from Anglo-American economic geography, are connected. All are part of a global disciplinary network. Everyone is connected, all bodies count. In the case of the "relational turn," it has been especially Asian economic geographers, as well as Continental Europeans, who want to count, to be part of what they conceive as a world-wide network linking the discipline, and formalized now in three "Global Conferences in Economic Geography," the first significantly in Singapore in December, 2000, followed by meetings in Beijing and Seoul.

The larger point is that the minds that come up with and develop academic disciplines cannot be divorced from the bodies that they inhabit. Disciplinary knowledge is embodied knowledge. Consequently, one needs to know something about the changing bodies practicing economic geography to understand changing disciplinary knowledge.

2.2.2 Books

Although books are material objects – even in virtual form, they require *hardware* to be read – this doesn't lessen their cultural import. As artefacts they serve many cultural purposes. They introduce and acculturate novices into the field (the aim of the textbook); they are repositories of what Kuhn (1970) called "exemplars," classic theories, concepts, and case-studies on which disciplinary practice, craft, and judgment rest; they are deposits of disciplinary memory; they are sparks

for creative new projects; they are objects to give to outsiders to show them what we do, and to persuade them of its worth; they are a means to forge allies both inside the discipline, as well as outside including funding bodies, government bureaucracies, even Royal Commissions. In short, the materiality of a book does not make it inert and dead, but is the very means of its cultural liveliness and engagement.

Books are able to achieve these cultural ends because they travel (they are “mobile”), while their inscriptions remain the same (they are “immutable”). That said, interpretation and judgment of those inscriptions vary depending upon the culture of the place in which they are made. For example, David Livingstone (2003, ch. 4) discusses the remarkable range of different interpretation given to Charles Darwin’s *The Origin of Species* as it variously travelled during the late nineteenth century to Edinburgh, Belfast, Dublin, Princeton, NJ, and Charleston, SC. Both reading and writing are culturally infused.

The first English language textbook in economic geography was George G. Chisholm’s (1889) *Handbook of Commercial Geography*. It was fundamental to the creation of the field, and its expansion. With that book one could show that economic geography was no longer just an idea, merely an intellectual distinction. It literally possessed substance. The discipline was materialized: set out in ink and paper, folded between two sturdy covers, and weighing in around a kilogram. One could now literally hold the new discipline in one’s hands, and pass that discipline around to interested others. Certainly, it reached the hands of fresh-eyed university and extension students. Chisholm used his *Handbook* as a text for a full-year course of lectures he gave at Birkbeck College, University of London, beginning in 1896. But it was also passed on to education boards, and in the UK even to a Royal Commission that determined school and university curricula (MacLean 1988: 23). It also made its way to other academics, showing that there was a new discipline on the block. And it went to those, sometimes far afield, who wanted to practice the new discipline of economic geography themselves. For example, Emory R. Johnson (1906), a transportation economist at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, cited Chisholm’s book in 1906. That same year a former doctoral student of Johnson’s, J. Russell Smith, used the *Handbook* to argue for the importance of establishing a separate Department of Geography and Industry at the Wharton School, which was created in 1906 with Smith as founding Head. In 1913, Smith (1913) used the *Handbook* as a template for his own textbook, *Industrial and Commercial Geography*, which was widely picked up as a text for the new discipline among US colleges offering courses in economic geography (Fellmann 1986).

Of course, it is not only Chisholm’s book that provided a foundation for the discipline. J. Russell Smith’s was later important, and at the turn of the nineteenth century so were those of Lionel Lyde (1863–1947), Professor of Economic Geography at University College London from 1903, and author of such stirring titles as *Man and his Markets* (1898) and *A Commercial Geography of the British Empire* (1903). By the end of the First World War, economic geography was up and running in Anglo-American universities. But already it was shifting perspective, tilting inward, increasingly leaning toward a regional perspective. The textbooks, though, kept on coming. But now written not about imperial global production and

the world-wide movement of commodities, but about the peculiarities of unique regions, which were represented using stock typologies into which the economic geographical facts of a region were meticulously sorted. Being an economic geographer now meant learning the typology, and all the facts under each of its categories. Ray Whitbeck and Vernor Finch (1924) at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, for example, deployed a parsimonious four-fold classification typology in their textbook, *Economic Geography*, while the more expansive Clarence Jones (1935) at Clark University provided an eight-fold classification. In the scheme of things, it turned out to be wildly popular, becoming “the standard introductory text on the subject for thousands of college students” (Hudson 1993: 167).

But Clarence Jones’s (1935) *Economic Geography*, which began with the immortal line “Most of us wish to visit distant lands ... to hunt lions and tigers in the forests and savannas of Africa,” could not cut it as a text for what came next from the late 1950s, i.e., spatial science. Something completely different was required: a primer on geographical theory, modelling, and statistical techniques. Peter Haggett’s (1965) book *Locational Analysis in Human Geography* brilliantly filled that need. It did so in part because it succeeded so well as a cultural artefact.

Locational Analysis did several things, including: (1) introduced novices to the field, persuading them of the virtues of practicing the new approach. The book’s origins were “much thumbed and much-revised lecture notes” that Haggett (1965) used in his third-year class on “Locational Analysis” taught on Saturday mornings at Cambridge University. Those students would not have been exposed to a theoretical or mathematical geography before Haggett’s class, and so were the perfect audience for trying out and sharpening the presentation. (2) The book travelled extensively, with its first edition selling 40,000 copies (Thrift 1995: 383), and accumulating 378 citations between 1966 and 1984 (the third most cited book in all of geography for that period; Wrigley and Mathews 1986). (3) It became an “obligatory passage point” in Latour’s terms, with anyone practicing spatial science required to read it. In this, Haggett also prepared the ground from the mid-1960s by organising lectures for British sixth-form geography school teachers precisely around the themes of *Locational Analysis* (the Maddingly Hall lectures). Consequently, when sixth-form students went on to university to read geography they expected to read Haggett. (4) *Locational Analysis* was a flag bearer for the discipline, showing non-geographers what geography could do. The urban planner, Peter Hall, writing in *New Society*, for example, described it as “the most original and important book from a British geographer for many years” (quoted in Thrift 1995: 383). (5) It was stuffed with Kuhnian exemplars, and most frequently represented by the miniature diagrammatic spaces that littered its pages (there were 162 numbered illustrations in 310 pages of text). Each figure showed with great economy and clarity the exemplary virtue of some spatial theory, model or technique.

More examples could be given. The point is that books are not like tablets handed down from the mountain top carrying divine force. To be successful, readers must be persuaded that they should be read, be convinced of what they read, and then to pass on their reading. Books gain their power on the ground through cultural, not celestial, means.

2.2.3 *Machines*

Compared to other disciplines, especially those in the natural sciences, economic geography has not been a big user of machines to produce knowledge. Of course, early economic geographers like Chisholm and Smith were deeply concerned with machines, interested not only in individual pieces of equipment, but in the larger genus that by the late nineteenth century had created the object of their new study, economic geography. Writing in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Chisholm and Smith thought latent Promethean impulses had been at last unshackled, breaking loose old geographical constraints on the production and movement of goods. Innovations in transportation and communications – the railways, the steamship, the internal combustion engine, the telegraph, the telephone – allowed for a hitherto unachieved global integration of commodity production, circulation and exchange, finally circumscribing nature’s historical niggardliness.

Germane here, in representing machines and their geographical effects, the early economic geographers used machines. Chisholm’s book has no photographs, but Smith’s is full of them. Many were gleaned from U.S. government sources, but a significant number were taken by Smith himself with his own camera as he travelled the sites of industrial and commercial geography. Chisholm’s book is notable for its pull-out, two-tone, multi-patterned regional transportation and commercial maps individually glued between folio pages. Those maps were not drawn by Chisholm, but a colleague, “F. S. Walker, FRGS” [Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society]. Accordingly, it was Walker who deployed the machinery of map-making that during especially the second half of the nineteenth century was radically improved as a result of technological changes (Pearson 1983 provides a detailed inventory). It was now much easier to print different color tones, incorporate varied map markings, and change fonts and sizes, all features found in the *Handbook’s* maps.

Machines came into their own, especially within the post-war spatial science version of economic geography. The hallmarks of that movement were numbers and calculation. At least initially, the numbers were limited, with calculations relatively simple. A slide rule was sufficient. Better still, though, was a mechanical calculator. There were manual ones like the Monroe, although increasingly they were supplanted during the 1950s by electrical versions like the Marchand or the Frieden. The situation wasn’t static, though, with the amount of numerical data and the complexity of calculations increasing exponentially. By the late 1950s, even the Marchand and Frieden couldn’t cut it anymore. More machine help was necessary. Fortunately, precisely at that moment help became available. The first commercially sold computer in North America was the IBM 650 launched in 1954, bought by Columbia University. Other universities quickly followed, including at the University of Washington and the University of Iowa, which both had geography departments beginning to travel down the road of spatial science. There was no formal training for those early spatial scientists in using the computer, though. It was a “bootstrap operation,” as Brian Berry (Interview with the author, Pittsburgh, PA, April, 2000), a student at the University of Washington, called it. Nor initially were there any formal programming languages. Michael Dacey (Interview with the author,

Evanston, IL, November, 1997), who was a student with Berry at Washington, remembers one had to “programme with patch panels, actually plugging in wires.” And Waldo Tobler (Interview with the author, Santa Barbara, CA, March, 1998), also at Washington, remembers:

We had to go up to the attic of the Chemistry building at 2 a.m. so we could run the computer by ourselves. They didn't have any computer operators in those days, and that was before computer languages like FORTRAN. ... To cover programming on the 650 you had to pick up two bytes of information on one rotation of the drum. It had a 2K memory which rotated real fast. And if you were clever, you could pick up two pieces of information in one rotation.

In comparison to present computing capacity, these early machines and procedures were like lumbering dinosaurs. But in terms of the culture of the time, they represented rocket science, or at least, spatial science. Moreover, machines and operating procedures transformed rapidly, very quickly becoming *de rigueur* within the new culture of economic geography, spatial science. Haggett's (1965: 248) *Locational Analysis*, for example, extolled the virtues of “high-speed computers,” using them to derive specific maps and numerical results in his own text. Those maps and results would never have been produced without these machines. They were not just lifeless instruments (tangles of wires joining switches, buttons and flashing lights), but separate and independently contributing actors. How a computer was designed, what it could do, made a difference to the knowledge that spatial scientists generated, thus affecting the very character of economic geography as a discipline.

The computer was perhaps the most important of the machines for spatial science, but there were others, admittedly less sophisticated but enjoying at least walk-on roles. The lowly slide-rule was an early performer, and later the line-printer, and the Xerox machine. Key at the University of Washington was another machine, the duplicator. The chair of the department in the mid-1950s, Donald Hudson, gave the graduate students unlimited access to paper, ink, and use of the machine. It was used initially for mimeographing internal discussion papers, but later as the means to reproduce a Departmental discussion paper series. It was sent around the world, and catalytic in forging spatial science in other places. Haggett (1965), for example, acknowledges its influence on his own work. Like the computer, the duplicating machine made a profound difference to how spatial science in economic geography was shaped. As a result, if we want to understand the discipline, we need to understand its machines. It is necessary write a history of economic geography from its machines outward.

2.2.4 Places

While the role of place of economic geography seems like a topic that should have gripped the attention of geographers, in reality it has been barely studied. This lack of response goes to the powerful hold of rationalism. Rationalism contends that place does not matter in the production of ideas. Rationalism is universal, found

everywhere, rendering irrelevant the peculiarity of the place in which inquiry occurs. It is the “view from nowhere,” as Thomas Nagel (1986) labels it. Against this rationalist view, however, has emerged quite a different one over the last 40 years that holds that the character of place, its culture, is utterly critical to the formation of ideas that occurs there (or doesn’t). It is a view put forward primarily by sociologists rather than geographers, however.

The first, Bruno Latour, conceives place as an imperial “centre of calculation,” with circuits of travel radiating outward to collect and bring back materials of all kinds. At the center, the material is sorted, analysed, interpreted and displayed, used as the basis for decisions sent back to the periphery to effect action at a distance. Latour’s geographical model it is at least half right as a depiction of the geography of the discipline during its early years. European national capitals were in particular the first sites at which the discipline initially emerged. Universities in Berlin and Paris were the first to employ economic geographers from the 1870s, and then slightly later, the University of London. As mentioned, Chisholm began as a sessional lecturer at Birkbeck in 1896, and in 1903 Lyde secured his Chair at UCL. In 1908 Chisholm went to another national capital, Edinburgh, where he was the founding appointment in Geography at that city’s university, first, as Lecturer, and from 1920, as Reader. In the United States, the first courses in economic geography were taught in 1893 at Cornell and the University of Pennsylvania (Fellmann 1986). In 1906 at the University of Pennsylvania, Russell Smith became the inaugural chair at the Department of Industry and Geography. Not all these sites were imperial “centers of calculation,” however. Ithaca, New York, where Cornell is located, was hardly that. And there were other places where economic geography was practiced that do not fit Latour’s scheme such as the University of Chicago, home to the very first department of geography in America (1903), and a well-known early economic geographer, Walter S. Tower (Harris 1979). Or again, the geography department at Clark University in Worcester, MA, founded in 1921, began publishing four years later the flagship journal of the sub-discipline, *Economic Geography* (1925). But again Worcester was hardly an imperial center of calculation. As for Latour’s thesis about the importance of circulations around centers of calculation, Chisholm relied heavily on the availability of statistics taken from the British colonies and accumulated in London. Those statistics were laced throughout the *Handbook*, especially amassed in a 60-page statistical appendix. But being in London also gave Chisholm access to all kinds of reports and journals, as well as foreign language books, on which he says in his preface he relied (Chisholm 1889:iii-vii). Or again, according to Clout (2003), Lyde relied both for his publications and his lectures on an enormous collection of meticulously kept clippings taken from newspapers and periodicals acquired in Central London. Whether either the *Handbook* or *Man and his Markets* were the basis of action at a distance is less clear. The *Handbook* went to 20 editions (the last in 1982), and was used as a text for many years for British professional exams in banking and commerce, so one would expect some effects. Brian Hudson (1977), at least, argues for a strong link between the texts of late nineteenth and early twentieth century British geographers and action at a distance in the British colonies they geographically represented.

The works of the other two sociologists discussed, Hetherington (1997) on heterotopias and Gieryn (2002) on truth spots, are relevant to understanding the geography of spatial science and its immediate aftermath. At the basis of Hetherington's argument is that for fundamental social and intellectual change to occur there must be geographical sites, places, sufficiently open and porous to allow the new way, whatever that might be, breathing space and elbow room to develop. Hetherington's example is the Palais Royale in Paris that opened up a heterotopic space against the *ancien regime*, allowing it to "become the focus for other interests and hopes for social change" in revolutionary France (Hetherington 1997: 51).

The key heterotopic spaces for the emergence of spatial science in economic geography during the second half of the 1950s were the departments of geography at, respectively, the Universities of Washington (Seattle) and Iowa (Iowa City). At both places there was a reaction against the *ancien régime* of regional geography and a hope that it would be replaced by a revolution based on numbers, calculation, rigorous theory and the IBM 650. But what was it about the departments at Washington and Iowa as geographical sites that fostered the necessary elbow room and breathing space for change? Both departments until the mid-1950s were second-tier intellectually, on the margins of American geography. The department of Washington was older than Iowa's, and had been run by the Earls, a husband and wife team, both committed regionalists, but with little academic kudos. The department at Iowa was created only in 1946 when the Dean assigned a professor from the Business Faculty, an economist by training, Harold McCarty, as chair. In contrast, the powerhouse American geography departments after the War were staffed primarily by well-known regionalists. They had a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, such as at Wisconsin (Richard Hartshorne), Syracuse (Preston James), Harvard (Derwent Whittlesey), Chicago (Wellington Jones), Michigan (Robert Hall), and Berkeley (Carl Sauer). Given the challenge to regionalism that spatial science represented, it would have likely met with considerable resistance at these top-tier departments (especially given also the forceful personalities of some of the academic staff like Hartshorne, James and Sauer). Resistance to change would be less in weaker departments like Washington's or departments that had yet to establish a tradition like Iowa's. For brevity's sake it is not possible to provide a detailed unfolding of the "revolution" at those two places (details are found in Barnes 2001a, b, 2003). My argument, following Hetherington, is that they occurred because of the peculiar local cultural conditions found at each place, making them temporarily at least heterotopic spaces. It was not inevitable that change would occur. Spatial science did not emerge from any iron law of rationality asserting itself. Rather, it was conjunctional, the consequence of several factors converging, including the cultural character of the place where those conjunctions met.

In his 1977 textbook on quantitative methods for geographers, Peter Taylor presented, half-tongue-in-cheek, a flight map for "Quantgeog Airline Flight Plan" (Fig. 2.1; Taylor 1977: 15). It is a remarkable map because it is one of the few in geography that is not a cartography of things, but a cartography of an idea, spatial science. In Gieryn's terms, the sites on Taylor's map represent "truth spots." They




Fig. 2.1 Quantgeog airlines flight plan (Source: Redrawn from Taylor 1977: 15)

are places where the work of spatial science is done, and because the work is done at those sites, one believes that the truths generated hold not only in those places but everywhere else too. It becomes “true all over” (Gieryn 2002: 118). The term “truth spot” is a reminder that place occupies a persuasive force in knowledge claims. But the term can also be used to understand why some places suffer once that persuasive force diminishes. To use Taylor’s map again, in 1977 two of the truth spots of spatial science he identifies were the University of Chicago and the University of Michigan. They became truth spots because students who were at the Universities of Washington and Iowa in the late 1950s gained jobs at Chicago and Michigan, and recreated at these latter sites the conditions that held at the former. But all this changed again when in the mid-1980s both the University of Chicago and the University of Michigan closed their departments of geography. These closures were partly a result of a suspicion held from the late 1940s among administrators of top-tier American universities, such as Chicago and Michigan, that geography as an academic discipline was not up to the task of making any of its knowledge claims “true all over.” This step occurred directly from the closure of geography at Harvard in 1948 following the belief of its President, James Conant, that geography was “not a university subject” (quoted in Smith 1987: 159). But partly it was also a result of key faculty who practiced spatial science leaving Chicago and Michigan for elsewhere. University administrators thought if anyone was capable of making claims true all over it was the spatial scientists. But if they went, so did the status of the truth spot.

2.3 Conclusion

In putting forward his pragmatist philosophy in 1910, the American philosopher William James made the comparison with rationalism. Rationalist philosophers, he wrote, “have always aimed at cleaning up the litter with which the world is

apparently filled. They have substituted economical and orderly conceptions for ... tangle.” In comparison, pragmatism “offers but a sorry appearance. It is a turbid, muddled, Gothic sort of affair without a sweeping outline and little pictorial nobility” (James [1910] 1977: 26).

The same is true in comparing a rationalist account of the history of economic geography with a cultural history. The rationalist account sees ordered Progress, and increasing convergence to the Truth. History’s litter would be cleaned up. But that is clearly not my cultural history of economic geography. It is a messy, “turbid affair,” with bits of the past littering the present, with no “sweeping” narrative holding all the parts together, giving them direction. Instead, there are only a series of historical awkward corners, disjunctive with what comes next. But that is culture for you. It often behaves badly. That is what my four historical vignettes written around bodies, books, machines and places show. They do the darndest things. Economic geography may consequently lack “pictorial nobility,” but such images are usually fantasies, projections of idealism. Instead of writing a history of economic geography of what we would like it to be, my intent by incorporating culture has been to write it as it is.

References

- Barnes, T. (2000). Inventing Anglo-American economic geography: 1889–1960. In E. Sheppard & T. Barnes (Eds.), *A companion to economic geography* (pp. 11–26). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Barnes, T. (2001a). In the beginning was economic geography: A science studies approach to disciplinary history. *Progress in Human Geography*, 25, 455–478.
- Barnes, T. (2001b). Lives lived, and lives told: Biographies of geography’s quantitative revolution. *Society and Space: Environment and Planning D*, 19, 409–429.
- Barnes, T. (2003). The place of locational analysis: A selective and interpretive history. *Progress in Human Geography*, 27, 69–95.
- Barnes, T. (2011a). From region to space. In J. Agnew & J. Duncan (Eds.), *The Wiley-Blackwell companion to human geography* (pp. 146–160). Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Barnes, T. (2011b). Spatial analysis. In J. Agnew & D. Livingstone (Eds.), *The Sage handbook of geographical knowledge* (pp. 380–391). London: Sage.
- Barnes, T., & Sheppard, E. (2010). ‘Nothing includes everything’: Towards engaged pluralism in Anglophone economic geography. *Progress in Human Geography*, 34, 193–214.
- Bathelt, H., & Glückler, J. (2003). Toward a relational economic geography. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 3, 117–144.
- Chisholm, G. (1889). *Handbook of commercial geography*. London/New York: Longman, Green, and Co.
- Clout, H. (2003). *Geography at University College London: A brief history*. London: Department of Geography, University College London.
- Doel, M. (1999). *Poststructuralist geographies: The diabolical art of spatial science*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Fellmann, J. (1986). Myth and reality in the origin of American economic geography. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 76, 313–330.
- Foucault, M. (1986). Of other spaces. *Diacritics*, Spring, 22–27.
- Fuller, S. (2000). *Thomas Kuhn: A philosophical history of our times*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Galison, P. (1997). *Image and logic: A material culture of microphysics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Gibson-Graham, J. K. (1996). *The end of capitalism (as we knew it)*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Gieryn, T. (2002). Three truth-spots. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, 38, 113–132.
- Gleick, J. (2003). *Isaac Newton*. New York: Pantheon.
- Haggett, P. (1965). *Locational analysis in human geography*. London: Edward Arnold.
- Haraway, D. (1991). *Simians, cyborgs and women: The reinvention of nature*. London: Routledge.
- Haraway, D. (1997). *Modest_witness@second_millennium.femaleman@ meets_oncomouse™*. London: Routledge.
- Harris, C. (1979). Geography at Chicago in the 1930s and 1940s. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 69, 21–32.
- Hetherington, K. (1997). *The badlands of modernity: Heterotopia and social ordering*. London: Routledge.
- Hetherington, K., & Law, J. (2000). Materialities, globalities, spatialities. In J. Bryson, P. Daniels, N. Henry, & J. Pollard (Eds.), *Knowledge, space, economy* (pp. 34–49). London: Routledge.
- Hudson, B. (1977). The new geography and the new imperialism: 1870–1918. *Antipode*, 9(2), 12–19.
- Hudson, J. (1993). In memoriam: Clarence Fielden Jones, 1893–1991. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 83, 167–172.
- Huntington, E. (1915). *Civilization and climate*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- James, W. (1977 [1910]). *A pluralistic universe*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Johnson, E. (1906). *Ocean and inland water transportation*. New York: D. Appleton and Co.
- Jones, C. (1935). *Economic geography*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.
- Kuhn, T. (1970 [1962]). *The structure of scientific revolutions* (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Latour, B. (1987). *Science in action: How to follow scientists and engineers through society*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Latour, B. (1988). *The pasteurisation of France* (A. Sheridan & J. Law, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Latour, B. (1990). Drawing things together. In M. Lynch & S. Woolgar (Eds.), *Representation in scientific practice* (pp. 19–68). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Latour, B. (1993). *We have never been modern*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Livingstone, D. (1994). Climate's moral economy. Science, race and place in post-Darwinian British and American geography. In A. Godlewska & N. Smith (Eds.), *Geography and empire* (pp. 132–154). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Livingstone, D. N. (2003). *Putting science in its place: Geographies of scientific knowledge*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- MacLean, K. (1988). George Goudie Chisholm 1850–1930. In T. Freeman (Ed.), *Geographers bibliographical studies* (Vol. 12, pp. 21–33). London: Mansell.
- Massey, D. (1984). *Spatial divisions of labour: Social structures and the geography of production*. London and Basingstoke, MacMillan.
- Nagel, T. (1986). *The view from nowhere*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Pearson, K. (1983). Mechanization and the area symbol: Cartographic techniques in 19th century geographic journals. *Cartographica*, 20, 1–34.
- Powell, R. (2007). Geographies of science: Histories, practices, localities, futures. *Progress in Human Geography*, 31, 309–329.
- Putnam, H. (1981). *Reason, truth, and history*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rowley, V. (1964). *J. Russell Smith: Geographer, educator, and conservationist*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Sapper, K. (1931). Economic geography. In *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences* (Vol. 5, pp. 626–629). New York: MacMillan.
- Scott, A. (2000). Economic geography: The great half century. In G. Clark, M. Feldman, & M. Gertler (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of economic geography* (pp. 18–48). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Smith, J. R. (1913). *Industrial and commercial geography*. New York: Henry Holt and Co.
- Smith, N. (1987). "Academic war over the field of geography": The elimination of geography at Harvard, 1947–1951. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 77, 155–172.
- Taylor, P. (1977). *Quantitative methods in geography: An introduction to spatial analysis*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Thrift, N. (1995). Peter Haggett's life in geography. In A. Cliff, P. Gould, A. Hoare, & N. Thrift (Eds.), *Diffusing geography: Essays for Peter Haggett* (pp. 375–395). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Whitbeck, R., & Finch, V. (1924). *Economic geography*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Wrigley, N., & Mathews, S. (1986). Citation classics and citation levels in geography. *Area*, 18, 185–194.
- Yeung, H. (2005). Rethinking relational economic geography. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 30, 37–51.

Chapter 3

The Cultural Turn in Geography: A New Link in the Commodity Chain

Elaine Hartwick

The sphere of consumption has to be portrayed as a realm of freedom. Where demand far exceeds need, the consumer has to feel that she or he can do whatever he or she wants in the market place – buy this, not that, apparently at will. Popular culture must revolve around consumption to clear markets filled to over-flowing with piles of commodities derived from globalized production systems. For this culture of consumptive freedom to prevail, the commodity has to appear out of nowhere, stripped of background. So culture has a function: masking the social and material reality of the production of commodities. This means that the environmental component of commodity production has to be eradicated, although recently we find a new twist on this phenomenon, green-washing the commodity. In particular, “masking the material” means “eliminating the labor” from consumptive consciousness. This is because labor is the most contradictory aspect of consumptive happiness.

Critical social theory in the Marxist tradition wants to disturb this dream state. The analysis of commodity chains is the theoretical agent of this awakening. Commodity chain analysis, linking the act of consumption with the process of production, is the geographical basis for a materialist and discursive deconstruction of consumption culture. As an act of critical politics, commodity chain analysis reveals to consumers the social, cultural and environmental consequences of their otherwise casual act of buying commodities. This process entails deconstructing consumption, in the sense of culturally decoding the images that induce consumption. But it then extends this act looking at how images hide or, better still, reverse, the material reality of production thousands of miles away, such as toys that give pleasure to Western kids are made under miserable conditions by child workers in China. Exploring consumption in this way blurs the lines between economic and cultural geography, as

E. Hartwick (✉)

Geography Department, Framingham State University, Framingham, MA, USA
e-mail: ehartwick@framingham.edu

both are integral parts of a deliberately totalizing socio-economic-cultural analysis. Further, as industrial capitalism is overtaken by financial capitalism, a new link needs to be added to the commodity chain, as finance, speculation and debt further distance both producers and consumers from economic reality – this is particularly the case for the speculative trading of commodities in the futures markets. This chapter explores these issues in terms of new actors and new cultural, political, economic power flows in the global financial capitalist economy.

3.1 Theories of Commodity Chains

Early notions of commodity chains were developed in world systems theory, radical geography, and related social sciences. World systems studies looked at the inter-organizational networks of global companies. For Hopkins and Wallerstein (1986: 159) the term “commodity chain” referred to “a network of labor and production processes whose end result is a finished commodity.” Gereffi et al. (1994: 2) likewise saw inter-organizational networks of commodities as linking “households, enterprises and states to one another within the world-economy.” In the discipline of geography, Sack (1997) advocated a relational framework in which the creation of place and meaning was linked with consumption: specifically he examined how the consumer’s world hides connections to place realms of meaning, nature, and social relations. Harvey (1989: 101) implied the notion of commodity chains linking the effects of consumption with material production in an analysis of postmodern capitalism. Dicken (1994) used “production chains” and Storper (1992) “consumption chains” to elaborate spatial relationships within networks of firms. In these studies, firms comprise the main unit of analysis, while unequal distributions of wealth along chains are outcomes of corporate competition and innovation. Although useful, this work does not incorporate the sign of the commodity at the consumption end in an analysis of commodity aesthetics, nor does it investigate the material conditions at the production end.

In a more complex and inclusive model of commodity chains, the radiating effects of the commodity at the consumption node, the social and natural conditions at the production node, and the complex intersections of commodity chains at various intermediating and terminal points, are added to a simple model of commodity movement. This expanded version integrates the generation of cultural (signifying and representational) effects at the consumption node with the social and natural conditions at the production end of the chain, the purpose being to show the effects of one on the other, “bringing home” to consumers the results of consumption. In contrast to earlier theories, this expanded formulation sees commodity movements (the vertical dimension) connecting nodes that are *places* (horizontal dimensions) located at different nodes along commodity chains. Place is theorized as having a radical, subversive history (Relph 1976). This view lends the analysis a potential for bringing together several aspects of the production and consumption of commodities. In this vein, the commodity chain is posited as a way of tying together material

and signified realities, consumption and production, and activities separated by space, providing a fuller interpretation of the material world and the real, human actors who live in it (Hartwick 1998).

3.2 Deconstructing Consumption

In postmodern capitalism consumers potentially have great political as well as economic power in the marketplace. Deconstruction is posited as one aspect of realizing that power, while commodity chains are ways of grounding critical politics in geographical realities.

At the terminal nodal point of consumption, the radiating image of a commodity produces a “halo effect” of socially-constructed meanings. Such meaning systems can be analyzed in a number of ways, including the aesthetics of representation and consumer taste. The preferred theoretical tradition here is the semiotics of Peirce (1931–1935) and Eco (1976). In these materialist social semiotics, a commodity has two meanings: a first-order meaning at the level of function, and a second-order imputed meaning at the level of symbolic effect. Semiotic analysis tries to reveal the social prescription of the meaning of a commodity. In a postmodern sign economy, first-order meanings, based in physical needs, have been transformed into second-order representational meanings, emanating from social status and cultural allusion (Gottdiener 1995). However, for a complete explanation, the conditions of production must be included *within* this kind of social semiotic analysis. Stark contrasts in material and cultural conditions so intensify second-order symbolic meanings that they mutate into a third, specifically geographical, meaning. Images are usually added to commodities at, or near, the organizational centers of global trading systems, where the producers of sign value share the cultural norms of the consumers. Underdevelopment, unequal exchange, profit flows and power differences, vastly different conditions of life, and other geographical realities must be hidden behind the image of the commodity to give the impression that consumption is effortless and without negative side effects. In general, adding social semiotics to commodity chain analysis expands the horizontal analysis of commodities at the consumption end and creates awareness of vertical linkages to producers. We will revisit this aspect when discussing commodity speculation, where the image of the physical good hardly occurs to traders who may never have seen a barrel of oil or a pork belly, but only see the dollar sign. In this case of advanced perversity, image-space becomes completely detached from physical reality.

3.3 Material Analysis of Production

The conditions of production at the other (production) terminus of the commodity chain include the social relations of production and relations between workers and families, hence the reproduction of the household. This, in turn, consists of social

relations of reproduction (gender, class, ethnicity) and social relations with nature, including the worker family's reproductive use of subsistence land and resources (termed "mode of reproduction" by Peet 1991: 178–182). The complete set of the conditions of existence of the producers and the full range of natural conditions of production that enter into the materiality of the commodity and pass thereby into the distant bodies of consumers.

Commodity chains articulate one with another at various nodal points of the intersection of their pathways. At the production end, commodities of prime significance form the conditions of existence for secondary commodity chains. At other significant nodes along chains – processing points in particular – chains converge into "commodity bundles" that make up imaged-complexes entering the consumption node; the entire complex combines to signify status, wealth and power through radiating interconnected significations. As Glennie and Thrift (1993: 605) note, "systems of provision," like commodity chains, are characterized by "leakiness," in both material and symbolic ways, which influence other systems of provision – they catalogue the inter-twining between commodities, advertising of linked products, consumer reflexivity, and consumption across several commodity systems. Nodes of consumption are thus points of convergence for series of imaged complexes of commodity chains. In this last sense, each purchase is said to culminate an entire complex of commodity production and representation, linking together several lines of waged workers, un-waged reproducers of waged workers, and natural resources.

3.4 Finance Capitalism

Over the last 30 years, capital has shifted significantly from production to finance; its sphere of operations expanded outwards, to every nook and cranny of the globe; the speed of its movement increased to milliseconds; and its control extended, to include "everything." We now live in the era of global finance capitalism (Hilferding 1910) or what Harvey (2005), similar to Martin (2002), describes as "the financialization of everything," meaning control by finance of all other areas of the economy. Financialization has involved increasingly exotic forms of financial instruments and the growth of a shadow banking system, off the balance sheets of the banks. The repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999, which separated commercial from investment banking (keeping commercial banks out of the stock markets), symbolized the almost complete deregulation of a financial sector that has become complex, opaque, and ungovernable.

On the one hand, we find the over-accumulation of income in the hands of a few, particularly in the United States. On the other hand, we find the majority of people with stagnant or declining real incomes, threatened by globalization, with little collective bargaining power in the production sphere. With stagnant real incomes, the "consumption-to-the-max" that began under Keynesianism and Fordism, but remains typical of neoliberal societies, requires credit and going into debt. So it is that inequality produces indebtedness at all levels, from consumers to industries to

states, and in all aspects of life. This results in a newly intensified form of a long-existing exploitation known as “debt peonage.” Whereas industrial capitalism primarily exploits productive workers through the wage system, finance capitalism adds the exploitation of consumptive individuals via indebtedness. The idea is to have everything bought with maxed-out credit cards, so that purchases yield several years of interest at far higher rates than banks pay on deposits. The commercial banks and a range of other unregulated lenders of last resort (“no credit record, no problem”) reap the difference. Investment banks join in by speculating on this vast pool of debt, as with mortgage bundling, credit default swaps, etc., where quick and easy money is made in large quantities.

And then there are the various, highly sophisticated financial maneuvers to increase, and then decrease, commodity prices via the futures markets – for example petroleum in early 2011, when the price of oil went from \$86 a barrel for light, sweet crude on February 11 to \$110 on April 15, although there was no immediate shortage on the world market. The name for this version of financial exploitation is price gouging. The cost is born by people as consumers through exorbitant mortgage payments and high gasoline prices directly, but also losing their house, becoming homelessness, not being able to get to work, or the sacrifices made in avoiding these working family catastrophes – all this pain and suffering just to make rich people even richer. Finance capitalism intensifies old methods or invents new methods of exploitation, and new modes of discipline, that pass mainly through the sphere of reproduction rather than the sphere of production: credit cards and bank loans; inflated house prices; high commodity prices due to commodity futures trading; and a long list of similar mechanisms thought up by sharp financial minds. This intensified exploitation through the medium of debt peonage, price gouging, and other, similar devices, is the economic and cultural basis for the worst excesses of finance capitalism (Peet 2011).

3.5 The Cartography of Commodity Speculation

So, a new node of influential power has intensified on the commodity chain: the speculative nodal point within the global management of commodity production and trade. At these speculative points, in New York, Chicago, London, and a few other locations elsewhere, traders “map” the world of commodities as a maze of statistics, graphs and informational bullets rather than a material vision of physical products, actual flows and movements. The commodity itself never passes through the hands of the traders, who never see the fingerprints of producers in their daily trading lives. Oil is thought as a contract rather than a gooey substance – black gold is the nearest to material vision, the movement of commercial paper rather than oil in tankers. Traders swapping contracts in the futures markets illustrate the postmodern notion of “all is image.”

However, ghost trading is rooted in real lives, real economies and real environmental crises. The risk endemic to futures trading in finance capitalism extends to

risky environmental relations. Capitalist culture becomes risk-ridden, short-term in memory and anticipation, careless about consequences – consuming for the moment, without regard for the environmental future. Production, consumption, economy and the use of environments are subject to a more-removed-from-reality, more abstract calculus of power, in which ability to contribute to short-term financial profit becomes the main concern, and long term consequences are not so much ignored, as glossed over, through sophisticated corporate advertising, think tank excuses, and pseudo-green propaganda (“we too care about the environment”). Environmental risk (mitigated by good quality public relations to excuse the “occasional mistakes”) represents the frontier in business success. Every time a BP-Gulf Coast-type disaster is cleaned up, green-washed, excused, and forgotten, the risk business just keeps getting better, more knowledgeable, smoother in its politico-cultural operations. The risk that produces economic catastrophe also creates environmental crises (Peet et al. 2011).

And yet, under finance capitalism we find state regulation of development, and its relations with labor and the environment, diminishing in significance due to the intensification of neoliberal beliefs about government, markets and policies. This includes mass beliefs. Hence the Tea Party movement is founded on the idea of a smaller, less interventionist government at a time when state intervention in the form of environmental and social regulation is all we have in the way of collective response to the destruction of nature, culture and society. Marx spoke of “false consciousness.” This is more a case of “reverse consciousness” – the opposite of what should be the popular mentality. Or maybe “perverse consciousness?”

3.6 A Cup of Coffee

When students are asked where their morning coffee came from, most say, Colombia. I jokingly reply, yes perhaps Colombia and it was hand-picked by Juan Valdez, the mythologized happy peasant celebrated in coffee commercials who also has time to travel to Western grocery stores, advising the confused customer about which grind to buy. Over the years I have collected a dozen or so ads of Juan Valdez snowboarding, skiing, surfing, being a fashion leader, etc.

Coffee is the world’s second most-heavily traded commodity after oil. Both commodities are traded on the spot markets as barrels and bags of physical substances. Increasingly trading goes through the futures markets, which had a real economic function at one time. The coffee business needs to “hedge” against frost or other catastrophes, so coffee is bought in advance at a fixed price. Over time, and especially in the last half decade, the futures markets intended to secure the price of commodities in advance became highly speculative. The London Commodity Exchange deals in Robusta coffee (which comes mainly from Africa) and the New York Commodity Exchange deals mainly in Arabica coffee (of the kind produced in Latin America). Commodity prices can move very quickly, because of the huge amounts of money and the high degrees of leveraging involved. Such short-term

fluctuations make it difficult to plan, invest in, or earn a reliable living from coffee production. Weather conditions, as with frost (in 1975 and 1994) or drought (in 1984), sometimes damage the huge Brazilian coffee crop (20% of the international market), causing the international price to rise. But then the price of coffee is subject to far greater price fluctuations on the international futures market. When the price of coffee is artificially high large numbers of bushes are planted. Three years later these start producing in abundance, causing a glut, a price slump, taken advantage of by traders “selling short.” Then, no new bushes are planted, causing a shortage and a price rise, again taken advantage of by traders “buying long”. These real changes in production and the fluctuations in climate and weather are experienced by the trader only as possible bases for speculative money making. In neo-classical economic theory, price is supposed to signal information that guides accurate decisions about production. As if this were ever the case, that function has been transformed. Now price signals quick profit opportunities. It is estimated that the price of coffee between 2007 and 2011 rose 50% due to the futures market alone. Futures trading is portrayed as rationalizing fluctuations in the conditions affecting the supply and demand for commodities, making prices predictable. But deconstruction shows it to be merely one more way of extracting revenue from commodity producers. In the end, only one-twentieth of the price of a cup of coffee reaches the people whose lives are spent growing and harvesting it. Coffee producers play no role in determining the prices that set the livelihood context of their existence. And, while coffee drinking occurs under an aura of freedom – morning wake up, afternoon break, evening pick-up – the price again has little relation to the demand their happiness creates. So speculation in the commodity futures markets in one strange way makes producers and consumers into similar victims. We need a politics that can realize the potential in these similarities.

3.7 Conclusion

In *Capital Volume 1*, Marx writes: “A commodity is a mysterious ... whose qualities are at the same time perceptible and imperceptible by the senses. ... There is a definite between men, that assumes in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things.” Marx calls this the fetishism of commodities and proceeds to uncover the origins of the fetish. Here we have looked at some of the myriad fetishisms of commodities that have developed under contemporary capitalism. In the marketplace, commodities appear shorn of the socio-spatial relations between producers and consumers in order that consumption can proceed in mindless happiness. Commodity chain analysis reveals those connections and reconnects consumption with production, consumers with producers. On the futures markets, commodities are traded merely to make money, yet this purely speculative mania is presented as rational and necessary. Analysis of the futures markets reveals another aspect of commodity production and consumption – the price gouging that increases the cost to the consumer while delivering little to producers. Commodity culture disguises

exploitative social relations. Here we have examined two ways of joining cultural with economic analysis as part of a critical politics focused on unveiling the mysterious world of commodities. Doing cultural geography means practicing a critical politics of the economy.

References

- Dicken, P. (1994). Global-local tensions: Firms and states in the global-space economy. *Economic Geography*, 70, 101–128.
- Eco, U. (1976). *A theory of semiotics*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Gereffi, G., Korzeniewicz, M., & Korzeniewicz, P. (1994). Introduction: Global commodity chains. In G. Gereffi & M. Korzeniewicz (Eds.), *Commodity chains and global capitalism* (pp. 1–4). Westport: Praeger.
- Glennie, P., & Thrift, N. (1993). Modern consumption: Theorizing commodities and consumers. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 11, 603–606.
- Gottdiener, M. (1995). *Postmodern semiotics*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Hartwick, E. (1998). Geographies of consumption: A commodity-chain analysis. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 16, 423–437.
- Harvey, D. (1989). *The condition of postmodernity*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Harvey, D. (2005). *A brief history of neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hilferding, R. (1910). *Das Finanzkapital. Eine Studie über die jüngste Entwicklung des Kapitalismus*. Vienna, Wiener Volksbuchhandlung [Translated in 1981 as *Finance capital. A study of the latest phase of capitalist development*. T. Bottomore (Ed.). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul].
- Hopkins, T., & Wallerstein, I. (1986). Commodity chains in the world-economy prior to 1800. *Review*, 10, 157–170.
- Martin, R. (2002). *Financialization of daily life*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Peet, R. (1991). *Theories of development*. London: Routledge.
- Peet, R. (2011). Inequality, crisis and austerity in finance capitalism. *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society Advance Access*, 4, 383–399.
- Peet, R., Robbins, P., & Watts, M. (Eds.). (2011). *Global political ecology*. London: Routledge.
- Peirce, C. (1931–1935). *Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Relph, E. (1976). *Place and placelessness*. London: Pion.
- Sack, R. (1997). *Homo geographicus: A framework for action, awareness and moral concern*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Storper, M. (1992). The limits to globalization: Technology districts and international trade. *Economic Geography*, 68, 60–93.

Chapter 4

Consumption Geographies: Turns or Intersections?

Juliana Mansvelt

Thirty years ago it was possible to say that the field of consumption studies in geography was a limited and relatively minor part of the discipline. This is certainly no longer the case, with numerous researchers turning their attention to the ways in which processes connected to consumption make our geographies. Most of this research has been situated within cultural and social geographies; however it would be wrong to say economic geographers have not engaged with consumption, or that this engagement was simply a consequence of the cultural turn in geography in the 1980s and 1990s. Richard Hartshorne (1959), whose work is most associated with the regional geography tradition, stressed the need to understand the areal variation of consumption across the earth noting:

There is, however, on aspect of man's economy which would provide the basis for a unitary segment of geography- namely the geography of consumption. ... This, as Allix has emphasized, is a form of areal variation over the earth, and within different parts of individual countries, of greatest significance for all geography [49:296]. To relate such a field to the many essentially separate geographies of production, we need to develop far more than we have the geography of exchange, including marketing as well as transportation.

Similarly, in an article entitled "Towards a Geography of Consumption," Hecock and Rooney (1968:392), writing when spatial science tradition was at its apex, highlighted "the neglect of the consumptive aspects of economic geography" in their call for research on available data on consumer expenditure patterns and behaviors. In the Marxist tradition, the recognition of the necessity of consumption as a means of realizing surplus value as part of the continued viability of the capitalist mode of production has long been acknowledged by economic geographers, but forays into the way in which consumption is constituted economically have not always been

J. Mansvelt (✉)

Geography Programme, School of People, Environment and Planning, Massey University,
Palmerston North, New Zealand
e-mail: J.R.Mansvelt@massey.ac.nz

forthcoming. Similarly, engagements with the economic aspects of consumption have not often penetrated the research of those more interested in the cultural politics and construction of consumption in place. The need to overcome this impasse has been identified and discussed for the last two decades, though perhaps as Schor (2007) suggests at times more energy has been expended debating how this might be done than actually doing the research which advances this debate!

With the rapid expansion in geographical consumption work in the 1980s both cultural and economic perspectives on consumption were evident, but then, and now, continue to differ in their relative significance and foci. The metaphor of an “intersection” consequently seems a more appropriate one to categorize the development of consumption geographies than “turns”! The early part of this chapter outlines the emergence of consumption as a disciplinary field. I then examine some of the debates and subjects that have seen increasing connections between cultural and economic consumption geographies. The chapter concludes with a discussion of research themes in which perspectives derived from cultural and economic geographies are providing new insights into the relationships among people, things and places.

4.1 A Brief Turn Through Time: Linking the Rapid Expansion of Geographies of Consumption to Social and Spatial Change

It was during the latter decades of the twentieth century that emphasis in geography shifted from the description and mapping of social and spatial consumption behaviors toward the construction of consumption spaces. During the 1970s and 1980s, geographical consumption research primarily focused on the description, mapping and modeling of people as consumers, and the provision of commodities in such areas as food, healthcare, energy and resource demand, public and private housing, leisure and recreation. Urban geographers were particularly focused on the ways in which goods and services were organized and consumed collectively (Knox 1987; Pinch 1985). During this period in many capitalist countries, Keynesian politics and welfare-states were beginning to come under pressure and individual forms of consumption, consumer responsibility and conceptions of citizenship were being reworked. Despite a long heritage of work on collective consumption (such as housing, health, education, transportation), attention turned to consumption as an individual practice. The consumer, though an increasingly diverse and unmanageable construct (Gabriel and Laing 2006), emerged over the course of the last two centuries as an increasingly important cultural, political and economic subject, particularly with respect to his/her links with citizenship, and of late with regard to the responsibilities accorded to consumers in relation to neoliberal governmental policies (Trentmann 2006).

From the 1970s, visions of a post-modern epoch and common narratives of cultural flows associated with globalization heralded an increasingly important

role for, and visibility of, consumption-related practices and places. Notwithstanding debates about the representational status of consumption in contemporary society, geographers more often acknowledged the significance of consumption practices in the production of everyday life – whether experienced in the spaces of government, markets or households, in circumstances of wealth or poverty (Jackson 2002). At this time Marxism and other critical standpoint theories (such as feminism and humanism) that had provided structural and foundational imperatives for relationships among people, things and places were themselves becoming subject to increasing critique. The rise of post-structuralist and post-colonialist perspectives that highlighted differences and diversity in social-spatial relations challenged many of the assumptions implicit in these foundational theories and supported a more reflective analysis of the relationships between production and consumption, and the historical emergence of modern consumption and consumer practice. Leslie (2009) attributes the rapid expansion of consumption studies in the 1990s to a number of things: the development of a more flexible regime of accumulation, the broader cultural turn in geography, and even the emergence of consumption as the latest geographical fashion.

Recent scholarship has highlighted the impossibility of separating the cultural from the economic with regard to how societal (and accordingly spatial) change is produced and expressed. While the rise of modern consumption is argued to precede the Industrial Revolution (Glennie and Thrift 1993), the increased visibility of consumption practices, spaces and commodities in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries resulted from a range of factors. The development of flexible systems of production (such as just-in-time small batch processing, short-run production lines, and more efficient communicative mechanisms) saw an increased capacity for firms to respond to, and to initiate shifts in, consumer practice and demand. The post-World War II growth of buyer-led commodity chains (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994), the diffusion of networks of innovation and expertise, and the ability of production networks to produce a wider range of commodities across multiples spaces under globalization have also been significant. Changes in systems of production have been both a consequence and a cause of other societal changes that altered consumer culture and emphasized reflexive consumerism as a way of life (Miles 1998). The rapid development of the advertising industries from the 1920s and of branding and marketing strategies have brought the representational aspects of commodities to the fore across the number of media platforms, encouraging consumers to reflect on the “identity-value” of commodities and their inferred importance in mediating everyday relationships and practices. Exposure to commodities is an integral part of everyday life for many, facilitated by the development of sophisticated retail spaces that highlight the representational nature of commodities for the individual evoking images of “elsewhereness” (Hopkins 1990), fantasy, leisure and pleasure (Goss 1993). The growth of the internet and mobile computing technologies have also opened up new spaces for consumption, which exist alongside a range of traditional and alternative retail formats for both new and second hand goods.

However the ubiquity of consumer products and services, choice and access to commodities has not produced increased quality of life for all. The intensification of

many processes related to consumption in the latter half of the twentieth century, including the effects of globalization and trade, the commodification of new spaces and practices in both urban and rural landscapes, and the impacts of commercial culture and material access to commodities, have been expressed unevenly. Disparities in material standards of living within and among countries have prompted greater attention to the economic and cultural role of consumption and to the ways in which it mediates relationships between people, things and places. The relationship between production and consumption has been highlighted in debates about environment and sustainability (including concerns related to climate change, deforestation, pollution and resource use) (Eden et al. 2008; Mansvelt 2011). This focus has brought the recognition that it is not only production imperatives that pose challenges to the sustainability of current lifestyles and environments, but that the politics and practice of consumption also matter (Cohen and Murphy 2001).

4.2 Turns and Intersections – Economic and Cultural Perspectives on Geographies of Consumption

It was not until the late 1980s that consumption became a subject of considerable geographic interest. Developing rapidly, at a time of interdisciplinary debates about the significance of the “economic” and “the cultural” in explaining social structures and spatial relationships, it is perhaps not surprising that consumption geographers were faced not so much with a distinctive “cultural turn”, but confronted a competing and at times complementary series of approaches and intersections informed by both cultural geographies and economic geographies.

Much of the consumption research that emerged in the late 1980s initially sought to redress the relative neglect of consumption by human geographers, emphasizing its contributions to the production of space and the role of material sites and practices of consumption in relation to capitalist processes of exchange (Sack 1992). The application of political economic approaches to consumption was perhaps a “natural” extension of an already powerful critique of the way in which society and space were structured according to the capitalist production imperatives. For consumption geographers, Marxian understandings of the world, informed by structuration (Giddens 1984) and/or critical realism (Sayer 1992) provided a means of conceptualizing the relationship between structure and agency and the mechanisms and practices by which contingent and structural (causal) processes could be separated. Thus political-economic perspectives provided a critical lens to view the rise of consumption spaces such as malls, theme parks, department stores, and leisure spaces. They highlighted the importance of economic process in shaping consumer practice and in structuring spaces of exchange. However they tended to emphasize consumption as a consequence of production and final consumption (framed in terms of purchase) by individual consumers. Additional contributions of Marxist-inspired cultural theorists such as Gramsci, Horkheimer, and Adorno provided new insights into commercial

culture and the role of power, with purchasing operating as a means of overcoming alienation but simultaneously reinforcing uneven class relations. Recognition of the operation of the capitalist mode of production in creating and exacerbating the already uneven development of places extended to concerns about collective consumption and the class-based struggle of urban social movements (Dunleavy 1980; Saunders 1981).

Political economic understandings have informed understandings of how and why production and consumption processes have become dispersed across wider spaces through processes of urbanization, industrialization and globalization in many nations and the connections among states, firms, producers, and consumers. They have provided insights into the role of the state and regulatory frameworks in influencing consumption practices and patterns particularly with the transition from welfare states to neoliberal forms of governance. In focusing on actual sites of exchange, geographers have largely avoided perspectives derived from conventional economics that depict consumption solely as the premise of consumers making rational calculations based on the utility of goods. Accordingly, most do not see consumption as an autonomous and unproblematic set of practices that reflect relations of demand and supply in a market place. Goss's (1993, 1999) research on mega-malls, for example, used Marx's concept of commodity fetishism to consider how consumer culture is facilitated through the creation of particular contexts in which commodities are sold and through the relations and meanings that are ascribed to commodities as they are presented and purchased in these spaces. Market exchange in these spectacular retail spaces shifted human relationships with things from an object of labor through production to a commodity that invokes the possibility of different kinds of human relations (e.g., strength, desirability, love, power, beauty). Retail and leisure landscapes were powerful symbolic and economic constructions designed to enchant and offer potential consumers new possibilities for self-reflexivity, identity formation, and moral positioning. Though informed by political economy approaches, this work often also drew on the cultural tradition of reading landscape as text (Cosgrove 1989) derived from semiotics and informed by the post-structuralist writings of Jean Baudrillard and Jean-Francois Lyotard. Reading landscape as text emphasized the intended meanings of the creators and designers of consumer spaces, and drew attention to the ways in which these environments might be read by consumers.

Greater attention to the cultural as part of understandings of the significance of consumption, the role of consumerism and the actions of consumers also highlighted the deficiencies of structural explanations of economic change derived from Marxian political economy. This critique brought renewed attention to the ways in which concepts such as the consumer, the consumption site, and the market were not universal, homogenous categories but rather diversely constituted across time and place. Similarly commodities were not simply economic productions, but cultural products whose meaning and use might be struggled over and experienced differently. Though approaches derived from economic geographies have helped establish a rationale for consumption and have recognized the role of cultural production as part of the production of economic value – they have not always addressed the

significance and meaning that consumption related practice has for groups and individuals in particular contexts, nor recognized the implicit masculinism and assumptions about human behavior embedded within them (Gregson 1995).

While the increased visibility of and emphasis on consumption as a part of critical human geography might be attributed to the cultural turn of the late 1980s and early 1990s, there were clear precedents of the need to address cultural aspects of consumption as part of earlier work within economy geography. Klausner (1986:29), for example, suggested that consideration of local culture and the role of women involved in domestic labor had been excluded from Marxist understandings of capitalist production and that “a more complete view of social reality and social change” would be gained by looking at the relationships among production, consumption, and social reproduction. Cultural geographers also explicitly acknowledged the ways in which economic considerations of value and market framed consumption cultures, with Mort (1988:215) arguing “cultures of consumption are the point where market meets popular experience and lifestyles on the ground.”

At around the same time as human geographies were being reinvigorated by greater attention to the role of culture in terms of both theoretical approaches and subject, new disciplinary foci were emerging which sought to bridge the divide between cultural and economic research. The new retail geographies of the 1980s (Wrigley and Lowe 1996, 2002) were and continue to be concerned with examining the power of retail capital and significance of changing retail practices in structuring and responding to consumption. Connecting retailing with political, economic and cultural processes was also exemplified in research by Peter Jackson et al. (2000) on commercial cultures, which sought to understand how the market and processes of commerce were embedded in a variety of cultural processes by tracing the connections among economies, practices, and spaces. This work has been extended with research on transnationalism with an emphasis on the geographies of relations surrounding the social and spatial lives of commodities (Jackson and Dwyer 2004).

A major strand of work that endeavors to bring economic and cultural understandings of the connections between consumption and production has been with respect to commodity chains and networks (Hughes and Reimer 2004). Here the connections among things, people, and places are seen as linked through a range of regulatory regimes, institutional and individual practices surrounding production, manufacturing, marketing, distribution and retailing. In recent years these strands of research have acknowledged much more explicitly the cultural construction of the economic sphere and the economic construction of culture. This admission has extended analysis of the sphere of consumption, moving beyond purchasing to use, reuse, resale, and disposal and to considerations of the multiple ways in which consumers may help shape commodity networks and flows (Goodman et al. 2010).

During the 1990s, new intersections of cultural and economic interpretations of consumption were emerging across in a number of research areas. There was an expansion of critical geographical work on leisure/tourism practices and spaces (Crouch 1999; Aitchison et al. 2000) and of production and consumption connections in urban (Jayne 2006) and rural areas (Cloke 1993). Partly as a response to the cultural turn and the emphasis of geographic studies on the textual readings and

representations in consumption sites, an “ethnographic turn” in research sought to understand how consumption was actively produced and given meaning by people in relation to the material and social contexts of which they were a part. As a foil to work on spectacular spaces, Nicky Gregson, Louise Crewe and colleagues studied “alternative spaces of consumption,” that is, flea markets, second hand shops and car-boot fairs (Gregson 1994; Gregson and Crewe 1997, 2003). Others turned their attention to strip and traditional retail centers, and mundane practices such as grocery shopping with a view to broadening work beyond middle class consumers and sites of consumption (Miller et al. 1998). Here the consumer was seen as actively (albeit not always under circumstances of one’s choosing) contributing to the production of consumer spaces, subjectivities, and socialities. Rather than simply emphasizing the cultural representation of consumption practice, or the ways in which consumption is caught up in processes of distinction and identity formation, these ethnographic studies emphasized practice, performance and embodiment, and the everyday “work” of consumption. Eating food and surfing the net, for example, were demonstrated to have an important role in cultural politics and invoking relations of power, morality and care (Bell and Valentine 1997; Valentine and Holloway 2001).

Governmentality theories (Dean 1999; Rose 1999), which emphasize the conduct and techniques of governing, have also helped theorize how and why how individuals are shaped and appealed to as consumer citizens, particularly with regard to neoliberal prescriptions that position consumers as autonomous, rational, risk-minimizing individuals making decisions and acting responsibly in the marketplace (Katz and Marshall 2003). Actor-network theory (a series of approaches rather than a theory per se that derives from the work of Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, and John Law) provided insights not just into the political and economic functioning of societies, but into how everyday practices like shopping, using domestic appliances, and home furnishing are subject to and productive of a politics of power that extends beyond immediate consumption contexts (Hitchings and Lee 2008). The emergence of relational geographies (Bathelt and Glicker 2003) and material geographies (Massey and Clark 2008) has affected both economic and social/cultural geographies and highlighted how consumption is constituted through relationships between human and non-human actors as assemblages that bind people, things and institutions together across multiple spaces. Much of this work draws loosely on actor-network approaches that seek to understand how networks are formed, maintained, and dissolved.

Despite recognition that economic geographies are culturally constituted and that cultures are subject to and constructed through the economic processes, deciding how to engage with such connections through consumption research remains an enduring challenge. While the development of consumption geographies has demonstrated evidence of both economic and cultural turns, these “turns” have not always been integrated, with many strands of research operating in parallel rather than in conjunction with one other, perhaps in part as a function of disciplinary silos and the kinds of conferences, meetings, books, and journals where such research has been published. Consumption geographies still appear to sit largely at the fringes

of economic geographies, with much mainstream economic geography emphasizing concerns of production, or recognizing the role of consumption as an important but relatively unexamined moment of exchange in circuits of capital. Likewise research that has emphasized the significance of the consumer, consumption sites, and consumption practices in the production of meaningful space and social relationships has not always acknowledged the economic realities and materialities of consumption choice and behavior.

However as the previous discussion has suggested, intersections between economic and cultural perspectives do not so much bridge some kind of divide but are breaking new ground within both cultural and economic geographies. I now turn to some areas of geographical research that have presented possibilities for the development of new knowledge, deriving from economic and cultural geographies.

4.3 The Material

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, cultural geographers were again focusing attention on the “material” aspects of society and space. This call to rematerialize social and cultural geographies was not intended to diminish work on the representational aspects of consumption but rather to highlight the properties of matter in creating social and spatial relations (Jackson 2000). While Marxian approaches categorized commodities as objects of human labor and acknowledged the importance of the material (be it commodities or nature) as part of production and consumption processes, the rematerialization of human geography gave greater attention to the role of embodied and performative material practices, material culture, and things. Jackson (1999) argued for a consideration of the “social life of things” recognizing how both economic and cultural attributes of things and their biographies are a part of the construction of value. He also emphasized the ways in which the material is not simply an artifact of social life but an important arbiter of it, the social forming as a consequence of the traffic in (and of) things. With regard to consumption geographies the rematerialization of human geography has seen renewed emphasis on the role of material form, processes and objects in structuring and expressing consumption practices (such as eating, drinking, socialising, hobbies, collecting, repairing and wasting).

In discussing the significance of the material, geographers drawing on a variety of feminist, poststructural, postcolonial, and queer perspectives have sought to understand the role of the material in consumption. Consequently things can become a means of radically externalizing feelings and shaping identities, influencing practices and beliefs, but also in shaping wider social relations and subjectivities (Kingsbury 2007). Gorman-Murray (2008), for example, demonstrated how domestic materiality provides a means of reconciling multiple dimensions of the self for gay men and lesbians.

The capacities of things to have effects are a function of the relations and associations in which they are embedded, with the material seen helping to hold

entangled networks and flows of people and entities together. Yarwood and Shaw (2010) revealed the identities of model railway enthusiasts as professional or amateur are shaped not only through skills but through the tools, train components, and displays of enthusiasts. Geographical research on interior furnishing, display and household practices has demonstrated the difference matter makes to the production of everyday life. Crewe et al.'s (2009) study of household consumption in England revealed that even mundane objects such as vacuum cleaners and televisions possess a form of agency, challenging people's capacity to control their household spaces. Thinking about the agency of material things, and the ways in which a functioning material world helps hold and stabilize social relationships and material flows consequently provides rich ground for cultural and economic constructions of consumption geographies.

4.4 The Human/Non-human, Animate/Non-animate Interface

Hybrid forms of human and non-human relations may range from material things that have both animate and inanimate constitution (such as nano particles, vaccines, tissue cultures) to entities that involve assemblages of people and things that together create a particular entity, such as the or the kind of hybrid/cyborg self that is formed through an individual's attachment to mobile phones (Thompson and Cupples 2008). For example, genetic modification and pressure to extract "biocapital" in the form of proteins, tissues cells and DNA and the consumption of new bio-technologies, reproductive and xeno-transplantation technologies (de la Bellacasa 2010) problematizes previously taken-for-granted understandings of what it means to be human in a globalizing world and the ways in which entities may assume a particular moral, economic, political value. Thus human and non-human relations can become key issues for consumption research entangling entities such as nation-states (such as biosecurity), firms (biocapital), and individuals (biopolitics).

Since the end of the twentieth century, the post-structuralist writings of Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, and Donna Haraway challenged the separation between the human and non-human, the animate and the inanimate, recognizing the possibilities of hybrid forms with each acting on and with the other (Roe 2009). Reconsidering the interface between the human and non-human world has also meant the distinction between nature and culture can no longer be sustained, further entangling the connections between physical and human geographies and creating possibilities for the role of consumption as a critical part of environmental geographies. Studies in which the relationality of human and non-human are stressed also provide a way of thinking about the ways in which intentionality towards others is shaped. Research on animal geographies (Philo and Wilbert 2000) and critical pet studies (Nast 2006), for example, challenges a view of animals and pets as mere possessions and commodities implying new responsibilities to care for and respond to both non-human and human others.

Reflecting on the ways in which hybrid assemblages of human and non-human construct the world has enabled geographers to consider not only the agency that may be expressed towards others and other material things through consumption, but the ways in which material, non-human things enable and influence human actions as consumers. For example, Becky Mansfield's (2011) writing about the production of (un)healthy nature notes how aquaculture practices blur boundaries between fish and human bodies. Using a Marxian perspective, Mansfield brings together the cultural and the economic to show how the crisis in capture fishing because of overfishing and pollution in food chains has resulted in attempts to resolve this dilemma through aquaculture. The intentional and unintentional exposure of fish to chemicals through aquaculture has produced healthful fish, yet also fish with higher levels of toxicity. Her research demonstrates that consuming fish is consequence of the ways in which nature and culture, the human and non-human, production and consumption are entangled.

Human/non-human relations do not just extend to living things. Tools, appliances, and forms of tangible and digital technology are also caught up in the ways in which consumption spaces, socialities, and subjectivities are produced. When things break down and need repair, this is a reminder of the ways in which cultural and economic relations are taken-for-granted (Graham and Thrift 2007). In addition, the material properties of new digital technologies may have profound effects on the ways in which things become part of relationships of exchange, and how they are produced and consumed, opening up new territory for researchers interested in the inseparability of economic and cultural relationships. The circulation and exchange of digital images, and of sound in the form of audio and video files. has for example impacted not only how they are purchased (electronically) but also how they are consumed (downloaded to iPods, computers, etc.) and in what spaces (e.g., new territorial formations on the internet for accessing and ensuring protection of copyright, new forms of personal and mobile soundscapes, and new social relationships such as brand communities). Such changes have impacts for other material geographies including the (de)re-valuation of old technologies such as VHS tapes and vinyl records (Dodge et al. 2009).

4.5 The Consumer and Co-production of Consumption

Geographical research has in the last two decades largely focused on practice and has recognized the multiple ways in which consumers are produced in particular spaces through relationships with family, friends, media, marketers, retailers, and mall and store designers. Increasingly attention is turning to a broader range of entities (such as governments, firms, NGOs, marketers, ethical campaigners, and activist groups) with a view to understanding their significance in the shaping of consuming subjects. Technologies that have been applied to the consumer also pose rich ground for challenging economic and cultural divides through studying how consumers are shaped and acted upon in the absence of the body through consumer

database profiling, on-line tracking, and direct marketing campaigns and for the ways in which the actions of consumers and commodities might be connected through such digital technologies such as RFID tagging, and electronic store inventories (Zwick and Dholakia 2004).

While recognizing the possibilities of consumption for creating multiple subjectivities, geographers have tended to reject notions of the consumer as a rational and homogenous subject and one whose consumption in the contemporary work is self-obsessed and identity-free. Instead the emphasis has been on the ways in which social life and space are created and made meaningful through consumption, and particularly how the consumer and consumption activity are performed and embodied in differing sites of consumption, particularly focusing on the home, retail and leisure spaces. Laying aside arguments about whether consumers are sovereign or duped, geographers have instead sought to understand how consumption practices are intersectional, i.e., gendered, sexed, aged, raced and classed and the ways in which consumption is worked at, performed and given meaning by in wider material networks in particular spaces.

Recent emphasis on the co-constitution of political projects (Lewis et al. 2008) has seen the integration of both practitioner and academic, economic and cultural knowledges with respect to commodity networks. However understanding and interpreting the role of tacit knowledge (knowledge that may be felt and expressed through the body in ways that are difficult to describe) through consumption and production remains challenging. The active participation of consumers in the production of the commodity through such practices as authoring Wikipedia articles and blogs, participating in brand conventions, viral marketing, creating social media video has had much publicity in recent years and has been referred to as “consumer co-creation” (Zwick et al. 2008) and “presumption” (Ritzer and Jurgenson 2010). While consumer co-creation may diminish the power of intermediaries in production of commodities and reduce the relative distance between the producer and consumer, research on this topic is necessary to ascertain whether such mechanisms do engage and empower consumers more fully in the marketplace or whether they simply encourage brand identification, raise exchange value, and increase consumer loyalty. These forms of production and consumption where much of the products (such as on Flickr or YouTube) are offered for free also has implications for how value is ascribed and territorialized. Consequently investigating political, economic, and cultural constructions of consumers remains a significant issue particularly in an era in which citizenship and the exercise of choice, knowledge and self-responsibility are being stressed.

4.6 Transnational Actor and Commodity Networks

Work on commodity chains and networks has perhaps made the greatest inroads in terms of the bringing together of cultural and economic perspectives connecting consumption and production. While there are a number of variants of commodity

chain approaches, these have centered on the power of institutional agents such as manufacturers, buyers, distributors, and retailers to influence and maintain flows of materials, peoples and knowledges across a chain which spans production and consumption. Early commodity chain research was particularly influential in making visible the ways in which production was organized transnationally, but did little to expand on the role and experience of consumers. While the linear commodity chain has been recognized as an inadequate representation of the complexity of commodity connections between production and consumption in globalizing world, it remains a popular metaphor for shaping and supporting the actions of network actors such as producers, NGO and consumer activist (Jackson et al. 2006).

Work on transnationalism and commercial cultures has focused attention on the ways in which commodities and their meanings circulate and are transformed and how such meanings are both shaped by and responded to by other parts of the network. Much of this work has been directed towards understanding the material and symbolic shaping of food and clothing cultures transnationally. Gökarıksel and Secor (2009) show how geopolitics, religious beliefs and imaginings, neoliberal capitalism, and gender and religious identities are entangled in the production and consumption of Islamic veiling fashion in Turkey. In contrast to commodity chain research of the 1990s, much of the work this century has not stopped at retailers, but has investigated how consumers become enrolled in and performance of particular cultural and economic networks, communities, relationships and lifestyles and how these in turn reverberate through the network. A significant amount of research is now being conducted on disposal and wasting, not only to understand practice of this but as a means of thinking about how value is shaped within and outside economic relations of commodity exchange, and how the devaluation of things is connected to both production and consumption (Gregson et al. 2007). Crang's (2010) research on shipbreaking, for example, shows that the very logics of the low cost locations that made containerization possible are the same logics that see them broken up for scrap on open beaches in South Asia. However as Yeung (2005) argues, in order to advance understanding it is necessary to do more than just make the link between production and consumption, engaging with and attending to social, economic and environment challenges involves addressing multiple relations. The viability of the market for carbon credits, for example, cannot be understood without looking to their connections to a range of factors including science, international negotiations, corporate cultures, media attention, and consumer preferences (Bumpus and Man 2008).

4.7 Moral Economies and Ethical Consumption

The need for insights from both cultural and economic geographies is pressing in the context of the negative impacts of human activity. Issues such as environmental degradation, climate change, resource depletion, poverty, deforestation, homelessness, food scarcity, diasporas, disease, and loss of biodiversity may seem intractable.

Perhaps this is because they demonstrate so visibly the ways in which nature and culture, and political, economic and environmental, human and non-human relations exist not as binaries but as complex entanglements of material and representational relations stretched across space. The uneven global consumption of commodities has been well documented, but even in so called developed nations, access to basic goods and services is a struggle for many (Nast 2006). While geographers have long recognized the role of production and consumption in structuring such differences, in the last two decades there has been renewed interest in the ways markets operate and in the political nature of all consumption. For Sayer (2000) the concept of a moral economy allows recognition of the ways in which economic activity is influenced by moral sentiments and norms. This view challenges notions of economies or markets as neutral spaces of exchange and distribution. Instead the concept highlights how markets are territorial spaces shaped by moral activity. Such perspectives elide any division between culture and economy and allow us to see the consumption patterns of lives of both rich and poor as connected (Beaverstock et al. 2004).

Though all consumption is in a sense political (Barnett et al. 2005), “ethical consumption” has remained a specific area of geographical endeavor, perhaps reflecting as Lewis and Potter (2011:10) argue another cultural turn whereby questions of politics becomes connected to everyday life. Carrier (2010) argues ethical consumption strengthens the assumption that personal, consumption decisions are an appropriate and effective vehicle for correcting what are seen to be the ill effects of a system of capitalist production and commerce. However, Coles and Crang (2011) argue a double fetish is at work here, with consumers being exposed to specific and partial commodity knowledges which may re-inscribe distinction and continue to subordinate the position of others. Contemporary consumers are encouraged to care through consuming fair trade, slow food, ‘green’ and cruelty free products and now ‘Cool Aid’ consumerism promoted by the rich and famous (Andrews et al. 2011). A wide variety of networks and campaigns focus on the ethicality of the materiality of the products and the social and spatial relations that surround them. However, Hobson’s (2003, 2008) research has shown that individual household practices directed toward sustainable consumption are in themselves are unlikely to succeed in achieving sustainable futures. Rather it is important to direct attention to how ethicality is shaped and in what spaces and the potential effect of other parts of production and consumption networks in order to effect real change (Coles and Crang 2011). Civil city organizations and NGOs might for example, have an important mediating role in shaping ethical relations between producers, retailers and consumers and securing more sustainable outcomes for the planet (Hughes et al. 2010).

Work on ethical consumption by economic and cultural geographers has revealed the ways in which normative prescriptions of ethics underpin not only the development of firm’s codes of social responsibility, organic and fair trade production networks but also how they shape moral concerns of people (Pykett et al. 2010). Freidberg (2010), Slocum (2007), and others have shown nevertheless that even green or alternative networks or production and sites of consumption may reinforce

hegemonic power structures, demonstrating the necessity of considering not only why, but how and where mainstream and alternative economies function, but also the real effects of these for individuals located both near and distant. As Featherstone argues (2011:xxix),

The questions raised by and ethics of consumption are not just about how to live a life of more regulated consumption, they ask us to think about the nature of the things we consume and their fate, their potential, or right to be something more than waste.

For geographers there are also the cultural and economic questions of where and how value is ascribed, to what and in what places, and the sorts of geometries of power in which people and things are entangled.

4.8 Conclusion: Cultural and Economic Intersections in Consumption – Making a Difference?

As geographies of consumption expanded rapidly in the latter decades of the twentieth century, they have not so much undergone a singular economic or cultural turn but have been characterized by the growing intersection of cultural and economic perspectives in particular research agendas. Goodman et al. (2010:5) argue that consumption brings together elements spatial mobility and fixity, the spectacular and the mundane, space and place, material and the discursive, local and global, culture and economy. Consequently, as consumption geographies have developed, a focus on the limitations of economic and cultural approaches has diminished, with a growing integration and application of insights from both fields of knowledge.

In thinking critically how markets, consumers, commodities and territories are made, the political and ethical assumptions that underpin them, and how value is constructed through them, economic and cultural geographers have revealed societal norms, discourses and relationships which may produce forms of exploitation of nature/cultures. Some years back I wrote

It is crucial to explore the (moral) spaces of visualization and embodiment and translation that result from the seeing, doing and becoming of consumption as situated social practice, and as part of the practice of geography. Doing so may assist in understanding and addressing the undesirable and uneven consequences of the power geometries that result. (Mansvelt 2005:164).

Such words seemed easy to write at the time, but I realize the challenge is how to *address* such revelations. How might recognition of hegemonic power relations inform actions designed to alleviate or ameliorate undesirable environmental or social consequences? What is my role as an academic (interested in the consumption practices of older people) in enabling and making visible the possibilities for self-determination and enabling alternative futures which may be very different to those I believe in? I have come to realize normative proclamations of ethicality, while good for some (such as buying local food), may have costs for others

(affordability and access for those on lower incomes, negative effects on economies and livelihoods depend on export or long distance travel of agricultural produce) (Hinrichs (2000) cited in Goodman et al. (2010:23)). Thus it is easy to see how the products of our research can become a basis for intellectual imperialism. Where we speak from, in what places, to whom and how we do so, does matter. The increasing entanglement of cultural and economic perspectives within consumption research has gone some way to revealing taken for granted assumptions derived from these perspectives with regard to the shaping of resources, markets, consumers, bodies, nature/culture, human/non-human, commodities and possessions. At the heart of much of this research are questions of how value is shaped and destroyed through relations and across spaces. Consequently, the increasing intersection of cultural and economic geographies may provide fruitful insights into the role and nature of consumption. New connections between both geographies and geographers may also open up spaces for meaningful dialogue and possibilities for intervention in an unevenly structured world.

References

- Aitchison, C., MacLeod, N., & Shaw, S. (2000). *Leisure and tourism landscapes: Social and cultural geographies*. London: Routledge.
- Andrews, G., Kearns, R., Kingsbury, P., & Carr, E. (2011). Cool aid? Health, wellbeing and place in the work of Bono and U2. *Health & Place*, 17(1), 185–194.
- Barnett, C., Cloke, P., Clarke, N., & Malpass, A. (2005). Consuming ethics: Articulating the subjects and spaces of ethical consumption. *Antipode*, 37(1), 23–45.
- Bathelt, H., & Glückler, J. (2003). Toward a relational economic geography. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 3(2), 117–144.
- Beaverstock, J., Hubbard, P., & Short, J. (2004). Getting away with it? Exposing the geographies of the super-rich. *Geoforum*, 35(4), 401–407.
- Bell, D., & Valentine, G. (1997). *Consuming geographies: We are where we eat*. London: Routledge.
- Bumpus, A., & Man, D. (2008). Accumulation by decarbonization and the governance of carbon offsets. *Economic Geography*, 84(2), 127–155.
- Carrier, J. (2010). Protecting the environment the natural way: Ethical consumption and commodity fetishism. *Antipode*, 42(3), 672–689.
- Cloke, P. (1993). The countryside as commodity: New rural spaces for leisure. In S. Glyptis (Ed.), *Leisure and the environment: Essays in honour of professor J.A. Patmore* (pp. 53–66). London: Belhaven.
- Cohen, M., & Murphy, J. (2001). *Exploring sustainable consumption: Environmental policy and the social sciences*. Oxford: Pergamon.
- Coles, B., & Crang, P. (2011). Placing alternative consumption: Commodity fetishism in Borough Fine Foods Market, London. In T. Lewis & E. Potter (Eds.), *Ethical consumption. A critical introduction* (pp. 87–102). Abingdon/Oxon/New York: Routledge.
- Cosgrove, D. (1989). Geography is everywhere: Culture and symbolism in human landscapes. In D. Gregory & R. Walford (Eds.), *Horizons in human geography* (pp. 118–135). Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Crang, M. (2010). The death of great ships: Photography, politics, and waste in the global imaginary. *Environment and Planning A*, 42(5), 1084–1102.
- Crewe, L., Gregson, N., & Metcalfe, A. (2009). The screen and the drum: On form, function, fit and failure in contemporary home consumption. *Design and Culture*, 1, 307–328.

- Crouch, D. (Ed.). (1999). *Leisure/tourism geographies*. London: Routledge.
- de la Bellacasa, M. (2010). Ethical doings in naturecultures. *Ethics, Place and Environment*, 13(2), 151–169.
- Dean, M. (1999). *Governmentality: Power and rule in modern society*. London: Sage.
- Dodge, M., Kitchin, R., & Zook, M. (2009). How does software make space? Exploring some geographical dimensions of pervasive computing and software studies. *Environment and Planning A*, 41(6), 1283–1294.
- Dunleavy, P. (1980). *Urban political analysis*. London: Macmillan.
- Eden, S., Bear, C., & Walker, G. (2008). Mucky carrots and other proxies: Problematising the knowledge-fix for sustainable and ethical consumption. *Geoforum*, 39, 1044–1057.
- Featherstone, M. (2011). In T. Lewis, E. Potter, T. Lewis, & E. Potter (Eds.), *Ethical consumption. A critical introduction* (pp. xvii–xxviii). Abingdon/Oxon/New York: Routledge.
- Freidberg, S. (2010). Perspective and power in the ethical foodscape. *Environment and Planning A*, 42(8), 1868–1874.
- Gabriel, Y., & Laing, T. (Eds.). (2006). *The unmanageable consumer* (2nd ed.). London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: Sage.
- Gereffi, G., & Korzeniewicz, M. (Eds.). (1994). *Commodity chains and global capitalism*. Westport: Greenwood Press.
- Giddens, A. (1984). *The constitution of society: Outline of a theory of structuration*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Glennie, P., & Thrift, N. (1993). Modern consumption: Theorising commodities and consumers. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 11(5), 603–606.
- Gökarişel, B., & Secor, A. (2009). New transnational geographies of Islamism, capitalism and subjectivity: The veiling-fashion industry in Turkey. *Area*, 41(1), 6–18.
- Goodman, M. K., Goodman, D., & Redclift, M. (2010). Introduction: Situating consumption, space and place. In M. K. Goodman, D. Goodman, & M. Redclift (Eds.), *Consuming space placing consumption in perspective* (pp. 3–40). Farnham, England and Burlington VT: Ashgate.
- Gorman-Murray, A. (2008). Reconciling self: Gay men and lesbians using domestic materiality for identity management. *Social and Cultural Geography*, 9(3), 283–301.
- Goss, J. (1993). The “magic of the mall”: An analysis of form, function, and meaning in the contemporary retail built environment. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 83(1), 18–47.
- Goss, J. (1999). Once-upon-a-time in the commodity world: An unofficial guide to mall of America. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 89(1), 45–75.
- Graham, S., & Thrift, N. (2007). Out of order: Understanding repair and maintenance. *Theory, Culture and Society*, 24(3), 1–25.
- Gregson, N. (1994). Beyond the high street and the mall: Car boot fairs and the new geographies of consumption in the 1990s. *Area*, 26(3), 261–267.
- Gregson, N. (1995). And now it's all consumption? *Progress in Human Geography*, 19(1), 135–141.
- Gregson, N., & Crewe, L. (1997). Performance and possession: Rethinking the act of purchase in the light of the car boot sale. *Journal of Material Culture*, 2(2), 241–263.
- Gregson, N., & Crewe, L. (2003). *Second-hand cultures*. Oxford: Berg.
- Gregson, N., Metcalfe, A., Crewe, L., Gregson, N., Metcalfe, A., & Crewe, L. (2007). Moving things along: The conduits and practices of divestment in consumption. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 32, 187–200.
- Hartshorne, R. (1959). *Perspective on the nature of geography*. Madison: Association of American Geographers.
- Hecock, R., & Rooney, J., Jr. (1968). Towards a geography of consumption. *The Professional Geographer*, 20(6), 392–395.
- Hinrichs, C. C. (2000). Embeddedness and local food systems: Notes on two types of direct agricultural markets. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 16(3), 295–303.
- Hitchings, R., & Lee, S. (2008). Air conditioning and the material culture of routine human encasement: The case of young people in contemporary Singapore. *Journal of Material Culture*, 13(3), 251–265.

- Hobson, K. (2003). Thinking habits into action: The role of knowledge and process in questioning household consumption practices. *Local Environment*, 8(1), 95–112.
- Hobson, K. (2008). Reasons to be cheerful: Thinking sustainably in a (climate) changing world. *Geography Compass*, 2(1), 199–214.
- Hopkins, J. (1990). West Edmonton Mall: Landscape of myths and elsewhere. *The Canadian Geographer*, 34(1), 2–17.
- Hughes, A., & Reimer, S. (Eds.). (2004). *Geographies of commodity chains*. London/New York: Routledge.
- Hughes, A., Wrigley, N., & Buttle, M. (2010). Ethical campaigning and buyer-driven commodity chains: Transforming retailers' purchasing practices? In M. Goodman, D. Goodman, M. Redclift, M. Goodman, D. Goodman, & M. Redclift (Eds.), *Consuming space. Placing consumption in perspective* (pp. 123–146). Farnham/Burlington: Ashgate.
- Jackson, P. (1999). Commodity cultures: The traffic in things. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 24, 95–109.
- Jackson, P. (2000). Rematerializing social and cultural geography. *Social and Cultural Geography*, 1(1), 9–14.
- Jackson, P. (2002). Consumption in a globalizing world. In P. Taylor, M. Watts, & R. Johnston (Eds.), *Geographies of global change: Remapping the world* (pp. 283–295). Malden: Blackwell.
- Jackson, P., & Dwyer, C. (Eds.). (2004). *Transnational spaces*. London: Routledge.
- Jackson, P., Lowe, M., Miller, D., & Mort, F. (2000). *Commercial cultures: Economies, practices, spaces*. Oxford: Berg.
- Jackson, P., Russell, P., & Ward, N. (2006). Mobilising the 'commodity chain' concept in the politics of food and farming. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 22, 129–141.
- Jayne, M. (2006). *Cities and consumption*. Abingdon/Oxon/New York: Routledge.
- Katz, S., & Marshall, B. (2003). New sex for old: Lifestyle, consumerism, and the ethics of aging well. *Journal of Aging Studies*, 17, 3–16.
- Kingsbury, P. (2007). The extimacy of space. *Social and Cultural Geography*, 8(2), 235–258.
- Klausner, D. (1986). Beyond separate spheres: Linking production with social reproduction and consumption. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 4(1), 29–40.
- Knox, P. (1987). Collective consumption and socio-spatial change. In M. Pacione & M. Pacione (Eds.), *Social geography: Progress and prospect* (pp. 164–200). London: Croom Helm.
- Leslie, D. (2009). Consumption. In R. Kitchin & N. Thrift (Eds.), *International encyclopedia of human geography* (pp. 268–274). Oxford: Elsevier.
- Lewis, T., & Potter, E. (2011). Introducing ethical consumption. In T. Lewis & E. Potter (Eds.), *Ethical consumption: A critical introduction* (pp. 3–23). Abingdon/Oxon/New York: Routledge.
- Lewis, N., Lerner, W., & LeHeron, R. (2008). The New Zealand designer fashion industry: Making industries and co-constituting political projects. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 33(1), 42–59.
- Mansfield, B. (2011). Is fish health food or poison? Farmed fish and the material production of unhealthy nature. *Antipode*, 43(2), 413–434.
- Mansvelt, J. (2005). *Geographies of consumption*. London: Sage.
- Mansvelt, J. (2011). Introduction. In J. Mansvelt (Ed.), *Green consumerism. An A-Z guide*. London: Sage.
- Massey, D., & Clark, N. (2008). Introduction. In N. Clark, D. Massey, & P. Sarre (Eds.), *Material geographies: A world in the making* (pp. 1–6). London: Sage.
- Miles, S. (1998). *Consumerism as a way of life*. London: Sage.
- Miller, D., Jackson, P., Thrift, N., Holbrook, B., & Rowlands, M. (Eds.). (1998). *Shopping, place and identity*. London/New York: Routledge.
- Mort, F. (1988). Boy's own? Masculinity, style and popular culture. In K. Chapman & J. Rutherford (Eds.), *Male order: Unwrapping masculinity* (pp. 193–225). London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- Nast, H. (2006). Critical pet studies. *Antipode*, 38(5), 894–906.
- Philo, C., & Wilbert, C. (Eds.). (2000). *Animal spaces, beastly places: New geographies of human-animal relations*. New York: Routledge.

- Pinch, S. (1985). *Cities and services: The geography of collective consumption*. London/Boston: Routledge.
- Pykett, J., Cloke, P., Barnett, C., Clarke, N., & Malpass, A. (2010). Learning to be global citizens: The rationalities of fair-trade education. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 28(3), 487–508.
- Ritzer, G., & Jurgenson, N. (2010). Production, consumption, prosumption. *Journal of Consumer Culture*, 10(1), 13–36.
- Roe, E. J. (2009). Human-nonhuman. In R. Kitchin & N. Thrift (Eds.), *International encyclopedia of human geography* (pp. 251–257). Oxford: Elsevier.
- Rose, N. (1999). *Powers of freedom: Reframing political thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sack, R. (1992). *Place, modernity, and the consumer's world*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Saunders, P. (1981). *Social theory and the urban question*. London/New York: Hutchinson.
- Sayer, A. (1992). *Method in social science: A realist approach* (2nd ed.). London/New York: Routledge.
- Sayer, A. (2000). Moral economy and political economy. *Studies in Political Economy*, 61(spring), 79–103.
- Schor, J. (2007). In defense of consumer critique: Revisiting the consumption debates of the twentieth century. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 611, 16–30.
- Slocum, R. (2007). Whiteness, space and alternative food practice. *Geoforum*, 38, 520–533.
- Thompson, L., & Cupples, J. (2008). Seen and not heard? Text messaging and digital sociality. *Social and Cultural Geography*, 9(1), 95–108.
- Trentmann, F. (2006). The evolution of the consumer: Meanings, identities, and political synapses before the age of affluence. In S. Garon & P. Maclachlan (Eds.), *The ambivalent consumer: Questioning consumption in East Asia and the West* (pp. 21–44). Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press.
- Valentine, G., & Holloway, S. (2001). On-line dangers? Geographies of parents' fears for children's safety in cyberspace. *The Professional Geographer*, 53(1), 71–83.
- Wrigley, N., & Lowe, M. (Eds.). (1996). *Retailing, consumption and capital: Towards the new retail geography*. Harlow: Longman.
- Wrigley, N., & Lowe, M. (2002). *Reading retail*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Yarwood, R., & Shaw, J. (2010). 'N-gauging' geographies: Craft consumption, indoor leisure and model railways. *Area*, 42(4), 425–433.
- Yeung, H. W.-C. (2005). Rethinking relational economic geography. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 30(1), 37–51.
- Zwick, D., & Dholakia, N. (2004). Whose identity is it anyway? Consumer representation in the age of database marketing. *Journal of Macromarketing*, 24(1), 31–43.
- Zwick, D., Bonsu, S., & Darmody, A. (2008). Putting consumers to work: 'Co-creation' and new marketing governmentality. *Journal of Consumer Culture*, 8, 163–196.

Chapter 5

Gender, Commodity Chains and Everyday Life

Deborah Leslie

Commodity chains connect all the activities associated with the production of one good or service, such as manufacturing, consumption, design, retailing, marketing and advertising. The aim is to trace the entire trajectory of a product across time and space, including the movement of material resources, value, finance, and knowledge, as well as signs and symbols. The growing interest in commodity chain approaches is tied to a broader “cultural turn” in economic geography, which aims to bring together economy and culture, production and consumption, and the material and the symbolic (Hughes and Reimer 2004). It is also related to a growing “economic turn” in cultural geography, which has seen a heightened interest in corporate cultures, consumption, and processes of commodification.

The aim of this chapter is to foreground the gendered nature of commodity chains through a case study of fashion.¹ Fashion is an ideal product to explore the changing nature of commodity chains because it is a highly globalized sector. The last several decades have seen the continued shift of garment production to developing countries (particularly in Asia), while design and marketing continue to be centralized in large global cities (usually within developed countries) (Aspers 2010; Rantisi 2004). A commodity chain approach provides a useful device for understanding contemporary processes of globalization, and for conceptualizing the unequal distribution of wealth encompassed within new international divisions of labor (Ramamurthy 2004:739). The clothing industry also provides an excellent vantage point for analyzing the gendered nature of global commodity chains. Fashion commodity chains are characterized by enormous inequalities

¹ Although there are differences, fashion, clothing and garments are used interchangeably in this paper.

D. Leslie (✉)

Department of Geography, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada
e-mail: deborah.leslie@utoronto.ca

along the lines of gender, race, class and nationality. Men dominate at the top levels of the industry (especially design, distribution and manufacturing), but women make up most of the workforce across the chain. They are also involved in the majority of purchasing decisions.

Organized into three main sections, the paper begins by outlining a feminist commodity chain approach. The second section examines the nature of the fashion commodity chain, including its unique temporality and spatiality. The third section explores these issues through a focus on one particular site in the fashion chain. Drawing on a case study of fashion designers in Toronto, this section examines how designers share much in common with women employed at other sites in the chain, including high levels of employment instability and gender discrimination, as well as difficulties combining home and work. An understanding of the connections among women across the chain foregrounds the political possibilities inherent in uniting different groups of women.

5.1 Gendering the Commodity Chain

Commodity chain approaches were first introduced by world systems theorists. In particular, the notion of a commodity chain originates in an article by Hopkins and Wallerstein (1977:128):

What we mean by such chains is the following: take an ultimate consumable item and trace back the set of inputs that culminated in this item- the prior transformations, the raw materials, the transportation mechanisms, the labour input into each of the material processes, the food inputs into the labour. This linked set of processes we call the commodity chain.

Although the notion of the commodity chain can be traced to world systems theory, Bair (2005) identifies a significant disjuncture between the commodity chain research deriving from Hopkins and Wallerstein, and the conceptualization developed by Gereffi and his colleagues (often referred to as the ‘global commodity chain’ or GCC paradigm). The GCC approach has become a particularly influential approach in the last couple decades.

According to Gereffi (1995), a commodity chain has four main features. The first aspect is an input–output structure, which includes a group of products and services linked together in a sequence of value-adding activities. The second dimension is a distinct territoriality, including the location of raw materials, production, export, and marketing activities. The third feature is a particular governance structure, which refers to the relationships of power that determine how financial, material and human resources, as well as economic surpluses, are allocated across the commodity chain. The final component of a commodity chain encompasses its institutional context, including the role of government, unions and other regulatory institutions.

Of these four aspects, it is the governance dimension that has received the most attention in the GCC literature. Research has focused on the nature of production networks and inter-firm relationships. This focus on the distribution of power and

profits along the chain has been extended in the more recent ‘global value chains’ (GVC) literature, also identified with Gereffi. In this research, there is a particular emphasis on the technical aspects of chain governance (Gereffi et al. 2005).

As noted, Bair (2005) argues that the conception of the commodity chain articulated within the GCC and GVC literatures differs fundamentally from that advanced by world systems theorists. World systems theorists (such as Hopkins and Wallerstein) understand commodity chains as encompassing not only the steps involved in the processing of raw materials into final goods, but also the networks connecting productive activities with the social reproduction of human labour, something neglected in GCC accounts. World systems theories acknowledge the importance of labor as an input to the production process, and as a node in the chain that has to be reproduced. In her agenda for future commodity chain research, Bair (2005) calls for greater attention to reproduction and everyday life, and to the social, cultural and political context in which chains operate. In this capacity, she also highlights the need for further research on the gender divisions of labour that characterize chains.

Women constitute a large majority of the workers assembling products for international markets. In this way, global commodity chains are as much female-led as export-led (Joekes in Ramamurthy 2004:740). Despite the fact that the exploitation of women has been a constitutive feature of global commodity chains, Palpacuer (2008:402) argues that “mainstream GCC/GVC research has barely ventured into the world of women workers”. Little attention has been paid to the impact that commodity chains have on the large numbers of women labouring at the base of chains (Hale and Opondo 2005).

In order to address some of these gaps, Ramamurthy (2004) advocates a feminist commodity chain approach. She identifies a feminization of global commodity chains, arguing that conditions of employment that used to be associated with women’s work – low pay, irregular hours, and insecurity – have now become a generalized feature of many forms of employment. For Ramamurthy, there is a lack of attention to the way in which national governments and multinational corporations exploit gender ideologies in different parts of the world to further their export development strategies. She notes that

the gender and cultural politics of national regimes vary greatly. Some nation states, and the multinational corporations which operate in them, have opportunistically intensified or recomposed gender ideologies in some instances and decomposed them in others (Ramamurthy 2004:740).

As one example, Ngai (2005) illustrates how global forces combine with local patriarchal cultures to create ideal conditions for the exploitation of female labour in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone in China. She illustrates how young women, most of them under the age of 25, work over 12 hours a day assembling garments, toys and electronics. These women live in crowded conditions near the factories, but this “dormitory labor regime” grants only temporary resident status to workers. They are deprived of basic rights of local citizenship, such as having the right to register a marriage or childbirth in Shenzhen. Ngai (2005) argues that such

arrangements transfer the costs of the reproduction of labour back to the rural communities that provide the temporary labour in the first place. Thus, rather than providing an alternative to rural poverty, global commodity chains perpetuate relations of rural–urban inequality.

In this regard, Ramamurthy (2004) echoes some of Bair’s concerns, arguing that commodity chain analyses often fail to acknowledge the critical importance of the household to the viability of new production regimes. The costs of economic restructuring are often passed on to women, whose reproductive labor plays an important role in supporting production. Ramamurthy (2004) calls for a commodity chain approach that is sensitive to women’s labor and gender ideologies at each site in the chain. Such a conceptualization is cognizant of the way in which narratives of globalization naturalize gendered and racialized constructions of difference, reproducing binaries between men and women, as well as between the First and Third Worlds. While conventional commodity chain approaches foreground class relations, a feminist approach explores the intersection of class, gender, race, sexuality and nationality.²

In addition to foregrounding the neglect of gender in conventional commodity chain analyses, Ramamurthy (2004:741) also critiques what she sees as highly masculinist undertones characterizing many accounts, which refer to chain “drivers” and assume a flow to investments. By contrast, she argues that a feminist commodity chain analysis would begin “with the possibility that global commodity chains – as connections across times and places – are neither linear nor unidirectional nor closed” (Ramamurthy 2004:741).³ As Ramamurthy (2004:743) suggests, a feminist commodity chain analysis uses gender “as an analytic of power to track the open-endedness, contingency and rupture of commodity chains”. Transcending the economism of other approaches, a feminist analysis is sensitive to the mutually constitutive link between production and consumption, the material and the symbolic. It draws attention not only to processes of production and value adding sequences, but to the role of discourse. As Ramamurthy (2004:741) argues, “production produces more than just commodities; individual and collective identities are constituted in process of production.” A feminist commodity chain analysis thus considers the mutually constitutive relationship between the material and the symbolic, as well as between gender, class, race, sexuality and age. It also highlights the way in which chains are connected to the reproduction of everyday lives.

²These identities are conceptualized in non-essentialist terms (Ramamurthy 2004).

³There are some parallels between Ramamurthy’s (2004) conception of a non-linear chain and the literature on commodity ‘circuits’ and ‘networks’. Rather than tracing causality and attempting to reveal which sites are dominant, commodity circuit and network accounts examine the interdependence between nodes. The goal is to analyze the diverse meanings attached to commodities at different times, places and phases, and to consider how goods are displaced from one site to another (see Hughes and Reimer 2004).

5.2 Fashion: A Feminized Commodity Chain

The fashion commodity chain is characterized by considerable contrasts between those employed at the top of the hierarchy and those laboring at the bottom, as well as between those producing fashion commodities and those consuming them. The geographical distance between manufacturing workers and their ultimate employers, and between workers and consumers, means that ethical connections are difficult (Wills and Hale 2005).

The fashion commodity chain exhibits not only by class-based and geographic inequalities, but by gendered inequalities. Women have long been associated with the preparation of raw materials for clothing (including spinning and weaving textiles), as well as with the sewing and alteration of garments. Women, especially bourgeois women, have also played a prominent role in the consumption of clothing, having recognized early on its significance for communicating status, taste and gender roles (Breward 1994:34). Fashion is important in defining and redefining the boundaries of gender, and there is a strong historical association between femininity and fashion (Entwistle 2000).⁴

In the current period, women continue to form the majority of the workforce at all sites in the chain. In manufacturing, for example, men are concentrated in ownership, management, and supervision, but women dominate as production workers (Hurley 2005:116). The clothing industry is highly sensitive to labor costs, and women are seen as cheaper (Hurley 2005:116).⁵ Not only do women dominate in manufacturing, they also constitute a majority of the labour force in retailing, design, modelling, education, consumption and the fashion media (Leslie 2002). As Angela McRobbie (1997:84–85) concludes,

apart from a few men at the top, including manufacturers and retailers, celebrity designers and magazine publishers, it is and has been a female sphere of production and consumption. For this reason alone, fashion is a feminist issue.

Gendered inequality intersects with racial and ethnic inequality. Garment manufacturers that relocate offshore frequently employ racist discourses, drawing on Orientalist constructions to argue that Asian women are naturally suited to repetitive work and are more docile (Entwistle 2000:215). Garment producers that remain in North America and Europe similarly take advantage of immigrant women, many of whom enter as the “chattel” of their male partners (Entwistle 2000:216).

⁴ Just as fashion is defined as fickle, frivolous and ephemeral, women have been constructed as weak and inconstant (Entwistle 2000:148).

⁵ Recent changes in the sector have had a gendered impact. The shift of production overseas, for example, has had a disproportionate impact on women, who dominate factory work. By contrast, men are concentrated in management and distribution and have been more likely to retain their jobs in developed countries (Hurley 2005). The trend toward informalization also has dramatic impacts on women, many of whom are increasingly categorized as self-employed, and denied access to welfare (Hurley 2005:119).

Each new wave of immigrants provides a supply of workers that can be exploited. Clothing is thus marked by distinct ethnic, racial, gender and class divisions.

Fashion is also characterized by a unique temporality and spatiality. Fashion commodity chains are subject to short product cycles. As Entwistle (2009:55) argues, “aesthetic commodities are more nebulous than other sorts of products, such as vegetables or garden implements, since they are concerned with properties of ‘beauty’, ‘style’, or ‘design’, which are effervescent categories that change over time and across different social spaces”.⁶ As an aesthetic commodity, fashion is the perfect good to investigate the mutually constitutive ties between the economic and the cultural, as well as the material and the symbolic. As Entwistle (2009:74) puts it, “economic calculations in aesthetic economies are always by definition, cultural ones.”

These calculations involve considerable risk. As Weller (2007:42) argues, “fashion knowledge is commonly understood as an aesthetic knowledge, and as an unstable and constantly changing form of knowledge that promotes incessant change without progress.” In such a universe, economic value is constantly being undermined (Entwistle 2009:51). Fashion commodities “are clearly depreciating at a fast rate: once in the store, there is a small window of opportunity to sell fashion clothes before they are ‘out of fashion’, while fashion model careers are notoriously short-lived and have only a few seasons in which to make an impression” (Entwistle 2009:51–52).

The speed with which fashion circulates has increased in recent years with the advent of “fast fashion” (Tokatli 2008).⁷ The reduction in lead times places additional pressure on suppliers to seek out a more flexible workforce, creating heightened instability for workers across the chain (Wills and Hale 2005:30; Hale 2005). No one wants to be left with clothing they cannot sell and the industry has dealt with this unpredictability by pushing risk down through the chain, from retailer to manufacturer to contractor and subcontractor to worker (Howard 1997:15). Increased flexibility means that workers are increasingly casual and are denied access to sickness benefits and maternity leaves (Entwistle 2000:219).

The temporality of fashion also lends itself to a greater sexualization of work. In the realm of production for example, Siddiqi (2009) argues that vulnerability to sexual harassment in the workplace depends, among other things, on the nature of the product being manufactured. Her research indicates that the garment industry is prone to higher levels of sexual harassment than electronics or other types of manufacturing.⁸ Writing about Bangladesh, she observes

⁶ Aesthetic values are important to many types of goods, but fashion exists at the extreme end of the continuum.

⁷ Fast fashion aims to take a design from catwalk to the mass market in 3 weeks (Aspers 2010).

⁸ By contrast, the pace of work is less frenetic in electronics manufacturing, where workers do not confront harsh deadlines. The work requires a high degree of concentration and a quiet workplace (Siddiqi 2009).

the pace and structure of production in garment factories—more specifically, the lead-time—critically inflect disciplinary practices on the shop floor. Sexualized disciplinary regimes— including the intensity of *awkottho gali* (unspeakable verbal abuse) in the Bangla factories—obtain directly from the frenzied pace of production that comes with extremely tight delivery schedules. The imperative of meeting production targets with shortened lead time translates into the incessant verbal coercion of workers to meet their production targets (Siddiqi 2009:11).

Garment production workers confront a hostile, intimidating and sexually charged work environment, characterized by a highly sexualized vocabulary and body language (Siddiqi 2009). In order to meet production targets, garment production is also associated with higher levels of night work, which increases women’s vulnerability to sexual assault (see also Hurley 2005).

The sexualization of work is also apparent at the retailing and advertising sites in the commodity chain. One example is provided by ethical fashion company, American Apparel. This firm is known for its highly sexualized work environment, characterized by heterosexual horseplay and a relaxed, “party” atmosphere. The company’s owner has been charged with a number of cases of sexual harassment, and retail stores are adorned with pornographic imagery. Sexualized images of company employees are depicted in all of the firm’s advertising, the majority of which are young, white, slim and female.⁹ Moor and Littler (2008:717) conclude that “creating an image of a white boss and his harem of sexually powerful cosmopolitan workers has some distinctly old-fashioned – and yet simultaneously only too contemporary – echoes of imperialist exploitation.”

The highly gendered, racialized, and sexualized nature of this commodity chain relates not only to the product’s unique temporality but to its spatiality. Clothing is worn on the body and literally becomes a part of the body. As Entwistle (2000:1) suggests, “fashion is about bodies: it is produced, promoted and worn by bodies. It is the body that fashion speaks to and it the body that must be dressed in almost all social encounters.” The intimate nature of clothing is obvious in the case of fashion modelling and consumption. However, even in the case of fashion buyers, whose job is to purchase clothing lines for major retail chains, Entwistle (2009:41) illustrates that knowing what to buy is about being able to demonstrate this knowledge through bodily enactments and performances. The buyers she interviewed in London were aware that they had to “look the part” and embody the image the store was seeking to establish (Entwistle 2009:42). As Entwistle (2009:41) notes, “one has to have a particular kind of body to be inside this world in the first place.”

Although the conditions of work vary dramatically between sites, the unique spatiality and temporality of fashion means that workers also share common experiences of insecurity. Workers at all sites experience risks related to sexual harassment and discrimination. They face constant anxieties related to body weight and

⁹ Images of factory workers are used to establish the sweatshop-free image on the company’s website, while retail workers are used to build a cosmopolitan and sexually liberated image in advertising.

appearance, and the risk that their ‘look’ may go out of style. Workers also confront increased volatility in their hours and pay, and are often employed on short term contracts or as homeworkers. These conditions undermine the ability of workers to reproduce themselves. The next section explores these issues through a case study of fashion design.

5.3 Gender, Risk, and Everyday Life in Fashion Design

Drawing on research on independent fashion designers in Toronto, Canada, this section examines the feminized and risky nature of fashion design, and the complex and nonlinear ties that bind women across the chain.¹⁰ The case of fashion design illustrates one of the common problems confronted by women at all sites: the problem of combining home and work and the struggle to reproduce oneself and one’s family.

As noted earlier, fashion design is an overwhelmingly female field. McRobbie (1998:35) describes the female dominated nature of fashion design programs in the U.K., arguing that women are seen as more suited to fashion than fine art (McRobbie 1998:35).¹¹ Fashion design programs are also feminized in Canada. One program director cites a prevalent stereotype surrounding fashion design: “85% of our students are women. I think it is just one of those natural selection things. Women are just naturally attracted to fashion” (interview, fashion educator, Toronto). The feminization of the field continues after graduation. As a designer argues, “there are no men. ... I think fashion design in general is more dominated by women... I actually love the fact that most of the people I know who are doing it are women. It makes it more comfortable, and keeps it friendly. ... It is kind of like going to an ‘all girls’ school” (interview).

Despite the gendering of the profession, there is strong consensus that all of the best known designers are men. As one female designer observes, “It’s strange because it is one of those things where most of the fashion students are girls but it is the guys who get the attention and more famous designers are almost always men” (interview). A city official agrees: “On the design side ... the numbers for women probably are higher, but when you start to think about the top designers... there are actually more males than females that come up” (interview). The dominance of men at the top of the design hierarchy suggests that women face systematic barriers in the labor market. As one college instructor notes,

in terms of gender – there probably is that glass ceiling for certain women because at the end of the day a lot of the high powered positions, even in the garment industries, are held by men (interview, fashion educator).

¹⁰ The paper draws upon a case study of 57 semi-structured interviews with fashion designers, government officials, educators and design councils in Toronto, Canada. Interviews were conducted between 2007 and 2009, and ranged between 1 and 2 h in length.

¹¹ The feminization of fashion design programs means they are accorded lower status in the hierarchy of the art world.

Designers attribute the success of male designers to the media:

I think you do a whole lot better if you're a gay man... Arthur Mendoca and Jeremy Lang are media darlings. People love them. They are very charming and very talented. I just don't see the same happening with a female designer (Interview, fashion designer).¹²

Not only do women confront gender-based discrimination in the industry, but they also grapple with sexualized discourses, particularly in fabric wholesaling. As one designer comments, "We call them 'garmentos' – older men that call you sweetie or honey" (interview).

As noted earlier, not only is fashion is feminized, but it is subject to high levels of market volatility (Banks et al. 2000). Because its primary value is symbolic, it generally involves short-lived cycles and high levels of uncertainty. In her study of fashion designers in the U.K., for example, McRobbie (1998) finds that many young designers are exploited working for large fashion houses at home and abroad. They confront long hours and low pay, and complain of unscrupulous practices, such as not being paid for overtime. Employment contracts are often short term, adding another layer of uncertainty. The lack of a living wage, combined with high stress and exhaustion, leads to numerous bodily and health problems (McRobbie 1998:77).

In response to these conditions, many young designers start their own labels. While gaining a degree of autonomy, these young women end up engaging in self-exploitation. As McRobbie (1998:83) puts it, "ideologically work is turned into a source of reward through the emphasis on creativity, no matter how irregular the earning and regardless of how long the hours. This ethos also encourages a new and distinctive merging of the self with work". Independent fashion designers are forced to fall back upon their own resources, taking responsibility for their own careers (McRobbie 2002). In order to compensate for these risks, McRobbie (1998) finds that many independent designers combine their design work with other forms of employment, such as freelancing, waitressing, or working as a fashion educator.

These stories resonate with the experiences of independent fashion designers in Toronto. As one independent designer describes, "I have more flexibility with my hours, but I still work more than most people because I'm an entrepreneur" (interview, designer). Another designer cites the hardships she has encountered along the way: "I started when I was 24. ... I was doing a lot of waitressing and I worked for another designer, which made me see that you can run your own business." Despite her successes as an independent designer, she describes how her income continues to be unstable and her financial situation is characterized by constant debt. Another designer describes how

When I started there were days when I would just go to my room and cry because I wasn't making any money and I worked there by myself for I guess the first two years- six days a week- and on the seventh day I would go out to my factory. God said the seventh day, rest.

¹² Discrimination against female designers led one well-known female design team in Toronto to refrain from putting their names on their label. As they describe, "so even though we went to school for fashion, I don't think either of us thought we could put our name on the label, and one thing we did do was put [name of label] as the label, for one reason- there were very few women designers internationally!" (interview, female design team).

NO! So that was a challenge. I just couldn't afford to hire anybody. I was designing in the back room of the store (interview).

This designer describes some of the financial uncertainties associated with being an independent designer:

I have some retailers who owe me \$10,000 and they are not paying me until September when they need to order new things. They have owed me since February and that's a real problem for a lot of small designers- young, starting-up designers. If a store goes out of business or doesn't pay them, they go out of business too (interview, designer).

Fashion design is thus characterized by extreme risk and insecurity. One designer sums it up: "I think what you have to do is have a Plan A, B, and C, and I just rotate through these plans" (interview).

There are clear parallels here with other forms of employment across the commodity chain such as manufacturing, modelling and retailing. As McRobbie (1997:86) points out, despite the glamour attached to fashion design, many female designers labour with the constant threat of unemployment and "the class divide between them and machinists is not as great as it might seem".¹³

One of the most difficult problems female fashion designers confront is the struggle to combine home and work. Long and unpredictable hours are not conducive to having a partner or raising a family and many designers don't even make enough money to pay for childcare expenses (McRobbie 1998). As one designer in Toronto describes,

it makes it harder, being a woman, if you have hopes of a domestic life. I don't know anyone in fashion with children, to be honest, because it's a very demanding industry. My friends who have done the best are gay men. They've gone to New York. They don't have anything to lose really. I met a woman who has been working in the industry for fifteen years and she mentioned she had to sacrifice her social life for a long time, and only now does she, in her later thirties, have a husband and children (interview, fashion designer, Toronto).

This sentiment is summed up by another designer:

It's pretty bad in Toronto, but it gets even worse if you go to a fashion capital. I have friends working in Paris and I have friends working in New York, and you're expected to work until two in the morning and come back for eight in the morning doing fittings and it is crazy. And there's also parties and social engagements and you're expected to be at all of these things. So having a regular life is sometimes impossible. In Toronto that's not the case. It is not quite that demanding, but I used to have to work until eight on Friday nights and weekends, and travel all the time, and it can be really hard on the rest of your life.

Some of the female designers interviewed explicitly mentioned that they had stayed in Toronto, rather than move to New York, because the hours were not as intense. It was perceived as an easier place to have a family and access high quality public schools and health care (Interviews). Across the fashion chain, then, there are

¹³ As McRobbie (1998:6) notes, the romantic portrait of the designer, spurning the market and disavowing the need to make a living, does not equate with the enormous expansion of the cultural economy that is full of 'struggling artists' who are part of a low paid casual economy.

important issues relating to employment instability, long hours and social reproduction. Whether it is the struggle to make enough money to support oneself or the ability to have a child, women have a particularly difficult time combining home and work in their everyday lives.

In addition to long hours and low pay, and the difficulties of combining home and work, many young designers find themselves also having to work at multiple sites in the chain, further eroding the boundaries between nodes. McRobbie (1998:87) describes how the model of “‘sewing and selling’ on a small scale is a more accurate picture than the idealised image of running a studio and handing over all the sewing to a part-time machinist”.¹⁴ One designer in Toronto has her design studio in the basement of her house, which also serves as her manufacturing facility. She does all the sewing herself, with the help of a recent graduate of a local design school:

I have always done my manufacturing myself and trained staff how to do it...I've taken on all the hand finishing myself, which I do in front of the T.V. at night which actually works well with the baby, because he falls asleep on the couch and I can get a lot of work done (interview, designer).

Similarly, an established design team manufactures in house, and describes the need for flexibility at their facility:

We have a production manager and a sample maker, and a production sewer. The sample maker does do production as well and then we have a cutter/presser. ...We've always trained the other jobs for the person and then we have an assistant who does everything for everybody ... and then we work. We're not just designers. We can do all that (interview, female design team).

This arrangement saves money for the firm:

too many people want to be good designers, but you also need to be a good grader and a good pattern maker. ... If you're a good designer and you can't make patterns, then right away you're hiring someone. You're trying to run a small business and you have to spend \$60,000 hiring a patternmaker (interview, female design team).¹⁵

While it is common for female designers to engage in production, many also sell their own clothing, blurring the boundaries between design and retail. For example, one designer in Toronto developed a collective, where a number of designers sell their clothing in the same shop:

we came up with the idea of charging [each designer] \$100/month. They work one day a week in our store. ... And there was a point where there were seven designers and seven days of the week, and my job shifted to having more free time to focus on my line (interview, designer).

¹⁴ Despite the attempt in fashion design schools to distance design from traditional forms of women's work, such as dressmaking, and to establish its fine art status, fashion design remains close to its origins in dressmaking, and close to other nodes in the value chain (McRobbie 1998:181). Many young fashion designers earn their living designing and sewing one off orders, similar to a traditional dressmaker (McRobbie 1998:87).

¹⁵ It is interesting to reflect that none of the male designers interviewed did their own sewing.

She describes the sense of solidarity she has with the other female designers: “I’m carrying on women’s work and the other sewers are women and the customers are women ... I like that aspect. It feels like a sisterhood to help designers start their business and help them balance their business with their life” (interview). Retailing one’s own fashion line provides valuable market contact. It also forms the basis for the formation of supportive collective identities across the chain.

Thus, not only are there parallels between fashion design and work located at other parts of the chain, but female designers also work across multiple sites in the chain. This observation illustrates the blurred and non-linear nature of the relationships between nodes, and the multistranded connections that constitute the chain.

5.4 Conclusion

Fashion has a unique spatiality and temporality, characterized by short product life cycles and rapid turnover. It is also a commodity that attaches to the body in intimate ways. As a consequence, fashion work is prone to high levels of risk and insecurity. It is also a highly sexualized field, lending itself to harassment and discrimination in retailing, design, modelling, and manufacturing.

The case of the fashion chain illustrates how commodity chains radiate into the realm of everyday life, compromising the ability of the worker to reproduce herself. Low pay and unstable hours make it difficult to carve out a living in this industry. Offshore manufacturing workers are often denied rights, such as the ability to register a birth or marriage in their local area. Alternatively, they are subject to pregnancy tests that limit their ability to have children. They are increasingly forced to become self-employed homeworkers, eroding the boundaries between work and home life. The same is true for fashion designers. Many designers find that work seeps into their personal lives, making it difficult to have a family. The ability to support one’s self, to raise a family, and to access childcare, benefits and schools, is an important issue. Women thus share many experiences across the fashion commodity chain, and some women end up working at multiple sites. This observation illustrates the contingent and non-linear nature of the chain.

If women share these experiences, how can we unite the interests of women divided by class, race, ethnicity and place? For McRobbie (1997:85) the parallels between sites across the chain provide opportunities for organizing: “If we consider these one at a time, demonstrating their mutual dependence, as well as their apparent distance from each other, it is possible to see a set of tensions and anxieties which in turn provide opportunities for political debate and social change.” McRobbie argues that retailers, consumers, magazine editors need to work together. Retailers, for example, could be pressured to implement corporate codes of conduct, which could improve working conditions for women in manufacturing. Powerful fashion magazines could use their position to lobby for change. McRobbie suggests that responsibility also rests with female consumers, who need to be encouraged to make ethical choices: “the energetic enthusiasm of women across the boundaries of

class and ethnicity for fashion could be used to transform it into a better place of work, rather than allowing it to remain a space of exploited production and guilty consumption” (McRobbie 1997:87).

There is a danger here, however, that the female factory worker is cast as victim. Siddiqi (2009:155) worries that the factory workers’ body is often appropriated: “for global feminists, she stood for the universal subordination of women; for critics of imperialism and capitalism, she was the embodiment of exploitation by (western) predatory capital; and for human rights activists, she represented the violations of the dignity of labour that occur in the absence of regulation and accountability.” Anti-sweatshop movements, for example, often draw upon gendered and racialized discourses of the passive third world woman in need of rescue. This script mobilizes First World women to save women workers ‘over there’. Siddiqi (2009) argues that such decontextualized projects incorporate gross simplifications, which ignore the messy and contradictory nature of factory work and the multiple contexts in which it is proliferating. Such projects flatten differences and ignore workers’ own priorities and desires. They enact their own violence, even as they work to undermine other forms of violence. This politics may achieve some gains, but it often ends up working against the interests of female workers (Siddiqi 2009; Moor and Littler 2008).

A feminist commodity chain analysis is sensitive to these dynamics, and to the complex and contingent nature of chains. It is attuned to the parallels between sites and to mutually constitutive relationship between the material and the discursive. It highlights the open, complex and non-linear nature of power relations along chains, and the intersection between different forms of power linked to class, gender, race, ethnicity and nationality. Any attempt to forge a politics of fashion has to be sensitive to these lines of difference.

References

- Aspers, P. (2010). Using design for upgrading in the fashion industry. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 10, 189–207.
- Bair, J. (2005). Global capitalism and commodity chains: Looking back, going forward. *Competition and Change*, 9(2), 153–180.
- Banks, M., Lovatt, A., O’Connor, J., & Raffo, C. (2000). Risk and trust in the cultural industries. *Geoforum*, 31(4), 453–464.
- Breward, C. (1994). *The culture of fashion*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Entwistle, J. (2000). *The fashioned body. Fashion, dress and modern social theory*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Entwistle, J. (2009). *The aesthetic economy of fashion: Markets and values in clothing and modelling*. London: Berg.
- Gereffi, G. (1995). Global production systems and third world development. In B. Stallings (Ed.), *Global change, regional response*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gereffi, G., Humphrey, J., & Sturgeon, T. (2005). The governance of global value chains. *Review of International Political Economy*, 12(10), 78–104.
- Hale, A. (2005). Organizing and networking in support of garment workers: Why we researched subcontracting chains. In A. Hale & J. Wills (Eds.), *Threads of labour* (pp. 40–68). Oxford: Blackwell.

- Hale, A., & Opondo, M. (2005). Humanizing the cut flower chain: Confronting the realities of flower production for workers in Kenya. *Antipode*, 37(2), 301–323.
- Hopkins, T., & Wallerstein, I. (1977). Patterns of development in the modern world system. *Review*, 1(2), 11–145.
- Howard, A. (1997). Labor, history and sweatshops in the new global economy. In A. Ross (Ed.), *No sweat: Fashion, free trade and the rights of garment workers*. London: Verso.
- Hughes, A., & Reimer, S. (2004). Introduction. In A. Hughes & S. Reimer (Eds.), *Geographies of commodity chains* (pp. 1–16). London: Routledge.
- Hurley, J. (2005). Unravelling the web: Supply chains and workers' lives in the garment industry. In A. Hale & J. Wills (Eds.), *Threads of labour* (pp. 95–132). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Leslie, D. (2002). Gender, retail employment and the clothing commodity chain. *Gender, Place and Culture*, 9(1), 61–76.
- McRobbie, A. (1997). Bridging the gap: Feminism, fashion and consumption. *Feminist Studies*, 55, 73–89.
- McRobbie, A. (1998). *British fashion design. Rag trade or image industry?* London: Routledge.
- McRobbie, A. (2002). Clubs to companies: Notes on the decline of political culture in speeded-up creative worlds. *Cultural Studies*, 16(4), 516–531.
- Moor, L., & Littler, J. (2008). Fourth worlds and neo-Fordism: American apparel and the cultural economy of consumer anxiety. *Cultural Studies*, 2(5), 700–723.
- Ngai, P. (2005). *Made in China: Women factory workers in the global workplace*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Palpacuer, F. (2008). Bringing the social context back in: Governance and wealth distribution in global commodity chains. *Economy and Society*, 37(3), 393–419.
- Ramamurthy, P. (2004). Why is buying a 'Madras' cotton shirt a political act? A feminist commodity chain analysis. *Feminist Studies*, 30(3), 734–769.
- Rantisi, N. (2004). The ascendance of New York fashion. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 28(1), 86–106.
- Siddiqi, D. (2009). Do Bangladeshi factory workers need saving? Sisterhood in the post-sweatshop era. *Feminist Review*, 91, 154–175.
- Tokatli, N. (2008). Global sourcing: Insights from the global clothing industry – The case of Zara, a fast fashion retailer. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 8, 21–38.
- Weller, S. (2007). Fashion as viscous knowledge: Fashion's role in shaping trans-national garment production. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 7(1), 39–66.
- Wills, J., & Hale, A. (2005). Threads of labour in the global garment industry. In A. Hale & J. Wills (Eds.), *Threads of labour* (pp. 1–15). Oxford: Blackwell.

Chapter 6

Economic Rationality, Ethnic Identity, and the Geographies of Consumption

Lucia Lo and Lu Wang

Consumption research in geography has gone through two distinct phases. Before the 1980s, the focus was on the behavioral aspect of consumption and the spatial regularities of retailing. Neoclassical economics provided much of the theoretical backdrop and modeling characterized the spatial science approach to consumption. With the end of the quantitative revolution and fueled by an explosion of consumption studies in sociology and anthropology, much geographical inquiry on consumption since the 1980s has followed the “cultural” turn; location analysis and behavioral modeling gave way to emphasis on identity, representation, and meaning. This shift created a dramatic divide in the conceptualization (economic behavior vs. cultural/social experience), theoretical underpinnings (neoclassical economics vs. social/cultural theories), and methodological approaches (quantitative modeling vs. qualitative interpretations) of consumption. As Barnes said, the newer cultural approach is “concerned with reconceiving the consumer as an actor by moving away from the (older economic) models of rational utility maximization ... (to) allow a cultural sensitivity in understanding the nature of the goods consumed ... and the (meanings of) places in which they are bought” (2003:194).

In essence, consumption exemplifies the ongoing dialogue between economy and culture (Sayer 1997; Thrift 2000). It represents the “site on which culture and economy most dramatically converge” (Slater 2003:149). In practice, the socio-cultural has overshadowed the economic in the geographical literature on consumption in

L. Lo (✉)

Department of Geography, York University, Toronto, Canada
e-mail: lucialo@yorku.ca

L. Wang

Department of Geography, Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada
e-mail: luwang@ryerson.ca

the past two decades (for example, Appadurai 1996; Bourdieu 1984; Featherstone 1991; Miller 1998; Slater 1997; William et al. 2001). After repeated calls for a convergence of the two in the discipline (Jackson 2002; Barnes 2003), Jackson et al. (2006) and Clarke et al. (2006) provide a possible direction that geographical research on consumption can take to address related theoretical, conceptual and methodological differences. An approach combining traditional quantitative techniques with focus on the economic nature of consumption and the recent qualitative work that reveals consumers' lived experience not only converge the economy and culture but somehow transcend the dualism, suggesting the inseparability of the two spheres in any sort of consumption and shopping practice.

In addition to the neoclassical economic approach, there are three related strands of literature that are relevant in addressing the cultural-economic dualism in consumption. The commodity chain approach, in linking the production and consumption spheres, places shopping as part of a larger socio-economic system (Hartwick 1998, 2000). The literature on shopping malls focuses on the commodification of reality, and argues that shopping centers are both luminal and manipulative (Goss 1993) as they provoke imaginations and invoke meanings and representations. There is also a recent and growing body of work on how ethnicity drives urban production and consumption especially in the case of the Chinese (for example, Zhou 1998; Li et al. 2002; Wang 2004; Hackworth and Rekers 2005; Hamlett et al. 2008; Kaplan and Li 2007; Wang and Lo 2007a, b; Wang et al. 2008; Lo 2009). The growth of ethnic economies changes commercial landscapes and the way immigrants shop.

In this context, this paper examines the consumer choice behavior of Chinese immigrants in Toronto, Canada, a multicultural society where different ethnic groups are encouraged to maintain their heritage instead of assimilating into "mainstream" norms (Jackson 2000), and where ethnic entrepreneurial activities, some in response to ethnic demand, produce a new urban retail landscape (Wang 1999, 2003). It provides a hybrid view on consumption and grounds the ongoing debates on the sociocultural embeddedness of economic action. Marketing is one of the few disciplines that have connected theories on culture and ethnicity to theories of consumer choice, yet it focuses primarily on how ethnicity drives purchasing behavior (Donthu and Cherian 1992, 1994; Venkatesh 1995; Hui et al. 1998; Rossiter and Chan 1998; Laroche et al. 1998; Chung and Fischer 1999) and how acculturation/assimilation impacts consumption practices (Webster 1994; Lee and Tse 1994; D'Rozario and Choudhury 2000; Eastlick and Lotz 2000; Chankon et al. 2001). Geographical research on ethnic consumer behavior is scarce until recent contributions from Wang (2004), Wang and Lo (2007a, b), and Lo (2009).

Using a mixed method approach that combines focus group discussions, field visits, and a questionnaire survey, this paper explores the complex relations between ethnic identity and economic rationality in immigrants' choice of shopping venues. The relative importance of the cultural to the economic, and vice versa, rests on the discursive context in which the consumption practice takes place. Echoing Jackson and Holbrook's (1995) study on shopping and the cultural politics of identity, this study shows that for Chinese immigrants, shopping for certain products and services is filled with socio-cultural meanings. Paralleling the work of Gregson

et al. (2002) on shopping, space, and practice, we also find ethnic shopping places are important social spaces for many immigrants who are also co-actors in producing the unique ethnic retail environments.

6.1 Scholarly Context

6.1.1 *The Culture-Economy Dialectic*

As a result of the paradigm shift from the spatial economic tradition to the socio-cultural approach, research on the geography of consumption has evolved from an under-socialized tradition centering upon neoclassical economic principles to a new cultural approach “grounded in meaning, identity, representation and ideology” (Gregson 1995:139).

Before the cultural turn, studies of consumer spatial behavior often went hand in hand with normative retail location analysis. With neoclassical economic underpinnings, consumers are viewed as rational agents who consciously calculate and maximize utility that is constrained by travel cost, purchase cost, and other measurable economic or spatial criteria. Spatial interaction models and discrete choice models assume the neoclassical mode of reasoning (Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985; McFadden 1976; Niedercorn and Bechdolt 1970). As Barnes (2005) points out, the quantitative approaches employed by economic geographers in those days remove any trace of culture from the studies because of their incapability of writing culture into an equation. As a result, consumption was largely conceptualized as an economic activity with space functioning as a major economic factor.

The more recent literature (Appadurai 1996; Bourdieu 1984; Featherstone 1991; Miller 1998; Slater 1997; William et al. 2001) views consumption mostly as a socio-cultural phenomenon. “Meanings of things are placed on the center stage of analyses of consumption as an aspect of cultural reproduction” (Slater 2003:152–153). This view is in stark contrast to the spatial science approach that focuses on the economic nature of consumption and emphasizes rational behavior. Consumption is seen as not just “an isolated and monetary act of purchase,” but a “social process whereby people relate to goods and artifacts in complex ways” (Jackson and Holbrook 1995:1914), echoing the social-embeddedness view of economic action in economic sociology (Granovetter 1985; Swedberg and Granovetter 2001). The choice of shopping venues is thought to be based on “questions of image and identity rather than narrow economically driven criteria” (Crewe 2003:227). Scholars draw upon disciplinary theories in literary criticism, sociology, anthropology and even film studies to stress the negotiated nature of consumption and its importance in the construction of identity and meanings associated with various consumption sites.

A clear gap exists between the two perspectives and few have expressed interest in combining them to examine the geography of consumption and shopping.

Under the current cultural views, consumption is conceptualized more as a socially and culturally embedded economic activity, and less as an economically bounded socio-cultural experience despite the fact that any shopping incurs travel and expenditure, and economic considerations are still valid (Wang and Lo 2007b). On the supply side of retail geographies, Wrigley and Lowe (1996) suggest taking both the economic and the cultural seriously, and combining “an exploration of the economic structures of retail capital with an analysis of the cultural logic of retailing.” However, on the consumption side, there has been little evidence of a true convergence of economic processes and cultural logic (Jackson 2002). Seeing the over-powering dominance of cultural and social perspectives in economic geography, Sayer (1997:16) advocates a renewed interest in the “economic” and encourages “attempts to combine economic and cultural interests rather than largely abandoning or diluting the former”. In a wider disciplinary context, although we see more frequently that economic geographers are active in regaining interests in the economy (Barnes 2001; Rodrigues-Pose 2001; Yeung 2001), social and cultural geographers are also pleading not to neglect economic issues and processes (McDowell 2000). Even Daniel Miller, who primarily engages a cultural anthropological perspective in his influential work on shopping, observes from his ethnographic work the “strategies by which shoppers attempt to save money while shopping” (Miller 1998:6). Putting all these together, it suggests a need to re-evaluate the over-socialized/culturalized view of consumption and re-establish the role of the economic in understanding the complex and contested nature of consumption.

6.1.2 Production of Ethnic Shopping Spaces

Geographic research on consumption pays scant attention to culturally distinct groups despite attention on class, age and gender as influential factors. Murdie (1965) and Fotheringham and Trew (1993), and more recently, Wang (2004), Wang and Lo (2007b), Hamlett et al. (2008) and Lo (2009), remain the few that explore the shopping behavior of ethnic groups. In marketing, studies on ethnic consumers, heavily grounded in the social theories of ethnicity (Costa and Bamossy 1995), are centered on how ethnicity drives consumption. They are largely influenced by two distinct views on ethnicity – ethnicity as primordial and given, and ethnicity as socially constructed (Jenkins 1996; Yang 2000). Cross-cultural studies comparing the consumption patterns among different ethnic groups allude to the primordial view of ethnicity that is defined by static demographic classification based on last name, origin, race, language, or religion (Geertz 1973; Van den Berghe 1981). Of course, speaking of the Hispanic or any other culture monolithically obscures the important differences that may exist within each of these externally-assigned groups and the differences in members’ attachment to the group (Chung and Fischer 1999; Wang 2004). Thus others view ethnicity as constructed, multi-faceted, dynamic and situational, with various consumption patterns due to differential allegiances to the

ethnic group (Sollars 1989; Nagel 1994). This view of ethnicity is based on the concept of ethnic identity. Fluid and developmental, ethnic identity measures an individual's association or dissociation from his/her ethnic group, or retention or loss of aspects of his/her culture of origin. Terms such as "Chineseness" or "Cubanness" are expressions of ethnic identity. Methods developed to measure ethnic identity, either using self-assessment or incorporating multiple dimensions of ethnicity such as language and social interaction (Chung and Fischer 1999; Laroche et al. 1998), inform this study that seeks to build the ethnic factor into the traditional geographic model on consumer behavior.

The geographic work on commodity chains provides another interesting backdrop for the study. The notion of commodity chains is central to linking the various actors – producers and consumers in particular – involved in the capitalist production process (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994; Hartwick 1998, 2000; Coe et al. 2007). With various versions and different directions of flow, a commodity chain typically links production, processing, marketing, and the terminal node of consumption, along the transportation network. While traditional economic geography focuses more on the production side (e.g., firms, manufacturing sector, industrial clusters and districts), recent years have seen, as discussed earlier, increasingly more work on the cultural side of consumption. The commodity chain perspective contributes to bridging the gap between economic geography and cultural geography by bringing the production and consumption into one framework (Dicken 1998; Friedland 2001; Leslie and Reimer 1999). While this study does not aim to trace the specifics at the point of production (for example, goods originated in China and sold in Chinese supermarkets in Canada), we found it informative to recognize how a simple China-made product has acquired meanings while traveling through the commodity chain and before being consumed by an ordinary Chinese immigrant in Toronto. Particularly, we are interested in revealing, in the latter half of the commodity chain, how marketing helps create an appealing ethnic shopping environment. In an earlier paper, we noticed the "Chinese" way of processing and presenting products (e.g., live fish in tanks) in Toronto's Chinese supermarkets (Wang and Lo 2007b). We argue here that it is in the latter half of the commodity chain that products become even more cultural due to packaging, marketing and presentation strategies. This includes products that are technically non-cultural. As an example, when a Chinese supermarket in Toronto stocks Lipton tea bags in boxes displaying *lip ton hung chai* in Chinese, the product takes on a different meaning from a similar color-wise and size-wise Lipton box without the Chinese characters. The former, commonly on display in supermarkets in Hong Kong, elicits among Chinese immigrant consumers meanings subconsciously intended by the supermarkets. Products of this nature carry socio-psychological meanings and produce nostalgia of the homeland.

The magic of commodities is in a way similar to the magic of the mall discussed by Goss (1993). Ethnic shopping places are signifiers of social relations and extend beyond their immediate function of selling commodities and acting as an economic space. Their floor layout, store design, product origins and display, as well as organized activities, communicate specific meanings and trigger certain imaginations.

Gregson et al. (2002) argues that shopping spaces are constituted by shoppers and made sense of through their shopping practices. Ethnicity in the commercial world is now seen as instrumental to the reproduction of cultural differences that sell and ethnicity can be commoditized or fashioned when the product moves along the commodity chain (Dwyer and Jackson 2003). In this paper we are interested in finding out how immigrant consumers who shop at Chinese stores and Chinese malls help co-produce, along with other agents such as mall developers and ethnic entrepreneurs, a unique ethnic shopping space through browsing and mingling with co-ethnics. In this regard, meanings are created and added to the consumption space where shopping activities occur, which means that the commodity chain does not necessarily end at the consumers who contribute to producing the “commercial spaces of multicultural” (Dwyer and Crang 2002).

Therefore, we suggest a hybrid approach to combine traditional economic and recent socio-cultural ways to examine the geography of consumption in a multicultural context. This approach brings together several different streams of scholarship into one framework – the consumption modeling literature, the literature on ethnicity and ethnic identity, the commodity chain literature and the literature on the cultural logic of consumption. It considers the socio-cultural embeddedness of immigrant shopping behavior and cultural identities of ethnic retail spaces, and suggests that economic considerations remain important in shaping immigrant shopping practices.

6.2 Retail Opportunity Structure Facing Chinese Immigrants in Toronto

Recent trends in international migration have made ethnicity an especially salient feature in our economy. The presence of a diverse population, accompanied by a whole range of ethnoracial social, economic, and religious institutions, transforms the production and consumption of urban spaces, as evidenced by numerous work on place making (e.g., Dunn and Roberts 2006; Hackworth and Rekers 2005), new forms of ethnic economy (e.g., Zhou 1998; Li et al. 2002; Lo 2006; Lo and Wang 2007), new ethnic retail formats (Wang 2004), and planning conflicts due to ethnoracial differences (e.g., Preston and Lo 2000, 2009).

In Canada, the Chinese have been the largest immigrant group since 1987. Over one million in number, they are now Canada’s largest visible minority (i.e., non-white) group. Over 40% of them live in Toronto. In 2006, ethnic Chinese accounted for 10.6% of the Toronto metropolitan area’s population, up from 6.0% in 1991. This growth represents a substantial market for businesses to penetrate.

Due to the emphasis of Canadian immigration policy on vocational and entrepreneurial skills, recent Chinese immigrants were generally of middle-class background in their origins. Many settled in the suburbs right after immigrating to Canada (Lo and Wang 1997). Compared to those living in the old inner-city Chinatowns, newcomers to the suburbs are better educated and more proficient in

the official language, and they generally have higher purchasing power. Unlike early Chinese immigrants, they have no problem accessing the numerous non-Chinese-owned and -operated businesses in their environs.

At the same time, the influx of Chinese immigrants to Toronto in the last two decades has led to the development of one of the largest and most institutionally complete Chinese ethnic economies outside Asia (Preston et al. 2003). The conventional view of ethnic businesses as small-scale operations offering a limited array of low- and mid-order goods and services no longer applies. Toronto's Chinese ethnic economy provides a full array of goods and services one would expect from the larger Toronto economy (Lo and Wang 2007). The rapid development and diversification of Chinese businesses is also reflected in the more than 60 Chinese shopping malls/plazas in Toronto. These Chinese malls and plazas are host to a large number of Chinese-owned and -operated businesses, including electronic stores, restaurants, supermarkets, doctor's offices, travel agencies, bookstores, gift shops, high-end jewelers, video stores, game arcades, clothing boutiques, beauty salons and spas. For example, the Pacific Mall and Market Village shopping complex contains over 400 stores on a floor area of 500,000 square feet. It functions like a regional shopping center for the Chinese (Wang 1999, 2003). These Chinese shopping centers represent culturally-distinct spaces that can be easily distinguished from the mainstream ones in terms of merchandise mix, brand names, service language, and the ethnicity of owners, employees, and consumers. In addition, a survey of the Chinese business directories in 1997 finds almost 6,000 listings in the greater Toronto area; among them are 145 supermarkets (plus another 27 stores selling either seafood, meat, produce or fruit), 88 bakeries, 547 restaurants, 83 electronic stores, 141 travel agencies, and 223 family physicians and dentists (Lo 1999). With so many Chinese-owned and -operated businesses catering primarily to their co-ethnic population, Chinese immigrants are offered the privilege of being choosy between their own ethnic economy and the economy at large.

In this study, we choose supermarkets, electronic stores, and travel agencies as examples to explore how Chinese immigrants choose between co-ethnic businesses and others. The underlying assumption is that Chinese establishments (i.e., supermarkets, electronic stores and travel agencies in our study) compete with mainstream¹ chain stores. Two points are worth mentioning. First, many Chinese stores carry not only the product mix available in the mainstream stores but also product brands commonly sold in China, Hong Kong or Taiwan. Second, the Chinese supermarkets, electronic stores and travel agencies are generally smaller than their counterparts in the larger economy.

¹ Although one could argue that the boundary between ethnic businesses and mainstream businesses is not always sharp, ethnic stores especially enclave-type stores generally target at a co-ethnic niche market whereas mainstream businesses are prepared to serve everyone.

6.3 Methodology

Data collection for this study began in 2001/2002. We combined focus groups, field visits, and questionnaire survey to examine the consumption choices of Chinese immigrants. The focus groups explored the Chinese immigrants' experiences with Chinese shopping spaces and their likes and dislikes of the stores in those spaces; the field visits observed characteristics of Chinese shopping places such as store size and store layout; the questionnaire survey provided detailed quantitative information regarding the relative patronization of Chinese and other shopping places.

The use of focus groups has been informative in some recent geographical investigations of consumption and retailing (Jackson and Holbrook 1995; Wrigley 2002; Wrigley et al. 2004). It is efficient in revealing respondents' attitudes, feelings, experiences and reactions. In our study, two focus groups were conducted prior to the questionnaire survey. Participants were recruited through snowball sampling and advertising in a website that serves the Chinese population in Toronto. We found that sharing the same ethnic background with the participants to be an enabling agent in this study. Apart from being able to explain in Chinese the purpose of the discussions, we helped the participants feel at ease and thereby interact more spontaneously.

The questionnaire survey explored the shopping habits of a random sample of Chinese immigrants residing in two contrasting neighborhoods in the City of Toronto. As Fig. 6.1 illustrates with the example of supermarkets, the Scarborough study area has a very high concentration of Chinese immigrants and Chinese




Fig. 6.1 Study areas

businesses, whereas the North York study area has a fairly heavy concentration of Chinese immigrants but sparse Chinese shopping opportunities. The clustering of Chinese in these two areas ensures two substantial ethnic markets, and different densities of Chinese establishments indicate different degrees of accessibility to ethnic businesses. The fairly small size of the two study areas ensures similar opportunity sets facing consumers in a study area. The survey focused on immigrants from mainland China and Hong Kong as they represent the two largest Chinese subgroups in Toronto.

A total of 317 Chinese immigrants provided detailed accounts of their shopping behavior and consumption habits, including items they typically purchased, the frequency of visiting Chinese and mainstream businesses, and the names and locations of these businesses. Apart from the respondent's socio-economic characteristics such as household income, age and length of residence in a western society,² the survey also explored the individual's affiliation to the Chinese ethnic group. The sample is evenly distributed between the two study areas, each having about the same number of Hong Kong Chinese and mainland Chinese immigrants. Subsequent to the questionnaire survey, Chinese stores mentioned by the respondents were visited to gain a full understanding of the characteristics of Chinese shopping places. For example, all the supermarkets mentioned were visited and their store size was measured.

These methods complement each other. While the qualitative information from the focus groups enables an in-depth understanding of consumer experience, attitudes and observations, the quantitative data from the survey and store visits reveals consumption patterns across a relatively large sample. In what follows, we highlight some findings from the focus groups before presenting the results of the questionnaire survey.

6.4 Themes from Focus Groups

6.4.1 *Ethnic Economy and Immigrant Adaptation*

Although differing in length of residence in Canada, residential location, age, employment status and other socioeconomic characteristics, the participants in our focus groups generally expressed a favorable attitude towards the growing Chinese ethnic economy in Toronto. The multicultural business environment was regarded as a desirable aspect of the city in which they chose to settle. Most participants preferred

² A longer length of residence in the west (i.e., North American and European countries) likely brings changes to the consumer behavior of Chinese. Length of residence in the west is a better indicator than the length of residence in Canada, as some respondents stayed in the U.S.A. or Europe before immigrating to Canada.

Chinese business to “Western businesses”, a phrase commonly used by the Chinese immigrants in reference to Canadian “mainstream” businesses. Several times in each focus group, the discussion turned to a short exchange among the participants on where to get, for example, the best travel deals. This phenomenon suggests the positive role of an ethnic economy in an immigrant’s adaptation in a receiving society (Light and Gold 2000; Waldinger 1995; Waldinger et al. 1990).

6.4.2 Meanings of Immigrant Consumption and Ethnic Consumption Spaces

Our focus groups revealed important socio-cultural dimensions of immigrant shopping activities. Even the most ordinary household provisioning – grocery shopping – was practiced with some social-cultural significance (Wang and Lo 2007b). A participant named Lin mentioned that she liked to browse and window-shop in Chinese supermarkets: “I go to Chinese stores and I try different ones and compare which one got new stuff from China, like spicy sauces from Sichuan (province) ... You know, I am from Sichuan. Sometimes I don’t buy and just go and look around what they have in there. It’s fun.”

For Lin, an ordinary can of China-made spicy sauce carries additional cultural meaning as it reminds her of her hometown in China and her pre-migration life. Echoing Dwyer and Jackson’s (2003) commodity-chain analysis of the fashion industry, Lin’s account indicates that the meaning of a grocery item is also shaped and reproduced while it travels from the manufacturer in China to a Chinese supermarket in Toronto. Also mentioned in the focus groups are a number of familiar ways that grocery items are processed and/or displayed in Chinese supermarkets: live fish in a large water tank, whole chicken with head and feet intact, different cuts of pork including such parts as liver and shoulder blade and so on. These grocery items are considered very “Chinese,” unlike what one participant said about the meat from Food Basic (a Canadian supermarket). She complained that the meat cuts from Food Basic were “strange” and she did not know how to cook the meat she got from there.

To many participants and their friends and families, Chinese supermarkets also act as social and cultural spaces. Lin was nostalgic about her hometown in China while grocery shopping in a Chinese supermarket. She constructed an “imagined” space in the store. For others, especially seniors who often have a relatively narrow social circle and are less mobile, Chinese supermarkets are amenable social environments. Mr. Ma’s in-laws, although “not speaking a single word of English”, can get out “by themselves” and go to Chinese supermarkets where “they can browse Chinese products and meet other Chinese seniors in the store.” The social use of Chinese supermarkets indicates that immigrants are not only consumers in ethnic shopping spaces but co-actors in producing the unique ethnic retail environment.

As for using travel agencies, most participants, like Liu, preferred Chinese agencies. The reasons identified include “price” and “culturally customized services”. The latter refers to the availability of Chinese tour guides and Chinese members in the group, better package tours, and customized vacation itineraries that support the

culturally specific travel habits of many Chinese, such as the desire to “see as many places as possible instead of lying on the beach in one place for days”:

Liu We always use Chinese travel agencies like Safeway Travel and Four Season Travel.

Moderator For going back to China?

Liu Not really. We went to Europe and the States for our vacation ... The price was good and they took people to Chinese restaurants [smile] and places we [Chinese] are interested in.³

A few did not like to have tour guides and pre-planned itineraries that are typical of trips organized by Chinese travel agencies. Unlike Liu, they turned to non-Chinese travel agencies that booked their flights and accommodation only. These are the individuals who tend to have a longer stay in Canada and have a higher socio-economic status.

6.4.3 Interplay Between Culture and Economy in Store Choice

Sayer (1997) and Thrift (2000) have pointed out the inseparability between the economic and the cultural in consumption. It was interesting to notice how our focus group participants made trade-offs between culture and economy in choosing shopping destinations. For example, the overwhelming preference for Chinese supermarkets indicates the importance of ethnicity and culture; the desire to get “meat with certain cuts,” “live fish and crabs,” or “chicken with head intact” seems to outweigh the travel effort to get to Chinese supermarkets that are farther away than the neighborhood supermarket.

In the case of shopping for electronics, the picture is somewhat different. Chinese electronic stores⁴ did not have a market share as big as Chinese supermarkets or Chinese travel agencies. They influence consumer decision in different ways. The Chinese electronic stores in Toronto are smaller in size than the mainstream big box retailers such as Future Shop and Best Buy – the largest two electronic retail chains in Canada. Yet they typically carry high-end Japanese products such as high definition televisions and digital cameras as a response to the desire of immigrants from Hong Kong and China who embrace “going for the highest-end product”, a shopping habit developed long before moving to Canada. They usually do not have

³ The extracts are from the conversations. ... represent words omitted and [...] are added by the authors for clarification purpose.

⁴ Compared to Chinese supermarkets and travel agencies, the number of Chinese electronic stores is smaller. Their corner-store-like size is in sharp contrast to big boxes like Best Buy. However, with the aid of packed display and using extra high shelves for storage, many Chinese electronic stores are able to achieve some spatial efficacy to overcome their small size and carry a wide selection of products from the newest models of plasma TV and digital cameras to small appliances like Japanese-made rice cookers.

refund or exchange policies. For those few who shopped at Chinese electronic stores, they were attracted by “lower prices,” “the room for negotiation,” and “models ... not available in places like Future Shop.” For others, although “mainstream” stores may not offer all the products and brands they are interested in, they chose them for better after-sale service. Some even saw Chinese electronic stores as brokers who “helped” them get a good deal at mainstream stores.

Wen We got a rear-projection TV from Future Shop. Before we bought it, we went to Golden Electronics (a Chinese electronic chain in Toronto) because we know they usually have good prices.

Moderator Why didn't you just buy from Golden Electronics?

Wen Well, Future Shop has better refund policies. Chinese stores only give manufacturer warranty and we cannot return [the TV] for sure if we don't like it.

Moderator Do you have to pay more in Future Shop?

Wen Not really. [Smile] Future Shop has price match. We told them Golden Electronics has a better deal, they immediately know whom we are talking about and asked how much we saw at Golden Electronics. They didn't even call them to check and offered us the same price. And we took it!

The focus groups suggest the importance of ethnicity and culture in immigrant shopping behavior. The observations help address some of our theoretical concerns about the interplay between culture and economy in immigrant shopping practices. The following modeling approach confirms these focus group findings.

6.5 A Logistic Regression Approach to Chinese Immigrant Consumer Behavior

The information obtained from the questionnaire survey allowed us to model immigrant shopping behavior and assess the relative importance of ethnicity/culture and economic rationality when Chinese immigrants chose between Chinese and mainstream businesses. We estimated three logistic regression models, respectively on grocery shopping, the use of travel services, and shopping for electronic products. Chinese ethnic identity was measured on the recognition of its multi-faceted nature and incorporated into the model in order to assess how ethnicity interplays with economic variables (i.e., distance and income) used in traditional consumption models.

6.5.1 *Dependent and Independent Variables*

In all the three models, “preference for Chinese businesses” is the dependent variable. This preference is inferred from a revelation of past major grocery shopping trip, experience of using travel agencies within the last 3 years, and experience of purchasing electronic items such as a TV, VCR, DVD player, computer, CD or MD

(mini disc) player, and small kitchen appliances. If an individual patronized Chinese businesses for the good/service more often than mainstream businesses, a “strong preference” for Chinese businesses is derived; if less often, a “weak preference” is defined. If the frequency of visiting Chinese businesses is the same as that of visiting mainstream businesses, an “equal preference” is assigned. Thus, the dependent variable is a polytomous variable with three categories – strong, weak and equal preference.

Independent variables include the strength of Chinese ethnic identity, length of residence in a western society, income, age, education, immigration origin, and perceived store attributes. In modeling grocery shopping, accessibility was included as an additional variable as the traditional geographical theory on consumption suggests spatial separation a decisive factor in shopping for low-order goods such as groceries. Association analyses (i.e., Pearson correlation, ANOVA, and Chi-square test) were conducted among the independent variables before the modeling efforts. Generally speaking, the correlations are weak and any bias due to multicollinearities deems low. To ensure that including all these variables in the logistic regression does not create bias, and one variable does not mask errors of others, some post hoc analyses were conducted after the modeling exercise. The *post hoc* analyses removed from the model the most significant variable associated with others. The results were similar. This observation confirms that bias due to multicollinearity is low, and the results truly reflect the relative importance of the explanatory variables.

Here we briefly explain how ethnic identity and geographical accessibility were measured in this study (see Wang (2004) and Wang and Lo (2007b) for detailed explanations). Our measurement of ethnic identity rests on a multidimensional conceptualization proposed by Christian et al. (1976) and Phinney (2003), and empirical measures Phinney (1992, 2000) used for a range of ethnic groups. We identified four important dimensions of Chinese ethnic identity: (a) views on Chinese culture, traditions and customs; (b) social interaction and participation within Chinese settings; (c) the use of Chinese language at work, with family, and with friends; and (d) the use of Chinese media versus mainstream media. These four dimensions were explored through 16 Likert-type questions. The Cronbach Alpha for the 16-item measure was an acceptable high of 0.73, indicating that the measure is internally consistent and each question assesses the sense of being Chinese from a different angle. A simple additive weighting method (Chung and Fischer 1999; Donthu and Cherian 1994) was used to yield an ethnic identity score for each respondent. The score was then included in the models as an independent variable.

In terms of accessibility, we constructed a “relative accessibility index” (6.1) to calculate the relative ease of visiting Chinese supermarkets, as compared to mainstream locations.

$$RA_c = A_c / A_m, \text{ where } A = \sum_j W_j f(d_{ij}) \quad (6.1)$$

In Eq. 6.1, RA_c is the relative individual accessibility to Chinese supermarkets, and A_c and A_m respectively measure the accessibility to Chinese and mainstream supermarkets. The gravity-type measure was used to calculate individual accessibilities

(A_c and A_m). Store attractiveness, W_j , was measured by store floor space. Using the Shortest Network Algorithm in ArcGIS, spatial separation, d_{ij} , was represented by auto travel time along the road network, taking into consideration different speed limits. For the impedance function in Eq. 6.1, we chose the Gaussian measure ($f(d_{ij}) = \exp(-d_{ij}^2 / \nu)$). Borrowed from Kwan (1998), the parameter ($\nu=180$) indicates that the probability of a consumer selecting a supermarket beyond 20-min driving time is slim. This is consistent with the maximum distance threshold (20-min driving time) for grocery shopping used by Openshaw (1975, cited in Fotheringham 1988).

6.5.2 The Models

The categorical nature of the dependent variable suggests logistic regression be used. In the grocery and electronics models, the dependent variable contains three categories of preference and multinomial logistic regression was used. In the travel model, due to the extremely uneven split of the sample, equal and weak preferences were merged to produce only two categories of preference, and a binary logistic model was estimated and step-wise regression was used to reveal how the introduction of each variable impacts the model.

In the grocery and electronics models (Tables 6.1 and 6.2), “strong preference” serves as the reference group for the calculation of the odds ratio. The modeling module in SPSS produced two non-redundant logits – g_1 and g_2 , each comparing a preference type to “strong preference”, and each having a set of nonzero coefficients. In the travel model (Table 6.3), the combined “weak” and “equal” preference category serves as the reference group. One logit was calculated and its coefficient is denoted by β .

Tables 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 report the estimated models. All coefficients have the expected signs. The results suggest a distinction between the electronics model and the other two models. In the grocery and travel models, a strong preference is strongly associated with stronger Chinese ethnic identity; modestly but significantly associated with better accessibility, older age and lower household income in grocery shopping, and with older age and Hong Kong origin in using travel agencies. In the electronics model (Table 6.2), the most significant explanatory variable is price. A modest but significant relation exists between preference and ethnic identity. Income is also significant.

Generally speaking, ethnic identity – the degree of allegiance to the Chinese group – is a consistently important factor that explains the various preferences for Chinese businesses. Mathematically, in grocery shopping, a one-unit increase in the ethnic identity score significantly enhances the odds of having a “strong preference” to a “weak preference” by 1.05 [$\exp(0.046)$], and the odds of having a “strong preference” rather than an “equal preference” by 1.03 [$\exp(0.028)$]. The domination of ethnic identity as the most significant variable is particularly evident in the travel model in Table 6.3.

Table 6.1 Results of the grocery model (N=211)

	g_1 : weak vs. strong		g_2 : equal vs. strong	
	β	Exp(β)	β	Exp(β)
Intercept	5.661**		6.787**	
Ethnic identification	-.046**	.955	-.028**	.972
Years in the West	-.001	.999	.007	1.007
Product variety	-.186	.831	-.055	.946
Price	-.163	.849	-.088	.916
Store environment	.090	.914	-.032	1.032
Relative accessibility	-.011*	.989	-.051*	.950
Household income = below \$50,000	-1.585*	.205	-.405	.667
Household income = \$50,000–\$90,000	-1.285	.277	-.907	.404
Household income = more than \$90,000	0 ^a	.	0 ^a	.
Education = less than bachelor	.688	1.990	.093	1.098
Education = bachelor and above	0 ^a	.	0 ^a	.
Age = below 30	1.897**	6.665	.158	1.171
Age = 30–40	.470	1.600	.400	1.492
Age = more than 40	0 ^a	.	0 ^a	.
Origin = Hong Kong	.191	1.210	.039	1.040
Origin = China	0 ^a	.	0 ^a	.

Model fitting information: 2 Log likelihood = 308.971
 Chi-Square = 34.683. Degrees of freedom = 24. Sig. = .073

** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

^aThis parameter is set to zero because it is redundant

Table 6.2 Results of the electronics model (N=177)

	g_1 : weak vs. strong		g_2 : equal vs. strong	
	β	Exp(β)	β	Exp(β)
Intercept	1.545		-2.323	
Ethnic identification	-.027*	.973	.003	1.003
Years in the West	.017	1.017	-.037	.963
Mainstream store service	.056	1.052	.302	1.352
Mainstream store price	.723**	2.061	.412	1.510
Education = less than bachelor	-.551	.576	-.484	.617
Education = bachelor and above	0 ^a	.	0 ^a	.
Age = below 30	-.708	.493	-.695	.499
Age = 30–40	-.257	.773	-.425	.654
Age = more than 40	0 ^a	.	0 ^a	.
Household income = below \$50,000	-.864*	.421	-.643	.526
Household income = more than \$90,000	-1.200**	.301	-.772	.462
Household income = \$50,000–90,000	0 ^a	.	0 ^a	.
Origin = Hong Kong	-.624	.536	.108	1.114
Origin = China	0 ^a	.	0 ^a	.

Model fitting information: 2 Log likelihood = 333.010
 Chi-Square = 35.116. Degrees of freedom = 20. Sig. = .019

** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

^aThis parameter is set to zero because it is redundant

Table 6.3 Results of the travel model (N = 186)

	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 4	Step 5	Step 6	Step 7	Step 8
Intercept	3.113**	-2.245	-2.282	-1.459	-1.911	-1.870	-1.891	-3.171
Years in the West	-.061**	-.029	-.033	-.055	-.054	-.053	-.052	-.128**
Ethnic identification		.054**	.050**	.053**	.054**	.055**	.054**	.069**
Education = less than bachelor			1.044*	.804	.837	.824	.795	-.128
Education = bachelor and above			0 ^a	0 ^a	0 ^a	0 ^a	0 ^a	0 ^a
Age = below 30				-.202	-.187	-.186	-.195	.374
Age = 30–40				-1.334	-1.323	-1.313*	-1.319*	-1.431*
Age = more than 40				0 ^a	0 ^a	0 ^a	0 ^a	0 ^a
Household Income = below \$50,000					.143	.135	.088	-.147
Household Income = \$50,000–\$90,000					.790	.793	.783	.589
Household income = more than \$90,000					0 ^a	0 ^a	0 ^a	0 ^a
Price factor = yes						-.094	-.059	.279
Price factor = no						0 ^a	0 ^a	0 ^a
Service factor = yes							.185	.439
Service factor = no								0 ^a
Origin = Hong Kong								2.368**
Origin = China								0 ^a
Model Chi-Square	3.993**	11.141**	14.198**	18.528**	19.706**	19.728**	19.797**	26.800**
Degrees of freedom	1	2	3	5	7	8	9	

** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

^aThis parameter is set to zero because it is redundant

It is particularly interesting to note how Chinese ethnic identity compares with other factors. In the process of choosing a supermarket and a travel agency, ethnic identity is a decisive factor that outweighs economic rationality represented by price, income, and geographic accessibility. This observation contradicts the neoclassical view that the economy is a primary consideration in consumer decision-making. That respondents from the North York study area travelled a long distance for groceries also challenges the traditional geographical view on grocery shopping as a local activity.

The electronics model however reveals a different picture. Price outweighs ethnic identity although ethnic identity is still significant. The higher the price level, the weaker the preference for Chinese stores. Two explanations are obvious. On the one hand, for higher order goods such as electronics, economic factors may matter more than cultural reasons in the choice of shopping venues. As expressed by some of our focus group participants, mainstream electronic stores provide “better refund policy” although they offer mostly “mainstream brands” (meaning brands unheard of in their country of origin, or non-international brands) and charge “a higher price.” On the other hand, unlike grocery or travel, electronic products bear fewer cultural meanings. Except for brand recognition which is a “class” thing, electronic products are more universal; a local North American RCA TV from Future Shop functions in the same way as an internationally known Sony from a Chinese store. However, the interaction between buyers and providers can be culturally significant. This explains why ethnic identity is still significant

Finally, the effects of other demographic variables vary. Regarding the age factor, those below 30 are more likely to display a weak preference compared to people over 40, possibly indicating that young Chinese immigrants are more receptive to Western styles of food and travel or care less about traditional methods of preparing Chinese dishes or having a Chinese tour guide and going for Chinese food while touring places. Lower-income groups are more likely to have a strong preference for Chinese supermarkets. This may have to do with the fact that Chinese supermarkets generally offer lower prices, although the impact of price as well as other store attributes is considered insignificant. Compared to mainland Chinese immigrants, Hong Kong Chinese immigrants are more likely to prefer Chinese travel agencies. This is probably due to the fact that at the time of the survey, there were more Hong Kong Chinese owned and operated travel agencies in Toronto and there were fewer tour guides speaking Mandarin – the Chinese dialect spoken by most mainlanders. This says that language is particularly important in service consumption.

6.6 Final Remarks

Our main purpose in this chapter is to bring together a diverse range of methodologies to examine the geography of consumption. By including the traditional neoclassic economic and the more recent socio-cultural approaches, we hope to add knowledge of the geography of consumption. Using the Chinese immigrants in

Toronto as a case study, we explored how immigrants choose between ethnic consumption spaces and mainstream venues in three consumption areas – grocery, electronics, and travel agency. The mixed-method approach allows us to obtain both qualitative and quantitative information. We focused our attention on the interplay between Chinese ethnic identity and economic rationality in the choice of shopping venues, in order to address our theoretical concern about the socio-cultural embeddedness of immigrant consumption.

Our analyses suggest that ethnic identity is a crucial factor in immigrant shopping decision making: the stronger the Chinese ethnic identity, the greater the preference for Chinese ethnic businesses. Recognizing the socially constructed nature of identity, we did not treat ethnic identity a simple binary. Rather, it is conceptualized as a multidimensional construct that reflects critical aspects in an individual's psychological and behavioral processes in understanding self-group relationship. In the logistic model, the Chinese ethnic identity was measured along four dimensions; a closer tie with Chinese culture and traditions, more frequent socialization with co-ethnics, more frequent use of Chinese language, a preference for Chinese media over non-Chinese media collectively lead to a stronger preference for Chinese retailers and service providers. The inclusion of a composite ethnicity measure based on a complex 16-item scale is a useful way of bridging the quantitative-qualitative divide characteristic of the traditional economic modeling approach on consumer behavior and the current socio-cultural view of consumption.

In the context of the current focus on the culture of consumption, this study is unique in combining “economic and cultural interests rather than largely abandoning or diluting the former” (Sayer 1997). By examining the role of economic factors and accessibility in immigrant shopping, this study recognizes the value of the traditional conceptualization on consumer spatial behavior (Golledge and Stimson 1997). Economic rationality still matters. Price, income and geographical separation in various degrees influence how immigrants patronize ethnic businesses. Ethnic identity overshadows economic rationality and plays a decisive role in Chinese immigrants' patronization of Chinese supermarkets and Chinese travel agencies. Chinese immigrants traveled a longer distance to reach a Chinese supermarket, not necessarily just for “imported ethnic products” but also because of unique cultural practices of Chinese businesses such as providing live fish, poultry with head and feet intact, and beef and pork cut in special ways and at flexible quantities. It is a similar story with regard to the utilization of travel agencies. Ethnicity matters more than price. The selling point of Chinese agencies is the package tours that support the culturally specific “travel habits of many Chinese.” These findings support the socio-cultural embeddedness of immigrant consumer behavior. Immigrant consumers are not necessarily rational actors who make choices based on a known spatial structure and economic attributes; their ethnicity and cultural background can be a crucial factor shaping their shopping behavior.

This study also adds to the literature on commodity chains by revealing that immigrant consumers are co-producers of ethnic consumption spaces, along with other actors such as mall developers and ethnic entrepreneurs who create the physical shopping space. Through browsing, socializing with co-ethnic consumers and

providing feedback to retailers, immigrants also help built and reinforce the multicultural shopping environment that has an attractive cultural ambience to more shoppers. The unique cultural ways of processing and displaying grocery items at Chinese supermarkets also indicate that for immigrant consumers, goods acquire more cultural meanings going down the commodity chain.

The relationship between ethnic identity and economic rationality is complex and intertwining. While ethnic identity plays a more important role than economic factors in the choice of supermarkets and travel agencies, price outweighs ethnic identity in the demand for electronics. Chinese immigrants preferred mainstream electronic stores for better after-sale service even though their prices are higher. It seems that economic factors play a bigger role than culture and ethnicity when it comes to shopping for higher-order goods. Alternatively, the shopping context matters. The relative weights between ethnic identity and economic rationality in the three models attest that there are more cultural meanings to grocery and travel services than electronic products. The complexity of the interplay between ethnic identity and economic rationality nonetheless indicates the inseparability between the two spheres – culture and economy – in the geography of immigrant consumption (Wang and Lo 2007b; Lo 2009).

Finally, we found the mixed methods used in this study particularly effective. The “methodological triangulation” (Jackson et al. 2006) allows us to understand the particularities of immigrant consumer behavior. The focus groups generated rich qualitative data on experiences and meanings related to immigrant consumption. As focus group findings are “relatively unstructured, ... not statistical, (and) not readily generalisable to a wider population” (Flowerdew and Martin 2005: 142), the probabilistic sample from the questionnaire survey and subsequent statistical analyses provided insights into the relative effects of a full mix of factors – ethnic identity, economic variables and demographic variables. The findings from each method complement each other. Collectively they enhance the validity and reliability of the study.

Acknowledgements This research was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Grant No. 410-2001-1093). We are grateful to all the participants in this research and wish them well in building their new lives in Canada.

References

- Appadurai, A. (1996). *Modernity at large: Cultural dimensions of globalization*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Barnes, T. J. (2001). On theory, history, and anoraks. *Antipode*, 33, 162–167.
- Barnes, T. (2003). Introduction to the culture of economy. In K. Anderson, M. Domosh, S. Pile, & N. Thrift (Eds.), *Handbook of cultural geography* (pp. 89–97). London: Sage.
- Barnes, T. (2005). Culture: Economy. In P. Cloke & R. Johnston (Eds.), *Spaces of geographical thought: Deconstructing human geography's binaries*. London: Sage.
- Ben-Akiva, M., & Lerman, S. (1985). *Discrete choice analysis: Theory and application to travel demand*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

- Bourdieu, P. (1984). *Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste*. London: Routledge.
- Chankon, K., Laroche, M., & Tomiuk, M. (2001). A measure of acculturation for Italian Canadians: Scale development and construct validation. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 25(6), 607–637.
- Christian, J., Gadfield, N., Giles, H., & Taylor, D. (1976). The multidimensional and dynamic nature of ethnic identity. *International Journal of Psychology*, 11, 281–291.
- Chung, E., & Fischer, E. (1999). It's who you know: Intracultural differences in ethnic product consumption. *Journal of Consumer Marketing*, 16, 482–501.
- Clarke, I., Jackson, P., Hallsworth, A., de Kervenoael, R., Perez del Aguila, R., & Kirkup, M. (2006). Retail restructuring and consumer choice 1: Long-term local changes in consumer behavior: Portsmouth, 1980–2002. *Environment and Planning A*, 38, 25–46.
- Coe, N., Kelly, P., & Yeung, H. (2007). *Economic geography: A contemporary introduction*. Malden: Blackwell.
- Costa, J., & Bamosy, G. (1995). *Marketing in a multicultural world: Ethnicity, nationalism and cultural identity*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Crewe, L. (2003). Geographies of retailing and consumption: Markets in motion. *Progress in Human Geography*, 27, 352–362.
- D'Rozario, D., & Choudhury, P. (2000). Effect of assimilation on consumer susceptibility to interpersonal influence. *Journal of Consumer Marketing*, 17(4), 290–307.
- Dicken, P. (1998). *Global shift: Transforming the world economy*. London: Paul Chapman.
- Donthu, N., & Cherian, J. (1992). Hispanic coupon usage: Impact of strong and weak ethnic identification. *Psychology and Marketing*, 9(6), 501–510.
- Donthu, N., & Cherian, J. (1994). Impact of strength of ethnic identification of Hispanic shopping behavior. *Journal of Retailing*, 70, 383–393.
- Dunn, K., & Roberts, S. (2006). The social construction of an IndoChinese Australia neighbourhood in Sydney: The case of Cabramatta. In W. Li (Ed.), *From urban enclave to ethnic suburbs: New Asian communities in Pacific Rim countries* (pp. 184–202). London: Sage.
- Dwyer, C., & Crang, P. (2002). Fashioning ethnicities: The commercial spaces of multi-culture. *Ethnicities*, 2, 410–430.
- Dwyer, C., & Jackson, P. (2003). Commodifying difference: Selling EASTern fashion. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 21, 269–291.
- Eastlick, M., & Lotz, S. (2000). Objective and multidimensional acculturation measures: Implications for retailing to hispanic consumers. *Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services*, 7, 149–160.
- Featherstone, M. (1991). *Consumer culture and postmodernity*. London: Sage.
- Flowerdew, R., & Martin, D. (2005). *Methods in human geography: A guide for students doing research projects*. Harlow: Pearson Prentice Hall.
- Fotheringham, A. (1988). Market share analysis techniques: A review and illustration of current US practice. In N. Wrigley (Ed.), *Store choice, store location, and market analysis* (pp. 120–159). London: Routledge.
- Fotheringham, A., & Trew, S. (1993). Chain image and store choice modeling: The effects of income and race. *Environment and Planning A*, 25, 179–196.
- Friedland, W. (2001). Reprise on commodity systems methodology. *International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food*, 9(1), 82–103.
- Geertz, C. (1973). *The interpretation of culture*. New York: Basic Books.
- Gereffi, G., & Korzeniewicz, M. (1994). *Commodity chains and global capitalism*. Westport: Praeger Press.
- Golledge, R., & Stimson, R. (1997). *Spatial behavior: A geographic perspective*. New York: Guilford Press.
- Goss, J. (1993). The magic of the mall: Form and function in the retail built environment. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 83(1), 18–47.
- Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 91, 481–510.

- Gregson, N. (1995). And now it's all consumption? *Progress in Human Geography*, 19, 135–144.
- Gregson, N., Crewe, L., & Brooks, K. (2002). Shopping, space, and practice. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 20, 597–617.
- Hackworth, J., & Rekers, J. (2005). *Ethnic identity, place marketing, and gentrification in Toronto* (Research Report 203). Centre for Urban and Community Studies, University of Toronto.
- Hamlett, J., Bailey, A., Alexander, A., & Shaw, G. (2008). Ethnicity and consumption: South Asian food shopping patterns in Britain, 1947–75. *Journal of Consumer Culture*, 8(1), 91–116.
- Hartwick, E. (1998). Geographies of consumption: A commodity-chain analysis. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 16, 423–437.
- Hartwick, E. (2000). Towards a geographical politics of consumption. *Environment and Planning A*, 32, 1177–1192.
- Hui, M., Kim, C., & Laroche, M. (1998). A typology of consumption based on ethnic origin and media usage. *European Journal of Marketing*, 32(9), 868–883.
- Jackson, P. (2000). Multiculturalism. In R. Johnston, D. Gregory, G. Pratt, & M. Watts (Eds.), *Dictionary of human geography* (p. 528). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Jackson, P. (2002). Commercial cultures: Transcending the cultural and the economic. *Progress in Human Geography*, 26, 3–18.
- Jackson, P., & Holbrook, B. (1995). Multiple meanings: Shopping and the cultural politics of identity. *Environment and Planning A*, 27, 1913–1930.
- Jackson, P., Perez del Aguila, R., Clarke, I., Hallsworth, A., de Kervenoael, R., & Kirkup, M. (2006). Retail restructuring and consumer choice 2: Understanding consumer choice at the household level. *Environment and Planning A*, 38, 47–67.
- Jenkins, R. (1996). Ethnicity etcetera: Social anthropological points of view. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 19(4), 807–822.
- Kaplan, D., & Li, W. (2007). *Landscapes of the ethnic economy*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Kwan, M.-P. (1998). Space-time and integral measures of individual accessibility: A comparative analysis using a point-based framework. *Geographical Analysis*, 30, 191–216.
- Laroche, M., Kim, C., & Tomiuk, A. (1998). Italian ethnic identity and its relative impact on the consumption of convenience and traditional foods. *Journal of Consumer Marketing*, 15, 125–151.
- Lee, W.-N., & Tse, D. (1994). Changing media consumption in a new home: Acculturation patterns among Hong Kong immigrants to Canada. *Journal of Advertising*, 23(1), 57–70.
- Leslie, D., & Reimer, S. (1999). Spatializing commodity chains. *Progress in Human Geography*, 23, 401–420.
- Li, W., Dymski, G., Zhou, Y., Chee, M., & Aldana, C. (2002). Chinese American banking and community development in Los Angeles County. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 92(4), 777–796.
- Light, I., & Gold, S. (2000). *Ethnic economies*. San Diego: Academic.
- Lo, L. (1999). *Chinese Business Database 1997*. Unpublished research data.
- Lo, L. (2006). Changing geography of Toronto's Chinese ethnic economy. In D. Kaplan & W. Li (Eds.), *The landscapes of ethnic economy* (pp. 83–96). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Lo, L. (2009). The role of ethnicity in the geography of consumption. *Urban Geography*, 30(4), 391–415.
- Lo, L., & Wang, S. (1997). Settlement patterns of Toronto's Chinese immigrants: Convergence or divergence? *Canadian Journal of Regional Science*, 20, 49–72.
- Lo, L., & Wang, S. (2007). The new Chinese business sector in Toronto: A spatial and structural anatomy of medium- and large-sized firms. In E. Fong & C. Luk (Eds.), *Chinese ethnic businesses: Global and local perspectives* (pp. 64–85). London/New York: Routledge.
- McDowell, L. (2000). Acts of memory and millennial hopes and anxieties: The awkward relationship between the economic and the cultural. *Social and Cultural Geography*, 1, 15–23.
- McFadden, D. (1976). The mathematical theory of demand models. In P. Stopher & A. Meyburg (Eds.), *Behavioral travel demand models*. Lexington: Lexington Books.
- Miller, D. (1998). *A theory of shopping*. Cambridge: Polity Press/Cornell University Press.

- Murdie, R. (1965). Cultural differences in consumer travel. *Economic Geography*, 41, 211–233.
- Nagel, J. (1994). Constructing ethnicity: Creating and recreating ethnic identity and culture. *Social Problems*, 41(1), 152–168.
- Niedercom, J., & Bechdolt, B. (1970). An economic derivation of the ‘gravity law’ of spatial interaction. *Journal of Regional Science*, 10, 407–410.
- Phinney, J. (1992). The multigroup ethnic identity measure: A new scale for use with diverse groups. *Journal of Adolescent Research*, 7, 156–176.
- Phinney, J. (2000). Identity formation across cultures: The interaction of personal, societal, and historical change. *Human Development*, 43, 27–31.
- Phinney, J. (2003). Ethnic identity and acculturation. In M. Chun, P. Organista, & G. Marin (Eds.), *Acculturation: Advances in theory, measurement, and applied research* (pp. 63–82). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Preston, V., & Lo, L. (2000). ‘Asian theme’ malls in suburban Toronto: Land use conflict in Richmond Hill. *The Canadian Geographer*, 44, 182–190.
- Preston, V., & Lo, L. (2009, February). Ethnic enclaves in multicultural cities: New retailing patterns and new planning dilemmas. *Plan Canada*, pp. 72–74.
- Preston, V., Lo, L., & Wang, S. (2003). Immigrant’s economic status in Toronto: Stories of triumph and disappointment. In P. Anisef & M. Lanphier (Eds.), *The world in a city* (pp. 192–262). Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Rodrigues-Pose, A. (2001). Killing economic geography with a “cultural turn” overdose. *Antipode*, 33, 176–182.
- Rossiter, J., & Chan, A. (1998). Ethnicity in business and consumer behavior. *Journal of Business Research*, 42(1), 127–134.
- Sayer, A. (1997). The dialectic of culture and economy. In R. Lee & J. Wills (Eds.), *Geographies of economies* (pp. 27–36). London: Arnold.
- Slater, D. (1997). *Consumer culture and modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Slater, D. (2003). Cultures of consumption. In K. Anderson, M. Domosh, S. Pile, & N. Thrift (Eds.), *Handbook of cultural geography* (pp. 147–163). London: Sage.
- Sollars, W. (1989). *The invention of ethnicity*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Swedberg, R., & Granovetter, M. (2001). Introduction to the second edition. In R. Swedberg & M. Granovetter (Eds.), *The sociology of economic life*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Thrift, N. (2000). Pandora’s box? Cultural geographies of economies. In G. Clark, M. Feldman, & M. Gertler (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of economic geography* (pp. 689–704). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Van den Berghe, P. (1981). *The ethnic phenomenon*. New York: Elsevier.
- Venkatesh, A. (1995). Ethnoconsumerism: A new paradigm to study cultural and cross-cultural consumer behavior. In J. Costa & G. Bamossy (Eds.), *Marketing in a multicultural world: Ethnicity, nationalism, and cultural identity* (pp. 26–67). Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Waldinger, R. (1995). The ‘other side’ of embeddedness: A case study of the interplay of economy and ethnicity. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 18, 555–580.
- Waldinger, R., Aldrich, H., & Ward, R. (1990). *Ethnic entrepreneurs: Immigrant and ethnic business in industrial societies*. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Wang, S. (1999). Chinese commercial activity in the Toronto CMA: New development patterns and impacts. *The Canadian Geographer*, 43, 19–35.
- Wang, S. (2003, April, 24). Distribution of Chinese shopping centers. *Ming Pao Daily*, Property Gold Pages, p. 34.
- Wang, L. (2004). An investigation of Chinese immigrant consumer behavior in Toronto, Canada. *Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services*, 11, 307–320.
- Wang, L., & Lo, L. (2007a). Global connectivity, local consumption, and Chinese immigrant experience. *GeoJournal*, 68, 183–194.
- Wang, L., & Lo, L. (2007b). Immigrant grocery shopping behavior: Ethnic identity versus accessibility. *Environment and Planning A*, 39, 684–699.
- Wang, L., Rosenberg, M., & Lo, L. (2008). Ethnicity and utilization of family physicians – A case study of mainland Chinese immigrants in Toronto, Canada. *Social Science & Medicine*, 67(9), 1410–1422.

- Webster, C. (1994). Effects of Hispanic ethnic identification on marital roles in the purchase decision process. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 21, 319–331.
- William, P., Hubbard, P., Clark, D., & Berkeley, N. (2001). Consumption, exclusion and emotion: The social geographies of shopping. *Social and Cultural Geography*, 2, 203–219.
- Wrigley, N. (2002). Food deserts in British cities: Policy context and research priorities. *Urban Studies*, 39, 2029–2040.
- Wrigley, N., & Lowe, M. (1996). *Retailing, consumption, and capital: Towards the new retail geography*. London: Longman.
- Wrigley, N., Warm, D., Margells, B., & Lowe, M. (2004). The Leeds “food deserts” intervention study: What the focus groups reveal. *International Journal of Retail and Distribution Management*, 32, 123–136.
- Yang, P.-Q. (2000). *Ethnic studies: Issues and approaches*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Yeung, H. (2001). Does economics matter for/in economic geography? *Antipode*, 33, 168–175.
- Zhou, Y. (1998). Beyond ethnic enclaves: Location strategies of Chinese producer service firms in Los Angeles. *Economic Geography*, 74(3), 228–251.

Chapter 7

Trust and Distrust: Culture Finding Its Way into Economics or the Other Way Round?

Geir Inge Orderud

Although trust often referred to an underlying factor of territorially embedded economic systems (Storper 1997; Scott and Storper 2003; Asheim 2000), and as such was an integral part of the “rise of the cultural dimension as a legitimate arena of economic concern and the economic dimension as a legitimate area of cultural concern” (Thrift 2000:689), there are few contributions within geography focusing directly on trust. According to Murphy (2006:428), trust has remained “rather undertheorized within economic geography and regional science.” Murphy contributed by introducing a three-part typology of trust: the micro-scale trust of subjectivity (e.g., individual cognition); the meso-scale trust of inter-subjectivity (e.g., face-to-face encounters); and the macro-scale trust of institutional and structural context, thereby making trust a scalar phenomenon capable of moving “beyond solely instrumental conceptualizations of trust ... and toward a relational understanding of how the means for establishing and sustaining collaborative relationships influences the development and potential of such ‘ends’ as clusters and production networks” (Murphy 2006:443). In spite of this, trust seems to remain rather under-theorized in geography, functioning more as a taken-for-granted background variable.

Trust is generally considered as an important variable for making interpersonal relations, organisations, and societies work. Studies within different disciplines document that trust might be important in relation to the spatiality of industrial production systems (e.g., Aoyama and Ratick 2007; Ettliger 2003; Granovetter 1985; Lorenz 1988; McEvily and Zaheer 2004; Orderud 2007; Zolin and Hinds 2004). More generally, in disciplines like sociology, political science, and management studies, theories of trust have been developed on the basis of utilitarian individualism, rational choice institutionalism, neo-institutional phenomenology, functionalism, and structuration theory, and have been applied in studies of cultural, economic and

G.I. Orderud (✉)

Department of Socio-Economic and Territorial Studies, Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research, Oslo, Norway
e-mail: geir.orderud@nibr.no

political topics. Below, some contributions of this literature are presented and discussed in order to improve our understanding of trust in the intersections of cultural and economic geography, but also to discuss what the discipline of geography might contribute regarding trust as part of the cultural turn.

The increasing importance of, and focus on, trust during the last couple of decades have been explained by the shift from in-house industrial production to sub-contracting (Lorenz 1988). More generally it is said to refer to emerging inefficiencies of institutions that previously were taken for granted and institutions operating differently under different conditions, including the increasing importance of human agency and an array of choices; mounting interdependency, differentiation, specialisation and complex institutional structures; rising levels of anonymity; and more serious threats and hazards in the context of a risk society (Sztompka 1999). In short, the greater importance of trust is linked to the emergence of “high modernity,” post-modernism, and globalisation, which is paradoxical because trust is also considered as easier to sustain in smaller, traditional communities. The reason might be that trust in today’s society cannot be taken for granted, but needs to be nurtured and facilitated.

Furthermore, the last four decades have been dominated by neoliberalism, which is characterized by the “*privatization of state-run assets ...; liberalization of trade in goods and capital investment; monetarist focus on inflation control and supply-side dynamics; deregulation of labour and product markets to reduce ‘impediments’ to business; and the marketization of society through public–private partnerships and other forms of commodification*” (Birch and Mykhnenko 2010:5 italics in original). Neoliberal advocates maintain that the aim is individual freedom and the “free market” in order to achieve efficient allocation of resources; only a market is considered capable of efficiently coordinating actions of numerous participants. Neoliberalism may be considered as an effort to make “rational economic man” and the pursuit of individual self-realisation the “default” model of human behavior, with obvious implications for culture (e.g., Robertson 2007; Twenge and Campbell 2009; Willig 2009). The question is whether the cultural turn has been facilitated by a previous economic turn within culture, i.e., the intrusion of neoliberal values into the everyday life of people.

Neoliberalism is mostly about political economy and governance. Harvey’s (2005) claim that neoliberalism is primarily about restoring class power and moving wealth back to the capitalist class looms large here. The neoliberal project seems also to be about shaping the model capitalist citizen, with shopping as his or her number one hobby and self-realisation through commercialized consumption. Trust is part and parcel of these changes, underlining that a study of trust (and distrust) also is about politics: trust is about making politics work or not work, and is in turn made by politics. Brenner and Theodore (2002:343) state that “neoliberalism represents a strategy of political-economic restructuring that ... uses space as its ‘privileged instrument.’” Making this strategy work require some level of generalized trust in neoliberal society, but this process faces resistance and counterattacks, thereby creating multiple, contingent neoliberal trajectories (Birch and Tickell 2010; Brand and Wissen 2005; Hart 2008; He and Wu 2009; Kohl 2006; Larner 2003;

Peck and Theodore (2007; Perrault 2006) that are materializing in different regulation regimes (Aglietta 1998; Boyer 2000). A number of studies on trust in organisations are instrumental in the way that they aim to provide formulas for how to facilitate trust between executives and workers in order for it to achieve its aims (e.g., Kramer and Cook 2004; Cook et al. 2005). Segregation, gentrification, gated communities, and struggles over urban space are made and remade, constituting and in turn constituted by existing trust bases. Are there any insights from the encounters between culture and economy to be earned from making the political dimension trust dimension explicit?

7.1 Theories of Trust and Their Political Consequences

Several authors have tried to contextualize trust with notions like calculation, assurance, confidence, faith, reliance and familiarity (Farrell 2009; Foddy and Yamagishi 2009; Hardin 2002; Luhmann 1988; Möllering 2006; Nooteboom 2002; Seligman 1997; Sztompka 1999). The boundaries among these concepts are fuzzy and allude to different theoretical positions, but suffice here to note that much of the discussion revolves around demarcating certainty from uncertainty.

According to Hardin (2002), “trust is little more than knowledge; trustworthiness is a motivation or a set of motivations for acting” (p. 31). Farrell (2009) sees trust as an expectation, stating that “although trust facilitates certain kinds of action, it is not an action itself” (p. 129), and states that “trust is a set of expectations about whether another party may be expected to behave in a trustworthy manner over a particular issue or set of issues.” Consequently, trustworthiness is closer to an action than is trust itself. This understanding of trust runs counter to the idea that trust is both a noun and a verb. In this respect Nooteboom’s (2002:8) distinction between “trust, on the part of the trustor, and trustworthiness, on the side of the trustee” is appropriate. He underlines that these dimensions are related; for example, “rational trust is based on an attribution by the trustor of reasons for trustworthiness to the trustee” (page number is cited earlier).

Regarding theories of trust, it is reasonable to start with Hardin’s (2002) approach because his view mirrors neoliberal hegemony: he is a proponent of a strictly individualist approach that centers on individual self-interest and rationality, which he formulates in the maxim that “I trust you because I think it is in your interest to take my interests in the relevant matter seriously in the following sense: you value the continuation of our relationship, and you therefore have your own interests in taking my interests into account” (p. 1). For Hardin, distrust is the negative of trust, but the causes of trust or distrust can differ: less knowledge is required for establishing distrust than trust; losses from cooperating with someone who proves to be untrustworthy are typically much larger than the gains from cooperating with someone who acts in a trustworthy manner; and interests might conflict, causing distrust but not necessarily because the second party specifically wants to harm the interests of the first (Cook et al. 2005). Distrust is also linked to power, and following Hardin’s

assumption about people following their self-interests, increasing power inequalities lead to increasing distrust, causing a barrier for trust to emerge, and absolute power makes trust superfluous (Cook et al. 2005).

For Hardin (2002), to have “an economic street-level epistemology” (p. 115) of trust what is needed is a “theory that focuses on the individual and on the ways the individual comes to know or believe relevant things, such as how trustworthy another person is” (pp. 115–116). He identifies inductive knowledge and theoretical knowledge as bases for trustworthiness. For trust to emerge, teaching children to be trustworthy and acquire a capacity to trust and cooperate with others is central. Here the political bias of Hardin emerges: “those whose early years are spent in fractured conditions of caprice and neglect, as in the case of many children of American inner-city communities wrecked by poverty, drugs, and broken families” (p. 117), experience a disadvantage; thus, “the terrible vision of a permanent underclass in American ghettos may have its grounding in the lesson that the children of the ghetto are taught all too successfully: that they cannot trust others, especially not outsiders or strangers but often also not even closer associates” (p. 117). In addition, “providing opportunities of educational and economic mobility does not equalize prospects for the ingrained distruster, who cannot be optimistic enough to take advantage of opportunities that entail risks of betrayal” (p. 117). It is a short way from this view to the “culture of poverty” theory that has haunted American social science and politics for decades, from the Moynihan report (1965) of the mid 1960s and the concept of culture of poverty put forward by Lewis (1970), to the mid-1980s, with Charles Murray’s (1984) attack on liberal welfare programs as the cause of poverty, to a renewed focus in 2010 by a special issue of the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (Small et al. 2010). Applying trust as a driver for the American urban ghetto takes us straight into the politics of segregated urban neighbourhoods. If ghetto residents are “lost” because they lack the capacity to trust, act trustworthy, and engage in cooperation, then the likely policy measures are of an instrumental type.

Returning to Hardin’s theory of trust, we should also note that following his definition of trust, cooperation without trust becomes essential, in which case institutional arrangements facilitating cooperation are decisive. Although Hardin (2002) and Cook et al. (2005) focus on the lack of trust in certain social segments, their perspective is still that institutions only gain trust when they meet the self-interests of the individual. Alternatively, they assert that the only institutional context for individuals to cooperate without trust, but still on the basis of self-interest, is the market. When discussing the government, Hardin (2002) states that “I must know that the agents or the institutions act on my behalf because they wish to maintain their relationships with me. That is generally not possible for a government and its officials” (p. 156). Hardin (2002), following a common U.S. tradition, opines that “it is commonly supposed that we should openly distrust government” (p. 107). He concludes by stating that this distrust is “grounded in a real understanding of the likely incentives that government officials sometimes face,” that this understanding is “a logical inference from normal human interests,” and “in sum, it makes far readier sense to distrust government than to trust it” (p. 167). Apart from the

theoretical challenge of his view, which assumes a generalized level of distrust but not trust, this view is about politics, and coincides conveniently with neoliberal notions of governance.

Furthermore, “*trust and trustworthiness, are at best, complements to organizationally induced incentives*” (Cook et al. 2005:134, italics in original), that is, “networks and relations of trust among those in a particular workplace can complement the formal organizational design to the advantage of the organization only when the relationships are personal and ongoing, and they are oriented toward information-sharing and negotiation meant to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the work process over time” (pp. 141–142), or else they are detrimental. Trust relations among employees contribute to organisational efficiency only “when there are also complementary cooperative relationships with supervisors and top management” (p. 144). In short, networks of trust “remain secondary and supplementary to the organizational design as means for eliciting reliability and cooperation” (p. 150), a perspective that assumes employers will treat workers well in order to achieve organisational efficiency.

Although it emerged during the cultural turn, Hardin’s and his colleagues’ approach can be seen as an effort to minimize the role of trust and make this minimalist version suited for the neoliberal societal order. But there are alternatives to Hardin’s approach, most of which include the notion of “generalised trust.” A central point in this respect is whether people can trust, for instance, governmental agencies on the basis of individual self-interest, or whether the government agency will respond to this particular person’s trust by meeting their demands. We might ask whether it is not the case that the trust of each person in an agency is about whether the agency serves the interests of categories or groups of people. This means that trust (or distrust) operates at a different scale than that of the individual, i.e., trust inherently necessitates a collective, not individual, scale.

One theoretical approach that accepts the existence of generalized trust is offered by Giddens (1994), who locates trust, together with risk, within a broader notion of reflexive modernization, wherein active trust is established on both the personal and institutional levels by “opening out” to others. Closely related to this view, Sztompka (1999) links trust to judgments about others’ future actions, focusing on uncertainties and risks, and then combines human agency and structure in an analysis of trust cultures. Building on Giddens’s structuration theory, Sydow and Windeler (2003) discuss how the creation of knowledge and control within inter-organizational networks is a means of trust building (or destruction), and how knowledge and control are in turn affected by inter-organizational trust. Thus, building organizational trust is a “multi-level process during which individual and collective actors recursively refer to established rules and resources and thereby reproduce and eventually transform them” (p. 94).

Nooteboom (2002), adopting an institutional approach, combines transaction costs economics and knowledge theory using a constructivist and hermeneutic perspective on trust in which “institutions enable, constrain and guide behaviour, and are stable and engaging with respect to behaviour” (p. 32). Möllering (2006) presents a neo-institutional and phenomenological perspective, with trust (or distrust)

emerging through a reflexive process “building on reason, routine and reflexivity, suspending irreducible social vulnerability and uncertainty *as if* they were favourably solved, and maintaining a state of favourable expectations towards the actions and intentions of more or less specific others” (p. 356, italics in original). Two notions are introduced: *natural attitude*, meaning “actors normally do not doubt the reality of their everyday world” and they “assume that other people’s view of reality is not too different from their own” (p. 358), and *institutional isomorphism*, meaning that “actors who have been socialized to place or honour trust in certain types of situations will conform to this expectation, because otherwise they would be going against their own nature or against the objective reality of society” (p. 362). Following from this view, institutions become “a basis for trust between actors, because they imply a high degree of taken-for-grantedness, ... institutional-based trust between actors requires that the institutions on which such trust is based are ‘trusted’ themselves, ... actors (re)produce collectively the institutional framework which then serves them as a source for trust (in other actors), but becomes an object of trust (in institutions), too” (p. 373). The institutional approach represents trust as a “phenomenon capturing how actors use their embedded agency to deal with the irreducible social vulnerability and uncertainty without which one would not speak of ‘trust’” (Möllering 2006:373). Power is obviously part of social vulnerabilities, and Nooteboom (2002) states that “if one is very powerful, one tends to harbour more suspicion that people subjected to one’s power are not trustworthy only because they have no choice. Thus power can breed suspicion and absolute power can yield rampant paranoia” (pp. 196–197). This understanding of trust and power resembles Hardin’s.

The institutional approach represented a criticism of the neoliberal approach (Rose 2006), with Stiglitz’s (1998, 2008) version representing adjustments to this strategy more than a radical break. For instance, Möllering (2006) invokes notions such as natural attitude, institutional isomorphism, and embedded agency in a theory of evolutionary institutionalism. From this it is a short step to studies of territorially embedded industrial systems, in which local cooperation is facilitated by trust emerging from natural attitudes and institutional isomorphism. But it can also be the case that trust accompanies the process of distancing (Amin and Thrift 2002), which essentially breaks down territorially embedded systems. Nevertheless, there are numerous studies preaching the wonders of endogenous growth, with a focus on how to facilitate innovation¹ and learning in (city) regions. Studies like these have been initiated in order to fit into policies for achieving economic growth and jobs under the pressure of global market forces, often invoking public–private partnerships at different scales. As state subsidies for industrial development have dwindled under neoliberalism, facilitating regional and local cooperation remains one of few options left for creating or maintaining jobs locally.

For example, the neo-institutionalism of Möllering (2006) approaches urban poverty by focusing on institutional structures inside and outside the ghetto in order to understand the process of ghetto formation and maintenance. Apparently,

¹ Studies of innovation often focus on understanding the process of innovation, including venture capital.

ghetto residents' "natural attitudes" and institutional isomorphism are identifying culture of poverty traits within the ghetto, but a truly institutional approach would ask how these traits are shaped by forces and processes from outside the ghetto, or how they emerge from the interaction between processes inside and outside the ghetto. William Julius Wilson, who previously (1987) explained the urban underclass ghetto by shortcomings of the labor market, now presents "an approach that recognizes the complex web of structural and cultural factors that create and reinforce racial inequality" (Wilson 2010:214). Thus, he asserts that "one of the effects of living in a racially segregated, poor neighborhood is the exposure to cultural traits that may not be conducive to facilitating social mobility" (Wilson 2010:204), which despite assurances about the importance of structures, might be used to blame the ghetto residents for their poverty. Furthermore, his policy measure is to disperse poor people out of poor communities, and to take the ghetto out of the child through education. Here trust and distrust lurk in the background: the ghetto poor will develop the necessary trust in societal institutions by being exposed to more affluent people and through the right schooling. However, placing poor people in affluent neighbourhoods might stigmatize the poor, especially children who always are short on material goods compared to others and, for instance, cannot afford to take part in school activities requiring economic support from their parents.

Moving to Luhmann (1979), we find a functionalist theory of trust in which systems constitute themselves by means of the distinction between the inner and outer, and maintain themselves by stabilizing this boundary. In this view, "if we conceive rationality in the sociological sense as system rationality, it is plausible to seek in this inner/outer distinction *a rational criterion for the distinctive location and the joint increase of trust or distrust*" (p. 90, italics in original). Within systems, trust contributes to reduce social complexity by "replacing missing information with an internally guaranteed security" (p. 93), thereby depending on "other reduction mechanisms developed in parallel with it, for example those of law, of organization and, of course those of language, but cannot, however, be reduced to them" (p. 93). Here, a process of learning is crucial, and "the underlying assumptions of this learning process are laid down in infancy" (p. 27) and within families, but "the learning process does not end there. New situations and new people are continually posing new problems for trust throughout life" (p. 28). Distrust is seen as a functional equivalent of trust, making a choice between them possible, but because they require simplification neither of them is feasible as universal attitudes. However, systems need for their survival "mechanisms which prevent distrust from gaining the upper hand, and from being reciprocated by a process of reciprocal escalation, turned into a destructive force" (p. 75).

Although Luhmann links people's (or system's) learning to infancy, it is understood as an on-going process, thereby making people capable of moving back and forth from having low-trust or high-trust attitudes. If the ghetto is considered a particular system, some might claim it to be characterized by lack of trust or dominated by distrust. A culture of poverty label might easily be attached to the ghetto. However, the ghetto as a particular system is part of and connected with other systems.

The functionalist approach allows space for contradictions and conflicts through the interactions between systems of trust and distrust, and explicitly makes distrust a force of system destruction. Nevertheless, the functionalist approach can be criticized for explaining the existence of particular systems in a self-referential manner, that is, the approach “can succeed only if there are reasons for believing in a feedback loop from the consequence to the phenomenon to be explained ... these reasons can only be the exhibition of a specific feedback mechanism in each particular case” (Elster 1983:61). Assuming trust is present, a certain economic and cultural system may be explained by its mere existence, without exact knowledge about it actually works.

Summing up, trust and distrust seem to have been the focus of traditional rational choice theory based on rational “economic man,” a view that represents trust as a purely individual phenomenon; in contrast, institutional theories incorporate generalized views of trust, that is, trust exists and extends well beyond the self-interest of the individual. The cultural turn placed trust/distrust and trustworthiness higher on the analytical agenda of different disciplines. However, in the context of contemporary neoliberal reality, trust and trustworthiness have been accommodated under that theoretical and political umbrella, which is to say that individualist notions are still highly influential. Insights from institutional theories have been adopted by neoliberal perspectives. In neoliberal development contexts, trust plays the role of soft power, inducing commitments for particular actors, policies, communities, and societal systems.

What are conspicuously lacking, though, are radical and Marxist analyses of trust and distrust. This absence might be linked to the perception that the cultural turn is an attack on Marxist-oriented approaches, but it might also be that trust and distrust have no large role to play in class analyses of capitalist economies and societies. Thus, exploitations by the capitalist class objectively causes class-based distrust as well as objective intra-class trust. That there will no trust between individual capitalists and workers is a real force influencing the reality of class struggle. However, radical analyses and politics trying to counter injustices could draw upon the insights gained from studies of trust/distrust that have flourished under the cultural turn. For instance, such studies can illuminate how to forge trust-based alliances of resistance and struggle against oppressive policies, or disclose how trust as part of soft power maintains, increases, and conceals different types of class exploitation. Addressing trust as part of soft power would mean understanding the role of education, research, and expert knowledge, media communication, information strategies and dialogue, and civil society and voluntary organizations as means for developing effective political strategies.

7.2 Trust and Distrust Within Geography

Trust has not been very much studied within the discipline of geography, beyond functioning as a background variable in studies discussing territorial embeddedness, and as such it has also played a secondary role within the cultural turn. The remainder of this chapter discusses trust and distrust in a geographic context.

7.2.1 *The Basis*

Overall, studies of trust in geography might be considered part of a spatial turn in many social sciences (Warf and Arias 2008), including critiques of neoclassical economics. A move “beyond solely instrumental conceptualizations of trust (i.e., trust as lubricant, relational asset, input, or sunk cost) and toward a relational understanding of how the means for establishing and sustaining collaborative relationships influences the development and potential of such ‘ends’ as clusters and production networks” (Murphy 2006:443) is still sorely needed.

This shift means, first, understanding space as relational. Hardin (2002) defined trust as an intrinsically relational phenomenon. Nooteboom (2002) made trust a four-place predicate: “someone (1) trusts someone (or something), (2) in some respect (3), depending on conditions such as context of action (4). This context of action includes the dynamics of interaction” (p. 38). The notion of context alludes to space, but for Nooteboom it is simply a container of social phenomena and processes. Murphy (2006), however, tried to make trust a “socio-spatial process enacted by agents through relations mediated by structural factors, power differentials, emotions, meaning systems, and material intermediaries” (p. 429). In short, we should see trust as a phenomenon and a process shaped by its spatial context but also shaping this very context. Orderud (2007), discussing price competition and trust in a study of the home-building industry, concluded that trust seems to offset pure economic rationality, but also that there is an economic rationality of trust: “This interaction has implications for the spatiality of home-building in places, but also the other way round. The existing spatial pattern of home-building influences the dynamics of trust, its bases as well as its different levels” (p. 355).

Murphy (2006) introduced a scalar perspective on trust, but one that comes close to understanding scale as socio-spatial levels, that is, the subjectivity of a person, the inter-subjectivity of encounters among persons, and socially generalized and institutionalised trust. During the last decade, scale has been a contested issue within geography, with some arguing for human geography without scale or a flat ontology (e.g., Jones et al. 2007; Marston et al. 2005; Thrift 2004), while others defend the scaled ontology (e.g., Chapura 2009; Jessop et al. 2008; Leitner and Miller 2007; MacKinnon 2010). Sayre (2009) distinguished different meanings of scale, i.e., as a size with measurements expressed in standardised units as the basis for particular operational scales (granularity and extent); as a level that denotes a certain spatial perspective of what will and will not be observed and analyzed; and as a relation “defined by the spatial and temporal relations among (processes at different) levels” (p. 101). Following Sayre (2009), scale is understood here as relational, with a focus on processes that are spatial and temporal and are produced as part of social and material processes. Finally, scale is about politics: thus, “the production of geographical scale is the site of potentially intense political struggle” (Smith 1993:97), and several studies have disclosed the power and inequalities of scalar politics (e.g., Swyngedouw 2000, 2007; Leitner et al. 2008; Mahon 2006; McCarthy 2005).

Analysing trust from a geographical perspective means asking how space shapes trust/distrust and how trust/distrust in turn shape geography; asking how trust/distrust relate to the shaping of types and forms of scale, and vice versa; and asking how politics are intertwined with scalar formations and thus trust and distrust. One of the particularities of trust is that it is both a verb and a noun, thereby making it doubly relational towards space. The chapter now engages with some examples of trust and distrust within the economy, focusing on processes of scale construction and rescaling.

7.2.2 Three Cases of Rescaling of Trust

Starting with the intra-organizational scale, a case from a cardboard packaging company in Norway is instructive. During the 1990s, digital control engineering was introduced, which caused an internal restructuring of operation procedures and power relations. Integrated in this process was a changing role for trust. After the corrugated cardboard was cut and folded, it was ready for printing of brand names and other steps. Previously, the operators ran printing operations on the basis of a technical rationality, for instance, making a print with a lighter red colour and then successively darker red colors. Work orders are arranged according to what saved printing time and use of resources. In short, they were entrusted by the management to run the printing operation. With the introduction of electronic control engineering, the decision-making structure was rescaled, transferring power from the operator to the planner sitting in administrative offices. The planners arranged orders according to a purely economic rationale, that is, they paid more attention to orders that needed to be completed within a certain time period rather than the most cost-efficient sequence of jobs (Orderud et al. 1997). In the early twenty-first century, the same company was taken over by an international firm and a new round of intra-organisation rescaling occurred with the introduction of the German enterprise resource planning tool called SAP (Systems, Applications and Products in Data Processing): decision making power was transferred from the administration of the Norwegian factory to the European headquarters, which had tight control over resource use.² In addition, a foreign corporate executive officer is running the Norwegian factory.

These are well known changes in industries around the world, made possible by new technologies in interaction with changes in how markets are organized and regulated. What about the cultural turn and the claimed importance of trust in this respect? Essentially, the case reveals changing power relations and a deskilling process. The first change meant transferring power over the production process from operators on the floor to planners in the administration, and the second change

²Personal communication to author from informants.

meant transferring power from the administration at the factory to another administration with management power over several previously independent factories. Changes in the nature and level of trust are an intrinsic part of these changes. The transfer of decision making power from operators to planners meant the abolishment of existing trust relations, either making trust redundant and replacing it with blunt orders from above, or new forms of trust emerged. The transfer of decision-making power from the local firm to the European corporate headquarters meant extending existing communication lines and introducing a new context and conditions for intra-organisational trust.

The constant interaction between operators and planners allowed planners to exercise control according to the criteria of economic profitability and reducing the task for operators to simply carrying out jobs according to a prescribed order. Generally, however, a stronger weight given to economic profitability makes trust more unstable and prone to turn into distrust. For the local administration, becoming part of a global company and the SAP system introduced more complex relations. For one thing, different corporate cultures together with frequent changes of top leaders mean more volatility regarding trust and distrust. Further, new alliances can arise: groups that formerly opposed each other (e.g., administration versus workers) might find common cause in trying to keep their jobs. Unions oppose the administration when negotiating over wages and job conditions, but then line up with the administration against the headquarters, making company politics fuzzier. Generally, this case describes a situation where trust seems to erode, and possibly tip into distrust. The role of trust as presented in the literature on the cultural turn often overlooks such as nuances, but it is possible to claim that trust as part of a corporate logic has become powerful.

A second case involves the public sector. Nordic countries are commonly characterized as welfare state regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1996), and as such allow other dimensions than economic market rationality to guide the provision of public services. Ideally in this context we might expect that trust should play a large role in public policy. However, the actual practice is mixed. Neoliberal principles have become part of the so-called Nordic Model through neo-institutional New Public Management (NPM) principles for running the public sector. However, the Nordic neoliberal version is argued to be less developed compared to some other countries (e.g., the U.K. and New Zealand) due to the strong social-democratic traditions there (Christensen and Læg Reid 2001). In essence, NPM strategies focus on competition among service providers, accountability for results, labelling citizens as clients or customers, and the restructuring of the provision of public services (Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Skelcher 2000). It is claimed that the gains from competition also will befall the public sector through the NPM reorganization, particularly as public sector agencies are split in units responsible for different tasks. For instance, within public water provision and waste water treatment, a unit responsible for maintenance and repair might be established providing services to the water provision and water treatment unit. Maintenance work is then ordered by the water providers. If maintenance staff should do some additional tasks when carrying out the tasks being

ordered, they will not be remunerated for what they do, even though it might be needed and efficient.³

Similar to the packaging factory case presented above, this case is also about power. Previously, maintenance workers considered whether to add tasks when out on a mission, often consulting with a team leader. Under the NPM single purpose system, officers make decisions based on administrative priorities and economic considerations. This is concentration of power in particular units (often administrative) at the expense of operational units (often workers), involving a new time-scale structure of work relations, with implications for the role and nature of trust. Previously, trust in these relations was about whether those working in the field were making sound judgments of what to do and how to carry out tasks. This type of trust is removed and replaced with a type of trust that assumes front line officers/workers will do what they are ordered to do, like soldiers (Miller 2004), and that they carry out tasks according to instructions and allocated resources. In short, public sector intra-organizational trust has turned into (potential) trust based on economic incentives and economic relations. Parallel to the packaging case, this makes trust more volatile and prone to become distrust, or alternate between trust and distrust. Beyond the obvious political dimension of turning a public sector activity into a quasi-market, labor unions might more easily be a victim of divide and conquer tactics in negotiations over wages and working conditions.

NPM might be seen as a third way between the neoliberal privatization strategy and the previous public sector, and as such it might be considered as an institutional theory based on a response to neoliberal theory. However, although this might have meant a move away from the most extreme neoliberal policies, for instance in the U.K. following Blair's third way, it meant a move towards neoliberal policies in, for example, Norway. Furthermore, the establishment of single purpose units resembles the outsourcing phenomenon of private sector businesses. Outsourcing or sub-contracting, which Lorenz (1988) claimed would make trust more important, might replace one type of trust with another type. Trust forged by and based upon intra-organizational bonds, including corporate loyalty and informal bonds, is replaced by trust that essentially is based on purely economic transactions mediated through prices.

My third case revisits a previous analyses of the Norwegian home-building industry and related bank and financing (Orderud 2006, 2007, 2011). It does not address trust and territorial embeddedness per se, but the rescaling and restructuring of trust under changing conditions, including the cultural turn. The 1980s saw a deregulation of housing and home-building, as well as a deregulation of finance, unleashed by the political Right and eventually leaping into a housing market crack and bank crisis around 1990. These events led to a reregulation of banking but with a deregulated housing market developing through the 1990s and into the twenty-first century. The last two decades have seen a professionalization of the actors

³ The example was provided by an public officer in a municipal water provision and water discharge department.

involved in home building, including banking and finance. There have been mergers creating a few big actors and a certain undergrowth of smaller companies, and some big construction companies and banks from Sweden and Denmark established themselves in the Norwegian market.

Some of the changes can be illustrated like this: Before the deregulation of the housing market, cooperative housing associations operated as housing policy instruments for municipal authorities, complemented by some large private construction companies engaged in home building. For instance, the chief of land planning in a city brought with him the top executive of the cooperative housing association and the top executive of one respected private builder, handing over one area for development to each of them. Furthermore, the loan handling officer in a bank would call the top executive of the bank and say that 'x' company asked for a construction loan and they had appropriate creditworthiness. Starting the planning process, the home builder would gather a team consisting of three to five entrusted persons and decide what to do. Today, private developers launch plans for developing areas and then enter into a process of getting approval from municipal planning and building authorities, or they compete for development projects for renovation. There are far more people and professions involved when home builders plan and implement housing projects. Large construction companies have established property developer departments staffed mainly by economists with real estate competence, and a few also have integrated real estate agencies. Banks, especially the larger ones who fund the majority of home building projects, have introduced procedures for assessing the creditworthiness of companies applying for different types of loans, covering quantitative and qualitative data, economic solidity and competence, market conditions, et cetera. Large banks have established departments or units handling home building or office building and many of them have established their own real estate agencies.

Is the increasing number of participants a sign that trust is becoming more important? Surely, the number of relations that are potentially characterized by trust (or distrust) has increased, and the time-scale of trust has been restructured. The pre-deregulation phase was characterized by much political trust, meaning that the home builder would contribute to meeting the politically formulated housing aims. The economic component was production oriented through a focus on building costs and quality, that is, it was dominated by engineering concerns. The market component was about allocating homes according to rules at stipulated prices, linked to subsidies. In the post-deregulation phase, the importance of political component is reduced, but not totally excluded, but it has changed to become a means for property developers to have contentious building projects approved, often against the planning authority's recommendations. The economic component has increased in importance, becoming closely linked to the selling of homes. My studies, cited above, concluded that price competition and trust interact during the process of a home building project but that trust plays a relatively larger role in the first phases and price a larger role in later phases. Consequently, the basis for trust has changed, making it part of market processes. The focus on trust under the cultural turn is intrinsically linked to this emerging market regime and how trust is rescaled as part of the deregulation of housing and home-building.

7.2.3 *Trust and Rescaling, Not Just Rescaling of Trust?*

The above examples show how trust, and correspondingly distrust, have been rescaled concurrent with technological and institutional changes. What, then, about the role of trust (and distrust) for the choice of technology and institutional arrangements? Of course, trust might be involved when choosing a certain technological solution or a particular brand, including considerations about price, quality, and non-economic factors, but could trust/distrust play a more fundamental role for how digital control engineering is introduced within the packaging company? The push for making the production process more cost-effective and profitable is an obvious factor, but why should a firm transfer the decision regarding the priority of printing orders from operators to planners? It could actually be a result of distrust in the competence and willingness of the operators to make the right decisions regarding the printing sequence because changing colors often cause the operator to do more tasks than before. Changing levels and scales of trust are also observable in the NPM case in the public sector and whether the splitting up of agencies is essentially about distrust in the context of cutting costs.

The home-building example depicted a more complex case, describing how deregulation changed how different actors operate and interact. Many of the adjustments made by the actors can be seen as ways of handling the increasing uncertainties caused by the market of housing. This meant that one of the aims among actors involved in home building was to reduce and cope with uncertainties, thereby also making trust a potential issue, first, in pulling together partners and interacting with the municipal planning authorities, and second in establishing procedures for making judgements about and taking precautions against unforeseen market trends. In order to acquire the necessary knowledge about local markets as well as competence, scaling the organisation to make it capable of operating locally as well as in a “distanciated” mode is crucial. Trust is part and parcel of this scaling, that is, designing institutional procedures facilitating the “right” type of trust.

When analyzing rescaling of trust and vice versa, the use of standards should be considered. Standards aim to govern the conduct of agencies, companies, employees, and citizens in order to produce more predictable outcomes, according to some pre-defined criteria. This phenomenon has been linked to neoliberal governing; for instance, benchmarking has been described as a “push for constant innovation (for example, higher standards and performance levels), notions of ‘creative destruction’ and ‘lead-sector development’, and last, but by no means least, the more rapid circulation of capital” (Larner and Le Heron 2002:763). However, Higgins and Larner (2010) downplay the neoliberal aspect, making it more open-ended and underlining that “it is important to focus on how standards are rendered workable in local interactions and settings” (p. 206). Suffice it here to say that standards might serve the neoliberal agenda as well as counter-actions against worsening work conditions. Of more interest is any possible link between standards and trust, and the scaling of trust.

Standards might reduce uncertainties and consequently also possibly reduce or soften the need for trust relations, thereby moving the issue into the confidence domain.

However, it might also very well be that standards reduce the need for trust among certain actors and make trust even more decisive for other actors, or replace it with some sort of distrust. For instance, Henman and Dean (2010) describe how ICT standards used in social policy involve the social sorting of groups of people, and Bain and Hatanaka (2010) describe how third-party certification privileges the global North's expert knowledge over the global South's local and experienced-based knowledge. From the packaging case presented above, the SAP-standard shows how it opened up the possibility of transferring power and reduced uncertainties, and thereby reduced the need for one type of trust and potentially enhanced the need for different type. This case was clearly spatial. Another case in point is the development of standards for assessing loan takers in home building. Here models, which can be understood as standards, were developed in order to move from trust and relationally based judgment to appraisals/assessments, which are less based on trust. However, as described in Orderud (2011), this shift did not discard trust as such, but rather made knowledge gained through trust relations more systematic and transparent. In short, changing conditions apparently downplay or discard the need for economic relations to be based on trust, but then trust makes its way back in as a basis for the underlying knowledge.

7.3 The Cultural Turn and Trust, and What About the Politics?

The message that emerges from the above discussion is that the neoliberal hegemony went beyond just changing the nature of trust within economics and removing trust from economic relations. This change brought economic thinking and economic motives into the field of culture, and thereby influenced how citizens interact, including their bases for trust and distrust. Concurrently, the nature and scale of trust in economic relations also changed, or were replaced by cooperation without trust (Cook et al. 2005), and it may be that this change reflects the rise of the network society (Castells 1996, 2001). However, the intrusion of economically based self-interested behavior in analyses of culture, including consumer culture, may have opened the road in the opposite direction, allowing "culture" with a modified trust dimension to enter into economic analysis. Anyway, in this process trust has been altered and rescaled according to the technological and institutional restructuring of the economy.

Scales of trust and distrust (both personal and generalized), and its rescaling, are spatially relational through the interactions of actors and institutions. In this way, trust might be a contributing factor to the emergence of particular territorial formations. Here it is important to recognise that a multiplicity of spatial formations might coexist, some more solid and long term than others: for instance, states potentially represent fairly stable territorial formations depending on the strength of generalised trust and power structures; industrial clusters are more prone to changes, but might

linger on depending on the strength of trust relations; and companies are generally volatile regarding their spatial organization. Some companies might have a fairly long life in one location but with distanced relations emerging and, as shown above, the micro power structure might change.

The cases presented above are largely de-coupled from politics. Obviously, politics is part and parcel of altering the bases of and types of trust, as well as the scales of trust, and how these processes contribute in making, remaking, and breaking up different territorial formations. At the global scale are structural changes initiated by the capital's demand for renewing the basis for accumulation and profit (Harvey 2005), which is currently expressed by the different versions of neoliberal hegemony. This has meant that countries around the world have been imposing quite a number of measures to deregulate and integrate national economies in the global economy. In the West, the outcome has been "variegated capitalism," with different political forces fighting to implement their own neoliberal versions.

The packaging company case describes how new technology was used to alter production-related decisions. Moving power upwards in the organization might be linked to overall neoliberal policies of facilitating the accumulation of capital. The NPM case and single purpose units in the public sector, together with privatisation and outsourcing, are influencing on the conditions for running labor unions, with some political forces trying to weaken the power of unions in order to reduce wages and other labor-related expenses. Bourdieu (1998:3) argued that the neoliberal project seeks "to weaken or abolish collective standards or solidarities". This is, however, not a unidirectional trend but is contentious and filled with struggle: for instance, Republicans in the U.S. used the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis to attack the rights of unions in the public sector to negotiate collective agreements. Similarly, the business association in Norway in the wake of the introduction of the E.U.'s Directive on Temporary Staff Recruitment Agencies argued for relaxing regulations of generalizing collective agreements between businesses and labor for employees (Seierstad 2011). Although the U.S. and Norway are far apart regarding how the economy is organized and managed, there are similarities in how capital and the political Right are pushing to weaken the position of labor in its struggle for higher wages and improved working conditions.

The home-building case describes how neoliberal deregulation of housing is restructuring the home-building sector, with more weight placed on profit. This might also relate to the provision of affordable housing for the poor. In practice, for new homes this means building in not-so-attractive locations, and for second-hand homes it means allocating the poor to neighborhoods that are in a process of decay or are already characterized as run-down. Trust and distrust within the home-building sector involve selling homes and generating profit under existing market conditions. What consequences might follow for residential differentiation, segregation, discrimination, and ghetto formation depend on wage and wealth disparities, public redistribution policies, and housing subsidies.

Embedded in these processes and influenced by them is generalized trust, which many theorists argue provides the necessary glue for a cohesive society. We might

wonder how policies creating larger inequalities in society are able to sustain or develop this glue, and some scholars have argued it does not; on the contrary, neoliberal policies potentially cause the erosion of trust and outright (class-based) distrust. In this respect, the issue of laying the basis for cooperation without trust, as noted by Cook et al. (2005), emerges as a central issue under the neoliberal project, which uses the lack of trust to discipline labor through the formation of the “right” type of trust. This chapter argues that altering what constitutes trust is a decisive part of the neoliberal project of individualization, with its focus on markets and consumption, a project that is highly differentiated according to class. Consequently, trust is very much about cultural politics and making culture resemble the market economy. In this reading, the existence of trust reflects the capitalist model citizen and the acceptance of large social disparities. Consequently, it is important to link trust (and distrust) to theories of justice, including spatial justice.

References

- Aglietta, M. (1998). Capitalism at the turn of the century: Regulation theory and the challenge of social change. *New Left Review*, 232, 41–90.
- Amin, A., & Thrift, N. (2002). *Cities: Reimagining the urban*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Aoyama, Y., & Ratick, S. (2007). Trust, transactions and information technologies in the logistics industry. *Economic Geography*, 83(2), 159–180.
- Asheim, B. (2000). Industrial districts: The contribution of Marshall and beyond. In G. Clark, M. Feldman, & M. Gertler (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of economic geography* (pp. 413–431). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bain, C., & Hatanaka, M. (2010). The practice of third-party certification: Enhancing environmental sustainability and social justice in the global South. In V. Higgins & W. Larner (Eds.), *Calculating the social: Standards and the reconfiguring of governing* (pp. 56–74). Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Birch, K., & Mykhnenko, V. (2010). Introduction: A world turned right way up. In K. Birch & V. Mykhnenko (Eds.), *The rise and fall of neoliberalism: The collapse of an economic order* (pp. 1–22). New York: Zed Books.
- Birch, K., & Tickell, A. (2010). Making neoliberal order in the United States. In K. Birch & V. Mykhnenko (Eds.), *The rise and fall of neoliberalism: The collapse of an economic order* (pp. 42–59). New York: Zed Books.
- Bourdieu, P. (1998). The essence of neoliberalism. *Le Monde Diplomatique* (English ed., J. Shapiro, Trans.). Paris. Available at <http://mondediplo.com/1998/12/08bourdieu>. Accessed November 8, 2010.
- Boyer, R. (2000). The political in the era of globalization and finance: Focus on some regulation school research. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 24(2), 274–322.
- Brand, U., & Wissen, M. (2005). Neoliberal globalization and the internationalization of protest: A European perspective. *Antipode*, 37(1), 10–17.
- Brenner, N., & Theodore, N. (2002). From the “New Localism” to the spaces of neoliberalism. *Antipode*, 34(3), 342–347.
- Castells, M. (1996). *The information age: Economy, society and culture. Volume I: The rise of the network society*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- Castells, M. (2001). *The internet galaxy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Chapura, M. (2009). Scale, causality, complexity and emergence: Rethinking scale’s ontological significance. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 34(4), 462–474.

- Christensen, T., & Lægread, P. (2001). New public management: The effects of contractualism and devolution on political control. *Public Management Review*, 3(1), 74–94.
- Cook, K., Hardin, R., & Levi, M. (2005). *Cooperation without trust?* New York: Russell Sage.
- Elster, J. (1983). *Explaining technical change: A case study in the philosophy of science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). *The three worlds of welfare capitalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Esping-Andersen, G. (1996). *Welfare states in transition: National adaptations in global economies*. London: Sage.
- Ettlinger, N. (2003). Cultural economic geography and a relational and microspace approach to trusts, rationalities, networks, and change in collaborative workplaces. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 3(2), 145–171.
- Farrell, H. (2009). Institutions and midlevel explanations of trust. In K. Cook, M. Levi, & R. Hardin (Eds.), *Whom can we trust: How groups, networks, and institutions make trust possible* (pp. 127–148). New York: Russell Sage.
- Foddy, M., & Yamagishi, T. (2009). Group-based trust. In K. S. Cook, M. Levi, & R. Hardin (Eds.), *Whom can we trust: How groups, networks, and institutions make trust possible* (pp. 17–41). New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Giddens, A. (1994). Risk, trust, reflexivity. In U. Beck, A. Giddens, & S. Lash (Eds.), *Reflexive modernization: Politics, tradition and aesthetics in the modern social order* (pp. 184–197). Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 91(3), 481–510.
- Hardin, R. (2002). *Trust and trustworthiness*. New York: Russell Sage.
- Hart, G. (2008). The provocations of neoliberalism: Contesting the nation and liberation after apartheid. *Antipode*, 38(4), 678–705.
- Harvey, D. (2005). *A brief history of neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- He, S., & Wu, F. (2009). China's emerging neoliberal urbanism: Perspectives from urban redevelopment. *Antipode*, 41(2), 282–304.
- Henman, P., & Dean, M. (2010). E-government and the production of standardized individuality. In V. Higgins & W. Larner (Eds.), *Calculating the social: Standards and the reconfiguring of governing* (pp. 77–93). Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Higgins, V., & Larner, W. (2010). From standardization to standardizing work. In V. Higgins & W. Larner (Eds.), *Calculating the social: Standards and the reconfiguring of governing* (pp. 205–218). Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Jessop, B., Brenner, N., & Jones, M. (2008). Theorising sociospatial relations. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 26(3), 389–401.
- Jones, J. P., III, Woodward, K., & Marston, S. (2007). Situating flatness. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 32(2), 264–276.
- Kohl, B. (2006). Challenges to neoliberal hegemony in Bolivia. *Antipode*, 38(2), 304–326.
- Kramer, R., & Cook, K. (Eds.). (2004). *Trust and distrust in organizations: Dilemmas and approaches*. New York: Russell Sage.
- Larner, W. (2003). Neoliberalism? *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 21(5), 509–512.
- Larner, W., & Le Heron, R. (2002). The spaces and subjects of a globalising economy: A situated exploration of method. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 20(6), 753–774.
- Leitner, H., & Miller, B. (2007). Scale and the limitations of ontological debate: A commentary on Marston, Jones and Woodward. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 32(1), 116–125.
- Leitner, H., Sheppard, E., & Sziarto, K. (2008). The spatialities of contentious politics. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 33(2), 157–172.
- Lewis, O. (1970). *Anthropological essays*. New York: Random House.
- Lorenz, E. (1988). Neither friends nor strangers: Informal networks of subcontracting in French industry. In D. Gambetta (Ed.), *Trust: Making and breaking and cooperative relations* (pp. 194–210). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Luhmann, N. (1979). *Trust and power*. Chichester: Wiley.

- Luhmann, N. (1988). Familiarity, confidence, trust: Problems, and alternatives. In D. Gambetta (Ed.), *Trust: Making and breaking and cooperative relations* (pp. 94–107). Oxford: Blackwell.
- MacKinnon, D. (2010). Reconstructing scale: Towards a new scalar politics. *Progress in Human Geography*, 35(1), 21–36.
- Mahon, R. (2006). Of scalar hierarchies and welfare redesign: Child care in three Canadian cities. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 31(4), 452–466.
- Marston, S., Jones, J. P., & Woodward, K. (2005). Human geography without scale. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 30(4), 416–432.
- McCarthy, J. (2005). Scale, sovereignty, and strategy in environmental governance. *Antipode*, 37(4), 731–753.
- McEvily, B., & Zaheer, A. (2004). Architects of trust: The role of network facilitators in geographical clusters. In R. Kramer & K. Cook (Eds.), *Trust and distrust in organizations: Dilemmas and approaches* (pp. 189–213). New York: Russell Sage.
- Miller, G. (2004). Monitoring, rules, and the control paradox: Can the good soldier Svejik be trusted? In R. Kramer & K. Cook (Eds.), *Trust and distrust in organizations: Dilemmas and approaches*. New York: Russell Sage.
- Möllering, G. (2006). Trust, institutions, agency: Towards a neoinstitutional theory of trust. In R. Bachmann & A. Zaheer (Eds.), *Handbook of trust research*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Moynihan, D. (1965). *The Negro family: The case for national action*. Washington, DC: Office of Policy Planning and Research, U.S. Department of Labor.
- Murphy, J. (2006). Building trust in economic space. *Progress in Human Geography*, 30(4), 427–450.
- Murray, C. (1984). *Losing ground: American social policy, 1950–1980*. New York: Basic Books.
- Nooteboom, B. (2002). *Trust. Forms. Foundations, functions, failures and figures*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Orderud, G. (2006). The Norwegian home-building industry – Locally embedded or in the space of flows? *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 30(2), 384–402.
- Orderud, G. (2007). Is trust a driver for territorially embedded industrial systems? A case study of the home-building industry in Norway. *Geografiska Annaler Series*, 4, 341–359.
- Orderud, G. (2011). Finance, home building, and urban residential structuring. *Antipode - A Radical Journal of Geography*, 43(4), 1215–1249.
- Orderud, G., Bjørnsen, H., Sørli, K., & Vanberg, V. (1997). *An industrial analysis of Buskerud County* (NIBR report 1997:27). Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research (in Norwegian).
- Osborne, D., & Gaebler, T. (1992). *Reinventing government: How the entrepreneurial spirit is transforming the public sector*. Reading: Addison-Wesley.
- Peck, J., & Theodore, N. (2007). Variegated capitalism. *Progress in Human Geography*, 31(6), 731–772.
- Perreault, T. (2006). From the guerra del agua to the guerra del gas: Resource governance, neoliberalism and popular protest in Bolivia. *Antipode*, 38(1), 150–172.
- Robertson, M. (2007). Discovering price in all the wrong places: The work of commodity definition and price under neoliberal environmental policy. *Antipode*, 39(3), 500–526.
- Rose, P. (2006). From Washington to post-Washington Consensus: The triumph of human capital. In K. Jomo & B. Fine (Eds.), *The new development economics: After the Washington Consensus*. London: Zed Books.
- Sayre, N. (2009). Scale. In N. Castree, D. Demeritt, D. Liverman, & B. Rhoads (Eds.), *A companion to environmental geography* (pp. 81–94). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Scott, A., & Storper, M. (2003). Regions, globalization, development. *Regional Studies*, 37(6/7), 579–593.
- Seierstad, D. (2011, March 26). The business association against generalisation. *Klassekampen* (in Norwegian).
- Seligman, A. (1997). *The problem of trust*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Skelcher, C. (2000). Changing images of the state: Overloaded, hollowed out, congested. *Public Policy and Administration*, 15(3), 3–19.

- Small, M., Harding, D., & Lamont, M. (2010). Reconsidering culture and poverty. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 629(1), 6–27.
- Smith, N. (1993). Homeless/global: Scaling places. In J. Bird, B. Curtis, T. Putnam, G. Robertson, & L. Tickner (Eds.), *Mapping the futures: Local cultures, global change* (pp. 87–119). London: Routledge.
- Stiglitz, J. (1998). *More instruments and broader goals: Moving toward the post-Washington Consensus*. 1998 Wider Annual Lecture, Helsinki. http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/download/papers/2005_More_Instruments.pdf. Accessed March 21, 1998.
- Stiglitz, J. (2008). From the Washington Consensus towards a new global governance. In N. Serra & J. Stiglitz (Eds.), *The Washington Consensus reconsidered* (pp. 3–13). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Storper, M. (1997). *The regional world: Territorial development in a global economy*. New York: Guilford Press.
- Swyngedouw, E. (2000). Authoritarian governance, power, and the politics of rescaling. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 18(1), 63–76.
- Swyngedouw, E. (2007). Technonatural revolutions: The scalar politics of Franco's hydro-social dream for Spain, 1939–1975. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 32(1), 9–28.
- Sydow, J., & Windeler, A. (2003). Knowledge, trust, and control: Managing tensions and contradictions in a regional network of service firms. *International Studies of Management and Organizations*, 33(2), 69–99.
- Sztompka, P. (1999). *Trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Thrift, N. (2000). Pandora's box? Cultural geographies of economics. In G. Clark, M. Feldman, & M. Gertler (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of economic geography* (pp. 689–704). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Thrift, N. (2004). Intensities of feeling: Towards a spatial politics of affect. *Geografiska Annaler Series, B86*(1), 57–78.
- Twenge, J., & Campbell, W. (2009). *The narcissism epidemic: Living in the age of entitlement*. New York: Free Press.
- Warf, B., & Arias, S. (Eds.). (2008). *The spatial turn: Interdisciplinary perspectives*. New York: Routledge.
- Willig, R. (2009). Self-realization options: Contemporary marching order in the pursuit of recognition. *Acta Sociologica*, 52(4), 350–364.
- Wilson, W. (1987). *The truly disadvantaged: The inner city, the underclass and public policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Wilson, W. (2010). Why both social structure and culture matter in a holistic analysis of inner-city poverty. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 629(1), 200–219.
- Zolin, R., & Hinds, P. (2004). Trust in context: The development of interpersonal trust in geographically distributed work. In R. Kramer & K. Cook (Eds.), *Trust and distrust in organizations: Dilemmas and approaches* (pp. 214–238). New York: Russell Sage.

Chapter 8

Building the Beloved Community Through Techno Music Production in Detroit

Deborah Che

Musical production can be a means of fostering community-based economic development. This chapter examines Detroit techno music production and the Submerge collective in its fostering an economic model reflecting community-based theoretical work/interventions conceptualized by Martin Luther King, Jr., William Bunge, and James and Grace Lee Boggs, which connected the global and local in addressing the problems of America's deindustrialized inner cities. Techno music production in Detroit, in part an artistic response to deindustrialization, can be seen as social in nature, caught in what King (1963) terms "an inescapable network of mutuality" that built the catalog and its worldwide reputation. In light of the limited opportunities for city youth given deindustrialization and the defunding of public schools (particularly its arts programs), Detroit's techno community also has been active in building a model of musical production that would foster current artists as well as the next generation of musicians while producing a critical alternative to mainstream urban music that glorifies violence and programs failure. Unlike Richard Florida's-inspired cool cities initiatives in Detroit and Michigan, which focus on attracting and keeping footloose creative workers who have individualized, temporary commitments to place, Detroit's globally recognized techno musical production represents a creative and mutually supportive community that has long been part of the city that has provided them with inspiration and to which it is committed.

D. Che (✉)

School of Tourism and Hospitality Management, Southern Cross University,
Coolangatta, Australia
e-mail: deborah.che@scu.edu.au

8.1 Beyond Economics, Embracing Community

The health of the black working and middle classes has been interconnected with that of U.S. manufacturing, and in particular, that of Detroit's automakers. Henry Ford offered the then-unheard of \$5 a day wage to both black and white workers. Even though blacks were often relegated to unskilled jobs such as sweeping the floors and pouring hot steel in foundries, these wages helped fuel the Great Migration from the U.S. South. As a result, from 1910 to the 1930s, the city's black population increased by more than 600%, a rate four times faster than Chicago's (Dzwonkowski 2009). Good factory wages also bolstered African American home and car ownership as well as black businesses catering to auto workers. Detroit became home of the most affluent African-American population in the U.S., with the largest percentage of homeowners and the highest comparative wages (Mahler 2009). The auto worker was therefore an embodiment of success in the black community. Gwendolyn Warren, who headed the Infernos, the teen club of Detroit's Fitzgerald neighborhood, and later the Detroit Geographical Expedition and Institute (DGEI), characterized the black "eligible young bachelor" as the guy who "has got a gig at the factory and you know damn well he is going to get a check every Friday." In contrast in the white community, she thought the eligible bachelor might be the guy with a college education (Warren 1971:10). However even by the 1960s, growing automation, business slumps and periodic waves of unemployment and strikes in the auto industry that employed her neighbors, negatively affected Fitzgerald (Bunge 1971). The flight of manufacturing, capital, and population (Table 8.1) from Detroit to its suburbs compounded the impact of the cyclical nature of the auto industry on employment for Fitzgerald and other African-American residents of Detroit. From 1950 to 1956, 55 of the 124 manufacturing firms located in the suburbs had moved out of Detroit (James 2004). Additionally all 25 of the plants the Big Three automakers (Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler) built in the metropolitan Detroit area between 1947 and 1958 were in suburban communities. Most were located more than 15 miles from the center city (Sugrue 1996), which curtailed job opportunities for many black Detroiters, who, unlike whites, could not move with the jobs to the suburbs given lower incomes and housing discrimination. Black youth did not have seniority in the plants and saw automation curtailing their future by eliminating the factory jobs that blacks had struggled for (and won) at the beginning of World War II. They thus rebelled in 1967 against both the automation that made them expendable or in Vietnam, and against the police force which many black Detroiters considered a white occupation army in an increasingly black city (G. Boggs, Interview, May 25, 2008).

In the face of the economic and social crises facing urban African-America, theorists and activists proposed community centered alternatives. Stemming from his involvement in the Fitzgerald Community Council, which was organized to maintain high-quality schools and fight block busting and slum expansion as the residential color line fell in Detroit, William Bunge increasingly focused on the concerns of youth who he saw as key to the future and building community. Using

Table 8.1 Detroit's population, 1940–2010

Year	Black	Black (%)	White	White (%)	Total
1940	149,119	9.2	1,474,333	90.8	1,623,452
1950	300,506	16.2	1,545,847	83.6	1,849,568
1960	482,223	28.9	1,182,970	70.8	1,670,144
1970	659,022	43.6	815,823	54.0	1,511,482
1980	754,274	62.7	402,077	33.4	1,203,339
1990	775,833	75.5	212,804	20.7	1,027,974
2000	770,728	81.0	100,371	10.6	951,270
2010	590,226	82.7	75,758	10.6	713,777

Sources: Detroit News (2007), U.S. Census Bureau (2011)

innovative and politically charged mapping, he argued for safer play environments by highlighting the deaths of black children along routes used by white suburban commuters and for improved school districting and increased local control of Detroit Public Schools (DPS), which had a growing African-American student population, but were controlled by a white school board. Bunge also indicted the schools, defunded by the auto industry which pressed for decreased taxes during the recession of the early 1960s by threatening to move to lower tax areas in the U.S. South and Canada, and by angry white voters defeating millage increases, for preparing youth for factory jobs of the past (Bunge 1971). They did not impart technical expertise needed for the industry's future work. In contrast the DGEI, which Bunge initiated by bringing together academicians and neighborhood activists, would provide a more participatory, practice-oriented education experience that would also facilitate neighborhood decision-making and transformation. In the DGEI, local residents would identify the research orientation that would address community problems and needs, while academic geographers would impart the technical skills and the theory to connect local experience, thinking, and action with national and global challenges such as deindustrialization, which had had such devastating local impacts. In the DGEI educational process, community benefits would be emphasized, rather than those of the university or individual, thus better fitting the traditional group orientation in African-American neighborhoods (Horvath 1971).

The DGEI's educational aims could fit well into Martin Luther King, Jr.'s Beloved Community concept. In his 1967 "Where Do We Go From Here: Community or Chaos?," King recognized that the post-Selma, post-Voting Rights Act Civil Rights movement needed to further structural, systematic changes to eliminate poverty and unemployment in the U.S. and abroad. He argued for a revolution of values involving a shift from a "thing-oriented" to a "person-oriented" society in order to restore communities, noting "When machines and computers, profit motives and property rights are considered more important than people, the giant triplets of racism, materialism, and militarism are incapable of being conquered" (Boggs 2007). King envisioned a Beloved Community, an interconnected community bound together by agape, a love that would encompass understanding, goodwill, and restoration. Community development, rather than individual materialism, would be emphasized.

The Beloved Community concept which drew from his earlier civil rights work in the South as well as his concerns with economic problems and segregation in northern cities such as Detroit where he gave his first “I Have A Dream” speech that Berry Gordy released on his Black Forum label would go beyond capitalism’s emphasis on the market, individualistic competition and profit maximization. It would incorporate social and economic justice principles while recognizing needs of the economically oppressed in the U.S. and worldwide (Inwood 2009).

Given their involvement in Detroit for over 50 years, autoworker James Boggs and his wife Grace Lee Boggs, various left, labor, Black Power, and environmental activists, most fully implemented theoretically-informed, youth-oriented, community-based formulations. The aftermath of the 1967 riots highlighted the distinction between a rebellion and a revolution for them. While Marxism had been based on the idea that when the social forces became more militant, they would sweep away those in power and the workers organized and disciplined by the process of production would be ready to take over and create a new society, it was obvious to Grace Lee Boggs (Interview, May 25, 2008) that the young people who rebelled were not going to create a new society. The Marxist tradition that she had been working in and whose ideas and ideologies had been adequate for the industrial epoch were no longer adequate for the new epoch they were entering. The Boggses began a critical reinterpretation of Marxism with an emphasis on the grassroots. While supporting the election of Coleman Young as Detroit’s first black mayor in 1973 and his subsequent integration of City Hall and the police and fire departments (G. Boggs, Interview, May 25, 2008), they were critical of Young’s considering the problems of deindustrialization, disinvestment, mass unemployment and the crime/crack epidemic of the mid 1980s as solely economic. He minimized human and social relations (Boggs 1998). As such, Young addressed them by using tax abatements and developer-driven megaprojects (i.e., Poletown and the Renaissance Center), which failed because they were “based on the illusion that we can bring back the good old days when Detroit was the auto capital of the world, and hundreds of thousands of workers came to the city to do manufacturing jobs at the decent pay which had been won through the organization of the union” (Boggs 1988). Given outsourcing and high-tech, which reduced the number of workers needed to produce goods and services, and their opposition to Young’s casino gaming solution to unemployment which he argued would bring 50,000–80,000 jobs, the Boggses proposed small-scale development based on redeveloped, redefined, self-reliant, sustainable multicultural communities (Boggs 2008). James Boggs argued that Detroiters have to “begin developing our own small enterprises growing our own food, creating our own businesses, developing a community and making that rather than economic growth the purpose of the society” (Boggs 1998). This alternative to casino gambling and reliance on the auto industry would involve a new model of production based upon serving human and community needs, rather than upon the free marketplace and large-scale industrial jobs. Such small enterprises would enhance human skills in conjunction with new technologies and constantly readjust to serve the needs of local consumers. This new model would also require reconsidering the purpose of cities such as Detroit. Instead of being places one migrated to

for jobs with large paternalistic corporations, cities would be places “based on people living in communities who realize that their human identity, love, respect and responsibility for self is based on that for others than on material wealth and not as existing to make capital for production or dependent on capital to live” (Boggs 1988). The Boggesses’ reformulation of cities, communities, and economic enterprises strongly mirrored King’s Beloved Community.

In Detroit, the Boggesses put their ideas into practice for youth in ways that also echoed the DGEI. In a focus on the youth made redundant by deindustrialization and susceptible to the drug culture, James Boggs and other activists initiated Detroit Summer, which echoed the Civil Rights era Mississippi Freedom Summer in calling for university students to work with local youth as part of “an Intergenerational Multicultural Youth Program/Movement to rebuild, redefine, respirit Detroit from the Ground Up.” As with the DGEI, learning would come from practice. In contrast with school systems following the “command and control” model created 100 years ago to prepare young people for factory work (Smith 2008), Detroit Summer would foster youth decision-making, self-confidence, skills in working with one another, and activities such as planting community gardens, painting public murals, rehabilitating houses, repairing bikes needed for alternative means of transportation, and organizing and participating in workshops, youth-led media arts projects, community-wide potlucks, speak-outs and intergenerational dialogues (Boggs 2006). While the Boggesses were not aware of Bunge’s DGEI and King’s Beloved Community when establishing Detroit Summer (Boggs 2006), all these theorist-activists’ formulations stressed youth and the community as the basis and focus of education, direct action, production, and transformation in the deindustrialized city. In this chapter, I argue that Detroit techno music production is an artistic response to deindustrialization, unemployment, and the drug crisis, as exemplified by the highly-influential second-wave musical collective, Underground Resistance (UR), and Submerge Distribution founded by UR’s “Mad” Mike Banks, and operationalizes ideas put forth by King, Bunge, and the Boggesses in their emphasis on youth, community, and the social. Instead of being driven by individualistic economic motives, Detroit’s African American techno musicians have built a beloved community in Detroit and beyond.

8.2 Techno Music and Building a Beloved Community in Detroit

Years before Toffler’s “Third Wave” and the birth of Techno, Detroit has been known as a vibrant music community. John Lee Hooker, George Clinton & Parliament Funkadelic, the Electrifying Mojo, and of course Berry Gordy’s Motown left a deep legacy of Black musical history to America’s Seventh City, a dying and largely discarded monument to the age of industry and mass production. Initiated by the forward musical visions of Juan Atkins, Kevin Saunderson, and Derrick May, influenced by Detroit’s rich urban soundtrack, and inspired by the futuristic sounds of Prince, Kraftwerk, Giorgio Moroder, The B52’s, New Order, and Depeche Mode, over the last 10 years a legion of ‘techno rebels’ have spawned a Black musical revolution that has shaped a generation. Detroit techno is about taking the

pure essence of human emotions, soul, mixing it with technology, and putting it on wax; an ultimate depiction of Toffler's future shock manifesto in its fusion of man and machine (Detroit: Beyond the Third Wave 1996).

Detroit techno flowed from a music-rich environment where industrial production built, then largely abandoned the city. The influential DJ The Electrifying Mojo's free-form mix of European instrumentals, new wave, funk, rock, soul, and anything that fit the "mood-mat," not a radio format (Mojo 1995), helped shaped techno. Instead of letting radio be an instrument of divisiveness (i.e., the white and black radio stations prevalent on the dial), Mojo's shows connected listeners and genres of music including the funk and electronic music respectively embodied by Parliament Funkadelic and Kraftwerk that young African-Americans heard and melded into a sound all their own. In addition to opening minds through music, Mojo also spurred listeners of his 1980–1990s radio shows to think about the future and present-day social events, economic problems, and also potential solutions facing African American youth in Detroit and other urban areas. Given the dramatic decline of auto work in Detroit resulting in the city having half as many manufacturing jobs in 1982 as it had in 1963, a number which was halved again by 1992 (Boyle 2001), and the deadly rise of crack cocaine, Mojo (1995:433, bolded and italicized as in the original) stressed in his prelude to "Where Have All the Dreamers Gone":

One of the most pressing problems in African-American communities today is the *high and unacceptable* rate of adult and youth unemployment. The gross economic deprivation of the inner cities all across America coupled with a massive proliferation of *drugs* and *guns* in these communities have resulted in *violence, bloodshed, unprecedented hopelessness, and near anarchy*. There is a need for a strong, forceful, evangelical wave of entrepreneurship to sweep through the inner cities and provide decent jobs at decent wages. ... As much as children are encouraged to become lawyers, teachers, and doctors, they should also be encouraged to become business owners, manufacturers, designers, and distributors. We have raised too many children to silently join the consumer class without the vision to become part of the producer class. Perhaps it is time for parents to refocus their children from dreams of being participants in the *consumer spectrum* to *visions of being prolific* on the *producing-side* of the economy.

Influenced by Mojo's music and ideas, Detroit's young techno pioneers set out to map a new music-based, entrepreneurial future for themselves. With a DIY ethic like the punks, they utilized inexpensive technology such as the Roland TR 808 and 909 drum machines and the TB 303 Bassline costing \$1,500–2,000 (Berk 2000) to create music and what became a global industry. Watten (1997) argued that by developing an industry based on music that utilized references to machines, mass production, and automation in a city where more people were losing jobs due to automation, Detroit techno's African American creators' use of computers was a radical cultural reconfiguration. The falling cost of technology which facilitated machines' substitution for labor also facilitated the Detroiters' use of machines to create music, become recording artists, and out of necessity, become record label owners. Juan Atkins, techno's "Originator," pressed a 12-in. record himself when his demos were rejected by other labels. He started his Metroplex label in 1985 in order to release "No UFO's," in which he sang of the possibility of seeing UFOs, despite the denial of their existence. In addition to the DIY ethic, Detroit techno also

embodied an earlier African-American self-empowerment philosophy (Rubin 2000) as well as musical traditions, which linked the future, transformation, liberation, technology, and pan-Africanism (Connell and Gibson 2003; Williams 2001), and that expressed their living conditions and what could not be spoken (Smith 1997). Atkins explained the aesthetic that drove him saying: “To me, the system is bent on keeping people in despair, hopeless, not wanting to achieve anything, so if you keep your head up high maybe you’ll start realizing things that you never thought possible, and seeing a UFO is probably the ultimate impossibility” (Rubin 2000:116). First-wave techno artists and high school friends, Derrick May (the “Innovator”) and Kevin Saunderson (the “Elevator”) similarly dreamed, created music, and started labels (Transmat and KMS respectively). Like Atkins’ Metroplex label, they had studios located on a section of Gratiot Avenue in Detroit that was called ‘Techno Boulevard’. Musicians in close proximity to another fostered a community of mutual learning and creativity as they remixed each other’s material (Sicko 1999).

Detroit techno was also noted for its unique sound and products. Second wave techno artist Jeff Mills, who was known as The Wizard on Detroit radio due to his turntable and mixing skills, and Mike Banks co-founded Underground Resistance, the music collective with a name that reflected their parents’ backgrounds of having supported the ‘resistant’ Dr. Martin Luther King’s Civil Rights Movement and anti-war campaigns (Von Thülen 2007) and that was/is responsible for some of the most innovative sounds and products. Jeff Mills and UR developed the digital innovation of the ‘locked’ circular instead of spiral groove that was featured on UR’s *Discovers the Rings of Saturn X-102 EP* (Sicko 1999). The album’s 14 songs, named after the planet’s rings and moons, had track lengths and widths on the vinyl copies that corresponded to the actual sizes of and distances between the celestial bodies (Sicko 2010). Working with former Motown sound engineer and veteran record cutter Ron Murphy to bring out the bass, or the bottom end, UR records would be mastered so hot that the needle would almost jump off (Copeland 2004). Messages were also etched into the records, furthering mystery and distinctiveness. The records by UR and every major Detroit techno artist then were pressed at Archer Record Pressing, one of three to five such facilities in the U.S. and eight to ten worldwide (Aguilar 2009). Marrying affordable, accessible technologies with human skills and innovation, Detroit’s techno producers did not have to maximize selling as many copies as possible of one record as the major labels did (Gebesmair 2009). By developing a competitive niche in the music industry that exported mainly to Europe and Japan, where techno exploded, Detroit techno thrived as a small enterprise alternative.

Submerge Distribution, which was founded by UR’s Mike Banks in 1992 to handle the day-to-day business functions (pressing, mastering, invoicing, wholesaling and retailing including via mail order) for Detroit techno, in particular embodied the Beloved Community alternative to profit-maximizing, large-scale production. Learning from Juan Atkins, who shared his experiences with licensing, shipping and selling records, and distribution (Copeland 2004), Submerge developed a new, networked collective business model with its own means of manufacturing, distributing, and promoting recordings and merchandise from many local techno artists’ labels (McCutcheon 2007). In bringing the best talents

on different labels together under a collaborative umbrella, Submerge made Detroit's underground (and above ground) techno community an economically viable, artistically independent one that permitted experimentation (Sicko 2010). As a one-stop shop where one could buy all the Detroit techno music, it supported the creative community by enabling artists like Kevin Saunderson who were frequently performing overseas to continue recording on his KMS label while distributing through Submerge. Submerge exported about 80% of the city's electronic music labels to retail customers (Casper 2004). It has expanded to serving the global techno community by distributing labels like Final Frontier (Italy), Diaspora Records (Ireland), Sud Electronic (London) (Copeland 2004). While Submerge largely profited from sales external to the city and thus differed somewhat from the Boggses' emphasis on an enterprise serving local consumers, Submerge represents a community-building small-business model (McCutcheon 2007). That it fostered the development of the entire techno community in Detroit and abroad, not solely on maximizing profits, fits the Beloved Community enterprise model. Its Detroit-based business also helped support the wider community, providing needed jobs in Detroit, as anywhere from 30 to 50 people were attached to a single record, from the UPS man, the mastering guy, the label printer, those at the pressing plant, etc. (Copeland 2004).

Submerge has continued to support the Detroit techno community as it has broadened to an entertainment company with a focus on Detroit electronic music. In handling recording, management, distribution, licensing, and publishing for Detroit's techno artists, it has introduced them to new audiences via products such as video games. Mike Banks brokered a deal with Rockstar Games that in return for getting Submerge on the soundtrack for its popular street racing video game, "Midnight Club 3: Dub Edition," required Rockstar to include both long-time and younger Submerge artists, feature Detroit streetscapes and muscle cars, and make a \$5,000 donation to the Detroit Youth Center located down the street from Submerge headquarters. Although the licensing fees just covered the cost of setting up the deal with Rockstar Games, the arrangement involved building relationships for and increasing public awareness of the Detroit techno community (Carter 2005).

8.3 Saving and Fostering Detroit's Youth Through Techno

I shall no longer hold my peace and watch my community be dismantled one block, one house, one brick, and one person at a time. ... I pray that I never sink to such a tragic and abominable level that many in the radio industry have found themselves. ... Those of you who can sit back and watch all of those young boys being murdered, you just let the music play. Take your commercial breaks – feeding time – please!

The Electrifying Mojo (1996:xxix) on music he considered a soundtrack to genocide.

For The Electrifying Mojo and the Detroit techno artists he influenced, music was not just about generating jobs and revenue, but on sustaining life and a

community by saving its youth. Music as they conceived it would allow listeners to imagine or dream, not glorify the negativity and violence of the drug culture. Given the explosion in crack cocaine sales and associated killings through the early and mid-1980s in Detroit, the association of drugs with techno in Britain was troubling to many in Detroit's techno community (Sicko 1999). To counteract the poison of drugs and to defend the community from "aural and visual land mines programming people for failure," Mike Banks and UR aimed to "bring futuristic music into the 'hood to inspire people to have a future, to think about a future, to imagine" as Mojo had done for them. Coming from a military background, Banks explained his position:

There's many, many things in the 'hood designed to crush you. Me coming, I like the military background, I admire the crush. I admire you put 40 ounces in the neighborhood and every weekend 3, 4 hundred mugs shoot each other up, just off some beer. I admire that you use some of the most beautiful women in our culture to advertise some cheap ass wine like MD 20/20. I think that's genius and I've noticed that genius around the world. I've noticed it in Aborigine camps in Australia, I've noticed it in Irish neighborhoods in England, I've noticed it on Indian reservations. These are simple tools of colonization that have worked for hundreds and hundreds of thousands of years to keep mother fuckers blind. I don't know how else you've got to tell people to avoid this shit, but they keep on messing with it. So I think the tool is a hell of a tool, but the one I didn't see, I mean because I could see the billboard signs "Drink this beer," "Smoke these cigarettes," all you poor motherfuckers who don't got no money, play the lottery, maybe you'll win three million dollars. The lottery ticket never falls in Detroit. All the vices that you live in and walk in and see. OK, I was fortunate. I had a father, he pointed them out, he said look, these are all land mines (Fig. 8.1) to catch your ass so you don't succeed and you end up in prison or dead. Either you see them or you don't. But the one I didn't get was the one coming through my ears. And when they started shutting down PE (Public Enemy) and stuff that I thought that I needed to hear, I was mad, I was real mad. Because I understood then that the radio was just another enemy. In fact one of the big, programmers, they was programming us for failure, no kind of success. And I still believe that's what they're doing now (M. Banks, Interview, June 4, 2008).

With the consolidation and corporatization of radio station ownership, radio has declined as a medium to air local issues and artists and to transmit music that would challenge and open young minds to possibilities. According to Banks (Interview, June 4, 2008), when his partner Jeff Mills was on Detroit radio during the 1980s, he was told by a "so-called" black radio station in the city not to play Public Enemy, the influential and political rap group, or he would be off the radio. He refused to go along with this demand and quit. While being cited by nearly every first and second wave Detroit techno artist as well as ones from southern Ontario as a major influence, the Electrifying Mojo's refusal to adhere to radio formats or musical genres led to his having to move from no fewer than six Detroit-area stations since the mid-1970s. At one point he had to offer content over the phone at 976-MOJO (Sicko 1999:88). Although self-described as "ageless" and alive (as of 2011), Mojo is no longer on the air. In contrast, music glorifying violence and drugs from which violence results can readily be heard on the radio. Submerge has promoted hip hop alternatives to this poisonous music. Some of Detroit's well-respected hip hop, most notably Natives of da Underground's "Pack da House" produced by J. Dilla went



Fig. 8.1 Visual land mines in Detroit (Photo by Deborah Che)

global on the Submerge-distributed UpTop Entertainment. Additionally to counteract the sonic warfare of radio that programs people in the same way you program a computer – garbage in, garbage out (C. Harris, Interview, June 4, 2008), UR released *The Other Side of Bling*, which featured songs such as “Hunting the Program Director,” “Kill My Radio Station,” “Toxic Broadcast,” “Death of My Neighborhood,” and “Technology Gap.”

Through their presence in Detroit, UR and Submerge build community by giving a sense of possibility beyond the drug economy. Submerge has stayed in the city, combating the prevailing belief that “making it” in the inner city equates with moving out. Banks explained that youth “need more examples of success than just the dope man, so we sit tight. You know I got offers to go to this country or that country to put my business wherever, but Detroit made me, Detroit made all the artists that come through it, so I mean I think keeping your original catalyst is very important.” While staying means providing a role model to youth, the city also is key to the artists’ creative processes, providing a raw element unique to the Detroit techno sound (Copeland 2004). Although Banks and second wave artist Carl Craig keep their businesses (Submerge and the Planet E record label respectively) in Detroit, their careers illustrate how techno offers mobility and possibilities of seeing the world beyond it (beyond the ‘standard 2-year stint in the military’, or the “Baghdad Express” as one UR song puts it). Banks tells the young athletes and musicians he

THE DETROIT SUMMER YOUTH SPACE & MIXWORKS PRESENTS
UR
 UNDERGROUND RESISTANCE

FOR THOSE WHO KNOW III

A benefit to raise funds for the Detroit Summer Youth Space. This space is the vision of MC invincible. The bldg. needs a roof and other repairs to be functional. It will be dedicated to teaching computer, music, and art skills for Detroit's inner city youth. UR believes in this vision and will do this rare gig at no cost to the Detroit Summer Youth Space Organization. Come see Detroit's true keepers of the Underground and support an organization that is trying to do some righteous shit! Don't fall victim to all the fake ass parties being held for the festival. There are NEVER that many parties in Detroit!! Mafukaz just want your EURO'S!!!
 OUT-038

DETROIT SUMMER YOUTH SPACE & MIXWORKS PRESENTS...
FOR THOSE WHO KNOW III
 MEMORIAL DAY, MONDAY MAY 31ST
 BENEFIT FOR THE DETROIT SUMMER YOUTH SPACE
 3611 CASS (NORTH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING - MACK AVE)

TIMELINE (LIVE)
 ASSAULT SQUAD DJ'S
DJ ROLANDO
 AKA THE AZTEK MYSTIC
BUZZ GOREE
 AKA CLANDESTINE
JAMES PENNINGTON
 AKA SUBURBAN KNIGHT

UR metrotimes mixworks
 Advance Tickets Available
 www.groovetickets.com
 Admission \$10.00 Before 11p.m.
 10p.m. until
 info: mixworks313@hotmail.com
 www.undergroundresistance.com

Fig. 8.2 For those in the know (Source: Underground Resistance 2004)

works with to ask the local drug dealer to pull out his passport and ask him how many stamps he has in it. Likely the drug dealer will not be able to produce a passport because “Part of what they don’t tell them, part of what they should say in a rap video, when you sell a certain amount of drugs, what country wants you? You don’t get issued a passport, you denied. So if you’re going to be a criminal genius, before you start, you should get a passport. Because once you get caught selling drugs, you not going to get one. So you can’t even make an escape like in the movies” (M. Banks, Interview, June 4, 2008). In contrast, Banks can show young people his passport containing stamps from the many countries UR has performed in, evidence of the much respected, global reputation the group has and of the possibilities for transcending local land mines.

In addition to providing concrete examples of young minority men creating businesses and a global industry from scratch, Detroit techno artists have worked actively to nurture the next generation of Detroit techno artists and to maintain a Beloved Community centered on music and creativity. UR performed a rare live set, “For Those in the Know” (Fig. 8.2) to benefit Detroit Summer Youth Space, an independent youth media center in the Cass Corridor offering workshops and studio space to the community in order to foster the use of art and media for creative expression and social change, and to promote independent media and youth voices (Detroit Summer n.d.). The benefit funded infrastructure improvements targeting computer literacy (Casper 2004), critical given the growing technology gap inner city Detroit youth face. Like the DGEI, Detroit Summer would strengthen technical skills with

the aim of developing community and serving human needs, but through enhancing computer and internet literacy, music production, song writing, independent journalism, website design, and event production ([Detroit Summer n.d.](#)). Likewise, Carl Craig, whose 20-year old Planet E record label shipped nearly 20,000 vinyl records in 2010 to customers outside the city, 70% of them to Europe ([Glasspiegel 2011](#)), has been also been active in nurturing the next generation of Detroit techno artists. In the past he distributed free techno tapes to kids, exposing them to the music which could not be heard on commercial radio ([Rubin 2000](#)). Most recently he organized the week-long “The Future is Now – When Techno Meets Contemporary Electronic Music Seminar” during the tenth anniversary of Detroit’s Movement (Electronic Music) Festival (2010). The youth seminar included daily themes such as engineering and production, business, and music theory as well as panel discussions led by classically trained, electronic and hip-hop musicians, singers, sound engineers, and entertainment promoters and organizations. Craig’s foundation, which presented the seminar with the Detroit School of Arts, aimed to “expose urban youth to all genres of music in the belief that inspiration can come from anywhere and anyone can be a muse” ([Backspin Promotions 2010](#)). Such efforts by Detroit techno artists to foster the development of a creative, people-oriented community, which depends on the health and well-being of its youth, are even more important now given the DPS’ \$327 million deficit, subsequent school and program closures, a state emergency takeover of the district, and most recently the creation of a state-run school district which would take DPS’ worst performing schools and put them under control of principals, parents and teachers ([Chambers 2011](#)).

8.4 Developing a Global Beloved Techno Community

Given the global nature of techno and following King’s conception of the Beloved Community, Submerge has extended its music and expanded the Beloved Community globally. While industry representatives from major labels have attributed declining recording sales to downloading and peer-to-peer file-sharing via the Internet ([Gebesmair 2009](#)), for Submerge downloading in less affluent markets is not a major issue. Downloading has expanded its fans in these new markets. In one African country, all music had to be shipped through France, which made it so expensive no one could afford it. Due to the lack of sales, the artists also were not making any money. Via downloads, people could access the music which then gave Submerge artists the exposure and opportunity to perform and earn money from shows there in the future. Likewise in Brazil, where the number of customers buying music on Submerge’s mail-order was limited, downloading extended its fan base as evidenced at a festival UR performed at in Sao Paulo. Despite the limited sales, out of seven acts on the lineup, 44% of the attendees polled said UR was the main act they came to see. However in markets where people could afford the music, fans supported UR and Submerge by buying the music on CD or vinyl ([C. Harris, Interview, June 4, 2008](#)).

For UR and Submerge, fans connected through electronic media are critical to building a global community that cares about the music and Detroit. When a proposal called for the Cass Corridor neighborhood where its old headquarters was located in to be bulldozed for a new Detroit Tigers stadium (since built elsewhere), Submerge appealed to supporters online for help in fighting outside developers and City Hall by showing them the neighborhood was more than “decayed buildings, drugs, and crime” (Sheridan 2001:170). In response, one supporter from Portland, Oregon wrote city officials to explain the importance of techno as a homegrown musical form that had become an international phenomenon and of Submerge as an example of “neighborhood self-development with global impact.” Stressing the importance of such community-based enterprises advocated by the Boggesses, he wrote, “It is a matter of changing the concept so that those small, family-operated efforts become a full partner in the effort to rebuild the city, alongside the larger enterprises all the way up to Ford and General Motors. If there is one lesson I learned from my visits to your city in the last 2 years (for the Detroit Electronic Music Festivals), it is that mega-development along the lines of the Renaissance Center is virtually irrelevant to the future of Detroit as most people would want it” (Sheridan 2001:171). Similarly when corporate adversary Sony BMG released a note by note, reproduced version of the club hit “Knights of the Jaguar” by DJ Rolando (Rocha) when UR would not license it to them, UR’s supporters, its “digital killer bees” offered legal help (McCutcheon 2007). The ensuing controversy engendered publicity and support that helped make “Jaguar” an international hit. According to Banks (Interview, June 4, 2008), techno is one of the rare forms of music where connected fans give back, providing Submerge with technological advice and software updates.

In furthering the global community, Submerge and UR have also used fans’ connection with the music to raise awareness and concern about the challenges the city and its residents face as well as to combat negative stereotyping and media images. During interviews with UR, some European and Japanese media negatively portrayed Detroit as a ghetto where people were living in shacks, Robocop, the Third World, or the Wild West. One interviewer even asked Banks how it felt to live in the ghetto. Banks noted, “You know, you don’t tell nobody they live in the ghetto. I know where I live. I don’t need to hear it from you where I live at. Ghetto is in your mind. You know, my mother kept a clean house. We didn’t have a roach or a rat in it. But down the street it might be a different story. Maybe they don’t own their house. Maybe it’s a suburban dude that owns their house and he don’t keep his damn property up” (Copeland 2004). To offset the negative images of Detroit as well as to familiarize fans with the city’s issues and character, UR made records that could only be purchased in Detroit. When those overseas visitors came to buy the records, Banks would take them on *his* tour of Detroit (Fig. 8.3), which included (1) Indian Village and Sherwood Forest, upscale neighborhoods where home owners took pride in keeping up their properties and thus combated broad brush views of Detroit as a ghetto; (2) Belle Isle, the largest city island park in the U.S.; (3) the Motown Museum; and (4) the urban environmental art Heidelberg Project, in which artist Tyree Guyton incorporated cast-off, abandoned objects to provoke thought about problems like blight, abandonment, declining neighborhoods that




Fig. 8.3 Counteracting negative images: UR’s alternative tour of Detroit (Clockwise – The Heidelberg Project, The Motown Museum, Indian Village house) (Photos by Deborah Che)

were largely ignored by the city in favor of high profile developments downtown, homelessness, drugs, racism, and child abuse. In addition to combating negative media stereotypes, UR is selective when determining its concert schedule, aiming to play for people who are “sincerely concerned about some of the issues or, or the intensity of what this music represents” (Copeland 2004). In this way, UR has acted as ambassadors for Detroit, raising awareness of the city and its music, both of which draw strength through adversity, and creating a beloved global community of those who care.

8.5 Fostering a Creative Community, Not Merely Attracting the Creative Class

In response to deindustrialization and population loss, particularly of the young, college-educated, and influenced by Richard Florida, Michigan and Detroit have seen the arts and creative industries as avenues to rejuvenating the economy. According to Florida, cities should be transformed to enhance their diversity (openness) and their coolness as measured by the availability of cultural and

nightlife amenities in order to attract the ‘creative class’ (i.e., individuals such as artists, engineers, writers, and entertainers who create for a living), since such places will thrive in a post-industrial economy dependent on their talent (Florida 2002). Michigan thus kicked off the Creative Cities Initiative in 2004 and Detroit introduced a new “D. Cars, Culture, Gaming, Music and Sports” brand ad campaign that portrayed the city as cool, trend setting, and forward moving. The press also touted the low cost of housing in Detroit, which has attracted artists from Chicago, New York, Boston, Germany, and the Netherlands who have bought houses in some of the city’s edgier neighborhoods for \$100 to a few thousand dollars (Hodges 2009), as well as one-bedroom lofts in Midtown Detroit, which is (relatively) booming with investment and employee housing incentives offered by Wayne State University, the Henry Ford Health System, and the Detroit Medical Center which can be had for \$150,000 vs. \$500,000 for comparable properties in Boston (Neavling 2011a). As Detroit Mayor David Bing sees attracting young professionals to Detroit who bring “creative ideas, fresh energy and investments with them” as key to revitalizing the city and improving the economy, he plans to improve services in Midtown (Neavling 2011b), despite the fact that Detroit continues to lose population in many other neighborhoods (Table 8.1).

Florida’s creativity thesis however is not without its critics. Peck (2009) found the creativity thesis fitting into the neo-liberal agenda, with the government’s only role being to create the artsy, “24/7 plug and play” neighborhood environments the creative class favor. Additionally since the creatives are mobile, hold weak social attachments, and “value place for only as long as it facilitates their self-actualization,” they are likely to pick up and move to cities that offer more attractive professional and lifestyle opportunities. While Florida asserted that Detroit could succeed in attracting and retaining talent by valuing its creative assets in a presentation during a 2-day transformation workshop there that referenced the White Stripes and Eminem (Peck 2009), he recently used Jack White’s move to Nashville to illustrate the shift of the music industry from formerly dominant regional and traditional crossroad centers unable to respond to new genres such as Detroit to new locations such as Nashville, which Florida asserted had a broad range of sounds, talent pool, infrastructure, and genres that Detroit did not (Florida and Jackson 2010). Thus to Florida, Detroit despite its historical and current production of jazz, rock, techno, rap, and hip-hop fell short on creativity and diversity, which contradicts how his well-packaged creativity argument supposedly fits all cities, including Detroit (Peck 2009).

Moreover in Detroit, the creativity thesis troublingly focuses on making the city cool in order to attract, retain, and nurture creative class newcomers from the suburbs or other cities, states, and countries, and not valuing the creative people already in the city. While Detroit Summer co-founder Shea Howell (2010) felt Florida’s ideas on the “4 T’s,” attracting Talent with Tolerance, Technology and amenity-oriented Territorial assets could spur the state to address its intolerance, lack of investment in technology, and the squandering of its natural resources, the press and corporate and government leaders have instead simplistically concluded from Florida’s findings that Detroit is a blank canvas waiting for young artists. Mike Banks (Interview, June

4, 2008) wryly noted that “there’s been people that come and try different projects in the urban inner city. . . . People love this environment because this is capitalism gone wild. This is the end of the run. This is the boomtown gone bust and people love the iron, the rot, the decay, they love that shit. As my man said in the movie (*Apocalypse Now*), it’s like napalm in the morning, it smell like victory. You know, they *love* this. They love to see us struggle.” The creativity thesis as applied in Detroit not only fit the neoliberal agenda, but also tapped into a common narrative of Detroit as a dystopic frontier that needs to be reclaimed – after the 1805 fire that destroyed the city, the 1967 riot/rebellion, and now the aftermath of the long-term meltdown of the auto industry. As a dystopic frontier, Detroit is a “wild, lawless, chaotic place; a world turned upside-down and inhabited by others against which the Self can be defined and valorized” (Sheridan 2001:46). However in trying to attract urban pioneers, Detroit has not fully recognized its own creative residents who stayed committed to the community, and in the case of Detroit’s techno artists created a global industry while remaining largely unknown at home.

Small enterprises that foster economic development and community such as techno are needed, but are not a total solution to Detroit’s challenges. Building a Beloved Community as part of business development should not be interpreted as everyone can lift themselves up by their bootstraps, leaving the government with no role. From his experiences of travelling and performing in Tokyo, London, Berlin, Sao Paulo, Barcelona, etc., Banks felt for Detroit to have any urban revitalization, to be a “world class city” as former mayor Dennis Archer called it, the city needs mass transit. The connectivity would decrease how people are alienated or locked into their own neighborhoods and ways of doing things (M. Banks, Interview, June 4, 2008; Copeland 2004). Mass transit is also especially needed in the Motor City where a third of the residents do not have cars. Only the government, which built the interstate highways facilitating flight from America’s cities, can provide this infrastructure. The government is also needed to fund schools and programs providing a safety net for Michigan’s children who have borne the brunt of the state’s economic problems, with childhood poverty and neglect increasing in the state’s lost decade. William Bunge (Personal communication, May 3, 2009) expressed concerns that the suffering of Detroit’s children would increase with Chrysler’s and GM’s bankruptcies, while “the money for Detroit’s schools, health care, unemployment for their parents is drained away by endless and unwinnable war.” Given the draw-down of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, resources for needed infrastructure and services may be available. A resolution from the U.S. Conference of Mayors has called for using the money spent in Iraq and Afghanistan for needed social services, to promote job creation, and to redevelop cities’ infrastructure, schools, and roadways (Naylor 2011).

Regardless of the amount of money being spent for the military conflicts that is redirected to urban infrastructure, schools, and social programs, given local, state, and federal government budget deficits and the inability to rely on large corporations to create the needed jobs in the U.S., Detroiters need to develop their own small enterprises, create businesses and build community like Detroit’s techno founders did. While some of Detroit’s techno artists have left, having opportunities

for extended residencies in clubs overseas that are unavailable in Detroit or have relocated to Berlin, the current center for techno, others have stayed attached to the community, musicians, and the key infrastructure. Detroit can remain a center of techno music production in the changing music industry given the death of distance through the Internet that brings people and their networks together and given the new opportunities that video games, film, television production and new mobile technologies and production provide (Bloustien 2009:455). Micro-businesses and medium-sized enterprises such as Kyle Hall's Wild Oats label can thus still become key players in the creative knowledge economy. Hall, a teenage DJ, producer, and label owner who was mentored by Detroit electronic music giant Mike Huckaby, has been called Detroit's electronic future. Although Hall is often touring Europe or Asia, he runs and maintains his label from Detroit (*Metro Times* 2010). By staying in Detroit and supporting youth like Kyle Hall who can then create businesses and institutions as they did two decades earlier, Detroit's techno musicians created an industry and a Beloved Community, not an assemblage of creative class individuals. Through such a community Detroit techno can continue to innovate and prosper in Detroit as Submerge label manager Cornelius Harris says, "The key with being able to function in Detroit is not to look at what it is, but to understand what's possible and to move from that place. People in music do it all the time. They do it every day, which is amazing to me. You've got this thing that doesn't exist and you bring it into existence. That's the definition of magic" (Glasspiegel 2011).

Acknowledgements I would like to thank Mike Banks, Grace Lee Boggs, Bill Bunge, and Cornelius Harris for their time, their writings and creative works, and the insights they shared on Detroit. I would also like to thank Derek Alderman and Michael McDonnell for pointing me respectively to key writings by and on Martin Luther King, Jr. and to statistics on Detroit.

References

- Aguilar, L. (2009). *Vinyl records firm presses on*. <http://www.detnews.com/article/20090502/BIZ/905020367/-1/ARCHIVE>. Accessed May 5, 2009.
- Backspin Promotions. (2010). *Press release for the future is now – When Techno meets contemporary, May 24–28, 2010* at the Detroit School of the Arts. <http://www.backspinpromo.com/CCFFIN.pdf>. Accessed August 18, 2010.
- Berk, M. (2000). Technology: Analog fetishes and digital futures. In P. Shapiro (Ed.), *Modulations: A history of electronic music: Throbbing words on sound* (pp. 188–209). New York: Caipirinha Productions.
- Bloustien, G. (2009). Music and the creative knowledge economy. In D. Scott (Ed.), *The Ashgate research companion to popular musicology* (pp. 449–465). Farnham: Ashgate Publishing.
- Boggs, G. (1998). *Living for change: An autobiography*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Boggs, G. (2006). *Building the beloved community in the city*. Text of speech given 24 March 2006 at the Seminary Consortium for Urban Pastoral Education, 2006 Congress on Urban Ministry, Chicago.
- Boggs, G. (2007). *Recapture MLK's radical revolutionary spirit: Create cities and communities of hope*. Text of speech given January 15, 2007 at Eastern Michigan University, Ypsilanti, MI.
- Boggs, G. (2008, May 31). *Presentation at the Beloved Communities Initiative (BCI) meeting in Detroit, MI*.

- Boggs, J. (1988). *Rebuilding Detroit: An alternative to casino gambling*. Text of speech given June 24, 1988, Detroit, MI. <http://www.boggscenter.org/jbcasino.htm>. Accessed June 26, 2007.
- Boyle, K. (2001). The ruins of Detroit: Exploring the urban crisis in the motor city. *Michigan Historical Review*, 27(1), 109–127.
- Bunge, W. (1971). *Fitzgerald: Geography of a revolution*. Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing.
- Carter, K. (2005, April 10). A digital Detroit: How a revered techno company got in on the action. *Detroit Free Press*, 1J, 2J.
- Casper, K. (2004). *In the flesh again: Mike Banks and the elusive Underground Resistance set for first live Detroit gig since 1992*. <http://www.metrotimes.com/editorial/story.asp?id=6275>. Accessed June 28, 2007.
- Chambers, J. (2011). *Sweeping overhaul set for ailing Michigan schools*. <http://detnews.com/article/20110621/SCHOOLS/106210377>. Accessed June 21, 2011.
- Connell, J., & Gibson, C. (2003). *Sound tracks: Popular music, identity, and place*. London: Routledge.
- Copeland, L. (2004, November 8). *Interview with Mad Mike Banks on the Liz Copeland Program*, WDET-FM 101.9.
- Detroit News. (2007). *Interactive: Population change in Metro Detroit*. <http://detnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070719/METRO/70718001>. Accessed July 24, 2007.
- Detroit Summer. (n.d.). *Loud and clear*. Information sheet.
- Detroit: Beyond the Third Wave. (1996). *CD liner notes*.
- Dzwonkowski, R. (2009). *Auto jobs shake-up slams black middle class*. <http://freep.com/article/20091220/SPECIAL04/912200503/1411/Detroit-automakers-on-new-path-hope-flickers>. Accessed January 8, 2010.
- Florida, R. (2002). The economic geography of talent. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 92(4), 743–755.
- Florida, R., & Jackson, S. (2010). Sonic city: The evolving economic geography of the music industry. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 29, 310–321.
- Gebesmair, A. (2009). The transnational music industry. In D. Scott (Ed.), *The Ashgate research companion to popular musicology* (pp. 467–483). Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
- Glasspiegel, W. (2011). *Detroit Techno City: Exporting a sound to the world*. <http://www.npr.org/blogs/therecord/2011/05/27/136718287/detroit-techno-city-exporting-a-sound-to-the-world>. Accessed May 27, 2011.
- Hodges, M. (2009). *Detroit's hard edge – And dirt-cheap real estate – Attract artists from around the world*. <http://www.detnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090313/LIFESTYLE/903130306/&imw=Y>. Accessed March 13, 2009.
- Horvath, R. (1971). The 'Detroit geographical expedition and institute' experience. *Antipode*, 3, 73–85.
- Howell, S. (2010). *Creative culture. Living for change/thinking for ourselves news*, November 21–27. Emailed newsletter November 21, 2010, from Grace_Lee_Boggs@mail.vresp.com.
- Inwood, J. (2009). Searching for the promised land: Examining Dr. Martin Luther King's concept of the Beloved Community. *Antipode*, 413, 487–508.
- James, S. (2004). *A frenzy of change: How Northland, now 50, jump-started suburbs' growth*. http://www.freep.com/news/metro/burbs18_20040318.htm. Accessed August 9, 2004.
- King, M. L. Jr. (1963). *Letter from a Birmingham Jail*. http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html. Accessed March 8, 2012.
- Mahler, J. (2009). *G.M., Detroit and the fall of the black middle class*. <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/28/magazine/28detroit-t.html?pagewanted=1&r=2&hpw>. Accessed July 3, 2009.
- McCutcheon, M. (2007). Techno, Frankenstein and copyright. *Popular Music*, 26(2), 259–280.
- Metro Times*. (2010). *When your biggest fans are an ocean away: A few Detroiters who give thanks to "Angels" abroad*. <http://www.metrotimes.com/culture/story.asp?id=15262>. Accessed August 23, 2010.
- Mojo, T. E. (1996). *The mental machine: A 21st century book of narratives, poems, and prose*. Detroit: J-Stone Audio Books.

- Naylor, B. (2011). *Mayors want war money spent at home*. Published online 20 June 2011. <http://www.npr.org/2011/06/20/137304968/mayors-want-war-money-spent-at-home>. Accessed June 21, 2011.
- Neavling, S. (2011a). *Detroit's profile grows as investors, young professionals return to city*. 2011. <http://www.freep.com/article/20110109/NEWS01/101090450/1322/Detroits-profile-grows-as-investors-young-professionals-return-to-city>. Accessed January 9, 2011.
- Neavling, S. (2011b). *Young people to revive Detroit*. Published online March 5, 2011. <http://www.freep.com/article/20110305/NEWS01/103050317/1001/NLETTER09/Young-people-to-revive-Detroit?source=nletter-news>. Accessed March 5, 2011.
- Peck, J. (2009). The cult of urban creativity. In R. Keil & R. Mahon (Eds.), *Leviathan undone? Towards a political economy of scale* (pp. 159–176). Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
- Rubin, M. (2000). Days of future past. In P. Shapiro (Ed.), *Modulations: A history of electronic music: Throbbing words on sound* (pp. 108–129). New York: Caipirinha Productions.
- Sheridan, D. (2001). *Narrative and Counter-narrative in Detroit*. Ph.D. dissertation, East Michigan State University, Lansing, MI.
- Sicko, D. (1999). *Techno rebels: The renegades of electronic funk*. New York: Billboard Books.
- Sicko, D. (2010). *Techno rebels: The renegades of electronic funk* (2nd ed.). Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
- Smith, S. (1997). Beyond geography's visible worlds: A cultural politics of music. *Progress in Human Geography*, 21(4), 502–529.
- Smith, B. (2008). *Invincibility: Detroit rap's fastest-rising star creates her sonic calling card from activism and dissent*. <http://www.metrotimes.com/editorial/story.asp?id=13130>. Accessed August 8, 2008.
- Sugrue, T. (1996). *The origins of the urban crisis: Race and inequality in postwar Detroit*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- U.S. Census Bureau. (2011). *2010 census. Race, Hispanic, or Latino, age, and housing occupancy: 2010*. Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau.
- Underground Resistance. (2004). "For those in the know III". Unpublished flyer.
- Von Thülen, S. (2007). *Mike Banks über Underground Resistance: "You will find the strength in the sound and make your transition."* <http://www.de-bug.de/texte/4639.html>. Accessed June 24, 2007.
- Warren, G. (1971). *No rat walls on Bewick*. Toronto: Canadian-American Geographical Expedition Field Notes 6. (Reprinted 1977).
- Watten, B. (1997). The constructivist moment: From El Lissitzky to Detroit techno. *Qui Parle*, 111, 57–100.
- Williams, B. (2001). Black secret technology: Detroit techno and the information age. In T. L. N. Tu, A. Nelson, & A. Hines (Eds.), *TechniColor: Race, technology, and everyday life* (pp. 154–176). New York: New York University Press.

Chapter 9

Exploring the Role of Networks in the Creative Economy of North East England: Economic and Cultural Dynamics

Roberta Comunian

The growing importance of culture within different contexts, and especially the economic ones, has led to theorizations of a cultural turn in the economy, where the cultural dimension is called upon to explain economic processes and development (Scott 1997). The cultural economy can be defined by those sectors that engage with products and services “whose subjective meaning, or, more narrowly, sign-value to the consumer, is high in comparison with their utilitarian purpose” (Scott 2000: 462). The rise of this cultural dimension in everyday life and economics has been explained through the growth of leisure time, education, and disposable income, leading to an increased consumption of leisure and cultural goods. Indeed, as many authors suggest, culture is no longer a specific field or sphere of social life but can now be found in everything, from urban spaces, to communications, and commercial goods (Hirsch 1972; Lash and Urry 1994; Flew 2002). O’Connor (1999) suggests that this growth in demand leads not only to an expansion of the market but also to the proliferation and fragmentation of markets, with products defining individual and group identity.

Within this growing attention to culture and creativity as economic fields, many authors have investigated how creative products (Sunley et al. 2008; Scott 2004) and creative systems (Pratt 1997) come together and grow in specific geographical contexts. The role of place (Drake 2003) has been particularly relevant to all previous research, and even more in relation to concepts like creative clusters (Pratt 2004; Turok 2003) and creative cities (Comunian 2011).

This chapter aims to be a critical reflection on the role of networks and networking in the context of the creative economy. There is a large literature emerging on the role of networks in general in various economic contexts (Grabher 2004), and some

R. Comunian (✉)
School of Arts, University of Kent, Kent, UK
e-mail: R.Comunian@kent.ac.uk

older theoretical frameworks, such as clusters and industrial district analysis, place considerable importance on networks and interactions. However, the dynamics and interactions that emerge in the context of the creative economy provide an interesting setting to test and explore how individuals use networks in their creative and cultural practice, often managing not only a business but the progression of their knowledge and artistic practices.

The data and research on which the chapter is based were conducted in 2005–2007 in a northeastern region of England, Newcastle-Gateshead, an old industrial city-region trying to establish itself as center for the knowledge and creative economy. The research mapped some of the dynamics of individuals working in the creative economy in this context and captured their interactions and engagement as a key element to the local creative development of the city.

The chapter is organized in four sections. First, it provides a brief overview of the networks literature. Networks have been a considerable arena of interaction between economics and cultural studies theorists and therefore provide a key platform of engagement in the analysis of the creative economy. The second section introduces the methodology and the case study of Newcastle-Gateshead and the North East of England. The case study also highlights the complex interconnections and interdependence between local cultures and local economies. Results and issues emerging from the research project are discussed in the third section, while the final part addresses key findings and conclusions.

9.1 From Clusters to Networks: Across Economy and Culture

One of the key approaches to studying the role of networks is a clusters perspective, which considers the value of interactions among a specified group of individuals, often in a confined context (a city, a quarter, a region). This theme is particularly true in relation to creative and cultural industries.

Most authors looking at creative industries at the local and regional levels have used some kind of cluster approach, on the basis that clustering plays an important role in these industries. For example, Scott (2000, 2002, 2005) and Storper (1989; Storper and Christopherson 1987) specifically developed their studies in the context of cultural clusters, i.e., the development of the film industry in Hollywood. Other authors have focused on the analysis of clustering in different sectors: film and media (Coe 2000; Turok 2003); design; advertising (Grabher 2001); software and new media (Pratt 2000; Christopherson 2004); and music (Brown et al. 2000; Gibson 2005).

The physical clustering of organizations and companies in the creative industries is explained in a variety of ways, from supply chain relation and product innovations to access to specific knowledge resources and labor markets. However, it is often the case that these benefits of clustering are not simply delivered by mere co-location of organizations, but are more strongly developed through the establishment of collaborative networks. This new focus on connections across space and

time has been recently presented as a relational turn in economic geography (Sunley 2008). In the investigation of the creative economy, it is important to keep in mind the overlapping connections across economic, social, and cultural networks. Crang (1997) suggests that in economic geography “content is being rethought in terms of what social and spatial proportions of life count as economic, what proportions (if any) are therefore non-economic, and how these designated spheres of the economic and non-economic interrelate” (1997: 3). Capturing the interconnections between the economic and cultural dimensions and how they interrelate is challenging when we research the cultural and creative economy.

The movement towards a social network markets approach proposed by Potts and Cunningham (2008) is a useful step as creative and cultural industries are considered embedded in a “creative ecosystem” (Jeffcutt 2004) that is not sector- or industry-bound. In the context of creative industries, there has been a growing interest in the way the social and cultural dimensions are intertwined not only with sites of exchange and consumption but also with production systems and supply-chains. This is not a new theme for researchers in the field, but it can be argued that very little attention has been directed towards understanding the nature and dynamics of these networks.

Using the classification of models of clusters developed by Gordon and McCann (2000), much of the research around the creative industries clusters has concentrated on the first two models, i.e., a “pure agglomeration economies” model emphasizing the importance of external economies and agglomeration, and the “industrial complex” model that focuses on the input-output connections among firms in the cluster (Grabher 2001; Scott 2002, 2005; Coe 2000; Pollard 2004). Although many studies have touched on the “social network model,” few have explicitly focused on it (Julier 2005; Kong 2005; Banks et al. 2000). While the use of industrial data and exchange has been the main methodology for the industrial mapping, the social network aspect has been primarily investigated through qualitative interviews with people working in the creative sector.

Although not much research has been conducted on the actual structure and organization of these networks, a large part of the literature related to clusters and regional economic development within the creative economy make claims about their importance using sectoral case studies and investigations (Christopherson 2002; Coe 2000; Crewe 1996; Ettlinger 2003; Grabher 2002; Johns 2006; Mossig 2004; Neff 2004). These arguments have been, on various occasions, connected with the urban cultural infrastructure through analyses of cultural milieu. Brown et al. (2000) suggest focusing on the role of the “cultural quarter,” i.e., how physical linkages are dependent on social linkages. “The complex networks of activity and exchange are given a context – they take place. This place acquires a series of associations which can be iconic (Bourbon Street, Carnaby Street, Kings Road, Haight Ashbury) but are also spatially embedded social networks. ... It is these ‘scenes,’ ‘milieus,’ ‘happening places’ which are the real context for a local music industry rather than ‘facilities’” (Brown et al. 2000: 446). Nevertheless, arguments in favor of prioritizing a network approach over a co-location understanding of the creative industries have emerged recently (Chapain and Comunian 2010) and a new

understanding of the importance of scale within the creative economy has expanded this framework (Coe 2000).

The shift from the neoclassical approach to economic geography based on competitive advantage and transactional factors (Porter 1998) to institutionalism and relational assets, including “institutional thickness” (Amin and Thrift 1993), “untraded interdependencies” (Storper 1997), and relational thinking (Yeung 2003), can also be seen in the literature pertaining to the creative industries, such as “creative ecosystems” (Jeffcutt 2004) and the “sociality of cultural industries” (Kong 2005). Emerging from a fuzzy literature that has not been able to pin-point the dynamics behind the interactions among the creative industries, the concept of the creative cluster (Pratt 2004; Wu 2005; Turok 2003) has been used by policy makers and researchers without a clear understanding of the sort of interactions that place at the local level within the creative economy. In fact a gap in the literature in reference to the way the creative industries work and interact at the local level – to which this research aims to contribute – is still present: “there is a lack of strategic knowledge about the relationships and networks that enable and sustain the creative process in a knowledge economy” (Jeffcutt and Pratt 2002: 228).

I argue that networks play an important role in the creative economy for reasons specific to the creative industries sector for three reasons. First, I maintain that the creative industries sector is comprised of small and medium size companies, and solo trading is typical. It is therefore easy to think about how networking can have a role and an impact in the development of economic growth and support for the sector (Taylor 2006). Second, work patterns of the creative sector are frequently characterized by unstable, temporary working conditions (part-time, freelancing, contract working); therefore networking is important to access work and obtain future contracts (Blair 2001). Third, social dynamics are an important part within the economic fabric of the creative economy and they relate to the creation of trends and scenes as well as to the social exchanges that enable cultural intermediaries to set values and trends (Fleming 2002).

9.2 Researching Networks in Newcastle-Gateshead

Newcastle-Gateshead represents a challenging case study for research into the development of local creative and cultural economies. The growing local attention paid to this sector is part of a long-term regeneration commitment, although the area lost the European Capital of Culture prize in 2008 (Griffiths 2006; Jones and Wilks-Heeg 2004) and cannot therefore be compared with more famous case studies (Balsas 2004; Richards and Wilson 2004). Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons, the city, and in particular the Quayside regeneration project by the Gateshead City Council, is considered a successful model of cultural regeneration (Bailey et al. 2004; Miles 2005a; Minton 2003). Some authors have offered reasons and data for this success (Bailey et al. 2004; Miles 2005a, b), while others have considered the limits of the regeneration (Byrne 2002; Byrne and Wharton 2004).

My focus is not on the outcomes of the regeneration, but on the network and collaborative approaches adopted by creative practitioners.

In the context of Newcastle-Gateshead and the North East of England, the new emphasis and attention towards the creative economy can be linked with a long process of cultural regeneration of the region. This process started when the region attracted the Year of Visual Arts in 1996. The ability of some regional actors (led by Northern Arts, today the Arts Council North East) to attract large public investments to the region in order to revitalize the local economy and to develop local participation in arts activities are widely acknowledged (Bailey et al. 2004). These investments have enabled the creation of large publicly funded cultural infrastructures, not only in contemporary art (The Baltic) and music (The Sage Gateshead) but also in theaters (refurbishments of the Northern Stage, Theatre Royal and Live Theatre), crafts (National Glass Centre, expansion of the Shipley Gallery), literature (Seven Stories), dance (Dance City), and other important events. The question of whether, and how far, public sector infrastructure benefits the local creative economy is not a simple one. Nevertheless, the region and specifically Newcastle-Gateshead have benefited from a new image as a “creative city.”

At the beginning of the 2000s, the Regional Development Agency (RDA) and local authorities and support agencies started to look at the potential economic impacts of the creative economy locally and regionally, with a strong commitment to the idea of fostering “cultural quarters” (Jayne 2005). Alongside the cultural regeneration of the region, the Regional Development Agency, ONE North East, and local authorities and support agencies have been particularly interested at the potential economic impacts of the creative economy locally and regionally (CURDS 2001; ONE North East 2007). One of the emerging patterns of this development is the establishment of sectorial networks and organizations supporting people in the creative sector. The development of these networks, sometimes formal and institutional, other times artist-led and informal, represents an interesting emerging phenomenon.

The idea of developing a “cultural quarter” strategy in the city has been influential and has involved different actors. In particular, at the marketing and promotional level, a first formulation of the “cultural quarters” map of the city was developed by the Newcastle-Gateshead Initiative (NGI), a municipal agency. In its first version, five cultural quarters were included: the Quayside, Grainger Town, the Haymarket, Chinatown, and Jesmond. The definition of a “cultural quarter” was based mainly on the consumption of culture, either through the presence of large cultural institutions or trendy shops. In this classification, no mention was given to the Ouseburn Valley, which held the larger co-location of artists and creative practitioners in the area. Since 2002–2003, a second “cultural quarter” strategy has been led by the University of Newcastle, which developed a new master plan and major refurbishment initiative for its cultural facilities and also addressed the role of cultural production (specifically through the Culture Lab and the Northern Writer’s Centre). More recently, a wider focus has been developed that is not based on clusters but on networks.

Specifically, various networks and infrastructures have been put in place to address the needs of the various creative sub-sectors. Agencies like Codeworks (for media industries), Northern Film and Media (for the moving image sector), or

New Writing North (for writers) and others have been in charge of developing schemes and training to boost the local creative economy. Other schemes such as the Culture Business Venture have been created to provide funding for creative businesses.

Within this research context, my project focused specifically on the role of networks, adopting a mixed method approach. The sample included individuals belonging to the creative economy of the North East who were willing to take part in the research. The names of the individuals were selected from business directories and listing magazines as well as individuals involved in public policy activities and initiatives in the sector. Overall, around 400 individuals were contacted via e-mail or telephone and invited to take part in the research. The positive responses allowed a sample of 136 individuals to be interviewed between September 2005 and April 2006, covering different sub-sectors of the creative and cultural industries and ranging from directors of private companies to sole traders, from policy makers to not-for-profit cultural sector managers. The interviews covered six main areas: the present role and position of the person and his/her career development; the involvement with public funding and public sector projects and organizations; relations with cultural and arts institutions; relations with place and its importance in their practice; relations with other creative/cultural industries or creative people and role of networks; opinions and interactions with the support and public sector infrastructure. After the interview each individual was also asked to complete a social network analysis (SNA) questionnaire. I focus on the results from the qualitative interviews undertaken and explore the accounts of creative practitioners and the role that networks play in their work and creative practice.

9.3 The Role of Networks in the Creative Economy

The literature related to clusters and regional economic development emphasizes the importance of networks and interactions. Many dynamics of network interactions reflect the broad economic geography literature; however, some seem specifically related to the socio-cultural dynamics of the creative economy or have specific relevance in this sector. In particular, I identified the following key dynamics common to the broader economic geography literature:

- Networks and labor markets;
- Networks as marketing/branding opportunity;
- Networks as social support and professional development;
- Networks as funding opportunity.

Each of these is examined below.

9.3.1 Networks and Labor Markets

The “labor pool” dynamic is a traditional argument of economic geographers in relation to industrial clusters. A more recent take on this topic, and more closely related

to the creative economy, is the analysis of dynamics of project-based work and freelancing in the knowledge economy (Grabher 2004; Baines 1999; Dex et al. 2000). In the context of Newcastle-Gateshead and the North East of England, networks are believed to be important to access job opportunities. This point is central, as many of the jobs are project-based or short-term and contracting and freelancing is essential in the ecology of the creative industries in general. As one interviewee noted:

There are not that many jobs in the North East and lots of people go to people who already know, so it is all about networking, what you are willing to do for free, what you are willing to do for cheap, lots of favors. It is an insular community, so you have to work hard to get any work at all (freelance cartoonist).

Part of the overlap of activities and collaborations depends on the changes in careers and people's movements from one organization to another. Most workers tend to remain and work in the region for a long time and maintain their contacts throughout their diverse activities or diverse career paths, as this person describes:

The same people are doing everything and moving around. For example as people move in their career some people might move from University, then they start their own theatre company, then they move to Live then move to Northern Stage. People move in and out from the Arts Council, because you can have a big overview and you want to move on. Then they want to get back to more basics, you go to work for the organization you were serving there, you see the same people but they are not doing the same job they were doing last time (creative voluntary support manager).

9.3.2 *Network as Access to the Market*

Artists and craft workers rely on the network as a market building strategy and as a marketing strategy in itself. In a variety of creative sectors, from design to visual art and music, creative practitioners come together to create a critical mass that facilitates the promotion of their work and the establishment of an image or a brand. One example in the North East is "DesigNEd and Made," which promotes designers and makers in the region and helps them build a brand in a way to promote their work and their practice. This network enables them to access a wider market and interact with a broader commissioning clientele. One respondent noted:

I think it is really important for the North East to show that this kind of work exists in the region, that there is work here which is pushing the boundaries, and unless you have something like DesigNEd and Made other regions, and the rest of the UK and the world, won't know about the North East and what is going on here (designer and maker).

Another example is Cohesion, the network for glassmakers, originating in the north of England. It is sponsored by the City of Sunderland. The aim of Cohesion is to assist and support glass businesses and practitioners to develop their skills, to create new opportunities and to promote the quality and diversity of their work to wider markets. As one person put it,

Within the glass world the North East is well and truly on the map because of Cohesion and the Glass Centre and everything. Commissions are passed on to me through the network or

from other artists because they cannot do the job and it is really about being in the right place at the right time, and the same when I cannot do a job, I try to pass it on to other colleague (glass artist).

Networking is considered vital also to getting commissions and sales. In a sector where the product often needs to be designed or commissioned before being sold, the importance of networking is even greater as the artist or creative practitioner needs to develop trust towards his work and name before being asked to produce a product. One noted

Networking I think it is vital, it depends on how much you throw yourself into it, take somebody like N, all his work and sales are just through word of mouth, through getting himself everywhere, talking to everybody, being involved in everything. ... that's pretty much 100% of his work (photographer).

9.3.3 Network as Social and Business Support Infrastructure

Another useful dimension of the network is the support that people get out of it. On the one hand it is possibly moral and psychological support, such as comments like “do not worry” or “I had the same problem”; on the other hand it is also a form of business support. Creative industries rarely receive assistance from the “mainstream” business community (although I think this is very much based on their experience: if they find a person competent and useful they will rely on business support; if they find somebody not familiar with their issue they will dismiss business assistance as irrelevant to their needs). Many creative sector workers believe that the best people to provide support or business advice are those who have experience in their field; therefore the peer-to-peer support through formal and informal networks and advice seem to create the personal support infrastructure that a creative industry firm needs. One interviewee said

It is very much a social network. It's an attempt, kind of to see each other on a social level, go out for a drink and talk about what we're working on and about things that are coming up, which you know, if it is something that someone is involved in then we go along to support each other, just do it that way very informally (freelance web designer).

The fact that most creative industries consist of small companies and often sole traders also creates a need for the creative practitioners to establish a platform of cultural exchange and an opportunity to share ideas.

It's quite an insular business and you can spend days without seeing anybody or talking to anybody. So, it's crucial to have contacts with people who are within the creative industries; because whether it's a painter or a ceramics person or whatever, a lot of the problems you may encounter are very common in ... and sometimes just the creative blockages that you go through, it's kind of reassuring sometimes to talk to people who have, you know, and you find that a lot of people go through the same kind of process (visual artist).

However, alongside the personal support, valuable business advice is passed on in informal ways, providing a form of professional development and mentoring among local practitioners. Two quotes reveal this theme:

The most important thing is mixing with other people, you can make do without all the services provided and business advice but the most valuable information comes from other people doing the same things as you who are a year or two years further down the line and can remember how it is like to be in your position but they worked through those problems and they can advise you on how to do things (textile artist).

The network I have set up working with our designers, have been really invaluable in terms of having other people to discuss ideas with, that's primarily been people that I met through my shop and I am now involved with and also people that I worked with, like the graphic design company I used, I work a lot with them for general advice this is invaluable also because I work freelance, sharing information and ideas and support, it is very important to me (freelance festival director).

9.3.4 Networks as Funding Structures

Another important role of networks is related to access to funding. Public sector organizations and funding agencies are closely interlinked with practitioners in the network (Comunian 2011). Some of the networks based in the North East are directly funded by the public sector or by other agencies. For example, the Cohesion glass artists' network was started by the Sunderland City Council; DesignED and Made was started organically by a group of artists and makers and was then supported by public funding from the Arts Council; the Artists Network was supported by Northumberland County, New Writing North; and Dance Connect is supported by the Arts Council. One said

So what we have done through the network, we are employing a contract person we are paying on an annual contract, just to go out and look for funding, rather than just waiting to step across them, she is actively approaching organizations and researching what is available, that is proving very effective, and attracted more funding that we expected so far (photographer).

Considering the widespread use of local networks by creative industries, supporting different networks and communicating through them provides an effective structure to sustain them. In fact, considering the development of some formal and informal networks regionally, it seems clear that the public policy and funding have considered networks a strategic way to support and sustain the creative sector. As one replied,

Well, I am chair of the North East design association; it promotes best practice in the delivery and use of design. So it helps businesses use design more effectively and tries to help designers deliver designs more effectively and better. That has received funding from Business Link and from One North East (designer).

Networks, whether formal or informal, allow the public sector to deliver information and support to different people by simply supporting one organization.

They make public investments look more sustainable: instead of investing in one single person, the sector can invest in sustaining the whole industry. This tactic is also seen as an efficient and effective way to promote the creative industries of the wider world by promoting and marketing them. However, there are also limits and difficulties in supporting networks. There is always a risk that some people do not want to take part in the network, or simply do not fall into the remit of a specific network, and feel withdrawn and cut off from the possibility of further interaction. Networks exclude as well as include people.

9.4 Navigating Through Networks

Alongside these dynamics, there is a recognition both in the literature and among the participants of my research that the degree of formality or informality of networks matters. So, the success of the creative sector is not simply about networking but also concerns the nature and structures of networks and how individuals feel about these interactions. For example, if a network is organically developed by practitioners (rather than established by an institution) it is more relevant to the sector's activities. One respondent said

because it is artist-led we are making it what we need, we know what we need and we are making it that, coming from us it is going to be more relevant than if it was coming from people in the public sector, who have the best intention but they do not work in the sector and they do not know exactly what we need (textile artist).

Although networking is often considered part of a business practice, people working in the creative industries do not always perceive the need to network as part of their business development. Formal networking is often boring and implies mixing with people from very different social contexts or business sectors. On the other hand, the social dimension is perceived as very important to career success, so often networking is a matter of informal interactions, sharing a common space, such as meeting at a pub. One take on this issue was:

networking is not done formally, it's all done you know as you pass somebody in the corridor, have a coffee, you chat in the bar after a gig and that's kind of how I want it to be because if you sit down and formally network, culturally that doesn't fit comfortably with the kind of people that tend to be doing the job (director, New Media Company).

Many respondents highlighted the role of public sector institutions and their support in the running of the networks; for example this filmmaker suggests that they can help in establishing further interactions:

it is relevant because they can provide opportunities for people to meet, both formally and informally and they can provide some sort of marriage, kind of marriage bureau (filmmaker, film company).

However, for others, public sector and institutionally-run networks are too rigid and inhibit informal social interactions. For example,

then Northern Arts decided to have a new full-time officer ... a professional came in, ... everything now is so much more formal rather than informal, it was an old fashioned writers

group, people talked about all the processes of writing, they gave advice to one another, that kind of social network that went down and it disbanded, it went on to another level, more professional, to a bigger scale ... It is a shame because those networks are not there anymore (freelance writer).

Looking at this issue from a policy perspective, networks are a key player in the delivery of a sustainable support system that provides answers to the needs of the creative industries. Nevertheless it is important not to limit the support to mainstream and established networks but also to support the more hidden or temporary ones, which can be the first step for people into the sector.

Overall, respondents showed a high degree of awareness of their network strategies and how grassroots or organic networks provide different and often complementary opportunities to institutional or structured networks. Creative practitioners tend to rely on different type of networks, so they attend events and keep company in organizations in which they can ask for information and advice. Sometimes formal networks are considered useful but too structured; they are more like professional development organizations than actual networks. One element that was central is the social dimension of the network and the types of bonds and experiences that hold members together. In this respect, it is often the case that within large formal networks people form smaller and closer social networks. In the words of one interviewee,

I suppose previously I was more involved in that infrastructure type networks, but now I am much more in organic networks but within that I do still link in those infrastructure one, you need both. ... There are a lot of people with funding out there and it takes quite a lot of time to get around them all so you need some kind of mechanism to make it easier for you to get in contact with people (freelance festival director).

9.5 Conclusions

The role that networks play in regional dynamics has become prominent in economic geography (Coe et al. 2004). Networks have proven to be valuable forms of support for small and medium size companies as a means to access support, information, and knowledge (Fuller-Love 2009).

This chapter shed light on network values and dynamics specific to the creative industries and creative practitioners. Networks play a central role in the development of sustainable creative production systems in the urban economy. Of course, the relevance of networks depends on the size and nature of the companies involved, and different sectors of the creative economy rely on networking activities for different reasons or with different effects. The chapter aims to provide an exploration of these dynamics that closely connect economic, cultural and social exchanges and interactions. The nature of networks in the creative economy highlights the overlapping connections between socio-cultural and economic networks. Their interconnectedness means that in order to better understand and support the creative sector, it is important to adopt ethnographic research approaches and qualitative accounts.

Another characteristic that makes the study of this sector particularly challenging for researchers is the mix of formal and informal networks on which creative practitioners rely. As O'Connor (2002) suggests, these networks are underpinned by infrastructures of knowledge and expertise that do have formal, institutional dimensions but equally are embedded in more amorphous social and cultural infrastructures described as a "soft infrastructure" or "creative infrastructure." These terms concern informal networks, place-specific cultural propensities, and "structures of feeling" that are very difficult to grasp, let alone strategically direct, but which nonetheless are crucial to the urban regional "innovative milieu" (O'Connor 2002: 27).

A challenge that remains for researchers on networks is how to capture the evolving nature of networks. The current research assesses the network dynamics in which many creative practitioners were involved, but the unstable nature of the business models and practices, which often rely on part-time and temporary contracts/projects, means that the nature of networks and interactions is always changing and that creative practitioners often acquire greater awareness of the value of managing and interacting with these changes within and across networks.

Acknowledgements Thanks to the artists and creative practitioners that took part in the research and gave their time for interviews and meetings. I am particularly grateful to CURDS (Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies) of the University of Newcastle upon Tyne for the hospitality and support provided during the field research. The author remains responsible for any shortcomings.

References

- Amin, A., & Thrift, N. (1993). Globalization, institutional thickness and local prospects. *Revue d'économie régionale et urbaine*, 3, 405–427.
- Bailey, C., Miles, S., & Stark, P. (2004). Culture-led urban regeneration and the revitalisation of identities in Newcastle, Gateshead and the North East of England. *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 10, 47–65.
- Baines, S. (1999). Servicing the media: Freelancing, teleworking and 'enterprising careers'. *New Technology, Work and Employment*, 14, 8–31.
- Balsas, C. J. L. (2004). City centre regeneration in the context of the 2001 European capital of culture in Porto, Portugal. *Local Economy*, 19(4), 396–410.
- Banks, M., Lovatt, A., O'Connor, J., & Raffi, C. (2000). Risk and trust in the cultural industries. *Geoforum*, 31, 453–464.
- Blair, H. (2001). 'You're only as good as your last job': The labour process and labour market in the British film industry. *Work, Employment and Society*, 15, 149–169.
- Brown, A., O'Connor, J., & Cohen, S. (2000). Local music policies within a global music industry: Cultural quarters in Manchester and Sheffield. *Geoforum*, 31, 437–451.
- Byrne, D. (2002). Industrial culture in a post-industrial world: The case of the North East of England. *City*, 6, 279–289.
- Byrne, D., & Wharton, C. (2004). Loft living – Bombay calling: Culture, work and everyday life on post-industrial Tyneside, a joint Polemic. *Capital & Class*, 84, 191–198.
- Chapain, C., & Comunian, R. (2010). Enabling and inhibiting the creative economy: The role of the local and regional dimensions in England. *Regional Studies*, 43, 717–734.
- Christopherson, S. (2002). Project work in context: Regulatory change and the new geography of media. *Environment and Planning A*, 34, 2003–2015.

- Christopherson, S. (2004). The divergent worlds of new media: How policy shapes work in the creative economy. *Review of Policy Research*, 21, 543–558.
- Coe, N. (2000). The view from out west: Embeddedness, inter-personal relations and the development of an indigenous film industry in Vancouver. *Geoforum*, 31, 391–407.
- Coe, N., Hess, M., Yeung, H. W.-C., Dicken, P., & Henderson, J. (2004). ‘Globalizing’ regional development: A global production networks perspective. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 29, 468–484.
- Comunian, R. (2010). *Exploring the potentials of social network analysis: Mapping networks of knowledge and support in the creative economy of the North-East of England*. ERSA (European Regional Science Association) 50th Congress. Jönköping, Sweden.
- Comunian, R. (2011). Rethinking the creative city: The role of complexity, networks and interactions in the urban creative economy. *Urban Studies*, 48, 1157–1179.
- Crang, P. (1997). Cultural turns and the (re)constitution of economic geography. In R. Lee & J. Wills (Eds.), *Geographies of economies*. London: Edward Arnold.
- Crewe, L. (1996). Material culture: Embedded firms, organizational networks and the local economic development of a fashion quarter. *Regional Studies*, 30, 257–272.
- CURDS (Centre for Urban and Regional Development). (2001). *Culture cluster mapping and analysis*. Newcastle Upon Tyne: Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies for ONE North East.
- Dex, S., Willis, J., Paterson, R., & Sheppard, E. (2000). Freelance workers and contract uncertainty: The effects of contractual changes in the television industries. *Work, Employment and Society*, 14, 283–305.
- Drake, G. (2003). ‘This place gives me space’: Place and creativity in the creative industries. *Geoforum*, 34, 511–524.
- Ettlinger, N. (2003). Cultural economic geography and a relational and microspace approach to trusts, rationalities, networks and change in collaborative workplaces. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 3, 145–171.
- Fleming, T. (2002). Supporting the cultural quarter? The role of the creative intermediary. In D. Bell & M. Jayne (Eds.), *City of quarters: Urban villages in the contemporary city*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Flew, T. (2002, January 23–26). *Beyond ad hocery: Defining creative industries*. Cultural Sites, Cultural Theory, Cultural Policy II International Conference on Cultural Policy Research, Wellington, New Zealand.
- Fuller-Love, N. (2009). Formal and informal networks in small businesses in the media industry. *International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal*, 5, 271–284.
- Gibson, C. (2005). Recording studios: Relational spaces of creativity in the city. *Built Environment*, 31, 192–207.
- Gordon, I., & McCann, P. (2000). Industrial clusters: Complexes, agglomeration and/or social networks? *Urban Studies*, 37, 513–532.
- Grabher, G. (2001). Ecologies of creativity: The village, the group, and the heterarchic organisation of the British advertising industry. *Environment and Planning A*, 33, 351–374.
- Grabher, G. (2002). Cool projects, boring institutions: Temporary collaboration in social context. *Regional Studies*, 36, 205–214.
- Grabher, G. (2004). Learning in projects, remembering in networks? Communality, sociality and connectivity in project ecologies. *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 11, 99–119.
- Griffiths, R. (2006). City/culture disclosures: Evidence from the competition to select the European capital of culture 2008. *European Planning Studies*, 14(4), 415–430.
- Hirsch, P. M. (1972). Processing fads and fashions: An organization-set analysis of cultural industries systems. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 77(44), 639–659.
- Jayne, M. (2005). Creative industries: The regional dimension? *Environment & Planning C: Government & Policy*, 23, 537–556.
- Jeffcutt, P. (2004). Knowledge relationships and transactions in a cultural economy: Analysing the creative industries ecosystem. *Media International Australia Incorporating Culture and Policy*, 112, 67–82.

- Jeffcutt, P., & Pratt, A. (2002). Managing creativity in the cultural industries. *Creativity and Innovation Management*, 11, 225–233.
- Johns, J. (2006). Video games production networks: Value capture, power relations and embeddedness. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 6, 151–180.
- Jones, P., & Wilks-Heeg, S. (2004). Capitalising culture: Liverpool 2008. *Local Economy*, 19, 341–360.
- Julier, G. (2005). Urban designscapes and the production of aesthetic consent. *Urban Studies*, 42, 869–887.
- Kong, L. (2005). The sociality of cultural industries. *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 11, 61–76.
- Lash, S., & Urry, J. (1994). *Economy of sign and space*. London: Sage.
- Miles, S. (2005a). Understanding the cultural ‘Case’: Class identity and the regeneration of NewcastleGateshead. *Sociology*, 39, 1019–1028.
- Miles, S. (2005b). ‘Our Tyne’: Iconic regeneration and the revitalisation of identity in NewcastleGateshead. *Urban Studies*, 42, 913–926.
- Minton, A. (2003). *Northern soul: Culture, creativity and quality of place in Newcastle and Gateshead*. London: DEMOS & RICS.
- Mossig, I. (2004). The networks producing television programmes in the Cologne media cluster: New firm foundation, flexible specialization and efficient decision-making structures. *European Planning Studies*, 12, 155–171.
- Neff, G. (2004). The changing place of cultural production: The location of social networks in a digital media industry. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 597(1), 134–152.
- O’Connor, J. (1999). *Definition of cultural industries*. Manchester: Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester Institute for Popular culture.
- O’Connor, J. (2002). Public and private in the cultural industries. In T. Johansson & O. Sernhede (Eds.), *Lifestyle, desire and politics: Contemporary identities* (pp. 15–33). Gothenburg: Centre for Cultural Studies, University of Gothenburg.
- One North East. (2007). *Commercial creative industries sector*. Newcastle Upon Tyne: One North East and Culture North East.
- Pollard, J. (2004). From industrial district to ‘urban village’? Manufacturing, money and consumption in Birmingham’s jewellery quarter. *Urban Studies*, 41, 173–193.
- Porter, M. (1998). *On competition*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
- Pratt, A. (1997). The cultural industries production system: A case study of employment change in Britain, 1984–91. *Environment and Planning A*, 29, 1953–1974.
- Pratt, A. (2000). New media, the new economy and new spaces. *Geoforum*, 31, 425–436.
- Pratt, A. (2004). Creative clusters: Towards the governance of the creative industries production system? *Media International Australia*, 112, 50–66.
- Richards, G., & Wilson, J. (2004). The impact of cultural events on city image: Rotterdam, cultural capital of Europe 2001. *Urban Studies*, 41(10), 1931–1951.
- Scott, A. J. (1997). The cultural economy of cities. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 21(2), 323–340.
- Scott, A. (2000). *The cultural economy of cities*. London: Sage.
- Scott, A. (2002). A new map of Hollywood: The production and distribution of American motion pictures. *Regional Studies*, 36, 957–975.
- Scott, A. (2004). Cultural-products industries and urban economic development: Prospects for growth and market contestation in global context. *Urban Affairs Review*, 39, 461–490.
- Scott, A. (2005). *On Hollywood: The place, the industry*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Storper, M. (1989). The transition to flexible specialisation in the US film industry: External economies, the division of labor, and the crossing of industrial divide. *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 13, 273–305.
- Storper, M. (1997). *The regional world: Territorial development in a global economy*. New York: Guildford.

Storper, M., & Christopherson, S. (1987). Flexible specialization and regional industrial agglomerations: The case of the U.S. motion picture industry. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 77, 104–117.

Sunley, P. (2008). Relational economic geography: A partial understanding or a new paradigm? *Economic Geography*, 84, 1–26.

Sunley, P., Pinch, S., Reimer, S., & MacMillen, J. (2008). Innovation in a creative production system: The case of design. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 8, 675–698.

Taylor, C. (2006). Beyond advocacy: Developing an evidence base for regional creative industry strategies. *Cultural Trends*, 15, 3–18.

Turok, I. (2003). Cities, clusters and creative industries: The case of film and television in Scotland. *European Planning Studies*, 11, 549–565.

Wu, W. (2005). *Dynamic cities and creative clusters* (Working Paper 3509). Washington, DC: World Bank Policy Research.

Yeung, H. W.-C. (2003). Practicing new economic geographies: A methodological examination. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 93, 442–462.

Chapter 10

The Relevance of Scale Economies in Economic and Social Relationships in the New Economic Geography

Luca Spinesi

The spatial distribution of economic activities and agents is the research focus of both economic geography and geographical economics. That economic activities and population are unevenly distributed in space is self-evident. Different regions of the planet exhibit varying climates, degrees of accessibility, and endowments of natural and productive resources. All these features, often referred to as “first nature” in the economic geography literature, have played a role in explaining the various stages of economic development. Yet humankind has always tried to overcome the constraints of first nature, thus generating a spatial distribution of economic activities that is in some degrees independent from natural advantages or disadvantages. Indeed, it is also self-evident that income, commodities, services and the many elements affecting the well-being of individuals are highly unevenly distributed in space, and therefore among individuals, and that first nature allows at best for a non-major contribution in shaping such an economic landscape. The main focus of economic geography aims at understanding spatial variations and distributions of the economic activities coming from second nature elements, which depend on endogenous human actions and choices.

This chapter shows that besides traditional elements such as first nature and the key elements taken into account as second nature, new ingredients can enter in economic geography research, which can be useful in understanding the spatial distributions of economic activities and agents. In particular, this chapter shows that three main ingredients are found in economic geography research, which are: (a) scale economies, (b) circular causation or cumulative causation, and (c) the existence of multiple equilibria. The first is found in all research in spatial and localization research, as will be shown, while the other two are more typical of the new

L. Spinesi (✉)
Department of Economics, University of Rome, Rome, Italy
e-mail: luca.spinesi@unimc.it

economic geography approach. It is argued that social relationships among agents and social norms play a key role in understanding the spatial distributions of economic activities and agents.

10.1 A Brief Historical Overview

During the second millennium the world income increased 13 times more rapidly than did the world's population, and relative disparities also increased. Yet it is with the Industrial Revolution that major and dramatic changes in the economic and spatial landscape occurred at an unprecedented scale and intensity. The dramatic changes starting with the Industrial Revolution had remarkable consequences for economic disparities across regions. Indeed, the standard deviation of per capita GDP among countries increased faster than the increase in per capita GDP of European countries. The income per capita of Europeans did not differ from that of other inhabitants of the planet at the beginning of the second millennium, while it is currently seven times higher than the world median (see Bairoch 1988 and Combes and Thisse 2008). The Industrial Revolution reshaped the economic landscape through two major changes that can be summarized as first, the productivity gains associated with a drastic lowering of production and transport costs and a reduction in the time to transmit information, and second, the radical transformation of agricultural societies into industrial and urbanized ones, in which services have become the largest and most important economic sector in high income countries. Yet a growing polarization of economic spaces emerged, and disparities among regions accelerated.

This aspect of regional disparities and growth divergence remains true to this day. The current standard of living is comparable across developed countries, which have reached similar stages of technological development, are governed by similar social and political rules, and have populations with similar levels of educational attainment. Moreover, one can note that traditional sectors, such as manufacturing, and more recent sectors, such as high technological industries, are all active, and that developed regions compete for technological supremacy along similar product lines.

Specialization in innovation can arise from the existence of localized spillovers, from specific local knowledge, and from both exogenous first nature characteristics of each country and social norms. Yet, striking contrasts between regions can be observed. The technological advances, and the speed at which newer and newer technologies are introduced in the marketplace, generally favor a more uniform spatial distribution of goods and ideas, although these are often coupled with unequal distributions of economic activities in space. Furthermore, spatial variations in the size and composition of populations, in per capita GDP, in regional structures of production, in the cost of living, and in the distribution of occupations still exist.

Interestingly, the level of regional wealth across the world seems to be tied to proximity with the global core: being close to rich regions makes it very unlikely that a region will be very poor. In Europe during the Industrial Revolution, distance from the core, i.e., the UK, was associated with declining levels of prosperity. This observation remains true today both inside countries and across national borders. In the U.S., this relation is not as strong as it is in the E.U. This difference suggests that spatial development is more even within the U.S. than within the E.U. This could be because the U.S. space economy has been integrated for a longer time in the former than in the latter.

It is worth emphasizing that the advantages of agglomeration and spatial proximity to the core observed since the Industrial Revolution become more marked when drastic declines occur in transportation costs and in the costs of transmitting information and ideas among agents. The advantage derived from proximity to the core highlights the role of scale economies in economic activities and in reinforcing agglomeration phenomena. I underline here that besides such elements, social relationships among agents play a large role in this process; in particular, scale economies and increasing returns have widely varying meanings according to social relationships and norms. Scale economies are always tied to social relationships. A distinctive feature of geographical economics and economic geography is the existence of localized versus non-localized scale economies, with the former literature focusing on non-localized scale economies. This type of scale economy takes the form of social relationships among agents in production and consumption activities.

10.2 The Economic Geography Contribution

One of the objectives of economic geography is to understand why being spatially centralized provides such a strong advantage in terms of income and productivity. GDP per capita is the standard indicator of the economic performance of a region or a country. Moreover, and more importantly for understanding this process, GDP provides a crude but simple measure of the economic size of a region. It thus gives us some insight into the potential of a region to attract new activities.

Although a large part of economic analysis takes place in a dimensionless space, it would be unfair to claim that spatial issues were totally absent from economic theory before the recent upsurge of economic geography. Indeed, location theory has a long history, and it has been dominated by two approaches: the firm location model, in which each firm makes its location choice in isolation from competitors, and the spatial competition model, which focuses on the location of several firms simultaneously that are competing to attract consumers dispersed across space. In the firm location model, the objective of any firm is to locate a plant in the plane by minimizing the weighted sum of Euclidean distances from that plant to a finite number of sites corresponding to input and output markets (the minisum problem). I consider the last approach later, when imperfect competition is introduced.

These models suggest a behavior of firms in which location choice is either sluggish or catastrophic. In the minisum problem, each firm is described as having a single plant and the decision that firms make about how many plants to operate is not considered at all. This issue becomes non-trivial when transportation is costly and there are increasing returns to scale at the plant level. Increasing returns lead the firm to concentrate its production in a few plants, whereas transport costs raise the issue of where to locate those plants. In this approach, the location decision made by a firm is taken in isolation from its competition with other firms. Considering more than one firm allows us to turn to the spatial economy within a perfectly competitive setting.

In a general equilibrium framework in which the transport sector is explicitly accounted for, and allowing for variable land consumption by all agents, the Spatial Impossibility Theorem has been proven by Starrett (1978): Assume an economy with a finite number of locations and a finite number of consumers and firms. If space is homogeneous, transportation is costly, and preferences are locally non-satiated, then there is no competitive equilibrium involving transportation. In a homogeneous space, this means that preferences and technologies are the same for all agents. The main message from the spatial impossibility theorem is that if economic activities are perfectly divisible, a competitive equilibrium does not exist. As a consequence, understanding the spatial distribution of economic activities cannot escape the limited assumptions that underpin the Spatial Impossibility Theorem.

Based on Alfred Marshall's contributions, modern urban economics assumes that local externalities exist and are numerous. Marshallian externalities arise because of: (a) increasing returns at the firm level due to mass production; (b) thick labor markets consisting of specialized labor forces and the uneven production of new ideas; (c) the availability of specialized input services; and (d) the uneven distribution of infrastructures. Such externalities concern the supply side of the economy. Yet, as Haig (1926) argued, agglomeration economies can also be generated from the demand side. For instance, migration towards a large city may be based upon a variety of preferences, including the possibility of purchasing a large variety of goods and services. In this way, under perfect competition, industry location can be explained in terms of localized production and/or consumption externalities. In short, agglomeration cannot be theorized without examining consumer tastes and preferences, which are culturally embedded.

Classical trade models are based on comparative costs or comparative advantage: countries specialize in the production of the goods in which their opportunity cost is lowest. For classical trade economists, space is heterogeneous in terms of technological opportunities, and in particular it is localized knowledge, embodied in the skills of the local workforce, which generates spatial inhomogeneity. In the neoclassical theory of international trade, pioneered by Heckscher (1918) and Ohlin (1933), spatial heterogeneity stems from first nature factors, such as natural resources, and more generally productive factors, which are unevenly distributed among countries. Regional variations reflect the immobility of natural resources and productive factors that generate productivity. Because of such an immobility of factors, specialization arises once trade is liberalized: a country specializes in the production and exportation

of the commodities that are relatively intensive in its relatively abundant resources. It is worth underlying that, compared to location theory, a distinctive feature of both classical and neoclassical trade theories is that in the latter, countries are considered as being dimensionless.

This approach overcomes the Spatial Impossibility Theorem by introducing either nonmarket interactions among agents or spatial heterogeneities. Both strategies allow perfect competition and the assumption of price-taking, rather than price-setting, to be preserved. An alternative route consists in assuming that firms have some market power, i.e., they are not price-takers in their output markets. This line of thought dates back to the spatial competition model offered by Hotelling (1929), from which the principle of minimum differentiation arises. This is due to competition between firms for market areas, the so called market area effect, which leads sellers to congregate in a same location to maximize the share of consumers to which each firm has access. However, the principle of minimum differentiation no longer holds; the reason is that the incentive to soften price competition when conglomeration happens induces sellers to separate, and the price effect always dominates, at least locally, the market area effect. Whether firms choose conglomeration or separation depends on the degree of product differentiation as well as transport costs: the more differentiated the products and the lower the transport costs, the more likely clustering is to occur.

An alternative approach based on some degree of firms' market power was suggested by Kaldor (1935). He claims that a firm affects the sales of its neighboring competitors, but not distant ones. In this way, it is strategic interaction that is spatially localized. As a consequence, the impact of a price reduction of a firm is not symmetric across its competitors. A complicated oligopolistic strategic interaction among firms arises. A way to escape from oligopolistic interactions among competitors has induced the new economic geography (NEG) to assume monopolistic competition, in which interactions among firms are less strong. This route allows several aspects of spatial competition to be considered within a general equilibrium framework. The key ingredients of the NEG approach are the existence of imperfect competition, increasing internal returns to scale to firms, and circular causation.

Finally, under imperfect competition, the spatial distributions of economic actors affect each other, which raises the principle that circular causation plays a crucial role in the spatial distribution of the economic activities, and that agglomeration is obtained as a result of a continuous reinforcement effect once some (economic) forces are set in motion. This idea was put forward by Young (1928) as a possible explanation of economic growth and development.

In the last decades, a very important contribution to economic geography comes from Paul Krugman (1991) with his basic core-periphery model. In this view, the economy is subjected to both dispersion and agglomeration forces, and the spatial allocation of economic activities is the result of the combination of these. Agglomerative (centripetal) forces are generated through a circular causation of forward linkages, the incentive of workers to be close to the producers of consumer goods, and backward linkages, the incentive for producers to concentrate where the market is larger. Dispersive (centrifugal) forces include the immobility of unskilled

workers, whose demand for the manufactured goods needs to be satisfied, and the market-crowding effect that accompanies the agglomeration of a growing number of firms producing different varieties. Krugman's core-periphery pattern is likely to occur when the transport cost of manufactured goods is low, when product varieties are sufficiently differentiated, or when the expenditures on manufactured goods are large enough. Yet, agglomeration in the core need not occur.

Several lines of research have extended this basic model. One is the seminal contributions by Krugman and Venables (1995) and Venables (1996), whose papers consider intermediate inputs as a source of circular causation. In particular, the final manufacturing sector uses a variety of intermediate inputs and increasing returns to scale. In this case, it is shown that the concentration of manufacturing activity can occur even in the absence of factor mobility. Another line of research follows Helpman (1998) by assuming complete factor mobility and introducing immobile amenities (housing) as an alternative dispersion force to immobile unskilled labor. Other subsequent theoretical research has achieved greater analytical tractability by amending the core-periphery model in other ways (see among, others Baldwin et al. 2003; Baldwin and Martin 2004; Robert-Nicoud 2005). Finally, the most recent development in NEG consists in shifting from two to three (or more) regions, which interact both directly and indirectly, introducing complex feedbacks.

One of the major implications of circular causation is that even minor events can generate large regional disparities. That is, the dynamics of the model economy are subject to catastrophic bifurcations, points at which their qualitative character suddenly changes. As a consequence, the location of economic activities can be explained as the result of historical processes and accidents. The role of circular causation among the location decisions of different agents has been stressed in terms of regional divergence. In particular, it has been argued that growth is localized because both technological and social innovations tend to be spatially clustered, and their diffusion across space is slow. Note that circular causation may be driven by coordinated expectations about future changes in industry location, which are then self-fulfilling. Moreover, the existence of multiple equilibria becomes a standard result of the new economic geography's emphasis on scale economies and circular causation. Scale economies and of circular causation, in turn, reflect social practices and norms that play a key role in selecting which equilibrium will emerge.

Recently, the main theoretical foundations of the new economic geography, such as the roles of consumers' love for variety of goods and services, increasing returns to scale, and low transport costs in determining the distribution of economic activities across space, have enjoyed mounting support. As remarked by Redding (2009), "Despite the considerable theoretical and empirical advances that have been made, there remain a number of areas for potential further research. One is the respective contributions of love of variety, increasing returns to scale and transport costs and other potential sources of agglomeration, such as knowledge spillovers and the pooling of specialized skills as also emphasized by Marshall (1920)."

New economic geography models also offer a plausible explanation for higher wages in densely than in sparsely-populated regions. Yet it is also true that the

assumption of spatially mobile labor, in particular skilled labor, describes the U.S. more accurately than the E.U. Even in this case cultural, social, and institutional considerations can help to explaining the different mobility of populations in the E.U. and in the US, and across space in general.

10.3 Final Remarks

Classical location theory, theories of trade, the Marshallian theory of spatial agglomeration all represent key ingredients for understanding spatial agglomeration and the distribution of economic activities and agents across space. The new economic geography has extended this line of analysis by incorporating scale economies and circular causation, and a major contribution of this step is the recognition of the existence of multiple spatial equilibria. In the light of the above, social habits, social norms, and social relationships play a key role in determining the spatial distributions of economic activities. Importantly, including social norms, social relationships, and institutions leads location theory to an emphasis on economic externalities that are either internal or external to firms. These considerations are important in theorizing the nature of uneven development. For example, Rodrik et al. (2004) found that geographical determinants, as captured by first nature factors, have at best a weak effect on income levels around the world, while trade does not play any role in determining national income levels; rather, it was institutions, in all their cultural and political complexity, that played a central role in determining uneven development. This conclusion nicely illustrates that traditional neoclassical models, failing to take space and culture seriously, may be complemented or replaced by more realistic approaches that integrate social behavior and institutions into economic and geographic analysis.

References

- Bairoch, P. (1988). *Cities and economic development: From the dawn of history to the present*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Baldwin, R.E., & Martin, P. (2004). Agglomeration and regional growth. In J.V. Henderson & J.F. Thisse (Eds.), *Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics* (pp. 2671–2711). Elsevier.
- Baldwin, R., Forslid, R., Ottaviano, G., & Robert-Nicoud, F. (2003). *Economic geography and public policy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Combes, P., & Thisse, J.-F. (2008). *Economic geography: The integration of regions and nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Haig, R. (1926). Toward an understanding of the metropolis. I. Some speculations regarding the economic basis of urban concentration. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 40, 179–208.
- Heckscher, E. (1918). *The continental system: An economic interpretation* (English Trans.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Helpman, E. (1998). The size of regions. In D. Pines, E. Sadka, & Y. Zilcha (Eds.), *Topics in public economics: Theoretical and applied analysis* (pp. 33–54). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Hotelling, H. (1929). Stability in competition. *The Economic Journal*, 39, 41–57.
- Kaldor, N. (1935). Market imperfection and excess capacity. *Economica*, 2, 35–50.
- Krugman, P. (1991). Increasing returns and economic geography. *Journal of Political Economy*, 99(3), 483–499.
- Krugman, P., & Venables, A. (1995). Globalization and the inequality of nations. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 110, 857–880.
- Marshall, A. (1920). *Principles of economics*. London: Macmillan.
- Ohlin, B. (1933/1968). *Interregional and international trade*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Redding, S. (2009). Economic geography: A review of the theoretical and empirical literature. In D. Bernhofen, R. Falvey, D. Greenaway, & U. Kreickemeier (Eds.), *The Palgrave handbook of international trade*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Robert-Nicoud, F. (2005). The structure of simple. New economic geography models. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 5(2), 201–234.
- Rodrik, D., Subramanian, A., & Trebbi, F. (2004). Institutions rule: The primacy of institutions over geography and integration in economic development. *Journal of Economic Growth*, 9(2), 131–165.
- Starrett, D. (1978). Market allocations of location choice in a model with free mobility. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 17, 21–37.
- Venables, A. (1996). Equilibrium locations of vertically linked industries. *International Economic Review*, 37, 341–359.
- Young, A. (1928). Increasing returns and economic progress. *The Economic Journal*, 38, 27–42.

Chapter 11

Consuming the Spectacle: Tourism and Communication Technologies in Santiago de Compostela

Carlos Ferrás Sexto and Yolanda García Vázquez

Marketing, media culture and new communication technologies create real and fictional images of cities and regions. Such multimedia representations diffuse through traditional media like television or newspapers, but also through computer screens and online social networks. As a result, individual and collective perceptions of places are often formed through the business strategies of the tourist industry, and the city becomes a spectacle that attracts the “look of the other,” a product consumed by visitors, tourists, citizens, residents, and public and private investors. Judd (2003) speaks of the postindustrial city as a theme park, a tourist bubble distinct from the surrounding landscape in which “shopping centers” are places of entertainment, art and everyday life. In this reading, urban residents become “tourists” in their own cities, and a wealthy creative class may demand authenticity and diversity in the face of constant pressures for cultural homogenization. Mattelart and Neveu (2004) focus on the new centrality of culture in the urban economy as opposed to purely economic discourses in which culture acts as a commodity but unlike any other.

Mass tourism was born in the nineteenth century as a consequence of the Industrial Revolution, which allowed the ease of movement that served leisure, social and cultural motivations. Earlier tourist trips were related to trade, migration, conquest and war. The Englishman Thomas Cook pioneered the business. In 1841, he conducted the first organized tour of history and was a forerunner of what today are known as tourism packages. Ten years later, he founded the travel agency Thomas Cook and Son, the first in the world. Urry (1995) observes that tourism during the nineteenth century often consisted of resorts and tours of cultural immersion in the cradles of civilization such as Athens, Egypt, and Rome.

C.F. Sexto (✉) • Y.G. Vázquez
Geography Department, University of Santiago de Compostela,
Santiago de Compostela, Spain
e-mail: carlos.ferras@usc.es

Today tourism is an enormous industry, arguably the largest in the world in terms of employment. The democratization of tourism, and the resulting phenomenon of mass tourism, flourished during the decade of the 1960s with spread of the automobile and the increased mobility of people (Gali Espelt 2005). No longer the exclusive preserve of the elites, cheap air travel has greatly boosted tourism and travel. Accordingly, tourism has experienced enormous growth globally (Buhalis 2003; World Tourism Organization 2009); today tourism revenues exceed that of oil, food, or automotive exports. Tourism has become one of the largest sectors of international trade and represents a major source of income in many countries. In Spain, tourism has been a powerful stimulus to economic activity, accounting for 11% of the country's gross domestic product and 12.5% of employment (Consejo Español de Turismo 2006).

We offer a critical reflection on tourism, the cultural economy of the city, and its relationship with advertising and new technologies of communication as illustrated in the case of the city of Santiago de Compostela, Galicia. In explicating how tourism is enabled and constrained by information technologies, we attempt to show how the cultural and the economic are hopelessly entwined in the landscapes and cultures of the city.

11.1 New Communication Technologies and Tourism

Tourism has changed much over the past two decades, largely due to the incorporation of new information technologies and new forms of tourism. In addition, there has emerged a new profile of tourist, one who is an information seeker. Tourists now typically have the opportunity to compare destinations, check prices, and make reservations over the Internet as well as traditional venues such as travel magazines. Particularly relevant are the possibilities of travel blogs that offer bidirectional means of communication and exchanges of experiences among travelers and tourists, including, in the Spanish case, the Altair travel blog (www.altairblog.com), Traveler's blog (www.diariodelviajero.com), or Travel Blog Madness (locuraviajes.com/blog/las-piramides-de-gizeh-donde-el-tiempo-never-go). These blogs allow web surfers to construct collective images and views of places from numerous first-person accounts of visitors and tourists. Information channels are created that are flexible and interactive as well as open and participatory. Tourists tired of the traditional venues can participate in a more inclusive and dynamic in the process of selecting their destinations. The opportunities offered by the Internet have not only affected the ways in which they may plan a trip but also have dramatically affected how tourist cities promote themselves, as they must offer a wide range of multimedia material to promote the site and compete with other tourist cities (Gali Espelt et al. 2000).

Buhalis (2002) observes that information technologies are a major means by which companies conduct their operational strategies, allowing them to manage information, expedite functions, and communicate interactively with their customers. Peppard (1993) affirms that information technology facilitates the flows of information

both within and among enterprises. Castells (2000) writes of a new social and economic paradigm organized around information technologies that has dramatically changed how people communicate, produce, and manage information. This new paradigm is exemplified in the ways in which tourists seek new opportunities and how tourism enterprises use such media to enlarge the market their products and services. The internet has become the foremost communications technology driving the rapid growth and spread of tourist information (Meeker 2001). In 1999 there were only 100 million internet users worldwide; by 2011, there were an estimated two billion (Foundation Orange 2011).

The internet has led tourists to change their behavior, and tourist companies and institutions have changed their promotion and distribution channels accordingly (Buhalis 2000; Fesenmaier 2007), leading to a deep restructuring in the sector. For example, information technologies facilitate the development of virtual enterprises and provide new opportunities and tools for tourist destinations to represent themselves. In the Spanish case, according to a 2010 report entitled *eEspaña* by the Foundation Orange, 60% of tourists visiting the country used the Internet as a tool to prepare for their travel there. Among domestic tourists, Internet usage is lower, although growth rates are very high (Consejo Español de Turismo 2006).

Traditionally the most important role attributed to information technology in the tourism sector has been equated with the development and implementation of central reservation services and destinations (CRRS). Over time, three major technological breakthroughs have affected the tourism industry, including:

- The creation of central reservations services (CRRS) in the 1960s by airlines;
- The conversion of the CRRS into global distribution systems in the 1980s, which allowed the networking of travel agencies, hotels and airlines using programs such as Amadeus or Galileo;
- The popularization of systems of electronic information and commerce via the Internet in the 1990s, which allow disintermediation (i.e., the decline of travel agents) and direct access by consumers.

Perhaps the biggest impact of new information technologies and communication in the tourism sector is in distribution and sales (Buhalis and Licata 2002), i.e., searching for information, reservations and purchases of products and tourist services. The Internet allows for almost universal access to tourism services and so creates new opportunities in marketing channels. According to Buhalis (2003), the contribution of ICT to tourism is multidimensional as it allows companies new ways to organize their activities, including efficiency improvements, better communications with clients and suppliers over large areas, and easier agreements with business partners. For customers of these companies, the internet facilitates price transparency, better visual and graphic information, and time savings. Clearly the increasing use of the internet for travel planning has altered the behavior of both tourists and the businesses that cater to them. Moreover, tourist destinations have changed the distribution channels of their promotional materials (Buhalis 2000; Pan et al. 2007), including real-time dissemination of information via the internet and electronic payments for services (Meeker 2001).

11.2 The Consumption of Tourist Images

Tourist images are the first step in shaping the expectations of potential visitors, and thus affect the number of visitors a destination city receives. Traverso Cortés (2007) argues that images have the power to make places, i.e., to define how they represented and conceived (see Alberich 2006).

The images used to inform tourists have changed throughout history. Gali Espelt (2005) conducted a quantitative and qualitative study of tourist images from 1850 to 2002, concluding that advertising has long exerted a significant influence on the dynamics of individual consumption. He distinguishes the following stages:

- The birth of tourism during the era of the romantic traveler and explorer, i.e., 1859–1900.
- An artisanal period, 1900–1950, in which tourism was typically the domain of a social elite.
- The Fordist period, 1950–1980, in which mass tourism standardizes and homogenizes the industry and the tourist experience.
- A post-Fordist period, 1980–the present, in which niche tourist markets arise via the internet.

In the current era, the consumption of images digitally represents a virtual journey conducted prior to undertaking a physical trip. Although ideally tourist images should be as realistic as possible, in practice fictitious and unrealistic images are often generated to generate hype. Baudrillard (2002) held that in the postmodern era, the private sphere disappears and everything becomes a public show, a simulacrum made possible through electronic communication. Thus, we live in an era that celebrates the consumable symbol, in which images, pastiche and simulation become the basis for the economic system. Such images, even deceptive ones, become a main reference source for tourists. Therefore, as Urry (2002) notes, tourist sites often produce and are defined by globalized images such as the Eiffel Tower or the iconic tropical image of the sunny beach, which circulate readily through the internet. According to Rojec and Urry (2005), today's media provide a wealth of visual images that reflect a new era of tourism.

Images of a destination created in the minds of potential visitors are consumed in complex ways. Traverso Cortés (2007) identifies several meanings of an image, including the following: “The image is the result of the interaction of all the experiences, beliefs, feelings, knowledge and impressions of each person regarding an entity” and “The image is the sum of beliefs, ideas, and impressions that a person has about a destination.” Gali Espelt (2005) distinguishes between perceived images *in situ*, *a priori*, and *a posteriori*. *A priori* images are those related to the individual's mental constructions before visiting a place. Images *in situ* are the result of an evaluation of a place during the physical visit there, and *a posteriori* images involve the reinterpretation of lived experience once the tourist has

returned to his or her residence. Similarly, Miossec (1991) distinguishes three types of images:

- The Universal, which have evolved throughout history and have sedimented in the collective imagination.
- Mayflies, which are the result of a continuous reinterpretation of reality by the media and literature.
- The Eddy, which are those that have been promoted through place marketing by promoters of tourism destinations and tour operators with the aim of influencing the decision process.

Palou Rubio (2009) writes of the mock city in analyzing pictures consumed by tourists in Barcelona, noting that the images promoted are sometimes contradictory. The Barcelona Olympics of 1992 put the city on the global map as a tourist destination. In 2002, Barcelona ranked as the seventh most popular tourist destination among European cities. Palou Rubio speaks of a “real” and an “ideal” or “unreal” Barcelona. The idealized Barcelona lacks the defects, inconsistencies, disorder, and dirt inherent in any city. Palou Rubio argues that the idealized Barcelona exists only as the reflection of real Barcelona.

For many places, the internet has become a powerful promotional mechanism, allowing advertising text and images, as well as promotional videos and even music, to reach a wide audience. In Spain under Article 2 of the General Advertising Act, “Advertising is any form of communication by a person or entity, public or private, in the exercise of a commercial, industrial, craft, or profession in order to promote directly or indirectly, hire movable or immovable property, services, rights or obligations.” The total advertising revenue for digital content in Spain in 2009 was 5.2 billion euros, although this volume has declined during the recent economic crisis (eEspaña 2010–Foundation Orange 2011). According to the European Interactive Advertising Association, the Internet has established itself as the advertising venue most consumed by the Spanish people, as measured by the number of hours devoted surfing the web (5.5 h per week) compared to reading newspapers (4.6 h per week) and magazines (3.6 h per week). These numbers reflect Spain’s position as the fifth largest country in the European Union in terms of internet users (eEspaña 2010–Foundation Orange 2011). The country’s internet penetration rate hovers around 62%.

Spanish tourism has been deeply shaped by the internet. The eEspaña (2010) study claims that more than half of Spanish and European internet users look for information to plan their trips. Thus, one of the most important information channels used to boost the image of a city is the internet, whose representations have become a form of interurban competition for tourists. However, finding a way to differentiate themselves is difficult for tourist destinations, which often face a limited number of potential visitors and fierce competition. As pointed out by Sanchez Guzman (1989:163) “The creative process is called, if anything, the most important step of advertising communication and its importance derives from a transcendental: advertising emits a single message to provoke behavior changes to

a heterogeneous group of individuals, each of them individually or in groups, with different personalities and habits.”

11.3 Santiago de Compostela in Context

Santiago de Compostela is a medium sized city in Galicia that lies along the urban corridor between the provinces of A Coruña and Pontevedra in the northwest of Spain (Fig. 11.1). With a population of 95,000 inhabitants, it is experiencing demographic stagnation. It is the political and administrative capital of the Autonomous Community of Galicia and the Galician Parliament. Its urban landscape is closely linked to its historical heritage as an important center of pilgrimage based on the religious cult of the Apostle Santiago (St. James) since the medieval era. The historical memory of this city is dominated by its image as a religious center, linked to the tomb of St. James (Santos 2002b; Ferrás 2004). It contains a number of monumental historical buildings, including the Cathedral, the Palace of Raxoi, and the historic city square, Plaza del Obradoiro, among others. The historic city center has become a space of spectacle, including, for example, the Cathedral, in which one finds the world’s largest incense burner called “Botafumeiro” swinging from the dome. Santiago de Compostela is also home to a secular university, the 520-year-old University of Santiago, which is among the oldest educational institutions in Europe. Today the city is listed as a World Heritage site by UNESCO.



Fig. 11.1 Location of Santiago de Compostela, Galicia, Spain

Santiago has a series of ongoing cultural programs throughout the year at the Auditorium de Galicia and the University of Santiago as well as several theaters. It is home to the Philharmonic Orchestra of Galicia and hosts numerous music concerts. It has an extensive network of museums, most notably the Museum of Galician Culture, the Museum of Contemporary Art, and the Pilgrimage Museum. It also contains the Palace of Congresses and the Exhibition Hall of Galicia, which host business conventions, congresses, and academic meetings (Miranda 2008).

From a planning point of view, Santiago has received international renown, including an award from the European Union, in recognition of its policy of conservation of its historic center. The setting up and functioning of a public body called the Consortium of Santiago de Compostela, which represents the central, regional and local governments and is headed by the King of Spain, contributes to the enhancement of the city's cultural image. In recent years, the city has enjoyed a boom in the provision of infrastructure, such as peripheral highway, Lavacolla Airport, the Palace of Congresses, the Auditorium de Galicia, expansions of the University of Santiago, and the Museum of Contemporary Art, but all this was not accompanied by population growth and increases in the housing stock. Santiago has thus experienced urban development without population increases, which tend to occur in the municipalities in its periphery, where housing and urban policies are less rigid. Today they are grave problems of transportation and communication between the city and the towns of the periphery.

In the urban landscape of Santiago today there thus co-exist the old and new, traditional and contemporary aesthetics in the architectural palimpsest of Roman, medieval, baroque, renaissance, modern and contemporary buildings. Traces of important contemporary architects of international fame are evident in the works of Alvaro Siza and the rationalist design of the Museum of Contemporary Art, or Norman Foster's Telecommunications Tower on nearby Mount Pedroso. In the near future, the city's reputation as a cultural center will be strengthened with the completion of the City of Culture, a large project financed by the Xunta de Galicia on Mount Gaiás that is intended to summarize the culture of Galicia both old and new, urban and rural; it was designed by the American architect Peter Eisseman, who contributed to the design of the Holocaust memorial in Berlin.

Its status as an important historical center, a university city, its role as the political capital of Galicia, and as the terminus of the Ways of Santiago (the multiple pilgrimage routes) are the primary elements that shape the city's public image. Hosting several international events contributed greatly to strengthening this cultural image. It was celebrated as the European Capital of Culture in 2000. Accordingly, Santiago's economy is heavily service-oriented, reflecting its position as a center of cultural tourism. Official statistics show a flow of roughly ten million visitors to Santiago annually (Santos 1999, 2002a).

Santiago's local authorities are currently carrying out ambitious programs for the rehabilitation of buildings in the historic center, including both residential and commercial ones. The challenge is to rejuvenate the historical center and enhance its commercial and service sectors in the face of traffic congestion. Real estate speculation has seen the growth of luxury homes that coexist with pockets of marginalized

populations. The contemporary municipality of Santiago also contains the New City, suburbs and rural parishes, which dilute the historic city's tourist image. The New City, popularly known as Ensanche, started in the 1970s as a series of densely populated buildings that currently are in dire need of urban renewal.

11.4 Promoting Santiago de Compostela

There is a wide network of actors involved in the dissemination of Santiago's external image. Local and regional public agencies are coordinated through the Consortium for the City of Santiago, an organization that focuses on the promotion of the city through internationally coordinated policies to spread its image as a Cultural City of Excellence. The University of Santiago, the Confederation of Employers, the Chamber of Commerce, the media, neighborhood associations, and nongovernmental associations have all played a role in the dissemination of its image. Throughout the printed and digital promotional material aimed at tourists, we see a repeated emphasis on the monumentality of the historic center of Santiago, its infrastructure, and cultural educational opportunities. The desired image to be projected is that of an idealized, cosmopolitan city in which tradition and contemporary cultures harmoniously coexist.

For Santiago, the production and dissemination of information over the internet has become a central tourism marketing strategy. The Way of Santiago is the flagship tourist attraction on the city's web pages. The local tourism promotion web (www.santiagoturismo.com) broadcasts an image carefully focused on the city's aesthetics, including three-dimensional photographic visions of its historic architecture; with no verbal message, it offers a virtual journey that includes visits to landmarks, restaurants, horseback riding on idyllic meadows, and panoramic views from the balconies of palaces. It also seeks to recreate the classic romantic image of the university environment of the nineteenth century, during which wealthy university students called their school "Tunas University" and courted young women on the balconies of stately homes. The aesthetics of the historic city are thus harnessed as an instrument of economic development. Santiago has also sought to "sell" the city as an ideal setting for filming movies; its website offers specific services to directors of films (Fig. 11.2).

Aside from tourists and tourism entrepreneurs, who may be interested in a city like this? The creation of a virtual image of the city as spectacle benefits politicians and the local business community, including the media and tourist-driven sectors. However, the discourse of the virtual city ignores the marginalized populations that are also part of the real Santiago. The city has an unemployed population of roughly 8,000–10,000 people, and 4,000 people living in extreme poverty, that is, with annual incomes less than a 1,000 euros. In addition, 20,000 people are considered poor and live on an annual income of 7,000 euros (VV.AA. 2011). Some of the low-income population includes immigrants, gypsies, and the structurally unemployed, victims of the neoliberal assault on the Spanish state. We conclude that the spectacular, idyllic,

Fig. 11.2 Idyllic image of Santiago de Compostela
(Source: Authors)



romantic and idealized city is constructed as a consumer product for the eyes of millions of tourists who visit each year. The virtual Santiago reflects a concerted and powerful media effort that benefits the “status quo” of politicians and businesses but ignores the reality of poverty and inequality.

11.5 Galician Culture in Tourist Images of Santiago de Compostela

As Castells (2002) notes, based on a study conducted in Catalonia, people often identify more with their region and/or locality than with the nation-state, a scale at which feelings of collective identification are more diffuse than the scale of the family or personal identity. Modern Catalan identity was constructed during the resistance to the centralized monarchical state oppression of Philip V in the sixteenth century and reached its pinnacle during the Franco regime (1945–1975). In the case of Galician identity, Juana and Prada (2005) observe similar a factor of resistance to Spanish political centralization.

Galician regional cultural identity is often associated with regional political movements. Pujolar (2006), drawing on the Catalonia case, argues that globalization reworks local or minority cultures, but that such cultures may soon become tourist attractions themselves. He argues that local languages may draw tourists and help to develop a tourist-oriented “sense of place.” Is Galician culture an element of attraction in drawing tourists to Santiago de Compostela? How is this culture reflected in the internet and the city’s web pages?

The Galician language is not particularly visible on the internet and the city's official website. We also conducted a survey of the menus of 35 important restaurants in the historic city of Santiago de Compostela during March 2010 and concluded that 90% offer Galician products; 48% of the names of the establishments were Castilian; 11% offered the menu only in Galician, and 89% only in Castilian. Only 23% offered menus trilingual versions in Castilian, Galician, and English.

The tourist information office in Santiago de Compostela offers printed promotional materials in English, Castilian and Galician. Through field work carried out in May 2010, we observed the office staff interacting with tourists in the Galician language at the beginning of the conversation as foreign tourists are often interested in Galician culture, especially the cuisine and language. We also conducted qualitative interviews with the office staff, one of whom commented that "Galicia sells culture and language and what is especially attractive is its link to Celtic culture," while noting that many tourists buy Galician folk music. Similarly, the director of international courses offered by the Galician University of Santiago emphasized the success of Galician language courses among foreigners, especially Europeans, who are interested in acquiring a thorough knowledge of Galician culture.

An analysis of Galician web content related to tourism in Santiago de Compostela was carried out in June 2010 to see how the Galician culture is represented, and at times diluted by, the other tourist dimensions of the city, such as its monumental architecture, the green landscapes of Galicia, the sea and the beach, and the region's gastronomy. To a lesser extent the region's Celtic culture was highlighted. However, there is an official commitment to the Galician language in the city's ethnographic museum, the Museum of the Galician People, and on the city council, in which the home language is Galician. An analysis of websites of 15 hotels in the city in June 2010 found that Castilian is the dominant language and that few offer materials in the Galician language; only one offered the opportunity to select the Galician language. It seems therefore that while Galician culture may be attractive to tourists in Santiago, the internet is not yet an effective means of promoting Galician culture.

11.6 Conclusions

With widespread access to information on the web, including audiovisual productions, today's cities compete to attract visitors and investors by building a "brand" or identity that differentiates them from their rivals. Local cultural and community identities (as exemplified in monuments, history, traditions, music, food, lifestyles, etc.) can become digital products offered in a global marketplace through Web portals and e-commerce systems designed as marketing strategies. This set of circumstances elevates audiovisual representations to the status of a spectacle creating and catering to consumer needs based on aesthetics. Urban tourism products are territorial images perceived by the actors and stakeholders alike and disseminated through the media. Given the context of the information society, regions, cities or

municipalities compete in a race for development. Place marketing is an extremely valuable tool for regions in this competition.

We argue that it is time to reverse the distribution of social benefits derived from the strategic marketing techniques employed by multinational enterprises to promote mass consumption, and instead use such techniques for the purposes of personal enrichment and social development. Digital media and broadcasting over the internet present new opportunities to spread information quickly, affordably, and flexibly.

The case of Santiago de Compostela is an example of urban spectacle that, from the point of view of mass tourism, is a success story based on the creation of an idyllic, romantic and idealized consumer product in the eyes of millions of tourists who visit each year. Do the effects of computer-mediated images disseminated through the mass media as a marketing tool constitute a success or a failure? Such a question is difficult to answer: Santiago de Compostela has enjoyed enormous success as a commodified place designed for tourists and the tourism industry, but is often viewed as unattractive as a place to reside. The romantic, tourist-oriented image constructed and disseminated through the internet has not been able to promote sufficient economic development to overcome the city's high unemployment and stagnant demographic profile.

References

- Alberich, J. (2006). *Cultura audiovisual digital*. Barcelona: Paidós.
- Baudrillard, J. (2002). *La illusion vital. Siglo XXI*. Madrid: Paidós.
- Buhalis, D. (2000). Marketing the competitive destination of the future. *Tourism Management*, 21, 97–116.
- Buhalis, D. (2002). eTourism: Challenges and developments. In *Tourism industry and education symposium* (pp. 30–36). Helsinki: Jyväskylä Polytechnic.
- Buhalis, D. (2003). *eTourism: Information technology for strategic tourism management*. London: Pearson.
- Buhalis, D., & Licata, C. (2002). The future of e-tourism intermediaries. *Tourism Management*, 23(3), 207–220.
- Castells, M. (2000). *La Era de la Información* (Vols. I & II). Madrid: Alianza.
- Castells, M. (2002). Iniciativa empresarial e integración social. *La Factoría*, 17. <http://www.lafactoriaweb.com/default-2.htm>
- Consejo Español de Turismo. (2006). *Plan de Turismo Español 2020*. Madrid: Ministerio de Industria.
- Ferrás, C. (2004). *Nuevas tecnologías y economía cultural*. Santiago de Compostela: Idega.
- Fesenmaier, D. (2007). Introduction: Challenging destination promotion. *Journal of Travel Research*, 46, 3–4.
- Foundation Orange. (2011). *eEspaña 2010*. Madrid: Foundation Orange.
- Gali Espelt, N. (2005). La humanización de las imágenes emitidas por la publicidad de los destinos turísticos monumentales. *Pasos*, 2, 25–45.
- Gali Espelt, N., Majo, J., & Vidal, D. (2000). Patrimonio cultural y turismo: nuevos modelos de promoción vía internet. *Cuadernos de Turismo*, 6, 73–87.
- Juana, J., & Prada, J. (2005). *Historia de Galicia. Capítulo Preliminar Historia e identidad en Galicia*. Barcelona: Ariel.

- Judd, D. (2003). El turismo urbano y la geografía de la ciudad. *Eure*, 29(87), 1–9.
- Mattelart, A., & Neveu, E. (2004). *Introducción a los estudios culturales*. Barcelona: Paidós.
- Meeker, M. (2001). *La publicidad en Internet*. Barcelona: Ediciones Granica.
- Miossec, J. (1991). La imagen turística. En I. Ieraca: *La regione turistica*. Padova: CEDAM.
- Miranda, D. (2008). *Análise do desenvolvimento e o potencial do turismo. Estudo de caso de Galicia e Santiago de Compostela*. Santiago de Compostela: Xunta de Galicia.
- Palou Rubio, S. (2009). La ciudad fingida. Imágenes y promoción del turismo en Barcelona. Perspectiva histórica y cuestiones del presente. *REDMARKA*, 1(3), 79–104.
- Pan, B., Macluarin, T., & Crotts, J. (2007). Travel blogs and the implications for destination marketing. *Journal of Travel Research*, 46, 35–45.
- Peppard, J. (1993). *IT strategies for business*. London: Pitman.
- Pujolar, J. (2006). *Lengua, cultura y turismo. Perspectivas en Barcelona y en Cataluña. Turisme de Barcelona*. Barcelona: Paidós.
- Rojec, C., & Urry, J. (Eds.). (2005). *Touring cultures: Transformations of travel and theory*. London: Routledge.
- Sanchez Guzman, J. (1989). *Breve Historia de la Publicidad*. Madrid: Ciencia Tres.
- Santos, X. (1999). Mito y realidad del Xacobeo. *Boletín de la AGE*, 27, 103–117.
- Santos, X. (2002a). El camino de Santiago. Turistas y peregrinos hacia Compostela. *Cuadernos de Turismo*, 18, 135–150.
- Santos, X. (2002b). Pilgrimage and tourism at Santiago de Compostela. *Tourism Recreation Research*, 27(2), 41–50.
- Traverso Cortes, J. (2007). Modelo para la obtención de la imagen de un destino turístico. *Estudios Turísticos*, 174, 33–48.
- Urry, J. (1995). *Consuming places*. London: Routledge.
- Urry, J. (2002). *The tourist gaze*. London: Sage.
- VV.AA. (2011). *Informe sobre la pobreza en Santiago de Compostela*. Cáritas Interparroquial. <http://www.caritas-santiago.org/2011/05/05/>
- World Tourism Organization. (2009). *Changes in leisure time: The impact of tourism*. Madrid: World Tourism Organization.

Index

A

Actor-network theory, 9–11, 53
Advertising, 42, 44, 49, 65, 71, 86, 144, 168,
170, 171
Agglomeration, 4, 6, 7, 12, 145, 161–165
Artists, 74, 123, 129–133, 147, 149–152

B

Bangladesh, 70–71
Benjamin, Walter, 3
Body/bodies, 9, 19, 22, 24–28, 35, 42, 56,
61, 71
Books, 27–29, 32, 35, 53

C

Children, 3, 74, 76, 106, 109, 125, 128, 138
Class, 84, 95, 104, 106, 109–110, 119, 124
Clothing industry, 65, 69
Clusters, 4, 12, 83, 103, 111, 117, 143–145,
147, 148
Coffee, 11, 44–45
Commodity chains, 8, 10–12, 39–45, 49, 52,
57–58, 65–77, 80, 83–84, 88, 96, 97
Commodity fetishism, 3, 11, 51
Consciousness, 1, 2, 5, 8, 9, 39, 44
Consumption, 3, 7–8, 10–12, 39–42, 45,
47–61, 65, 69, 77, 79–85, 95–97, 104,
119, 143, 145, 147, 161, 162, 170, 177
Creative class, 7, 12, 136–137, 139, 167
Cultural economics, 8
Cultural industries, 144–146, 148
Cultural turn, 1, 2, 7, 11, 13, 39, 47, 49, 50,
52, 53, 59, 60, 65, 79, 81, 104, 107,
110, 112–115, 117, 143

D

Deregulation, 42, 104, 114–116, 118
Detroit, 12, 123–139
Division of labor, 7

E

Economic turn, 2, 65, 104
Economies of scale, 4, 7
Emilia–Romagna, 5
Emotions, 7, 111, 128
Ethnicity, 2, 4, 12, 42, 76, 77, 80, 82–85, 89,
90, 96–97
Explicit knowledge, 5

F

Face-to-face, 5, 6
Fashion, 6, 11, 58, 65–77
Feminism, 10, 11, 27, 42, 49, 66–69, 77
Finance, 42–43
Florida, Richard, 7, 12, 123, 136, 137
Food, 8, 48, 53, 56, 58–60, 66, 85, 88, 126,
168, 176
Frankfurt School, 3, 11
Free market, 4, 104, 126

G

Gender, 2, 6, 10, 11, 22, 24, 26, 42, 57, 58,
65–73, 77, 82
Giddens, Anthony, 5, 50, 107
Globalization, 2, 11, 42, 48–51, 65, 68, 175
Governmentality, 53
Granovetter, Mark, 3–4, 81, 103
Growth poles, 4

H

Haraway, Donna, 9, 22–23, 25, 55
 Harvey, David, 40, 42, 104, 118
 Hollywood, 7, 144
 Hybrid, 2, 55–56, 80, 84

I

Identity, 2, 3, 6, 8–10, 49, 51, 53, 57, 79–84,
 90–97, 127, 175
 Immigrants, 6, 12, 69–70, 80–97, 174
 Innovation, 4, 7, 12, 30, 40, 49, 108, 116, 129,
 144, 160, 164
 Internet, 49, 56, 134, 139, 168–171,
 174–177

J

Justice, 119, 126

K

Keynesianism, 42, 48
 King, Martin Luther, 123, 125, 129
 Knowledge spillovers, 4, 164
 Krugman, Paul, 4, 13, 163–164
 Kuhn, Thomas, 20–21, 27, 29

L

Labor, 1, 3, 4, 7, 25, 39, 40, 44, 51, 52, 54,
 67–69, 72, 109, 114, 118, 119, 128,
 144, 148–149, 162, 164, 165
 Landscape, 5, 9, 50, 51, 80, 159, 160, 167,
 168, 172, 173, 176
 Language, 9, 22, 30, 82, 83, 85, 95, 96,
 175, 176
 Latour, Bruno, 22–24, 29, 32, 53
 Learning regions, 4
 Leisure, 48–52, 57, 143, 167
 Luhmann, Nicholas, 109

M

Marshall, Alfred, 4, 162, 164, 165
 Marx/Marxism, 2, 3, 8, 39, 44–47, 49–52, 54,
 56, 110, 126
 Masculinism, 10, 24, 26, 52, 68
 Massey, Doreen, 9–10, 26–27
 Moral economies, 11, 58–59
 Music, 12, 123, 127–139, 144, 145, 147, 149,
 171, 173, 176

N

Neoclassical economics, 1, 3, 8, 13, 45, 79,
 81, 95, 111, 146, 162–163, 165
 Neoliberalism, 11, 12, 42, 44,
 104, 108
 Networks, 4–8, 10, 12, 40, 49, 53, 55,
 57–59, 67–68, 103, 107, 111, 139,
 143–154, 167
 Non-humans, 11, 53, 55–56, 59, 61

P

Pets, 55
 Polanyi, Michael, 5
 Post-Fordism, 4, 8, 11–13, 170
 Post-structuralism, 9, 49, 51, 55
 Property rights 4, 8, 125

R

Rationality, 8, 20–21, 79, 80, 90, 95–97, 105,
 109, 111–113
 Relational space/geography, 8–10, 27, 40, 53,
 103, 111–112, 117, 145–146
 Retailing, 52, 65, 69, 71, 74, 76, 79, 82, 86

S

Santiago de Compostela, 13, 167–177
 Science studies, 19–24
 Semiotics, 3, 41, 51
 Shenzhen, 67
 Shopping malls, 8, 11, 80, 85
 Spatial science, 26, 29–34, 47, 79, 81
 Spatial turn, 111

T

Tacit knowledge, 5, 21, 57
 Technology/technologies, 13, 49, 55, 56,
 118, 126, 128, 129, 133, 139, 162,
 167–169
 Telecommunications, 5, 173
 Toronto, 11, 66, 72–75, 80–96
 Tourism, 13, 52, 167–177
 Trust, 4–6, 10, 12, 103–119, 150

U

Uncertainty, 4, 73, 105, 108
 Uneven development, 13, 51, 165
 Untraded dependencies, 5, 12, 146